The Experience of Being as Goal of Human Existence:
The Heideggerian Approach

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Abbreviations

1. Original Works

BH Brief ueber den Humanismus
DE Denkerfahrungen
ED Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens
EM Einfuhrrung in die Metaphysik
FD Die Frage nach dem Ding
FS Fruehe Schriften
FW Der Feldweg
GL Gelassenheit
GP Die Grundprobleme der Phaenomenologie
HD Erlaeuterungen zu Hoelderlins Dichtung
HH Habel der Hausfreund
HT Heraklit
HW Holzwege
ID Identitaet und Differenz
KM Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik
N I Nietzsche I
N II Nietzsche II
PM Parmenides
PT Phaenomenologie und Theologie
SD Zur Sache des Denkens
SF Zur Seinsfrage
SG Der Satz vom Grund
SP "Nur ein Gott kann uns retten,"
"Der Spiegel" Interview
SZ Sein und Zeit
TK Die Technik und die Kehre
UK Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes
US Unterwegs zur Sprache
VA Vortraege und Aufsaetze
VS Vier Seminare
WD Was heisst Denken?
WG Vom Wesen des Grundes
WM Was ist Metaphysik?
WN Wegmarken
WP Was ist das--die Philosophie?
WW Vom Wesen der Wahrheit

2. English Translations

BPP Basic Problems of Phenomenology
BT Being and Time

BW Basic Writings
DT Discourse on Thinking
EB Existence and Being
EGT Early Greek Thinking
EP The End of Philosophy
GE German Existentialism
IAD Identity and Difference
IM An Introduction to Metaphysics
KPM Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
LH Letter on Humanism
PLT Poetry, Language, Thought
QB The Question of Being
QCT Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays
SI "Only a God Can Save Us, "Der Spiegel's" Interview with Martin Heidegger"
TB On Time and Being
WCT What Is Called Thinking?
WIP What Is Philosophy?
WL On the Way to Language
WT What Is a Thing?

Preface

Martin Heidegger is the philosopher of Being. We find him consistently dealing with this topic in his works. Both, in the early and later phases of his thought, his main concern was the meaning of Being. In his early thought, he studied the meaning of Being by attempting a Dasein-analysis believing that he could understand Being by clarifying the reality of Dasein. When this approach by Dasein to Being foundered, he then undertook an approach from Being to Dasein, with the help of which he succeeded in experiencing Being. In both phases of Heidegger's thought, it is Dasein who experiences Being, as the manifestation of Being can only be discovered by Dasein. This discovery of Being is Dasein's path to total authentic personhood. Thus, for Heidegger, Dasein's experience of Being is the ultimate goal of his existence. This book, entitled *The Experience of Being: as Goal of Human Existence*, attempts to elaborate the theme of Dasein's experience of Being, thereby attaining his total authenticity. My interest in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger led me to work on his philosophy for my Ph.D. program, which I completed at the University of Madras, under the guidance of Dr. Ignatius Vyagappa, Ph.D. The thesis, entitled *From Being-in-the-World to Being-toward Being: Martin Heidegger's Philosophy of the Authentic Human Person*, was published by SAC Publication, Nagpur, in 1996. Then, encouraged and supported by Dr. George F. McLean, Ph.D., professor emeritus of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America, Washington D.C., I undertook a comparative study of Shankara and Heidegger entitled *The Authentic Human Destiny: the Paths of Shankara and Heidegger*, which was published by the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington D.C., in 1998.

Now having completed the present project, I remember with gratitude those people who have helped me in my effort to bring out this volume. In a special way I acknowledge the encouragement, assistance and the suggestions I have received from Professor George F. McLean, Ph.D., in developing this work. I remember with gratitude Reverend Fr. Roc Gerald Majella, SAC, and Brother Thomas P. Mathew, who helped in the preparation of the manuscript. I sincerely acknowledge the Rector and the staff of Pallotti Institute of Philosophy and Religion, Goa, India, for allowing me to use the library and the computer facilities of the Institute and express my sincere thanks to the Pallottine community in India for their concern and support.

Introduction

History in its unfolding blesses humankind with eminent persons, who with their thinking and living make a difference not only for the people of their time and culture, but also for others and for many generations to come. One of such great minds whom Germany has given to the present is Martin Heidegger, who left an indelible mark on contemporary thought. Before we attempt to study Heidegger's philosophy of Being, in the first section of the introduction, we look into his life, background and thought. The last section will spell out the plan by which we shall analyze the Heideggerian perspective of the experience of Being.

1. Heidegger's Life and Thought

Here, we look into the life and background of Martin Heidegger, focusing on his multifaceted personality and on the quality of seeking which is characteristic of him. In attempting to understand Heidegger's thought, the threefold interpretation by different thinkers will be analyzed.

1.1. Heidegger's Life and Background

Martin Heidegger, who is acclaimed as a seminal thinker and a significant philosopher of the present era, is sometimes referred to as "a man without a biography."[1] Though this might be an exaggeration, yet his life was simple and normal as that of an ordinary German professor. Except for the period between May, 1933 to February, 1934 during which he was involved with the Nazi party of Hitler, his life was basically uneventful.[2] He was born at the little town of Messkirch, in Southwest Germany on September 26, 1889. For the most part he lived and worked there, in the town of his birth—except for the five years at Marburg—until he died on May 26, 1976, four months before his 87th birthday.[3] Some of his writings highlight his life and his multifaceted personality. *The Course of My Life*,[4] *A Recollection*,[5] and *My Way to Phenomenology*[6] give biographical details regarding Heidegger's life, education, academic pursuits and the influence of other thinkers upon him. His essays *Why Do I Stay in the Provinces*?[7] and *Pathway*[8] point to Heidegger's desire for oneness with nature, which one can experience only in the simple, still, calm and rustic life of the country. Such a natural environment gave him the perfect space and the solitude[9] that was needed for his philosophical search.

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[1] Thomas Sheehan, ed., *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker* (Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1981), p. 3.

[2] Cf. *ibid.*, p. v.

[3] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 3.

[4] Cf. Martin Heidegger, "The Course of My Life," in *Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to His Philosophy*, by J.J. Kockelmans (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), pp. 1-2. This small 'sketch,' written in 1914, contains biographical details that accompanied Heidegger's doctoral dissertation.

[5] Cf. Thomas Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, pp. 21-22.

[6] Cf. Martin Heidegger, "My Way to phenomenology," *Existentialism: from Dostoevski to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: New American Library, 1975), pp. 234-241.

[7] Cf. Thomas Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, pp. 27-30.

[8] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 69-72.

[9] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 28.

Throughout his life, Heidegger was a seeker. As every seeker is called to be, Heidegger was courageous in his search never being afraid of going wrong while seeking. But, when he realized that he was in the wrong, he was never apologetic about it; nor did he regret his having gone astray from the truth. Instead, he moved forward and continued his search. This is clear from the statements he made during the *Der Spiegel Interview*.[10] This attitude made Heidegger isolate himself from National Socialism and resign the office of the Rector of the Freiburg University.[11] He did not count the cost of choosing what is true, when he knew it to be the truth. Bernhard Welte gives the following tribute to Heidegger:

He [Heidegger] was always seeking and always underway. At various times he emphatically characterized his thinking as a path. He traveled this path without ceasing. There were bends and turns along it; certainly there were stretches where he went astray. Heidegger always understood the path as one that was given him, sent to him. He sought to understand this word as a response to an indication to which he listened without respite. For him, to think was to thank, to make a grateful response to that appeal.[12]

1.2. Heidegger's Thought

The 'matter-for-thought' of Heidegger's seeking has been received with great interest, even though he himself has been suspect due to his involvement with Nazism. Heidegger is one of the few thinkers to whom much attention has been paid by researchers and scholars during his lifetime. There are differences of opinion among the Heideggerian scholars over the manner in which his philosophy should be viewed and interpreted. Heideggerian commentators give a threefold interpretation of his thought. We shall consider each of them in detail.

1.2.1. The Threefold Interpretation of Heidegger's Thought

One opinion sees the whole of Heidegger's thinking as contained in his major work, *Being and Time*, as it anticipates all the themes that occur in his later writings.[13] Another view recognizes three separate periods in Heidegger's path of thinking.[14] A third view speaks of two periods in Heidegger's thinking named Early Heidegger or Heidegger I, and Later Heidegger or Heidegger II. This view is held by a number of reputed commentators of Heidegger. According to them there was a shift[15] in Heidegger's thinking that made him move from the early to the latter phase, though

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[10] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 45-67.

[11] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 52.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[13] Cf. Roger Waterhouse, *A Heidegger Critique: A Critical Examination of the Existential Phenomenology of Martin Heidegger* (New Jersey: Humanitas Press, 1981), p. x.

[14] Cf. Vincent Vycinas, *Earths and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961). Vincent Vycinas speaks of the phase of Dasein, the phase of Being and the phase of earth and gods, as three phases in Heidegger's way. Cf. also James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 183-186. Demske speaks of the first, the middle and the final stages of Heidegger's thinking.

[15] Heidegger himself explicitly accepted that there was a shift in his thought. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Brief ueber den Humanismus," *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), p. 325 (Hereafter: BH, Wegmarken). Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings: From 'Being and Time' (1927) to 'The Task of Thinking' (1964)*, ed. D. F. Krell (London: Routledge and Kegen Paul Ltd., 1978), pp. 207-208.

they differ among themselves regarding the nature of the shift. Thinkers like John Wild, Alphonse de Waelhens, Lazalo Versenyi and some others see a break in Heidegger's thought such that there is no bridge leading from Heidegger I to Heidegger II. In other words, they speak of a complete break between the two phases. Others, such as Otto Poeggeler, William J. Richardson, Walter Schulz and Werner Marx, though recognizing the shift in Heidegger's thinking, hold for a coherence and unity of both phases. In other words, they see both phases, not as isolated from each other, but, as having a continuity, both in content and aim, though the perspective is different. Thus, for them, Heidegger II is an explication and an interpretation of Heidegger I from the perspective of Being.[16]

The view of the second group of thinkers seems to be in agreement with what Heidegger himself thought about the shift in his thinking. For Heidegger, the change involved in the shift is neither a break in his thinking, nor an abandonment of the earlier standpoint for the later. To quote him: "This turning [shift] is not a change of standpoint from *Being and Time*, but it is the thinking that first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which *Being and Time* is experienced."[17] Besides there are some topics which Heidegger promises—at various places in *Being and Time*— that he would take up in the section of 'Time and Being,'[18] for example, the fuller development of the idea of phenomenology,[19] of ontology[20] and the discussion on language.[21] The fact that Heidegger wanted to publish these topics in the unpublished section of *Being and Time*, viz., 'Time and Being,' from a different perspective, substantiates Heidegger's claim that the change envisaged in the shift is already present at the initial stage of *Being and Time*. Heidegger clarifies this point when he says: "Only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to be thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thoughts of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is in [Heidegger] II."[22] Thus, the 'matter-for-thought' in *Being and Time* has not really changed even after the shift, but the perspective with which it is considered changes. Heidegger remarks: "…the road [*Being and Time*] has taken remains even today a necessary one, if our

Cf. also William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. xvi, xviii, xx. The shift has taken place in five books Heidegger has written after *Sein und Zeit*, viz., *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1928), *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1928), *Was ist Metaphysik*? (1929), *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1930) and *Einfuehrung in die Metaphysik* (1935). The first two books continue the theme of *Being and Time*, while in the next two already the tone is set for the transition and Being gains prominence over Dasein. In the last book, especially in its later part, the shift is inaugurated.

[16] Cf. J.L. Mehta, *Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii, 1978), PP. 350-351. Cf. also A. Borgmann, "The Transformation of Heidegger's Thought," *Personalist*, 47 (1966): 485-486. Thinking in the line of the second type of thinkers, Johnson J. Puthenpurackal speaks of the relation between Heidegger I and Heidegger II as 'unity of thinking and difference in perspective.' Thus, for him, the way of Heidegger is a movement from the hermeneutical circle (Dasein) to an alethological circle (Being). Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, *Heidegger: Through Authentic Totality to Total Authenticity* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), pp. 229-254.

[17] *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 325; *BW*, p. 208.

[18] Cf. Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation," trans. R.H. Grimm, *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 164.

[19] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 12th ed. (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972) p. 357 (Hereafter: *SZ*); Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), pp. 408-409 (Hereafter: *BT*).

[20] Cf. *SZ*, p. 230; *BT*, pp. 272-273.

[21] Cf. *SZ*, p. 349; *BT*, pp. 400-401.

[22] William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. xxii.

Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being."[23] Commenting on this point J.L. Mehta concludes that the writings after the shift are a critique and a commentary on *Being and Time*.[24] Therefore, for Heidegger, the completion of the shift "is not a turning to a new position, but rather is a return to the original point of departure and a return to the ground upon which the circle-of-thought has rested from the beginning."[25]

1.2.2. Circumstances of the Shift in Heidegger's Thought

Two events seem to have contributed to the shift in Heidegger thought. They are: the failure of *Being and Time* to accomplish its intended task of clarifying the meaning of Being and Heidegger's political involvement. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger raises the question of Being[26] and analyzes it in relation to time.[27] He chooses the existential analysis of Dasein[28] in man and Dasein in his later writings, as he uses them as synonyms.[29] There is an inconsistency in Heidegger's use of these terms. We translate it as 'human person' or 'man,' as the self-structure Heidegger speaks of in the term 'Dasein'; in the last analysis, it is the human entity. In clarifying the nature of Dasein Heidegger distinguishes between two types of analysis, viz., the existential-ontological and the existentiell-ontical. The first pair refers to the realm of structures underlying Dasein, while the second pair refers to the level of the concrete acts of existence. It is in the latter that the former is actualized in its various possibilities. Man is existentiell and ontic; but Dasein is that which constitutes the '*Da*' of '*Sein*' in man.[30] In later Heidegger, he ignores this distinction as well to clarify the meaning of Being, as he has the ontic, ontological and ontico-ontological

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[23] *SZ*, p. vii; *BT*, p. 17. It is an interpolation made by Heidegger in the 7th edition of *Being and Time*, in 1953.

[24] Cf. J.L. Mehta, *Heidegger: The Way and the Vision*, p. 344.

[25] Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation," pp. 165-166.

[26] Martin Heidegger uses two German terms "*Sein*' and '*Seiende*.' The former is translated in English as 'Being,' while the latter is rendered as 'being.' For Heidegger, there is a fundamental difference in the meaning of these two terms. The former is referred to as the 'Being of beings' (*Sein des Seiendes*). Being itself is not a being, but the ultimate condition, which allows all beings to exist. It is a process, which gives being passage from nothingness to existence and by which beings remain in existence. It is often referred to in Heidegger's writings as the Ground or the Source, as it sustains beings in itself. Cf. Rudolph J. Gerber, "Heidegger: Thinking and Thanking of Being," *Modern Schoolman*, XLIV (1967): 205-206. Cf. also *SZ*, pp. 2-8; *BT*, pp. 21-28.

[27] Cf. *SZ*, p. 1; *BT*, p. 19.

[28] The term 'Dasein' has been translated in various ways. William J. Richardson renders it as 'There-Being.' R.J. Gerber translates it as 'Being's-place.' It derives from the German term '*Da*' (there) and '*Sein*' (Being). For Heidegger of *Being and Time*, Dasein does not equal man: while man is a being, Dasein is a process. It is a process of being a 'self,' as Dasein's nature is such that it is an ability to be. Dasein's selfhood lies in its ability to resolve upon being itself. This process comes to pass only in man. So Heidegger speaks of Dasein 'in' man. It provides the horizon in which the inner-worldly things are rendered manifest. The entire self-structure, i.e., Dasein, is neither masculine nor feminine, but neuter, as Dasein may come to pass in an 'I' or in a 'thou'; in a male or in a female. But Dasein is not an impersonal process, but pre-personal in the sense that it is an *a priori*, which renders individual selves possible. That is why often the neuter pronoun 'it' is used to refer to it. Cf. John D. Caputo, "Heidegger's Original Ethics," *New Scholasticism*, 45 (1971): 128. Cf. also *SZ*, p. 11; *BT*, p. 32. But Heidegger does not follow this distinction.

[29] Cf. BH, Wegmarken, p. 346; BW, pp. 228-229.

[30] Cf. SZ, pp. 11-13; BT, pp. 32-34. Cf. also James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 17.

priority.[31] In this endeavor, that which interrogates (*das Befragte*) is Dasein; that which is interrogated (*das Gefragte*) is Being; and that which is to be found out by asking (*das Erfragte*) is the meaning of Being.[32] Even though this was Heidegger's aim, he did not succeed, as he dealt only with the preparatory analysis of Dasein and his relationship to temporality; section three that should have treated the relationship between temporality and Being, viz., 'Time and Being' did not appear as per the original plan.[33] Heidegger indicates the inadequacy of *Being and Time* to accomplish the task of clarifying the meaning of Being at the end of the written portions of *Being and Time* as follows:

…our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein's being remains only one way which we take…. Whether this is the only way or even the right one at all, can be decided only after one has gone along it. The conflict as to the interpretation of Being cannot be allayed, because it has not been enkindled….it is of the kind which cannot get enkindled unless preparations are made for it: Towards this alone the foregoing investigation is on the way.[34]

Thus, it is clear that the published portion of *Being and Time* has failed to achieve its original aim. The reason for the failure of *Being and Time* was that, though Heidegger wanted to break with the metaphysical tradition and subjectivistic thinking, he was not able to completely escape it at that time.[35] In *Being and Time*, he raises the question of Being from the subjectivistic perspective, even though he did not want to do so. Thus, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger has each leg in a different boat. On the one side, he wants to extricate himself from the metaphysical-subjectivistic thinking and on the other side, he is unable to pull himself out of the very thinking he detests. "Throughout *Being and Time* there is a tension owing to the fact that the work lies half-way between metaphysical thinking and the new way of thinking."[36] For example, Heidegger speaks of Dasein's essence as existence in the sense of transcendence, and yet limits himself by saying that every existence is one's own, i.e., an owned selfhood. Again, the authenticity of Dasein is reached by the call of conscience, which cannot be controlled by Dasein: But authenticity is attained only when Dasein resolutely owns the call in anticipation of his own death. These examples from *Being and Time* indicate that it was bound to fail, as it was attempting a new way of thinking without fully escaping metaphysical thinking.[37] To quote Heidegger:

The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that abandons subjectivity [Heidegger II] is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of *Being and Time*, the third division of the first part 'Time and Being' was held back…. The section in question was

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[31] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 13-15; *BT*, pp. 34-35.

[32] Cf. Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation," pp. 164-165.

[33] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 165. For the design of *Being and Time* as planned originally cf. *SZ*, pp. 39-40; *BT*, pp. 63-64.

[34] *SZ*, pp. 436-437; *BT*, pp. 487-488.

[35] Cf. Michael E. Zimmermann, "The Foundering of Being and Time," *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975), 102.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 106. Cf. also Otto Poegeller, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, 2. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983), p. 180.

held back because thinking [Heidegger I] failed in the adequate saying of this turning [shift] and did not succeed with the help of the language of Metaphysics.[38]

Besides the failure of *Being and Time*, Heidegger's political involvement may possibly be another event that influenced Heidegger to make the shift in his thinking. Martin Heidegger actively supported, especially in his public addresses at the University of Freiburg and to many workers' groups, the cause of Hitler and his National Socialist Party,[39] besides being an active member of the party for ten months between 1933 to 1934. One might wonder why such an outstanding thinker of the time, who was supposed to be the spiritual leader of the academic community and the nation,[40] could fall in line with the thinking of Hitler and the Nazi Party.

One reason was Heidegger's belief in himself as the philosopher-prophet who was called to guide the German nation in that troubled period of the 1930s, just as Fichte did in the early 1800s. Besides, he also believed that with his national and international reputation as a philosopher he could do something to alter the destiny of Germany for the better. It would have been wrong for any person of Heidegger's standing to remain unmoved when his nation went through such turmoil. As an authentic patriotic citizen of Germany, he may have felt within himself that he should give spiritual direction to the German nation. This was probably what the nation expected of an outstanding thinker like Heidegger.[41] Just as Plato attempted to bring about a philosopher-king at Syracuse by genuine support and education, Heidegger felt that the particular political situation of Germany in 1933 called him to guide the political leader of Germany. This may have led to Heidegger's support Hitler and his National Socialist Party, the dominant political force in the 1930s.

Another possible reason was his belief that Adolf Hitler was a practical, wise man and an efficient leader of the German nation, in whose hands the Germans must place their destiny. The 1930s was a period of general political confusion. There were some 22 political parties in Germany, quite divergent in their views regarding national policies. As none of these parties was able to solve the nation's problems, a strong leader and a national party was the need of the time. Heidegger saw in Adolf Hitler and in the National Socialist Party an answer to this need. He spoke in favor of Hitler. Even though the initial impression of Heidegger was negative, during the early months of his tenure as the Rector of the Freiburg University he realized that he needed to make some compromises with the officials of the party to get a wider audience for his views. Heidegger differed with the Party, especially on its racist tendencies, but believed that the movement could be guided by the presence of intellectuals like him from within.

Heidegger's belief in himself as a philosopher-king to guide the German destiny, his belief in Hitter and his party as the salvation of German nation, and belief in his and other intellectuals' ability to direct the course of the National Socialist Party, all came to a standstill when circumstances forced him to resign from his office of Rector in spring 1934. After his resignation, the intellectuals of the Nazi Party attacked Heidegger personally in their writings. He was constantly watched, especially during his lectures. In 1934, he was prevented from participating in the International Philosophical Congress in Prague, and in 1937 was excluded from the German delegation for the International Descartes Congress in Paris. Heidegger was declared the most

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[38] *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 325; *BW*, pp. 207-208.

[39] Martin Heidegger, *German Existentialism*, trans. Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965), pp. 19-20, 42 (Hereafter: GE).

[40] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 18.

[41] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 15.

expendable professor and sent to the Rhine to build fortifications. From these happenings after his resignation as Rector, Heidegger realized that he was unrealistic in believing that he could change the course of National Socialism, which was a racist social Darwinism, an active subjectivism and a philosophy of will-to-power. It also dawned on him that besides having no control over this type of world view, he himself was in its hold as long as he was an ardent supporter of the National Socialism of Hitler. This awareness made Heidegger undertake a study on Nietzsche's philosophy of will-to-power from 1936-1944. He gave lectures on Nietzsche in which he criticized the National Socialist world view which accepted Nietzsche's philosophy as its basis. Heidegger's involvement with the political situation in Germany between 1933-1934 enabled him to understand experientially the danger of subjectivistic thinking, characterized by the will-to-power that was active in Hitler's Nazi ideology and which he himself was attempting in *Being and Time*. This led him to shift his thinking, enabling him to raise the question of Being from a new perspective.

As early as the 1920s, Heidegger was aware of the fact that he had to break with metaphysical-subjectivistic thinking and pose the question of Being in a non-metaphysical way. But he was neither certain of the exact method of approach, nor did he have, at that time, the right conceptual frame-work. Heidegger began to grasp the full implications of the shift and the direction he needed to take in order to raise the question of Being only after the foundering of *Being and Time* and his political involvement in 1933. This enabled him to realize the inability of metaphysical language to understand Being and the danger of subjectivistic metaphysical thinking, respectively. In his letter to William Richardson Heidegger notes: "…the matter thought in the term reversal [shift] was already in my thinking ten years prior to 1947." This clearly points to the fact that before, during and after his political involvement, Heidegger began to reflect seriously on the shift. Thus, the completion of the shift happened in Heidegger's thinking during the decade before 1947, even though Heidegger was aware of the shift as early as the 1920s.

The shift from Heidegger I to Heidegger II is then not something abrupt or sudden. It not only is related to Heidegger's intellectual development, but is conditioned by his political involvement. Basically it is a shift in perspective rather than a reversal in Heidegger's thinking. Heidegger I is a movement from Dasein to Being, while Heidegger II is a movement from Being to Dasein. Firstly, this involves a change of perspective in which the emphasis moves from Dasein to Being as the horizon of Dasein. Secondly there is a change in the relationship between Being and Dasein, in which the role of Being is appreciated as ontologically prior to that of Dasein. In both of these phases Dasein plays a significant role: while Heidegger I encounters Being in and through his involvement with the world of his concern, for Heidegger II Dasein is the lighting-up-place of Being.

1.2.3. Consequences of the Shift in Heidegger's Thought

The shift in Heidegger's thought has brought about significant changes in his perception of the philosophical quest, the task of philosophy and his use of language. Firstly, there is a change in Heidegger's attitude towards his philosophical quest. Heidegger I is characterized by an attitude that is aggressive in which Dasein thinks of himself as destined to understand the truth of Being. It continues in his writings and lectures until 1934. Heidegger II gives up will and self-assertion in the face of Being. In other words, the aim of his entire quest becomes a complete unconditional surrender to the voice of Being. Thus, Heidegger moves from the assertive will of Dasein to that of tranquil detachment.

Secondly, there comes about a change in Heidegger's view of the task of philosophy. Metaphysics, as the core of philosophy, is abandoned; even the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* comes to a standstill. The thinking that is characteristic of Heidegger I gives way to a poetic type of thinking. This is much deeper than metaphysics and, according to him, it is no longer, strictly speaking, philosophy. Such thinking is not centered on Dasein and moving toward Being, but rather is claimed and favored by Being. Dasein is the lighting place of the truth of Being. Such thinking is experiential, non-subjective and non-logical in the strict sense. It is a docile meditative questioning filled with the sense of wonder and marvel. It is an attendance to the mystery of Being manifested in history.

Thirdly, the shift effected a considerable change in Heidegger's language. As the thinking of Heidegger II becomes more poetical, he drops the metaphysical and technical terminology and introduces a terminology that is expressive, poetic and symbolic. 'Fourfold,' 'dwelling in the neighborhood of Being,' 'seeing the truth of Being' and writing the term 'Being' with the cross mark are a few examples of such language. Besides, the language of Heidegger II is characterized by imagery. Dasein as the shepherd of Being, language as the house of Being and referring to the state of Dasein as homelessness are some illustrations of the rich imagery present in later Heideggerian writings.

2. Plan of the Work

So far we have looked into the life, background and thought of Martin Heidegger. Now, we would spell out the plan in terms of the theme which this book is going to develop.

The first chapter clarifies the nature, characteristics and manifestation of Being, elaborating besides the realm in which this experience of Being takes place and Dasein in the state of Being-experience. The nature of Dasein is studied in terms of the notion of the fourfold relationship of belonging-together between Being and Dasein, and the ontological difference between Being and beings. Then the various characteristics Heidegger attributes to Being are highlighted. The manifestation of Being is a self-gifting of Being, which takes place in the mode of time-space play. Dasein can experience the manifestation of Being only in the realm of *Ereignis*, which is different from the realm of metaphysical thinking, science and technology. In experiencing Being in the realm of *Ereignis*, Dasein becomes the lighting-up-place of Being, the shepherd of Being and the seer of the truth of Being. Thus, Being, the goal of Dasein, is clarified in its different aspects.

In the second chapter, we explore the notion of Dasein in the state of care. In this state Dasein leads a life of threefold involvements, viz., epistemological, relational and existential. In the epistemological level, Dasein experiences himself as a state-of-being, understanding and discourse. As relational Dasein has a relationship of pre-occupation with the environing world of entities and a relationship of solicitude with other Daseins. The network of these twofold relationships constitutes Dasein's world. As existential, Dasein is fallen, called to be authentic and finds himself in time and history. These threefold involvements confuse Dasein about his existence and lead to a life centered on himself. Moving away from this state of care is an essential condition for the attainment of the experience of Being. Thus, in expounding Dasein in the state of care, we would like to highlight the need of Dasein to transcend this state in order to ascend towards the experience of Being.

The third chapter speaks of the occurrence of the experience of Being. Having clarified the notion of Being and the condition to be removed for experiencing Being, we are in a position to speak of its occurrence. The first section deals with the path to the experience of Being. Heidegger

proposes an ascending path that involves three stages, viz., essential thinking of Being, dwelling in the neighborhood of Being and seeing the truth of Being. The second section treats the attainment of the experience of Being with the help of the threefold stages of the path. Essential thinking of Being is attained by release. Dwelling in the neighborhood of Being is experienced in the poetic presencing of Being in the original homecoming, in which Dasein dwells by the poetic dwelling in the three ecstases of time. Seeing the truth of Being is attained by the revealing-concealing process of *aletheia* and Dasein's being in language, the house of Being. When Dasein moves in these ascending stages, he is able to break the clutches of the state of care and to experience Being. In the process of this movement from the state of care to the state of Being, Dasein attains his total authentic existence. Dasein's experiencing of Being and attaining total authentic existence are the topics of the third section of the third chapter.

In the fourth chapter we attempt critically to evaluate Heidegger's philosophy of the experience of Being and related issues. Our critique will include a negative and a positive appraisal. The negative appraisal will focus on the inadequacies and discrepancies of Heideggerian thought, while the positive appraisal will highlight Heidegger's contributions and the new perspective that is present in his philosophy. The conclusion attempts to bring to light the purpose of Heidegger's philosophy of Being. Heidegger wanted persons to experience integration and wholeness in every sphere of their existence, which is lacking today. They have lost it because they have forgotten to think of Being for many centuries. Caught in a life of care and dominated by technicity, people have given themselves to fragmentation, which expresses itself in their personal life and in interpersonal relationships at the communitarian, social and national levels. Attempts to achieve unity often fails, because such unities are quite peripheral. For Heidegger, genuine unity is achieved by opening oneself to the realm of Being, using the path he proposed. In his openness to Being, one experiences unity within oneself, unity with others at the interpersonal level and the absolute unity of all in Being. When such a vision takes hold, the person is able to uphold the unity of everything, without losing one's identity in this unity.

1
Being: The Goal pf Dasein's Existence

In the Heideggerian perspective, the ultimate goal of Dasein's existence is the experiencing of Being. He is transcendence by his very nature and has a destiny that goes beyond his everyday concerns. Dasein is not merely called to be a being-in-the-world, but is destined to be a being that is open to Being. Though Dasein cannot run away from his 'in-the-world-existence,' he is called to transcend the former and be a being-toward-Being, and in the process experience Being. This chapter attempts to elaborate the reality of Being, which is the goal of Dasein's existence. The first section speaks of the nature of Being in terms of "the fourfold," the relationship of belonging-together between Being and Dasein and the ontological difference between Being and beings. Besides, it would also bring to light the various characteristics of Being. In the second section we attempt to spell out the manifestation of Being in the time-space-play. The nature and characteristics of the realm in which the experience of Being happens is the topic of the third section. The fourth section deals with Dasein, who is the experiencer of Being and the transformation that happens in him as the result of his experiencing Being.

1.1. Nature and Characteristics of Being

According to Martin Heidegger the ultimate goal of Dasein's existence is to experience Being as it manifests in history. He understands Being in relation to the fourfold, the relationship between Being and Dasein, which is one of belonging-together, and the relationship between Being and entities, which is one of difference. In this section, therefore, in attempting to explore the nature of Being, we unfold the notions of the fourfold, Dasein's belonging-together to Being and the difference of entities from Being. In attempting to point out the basic characteristics of Being, we would explain them in terms of the various designations Heidegger gives to Being.

1.1.1. Nature of Being

This section attempts to clarify 'what Being is' in terms of the fourfold, viz., the physical, the divine, the mortal facets of Being, and Being's relationship with Dasein and entities.

1.1.1.1. The Fourfold

Heidegger uses the German term '*Geviert*' to refer to Being. It is related to the German term '*Vier*,' which means number four. The prefix '*ge*' has a collective signification. So the term '*Geviert*,' as used by Heidegger, is translated as the foursome,[1] the quadrate[2] and the fourfold.[3] Heidegger clarifies the notion of the fourfold in relation to the thing (*das Ding*). A thing, in the Heideggerian sense of the term, must be understood in relation to its being. It involves a viewing of the thing in relation to the four 'aspects' of Being, viz. the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. 'Earth' and 'sky' constitute the natural 'component' of Being, while 'divinities' and

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[1] Cf. Vincent Vycinas, p. 224.
[2] Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 570.
[3] Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 158.

'mortals' constitute the divine and the human 'components' of Being respectively.[4] For Heidegger, a thing's being or essence is understood when we consider it in relation to all these aspects of Being. Let us, for example, take a flower. It can be considered as an object that is grown, sold and bought. But this way of looking at the flower does not present its authentic being. The authentic essence of the flower can be understood only in relation to the fourfold: It is the earth in which the flower is grown; the sky has given it sun and rain; the divinities in whose honor it is placed at the alter; and the mortals to whom it brings joy.[5] Thus, it is the unity of the fourfold, the four facets of Being, that constitutes the being of a flower. This unity of the earth, the sky, the mortals and the divinities in the thing Heidegger calls the 'thinging of the thing.'[6]

Now we shall spell out in detail what each of these 'elements' stands for. The earth is that which constructively supports the growing and blossoming plants, besides rendering them fruitful. It is the earth which preserves the rock and the water. It is on the earth that animal life and all other forms of life continue. The sky is the path of the sun and the moon. It is in the sky that the stars shine. Changes in season, the light and the dusk of the day, gloom and glow of the night, good and bad weather, the moving clouds and the blue depth of the ether — all happen in the sky. The divinities (*Goettlichen*) are the messengers of the Divine (G*oettheit*).[7] Out of the holy sway of the Divine they appear and withdraw into concealment. Mortals are human beings. They are called mortals because they can die. Animals are not mortals, for they perish;[8] only men die. Death is the shrine of nothing and so it can never exist; yet it presences the mystery of Being. Mortals are called mortals not because their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable of death as death. Mortals are those who have a relationship of presencing to Being as Being.[9]

Having clarified the notion of the fourfold, we now enter into the study of Being by pointing out the nature of the relationship Being has to Dasein and entities.

1.1.1.2. Being, Dasein and Entities

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[4] Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 527.

[5] Cf. James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 150.

[6] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Vortraege und Aufsaetze*, 4. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), p. 170 (Hereafter: *VA*); Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 178 (Hereafter: *PLT*).

[7] In speaking of divinities (Goettlichen) and the Divine (*Goettheit*), Heidegger refers neither to the pagan gods as opposed to the Christian God, nor to the Christian notion of angels, as messengers of God, even though these two notions would well fit into what Heidegger was talking about. Heidegger holds a strict neutrality regarding the problem of God. He takes the divinities as part of the phenomenological 'constitution' of Being, as we experience them. In this sense the divinities are signs of the Divine, who preserve the Divine in our daily experience. Heidegger does not clearly discuss the exact nature of the Divine. Cf. James M. Demske, "Heidegger's Quadrate and the Revelation of Being," *Philosophy Today*, 7 (1963), p. 258, fn. 8.

[8] Heidegger distinguishes between dying and perishing also in *Sein und Zeit*. Cf. *SZ*, p. 247; *BT*, p. 291.

[9] Cf. *VA*, pp. 143-145, 170-171; Basic Writings, pp. 327-329; *PLT*, pp. 178-179. The fourfold, as explained above, must not be misunderstood as four types of beings in the ontic sense. We cannot speak of them as being ontically and causally related, because they are beyond the realm of beings (*Seienden*), but are 'aspects' or 'moments' of Being in relation to the thing. The fourfold is the articulation of Being itself. Cf. James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 151. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, p. 231.

Heidegger discusses the question of the relationship between Being, Dasein and entities in the context of the age old philosophical principles of identity and difference. There exists a relationship of 'identity' between Being and Dasein, while Being's relationship to entities is one of difference. This difference, as such, between Being and entities can be understood only with reference to Being's relation to Dasein. Let us, now, briefly consider Being's relationship of 'identity' with Dasein and that of 'difference' with beings.

1.1.1.2.1. Being's Belonging-together to Dasein

"Appropriation," says Heidegger, "appropriates man and Being in their essential togetherness."[10] This essential togetherness between Being and man is understood by Heidegger in relation to the principle of identity: 'A' is 'A.' Referring to the Parmenedian sense of identity, Heidegger translates this principle as 'A' is same as (*to auto*) 'A.' This 'is' and '*to auto*' in the principle of identity suggests the idea of every being is, in itself, the same with itself. In other words, there is an identity to every being, viz., the unity with itself that is brought about by Being. Thus, the principle of identity speaks of the Being of beings which holds beings in their unity and identity.[11] Having stated that the principle of identity, in fact, refers to Being of beings, Heidegger refers to the fragment of Parmenedes.[12] The fragment reads: "*To gar auto noein estin to kei einai*" and it is rendered in English as "thinking and Being (*das Sein*) are the same."[13] For Heidegger, like any other translation of pre-Socratic terms and definitions, this translation is based on metaphysical categories, in which the original Parmenedian meaning is lost.[14] Heidegger understands the Greek '*einai*' in the original sense of '*physis*,' viz., emerging abiding power. In other words, '*einai*' means Being as finite presence (*Anwesenheit*).[15] The term '*noein*' means "receptive coming to stand."[16] Heidegger concludes that 'to auto' (the same) understood in relation to '*einai*' (Being) and '*noein*' (thinking/man)[17] is not only of equality (*Gleichgueltigkeit*) or of indifference (*Einerleihei*t), but rather it is a belonging-together (*Zusammengehorigkeit*).[18] Thus, speaking of identity as belonging-together Heidegger says: "We must acknowledge the fact that in the earliest period of thinking, long before thinking had arrived at a principle of identity, identity

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[10] Martin Heidegger, *Identitaet und Differenz*, 6. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), p. 27 (Hereafter: *ID*); Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 38 (Hereafter: *IAD*).

[11] Cf. *ID*, pp. 10-13; *IAD*, pp. 23-26.

[12] This Parmenedian fragment is differently numbered by Heidegger in two of his writings based on different editions to which he was referring. In *EM* (p. 104) he refers to it as Fragment V, while in *VA* (p. 223) he refers to it a Fragment III. Cf. George J. Seidel, *Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socrates* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), p. 159.

[13] Martin Heidegger, *Einfuehrung in die Metaphysik*, 4. Auflage (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1976), p. 104 (Hereafter: *EM*); Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (London: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 136 (Hereafter: *IM*).

[14] Cf. *EM*, p. 77; *IM*, p. 101.

[15] Cf. *EM*, p. 46; *IM*, pp. 60-61.

[16] *EM*, p. 105; *IM*, p. 138.

[17] Heidegger identifies thinking and man, and considers thinking as 'that-which-is' man. It does not mean that he denies the emotional and other aspects of man. Heidegger does not see man as a mere rational animal, but rather views him in relation to the totality of his existence. Thus, he characterizes all that is in the totality of man's existence as thinking. Cf. *ID*, p. 17; *IAD*, p. 30.

[18] Cf. *EM*, p. 106; *IM*, p. 138.

itself speaks out in a pronouncement (fragment of Parmenedes) which rules that: thinking (man) and Being belong-together in the same and by virtue of the same."[19]

'Belonging-together' can be understood in two different ways based on the emphasis we give to each of the two words present in the compound. If we see in this compound 'belonging' as determined by 'together,' the stress would be on unity. In this sense 'belonging-together' would mean to be a part of a unity, a manifold or a system. This is what the metaphysical thinking refers to as '*connectio*,' i.e. a necessary connection or a casual relation of one with another.[20] For Heidegger, such a way of considering is onto-theol-logical, in that it is concerned with the beingness of beings, and the highest being as the cause of all other beings.[21] 'Belonging-together' can also be seen as 'together' being determined by 'belonging.' In this sense 'belonging-together' is not understood as the unity of togetherness of the related in a manifold or system, but rather the related belong to each other in the same.[22] In other words, there exists an appropriating relationship between the related, that they let each other enter into their realms by their belonging-together.

Understood in the former sense of 'belonging-together,' the belonging-together of Being and man amounts only to a causal relationship. But considered in the latter sense, it means that Being and man belong-together in the realm of *Ereignis*. It would mean that, both Being and man hold each other in the belonging-together. Man, though an entity in the totality of beings, is distinctive in that, as a thinker of Being and a dweller in the nearness of Being, he is open to Being and stands, as it were, face to face with Being. Thus, man is oriented towards Being. In this orientation and openness towards Being, man listens and responds to Being.[23] Heidegger writes on man's belonging to Being as follows: "Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being and he is only this. This 'only' does not mean a limitation, but rather an excess. A belonging to Being prevails within man, a belonging which listens to Being because it is appropriated …to Being."[24]

Belonging-together is not only man's belonging to Being, but also Being's belonging to man. The presencing of Being to man is not one of mere causality or an occasional event. Being presences and abides in man by making a claim on him. Thus, Being draws (*an-geht*) man near it. Such an occurrence of Being as Presence (*Anwessenheit*) can come-to-pass only when Being appropriates man and finds in him a clearing place for its presencing.[25] On this point Heidegger remarks: "Being itself …belongs to us; for only with us can Being be present as Being, i.e., become present."[26]

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[19] *ID*, p. 14; *IAD*, p. 27.
[20] 20. Cf. *ID*, p. 16; *IAD*, p. 29.
22. Cf. *ID*, p. 17; *IAD*, p. 30.
23. Cf. *ID*, p. 18; *IAD*, p. 31.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Cf. *ibid.*
26. *ID*, p. 20; *IAD*, p. 33.
27. *ID*, p. 19; *IAD*, pp. 31-32.
28. Cf. *ID*, p. 21; *IAD*, p. 33.
29. Cf. *ID*, p. 19; *IAD*, pp. 31-32.
[21] Cf. *ID*, pp. 52, 63; *IAD*, pp. 61, 70-71
[22] Cf. *ID*, p. 17; *IAD*, p. 30.
[23] Cf. *ID*, p. 18; *IAD*, p. 31.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] Cf. *ibid.*
[26] *ID*, p. 20; *IAD*, p. 33.

Therefore, "man and Being are appropriated to each other. They belong to each other."[27] This appropriation involves a mutual gifting of man to Being, and of Being to man, and an entry into the realms of each other. In turn, it brings about in man and Being a genuine and deeper belonging to each other.[28] The mutual belonging-together is a dedicating (*Zueignen*) and an appropriating (*Vereignen*) of man and Being to each other. Belonging-together, for Heidegger, is a more primordial type of relationship and is the basis of all other types of relationships metaphysics bespeaks between man and Being, such as, causal and other relationships.[29] No metaphysical thinking can help us to experience this belonging-together of Being and man; it can be experienced only when one enters the event of appropriation (*Ereignis*).[30]

Only in relation to man's belonging to Being can the real nature of beings be understood. In other words, Being by appropriating man to itself — in this appropriative belonging-together — manifests itself as the 'difference' (*Unterschied*) as such between Being and entities.

1.1.1.2.2. Being's Relationship of Difference with Beings

Heidegger considers Being (*das Sein*) always as the Being of beings. Therefore, every being (*Seiende*) must be understood in relation to Being. It means that we cannot speak of Being having a separate and independent existence as a reality, because, were it so Being would be a 'being,' however, great it may be. Heidegger says that "…it belongs to the truth of Being that Being may never 'be' without beings, and that a being is never without Being."[31] Therefore, Being is always Being of beings and beings are always beings of Being. The genitive or the 'of' in the former is an objective genitive, while in the latter is a subjective genitive.[32] Though Being and beings are so closely related to each other that we cannot think of one without the other, yet the relationship between Being and beings is one of difference.[33] The genitive 'of,' taken subjectively and objectively, indicates a difference[34] between the two. Heidegger calls this difference between Being and beings an ontological difference. What he means by it is not a mere rational distinction[35] between Being and beings, but a difference as difference.[36] Heidegger is of the view that metaphysics has failed to consider the ontological difference. It only looks at different elements of the difference between Being and beings, such as beings as grounded in Being, without ever questioning the difference as difference.[37] The forgetting of this ontological difference

[27] *ID*, p. 19; *IAD*, pp. 31-32.

[28] Cf. *ID*, p. 21; *IAD*, p. 33.

[29] Cf. *ID*, p. 19; *IAD*, pp. 31-32.

[30] Cf. *ID*, p. 24; *IAD*, p. 36.

[31] Martin Heidegger, *Was Ist Metaphysik?* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), p. 46 (Hereafter: *WM*); Martin Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, ed. Werner Brock (Indiana: Regnery/Gateway Inc., 1979), p. 354 (EB); Cf. also *EM*, pp. 24-25; *IM*, p. 32.

[32] Cf. *ID*, p. 53; *IAD*, 61-62.

[33] Cf. *ID*, p. 53; *IAD*, p. 62.

[34] In his book *What Is Called Thinking?* Heidegger refers to the genitive as the 'difference.' Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Was Heisst Denken?*, 3. Auflage (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1971), p. 144 (Hereafter: *WD*).

[35] Cf. *ID*, p. 53; *IAD*, p. 62.

[36] Cf. *ID*, p. 37; *IAD*, p. 47. For a clear presentation of the problem of the ontological difference and a comparative analysis of this concept with the '*esse*' and '*ens*' in St. Thomas Aquinas — Cf. John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), pp. 147-184.

[37] Cf. *ID*, pp. 53-54; *IAD*, pp. 62-63.

between Being and beings is the same as the forgetfulness of Being. "The forgetfulness of Being is the forgetfulness of the difference between Being and entities."[38] We think of Being genuinely "…when we think of it in its difference with beings and of beings in their difference with Being."[39] In other words, Heidegger in questioning the difference as difference asks about the 'between' (*das Zwischen*) of Being and beings and the way in which this 'between' is to be understood.[40]

In order to understand the 'between' or the difference as such between Being and beings, one must encounter the difference face to face. This involves a 'step back' from the metaphysical categories. The Being, as we mentioned earlier, is always Being of beings, i.e., Being 'is' in beings. This 'is' of Being in beings is not static, but transitive or active. Being is of such a nature that it is 'coming-over' (*Ueberkommnis*).[41] *Ueberkommnis* is the manner in which Being reaches beings. This 'coming-over' does not mean that Being leaves its place and comes into beings, as if beings were without Being first, and subsequently were approached by Being. But, rather, Being's 'coming-over' consists in Being's giving over of itself to beings and thereby un-concealing or revealing (*ent-bergend*) beings in themselves. Beings themselves come-to-presence only in and through this 'coming-over' and unconcealing process of Being. This, on the part of beings, is an 'arrival' (*Ankunft*),[42] in which beings in their being are un-concealed. Thus, the 'coming-over' of Being into beings is, at the same time, an 'arrival' of beings. Just as the 'coming-over' of Being is the un-concealing of beings, so also the 'arrival' of beings is the 'concealment (*Bergend*) of Being. Therefore, the un-concealment of beings is the concealment of Being. This 'coming-over' and revealing of beings on the part of Being and the 'arrival' and concealing of Being on the part of beings is a single process, which Heidegger calls *Unterschied* (differentiating). The process of *Unterschied* is an *auseinander-zueinander-tragen*, i.e., a process in which the 'coming-over' of Being and the 'arrival' of beings are kept apart, both bearing on each other. In other words, Being and beings are turned towards and away from each other. Heidegger calls this process *Austrag* (perdurance).[43]

Heidegger, thus, characterizes the ontological difference as the difference between 'coming-over' and 'arrival.' The difference grants a 'between' (*das Zwischen*), viz., the perdurance in which there prevails a clearing. In this clearing Being 'comes-over' into beings, thereby, un-concealing them in their being; while beings 'arrive' in their being and in the process conceals Being.[44] In this process beings are grounded in Being. To quote Heidegger: "Being becomes present as Being of beings, as the difference, as perdurance (*Austrag*), the separateness and mutual relatedness of

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[38] Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege*, 5. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), p. 336 (Hereafter: *HW*).

[39] *ID*, p. 53; *IAD*, p. 62.

[40] Cf. *ID*, p. 54; *IAD*, p. 63.

[41] The term *Ueberkommnis*, which we translate as 'coming-over' has the nuance of surprise or overtaking and thus of incalculability. Therefore, it is sometimes translated as 'overwhelming.' Cf. *IAD*, p. 17, fn. 2.

[42] The term '*Ankunft*,' which we translate as 'arrival' refers to the place, as it were, in beings in which Being arrives. It refers to that process by which beings come-on (*an-kommen*) in the sense that they are lighted by Being's coming-over. Cf. *ibid.*

[43] The term '*Austrag*' literally means carrying out or holding out. Its original meaning has the nuance of suffering and exertion. The '*Austrag*' is carrying out of the 'relation' of Being and beings, endured with an intensity that never lets up. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 17., fn. 3. John D. Caputo translates this term as 'dif-fering' based on the Latin '*differe.*' Cf. John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and St. Thomas Aquinas*, p. 151.

[44] Cf. *ID*, pp. 55-56; *IAD*, pp. 64-65.

grounding and of accounting for endure; Being grounds beings, and beings, as what is most of all, account for Being. One (Being) comes over the other, one (beings) arrives in the other."[45] Thus, *Unterschied* (differentiating) is a revealing-concealing perdurance, which is a mutual circling (*Uneinanderkreisen*) of Being and beings around each other;[46] a clearing (*Lichtung*) in which beings are grounded in Being;[47] and in which Being gives itself as the 'difference' historically as revealing and concealing.[48]

Thus, for Heidegger, Being is the ultimate foundational principle that has physical, divine and human facets. Though Being is not the same as Dasein, it has an appropriative relationship of belonging-together with Dasein. This relationship is more fundamental than any other relationship and the foundation of all other relationships. It is in relation to this relationship of belonging-together that the giving of Being is guarded and communicated. Being's relationship with entities is one of difference, even though it is Being that sustains beings. Since the nature of Being's giving is such that it gives itself in beings and withdraws itself in favor of beings, we are never able to capture or experience the fullness of Being. In this manner Being always remains a mystery to Dasein's experience. Yet it is Being that makes Dasein's experience of Being possible. Unless Being manifests itself, Dasein would never be able to have an experience of Being.

Now that we have clarified the notion of Being, in terms of the fourfold and Being's relationship to Dasein and entities, we can move on to consider the various characterizations Heidegger gives to Being.

1.1.2. Characteristics of Being

In Heidegger's writings, especially in the later ones, he gives many designations to Being. He makes use of metaphors and images to communicate his experience of Being. Here, our aim is to bring to light some of the major Heideggerian characterizations of Being.

1.1.2.1. Being is the Immediate

Being mediates between beings and establishes mutual relationship between them. As beings are mediated by Being, they are called the 'mediated.' But, Being which is the source of this mediation itself is not mediated by anything other than itself. Being is a going-forth, an emergence and an opening-up that enables beings to be present and related to each other. The emergence, the opening-up and the going-forth are from within Being. Being is Immediate. Being, the Immediate as the open, lights up beings and makes them shine forth to each other and to Dasein. But, Being itself is absolutely ultimate and does not need any form of mediation to open itself up to Dasein and to beings, because it is the Immediate that is inaccessible.[49]

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[45] *ID*, p. 60; *IAD*, p. 69.

[46] Cf. *ibid.*

[47] Cf. *ID*, p. 61; *IAD*, p. 70.

[48] Cf. *ID*, p. 59; *IAD*, p. 68. Heidegger is of the opinion that all the other differences spoken of in metaphysics between Being and man or Being and entities are fundamentally based on the ontological difference. Cf. *ID*, p. 62; *IAD*, p. 71.

[49] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Erlaeuterungen zu Hoelderlin's Dichtung*, 5. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981), pp. 59-60 (Hereafter: *HD*); Cf. William J. Richarson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 423-424.

1.1.2.2. Being is the Advent

Being is essentially presencing. The manner in which it presences itself is one of coming (Advent). Being always advances towards Dasein and its coming is always new and original. Thus, Being's advent is temporal. Though it is temporal, it is not limited to the time-spans (*Zeiten*) measured by man. Being's continuous coming to Dasein and to beings is not older than time, for it is time in its origin. Being's coming is the 'oldest' time, as time originated in Being's coming; yet it is the 'youngest' time, because the coming of Being never gets old. That is why the progress of history, i.e., Being's coming, is ever new.[50]

1.1.2.3. Being is the Spirit

Being is Spirit because it not only makes every being present, but also it be-spirits them. Because of this be-spiriting activity of Being, it unifies all beings and makes them appear in its collectedness, i.e., in its own Omni-presence. By unifying all beings in its unique presence, Being arranges all beings into a pattern of relationships, which Heidegger calls Being's 'essential thoughts.' This would imply that the unifying arrangement is Spirit's 'thinking' and the pattern of relationship is its 'thoughts.' Thus, Being, as Spirit, orders everything in the realm of beings, and the unified pattern of presencing all in its Omni-presence becomes the matrix of relationship, by reason of which beings can encounter each other. In this manner Being, as the Spirit, becomes the Law, which is Immediate and that mediates every relationship among beings.[51]

1.1.2.4. Being is the Glad-some

Being is characterized as the Glad-some (*das Heitere*).[52] This term explains Being in terms of the metaphor of light. It suggests not only the brightness proper to light, but also the serenity, light-heartedness and pleasantness that are associated with joy. Glad-some is the supremely Joyous, and the source of man's joy. Being, as Glad-some, communicates joyousness and light. With its splendor, Being, as Glad-some, lights up the disposition of men so that they may open themselves to all that is noble and benign in life.[53]

1.1.2.5. Being is the Holy

When Being, as Glad-some with its light and conserving power, guards and maintains the integrity of every being, it gives itself as the Holy. Glad-some and the Holy, therefore, are one and the same. Holy here means neither God nor gods. It is beyond gods and men, which guarantees to both the integrity of their being. Therefore, Being is not only that by which gods and men are; but also that by which they are holy. Being is also the Holy because it is the continual Coming, eternal

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[50] Cf. *HD*, pp. 57, 61, 65, 72-73; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 424-425.

[51] Cf. *HD*, pp. 58-59; William J.Richardson, *Heidegger: Though Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 425-426.

[52] Cf. *HD*, p. 18; *EB*, p. 247. Here,'*das Heitere*' is translated as the 'serene.' But William J. Richardson translates it as 'Glad-some,' as serenity is only one of the nuances contained in the German term. Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 444, fn. 8.

[53] Cf. *HD*, p. 18; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 444-445.

Origin, undefiled Hailing and unapproachable Immediacy. Being, as Holy, has two characteristics. Firstly, Being by its coming breaks down all ordinary patterns of everydayness in Dasein and opens him to its milieu. Secondly, Being, the Holy, is the eternal 'heart' of all beings, because it is the innermost source of their presence and their original time. In short, Being as the Holy is the perpetual Coming (Advent) that is the steadfast Law of be-spiriting beings, through which the relationship of beings is mediated.[54]

1.1.2.6. Being is the Source

Heidegger characterizes Being as the Source. This does not mean that the Source is hidden in the earth and sends forth waters to the unhidden world. Being, as the Source, is not hidden; rather in its giving it reveals. But in the moment of its revelation as the Source, it conceals itself. This is because Being, as the Source, in giving rise to what springs up from it, hides itself in what has sprung up from it, in order to remain itself as the Source. Thus, the self-withdrawal of the Source in giving rise to beings implies a withholding of Being so that it can truly be the Source. There is an element of mystery in this withdrawing and withholding dimension of Being.[55]

When Being, as the Source, is seen as the Source that is essentially a superabundance and continual overflowing, then it is the Origin (*Ursprung*). Being, as the Origin, implies that it gives itself out exuberantly and continually, that it surpasses itself and gives itself to itself, as if something is lacking in itself. Thus, Being, as the Origin, gives us the idea of Being's 'self-surpassing self-adequacy' in the continual giving of itself as the source.[56] When Being, the Source, is viewed as the steadfast source that never gives itself out completely, then Being is the Ground. As the Ground, Being gives rise to beings, but does not lose itself in the process. Instead it remains completely as the Source. Thus, Being, as the Ground, is the self-retaining Source that 'holds fast' to itself as the Source, while enabling support and existence to what derives from it. Only because Being is the Origin, i.e., the overflowing and superabundant Source, is it the Ground, viz., the steadfast and self-retaining Source.[57]

1.1.2.7. Being is the Expanse

In the metaphor of Being as Expanse, it is viewed as an open domain and a broad area that is completely free. Here Being gathers every being unto itself and all beings towards one another, that each being can rest within itself and among themselves. Thus, Being, as Expanse, is a gathering process and a horizon in which beings can be gathered together. This primordial openness that gathers every being unto itself, implies time and space and, thus, it is spatio-temporal.[58]

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[54] Cf. *HD*, pp. 18, 58, 61-62, 71; William J. Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 426-427, 444.

[55] Cf. *HD*, p. 138; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 446-447.

[56] Cf. *HD*, p. 23; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 444-445.

[57] Cf. *HD*, pp. 75, 138; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 445.

[58] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*, 6. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1979), pp. 38-42 (Hereafter: *GL*); Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking,* trans. J.M. Anderson and E.H. Freund (London: Harper Torchbooks, 1969), pp. 65-69 (Hearafter: *DT*).

1.1.2.8. Being is the Simple

Being is Simple, in the sense that it is one and unconstituted. Its strength does not consist in power and control; but in gentle insistence. It reaches out to man without any mediation from outside itself, and waits for man to discern its gentle ways. Being, as the Simple, appears always in a hidden but effective manner and brings blessings upon man. The Simple appeals to man on his pathway and solicits him to abandon himself in itself. Being, as the Simple, makes the appeal in the symbol of an oak tree, as it points to the secret of long and slow growth. Growth involves being open to the heavens and rooted in the earth, just like the oak tree. The appeal of the Simple and the One is addressed to man, to whom the Simple has an essential relationship.[59]

1.1.2.9. Being is the Open

Being, as the Open, is 'the Non-concealed' (*das Unverborgene*). The Open involves the matrix of relationships, in which Dasein's potentialities are brought to the fore. Being, as the Open, is the realm in which Dasein encounters the 'to-be-known.' It is the sphere, in which Dasein's potentialities are exploited in terms of actual contact with beings. Thus, Dasein's encounters take place in the Open, while standing in the Open and encountering the 'to-be-known'; Dasein experiences 'something-that-is-open' (*das Offenbare*), 'that-which-comes-to-presence' (*das Anwesende*), and 'that-which-is,' i.e., a being, and at the same time experiences the Open as different from it. It is the openness of Dasein to Being as the Open, and his being in the Open makes it possible for him to experience being that-is-open and that-which-comes-to-presence. Thus, Being, as the Open, provides Dasein with the realm in which all encounters take place.[60]

1.1.2.10. Being is the Gathering-process

Being is the Gathering-process that brings beings together into a unity and makes them abide by reason of the Gathering-process. The bringing together of beings in the Gathering-process is not a piling together in a disorganized manner, but a laying of beings side by side according to a set pattern. In other words, by Being's Gathering-process, beings are held fast in an order so that they can stand on their own being. Thus, Being's Gathering-process brings about a gathering together of beings, which results in an ordered collectedness of beings. In this manner the gathering activity of Being ends up in an arrangement and organization that is whole and complete.[61] Being is the original Source of this gathering activity and the collectedness that emerges from it. Being, as the Gathering-process, lights up beings in their being, makes them come-to-presence and lets them lie forth in unconcealment as themselves.[62]

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[59] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Der Feldweg*, 6. Auflage (Frankfut am Main: Vittorio Klosermann, 1978), pp. 3-4; William J. Richarson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 559-560.

[60] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Vom Waesen der Wahrheit*, 5. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosermann, 1967), pp. 11-16; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 214-215, 217.

[61] Cf. *EM*, pp. 95-103, 123; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 261-263.

[62] Cf. *VA*, pp. 208-211, 220-221, 2227; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp, 491-493.

Summing up Being's various characteristics, William J. Richardson concludes: "Being is Wealth, Treasure, a hidden Fullness. It is an inexhaustible Wellspring — ineffable ! — the Simple, the All, the Only, the One. Beyond this, we dare not say anything about Being 'itself' at all; we must simply leave it without name."[63] Now that we have seen the nature and characteristics of Being, we shall move on to consider the manifestation of Being as Dasein Encounters History.

1.2. Manifestation of Being

Being, in its essential and transitive belonging to man, gives itself as a continuous process of presencing and absencing, revealing and concealing, giving and withdrawing, both in the temporal and spatial aspects. Thus, spatio-temporal history is nothing else but the giving of Being in its time-space unity. History, therefore, for Heidegger, is always the history of Being. Speaking of the reason for Being's giving in a spatio-temporal manner, he says that it is a play of Being. In this section, we will, therefore, concentrate on Being's manifestation as a historical time-space-play (*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*).

1.2.1. Being's Manifestation in the Temporal Order

Heidegger speaks of the giving (*Geben*) of Being as 'presencing' (*Anwesen*). The presencing is naturally in the present (*Gegenwart*), and is related to what is present (*das Anwesende*). Being as presencing, understood in relation to what is present, brings what is present to openness or unconcealment. Thus, the giving of Being as presencing is a letting-presence (*Anwesenlassen*), i.e., letting what is present be open in the presencing of Being.[64] By letting what is present free into the open, by letting it belong to the presencing of Being,[65] it makes possible the letting presence of what is present;[66] this is the giving of Being.[67]

Having clarified Being's presencing as giving, we must raise the question of the nature of the giving (presencing) of Being. When we analyzed the notion of ontological difference between Being and beings, we pointed out that Being's 'coming-over' (*Ueberkommnis*)[68] to entities reveals beings and at their 'coming-on' (*An-kommen*) or 'arrival' (*An-kunft*), the Being is concealed. In 'coming-over' as presencing (*Aswessen*) and as giving (*Geben*) of Being there is an in-built concealment; this belongs to the essence of Being's giving. Thus, it can be truly said: "In sending itself, Being withdraws; in giving itself Being withholds; in presencing itself Being absences; in revealing itself, Being conceals."[69] For Heidegger, the giving of Being is "…the giving (that) holds itself back and withdraws."[70] He calls this giving a sending (*Schicken*) of Being.[71] It is in the light of this giving or sending that Heidegger sees history. History is always history of Being. Thus,

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[63] William J. Richjardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Though*t, p. 640.

[64] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 2. Auflage (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1976), p. 5 (Hereafter: *SD*); Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 5 (Hereafter: *TB*).

[65] Cf. *SD*, p. 40; *TB*, p. 37.

[66] Cf. *ibid.*

[67] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), p. 101 (Hereafter: *VS*).

[68] The 'coming-over of Being is the same as presencing or giving of Being.

[69] Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 180.

[70] *SD*, p. 8; *TB*, p. 8.

[71] Cf. *ibid.*

what constitutes the history (*Geschichte*) of Being is the sending (*Schicken*) or the giving (*Geben*) of Being.[72]

From what we have said, we can conclude that the history of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*) is not essentially an occurrence (*Geschehen*), though occurrence is involved in history, but that fundamentally it is the sending of Being (*Geschick von Seins*) in which Being holds itself back (*an sich halten*) in favor of what is sent, i.e., beings. 'To hold back' or 'to withhold' is used by Heidegger in the sense of the Greek term '*epoche*.'[73] Thus, we can speak of various epochs of the sending of Being. In other words, history as epochal is a fundamental characteristic of the sending of Being. Heidegger does not speak of Being as an epochal sending, and so we cannot speak of different epochs of Being. To put it in Heidegger's words: "…the actual holding back (*epoche*) of itself [Being] in favor of …the gift [beings], that is, of Being with regard to the grounding of beings."[74] In other words, "…as it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws."[75] Thus, the withdrawal aspect is something that belongs to the sending of Being.

Now, that we have clarified the epochal nature of the sending of Being, viz., the history of Being, we must, along with Heidegger, ask for the reason as to the epochal nature of the sending or the history of Being. It leads Heidegger to analyze the notion of time. Presencing (*Anwesen*) of Being, though it has a reference to the present (*Gegenwart*), also shows itself as an extending (*Richen*) in the three modes of time, viz., the 'what-has-been' (*das Gewesen*), the 'what-is-not-yet' and the present. The 'what-has-been' is not merely 'that-which-is-past' (*das Vergangene*), but it presences in its absence and still concerns man. In other words, the presencing is extended in the 'what-has-been' in the mode of the presencing the absence of 'what-has-been.' Presencing, as the absence of 'what-is-not-yet' (future) is extended in the mode of presencing as coming-toward-man. Thus, 'what-is-not-yet' in some way is already present in its absence and concerns man. Presencing is extended in the present as presencing what is present. Presencing lasts (*wahrt*), in the sense of abiding (*verweilen*) or is extended (*reichen*) in man, as the present, the past as 'what-has-been' and the future as 'what-is-not-yet.'[76] The mutual extending brings together the three ecstases of time and lets them belong together. In the mutual extending of the three, there comes about a 'lighting up of openness.'[77] The unity of these three dimensions of time by continuous mutual extending is an interplay (*Zuspiel*), which Heidegger refers to as a 'simultaneous time' (*das Gleich-Zeitige*).[78] By bringing these three dimensions into a mutual interplay, the extending determines all the other three, and is, as it were, the fourth dimension. "True time," says Heidegger, "is four dimensional."[79]

From our analysis of the nature of time, it is clear that though time is simultaneous by its fourth dimension of mutual extending of the three ecstases of time, still it gives itself as presencing

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[72] Cf. *SD*, pp. 8-9; *TB*, pp. 8-9.

[73] Heidegger does not use the term '*epoche*' as Edmund Husserl used it in his phenomenological method, as an epistemological tool of bracketing all knowledge to question and verify their validity. Cf. *HW*, p. 331; Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. D.E. Krell and F.A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 26 (Hereafter: *EGT*).

[74] *SD*, p. 9; *TB*, p. 9.

[75] *HW*, p. 331; *EGT*, p. 26.

[76] Cf. *SD*, pp. 14-15; *TB*, p. 13.

[77] Cf. *SD*, p. 15; *TB*, p. 15.

[78] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 6. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1979), p. 213 (Hereafter: *US*); Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, trans. P.D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 106 (Hereafter: *WL*).

[79] *SD*, p. 16; *TB*, p. 15.

(*An-wesen*) and absencing (*Ab-wesen*). In other words, the presencing of 'what-has-been' and 'what-is-not-yet' is in the mode of absencing,[80] while the presencing of the present is in the mode of presencing.[81] To quote Heidegger: "We call the giving which gives the true time an extending which opens and conceals. As extending is itself a giving, the giving of a giving is concealed in true time."[82]

Thus, Being sends and time extends. The sending of Being and extending of time belong together in the realm of *Ereignis*.[83] Being, as presencing, sends, while time as the realms of open (*Berich des Oeffenen*) is that in and through which Being's sending can show itself. Thus, Being and time are interrelated, as the sending of Being always shows itself in time. Heidegger, in his letter to William J. Richardson, says: "Presencing [Being] is inherent in the lighting up of self-concealment [Time]. The lighting up of self-concealment [Time] brings forth the presencing [Being]."[84] In other words, Being, as presencing, is always temporal in its presencing. It is only because the presencing or sending of Being is temporal that Being shows itself as a sending that is concealed. Being's presencing in relation to the ecstasis of 'what-has-been' (past) and to the 'what-is-not-yet' (future) are in the mode of absencing (*Ab-wesen*). The reason why Being — by its 'coming-over' to beings, and thereby revealing beings — withholds or conceals itself is due to the temporal nature of Being's giving or presencing. As soon as Being lights up beings, the moment of lighting-up becomes the ecstasis of the past, and being is withdrawn as the lighting-up. Thus, the epochal or withdrawal aspect of Being's sending is nothing other than the temporal character of Being's sending.[85] Since Being's giving is temporal, the history of Being is epochal. As Being always withdraws in favor of the 'given,' due to the temporal character of its sending, the history of Being as the presencing or giving of Being always remains finite.

1.2.2. Being's Manifestation in the Spatial Order

Heidegger speaks of the spatial dimension of Being's manifestation in relation to the analysis of the fourfold (*Geviert*), viz., the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals, which are not ontic entities, but 'aspects' or 'moments' of Being in its spatial dimension. We have clarified this notion earlier in this chapter. Now, we would like to consider how the fourfold unfolds in the history of Being, 'constituting' its spatial dimension.

Each of the fourfold — the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals — belong together by way of a simple unified fourfold. Each of the four mirrors in its own way the presence of the others. This mirroring each other, on the one hand, frees each of the fourfold, that each could be itself in the unity of the four. On the other hand, they hold each other in such a way that their essential being is towards one another. It, in turn, leads to the mutual appropriation of the four. None of the four insists upon its own separate particularity. But rather "each is expropriated in the mutual appropriation into its own being. This expropriative appropriating is the mirror-play (*Spiegel-spiel*)

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[80] 'Absencing' is to be understood in the sense of *'epoche'* as withholding, withdrawing, denying or concealing.

[81] Cf. *HW*, p. 320; *EGT*, pp. 34-35.

[82] *SD*, p. 16; *TB*, p. 16.

[83] Cf. *SD*, p. 21; *TB*, p. 20.

[84] William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. xxi.

[85] Cf. *HW*, p. 311; *EGT*, p. 27.

of the fourfold. Out of the fourfold, the simple onefold of the four is ventured."[86] Thus, the mirror-play of the fourfold does not stress so much on the four, but on the onefold of the four.

The mirror-play of the simple onefold of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals, for Heidegger, constitutes the world. The fouring, i.e. the unity of the four, in the appropriating mirror-play is the worlding of the world.[87] Thus, the 'thing,' as that which gathers the fourfold in their appropriating mirror-play is what, Heidegger calls, the thinging of the thing. Since, world is the inter-relation of the fourfold, the thinging of the thing is the worlding of the world. Heidegger writes on this point:

The four are united primordially in being toward one another, a fourfold. The things let the fourfold of the four stay with them. This gathering …letting-stay, is the thinging of the thing. The unitary fourfold of the sky and earth, mortals and divinities, which is stayed in the thinging of the things, we call — the world. Thinging things are things. Thinging, they gesture — gestate — world.[88]

Thus, for Heidegger, "Things bear world. World grants things."[89] The presencing of the world in things in the unity of the fourfold, is the worlding (*das Welten*) of the world.[90] The mirror-play of the fourfold into onefold, Heidegger calls, "the ring-dance of appropriating."[90]

Being, as the worlding of the four, i.e., in its spatial aspect, also manifests the un-concealing and concealing element. Heidegger indicates this by writing the term 'Being' (*Sein*) with a cross mark over it.[91] The term 'Being' with the cross mark points to the concealing dimension of Being, while one without the cross mark shows Being as revealing. Further explaining this symbolic crossing of the term 'Being.' Heidegger says that this crossing does not merely indicate something that is negative, but rather it refers to the mirror-play of the fourfold. Being in its spatial unfolding in history is the gathering of the fourfold at the place of intersection.[92] In other words, the history of Being, in its spatial manifesting is the gathering of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals in their unity. Out of this gathering emerges the worlding process by the mirror-play of the four.

Being's manifestation in its historical unfolding is, thus, a time-space event. It comes about as an epochal sending of Being due to the interplay (*Zuspiel*) of the three ecstases of time. It is determined by extending (*Reichen*) and a worlding process by the mirror-play (*Spiegel-spiel*) of the fourfold, which is brought about by the fouring of the four in the onefold.[93] Having outlined

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86 *VA*, p. 172; *PLT*, p. 179.

87 Cf. *VA*, p. 173; *PLT*, p. 180.

88 *US*, p. 22; *PLT*, pp. 199-200. Cf. Also *VA*, p. 174; *PLT*, p. 181. Heidegger in his later writings prefers the terms 'world' (Welt) and 'thing' (*Ding*) in the place of the terms 'Being' and 'being.' Cf. *SD*, p. 41; *TB*, p. 37. He also speaks of the ontological difference between 'world' and 'thing.' Cf. *US*., p. 25; *PLT*, pp. 202-203.

89 *US*, p. 24; *PLT*, p. 202.

90 *VA*, p. 173; *PLT*, p. 180.

91 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, 3. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), pp. 34-35 (Hereafter: *SF*); Martin Heidegger, *The Question of Being*, trans. William Kluback and J.T. Wild (New Haven: College and University Press, 1958), pp. 89-90 (Hereafter: *QB*).

92 Cf. *SF*, p. 31; *QB*, p. 83.

93 In *Discourse on Thinking* Heidegger speaks of the spatio-temporal character of the history of Being in terms of 'that-which-regions' (*Gegnet*), which is characterized by expanse (*Weite*) and abiding (*Weile*) which gathers everything into its abiding expanse. The horizon (*Horizont*) is the visual field of the *Gegnet* in which everything appears in the spatio-temporal aspects. Thus, here, Heidegger is pointing

the spatio-temporal character of Being's manifestation, Heidegger attempts to raise the question of the 'why' of this giving of Being. We turn our attention to this question in the next section.

1.2.3. Being's Manifestation: A Play of Being

To the question as to the 'why' of the spatio-temporal sending of Being or of the history of Being as un-concealing and concealing, Heidegger says that it is a play of Being. It is a time-space-play which Being sends to man,[94] and which is a lighting process in which entities can appear.[95] It is a play in which 'time times,' 'space spaces,' 'thing things' and 'world worlds.'[96] It is a world-play which lets one encounter the temporality of history in the three ecstases of time and its spatiality in the four world regions of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals.[97]

Speaking on the background of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason, Heidegger says that there is no 'why' to the play of Being. There is no answer to the question of 'why.' Being presences as giving and as withdrawing. It is a groundless play of Being. It is not a play that is conditioned by the will and calculative thinking.[98] The play does not allow any causal, planneout patterns.[99] It is similar to a child playing draughts.[100] Heidegger highlights this point clearly when he says: "It [Being] plays because it plays. The 'because' sinks into the play. The play is without 'why.' It plays while it plays. There remains only play: the highest and the deepest. But this 'only' is the all, the one, the unique."[101] The play, says Heidegger, has no parallels among entities.[102]

The manifestation of Being, as the play of Being, cannot be without man. It is a play of Being with man. Man is not a passive spectator, but a co-player (*Mitspieler*) with Being. Epochal sending of Being and the worlding process can not be spoken of without a man as essentially being part of it. Again the time-space-play of the historical manifestation of Being can only be understood in the realm of appropriation, as it is an alighting of Being in which the ontological difference is unfolded as the history of Being. In the next section, we make an attempt to bring to light the realm of the experience of Being.

1.3. The Realm of Dasein's Experience of Being

The nature of Being, according to Heidegger, can be understood only in the realm of *Ereignis*. In this realm is to be found understanding of the belonging-together (*Zusammenge-hoerigkeit*) of

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to the *Gegnet* as the Being and the *Horizont* as an epoch of history of its spatio-temporal manifestation. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*, 6. Afulage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1979), pp. 37-49 (Hereafter: *GL*); Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. A.M. Anderson and E.H. Freund (London: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 64-73 (Hereafter: *DT*).

[94] Cf. *SG*, p. 129.

[95] Cf. ibid, p. 109.

[96] Cf. *US*, p. 213; *WL*, p. 106.

[97] Cf. *US*, p. 214; *WL*, p. 106.

[98] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, 5. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), p. 183 (Hereafter: *SG*).

[99] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Die Technik und die Kehre*, 5. Aulfage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1982), pp. 42-43 (Hereafter: *TK*); Martin Heidegger, *The Question concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 44 (Hereafter: *QCT*).

[100] Cf. *SG*, p. 188. Cf. also *HW*, p. 258; *PLT*, p. 102.

[101] *SG*, p. 188; Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 194.

[102] Cf. *ID*, p. 58; *IAD*, p. 66.

Being and Dasein, the difference (*Unterschied*), as such, between Being and entities and the spatio-temporal nature of Being's manifestation. We shall briefly analyze the nature and characteristics of *Ereignis*.

1.3.1. Nature of Ereignis

Ereignis is rendered in English as 'appropriation' or 'the event of appropriation.' We could briefly clarify the notion of '*Ereignis*' by analyzing the term etymologically. Speaking of the term '*Ereignis*,' Heidegger speaks of it as a 'key word' (*Leitwort*) that cannot be pluralized, but is a *singulare tantum*. Strictly speaking it is untranslatable. To quote him: "As such a key term, it can no more be translated than Greek '*logos*' or Chinese '*Tao*.'"[103] In the common usage '*Ereignis*' means an event or happening. Heidegger speaks of its etymological affinity with two root words: '*er-eigen*' and '*er-augnen.*' The former is related to German '*eigen*' (own) and in this sense '*Ereignis*' means to come to one's own or to come to where one belongs. The latter word is related to the German '*Auge*' (eye), meaning to catch sight of, to see with the mind's eye or to see face-to-face. If we put these two meanings together, *Ereignis* gives the sense of being far removed from everyday events or something which we see with our mind's eye; yet it is something so close to us that we cannot see it, i.e., it is something to which we belong.[104] This is clear when Heidegger speaks of *Ereignis* as "…the most inconspicuous of the inconspicuous phenomenon, the simplest of the simplicities, the nearest of the near, and the farthest of the far, in which we mortals spend our life."[105] Here we notice a sense of mystery in Heidegger's consideration of the *Ereignis*. Being is different from *Ereignis* and only in the realm of *Ereignis* can Being be thought of. "Being …in respect of its essential origin can be thought of in terms of appropriation."[106]

Ereignis is the realm in which the truth of Being manifests. Therefore, Being must be understood in and through the realm of *Ereignis*. In other words, thinking of Being reaches its purity and perfection when it is thought from the realm of *Ereignis*. It is not available to the representative-calculative thinking and to individual experiences of men. It is, rather, given to the essential thinker, the poetic dweller, the seer and the shepherd, in his realization of his belonging-together with Being. "The event of appropriation is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their nature."[107] *Ereignis* is "…Dasein's complete Self-realization in Being and Being's appropriation (*Zueignen*)"[108] of Dasein. Having analyzed the nature of the realm of *Ereignis* we move on to study its characteristics.

1.3.2. Characteristics of Ereignis

Ereignis, i.e., the event of appropriation, is the fundamental realm in relation to which Dasein experiences Being. Firstly, *Ereignis*, as the realm of Dasein's experiencing of Being, makes the relationship of belonging-together between Being and Dasein possible. Heidegger, speaking of

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[103] *ID*, p. 24; *IAD*, p. 36.

[104] Cf. *ID*, pp. 24-25; *IAD*, p. 14, fn. 1.

[105] *US*, p. 259; *WL*, p. 128. A good study of the notion of *Ereignis* is found in J.L. Mehta, *Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision*, pp. 430-444.

[106] *US*. p. 260; *WL*. p. 129; Cf. also Heinz C. Luegenbiehl, *The Essence of Man: An Approach to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (Ann Arbor: Microfilms, 1979), p. 106.

[107] *ID*, p. 26; *IAD*, p. 37.

[108] Otto Poeggeler, "Being as Appropriation," p. 196.

this mutual appropriation of Being and man in the realm of *Ereignis*, says that man belongs to Being in that he listens to the voice of Being and is appropriated to Being.[109] Being belongs to Dasein in that only he can provide a place for Being to become present.[110] In this manner "man and Being are appropriated to each other …[and] belong to each other."[111] Thus, the belonging-together of man and Being is a mutual dedicating and appropriating which happens in the realm of *Ereignis*.[112] It is only in the event of appropriation that Being and Dasein reach out to each other and their true essence is manifested to each other. To quote Heidegger: "The event of appropriation is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their nature."[113] This belonging-together of Being and Dasein in the realm of appropriation becomes the foundation of Dasein's experience of Being in beings and manifestation of Being in history.

Secondly, the realm of *Ereignis* not only reveals to Dasein his mutual belonging-together to Being, but also the difference between Being and beings. Even though Being is always Being of beings and beings are always beings of Being,[114] still there is difference between them. Meaningful thinking of Being, for Heidegger, means "to think of it in its difference with beings and of beings in the difference with Being."[115] Being, in revealing itself in beings, chooses to withdraw itself in favor of beings, in the process grounding a 'between' them in which Being can ground beings in their existence, even though Being itself is concealed.[116] Thus, *Ereignis* is the realm in which Dasein encounters, in his belonging-together to Being, the true nature of Being and its relationship with beings as the difference.

Thirdly, *Ereignis* is the realm in which the relationship of Being to Dasein and beings is manifested in the spatio-temporal history. The self-giving of Being takes place in presencing and absencing due to the temporal nature of Being's giving and Dasein's experiencing of the giving of Being. The presencing of the 'having-been' (the past) and the 'not-yet' (the future) is in the mode of absencing, while the presencing of the present is in the mode of presencing.[117] As soon as Being gives itself to beings and grounds beings by lighting them up, the moment of lighting up becomes the ecstasis of the past; in the process Being itself is withdrawn. Thus, Being's giving is temporal. The spatial giving of Being is unfolded in relation to the fourfold, the different facets of Being. According to Heidegger, the mutual expropriative appropriating of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals constitutes Being's manifestation in the spatial aspect.[118] Thus, the interplay of the three ecstaces of time, viz., the 'having-been,' the 'not-yet' and the present, and the mirror-play of the fourfold, in which the historical manifestation of Being takes place, is available only in the realm of *Ereignis*, in which exists the mutual belonging-together of Being and Dasein.

Fourthly, it is the realm of *Ereignis* that reveals history as the play of Being. The time-space-play of Being, which is the history of Being, is that which Being sends to man.[119] It is Being's

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[109] Cf. *ID*, p. 18; *IAD*, p. 31

[110] Cf. *ID*, p. 20; *IAD*, p. 33.

[111] *ID*, p. 19; *IAD*, pp. 31-32.

[112] Cf. *ID*, p. 24; *IAD*, p. 36.

[113] *ID*, p. 26; *IAD*, p. 37.

[114] Cf. *ID*, p. 53; *IAD*, pp. 61-62.

[115] Cf. *ID*, p. 53; *IAD*, p. 62.

[116] Cf. *ID*, pp. 55-56; *IAD*, pp. 64-65.

[117] Cf. *HW*, p. 320; *EGT*, pp. 34-35.

[118] 118. Cf. *VA*, pp. 172-173; *PLT*, pp. 179-180.

[119] Cf. *SG*, p. 129.

lighting process in which beings are grounded in Being.[120] In this play of Being 'time times,' 'space spaces,' 'thing things' and 'world worlds.'[121] This play of Being, which makes history possible, takes place in the realm of *Ereignis*, in which Dasein is a co-player with Being.

Fifthly, the realm of *Ereignis* which opens Dasein to the *aletheia* of Being is a revealing that conceals, a giving that withdraws and a presencing that absences. Heidegger says that the two are not different, but "both sending itself and withdrawing itself are but one and same …,"[122] in which the mittence of Being is manifested in history. *Aletheia* involves an opening that lights up and a playground[123] in which the clearing of Being occurs. Thus, the sheltering of Being in *aletheia,* which implies mutual looking at on the part of Dasein and Being,[124] is revealed only in the realm of *Ereignis.*

Sixthly, *Ereignis* involves a 'step-back' from metaphysical thinking. According to Heidegger, metaphysics is a science of being as being. Its prime concern is not Being (*Sein*), but the beingness of beings. The beingness of beings was unified in the highest entity, which Aristotle called the first cause and the unmoved mover, and the later thinkers identified as God. Metaphysics insofar as it is a study of entities in their abstract universal beingness is ontology. And, insofar as it attempts to inquire into entities as fundamentally grounded in the highest entity — which is the ultimate reason for their beingness — metaphysics is theology.[125] Ontology and theology are not two parts of metaphysics; rather metaphysics is both at the same time as the beingness of beings is grounded in the highest being. Thus, for Heidegger, metaphysics is onto-theo-logic.[126] Heidegger is of the opinion that metaphysics began to be onto-theo-logic, ever since the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. That metaphysical tradition was solidified during the middle ages, continued through the modern period and culminated in the nihilistic philosophy of Nietzsche.[127] Thus, from Plato to Nietzsche there runs unbroken metaphysical thinking, which takes the form of subjectism especially since Descartes; it is consummated in Nietzsche's philosophy, which has led to forgetfulness of Being as Being.[128] Metaphysical thinking led to what Heidegger refers to as representational thinking (*Vorstellendes Denken*), in which the original insights contained in the pre-Socratic thinking have been replaced by the representational and intellectual concepts. As these metaphysical notions dominated every aspect of philosophy, thinking comes to be representation of ideas and truth comes to be the correctness of these representations, localized in a statement. This, in turn, led to the emergence of logic as the science of thinking.[129] With the emergence of logic as the science of thinking, rational thinking began to dominate over the Being of beings.[130] The movement of the rise of logic and reason over Being, reached its peak when logic was considered as the arbitrator of what is true and false, that is, when the principle of contradiction

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[120] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 109.

[121] Cf. *US*, p. 213; *WL*, p. 106.

[122] *SG*, p. 109.

[123] Cf. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, *Gesamtausgabe*, Abt. II, Bd. 5 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), p. 213 (Hereafter: *PM*).

[124] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 224

[125] Cf. *WM*, p. 19; Cf. Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back to the Ground of Metaphysics," *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre,* ed. Walter Kaufmann, p. 275 (Hereafter: *WGBM*).

[126] Cf. *ID*, p. 50; *IAD*, p. 59.

[127] Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 301-382.

[128] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Bd. II (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), pp. 201, 291-302 (Hereafter: *N II*). Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 281.

[129] Cf. *EM*, p. 143; *IM*, p. 188.

[130] Cf. *EM*, p. 136; *IM*, p. 176.

established itself as the most important law of logical thinking which no one could question.[131] Metaphysics, as a science of the beingness of beings and logic as a science of thinking could not really be separated in the development of Western philosophy, as logical categories and principles were, in fact, metaphysical. This, in turn, brought about subject-object thinking in modern philosophy and gave it an epistemological orientation, in the process forgetting to consider Being as Being.[132] Heidegger, in criticizing the traditional metaphysical thinking, does not totally deny the role of logic in thinking. But, he points out that the realm of knowledge should not be reduced to logic and reason alone, because deeper dimensions of life and reality and their meaning do not consist merely in logical coherence, but rather rest on existential experience. Thus, though Heidegger is not against reason and logic, he warns against the type of thinking that gives credit only to logic and that considers as false anything that cannot be explained in terms of logic. In saying this Heidegger asserts that only by attempting a 'step-back' from the metaphysical thinking can one make an entry into the realm of *Ereignis* wherein the experiencing of Being as Being is possible.

Finally, the realm of *Ereignis* involves moving away from technological thinking. It is characterized by the modern scientific method of strict logical verification and the technological attitude of domination. Modern scientific method implies research. With the help of research the world is organized by bringing into play the power of calculating, planning and molding all things.[133] There are three elements in modern scientific research, viz., the rigor of procedure, experimentation and institutionalization. The rigor of procedure consists in determining the area of scientific investigation in the realm of things. It is carried out according to a strictly planned project and is characterized by mathematical precision and exactness.[134] Experimentation involves scientific procedure, which begins by setting forth a hypothesis and the objectification of facts from which laws relating to their necessity and constancy are formulated. Institutionalization is aimed at guaranteeing the ongoing activities, such as specialization and specific forms of investigation of scientific research.[135] Besides the scientific method, there is what Heidegger calls the technological attitude of domination that is essential for the effective continuation of technological thinking. It is more aggressive than the scientific method and research. While the scientific researcher considers natural objects as something to be studied and investigated, a technologist looks for ways of exploiting the same object as a source of energy and power.[136] In other words, scientific research would investigate nature and its usability with mathematical precision, while the technological attitude would aim at actually realizing and exploiting the potencies of the object.[137] Thus, technological attitude is a type of will-to-power which looks upon nature only as something that can be known, manipulated and used. Machines are tools to enact man's domination over nature.[138] The scientific method, with its pre-planned, rigorous and

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[131] Cf. *EM*, p. 19; *IM*, p. 25.

[132] Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 125.

[133] Cf. *HW*, p. 87; Martin Heidegger, "The Age as the World Picture," *QCT*, p. 135.

[134] Cf. *ibid.*, Cf. Also Martin Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, 2. Auflage (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1975), p. 74 (Hereafter: *FD*). Martin Heidegger, *What is a Thing?*, trans. W.B. Barton Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Indiana: Gateway Editions, 1967), p. 95 (Hereafter: *WT*).

[135] Cf. *HW*, pp. 78, 90-91; *QCT*, pp. 125, 139.

[136] Cf. *GL*, p. 18; *DT*, p. 50.

[137] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Die Technic und die Kehre*, 5. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1982), p. 16 (Hereafter: *TK*); *QCT*, p. 16.

[138] Cf. Harold Alderman, "Heidegger: Technology as Phenomenon," *Personalist*, 51 (1970), 542.

mathematical approach of scientific research and the technological attitude with its manipulative and dominative tendencies lead to what can be called calculative thinking (*rechnendes Denken*). This consists in having a realistic and pragmatic view of life and reality. It is characterized by the unsentimental and businesslike outlook, which turns circumstances to advantage to attain an end. It involves meticulous planning and careful calculation whose ultimate aim is control or total power. This, in turn, results in man's everyday life becoming a struggle in the market place.[139] Man must move away from such manipulative thinking and acting in order to make the 'unbridged entry' into the realm of *Ereignis* and the experience Being in its giving.

Having looked into the nature and characteristics of the realm in which Dasein experiences Being, we move now to consider how Dasein finds himself in the state of the experience of Being.

1.4. Dasein in the State of the Experience of Being

Heidegger understands Dasein as essentially related to Being. Dasein's meaning, truth and even authenticity are understood in the light of this relationship. This relationship is not causal, but an appropriating belonging-together in which Being and Dasein enter into each other's realms. The task of Dasein is to be available for Being as a lighting-up-place for its revealing in spatio-temporal manifestation. Dasein is at the service of Being. This does not mean that Dasein is passive and at the mercy of Being, for Dasein plays the significant active role of responding to Being by receiving and preserving the truth of Being. In this section we will consider the role of Dasein as the lighting-up-place of Being, the shepherd of Being and the seer of the truth of Being, as he experiences Being.

1.4.1. Dasein: The Lighting-up-place of Being

Dasein is the lighting-up-place of Being in its giving. The role of Dasein consists in being the '*Da*' for Being to shine forth. It involves Dasein's availability in openness to Being and saying a constant 'yes' to the call of Being. As an essential thinker Dasein, by his openness to Being, lets Being evoke thought in him. In other words, Dasein, by opening himself to the call of Being, lets Being favor Dasein with the gift of being an essential thinker. Being gives itself as 'that which is most thought provoking,' i.e., as food for thought and then withdraws itself. In so doing, Being presences itself to Dasein as withdrawing. In the process, Being calls Dasein to think about that which is most thought-provoking which has withdrawn. Dasein is the playing-field or the lighting-up-place for this giving-withdrawing process of Being's call to think. Even in the process of the occurrence of essential thinking in release Dasein continues to be the 'place' of Being's revealing in that Dasein opens himself to "that-which-regions" (Being). This helps Dasein to rise above the pushes and pulls of everyday existence and brings about a freedom in Dasein to be his self, thereby opening himself for release.[140]

Dasein's ek-sisting consists in being attuned to the voice and the giving of Being. It is a standing-at or dwelling in the sphere of Being. Dasein is ek-sisting because he has already allowed himself to be the lighting up place for Being. Because Dasein has given himself to Being as a '*locus*' for its manifestation, Dasein is able to dwell or ek-sist in the nearness of Being. In ek-sisting or dwelling in Being, Dasein continues to be the lighting-up-place of Being. In the

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[139] Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Wo zu Dichter?," *HW*, pp. 270, 289; Cf. *PLT*, pp. 114-115, 135.

[140] Cf. Vensus A. George, From Being-in-the-World to Being-toward-Being: Martin Heidegger's Philosophy of the Authentic Human Person (Nagpur: SAC Publications, 1996), p. 152.

occurrence of dwelling or ek-sisting Dasein remains a 'home' for Being's arrival, in his poetic presencing. Being summons Dasein to itself by presenting itself as the Glad-some, the Holy, the Origin and the Ground. Here too, Dasein is, as it were, the screen in which the light of Being in its original giving shines forth.[141]

The truth of Being — Dasein's essential relation of belonging-together to Being, the relation of difference between Being and beings, and the history as the spatio-temporal sending of Being — is understood only in relation to Being's giving of itself to Dasein, the lighting-up-place. Dasein knows his essential belonging-together to Being only when he is open to Being in the realm of *Ereignis*. Only by 'being there' for Being does Dasein know his oneness with Being. We saw above that ontological difference is the relation of difference between Being and entities in the process of Being's coming-over to entities, revealing itself in entities and the arrival of entities in which Being is concealed. This is understood only in relation to Being's giving of itself as the difference in Dasein, viz. Being's lighting-up-place. Again, the spatio-temporal nature of the history of Being, which is a play of Being, also is revealed in relation to the playing-field, viz., Dasein. It is in relation to Dasein, the lighting-up-place of Being, that Being in its temporal nature gives itself in the interplay of presencing and absencing of the three ecstases of time. Here also the spatial nature of Being shows itself in the mirror-play of the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities and mortals.[142]

Thus, it is clear that Dasein is the lighting-up-place of Being at every stage of its manifestation. Though this role is receptive in nature, yet it is significant as it unfolds Being in its essential truth. By being the lighting-up-place for Being Dasein becomes the shepherd of Being, to which we turn in the next section.

1.4.2. Dasein: The Shepherd of Being

Our analysis of Dasein as the lighting-up-place of Being could have left us with the impression that Dasein is totally subordinated to Being. Though Being's role is primary in the Being-event, Dasein does play an active role — besides his role as the lighting-up-place of Being. He responds actively to the call, summons and giving of Being, thereby preserving what he has received by being the lighting-up-place of Being. In this sense Dasein guards and shepherds the presencing of Being in himself and in entities. This role of Dasein is our concern in this section.

As an essential thinker Dasein actively responds to Being. The response must be a corresponding response, i.e., a response that is on a par with the invitation. In essential thinking Being calls Dasein to thinking and gives food for thought. In other words, Being calls Dasein to think meditatively on Being as the most thought-provoking. Dasein returns a corresponding response in re-calling and thanking. Dasein, firstly, recollects the call of Being in memory and thanks Being for the gift of itself as the most thought-provoking. Re-collection of the call opens up Being's world to Dasein and lets him constantly keep it in his memory, while thanking makes Dasein accept the gift of Being as the most thought-provoking and continues meditating on it. Thus, thanksgiving leads Dasein to continue thinking of Being as the gift.[143]

The re-collective thanking for Being's gift of itself to Dasein opens him all the more for Being. In this opening of Dasein, Being as 'that-which-regions,' manifests itself by its primordial regioning and effects in Dasein a freedom to be his self. Possessing this inner freedom Dasein

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[141] Cf. *ibid.*
[142] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 153.
[143] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 154.

responds to Being firstly by non-willing, which frees Dasein from the entanglement with things. Secondly, by his active waiting on Being, Dasein is released towards things and attains an openness to the mystery of Being. Thus, by a corresponding response to the call, giving and regioning of Being, Dasein attains the state of release. In this response Dasein positively preserves the gift of Being.[144]

Such a released Dasein moves towards Being as ek-sisting, i.e., he begins to dwell in the nearness of Being. The process of movement towards dwelling, as we mentioned earlier, is primarily the task of Being. To the Being which gives itself to Dasein in poetic presencing and calls Dasein to dwell in its neighborhood, Dasein responds correspondingly by poetic dwelling in the poetic presencing of Being. The poetic dwelling of Dasein continues the original experience of homecoming that was brought about by Being and preserves it in the three ecstases of time, viz., past, future and present. The past experience of Being is cherished in Dasein's memory, not merely as something that happened in the past, but as the 'having-been' that i relevant to the whole history of Dasein. The same experience is viewed not as something finished, but as continuing and 'yet-to-come' in the future. The experience of Being is seen as a present reality to which Dasein gives expression in the present. Thus Dasein, by his poetic dwelling in the poetic presencing of Being, continues to dwell in the nearness of Being. In this way Being is shepherded in Dasein's own being.[145]

Besides shepherding Being in his self, Dasein also shepherds Being that is revealed in things by dwelling in the fourfold as the mortal. In other words, by dwelling in the fourfold Dasein shares Being in things and thereby builds things in their being. Dasein dwells in the fourfold by gathering together the fourfold, i.e., the three facets of Being. This shepherding of Being in things is done by Dasein by performing a four function within the fourfold: saving the earth as the earth, receiving the sky as the sky, waiting on divinities as divinities and taking upon himself or initiating his own nature as the mortal. In the fourfold, Dasein shepherds the Being that is manifested in things.[146]

1.4.3. Dasein: The Seer of the Truth of Being

In shepherding Being in Dasein's own being and in things, Dasein becomes the seer of the truth of Being. The truth of Being — the essential belonging-together of Being and Dasein, the relation of difference between Being and entities and the spatio-temporal history of Being — can be seen, in the sense of experienced or realized, only when it is received by Dasein in the realm of *Ereignis*. Being raises Dasein to its own level in the realm of *Ereignis*. Dasein is a co-partner in this essential relationship with Being. Only in the context of the belonging-together of Being and Dasein is the truth of entities, i.e. their essential difference from Being, unfolded. Dasein is a co-player with Being in the play of the spatio-temporal history of Being. In this manner, Dasein exercises an active role of receiving, responding and shepherding Being in its giving, and thereby becomes a seer of the truth of Being.

By shepherding Being Dasein sees its truth. As the seer of the truth of Being Dasein is called by Being to be the guardian and preserver of this truth of Being. Mans' attempt to bring dignity to himself as the lord of the world ultimately ends in failure. Therefore, the manner in which he needs to exercise this task is not one of dominating over and taking control of beings, but rather of waiting on, and attending to, Being by thinking of Being and dwelling in its neighborhood. Dasein is not

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[144] Cf. *ibid.*
[145] Cf. *ibid.*
[146] Cf. *ibid.*

a stranger to the neighborhood, as he has been close to the nearest of the near.[147] By dwelling in the nearest of the near and shepherding Being, Dasein sees the truth of Being. Dasein, the seer is "…a shepherd, who attends on and watches over …[and thereby] sees the revealing-concealing play of Being."[148] Thus, the seer is a person "who has seen the totality of what is present [Being] in its presencing,"[149] both by revealing and concealing.[150] The seeing is determined by the eye, but also by the lighting of Being that had been given to him as the shepherd.[151] The seer sees "because the lighting-up …of Being has been visited upon him."[152] In the visiting of Being upon Dasein, he attains the greatest dignity of the seer of the truth of Being.

Dasein sees the truth of Being by his openness to the unconcealing process (*aletheia*) of Being and dwelling in language, the house of Being. When Being un-conceals itself, Dasein sees into the openness of Being. By this seeing into Being, Dasein lets Being look at Dasein. In this mutual look of Being and Dasein, there occurs the unconcealing process in which Dasein's seeing the truth of Being takes place. Again language, as the house of Being, protects and preserves Being by bringing its truth into light. Thus, in language the truth of Being is guarded. Dasein is called to be a friend of the house (*Hausfreund*) of Being. The friend of the house of Being is the nearest to Being and he has affection for the house of Being. He is ready for a primordial dwelling in the house of Being, language.[153] Thus, Dasein, by dwelling in language, corresponds to language. In other words, Dasein is a co-speaker with the language that speaks. As a co-speaker, Dasein listens to the speaking of language and gives expression to what he has heard from language. Dasein, thus, by his seeing into the un-concealing process of Being and dwelling in language, the house of being, comes into a face-to-face contact with Being and its truth, and thereby shepherds the truth he has experienced. In shepherding Being and its truth, Dasein continues to be the seer of the truth of Being.[154] We can conclude that Dasein, as related to Being in an essential way, actively participating in Being's revealing of itself by shepherding Being's truth in himself and in things.

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[147] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 348; *BW*, p. 231.
[148] Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 202.
[149] *HW*, p. 321; *EGT*, p. 36.
[150] Cf. *HW*, p. 320; *EGT*, p.35.
[151] Cf. *HW*, p. 321; *EGT*, p. 36.
[152] William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 525.
[153] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Hebel der Hausfreund*, 4. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), p. 24 (Hereafter: *HH*).
[154] Cf. Vensus A. George, pp. 118-124.

2
Moving From Care: The Condition for the Experience of Being

In the last chapter, we analyzed the nature of Being, its manifestation and the realm in which the manifestation takes place. Besides, we have also looked into Dasein's experiencing of Being as the lighting-up-place of Being, the shepherd of Being and the seer of the truth of Being. Having clearly stated the various aspects of the goal of Dasein's existence, i.e., the experiencing of Being, we must address the question of the condition under which this experience of Being can be attained by Dasein. The essential condition for the attainment of the experience of Being consists in Dasein moving away from a life that is characterized by care (*Sorge*). Thus, in the second chapter, we proceed to study the different elements of Dasein's existence that is marked by care.

Dasein, by his very nature, is a being-in-the-world. His being-in-the-world is characterized by care. At this stage, he is caught up in and concernfully involved with entities and other Daseins, which he encounters as a being-in-the-world. He has to be bothered with a number of concerns, such as epistemological, relational and existential. Dasein's epistemological concern stems from the fact that he finds himself in the world, understands the world and expresses his understanding in discourse. As a result of this 'being-in' of Dasein, he possesses the characteristics of existence, mineness and authenticity or inauthenticity and enjoys a priority over every other entity in the world. Dasein also has a relational concern, which takes him to encounter entities and other Daseins like himself. The network of relationships he forms by these twofold encounters constitutes what can be called Dasein's world. Besides, Dasein faces an existential concern in which he has to cope with his fallenness, authenticity and temporal-historical nature. Thus, this chapter, in dwelling on Dasein as care, attempts to unfold the threefold concerns of Dasein that constitute his being as a being-in-the-world.

2.1. Care in Dasein's Epistemological Level

Dasein is a unique being. He is, on the one hand, "like any other entity, present-at-hand as real,"[1] and on the other hand, he is not a 'mere thing,' because he is involved with entities in circumspective concern (*Besorgen*) and discovers the kind of being a thing is. "Dasein …is the ontic condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement …as their kind of being, and which, thus, can make themselves known as they are in themselves."[2] Human existence, understood in this sense of the horizon in which every other reality in the world can have their meaning, Heidegger calls 'transcendence.' The term 'transcendence' means 'to pass over,' 'to step over' and 'to go through.'[3] Heidegger understands the term in relation to Dasein's 'being-in-the-world.' As transcendence, Dasein goes beyond all entities, including himself as a being and understands himself[4] and other things in their being. As Heidegger puts it: "What is transcendence is, indeed, beings themselves and that every being that can be and become unconcealed to Dasein, including that being which exists as 'its [his] self' [i.e.

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[1] *SZ*, p. 201; *BT*, p. 245.

[2] *SZ*, p. 87; *BT*, p. 120.

[3] Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problem of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 298 (Hereafter: *BPP*).

[4] Cf. *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, 67.

Dasein]."[5] In other words, human existence is the 'formative' agent of the world. He transcends beings and draws them out of their fundamental hiddenness and endows them with being, i.e., with meaning and truth. Dasein, by his very nature, is transcendence and only by transcending beings is his nature realized.[6] Speaking on this point J.L. Metha says:

Heidegger defines transcendence as the ground of ontological difference;[7] it is by virtue of his transcendence that man [human existence] can distinguish between Being and being and so relate himself to essents in the light of his comprehension of Being. In transcendence, Dasein goes beyond all essents as such, including itself [himself] reaching up to the world, which is part of the structure of transcendence, of Dasein's 'being-in-the-world.'[8]

Our concern, in this chapter, is to study this Dasein, the human transcendence, who is unique and different from all essents, by analyzing his nature, characteristics and priority.

2.1.1. Nature of Dasein

Heidegger characterizes human existence as 'being-in-the-world.' This expression contains two notions: 'being-in' (*In-Sein)* and 'in-the-world' (*in-der-Welt).*[9] Human existence, thus, essentially is 'being-in.' It involves the idea of 'there' (*Da).*[10] So human existence is the '*Da*' of '*Sein*' of the world. In other words, it is in the 'there' of human existence, i.e., in his 'being-in' the world that its being is disclosed. Thus, Dasein's 'being-in' is the basis of his familiarity with the world whereby which the structure of the world is disclosed.[11] The main concern of this section is to dwell on the nature of Dasein by analyzing the way in which Dasein is in his 'there,' viz., his 'being-in.' In elaborating this point, we will consider the meaning and modes of Dasein's 'being-in' and knowing the world as a typical mode of Dasein's 'being-in.'

2.1.1.1. Meaning of Dasein's 'Being-in'

Dasein's 'being-in' is not the same as "withinness" (*Inwendigkeit)*. In this sense we speak of one present-at-hand essent in another. Here the term 'in' is taken in its spatial sense. In this sense we consider something as containing a thing. For example, apple is in the basket, water is in the bucket and garment is in the cupboard.[12] 'Being-in' is distinct from the present-at-hand insideness of something present-at-hand 'in' something else that is present-at-hand."[13] Dasein's 'being-in' does not mean a spatial 'in-one-anotherness' (*In-einander)*[14] or 'side-by-sideness' (*Neben-*

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[5] Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), p. 18.

[6] Cf. I.M. Bochenski, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, trans., Nicholl and K. Aschenbrenner (London: University California Press, 1974), p. 171.

[7] Cf. *BPP*, pp. 227-228., 318-330. In these passages Heidegger deals, in detail, with the problem of ontological difference.

[8] J.L. Mehta, *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger,* p. 95.

[9] Cf. *SZ*, p. 53; *BT*, p. 79.

[10] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 132-133; *BT*, p. 171.

[11] Cf. *ibid.*

[12] Cf. *SZ*, p. 54; *BT*, p. 79.

[13] Cf. *SZ*, p. 132; *BT*, p. 170.

[14] Cf. *SZ*, p. 54; *BT*, p. 79.

einander).[15] 'Being-in' is also not to be understood on the subject-object schema because such a schema would divide the 'being-in' between the subject and the object. It amounts to the being side-by-side presence of the present-at-hand entities as the subject and object.[16]

Dasein's 'being-in' is not spatial, but existential. In this sense, the term 'in' derives from terms '*innen*' (to reside), '*wohnen*' and '*sich aufahalten*' (to dwell).[17] Thus, 'being-in' here means 'to be at home with,' 'to reside alongside,' 'to be familiar with,' 'to be involved in' and 'to be entrusted with that familiarity with the world about.'[18] It is in this sense that we speak of someone 'being in a profession,' 'being in a conspiracy' and 'being in love.' Here 'being-in' refers to the personal and existential 'inhood' which implies the relationship of dwelling and involvement. Thus, 'being-in' means Dasein's being accustomed to his environment and being in relationship to the entities of his surroundings. In other words, it involves Dasein's entanglement with things of his world.[19] Dasein's 'being-in comes in various ways. It consists in having to do something, producing something, consuming something, abandoning something, interrogating, considering and determining. All these activities show Dasein's interest in things and his concern for them. They can be called Dasein's caretaking (*Besorgnis*).[20]

The care-taking or 'being-in' is not an occasional property of Dasein which sometimes he has and at other times does not. We cannot speak of Dasein without his 'being-about' with entities. So 'being-in' is the essence of Dasein's being.[21] The most fundamental trait of Dasein's 'being-in' is what Heidegger calls '*Erschlossenheit*,' i.e., the disclosedness of Dasein. "Dasein is its (his) disclosedness."[22] Hence, Dasein's 'being-in' or 'there' is the clearing (*Lichtung*) within which the world is discovered or disclosed. Referring to the traditional metaphor of human nature in man, Heidegger says that this metaphor is an ontic way of pointing to the existential-ontological structure of human existence as disclosedness. To say that Dasein is 'lit up' (*erleuchtet*) means that as 'being-in-the-world' he is cleared (*gelichtet*) or he is a lighting-process. Dasein is illumined not by any other kind of being, but by his opened-up-ness to entities, which belongs to his very structure. It is the clearing of Dasein towards all entities of the world and is the basis of his familiarity with the world. It enables Dasein to encounter entities and be involved with them.[23] Dasein's 'being-in' is identical with the disclosedness of the world. To quote Heidegger: "…the world is 'there' its being-there is [Dasein's] 'being-in.'"[24] We could say that Dasein's 'being-in' is a state of Dasein's being, in which he is as opened-up-ness or that the lighting-process dwells among entities in concernful dealings (*Besorgen*) and discovers (*endeckt*) them in their being.

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[15] Cf. *SZ*, p. 55; *BT*, p. 81.

[16] Cf. *SZ*, p.132; *BT*, 170.

[17] Cf. *SZ*, p. 54; *BT*, p. 80. In Heidegger's later writings the idea of 'dwelling' is a significant theme. "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken" and "…dichterisch wohnt der Mensch," *VA*, pp. 139-156, 181-198.23. Cf. *ibid;* Cf. also John Richardson, *Existential Epistemology: A Heideggerian Critique of Cartesian Project* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 25.24. *SZ*, p. 143; *BT*, p. 182.

[18] Cf. *SZ*, p. 54; *BT*, p. 80.

[19] Cf. *VA*, pp. 192, 202.

[20] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 56-57; *BT*, p. 83.

[21] Cf. *SZ*, p. 57; *BT*, 84. Cf. also Gilbert Ryle, "Hiedegger's *Sein und Zeit*," *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays*, ed. Michael Murray (London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 58-59.

[22] *SZ*, p. 133; *BT*, 171.

[23] Cf. *ibid;* Cf. also John Richardson, *Existential Epistemology: A Heideggerian Critique of Cartesian Project* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 25.

[24] *SZ*, p. 143; *BT*, p. 182.

2.1.1.2. Modes of Dasein's 'Being-in'

In clarifying the meaning of Dasein's 'being-in,' we have been looking at the general layout of the '*Da*' or the 'there' of human existence. In this section, we want to look into the 'how' of this '*Da*' of Dasein, i.e., the 'how' of Dasein's 'being-in.' In other words we would like to consider the basic modes or ways in which Dasein is disclosive. There are three modes of Dasein's 'being-in, i.e., Dasein discloses himself in three ways: 'state-of-being' (*Befindlichkeit*),[25] 'understanding' (*Verstehen*) and discourse (*Rede*). Now, we could briefly consider each of these.

2.1.1.2.1. State-of-Being

Heidegger gives the name 'state-of-being' (*Befindlichkeit*) to the first determining awareness of oneself as 'being-in-the-world.' It refers to the way Dasein is 'placed' (*sich finden*) in life and in the world. It is the 'already-being-found-himself-thereness' of Dasein.[26] The state-of-being, for Heidegger, is an existential of Dasein, which is prior to all psychological moods[27] and belongs to Dasein's existential structure. What is indicated ontologically by this term '*Befindlichkeit*' is what is ontically most familiar to Dasein, viz., his moods (*Stimmung*) and his 'being attuned' (*Gestimmtsein*) to the world. In other words, the existential structure of Dasein's state-of-being is revealed through his ontic moods. "Mood," thus "is the lived expression of the state-of-being."[28] Dasein, as state-of-being, is never free of moods and is attuned to the world in one way or other. With the help of the moods Dasein discovers that he is in a particular way.

State-of-being, with its ontic expression — the moods — discloses the 'being-in' of Dasein in three ways, viz., in Dasein's being delivered over to his moods, in his concernful dealing with entities and in his being submissive to the world. In the state-of-being, firstly, the Dasein is, as it were, 'delivered over' to his moods[29] and finds himself in one or other type of encounter which is beyond his control. Moods often overcome Dasein and he could affect them only to a limited degree. Often Dasein does not choose the particular situation in which he finds himself. For example, Dasein is thrust into a fearful mood without wanting to enter into that state. Thus, Dasein is always in some or other mood and shows himself "as a naked 'that it [he] is' and has to be."[30] Consequently, Dasein does not start his existence, but finds himself as already existing, whether it be in a given situation or from his origins. His existence has already started without his ever knowing or choosing. Dasein's Being as "that it [he] is" does not give a clear indication as to his origin and destiny. The 'whence' (*Woher*) and the 'whither' (*Wohin*) of Dasein remain obscure and hidden. Though these are hidden, Dasein is disclosed as a being that already is in one or another

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[25] The term *'Befindlichkeit'* has been translated differently. William Richardson renders it as 'disposition,' Cf. p. 64; John Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as 'state-of-mind,' Cf. *SZ*, p. 133., *BT*, p. 172; Vietta gives it a psychological meaning and renders it as 'sensitivity.' Cf. Egon Vietta, "Being, World and Understanding: A Commentary on Heidegger," *The Review of Metaphysics*, 5 (1951), 157-172. Since this German term '*Befindlichkeit*' refers to the state or the situation one finds oneself in, we prefer to translate it as 'state-of-being.'

[26] Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 64.

[27] Cf. *SZ*, p. 137; *BT*, p. 175.

[28] *SZ*, p. 134; *BT*, pp. 172-173. Cf. also Roger Waterhouse, *A Heidegger Critique*, p. 85.

[29] Cf. *SZ*, p. 134; *BT*, p. 173.

[30] *Ibid.*

mood. It is Dasein's non-theoretical awareness of himself as being revealed in his moods, as an essent that is delivered, and which is a naked fact that Heidegger calls 'thrownness' (*Geworfenheit*).[31]

Dasein, therefore, is thrown and is in a continuous throw which he can 'never get back behind.'[32] Dasein's thrownness must be conceived as the "facticity of its [his] being delivered over."[33] Facticity is different from factuality (*Tatsaechlichkeit*) of the present-at-hand entities. Heidegger calls the factuality of entity as the '*factum brutum*' (brute fact).[34] But Dasein's facticity consists in that he is his 'there' in such a way that he finds himself in his world. Facticity is "the mood [that] brings Dasein before the 'that-it [he] -is' of its [his] 'there' which, as such, stares it [him] in the face, with the inexorability of an enigma."[35] Facticity, therefore, refers to the unavoidable and unchangeable character of the thrownness of Dasein. Though in the state-of-being Dasein is factically thrown into his moods, he should master his moods through knowledge and will. In other words, Dasein should take responsibility for himself, as if he were his own making, i.e., Dasein must overtake his own thrownness and accept it as his way to be (*zu sein*) and hold responsibility for it.[36]

Secondly, in the state-of-being the thrownness of Dasein is revealed as a thrownness into the world of entities. The thrown Dasein is not revealed as an isolated subject but as a 'totality-to-be-in-the-world'[37] and as having inseparable relationship with the entities of this world. In other words, in Dasein's thrown existence not only his own existence is revealed, but also the existence of other Daseins and the world with all its entities are disclosed. It would mean that in the state-of-being, Dasein's 'being-in-the-world' is disclosed, by which Dasein shows not only that he is, i.e., a thrown Dasein among other entities, but also 'that he has to be,' i.e., he is a thrown existence, who directs himself, by being concerned with things and persons in the world. Thus, in the state-of-being, Dasein finds himself as a 'way to be,' which is the basic condition for the possibility of discovering the world, with its entities, by moving towards them dynamically.[38]

Thirdly, since, in the state-of-being, Dasein is primarily disclosed as a 'being-in-the-world' and attuned towards entities in cirumspective concern, he is disclosed as one who is submissive to the world. Considered as thrownness, Dasein finds himself in the world. He seems to be passive: the world moves towards Dasein, and he has to submit himself, as it were, to the world. Through Dasein's openness to the world, Dasein discloses himself as thrown to the submissiveness to the world. Since he is open to the world, Dasein can be affected, impressed and threatened in his '*Da*' by entities and other Daseins. For example, a journey by a car or a train may be looked at as something dangerous or particularly welcoming, depending on the 'what-for' of the journey. The 'what-for' brings about different moods on Dasein and thereby affects his attitude towards the journey. If one expects something disturbing after the journey, this 'what-for,' viz., the expectation of something disturbing, would effect the mood of fear. This would, in turn, make Dasein take the journey as something dangerous or the speed of the train as something alarming. On the other hand, if something particularly interesting is expected after the journey, then the mood effected

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[31] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 134-135; *BT*, pp. 173-174.
[32] Cf. *SZ*, p. 135; *BT*, p. 174. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 33-34.
[33] *SZ*, p. 135; *BT*, p. 174.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] Cf. *SZ*, p. 136; *BT*, p. 175.
[36] Cf. *ibid.*
[37] Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 65.
[38] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 136-137; *BT*, pp. 176-177. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, pp. 43-44.

may be joy. In this mood, Dasein would see the very things — the journey by the train and its speed — as something welcoming.[39] Thus, the world outside, by bringing about various moods in Dasein and changing his attitudes towards existential situations, affects Dasein, and thereby makes him submissive. To quote Heidegger:

The fact that this sort of thing [entity present-at-hand] 'matters' to it [Dasein] is grounded in one's state-of-being; and as a state-of-being it [he] has already disclosed the world as something by which it [he] can be threatened for instance. Only something which is in the state-of-being of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that that what is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by attunement of a state-of-being.[40]

In "*Befindlichkeit*," therefore, the compelling force of the world is revealed. Things encounter Dasein and he is, in some way, at the mercy of things, as he is constantly exposed to the world. Speaking of this characteristic of the state-of-being, Heidegger writes: "Existentially a state-of-being implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us."[41] In state-of-being, Dasein is disclosed as a thrown existence, which is involved with entities in the world, and thereby, in some way affected by them. As an essential mode of Dasein's disclosedness, the state-of-being, by pointing to Dasein's thrownness and facticity, represents more of Dasein's passive mode of disclosednesss. Now, we turn our attention to the second mode o Dasein's disclosedness, viz., understanding.

2.1.1.2.2. Understanding

Traditionally 'understanding' (*Verstehen*) had a reference to the intellectual grasp of things. But, for Heidegger it is a mode in which Dasein can overtake his thrown existence of the state-of-being. '*Verstehen*' implies the ability to stand Dasein's thrownness, in the sense that it can be actively developed. Understanding is not a property of Dasein, but is rooted in Dasein's 'ability to be' (s*einskoennen*); it is a basic mode of Dasein's being. "Dasein is in every case what it can be and in the way in which it is its possibility."[42]

Though Dasein is primarily 'being-possible' (*Moeglichsein*), there is a difference in the way Dasein has possibilities and the way in which a present-at-hand entity 'has' possibilities. The possibility of an entity is discovered in terms of 'what-it-is,' viz., its usability (*Dienlichkeit*) or serviceability (*Verwendbark*). But, Dasein constantly goes beyond 'what-he-is' towards 'what-he-is-not-yet.' Dasein's 'being-in,' by way of understanding, involves that it is always directed towards some 'for-the-sake-of-which' (*Worumwillen*). Since understanding is not merely a theoretical grasp of Dasein's possibilities but a capacity to achieve these possibilities, it positively effects by manipulating the resource. For example, understanding a hammer's involvement consists not merely in knowing that a hammer is for driving nails, but in knowing how to carry this out.[43] "Understanding is the existent being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-being; and it is so

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[39] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 137-138; *BT*, p. 176-177. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 32-33.
[40] *SZ*, p. 137; *BT*, p. 176.
[41] *SZ*, pp. 137-138; *BT*, p. 177. Cf. also EB, pp. 34-35.
[42] *SZ*, p. 143; *BT*, p. 183.
[43] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 144-146; *BT*, pp. 182-186. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 26-27.

in such a way that this being discloses in itself (himself) what its (his) being is capable of."[44] This essential tendency of understanding to press forward into Dasein's possibilities Heidegger refers to as projection (*Entwurf*). The term "*entwerfen*" literally means 'to throw something off.' In ordinary usage it means to sketch, to draft or to design a project. Thus, for Heidegger the project of Dasein involves understanding himself — as the thrown projection — and the entities in terms of his possibilities and to actualize these possibilities, even though he does not have a full thematic grasp of this projection.[45] "As projecting, understanding is the kind of being of Dasein in which it [he] is its [his] possibilities as possibilities."[46]

As understanding, Dasein is a being-towards-possibilities. The projecting of understanding has the possibility of developing itself (*sich auszubilden*). The development of understanding, Heidegger calls, interpretation.[47] In interpretation, understanding does not become anything different, but, as Heidegger says, it becomes itself. In fact, interpretation is grounded in understanding and not vice versa. Nor does interpretation bring any new information about what is understood, but rather it consists in working out the possibilities which are already projected in understanding. Thus, "in it [interpretation] the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it."[48] For example, we interpret a hammer, as a hammer, having some assignment in an equipmental system.

There are two moments involved in the act of interpretation, viz., the 'as structure' (*als-Struktur*) and the 'fore-structure' (*vor-Struktur*). In his interpretative circumspection, Dasein understands an entity in its 'in-order-to,' i.e., that an entity is for such and such purpose. When Dasein understands what something is for (*Wozu*), it is understood as Dasein is to take the thing in question. Whenever Dasein sees something, he sees it as something. For example, he sees a table as a table, a chair as a chair, a door as a door, and a bridge as a bridge. The 'as' that makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood, Heidegger calls 'as-structure.' The pre-predicative explication of what is understood by means of the 'as' lies before (*liegt vor*) Dasein making any thematic assertion about it. Again, in the understanding of something as something, Dasein does not throw any signification over something that is present-at-hand or add a value on it, but rather Dasein lays bare only what he has encountered in his involvement with that entity. In other words, in interpretation Dasein makes clear what is already there in entities, as entities.[49] In interpretation the 'as-structure' is made explicit.

The exposition of the 'as-structure,' i.e., interpretation, is grounded in the 'fore-structure,' which consists of a 'fore-having' (*Vorhabe*), 'fore-sight' *(Vorsicht*), and 'fore-conception' (*Vorgriff*). Firstly, in every case interpretation is based on something we have in advance, i.e. a fore-having. It consists in Dasein's comprehension of his world, in its totality, purpose and involvements. In other words, what Dasein has, in advance, is the total range of ways in which Dasein relates to an entity, which is interpreted in terms of its 'in-order-to' or 'what-it-is-for.'

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[44] *SZ*, p. 144; *BT*, p. 184.

[45] Cf. *SZ*, p. 145; *BT*, pp. 184-185. Cf. also Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 28.

[46] *SZ*, p. 145; *BT*, p. 185.

[47] Heidegger uses two German terms for the English term "interpretation," viz., "*Interpretation"* and "*Auslesung*." The latter term is used in the broader sense of referring to Dasein's activity that lays bare (*aus-legen*) something as something. The former term is used to apply to interpretations, which are more theoretical and systematic, as in the exegesis of a text. Cf. *SZ*, p. 1; *BT*, p. 19, fn. 3.

[48] *SZ*, p. 148; *BT*, pp. 188-189.

[49] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 148-150; *BT*, pp. 189-191. Cf. also Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970.), p. 94.

Secondly, interpretation is characterized by a fore-sight, which is an interpretative assimilation that takes place under the guidance of some consideration in respect to which something is understood or explicated. Fore-sight, therefore, brings limits on fore-having, by seeing something from a certain point of view. Thirdly, there is the fore-conception, in which, the interpretation occurs in terms of a conceptual scheme, and thereby an entity is interpreted as itself. Thus, in every interpretation there is present a fore-structure and an as-structure. The clarification of the as-structure by the fore-structure is what we call interpretation. In other words, whenever something is interpreted as something it is based on a fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception.[50]

The entity that is interpreted is expressed in an assertion (*Aussage*). Heidegger considers assertion as a derivative form of interpretation, which in the final analysis is grounded in understanding.[51] In clarifying the full structure of assertion Heidegger attributes three significations to assertion. Firstly, the preliminary signification of assertion is "pointing out" (*Aufzeigen*), in the sense of 'holding up for view,' 'drawing attention to' or 'exhibiting.' In this sense Heidegger is referring to the original meaning of the Greek term "*logos*" as "*appophanasis*," viz., letting an entity be seen from itself.[52] In the assertion 'the hammer is too heavy,' what is discovered is not the meaning, but rather an entity ready-to-hand (*Zuhanden*).[53] Thus, assertion 'points out to' and 'represents' the reality of the entity. Secondly, assertion means a predication, in which a subject is given a specific character, by attributing it a predicate, thereby determining the subject by the predicate. What has been exhibited in the first sense has been narrowed down, by giving an added determination through the predicate. In the assertion 'the hammer on the table is heavy,' we have narrowed down the denotation of the statement by a new predicate 'on the table.' The second sense still has the idea of 'pointing out.'[54] Thirdly, assertion means communication (*Mitteilung*) or speaking forth (*Heraussage*). Assertion is communication in the sense that it lets other Daseins also see what is exhibited as, thus, determined. What is, thus, shared through communication is a common mode of concernful dealing with an entity. The communication is aimed at inducing the other to adopt the same concernful relationship towards that entity.[55] Bringing together these three significations of assertion, we can define assertion as "a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates."[56]

2.1.1.2.3. Discourse

Besides '*Befindlichkeit*' and '*Verstehen*,' discourse (*Rede*) is the third fundamental existential of Dasein's 'being-in. For Heidegger, "discourse is the articulation of intelligibility."[57] Discourse is that which underlies both interpretation and assertion, as these both presuppose understanding and articulation in discourse. Thus, intelligibility of being-in-the-world "…expresses itself as

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[50] Cf. *SZ*, p. 150; *BT*, p. 191. Since something as something is based on the fore-structure, for Heidegger there is no interpretation without presupposition. An interpretation based on a presupposition, does not amount to a circular argument. Therefore, one must not try to get out of the circle, as only by entering the circle in the right way can one interpret an entity. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 150, 152-153; *BT*, pp. 191-192, 193-195.

[51] Cf. *SZ*, p. 154; *BT*, p. 195.

[52] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 32-34; *BT*, pp. 55-58.

[53] Cf. *SZ*, p. 154; *BT*, p. 195. Cf. also *BBP*, p. 209.

[54] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 154-155; *BT*, pp. 196-197.

[55] Cf. *SZ*, p. 155; *BT*, pp. 197-198. Cf. also *BPP*, 210.

[56] *SZ*, p. 156; *BT*, p. 199.

[57] *SZ*, p. 161; *BT*, pp. 203-204.

discourse."[58] Heidegger distinguishes between discourse (*Rede*) and language (*Sprache*). Language is the spoken form of discourse. "The way in which discourse gets expressed is language."[59] Language is totality of words in which discourse has a "worldly" being of its own. The discourse is an existential of Dasein, while language is a fact, an entity present-at-hand within-the-world and a ready-to-hand, with the help of which discourse can be expressed. Language can be broken up in words, but discourse is that which gives meaning. Discourse, thus, as meaningful articulation of the attuned understanding is part of the existential constitution of the openness (being-in) of Dasein.[60]

There are basically four structural components of a discourse. They are: What is spoken of (*das Worueber der Rede*); What is spoken as such (*das Geredete als solches*); Communication (*Mitilung*); and Expression (*Ausprechung*). Firstly, what is spoken of in all forms of discourse — whether it be accepting or refusing, demanding or warning, pronouncing, consulting or interceding — are always about something. "Talking is talk about something."[61] Thus, discourse shows, in its own structure, the basic pattern of Dasein's mode of being, i.e., the disclosedness of being-in-the-world.[62] Secondly, what is spoken about (*das Beredete*) in discourse — whether it be request, question or statement — is always a 'talk to' someone in a definite way. In other words, in discourse there is "something said-in-the-talk-as-such" (*ein Geredete als solches*) which is intended to reach someone outside of Dasein. "In this 'something said' discourse communicates."[63] Thirdly, the discourse is communication (*Mitteilung*), but not in the sense of giving some information and experiences, such as, opinions and wishes from within one Dasein to another. The communication Heidegger speaks of is taken in the wider existential sense in which Dasein-with is essentially manifested in a co-state-of-being (*Mitbefindlichkeit*) and a co-understanding (*Mitverstehen*). In discourse, being-with becomes explicitly shared in the sense of taking hold of and appropriated.[64] Fourthly, through discourse Dasein expresses himself. Whenever Dasein communicates something in what is 'said-to-talk,' he expresses himself (*spricht sich …aus*) in discourse. In this expression Dasein does not give something from within himself, because, as being-in-the-world, he is already "out side" when he understands and expresses. What is expressed, in discourse is precisely this "being-outside," i.e., Dasein's state-of-being. Dasein's being-in, in its state-of-being, is made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the "tempo" of the talk and the way of speaking.[65] These components of discourse are not to be considered as empirically determined properties of a language. But they are existential characteristics rooted in the ontological structure of Dasein, which makes language ontologically possible.[66]

Discourse, as an existential state of Dasein, discloses and constitutes Dasein in his possibilities. 'Hearing' (*Hoeren*) and 'keeping silent' (*Schweigen*) are two modes that belong to discourse. Besides, these two show how discourse and understanding are interconnected. We shall look briefly into the two modes of discourse. When we do not hear something aright, we say we

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[58] *SZ*, p. 161; *BT*, p. 204.

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] Cf. *ibid.*

[61] *Ibid.*

[62] Cf. *ibid.*

[63] *SZ*, p. 162; *BT*, p. 205.

[64] Cf. *ibid.*

[65] Cf. *ibid.*

[66] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 162-163; *BT*, p. 206.

have not understood what is said by the other. It is not by some accidence that we say this, because Dasein hears only because he understands. Besides, 'giving ear to' is an existential openness of Dasein for others and for his own potentiality-for-being. The ability to hear, which basically comes from understanding in the primordial sense of 'being-open,' is the basis of what Heidegger calls 'hearkening' (*Hoerchen*). It is a type of listening, which is prior to sensing tones and sounds. Dasein, as dwelling along side the entities within-the-world, 'just hears something all around' (*das nur-herum-hoeren*), like sounds of motorcycles, moving cars and talking of people. This type of hearing is a privation. But hearkening consists in the existential possibility that talking and hearing be understood. Understanding arises neither in too much talk (*vieles reden*), nor busily 'hearing all around.' Only he who understands can hearken or listen (*zuhoeren*).[67]

Another important mode of discourse is keeping silent, which also has its basis in understanding. In conversation, he who keeps silence can contribute more by developing a more authentic understanding. But, the one who talks too much can do a lot of damage in the sense that he reduces comprehension to triviality by his incessant talk. But, to be silent does not mean that one should be dumb. A dumb person, being not able to speak, will all the more like to speak. One who is accustomed to keeping silence all the time is not able to keep genuine silence, at a given moment, as he would never be speaking anyway. One can keep silence authentically only in genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silence, Dasein must have something to speak, i.e., he must have understanding.[68]

Now that we have considered the modes of Dasein's 'being-in' viz., state-of-being, understanding and discourse, we could analyze Dasein's knowing the world (theoretical knowledge), as a mode of Dasein's 'being-in' that is founded in Dasein's being-in-the-world.

2.1.1.3. Knowing the World: A Founded Mode of Dasein's 'Being-in'

Traditional epistemology considered Dasein's knowing the world with reference to subject-object relationship: Dasein is the subject and the world is his object. Such a conception presumes Dasein as an entity present-at-hand and the knowledge he has by the subject-object relationship to be, as it were, a quality of the subject. But Heidegger considers Dasein's basic constitution as being-in-the-world. 'Being-in,' as we have seen, is an existential of Dasein, in the sense that Dasein is familiar with his world. His involvement and familiarity with the world is one of concern and care-taking. Thus, every dealing of Dasein relating to the world is founded on this care-taking involvement of Dasein. Therefore, knowing, which is a primordial involvement of Dasein with the world, must fundamentally be a care-taking. Heidegger says: "Knowing is a kind of being which belongs to being-in-the-world."[69] Therefore, the interpretation of knowledge as a relation between subject and object lacks the truth. "Subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and the world."[70]

From what we have said it is clear that Dasein's knowing the world is grounded in Dasein's 'being-already-alongside-the-world.' It involves not a mere fixed staring at something that is present-at-hand, but it is being fascinated by the world with which Dasein is involved. Though fascinated by the present-at-hand entity and being alongside this entity, Dasein abstains from manipulations with it, thereby standing face to face with it as a spectator. Looking at an entity in

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[67] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 163-164; *BT*, pp. 205-208.
[68] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 164-165; *BT*, p. 208.
[69] *SZ*, p. 61; *BT*, p. 88.
[70] *SZ*, p. 60; *BT*, p. 87.

this mode is characteristic of cognitive care-taking of Dasein's knowing the world, i.e., Dasein's knowing the world by means of his looks which are more or less determined by his viewpoints. Such a looking-at amounts to a mode of dwelling alongside the entities within the world. In such a dwelling, where Dasein holds himself back form all manipulation and utilizations,[71] the perception of the present-at-hand (the world) is completed. The perception is reached when Dasein addresses himself to something as something and discusses it as such. In other words, perception becomes an act of making something determinate when the something is interpreted as something. What is perceived, thus, and made determinate by interpretation can be expressed in a proposition. According to Heidegger, the perceptive retention of an assertion about something is not a mere representation of the knowledge that is appropriated by Dasein, but is itself a way of being-in-the-world.[72]

When Dasein directs his looks towards something and understands it as something, he does not come out of an "inner sphere" in which he was initially, but rather he is always "outside" alongside entities, thus belonging to a world which is already discovered by him. Again, in such an act of knowing, Dasein does not get out of an "inner sphere" when it dwells alongside the entity to know and determine its character, but it is still "inside," in the sense that he is himself "inside" as a being-in-the-world which knows. To quote Heidegger: "…the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining and preserving Dasein which knows remains outside, and it [he] does so as Dasein,"[73] i.e., as a being-that-is-already-alongside-entities. Heidegger, thus, considers all forms of knowing, whether it be perception, in which knowledge is attained, forgetting, error or delusion, in which knowledge is seemingly obliterated, as modification of Dasein's primordial being-in as a being-in-the-world.[74]

On account of Dasein's knowing the world, which is founded on his care-taking involvement with entities, he achieves a new status of being towards (*Seinstand*) the world, which Dasein discloses in himself. This involvement of Dasein with the world, viz., his 'being-in,' is not arrived at in the phenomenon of knowing, nor does it arise from the way in which the world acts upon Dasein. Rather only because Dasein is 'being-in,' does he have the capacity for this specific mode of coition, i.e., knowing the world. Thus, "knowing (the world) is a mode of Dasein founded upon (its) [his] being-in-the-world."[75]

Having analyzed the nature of Dasein in his 'being-in' as state-of-being, understanding and discourse, and having indicated knowing the world as the founded mode of Dasein's 'being-in,' we now proceed to look into the characteristics of Dasein.

2.1.2. Characteristics of Dasein

Dasein's nature cannot be expressed as to his whatness (*Was-sein*), but has to be understood in his own way of being (*Zu-sein*). In other words, the essence of Dasein cannot be described by

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[71] Here, Heidegger is indicating the traditional distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. Knowing the world is a theoretical knowledge founded on Dasein's concernful being-alongside entities. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 61-62; *BT*, pp. 88-89.

[72] Cf. *ibid.* Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, p. 33.

[73] Cf. *SZ*, p. 62; *BT*, p. 89.

[74] *SZ*, p. 62; *BT*, p. 90.

[75] *Ibid.* Cf. also Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study* (London: Routledge and Kegen Paul, 1977), p. 37.

enumerating his qualities and attributes, but only by analyzing how he is in relation to himself and to his world.[76] Dasein is a unique being, different from mere present-at-hand entities. Dasein is an 'existent being,' while the present-at-hand entities simply 'are.' While Dasein is the questioner of the being of entities, the entities are things that are questioned.[77] Heidegger, thus, characterizes Dasein as existence, mineness and authenticity or inauthenticity.

2.1.2.1. Existence

According to Heidegger, "the essence of Dasein lies in its [his] existence."[78] Heidegger's use of the term 'existence' must be distinguished from the traditional term 'existential,' which refers to the entities present-at-hand.[79] The German term '*Existenz*' etymologically means 'to stand out from.' Dasein 'ex-sists,'[80] i.e., stands out from all other things in the world, in the sense that, unlike all other things Dasein is open to himself and to his world. Besides, he also takes responsibility for himself and to the world and, to some extent, he can shape his destiny and that of his world.[81] In this sense, Dasein, as existence, is ec-static, which literally means: standing beyond the static entities of this world. For Heidegger, all other beings are, but they do not exist. He highlights this point as follows: "Man [Dasein] alone exists. The rock is, but it does not exist. The tree is, but it does not exist. The horse is, but it does not exist. The angel is, but it does not exist. God is, but he does not exist."[82] In this statement, Heidegger does not deny the reality of entities like rock or tree, but only points to the unique type of being which Dasein, as existence, is. Dasein, as existence, "is set apart in the realms of beings as the only existing being which can undertake an inquiry into Being in terms of his peculiar existence."[83]

This ecstatic nature of Dasein as existence, i.e., standing beyond things that are static and understanding their being, brings to light another significant aspect of human existence. Since Dasein is not a mere thing, but is "to be" (*zu-sein*) or existence, he is not something static, but a reality that is to be achieved. To exist is to-be-on-the-way (*unterwegssein*). It would imply, that Dasein is always stretched forward towards his still-to-be-realized being. Thus, human existence is never complete in his being, and we can never aim at possessing an exhaustive understanding

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[76] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 12, 42; *BT*, pp. 32-33, 67. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, pp. 26-27. Cf. also John McGinly, "Heidegger's Concern for the Lived-world in his Dasein Analysis," *Philosophy Today*, 16 (1972), 104-105.

[77] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 302, 436-437; *BT*, pp. 350. 387. Cf. also Harold Alderman, "Heidegger on Being Human," *Philosophy Today*, 15 (1971), 19.

[78] *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 67. Cf. also *SZ*, pp. 12-13; *BT*, pp. 32-33.

[79] Heidegger uses the term 'existence' exclusively to Dasein. While Dasein exists, the other entities are. Cf. *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 67. Since the nature of Dasein is characterized by existence, Heidegger calls Dasein's existence-structure 'existential' and distinguishes it from categories, which are characteristic of beings other than Dasein. 'Existential' refers to the 'who' (Dasein), while 'categories' refers to the 'what' (the present-at-hand entities in the broadest sense). Cf. *SZ*, pp. 44-45; *BT*, pp. 70-71. Cf. also Werner Marx, *Heidegger and Tradition*, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Green (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 87-88.

[80] Heidegger often uses hyphenated words for the sake of emphasis. Here, the word 'ex-ists' (*ek-sistiert*) points to Dasein's peculiar character of standing out among other entities. Cf. William J. Richardson, p. 39, fn. 31.

[81] Cf. John Macquarrie, *Martin Heidegger* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968), p. 12.

[82] *WM*, p. 16.

[83] Harold Alderman, p. 20.

of his nature at a given moment, as always there is something outstanding. Dasein is an existence, which is "already-begun-still-to-be-achieved."[84]

In this regard other things present-at-hand are different from Dasein. They possess a static quality about them. They have their fixed and given essences. Their properties and qualities can be listed. For example, a table or a piece of stone can be described in terms of their color, hardness, length and weight. Besides, for them, their own being is never an issue. They do not transcend their realm. But Dasein is not stable, but dynamic. Human existence cannot be understood in terms of properties, but only in terms of his possibilities. Dasein does not have a fixed essence as things have. The essence of Dasein, if we can speak of one, has to be related to the fulfilling of his possibilities in the context of his concrete existence. Heidegger says: "…those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity [Dasein] are not properties present-at-hand of some entity…. [But] are in each case possible ways for it [him] to be and no more than that."[85] Thus, "in each case Dasein is its [his] possibility and it [he] 'has' this possibility but not just as a property …, as something present-at-hand would."[86] As existence, Dasein is a being which stands out above other entities present-at-hand and moves towards actualization, its possibilities, thereby ever remaining 'on the way' (*unterwegs*).

2.1.2.2. Mineness

Dasein is existence and he is his own possibilities, which are yet to be realized. So, Dasein does not have any fixed essence. Therefore, there is a uniqueness about the individuality of Dasein. Dasein is always someone's own existence. Human existence cannot be grasped as an instance or special case of some genus of the things present-at-hand.[87] To these present-at-hand entities, their own being is never an issue. But Dasein is "that entity which in its [his] being has this very being as an issue…."[88] Therefore, unlike other entities, human existence cannot be a matter of indifference and he can never be substituted for another.[89] Dasein "…is in each case mine."[90] Since human existence by his very nature is one's own and cannot be treated as a specimen of a class, "one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it [him]."[91] Therefore, Heidegger concludes that the essence of Dasein lies in the fact "that in each case it [he] has its [his] being to be and has it as its [his] own."[92]

2.1.2.3. Authenticity or Inauthenticity

Since Dasein is existence, i.e., he is not a finished product, but an on-going possibility and one which is one's own (*Jemeinigkeit*), he has constantly to choose from the possible ways for him to be. That is why Heidegger says: "In each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another.

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[84] William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 39. Cf. also James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, pp. 19-20.

[85] *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p.67. Cf. also John Maquarrie, *Martin* Heidegger, pp. 12-13.

[86] *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 67.

[87] Cf. *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, pp. 67-68.

[88] *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 68.

[89] Cf. *ibid.*

[90] *Ibid.*

[91] *Ibid.*

[92] *SZ*, p. 12; *BT*, pp. 32-33.

Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it [he] is in each case mine."[93] Dasein, thus, has the ability to choose the particular way of his being-in-the-world. "And because Dasein is in each case essentially its [his] own possibility, it [he] can, in its [his] very being 'choose' itself [himself] or win itself [himself]; it [he] can lose itself [himself] and never win itself [himself] or only 'seem' to do so."[94] This would mean that Dasein is a possibility which can realize or neglect, develop or reject, build up or forget his own being. Human existence is what he makes of himself, and his own being becomes for himself his own constant problem. In other words, Dasein can either stand out as the distinctive type of being that he is. Or he can be involved in a routine manner of living in which his possibilities are not determined by himself, but are taken over and dictated to him by the pressures of circumstances and society, and thereby live a mediocre existence.[95]

Thus, we can speak of two fundamental ways in which Dasein can exist, viz., an authentic and an inauthentic human existence. Human existence is authentic (*eigentlich*) when he 'owns' his own possibilities of being or chooses himself as his ownmost possibility. It is inauthentic (*uneigentlich*) when he is blind to his own possibilities either by ignoring or giving them up.[96] Dasein often finds himself in the inauthentic state; but authenticity is not something which can be gained once for all, but must be decided as new situations come along. Besides, inauthenticity is not a less or lower degree of being or a mere an aspect of authenticity. But, as modes of Dasein, authenticity and inauthenticity are based on Dasein's character of 'my-ownness.' Dasein is an issue for himself not only in the state of authenticity, but also in the state of inauthenticity, even though the latter is a mode of fleeing.[97]

2.1.3. Priority of Dasein

Our consideration of the characteristics of Dasein, viz., Dasein as existence, which is characterized by his own possibilities, which can be realized or neglected depending on his authentic or inauthentic choice respectively, clearly points to the fact of the priority of Dasein over other entities. Dasein is a special being, which is capable of encountering beings and laying-bare their being, meaning and truth. In this section, in considering the priority of Dasein, we will attempt to uncover the relationship of Dasein to Being (*das Sein*), meaning and truth.

2.1.3.1. Dasein: The Comprehender of Being

Speaking of Dasein and his relationship to being, Heidegger remarks the following:

Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it [he] is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its [his] very being, that Being is an issue for it [him]. But in that

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[93] *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 68.

[94] *Ibid.*

[95] Heidegger calls this factor that leads to an average and mediocre existence '*das Man*,' which is translated into English as the 'they' or the 'them-selves.' Cf. *SZ*, pp. 126-127; *BT*, 164-165. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, pp. 30-31.

[96] Cf. *SZ*, p. 43; *BT*, p. 68. Cf. also John Macquarrie, *Martin Heidegger*, p. 14.

[97] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 43, 44; *BT*, pp. 68, 69. Cf. also *BPP*, pp. 170-173. Here, Heidegger speaks of mineness as the basis of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding, in relation to 'for-the-sake-of-whom.' Cf. also *SZ*, p. 53; *BT*, p. 78.

case, that is the constitutive state of Dasein's being, and this implies that Dasein in its [his] being, has a relationship towards Being — a relationship which itself is one of Being.[98]

Thus, Heidegger claims that Dasein, even before he poses the question of Being, has some comprehension of Being. In Dasein's relationship with other beings, they are open to him, and he is able to know not only what they are, but also how they are. In other words, Dasein is able to comprehend what makes them what they are, viz., their being. When Dasein expresses his moods in exclamations (e.g. Snake!) the 'is' is already presupposed. Besides his own moods express his own being, i.e., it is in such and such a way.[99] Dasein's comprehension of Being is not a clear concept. It is obscure, pre-conceptual and for the most part undetermined and vague. Dasein's primordial comprehension of Being is not only pre-conceptual, but also unquestioning in the sense that it calls no attention to itself and raises no questions. Speaking of this Dasein's basic understanding of Being, Heidegger states: "…this vague average understanding of Being is still a fact."[100]

Though Dasein's understanding of Being is preconceptual and vague, it renders the Being question possible. If Dasein does not have this fundamental comprehension of Being, he will never be able to raise the question of Being at all. This comprehension of Being is not something accidental to Dasein. The very name Heidegger ascribes to human existence, viz., Dasein (the '*Da*' of '*Sein*') points to the fact of how the comprehension of Being is fundamentally rooted in Dasein's Being. In other words, this primordial comprehension of Being constitutes Dasein's ontological structure. That is why Heidegger remarks: "Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being."[101] This quality of Dasein's comprehension of Being is that which makes Dasein ontically distinct from all other entities, even though Dasein, like any other entity, is an entity in the world. "Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it [he] is ontological."[102] Our earlier characterization of Dasein as existence is founded on his understanding of Being. "It is only on the basis of Comprehension of Being that existence is possible."[103]

Heidegger thus speaks of a threefold priority of Dasein due to his relation to Being. Firstly, Dasein has an ontic priority, in that he is existence, i.e., he is ecstatic, stands out from (*ek-sistiert*) and transcends other beings, besides his openness to Being. Secondly, Dasein has an ontological priority because he is able to understand Being (*Sein-Verstand*). Thirdly, Dasein has a priority which Heidegger calls an ontico-ontological priority, in that by his understanding of Being, he understands his own being, that of other Daseins and that of entities. In such understanding Dasein provides the ontico-ontological conditions for the possibility of any other ontologies.[104] Thus, Dasein is the worldly human being, which provides in himself an opening for Being to be revealed. Human existence is the questioner of Being and, in posing the question about Being, he creates an

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[98] *SZ*, p. 12; *BT*, p. 32.

[99] Cf. *SZ*, p. 141; *BT*, pp. 180-181.

[100] *SZ*, p. 5; *BT*, p. 27. Cf. also William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 33-34.

[101] *SZ*, p. 12; *BT*, p. 32.

[102] *Ibid.*

[103] Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Bonn: Verlag Fred. Cohen, 1929), p. 205 (Hereafter: *KM*).

[104] For Heidegger, Dasein is the only being among all entities who can provide access to the question of Being. Only in the context of the fundamental ontology of Dasein's existential analysis can we speak of any other ontology. Cf. *SZ*, p. 13; *BT*, p. 34.

opening that transcendentally grounds all other realms of inquiry.[105] Since the meaning of entities and their truth are grasped in their relation to Dasein, we shall now consider Dasein's relation to meaning and truth.

2.1.3.2. Dasein: The Meaning-Giver

Generally speaking the meaning of something is that which makes it intelligible or understandable. In other words, anything that is intelligible is said to have meaning, even though it is not expressed explicitly or thematically. "Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility …of something maintains itself."[106] A being is intelligible, i.e., it has meaning, only when it is revealed in its enabling ground, viz., Being. In this sense meaning really refers to Being of beings. When one comprehends the Being of beings, then the entities become meaningful. That is why Heidegger writes: "Strictly speaking, 'meaning' signifies the 'upon-which' of the primary projection of the understanding of Being."[107]

Since the meaning of a being is related to the understanding of its being, and the understanding the Being of beings is something that belongs to the structure of Dasein, we can say that the meaning of beings is something essentially related to Dasein. The meaning of the phenomena and that of the propositions, in the final analysis, depends on Dasein. Human Dasein, thus, is the meaning-giver of his own existence and that of the things present-at-hand. In the strict sense, we cannot speak of non-human entities having meaning, as their meaning ultimately depends on the meaning-giver, i.e., the human existence. For example, the meaning of a tree as a meaningful object of aesthetic beauty or that of a thing ready-to-hand is discovered, not by the tree itself, but by Dasein; or a building is not a home unless Dasein gives it that meaning by dwelling in it or caring for it. Thus, the meaning of beings is fundamentally based on the concernful dealings of Dasein towards these entities. To quote Heidegger:

Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities lying 'behind' them or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain.' Dasein only 'has' meaning so far as the disclosednesss of 'being-in-the-world' can be 'filled-in' by entities discoverable in that disclosedness. Hence only Dasein can be meaningful …or meaningless…. That is to say, its [his] own being can be appropriated in understanding or can remain neglected to non-understanding.[108]

2.1.3.3. Dasein: The Discloser of Truth

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[105] Cf. Harold Alderman, p. 19.

[106] *SZ*, p. 151; *BT*, p. 193.

[107] *SZ*, p. 324; *BT*, p. 371.

[108] *SZ*, p. 151; *BT*, p. 193. The above quote from Heidegger might convey the impression that he, like the idealists, makes meaning the property of Dasein at the cost of the reality of things present-at-hand. But, if we understand what Heidegger says here in the context of his philosophy of Dasein's being-in-the-world, we could say that he stresses only the primary role Dasein plays in the act of giving meaning and the secondary meaningfulness of entities. Cf. George J. Stack, "Heidegger's Concept of Meaning," *Philosophy Today*, 17 (1973), 260. Cf. also Edward G. Ballard, "Heidegger's View and Evaluation of Nature and Natural Science," *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*, ed. John Salis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970), p. 52.

Heidegger, in putting forth his theory of truth, begins with the traditional understanding of truth. Traditional thinkers gave a logical interpretation of truth saying that the essence of truth lies in the correspondence (*adequatio*) between the intellect and the object. The 'place' of the logical truth, thus arrived at, is assertion or judgment.[109] Heidegger, while not denying the validity of this interpretation of truth, considers it as inadequate, as it does not enter into the deeper existential level. In all such agreements the relation is between two entities, as subject and as object. This relation is of such a nature, that the judgment, 'so' expresses that which is judged 'as' it in itself is. Thus, the 'so …as' (*sowie*) constitutes the nature of the agreement. Heidegger raises the question of the basis of the 'so …as' agreement. According to him, the agreement is based on what he calls 'confirmation.' "Confirmation signifies the entity's showing itself in its self-sameness. The confirmation is accomplished on the basis of the entity's showing itself."[110] The assertion 'someone is coming in' is true not because there is an agreement between my intellect and the coming in, but because it can be confirmed by looking towards the entrance of the house and by checking it for myself. In other words, the logical agreement 'so …as' is based on a deeper experience of the one coming in and confirming in existentially.[111] Therefore, the truth is not founded in the agreement between the knower and the known object, but rather it consists in uncovering or discovering (*Entdeckend-sein*) the what of the entity's showing itself by confirmation. We can speak of a statement being true only when we discover the essent in itself and give utterance to it by letting-itself-be-seen. Thus, "being-true ('truth') — means Being uncovering."[112]

From what we have said, it is clear that truth in its most primary form is Being-discovering, whether it be in entities or in Dasein. This mode of uncovering of Being is a mode, which is disclosure or unconcealment (*aletheia*). Since Dasein is that being which is disclosure par excellence, he is the basic truth on whom all other truths are rooted. The truth of any being is discovered so long as Dasein is. The truth of things present-at-hand is secondary to that of Dasein's way of being. Dasein's truth consists in Being-discovering, while the truth of things depends on being discovered in their discoveredness. Even a scientific principle such as, Newton's law, the principle of contradiction and all such truths are true only so long as Dasein is. Until Newton discovered the law, it was hidden and concealed. It became a law only when it was discovered and exhibited by Newton. Since all truths are rooted in Dasein, we cannot speak of eternal truths, unless Dasein is eternally existing.[113] On this point Heidegger remarks as follows:

Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in truth. Disclosedness is a kind of being which is essential to Dasein. 'There is' truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed.[114]

To say that all truth is relative to Dasein, however, does not mean that the truth is subjective in the sense of being left out in the hands of an arbitrary subject. Nor do we say that entities are in untruth. Heidegger stresses the primacy of Dasein in the disclosure of truth. The discovery of truth is made possible through Dasein's openness to Being in essents, and that the truth of the essents is

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[109] Cf. *SZ*, p. 214; *BT*, p. 257.
[110] *SZ*, p. 218; *BT*, p. 261.
[111] Cf. *SZ*, p. 214; *BT*, p. 257.
[112] *SZ*, p. 219; *BT*, p. 262.
[113] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 226-230; *BT*, pp. 269-273.
[114] *SZ*, p. 226; *BT*, p. 269.

disclosed to him independently of his subjective whims. This, also, gives truth an universal validity.[115] In other words, we could say that Dasein is, as it were, a screen on which the truth of essents can come alive. Dasein does not create truth, but only lays-bare and uncovers the truth that is in an essent. Only as related to Dasein can an essent have its truth.

From our consideration of Dasein's nature, characteristics and priority, we aimed at clarifying Dasein as care in the epistemological level, which itself is based on his 'being-in' as existence that marks his being qualitatively different from that of any other entities of the world. Having done that, we could analyze the 'in-the-world' aspect of Dasein as care, viz., his world of relationships.

2.2. Care in Dasein's Relational Level

By the very fact that Dasein is in-the-world, he is relational. In his everyday existence Dasein is involved actively with other entities towards which he has concernful involvement and other Daseins who are similar to him and towards whom he has the relationship of 'being-with' (*Mitsein*). Considering Dasein in his relational dimension, in this section, we would make an attempt to see Dasein as related to his environmental relationships, interpersonal relationships and the relationship with the world, which is the totality of Dasein's net-work of references regarding the environmental and interpersonal relationships.

2.2.1. Dasein's Environmental Relationships

When we consider Dasein as relational, the first notion we encounter is Dasein's being as part of the environment. It is indicated by the German term '*Umwelt*,'[116] i.e., the environmental world. It is that which is closest to Dasein in his encounter as a being-in-the-world.[117] The environmental world of Dasein's encounter is filled with entities other than Daseins. These entities 'belong to the world' with which Dasein has dealings (*Umgang*).[118] In order to understand Dasein's relation to these entities of the environmental world, we must clarify their nature and the nature of Dasein's dealings with them.

2.2.1.1. Entities as Present-at-hand and Ready-to-Hand

The entities of the environmental world are viewed by Dasein from two perspectives, viz., theoretical and practical. When Dasein adopts a view that is theoretical,[119] in the sense of observing (*Hinschauen*), the entity appears to Dasein as something present-at-hand (*das Vorhandene*). This present-at-handness (*Vorhandenheit*) is the state of something being 'on hand.' Looking at an entity from this perspective conveys a sense of objectification to the entity in question. Here the entity is seen apart from its sphere of daily involvement and, therefore, as something static which

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[115] Cf. *SZ*, p. 227; *BT*, pp. 269-270.

[116] The prefix of the term '*Umwelt*,' '*um*' has a spatial meaning and is translated into English with the term 'around.' Often '*Umwelt*' is translated as 'environment' or 'the world about.' The prefix '*um*' is used in the same sense in words such as, 'Umgang' (dealings), 'Um-zu' (in-order-to) and 'Umsicht' (circumspection). Cf. *SZ*, pp. 66-67; *BT*, p. 95.

[117] Cf. *ibid.*

[118] Cf. *ibid.*

[119] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 59-62; *BT*, p. 97.

occupies a place. In this way an entity is considered as a 'mere thing' out there.[120] If Dasein views an entity from the practical point-of-view, i.e., in Dasein's concernful dealings with that entity, then the entity presents itself to the Dasein as an 'equipment' or a 'tool' (*Zeug*) that can be put to use for a particular purpose. Thus, we can speak of an equipment for writing, working, transporting and measuring. This ability to be used for a purpose is characteristic of an equipment.[121] Because of this quality, Heidegger refers to an equipment as the 'ready-to-hand' (*das Zuhandene*). As ready-to-hand, the equipment is something handy, conveniently near and suited for use by Dasein. Just as a hand is so familiar with the glove which is in the hand, so also Dasein is familiar with entities within-the-world.[122]

From what we have said so far about entities, it is clear that Heidegger speaks of the same entity as something present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. This does not imply a division within the entity itself. But the difference comes about because of the way Dasein views the same entity. If Dasein views the entity in the theoretical perspective, he sees the entity as present-at-hand, out there. If he views the same entity from the practical point-of-view, i.e., in terms of his concernful dealings with the entity, he sees the entity as a tool, ready-to-hand. In the former case, the entity is seen in its static nature, while in the latter case, the entity is seen in its dynamic aspect of usability or serviceability.[123]

For Heidegger, Dasein's relationship with entities, is mainly one of proximity and involvement.[124] This over-all involvement of the care-taking of Dasein towards equipments and encountering them as ready-to-hand, Heidegger calls concern (*Besorgen*). In this state of concern the equipments and their being matter to Dasein. The concern of Dasein towards entities is characterized by an existential cognition which Heidegger calls circumspection (*Umsicht*). '*Umsicht*' means 'to look around' or 'to look about.' Circumspection is not characterized by a detached looking at entities, but involves the actual use of the equipment. In circumspection Dasein 'looks about' to see if the tools are in order for a particular purpose, or if the tool selected is best for the job. For example, circumspection is concerned about discovering whether a hammer is appropriate for the job of hammering. Thus, concern does not just dwell on the entity, like theoretical cognition, but instead passes through and goes beyond to the task to be accomplished. Besides, circumspection reveals not only the 'in-order-to' of a ready-to-hand, but also discovers the particular equipment in relation to the equipmental system of which it is a part.[125] Circumspective concern, thus, is that which reveals to Dasein the being of an equipment, viz., its equipmentality (*Zeughaftigkeit*).

Now that we have considered the difference between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand entities and the basic type of involvement of Dasein towards them, viz., circumspective concern, we turn our attention to the Being of these equipments, with which Dasein is concerned.

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[120] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 68, 69; *BT*, pp. 96, 98-99. Cf. also Werner Marx, p. 86.

[121] Cf. *SZ*, p. 68; *BT*, p. 97.

[122] Cf. Werner Marx, p. 89. Cf. also *SZ*, p. 69; *BT*, p. 98.

[123] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 61-62; *BT*, pp. 88-89. Cf. also Leon Rosentine, pp. 337-338. Cf. also Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 15, fn. 69.

[124] For Heidegger, the theoretical mode of knowing is one which lacks Dasein's practical circumspective concern, as it is a mere speculative observation. He does not deny its value, as it is a mode of knowing that is founded on Dasein's being-in-the-world. But, Heidegger holds the value of existence over knowledge; for him, 'to be' is more primordial than 'to know.' Cf. *SZ*, pp. 59-62; *BT*, p. 86-90.

[125] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 68-69; *BT*, pp. 97-98. Cf. also *BPP*, p. 163. Cf. also John Richardson, p. 18.

2.2.1.2. Entities in Their Equipmental Referential Totality

An equipment, as we mentioned, is basically an 'in-order-to' or "for-the-purpose-of" (*um-zu*) and its reality is always understood in relation to something else. For example, the pencil is for writing and the car is for driving. "In the 'in-order-to' as structure there lies an assignment or a reference of something to something."[126] Since in its very structure an equipment is related to another, we cannot speak of an implement having meaning in itself, but always in relation to an equipmental totality. The reference 'for' (food for eating and money for buying) is the basic feature of an equipment, in its relation both to another equipment and to an equipmental system to which it belongs. To quote Heidegger:

Taken strictly, there is no such thing as an equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipments, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to.' …A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to' such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability.[127]

Therefore, the equipmentality of the equipment consist in it always belonging to and accompanying other instruments; it resides in a purposeful referential totality of equipments. Only by being part of such a referential whole can the purpose of an equipment be achieved and actualized. For example, ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, door and room, never show themselves as they are for themselves. But, if understood as an equipment for residing taken in its totality, all these individual equipments do have a significance in relation to the unity of the pattern of these references.[128]

An equipment shows its equipmentality, not only in its dealings with the other tools alone, but also with the work (*Werk*), in the sense of that which is produced as a result of 'working at' something; for example, footwear. "The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered."[129] The work produced, i.e., footwear, is the 'towards-which' (the purpose) of the tools; besides it also has a reference to its own 'towards-which' in relation to its usability. Again, it has a reference to the material 'out of which' or 'whereof' (*woraus*) it is made, i.e., the leather. Finally the work produced has a reference to the 'for-the-sake-of-whom,' viz., the person, who would use it.[130] Thus, the equipmental dealings are conditioned by the various modes of reference and assignments of the 'in-order-to' relating to the work itself.[131]

The equipmental dealings, therefore, are not isolated involvements only among the tools, but also are related closely to other such complex patterns relating to the work done and 'for-the-sake-of-which' it is done. All these relational patterns relating to the equipments are interrelated, which results in an equipmental system or an equipmental referential totality. The complex equipmental involvements often remain unnoticed or are taken for granted by Dasein in his everyday existence. Dasein comes to grips with them and becomes aware of such relational complex only when the smooth functioning of these systems is disturbed. "The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather there when we concernfully submit ourselves to them…. But when an assignment

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[126] *SZ*, p. 68; *BT*, p. 97.
[127] *Ibid.*
[128] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 68-69; *BT*, pp. 97-98.
[129] *SZ*, p. 70; *BT*, pp. 99.
[130] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 70-71; *BT*, pp. 99-100.
[131] Cf. *SZ*, p. 69; *BT*, p. 98.

has been disturbed — when something is unusable for some purpose — then the assignment becomes explicit."[132]

Heidegger speaks of three ways, in which, the breakdown in the equipmental system can take place, and, in turn, can bring to Dasein's circumspection the complex equipmental references of which he tends to lose sight in his everyday existence. Firstly, the equipmental system is disclosed to Dasein in it totality when he is doing a work, especially when he encounters an equipment as damaged and unusable. In this state the implement falls out of its totality and becomes unusable to do the work for which it is intended. Heidegger calls this inability of the equipment to be an equipment, conspicuousness (*Auffaelligkeit*). Here we see an equipment, having lost its equipmentality, lying before us as a present-at-hand entity or as something 'un-ready-to-hand.' Secondly, the equipmental system discloses itself when Dasein discovers that a particular equipment, which is intended to be used for performing a task, is missing. The more urgently Dasein needs the equipment, to that extent it authentically encounters the un-readiness-to-hand of the missing equipment. This absence of the equipment to perform a task is called obtrusiveness (*Aufdringlichkeit*). Here an equipment presents itself as un-readiness-to-hand by its non-availability. Thirdly, an equipmental system is disclosed when an equipment, losing its readiness-to-hand, stands in the way of achieving an 'in-order-to' or purpose. This type of presence of an equipment, as blocking the achievement of the purpose is called obstinacy (*Aufaessigkeit*). Here the equipment is neither unusable, nor is it missing, but becomes un-readiness-to-hand by not letting the intended purpose be achieved.[133]

In each of these modes, viz., conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy, the equipment, as it were, loses its character of readiness-to-hand and brings to the fore the characteristic of the objective present-at-handness of an entity. In other words, in all these modes a particular equipment presents itself in an un-readiness-to-hand in a given equipmental-referential complex. In thus presenting itself, an equipment not only reveals itself to Dasein's circumspection as unusable, unavailable or missing and thereby standing in the way of a task being performed, but also reveals everything connected with this equipmental system, viz., the work and all that goes with it.[134] We could, for example, consider the carpenter at work at his workshop. His work goes on smoothly and, while involved in work, the whole working referential complex is, as it were, lost to him. Suddenly, he finds the hammer missing or the plane no longer works. This breakdown in the equipments, hammer or the plane, reveals to him not only that a particular equipment is out of order, but also the work situation in which this particular tool has failed. In this connection, Arland Ussher remarks: "The world as world is only revealed when things go wrong."[135] To quote Heidegger:

When something ready-to-hand is found missing, though its everyday presence …has been so obvious that we have never taken any notice of it, it makes a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness and now sees

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[132] *SZ*, p. 74; *BT*, p.105. Cf. also *BPP*, p. 309.

[133] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 73-74; *BT*, pp. 102-104.

[134] Cf. *SZ*, p. 74; *BT*, p. 104. The opposite of these three modes, which bring about a breakdown in the equipmental system, viz., 'inconspicuousness,' 'unobtrusiveness' and 'non-obstinacy,' do not, in any way, point to the objectivity of the equipments as the equipmental referential complex. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 75-76; *BT*, p. 106.

[135] Arland Ussher, *Journey through Dread* (New York: The Delvin Adair Company, 1955), p. 80.

for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with and what it was ready-to-hand for (the equipmental system). The environment announces itself afresh.[136]

Thus, in the context of the equipment, the totality of the equipmental referential complex is lit up, and the equipmentality of the equipment and the environmental world is revealed to the circumspecive concern of Dasein.

The entities are present in the environmental world as equipments ready-to-hand and things present-at-hand in the cognition of the equipmental referential system. The notion of the environment involves the idea of space. In the next section, we shall consider the entities as related to space, i.e., in their spatiality.

2.2.1.3. Entities in their Spatiality

Heidegger, like Descartes,[137] did not think of space as something that is empty and later filled up with things. For Heidegger, space is not something limited to entities in the world, but it is also related to Dasein. It is only in relation to Dasein's spatiality that the spatiality of the entities' ready-to-hand can be grasped. In his analysis of space, Heidegger looks into the spatiality of entities and that of Dasein.[138]

The spatiality of entities ready-to-hand is manifested in two ways. Firstly, in his everyday dealing with an equipment, Dasein finds the ready-to-hand equipment as being close to Dasein. The term Heidegger uses, namely, '*Naehe*' can be translated as 'closeness' or 'nearness.' It indicates the nearness of something close to us.[139] The term 'readiness-to-hand' indicates the characteristic of closeness. Every entity that is 'at-hand' or that can be handled, points to the varying closeness or distance from and to the one who handles that entity. But this 'closeness,' which is the fundamental characteristic of the entities ready-to-hand, is to be taken not in measurable distances, but in terms of Dasein's circumspective concern. In this sense we can speak of the spectacles that one wears on the nose as being further away than the picture out there on the wall; or the bus for which one is running is closer than the ground on which one runs.[140] The second characteristic that the ready-to-hand entities reveal is one of direction (*Richtung*). It also must be understood in relation to Dasein's circumspective concern.[141]

These two features, viz., closeness and direction, give an equipment a place (*Platz*) in the equipmental-referential totality. In other words, they constitute an equipment in a 'locality,' giving it a fixed *locus* and setting it in its proper place in the schema of equipmental referential totality. Thus, 'having-a-place' is different from 'being in a position (*Stelle*) in space,' which is a 'random occurring,' 'lying around' or 'being a present-at-hand entity somewhere.' Thus 'having-a-place' or 'locality' and belonging to an equipmental totality give an answer to the question about the 'whither' (*das Wohin*) of an equipment. The 'whither' is an ontological condition for the

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[136] *SZ*, p. 75; *BT*, p. 105.

[137] Descartes considered 'extension in space' as the basic character of entities in the world; they differ essentially from the 'thinking I,' whose basic quality is thinking. Thus, he made a fundamental distinction between '*ego cogitans*' and '*res extensa.*' Cf. *SZ*, pp. 89-101; *BT*, pp. 122-134.

[138] The spatiality of the ready-to-hand can be spoken of as the noematic dimension, while the spatiality of Dasein can be viewed as the noetic dimension. Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 18.

[139] Cf. *SZ*, p. 102; *BT*, p. 135, fn. 1.

[140] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 102, 107; *BT*, pp. 135, 141.

[141] Cf. *SZ*, p. 102; *BT*, p. 135.

possibility of an equipment to have a place in the equipmental totality.[142] "This 'whither' which makes it possible for equipment to belong to somewhere …we call the region."[143] The referential totality of the equipment is ontologically prior to the equipmentality of a particular equipment. In the same way, the region as the 'whither' of the equipmental totality is ontologically prior to the 'locality' of a particular equipment.

Speaking of the region, Heidegger says that it should not be understood in the geographical sense, but as the 'whither' of the readiness-to-hand it is a matter of Dasein's concern. For example, Heidegger speaks of regions of life and death, in relation to churches and graves, which are laid out according to the rising of the sun and its setting.[144] Thus, all these features, viz., closeness and direction and their togetherness constituting the region and relating to the spatiality of the equipment, can be discovered only in relation to the spatiality of Dasein. We shall move then to consider the spatiality of Dasein.

Corresponding to the spatiality of the equipment, Dasein's spatiality is constituted of two existentials, viz., de-distancing (*Entfernung*) and directionality (*Ausrichtung*).[145] The first is de-distancing. Heidegger uses the German term '*Entfernung*' to indicate this first existential. The term communicates the idea of 'bringing closer.' De-distancing "amounts to making farness vanish, …making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close."[146] In other words, it is a capacity of Dasein to bring about closeness. By its active circumspective concern Dasein can bring an entity close. For example, when one learns about the plan and means of building a shopping complex in the city, he brings closer the parts of this equipment totality. By so doing, he brings close circumspectively the equipments, which, he will use as a means to actualize the project and achieve his ends. Thus, de-distancing is a circumspective bringing close of an equipment. It is possible for Dasein because it is an intrinsic tendency that belongs to the very being of Dasein. "In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness."[147] This tendency to closeness is not a bringing close in terms of measurable distance, but one which relates to the circumspective concern of Dasein. For example, 'a good walk' or 'a stone's throw' has a definiteness relating to Dasein's concern. Measurements, such as, 'an half an hour's walk' is to be understood in terms of duration rather than of number. A path way that is long 'objectively' may be shorter, very long or hard-going, depending on Dasein's concernful look.[148] "Circumspective concern decides as to the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand environmentally."[149] Thus, "Dasein is spatial in the sense that it (he) discovers space circumspectively, so that indeed it (he) constantly comports itself (himself) de-distantly towards the entities thus spatially encountered."[150]

The second characteristic of Dasein's spatiality is directionality. The idea of directionality is implied in de-distancing, because every bringing close involves a direction from which the equipment is brought close or the region in which it has the locality. Dasein's directionality, like that of de-distancing, is something that essentially belongs to him, and he takes these directions

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[142] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 102-103; *BT*, pp. 135-136.
[143] *SZ*, p. 103; *BT*, p. 136.
[144] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 103-104; *BT*, pp. 136-137.
[145] Cf. *SZ*, p. 105; *BT*, p. 138, fn. 2.
[146] *SZ*, p. 105; *BT*, p. 139.
[147] *SZ*, p. 105; *BT*, p. 140.
[148] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 105-107; *BT*, pp. 140-142.
[149] *SZ*, p. 107; *BT*, p. 142.
[150] *SZ*, p. 108; *BT*, p. 143.

along with him, being guided by circumspective concern.[151] Dasein's spatiality, by way of de-distancing and directionality, makes him encounter the equipmental ready-to-hand in terms of the twin characteristics of an equipment, viz., closeness and direction.[152]

2.2.2. Dasein's Interpersonal Relationships

In the last section we have been dealing with the entities and their relation to Dasein. But, in Dasein's being-in-the-world, he is not only involved with entities but also related to other Daseins. Dasein's world, whether it be related to entities or other Daseins, is a 'with-world' (*Mitwelt*). Dasein is 'along-with' (*bei*) entities; but he is 'with' (*mit*) Daseins. The other Daseins are neither present-at-hand entities or ready-to-hand tools, but are essents that are like Dasein. Heidegger remarks: "These entities [other Daseins] are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are like every Dasein …, in that they are there, too, and with it [him]."[153] In this section, we shall explore the nature of Dasein's relationship with other Daseins.

2.2.2.1. Being-with: An Existential of Dasein

The nature of Dasein's relationship with the other is characterized by 'being-with' (*Mitsein*). Dasein as being-in-the-world is always 'Dasein-with' (*Mitdasein*) and he shares a 'with-like' (*Mithaften*) character with others. Thus, Dasein as 'being-in' is always a 'being-with,' and his world is a 'with-world' (*Mitwelt*).[154] The notion of Dasein as 'being-with' is indicated in Heidegger's consideration of Dasein's relation to the tools in a work produced (e.g. footwear). The 'towards-which' of its usability is related to a 'for-the-sake-of-whom,' i.e., to someone who would wear it. Thus, in a work situation, Dasein is not only related to the environmental world of equipments but also, in the last analysis, to essents with Dasein's kind of being, which he encounters as the user, the wearer or the one who possesses. Dasein's world is a co-world and his 'being-in' is 'being-with-others.'[155]

The 'being-with' of Dasein is, in every case, characteristic of one's own Dasein. The statement 'Dasein is essentially being-with,' is not to be taken in the ontic sense of one concrete entity being related to another concrete entity environmentally and factically.[156] But it must be taken in the existential-ontological meaning, i.e., being-with as an existential of Dasein. Heidegger's contention is that Dasein is always being-with in his structure, whether or not factically (ontically) the other is present-at-hand or perceived.[157] This claim of Heidegger is based on another assumption, that in the pre-theoretical everyday experience of Dasein, i.e., in his existential perception, he has no experience of the self. The reason Heidegger puts forth in favor of this assumption is the basic existential experience of Dasein. Dasein's everyday life is lived amidst various demands to be met and tasks to be performed, in relation to the others, and not as a self

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[151] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 108-109; *BT*, pp. 143-144.
[152] Cf. *SZ*, p. 110; *BT*, p. 144.
[153] *SZ*, p. 118; *BT*, p. 154.
[154] Cf. *SZ*, p.118; *BT*, pp. 154-155.
[155] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 70-71, 117-118; *BT*, pp. 100, 153-154.
[156] Cf. *SZ*, p. 119; *BT*, p. 155.
[157] Cf. *SZ*, p. 120; *BT*, p. 156.

giving orders or as witnessing events that are taking place.[158] The primary experience of Dasein as being-with is described by William Ralph Schroeder as follows:

The materials one works on are made by others; the tasks one performs are taught by others; the products one makes are destined for others; the functional use of things comes to them collectively — everyone understands what things are for; one's own understanding is a specification of this common sense. One's existence is always articulated in a world …with others.[159]

For Heidegger, the relatedness of Dasein to the other is an *a priori* and precedes all other empirical (ontic) relationships to the other. In fact the basic relationship of being-with is what makes an ontic encounter among Daseins possible.[160] If anyone does not possess this basic existential relatedness to the other, it would mean that he lacks the specific mode of existence that is characteristic of Dasein.[161]

Since Dasein's primordial existential experience of his being is that of being-with-others, it follows, that one cannot define others without any reference to Dasein. Nor can one think of the other in a detached manner of observation, but encounters the other in one's practical concerns. Thus, the other is experienced not as distinct from oneself, i.e., experienced as similar to oneself, engaged in tasks like oneself and involved in cares like oneself. In other words, one experiences the other as one's replica.[162] Thus, Heidegger holds that Dasein's basic experience of the other is not "that they are present-at-hand self-sufficient beings whose minds are hidden, but rather that they are engaged, accessible beings, who share the same instruments and gathering places and function very much like oneself."[163] It is only because every Dasein is essentially being-with that each can experience the other Dasein in his own being-with. To quote Heidegger: "only in-so-far as one's own Dasein has the essential structure of being-with is its [his] Dasein-with encounterable by others."[164] Heidegger sums up the basic nature of Dasein's relationship to the other as follows:

By 'others' we do not mean everyone else but me — those over against whom the 'I' stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself — those among whom one is too. This being-there-too …with them does not have the ontological character of a present-at-hand-along 'with' them within a world. This 'with' is something of a character of Dasein; the 'too' means sameness of being, as circumspectively concernful being-in-the-world.

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[158] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 115-116; *BT* pp. 150-152. According to Heidegger, the notion of the 'self,' as a subject that guides the events and is a witness to these events, is not the existential (pre-theoretical) experience of Dasein. Only in highly reflective states of mind, such as Husserl's *epoche*, can the notion of the self be attained. But the basic existential experience of Dasein about himself is 'being-with.' Cf. William Ralph Schroeder, *Sartre and His Predecessors: The Self and the Other* (London: Routledge & Kegen Paul, 1984), pp. 131-132.

[159] *Ibid.*, p. 133. Cf. also *SZ*, pp. 117-118; *BT*, pp. 153-154.

[160] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 120-121; *BT* pp. 156-157.

[161] Cf. *SZ*, p. 123; *BT*, p. 160.

[162] Cf. William Ralph Schroeder, pp. 132-133.

[163] *Ibid.* Schroeder holds the view that the main concern of Heidegger's inquiry is not to question the nature and characteristics of the other; but rather to articulate the essential structures of human existence. In so doing, he presents the notion of the other as an ontological existential of Dasein. We do not subscribe to this view, as it undermines all Heidegger says about the other. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

[164] *SZ*, p. 121; *BT*, p. 157.

'With' and 'too' are to be understood existentially, not categorically. By reason of this with-like …being-in-the-world, the world is always the one I share with others.[165]

Having analyzed Dasein's being-with as an existential of Dasein, expressed in the pre-ontological level in a world which is common to all Daseins, let us consider the modes of Dasein's being-with.

2.2.2.2. Modes of Dasein's Being-with

Just as Dasein's 'being-in' with the ready-to-hand is characterized by concern (*Besorgen*), the primordial relatedness of Dasein and other Daseins is referred to by Heidegger as solicitude (*Fuersorge*). There are two basic modes of Dasein's solicitude, viz., negative and positive. The negative mode of solicitude is indifference (*Gleichgueltigkeit*) which fundamentally consists in one not mattering to another. Thus, in this state, one fails to show positive solicitude towards the other.[166] The positive solicitude is of two modes.

The first positive mode of solicitude is that which leaps in (*einspringen*) for the other. It is a kind of solicitude in which one takes over the cares and worries of the other by taking over his place. The one who was overburdened so far is relieved and steps back, as the matter had been looked into. In such a solicitude, the one who comes to help out, by taking over the responsibility of the other fully, dominates the other and interferes with the freedom of the other. Let us take the example of a person who is burdened with the responsibility of preparing an academic project. If a person approaches this situation with the first mode of solicitude, he would leap into the situation and occupy the '*Da*' of the other's world and finish the academic project by himself. The other is dominated and he is not given the freedom to do the task in the way he wanted. Thus, the other is reduced to the level of an equipment, as the other is treated as if he were an entity. The second type of positive solicitude is one of leaping ahead (*vorausspringen*) of the other. This type does not interfere or take away the freedom of the other. In it, the other is freed for his own concern, in the sense that one anticipates and opens up to the other his own existentiell ability to be. In other words, by his support, assistance and suggestion one opens up the care of the other so that he can existentially face it and solve the issue in his own way. Such a solicitude helps one to become transparent in his own care and internally to become free to face and solve it. Applying the same example to this type would mean that one might discuss the project with the other, anticipate or open up the various possibilities of doing the project and help him to do the job in his own tempo and phase. In this solicitude the person is not dominated or interfered with, but only helped and freed for doing the project.[167]

Everyday being-with one another often takes one of the two forms of solicitude, viz., the negative mode or one of the two types of positive solicitude.[168] The two types of positive modes of solicitude are guided by two forms of disclosure, viz., considerateness (*Ruecksicht*) and forbearance (*Nachsicht*), just as Dasein's concern towards entities (*Besorgen*) is directed by circumspection (*Umsicht*).[169]

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[165] *SZ*, p. 118; *BT*, pp. 154-155.
[166] Cf. *SZ*, p. 121; *BT*, pp. 157-158.
[167] Cf. *SZ*, p. 122; *BT*, pp. 158-159.
[168] Cf. *SZ*, p. 122; *BT*, p. 159.
[169] Cf. *SZ*, p. 123; *BT*, p. 159.

Heidegger speaks of various other modes in which Dasein is being-with, such as, "being-for, against, or without one another, passing one another by (and) not mattering to one another."[170] But all these forms, according to Heidegger, can be brought under the positive and the negative modes we have discussed as expressions of the positive or negative modes. Again, modes of Dasein such as 'being-for-oneself,' 'being-oneself,' 'being-alone' and 'being-away' are all expressions of Dasein's being-with in the negative mode. These expressions point to Dasein's lack of awareness of his primordial existential being-with. Therefore, these modes are privative modes of Dasein's fundamental being-with. To quote Heidegger: "Even Dasein's being alone is being-with in the world. The other can be missing only in and for a being-with (i.e. Dasein)."[171] This is not only true of the negative modes, but also of the positive modes, such as being empathetic towards the other. For Heidegger, "empathy does not first constitute being-with; only on the basis of being-with does empathy become possible…."[172] Thus, being-with is the existential of Dasein and all forms of being-with are expressions of the positive or negative modes of solicitude.

Dasein's world is constituted by being-alongside-with-entities ready-to-hand in cirumspective concern and by his being-with other Daseins in respectful solicitude. Having looked into Dasein in his relatedness to entities and other Daseins, we enter the study of Dasein's relation to the world as a whole in his relational totality.

2.2.3. Dasein's Relationship with the World

Heidegger begins his analysis of the world and its relationship to Dasein by indicating the various senses in which the term 'world' is used. He identifies its four uses and limits to one of them his use of the term 'world.' Firstly, it signifies the totality of the present-at-hand entities which Dasein encounters within-the-world. Secondly, it means the being of the totality of beings other than Dasein. In other words, in this sense, the term 'world' indicates any realm which comprises the multiplicity of entities. Thus, we can speak of the world of mathematics, which signifies the realm of possible objects of mathematics. Thirdly, 'world' is taken as the complex which is opposed to Dasein, but 'wherein' factual Dasein lives. In this sense, the term 'world' has a pre-ontological existentiell signification. Here, 'world' stands for the 'we-world' (*Wir-welt*) with others and one's own closest world of environment (*Umwelt*). Heidegger uses the term 'world' in this third sense. Fourthly, the term 'world' is used in the ontological-existential sense and indicates the being of the world (*Weltlichkeit*) of Dasein's 'wherein,' i.e., the worldhood of the world. This meaning embraces in itself the *a priori* character of the worldhood in general.[173]

Now, we could turn our attention to Heidegger's use of the term 'world,' taken in the pre-ontological and pre-thematic sense. Understood in this sense, world has environmental and communal dimensions. It is a world in which Dasein is related to the entities and other Daseins, in circumspective concern and respectful solicitude respectively. Thus, 'world,' taken in this sense, is the matrix or horizon of Dasein's total relatedness to entities and others (*Bezugszusammenhang*) and the matrix of total meaningfulness (*Bedeutsamkeit*) of Dasein himself, entities and others. Now, we could consider the world in these two aspects.

2.2.3.1. World: The Matrix of Dasein's Relational Totalities

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[170] *SZ*, p. 121; *BT*, p. 158.
[171] *SZ*, p. 120; *BT*, pp. 156-157.
[172] *SZ*, p. 125; *BT*, p. 162.
[173] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 64-65; *BT*, p. 93.

In dealing with Dasein and his relatedness to equipments, we mentioned that an equipment is essentially 'for the purpose of' or 'in-order-to' (*um-zu*) do something, and that it is not an isolated tool, but that it has a relatedness to the whole equipmental totality of which it is a part. In other words, an equipment, as a ready-to-hand, has twofold references (*Verweisung*), viz., to its own equipmentality and to the equipmental referential totality of which it is a part. Firstly, an equipment, as a sign, refers to its own 'towards-which.' For example, the directional signal of an automobile points to the direction towards which the driver is going to make a turn. Secondly, an equipment also has a wider reference to the whole equipmental system to which it belongs. For example, the indicator in a motor car has a reference to the whole sphere of traffic.[174] For Heidegger, an equipment is indicative of the ontological structure of the ready-to-hand entities and that of the referential totalities.[175]

From this, it is clear that the ontological structure of a ready-to-hand equipment has a reference which is beyond it own equipmentality. Firstly, by its very nature an equipment has an involvement (*Bewandtnis*) and this always implies two aspects, viz., the 'with' of the involvement (*Womit der Bewandtnis*) and the 'in' of the involvement (*Wobei der Bewandtnis*).[176] For example, 'with' the hammer there is the involvement 'in' hammering. The 'in' of the involvements is always a 'towards-which' (*das Wozu*) of serviceability and the 'for-which' *(das Wofuer)* of usability.[177] Secondly, this involvement of the equipment is not limited to its own isolated '*wozu*' and '*wofue*r,' but is open to the pattern or matrix in which it finds itself (*Bewandtnisganzheit*), and it, in turn, is part of a larger pattern. For example, 'with' the hammer there is the involvement 'in' hammering; 'with' hammering there is an involvement 'in' nailing; and 'with' nailing there is an involvement 'in' building a house. This process of 'with …in' does not go on indefinitely, because all these limited '*wozus*' lead back to an ultimate 'towards-which' and which Heidegger calls 'for-the-sake-of-which' (*Worumwillen*), which is always Dasein. In the given example, the house is for Dasein.[178] Thus, for Heidegger, Dasein is the final center towards which all involvements are directed. Since all such equipmental involvements find their destination in Dasein, it would mean that the worldhood of the world belongs to the being of Dasein himself. To say it in the words of Heidegger:

But the totality of the involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 'towards-which' in which there is not further involvement: this 'towards-which' is not an entity with the kind of being that belongs to what is ready to hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose being is defined as being-in-the-world [Dasein], and to whose state of being the worldhood itself belongs.[179]

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[174] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 76-78; *BT*, pp. 107-109.

[175] Cf. *SZ*, p. 82; *BT*, pp. 113-114.

[176] Cf. *SZ*, p. 84; *BT*, p. 115.

[177] Cf. *SZ*, p. 84; *BT*, p. 116.

[178] Cf. *ibid.* Heidegger's insistence on Dasein as the ultimate reference of every other entity in the world does not amount to a doctrine of egocentricity. It indicates only that because of his ontological structure an entity is destined towards Dasein, whereas the being of Dasein is such that it cannot be referred to anything other than himself. Cf. *SZ*, p. 123; *BT*, pp. 160-161.

[179] *SZ*, p. 84; *BT*, p. 116.

Thus worldhood of the world, as belonging to Dasein's being, is an existentiale. In other words, it is a necessary and *a priori* horizon of Dasein's existential structure.[180] The world is that 'wherein' (*worin*) Dasein, as an entity already was, and to which he can return (*zurueckkommen*) for any explicit thematization of it.[181] It is the 'wherein' when Dasein encounters all other entities in circumspective concern and other Daseins in respectful solicitude. It is the 'towards-which' the equipmental systems in their relational complex are pointing by their structure.[182] "World, then, is a non-ontic, non-thematic, pre-disclosed 'there' wherein There-being (Dasein) encounters the purposeful beings with which it is preoccupied in its everyday commerce with the world-about."[183]

The world, as understood by Heidegger, is a 'wherein' of the matrix of Dasein's total relatedness. This 'wherein' is not be taken in the spatial sense, but in the sense of a horizon in which all patterns of referential totalities, whether they belong to the environmental world (*Umwelt*) or the 'we-world' (*Wir-welt*), which has the nature of the community, converge. The unity of this system of Dasein's relations is Dasein himself, because he, as we mentioned earlier, is the ultimate 'for-the-sake-of-which' of all equipmental and referential totalities. The world belongs to Dasein. The worldhood of the world consists in "the being of that ontic condition which makes it possible for entities within-the-world to be discovered at all."[184] Therefore, the worldhood of the world can be considered formally as a system of Dasein's total relatedness. Understood thus, it provides the basis on which entities can be discovered as they are in themselves.[185]

2.2.3.2. World: The Matrix of Dasein's Total Meaningfulness

Since the world, as the matrix of Dasein's relational totalities, consists in Dasein's own being, the meaningfulness of these relational systems must be understood in Dasein's own being. So, our speaking of the involvement of equipments towards Dasein, in fact, amounts to Dasein letting them be involved (*Bewandtenlassen*) with him. It implies that Dasein frees the ready-to-hand for meaning.[186] In other words, the letting-be-involved of entities by Dasein is the ontological condition for an entity being encountered in its readiness-to-hand. An entity is freed for involvements in terms of its 'with which' and 'in which.' For example, in terms of hammering, the hammer is freed for involvement.[187] Understood ontologically, the letting-be-involved of entities by Dasein, amounts to Dasein's disclosing the totality of involvements as the world within which entities can have their involvement. The freeing of entities for totality of involvements and the 'for-which' of their being freed must have been disclosed to Dasein primordially. In other words, Dasein has a prior understanding of the world towards which, he, as an entity comports himself.[188] On this point Heidegger remarks:

That wherein (*worin*) Dasein understands itself [himself] beforehand in the mode of assigning itself [himself] is that for which …it [he] lets entities be encountered beforehand. The 'wherein'

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[180] Cf. *SZ*, p. 64; *BT*, p. 92.

[181] Cf. *SZ*, p. 76; *BT*, pp. 106-107.

[182] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 85-86; *BT*, pp. 118-119.

[183] William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 56.

[184] *SZ*, p. 88; *BT*, p. 121.

[185] Cf. *SZ*, p. 88; *BT*, pp. 121-122.

[186] Cf. *SZ*, p. 85; *BT*, p. 117.

[187] Cf. *SZ*, p. 85; *BT*, pp. 117-118.

[188] Cf. *SZ*, p. 86; *BT*, 118.

of the act of understanding which assigns or refers itself is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of being that belongs to involvements; and this 'wherein' is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which …Dasein assigns itself [himself] is what makes up the worldhood of the world.[189]

Since Dasein has a primordial understanding of this 'wherein,' he is familiar with it. The familiarity is constitutive of Dasein and makes his understanding of beings. The complexity of relations in which Dasein lives and from which he draws all meaningfulness of things makes up the context in which he understands himself and his world. The matrix of meaningfulness Heidegger calls 'significance' (*Bedautsamkeit*). In his familiarity with the significant relationality, Dasein constitutes the ontic condition for the possibility of discovering entities, which are encountered in the world, with involvements. This meaning and significance is an existentiale of Dasein's being-in-the-world.[190] Thus, for Heidegger, the world is not a thing or collection of things but is a matter of Dasein's 'being in' in the matrix of relational and referential totalities. "The world," therefore, "is an intersubjectively constituted referential totality, in which it becomes possible for Dasein to encounter other entities, both of its [his] kind and the ready-to-hand."[191]

The worldhood of the world consists in the total meaningfulness or significance of the relational structures of the referential totality. Thus, we can speak of as many worlds as there are different meaningful or significant referential totalities. For example, we can speak of a work-world, or an academic-world. It is not the subjectivization of the world concept, but a mode of relating to beings in concernful dealings. This always is guided by a pre-thematic attunement which, in turn, defines Dasein as a possibility of relating to beings. Taken in this sense, the world is not a creation of Dasein, but Dasein's way of giving meaning to the existential relational complex in which he finds himself.[192]

2.3. Care in Dasein's Existential Level

Besides Dasein's epistemological and relational concerns, his being as care has an existential and personal dimension. Seen in this aspect of care, Dasein is a fallen existence (*Verfallensein*).[193] He is temporal and historical, and called to be an authentic being. In this section we would like to consider Dasein in these aspects.

2.3.1. Fallen Dasein

Dasein's being as care in its personal aspect implies that he is caught up in his everydayness. This involves becoming lost in the everyday troubles of life, and forgetting to be his true self. In this section, we attempt to analyze the notion of Dasein's fallenness by spelling out its nature, motive and modes.

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[189] *SZ*, p. 86; *BT*, p. 119.
[190] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 86-87; *BT*, pp. 119-121.
[191] Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 24.
[192] Cf. *SZ*, p. 87; *BT*, pp. 120-121.
[193] Heidegger uses the German term '*Verfallen*' to refer to the everyday being of Dasein. As a noun it is usually translated into English as 'falling' or 'fallenness.' As a verb it means 'to fall.' It has the connotation of deteriorating, collapsing or falling down. Cf. *SZ*, p. 21; *BT*, p. 42, fn. 2. Cf. also *SZ*, p. 134; *BT*, p. 172, fn. 1.

2.3.1.1. Nature of Dasein's Fallenness

The fallenness of Dasein is not to be viewed in the sense of any negative evaluation. Neither is it to be understood in the sense of moral degradation or as a state comparable to that of original sin.[194] Nor does it mean that Dasein altogether loses his being and becomes a being that is 'no-longer-in-the-world.' It also does not imply that Dasein was in a 'higher primal state' and has fallen to a lower state of existence. Fallenness is not to be conceived as Dasein's being an isolated ego which has become displaced from himself to the world as a present-at-hand entity.[195] Falling is not to be taken as an ontic assertion about the corruption of human nature. These ways of looking at Dasein would amount to ontic (anthropological) ways of perceiving Dasein's fallen state. But falling has to be understood in relation to Dasein's existential constitution.[196]

In order to clarify the nature of the fallen Dasein, besides stating what falling is not, we must raise the question of the 'who' (*Wer*) of Dasein in this fallen state. On this point Heidegger states: "The 'who' is not this one, not that one, not oneself …not some people …, and not the sum of all. The 'who' is the neuter, the 'they'."[197] He attributes many characteristics to the 'they.' The first is distentiality (*Abstaendigkeit*) in which the everyday Dasein stands in subjection (*Botmaessigkeit*) to others. In other words, the 'they' determines the everyday possibilities for Dasein. Here Dasein is not his self, but is taken over by the 'they.' Distentiality consists in Dasein's 'being-with-one-another.' It dissolves one's own identity completely into the being of the other, to such an extent that the distinction between the other and oneself is destroyed and, thereby, the total control of the 'they' is established. Thus, Dasein takes pleasure, reads, judges and is shocked based on the standards set by the 'they.'[198] Distentiality is founded on the second, viz., mediocrity (*Durchschnittlichkeit*).[199] Having brought about the loss of identity of Dasein, by distentiality the 'they' maintains this loss factically in mediocrity. Here, everything exceptional and extra-ordinary is done away with. Every type of priority is suppressed and all possibilities of Dasein are leveled down (*einbrenen*).

All these features come together to constitute the third characteristic of the 'they,' which Heidegger calls publicness (*Offenlichkeit*). In it, all genuineness and specialty that essentially belongs to Dasein is obliterated and obscured. Only the superficial in things are touched upon. The 'they' controls the way in which the world is interpreted. It presents every judgment and decides upon it and takes away Dasein's responsibility.[200] "It was always the 'they' who did it, and it can be said that it has been no more."[201] Thus, in publicness, Dasein is fully disburdened by the 'they,' and in this disburdening of responsibilities he finds a sense of security. Besides, the 'they'

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[194] The term '*Verfallen*' as used by Heidegger has no moral signification. His use, here, is similar to what he speaks of in his later philosophy, viz., forgetting the truth of Being. Cf. BH, Wegmarken, p. 329; BW, p. 212.

[195] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 175-176; *BT*, p. 220.

[196] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 179-180; *BT*, p. 224.

[197] *SZ*, p. 128; *BT*, p. 164. The German term '*das Mann'* is often rendered in English as 'the one,' 'the they,' 'the they-self' and 'the anonymous one.' Though inauthentic, 'the they' belongs to Dasein's essential constitution.

[198] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 126-127; *BT*, p. 164.

[199] The German term '*Durchschnittlichkeit*' communicates the notion of doing the minimum. It has been translated into English as 'averageness.' We prefer to translate this German term with the English term 'mediocrity,' as it brings out the full connotation of the German term in question.

[200] 200. Cf. *SZ*, p. 127; *BT*, pp. 165-166.

[201] *SZ*, p. 127; *BT*, p. 165.

constantly accommodates Dasein by the disburdening and retaining subtly its 'stubborn domination.' The net result is "everyone is the other and no one is himself."[202] These traits we have described so far provide Dasein with a constancy (*Staendigkeit*) for the state of falling, from which he does not want to be disturbed. The 'they' is not a property, but is an existentiale of Dasein. To quote Heidegger: "The 'they' is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution."[203]

Having delineated the characteristics of the 'who' of Dasein in the fallen state, we shall now elaborate the nature of the state of fallenness. It signifies Dasein's state of absorption in (*Aufgehen bei*) or immersion[204] in the world of his concern. Fallenness consists mostly in being lost in the publicness of the 'they.' It is a losing sight of the truth about one's own being, or a dimming of one's understanding of oneself, of one's possibilities and limitations. In other words, fallenness is a state in which one fails to grasp one's being with transparency and clarity. It is an entanglement with the life-world (*Lebenswelt*), so much so that Dasein loses sight of his roots.[205] Falling is a state in which, not only has Dasein lost his vision about himself, but also he understands himself in terms of others. One hardly realizes that one's thoughts, feelings, beliefs and ideals are shared by others even though they might appear to be one's own. In fact, Dasein begins to guide his life in full conformity with everything the other expects of him. For example, the buyer determines what the producer must produce and the seller must sell. A professor or an officer becomes part of a set-up and, in doing so, automatically takes over the norms and *modus operandi* of the system. Thus, in falling, Dasein loses his individuality, i.e., being-one's-self, and allows his life-world to be guided by the 'crowd' or the 'impersonal' self.[206]

Caught up in this publicness and losing itself in the 'they,' Dasein falls into a groundlessness. This domination of the 'they' becomes for Dasein a constant temptation (*Versuchung*), in the sense that it leads Dasein to falling. Since Dasein is constantly tempted towards falling, he is gradually led to believe that in such a state he is secure and genuine and that the fulfillment of his possibilities are guaranteed. The supposition that Dasein's life is genuine and he is 'in the best of order' brings to Dasein tranquillity (*Beruhigung*).[207] "Falling 'being-in-the-world' which tempts itself, is at the same time tranquilizing."[208] In tempting and tranquilization, the falling is aggravated as Dasein is not at peace or at rest. As falling becomes aggravated, Dasein is moving towards an alienation (*Entfremdung*) in which his own potentiality-for-being is hidden from him. "Falling being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilizing, it is at the same time alienating."[209] Alienation does not tear down Dasein factically from itself, but rather closes off from Dasein his authentic possibilities. It results in Dasein falling into an entanglement (*Verfaengnis*) with himself.[210] These four characteristics, viz., temptation, tranquilization, alienation and entanglement, belong to the state of falling. Though, in falling, Dasein takes a 'downward plunge' (*Absturz*) out of himself

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[202] *SZ*, p. 129; *BT*, p. 165.

[203] *SZ*, p. 129; *BT*, p. 165.

[204] Werner Marx uses the term 'immersion' to translate *'Verfallen.'* This translation brings out the actual meaning intended by Heidegger. Cf. Werner Marx, p. 91.

[205] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 175-176; *BT*, p. 260. Cf. also Edward G. Ballard, p. 55.

[206] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 126-129; *BT*, pp. 164-166. Cf. also William Ralph Schroeder, pp. 135-136. Cf. also Harlod Alderman, pp. 23-24.

[207] Cf. *SZ*, p. 177; *BT*, pp. 221-222.

[208] *SZ*, p. 177; *BT*, p. 222.

[209] *SZ*, p. 178; *BT*, p. 222.

[210] Cf. *SZ*, p. 178; *BT*, pp. 222-223.

into himself, into his groundlessness, he is under the impression that his way of living is an 'ascending,' as the truth about his own true self is hidden from him. Heidegger uses whirl (*Wirbel*) as the symbol to indicate Dasein's falling. In falling Dasein is 'thrown' into the bottomless living of everydayness and continues to be in this thrown state, totally whirled by the 'they.'[211]

Having considered the nature of falling, the question arises as to why Dasein has the tendency to fall and remain inauthentic in his everyday existence. This is the topic of the next section.

2.3.1.2. The Motive of Dasein's Fallenness

Speaking of the motive of Dasein's falling, Heidegger says that the flight from Dasein's own self and absorption in entities of the world and with others is due to Dasein's experience of his own being as inherently dissatisfying. Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is the ground of all his encounters; but this ground itself is experienced as groundless. Heidegger refers to this groundless and unsettling dimension of Dasein's being-in-the-world as guilt (*Schuld*). Thus, this basic guilt, for Heidegger, is the motive of Dasein's falling.[212] Before we enter into analyzing the meaning of the term 'guilt,' as used by Heidegger, we should consider its common and ordinary meaning.

In our everyday usage, the term 'guilt' has two meanings. Firstly, it has the sense of 'owing' or 'having something due to an account.' Thus, 'being guilty' means 'having debts' (*Schuld haben*). The other modes of guilt, taken in this sense, are depriving, borrowing, withholding, taking and stealing. This sense lays emphasis on the claim of the other to whom is in debt. The second ordinary signification of 'being-guilty' is 'being responsible for,' (*schuldig-sein an*). In this sense of 'having responsibility for something,' the fact that someone has incurred a blame or committed a fault for which he is responsible comes to the fore. These two ordinary usages of the term 'guilt' together convey the notion of a failure to fulfill a requirement, through omission or commission, and that one is responsible for endangering, mis-leading or ruining the other in his existence.[213]

Heidegger uses the term 'guilt' in a more original and ontological sense. 'Being guilty' is mode of Dasein and this notion must be freed from the moral and legal concepts. All moral notions which indicate a lack, such as 'being indebted to' and 'being responsible for' are based on the original notion of guilt, in which inheres the character of 'not' or 'nullity.' In other words, the notion of guilt is not something emerging from the violation of moral norms or an offense committed, but, on the contrary, the latter itself is grounded in the more fundamental 'not' or 'nullity,' that is characteristic of Dasein's being, viz., guilt. To quote Heidegger: "Being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness …, but on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only on the basis of primordial being-guilty."[214] Thus, in the notion of guilt, taken in the primordial sense, lies the character of the 'not' or 'nullity.' Guilt, therefore, is something that fundamentally belongs to Dasein. "Being-guilty belongs to Dasein's being and signifies the null being-the-basis of a nullity."[215] Therefore, in order to understand guilt in this original sense, we must analyze the

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[211] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 178-179; *BT*, p. 223.
[212] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 284-285; *BT*, pp. 329-331.
[213] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 281-283; *BT*, pp. 327-329.
[214] *SZ*, p. 284; *BT*, p. 329.
[215] *SZ*, p. 305; *BT*, p. 353.

two existential limitations (*Nichtigkeiten*).[216] These two existential limitations are two different ways in which Dasein's being is dissatisfying to him and lead Dasein into falling.[217]

The first existential limitation Heidegger speaks of is Dasein's facticity or thrownness. It refers to the way Dasein already finds himself in the world, i.e., in a particular complex of equipmental system. Dasein finds himself (*sich findet*) in the world, having not chosen his world. In describing "*Befindlickeit*" we have explained the factical nature of Dasein. The significant aspect of this existential limitation consists in Dasein's inability to be his own ground or to change the state-of-being to which he is thrown. Dasein must choose the situation in which he is thrown and make the best of it. Heidegger remarks: " As existent, it (Dasein) never comes back behind its (his) it (he)-is-and-has-to-be' from its (his) 'being-its (his)-self' and leads it (him) into the there."[218] This ontically and factically implies that one has no control on the situation that went before his birth, early growth and development of skills, as most of these are determined for him by his thrownness. All that he can do is be open to the possibilities of his thrown projection. In other words, it means that Dasein never has power over his own most being from the ground-up, and he is never the cause of his own being.[219] This thrownness, as an inability in Dasein to generate a world for himself and as an inability of Dasein to choose the basis responsible for his own choices, constitutes the first existential limitation in Dasein.

The second existential limitation consists of the limitations that constitute these choices themselves. In choosing one of the possibilities, Dasein has to give up the other. Dasein has no freedom to choose all possibilities. By nature, choice involves preferring one alternative to another. So, this inevitable preclusion of various possibilities, which is inherent in the nature of choosing, is the second existential limitation that belongs to Dasein's projective way of being. Heidegger remarks: "The nullity (existential limitation) we have in mind belongs to Dasein being-free for its (his) existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, is only in the choice of one possibility — that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them."[220] These two existential limitations — Dasein's thrown projective understanding which he cannot ground himself and the limitation that is imposed in Dasein's freedom to his own possibilities — together constitute the guilt, in its primordial sense. Thus, guilt is the essential 'lack'[221] in Dasein's nature which he does not want to face up to in his everyday existence.

The existential limitations which constitute Dasein's guilt are essential conditions of his being-in-the-world which disturbs Dasein. Falling is nothing else but a flight from the recognition of these disturbing conditions. Dasein is always aware of his guilt; but in the special state-of-being called anxiety,[222] guilt, the motive of falling, gets explicitly and directly recognized. The anxious

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[216] The German term '*Nichtigkeit*' is usually rendered in English as 'nullity.' But we translate it as 'existential limitation,' as it refers to the fundamental lack that belongs to Dasein's existential structure.

[217] Cf. John Richardson, pp. 129-130.

[218] *SZ*, p. 284; *BT*, p. 330.

[219] *SZ*, pp. 284-285; *BT*, pp. 330-331.

[220] *SZ*, p. 285; *BT*, p. 331.

[221] When we speak of guilt, as described by Heidegger, as a 'lack,' we do not mean that it is an absence of present-hand-entity; but we are referring to Dasein's ultimate groundlessness. This 'being-guilty' is the basis of all ontic expressions of guilt in the moral and legal aspects of human existence. Cf. *SZ*, p. 286; *BT*, p. 332.

[222] For Heidegger, 'anxiety' is a special state-of-being, which is different from fear. In fear, there is an object present-at-hand we are afraid of. But, in anxiety there is no object, as the very being-in-the-world of Dasein is threatened. In other words, in anxiety the very being of Dasein is challenged. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 140-142, 184-191; *BT*, pp. 179-182, 228-235.

Dasein feels uncanny and not-at-home (*Unheimlich*)[223] because, in anxiety, he comes into face-to-face contact with these existential limitations which constitute the guilt and which are essential to Dasein being challenged by his own guilt. In this situation, Dasein tries to get away from himself. In other words, Dasein flees from the direct recognition of these contingencies of his being, viz., his fundamental groundlessness, and drifts into everydayness. Falling, thus, amounts to Dasein's way of avoiding an existential grasp of his guilt and an attempt to maintain his immersion among entities and others by merely preoccupying himself in existential possibilities in a given equipmental system. In falling, Dasein not only fails to face his true being, but also whole-heartedly identifies himself with the particular situation and accepts it as the true reality by ignoring all other alternative ends and choices.[224]

From what we have said it is clear that the primordial guilt, which is constituted of existential limitations and Dasein's unwillingness to face honestly his true being, is the motive of Dasein's falling. Having analyzed the motives of falling, we shall speak of its modes.

2.3.1.3. Modes of Dasein's Fallenness

Heidegger speaks of three modes of Dasein's falling. Dasein is not his genuine self in these three ways, viz., curiosity (*die Neugier*), idle talk (*das Gerede*) and ambiguity (*die Zweideutligkiet*). We will consider each of these briefly and see how fallenness is manifested in these modes.

2.3.1.3.1. Curiosity

Heidegger terms 'curiosity' Dasein's attitude towards the world and entities within it in the fallen state. This is a tendency towards 'seeing.' In curiosity, Dasein allows himself to be carried away (*mitnehmen*) by the looks of the world. Here one sees for the sake of seeing, and what is seen is not seen in order to understand. Curious Dasein leaps from one new thing to another. What is aimed at, in seeing, is not the truth of reality, but just novelty for the sake of novelty. Therefore, curiosity is characterized by a 'not-abiding' or 'not-tarrying' (*unverweilen*) along-side what is closest to Dasein. In curiosity Dasein is restless about novelties, constantly seeking excitement and changing encounters. This, in turn, leads him to continuous distraction and dissipation, thereby, always scattering into ever new possibilities. Being caught up in distraction, Dasein loses the sense of wonder or beholding the world with admiration. Curious Dasein, by his inability to dwell and to wonder about, and by his constant distraction, lives a life of 'never-dwelling-anywhere' (*Aufenthaltslosigkeit*), as curiosity takes Dasein everywhere and yet nowhere. Curiosity uproots Dasein in his genuine being. Thus, what is superficially seen in curiosity is expressed or given out in idle talk.[225]

2.3.1.3.2. Idle Talk

The German term "*Gerede*" is used by Heidegger to refer to the second mode of Dasein's falling, viz., the talk is characteristic of everyday Dasein. It is often translated as 'chatter,' 'gossip' 'prattle' and 'idle talk.' It comes about as a result of one's gossiping or passing the word along. In

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[223] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 185-186; *BT*, p. 230.
[224] Cf. John Richardson, pp. 136-140.
[225] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 170-173; *BT*, pp. 214-217.

idle talk what is talked about (*das Geredete*), is heard only in a random manner, but not understood. In other words, one is not fully involved with the content of the talk, but rather superficially and vaguely hears what is said. Thus, in this mode, speech becomes its own end, and diction, pronunciation and the style of speaking become the criteria to decide about the genuineness and relevance of the speech. It involves a constant repetition. Even though idle talk is superficial and ungrounded, by repetition it appears to be authoritative. Idle talk is not just limited to vocal chatter, but consists also of a written form (*das Geschreibe*), which is based on the hearsay (*Hoerensagen*) that feeds on superficial reading. Though groundless, idle talk easily becomes public and hence is often taken for genuine discourse. Besides, idle talk does not pass off consciously something as something, but instead remains in the superficial level. So, it closes off (*verschliessen*) what it pretends to disclose (*erschliessen*) and thereby discourages any new inquiry, understanding, interpretation and communication. Thus, gossip, by casting out understanding, cuts off Dasein from the primary ontological relation to the entities in the world, to the other Dasein and to his own self.[226]

2.3.1.3.3. Ambiguity

Ambiguity is closely related to curiosity and idle talk. Ambiguity takes away the genuineness in both of these modes. It mars the truth of not only the world, and Dasein's being-with-others, but also gives a false impression of Dasein's own understanding of himself. Ambiguous Dasein finds himself in the state of publicness and is unable to decide whether what has been disclosed is genuine or not. Being caught up in the whirl of daily activity, fallen Dasein is no more 'straight-forward.' As ambiguity takes hold of Dasein, no genuine knowledge is possible, as everything is based on hearsay and without taking into consideration what is really happening. Ambiguity also dominates Dasein's being-with-one-another. Everyone fixes his eye on the other and watches how the other will comport himself. 'Being-together-with-the-other' is characterized by a tense watching of one another, and by an ambiguous spying on each other, which involves a mutual over-hearing.[227] Heidegger says: "Under the mask of 'for one another' an 'against one another' is in play,"[228] in the mode of ambiguity.

All these three modes constitute Dasein's falling, and they are interconnected in their being. Heidegger remarks:

Dasein is always ambiguously 'there' — that is to say in that public disclosedness of being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep 'things moving' where, in an everyday manner, everything (and at the bottom nothing) is happening.[229]

Thus, the fallen state of Dasein is disclosed through these modes of curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity. In the following section, we proceed to consider the manner in which Dasein can attain his authentic existence by moving away from the fallen state of existence.

2.3.2. Authentic Dasein

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[226] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 167-170; *BT*, pp. 211-214.
[227] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 173-175; *BT*, pp. 217-219.
[228] *SZ*, p. 175; *BT*, p. 219.
[229] *SZ*, p. 174; *BT*, pp. 218-219.

Though Dasein is fallen in his everydayness, he is called to be an authentic human being. In this section, we will probe into the question of the authenticity of Dasein. Besides, we would show how the existential notion of the authentic whole Dasein is existentially and ontically attested in Dasein himself. This we will clarify by the analysis of the notions of conscience and resoluteness. We will also deal with the question of the unity between the wholeness and authenticity of Dasein, by exploring the notion of anticipatory resoluteness.

2.3.2.1. Conscience

Heidegger's analysis of conscience is different from the traditional philosophy that has thematized it.[230] For him, conscience, as such, does not pertain to the realm of knowledge, but to the realm of existence. It is an existential, which belongs to Dasein in his concrete being-in-the-world. Heidegger's analysis of conscience is different from the psychological, theological or popular interpretations, for the analyses conscience ontologically and existentially. In other words, Heideggerian analysis traces conscience back to its existential structures which make it an existential of Dasein.[231]

2.3.2.1.1. Conscience: A Call

Conscience, as an existential of Dasein, is not a present-at-hand fact or event which occasionally occurs and to the justification of which inductive empirical proofs might be given; it is a structural mode of Dasein's being, which manifests in Dasein's factual existence.[232] Conscience is revealed as a call (*Ruf*). The call of conscience has the character of an appeal (*Anruf*) to Dasein, to be his own inner most potentiality-for-being.[233] To this call of conscience, there is the corresponding hearing or listening. Losing himself in the publicness and idle-talk of the 'they,' Dasein fails to listen (*ueberhoeren*) to his own self, but rather listens to the 'they.' The only way of freeing oneself from the self-forgetful giving of Dasein to the 'they' is to listen to the voice of his own conscience. The call of conscience, by its appeal, breaks Dasein's listening to the 'they' and calls him out of this anonymous mode of existence. The call of conscience has the mode of discourse (*Rede*). Just as in discourse the vocal expression is not essential to Dasein, so also the call of conscience is often a soundless call which is a giving-to-understanding (*zu-Verstehen-geben*). The call is unaffected by curiosity and idle-talk, causes a jolt and an unsettling shake up in the one who wants to be brought back from the sway of the 'they.'[234]

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[230] The traditional philosophy considers conscience as the subjective condition for morality. Conscience is, thus, related to the intellect. Conscience does different functions before, during and after a human act is performed: i) before: it commands or forbids, counsels or dissuades the act; ii) during: it makes the doer aware of the goodness or badness of the act he is doing; iii) after: it approves or disapproves, praises or blames, induces satisfaction or uneasiness. Cf. Joseph de Finance, *Ethica Generalis* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1959), p. 247.

[231] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 268-269; *BT*, p. 313.

[232] Cf. *SZ*, p. 269; *BT*, pp. 313-314.

[233] Cf. *SZ*, p. 269; *BT*, p. 314.

[234] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 270-271; *BT*, pp. 314-316. In this regard, Heidegger also maintains that conscience should not be reduced to any psychical faculties, such as thinking, feeling or willing. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 271-272; *BT*, p.317.

The call of conscience, which is of the mode of discourse, has a number of characteristics. Firstly, what is spoken about, in the call of conscience, is the average everyday Dasein himself. The call itself is not vague or indifferent, but is presented in a way that Dasein, though caught up in his everyday care, can understand. Secondly, what is appealed in the call of conscience is not what Dasein is expected to be, able to do, has achieved or stood for in public everyday life; nor is it the self, which can become for itself an object of self-criticism and introspection, and which is separate from the outer world and caught up in analytically gazing at psychical conditions. The call of conscience passes over all these and appeals only to that self which is in the mode of being-in-the-world. Thirdly, the appeal in the call of conscience, i.e., the content of the call, is strictly nothing. The call does not assert anything or give any information; neither is it a soliloquy. But it is the summoning of the self, it himself, i.e., to his ownmost potentiality-for-being-his-self. In other words, what the call gives Dasein to understand is the fundamental groundlessness of his being-in-the-world, viz., Dasein's guilt.[235] Fourthly, the call of conscience does not show itself in loud talk, but in the mode of silence and in it alone. The fact that what is called is not expressed in words or spoken aloud, does not make this call of conscience indefinite or mysterious, but only points to the fact that 'what is given to understanding' by the call does not depend on external articulation or communication. Neither does it make the call of conscience and its appeal less effective, because often silence is more effective than loud talk. Finally, though there is an apparent vagueness regarding the content of the call, what the call discloses is clear and unambiguous, viz., the direction the self must take to move from the 'they' and to be authentic.[236]

2.3.2.1.2. Conscience: The Call of Care

Considering the conscience as a call, we stated that one to whom the call is addressed is the 'they.' The one toward whom the 'they' is called to move is also the same self, as the call of conscience is addressed to the self to be his self. The content of the call or what the call gives to understand is Dasein's fundamental groundlessness, i.e., his primordial guilt. Now the question we must ask ourselves is the 'who' of this call or the caller of the call of conscience.

The caller of the call of conscience conceals himself in a peculiar indeterminateness and indefinability. The caller cannot be known, as entities in the world are known, by name, status, origin or repute. There is nothing specific that we can observe or say about the caller. One who calls holds himself aloof so that his identity cannot be known. The only characterization that we can give him is that he calls. We may say that Dasein is the caller and that he calls himself to himself. Even if this is so, there is some peculiar impersonal character about the call, because the call comes unexpectedly, unwished for and independent of Dasein himself. Dasein himself never plans, neither is prepared for, nor voluntarily performs this call. At the same time, it is clear that the call does not come from some other Dasein in the world. Heidegger remarks: "The call comes from me and yet beyond me and over me."[237] There are some who hold the view that the call comes from some alien power, viz., God, while others explain away conscience in terms of some biological theory. Heidegger does not approve of such theories because the basic assumption behind them is that whatever exists must be present-at-hand reality. According to Heidegger, only the analysis of the existential constitution of this entity who calls can give us the clue to

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[235] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 280-289; *BT*, pp. 325-335.
[236] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 272-274; *BT*, pp. 317-319.
[237] *SZ*, p. 277; *BT*, p. 322.

understanding him who does the calling.[238] To clarify the subject of the call of conscience, Heidegger refers to the analysis of the thrownness of Dasein, which is his factical existence. In this thrown mode of existence, the 'why' of Dasein's thrownness is hidden from him, while 'that-it [he]-is' is disclosed to Dasein. The fact is that Dasein's thrownness is revealed to himself in the state-of-being. Dasein often reacts to it by fleeing, because it brings Dasein face-to-face with his isolated being-in-the-world, which makes him feel not-at-home. Anxiety is the most fundamental state-of-being, which reveals Dasein fundamentally as the thrown object. Heidegger suggests that the caller of conscience is this anxious Dasein in his not-at-homeness (*Unheimlichkeit*). In other words, the thrown and anxious Dasein becomes the caller of himself from his everyday fallenness.[239] To quote Heidegger on this point: "The caller is Dasein in its [his] uncanniness: primordial, thrown being-in-the-world as the 'not-at-home' — the bare 'that-it[he]-is' in the 'nothing of the world.' The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice."[240]

Thus, the call of conscience summons Dasein to his ability to be (*seinkoennen*). The call speaks in the uncanny mode of silence. Conscience, having its basis in Dasein's thrownness, calls Dasein back from the idle-talk of the public into his ownmost potentiality-for-being, in the face of anxiety. Existentially understood, the call of conscience sees to it that it constantly makes Dasein feel 'not-at-home' and anxious about his existence, thereby posing a constant threat to Dasein's lostness in the 'they' and his forgetfulness of himself in his everydayness.[241] Thus, the call of conscience shows itself as the call of care. Heidegger remarks:

Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which in its [his] thrownness [in his being-already-in], is anxious about its [his] potentiality-for-being. The one to whom the appeal is made is the very same Dasein, summoned to its [his] ownmost potentiality-for-being [ahead-of-himself….] Dasein is falling into the 'they' [in being-already-alongside-the world of concern], and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience — that is, conscience itself — has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its [his] being, is care.[242]

The conscience, which is the call of care, like death, is in every case 'mine' and it is addressed only to me. For Heidegger, 'public conscience' or 'world conscience' is a dubious fabrication.[243] Thus, conscience, specially with the character of 'my-ownness,' is an attestation of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-being and this attestation lies in Dasein himself. But what is attested by conscience and the full nature of this attestation can be envisaged only when we deal with how this call of conscience is heard and understood. We move on to this point, in the next section, resoluteness.

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[238] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 274-276; *BT*, pp. 319-320.
[239] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 276-277; *BT*, pp. 320-322.
[240] *SZ*, pp. 276-277; *BT*, p. 321.
[241] Cf. *SZ*, p. 277; *BT*, pp. 321-322.
[242] *SZ*, pp. 277-278; *BT*, pp. 322-323.
[243] Cf. *SZ*, p. 278; *BT*, p. 323. In interpreting conscience as subjective, Heidegger opens himself for criticism that his treatment of conscience lacks objectivity. But, for Heidegger, it is only by limiting the arbitrary domination of the they-self, that Dasein can have objectivity of the appeal of conscience for authenticity. Cf. *ibid.*

2.3.2.2. Resoluteness

The co-relate to calling is listening. The proper listening to the call consists in wanting-to-have-a-conscience (*Gewissen-haben-wollen*). Only by wanting-to-have-a-conscience, can Dasein be his authentic potentiality-to-be. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience is manifested in the mode of Dasein's disclosedness, with its marks of understanding, state-of-being and discourse.[244] Therefore, genuine hearing the call of conscience, first, involves the understanding of the existential of one's own being and the existential limitations associated with the guilt. In other words, it would mean Dasein's understanding of his ownmost potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. Dasein's understanding of the call of conscience is accompanied by the state-of-being, anxiety, which brings to the fore the homelessness of Dasein's own self. The mode of discourse that is characteristic of this anxious self-understanding is not expressed aloud, but in silence, which the inauthentic Dasein must listen to in silence. To the one who is caught up in idle-talk and curiosity, the call of conscience, in its silent manifestation would appear as non-existent. The pre-eminent and authentic disclosedness of Dasein, attested by Dasein's wanting-to-have-a-conscience, shows itself as the silent and anxious self-projection Heidegger calls resoluteness.[245] To quote Heidegger:

The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience is thus constituted by anxiety as the state-of-being, by understanding as the projection of oneself upon one's ownmost being-guilty and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself [himself] by its [his] conscience — this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty in which one is ready for anxiety — we call resoluteness.[246]

From what Heidegger has said in the above quotation, it is clear that resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) is the authentic mode of disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of Dasein.[247] Since the disclosedness of Dasein is the primordial truth and the way in which Dasein is in truth,[248] and resoluteness being the authentic mode of Dasein's disclosedness, resoluteness, as we described above, is the truth of Dasein which is the most primordial and authentic.[249] Thus, the call of conscience, listened to in resoluteness, recalls Dasein from his inauthentic everyday pre-occupation to an authentic disclosedness. In fact, it does not change Dasein's world, but rather transforms Dasein's awareness of his world and others. The world of Dasein does not suddenly have a new content, nor has the circle of people around him changed. But, there is a difference in Dasein's comprehension of entities and other Daseins, as these are viewed from the point-of-view of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-being. In other words, Dasein's authentic being-his-self does not mean that he has a self that is unattached and cut off from the world, but Dasein's 'being-alongside-the-ready-to-hand' and his 'being-with-others' "are given a definitive character in terms

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[244] Cf. *SZ*, p. 278; *BT*, p. 324.

[245] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 295-297; *BT*, pp. 341-343.

[246] *SZ*, pp. 296-297; *BT*, p. 343.

[247] Cf. *SZ*, p. 297; *BT*, p. 343. The etymological connection between these terms is noteworthy. '*Erschliessen*' means 'to open' or 'to disclose.' '*Entschlissen*' means the same. The prefix '*ent*' is privative and so '*ent*' + '*Schliessen*' (to close), points to a resolute or self-decided opening. Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal. p. 60, fn. 103.

[248] Cf. *SZ*, p. 212; *BT*, p. 256.

[249] Cf. *SZ*, p. 297; *BT*, p. 343.

of their ownmost potentiality-for-being-their-selves."[250] In resoluteness, Dasein does not stop taking care of his environmental world, nor does he stop his dealings with the community to which he belongs, but only changes his attitude towards these, from one of inauthenticity to that of authenticity. The reason for this change in attitude is that in resoluteness "Dasein gets an authentic grasp of himself and comes to grips with things as they are"[251] authentic. Commenting on this point, B. J. Toussaint notes: "Resoluteness does not place Dasein in a different world; it does place the world in a different light."[252] Summing up this point Heidegger writes:

Resoluteness, as authentic being-one's-self, does not detach Dasein from its [his] world, nor does it isolate it [him] so that it [he] becomes a free-floating I. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its [his] current concernful being-alongside what is ready-to-hand and pushes it [him] into solicitous being with others.[253]

Resoluteness, therefore, frees Dasein from himself for his world, in the light of the 'for-the-sake-of-which' of his own potentiality-for-being. It also frees Dasein in his relationship with others in the sense that resoluteness enables him to allow them to be themselves. A resolute Dasein, thereby, becomes, as it were, the conscience of others, which, in turn, brings about the disclosure of mutual potentialities to each other. This, in turn, helps them to be authentically 'being-their-selves' and authentically to 'be-with-one-another.'[254]

By its very ontological essence resoluteness is related to a factical Dasein in a particular time. It exists only in a resolution (*Entschluss*), which is the "disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible in the [given] time."[255] Thus, only in a resolution does resoluteness achieve its existential definiteness. This existential definiteness of resoluteness is elucidated by Heidegger, with reference to the existential phenomenon called 'Situation.'[256]

Though this term has a spatial reference, Heidegger uses it in an existential sense. Just as Dasein is disclosed in his 'being-in' or 'there,' so also the resoluteness of Dasein is disclosed in a Situation. In other words, Situation is the 'there' of an existing Dasein as disclosed by his resoluteness. It is essentially different from the objective frame-work or setting of the present-at-hand entities, circumstances, events and happenings, which constitute the background of Dasein's activity. But, it is rather the internal ontological structure which makes such Dasein's activities possible. Dasein's Situation is his own 'being-in' or the 'being-there' in the world in so far as this is the ground of all actions and decisions. Situation has its being only in relation to resoluteness which alone discloses resolutely the existing Dasein, just as Dasein can be spoken of as 'being-in'

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[250] *SZ*, pp. pp. 297-298; *BT*, pp. 343-344.

[251] Thomas Langan, *The Meaning of Heidegger* (London: Routledge & Kegen Paul, 1959), p. 38.

[252] B. J. Toussaint, *Interpretation of Self in Early Heidegger* (Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1977), p. 180.

[253] *SZ*, p. 298; *BT*, p. 344.

[254] Cf. *ibid*. From what we have said here, it is clear that there is no indication of solipsism in Heidegger's notion of Dasein's authenticity, which is attained when the call of conscience is genuinely listened to in resoluteness. Dasein continues to maintain all his relationships, but in a new authentic manner. Cf. James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, pp. 42-43.

[255] *SZ*, p. 298; *BT*, p. 345.

[256] Heidegger uses two German terms '*Situation*' and '*Lage*,' which are rendered in English 'Situation' and 'situation,' respectively. Here, he uses the first term; '*Lage*' is used more in the spatial meaning. Cf. *SZ*, p. 300; *BT*, p. 346, fn.1

or 'there' only in and through his disclosedness. Thus, the call of conscience summoning Dasein in his ability-to-be attains a concrete and definite existence in resoluteness.[257] In the call of conscience, listened to in resoluteness with reference to the existential Situation, a concrete attestation of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole occurs in Dasein himself.

2.3.2.3. Anticipatory Resoluteness

So far, our consideration of the whole authentic Dasein has given us two significant phenomena, viz., the existential project of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole, which consists in the authentic being-towards-death or anticipation of death, and the existentielly demonstrated phenomenon of resoluteness as the wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which consists in authentic potentiality-for-being as resoluteness. These two phenomena seem to be certainly interrelated, as Dasein attains his wholeness in anticipation and his authenticity in resoluteness. The question that we face now is the nature of this relationship between anticipation and resoluteness. Only by achieving these two phenomena, would we be able to have a full knowledge of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole. This is our task in this section.

Dasein in his existentiell actualization of authenticity in resoluteness accepts guilt as his ever-present existential structure. The guilt which lies in the very core of Dasein is not a passing feature in Dasein, but is something constant and extends to the entire being of Dasein "right to its (his) end."[258] "Resoluteness is, thus, full and authentic only insofar as it acknowledges and accepts being-guilty unto the end, i.e., insofar as it coincides with a being-unto-death, which simultaneously accepts the being-guilty of Dasein."[259] Through anticipation of death, thus, resoluteness reaches its own authenticity. To quote Heidegger:

Understood as being-towards-the-end — that is to say, as anticipation of death — resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. Resoluteness does not 'have' a connection with anticipation, as with something other than itself. It harbors in itself authentic being-towards-death, as the possible existentiell modality of one's own authenticity.[260]

In other words, only by anticipating Dasein's existential guilt right up to his end, i.e., until his death, does resoluteness become an authentic being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-being.[261] Thus, "resoluteness is authentically and wholly what it can be, only in anticipatory resoluteness."[262] On the other hand, anticipation, which up to now has been considered only as a hypothetical existential projection, is given an existentiell and factical guarantee or attestation through the addition of resoluteness. On this point Heidegger remarks: "Anticipation 'is' not some kind of free-floating behavior, but must be conceived as the possibility of the authenticity of that resoluteness which has been attested in an existentiell way — a possibility hidden in such resoluteness and thus attested therewith."[263] Thus, anticipation of death gives resoluteness its authenticity by making Dasein aware of the constancy of the existential guilt, until his end; while

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[257] Cf. S Z, pp. 298-301; *BT*, pp. 344-347.

[258] Cf. *SZ*, p. 305; *BT*, p. 353.

[259] James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 44.

[260] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 305-306; *BT*, pp. 353-354.

[261] *SZ*, p. 309; *BT*, p. 356.

[262] *SZ*, p. 309; *BT*, p. 356.

[263] *SZ*, p.309; *BT*, p. 357.

resoluteness gives anticipation its facticity, i.e., its ontic dimension, and thus, completes Dasein's wholeness. From what we have said, it is clear that anticipatory resoluteness makes us understand Dasein as existentially structured (by anticipation of death) and existentielly attested (by resoluteness) authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole.[264]

Having already shown the interconnectedness of anticipation and resoluteness, Heidegger moves on to say that this union, i.e., anticipatory resoluteness, is not a connection that is forced from outside, but, that these two elements have real internal connection. To substantiate his claim, he proceeds to show how anticipation and resoluteness complement each other. Firstly, resoluteness, by wanting-to-have-a-conscience, i.e. by listening to the call of conscience, brings back Dasein from his lostness in the 'they' to the possibility of being his authentic self. Here, anticipation enters the picture and reveals death as Dasein's ultimate potentiality, thereby making Dasein's potentiality to be his self completely authentic and wholly transparent. Secondly, the call of conscience, listened to in resoluteness, individualizes Dasein by manifesting in him his own being-guilty. Anticipation, by focusing Dasein's attention on death as his non-relational possibility, further enhances and completes this process of Dasein's individualization. Thirdly, resoluteness points to Dasein's primordial being-guilty as a constant feature of Dasein's existence, and hence that it is not dependent on the incidence or the paying off of the factical indebtedness or guilt. Anticipation, in its turn, uncovers the inevitability of this primordial guilt of Dasein by including in it the notion of death as something that cannot be outstripped by anything.[265]

Carrying the comparison further, Heidegger calls our attention to the similarity in the type of certitude found in resoluteness and anticipation of death. Resoluteness is certain of the existential guilt of Dasein, which makes Dasein's existence insecure. Thus, in resoluteness, Dasein is certain about his own uncertainty of existence. This is so, because in resoluteness Dasein becomes aware that he cannot resolve any given situation, nor hold on to any decision forever, but must hold himself open and free for factical Situations and possibilities.[266] The last of these possibilities towards which Dasein is open in resoluteness is death, which is a certain possibility, yet there is an indefiniteness about it. But the anticipation of death, as the extreme possibility of Dasein, viz. that in death Dasein must simply 'take back' everything, gives resoluteness a certainty that is authentic and whole.[267]

Resoluteness in making Dasein aware of his primordial guilt, as mentioned earlier, also brings with it an indefiniteness which prevails throughout the whole of Dasein's existence. This indefiniteness of resoluteness, in turn, brings anxiety in Dasein. The anticipation of death reveals the fullness of this indefiniteness for it opens Dasein for the greatest indefiniteness of his potentiality-for-being, i.e., death. The anxiety that arises at the face of anticipation of death completes the anxiety that arises in resoluteness from Dasein's awareness of guilt, because the indefiniteness in anticipation of death is the certain possibility of the impossibility of Dasein himself.[268]

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[264] Cf. *ibid.* Cf. also James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 44.

[265] Cf. *SZ*, p. 307; *BT*, pp. 354-355.

[266] The attitude of resolute Dasein, i.e., his being free for current Situations and possibilities, does not amount to the indecisiveness or irresoluteness of inauthenticity. It is rather the acknowledgement of the way things are and confirmation of his own authentic resoluteness. By remaining ever open to the varying Situations, Dasein is aware of his primordial groundlessness, i.e., his existential guilt. Cf. *SZ*, p. 308; *BT*, pp. 355-356.

[267] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 307-308; *BT*, pp. 355-356.

[268] Cf. *SZ*, p. 308; *BT*, p. 356.

Thus, our analysis of the complementary nature of anticipation and resoluteness, clearly shows that the various aspects of the existential concept of death are implicitly concealed in resoluteness and they get completed when understood in the light of the anticipation of death. From this, it is clear that only in anticipatory resoluteness is Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole ultimately revealed. In doing so, we have also clarified both the existential-ontological structure of Dasein and the existentiell-ontical realization of the whole authentic Dasein.[269] Combining these two notions of 'anticipation' and 'resoluteness' J.M. Demske formulates the authenticity of Dasein or his authentic being-towards-death, as follows:

It is the understanding and acceptance of oneself in terms of the negativity of death as one's own most proper and distinctive possibility-to-be [which is non-relational, irretrievable, unsurpassable, certain and yet indeterminate as to its when], which negatively first announces itself through the call of conscience to the silent and unprotestingly anxious acknowledgment of one's own existential guilt; this self-understanding reveals to Dasein its [his] condition of being lost in the inauthentic state of anyone-self [they] and brings it [him] face to face with the possibility of being its [his] own true self by accepting and affirming its [his] own negativity in an impassioned freedom unto death, liberated from popular illusions, factious, sure of itself [himself] and anxious.[270]

Since outside of authentic being-towards-death, Dasein has no authenticity, authentic being-towards-death and authenticity of Dasein are one and the same, viz., anticipatory resoluteness. In this anticipatory resoluteness, we can understand Dasein's potentiality-for-being-an-authentic-whole, i.e., a Dasein who is whole and authentic.

2.3.3. Temporal-Historical Dasein

In the notion of anticipatory resoluteness, we have come to understand Dasein in his wholeness and authenticity. A Dasein that is whole and authentic conveys the idea of relation to his end. In other words, in anticipatory resoluteness we have begun to understand Dasein in his finitude. Now Heidegger raises the question of that which enables Dasein to exist as anticipatory resoluteness in his finitude. In other words, Heidegger raises the issue of the ontological condition for Dasein's existence, as the authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole. In answering this question Heidegger presents temporality as the ground of Dasein's being as care. In this section we will consider the notions of temporality and historicality, which, indeed, is a concretization of temporality.

2.3.3.1. Dasein in His Temporality

In our ordinary understanding, we consider 'time' as a pure and indefinite sequence of 'nows' having no gap or interruption. This stream of 'nows' is endless and irreversible. In such a conception of time, future would consist of the 'nows,' which were and which are no longer; and the present would be the 'now' which is the moment. In this view, time as such and its particular

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[269] James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 46. Cf. also *SZ*, pp. 258-259, 266, 296-297; *BT*, pp. 302-304, 310-311, 342-344.

[270] James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 46. Cf. also *SZ*, pp. 258-259, 266, 296-297; *BT*, pp. 302-304, 310-311, 342-344.

moments, i.e., the 'nows' are considered as present-at-hand reality.[271] While Heidegger does not ignore the validity or justification of this conception of time, he holds that this type of time is not a temporality of Dasein because Dasein is transcendence, and so he ex-ists or stands out above all other entities, in that by anticipation, he is what he can be, i.e., he is his own potentiality. The structure of Dasein's temporality implies a future, a past and a present, and this is something proper to Dasein as existence. "The future, the character of having been [past], and the present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the 'towards-oneself,' the 'back-to oneself' and the 'letting-oneself-be-encountered-by'."[272] These characteristics of 'towards,' 'to' and alongside' show temporality as '*ekstatikon*,' i.e., standing out of itself. "Temporality is the primordial 'out-side-of-itself' in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of future, the character of having been and the present as 'ecstases' of temporality."[273] Thus, in temporality the succession of 'nows' is not an entity. The essence of temporality consists in the temporalizing unity of the ecstases, and temporality itself cannot be spoken of as prior to the ecstases.[274]

As a process, temporality temporalizes in various modes. The basic modes are authentic and inauthentic temporality.[275] The authentic mode of future ectasis is anticipation (*Vorlaufen*), in which, Dasein projects towards his final possibility, viz., death. The future ecstasis of inauthentic temporality is one of awaiting (*Gewaertigen*) one's possibilities. The significance of awaiting consists in the actualization of the thing awaited.[276] The authentic mode of past ecstasis is repetition (*Wiederholung*). It is the way in which Dasein's thrownness can acquire a transparency. The inauthentic mode of the past ecstasis is having forgotten (*Vergessenheit*) in which the thrownness is hidden from Dasein's view.[277] The authentic mode of the present ecstasis is the moment of vision (*Augenblick*), which consists in Dasein being involved with the other two ecstases, viz., anticipation and repetition. In other words, it would amount to his involvement with the environmental and communal worlds, without losing himself. The inauthentic mode of present ecstasis is making present (*Gegenwaertigen*), by which Dasein loses himself in the ready-to-hand.[278] Unlike the inauthentic temporality in which the present ecstasis plays a significant role — as the inauthentic Dasein is concerned mainly with the present — in authentic temporality the ecstasis of future has the pre-eminence. This is because by existing authentically towards death as a future possibility in anticipation, Dasein exists finitely. Thus, since the federal ecstasies makes Dasein appropriate his own being, i.e., finitude, it has a priority over other ecstasies.[279]

Now that we have clarified the notion of temporality of Dasein in general and indicated its authentic and inauthentic modes, we shall reinterpret our preliminary analysis of Dasein in terms of temporality.

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[271] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 329,423-424; *BT*, pp. 377, 475-467.

[272] *SZ*, p. 329; *BT*, p. 377.

[273] *ibid.* The root meaning of the word '*ecstasies*' is standing outside. It is generally used in Greek to mean 'removal' or 'displacement' of something. Heidegger, using this word in relation to Dasein, refers to this quality of 'standing out' above all other entities. The term 'existence' also come from the same root word. Cf. *ibid.*, fn. 2.

[274] Cf. *SZ*, p. 329; *BT*, p. 377.

[275] Cf. *SZ*, p. 328; *BT*, p. 377.

[276] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 261-262, 336-337; *BT*, pp. 306,386.

[277] Cf. *SZ*, p. 339; *BT*, pp. 388-389.

[278] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 328, 338; *BT*, pp. 376, 387-388.

[279] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 330-331, 426-427; *BT*, pp. 378-379,479.

2.3.3.1.1. Temporal Noetic Dasein

Here our main concern is to reinterpret Dasein's disclosedness or being-in (*Da*), viz., understanding, state-of-being and discourse, in terms of temporality. In other words, we want to show that these three modes of Dasein's 'standing in' are not isolated modes, but rather that they constitute a temporal unity with the corresponding ecstasies, viz., the future, the past and the present.

Understanding in its primary and existential sense always is a projecting towards Dasein's potentiality-for-being, for-the-sake-of-which Dasein exists. That is to say, in understanding Dasein is disclosed to what he is capable of. The projection, in virtue of which a possibility of Dasein is understood is always federal. Thus, understanding is fundamentally related to the ecstasies of future. The projective understanding, though it has future as its fundamental ecstasies, must also be related to the other ecstasies of the past and the present in order to be authentic.[280] In authentic understanding, Dasein perceives things in their primordial light. Here, Dasein interprets the present situation in the light of the past, which constitutes Dasein's being as the 'has been' (*Gewesen*), and that of the end which one intends to achieve, in involving himself in this interpretation, viz. the future. Thus, the authentic understanding, by anticipation, takes hold of its past and all the significance it can offer to the present act of interpretation (a moment of vision) and freely moves towards the not-yet (future), thereby bringing new significance and meaning to the thing or the possibility that is understood. But on the contrary, if Dasein loses the essential futurity of his projective understanding, forgets its 'has been,' its significance to the present and to the future, he fails to realize what things are really for and their genuine relatedness as they simply make things present. In this attitude he waits for the actualization of the thing so that he can possess them. This leads Dasein not to see things in the new light, but in the light of the preoccupation of daily life.[281]

Unlike understanding, which is grounded in the ecstasies of the future, the state-of-being, which is the fundamental condition of Dasein as thrown, is founded in the ecstasies of the past. Thus, in state-of-being, the other two ecstasies, viz., future and present, are modified by the past or 'having been.' This is because, in state-of-being, Dasein's past is given to him and he is focused towards the event of his origin, and as a result, every other aspect of Dasein's existence is 'tuned' by what has come before. In spelling out the temporal interplay of the ecstasies of '*Befindlichkeit*,' Heidegger specially deals with fear as the inauthentic mode and anxiety as the authentic mode.[282] In the inauthentic state-of-being, viz., fear, Dasein fails to be in touch with the past, and fails to see his relevance in the future and the present ecstasies because of his absorption in his concern. Thus, when Dasein is under the grip of fear, he is in a state of confusion and, as a result, is not able to understand his past, viz., his background, and his responsibility to make something of the past in the present and in the future. In the state of fear, there involves on the part of Dasein a forgetfulness of the past which brings about a disruption in the temporalizations of the present and the future. This, in its turn, bars Dasein from having a clear vision of the present, but instead makes present his concern. In this state of affairs an authentic anticipation is not possible, but Dasein waits for the object of fear and for the means of escape.[283] Anxiety, on the other hand, is fully open to Dasein's past and helps Dasein to grasp the limits of his being-in-the-world, i.e., a

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[280] Cf. *SZ*, p. 350; *BT*, p. 401.
[281] Cf. *SZ*, P. 336-339; *BT*, pp. 385-389. Cf. also Thomas Langan, *The Meaning of Heidegger*, pp. 45-46.
[282] Cf. *SZ*, p. 340; *BT*, pp. 389-390.
[283] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 341-342; *BT*, pp. 39392.

thrown existence. Thus guided by anxiety, Dasein takes hold of his past and his possibilities and relives them in the present, with reference to his own projections towards the future. In other words, in authentic state-of-being, i.e., in anxiety, Dasein, remaining in the present, turns back into the past to bring what has been, viz., the past possibilities, forward into the future.[284]

The disclosedness of Dasein that is reached in understanding and state-of-being becomes articulated in discourse. Therefore, discourse, as such, does not temporalize in any special ecstasies. But discourse, in itself, is temporal in the sense that all discourses, whether they be talking about something or talking to someone, are grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality. Discourse always is a making present: an understanding which is federal and a state-of-being, which is primordially related to the past. Thus, we can say regarding discourse that, though in it none of the ecstasies of temporality dominates, it is an integration of all the three temporal ecstasies in a dynamic whole.[285]

2.3.3.1.2. Temporal Everyday Dasein

In this section, we want to reinterpret Dasein as everyday being-in-the-world from the aspect of temporality. Dasein, as everyday being, is 'being-alongside-entities-within-the-world.' This mode of Dasein's being raises two issues, viz., circumspective concern and the world. Besides, in his everydayness, Dasein is in the fallen state in which he is constituted of care. Our task here is to consider the temporality of the following themes, viz., circumspective concern, the world and fallenness, which fundamentally constitute Dasein's everyday being-in-the-world.

Firstly, in Dasein's everyday being in the world, he encounters the ready-to-hand (*Zuhanden*) and the present-at-hand (*Vorhanden*). Dasein's circumspective concern for them emerges in the context of the total work-world, i.e., the equipmental system. The fact that Dasein is involved with equipments implies that he possesses *a priori* awareness of the destination or the 'towards-which' of the equipmental system, because Dasein lets the ready-to-hand be involved with him only relating to his purposive activity. This means 'that-which-is-for' of the involvement belongs to Dasein's past and is retained as the 'has been.' Dasein understands that the purpose or the 'towards-which' of the equipmental system also has the structure of awaiting, as it is oriented towards Dasein's projective concern, and thus, has the ecstasies of the future. What is characteristic of the circumspective concern is not awaiting the 'what-for' (future) nor the retention of the destination (past), taken in an isolated manner and constituting the temporal background of the making present. Rather it is the unity of the three ecstasies of temporality that constitutes the circumspective concern in its temporality. In other words, Dasein makes the equipmental system present in his circumspective concern with reference to his future ends, i.e., awaiting future ends, on the basis of the retention from the past.[286] On this point Heidegger remarks: "The awaiting of what it [he] is involved in and — together with this awaiting — the retaining of that which is, thus, involved makes possible in its [his] ecstatical unity the specifically manipulative way in which the equipmental system is made present."[287] The temporality of circumspective concern is clarified,

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[284] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 342-344; *BT*, pp. 393-395. For Heidegger, fear and anxiety are not the only types of state-of-being; there are others, such as disgust, sorrow, despair, joy, enthusiasm and even hope. The state-of-being of hope seems to appear wholly in the future, as in it the past and the present flow into the future. Cf. *SZ*, p. 345; *BT*, pp. 395-396.

[285] Cf. *SZ*, p. 349; *BT*, p. 400.

[286] 286. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 352-353; *BT*, pp. 403-405.

[287] *SZ*, p.353; *BT*, p. 404.

further, with reference to the three modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy. In an equipmental whole, with which Dasein is involved, an equipment emerges into conspicuousness, when it shows itself as unworkable or damaged, and thus holds up the awaiting-retaining-making present by bringing about a collision between the practical aim of Dasein and the 'what-for' of the equipment. Similarly, in Dasein's circumspective look, he discovers an equipment as missing (obtrusiveness) only because the awaiting temporalizes itself in unity with the retention which presents itself. This is also true of obstinacy. In all these three cases, if Dasein does not expect the particular equipment in question to function in the present and in the future, in the way it has done in the past, the break-down in the functioning of the tool will not be noticed. Thus, circumspective concern is fundamentally a temporal unity of expecting (future)-retaining(past)-making present (present).[288]

Secondly, as we have already seen, that the world is a unity of Dasein's referential totalities and their significance. Attempting to interpret the world in terms of temporality, Heidegger says: "The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatic unity, has something like a horizon."[289] The ecstasies of this unity are not without any direction, but each of them has a 'where to' (*ein Wohin*) or direction, which Heidegger calls 'horizonal schemata.' It is different in each ecstasies. The schemata in which Dasein moves towards himself in the ecstasies of the future is the 'for-the-sake-of-himself.' The schemata in which Dasein is disclosed to himself in the ecstasies of 'has been' (past), as thrown to a particular state-of-being, is 'before-what' which includes 'the fact that Dasein is thrown and the 'to which' he is abandoned. Dasein, thus existing 'for-the-sake-of-himself' and as being thrown, finds himself alongside entities and makes present in his concernful dealings with entities. Thus, the horizonal schemata of the present is marked by the 'in-order-to' of entities.[290]

The unity of this horizonal schemata is, in fact, grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality. It determines the way in which factically existing Dasein is disclosed. In the ecstasies of the future Dasein's potentiality-for-being is projected; in the ecstasies of the past Dasein is disclosed as 'being-already; and in the ecstasies of the present Dasein his circumspective concern is disclosed. Thus, Dasein in the ecstatic unity of temporality — Dasein, existing as a potentiality-for-being (future), as thrown (past) and as among essents (present) — understands himself in terms of the unity of horizonal schemata, that is, of the connection between 'for-the-sake-of-himself' of Dasein, the 'in-order-to' of the entities of Dasein's concern and in the light of 'before-what' of Dasein's 'has been.' In grounding the unity of the horizonal schemata of Dasein in the unity of the ecstasies of Dasein's temporaltiy, the world is disclosed to Dasein as the mode of his own being.[291] Heidegger remarks on this point:

In so far as Dasein temporalizes itself [himself], a world too. In temporalizing itself [himself] with regard to its [his] being as temporality, Dasein is essentially 'in the world' by reason of the ecstatico-horizional constitution of that temporality. The world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality. It 'is,' with the 'outside-of-itself' of the ecstasies, 'there.' If no Dasein exists, no world is 'there' either.[292]

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[288] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 354-356; *BT*, pp. 405-408.

[289] *SZ*, p.365; *BT*, p. 416.

[290] Cf. *ibid.*

[291] Cf. *SZ*, p. 365; *BT*, pp. 416-417.

[292] *SZ*, p. 365; *BT*, p. 417. Heidegger also explains the temporality of space in terms of the ecstatico-horizonal character of Dasein's being. Just as the world is understood in relation to Dasein and his temporal

Thirdly, in fallenness Dasein fails to hold on to the future and the past ecstasies and increasingly limits himself to the present. "…falling has its existential meaning in the present."[293] Though fallenness is characterized by three modes, viz., ambiguity, idle-talk and curiosity, Heidegger restricts the investigation of the temporality of fallenness by considering curiosity, in which the temporality of Dasein's fallenness is easily seen.[294] According to Heidegger, curiosity has a distinctive tendency for potentiality-for-seeing. It sees things not to understand them, but only for the sake of seeing and having seen. It does not have a future and past ecstasies. Curiosity's craving for the new is a projection towards the not-yet. But in making present the future possibility, Dasein is caught up in himself and sees the future inauthentically, in that he seeks to run away from waiting for the not-yet as a possibility and sees it, as it were, as something actual. Thus, Dasein is always on the move from one new thing to another and never dwells anywhere.[295] The reason, for the curious Dasein's insistence on continued holding onto the present and avoiding the past ecstasies by retention and the future by anticipation of possibilities, is that in being open to past and future ecstasies there is a greater danger of facing the existential limitation essential to guilt, to one's own last possibility, viz., death, and to the anxiety that comes from it. The continued insistence on the present helps Dasein exist in an unchallenged and inauthentic manner. Thus we see that the falling of Dasein is fundamentally constituted of temporality.[296]

2.3.3.1.3. Temporal Whole Authentic Dasein

We have already seen that Dasein's whole and authentic existence is brought about by anticipatory resoluteness. According to Heidegger, this process of authenticity has a structure corresponding to that of the threefold structure of care. Firstly, the anticipation of death concretizes the moment of authenticity which basically consists in Dasein's being-ahead-of-himself. Secondly, resoluteness in the face of one's own guilt concretizes the moment of already-being-in. Thirdly, the summons into the Situation is the concrete expression of being-with. In interpreting this process of authenticity temporally, Heidegger shows that in his authentic and total existence the being of Dasein is temporal.[297]

Dasein, as being-ahead-of-himself, understands himself with reference to his ownmost potentiality-for-being. In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein opens himself to his ultimate possibility, viz. death, and continues to understand it as a possibility. The standing before this utmost possibility allows him to come towards himself. "This letting-itself [himself]-come-towards-itself [himself] in that distinctive possibility which it [he] puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards."[298]

Thus, the coming of the future into the present as a possibility Heidegger calls the phenomenon of futurity. This is possible only because Dasein as existence is ahead-of-himself and

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character, so also the temporality of space is understood in relation to Dasein. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 367-369; *BT*, pp. 418-421.

[293] Cf. *SZ*, p. 346; *BT*, p. 397.

[294] Cf. *ibid.*

[295] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 346-347; *BT*, pp. 397-399.

[296] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 348-349; *BT*, pp. 399-400. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 148-150.

[297] Cf. James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 48.

[298] Cf. *SZ*, p. 325; *BT*, p. 372.

is oriented towards the future. In the next stage, anticipatory resoluteness in understanding Dasein's own essentially being-guilty takes over this existential guilt as a thrown possibility or as he is already-being-in. In doing so, Dasein comes back to himself, to his already-having-been, viz., to his past. The past can be appropriated to Dasein's present experience only if he is oriented towards the future. At the third stage, anticipatory resoluteness discloses the Situation and Dasein is summoned to it, to the authentic acceptance of the truth of Dasein's fallen being-alongside, a structure in which Dasein finds himself in his encounter with entities within-the-world. Such an encounter is possible by making such entities present.[299]

Anticipation of death, resolute acceptance of existential guilt and summons to the Situation are three moments which are made possible on the basis of the three phenomena, viz., letting-oneself-come-to-oneself (future), coming-back-upon-oneself (past) and encounter (present). Thus, the authentic wholeness of Dasein is made possible by the fact that Dasein in his basic structure is federal, having-been and presencing, i.e., temporal.[300] In other words, the having-been, existential guilt, by coming back upon itself, is appropriated into Dasein's situation through its orientation towards coming, by anticipation of death, together constituting the being of the authentic whole Dasein. Thus, it is clear that the whole authentic Dasein is temporal.

2.3.3.2. Dasein in His Historicality

In our consideration of death as the end of Dasein, anticipatory resoluteness as the basis of his authenticity and particularly temporality as the foundation of Dasein's being, we have attempted to spell out Dasein's authentic being-a-whole. Though our analysis has reached a certain degree of completeness, it is still incomplete because it has not delved into the question of Dasein's birth and the stretch of life 'between' birth and death. So we have overlooked, in our study of Dasein's being-a-whole, the 'connectedness of life (*Lebenszuzammenhang*), which Dasein constantly maintains.[301]

At first glance, this stretch between birth and death and its connectedness seems to be a matter of a sum of successive experiences taking place in time, between these two moments, viz., birth as something that was and is no longer and death as something not-yet but which will happen. The assumption behind this view is the perception of Dasein as a present-at-hand entity and birth and the death as two concrete present-at-hand moments which originate and terminate Dasein's existence respectively, and also happen in time.[302] But Dasein's stretching along is not of this type, as it is being-in-the-world, and birth and death are ever present realities of Dasein's existence as being-in-the-world. Dasein, thus, stretches along in such a way that from the moment of his birth he is constituted as a stretching along. "The 'between' which relates to birth and death already lies in the being of Dasein."[303] In other words, factical Dasein exists as born until he dies and from the moment of his birth he is dying, because by his very nature Dasein is a Being-towards-death. Therefore, as long as Dasein exists factically both of these 'ends' and their 'between' are part of Dasein's being-in-the-world.[304] The movement that is characteristic of the connectedness of Dasein's life, i.e., Dasein's stretching himself along, Heidegger calls 'historizing'

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[299] Cf. *SZ*, p. 325-326; *BT*, pp. 372-374.
[300] Cf. James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 49.
[301] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 372-373; *BT*, pp. 424-425.
[302] Cf. *SZ*, p. 373; *BT*, pp. 425-426.
[303] *SZ*, p. 374; *BT*, p. 426.
[304] Cf. *ibid.*

(*Geschechen*).[305] By clarifying the structure of Dasein's historizing and the existential temporal condition of his possibility we can understand ontologically the historicality of Dasein (*Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins*).[306]

This historicality of Dasein or his history (*Geschichte*) is not different from temporality; rather the former must be elucidated in terms of the latter. To quote Heidegger on this point: "In analyzing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to show that this entity [Dasein] is not temporal because it [he] stands in history, but that, on the contrary, it [he] exists historically and so exists only because it [he] is temporal in the very basis of its [his] being."[307] Therefore the interpretation of the historicality of Dasein is, indeed, a more concrete working out of Dasein's temporality.[308] Thus, our task in this section is to expose the problem of Dasein's historicality in its authentic and inauthentic modes and to present the historical Dasein as the existential basis of any science of history.

2.3.3.2.1. Dasein: A Historical Being

Heidegger begins his exposition of Dasein's historicality by considering the various meanings of the term 'historical' as understood in the ordinary everyday use of the term. Firstly, something is spoken as historical in the sense of something as past and as bygone. Here the 'past' means 'something no longer present-at-hand.' Secondly, something is seen as historical in that it has originated in the past, still continues to be present, having effects on the present, and will continue to affect the future. For example, a temple of the past is present now and will continue to be in the future, having certain effects on the people in the present and in the future. Thirdly, the term 'historical' is referred to the whole of beings that change in time as different from nature, i.e., human groupings, their cultures and civilizations. In this sense man becomes the subject-matter of history. Fourthly, something that is handed over, by way of tradition, is also called historical. All these significations are connected on one point, i.e., they all relate to man as the 'subject' of events.[309]

From our analysis of the various everyday meanings of the term 'historical,' we come to the conclusion that this term is used not only of Dasein, but also of other entities. Now the question arises as to the origin of historicality. Does historicality belong fundamentally and primarily to Dasein or to entities?[310] In answering this question, Heidegger attempts to clarify the way in which the entities in the world, such as nature, and the 'world-historical' entities (*Welt-Geschichtiche*), such as antiques, works of art, books and buildings are historical. Nature, for example, is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been colonized or exploited, as a battlefield, or as a site for a

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[305] The term '*Geschehen*' means a ' happening' or an 'occurrence.' It is translated as 'historizing,' in the sense of 'happening in a historical way.' In this sense, historizing is characteristic of all historical entities and not limited to historians alone. Cf. *SZ*, p. 20; *BT*, p. 41, fn. 1.

[306] In this context, we must distinguish between Heidegger's two uses of the term 'History.' He uses two German words: '*Geschichte*' and '*Historie*.' 'Geschichte' means the actual historical process. The other terms associated with it are: '*Geschchtlichkeit*' (historicality) and '*geschichtlich*' (historical). The term '*Historie*' means the study of the historical process, which is rendered in English as 'Historiology' or Science of History. The other terms associated with it are: '*Historitaet*' (historicity) and '*historisch*' (historic). Cf. *SZ*, p. 10; *BT*, p. 30, fn. 1. Cf. also *SZ*, p. 378; *BT*, p. 430.

[307] *SZ*, p. 376; *BT*, p. 428.

[308] Cf. *SZ*, p. 382; *BT*, p. 434.

[309] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 378-379; *BT*, pp. 430-431.

[310] Cf. *SZ*, p. 379; *BT*, p. 431.

cult.[311] Nature can be spoken of as historical, as it has its historizings (*Geschechen*) in the world. But, its historicality is related to the one who makes them happen. In the example cited earlier, nature's historicality is related to one who would exploit it as a countryside, battlefield, a place of colonization or a site for cult. Take another example of an article in question, which is present now, but belongs to the past. The article is called historical, even though it is not strictly in the past, in the sense of 'being no longer.' But this article, which still exists as a present-at-hand entity, can have the character of the past and historicality because it belonged to an equipmental system that was part of the world of a Dasein that has-been-there (*Da gewesen*). Thus, this article is historical because of its affinity to the Dasein that has-been-there.[312]

The natural consequence that can be drawn from the preceding analysis is that that which is primarily historical is Dasein and the entities we encounter in the world, viz., the nature and the world-historical entities are historical only in a secondary sense.[313] Thus, in the ultimate analysis, "the historizing of history is the historizing of the being-in-the-world."[314] The historicality of Dasein is the historicality of the world, because, 'with the existence of historical being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world."[315]

2.3.3.2.2. Modes of Dasein's Historicality

At the close of the last section we reached the conclusion that Dasein is primarily historical, and entities are historical to the extent they are related to Dasein's historicality. But we have not yet spelled out the basic constitution of this historicality of Dasein. Authentic historicality is the ontological basis for the historicality as a constitutive state of Dasein. Hence, the study of the authentic historicality and asking for the basic constitution of historiality is one and the same.[316] Historicality is authentic if the historizing takes place in the world's essential existent unity with Dasein. If the historizing takes place within-the-world of what is ready-to-hand or what is present-at-hand, then we have the inauthentic mode of Dasein's historicality.[317] In this section we will clarify the authentic mode of historicality and, therefore, explore the basic constitution of Dasein's historicality and distinguish it from inauthentic historicality.

Since historicality is centered fundamentally on Dasein's temporality, as the former is the concrete working out of the latter, the basic constitution of historicity must be sought in temporality, which is the being of Dasein. Since, temporality determines Dasein's authentic whole existence in the mode of anticipatory resoluteness, authentic historizing of Dasein and his authentic historicality (therefore, the basic constitution of Dasein as historical) must be founded on anticipatory resoluteness. In other words, we can speak of the authentic historicality of Dasein only in relation to temporality and anticipatory resoluteness.[318]

In anticipatory resoluteness Dasein understands himself with regard to his potentiality-for-being, by standing face to face with death and taking upon himself his own thrownness and

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[311] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 388-389; *BT*, p. 440.
[312] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 380-381; *BT*, pp. 431-433.
[313] Cf. *SZ*, p. 381; *BT*, p. 433.
[314] *SZ*, p. 388; *BT*, p. 440.
[315] *Ibid.*
[316] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 386-387; *BT*, pp. 438-439.
[317] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 389-390; *BT*, pp. 440-441.
[318] Cf. *SZ*, p. 382; *BT*, p. 434.

resolutely existing in a given situation, projecting upon a particular existientiell possibility. But, anticipation of death existentially, as an unsurpassable innermost possibility, only guarantees the wholeness and authenticity of resoluteness, does not disclose those existentiell-factical possibilities of Dasein which constitute the historizing of the stretch between birth and death. Even Dasein, as a thrown being-in-the-world does not disclose the factical possibilities, as in his everydayness he has submitted himself to the sway of the 'they.' The everyday Dasein's possibility or heritage (*Erbe*) is one of his thrown being-in-the-world, as Dasein is marked by ambiguity, and his understanding is marked by the public way of interpreting his possibilities. But, in fact, it is in resoluteness that Dasein comes back to himself, and it is resoluteness which discloses to Dasein his factical-existentiell possibilities of authentic existing. Thus, it is in resoluteness, i.e., in the resolute taking over of one's thrownness, that heritage — the whole of givenness that Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is with — is handed down to himself.[319] Heidegger remarks: "In one's coming back resolutely into one's thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as having thus come down."[320]

Thus, the more Dasein opens himself to death, in anticipation, and the more resolute he is, to that extent Dasein will find his possibilities. So, 'being free for death' gives Dasein his goal and leads him to his finitude. The Dasein that has grasped the finitude of existence — the authentically existing Dasein — frees himself away from all possibilities of pleasure, of taking things lightly and of evasion, and accepts the heritage that he hands down to himself in his primordial historizing.[321]

The authentically existing, Dasein taking over his heritage which "it [he] has inherited yet freely chosen,"[322] understands himself in terms of 'fate' (*Schicksal*) and destiny (*Geschick*).[323] 'Fate' consists in Dasein's awareness of his finitude in one's possibilities, and 'Destiny' is the communitarian dimension of finite 'givenness.' The latter is not a sum total of the former. Since Dasein is born in a community and his historizing until death takes place in relation to a community, fate cannot be understood apart from destiny. Therefore, Dasein's historizing is always a co-historizing, in the sense that, though he has an individual fate, he still shares in the destiny of the community, as Dasein is an integral part of the community. "Only in communicating and struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its [his] generation goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein."[324] This 'fateful destiny, which Heidegger calls 'the powerless superior power' (*Ohnmaechtige Uebermacht*), i.e., Dasein's finite freedom, makes death, guilt, conscience, freedom and finitude equiprimordially reside together in Dasein's being, and thus, effects Dasein's authentic historicality.[325] Heidegger sums this up as follows:

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[319] Cf. *SZ*, p. 383; *BT*, pp. 434-435.
[320] *SZ*, p. 383; *BT*, p. 435.
[321] Cf. *SZ*, p. 383; *BT*, p. 345.
[322] Heidegger's implication in speaking of 'inherited but chosen' is that those who have not authentically opened themselves in accepting their fate, may not possess the fate. Cf. *SZ*, p. 384; *BT*, p. 436.
[323] The terms '*Schicksal*' and '*Geschick*' are related to the root word '*schicken*' (to send). They are often used as synonyms. But, Heidegger uses these words to refer to the destiny of the resolute individual and the destiny of the community, respectively. Cf. *SZ*, p. 385; *BT*, p. 436, fn. 1.
[324] *SZ*, pp. 384-385; *BT*, p. 436.
[325] Cf. *SZ*, p. 385; *BT*, p. 437.

Only an entity which, in its [his] being, is essentially FEDERAL so that it [he] is free for its [his] death and lets itself [himself] be thrown back upon its [his] factical 'there' by shattering itself [himself] against death — that is to say, only an entity which, as federal, is equiprimordially in the process of HAVING BEEN — can, by handing down to itself [himself] the possibility it [he] has inherited, take over its [his] own thrown existence and be IN THE MOMENT OF VISION for 'its[his] time.' Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate — that is to say, authentic historicality.[326]

Resoluteness may not know the origin of his potentialities explicitly. But if he does know it explicitly, it is known in repetition (*Wiederholung*) which consists in handing down explicitly, by going back into the possibilities as that-has-been-there. Thus, authentic repetition consists in anticipatory resoluteness, for only in it can Dasein first make the choice which would make him free for a faithful handing over of what he considers worth repeating. Such repetition does not bring again (*wiederbringen*) something that is past, nor bind the present to that which is no longer, but makes a reciprocative rejoinder (*erwiedert*) to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there, understanding his genuine originality. Resolute historicality, interpreted in this way, has its focus neither in the past nor today, nor in its connection with the past, but in the authentic historizing of existence, which originated from Dasein's future, i.e., in Dasein's authentic being-towards-death.[327] "As a way of being for Dasein, history has its roots so essentially in the future, that death, as that possibility of Dasein, throws anticipatory existence back upon its [his] factical thrownness, and so for the first time imparts to having-been its [his] peculiarly privileged position in the historical."[328] From this it is clear that Dasein does not become first historical in repetition, but only because he is historical as temporal can he take over himself in his historicality by repetition. "Authentic being-towards-death (anticipatory resoluteness) — that is to say finite temporality — is," therefore, "the hidden basis of Dasein's (authentic) historicality."[329] Such an authentic historical Dasein understands the entities in relation to himself and passes on this authentic dimension of his primary historicality to entities in his being-in-the-world. Therefore, a genuine world history is that which is understood in terms of Dasein's fateful destiny.

Having explored the authentic mode of historicality, i.e., the constitution of Dasein as historical, we can move on to consider how inauthentic historiality is different from the authentic historicality of Dasein. The inauthentic factical Dasein, in his fallenness, is entangled with the objects of his concern. Such a Dasein considers himself 'one-like-many' under the influence of the 'they.' He understands himself in terms of the entities within-the-world because in inauthentic state Dasein himself is not the sphere of historizing, which takes place in the realm of the present-at-hand entities. Thus, Dasein understands his history world-historically, seeing himself as the subject of events and circumstances, and thereby as having a substantial existence. This perception of his history brings to Dasein a disconnected view of his history. Inauthentic historicality lacks the connectedness of the authentic mode of historicality; every event is an isolated moment that appears and after a while disappears.[330] This perception is due to the fact that inauthentic Dasein is totally not in touch with the fundamental features of his being-in-the-world, i.e., his being as a continuous stretch from his birth to death. In other words, Dasein in his inauthenticity is blind to

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[326] *Ibid.*

[327] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 385-386; *BT*, pp. 437-438.

[328] *SZ*, p. 386; *BT*, p. 438.

[329] *Ibid.*

[330] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 389-390; *BT*, pp. 441-442.

his fate, i.e., he is unaware of his finitude and wholeness. Due to the lack of the awareness of the connectedness of existence, he lives today and in awaiting the new thing has already forgotten the old. Besides, under the sway of the 'they' inauthentic Dasein evades choice. Since he is blind to his possibilities, no repetition of the past is possible in the inauthentic state; all he has is the actual leftover from the past, i.e., information about that which was present-at-hand. Thus, Dasein's present is loaded with the past.[331] It is only in inauthentic historicality that the question of the connectedness of life's stretch becomes a basic issue, as, unlike in authentic historicality the unity of life is shattered.[332] Thus, the inauthentic mode of historicality, is not a historicality, in the strict sense, since it lacks the basic characteristics of being historical.

2.3.3.2.3. Historical Dasein: The Existential Source of Historiology

We have already said that Dasein is historical in the primordial sense and the historicality of entities is only secondary. If this is the case every factual science must be dependent on the Dasein that is authentically historical, and historiology (*Historie*) must be founded on Dasein's historicality in an intimate way, as the former is the study of the history (*Geschichte*) of Dasein. The claim of Heidegger is that historiology is ontologically rooted in the historicality of Dasein and so it must not be conceived as an abstraction made from the studies of other sciences.[333] To quote Heidegger: "Whether the historiological disclosure of history is factically accomplished or not, its ontological structure is such that, in itself, this disclosure has its roots in the historicality of Dasein."[334] To grasp the 'how' of this would amount to arriving at an existential origin of historiology from the historicality of Dasein. We propose to do this in this section.

Historiology, as a science, aims at the disclosure of historical entities. It is done, as any other science, by thematizing. The approach to the thematization demarcates the realm of thematizing, and this, in turn, gives methodological directives. If a historical entity of the past is to be investigated, it must be thematized in relation to the equipmental systems which belong to the world of the Dasein as 'having-been-there,' to which it was a part in the past. If the Dasein — to which this past entity is related — no longer exists, then this object is related to the Dasein that has-been-there as something that has-been-there. Thus, the entity of the past, which we intend to thematize in historiology, also must have the kind of being of Dasein, as the having-been-there, because only Dasein is primarily historical and every historiological thematization must be made in relation to the Dasein which is historical.[335] Thus, relics of the past monuments, records and reports can function as possible matter for historical investigation only because they are already world-historical in their mode of being, by their relationship to a Dasein that has-been-there. These entities, which are accepted for thematization as related to a Dasein that has-been-there, can be meaningfully studied, examined and assessment made of them only on the basis of the historicality of the contemporary Dasein, i.e., the historian, who does the historiological investigation. Thus, in the authentic historicality of Dasein, manifested in the repetitive disclosure of what-has-been-there, lies the existential foundation of historiology, as a science.[336] Basing itself on Dasein's authentic historicality, historiology reveals by repetition of the Dasein which has-been-there in his

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[331] Cf. *SZ*, p. 391; *BT*, pp. 443-444.
[332] Cf. *SZ*, p. 390; *BT*, pp. 441-442.
[333] Cf. *SZ*, p. 393; *BT*, p. 445.
[334] *SZ*, p.392; *BT*, p. 444.
[335] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 393-394; *BT*, pp. 445-446.
[336] Cf. *SZ*, p. 394; *BT*, p. 446.

possibility and thereby manifests the universal in the particular. Therefore, the theme of historiology is the authentic existential potentiality as it has-been-there. "The theme of historiology is neither that which had happened once for all, nor something universal that floats above it, but the possibility which has been factically existent."[337]

Since the past Dasein as the has-been-there is the basic theme of historiology and can be disclosed in repetition as a resolute fate, a true historian who treats this theme historiologically, can disclose the history of the past in his potentialities so powerfully that he may have telling effects on the future. "Only by historicality which is factical and authentic can the history of what has-been-there, as a resolute fate, be disclosed in such a manner that in repetition the 'force' of the possible gets struck home into one's factical existence — in other words, that it comes towards that existence in its federal character."[338] Therefore, historiology takes its starting point not from the present moving towards the past, but from the future. "…historiological discourse temporalizing in terms of the future."[339] The selection of what is to be the object of historiology "has already been met with in the factical existentiell choice of Dasein's historicality, in which alone historiology first of all arises and in which alone it is,"[340] i.e., in the historian who does the historiological investigation.

According to Heidegger, such an unveiling of what has-been-there, based on fateful repetition and done by a genuine historian, is not to be considered 'subjective' in the negative sense. On the contrary, only such a thematization, based on the authentic historicality of the historian can guarantee the 'objectivity' of historiology. The validity of any science depends on its object being thematically presented to understanding in its true being without any disguise. This is true of historiology if the historicality of the historian makes the theme objectively possible.[341] But Heidegger warns about the possibility of historiology being either used for life or abused, as historiology is based on Dasein's historicality. If the historicality is genuine, authentic and founded on the fateful destiny of Dasein, then it is used for life. Founding historiology on inauthentic historicality would amount to abusing it.[342]

Now that we have looked into the threefold dimensions of Dasein's being as care, in the following section we move on to understand who Dasein is in the state of care.

2.4. Dasein in the State of Care

Dasein's being as care manifests the human person in his ultimate finality. Everything, including Dasein and his being, is understood in relation to his self and his world. Dasein is the focus of attention and everything revolves around him. Yet Dasein is viewed as a finite existence characterized by existential guilt, existential limitations and existential death. Thus we have a seemingly contradictory image of the human person when we consider him in terms of care. We elaborate, in this section, Dasein's being as care in these twofold aspects.

2.4.1. Dasein: The Self-sufficient Existence

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[337] *SZ*, p. 395; *BT*, p. 447.
[338] *Ibid.*
[339] *Ibid.*
[340] *Ibid.*
[341] *Ibid.*
[342] Cf. *SZ*, p. 396; *BT*, p. 448.

Dasein is a unique type of being. He is just like any other entity in the world. Yet, he transcends all other entities, as he has a pre-conceptual understanding of Being, as only in relation to Dasein is everything else understood. That is why he is referred to as 'existence' and 'transcendence.' He could never be the object of any one's concern except that of himself. Of all entities, it is only for Dasein that existence is an issue. Thus, Dasein stands out and stands apart from all other entities. Besides, existential Dasein is always one's own and is characterized by 'my-ownness.' This 'my-ownness' of Dasein, on the one hand, gives him uniqueness and, on the other hand, makes him a free and self-sufficient being which needs to make his own choices and decisions, and be responsible for them. Dasein, thus, has to depend on his own self for his personal concern. Thus, this quality of 'my-ownness' cuts Dasein off from others and moves him to his self and world. Because Dasein is unique and his own, he is the only type of being that can be authentic or inauthentic in his choices and living. Since Dasein is his own possibilities, he can choose or lose himself, own his possibilities or reject them, build up or forget his own being. Thus, Dasein is what he makes of himself; his life and choices depend totally upon him.[343]

Dasein also has a priority over all other entities in the sense that he is the existential horizon in relation to which everything else is studied and understood. Dasein, with his pre-conceptual understanding of Being, is the only being that raises the question of the meaning of Being. In other words, the meaning and truth of Being can be understood only in the light of Dasein. Besides the meaning and truth of entities depend on Dasein. One cannot speak of the truth of entities apart from Dasein, as the discoverdness of entities is possible only for the discovering Dasein. Thus, Dasein is the meaning-giver and the foundation of every truth. Therefore, not only is ontology the study of Being, but, also any science, for that matter, is possible only because there is Dasein. If it were not for Dasein, no meaningful study of reality is possible.[344]

This indispensability of Dasein for any meaningful study of reality consists in that Dasein is understanding. Understanding discloses to Dasein what he is capable of, viz., his possibilities and that of the entities. This disclosure is not merely theoretical, but existential and practical. Dasein's understanding involves not mere knowledge of the possibilities, but also the project on the basis of which these possibilities can be actualized. Therefore, understanding his possibilities, Dasein makes assertions. Besides, Dasein can communicate the interpretation of the projective understanding in discourse. In this manner Dasein becomes the basis for any meaningful study of reality.[345]

Dasein, as projective understanding, is always 'in-the-world.' The term 'in-the-world' is not to be taken in the spatial, but in the existential sense of relatedness to the world. Dasein is part of the environmental and social worlds. The former consists of Dasein's being-along-side the entities in his concernful dealings and preoccupation, while the latter refers to Dasein's relationship of solitude with other Daseins. It is a relationship of 'being-with.' These relationships, of 'being-along-side' entities and being-with others constitute Dasein's world. Dasein's world is nothing other than the complex matrix of his relationships within this environmental world and the social world and the totality of their meaningfulness. Thus, the meaning of the world, both in its environmental and social aspects, is ultimately related to Dasein, which is the ultimate 'for-the-sake-of-which' and towards which everything moves.[346]

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[343] Cf. Vensus A. George, p. 147.
[344] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 148.
[345] Cf. *ibid.*
[346] Cf. *ibid.*

Not only in his noetic and relational dimensions, but also in his authentic and historical aspects Dasein is presented as self-sufficient existence. The fallen Dasein is called back to his authentic self by the call of conscience. The subject who calls is the fallen and anxious Dasein in his 'not-at-homeness'; he calls himself to be his authentic possibility. When the fallen Dasein listens to his own call — by wanting-to-have-a-conscience in resoluteness, in the given 'Situation' — he moves towards authenticity. The anticipation of death as the ultimate possibility facilities this process. Thus, the anticipation of Dasein's own death in resoluteness, i.e., anticipatory resoluteness, is that by which Dasein attains his authenticity. Dasein needs none other than himself for his authenticity. Neither the environmental nor the social world has any influence on Dasein's self-hood. In other words, Dasein's authentic existence is attained neither by his 'being-along-side' entities, nor by his being-with other Daseins. It is achieved rather by Dasein's "being-oneself" in anticipatory resoluteness, i.e., in his anticipation of death as the final possibility in resolute reflection. Anticipation of death, when seen as Dasein's 'being-towards-his-end,' not only leads Dasein to his authentic state, but also reveals to Dasein his completeness and wholeness. Dasein, thus, understands his totality not in relation to anything else but himself.[347]

The wholeness of Dasein, and all that is said about Dasein, is based on Dasein's temporal nature. We can have a grasp of Dasein as a human existing reality only in relation to the three ecstasies of temporality, viz., the 'what-has-been' (past), the 'not-yet' (future) and the 'what-is' (present). This makes Heidegger clarify every previous notion regarding Dasein in the light of temporality in the later part of *Being and Time*. When this temporality is concretized — and seen in relation to the stretch of life between the birth and death of a reality — then, we have the history of that reality. The study of such history or a number of such histories in relatedness is historiology. Thus, the temporal-historical nature of Dasein or that of any other entity in the world can be understood only in relation to Dasein. No science of historiology is possible if there is no historical Dasein who is the existential source of any scientific study of historical events. Thus, both temporality and historicality can be understood only in relation to temporal-historical Dasein.[348]

Our consideration of Dasein, so far — as existence, the existential horizon of every other reality, as projective understanding and as the basis of his own wholeness, authenticity, temporality and historicality — clearly points to Dasein's self-sufficiency in the state of care. Having dwelt on Dasein's self-sufficient existence, we move now to analyze Dasein in his finite and limited existence.

2.4.2. Dasein: The Finite Existence

Many sections in *Being and Time* depict Dasein as inauthentic, swayed by moods, anxious, estranged and alienated. These sections present Dasein as an existence that is finite, helpless and dependent. Dasein's disclosedness is characterized by the 'state-of-being'; William J. Richardson calls it Dasein's "already-being-found-itself (himself)-thereness." It is the experience of Dasein as being 'placed' in a given 'Situation.' This state is characterized by various moods. Thus, in the state-of-being Dasein experiences himself as being thrown or being delivered over in a situation in which he is controlled by various moods such as anxiety, fear or joy. This thrownness is not only a handing over of Dasein to his own moods, but also a thrownness among entities, because Dasein always finds himself as involved with realities other than himself. This involvement with entities does matter to Dasein, often they too produce various moods in Dasein. Thus, the

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[347] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 148-149.
[348] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 149.

thrownness among entities involves Dasein's submissiveness to, and helplessness before, the entities among which he is thrown. Here, we see Dasein's being as limited by his moods with which he finds himself and by the entities among which he is 'placed.'[349]

The thrown factical Dasein is characterized by existential guilt (*Schuld*). It is not to be taken in the moral and legal sense of guilt, viz., as being indebted to, or being responsible for. Here the term 'guilt' is taken in the existential and primordial sense. Guilt is something that belongs to Dasein's nature fundamentally and essentially. It is an existential lack in Dasein's Being. It consists in twofold existential limitations. The first is related to Dasein's thrownness. The thrown Dasein, as he finds himself in his thrown existence, is not able to choose his own ground or the state-of-being. In the concrete it means that the condition, time and all such details of Dasein's birth and early growth are determined for Dasein by his thrownness. Neither is Dasein able to get back behind his own thrownness and know the "how" and "why" of his thrownnes. It continues in one's life, as one is thrown in various 'Situations' without ever desiring them. This existential limitation makes Dasein groundless, as he is not an explanation for his own thrown existence. In other words Dasein has no power over his ownmost being, as he did not cause his existence. The second existential limitation consists in the limitation that constitutes Dasein's choices. In the given existential 'Situation,' Dasein is not free to choose all his possibilities. In choosing one possibility he has to give up all others. This unavoidable preclusion of all the other alternatives except the one chosen constitutes the second existential limitation. Both existential limitations make Dasein's existence groundless and dependent in relation to the past ecstasies of Dasein.[350]

Just as existential guilt and existential limitations keep Dasein's past in abeyance, so also Dasein's 'being-towards-death' keeps his future in abeyance. Because death is an existential of Dasein that is present with Dasein from the moment of his birth and the fact that it is Dasein's ownmost possibility of the impossibility of his Being — along with death's indefiniteness as to its when — Dasein has no hold on his own being relating to the future. Thus, death brings a basic limitation of Dasein relating to the future, as it makes Dasein's existence finite.[351]

As existential guilt, existential limitations and death point to the groundless nature of Dasein's own existence; relating to the past and the future respectively, Dasein feels a sense of unsettlement within himself. This unsettlement expresses itself in the mood of anxiety. The anxious Dasein avoids facing his existential state-of-being (past) and existential death (future) and focuses only on the present ecstasies. Living only in the present leads Dasein to the state of fallen existence. The fleeing of Dasein from his own truth about himself presents a Dasein that is anxious and helpless.[352]

In the state of fallen existence Dasein gets lost in the present involvement, so much so that Dasein is cut off from his past and the future. This results in a breakdown in the temporal character of Dasein. Since, Dasein is focused fully on the present, he loses his unique existence and gets lost in the 'they' which gives him a publicness in which his choices are determined by others. Here life is characterized by everyday mediocrity. Dasein now believes that he is his true self, while being far away from the truth about himself. His thinking is characterized by ambiguity, his speech by idle talk and his motive for action turns out to be curiosity. It is a state of alienation and

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[349] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 150.
[350] Cf. *ibid.*
[351] Cf. *ibid.*
[352] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

estrangement in which Dasein runs away from anxiety that results from the awareness of existential guilt and existential death.[353]

The analysis of Dasein's state-of-being, existential guilt, existential limitations, death and fallen state clearly points to the finite, helpless, dependent and anxious Dasein, whose existence is marked by tragic sense.

Thus, in the state of care, Dasein perceives himself in different moods. Sometimes he thinks that he is the ultimate source in relation to whom Being, meaning and truth are understood. At other times, he feels that he is a dependent, finite and helpless Dasein. This confusion about his nature also blinds him regarding his destiny and how to work towards it. In this manner, Dasein continues to be caught up in care.

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[353] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 151.

The Occurrence of the Experience of Being

In the first chapter we looked into the reality of Being which is the goal of Dasein. The nature of Being was clarified in terms of the notions of the fourfold and the relationship between Being, Dasein and entities. We also clarified the characteristics of Being; the manifestation of Being takes place in history in a time-space play. We also spoke of the realm of *Ereignis* in which Dasein can encounter Being. When Dasein comes into a face-to-face relationship with Being, he becomes the lighting-up-place of Being, the shepherd of Being and the seer of the truth of Being. The second chapter dealt with the condition that must be removed to attain the experience of Being, namely, the state of care, in which Dasein's being is constituted of threefold concerns, viz., epistemological, relational and existential. In the state of care, Dasein experiences himself in a contradictory manner; he perceives himself both as a self-sufficient being who does not need the help of any other, and as a finite and dependent being. Only when Dasein comes to grips with this confusion about himself and moves away from a wrong self-perception would he be able to achieve total authenticity. This is possible only when Dasein moves from an existence characterized by care to a way of being that involves an openness to the manifestation of Being. In the light of the last two chapters this chapter will discuss how Dasein can attain this total authentic state of existence. In elaborating this point, we will consider the path to, and the attainment of, the experience of Being. We will bring to light also the total authenticity of Dasein as goal of the experience of Being.

3.1 The Path to the Experience of Being

Having looked into the goal of Dasein, viz, Being, and the state of care, which Dasein must escape in order to attain the experience of Being, we will now consider the path of Dasein that leads him to his goal. In order that Dasein attain the goal of experiencing Being he must move through an ascending path of essential thinking of Being as dwelling in the neighborhood of Being and seeing its truth. Here, we shall study these three stages of the path of Dasein to the experience of Being.

3.1.1. The Essential Thinking of Being

The essential thinking of Being does not consist merely in having an opinion about something. It is neither a representing, nor the development of a conceptual system of thinking with a chain of logical premises which lead to valid and certain conclusions. Besides, it cannot be brought under any logical categories, and hence is neither practical nor theoretical; rather, it comes to pass before all these distinctions.[1] Thus, thinking of Being overcomes onto-theo-logical thinking and language.[2] Such thinking is non-subjective, non-representative and non-logical in the sense of pre-subjective, pre-representative and pre-logical respectively. This means that this thinking is not irrational, but pre-rational;[3] it is anti-logic, yet not illogical.[4] Speaking about his book, *What Is*

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[1] Cf. *BW*, p. 236.
[2] Cf. *ID*, p. 66; *IAD*, p. 73.
[3] Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 19-20.
[4] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 345; *BW*, p. 227.

Called Thinking?, Heidegger says that it not a treatise on thinking. He admonishes his students that they must not think about what thinking is;[5] rather they should learn to think.[6] Heidegger uses many names to refer to this thinking of Being (*Seinsdenken*): meditative thinking (*besinnliches Denken*),[7] essential thinking (*wesenliches Denken*),[8] primordial thinking (*anfaenliches Denken*),[9] recollective thinking (*andenkendes Denken*)[10] and courageous thinking (*herzhaftes Denken*).[11] Now we shall move on to analyze its nature and characteristics.

3.1.1.1. The Nature of Essential Thinking

Clarifying the meaning of the title of his book, *What Is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger speaks of the four possible ways in which it can be interpreted. Firstly, it can refer to the question about the meaning of the word 'thinking.' Secondly, it can mean what thinking signifies in the history of thought. Thirdly, it can be a question about the pre-requisites needed to think rightly. Fourthly, the question can also mean: "What calls us into thinking?," or "What evokes thinking in us?"[12] Heidegger, while recognizing the validity of each of these interpretations, holds to the fourth interpretation as it decisively poses the question, in spite of the fact that it is foreign to common understanding.[13] The fourth interpretation, viz., "What is it that directs us into thought and gives us direction for thinking?"[14] already presupposes that there is a relation between Being and thinking as between the caller and the called.[15] Thus, essential thinking involves a call from Being which evokes thought in Dasein and a response from Dasein. Our analysis of the nature of essential thinking in this section will consist in treating it as a call of Being and a response from Dasein.

3.1.1.1.1. Essential Thinking: A Call of Being

Heidegger says: "We never come to thoughts. They come to us."[16] Essential thinking is not something which man can do as and when he wants. Man can be an essential thinker only in so far as he stands in the 'lighting' of Being.[17] In this process Being is primary, for thinking belongs to Being. Dasein is able to think only because he is enabled (*vermoegen*) to think. The enabling is a

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[5] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Was Heisst Denken?*, 3. Auflage (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1971.), p. 9 (Hereafter: *WD*); Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?*, trans. J.G. Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 21 (Hereafter: *WCT*).

[6] Cf. *WD*, p. 75; *WCT*, p. 86.

[7] Cf. *GL*, p. 13.

[8] Cf. *WM*, p. 48.

[9] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 49.

[10] Cf. *WD*, p. 95.

[11] Cf. *GL*, p. 25.

[12] Cf. *WD*, p. 79; *WCT*, pp. 113-114.

[13] Cf. *WD*, pp. 79-80; *WCT*, pp. 114-115.

[14] Cf. *WD*, p. 80; *WCT*, p. 115.

[15] Cf. *WD*, p. 162; *WCT*, p. 243. Cf. also William J. Richardson, Heidegger: *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 596

[16] Martin Heidegger, *Aus der Erfahrung des Denken*, 4 Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), p. 11 (Hereafter: *ED*); *PLT*, p. 6.

[17] Cf. *SG*, p. 147.

favor (*Moegen*) Being bestows on man,[18] thereby presencing man in his essence, i.e., as an essential thinker.

Being enables thinking in man because 'it wants' (*es braucht*)[19] thought and 'there is need for' thinking. "By reason of its nature Being must itself be served, tended, guarded by thought, and hence is 'in want of' thought in order to be itself."[20] There is a relationship between Being's giving (*es gibt*) and Being's wanting (*es braucht*).[21] Thus, Being's giving itself is its wanting itself. In wanting itself to be thought, Being gives itself to thought. In this wanting is concealed an appeal that calls forth thought.[22] Thus, Being calls man to think. The call of Being is not a periodical one nor is man's thinking an occasional human activity, for the former is something constant while the latter is something essential to man. Man is a thinker only because he is called to think.[23]

The German term '*heissen*' (to call) has a variety of meanings, such as invite, instruct, demand and direct. It is related to the word '*keleuein*' which means 'to get something underway,' The old use of the term '*heissen*' also means 'letting reach' (*gelassen lassen*). Thus, the term '*heissen*' in its original use has the notion of 'helpfulness.'[24] The analysis of the term '*heissen*' clearly points to the fact that that which calls us to think helps us to think, by giving itself to think. Heidegger says: "What calls us to think, gives food for thought."[25] That which gives food for thought is "that which is eminently thought-worthy" (*das Bedenklichste*),[26] viz., Being, which gives to thought its to-be-thought.

The mode in which Being gives itself to thought is one of withdrawing. In other words, what calls on us to think and gives food for thought gives itself as withdrawing. Withdrawal is not totally negative in the sense of absence of Being, but something real and actual. It is not nothing, but the presence of Being as absent. When Being withdraws itself from us, it draws us in such a way that we bear the stamp of being drawn toward; thereby we ourselves become pointers, pointing towards Being. It is the withdrawing presence of Being that calls man to thinking and that which looks for thinking in man.[27] Thus, calling Dasein to think, Being gives itself to be thought and wants itself to be thought. It draws man to thinking by withdrawing itself from him, thereby making him a pointer to itself.

In the "Postscript" to *What Is Metaphysics?* Heidegger speaks of the call of Being, which to a certain extent is comparable with the mode of Being's gift of itself in its withdrawing. Here it is in the context of anxiety: Being calls Dasein to itself. Anxiety is an experience of Beinglessness (*Seinlosigkeit*).[28] Being is the noiseless voice which makes itself heard in Dasein through the attunement of anxiety. In the attunement of anxiety Dasein may learn to experience Being in the

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[18] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 314; *BW*, p. 169.

[19] Heidegger translates the Parmenedian word '*chere*' into German '*es braucht*,' which is rendered in English as 'there is want of' or 'there is need of.'

[20] Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 597; Cf. also *WD*, p. 85; *WCT*, p.121.

[21] Cf. *WD*, p. 116; *WCT*, p. 189. For a clear exposition of '*es gibt*' — Cf. *SD* pp. 1-25; *TB*, pp. 1-24.

[22] Cf. *WD*, p. 119; *WCT*, p. 196.

[23] Cf. *WD*, p. 80; *WCT*, p. 115.

[24] Cf. *WD*, p. 82; *WCT*, p. 117.

[25] *WD*, p. 85; *WCT*, p. 121.

[26] *WD*, p. 131; *WCT*, p. 164.

[27] Cf. *WD*, p. 5; *WCT*, p. 9.

[28] Cf. *WM*, p. 46; *EB*, p. 353.

form of non-Being.[29] In other words, through anxiety Being lights up in man its own relation to Dasein's essence. The noiseless voice of Being is a call and an appeal to Dasein to be the place where its truth can be preserved. Heidegger stresses that the call is not Dasein's doing, but something that comes from the bounty of Being. Thus, the essential thinking is an occurrence of Being which comes from Being's initiative.[30]

3.1.1.1.2. Essential Thinking: Dasein's Response

Though essentially primordial thinking comes about from the initiative of Being, yet Dasein is not a mere passive agent in the process of responding. Dasein needs to concentrate upon the call of Being. It involves a certain activity in the process of essential thinking.[31] Dasein, thus, responds to the voice of Being by a response that is 'corresponding'(*entsprehend*) to the call. The term 'correspondence' (*Entsprehung*), which in normal usage meaning 'response,' 'answer' or 'reply,' Heidegger uses in the sense of 'conformity' or 'agreement.'[32] So, to correspond to the call of Being is to attune oneself to the call of Being, to 'echo' the voice of Being and to be obedient to the voice of Being.[33] As Dasein is called to think, the primordial corresponding consists in giving oneself to genuine thinking.[34] The call to thinking, and the corresponding response on the part of Being and Dasein respectively, involves a twofold relationship between Being and Dasein: Being 'calls' and 'gives'; Dasein 're-calls'(re-collects) and 'thanks.' In other words, Being 'calls' Dasein to think and 'gives' itself as food for thought and Dasein responds by 're-collecting' in memory the call of Being and 'thanking' Being for its gift of itself. This relationship can be substantiated by the etymological relatedness of the word '*Denken*' (to think) to '*Gedaechtnis'* (memory) and '*Danken*' (to thank). The root word '*Gedanc*,' a middle German word contains the nuances of thinking, memory and thanking.[35] We could now spell out re-collection and thanksgiving as Dasein's response to the call and giving of Being respectively.

Dasein responds to the call of Being by re-calling (*Ge-denken*) the gift of Being. The root term '*Gedanc*,' from which '*Gedaechtnis*' derives, means the 'gathering that recalls.'[36] Thus, '*Gedaechtnis*' consists in the 'gathering-together' of the gift of Being thoughtfully and holding it in memory. In other words, the gathering-together is a re-collection (*An-denken*) in memory.[37] The re-collection consists in Dasein thinking on the source, viz., Being, which is most thought-provoking,[38] and which called Dasein in the first place to think. By thinking as the gift of Being, Dasein gathers-together in memory the thought of Being and lets it rest in the center of his being,

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[29] In his essay "What Is Metaphysics," Heidegger speaks of Being, as Non-Being (*das Nichts*). But, here, he does not mean 'non-existence' (*das Wesenlose, das Nichtige*), but sees Being as purely the 'other' than everything that is, i.e., 'that-which-is-not' (*das nicht Seiende*). Cf. *WM*, pp. 45-46; *EB*, p. 353.

[30] Cf. *WM*, pp. 46-48; *EB*, pp. 354-356.

[31] Cf. *HW*, p. 214. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, p. 79.

[32] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Was Ist Das — die Philosophie?*, 5 Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1972), p. 21 (Hereafter: *WP*). Martin Heidegger, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. W. Kluback and J.T. Wild (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1958), p. 69 (Hereafter: *WIP*).

[33] Cf. *WM*, pp. 50, 51; *EB*, pp. 358, 360.

[34] Cf. *TK*, p. 40; *QCT*, p. 41.

[35] Cf. *WD*, pp. 91-94; *WCT*, p. 138-147.

[36] Cf. *WD*, p. 92; *WCT*, p. 139.

[37] Cf. *ibid.*

[38] Cf. *HD*, p. 150.

viz., the heart (*Herz*).[39] In doing so, Dasein 'keeps' (*verwahrt*) and preserves (*bewahrat*) Being — that which is most thought worthy — from oblivion, i.e., from being forgotten.[40] In the process of re-collection, Being becomes present to, and real to, Dasein, and the differences of 'here,' 'there,' 'now' and 'then' disappear.[41] Thus, by re-collection Dasein responds to Being by offering the center of his being, viz., the heart, as the lighting-up place for Being. Besides, re-collection, by opening up the world of Being to Dasein and constantly keeping the gift of the call to thinking in memory, raises in Dasein a sense of gratitude and thanksgiving.

The German root word '*Gedanc*' not only means memory or re-collection, but also 'thanks.' Memory and thanksgiving go together and belong together. Thanksgiving emerges in Dasein, when it gathers into his heart the call and giving of Being in re-collective memory. In other words, only in re-collective gathering, i.e. memory, is Being, which calls Dasein and gives itself to be thought, thanked. Memory, as the re-collection of Being is a thanking of Being: for Heidegger, every memorial service is a thanksgiving service.[42]

Having shown the relationship between recollection and thanksgiving, we could analyze what thanking is and how Dasein responds to Being by thanking. Being's supreme gift to the thinker (Dasein) is the very Being by which he is a thinker. By calling to thinking and giving itself as food for thinking, Being makes Dasein the thinker of Being. The best way to respond to this giving of Being is accepting the gift, which would mean that Dasein assumes the call and yields to it. Acceptance is the most original form of thanksgiving.The acceptance of the gift of Dasein's nature, as the thinker of Being, involves giving of oneself to thinking. Thinking is thanksgiving. In thanking Being, Dasein thinks of Being; and in the thinking of Being Dasein accepts the gift of existence as the thinker of Being. Thus, for Heidegger, pure thanks lies in that we give ourselves to the thinking of Being.[43] From this it follows that our supreme thanksgiving to Being is thinking and our profound thanklessness is thoughtlessness of Being.[44] William J. Richardson summarizes thanking as thanksgiving, and what it involves on the part of Dasein as he reaches towards Being as the thinker of Being as follows:

Thinking as thanksgiving [involves Dasein's] complete acquiescence to Being. This is accomplished when There-Being [Dasein] plays a role of attentive attent-ant of Being in profound and docile re-collection…. There-Being [Dasein] must turn to Being, opening itself [himself] up, com-mitting itself [himself], abandoning itself [himself] to its [his] exigencies…. It is the responding that is decisive…[for] thought …becomes authentically functional only in the movement of response.[45]

Dasein, thus, by opening himself to Being as its attentive attendant, i.e. by his readiness for thought, thanks Being for its giving of itself.

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[39] Cf. *WD*, p. 92; *WCT*, p. 139. Heidegger considers man's heart as the innermost core of his essence and does not give prime importance to intellect.

[40] Cf. *WD*, p. 97; *WCT*, p. 151.

[41] Cf. *WD*, p. 92; *WCT*, p. 140.

[42] Cf. *GL*, pp. 9-26. This address is delivered on the occasion of the 175th birthday of the German Composer Konradin Kreutzer on Oct. 30, 1955 in Messkirch. Here, Heidegger points out that commemoration of a person is a thoughtful and thankful remembrance of that person.

[43] Cf. *WD*, p. 94; *WCT*, pp. 142-143.

[44] Cf. *WD*, p. 94; *WCT*, p. 143.

[45] William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p 602.

3.1.1.2. Characteristics of Essential Thinking

Now that we have discussed the nature of essential thinking, we could highlight some of its characteristics. It is the *experiencing* of Being (*Erfahrung des Seins*). Of all entities, only Dasein can experience the 'what-it-is' of Being, when addressed by the voice of Being.[46] Essential thinking is consent or readiness (*die Bereitschaft*) for anxiety. When Being, as Non-Being, makes its appeal to Dasein through the medium of anxiety, Dasein's response to the call of Being is one of readiness for anxiety. In saying 'yes' to the call of Being, Dasein is ready to tread the untrodden region of Being.[47] It is self-diffusion: Dasein 'pours-himself-out' to the positive lighting of Being. In so doing he becomes a lighting place for Being and its truth as it becomes manifest in things.[48] Thinking is *self-surrender* by which Dasein gives his entire essence to Being's wanting to have a place of disclosure.[49] It is *self-assumption*. It consists in Dasein being entrusted with the task of assuming the charge of watching over Being. This is accomplished by Dasein's relationship to Being, which Being itself establishes.[50] Essential thinking is *an echoing of Being*. The response of Dasein to the silent voice of Being is one in which Dasein resounds it with such fidelity that Dasein's thought is, indeed, an echo of the voice of Being. But, at the same time, it is Dasein's own as it stems from Dasein's freedom.[51]

It is *docility*. It consists in being observant and heedful to the demands of the voice of Being.[52] Thinking is an assistance to Being. By caring for the need for the place of disclosure in historical humanity, Dasein assists Being to be itself.[53]

Thinking is *an offering*. It consists in Dasein's self-diffusive surrender to Being. It involves the forgoing of attachment with the ontic order, the calculating thinking and being at home with the fundamental thought Being brings to pass. Besides, it implies that Dasein takes upon himself the noble poverty of Being, which deals with the supremely simple and the intangible. But to this poverty belongs genuine wealth. The paradox of wealth and poverty is proper to the thought as offering.[54] Essential thinking is *involvement*. In spite of his great poverty of being detached from the ontic level of Dasein, yet he maintains continued involvement with entities. It is by thinking that the truth of Being is preserved in beings.[55] Thinking is freedom. Dasein's self-surrender of himself to Being, though done at the 'wanting of Being' (*es braucht*), is done with complete freedom on the part of Dasein. Dasein lets Being be in and through himself. Such a 'letting-be' is freedom. Thus, thinking of Being belongs not only to Being, but also to Dasein.[56]

It is thanksgiving. The free surrender of Dasein to Being in thinking is not a mere response to Being's appeal, but a thanksgiving for the bounty of Being's gift.[57] Thinking is a historical process.

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[46] 46. Cf. *WM*, p. 47; *EB*, p. 355.
[47] Cf. *ibid.*
[48] Cf. *WM*, p. 49; *EB*, p. 358.
[49] Cf. *ibid.*
[50] Cf. *ibid.*
[51] Cf. *WM*, p. 50; *EB*, p. 358.
[52] Cf. *ibid.*
[53] Cf. *ibid.*
[54] Cf. *WM*, pp. 50-51; *EB*, pp. 358-359.
[55] Cf. *WM*, p. 51; *EB*, p. 359.
[56] Cf. *WM*, pp. 46-47; *EB*, pp. 355-356.
[57] Cf. *WM*, p. 49; *EB*, p. 358.

The essence of man on whom Being bestows its gift is 'historical.'[58] Essential thinking is an interrogation. It is a step-by-step advance towards the answer, which, in turn, leads to further questions, thereby probing deeper into the origins of reality.[59]

All the characteristics we have listed here do not say anything more than what we have already said about essential thinking as a process of Being's coming towards Dasein and Dasein's moving towards Being in response. This process is a temporal-historical one and it is achieved by Dasein being a lighting-up-place for Being, both in Dasein and in beings.[60]

3.1.2. Dwelling in the Neighborhood of Being

Heidegger refers to the state of Dasein which results from essential thinking as dwelling (*Wohnen*) and describes it in various ways. He calls it as an indwelling (*Instaendigkeit*)[61] and as a standing in the openness of Being.[62] It is the opening of Dasein for openness[63] and the abiding of Dasein in his 'origins' (*Herkunft*).[64] Thus, dwelling is Dasein's 'ek-sisting,' i.e., standing in the openness of Being. Besides dwelling is a state in which Dasein is involved with things in an authentic way. In other words, Dasein builds (*bauen*)[65] and spares (*schonen*)[66] things in their authentic being. in describing the nature of dwelling in this section, we will consider it as Dasein's ek-sisting and building.

3.1.2.1. Dwelling: Dasein's Ek-sisting

The manner in which Heidegger views man is different from that of the perception of traditional philosophers. In this section, we will look briefly into the way traditional philosophy understands man and will distinguish it from that of Heidegger.

3.1.2.1.1. Traditional View of Man

Traditionally man was considered as a rational animal. According to Heidegger, the definition of man as 'rational animal' is a metaphysical interpretation of the original Greek description of man "*zoion logon echon*."[67] This metaphysical statement about the nature of man considers him

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[58] Cf. *WM*, p. 40; *EB*, p. 359.

[59] Cf. *WM*, p. 44; *EB*, pp. 351-352. These and many other characteristics Heidegger describes of essential thinking seem to be assertions, as he does not tell us how this knowledge comes about. Heidegger himself is not interested in studying about thinking rationally. Therefore, we could say that he makes these statements about essential thinking from his own experience of this primordial thinking of Being. Since it belongs to the realm of man's inner experience, a verification of it seems to be an impossibility. Cf. Versus A. George, p. 84, fn. 85.

[60] Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 478-482.

[61] Cf. *GL*, p. 70; *DT*, p. 81.

[62] Cf. *WM*, p. 15; *WBGM*, p. 272.

[63] Cf. *GL*, p. 59; *DT*, p. 81.

[64] Cf. *GL*, pp. 60-61; *DT*, p. 82-83.

[65] Cf. *VA*, p. 140; *BW*, p. 324.

[66] Cf. *VA*, p. 143; *BW*, p. 327.

[67] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 319. *BW*, pp. 202-203. Cf. also *EM*, p. 134; *IM*, p. 175. Here, Heidegger claims that the original meaning of the Greek terms '*zoion*' and '*logon*' are lost sight of and the former is taken to mean 'animal,' while the latter is taken to mean '*ratio*.'

as a type of animal with the special quality of rationality. Thus, here man is viewed in terms of animality rather than of humanity.[68] This type of thinking about man led to viewing man as a rational animal, a human entity, and a spiritual-bodily entity. In other words, man is considered as an entity among other entities, which has some power of control and manipulation over other beings. Though this way of looking at man is not wrong, it has failed to provide the dignity, says Heidegger, that man possesses.[69]

Since man was thought of only in relation to *animalitas* and not in relation to his true nature, i.e., his *humanitas*, the real nature of man has not been thought of for a long time in the history of Western metaphysics. In consequence, man's true essence is concealed from his own vision. As man did not think of his nature as it is in itself, the homeliness of his own essence is barred from his sight. This, in turn, has led to man's being away from his home. In other words, not knowing his own nature, man could never be at-home-with-himself.[70] The metaphysical way of defining man fails to see man and his essence in the light of man's relationship to Being; instead man is seen as related to entities and in the process Being (*Sein*) is mistaken for beings (*Seienden*).[71] Heidegger's understanding of Dasein attempts to undo the flaw in understanding the nature of man brought about by metaphysical thinking, by considering man's humanity and its relationship to Being.[72] To Heidegger's understanding of man, now, we could turn our attention.

3.1.2.1.2. Dasein as Ek-sistence

According to Heidegger, Dasein is ek-sistence (*Ek-sistenz*) and ek-sisting is the way that is proper to Dasein.[73] It consists in Dasein's being attuned (*ge-stimmt*) to the voice (*Stimme*) of Being, which gives itself to Dasein in silence and to which Dasein is called to listen (*hoeren*), even under the loudest noise.[74] In other words, Dasein's ek-sisting consists in Dasein being attuned to listen to the call of Being and enabled to respond to the call by his openness to the light of Being. Thus, as ek-sistence, Dasein stands out in the openness of Being. The term 'Dasein,' only in the sense of ek-sistence, stands for the reality of the involvement (*Bezug*) of Being in human nature and the fundamental relationship of man to the openness of Being.[75] From this it is clear that ek-sisting is Dasein's essence, because only as ek-sisting can man 'stand in' (*innestehen*) or dwell (*wohnen*) in the sphere of Being, as man.[76] The character of 'standing in' or 'ek-sisting,' viz., the 'there' (*das Da*) sets Dasein the lighting of Being (*Lichtung des Seins*).[77] Thus, the true nature of man's essence is unfolded only when Dasein is seen in the light of Being, viz., as ek-sistence.

In the process of Dasein's ek-sisting or dwelling in the light of Being, Heidegger gives primacy to Being and subordinates the role of man to that of Being. If it were not for Being's initial

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[68] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 321; *BW*, p. 204.
[69] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 327; *BW*, p. 210.
[70] Cf. *US*, pp. 45-46; *WL*, p. 167.
[71] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 329; *BW*, p. 212.
[72] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 339; *BW*, p. 222.
[73] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 321; *BW*, p. 204. In his later writings, such as, *Letter on Humanism* and in 'Introduction' to his book *What Is Metaphysics?* Heidegger clarifies and interprets the central notion of *Sein und Zeit*, viz., Dasein as existence. He replaces the term 'existence' with 'ek-sistence' and uses the term to mean Dasein's dwelling in the nearness of Being.
[74] Cf. *SG*, p. 91.
[75] Cf. *WM*, p. 15; *WBGM*, p. 272.
[76] Cf. *WM*, p. 14; *WBGM*, p. 271.
[77] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 323; *BW*, p. 205.

openness to Dasein, he cannot be the lighting of Being. In other words, in the ek-sisting or dwelling of Dasein in the light of Being, the role of Being is primary.[78] This becomes clear also when we consider the structure of Dasein as ek-sistence. Heidegger's analysis of the structure of Dasein as ek-sistence follows more or less the pattern in which it is considered in *Sein und Zeit*. The ek-sistence is spoken of as a projection that is essentially thrown and fallen and which is constituted of care. Heidegger speaks of this thrown projection as a 'fateful sending' that is brought about by Being.[79] Heidegger remarks:

…the projection is essentially thrown projection. What throws in projection is not man but Being itself, which sends man into the ek-sistence of Dasein that is his essence. This destiny comes to pass as the lighting of Being as which it is. The lighting grants nearness to Being. In this nearness, in the lighting of the *Da*, man dwells as the ek-sisting one without yet being able to properly experience and take over this dwelling.[80]

Again, Heidegger indicates that Dasein, as ek-sistence, is constituted of care by the throw of Being when he says: "Being itself, which as the throw has projected the essence of man into 'care,' is as this openness of Being."[81] These two quotes from Heidegger clearly indicate the role of Being in Dasein's dwelling as primary.

But in the process of dwelling in the nearness of Being, though thrown into his destiny by Being, man does play a role. By his dwelling he guards and preserves Being and its truth.[82] Dasein lets himself open to Being and allows Being to shine forth, thereby becoming a lighting-up-place in which Being dwells and its truth is preserved. It involves, on the part of Dasein, a corresponding openness to the destiny to which the throw of Being leads him. To put it in Heidegger's words: "…for man it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in his essence which corresponds to such destiny; for in accord with this destiny man as ek-sisting has to guard the truth of Being."[83]

From what we have said, Heidegger's claim becomes clear. For him, man's essence does not lie in his relationship with entities, i.e., man as the subject and entities as objects which he looks over and manipulates. But, rather, the essence of man must be understood in terms of dwelling in the nearness of Being. It involves Dasein's openness or standing out in the lighting of Being, thereby becoming the lighting-up-place of Being. Man is man, and he is his essential nature only because he ek-sists, i.e., stands out into the openness of Being. Only by dwelling in the light of Being does the 'ek' of ek-sistence essentially unfold.[84] To quote Heidegger:

Man is never first and foremost man on either side of the world, as a 'subject,' whether this is taken as 'I' or 'we.' Nor is he simply a mere subject which always simultaneously is related to object, so that his essence lies in the subject-object relation. Rather, before all this, man in his

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[78] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 330; *BW*, p. 213.
[79] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 325; *BW*, p. 207.
[80] *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 334; *BW*, p. 217.
[81] *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 346; *BW*, p. 229.
[82] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 330; *BW*, p. 213.
[83] *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 327; *BW*, p. 210.
[84] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, pp. 346-347; *BW*, pp. 228-229.

essence is ek-sistant, into the openness of Being, into the open region that lights the 'between' within which a 'relation' of subject to object can 'be.'[85]

Thus, only when man dwells, as ek-sistence, in the openness of Being by being a lighting-up-place for Being can he have a genuine relationship to entities. Fundamentally and primordially, Dasein, as ek-sistence, is a dweller in the nearness of Being. Dwelling thus in the light of Being, Dasein can also genuinely dwell among things (*Dingen*) by building and sparing them.

3.1.2.2. Dwelling: Dasein's Building

According to Heidegger the German terms for dwelling (*Wohnen*) and building (*Bauen*) are intimately related to each other. Although not all buildings are dwelling places, yet one attains dwelling by means of a building. In other words, building is a means to the goal of dwelling. Heidegger, while not denying the means-end relationship between building and dwelling, says that the means-end schema does not help us to see the essential relatedness of building and dwelling, as it considers building and dwelling as two separate activities.[86] Heidegger speaks of an essential relation between building and dwelling, as the former is identical with the latter. This is clear when he says: "…building is not merely a means and a way towards dwelling; to build is already it itself to dwell."[87] In order to understand this relationship between building and dwelling, just as does Heidegger, we must etymologically analyze these two terms and their implications.

3.1.2.2.1. Building and Dwelling: An Etymological Analysis

There are two senses in which the term '*Bauen*' (building) is used, and in both of these senses it is related to '*Wohnen*' (dwelling). The first or the broad sense of the term '*Bauen*' refers to the way in which Dasein is on this earth,[88] while the second or the strict sense signifies the manner in which Dasein comports himself in the structure of the dwelling process in relation to the things it cares for.[89]

Taken in the broad sense, '*Bauen*' is an equivalent of the term '*Wohnen*,' for according to Heidegger, '*Bauen*' derives from an old High German word '*buan*,' which means to remain or to stay in a place, i.e., to dwell. The original meaning of the verb '*bauen*' is lost in the German usage, even though a trace of it is left in the German term '*Nachbar*.' The '*Nachbar*,' the '*Nachgebur*' or the '*Nachgebauer*' means the 'near-dweller' or the 'near-by-dweller,' i.e. the neighbor. Again, the verbs related to '*bauen*,' such as, '*bueren*,' '*beuren*' and '*beuron*' — all mean to dwell in a place. The root words of '*bauen*' — '*buan*,' '*bhu*' and '*beo*' — bear an affinity to the German forms of the verb 'to be' (*sein*), viz. '*ich bin,*' and '*du bist*' ('I am' and 'you are'). Thus, '*bauen*' taken in

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[85] *BH*, Wegmarken, pp. 346-347; *BW*, p. 229. Heidegger does not deny the subject-object relationship between man and entities. But he says that the nature of man is prior to the subject-object relationship, as man's true nature has to be understood in the light of his relationship to Being. Only in the context of Dasein's relationship to Being can all other relationships including the subject-object relationship be rightly understood.

[86] Cf. *VA*, pp. 139-140; *BW*, pp. 323-324.

[87] *VA*, p. 140; *BW*, p. 324.

[88] Cf. *VA*, p. 141; *BW*, p. 325.

[89] Cf. *VA*, p. 142; *BW*, p. 325.

the broad sense suggests the way in which Dasein is on the earth, viz. his dwelling. In this sense to dwell or to build means to be a human being and to be a mortal on the earth.[90]

'*Bauen*,' considered, in the strict sense, i.e., in relation to that which is built, means to cherish, to protect, to preserve and to care for.[91] In other words, it means to tend or to spare (*schonen*). In this sense also '*bauen*' is related to '*wohnen*.' The term '*wohnen*' is derived from the old Saxon term '*wuon*' and the Gothic term '*wunian*.' The term '*wuon*' means to remain in a place, like the old use of the term '*bauen*.' The term '*wunian*' means the way in which this 'remaining in a place' is experienced, i.e., to remain in a place in peace, or to be brought to peace. The German term for peace '*Friede*' has the nuance of 'being preserved from harm and danger,' 'to treat with consideration,' 'taking care of' and 'safeguarding.'[92] In other words, the term '*wohnen*' (to dwell) means "to be set at peace …to remain at peace …[and] the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its essence,"[93] i.e., to tend or to spare. To quote Heidegger: "The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing (or tending)."[94] Thus, it is clear that '*bauen*' in the strict sense also means '*wohnen*.' In this sense, to dwell or to build means to let things be in their essence, by sparing them within the light of Being.

3. 1.2.2.2. Building as Dwelling

It is to the second sense of '*bauen*' that Heidegger refers when he talks about building things by sparing (tending) them. Building, in the sense of sparing or dwelling, involves the notion of accomplishing something by toil or doing something by work — as for example tilling the soil or cultivating the vine.[95] Heidegger mentions two modes of building, viz. building as cultivating (*colere*) as the farmer does the cultivating in the fields, and building in the sense of raising edifices (*aedificare*) as the construction-worker constructs a temple.[96] In both of these cases man builds (*bauen*) or accomplishes something: if cultivating, it is the farm that he cultivates; and if constructing, it is the temple he constructs. In both of these cases, one must address oneself to two questions: the first is about the nature of the 'thing' (*Ding*) built and the second is about the nature of building or accomplishing (*Bauen*). Heidegger, limiting himself to the second mode of building, viz., building in the sense of constructing and taking a 'bridge' as an example for the thing,[97] addresses himself to these questions.

Raising the question of the nature of the 'thing,' Heidegger speaks of it in a way that is different from the traditional understanding. For him, the thing is not "the Roman '*res*,' the late Greek '*on*,' the medieval Latin '*res*' or the modern *Gegenstand* (object)."[98] A thing, fundamentally, is not something that is; but rather it is something that 'things' (*dingt*). The old High German word '*Ding*' (thing) means 'gathering' (*Versammlung*). In 'thinging' the thing gathers the fourfold (*Geviert*) — the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals — into a thing. In this thinging of the thing, i.e., in the gathering of the fourfold in the thing Being presences itself

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[90] Cf. *VA*, p. 141; *BW*, pp. 324-325.
[91] Cf. *VA*, p. 142; *BW*, p. 325.
[92] Cf. *VA*, p. 143; *BW*, pp. 326-327.
[93] *VA*, p. 143; *BW*, p. 327.
[94] *Ibid.*
[95] Cf. *VA*, p. 143; *BW*, p. 325.
[96] Cf. *ibid.*
[97] Cf. *VA*, p. 146; *BW*, pp. 329-330.
[98] Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 186. Cf. also *VA*, p. 169; *PLT*, p. 177.

in the thing and the thing 'is' in its being.[99] Each thing gathers into itself the fourfold in its unique way. Let us take the example of the bridge. The bridge gathers the earth as the landscape around the stream. It gathers the sky by being ready for the sky's weather and its changing nature. The bridge gathers before the divinities and visibly gives thanks for their presence, even though their presence is obstructed or wholly pushed aside by our thoughtlessness. It gathers the mortals, as mortals, by granting them their way, that they may come and go from one shore to another. In this manner, the bridge, as a thing, gathers to itself the fourfold — the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals — in its unique way.[100]

The gathering of the fourfold is localized into a place (*Ort*). But the place did not exist as a place prior to the bridge, even though there were many sites (*Staette*) by the river bank where it could arise. In other words, a place comes about only because of the bridge as a thing.[101] Space is something that has been made room for by place. It is a certain free area within a boundary in which the thing begins to come-to-presence. Therefore, the essence of the space depends on place,[102] and it comes about as a result of the thinging of the thing. In other words, place and space are understood only in relation to the thinging of the thing, viz. in the gathering of the fourfold into the thing.

Now that we have clarified the nature of the thing, we could consider the nature of the building (*Bauen*). The building of the bridge does not consist in the human activity of fashioning the concrete structure (though it is not excluded) which we call a bridge. Heidegger clarifies this point as follows:

…the essence of the erecting of buildings cannot be understood adequately in terms either of architecture or of engineering construction, nor in terms of a mere combination of the two. The erecting of buildings would not suitably be defined even if we were to think of it in the sense of the original Greek '*techne*' as solely a letting-appear, which brings something made, as something present, among the things that are already present.[103]

On the contrary, erecting buildings, according to Heidegger, is a process of bringing forth (*herbringen*) or letting-dwell Being in the limits of the thing and, in turn, letting the thing itself presence (*hervorbringen*) what it is in itself. Thus, for Heidegger, "the essence of building is letting dwell"[104] by which Dasein brings forth things as things and lets things be things.

It is by the process of letting things be things that Dasein builds or spares Being in beings. The building is a dwelling in the sense that Dasein lets Being dwell in things. Commenting on this point William J. Richardson says that sparing (tending) Being in beings, and building beings by bringing them forth as they are in themselves are one and the same. In fact, in sparing Being in beings, Dasein brings forth things as things.[105] Dasein can build things in this way, because of the bi-dimensional character of his dwelling. William J. Richardson notes:

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[99] Cf. *VA*, p. 166; *PLT*, p. 174.
[100] Cf. *VA*, pp. 147-148; *BW*, pp. 330-331.
[101] Cf. *VA*, p. 149; *BW*, pp. 331-332.
[102] Cf. *VA*, p. 149; *BW*, p. 332.
[103] *VA*, p. 155; *BW*, p. 337.
[104] *Ibid.*
[105] Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 586.

it [Dasein] can let things shine forth in their own 'place,' occupying their own 'space,' because from the very beginning its [his] open-ness to Being is an open-ness to all 'space,' …its [his] ontological dimension, is a constitutional near-ness to things. But only when this ontological dimension is articulated on the ontic level in things among which There-Being [Dasein] sojourns does There-Being [Dasein] find itself [himself] genuinely 'at home' in its [his] nearness to things.[106]

But the bi-dimensional character of Dasein does not bring about the building and sparing things. There is a need on the part of Dasein to dwell in the openness of Being as ek-sisting so that he can effectively build things as things. For "…building is really dwelling."[107] To quote Heidegger: "We do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, we are dwellers."[108] Again he says: "Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build."[109] Heidegger concludes that "Dasein must ever learn to dwell"[110] by being open and docile to the voice of Being.

3.1.3. Seeing the Truth of Being

Essential thinking of Being and dwelling in the neighborhood of Being takes Dasein to the third stage of the way to the goal, viz., seeing the truth of Being. The truth of Being consists in Dasein recognizing his relationship of belonging-together to Being, the relation of difference that exists between Being and entities and history as the time-space-play of Being. When the truth of Being dawns on Dasein, he becomes a shepherd who guards Being as it is manifested in relation to himself, the entities and history. Speaking about Dasein as the seer and the shepherd of Being, Heidegger says: "Man is not a lord of beings *(Seienden)*. Man is the shepherd of Being *(Sein)*. Man loses nothing 'less,' rather he gains in that he attains the truth of Being. He gains the central poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being's truth."[111]

Man, thus, is the shepherd of Being and its truth. In other words, he is called by Being to be its guardian and preserver. The manner in which he needs to exercise the guardianship is not one of lording over, but is one of waiting on and attending to Being. Only when Dasein Dwells in the neighborhood of Being, can he become a shepherd, because as a shepherd Dasein is an attendant who waits on the presencing of Being. A shepherd is not a stranger; but he knows the neighborhood, as he had been dwelling in the nearest of the near.[112] Only by dwelling there does Dasein become a shepherd.

Such a shepherd is a seer of the truth of Being. The German word '*wissen*' (to see) and its Latin equivalent '*videre*,' signify 'seeing' in the sense of attaining wisdom, rather than mere intellectual seeing. A seer is one who has already seen the presencing of Being[113] as revealing and

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[106] *Ibid.*
[107] *VA*, p. 142; *BW*, p. 326.
[108] *VA*, p. 143; *BW*, p. 326.
[109] *VA*, p. 154; *BW*, p. 338.
[110] *VA*, p. 155; *BW*, p. 339.
[111] *BH*, Wegmarken, pp. 338-339; *BW*, p. 221.
[112] *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 348; *BW*, p. 231.
[113] Cf. *HW*, p, 321; *EGT*, p. 36.

concealing.[114] The seeing is determined not by the eye, but by the lighting of Being that has been given to him already.[115] The shepherd, in shepherding the truth of Being, stands in the light of Being's presence and thereby sees the truth of Being. Therefore, the shepherd of Being is the seer of Being. The shepherd, in shepherding Being, sees its truth. In other words, the seer is "a shepherd who attends on, and watches over…sees the revealing-concealing play of Being"[116] in history. The whole process of seeing the truth of Being belongs to the realm of *Ereignis*, in which Dasein and Being own each other. In this mutual owning of Dasein and Being, Dasein bestows the highest dignity of being on the shepherd and the seer of Being.

3.2. The Attainment of the Experience of Being

Now that we have analyzed the three stages of the way, we may highlight the attainment of the goal, i.e., the experience of Being. Essential thinking is attained in release (*Gelassenheit*).[117] Dwelling occurs in Dasein in relation to his homecoming to the source and sparing (tending) the fourfold in things. Seeing the truth of Being becomes a reality for Dasein when he opens himself to the un-concealment of Being and to language, the house of Being. In attaining the goal, at every stage, there is a genuine interaction between Being and Dasein: Being's gift of itself to Dasein and Dasein's corresponding response in receiving Being's gift. In this section, we attempt to bring to light the twofold movement on the part of Being and Dasein, in attaining the goal.

3.2.1. Essential Thinking

According to Heidegger, essential thinking occurs in relation to release (*Gelassenheit*). Heidegger refers to the term '*Gelassenheit*' as an 'old word.'[118] By this he points to the affinity of the word to the German mystical tradition, especial to the thought of Meister Eckhart.[119] Heidegger himself, as with the case of thinking, does not attempt to write a treatise about *Gelassenheit*; he rather was interested in its occurrence.

Regarding the nature of release, we have a clear statement of Heidegger. In the context of Dasein's attitude towards technology, he says that the term '*Gelassenheit*' expresses a 'yes' and a 'no' at the same time.[120] In other words, it is an attitude of accepting technology in one's everyday life, but at the same time not being mastered by it. We could say that it is a state of consciousness in which Dasein is involved with things, yet not entangled with them. For Heidegger, the state of release is primordially brought about by Being. But Dasein also has to play his part. Thus, release

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[114] Cf. *HW*, p. 320; *EGT*, p. 35.

[115] Cf. *HW*, p. 321; *EGT*, p. 36.

[116] Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 202.

[117] The German term '*Gelassenheit*' has the nuances of 'composure,' 'serenity' and 'setting-free.' Cf. *DT*, p. 54, fn. 4. It is usually rendered in English as 'releasement.' We prefer to translate it as 'release,' because it is a better English formulation of the German term '*Gelassenheit*' and contains all the nuances of the English term 'releasement.'

[118] *GL*, p. 23; *DT*, p. 54.

[119] Meister Eckhart was a mystic of the middle ages, whose thinking had a tremendous influence on Heidegger's thought. But Eckhart is a Christian mystic, while Heidegger is a thinker of Being.

[120] Cf. *GL*, p. 23; *DT*, p. 54.

is a task to be accomplished both by Being and Dasein. In the following pages, we will attempt to analyze the attainment of essential thinking in release by the co-operation of Being and Dasein.

3.2.1.1. Release: The Task of Being

In dealing with release in his book *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger uses a new term to refer to Being (*Sein*). He calls Being '*Gegnet*,' which is rendered in English as 'that-which-regions.'[121] Heidegger says that *Gegnet* is the primordial openness which 'gathers' (*versammelt*)[122] and is characterized by expanse (*weite*) and abiding (*weile*) that point to the spatio-temporal character of the *Gegnet*.[123] Heidegger calls it 'region-of-all-regions.'[124] Thus, *Gegnet* is nothing other than Being in its spatio-temporal character.

There are two ways in which the regioning of 'that-which-regions' (*das Gegen der Gegnet*) manifests itself in relation to Dasein and things. Firstly, the regioning of 'that-which-regions' relating to Dasein is *Vergegnis* (regioning). It is a primordial regioning, by which 'that-which-regions' lets Dasein be open to it in the sense of Dasein being appropriated to it.[125] In other words, *Vergegnis* is that letting by Being which helps Dasein to rise above the pulls and pushes of everyday existence and to turn towards 'that-which-regions,' resulting in a freedom in Dasein to be himself. Secondly, Heidegger speaks of a second type of letting of 'that-which-regions' in relation to things. This type of regioning is called *Bedingnis* (bethinging). It consists in letting things be things. Things are things only when they are laid to rest in the abiding expanse of 'that-which-regions.' A thing is a thing only insofar as it is 'bethinged' by 'that-which-regions.'[126] These two types of regioning by 'that-which-regions' (Being), in relation to Dasein and things should not be understood in the causal sense or in the transcendental-horizonal sense. Therefore, it is neither an ontic nor an ontological relationship. It is a relationship that belongs to the realm of Being as 'that-which-regions.'[127] Thus, 'that-which-regions' by *Vergegnis* lets Dasein be open to the region of 'that-which-regions' and by *Bedingnis* lets things be things. In doing so Being initiates the process of release, in which the activity of Being is primary.

3.2.1.2. Release: The Task of Dasein

Release is the task not only of Being, but also of Dasein. Though, 'that-which-regions' lets Dasein be open to itself, release cannot come about until Dasein is released towards 'that-which-regions.'[128] Dasein must 'turn from' will, which for Heidegger is the basis of all representative-calculative thinking, and must 'turn to' Being by waiting on it. In the following section, we would elaborate Dasein's twofold tasks of 'turning from' and 'turning to.'

3.2.1.2.1. Non-willing: The Negative Step

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121 Cf. *DT*, p.66, fn. 1.
122 Cf. *GL*, p. 38; *DT*, p. 65.
123 Cf. *WP*, p. 13; *WIP*, p. 49.
124 Cf. *GL*, p. 40; *DT*, p. 66.
125 Cf. *GL*, p. 51; *DT*, p. 75.
126 Cf. *GL*, p. 52; *DT*, p. 75.
127 Cf. *GL*, p. 53; *DT*, pp. 75-76.
128 Cf. *GL*, p. 49; *DT*, p. 73.

The first step towards the attainment of release is a turning from willing. As representational-calculative thinking is a kind of willing, such a thinking cannot be stopped by will, as willing strengthens willing. Release cannot come about unless Dasein is ready to give up willing. In other words, while Dasein is able to wean itself from willing, it can move towards release.[129] Therefore, the 'turning from' willing amounts to non-willing (*nicht wollen*) and consists in willingly renouncing willing.[130] Renouncing willing involves a trace of willing, as we have to will not to will. Heidegger says that such traces of willing in willing non-willing, disappear and dissipate in release.[131] To say that release is beyond willing would amount to the passivity of Dasein in the state of release, which is not true, as the distinction of willing and non-willing, activity and passivity, all belong to the domain of the will. Since release is a state that is beyond the realm of the will, all such distinctions do not apply to release.[132] The so-called 'not-doing' associated with the released individual, says Heidegger, is not a cowardly allowing of things to drift along,[133] but a power of action and resolve.[134] Non-willing is the first step, though a negative one, that Dasein must take in order to free himself from his entanglement with and domination by things. Once Dasein is turned away from willing, he can begin to wait on Being.

3.2.1.2.2. Waiting: The Positive Step

Dasein's positive response to the regioning (*Vergegnis*) of 'that-which-regions' is waiting (*Warten*). It is an attitude of Dasein, which consists in taking a deliberate stand of attentiveness to Being. Such a waiting lets Being present itself as itself. It is doing nothing but waiting.[135] We always await something, while in waiting there is no real object. "In waiting we leave open what we are waiting for."[136] In waiting, we release ourselves into the openness, because we leave open what we wait for. Waiting moves into the openness without any representation. To wait is to be on the way (*unterwegs*) towards openness, i.e., Being.[137]

Waiting, on the part of man, involves a twofold movement: one towards things and the other towards Being. Firstly, the movement of waiting towards things, is called 'release towards things' (*die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen*). It is an attitude of Dasein that is ambivalent. It is saying 'yes' and 'no' to the same thing at the same time: 'yes' because we need the thing, as it has a reference to our life; 'no' because we do not want the thing to dominate us and take our life wherever it wants. If we are released towards things, in this manner, says Heidegger, our relationship to things becomes "wonderfully simple and relaxed."[138] Secondly, the movement of waiting towards Being is 'openness to the mystery' (*die Offenheit fuer Geheimnis*). When we deal with things, or when we are affected by them either by fascination or dislike, the meaning of these happenings tends to be hidden. We tend to be taken over by external dimensions of reality while being totally blind to the mystery-dimension or the inner aspect of reality. To quote Heidegger: "…we stand at once

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[129] Cf. *GL*, p. 31; *DT*, pp. 59-60.
[130] Cf. *GL*, p. 30; *DT*, p. 59.
[131] Cf. *GL*, p. 59; *DT*, p. 81.
[132] Cf. *GL*, p. 33; *DT*, p. 61.
[133] Cf. *ibid.*
[134] Cf. *GL*, p. 58; *DT*, p. 80.
[135] Cf. *GL*, p. 42; *DT*, p. 68.
[136] *Ibid.*
[137] Cf. *GL*, p. 48; *DT*, p. 72.
[138] Cf. *GL*, pp. 23-24; *DT*, pp. 54-55.

within the realm of that which hides itself from us, and hides itself just in approaching us."[139] According to Heidegger, everything in the world has this mystery dimension which hides itself. He cites the example of technology. In waiting, we turn towards the dimension of mystery in things. The more we, in waiting, open ourselves to the mystery-dimension of reality, to that extent release occurs in us[140] and we become thinkers of Being. For Heidegger, release towards things and openness to mystery belong together. They help us to live in the world in a different way by giving us new ground to stand on and a new vision that would guide our lives.[141]

3.2.2. Dwelling in Being's Nearness

Dwelling is attained in Dasein, both, in relation to Being and beings. When Dasein opens himself to the poetic presencing of Being by poetic dwelling, he dwells in the neighborhood of Being. It involves a homecoming *(Heimkommen)* or a return (*Rueckehr*) to the source (*Ursprung*)[142] at the summoning of Being, and a preservation of this original homecoming by re-collective (poetic) dwelling in the three ecstases of time. Dasein dwells among things when he lets beings be in their being. This is done by Dasein's sparing (tending) the fourfold, viz., the three 'facets' of Being in things, thereby letting things be things. Here, we will consider the attainment of dwelling in relation to the homecoming and to the fourfold.

3.2.2.1. The Homecoming: Being in Dasein

In many of his writings, Heidegger, speaks of the 'homelessness' (*Heimlosigkeit*) of man. It is not a 'housing-shortage' (*Wohnungsnot*) or a lack of houses to dwell. 'Homelessness' consists in being 'strangers' in one's own homeland (*Heimat*), and being a neighbor (*Nachbar*) to the world dominated by technology. It is loss of man's rootedness (*Bodenstaendigkeit*)[143] in Being. Besides, 'homelessness' is an abandonment of Being and a symptom of the forgetfulness of Being,[144] which, in fact, is a being away from the homeland. Dasein's homeland, for Heidegger, is nearness to Being.[145] Dasein's homecoming is dwelling in its homeland, i.e. nearness to Being. Dasein is summoned to the homeland by a primordial poetic presencing to which Dasein responds by poetic dwelling. This is our concern in this section.

3.2.2.1.1. Poetic Presencing: The Original Homecoming

It is Being which summons Dasein to his homeland. The summoning takes the form of Being manifesting itself to Dasein in its characteristics. Firstly, Being is Glad-some (*das Heitere*), which suggests the nuances of brightness of light, serenity and gentle joy.[146] The Glad-some is the source of joy and so it is the most Joyous one (*das Freudigste*). The Glad-some, by sending rays of joy, enlightens the homeland and makes it a welcome place for the homecoming Dasein. This, in turn,

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[139] Cf. *GL*, p. 24; *DT*, p. 55.
[140] Cf. *ibid.*
[141] Cf. *ibid.*
[142] Cf. *HD*, p. 23; *EB*, p. 258.
[143] Cf. *GL*, pp. 15-16; *DT*, pp. 48-49.
[144] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, pp. 335-336; *BW*, pp. 218-219.
[145] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 335; *BW*, p. 218.
[146] Cf. *HD*, p. 18; *EB*, p. 247.

lights up the disposition of the home-comer to experience all that is noble in the homeland.[147] Secondly, Being presents itself as the Holy (*das Heilig*). By 'the Holy' Heidegger means neither God nor gods. 'The Holy' is the ultimate conserving power which guards beings in the integrity of their being. Being, as the Glad-some, is the Holy. The articulation of the Holy constitutes the primordial poem, which is seen as the 'thoughts' of Being-as-the-spirit.[148] Thirdly, Being shows itself as the Origin (*Ursprung*). Heidegger says: "…what is most proper and most precious in the homeland consists simply in the fact that it is this nearness to the Origin — and nothing besides…."[149] Being, as the Origin, is best understood in the image of an overflowing and continuous source. It is Being, as source, that attracts the poet-wanderer to its nearness.[150] Finally, Being shines forth itself as the Ground (*Grund*). Though Being is a continuous source and gives itself out, it retains itself as the source. In other words, while giving itself out, Being does not empty itself, but rather remains a steadfast and consistent source. It is in this sense of self-retaining and continuous source that Being presents itself as the Ground.[151]

Thus, Being summons Dasein to its nearness by manifesting itself as the Glad-some, the most Joyous, the Holy, the Origin and the Ground. In Being's manifestation of its qualities begins Dasein's homecoming. Heidegger considers Dasein's homecoming in terms of poetry, viz., in terms of bringing into poetry the primordial poetic presencing of Being. Being addresses and hails itself as the primordial poem, to which the poet (Dasein) must give expression in words. Dasein's homeland is to be found in the very source that hails Dasein, viz., Being.[152] There are three moments or stages in the poet's homecoming.

The first moment depicts the poet's early days and his experience of the source. The poet, as a youth, grows up in the realm of the source without ever fully appreciating it. As his poetic spirit is 'open to the open,' he has some (pre-ontological) awareness of Being. But this awareness is often obscured as the source manifests itself in the finite beings. The more he aims at penetrating the mystery of the source that is manifested in beings, the more he gets lost in things and Being, as it were, evades him. Because of the withdrawing nature of the source he is not able to hold off the difference between Being and beings.[153] In spite of this state of forgetfulness of Being, the poetic spirit (Being) keeps him oriented towards Being. The orientation towards the source brings in the poet an awakening to go abroad to seek that which brings him closer to the source. Here, Heidegger compares the German poet, who is the master of form (clarity of exposition) and can fully be forgetful of the spirit, viz., fire, which is the characteristic of the Greek poet. The German poet can have fire only if he has the courage to leave the homeland and make the journey abroad, so that in coming back after the journey, he can dwell genuinely 'at home' near the source.[154] Such a journey abroad is an essential condition for the homecoming and becoming-at-home. Indeed, the journey from its first moment is a returning, as it is that which makes the poet experience what he really is, i.e., his poetic destiny.[155]

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[147] Cf. *HD*, pp. 14, 18; *EB*, pp. 247-248.
[148] Cf. *HD*, pp. 17, 18, 86, 108, 116.
[149] *HD*, p. 23; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 445.
[150] Cf. *HD*, pp. 88, 125, 138.
[151] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 75, 138
[152] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 23.
[153] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 87-89.
[154] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 83-84, 89.
[155] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 79, 87.

The second moment is the actual taking of the journey abroad. To experience the source, the poet must move with the stream, move down to the sea and experience the richness of the source.[156] To appreciate the native soil, as the homeland that is near to the source, the poet must make a voyage to the land of Greece,[157] and be burned by the fire of Being.[158] In the journey, the poet is constantly guided by Being. Every experience abroad reveals more and more of the home. Finally, "…the fire has let him experience that it itself must be brought back from abroad into the homeland in order that there this proper endowment, the facility for clear expression, can release its native powers in relation to the fire."[159] It, in turn, will help him to produce a poetry of proper depth.

The third moment is the poet's return to the homeland. It is the return to the homeland enriched by his experience abroad that brings the poet to maturity. It helps the poet to possess the homeland in a new and authentic way.[160] For example, the poet's voyage to Greece and being burned by the fire, which is characteristic of Greek poetry, helps him to understand the disciplined style and clarity of expression of the German poetry in a new way, and this, in turn, would make him a mature poet.[161] Thus, the poet's homecoming helps him to understand his homeland in a new way. It is a moving into the nearness[162] and a following of the source.[163] But, the passage into the source is not such that we can dissolve the mystery dimension of the source or Being. The poet can never get at this fully. Being, as mystery, has to be faced in the reverential awe *(Scheu)*.[164] Being, as Joyous, is experienced by the poet with joy (*Freude*).[165] Thus, the poet experiences Being by varying attunements. In the process he comes to the nearness of Being and finds that therein lies his homeland. Being-at-home in his homeland, i.e., by his dwelling in the neighborhood of Being, the poet is able to sing or give expression, in poetry, to the Being-dimension of beings. It is the genuine homecoming and dwelling.

According to Heidegger, the following and drawing near to the source involved in homecoming, is not something accomplished once and for all. It is Dasein's original experience of homecoming which is brought about by the summoning of Being. It is Dasein's original return to the source, i.e., Being. The process must continue as long as the poet remains a poet. It must be sustained and preserved by a continuous abiding in the nearness to the source, thereby making it a place of dwelling (*Wohnen*).[166] To quote Heidegger: "The one condition of becoming-at-home in his proper domain, …the journey abroad has been fulfilled. But this fulfillment remains fulfillment only on the condition that what has been experienced …is preserved."[167]

3.2.2.1.2. Poetic Dwelling: Preserving the Original Homecoming

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[156] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137-138.
[157] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 78-79.
[158] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 90.
[159] *Ibid.*, p. 89; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 451.
[160] Cf. *HD*, p. 89.
[161] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 14, 109.
[162] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 113.
[163] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 138.
[164] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 124.
[165] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 24-25.
[166] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137-139.
[167] *Ibid.*, p. 121; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 453.

Poetic dwelling consists in the poet's continuous keeping of what he learned from the journey, viz., his awareness of the beginnings, the turning points and his original return. Besides, it involves a deeper appreciation of the Being's poetic presencing, as the Glad-some, the Joyous, the Holy, the Source and the Ground, which has in the first place made the original homecoming possible. In other words, poetic dwelling involves a re-collecting poetically upon 'what-is-past.' Such a poetic dwelling is not a mere remembering of 'what-is-past' as past. Rather, besides effectively bringing to memory 'what-is-past,' it makes the original homecoming a 'still-to-come' experience in the future and a present experience of giving utterance to the original experience in the form of poetry. Thus, poetic dwelling, by which Dasein continues to dwell in the nearness of Being is temporal and has the dimensions of recalling the past, coming to the future and rendering the present in relation to the original homecoming. We can elaborate the poetic dwelling in these aspects of temporality, viz., the past, the future and the present.

The past, viz., the original homecoming, which was Being's poetic presencing, is that on which the poet must poetically dwell. The past, in question, is not a mere memory of what has happened once and is forgotten, but is such that it has an influence on the poet. Thus, the past, still is a 'having been' but as such it is real to the poet now as it was when he first experienced.[168] The poetic dwelling on the past as 'having been' on the part of the poet is a greeting or hailing (*Gruessen*)[169] of Being for its poetic presencing. It involves a certain docility and self-surrender on the part of the hailer (the poet) to the hailed (Being). In so doing, the hailer allows the hailed, by his openness to be hailed, to shine forth in a way that is proper to the hailed. The hailed accepts the hail of the hailer and, in turn, hails the hailer.[170] Thus, in the reciprocal hailing of Being and the poet (Dasein), the original homecoming is re-lived and thereby preserved. Heidegger remarks on this point as follows: "The heavenly fire [Being] imposes itself on him [the poet] who hails it …as thought and abides near him as that which comes-to-presence in …what-is-past [the original experience of homecoming]."[171]

The Holy or the Hailed is also the poet's future, because by his poetic destiny the poet must bring forth in words the original poetic presencing of the Holy.[172] The Holy comes to the poet as a primordial poem, before his poetizing. The poet must bring the primordial poem into words. Thus, for the poet to dwell poetically upon 'what-is-past,' i.e., upon the primordial poetic presencing of Being (original homecoming), is to dwell upon 'what-is-coming' to him in the future, as by his poetic dwelling the poet experiences again and preserves the Holy as given in 'what-is-past.' Dwelling upon 'what-is-coming' is conversely to dwell upon 'what-is-past.' In other words, the poet dwells upon the Holy that is given in the past as 'having been' (the past) and as 'that-which-is-coming' (the future). Thus, in the Holy, the past and the future are unified.[173]

When the Holy gives itself as the primordial poem and continues to come (future) to the poet who has been hailed by the Holy itself by its original poetic presencing (past), the task of the poet is to render present (present) the Holy in the words of his poetry. The poet does this, insofar as he poetically dwells by being at home near the source. The present dimension of the poetic dwelling consists fundamentally in that the poet learns to use his native propensity for poetry, viz. the ability for clear expression and organization of the poetry, with an authentic freedom of the spirit. In the

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168 Cf. *HD*, pp. 79-80, 110.
169 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 91.
170 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 92.
171 *Ibid.*, p. 110; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 454.
172 Cf. *HD*, p. 98.
173 Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

initial stage of poetic presencing the poet, though close to the source, neither knew the source clearly nor was aware of his inner propensity for poetry. But the original homecoming liberates him and lets him know and dwell in the homeland, i.e., nearness to Being, besides letting him know his native ability for poetry in a new way. Thus, now, the poet, knowing the source and the homeland, dwells in it poetically and gives authentic expression to his experience of the source and the homeland, facilitated by his new awareness of his native ability for poetry. This happens only as a result of the poet's experience of the original homecoming. To quote Heidegger: "…[The poet] exercises [his] native endowment, the clarity of expression, 'freely' only then, when what is clear in his utterance is permeated by the open experience of that which is exposed."[174]

Thus, the original poetic presencing of Being, i.e., the original homecoming of the poet is preserved and sustained as an ever-present dwelling in the nearness of being by poetic-dwelling. It involves re-calling it as an experience of the hailing of Being in the past; a waiting on it as an experience in which the Holy (Being) continues to come to the poet in the future; and as an experiencing of the Holy in the here and now, to which the poet gives the fullest expression in the present in poetry by using his inner ability for poetic utterance in an authentic freedom of the spirit. From what we have said, it could be concluded that the original presencing of Being in the primordial poem is preserved and sustained in the poetry or in the poetic word of the poet. William J. Richardson speaks of the poetic word of the poet as "…a word of 'hailing' inasmuch as it greets what is past; at the same time, it is a 'prophetic' word, inasmuch as it articulates what is coming, both for the same reason, because it seeks to utter past and future in their original correlation, the holy as such. Such a word can be uttered only if the poet has learned to use his native talent with a freedom that is genuine."[175]

Heidegger, thus, speaks of the attainment of dwelling in the nearness of Being, in terms of poetizing, both on the part of Being and that of Dasein (poet). Dasein is a dweller in the neighborhood of Being when he experiences the giving of Being in poetic presencing and preserves it by poetic dwelling, by giving expression to his experience of Being in poetry. By using the image of poetic giving, poetic receiving and poetry, Heidegger drives home the point that Dasein's dwelling in the nearness of Being is brought about by a reciprocal interaction of Being and Dasein.

3.2.2.2. Dasein's Sparing the Fourfold: Being in Things

Dasein's dwelling among things consists in sparing and preserving the fourfold. "To preserve the fourfold, to save the earth, to receive the sky, to wait on divinities and to initiate mortals — this fourfold preserving is the simple essence of dwelling."[176] 'To spare' or 'to preserve' means to take something under one's care or to look after something. To preserve the fourfold, thus, means to keep it under the watchful care of Dasein. The sparing (tending) of the fourfold by Dasein involves a mode of Dasein's relating to things, by and in which Dasein spares the fourfold in things. In other words, Dasein, by his relation to things, lets things gather the fourfold in themselves. It, in turn, would mean that Dasein lets the earth, the sky, the divinities and mortals bring the structure of the world in which things can be what they are in their being[177] into the primordial unity of the fourfold. Dasein, as the dweller and the builder, plays the key role in sparing

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[174] *Ibid.*, p. 111; Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 112.
[175] William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 457.
[176] *VA*, p. 153; *BW*, p. 336.
[177] Cf. Vincent Vycinas, p. 115.

(tending and preserving) things by bringing about the unity of the fourfold in things. Man is the '*Da*' of '*Sein*' and he dwells in the fourfold by gathering the fourfold in things. To quote Heidegger: "Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling."[178] So the dwelling of Dasein, as mortal, in the fourfold is the sparing and building of things.

Firstly, mortals dwell in that they save (*retten*) the earth. The term 'saving' is not to be taken in the sense of preventing something from danger or destruction. So saving the earth means much more than to exploit or to wear out the earth by the manipulative nature of science and technology. By saving the earth, the mortals not only prevent mastering and subjugating the earth, but also set the earth free that it can be in its true nature. Concretely this means to leave it in its essence, guard it by sustaining it in its elements, and thus allow the emerging of vegetation and animal life. In other words, saving the earth consists in using the earth in the proper way, instead of exploiting and destroying it.[179]

Secondly, mortals dwell insofar as they receive or accept (*empfangen*) the sky as the sky. It means that "they leave to the sun and to the moon their journey, to the stars their course, to the seasons their blessings and their inclemency; they do not turn night into day and day into a harassed unrest.[180] Concretely it would imply that the mortals must respect the unnamed and guard the unknown. It is not attempting to solve the secrets of Being by raising up metaphysical systems and rational thinking, but to respect the mystery of Being. When no help is offered in knowing these mysteries, the dweller is patient and when lights are offered he guards its rays from everyday idle-talk.[181] In other words, it involves a 'letting-things-be-as-they-are' and letting them reveal their essential being.

Thirdly, mortals dwell in that they wait on (*erwarten*) the divinities as divinities. In hope they look up to the divinities to receive what they hoped for. It involves that Dasein be attentive and alert to receive signs of the intimations regarding the appearing of the divinities and not miss the signs of their absence. Besides, they are also asked not to make their own gods and are warned against worshipping the idols. Concretely, it means that the mortals should not mistake a being (*Seiende*) for Being *(Sein)*. The idols of calculative thinking must be left behind. In case the Holy has withdrawn, they must wait for the arrival of the "weal that has been withdrawn."[182]

Fourthly, mortals dwell in that they initiate their own essential nature, viz., their being capable of facing death as death. While saving the earth, receiving the sky, waiting on divinities, Dasein must dwell in the perspective of his own mortal nature. Death, according to Heidegger, is not an empty something which is our life's goal, nor is it only an end-point of one's life; death is a continuous process in the life of Dasein. Therefore, dying a good death is the same as living a new life. In fact, an authentic realization of his mortality can help Dasein to dwell genuinely in the fourfold in its unity, thereby to spare and to build things.[183]

Dasein, thus dwelling on the earth (*auf der Erde*), saves the earth as the earth; by dwelling under the sky (*unter dem Himmel*) receives the sky as the sky; by dwelling before the divinities (*vor den Goettlichen*) waits on the divinities as divinities; and finally by taking upon himself his own essence of mortality, by accepting death as death, preserves the fourfold, and thereby dwells

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[178] *VA*, p. 144; *BW*, p. 328. Cf. also Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 158.

[179] Cf. *VA*, p. 144; *BW*, p. 328. Cf. also Werner Marx, *Heidegger and Tradition*, p. 238.

[180] *VA*, p. 144; *BW*, p. 328.

[181] Cf. Thomas Langan, *Meaning of Heidegger*, p. 126.

[182] Cf. *VA*, p. 145; *BW*, p. 328. Cf. Also Thomas Langan, *Meaning of Heidegger*, pp. 126-127.

[183] Cf. *VA*, p. 145; *BW*, p. 329. Cf. also James M. Demske, "Heidegger's Quadrate and the Revelation of Being," p. 253.

among things. In so doing, Dasein builds things in their essential being or spares (tending) Being in beings. "Dwelling, inasmuch as it keeps the fourfold in things, is, as this keeping, a building"[184] Dasein, by his fourfold sparing of the things, by dwelling in the fourfold, lets things be things in relation to the four facets of Being, viz., the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. In this letting-be of things, Dasein does not attempt to manipulate, master or compel things, but instead builds things in their essential nature, i.e., in relation to the fourfold. It is not an indifference or lack of interest in things, but rather a letting-be, which allows things to manifest Being (*Sein*) in their essence.[185]

3.2.3. Seeing Being's Truth

Dasein's seeing the truth of Being, in the sense of 'realizing' or 'experiencing,' cannot be attained as long as one does not move away from the attitude of representational thinking, in which man sees himself as rational animal. This seeing involves a leap (*Sprung*) from the level of logic dominated by thinking to the realm of *Ereignis* in which man and Being are naturally appropriated to each other in their essential nature. Speaking of the nature of the leap, Heidegger says that it is an abrupt leap, as entry into the realm of *Ereignis* is an 'unabridged entry,' and entry that can come about only if we let go the logic-dominated thinking. Only such a leap into the realm of mutual appropriation of Being and man can let Dasein see the truth of Being.[186] The entry into the realm of *Ereignis* — thereby seeing the truth of Being — can come about when Dasein as the seer looks into the process of Being's un-concealment (*aletheia*) and by his dwelling in language which is the house of Being. In this section, we will see how the seeing is accomplished in Dasein by his openness to *aletheia* and language.[187]

3.2.3.1. Dasein and *Aletheia*

The Greek term '*aletheia*'[188] means 'un-concealment' (*Un-verborgenheit*). It communicates the notion of being unhidden or revealed. It is literally the '*a*' of '*lethe*.' The Greek '*a*' and the corresponding German '*un*' are taken in the privative sense,[189] i.e., in the sense of undoing the concealing that is there. There is a gradual change in Heidegger's understanding of the term '*aletheia*.' Heidegger did not use the term to mean 'truth' (*Wahrheit*), not did he continue to consider truth as *aletheia*; he studies *aletheia* as *aletheia*.[190] *Aletheia* is rendered in four different senses. The first two correspond to the concealing and revealing aspects of *aletheia*, based on the emphasis given either to the '*a*' or to the '*lethe*.' The former points to the revealing while the latter

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[184] *VA*, p. 145; *BW*, p. 329.

[185] For Heidegger, the sparing (tending) things by dwelling, as we have explained, is different from the tendency of modern man to exploit the earth, control the sky, encapsulate God in metaphysical concepts and refuse to accept the finitude of man. Cf. James M. Demske, "Heidegger's Quodrate and the Revelation of Being," pp. 253-254.

[186] Cf. *ID*, 20-21; *IAD*, pp. 32-33.

[187] '*Aletheia*' and 'language' has to be understood in relation to the realm of *Ereignis*. It is *aletheia*, as a process of un-concealing of Being and Language, as the house of Being that lets Dasein see Being in its truth.

[188] Heidegger does not accept the metaphysical rendering of '*aletheia*' as 'truth' and translates it in *Sein und Zeit* as 'Being-uncovering.' Cf. *SZ*, p. 220; *BT*, p. 262.

[189] Cf. *PM*, p. 20.

[190] Cf. *SD*, p. 77; *TB*, p. 70.

stresses the concealing.[191] It is, in this sense, that we have spoken of Being as giving and withholding; approaching and withdrawing; presencing and absencing. The third way of rendering *aletheia* refers to the metaphysical understanding of the term, in which it comes to mean truth, certitude and correctness as opposed to falsity, uncertitude and incorrectness.[192] The fourth way of understanding *aletheia* means the unconcealment or the clearing of Being. We will consider this meaning of *aletheia* in detail.

The essence of *aletheia* as 'unconcealment' is openness,[193] which is unconcealed in *aletheia*. But this openness is not the result of an unconcealment, but rather unconcealment occurs only because the fundamental openness lets it occur by being its source and foundation. There is a genuine freedom associated with the unconcealing of the openness.[194] It is in relation to this freedom that the essence of the openness lightens up.[195] The openness is the 'play-ground' (*Spielraum*) and is the lighting or clearing (*Lichtung*). The openness is the shelter of Being[196] and in the open-shelter of Being each of the unconcealed is sheltered.[197] Heidegger clarifies this un-concealing dimension of *aletheia* in terms of the image of forest-clearing (*Waldlichtung*). Clearing of the forest is associated with a dense forest which fully hides its expanse. The clearing of the forest involves letting light in, or letting the forest be open and free. The letting-light-in presupposes the openness of the forest. Thus, clearing lets the open expanse of the forest 'be' there for everything to be sheltered in.[198] Through this image, Heidegger understands *aletheia* as the clearing.[199] It refers to the primordial realm of the open, out which the interplay of revealing and concealing and the mirror-play of the fourfold comes-to-pass. In other words, *aletheia* as unconcealment, reveals the realm of *Ereignis*, viz., the event of appropriation, in which man belongs to Being and beings are sheltered in the historical unfolding of Being in the play of time and space.

Since *aletheia* is unconcealment of the truth of Being in the event of appropriation, there naturally involves a role for Dasein to play in this unconcealing process, as he is the seer of the truth of Being. We could highlight the role played by man in the revealing process of Being. "Mortals are irrevocably bound to the revealing-concealing gathering which lights up everything present in its presencing."[200] Man, as the thinker of Being, opens himself to the mystery of Being; man, as ek-sistence and dweller in the nearness of Being, stands in the open of the clearing and looks (*blickt*) into it; and finally, man, as the shepherd and seer of the truth of Being, sees (*sieht*) into the openness of Being. As man sees into the openness to Being, Being itself frees for itself the 'it is' of each entity. In this freeing, Being looks at (*anblickt*) man in his shepherding of the openness of Being.[201] Thus, by his seeing into Being, man lets Being look at him. The mutual look (*Blick*) is the belonging-together of Being and man, in which *aletheia* or the unconcealing of being occurs. Man alone, as standing in the clearing of Being and as shepherding, preserves the truth of

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[191] Cf. *PM*, pp. 22-23.
[192] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 27, 38-39, 42.
[193] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 208.
[194] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 213.
[195] Cf. *ibid.*
[196] Cf. *ibid.*
[197] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 224.
[198] Cf. *SD*, p. 72; *TB*, p. 65.
[199] Cf. *SD*, p. 75; *TB*, p. 68.
[200] *VA*, p. 273; *EGT*, p. 122.
[201] Cf. *PM*, p. 224.

Being. He sees into the openness of Being and lets himself be looked at by Being. In doing so, he becomes a genuine seer of the truth of Being. *Aletheia*, as unconcealment of Being, needs man for its revealing of Being. Being, as the clearing of truth needs Dasein for its clearing. That is why Heidegger says that "human nature is given over to truth, because truth needs man."[202] But since the truth of Being is that which lets man belong to Being in the first place, Being is primary in this process. Even though priority lies in Being, yet Being needs man in that its truth is preserved by means of man's seeing into the openness of Being. Thus, we can say that *aletheia*, as the unconcealment of Being, happens only in relation to the mutual look of Being and man, i.e. in their belonging-together.

3.2.3.2. Dasein and Language

The truth of Being can be attained by Dasein's openness to language, the house of Being, besides his openness to *aletheia*. When Heidegger speaks of language, he does not refer to the metaphysical-technological language. Such a language simply informs or gives information[203] and so lacks genuine speaking. Neither does Heidegger understand language as commonly understood, viz., as an expression (*Ausdruecken*) and an activity (*Taetigkeit*) of man. It is, firstly, an expression as it utters or externalizes something that is internal. Secondly, language is an activity because it is something that comes about as a result of man's speaking.[204] For Heidegger, understanding language in this way does not take us to the essence of language. It can only be reached when we consider the being (*Wesen*) of language.[205] In order to inquire into the being of language, we must ask ourselves, as to the way language, as language, occurs. In other words, in order to understand language in its being, we, instead of talking about language, must let language speak to us in its being. Only by letting the language speak within itself, can we bring language, as language, i.e., in its being, into language.[206]

In order that language may speak to us in its being, Heidegger goes on to analyze the pre-Socratic notion of '*logos*,' which means both Being (*Sein*) and language (saying).[207] '*Logos*' is derived from the verb '*legein*,' which is equivalent to the German '*legen*' (to lay) and Latin '*legere*' (to read). The Greek '*legein*,' like its Latin and German equivalents, has the nuance of 'collecting or bringing together,' i.e., a laying which gathers.[208] As a laying that gathers, '*legein*' keeps the gathered in the open. In this sense, '*legein*' means to say (*sagen*). For saying (*die Sage*) consists in the letting-lie-together, as gathered, before that which gathers.[209] Thus, the essence of language, as saying, in its original Greek sense is "the gathering letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing."[210] In other words, saying or language, in the original sense of '*logos*' and '*legein*' is a showing (*Zeige*) or a letting-appear. Therefore, the analysis of the primordial Greek term '*logos*' lets language, as language, speak of itself from within itself — in its being —

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[202] *GL*, p. 63; *DT*, p. 84.
[203] Cf. *US*, p. 263; *WL*, p. 132.
[204] Cf. *US*, p. 14; *PLT*, p. 192.
[205] Cf. *US*, pp. 200-201; *WL*, pp. 94-95.
[206] Cf. *US*, p. 12; *PLT*, p. 190.
[207] Cf. *US*, p. 185; *WL*, p. 80.
[208] Cf. *VA*, p. 201; *EGT*, p. 61.
[209] Cf. *VA*, p. 205; *EGT*, p. 64.
[210] *VA*, p. 220; *EGT*, p. 77.

as a saying that shows something or that lets something appear. "To say (language, as saying) means to show, to make appear the lighting — concealing — revealing offer of world."[211]

The above quotation from Heidegger not only indicates what language, as saying, is, but also what it shows or makes appear, viz., the world. The naming of a thing, by the word[212] is a calling of the thing to its being, i.e., the thinging of the thing.[213] The word is unfolded in the thinging of the things, i.e. in the gathering and bringing near of the fourfold — the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. In other words, in naming the world, in saying that a thing 'is' in its being, or a thing things (*bedingt*),[214] we are saying the same thing. The thinging of the thing is the worlding of the world and the presencing of the presencing. Thus, language as the saying that shows, is nothing other than Being as the worlding in its revealing-concealing character, and which unfolds in history in the time-space-play.[215] It is language as saying, understood in this way alone, that genuinely speaks[216] as the peal of stillness.[217]

The house of Being is language as saying, that is, it shows the world in its time-space-play and lets happen the difference (*Unterschied*) for world and things[218] by worlding the world in the fourfold.[219] Language protects the presencing of Being by bringing into light the truth of Being.[220] In other words, language is the house that gathers everything in it, so that in this house they find their essence, their name and their being. By providing protection (*die Hut*) and housing the beings in being, language houses Being. It is in language that the truth of Being is guarded. Language is the house of Being, because language as saying is a mode of appropriation[221] and belongs to the realm of *Ereignis*. Language is the mode of appropriation; in revealing it withholds.[222] Its movement is historical, i.e., epochal[223] and calls to difference between world (Being) and things (beings).[224] Language, when seen in terms of the event of appropriation, is not inaccessible to man. As the seer, man sees the truth of Being that is found in language, the house of Being.

Language, the house of Being, needs man in order that it speak of Being. Man plays a great role in the linguistic manifestation of Being. Speaking of the role of man in seeing the truth of Being, as it comes to pass in language, Heidegger says: "Language speaks. Man speaks only in so

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[211] *US*, p. 214; *WL*, p. 107.

[212] Heidegger distinguishes between the 'word' (*das Wort*) and 'terms' (*Woerter*). Terms are found in dictionaries, but not the word. The word 'is' not, but it gives (*es gibt*). It is the giver (*das Gebende*) and not the given (*das Gegebende*). Word names things. The naming by the word is not an external label, but it stands for the being of the thing. In naming a thing, word 'bethings' (*bedingt*) that thing in its being. Terms are only the written form of what the 'word words' in the 'thinging of the thing.' Cf. *US*, pp. 192-193, 163-164, 232; *WL*, pp. 87-88, 60-62, 151.

[213] Cf. *US*, p. 22; *PLT*, p. 199.

[214] Cf. *US*, p. 216; *WL*, p. 108.

[215] Cf. *US*, p. 215; *WL*, p. 108.

[216] Cf. *US*, p. 265; *WL*, p. 134.

[217] Cf. *US*, p. 30; *PLT*, p. 207.

[218] Cf. *ibid.*

[219] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 311; *BW*, p. 193.

[220] Cf. *US*, p. 267; *WL*, p. 135.

[221] 220. Cf. *ibid.*

[222] Cf. *US*, p. 186; *WL*, p. 81.

[223] Cf. *US*, p. 264; *WL*, p.133.

[224] Cf. *US*, pp. 24-25; *PLT*, pp. 202-203.

far as he corresponds to language."[225] Man is neither the inventor nor the speaker of language. He is the co-speaker, and is capable of passing on the speaking of Being. "Man is capable of speaking only insofar as he, belonging to saying, listens to saying, so that in resaying it he may be able to say a word."[226] Though man is a co-speaker and is enabled by language in his speaking, yet language needs him, in order that this 'peal of stillness' can be brought into speech. "Saying is in need of [man for] being voiced in the world."[227] In his belonging to the stillness of language, man speaks aloud in his own unique way.[228] The different languages are different ways of responding to speaking aloud the silent voice of language. But, though man speaks in various languages which consist of 'terms' (*Woerter*), the genuine responding is done in words (*Worte*), which is beyond the linguistic differences. In genuine speaking man does not speak about languages, but rather speaks from the primordial language, which is the basis of all human speaking.[229]

Man's response to the silent presencing of language presupposes a listening.[230] In listening man lets-himself-be-spoken-to. It is in letting oneself into saying[231] that one can see the Being that is housed in language as saying. One needs to keep a listening silence. Just as man responds to the speaking of language by speaking aloud what is heard in language, in the same way the peal of silence of the saying must be received or listened to by a corresponding silence.[232] In this way, by speaking and keeping silence, man listens and thereby corresponds to language.[233] Thus, man comes to attain the truth of Being in language when the belonging-together of Being as speaking (*Sprechen*) and man cor-respond (*Ent-sprechen*). In the speaking-corresponding relationship, man sees his unity with Being, the difference between world (Being) and things (beings) and the time-space-play manifestation of Being in history. As the seer and shepherd of the house of Being, i.e. language, it is man's home as well. He guards his home, viz. language, by shepherding the Being it houses.

3.3. Dasein's Total Authenticity: The Goal of the Experience of Being

Dasein attains total authentic existence when, having opened himself to the voice of Being, he begins to focus more on Being, as the thinker, the dweller and the seer, rather than on himself. In other words, Dasein must base his life more on Being. This would involve a movement of Dasein from the state of care to the state of the experience of Being. Thus, the occurrence of authenticity in Dasein involves a single and a continuous process of Dasein moving from himself towards Being. But twofold movements are inherent in this single way of Dasein to authenticity, viz. the movement from care and a movement towards Being. The clarification of these twofold movements can enable us to explain Dasein's authenticity. This is our task in this section.

3.3.1. A Movement from Care

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[225] Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenologie und Theologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), p. 41 (Hereafter: *PT*).

[226] *US*, p. 266; *WL*, p. 134.

[227] *Ibid.*

[228] Cf. *US*, p. 30; *PLT*, p. 208.

[229] Cf. *US*, pp. 150-151; *WL*, pp. 50-51.

[230] Cf. *US*, p. 32; *PLT*, p. 209.

[231] Cf. *US*, p. 255; *WL*, p. 124.

[232] Cf. *US*. p. 262; *WL*, p. 131.

[233] Cf. *US*, pp. 32-33; *PLT*, p. 210.

In the state of care, Dasein has an inconsistent perception of himself because he sees himself on the one hand as an all powerful, self-sufficient being and, on the other hand, as an anxious, helpless, dependent and finite being. Seen in both of these aspects Dasein stands completely alone. As a self-sufficient being, Dasein stands alone because he is not in need of any other reality to know the truth about himself, the meaning of his life and even his authentic existence. As a finite and dependent being, Dasein stands alone in his anxiety because there is no one to help the anxious Dasein. This point is clearly illustrated in the fact that existential guilt, existential limitations and existential death must be faced by Dasein all alone, as no one can take his place relating to these. Even the so-called relatedness to Being, entities and other Daseins does not add anything to the self-hood of Dasein. The much talked about relationship to Being, viz., Dasein's pre-conceptual understanding of Being, seems to be only a theoretical awareness of Dasein, rather than a real relationship of unity between Being and Dasein. This also is clear from the fact that at the end of *Being and Time*, we know more about the Dasein who questions than what is questioned, viz., Being and the meaning of Being.[234] In other words, *Being and Time* does not succeed in establishing a real relationship between Dasein and Being. All these points amply prove that, in the state of care, Dasein is totally alone, completely cut off from every other entity and fully closed up within himself.

Dasein's perception — that he is self-sufficient in his knowing, in his relatedness to other realities and in his whole, authentic, temporal and historical existence, and depends on nothing else in any of these aspects — seem to lack the truth, because a Dasein that is finite, left alone, anxious and dependent cannot be self-sufficient. Though one cannot deny Dasein's uniqueness and his ability to understand, interpret and express in discourse, still to say that he is self-sufficient and precludes any dependency on anything would be an over-statement. Besides, a Dasein that is characterized by guilt, existential limitations, and death as essential aspects of his nature cannot be the ultimate explanation for himself both in relation to his past and the future. Thus, a Dasein, who is groundless regarding his past and future, and runs away from accepting this fundamental groundlessness of his existence and the anxiety that arises from it cannot be self-sufficient existence. From what we have said, it is clear that Dasein, as care, cannot be a self-sufficient existence; so it is an existence that is in need of help from outside himself.

Now, since Dasein is not self-sufficient and dependent, strictly speaking he is incapable of bringing about his own authentic personhood. Because Dasein basically stands alone, reduced to his own resources which are limited, he cannot be the reason for his own authenticity. The call of conscience, which is, in fact, the call of the anxious Dasein in his 'not-at-homeness' cannot pull Dasein out of the mire of inauthenticity. The call of Dasein to himself to be his authentic self is comparable to a man who is sinking in the water trying to lift himself up out of the water by holding the hair on his head. It could also be compared to a blind man leading another blind man. The resolute response of Dasein to his own call in the given existential 'Situation,' and the anticipation of death facilitating this resolute return to one's own being add a heroic and tragic sense to Dasein's existence. We do not want to deny the possibility of Dasein moving towards his authenticity in this manner. But the authenticity towards which Dasein moves is not a genuine authenticity because Dasein tries to be his authentic self which is basically groundless and limited. Thus, we could say that the so-called authenticity that is seemingly taking place in the state of care is incomplete; it is nothing more than Dasein's reflective acceptance of his own tragic existence.

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[234] James M. Demske, *Being, Man, Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 184. Cf. *HD*, pp. 24-25, 124. Cf. also William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 46-462.

What is achieved, in this reflection of Dasein on his finite existence, is not genuine authenticity, but an understanding of his wholeness or completeness as a temporal-historical existence.

From what we have said, it follows that Dasein in his self-enclosed, lonely and self-centered existence cannot attain his genuine and authentic self-hood. As an existence that is cut off from genuine relationship with other realities, Dasein lives only for himself and for the sake of his structural existence alone. Dasein's involvement with other entities is conditioned by his own interest to maintain his self. Therefore, in order to attain genuine authenticity, Dasein must move from the state of care. The 'movement from care' we are talking about is not a throwing out of Dasein's earlier existence; nor is it a total break with his past. Rather, it consists in a change in the perspective of Dasein, as he is able to see everything from the perspective of Being. It involves a breaking of the shell within which Dasein has enclosed himself and moving into the open. Thus, when Dasein's movement from care takes place, he moves out of his 'walled-existence' of self-centered living to a genuine life of belonging to Being.

3.3.2. A Movement toward Being

As Dasein opens himself to a life of movement towards Being, he no longer views his life and destiny from the perspective of the enclosed, self-assertive and lonely self. He lets go of his self conditioned by care, and opens himself to Being in a genuine and real way by giving himself to essential thinking. As an essential thinker, Dasein responds to the call of Being by re-collection of the call and thanks Being for the gift of the call. In the process, Dasein is released towards things and is opened to be mystery of Being. Release is an attitude of saying 'yes' and 'no' to the same thing at the same time. It is an attitude of accepting something as a need in Dasein's existence and at the same time not being mastered by it. It is a state in which Dasein is involved with things, but not entangled with them. In other words, in release Dasein is able to see himself and everything else in the mystery dimension of Being.

This twofold release makes Dasein a dweller in the neighborhood of Being As a dweller in the neighborhood of Being, he dwells in the fourfold in which Being shines forth. Dasein finds himself in the fourfold as the mortal, who is not able to get back behind his nature as the mortal. But, he recognizes his mission to guard the light of Being in the fourfold, basing his life on Being. He does this task by saving the earth as the earth, receiving the sky as the sky, waiting on divinities as divinities and initiating his own essential nature as the mortal. Thus, dwelling in this manner, in the fourfold, Dasein builds things in their essential nature and spares (tends or preserves) Being in beings. In doing so, he protects the presencing of Being.

Such a Dasein becomes the seer who sees and shepherds Being. Dasein sees the truth of Being not by lording over beings, but by shepherding Being and its truth. As a shepherd, Dasein attends to Being and waits on its presencing. In this attentive-waiting on Being and watchful-shepherding of the presencing of Being Dasein becomes a seer. Dasein's nature, as a seer, and the nature of his seeing the truth of Being cannot be understood in the light of metaphysical thinking, which is characterized by Dasein's falling away from Being. In this kind of thinking Dasein is concerned with beings in their abstract beingness and about that being which is the basis of all beingness. Thus, metaphysical thinking is onto-theo-logic, and in the process the whole question of Being (*Sein*) is forgotten. It forms the basis for modern technological existence, which ends up in a representational-calculative outlook in which reason and logic dominate thinking. Everything is seen as something that can be studied by research and manipulated with the use of technology. When Dasein gives up this type of thinking and opens himself to the Being's unconcealing-

concealing process (*aletheia*) and to language, the house of Being, in the realm of *Ereignis,* he becomes the seer of Being and shepherds its truth., viz., the total authentic Dasein.

Thus, the total authenticity of Dasein occurs when Dasein moves from a state dominated by care to the experiencing of Being. It is a single process with inherent twofold movements. It is not to be understood in a spatio-temporal sense, even though space and time may be involved in the process. Fundamentally, it consists in a shift in perspective and attitude of Dasein towards his life and destiny. In the state of care Dasein's life, destiny and authenticity are understood as the task of Dasein alone, whereas in the state of Dasein's experience of Being, the same are seen in the light of the appropriating belonging-together of Being and Dasein. In the former state Dasein is totally closed up in himself, while in the latter Dasein opens himself genuinely to Being, entities and himself. This threefold openness involves a shift in Dasein's perspective. To the extent Dasein effects this shift, to that extent he moves towards Being; in the process he becomes a totally authentic human person.

3. 4. Total Authentic Dasein

The total authentic Dasein is no longer the Dasein who is caught up in the state of care. Though he has not broken his ties of the past and is living a life fully 'in-the-world,' there have come about significant changes in the way he looks at his everyday life and his concerns. There is a marked change in the way he perceives himself, his world and his destiny. Besides, in the state of Being-experience there comes about, in Dasein, a deep relationship of belonging-together to Being and relationship of building and sparing things. In this section, we make an attempt to clarify Dasein's perception of himself and the nature of his relationship to Being and entities in the state of his experience of Being.

3.4.1. Dasein's Perception of Himself

When this movement from the state of care to the state of Being-experience occurs in Dasein there come about significant changes in Dasein's perception of himself. Dasein understands himself in a new way when he is opened to Being. His relationship with himself has changed immensely, as his meaning, truth and authenticity are understood in his relationship with Being. Dasein is not alone in his self-enclosed and self-centered existence. In his genuine openness to Being and entities a new vision of himself has dawned on Dasein. There is no inconsistency regarding his nature. Dasein still remains the most powerful of all beings. He is the only being who can understand Being, and enter into a relationship of belonging-together with it. Besides, he still is the meaning-giver of entities, the discloser of the truth of reality and enjoys the threefold priority, viz., the ontic, the ontological and the ontico-ontological, over other realities. Though Dasein has all these qualities, he no longer thinks so highly of himself, for he knows that all he has is the gift of Being.

Dasein now knows that he is not a self-sufficient existence, as his destiny depends on Being. In fact, his openness to Being has raised Dasein to the state of *Ereignis*, thereby making Dasein the standard-bearer for Being. Dasein still is the same finite and limited being, characterized by existential guilt, existential limitations and existential death, besides, anxiety, fallenness and care. Yet Dasein is not worried about these aspects of his nature, but instead he accepts these unsettling dimensions of his nature with calmness and serenity. The reason for such a change in Dasein's attitude is that, unlike the state of care, the authentic and Being-centered Dasein does not face his

finitude and limited existence all alone. Dasein's finitude, including death, instead of creating unsettling moods in Dasein, leads him back to Being, which is his ultimate ground. The reason for anxiety, struggle and the tragic feeling was the inability of the self-centered Dasein to ground his own existence. Now that Dasein is grounded in Being, these unsettling dimensions of Dasein's nature do not matter to him as much as before. Since Dasein is securely grounded in Being, all inconsistencies about his nature fall apart.

Thus having found his ground in Being, Dasein attains a sense of balance and integration in his life. As a result he is able to cope with the inadequacies of his temporal nature. His past is linked to the present and the future flows from his present. Thus Dasein, living in the present, is able to think of his past with gratitude, as it was Being's gift to him. At the same time, he is able to move from the present to his future with the sense of hope, as the manifestation of Being enables him to face the future with confidence. Guided by the presence of Being, at every step, Dasein accepts his life without any fear and moves on with the sense of purpose and mission. Dasein's mission is not to get caught up in his uncertainties or successes that come from his nature and activities, but to wait on Being as the attentive attendant, to experience in himself Being's continuous giving and to guard it as a shepherd. Having attained the sense of mission and purpose, and being committed to this cause, Dasein dwells in a state of peace, tranquillity and contentment.

Besides, Dasein has a realistic understanding of himself. He is aware of his own insufficiency to bring about his genuine authenticity. He knows that he must depend on Being for his total authentic existence. As a result, Dasein depends more on Being than on himself; it is Dasein's openness towards Being that makes this state of existence. Dasein is also aware that he cannot take the first steps towards authenticity unless he is called, summoned and claimed by Being. He knows that it is not the anxious Dasein, of the state of care, in his not-at-homeness that calls him to be authentic. Rather, it is Being that initiates this movement by its revealing-concealing mode of giving. He is only called to respond to Being correspondingly, in order to experience Being in the depth of his heart.

3.4.2. Dasein's Relationship to Being and Entities

Not only has Dasein begun to see himself in a different perspective, but also he has opened himself towards new ways of relating to Being and entities. This section elaborates the changed relationships Dasein has with Being and entities.

3.4.2.1. Dasein's Relationship to Being

In the state of the experience of Being, Dasein encounters Being in a relationship of belonging-together. It involves Dasein and Being entering into each other's realms. It is an interactive relationship in which Being reveals itself to Dasein and conceals itself. The withdrawing or concealing dimension of Being makes Dasein seek Being, respond to Being and preserve Being. Every stage of Dasein's movement towards authentic personhood and total authenticity is characterized by the giving of Being in Dasein as the lighting-up-place of Being and Dasein responding to Being by shepherding and preserving this gift of Being. For example, at the stage of Dasein's essential thinking Being calls and gives, while Dasein re-calls the call of Being by re-collection and thanks for Being's gift. Release is brought about by Being's regioning and Dasein's response of non-willing and waiting on Being. Dasein begins to be a dweller in the nearness of Being, by Being's poetic presencing and Dasein's poetic dwelling on the poetic presencing of

Being in the three ecstases of time. Dasein becomes the seer of the truth of Being, when Being's look (*Blick*) is reciprocated by Dasein's seeing, and when this mutual look into each other's realm occurs in the process of the revealing of Being. Again, Dasein sees Being in its truth by dwelling in language which houses Being, in the process co-speaking with language which speaks of Being. Thus, Being's giving and Dasein's responding is an essential characteristic of Dasein's state of total authenticity.

The giving of itself to Dasein on the part of Being and the receiving-responding to the giving of Being by Dasein clearly point to the nature of the relationship that exists between Being and Dasein. It is a one-to-one relationship. It is different from the vague pre-conceptual understanding of Being that marks Dasein's being as care. It is an appropriating relationship of identity and belonging-together, which takes Dasein and Being to each other's realms. Being claims Dasein for itself, and Dasein also claims Being, in the sense that he lets himself be claimed by Being. Thus, in Being's claim, Dasein claims Being.

Even though Being is the closest to Dasein in this relationship of belonging-together, yet it is the farthest from Dasein. To put it differently, in spite of the fact of Dasein's relationship of belonging-together to Being and his encountering of Being in Dasein's own being and in that of the entities, Being is, in some sense, far away from Dasein. Being always remains a mystery to Dasein. He can never get hold of the whole of Being. Dasein experiences Being in different attunements: Being as the Joyous is experienced in joy; Being as the totally other is experienced in dread and wonderment; Being as the Holy and the Source is experienced in reverence; and Being as the one that does not admit complete and immediate experience, i.e., Being as the Immediate that is inaccessible, is experienced in the attunement of awe.234 All such attunements and dispositions constitute the affective temper of the authentic Dasein in his experience of Being. But these attitudes do not depend on Dasein, but are due to the way Being gives itself to Dasein, viz., in the revealing-concealing process. As soon as Being gives itself in an entity, it withdraws in favor of the entity in which Being is revealed. As a result, the entity is revealed and Being itself is concealed. Thus, Dasein cannot have the total experience of Being, but only experiences it as revealing and concealing, giving and withdrawing, presencing and absencing, all according to the attunements produced in Dasein by the different modes of the manifestation of Being. This manner of Being's giving makes Dasein continue his seeking of Being. Even in the state of Being-centered living, Dasein must continue to be the lighting-up-place of Being and shepherd the revelation of Being in himself and in entities. In this continued seeking, receiving and shepherding of Being, Dasein moves towards his total authenticity.

3.4.2.2. Dasein's Relationship to Entities

When Dasein experiences Being, he is not only related to Being in an authentic manner, but also related to all other entities. Dasein preserves and shepherds Being as it is manifested not only in his person, but also as it is revealed in things. Firstly, Dasein, in his essential relatedness to Being, points to the ontological difference, i.e., the relationship of difference between Being and entities. In his essential belonging-together to Being, Dasein experiences the realm of 'between' (*das Zwischen*) that differentiates (*Unterschied*) Being and entities. It is a process in which Dasein experiences the coming-over of Being and the arrival of beings, whereby beings are grounded in their being by Being. In this relationship, Being and beings bear on each other and are kept away from each other. Being turns towards beings to ground them in being, while beings turn towards Being to be grounded in their being. Being is kept away from beings as it conceals as soon as

beings are revealed in their being, while beings are kept away from Being, as they are essentially different from Being.

Secondly, Dasein, as the essential thinker, attains release. In the state of release he gives up non-willing and waits on Being. This leads Dasein to a twofold movement: openness to the mystery of Being and a release towards things. The latter movement implies that Dasein cultivates right attitude in his dealing with things. It consists in giving things the value they have and accepting their importance in his life, while not allowing things to dominate his life. He is no more caught up with entities in concernful pre-occupation, as he is in the state of care, but he respects and values things in the right way. Such an attitude of relating to things fills Dasein with a sense of tranquility and peace. Besides, he also treats things with respect. He does not look at things from the perspective of science and technology, as something to be used and exploited, but rather as a place in which Being is revealed and which he attempts to preserve.

Thirdly, Dasein shepherds and preserves Being in things by dwelling in the fourfold. Thus, Dasein's task in the state of Being-experience becomes the preservation of Being as it manifests in the fourfold. Dasein, by saving the earth, receiving the sky, waiting on divinities and accepting his own nature as the mortal by living as mortal, preserves Being in its physical, divine and human facets. In this manner being allows things to grow in their essential nature and to manifest the Being in which they are grounded in their own way. This relationship of Dasein to entities is much deeper and more personal than Dasein's relationship of concernful pre-occupation with entities that characterizes the state of care.

Thus, the life of Dasein, as totally authentic, is completely transformed. There is a sense of purpose, dedication and mission in his life. He lives not for himself, but for Being: to see its manifestation, guard it in himself and in entities. His life is lived from the mystery perspective of experiencing Being, shepherding Being and communicating Being's self-giving.

4
A Critique

Attempting a critique on Heidegger, Walter Biemel says: "We can either view this thinking [Heidegger's philosophy] from outside and seek to analyze and criticize it or we can endeavor to understand it from within."[1] Our critique of Heidegger, in this section, does not aim at either of these alternatives, but rather intends to do both. On the one hand, we would like to view Heidegger's philosophy in a distanced manner, by standing outside it and thereby showing what is lacking in it. On the other hand, we would like to enter into it, so as to understand the hidden positive dimensions of Heidegger's thought. In other words, here we plan a negative and positive appraisal of Heidegger's notion of the experience of Being and other related issues.

4.1. Negative Appraisal

In our negative appraisal of Heidegger's thought, we do not want to hold him responsible for what he did not include in his philosophy. It is not possible for a thinker to include everything under the sun in his philosophical reflection. It would be unreasonable to expect it from any thinker, however great he may be. Neither do we want to criticize him for the errors in his philosophy which are due to his background and intellectual heritage. But Heidegger can be held accountable for what is lacking in what he has said. In other words, we can criticize him for not saying what he should have said in what he said, viz., the inadequacies. Again we can criticize him for the lack of logical consistency and clarity in what he said, viz., discrepancies. So our negative appraisal focuses on the inadequacies and discrepancies of Heideggerian thought.

4.1.1. Inadequacies

In this section we want to bring to light some inadequacies in Heidegger's philosophy. Had he accepted these inadequacies and attempted to correct them, his work would have a completeness which it does not have.

4.1.1.1. Rational Epistemology

In *Being and Time* Heidegger speaks of knowing as founded upon Dasein's being-in-the-world.[2] In other words, it means that before one has theoretical knowledge about a thing, he can use this thing. For example, one may not have detailed knowledge about the nature and function of electricity, yet he can use electricity in his day-to-day life. This is a fact of our experience and does not mean that objective and scientific knowledge is unnecessary, superfluous or insignificant, as it is founded on Dasein's being-in-the world. Heidegger distinguishes knowing from understanding. The latter is an existential of Dasein which enables him to interpret his possibilities and express them in assertions. It is more primordial than knowing, as understanding is not conceptual but is a pre-conceptual experience of reality. Since this is so, what is understood, interpreted and expressed in assertion cannot be genuinely communicated to the other in the public

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[1] Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study*, p. 149.
[2] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 59-62; *BT*, pp. 86-90.

world. The communication that is involved in understanding and discourse is of such a nature that it only induces or hopes the other to adopt the some concernful dealing with an entity which one has entered into. Since Heidegger does not develop a rational epistemology in *Being and Time*, but reduces epistemology to an ontological experience of the essences of things in an understanding which is primordial and pre-conceptual, Dasein can neither objectively validate nor communicate what he has experienced in understanding.

Even in later Heidegger there is no objective theory of knowledge. Instead of 'understanding' of *Being and Time*, Heidegger speaks of 'thinking,' 'dwelling' and 'seeing,' referring to Dasein's relationship to Being. Here, Dasein's thinking is not objective rational thinking but a meditative reflection. The dwelling is a waiting-on and listening-to Being. Seeing consists in experiencing or realizing Being. Thus, Heidegger, in his later phase, is also left with the same problem of objectively validating and communicating Dasein's experiencing of Being.

This lack of rational epistemology in Heidegger's philosophy clearly points to his inability to clarify the question of the meaning of Being. Neither *Being and Time*, nor later Heideggerian thinking, has succeeded in objectively clarifying the meaning of Being. Early Heidegger inquired into the nature of Dasein and raised the question of Being, while later Heidegger highlighted the revealing of Being as a play in the epochal history, without ever attempting to clarify the meaning of Being and its objective validity in a rational way. All that Dasein could do, according to Heidegger, is to formulate the truth about his own experience of Being in himself and entities and hope that others would come in line with its experience.

What made Heidegger discard the significance of scientific knowledge and a rational epistemology and idolize the experiences of craftsmen, artists, poets and thinkers, was his strong conviction that metaphysical thinking and its outgrowth, technological thinking, brought about the rootlessness and inauthenticity in human existence. This made Heidegger emphasize praxis-oriented understanding. In doing so, the objectivity of knowledge which is characteristic of scientific inquiry was lost sight of. Another possible reason for this can be traced to Heidegger's interest in the hermeneutical tradition which distinguished between natural sciences and human sciences. The former is guided by logic and scientific method, while the latter is governed by hermeneutics. Thus, in over-emphasizing hermeneutics, Heidegger underrated the value of science, logic and a rational epistemology.[3]

4.1.1.2. Inter-subjective Relationships

Even though Heidegger speaks of 'being-with' as an existential of Dasein's being-in-the-world, his consideration of Dasein's communal world is rather deplorable. Heidegger's analysis of inter-subjective relationship is very brief, and it is presented as a type of appendix to the analysis of Dasein as being-alongside-entities. In a work situation, the 'towards-which' of the usability or the 'for-the-sake-of-whom' of the work produced is the other Dasein. He also appears as the buyer and seller of the work produced, or as the provider of the material for the work to be done. Thus, Heidegger introduces one Dasein to another in the context of the 'work-place,' where one is involved with the entities ready-to-hand. It is surprising that he, who speaks of Dasein as essentially 'being-with,' establishes inter-subjectivity in an indirect manner, i.e., through the entities, rather than in a direct face-to-face relationship between two Daseins.

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[3] Roger Waterhouse suggests that Heidegger's main concern is Ontology and praxis-centered thinking, not a theory of knowledge. Cf. Roger Waterhouse, pp. 149-163.

Again Heidegger speaks of two modes of Dasein's 'being-with,' viz., the negative and the positive. Strictly speaking neither of these two modes is a genuinely authentic relationships. The negative mode consists in one not mattering to another. The positive mode is of two types, viz., either Dasein dominates the other or leads the other into freedom and responsibility. In dominating and in leading the other, there is no genuine I-thou relationship about which Buber and Marcel spoke. In both cases the Dasein that dominates or leads the other stands above the one that is dominated and that is led. Roger Waterhouse compares this relation of intersubjectivity to relationships such as master-pupil, parent-child and God-man,[4] in which the relationship is one of dependency rather than reciprocity. Besides, Dasein's relationship with the other is generally spoken of as a state of inauthenticity. Inauthenticity is a state in which Dasein is fallen, and he is not his true self. It is dominated by the other, i.e., the 'they.'[5] Even though Heidegger says that being authentic does not mean running away from the environment and social world;[6] yet Heidegger's treatment of intersubjectivity belongs to Dasein's everydayness, which is often seen as inauthentic.[7]

If we turn our attention to later Heidegger, the situation is no better, as there is hardly any mention of other Daseins. It is mentioned only in relation to the fourfold, where it is referred to as the mortal. Even here the indication is to the individual Dasein rather than to the intersubjective community of Daseins. As mortal, Dasein is understood only in relation to the other three of the fourfold, as the mortal Dasein is only a facet of Being. Besides, Being's call, giving, regioning and poetic presencing are more directed to the individual Dasein who recalls, thanks, waits on and poetically dwells. The meditative thinking, dwelling in the nearness of Being and seeing the truth of Being, in some sense calls for a moving away from other Daseins, as only in absolute openness to Being can Being's call be re-collected and gift be thanked. Again, later Heidegger speaks of Being's giving of itself in things, in poetry, in art and in language. Dasein is called to shepherd Being's presencing in all these. But we do not have any reference to Being's revealing of itself to other Daseins or to an intersubjective community of Daseins of which Dasein is a shepherd. Being is spoken of as giving itself to Dasein through language, without a genuine intersubjective dialogue. Thus, both in the early and the later Heidegger, the analysis of Dasein's inter-subjective relationships is deficient. Dasein is seen in both the phases as being alone, without genuine inter-subjective communion, dialogue and reciprocity.

4.1.1.3. God: The Eternal Thou

Heidegger's philosophy does not consider the possibility of God to whom man can have genuine relationship. Just as the notion of the other, in the sense of communal existence, is absent, so also the notion of the other, as the Absolute and Eternal Thou, is absent in Heidegger's thought. In the early phase, Heidegger is totally indifferent to the question of God, while in the latter phase the notion of God is considered in a different name, viz., the Divine. Here the Divine is simply an aspect of the phenomenological revelation of Being. But the Divine, as spoken by Heidegger at the later phase, is of such nature that it would not in any way satisfy man's religious aspirations. Nor is it such that man can offer his worship and adoration. Thus, though Heidegger has succeeded

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[4] Cf. Roger Waterhouse, *Heidegger Critique*, p. 176.
[5] Cf. Rene Weber, "A critique of Heidegger's Concept of Solicitude," in *The New Scholasticism* 42 (1968): 537-560.
[6] Cf. *SZ*, p. 263; *BT*, pp. 307-308.
[7] Cf. *SZ*, pp. 117-126; *BT*, pp. 153-163.

in thinking of God in a novel way, he has not provided a notion of God that will instill religious feeling in Dasein.

4.1.1.4. Morality and Value System

Even though there are thinkers[8] who claim that there is an ethical system in Heidegger, it is rather difficult to accept their point of view. The absence of the other, both in vertical and horizontal dimensions, gives way to the absence of a moral and value system in Heidegger. Since he does not envisage an intersubjective community, morality becomes something superfluous. Besides, the appeal to live a moral life is related to God as the rewarder of the one living moral life. Since these two are vague themes in Heidegger, morality as well becomes an automatic topic of vague consideration. Besides, though there are ethical ideas in Heidegger's thought, such as the call of conscience, call of Being, resoluteness and call to authenticity, he does not attempt to spell out any practical way of giving guidance to moral life relating to Dasein's concrete situation. Thus, in some sense we agree with Camele[9] in saying that Heidegger has precluded a socially and situationally oriented ethical system.

4.1.1.5. Bodiliness of Dasein

Heidegger, in attempting to analyze Dasein, criticized the traditional notion of man as 'rational animal,' saying that this definition is incomplete as it only defines man from his animality rather than his humanity. But he seems to have done the opposite, as he has totally ignored the animality of Dasein, as a bodily nature. Dasein is spoken of as being-in-the-world. Yet the world of Dasein is a relatedness to various equipmental systems and their significance rather than the concrete bodily nature. The consideration of Dasein — as the state-of-being with its moods, as being-towards-death, as having existential guilt and existential limitations, as a thrown and factical existence — remains incomplete because none of these aspects of Dasein is seen from the bodily dimension. Had Heidegger taken these aspects to the level of a Dasein that is bodily, his Dasein analysis would have attained a concreteness which it does not have. Thus, Heidegger's Dasein analysis is incomplete and not fully concrete as he claimed.[10]

If we turn our attention to later Heidegger, the situation is not very different. In considering Dasein as an aspect of the fourfold, which is the manifestation of Being in its spatiality, we can find a reference to Dasein being rooted in the spatial manifestation of Being. The same is also indicated in Dasein's building things, by saving the earth, receiving the sky, waiting on Divinities and initiating its mortal nature. But these are only indications. The bodiliness of Dasein, as an essential aspect of its nature and being, is not considered in the latter phase as well.

The absence of the consideration of the bodilyness of Dasein in Heidegger's Dasein analysis is the fundamental reason for all the above-mentioned deficiencies. Body is a significant reality as

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[8] John D. Caputo speaks of an original-ethics in Heidegger, which refers to the thoughtful meditation upon the essence of dwelling as the issue of Being: "Heidegger's Original Ethics," *The New Scholasticism,* 45 (1971), pp. 127-138; Giles Driscoll considers Heidegger as an ethical monist who gives an ontological structure for an ethics. "Heidegger's Ethical Monism," *The New Scholasticism*, 42 (1968), pp. 497-510.

[9] Cf. Anthony M. Camele, "Heideggerian Ethics," *Philosophy Today,* 21 (1977): 284-293.

[10] Cf. Guentes Stern, "The Pseudo-concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 8 (1947/48): 337-371.

it is the point of contact in our concrete existence. If not for the body, no relationship of any kind can be built. Since this all-important dimension is missing in Heideggerian Dasein analysis, any relationship that is genuine and personal is missing, whether it be relating to God, the other or the community. Besides moral dimension and the intellectual dimension of the possibility of objective knowledge is related to Dasein's bodily interactions. Thus, the omission of the analysis of the bodily nature of Dasein is a significant deficiency in Heideggerian thinking.

4.1.1.6. Dasein's Experience of Being

Heidegger's perception of Dasein's experience of Being, which is the state of his authenticity, is also not a welcoming one. The authenticity that is spoken in the early Heidegger is not a genuine one, as it is nothing else but Dasein's reflection on himself. It only brings Dasein to the state of lonely and self-centered existence, in which Dasein is cut off from every other type of existence. Even Dasein's experience of Being, as highlighted in the later Heidegger, and the authenticity that is associated with this state, also contains a vacuity. Though the authentic Dasein is open to Being in things and understands himself and his destiny in a new way, yet he lacks the dimension of genuine relationship. Dasein's openness to Being takes Dasein away from other relationships. Dasein is not in genuine inter-subjective relationship, even in this state of authenticity. Besides, Dasein's openness to the Divine is one of intellectual waiting or contemplation. The ultimate joy or happiness Dasein attains at this state of authenticity consists in being lost in wonder at the presencing of Being. As a result, even in this state of authenticity Dasein is alone. He is no more an anxious Dasein who sought in himself the source of authentic existence, but a resigned Dasein which knows that he is limited and that he must depend on Being for his happiness. The ultimate purpose of Dasein in this life is to seek and receive the gift of Being and to shepherd it in his being. Such a state of authenticity seem to be divorced from genuine action, as it has less and less to do with the social relationships. It is more of waiting passively for the moment in which Being reveals itself. Thus, Dasein's authenticity, as considered by Heidegger in both the phases lacks a completeness, and so it is not a totally fulfilling experience, even though the latter is better than the former.[11]

4.1.1.7. Finitude of Dasein

According to early Heidegger, human existence is characterized by a radical finitude. The situation of Dasein in the world is tragic and grim. Dasein is centered on himself, cut away from others, the Divine and Being. It is a state in which Dasein is lonely, helpless, anxious, and his life lacks meaning and purpose. Besides, human existence is characterized by existential guilt, existential limitations and death. There is no one to help Dasein except himself. Dasein's being-in-the-world is a state of inauthenticity, marked by involvements and entanglements with entities and other Daseins. Even the authentic state is far from being a desirable one, as it does not bring Dasein to the state of happiness, as Dasein is all by himself in a world that is separated and isolated. The situation of the world in which Dasein finds himself is no better. It is under the grip of metaphysical and technological thinking. The scientific approach to life and the technological attitude of domination has led to a thinking that is calculative. The will-to-power eliminates man in all his endeavors; the value of life and reality is lost. In the process of the struggle for power

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[11] Cf. Roger Waterhouse, pp. 179-192

and survival, man himself is made a commodity and the most important raw material. Man has looked upon technology as a means to happiness. But technology has victimized man, as he is controlled by technology. Heidegger gives many images, such as, 'world-night,' 'a time of destitution,' 'endless winter' and 'a time in which Gods have fled' to refer to this depressing situation of modern man.

Even later Heidegger does not give a better view of Dasein's existence and destiny. In the state of authenticity, Dasein accepts his inability to be the master of himself and totally depends on Being. Dasein is helpless, as all that he can do is to accept his inability to cope with his finitude and resign passively to the presencing of Being. Even this state of passive openness to Being is devoid of social and communitarian dimension. The authentic Dasein has no genuine and reciprocal relationship with the other, as there is no place for love, togetherness, genuine friendship, fellowship with the other, cooperation and one-to-one concern. Dasein, thus, is presented as a being that is incapable of any committed relationship, while he is only capable of anxiety in the face of death, guilt and existential limitations, and a tranquil waiting on the presencing of Being. The absence of genuine relationship in the totality of Dasein's existence makes Dasein's finitude more acute as he has, always, to face life all alone, having no word of encouragement and support from others. Thus, Heidegger's philosophy of the radical finitude of Dasein leaves Dasein with an unhappy and a solitary existence.

Besides, Heidegger's path to authentic human destiny lacks a sense of hope for the future. Gabriel Marcel says: "Hope is for the soul what breathing is for the living organism. Where hope is lacking, the soul dries up and withers."[12] Both in early and later Heidegger, Dasein's life ends with death. There is nothing to hope for in the future after death. Not only does Dasein find himself in a particular state-of-being, as factical and thrown, having no idea as to his origin, but also as his existence ends in death it has no idea as to what is after death. All that Dasein can do is to cultivate the genuine attitude of being-towards-death by anticipation of death and to open himself to the giving of Being in re-collection and thanksgiving, without ever knowing where such an authentic state is leading. If this is all, in the last analysis what is human existence, what is the worth of human living? What is the purpose and meaning of human existence? Why at all should Dasein live such a lonely and enclosed existence? Heidegger does not seem to have answers to these questions. Thus, Heidegger's philosophy of a finite Dasein, presents a human existence whose life is dark and tragic and which lacks ultimate purpose, meaning and happiness.

4.1.1.8. Impracticality of the Heideggerian Path to Being

According to Heidegger, to attain his goal of the experience of Being, Dasein must move through an ascending path of thinking of Being, dwelling in the neighborhood of Being and seeing the truth of Being. Essential thinking of Being is not merely having an opinion about something; neither is it representative thinking, nor a conceptual system of thinking, with a chain of logical premises which lead to valid conclusions. It is a call of Being that enables thinking in man. Though it is a thinking that comes about in man at Being's initiative, Dasein is called to respond to the call of Being by concentrating on Being and its giving, by re-collection and thanksgiving. Dwelling in the neighborhood of Being consists in Dasein's standing in the openness of Being as ek-sistence. It means that Dasein is attuned to listen to Being by ek-sisting in its neighborhood and is enabled to respond to the presencing of Being by his openness to the light of Being. Dwelling also involves Dasein's building entities by sparing (tending) and guarding Being's revealing in them. Seeing the

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[12] Gabriel Marcel, *Homo Viator,* trans. by Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962), p. 10.

truth of Being implies that Dasein attends on experiences and watches over the revealing-concealing time-space-play of Being. In this interactive giving of Being and Dasein to each other, they both enter into the realm of each other in a relationship of belonging-together and claim each other. In this claim, there comes about a mutual owning of Being and Dasein, which bestows on Dasein the dignity of being the shepherd of Being.

The Heideggerian path to experience Being, with its threefold ascending movements, is not a practical one. Heidegger, though he speaks of three stages of Dasein's path to Being, does not give any practical steps that should facilitate Dasein's movement at each stage. He speaks about these stages in a vague and abstract way. The value of any path to self-realization consists in how it helps the aspirant to move towards his ultimate destiny. Since the path proposed by Heidegger does not suggest any practical steps to enable the Dasein who seeks Being and its presencing, one wonders how practical and useful the path of Heidegger for the experiencing of Being is.

4.1.2. Discrepancies

Besides, the above-mentioned inadequacies, there are a number of discrepancies in Heidegger's philosophy. He leaves many concepts vague and unclear. Had he attempted to be precise and made an effort to clarify some of these concepts, many of the errors that are found in Heideggerian thinking could have been avoided. Now, we will highlight some of these discrepancies.

4.1.2.1. Inauthenticity and Everydayness

Heidegger defines Dasein's everydayness as: "Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting …both in its being alongside the world and in its being-with others."[13] This text from Heidegger clearly identities the everyday existence of Dasein with his inauthentic existence. If this is so, every involvement of Dasein, as being-in-the-world with entities and other Daseins, is inauthentic. Such a position sounds absurd as it would mean that Dasein by his very being-in-the-world is inauthentic. Though Heidegger's thinking reaches such an absurd state on this point, he does not make an attempt to clarify the notions of inauthenticity and everydayness, both in their relatedness and differences. But rather he considers these concepts in a vague and ambiguous manner, which leads to lack of precision and further misunderstanding of Heidegger's thought.

4.1.2.2. Present-at-hand and Ready-to-hand

Heidegger's distinction of entities as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand is based on the way Dasein looks at an entity. There is no such division within an entity. If Dasein looks at an entity from a theoretical perspective, then it is seen as present-at-hand or as 'out-there.' But if Dasein sees the same thing from the practical point of view, i.e., in relation to what he can do with that thing, then it would present itself to Dasein as a tool or the ready-to-hand. In making this distinction Heidegger clearly demarcates two types of Dasein's attitudes, viz., the attitude of detached viewing of a thing and the attitude of encountering an entity in its practical mode. The former is the attitude of a scientist, while the latter is the attitude of a workman. The former refers to scientific and

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[13] *SZ*, p. 181; *BT*, p. 225.

objective knowledge about things, whereas the latter points to understanding things in their essential ground in the Heideggerian sense.

This strict distinction — between things present-at-hand and ready-to-hand; scientific attitude and practical attitude; knowledge and understanding — remains only at the rational level and not in relation to the concrete situation of man. In a concrete experience we find that theoretical knowledge and practical attitude go hand in hand, as one is not complete without the other. We need understanding or practical attitude to do the work and require scientific or objective knowledge to make our practical attitude into a well-developed body of knowledge, which can be studied objectively. This is clear from our work experience. Thus, Heidegger's strict distinction of knowledge and understanding and viewing them as having no relation to each other is inconsistent and inadequate.

4.1.2.3. Divine and Being

Heidegger speaks of the Divine as one aspect of the fourfold. It is the immortal aspect in and through which Being manifests itself. Thus, the Divine is seen as an aspect of the revelation of Being. Besides, Heidegger also speaks of the manifestation of the Divine in its presencing and absencing. The Divine is also said to be part of the wording-process of the unconcealment of Being.[14] Yet, Heidegger does not identify Being with the Divine.[15] He also speaks of the Divine as an entity,[16] and so Being cannot be the Divine. While Heidegger does not make an attempt to clarify the nature of the Divine's relationship to Being, he makes inconsistent statements regarding their nature and relationship. This inconsistency and lack of precision in Heidegger's thinking relating to the Divine and Being paves the way for various interpretations by Heideggerian scholars.[17]

4.1.2.4. Anti-Conceptualism

Another obvious inconsistency in Heidegger's thinking is its anti-conceptualist stand. In the early phase, Heidegger, stressing the importance of understanding, ignores the validity of objective knowledge and cognition. In the later phase, he is critical of metaphysical and representational thinking. He claims that his originative thinking is non-conceptual. But this claim is paradoxical, as nothing can be expressed without the help of concepts. The many volumes of Heidegger's writing and the many lectures he gave were not devoid of concepts. Even the research that is done on Heidegger, uses concepts and interprets the concepts used by him. As a matter of fact, Heidegger uses the propensity of the German language to express philosophical concepts and forms new concepts and expresses them in terms, by playing on the prefixes and suffixes, giving them novel nuances and meanings. If not for using concepts he would not have written what he has about his non-conceptual and non-metaphysical thinking. Thus, Heidegger was, indeed,

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[14] Cf. *VA*, p. 144; *BW*, pp. 327-328.

[15] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 328; *BW*, p. 210.

[16] Cf. *TK*, p. 45; *QCT*, p. 47.

[17] For various interpretations on the nature of the relationship between the Divine and Being: Cf. John Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology* (London: SCM Press, 1966). Cf. also Heinrich Ott, *Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg Theologie* (Zolliken: Evengelisches Verlag, 1955). Cf. also Thomas F. O'Meara, 'Heidegger on God,' *Continuum*, 5 (1967/1968): 686-698.

inconsistent in denouncing the value of conceptual knowledge, while using the very concepts to denounce their importance.

4.1.2.5. Ontological-Existential and Ontic-Existentiell

Heidegger distinguishes two levels in his analysis of Dasein, viz., ontological-existential and ontic-existentiell. The former refers to the structures underlying Dasein while the latter indicates the level of concrete acts of existence. It is in the ontic-existentiell that the ontological-existential structures are actualized. Though Heidegger made this distinction and aimed at working out the Dasein analysis on the ontological-existential level, often enough he moves into the latter. A clear example is found in the call of conscience and the resolute wanting-to-have-a-conscience. Here, the call of conscience belongs to the ontological-existential level, while resoluteness is an attestation of the former in the ontic-existential level.[18] In the later phase Heidegger no longer keeps to this distinction in his analysis of Dasein.[19] This causes Heidegger to substitute the term 'Dasein' by the term 'man' (*Mensch*) in later writings.[20] The inconsistency in maintaining this distinction, both by Heidegger and his commentators, has led to wrong interpretations of his philosophy.

So far, we have looked into what Heidegger did not say, which he should have said, in what he said and the logical inconsistencies in what he said. Having done so, we do not want to give the impression that Heidegger's thinking is basically negative in character. We, having distanced ourselves from Heideggerian thinking, wanted to look at it objectively, and we found it wanting in the aspects we have mentioned. It does not mean that the merit of Heidegger's thinking is undermined. Now coming closer to it we want to highlight its positive aspects. This is our task in the next section.

4.1.2.6 Scope of Heideggerian Path to Being

All three stages of the Heideggerian path involve highly reflective and mystical states on the part of Dasein. The essential thinking of Being is attained in release, which involves a twofold 'regioning' on the part of Being and Dasein who must turn from non-willing and await upon Being. Dwelling in the neighborhood of Being is initiated by Being's giving of itself as the Glad-some, the Holy, and the Source, that is the Origin and the Ground. This initiative of Being is given in an original poetic presencing of Being, which involves Being's 'homecoming' as the Glad-some, the Holy and the Source. Dasein begins to dwell in Being's neighborhood when he preserves this original 'homecoming' by recollecting poetically upon it as what-is-past, experiencing it as a reality still-to-come in the future and as a present experience of giving utterance to it in the words of his poetry. Dasein dwells in Being's manifestation in things by sparing (tending) the fourfold: by saving the earth as the earth, by receiving the sky as the sky, by waiting on divinities as divinities and by initiating his own nature as the mortal. Dasein sees the truth of Being by opening himself

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[18] For various interpretations on the nature of the relationship between the Divine and Being: Cf. John Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology* (London: SCM Press, 1966). Cf. also Heinrich Ott, *Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg Theologie* (Zolliken: Evengelisches Verlag, 1955). Cf. also Thomas F. O'Meara, 'Heidegger on God,' *Continuum*, 5 (1967/1968): 686-698.

[19] Cf. Ralph Powel, "The Late Heidegger's Omission of the Ontico-ontological Structure of Dasein," *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*, ed., John Salis, pp. 116-137.

[20] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 346; *BW*, pp. 228-229.

to the initial giving of Being in the revealing-concealing process, which involves a mutual look of Being and Dasein on each other's realms. Besides, truth of Being is experienced by Dasein by Being's self-giving in language, the house of Being, and Dasein's dwelling in it by co-speaking with language.

The three stages of Dasein's attainment of the experience of Being mean that he is capable of deep reflection, understanding and intuitive experiencing of Being. It would be too much to expect such a high intellectual and reflective state from most people. it seems to us that most ordinary persons would find it difficult to use Heideggerian path to experience Being. The fact that Heidegger proposes this path as Dasein's only way to Being may be that he was convinced that this way could help all. Heidegger does not specify this point in any of his writings. Nor does he propose that the scope of the Heideggerian path to the attainment of the experiencing of Being is very limited, as it can be used only by people capable of high intellectual and intuitive capacities. Therefore, Heidegger, by proposing such a path to experiencing of Being, either thinks that all categories of people are poets and thinkers or excludes all categories of people, except the poets and thinkers, from experiencing being. In both of these cases Heidegger's view involves an inconsistency.

4.2. Positive Appraisal

Speaking of Heidegger and his philosophical endeavor Gilbert Ryle says: "He shows himself to be a thinker of real importance by immense subtlety and searchingness of his examination of consciousness, by the boldness and originality of his methods and conclusions, and by the unflagging energy with which he tries to think behind the stock categories of orthodox philosophy and psychology."[21] This tribute of Ryle, indeed, is a fitting one for an original and seminal thinker, such as Heidegger. He has given a new vent to philosophizing by the novelty of his approach and by his unorthodox methodology. He has let in new air and has inaugurated new thinking, which in some ways can supplement the traditional metaphysical thinking. Herein lies Heidegger's significance. Any original thinker, due to the novelty of his thinking, tends to commit errors in his thinking. Heidegger himself states as follows: "He who thinks greatly must err greatly."[22] The errors found in Heideggerian thinking do not make him less of a thinker. In this section, we want to bring to light the contributions of Heideggerian thinking and the new Heideggerian perspective that opens the traditional issues to new light.

4.2.1. Contributions

Here we focus our attention on Heidegger's positive contributions in the field of philosophy and thinking, taking into account the aim, task and purpose of his philosophy.

4.2.1.1. Heideggerian Philosophy: A Call to Genuine Living

The main reason for Heidegger's attempt to take the new venture is the problems posed by the sudden developments of the positive sciences by the end of the nineteenth century and their impact on the early twentieth century. During this era of history, there were great developments in the

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[21] Gilbert Ryle, "Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit," *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 1 (1970), 13.

[22] *ED*, p. 17; *PLT*, p. 9.

positive sciences. Classical physics gave way to nuclear physics and microphysics. Freudian psychotherapy made a break-through in the field of psychology. Medical sciences, with their new developments, challenged psycho-physical determinism. Every science was independent and was interested in its own discoveries. The whole thrust of the sciences was focused towards bringing practical and useful results, without ever questioning the ultimate truth of the propositions with which they were working. Sciences were considered to be such only if they brought practical and useful effects. At this juncture in the history of the West man had lost his desire for ultimate meaning, truth and Being and turned his attention in finding facts that worked. Being blind to the foundational realities of human existence he has turned out to be a slave to his own scientific progress. It brought about a culture that is technologically oriented, which saw everything, including man, as a tool that can augment the progress of the sciences and bring about better living conditions.[23] Having thus lost the sense of finality and purposefulness in life, man has become the victim of confusion in every aspect of his existence. In this 'hopeless' situation brought about by the technological revolution and scientific progress, the meaningfulness of human existence was deteriorating.[24]

This deteriorating situation to which human existence is led by the so-called progress in technology and science is the main concern of Heidegger's philosophy. The homeliness of human communities was giving way. People became strangers to themselves in their own homeland. Having lost the rootedness of their lives, their lives became superficial and artificial. The call of destiny rings no more in their ears; everyone is lost in the oblivion of the cares of his/her everyday existence.[25] Heidegger expresses his insight into the spirit of his age in a memorial address he delivered in honor of the famous composer Reweigh Kreutzer, a native of his region, as follows:

Many Germans have lost their homeland, have had to leave their villages and towns, have been driven from their own native land. Countless others …have been caught up in the turmoil of big cities and have been resettled in the wastelands of industrial districts. They are strangers to their own former homelands. All those who have stayed on …they are more homeless than those who have been driven from the homelands. Hourly and daily they are chained by Radio and Television. Week after week the movies carry them off into uncommon …realms of imagination and give the illusion of a world that is no world…. All that with which modern techniques of communication stimulate, assail and drive man today from the tradition of his native world …what is happening here with those driven from their homeland no less than with those who have remained? Answer: the rootedness …of man is threatened to the core! Even more: The loss of rootedness is caused not merely by circumstance or fortune, nor does it stem from the negligence or superficiality of man's way of life. The loss …springs from the spirit of the age into which all of us were born.[26]

Heidegger, by his philosophical enterprise, intended to call man, who is fragmented by the scientific-technological culture, to the wholeness and authenticity of his existence. It involved a calling back to their roots men who are caught up in the fragmented way of living that is characteristic of everyday existence, and opening them to the call of destiny. It is a summons to turn away from aimless living and an invitation to turn to a purposeful life. Thus, Heidegger's

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[23] 23. Cf. *VA*, p. 88; *EP*, p. 104.
[24] Cf. Reynold Borzaga, ed., *Contemporary Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 114-122.
[25] Cf. *DT*, pp. 48-49.
[26] *Ibid.*

philosophy, beyond any doubt, is a call to an authentic human existence and to genuine human living.

4.2.1.2. Heidegger's Philosophy: A Critique of Scientism and Technologism

It was Heidegger's belief that such rootlessness of human existence was brought about by the traditional metaphysical thinking that characterized the whole history of Western philosophy starting from Plato. According to him every significant thinker in the West since Plato has interpreted reality, being and truth in a subjectivistic manner dominated by reason and logic. As a result thinking became a mere representation and a conceptual formulation of reality, being and truth. Philosophy's main concern turned to epistemology. This forming and representing ideas and concepts and the focus on their logical validity made men forget the essential ground of reality.[27] The drift away from the ground of existence for over two thousand years reached its peak in modern times in Nietzsche's nihilistic philosophy of will-to-power, which is the dominant force behind contemporary scientific and technological movements. Heidegger clearly saw how such thinking could affect the actual concrete living of an individual and of a nation, especially in the concrete application of Nazi ideology in Germany in the 1930s. He, himself, had fallen victim to such thinking, especially during 1933-1934 when he supported the Nazi ideology and program for Germany.

Having been convinced of the evil effects of the conceptualistic and logic-dominated metaphysical-technological thinking which led to scientism and technologism, Heidegger wanted to replace it with a new type of thinking which would obliterate the consequences of metaphysical thinking. In order to inaugurate this new thinking and thereby take man to his authentic destiny, Heidegger took a 'step-back' into the history of Western metaphysics, so as to effect a destruction of metaphysical thinking and in the process pave the way for his originative and primordial thinking.

4.2.1.3. Heideggerian Philosophy: A Primordial Thinking of Being

Since Heidegger wanted to rectify the fragmentation brought about in human existence, thinking and knowing by metaphysical thinking and desiring to found them on an ontological ground, he limited his analysis of human existence and its authenticity to one dimension, viz., to the transcendental and ontological dimension of Dasein's openness to the truth of Being. For him, the ontological dimension is the most fundamental aspect and the one on which all the other modes of human existence are based. Besides, the ontological consideration implicitly includes all the other dimensions, as it reveals human existence in its uniqueness. For example, to say that man ontologically 'is,' includes implicitly that man is political, economic, social, psychological, moral, theological and bodily. It bases all these while transcending all adjectival and secondary aspects. Therefore, Heidegger's analysis of human existence is primordial and his thinking is originative.

Many of the criticisms we have leveled against Heidegger come from the fact that the philosophical stand he has taken in his analysis of human existence is primordial and one-dimensional. He could have attempted to consider Dasein and his authentic existence of experiencing Being in a multi-dimensional manner, as have such thinkers as Levinas, Marcel, Buber, Sartre and Jaspers. But Heidegger did not want to do that. He did not want further fragmentation of Dasein in various dimensions, but rather preferred the bringing-together of all

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[27] Cf. *WD*, p. 30; *WCT*, p. 82.

the dimensions of Dasein into one unifying ground, viz., Being. Thus, the uniqueness of Heideggerian thinking consists in that it is not multi-dimensional, but rather one-dimensional and primordial.

Even though Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's destiny as linked up with Being is primordial and ontological, it does not totally exclude Dasein his other aspects and in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein there is an openness to various dimensions. He speaks of Dasein as 'being-alongside-entities,' as 'being-with-others,' as having a conscience and a resolute desire to follow the call of conscience, as a mortal, who waits on divinities for their time of arrival. All these are references to such other dimensions as intersubjectivity, moral and theological. But Heidegger did not work out the details of these dimensions, because they were not the main concern of his philosophical endeavor. The significant influence of Heidegger's primordial thinking on various sciences, such as philosophical anthropology, philosophy of history, ethics, aesthetics, literature, psychiatry, hermeneutics and theology,[28] vouches for this multi-directional openness of Heidegger's primordial analysis of Dasein. Heidegger elaborately analyzes Dasein as related to the truth of Being, as it was the main concern and intent of his philosophical endeavor. Thus, Heidegger without any doubt has contributed positively to the field of philosophical thinking. His primordial thinking and his anti-metaphysical stand have opened a new perspective. To this we now turn.

4.2.2. The New Perspective

Metaphysics with its conceptualistic and logic-dominated thinking presents a view of reality that is static and reified. Everything is seen in term of the dichotomy between subject and object. But Heideggerian primordial thinking views everything in a new perspective that is dynamic. In this section, we highlight how the world, Dasein, the Divine and Being are seen in this new perspective.

4.2.2.1. World

While Heidegger does not deny the traditional cosmological view of the world or it existence, he views the world in a dynamic way that is different from the traditional conception. The world is always related to Dasein: it is always Dasein's world. The world is understood in the context of Dasein's being-alongside-entities and being-with-others. The world is constituted of the matrix of Dasein's relatedness to the various equipmental systems and their interrelatedness. Besides, the world is understood in the totality of the significance of this interrelatedness. Thus, we can speak of as many worlds as there are meaningful interrelated equipmental systems. It is not a mere subjectivization of the world, but seeing the world from the ontological perspective of Dasein.

In the later Heidegger, the world is seen as the manifestation of Being in its spatial and temporal character. The spatial character of Being is given to Dasein in relation to the facets of Being, viz., the fourfold. It is the mirror play of the fourfold, i.e., the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals, that lets Dasein experience Being in its spatial dimension. The temporal dimension of Being is given in the inter-play of the three ecstases of time, viz, the past, the present and the future. Thus, Dasein's experience of the world is, in fact, his experience of Being. The world history experienced by Dasein is the history of Being. But, in order to experience the history of

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[28] Cf. C. Astrada et al., eds., *Martin Heidegger's Einfluss auf die Wissenschaflen* (Bern: A Francke AG, 1949). Cf. also William U. Spanos, ed., *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature* (London: Indiana University Press, 1979).

Being in its authentic manifestation, Dasein must be open to the mystery dimension of Being's giving as an essential thinker, a dweller in the nearness of Being and a seer of the truth of Being. Only in opening himself to the mystery of Being manifested in history does Dasein find his authentic world and also his authentic destiny.

4.2.2.2. Dasein

Heidegger does not accept the traditional definition of man — rational animal — as complete. According to him, from the new and existential perspective such a comprehensive and all-embracing definition of human existence is not possible. In his existential analysis Heidegger distinguishes between Dasein and man. Man, in the metaphysical sense, is a being, whereas Dasein is a process that comes to pass 'in' man. Dasein, as a process, occurs only in man. Therefore, Dasein is not a statistically present being, but a dynamic process which must take over his existence by active resolve and by receptive openness to Being. Seen in Heidegger's primordial perspective, Dasein is the 'place' in which innerworldly beings and Being are made manifest. Besides, the structure of the selfhood of Dasein is neutral, as it may occur in a male or female; in an 'I' or in a 'thou.' But, this does not mean that Dasein is impersonal, but rather that he is pre-personal in the sense that he is the *a priori* basis for the possibility of ontic individual selves or persons. But in the later phase of his thought, Heidegger did not keep to this distinction between ontological and ontic levels in his understanding of Dasein. In the later thought, Heidegger sees Dasein as the 'place' that lights-up Being, in the threefold stages of Dasein's journey towards Being, viz, thinking of Being, dwelling in the nearness of Being and seeing the truth of Being and the shepherd, who guards and preserves Being's gift of itself to him.

4.2.2.3. Divine

Classical metaphysicians considered God as a being that is all-perfect, all-knowing and all-powerful. Heidegger neither speaks of God as an entity, nor does he identify God with Being in primordial thinking. He no longer uses the term 'God,' as it is a concept filled with metaphysical meaning, but uses instead the term 'Divine.' The Divine is considered in relation to the revealing of Being, to which the mortals remain open. Since the presencing of the Divine is part of the Being-process, it is to be understood as a historical process in which the authentically existing mortals and poets can experience the divine nods and traces. Since the Divine is an aspect of the historical process of the unconcealing of Being it cannot be contained in metaphysical concepts, nor can it be proved with the help of logical arguments. Thus, in primordial thinking one cannot speak of atheism, theism, monotheism or polytheism, as such distinctions in speaking about the Divine are based on metaphysical thinking.[29] Neither can we speak of any religions as having their own versions of the Divine, because the Divine cannot be contained in formulae, and the Divine expressed in conceptual formulas is no more the Divine. In other words, the Divine of which Heidegger speaks in his primordial thinking is beyond all religions. The basis of various religions and Gods is the manifold conceptual expressions of the Divine that are experienced in the Being-process. In other words, the Divine is that which is experienced by opening oneself to the revealing of Being, and 'Gods' are but the conceptual representation of the primordial experience of the Divine, which usually is expressed in faith-formulations. Thus, Heideggerian primordial thinking

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[29] Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 348; *BW*, p. 230.

gives us not a metaphysical conception 'God,' but, a mystical experiencing of the Divine as revealed in the Being-process.

4.2.2.4. Being

Heidegger rejects all attempts to give a precise definition of Being. For him, any attempt to give a definition of Being would amount to tying down Being to a particular concept. Heidegger often speaks of what Being is not, rather than of what it is. Clarifying the notion of ontological difference, he says that Being is not being, i.e., it is neither an existing reality, nor a sum-total of such existing realities. If we compare Being with beings, the former is a 'non-Being' or 'nothing.' Even though Being is not a being, yet it 'lets-be' particular entities; particular entities 'enshrine' the presence of Being. Being manifests itself in the revealing-concealing process. It comes over in the entities, unconceals itself in the process and reveals the entities. Being is to be understood in the 'event' of its historical sending. All these descriptions of Being point to the nature of Being which is a process or a historical sending rather than an entity. Speaking of the 'why' of the process, Heidegger just says that it is a 'play of Being.'

Being, therefore, cannot be understood with the help of metaphysical-representational thinking. It can be understood only in its relation to the realm of *Ereignis* (event of appropriation), i.e., in relation to the essential belonging-together of Dasein and Being. Every aspect of Being's revealing — through essential thinking, the fourfold, the poetic presencing, the unconcealing process, and the language — is to be understood in relation to the realm of *Ereignis*, which is a realm of deeper experience rather than mere intellectual knowing. Our consideration of Heidegger's analysis of the world, Dasein, the Divine and Being, clearly highlights the new perspective that is characteristic of the primordial thinking which Heidegger has inaugurated. This new perspective does not base itself on logic, reason and conceptual formulation, but is founded as a deeper level of the existential experience of Being that is beyond the tangible and the visible.

In this chapter, we have seen the philosophy of Heidegger in both its negative and positive aspects. Many of the criticisms we have mentioned do not stand up if seen in the light of his primordial thinking and Being-centered philosophy. In spite of the drawbacks and differences, Heidegger proposes a philosophy that is Being-centered, besides suggesting the path for the attainment of total authenticity in Dasein. He is concerned about helping men to come into touch with the deeper dimensions of their lives and to live a life centered on Being. Though there may be a few drawbacks in Heidegger's thought, the negative elements of his philosophy are outweighed by the positive.

Conclusion

Martin Heidegger lived at a time in history when man drifted away from his destiny. The 'will-to-power' marked the thinking of the time. Humankind raised itself to the center of reference for beings. It not only proposed meaning to objects, but also controlled them to suit its disposition. By becoming the ultimate reference point, it imposed itself upon beings and referred them to its own purposes. Modern man has become the 'self-imposing com-poser' of all beings, absolutely establishing his complete domination over everything.[1] The net-result is that the presence of beings has become a representation in and for the consciousness of man.[2] Thus, man's reason has become the supreme arbitrator of knowledge, and logic has dominated man's interpretation of beings. It, in turn, has led to a take-over of man and his life by technicity. This is the fundamental attitude by which every being, including man, becomes a commodity and a raw material. Scientific discoveries and technology are the instruments to actualize this attitude of technicity.[3] Led by these man has given free reign to science and technology which, become scientism and technologism, have outgrown the human capacity to cope with them and turned him into a victim.

Such a technological culture, based on rationalism, has made man concerned about only the surface aspect of reality, forgetting its depth dimension. Having become superficial, there followed a breakdown in every sphere of human existence. Since the unity of man was fragmented, it, in turn, led to the fragmentation of communities, societies and nations. Genuine personal, inter-personal and intra-personal relationships became a thing of the past. People were no more 'straight-forward.' Everyone fixed his eyes on the other and watched for his next move: every level of relationship was characterized by a tense watching of one another, a spying on each other and a mutual overhearing. In the international arena today man uses sophisticated technologies, such as satellites and other information instruments to pry into the secrets of other nations. Similar thing happen both in the personal and interpersonal realms, by way of telephone tapping, bugging and using similar means. Formalism and legalism, rather than genuineness, has become the rule that guides human relationships. Man does no longer consider the other as a 'thou,' but instead as an 'it' that can be used and exploited for one's self-gratification and advantage.

The breakdown of genuine relationships at every level of man's existence due to the attitude of technicity makes man unsentimental and business-like in his outlook on life. He views reality pragmatically and in terms of utility, in which terms the goal of every enterprise of man is to achieve maximum utility and benefit. Man goes about everything with meticulous planning and careful calculation in order to turn every circumstance to his advantage. The ultimate goal of such an endeavor is to attain the control of total power for oneself. We find striking examples in the realms of politics and business. In order to achieve and retain political power and political office, man today assassinates not only the character but even the life of a political opponents. Similarly, the business-world uses high-handed methods to sign business contracts. Thus, life becomes a constant struggle for power and a struggle to succeed. The Darwinian principle of 'survival of the fittest' and the Nietzschean motto of 'will-to-power' are the operative principles that guide men today. Such a mind-set leads to intrigues, manipulations, cheating, murders and even large scale wars. These attitudes degrade humanity, disrespect the human person and disregard his dignity.

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[1] Cf. *HW*, pp. 265-266.
[2] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 281.
[3] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 267-268, 271.

Martin Heidegger saw these realities concretized in the Germany of Hitler. Heidegger himself fell victim to such thinking in part of 1933 and 1934 when he supported Nazi power.

Learning from his own mistake and reflecting on the history of his times, Martin Heidegger realized that modern man has cut himself away from the true ground of existence. Being lost in the oblivion of the care of everyday living and living a life only to succeed and overpower others, man has no time to "stand and stare" or to wonder at the deeper dimensions of reality. Since man has identified his destiny with the tangible, the pleasurable and the useful, he has lost sight of the call to be authentic and genuine by contemplating Transcendence. In his attempt to bring the transcendental realm under his control, man attempts to exploit the earth, to control the sky, to encapsulate God in metaphysical and rational concepts and to presents himself as the ultimate source of everything, denying his mortal nature. In doing so, man has tried to prove to himself that there is no Transcendence beyond and above him.

Martin Heidegger addresses these men of our contemporary times though his philosophy of Being. He gives the message that the true destiny of man is attained only when he moves from his life of care and opens himself to the mystery of Being that is manifested in history. Man only needs to achieve this mindset to discern and discover the self-gift of Being. To acquire this mindset, says Heidegger, one need not ignore the values of science and technology, nor should one return to pre-technological living. But it is very important that the human person guard against the attitude of technicity, which attempts to take over every dimension of human existence. Man must not allow science and technology to turn into scientism and technologism. He must recognize that there is a depth, the realm of Transcendence, in which the mystery of Being is manifested. This realm is beyond the control of technicity, and cannot be explained by scientific method and technological discoveries. Man must see that the metaphysical, scientific and technological thinking of the past centuries has made him forget this depth dimension, and that this has led ultimately to the fragmentation of every dimension of reality. Now he must search for this missing depth dimension and effect the integration of all facets of human existence. We cannot come in touch with this mystery dimension of reality by our rationalizing and technical know-how. Openness to the mystery of Being requires a listening attitude, which is different from the exploiting-controlling technological attitude (technicity). The mystery of Being reveals itself; we must learn to wait and, as Heidegger calls it, "to be on the way."

The path to experience Being, thus, implies a 'step-back' from metaphysical, scientific, technological, conceptual, representational and rational thinking, and a leap into the primordial realm of Being (*Ereignis*). This leap is an "unabridged-entry," an entry no rational thought can bring about. No one can enter this realm unless he learns to recollect the giving of Being and has an attitude of thanks-giving for Being's self-gift. This calls man to move into the realm of intuition and mysticism. Man is called to make a leap into the "unthought source" and to a region that stands beyond, and is the foundation of, divergent philosophical and religious traditions. This primordial realm is beyond every tradition, 'ism' and ideology, but in some way is the origin and source of all such 'isms' each of which in a limited way points to this ultimate realm. J. L. Mehta says this about the realm:

This 'region of all regions' …is itself above all regional loyalties and the Babel of conflicting tongues. It is the realm of that universality and simplicity of primordial truth, the happening of *aletheia* …where alone divergent traditions, disfranchised of their exclusive claims and yet

without losing their own identity, can meet together as one, as belonging-together in the Self-same [Being].[4]

According to Heidegger, the reason for the divided and multi-polar world is that man has forgotten for centuries this primordial realm of being, which is the 'home' (*Heimat*) that unifies all diversities, at the same time giving each its own difference and uniqueness. Have lost touch with this realm, man has forgotten the original unity of all in Being. With the development of technology, especially in the areas of information and communication, the world has become a global village. Yet paradoxically it stands divided more than ever before. Heidegger believed that real unity cannot be brought about by this type of technological and manmade uniformity. In the same way, neither can philosophical, cultural, religious, political and linguistic differences that isolate nations and people from each other, be done away with by attempting to bring these matters in international forums for discussion and by ironing out compromise formulae for unity. As a matter of fact our present day world offers many such attempts under the auspices of the United Nations organization. But still it is a sad fact that in spite of all such efforts, not many solutions are found for most of the problems of division that exist in the world today. According to Heidegger, agreements arrived at in this manner are superficial and do not hold for long because the world has forgotten the fundamental unity of all in Being. Unless man opens himself to this primordial realm, no lasting unity can be achieved.

Martin Heidegger visualized a world civilization in which East and West, North and South, black, white or the colored live a life of unity in spite of their differences. He believed that world civilization can become a 'home' for all, not by way of technical uniformity or any other type of peripheral and superficial unity, but only by re-discovering the original unity of all in the primordial realm of Being. Until and unless humankind makes the leap into this primordial realm of fundamental unity the ideal of the unification of humankind will never be actualized.[5]

It was to re-discover this original unity of all in Being that Martin Heidegger proposed his path. He was convinced that if man follows this path, he would become the thinker of Being, the dweller in the nearness of Being and the seer of the truth of Being. As a thinker of Being, man would be able to move beyond representational thinking and the dominative nature of technicity. He would be able to order his relationship with entities in the right perspective and be open to the mystery of Being. As a dweller in the nearness of Being, man would be able to dwell in the realm of Being, by returning to the true source of his existence, viz., Being. Besides, he would be able to preserve the manifestation of Being by saving the earth as the earth, by receiving the sky as the sky, by waiting on divinities as divinities and by initiating his own nature as a person moving towards death. In the process man learns the true wisdom of Being that unifies all. As a seer, man sees his relationship of belonging-together to Being, the relationship of difference between Being and beings, and the manifestation of Being in the spatio-temporal history. In so doing man realizes his vocation as the shepherd of Being in himself and in beings.

When man becomes a shepherd, he is aware of his vocation in life. His goal is not to manipulate and dominate others; neither is it to exploit nature. He sees everything from the mystery perspective of Being. Man experiences every good he has in life, whether it be a person or a thing, in terms of the fourfold dimensions of Being, viz., as the fruit of earth, as the gift of the sky, as that which is blessed by the divinities and as that which is made for the happiness of mortal men. Seen in this perspective, man realizes that nothing should be destroyed, but must be preserved in

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[4] Cf. J.L. Mehta, *Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision*, pp. 643-644.
[5] Cf. Martin Heidegger *Denkerfahrungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), p. 137.

its genuine being so that it can continue to delight the generations of mortals yet to come. When man arrives at this level of experience, he will experience the inner unity of everyone with each other and all beings in Being. In this state, man would be able to live in depth unity with all in spite of differences as the wisdom gained by man opens him to the fundamental oneness of all, and he is able to overcome subject-centeredness, 'will-to-power' and all such dominative tendencies. Therefore, for Heidegger, only the path of the thinking of Being, dwelling in the nearness of Being and seeing the truth of Being can guarantee the emergence of one world civilization in spite of the many diversities, and provide a 'home' for all humankind. In such a state, man attains his ultimate goal: the experience of unity within himself, unity with others in interpersonal relationships, and absolute unity of all in Being.

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