

Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change
Series IV, West Europe, Volume, 6

**Italic Identity in Pluralistic Contexts
Toward the Development of Intercultural
Competencies**

Edited by
Piero Bassetti
Paolo Janni

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

Copyright © 2004 by

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

Gibbons Hall B-20
620 Michigan Avenue, NE
Washington, D.C. 20064

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Italic identity in pluralistic context : toward the development of intercultural competencies /
edited by Piero Bassetti, Paolo Janni.

p.cm. – (Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series IV. West Europe; vol. 6)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Italy—Civilization—20th century. 2. Italians—Foreign countries—Ethnic identity. [1. Civilization, Modern—Italian influencs.] I. Bassetti, Piero. II. Janni, Paolo. III. Series.

DG441.I88 2004
945.091—dc20

2004011129
CIP

ISBN 1-56518-208-1 (pbk.)

Table of Contents

Foreword <i>Paulo Janni</i>	v
Introduction <i>George F. McLean and Robert Magliola</i>	1
<i>Part I. Italic Identity in Pluralistic Context</i>	
Chapter I. Italic Identities and Pluralistic Contexts: Towards the Development of Intercultural Competencies <i>Piero Bassetti</i>	13
Chapter II. Catholicity, Italicity, and the Communication of Meaning <i>Gasper F. Lo Biondo, S.J.</i>	21
Chapter III. Hybridization Processes and the Origins of Italian <i>Fortuna</i> and Diaspora <i>Giovanni Bechelloni</i>	29
Chapter IV. Italicity <i>Helen Barolini</i>	53
Chapter V. Italics in Time of Crisis <i>Maddalena Tirabassi and Piero Gastaldo</i>	63
Chapter VI. Italian Citizenship, Nationality Law and Italic Identities <i>Kirk Buckman</i>	79
<i>Part II. The Development of Intercultural Competencies</i>	
Chapter VII. Racial and Ethnic Organizations: Service in the 21st Century <i>John Kromkowski</i>	93
Chapter VIII. New Identities in a Time of Globalization: The Case of Italy <i>Alberto Schepisi</i>	119
Chapter IX. Italic Identities and the Development of Intercultural Competencies <i>George F. McLean</i>	125
Chapter X. Comments: Italic Identities and Pluralistic Contexts <i>Paul Paolicelli</i>	143
Chapter XI. From Globalization to Interdependence: The Role of Religion <i>Paolo D. Siviero</i>	153

Chapter XII. What Remains of the West <i>Vittorio Emanuele Parsi</i>	161
Chapter XIII. Community and Corporate Culture in a Pluralistic World: A Structural Approach to Globalization <i>Charles Dechert</i>	187
Contributors	197
Index	199

Foreword

Paolo Janni

Our research on the concept of "italicity" was launched after many years of interviews and debates Piero Bassetti and I had on the occasion of the annual meetings of the Italian Chambers of Commerce abroad with many representatives of the Italian business community. This was a large community made up not only of Italians scattered over all the continents and of people of Italian descent, now totally integrated in the societies they have chosen to live in, but also of "foreigners" with no ties whatsoever with the Italian peninsula, yet who for some reason feel attracted by the Italian way of being. It is a large community of individuals which, although being separated by their past experiences and by their present political loyalties, nevertheless finds a mysterious common meeting ground in a shared feeling towards many old and new cultural aspects of the Italian life style.

The primary purpose of our research has been so far to understand this mystery and, in its wake, to find out whether this vast area of good will could become a positive force in promoting a better international understanding, in a world which every day is becoming increasingly both global and local. Each culture has both bright and dark sides, including the Italian culture. Therefore, we came to explore the concept of "italicity" in a spirit of humility. No culture can pretend to have alone the right answers to the daunting challenges of our times. The peace of the world can be preserved only through the collaboration, not the clash, of civilizations.

The multidisciplinary method we have pursued in this volume as well in the previous one (*The Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Era*) has taken us through three connecting rings, although in a rather casual way. The first ring includes the Italians living in the peninsula, whose old century regional and national traditions had been in the past heavily influenced by foreign cultures but which now in some way find it difficult to accept or absorb diversity.

The second ring has to do with the Italian diaspora. They are the descendants of those millions of people, most from the southern regions, who left Italy looking for a better life in the many diverse areas of the world. Free of nationalism, they still experience the internal conflict of coordinating their ancestral regional Italian traditions with full participation in the cultural mainstream of the societies where they live in.

The third and last ring includes the "italics", the de-territorialized group of "non-Italians" who do not identify themselves with the Italian national values but nevertheless have made Italian cultural and artistic heritage part of their own personal history and often share some aspects of the daily modern Italian life style.

A close relation tightly binds these three rings which interact in a permanent cumulative relationship of cause and effects. Any changing which take place inside any one has consequences on the other two. The events of the peninsula have their fallout—negative or positive—on the way the Italian diaspora tries to live its heritage. In the same way, the quality of the contribution the Diaspora makes to the daily life of the countries where it has chosen to live may affect—for the good or evil—the "italic" perception of the "italianita".

Our research has not yet reached the end of the road. But we have accumulated enough elements to believe that it is worth pursuing. This we shall try to do in the near future.

Introduction

George F. McLean and Robert Magliola

In the Spring of 2002 *Globus et Locus* of Milan and The CUA Center for the Study of Culture and Values held a seminar in Washington, D.C., on "The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age". This was a major first step of what promises to be a most fruitful cooperation.

This collaboration on the significance of the Italian heritage or "Italicita" for life in changing times is now being extended in two directions: One through a meeting in Milan on the contribution and interrelations of cultural heritages in the new global arena; the other through this meeting in Washington on the new role of Italicity for intercultural relations in a global world. This is part of a broader dialogue with the national ethnic communities who are now challenged to rediscover the values of their heritages and especially the way in which these can be lived in the pluralistic contexts which characterize this new millennium.

The Background

The initiation of this effort was dramatic. Originally the program had been envisaged for the Fall of 2001 as a celebration of Italian culture. But that plan was swept aside by the events of Sept. 11. Suddenly it became clear that cultural heritages in the global interchange of the new millennia were not unambiguous and could even be quite dangerous.

Was it time to abandon the distinctive cultures as expressive of the unique creativity of each people in order to envisage the passive peace of an homogeneous and undifferentiated humanity? If such a prospective half life—or "march of the clones"—strikes one with horror and revulsion, then the work of elaborating an alternative future must be correspondingly urgent. If the distinct heritages are to continue to play their essential humanizing role, then it has become crucial to understand their nature and interrelations in a much deeper and more sensitive manner.

Providentially, the two partners in the original plan seemed to constitute a uniquely complementary team to undertake just that work. *Globus et Locus* was concerned with practical ways in which the essence of Italian life might transcend the confines of the nation state of Italy. This led inevitably to the issue of how one culture could play a creative role in the new global interchange of peoples. The Center for the Study of Culture and Values, for its part, had encouraged and published 100 book-length studies of how people could draw on their cultures for facing present problems. The new events pushed it inevitably into the heart of the new crisis; how are culturally awakened peoples to live peacefully and productively one with another.

In view of the new situation their joint program was rescheduled and recast to read "The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age". When the two units met in the Spring of 2002 the complementarity of the two teams was immediately evident. Neither was able or interested in doing the work of the other, but each was vitally interested in the challenge being faced by the other. Session by session over the two days of the meeting the discussions grew in depth and intensity. At the end it was concluded, as must be the case in any really good conversation, that this had been a brilliant introduction which for that very reason compelled continuity.

Three steps on this common journey come immediately to mind. The first two could be taken in North America, namely, first to clarify the notion of Italian cultural heritage as not bound to the

borders of a single nation; and second to inquire into experiences of the interrelation of "Italicita" in a pluralistic context; the third which could best be realized in Milan is to investigate how this can be realized transnationally.

Italicita as Cultural Identity

The first of these follow-up steps is to go further into the notion of a "Italicita" as a way of life that is not bound to a single nation state but which can be conceived and/or lived separately from a particular territory, so as to be drawn upon in various of its facets by peoples of other cultures and/or places. Concretely, in this instance, this would be what has been termed "italicita" in some contrast to italianicity which would refer rather to the way of life as lived on the Italian peninsula.

In the conference in the Spring of 2002 this notion was introduced and considered in terms particularly of its socio-political aspects. Hence such issues as immigration or the relation between peoples were considered.

Implied in this but as yet unexplored were issues of cultural formation and cultural content. In order to be able to proceed to further issues of "Italicita" and its relation to other cultures it is necessary to apply other, appropriate arts and sciences in order further to clarify both the content of this notion and the mode of thinking required to relate it to other cultural content now broadly available in a global age.

Such a two day conference is recommended to be held in Washington during Oct. of 2003 as an integral part of a 10 week international seminar on "Cultural Identity and Globalization". There will be in attendance 2 scholars from Eastern Europe, 2 from Africa, 4 from Asia and 1 of Islamic origin. They will be joined by local representatives of philosophy, the arts and anthropology in order to shed light on the nature of a cultural, in contrast to a national, identity.

Conference on Italicity in a Pluralistic Context

A second step will attempt to examine the character of "italicita" as a cultural identity beyond the confines of a state by entering into discussion with Italian and other cultural groups as they experience their identities and interrelations as in the pluralistic context of North America.

Context

America, it is often said is a land of immigrants. This implies both challenges and opportunities. The challenge has been enormous. A century and a half ago the great waves of immigrants might better be called refugees as people sought refuge from the vast displacements of the industrial and other revolutions, from famine and from war. In this context their main concern was to find safe haven in America, to assimilate to its customs, and to enable one's offsprings to enter into the life of the host people.

Culturally the common image which directed public policy for this work of assimilation was that of a melting pot. This denoted especially the effort to meld in. Unfortunately, it connoted that in a generation or two persons were to lose much that provided their distinctive identity and with it much of the set of supports and standards by which they could sustain diversity and resolve problems.

Hence there was great need to provide new immigrants from the cultures of the Old World also with an intermediary to the social and political structures of the New World. This was to work both ways: to inculturate the arriving peoples into the new country and to enrich this nation with their classical heritages.

This work was taken up through ethnic heritage organizations, religious institutions and universities, often with specific emphasis on one or another ethnic group or religion. The intervening decades have been devoted largely to the processes of support, assimilation and interaction of ethnic experiences which have formed a unique integration of personal, family and community values. America as one people today is the proof of the success of the work of these national and ethnic groups operating as NGOs in the best traditions of civil society, and some indeed acquired notable resources for their services as basic insurers and burial societies.

The Present Challenge

Today the situation of those of Italian descent has evolved, and the opportunities for their cultural identity or "italicità" are vastly expanded. Various social sciences note that cultural forgetfulness appears more as a stage than as a permanent condition, for the questions "who am I" and "for what do I stand" are not ones that can be put aside, but recur at ever deeper levels. Inevitably, the search for answers to these fundamental questions drives us back to the reconsideration of the multiple origins and hence of the Italian cultural heritage embedded in contemporary America.

Once fully at home they are able to discover more fully what Italicity can mean in the American experience and to formulate answers to at least three other crucial questions: (1) how they can live their heritage more fully, (2) how they can enrich this adopted land with the riches of Italicity, and (3) how this interacts with that of other Americans of other cultural and racial backgrounds. If a people's culture is the place where their spirit dwells, then this rediscovery and articulation of their cultures must be central to their life. In this the engagement of university level competencies in anthropology and psychology, ethics and politics, especially with relation to Italian culture in North America is essential in order to identify the gift with which they can endow their adapted land and the intercultural competencies by which to live this.

As we enter into this global context we need now to move away from what separates and toward what unites. If this is not to mean the loss of the cultural heritages which constitute the cumulative process of our humanization, then the challenge is to find within these cultures the radical roots of relatedness. Just as we become good neighbors not by forgetting our family and all they have shown us about being a good neighbor, but by drawing upon this, so it is essential that the multiple peoples mine their heritages in order to enrich the global future.

Indeed, this need may be deeper yet, for the immense present challenge is precisely to develop the global society as a place for the progress of all of humanity, and indeed of the whole of nature. The resources for this lie not in a zero-sum economic search for profit or political search for power, but especially in the cultures such as Italicity which the various peoples have developed and their capacity for contributing to a stronger solidarity and community of peoples. This requires the discovery of the essential relatedness of cultural values and the intercultural competencies required to live convergently with others in a global age.

We must be able to say that it is not in spite of being Italian that we are global, but that global solidarity can be built only by the extrapolation of the deeply humanizing content matured over

the ages as italicity and other cultural heritages. We must learn to draw from these wellsprings of life rather than from the poison pools of hatred and hurt.

This volume brings Italian and American scholars into a conversation focused on their italicity and inter-cultural relations. This is intended not only to enable *Globus et Locus* and The Center for the Study of Culture and Values to learn and contribute on these issues, but to evolve their own capabilities for the delicate work with all cultural heritages in this new—and newly dangerous—millennium.

Part I, "Italic Identity in Pluralistic Context," concerns especially the issue of Italic identity as it has evolved in facing succeeding crises.

Chapter I, by Piero Bassetti, "Italic Identities and Pluralistic Contexts: Towards the Development of Intercultural Competencies," reviews the conclusions of the first joint Conference of *Globus et Locus* and the Center for the Study of Culture and Values, which posed an "Italic identity" comprising Italians in Italy, Italian ethnics outside of Italy, and even all those who, not themselves of Italian blood, identify with "Italian values." Bassetti enumerates these values, so congenial to the processes of an authentic globalization: a mild-mannered identity devoid of hegemonic intentions; non-resentment; highly developed aesthetic sensibility; affection; universalism; and cosmopolitanism. He then puts new questions to the second Conference, stressing the talent Italians have for *glocalization*; and therefore, how their experience can be instructive for the mixed identities now characterizing most populations of the world.

Chapter II, by Gasper F. Lo Biondo, S.J., "Catholicity, Italicity, and the Communication of Meaning," provides a speculative structure for this work by identifying the new awareness of human intentionality and the way in which this enlarges and transfer the sense of culture from national normativity to universal or Catholic hybridization composed of as many cultures as there are peoples.

Chapter III, by Giovanni Bechelloni, "Hybridization Processes and the Origins of Italian *Fortuna* and Diaspora," argues that the 'always already' hybridized culture of Italy, from the mixed society of the Etruscans through to the 17th century, founds the combination of openness, capitalist economy, and the 'good life', which makes a successful 'modern society'. Drawing from his thirty or so books, Bechelloni advances a theory of history which emphasizes the importance of geography and diaspora; he uncovers real 'origins' and decries the 'grand narratives' (constructed by 'victors') which obscure or distort them. Bechelloni urges on the modern world the skills of peace-making and openness to the 'other' which he considers Italicity's greatest contributions to civilization.

Chapter IV, by Helen Barolini, "Italicity," is a personal and literary description of moving as an American of Italian descent from broad unconsciousness of her own Italic roots to a conscious assimilation of her Italian heritage, while at the same time aiding her husband to make the opposite transition from Italy to America. In this she emphasizes the process of change that is ever in process and closer with the words of Tancredi in the *Leopard* "If we want everything to stay as it is, it all had to change."

Chapter V, by Maddalena Tirabassi and Piero Gastaldo, "Italics in Time of Crisis," looks at the relationships between Italians, Italian-Americans, and non-Italian Americans from the 19th century through to the present, and extracts therefrom some traits of 'Italicity'. Despite sporadically very harsh treatment, Italian immigrants and (later) Italian-Americans proved remarkably forgiving and cooperative in terms of the 'American experiment'. The reaction of Continental Italians during the recent mid-Eastern turmoil has been sympathetic to America even

though, by an overwhelming majority, they oppose the occupation of Iraq. Italicity seems to involve adaptability, kindness, and a persistent *joie de vivre* in the face of obstacles.

Chapter VI, by Kirk Buckman, "Italian Citizenship, Nationality Law and Italic Identities," explains the formal laws governing Italian citizenship, and Italy's 'Right to Return' provisions. In light of Bassetti's stress on "Italicity" instead of formal citizenship, Buckman justifies his paper by noting that the great waves of Italian emigration antedated the Italian *jus sanguinis* laws (1912 and 1992), and indeed the same cultural milieu, the "Italian epicenter," produced both the emigrations and the legislation for the Right to Return. Buckman supplies useful contrasts between the *jus soli* of France, the U.S.A., and Brazil, and the *jus sanguinis* of Italy and Germany (the latter two countries adopting Right to Return for largely opposite reasons).

Part II, "The Development of Intercultural Competencies," studies the special intercultural competencies of the Italic identity as these evolves from a long history of world engagement.

Chapter VII, by John Kromkowski, "Racial and Ethnic Organizations: Service in the 21st Century," operates according to the principle, enunciated so clearly by *Globus et Locus*, that ethnicities are *contextual*. Kromkowski uses the science of demographics to list the Congressional Districts in the U.S.A. where clusters of Italian-Americans constitute a "politically significant concentration." Fielding an array of the pertaining statistical charts, he shows how demographics can provide the data whereby the contributions, needs and aspirations of Italian-Americans can be better analyzed and (hopefully) served by the American commonwealth.

Chapter VIII, by Alberto Schepisi, "New Identities in a Time of Globalization: The Case of Italy," invokes a pyramidal model of globalization wherein international organizations are at the top and local communities at the base. Schepisi, Italy's ambassador to Ireland, maintains that the importance of citizenship in a nation-state is declining: 'identity' in the global age must become, instead, a matter of belonging to the universal and the local. Italians, because of their longterm historical identification not with a nation-state but with a 'universal' (the Roman Empire, then the Catholic Church) and a 'local' (village, town), are particularly good at showing the world how to do this.

Chapter IX, by George F. McLean, "Italic Identities and the Development of Intercultural Competencies," regards a main contribution of Italicity to be its talent at specifically intercultural competence. McLean uses a Gadamerian hermeneutics to show how "applicaton" of tradition involves a dialectic of whole and part, the birthing of "novelty," and a nurturing in "prudence." Interpretation of other traditions requires "sagacity" and a "dialectic of horizons," and Italians, so good at "combinations," can be a 'sign for the world' in this respect.

Chapter X, by Paul Paolicelli, "Comments: Italic Identities and Pluralistic Contexts," reports from the 'Italian-American', not the 'Italian' side, of Italicity, since its author's forefathers migrated to the U.S.A. in the 19th century. Paolicelli is a best-selling popular author who advocates the genre of "Legacy-Writing": he says his books, about the southern Italian villages whence the ancestors of most Italian-Americans emigrated, belong to the broader "American story" of the values each immigrant group contributes to the American polity. Paolicelli gives convincing explanations of why most Italian-Americans have drifted from an informed identification with contemporary Italy.

Chapter XI, by Paolo D. Siviero, "From Globalization to Interdependence: The Role of Religion," says that globalization is a misnomer, since the world is made up, more than ever, of "*dividuals*," i.e., persons constituted by their contextual region(s). Religions are a key factor defining these regions, and fundamentalist religions have converted difference into hostile

difference. Authentic religions must cultivate a proactive "dialogue among equals" aiming towards a healthy interdependence. Italy can become a showcase in this regard, since it now hosts new immigrants representing a diversity of religions.

Chapter XII, by Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, "What Remains of the West," presents a carefully documented and analytic study of current relations between the U.S.A. and Europe, especially Western Europe. Parsi argues that the Bush administration's *Realpolitik*, its distrust of international organizations and even its European partners and NATO, have forced Europeans to shift confidence from the Atlantic Pact to a more exclusive identification with the European Union. The Bush administration avers Europe touts peace-making and compromise because its military is weak; and Europe insists that the U.S.A.'s recourse to unilateralism and violence is a throwback to an imperialist era. Parsi reminds both sides of the Atlantic that they share a common legacy of liberal and democratic values, and should reconcile with each other for the good of the world.

Chapter XIII, by Charles Dechert, "Community and Corporate Culture in a Pluralistic World: A Structural Approach to Globalization," studies the development of a general theory of system especially by military and industrial groups. Drawing on his own experience in these fields he examines how the local and even national units are increasingly impacted by the broader context or system in which they exist. At the same time the Italic experience shows how to adjust from within the multiple facets of life to form an harmonious structure.

Part I
Italic Identity in Pluralistic Context

Chapter I
Italic Identities and Pluralistic Contexts:
Toward the Development of Intercultural Competencies

Piero Bassetti

The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age which marked the successful beginning of our mutual collaboration. Since that time, the Catholic University of America and Globus et Locus have embarked upon a course of research and reflection, which can, I am convinced, not only enrich our own experience, but also the current crucial debate on the global world in which we live, its peoples and its institutions.

I would like to cast our minds back to that which we achieved during that first seminar almost two years ago, for it was the starting point from which we developed and articulated our ideas together. The theme of study and debate was the "essence of Italic identity". Our point of departure—and it is at the root of all our efforts as the Globus et Locus Association—was the conviction that there is such a thing as an Italic identity, a unifying transnational dimension of an essentially cultural, rather than ethno-linguistic or juridical, nature that is based on citizenship.

This Italic entity is a great community of sentiment and values which, in our opinion, now goes far beyond the limits of descent or family relations of the 60 million people of Italian origin spread around the world. In fact, it also comprises all those who to a certain extent "feel Italian"—whatever ethno-linguistic and national differences there may be—because especially in recent years they have appreciated or shared Italian values and interests, whether this be through encounters with people (through business contacts, tourism, etc.), things (goods bearing the label "Made in Italy") or signs (information, art, cinema and all those communication processes which feed our collective imagination).

At our last gathering, we used this idea as a springboard for an attempt to identify and define the main features which make up this unifying "Italic" dimension and found them in certain significant common elements rooted both in ancient history and, at the same time, the more recent developments in the globalisation process: a mild-mannered identity (without any hegemonic pretensions deriving from a strong imperial and colonial tradition); not resentful (unlike those peoples who have been subjected to, or still live under, domination and oppression and therefore feel humiliated); aesthetic (conscious of the value of beauty); affective (aware of the value of feelings and, therefore, of the centrality of the family as the basic root of feelings); universalist (founded on the quest for universal shared values); cosmopolitan (marked by an openness towards the other, a desire for and capacity to listen to and engage in dialogue with the other).

Based on these premises which were enriched and articulated in an analytical manner through the various contributions and subsequent discussions arising from the first seminar, we developed our ideas over the following months, until we came to this second gathering. Over this period of time, each of us has in one way or another made a personal contribution. The Catholic University and its Center for the Study of Culture and Values made a significant contribution to the work of the seminar by editing the drafts produced by the participants.

This was an invaluable contribution in that it made it possible to publish and distribute a volume which today comprises the main element of our shared cultural heritage and can be recognised and communicated outside this context. Given that we are more a political-planning agent than academic institution, we at Globus et Locus have worked on a practical level as well as that of research. We have attempted to broaden our knowledge and ability to interpret, drawing up

plans, setting up experiments, in this way subjecting our hypotheses and theories to the test of empirical research and comparison with others.

On a concrete level, given our conviction that theoretical study must always act as guideline for procedure, but at the same time procedure can and must in turn form the basis for theoretical reflection, we have promoted a series of initiatives from the ground up, in an awareness of all the communities which make up the "Italic world" in the four corners of the world. These dealt with themes such as information and communication processes among and with Italic people, the conditions and means required for the essential knowledge (and therefore also self-representation and self-awareness) of the distribution and composition of this transnational community and finally, the multicultural and intercultural aspects which are the two fundamental options open to all diasporas and, at the same time, to all state organisations and societies which are increasingly articulated into multiple and diverse cultural communities and collective identities.

Throughout this period of work and study, we have become increasingly convinced that the concept of "glocalisation," on the one hand, and function, on the other, can serve as a useful and meaningful key to understanding the themes of identity and the growing copresence of different cultures in our society as well as possible policies and strategies for dealing with these and "governing" the outcome.

Glocalisation is the process by which the connection between local and global dominates our lives. The global is found in the local and vice versa. We not only see it in our own day to day lives, we also hear it from studies carried out by anthropologists, sociologists and social scientists in general. The "spaces" in our lives—in the sense of transnational spheres of social practices—physically take place (and nowadays, with increasing mobility, they often take place in different places) and are always to some extent the crossroads between the local and the global.

The "spaces", which we can therefore actually define as glocal (at the crossroads)—cultural, social, information and communication "spaces" and, more and more often, institutional, political and juridical spaces too—increasingly elude the reach of those institutions set up and designed around the concept of the centrality of territory.

In these "spaces", each individual tends to assume, and therefore expect that he be seen to have and be guaranteed, a multiple and diverse cultural, linguistic and also institutional and juridical sense of belonging. The dilemmas of multiculturalism and interculturalism arise in this context: how can multiple and diverse "spaces" be made to coexist peacefully within the same territory? And how can we reconcile the glocal nature of these spaces at the crossroads between a place and the world, this crossing of borders and territory with the traditional expectations of exclusive statehood?

The second key to understanding lies in the concept of function. In a glocal world, where territory has lost its confines and exclusiveness, it is functions which come to the foreground (research, culture, business, voluntary humanitarian projects, etc.), functions which cross territorial boundaries and take place beyond the confines of territories.

Around these functions, we see the formation of transnational functional communities (of research, study, business, international voluntary projects, etc.) which, with the mobility and work of their members, utilising the new technologies of communications and transport, create metaterritorial "spaces" crossing and interconnecting different continents, States and peoples. This gives rise to "multiple new senses of belonging and non-territorial but functional identities which reside and operate in these new spaces."

To sum up, the multiplication of "spaces" is, in many senses, the product of the multiplication of functions and, in turn, generates a plurality of identities and senses of belonging. Transnational

mobility, migratory processes, diasporas, the evolution of transnational functional communities, all contribute to what has been described as the "prismatic breakdown of space and belonging". This breakdown is something which traditional politics finds increasingly difficult to comprehend and especially regulate and gives rise to a displacement of politics, a "without place", which is eluded by the new metaterritorial spaces and multiple, hybrid, ambiguous dimensions of belonging and identity.

Another sphere of experience and study upon which, as *Globus et Locus*, we have worked during this period, is that relating to the ways in which the global interferes with "places" and places, in their turn, react to this interference. We experience in Italy, as you all know, a sort of defensive localism (that of the Northern League) which, out of fear and on the basis of a closed, immobile idea of identity, rejects globalisation, a localism which sees the place as not interconnected with, but rather opposed to, the world.

This defensive localism has neither understood nor recognised the multiplication of "spaces" and sense of belonging which have accompanied the decline of territories. It deludes itself, that it can fortify and close its borders and expect local, regional or national institutions to achieve this rather than promoting the possible and necessary task of creating interconnections and long-distance networks with the world beyond.

From a cultural point of view, in order to convince others and give itself legitimacy, defensive localism constructs myths (in our case, that of the Celts and the Po Valley) of the eternal permanence of identities, forgetting that identities are never a constant but a process. Throughout history, they have always been "constructs" arising in the course of diverse social practices, from the comparison with otherness and actually feeding on this otherness which is internal, even more than it is external, to the subject. There is always, so to speak, "another" already within us, even before the other outside of us.

In other words, identities and belonging, in differentiated and complex societies such as our own, are ever increasingly a "residing in displacement" (as commented by an attentive observer like James Clifford) or, in other words still, an unstable collocation within and between (in-between). Nothing permanent and univocal, but something mobile and articulated.

As has already been said in another language, "once you intervene in an interconnected world, you are always, to a certain extent, 'inauthentic', caught between certain cultures while implicated in others". In this globally interconnected world, identity and belonging basically arise from a continuous process of "cultural negotiation" which, starting with cultural elements already acquired, leads to the acquisition of new elements and the rejection of others and a second time around acceptance of still others, that is, a complex construct that is never entirely definitive, of identity and belonging. All the diasporas, all the transnational communities of a functional nature are to some extent the product of this process of cultural negotiation which can also be seen as a glocal process in that it takes place at the "crossroads" between places and the world.

On the basis of this phase of experiment and reflection which began with our last meeting, we have decided to propose now a deeper examination of the themes which are indicated in the very title of our convention, "Italic Identities and Pluralistic Contexts: Toward the Development of Intercultural Competencies." We considered it to be both useful and necessary to reflect on the fact that the process of construction of the Italic identity always takes place, nowadays, in a pluralistic context of culture and identity, starting from diverse identities and belongings: an individual is at the same time Italo-American or Italo-French (and, in this case, also European) and then, as far as local roots are concerned, also Lombard, Piedmontesi or Sicilian.

And we also wish to reflect on the fact that this process of drawing closer to constructing an Italic identity, which arises from the coexistence of multiple aspects within the same identity and belonging, also arises "between" different identities, that is, in an inevitably pluralistic context from an ethnic, linguistic and cultural viewpoint (all the more so in a culture which is the "nexus in a post-national network of diasporas, such as the United States today). In effect, pluralism is as much "in identities" as "between identities".

Given these premises and considerations, what we need to ask ourselves during these two days of work is therefore: How does the Italic identity relate to this pluralistic context, full of so many other senses of belonging and identities? What diverse forms does the essence of the Italic identity take in this relational context? How does the relatedness with other senses of belonging and identity—a relatedness which is intense and inevitable in a pluralistic context such as the American one—interfere with the process of construction and dynamics of change of the Italic identity?

And again, in this pluralistic context, what fundamental "spaces"—with the meaning defined earlier of transnational spheres of social practices—are promoted or as it were "inhabited" in a more meaningful way by the Italic communities? And, from a historical perspective, what are the most significant experiences that the Italic community has had in the past in this pluralistic context, especially when "put to the test" by tension, crisis and conflict? And what today are the new experiences, in more recent contexts, what challenges and opportunities do these provide for the Italic community'?

Finally, from the viewpoint of planning and politics, faced with the challenge of an increasingly pluralistic society which must manage to make differences coexist peacefully in the same territory, what do the options of multiculturalism and interculturalism represent? According to the intercultural option, in particular, that which is based on dialogue, interconnection and exchange, what original and significant contribution can the Italic community offer, based on their specific identity (which we attempted to articulate, define and discuss at our last meeting)?

We of *Globus et Locus* are firmly convinced of one thing, that interculturalism can succeed and that the Italic community can make a significant contribution to this success if we assume as the central value the "culture of functions" rather than that of territory. In other words, if we recognise that the "spaces" in which the encounter takes place, the dialogue, the exchange between human groups in a pluralistic context are above all meta-territorial spaces constituted from functions: study, research, the economy and the world of business, voluntary projects, and so on.

It is these "spaces" that form the basis for new communities, functional and glocal communities with their own specific institutions of reference, such as the university for research and study, Chambers of Commerce for business, NGOs or UN agencies for humanitarian and voluntary projects, and so on, which traverse and interconnect territorial communities and base their identity not on closedness but on openness and exchange.

We can, at this point, "come full circle" in our reasoning and return to the starting point of our last meeting: the essence of the Italic identity, the characteristics and forms of this identity. It is our theory that Italic communities are, by their very nature, particularly well-equipped for and well-disposed towards intercultural dialogue, pluralism of identity and belonging, the practices and experiences of functionalism (upon which, I would like to remind us all, is based the historic experience of the building of the European Union, which allowed us to end centuries of war on the continent) and, finally, the new challenges of interethnic societies and the global world.

This is a hypothesis which we wish to discuss in greater depth together during this two-day encounter and which we hope to continue in a future third meeting which here and now I take the opportunity of proposing be held by ourselves in Italy.

Chapter II

Catholicity, Italicity, and the Communication of Meaning

Gasper F. Lo Biondo, S.J.

My parents and extended family passed on to me the wonderful narrative of my own cultural identity as an Italian American, as did my four grandparents, who had come to the United States from penury in Palermo. I will explore my own personal experience by weaving together the three threads of italicity, catholicity, and the communication of meaning in the context of globalization, of increasing interdependence and the challenge of global community. In the reflections that follow I will attempt to deal with the question, how does our understanding of catholicity and the communication of meaning affect italicity. First I will talk about the notion of catholicity in the context of globalization. The second area I will explore is that of the communication of meaning in our globalized pluralistic inter-cultural context. The third and final consideration will be an attempt to put the notions of catholicity and the communication of meaning into the framework of the construction of a new kind of civil society from below.

The Context of Globalization and the Notion of Catholicity

In a study entitled, "The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local" Robert Schreiter says that with the phenomenon of globalization, the notion of Catholicity is being enriched. For our purposes I want to consider what he says in order for us to better understand the notion of catholicity (with a small Ac) or universality. In the context of globalization, I become capable of placing my experience of being Italian American into a more universal set of parameters than I did, growing up during the Second World War.

What Schreiter says about what globalization is doing to the Catholic religion is similar to what it is doing to my Italian American cultural identity. Globalization is "pushing the envelope" especially regarding one of the four major characteristics of the Catholic Church. Of the four, "One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic," three marks, he says, are pretty much in place. But what it means to be Catholic now calls for further reflection because something new is happening in the context of globalization and changing cultures. Just as those of us who are Roman Catholic can sense a change in how we perceive ourselves in relation to people of other religions, so too, we sense that the meaning of catholicity is changing. It is important that we explore this in order to probe the meaning of italicity.

What does "catholicity" mean in the context of globalization? In the past it has meant, in general, geographical expansion and fullness, completeness. This completeness was bound up with one particular culture that was normative in relation to other cultures. With the phenomenon of globalization and the new interactions resulting from the opening of economies and cultures, the experience of fullness and completeness of one's own culture changes. We carry a new notion of culture. We no longer approach our own culture in a normative way because we realize that there is no longer one single culture that is the norm for all other cultures.

We know that when one culture puts itself up as a norm, as in a hegemonic situation, everyone senses that something is askew. We now operate with an empirical notion of culture. But this empirical notion of culture goes hand in hand with the way we reproduce our italicity in a world community of many cultures. This is extremely important for our understanding of what "Italicity" means from the perspective of catholicity as a general term.

The Communication of the Meaning of Italicity in Our Pluralistic Inter-Cultural World

The second area that I want to talk about is our pluralistic inter-cultural context and how through the dynamics of the communication we build the common meaning of italicity globally. The communication of meaning is the key to understanding how italicity gets reproduced. It is constitutive of community and our consciousness of culture. Here I draw from philosopher-theologian, a Canadian, Bernard Lonergan, S.J. In the final chapter in his book *Method and Theology*, Lonergan talks about the functions of the communication of meaning. When we carry on the activity of the communication of meaning our operation is cognitive, constitutive, and effective. It is cognitive because it involves our power of reasoning. It is constitutive because it constitutes what's going on, and it is effective because it actually carries it out. When communication of meaning is successful, community happens. This is the basis for our approach to italicity in relation to civil society, as we shall see in the last section below.

Our pluralistic inter-cultural context is what Schreiter talks about when he explores the notion of catholicity. It is not enough to say that contexts are changing. The very way in which we perceive the contexts of our lives is changing. So that when we talk about contextual theology, or contextual anthropology, or any contextual approach, we realize that our way of perceiving and acting has taken on new qualities.

Schreiter mentions three elements that are relevant. One of them is the de-territorialization of context. This has to do with *locus*. The second one is the hyper-differentiation of context. Schreiter calls this hyper-differentiation—the movement is towards the local: the local differences become clear, which has many implications. And the third is a very interesting new characteristic of context, namely, the hybridization of context. My reading of Schreiter is that this does not necessarily refer to of the deep cultural meanings that people carry. These meanings do not hybridize so easily. My understanding is that hybridization indicates that the cultural context is no longer normative, and hence is not idealized. Indeed, when it is idealized politically or militarily, in a unilateral way or hegemonically, one reacts against it unless there be vested interests which must absolutely be kept.

These three elements shed light on the dynamics of the communication of common meaning or of building our italicity. They help us understand how the cultural meanings and values that constitute italicity are reproduced. But they do not tell us about the intentionality with which we reproduce those meanings and values. My Italian American family passed my traits on to me in a non-intentional way, for I discovered these traits to be the very way that I am. They are built into the way I resonate in so many of the manners that I describe as Italicity. The way in which these traits operate in the predominantly Anglo-Saxon culture of the United States is another matter. It is, I might say, the *croce e delicia* of being Italian American.

If now we consider how people build common meaning, this brings us to a very brief description of the grass roots Global Economy and Cultures social research project on which I have been working. This project of the Woodstock Theological Center, a Jesuit Center at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. This has implications for the promotion of peoples, cultures, and by extension, of italicity. It seeks to understand how globalization operates concretely in the local culture. When one refers to globalization, one normally uses abstract language that the anthropologists call "thin description". In the Global Economy and Cultures project we use narrative language that employs a "thick description" of globalization. This approach is based on the work of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his book *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Based on my work in the Woodstock project I would venture to propose that the narrative method should

be the preferred way for developing a better understanding of the relationship between itality, catholicity, and the communication of meaning.

The Woodstock study looks for how people—mostly the poor who are marginalized in the third world—take responsibility for their lives in the midst of rapid and radical change that is most frequently unfavorable to them, and how they deal with the challenges of changes related to the opening up of their local economy and culture. Narratives from around the world have been brought to us by local Jesuit social research and action centers. Take for example the story of a woman in northern India, which of course has nothing to do directly with Itality. She is a tribal person and religion was non-Brahminic. Her tribalism kept her out of the caste until they were forced to move, and then she became a Dalit. She lives in an area where there are coal mines. Since 1991 when the new economic policy of globalization was adopted by India she needs to "scramble" to survive. Her cultural and religious values are being adjusted and so her motivation and decision-making is extremely creative. She is an example of how even a very poor person has the power to communicate the meaning of her local culture. She is dealing creatively with globalization.

When international and global policies are formed without taking seriously the results of grassroots research in order to find out how people are creatively dealing with globalization, something important is missed. This is similar to what we can miss if we do not consider the dynamics of the communication of meaning in the process of reproducing our culture of Itality.

In a pluralistic inter-cultural context, and the dynamics of the building of a common meaning, the narratives of our lives are like gold mines. The woman in northern India, is building common meaning in her adjustment and cultural change. But she has no language for what she is doing, just as we also do not have an adequate way of talking about how we communicate the meaning of Itality. From the twenty first century onward, the reproduction of culture will have to take place in a conscious, intentional way, and George McLean talks about the dramatic significance of this new need for intentionality which shapes present cultural transformations.

An Indian Jesuit anthropologist once told me something that I think is very true, namely, that in the past cultures were reproduced and handed on unintentionally. My family handed it on to me without talking about it. In fact I lost my ability to speak Italian fluently. I spoke Italian until I went to school, when my parents said: "Be Americano." So there was no more Italian until I got to high school when I asked them: "Can I learn Italian?" That is, in the new context of globalization the building of common cultural meaning must now be intentional. In our educational processes, including *educacione popular* or informal adult education and in other forms of education, we need to create, design, new non-hegemonic educational materials that embody the intentional reproduction of culture. We Italian Americans need this very much in order to reproduce our itality. My nephews and nieces, and my grand nephews and nieces are ripe for it. I wish there were an educational tool that we might put into their hands for being more aware of themselves and the itality they carry.

Constructing a New Kind of Civil Society "From Below"

The third and final area for our consideration is that of constructing a new civil society from below. We have discussed the issues suggested by Professor Bassetti, namely, looking ahead to how the re-organization away from the nation states. My Woodstock Global Economy and Cultures project and other studies lead me to propose that the new civil society must be constructed from below, through differentiated cultural groups in networking and the building up common meaning. A new kind of global intentionality related to itality can emerge as a result of the

democratization of the communication of meaning of our common cultural heritage and our way of living life and loving life. This holds not only for those of us who carry itality but I think it holds for the future of other cultural heritages in the global community of the future.

This constructing from below is basically a process of development. Authentic human development does not consist simply in the accumulation of things, but involves the accumulation of practical knowledge including knowledge of one's culture. This form of social knowledge allows the whole human community to raise its standard of living because it unleashes enormous creative energies. This question of itality is a development issue having to do with the intentional way in which we approach the construction of the new civil society.

We can learn a great deal about how to go about discovering how our own intentionality can operate if we examine the intentionality of people whose narratives reflect the development of their own itality. The Woodstock research project offers some leads. Its methodological approach to narrative analysis attempts to discover the way in which people make crucial decisions about how to carry forward their own cultural meanings and values. Such a methodology reveals how the people in the narratives are "development actors."

There is a way of approaching this kind of decision making that reflects the dynamic structure of human consciousness. Once we become aware of how that dynamism actually operates in ourselves, we can learn how to reproduce our culture intentionally. This "transcendental method" comes out of the Aristotelian and scholastic epistemology, but it is carried forward by Lonergan. In the act of human knowledge and action we discover that our human consciousness progressively moves from simple empirical awareness through intellectual, rational, and finally moral awareness. When we discover these four levels of consciousness as truly operative in our own case, we acquire the tools that allow us to enter into the intentionality of the protagonists of our narratives. They are as follows:

- The first level is the level of experience. It is the empirical consciousness of what our senses observe.

- The second level, which arises when we ask: "what is going on or why?" etc., is that of understanding. This is the insight into ourselves and into one another, into our culture, into reality; it is the driving force of our consciousness.

- But because those insights have to be verified we must make judgement. This third level of consciousness is that level of judgments as to the truth and reality of what I claim. Once I make that judgement, I say: "Yes. This is the way I want to continue as an Italian American." - Then I say: "What do I do? What is the most valuable way of acting?" I then become morally conscious, and say: "What are my values?" This is to make intentional the reproduction of culture and the construction of common meaning and action in community.

These four levels deal with the process of knowing from below, that is, from the moment of sense perception to the final moment of decision and action based on experience. This approach to human knowledge goes hand in hand with a perspective of human development and the construction of new civil society which also is from below. Essentially it rests on building community. In the Enlightenment approach to community our self understanding as humans is based on a philosophical premise that antagonistic relations are the basis of society. On this premise, society comes together by contract because we are primarily in conflict, at odds, even at war with one another. This primarily dialectical approach to the whole way we imagine reality is questioned by Professor David Tracy in his book "The Analogical Imagination". He posits an

analogical approach to reality that recognizes that inter-subjective cooperation and community is the basis of society. Our inter-subjectivity is not primarily conflictual, but can become conflictual and disordered. The situation can be remedied. The way we are human is not essentially that of conflict with one another.

The world we want to build is a world in which community is the basis of society. And the building of community is essentially a building through inter-subjectivity. One takes the basic structure of human knowing and being just described and realizes that this is what we need to do in order to be together. We need, not only to be in touch with our own experience, but to be contemplative and aesthetically focused on the experience of the other. When I encounter people from another culture and learn their narratives as their works of art, how do I pay attention to that work of art? Can I open myself to the other without my own agenda, that is my own struggle for cultural identity, getting in the way?

Through our communication of meaning about our italicity we can establish a common field of experience that is not hegemonistic, a common understanding of that experience that does not make itself normative for other cultures, a shared judgement of what is true about it that embraces the reality of its particularities. Finally, in our shared responsibility for what we have discovered and want to do together we express authentically who we are. This understanding of building of community from below can be helpful in the construction of a new civil society. It is in this kind of civil society that our italicity can serve not only to enrich our lives, but to promote the welfare of all peoples. I am happy to be part of this venture.

Chapter III

Hybridization Processes at the Origin of Italian Fortuna and Diaspora

Giovanni Bechelloni

This chapter has been written after the Washington seminar and in the light of what was debated there, but also in the light of my own research about Italians and Italian Diaspora. The previous steps of my research activity were connected to three main ideas which I tried to develop in my previous works (Bechelloni 2003). Looking back to the roots of Italian identity from a comparative point of view and with special emphasis on what I have called a communicative gaze (or view), which has some important connections with the cosmopolitan view elaborated by German sociologist Beck.

The first idea is that ancient Italian identity (Etruscan-Greek-Roman) was since the beginning the result of a hybridization process which gave origin to a special kind of complex and open society, the ancestor of the so-called modern society.

The second idea is that Italy has been for centuries a place where diasporas arrived from Asia, Africa and Europe, from the North and the South, from the East and the West and from where diasporas in all directions departed.

The third idea is the Italians have a strong sense of place and conceive of themselves at the same time as "citizens" of Italy and "citizens of the world," being cosmopolitans and locals.

Starting from these three main ideas I began to elaborate what is becoming, in my mind, a new paradigm: a communicative approach to the historical existence of mankind. Two recent books of mine try to work on the construction of this paradigm both on a theoretical level (Bechelloni 2002) and on an empirical level (Bechelloni 2004). With the purpose of addressing issues of intellectual thinking and communication, my purpose is to find ways to pass from communication conceptualized like a danger for mankind (when it is performed in the mode of lies and propagandas, the typical attitude of a closed society) to a conception and a practice of communication conceived of as a resource (when it is performed in an open mind perspective, in the typical attitude of an open society). And my undertaking is to consider Italian traditions as a resource for the social construction of the kind of mentality and the kind of institutions which our cosmopolitan world needs.

It is interesting to notice that just in these last days (March 2004) three small books were published in Italy, moving in the same direction I have here sketched in my previous words and in the coming four paragraphs of this chapter. The three books are unusual. The first one has been written by a prominent economist and politician, Giorgio Ruffolo (2004), and deals with the long lasting history of Italy. The second one is a new collection of eleven brief novels written by fiction writers of different generations: they deal with the problem of Italian identity. The third one is a small collection of thirteen brief essays about peace keeping and building, written by prominent men: from S. Francis to Erasmus, from Kant to Gandhi, including the two Popes of the Catholic Church who, more than others, have acted communicatively for the construction of the peace.

Educate for Peace, Educate towards Interculturality

The Romans used to say *si vis pacem para bellum*, in other words "If you want peace, prepare for war". Today we could say, paraphrasing and completing: "if you want peace, educate towards

peace", just as John Paul II said on the 1st of January 2004 on the occasion of "World Peace Day", adding also that "a new world order is needed". The destiny of the world, the future of the human race, the future of history or—rather—historical existence, depend today on the interpretation we must give to the three aforementioned prerogatives, evoking the charismatic authority of a great Pope and of a great history: 1) *para bellum*, 2) educate for peace, 3) build a new world order. I have done this because I believe that the three passwords—if that term lends itself well, are not to be considered as opposing one another but complementary and interdependent.

The Romans summarized the programme of political action in two key words: *VIS* and *LEX*—Strength and Law. If we want peace, as everyone (or many of us?) today seem to proclaim—with the due exception of those (the Islamic fundamentalists and the like) who declare to want the "holy war" and in a joint effort are taking action to achieve this in various parts of the world—if we want peace we cannot naively think that all we have to do is say it, proclaim it and shout it in the streets.

As the Pope says, it is necessary to educate for peace. And all of us who listen to or read the Pope's words (which would be quite universally shared), we know and we must be aware that the educative action is no light matter; whatever objective this action proposes. In order to educate, it is necessary to have the human intellectual resources (cognitive, discursive and persuasive) which can be deployed in space and time. These are resources which must be singled out, formatted and finalized with respect to an objective—peace. World peace—which until now, i.e., a period of 5-6,000 years of historical existence of mankind, not only has not been achieved but has not even been proposed (with widespread utilization of resources and with far-sighted determination and tenacity).

Thus, if we want to educate for peace we must at the same time think about protecting the teachers of peace (and scholars too!) from the arrogance and aggression of those who do not share this wish for peace. Both *LEX* (steered in the right direction to produce and build a new world order) and *VIS* (the necessary strength) are needed to prevent us from being destroyed by those who are hostile towards the teachers and builders of peace.

Education, Law and Strength must necessarily go together and not be complementary and interdependent, in order to plan the necessary stages to be able to reach the final and difficult goal of achieving peace, world peace. The first stage is made up of the possibility to attain widespread approval of the causes of violence and wars. A great anthropologist, René Girard, believes that he has found this in the mimetic desire of destructive envy. A great sociologist, Norbert Elias, believes that the civilization process has brought about a drastic reduction of violence. A great historian, Ernst Nolte, thinks that the systematic negation of the will of the silent majority by the noisy minority could result in a world civil war still more destructive than the European civil war which has caused bloodshed both in Europe and a part of the world for almost all of the 20th century. These three theories could be complementary and convergent. A great amount of theoretical work is necessary which can discover reference points of many other authors who have questioned or who are now questioning human nature and its historical existence.

The second stage is the activation of an important and coherent educative project for the development of intercultural competence. It is a project which began to take shape in meetings and seminars promoted by Globus et Locus which took place in Washington in 2002 and 2003 at the CUA Center for the Study of Culture and Values. Education towards interculturality is the first premise and it is indispensable for this objective. To recognize that interculturality is not just a simple slogan but to be aware of how much sophisticated knowledge is necessary in order to recognize the 'others', the 'foreigners', who come from afar but also those near us, or totally within ourselves. As we were taught by the great pioneers who were the first to put the difficult task of

"knowing yourself" to the test: Socrates and Plato, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, St. Augustus and Plotinus, Marsilio Ficino and Montaigne, Rousseau and Stendhal, Freud and Jung. To recognize the others is the starting point for learning to communicate, to talk, to form a relationship and to perform common actions. To educate towards the development of intercultural competence means to educate towards building a special and sophisticated culture of communication. It means to educate and accept its complexity.

The third stage is that which is more interesting for us. It becomes an operative specification of the first two stages and at the same time a condition of possibility, a lever to start up—with great heuristic awareness and historical responsibility—the work of research-action and cultural policy necessary for establishing the congruent resources for setting up the first two stages.

The third stage is that which is overshadowed by the pioneering work of Globus and Locus, from the visionary but pragmatic ideas of Piero Bassetti. The basic idea which must be empirically explored and articulated conceptually in order to make it work politically and operatively is linked to the length of the historical existence of the Italians and to the open and polymorphic Italic identity.

Resulting from ancient diasporas—Etruscan and Phoenician, Greek and Celtic—which gave origin to the first hybrid configurations of the ancient Italian civilization (Etruria, Magna Grecia and Rome) the Italic identity has continued to subsist, in a process of never ending change and adaptation to the historical contingencies, with the new diasporas which arrived or came from the geographical space which has clearly defined Italy since the beginning of its historical existence: a peninsula and many islands in the centre of the Mediterranean Sea, the sea which has been the crucible of language, culture and religion for more than three thousand years. Unlike the other diasporas, above all Hebrew which has given origin and empiric base to the name, the Italic diaspora has never meant escape or banishment from Italy, drastic impoverishment of the original territory, the native country which established the particular configuration of peoples who began to call themselves *Italici* between the eighth and second century B.C. Starting from the names which were defined originally as small segments of the territory (called Viteliu in the city of Corfinio on the territory of the Osci, a population from along the Mediterranean coast between today's Lucania and Calabria) or a people called *Itali* who inhabited the southern most point of Calabria near today's Reggio. The name becomes generalized during the second social war, with the union joining Rome and the Italic peoples and is legitimized with the concession of citizenship (with Augustus) to all the inhabitants of the peninsula and subsequently to the inhabitants of the islands: Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and the smaller islands (with Diocleziano in the third century A.D.)

Italy, right from the beginning, was a land of diasporas. Arriving and leaving. And the reasons for such diasporas were by no means negative. The migratory process both entry and exit were activated by more or less positive reasons—if they can be described as such. Obviously not all were so. For example the slaves that the Romans brought in as spoils of war from the four corners of the world in that era certainly did not come of their own accord. However, the great majority of them, often significant segments of the ruling class of their respective countries, settled in Italy, obtained their freedom and devoted their time to agriculture or craftwork, literature or weapons.

Much in-depth work and research is needed in order to eliminate from historical data layers of incrustations created according to the wishes of the winners and for ideological reasons, or due to negative stereotypes, lack of memory or other forms of prejudice. During the lengthy Roman regime many Italics spread themselves over the various regions of the Empire for a great deal of different reasons (military or civil) and settled there. Instead, at the time of the "barbaric

invasions", quite extensive fractions of peoples,— Celtic, Scandinavian, Germanic and Slavonic settled in Italy.

From the beginning, if we must agree with the myths, the legends and the evidence (which according to R. Girard are always more truthful than we think), a characteristic of this flow of peoples entering and leaving Italy is mixed marriages. This fact is particularly important in order to recognize and positively evaluate a social custom which, instead, for centuries had been considered negative and stigmatized in many ways (some of which are still part of our modern culture). In this sense the old Italian proverb "*moglie e buoi dei paesi tuoi*" (literally "it is better that your wife and your executioner are from your own nationality") would no longer be such an indicator of reality but more of an instruction,— a command whose existence was indeed justified by the relatively large amount of mixed marriages (which is, moreover, a deeply rooted reality of Mediterranean culture).

From the year 1000 onwards with the rebirth of many Italian cities, whose presence was overshadowed in the second half of the first millennium A.D., a diaspora linked to the development of trade and navigation was born. From Florence and Siena, from Lucca and Pisa, from Amalfi and Venice, Genoa and Milan,— travelling with their ships and their caravans scattering settlements of merchants and bankers, sailors and jurists, preachers and advisors, artists and musicians, artisans and farmers throughout the world. Vice versa, foreigners coming to Italy. For religious reasons (the pilgrimages to Rome reborn as capital of the Catholic religion) as well as for political and military reasons.

Hence, Italy—a land of diasporas. And for this reason a meeting point and blending of cultures, hybridization and contamination. A blending which brought about the inception in time of a special *genius loci*, which should be more thoroughly explored, cultivated and communicated. For the work of empiric research and theoretic conception which was started by *Globus* and *Locus* (and which the writer had also independently started with his work edited over the past three years and with intense research, training and intercultural dialogue for the whole of the nineties) it is important to capture the intellectual breakthrough towards the construction of a different and more intriguing point of view for studying the history of Italy and the Italic identity.

In the light of the present configuration of military and ideological conflicts which are tormenting the world, that which had up to now been observed and made conceptual in negative terms could be once again made conceptual in a positive way. The experience of Italy becomes a great reserve of practical and intellectual resources which can be utilized from a pedagogic viewpoint for interculturality and from a political viewpoint—a realistic policy for peace.

Words such as immigration and diaspora, interculturality and peace, identity and Italicism, history, historical existence and collective memory are redefined and take on new heuristic value and enabled to open new doors to the long standing knowledge of the Italian historical processes in a context of deep-rooted processes of globalization. This is in order to seek new and different empiric evidence as well as to interpret facts, events and processes well known to us all.

The Significance of History: Aporias, Ambivalence and Openings

History is significant and it can be so in many different ways. Not only according to the time and the circumstances, not only a case of chance or luck, but also according to the subjectivity, and the decision of who takes the action, whether it is an individual, a group or even a population. The significance of history has explicitly entered into the Italian debate with two meanings and I would like to suggest a third and a fourth, perhaps a fifth.

The first meaning is the most widespread. In a short essay with the title, "The weight of the past in the collective conscience of the Italians," the great historian Jacques Le Goff in 1974 suggested the idea that the history of the Italians—with both republican and imperial Rome, with the Middle Ages of merchants and papacy, with the Renaissance and the Baroque—had been so great, so unique and unrepeatable as to arouse at one point, ambivalent feelings in the "collective conscience of the Italians": from an aspect of impotence ("no matter what we do we will not be able to be as great as we once were") together with emulation and pride. As shown by the dreams and projects cultivated during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on the "Italian superiority" (Gioberti), on the "Third Rome" (Mazzini), on the "Great Italy" (the multiple declinations of the futuristic, modernistic and nationalistic avant-garde of Marinetti and Corradini, Prezolini and many others) which were spoken of by Emilio Gentile in 1997.

Both in the case of impotence as well as that of emulation and pride the past of the Italians weighs negatively. This is not a suggestion of Le Goff but it is an observation that I can make. Both on the number of chapters in the second part of Gentile's book dedicated to the second half of the twentieth century: from the death of the homeland in 1943 to the ambiguous celebrations of the hundredth anniversary of national unity in 1961. Also on the scope of my own memory of the role that history has played in the political-cultural Italian debate up to the present day, above all starting from the editorial, ideological and political revival and the so-called anti-fascist activists after the regrettable and piloted demonstrations in July 1960. The distant past, especially that of Rome, becomes erased and irremediably lost in the pitiful propagandistic exploitation by the Fascist party, government and regime, in spite of the good reasons and good motivation of others.

The recent past, that which is still present in the collective memory of many Italians, is denied in its "actual reality" in order to be administered in small doses (and sometimes massive ones), completely transformed and deformed by ideologies and propaganda often disguised or hidden by the curial panels of science, ethics and morals. The history of the war and the resistance, the institutional referendum and the constitution, the reconstruction and the economic boom, from 1968 and the years of terrorism, from the eighties to 'kickback city', produces a partisan historiography which becomes a publicly known ideology or propaganda by the media and the schools, in the universities and political communication up to the present day;—producing that split between history and collective memory which Franco Ferrarotti referred to in 1998.

According to this meaning therefore, history is a burden. We could say "The burden of the Italians," paraphrasing a famous motto coined by Rudyard Kipling when he wrote of "the white man's burden". As we can see analytically further ahead and as I have been able to observe during my many years of didactic activity, here is a burden in the face of which every Italian (and above all the new generations) is almost paralysed and disoriented,—because he does not know who is right. He cannot face a task which is enormous, complicated and risky. The distant history, that of Rome which could even attract him, is better left alone, because it has nothing to do with him. Recent history, source of unending controversy which goes under the heading of "the past that does not want to pass" is too complicated.

The second meaning is more technical. It comes from a brilliant essay of one of our most perspicuous scholars of the mind, Domenico Parisi. In an article called "The importance of history," published in the prestigious magazine *Il Mulino*, issue n. 312 in 1987, Parisi does not speak explicitly about Italy but forms a comparison between Europe and the U.S.A., starting from the differing importance of history in the memory of the Europeans and the Americans. Parisi claims that a human being's memory, even that which has been trained to store and utilize a great amount of it, is limited. Each of us should decide (more or less as we are nowadays used to doing

with our computer) what to include and preserve. For example, if we memorize names, telephone numbers, addresses (i.e., data that could be stored externally to be consulted when necessary) then there would be no space for facts, ideas and concepts which can be linked together to produce new ideas and concepts and for decision making. According to Parisi the Europeans were overloaded with history, so much history that involved them and therefore, unlike Americans, are little oriented to the present and to the future. Consequently they are less pragmatic, less innovative. History encumbers their memory, prevents those virtual connections which could help them to face and resolve the problems of the present.

In this second meaning, therefore, history is a cumbersome weight. It takes up too much room in the memory of the Europeans (naturally including the Italians) and prevents them (or rather makes it more difficult for them) to realistically orient themselves towards the present and to be innovative. In Parisi's opinion this is one of the reasons explaining the success of the Americans, their greater capability to compete and renew. A population made up of emigrants who - breaking away from their past the moment they decided to emigrate - subsequently find themselves "forced" to build a new nation and invent a new future. Both these meanings of the weight of history are poles apart from the belief that history is a *magistra vitae* which was very fortunate for some centuries.

However, I think that one can work on a third meaning. History weighs, in the sense that it is important. In the sense that history, seen as historical existence, is no light matter. It is important in many ways. It is important as far as the historical existence of a family or lineage, of a small village or a city, of a nation or a continent (or sub-continent) of a people or a civilization when it becomes collective memory and even more so when such memory is widely shared and fires the collective fantasy, and crystallizes into myths, legends and proverbs; or, better still, when it becomes historiography, the words written and justified by tradition and science. But also when it embodies visible evidence: represented by both roads and places of worship, buildings and churches, works of art or ceremonies and rites.

But history is important in many other ways. Less evident and more concealed. In ways which so to speak are incorporated in the collective and individual experience so as to be considered natural, biological and extraneous to historical existence. Here we are speaking about those ways which once—up to the so-called Second World War, up to the so-called Holocaust—were considered as racial attributes. That still today they are considered as ethnic attributes (with all the ambiguity connected with the term 'ethnic': for some equivalent to race and for others to culture) or 'identifying' (also here with the ambiguity connected to the term identity).

Ways which are observed, described and told about according to various labels and names which are at times (or often) misleading, the traditions or customs, ways of being and living which sometimes become what is now called *folklore*; but often evoked or studied according to other categories with respect to those sanctioned by the various social orders and by historiography: archetypes (Jung), collective unconscious (Hillman), cultural universals (Girard) and mental and imaginary universals (Vico).

If history is important, if it weighs according to this meaning too, I believe that we can and we must say, as we have already mentioned and we shall mention further, that for few other populations of the earth, history during its long, articulated and complex existence can count as a source of inspiration and as an anchor of the times and circumstances, contexts and situations, for the Italian people, for all the people or their ancestors or friends who have lived or live, shared all or part for whatever length of time of that beloved country from the Alps to the Mediterranean

called Italy. The Italians, or the 'Italics', the term Piero Bassetti suggests for those who without any blood ties with Italy and its civilization feel in some way close to it.

But, in order that this third meaning of the significance given to the importance of history can prevail over the other two already mentioned, that it can become the forerunner of a conscious political and cultural use for a future of peace and harmony not only among the Italics but also among all the people of the world, it is necessary firstly to take into account a fourth meaning. A negative meaning which has weighed heavily on my life and the burden is still there. On my life - like other Italics in Italy and the world, now as in the past. A negative meaning which has weighed heavily, above all, on the entire historical existence of Italy which in 1861 achieved its political unity and the inception of the building of a national State;—a meaning which, in many environments up to the present day, has won an existence in the history of the Italians and the Italics.

History weighs us down, therefore and also in a fourth meaning. History seen not so much as a series of events which have left their mark and affect us or our ways of thinking and acting. Rather more, history seen as that version or interpretation of the facts (of the historical existence of a people or a civilization) which has managed to establish itself as the best, legitimate and real history. The most reliable which often becomes also the most widespread, the most quoted by the media and in the schools, universities and in specialized literature. It is history written and told by those who presume (who presumed in a certain moment of the historical process and the state of the linkage of intellectual strength among peoples) to be the winners. It is history written and told by those who have managed to build and impose a dominant pattern, which has become also a revelation, insofar as it appears as common sense.

I am perfectly aware that what I am about to write could be considered temperamental, superficial or unfounded. What I am about to write, in fact, is conjectural, a hypothesis—not yet a theory. Neither am I able to produce sufficient evidence or argument to transform my hypothesis into a theory, although I hope to succeed in meeting enough interlocutors convinced enough to help me to transform my hypothesis into a research programme.

The first test, that which today is less confutable, concerns the origins and roots not only of the historical existence of the Italics but of the Western civilization. I am alluding to the cancellation, over many centuries of the Etruscan civilization and with it the multitude of peoples who came from the sea and from the near East (Phoenicians and Mycenaeans, Carthaginians and Greeks) and contributed in building ancient pre-Roman Italy as the cradle of Western civilization: a culture built through contamination and crossbreeding, co-existence and a mixture of diversity. A cancellation which only the archaeological findings in the 19th and 20th centuries partially lessened, but not totally. As it is easy to ascertain in the history books from all over the world and in the recent diatribe on the European Constitution, during which the insistent allusions to Christian or Greek-Roman roots came to light, but never the real roots of European civilization as a Western civilization which can surely be traced back to that of the Etruscans. The cancellation of the *Etruscan* roots is an extremely significant fact also ideologically and politically for the future of the world today. Such a cancellation, in fact, implies consequences of some relevance. It prevents the idea that the Western civilization was born in the East from entering into the collective and historical memory, born from the first extraordinary hybridization between the East and the West. In times of globalization it would be important to make everyone understand that globalization has deep and ancient roots (2,800 years) which go down in the processes of sophistication and hybridization between cultures set in motion by the great migratory processes which have characterized the same formation of human history from prehistoric times to that which

was realized in the Near East 5 to 6 thousand years ago, between Mesopotamia (the so-called fertile half moon), Israel and Egypt of the Pharaohs.

Rome's victory, the political unification of all Italy and the concession of Roman citizenship to the Italics (under Augustus) brought about the progressive cancellation, to the *damnatio memoriae*, of peoples and the cultures which preceded, accompanied and contrasted the rise of Rome. This was the first of a long series of cancellations which has affected the historical existence of Italy and the Italics.

A Digression on the Causes of *Damnatio Memoriae*

Cancellation which negates origins, this is my idea which could be proved by the necessary researches, from a common matrix which we could name "linkages of power" or "violence". It is the state of the linkages of power among peoples, culture and political regimes which result in either highlighting or putting into the background the principal characteristics, the fundamental course of historical processes: thus transforming historical existence into historiography, history and collective memory, so that they become legitimate, dominant and the commonly accepted sense for long or shorter periods in time and cultural and geographical space of various dimensions.

For linkages of power or violence I do not necessarily mean military power or war. Even for ancient and modern history one can utilize the distinction that was put forward by Nye in 2002, in order to bring into focus the characteristics of American power in the 20th century: that between soft power and hard power. By observing the length of the historical existence of peoples and civilizations we can catch the interweaving between the two types of power as well as their respective relative autonomy, picking out the competitive advantage which has permitted peoples and civilizations to prosper via the practice of hegemony and soft power as bearers of resources, innovations and technology equipped with their own strength of conviction and seduction.

It is the case, for example, of the success, realized over some centuries by the Etruscan civilization in most of ancient Italy and a part of the Mediterranean. Success realized with the soft power of commerce and agricultural technique, plumbing and craftwork, lifestyle and town planning, of the same configuration or political order of the city (which prefigure in part that of "open" Rome) rather than with the hard power of weapons. The Etruscan soft power becomes a component of the Roman civilization. The Roman civilization extends geographically and has existed for a long time not only because it has a powerful dissuasive strength made up of the hard power of its army but also because it perfects a political order which by exploiting the limits of the previous or contemporary political regimes (being either those of the Greek collective democracies or the classic principalities of the Middle East) manage to build a model of society which more than any other comes close to that of the "open society" which was theorized by the liberal thoughts of the 20th century.

Therefore it is not the power or violence as such that can, alone determine the result of a historic or historiographic diatribe - more is needed. For example the widespread conviction in the minds of a group or a population that power and violence are determinant or decisive. Such a conviction only adds power to power and violence to violence, with a specific symbolic force which can take on different values and configuration (aesthetic or anthropologic-cultural, legal and scientific, ideological and religious), each adding power to the power of strength and violence, weapons and armies.

Such force is greater if the power of weapons exists, united with the symbolic strength which results from one or more convictions which are brought to mind, and it finds itself in competition

with groups or populations which not only are less powerful but furthermore are convinced that conflicts between peoples cannot be solved by the use of force. If then these peoples—whether they are cities, states or continents—are rich and benefit from a lifestyle or an enviable quality of life, then their destiny is decided; this is the experience of 5 or 6 thousand years of historical existence of human civilization; resorting to power and violence, weapons and armies becomes inevitable and disastrous for the losers and today could be disastrous for us all. It could possibly bring about not only the end of history but even of the same historical existence of human civilization.

It is important to highlight that what makes it inevitable and disastrous is made up of a combination of the co-presence of two interconnected causative factors: the imbalance between the power of two potential competitors and the asymmetry between their beliefs. Contributing to the basis of such convictions, that which we can call a social theory (with strong pragmatic value) are the analyses on the long-lasting historical existence which can be performed on the supply of not only the pioneering reflections of Niccolò Machiavelli (on unarmed prophets and further still) but also and above all on the more recent analyses elaborated in the context of a possible end to history by some great contemporaries such as Norbert Elias and Arnold Toynbee, René Girard and Ernst Nolte.

The Etruscans gave up in the face of the power and violence of the Romans not only because they were less powerful but also because being so sure of their cultural and civil superiority they did not realize that they could be envied, copied and cast aside. They had no equipment, joining their forces when they were still in time for counter-balancing and contrasting the Roman military forces. They were defeated by the Romans who cancelled them also because, in the few cases we remember, the Romans were able to count on the collaboration and betrayal of noteworthy Etruscans who underestimated the seriousness of the events.

What happened to the Etruscans was not repeated with the Romans. Not in the same way. The Romans lasted longer and managed to build a civilization which was able to absorb many characteristics of the previous and coeval cultures. Not only the Etruscan and Greek but in the Hellenistic dimension and in a universal perspective, all the cultures of the Mediterranean and Europe of that time (Asiatic, African and Celtic) contribute to make the Roman civilization a complex one which anticipated many features of the modern Euro-Asiatic civilizations.

Also the Roman civilization, however complex and differentiated, open and inclusive as it may be, suffers from the same imbalance which the Etruscans had been through, at the origin of the historical existence of Rome and then slowly the other civilizations or other populations which come into conflict with its expansive dynamics; due to the clever interweaving between soft power and hard power which characterised them from the beginning. There are so many factors, elements and admirable interweaving that the studies of the last fifty years have brought to light and which explain the extraordinary and in a way everlasting success of Rome. Just to list them would lead us astray. However it is important to point out two relevant facts which in much greater proportion assimilate the "end" of Rome in the West to the "end" of the Etruscans in Italy.

Envy of richness and well-being, and the style and quality of life of the "Romans," attracts the attention and fires the envy of the Northern populations (Germanic, Slavic and Scandinavian) which have nothing to lose and everything to gain,—Northern populations which are aware that Rome's power is always made up more of soft power than hard power. As that which had already happened for the first time, in the forest of Teutoburgo (9 A.D.), when a daring Germanic leader, Arminio, who had not only become an ally of Rome but an official and a citizen, realized that the

legions were not invincible. And it is not by chance that their dramatic defeat unsettled Augustus' last years, who as a superfine politician realized just how vulnerable that great empire was.

The day will come when the "Germanic hordes" lay waste the city of Rome. If it is the first time it certainly will not be the last. The Roman republican aristocracy, vibrant heart of the State and the army, religion and culture for many centuries, gradually increased, absorbing the new classes which were establishing themselves in Italy and Spain, in Africa and in all parts of the empire but it is not able to express a common feeling to nourish the civil, religious and military infrastructure of a State and an empire which is becoming more and more complex and differentiated.

Geographical Destiny and Historical Existence

One needs long practice before he can realize the advantages of becoming comparative. One must obtain direct experience of travelling in time and space and the more you travel the more you can perceive the changes that occur in the way you look at people and places, at structures and events. One learns, little by little, how to estrange what is familiar and to make familiar what is alien to us. One begins to build up a new kind of narrative and finally he realizes that he has broadened his view of the world. He can reach a point of view where he can capture, at the same time, a holistic view of the social world and an analytical approach to minor facts and events.

There are many different ways on how to engage in the travelling experience. One classical way in Europe, mainly in the XVIII and XIX centuries, had been what was called the Grand Tour to Italy. The sons (more rarely the daughters) of the wealthy aristocratic and bourgeois families of the northern countries were sent, in their twenties, for a long journey to Italy to complete their education. It was for them an extraordinary experience of total immersion in other worlds: the world of history (the Etruscan places, the Roman ruins, the Medieval towns, the Renaissance splendours), the world of beauty (the masterpieces of art, the colours and the harmonies of the landscape) the world of the Mediterranean way of living (music and food, people and sunshine) and much more (enchantment and seduction). In a more or less similar way the Grand Tour to Europe has been part of the educational process of wealthy young adults coming from outside Europe in the second half of the XIXth and the first half of the XXth centuries, mainly from the Americas.

A less expensive, but more compelling way to become comparative is to dedicate part of one's own time to studying ancient history. As it has been lively written by a famous British historian (Arnold J. Toynbee): to study the ancient history of Greece and Rome is an extraordinary experience because you can learn how a civilization came into existence, how it flourished and how it finished. Another advantage comes by studying ancient history: one is not disturbed by the excess of information that comes when one has to deal with contemporary societies.

But there are other available ways. The XXth century experience that comes from anthropological research throughout the world. With a methodological awareness (which has been outlined by René Girard [2002]) whereby most anthropologists, nowadays, tend to emphasize differences more than similarities among cultures. Or, as important as all those I have mentioned up to now, one can try to become comparative by reading novels and stories of the great writers of different cultures and different times. All the ways that I have mentioned can be part of the exercise I am suggesting for the purpose of building a way of observing and interpreting your own culture so to try to avoid being too familiar with the object of your research. And so one can try to become,

as the great German sociologist Norbert Elias has taught us, both detached and involved at the same time in what we are trying to understand.

If now, after these methodological premises, we look at Italy and the Italians from the stand point of comparativism we can be immediately aware of a few main particular facts which can help to clarify some important features of Italian culture. The first has to do with geography and the second with history. From these two points of view, the place which has been called Italy for about 1000 years (but which has existed historically for at least 3000) is made up of a peninsula and some islands, which are just in the middle of a closed, but large, sea, the Mediterranean. It's a place characterized by at least two main facts: a mild climate and a location which makes the peninsula and the nearby islands the most reachable from the three surrounding continents: Asia, Africa, Europe.

We have to keep in mind these few facts (see Diamond 2001; Nolte 2003): 1) the humanization process began in Africa, 2) human beings moved first to the east, 3) history began in the region of Asia whose ancient name was "mezzaluna [half moon, or 'crescent'] fertile" (with the division of labour through agriculture, writing and town), about 5000 years ago, 4) people moved from the middle east in both directions towards East and towards West, 5) the easiest way was towards the west, because the Mediterranean sea was one of the easiest means of communication in comparison with the deserts and mountains of central Asia.

It is not difficult to conclude that the place we now call Italy had a competitive advantage, from a geographical point of view, in relation to other places also located in the Mediterranean sea. It had a more homogeneous mild climate and was reachable (because of its extensive coastline) by ships coming from many different parts of the world. Therefore it happened that over quite a long period of time people arrived in Italy from different places (Asia, Africa and some also from northern parts of Europe) and at a certain moment the hybridization process between these different people living together in a place with a mild climate by the sea began to be productive of an innovation process.

It began, first, with the Messapian civilization which flourished in the Southern part of Italy (Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria) where they developed agriculture and imported from Asia the model of the town. Then it was with the more complex civilization of the Etruscans which also was the result of a hybridization process between people coming from Asia and others who arrived before. The Etruscans, who settled in the central part of Italy, between Rome and Florence, (but they also arrived as far north as Bologna and south to Naples) are considered the beginners of what will be subsequently called the western civilization. The Etruscans flourished between the VIIIth and IIInd centuries before Christ. They were an aristocratic-ruled culture made by farmers (they brought olives and grapes from Greece), town builders (they "invented" the round arch), miners, sailors, diviners (the so-called "Etruscan discipline" was still very important during the Roman empire and the Roman aristocrats used to send their sons to learn in schools that existed in some Etruscan towns).

Then the Greeks arrived in the Southern part of Italy where they created rich colonies (Magna Grecia) where important institutions and social roles were "invented", from the Athenian Vth century model: the marketplace and the merchant, the academy and the philosopher, the theatre and the actor, the areopagus where citizens discussed and made decisions. All these institutions and social roles will be central in the history of mankind for centuries of the future and mainly for western civilization. The modern concepts of individuality, of communication and of democracy are inconceivable without these premises.

All these historical events that occurred before the Roman civilization in the place which now we call Italy, are important to remember; because they are consistent with the theory which tries to explain the interdependence between geography and history. Geography is a given; it existed there before human beings discovered the many conveniences and utilities of the place and before, since the beginning of history, the long lasting migration process, made by inhabitants of different origins and different cultures combined to make it what it became and now is.

No other place in the world, from what I can understand, has been created in such a way. Similar to other places located in the Mediterranean area (or elsewhere) but with a particular prominence of the kind of hybridization process which nowadays we can see at work in many different areas of the world.

Mobility and Hybridization, Aristocracy and Luxury

So, if we put together the personal experience of present day Italians (made also by the living memory of their ancestors which still surrounds them in everyday life) with so much insight about past centuries we can read about in the books of historians, we can understand the origin of the "made in Italy" to a much wider extent,— the aesthetic values of Italian fashion. The values come from the long lasting history of wealth and well being of people accustomed to play the game of life through communication and theatricality, *piazze* and *palazzi*, *chiese* and *teatri*, comedy and tragedy, melodrama and music.

Italy has been a place in the world, since the beginning of what we call historical existence, where people came to work and to live because it was convenient for them. For the purpose of taking advantage of the existing conveniences, they were compelled to learn how to live together, how to cooperate in the context of urban life and agriculture, commerce and sailing, how to communicate among different cultures; through conflicts and wars, agreements and peace keeping. Complex political institutions were invented mainly in the forms of the aristocratic republic.

Italy became a wealthy place. Where the life style of the aristocrats activated the work of artisans and artists, farmers and slaves, architects and bricklayers, merchants and sailors, painters and sculptors, philosophers and writers. Mainly with the Etruscans, the Greek's colonies, finally with the Romans. Mainly through the work of merchants and navigators who have been for centuries and centuries the main connection between East and West. The Mediterranean sea, which was at the origin of the Italian *fortuna* (fortune), became, for the Romans the *mare nostrum* (our sea). With the Romans, the migration process increased and people (such as soldiers and settlers, sailors and merchants, aristocrats and intellectuals) migrated from Italy to all the places (in Europe, Asia and Africa) where the Romans had arrived with their dominion.

For a long period of time (about eight centuries) the Romans were able to create and rule the larger empire in history with what they called *vis et lex* (force and law). The secret was an extensive and strong aristocracy which was at the same time active in the armed forces, in the economy and in politics.

The hardcore of this élite was the family which was the most important institution, the cradle of religion (the most important gods were family gods: the *Penates*, ancestor protectors of the family and of the republic), the place where the woman was the queen, although subordinated to the *pater familiae* (the man, father of the family). The Roman ruling élite was also an open élite, ready to integrate newcomers who had been able to become rich or powerful in some way; without distinction from the ethnic point of view (Le Bohec 2002).

Public and private life of the élite were interdependent and life styles were oriented to show wealth and luxury; either in their private houses and villas or in the public places: squares and forums, temples and theatres. The life style of the Roman aristocracy was a particular mixture of severity (sense of responsibility towards the family and the republic, strong religious feelings) and, at the same time, the love for luxury as a way of enjoying life and as a means of communication, a sign of power and status. The bulk of the main features of the Roman culture, as a result of an intense hybridization of different previous cultures coming from the three continents of Africa, Asia and Europe, is particular of the Mediterranean area, of the Hellenistic culture.

With the collapse of the western part of the Roman empire new groups of people came to Italy (and in the Mediterranean area) from the North (Germans and Scandinavians), the East (Slavs) and the South (Arabs and Jewish) and gave origin, in the second half of the first millennium, to a new process of hybridization, especially in Italy, Portugal and Spain.

During those centuries the heritage of Rome was still cultivated, especially in Italy, where a new religious institution, the Roman Catholic Church, grew up and kept open the universalistic appeal of the Roman culture. And it is with the second millennium that the reality of modern Italy and modern Italians began to have the particular characteristics they still have.

To improve our understanding about all these processes of the past we have to change the categories which were built in Europe after the Protestant Reformation, the national building of the State, the construction of the main sociological concepts. Especially the Weberian categories concerning the rationalization and modernization processes of the West, viz., capitalism and the State as social realities coming from Northern Europe:— Calvinism, the English industrial revolution, the French political revolution.

Therefore we have to keep in mind four main assumptions: (1) the Roman culture and civilization has been a very complex and differentiated world and much of that heritage is still with us; (2) capitalism and modern forms of commerce and industry existed long before the industrial revolution; (3) both of these were created by people—the Romans, the Italians, the Mediterraneans—who came into existence through a complex and never ending process of hybridization of different cultures of the East and the West, the North and the South; (4) hybridization of cultures and religions, of people and life styles, is at the origin of the wealth of nations and especially of the magnificent luxury which flourished with Rome and with the Renaissance (which means the coming back of the classical era of the Greeks and the Romans).

In the writings of prominent historians such as Philip Jones (1974), Jacques Le Goff (1974), Fernand Braudel (1986), and Oscar Nuccio (1995), it is carefully explained how Italy and Italians became the protagonists of the huge historical processes that changed the face of the western world and created what we call modern civilization. From the beginning of the second millennium and the increasing development of commerce, merchants, navigators and bankers of Siena and Florence, Venice and Genoa, Lucca and Pisa become the creators of modern capitalism. The main aristocratic and bourgeois families of Italian cities became the leading force that made of Italy, especially during the splendour of the Renaissance and the Baroque centuries (XVth-XVIIth), the centre of European and Western civilization. Commerce between Asia and Europe, Northern Europe and Southern Europe and between the Americas and Europe has been practically a monopoly of the Italians for more than five centuries. Not only of the Italians operating in Italy but also of the thousands of them who emigrated everywhere in the World where there were possibilities to become rich with economical activities such as commerce, industry and agriculture. And all the beautiful and refined cultural products that were created during the peak years of the

Roman period and the Renaissance period were the outcome of what we can call the spirit of republican aristocracy.

The aesthetic values we can still admire and appreciate in the Italian landscape and in the Italian cities, the *divina semplicità* (divine simplicity) of Italian cuisine, the typical Italian attitude for what is called the *bella figura* (to show up well), the good taste for dressing well when going public, the quality of modern industrial design, the persistent success of the luxury industry,¹— all these things which are "made in Italy," are the result of a special kind of creativity which is incorporated in Italian heritage.

A heritage as a social construction which began with the hybridization process and has been at the origin of the specific kind of civilization we now call Italian and which had been Etruscan, Roman, Medieval, Renaissance, Baroque. The hybridization process gave origin to a special kind of sociality, a smiling openness to others (the *sorriso etrusco*) which has been, and still is, the main Italian resource. A special art of dealing with people,— to make commerce, to accept and integrate with others. And these are the main reasons, in their operative phrases:—1) at the origin of wealth and luxury; (2) for the formation of a distinguished aristocracy, master of elegance and good taste; (3) for a dissemination of Italians in the world; (4) for a deep sense of hospitality.

If nowadays we can see people of Italian origin everywhere around the world and mainly in the so-called new world of the Americas and Australia, this is a consequence of a long history:² it is the living heritage incorporated in the feelings and in the collective and unconscious memory of people who since the beginning of their historical existence began to learn how to deal with *others*, how to integrate with *others*. *Playing the game of life* by using all the arts of communication. Italian fashion is one of the results, one of the means of a *communicative* art of living.

Notes

1 The luxury industry is a growing industry in the world (about 100 billion dollars in 2001, and Italy is the leader with 30 percent of the total turnover (Centorrino 2001:59).

2 By population 'of Italian origin', we intend people whose father or mother have Italian ancestors; many Italians are married to someone of different ethnic or national origin. So while Italians living in Italy are about 57 million, people of Italian origin living around the world are about double. One can find Italians everywhere but the larger numbers are in Australia, Canada, USA (about 20 million), Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil (about 25 million).

Bibliography

- Arnaldi G. (2002), *L'Italia e i suoi invasori*, Laterza .
- Bassetti P. (2001), *Globali e locali!*, Giampiero Casagrande.
- Bechelloni G. (2004), *Il silenzio e il rumore. Destino e fortuna degli italici nel mondo*, Mediascape Edizioni.
- Bechelloni G. (2003), *Diventare italiani*. Coltivare e comunicare la memoria collettiva, Ipermedium.
- Bechelloni G. (2003), *Diventare cittadini del mondo. Comunicazione e cosmopolitismo responsabile*, Mediascape Edizioni.
- Bechelloni G. (2002), *Svolta comunicativa*. Sette lezioni, Ipermedium.
- Beck U. (2003), *Lo sguardo cosmopolita*. Prospettive dell'epoca postnazionale, il Mulino.
- Braudel F. (1986), *Il secondo Rinascimento*. Due secoli e tre Italie, Einaudi

- Cassano F. (1996), *Il pensiero meridiano*, Laterza.
- Centorrino M. (2001), *Il valore del lusso*, Rubbettino.
- De Mauro T. (1987), *L'Italia delle Italie*, Editori Riuniti.
- Diamond J. (1998), *Armi, acciaio e malattie*. Breve storia del mondo negli ultimi tredicimila anni, Einaudi.
- Elias N. (1994), *Reflections on a Life*, Polity Press.
- Ferrarotti F. (1998), *L'Italia tra storia e memoria*, Donzelli.
- Franzina E. (1995), *Gli italiani al nuovo mondo*. L'emigrazione italiana in America 1492-1942, Mondadori.
- Freyre G. (2003), *Casa-grande e senzala*. Formação da família brasileira sobre o regime da economia patriarcal, global editora.
- Gentile E. (1997), *La grande Italia*, Mondadori.
- Germani G. (1979), *Sociologia della modernizzazione*, Laterza.
- Girard R. (2002), *One Long Argument from the Beginning to the End* (tr. it. 2003, Cortina).
- Jones P. (1974), *La storia economica*. Dalla caduta dell'Impero romano al secolo XIV, in AA.VV. *Storia d'Italia*. Vol. 2, t. 2, pp. 1469-1810.
- Hall E.T. (1989), *Beyond Culture*, Anchor Books.
- Hillman J. (1983), *Inter Views* (tr. it. *Il linguaggio della vita*. 2003, Rizzoli).
- Ianni P. e McLean G. (2003), *The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age*, Cardinal Station.
- Jarussi O. (2004), a cura di, *Viva l'Italia*, Fandango.
- Le Bohec Y. (2002), *L'esercito romano*, Carocci.
- Le Goff I. (1974), *L'Italia fuori l'Italia* in AA.VV. *Storia d'Italia* vol. 2, t. 2, pp. 1935-2084.
- Magini L. (1987), *La parola degli Etruschi*, Il Ventaglio.
- Nakamura H. (1993) *Il paese del Sol Calante*, Sperling & Kupfer.
- Nolte E. (2003), *Esistenza storica*. Fra inizio e fine della storia? Le Lettere.
- Nuccio O. (1995), *La civiltà italiana nella formazione della scienza economica*, Etaslibri.
- Perniola M. (2001), *Del sentire cattolico*. La forma culturale di una religione universale, Il Mulino.
- Pickering M. (1997), *History, Experience and Cultural Studies*, Macmillan
- Ribolini L. (2004), *Il libro della pace*, Vita.
- Romano R. (1997), *Paese Italia. Venti secoli di identità*, Donzelli.
- Ruffolo G. (2004), *Quando l'Italia era una superpotenza. Il ferro di Roma e l'oro dei mercanti*, Guandi, Torino.
- Toynbee A. I. (1949), *Civilization on Trial* (tr. it. *Civiltà al paragone*. Un classico della storia comparata, 2003, Bompiani).
- Veyne P. (2000), *La società romana*, Laterza.

Chapter IV
Italicity
Helen Barolini

This chapter concern "Italic Identity and Pluralistic Contexts: Toward the Development of Intercultural Competencies". I participate as a curious newcomer to the concept to see if I can, in fact, discover some transcultural phenomenon called "Italicity". What I can more easily relate to is interculturalism since that has been the main focus of my written work and the actual reality of my life. I can easily agree on Italy's contribution to the whole human patrimony.

I have witnessed a great opening in Italy to the concept of Interculturalism from the time, some decades ago, an Italian publisher told me there was no interest in Italy in Italian American writers, or for novels on immigrants in general. The tide had changed by 1999 when on a speaking tour in Italy a woman in the audience in Verona said in reference to my novel, *Umbertina*—"that is our history, too, why don't we have your book in Italian?" It was a thrilling moment of connectedness and I was able to respond that the book was being published in Italy and would soon be followed by another work of mine. *Chiaroscuro: Essays of Identity*. Also recently published in Italy is *Rosa: Life of an Immigrant Italian* to which I wrote an Introduction. Rosa's true life story as a Northern Italian immigrant worker joins the stories of those others from the North of Italy portrayed by novelist Mari Tomasi. Finally the story of the great exodus of peoples from the North and the South of Italy is becoming accessible to an Italian public that had seemed indifferent. I remember when I lived in Italy wondering why no Italian novelist had found material in such a huge and compelling episode of Italian life.

My interest, my belief, is in literature: therein lies the true story of a people more than in official documents that recount the affairs of state. And literature is not the temporary bestsellers that are here today and forgotten tomorrow, but those writings that become a permanent record and a peoples' lasting heritage. I believe in the translation of such literature to build bridges between nations and among peoples. One of my greatest joys was to acquire enough knowledge of Italian to be able to translate not only my late husband's work, but also that of some other Italian authors.

This is the bridge across the seas envisioned in Antonio Barolini's poem "Preghiera."¹

*Qui or là, Signore,
non so dove mi dirai di posare.
ma e tutto un ponte
sopra il mare
e non ci sono due lingue e due isole.*

E unica la vita, la parola, la morte.

*E unica la voce degli uccelli
e il gracile cantare
per le tue verdi isole sul mare.*

I believe in what has been identified as the function of the novelist: to bring into view unexplored areas of life, for the lasting story of a people is in its literature. People have always

told stories—it's how we communicate, how we know each other, and others know us. My intercultural story has been told both in novels like *Umbertina* which is the multi-generational story of the nineteenth century exodus of Italians to the New World, as well as in essays exploring identity questions and even in a cookbook called *Festa: Recipes & Recollections of Italian Holidays*. Food is more than sustenance, it is a deep statement of a people's culture; the ways of preparing and presenting food and the ritual of eating together has much to say about how a people think of themselves.

It was 1948 when I found my way to Italy as an uncertain American descended from Italian grandparents but knowing no Italian. imbued only with the wish to find my family heritage. Italy was still devastated from the effects of the war and still very much an agricultural society. I was a "first-wave" Italian American on the ancestral trail. And when, eventually, I married a Northern Italian he jested that it was possible because I had been re-made in America from my Southern Italian roots. And this was at a time when many Italian Americans aspired to marry out of their culture. I, instead, intensified the Italian cultural bond.

Antonio Barolini was a journalist and an author and soon after we married, as fate would have it, he was appointed consul-general in the very place I had come from, Syracuse, New York. Thus he had his own intercultural experience in the USA as I had had in Italy. The blending of cultures has continued with our daughters. Not only was my *Umbertina* a bridge-novel moving between two worlds, but his poetry collection, *Elegie di Cirotton*, did so as well. We became an intercultural couple influencing each other's work. This past June a literary award was given to me by the Order of the Sons of Italy in America that recognized my work "for creating a bridge between the homeland and ancestral roots."

I have always seen my writing as an ongoing discourse between my American self and my Italian heritage. Thus I wrote *Festa* not only as recollections and recipes of my family life in Italy, but also as a handbook of tradition to pass on to my daughters and then to the next generation. Along with literature, I value ritual and allegory in life and this I addressed in my book *Festa*. More than just recipes I wanted to give the sense of ritual as a kind of magic to soften the routineness of day-in and day-out life. In the Afterword I quote the anthropologist Margaret Mead saying she did not think that "ritual can be relegated to the past... It is an exceedingly important part of all culture. It is on ritual forms that the imagination of each generation feeds." And living in Italy I found that Italian culture embodies ritual.

Whether it was the long ago ancestor of Antonio Barolini adding an ex-voto to the wall of a Venetian church already bedecked with hundreds, or my daughters and myself preparing the seven-fish dinner of Christmas Eve, or, when she was alive, my mother right into her nineties rolling out the ancestral cookies from Calabria passed down by her own mother, or my grandson in Urbino marching solemnly with the rest of his first-grade class into church on October 4th to honor Italy's patron. St. Francis of Assisi—wherever and whatever it is, ritual speaks to us as a needed part of our being. Celebrating over food is persistent in the collective human consciousness. Carl Jung also saw the need for ritual in our lives—something we cannot get away from as long as we have our humanity. There is in human nature that which makes us express symbolically what is deep within us. The danger is not in ritual becoming superstition or mere formality, but in human beings becoming so depersonalized that they lose their need for the mysteries, and so their humanity ... ritualizing makes real to the participants who they are and where they come from.

Italy preserves ritual. On a visit back I found posters affixed to the city walls of Ravenna proclaiming the feast of the Guardian Angel. I remembered the prayer to her Guardian Angel that my youngest daughter learned at school in Rome. The Guardian Angel of Italian children goes

back in time to the Roman tutelary spirit of the classical world. I remember that Italian daily papers always include, along with birth and death notices, the saint of the day. Even for those of us who are not part of institutional religions, ritual is important.

Italy came late to nationhood and is less aggressively nationalistic than other countries more open to the spirit of the European union. Italy is still a country particularized by region, province, even town and village. In an era of globalization, it is the United States that is making a global imprint through nation-building, consumer marketing, and the dominance of English rather than through humanist ideals. Times have changed from when Europeans and Americans venerated Italy as the cradle of Western Civilization. Who could have imagined MacDonald's or Starbucks in the center of Rome, blue jeans worn at the theater or opera, cell phones everywhere, even in the hand of a gondolier on the Grand Canal of Venice, or a giant mall outside Florence and supermarkets everywhere.

In the Fascist period, there was an effort to spread the concept of *'italianità'* to form a nationalistic Italian character. But Italians have always identified more with their region than with "nation"; for them that is a later concept: their allegiance is localized. They speak of themselves as Veneti, Toscani, Napolitani, Romani, etc., and supposed characteristics such as stinginess, dullness, sanctimoniousness, are harmlessly and commonly applied to the inhabitants of the various regions. There exist regional divisions as extreme as the Lega del Nord and the Question of the South. Pizza is neapolitan, risotto is from the north, the Florentine steak is Tuscan. A rather unusual example of cross-cultural confusion pointed out to me by a friend is that American basketball player Kobe Bryant endorses "nutella"—and probably thinks of it as American product.

Since nationhood came late to Italy in comparison to other European nations, this perhaps has made them less nationalistic than other Europeans and more inclined to see themselves as part of a European union. Paradoxically, this *campanilismo* itself makes Italians more open to multinationalism—a patchwork of city-states, after all, was part of their very history. And the Italian worker migrates all over Europe to find work, thus becoming exposed to other countries and cultures.

With Italy regional in allegiance rather than nationally cohesive and with the influx of immigrants from Africa, the Philippines, etc., to fill the work gap, there is even less of a so-called "national type." As Italy's birth rate keeps lowering the differences will become even more apparent. Despite a recently published guide to entice Americans on how to be Italian and lead the so-called "slow-life" in the land of "slow-food," Italians themselves seem more and more to emulate a fast-paced American culture geared to materialism, eat the fast food of a *tavola calda* and lead a more frenetic lifestyle. Italian television and journalism is rife with American expressions from "exit polls" to "blind trust" with a recent headline reading: "Bush OK con Silvio." Italian girls, reported correspondent Vittorio Zucconi are now named Debby, Kristen, Suellen—a trend started perhaps when actress Loren anglicized herself into Sophia. Language is the Homeland said the Nobel Laureate, poet and essayist Czeslaw Milosz. But the Italic peninsula long ago finished having a universal language in Latin; English and perhaps Spanish now fill that role.

If not Boccaccio perhaps the spread of Italian cinema has had its effect on current American mores where the more open expressiveness and plethora of sexuality has overcome the puritanical restraints in American culture. But in a United States enamoured of Italy there still continue to be distortions in perception of Italian Americans as shown in film, theater, literature, and popular culture. Using an Italian American character is popular in American fiction but often rendered in a distorted way by authors of non-Italian background. For example, in Marge Piercy's novel "Fly Away Home" an Italian American family is described as having a roast beef dinner on Christmas

Eve—a cultural impossibility. Other questionable renderings of Italian Americans appear in John Patrick Shanley's "Moonstruck," Tennessee Williams' "The Rose Tattoo," Arthur Miller's "View from the Bridge," Francine Prose's "Household Saints," and so on. On the positive side, unlike Anne Bancroft, contemporary Italian American actresses have kept their Italian birth names and are Laura San Giacomo, Marisa Tomei, Annabella Sciorra, Sofia Coppola. Even so, some Italian Americans continue (à la Americana) to mispronounce their own names (e.g., politicians Battaglia and Coniglio and TV sports announcer Sal Marcianno) and even mangle common names of Italian foods like prosciutto and mozzarella.

History gives us examples of the peninsula's expansion into Europe beginning with the Roman Empire, then the Holy Roman Empire, to culminate with the influences of The Italian Renaissance in all areas of culture. From the time of the English poet John Milton, Europeans and then Americans journeyed to Italy on The Grand Tour to acquire culture and become civilized. Italy was the Arcadian vision of the English Romantic poets and 19th century well-to-do Americans like Henry James' family of Cambridge, Massachusetts. A sojourn in Italy was essential to one's education and cultural formation. And in all of Europe and even New England, Mme. de Staël's 1807 novel *Corinne, ou l'Italie* was the sensation of her time. Much of this I address in the Prologue to my new manuscript, "Six American Women & the Lure of Italy."

In my own personal family history' there was no lure to Italy, much less allegiance. I grew up without an Italian heritage, simply an identifying Italian surname and this was difficult in the days when fascist Italy was our enemy in war. There was actual shame in being Italian American.

However, as an avid reader I always knew there was another Italy. I sought it out after my university graduation. In Italy I learned the language, the culture, the foods, the styles, the life. When my Italian husband was assigned to the U.S. as correspondent for "La Stampa" of Turin, he experienced "americanization" as I had "italianization." 'The intercultural results are evident in our three daughters: the eldest is the Chair of the Italian Dept. at Columbia University and a well-known Dantista whose books have been translated into Italian; the second chose to remain in Italy where she married, raised a family and teaches English; and the third had her childhood education in Italy and still has her closest friends there. However, the merger of cultures will not, it seems, last beyond their generation.

The verifiable exogamy among Italian Americans is particularly notable in Italian American authors. Why? I have asked myself do they choose partners of other cultures because they think them more educated, cultured, socially acceptable? I continue to wonder if they have made a choice to marry outside their parents' culture as Mariana DeMarco Torgovnick describes herself doing in her memoir *Crossing Ocean Parkway*. In Brooklyn she went from the Italian neighborhood to the Jewish one where she married a Jewish man and advanced herself from DeMarco to Torgovnick, an intellectually upwardly mobile move she says. As intermarriage has become prevalent among Italian Americans, how has it affected the passing on of an Italian heritage to the children of such marriages, I see mixed results. Some embrace Italian traditions, others remain entirely' ignorant of them. In the case of my friend, a retired professor of English Literature of Italian background who married a Swedish woman, the Italian influence on his children is nil. Since family culture is mainly transmitted through the mother, in his case Swedish became the dominant influence in the family—becoming his children's second language and cultural choice while his attempts at fostering Italian never took root.

Is Italicity merely a new notion of the moment? Everyone loves Italian food, film, fashion, culture and countryside. But as my professor daughter reports of her non-Italian descended students of Italian, once they've "gone native" and lived in Italy, though they retain their love of

the language and literature, they are often disillusioned with the obstacles of Italian life: corruption in government; evasion of taxes by those, like autonomous entrepreneurs, who are not subject to oversight; non-functioning services; the reign of bureaucracy so endemic that it takes eight months to get a telephone installed; the domination of the media by millionaire Berlusconi; the lack of civic discourse, responsibility and communitarianism. What author Joseph Papaleo called "Fortress Family" is diminishing with the falling Italian birth-rate as more couples are having one child or none at all; single women are preferring the workplace to the home; and the trend is for nursing homes to take care of the elderly rather than for their families tending them at home.

One fears that it is not Italicity which will become global, but Americanization which already has. The American correspondent in Rome, Sylvia Poggioli recently reported on National Public Radio her findings regarding how America is seen through European Eyes. In her report on Italian attitudes towards the U.S. she found that while the government of Italy supported the U.S. war in Iraq, the Italian people were overwhelmingly opposed. This reflects a longstanding duality: while Italians enthusiastically embrace American culture, they are fierce opponents of American politics. I can remember, during the years of the Vietnam war when I was living in Rome, how I was constantly confronted about the war though I personally was not its supporter. This is a long-standing paradox: Italian intellectual anti-Americanism in regard to many social issues such as the environment, the death penalty, gun control, lack of medical insurance and nursery schools, and the excesses of the Protestant work ethic exists while americanization is visibly a part of contemporary Italian life.

Besides the good things of Italian life that everyone loves, another side of Italy is shown in the titles of two recent books reviewed by Alexander Stille in the October 27, 2003 issue of The New York Review of Books: one book is *The Dark Heart of Italy* by Tobias Jones and the other is *Italy and Its' Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State, 1980-2001* by Paul Ginsborg. Stille's review reveals an Italy that has been not only the exemplar of *la dolce vita* but also the 20 century laboratory of some very bad ideas: fascism, amoral familism, mafia, left-wing terrorism. The title of Stille's piece is "Italy: the Family Business" and he refers to Prime Minister Berlusconi's children managing all his media properties and not letting him sell them off as he should be obliged to do according to his position as head of the government. Stille mentions that half a century after Edward Banfield's study, *The Moral Basis for a Backward Society* in which Banfield described amoral familism in an Italian village, "for Ginsborg, a central quality of Italian life is amoral familism"—and he longer means the rural poor, but successful entrepreneurs who successfully run family businesses. An astonishing 83 percent of Italian businesses are family owned: sons stay on in the family home before marriage often marrying late or not at all. These self-employed family businesses routinely evade taxes while salaried, civil servant employees subject to automatic withdrawal of their wages for taxes bear the burden. Stille concludes: "Berlusconi has established amoral familism on a national and even planetary scale."

Even so there is no doubt that Italy is much better off now than at the end of World War II when the country was in ruins. The Catholic vs Communist political stand-off led to outbreaks of both right-wing & left-wing terrorism resulting in the shocking kidnapping and murder of Prime Minister Moro.

Today Italy is an industrialized nation, prosperous, well-educated, and women have astonishingly won important rights against all odds in a country where the Church is so dominant. More questionable in current Italian society is the celebration of wealth "Dallas" style, and the worship of material success as a sign of political leadership, evidenced in the election of media magnate Silvio Berlusconi to lead the government.

The ancient Greeks invented the state (*polis*) and statecraft. The polis was the natural association that nurtured what was best in its citizens and gave them their identity. Civic duty was primary, and Aristotle's logic put polis before family because it established the context of rights and duties that makes family life and civilian life possible. In Homer the stateless, lawless man is viewed as the most tragic of figures. Quite different is the Italian view where Familism was not only the strongpoint of Italian society, but also its greatest obstacle to civic organization and communitarianism.

Still I believe there is a world heritage to be mined from Italian culture—and that is humanism, the great gift, retrieved from the ancients, of the Italian quattro and cinquecento Renaissance. The Greek classics were not only rediscovered but were spread through Europe by the genius of the master-printer and scholar of Venice, Aldo Manuzio, renowned as Aldus. He is a personal hero of mine and the subject of my book, *Aldus and His Dream Book*.

As celebrated as are the Renaissance artists, inventors, and sculptors, it was also the period of thinkers and scientists who celebrated the qualities and possibilities of humankind. This humanistic gift is what makes the Italian character so appealing—so ready to empathize with other human beings, so approachable and recognizable. It is what contributes to Italian *saper vivere*.

I spent some of my time in Italy exploring the early printing presses there and concentrating on Aldus—finding his birthplace Bassiano outside of Rome, the castle at Carpi where he tutored the young princes (and in modern times became known for the infamous concentration camp located nearby), and then the location of the renowned Aldine Press in Venice. Aldus' life and work remain exemplars of dedication to making available to all people in his celebrated low-cost pocket-sized editions works that before had been available only to a privileged class. In 153 editions he gave readers the best of what had been thought and written of the past, including Dante, as well as contemporary authors like his fellow Humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam.

Aldus was a true exemplar of intercultural exchange—he brought learning out of the cloistered halls of monasteries or palaces and made it available to the public at large through his invention of the octavo book. He brought the Greek and Latin classics to a greatly expanded audience throughout Europe.

The other great idea, still prominent I believe in Italian life is the concept of *educazione* meaning not only being educated in book learning but also being well brought up in the sense of knowing how to behave—being *ben educato* rather than *mal educato*. How to behave well, interact with others, show consideration for others is still an Italian quality. It is not just the courtliness of Castiglione's Courtier, but the common decencies of everyday life. Going into a store, people salute each other with *buon giorno*, say *prego*, *per favore*, *per cortesia* and *grazie*—never, "no problem!" The other side of the coin, the true *mal educazione*, is the kind of *snobbismo* practiced by those who consider themselves of an upper class.

In a recent work I wrote of my regret in Florence at seeing the change from a quiet walker's town to the surge of tourists and traffic. The old agricultural Italy is gone, Italy is a major industrial nation in the world. The world has shrunk and its common denominator seems to be americanization. Yet a humanistic aspect of Italian life still persists. The values of a fully realized human being were emphasized in the Italian Renaissance and from Italy spread throughout Europe, and perhaps can still be influential as a concept of Italicity.

So perhaps in Tancredi's words to the Prince in *The Leopard*, 'If we want everything to stay as it is, it all had to change.' In this case perhaps ongoing change is the basis for renewal of Italy's humanistic message. Henry James once saw how the traveler to Italy became more civilized just by being there, and hopefully this humanistic lesson has not been totally lost in the current wave

of materialism. "People," said James, "who had never before shown knowledge, taste, or sensibility" were blown over just by being in Italy. In fact, the fruits of nature and of human endeavor continue to affect the visitor to Italy. Perhaps the greatest gift Italy offers is not only its past and its lesson of continual renewal, but also the evidence of civilization it imparts in the values of non-denominational humanism.

Note

1. From *Elegie di Croton* (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1959).

Chapter V
Italics in Times of Crisis
Maddalena Tirabassi & Piero Gastaldo

We try to identify, describe and explain some traits of Italicity through a look at Italian American communities and Italy-United States relationships in times of crisis. We do not mainly consider diplomatic or strictly political relations; rather, we look at attitudes and perceptions of Americans, Italians and Italian-Americans in some relevant moments of contemporary history from World War One onward. The starting point will be a simplified description of what we feel to be the historical context in which these processes have taken place. We will then take a rhapsodic look at some moments of crisis, both between Italy and the United States, as well as within Italy and the United States. The confinement of Italian enemy aliens in World War Two, the Vietnam crisis and the new ethnicity arising in its aftermath, 9-11, and the Iraq war will be briefly examined, also in the light of contemporary opinion polls. We will finally offer a tentative explanation for some Italian—or, better, Italic—syndromes, which seem to emerge from these historical materials, namely the weakness of hostile *vis-à-vis* empathic and pacifistic attitudes among Italics. While dysfunctional in a world of warring nation-states, these Italic traits may prove to be an important source of inspiration for a more peaceful world system.

The Melting Pot Revisited

The beginnings of the Italian American experience have been far from trouble-free and easy. Italian immigrants were not among the welcomed, at least in great parts of the United States, for decades. Even their recognition as "whites" has been an object of discussion. Their role in American society has been for years not as central as their numbers might have implied, and the question of stereotyping seems to be—even if more marginally—a matter of discussion even today, when Americans of Italian descent are nonetheless quite clearly part of the mainstream.

Given all these background factors, one might expect a very troublesome relationship between Italian Americans and American politics and society in times of crisis, those times that seem to cast doubts on the actual strength and viability of the melting-pot model. A bit surprisingly, this does not seem to be the case. Even when international and domestic conditions seem to converge in creating a rift between Italian Americans and mainstream America, the fundamental relationship seems to hold quite well. This does not imply, quite obviously, that we should forget or dismiss all the problematic elements in this broad picture: the current historiographical debate gives ample evidence of them.

However, even once we take a more nuanced and problematic look, Italian Americans still emerge as a comparatively loyal, trusted and "easy" component of the American melting pot in times of crisis. Is there something about their cultural heritage that may help to explain this set of facts? Before even attempting at finding any answer, we should take a closer look at some of these critical moments and at their consequences. We may end up discovering that in order to fully answer the questions, we have to look also at the other side of Italicity, that is to the Italian-Italians and their culture.

Every time an international crisis arises, the limits of the American melting-pot model become more clearly visible. A closer look at the construction of this myth will help to understand its built-in limits. As Desmond King has clearly stated, "Americanization processes have been the means

through which a dominant image of "American-ness has been artificially constructed to hold a fragile and centrifugal society intact ... It occurred by the promotion of a unifying framework or a set of ideas that have proven over time sufficiently broad to facilitate a multiplicity of views ... at the price of the short term suppression of some group's or individual's values, limitations that have put a mark on US politics (King, 2)." Immigration laws during the thirties defined a narrow interpretation of 'Americanness' by privileging the Anglo-Saxon conception of US identity, by sanctioning a second class position of non-whites—through the segregation of blacks—and by excluding also certain kind of immigrants,— since the United States identity was mainly shaped by a white Anglo-American inheritance, "the melting-pot assimilationist model implied first that those permitted to engage in assimilation should be largely pre-selected. Whiteness or rather non-blackness became a powerful unifying force" (King).

Once immigrating into the United States, Italians, like all others arriving on America's shores, were made to fill out a standardized immigration form. In the box for race, at least between the 1880's and 1910's, they faced two choices: Northern Italian (Celtic) or Southern Italian (Mediterranean). On the line requesting information on color, they wrote simply "white." By World War II, the only option they had for race and color questions was "white". Italians, color-blind when arriving in America, were called to share in the American, racialized vision of society.

As Thomas A. Guglielmo demonstrates in his book, "While many suffered from racial prejudice and discrimination, they were nonetheless viewed as white, with all the privileges this color classification bestowed, in the corridors of American power". Italian Americans having suffered the brutalities of racism (Stella, Vecoli) and benefited from the privileges of whiteness (David Roediger), experienced a peculiar relationship with blacks which varied according to times and contexts: episodes of cooperation, of which the labor struggle is a good example, were counterpointed by moments of hard contrasts, as in neighborhood fights (Venturini, Luconi, Rizzo, Salerno, Meyer, Sciorra).

WWI and the Americanization Campaign

In 1911 the Dillingham Commission created with the purpose of examining the characteristics and the consequences of the mass immigration (through what has been defined by Martellone as "a pretentious scientific approach") showed the difficulties in assimilating the second wave of immigrants, denouncing in particular their reticence in gaining American citizenship. WWI nourished anti-alien sentiments, starting with the immigrants of one of the nations at war, Germany, not for racist reasons—since by the second half of the 1800s German Americans were well integrated into American Society—but because of their attitudes and conduct during the war: the perception of divided loyalties, the outrage at submarine warfare, and finally, after 1917, the fear of sabotage within the United States. The war showed other limits of the melting pot: the return home of thousands of immigrants to fight in their national armies (Gleason, 245), and the fact that the United States Army was largely composed of immigrants who could not even speak English. The country felt endangered and responded with anti-alien sentiments. Even if Italians were on the same side as the United States, and even if they fought in sizable numbers *in* the US Army, they were victims of prejudices.

Immigration laws during the 1920s, with the National Origin Quota system, marked the prevalence of ethnic and racial restrictionism by privileging the Anglo-Saxon conception of US identity, reducing dramatically the number of immigrants coming from south and eastern Europe. The option for a more open society expressed by Kallen's theory of cultural pluralism, developed

during the Progressive Era, succumbed. The 1920's, and partially the 1930's, saw the development of the Americanization movement. Naturalization was promoted and immigrants were encouraged to learn English, to take US citizenship, to learn and adopt American customs. As far as Italian Americans are concerned we can summarize it by saying that their integration into American society was based on a "modernization" of customs, which meant a beginning of adaptation of their ethnic values to the American society. It meant mainly a slow change of the position of women within the family: acceptance of women's work and education, freedom in their marital choices, acceptance of the American social welfare system. In the meantime, second generation Italian Americans tried to disguise their ethnic identity.

Fascism and WW II

There is a large amount of historical research about the relationship of Italian Americans with their mother country during the Fascist years, which explores the paradox of the construction of Italian identity during those years. The overall good relationship between fascist Italy and US governments (strong financial and diplomatic relations which included discussion about the Quota Acts between Mussolini and the US Administration), the cautious fascist propaganda towards the Italian American community, the image of Italy becoming a modernized country under Mussolini spread by most of American media, on the one end created an Italian identity even among those immigrants who till then had perceived themselves at most as "regional". On the other hand, the respect gained by their home country made them feel more accepted in the new country (Diggins).

The emergence of a new totalitarian state in 1933, with Hitler's rise to power, and the Italian imperialistic turn with the Ethiopian War of 1935, started to change the relationship between the immigrants' country of origin and the United States. Italian Americans were deeply affected: the majority responded by manifesting a double loyalty to Italy and to President Roosevelt, while contrasts with the black community increased (Venturini).

Enemy Aliens

In the 1940's Italians and Germans were the two largest immigrant groups in the country, and Italians were the largest foreign-born group.¹ Although still vastly illiterate and unskilled, some had already entered upon business and professional careers. When the war came, the mayors of two major cities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts were of Italian descent: Fiorello La Guardia in New York City and Angelo Rossi in San Francisco.

On December 8, 1941 President Roosevelt, neglecting the fact that the United States was not yet formally at war with Mussolini, signed Public Proclamation 2527 that declared all the Italian resident aliens in the country «alien enemies» (Tintori, 2001). The FBI, under the Department of Justice, was supposed to arrest those who, on the basis of the previous two years of investigations, had been listed as «dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United States».

The regulation deeply affected the lives of Italian Americans. After the declaration of war, each alien was required to bring a passport-sized photograph, be fingerprinted, and always carry his photo-identity card, entitled «alien registration certificate». A curfew between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. had to be observed; travels of more than five miles from home were regulated; possessions of guns, ammunition, short-wave radios, cameras, and signaling devices were forbidden; it was required to report any change of residence or employment to local police.

The internment of the targeted enemy aliens begun on the night of December 7, 1941. Over the next several weeks the FBI detained 1,566 Japanese aliens, 1,301 Germans, and 243 Italians. Many of those arrested and later interned were longtime residents and while not naturalized citizens, had American-born children or wives who were U.S. citizens. Although the authorities never informed these individuals of the reasons for their detention, it is apparent from their FBI records that nearly all fell into one or more of these three categories: members of the Federation of Italian War Veterans, or IWW (veterans of the First World War in Italy known as *Ex Combattenti* in the Italian community); editor/writers for Italian-language newspapers and announcers on Italian-language radio; and instructors in Italian-language schools sponsored by an Italian consulate. More relevant to our point, although the restrictions were quite hard, on the whole the Italian American image in the United States was not of a dangerous ethnic group; such feelings played a major role in the selection process. The following conversation between President Roosevelt and Attorney Francis Biddle, in charge of the internment, appears in Biddle's memoir, *In Brief Authority*:

"And you're going to intern all of them?" said the President in a tone that suggested he approved of the idea.

"Well, not quite," replied Biddle

"I don't care about the Italians," continued Roosevelt. "They are a lot of opera singers, but the Germans are different; they may be dangerous..." (Tintori, 2001, 242).

A public-opinion poll conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence to analyze which of the enemy-alien groups was considered most dangerous went like this:

The survey

"The distinctions which Americans make among the members of the Axis are reflected in their attitudes toward the dangers presented by enemy alien groups in this country. A national sample divided as follows in response to the question, 'Which do you think the United States should consider its number one enemy, Japan or Germany?'

Japan 35 percent

Germany 46 percent"

(Italy was not even mentioned)

"An identical division respecting the nationals of these two countries was obtained in response to the question, 'Which of these alien groups in the US do you think is most dangerous, the Japanese, Germans or Italians?' 35 percent named the Japanese; 46 percent named the Germans."

The prevailing American tendency to regard Italy as a negligible factor in the war also finds its reflection in popular attitudes toward Italian aliens residing in this country. As menaces, the Italians rank a very poor third place to the Germans and Japanese in the opinion of the American public. Only 2 percent named them as most dangerous in response to the question...

None of the people of Italian parentage put Italian-born aliens in first place.

Although this comparative ranking cannot be regarded as an indication that the American public is unconcerned about Italians, it does show plainly that it distinguishes them sharply from the Germans and the Japanese...

Italians in the US can perhaps be utilized in waging psychological warfare against the land of their birth. Possibly they could become effective instruments to promote sentiment within Italy for withdrawal from war. A large percentage of them are, no doubt, loyal to the United States and to democratic institutions...

Selective and special treatment could be accorded the Italians apparently without arousing American fears in any high degree. Separation of them from the other enemy alien groups in this country may prove a useful first step in separating Italy itself from the other members of the Axis.²

The removal of the enemy-alien stigma from the Italian-American community occurred on October 12, 1942, while German Americans remained enemy aliens until the end of the war as did roughly 100,000 American citizens of Japanese descent. It can be also worth mentioning that in Canada the 632 Italian enemy aliens remained interned from 1939 up to 1945 (Tintori, 2000, 117).

In addition to stereotypes, three specific factors led to the early lifting of restrictions on Italian Americans: the political weight of the six million Italian American voters whose majority sided with the Democrats; the outstanding contribution of the Italian community in the military and on the home front (in each division of the army there were at least 500 soldiers of Italian descent, for a total of roughly 750,000 regulars. The very first casualty suffered by the United States was an Italian American, Rudolph Lupino (Tintori, 2001, 244)); finally the anti-fascist campaign of some prominent Italian American leaders (Tirabassi, 1976).

From the 1950's to the Iraqi Crisis

The 1950's saw the full integration of Italian Americans. They had contributed to the liberation of Italy fighting in the US Army. During the first decade of the Cold War to be in America meant to them to be in the land of freedom and also in the land of consumption and now the majority of Italian Americans was finally pertaining to the American middle class.

The American dream was interrupted by the Vietnam War—TV programs daily showing images of American soldiers burning villages and abusing Vietcong prisoners—and by the emergence of the black revolt. Italian Americans were mostly represented in the US army and less among the students protesting in the campuses but were among the minorities benefiting by those years of revolt. The reasons may be attributed to the fact that Italian Americans were defending their newly acquired full citizenship, and black emancipation represented a menace to their status; they were in large part politically conservative (with the exception of the beat generation group, and the radicals); on the whole the mass of Italian Americans loved America too much to partake in the protests.

Nevertheless the decline of the American Protestant leadership, provoked by the crisis of its values during the sixties, were among the facts encouraging ethnic pluralism³ (Tirabassi, 1981, 145). The standard interpretation of the melting pot model, with its de facto white Anglo-Saxon bias was thus supplanted by a vision of society which left space for ethnic differences. Following the example of the Black Power movement, other minorities also succeeded in obtaining the institution, inside the academic world, of specific disciplines dealing with immigration and ethnicity. Italian Americans rediscovered their roots; they did not hide anymore.

When the September 11th attack occurred, Italian Americans strongly identified with the United States,⁴ as Geraldine Ferraro stressed in an interview with an Italian Press Agency: "Gli italoamericani hanno condiviso con gli americani l'accaduto"; on the other hand the outbreak of the War in Iraq seems to have divided the Italian American community. Ferraro herself shared with another Italian American politician, Nancy Pelosi, Leader of the Democrats at the Congress, the opinion that a stronger international cooperation was needed to solve the problem of terrorism.⁵

In the H-Itam list server occurred this exchange:

As a politically active, politically progressive Italian American, I appreciate recent attempts to widen the lens of this listserve by including information about anti-war protests in Italy and the

United States. We're a diverse community, and our on-line discussion should reflect and nurture this diversity. Frankly, it's a welcome break from the usual anti-defamation diatribes.

The reply was:

"If you wish to attack the war or defend it, find another forum. If politics have to enter this listserv, I will have to delete all of the post without reading them until the war is long over. This will be the last message on the war."⁶

Iraq Seen from Europe

The Iraqi crisis, however, is more relevant to another side of itality, namely to the Italians of the old peninsula. Quite undoubtedly, this crisis has been the most divisive in European-United States relationship in the post-WWII years. To what extent has this affected Italy/US relationships? How, in particular, has the Italian civil society reacted to this unprecedented transatlantic divide? Has itality played any role in widening or narrowing this divide? Has, in particular, the outcome been affected by the persistent system of informal ties, of shared memories, of common traditions, that has been the result of the great Italian emigration?

We can try answering some of these questions through a number of hints. Italy is one of the European countries that have taken a clearly pro-US stance during the crisis, to the extent of deploying troops in peace-keeping operations and suffering heavy casualties in Iraq. But Italy is also one of the European countries whose public opinions were and are most clearly against the war. We are not so naïve as to think that public opinion is decisive in shaping foreign policy, international relations representing a largely autonomous sphere of political action. What is relevant to our point is, however, the fact that the anti-war protest, with its strong religious overtones, did not take—in its vast majority - the radical anti-American stance that was visible in other countries; and that it always coexisted with a widespread understanding of, and some sympathy with, the American predicament even among the leftist political parties. In other words, a widespread pacifism did not turn into anti-Americanism, as was the case elsewhere in Europe and the world.

Let us take a closer look at some data that may help to support and expand these claims.⁷ First, pacifism. Only 12 per cent of Italians strongly agree with the statement that "under some circumstances, war may be necessary to obtain justice". This compares with 55 per cent of US respondents, 35 per cent of the British and 27 per cent of the Dutch. The figures for Italy are not dramatically different from those we would have for Germany and France. But these anti-war attitudes coexist with feelings toward the US which are much warmer than those of other continental countries. In the 2002 "American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy Survey," Italians, together with British and Poles, showed warmer feelings toward the US than toward any of the European countries asked about. In a part of this survey based on the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations' so called "thermometer readings", Italy gave a 68 degrees (on a 0-100 scale) reading to the US, the highest among continental countries, on a par with Britain. Still in 2003 *Transatlantic Trends*, at the time of the Iraqi crisis, Italy, the UK and Poland are the three European countries showing warmer feelings to the US: for all three this is down to 61 from 68, but it still is significantly higher than in France (where it is 50 per cent) or in Germany (56). These feelings are reciprocated, by the way. In the "thermometer" of the US public opinion, Italy leads all continental countries, and its appreciation among Americans has been significantly growing in recent years, according to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations polls: from 58 per cent in

1992, to 62 per cent in 1999, and 65 per cent in 2002—a remarkable level which proved stable even at the height of the 2003 transatlantic crisis. (Figures 1-3)

Now, is there a common thread which may connect these recent opinion polls with the American and Italian American attitudes in World War II we have previously examined, or with long term cultural images of Italy and Italians, in a word, with *italicity*? While aware of being unable to say anything on the subject which may aspire to a scientific status, we may nonetheless venture into offering a totally subjective understanding of this ‘common thread’. Yes, we do believe that some of these contemporary traits might have to do with a deep tradition, with a narrative of *italicity* which is best understood in a long term perspective.

If we venture further in this highly subjective and selective interpretation of cultural materials, we end up finding among the deep layers of *italicity* a form of meekness, a fundamentally pacifist disposition, a preference for dialogue, negotiation and adaptation over violent confrontation. Several different streams converge into this current: popular Catholicism, with its strong emphasis on motherhood—but also the early experience with an urban-mercantile culture that loathed unrestricted warfare and developed a highly ritualized form of limited war, with the "compagnie di ventura" model—and then the postwar rejection of Fascism and the predominantly universalistic orientation of the 1945-1990 political cultures. Each of these would deserve a much larger coverage and a deeper reflection than we will be able to do here.

We only want to note that some of the constitutive elements of the cultural perspective that *italicity* tries to define are in fact embodied in *topoi*, stereotypes and prejudices that have often been used to deliver a sense of backwardness, and to illustrate the ultimate failure of Italians to produce a fully modern state and society. But we could instead see them as long term cultural factors that enable Italian society to free itself from some of the limiting factors of nation-state perspective, transcending it and more easily reaching a cosmo-political orientation.

It is exactly in the strength of this pre-modern layer that a Jewish intellectual like Karl Löwith, writing when Europe was still under the grip of Nazism, viewed the fundamental factors that would prevent Italian society from being "another Germany", in the sense of a fully Fascist society, and would finally restore the country to its civilized, benign self. It is popular Catholicism that Silone and Pasolini, to mention two writers belonging to different traditions, were ready to identify as a source of deep human values which transcend politics. Obviously, this focus on the bright side of *italicity* should not be seen as a denial of the dark side of the Italian experience. We may mention the 1938's Racial Laws, the aggression of Ethiopia, or the fact that today some of the most blatantly racist statements to be heard in European politics come from some members of the current ‘majority’ in the government. However, in the actual practice of Italians even these dark moments were mitigated by hundreds of acts of justice and mercy, whose equivalents are not easily found in other European societies.

Again, is there something about *italicity* that may explain all this? There seems indeed to be a peculiar syndrome surrounding the relationship of Italians, and Americans of Italian descent, with war, peace, hostility and otherness. On the one hand, Italians are perceived even by an enemy—as the US was in 1942—as not really or deeply hostile and dangerous. On the other hand, Italians seem to be able to combine, better than most other Europeans, a very strong dislike for war, which makes them in fact the most pacifist country in the EU, with a fundamental, deep sympathy with the US, even when these are perceived as a war-prone, aggressive superpower. The often jokingly quoted "un-warlike" attitude of the Italians has, presumably, very little to do with DNA and a lot to do with history and culture. But also their fundamental cosmopolitan outlook, the weakness of their self-perception as a nation coupled with the very strong sense of being a

civilization, their universalistic but hardly aggressive attitude, all these are cultural traits which have often been misrepresented, and almost regularly perceived as dysfunctional in an age of warring nation-states. Today, in a different kind of situation, these same traits may prove to be an extremely important ingredient for a more tolerant and less suicidal world culture.

These attitudes should not to be confused with isolationism, or cynicism, or an ‘anything goes’ morality. More Italian troops have been deployed overseas in the last 20 years, since the Lebanon crisis, than ever before—even more than during the heydays of imperialism. However, even with military deployments, a fundamental peacekeeping culture has emerged, and proved to be remarkably successful in the stabilization of Albania or Kosovo. Let us also think of the difference between the political management of the Sudtyrol ethnic conflict, a management which was so highly successful, and what happened in the Basque countries, Corsica or Northern Ireland. Is the difference only one of political context or does culture, deep anthropological culture, matter? We tend to favor the latter interpretation.

In today’s combination of pacifism and pro-US attitudes we see both a result of these long standing cultural patterns and of the pervasiveness of the emigration experience among the Italians. Six millions of Italian immigrants with the continuous exchange that occurred over the century, by way of remittance, letters, visits home, have rendered the US closer to Italy than most European countries.

Notes

1 I would like to acknowledge Guido Tintori, for giving me the documents and the permission to quote his essay (2001, *passim*).

2 RG208, OFF Bureau of Intelligence, Intelligence Report # 19, *Distinction Among Alien Groups*, April 21, 1942, Subject File of the Chief, Feb 1942- Jan 1944, OWI, NARA II, courtesy of Guido Tintori.

3 The term ‘cultural pluralism’ was used far before its time by Horace Kallen in 1914 in an article in which he attacked the theory of assimilationism resumed in the expression ‘melting pot’, and ‘cultural pluralism’ supported the thesis of the maintenance of the cultures of the various ethnic groups. According to ‘cultural pluralism’, immigrants not only had to maintain their own ethnic identity but also should enrich the American society with their own cultures (Martellone, 1980).

4 "Geraldine Ferraro: un posto nella storia degli italo-americani in USA", *News Italia Press*, X, 150, 4 agosto 2003.

5 Nancy Pelosi, "La ‘sfida tricolore’ degli USA", *News Italia Press*, X, 128, 3 luglio 2003.

6 Message of Lawrence Squeri, H-ITAM, March 26

7 Unless otherwise specified, data are taken from *Transatlantic Trends*, a survey conducted since 2001 by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, in cooperation with other institutions. In particular, the Spring 2003 survey was jointly supported by the German Marshall Fund and the Compagnia di San Paolo.

Bibliography

Daniels, Roger, *Prisoner without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II*, New York: Hill & Wang, 1993.

Daniels, Roger, *Concentration camps: North American Japanese in the United States and Canada during World War II*, Malabar, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1981.

- Daniels, Roger, "L'internamento di 'Alien Enemies' negli Stati Uniti durante la seconda guerra mondiale", *Àcoma, Rivista Internazionale di Studi Nordamericani*, 11, Summer-Fall 1997.
- Diggins, John. P., *L'America, Mussolini e il fascismo*, Bari, Laterza, 1972.
- Duliani, Mario, *Città senza donne*, Campobasso, Cosmo Iannone, 2003.
- Guglielmo, Jennifer and Salvatore Salerno, (eds), Afterword by David R. Roediger), *Are Italians White? How Race Is Made in America*, 2003.
- Guglielmo, Thomas "No Color Barrier": Italians, Race, and Power in the United States", in Thomas, pp. 29-43.
- Guglielmo, Thomas, *White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945*, Oxford University Press, 2003.
- King, Desmond, *Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and The Origins of the Diverse Democracy*, Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 2002.
- Luconi, Stefano, "Frank Rizzo and the Whitening of Italian Americans in Philadelphia", in Guglielmo J. cit., pp. 177-91.
- Luconi, Stefano, *From Paesani to White Ethnics: The Italian Experience in Philadelphia*, New York, SUNY Press, 2001.
- Mangione Jerre, *An Ethnic at large: a memoir of America in the Thirties and Forties*, New York, Putnam, 1978.
- Martellone, Anna Maria, *La "questione" dell'immigrazione negli Stati Uniti*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1980.
- Meyer, Gerald, "When Frank Sinatra Came to Italian Harlem: The 1945 'Race Riot' at Benjamin Franklin High School", in Guglielmo J. cit., pp. 161-76.
- Salerno, Salvatore, "I Delitti della Razza Bianca (Crimes of the White Race): Italian Anarchists? Racial Discourse as Crime" in Guglielmo J. cit., pp. 111-23.
- Sciorra, Joseph, "Italians against Racism?: The Murder of Yusuf Hawkins (R.I.P.) and My March in Bensonhurst", in Guglielmo J. cit., pp. 192-209.
- Stella, Gian Antonio, *L'orda: Quando gli albanesi eravamo noi*, Milano, Rizzoli, 2002.
- Tintori, Guido, "Politiche di internamento in Canada durante la seconda Guerra mondiale" in Aa, Av., *Il Canada tra modernità e tradizione*, Monopoli, Schena, 2000, pp. 109-23.
- Tintori, Guido, "New Discoveries, Old Prejudices: The Internment of Italian Americans during World War II", published in Lawrence Di Stasi, ed, in *Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment during World War II*, Heyday Books, Berkley, 2001, pp. 236-254.
- Tirabassi, Maddalena, «La Mazzini Society (1940-46): un'associazione di antifascisti italiani negli Stati Uniti» in *Italia e America dalla Grande Guerra ad Oggi*, a cura di Giorgio Spini, Gian Giacomo Migone, Massimo Teodori, Venezia, 1976, pp.141-58.
- Tirabassi, Maddalena, «Enemy Aliens or Loyal Americans?: The Mazzini Society and the Italian-American Communities» in *Rivista di Studi Anglo-Americani*, 4-5, 1984-85, pp. 295-313.
- Tirabassi, Maddalena, «Nazioni Unite (1942-1946): l'organo ufficiale della Mazzini Society», *L'antifascismo italiano negli Stati Uniti durante la Seconda guerra mondiale*, Roma, 1984, pp. 295-313
- Tirabassi, Maddalena, «Un decennio di storiografia statunitense sull'immigrazione italiana» in *Movimento Operaio e Socialista*, II, (gennaio-giugno 1981), pp. 145-60
- Vecoli, Rudolph, "Are Italian Americans Just White Folks?", *Italian Americana*, 13, 2, summer 1995.

Venturini, Nadia, *Neri e italiani ad Harlem: Gli anni trenta e la guerra di Etiopia*, Milano, Angeli, 1990.

Sources:

Transatlantic Trends 2003 CSP and German Marshall Fund; AHIA Debate.

Chapter VI

Italian Citizenship, Nationality Law and Italic Identities

Kirk Buckman

Introduction

On first consideration, a discussion of Italian citizenship appears antithetical to the larger project of developing an understanding of Italic identities. The notions of citizenship and identity seem so distinct and mutually exclusive as to preclude a meaningful discussion of Italian citizenship within the context of Italic identities. Any understanding of "citizenship" must necessarily begin with legal membership in a territorially bounded polity. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) confirms this point, defining citizen as "A member of a state, an enfranchised inhabitant of a country, as opposed to an alien;" and "citizenship" as "The position or status of being a citizen, with its rights and privileges" (OED, Second Edition, 1989). In contrast, Piero Bassetti deliberately removes Italicity from the legal dimension of any specific territory or polity, defining Italicity as a transnational identity based on consciousness and cultural values bereft of a bounded territorial element (Bassetti, 2003, 22). The consequent gulf between the construction of a post-national and trans-national cultural italic identity and an exclusive, territorially bounded notion of membership in the Italian polity renders a discussion of citizenship according to both terms almost impossible. One is confronted with the nearly insurmountable task of considering Italian citizenship without the terms "Italian" or "citizenship."

However, consideration of each notion on its own terms reveals significant common ground between the historical constructions of Italic identities and Italian citizenship. More specifically, the historical migrations from the Italian peninsula, which predate the creation of the modern Italian state, reside squarely at the source of Bassetti's notion of Italic identity and the cultural idioms (Brubaker, 1992, 16) that shaped the formal rules governing accession to Italian citizenship or nationality in 1912 (Koenig-Archibugi, 2003; Pastore, 2001). From this perspective, the migrations away from the Italian peninsula prior to and during the construction of the modern Italian state at the end of the nineteenth century provide an analytical bridge to transcend, at least in a limited manner, the aforementioned incompatibility between Italicity and Italian citizenship. Italian citizenship remains a legal construction associated with the Italian polity, but the same cultural idioms that informed the construction of the formal rules governing accession to Italian citizenship lay simultaneously at the center of Italic identities.

The formal rules defining Italian citizenship were originally adopted in 1912 and subsequently amended in 1992. These rules embraced the principle of *jus sanguinis* as the legal principle determining accession into Italian citizenship, granting the possibility to obtain Italian citizenship to the children and grandchildren of Italian citizens. By adopting *jus sanguinis*, these rules institutionalized an ethnic conception of Italian identity and thus can be seen to be consistent with a limited notion of Italicity. These rules are consistent with a limited notion of Italicity because on the one hand, they maintain a formal connection between the global Italic diaspora and the Italian state, but on the other hand, they restrict the legal possibility to obtain full Italian citizenship to the children and grandchildren of Italian emigrants. Bassetti's notion of Italicity seeks to develop the transnational cultural dimension of the Italian diaspora in a manner akin to the Jewish diaspora as it developed prior to the twentieth century (Bassetti, 2003, 17-21). The transnational component of Israel's formal citizenship laws is unlimited. Israel's Law of Return (5710-1950, amended in

1954 and again in 1970) establishes an unlimited hereditary right to obtain Israeli citizenship to any Jew. In the Italian case, the principle of *jus sanguinis* serves as a formal bridge, which, by maintaining the right to return to Italy as a full citizen, also nourishes a cultural and sociological bond with Italy.

Thus, the construction of Italicity and Italian citizenship are not wholly incompatible. While it is impossible to explain Italian citizenship entirely in terms of Italicity, a discussion of Italian citizenship and identity is relevant to a discussion of Italicity. Furthermore, despite Bassetti's reluctance to insist on a formal, current connection between Italy and Italic identities, the Italian peninsula remains at the epicenter of Italic identities. Bassetti states as much:

In the light of these considerations and in this frame of reference, it may be possible better to understand "Italicity" and how Italicity can differ from, and go beyond "being Italian." Undoubtedly it has strong historical roots in terms of identity, linked to centuries of Italians' trans-territorial and trans-national mobility. But it is not limited to these roots, although it continues to nourish itself through them (Bassetti, 2003: 19).

Cultural Idioms and Formal Citizenship in France, Germany and Italy

European Member States tend to base their citizenship laws on two fundamentally incompatible notions. In *Nationhood and Citizenship in France and Germany*, Rogers Brubaker (1992) analyzes the distinction between these two philosophical and legal forms of inclusion—*jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*. Strictly speaking, *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* are "principles governing the unilateral attribution or ascription of citizenship by the state, not the voluntary acquisition of citizenship by an individual through naturalization" (Brubaker, 1992, 119). Since 1889, France has embraced the *jus soli* conception, which confers citizenship on individuals born on the territory. Since at least 1913, Germany bases its citizenship laws on the *jus sanguinis* conception, which confers citizenship through parental lineage or blood. Brubaker explains that these laws result from cultural idioms, politics and historical experience.

France experienced a republican revolution in 1789, which, in its efforts to dismantle the feudal legacy of privilege, embraced a universalist understanding of citizenship based on legal equality. Between 1881 and 1889, when the contemporary *jus soli* law was being constructed, an alternative proposal, which would have based the new law on *jus sanguinis*, failed. Brubaker explains that the central factors leading the Chamber of Deputies to embrace *jus soli* were: one, the perceived unfairness of second generation immigrants avoiding military service; and second, that such a distinction would undermine the assimilation of foreigners into French society, perpetuating what Brubaker terms "nations within nations" (see also Lefebvre, 2003).

The extension of *jus soli*, then, was defined by the Republicans of the Chamber as a means of eliminating the "odious privilege" enjoyed by long-settled foreigners and preventing the emergence of nations within the nation (Brubaker, 1992, 106).

In contrast to France, Germany embraced a definition of its citizenry based on *jus sanguinis* in 1913. Prior to 1913, the individual Länder of the German Empire had embraced exclusively *jus sanguinis*. The explanation for this strict adoption of *jus sanguinis* resides with the historically late construction of a German state and the ethnic composition of Prussia. The Catholic Polish and Jewish populations in Prussia made it intolerable to Bismarck to adopt a citizenship law

based on a territorial element. Thus, Bismarck secured the passage of education laws in 1872-1873 making German the compulsory language of instruction in elementary schools in Upper Silesia, and West Prussia and made German the sole language of public life in 1876 (Brubaker, 1992, 129). Another important element in explaining Germany's adoption of *jus sanguinis* was the geographic position of Germany as a "frontline" state subject to influxes of diverse ethnic populations. Until the conquest of Germany in 1870, German nationalism had been defined as a people, *ein Volk*, without a state. German speaking communities resided outside the narrowly defined geographic territory of Germany and could be included as German citizens despite not being born on the territory. After World War II, when Germany lost territory, it embedded *jus sanguinis* in its new constitution, the Basic Law, as a mechanism to protect the possibility of its citizens to return to Germany from its former territories and from behind the Iron Curtain.

Mathias Koenig-Archibulgi explains that Italy faced fundamentally different concerns than France or Germany. In contrast to the experiences of France or Germany, Italy's main concern has been emigration. In this respect, the interest in global Italic identities is even more relevant to Italian citizenship than for other countries. Until recently, relatively few foreigners have wanted to become Italian, and there are relatively few foreigners living in Italy.¹ Moreover, where France sought to integrate "foreigners" born on French soil into French society, and where Germany sought to exclude "foreigners" born on German soil, "in Italy, the significant problem was not how to integrate foreigners, but how to integrate Italians in the state, in other words, how to transform Italian nationals into loyal Italian citizens" (Koenig-Archibulgi, 2003, 103).

Ferruccio Pastore makes a similar point. The parliamentary discussions and motivations that led to the Italian nationality law of 1912 were based largely on reactions to Italian emigration and naturalization laws in foreign countries. Pastore comments that the Italian ruling class held essentially passive attitudes towards the mass emigrations at the end of the nineteenth century and start of the twentieth, but suggests that the motivation for the adoption of the principle of *jus sanguinis* emanated partly from the perception that Italian identity would survive generations living abroad.

After unification, the political ruling class maintained, with relative continuity, a broadly positive—although essentially passive—attitude towards emigration, which was viewed as a contributor to economic growth and the relaxation of social tensions. Despite this, the ruling class, during the monarchical as much as the republican period, resisted the strongly integrative policies of some countries of immigration. It did so on the basis of a 'strong' conception of Italian nationality as a tie sufficiently resilient to survive emigration, even after generations (Pastore, 2001, 96).

One of the main catalysts to Italy's 1912 naturalization law came from the declaration of the Brazilian Republic on November 15, 1891 and its new constitution. Brazil's new constitution embraced the principle of *jus soli* and automatically transformed all foreigners present prior to Nov. 15, 1891 into Brazilian citizens "unless they declared a desire to keep their original nationality within six months," Brazil's 'Great Naturalization' (Pastore, 2001, 96-97). Italian emigration to Argentina and the United States was equally important and generated similar conflicts over nationality laws. Italy's political elite responded by creating nationality laws that would protect the opportunities for emigrants and their descendants to recover Italian nationality. Pastore offers two fundamental reasons for this reaction: one, to avoid ostracizing this important source of material wealth through remittances; and two, to avoid provoking a potentially divisive

political battle in a still immature and fragile state and economy. The net result was to create a nationality law that encouraged dual citizenship, which may have contributed to the further weakening of Italian nationality (Pastore, 2001, 96-99).

Italy's nationality law of 1912 was amended in 1992, and now has the following features:

1. Absolute predominance of *jus sanguinis*;
2. Italians who apply for foreign nationality may keep Italian nationality;
3. Former Italian nationals who reside in Italy for one year in Italy automatically become Italian citizens unless they expressly reject it;
4. Children and grandchildren of former Italian nationals may acquire Italian nationality at the age of maturity if they have resided in Italy for at least two years before then;
5. Naturalization requires a minimum residency period of ten years, except for EU nationals, who may apply for Italian nationality after four years (Koenig-Archibulgi, 2003, 104).

As in Germany, *jus sanguinis* was a means to sustain the Italian nation as it lived abroad. The distinction, however, was that where Germany originally embraced *jus sanguinis* in order to exclude non-ethnic Germans from becoming citizens, Italy embraced *jus sanguinis* in order to expand the opportunities for descendants of emigrants to recover Italian nationality. Moreover, from the historic perspective of the formation of Italic identities, the critical moment came in 1912, when the political class established formal rules that contributed to the perpetuation of a formal bond between emigrant communities and the Italian state.

While lamenting Italy's unwillingness to adopt a more aggressive assimilationalist naturalization law based on *jus soli*, Pastore remarks that the *jus sanguinis* principle has contributed to the maintenance of an Italian cultural identity abroad. In this sense, the possibility to reclaim Italian nationality or citizenship may be understood to correspond to Bassetti's notion of Italicity: "From the point of view of effective participation in national political life, the millions of Italians resident abroad, citizens by descent or through a recovery of citizenship (and thus dual nationals), remain at best a 'virtual people'" (Pastore, 2001, 103). The irony, of course, is that Italy has over the last three decades become a country of net immigration and where its nationality laws were intended to maintain a bond between emigrants and the Italian state, these same rules have formed a correspondingly high barrier to the assimilation of foreigners. Indeed, the 1992 law introduced considerable new restrictions on foreigners applying for Italian citizenship, including the establishment of a "detailed hierarchy among different categories of foreigners, [and] fixing different residency requirements for each" (Pastore, 2001, 105).

Conclusion

T.H. Marshall constructs a historical understanding of citizenship based on the creation of civil, political and social rights. Putting aside the historical accuracy of Marshall's argument (see Klausen, 1995), his notion of modern democratic citizenship concurs with this second definition and corresponds more closely with the modern construction of reciprocal rights and obligations between the state and the individual. These rights and obligations are neither irreversible nor unambiguous. Indeed, if politics is about the distribution of scarce resources, then these rights and obligations, which form the essence of modern citizenship, are the very essence of politics.

Just as Marshall argues that "social rights," which we can understand as entitlement programs of the modern welfare state, have resulted from historical progress, more recent observers of the

welfare state make similarly historical arguments to explain how and why these entitlement programs vary across countries (Esping Andersen, 1990; Skocpol, 1992; Steinmo, et al., 1992). Rogers Brubaker adopts a similarly historical view to explain how the rules governing who becomes entitled to these rights and privileges, i.e., a citizen, are formed. Indeed, he suggests that the formal rules governing who becomes a citizen are shaped profoundly by a nation's history. It is Rogers Brubaker's perspective that informs this essay and its interest in the cultural idioms and political context that shaped the construction and implications of Italian citizenship or nationality. There is unquestionably a large set of issues relating to the legal, political and social dimensions of Italian citizenship that have not been addressed by this essay, but the purpose of this essay has been to relate formal membership in the Italian state with global Italic cultural identities.

As 2004 approaches, Italy's current turn to hold the rotating presidency of the European Union (EU) is coming to a painful, disappointing close. The optimistic efforts to adopt a European constitution in a new Treaty of Rome and construct a European citizenry failed over the weekend of December 13, 2003. The central issue leading to the collapse of the effort was the weighted votes of mid-size member countries such as Poland and Spain in the Council of Ministers, the central decision-making body in the EU (Tagliabue, 2003). While the larger European project was being forged, Italy has been simultaneously engaged in a difficult effort to redefine its constitution and the legal, political and social elements that define its proper citizenry. While there are important differences between the two cases, these developments share similar causes and timelines. Both Italy and Europe have been reexamining their institutional, political and cultural identities since the end of the Cold War, and there is much reason to believe that both will develop a deeper sense of common identity. However, the future directions of these identities are undetermined. Furthermore, it is unclear if Italy will significantly reform its constitution (Pasquino, 1998; Furlong, 2003), and it is now even more uncertain whether the EU will renew efforts to establish a Constitution for Europe and construct an effective and powerful European government (Moravcsik, 2002).

Nevertheless, despite the failure to ratify the draft constitution, European citizenship was legally established by the 1992 Treaty of European Union (Maastricht) and modified by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (effective May 1999). Article 8 of the draft constitution treaty adopted the same language:

Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship; it shall not supercede it.

Even though the constitution treaty was not adopted, the language remains legally part of the European *acquis communautaire*. The language clearly recognizes a citizenry but grants no authority to its polity to bestow citizenship; that power resides undisputedly with the Member States. Preuss, et al. suggest "Apart from its 'anemic content,' ... Union citizenship seems to suffer from the fact that its extension is completely determined by rules decided outside the legislative procedures of the EU" (Preuss, et al., 2003, 5). J.H.H. Weiler similarly acknowledges that "this is a trite, banal phrase," but elaborates that its essential deference to the Member States reveals an important debate about European integration. On the one hand, Weiler suggests that skeptics perceive such empty symbolism as wishful thinking or "trivial and empty" (Weiler, 2-3). On the other hand, proponents of a deeper union fear that such empty language may be perceived as a dangerous symbol that may exacerbate nationalist reactions and antagonize efforts to proceed with the European project.

Rightly or wrongly, the notion of a European citizenry has entered the European vocabulary and brings to a head whether the original project, "to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" (Preamble, Treaty of Rome 1957), or should establish a single European people (Weiler, 6-7). The parallel between Europe and Italy is that both polities possess a cultural heritage, which is claimed often to form an identity. Moreover, the tension across EU member states' differing naturalization laws is the same tension that led Italy in 1912 to adopt the principle of *jus sanguinis* as the basis of Italian nationality law. The consequent dual nationality that emerged has at least not undermined the development of Italic identities abroad, and at most contributed to and fostered the perpetuation of global Italic identities. The tension between *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* persists, but at least from a cultural perspective, this tension may be adequate for the formation of dual identities akin to the development of dual citizenship for the Italic peoples who maintain the possibility to reclaim their Italian citizenship.

Piero Bassetti's notion of Italic identities is based on consciousness and cultural values that transcend the territorial dimension of Italy. From this perspective, Italicity is essentially closed to entertaining a discussion of formal citizenship as it relates to Italy. However, the persistence of *jus sanguinis* as the governing principle of Italian naturalization law establishes a cultural element that bridges formal membership with an ethnic component.

Note

1 In 1998, foreigners composed 6.3 percent of France's total population, 8.9 percent in Germany, and 2.1 percent in Italy (Koenig-Archibulgi, 103).

References

Piero Bassetti, "Italicity: Global and Local," Chapter 1 in Paolo Janni and George F. McLean, eds., *The Essence of Italian Culture and The Challenge of A Global Age* (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003) 13-23.

Saverio Battente, "Review Article: Nation and State Building in Italy: Recent Historiographical Interpretation (1989-1997), II: from Fascism to the Republic," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 6, 1 (2001) 94-105.

Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

Mark Donovan "The Italian State: No Longer Catholic, No Longer Christian," *West European Politics* 26, 1 (Jan. 2003) 95-116.

———, "Election Report: A New Republic in Italy? The May 2001 Election," *West European Politics* 24, 4 (Oct. 2001) 193-205.

Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

Paul Furlong, "Italian Regional Reform in Constitutional Context," Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association (Leicester, UK: April 2003).

Mark Gilbert, "Transforming Italy's Institutions? The Bicameral Committee on Institutional Reform," *Modern Italy* 3, 1 (May 1998) 49-66.

Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988* (New York: Penguin Books USA Inc., 1990).

Jytte Klausen, "Social Rights Advocacy and State Building: T. H. Marshall in the Hands of Social Reformers," *World Politics* 47, 2 (Jan. 1995) 244-267.

Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, "National and European Citizenship: The Italian Case in Historical Perspective," *Citizenship Studies* 7, 1 (2003) 85-109.

Joseph La Palombara, *Democracy Italian Style* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1987).

Edwige Liliane Lefebvre, "Republican and Universalism: Factors of Inclusion and Exclusion in the French Concept of Citizenship," *Citizenship Studies* 7, 1 (2003) 15-36.

T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

Mario B. Mignone, "Emigration and Italian National Identity," *Forum Italicum* 35, 1 (2001) 129-140.

James L. Newell and Martin J. Bull, "The Italian General Election of May 2001," Keele European Parties Research Unit (KEPRU) Working Paper 4 (School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment (SPIRE), Keele University, UK: 2001).

OECD, *Economic Survey of Italy, 2003* (July 2003).

Gianfranco Pasquino, "The Italian National Elections of 13 May 2001," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 6, 3 (2001) 371-387.

———, "Reforming the Italian constitution," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 3, 1 (1998) 42-54.

Ferruccio Pastore, "Nationality Law and International Migration: The Italian Case," Ch. 4 in R. Hansen and P. Weil, eds., *Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) 95-117.

Silvana Patriarca, "Italian Neopatriotism: Debating National Identity in the 1990s," *Modern Italy* 6, 1 (2001) 21-34.

Ulrich K. Preuss, Michelle Everson, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Edwige Lefebvre, "Traditions of Citizenship in the European Union," *Citizenship Studies* 7, 1 (2003) 3-14.

Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992).

Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

John Tagliabue, "European Union Can't Reach Deal on Constitution," *New York Times*, Dec. 14, 2003, p. 1.

J.H.H. Weiler, "To Be a European Citizen - Eros and Civilization," *Working Paper Series in European Studies*, Volume 1, Number 2 (European Studies Program, International Institute, University of Wisconsin—Madison: 1998).

Part II
The Development of Intercultural Competencies

Chapter VII

Racial and Ethnic Organizations: Service in the 21st Century

John A. Kromkowski

The clarification and development of the concept and experience of Italicity and the larger project of establishing new constructive relationships among mainstream and marginalized populations and various cultures can be furthered by exploring a particularly significant but frequently ignored dimension of geographical clustering of ethnic groups and the unique role and function of community-based ethnic and racial organizations. Attention to the local and its relationship to the regional, national, international and global arenas is especially interesting for its capacity to sharpen various types of value distinctions. Moreover, at the local level the primary experiences of human communities can be encountered, described and documented as various means and methods of cooperation and conflict between and among the driving values of various cultures, and the attendant loyalties of persons and associations devoted to community well-being and the preservation and development of cultural legacies and traditions. Such systematic observations and assessments are required to inform the search for adequate and insightful framing of the public choices affecting change and continuity. These choices shape both the burden and the benefits of public policy related to community-based existence in a globalizing world. In this regard we are in a historically unique position. Though our primary concern is Italicity, in the process and under the pressure of globalization, its characteristics cannot be adequately discerned by a direct comparative method focused on what is Italic in Europe and the United States or places such as Chile, Argentina, and Australia.

The task at hand is more complex because the very essence of Italicity is contextual and its particularity must be explained at the community-based level. Moreover, Italicity is an ongoing process of social construction and the reproduction of Italicity is not only generational, but is also areal/spatial, i.e., related to sub-national situations that may be related to national and supranational efforts which are the willful projects of cultural advocates and entrepreneurs intent on organizing, mobilizing and defining Italic issues and agendas. In an earlier paper in this series I attempted to sketch a profile of the Italian American experience. In this paper I hope to deepen our understanding of the topic by exploring a research and action that would foster the development of intercultural competencies, to recovery the local dimensions of culture and values and finally, to advance a networking process among local NGOs and national and international intermediaries that would support and sustain the transmission and representation of what is valued from the local to the national and global arenas That proponents of Italicity should assume a pivotal position in this process is posited. A fuller elaboration of the value and appropriateness of Italicity depends on the efficacy of its evocation and in this respect is an existential research question sustained by the premise that the presence and power of urbanization rooted in the Italic experience makes it particularly bondable to pluriformity. Pluriformity is an essential characteristic of urban life, a composite of differentiated social communities united for collective action and sharing an overarching and common bond of union. Thus world urbanism and America urbanization are inseparable from the development of ethnic organizations as NGOs. They have the charge of representing and educating their constituencies: helping them truly to integrate into the power systems, while at the same time assisting frequently isolated and alienated populations to discover cultural traditions and to retain heritages that are the encasements of social values and personal virtues. NGOs must do this work in times of rapid social, economic and demographic change when

value- transformations are inescapable owing to the force of social interaction and the withering of previous dominant symbolizations of order and social controls.

Moreover, on September 11, 2001 came the tragic and terrible event showing the awesome horrors that can befall mankind when unrelieved fear and hatred is untempered by reason and dialogue. American community groups face these challenges of the new century with multiple resources and responsibilities. This event caused the conveners of the first American seminar on Italicity to postpone the meeting that produced the first American and Italian volume devoted to understanding this very significant reformulation and articulation of the essence of the behavior, mind-set, value-orientation, style and cultural formation. Though violence and troubling events influence the development of human affairs, the wider horizons of research and action in support of deepening understanding of the cultural foundations of civilization and assessing the contours of new interactions of Italic culture in new contexts of Europe and America and then other situations must move to continue this and to take steps toward achieving the goals so clearly and iconically captured in *globus et locus*. These words are an Italic form that is definitive of the local and world-wide realities of our time within which our practice and understanding of Italicity and its relationships to other modern types of urban ethnicity and the values and cultures that are emerging in current practices of social articulation as competitors to the economic and political spheres of order and relationships that are driving globalization. The findings presented in the first collection of articles on this topic are suggestive of a need to deepen and to extend our treatment of the topic and it to this end that the following argument for a research and organizing project is proposed as a new thrust designed to discover, critique and foster articulations of Italicity in the pluralistic contexts in the United States. This new direction and its anticipated outcomes will document the various patterns of Italicity that are existent in the United States and in this process aspire to energize a new coalition of American ethnic organizations devoted to the development of intercultural competencies for the improvement of policies related to the national, regional and global realities of our time.

It is the burden of this situation to move beyond the general characteristics of Italicity in America and to develop an action research project that would 1) at the national level include training and technical assistance designed to foster intercultural competencies among racial and ethnic organizations with offices in Washington DC and 2) at the local level with the assistance of community groups in Congressional Districts that have meaningful concentrations of ethnic populations in each district to explore a counter-part to the national initiative that would concentrate coalition building among ethnic groups and ethnic leaders and the identification of convergence issues among ethnic groups that would reconstitute bonds of union, invigorate platoons of friendship and produce prototypic models of intercultural cooperation that could become demonstrations for new and successful ways addressing the intercultural imperatives of our time.

While American social values have been changing in the last few decades and continue to change, America has become more diverse, and in many ways more unequal, than ever before in its history. Even those counted as minorities far outsize most countries: 35,000,000 Hispanics; 34,500,000 blacks; 10,500,000 Asian Americans; and 4,000,000 Native Americans. Eastern and Southern-Mediterranean Americans comprise nearly 16 percent or over 40 millions persons. Of these nearly 16 millions are Italian-Americans. Though such macro-level demographics are revealing, a truer picture of ethnic and cultural interaction emerges from finer grain analysis, which the use of Congressional District data facilitates. Certain deep lines of continuity emerge from the rudimentary analysis of demographic clusters of the foundational populations and the immigrants.

Ethnic political development and more detailed analysis of embedded values of ethnic political phenomena may enable us to assess the longer cycles of change and continuities that form the deep structure and the ethnic dimension of the America regime.

The study of ethnicity in American politics is obviously part of the study of variation. Life of course is about variation. No one is precisely "average". In fact, as the late statistician and philosopher, W. E. Deming showed even in the most simple system an incredible amount of variation is present for those not accustomed to looking for it. In Deming's famous Red Bead experiment,¹ Deming mechanically draws a paddle full of 50 marbles from a batch of 4000 marbles, which have a known mixture of 20 percent red marbles and 80 percent white marbles. The idea that each paddle *should* have 10 red beads out of the 50 is forever dispelled.

Instead, one learns that in a stable system, one need not search for special meaning unless the percentage of red beads falls above or below "control limits" defined by the simple equation:

$$p \pm 3 p(1-p)/N$$

where p = the total proportion of red beads derived from sampling and N = the sample size, in Deming's example, $N=50$. Hence, in the Red Bead experiment, it is not meaningful that any particular paddle dipped into the batch of mixed marbles pulls out between 1 and 19 red beads.

Table 1

Group National Percentage Number of Congressional Districts with meaningfully high Percentage

African-American	9.6	141
American Indian	3.5	14
Asian-American	2.9	105
English-American	13.1	226
French-American	4.1	48
German-American	23.3	186
Hispanic-American	8.8	127
Irish-American	15.6	225
Italian-American	5.9	135
Polish-American	3.8	131

Using this principle of meaningful variation and U.S. Census data regarding ethnicity in Congressional Districts, we find that America remains amazingly "unmixed" or statistically "out of control." America remains lumpy beyond the superficial and scientifically meaningless categories which inform much of the political debate regarding ethnicity and race. For example nearly all reports of public opinion including National Election Exit Polling Data continue to make much of the white and black categories and the synthetic groupings of Asian and Hispanic/Latino populations that are not only comprised of various national traditions and ethnicities but also are quantitatively extremely small segments of the electorate. Instead of using the category "white," the following statistical test uses the U.S. Census data for several of the largest American ethnicities and owing to the need for national comparability this analysis respectively combines Native Americans, Asian American and Hispanic American communities into three data clusters comprised of all of their respective nations, tribes and ethnicities. Table 1 reveals the extent of

patterns and clusters of ethnicities in U.S. Census districts that are above meaningfully high percentages for ten of the largest ethnic groups. This test documents and establishes the baseline from which impacts on the political culture, electoral strategies and campaign tactics of these groups and combinations of these groups can be assessed. Patterns of ethnicities in each congressional district provide a measurable and meaningful method of locating the particular contours of ethnic group interaction, its intensity and magnitude.

So stunning is the concentration of ethnicities that only one Congressional district (KY 5) does not have a meaningful concentration of any of the ten groups noted above.²

These data sources have been prepared and arrayed to focus our attention on the strategic shift in research and action proposed in this paper: Decentralization of efforts to develop understandings of the human scale interaction of ethnic populations in nationally significant political units B- the Congressional District B- and the primary transmission of such findings to national ethnic organizations so as to enhance their development of intercultural competencies that are rooted in the experiences of specific locations and thus enable them to become more representative of intergroup realities in an area that is simultaneously more centralized and decentralized. This project is proposed as test and model for addressing critiques of national interest groups and to narrow the gap between national organizations and the experiences of inter-ethnic realities in Congressional Districts. The proposal would explore the variety of interethnic relations that exist in various contexts and the variations of ethnic identity that are emerging. Finally the project would enable us to discern how these identities comport with the concept of Italicity and its expression in ways that are important for both domestic and international policies.

The disaggregation of national ethnic data to clusters at the level of the Congressional District has enabled a fresh analytical perspective regarding ethnic identity and American ethnicities. During the last decade U.S. Geographic Information Systems, including mapping of ethnic population settlements, have transformed our analytical capacity to understand ethnic demography. Researcher have produced finer-grained profiles of ethnic clustering at the level for thousands of State legislative districts.³ Such detail may be too detailed for this project though significant for testing the concept of Italicity in small- scale State senate and Assembly Districts which number nearly 700 districts comprising Italian –American at 10 percent of the population, more than 80 districts at 25 percent of the population and four districts with 50 percent of the population. Though important for our understanding of politically significant concentrations in various states and an access proxy of location Italian- American enclaves the consequences of such state level data may be left for future efforts depending on the outcome of Congressional District research into the interaction of ethnic groups clustered in political units with total populations of approximately 650,000 persons which range from a higher of 41 percent to 5.9 percent—the level at which the Italian-American voting age population meets its national average and thus would not be indicative of the measurable clustering effect used as baseline for meaningful concentrations of ethnic populations in Congressional Districts.

The proposed agenda for racial and ethnic organizations and their service to the development of new cultural capacities and intercultural competencies in the 21st century challenges the trend toward the nationalization of ethnic and racial organizations without diminishing the significant legitimacy that such advocates accomplished on the national and international scene. Decades of institutional development have gone into expanding the capacity of racial and ethnic groups so as to make their presence and participation in the interest groups regime and public affairs process a lasting part and frequently crucial difference in the character of national and international governance. The task at hand is to deepen the humanizing experiences of cultural communities,

their legacies of wisdom, understanding derived from access to the human spirit encased in traditional legacies and to explore inter-ethnic relations especially coalition-building, ethnic group identity and group formation, heritage maintenance and celebration, leadership, and innovation at the Congressional District level. Such action research will make possible the process of understanding phenomena which include Italicity, but in fact extend well beyond the particularity of this manifestation to a wider arena of the human and social capacity to express and to participate in forms of community that are freighted with some of the deepest channels of access to meanings and realities constituting the human condition. This cultural turn invites national, ethnic, and racial organization into a process of re-legitimizing their national and international claims of particular representation and to widening their horizons toward the discovery of convergent issues at the regional and international level as well as the tactical and strategic return to the community level of interethnic relations as a source of services and as a source of lived experiences of racial and ethnic vernacular learning and practice which can re-certify the authenticity and representative character of national ethnic and racial organizations. The latter have become sclerotic and not sufficiently attentive to the new clusters of ethnic communities and the recovery of interest in the traditional as an access point into the sphere of human spirit and the rearticulation of cultural relevancy typified by the work of *Globus et Locus* on the concept and experience of Italicity.

An action research project focused on a targeted sample of Congressional Districts would allow the testing of approaches to intercultural situations and would further the redefining of local relationships created in particular contexts constituted by the unique intercultural settings existing in a set of Congressional Districts which have interesting and meaningful concentrations of Italian Americans.

The overall rationale and purpose of this approach to the development of intercultural competencies will be spelled out later in this paper. However, the thrust of the project and experiment in localized action research is simple: In many respects the capacity to fashion national remedies for problems related to the lack of understanding of the intercultural imperatives of pluralistic societies and international relations has reached a curiously chaotic phase that includes intense levels of conflict as well as impasses, stalemates and even stunning levels of irrelevancy. This new strategy and its implicit new direction aspires to help ethnic and racial organizations engage substantively and effectively in the civil polity of their communities as full partners in the effort to overcome prejudice and build lines of communication and cooperation in facing on the community level the problems which face our nation and our world toward the realization of American ideals of justice and equality for all citizens.

Dr. Thaddeus Radzilowski, President of the Piast Foundation, framed a rationale for understanding ethnicity in America which I believe can substantively and operationally be applied to the experience and concept of Italicity and certainly must be included in any further clarification of Italicity in the American context and to the task of research and action proposed in pursuit of decentralizing our search for understanding the manifestations of Italicity at the level of Congressional Districts with meaningfully high concentrations of persons identifying themselves as Italian American.. The following text elaborates the core elements of a new discussion of local identity, which are most relevant to the clarification of new understanding of intercultural competencies and in my opinion to our understanding of Italicity and how this concept and experience must be related to the discussion of ethnicity and local identity and the processes which are the undergirding of successful approaches to the development of intercultural competencies.

Table 2, "Congressional Districts by Highest Percentage of Italian-American Population," developed by the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs (NCUEA) provides cross-tabs in these

Congressional Districts for the following ethnic populations: African-American, Asian-American, English-American, French-American, German-American, Hispanic-American, Irish-American, Native American and Polish-American. The twelve (12) states within which these Congressional Districts are located are New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Louisiana, and Florida. These sixty-six Congressional Districts in twelve states are not only significant for their Italian -Americans but also include clusters of other ethnic groups and other regional cultural impacts which may be suggestive of typologies of pluralistic cultures within which Italian Americans and others have participated and in which the formation of italicities can be discerned. Moreover, understanding the processes of intercultural relations in Congressional District B, the smallest unit of representation recognized by the US Constitution, may open new questions related to the nexus of interest groups, political participation and representative government that would deepen our understanding of currently salient discourse on both democracy and economic development and their relationship to the cultural sector represented in this case by the concept and process identified as Italicity.

Ethnic and Civic Culture in an Age of Globalization

Ethnicity is one of the deepest and most enduring of human identities because it is based on language, religion, culture, family, common history and local community. It can have political salience and as such can play both negative and positive roles. However, political or public salience is not necessary for its survival. It can be the basis of community formation and a generous pluralism on the one hand, or divisiveness and prejudice on the other.

Ethnicity in America is a creative adaptation to life in the New World by immigrants, both free and coerced. It was an attempt by newcomers to make themselves "at home" in a new place, often under difficult and challenging conditions. Out of the process came cultures that were born out of preservation, adaptation, direct borrowing and invention, often reinforced by prejudice and interest. Successful ethnicities have kept the ability to change themselves to meet new conditions as well as to modify the dominant society in which they are embedded and to affect other ethnic cultures with whom they exist.

Ethnic adaptation to preserve core values and to mobilize group members in times of difficulty has happened with remarkable speed given the usual more leisurely pace of historical change. To be able to anticipate and use ethnicity in ways beneficial to the evolution of our society requires a clear understanding of recent history and current prospects if it is to succeed.

At this moment ethnicity does not play a significant political role as it potentially could because the language of race continues to dominate the public discourse. For groups that are lumped together as "white" there is no venue for operation or any sets of values, networks, languages, etc. to draw on to impact policy and civic development as the carriers of those values are in ethnicity not in race. Despite all of the talk of "whiteness" or white culture or white ethnicity, there is neither identity nor culture there. It has no story especially for those with a strong ethnic identity. At this moment, given a free choice to self identify, less than 1 percent of the population chooses "white" or any variation thereof. There are more Slovaks than "whites."

Given the rapid change that has taken place in the public perception of minority status and other metaphors and understandings that have had currency over the last half century, it is not farfetched to predict a significant collapse of the "whiteness" discourse and a major shift in the

way the unique African-American situation of American society is positioned and discussed in the public square in the *near* future.

At this point it is not utopian to suggest the possibility of the re-politization of ethnicity and its return as a vehicle to talk about civic values, community and multiculturalism. This discourse will require rethinking of multiculturalism at the same time. Its harder version, which postulates the incomprehensibility and irreconcilability of cultures to each other, is useless for any civic dialog. Multiculturalism in its soft form is at this time too superficial and vapid to carry any meaningful concepts of community development. Neither has a language or a story out of which to fashion a political dialogue, nor are they, any more than is race, embedded in institutions in which people can act in the civic arena.

In order to prepare for the re-emergence of ethnicity as an element of political culture beyond its current use, which confusingly straddles the issues of race, and ethnicity, we need to begin to try out ideas and ways of talking about it in new contexts. We should begin with pilot projects in a number of areas. Because of my own experience and because of the nature of the locale, I would clearly suggest my own Institute working with the University of Michigan in Detroit and Dearborn as one of the major sites for such activity.

The Detroit area has a large Polish-American population (600,000), the largest Arab-American population in the United States (300,000) a sizeable Italian-American group and a growing Hispanic, largely Mexican- American, population anchored by a city which has an 80% African- American population. The university has centers for the study of Arab and Hispanic population and a new endowment for a Polish chair and center. The area's fifth largest ethnic group is Italian-American.

Secondly, we must take the pilot project to a national level and make it available to leaders of ethnic groups in the United States. We can prepare training materials drawn from the lessons of the pilot projects and assist groups in using them. The key will be to have groups reflect on their history and experience in America and the adaptation of their cultures to the American reality with an eye to learning how they can utilize that experience in shaping a generous and genuinely multi cultural society and civic life.

A third step is to teach the application of the insights of the ethnic experience in America in the homelands of the ethnic groups who have created and shaped American civic life and institutions. This is very important as many of these nations are emerging out of communist or other dictatorships and are seeking ways to work out democratic and pluralist solutions within their own polities, but also to become part of regional or even continental unions with peoples of quite different cultures and with histories of mutual antagonism.

As I have extensive ties with universities and foundations in Poland, Ukraine, Albania, Slovakia, Macedonia and Bulgaria, I would be willing to work on that piece. I have organized and chaired meetings and conferences in East Central Europe.

In transmitting our experience there I suggest that at least part of the program involve participants from a number of ethnic groups who have lived, worked and shared a civic life in the same cities or areas over multiple generations to actually demonstrate beyond the experience of the homeland ethnic group how it works in practice. Whenever possible African- Americans should be included.

It is important to note as a caution that in so far as we espouse and practice multiculturalism and believe in a pluralist and open society, we are being quintessentially Western and especially American. It might ironically be even seen as one of our ethnocentricities given the fervor of our commitment. No other modern world culture has placed such a high premium on such ideas nor

developed their theoretical underpinnings as well as we have. These are not transplanted concepts without roots in our culture. Thus, we have a greater certainty we can succeed at them, more than perhaps any other society in the world. We need to be able to take this fact into consideration in our preparation for the work we will do overseas.

Because I am a historian who has written at some length about these problems and because I have been involved as an activist in many of the main developments in the field of ethnicity since at least 1967, I have chosen to look at the problem from a historical point of view to set a context for my suggestions. It follows this summary.

European Ethnicity since World War II

The Second World War turned the melting pot into a pressure cooker for most American ethnic groups. While the war had mobilized many of them for relief and political support for homelands that were caught up in the storm of war and hence intensified identity with ancestral home, it also put unparalleled pressure on them to Americanize and to show their unquestioning loyalty to the United States in the face of total war. The second generation served in unprecedented numbers in the war and came back imbued with American patriotism. The Cold War during its first intensive phase from the late forties to the early sixties continued and even strengthened the need for conformity. European ethnicity was mobilized by the U.S. government for the struggle against Communism. On the national domestic scene, by contrast, ethnicity was muted to play down any hint of foreignness. Its public expression was largely confined to underlining its 100% Americanism. In private, however, ethnicity continued to inform, enrich and shape the family and neighborhood life of most Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry and to shape their responses to life, culture and politics.

This was a contrast with the 1930s, which saw a resurgence of public ethnicity after the Americanization following World War I. The Depression called forth the need for mutual assistance and community solidarity, which translated, in many areas of the country into direct support of the new CIO unions. The ethnic infrastructure of halls, newspapers, neighborhood networks and radio became one of the keys to the success of the organizing drives. Most importantly, it was the hidden basis for worker solidarity. Most remarkable was the intergroup cooperation and mutual support that was engendered. Ethnicity was also given legitimacy by the direct government support of folk cultures to help combat despair and deflect anger and the attraction of radical ideas during the Depression

Another surge in the political expression of ethnicity in these groups emerged across the country in the nineteen sixties as the "new ethnicity." It was not new, but it was a new public expression of it. Its origins were complex and cannot be fully explicated here. To enumerate the main causes however we need to list:

—Détente and the waning intensity of the Cold War, which undermined the need for a façade of, united America.

—Religious change born out of Vatican II, which threatened the religious worldview of many and was used as a new tool of Americanization as *Aggiornamento* became associated with an updated American Catholicism and ethnic enculturations were seen as "Tridentine."

—Assaults on ethnic neighborhoods by city planners, highway builders and private developers.

—The social and political upheavals and the new language of politics born out of the reaction to the Vietnam War.

—Generational change in the ethnic groups themselves accompanied by changes in the economic and educational levels of the groups. Many expressions of the new ethnicity came out of the college-educated third and fourth generations.

—The movement of the Civil Rights Movement north, the confrontation over integration of schools and neighborhoods. This resulted in the shift of the southern metaphors of black and white to multi-ethnic northern cities.

The expression of ethnicity, which resulted, was both positive and negative. They became the basis for new coalitions such as the National Council of Neighborhood Women and the Black Polish Alliance. They also provided the basis for resistance to bussing and movement of African-Americans into ethnic neighborhoods. The most promising result was the neighborhood movement which provided a venue for the expression of the civic virtues of responsibility for neighbors and environment, cooperation and mutuality, community solidarity, the importance of home, family and place as the basis for a politics rooted in ethnicity. In general it was a successful adaptation.

By the nineteen eighties the public language had again changed. The metaphors of Third World resistance to colonialism born out of opposition to the Vietnam War was transferred to domestic politics and Third World people were equated with a new domestic group, "people of color." The black/white metaphor resulted in the leveling of the ethnic reality into a simple bi-polar racial world. Both of these undermined the possibility of a common language to build solidarity.

Supporting a Generous Multiculturalism

With the coming end of the dominations of this bi-polar thinking in American life we can see the possibility of a re-emergence of ethnicity that will include not only the older third and later generations of the old ethnic groups who continue to hunger for identity that has a meaning, a rich culture and a story which "white ethnicity" does not offer, but also the new immigrants from most of these groups who continue to come with the language and culture of the homeland and who must be brought into engagement with American life and culture. For this we need new expressions of ethnicity that can underpin a generous multiculturalism. Its legitimacy has already been established. Now we need to give it rooting in solid values that come out of each ethnic group's experience and to its expression in their different enculturations to be shared across groups.

There are two elements that need to be developed if we are to be successful. First, the soft multiculturalism that is based on superficial sharing of cultures has to be given some rigor. It is now largely based on the exchange of information about the folk and high culture of the homeland and contains almost nothing about the American experience of the group, the cultural adaptations it has developed to make it successful in the New World or its interactions with others. This is where we can learn about the contributions of the group to the civic culture of the communities it lives in.

The second element is that we need to train the leaders of groups to reflect on and tease out of their history precisely those experiences which allowed them to be successful and to contribute and to think about those virtues which are particularly important for ethnic leadership, especially their role in articulating goals and brokering between groups. It is at this point that we will be able

to move to mobilizing ethnic groups to use their experience positively and to teach those lessons abroad.

The Resources

Prior to developing this decentralized model, the Center for the Study of Culture and Values held 3 seminar meetings for the Washington national coordinating councils of the racial and ethnic communities to ascertain their specific requests for assistance. Many of the fifty-plus ethnic organizations with national offices in Washington including the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, the National Italian American Foundation, Order of Sons of Italy, The Polish American Congress, National Council of LaRaza, The One America Foundation, The Lusa-American Foundation and other related organizations represented the most extensive national background and experience devoted to intercultural relations for a period of over three decades with ethnic and racial groups in cities across the country and in countries across the world. These organizations have struggled with the emergence of pluralism and the welter of claims made in pursuit of equitable distribution of resources and support for cultural democracy and the right to the preservation and development of cultural legacies.

These organizations have taken leadership roles in the last several years in a variety of areas, which include but are not limited to:

- (a) co-chairing an ethnic-racial coalition of some 60 plus groups working on the Census procedures for the year 2000;
- (b) instituting a One America award involving such individuals as President Clinton, Muhammad Ali and others;
- (c) instituting a series of seminars dealing with various aspects of racial reconciliation;
- (d) inaugurating a college level course on race and ethnicity in American life, which was first taught at the Catholic University of America in Washington, and is being used in an American college in Italy;
- (e) distributing resources to libraries, teachers at the university and college levels and to the broader local school population at the primary and secondary levels.

The Specific Needs

The wealth of this experience combined with the seminars noted earlier, confirmed our suspicions that the leadership of ethnic-racial organizations in the Washington area need assistance in helping their constituencies face vital and serious challenges. The soundings in the three previous seminars manifest a number of specific, concrete needs had by local racial and ethnic groups if they are to respond to the new challenges. They need and desire help in several key areas:

(1) The first area is that of communications in the broadest sense. That is, to serve the community at large not only in order to attract its help, but also to play their proper role these organizations need to be able to reach out to the media, to the business and labor communities, to American public policy leaders, and to the public at large. Journalist Chuck Conconi, senior editor at *Washingtonian Magazine*, spoke to the ethnic-racial leaders at one seminar as did journalist Michael Barone. The sessions demonstrated a profound interest on the part of the community leaders in learning how to deal with the media and other opinion leaders.

(2) Community based ethnic and racial groups, particularly because of September 11, now have an urgent need for strategic and tactical planning. How can they do their essential jobs while faced with more and more serious problems than ever before, with tensions that divide as well as unite, and in a period of declining resources.

(3) A third major need for the Washington based groups is to create a resource pool so they can assist each other as the occasions arise. In fact the coordinating work done by the Center for the Study of Culture and Values is the sole regular exchange of information among the Washington based ethnic and racial coordinating groups.

The Response

Based on the extensive experience of the principals of this project and the needs expressed by the racial-ethnic leaders in the seminar noted, the following process has been hammered out which we feel can and will be of substantial assistance to the Washington based groups. This is intended not only to provide necessary steps to help them survive and thrive as organizations, but also to assist them in keeping their respective cultures vitally alive while partaking fully of the American experience.

Additionally, we expect that the realization of this program will become a model for other metropolitan areas around the nation. It will be so structured as to provide program concepts and materials for state and community based college programs and local foundations cooperating jointly for the good of their communities.

Monthly Seminars on Specific Training Issues

This initiative of the Center for the Study of Culture and Values includes a series of seminars for the Washington based ethnic-racial coordinating groups.

These seminars will deal with a variety of issues:

(a) *Media and Communications* B as noted, this issue is of paramount importance to the Washington based groups. Veteran Washington journalist will conduct the seminars dealing with any and all aspects of medial relations and of interface with the larger Washington public policy community.

(b) *Sessions on Strategic Planning* B these will draw upon university specialists from the social sciences as well as experts from organizations that have demonstrated specific competence in this area. Stress will be given to attainable short and long-term goals as they relate to the purpose of the individual racial and ethnic organizations.

Several of these sessions will be held on Capitol Hill with an invited audience not only of the community leaders, but also of congressional leaders and its key staff members.

All organizations in the Washington area, whether they have attended such sessions or not, will receive monthly information sheets on the sessions together with key contact information.

Individual Training Sessions

The general sessions described above will be supplemented by intensive individual training sessions with special emphasis on the specific issues of communications and strategic planning while are being faced by particular organizations. These will be selected for this training within

the first few months of the program as a summary of the key points and procedures is distributed to all Washington based groups. The sessions will be conducted by practitioners best suited to work effectively at each of the local sites and liaison with the national racial and ethnic organizations and networks.

The program as described will enable Washington based organizations to contribute substantially to local contexts and thus foster more informed participation and a more effective transmission of intercultural competencies into the civic polity of our nation. Beyond this it also will be a model for other areas, community colleges and foundations in their search to enliven civil society as a base for effective citizen cooperation in times of special tensions and challenges. Over the past three decades materials on ethnic groups in America have researched the following topics: origins, migration, arrival, settlement, economic life social structure, social organization, family and kinship, economic and educational and health behaviors, religion, politics, and large-scale patterns of intergroup relations; the maintenance of group solidarity in terms of language, literature, folklore, food, festivals, music and forms of communication and networking. To deepen such analysis with further attention to the value foundations encased in cultures, to foster the art and science of coalition building at the Congressional District level and to reenergized national and international organizations devoted to shaping public policy in new directions through education and advocacy defines the agenda of service required to meet the challenges of the 21st century. To ignore and deny the significance of non-governmental organizations related to ethnic cultures and to focus on the ragged-edges of conflicts that have engaged race and ethnicity as causes of divisiveness rather than as a cultural resource from which we can mutually draw are two central aspects of the past. The new thrust and new direction that can emerge from the Italicity initiative and the proposed weaving of its potential as a recovered well-spring of values and a potent evocation of the human spirit could resonate not only among those particularly interested in what is Italic but among others engaged in parallel and equivalent probes into the mystery of being as it is manifested in various ways and narratives. These converge into accounts of personhood, peoplehood, nature and the divine—common experiences of reality—which are accessible in the articulations of culture and even "learnable," as we cultivate the capacity to become multi-culturally competent and shape the development of a philosophy of culture addressing current needs.

Notes

1 See W. Edwards Deming, *The New Economics for Industry, Government, Education* (MIT, Center for Advanced Engineering Study: Cambridge, 1994).

2 This macro means does not ignore the fact that no one lives in all of America. However, this statistically unstable mix of ethnicities persists, too lesser and greater extent, even when the analysis is performed using the statewide percentages for p rather than the national averages. Moreover, the data should dispel the persistent myth of a homogenous "white" America, which most data sets provide. The warrant for fine-grain analysis elections is firmly based on statistical grounds. Not surprisingly this research method reflects campaign strategies and the practice used to in voter ID polling and the tactics of targeted turnout.

3 William Lilley, III, Lawrence J. de Franco, and William M. Defenderfer, III, *State Atlas of Political and Cultural Diversity* (Congressional Quarterly Press: Washington DC, 1997)

Chapter VIII

New Identities in a Time of Globalization: The Case of Italy

Alberto Schepisi

Premise

My current posting as Italian Ambassador to Ireland offers me a privileged viewpoint to understand how globalization is transforming the meaning of concepts such as the State, the Nation, the identity of individuals and peoples. In the new global scene created by the whirlwind progress in technology, communications, transport and computer science, Ireland matters so much more than the limited size of its territory and its population of only four million inhabitants might lead one to believe. The tens of millions of people of Irish origin (living above all in the United States, Canada and Australia) are in fact no longer isolated and separated from their homeland, whence their ancestors had fled out of hunger and desperation over a century ago. Globalization has created a network of relationships, of economic, cultural, social and even political opportunities which are a clear proof of the real size of Ireland in the world.

The two communities, the local community enclosed within the State of the Republic of Ireland and the global community scattered in the Irish collectives throughout the world, have become welded and have formed a single unit defined by the term "Irishness". It is almost as if the narrow confines of this small island in the Atlantic slowly expand and mix with the world, until they identify themselves with the world and intertwine with the boundaries of other peoples, other States, other Nations.

By studying the effects of globalization on the roles of States and of Nations, one can now understand how a country which up until a few years ago was very poor, like Ireland, has become, in a very short space of time (which more or less coincides with the time of globalization) one of the richest in Europe, with a "pro capite" income which is even higher than that of its ancient coloniser, the UK.

The New Identities of Peoples and Individuals in the Globalized World

On a planet where space and time, the traditional and concrete points of references within which human life has been always organized, have now become relative and almost abstract concepts because distances are shortened and time is reduced to the point of disappearance, the political boundaries of States are changing in meaning, are becoming weaker and at the same time are spreading out. States are no longer the only subjects of international law: above and below these, new subjects are being born. These are the supranational and transnational public and private bodies, the international organisations, both of universal and regional nature, the ethnic minorities, the regions, the local bodies, and even the individuals themselves, who acquire an international legal personality when their right to turn to the International Courts of Justice, independently of their nationality, is recognised.

It is as if international law is slowly rotating on an axis which, moving away from its traditional horizontal plane, tends towards a vertical position until it forms a pyramid, (with similarities to the medieval world) in which variable, mobile and intersecting institutional geometric units are present. In this new order of international society produced by globalization,

it becomes more and more important for individuals to feel they belong culturally and spiritually in the sense of nationality, rather than legal and formally in the sense of citizenship.

Besides a passport, which is issued on the basis of precise formal prerequisites, the cultural choices, the style of life and the constantly developing identity of an individual in fact acquire importance in order to define him/her. In a world where the reality of life does not coincide with the abstract borders of politics, and in which concrete interests unite all men in the perception and awareness of a shared destiny, the identity of peoples, nations, and individuals transcends and exceeds the size of a State's territory.

The space of States, freed from the artificial boundaries marked by politics, is spreading; it, therefore, becomes an open place, a place for dialogue and comparison where belonging does not derive from formal prerequisites of a juridical nature. In such wider spaces, on the contrary, the sense of belonging rather stems from the consciousness and perception of a shared past (history, traditions, customs handed down throughout the centuries); but also, and above all, it derives both from sharing, in the present, the same values, ways of life and cultural models, and from a common vision of one's future destiny and one's role in the world.

In this more open world, real identities, not anymore strictly linked with their territory (which were the almost exclusive source of protection and survival of men when agriculture constituted the greater portion of national income), constantly interact with each other, free from conventional limits. They become, like a kaleidoscope in continuous movement, more exposed to comparison, dialogue, and change. In our time of globalization they live no more in the isolation which anchored and tied them to an idealized past for fear of facing the realities of the present and the uncertainties of the future. As a matter of fact this isolation gave them the illusion (that they felt could be granted by a rigid territorial protection) of escaping the dangers of external contamination, and made them unnecessarily aggressive against anything "new" and "different".

The new identities of peoples and individuals have, in the pluralistic and global village, become factors of reciprocal enrichment, of comparison and dialogue, in the same way as spoken languages are constantly transforming and changing ("panta rei") in order to survive, like the very nature of living creatures. In a globalized world, the equal dignity of all citizens and every nation must coexist side by side and be in harmony with pluralism, with the diversity of cultures, identities and the ways of life of "the others". In a world without boundaries, "local" and "global" are no longer in antithesis. The particular and the universal become the two sides of the same coin: one cannot be apart from the other. In a world of territorial divisions, of traditional identities, threats came from outside. In order to protect oneself, it was necessary to erect frontiers, to build walls (as happened not only in the Middle Ages but even in our days; just think of the Berlin wall), physical and legal obstacles against the contaminations and dangers from anything "different" and "new". In the world of new identities, originated by globalization, threats to the existence and the survival of human beings no longer arise from a space which is external to one's own territory.

The challenges posed in the 21st century (terrorism, organised crime, infectious diseases, pollution, the energy crisis) are transnational and no longer occupy defined spaces or respect State boundaries: no country can tackle them on their own, or can erect barriers or walls to avoid them, because they can penetrate any territory and any space. The battlefield is everywhere and everybody lives inside the battlefield. As an effect of the growing emigration of peoples in the 21st century we can no longer expect to find, even in the very houses where we live, uniformity of usages, customs or languages. Our identity is constantly challenged by the exposure to different identities, which no law can succeed in negating.

The new identities of individuals and peoples in the third millennium, untethered as they are from territory and constantly exposed to new contacts and changes, are therefore subjective and not objective; they are variable, they are mobile: they are not crystallised; they are inclusive and not exclusive; peaceful and not aggressive and violent: they have to co-exist in a pluralistic, open society which is constantly evolving and must be tolerant and respectful of the diversity of others in order to survive.

The Meaning of Italian Identity in the Globalized World

Similar to Ireland, Italy too has known the tragedy of emigration in its history, the difference being that its citizens did not know—like the Irish—the language of the new world where they went to start a new life. And just as for Ireland, the tens of millions of Italians (with or without a passport: this difference, as I mentioned before, is no longer so fundamental) who are living in the five continents—their "diaspora"—now constitute a great resource. Not only for their homeland but for all human kind. They are an asset for their land of origin because these millions of people constitute, through their choices, their style of life, the continuing affirmation of their own identities, an outstanding contribution to the economic, cultural and linguistic development of our country. Before globalization, their identity remained detached from their previous homeland, therefore losing the capacity for comparison, for growth, for renewal and therefore risking - as often happens to identities deprived of connections—the loss of the sense of their own origins, thus becoming a kind of a "caricature" of the reality which has long since gone.

Globalization has, instead, made it possible for these identities to reconnect with the reality of their Italian origins and therefore to live, not just in the memory of a distant past, in an unreal present and with the perspective of a future where, in their new homeland, they will be assimilated, and therefore disappear. On the contrary, globalization allows these identities to live in a present and real world, where it is possible to find a new equilibrium and harmony between a nostalgic past and a hopeful future.

I believe that Italians, more than any other people, are particularly fit and ready for the experience of globalization. Their weak sense of belonging caused by the tormented events of history which only over a century ago brought political unity to the nation; their local and particular cultures which are the products of the history of a land divided for centuries into small political entities, constantly dismembered and then recomposed under different foreign dominations; and, moreover, the knowledge of being, despite extreme political and territorial fragmentation, part of universal entities (like the Empire and the Church); all of these elements, together with a flexible character which is generally open to foreigners, make of the Italians a people whose characteristics seem ideal to tackle this new phase in the history of the world.

It is not by chance that the Italian way of life, which places greater emphasis on quality rather than on quantity, is spreading ever more throughout the world. In a society where the concept of the property of goods and services (which is mainly related to an idea of territory and of quantity), is slowly being replaced by the idea (tied more to the quality of life, which knows no territorial limits) of temporary access and availability to goods and services (I am thinking of Rifkin's book, *The Civilisation of Access*), Italian culture is becoming an example that is increasingly appreciated in many fields: in fashion, in music, in art, in design and in gastronomy.

With its position in the Mediterranean, Italy has always been, by necessity if not by choice, a land of networks, of links, marked by a universalistic vocation which attempts to respond to the conflicts and divisions of the world with a push for unification which goes beyond its boundaries.

This universality, whose heritage has been the cause of delays and weaknesses for our country for an entire phase of its history, can today be transformed into an advantage, and that is to say, into a capacity to see more freely beyond the narrow confines of the State. Lets think, in this respect, to the construction of Europe. Whilst the stronger countries will be hesitant to free themselves from the constraints of their State, Italy will be burdened by a lesser load and, in this new era of globalization, its weakness, precluding any imperialistic or neo-colonial connotation (or temptation...), can rather become a force in the service of peace and international co-operation.

Yes, Italy can be a force in the service of the progress of nations in order to build a pluralistic and democratic world, free from the barriers of fundamentalism and nationalism,—a new world where goods and services will be accessible and guaranteed to everyone. Yes, Italy can be a force for a safer and more peaceful world, enriched by its different identities, but at the same time a world united in the knowledge of the shared destiny of present and future generations.

Chapter IX

Italic Identities and the Development of Intercultural Competencies

George F. McLean

Italicity

This conference continues the work published as *The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age*. That conference did not consider cultural identities simply as a matter of a particular people bound by the territorial boundaries of their people. On the contrary it looked at cultural identities as achievements of humanity constituting integral dimensions of our common patrimony. Thus whereas natural resources, whether the money in a person's wallet or the iron in a people's mines, are theirs and cannot be shared without being diminished, the resources of the spirit may be multiplied and by that very process be intensified rather than diminished. Cultures then were described in terms of the openness of their destiny, and thus as "Italic" because "Italian" is something which belongs restrictively to the peoples and nation of Italy.

Such a notion is rather new, however, because it reflects the quite recent rediscovery of cultures as the spiritual dimension of the human person integrating all of life, both external and internal. Moreover the notion of italicity adds recognition of the emerging consciousness of the expansion not only of economic interchange, but of information to create a truly global milieu. What is the status of a culture as rich as that of the long Italian tradition precisely as it slips the bond of space and is drawn upon by others to enrich their lives?

Such was the status questions of our conference one year ago. At the end, in an executive committee meeting it was suggested by at least one person that the notion of "Italicity" was in need of further exploration. If this meeting had succeeded in detaching it from the bounds of territory and politics in what in fact did Italicity consist? This is a difficult question for it is not a material object physically observable and describable, and able to be categorized though abstraction in clearly defined universal terms. Rather it is a type of aesthetic paradigm like the Parthenon in Athens which inspires a limitless number of variations, none of which exhaust the potential of the paradigm. "Italicity" is not an object to be observed and exhaustively described once and for all, but an inspiration to be creatively unfolded in ever new ways with each new opportunity for human creativity. It adds spice and flair to what otherwise would be ordinary and mundane; it adds verve to what could otherwise be staid; it embodies a *joie de vivre* as when the sun is shining, and an ability to adjust and tenaciously to survive when the things turn dark and somber.

Perhaps then what might be sought is not so much a clarification of the term or notion of Italicity, but a way of drawing upon it in the process of facing the challenges of life. But what are these challenges for our day?

Pluralism and Intercultural Competencies

My suggestion is reflected in the title of this conference. Originally it read "Italian Identities" which of course, and for reasons noted above, was changed to "Italic Identities". But it continues with the words "pluralistic contexts" and the subtitle "Toward the Development of Intercultural Competencies." These words are in recognition of the fact that since our last meeting cultural identities have been plunged into chaotic confrontation through efforts violently to impose one culture upon another and the deep and pervasive reaction against this across the world and even in

the United Nations. If we wish to look for ways in which cultures in their uniqueness can be shared fruitfully with others we cannot ignore this major experience of the last year and the guidance it can offer. And if you can bring to Washington some positive sense of the way cultures can contribute positively to one another it will be a gift most urgently needed.

"Italicity" does exist among an increasingly self-conscious set of diverse cultures which now must coexist as a matter not of violent imposition, but of suave cooperation. This is not something with which we are born, but is a competency to be developed. However, the term "competency" should not suggest reduction to a mere skill similar to that of the tradesman in manipulating various materials to obtain the appropriate result. In this case we are dealing rather in the aesthetic order in search of harmony in a conflicted world. Here we look again at "Italicity", not merely as an export to enrich others, but with concern for how it can work creatively with others to build human comity in a conflictual world. We look to "Italicity" both for its content and for the manner and mode of that content, both as meaning and as style.

Certainly it could not be my part of this conference to speak to "Italicity" either as content or as style. Though I lived in Italy continually for seven years, this task must be left to those born and raised in its culture. Yet it could be helpful here at the beginning of our deliberations to suggest ideas that have emerged from developments in the fields of hermeneutics as the art of the interpretation and application of cultures. First, I would like to draw upon some notions regarding the nature and process of cultures which I prepared but did not present last year; these appeared in the Proceedings volume: *The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of Globalization* and then suggest a way of applying these to our issue, namely, the contribution of "Italicity" to the development of intercultural competencies.

First of all, then what is a culture?

Cultural Traditions

Together, these values and virtues of a people set the pattern of social life through which freedom is developed and exercised. This is called a "culture". On the one hand, the term is derived from the Latin word for tilling or cultivating the land. Cicero and other Latin authors used it for the cultivation of the soul or mind (*cultura animi*), for just as good land, when left without cultivation, will produce only disordered vegetation of little value, so the human spirit will not achieve its proper results unless trained or educated.¹ This sense of culture corresponds most closely to the Greek term for education (*paideia*) as the development of character, taste and judgment, and to the German term "formation" (*Bildung*).²

Here, the focus is upon the creative capacity of the spirit of a people and their ability to work as artists, not only in the restricted sense of producing purely aesthetic objects, but in the more involved sense of shaping all dimensions of life, material and spiritual, economic and political into a fulfilling. The result is a whole life, characterized by unity and truth, goodness and beauty, and, thereby, sharing deeply in meaning and value. The capacity for this cannot be taught, although it may be enhanced by education; more recent phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiries suggest that, at its base, culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation.³ This leads us beyond self and other, beyond identity and diversity, in order to comprehend both.

This constitutes the basic topology of a culture; as repeatedly reaffirmed through time, it builds a tradition or heritage about which we shall speak below. It constitutes, as well, the prime pattern and gradation of goods or values which persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through

lenses formed, as it were, by their family and culture and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history—often in its most trying circumstances. Like a pair of glasses, values do not create the object but focus attention upon certain goods rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for the affective and emotional life described by the Scots, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, as the heart of civil society. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action which, in turn, reinforce the pattern of values.

Through this process a group constitutes the concerns in terms of which it struggles to advance or at least to endure, mourns its failures, and celebrates its successes. This is a person's or people's world of hopes and fears in terms of which, as Plato wrote in the *Laches*, their lives have moral meaning.⁴ It is varied according to the many concerns and the groups which coalesce around them. As these are interlocking and interdependent a pattern of social goals and concerns develops which guides action. In turn, corresponding capacities for action or virtues are developed.

This sense of tradition is vivid in premodern and village communities, but would appear to be much less so in modern urban centers. Undoubtedly this is in part due to the difficulty in forming active community life in large urban centers. However, the cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values of a culture through time is not only heritage or what is received, but new creation as this is passed on in new ways and in response to emerging challenges. Attending to tradition, taken in this active sense, allows us not only to uncover the permanent and universal truths which Socrates sought, but to perceive the importance of values we receive from the tradition and to mobilize our own life project actively toward the future. This diachronic sense of culture will be treated more below.

But because tradition has sometimes been interpreted as a threat to the personal and social freedom essential to a democracy, it is important here to note that a cultural tradition is generated by the free and responsible life of the members of a concerned community or civil society and enables succeeding generations to realize their life with freedom and creativity.

In fact, the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to a people's evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history, the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. Horizontally, we learn from experience what promotes and what destroys life and, accordingly, make pragmatic adjustments.

But even this language remains too abstract, too limited to method or technique, too unidimensional. While tradition can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feedback mechanisms and might seem merely to concern how to cope in daily life, what is being spoken about are free acts that are expressive of passionate human commitment and personal sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances and constructing and defending one's nation. Moreover, this wisdom is not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns; it concerns rather the meaning we are able to envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments over a period of generations, i.e., what is truly worth striving for and the pattern of social interaction in which this can be lived richly. The result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes our awareness of the bases for the decisions of which history is constituted.

This points us beyond the horizontal plane of the various ages of history; it directs our attention vertically to its ground and, hence, to the bases of the values which humankind in its varied circumstances seeks to realize.⁵ It is here that one searches for the absolute ground of

meaning and value of which Iqbal wrote. Without that all is ultimately relative to only an interlocking network of consumption, then of dissatisfaction and finally of anomie and ennui.

The impact of the convergence of cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and its imaginative configuration in such great epics as the Iliad or Odyssey. All conspire to constitute a culture which, like a giant telecommunications dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range and penetration of our personal sensitivity, free decision and mutual concern.

Tradition, then, is not, as is history, simply everything that ever happened, whether good or bad. It is rather what appears significant for human life: it is what has been seen through time and human experience to be deeply true and necessary for human life. It contains the values to which our forebears first freely gave their passionate commitment in specific historical circumstances and then constantly reviewed, rectified and progressively passed on generation after generation. The content of a tradition, expressed in works of literature and all the many facets of a culture, emerges progressively as something upon which personal character and society can be built. It constitutes a rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it be accepted and embraced, affirmed and cultivated.

Hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part or arbitrary will on the part of our forebears that our culture provides a model and exemplar. On the contrary, the importance of tradition derives from both the cooperative character of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience and the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have defined, defended and passed on through time the corporate life of the community as civil society.⁶

Ultimately, tradition bridges from ancient philosophy to civil society today. It bears the divine gifts of life, meaning and love, uncovered in facing the challenges of civil life through the ages. It provides both the way back to their origin in the arché as the personal, free and responsible exercise of existence and even of its divine source, and the way forward to their goal; it is the way, that is, both to their Alpha and their Omega.

Hermeneutic Interpretation and Application of One's Cultural Tradition

Dialectic of Whole and Part

First of all it is necessary to note that only a unity of meaning, that is, an identity, is intelligible.⁷ Just as it is not possible to understand a number three if we include but two units, no act of understanding is possible unless it is directed to an identity or whole of meaning. This brings us directly to the classic issue in the field of hermeneutics, described above as the hermeneutic circle, namely, knowledge of the whole depends upon knowledge of the parts, and vice versa. How can we make this work for, rather than against us in the effort to live our cultural tradition in our global days?

Reflection on the experience of reading a text might prove helpful. As we read we construe the meaning of a sentence before grasping all its individual parts. What we construe is dependent upon our expectation of the meaning of the sentence, which we derived from its first words, the prior context, or more likely a combination of the two. In turn, our expectation or construal of the meaning of the text is adjusted according to the requirements of its various parts. As we proceed to read through the sentence, the paragraph, etc., we reassess continually the whole in terms of the parts and the parts in terms of the whole. This basically circular movement continues until all appear to fit and be expressive.

One set of problems regarding a hermeneutics of tradition concerns not its content but rather its relation to the present, for if our present life is simply a deadening repetition of what has already been known, then life loses its challenge, progress is rejected in principle, and hope dies. Let us turn then from tradition as a whole to its hermeneutic application in our days.

Novelty

To understand this we must, first of all, take time seriously, that is, we must recognize that reality includes authentic novelty. This contrasts to the perspective of Plato for whom the real is idea or form which transcends matter and time, while these, in turn, are real only to the degree that they imitate or mirror the ideal. It also goes beyond the perspective of rationalism in its search for simple natures which are clear, distinct and eternal in themselves and in their relations. A fortiori, it goes beyond simply following a method as such without attention to content.

In contrast to all these, to recognize novelty – especially the novelty of our living of our own tradition – implies that tradition with its authority (or *nomos*) achieves its perfection not in opposition to, but in the very temporal unfolding of, reality. For the human person is both determined by, and determinative of, his changing physical and social universe. Hence, to appreciate moral values one must attend to human action: to the striving of persons to realize their lives, and to the formation of this striving into a fixed attitude (*hexis*). In distinction from physics then, ethos as the application of tradition consists neither of law nor of lawlessness, but concerns human institutions and attitudes which change. Ethical rules do not determine, but they do regulate action by providing certain broad guidelines for historical practice.⁸

What is important here is to protect the concrete and unique reality of human life—its novelty—and hence the historicity of our life. As our response to the good is made only in concrete circumstances, our cultural tradition and our ethics as a philosophic science must be neither purely theoretical knowledge nor a simple historical accounting from the past, but we must enable our cultural tradition via our moral consciousness to help in concrete circumstances.

Application and Prudence: Ethics vs Techné

In this an important distinction must be made between *technè* and ethics. In *technè* action is governed by an idea as an exemplary cause which is fully determined and known by objective theoretical knowledge (*epistème*). Skill consists in knowing how to act according to a well-understood idea or plan. When this cannot be carried out some parts of it are simply omitted in the execution.

In ethics the situation, though similar in being an application of a practical guide to a particular task, differs in important ways. First, in moral action the subject makes oneself as much as one makes the object: the agent is differentiated by the action itself. Hence, moral knowledge as an understanding of the appropriateness of one's actions is not fully determined independently of the situation.

Secondly, the adaptations by the moral agent in applying the law or traditions found in the various cultures do not diminish them, but rather correct and perfect them. In themselves laws and traditions are imperfect for, inasmuch as they relate to a world which is less ordered, they cannot contain in any explicit manner the response to the concrete possibilities which arise in history. It is precisely here that man's freedom and creativity are located. This does not consist in the response being arbitrary, for Kant is right that freedom without law or some traditional guiding

nomos has no meaning. Nor does it consist in a simply automatic response determined by the historical situation, for relativism too would undermine the notion of human freedom. Human freedom consists rather in shaping the present according to a sense of what is just and good and in a way which manifests and indeed create for the first time more of what justice and goodness means.

That laws and tradition are perfected by their application in the circumstances appears also from the way they are not diminished, but perfected by *epoche* and equity. Without these, by simple mechanical replication the law would work injustice rather than justice. Ethics, therefore, is not only knowledge of what is right in general but the search for what is right in the situation. This is a question, not of mere expediency, but of the perfection of the law and tradition; it completes moral knowledge.⁹

The question of what the situation is asking of us is answered, of course, not by sense knowledge which simply registers a set of concrete facts. It is answered rather in the light of what is right, that is, in the light of what has been discovered about appropriate human action and exists normatively in the tradition. Only in these terms can moral consciousness go about its major job of choosing means which are truly appropriate to the circumstances. This is properly the work of intellect (*nous*) with the virtue of prudence (*phronesis*), that is, thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means in the circumstances. These now include the new components of one's own living cultural tradition; they include as well the other participants of a pluralist civilization. Indeed in the new global context they include all civilizations with all existent differences.

In sum, application is not a subsequent or accidental part of understanding, but rather codetermines this understanding from the beginning. Moral consciousness must seek to understand the good, not as an ideal to be known and then applied, but rather by and in relating this to oneself as sharing the concerns of others. In this light our sense of unity with others begins to appear as a condition for applying our tradition, that is, for enabling it to live in these global times.

There is then a way out of the hermeneutic circle. It is not by ignoring or denying our horizons and prejudices, but by recognizing them as inevitable and making them work for us. To do so we must direct our attention to the objective meaning of the text in order to draw out, not only its meaning for the author, but its application for the present. Through this process of application one serves as midwife for the historicity of tradition or culture, and enables it to give birth to the future.¹⁰

Hermeneutics as Interpretation of Other Cultural Traditions

We must now see how hermeneutics can help toward a better understanding of the structure of communication between peoples, what dynamisms separate us, make sagacity (*sunesis*) difficult, impede our judgment and thus inhibit living our tradition in a pluralistic context?¹¹

Thus far we have treated, first, the character and importance of tradition as the bearer of long human experience interacting with the world, with other men and with God. It is constituted not only of chronological facts, but of insights regarding human perfection and values and virtues which over time have been forged into cultures and civilizations in man's concrete striving to live with dignity, e.g. the Indian ideal of peace, the Greek notion of democracy, the enlightenment notions of equality and freedom. By their internal value each stands as normative in relation to the aspirations of those who live within that culture.

Secondly, we have seen the implications for the content of tradition of the continually unfolding circumstances of historical development. These do not merely extend or repeat what went before, but constitute an emerging manifestation of the dynamic character of the classical vision articulated in epics, in law and in political movements.

It remains now to look at how, conscious of our own tradition, we can live it faithfully and fruitfully with others in a time of intensifying intercultural engagement and cultural pluralism.

In brief the glorious character of a cultural tradition has its down side. For the greater be that tradition and the more beautiful, successful and satisfying the life it engenders, the more one is liable to remain therein in a process of mere repetition. Innovation and creativity shrivel and the response to new challenges is less vigorous, innovative and successful. If we hear only the same stories, fables and proverbs we remain locked into one mind set or horizon. The way out requires access to new stories which reflect the life experience and creative responses of other peoples. Their effect is not so much to add to our culture from without elements that are alien and incongruous, but to enable us to look afresh at our own cultural tradition and to draw out in a creative manner new responses to the new challenges we face.

Dialectic of Horizons

In encountering other cultural traditions we begin to look more consciously into our own tradition and come to a prior conception of its content. This anticipation of meaning is not simply of the tradition as an objective or fixed content over and against us. It is rather what we reproduce uniquely in our hearts and minds as we participate in the evolution of the tradition, thereby further determining ourselves as a community. This is a creative stance reflecting the content, not only of the past, but of the time in which I stand and of the overall life project in which I am engaged. For the cultural tradition it is a creative unveiling of its content as this comes progressively and historically into the present and, through the present, passes into the future.¹²

In this light time is not a barrier, a separation or an abyss, but rather a bridge and an opportunity for the process of understanding; it is a fertile ground filled with experience, custom and tradition. The importance of the historical distance it provides is not that it enables the subjective reality of persons to disappear so that the objectivity of the situation can emerge. On the contrary, it makes possible a more appreciative meaning of our own and other cultural traditions, not only by removing falsifying factors, but by opening new sources of self and inter-subjective understanding and new perspectives. These reveal in the traditions unsuspected implications and even new dimensions of meaning of which heretofore we were unaware.¹³

Of course, not all our acts of understandings are correct, whether they be about the meaning of another culture, its set of goals or a plan for future action. Hence, it becomes particularly important that our understandings not be adhered to fixedly, but be put at risk in dialogue with others.

In this the basic elements of meaning remain the substances which Aristotle described in terms of their autonomy or of standing in their own right, and, by implication, of their identity. Hermeneutics would expand this to reflect as well the historical and hermeneutic situation of each person or cultural tradition in the dialogue, that is, their horizon or particular possibility for understanding. A horizon is all that can be seen from one's vantage point(s). In reading a text or in a dialogue with other cultural traditions it is necessary to be aware of our horizon as well as that of our partners. When our initial projection of the meaning of another's words, the content of a cultural tradition or a sacred text will not bear up in the progress of the reading or the dialogue,

our desire to hear our interlocutor in the conversation drives us to make needed adjustments in our projection of their meaning.

The assessment of what is truly appropriate requires also the virtue of sagacity (*sunesis*), that is, of understanding or concern for the other. One can assess the situation adequately only inasmuch as one in a sense undergoes the situation with the affected parties. Aristotle rightly describes as truly terrible the one who can make the most of the situation, but without orientation towards moral ends or concern for the good of others in this situation. Hence, there is need for knowledge which takes account of agent as united with the others in mutual interest or love.

This enables us to adjust not only our prior understanding of the horizon of the other with whom we are in dialogue, but especially our own horizon. One need not fear being trapped in the horizons of our own cultural tradition or religion. They are vantage points of a mind which in principle is open and mobile, capable of being aware of its own horizon and of reaching out to the other's experience which constitutes their horizons. Our horizons are not limitations, but mountain tops from which we look in awe at the vast panorama all of humankind and indeed all of creation. It is in making us aware of this expansion of horizons that hermeneutic awareness accomplishes our liberation.¹⁴

In this process it is important that we remain alert to the new implications of our cultural tradition. We must not simply follow through with our previous ideas until a change is forced upon us, but must be sensitive to new meanings in true openness. This is neither neutrality as regards the meaning of our tradition, nor an extinction of passionate concerns regarding action towards the future. Rather, being aware of our own biases or prejudices and adjusting them in dialogue with others implies rejecting what impedes our understanding of our own tradition and that of others. Our attitude in approaching dialogue must be one of willingness continually to revise, renew and enrich our initial projection or expectation of meaning.

Dialectic of Question and Answer

The effort to draw upon a tradition and in dialogue to discover its meaning for the present supposes authentic openness. The logical structure of this openness is to be found in the exchange of question and answer. The question is required in order to determine just what issue we are engaging—whether it is this issue or that—in order to give direction to our attention. Without this no meaningful answer can be given or received. As a question, however, it requires that the answer not be settled or determined. In sum, progress or discovery requires an openness which is not simply indeterminacy, but a question which gives specific direction to our attention and enables us to consider significant evidence. (Note that we can proceed not only by means of positive evidence in favor of one of two possible responses, but also through dissolving counter arguments).

If discovery depends upon the question, then the art of discovery is the art of questioning. Consequently, whether working alone or in conjunction with others, our effort to find the answer should be directed less towards suppressing the position of another culture and the questions it raises, than toward reinforcing and unfolding these questions. To the degree that their probabilities are built up and intensified they can serve as a searchlight. This is the opposite of both opinion which tends to suppress questions, and of arguing which searches out the weakness in the other's argument. Instead, in conversation as dialogue with other cultures and civilizations one enters upon a mutual search to maximize the possibilities of the question, even by speaking at cross-purposes. By mutually eliminating errors and working out a common meaning, we discover truth.¹⁵

Further, it should not be presupposed that a text or tradition holds the answer to but one question or horizon which must be identified by the reader. On the contrary, the full horizon and above all its transcendent source is never available to the reader. Nor can it be expected that there is but one question to which the global text or its multiple traditions hold an answer. The sense of any text, (a fortiori the global text,) reaches beyond what any human author intended.

Because of the dynamic character of being as it emerges in time, the horizon is never fixed but is continually opening. This constitutes the effective historical element in understanding. At each step new dimensions of the potentialities of the tradition opens to understanding. Especially, the meaning of a text or tradition lives with the consciousness – and hence the horizons – not of its author, but of the many who live the tradition with others through time and history. It is the broadening of their horizons, resulting from their fusion with the horizon of a text or a partner in dialogue, that makes it possible to receive answers which are ever new.¹⁶

In this the personal attitudes and interests of the various cultures are, once again, highly important. If the interest in developing new horizons were simply the promotion of one's own understanding then one culture could be interested solely in achieving knowledge for the purpose of domination over others. But this would lock one into an absoluteness of one's prejudices; being fixed or closed in the past or in oneself they would disallow new life in the present. In this manner powerful new insights become with time deadening pre-judgments which suppress freedom.

In contrast, an attitude of authentic openness appreciates the nature of one's own finiteness. On this basis it both respects the past and the multiple cultural traditions and is open to discerning the future. Such openness is a matter, not merely of new information, but of recognizing the historical nature of man. It enables one to escape from limitations which had limited vision thus far, and enables one to learn from new experiences. It is recognition of the limitations of our finite projects which enables us to see that the future is still open.¹⁷

This suggests that openness does not consist so much in surveying others objectively or obeying them in a slavish and unquestioning manner, but is directed primarily to ourselves. It is an extension of our ability to listen to others and other cultures, and to assimilate the implications of their answers for changes in our own positions. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that our cultural heritage has something new to say to us. The characteristic hermeneutic attitude of effective historical consciousness is then not methodological sureness, but devout listening and a readiness for experience.¹⁸ Seen in these terms our cultural heritage is not closed, but the basis for a life that is ever new, more inclusive and richer.

Encounter of Traditions and Cultural Enrichment

From the above we can conclude that the encounter with other cultures should not mean absorption of one by the other for each has its own organic identity developed over centuries and embedded in its language and symbol system. These cannot be taken away and supplanted by one that is alien without the most profound disorientation.

But neither should one think simply of grafting elements of one culture upon another for that would constitute a strange creature lacking in harmony and integration. Indeed we find in medical transplants as well as in confronting major immigration the tendency of a body to protect itself and to reject alien elements.

If neither of these approaches is conceivable then another approach is needed. This is to add new elements not from without, but from within. To be born into a culture that has been elaborated by our forebears through the ages is to be endowed with a great gift. We are able to draw upon this

to the degree that we can raise questions and look thereto for a response. If there are limitations in outlook they might be not so much on the part of the cultural tradition or outlook but on our part, that is, in our inability to raise the pertinent questions. This is understandable if we have heard only the same proverbs and stories and if these come from persons who share our same culture.

In order to be able to raise truly new questions we need to hear new stories and see new ways of doing things. The effect is not to graft alien elements upon us, but to stimulate our minds so that we can interpolate our tradition afresh and draw forth not only wisdom that is old and developed in response to earlier circumstances, but insight that is fresh in response to present challenges.

This requires that cultures be possessed of inexhaustible resources. For this there are both religious and philosophical reasons. Huntington points out in his *Clash of Civilizations* that each great civilization is rooted in a great religion and correspondingly—with the exception of Buddhism—that each great religion has given birth to a great civilization. As civilizations are the largest cultural unit, indeed the largest "we", this entails that inherent within a culture or civilization there is a relation to the infinite and inexhaustible one, true and good. As no culture can exhaust this, if correctly addressed it can always generate new meaning consistent with its own identity as the mediating structure.

Philosophically Martin Heidegger developed this through his notion of the inexhaustible abyss of being emerging into time or being unveiled through the *dasein* or conscious human being. In this light truth and hence the other transcendental properties are not limited realities assembled like stone blocks as material for constructing a building, and therefore soon to be exhausted, but a limitless flow of reality as *daseins* and communities live through time.

In our case this suggests a special contribution for Italicity and one for which it may be especially fit. Last year it was said that because the national structure of Italy was more recent at least by comparison with many other nations and because "la donna e mobile" it might be hoped that its culture could be more readily exported. I would suggest also that especially because of its exciting vivacity and its ability always to make a "combination" it is especially capable of stimulating one to think afresh, and to see even their own culture in new light so as to draw forth from this responses that are truly creative in responding the challenges of the day.

This ability to respond to challenges might be thought of as enabling merely pragmatic steps in a mechanistic feedback mechanism. But beyond that one might also note that the questions raised by meeting another culture in new circumstances may be more spectacular yet. For what can be stimulated is not only a horizontal step along our path through time and space, but a vertical deepening of our whole sense of meaning and value, of the quality of our hopes and our commitments. It is particularly this depth dimension which can be opened by meeting a new culture. It is not simply how to manufacture some product or how to handle some special problem, but the stimulus to see life somewhat differently, to bring forth more of the potential of one's culture and thus to live more fully. For this the zest for life, which is perhaps the special character of Italic culture, could prove particularly appropriate.

Notes

1 V. Mathieu, "Cultura" in *Enciclopedia Filosofica* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967), II, 207-210; and Raymond Williams, "Culture and Civilization," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), II, 273-276, and *Culture and Society* (London: 1958).

2 Tonnelat, "Kultur" in *Civilisation, le mot et l'idée* (Paris: Centre International de Synthese), II.

3 V. Mathieu, "Cultura" in *Enciclopedia Filosofica* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1967), II, 207-210; and Raymond Williams, "Culture and Civilization," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), II, 273-276, and *Culture and Society* (London: 1958).

4 *Laches*, 198-201.

5 H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translated from the 2nd German edition, 1965, by G. Barden and J. Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1975), pp. 245-253.

6 *Ibid.* Gadamer emphasized knowledge as the basis of tradition in contrast to those who would see it pejoratively as the result of arbitrary will. It is important to add to knowledge the free acts which, e.g., give birth to a nation and shape the attitudes and values of successive generations. As an example one might cite the continuing impact had by the Magna Carta through the Declaration of Independence upon life in North America, or of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in the national life of so many countries.

7 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

8 *On History* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), pp. 177, 202.

9 *Dynamics of World History* (La Sulle, IL: Sheed and Ward, 1959), pp. 51, 402.

10 *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

11 Gadamer, pp. 278-289.

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 261-264.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 262.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 263-264.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 333-341.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 273-341.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 336-340.

18 *Ibid.*, pp. 319-324.

Chapter X
Comments: Italic Identities and Pluralistic Contexts
Paul Paolicelli

I am a journalist and writer, not an academician, and not necessarily skilled or prepared for such a broad and important topic. In fact, I've had to immerse myself in an attempt to define some of the basic terms being discussed. I think, as the grandson of Italian immigrants, I do understand "italicity," if only because I've written a book in an attempt to define Italian values which have been transported and translated to the New World.

I'm reminded of a cartoon I once read that showed a little girl excited over a pending visit by "the Italians." "The Italians are coming," she repeated to everyone in her acquaintance. When the big day finally arrived the child was beaming. She told one of "the Italians" that she was "part" Italian. "What part is Italian?" the visitor asked. "My stomach," she said, proudly.

Well, if I had to say what part of me is Italian, I'd have to say my heart. For if I understand the sense of "Italicity," then it comes from the heart and from the values of our culture and heritage which rest in the heart as much, as if not more than, the psyche.

A few years ago, as I was in Sicily researching my second book, *Under the Southern Sun*, I had the privilege of interviewing Nené Troncale, the nephew of the American film director Frank Capra. The Troncale family is the last remaining branch of the Capra family in Italy. I was fascinated by the story of a poor Sicilian boy who could come to the United States without wealth or letters and, within a generation, define though the art of motion pictures, nothing less than America for Americans. "You have to remember," Nené told me, "my people didn't bring valuables to America, they brought values." It's those values that I believe are at the core of "italicity," if I understand it correctly.

As a result of those values and of our history, I do not think that Italian Americans can be approached from the Italian side of the equation. Rather, I think any approach or discussion of their "italicity" now needs to stem from the American experience. We are more than a century away from the great wave of Diaspora that began in the early 1880s. After two world wars, several lesser wars, a moon landing, a presidential assassination and resignation, and countless other "American" experiences too numerous to mention, any contemporary linkage for Italian Americans with the political entity of Italy is tenuous, at best. Our young people have a definition of "being Italian" that is sensibility more than memory or, sadly in some cases, facts. Many of us dealing with the American part of that experience are trying to find the way to reach our young people with a meaningful and significant set of definitions to retain the "Italian" part of our culture. Those definitions must be broader than a "Godfather" or "goomba" image, or we will lose the links with our heritage in another generation. Many of us believe those links must come from, in great part, our literature; Italian American literature, so long ignored by the general American publishing houses and general reading public.

As Helen Barolini has so eloquently pointed out, there has been a great mythology about Italian American readers and an aversion to publish our literature based on that marketing strategy and mythology. We are making some inroads into that bias, but the truth remains that Italian Americans, by and large, don't seem to demand a literature of their heritage, but prefer to stay within the confines of oral family histories.

The Italian American story is an important and essential part of the American story, yet it hasn't received the same attention, distribution, promotion or readership that general historians

enjoy. I believe part of the problem lies with the insistence on "genre" for marketing of literature, and the assignment of "genre" that is often misleading or inaccurate. Much nonfiction writing that tells the stories of our Americanization process, writing that details the lives of our own families, has generally been relegated to intellectually ethnic and political ghettos and neatly restricted to those byways by publishers and public alike. We need to bring that literature out into the broader market place. To define it for what these tales truly are: the stories of how Americans are and were made, and why. It's time for publishers, book sellers, readers, academics and authors alike to ask that the designation of "ethnic" or marginal perimeters be lifted from an entire field of vital literature, and that writing become better identified for what the American experience is and has always been; we are the greatest living symbol for diversity, its success and failures.

There is now a growing and persistent body of literature that defines that process. What it is not is Italian-American, or Greek-American or Irish-American or any other form of hyphenated segregation, but rather our history, the 'songs of ourselves' to borrow from the poet, told on the broad and vivid canvas of the American experience. We want it labeled for what it is, "Legacy Writing."

A few years ago, when my first book, *Dances with Luigi* was published, I adamantly insisted that it be marketed in the general marketplace and not be marginalized as an "Italian-American book." For one thing, I didn't know anything about Italian-American organizations and, for another, I never thought of myself as part of that group, but rather as a professional American with an ethnic past. It was that past I was trying to evaluate and educate myself about, not any sort of active present-tense community in my life.

For another thing, as Helen Barolini has also said, I'd been told consistently as I wrote the drafts for that book that publishers didn't believe there was an Italian American reading public; publishers say Italian Americans don't read or, if they do, it's periodicals that are mostly sports oriented. If they did accept manuscripts dealing with those themes, they were only good for a 5,000 issue run at best and would never get reviewed in the serious or major periodicals or broadcasts. Sadly, my research showed that most of this is true about the New York publishers' attitudes, another reason to try and avoid the Italian American label. I was more fortunate than many others. I had an agent who knew "a guy who likes books on Italy." That "guy" turned out to be Thomas Dunne of Thomas Dunne Books, an imprint of St. Martin's Press. Tom does like books about Italy and was willing to take a chance on "Luigi."

Dances with Luigi defied that stereotype, went through three hardback printings and is now out in soft cover. Not because of any altered marketing strategy on my publisher's part, but in part thanks to Barnes and Noble having selected the book for its "Discover Great New Writers" program and, in part, because I was an established journalist with a lot of contacts. The book surprised them. Meanwhile I met hundreds of folks earnestly trying to discuss and learn about the Italian American culture, enough so that I thought the publishers might be wrong about Italian American reading habits.

As it turns out, and after having published my second book, *Under the Southern Sun*, with a similar theme this year, my strategy for "Luigi" was the correct marketing strategy. I've learned the hard way with that second book, and which I did try to actively market as an "Italian-American book," that no such market exists. That's not to say that, like all other things in dealing with Italian Americans, there aren't contradictions; there are some very strong pockets of individuals out there who are completely dedicated to finding and celebrating the literature and other matters relating to the serious discussion of their culture and ethnic origins. But they function independently. There

are no overriding links between them and the millions of others who share their heritage and gene pool.

I don't know why this is, but suspect it has much to do with our history and timing in coming to this country. We came from people who functioned best on the family and small community level. That native psychology seems to have permeated our way of looking at the world without our ever even being aware of or being capable of articulating those thoughts. Italian Americans just don't think in terms of broad linkage with other Italian Americans. Blame Woodrow Wilson and his war against hyphenation, blame Sacco and Vanzetti, blame Al Capone or Mario Puzo, but for whatever reasons, we don't think in larger community, only smaller ones.

We can't answer much about ourselves. For example; how many of us are there? Some organizations say 20 to 22 million while others claim as many as 32 million. Where do we live? If you believe the majority of the popular literature and films about us, we mostly live in New York, despite that fact that even if the lowest figure of 20 million is accurate, that means that the overwhelming majority of Italian Americans, at least 14 or so million, don't live in New York or its environs. When I did a talk in Kansas City this summer, we had a full house of mid-westerners with vowels, seemingly rabid for information about their culture and history that didn't have a thing to do with the Brooklyn Bridge, organized crime, or gambling casinos in Las Vegas. They thought of themselves as Midwesterners and identified with the sense of isolation that I've found, as a journalist, to be common among the political thought of the middle of the country.

What they liked about my book, or said so at least, was its inclusiveness and the fact that it wasn't a product of a New York writer or thinker. They've felt neglected in that their definition of themselves as Midwesterners with an Italian origin is largely overlooked in the popular media.

The "Order of the Sons of Italy" bills itself as the largest organization for Italian Americans,—it claims "more than 600,000 members and supporters." I'm proud to be a member of this organization and am deeply indebted to my local chapter in Columbus, Ohio and the national organization for all of the enthusiasm and attention they've paid to my writing. In March, my second book was honored as one of four initial "recommended reading" volumes at the inaugural of that program in Washington, D.C. And while they've gone out of their way to suggest reading to its membership, the fact is that the organization itself is in a struggle for definition at the moment and attempting to shift away from the old and fraternal nature of the group into a more streamlined and culture-based society. It isn't an easy task nor smooth transition. Mainly because the generation that now controls the organization doesn't seem to have found the secret to attracting the younger generation and, without them, there will be no "Sons of Italy" in another twenty five years. And as far as cultural activities go, it really varies widely from group to group. The notion of a recommended literature has yet to take significant root as the individual chapters, more than 700 scattered about the United States, still try and cope with declining membership and geographical agenda. Trying to contact these organizations for attendance at readings I gave over this past summer proved to be all but impossible, despite the genuinely appreciated recommendation from the national offices. Literature just isn't something on most local calendars or horizons at the moment.

Now I realize, it's not the job of the Sons of Italy to promote my or any other author's books. But it is their job to help define the culture and to promote themselves to our children as a relevant organization. I empathize with their frustrations in finding that relevancy. Not too long ago, I spoke with some folks up in New Jersey who were putting together an "Institute for the Study of Italians in America." Their first priority was funding language classes in New Jersey elementary schools to teach the Italian language. That's a terrific endeavor. I think our kids absolutely need language

study and that they should be learning languages like their European counterparts, from elementary school on.

But I have a concern about the Italian language *vis-a-vis* my culture, the Italian American culture. I was forty-five years old before I could speak a simple declarative sentence in the Italian language. Does that mean I wasn't a full or real Italian American, despite the fact that all of my ancestors came from Italy?

In fact, Italian Americans speak English. There are very important historical reasons for this language shift in my grandparents generation, history that I and dozens of others have written about, explaining why the language was abandoned. Explaining why it wasn't spoken in our homes. So, if we're going to "study Italians in America," should language training be the first priority or the key to accessing our culture?

I think the key to understanding is through our factual and annotated history which remains largely ignored by the very groups purporting to be representative of the culture, in part because that literature itself is largely inaccessible. One has to hunt for it on the Internet or in the book stores. It's categorized by whim or marketing strategy, and ultimately it becomes a word-of-mouth process, the very hardest way to sell books. ("Luigi" was put in the travel section because Frances Mayes wrote a book about Frances Mayes and her husband adjusting to a new life in Tuscany that became a best seller, yet "Luigi" has little to nothing in common with that book other than the central geographic location).

I think we've reached a cultural crossroads. My culture isn't Italian. It's Italian-American. Knowledge of my culture doesn't require the formal study of the Italian language or the history of Italy nor understanding, *per se*, of contemporary Italy. The core culture is, of course, Italian and any study of Italy's language, politics, history and culture is enlightening, but completely unnecessary in trying to evaluate the Italian experience in America. In fact, I believe the linkage and emphasis on that linkage intimidates or repulses millions of people who only know their culture through the American experience and don't want to be reminded of their lack of language skill or told how their parents' and grandparents' dialects weren't up to educated standards. My father, and millions like him, refused to speak Italian with an actual Italian because he felt inferior and had been told repeatedly that his Italian language skills weren't sufficient—it was a source of shame, not pride, for his generation. They were reminded of how poorly educated most of their parents had been. And they were reminded of how Italy had rejected them, failed them. The link with Italy could stir painful memories and even avoidance.

And that's the same dichotomy I see in the Italian American organizations of today. I'm not sure we are appealing to the "average" Italian American interest, or have defined our local characteristics well enough to understand an appeal broader than a hot sausage sandwich at a yearly festival. The biggest success story I'm aware of in the Sons of Italy is in Dayton. My friend, Tony Spazziani, the chapter president, built a bocce court and tripled his membership. I don't oppose the building of bocce courts, either, but it's a weak link at best to a culture that is comprised of, let's say, 26 million Americans who need a more compelling reason to connect with one another. We're not going to do it through the conjugation of verbs or the tossing of balls. We need an overarching definition that reaches out and allows people to identify with the core elements.

Our literature should be a natural bridge to the study and appreciation of our culture.

But before you can read about the culture, you have to be able to find what's being written. I believe the fundamental marketing category is wrong: it's American history, not Italian history. It's the American experience, not the Italian experience. It's inclusive, not exclusive, and we invite all to read it, not just those of a specific heritage or ancestry.

I can tell you that there's something going on in my American generation—"Baby Boomers"—whose sixties psychedelic mantra of "sex, drugs and rock 'n roll" is giving way to a broader search for substance. Genealogy is the fastest growing hobby in this country today and the internet is used for the search on this subject—used more than anything else on the internet except pornography—which might mean that mantra from the sixties has been only slightly modified. But there is no denying a shift in values among my contemporaries, probably a companion and inevitable part of the aging process, but what fascinates me is how universal our search into our collective pasts seems to have taken over. There is no empirical standard for this, at least none that I'm aware of, but I am convinced that we Americans have always searched for spiritual truths that go beyond the confinement of organized religion or the brayings of punk rock. What I've heard in my travels, over and over, from groups I've talked with and individuals who have contacted me after reading my books, is that they have found both pursuit and meaning in the attempt to understand that generation that died in a land where they had not been born.

Perhaps this has always been the case? What makes this topic unique is the American experience, not the countries of origin. Being Italian American adds a colorful, dramatic and flavorful dynamic to the American experience, but it's the American experience that defines our culture, and not vice versa. Is that perhaps one of the reasons contemporary Italians seem so unconcerned with our experiences and why so many Italian Americans are disconnected from the Italian part of their heritage? How do we reach these people, these isolated Italian-origin islands, as writers or artists or journalists?

I believe the contact must come through their American roots. As the Italian American activist, Sam Patti said, "Italian American history is American history." We were not merely divorced from Italy, or descended from Italy. We were, in many cases, rejected by Italy, or our grandparents themselves rejected their native land, and thus those first ocean-crossing adventurers left Italy behind them.

Can we reconnect to a sense of heritage by learning Italian? Somewhat, I suppose. I studied the language, and fumbled in it long enough and well enough to manage many of my interviews for that first book in Italian. However, while it is certainly a beautiful language and the study of it or any language can only lead to better understanding of the world and its people, the Italian language is not part of the Italian American culture.

We speak English and teach it to our children, for solid historical, financial, cultural and even existential reasons. We weren't taught Italian, nor was it offered in schools when my generation was young and attended schools which required language courses. The reasons for the absence of that language makes a statement as strong as any reason for having it taught. Those reasons only reinforce the American part of the journey, the American part of the equation. We weren't taught it because of prejudice. We weren't taught it because we were descended from people who never learned the "proper" form of their own language in the first place, who spoke "dialect" and who were taught to be ashamed of their lack of language skill and formal learning. We weren't taught it because they didn't want us jabbering away in Calabrian or Sicilian or Abbrusese language forms; they left those places behind and they chose this place, this America, for their family. They accepted the fact that their language was part of what they had to sacrifice for their children's future. They created Americans, gave birth to *Amerigani*, to English-speaking kids, not to Italian *raggazi*.

We can only reach these "kids" today by broadening our reach and definition, by reaching out to them as Americans and explaining that our stories are their stories, their families, their place in the American tapestry; and reach out simultaneously to all other Americans who undoubtedly have

similar interests and histories. I believe we need to call this emergent genre in American letters, "Legacy Writing." My colleague and friend, Fern Schumer Chapman, author of *Motherland*, and I have developed a series of articles attempting to define this label. Ms. Chapman's book, subtitled, "Beyond the Holocaust, A Mother-Daughter Journey to Reclaim the Past," deals with the author's trip to Germany with her mother, one of only 1,000 Jewish children admitted to the United States in the late 1930s to escape Hitler's anti-Semitic programs and eventual extermination. Her book is richly textured and layered dealing with both the author's and her mother's lives and thoughts as Americans returning to the horrors of Europe and the mother's childhood memories. She's listed in books stores under "Judaic," "Women's Studies," "Holocaust," etc., all of which apply to her book but none of which accurately describe the book. "Legacy Writing" is our American history told by the participants. It's, as Fern calls it, "history from the bottom up," history that is as strongly based on memory as documentation. It's the stories of Americans who have participated in all aspects of the American experience, told by the participants to journalists (in the professional or basic sense of the word) or family members for the preservation of and sometimes celebration of those experiences. What it is not is formal history, though it does not deter from the study of formal history nor conflict with it.

"Legacy Writing" includes novels, which can often reveal truths in ways non-fiction cannot. But fundamentally, "Legacy Writing" is the story of ourselves, told by ourselves, in a broader way than a straight memoir or travel narrative. Not formal histories, as such, but like that wonderful Italian word, *la storia*, it's both the history and the story of our individual experiences in the American fabric, told from a highly individualistic point of view. Creative non-fiction, if you will. A defining narrative of who we are individually and how we live in our individual identities, as well as collectively within the American identity. Legacy writing tells the little stories that overarch the much larger historical events and places, while offering a unique perspective on some very important pieces of the American puzzle.

That's what we want publishers and public alike to see and celebrate, a body of literature that is stories of our selves told by our selves in the American context. As for the Italian Americans, our story is as essential to American history as any. Can you imagine an America without Italians? I, for one, would not even want to try. If there is such a thing as "italicity," then we have proven it by our American actions. Italian Americans have not only succeeded in this culture, they have often defined the culture itself. The children of Italian immigrants, often themselves poorly educated, became American icons in cinema, sports, banking, broadcasting, music, law, education, and countless other fields. Our adventures in this land have enriched both us and it. Yet our literature lags behind. Those stories need to be told to our children as they greet their American future.

And if they greet that future with a renewed sense of Italian American *values*, of the *values*, not "valuables," that their grandparents and great-grandparents carried to America and throughout the world, I believe that future will be greatly enhanced.

Chapter XI

From Globalization to Interdependence: The Role of Religion

Paolo D. Siviero

This paper presents the experience of the organization "Religions for Peace", and especially it refers to Milan's branch of the organization, as an experience of inter-religious dialogue and of cooperation between religions, which I consider one of the most valuable experiences in the development of an inter-cultural competency.

Religions for Peace (or World Conference on Religion and Peace)¹ is the largest international coalition of representatives from the world's great religions who are dedicated to achieving peace. Respecting cultural differences while celebrating our common humanity, WCRP is active on every continent and in some of the most troubled places on earth, creating multi-religious partnerships that mobilize the moral and social resources of religious people to address their shared problems.

The World Conference on Religion and Peace was founded in 1970 to provide leaders of the world's many religions with a forum in which they can share common concerns, address collective challenges, and express their hopes for the future. Since then, WCRP has done just that, bringing together hundreds of key religious leaders every five years—most recently in Amman, Jordan, in 1999—for World Assemblies in which people of many faiths discuss the great issues of our time and affirm their shared commitment to multi-religious cooperation and common living.

At the same time, working on an international, regional, and national basis, Religions for Peace creates multi-religious partnerships that mobilize the moral and social resources of religious people to address their shared problems. WCRP is active in more than 40 countries, working with national affiliates and regional organizations, as that of Milano, to find and implement local solutions to local challenges. In the world's great capitals and in remote rural villages, WCRP affiliates with and empowers religious communities to improve lives and promote peace.

Religion and Globalization

As globalization is one of the most widely used, but complex concepts in social sciences, I am convinced that globalization is not a global matter at all. It has been incorporated into journalistic, political, academic and intellectual discourses to encapsulate various trends that are shaping the political, economic and cultural dimensions of the way we live and think. Therefore, it means different things to different people.

From a fashionable start—embodying images of technological progress and economic dynamism—it has progressively become the object of a civil society backlash in a rather polarized debate between global utopia and global dislike. Globalization is an elusive and multi-dimensional concept that can be defined in a narrow or broad sense, symbolized by an ongoing process of structural transformation with positive and negative globalizing effects. At the heart of the phenomenon is an ever-changing concept of time and space characterized by the global intensification of political, economic, social and cultural linkages, which have fundamentally altered the nature of interactions between people, nations and societies.²

If globalization has led to homogenization in many fields, it has also increased cultural assertivity and awareness of cultural differences and distinctiveness. It is a phenomenon that globally concerns the World, but that belong to the so-called "western model of society". Globalization does not cause the emergence of a global idea of community. On the contrary, it has

demonstrated that a society with a single cultural project is not viable. Historical experience confirms that it is impossible to convince millions of people to adhere to a single cultural standard of civilization, especially if it means adhering to standards other than one's own.

Religions, and the belonging to a religious community, have become one of the most important matters of distinctiveness. More than nationalism, which refers to the concept of Nation as principle and inspiration of policy making, communalism is emerging as factor of identification and element of political commitment. Since religion is used as matter of political distinctiveness, values inspired by it become just secondary factors. It becomes clear why communalism is in close relationship to most of the recent conflicts and why religion may be easily exploited through hatred and warfare.

Religious wars, crusades, pogroms, and jihads have marked the history not only of Europe, but also of the entire world. Religions teach us that this is wrong, but religious fundamentalists attempt to misuse every religious tradition to mark their distinctiveness and cause conflict. Religion stands as one of the strongest elements of diversity, but religions have a singular role to play and a unique contribution to give to create the condition for a peaceful coexistence of all human kind. Agreeing with Max Weber, I would maintain that not only have the differences found in outer forms and in the systems of values been shaped under the influence of religions, but social and political, economic and cultural factors have been directly influenced by it.³

Many people today clearly see that the peaceful future of humanity largely depends on its ability to bring the existing models of civilization into harmonious cooperation within the context of globalization. As the largest and best-organized component of civil society, religious communities are uniquely placed to undertake this task. Together, they claim the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of the world's population—men, women and children on all continents—often organized at local, national and international levels. But religious communities offer more than a significant channel for communication. The teachings of all of the world's religions share a common set of core values which form the basis for a global ethic—a fundamental consensus on binding values, irrevocable standards and personal attitudes for all of humanity, regardless of social origin, sex, skin color, language—or faith. Religious communities bear the responsibility to demonstrate that such values, standards and attitudes can be lived in order to ameliorate conflict and create the conditions for peace.

Religious leaders and religious communities have to be committed in engaging the deep moral resources of their religious traditions for peace, justice, truth and reconciliation. This could be defined as a political role of religions. An example of this kind of activity is the "Appeal to the City" which religious leaders of Milano wrote and signed in 2000.⁴ This constitutes the basis and the starting point of an ongoing experience.

An example of "Good Practice," a kind of dialogue which is able to 'stand under' both 'grounds', can produce real understanding.⁵ A dialogue that replaces the concept of globalization with that of *interdependence*.

From Globalization to Interdependence

If globalization is not a global matter, then interdependence means a global and globalized attitude whereby one can look at the world. Interdependence requires the acceptance of the idea of a global connection between my action and its results on others. Interdependence requires a shared responsibility for a common and global living. This is not just a religious matter. It is a matter that religion is rightly playing but can be played also by other social actors.

Even during the Roman Empire, "Concordia civitas facta erat", quoting Sallustio,⁶ meaning that society, the city, was based on shared (concordia) principles that made law. Moreover, as the Empire included people of different cultures, religions and traditions, that law was the result of inter-cultural dialogue.⁷ Italy, actually, has been witnessing a great influx of migration, from East as from South. The phenomenon is changing the very profile of our country, rendering its cities increasingly multiethnic and multi-religious.

As a result of a mature sense of responsibility and of interdependence, people are spontaneously moving from a passive acceptance of the situation, to an active policymaking. Moving from the acceptance of our new multicultural identity, to an active regeneration of that identity with an intercultural approach.

From Multi-culturalism to Inter-culturalism

As opposed to the trend of 'multi-culturalism', which is the way most modern societies are developing spontaneously, the intercultural approach is a *deliberate, proactive* and dynamic choice based on a standing dialogue among equals.⁸ Interculturalism is the result of a joint endeavor to create a type of political link that can reconcile globalization and humanism, the universal and the individual, the global and local levels. I quote Jean Monet:

Convincing men to talk to each other is as much as one can do for peace. However, several, equally necessary, conditions need to be met:

One is that a spirit of equality should preside over the talks and that no one should come to the table with the aim of gaining an advantage over the other. Another condition is that they should speak about the same thing. And a third is that they should all be seeking their joint interest.

I would add one more condition: they should understand each other. In other words: they should be willing to meet, putting aside their mutual prejudices and stereotypes.

An interdependent consideration of the world, intercultural dialogue, and enhancement of diversities, are characteristics of a mature society. They could be a contribution to a mature cultural identity that multi-religious cooperation can support and even improve.

Religion: Identity and Relation

As said, globalization has increased cultural assertivity and awareness of cultural differences and distinctiveness. Globalization is also contributing in order to alter not only certainties of the individual but also the very idea of the individual. The individual is tied in networks of relations and it seems that his/her self-identity comes about as a result of those relations. Relations are connected with his/her belonging to a community, a juxtaposition of sameness and difference of the real and the imagined in variegated local settings. But the relation stands before the individual.⁹

There seems to be a lack of importance based on traditional elements of distinctiveness such as nationality, language, color of skin and so on. A person is mostly identified through his connection and belonging to a community or a group.

Using the concept theorized by Louis Dumont in describing the Indian social system, the individual is becoming "*dividual*"¹⁰ [not *individual*]. A person is mostly recognized and identified by his relations with others rather than with/by himself. We should no longer speak about

individualism, because an individual alone would be nothing,—he/she has to be part of a hierarchy, of a kind of castal system, to be recognized and cooperate with others. This is particularly true about religions. Although there is a widespread sense of relativism about religion, a relativism that sometimes risks becoming a syncretic attitude, events, especially tragic ones, testify that often religious belonging motivates fundamental political and economic choices. However, a different perspective can also be considered.

‘Glocal’ Religious Attitudes

We said that religions share common values. We well know that one of the basic principles of every religion is not only acceptance of others but also love and respect for the neighbor. We all know that this value is shared by every religion and is called in the West the "Golden Rule". It is not a matter of compassion. Just through the feeling of love that belongs to the religious faith, one can find the meaning, the spur, the miracle, enabling one to move from the self to the others, from selfishness to solidarity.

In this deeply religious value, the individual is able to transcend himself/herself and open up to others. The individual acquires a global and interdependent vision that he applies to his/her local and daily life. This could rightly be considered a good example of ‘*glocalism*’. This glocalism is the first and very step to peace. If we do not just consider peace as the place where there is no war, but, as religions say, the condition of fulfillment of every and each one of us, we immediately understand that this condition:

- is local, because it concerns me;
- is global, because it universally concerns human kind;
- is glocal, because the assumption of my fulfillment depends on my willingness to make possible the complete fulfillment of my neighbor.

I think this can be the very contribution of religions.

Actually, we, as "Religions for Peace", are trying to work along this path. It is a way that first of all calls for a personal commitment. Thinking that this must involve all religious communities from the beginning may sound very much like a utopia. It is an attitude that moves from personal and individual commitment, passing through communities to reach the whole human kind at the end. I am sure that though our Italic identity is the result of a contamination with other identities, nonetheless, in so much as we can speak about Italic identity, this Italic identity can be a ‘ground’ for religions to play their complete role both globally as locally.

Notes

1 www.religionsforpeace.org.

2 L. Bekemans "Globalization and Solidarity" conference paper, *Dialogue interculturel*, Commission européenne, DG EAC « Action Jean Monnet », Bruxelles 20-21 Mars 2002.

3 Max Weber, *Sociologia della religione*, Torino, Edizioni di Comunità, 2002.

An Appeal to the City

To Milan, the crossroads of various cultures and traditions, but especially a home to people from all over, so that it wholeheartedly participates in the commitment to ensure liveability, hospitality and peace.

1. People today find themselves living in a multiethnic society in which individuals of different religions, cultures and education come into contact. Their increasing interdependence has defined a new community full of tumult and tension that can create a valuable opportunity for necessary dialogue and exchange.

2. The issue of reciprocal acceptance is profoundly rooted in the principles and spirit of each tradition and is demonstrated by recent inter-religious encounters. We all realize that acceptance of others is a precise human and religious duty, and must constitute for all a fundamental value towards the achievement of peace. Putting acceptance into practice enriches and vivifies the common human condition.

3. We strongly believe that conflicts often tied to extreme forms of integralism [fundamentalism] are in contrast with each religion in its correct interpretation. We want to do our part so that this conviction is affirmed more deeply and rapidly within each tradition. Therefore, we suggest cooperating to defend the dignity of humans and their spiritual values.

4. We realize that through teachings and example, religions must indicate the spiritual path of humankind. Through this appeal, we wish to express our commitment so that from this day forward, Milan will also launch a concrete common project to promote acceptance fueled through a spirit of justice and based upon reciprocal awareness and respect.

5. Each individual must abandon conditioning and discrimination and, with an open mind and heart, establish a serene and constructive dialogue with all while respecting the differences.

Milano, October 25th 2000

—General Secretary of "*Religion for Peace – Milano*"

4 *Religioni per la pace nello spirito di Assisi*, Milano, Centro Ambrosiano, 2001.

5 Raimon Panikkar, *L'incontro indispensabile: dialogo delle religioni*, Milano, Jaka Books, 2001.

6 Sallustio, *De Coniurate Catilinae* VI, 1-2.

7 Massimo Cacciari, "Digressione su impero e tre Rome" in *Micro Mega*, *Almanacco di filosofia*, 5/2001.

8 AA. VV. "Pace e globalizzazione", Bologna, EMI, marzo 2003.

9 Jean-Luc Nancy "Globalizzazione, libertà, rischio" in *Micro Mega*, *Almanacco di filosofia*, 5/2001.

10 Luis Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus, il sistema delle caste e le sue implicazioni*, Milano, Adelphi edizioni, 1991.

Chapter XII
What Remains of the West
Vittorio Emanuele Parsi

Westerners: Atlantics or Europeans?

In the months leading to the Iraqi conflict, and in the months it was waged, a doubt resounded almost everywhere in Europe on whether allegiance towards the Atlantic Pact had not become, for the first time ever, an alternative to loyalty towards Europe. Though mass media contributed to emphasise it, there emerged in Europe the opposition between an ‘American party’ in favour of a military solution against Saddam Hussein’s regime, and a ‘European party’ that was willing, albeit indicating its own alternative way, to go as far as to conspicuously deny its solidarity for the American ally when manifesting it was most crucial.

Beyond the role the media may have played in flaring differences, it is becoming increasingly difficult to shrug off the feeling that Europe and the United States are seeing the world through different lenses and that they do not always share a ‘western’ stance as far as the truly crucial issues of international policy are concerned. The concept of West itself appears to be progressively losing the political relevance that, starting from 1945, had characterised it in a different way with respect to the past. It was in fact the emergence of US leadership over the West that built this construction which became associated to the image of a political player that was, under many aspects, unitary, at least in its international dimension. The Cold War, and the rivalry with the communist ‘East’, had produced the unprecedented result of a West that was united not only culturally but also politically, for the first time free of the internecine wars that had been a constant feature of its history.¹ In the years immediately after 1989, the political unity of the West had gradually been shaken, loosened from both sides of the Atlantic by a long sequence of ‘events’ and actions on the American side and by the ideological revisions and changes of attitude on the European side.

If the transatlantic security community still exists—though reduced to almost its literal meaning²—we must ask: in what state of health is the permanent alliance between Europe and the US that emerged following the latter’s extenuating victory in the Cold War? To answer this question, we should start from the three elements that inform the expectations of reciprocal peace between the members of a security community: a shared collective identity, institutions that are in a position to sustain the relationship and economic interdependence.³

In terms of shared identity, the peak recorded after September 11, 2001, when European public opinion was overwhelmingly with the USA, is a distant memory. One could argue infinitely on whether the dilapidation of such a huge capital of solidarity and sincere sympathy should be ascribed to the volatile nature of these sentiments, or to the shortcomings of the Bush administration or, rather, to the inevitable development of history. There is no doubt, however, that America made significant mistakes in the way it wielded its enormous power. Rather simplistically, it assumed that the rest of the world, faced with America’s overwhelming power, would have, more or less willingly, aligned itself to Washington’s positions. The United States underestimated the importance of international institutions, picking up, above anything else, their function as controllers of American power—and, ultimately, of American hegemony—and not as guarantors of an international stability led by the US. It overestimated the autonomy (with respect even to allies) that military supremacy is in a position to offer, forgetting that war is, as

Clausewitz teaches, the continuation of politics through other means and not its overcoming or—even worse—its removal.⁴ Even while articulating what continues to be the main tenet of his administration after September 11, "the war on terrorism", President Bush has never clarified what is expected from allies in the struggle against the common enemy, to the extent that it is impossible to understand, as has been pointed out, "who is on the American side" nor "why are so many of those who are included in what Bush calls 'this mighty coalition of civilized Nations', such as countries in Europe and Asia, still griping that they do not feel a part of any larger cause".⁵

There is no doubt that Europeans and Americans continue to share their appartenance [mutual belonging] to the West, but the political significance of this belonging is increasingly becoming less distinct. If the Judeo-Christian tradition and the values of enlightenment modernity still represent a common terrain, what changes radically is the way this tradition and these values are experienced and interpreted on both shores of the Atlantic. We both have solid democratic institutions, but we both turn up our noses on the other's models of society, economy and political participation. We differ on the death penalty and on the role of force in domestic and international policy, we perceive the world differently and propose alternative, often contrasting, solutions to solve the problems. According to Charles Kupchan, one of the most pessimistic voices on the state of transatlantic relations, the situation is very serious and relations are on the verge of breaking-off:

The two sides of the Atlantic follow different social models. Despite recent deregulation across Europe, America's laissez-faire capitalism still contrasts sharply with Europe's more centralized approach. (...) Americans still live by the rules of Realpolitik, viewing military threat, coercion, and war as essential tools of diplomacy. In contrast, Europeans by and large have spent the past fifty years trying to tame international politics, setting aside guns in favor of the rule of law. On July 1, while the EU was celebrating the launch of the International Criminal Court, the Bush Administration was announcing its intention to withdraw U.S. forces from Bosnia unless they were granted immunity from the court's jurisdiction. Europeans see America's reliance on the use of force as simplistic, self-serving, and a product of its excessive power; Americans see the EU's firm commitment to multilateral institutions as naive, self-righteous, and a product of its military weakness.⁶

If the scenario depicted by Kupchan may appear to be excessively catastrophic, the tones used by Henry Kissinger, an observer who as a rule holds a more optimistic view of Euro-American relations, are not any brighter. Mr Kissinger warns: "What the current generation of Americans knows about Europe grows far more out of business deals than political or cultural ties. On the other hand, the United States, about which most Europeans learn through their mass media, is defined by the death penalty, the allegedly inadequate system of medical insurance, the vast American prison population, and other comparable stereotypes".⁷

It is undeniable that the number of reasons why Europeans and Americans should get along is infinitely higher than the number of issues that divide them, nevertheless the dominating perception is one in which the time of a more or less spontaneous harmony is gone for good. For conservatives and sustainers of a clear and traditional *Realpolitik*, the problem is the return of an assertive idealism as the guiding force of American foreign policy—a sort of "Wilsonism in boot" as Pierre Hassner⁸ has defined it. For the liberals, on the other hand, it is just this return to the politics of muscle-flexing and of power (*Machtpolitik*) that is the crucial problem in these years—the years of America's gradual separation from Europe. Thus, both US and Europe, though

starting-off from a diverging interpretation of America's foreign policy, once again arrive at the same conclusions—bleak conclusions for those who assign to the firmness of the West a pivotal role in ensuring a freer and safer world.

It is certainly not coincidental that the difficulties faced by the concept of West, as we have known it from the end of the Second World War,⁹ has been corroborated by the crisis of NATO, the institution that, beyond its role as a traditional military alliance, has for more than fifty years contributed most in nourishing, materially and symbolically, a shared identity. The story of NATO after the end of the Cold War is truly unique. Declared all but dead at the beginning of the Nineties by those who saw it as being indissolubly linked to the destiny of the enemy it had been called to confront, the Alliance has survived thanks to the redefinition of its strategy. Propped up by the long series of crises and conflicts that marred the Nineties (from the invasion of Kuwait to the wars in Former Yugoslavia), the Atlantic Alliance has re-emerged as an irreplaceable integrated politico-military structure, the only one that is in a position to allow the US-led international community to carry out an efficacious military intervention in the name of peace keeping or peace enforcement. Also as a consequence of its progressive enlargement, NATO represents the most visible manifestation of the supremacy of the West and of the political relevance that the concept of West continues to have. Above all in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO has proved to be effective in handling 'out of area' missions, i.e. missions that take place in areas outside the Alliance's traditional theatres of operation. Paradoxically, the days immediately after September 11, 2001, recorded the highest level of institutional solidarity within the Alliance but at the same time also its objective decline following the concrete decision on the part of the Americans to devalorise it. While the Atlantic Council went as far as to invoke for the first time ever Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (the fundamental article of the Alliance itself, according to which any attack against one of its members is to be considered as an attack against all the other allies), Washington clearly showed it did not appreciate a formal 'multilateralisation of the crisis' even within an institution that is markedly in favour of the United States such as NATO has logically been for over fifty years.

At the time when America suffered the most serious act of war in its territory since the Civil War, the refusal to act within the Alliance is explained with the American will to have a free hand in choosing how to respond to the attack, exercising, above all other considerations, its sovereign right of self-defence,—America wanted no shackles nor impediments that may obstacle the will of the United States to design the architecture, and to dictate the timing, of the War on terror, launched immediately after September 11.

The American decision had serious repercussions on the Alliance, because it highlighted its political irrelevance (and partly also strategic) at the exact moment the *foedus* was unexpectedly called to go into action. But there is more to it. This option, taken up by the Bush administration with a rapidity and a unanimity of visions between the Department of State and the Pentagon that was not to be repeated, also marked the beginning of the à la carte conception of alliances, which is probably the single most significant change in the post-Cold War scenario. The passage from a conception according to which—as explicitly outlined by the Defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld—it is necessary to allow the mission to determine the coalition and not allow the coalition to determine the mission is most probably the clearest signal to date that Washington considers this current phase as being substantially discontinuous with respect to the Cold War period. Come to think of it, well before September 11, the conservative milieus, reflecting on Clinton's interventionism in the Balkans, had noticed how "The transformation of NATO from an alliance to defend the territory of its members to an ambitious crisis management organization"

had had negative implications for the United States. Although America has important strategic and economic interests in Europe, it should not be involved in "parochial quarrels and conflicts that should be left to the leading European States to resolve as they choose" without dragging the USA in a never-ending series of irrelevant and dangerous disputes.¹⁰

The climate has radically changed with respect to the Nineties when in Brussels and in the other capitals of the Old Continent the eastward rush of NATO was considered as being practically 'imposed by Washington' and viewed with ill-concealed irritation in the framework of an implicit challenge to the Union's most difficult widening and deepening process. In those days, the American administration considered the Atlantic Alliance to be crucial to the extent that it was willing to challenge Russia's hostility (as well as the fears and coldness of a number of European allies) just to accelerate the entry into its military structure of the former Soviet satellites, from Poland to Hungary, to the Czech Republic. How much time has passed since the days when NATO appeared destined to cut for itself the role of the new 'UN of the democracies'! In his speech at the West Point Military Academy in May 1997, Bill Clinton listed four reasons to justify the need to enlarge NATO: strengthen the Alliance so as to ensure peace in a world threatened by the conflicts of the new century; to contribute towards the consolidation of democracy's historic victory in Europe; to encourage membership candidates to resolve their differences by peaceful means; to eliminate the artificial border Stalin had drawn over Europe and usher Europe towards stability.¹¹ The strength of those reasons has waned significantly, and many in the US are raising doubts that until a few years ago were unthinkable, on whether NATO is still the heart of the Transatlantic pact and on how a unified Europe will affect the very concept of an Atlantic partnership. On the other hand, if we consider the events that have taken place in these last years, Europeans and Americans are increasingly divided not only as to 'how' to go about things but even as to 'what' to do. More explicitly, America and Europe appear to disagree not only about the 'solutions' to the problems but even about which 'problems' to solve and of their 'priority'.

Compared to the past, in the current difficult phase of the Euro-American relationship there is "an important qualitative difference. The early crises within the alliance were generally in the nature of family disputes, having to do with differing interpretations of the requirements of an agreed common security. Today the very definition of common security and, indeed, of common purpose is being questioned".¹² Paradoxically, international terrorism of the Islamic kind—the terrorism that appears to have been one of the causes behind the heightened tension in Euro-American relations and the crisis of international institutions—is in reality one of the few areas where the differences between the two shores of the Atlantic are "limited" to the definition of the most adequate response to give. Americans and Europeans, especially after the wave of attacks in North Africa and the Middle East, believe that the latter area represents a very serious problem and that the fight against terrorism is a priority. "The greatest problem in transatlantic cooperation over homeland security used to be the very different ways Europe and America viewed the threats they faced. Unless Europe became convinced that it faced a danger comparable to that confronted by America, Washington could not have confidence that European leaders would do enough to deny terrorists ground for planning, recruiting, and staging future attacks. (...) Now the most important issue in transatlantic homeland security is whether these higher threat perceptions in Europe will be sustained and will lead to significant advances: the harmonization of national policies and better cooperation with the United States".¹³ While the perception of threats on the part of both Americans and Europeans is once again more alike, especially after September 11, there continues to be substantial differences on the strategies to be adopted, inasmuch as they "have similar views of threats, but different impulses on how to respond to them"¹⁴ so that if America

tends to privilege a military response, and to rely on intelligence, in order to physically eliminate the structures and the logistics bases of terrorist organisations, Europe prefers to encourage a wider-reaching policy whose aim is to uproot the economic and cultural causes of fundamentalist terrorism. And all one needs to do is to observe the opposite attitudes that Europe and America have with regards to the Palestinian Authority and State of Israel to understand that differences are obvious and not mere nuances. As for other issues, the differences go as far as the definition of the problems themselves. A conspicuous example concerns the issue of the arms of mass destruction. The fight against this phenomenon is a strategic priority for the United States, while it isn't for Europe (if not in words). Europe does not feel threatened by fact that one or more of the so-called 'rogue states' could come into possession of arms of mass extermination. America is obsessed by this danger. Europe is not even wholly persuaded that the category of rogue state is at all that convincing, nor that states such Iran or Syria are focus points of the 'axis of evil'. America, on the other hand, appears to be willing to construct also around this category its idea of foreign policy for the 21st century, and believes that countries like Iran or Syria should be treated as a consequence. For Europe, the United Nations is a precious commodity, to be conserved even to the detriment of a possibly enhanced decision making process when dealing with the thorniest issues in international policy. America believes that the UN is a cumbersome relict of the Cold War, more of a hindrance than of any utility.

"Europeans and Americans differ most these days in their evaluation of what constitutes a tolerable versus an intolerable threat. This, too, is consistent with the disparity of power".¹⁵ This is Robert Kagan's well known thesis, in which he sees Europeans as peaceful Venusians and the Americans as bellicose Martians, the former dreaming of a Kantian world where violence has been substantially banned and the latter struggling in a harsh Hobbesian arena where force is the only accepted currency. It is the inability to respond to threats with force that makes Europeans so 'tolerant', and, even more significantly, it is the awareness of their military weakness that leads Europeans to 'remove' even the existence of threats and to deal almost exclusively with those problems that have a greater possibility of being solved or, at least confronted, by political means or with the payment of large sums of money. The "psychology of weakness" leads Europeans to focus on "issues—"challenges"—where European strengths come into play but not on those "threats" where European weakness makes solutions elusive".¹⁶

Oddly enough, it is a soldier, the former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman general Hugh Shelton to recall—paraphrasing the English proverb "When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail"—that "the American military is a terrific hammer. But not every problem is a nail".¹⁷

The Fragmentation of the International Political System

Though transatlantic relations are undergoing a critical reassessment phase, there is no doubt that it is still possible to consider the West as a highly institutionalised and pacified international subsystem founded on democracy and the free market. It is in all effects a security community whose members at least share the interest of cooperating for common security. Until now that security has been guaranteed by the supremacy of the United States, so that within a West thus conceived it is out of place to complain about the necessity of a 'balancing' of American power, whilst the stress should be confirmed on 'binding' the US. Clearly, the problems could arise when the 'minority shareholders' of this community feel that the dominating power, following its unilateral initiatives in areas outside the West, could put the community's collective security in jeopardy. And that is exactly what is and what some believe has been happening since the Third

Gulf War or from the Afghan War, to the extent that one asks whether the West should be reinvented, whether the date that decreed the demise of the Post-War and Atlantic West should be November 9, 1989, rather than September 11, 2001: "To future historians, November 9, 1989, will mark the end of the old West—and the beginning of a dissonance between European and American interests. Let us hope that the bitter rivalry witnessed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, will go down as a temporary emotional rupture, rather than as the end of a constructive transatlantic partnership".¹⁸

Germany is a good example of this change in the way the US is perceived. The 'pacifist' stance taken up by the Chancellor Schroeder of Germany during the Iraqi conflict cannot be explained in exclusively ideal nor in merely cynical pre-electoral terms. Mr Schroeder is certainly not an 'integral pacifist' and he is most certainly not anti-American: under his leadership Germany took part in the Kosovo conflict (a conflict that was not authorised by the UN's Security Council) and deployed German soldiers in Afghanistan after September 11. Germany itself was and continues to be the United States' most important strategic ally in Europe. And, on the other hand, after the Second World War it was America that repeatedly guaranteed not only the security of Germany's borders but also the democratic reliability of its new institutions. America has done so by pressing for German rearmament, for its association into NATO during the Fifties and, more recently, during Helmut Kohl's mandate, for the immediate reunification of the eastern *Laender* and East Berlin with Bonn. And just as certainly, Mr Schroeder cannot be considered as being so bold and incautious as to put in jeopardy the strategy aimed at consolidating Germany's presence within the West, which can be traced back to the Bismarck era.

What seems to have driven the Chancellery's strategy are two less contingent considerations. The first has to do with the eternal question regarding the security of Germany's borders. Since over half a century, the Rhine border has been—towards the west—one of the most open and secure, and France, the former rival, has become Germany's most important ally in Europe. Towards the east, Russia, much weakened and geographically less contiguous (Poland, Ukraine and Byelorussia separate her from Germany) is the principal German creditor. Relations between Moscow and Berlin have never been so good, at least not since the Twenties of the previous century, at the time of the Treaty of Rapallo, when the Weimar Republic and the newly established Soviet Union were both at the margins of the system of European states: one as heir of the defeated Kaiser's empire, and the other inasmuch as governed by a revolutionary communist regime. Today—and that too for the first time in history—while the German borders are not in anyway under risk, Germany is also the Old Continent's undisputed leader. Thus, when asked: "What enemies does Germany have?" one could presume that Mr Schroeder answered "None. Excepting those that the United States creates. ..."

The second consideration stems from just this excess zeal on the part of the US (at least from Berlin's point of view) and sheds light on an ambitious project: that of bringing to an end the tutelage America exercises over German democracy. A Germany that has no 'natural enemies' is obviously keen to see the scaling down of Americana protection. But a Germany that cuts for itself the role as champion of the 'anti-war front' against the former guarantor of the democratic nature and non-aggressive nature of its institutions is one of the most outstanding turnarounds not only on America but especially of history itself. Right from the outset, Germany has always had to come to terms with the issue of 'Prussian militarism'. And Europe has had to frequently bear the consequences of a phenomenon that, because it was not properly handled by German state institutions, involved her in continuous outbreaks of aggressions. In transforming itself from a 'militarist power' to a 'pacifist power', Germany has thus achieved two important results. On one

hand, it has broken free from American tutorship—something that could be achieved without causing apprehension in Europe only if it opted for the peace camp as opposed to the warring one privileged by the United States. On the other hand, Germany has regained and consolidated the leadership, in terms of cultural penetration, that it had failed to achieve twice in the 20th century (when it had chosen a politico-military option) and that in the past forty years had been endorsed exclusively by the sheer strength of its economy.

However, this friction within the West has taken place against a background of an international political system that is increasingly becoming less unitary and is articulating itself in a number of subsystems, each one of which, though forced to cohabit with one another, is regulated by its own set of rules and policies. As a matter of fact it is possible to single out, alongside the western system, other subsystems, all sharing the characteristic by which ‘internal peace’ and the impossibility of war as an instrument to resolve controversies sound more like declarations of principles rather than effective conduct or realistic expectations.¹⁹ In Asia—the subsystem that brings back to mind 19th century Europe—the war between strategic rivals (China, Japan, India and Russia), though certainly not representing an immediate danger, is nevertheless not an unlikely event. In this subsystem, exactly as used to take place in 19th century Europe and not during the Cold War, ideology plays but a marginal role in determining the status of the relations between the four principal regional powers.

The Middle East is the third system, a system that under many aspects follows a pre-Westphalian pattern. Here the wars continue to be characterised and justified by religious motivations. The utilisation of religion as an instrument and ostensible reason for foreign and security policy has yet to be cast aside. And in addition this situation involves states that are still very fragile: i.e., the two processes that must necessarily be involved, secularisation and consolidation of the state, are not fully in place, nor even likely to be so. This perfectly explains why it is unthinkable that the State of Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East, can even conceive of programmatically renouncing violence without putting at risk its very survival. But this also sheds light on the difficulties that any leadership in Israel has in fully trusting the promises made by all its regional counterparts, or in signing peace treaties that are not guaranteed (also in military terms) by the United States. The last system is Africa, which is, in reality, a scenario of progressive (and, substantially, irreversible) worsening: a worsening of general conditions that has coincided with decolonisation and the disastrous failure of that process.²⁰

We are in fact faced with a contraction of the international political system in its unitary dimension. That part of the world where we are still able to apply in a painless way our categories is once again restricted to the West and to a few of its offshoots. Emerging in the Middle East to Africa and Asia there are regional subsystems that differ in terms of rules, expectations, conduct, characteristics and probability that the players may take recourse to violence, etc. This contraction leaves empty spaces that progressively take up the guise of ‘failed state’, i.e. of territories that are distinguished by two characteristics: the absence of an authority that is in a position to monopolise legitimate violence and lack of accountability with regards to the international community. This produces an international system that is hardly unitary in terms of rules and conduct, but rather segmented in subsystems that are often only coercively united during crises, terrorist attacks à la bin Laden and wars.²¹

In such subsystems—where, nevertheless, contours are unclear and mobile—there are a number of global or multiregional players that are condemned to be incoherent and hypocritical: because if they want to act according to the rules of the subsystem they are intervening in, they must cast aside all coherence to their internal canons. The classic example is represented by the

American policy in the Middle East. Whenever American policy aspires to be appropriate, it is exposed to the criticism, in its internal forum, of part of the public opinion of the west (and of those who can relate to western values) but when it tries to apply a 'liberal democratic' standard. It gets accused of cultural and political imperialism.

Old Europe, New Europe

In this changed context, the destructive potential on transatlantic relations of a crisis that went out of hand may be irreversible. Relations and institutional fabric could then be reconstructed but with extreme difficulty. On the other hand, the harshness with which Donald Rumsfeld spoke of 'old Europe', as against a 'new Europe', when talking about France and Germany following their document that openly condemned America's political challenge of UN policy, was more than just a case of verbal intemperance. Mr Rumsfeld's comment in reality comes from the consolidated tradition of a vision of international policy that—and herein lies the crux of the matter—antedates the political invention of the West, going as far back as to the end of the 17th century when a few tens of thousands of Europeans decided that to 'put an ocean' between their past and future was the only thing they could do to be able to live according to their values, free from wars as well as political and religious persecutions carried out in the name of power, justice and the 'true' faith.

Some hundred-fifty years after the landing of the Mayflower the Founding Fathers, in the name of liberty and their faith in democracy, took the grave decision to give up being full British subjects and "invented" themselves as American citizens. The second secession from Europe also marked the beginning of America's idealistic isolation as explicitly clarified in George Washington's famous political testament in which he warned his successors to keep away from old Europe and from its power politics that was obsessed by the struggle for power and world domination. Washington's considerations would be considered for many years to come as the origin of America's 'isolationist' thought. It is in many ways not far from the truth. After all Europe was, at the end of the 18th century, the international political system, and thus tracing for oneself an alternative path with respect to it was equivalent to isolating oneself from world politics. But from a less Euro-centric perspective, one could affirm that after George Washington there started a tradition that could best be defined as 'exceptionalism' rather than of 'isolationism'.

The faith in the exceptionality of America has in fact been the constant of American foreign policy in all eras. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine itself—the one that is best summed up with the slogan "America to Americans"—was not only conceived to shut the new continent's doors on Europe's ambitions to divide the former Spanish colonies that had just declared their independence. Nor can it be dismissed as merely a clumsy attempt to create an ideological mantle for the United States' imperialist ambitions over the whole of the western hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine also reflected the idea that the North American example could stand up as a paradigm for the entire continent. It would be Theodore Roosevelt, some seventy years later, who would bring America back into the large international arena, cutting for the United States a role of great power after the Hispano-American war of 1898.

Significantly, we would have to wait for the early part of the 20th century and the 'call' coming from the endangered democracies of Europe, before the ties between the two sides of the Atlantic, that had been severed over a century before, could once again be reforged. From then onwards, the two worlds would come as one only whenever the call to defend democracy was heard. Every time this common heed was less felt, as in the two decades between the world wars, the awareness of this common identity also ebbed—and this was almost invariably the signal of

an overall weakening of democracy. But even at the time when America and Europe realise that they share the huge heritage—so rare in the world—represented by democratic institutions, the Americans will still not cease to consider themselves different and better.²²

Choosing the concept of ‘exceptionalism’ as the key interpretative category of American history allows us to grasp a further element—an element that is decisive to understand why the United States, starting from the Cold War but even more drastically with the George W. Bush administration, has opted to pursue an increasingly more assertive unilateralism. In fact, if we reflect on the history of the United States we should consider, above all, a datum. For America it is but normal that its power is limited by checks arising from its own capacity and will. At the end of the war against England between 1812 and 1815 until the second half of the 20th century, America never had to face an external challenger that was in a position to ‘contain’ its power. Every time there was a drawback, a threat or a problem the American response has always been the same: set aside more resources, time and effort so as to resolve the problem, eliminate the threat and reform, for the better, the world. Americans have been steadfast to this idea during the two world wars and even in dramatic moments such as Pearl Harbour and the long years of the struggle against Nazism.

It was only with the Cold War that Americans for the first time in their history had to experience that sense of limit imposed from the outside that is instead normal for us Europeans. Hundreds of years of experience within a system made up of competing sovereign states has taught us that power of persuasion in negotiations depends above all on the options that the negotiator has, or seems to have, at his disposal, and that good diplomacy is generally the outcome of a wise balancing of benefit and punishment. This different—rather: opposite—view of what normality is for us and for Americans can be traced back in our history on the awareness that Europe itself was born as a ‘limit’, as the impossibility to recreate the pristine unity of the *christiana respublica*. European multifacetedness and plurality that we rightly claim and appreciate as an extraordinary cultural heritage and for which we are called to construct a truly courageous institutional architecture that can contain and give it political identity as well as unity of intents, originated from a ‘failure’.

Herein is the principal point of incommunicability and politico-cultural differentiation between Europe and America: our history as Europeans stems from a bloody failure, their history as Americans from an extraordinary success. In addition, one could paradoxically affirm that while the problem for America has always been that of being able to think and build a foreign and international policy that is coherent and equal to this incredible and cumbersome success, recent European history has been marked by the transformation of that original and lengthy failure into an extraordinary innovation of the politics between states.

It appears that Europe and America have followed two different paths that are not necessarily destined to cross in a stable and institutionalised way. And this would have continued for a long time, with the exception of infrequent and uninspiring contacts, had not two elements emerged to bring the two sides of the Atlantic closer. The first was the natural ability of democratic ideas and principles to spread within western culture, which by the 20th century had become the most peculiar traits of its political culture. Prepared by the spreading of the values of liberalism and nationalism during the 19th century, the 20th century saw democracy struggle hard, and ultimately triumph, associating itself with the West to become its distinctive regime. To the extent that it is so indissolubly linked to the West to appear to be incompatible with a number of non-European states in their search for true national independence.

The second element that led to transatlantic rapprochement was the meeting of the paths along which both America and Europe had symmetrically developed their policies in the international arena. In the 20th century, the return on the international scene of the United States was a natural consequence of its economic development and expansion. But the immediately hegemonic way this manifested itself was the substantially inevitable consequence of American exceptionalism, which led the United States to become the champion of an idea of international order that was in many ways conspicuously similar to the internal one.²³ Kagan's affirmation according to which Europe lives in 'Kantian paradise' while America is forced to struggle in a Hobbesian international arena is but half the truth. Because he omits a significant 'detail'—one that can explain American policy better than the recurrent image of 'international anarchy' that is often called upon. The detail lies in the fact that in the United States' foreign policy vision there recurs with extraordinary regularity the idea that America will be secure only when the rest of the world will follow its example.

At the 1919 Versailles Conference, the attention that above all Europeans paid on the obstinate re-affirmation of the principles of national self-determination and on the legitimisation of national borders along mainly ethnic bases, did not allow for sufficient stress to be given on the truly revolutionary element that was contained in Woodrow Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points" with which the American president calls on the victorious powers to pave the way for the order that was to be put in place after the end of the First World War: there must be a way, even in the anarchic international arena, to pursue and reach a level of democracy that is similarly hoped for in the domestic arena. And this highly ambitious objective may be achieved only on condition that the American example be followed.²⁴ The American hegemony that brought order, democracy and free market in half of Europe after the end of the Second World War was not that different, in this context, from what Wilson had sought to achieve. Vice versa, it was the crashing down of the first European attempt to draw up an original synthesis aimed at achieving an 'order in plurality', i.e. to ensure the one and the other through a policy of balancing of power, that led to the calling—two times in the 20th century—of the "great king" to offset Germany's recurrent hegemonic temptations, heralding the advent of another hegemonic force, this time non-European.

Herein lies the origin of the political meaning of the idea of West, the concept that is the extreme synthesis between Europe and America and that stands on two pillars. The first is represented by the democratic nature of the West: without democracy there is insufficient binding agent to keep peacefully together that which is encapsulated by the concept. The corollary of this first assumption is that the safeguarding of democracy in its European part (i.e. on the Atlantic shore where it has historically proved to be more fragile) is essential for the survival of the West as a whole. The second pillar is constituted by the fact that the concept has demonstrated an extraordinary political force ever since the western space has been dominated by the United States.²⁵ As events have developed in these past two years, we will have to ask if the political sense of this conceptual category (which we know is much older in cultural terms) will be able to survive the scaling down of American hegemony. Inasmuch as Europeans we would then have to ask if, with the demise of communism and the accentuation of American unilateralism, it is still the concept the 'West' we "refer to when we say 'we, the members of this political community' (...) even on condition of suffering temporary disadvantages".²⁶

Whatever may be our judgement on the latest Iraqi campaign, it encloses and reveals a paradox. While American hegemony outside the West grows, to the extent of assuming at times the traits of a semi-imperial authority, it is no longer so unchallenged within it: not because there is in the West a power that would like to take its place, but because governments, public opinions

and other authorities contest its legitimacy on the basis of a no longer consonant assessment as to what should be understood as being in the general interest of the West.²⁷ It is the so-called "paradox of the *hegemon*", where the leader state within a political system is at the same time both *hegemon* and great power. Each leader state clearly has the material capacity to act unilaterally, but if it does so at the expense of the system as a whole, it risks losing its hegemony, which requires some consensus on the part of those over which it is exercised. Therefore there is a fully fledged contradiction between the propensity of a great power to act unilaterally in order to pursue its national interests and the desire to maintain long-term stability. After September 11, America seems to have resolved the paradox by opting for the role of great power rather than that of leader of the West, making a decision that is partly understandable considering that the protection of its citizens and territory had once again become a priority for the Bush administration.²⁸

Thus the question we Europeans must ask, following an America that is becoming more of a 'lonely superpower' and less of a 'leader of the West', is very simple: if the settlers in 1776 had to become Americans because they felt that it was the policy enforced on them by London that prevented them from being, at the same time, British subjects and free individuals, is Europe faced with a similar option, is it at a crucial crossroads? Following America's recent political choices, must we, also in order to preserve our liberty, cease to be "citizens" of the West and become, above all else, "Europeans"?

Europeans and Westerners

As we mentioned earlier, Europe built itself along a horizon where security was guaranteed by its American ally, where there was no room for a divergence between the vital interests of the Americans and those of the Europeans and where the threat was represented by Soviet communism—a common enemy that brought the threat into European territory. There were disagreements in those years, some bitter: just consider the Vietnam war. But the disagreements regarded issues that took place far away, where European countries did not have interests which they felt could be threatened by American initiatives they disagreed with. Today the scenario has radically changed: there may be strong differences in opinion and interests between Europeans and Americans even regarding such a crucial issue as common security. Some American decisions may even be viewed as making Europe less secure, because they have an impact on the security of the continent. Moreover, the threat comes from several areas and can no longer be localised in the Old Continent. Thus, while it may objectively lose importance for the United States (at least in the short-term and as far as security is concerned), Europe has to come to terms with its weakness in defence and foreign policy. Thus Europe finds itself to be oscillating between the desire to distinguish itself from the powerful ally and the awareness that the Euro-Atlantic relationship continues to be crucial above all for Europe, which does not have resources, army and armament industry in common, appropriate institutional tools, nor a common security doctrine or policy.

It has become consuetudinary nowadays to underline the Union's role as a civil power and champion of a civilising mission, pursued this time 'through example'. It is truly unbearable, this worn out and extremely belated European copy of 'American exceptionalism', in which Europe has set as its 'highest institutional goal' the watering down of national sovereignties. In addition, this position is conspicuously complementary with that held by American neo-conservatives who blame Europe's military weakness on its political culture and not on its divisions. In reality, if "it is true that Europeans prefer soft power", i.e. that they "prefer to stabilize and shape the world

through economic blandishments and sanctions, diplomatic persuasion, cultural affinity and prestige"²⁹ rather than military force, it would be wrong to believe that a more united Europe would renounce also the use of military clout.³⁰

It is true that alongside the "challenge to globalisation" and the "impact of the single currency", the "memory of war"³¹ is one of the unifying powers that contribute to make us specifically Europeans within a wider West. And it is just as true—as outlined by the person who highlighted this element—that although "liberal democracy is the form of government that is most committed to peace, citizens must accept the possibility of going to war against anti-democratic powers if they want to take democracy seriously and preserve its future". It is undeniable that together with a lack of clarity and with the inability to create the political bases— before even the institutional ones—of a foreign policy, there has been the contribution of an excessively illusory and literal version of the idea of Europe as a "civil force", as if it were possible to aspire an international role only thanks to cooperation and association, to development aid or to integration, thus "renouncing before hand to make decisions on war and peace, to carry out, as a united Europe, the required interventions".³²

Though Europe may indeed be living in a Kantian paradise, governed by regulations and not by force, a number of specifications are nevertheless called for. First of all, it must be stressed that all this continues to be possible until someone else is in charge of handling security. Europe has chosen to offer the world the example of a "shared sovereignty" that respects the sovereignty of others, including that of its adversaries, when the latter show willingness to compromise, to negotiate and be dissuaded. But to ensure the credibility of this strategy it is necessary for "Europe not to repudiate the use of force entirely and that it should be sufficiently capable of the exercising it to cooperate with the United States, possibly even to do so without help", to avoid that the dialogue between the "arrogance of power" and the "arrogance of impotence" may lead to "confrontation or even divorce".³³

And secondly it should be underlined that when Europe pursues its objectives of economic power it does so with the same unscrupulousness and 'arrogance' shown by the United States, because Europeans are perfectly aware that globalisation is ensured by American political and military power. The attempt to create a strong and viable European political identity does appear to be very difficult but it also decisive. Up to now, Europe has been unable to create other foreign policy but of the 'integrationist' type, and it was no coincidence that it found itself in difficulty when the integration document, the EU admission document, was not credible (as in Turkey's case). Faced with the challenges of international politics, it appears that the only strategy Europe substantially has is to transform the issues of foreign policy into issues of internal policy, bringing into its borders confining states, thus renouncing to define a fully fledged doctrine to guide its necessary presence in the global arena and to determine a European national interest. In this light an illuminating example comes from the history of the United States, the ally and rival with whom reciprocal difficulties are on the rise. For over a century, during which exclusively focus was given on pushing westward its Frontier, the United States was substantially absent from the international scene. Today Europe runs the risk of being almost exclusively absorbed, over the next ten years, in pushing its frontier eastward, and the resources that are required to play a unitary role in the international scene will thus be extremely hard to find. Yet, in its interest, Europe must give up this isolationist approach and assume its share of co-responsibility in the governance of the international political system, which needs, before all other considerations, to be reconstructed in its unitary dimension. Observing the constitutional developments underway at the end of 2003, an American commentator said, a dash too optimistically: "Europeans, finally, will also have to wake

up to the fact that their security now depends more than ever on developments beyond their borders. One of the reasons for the current transatlantic divergences is that while Washington is focused on global developments, Europeans, quite understandably, are preoccupied with the enormous challenges of finishing the peaceful integration of their continent, through EU enlargement, the euro, and a constitutional convention. These are very important projects, themselves major contributions to world peace and stability, but they are no longer enough. By 2004, when ten new members are likely to have joined the EU and a new constitution is in place, the new Europe will have to set its sights beyond its borders if it wants to preserve the close global partnership with the United States that both sides need".³⁴

To this end the self-serving research of a breakdown in the unity of the West is not only futile but also damaging.³⁵ There are by now too many voices, and interests, that on the other side of the Atlantic are regularly raised to underline that America does not need allies like European countries and to indicate a new 'Pacific way', more vital and strategic for the United States compared to the glorious and dusty Transatlantic solidarity.³⁶ The break-up of the institutionalised cooperation between Europe and United States would be damaging for both partners. Europe still needs the USA to protect itself against threats that are increasingly becoming wider, costly and difficult to combat. The United States still needs its European allies not only in order to provide legitimacy (political) to its hegemony, but also to fight global transnational terrorism that makes any exclusively national strategy entirely inadequate, even when enforced by a superpower such as the United States. It is just in this sector that the USA "will discover incentives to pursue a multilateral strategy and make bargains with other countries in order to gain their support. The United States needs partners".³⁷

If the United States is tempted in these years to overestimate the use of force, Europe appears to be dangerously underestimating it, as if it wished to escape from the tragic reality of international politics without realising that, at times, to encourage and defend good it is necessary to resist evil, also by fighting it. In its own interest, America must cast aside the complacent unilateralism—whose most popular champion has been Robert Kagan—that does not suit nor honour it and is contrary to its interests. America must once again forge "a common U.S.-European approach to confront the most pressing strategic issues of the day", perfectly aware that to forge a new and stable international order, "Unilateralism and ad hoc coalitions will not be good enough". Europe must, on the other hand, realize that the "threat we face is a common one" and must "stop seeking to define its identity and role in the world in contradistinction to that of America".³⁸ And above all "Europe must also realistically appraise current multilateral institutions", because the European insistence to solve all crises and decisions within the framework of the UN, "when that institution, as currently structured, is obviously not up to the job," leads to the overshadowing of the fact that "There is a real gap today between the scope of the problems and the capacity of existing international institutions to handle them".³⁹

America cannot pull out from the world and retire in a splendid isolation that is no longer possible. It has the extraordinary opportunity to do so according to the conditions and timings it can contribute to define; or it can wait until the problems will flare into conflicts, according to the conditions and timing set by its enemies. "The choice is between the United States against the world or a United States with the world, in which America accords the same respect to other countries that it does to its own citizens drawn from so many other lands. That, truly, would be a worthy goal".⁴⁰

Although Europeans and Americans feel—at times with too much haste—that they are different from each other, they must continue to be aware that their common belonging to the West

makes them very 'similar' compared to non-westerners. Americans and Europeans widely share the same liberal and democratic aspirations for "their societies and for the rest of the world", they have a common interest for a "open international trading and communications system", for the availability of energy sources and for the non proliferation of "the arms of mass destruction", in the prevention of humanitarian disasters and in the restraining of that "small group of dangerous states that do not respect human rights and are hostile to these common Western values and interests".⁴¹

Above all, Europe and Americans must continue to firmly realise that the Transatlantic relationship, the friendship between Europe and the United States, continues to be the building block of democratic peace and of European security, both of which are the necessary conditions for world stability and global stability.⁴²

Notes

1 As revealed by Roberto Esposito, alongside this interpretation that underlines the "fulfilment" of one's "own values: liberty, progress, peace" there is the interpretation at its "radical extreme" according to which the "West declines because it never succeeded to fulfil itself: i.e. to fulfil the values that were considered achieved in the first model". Cfr. R. Esposito *Occidente*, in Idem, *Nove pensieri sulla politica*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1993, pp. 207-231, quoted here from pp. 207 and 208.

2 On the concept of security community, cf. K.W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957.

3 On this topic, cf. T. Risse, *Beyond Iraq: Challenges to the Transatlantic Security Community*, paper presented to the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington D.C., January 24, 2003.

4 On the consequences of the relations between US, UE, Russia on American strategy after September 11, see A. Stent and L. Shevtsova, *America, Russia and Europe: a Realignment?*, in "Survival", XLIV (2002-03), n. 4, Winter, pp. 121-134.

5 Cfr. M. Hirsch, *Bush and the World*, in "Foreign Affairs", LXXXI (2002), n. 5, September/October, pp. 18-43, here quoted from p. 20.

6 Cfr. C.A. Kupchan, *The End of the West*, in "The Atlantic online", November, 2002, pp. 2-3, <http://www.theatlantic.com/>

7 Cfr. H. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the Twenty-First Century*, revised edition, Free Press, New York 2002, p. 35.

8 Cfr. P. Hassner, *The United States: the empire of force or the force of empire?*, "Challiot Papers" n. 52, September 2002, p. 43.

9 Cfr. C. Galli, *Spazi politici. L'età moderna e l'età globale*, Il Mulino, Bologna 2001, p. 127 and following, regarding the new and temporary spatialisation of politics following World War II with the East-West division.

10 Cfr. T. G. Carpenter, *A Great Victory?*, in *NATO's Empty Victory. A Postmortem on the Balkan War*, (edited by), Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., 2000, p. 7.

11 President Bill Clinton, *Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement*, West Point, New York, May 31, 1997.

12 Cfr. H. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy*, 2002, p. 33.

13 Cfr. J. Stevenson, *How Europe and America Defend Themselves*, in "Foreign Affairs", LXXXII (2003), n. 2 March/April, pp. 75-90, here quoted from p. 88.

14 Cfr. The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, p. 3, <http://www.gmfus.org/transatlantictrends>. See also the indepth study by R. Asmus, P.P. Everts e P. Isernia, *Power, War and Public Opinion: Thoughts on the Nature and Structure of the Transatlantic Divide*, available at the same site.

15 Cfr. R. Kagan, *Power and Weakness*, in "Policy Review", n. 113, June & July 2002, pp. 3-28, here quoted from p. 12.

16 Cfr. R. Kagan, 2002, p. 13.

17 Quoted in K. Schake and K. Becher, *How America Should Lead*, in "Policy Review", n. 114, August & September 2002, pp. 3-18, here quoted from p. 13.

18 Cfr. D. Moisi, *Reinventing the West*, in "Foreign Affairs", LXXXII (2003), n. 6, November/December, pp. 67-73, here quoted from pg. 73.

19 As for the model of the world divided up in several subsystems, I re-elaborated H. Kissinger hypotheis in *Does America Needs a Foreign Policy?*, here quoted from pp. 25-26.

20 The idea of the decline of a political system that is truly global as outlined by Henry Kissinger had been indirectly advanced by Samuel Huntington in his famous *Clash of Civilisations*. In fact, Huntington outlines a world divided in fields of action and influence for the major civilisations (Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latino American and African), associating for each one a specific conception and conduction of foreign policy that is more inducive – *rebus sic stantibus* – to war than to cooperation (or to *harmony*, if we want to recall an old liberal concept). Cfr. S.H. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York 1996.

21 Cfr. V. E. Parsi, *The Global Political System: From One to Many?*, in "Irish Studies in International Affairs", XIV (2003), pp. 205-219.

22 On the future of Euro-American relations, cfr. C.A. Kupchan, *The End of American Era. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2002.

23 Cfr. G.J. Ikenberry, *After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2001.

24 Cfr. R. A Kennedy, *Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and an American Conception of National Security*, in "Diplomatic History", XXV (2001), n. 1, Winter, pp. 1-31.

25 For this cfr. C. Layne, *America as European Hegemon*, in "The National Interest", (2003), Summer, pp. 17-29.

26 Cfr. B. Henry, *Mito e identità. Contesti di tolleranza*, Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2000, p. 85.

27 Cfr. R. Lambert, *Misunderstanding Each Other*, in "Foreign Affairs", LXXXII (2003), n. 2, March/April, pp. 62-74.

28 Cfr. B. Cronin, *The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations*, in "European Journal of International Relations", VIII (2001), n. 1, pp. 103-130.

29 Cfr, D.P. Calleo, *Power, Wealth and Wisdom. The United States and Europe after Iraq*, in "The National Interest", LXXII (2003), Summer, pp. 5-15, here quoted from p. 13.

30 On the concept of *soft power*, cf. two works by J. S. Nye Jr.: *Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power*, Basic Books, New York 1990 and *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, Oxford University Press, New York 2002.

31 Cfr. F. Cerutti, *Verso l'identità politica degli europei. Un'introduzione*, in *Un'anima per l'Europa. Lessico di un'identità politica*, edited by F. Cerutti and E. Rudolph, Edizioni ETS, Pisa

2002, pp. 17-55, here quoted from p. 31, ed. or. *A Soul for Europe : on the political and cultural identity of the Europeans*, Sterling, Leuven 2001.

32 Cfr. F. Cerutti, *Pace e guerra nella coscienza europea*, in *Un'anima per l'Europa*, cit., pp. 151-171, quoted here from respectively pp. 156 e 165.

33 Cfr. P. Hassner, *The United States*, 2002, p. 48.

34 Cfr. P.H. Gordon, *Bridging the Atlantic Divide*, in "Foreign Affairs", LXXXII (2003), n.1, January/February, pp. 70-83, here quoted from p. 83.

35 A similar warning comes from European scholars, starting with the French. Cfr. P. Hassner, *Europe/Etats-Unis: La tentation du divorce*, in "Politique Internationale", été 2003, n. 100, pp. 161-176.

36 Cfr. C. Kennedy and M.M. Bouton, *The Real Trans-Atlantic Gap*, in "Foreign Policy", n. 133, October/November 2002, pp. 64-74.

37 Cfr. G.J. Ikenberry, *Conclusion. American Unipolarity: The Sources of Persistence and Decline*, in *American Unrivaled*, pgs 284-310, here quoted from p. 308.

38 Cfr. R.D. Asmus and K.M. Ollack, *The New Transatlantic Project. A Response to Robert Kagan*, in "Policy Review", October & November 2002, pp. 3-18, here quoted from p. 17.

39 Cfr. R.D. Asmus, *Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance*, in "Foreign Affairs", LXXXII (2003), n. 5, September/October, pp. 20-31, here quoted from p. 29.

40 Cfr. R. Harvey, *Global Disorder*, Constable 2003, p. 242.

41 Cfr. P.H Gordon, *Bridging the Atlantic Divide*, p. 75.

42 Cfr. C.M. Schweiss, *Sharing Hegemony. The Future of Transatlantic Security*, in "Cooperation and Conflict", XXXVIII (2003), n. 3, pp. 211-234.

Chapter XIII

Community and Corporate Cultures in a Pluralistic World: A Structural Approach to Globalization

Charles R. Dechert

This past century has been a time of unprecedented social violence and of social and cultural change based upon technologies that have shrunk the earth to a global village in which people, raw materials and commodities, manufactured products and information are in close proximity, easily exchanged. The high culture of the university manifested in its basic organizational structure, faculties and departments with their subject matter specialties, paradigms, approaches and methodologies, is increasingly shared. The universe of knowledge as it emerged in Italy in the twelfth century and expanded into the rest of Europe in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was extended to encompass the arts and engineering in the following centuries and then into the description, systematization, and symbolic representation of the natural world in the seventeenth and following centuries.

Italy had institutionalized the universe of knowledge and practice that is now a universal human patrimony. As the Studium of Padova arose from the migration of faculty and students from Bologna, today's global universe of knowledge is the end product of an organic process resembling mitosis in living organisms. The easy mobility and shared values and commitments of the entire academic world is clearly evident in their faculties, journals, international meetings and the consensual global recognition of achievement.

The contemporary mainstream of global cultural and intellectual life focuses on the complexity and inter-relatedness of things and of the concepts and symbols that express them. The *New Science* of Vico anticipated this while the life sciences as they developed over the recent centuries have required delving into the complexities of living systems, their dynamic internal equilibria, and their interaction with an external environment.

In Germany, Britain and the United States, World War II witnessed the emergence of Operations Research, modeling complex phenomena in time in order to optimize resource allocation in goal-oriented activities. "Purposiveness" was restored to scientific acceptability as cybernetic systems were defined in terms of matter/energy and information, communication, command and control. Such systems might be purely mechanical or electro-mechanical like engine governors or gunlaying anti-aircraft radar. Living systems also adjusted (in the short term) and adapted over longer time spans to their environment. Social groupings like armies, industrial plants or cities comprised men and machines and a physical infrastructure extended in space and time—all behaving purposefully. Efforts emerged to develop a General Theory of Systems.

The United States' military establishment was much taken by this emerging paradigmatic approach, the thrust to conceptualize complex, goal-oriented structures and their ordered activities. A century of radical new scientific thinking and application was coming to a head with the work of such men as Maxwell, Claude Bernard, Willard Gibbs, Frederick Taylor, Edison, Henry and Brooks Adams, Mahan, Fisher, Von Bertalanffy, Watson, Von Neumann and many others, both in and outside the academic community. Science was increasingly characterized by a rapidly emerging world of institutional research, "think tanks" employing the more and more sophisticated information processing capabilities provided by the transistor, integrated circuitry, and ever more capable operating systems and programs.

The National Defense Act of 1947 had restructured the military establishment and created a more integrated and coherent system for the conduct of foreign affairs. When I entered active duty in the Air Force in 1952 that service had already established the "Weapons System Concept": each major aircraft (B36, B47 B52, etc.) was conceived as a system with such subsystems as propulsion, airframe, electronics, basing requirements, personnel and training, etc.—all developing separately yet subject to continuing modification and improvements in terms of the whole. Often these systemic changes were quite radical, e.g. the B58 (Hustler) went from subsonic to supersonic. System components (subsystems) were characterized by widely diverse development and production timespans organized to come together simultaneously five or more years in the future with sufficient aircraft, crews, bases and facilities, spare parts and trained technicians to establish the first operational wing for that system.

My work in the Air Training Command focused on the human components of such weapons systems, first as Coordinator of a six man participant-observer study of Basic Training at Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, TX, and then on the staff of the Human Resources Research Center (AF Personnel anti Training Research Center). Subsequently I worked in Washington, DC at Headquarters, USAF, on the information requirements needed to make such weapons systems responsive to defined U.S. policy interests in the process of continuing national adjustment and adaptation in a "Cold War" environment.

Subsequently I went to Johns Hopkins University's Bologna Center for postdoctoral work on the emerging European Economy (Coal-Steel Community, Euratom, Common Market) and gave a series of lectures on Operations Research at the International University of Social Studies (now LUISS) in Rome. Invited there to serve as Visiting Professor of Comparative Economic and Social Policy (1957—1959), I applied the systems concept to social research (and research methodology) with applications to both business and public administration.

Systemic thinking had led to such practical applications in the U.S. as the Critical Path Method and Program Evaluation and Review Technique employing the notion of functionally specialized system components acting synergically in a complementary fashion over time. The notions were universally applicable. Implicit in this, however, was a recognition of the hierarchical organization of functions and of the groups and persons performing them, coordinated at successively higher levels of complexity in terms of numbers of components and inter-related activities. Frederick Taylor's "functional organization" implies continuing coordinative communication among its components, but the number of communications channels (c) required in a "flat" (non-hierarchical) organization expands exponentially as the number of components (n) grows ($c=n^2-n$). Communication requires time hence there are inherent limits to the span of control and some form of hierarchical organization is required as the range and complexity of activity grows. Such organizations need not be authoritarian and often take the form of "networks". The "principle of subsidiarity," relegation of decision-making to the lowest competent level, is inherently required for effective social communication, command, and control. It applies both to omnicompetent groups or communities and to groups that are functionally specialized.

I use the term community for a group capable of providing all that life requires; performing the whole range of functions (purposive activity) needed for "life" and at a more complex level the "good life".

Such omnicompetent communities are largely natural and self-explanatory; like organisms they exist in and for themselves though they may have an impact, positive or negative, on their environment, social, constructed, and natural. Human communities may be conceived as a hierarchy in terms of numbers of persons, territorial extent and functional complexity.

Family
Village or Neighborhood
City
Region or Province
Nation and/or State
Continental and/or Imperial Community (economic and/or political)
Global Community

Although necessary to reproduction, the isolated family, even under the most favorable conditions can barely provide the necessities of life: food, water, shelter, clothing, tools, hygiene, waste disposal, formation anti socialization of new members. In association with other families cooperative effort is possible, and some degree of functional specialization. With the city, the good life is possible, clear language and formal education, the arts, specialized production and markets, law and civic order, defense, commerce. As we move to the region or province, the territorial and political come to the fore, ordering and defending ultimately with coercive force, the cultural, ethnic and linguistic bonds and barriers that unite or separate groups. Each of the larger modern European nation states made a conscious effort to create a more or less homogeneous national culture by penalizing the ethnic, linguistic, or religious "other". In now transcending the national state we are finding that these larger politico/economic aggregates must learn to institutionalize and live with diversity. A broad spectrum of potentially viable alternatives are compatible with public order, civil society and high levels of human well-being.

It should be noted that in a clearly structured society larger communities, under stress, can "degrade gracefully" as component communities assume or reassume functions they may have lost or permitted to atrophy as they developed, ultimately to global scale. For example my shoes and clothing are now produced in the Far East, my wine in Chile, while I welcome Chinese and Latin American students in my lecture hall.

The social dynamic of "globalization" becomes especially clear at the level of functionally more specialized corporations and associations. By the 1960's it was clear that the international relations paradigm created by the Peace of Westphalia was no longer adequate. In my study *Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi: Profile of a State Corporation* I was compelled to treat this Italian state oil and gas company as "parasovereign" exercising such a high degree of autonomous decision-making as to make it a significant actor in global economics and politics in its own right. It undercut the major international oil companies' contract relations with the Middle East producing countries, especially' Egypt and Iran. It established an independent relation with the Algerian FLN, looking toward a favorable relation with the post-colonial government, undercutting the position of Italy's European partner, France. ENI acquired and developed corporations in other industries to gain or regain Italian internal political constituencies and provide patronage. It ran a national newspaper *Il Giorno* with a distinct political slant, created a utopian company community, Metanopoli, outside Milan—all seemingly without any effective government control—perhaps anticipating the post-communist Russian experience of "privatization," becoming in Luigi Sturzo's phrase the "controllato controllore".

The extraordinary autonomy and initiative of North American, British and European firms is well known. At the associational level the transnational political parties continue to exercise considerable moral authority. The global science community is playing a critical role in a vast range of projects ranging from public health to nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction,

environmental concerns and the very meaning of "development". Non- Governmental Organizations (including those overtly or covertly sponsored or controlled by governments) make themselves heard through the media and international public organizations like WHO, UNESCO, ILO, etc.

Not least, at the associational level we find manifestations of the "Clash of Civilizations" as the deepest cultural commitments and values of peoples amid religions encounter one another. Christianity in its Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant forms appears to be undergoing a process of selective erosion and demographic crisis. Islam remains divided into Sunni and Shiite, with modernizing secular governments opposed by efforts to introduce Shariyah, and well-financed and highly motivated Muslim splinter groups engaged in demonstrative, terroristic violence in a protest that is at once cultural, territorial, ethnic, and often despairing. Hinduism at the popular level feels the assault as do the animists of Africa, Asia and the Americas while the enforced naturalism and secularism of the once modern socialist twentieth century has too often occasioned both demographic and moral collapse. American mass media, popular culture and popular cuisine are increasingly attractive and universal. The counter-revolution in Moscow, August 1991, was fed by takeout from a newly franchised Moscow Pizza Hut.

What has this to do with "Italicity"? I would suggest that Italy, with its long, well-documented and variegated history provides a wealth of institutional experiences and experiments whose outcomes are largely known and amenable to analysis. The fountains of historic writing and analysis in the Greco-Roman tradition, Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius, Livy, Svetonius, Augustine, Eusebius, *et al.* provide not only narrative but an interpretation and evaluation of the institutions created by will and reason, force and moral authority.

Italy itself has been a melting pot of peoples and cultures for millennia from prehistoric hunters of the north to the Villanovan, the Celtic and those eastern immigrants who became the Etruscans and mixed with the Latin peoples, the Romans who encounter the indigenous peoples of the south, Greek immigrants, and Phoenicians. In the later Empire Italy sees a new wave of Germanic peoples from North and East, Arabs from North Africa and then Normans and Aragonese right up to the present when we witness the ever increasing significance of black Africans, in part from Italy's short-lived twentieth century Empire, the *Mare Nostrum* of Fascism.

Italy teaches the possibility of a peaceful convivence of peoples in a pluralistic civil society characterized by both geographic amid ethnic/cultural communities at several levels, gradually fusing by marriage at the most basic level and by the cultural effects of shared language (so many dialects!) and a culture both classical and Catholic until the very recent past.

Politically, Italy has experienced the full range of institutional forms from the tribal horde in migration to the *polis* at Marzabotto and Rome itself, the transportation of Greek civic culture to Sicily and the South with those classic forms of political decision-making still with us: monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and mixed constitutions. It witnessed the failure of the *polis* (and the hegemonic maritime empire of the Delian League) with the Athenian defeat at Syracuse, and ultimately replaced it with the centralized principate, balancing military amid civil authority.

As the Eastern Mediterranean fell into the warlordism of the Alexandrian Empire and its successor states, Rome's peninsular hegemony achieved imperial dimensions with its Gallic and Spanish acquisitions and senatorial/military victories in the Punic Wars over the mercantile aristocracy of Carthage. The late Republic and the Civil Wars led to the incorporation of Gaul, Egypt and the Near East while testing and proving dysfunctional or at least inadequate the incrementally created republican political institutions now incompetent to manage the military machine at the core of the empire. The principate of Augustus began to develop a set of interacting

social institutions whose functionality is witnessed by their long term survival and adaptability, right up to the present time. Perhaps the most important is Roman Law, increasingly nuanced and implemented by professionally competent civil administrators/judges, and lawyers usually trained in rhetoric. A civil service maintained systematic records, including an increasingly universal census extending under Augustus to the whole Empire, while treaties, contracts and wills were affirmed and preserved normally in association with the institutions of religion and the invocation of divine sanctions.

The universal military service in war of Republican Rome had been supplemented by allied forces. The permanent regular army created to conduct the continuing siege of Veii toward the end of the fifth century B.C. became a permanent, professional, long term service, a mercenary army organized in legions complemented by auxiliary forces recruited throughout the empire. Lictors had traditionally maintained civic order in the presence of magistrates. Watchmen and guards, both private amid public, maintained protective watch and by the first century A.D. were complemented by *agentes in rebus*, a sophisticated secret police/informant system that persists with considerable historical continuity into our own time in such institutions as the Austrian imperial *sbirri*, the Gestapo and SD, the *okhrana* and successor CHEKA, NKVD, KGB, the British intelligence and counterintelligence services, the Italian OVRA amid SIMI, the FBI, military intelligence and counterintelligence and now the U.S.' counterterrorism effort integrated at cabinet level.

Functional specialization in the economy existed at the local level in Italy from time immemorial; in agriculture, in the trades and crafts, in commerce and transportation overland, fluvial, and maritime. Pompeii is a treasure trove for the economic and social historian. The records of Italy's medieval communes with their sophisticated guild system, regulation, quality controls, institutionalized professional formation and conditions of labor, and corporate treatment of the craftsmen and their families as members of an intermediate community sheltering them from the dire consequences of illness, accident and grave misfortune, are exemplary and assume a multiplicity of forms. They point out the close relation of civic community, law, public policy and humane economic enterprise.

It is certainly not by accident that Italy provides us with the most long-lasting examples of corporate economic enterprise. I think especially of Fabbriano in paper and Beretta in light arms. The invention of double entry bookkeeping, the application of the behavioral analysis of inputs as related to outputs in symbolic form, is still universally applied, as are the accounting, banking and credit instruments and methods developed by the Venetian, Florentine, Lombard, and Genoese mercantile communities.

The political pluralism that arose out of Renaissance Italy is exemplary for its moderation, sense of limit and avoidance of extremes of bloodshed amid destruction, and hence relevant to a global society emerging from the catastrophic violence, physical and moral, domestic and international, characterizing the 20th century. Small polities employed limited resources for limited, achievable objectives. Having experienced a century and more of Realpolitik we can reassess the "contribution" of Machiavelli who complained that mercenary forces employed intelligence and maneuver to force their adversaries into negotiation as opposed to the sanguinary imposition of will that would come increasingly to characterize the emerging European national states, among the last of which was Italy. Savoy succeeded in imposing a national language and literature, an aggressive, expansionist military presence abroad, an oppressive national police and fiscal presence, economic policies that protected northern industry and banking at the expense of the occupied south, and the liberal political institutions inspired by Britain: a limited monarch, voting and representative legislature, political parties and greater freedom of action and

expression—all together labeled "il Risorgimento". Interestingly the Century of Italian Unification celebrated at Torino in 1970 had little popular appeal. Extreme nationalism had produced chronic poverty in the Mezzogiorno, the slaughter of a generation in World War I, the pretensions of Fascism resulting in war, civil war and occupation, tremendous social upheaval and permanent ideological/cultural division, a demographic crisis and the massive immigration now literally changing the face of Italy.

The constructive response to these challenges has included a reaffirmation of the traditional regions and regional cultures, an outward looking foreign policy in the context of NATO and the European Community and its economy, a willingness to contribute altruistically to international peace and peacekeeping initiatives, an almost incredible artistic and economic creativity and productivity largely institutionalized at a human scale that can provide a model of development.

In brief I am suggesting the relevance of Italian history and its well documented social creativity, its multiplicity of institutional forms at all levels of community and through the whole range of functional organizations and associations from Benedictine monasticism and representative government to the modern corporation, from the invention of the modern university to the institutionalized academy of art and the academy of science, from milling machinery to the postal/parcel service of Thurn and Taxis to early high speed interurban transport. This institutional record, its successes and failures (like the current demographic and agricultural crises) merit detailed study for the breadth and detail of this human experience, for its multiplicity of alternatives tried, for its instructional capacity in a rapidly emerging global society—but above all for the fundamental humanity of the Italian experience.

Interestingly enough, this emphasis on history and its lessons formed the basis for princely formation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as Turin and the House of Savoy began to move toward the ultimate political unification of the peninsula and the creation or re-creation of a sense of Italicity.

Contributors

Helen BAROLINI, author, *Hastings on Hudson*, New York.

Piero BASSETTI, President, *Globus et Locus*, Milan.

Giovanni BECHELLONI, Professor, The Department of Sociology, University "Cesare Alfieri", Florence.

Kirk BUCKMAN, Professor, The Department of Politics, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

Charles DECHERT, Professor Emeritus, The Department of Politics, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

Paolo JANNI, Ambassador of Italy (Ret); Senior Fellow in European Politics, The Catholic University of America; writer for the Italian daily newspapers: *Avvenire* (Milan) and *Il Mattino* (Naples).

John KROMKOWSKI, Professor, The Department of Politics, The Catholic University of - America, Washington, D.C.

Gasper LO BIONDO S.J., President, Woodstock Theological Center, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

George F. McLEAN, The Center for the Study of Culture and Values, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

Paul PAOLICELLI, Journalist and best selling author, Pittsburgh.

Vittorio Emanuele PARSI, Professor of International Relations, Università Cattolica, Sacro Cuore, Milan. Foreign Affairs Columnist for *Avvenire*, Milan.

Hon. Alberto SCHEPISI, Italian Ambassador to Ireland.

Paolo Daniele SIVIERO, Centro Ambrosiano Documentazione per le Religioni. Coordinator for "Religion and Oriental Cultures", Milan.

Maddalena TIRABASSI, Agnelli Foundation, Turin.