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Private and Public Social Inventions in Modern Societies

Polish Philosophical Studies, II

edited by
Leon Dyczewski , John Kromkowski and Paul Peachey

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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Acknowledgements

Preface

George F. McLean

A characteristic weakness of modern rationalisms is to bargain away the breadth and inclusiveness of vision for precision, simplicity and control. On the one hand, some rejected the concerns of community, focused exclusively upon the single, and ultimately the private individual, attempted to endow this isolate with complete and arbitrary control over its life, and built a vision of human relations modeled upon unbridled competition.

On the other hand, for a century and a half Marxism presented itself as a utopian vision for the development of human society. After the modern style of clear, analytic insight it identified clearly the material components of reality; with ingenuity it developed a dialectical tool for manipulating the public forms which this could take; with hubris it claimed to explain thereby the whole of reality; and with cruel purpose it suppressed all that did not fit this pattern, namely, all that was private.

The effect was at first to raise the hopes of broad groups of people and to generate heroic sacrifice and self abnegation. In the end, however, as its limitations stifled personal initiative and suppressed creativity, the result was a system which repressed those who had much to contribute and rendered entire nations incapable not only of providing for their basic material needs, but of the hope which drives the present and opens to the future.

The joint-colloquium on public and private social inventions in modern society, the work of which is reflected in this volume is an effort to overcome extremes and to lay a foundation for a more humane 21st century. It grew out of a dozen years of cooperation between Polish scholars of the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) and their confreres at the Catholic University of America (CUA), Washington. During that time some 75 Polish specialists from the full range of academic disciplines each spent a semester at Catholic University. There they were able to update their bibliographies and to assimilate the latest methods in their disciplines. What is more, they were able to do this in a cultural context which reflected not only the ideologies of public vs. private, with their emphasis on the material and upon technical controls, but the rich spiritual tradition of Western Civilization which gave birth to the creative dynamism of modern times. The program helped to lay a firm basis for the Polish breakthrough, which shook free from the confines of ideology and opened the breach through which the other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe poured during the remainder of 1989.

It was at the very conclusion of this cycle in 1989--the day following the first free election in fifty years for Poland and indeed in the whole of Eastern Europe--that this joint colloquium on the public and the private began. Its task was to examine the perennial human dilemma regarding the way in which humanity could be constituted of multiple individuals and yet achieve community in social life. It sought out ways in which self-conscious, free and responsible persons and peoples could build a public life capable of promoting the creative powers of its peoples, of caring for its weak and elderly, and of reaching out in union with others to construct a social life worthy of mankind for the impending century.

The work of the colloquium began with a statement of the problem which reached beyond the ideological totalizations of the public at the expense of the private or, vice versa, to the fundamental task which faces every age, namely, how to relate the person and the social whole. This was followed by more detailed studies of the issue in the three major areas of family and neighborhood, education and religion, and economics and politics.

In each field papers were presented by both Polish and American scholars analyzing the experience and the social inventions of the two peoples as they approached the issue from two very different political and economic experiences, while sharing at a deeper level the basic values of their common Christian heritage.

That the discussions were punctuated by the notices not only of solidarity’s electoral triumph in Poland, but of the tragedy unfolding in Tienanmen Square gave sober warning of the radical seriousness of the historical process in which we are engaged. In the pattern of that week’s combination of crucifixion and resurrection, each people must reconcile the public and private dimensions of life in a process which overcomes the destructive conflicts and leads to the celebration of life that is at once personal and deeply social.

In this light what is important is not to choose between the public and the private, as if a utopia could be constructed by choosing one and excluding the other. Indeed, the paper of Stephen Schneck probes deeply enough to show with Hannah Arendt how statism is not merely a problem of the East but a characteristic of all modern societies. The experience of this century is that such a road leads to catastrophe. Rather the task of life--and thus of universities--is to find how the two can be interwoven with the public or state to constitute a path of authentic human progress for the century to come.

This volume marks the opening of a new phase in this journey.

Introduction

Leon Dyczewski

In the last few decades one can observe two mutually opposed tendencies in the world's socio-political systems. One is an expansion of the state in a totalitarian manner with attempts to subordinate the individual, all social groups and the whole society to the state; this tendency gave rise to such 20th socio-political systems as German national socialism, Marxist-Leninist socialism, and Chinese communism. The other tendency is an expansion of individualism to forms of unlimited liberalism in economy, anarchism in political life and unbridled freedom in the field of ethics. Both tendencies are developed to varying degrees in particular states, but on a global scale they have caused acute crises in social life perceived as a whole. An analysis of these crises indicates that at their basis lies a misapprehension of the mutual relations between the individual and the society, as well as between the society and the state, wrongly understood both by many politicians and by average citizens. An improper interpretation of these relations spawns many errors and false solutions in politics and economics, in neighborhood life and the family, and in raising and educating the younger generation.

These problems have recurred frequently in discussions taking place during the seminars sponsored for a number of years in Washington, D.C. by the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy: social topics as "Relations Between Cultures", "Urbanization and Values", "The Place of the Person in Social Life" and "Freedom and Choice in a Democracy". The participants in the seminars represented various sciences, world views, backgrounds and countries of origin including Africa, South America, Asia and Europe. Poland was represented by a series of professors including Professor dr. hab., Leon Dyczewski, Dr. Leszek Paga, and Professor dr. hab., Walerian Slomka and Dr. Jaolwiga Rakowska from the Catholic University of Lublin.

Poland has been the site of very interesting and extremely important events and changes which have attracted the attention of all, especially the Americans and Africans. The former were mainly interested in the disintegration of the socialist system and the consequences of this process; the latter in turn wanted to find out if it was at all feasible to purge a system of mistakes and distortions. All the transformations achieved in Poland under the initial inspiration and influence of the social movement known as Solidarnosc were regarded as a process of the liberation of Poland and other countries from the Marxist-Leninist socialist systems. The conviction that this was the last stage of this system in its prevailing form and the beginning of a whole new era for Central and Eastern Europe generated the idea of organizing a Polish-American symposium.

From the discussions of Professors George F. McLean, John Kromkowski, Paul Peachey, Dean Hoge and Leon Dyczewski, the subject of "privacy" and "publicness" in modern society emerged as a topic for a Polish-American symposium. This was based on a number of reasons:

a) Although more easily accessible to empirical analysis, the subject of the mutual relations between "privacy" and "publicness" is a corollary of the problem of relations between the individual and society, as well as between society and the state. Thus, dealing with the questions connected with "privacy" and "publicness" in modern society touches problems which today are most urgent and significant.

b) In spite of the differences between their state systems, in both societies, Polish and American, there occur identical abnormalities between "privacy" and "publicness", including such fundamental phenomena as a weakening of involvement in public life and its far reaching formalization, as well as escape into private life. Sometimes these phenomena assume almost pathological forms. For instance, it may happen that the same individual lives as if in two independent worlds, private and public. In one of them such a person is dynamic and creative, respecting obligatory norms and manifesting a friendly attitude towards others; in the other world the same individual is passive and aggressive, uninterested in the affairs of others and uninvolved in purposes which transcend personal aims. This raises questions about the factors which condition the improper functioning of "privacy" and "publicness" in modern society, and about the extent to which such conditioning is determined by systemic and non-systemic elements.

c) A discussion about these problems among Polish and American scholars, representing different backgrounds and different experiences in social life, could be expected to result in new theoretical solutions as well as in suggestions for social policy and social activities directed towards a more harmonious interconnection between what is private and what is public in modern society.

The problems of "privacy" and "publicness", thus perceived, were to be analyzed in the lives of a local society and of a neighborhood, in marital and family life, in the systems of education and upbringing, and in the economic and political realms of life. Analysis of the problems in question in these domains of social life in societies characterized by different systems and pasts promised to be productive. The symposium was therefore planned as international and interdisciplinary, for it was projected that, looking from the points of view of their different experiences, the participants would mutually stimulate one another to seek more inventive solutions for linking harmoniously these two aspects of social life.

This first Polish-American symposium took place in Kazimierz Donly on the Vistula in the Center of Creative Reflection of the Catholic University of Lublin. The organizers of the symposium were the departments of Sociology and Political Science and the Council for Research, Values and Philosophy Catholic University in Washington, D.C. (P. Peachey, J. Kromkowski, G. McLean, respectively) and the Social Department of the Social Science Faculty of the Catholic University of Lublin (L. Dyczewski, M.Tarnowski). It was the first joint symposium by the scholars in the social sciences of the two universities, which for years have maintained scientific contacts and cooperation. The collaboration between the two institutions of higher education has been crowned and deepened by this meeting, which provided the participants with an outstanding opportunity to exchange results of specific studies, theories, social ideas, personal views and different scientific approaches.

The present volume constitutes the fruits of this symposium, though only partly so, because it does not include the contents of the very rich discussions which clearly predominated during the sessions. The papers were presented and their main theses served as the subject of lively and creative debates.

In presenting this work we hope that the reader will find much comparative material on mutual relations between what is private and public in the lives of Polish and American societies. This should stimulate further theoretical analyses, research and activities leading to a more productive relation between the two spheres of social life. Such a search is particularly needed by Poland where our public life is being built on principles entirely different from those applied thus far: all is being created anew and approaches developed could well point the way for Eastern Europe for centuries to come.

We hope also that the present publication will contribute to closer cooperation between Polish and American social scientists. This would be especially valuable because the exchange of experiences, conceptualizations and concrete suggestions in this field is needed for the creation of a more humane, that is, a personal society which can give rise to ever improving conditions for the personal development of its members.

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Part I
The Issue

Chapter I

The Dichotomy of "Private" and "Public" as a Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Social Reality

Jan Turowski

The notions of "private" and "public" have been used with increasing frequency in recent years as basic categories of analysis in sociological literature.[1] This study will analyze a fundamental social dilemma, namely, whether there are any structural contradictions between the so-called private and public interests and spheres. The issues include: whether those two spheres have been deformed, whether it is possible to unite "private" and "public," and what are the continuities and discontinuities in private and public social inventions in modern society?

The Meanings of the Notions of "Private" and "Public"

Difficulties arise immediately when one tries to explain the notions themselves. A number of authors emphasize that the notions are both impressive and ambiguous. Because they are difficult to operationalize, it is hard to determine their empirical sense and semantic content, and as they are frequently assigned a purely normative and evaluative, rather than a neutral, character their use in sociological analysis is more confused. In spite of these objections, they are employed as basic categories for dividing the relations of social life into two large parts.

The notion "private" is associated with the notion "interest," signifying the good, the goals and activities undertaken by one for one's own benefit, as opposed to the activities conducted for the good of everybody. This orientation to an individual's own good rather than to the common good of everyone provides a criterion distinguishing "private" and "public." Secondly, the notion "private" comprises the sphere of aspirations and activities which are not subject to control from the outside. "Privacy is defined as space of free movement or domain of autonomous activity, which is free from the control of larger groups."[2] Privacy includes physical space, objects and edifices, that is, private property to which others have no access. Privacy and its scope are determined by the kind of interaction and the degree of distance or isolation. In a given system of culture this makes up a so-called right to privacy which cannot be infringed upon without the consent of a given person or group. The right to privacy is usually regulated by the laws and moral norms of a given society.

According to Hans Paul Bahrdt, "private" and "public" are certain spheres of life and kinds of activity of an individual. Their borders are difficult to define exactly and explicitly since they change with time. Spatially, however, the "private sphere" comprises: an apartment, a house, and property. Socially, it includes the family, circles of friends, and all other informal groups which are based on the relationships of kinship, neighborhood and friendship--Bahrdt calls them

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[1] For problems and discussions on "private" and "public" see J.A. Beckford, "The Ideologies of Privacy," *Current Sociology*, 30 (1982).

[2] *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, XII, 480-487.

"intimate" groups. The notion "privacy," he observes, comprises all kinds of an individual's activity which take place within a common residential situation.[3]

On the other hand, unlike private interest and privacy, public interest means the common good which is created and used by all or by the majority of the members of the society. It is commonly understood to comprise those activities which are necessary for the functioning of the state of community. Pendleton Herling writes: "In substantive or policy terms, the public interest may be envisaged as embracing those activities necessary to the safety of the state and the welfare of the community: defense, police protection, education, public health and sanitation."[4] The range of those goals and activities, which are important for the community, is defined variously in different societies. In the totalitarian countries of state socialism, public interest comprised almost all spheres of life. An identity was understood between state and society, and between the public interest and that of the ruling party. Above all, there was an absolute superiority of the public interest as determined by the party over the interests of an individual.

In countries with traditions of political pluralism, the public is defined on the basis of an agreement by the majority or by a compromise between political groups.

A number of authors view "public" not only as the "common good" of everybody--the "public interest"--but as the activities leading thereto and participation by the people in such activities. Therefore, they write about "public life," "the sphere of public life," and "the public sphere." They describe the functioning of broader social groups, such as the state or global society, and the participation of people in their activities.[5] Jürgen Habermas considers public life in modern society to comprise the state with the extended organs of its authorities, large industrial corporations, local and other communities and their functions.[6] Similarly, Richard Senett understands "public" as "political life" in a given society, that is, the social structures outside the family and their functioning.[7] On the other hand, according to H.P. Bahrdt, the "public sphere" (*Oefentlichkeit*) includes all kinds of activities which take place outside the family, its home, communities of families, kinship, neighborhood or friends. Therefore, sociologically, "public" means the institutionalization of the general collective life in which everyone can participate. Theoretically this takes place in a democratic state and its institutions over which the population can wield control.

Deformations of Public Life

For many authors contemporary society is characterized not only by a lack of any links between what is private and what is public, but by deformations in both these spheres. Jürgen Habermas sees a deformation of the public sphere in the exclusion of the individual from participation in the process of decision-making in public affairs. Political life in contemporary society has been controlled by the state and its extended political and administrative institutions, or absorbed within the framework of large organizations coordinated by the state. Commercialized mass media serve not only the formation of rational social opinion and the public interest, but the interests of different group and class lobbies.

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[3] H.P. Bahrdt, *Die moderne Grosstadt. Soziologische Ueberlegrungen zum Staedte-bau* (München, 1961) and *Wege zur Soziologie* (München, 1973).

[4] P. Herling, "Public Interest", *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XIII, 180.

[5] Cfr. A. Giddens, *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory* (London, 1982).

[6] J. Habermas, *Strukurwandel der Oeffentlichkeit*, 5 Aufl. (Neuwied und Berlin, 1962); *Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus* (Frankfurt/M, 1973).

[7] R. Senett, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York, 1978); M.P. Smith, *The City and Social Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).

The sphere of social consciousness has been deformed by being subjected to different irrational and technocratic ideologies. People perform either specialized, technical actions or actions directed by the decision-makers and managers, though such actions are called participation in decision-making.

A similar diagnosis of the deformation of the public sphere is put forward by Hans Paul Bahrdt who points to the excessive extension of the function of the state and of large corporate monopolies in the fields of production and consumption. Even the workers or consumers in defending themselves against the omnipotence of large, centralized structures fall into the trap of their own bureaucratic and hierarchically structured organs which make decisions about them in advance. On the other hand, Theodore Roszak seeks the reason for the deformation of the public sphere in the alienation of an individual from the public life, not only factually but intentionally, as determined by the nature of our productive and consumer culture.

Richard Senett, author of *The Fall of Public Man*, proposed the most incisive view of the deformation of public life. According to Senett, the death of public life is reflected in the general withdrawal from it by the members of contemporary society as was the case with the Romans after the death of the Emperor Augustus. Similarly, contemporary citizens treat any required participation in public life as mere formal duties and take part in them only when necessary and then only passively.

Another sign of the erosion of the public life is a reduction in public interaction. In pre-industrial society, collective life took place in complex social communities; now it takes the form of specialized, formalized organizations. Personal interaction and relations in the economic sphere have died out and been replaced by large mute department stores. Public life in towns has ceased: streets and parks have become deserted and the erosion of public areas has become general. The depersonalization of the public sphere is reflected also in the formalization of necessary contacts, in which one participates without inner emotional involvement.

The signs of the deformation of "public life" are then as follows: lack of participation in different forms of public life; formal rather than real participation; lack of participation in decision-making regarding the important issues in the state, municipalities or communities; passivity and submission to manipulation by decision-makers and managers.

The deformation of public life in socialist countries was total since the state comprised all the spheres of life through the administrative and political institutions directed and controlled by the Communist Party. In the socialist system, society and individuals became "nationalized." Citizens lived within this system; they worked and spent even their spare time in state institutions in manners planned by centralized political authorities with whom they felt no identification.

In view of this, as confirmed by numerous diagnoses, it became relatively general for the population to withdraw from political and social life with a simultaneous increase of passive attitudes. This was intensified by the manner of ruling in the early decades which was based, as was the case in Poland, upon pressure and terror. The aversion to any social and political activity was deepened when the population was forced to keep up appearances and simulate voluntary action and participation in the decision-making process. Both society and individuals were deprived of their subjectivity in such a system.[8]

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[8] These statements are based on the following works: *Zalamanie porzadku etatystycznego* (Warszawa, 1988); *Spoleczenstwo polskie czasu kryzysu, Praca zbiorowa pod red. St. Nowaka* (Warszawa,

Comparison of the deformations of public life in democratic and totalitarian systems points up the difference between the two types of political systems in the range of this deformation and its mechanisms. In democratic systems it consists in the "outside control" of an individual by means of propaganda, fashion, degree of monopolization of production, etc., while in the totalitarian systems it consists in an incapacitation and coercion of an individual by means of direct and open, or indirect and concealed, pressure.[9]

Deformations of the Private Sphere of Interest

Deformation of the public sphere causes a breakup of the private sphere, as is noted by Hans Paul Bahrdt. One observes an ideologization of the family home and the enclosing of oneself within the sphere of private affairs and family life. Privacy becomes a barricaded fortress which provides an escape from public life.

According to Richard Senett, the impact of industrial capitalism deprived the public activity of any moral legitimation, which it transferred to privacy, the private amassing of goods and profit-making. The signs of this deformation of the private sphere are: focusing upon getting richer and gathering goods, an orientation to one's own interest, and a growth of attitudes of consumption. Referring to Freud, Senett states that the members of contemporary capitalist society are seized by an illness, the mentality of narcissism. Privatization, narcissism and egoism lead to two personality types in successive generations. On the one hand, there are the professionals in public life--the decision-makers, experts and managers--who dominate public life and through required education and manipulation direct the masses of citizens. These passive masses are the "spectators": they take no part in public life, show a passive attitude and see nothing worth doing outside of business and their own family. These "spectators" even detest politics, but nevertheless judge the professionals, criticizing them and making claims upon them. Societies suffer from illnesses, states Senett, in both the socio-psychical and the moral sense.

Deformation of the private sphere, according to H. Marcuse, consists in a situation in which, although it should provide an arena for free self-expression and auto-determination, yet under the influence of mass and monopolistic production even the private sphere becomes an area of conformism and outside determination. In this way, private life avoids social control, but comes under the control of the cultural and socio-economic system; this produces a supremacy of society over the human being.

Descriptions of deformations of the private sphere in developed capitalist countries can be referred, *mutatis mutandis*, to socialist countries. There exist, however, some major differences. For example, it is stated that in the Polish value system such aspirations as high salaries, material prosperity and family happiness rank high. Hence, there is an orientation to the sphere of private life and a simultaneous distance from public affairs. However, these signs of the predominance of private interests and private affairs are of a different scale and are differently conditioned. A section of the diagnosis put forward by the Polish Sociological Association explains the reason:

Quite numerous categories of Poles feel their values and aspirations blocked in the sphere of both public needs and personal and material needs, that is, the need for socio-professional promotion, and for a feeling of material security for the future. This means that these people necessarily find

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1984); *Polacy-1984-Dynamika konfliktu i konsensusu* (Warszawa, 1986); *Spoleczenstwo polskie drugiej polowy lat 80-tych Wyd. Polskie towarstwo Socjologiczne* (1987).

[9] *Czlowiek w poszukiwaniu zagubionej tozsamosoi* (Lublin: KUL, 1987).

themselves in a state of general frustration. On the other hand, in none of the domains in which they experience frustration of their needs or aspirations do they expect to find immediate improvement.

This general frustration results in different forms of aggression, including verbal aggression. The signs of pathology in family life could be observed: "escape from oneself" to alcoholism, drug-taking, annihilation, apathy or indifference to everything. These signs of deformation of personal life were characteristic of this society.

Strategies to Counteract Deformations of the Public and the Private

Critics of contemporary society who make use of the dichotomic concept of public and private spheres of life try to point to the strategies or general orientation of activities which could lead to some reconciliation between the private and the public. Most frequently this reconciliation is defined in categories of balance, but further criteria are sometimes formulated differently. For example, H.P. Bahrdt speaks of a polarization of these spheres, while J. Habermas criticizes their "impermeability," putting forward the postulate that they should become permeable while maintaining their separate character.

Approaches to this issue are not explicit, but seem to adopt implicitly the principle of the Polish political scientist, Antoni S. Kaminski, according to whom "where there exists no distinction between the private and the public spheres, there is no citizens' society--public interests arise in a citizens' society, and it is only here that they can find support." On the other hand, where there is no private property there can be no private sphere. These are the starting points for strategies which differentiate as they proceed. With some simplifications one can group them in the following way: a concept of neo-liberal rationalism, an anti-culture concept, a concept of self-governments and cooperatives, and a mystic-anarchistic concept.

The neo-liberal concept is represented by Jürgen Habermas. He considers the complete development of public life to constitute the early period after the Great Revolution in France. In structural terms, political life proceeds openly and publicly in such a state of society. State and society are distinguished from each other, while public opinion functions as the mediator between the two. All citizens participate in its formation on the basis of freedom of speech. Thus, power is wielded based upon the rational opinion of the citizens. Public life can be assured by institutional guarantees of the freedom to organize meetings and form associations and unions, and by the rejection of any pressure, whether physical or psychic. Removing the barriers between private and public "speech" will make it possible to increase rational social consciousness and full communication between the members of society. Alvin Gouldner considers this situation to lack realism since it does not include any definite program for changing the large social structures.

A second strategy is found in the "anti-culture" program which has different versions. One is the radical version put forward by Theodore Roszak[10] according to whom only a cultural revolution can change existing social relations. He proclaims the program of so-called anti-culture which to some extent provided the ideological grounds for the mass social movements of the 1960s. Anti-culture in the field of social structures must be based on collective forms and activities, which must be on a small scale. These are--and should be--small, voluntary unions, local communities, production units, housing collectives, small religious groups, and so on. These new structures have the potential to improve and deepen their members spiritually. Each kind of such communities will radiate and lead to a transformation of the whole urbanized, municipal society. They are the ones to bring down the existing, centralized power and to create a collective and spiritually more perfect society. They will heal political life and ensure a many-sided growth for the individual.

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[10] Theodore Roszak, *Where the Wasteland Ends* (New York: Doubleday, 1973); *The Unfinished Animal* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).

The third strategy is the program of the state's democratization, which appeared in certain socialist countries, especially in Poland (e.g., the "Solidarity" movement). This can be summarized in a most general manner as a program of shifting, by means of reforms, from a "nationalized" to a self-governing, cooperative society based upon self-government and collective organization. Independently of the deeply democratized structure of state authorities securing the influence of an individual on the state's government, the social structure would be filled by self-governments: territorial, labor (in factories), professional, cooperative. The idea of uniting the private and public interests would find a possible real and effective solution in self-governing units and collective forms.

The fourth type of strategy can be termed mystic-anarchistic in the sense of an individual's breaking off from the existing structures and public life and taking up activities which have meaning in themselves and express the author. It is a strategy of gaining oneself through contemplation, meditation, controlling the body or erotism, or achieving so-called "self-expression." Although this kind of behavior is a protest against existing public life, it occurs within communities of like-minded individuals. Dissolution of "private" and "public" takes place through breaking with the collapsing society, its culture and forms of public life.

Anarchistic strategies are even more radical. They proclaim breaking not only the existing structures of political life, but those of traditional private life as well in order to achieve a complete and general decentralization of structures. In this way, the factors of individual development will be released, namely, aggression, conflicts, disorder, contradictions and combat. Thus, for instance, Richard Senett accuses the family, neighborhood, and local communities of repressing aggression and an individual's aspirations to fight. Only groups of people created as a result of conflict can revive the public life which has been suppressed or even extinguished. The above are the four general models of solving the relations between the spheres of private and public interest. Only in particular levels and areas of social life is it possible to detect continuities and discontinuities in the modern society through private and public social inventions.

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Chapter II

Scylla or Charybdis:
Rethinking the State/Society Dichotomy

Stephen Frederick Schneck

The terms "state" and "society" are loaded. Each carries on its back a few centuries of varied use and purpose. Each owes its origin to a particular thread of circumstances in history. Especially when used in the vicinity of the other, each term incites speaker and hearer to make normative judgements.

The grandfather of contemporary thought, Hegel, must be granted responsibility for much of the latter claim. In *The Philosophy of Right*, he distinguishes society and state in a manner that became definitive for most of today's social theorists and scientists. Society is the antithesis of the family, which represents a human sociality of force, necessity and absolute hierarchical authority. "Society," in contrast, is the sociality of freedom, choice and individual sovereignty. For Hegel, family and society are each incomplete and excessive, being only exaggerated facets of the complete sociality required for being completely human. Both notions beg the complete sociality for human being wherein force and freedom, necessity and choice, hierarchical authority and individual sovereignty are (in the sense of Hegel's *Aufhebung*) completed, canceled and transformed into a unity. This complete sociality, of course, was the Hegelian idea of the "state." In this way the idea of the state became *normative* and *critical* for all other human conditions of sociality.[1]

The idea of the state as criterion for all other human conditions came to exercise a powerful fascination on contemporary thought. Marx, Weber, Scheler, Croce, Schmitt, Spencer, Treitschke--left, right and center: despite the various differences among these social theorists, their basic understanding of state and society remained remarkably consistent with Hegel's formulation. To be sure, some would celebrate the society over the state--Spencer, for example.[2] But Hegel's ideals and terms are the *lingua franca* of the debate.

In light of this, the argument to be made here is intended to interject some suspicion into our use of these terms, and to cast doubts on the normative implications such usage incites. The argument will proceed in two parts: 1) an assessment of the terms themselves; and, 2) an appraisal of the normative implications of the origin and reality of the terms.

The Terms "State" and "Society"

The word "state" traditionally has been traced to the medieval concept of *status publicus*, literally "public condition."[3] State here is understood as standing in, or being present for, this "public state." This is elaborated in the context of the medieval notion of representation, in the manner that a scapegoat re-presents the sins of the community. In the last few decades, study of the intellectual history of the word "state" has uncovered more complex roots to the modern word.[4] Wolfgang Mager, for example, in his pathbreaking work on the history of the concept of state, has teased out an interesting link between the medieval usage and the contemporary understanding of the word. Differentiating between the medieval usage of state, which was always "state of something" and the modern usage of the term as a thing in itself, Mager finds a turning point toward the modern usage in the northern Italian renaissance. The medieval, Thomistic classification of political communities according to who rules--*status principis, status regalis* and so forth--gradually allowed a linguistic separation in the vernacular of *il stato* (the state itself) from whatever authority rules. As Mager argues, "this differentiation led to the terminological differentiation of *status*, *communitas* and *res publica*."[5] Hence, the idea of the state, now understood as distinct from the political community itself, emerges concomitantly with the emergence of modernity.[6]

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[1] G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, various editions. See especially the third part, "Ethical Life," where the dialectic of right reveals an inner dialectic of ethical life comprised of three moments: family, society and state.

[2] See Spencer's essays collected in *Man versus the State*, ed. Truxton Beale (New York: Kennerley, 1916).

[3] A well-known version of this traditional argument is made by Ernst H. Kantorowicz in *The King's Two Bodies*(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 271.

This new usage has the state as a sort of generic representative of the political community, an empty husk to be made concrete according to the *ad hoc* character and desires of the political community. State, then, becomes a universal category to be given flesh by *fortuna* and the *virtue*s of actors in the political community. In perceiving state in this fashion, Mager contends that a gradual separation of the idea of state from society becomes possible. Where medieval thinking had a fundamental unity of *civitas sive societas civilis*, the renaissance Italians were already distinguishing the state from the society. Even the linguistic origin of the state/society dichotomy, in other words, is to be found in the transition to modernity.

What was behind this separation, what purpose? Political theorists have traditionally looked at this separation of society from state as part of a wider liberation from the monolithic authority structure of the medieval world. It was seen to parallel the religious pluralism of the Reformation, the aesthetic pluralism made possible by the Renaissance, and the general turn from universal external authority toward individual, private criteria for authority. Just as Descartes would erect a cosmos not on divine authority but upon the multiple private authorities of the *cogito*, so political thinkers would reject singular divine authority and replace it with the pluralism of individual sovereignties exercised through a serving state.

Recent scholarship, however, has challenged this happy version of the separation of state and society. Albert O. Hirschman, for example, contends that the watershed for the emergence of the ideas of state and society was reached when "a feeling arose in the Renaissance and became firm conviction in the seventeenth and eighteenth century that moralizing philosophy and religious precept could no longer be trusted with restraining the destructive passions of men."[7] In other words, the supposed liberation that occurs from the fragmentation of authority is suspicious. The fragmentation of authority as in state and society can also be perceived to have led to better techniques for discipline and control. Michel Foucault, in fact, puts this perhaps too strongly when he maintains that the monolithic authority structure of the medieval world (characterized by external force and repression) was jettisoned for the structures of state and society which more effectively put human passions to use through the inculcation of self-discipline by appeal to private interests rather than through simple repression.[8] Greater management of peoples is maintained at lower "cost" by harnessing passions in the dialectic tension of state and society than was available through more simple monolithic authority structures.

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[4] Wolfgang Mager's book, *Zur Entstehung des modernen Staatsbegriffs* (Mainz: Verlag AWL, 1968) is the pathbreaking study on the history of the term state. The history offered here only paraphrases Mager's argument.

[5] *Mager*, 419.

[6] See my treatment of this from the perspective of Max Scheler's notion of "the bourgeois" in *Person and Polis: Max Scheler's Personalism as Political Theory* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987), chapter four.

[7] Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and Interests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 14-15.

In a recent study of modern authority in state and society, William Connolly elaborates on the themes of Hirschman and Foucault.[9] Connolly's work leads this essay's argument back to the central figure of Hegel for the problem of state and society by way of the canonical texts of the history of political thought, especially through Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His purpose is to offer a genealogical reading of the canonical texts of modern political theory, all in consideration of the modern problem of authority and difference. Connolly reads Hobbes differently than standard interpretations. He sees Hobbes' starting point to be not a realist appreciation of nature, but only nominalist artifice. Indeed, Hobbes, then, rejects the very idea of nature, since nature is presented as only an automaton created by a God who is Himself presented as a creation of human beings. This reading radically changes Hobbes' political theory. The perversely self-focused individuals of the original condition are now perceived to be not "natural" but contrived. Such an original individual is revealed to be only "a domesticated human," "an artifice made 'fit for society'," "whose guided passions protect society from the destructive effects of anarchic behavior."[10]

The upshot of this is that Hobbes does not argue for a realist political theory based on human nature. The idea of nature itself is a rhetorical device used to foster a calculative rationality that can then be manipulated to extend a given social order. Hobbes, the student of Bacon, does one better than the Baconian wedding of reason and power; reason is offered as only a creature of power.[11]

The supposed Hobbesian distinction between society and state evaporates in Connolly's reading. Both the natural state and the civil state turn out to be elements of a common enterprise for externally disciplining human behavior. Society and state mutually reinforce each other in providing the discipline for controlling human behavior. Connolly suggests, however, that there is an inherent problem in the externality of Hobbes' scheme. Because the discipline is overt and transparent to all parties, in order to work its operation would require a vicious circle of ever more rigorous coercion. "Coercive power would penetrate more deeply into the body politic; public space would be defined more broadly; words and conduct would be regulated more extensively; the self would be subjected to more detailed regulations to help it maintain its self-control."[12] The Hobbesian sovereign devolves to become an external monopoly of authoritative violence designed to bring order to civil society.

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[8] See Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Random, 1970) and especially *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

[9] William Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

[10] *Connolly,* 28.

[11] It is intriguing in light of this to note the subtle and meaningful distinction between Bacon's famous statement, "Nam et ipsa scientia potestas est" (*De Haeresibus*), that knowledge itself is power, and Hobbes' somewhat different claim that "scientia propter potentiam" (*De Philosophia*). By seeing knowledge as leading to the end, which is power, Hobbes implies that knowledge and reason are only instrumental to the acquisition of power; they are not ends in themselves. Cf. Hobbes, "Of Philosophy," *English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, ed. & trans. William Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1839), p. 7. See also *De Philosophia*, *Opera Philosophia*, ed. Guliemi Molesworth (Aslen: Scientia Verlag--reprint, 1966), 6.

[12] Connolly, 39.

On the heels of this, therefore, Connolly’s turn to Rousseau is fascinating, for his assessment of Rousseau is just the reverse. Asked the secret for the comportment of her children, in Rousseau’s *Heloise*, Julie wryly turns the question back: "Have you noticed that they disobey me?" "That would be difficult," comes the reply, "when you never command them." Where Hobbes’ command theory of political obligation involved ubiquitous *external* disciplinary examination of individuals by the powers of the sovereign, Connolly maintains Rousseau would use civil virtue to *internalize* discipline--mimicking the unreflective grip of authority in the natural state. Children are metaphors for all that nature is as it "comes from the hand of the Creator": wholesome, without the alienation that brings reflection and resentment, and unsullied by society. Connolly’s thesis has Rousseau gently drawing such children from the natural condition into the human condition. They are drawn from the holistic world of nature which they unreflectively inhabit, into the holistic communitarian world of convention. This new world too, on Connolly’s reading of Rousseau, should be one inhabited unreflectively. In political terms the reading has interesting implications: civil virtue in Rousseau’s political writings would be a mechanism to constrain reason to the "necessities" of conventional life so that reason more closely resembles the ecstatic instincts of the natural condition.

To triumph in this, civic virtue must incite the self-discipline needed to mold the citizen into the political state as completely as the animal is molded by the Creator into its niche in nature. "Everything in society must be devised so that the self can wage this quiet battle successfully," Connolly writes, "and the very stringency of the external organization Rousseau commends reveals the intensity of the internal battle."[13] As Connolly reads Rousseau, the crucial external organization for the triumph of civic virtue in this internal struggle is civil religion. Civil religion is the foundation for civic virtue, the mechanism for achieving the unreflective community needed for Rousseau’s cohesion of justice and utility.

This comes back, then, to the problem of state and society in the shadow of Hegel. In response to Rousseau, Connolly’s Hegel does not endorse philosophizing "by the light of nature". Instead, he sees nature as an otherness--a realm of difference--that must be overcome dialectically by an emerging, comprehensive rationality associated with God realizing his essence in history. Furthermore, Hegel’s state clearly is also not the external mechanism of sovereignty necessary to discipline society as imagined by Hobbes. State overcomes both the internality of *Gemeinschaft* and the externality of *Gesellschaft*. Connolly’s stress in this focuses on the tensions of the dialectic in favor of a focus on *Aufhebung*--which he reads as the annihilation of difference and the raising up of an (ultimately universal) unity. For politics, the result is what Connolly calls "the politics of inclusivity," where the *Aufhebung* begs political consensus or concord. "[I]nstilled within us," Connolly explains for Hegel, "is a purpose to pursue each historical moment of concord until the contradictions within it become visible and compelling and then to forge new and higher forms of concord which express more fully both the essence of Being and the essence of humanity."[14] In appraising *The Philosophy of Right*, wherein Hegel reveals that the state is the final concord, Connolly maintains that human living is presented as an utterly ordered, seamless and rational sociality--without disruptions, tensions or arenas for the creative interplay and enhancement of difference. When Karl Marx comes to preach the end of politics in communist society, it is only an echo of the end of politics preached by Hegel in his concept of the state.

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[13] *Ibid.*, 58.

[14] *Ibid.*, 86.

The distance between such thinking and Connolly's post-modern liberalism is striking. Connolly contends that Hegel (and his materialist stand in Marx) would "depreciate the importance of politics in the realized society because each has too much faith in the possibility of transparency and harmony in the realized state." "Hegel and Marx put politics on ice," he continues, wherein "the importance of its disruptive dimension is subtracted from the value of its unifying dimension, squeezing creativity, contestability and tragedy out of the sphere of politics."[15] When Hegel raises the idea of the state to that of the criterion for all human conditions, therefore, he does not hearken back to a God of the medieval world. That *civitas sive societas civilis* for the medieval does not render *civitas* a measure for all human sociality. Thomistic politics imagines a harmony; Hegel's dialectics forgoes harmony for *Aufhebung*. For Hegel, society is only an inferior moment in the course of sociality as it proceeds to completion and perfection in the idea of the state.

If this essay were to follow Connolly, Foucault, Hirschman and Mager in their assessment of the concepts of state and society, suspicion about these terms would seem warranted for the concepts are utterly modern. On one hand, the early modern and liberal separation of state and society is not as certainly linked to prospects for liberation as has traditionally been believed--indeed, if Foucault is to be believed, the separation aims at better techniques of discipline. On the other hand, the dialectical recombination of society into state in the manner of many later modern theories in the shadow of Hegel certainly has no greater attraction. Perhaps, the ideal of society holds greater promise as criterion for the condition of being human.

Normative Implications

The ideal of a rational society, although an older modern notion, probably exercises the greater hold on the modern mind. Consider the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas, for example, and his famed "legitimation crisis."[16] Habermas begins with a revision of Marxist theory on state and society. Where Marx had seen only an economic structure in human life, he sees three interrelated structures: economic, political and socio-cultural. Borrowing from Marx's crisis theory, Habermas asserts that the basic contradictions of capitalism perceived by Marx remain, and that averting the economic crisis of capitalism was obtained only by shifting the pressures of the contradictions from the economic to the political system. In late capitalism, then, the state is greatly enlarged and granted wider discretion in order to manage the increasing pressures transferred from economics. As the state has shouldered increasingly the burdens of these pressures, resulting in spiraling budgets and irresolvable political demands, a different manifestation of the crisis looms. The crisis shifts from the economic sphere to the political sphere as the state takes the basic contradictions of capitalism into its own bosom. The state is placed in a precarious cycle not only meeting more and more demands, but also continually fostering new demands in order to draw the crisis from the realm of economics. Ultimately, the demand cycle on the state begins to erode the ability of the state to act responsibly and rationally--at this point the state is utterly a creature of the demands it has fostered. Thus, Habermas argues, by sidestepping the tendencies to economic crisis, the contradictions of capitalism only re-emerge in the guise of a "rationality crisis" such that the political sphere of the state is threatened from within by its own inability to engage in rational policymaking.[17]

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[15] *Ibid.,* 130.

[16] Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1975).

[17] Habermas, 61-68.

Like the economic crisis, however, Habermas believes that the rationality crisis too can be sidestepped. In a nutshell, the key is to turn to non-rational support for the state. If the state is unable to operate rationally, then rational support for state policies from the people will not be forthcoming. If policies are no longer "rational and responsible," then those who expect rational policies will withdraw their support and the legitimacy of the state will evaporate. Faced with this reality, the state's solution is to change the basis of its support from rational support through participation in rational policymaking into something else. In other words, the state begins to tinker with the hearts and minds of people in the socio-cultural sphere. Subtly, on occasion, but with force nonetheless, the state endeavors to impel the hearts and minds of its citizens to support the state itself as rational legitimacy is leeched from authority. Of course, this turn to the socio-cultural sphere inevitably transfers the crisis pressures to that sphere, resulting (from the perspective of the political system) in Habermas' celebrated "legitimation crisis." Accepting popular sovereignty, the legitimacy of the modern state is based on free and rational support from the people for the state. By enforcing participation and support, the state generates a fundamental contradiction in the political system that results in the crisis of legitimation. The state cannot handle the crisis transferred to the socio-cultural realm:

> We have seen now that the state cannot simply take over the cultural system, and that expansion of the areas of state planning actually make problematic matters that were formerly culturally taken for granted. "Meaning" is a scarce resource and is becoming ever scarcer. Consequently, expectations oriented to use values--that is, expectations monitored by success--are rising in the civil public. The rising level of demand is proportional to the growing need for legitimation. The fiscally siphoned-off resource "value" must take the place of the scanty resource "meaning." Missing legitimation must be offset by rewards to the conforming system. A legitimation crisis arises as soon as the demands for such rewards rise faster than the available quantity of value, or when expectations arise that cannot be satisfied with such rewards.[18]

Put more prosaically, when it enforces support by replacing meaning with values in the socio-cultural sphere, the state undercuts the possibility of the *free* and *rational* support that is the basis for the legitimacy of the state itself. As a result, real politics ceases.[19]

From what has been argued before, Habermas' analysis of the interplay of state and society is important. He demonstrates that, on one hand, state manufactured values preclude the modern norm of legitimacy, while on the other hand that the norm cannot be acquired in modern society. But, behind the analysis lies a troublesome ideal human condition as criterion. The most complete elaboration of this condition is Habermas' revised "ideal speech situation" that he calls "discourse ethics," but for the purposes of this review it may better be called by his earlier term "rational society."[20] The criterion against which the contemporary state and society are inspected is an Enlightenment ideal of a rational society of participation directing the services of a servant state. But, Habermas' ever-narrower criteria for the rationality of his rational society seems to narrow the playable space for the same politics so necessary for Habermas' own celebrated notion of legitimacy.

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[18] *Ibid.*, 73.

[19] In his book, *Theory and Practice* (Boston: Beacon, 1978), Habermas seizes on the importance of the loss of the political in modern state-society. Sadly, his more recent works have turned away from a political understanding of his rational society toward "scientific" explanations of rational society.

[20] Habermas, "Diskursethik--Notizen zu einem Begruendungsprogramm," in *Moralbewusstsein und Kommunikatives Handlen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983). Cf. Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1970).

On the occasion of Harvard University's 327th commencement, Alexsandr I. Solzhenitsyn spoke to the dangers implicit in the ideal of a narrowly defined, rational society. The problems of state were obvious to him; he spoke to the dangers of the totalitarian state for the Soviet peoples of his homeland. But, this concern with state was not the focus of his address. He tells his audience of young Americans, "should I be asked whether I would propose the West, such as it is today, as a model to my country, I would frankly have to answer negatively." For, he claimed,

> If our society were to be transformed into yours, it would mean an improvement in certain aspects, but also a change for the worse on some potentially significant points. Of course, a society cannot remain in an abyss of lawlessness, as is the case of our country. But, it is also demeaning for it to stay on such a soulless and smooth plane of legalism as is the case of yours. After decades of violence and oppression, the human soul longs for things higher, warmer, and purer than those offered by today's mass living habits, introduced as by a calling card by the revolting invasion of commercial advertising, by TV stupor, and by intolerable music.[21]

Looking at the West as an exemplar of the idea of society, he claims that the West has "recoiled from the spirit and embraced all that is material, excessively and incommensurately." This has turned "modern Western civilization on the very dangerous trend of worshipping man and his material needs," such that "everything beyond physical well-being and the accumulation of material goods, all other human requirements and characteristics of a subtler and higher nature were left outside attention."[22] As a result, he maintains:

> No, I could not recommend your society as an ideal for the transformation of ours. Through deep suffering, people in our country have now achieved a spiritual development of such intensity that the Western ideal in its present state of exhaustion does not look attractive.[23]

In many respects, Solzhenitsyn's model for human sociality is equally worrisome for what its implementation would pose for the political space needed for being human. But, after the review of the triumph of reason in Hegel's state and of the repressive rationality of Habermas' society, Solzhenitsyn's warning is timely. An irresponsible and oppressive society is the Charybdis to the Scylla of an irresponsible and repressive state. Both, when under the hegemony of modern rationalism, foreclose the space open to responsible and creative human action. Both would narrow the horizon of possibilities open to civilization. We are mistaken, then, to imagine either state or society as criterion for the condition of being human.

A classical ambiance surrounds this notion of being human. Creativity and civilization are celebrated; constraints on creativity or civilization are suspect. The English word "civilization" etymologically carries this ambiance on the tongue: civilization <-*civitas* <- *polis*. Perhaps, it is this *polis* Aristotle had in mind when he imagined the natural condition for being human to be the public life of the citizen in the city. The public life was the locus of creativity and civilization. The *polis* was a space open and amenable to the conduct of being human. Hannah Arendt, perhaps the most important political philosopher of the 20th century, draws from this understanding of the *polis* in her critique of state and society. "To be political," she says, "to live in a *polis*, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence." Indeed, she continues, in the ancient Greek sense of the term "to force people by violence, to command rather than persuade, were prepolitical ways to deal with people characteristic of life outside the *polis*, of home and family life, where the household head ruled with uncontested despotic powers--or of life in the barbarian empires of Asia, whose despotism was frequently likened to the organization of the household."[24]

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[21] Alexsandr I. Solzhenitsyn, "A World Split Apart," in *World Split Apart*, edited by Thomas Strong (New York: Vintage, 1979), 12-13.

[22] Solzhenitsyn, 16.

[23] *Ibid.*, 12.

> The distinctive trait of the household sphere was that in it men lived together because they were driven by wants and needs. The driving force was life itself; the penates, the household gods, were, according to Plutarch "the gods who make us live and nourish our body" [Plutarch, *Questiones Romanae* 51].[25]

The realm of the household (in Greek *oikia*, root of the English word "economic") was without the open space for creativity and expression available in politics. It was a realm determined by necessity, particularly the private necessity of each individual human life. A politics that did not allow the open, public space for creating civilization--a politics of private necessity such as was perceived in the barbarian empires of Asia--was not really politics:

> Under no circumstances could politics be the only means to protect society--a society of the faithful, as in the Middle Ages, or a society of property owners, as in Locke, or a society relentlessly engaged in a process of acquisition, as in Hobbes, or a society of producers, as in Marx. . . .[26]

"The realm of the *polis*," in contrast to the realm of *oikia*, represents, in Arendt's analysis, "the sphere of freedom." Here creative action was celebrated. "At the root of Greek political consciousness," she claims, "we find an unequaled clarity and articulateness in drawing this distinction. No activity that served only the purpose of making a living, of sustaining only the life process, was permitted to enter the political realm."

> Without mastering the necessities of life in the household, neither life nor the "good life" is possible, but politics is never for the sake of life. As far as the members of the *polis* are concerned, household life exists for the sake of the "good life" in the *polis*.[27]

In the *polis* all was public and public-concerned; in the household, all was private. In the *polis* actions were granted public space for freedom and creativity; in the household (or in politics that took its bearings from the household) no space was granted and all was done for the requirements of material necessity.

Reconsider Solzhenitsyn's rejection of both state and society in the context of Arendt's thesis. Modern society is rejected by Solzhenitsyn because it remains almost utterly at the level of material necessity and private interests. State, too, is rejected because, like the ancient barbarian empires of

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[24] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 26-27.
[25] *Ibid.*, 30.
[26] *Ibid.*, 31.
[27] *Ibid.*, 37.

Asia, it seems no more than the household writ large. Something "warmer" (to borrow from Solzhenitsyn) is required for being human. A genuine public realm in the sense of Arendt's *polis* is lost to modernity; neither state nor society offers such a condition. With Solzhenitsyn's reasoning on this, Arendt agrees. She argues that the public/private distinction is eliminated in the modern world, that the supposed state/society separation of modernity only conceals a fundamental unity. State and society are two-sides of the same coin, such that the actual possibility of a public realm and a private realm are lost to moderns:

> In the modern world, the social and the political realms are much less distinct. That politics is nothing but a function of society, that action, speech, and thought are primarily superstructures upon social interest, is not a discovery of Karl Marx but on the contrary is among the axiomatic assumptions Marx accepted uncritically from the political economists of the modern age. This functionalization makes it impossible to perceive any serious gulf between the two realms; and this is not a matter of a theory or an ideology, since with the rise of society, that is, the rise of the "household" (*oikia*) or of economic activities to the public realm, housekeeping and all matters pertaining formerly to the private sphere of the family have become a "collective" concern. In the modern world, the two realms indeed constantly flow into each other like waves in the never-resting stream of the life process itself.[28]

From what has been said, state and society are terms to be used with much suspicion. From Mager, it was demonstrated that the origins of the terms and concepts "state" and "society" are to be found in the breakdown of the medieval polity and the emergence of the modern. From Foucault and Hirschman, moreover, it seems that the distinction between the concepts is perhaps linked to more effective technologies aimed at social discipline and control. From Connolly, it seems the Hegelian state would not be an appropriate condition for being human, that the state as ideal and criterion of the human condition dialectically would come to eliminate the space available for human creativity and expression. From Solzhenitsyn, likewise, it seems that modern society--dominated by the fads and fashions of mass culture--would similarly repress this space. And, from Arendt, it has been learned that state and society are not finally distinct, but are only two sides of the common coin of modern sociality, a sociality that has lost the public space wherein genuine human being is possible.

As a modest contribution to the review of the *status questionis* of the topic state and society, perhaps the best this essay can offer is a sense of confusion and anxiety about the concepts. State and society cannot easily be delineated; in some ways they are only parts of a larger whole. Neither seem to be sufficient for the condition of being human; and, neither simply can serve as normative measure for human sociality. Either notion when taken as criterion for the human condition seems repressive of the space needed for the human condition.[29]

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it might be well to consider state-society as something of a unity, the paradigmatic sociality of modern experience. Indeed, this paradigm largely defines the character of the modern human condition. While for some purposes it may be valuable for analysis to separate the modes of state-society into state-dominant and society-dominant, it should be recognized that focusing on the increasingly slippery difference between the two only serves to obscure the more fundamental singularity of state-society. The "free" market of the West is best recognized as a mechanism for the imposition of authoritative fads and fashions that successfully foreclose possibilities for human expression by reducing human life to labor and consumption. Similarly, Solzhenitsyn even foresees that mass society's demands in the publishing marketplace in the West may more effectively censor literary expression than does the state in the East. Although there are clear and important differences between Madison Avenue and the Soviet *samizdat*, their similarities justifiably deserve our concern. State-society is a singular reality undergirding whatever significant differences exist between state and society. Liberation from the repression of state-society is not to be found by pursuit of state or society.

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[28] *Ibid.,* 33.

[29] In a conference drawing on faculties of two Roman Catholic universities, it is interesting to note that this confusion and anxiety about state and society is also expressed in a long train of papal encyclicals on related topics.

In this larger sense, then, state-society can be recognized as something like Hannah Arendt's notion of household raised to ubiquitous generality. The idea connotes a smothering familiarity that instructs the personal soul into an intimately disciplined order. Moreover, this is not a familiarity informed by mutual concern and love for the other as may be the case of family life. Rather, for state-society the other is a reified agent to be directed for the purposes of something like consumption or production. Unlike Arendt's *polis*, state-society is largely concerned with its requirements. It is not concerned with Solzhenitsyn's "higher, warmer, and purer." State-society opposes diversity and pluralism, filling the space for personal responsibility and creativity with scrutiny. Like Arendt's household, without open space for genuine and creative difference, state-society is the realm of necessity and not freedom.[30]

The concerns raised in this brief introductory essay are not novel. The issue of state or society is at the heart of the politics of the post-Hegelian world. If there is any contribution to be made by this essay to the extensive literature on the topic, it may be only a "considered uncertainty" about distinctions such terms imply in the light of what has been said. The problems that both state and society pose inevitably are only representations of deeper problems in modern sociality itself. Any consideration of state or society, by this account, must recognize that each concept is but an aspect of the larger, paradigmatic sociality of the modern world.

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[30] Put differently, the space endangered by state-society for the human condition is open to unconstrained (even Nietzschean) politics. This would be a politics that militates against all efforts to constrain the possibilities of the human condition with appeals to universal ends or natures, eidetics of teleologies. Some would argue that such politics can only be described obliquely, but one can imagine certain virtues congruent with the notion. Consider disintegration, distance, impermanence, playfulness, strangeness, disruption or uncertainty. Where the politics associated with state-society seeks ultimate integration of parts into a whole, I see a need for recursive disintegration. Instead of folding parts into the conformity preached by state-society, I believe politics must promote distance and separation. Authority would be transitory, *ad hoc* and impermanent--not universal; as there is no *telos* to complete, such completion does not occur (no Hegelian state, no communist society; and the community of saints needs reinterpretation). The social order would be revealed as a construction, not a structure, and its on going playful recreation would be promoted. Strangeness and difference would be recognized as part of the dialectical origin of creativity in the human condition. Disruption maintains and augments this strangeness and guards against permanence, completion and integration. And, a considered uncertainty would be the highest virtue of public life.

Part II
Family and Neighborhood

Chapter III
The Family: Private or Public

Leon Dyczewski

The family is often considered to be a private matter, but its importance is not limited exclusively to the dimensions of private life. In various ways, the family is related to public life upon which it depends and which it influences. The underlying thesis of my paper is that, as the basic social group, the family embraces in itself both that which is private and that which is public.

It is easy to prove such a thesis in the case of a traditional society in which private life is closely related to public life. Whatever happens at public squares is talked about and continued at homes, and vice versa; whatever is going on within the small space of a family is well-known to the whole local society. The bedroom as a symbol of privacy is not so clearly isolated from the market as a symbol of sociality as is the use in modern society.

In modern society that which is private is clearly isolated from what is public; the two spheres of human life are looked upon as being opposite. The family, then, if it wishes to function well must preserve an appropriate distance from public life, think some sociologists, including T. Parsons. He proposed that only one member of the family should be professionally engaged or participate in the social system of public life, lest the balance of a family system be disturbed. T. Parsons' contribution to understanding the family as a system is one aspect of the present presentation of the dichotomy of family and state or society:[1] here the family is regarded as a system of private life, the state-society as a system of public life.

The isolation of what is private from what is public may go so far in modern society that the same individual becomes, as it were, two persons in the two kinds of life. In public life he or she can be open, friendly and helpful with dialogue and democratic attitudes; in private life, however, the same person can be closed, silent, strict, despotic and dictatorial; or perhaps the very opposite may be the case. Rudolf Hess, the commandant of the concentration camp in Oswiecim, is a perfect example of such a dissociation. In marital-family life he was sensitive, tender, direct, ready to help and democratize; in public life he was cool, disinterested, strict, cruel and despotic.

In modern society the family has withdrawn from many spheres of public life, but has not yet given it up. Its withdrawal from public life is particularly evident in the period of abrupt changes in the first phase of the transition between traditional and modern society. When social life gains a certain degree of stability, the family works out new forms of participation in public life; this is the second thesis of the paper.

Family relations with public life are more ephemeral than those with private life, for such participation depends upon social conditioning in the broadest sense of the word, upon systems and political orientation. Family relations with that which is private are much more stable, however: this is the third thesis of the paper.

I will try to prove the above theses first of all in the context of Polish society after World War II. In that period Polish society joined the group of so-called modern societies. The objective index of this process is a growth of the urban population from 27 percent in 1931 to 61 percent in

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[1] T. Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 58-112.

1987.[2] The complications of the social situation caused by this process were exacerbated by setting up a socialist system based upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism and allegiance with the USSR. As this system was totally alien to the cultural and political heritage, the process of creating relations between the family and the public sphere was much more difficult than in many other modernized countries. That process continued in an especially difficult situation as political and administrative authorities forced the family to withdraw from many spheres of public life by limiting possibilities, against which the family had to defend itself. For instance, there were attempts by the social-political system to tie the family to the place of work, e.g., by organizing infants' nurseries, kindergartens and nationalizing schools. These attempts failed because the family adopted a negative attitude towards them.

The Family and Privacy

Two statements related to our subject follow from observation and empirical research: 1) A great majority of citizens concentrate their aims and activities almost exclusively on their marital-family life and are not interested in public affairs. A successful marital-family life is a value most often chosen by the young generation in a phenomenon called family-centeredness.[3] 2) The family as a social group has withdrawn from many forms of sociality, both those which are basic, such as neighborhood, local relationships and schools, and those which are of broader range, such as political parties and socio-cultural processes.[4] These phenomena are typical of all countries of Europe, but may differ somewhat in their causes. The following appear to play an important role in Poland.

Decrease in Family Size and Growth in Its Individual Character

The family is a small and clearly individual social group; the limits which describe who belongs to it and who does not are very clearly determined by marriage, kinship or a special legal act by virtue of which a person belongs to a family. In the case of the family, then, there is no instability of members, as would be the case in other social groups to which one can be assigned or from which one can resign. The family is a small group to which members constantly belong. In recent decades this group has decreased in number. In 1984 the Polish family consisted of an average of 3.26 persons: a little more in the village (3.45 persons) and a bit less (3.14 persons) in the town.[5]

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[2] *Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1939* (The Little Yearbook, 1939), (Warszawa: GUS, 1939), 11; *Rocznik Statystyenzny*(The Yearbook, 1988), (Warszawa: GUS, 1988), 39.

[3] W. Adamski, K. Staszynska, "Tozsamosc wartosci a konflikt interesow w relacjach miedzypokoleniowych: polemiki i interpretacja badan" (The Identity of Values and the Conflict Between the Generations: Polemics and Reinterpretation of Research), *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, 4 (1985), 133-148; L. Dyczewski, "System wartosci w swiadomosci mlodego pokolania" (The System of Values in the Consciousness of the Younger Generation), *Roczniki Nauk Spolecznych "KUL"*, 8 (1980), 259-271; L. Dyczewski, *Rodzina polska i kierunki jej przemian* (The Polish Family and Trends in Its Changes) (Warszawa, 1981), 23-25; W. Socha, "Miejsce rodziny w systemie wartosci moralnych czterech pokolen w Polsce" (Rok, 1984) (The Family in the System of Values of Four Generations in Poland - 1984), *Problemy Rodziny*, 4 (1985), 3-9; A. Sulek, "Wartosci zyciowe dwoch pokolen" (The Values of Two Generations), *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, 2 (1983), 77-87.

[4] F.X. Kaufmann, "Die gesellschaftliche Situation der heutigen Familie," in: *Ehe im Umbruch*, A. Beckel, ed. (Munster, 1969), 116; G. Wurzbacher, H. Kipp, "Das Verhaltnis von Familie und offentlichen Raum," in *Tio Die Familie als Sozialisationsfaktor*, G. Wurzbacher, ed. (Stuttgart, 1968), 6.

The Polish family is less isolated from the circles of kinship and neighborhood in comparison to Western countries. It maintains quite frequent and lively contact with relatives of the first degree; with other relatives its contacts are real but more selective on the basis of mutual interests or the vicinity of one's place of residence. Quite often three or four generations live together under the same roof. Such so-called multi-generational families constitute *ca* 14 percent among the mass of Polish families (*ca* 20 percent in the village; 10 percent in the town).[6] In many cases they run the house together; this takes place more often in the village (where in 1984, 1167 families formed 100 households) than in the town (where 1078 families formed 199 households).[7]

In view of frequent and rich family contacts one can say that a typical Polish family is a small family consisting of parents and children who still depend upon their parents. Such a family is related to other small families and to relatives who are unmarried. Mutual family relationships are formed according to the principle: "familiarity, but at a distance," "intimacy, but at a distance."[8] The small family wants, as far as is possible, to preserve its individual character: to live in the seclusion of its own house. That family furnishes its apartment and forms the style of its everyday and festive life in a very individual manner. It creates a microworld beyond which only a few things escape, and when they do it is treated as something negative.

The Polish family has created an individual structure for the privacy of life. But this privacy opens rather easily to persons with whom the family members are either related, on friendly terms or acquainted; to keep to themselves is alien to the privacy of the Polish family.

In marital-familial life one can distinguish three kinds of ties: structural-objective, cultural and personal:

1) A structural-objective tie comes as an effect of the existing differences of sex and age among the members of the family; these differences arise in fulfilling different tasks, in achieving the material basis for life and in developing one's household. We can find such a tie first of all in the following relations: parents - children, husband - wife; the type of authority exercised and the way their house is run are some of its aspects.

2) The cultural tie is effected by accepting identical or similar values, norms, patterns of behavior, or different assumptions connected with the outlook on life and various political orientations. This kind of tie manifests itself in various ways of enjoying the cultural output and of acquiring new cultural content, as well as in taking into account the demands of religion and of legal rules. The cultural tie is manifested by the various ways in which people celebrate festivals and festive family occasions, in familial customs, and in whether family members belong to the same or different religious, ideological and political groupings.

3) The personal tie is an outcome of positive emotional experiences, mutual acceptance, mutual guarantees of a sense of security, coming to know each other and aiming at common goals. This tie manifests itself in mutual contact, whether in caring for another person in the family, bringing him or her help and being willing to be with that person. Various research proves that this

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[5] L. Dyczewski, "Polityka rodzinna w Polsce. Stan aktualny i kierunki rozwoju" (The Family Policy in Poland. The Present Situation and the Trends of the Development), *Chrzescijanin w Swiecie,* 7 (1987), 50.

[6] L. Dyczewski, *Rodzina polska*, 73-76.

[7] L. Dyczewski, *Polityka rodzinna*, 50.

[8] L. Dyczewski, *Wiez pokolen w rodzinie* (The Bond Between Generations in the Family), (Warszawa, 1976).

kind of tie prevails in today’s Polish family. Free choice of a spouse is conducive to the development of this tie. At its base is mutual love and a lesser number of so-called "unwanted" children.[9]

The family which is characterized by a personal tie possesses a high degree of consistency and is attractive for its members. They are willing to come back and to spend their time together both at home and outdoors. This enhances the private character of the family life.

The Attitude of the Younger Generation Towards Marriage, Family and Children

Today young men and women are free to choose their own spouse and to establish their family with fewer family and social pressures than in the past. The young man treats marriage and family more as his personal and private matter. In Western countries this process has gone so far that many young couples live together unwed. They are married in the presence neither of the state authorities nor of religious leaders because they consider marriage to be their private business. In the United States more than two million couples live unwed, in West Germany over 500,000, in Austria *ca* 70,000. In Poland this phenomena is not so widespread, indeed, there is an opposite tendency: young people decide to live together and have as festive a wedding as possible in both the civil and church orders. Where not so long ago civil marriage was regarded as a legal necessity and was contracted in a very similar manner, today it is a festive secular custom.

There are two manifestations of marriage and family being regarded as a private matter. First, the younger generation searches almost exclusively for personal happiness in marriage and family; at the same time they think that happiness is given by the very fact of establishing a family, rather than by mutual cooperation with their spouse and children. Thus, after some time, if young people have not reached their expected happiness in their family, they break up easily and establish a new one. The increase in the number of divorces has at its base in part this development in a consciousness in the younger generation of marital familial life as a private matter.

In the period from 1960 to 1982 the annual number of divorces increased by 31,892--that is by 215 percent. An especially rapid growth of divorce is recorded in towns: in 1982 out of 1000 newly married couples in towns there were 207.1 divorces (vs. 57.2 in villages); thus, in towns statistically every fifth newly married couple breaks up. This is characteristic especially of such big cities as Warsaw, Wroclaw and Lodz.[10]

A second symptom of this private sense of marriage and family is that children are treated by young couples almost exclusively as the fruit of their mutual love, the fulfillment of their need for parenthood, and as a factor in the personal development of the parents. In fact, religious, marital and social motives to have children rarely play a role. This is one of the causes of the quite sharp decrease in the number of children in the Polish family. More often it is a family with two children; few families have three children; even less have four or more. In villages the number of families with more children is higher.

The fact that attitudes towards a child have become a private matter lies at the base of the rise in the number of abortions. The mother or both parents take this decision upon themselves when they conceive a child beyond their planned number of children or when the child is conceived in an unsuitable time. The Abortion Act, introduced in 1956, turned the child over to its mother or parents to do with whatever they please, including killing it. The legislation treats the number of children in the family as simply a private matter for the married couple.

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[9] L. Dyczewski, *Rodzina polska*, 177-194; L. Dakowicz, "Wplyw systemu wartosci na spojnosc wiezi malzenskiej" (The Influence of the System of Values on the Bond Between the Spouses), in: *Rodzina jako system interakcji* (Lublin, 1988), 153-167.

[10] L. Dyczewski, B. Lachowska, S. Lachowski, "Systuacja kobiety w polskim spoleczenstwie" (The Situation of the Woman in Polish Society), *Ateneum Kaplanskie*, 2 (1988), 224-228.

Characteristics of Polish Society

In Poland, as in many other countries, social life has lost its general character and has been divided into particular sectors which have begun to function independently of one another. Hence, now we have the following sectors: production-trade-consumption, upbringing and education, work and culture, health and life environment, tradition and the past, and even religious outlook on life and morality. All these sectors now have lives of their own. We may add to these general civilizational and cultural changes in postwar Poland other changes, namely, those in the socio-political system. Based upon the alliance with the Soviet Union the new socialist authorities began to introduce, with all available means and methods, the principles of Marxism-Leninism throughout social and private life. New social structures were established and new social inequalities formed. Step by step citizens were deprived of the subjective character of political life and limited in their public activity.

As a result of all these changes, social life in the broadest sense of the word became very complicated, obscure and bureaucratic, leading to an atmosphere of uncertainty and indifference. Many citizens started to run away to such safer and "more humane" regions as groups of friends, informal groups and above all the family. This tendency to escape was aggravated in the 70s and remained till the end of that regime. With the establishment of "Solidarity", interest in public affairs revived strongly and can be observed nowadays when society has a better chance to participate and to take a more active part in many spheres of social life.

The young generation "escaped" by clinging to marital-familial life. This phenomenon is clearly observable in the sharp contrast between the images of this kind of life and those of public life which all Poles build up for themselves on the basis of their experience in their job, in government offices, shops or means of transportation. On the other hand, the marital-familial life seems to be a milieu of direct contacts filled with kindness and truth, of creative, free and totally responsible activity, of peace and rest.

There are various symptoms of the young generation’s "escape" from public into marital-familial life, among which are: a strong tendency to establish one’s own family and the lowering of the age of people who want to marry.

Young people, born and brought up in Poland, simply cannot imagine their life without establishing their own family. Almost all youth between 14 and 25 years of age (98 percent) want to marry. Comparing the present period with the period of non-industrialized, non-bureaucratized and non-socialist Poland, presently the percentage of adults who are married is higher than it was in the past. In 1931 every fifth woman at the age of 30-39 remained single, now every tenth.[11] Not to establish one’s own family today is exceptional.

Despite the fact that the period of schooling is longer now and that we favor careful preparation for marriage and family, and even despite the difficulties in getting a flat and finding a job, young Poles establish their families relatively early. In 1982 the average age of women at marriage was 22.2, and in general women were two years younger than their husbands. From the period of 1931-32 up to 1982 the average women's age of marriage was lowered by 1.2 and men's by 2.1 years.[12]

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[11] L. Dyczewski, *Rodzina polska*, 23.

Such a phenomenon that young people establish their family early takes place in all strata of society and also among students. In the 60s marriage among students was an exception; in 1979 over 20,000 students were married;[13] today it is a still more frequent phenomenon. When asked: "Why do you marry so young"? they usually answer: "It is easier to live together." For many young people marriage constitutes a kind of refuge, a protection from an unfriendly or even, in their view, sometimes hostile state or society.

The Attitude of the State Towards the Family

Aristotle said that the society or state consists of families and such a standpoint was maintained for ages. While fulfilling many functions, the family was also a strong partner of the state and played an important role in its life. The modern state has abandoned such a principle and based itself on the individual. Being more susceptible to changes and changing one's place of residence and social status more easily, the individual has become the crucial element of the modern state, which bases its development upon the individual. Authorities in the modern state treated the family as the totally private affair of its citizens and almost entirely lost interest in it. Premiers, generals and factory owners do not interfere in the marriage and family affairs of their ministers, officers or workers as was normal in traditional societies. In modern society the family has been left on its own. In the 19th century some held that the state should take care of the family. In that spirit Pope Leo XIII demanded adequate earnings for the family in his encyclical "Rerum Novarum". Despite many opinions that the state should take care of the family, the range of this support remains narrow, even in rich states which can afford it. There is a firm position in these states that marriage and family are exclusively the private affair of the citizens.

In postwar Poland the state's standpoint concerning marriage and family has been varied and incoherent. On the one hand, the socialist authorities tend to tie marriage and family closely with the state in accordance with a Marxist assumption that marriage and family are the basic cells of state life. On the other hand, there is a strong tendency to treat marriage and family as a private matter of citizens. The effect of this is that social policy towards marriage and family has been characterized by discontinuity. According to the party in power, the range of help and protection for the family is increased or reduced. For example, the family was given more help immediately after the war in the very difficult period under B. Beirut than in the prosperous 1970s under E. Gierek.

The second consequence of the standpoint adopted by the socialist authorities towards marriage and family is that they are to a great extent pro-familial in law and rules, while in practice the actual protection and help aimed at the family is small.

Polish authorities obliged themselves to give "as great as possible aid and protection to the family, especially at the time when it is established and in the period when the family is still responsible for the care and education of children dependent upon it."[14] The regulations are still being amended and extended to protect and help marriage and family. In many cases they were introduced earlier and are better than in other countries, though the actual help remains insufficient. Here are some examples:

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[12] L. Dyczewski, B. Lachowska, S. Lachowski, "Sytuacja kobiety", 222.

[13] "Raport o warunkach startu zyciowego i zawodowego mlodziezymateriaty wyjsciowe" (Report the Conditions of Life and the Professional Conditions of Youth" (Warszawa, 1981), 149.

[14] Art. 10, ust. 1 z *Paktu Praw Gospodarczych, Spolecznych i Kulturalnych,* ratyfikowanego przez Rade Panstwa w dniu 3.03.1977 roku (Art. 10, 1 from The Pact of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).

Maternity benefits provided for women on maternity leave in 1984 equalled on the average 45.6 percent of an average monthly pay in a socialized industry. Child benefits, provided since 1976, in June 1986 constituted barely 8.56 percent of an average monthly pay in a socialized industry. Educational benefits, introduced in 1981, in 1984 constituted barely 1/6th of an average pay in socialized industry. Thus financial help provided for the family by the state is rather symbolic. Non-financial services are also insufficient and less than in other socialist countries, because in Poland less money is spent on non-financial social services. In 1984, 786.9 million was spent on such services, i.e., *ca* 11 percent of the State revenues. In 1980 somewhat more money was spent in other socialist countries, e.g., in Bulgaria and East Germany over 18 percent, in the USSR over 15 percent, in Czechoslovakia over 13 percent.[15] In the following years the share of non-financial social services in the State revenues was smaller still, which caused a reduction in the State's aid to the family.

The modern state is interested in the family and supports it, especially through different aspects of a so-called population policy, though the purposes of this policy are not always in accord with the family. From the state's point of view, a proper population policy can cause harm to the family in general. Present-day China or some Western countries may serve as examples here. In order to put a stop to the increase in the population, Chinese authorities drastically limited the number of children per family to one. This policy is inconsistent with the whole Chinese culture and may have negative effects for an average family. Some Western countries grant big allowances for the second or third child, but then for the next child they pay less; this can disturb the overall marital and family life. Sometimes the population policy is aimed at the optimum number of citizens or at preparation for life in the State. The care of the family as a whole decreases in importance and is treated almost exclusively as a private matter of the citizens. There is no generally planned infrastructure which could strengthen the ties between the spouses and generations, would be conducive to a just division of labor in the family, would strengthen the stability of moral norms and, finally, would be conducive to cultural development.

The Family and the Public

The political and broadly social situation in postwar Poland has created new conditions for the family's participation in public life. It was ousted from some domains of public life; it has withdrawn from others; almost by force it was drawn into still others. Since World War II the family has been working out new forms of participation in public life, such as the following.

The Family's Participation in Public Life Through the Process of Socialization

Though there are many definitions of socialization, all express a process of introducing the young generation into social roles (the sociological formulation) or into a system of values, norms and patterns of behavior (the cultural formulation). Because of the relatively coherent set of roles, values, norms and patterns of behavior in traditional society, its process of socialization proceeded relatively easily. In modern society this coherence has been destroyed. In fulfilling socializing tasks the family has to choose between a variety of roles, values, norms and patterns of behavior which often are themselves contradictory. Hence, the family works out a special selective function. In the relatively isolated familial environment the of family members can live according to their own system of values, norms and patterns of behavior in introducing the young generation into social life and social roles. The family can create its own image of man and society and what it passes on to the younger generation in the process of socialization is not indifferent to public life, to the governing party and to opposition groups. Political leaders are perfectly aware of this role of the family.

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[15] L. Dyczewski, *Polityka rodzinna*, 55-58.

In introducing political and social changes as rapidly as possible, the legal rules and moral principles regarding marriage and family life are also changed. Though quite often this causes many negative phenomena and weakens the family, the political leaders do not give up; they introduce changes through which they want to shake up the process of socialization in the family. They wanted to lessen the influence on public life which the family exerted in old and long accepted ways. The leaders of the French October Revolution as well as the socialist authorities in Poland after 1945 acted in a similar manner. Together with the change of the system, they began to introduce new legal rules and moral principles in relation to marital and familial life. The most important were the following: marriage and the family were regarded as merely secular institutions; divorce and abortion were encouraged; professional roles were preferred to familial roles; the younger generation was more important than the older one (it went so far that they were placed in opposition); extramarital relations were regarded as morally acceptable if they did no harm to the persons involved; the value of a child was appreciated above all in social rather than personal respects; affairs of state were more important than those of family.

According to much research the majority of Polish families remained religious, attached to tradition and with a strong multi-generational tie. They valued all that is connected with the concept of persons, rather than the concept of citizen; in general they did not accept divorce, extramarital sexual intercourse and abortion (though these phenomena occur quite frequently, this is less frequent than in other countries); they appreciate family above State life.[16] The process of socialization in families which adopt such attitudes undoubtedly influences the form and range of the participation of the average Pole in public life, assuming a dysfunctional role towards public life organized by the State. In recent decades the average person engaged in public life only in so far as was necessary and then only if it satisfied his own needs and convictions; however, he eagerly engaged in public life organized, not by the State, but by society.

Since World War II the family has played an important role in encouraging national traditions and in forming political opinions and social, moral and religious attitudes. Often the family played a more important role than the school, mass media, workshops or clubs. Preserving its own independence towards the State and the public life it organized, the family became a milieu where public life was formed, especially in periods of political pressure exerted by the governing party. Many social and political matters were discussed in the family which were dangerous to discuss in other places. The family organized meetings of political, social and cultural leaders; it created activists for public life and became an important structure for public life.

The Family's Participation in Public Life Through the Professional Work of Its Members

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[16] *Ciaglosc i zmiana tradycji kulturowej* (Continuity and Change in the Cultural Tradition), ed., S. Nowak (Warszawa, 1989); L. Dyczewski, "Konflikt kulturowy czy kulturowa kontynuacja pokolen w rodzinie miejskiej" (The Conflict Between Generations or the Continuation of Culture in Modern Family), in: *Z badan nad rodzina*, ed., T. Kukolowicz (Lublin, 1984), 130-158.

In modern society the place of work has been separated from the family. This phenomenon has been more frequent and broad because, according to socialist theory, the means of production were nationalized wherever possible. The workplace then was to be more than a mere place for producing material goods; it should be a creative environment of political, social and cultural activity. Acting on these assumptions, the socialist authorities in Poland attempted to engage as many citizens as possible in their industries. Because the workplace was supposed to lead the whole of social and political life, many women were engaged in professional work to enable them to have an opportunity to participate in the totality of life. Thus, today, a very high percentage of women work professionally. In 1983 they constituted 43.7 percent of the total number of people employed in socialized industry; nearly every second worker was a woman, the majority of whom were wives and mothers. About 75 percent of married women earning their living in sectors outside agriculture worked professionally.[17]

Despite the fact that so many members of the family worked, their participation in public life did not increase. There were many political reasons for this, but the motives for which women went to work were important. They did so because their husbands' or fathers' earnings were not enough; few women went to work because they loved professional work, or wanted to broaden their interests, to participate in social life, to be independent financially of their husbands, or to have their own environment and friends.[18] It is such non-material motives that constitute a fuller engagement in public life, but in order to be engaged therein one has to have time and broad interests.

Hence, places of work did not become environments pulsating with public life, as the authors of socialism projected. A considerable change occurred when "Solidarity" was established. Workshops quickly became places of public activity; wives, mothers and whole families joined. Families became interested in what was going on in the workplace, and when needed they supported those who act for the common good.

The Family's Engagement in the Basic Sectors of Modern Society

D. Bell, when describing modern society, says that it is characterized by the development of the health, education, research and State sectors.[19] The family takes an increasingly active and effective role in forming these sectors of public life.

In the health sector the family demands a clean environment, unpolluted food, and home devices which are practical and neither dangerous to use nor expensive. It insists that producers and politicians work in this direction. If this does not bring about needed changes, the family puts the offending devices and goods under a boycott, organizes protest marches, etc.

In the sector of education and research, the presence of the family is becoming more and more important. It tends to create an independent structure for education and child-rearing. It demands the right to organize private kindergartens, schools and independent youth organizations. The family willingly sends its children to summer and winter camps organized by non-State institutions and individual persons, though those organized by the State were less expensive and better equipped. By doing this, the family supports and strengthens cultural and political pluralism.

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[17] Obliczenia na podstawie Rocznik Statystyczny, 1984. (The Calculation on the Ground of the Yearbook, 1984) (Warszawa: GUS, 1984), p. xxxiv-xxxv; A. Kurzynowski, *Aktywizacja zawodowa kobiet zameznych w Polsce Ludowej* (The Professional Work of the Married Women in Poland), (Warszawa: 1979), 20.

[18] *Kobieta w Polsce* (The Woman in Poland), (Warszawa: GUS, 1975), 75; L. Dyczewski, B. Lachowska, S. Lachowski, "Sytuacja kobiety," 239-241.

[19] F.W. Scharph, "Strukturen der post-industriellen Gesellschaft," *Soziale Welt*, 1 (1986), 3-24.

In the state sector the family manifests its presence by demanding the revision of marital and family law, by putting forward proposals for new acts, and by demanding larger, better equipped and better functioning familial infrastructures.

The family participates in all these sectors on an increasingly wider scale and in a manner different from traditional societies. Today it participates in them not as a single family, but as groups and familial organizations. Here, we can distinguish two types:

The first type represents nationwide family organizations which, in turn, represent families of the whole country. Such an organization is, e.g., the *Osterreichischer Familienverband*. This is a strong organization that puts pressure on public authorities; indeed it has its own representatives in the government, including the minister for the family. The main task of this organization is to develop family legislation, create family infrastructure, form a positive social opinion concerning the family, and organize and support institutions that give aid to the family. There is no such organization in Poland. There is, however, the Polish Women's League, the Board of Family attached to the People's State Council, and the Polish Episcopate's Committee for Family Affairs. The main purpose of these three organizations is to analyze marriage and the family, and to put forward suggestions for social policy in favor of marriage and the family. In the past the efficacy of these organizations has been poor for they had neither power nor representation in national bodies.

The second type of familial organizations are those on the local level. Their task is to create ties between families, to help to organize kindergartens or special rooms where a small child may stay when its mother is occupied and there is no one with whom to leave her child, to organize meetings of young couples and family weekends, to provide instruction in the areas of marriage and family life or upbringing, etc. Such kinds of organizations and familial groups were established out of religious inspiration and act in connection with the Catholic Church. The most popular are the following:

- *Family of Families*: established in the 50s, it functions in Warszaw and its vicinity, with *ca* 3000 (1987) members;
- *Home Church*: established in 1973 in the context of the Light and Life movement, it has *ca* 1000 family circles in 26 dioceses (1987);
- *Gaudium Vitae*: established in 1930, *ca* 150 women (1987) join this organization annually;
- *Alliance of Families*, established in 1981, *ca* 2500 families (1987);
- *Solidarity of Families* established in 1981;
- *Pro Familia*: established in 1982.

The Personalistic Conception of Social Life: A Basis for Joining the Private and Public Dimensions of Family Life

We have discussed here domains of familial life in which the private and public are clearly marked. On the basis of this material we can formulate some more general statements:

a. Present modern societies began to develop along individualistic or collectivist conceptions of social life. Traces of these conceptions are found in legislation, the manner of governing, education and upbringing, industrial life, architecture and the social mechanisms. The consequence is a dichotomy in the understanding of the public and the private. In such a situation it is simply impossible for the family as a basic group in individual and social life to fulfill the role of a link between these two dimensions of human existence.

The situation in which the individualistic conception of social life dominates everything is conducive to the family's deepening its private character. This life style is best expressed by the English saying "My home is my castle." This motto was created in England in the second half of the 19th century when the individualistic conception of social life was stronger. In fact, the family is involved in many activities of a political character, but their ultimate motive is not the common good as the basis of that which is public, but their own or group interest.

In the situation in which the collectivistic conception of social life dominated, the family fled to the private as its refuge for the preservation of its own independence and identity. The family joined public life, which is identified most often with state activity, only to the extent necessary. The family itself organized public life in those dimensions in which the collective social system allowed.

b. It is not impossible to overcome the dichotomy between what is private and public in modern societies, but the only way to do so is to give up the individualistic or collectivistic conceptions of social life. This can be done by adopting a personalist conception of social life. According to this conception every person who wants to develop properly must participate at the same time both in what is private and in that which is public. As these are not only two different spheres of life, but two dimensions of human existence, the family should participate in both of them as the basic group of individual and social life. The family should organize its own life and form its members in such a way as not to lose the dimension of that which is public; public life should be organized in such a way as not to destroy that which is private. These mutual relations can be formulated in the following diagram:

family

The State Person Individual

Society

c. The private and the public are interrelated in the family which, however, tends rather to that which is private than to that which is public. In other words, the family is a basic social structure of that which is private, but cannot be closed to that which is public: it should not be deprived of that dimension. The development of that which is private is based upon the family being a small social group with personal and cultural ties. On the other hand, the basis for that which is public is the nature of the family as a social institution.

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Chapter IV

Family, Society and State in the USA: Some Reflections

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In recent decades the notion of a national family policy has become a controversial political issue in the United States. Our society is undergoing some wrenching changes that deeply impact upon our family systems and mores. Moreover, most social problems affect families indirectly when not directly. Governments have responded variously to specific problems--child neglect, poverty, teen-age pregnancies, and the like--but the feeling has grown that these responses should be coordinated in a national family policy. However, family, marital, and sexual values and practices in the United States, given our heterogeneous population, vary greatly, and policy issues quickly turn emotional and ideological.

It is my task here to describe and to assess the American experience with family policy initiatives. I will comment first on the career of family problems and responses in the United States, then briefly retrace the efforts toward a family policy, notably by the Carter Administration during the second half of the 1970s. Finally, I will discuss a few of the emerging issues.

The Family vs. the Public Domain

Conventionally we view the family as prior to the society, both genetically and historically; genetically, because the family provides the human material from which the state and other social formations are constructed; historically, because as we well know the family precedes the state. As far as we can tell, "the family" emerged with the birth of our species; whereas, "the state" as we know it today is a recent fabrication. In a measure the state rises in opposition and as a challenge to the family. That challenge has evolved historically. In its early stages, political authority often presented itself as a simple extension of patriarchal rule. Nor have solidary values embodied in family and kinship totally disappeared from the modern state. The nationalism linked to the modern state appeals to familial sentiment, as illustrated, for example, by such terms as "fatherland" or "motherland." Nonetheless, in certain specific respects, the logic and interests of families and states are contradictory.

For example, despite the familial overtones of nation-state ideology, the elementary unit in the modern state is the "citizen," not the family or the lineage. Nowhere is this more evident than in the limits placed by the state on the claims of parental jurisdiction over children. The state reserves for itself the right to intervene on behalf of the child, as well as the right to decide when such intervention is appropriate. This abstraction of the individual from his/her social matrix, as we shall see, places the state inevitably on a collision course with "the family."

In practice, difficulties arise also from the regulatory functions of the state. The family, as indicated, is a pre-political given in human existence. It is there, with its self-perpetuating dynamic, that the state arrives much later on the scene. Nevertheless, by way of its regulatory mandate, the state insinuates itself into a position of authorizing, and hence even seeming to institute, the family (e.g., the marriage license). States, however, rise and fall. When they fall, "the family" picks up the pieces, and thus is the social "protoplasm" from which all other formations grow. Thus, the critical argument that family policy means state encroachment on family turf, though by no means a full account of the matter, is not without substance.

The differentiation of a "public" sphere from the domestic group preceded the rise of the state. Public and private domains are reciprocally determined.[1] Further institutional differentiations followed, among which the "economy" and the "state" are the most important. We need, but do not possess, a concept for the social totality from which the "state" (sphere of government) has been abstracted. The Hegelian triad--family, civil society and state--is the most likely conceptual solution.[2] However, the middle term, "civil society," is ambiguous and ideologically freighted; it has not gained general acceptance or clear definition.

In American usage, we frequently distinguish the "private" (nongovernmental) from the "public" (governmental) sectors, in part paralleling the Hegelian distinction between civil society and the state. But much of our associational and economic life, though nongovernmental, nonetheless possesses a "public" character. Moreover the external encroachments that appear to threaten the family derive not only from the state, but from society as well. Indeed, governmental interventions are justified in part by the need to protect the family from the civil society, especially from the ravages of the economy.

Whatever our language, the dynamics and interests of state and society are complementary as well as conflictual. Unfortunately, our polemical experience in state-family relations sometimes hinders the development of the deeper, more nuanced grasp of the family in the modernization process. Admittedly, as we have just seen, there is a sense in which the state grows at the expense of the family, the former forcing the latter into a defensive--and losing--position. Losing function after function to the state and civil society, the family shrinks and declines. Mere quantitative measurement, however, is misleading. Family systems not only surrender functions, but in the process, undergo positive transformation. In the language of game theory, family-state relations may parallel a positive-sum rather than a zero-sum game. There are gains for the family as well as for the state.

The modern state is distinguished from its predecessors by the fact that individual citizens rather than families constitute its building blocks. As I shall note presently, at least in the American context the state intervenes in families on behalf of individuals in the family and not on behalf of the family per se. While this tends to reduce families to mere aggregations of individuals, it also enhances personal autonomy, a value long prized in Western society. Correspondingly, the axis of the family unit shifts increasingly from the *blood tie* (mother-child) to the *conjugal tie*. Marriage partners become *personal* rather than *familial* choices. Personal fulfillment, hence the nurture of persons, assumes increasing importance in family life. It may thus be argued that "loss of functions" frees the family unit to concentrate directly on its primary task.

Conjugally-based families, however, tend to be more fragile than consanguineously-based families, for being rooted primarily in personal choice the former lacks structural support: such are the risks of freedom. Meanwhile, however, the vulnerabilities of the conjugal family are heightened by our lack of preparation for the relative shift from consanguinity to conjugality as the family axis. Though that shift is implicit in Biblical faith, until very recently, human sexuality and marriage have been viewed in official church teachings largely in instrumental terms. Reproduction of the race was seen onesidedly as the *raison d être* of both. The intrinsic personal significance of the union of the spouses has been slighted in ethics and culture, a lack tied, in turn, to inadequate views of the human person. Readiness to dissolve marriages--in the United States we are approaching a 50 percent divorce rate--is a symptom of these deficiencies. I will return to this problem in the final section of this paper.

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[1] Werner Jaeger, *Paideia. The Ideals of Greek Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), 111.

[2] G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942) (1841); *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspective*, John Keane, ed. (New York: Verso, 1988).

Some Uniquely American Problems

This paper addresses questions of family policy in the United States. To some degree the problems adumbrated are common to modernizing societies generally. Yet country by country responses to modernization vary greatly according to their varied resources, histories and cultures. Though often hailed as the land of freedom and opportunity, the U.S. is plagued by high rates of social pathologies--crime and violence, divorce, illegitimacy, teen-age pregnancies, drug addiction, and the like. Sometimes these dislocations are thought to foreshadow outcomes in other lands as well. Perhaps, however, these pathologies arise from developments that are uniquely American.

What are these idiosyncrasies? I cite two examples where the accidents of American history have blown out of proportion some elements of the modern experience. The first is individualism. Its values, while cherished in the United States, are essentially European or Western in origin. The historical circumstances of the "New World," however, permitted and fostered a more sweeping expression of these yearnings and impulses than was possible in the "Old World." Abundant land, prolonged frontier conditions, and sparse population all permitted, indeed often required, a "rugged individualism." At best, generosity and mutuality flourished among the pioneers. Yet in the resulting ethos, accountability to the common good lags behind the celebration of individual freedom. All too often today, people walk away from marital, familial or other solemn obligations, because, to cite a popular phrase, "I am entitled to my own happiness."

The second example is the pluralism of American culture and American society. Recognition that human social existence is intrinsically pluralistic is rapidly spreading worldwide. A condition at first tolerated uneasily, is increasingly embraced as normal. In the United States pluralism is first of all a demographic fact. Though there are forces that unify, as new waves of immigrants pour into the country, the population, and hence the culture, becomes ever more heterogeneous. Pluralism is also a constitutional principle: as such it is defined as federalism. States forming the union reserved important powers to themselves; powers within the federal and other governments are divided; political power is dispersed locally. Public and private power are often shared and mixed. Finally, the continuing development and differentiation of the society recurrently reshuffles the patterns of stratification, of interests, and of power groupings within the society.

One might say that this is pluralism with a vengeance. But meanwhile unease mounts. Earlier such diversity was undergirded by values widely shared. Now the question looms: can a society cohere without a moral and/or spiritual consensus? Are the formal rules that frame democratic discourse enough to hold a pluralistic society together without an underlying or unifying faith? Questions such as these, I shall note below, feed the controversy surrounding family policy options. In broader terms these questions are now widely discussed, sometimes in polarizing terms, but at times in ways that cut across conventional left/right distinctions.[3]

A National Family Policy?

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[3] See, e.g., Richard John Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America* (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s, 1986); Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981); and Allan Bloom,*The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987).

Social legislation and public welfare institutions emerged belatedly with the rise of the modern state. Such developments in the United States tended to follow, with some delay, developments in England. Older legal traditions, inherited in part from Roman law, upheld the rights of authority, and thus of existing orders. Beginning in the nineteenth century, increasing attention was devoted to the needs and rights of the wards of authority--children, orphans, women. Meanwhile, private charities preceded these developments by many centuries, along with the English "poor laws" dating from the early 17th century.

For the United States a series of decennial While House Conferences on Children and Youth, beginning in 1909, represented a new departure. Initially in the U.S., relief for the poor and welfare responsibilities were left to the states, and within states, to localities. Previously states had enacted protective laws for children, with parents and then next of kin held responsible for child care. Setting standards for, and licensing of, private agencies also fell within state purview. The 1909 White House Conference stimulated further state action, notably the establishment of state commissions. The Conferences led also to the development of a federal Children's Bureau (1912). Beyond this, the Conference drew national attention to the needs of children, addressing primarily those needs beyond the immediate concern of the states.

The next major milestone was the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, part of President Roosevelt's "New Deal" response to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Initially embracing less than half of the working public, within 30 years that program embraced, at least potentially, the entire population. This program includes aid to dependent children, administered through the states. The program is conceived as a form of social insurance, financed by deductions from workers' earnings. It is designed to provide protection against three basic risks--oldage, long-term disability, and the death of the breadwinner. Originally attacked as "socialistic," Social Security has now become virtually politically untouchable due to public opinion.

The third major benchmark was the enactment in the 1960s of the "Great Society" programs, the "War on Poverty," and Civil Rights legislation of the Kennedy-Johnson years. It will not be possible here to list, let alone discuss, the torrent of federal legislation and social programs of the middle decades of the century. The list of family-impacting initiatives must include also urban renewal, public housing, and other housing policies.

The final milestone in this series of twentieth century social welfare and social insurance initiatives is the reaction of the 1980s. Popularly associated with the Reagan presidency, and with good reason, the retreat from public (i.e., state) initiatives constitutes a broader trend with the Western (OECD) countries. Though the "welfare state" is not rescindable, it appears that at least for some times, social insurance and welfare were consuming a larger share of the GNP than economies were able or willing to bear. The pendulum swings back.

This retreat from federal activism, however, was compounded with reactions to the turmoil of the 60s, a heady mixture of civil rights and "anti-war movements, which served as catalysts for other sorts of grievances. Both constructive and destructive energies were unleashed. We are still trying to figure out what happened to us in the 1960s."[4]

As social problems were addressed singly over the decades, many roads appeared to lead back to "the family." Strengthening and restoring "the family" thus appeared to be a worthy policy objective. Accordingly, the possibility of a national family policy first surfaced in the federal agencies in the mid-1960s.[5] By the mid-1970s there was a flurry of interest in the possible formulation of a "family impact" policy that would require consideration of the possible impact on families of all federal programs. Jimmy Carter displayed some interest in family policy issues early in his 1976 presidential campaign. His running mate, Senator Mondale, had led earlier on family legislation in the United States Senate. By the time of his election Carter had made up a series of campaign promises of family initiatives, including the convening of a White House World Conference on the Family.[6]

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[4] For example, Daniel Bell, "Sensibility in the 60s," in *Man and Society: Focus on Reality*, Robert V. Guthrie & Edward J. Barne, eds. (Palo Alto: J. Freel, 1972), 13-38; Todd Bitlin, *The Sixties: Days of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam, 1987).

Yet implementation was something else. Some issues, such as abortion, were politically problematic, with the Democratic constituency to which he was beholden. Work with the agencies, especially HEW (the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) likewise was difficult. Joseph Califano, Jr., an advisor to Carter during the campaign and subsequently appointed as Secretary of HEW, when asked about family policy in February, 1978, more than a year into the New Administration, replied, "The Administration, to date, has established no overall family policy, but a great deal of attention has been focused on the interaction of programs and proposed legislation with an impact on families."[7] In fact, the Carter Administration never articulated a "family policy" nor significant new legislation in the field.

The Conference, though announced soon after the inauguration in 1977, did not materialize until 1980, and then in a less auspicious form than originally intended. Though the substantive problems confronting such a conference were formidable enough, the crippling obstacles were ideological, symbolic and political. Family definitions and the appointment of conference leadership cut across the entire range of emotionally-charged issues in social policy--sexism, racism, divorce, abortion, homosexuality, and the like. The conference issued a number of recommendations, such as Social Security reforms to eliminate biases against families, but no family policy as such. One highly visible outcome was replacement of the concept "the family" in public discourse by "families," a bow to the diversity of peoples, cultures, and values that comprise the society.

Family and State in the Modernization of Societies

Senator Daniel Moynihan, a major actor in the shaping of social policy since the 1960s, recently repeated a statement he had made 20 years earlier while serving as a sociologist in the Johnson Administration. Quoting the noted anthropologist, Malinowski, Moynihan continued:

> Family life not only educates in general but its quality ultimately determines the individual’s capacity to love. The institution of the family is decisive in determining not only if a person has the capacity to love another individual but in the larger sense whether he is capable of loving his fellowmen collectively. The whole of society rests on this foundation for stability, understanding and social peace.

But he[8] also maintained that:

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[5] Daniel P. Moynihan, *Family and Nation* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1985).

[6] Gilbert Y. Steiner, *The Futility of Family Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981).

[7] *Ibid*., 27.

[8] Moynihan, *op. cit.*, 38.

In the nature of modern industrial society, no government, however firm might be its wish otherwise, can avoid having policies that profoundly influence family relationships. This is not to be avoided. The only option is whether they will be residual, derivative, in a sense concealed ones.[9]

If these two assumptions are valid--the social indispensability of vital families, and the inescapability of government policies vis-a-vis families--American society confronts a deep crisis. As James Coleman observes (or is it Urie Bronfenbrenner?), "it would appear that the process of making human beings is breaking down in American society." The difficulty begins with the absence of a consensus regarding both propositions, as Moynihan himself realized. We have a divorce rate approaching 50 percent and there are projections that half or more of today's infants will live in single parent families before they reach the age of eighteen. Out-of-wedlock births account for more than one-fifth of all births. Annually 60 of every 1,000 American women under the age of 18 have abortions. In many problem areas, such as poverty, delinquency and unemployment, youths from incomplete families are overrepresented.

What is the meaning of these rates, the list of which could be greatly extended? Large segments of the population mostly, religiously inspired, have been aroused, even politically mobilized. At the opposite extreme are vocal minorities espousing theories that anticipate and welcome the disappearance of "the family." Most of the social science guild suggests rather coyly that what we witness is family "change," rather than crisis. Each of these responses has a degree of validity; none alone solves the problem; nor do the views readily mix.

Similar disagreements prevail regarding the responses of government. Some look, perhaps all too readily, to government. Others argue that government intervention in family affairs merely exacerbates existing problems or introduces new ones. Such views, as already indicated, were encouraged during the Reagan presidency. President Reagan in his first inaugural (1981) asserted that government is not the solution to our problems--it is the problem. In a 1983 radio broadcast he elaborated: "There is no question that many well-intentioned Great Society-type programs contributed to family breakups, welfare dependency, and large increase in births out of wedlock."[10] Though the evidence was hardly that clear or sweeping--the President was voicing personal conviction--still the charge was not groundless: not all the federal social programs had been roaring successes.

Do we face a crisis or don't we? Is the family breaking down, with the dire consequences we observe, or is an outdated institution yielding to something new and better? Is the state, specifically its government(s), the problem or a source of amelioration? We don't agree, and events will not wait for us to reach agreement. We have been set down in an uncharted sea. "The family" has been taken out of our general consensus; there are only "families"--as many as our cultural diversity casts up. President Carter observed that "government steps in by necessity when families have failed," and when the chips are down, few Americans would seriously disagree.

The very notion of crisis, as we always note, entails both danger and promise. We need not panic--families and agencies, both private and public--still have great resilience. What is happening is that our intersubjectively shared perceptions are finally catching up with reality, and that is a liberating experience. Our human existence is always and intrinsically pluralistic and open-ended. Crisis clears the deck for us to reach more deeply into reality and to build and rebuild on deeper foundations.

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[9] *Ibid.*, 192.

[10] Quoted by Moynihan, *op. cit.*, 57.

To illustrate I shall comment on two themes anticipated in the foregoing discussion. Both have to do with the transformation of family existence in the modernization process. When we address the confrontation of family and state (and to a considerable extent the "civil society" as well), we are thrust back to the *Fragestellung* of sociology’s founding fathers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the fate of *Gemeinschaft* in a world increasingly constructed as *Gesellschaft*. These, and similar ideal typical concept pairs, have long since been assimilated and exploited in the discipline. As they stand, such polar typologies are too general and indefinite for empirical use. Yet they identified problems, still baffling, that perhaps only further history can resolve: Can the human person be formed and then sustained without a solidary, in effect, a familial, anchor? If the answer is no, is it realistic to look anywhere but to "the family"? Heretofore we have not confronted these questions radically.

Secondly, not having done so, we have tended to look at families primarily as *Gemeinschaft* survivals, as the one haven in which to take refuge from *Gesellschaft* (circling the wagons, as in the American West). To be sure the literature on the transformation and reduction of families into aggregates of individuals and corresponding individualistic therapies is extensive. Such treatments for the most part, however, fall short of a personalistically-informed analysis of the shift from consanguinity to conjugality as the (intended?) foundation of family living. Much of the problem stems from a historically-shaped misreading of Biblical materials. Much of the religiously inspired family renewal effort in the United States mistakenly appeals to the patriarchal traditions of Biblical times, missing the thrust that climaxes in highly personal community.

Systematically the transition from consanguinity to conjugality as the axis of the family system is well-advanced. In important areas, however, development lags. Full admission of women to participation in "civil society" and state alike is only now well under way. Among blacks, tangled configurations of class and structural racism force single-parent female-headed "families" back into pseudo-extended (consanguineal) patterns. But time does not permit a discussion of these problems.

Finally, with regard to family policy, I have dwelt on problems and frustrations. Meanwhile, much has nonetheless been accomplished and learned, chiefly in the piecemeal fashion in which genuine advances must come. Social Security--Old Age and Survivors Benefits--is a success story. Over a few decades poverty as a systemic problem among the elderly has been eliminated. In effect, it is an income policy that has worked. This will be far more difficult to achieve at other levels, but it tells us something important, namely, that our task is not to wring our hands, or to panic, but *carpe diem*.

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Chapter V

The Social Structure of Local Rural Communities in Poland: Present and Future

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There are three kinds of reintegration of the rural communities in Poland and three big problems connected with their redevelopment. The first concerns rebuilding common activities of the inhabitants of the villages as a local community. The second is the formation of communes as self-governing socio-economic and administrative organisms. The third problem is connected with the rise of industrial and agricultural regions. Let us discuss these forms, as well as three problems of reintegration of the rural communities in Poland.

The Village

The problem of the reintegration of the common activities of the inhabitants of a village is bound up with changes within the village as a local community. The Polish village is undergoing a process of disintegration of its traditional structure and organization on the one hand, and a process of creation of elements of a new organization, on the other. The rural population in Poland has undergone a number of changes. In the period between the wars the rural areas were inhabited by 72.3 percent of the whole national population; in 1986 it had only 39.5 percent. Before World War II, 60 percent of professionally active people in Poland were employed in agriculture or worked on farms, while at present only 25 percent are employed in agriculture. This means that individual villages in Poland were inhabited by a peasant population and constituted an homogeneous local group. At present the peasant families working exclusively on their farms constitute about 50 percent of the rural population, the rest being made up of part-time farmers' families or industrial works' families, and so on. Each village has become a heterogenous unit. The population of suburban villages in industrial regions presents an especially differentiated professional structure. Thus, for instance, in Southern Poland (the Rzeszow, Cracow and Silesia regions) there are so-called workers' villages where only a small percent of the families and their grown-up children work solely on their farms.

It is estimated that of about 2.5 million individual farms, half are worked by people who find employment also outside their farm. The social-professional structure of the inhabitants of the village is greatly differentiated, the class structure of the rural population having changed radically. The so-called localized class structure of the peasant population has broken up. Formerly, in each village rich peasants' families lived side by side with landless people, small farmers and agricultural workers. All were connected with work in agriculture and needed one another in spite of the disparity of their interests. Nowadays, different socio-professional groups and social strata of the village inhabitants have different interests. This situation influences their involvement in the problems of the village. Especially part-time farmers' and industrial workers' families who want to emigrate to the towns and cities have neither the time nor the interest to work for the local community.

In the traditional village the social bond was based on neighborly and very extended kinship relations. These two kinds of dependencies constituted the source of the need for mutual aid and cooperation between villages. The village was a group of people who were close to each other as neighbors or relatives. Now, the continuity of the generations in the village has been broken. In the post-war period about 6 to 8 million people emigrated from the villages. Each year, 120 to 200 thousand people emigrate from villages to towns. The range and frequency of the contacts of village inhabitants, including the agricultural population--not only commuters--have vastly increased. Several neighbourhoods are changing into selective and limited ones.

The village as a traditional community either is losing or finds reduced its economic character and administrative functions. The function of social control by way of social opinion also is becoming smaller due to the diversity in the system of values and the attitudes of the villagers: the village has undergone a shift from a closed local community to an open territorial unit.

The disintegration of traditional village communities is neither complete nor uniform. Some limited elements of traditional organization have remained until today in rural life. Neighborhood relations exist in smaller circles of families: kinship, affinity relations and some forms of informal cooperation, customs, etc. Many factors supporting identification with one’s village are still effective, including: 1) residence by families in a village over several generations, 2) emotional attachment to the land, 3) frequent contacts among the villagers, 4) some common traditions and heritage, and 5) the possibility of identifying readily with each other and the community afforded by the pattern of farm location along a given road and fields.

These factors provide for the existence of some remnants of the informal, traditional organization of social life which makes up the informal elements in the new local territorial groups. But what are these new forms?

Parallel to the process of disintegration of the traditional, informal structure and organizations of the village as a local community at the end of the 19th century, different associations and unions began to form in the rural area. They grouped the farmers from particular villages or a few neighboring villages with a view to joint activity. These were savings and loan societies, machine companies, dairy products cooperatives, cooperatives of supply and outlet, etc. All the important community activities began to be based in these associations, organizations and formal institutions and their coordinated actions. In the period between the two wars, these associations and unions were greatly developed. A broad and important activity was pursued, especially by the so-called "Rural Circles." Enlightened professional farmers who enjoyed authority among the village inhabitants headed these circles. In this way reintegration of the villages as local communities took place, since the formal organization of the village overlapped (though not without obstacles) the existing elements of the former informal structure.

After World War II the policy of the socialist state was directly or indirectly aimed at the collectivization of individual farming. The centralistic mono-party system of governing which was introduced reached to the lowest levels of organizational structures. All social organizations, unions and socio-economic associations in rural areas were dissolved; they were merged or formed anew by executive order and their management was imposed always by higher party leadership. With time, a few bureaucratic and centrally managed organizations of socio-economic character became fixed and even were called cooperative associations. Affiliation in these structures, being imposed economically, was obligatory, though participation in their activity was a fiction. Consequently, opposition against that anti-democratic and imposed system of management became common among the rural population. Apathy and passivity overcame public life.

The present political changes and economic reforms in Poland are directed toward rebuilding local rural communities as authentic and self-governing. To be so, the following conditions must be met: 1) to introduce full and real freedom to form socio-economic, political and cultural organizations and to develop the competition between them needed to rebuild the formal organization of the village; and 2) to reintroduce the institutions of self-government in individual villages in the form of self-governing organs like the office of village administrator (*soltys*) elected by the villagers, a council for this office and a general rural assembly. They must be given the proper material means and competence to act on the matters in their area.

The Commune-Municipality

The second kind of reintegration of the rural community is the commune (*Gemeinde*), which existed in Poland in the period between the two world wars and even earlier. The essential feature of the commune is that it unites a certain number of neighboring villages linked by economic ties to form one self-governing administrative unit. In 1986 2,122 communes existed in rural areas, each of them embracing about twenty localities with the central town or village connecting them through its economic, communal and trade facilities and relations. A commune serves not only as an administrative unit, but as a means of coordination for all single-purpose frameworks and associations, as well as an institution of self-government and administrative power for the inhabitants. Within the commune framework and by participation in its councils or commissions, the formal and informal groups and their leaders were able to be in touch and to combine their forces. When the localities or villages of the commune form a complete socio-economic entity, it develops as a local community. If the commune hopes to fulfill the social functions of coordination, direction and inspiration of cooperation and social activities, it must be more than an artificially created administrative unit.

In the post-war period in Poland the idea of the commune was distorted through a process which continued until recently. A commune was not a self-governing local community. The head of the commune was not chosen by the population, but was appointed by the *voivode*, that is, by a higher organ of state administration. The elections of the councilors to the Communal National Council as a legislative and controlling party was maintained. Important decisions lying in the competence of the organs of the commune were made by higher levels of state administration, and so on. The commune was viewed as the lowest organ of state authority, not as a self-governing community of villages associated functionally with each other.

Between 1955 and 1972, the communes were suppressed and their place was artificially assumed by the district consisting of three or four villages. Beginning with 1972, the communes began to return again as larger administrative units, but again certain definite villages often were included artificially in a given commune without the agreement of the inhabitants, and so on. Hence, the centralized system of administration imposed from above hampered the development of self-governing communities.

The rebuilding and adequate development of communes as local or territorial communities will take place only when at least the following conditions are satisfied:

1) the organs of commune authorities regain their self-governing character;

2) the commune becomes a self-governing whole within its territory and within the sphere of its own problems and population;

3) the communes have the possibility of forming and of having at their disposal commune property; and

4) organizations, institutions and associations working within the area of the commune develop horizontal coordination.

The Rural-Urban Region

A third kind of new local community revealed by regional studies of the structure of settlements and industrializing areas in Poland may be called a socio-economic region or rural-urban formation. Usually the center of such a region is located in a new industrial town or an old, industrializing one. Joining many villages and small towns, such a town functions as a local market, a center for social and cultural life for many localities, a place of immigration, and a point to which many people regularly travel to work. The formation of these socio-economic regions became known from studies of the Milejow region in the Lublin district and the new industrial regions, Pulawy, Konin, Plock, and Tarnobrzeg. On the basis of about five thousand diaries written by the rural youth, J. Chalasinski has pointed out that these new rural-urban formations are rooted in the consciousness of the leaders who help create them and are engaged in public activities.

As a new entity, these rural-urban regions are characterized by numerous regionally coordinated organizations and institutions, such as the professional association of farmers or so-called "Rural Circles," political groups, youth associations, public schools, adult and vocational schools, the so-called "Houses of Culture," etc. According to Chalasinski, the most important and difficult task for scientific research will be to work out a modern model for these rural-urban regions, for till now no precise patterns or models for rural relations have been established in Poland or elsewhere in the world.

In Poland we can speak then of three kinds of rural communities: the small rural communities embracing the elements of the old informal organization of the village but supported by local units of associations, organizations and institutions; the communes; and rural-urban regions.

Conclusion

1. The revival of authentic local self-government in villages, municipalities, communes and rural-urban regions is the fundamental factor of the matrix development of agricultural and rural life.

2. The economic and social life of the country must be thought through beginning from the state and cooperative monopolies; freedom in the formation of social organizations and associations, as well as of economic enterprises, must be restored.

3. Rather than heavy industry, development must center in agriculture and food industries, and in industries producing the means of production as well as services for agriculture.

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Chapter VI

The Renewal and Recovery of Urban Neighborhoods

John A. Kromkowski

People don’t live in cities; they live in neighborhoods. Neighborhoods. Neighborhoods are the building blocks of cities. If neighborhoods die, cities die. There’s never been a Federal policy that respected neighborhoods. We destroyed neighborhoods in order to save them.

I used to think I wanted to save the world. Then I got to Washington, and thought I’d save the city. Now I’d settle for one neighborhood. *Msgr. Geno Baroni*

The Challenge and Opportunity

In the 1960s the civil rights movement served notice that after almost two centuries an American ideal of equal treatment before the law must become a reality. It also reminded us that America was the special nation which promised hope, dignity and justice for all. Yet the translation of these profound desires, first embodied by the heroic actions of the civil rights movement, into the civil rights laws, these laws into programs, and these programs into the bureaucratization of the civil rights movement and civic impulses is a sobering tale of the unexpected consequences of focusing on legalistic strategies and state-imposed remedies. Such unanticipated and disallowing outcomes suggest that the promises of the American covenant cannot be achieved merely through the sound of great and prophetic words or through legal authorization by the stroke of a pen. The tasks of justice emerge from the specific injustices encountered. An additional stunning irony of this era was the expectation that the urban crisis could be resolved by strategies designed to combat racism. Msgr. Geno Baroni was among the first civil rights activists--Catholic Coordinator for the March in Washington at which Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his *I Have A Dream* Speech--to perceive the bankruptcy of racialism and classism in the politics and policy of the late 1960s. Baroni and his associates at the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs (NCUEA) developed an alternative approach to urban economic and cultural contradictions. This approach implied a critique of the civil rights movement and its advocate governmental agency, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. At bottom this difference involved ethnic and racial culturalism versus a White v. Black/Majority v. Minorities vision of America and the relative importance and emphasis on place and community v. individual rights and the universal claim of social justice.[1] These advocates for urban neighborhoods and cultural pluralism argued for the creation of a National Neighborhood Commission which would promote the renewal of urban life and more adequately address the pluralistic character of American culture.

The argument of this paper is that the contemporary disarray of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and the flagging impulses of the civil rights movement can be traced to failures of insight and strategy that separated the civil rights and neighborhood movements. A review of this unfortunate cleavage indicates that it is time to put new wine into the skins of a public agency and a newly inspired citizens' movement. The experiences and disillusionment of the last decade require a new vision of the American reality--not an impossible dream, but a practical community-based approach to urban life for a pluralistic and diverse urban society composed of thousands of neighborhoods.

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[1] The position paper "Neighborhood Revitalization: Neighborhood Policy for a Pluralistic Urban Society," Appendix A, NCUEA, 1976, drafted by John A. Kromkowski, Arthur Naparstek and Geno Baroni provides a clear set of notions derived from the ferment of the late 60s and the urban crises which created the Neighborhood Movement. This paper was presented at the White House Conference on Ethnicity and Neighborhood, May 5, 1976, which was convened to focus urban policy on ethnicity and neighborhood, the ignored and neglected dimensions of previous approaches.

On one level, the civil rights movement of the 1960s addressed universal human concerns; but on another level it was an attempt to solve a regional problem. The movement embodied an understanding of problems and applied a set of approaches that derived largely from the experience in the South. The slavery experience and its consequences had seared the American conscience in the nineteenth century. The destruction of its ancient vestiges seared the nation again in our time, once more burning its grief and anger beyond the South.

There were indeed serious social, economic and civil injustices in the Southwest, Midwest and North. Poor, powerless and excluded ethnic Americans had suffered crippling disabilities as a result of discrimination. Yet, it is not at all true, as some asserted, that racism was as deep and as intractable in these regions as it was in the South. The apparent intractability of racism in the industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest, for example, was a result of faulty analysis and inappropriate approaches to the tasks of justice. Attempts to change patterns and practices which had not been born out of racism (or the desire to discriminate) were optimistically initiated throughout these regions, as well as the entire nation. These attempts gained political momentum; their desire for liberty, justice and freedom invigorated the spirit of at least one generation.

Because the social reality and common dynamics of a divided nation with unique regional and local characteristics were more complicated and complex, however, the struggle against racism yielded uneven and unanticipated results. Such results grew, at least in part, out of an inability to recognize the importance of, as well as the lack of support for, community-based institutions. The influence of local economic and social justice institutions on individuals and communities was painfully slow and inefficient for the nationalizing and modernizing thrust of self-confident legal activists and universalist technocrats. Thus, their national efforts tended to devalue all such institutions and their critique of racism and the Southern experience was expanded to a critique of all localism.

Without challenging their critique of racism in the South, it is nonetheless clear and certain that the Southern experience, for the most part, was unlike the urban neighborhood reality of the Northeast and Midwest. In fact, the entire experience of racism in America is overlaid with an array of other experiences and realities. The factors of pluralism, class, ownership, diversity, unionism, education and coalition politics addressed by political organizations are particularly salient for understanding why the pursuit of civil liberties presented an entirely different challenge to the communities of the Northeast and Midwest.

To focus merely upon racism in the struggle for justice revealed a poverty of analysis that neglected to calculate other intrinsic elements and factors of life there and in other regions. It neglected the importance of community cohesion and non-governmentally negotiated approaches to resolving social and economic inequity, as well as the often modest but usually lasting results brought about by indigenous organization and self-help community-based techniques. To ignore and neglect these complex and sophisticated factors illustrates an inability to understand pluralism, diversity and the social texture from which citizenship emerged in America. Public therapy cannot be based on an inaccurate analysis of the social reality it intends to cure. A similar misdiagnosis may exist today.

The 1980s and 1990s are a new political context: a period of policy assessment, diminishing public resources and a power struggle between civil rights leaders and government. Advocates of social justice may have lost their base of support; various public entitlements are threatened; and the civil rights movement is divided and conquered by "the opposition". We are, in fact, at a moment in public affairs when advocates for the public good may succeed, like Pogo, in doing themselves in.

By the mid 1980s the stridency of single-issue groups, the rhetoric of racism and bigotry, ethnocentric and religious righteousness, and anti-immigrant hysteria all have strained the coalition-building process. Social and economic analysis designed to measure and remedy illegal discrimination have become twisted debates. Divisive contentions about the reality or relative intensity of racial, ethnic, religious and sexual inequality have become cost-benefit calculations. The claims of the elderly and handicapped have fragmented even further the original thrust for liberty and justice. Contradictory findings from many social sciences are used to buttress these conflicting claims for remedies and results. Allowing ourselves to be goaded into such a morass of narrow and special pleas demeans all claims for social and civil justice. It is time for a new analysis of America and for a renewal of our public will in the service of liberty and justice for all. In this situation the work of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights should not be an irrelevant discussion or a simple-minded preachment.

Moreover, it is time to acknowledge that civil rights can hardly be guaranteed if their protection is dependent solely on efforts of a concerned government agency. The civil rights establishment must address the urgent task of enabling persons concerned with civil rights to take the lead once again in designing a new agenda.

It is time for new directions which transcend both the politics of regional approaches to national needs and the politics of designated special status and inter-ethnic manipulation in America. To renew the civil rights movement we need a long-range politics of human development which transcends region and ethnicity, but does not ignore it; which improves economic well-being based on work and need and transcends the politics of unionism and designated special status, but does not ignore the dynamics of influence, access, advantage and mobility; which recognizes that America is, as Father Hesburgh, a former member of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, said, "a nation that promised hope, promised dignity and promised freedom for people." These are the political promises we must learn to keep! Finally, though a national effort in civil rights is needed, it is time to recall the words of John Hannah, another former member of the Commission, "If my years of experience here taught me one thing it is that the problem of civil rights may be solved not by national programs, but by local programs; not by federal action, but by community action."

In the 1960s in America the civil rights movement agreed on the need for national action in search of justice. In the 1980s Americans began to challenge the efficacy of national institutions. Recent presidential elections illustrate voter protest against government and public regulations. This same impulse, however, has provoked another sort of social force which has coalesced in the neighborhood movement. Rather than endorsing the critique of bankrupt policy by electing anti-government candidates, which simply yields questions of public order to private power, the neighborhood movement calls for the recovery of citizenship through the empowerment of government in support of community-based institutions. The challenge of the 1980s was to secure civil rights in communities and to discover how community-based power can be leveraged beyond a locality and region. The National Neighborhood Coalition argued that it was time for governments to listen to neighborhoods and thereby to balance the influences of organized interests and private power in America.[2]

A reenergized Commission on Civil Rights could become the champion of the American neighborhoods and bring their story to government. A renewed CCR could also shape a civil rights agenda designed to understand, to protect and to encourage community-based institutions. Community-based institutions can create a sense of human scale, individual efficacy and common citizenship. There is abundant evidence in many countries that community-based institutions have brought about wholesome and helpful bonds between individuals, as well as between people and large-scale institutions. In fact, community-based institutions may create the bonds of social solidarity needed to assure fairness from the government, corporations, the communications industries and organized interests which dominate the riot of resourcing and litigation which many modern national governments have become.

A society of unconnected and autonomous persons in perpetual litigation, engaged in never-ending struggles for limited resources, hardly engenders the virtues and goals sought through civil rights laws. On the contrary, such strains in times of emergency could well lead to political disintegration and require extraordinary and tyrannical corporate and military remedies. In the face of such a future, the importance of non-governmental institutions as the seedbed of human dignity and civil rights in this society should not be ignored.

Advocacy for enforcement of civil rights laws is no longer sufficient. It is time to refocus the vision of justice which guides people by reconstituting the bonds of solidarity at the neighborhood level. Discussions regarding the creation or recreation of the Commission on Civil Rights provides an appropriate public moment for a renewal of the civil rights movement and the recovery of social solidarity and civility. Such renewal and recovery of certain basic elements of a national tradition can begin because the vast majority of citizens of all ethnic, religious and cultural traditions believe in liberty and justice for all.

The civil rights movement has demonstrated that society can be changed by political speech and penetrated by legal power. Yet thirty years of progress and growth have shifted public attitudes in a variety of ways. Measured levels of trust in large-scale institutions have plummeted. Many have grown increasingly distrustful of activities supported by large-scale corporations, the national government and even national service and religious institutions. Confidence is waning in sophisticated systems designed to assure defense and safety. The ability of these institutions to meet national needs is uncertain. We appear to be facing a crisis of confidence and trust. The movement towards liberty and justice for all seems derailed.

It is the moment to explore neighborliness as a certain and basic social and moral feature of the national reality. At minimum, cognizance of the neighborhood in the national equation should enable us to limit the exacerbation of our problems and perhaps enable us to prevent the further erosion into irrelevance of the civil rights movement.

Understanding and governing with civility a neighborhood (a territory say, inhabited by less than 10,000 people) is a task of uneven difficulty. Therefore, it is important to appreciate the sometimes messy attempts to understand contingency and complexity in human affairs. *A priori* recognition of complexity, not the pretense of righteousness and moral superiority, are essential pre-conditions for the peaceful resolution of conflict, the equitable distribution of resources, and the building of coalitions. Preaching simple answers to a neighborhood or a nation is not an adequate substitute for understanding the dynamics of power and order in an industrial, multi-class, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic urban world.

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[2] See Appendix B, "A Declaration of Neighborhood Roles, Rights and Responsibilities," Neighborhood Coalition, May 13, 1982, Washington, D.C. The statement was drafted by Howard Hollman and approved by the Neighborhood Coalition, an organization of persons and institutions based in Washington, D.C. which advocates direct national governmental assistance to community-based organizations.

In fact, it is precisely the analytical and rhetorical failures and the resulting political inability to maintain the necessary coalitions to resolve conflicts that provoked the deterioration of public affairs and undermined the covenant of consent which "inspirited" national promises. Ironically, the legal struggle for rights and the passion of religious language in politics often eroded the bonds of community in which both were rooted. The legal-religious approach was fueled by an unspoken belief that great words produced lasting institutional change and assumed that guilt was a primary moral sentiment.

Given the current focus on economic solutions for human difficulties the importance of reenergizing the civil rights movement is particularly acute. It is time to recall that, at the deepest level, civility and civil rights are not merely the products of inspired speech and law. They spring from the best and most generous impulses in human society and culture and by most are created, experienced and learned through and in living communities. For all of their weaknesses and supposed closed character, the structures of society that bring people together at the human face-to-face level of existence, remain the most lasting and effective guarantee of personhood and civil well-being. Czeslaw Milosz, in his Nobel Award lecture, points toward the enormity of the loss that must be overcome when these little worlds of learning, meaning and social solidarity are destroyed:

> Perhaps our most precious gift . . . is respect and gratitude for certain things which protect us from internal disintegration and from yielding to tyranny.
>
> Precisely for that reason, some ways of life, some institutions become a target for the fury of evil forces--above all, the bonds between people that exist organically, as if by themselves, sustained by family, religion, neighborhood, common heritage.
>
> In other words, in many countries traditional bonds of *civitas* have been subject to a gradual erosion and their inhabitants become disinherited without realizing it.[3]

The poor, powerless and ignored ethnic and excluded racial groups are signs of unfulfilled promises, but the profound disintegration of the generous and open spirit which made these promises is a stunning irony. It is time to remember national promises of dignity, liberty and justice for all. To rebuild community in America on an understanding of its complexity, its pluralism and the importance of small-scale community-based institutions is the agenda for the renewal and recovery of solidarity in the pursuit of justice.

A reconstituted Commission on Civil Rights could provide the national impetus for the reconstruction envisaged. Such an enterprise should be grounded in an understanding of the experiences of American neighborhoods, an appreciation of their diversity and particularly the ethnic elderly that have been ignored and neglected. The following discussion of neighborhood definition and operations as well as the examples of approaches used by neighborhood organizations--development corporations, service providers, and an illustration of a local organizing effort to improve health care--indicate elements of the effort needed to recover and to renew the capacity of community-based institutions. They also suggest the task of reshaping public policy in ways which would not impede and perhaps support the efforts of neighborhood organizations--people helping people, people helping themselves to equitably distribute the public and private resources that large-scale modern bureaucratic institutions have used to disenfranchise them and make them a dependent element of public and private domination.

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[3] Czeslaw Milosz, *Nobel Award Lecture* (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1980).

Neighborhood Definition

There is not a single city in the United States without at least some sort of community or neighborhood organization. The daily press overflows with examples of these groups successfully attacking and solving urban problems. They have stopped highways from plowing through their environment. They have closed down or forced changes in companies whose toxic wastes, emissions and sewage have polluted their neighborhoods. They have used zoning to leverage a stake in how the land in their neighborhood is to be used. Their relationship to each other and to other institutions varies even within apparently similar metropolitan conditions.[4] Various political cultures and emphasis on bureaucracy, conflict and cooperation influence the consequence of neighborhood leaders and community-based organizations.

The time for systematic policy development and civic/political formation on behalf of neighborhoods as the essential social entities of modern societies has come. The enormity of this task is daunting. For example, despite the validity of developing an ethic of local neighborhoods which seek to safeguard the entire planetary ecosystem, the experiential reality is echoed in a battle cry which has become increasingly familiar in the last two decades, "Not in my backyard!"--NIMBY. While many progressives shake their heads and condescendingly bemoan such small-minded parochialism, the real challenge is to focus communitarian energy in ways which shape and share the burden. To revitalize urban economies and promote peaceful resolution of conflict--one neighborhood at a time--is a radically fresh approach to the relationship between state and civil society which is constituted by thousands of neighborhood. How large a task is neighborhood and civic renewal? Discovering what sorts of neighborhood exist in America is among the most important steps toward defining civil society.

In 1979-1980, for the first time, the U.S. Bureau of the Census offered to supply neighborhood statistics to any municipality of 10,000 or more residents which met certain requirements. Information was supplied on 27,000 neighborhoods or 1,252 jurisdictions that requested neighborhood.

Participation in the Census Bureau’s Neighborhood Statistic Program was contingent upon three criteria in addition to the 10,000 plus population size. First, all neighborhoods for which statistics were provided must be official, i.e., recognized by the municipality or a central neighborhood council. Secondly, neighborhoods must be distinct: their boundaries could not overlap. Finally, advisory representation was required from each neighborhood. Though the Census data indicate the size and number of neighborhoods as well as social, economic indicators, the issue of neighborhood definition is not entirely resolved. The US Census Neighborhood Statistics Program enabled jurisdictions to design their own approach to neighborhood definition. Table 1 and 2 (pp. 113-114 below) reveal the broadest outline of this process.

Broden and his colleagues identified six major approaches to defining neighborhoods: 1) homogenous, 2) intimate, 3) political, 4) functional, 5) economic, and 6) citizen perception.[5] Each approach to the neighborhood elucidates dimensions of its essential and local reality.

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[4] See Appendix C, Recent Newspaper Accounts of Neighborhood Action.

[5] See Appendix D, Neighborhood Statistics Program of the U.S. Census and NCUEA.

The homogenous approach generally assumes: a) that cities can be divided into distinct areas using physical boundaries, and b) that there is a tendency for people of similar ethnic and/or demographic characteristics to populate those distinct areas. Cities are viewed as a collection of distinct areas, each with its own homogenous populations, so that each neighborhood tends to act in its own distinct way. A popular variation of this approach is found in Michael Weiss, *The Clustering of America*. Forty types of neighborhoods based on income, home value and education and other consumer preferences, capacities and social indicators as well as the prevalence of each of the types were developed by Weiss and his associates at Claritas Corporation. An alternate view of the American reality emerges from the neighborhood data-base of the 1980 Census.[6] (See Tables 3 and 4.)

The intimate definition sees neighborhoods as "urban villages" as sociological antidotes to the anonymous and impersonal urban industrial life. Primarily sociological, this approach searches for social bonding or networks which may be based upon familialism, friendship, religion, ethnicity, social interaction, value consensus and/or the common use of physical facilities. In general, this approach defines a neighborhood as a set of intense and intimate relationships between individuals in a certain locale. The type of communal life or association which creates these bonds or networks influences the degree to which an "intimate" neighborhood is spatial or merely sociological.

The political approach suggests political alliance as the basis for defining neighborhoods, which imply some kind of collective action and commitment. Saul Alinsky argues that cities should respond to community organizations which develop out of specific issues which will not be geographic in domain. This approach implicitly and explicitly rejects geographically defined neighborhoods. However, other politically defined notions of neighborhood argue that whenever political power is granted, even through enacted boundaries, real community will arise. A second non-issue political view recognizes geographic boundaries, but generally believes that residents know those boundaries. Democracy breeds community; thus, the political neighborhood results when governance is transferred. A third political approach suggested by governments in nations like China and Cuba is that neighborhoods are urban units of control. These neighborhood level governmental agencies help decide who goes to college, provide health care, and allocate housing. In addition they promulgate propaganda and act as an intelligence unit to limit dissent.

Another approach believes that neighborhoods are foci of functional common interest. The functional perspective sees neighborhoods as a spatial area whose residents are bound together by common function and institutions: schools, shopping districts, parks and health care clinics. However, this binding is on a less intense scale than the political or intimate approaches. For example strong neighborhoods can exist without social intimacy among neighbors when there are strong expectations of property maintenance. The functional approach was very influential in town planning in England where planners influenced by the 1946 Dudley report on town planning attempted to create neighborhoods in new towns by such centrally located common services as schools or shopping areas in each area of a city. As a tool for analyzing existing cities, the functional approach locates amenities. User residences then may be mapped to see if geographic clusters emerge.

Broden, Kirkwood, Roos, and Swartz identify the economic approach to neighborhood definition and delineation as one which utilizes the perspective of housing markets. They write:

This approach places heavy emphasis upon the individual consumer who evaluates housing in terms of the physical structure and the environment surrounding it. The ‘neighborhood’ is the locale around a structure which defines the burdens and benefits associated with owning a house in a given location. These burdens and benefits include crime, pollution, schools, parks, zoning provisions, property repair, etc. "Neighborhood viewed in this way is regarded as a distinct housing submarket."

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[6] Michael Weiss, Data File on American Neighborhoods.

This definition incorporates some of the other perspectives on neighborhood definition because the area which has either very intimate ties or a strong set of functional ties will be identified as a distinct housing submarket. Roos and Swartz have defined neighborhood as a domain of localized externalities. They suggest that certain activities at the neighborhood level produce costs and benefits for everyone in that area, not just the actor. These positive and negative externalities have spatial domains which define the neighborhood. In addition, housing demands, land use, physical boundaries. and other factors place limits on actual domain.

Finally, a citizen perception model of neighborhood relies upon boundaries perceived by the citizens. Although this definition may include many of the other perspectives discussed, it is more appropriately a methodology for delineating neighborhoods. While a strict application requires individuals in isolation to draw boundaries from which researchers look for commonalities, a less formal citizen perception approach has been used most notably in Ahlbrandt’s and Cunningham’s Pittsburgh *Neighborhood Atlas*. The *Atlas* was developed through neighborhood group discussions, meetings and consensus, supplemented by randomly mailed questionnaires which in addition to demographic information asked the respondent for the name of his/her neighborhood. This information was used to map areas by similar responses. Regardless of the approach used to define neighborhoods, the activities of neighborhood organizations reveal a variety of capacities. The following generic forms of action can be regularly found in neighborhoods. The following catalogue of neighborhood operatives indicates the characteristics and limitations of various activities. An inventory of roles and functions provided by neighborhood organization indicates their potency as a bridge between the governmental and private sectors and their pivotal importance for civil society and its constructive operations. These neighborhood operations are the social products of neighborhood organizations. The importance of this form of social invention cannot be underestimated in any discussion of state and civil society. Understanding this level of social innovation is essential for pathology related to urban life and the realization of multi-ethnic accord in America.

Neighborhood Operations

Safety, Security, and Social Order. This operation consist of activities such as neighborhood crime watch, fostering anti-crime attitudes among residents, cooperation with/monitoring of law enforcement agencies, arson prevention programs, school violence prevention activities, and community pressure and sanctions to combat a variety of detrimental social behaviors (for example, dropping out of school, teenage pregnancy, buying stolen property, vandalism, etc.). These activities make the community safe for investments, increase the social and economic participation of residents, and reinforce positive growth-oriented social behavior. The safety, security, and social order operations help transform the neighborhood by preventing the flight of individuals and families with rising incomes and providing an environment where other operations can be performed effectively.

Neighborhood Improvement/Sanitation. This operation consists of activities such as block clean-up campaigns, community gardens, garbage collection contracts with local government, facade improvement programs, tool lending libraries, and increasing neighborhood amenities such as parks, picnic areas, trees and shrubs. These activities make the neighborhood look better and residents feel better. The improvement/sanitation operation helps transform the neighborhood by increasing the sense of belonging among residents and increasing their participation in the total revitalization process. Furthermore, visible signs of resident pride and concern in the neighborhood help increase the service response of municipal agencies.

Family Support and Adjustment. This operation consists of activities such as day care and elderly care programs, youth recreation and development programs, family counseling, drug and alcohol abuse assistance, social service advocacy and guidance. These activities are geared to each subpopulation that requires support to participate in, and contribute to, the economy or needs support to establish or maintain healthy social functioning. This operation helps transform the neighborhood by breaking what many social theorists refer to as "maladaptive, lower-class social pathologies." In addition, family support and adjustment activities form the core of social service enterprises at the neighborhood level.

Human Capital Development. This operation consists of activities such as employment and training programs, entrepreneurial training, literacy programs, and activities to support public and private elementary and secondary schools which serve neighborhood residents. These activities increase the earning power of local residents. The human capital development operation transforms the neighborhood by increasing the immediate marketable skills of residents and enabling neighborhood children eventually to attain higher income levels than their parents. Human capital development is one prerequisite for increasing community income available for maintaining property, home ownership, and improved cash flows in local enterprises. Distressed communities are characterized by having the local public school as the primary (or sole) vehicle for human capital development for the overwhelming majority of children and having no major human capital development efforts for adults.

Income Production. This operation consists of all activities which produce cash income and other financial assets for people residing in the neighborhood. (A neighborhood enterprise which provides income to a nonresident owner/operator and nonresident employees would not be considered an income production activity in the neighborhood context.) The income production operation helps transform a distressed neighborhood by maximizing the income of residents by shifting them from a jobless status or welfare dependency to employment and from low-wage to higher-wage jobs. Minimizing participation in antisocial activities such as the sale of illegal drugs also increases income production by reducing the presence in the neighborhood of items or activities which destroy earning and educational capacities and an environment conducive to maintaining middle-income families. Increasing income is a prerequisite for successful human capital development, property maintenance, and support operation. Government subsidies and private sector grants for human capital development, property maintenance, and family services can improve conditions temporarily, but long-term success is dependent on increasing the income residents can devote to these operations.

Property Maintenance. This operation consists of activities such as facade improvements, house painting programs, landscaping programs, tool lending libraries, home improvement and maintenance workshops, low interest renovation loans, and other activities which preserve, maintain, or improve the value of residential and commercial property in the neighborhood. These activities increase the financial assets of the residents and provide a basis for maintaining an influx of new families with incomes equal to or surpassing the incomes of existing residents. Property is second in improvement only to the residents themselves as a neighborhood asset.

Health. The operation consists of activities such as prenatal care classes and clinics, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), hospital services, and home health care for the elderly. These activities decrease health problems which impede resident participation in the work force, education, or training. Adequate access to good health care facilities is an important factor influencing the mobility patterns of middle-income families or families rising out of poverty. Furthermore, health care services are a major source of jobs which can be located in the neighborhood.

Transportation. This operation consists of activities to increase the mobility and economic participation of residents as consumers and wage earners. Activities such as van pools to transport local residents to suburban jobs, transportation services for the elderly, and political activities to influence mass transit routes and fares are common in revitalizing neighborhoods. (Revitalizing neighborhoods were observed to be characterized by a high percentage of car ownership by families, or numerous mass transit routes through the neighborhood, or communist-owned van pool or mini-bus services.)

Neighborhood Organizations

Some Examples of Specific Approaches

Activities and accomplishments by neighborhood organizations in American neighborhoods give a more complete picture of how neighborhood organizations fulfill their purposes.

--"The Broadway-Fillmore Neighborhood Coalition" in Buffalo, New York, has sponsored various forums and meetings among residents, city officials and private interests to assure that renovation of the local Broadway Market runs smoothly and meets the ongoing needs of residents--including the elderly. This market is more than just a food distribution facility to long-time residents; it is a longstanding neighborhood institution and landmark.

--"Citizens to Bring Broadway Back" in Cleveland’s near southeast side has worked on several issues which relate directly to the quality of life of the local elderly. They worked diligently to see that a new fire station was built in the neighborhood; they worked with other local groups and agencies to catalyze the development of a $3 million, 70 unit, elderly highrise in the neighborhood; and they have worked for several years on issues relating to crime prevention, fuel cost containment, and the provision of adequate human services for residents.

--"Kensington Action Now" in Philadelphia has maintained the membership of senior citizen associations over the years and has worked on specific issues relating to seniors through an ongoing Senior Committee. Activities have included: convincing the Philadelphia Corporation to plan a "meals on wheels" program in the neighborhood; work on various crime and arson prevention issues that led to, among other things, increased police patrols; and work to establish a senior citizen center in the neighborhood.

--"The Human Action Community Organization" (HACO) of Harvey, lllinois, responded to a growing crime rate affecting its elderly by organizing an all-volunteer Victim/Witness Assistance Program which included: quarterly meetings with police, prosecutors and judges to assure cooperation; a quarterly accountability meeting with the State's Attorney's Office; the assignment of only one prosecutor to each case in order to ensure continuity in each case; notices to victims/witnesses a week before court dates; an escort service to transport and protect elderly victims and witnesses; a nightly patrol of the homes of victims/witnesses by HACO's crime Stop Patrols; and presentation meetings with the prosecutor's office.

--"The Washington Heights/Inwood Coalition" in Manhattan provides a Community Mediation Service which helps residents, including the elderly, to deal with conflict on an intra-family, inter-family, or intra-neighborhood level.

--"United Seniors in Action," in both Minneapolis and Indianapolis, carried out city-wide campaigns to win discounts on prescription drugs of 10-25 percent from major regional stores.

--"Asylum Hill Organization" in Hartford, Connecticut, is a coalition of seniors, tenants and issue groups which work on the problems of housing, crime, health care, youth and unemployment. Its member group, "Seniors for Action in Asylum Hill" has focused recently on increasing police foot patrols, reducing prostitute activity, developing better elderly transportation services, and keeping open a local medical clinic that serves 3,000 elderly and low income residents.

The way in which neighborhood organizations assist in the provision of human services to their communities are varied, but the basic approaches and strategies common to all multi-issue, multi-based neighborhood organizations involve empowering neighborhood resources. Whether it is youth or families or tenants or homeowners or elderly that one targets for assistance in a neighborhood, neighborhood organizations offer the opportunity for residents to join together on specific, immediate and realizable issues and projects that, in the end, will benefit everyone.

To simply isolate a certain group, for example the elderly, as a specific "consumer" of human services is to overlook a number of their most important needs as residents in the community. They need to feel some degree of control over their lives. They also want to feel that they are a part of the mainstream of the community. And they need those natural support systems that come through interaction with other generations and groups in the community. Multi-based neighborhood organizations can fulfill these needs and others simply through basic processes that are common to all organizing efforts.[7]

Beyond the organizing processes themselves, neighborhood organization successes often include either new, expanded or improved service for all in the community--from the most vital and active ones to those most dependent on others for basic needs. Not the least important of these needs are economic development and housing fostered by development.

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[7] See Thomas Broden, Kirkwood, Roos, Swartz, "Neighborhood Definitions: A Bibliography" in *Strengthening Volunteers Initiatives*, 2nd edition (Washington, D.C., NCUEA, 1983). Additional references to the types of social, economic and political restructuring envisaged by the neighborhood movement can be found in Jane V. Cunningham and Milton Koller,*Building Neighborhood Organizations* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1983); Harry C. Boyte, *Community Is Possible* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984); Howard W. Hollman, *Neighborhoods: Their Place in Urban Life* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984).

Neighborhood Development Corporations

Neighborhood development corporations are growing in both their numbers and in their capacity as catalysts for development and revitalization in American neighborhoods. As with multi-issue neighborhood-based organizations, these institutions undertake activities that relate to a variety of constituent groups in a community. Though the ventures they develop generally cut across generational and ethnic lines, the programs they set in motion often include the entire community, from the earliest planning phases to such end results as an improved flow of goods and services in and out of the community as well as the revitalization of buildings, residences and facilities.

Factors which ensure a steady rise in production, distribution and ownership within a community form a complex equation that depends largely upon very localized characteristics, dynamics and developments. Yet, as with neighborhood organizations, there are a common set of tools, resources and organizing approaches which neighborhood development practitioners can use in developing the community and promoting its full economic potential. The following examples of specific ventures and accomplishments give an idea of the range of these tools, resources and organizing approaches which assist the elderly:

--"Greater Southwest Development Corporation" in Chicago, Illinois, has responded to a growing housing problem among the neighborhood's elderly homeowners--the houses in which they have lived for years are in need of upgrading, regular maintenance and constant small repairs, but they cannot afford all the costs involved, and they are increasingly limited in the amount of sweat equity they can invest personally in their homes. Greater Southwest established a Senior Citizen/Handicapped Home Repair Service which uses grant money and other resources to address this need. The corporation is also initiating the development of a senior citizen apartment complex.

--"Broadway Development Corporation" in Cleveland, Ohio, is working on a number of projects that will directly assist elderly residents. They are developing a $2.5 million renovation of a vacant, dilapidated commercial building to create a new mini-mall for the neighborhood. They are also assisting a family-owned grocery store in an expansion project which will double the size of the store and expand the food services available to the community. Lastly, they are working on the renovation of an unused theater building which will create low-cost apartments in the heart of the commercial corridor of the neighborhood.

--"The Lawrenceville Development Corporation" in Pittsburgh is a new neighborhood development corporation established to provide a vehicle through which the neighborhood can undertake specific housing, commercial and industrial development ventures. One of its major goals is to revitalize the commercial corridor by attracting new businesses and assisting others.

--"The Liberty Communities Development Corporation" of Baltimore has advocated and participated in the early planning of a multi-purpose center which will include senior citizen services as one-third of its activities. The services will include: crafts and other social activities, health services, transportation to and from the center, "meals on wheels", lunches at the center, etc. The organization has worked also with a local food store owner who runs a shuttle bus between the shopping center where his store is located and several local elderly apartment complexes.

The examples presented here do more than indicate the variety of ventures which these neighborhood development institutions undertake. They indicate also the variety of levels through which development corporations can assist a community. The "Greater Southwest Development

Corporation" example shows how a development corporation can be very directly involved in the lives of the elderly through such things as home maintenance services. The "Liberty Communities Development Corporation" example demonstrates the potential role of development corporations as advocates, planners and/or coalition builders in the expansion or creation of services. "The Broadway Development Corporation" indicates how a neighborhood corporation can indirectly better the quality of life for Americans by strengthening the neighborhood’s commercial corridor and ultimately keeping the flow of goods and services where residents can get at them. Some neighborhood organizations specialize in social and medical services which are not usually available locally nor adequately provided by external professional service providers. Social workers in cooperation with neighborhood organizations are bridging the gap between client and the professional service providers.

Neighborhood-Based Social Services

As with other major neighborhood entities, neighborhood service providers generally serve a wide range of age groups within a community. For this reason, they often function as multi-purpose or multi-service centers, offering a variety of activities and programs including: youth services, winterization programs, job training and counseling, child care, recreation and cultural enrichment programs, health services, and, of course, senior citizen programs. In fact, because of their ability to provide a human services "tool box" within a community, the other major neighborhood entities make regular referrals to them, pass out literature about their services, and serve on their boards in order to assure that the "tool box" is being used effectively.

The following examples demonstrate how neighborhood service providers can serve a very positive role for persons in American neighborhoods:

--"HARBEL, Inc." of Baltimore is a multi-purpose neighborhood center on the city’s northeast side. It provides a range of services and has an ongoing committee structure in the following areas: youth counseling and services, neighborhood operations, crime prevention, mental health, community information, housing assistance, etc. Those programs which help the elderly include: mental health outreach services, homesharing service, winterization programs, the senior committee, advocacy for and among elderly member groups, and work to further develop the neighborhood’s natural helping networks.

--"The North Ward Educational and Cultural Center" serves a large Italian community in Newark, NJ. Begun in 1971, it offers a variety of programs and services, including: early childhood development, youth enrichment, senior citizen services, recreation activities, education, vocational training, interaction, health services, cultural awareness programs, and building restoration assistance. The senior citizen services have a staff of their own and reach out to more than 2,000 Italian-American elderly. The services provided these elderly include: medical transportation, shopping and recreational transportation, outreach, nutrition, information and referral, educational activities, employment, cultural awareness, health screenings, and youth escorts.

--Employment support group networks in such cities as Chicago and Washington provide the elderly and other unemployed individuals the opportunity to work together for a common goal--employment. The Employment Support Center in Washington offers a variety of employment services to its member self-help groups, including: job leads, career counseling, guest speakers, referrals, etc.

In the older industrial cities, poverty remains high among the elderly. According to Representative Augustus Hawkins and the National Council of Senior Citizens, 25 percent of the elderly live below the poverty level and only 12 percent are employed. Only 21 percent of displaced older workers have found new jobs. An employment "tool box" such as those supplied through employment support networks may be an important way to address these problems.

In addition to employment-related services, it is clear that neighborhood centers such as "HARBEL, Inc." and the North Ward Educational and Cultural Center are effective because they provide elderly services as part of a more comprehensive approach to the overall needs of the neighborhood. They serve a networking, information-sharing and cohesion-building function as much as they serve a service delivery function. Their relationship to churches, neighborhood groups and other neighborhood entities makes them a natural focal point for helping networks in the neighborhood.

Our experiences with and analysis of, elderly ethnic Americans suggest that their lack of representation on hospital boards, United Way planning boards, and in the direction of health planning boards, as well as their absence from the executive suites of major corporations and foundations, has minimized their influence in shaping the nation's care system. The reshaping of accountable and responsive health care is an ideal intergovernmental organizing issue which ethnic leaders should explore.

Local Health Care Campaigns

The ethnic elderly in urban neighborhoods are especially affected by disparities in the health care system. Among other factors, rising costs, inadequate or absent insurance coverage, and the reduction of public and non-profit hospitals in cities, have strained everyone and have especially hurt the elderly. Ethnic elderly may be especially strained not only because they live in cities and because they are elderly, but also because they do not have designated minority status and therefore may not qualify for certain kinds of assistance. Cultural and language barriers may also keep the ethnic elderly from seeking the service they deserve. Rather than organizing to gain minority status, the neighborhoods and communities in which ethnic-American elderly live should organize around convergent issues which the American health care system has produced and which affect all of the residents.

Local health care campaigns can be effective ways of winning discounts for the elderly from local businesses, hospitals, and doctors; of securing waivers for home and community-based long-term care; of providing transportation services; of utilizing alternative providers; and, of getting and using good generic drug laws. Effective health care organizing strategies may grow out of community and neighborhood organizations, concerned parishes, neighborhood residents, and coalitions between and among any or all of these and other neighborhood entities.

The Villars Foundation has recently published a comprehensive health care organizing manual, *The Best Medicine: Organizing Local Health Care Campaigns*.[8] It outlines some of the following campaigns:

Hospitals. A hospital campaign is based on focusing upon one hospital to urge its physicians with admitting privileges to accept assignment and provide other medicare discounts. Hospitals that need to fill up their beds may be willing partners in this campaign based on the prospect that an agreement with the hospital and the doctors who use it will result in increased medicare utilization.

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[8] See *Strengthening Citizen Initiatives*, which includes a training curriculum and exercises, as well as a bibliography on community organizing.

Successful assignment campaigns are based on the perception that enough new patients can be delivered to the targeted provider(s) to make the contract economically worth their while. This can begin on a small scale--the campaign will attract seniors because of its obvious economic advantages.

Doctors. A few years ago, a campaign to convince doctors to accept assignment and provide other discounts for medicare patients would have had a 50-50 chance of success, at best. But times are changing and physicians now are more amenable than in the past. The success of a physician campaign depends on two approaches. (1) Competition: physicians in over-doctored areas may quickly understand the economic benefits of more patients and free publicity (programs provide enrollees with a list of doctors who have signed on). (2) Guilt and Social Responsibility: as seniors make their plight over medical costs better known, doctors are put in an awkward position. It is heartless for Dr. Greed--who makes $200,000 a year--to charge so much that poor Mrs. Smith with an income of $5,000 a year can't afford to see him.

Transportation Services. The availability of all the medical services in the world is useless if one cannot get to them. Large numbers of the elderly and disabled cannot get health care because they lack transportation to get there.

Federal medicaid regulations issued in 1969 (42 CFR 431.53) require that state Medicaid plans specify that the medicaid agency will assure necessary transportation for recipients to and from providers, and describe the methods that will be used to meet this requirement.

Besides medicaid, there are other sources of funding for the "transportation disadvantaged." These include Title III of the Older Americans Act, Section 16 (b) (2) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act and Section 18 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act. Unfortunately, there is little coordination between these various programs, and state transportation plans often either exist only on paper or adopt such strict limits on reimbursable transportation services that few, if any, recipients actually receive help.[9]

Alternative Providers. One way both to increase access and to reduce the cost of care is through the use of alternative providers: nurse practitioners, physician assistants, nurse-midwives, birth centers, women's clinics, etc. Alternative providers reduce the cost of health care because of their low technology approach and reasonable charges. They improve access because they practice in underserved areas. They can provide high quality preventive and primary care.

The use of alternative providers has special implications for improved care for the elderly. Alternative providers spend more time with their patients, a crucial ingredient for dealing with the chronically ill.

Despite proven benefits of alternative providers, many states limit their practice through licensure procedures. Physicians' strong combat of any attempt to liberalize these laws requires difficult, time-consuming campaigns.

A variety of different campaigns can be waged to increase the utilization of alternative providers. Some campaigns have tried to influence hospitals to grant these providers admitting privileges, to get third party payers to reimburse their services, or to protect them through anti-trust legislation. Other campaigns have been aimed successfully at changing state licensure laws.

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[9] Anon, *The Best Medicine: Organizing Local Health Care Campaigns* (Washington, D.C.: The Villar Foundation, 1984).

Generic Drug Laws. Generic drug law campaigns seek to increase the role of the patient and, to some extent, the pharmacist in the decision-making process when a patient takes a prescription to the pharmacy. Too often the pharmacist looks at the prescription and dispenses exactly what the prescription says, charging the going rate for brand names.

One approach is to require the pharmacist to lay the choice before the customer and allow the customer to make the final decision. Another approach is to demand that the state agency which regulates pharmacies conduct spot checks with undercover inspectors. Still another option is to work for a law requiring that the prices of the best-selling drugs be posted; however, even when this is enacted, many generics don't appear on the top 50 best-selling lists.

Generally the best approach is to pay special attention to ways to get the responsible state agency to monitor and enforce the provisions of the law, to get generic drug prices posted along with brand name prices, and to obtain stiff penalties for violations.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Neighborhoods are a strong determinant of the quality of American life: families live and rear their children in a neighborhood setting; youth are affected by the opportunities and influences they find in their neighborhoods; older people treasure their neighborhood and look to it for the support they need for independent living. Persons of all ages, income groups, races and ethnicity want to live in neighborhoods that are safe and clean, contain decent, affordable housing and suitable community facilities, and offer opportunities for civic participation and self-determination.

A variety of neighborhood entities contribute to achieving better communities, including parishes, community newspapers, neighborhood organizations, neighborhood development corporations, neighborhood service providers, fraternal associations, etc. They should be carefully targeted and thoughtfully assisted in a manner that fosters active and productive partnerships between public agencies, private institutions and neighborhood-based organizations. Residents--including the elderly--should be fully involved in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all public and private programs affecting their neighborhood.

The public and private sectors can make significant contributions to neighborhood life. It is particularly important that sufficient capital flows to lower income neighborhoods to permit homeownership, housing rehabilitation, development of new enterprises and support of existing ones. This should be facilitated through a combination of regulations assuring fair treatment of all neighborhoods and selective tax measures offering extra incentives to invest in neighborhoods with the greatest needs. Strong private-sector/neighborhood partnerships should also be encouraged.

Neighborhood residents need the organizational capacity and sufficient resources to initiate self-help activities and participate as full partners with the public and private sectors. The experience of the past twenty years has shown that small amounts of federal, foundation and private funds have served as fruitful catalysts in helping various neighborhood entities carry out programs and activities in response to unmet needs-including those of elderly residents. Within their program spheres, these sources of funding and capital should see that the appropriate resources and technical assistance are available for neighborhood-based activities, including:

community development, housing, youth employment, job training, education, economic development, crime prevention, health and human services.

It is through this comprehensive approach to neighborhood stabilization and revitalization that the elderly will be best served. Like all other residents in a given community, the life and needs of the elderly are dependent upon the vitality of the institutions, natural networks, economy, culture and other factors which form the basis of a supportive community existence. With this in mind, the following might be proposed:

--Fraternal organizations and the publications they distribute should look more closely at, and advocate issues affecting, the elderly, such as: utility costs, generic drugs, public and private health care policy, victim compensation, elderly housing strategies, banking and pension fund investments, etc.

--Diffusion of information and techniques as well as leadership training for persons living in ethnic communities are needed.

--Networking and information sharing between neighborhood people and care providers must be encouraged.

--Neighborhood and ethnic leadership need capacity-building technical assistance, particularly for the development of solid housing ventures.

--An American Neighborhoods and Communities Fund should be established to target resources to innovative activities initiated by neighborhood organizations.

During the 1980s the federal well ran dry for urban neighborhood and community organizations. Most direct financial support to these groups was abolished, leaving an enormous funding gap that the private, church and fraternal organizations were unable to fill. Many communities now confront a host of problems, including rising unemployment, scarce housing and deteriorating social services--problems that result from events and actions beyond the ability of communities to control. Clearly, a new approach to revitalizing neighborhoods is needed, one that recognizes that community groups can effectively serve the diverse needs of the elderly and their families.

If established by federal legislation, a "Neighborhoods and Communities Fund" would draw on the strengths of independent, community-based groups by directly funding their innovative community improvement activities. In the past, many federal programs and funds have been poorly targeted as lawmakers and administrators dictated categories of activity and approaches to problem-solving. In contrast, the involvement of neighborhood organizations makes it easier to focus social services, housing, economic development and other resources upon intended beneficiaries. An American Neighborhoods and Community Fund could promote this involvement and be responsive to the initiatives and concerns of neighborhood residents and their institutions and organizations.

In some respects the struggle to recover and to renew urban neighborhoods which began nearly a generation ago, as the illustrations presented in this paper indicate, has produced significant results. In other respects awareness of the founding notions of the urban ethnic neighborhood movement and the diagnosis prescribed are as needed today as they were decades ago. Thus, this sketch of the American reality and the policy and practice recommendations argue the importance of recovering the founding ideas of the neighborhood movement and resuming or at least inviting a new generation to consider our commitment to the people of American neighborhoods from which a peaceful, pluralistic and just urban society can be constituted.

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Appendix A

Position Paper on Neighborhood Revitalization: Neighborhood Policy for a Pluralistic Urban Society

The city is the cradle of our traditions and our civilization. The American Revolution, which gave birth to our country, was fashioned and fought in the cities and towns from Boston to New Orleans. The great American experiment--liberty and justice for all--was first experienced by millions of immigrant Americans who came to the cities and there developed the rich mixture of human spirit which characterizes the form and style of a fully human life, our urban civilization. Only cities offer the possibility for the continuation of this full human life through the enhancement of urban fellowship and social development. Burchard is right when he says that only the city can aggregate the fiscal and human resources which enable persons to enjoy their life and work in a framework of civic amenities. Those amenities are the obvious ones: well-tended lakes and rivers, green areas and parks, distinguished buildings, great universities, libraries and museums, outstanding restaurants, fine music, exciting shops, the theater, fountains, art in the streets, opportunities for participatory recreation and spectator sports, and historic squares. But they also include healthy neighborhoods with diverse traditions, styles and tones of life, and accountable and responsive government which is attuned and wholly dedicated to the important task of enhancing these civic amenities.

Yet today we are callously abandoning our cities and apparently espousing a Candide-like policy of pessimism and anti-urban privatism. Our national urban policy has not only threatened our cities with fiscal bankruptcy, but more tragically our cities have nearly ceased fulfilling their special and unique capacity to enliven the human spirit. Our cities are not producing the civilizing influences of work, education, art, music and fellowship that of necessity must be located and developed in them. These problems are often discussed and volumes of research have been directed towards eliminating the *urban crisis.*

Discussion and research, however, are not enough. Our national urban policy has neglect a basic dimension of urban life; the *civitas* has been forgotten.

In the ancient world, *urbs* was the place of assembly, the dwelling-place, a sanctuary of the *civitas. Civitas* was the religious and political association of families and tribes--the people bound together in civic association. By focusing on external concerns, the physical items, to the exclusion of civic concerns, our national urban policy has nearly destroyed the various levels of human associations which make urban life possible. Serious consequences, perhaps fatal results, derive from urban strategies that fail to recognize that a city is primarily a "little world" that is illuminated with symbols, shared experiences, and traditions. As Voeglin suggests, this world of meaning is not an accident or a convenience, it is the experience of their human essence.

In sum, our urban policy must be rethought and refashioned into a civic policy which in broadest outline is cognizant of the civic life of our cities and supportive of two pre-eminent features of that life which have been thoughtlessly squandered, our rich variety of ethnic differences and their life blood, our urban neighborhoods.

The fondest of our family traditions of diverse populations have been nurtured and protected in our urban neighborhoods. The urban neighborhoods have produced civility, order and stability. They are sustained by a delicate network of interpersonal, family, cultural, economic, religious, and political relationships. In fact, a good measure of a healthy city is the health and vitality of its various ethnic neighborhoods.

Many of these healthy neighborhoods have been and are being destroyed, mostly by government action or inaction. In a steady procession of good-intentioned but basically faulted programs initiated by national urban strategists and compounded by faulty local initiatives and planning, our city neighborhoods--and all that they have meant for our country and our people--are tragically passing from the scene. With their damage our greatest American cities will be no more.

The economic bind facing the cities is mounting daily. The middle classes of all races and nationalities are being forced to flee the city. The tax base is eroding, jobs are disappearing, mass transportation is a farce, there is no adequate housing policy or program, health costs are mounting, educational standards are decreasing; through all of this the quality of life in America is deteriorating.

Power must be returned to the people, to all the people. We cannot allow our cities to be havens for the very rich and the very poor with a wall around them separating out America's middle classes. Ownership must be expanded, jobs must be created, planning must relate to human and neighborhood needs. Above all, voluntary associations which speak to the needs of all citizens must be created and supported in every neighborhood to give voice and power to our citizens' aspirations. This will enable them to be heard in the halls of political responsibility so that their needs will be addressed.

The problems of our city neighborhoods affect farmer and suburbanite, as well as city dweller. They share this complex situation in such a close-knit way that the problems of one cannot be solved unless they are all addressed. No longer can we pit farmer against city dweller, suburbanite against rural American, or the small city neighborhood against the large city. All these have, we now know, the same problems, which vary only in quantity. The same policies and lack of vision and planning affect all. The same forces that are causing the closing of the small farm are also driving the middle class from our cities. Now is the time for a unified effort; we must not neglect or turn our backs on the grandeur of our neighborhood traditions and life in our cities. Such neglect will return to haunt us in the years ahead.

Most of our public and private institutions as well as the urban policy of federal, state and local governments have ignored the ethnic factor in urban American society. We cannot understand the urban crisis unless we understand the ethnic, racial and cultural diversity of the American people. One of the challenges of our quest as Americans for self-definition is to recognize that our national self-image as a melting pot is not an adequate framework to deal with our ethnic and racial diversity. We need, therefore, a new rhetoric to begin the task of redefining ourselves as Americans. We are the most ethnically, racially, religiously, regionally-diverse nation in the world.

Many scholars, policy analysts and others agree that the neighborhood is a neglected unit of American urban life. But now residents in cities all across the country are organizing to improve their neighborhoods. Strategies for neighborhood revitalization have many variations, and evolve from different ideological perspectives. However, one theme runs throughout every strategy--the desire to assist people to become more involved in the processes of governance and thus to share in the control of their neighborhoods and their lives.

To date, two major streams of thought have influenced this movement. The first includes those proponents of neighborhood government who return to the principles of Jeffersonian democracy and the conceptual notions put forth by Mumford and Jacobs. They define the problem in human and moral terms, and argue that because family and community life suffer people do not cope well with the diversity and pressures of the city. They assume that people will live better if they have options for control and that the way to achieve this is by a return to smaller units of government.

The second stream consists of those proponents of American Federalism who also decry the trend toward centralization and bigness. However, they define the problem within the context of the good government and reform movements of the early twentieth century and build on the theoretical framework of contemporary public administration. Their approach is functional and structural with emphasis on identifying the tasks which can best be carried out by small service areas in order to achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness and productivity.

The primary focus of any decentralization strategy must be the city, for without a workable strategy of neighborhood decentralization on the local level, the best efforts of other governmental units will be fruitless. We should develop a two-phase neighborhood decentralization model that would begin a process of combining political and administrative decentralization in a fashion that permits and encourages citizen participation. It would have to recognize that each city is different and that no one can prescribe a generic model. Nor can one prescribe the mechanics of developing linkages between neighborhoods, city and regional governmental units. Such a model should be considered a limited approach toward meeting selected needs on a neighborhood level.

There is a paucity of federal legislation which legitimizes the neighborhood as a legal unit. A major problem in writing legislation has been in defining the appropriate role of the federal government. We define the role as having to deal with three major areas of concern:

1) the structuring of financial resources;
2) the reorientation of federal programs, agencies and regulatory bodies; and
3) the provision of technical assistance through model legislation.

More specifically, a neighborhood policy needs to be enacted to serve as a model for a comprehensive approach toward:

1) restructuring the procedures of governance through a mix of centralization and decentralization of services;
2) restructuring financial systems with emphasis on subsidy and incentive programs;
3) molding federal funds and programs with local conditions;
4) provision of oversight over relevant regulatory bodies in the context of neighborhood problems; and
5) rearranging human and educational service delivery systems in ways which will increase utilization and decrease ethnic and racial tension and polarization.

We need to begin to discuss the development of legislative and executive action that would redirect priorities in favor of a national neighborhood policy. Legislative and executive action must lead toward neighborhood re-investment through increased policy, strategies, and programs for neighborhood revitalization. Federal agencies and departments, including the Departments of Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Health, Education and Welfare, and special agencies such as the Small Business Administration, ACTION, the Community Services Administration, and the Office of Minority Business Enterprise must take the lead in developing policy, strategies, and programs for neighborhood revitalization (housing), neighborhood market place revitalization, economic development, and the stabilization of communities through serving basic human needs.

We could mention good efforts by every one of these federal agencies and departments but we need to recognize that *convergent* issues at the neighborhood level and *bridge* issues are needed to build a greater and broader racial and ethnic constituency for neighborhood revitalization.

In sharing our views today about the development of a national neighborhood policy and specifically focusing on neighborhood revitalization in a pluralistic urban society, I would like to make a priority recommendation of a Presidential Commission on Neighborhood Policy. This could begin with a review of all our federal programs and their impact on neighborhoods. The Commission or Task Force could take the ideas and suggestions mentioned earlier in this paper under consideration as its initial agenda. It should incorporate two ideas: a pluralistic urban society and neighborhood revitalization.

Neighborhood decentralization is no urban panacea, but must be studied in light of our increasing concern for community and the problems besetting our cities. The challenge to government at all levels is in devising creative policies which can support appropriate political and administrative decentralization efforts.

Appendix B

A Declaration of Neighborhood Roles, Rights, and Responsibilities

We the people of the United States of America come together in varied ways in response to common needs and shared interests. In this declaration we are speaking as neighborhood people who are involved as individuals and through organizations working to preserve and improve our neighborhoods.

As neighborhood people we are concerned about our homes, our families, our neighborhoods, our physical environment and safety, and the institutions and agencies serving us within our neighborhoods. We want to be certain and that we, our neighbors, and people in other neighborhoods have sufficient income to meet basic human needs. We want adequately paying jobs for all who can work and sufficient means of economic livelihood for those who cannot. We want the amenities of the good life. We want freedom to pursue individual activities, but we also recognize our interdependency.

As neighborhood people we rely upon many different organizations, both public and private, to fulfill our needs. We do many things individually to care for ourselves and our families. We serve as volunteers to help our neighbors. We form neighborhood organizations to act as our advocate in dealing with government and the private sector, to undertake neighborhood projects, and to provide specific services. We join with people in the broader community to form other kinds of voluntary organizations. As entrepreneurs and investors, we are involved in business enterprises. We rely upon a variety of governmental units -- local, state, and national -- to help us meet common needs and to guarantee liberty and justice for all. Because many of our needs can be met by small-scale, close-to-home operations, any neighborhood desiring to have direct control over neighborhood projects and services should have the right and resources to do so.

As neighborhood people we realize that our neighborhoods vary widely in population make-up, economic resources, and cohesiveness. Many neighborhoods have already demonstrated their capacity to administer program activities and services, such as housing rehabilitation, commercial revitalization, energy conservation, food programs, child care, youth services, home care for the aging, health services, crime prevention, employment and training programs, arts, recreation, and many more. Other neighborhoods want to develop this capability. Therefore, governments, voluntary organizations, and philanthropy should recognize this desire and should encourage and assist neighborhood organizations to undertake activities of their own choosing. As this occurs, each neighborhood should have flexibility to organize itself as it deems appropriate rather than being forced into a single mold.

As neighborhood people we affirm that when our neighborhood organizations want to take on direct operations, they should have dependable sources of income to allocate as they determine. Among the possibilities are their own tax base, shared revenues with guaranteed minimum, a fair share of united giving campaigns, and income from investments and enterprises. They should also receive grants, contracts, and donations. Because our neighborhoods have widely varying needs and vastly different economic bases, local, state, and national governments, philanthropy, and the private business sector should take action to achieve greater equity in the resources available to neighborhoods.

As neighborhood people we want to participate in economic enterprises located in and serving our neighborhoods. We expect to do this as individual entrepreneurs, partners, stockholders, and investors and as members of cooperatives and shareholders of community-owned enterprises. A major function of these economic activities should be to provide employment opportunities for our fellow residents. Where local jobs in the private sector and the regular public sector are insufficient to achieve full employment, we believe that government-financed job creation should occur. As this happens, neighborhood organizations and neighborhood-based enterprises should be allocated funds to hire unemployed and underemployed residents in jobs meeting neighborhood needs.

As neighborhood people, even as we take on direct operations, we will continue to rely upon local, state, and national governments to fulfill many of our needs. These, too, are our instruments as we act as citizens of the municipality, county, state, and nation. As this occurs, we insist that we should have a meaningful voice in formulation of policies affecting our neighborhoods. This should be achieved through our elected representatives, through a varied array of citizen participation practices, and on occasion through ballot initiatives and referendums. All of these governments should be held accountable for the ways in which their actions affect our neighborhoods.

As neighborhood people we look to the federal government to take responsibility for national solutions to national problems and to take positive actions to assure that equal rights are available to all Americans. We believe that equity is an important goal for the United States and that the federal government should use its powers of taxation and expenditure to achieve a fair distribution of the nation’s resources among generations, economic groups, and geographic areas (regions, urban/rural, city/suburb). We advocate direct federal funding of neighborhood organizations for activities amenable to neighborhood administration. Where federal grants go to our state and local governments, they should be directed toward clear national objectives, governed by the principle of equity, and controlled by our elected representatives within these governments. In the expenditure of federal funds, state and local governments should be held accountable for meeting specific performance standards and should be required to achieve full participation of persons served and other citizens in policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. Neighborhood organizations should be entitled to receive a fair share of federal funds going to and through state and local governments.

As neighborhood people we expect our state and local governments to be guided by principles of equity, participation, and accountability. They should make state and local tax funds available to neighborhood organizations. State government through statutes, and local government through charter and ordinance, should enable neighborhoods which want to organize their own governments to have both the authority and the resources to do so. Where organized, neighborhood governments should also be guided by principles of equity, participation, and accountability.

As neighborhood people, we also look to the private business sector and to voluntary organizations and philanthropy to meet many of our needs. In locating facilities, businesses should respond to the desire of neighborhood residents for jobs and services. They should seek joint ventures with neighborhood organizations and should direct a fair portion of corporate contributions to neighborhood-based activities. Voluntary organizations should assure that their operations are truly responsive to neighborhood needs. They should provide opportunity for full neighborhood participation in policy-making, evaluation of services, and implementation, including contracting with neighborhood organizations to run specific services. Foundations and united giving campaigns should assign top priority to needs of low and moderate income neighborhoods and should fund neighborhood organizations and providers of neighborhood technical assistance.

As neighborhood people, we recognize that we have responsibilities as well as rights. Therefore, we pledge that we will work as individuals and through our neighborhood organizations to help one another, care for children, the aging and others in need, guide our youth, look out for the safety of our homes and streets, maintain our properties, make proper use of public facilities, and strive diligently to achieve liberty and justice for all.

Adopted by the Neighborhood Coalition, May 13, 1982, Washington, D.C.

Appendix C

Newspaper Accounts of Neighborhood Action

Study Finds Councils at Grass Roots

by Don Ahern

Citizen participation is healthier and much more a part of government in St. Paul than in Minneapolis, according to a study reported in a publication of the University of Minnesota's Center for Urban and Regional Affairs.

But the lack of a strong system in Minneapolis has forced citizens groups to identify more clearly their priorities, even though they have a harder time communicating with City Hall.

The urban and regional affairs center conducted interviews with 40 neighborhood organization leaders and staff members over the past year. The results of those interviews are contained in the June issue of the center's newsletter, the CURA Reporter.

While the article refrains from directly ranking the two cities against each other, it makes it clear that St. Paul's system of 17 funded community councils encourages citizen participation throughout the city. In Minneapolis, the article says, communities are pitted against each other in competition for grants with no assurance of continued funding.

However, the different types of funding contribute to greater independence by Minneapolis groups and more dependence on city funds in St. Paul.

Although St. Paul's system works well, said Jack Whitehurst, a co-author who did the interviews, it is so well organized that it almost becomes a level of city government.

"The people I talked to said the councils need to become more proactive. They are too reactive to a lot off little things. They should be developing their own solutions to problems. It's kind of like the city wants them to do its dirty work."

The article states, in part: "St. Paul displays a strong interest in citywide, organized citizen participation as evidenced by the district council system, the early notification system, distribution of funds, and city staffing assignments for neighborhood programs.

"While Minneapolis groups search for timely information about what the city council is doing, St. Paul groups are concerned that the government may be too involved. . . . Ironically, the district council system (in St. Paul) is such a well-used mechanism for the agendas of various city offices that many district councils have difficulty making room for their own issues, developing their own priorities and asserting their own concerns effectively."

St. Paul's citizen participation director, Geraldine Jenkins, agreed that "we sometimes overwhelm the district councils in paper" while Minneapolis neighborhood activists struggle lo find out what is going on. Jenkins said the article was generally accurate, at least in its references to St. Paul.

The article also said that "it was clear in the interviews that Minneapolis organizations are hostile toward the system and more likely to blame external forces (the city council, the planning commission or the city coordinator’s office, for example) if their organizational priorities are sidetracked.

"Neighborhood staff and leaders in Minneapolis believe the city has little, if any, interest in organized citizen participation in decisions by the city council, the planning commission or the various other city departments."

Minneapolis planning director Oliver Byrum said that quotation "reflects a view that if you’re not giving us money, you’re not doing anything for us." Minneapolis does more staff directed community activities, such as conducting door-to-door needs surveys of neighborhoods, he said. But he added that the article was basically accurate. He said Minneapolis cut back on its district council financing in the early 1980s as federal funds began to dry up. "We felt that there were other ways to get things done," he said. "And there is the feeling that organized groups represent themselves, but do they really represent the community."

In St. Paul, the article says, "organizations seem to believe that the system is there to help them and are more likely to blame themselves if their priorities are sidetracked."

The relative strength of district councils in St. Paul was illustrated by a reference to a few instances in which citizens had first to enlist the aid of their city council member to push for district council action on a particular issue, rather than the other way around. The St. Paul City Council seldom will act on a neighborhood issue without consulting the appropriate district council, although the advice is not always heeded

In its summary, the article concluded that the challenge for Minneapolis neighborhood organizations "lies at the municipal level--whether the city will value organized neighborhood participation seriously enough to provide community organizations with the basic administrative resources necessary." The challenge in St. Paul, according to the article, "lies at the neighbor level." As even more demands are placed on the district councils, it will be increasingly important for St. Paul’s neighborhood residents to make clear choices and pursue those things most critical to the future of their communities.

New York Neighborhood Coalition Successfully Ties Expanded Banking Powers to Community Reinvestment

In mid-January new banking rules went into effect in New York State that will generate an estimated $750 million to $1 billion in new investments in low and moderate income neighborhoods and rural communities. The adoption of these new rules establishes an important precedent for future banking deregulation, demonstrating how expanded powers for banks can be coupled with incentives to encourage lending to disinvested communities. The new banking rules also represent a significant victory for a coalition of neighborhood groups in New York City which were instrumental in bringing about adoption of these banking regulations. The groups sought to preserve access to financial services for modest income consumers in an era of deregulation of the financial services industry. The Center for Community Change and its Neighborhood Revitalization Project (NRP) aided these groups in their efforts.

The neighborhood groups’ efforts were spearheaded by the New York City-based Coalition against Redlining (CAR) and its local technical assistance arm, the Community Training and Resource Center (CTRC). CAR is an umbrella organization representing more than 30 local neighborhood groups that serve low and moderate income areas.

The Center began NRP in 1976 to develop new methods whereby local community groups could influence the flow of public and private resources for neighborhood revitalization and preservation. NRP responds to requests from local groups by providing economic, legal and public policy analyses on issues affecting neighborhoods. NRP has been especially effective in expanding the ability of local groups to use public resources, like the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) programs as well as to stimulate increased private investment through the use of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The project also provides the necessary analytical tools to enable grassroots community groups to tackle newly emerging problems, such as bank branch closings and their impacts on low and moderate income areas.

CAR’s effort to develop new mechanisms to preserve access to financial services for poorer neighborhoods dates back to January 1984, when the coalition and NRP were asked to testify at a hearing held by the New York State Temporary State Commission on Banking, Insurance and Financial Services. The State Legislature established the blue ribbon commission, chaired by Adrian DeWind, the former head of the New York State Bar Association, in 1983 to develop recommendations that would permit state-chartered banks to enter new fields such as insurance and real estate and corporate equity investments.

Both CAR and NRP staff testified at the hearing about their growing concern that banking deregulation may have unleashed new disinvestment forces in low and moderate income communities. Both groups cited the wave of bank branch closings in the city’s less affluent neighborhoods as evidence that banks were beginning to "demarket" their services to low and moderate income consumers. The testimony also touched on the credit availability problems posed by branch closings and their dire consequences for revitalization efforts.

The CAR and NRP testimony had an impact on the Commission, whose final report acknowledged that banking deregulation had adverse impacts on low and moderate income consumers, on certain urban neighborhoods and on small business. The DeWind Commission concluded that the state had an obligation to devise a set of safeguards to curb these adverse effects and to preserve full access to financial services. Further, the Commission recommended that safeguards be included in the legislative package permitting banks to enter new fields.

The DeWind Commission’s report generated a good deal of publicity, particularly concerning its findings about the adverse impacts of banking deregulation. Using the momentum provided by the Commission’s report, CAR, with NRP’s assistance, developed a specific set of policy recommendations that could be incorporated into legislation giving banks expanded powers. NRP and the Coalition devised several reinvestment proposals, including tying expanded banking powers to an individual institution’s lending performance in low and moderate income areas, expanding public disclosure requirements for banks utilizing expanded powers, revising the State Community Reinvestment Act and instituting a supervisory procedure governing bank branch closings.

The proposals formed the basis for a Neighborhood Agenda on Banking Deregulation that was supported by a neighborhood consumer alliance including groups such as CAR, the New York Public Interest Research Group and the New York State Tenant and Neighborhood Coalition. The *ad hoc* coalition held several meetings with State Banking Department officials in an effort to convince them to incorporate the proposals in the Governor’s banking deregulation legislation.

The DeWind Commission report formed the basis for expanded powers legislation included in an omnibus Banking Bill introduced in the State Legislature in late spring. The omnibus bill included provisions permitting state-chartered banks to make direct equity investments in real estate projects. It also directed the Banking Department to consider an institution's reinvestment performance in determining the extent to which it could invest in real estate. Because the legislation did not include the Neighborhood Agenda provisions, however, CAR opposed it. Eventually, a compromise was reached and the legislation was adopted, but not before the Superintendent of Banking promised to include the Neighborhood Agenda through his agency's rulemaking authority. The Superintendent agreed to promulgate rules in the following areas:

- requiring banks to disclose information about their small business lending;
- requiring licensed mortgage bankers to disclose their patterns of lending, just as do banks;
- requiring that banks be subject to an annual Community Reinvestment Exam with a graduated numerical scoring system, replacing the pass, fail method of rating that gave banks little incentive to improve their performance; and,
- pegging real estate equity investments permitted by the new legislation to a bank's community reinvestment score.

The Omnibus Banking Bill was also amended to provide for a four-year sunset, to ensure that satisfactory regulations were instituted before the bill came up for renewal. A final piece of the compromise was the statutory enactment of a branch closing provision. This requires banks to give 90 days notice of proposed branch closings and to provide the Banking Department with confidential information on branch deposits, profits and losses and a map of the area showing remaining financial services. The department must determine whether the closing will result in a "significant" reduction of banking services to the area. If so, the department must conduct meetings with community leaders and banks to explore replacing the closed facility.

The bill passed the State Legislature in late June and was signed into law in early July. Although disappointed that the Neighborhood Agenda was not included in the legislation, CAR leaders were determined to ensure that the Banking Superintendent followed through on his commitment to adopt these proposals by regulation. Throughout the summer, NRP worked closely with CAR leaders and the CTRC staff in developing suggestions for the regulations. In addition, CAR leaders and NRP staff attended several meetings with Banking Department officials to discuss these proposals.

In early September, the Governor and the Banking Superintendent announced a proposal to link the ability of banks to use the new powers to their CRA scores. According to the proposal, banks with the highest CRA scores (i.e., the best records in meeting the credit needs of low and moderate income areas) would be permitted to invest up to 5 percent of their assets in real estate equity, while banks with lower ratings would be permitted to invest as little as 2 percent.

In addition, the Banking Department's proposal included a formula for determining specific set-aside investment requirements for banks utilizing expanded powers. The CRA ratings would be used to determine how much banks must invest in low and moderate income areas (defined as areas eligible for CDBG funding). Banks with the highest, or "satisfactory," rating would have to invest the value of 5 percent of the real estate in CDBG-eligible areas. Those rated "inadequate" or "unsatisfactory" would have to invest 10 percent.

The proposed rules were generally praised by CAR leaders, although they were concerned that the proposal was not well-targeted to benefit low income people or to discourage displacement of poor people resulting from the new investments. CAR asked NRP's help in analyzing the proposal and in developing recommendations for improving the regulations. Based upon discussions with CAR members and members of other community and housing organizations, NRP developed detailed comments on the department’s proposed rules and suggested modifications that would strengthen the impact of the reinvestment requirements for low and moderate income people. Several of these suggestions were incorporated in the Banking Department’s final rules, which were adopted last December.

NRP is now advising CAR on its plans to hold a statewide conference on strategies for implementing the new banking rules. The conference is scheduled for March.

For further information, contact NRP Director Allen Fishbein, Center for Community Change, 1000 Wisconsin Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007; 202/342-0594.

Part III
Education and Religion

Chapter VII
The Dialectics of Public and Private in Education and Social Life

Lech Witkowski

The Public Sphere and the Potential for Emancipation

The category, "public sphere," if analyzed dynamically in relation to the "private sphere," can constitute a fruitful theoretical tool for descriptions of the scale left to individuals in influencing political and social processes. This is true despite the fact that the theory of this category may not be sufficiently founded. One of the results of our presentation will consist eventually in making explicit certain patterns of the opposition between public and private in order to show that any rigid limits imposed *a priori* upon "public" make the very category inoperative and often inapplicable. Jürgen Habermas[1] was inclined to treat the public sphere as an historically given term, rather than as an ideal type for theoretical consideration. Nevertheless, it is due to him that viewing social relations in terms of the quality of the "public sphere" has become crucial for efforts to make explicit, and to eliminate, "ideologically frozen relations of subordination." Its role for the theory of education has been studied by Henry A. Giroux.[2]

In order to clarify my own analytical approach concerning the notion of the public sphere and its applications to educational institutions it should be noted that in the broadest terms this notion refers to a sphere which is open and authentically present within the discursive practices of a given society. It can be characterized by its basic function of articulating various ethical, political and religious options, including a critical attitude towards state power and its agents. To be more specific, the status of this category can be differentiated on the basis of reference to various types of socialization and to their respective logics for regulating power relations between an individual and his social environment.

The analysis of the public-private relationship in terms of types of socializations requires complementing the traditional opposition of primary (a symbiosis of the individual and his world seen as the only possible one) and secondary socialization with the concept of "critical socialization". This can be done through subdividing the secondary type into "strictly secondary" (in which a destination and even collision of a given life and the world can be preserved) and "critical" (where the individual preserves his autonomy and subjectivity regarding his activities in the world).[3] Reduction of secondary socialization to mechanisms which generate "role identity" is no more than the level of the "conventional" organization of interactions with its logic of reproducing rules, standards and the pre-given definitions of roles (which I link with "strict secondary" socialization). All this actually sanctions the state of affairs in which "education still consists of wielding power," of reducing the individual's subjectivity rather than of promoting it towards more action.

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[1] Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit* (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1962).

[2] Cf. Henry A. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education* (South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey, 1983), 234-242.

[3] I came to this division of secondary socialization while critically analyzing P. Berger’s and T. Luckmann’s approach in their *The Social Construction of Reality* (Polish edition; Warszawa: PIW, 1983). The basic idea was applied from my study of L. Kohlberg’s and J. Habermas’ confrontation of the conventional and the post-conventional levels of development, cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon, 1979).

This level can be attained only through an entirely different attitude in facing the world, linked with the idea and postulates of "critical socialization" consonant with postulates oriented towards reaching a new level of individual competence. On this basis entering into conflict with hitherto existing fixed conventions or definitions of situations becomes not only tolerated, but also a highly respected and desired natural reaction to the world. It enables counterposing present regulations with their alternatives or at least some modifications. In such difficult critical socialization one expects the elimination of factors blocking an individual's claim to personal autonomy and subjectivity. One expects also the conflict in promoting such competence to involve not just a destructive struggle, but a process of discursive confrontation preserving interaction, respect for subjectivity and the right to autonomy. This level of interaction enables one to treat discursively the problem of the legitimacy of norms and principles which hitherto was taken for granted. It creates a platform for criticizing and eventually rejecting claims of traditional social institutions and their respective authorities in their often onesided, irreversible domination over individuals.

Often one may get the impression that schools and other educational systems strive toward natural and conflict-free prolongations of the "logics" of primary socialization.[4] They strive always to preserve and root full affirmation of that attitude towards the world transmitted via the pattern of secondary socialization, namely, of identification, "enthusiastic" presence and participation in this world. Clearly, such pedagogical systems wish to achieve the results of "strictly secondary" socialization with a smooth adaptation of the individual's activity to the norms and standards of the world. This has its pathology in the form of "a split identity" or prolonged "crisis of identity" resulting from efforts to divide radically the individual's public and private actions along with their respective spheres with a corresponding reduction of the problem of individual autonomy and critical competence in the private sphere. The "logic" of strictly secondary socialization contains a very special principle, namely, the "split world." This principle consists in recognizing as natural a strict demarcation between the public and private sections of the world. Thus, one radically counterpoises the ways of organizing the "internal" world of the individual with its expression in actions, on the one hand, and the "external world" as the social environment of the individual, with its collectively imposed and controlled modes of acceptable behavior, on the other hand. The division is carried out by opposition between, on the one hand, recognition of the right of an individual to autonomy in thinking and private opinions (which are "kept to himself,") and, on the other hand, the need for close regulation of his behavior and actions in public, that is, among other people and with authorities and institutions. On the basis of this division, in the "public" world one would be obliged to respect various "public" rules of the social game which might not necessarily be consonant with what the individual believes, and which could not and should not be questioned in openly articulated individual disagreement.

From the point of view of education this principle of division reflects a type of socialization according to which the basic institutional request is reduced only in order to prepare the individual in his "public" behavior to respect, that is, to obey, definite positions despite lack of emotional engagement or, if the emotions are negative, independently of them. Within such a framework an individual is considered to have the right not to admit such positions to that part of his identity which constitutes his self-conception, while at the same time he is urged to subordinate his individual world of action to such positions as a prerequisite for institutional approval.

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[4] As I noted, the traditional and, in its humanism, sentimental version of pedagogy suggests a need to make school so nice and attractive to the children that they will "love" it. However, one should not overlook a certain discontinuity in types of identification which remain at the basis of the distinction between primary socialization in the family and the secondary one. The roles which the child meets in school become much more general and partial. Berger and Luckmann were right in indicating that as a prerequisite for successful socialization, a child is supposed to love its parents, but not its teacher.

An historical illustration might be found in the institutional surveillance and persecution by the Church Inquisition which interfered not only with one’s world of behavior but also into one’s sphere of thought and emotion, subjecting these to the canon of strictly standardized "role identity." This can be interpreted as an essential destruction of one’s individual emotional privacy through its strict external surveillance by the institutional claim of the Holy Office to a privileged, indeed, to the only normatively valid standard of behavior, as well as of thinking and of emotional engagement. The same idea of the "public" destruction of privacy has been applied repeatedly by G. Orwell in his vision of the "thought police" in 1984. Paradoxically, any such destruction means also a total (because totalitarian) reduction of the public sphere to the logic of "blind" and "naked" power: sooner or later executors share equally the fate of their former victims. Stalinist practice has shown that under such circumstances even an individual’s renunciation of his or her rights or of any aspiration to present in "public" his or her own emotions and feelings--even open devotion to ideals articulated officially--does not help much. For the destruction of the private is linked with a pathological replacement of the "public" by an automatic, cold-blooded and narrow-minded logic of instrumentally eliminating any risks there might be to power in their remaining beyond control a sphere of autonomy in thought--not to mention in actual deed.

Socialization and Critique

It is important to note that the relationship between the public and private sphere can be characterized differently depending upon the type of socialization which dominates in a given social context. Here I shall try to be more specific regarding the notions of "primary," "strictly secondary" and "critical" types of socialization which were introduced above.

Within the framework of primary socialization the two spheres seem not to be separated from each other; the principal mechanism of the adaptation of the individual to his environment is based upon a logic of the symbiosis of a given life with the world, treated almost instinctively as the only one possible. Within the framework of strictly secondary socialization, however, one can distinguish these spheres; it is possible to perceive their separateness and even that some collision of the two is natural and not easy to eliminate. At the same time, however, one is faced with indications that successful adaptation of an individual within and following the logic of such a framework is characterized by consciously renouncing individual claims to autonomy and subjectivity in action, except in the exclusively private sphere. On the other hand, this means automatic subordination of self to the power of other institutional "instances" which define the principles of "public" life and thus what behavior will be permissible. At this level of the logic of the public-private relationship an "immature" attitude is thought to be characterized by "strictly secondary" behavior which embodies "role identity"; the scope of the "humanistic" attitude of public institutions is reduced to tolerance, that is, to a declared or actual readiness to respect an individual’s private sphere, namely, one’s feelings, aspirations and identity. This respect extends so far as has been codified in judicial and symbolic conventions taken as legitimate and unquestioned in society. Though they are without a specific source, they are obligatory for all.

The basis for identifying a separated level of "critical" socialization beyond the framework of the strictly secondary one is that post-conventional individual development (as well as that of institutions in society) does not presuppose a radical counterposition of the public and private sphere. The demarcation of the public from the private, which is so characteristic of strict secondariness in socialization, does not obtain within the new horizon of identity at the post-conventional level. This division loses its legitimacy since the individuals preserve their autonomy and subjectivity regarding their activities in the world. This enables one to influence the style and scale of public rules in one's private world; it enables one also to verify and eventually even to reject the validity claims put forward by institutions and advocates of the "public" world and its *ethos* of fixed moral, ideological and organizational conventions. The level of critical socialization, with its new claims of individual subjectivity, can be coordinated naturally with the post-conventional functioning of the social world. Only for a world organized in a "conventional" way does such critical socialization constitute a dangerous challenge through attempting to execute strict secondariness in role identity.

At the post-conventional level "critical" attitudes towards the world cease to be dysfunctional since there all group and social activity is founded upon engaging individuals in the creation of collectively recognized rules. Collective groupings are constituted through a practical recognition of the autonomy and subjectivity of their members. Such a post-conventional community in an allegedly exclusively private or even intimate sphere of individuals is valuable, and at times even required for the destruction of those blockages which render the individual helpless in the face of vital problems--where a post-conventional or personal community cannot be replaced by mere collective therapy.

In view of such relations between public and private, neither a symbiosis prior to reflection fusing the private with the public (prior to the dilemmas of autonomy), nor a strict demarcation splitting the world into two in congruent variants of rationality and meaning can provide an appropriate solution. That would require reciprocal interpenetration, which is indispensable for the transformation and constitution of each of the two spheres. This alone constitutes the prerequisites for critical socialization. This cannot be reduced to strictly secondary socialization without abandoning the promotion of those advanced modes of humanism required to strengthen both individual development and social advancement.

These comments need further careful analysis and explanation. The penetrability and plasticity of the reciprocal influences of the public and private spheres should not mean complete transparency one to another. "Public" transparency of the private sphere would mean its complete destruction for it would destroy the vitally needed intimacy beyond undesirable intrusion. On the other hand, private transparency of the public sphere would also be destructive for it would mean that according to the typically "enlightenment" illusion of reason the individual would be reduced constantly to the patterns of universal, rather than individual, reason. Secondly, one must keep in mind the fact that this penetrability may be characteristic of anomic regression in behavior when one mixes what is private and public in the roles played by a given individual; "performing a public role may have as its aim taking care of strictly private interests, taking upon oneself a private role may often happen *pro bono publico*."[5] In such cases both spheres penetrate each other in such a way that their functional distinction in expressing individual autonomy and subjectivity is destroyed.

An important issue which clarifies the implications of the analysis of society in terms of the quality of the "public sphere" is the legitimization of the system of power. Habermas notes that when wide sections of society concentrate their commitments within the private sphere, with a simultaneous withdrawal from participation in the public sphere--even when a certain autonomy in representing one’s individual will and interest, is allowed for--the system becomes almost exclusively one of "negative" legitimacy based upon the depolitization of the public sphere and leading eventually to a decline of the formation of "radical-democratic will."[6]

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[5] Cf. Miroslawa Marody, "Antynomie spolecznej swiadomosci" (Antinomies of Social Consciousness), *Odra* (no. 1, 1987), 4-9.

This observation should be emphasized as a "strategic" point for contemporary thought regarding critical socialization, since it sensitizes us to the complicated and even contradictory nature of the task and methods for regaining "political subjectivity." In Habermas’ view this cannot be carried out effectively by traditional means of political struggle. In highly developed societies Habermas observes even a vanishing of critical potential for the public sphere as a result of the means and contents of mass communication and the "logic" of political party systems. Along with the "colonization of the life world," Habermas identifies a sort of "refeudalization of the public sphere" through "private interest groups which more or less openly fulfill political functions, directly negotiate with public authorities, and manipulate to exclude citizens from effective participation in the decision-making processes."[7]

In this context the ideal of "undistorted" communication "free from domination" becomes also a criteria for identifying the pathologies of social life which deprive people of the capacity to control the conditions of their own life.

Habermas’ fundamental thesis on the decline in the authentically public sphere, with its critical function of mediating through free social discourse the degree of independence and alienation of political institutions, increases the challenge to revitalize this sphere. This is particularly so since, as noted by H. Giroux,[8] radical social transformation through education depends especially upon the quality of the public sphere, namely, its ability to enable individuals to acquire the competence and will for actual engagement with civil courage. If the school is to embody these opportunities and safeguard itself against degradation to the level of a simple instrument for reproducing a rejected, unchallenged or neglected political system, then it must commit itself to the practice of restoring political subjectivity through creating alternative possibilities for discourse wherever possible. The task is especially difficult since it must include a radical social option rejecting the deprivation of the right to active participation by all. Moreover, the need for continuing reflection and for initiatives which inspire and integrate critical activity is challenging in view of Habermas’ supposition that the traditional means of education for the formation of citizens and other cultural identities have ceased to be effective and must themselves be modified.

Education and the Quality of Public Life

Among various criticisms of the school and of educational systems, one which slowly is coming to the fore concerns primarily their lack of any clear reference to the quality of their social environment, its mechanisms and logic. This is not just a question of replacing purely "internal" criticisms of education concerned with the work in the classroom by its "external" counterpart. For then one would take as the starting point the school’s "reproductive" role in strengthening the inequalities and injustice which exist between social classes in terms of their political power or access to "cultural" capital. What is at stake here is rather an effort to search for new categories and attitudes which make it possible to overcome the traditional internal-external opposition and to establish a perspective in which both contexts are not only interconnected, but interrelated in a dynamic and evolutionary relationship. This relationship must be represented by a theory of education which, on the one hand, will be able to refer to the quality of the process of the individual’s psychological development and, on the other hand, will leave room for reference to the quality of the evolution of society. Such a theory of education can no longer be merely a reduced traditional pedagogy, just as it should not be dissolved within the broader discussion of the political and other institutional mechanisms influencing the schools. What is needed is a kind of educational and pedagogical philosophy practically and theoretically rooted in a psychological and sociological understanding of the potential and actual conditioning which takes place in education. I do not suggest that such a perspective already has been elaborated, but it is possible to indicate some of its elements.

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[6] Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Kultur und Kritik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), quoted from the Italian edition,*Cultura e critica* (Torino: Einaudi, 1980), 71, 74.

[7] Cf. Nicola Paoli, note in *Cultura e Critica*, 283.

[8] Cf. Henry A. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance*.

Such a radical theory of education would contain the following. First, a realistic and profound criticism of the foundations of education and a humanization of the contents of the curriculum and of interpersonal relationships within the school. Second, extension of authentic participation to teachers and parents as institutionally respected subjects in stimulating the development of the personal potential of the young and promoting their access to diversified and universal cultural contexts. Third, preparation of young people to contribute intellectual and emotional dynamism to society and, with imagination and commitment, to push back the limits of what hitherto has been possible. That is, not merely to find a place for themselves in the world, but to contribute to the realization of a world in which one can find a fitting place.

All these tasks are beyond the reach of education unless it is seen within a theoretical analysis and practical transformation of the mechanisms and structures of the social world perceived in terms of the actual and potential tensions between social aspirations and institutional barriers. Thus, criticism concerning education becomes possible primarily as criticism directed towards society: pedagogy cannot be perceived outside of critical social theory.

It is important to stress also for philosophical analysis that the climate and success of education is effected by the lack of social approval of individuality representing autonomous thinking and valuing, by institutional disempowerment of civil courage, as well as by hesitancy to respect and appreciate social initiatives contrary to claims of political monopoly. Practical exclusion of wide sectors of culture and its heritages from the overall social debate, as well as a monopolizing of the search for the solution of contemporary problems and dilemmas deprive educational institutions of the ability to function in promoting and disseminating the competencies needed to deal with such challenges. Sanctioned by solemn ritual, replete with superficial phraseology and carried out under administrative pressure and control, "structural exclusion" of education from concern with public issues cuts the roots of its basic social function and dooms it to a kind of social schizophrenia. Dwelling on a fictitious world, it promotes cynicism and anomic reactions, is deprived of norms and values beyond those of egoistic privacy, and is aggressively opposed to or neglects the rights of others. One can easily observe how the blockade upon the subjectivity of both teachers and pupils in the official everyday life of the schools and, most of all, the dysfunctional character of all nonconformist behavior in "official" institutions create a mechanism which represses interests and commitments and promotes compensation, apathy or aggression against the world. Often they push one towards marginalization in search of privacy, towards counter-cultural self-identification and behavior, or simply beyond the frontiers of accepted reality. The drama of the emigration of tens of thousands of the young in the 80s had much to do with their refusal and incapacity to give shape to their private identities in a world whose public life neither invited, nor sufficiently tolerated, nor created prospects for individual vitality.

Education and the Principle of Minimum Authority

The public-private relationship and its involvement in processes of education can be illustrated in terms of Jürgen Habermas' theory, by relating it to his "universal pragmatics" linked with the so-called "validity claims" present in all communication, namely, the claims to a clear linguistic expression, the claim to a truthful attitude in communicating content and, finally, the claim to a justified normative stand. Without entering into the details of this conception, let us note one of its implications. A successful process of communication contributes toward agreement, mutual affirmation and acceptance of the form and contents represented, together with their normative implications. This is possible provided there exists between the partners involved in the process a relation which embodies the principle of minimum communicational authority attributing to both sides in communication the "ability to present acceptable arguments."[9]

Only under such a condition can there exist readiness for meaningful communicative interaction, namely, listening attentively, considering profoundly, trusting and thinking through the train of reasoning and its force and, in consequence, following this agreement in one's own actions.

Of course, the "validity claims" and the acceptability of arguments can be better perceived when contrasted with the eventual dangers of distortion in communication and of blocked interaction. Let us presume an extreme example. Let us suppose a case in which within the educational process the principle of minimum authority does not obtain so that there is at least a partial rejection of what has been offered. The teacher or parent shares the normative engagement of the recipients, and fully approves and affirms them as subjects. In particular, their offer is linked with the most sincere intention of respecting the subjectivity and autonomy of the recipients. Nevertheless, the students do not accept in this sense what is offered. All this may happen when the teacher as person or the school as an institution shapes its axiological orientation with reference to the values recognized by the pupils and when other elements in Habermas' validity claims are fulfilled objectively as well. Thus, though the offer is sincere, it is not treated as such--it is not credible; the content of the offer is true, but the recipients are not ready to treat it as such or to check it objectively; the linguistic code is clear verbally, but its form is not appreciated.

To illustrate the last gap between an objective state and its subjective status one may recall the example of Orwellian "newspeak," where the Ministry of War was actually called the "Ministry of Peace." In Poland an analogical term for newspeak, "nowomowa," was identified earlier by sociologist Jan Strzelecki[10] with a "lyrical" model of socialism and its political language. Sometimes the very sound of such verbal structures in an educational setting was treated with hostility and blocked any agreement. We were thus confronted with a situation in which there is a certain rupture between the formal side of the process and its subjective and emotional perception by one of the parties. Cases of negation of the principle of minimum communicative authority, e.g., in family, in the crisis of adolescence, in school--in fact, much more often and more naturally than one would be inclined to believe--illustrate beyond doubt that one's objective intentions and the orientation of one's engagement are not themselves decisive for the processes of education or identity formation.

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[9] Cf. Carl Freidrich, *Tradition and Authority* (London, 1972).

[10] Cf. Jan Strzelecki, "Historia jako wcielenie wartosci" (History as Embodiment of Values), *Odra* (no. 11, 1982), 13-17; "Socjalizmu model liryczny" (Lyrical Model of Socialism), *Odra* (no. 1-8, 1982), 23-27; "Propozycje jezyka lirycznego": Model socjalizmu (Proposals for a Lyrical Language: The Model of Socialism), *Teksty* (no. 1, 1981), 31-54 (all texts in Polish).

The formal analysis of such a model leads to conclusions which are quite paradoxical from a traditional pedagogical perspective, although they are supported by the empirical findings of sociology and social psychology. They can be expressed as the social costs of an educational process taking place under the conditions of at least partial rejection of the educational offer. The most essential phenomenon is the lessened inclination in the recipients to respect in their activity the norms and values they had accepted previously, but which now are considered as an integral part of what has been rejected and are treated as representative for the refused offer and its source. There emerges a phenomenon of ejecting from one's own world of action values which previously had been accepted. In more universal terms this phenomenon can be described, as with Erik H. Erikson,[11] as "negative identity" which entails the risk of manifest behavior emotionally affirming an alien ethos which might be preferred over a violently rejected social offer. In fact, this is actually self-aggressive and self-destructive, since the individual looks for roots in norms and values which are alien to his basic emotional sensitivity. Thus, one experiences a process of expropriation from values, not eliminating them totally from one's individual self-concept, but imposing limits on their presence in one's own activities in the surrounding world. There may emerge a cynical attitude towards the very values belonging to one's own decalogue; though a sort of "axiological residuum" remains, it is manifest only within an ever more reduced area of individual activity and relationship with the social environment. It may even blunt sensitivity towards one's proper internalized values to such a point that the individual concerned will no longer consider activities as of value or as making sense once they are perceived as having been affirmed by the source of the educational offer that has been emotionally rejected.

Implications of such considerations for educational theory are drastic, even if treated as an empirical hypothesis. This is due to the fact that no matter what kind of pedagogical intent and humanistic message animates the education, as a result of carrying it out without satisfying the minimum of communicational authority described above, one may face a reduction of axiological emotivity and sensitivity on the part of the subjects concerned at the lowest levels of individual identity, typical of anomic adaptation or traumatic reactions. Eventually there can remain a sort of axiological residuum in one's personal identity, i.e., the ability to recognize a certain set of values in one's self-conception without manifesting these values or actively defending them in one's individual actions--which are dominated instead by interest, profit and cynicism.

In society the coexistence of these personal values with powerfully opposed institutions leads to these institutions ceasing to be considered as valuable. Therefore there arise widespread counter-cultural reactions against the social environment perceived as hostile. Ostentatious affirmation of norms and values neither recognized in the educational environment nor internalized as integral components of the subjects of such reaction become typical. The danger linked with such negative identifications is that both the affirmed groups, e.g., youth gangs or rock fans, and the rejected part of society, may push such an individual into irreversible compensatory commitments or at least make the drastic and little intended consequences of one's temporary gestures decisive for one's entire life.

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[11] I have analyzed thoroughly this concept in the first monographic study in Poland devoted to Erikson, cf. Leck Witkowski, *Rozwoj i tozsamosc w cyklu zycia: Studium koncepcji Erika H. Eriksona* (Development and Identity in the Life Cycle: A Study of This Conception by Erik H. Erikson), (Torun: UMK, 1989).

Although there has been no direct reference to the public-private dilemma here, it too can be stated in these terms. Namely, approaching education from a communicative point of view we wanted to suggest that the private world of the individual is influenced negatively by the "public" efforts to offer him values. This is so even when they are derived from a highly humanistic tradition, if there does not exist even a minimum authority principle to support the process of communication. One has to take into account the real phenomenon of resistance or of striving to sabotage cooperation in the educational process by the recipients of the transmitted message.[12] Not only does this lead to formal rejection of the content of the message, but the whole process becomes destructive of the private world of the individual, including his axiological stand.

The only way out of this situation would seem to consist in establishing real public spheres integrated with education where there will be a chance for an individual publicly to articulate his values without the obligation to split one's own identity into the "official" or publicly manifested and the hidden or "true" face, manifested only in the most private circumstances. Under their socio-political conditions, for a very long time young Poles and their teachers had to face the challenge of such a situation. The school, often identified with a rejected ideology or authorities, became an integral part of an alien world constituting a barren process of intellectually and emotionally superficial efforts. "To go to school" meant to "play a role," to pretend to be there in order to work and to profit from it, while presence in school had become not only unfruitful, but often destructive and irreversibly demoralizing.[13] It seems obvious then that if its function is to be something other than killing the vitality of subsequent younger generations, education of itself cannot be an effective instrument of any social system imposed by a power contrary to the cultural heritage of the society.

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*This text uses some sections from the author's book in Polish, *Tozsamosc i zmiana. Wstep do epistemologicznej analizy kontekstow edukacyjnych* (Identity and Transformation. Introduction to the Epistemological Analysis of Educational Contexts), (Torun: UMK, 1988). The basic inspiration and the point of reference is the critical social theory of Jürgen Habermas and some basic knowledge concerning this theory is taken for granted. In particular one might consult Habermas' *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979). This is linked here with the reference to Lawrence Kohlberg's vertical structure of "levels" of moral development, interpreted by Habermas in terms of preconventional, conventional and post-conventional types of symbolic organization, with their characteristic discontinuities of transition and basic "logic" of development. Much is owed also to the analysis of types of socialization processes by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in their *The Social Construction of Reality* (Polish edition; Warszawa: P.W., 1983). Cf. also Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education. A Pedagogy for the Opposition* (South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey,

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[12] This idea goes beyond Pierre Bourdieu's conception of "transmission of social inequalities" by culture. The evolution of the "new sociology of education" beyond Bourdieu's conception is discussed in Henry A. Giroux, "Theories of Reproduction and Resistance in the New Sociology of Education: A Critical Analysis," *Harvard Educational Review*, 53 (1983), 257-293.

[13] Cf. Zbigniew Kwiecinski, "Szkola jako wcwiczanie w kulture pozornego wysilku. Studium przypadku" (School as Training Into the Culture of Apparent Effort: A Case Study), *Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny* (no. 3, 1987), 49-70.

1983).

Chapter VII

Public and Private in the Field of Education

George F. McLean

As a focus for a people's struggle to work out its personal commitments and its common strivings, the field of education holds a special place. Its concern is with the people's most passionately held treasure, namely, its children. It is a field in which common effort is required in the realization of the people's most deeply held values and their most concrete goals. All converge here: past and future, value and realization, person and community--and hence all our efforts both private and public.

In approaching this topic, it is important to avoid falling into a dichotomy which itself reflects the dilemma into which the Western world had fallen by the beginning of the last century. In that dichotomy 'private' is taken simply as a code word for an untrammeled individualism or liberalism, while public bespeaks any impersonal common structure. This has been the context, if not the cause, of the polarization which has paralyzed our societies in this century.

Hence, it is important that reactions against overemphasis upon the public not simply accept the premises of this polarization, and thereby find themselves with no place to go but an equal overemphasis upon the 'private'. Past experience teaches us that in time this will lead back to the public, and hence to the private, etc., in a bitter and destructive dialectic. We need instead to understand something of the historical context of the educational horizons in which we live and work, to learn from our experience the deeper causes of success in this effort, and then proceed to search out new and more adequate ways to conceptualize the project of education for the future.

In this light I would like to look then at two main points: first, the historical background of this issue with special reference to North America and the original Anglo-Saxon heritage of its institutions; second, the recent studies on the effectiveness of private, specifically Catholic, schools. The conclusion will draw one implication of these studies for national educational polity.

Historical Evolution of the Public Dimensions of Education in the U.S.

The history of this issue goes back, of course, to Plato and his *Republic*, which remains the classic work on education and the life of the *polis*. The human search as a whole, that is, the search for the good life, is dependent upon the quality of the society which, in turn, depends upon its leadership. Good leadership, however, depends upon the education of the leaders which must reflect the dimensions of the soul and the corresponding dimensions of knowledge. Society then depends upon education, and from Plato onward this mode of understanding and responding to the general issue had been central to the community of efforts in the West.

The roots of the tension between private and public were there also in Plato, for: (a) if the levels of knowledge as described in the simile of the line and the allegory of the cave were attained sequentially and only some of the populace were to be trained to the highest level, namely, that of wisdom; and (b) if that wisdom is needed to direct the broad spectrum of such formative dimensions of life as law, athletics, drama and architecture, then (c) the few wise persons must rule all those areas of one’s life. In this realm of the philosopher king the private is lost; all must be public. Indeed, a mother is to look upon her child only in terms of the state.[1]

The sharper edges of his abstract model were modified by Plato himself, while the influence of Aristotle and of Christianity would do much to bring forward the significance of the concrete and then of the personal, if not the private. In modern times especially in the Anglo-Saxon cultural areas we experience an opposite tide first radicalizing the individual and then flowing from the private to the public. Thus, in the 15th century, nominalism converted the notion of the personal to the much more radically individualistic notion of ‘private’, which, in turn, generated a new and more radical evolution of ‘public’ in a move so pervasive as to redefine the metaphysical, epistemological and psychological horizons of Europe and North America. Concretely, with a view to affirming the freedom of the divine will, even vis-a-vis the divine intellect, nominalism affirmed that all resulted from absolute, unique and unrelated acts of the divine will. There was then no common nature for humans, or indeed for any beings: each was simply single. There is no basis in reality for universal terms or statements: each instance was simply unique. Nor was there any inner basis for community: the task of all social arrangements was simply to defend the nuclear, unknowable and unrelated center that was the single self. All then was private: the public would be its servant.

In the Anglo-Saxon tradition this orientation built politically upon the *Magna Carta*. In the United States, due to its revolutionary history this was reinforced by a deep collective rejection of an insensitive and remote political authority. To this has corresponded the effort to delimit the rights of any subsequent central government in order to guard watchfully against its intrusion into local or private life. Particularly in education in the U.S., this has been reflected in the basic and pervasive principle that education at the primary and secondary levels was to be under the control of elected local school boards. Until after World War II higher education too was massively a private affair.

Even today this remains true in many basic ways. The accreditation of colleges and universities, and hence the public recognition of their degrees, is carried out, not by the government, but by regional accrediting associations formed and managed entirely by the institutions themselves. College entrance exams are the work of an entirely independent entity. Professional academic associations are formed simply by the determination of their members, with no governmental registration or even legal incorporation, unless this latter is sought for financial reasons. The publication of textbooks is carried out by private companies--though adoption of these by public schools can be financially decisive.

In this there is, of course, a crucial public interest. In a democracy, where the direction of public affairs is ultimately the responsibility of its citizens, the broad development of their understanding is crucial. This was noted by Thomas Jefferson, one of the Founding Fathers of the nation: "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."[2] Thus, he proposed a system of schooling for Virginia which would assure for everyone the right to basic education and provide the more capable with advanced schooling.

The goals Jefferson stated for primary and higher education are as follows:

I. Primary Education.

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[1] Plato, *Republic*, 460.

[2] Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Charles Yancey, January 6, 1816, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Putnam, 1892-1899), X, 4.

To give to every citizen the information he needs for the transaction of his own business;

To enable him to calculate for himself, and to express and preserve his ideas, his contracts and accounts, in writing;

To improve, by reading, his morals and faculties;

To understand his duties to his neighbors and country, and to discharge with competence the functions confided to him by either;

To know his rights; to exercise with order and justice those he retains; to choose with discretion the fiduciary of those he delegates; and to notice their conduct with diligence, with candor, and judgment;

And, in general, to observe with intelligence and faithfulness all the social relations under which he shall be placed.

II. Secondary Education.

To form the statesmen, legislators and judges, on whom public prosperity and individual happiness are so much to depend;

To expound the principles and structure of government, the laws which regulate the intercourse of nations, those formed municipally for our own government, and a sound spirit of legislation, which, banishing all arbitrary and unnecessary restraint on individual action, shall leave us free to do whatever does not violate the equal rights of another;

To harmonize and promote the interests of agriculture, manufacturing and commerce, and by well informed views of political economy to give a free scope to the public industry;

To develop the reasoning faculties of our youth, enlarge their minds, cultivate their morals, and instill into them the precepts of virtue and order;

To enlighten them with mathematical and physical sciences, which advance the arts, and administer to the health, the subsistence, and comforts of human life;

And, generally, to form them to habits of reflection and correct action, rendering them examples of virtue to others, and of happiness within themselves.

Jefferson considered the schools themselves, however, to be but one part of the educational effort. The school was to provide skills and basic learning, but he saw education to be much broader and located it more in the general life of the people--in public libraries, lecture series and societies for farmers, for trades people and for artisans.

During the first decades of the 19th century a great fervor swept the country with a sense that the nation had a biblically inspired religious mission to establish a new dawn of freedom under God and that, broadly understood, the education of the citizen was an essential part thereof. Central to this movement, was the figure of Horace Mann, Secretary of the Massachusetts Educational Society, who focused upon the development of a public educational system. This idea was forcefully argued and spread gradually from the Northeast. It took some time to develop throughout the country and to extend to secondary education, and more recently even to higher levels. Primary and secondary public education obtained solid financial footing upon judicial recognition of property taxes as a legal source for their funding. From that time forward the development of a school board and school system became a major public concern for each city and town, while the standards or quality of the local school systems was the responsibility of the individual states. The school system then was public, but in a restricted sense, first because it was local in direction, and second because though this system was one of common schools, it was only one of the many formative influences in the molding of the citizenry, which was shaped even more by family, church, neighborhood and craft.

In this century John Dewey took a decisive step to expand the ambit of the public school system. With William James and others he had moved from the philosophical idealism which previously had characterized the North American mind and its educational establishment to a new empiricism and pragmatism. The idealist worldview and value system which had been the heart and mind--the driving inspiration and integrating vision--of education in the United States now made little sense to them. They had little choice but to become educational reformers.[3] Dewey may have read the situation too superficially, considering it to have been the industrial revolution and urbanization which undermined the cultural values of the people. In fact, the nation was facing the need also in the early part of this century to assimilate large numbers of immigrants coming from southern and eastern European countries. These were less related to the cultures of the earlier English and German settlers, and their religious cultures were relatively untouched by the new pragmatism and empiricism. Dewey looked to education, understood precisely in terms of schools, for an answer to the resulting problems of socialization and democratization--indeed, to resolve pretty much all problems in business, politics, social harmony, industry, and agriculture.

This had two major implications for the shift from private to public. First, through Dewey, both in educational theory and in curriculum planning, the school became the substitute for the informal education of the home, neighborhood and workplace. Indeed, in his *Democracy and Education,* Dewey began with early chapters on the education of the whole person, but by the middle of the work he had moved on to speaking of the school as the whole of education. His hope that all could be solved by education became so predominant in the American psyche that Lawrence Cremins in his Horace Mann Lecture of 1965 noted: "In other countries, when there is a profound social problem there is an uprising; in the United States, we organize a course!"[4]

As a result and secondly, though the original principle according to which education was a local responsibility was retained, the burgeoning size and bureaucratization of the schools diminished their personal character so that the persons engaged were no longer known and responded to. The public interest in education had insidiously transformed education into a largely public affair.

L. Cremins notes a disturbing and not unrelated development of the first half of this century which accompanied the development of mass communications. With the increasing concentration of people in urban centers, the vast increase in literacy and newspaper readership, and the development of films and radio, the stage was set for a new meaning of ‘public’ for the education of the people. This was pioneered at the direction of Hitler by Goebbels’ Ministry for Popular Education which he described as bringing "cinema, radio, new educational institutions, art, culture and propaganda" under one administration "to serve the purpose of building the intellectual-spiritual foundation of our power and of capturing not only the apparatus of the state but the people as a whole."[5]

Could Jefferson’s sense of education as a key to freedom be transformed into a means for its suppression? Perhaps, but in fact, Dewey’s basic orientation was quite the contrary. Just as the Greek emphasis upon the polis and the public ceded gradually to a more personal and thus communitary Christian vision, Dewey would attempt to fashion a vision that through being more communitary would be more personal and free. In *Democracy and Education* he noted that:

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[3] John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston: Beacon, 1957).

[4] Lawrence A. Cremins, *The Genius of American Education* (Horace Mann Lecture, 1965; Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965).

[5] Edward Y. Hartshorne, Jr., *The German Universities and National Socialism* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1937), 29-31.

> A Democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a form of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity. These more numerous and more varied points of contact . . . secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed as long as the incitations to action are partial.[6]

The key to this is described by him as "growth," that is, the "constant expansion of horizons and consequent formation of new purposes and new responses."[7] The goal of education then is to form not functionaries of society or of the state, but human beings who continue to take account of new experience, redefine their purposes accordingly and, in turn, modify their actions.[8]

The school system is public, but its purpose is to form individuals who can work together in a democracy. The emphasis then is not upon previously created insight or values; what is important is not the content of a science or the traditions of a people. The direction, as Margaret Mead noted, is not the vertical handing down from teacher to student of what in principle is past or even ancient; it is the lateral transmission or sharing of what is being experienced or discovered.[9] Lawrence Cremins put it thus:

> In the formal education system, we might abandon utilitarian trivia in favor of those experiences that place a premium on learning how to learn, so that students could go on learning even after they had left the schools. Outside the formal system, we might nurture those standards of taste and judgment that would lead the public to demand more numerous and extensive oases amidst the wastelands of commercial areas and entertainment. And in the society at large, we might some day come to demand of all our institutions that they exert a continuing educative influence on individuals. It is such policies, I think, that are patently implied when we commit ourselves to the worth and dignity of every human being.
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> In the last analysis, there is no more human view of education than as growth in understanding, sensibility, and character, and no more noble view of democracy than as the dedication of society to the lifelong education of all its members.[10]

Historical Role of the Private in U.S. Education

1. The history of education in the United States, as in many other countries, began from what today would be called private religious schools, though they have always provided a service to the community. Whether an Indian Pandit or a Christian apostle, the religious person has the sense

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[6] John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 101.

[7] *Ibid*., 206.

[8] *Ibid*., 60-62.

[9] Margaret Mead, "Thinking Ahead: Why is Education Obsolete?" *Harvard Business Review* (1958), 23-30.

[10] Cremins, 36-37.

that there is wisdom and understanding which goes beyond common sense and animal survival, that this has been received, unfolded and evolved in a community through time, that each person as such has the capacity and destiny to inspire his or her life with this truth and to transform thereby his or her community, and thus that there is a great and ultimately important educational project at the heart of every human life.

This is carried out in an integrated and holistic manner in the continuing cycle of the Christian liturgical year with its readings, preaching and ritual in which the person comes to live Christ. At this level of spiritual meaning, education and life are not two, but one. It could be expected then that the founding of public school systems would come long after religious schools, that the public schools would be notably religious in their character and values. As the United States was a vastly Protestant country in its beginnings, its schools were strongly Protestant in their vision. (It is interesting to note that at one point the famous McGuffey Reader was revised in order to correct it for an anti-Catholic bias.)

What would happen when larger numbers of non-Protestant immigrants began to arrive? Predictably, they would begin to develop a set of schools in which their own most deeply held vision and sense of life could be shared with their children and integrated into the formation of their new-world view and evolving social attitudes. Further, if the public school system was largely Protestant, then it would be the Catholics who would organize this alternate system.

A few small efforts were made to accommodate this development--Catholic schools were funded by New York for a short period in the early 1800s and a few Catholic public schools were developed in the Midwest. Very broad efforts, however, were made to deny any public funding to Catholic schools, and laws were enacted in the various states to exclude any such funding. (It would be interesting to investigate the reasons for the strikingly different policy of Britain and Canada).

Hence, the Third Council of Baltimore devoted 50 percent of its time to the school issue and made strong policy decisions: e.g., that each parish was to have begun its own school within two years and that every Catholic child was to be in a Catholic School. However, this broad goal proved infeasible, for education was simply too vast and increasingly costly an undertaking to be carried out without financing from public resources, which would not be forthcoming.

This public decision was made formally by court decisions proceeding to apply ever more stringently a supposed "wall of separation between Church and State." In this, however, the court seemed ultimately to be mirroring and implementing the growing secularization of life in our times. This led to a fairly consistent series of decisions against any form of public assistance to, or participation in, Catholic schools. Thus, for example, within the last ten years a promising initiative according to which remedial instruction would be provided by public school departments to children on the premises of Catholic schools was initiated by the legislature but overturned in the courts. As a result, any such instruction must be provided either in public buildings or in public vans parked outside Catholic Schools--neither of which is truly feasible for reasons of scheduling and/or costs.

This financial restriction combined with changing demographics which: (a) lowered the size of the family, (b) moved many Catholic families to the suburbs--and hence away from the Catholic schools built earlier and in urban areas--, and (c) notably reduced the number of Sisters whose teaching in these schools on a largely volunteer basis had made them financially feasible. This combination resulted in a notable lowering of the Catholic school population in the last two decades.

Correspondingly, at first in response to Catholic protests against Protestant religious content, a secularizing attitude in public life has eliminated the religious dimension of the content of public education and resulted in an educational environment of textbooks, instruction and ritual which, though not intentionally anti-religious, has been to a large degree intentionally godless. Many feel this to be disastrous when it comes to the development of a child's vision. A view of the world which is systematically without a religious dimension forms a person insensitive to religion; effectively it removes religion from the next generation. For this reason Fundamentalist churches have begun to take up the responsibility of educating their children in so-called "Christian Schools. "As a result, despite the decline in Catholic parochial schools, the number of students in private religious schools has remained fairly constant, moving to a near equivalency in the number of Catholic and Protestant school children. See Figures 1 and 2.

2. Perhaps more interesting for our purposes in this regard are the recent sociological studies on how private schools work. These studies have made it possible to determine in a controlled manner the reason for the success of these schools, particularly parochial schools, which have been very successful! Despite their limited finances these schools are more integrated, have lower drop-out rates, better test scores in some fields, higher growth rates, higher college entrance rates and higher success rates in college. Some would attribute this to an ability to select their students, but the results remain when controlled for family background, etc. Indeed, these schools are uniquely effective in slum areas. Hence, at the present time the original mission of the common school (see below) is being better fulfilled in the private religious schools than in the public schools.

The field of private education had not previously been the subject of much research. In the last ten years this has changed due to a convergence of liberal interest in how these schools achieve their results among disadvantaged and high risk students, with conservative interest in how a value system works in an educational environment.

A major source of information was the 1980 study, "The High School and Beyond" which covered sophomores (30,000) and seniors (28,000) from 1000 schools, 84 of which were Catholic. To this have been added follow-up studies in 1982, 1984 and 1986, to provide a national longitudinal data base.

This data was analyzed in 1981 by James Coleman, Thomas Hoffer and Sally Kilgore in *High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared*. Even controlling for differences in family background, their study showed that Catholic schools provided a more orderly environment, and that their students had higher attendance rates, took more rigorous subjects, did more homework, and progressed faster. These findings were confirmed by Andrew Greeley in his*Catholic High Schools and Minority Students* in 1981.

In 1987 Coleman and Hoffer carried their earlier studies further in *Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of Communities* with the help of the longitudinal data which had become available in the years since their 1981 study. Their premise is that the determining factor is the social organization of the schools along with the related communities and families. Where these are functional and well-integrated the parents know their children's friends and the parents of these friends; the teachers also know the parents. In this situation the school can complement the family in the process of socialization, and concurrence in values contributes to achievement both by teachers and students.

Central to Coleman's work is the notion of "social capital," the network between persons that facilitates productive activity; for the school this is the relations between parents, teachers and students just described. Social capital can be found both in the family and in the community. In the former it could be lacking due to either structural deficiency as when one member of the family is absent, or due to functional deficiency as when communication is poor between family members. In a community social capital is had when parents of the children in a class know each other and share common values.

In this framework, Coleman and Hoffer were able to locate the source of the social capital of Catholic schools in the deeper bonds of their religious community. In this, Catholic schools have a distinct advantage over public and other private schools. The latter act for parents who do not form a community among themselves. The public schools often cannot act as agents of the community because their students come from a variety of unrelated neighborhoods (especially due to busing); nor can they act as agents of the family due to the prevalence of broken homes, confused values and educational goals.

Coleman and Hoffer explain also the success of Catholic schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods. A child from a home with low social capital can supplement this with social capital from the religious community which sponsors the school. Thus, a child from a single parent family is no more liable to drop out than is a child of a two parent family; in contrast, in a public school such a child would be twice as likely to drop out.

Studies by the National Catholic Educational Association have confirmed the findings of Greeley and Coleman and clarified further the distinctly religious roots of the social capital of parochial schools, determining that in Catholic schools religiousness and parental involvement were important indicators of success. Social class was also an indicator, but to a much lesser degree than in public schools.

The Schools--Private: Public:: Person: Community

Throughout the long debate on public and private in schooling there has been a continuing thread, namely, the notion of the common school. It has been held high as a democratic and egalitarian ideal, and it has been brought down in forceful blows upon those who would fail to conform, whether for religious, racial or language reasons.

For Dewey it was the essential meeting place to share different experiences and learn new things. For others it became increasingly bland, value-free, and then godless in a ‘least common denominator approach’ to pluralism.

Perhaps today we have the possibility of new approaches. The developing sensibility to cultures, their uniqueness and their indispensable contributions to human life may make it possible to look afresh at the issue.

To do that, however, it will be necessary to overcome the deep and typical dilemma of our century, namely, that between individualism and communalism. The former leaves one so centered upon oneself that the other can be looked upon only in a utilitarian perspective as a source of one’s own betterment; the former is so centered upon the common that there is no real room for the unique, the free and the creative.

The studies cited above on the success of Catholic schools point to something of the deepest importance, namely, that the roots for mediating private and public education are religious. This foundation in the infinite and the absolute leaves full range for all, while uniting, inspiring and moving each; it provide the basis for inalienable personal freedom and dignity, while relating this essentially to others in community. The resulting open notion of person in relation to community, and vice versa, constitutes an essentially improved step beyond individualism and communalism, beyond the closed notion of the ‘private’ and the impersonal realm of the ‘public’. It makes possible creative progress in our times on the issue of public and private in education.

For this to have its effect in these times of ever more technically structured time it has been necessary to evolve a more adequate philosophical understanding of the person, integrating the roots of objective human dignity with the creative subjectivity of our times; an integrated theory of psychological development with room not only for justice but for the concrete dimensions of love, gender differences and story-telling; a social dimension capable of integrating critical analysis with constructive harmony; and a pedagogical theory that understands the school as a place of moral growth related to the community. This research has been carried out under the auspices of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy by a set of coordinated teams of philosophers, psychologists, moral scientists and educators from north and south America. This is being extended through additional volumes or moral education--Asian and other traditions. Much has been done; much remains to be done in mining, modernizing and mobilizing the resources of our multiple traditions for the basic task of every society, the education of its children.[11]

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[11] Philosophical Foundation of Moral Education and Character Development; Psychological Foundation of moral Education and Character Development: An Integrated Theory of Moral Development; and Character Development in Schools and Beyond (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992).

Chapter IX

Religiousness in the Public and Private Lives of Poles

Wladyslaw Piwowarski

Both ordinary observation and the results of sociological research point to a growth of religiousness in Polish society in the 1980s. In this regard one may put forward several questions: Is it a quantitative or a qualitative growth? Does it tend to strengthen religious life or only social-nationality? Is it connected with the acceptance of religion as a personal and experienced value, or as the common good of the nation? Is it connected only with what is public, or also with the private? Certainly, it will be difficult to give an adequate answer to the above questions in the light of sociological research. Nevertheless, it is important to search for such answers in order to understand the power and character of Polish religiousness.

From the sociological point of view, religiousness is a socio-cultural phenomenon, i.e., a social fact revealed in the consciousness and life of individuals and human groups. This means that sociology deals with religiousness as manifested in the processes of communication, interaction and social groups. This important aspect of scientific research into religion does not exclude, but even assumes, investigating religion in other aspects. Undoubtedly, it does not exclude the influence of grace on the religious life of the believers.

Religiousness means here a system of beliefs which embraces man’s everyday experience while pervading and giving a general sense to all domains of his activity.[1] In this definition we may distinguish three basic parameters: a) everyday experience, b) religious culture, and c) religious activities. Experience lies at the basis of the second and third parameters and constitutes the domain of the research of such other sciences as phenomenology and psychology. Generally, it is assumed that there is only one human experience but that this experience is multidimensional, i.e., that it embraces many domains of reality. Among these, two that are basic are sacred reality (*sacrum*) and profane reality (*profanum*); consequently, we can speak of two basic experiences: religious and secular. The first is oriented upon the Higher Power which presents itself to the faithful as "tremendum and fascinosum," reveals to them its will, and calls upon them to submit themselves to it. This is the meaning of religion, i.e., knowing, recognizing and submitting oneself to God’s will.

The second experience is oriented to "this world"; this means that it excludes the religious point of view in evaluating man, life and the world. Thus, by religious culture here is meant a set of convictions, values and symbols which convey a total sense to the faithful, that is, to people who experience non-empirical reality. Finally, religiousness is the reality of the *sacrum*. It can be individual and collective, which, in turn, can be mass and interactional activities. Only interactional activities which contain a consciousness of mutual values and aims constitute a basis of religious fellowship and association.

It follows from what we have said that religiousness is closely connected with a religious experience: it is rooted in a person, and above all it constitutes a personal and experienced value. In case of lack of religious experience, one can speak about outer, environmental and cultural religiousness. The sociology of religion appreciates the importance of religious experience, yet it concentrates, first of all, on religious culture and religious activities.

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[1] Cf. P. Berger, Th. Luckmann, "Secularization and Pluralism," *Internationales Jahrbuch für Religionssoziologie* (Opladen: Köln Univ., 1966), 75.

On the basis of much research on Polish religiousness, one can accept the distinction between two levels of its functioning in society, namely, the public level ("the faith of the nation") and the private level ("the religion of life").

The difference between these two levels in Polish society is based on a general hypothesis, which makes it possible to direct further descriptions and analyses, that is: religiousness in Poland preserves its continuity and remains on a high level. It increases in some circumstances, but only on the public level. On the private level, religiousness undergoes considerable changes which tend in different directions, but most of all toward selectivity.

Religiousness in Public Life

This kind of religiousness can be operational through so-called "global professions of faith."[2] This parameter was introduced to the sociology of religion by L. Dingemans and J. Remy, who did not attach to it great importance. From the positive point of view, this parameter indicates one's affiliation with a religious group; from the negative point of view it indicates weaning from the traditions of one's ancestors. Its authors did not rightly value the indicative function of this parameter.

Within the framework of global professions of faith, usually two autodeclarations are taken from those asked to describe their attitudes towards faith and religious observances. These autodeclarations possess a subjective character, nevertheless they make it possible to uncover the structure of the opinions of the entire Polish population. The following centers provide this information: Public Opinion Research Center, Social Opinion Research Center and the Institute of the Philosophy and Sociology of Religion of The Polish Academy of Science (PAN).

Both indices of the autoidentification with faith and religious observances are high and are characterized by stability over a long period of time. As far as autoidentification with faith is concerned a considerable percentage of people in Poland claim to be profound believers (*ca* 20 percent). Profound faith is not always identified with intense religiousness because, as has been proven by more thorough investigations, these Catholics who claim to be profound believers very often have in mind a traditional and emotional attachment to "the faith of their fathers." Their faith is profound in the sense of being strongly rooted in tradition, especially family tradition, and of continuity within the framework of religious socialization in the family. The index of believers is also high (*ca* 70 percent).

The combined figure for believers and profound believers in 1960 was 83.8 percent for the village and 75.6 percent for the town. In 1984 the same index was 94.9 percent for the village and 87.2 percent for the town.[3] Both environments experienced a growth of religious attitudes, especially after 1980, of more than 11 percent. Those indicators establish that a generous majority of people in Poland are basically *sacrum* oriented and, what is more, search for meaning and identity in this sphere. The spread and affirmation of such an attitude points to the continuity of religiousness in both rural and urban environments; recently, there has been an increase in religiousness in big cities.

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[2] L. Dingemanns, J. Rèmy, "Kryteria zywotnosci katolicyzmu, Ludzie - Wiara - Kosciel," *Analizy socjologiczne* (Warszawa, 1966), 117.

[3] Cf. A. Pawelczynska, "Postawy ludnosci wiejskiej wobec religii," in *Roczniki Socjologii Wsi. Studia i Materialy*, VIII (1968), 73; A. Mikolejko, "Autoidentyfikacja religijna, motywacje i przeobrazenia religijnosci w opinii spoleczenstwa polskiego" (typescript, 2).

People indifferent to religion fell into a distinct category of the persons being studied. In 1960 the percentage of people who claimed to be indifferent was 14.6 percent in villages and 21.3 percent in towns. In 1984 we could observe a considerable decrease in the population of indifferent people, i.e., in the village to 3.4 percent and in the town to 9.2 percent.[4] This can be explained by the industrial situation of the country. Religious indifference is characterized by an orientation on the values of the world (the *profanum*) which are instrumental and businesslike. When people cannot realize these they become oriented to ultimate values. Special attention should be paid to non-believers in the socialist state. An atheistic attitude is characterized by an orientation to the values of the profane world which are treated as having ultimate meaning with which one identifies. One can treat such an attitude as a sort of substratum of religion, because in this attitude there is a tendency to absolutize and assign broader functions to humanistic values, e.g., to that of finding an overall view for everyday life. Based on a general country-wide questionnaire, the index of irreligious people is unstable for the most part. In 1960 it equalled 1.1 percent for the village and 3.1 percent[5] for the town; in 1984 1.6 percent for the village and 3.5 percent[6] for the town. Not only believers, but religiously indifferent people as well resist conversion to atheism.

Like autoidentification with faith, autoidentification with religious practices maintains a high level in Polish society and does not undergo change. First of all, the indices of those who practice systematically exceed 40 percent in Poland. The indices of those who do not practice systematically are also high (over 30 percent). Both indices can be treated jointly because Catholics who fall into those categories constitute a community of the so-called Sunday Catholics, i.e., those who at least take part once a month in Sunday Mass. In 1960 the indices of those who practice systematically and unsystematically were 80 percent for the village and 69.6 percent[7] for the town. The lack of division in further research into the village and town does not allow for a more precise comparison of those indices. Research shows that for the whole country this index equalled: 79 percent in 1984 and 78 percent in 1985.[8] These indices show a certain stability for the various kinds of religious behavior and their apparent growth in recent years.

Aside from Sunday Catholics there is a category of Catholics who practice rarely and can be classified as holiday Catholics. G. Le Bras describes them as going "to church when the bell is tolling in order to declare that they observe their ancestors' customs."[9] The index of this category of practicing Catholics was 12.8% for the village in 1960 and 17.9% for the town;[10] it was 15% in 1984, 19% in 1985.[11]

There remains still a category of the non-practicing to consider. In 1960 this was 6.3% in the village and 12.3% in the town.[12] In the 1980s a decrease of the number of the non-practicing took place to 5.7% in 1984 and 7.3% in 1985,[13] respectively.

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[4] Pawelczynska, 73; Mikolejko, 2.

[5] Pawelczynska, 73.

[6] Mikolejko, 2.

[7] Pawelczynska, 74.

[8] Cf. S. Kwiatkowski, "Religia i polityka," in *Przeglad Tygodniowy,* 1987, nr. 8.

[9] G. Le Bras, *Etudes de sociologie religieuse* (Paris, 1955), I, 5.

[10] Pawelczynska, 74.

[11] Kwiatkowski, nr. 8.

[12] Pawelczynska, 74.

[13] Kwiatkowski, nr. 8.

Generally speaking, the indices of religious autoidentification remain high and are characterized by stability. It is difficult to say to what extent the ritual kinds of behavior were an expression of accepting non-empirical reality and whether they are formed by this reality.

Religiousness in Private Life

By this kind of religiousness we understand here a conventional religiousness which in its own way is experienced and practiced every day. This religiousness can be more or less interiorized: its range may or may not overlap with "church" religiousness. Undoubtedly, it is multidimensional, e.g., it is operationalized by many parameters and indices. In accord with the distinction drawn above let us look first to religious culture and then to religious activities. Both parameters will be treated as examples, i.e., within their frameworks only some indices taken into account in much prior sociological research on religiousness will be discussed.

Religious knowledge is one of the basic aspects of religious culture. It does not have any exceptional importance for the religious life of Catholics; some even assume that there is no relation between religious knowledge and other aspects of religiousness. Nevertheless, it is also assumed that the process of enriching knowledge in the sphere of religion positively influences the attitude of faith and religious commitment.[14] Nowadays this influence seems greater than ever before. Earlier, religiousness was supported by tradition, opinion and the pressure of the environment, religious institutions, etc., but at present it demands a conscious motivation, option and choice--in other words, a personal commitment. What is more, the increase in the role of education and the general standard of culture in these days is a danger to religiousness among people of low religious knowledge. One can say that the higher the standard of "secular" education and participation in culture, the greater the demand for religious knowledge in order to support and develop religious life.

In the division between "open" and "closed" religious formation, only the first influences the attitude of faith and religious commitment in a positive way. It depends on continuously supplementing religious knowledge both in the sphere of doctrine and in the sphere of knowing "facts and dates" from the life of the Church. The recognition of this by many Catholics in Poland is the reason why they read books and Catholic papers, take part in talks, belong to debating clubs and religious fellowships.

Nevertheless, despite the growth of interest in religion and the Church, the standard of strictly religious knowledge is rather low, especially compared to the standard of religious convictions. Perhaps K. Grzymska-Moszczynska is right when she points out that her sociological research into religiousness tends to grasp a certain state of "theoretical" knowledge, which is not necessarily "practical" and of importance for a human individual in his everyday life. She notes that the majority of tests of knowledge "deal with the analysis of cold knowledge," whereas genuine information about the degree of information by the person under study might have regarded the degree of their "hot" knowledge, i.e., that which concerns those religious problems which are subjectively important for them." We do not deny the subjective element in religious knowledge, but it does not change the fact that a low standard in this sphere constitutes a specific characteristic of traditional religiousness.

As has already been mentioned, religious convictions are formed on a considerably higher level, though the so-called total acceptance of the truths of faith is a more and more rare phenomenon. Questioning or negating the truths of faith depends to a great extent on their character. More theoretical truths, less binding upon Catholics in their lives, are more readily accepted than the practical truths which imply obligations in a Catholic’s daily life. This is exemplified in the results of sociological research carried out in 55 parishes in Poland in two contrary environments: urban (u) and rural (r). Belief in: the Trinity was 88.3 percent (u); the redemption of humanity through Christ: 81.6 percent (u), 99.4 percent (r); Divine Motherhood of Mary: 92 percent (u), 92.2 percent (r); creation of the world: 73.2 percent (u), 94.9 percent (r); immortality of the soul 67.4 percent (u); 79.4 percent (r); resurrection of the body: 59.9 percent (u), 83.8 percent (r); existence of hell: 48.5 percent (u), 79.6 percent (r).[15] These degrees of people’s acceptance of the dogmas of faith show that in the sphere of beliefs Polish religiousness is theocentric ("there exists a God," "Higher Power," "Holy Trinity") Christocentric and Mariocentric; it is also inconsequent, unorthodox and selective. This gap between the levels of acceptance in both environments is particularly surprising. Taking account of the extreme variations in indices, it is 43.5 percent in urban environments and 23.8 percent in rural environments. The indices at the same time of faith in God (Holy Trinity) and negation of the immortality of the human soul as well as of the existence of hell prove that it is a "faith without Christian hope."

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[14] Cf. G. Kehrer, *Das religiose Bewusstsein des Industriearbeiters* (München, 1967), 74.

One can explain the above-mentioned phenomena and processes by two different socio-cultural contexts: the contexts of traditional society and pluralistic society. In the first, greater importance is given to religious orthodoxy connected with the experience and practice of faith. In the second, it is the contrary: believers emphasize religious experience, religious attitude and authentic religious fellowship; objectivized religious dogmas, religious institution and tradition are of lesser importance. Using W. James’ terminology, the believers in the pluralistic society are more "experience oriented" than "tradition-oriented":[16] "Fruits" are more important for them than "roots." That is why there is an increase in the number of Catholics who are not faithful to religious institutions in everyday life.

This unfaithfulness is even stronger within the sphere of moral convictions. It is found most often in research into basic (principal), ambivalent (indirect) and purpose-centered (instrumental-pragmatic) attitudes. The first of these expresses a basic moral orientation, i.e., acceptance of ethical principles despite circumstances; the second allows hesitation according to circumstances; the third concentrates rather upon these circumstances (situational morality).

Research carried out in the 70s proved that basic attitudes are had by no more than one quarter of adults in Poland, and such attitudes are adopted to a still lesser degree by youth. Ambivalent attitudes are more popular, especially in rural and provincial environments. Purpose-centered pragmatic attitudes are most popular, especially in urban environments.[17] This testifies to a distinct tendency to be directed in everyday life by calculation, to choose appropriate means in order to accomplish a purpose, and to adjust existing and well-known moral principles to one’s own concepts of life and action in a particular social environment. Thus we can speak of a relativism of moral norms, even of deviation from religious-moral norms; conscience gains in importance as a subjective norm in disregard of objective norms.

The above-mentioned situational ethic is found most often within the marital-family sphere. On the basis of much research one could think that there is no relation between religion and this kind of morality. Here, traditional-environmental and contextual-cultural demands are more important than profession of an ethical code. There is, however, a certain differentiation as far as the social relevance of a norm is concerned. Thus, for example, the prohibition of marital unfaithfulness and of abortion are more accepted socially than are other norms. This does not change the fact, however, that this domain of morality is particularly incoherent when confronted with faith and morality.

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[15] R. Kaminski, "Przynaleznosc do parafii katolickiej," *Studium pastoralne* (Lublin, 1987), 182-193.

[16] W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (New York, 1961), 195.

[17] Cf. J. Marianski, "Religijnosc w procesie przemian. Szkice socjologiczne" (typescript), 106.

In a sense J. Szczepanski is right when he writes in a somewhat simplified manner that:

> Poles relatively rarely apply themselves to the principles of their religion in the course of their work, in their everyday family duties, and in their everyday family life. On the other hand, they fulfill their religious duties ardently when these duties concern rites, worship and attendance at church. Hence, such religiousness does not penetrate family life; in particular neither a religious ethic of labor is created, nor a sense of religious duties resulting from religion.[18]

Apart from the character of religiousness, one has to take into consideration the social-economic situation which certainly has a bearing on the "moral outlook" of Poles.

Concerning religious activities let us consider first the emphasis in Polish religiousness upon religious practices. Those practices can be described as ritual behavior commanded or recommended by the church. Two kinds of behavior constitute the subject-matter of sociological researches, namely, attendance at Sunday mass (*dominicantes*) and the reception of the Eucharist (*communicantes*).

According to estimates, the number of participants in Sunday mass all over the country remains steady and at a quite high level. In 1980 the range of the indices extended from 35.3 percent in the diocese of Lodz to 73.2 percent in the diocese of Tarnow; in 1982, from 38.3 percent in the diocese of Lublin to 78.6 percent in the diocese of Przemysl. Generally, one can assume that the number of people who observe this practice increases, but this is not certain since in some dioceses the high indices of dominicantes decreases. For example, in the diocese of Katowice the state of this practice was: 1963 - 82.4 percent, 1974 - 63.1 percent, 1980 - 56.2 percent, 1982 - 55.6 percent. A certain decrease in the number of dominicantes has been found also in the dioceses of Tarnow, Krakow and Bialystok.[19]

It must be emphasized that Catholics who practice systematically constitute the majority of Sunday mass participants. This means that there is a certain "core" of people who practice continuously. One can regard them as believers who possess a mature sense of attachment to the Church and to a parish. Mass constitutes a certain religious value for them which they particularly appreciate. One can assume that their participation in it is an expression of their inner faith, and from this a continuum of religious life is revealed in outer behavior.

Obviously, the number of those who receive communion while participating in Sunday Mass remains at a considerably lower level. On an all-Polish scale this index in relation to those who were present at Mass in 1980 ranged from 10.2 percent in the diocese of Przemysl to 19.7 percent in the diocese of Gorzow; in 1982 from 12.1 percent in the diocese of Przemysl to 22.7 percent in the diocese of Czestochowa. Thus, one can speak of a slight growth in the index of communicantes in Poland.

Comparing the indices of dominicantes and communicantes, the more the dominicantes the less the communicantes. Participating in a mass without receiving the Eucharist is a characteristic feature of Polish folk (mass) religiousness. The high indices of communicantes in relation to the indices of dominicantes in the Western and Northern parts of Poland is worth noting. All dioceses situated on this territory exceed the country average of communicantes, which may prove that they have become the leading dioceses in the work of forming a conscious and profound religiousness.

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[18] J. Szczepanski, "Wymiary polskiej religijnosci (glos w dyskusji)," *Znaki czasu*, (nr. 6, 1983), 9.

[19] Cf. The investigations in Poland conducted by W. Zdaniewicz (Pallottinum). The results are presently being drawn up.

Participating in a Mass and receiving the Eucharist strengthens the sense of religious ties with institutions which fulfill a religious mission. This is especially the parish which, though it loses the character of a fellowship, yet is a milieu in which religious fellowships can be established. Contemporary changes "atomize" parishioners, but at the same time create new possibilities for entering into direct and personal contacts. This raises two interesting problems: the degree of attachment to a parish and whether believers are willing to belong to religious fellowships.

It is a characteristic feature that attachment to a parish is becoming evidently weaker, especially in relation to the "openness" of the social environment. In view of much research into the parish carried out by the Catholic University of Lublin one can say that 34.9 percent of people (u) 59.9 percent (r) identify with their parish, with their diocese: 4 percent (u), 7 percent (r); with the Church in Poland: 20.2 percent (u), 13.6 percent (r); with the universal Church: 31.7 percent (u), 17.2 percent (r); with none in particular: 7.3 percent (u), 2.1 percent (r). That is, of the four religious institutions the most important is the parish, then comes the universal Church, the Church in Poland, and then the diocese, which, however, is more important than the parish from the theological point of view. At present, the parish loses importance while there is a gain by the universal Church, or in the broader sense of the word, Christianity, or, still broader, religion and a general outlook on life (ecumenism). Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand that the Church in Poland is not so emphasized, when at the same time that there exists "religion of the nation."

This apparent inconsequence becomes even more evident in relation to religious groups. The statistics on the membership is the following: debating groups: 20.2 percent (u), 48.1 percent (r); instructional groups: 12.2 percent (u), 32.6 percent (r); formation groups: 16.8 percent (u), 35.5 percent (r); apostolic charitable groups: 3.6 percent (u), 19.8 percent (r). From the sociological point of view it is difficult to explain why in the rural environment there is a much stronger tendency to participate in religious groups than in the urban environments. Religious fellowships especially among the youth come into existence and develop in big cities. Their existence in villages, however, depends upon the parish priest, and one does not find such a spontaneous search for the sense of life and for identification as among big city inhabitants.

Probably, these two phenomena can be explained by the character of Polish religiousness, which is conditioned more on the level of everyday life than on that of the nation. These changes which find their expression in culture, social structure (although the political also has a certain importance here), and personality urge Poles to take up various quests on the basis of religion, e.g., towards an authentically increased religiousness or even towards treating religion instrumentally as a means to save values of a lower order.

Regarding the interdependence between demographic-social features and religious culture and religious activities, in the limited framework of this paper we shall merely make note of certain factors. The basic patterns proved by much earlier research remain unquestioned. Nevertheless, one can assume on the basis of research that in the 80s there was a revival in the sphere of the three parameters: religious experience, religious culture and religious activities. This revival was more widespread in the domain of religious experience and religious activities than in the sphere of religious culture. It took place more often among men than women, among young people (including students) rather than older people, among the educated rather than those of other categories, especially farmers; it was more frequent among the rich than the poor (which is incongruous with Marxism), and rather in big cities than in other social environments. The variable of party membership, omitted here, has great importance, especially as regards religious autodeclarations.

In view of the above general information which concerns culture and religious activities, one can attempt to show the basic direction of changes, and at the same time, provide a typology of attitudes towards religion which enables one to understand better the "religion of everyday life". Such a typology consists of: traditional religiousness, increased religiousness and selective religiousness.

- Traditional religiousness which formerly included masses of believers is now a thing of the past. Nevertheless, there are believers who live independently of the ongoing social-cultural changes and stick to folk religiousness. This manner of religiousness is able to provide them with a sense of meaning and identification, though it is not entirely identical with what the Church demands, i.e., with the model of institutional religiousness. Traditionally, believers are rather "traditionalists." If they negate or question the tenets of faith or moral principles, they do so primarily in a thoughtless and unmotivated manner; it is a consequence of religious neglect which finds its expression in losing contact with the Church and parish.
- Increased religiousness can be expressed on two levels: institutional and fellowship. On the first we find more and more Catholics who identify themselves with the Church both in doctrine and behavior. On the one hand, they appreciate Church authority, her doctrinal and political demands; on the other hand, they apply themselves to her recommendations in private, family and social life. This manner of religiousness is manifested by frequent confession and the Eucharist, participation in exclusive religious associations, support for parish festivals, etc. On the other hand, we find ever more rich varieties of religious movements and fellowships which are characteristic of the Polish Church. With few exceptions they do not seek their own purposes, but join in the revival of Catholicism or, more broadly speaking, of Christianity within the framework of the parish together with their priests. Hence, these movements are desirable in promoting changes in Polish folk religiousness; they concentrate on authentic evangelical religiousness and its influence upon everyday life.
- Selective religiousness is the most common character among a variety of changes and is revealed in both consciousness and religious behavior. In the former it appears rather in morality than in religion as those who believe selectively undertake processes of rationalization, privatization and individualization. Through those processes they undervalue the role of religious tradition, religious authorities, religious doctrine, and their professed outlook; they question or reject first the moral principles, then the dogmas of faith, and, finally, lose their ties with the Church. It is not a neglect, however, as in the case of traditional Catholics, but "a choice" connected with an individual’s life project.

Conclusion

From the above analysis, religiousness in Polish society appears to be characterized by continuity, especially on the nationwide level. Probably, the "80s" contributed little to this religiousness: perhaps, they contributed to the revival of "consequent religious parameters," though not on a global scale. On a nationwide scale religion functions as a common value inherited from ancestors which conveys meaning and identification for the great majority of people. This value is confirmed by practices of a mass character which are motivated religiously and nationally. In such a situation, religion easily fulfills an integrative function according to Durkheim’s principle that it is not important what one believes in, but how strong the faith is and to what extent this faith penetrates people’s life. Such a people observe religious practices, but without great consequences in everyday life.

On the level of daily life Polish religiousness undergoes desirable changes in many directions: less toward being more profound, but rather towards selectivity. This means that in religiousness in Poland spontaneous factors are more decisive than those which are controlled and conducive to maintaining a certain type of religiousness, namely, one that is traditional and constant.

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Chapter X
Voluntary Religion and the State in the United States

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This essay will seek to explain some elements of American religious history in order to make them intelligible to Europeans. The task is awesome because the existing scholarship is extensive, including various topics on divergent interpretations which I am not competent to evaluate. I can hope only to provide clarification on a few points and begin with the pre-revolutionary period.

Religion and the State in Colonial and Revolutionary Times

At the time of the Revolutionary War, 1775-1781, the United States was composed of thirteen English colonies along the Atlantic Ocean, the oldest of which (Virginia) had been settled in 1607. The population totaled 2.7 million, composed mostly of English-speaking freemen from England, Scotland, and Ireland, but including 400,000 African slaves. There were small non-English minorities, mostly Dutch, Germans and Swedes, but only in New York were any of them influential. Almost all Americans who professed a religion were Protestants. The largest groups were Congregationalists, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists and Lutherans. In addition there were a few Dutch Reformed, German Reformed, and Catholics. Catholics totaled about 25,000, mostly in two colonies--Maryland and Pennsylvania.[1] Nine of the thirteen colonies had established churches, and a majority of the colonies had laws restricting religious groups, most commonly banning Catholics and non-Christians. In the northern colonies the Congregational Church (Puritan) was established, and in several of the southern colonies the Anglican Church was established. Only two or three of the colonies had proclaimed religious freedom, though in reality such matters were impossible to enforce, and church establishment consisted mainly of church taxes and a few privileges for the clergy.

Religious Thought

The northern colonies were founded by dissenters from the established church (Anglican) in England, most of whom were Puritans or other Calvinists. Analysts of American culture agree that the Puritan outlook was a principal root of American culture.[2] The southern colonies were dominated by the Anglican church, but historically that influence were not as strong as that of the Calvinists in the northern and middle colonies.

The Puritans oriented themselves to the Bible and strongly emphasized literacy and Bible study for all Christians. They were dissenters from the traditional Anglican Church in England in that they believed Christians need no ecclesiastical intermediary between themselves and the Word of God, since when they gathered to discern the will of God the Holy Spirit would give them truth. Their doctrine was based on Matthew 18:20: "Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them."

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[1] For American church history see Sydney E. Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). For American Catholic history see Jay P. Dolan, *The American Catholic Experience* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985) and James Hennesey, S.J. *American Catholics: A History of the Roman Catholic Community in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

[2] Kenneth D. Wald, *Religion and Politics in the United States* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1987), p. 106. Also see Thomas Robbins and Roland Robertson (eds.), *Church-State Relations: Tensions and Transitions* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

The Puritans preached that they were the New Israel, in a new covenant with God. Just as Abraham had accepted the promise of God’s blessing for himself and his heirs if he pledged to do God’s work in the wilderness (Genesis 12:3), so the New Israel community members pledged themselves to God and each other to create a new society. They felt secure that God would favor their endeavors. For many Puritans the idea of setting up a Holy Commonwealth in North America as "a light to the world" and a "city set on a hill" (Matthew 5:14) was a holy calling, for they were alienated from the feudalism and corruption of Europe and wanted to start anew.

The covenant theology defined the source of social authority--the covenant of believers. Government and church leaders were elected and monitored by the community, and the citizens had no obligation to obey any leader who violated the prevailing conceptions of community, including traditional "rights of Englishmen" experienced in England. Both churches and towns were set up and governed democratically, based on covenants or charters. God was a partner or a guarantor of the contracts, and all were explicitly written with God’s will as orientation. There was no place for nobility, a privileged clergy or dynasty; no class of warriors or knights; no noble titles, no religious orders, no large landowning families. At the lower end, there were no serfs or landless peasants; the farmers were free landowners. However, there were black slaves in all the colonies.

The ecclesiology of the Puritans came directly from Calvinism: no apostolic succession, no claims to church authority in itself, no hierarchy, no allegiance to any European churches. Earlier pre-Reformation doctrines of the church were redefined, so that ordination was done on authority of the gathered community of believers; it was for a limited time without claims to ontological differences. Sacraments were redefined and de-emphasized. Church lands were very few and small by European standards. The churches were governed by local authority; their property was owned and governed by a local board of trustees. Any power of regional church bodies such as synods or dioceses was limited to whatever was voluntarily granted by local churches.

Governmental institutions in the colonies were English; the colonies were ruled by governors appointed by the English king. The northern colonies developed bourgeois democratic governmental institutions, but in the southern colonies a class of large landowners developed, predominantly in Virginia, who developed the beginnings of a landowning nobility. They developed fairly large plantations, worked by slaves, though by European standards they were small landowners. The estates were very small, and there were no large country houses, palaces or castles as were built by the barons, Junkers and boyars in England or Eastern Europe. Pressures toward development of a full-fledged nobility in the South were successfully resisted.

The subsequent history of church and state in the United States can be understood only from this pre-Revolutionary basis. The whole mentality was post-Reformation, bourgeois, anti-feudal and capitalistic. The ideals were imperfectly realized, however, as evidenced by the widespread adoption of slavery and participation in the slave trade, by the cruel suppression of the native American Indians, and by intolerance of anything non-Protestant or non-democratic. The pre-Revolutionary Americans hated the *ancien regime* and everything associated with it, including Catholicism. Above all they hated and feared Spain, which had fought England and the Lowlands for centuries, and which was now colonizing Latin America.

The Constitution and the First Amendment

After the Revolutionary War ended in 1781, the colonies attempted self-government in a confederation which proved unsuccessful and led to a constitutional convention in 1787. A new constitution was adopted and put into effect in 1789.

At this time most colonies had established churches or laws restricting religious groups, but seldom could the laws be enforced. Due to long distances, poor communications, and immigration from many European nations, there was almost no religious persecution. Also the majority of Americans at the time were not church members. Many were free thinkers, some were Deists, and some were church participants without becoming members. Large numbers were uninterested in religious matters.

The intellectual leaders of the revolution were mostly Deists. This reaction against the earlier rigid Calvinism was a product of the Enlightenment, glorifying reason, nature and science, and rejecting the divinity of Jesus, miracles, revelation and church authority. It emphasized individual freedom and natural law. The first four presidents (Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison) were all Deists, as was the famous Benjamin Franklin. They wrote the American Constitution based on post-Puritan, Enlightenment thought. All of them favored freedom of conscience and religion, and separation of church and state.

Throughout the 1770s there was vigorous debate on these issues, with the Puritan and Anglican leaders trying to hold on to their established churches and the more democratic religious groups opposing them. Even the Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore opposed any establishment. Slowly the state legislatures removed the religious establishments, and by 1833 all were gone.

In efforts to get the new constitution ratified, it was agreed that delegates would draft a Bill of Rights, which would become a series of amendments for immediate adoption. This was quickly done, and became an integral part of the Constitution. It contained ten amendments which guaranteed freedom of speech, petition, press, assembly, and so on. The first amendment contained a clause on religion: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This clause has been the basis of all subsequent debate and litigation about church-and-state matters in United States history. It has called on Americans to live out higher ideals than those to which they were accustomed.

Religion in the New Nation

Upholding Religious Freedom in the Courts

The writers of the Constitution were well aware of church-state issues in European history and tried to institute good guidelines for the new nation. They were afraid of tyranny and wanted above all to prevent a great concentration of power in any person or institution. They believed that alliances between a powerful church and an absolute state would corrupt both institutions. Thus they were careful to avoid any form of established church--including the existence of any religious tests for public office, any financial support for a particular denomination, or any form of favoritism to any group.

Some of the Founding Fathers, including Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, also opposed an established religion because, as they saw it, this would pervert the true meaning of religion. These persons believed that true religion consisted of benevolent conduct toward one’s fellow human beings. They denounced the superstition of the dogmas that priests and clergy had developed over the centuries, and they contrasted ancient dogma to the simplicity and beauty of religion’s moral content. John Adams wrote that all that was important in Christianity and the other religions could be found in the Sermon on the Mount and the Ten Commandments. In short, these leaders were suspicious of hierarchical churches and their pretenses to worldly power; they labored hard to keep them out of the new nation.

Also the Founding Fathers were aware of the political power of strongly-held religious faith, and they did not want to pit the new government against any future fanatical religious groups. History seemed to show that any attempts to impose a uniform faith by government action would inevitably unleash passion and violence by rival faiths. Regulating religion is futile. Jefferson argued that no established church can be strong and vital for a long period, since it will become too closely associated with political powerholders and will lose its freedom. So the Bill of Rights was written both to avoid any established church and also to allow all forms of religious life maximal freedom of expression.

The court system gradually interpreted the First Amendment in terms of concrete issues. The Supreme Court has handled hundreds of cases regarding religion.[3] The first important cases revolved around the postal system, specifically whether it should deliver mail on Sundays. At first the Supreme Court said yes, since otherwise the government would be granting official recognition to the Christian Sabbath, and non-Christians would be forced to respect a holiday they don’t recognize in their hearts. But later the Court reversed itself under public pressure and stopped Sunday deliveries.

There have been many crucial court cases regarding religion in the years since 1940, in what amounts to a basic reappraisal of church-state policy. The effect was to raise the wall of separation between church and state higher than before. Numerous court cases pertained to public school practices, and the Court tried to make the schools more truly neutral regarding religious practices. It stated that no public school buildings can be used for religious instruction, though "released-time" programs were allowable in which students left the school grounds for an hour or two each week to go elsewhere for religious instruction. It disallowed public prayer and Bible reading in the schools. It forbade Christmas programs seen as excluding non-Christians. On the other hand, the Court allowed some public funds to support private religious schools insofar as they were providing a general educational service; specifically, they could be used for buying general textbooks and providing school buses for religious schools.

Court decisions have striven to protect religious freedom of all sects and denominations. For example, preachers of all faiths were assured equal permission to speak in public parks. American Indians using peyote (an illegal mind-altering drug) in rituals were protected from prosecution under the drug laws. Children of Jehovah’s Witnesses families were given permission not to participate in the pledge of allegiance to the flag in school. Local governments were prohibited from putting Christian Christmas decorations such as Bethlehem manger scenes on public property.

Other areas have also been articulated. No religious property is subject to property taxes and sales taxes--unless it is a profitable business establishment owned by a church. Young men who are members of pacifist religious groups are exempted from the military draft and offered alternative service instead. The churches were given the power to celebrate weddings. In the last half-century the growth in non-traditional religious groups (Buddhists, new Christian sects, etc.)

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[3] Standard treatments of church-state court cases are: Leo Pfeffer, *Church, State, and Freedom* (rev. ed.) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967); Pfeffer, *Religious Freedom* (Skokie, Il: National Textbook Co., 1977); Frank J. Sorauf, *The Wall of Separation: The Constitutional Politics of Church and State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

has occasioned much judicial review of traditional American practices, with increased care given to protection of all minority religions.

Religious Organizations Influencing Political Action

All American religious groups work actively to influence political decisions in ways serving their interests or reforming the society. Thousands of efforts by churches to influence politics could be identified and analyzed; it has been a constant theme in American history. There were movements for penal reform, establishment of public schools, public health, and many, many others. Here I will recount only two, which give the overall flavor.

The first is the anti-slavery movement. At the time of the revolution there was already a widespread idealistic movement to abolish slavery, and all the northern states abolished it by 1804. The Constitution prohibited importation of slaves after 1808. (Meanwhile slavery was prohibited throughout the British Empire in 1833.)

The movement to abolish slavery gained strength in the 1820s, mostly led by churchmen, especially Quakers, Methodists and Baptists. The centers of the abolition movement were the Boston area and Ohio--the latter energized by waves of religious revivalism.[4] The major Protestant denominations were soon divided on the issue of slavery, and they split into northern and southern denominations totally independent of each other. For example, the Baptist and the Methodists both split in 1845. The northern branches condemned slavery, while the southern branches defended it. In the 1850s the abolitionist movement continued, mostly supported by northern church leaders, but no influence was possible on the southern states. Only when the North was losing the Civil War was the total emancipation of all slaves decreed by President Lincoln in 1863.

The second is the temperance movement. It arose in evangelical churches after the revivalism and new religious fervor of the 1800-1820 period. Its strength was in the Midwest, and it spread through networks of churches and preachers. By 1834 the temperance organizations had 1,000,000 members. The movement was strongest in New England and the Midwest; it had little support in the South, partly because many of its leading figures were also opposed to slavery. The leaders of the movement were against drunkenness, not against all use of alcohol, and they linked drunkenness to immorality and sin of all kinds. Many local communities voted prohibition of alcoholic beverages within their borders.

The National Women's Christian Temperance Union was formed in 1874, and later in 1895 the Anti-Saloon League was formed. Both were supported by evangelical church members, and both became strong political action organizations. They advocated a constitutional amendment banning the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor anywhere in the United States. In 1917 the Eighteenth Amendment, which did exactly this, was passed by Congress and sent to the states for ratification, which was soon accomplished. It went into effect on January 16, 1920 and represented one of the most interesting chapters in religion and politics in American history. Americans had practical reasons, not just religious reasons, for banning liquor, since it was seen as dangerous to workers in the new factories, and clearly it led to brawling among Blacks and immigrants.

The amendment was a dismal failure. Liquor consumption did decrease in the years after 1920, but inevitably there was a market for illegal liquor which spawned an immense industry of smuggling and secret manufacture. Crimes resulting from these activities became so notorious that the sentiment of the country gradually turned against the amendment. Slowly the opinions even of leading church leaders wavered, and by 1932 both candidates for president supported a repeal of prohibition, which took place in 1933. A great religious experiment was over, and Americans became more realistic about what kinds of social reforms are really possible. Clearly prohibition had not been supported by enough Americans to dry up the demand for alcohol--hence it was simply non-enforceable. The nation was too diverse religiously and ethnically, too urban, and too distant from its Puritan roots.

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[4] John L. Hammond, *The Politics of Benevolence: Revival Religion and American Voting Behavior* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Co., 1979).

Today religious political action is as strong as ever. Among liberal Protestants the main efforts are toward civil liberties in the nation and the world, restraint of American military intervention in Central America, restraint of the arms race, increased efforts to protect the environment, and efforts to alleviate the evils of poverty and racism. Among conservative Protestants the main goals are allowing public prayer in the schools, opposition to abortion, opposition to homosexuality, restraint of pornography, and restrictions on alcohol use. Among the Catholics the main issue is opposition to abortion, with smaller Catholic movements devoted to restraint of American foreign involvement (especially at it opposes Latin American liberation movements), greater support for private religious schools, and ending the arms race. The Jewish community is concerned mainly with support for the nation of Israel and for protection of civil liberties in the U.S.

A researcher in 1981 counted 75 specialized religious organizations which had offices in Washington, DC. Some represent specific denominations, but most often they are broad-based movements with single-issue goals. Some had national staffs as high as thirty persons.[5] But given the pressures in American politics, the religious political lobbies are tiny in comparison with others. For example, today the General Electric Corporation, a major manufacturer of military hardware, medical technology, and nuclear power plants, maintains an office in Washington, DC with a staff of 120.[6] American politics today is dominated by the influence of the large corporations, by contrast to which the religious groups are minor actors. The direct influence of religious groups on specific political decisions is usually small, hardly enough to measure. It is greatest when issues relate to family, personal morality, and public honesty, and when members of many of the 340,000 parishes in the United States can be mobilized in support of specific issues at local and national levels. The vast majority of American churches refuse to endorse any political parties or candidates, but they do take public stands and try to educate their members on public moral issues.

Two other interesting aspects of American religion and politics should be noted. The first is that, by European standards, the United States has been free of anticlericalism. This is probably understandable by the lack of clerical power and privilege ever since the disestablishment of churches in various states in the post-revolution period. No religious groups or orders had rich landholdings, palatial buildings or estates. The second interesting fact is that no religious political parties have ever developed. Probably this is the result of the uniquely American electoral rules. In the United States there is direct election of a president and of senators and representatives from states and districts. Only one person can win the presidency or be elected from a given state or district, creating a series of "winner-take-all" elections in which a vote for a third candidate of the right or left is in effect support for the voter’s least-favored candidate on the other side of the political spectrum. Because a vote for a third candidate is a vote for "your worst enemy," the most sensible strategy for those who want to avoid this fate is to form the largest possible pre-election coalition. The result is the uniquely American tendency to form only two political parties without clearly defined ideologies and agendas.[7] (This probably explains also the absence of strong socialist parties in American history.)

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[5] Paul J. Weber, "Examining the Religious Lobbies," *This World,* I (1982), 97-107; also see James L. Adams, *The Growing Church Lobby in Washington* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1970).

[6] Wald, *op. cit*., 153.

The Religious Situation at the End of the 20th Century

Religious fervor today is strong in the United States, contrary to the expectations of many social theorists who predicted a gradual secularization and weakening of religion. Unlike the history of most of Europe, in the U.S. Christian faith and institutions have survived well, and show no signs of disappearing. In 1987, 59 percent of the American population were members of religious groups, a figure which has been constant for several decades.[8] On an average Sunday in 1987, 40 percent of American adults attended religious services (38 percent of Protestants, 52 percent of Catholics).[9] These figures are high by any international comparison. In 1981-85, the European Value Systems Study Group surveyed over 20 nations, and asked respondents if they had attended religious services in the previous week. For the U.S. the figure was 43 percent; for Great Britain, 14 percent, for Canada, 30 percent; for West Germany, 21 percent; for France, 12 percent; for Sweden, 5 percent; for Hungary 5 percent. But some nations were higher: For Mexico the figure was 54 percent; for Republic of Ireland, 72 percent.[10] In international surveys done in 1974, just under 70 percent of Americans surveyed said they believed in life after death--a proportion of believers greater than that in Europe, Latin America, and the English-speaking world, and equal to that in the Far East and sub-Saharan Africa. As for the concept of an active God, more than two-thirds of the Americans polled endorsed such a belief, making the United States closer to the Third World than to societies that it resembles economically.[11] Similar to Poland, the U.S. is very religious.

Why is the U.S. higher in religious belief and fervor than other economically-similar nations? This question is debated. Probably the separation of church and state and the voluntary nature of the churches are important, since they prevent the institutionalized churches from forging any close alliances with political parties or privileged social groups, and since they require all churches to evangelize to attract their members and financial contributions. Possibly the ethnic and religious diversity of the U.S. is a factor, since ethnic groups often adhere to religious faiths and churches as part of their community life. Possibly our distance from twentieth-century European ideological crises and political crises is a factor. There is little Marxism in the U.S., and no great debate about socialism. These various factors are probably important, as far as we can guess.

In the middle 1980s the religious composition of the United States (measured by polls on "religious preference") is approximately 57 percent Protestant, 28 percent Catholic, 2 percent Jewish, 4 percent other, and 9 percent "none." The largest Protestant groups are the Baptists and the Methodists. The levels of inter-group religious prejudice have clearly fallen since the 1940s and 1950s, when they were first measured. Anti-Catholicism has almost totally disappeared, and anti-semitism has been gradually declining for 40 years. The strongest religious prejudices lately have concerned new religious movements such as Hindu sects, the "Jesus people" sects, and the Unification Church.

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[7] See G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America Now? A View for the 80s* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 117ff.

[8] Constant H. Jacquet, Jr. (ed.), *Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches,* 1988 (New York: National Council of Churches, and Nashville: Abingdon Press), 253. This annual report is the standard source of American church statistics.

[9] *Emerging Trends* (published by the Princeton Religious Research Center, a branch of the Gallup Organization) (January, 1988), 1.

[10] *Emerging Trends* (September, 1986), 5.

[11] Wald, *op. cit.,* 10.

The Protestant Community

Since the 1950s the Protestant denominations (over 200 in all) have gradually arranged themselves in two loose factions, often called the mainline Protestants and the evangelical Protestants. The issues dividing them are numerous and deep.[12] The mainliners generally believe in Biblical criticism and the value of secular scholarship, while the evangelicals teach the literal truth of the Bible and its eternal truth. The mainliners are liberal on most political issues, stressing personal freedoms, civil liberties, and humanitarian good works, while the evangelicals are intent on reforming personal morals (including opposition to abortion and homosexuality) and promotion of world evangelism. The mainliners have a higher educational and income level, but a lower level of church commitment per member. As a rough estimate, the mainliners are numerically two thirds as strong as the evangelicals.

Beginning in the 1960s, the mainline denominations have experienced declines in membership, which are traceable to low birthrates and weak church commitment among young adults. Many children of liberal Protestants attend universities and become relativistic about religious teachings, thus weakening their church commitment.

The Catholic Community

Two events occurred in the 1960s which affected American Catholics profoundly. First, John F. Kennedy became the first Catholic elected president, and then became almost a martyr when assassinated. This experience of a Catholic president changed American political life so much that since then no one has objected to Catholic candidates for any high office. Second, Vatican Council II proclaimed new teachings joyously welcomed by American Catholics. The Council said that Catholics should affirm religious liberties in all nations, that Catholicism should not press to be privileged or established in any way, that Catholics should reach out to others in ecumenical goodwill, that quasi-democratic structures should be developed at the parish, diocesan, and national levels, and that modern Biblical scholarship should be affirmed. All of these were good news to American Catholics, for it helped them be both good Catholics and good Americans. Also during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, American Catholics rose to higher levels of income and influence in American institutions; in the 1970s the average income of Catholics rose to a level higher than that of Protestants.

Catholic life has seen many recent innovations, mostly coming from the genuine spiritual feelings of the faithful. New forms of spirituality grew, including Marriage Encounter, Cursillos, and the charismatic movement; the laity took a more active part in worship and decision-making. The shortage of priests has opened the door for much more participation by laity and by Sisters.

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[12] Robert Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Wade Clark Roof and William McKinney, *American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

American Catholics affirm this, although they are not happy with the priest shortage and resent any curtailment of priestly services.[13]

An important innovation in American Catholicism is the new immigration, which began in 1965 when the immigration laws were changed. Today immigration into the U.S. is at unprecedented levels. About three fourth of the immigrants are Spanish-speaking, and the majority of the others are Asians. About two thirds of all the new immigrants are nominally Catholic, though the strength of their Catholic identity varies from strong to weak, and today thousands are being attracted into Pentecostal and fundamentalist Protestant churches. Since immigration will certainly continue--and in fact is unstoppable, regardless of what the government permits--American Catholicism will grow and will gradually become more Hispanic. At present it is about 25 percent (a rough estimate). About 9 percent or 10 percent of American Catholics are Polish.

A topic much discussed in recent years is the tension between American Catholics and the Pope in Rome. This tension is not unique to America, but is similar to the disagreements between the Pope and Catholics in countries such as Netherlands and Belgium. In summary, it seems to result from two different visions of church government--monarchical or democratic. A series of surveys have shown that American Catholics favor more democratic decision-making in the church at all levels--parish, diocese, and the Vatican. For example, Americans would like laity in parishes to choose their priests.[14] Also American Catholics favor more lay involvement in ethical decision-making in the Church, for example, on questions of birth control, marriage and divorce, sexual decision-making, and the role of women. Americans favor more collegial structures in the universal Catholic Church, less central authority from Rome. To illustrate, most American Catholics opposed the Pope’s suggestion that the power of national bishops’ conferences be reduced. America Catholics favor more self-determination by religious orders and communities, especially women’s communities which are trying to renew themselves along Vatican II guidelines. To solve the priest shortage, American Catholics favor optional celibacy for diocesan priests. Feelings of frustration with the Vatican are slowly mounting.

Probably the most basic source of the tension is the American experience of democracy and self-determination in all social institutions. All American institutions (apart from private business corporations) involve broad participation in decision-making processes. All politicians need to stand for re-election periodically. It seems natural to Americans to have church leaders, like all other leaders in society, elected by the members. From this perspective one can understand the immense impact of the American bishops’ two pastoral letters, one on nuclear weapons and the arms race in 1983, and the other on the American economy in l985. These two letters were a sensation to Catholics and non-Catholics alike. The first one was a media event, largely because the American Catholic bishops heretofore had never spoken so convincingly on such a central moral question, and partly because Americans were at that time weary of the Cold War rhetoric of the Reagan administration. The bishops wrote their pastoral letter during a three-year period of hearings and consultation with Catholics and non-Catholics of all viewpoints. They issued a preliminary version for public discussion before making final revisions, in an attitude of openness and dialogue. The outcome was a measured letter on the evils of the arms race and the need for East-West negotiations.[15] The process of writing the letter was as impressive as the outcome, and it raised the esteem of the bishops to an unprecedented level. The second letter was somewhat critical of the American economy and evoked criticism from some Catholic business leaders, but the majority of American Catholics appreciated it.

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[13] Dean R. Hoge, *The Future of Catholic Leadership: Responses to the Priest Shortage* (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1987).

[14] Hoge, *op. cit.*, 235.

[15] Jim Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983).

Conclusion

American churches are strong and will continue to be strong. There is some shift in relative power, with evangelicals and Catholics growing and mainline Protestants waning. There is talk of a "Catholic moment" coming soon in American life, in which Catholicism will have an unprecedented opportunity to influence American life; the idea is plausible.[16]

Future issues will probably be those which are in contention today--civil liberties, inclusion of minorities and environmental concerns. American religious groups will not speak with one voice. The diversity of American churches will produce ongoing debate and struggle as each denomination strives to interpret these world changes in its own theological view and as each tries to carry out its social mission.

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[16] Richard J. Neuhaus, *The Catholic Moment: The Paradox of the Church in the Postmodern World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987).

Part IV
Economics and Politics

Chapter XI

The Private Versus the Non-Private Sector in the Economy: The Polish Economy in Transition

Andrzej F. Lulek

The Nature of a Centrally Planned Economy and Its Reform

Centrally planned economies, sometimes called "socialist economies," worked themselves into a critical economic position. Their characteristic system of control and management achieved limited material effect. Central planning and control, when confronted with the barrier of limited resources, completely lost its instrumental validity. Its usefulness was, after all, limited strictly to an ownership model characteristic of a socialist type of economy, of which the basic feature was the dominant role of so-called "socialized" property, declared to be the best from the point of view of social needs. Control over this type of property was exercised by directive and distributive instruments through which the volume and structure of production were set and resources were allocated according to directively imposed indexes of the final effect. The same methods were applied to steer the primary distribution of income, and thus to set the levels of payments for the resources employed.

The sphere of private ownership of the means of production, if allowed to exist at all, had very limited dimensions. In Poland, this sphere was strongly rooted in agriculture, but industry, commerce and services were mostly the domain of "socialized" property. Such a disparity between private and state-controlled spheres had to have economic consequences. The part of the economy linked directly to the market and able to react to its signals was limited in size and was under the destructive influence of the centralized system of resource distribution. On the other hand, the dominant part of the Polish economy, being detached from the market, did not react to the real scale and structure of social needs and had disproportionately low output in comparison to their costs. As years passed, the separation of the structures of production led to a strong increase of the amount of "empty" money.

The First Stage of Economic Reform

A centrally planned economy, using directive-distributive instruments of control, is to a great extent a matter of the past in Poland. Since 1981 the Polish economy has been undergoing a process of change called "economic reform". For most of the 80s this process did not bring noticeable results due to the very shape of the reform in its initial stages and especially to the lack of deep changes of the relation between the private and the "socialized" spheres of the economy. The legal foundations of the Polish economic reform were aimed clearly at preserving the constitutive features of the socialist economy and increasing its efficiency through some corrective measures. The primary task of the reform was not to change the existing economic model, but to make changes within the model.

Some conclusions may be drawn from basic documents describing the shape of a new economic system. The ownership structure of the economy was not to be changed, for the basic productive unit was to remain a "socialist enterprise," i.e., a state enterprise.[1] It was defined as a unit "comprising a collective body of employees and the part of all-national property allotted to it, . . . which should independently perform its productive and service activities within the centrally managed national economy." Reform was limited to making the state enterprise partly independent in the financial and decision-making spheres, and introducing worker self-management into the management system of the enterprises. These provisions were stated in the September 25, 1981 laws on state enterprise and worker self-management.[2]

No deeper changes were made in the principles of control over the economy. As a result of the reform, the Polish economy was to preserve its socialist character, i.e., it was to function within the system of central planning and not to respond to the market, for the reform envisaged "central planning as one of the basic principles of socialist economy."[3] Changes in this sphere boiled down to a reduction in the scope of central planning and its involvement in minute details. The latter change was supposed to make central planning more rational and effective. The relevant law stressed the great importance of planning, stating that the Polish economy "is a planned economy based on the socialist economic system," and that economic development and higher living standards of the population can be achieved through planning.[4]

Other legal acts issued later by the Council of Ministers limited the range of the freedom of the enterprises and of workers self-management. If economic reform is understood as a set of changes in the very foundations of an economic system resulting in the creation of new rules for its functioning, then it becomes obvious that fragmentary changes which transferred only some rights to enterprises and employees did not deserve to be called reformative. They did not produce a new property system which would introduce the private sphere into the main segment of economy, and they did not transform the relationship between the state and the economy, between the political and the economic spheres. The initial selective liberalization of economic life was accompanied by the activation of instruments of direct state control: detailed planning indexes were replaced by government orders,[5] and central distribution of resources and price and wage controls were preserved through a special tax system. Thus, the so-called "first stage" of economic reform resulted not in a new economic system, but in a new manner of functioning for the old one.

The sphere of private economic activity, although still very limited, especially in industry, gradually began to attract more interest. New claims for equality of rights between the private and the state-controlled spheres could be heard. Finally, a special law of great importance, issued on 23 December, 1988,[6] gave a higher status to private initiative. This bill, which allowed for free entry and removed many bureaucratic barriers hampering the development of private enterprise, allowed the private sphere to take a more prominent place in the national economy.

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[1] See: *Podstawowe zalozenia reformy gospodarczej* (Basic Foundations of Economic Reform) (Warszawa, 1981), 48-50.

[2] "Ustawa o przedsiebiorstwie panstwowym" (Law on State Enterprise), *Dziennik Ustaw* (nr. 24, 1981 r., poz. 122); "Ustawa o samorzadzie zalogi przedsiebiorstwa panstwowego" (Law on Workers' Self-Management in State Enterprise), *Ibid*., poz. 123.

[3] *Podstawowe zalozenia*, 29.

[4] "Ustawa o planowaniu spoleczno-gospodarczym" (Law on Socio-Economic Planning), *Dziennik Ustaw* (nr 7, 1982), poz. 5l.

[5] "Uchwala Rady Ministrow, nr 280, w sprawie zamowien rzadowych na materialy i wyroby" (Executive Act on Government Order, nr. 280), *Monitor Polski* (nr 1, 1983 r.), poz. 9.

[6] See: *Rzeczpospolita* (special edition: Warszawa, 1 January, 1989).

The effect of these changes was a slightly new shape for the socialist economy. While in the past it had been a centralized state economy with a strictly licensed and marginally sized private sphere in non-agricultural sectors, with the new law it entered an unstable, transitional phase. The central system of control lost its edge and the structure of ownership was partially opened to changes. As opposed to the clear-cut model of socialist economy, the subsequent model was unclear and transitional. It was no longer a typical socialist economy, but not yet a market economy. The new opportunities for private economic activity should not be mistaken for "marketization" of this economy. The state's share of the overall capital resources was still overwhelming, and its domination of the external environment of the private sphere remained sufficiently strong and limiting for the latter still to be licensed.

This analysis of transformations in the Polish economy during the first two thirds of the 80s and its conclusions as to their sufficiency and proper direction make it necessary to raise the question of the nature of the desired economic reform. If a reform is a set of changes bringing an economy from an initial to a target stage, then it is necessary not only to define the specificity of the economy to be reformed, but to point out at least the basic features of the target system, its potential effects and the ways in which this transformation may be accomplished.

The above-mentioned features of the centrally controlled economy make it evident that persistence of that type of economy relied on deprivatization of the spheres of ownership and management. Central management is feasible and relatively effective only when ownership of the means of production is centralized as well. This interrelation could not be changed by the fact that, along with centrally managed and dominating state property, there existed a marginal private sector. The latter, as was said before, was too small to be competitive or complementary to the former, to which it was instead subordinated. This was the position as well of the private sphere, not only in production, distribution and exchange, but also in consumption. The first three of these phases of economic activity were under direct control: they were based mostly on "socialized" property and the position of the single person participating in them was merely that of an executor. The fourth phase, consumption, although seemingly private, proved also to be under external control through the models propagated (e.g., the "socialist consumption model"), the supply structure corresponding to these models, and even direct quantitative control of access to commodities (e.g., ration cards).

With the elimination of the market as the key institution in which exchange value is decided, and after renouncing the information function of the interaction between supply and demand, this economy deprived itself of the basic source of allocative criteria. Its most serious negative effect was the lack of microeconomic optimization in production and consumption.

If the specificity of a socialist economy is known and its disvalue can be seen clearly in its poor market achievements, the vision of the target economic model in the reform remains unclear. As may be concluded from the legal acts initiating economic reform in Poland, the intended target model could have been a socialist economy with a market in which state enterprises could compete with each other within a slightly loosened cincture of central control. The economic system would have preserved its basic features while, at the same time gaining some elasticity. The relationship between the state-controlled and private spheres would not have changed.

Similar traits could be found also in the concept of the reformed Polish economy, presented in the program of "Solidarnosc" trade-union.[7] The first thesis of the program stated that:

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[7] "Program NSZZ 'Solidarnosc' uchwaiony przez I Krajowy Zjazd Delegatow" (Program of "Solidarnosc" Trade-Union Adopted During the First Convention of Delegates), *Tygodnik Solidarnosc* (nr. 29, Oct. 16, 1981).

"Directive-distributive system of control over economic life which hinders rational management must be abolished. In this system, enormous economic power is concentrated in the hands of the party and bureaucratic machine." Nevertheless, the problem of individual participation in the system of ownership was not touched upon. The basic unit in the economy was to be a "social enterprise," i.e., one managed by employees and designed to administer a part of the national property. In such a case, the Polish economy would remain nationalized, but social control over its basic units would be wider and enterprises would be more independent in making decisions concerning the conditions, volume and choice of production.

The Second Stage of Economic Reform

The program of the second stage of economic reform, proposed in 1987, slightly changed this vision of a target economic model. On the one hand, it was assumed that central planning would be more general and part of the planning would be shifted to enterprises. This novelty was not that important, however, for the crucial role still was played by the system of central distribution of resources. Enterprises, while still being state property, were granted a little more freedom in their relations with each other and with other economic agents (e.g., creation of corporations), but they were not so free in their behavior as producers. On the other hand, it was declared that the system would be more liberal in accepting new economic activities undertaken by the representatives of private sectors.[8] Licensing was to be replaced by simple registration.

It is clear that two crucial spheres of the state’s direct involvement in economy, i.e., ownership and management, were gradually changing their character. Management was being decentralized, though direct control measures were still present. The structure of ownership was becoming more open for change. Private initiatives were promised more liberal treatment, although they were to remain a less important supplement to the state-controlled sector. As even these more liberal rules of registration could hardly make them more competitive, the private sector would have to change to force market behavior from state enterprises. Its complementarity would be limited only to some segments of the commodity market, while it could not become a partner in the input market. Such a double-sector structure of property produced an inconsistent economic system in which the service and manufacturing private sector would be limited through input links by the still non-market state sector.

Privatization

The state of affairs created by the laws binding since the beginning of 1989 has been quite different from that of the Polish economy prior to 1981. The result of the law on economic activity and another one which allowed foreign capital to be invested in Poland[9] was that the field for private economic activity has become wider. Although it is too early for complete data on new private enterprises registered after January 1989, it is known that most of them have not been industrial, but rather service and commercial units. This might have been caused by scarcity of private resources, and especially by uncertainty as to the stability of the new policy towards the private sector. Irrespective of the reasons, the new economic situation supported by the 1989 regulations obviously could be accepted as the desired target of economy.

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[8] *Program realizacyjny drugiego etapu reformy gospodarczej* (Program of the Second Stage of Economic Reform) (Warsaw, 1987).

[9] "Ustawa o dzialalnosci gospodarczej z udzialem podmiotow zagranicznych" (Law on Economic Activity with Participation of Foreign Subjects), *Rzeczpospolita* (special edition: Warszawa, Jan. 1, 1989).

For some time it has been almost a common conviction, especially among economists, that transformation of the Polish economy into a more effective and elastic entity compatible with market needs requires deeper changes which effect its roots in property. Restriction of changes to expansion of private sector alongside the dominant state sector is not an optimum solution. The required "marketization" of the economy can take place only when management is in the hands of those institutions directly involved in economic activities and when the right to determine the economic parameters of an activity is based upon ownership of the managed property. In other words, the target economic system is a pluralistic market economy in which everyone who is able is entitled to economic activity; no part of economy is reserved exclusively to but one type of ownership. In such a system, private initiative should be allowed in regions formerly reserved for the economic super-agent, i.e., the state.

At present, the term "privatization" is very often used in discussions of the prospective shape of the Polish economy. The term relates directly to the process of transition to market economy model. The notion of privatization is not the best one in this context, for it suggests a uniform system of private ownership as the only alternative. From the point of view of macroeconomic effects, exclusivity of no one type of ownership should be presumed *ex ante*. When looking at the countries which have no problems with market equilibrium and where such a situation is not reached at the consumer’s expense, we notice a clear constructive function of private property and of a diffused system of decision-making. Such conclusion, however, cannot be arrived at *ex ante* but *ex post*. The superiority of a given type of property, of a specific form of economic activity, can be judged only through its market effects.

Irrespective of the shortcomings of the notion of privatization, its meaning is important. The term describes the process of taking people out of the system in which they are only one element among the employed resources and turning them into co-owners and participants in decision-making. Privatization of the state property would mean, in this case, the transformation of the people employed in this property into its co-owners. Their participation in ownership would be a reason for their participation in the distribution of net effects. One of the advantages of such a solution is the fact that it is not new, because it has been tested in all market economies. The deregulation processes under way in some Western economies have proven that this method has not lost its attractiveness.

"Economic enfranchisement" can be a source of many advantages, both in the short and long run. The most important short run advantages can be:

- a deflationary effect connected with the transformation of a section of personal monetary resources into capital and investment of this capital in title deeds, thus weakening the pressure of empty money on the market;
- personal incomes would be composed of wages and profits from the invested capital, thus weakening the pressure of wages on costs and prices and weakening the inflationary pressure provoked by the supply-side;
- people would be free to decide how to spend their incomes. Thus far an average person has had limited opportunities in this sphere. Though money could be either spent or saved, the latter alternative led to a decrease in the purchasing power of money. In the new system, people would have the right to make investment decisions and to become active economic agents. Thus, the private sphere would enter the realm of investment policy as well.

Equally or even more important could be the long-run effects resulting from the real independence of economic units in the spheres of ownership and management, and from the new opportunities for social influence upon the behavior of the productive sphere. The most important among these would be:

- diffusion of economic power on the supply-side. (The place of the monopoly of the state as the owner and decision-maker having at its disposal an enormous part of supply would be taken by the network of independent producers, each of whom would be too weak to dictate the transaction conditions, thereby strengthening the position of demand.)
- shortening the channels of information between demand and supply so that the sphere of production could learn and react much more quickly to the changing market situation;
- the system of primary distribution would be brought closer to the market so that the remuneration for the various resources employed by enterprises would depend on their economic soundness and their position in the market;
- resources would be better allocated within the national economy inasmuch as members of society, while free in selecting their own investment strategies on the basis of clear criteria of effectiveness, to some extent could decide which production sector would get access to what amount of resources;
- social control over the activity of enterprises would be strengthened through the system of self-management, for the latter would be the real representative of the interests of the co-owner employees;
- attitudes towards work could be improved if the workers were co-owners rather than just employees, for this would result not only in a stronger personal involvement in work, but in a more critical attitude toward others’ work and more care for the economic condition of the entire enterprise.

So far, these effects remain in part potential. They may prove to be realistic if the process of transformation of Polish economy is continuous and if it leads to an activation of the private sphere. Thus, the precondition is the political will to break the ideological canons which have proved to be so destructive for economic life. However, even without political obstacles the process of privatization faces two basic barriers: lack of proper knowledge and habits, and lack of financial resources.

The first barrier is connected with lack of awareness by people of possible ways of executing their rights as co-owners, their ignorance of investment strategies applicable in various situations and, generally speaking, the lack of sufficient knowledge about the functioning of the capital market. In addition, active participation by individual persons in the capital market can be hampered by their low propensity to save, by too strong an attachment to passive saving, and by unwillingness to take a risk in transforming their savings into investment capital. The other barrier may be even more important: the scarcity of disposable resources in Polish society. As the people are simply too poor to invest on a larger scale, the spread of the private sphere can be blocked.

However serious they may be, the two barriers do not rule out progress in privatization. Lessening their impact is only a technical problem. To break down these barriers time is obviously needed. That is why the process of the expansion of the private sphere must be spread over a period of time. For this reason the external political environment of the economic system is even more important because its proper shape can guarantee the continuity of the process of privatization.

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Chapter XII

Obstacles from the Past to Economic Transformation

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November 1993 will be the 75th anniversary of the October Revolution and Russia’s adoption of the communist system. After World War II this system spread around the world, completely, changing the life of many nations. By the mid-80s almost 1.5 billion people lived under the *nomenklatura* system and worked daily in centrally planned economies. However, after decades of expansion and economic growth, the communist countries experienced very serious multilevel crises, of which the economic appeared to be the most disastrous. To shape future developments it is very important that this process be understood properly.

One could read frequently in Western newspapers and periodicals the thesis summed up by Jackson Diehl’s article in *The Washington Post* of October 16, 1988 that the "Communist World Can’t Jump Price Reform Hurdle." The article was quite typical of Western opinion on the economic troubles that have plagued the communist world since the beginning of the 1980s. In Poland that year inflation was expected to exceed 100 percent; in Yugoslavia, the rate was more than twice that. China faced unexpected obstacles in her economic reform; frightened by an inflation rate of 50 percent annually (the highest since the communists took power) the Chinese government slowed the implementation of new measures. In the Soviet Union, the future of economic *perestroika* looked gloomy.

Jumping the Price Hurdle. All the evidence seemed to support the title of Diehl’s article, and other Western evaluations were very similar. *The New York Times* of October 14, 1988 stated that "without an end to subsidies and establishment of market prices, which means a painful interim of austerity and inequality, there is no way to economic health." It does not say, however, how to establish market prices when the market simply did not exist in the communist countries. It is also worth adding that most reformers in centrally planned economies eagerly accepted the position of the international financial community that, to revive economic growth, a country must first raise consumer prices in order to diminish state subsidies. Thus, communist governments listed "price reform" as the first objective on their agenda. Hence, the question arises: why can they not succeed in jumping the price reform hurdle despite repeated efforts, if this agrees both with their own beliefs and with Western advocates? Could there be some trap hidden behind the hurdle?

The facts speak for themselves. Yugoslavia introduced an economic reform based upon the idea of "self-governing" socialism and free market prices in 1965. Hungary started her effort to reach a "socialist controlled market" in 1968. China introduced reform in 1978, which has been recognized widely as the world’s most dynamic transformation from a Stalinist economic model to a free market. Poland, after the convulsive years of Solidarity and martial law, climbed two "stages" of economic reform. The first one began in 1982 with 300 percent price hikes. The second one began at the end of 1987 and took observers by surprise by rejecting many communist economic dogmas. However, all these efforts seem to have failed to achieve their objectives. If the communist world has experienced repeated waves of reforms that simply do not work, the question is why?

Using Western Criteria. It is not easy to answer this question. The Western public, bankers, and journalists seem to forget at times the substantial differences between the two economic systems, trying to explain developments in the East usually by painting pictures with Western brushes and Western imagination. Such a method of explanation did not help to understand the essence of *perestroika* or the sudden delay in Chinese reforms; it made the picture dimmer instead of clearer.

Understanding the East has become a Western problem as great business and political opportunities have opened up. It is strongly possible that there will not be a single communist state on the earth by the end of this century. Is the West prepared to benefit from this entirely new situation? Are the reasons behind the fall of "The Eastern Empire" properly understood in order to exploit the opportunities for world peace? What are and will be the basic mechanisms of transformation from a Soviet-style economy to a free market, and is such a transformation a prerequisite for democracy? These are questions which, if improperly answered, may bring about revolutionary and violent developments, harming not only the one-third of the world population which had lived under the communist system, but the so-called Free World itself.

Communism walked on four legs: ideology, a "flat social structure," a centrally planned economy, and a political *nomenklatura* system. All of these have a very practical meaning and in the past have been very useful and even efficient; all of them must walk together in order for the system to be energetic. After decades of militancy based upon potent aggregation of most of the national resources under control of the state, all four legs apparently became more or less consumptive; all four shook so that walking became more and more painful.

Ideology

The practical meaning of ideology is hope. In the early stages of communism the people's expectations for a better future (perhaps, not for themselves, but surely for their children) had been one of the most important incentives for hard work and "mass political activity." When the future arrived, however, communist nations and their political activists at first faced empty shops and long lines of tired people hoping to buy merely the most basic goods. Instead of a promising future, communist societies faced deep economic, social and political crises. A widespread feeling of lack of hope for a better future became widespread.

Vitali Korotich, who edited the lively Soviet politics review, *Ogonyok*, when asked what he wants and is fighting so hard for, said simply: "I'm tired of labels; I want a normal country." In Budapest, a young journalist said in disgust: "Nothing works here the way it is supposed to in a normal country." In Poland, Solidarity's Lech Walesa said the real issue was no longer reforms, "It's how to get out of this abnormal system that can only produce absurdity." In the spring of 1988, Polish Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, then a Communist Party Politburo member, distributed a secret memorandum to the communist power elite warning that the future of the Soviet Union and of the communist system was in doubt. "Let's do something now before it's too late," said Rakowksi. The Kremlin's ideology chief, Vadim Medvedev, said modestly: "We have to understand better the practice of modern social democracy; our ideas on the economic and social bases of socialism need seriously to be renewed and deepened." It was the real end of communist ideology. What can replace it?

A Flat Social Structure

Social structure was flattened at the very beginning of the communist system: to be wealthy was equal to being an "enemy of the people." The top portion of society was physically or economically eliminated; the social hierarchy was turned upside down and the huge bureaucracy was recruited mainly from the bottom of society. That was one of the most important factors in building popular support for the system. The state bureaucracy provided a unique historic chance for the poor, uneducated and imprudent individuals and their families. A basic commandment in the communist bloc to anyone wishing to make a career in the system was: "Never try to be too professional, never try to be too intelligent; that will get you killed." Now there is an obvious need to diminish the number of bureaucratic positions in order to save resources and time; there is also a need to promote professionals instead of political activists. The differences between social stratification as a foundation of the political systems in democratic underdeveloped and communist countries are illustrated in Diagram 1.

Achieving Internal Equilibrium. Despite the curious character of social stratification under the communist regimes, quite logical rules were hidden behind this structure and stabilized the entire system. A certain balance in spending is essential for achieving an internal socio-economic equilibrium. The balance, however, depends upon the availability of economic resources, and the centrally planned economy and its state-owned companies are the major source of state spending for different purposes. At least half of all resources went to the state budget. The rest of the gross national product was strictly controlled by central planners. Thus, consumption was not a result of economic development, but was dictated by the central plan. The level of consumption and average salary reflected not the economy's ability to produce consumer goods, but the planner's conviction that these salaries offered to employees, when combined with expenditures for repressive forces, would be sufficient to maintain the social order. As the costs of the social order depended mostly on the extent of resistance, the situation in Poland differed from that of Romania, for example. The cheaper the social order, the more resources could be diverted from consumption to state projects, which were the main objects of the state's care because they represented a "state power" factor.

Additional factors influenced the socio-economic equilibrium of a communist country. One of them was state employee benefits directly connected with the social prestige of the bureaucracy. The more privileges available for the bureaucracy, the stronger was bureaucratic careerism, which solidified the whole balance of the system. On the other hand, the vast majority of the society depended on some subsidies from the state budget. The most important part of this "social security" factor were subsidies in areas of housing, food prices, health care and education. Since employees of the socialized sector were beneficiaries of this factor, changes of expenditures for these purposes influenced the whole system's equilibrium. Diagram 2 shows the main factors influencing the socio-economic balance of the communist society and the position of a centrally planned economy as the source of funds for maintaining social order and supporting the state power factor--the ultimate goal of the whole system.

Centrally Planned Economy

Central planning was the core of the communist system from its very beginning. Remarks from such prominent economists as Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek that such a system would ultimately be inefficient were neglected. At the early stage of communism, central state planning seemed triumphant and, to some degree, was backed with enthusiasm by many Western economists who warned that the West would be surpassed economically by Soviet-style nations.

The early successes of communist economies, however, were only short-term for they relied on a concentration of all available resources in order to obtain a high rate of economic growth. This effect could last only as long as the pre-communist market price structure was maintained. But, since communist states intentionally destroyed market forces and granted themselves the right of price regulations, their economies became blind.

Price Restructuring. The greatest plague of centrally planned economies was a lack of sense of locality. When prices ceased to be controlled, inflation shot up, central planning jerked convulsively from one direction to another; much investment was wasted; pollution became the most intense in the world; and in the system that claimed social justice to be the most important issue there was more inequality than ever. That is why governments of communist nations followed so willingly the World Bank's advice to begin reforms by first implementing price reforms. Rulers thought that this way they could revive the market price structure and restore the system's economic orientation, but it was not so easy.

A free market is not simply the implementation of price equilibrium; this is not even the beginning of market revival, nor should it be taken seriously as a prerequisite for major reforms. This can be seen from the example of Yugoslavia. Though Yugoslavia implemented price equilibrium in the late 1960s, the economic crisis seemed to be as painful as in Poland where price disequilibrium was intentionally sought for many years. That is because it is impossible to build a free market price structure on the surface of a completely centrally planned economic and social structure. Resistance to price restructuring came not merely from those who did not like it (nobody likes price hikes); the real resistance came from the substance of the communist system, from all the elements of its economy and social stratification. People resisted price hikes mainly because they doubted that they could bring any positive result since there was no link between price changes and productivity in a communist system. Thus, a communist country needed to start free market-oriented reforms not by price reform, but by introducing a new legal system, a new civil code able to secure property rights and accelerate the emergence of a capital market.

There is a substantial difference between the meaning of the term "market" in the two systems. In a free market system the market is a complex structure regulating the behavior of three market "actors": consumers, entrepreneurs and government agencies. In a free market system the government plays a specific moderator's role. In the centrally planned economy, the market means something entirely different: it is only a small margin of the economy where consumers can buy some goods with their salaries. Only this part of the economy is called market. Thus, one actor--the consumer--is being kept on a short leash by central planners, while another one--the entrepreneur--simply does not exist. The only independent and really decisive actor remains the state which is an amalgamation of the communist party structure, the government and its agencies, and the socialized sector of the economy. The difference between a free market complex and the market in a centrally planned economy is shown in Diagrams 3 and 4.

Thus, the national economy in a centrally planned system is divided into two areas which are not connected directly: the market and the non-market areas. The primary part of the economy is the non-market one; the market area is of secondary importance and represents the consumption factor from Diagram 2. The GNP is distributed in two sequences. The extent of consumption is not divided before the level of investment is stabilized. The level of consumption is what remains after the investment plan is executed. Interrelations between market and non-market areas are shown in Diagram 1.

The Nomenklatura System

The system of *nomenklatura*, which was frequently misunderstood in the West, stopped working. This system was very unusual because it gives more power to informal or non-normative institutional structures than to formal or normative ones. This allows power elites to implement the most democratic-looking legal systems in the most oppressive ways. For instance, it enabled Stalin to celebrate the abandonment of the death penalty in the Soviet penal code while millions of people were dying in the Gulag. The *nomenklatura* system was not reflected by law. The only legal basis for communist party power was its role as a "vanguard" as mentioned in the communist state's constitution. The real basis of its power, however, was the social contract formed and solidified by years of Stalinist repressions. The position of the Communist Party hierarchy in the state's structure is shown in Diagram 2.

Finally, the *nomenklatura* system stopped working. That Poland was a forerunner of the *nomenklatura's* decay could explain the Polish phenomenon. Formally and legally the Polish Communist Party had no power: it had always relied upon vocal orders, never written decisions, to carry out its wishes. That is why all the documents found by Solidarity activists investigating illegal practices contained only signatures of people from administrative institutions--Communist Party leaders appeared to be free of any charges. Even Mr. Gierek, Polish ruler and first secretary of the powerful Communist Party Central Committee, pretended he was not in a position to make any important political or economic decisions. He was fired from his post, but since there was no legal evidence against him, he was never punished. After martial law was implemented in Poland, the Polish *Sejm* became one of the busiest parliaments of the world, issuing hundreds of new regulations to prevent blaming the administration for further Communist Party apparatus power abuses. The Communist Party never recovered from this blow, and its informal power was weakened as never before. This was also a heavy blow to the *nomenklatura* system, which explained why Poland under military rule turned out to be one of the most liberal countries in Eastern Europe.

Life had become uneasy in the East not only for the ordinary people, but also for their rulers. Many questions coming out of the communist Pandora's box, if not answered properly, could result in hopelessness and violence. That is why the governments began desperately to seek for any pragmatic answer to the current crisis, no matter how unpleasant. The answer lay in the popular Polish joke, that "socialism is the longest way from capitalism to capitalism." Some communist governments understood the problem better than others. The Parliament in Budapest, Hungary, approved a Law on Corporate Association intended to let the private sector blossom, to liberate the movement of capital, and to allow Western companies to buy Hungarian ones. Hungarians look capitalism out of the closet and put it on the statute books.

The communist nations, after decades of economic and social experiments, found themselves trapped in a time machine, taking them back to the reality they had passed. They had to witness history again, but this time in reverse: from a centrally planned economy to a free market, from a flat and equalized society to social and political diversification, from *nomenklatura* to democracy, but also from hopelessness to newborn hope. This is a long, rocky, and dangerous path; but the West can help them mount the mule.

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Chapter XIII

The Political Economy of Free Market Reforms in Developing Nations

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Encouraging developing nations to embrace free market strategies of development was a principal theme--perhaps the single most coherent one--in the foreign economic policy of the Reagan era;* similar strategy characterized President Bush's foreign policy. In bilateral assistance programs and before multilateral lending agencies, the United States has trumpeted the economic advantages of free market liberalization. The evidence of free market capitalism's greater success in delivering the economic benefits of growth, enhanced trade competitiveness and flows of much-needed foreign capital is indeed overwhelming, especially when contrasted with the blatant failures of socialist collectivism. Perhaps the greatest testimony to the victory of the capitalist road to development is the increasing number of formerly statist regimes which have begun experimenting with the market, however cautiously and often against serious internal opposition. Simply put, most of the poor people on the planet, who have suffered enormously under misconceived programs of socialist, communist or fascist centralization, are today experiencing varying degrees of exposure to the competitive rigors of the marketplace.

It is true that there are precious few examples of countries successfully shifting away from dirigiste "command" economies toward de-centralized, market-oriented economic practices. Two of the outstanding postwar examples--West Germany and Japan--achieved their liberalization under American occupation and with the considerable support of the Marshall Plan and its East Asian counterpart. Today's market-oriented reformist nations therefore lack a blueprint to guide their efforts. Nevertheless, some "experiments" are today rather advanced (Chile since 1973; the People's Republic of China since 1978; Sri Lanka since 1978; Hungary and Mexico) while others remain hesitant and tentative (India since 1985; Egypt under Mubarak; post-Nyerere Tanzania; Algeria; Barbados; Indonesia; Vietnam; Ghana; Turkey).

Undoubtedly, a number of external factors have encouraged this trend toward "marketization" in the developing world. The example of the capitalist "Four Tigers" (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore) has clearly inspired others to imitate their phenomenal success. Overt pressures exerted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to tie new capital infusions to the adoption of acceptable measures of free market liberalization have been critical (though, some efforts at "reform" amount to window-dressing to earn a favorable nod from the multilateral lending agencies). The foreign aid programs of major developed nations similarly have tied new assistance to satisfactory progress in economic liberalization.

Despite this near unanimity with which the policies of marketization have been urged on the developing nations, and despite the abundant evidence now available from a widely diverse range of experiments with such liberalization, remarkably little attention has been paid to the actual historical record of such reforms. What has been the actual experience of such free market penetration in formerly closed societies? What have been the economic results of the reforms? What have been the unforeseen problems which these economies experienced? Perhaps most interesting, what have been the varieties of *political* experience which accompany marketization? What forms of political *resistance* to change have arisen, and how have political institutions been subject to change as a result of free market capitalism? How have political coalitions been constructed to initiate and to sustain the momentum of the market reform process? Finally, what have been the broader social and cultural consequences of reforms, and how have socio-cultural factors conditioned and affected the progress of market reform efforts?

This essay will attempt briefly to delineate answers to these empirical questions. It aspires to be suggestive, not exhaustive. It will suggest major *syndromes* of problems and potentially troublesome consequences which, the record suggests, attend any serious effort at liberalizing formerly statist economies. It will suggest as well what types of political strategies seem to work best in encouraging liberalization in the face of often tenacious sources of resistance. The point is not to argue against the feasibility or desirability of such efforts, but rather to illuminate the potential problems likely to arise, and hence to encourage more informed policy-making in both the developed and underdeveloped nations.

Marketization: Four Dimensions of Politico-Economic Change

Marketization of formerly closed or chaotic economies entails fundamental reforms in at least four principal areas:

1) *Reform of the Price System*. Allowing market forces to establish prices for capital and consumer goods and services is a key first step. Deregulation must extend not only to commodities, but also to credit markets affecting interest rates and other financial prices.

2) *Enterprise-Level Reforms*. Structural microeconomic reforms must allow managers sufficient autonomy to respond rationally to the fluctuations of prices in decisions affecting purchases of inputs, pricing of outputs, marketing and profit retention. Privatization and elimination of foreign subsidies is an important element of such reform efforts. The creation of genuine markets for capital, labor and other inputs is also important.

3) *Fiscal and Monetary Reforms*. Such reforms must encourage macroeconomic conditions favorable to the microeconomic reforms. This includes responsible budgetary policies including austerity measures and measures to reduce bureaucratic interference with the private sector and monetary policies which are noninflationary.

4) *Reform of the Foreign Economic Regime*. Dismantling tariff and nontariff barriers to trade permits international market competition to enhance the competitiveness of domestic industries. Liberalization of the treatment of foreign investors, establishment of realistic exchange rates and broad acceptance of GATT rules governing the trading system are included in these efforts.

Within each of these four arenas, an essential requirement will be legal reforms. In the absence of appropriate guarantees governing such issues as contracts, regulatory issues, treatment of foreign investors, and dispute settlement and adjudication little progress can be expected.

It is also important to appreciate that these four elements impact upon each other. Each element can affect the other in either positive or negative ways, as will be discussed below.

Price Reforms, Political, Social and Economic Considerations

Artificial controls on the prices of goods or services, whether final consumption goods or capital inputs, are fundamentally incompatible with the free market system. In such a system, prices are the essential signals which indicate how resources are to be allocated in order to respond to the forces of market demand and supply. Since price controls invariably prevent that signalling from occurring, production decisions cannot be geared to real conditions, but instead will reflect the arbitrary wishes of those political agents who control the prices. Misallocation of resources, gluts, shortages, consumer disaffection and producer inefficiency are the result. It is not surprising then to find that price reform is a first priority for nations pursuing a marketization development strategy.

Planning, Price and Enterprise Reform: The Sequencing Issue

The removal of centralized planning in favor of price reform and enterprise autonomy poses a host of difficult political, social and economic issues. A central issue is that of determining the proper sequence of reforms. Too rapid elimination of price controls is inherently inflationary unless accompanied, or even *preceded* by, measures to increase factor-mobility and enterprise reforms to encourage autonomous responses to market price "signals." Were prices to be decontrolled which managers were operating under the old "rules of the game" of meeting fixed quotas for a guaranteed fee there would be no incentive to respond efficiently to economize on inputs or improve marketing of outputs: they would simply continue to mark-up prices to cover costs. Similarly, if industrial prices are decontrolled but agricultural prices remain fixed, farmers' incentives to grow food declines and shortages result. Maintenance of "dual markets" within a *given commodity* category (e.g., meat) wherein a fixed proportion of output is sold to the state while the remainder may be sold, at higher prices, on the free market, is a prescription for speculative corruption and black marketeering. Maintenance of "dual markets" *between different* commodities (e.g., grain vs. other cash crops), wherein one commodity's price is fixed while others fluctuate, results in a transfer of resources out of the controlled category (grain) and into more lucrative production of marketable cash crops. In addition, the sequencing of decontrol of internal vs. external markets has proven to be a thorny issue: if external controls on capital flows are relaxed *before* reform of internal financial markets, capital flight may result as investors seek to escape artificially-low, controlled interest rates in favor of realistic (i.e., higher) rates abroad.

Finally, substantial evidence exists to support the desirability of liberalizing trade and encouraging exports *prior to* liberalization of capital markets. Otherwise, inflows of foreign capital (whether portfolio investment in search of higher real interest rates or direct investment attracted by the reform efforts themselves) result in an appreciation of the exchange rate which stifles exports. Similarly, reduction of protective tariffs should *precede* liberalization of capital markets. If not, capital flows into the secure protected industries and the new export industries will suffer.

Price Reforms, Inflation and Recessionary Cycles

The mix of measures implied in "Price Reform" includes several changes with serious inflationary implications. Inflationary pressures in turn may create the need for counter-inflationary measures which threaten recession. The mix of inflation and recession is one which could portend serious political instabilities.

One of the most common features of recent marketization reforms has been an upsurge of inflation which has proven quite difficult to dampen. Collectivized economies generally are characterized by an enormous pent-up demand for a vast array of durable and non-durable goods as well as services. Relaxation of price controls often releases these demand pressures and results in a classic demand-pull inflation, exacerbated by supply-side bottlenecks. Overheating economies which have also liberalized the foreign trade and payments sectors (by relaxing controls on imports and exports) may see substantial spillover of domestic demand into demand for imports, contributing to a rapid run-up of balance of trade deficits. Devaluation, in turn, can increase the prices of imports, thus worsening the inflationary problem.

The political and economic costs of such inflation are potentially enormous. Inflation often outstrips the ability of wage earners to keep up. Lagging real wages have translated into serious labor unrest in China and Chile. Perhaps even more importantly, inflation can impede efforts to reform enterprise management.

Reforms have ended the typical statist arrangements under which factory managers automatically received allocations of labor, capital and raw materials and were responsible only for meeting annual quotas of production, regardless of costs, quality or profits. But the new system required that prices be *unfrozen* as managers competed in the market for inputs of labor, capital and materials. Price deregulation became difficult as prices soared. Notably, in the case of the PRC, this raised fears of the sort of runaway spiral which helped bring down the Nationalist regime. It is plausible too that such concerns contributed to the hesitation in the reforms in state-owned enterprises in China.

Efforts to curb such inflation clearly pose the additional danger of economic recession. Tightening the money supply, raising interest rates, and resisting downward pressure on the currency, combined with the contraction in real wages, may arrest the inflationary spiral at the cost of creating a recession and labor unrest. Bankruptcies, unemployment and the sort of mounting governmental deficits associated with a recessionary period could pose a different but profoundly dangerous set of political problems for the reforms. Such was the case in Chile and China in the 1980s, where social tension and political disappointment nearly ended the reform efforts.

The possibilities of recession may also be expected to vary according to the severity and speed with which the other macroeconomic goals of deficit reduction and budgetary austerity are implemented. A country which traditionally has relied upon a large public sector as a source of spending and investment may probably not expect the heretofore small and neglected private sector to move quickly to replace public funds as providers of such investment. Again, too drastic or rapid a drawdown of public expenditures would worsen the likelihood of a recession attending the market reform process. Clearly such fears have in many other instances led to a watering-down of the reforms.

Enterprise Level Reform

Management and labor alike may resist those market reforms at the factory level which threaten the possibility of bankruptcy and unemployment. The trade-off between job security vs. the possibility of greater prosperity earned in a competitive market environment dampens enthusiasm for marketization at the factory level in numerous developing nations. Privatization efforts pose a number of delicate economic and political problems.

a) The success of any privatization scheme obviously depends critically upon the competitive abilities of the private sector. Throughout much of the developing world it simply cannot be assumed that the private sector is necessarily more efficient or more attuned to the pressures of the marketplace than state-owned enterprises (SOEs). On the contrary, the private sector in developing nations has often been highly protected, nurtured by direct subsidies and insulated behind high and effective tariff barriers. A long history of easy profits, official subsidies and protected markets has stunted their entrepreneurial spirit, while encouraging the forms of corruption and graft typical of such close government-business interconnections. In many countries the traditional private sector is a major roadblock to the development of market competitiveness, while the "informal" sector of the economy harbors the true entrepreneurial spirit.

In such a situation, privatizing former state-owned enterprises, especially monopolies, merely perpetuates inefficiency and encourages resistance to genuine marketization.

b) The overall context of such privatization efforts is important. While selling off money-losing SOEs appears an easy way to eliminate at least part of official deficits, it may require a host of other market reforms to ensure that mounting private sector losses do not simply take the place of earlier public sector deficits. If formerly public firms confront a "soft" budget constraint (i.e., are still allowed to function as monopolies, or continue to receive state subsidies, or are encouraged to expect official bailouts should performance not meet market requirements) the result could actually retard progress.[1]

c) Privatization poses direct threats to entrenched bureaucratic elites formerly charged with running state-owned enterprises. Political resistance is potentially widespread and formidable. Such has been the experience in the PRC, India, Sri Lanka and many other reform efforts.

Labor market reforms are another essential dimension of marketization. Typically in a pre-reform, statist economy the wages and movement of workers were administratively controlled and fixed. Workers were generally prohibited from changing jobs in pursuit of better wages, conditions or other incentives. Often migration to urban areas was forbidden. State-owned firms dominate the distribution of such services as housing, education, medical and health care, and even recreation. The net result was an immobile and stultified work force incapable of responding to new opportunities and tied inextricably in a web of state-dominated dependency. Market reforms must break these bonds in order for wages to reflect true costs of production and in order to free up the labor force to respond rationally to the appropriate signals of changing relative prices on goods and services and in changing salary and wage differentials. Such labor market reforms in turn must be sequenced with other enterprise reforms: if wages are allowed to rise, but firms still face a "soft" budgetary constraint with weak (or nonexistent) profit incentives the result will more likely be a wage-push inflationary spiral with no improvement in overall efficiency or productivity.

In a marketized economy, inputs and outputs are available for purchase on the market. Although some products judged critical may continue to be allocated by central authorities, decisions by managers should entail more or less purchases in the market rather than reliance on central allocation.[2] Management decisions should be motivated *primarily* by the pursuit of profit. In a marketized economy management is more or less free to ignore bureaucratic intrusions, as the bureaucracy is no longer responsible for appointments and promotions, no longer in control of input-allocation, and no longer in control of the entry or exit of firms in industry. In short, in a marketized economy autonomous managers confront a "hard" budget constraint. Finally, it is essential that there be substantial competition in the marketplace. In the absence of competition, measures to decontrol prices may simply reward monopolists with higher rents while contributing nothing to improving long-run economic efficiency and competitiveness.

Resistance to efforts at privatization arise from two key sources: Bureaucrats resist exchanging their powerful and lucrative positions as service-providers for less prestigious and less remunerative roles as contract administrators or regulators. Established franchised monopolists likely will similarly resist any introduction of genuine competition. In addition, a variety of less spurious arguments may be raised in opposition to privatization. The most common claims asserted by opponents of privatization include the contention that state-run services are *natural* monopolies and that there would be too few viable competitors able to provide such services in the absence of the state. Thus, the argument has gone, privatization would transfer power to private monopolists less likely to be responsive to social concerns (e.g. provision of access to services by the poor). Any coherent and extensive privatization strategy will succeed only if such arguments of the resistance can be effectively refuted. Any strategy to develop working coalitions which can sustain privatization will require an intellectual effort to address the "natural monopoly" argument.

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[1] The "soft" budget constraint is a concept elaborated by Janos Kornai. See *The Road to a Free Economy* (New York: Norton, 1990), especially 39-57.

[2] See the discussion of Dwight H. Perkins, "Reforming China’s Economic System," *Journal of Economic Literature*, XXVI (1988), 603-605.

Finally, even in the absence of willful resistance by turf-conscious bureaucrats, implementation of market reforms face many hurdles. Both the efforts by the former Soviet Republic and the Central and Eastern European nations have shown that even well-intentioned reformers confront enormous problems in coordinating their liberalizing efforts. Marketization requires that diverse agencies collaborate in effecting macro-and micro-economic changes. Such cooperation is often quite difficult to achieve.

An even greater source of resistance derives from the simple fact that the objectives of foreign investors may differ from those of local officials. In the past, for instance, the objectives of foreign investors--to produce and sell products to nearly 280 million Soviet consumers--often clashed dramatically with the Soviet desire that joint ventures produce primarily for the *export* market in order to earn vitally needed hard currency.

Finally, the success of enterprise level reforms may in turn depend importantly on the ability of reformers to alter existing educational policies. Third World education has been notoriously biased against the study of business and management and in favor of the study of law and liberal arts. One key example is China where, by 1979, a serious educational bottleneck existed and now many are opting for direct economic engagement rather than any higher education. In addition, many systems were biased in favor of universal elementary education. In China Deng reversed Mao’s egalitarian goal of mass education; whereas Mao’s system educated impressively large numbers of high school students, the quality of instruction was generally low. Between 1979 and 1985 the number of high school graduates declined from 7.2 million to 1.96 million and the number of high schools declined from 192,152 to 93,221.

Macroeconomic Reforms

Macroeconomic reforms are crucial to any marketization effort, especially in the initial stages. Market incentives and price deregulation cannot operate in a climate of runaway inflation. Monetary and fiscal controls are essential to break the economic and psychological inflationary spiral and to make price reform possible. To free prices without establishing fiscal responsibility and controlling the money supply is a prescription for disastrous inflation. Failure to control the creation of credit in the banking and financial sectors has lead to inflationary crises in a number of cases (Chile in the early 1980s; China in the late 1980s). Failure to allow interest rates to rise to realistic levels has also complicated reform efforts: artificially low interest rates have prompted capital flight as investors--legally or illegally--pursue higher returns on investable funds. Artificially low interest rates in combination with inflationary pressures can lead to panic buying, hoarding, shortages, and still greater inflationary pressures (China in 1988-1989). Tax policies must also be adapted to the exigencies of a market society. Tax breaks and subsidies for state-owned enterprises (the "soft" budget constraint) postpone the day of reckoning for these inefficient and uncompetitive enterprises, often at the expense of more competitive private firms.

In short, macroeconomic policies can encourage reform by allowing price deregulation in a non-inflationary environment. Macroeconomic stabilization is a *sine qua non* for the establishment of an economic and psychological environment where market signals and incentives guide economic activity.

Marketization thus entails a substantial reduction of the role of the state in the fiscal, monetary, and credit systems. In statist economies the central government budget represented a larger proportion of GDP than in market-oriented economies. The expenses of a huge bureaucracy, massive subsidization of inefficient state-owned enterprises and state control of capital and investment allocations contributed to the problem. Because a large fraction of net income was controlled by the central government, there was precious little role for banks, financial intermediaries, firms and households to engage in the allocation of funds. The result was a stifling of capital markets and the "crowding out" of market-responsive actors pursuing profitable discretionary investment prospects. Marketization will necessitate reversing the trend toward fiscal centralization and encouraging the growth of competitive financial intermediaries, new sources of credit, and monetary instruments to serve a developing capital market. Appropriate legal reforms to increase the transparency, predictability and security of the new instruments will also be critical to these decentralization efforts.

International Economic Reforms

Balancing Tariff Reduction and Exchange Rate Reforms

The implementation of reforms in the foreign trade and exchange rate sectors poses a particularly difficult set of problems. The proper pacing and sequencing of tariff reductions and the establishment of realistic, market-determined exchange rates is problematic. If tariffs are eliminated too drastically, once-protected firms may succumb quickly to a flood of foreign imports, resulting in heavy losses, possible bankruptcy and politically volatile unemployment problems. A combination of drastic tariff reductions *plus* the maintenance of overvalued foreign exchange rates represents a particularly difficult "double challenge." In Chile, domestic firms experienced import surges at the same time that Chilean exports were priced out of foreign markets, doubly encouraged by lower tariffs plus the effect of lower import prices and higher costs of Chilean exports expressed in terms of the overvalued national currency. Between 1977-1981, tariff rates fell to a low of 10 percent while the peso was fixed at the vastly overvalued level of 39 pesos to the dollar. The results were spiralling trade deficits, unrestrained imprudent borrowing by domestic *empresarios*, and a spending binge by Chilean consumers financed by an avalanche of debt, rising to $5.5 billion in 1981 alone. Subsequently, a modest increase in tariffs to 20 percent across-the-board plus the establishment of a crawling-peg system of regular adjustments (i.e. devaluations) of the peso restored Chile’s export competitiveness: exports rose 13 percent per year from 1982-1986, and nearly 20 percent in 1987. In this case, the need to temper Chicago School free market orthodoxy with strong doses of political and economic pragmatism averted an economic crisis which might well have undermined support for the continuation of the market reform efforts.

Changes in the foreign trade and currency regimes also raise potentially divisive questions concerning equity. There are clearly relative winners and losers in such economic reform. Losers include formerly protected industrial (and sometimes agricultural) interests who profited from previous state subsidies and import-substitution protective polices. Winners include export-oriented sectors and often non-traditional economic producers who benefit from currency depreciation, deregulation, and (perhaps) lower tax rates occasioned by the reduction or elimination of subsidies. Losers may also include those left unemployed or under-employed as a result of their firm's inability to withstand foreign competition, as well as workers whose real wages decline as a result of price deregulation, inflation and the need to restrain unit costs of production in order to remain internationally competitive.

The impact of liberalization of foreign trade upon traditionally protected sectors will likely prove disruptive. The degree to which this is true, and hence the appropriate pace at which liberalization should proceed, will vary depending upon the relative importance of external versus internal demand for a nation's output. To the extent that external demand is relatively low, a rapid liberalization can be expected to imply losses in the protected industries which will not be counter-balanced by gains in the exporting sectors.[3] The possibilities of a recession are therefore very real (especially if austerity measures necessitated to combat inflation are simultaneously implemented). The recessionary scenario may be further exacerbated by the time-lags involved in transferring resources from the import-substitution sector to the export sector. Such a process implies infrastructural investments which will likely occur only after a lag, whereas the losses experienced by the import-substituting sectors will be immediate, especially when accompanied by monetary and fiscal contraction. Thus, it is clear that the timing and sequencing of economic reforms in the foreign trade sector and in monetary and fiscal policies very probably will be a critical element in any successful marketization program.

Adoption of reforms in the trade and currency regimes will therefore clearly raise political dilemmas proportionate to the ability of winners and losers to organize politically. Any coherent political strategy of marketization must anticipate the distribution of likely gains and losses and provide a mix of incentives and disincentives to contain potential resistance from the once-advantaged losers. Such measures might include relatively unsavory measures such as curtailment of labor unions' right to strike (Mexico, Chile); provision of a temporary transition period of gradual phasing out of subsidies and reduction of protection as in Chile since 1982; adoption of employee stock ownership plans to help win labor support (Chile; China recently; Sri Lanka; India); and provision of adjustment assistance to industries judged to be legitimately damaged by import surges or by the financial effects of currency devaluations (e.g., industries dependent upon foreign imports of critical intermediate inputs).

Foreign Direct and Portfolio Investment

Liberalization of the regime governing foreign direct and portfolio investment similarly may raise a host of economic and political problems for reformers. Ideological resistance rooted in suspicion and fear of foreign imperialist penetration may be quite strong (as in the PRC among the "conservatives" or among leftist groups in Chile and Mexico, especially during the early phase of the reform efforts). Perhaps politically more significant is the likely opposition to foreign investment rooted in practical economic self-interest. The firms likely to feel most threatened by foreign competitors would include those formerly protected industries likely to be least prepared to meet the new competition; labor organizations seeking to guarantee certain levels of employment and the training of blue and white collar workers; assurances of certain levels of export performance where feasible; traditional landed elites ("latifundistas" in Latin America, landlords in India) likely to feel threatened by the shifts toward export-oriented cash crop production; and, of course, bureaucratic officials who see the relaxation of investment controls as a direct assault on their presumably once lucrative regulatory and licensing powers.

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[3] Such was the case in Brazil, 1964-1967. Even though exports grew rapidly, their small share of the GNP failed to compensate for broader output declines in the formerly protected sectors.

Just as the politicization of an economy elevates the stakes and the corruption associated with playing the political-economic game, so too any depoliticization will threaten directly once-powerful political-bureaucratic interests (a process clearly evident in the PRC, India, the Soviet Union and a host of smaller developing nations). Again, the maintenance of momentum behind the market reform efforts will likely involve a mix of carrots and sticks to buy off or intimidate the disaffected; "performance requirements" to satisfy the concerns of business and labor groups relating to investor performance and employment, training and indigenization of management; and enhanced opportunities for formerly protected sectors to participate in the newly-formed enterprises (e.g., joint ventures, provisions for reversion to native ownership after a set term, etc.). Such arrangement, condemned by free market purists have proliferated among the pragmatic reformists who appreciate the political necessity of such compromises.

Conclusions

When the decade of the 80s closed, Third World elites confronted formidable crises, including onerous levels of debt-service, declining earnings on traditional exports, and bloated, inefficient, money-losing public sector enterprises. In an effort to cope with these challenges, many developing nations have turned with unprecedented zeal toward economic liberalization, privatization and other market-oriented economic restructuring. Instead of opting for the more familiar strategies of squeezing more savings and investment from overburdened middle classes and oppressed peasants, ruling elites are opting instead to increase the efficiency of existing investments and of new undertakings through greater reliance on market forces. This phenomenon of "marketization" is not difficult to understand. Indeed, given the collapse of statist, collectivist and communist arrangements, the embrace of marketization strategies was rational, even predictable.

What is not at all so understandable or predictable is precisely what will be the effects of Third World marketization efforts. Markets are not apolitical abstractions. The classical economists, beginning with Adam Smith, appreciated quite clearly that markets are *political* constructs dependent for their smooth functioning upon social, cultural and political arrangements which may facilitate or impede market-oriented activities. In turn, the conduct of economic activity through the operation of the marketplace shape the political, social and cultural life of a nation. A market is an arena of competition. Competition *may* be inherently *conflictual* and such conflicts will occur *within* a context of existing political relationships which they probably alter in ways difficult to predict.

A number of urgent issues will dominate the agendas of future market reformists in the developing world. Perhaps most critical is the need to fabricate and sustain a supportive coalition to maintain the momentum of the reforms through the difficult times which seem inevitably to accompany such ambitious marketization efforts. The record suggests that markets are less spontaneous, harmonic and mutually beneficial, and more precarious, potentially conflictual and potentially disruptive than the conventional pro-market advocates have appreciated. A functioning market system in a developing nation context is likely to be a fragile political construct. Whether some variation of "neo-authoritarianism" is essential to the success of such marketizing reforms is a debate which this paper cannot hope to detail, much less to resolve. But the evidence is at least persuasive that an adroit balancing of diverse interests and an intelligent *plan* for the implementation of an appropriate sequence of reforms requires something more like *political will* than an apolitical spontaneous harmony of interests.

In short, marketization does not equal *depoliticization*; it is a political strategy. One should never presuppose that some natural coalition in favor of the market exists; but neither should one presuppose that resistance in any particular form will be inevitable.

How conscious human agents will respond to the mix of costs and benefits associated with marketization is an empirical question. Similarly, the nature of the coalition that will most successfully carry out such a program should not be presumed in advance. Prominent recent Marxists have reminded us that often people who share similar *class* interests will entertain quite different ideas and act according to quite different perceptions of their priorities.[4] Political, cultural and ideological factors in addition to material class interests undoubtedly will affect the ultimate shape of the forces arranged for and against marketization. The analysis of these "non-material" forces will, it is hoped, play an important role in future studies of the developmental process.

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[4] Prominent among these political/cultural Marxists are E.P. Thompson, Ian Roxborough, and Roger Garaudy. On the applicability of such approaches to the Chilean case discussed below, see Michael Fleet, *The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 14-20.

Chapter XIV

Toward the Personalization of Political Life

Joachim Kondziela

The notion of a "private sphere" in opposition to that of "public sphere" does not appear adequate for political life, which is related to political power: how it is seized, maintained and exercised. By definition, then, the political life is a sphere of public life.

In reference to the problem that concerns us, the subject character of a person or society seems the more adequate notion. At present in Poland general discussions are taking place on how to make Polish society the subject of social and political life. These emerge from the fact that for over forty years we lived in a system that made it impossible for both individual citizens and the whole society to function as anything more than mere "objects." The system with which we parted at the end of the 80s has always negated the subject character of the society, for power, which was seized by one party, soon extended over all spheres of social, cultural, political and economic life.

The ruling communist party justified its omnipotence and overwhelming domination in part on ideological grounds, namely, as the true representative of the working class identified with the nation. Thus, it excluded any kind of opposition which, in such circumstances, would be perceived only as "the enemy of the nation." The monopoly of the ruling class and its omnipotence was explained also on political grounds, namely, as the "right" political choice made by the Polish radical left at the end of World War II. This was an option in favor of socialism in the Stalinist version, which choice was supposed to legitimatize the group in power. As late as the early ‘80s it was still maintained that only this political force was able to guarantee Polish independence in the conditions of subjection to the U.S.S.R., as no other force was trusted by the Soviets. This approach was supposed to harmonize with a specific image of the Soviet self-security as seen from Warsaw.

The deterioration of the economy which resulted in intensified social dissatisfaction, as well as the influence of Solidarity which in the early ‘80s was an emancipating political movement, and, last but not least, the changes that took place in communist states, particularly the Soviet Union and Hungary, so affected the monopoly of the communist party that the totalitarian system began to break. This phenomenon was most explicit during the Xth plenum of the Central Committee of Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) and its results. The party declared its intention to abandon its ideological, political and economic monopolies. The decisions of the conference enabled the party to rationalize the idea of, and to find grounds for, talks with the opposition, which meanwhile had become a necessity.

For some time certain clearly defined symptoms have pointed to a restoration to Polish society of its identity as a subject. The most spectacular initiatives have been the following:

- The Constitutional Tribunal, before which the government lost a few cases;
- The Supreme Administrative Tribunal, before which an action against bureaucracy can be brought;
- The position of Ombudsman, to which a non-party person was appointed;
- First and foremost, "the roundtable talks" which, in reality, meant the acknowledgement of the opposition as a partner;
- The bill pertaining to associations: under this act both Solidarity of Workers and Solidarity of Farmers were re-legalized, numerous associations of academic youth were formed, and new

political clubs of various orientations began their activity (including the clubs of Christian Democracy);

- The bill concerning economic entrepreneurship, which declared equality for all three forms of ownership of the means of production;

- The bill which regulates the relations between the State and the Church, under which the Church was granted the status of an institution in public law, as well as a number of prerogatives previously denied the Church by the system of Stalinist socialism, such as the right to run private schools, hospitals, etc.;

- Liberalization in the sphere of press and publications, with drastic limitations imposed upon censorship including a bill for its total abolition;

- Democratic elections to 35 percent of the Sejm, i.e., the lower chamber of Parliament and to the entire Senate; the voting regulations agreed upon with the opposition at the "round table" enabled there to be a national plebiscite which was won so massively by Solidarity that Gen. Jaruzelski suggested that the opposition together with the so-called "government-coalition" form a grand coalition government;

- Some changes in the so-called "allied parties," the United Peasants Party and the Democratic Party, The same appears to hold true for Catholic or Christian groups in coalition with PUWP. It should not be ignored that for a long time they served as a kind of cloakroom for many people who retained a Christian orientation;

- The declaration of the creation of a multi-party system and a new constitution. The emergence of new political parties and election campaigns.

The communist party intended to transform itself into a political force participating in the system of parliamentary democracy, and party reformers intended to change it into a social-democratic party. What was at stake was no longer securing a monopoly of power, but rescuing such fundamental values as equality, social justice, the priority of labor over capital and the like, as well as certain social gains which make up the concept of the welfare state.

The process of Polish society regarding its subjective or spiritual character has been greatly influenced by the Roman Catholic Church. Her traditionally important role in the nation was maintained and even strengthened under the communist rule. Practically, communists were never the only leading force of a social and political character. When both the armed and the legal opposition were done away with after the war, the Church remained on the Polish political scene and had to be taken into account by the party in power. In this political system, the Church was always a place of refuge for those who thought differently, especially during the period of martial law, when it created a new public space as an alternative to that of the state. In addition, the mediating function of the Church, which was never questioned, should be emphasized.

The process in which Polish society is reassuming its character as a subject continues. It is manifest in the form of increasing pluralism both within the groups in power and the opposition. For example, within Solidarity there were, roughly speaking, two cooperative currents: populist and union-oriented, on the one hand, and reformist of a liberal or neo-liberal, on the other. When drastic economic reforms are carried out in the process of industrial modernization which involve a number of social problems such as unemployment, these two currents drift apart and no longer cooperate so harmoniously.

The process of the society's becoming the subject of social and political life made inevitable the formation and functioning of political parties. While once the need of the hour, there is apprehension regarding too great a number of political parties. In this respect we have a longstanding tradition from before the war, and warnings against excessive multiplication of political parties could be heard both from past authorities and Solidarity. For example, at one point Senator Dr. Adam Stanowski stated that there was no need to form a Christian-democratic party since Solidarity would have to call into existence its own party. This supposed and suggested a two-party system. Others thought Poland needs a large labor party based upon the principles of Christian ethics.

The process by which society acquires the character of a subject ever more clearly demands new forms of democracy, namely, participatory democracy, for a society derives its authentic subject character from participation in public life. In Poland, therefore, there is a great need for authentic forms of self-government in factories, institutions and local administration, i.e., elected community councils having the local property at their disposal.

As only participation can awaken responsibility effectively, it is necessary to enable citizens to participate both in social and political life, and also in economic life. Without participation it will not be possible either to overcome social-political limitations or to reconstruct the antiquated means of production. In addition, it is characteristic of participatory democracy to produce attitudes of solidarity and cooperation, rather than those of Jacobine confrontation.

Participatory democracy as a method of implementing the subject character is a process to be learned. As far back as antiquity people knew that democracy was not only a way of exercising power, but also a social virtue; it must be practiced as such.

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Chapter XV

Transforming Values into Governance: The American Experience

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The American Dream

"I want a house!" Those were the last words Andre Sakharov's wife, Yelena Bonner, spoke upon leaving the United States in 1986 to return to the Soviet Union. Her dream was not of homeownership per se, but something greater: to be oneself in one's private dwelling place. "A house," said Bonner, "is a symbol of independence, spiritual and physical." Then aged sixty-three, the Soviet dissident sorrowfully wrote: "I've never had a house . . . [not even] a corner I could call my own." She sadly concluded, "My dream, my own house, is unattainable for my husband and myself, as unattainable as heaven on earth."[1]

Yelena Bonner's "dream" of freedom is a very special one for Americans. Our national anthem proclaims the United States to be the "*land* of the free" and the "*home* of the brave." Moreover, Americans have poured as much mortar and brick into statues that immortalize the idea of liberty as they have into mausoleums that laud national heroes. The Statue of Liberty, the Liberty Bell, and Independence Hall are but a few examples.

These symbols point to an important truism about the American experiment: its success lies not in its structures of government, but in the preferences of its citizens for shared values. Among the most cherished is freedom. In 1776 Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." An American blue-collar worker in the early 1960s expressed similar sentiments:

> My God, I work where I want to work. I spend my money where I want to spend it. I buy what I want to buy. I go where I want to go. I read what I want to read. My kids go to the school that they want to go to, or where I want to send them. We bring them up in the religion we want to bring them up in. What else--what else could you have?[2]

A 1986 poll found little change in the ideas first articulated by Jefferson: 88 percent believed that "freedom and liberty were two ideas that make America great."[3]

These values form the core of an ideology that is uniquely American. G.K. Chesterton, after visiting the United States in the 1920s, concluded, "America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed."[4] In fact, Chesterton discovered the American "Rosetta stone": The core of the American Creed is a belief in the malleability of the future by the individual. The phrase "the American dream" captures these sentiments.

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[1] Yelena Bonner, "A Quirky Farewell to America," *Newsweek*, 2 June, 1986, 45.

[2] Robert Lane, *Political Ideology: Why the Common Man Believes What He Does* (New York: Free Press, 1962), 24.

[3] "Foreign Roots on Native Soil," *U.S. News and World Report*, 7 July, 1986, 31.

[4] Gilbert K. Chesterton, *What I Saw in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1922), 8.

The American dream is as old, and as young, as the United States itself. Regarding the presidency of John Quincy Adams, historian James Truslow Adams wrote that Adams believed his country stood for opportunity, "the chance to grow into something bigger and finer, as bigger and finer appealed to him."[5] More than 150 years later, little has changed. Like the sixth President, Americans continue to hope that their lives and those of their children will be better. Ronald Reagan once put it this way: "What I want to see above all is that this country remains a country where someone can always get rich. That's the thing that we have and that must be preserved."[6] A steelworker captured the sentiments expressed by Reagan more forcefully: "If my kid wants to work in a factory, I'm gonna kick the hell out of him. I want my kid to be an effete snot. I want him to be able to quote Walt Whitman, to be proud of it. If you can't improve yourself, you improve your posterity. Otherwise life isn't worth nothing."[7]

When asked by the Roper Organization in 1986 what the American dream meant, most Americans spoke in terms of education and property. Eighty-four percent said the American dream symbolized a high school education; 80 percent said freedom of choice was part of the dream; 70 percent said it was owning a home; 77 percent thought it was their children's receiving a college diploma and 68 percent said it was getting a college education for themselves; 64 percent said financial security was part of the dream; 61 percent said it was realized in "doing better than my parents"; 58 percent said it was owning a business; 52 percent said it meant progressing "from worker to company president."[8]

The freedom to excel is an important component of the American dream. But another value is also inherent in the concept: equality of opportunity. Americans have been nearly fanatical in their devotion to this particular value. In the 1940 film, *Knute Rockne-All American*, starring Ronald Reagan, Knute Rockne's on-screen father claimed that only in America could his Norwegian son start on an "equal basis with all other children."[9]

Faith in aggressive egalitarianism has made the American dream especially appealing to the ordinary citizen. Indeed, it is the common man and woman who figure most prominently in the dream's persistence. They gave birth to it; they sustain it. In his 1782 essay "What is an American?" Jean de Crevecoeur found the answer in the American penchant for hard work:

> Here the rewards of his industry follow with equal steps the progress of his labor; his labor is founded on the basis of *self-interest*; can it want a stronger allurement? Wives and children, who before in vain demanded of him a morsel of bread, now, fat and frolicsome, gladly help their father to clear those fields whence exuberant crops are to arise to feed and to clothe them all; without any part being claimed, either by a despotic prince, a rich abbot, or a mighty lord.[10]

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[5] The term 'American dream' was coined by James Truslow Adams during the Great Depression in *The Epic of America*(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935), 174.

[6] Ronald Reagan, news conference, Washington, D.C. 28 June, 1983.

[7] Quoted in Terry W. Hartle, "Dream Jobs?" *Public Opinion* (September/October, 1986), 11.

[8] Roper Organization for the *Wall Street Journal*, mid-October 1986, reported in *The Polling Report*, 23 February 1987, p. 1. Text of question: I'm going to read you some possible descriptions or definitions of The American Dream, and for each one I'd like you to tell me if that's very much what you understand The American Dream to mean, or sort of what it means, or not what it means." The percentages cited in the text are those who answered "very much." Multiple responses were allowed.

[9] *Knute Rockne-All American*, Warner Brothers motion picture, 1940.

[10] Michel-Guillaume-Jean de Crevecoeur, "Letters from an American Farmer," 1782 in *Living Ideas in America*, ed. Henry Steele Commager (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), 21.

More than two hundred years later most Americans still believe the dream rests on their individual efforts. A 1987 National Opinion Research Center poll found 66 percent saying that "hard work" is the most important factor in getting ahead; just 15 percent think "luck" is crucial.[11]

Americans are also aggressively egalitarian when it comes to making individual choices. A 1981 Decision/Making/Information study asked respondents to choose between a "Mr. Smith" and a "Mr. Jones": "Mr. Smith believes that consenting adults ought to be able to do whatever they want in private." Mr. Jones, on the other hand, says, "There ought to be laws against certain kinds of behavior since many private actions have social consequences." Despite concerns about pornography and lack of moral standards, 66 percent said they agreed "strongly" or "somewhat" with Smith; just 32 percent agreed with Jones.[12] Pollster Daniel Yankelovich says Americans want to act as they choose to conduct themselves according to their own lights.[13]

This predilection for pluralism extends to highly unpopular views and unconventional lifestyles. National Opinion Research Center studies show considerable public tolerance of persons who are against churches and religion, admitted communists, racists, homosexuals, or who are antidemocratic. In each case, solid majorities believe each should be allowed to speak freely and have books that advocate such beliefs on the shelves of the community library.[14]

The American Consensus

The values of freedom, liberty, and equality of opportunity are dominant themes in U.S. history. They explain, for example, why so many Americans admire successful entrepreneurs. In the nineteenth century Horatio Alger was a role model for many. By the late twentieth century Chrysler Board Chairman Lee Iacocca had become a folk hero.

Business people are celebrated principally because they embody the American dream. Not surprisingly, Americans are obsessed with property (and property rights), largely because they are the tangible products of a triumphant political creed. James Q. Wilson described the tendency of Southern Californians to display the fruits of their labors: "Each family had a house; there it was for all to see and inspect. With a practiced glance, one could tell how much it cost, how well it was cared for, how good a lawn had been coaxed into uncertain life, and how tastefully plants and shrubs had been set out."[15]

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[11] National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, General Social Surveys, 1972-1987. Text of the 1987 question: "Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important?" Sixty-six percent responded "hard work"; 18 percent, "hard work, luck equally important"; 15 percent "luck most important."

[12] "Decision/Making/Information," survey for the Free Congress Foundation, 4-5 November 1981.

[13] "American Values: Change and Stability: A Conversation with Daniel Yankelovich," *Public Opinion* (December/January 1984), 6.

[14] Sixty-five percent believe that "someone who is against churches and religion should be allowed to speak in the community"; "an admitted Communist," 56 percent; "someone who believes blacks are inferior," 58 percent; "an admitted homosexual," 64 percent; "someone who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country," 54 per cent. Likewise, those who do not favor removing a book from the public library with the views of "someone who is against churches and religion" is 60 percent; "an admitted Communist," 57 percent; "someone who believes blacks are genetically inferior," 61 percent; "an admitted homosexual," 56 percent; "someone who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country," 56 percent. Source: National Opinion Research Center, combined "General Social Surveys," 1972-1987.

The reverence for property is especially strong, even if not everyone has much to show off. In 1972 Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern made what he thought would be a surefire, popular promise to blue-collar rubber factory workers: As President he would seek to increase inheritance taxes so that the rich could bequeath less to their families and more to the government. To McGovern's amazement, he was roundly booed.[16]

In 1979, 26.1 million Americans, slightly more than one-tenth of the populace, were impoverished. By 1984 the figure had increased to 33.7 million, almost fifteen percent.[17] The failure of so many to attain the American dream exposes its numerous falsehoods. But Americans do not believe their ideology is at fault; they tend to lay much of the blame for not living up to its promises squarely upon themselves. A quarter of a century ago a mechanic said:

> I could have been a lot better off but through my own foolishness, I'm not. What causes poverty? Foolishness. When I came out of the service, my wife had saved a few dollars and I had a few bucks. I wanted to have a good time, I'm throwing money away like water. Believe me, had I used my head right, I could have had a house. I don't feel sorry for myself--what happened, happened, you know. Of course you pay for it.[18]

In 1986 an Iowa farmer facing foreclosure expressed a similar view: "My boys all made good. It's their old man who failed."[19]

Any attempt to limit the American dream meets with considerable resistance. Opportunity without constraints has been a recurrent pattern in our political thought. A 1940 *Fortune* poll found 74 percent rejected the idea that there "should be a law limiting the amount of money an individual is allowed to earn in a year."[20] Forty-one years later, the consensus held: 79 percent did not think that "there should be a top limit on incomes so that no one can earn more than $100,000 a year." Even those who earned less than $5,000 held that opinion.[21] A 1984 National Opinion Research Center survey found 71 percent believed that differences in social standing were acceptable because they resulted from "what people made out of the opportunities they had."[22]

Beneath such opinions is a faith that approaches fanaticism. Garry Wills wrote in 1978 that in the United States one must adopt the American dream "wholeheartedly, proclaim it, prove one's devotion to it."[23] He may have had in mind the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which was established during the hysteria about worldwide Communist expansionism in 1945. For three decades the committee inquired into the public and private lives of suspected communists. Perhaps the most notable among the committee's many investigations was one led by freshman Congressman Richard Nixon in 1946. Nixon doggedly pursued Alger Hiss' ties to the Communist party, an inquiry that eventually resulted in Hiss' indictment and conviction for perjury. However, the committee's injudicious blacklisting of other Americans formed a stain on the witnesses and the committee itself that could not be removed. In 1975 the Committee on Un-American Activities was abolished on the grounds that it, too, was un-American.

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[15] James Q. Wilson, "A Guide to Reagan Country: The Political Culture of Southern California," *Commentary* (May, 1967), 40.

[16] Cited in Lance Morrow, "Freedom First," *Time*, 16 June, 1986, 29.

[17] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1986*, 106th edition (Washington, D.C., 1985), 458.

[18] Quoted in Lane, *Political Ideology*, 69.

[19] Andrew H. Malcolm, "What Five Families Did After Losing the Farm," *New York Times*, 4 February, 1987, A-1.

[20] Cited in Everett Carl Ladd, *The American Polity* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987), 67.

[21] Survey of Civic Service, 5-18 March, 1981.

[22] National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, General Social Surveys, 1972-1984. Text of the 1984 question: "Differences in social standing between people are acceptable because they basically reflect what people made out of the opportunities they had." Sixteen percent responded, "strongly agree"; 55 percent, "somewhat agree"; 20 percent, "somewhat disagree"; 5 percent "strongly disagree."

[23] Garry Wills, *Inventing America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), xxii.

The Committee on Un-American Activities illustrates the country's rigid enforcement of its political orthodoxy. American Historian Daniel Boorstin rhetorically asks, "Who would think of using the word 'unItalian' or 'unFrench' as we use the word unAmerican?"[24] Indeed the phrase, "the American Way of Life," has taken on missionary proportions. In the nineteenth century Herman Melville compared Americans to the Biblical tribes of Israel, calling them "the peculiar chosen people . . . the Israel of our time."[25] A century later Ronald Reagan subscribed to a similar creationist view: "Think for a moment how special it is to be an American. Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this land, this island of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people in the world who yearn to breathe free?"[26]

Hamiltonian Nationalism versus Jeffersonian Democracy

After traveling what was then the breadth of the United States in 1831 and 1832, the Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville remarked: "All the domestic controversies of the Americans at first appear to a stranger to be incomprehensible or puerile, and he is at a loss whether to pity a people who take such arrant trifles in good earnest or to envy that happiness which enables a community to discuss them."[27] Tocqueville's observation stems from the relative ideological homogeneity in the United States--especially when compared to his native France. No wonder Tocqueville found the young nation's political disputes almost quaint, even charming.

But as Tocqueville notes, political scraps were earnestly fought. Most were the result of an insufficient ideological underpinning. The American Founding Fathers realized that freedom and liberty, the two ideas that "make America great," were not enough to build a nation. Writing in *The Federalist Papers* James Madison observed, "Liberty is to faction what air is to fire."[28] He labeled the cacophony of interest groups as the source of all "instability, injustice, and confusion" introduced into public forums, which have been "the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished."[29]

Liberty, in Madison's view, must have a suitable companion value to restrain its inevitable excesses. But which one? Tocqueville paired liberty with several values: morality, law, the common good, and civic responsibility.

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[24] Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 14.

[25] Quoted in Thomas E. Cronin, *The State of the Presidency* (Boston: Little Brown, 1980), 161.

[26] Remarks by the President and First Lady in a National Television Address on Drug Abuse and Prevention, Washington, D.C., 14 September, 1986.

[27] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. Richard D. Heffner (New York: New American Library, 1956), 90.

[28] James Madison, "Federalist Number Ten," in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist*, ed. Edward Mead Earle (New York: Modern Library, 1937), 55.

[29] *Ibid*., 53-54.

Each of liberty's potential mates seeks to restrain it. Even a staunch democrat like Andrew Jackson acknowledged that "individuals must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest."[30] Former *New York Times* columnist James Reston compared liberty without restraint to a "river without banks. . . . It must be limited to be possessed."[31]

But how to limit liberty and still possess it? This is a dilemma that troubled the American Founders, as well as those who adhere to the value of liberty today. Alexander Hamilton wanted liberty to be coupled with authority. Thomas Jefferson preferred that liberty be paired with local civic responsibility. It was on this basis that the enduring struggle between Hamiltonian Nationalism and Jeffersonian Democracy began.

Hamiltonian Nationalism envisions the United States as one "family," with a strong central government--especially an energetic executive--acting on its behalf. In 1791 Hamilton proclaimed:

> Ideas of a contrariety of interests between the Northern and Southern regions of the Union, are in the main as unfounded as they are mischievous. . . . Mutual wants constitute one of the strongest links of political connection. . . . Suggestions of an opposite complexion are ever to be deplored, as unfriendly to the steady pursuit of one great common cause, and to the perfect harmony of all parts.[32]

Richard Henry Lee, author of the American resolution calling for independence from Great Britain, warned that Hamilton "calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated government."[33] Jefferson was also wary of Hamilton's motives. Unlike Hamilton, Jefferson had a nearly limitless faith in the ordinary citizen. To a nation largely composed of farmers, he declared, "Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever He had a chosen people, whose breasts He has made the peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue."[34] Jefferson's devotion to liberty made him distrust most attempts to restrain it, particularly those of government: "Were we directed from Washington when to sow, and when to reap, we should soon want bread."[35] In 1825 Jefferson warned of the expanding power of state government and wrote that the "salvation of the republic" rested on the regeneration and spread of the New England town meeting.[36] The best guarantee of liberty in Jefferson's view was the exclusion of the "invisible hand" of government. Americans, he said, would "surmount every difficulty by resolution and contrivance. Remote from all other aid we are obliged to invent and execute; to find means within ourselves and not lean on others."[37]

Given the peculiar character of his compatriots, it was not surprising that Jefferson won the presidency in 1800. Six decades after the revolt against George III most remained suspicious of central government. Tocqueville described them as having "acquired or retained sufficient education and fortune to satisfy their own wants. They owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands."[38]

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[30] Quoted in Arthus M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (New York: Greenwich House, 1983), 105-106.

[31] James Reston, "Liberty and Authority," *New York Times*, 29 June, 1986, E-23.

[32] *Selected Writings and Speeches of Alexander Hamilton*, ed. Morton J. Frisch (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985), 316.

[33] Quoted in Edward Meade Earle's introduction to Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist*, p. xiii. Historian Claude Bowers agreed that Hamilton's goal was to "cripple" the states. See Claude Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy in America* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1925), 31.

[34] Quoted in Ted Morgan, *FDR: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 38.

[35] Quoted in Richard Reeves, *The Reagan Detour* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 19.

[36] Quoted in Robert F. Kennedy, *To Seek a Newer World* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 56.

[37] Morgan, *FDR*, 365.

Framing a Government

For nearly two centuries the debate between Hamiltonian Nationalism and Jeffersonian Democracy has dominated U.S. politics. Since the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Democrats have consistently aligned themselves with Hamilton, viewing the nation as one family. Republicans have preferred a revamped Jeffersonian democracy. As Reagan put it: "Through lower taxes and smaller government, government has its ways of freeing people's spirits."[39] He viewed the country not as a family, but a collection of diverse communities for whom liberty means "the right to be let alone."[40]

American historian Henry Steele Commager believes that since the founding, the character of the American people has not changed greatly nor has the "nature of the principles of conduct, public and private, to which they subscribe."[41] Our values may be constant, but the circumstances in which they are applied are not. The whiff of civil war, the onset of a depression, or the ravages of inflation inevitably cause Americans to take stock of the situation and their expectations of government, and to settle upon a course of action in a manner consistent with the American Creed. Usually a dominant personality has led the way. Abraham Lincoln reasserted Hamilton's vision of a national family so as to save the Union. Three score and ten years later, Franklin Roosevelt chose Hamiltonian nationalism to meet the challenges posed by the Great Depression.

During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan was the dominant personality on the American scene. He not only cast a long shadow over American politics, but gave sustenance to a reinvigorated Jeffersonian democracy by promising to take "government off the backs of the great people of this country" and turning Americans "loose again to do those things that I know you can do so well."[42]

Usually citizens do not want to choose between Hamiltonian nationalism and Jeffersonian democracy, but prefer the fruits of both. American newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann put it this way: "To be partisan . . . as between Jefferson and Hamilton is like arguing whether men or women are more necessary to the procreation of the race. Neither can live alone. Alone--that is, without the other--each is excessive and soon intolerable."[43] Nevertheless, Americans have tried at various intervals to live with one and not the other. The results have been less than satisfactory. Herbert Croly argued that Hamilton "perverted that national idea as much as Jefferson perverted the American democratic idea, and the proper relation of these two fundamental conceptions one to another cannot be completely understood until this double perversion is corrected."[44]

It is the inevitable perversion of Hamiltonian nationalism and Jeffersonian democracy that induces periodic swings from one to the other. As each prevails at one juncture or another,

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[38] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 194.

[39] Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, Washington, D.C., 27 January, 1987.

[40] The quotation comes from Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis' dissenting opinion in the case *Olmstead v. United States* (1928).

[41] Henry Steele Commager, *Living Ideas in America* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), xviii.

[42] Reagan-Carter debate, Cleveland, 29 October, 1980.

[43] Quoted in Reston, "Liberty and Authority."

[44] Croly, *The Promise of American Life*, 29.

Americans experience a sense of return when the old battles start up again on new but seemingly familiar territory. Hamilton would be astonished to learn that his concept of a national family is being used to promote the interests of the have-nots, especially women and minorities. And Reagan's[45] espousal of Jeffersonian democracy is premised on a welfare state first erected by Roosevelt's New Deal. The circumstances may change, but the arguments always have a familiar ring.

The Special Role of the President

Several years after leaving the White House, Harry Truman described the presidency as "the most peculiar office in the world."[46] British scholar Harold Laski elaborated on Truman's statement saying that the essence of the American presidency is "that it functions in an American environment, that it has been shaped by the forces of American history, that it must be judged by American criteria of its responses to American needs."

One of the unusual features of the American electorate is its insatiable need to reaffirm the American dream. This stems from the dream's inherent illogic. James Truslow Adams once wrote: "The American dream--the belief in the value of the common man, and the hope of opening every avenue of opportunity to him--was not a logical concept of thought. Like every great thought that has stirred and advanced humanity, it was a religious emotion, a great act of faith, a courageous leap into the unknown."[47]

In many respects the American dream has assumed religious trappings, with the president acting as a high priest. This is due, in part, to the voters' extraordinary expectations: the president is to make the American dream come true for them, just as it has come true for the president himself. Richard Nixon understood this when, as a candidate in 1968, he spoke of his youthful aspirations:

I see [a] child tonight. He hears a train go by. At night he dreams of faraway places where he'd like to go. It seems like an impossible dream. But he is helped on his journey through life. A father who had to go to work before he finished the sixth grade sacrificed everything so his sons could go to college.

A gentle Quaker mother with a passionate concern for peace quietly wept when he went to war but she understood why he had to go.

A great teacher, a remarkable football coach, an inspirational minister encouraged him on his way. A courageous wife and loyal children stood by him in victory and also in defeat.

And in his chosen profession of politics, first there were scores, then hundreds, then thousands, and finally millions who worked for his success.

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[45] Quoted in Emmet John Hughes, *The Living Presidency* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1973), 32.

[46] *Ibid*., 23.

[47] Adams, *The Epic of America*, 198.

And tonight he stands before you, nominated for President of the United States of America. You can see why I believe so deeply in the American dream.[48]

Presidents embody the dreams of their fellow citizens in a way that no other public official can. Political scientist Clinton Rossiter, a student of the American presidency, once wrote: "The final greatness of the presidency lies in the truth that it is not just an office of incredible power but a breeding ground of indestructible myth."[49] Seeking reelection in the midst of a bloody civil war with victory not yet secured, Lincoln was depicted in several "popular life" biographies as an example of what a poor American boy can achieve if he wants "to climb the heights."[50]

Not much has changed. Log cabins have been replaced by middle-class ranch homes. But political hagiographers still stress a president's relatively humble beginnings, or de-emphasize a president's more prosperous origins. Ronald Reagan was fond of reminding audiences of his early days as a lifeguard in Dixon, Illinois, earning fifteen dollars per week.

Presidents cannot simply pay homage to the American dream; they must reaffirm it by actions that enhance individual self-esteem and self-fulfillment. That task casts the president in a second great role: chief warrior in the struggle between Hamiltonian nationalism and Jeffersonian democracy. Traditionally, the presidency has been perceived as the principal mover in the engine of progress. Often that means a candidate for the office has to decide on the faction--Hamiltonian nationalism or Jeffersonian democracy with which he chooses to identify. Hamilton understood this when he wrote: "Every vital question of state will be merged in the question, 'Who will be the next President?'"[51]

The 1980s

Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981 amidst intense public dissatisfaction with government. Voters no longer believed that the federal government consisted of officials acting on their behalf. Rather, they saw a government dominated by a privileged few who were carelessly throwing away precious federal dollars. Surveys taken by the University of Michigan Center for Social Research tracked the growing disillusionment. In 1958, 18 percent agreed with the statement "The government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves"; by 1980 77 percent did so. Moreover, the proportion of respondents who thought "quite a few [of the people running the government] don't seem to know what they are doing" stood at 28 percent in 1964, 45 percent in 1970, and 63 percent in 1980.[52]

The desire of "we, the people" to regain control of the government from the ineptitude of political elites became so powerful that Americans strongly preferred the Jeffersonian concept of community, rather than centralized, government power. In 1936, a Gallup poll found most Americans favored a "concentration of power in the federal government"; by 1987 a majority favored a concentration of power in state government.

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[48] Richard Nixon, Acceptance Speech, 1968.

[49] Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (New York: New American Library, 1960), 103.

[50] Cited in Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln*, Volume Three: *The War Years* (New York: Dell, 1954), 661.

[51] Quoted in Hughes, *The Living Presidency*, 40.

[52] University of Michigan, Center for Social Research, selected surveys, 1958, 1964, 1970, 1980, and 1982.

Table One
Public Preference in regard to the Vesting of Government Power, 1936, and 1987
(in percentages).

	1936[53]	1987[54]
Federal government	56	34
State government	44	63
No opinion	--	3

Text of question: "Which theory of government do you favor: concentration of power in the federal government or concentration of power in the state government?"

A new brand of "consensus politics" was emerging. Eighty-three percent told poll-taker Louis Harris that they agreed with Reagan's inaugural proclamation that the size and influence of the federal government should be curbed.[55] As time passed, Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan appeared to be "bookend Presidents": one expanded and the other defined the limits of the federal government.[56] Each tried to make the system work, and in his own way each succeeded. Eventually, a new political agenda--one that consisted of restraining federal responsibilities and returning power to state and local governments, and to the individual--took hold. This stemmed from the resentment voters had toward the federal establishment, which had come to be seen as dominated by uncaring, dimwitted bureaucrats. As one American put it: "There's just thousands and thousands of white collar workers [in Washington] who do nothing but shuffle paper and don't do anything that's of any value to anyone. And they get a pay increment, they get incredible benefits, for what? It's just flab, it's just waste."[57]

The revolt against bigness of every sort resulted in a corresponding longing for community. Pollster Yankelovich reported that his surveys showed the public's "search for community," namely, the desire to compensate for the impersonal and threatening aspects of modern life by seeking identification with others, grew from 32 percent in 1973 to 47 percent at the start of the 1980s.[58] Since then the revolt against bigness has become entrenched. Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin found majorities in 1986 were willing to turn some important federal responsibilities over to the private sector: Seventy percent thought private industry, not the federal government, should continue producing electricity; 61 percent said private firms should provide insurance for U.S. companies doing business overseas; 50 percent thought industry should guarantee home loans. Wirthlin also found 67 percent agreed with the statement, "In the '60s and '70s, it was the federal government growing beyond our control that strongly contributed to the collapse of our economy, of confidence in our institutions, and a shaking of the very roots of our freedom."[59] A year later Wirthlin showed 50 percent believing local governments were most sensitive to their needs; just 26 percent selected state governments; and only 16 percent thought the federal government could be best described that way.[60] Anyone who occupies the Oval Office is in an echo chamber of a sort--listening and responding to the citizenry. During the 1980s the listening was intense, but the response was different from presidents in the recent past. Instead of proposing new federal programs, Reagan sought to inspire local communities to tackle the tough problems. Addressing the nation on the dangers of drug abuse he urged: "If your friend or neighbor or a family member has a drug or alcohol problem, don't turn the other way. Go to his help or to hers. Get others involved with you--clubs, service groups, and community organizations--and provide support and strength."[61]

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[53] George Gallup, Survey, 1936.
[54] Decision/Making/Information, survey for the Republican National Committee, 21-23 April, 1987.
[55] Louis Harris and Associates, survey, 22-25 January, 1981.
[56] The term "bookend Presidents" is Charles O. Jones'. See Weinraub, "The Reagan Legacy," 14.
[57] *Ibid*., 25.
[58] Yankelovich, *New Rules*, 251.

This politics of localism means continuing to use the "bully pulpit" of the presidency to persuade a Congress and a people, but it not as a forum to espouse big new government programs designed to address the needs of a national "family". Rather, presidents would cajole individuals and neighborhoods into acting on important national problems.

Conclusion

More than most presidents, Ronald Reagan understood that voters respond to symbols and phrases that evoke commonly held values. He followed this rule of politics so assiduously that, in effect, he became a *regent* entrusted by the voters with making American values a greater reality in their lives.

This has created confusion about his historical legacy. ABC News correspondent Ted Koppel said, "[We] will have to wait until the footlights dim and the houselights go up again, before determining whether the play was any good at all."[62] The observation points to a significant difference between Reagan and his predecessors. Heretofore it has been presidential actions that have usually shaped history's final judgments. Descriptors are often simply a line or two in the history books. For George Washington, "He was the Father of the Country." For Abraham Lincoln, "He saved the Union and freed the slaves." For Franklin Roosevelt, "He launched the New Deal and fought World War II." Only John F. Kennedy's brief tenure is summarized by single word, "Camelot," which expressed not actual accomplishments but a mood.[63]

Like Kennedy, Reagan's description will probably differ from the rest. His former communications director, Patrick Buchanan, suggests it will be "Restored America's spirit and economy, built the great space shield and drove out the Communists."[64] But Buchanan's lengthy and optimistic sentence focuses on deeds, not atmospherics; in reality the legacy lies not so much in his actions as president, but in the "sense of return" he gave the American people in their values.

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[59] Decision/Making/Information, survey for the Republican National Committee, 11-12 January 1986.

[60] Decision/Making/Information, survey for the Republican National Committee, 23 April 1987. Text of the question: "Recently, there has been much discussion about the functions performed at the three levels of government--federal, state and local. I am going to read you some phrases, both positive and negative, sometimes used to describe government. For each one that I read, please tell me whether you feel that phrase best describes the federal, state or local government. . .as most sensitive to my needs."

[61] Remarks by the President and the First Lady in a National Television Address on Drug Abuse Prevention, Washington, D.C., 14 September 1986.

[62] The Jennings-Koppel Report: Memo to the Future," ABC News broadcast, 23 April, 1987.

[63] For an analysis of this point see Lewis J. Paper, *The Promise and the Performance: The Leadership of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1975).

[64] Patrick J. Buchanan, "A Conservative Makes a Final Plea," *Newsweek,* 30 March, 1987, 26.

American voters are often of two minds. They are idealists who can respond positively to a return to values. They are also resolute pragmatists who wait, often not patiently, to see if a president's policies will work. In 1980 voters wanted their ideals reaffirmed and the lesson is simple: If a president can persuade the voters that his policies adhere to those cherished values *and* that, if adopted, these values will become an even greater reality for most Americans, then that president can move the country.

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