Social Philosophy: Paradigm of Contemporary Thinking

by
Jurate Morkuniene

Table of Contents

Preface

George F. McLean

In the watershed years of 1989-1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union a whole new life emerged across the vast lands stretching from Berlin and the Iron Curtain in the West to Vladivostok and the Pacific Ocean in the East. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe once again found their independence, Russia remerged from its long hybernation, and the Republics of Central Asia found themselves as newly independent states.

Now some 15 years later The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) is publishing a brace of books which state eloquently the subsequent creative efforts of the peoples involved to forge their pathway into their new and uncharted future. One work is by the UNESCO Chair in the Culture of Peace and Democracy, Professor Jurate Morkuniene, of the Law University of Lithuania. This is entitled: *Social Philosophy: Contemporary Paradigm of Thinking*. The other is effectively, though not intentionally, a companion volume by Professor Abdumalik Nysanbayev, Director of The Institute of Philosophy and Political Science of the Academy of Social Sciences of Kazakhstan and entitled *Cultural Heritance and Social Transformation in Kazakhstan*. Both are being published in the RVP series "Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change".

In the search for the path ahead people have been exploring different approaches. All are needed for all is to be redone, and to this each makes its own essential contribution. The series bringing these in a complementary manner is the fruit of an intensive RVP project integrating local team research, regional meetings and world colloquia. This process invoques insight from the many peoples of the world and brings these together at progressively higher or broader levels. The effect is to replace the previous deductive method of modern ideologies with a more inductive ground-up process that harvests the combined genius of the many peoples.

The work of Professor Morkuniene reflects a crucial path that harvests and projects one dimension of the heritage of human insight and commitment. This is the concentration upon man and human reason which has created the modern age and enabled it so dramatically to improve physical and social human conditions. Where after 1989 some would carelessly push all of that away in order to develop quite distinct dimensions of the human spirit while others would blame it for the aberrations of fascism and communism, Professor Morkuniene treats this with a much more sure hand. Her concern is not to lose the rich heritage of modern reason in its human and humanistic dimensions, but rather to disentangle this from its 20th century ideological overlays, and to identify the exciting new modes of creative scientific work which extend especially work in social philosophy.

In this it is truly a *tour de force*. It proceeds from the nature and sources of contemporary social cognition with special attention to issues of method and the revival of the tradition of critical thinking. On this basis it reviews the goal of social philosophy and the related issues of person, culture and globalization.

The work is truly wondrous in the resources it brings to the effort to build the future and the promise it projects. This makes it a book that must be read and without which no reconstruction of life in this vast post communist region can hope to succeed. It can, however, be no slight to suspect that no one path can do all; indeed it is often said that philosophers are endemically more correct in what they affirm than in what they reject. Certainly the affirmation of the recent heritage

of humanistic reason and the identification of the new ways in which this is opening marvelous new dimensions would seem to be the great and indispensable strengths of this work.

Yet, one might begin to suspect that the project is too simple when it projects that human problems, which at times emerge from the excesses and self enclosures of human reason, can be solved by more of the same. Many promisary notes are made of future scientific solution, but they are for issues that fall in registers that transcend the competence and concerns of a closed humanism. In contrast, the new phenomenological insights into the human person, which in fact undergirded Polish "Solidarnosc" by which all of Eastern Europe was liberated, are interpreted rather in terms of 18th and 19th century Scottish Common Sense Realism, or even termed tribal and savage.

It is in this light that one sees the crucial importance of work along the lines of the book by Professor Nysanbaev, *Cultural Inheritance and Social Transformation in Kazakhstan*. For in Central Asia, as well as in Lithuania, other much needed efforts are underway to complement the effort to salvage the humanistic content of modernity in this post modern, post Soviet age and to render it more deeply humane. These are of numerous hews, but perhaps the most different and hence the most complementary to the above work of Professor Morkuniene is that which looks into the cultural traditions of the people to harvest its long experience of human life in these circumstances over the centuries. As succeeding generations reviewed the lessons received from the often all-too-harsh life experiences of preceding generations, proceeded creatively to adapt these to the present, and passed them on to the following generations, a proper form in which life could be cultivated emerged and came to be called simply "culture." As continually and creatively corrected, adjusted and passed on by each generation, this was the cultural tradition or cumulative freedom of a people.

Indeed, this was central to the claim of Lithuania in Soviet days to be not a Soviet Republic, but a sovereign nation. Upon independendence this sense of a shared cultural heritage was so strong that there soon emerged the question of whether it left room for personal creativity – hence the title of a work from Lithuania published in the RVP series in 1994: *Personal Freedom and National Resurgence*: *Lithuanian Philosophical Studies I.*

The work of Professor Nysanbaev shows brilliantly how in Kazakhstan the importance of the cultural heritage of the nation now stands out in special relief. There we find some of the greatest scientists, philosophers and jurists of the golden medieval age of Islamic civilization. Their contributions subsequently were overlaid by the special virtues of a nomadic society. This combination now is challenged to provide the cultural identity and humane resources for the new nation of Kazakhstan as it works in its own way to develop the structures of a new nation at the beginning of the new millennium.

Professor Nysanbaev, himself one of the great scientists and philosophers of science of the past Soviet Union, understands from within the vast potentialities of modern science. But he understands as well its inability to defend itself against the political perversions by which this was denigrated and at times even twisted into an instrument of oppression. Beneath all this he is able to identify as well the dangers of a humanism which shuts out the humane and transcendent horizons and can threaten a new form of the dark night of the soul.

It is with this acute experience from the past and enlightened concern for the future of his people that he undertakes this work, short in length but truly great in vision. He examines the origins of Kazakh philosophy, the cultural inheritance and the traditional legal structure of the past. These he relates to the formation of the person and of the country as it emerges as an active participant in the newly global world.

In all of this he stays close to the traditional resources. We look to other of his works applying his eminent competencies in the fields of science to clarify what the new and properly contemporary competencies of reason promise for the great constructive efforts in which all peoples – Kazakh and Lithuanian not least – are now passionately engaged. In the meantime the brilliant work of Professor Morkuniene will suggest much that is becoming available. Together these two neatly balanced works provide not only a natural mutual critique, but even more the mutual reinforcement in which lie the true promise of the future of their great peoples, as of us all.

Introduction
What Is Contemporary Philosophy?

Jurate Morkuniene

As the speed of the processes of social development accelerate, a new philosophical image of the world is now emerging, accompanied by the formation of a new social philosophy.

It is not easy to give a precise and brief description of the contemporary social philosophy. It depends first of all on the level of the values of the person who attempts this, as well as on the ways one perceives the essence and tasks of philosophy itself. Different authors have their own understanding of the subject, the scope of problems and the goals of modern social philosophy. Contemporary social philosophy is not a mono-semantically defined field, because it generalizes its most complicated and rapidly changing objects such as society and person. In this sense social philosophy is always incomplete, relatively open and, therefore, a temporary, theoretically "imperfect", "non-systematic" and vulnerable theory. This does not mean that social philosophy is relativistic because it can be identified, has an object of investigation, and goals and methods of its own. Presently it is a rather well-established concept, and a rather strictly defined discipline.

Over the last few decades philosophy has been suffering a severe crisis. This was reflected in a fading interest in existentialism and structural philosophy. However, it was even more evident in the doubts whether, with its present more mature sociological theory and methodology, philosophy and social philosophy in particular is to play a more or a less significant role. In 1979 Pierre Bourdieu stated that philosophy is helpless in understanding and explaining society and man and therefore it is unnecessary, "it died and will hardly ever resurrect" and can be substituted by sociology and other social theories.

Philosophy responds too slowly to the changing paradigm of science, which was the reason for the above-mentioned crisis of philosophy at the turn of the 20th century. Claude Lévi-Strauss, who noted the weakness of social philosophy as far back as 1961, suggested that social philosophy should change its very essence, to acknowledge that it is no longer possible to study society solely with a logical or moral approach and to consider it only as a subject to be studied. There is a pressing need to understand what is most urgent in modern social cognition, namely, that new problems need new means of research; new tools of cognition must be "forged".

There is also a crisis of philosophy, but at present sociologists believe philosophy to be necessary, because of sociology itself is unable to attain the level of philosophical abstraction, it needs a meta-theoretical philosophical basis (P. Bourdieu). Contemporary sociology needs the researcher's approach, which only philosophy is able to provide because otherwise his investigation will be a merely an eclectic set of facts and examples or of metaphors which explain nothing.

Philosophy in the 21st century will return and revive to the degree that its methods correspond to the present paradigm of science. Up to now, the task of the whole science has been to eliminate vagueness, ambiguity, contradiction, whereas contemporary science accepts a certain vagueness or incompleteness of the phenomena and even of the concepts that explain them.

Philosophy will recover when it creates a new network of concepts and applies new methods of cognition. It will do so by reconsidering the problems of order and disorder, complexity and simplicity, evolution, truth and error, etc. Cognition is presently understood as a continuous, uninterrupted dialogue with reality. It has always been understood that no theory of social

philosophy can exhaust reality, stop the process and exhaust its object: social theory always remains relatively open.

The more perfect, i. e. the more complicated and rich the system, the more open it is: thus man and society are the most complicated and thus the most open systems. The main features of the new paradigm of social theories are reflected by (1) the notion of complexity, (2) the perception of cognition as a dialogue with reality, (3) the introduction of the explanatory principles of object–subject connections and relations, complementariness, antithesis, irreversibility, etc., and (4) the idea of an open system.

In solving social questions philosophy searches for truth, but this must be a contemporary truth, employing new principles to approach today's problems and making use of the attainments of other sciences … this task. Present philosophy does not "kill" a process by dissecting an integral live social phenomenon into parts, but "catches" this phenomenon, its deeply rooted relations and contradictions. The goals, methods and results are connected by a feedback relation which prevents the theory of social philosophy from becoming an unshakable dogma. Theories of social philosophy presently can be understood only as open, i. e. as beginning, improving, reaching maturity, becoming obsolete and fading into history.

Every human conception has had goals and ideals peculiar to its time by which its structure and specific methods have been modified. A conception searches for means and ways corresponding as much as possible to the new goals; it thereby it updates the content of its concepts or introduces new concepts, new methods.

Also in our times there is a need to formulate a social philosophy whose goals and the problems to be solved correspond to the contemporary paradigm of science and solve society's contemporary problems. Studies of the structure of the philosophical theory of humanism should be related to analyses of the new goals, new concepts and methods, new problems and changed functions.

Chapter I
Contemporary Social Philosophy: The Definition

Goals for Contemporary Social Philosophy

Contemporary social philosophy is characterized by what could be called a new anthropocentrism. The older classical anthropocentrism is being replaced by a new concept of man living in a world created by himself. Man once again returns to the "centre" only through his activity, creative work, cognition, and his ability to perceive the processes going on in nature and society, and to transform them by the methods heretofore unknown. New social philosophy, reflecting a feedback between man and the world created by him, endows the human "centricity" with only vectorial meaning. Man is perceived as being in the "centre" of the world only for the sake of the idea of practice.

According to new anthropocentrism, man is the creator of his world and of himself; he is resolved to improve his situation, and capable to of perpetual renewal of himself and of changing, renovating and improving the world. This is homo creator.

The idea of activities, of practice, which has brought man to the "centre" of the material (real) world, implies also the image of an open, incomplete, changing, becoming and developing world. The whole Western reasoning, which since the times of R. Descartes has absolutely opposed the man-subject to the world of the objects is bound for renewal. As man had been explained on the bases of the principles of a closed system, philosophical structuralism, which was particularly sensitive to the inadequacy of this kind of explanation, actually declared the "disappearance" of man as a whole, as the subject, his "death" (see M. Foucault, 1966). Presently this inadequate explanation is being replaced by another conception of man, explained on the grounds of the principles of open systems. Man as a social being is regarded as an open system of what only a relation with the environment (society and world) is a prerequisite (essence).

The process of becoming and the activities as a process of man can be reflected only by processes or by open theories. The purposefulness of contemporary social philosophy is obviously non-dogmatic and open theory.

The goals of philosophical theory change. Instead of these raised by classical philosophy, namely, to preserve personal identities and humaneness in itself, the goal of present-day philosophy is to reveal how the persons (man) should behave so as to preserve the humaneness in another person beside himself, i. e. to preserve the mankind and the world.

Thus, the goal of social philosophy can be defined as the attempt to elucidate the process of humanization: what basic actions create, preserve, change or destroy humaneness? Therefore contemporary social philosophy searches for the most common foundations that explain the processes of person's and society's humanization, bearing in mind that "essences" most often do not be on the surface and manifest themselves not directly, but indirectly. Instead, numerous special theories and sciences investigate and explain separate manifestations of man's and society's humaneness, while social philosophy analyzes the most general issues relating to the problem of the humanization of man and society.

As the main goal of social philosophy is cognitive, its results are devoid of direct practical meaning. However, without philosophical theory special social sciences cannot develop, because without meta-theory any research work in a social environment can precede only by trial and error.

Being full of errors such a way would be not productive but dangerous in solving social problems for it would lead to experimenting with people and society.

Contemporary social philosophy deals with yet another super-task. It becomes the plan, the principle and the predilection for action. This entails the philosophical upbringing of society and of the individual. Every opportunity to develop the individual's ability of decision-making means both a new level of his philosophical education and a new step of his civil consciousness.

The task of contemporary philosophy is not only to attain the truth, but also to show how this truth can become active. Contemporary philosophy is the means of both thinking and action. Philosophy no longer has absolutely established truth, but searches for the truth of its time, what can be ensured solely by our thinking, our actions. Cognition is now perceived as a constant, uninterrupted dialogue with reality.

The Functions and Tasks of Contemporary Social Philosophy

Philosophical social theory has a number of functions: first, it is an analysis of phenomena, i. e. an explanatory function; second, it formulates principles, which by delineating the ways and means of investigating the social conditions play the role of methodological criteria.

The concepts of the prescriptive level, which are used to express the main principles of theory, allow for the expansion of the limits of the theory of action in two directions by enriching the existing theory and revealing its new aspects. The system of philosophical concepts as a methodological tool can be applied in the sciences that deal not only with the laws of the historical development of society, but also with the specific forms and ways of the material and spiritual activities of man in ethics, sociology, social and general psychology, theoretical medicine, ecology, etc. The essential relations fixed in the conceptual philosophical theory act as a means of study, they predetermine the fact that the specific approach of concrete sciences to creating scientific abstractions is oriented to the analysis of essential rather than accidental relations.

One more function of contemporary social philosophy is to formulate the principles that later could serve as criteria for the evaluation of social progress. E. Maziarz has often stressed that the humanist who wishes to exert an efficient effect on the conditions of humanism needs first of all strict standards for their evaluation, the humanist is more than a mere observer-philosopher (1981, 121). This ensures that while studying social phenomena the scientific criteria will be not replaced by emotional, moral or "common sense" evaluations. It goes without saying that philosophical principles are not eternal rules, but only conditions and promises reconstructed by ideal theoretical means by which each and every person is able to develop as a harmonious and creative personality.

The principles of contemporary social philosophy can play a methodological role, not only as a cognitive tool marking further ways of studying the conditions and premises of humane society, not only as the criteria revealing the level of humaneness of the material and spiritual phenomena in society, but also as the basis of programs of action.

Thus, the task of social philosophy is to reveal the basic features in the society in which the development of each man would be the goal of the whole society. According to E. Gehmacher (1977), social philosophy could be called a science of the goals of humankind. And a theory explains the state or several states of a social system, which enable the satisfaction of the objective humane needs of every member of society. Therefore the main object of study of contemporary philosophy is the criteria of development and systematization of persons. The cultural level, creativity, talents, universality, harmony, health, happiness, freedom, spiritual beauty and

abundance of persons all depend on one and the same condition, namely a condition of life worthy of man.

The peculiar feature of contemporary social philosophy is that the human problem is being solved in new conditions, that is, both the new circumstances of man's being in the world and the new conditions of cognition of the world. In the present world man acquires a new form of identification, recognizing himself in both his spiritual rational constructions and his material production. Therefore the preservation of the philosophical tradition alone, i. e. the preservation of the classical way of solving the problems of man and society, a return or appeal to the former theories of social philosophy, would be ill-grounded.

Our goal here is not to elucidate the history of social philosophy or the genealogy of the problems. We shall touch only upon the more significantly changed principles, new conceptions and methods, i. e. we shall analyze the elements of social philosophy in the contemporary paradigm of thought.

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Chapter II
Premises of Contemporary Social Philosophy

The Issue of the Identity of Sociology

Contemporary European sociological thought inevitably exerts a tremendous effect on social thinking in countries moving towards an open society. The question arises: in which way is social theory possible? Contemporary sociological thought is characterized by an active search for contact points with philosophical conceptions. Social philosophy in its turn, after a long period of crisis appears to be re-emerging having acquired a new shape and together with sociology moving towards a new paradigm.

However, for this interaction to be fruitful, deliberate attempts at the theoretical thought are necessary. Thus, we shall try to analyse the problems of contemporary sociology and social philosophy, based on the premise that their interaction is inevitable, that both sociology and philosophy are rooted in each other and that only in this medium of integration both the former and the latter find a future.

A glimpse at the sociological studies of such classics of sociology as Max Weber or Emile Durkheim shows that their approach to sociological analysis was a similar one, which Raymond Boudon called a problem-solving analysis (1993, 30).

Classical sociology is many-sided. Alongside the theoretical level or dimension, in the works of the classics there exists also another dimension, that of history–philosophy or, according to R. Boudon, a prophetic dimension. Also M. Weber's "Entzauberung", K. Marx's "alienation" and E. Durkheim's "growing anomy" are in this level. These dimensions comprise what R. Boudon calls the "program of the classical school" and provide classical European sociology with its identity.

However, this program of the classical school in the opinion of many researchers such as R. Boudon, R. Münch, R. K. Merton, etc. has lost its influence on contemporary sociology. The "problem-solving analysis" has been replaced by a prominent tendency to "program entropy", the concept introduced by R. Boudon. This consists of several factors: intellectual, institutional and morphological.

Intellectual Factors. The content of the intellectual factors consists of popularization, predominance of "common sense" in decision-making, and a number of scattered and dissipated philosophical and ideological approaches. Several more or less contradictory ideologies, which inspired numerous sociological trends, began to decompose the program of the classical school. An evident result of one of such ideologies is the "common sense" ideology, whose intention was to eliminate any difference between problems and the non-problems. Since "common sense" and the related "common" experience (sometimes also designated as general knowledge) produce distorted and simplified pictures of social phenomena, the sociologist-empiricist is needed to reveal the "truth" about social phenomena. "Common sense" sociology (actually ideology) often does not or cannot see the cause behind behaviour or opinion and prefers a misty vis dormitiva (inactive meaning) type of premises. More vividly, it is better not to tell, write, or do anything; some things can be hushed up, etc. The main goal of the sociologist, that is, to understand consistently the causes and fundamentals, to provide explanations and argument, are forgotten. Guided by the above-mentioned "common sense" principles, the sociologists can even generate theories of cognitive value of the same kind as any other scientific discipline and can be guided by

the system of criteria presently employed by the natural and exact sciences. However, eventually there remain no sociological criteria to allow theory to decide about good and the evil. (Here it is worth noting that Australian aborigines had no notions of "good" and "bad", but neither they had have an ideology). In our times, rejecting these qualitative criteria means monolog thinking, the reverse side of which is relativism.

Sociology still is dominated by static paradigms, sometimes by the common sense approach, which maintains that one method is enough for all problems; this lays the foundation for a closed system. Common-sense sociology fails to see any reasons behind the behaviour and beliefs.

The essence of contemporary sociology is a direct existential interest. No difference is made between the scientific explanatory (Erklärung) and interpretational (Auslegung) dimensions. Here the paradox is that the same classics introduced sociology as a scientific discipline, i. e. as a discipline that strives for the same goals and adheres to the same procedures as exact and natural sciences. Nevertheless in the 20th century whereas the natural sciences made considerable progress, sociology lagged behind or came to a standstill. Moreover, the qualitative difference among social sciences, which became especially pronounced in the last century, was disregarded. Besides, one of the most important roles here belonged to the crisis of theory in general, even the opposition to theory (Jay M., 1996, 167, 169).

One more intellectual factor that has fortified the above-mentioned "program entropy" is the spread of dogmatic world outlooks, such as relativism and vulgar Marxism. In the relativistic approach, cognition and objectivity are only an illusion and the only correct theory would be that to claim that there is no truth. This would erase the difference between the problem and non-problem, between a real problem and a pseudo-problem. The job of sociologists overtaken by a dogmatic world outlook is to set limits on themselves or, in other words, to keep away from a problem that is embarrassing, though unfortunately it cannot be solved by none other than a sociologist. Thus, sociologists that adhere to this dogmatic approach are engaged only in collecting and analysing data.

Institutional Factors. Beside the above-mentioned ideological factors, other factors also contributed to "banishing" sociology from the program of the classical school. These factors can be called institutional. One of these factors is the extension of what J. A. Schumpeter in 1954 called "chamber sciences". The brief history of their formation is that after the second world war an evolution took place in sociology similar to that in economics: with the increase in the power of the state, its needs to "calculate and regulate" greatly intensified the need for data. An ever increasing number of economists and demographers spent more and more time on collecting data as means for economic, financial, social, demographic, etc. policy, rather than for explanation. What had been a means for politicians became a goal for "chamber", i. e. descriptive sociologists. Ever more fields, such as education, public health, culture, which traditionally had been the objects of sociology, acquired a political significance. An ever increasing number of sociologists became involved in such "chamber" sociology. The explanatory and cognitive, i. e. theoretical thinking activities were equated to the time spent, since the sociologists were engaged only in collecting data. The effect of this was to drive sociology to the situation in which data analysis became a completely moulded descriptive discipline. Of course, similarity can be hardly drawn between scientific activities and "data analysis", when this is treated as self-efficient. Data arrangement and summation is not an explanatory and even less a cognitive type of activities.

J. Schumpeter, in writing about chamber science, meant the sciences accommodated to meet the needs of the state. However, data now and in ever increasing demand by clusters of power or

interests, social movements, and ideological groups. Whereas in former times, the main tool in political debates was argumentation, at present it is data. This fact in turn adds to the chamber character of sociology.

One more institutional factor is provincialism (E. Allardt, 1993, 132) but not in a geographical sense. It is related to the expansion of academic sociology for what theoretical pluralism (as many opinions as men), fragmentariness is increasing. R. Boudon called it "academic anomy" (Boudon R., 1993, 37). As a result sociologists of different beliefs, guided by different paradigms, are rarely involved in scientific discussions (Boudon R., Allardt E.) and everything is left on the level of "common sense" (mentalité primitive) (Boudon R., 1993, 39).

Pierre Bourdieu in his book *Homo academicus* described this phenomenon in terms of the "intellectual field", "symbol or intellectual capital" and "institutional or academic capital". The "intellectual field" encompasses norms, rules, expectations and reward. The "symbol or intellectual capital" means scientific degrees, posts, names, reviews. The "institutional or academic capital" means a position allowing one to exert influence. These factors impede rather that stimulate the renewal and progress of scientific investigations; they frustrate rather than encourage the audacity of scientific thinking; they separate rather than unite researchers.

Morphological Factors. These factors are characteristic of sociology as a community, because the increasing division of labour leads to heterogeneity. One of the most common indices of this development is semantic anarchy. Even the concept of "theory" is not understood in a similar way. This polysemy also is indicative of the fact that contemporary sociologists, though well integrated socially, are poorly integrated intellectually. In contrast, though the classics did not belong to associations and unions; they did have a common program.

The growing variety of sociologies, their success in the mass media, being in demand by the state, and item the quantitative increment made sociology more reliable and much more exposed to the society than philosophy. However, according to R. Boudon, it is at the same time "Balkanized" exactly because of these three factors.

Conflict between Theoretical Sociology and Philosophy

Even quite recently the priority of sociology over philosophical theories seemed doubtless. P. Bourdieu in 1980 wrote that sociology has passed its pre-history, i. e. the great theories of social philosophy (1980, 19). He himself took an active part in this drama of philosophy and sociology, which is still unable to answer the question of what theoretical sociology is and what is its difference from social philosophy. He maintained the sociology, like all sciences, was created in opposition to the ambitions of global philosophy to be able to answer the eternal questions. P. Bourdieu arrived at the genially simple conclusion: sociology arises to steal from philosophy some of its problems, but to reject prophesies. The theory for which he searches should be an art to withstand paroles (*ibid.*, 50).

However, it was not easy to find a question that would be any more than a metaphor. Scientists had already demonstrated its infertility. P. Bourdieu himself had no doubts that there was nothing to prefer between obscurantism and scientism (ibid, 18). He points out the vulnerable spots in sociology and the reasons for its fallacies. It is first of all an uncontrolled, voluntaristic approach to the object and a negation of the fact that cognition depends on the approach, i. e. on the position occupied by the sociologist in the social space and in the scientific field (*ibid.*, 22).

Meanwhile as the approach is moulded by philosophy, it is necessary to consider its significance and necessity. P. Bourdieu acknowledged that all the old questions of philosophy, such as the sense of history, progress and decadence, the role of personality in history, etc. are encountered by philosophers in the most elementary actions of practice and expressed in the specific way they raise questions.

Which are the reasons that predetermines the type of question; and in sociological thinking how to the general problems appear? According to P. Bourdieu, one of the secrets of the art of sociology is its ability to find the empirical objects that allow very general questions to be raised in their regard (*ibid.*, 51).

As "common sense" or "general knowledge" on the level of everyday consciousness does not help to solve the problem, the approach is moulded by philosophy. G. Hegel had once emphasized that the theoretical, philosophical thought reaches beyond common sense, which is not philosophy. "Common sense" includes the maxims of the time, the way of thinking and the prejudices of the period. Unconsciously it is governed by the ideas of the given epoch. It seems reasonable to agree with P. Bourdieu when he says that the theoretical problems presented at the level of "common sense" are so severely distorted that the friends of theory fail to recognize in them their own offspring's (P. Bourdieu, 1980, 51). Thus, eventually he comes to recognize that the work done by him, i. e. sociology, mobilizes all theoretical resources (*ibid.*, 57).

Contradictory processes seem to be in operation. The tendency of a clear cut definition of the sociological field is very strong, but, on the other hand, the tendency toward inter-disciplinarity and fusion of several related disciplines, and the search for the philosophical and meta-theoretical foundations is evident. How does all this relate to philosophy?

Stimulated by the general progress of scientific reflection, as well as of science, in the last decade there have been modifications in both social philosophy and sociology, which can be understood and explained only as a theory, because data collection is an auxiliary discipline. Philosophy began raising questions never before raised, and sociology began looking for help in philosophy.

Meta-sociology or Social Philosophy?

The question "What is it that created contemporary social theory?" can already be answered as follows: it is both sociology and philosophy.

Edgar Morin, the pioneer of the new French sociology, as far back as 1976 wrote about the need of a "meta-theory" or "meta-sociology" and described it as what would be called philosophy by sociologists and sociology by philosophers (E. Morin, 1984). At the same time P. Bourdieu turned to philosophy because he saw one of the functions of philosophy to be "to provide sociologists with the tools to fight with the persecution on the part of positivistic epistemology" (1987, 57).

Today it is evident that both social philosophy and theoretical sociology have their niches in science. Philosophy has no "pure" philosophical problems analogous to the "pure" sociological problems of sociology. The difference is only in the level of abstraction, only a "question of the level". E. Morin in his book "An introduction to complex thinking" (1990) maintains that researches and investigators of society, in order to know what they are doing need common foundations. But the philosophical illiteracy of a sociologist often matches the sociological illiteracy of a philosopher. The problems of integration, complexity, substantiation, approach or principle arises as daily problems in theoretical activities. For instance, the concept of diversity is

important both for contemporary philosophy and sociology. It can be expressed in sociology as problems of national or sexual minorities, etc., in philosophy as the substantiation of cultural diversity, and equivalence, in politic sciences as problems of democracy. All have as a common denominator acknowledgement of diversity as a methodological principle. Each of the disciplines mentioned above offers its own understanding of the concepts, its own language and its own methods and keeps to its own level of abstractness.

However, why then is the philosophical level of thinking necessary? First of all, for investigation not to become eclectically composed of examples and metaphors, which explain nothing. Secondly, the philosophical level of thinking has special tasks, including the development or "training" (Socrates) of abstract thinking and the formation of the approach of the researcher. On the approach depend: first, the sphere selected for study; second, the goals of the investigation; third, the choice of theory as an explanatory model; fourth, the formulation of the problem itself.

What role does philosophy or sociological theory have to play in this as instruments of society building? Contemporary philosophy has developed the ability to view the world synoptically rather than reductionalistically, which is invaluable to the process of society-building. Social philosophy can begin asking the kind of questions which others might overlook, and it appreciates the fact that there are no strictly technical solutions for any of the social problems. The fundamental principles of social philosophy allow one to see the new forms, potentials and human developments that others do not see. Philosophy can bring a kind of expertise and viewpoint into social conceptions and programmes.

Change of the Paradigm: the New Paradigm of Complexity

"Fundamental sociology is not yet born", claimed E. Morin in 1973 (E. Morin, 1973, 225). He meant the creation of a new scientific conception which argues and overturns not only the established limits, but also the cornerstones of the paradigms (ibid, 227). That is, it thoroughly reconsiders the problems of order and disorder, complexity and simplicity, evolution, truth and fallacy, etc. In E Morin's opinion, we should speak not about the crisis of philosophy, but about the creation of new philosophy.

However, to this end first of all the "contemporary pathology of mind" should be overcome. The former pathology of thinking was its myths and gods, whereas the present day pathology of mind lies in a super-simplification, which renders us blind as regards the complexity of reality (E. Morin, 1990, 23). This shows that we still are in the epoch of the "barbarism of ideas", i. e. in the epoch of closed theories. Thus illness of theory is doctrinarism and dogmatism, which "confines theory in itself" (E. Morin, 1990, 23). To overcome this illness, the cornerstones of the paradigms should be turned over".

The perception of all objects as closed implies a classificatory, reductionalistic, direct-causality and strictly deterministic vision of the world. This is characterized by the antithesis "either – or" and rapid, ill-grounded systematization. This is the vision that dominated in physics from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. On the grounds of this paradigm of closed science philosophy described man in contraposition to the animal, culture in counter position to nature, man's world as the embodiment of order in counter position with natural "disorder". E. Morin concludes that in the very core of human philosophy there is a settled myth of a supernatural character to man so that the antithesis nature/man acquires the value of a paradigm (1973, 22). It is evident however, that man is not made of two opposing parts, one bio- natural and the other

psychosocial; it is also obvious that there is no Chinese Wall to separate his human from his beastly part, thus, every man is rather a "bio-psycho-social totality" (ibid.).

If man lives in culture and contains nature in himself, then how can he be simultaneously natural and super-natural? According to E. Morin, philosophy does not like to consider these questions and, as often happens, what cannot be explained is rejected. Eventually the problem itself vanishes from the field of consideration (*ibid.*, 23). Thus, biology was confined in biologism, i. e. in the conception of the closed organism, and "anthropology was closed in anthropologism", i. e. in the conception of isolated man (*ibid.*, 23).

However, contemporary social cognition can no longer be satisfied with the concept of isolated man. "The bell tolls for anthropology, which is deprived of the sense of complexity, whereas its object is most complex. Biology, with its less complex objects, is based on much more complex principles of cognition. The bell tolls for the closed, fragmentary and man-simplifying theory. The era of the open, multidimensional and complex theory begins" (*ibid.*, 1973, 211). Thus E. Morin "bids farewell" to the previous paradigm and looks for the foundations of that is new.

"Complexity is a word-problem, but not a word-solution", wrote E. Morin in 1990 (1990, 10). The very concept of complexity, first used by him in 1960, he borrowed from the theories of information, cybernetics, and systems (*ibid.*, 12). This concept dismissed banal meaning in order to unite in its content order, disorder and organization; inside the organization itself it united identity and distinction which latter concepts "work" only in mutual interaction whereas either as antagonistic or as complementary.

Whereas the task of the whole of science up to now was to remove or eliminate inaccuracy, ambiguity and contradiction, contemporary science accepts certain "inaccuracies" or vagueness not only of phenomena, but also in their description. For example, it was a considerable success in studying the thinking activities of man to appreciate that one of its advantages is ability to work and make decisions in the presence of incomplete and vague information. It has been acknowledged that the phenomena like freedom and creativity cannot be explained without complexity, which alone allows their appearance. "The simple is but a moment, an aspect among numerous complexities (microphysical, macro physical, biological, psychic, social)" (E. Morin, 1990, 51).

To consider social and humanitarian sciences as not being complex means to think, that, on the one hand, there is a purely economic reality, on the other a psychological, or yet legal, sociological or political one. These rather artificial categories are considered to be the reality. However, in E. Morin's opinion, as each measure contains other measures, no reality can be understood uni-dimensionally. For this reason we are doomed to doubting, to the thinking that is pierced by holes, to thinking that has no ground for absolute certainty (*ibid.*, 93). But is here that a new paradigm begins!

Cognition can and must be perceived as a perpetual, incessant dialogue with reality. When reality does not correspond to the logical rational system we have created, we must recognize that an ideal system is inefficient and inadequate for it does not embrace the complexity of reality. Therefore wrote E. Morin we are in the pre-history of human mind, for only complex thought will allow us to civilize our cognition (*ibid.*, 24).

This new "civilisation of cognition" he calls fundamental anthropology or social philosophy. Its task is to doubt the principles of the disciplines that chop a complex object, which actually is constituted only through interrelations, interactions, and complementarities, into counter position of complex elements, each one of which is confined in a separate discipline (E. Morin, 1973, 227). The philosopher poses a super task: to create a universal theory, which would be able to catch at

the same time both unity and diversity (*ibid*., 225). Cybernetics, general systems theory, the system of the concepts of ecological science provide the methods, concepts, contextual relations or, as he puts it, "create an introduction to complexity" (*ibid*., 12–13).

The Changed Concept of the Object–Subject Interrelation

Scientific reflection has always balanced between empiricism, which is in a direct touch with the objects, and idealism, which believes that it manipulates only concepts. Ever at present the concept of cognition of man and society often remains objectivistic because more "convenient".

Obviously the major problem of contemporary cognition is the relation between the subject and the object. It is becoming more and more evident that the subject of investigation, not only in social but also in natural sciences, is to a considerable degree contrived by the researcher. Here the concept of observer, which survived in science since the time of Pythagoras, is out of place. E. Morin has stressed that up to now the predominant idea was that of the world of objective facts purified from all qualitative decisions and subjective deformations; this idea was fortified by the experimental science and their verification procedures. It predetermined that the subject and subjectivity were regarded as "noise", i. e. disorder, distortion, fallacy which should be eliminated in order to gain the objective knowledge either as a "mirror" or mere reflection of the objective world. Thus, the whole Western ideology, which from the time of Descartes has made man the subject in the world of objects, should be turned upside down. This is an ideology of isolated man as a closed monad which could be opposed by Romanticism only by poetic means; and by scientism only in a mechanistic way; it regarded man too as an object (E. Morin, 1984, 325). We are already entering the epoch of "dialogical cognition".

The Idea of an Open System

Now all theories are seen to be unable to give a final explanation of reality, to stop the process and to "close" its object. They all doomed to remain open, i. e. incomplete, insufficient, and widely open to uncertainty and incognizability, but in need of continuing research and creating a meta-theory (E. Morin, 1973, 229). The more developed the system, the more complicated and abundant, the more open it is. Man and society are the most open systems. From the idea of the openness of the system follows the principle that the explanation of the system should be found not only in the system itself, but also in its relations with the environment, and that this relation is not a simple but a system-forming relation.

A new basis for explaining and understanding a new paradigm not only of natural, but also of social and humanitarian sciences is provided by many and convergent factors as well as: 1) perception of cognition as a dialogue with reality; 2) the notion of the complexity of theories, which follows from the complexity and non-one-dimensional understanding of reality; 3) the moments of object–subject relations, interactions, complementarities and opposition, which require catching both unity and the diversity; and 4) the idea of the open system.

Solving these questions, philosophy seeks the coeval truth; it looks for the grounds on which to base the solutions of contemporary problems, and draws in other sciences for this purpose; i. e. it loses its "purity". This requires a correspondingly, adequate and creative made of thinking, and develops it. It requires a corresponding approach on behalf of the researcher, which therefore acquires value of the paradigm.

Thus, both sociology and philosophy are involved in the process. These are looking for identity with reality and identity with scientific reflection (scientific reality). Otherwise together with P. Berger, we will be able to say only that the nature of reality is perfidious (1972, 120).

Speaking about the sociological thinking of the last decades, which could hardly be called the epoch of adequate sociology, usually the names of Cl. Lévi-Strauss, J. Habermas, N. Luhman, A. Touraine, P. Bourdieu, R. Boudon, E. Morin et al. are mentioned. By no means could they be called "pure" sociologists. At the present time the tension between sociology and philosophy is immense. It should be lowered while integration experiences essential growth, for sociology and philosophy are like two ends of the same segment. How could they be separated for? Philosophy implies the world outlook and is a methodology in the broad sense, while sociology is a step towards reality.

Methodology "both–and"

Using "both–and" instead of "either–or" is actually the "turnover" of the paradigm, i. e. renewal and deepening not of the conception of the subject, but of the prospects of the subject's cognition.

The ever rising problem of contemporary cognition is the problem of the "fencing off" philosophical thinking as well as of the natural and exact sciences or ways of the scientific thought, the problem of compartmentalization. Each of these ways would like to occupy its own niche without any projection to another. In reflective thinking, the naturalistic world outlook is still predominant, and no irrationalistic or humanistic methodology can compete with it. A dialogue between them, though it sometimes does takes place, provides only more arguments in favour of one's own approach rather than of accepting the opposite approach. An example was the long theoretical dispute between Cl. Lévi-Strauss and J. P. Sartre. Both thinkers remained in their separate thought "niches" or territories, sometimes enclave in type. Their peculiar feature was the contrast of sociology as a social subject and thus a science to philosophy as a humanitarian subject and thus apparently a non-science. The borderlines sometimes become vague and thin, especially in the period of social development or in developed Western societies. However, sometimes they become thicker and the distance becomes larger.

The ratio between scientific rationality and the values beyond science still remains very dim. One can maintain that at present philosophy is not strong enough to support a world outlook that would simultaneously embrace values and thought, good and accuracy. Usually either accuracy (strictness) or good is emphasized.

The essential precondition of this paradigm is that we are supposed to unconditionally to know all that is needed even before we start creating our own system. That is, we are supposed to be able to formulate statements sufficient for all the questions that might arise in future prior to thinking about them or their possible solutions. Of course, if we start from the precondition that all knowledge is based on pure practice or inborn ideas, or that the only one method is enough to solve all problems, or that to find the truth one cannot look beyond the literal sense, then we lay the foundations of a closed system.

The truth is that we do not know how a philosophical problem can be solved until we start solving it. We cannot start from absolute and clear ideas; they are rather the product of a long and tiresome work of thought, processes of explanation and understanding.

Thus, we approach the period of integration. It has been always present to a greater or lesser extent; otherwise the inventions of natural sciences would have been of no influence upon

philosophy. However, what is more important is that integration is most often acknowledged only "ideologically", because such is the fashion.

Nevertheless, at its beginning is the ever-accelerating work of the conscious unification of scientific "sub-spaces", all of which have their own vocabulary and language, into a common cognitive network (see E. Morin, I. Prigogine). This network, however, is as yet full of holes. Metaphorically speaking, we should construct a net of understanding in which all systems of knowledge of man and society are interwoven and mutually complementary, that is to make a "net of cognition". This can be created only by searching for relations, but it will never be created by a priori models. Rather, net is made of problems, their solutions, explanations of the concepts, search for relations, and from "questioning about man" (J. P. Sartre); it is not created from databases or statistics.

The multidimensional approach can be only in the sense of a "net", but not of a pyramid. Otherwise subordination can immediately emerge: this is higher and that is lower (sociology or philosophy) whereas nothing in the world process is "higher" or "lower". Of course, when we deal with a narrow problem our arguments are thesis–antithesis–synthesis, because the problem is usually already formulated. In this case one method can be quite enough. However, in a philosophical study in which we "manipulate" the objects of ideal concreteness but not of reality, where the field of research is wide, where new answers to new questions are sought for, where the process of both reality and thought is going on, – in this case no one method will suffice. The net of problems and answers, of argumentation becomes similar to a spider's net located in space and time. The goal of argumentation is to find correlations and their interactions.

Attempts are made to characterize this correlation as the paradigm of projection. According to D. Polis, every new projection adds to the exuberance of our experience and knowledge. In an additive but multiplicative ways, it deepens our projections into the same reality (1993, 39). The paradigm of projection seems to be similar to the paradigm of thesis–antithesis–synthesis, but it differs in many respects. First of all, a projection cannot be antithetical. It can be only different or of another kind. In the first case the synthesis is the goal, whereas the projection is independent of attaining the synthesis. Projections are correct, because they offer an integral approach to reality.

The projection of paradigm could collate the perspectives of Western and the Eastern thinking. Western thinking had a tendency to find only one explanation and to reject the others. It was a logic that could be called the "either–or". This Western logic is opposed by the Eastern logic which could be called a "both–and" logic. The difficulty with the Eastern is their evident fascination with paradoxes and unwillingness or unreadiness to solve them. Meanwhile the paradigm of projection accepts the "both–and" logic, but also demands that the paradox or problem be solved.

Contrary to religious or scientific fundamentalism, the new paradigm, which perhaps can be designated as the paradigm of projection, requires openness to complexity (see E. Morin). This means that the paradigm, figuratively speaking, "responds" to the problem in a flexible way, allowing for deviation from the norm instead of fanaticism. In dealing with the projections of a multidimensional reality the inability to acknowledge the possibility of the other projections would render us blind in the face of the exuberance of reality and lead to an inadequate world outlook. This is what has happened to sociology.

The aim of contemporary philosophy is to construct a model of reality with multiple projections. The goal of the model is not just to reflect reality, but to show that seemingly opposing projections can actually be harmonized, if they can be explained by a unified model. The model can serve as a source for hypothetical deduction and for verification of the subsequent projections. This type of model is actually the world outlook.

As a method, the projection paradigm means that we are seeking the points of contact or relations between different "sections" of the same reality. The paradigm of projections should not be regarded as a simple syncretism or relativism. For one projection complements and gives impetus to another.

The principles are a posteriori when we speak about our experience. However, they are valid a priori once formulated for ourselves based on our reflexive experience.

This method, on analogy with the choral technique of the Greek drama, could be called the strophe-antistrophe method. The chorus goes to one side of the podium, singing a strophe, and comes back singing an antistrophe (the replying strophe). The audience must hear both motions. It is ready for the antistrophe no sooner than the strophe has come to its end. The "strophe-antistrophe" paradigm allows one to leave questions open as long as we come back to them –in another way. Applying the strophe-antistrophe metaphor, it is possible to say that the strophe is a question: how do we grasp the truth in the transitory experience? It contains also the key to the antistrophe phase. The antistrophe is a reply but is not final. The long philosophical dialogue between Cl. Lévi-Strauss and J. P. Sartre could be such a strophe-antistrophe.

Philosophy, open to integration, and sociology, open to integration, is already a world outlook, which encompasses scientific, philosophical and value concepts. This is a field of sociological duties; it is practice for which and to which both an open philosophy and an open sociology are needed.

The Subject, Goal and Methods of Contemporary Social Philosophy

When will it be possible to speak about philosophical theory? For a science to be independent, it must have: 1) an o b j e c t, i. e. a certain continuous, objectively existing and relatively defined "piece" of reality; 2) a s u b j e c t, i. e. the aspect or a system of regularities upon which to base our studies of an object of reality: otherwise it is an ideal concreteness, a main problem or essential contradiction; 3) a task or a g o a l sought by science (theory); and 4) methods characteristic of and needed for this theory or science.

For instance, G. Klir, one of the founders of theory of systems, for an mature theory singles out: 1) the sphere of study (the object), 2) the sum total of knowledge in this sphere (the subject), as well as 3) acquiring new knowledge in this sphere and 4) the application of knowledge in this sphere, that is a multitude of the interrelated methods (the methodology) (see Klir G., 1981).

Elements and concepts of contemporary social philosophy have been rather sufficiently developed in philosophical reflection and can be systematized. Hence the main task of researcher to define the object, the subject, the goal and the method of philosophical theory.

The bject of fundamental social theory is social relations and processes involving nature as the environment, i. e. nature "re-created", humanized by man. This object is also the object of many other social and humanitarian sciences such as theoretical sociology, theoretical medicine, social ecology, humanistic psychology, humanistic philosophy and others.

The subject of research in contemporary social philosophy is the regularities in the development of society in which every member could become an unimpeded personality; i. e. could develop as a harmonious, integral, creative, talented human being freely, creatively, consciously and responsibly constructing its material, spiritual and social world. This means investigation of the conditions under which the development of every man becomes a target for society. It is a society in which, according to J. Habermas, "everyone could desire" or, according to R. Dahrendorf, "everyone could be given a chance" (1990).

The goal of social philosophy is to define the "quality" of man (see Th. Schultz), i. e. to reveal the qualitative criteria1 for evaluating the optimal conditions of social life that would predetermine the development of a free and creative personality. Otherwise they are called the criteria of a humane society. For example, they are the conditions that allow everyone to be the subject of activities; the conditions that provide for adequate cognition and thus management; the conditions that abolish the alienation of the social relations, etc. To reveal the criteria means to reveal the ways and means for creating a high quality of life, i. e. a complex of conditions favouring the utmost development of physical, spiritual and social forces of every man and of the whole society.

The methods of social theories depend upon the goals. The above-mentioned goal of contemporary social philosophy requires also a special method (or methods). Here a fruitful method is integration on the level of conceptual synthesis, i. e. transfer of the concepts and conceptual apparatus, as well as of the methods of investigation from one kind of science to another. This corresponds to the orientation or paradigm of contemporary science as a search for a relation among the phenomena and for a relation among sciences.

Note

1. In the opinion of W. Ashby, if we want an organization to be "good," we should first of all find the criteria that highlight "good" and "bad" organizations (Ashby W.R., 156, 328).

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Chapter III
Sources of Contemporary Social Cognition

The main approaches to the problem how man should be understood and explained represent opposite positions. First of all, scientific objectivity and preciseness are required. In this approach, the person is separated into elements, sides and aspects: "man dies". The most brilliant example of this approach is philosophical structuralism. The methods of exact sciences when applied to explaining man generally do not work. Another extreme is rejecting an objective analysis while trying to preserve and reflect specific features of human nature. Man is understood to be a unique object of cognition and subject of activities, therefore none of the objective laws of the world should be applied to him or her. These alternative conceptions are characterized by heuristic moments. Thus, it is the conceptions of these philosophical trends that are most worth to be studies.

J. P. Sartre's Existentialism as Humanistic Philosophy

According to J. P. Sartre, existentialism is humanism for the reason that if draws attention to "real" man, uplifts the value of personality and defends its interests against the hostile influence of collective and society. J. P. Sartre called his method "the concrete analysis of social phenomena". He found similar examples in K. Marx's works. J. P. Sartre notes that K. Marx neglected apriorism, but always relied upon experience, abundant factual material. However, contemporary Marxism, in his opinion, "forgot man", "lost completely any understanding of man". This forgetfulness is a consequence of the very dialectical scientific conception of nature, society and thinking, - of dialectical monism. Marxism understands the historical process as a natural process, it "believes that it is possible to turn the historical process into a process of natural history" (Sartre J. P., 1960, 125).

Sartre does not agree that dialectics can be beyond man, in an alien sphere. According to him, the dialectics of nature can be neither asserted nor neglected. "Everyone is free to believe or not, that in the laws of physics or chemistry some dialectical mind is manifested, in any case it is a non-scientific statement with respect to the facts of inanimate nature" (*ibid*., 129). Since "this external materialism lays down the dialectic as exteriority", "the Nature of man lies outside him, in an a priori law, in an extra-human nature beyond man, in a history that begins with the nebulae" (*ibid.*, 27), therefore, according to Sartre, the specific nature of dialectics is forgotten and human history is "dehumanized". In the conception based on dialectical monism, as one of the objects of nature in his development one obeys the laws of nature. In other words, he exists as a pure materiality governed by the universal laws of dialectics. Dialectical materialism smothers the problem of consciousness, rejects as a "foreign admixture" "a concrete live man with his human relations, his true or wrong thoughts, his real goals. He is replaced by the absolute thing" (*ibid.*, 125). Hence follows the conclusion that the materialistic world outlook is based on cognition of the object without a cognising subject. "By taking off all subjectivity and identifying it with pure objective truth, it enters the world of things inhabited by men-things" (*ibid.*, 30–31, footnote).

Men become men-objects, and the human nature is depreciated, derogated, because, in his opinion, "the basis and results of every philosophy that subjugates humanness to anything else but man are hatred of man" (*ibid.*, 249). Marxism, in J. P. Sartre's opinion, has forgotten the specific character of historical dialectics. Therefore it sees the driving force of the historical process only in economical circumstances which "act behind the man's back", and thus it ignores human

freedom. By doing so, Marxism, according to Sartre, rejects a concrete man as an embodiment of dialectical casualty and creation. In theory therefore Marxism turns into schematics, and in practice - into totalitarianism. This is the way to destroy humanism. In Marxism, man is dehumanized, turned into a scheme in which there is no place for man as creator and the subject of historical initiative: Marxism "forgot" man both as a subject of cognition and the creator of history. It "rejects as casual all concrete definitions of human life and from historical continuity preserves only its abstract skeleton of universality" (*ibid.*, 58). For this reason Marxism having lost "the sense of man", uses abstract "global" notions like "class", "worker", "bourgeois" which turn a "concrete" man into a scheme, a negligible magnitude (*ibid.*, 58). Sartre sees here anti-humanism, not because these abstract concepts are used, but because, in Marxism they are the limit and measure of everything. Existentialism, on the contrary, tries to "grasp" human practice by concrete concepts and thus to supplement Marxism. Inside the very heart of Marxism there is "an empty space for concrete anthropology" (*ibid.*, 59). Existentialism remained the "only definite approach to reality" (*ibid.*, 24). Therefore the task of existentialism is to "take man back into Marxism" (*ibid.*, 59).

More than once J. P. Sartre comes back to the problem of the significance of Marxism. He believes that "we have the method, the only one to correspond to the entirety of historical movement in its logical order: Marxism" ("*L'Arc*", 1966, 95). Existentialism then is bound to become the "anthropology" of Marxism, because Marxism lacks humanistic problems, neglects the individual, does not accept the value of the person; explains everything in term of "the collective", and sacrifices personal interests by the masses or for the collective.

The "Concrete" Person as the Subject of Humanism

In his essay "Existentialism is a Humanism" Sartre declares the individual mind's activity to be the foundation of humanism; later, in his "Critique of the Dialectical Reason", he grounds this on the possibilities of the concrete, individual man. In his search of a connection between "the world of things" and "the world of human subjectivity" Sartre explains the essence of man through the concept of "concrete" man.

One of the theses of existentialism is the "initial" absurdity of the external world ("being in itself"). Man is "thrown" into this world and forced to live "in the presence of absurd". Man exists, creates his essence, and becomes "being for himself" only because thanks to his mind he regularly isolates himself from the world and negates it. Only human existence, contrary to the inert existence of things, becomes manifested as a process, as the activity.

The basic principle of Sartre's conception of man is that man himself creates his essence by actively isolating himself from the environment in which he exists as a creative, developing, active and perpetually self-creating being. In the existentialistic treatment of man, even though based on the activity principle, two features are evident. First of all, while raising the problem of activity as the main prerequisite for understanding the essence of man, Sartre understands human activity only as an ideal rearrangement of the "situation". Freedom is related only to ideal activity which, even though emphasized as the means to overcome the absurdity of being, becomes absurd itself, because it is only ideal. Another key is his understanding of the existence as an individual psychic state of the individual, as isolated from social relations and from history. This approach results in an extreme by individualistic and subjectivist attitude to the essence of man. Man, who in Sartre's philosophy is perpetually creating himself ex nihilo, does it in an absolutely autonomous way. Thus, in Sartre's conception of man human activity is inevitably related to man's isolation. The

creative, active line in man is but a phenomenon of the spirit of an isolated individual (man-atom), his thinking, his consciousness.

Referring to the activities of the "concrete" subject, Sartre argues that it is man that is primary, whereas groups, collectives, social "ensembles" are secondary. The subject of history is an individual man in his "whole totality" (*totalité*), "wherever he is – at work, in his privacy, in the street" (1960, 42). It is "real people with their deeds and troubles" (*ibid.*, 28), with all their actions, passions and demands. In Sartre's opinion, "replacement of abstractions by concreteness" entails an attempt to establish individuality and particularity, and to reject universality.

Sartre also insists on switching to concrete notions. He claims that there exists not "the proletariat but proletariats (agricultural proletariat, which differs from industrial proletariat, French proletariat which differs from Turkish proletariat, etc.)". Individual man is explained by J. P. Sartre only anthropologically and through psychoanalytically interpreted experience of childhood, etc. (see Kirsner D., 1976, 6, 30).

By declaring a concrete, definite individual to be the historical subject, Sartre explains the whole historical process as the arithmetical sum of the actions of separate individuals. In his "Critique of the Dialectical Reason" he undertakes the task of finding out how "a synthesis of practices" is formed in a collective. In his approach, however, a group, or collective is not "super-consciousness", or a new quality. It is characterized only as an arithmetical sum of "individual practices", a "multitude" of practices with all the ensuing constraints (Sartre J. P., 1960, 542): "social practice does not exceed the rationality (*rationalité*) of individual practice" (*ibid.*, 532). On the contrary, if the prerequisites of existentialistic ontology are strictly observed, social practice (activities) looks external to the individual and restrains the individual's initiative because its inertness hampers and damages the creative action of individuals.

Society, according to Sartre, is a "multitude" of single creatures, not related by inter-subjective ties (ties of this kind are possible only in an amorphous group) and devoid of the common emotional state. Society is a discrete structure, "a multitude of individual fates" (1968, 11).

Guided by these assumptions, Sartre rejects the sociality of human existence, which is explained by him in terms of psychology (sociality is understood as something outward regarding man). Man is social when his behaviour conforms to socially acknowledged values, which, however, are unworthy of "true" man. In the process of his socialization man becomes a set of social roles – "masks". J. P. Sartre considers socialization as a derogation of man, because man is neither a set of "masks" nor "roles". He is something integral, but this integrity is preserved by the individual only in his self-consciousness.

Personal relations are established in the form of institutions. Sartre is strictly opposed to the institutions as facts of depersonalization. Therefore, according to him, any result following from the actions of an institutionalised group is alien to the individual's interests.

Although social action and the existence of a collective or community are treated as historical factors, their role is understood as only as negative with regard to the self-expression of the individual as individual. This hostility between the individual and society is immanent to history. The individual, in Sartre's opinion, is free only when he negates or rejects society, the environment and their related constraints. The individual's solitude or self-isolation from the world is treated as a law of existence. However, consciousness shrunk into itself finds its strength only in itself; it cannot cognize and consequently cannot manage this hostile world. Therefore the foundation of existentialism, as of the other subjectivist theories of freedom, is irrationality. The freedom of the individual, the "existential subject", is gained not in practical social activities, but by isolating oneself from society, "in oneself". It is not incidental that for Sartre there is not "society" but only

"situation", not "social relations" but only "inter-subjective relations" of individuals and groups, not "history" but only "the individual's historicity".

Existentialism turns historical problems into non-historical dramas of an abstract man, therefore it can be considered as the ideological manifestation of individuals' rebellion. J. P. Sartre's intention to implement "the humanistic program of Marxism" remains unrealized.

Existentialism formulates the initial principles of the analysis of man as independent of any social or historical definiteness. One of the principles of this is to treat spiritual activities as spontaneous and independent of any external reasons, a pure sphere of genuine activity. This principle follows from the assumption that human activities (activity) are separated from their material character and the spiritual principle from the material one. This dualism allows considering matter as the cause of human alienation.

The activities of the anthropologically concerned individual are explained as isolated from matter, objectivity and sociality, historically created conditions and means of activities, as well as from its own product which on being "hardened" into a material form becomes alienated. The creative activity of man, isolated from the factors that form and substantiate it, remains only abstract activity. Existentialism, in raising the humane thesis about man as a creative being and in searching for the possibilities of this creative work (freedom), absolutizes one aspect of human essence at the expense of another, isolating activities from history. Sartre rejected those incentives of human action that one way or other can be fixed as an external cause existing beyond the individual, as well as all other social and historical determinants of his behaviour. According to him, there is no way to warrant the direction which mankind should follow, as either in man or beyond him there is nobody to determine the goal and to direct progress towards this goal.

Based on the principle that there exists only direct existential practice, existentialism has absolutized the significance of the individual forms of the assimilation of the external world by man. Existential philosophy in general is characterized by absolutizing the sphere of phenomena and their explanation by means of everyday consciousness.

In the conditions of alienated society, when social relations inevitably become something self-dependent, these relations become seemingly independent of the activities of the individual. Two poles appears, one being man and his privacy, the other being "the environment", "the world" and history. This illusion, when fetishized, is the basis on which the philosophical idea of non-material activity arises.

Substantiation of "Human Freedom" in History

Freedom is a precondition for the development of humanism and a humane personality. The humanness of a philosophical conception requires that the problem of freedom is dealt in this conception. Therefore it seems important to elucidate the content of the Sartre's notion of freedom.

Prior to the "Critique of the Dialectical Reason", the basic principles of Sartre's approach to the problem of man's freedom had been grounded on and predetermined by his theory of the dialectics of "negation" developed in his work "Being and Nothing". The notion of absolute freedom of the individual grew from ontological dualism: "dialectical man" – "non-dialectical nature". Freedom is considered as a creation of a subject independent on any social or environmental conditions. It is the fundamental datum of human existence: "Actually we are freedom which makes its choice, but we do not choose to be free: we are doomed to freedom" (1943, 565). We are thrown into freedom, Here says Sartre employing the notion coined by M. Heidegger: Geworfenheit.

The humanism of Sartre's philosophy is based on the presumption of man's particularity and uniqueness, on the specific place of man in the world, on his not being "another thing"; he is not to be identified with any other object. This is argued by counter-posing "the world of things" ("*être en soi*") and "the world of man's subjectivity" ("*être pour soi*"). "Being in itself" is identical to itself, inert and devoid of contradictions. Whereas the main feature of "being for itself" ("*être pour soi*") is contradictoriness, dialectics. It was explanation of dialectics that predetermined J. P. Sartre's notion of freedom: in the dialectic process he absolutizes negation, meant to evoke contradictoriness and thus to serve as an internal impetus for initiating motion. The ability to negate is inherent only to "being for itself", i. e. consciousness. Therefore it is consciousness that is dialectical and thus active, negative and free. The ability to negate is considered the essential, immanent feature of the human being. Sartre found the value and uniqueness of the human being in its absolutely indeterminate and spontaneous nature. "Being for oneself" is the manifestation of the sense of life and its source. The individual creates his life and therefore existence is prior to essence. Human existence has a sense and a goal, whereas the world of things is absurd and non-cognizable. The purposeful activities of a subject are separated from objective reality. This ontological dualism paves the road to his voluntaristic concept of freedom.

By his conception of absolute freedom Sartre developed only the negative aspect of spiritual freedom and paid no attention to the positive content of freedom. The philosopher emphasized the self-will of consciousness, but not the realization of the abilities and ideals of what is human in individuality. The human consciousness rejects all that is not human and thus establishes itself as the unique, as a value, and thus as the true human being.

In this "Critique of the Dialectical Reason" Sartre rejects the absolute, non-substantiated concept of freedom; freedom is no longer treated as a voluntarist choice of his own being, made by man, but is linked with practical activities: the possibilities of man's freedom are to be sought in the sphere of his practical activities. In the "Critique of the Dialectical Reason" Sartre no longer considers freedom as an absolute, ideal choice of one's being, but rejects the notion of freedom–fetish (1960, 95, 249). The solution of the basic problems of humanism here is dependent on a novel approach to dialectics. Although he goes on rejecting dialectics is nature and again criticizes dialectical monism (*ibid*., 124–125), dialectics is not considered solely a phenomenon of human mind but is linked with individual and social practice. Thus he tries to ascribe the whole sphere of human activities to the sphere of dialectics.

Dialectics of Practice and the Limits of Cognition

In the first volume of the "Critique of Dialectical Reason" there is a problem – "to prove a strict equivalence of practice and dialectics as the logic of the negative act, i. e. as the logic of freedom" (1960, 156). From the "dialectics of negation" Sartre switches to the "dialectics of practice", because "dialectics as a live logic of act is revealed in practice" (*ibid*., 133).

Now practice becomes the key notion. The possibility of freedom is grounded by Sartre in his analysis of the limits of dialectical practice which moves dialectics from the sphere of pure consciousness to the social world. The elucidation of the possibilities of practice should prove the exceptional character of man's sphere of activities (historical being) and the value of the historical subject, as well as his uniqueness. This is the task of purely humanistic philosophy.

The degree to which free practical activities or man can create history while seeking his humanistic goals reflects the degree of freedom of man himself. However, Sartre agrees that for practical activities to be successful, there is need for cognition of the fields of action, i. e. of reality

which is beyond man and includes nature, material culture and social relations. Therefore in Critique of the Dialectical Reason he accentuates that practice is free only when people can cognize and reliably explain history. Consequently, the solution of the problem of freedom depends on the way the problems of cognition are solved. He underlines that the adequately solved problem of the cognizability of the objective world would not only lend his philosophy humanistic and optimistic meaning, but also would proved new basis to the notion of man's freedom.

The aim of cognition, as it is formulated in the first volume of Critique of the Dialectical Reason, is the "ability of man to create history while seeking his goals" (*ibid*., 102). In this work Sartre wants to "show and substantiate the tools of thinking that are used to cognize history, as well as to create it, since these are also practical tools" (*ibid.*, 135), or else he is looking for the ways to cognize social relations or "history"; so as the individual would not feel as a stranger, or "lost" in it, but could act freely and attain the desired results of his activities. An attempt is made to find "the limits of cognition". Since the limits of cognition in "Critique of the Dialectical Reason" are related to the character of practical activities, the solution of the problems of freedom, and hence also of humanism will depend on the way "practice" is understood.

Critique of the Dialectical Reason attempts to find the base for the cognizability of material being – "being in oneself". Sartre no longer separates "being in oneself" and "being for oneself" with an insurmountable barrier: he emphasizes that the world of material culture created by man comprises the project of the individual, his activity and matter – "inert memory". In the process of practice two spheres clash: man's project embodied in things and the inert world of matter, to which also social relations are ascribed.

According to this conception, however, processed matter unfortunately distorts human goals, as it reflects the subject's activity as inertness. (In the history and social relations this inertness is manifested as the distorted sequel of a human is (group's or collective's) activities, unexpected by individuals and impossible to foresee. To characterize this phenomenon Sartre uses the notion of "counter-finality" (*contre-finalité*).

The dualism of Sartre's philosophy inherent in this work allows considering "being in itself" only as the world of "things", alien to man and opposing his projects. "Being in itself" (comprising material culture, social relations, social institutions, etc.) is still treated as inaccessible, inconceivable to human consciousness and unknowable.

Thus, inert, non-dialectical matter limits the possibilities and freedom of cognition. Wherever the free will of man is encountered by matter, which is alien to it, his activities and their results always become inconceivable, and hence not free. Because of this world of things and relations, i. e. of material reality which is beyond man, every moment is perceived as "a constant threat to our life, as an opposition to our work, as the limit of our cognition" (*ibid*., 247). In this respect, as soon as the individual treated anthropologically or psychologically indulges in real activities, he immediately finds himself in the world of "vicious" matter (*ibid.*, 279), because "matter alienates the act that is treating it" (*ibid.*, 224). "Inertness" inevitably penetrates the conscious activities of individuals so that practice as the free activity of men "comes back to men as an independent and inimical reality" (*ibid.*, 224). Sartre describes alienation as "the field of inert practice being the field of our slavery". He means not an ideal slavery, but real enslavement with the aid of "natural" forces, "technical" means and "antisocial systems" (*ibid.*, 369). The "process of practice", or "materialization" (which in Sartre's philosophy is always synonymous to "alienation"), i.e., the sum total of millions of individual practices appears as an undesired and unsought result.

The moments of work are humane, because man is self-objectified through work; "this means that he loses himself to enable a human thing to come into the world and to enable himself to find

himself again in the objectivity" (*ibid.*, 238). However, the objectivation proceeds "through inert and external matter, therefore the product comes back to man as an enemy and makes him a stranger, a counterman" (*ibid.*, 224). Sartre stresses that inhumanity does not follow from human nature, but in every man there is an anti-humane structure, which is nothing other than material negation" (*ibid.*, 207).

Sartre delineates the limits of free practice when he creates the conception of "levels" ("layers") and "groups of practice" in the history of activities. According to "the level of inertness", he singles out three "layers" of practice: individual (*praxis*), inert (*pratico-inerte*) and social practice (*praxis-commune*).

Dialectical intelligibility is most strongly pronounced in "individual practice" (*ibid.*, 361). Within his individual project man feels as a creator, the subject of activities. Every action is understandable to him, because in individual (creative) activities the material necessity is a subjugated and surmountable moment. This is meant to be the only sphere that is free from compulsion: "Individual practice is an original act of dialectics" (*ibid.*, 373). Here he repeats his earlier view that man's freedom is essentially individual. Only the freedom of the individual and individual practice is genuine freedom, not burdened by inertia – matter, i. e. eventually it is the freedom of self-consciousness. In the completely free project of the individual Sartre leaves no objective landmarks or reference points. It is of not coincidental that the "project" is understood not in terms of any concrete plan, but as a manifestation of authentic being, non-conceptualized consciousness, "freely implemented totalization" (*ibid.*, 158).

However, since in every practice objectivation (materialization) is a necessity, the inert spheres ("anti-dialectics") penetrate even individual practice: "anti-dialectics" appears as an "inorganic picture of human activity" (*ibid.*, 346).

Thus, practice degenerates down to the "practice–process", by which concept Sartre means the so-called "inert practice" which obeys the "external law" and in which "necessity removes all the designed and teleological structures" (*ibid.*, 543). So far as practice is a process, i. e. so far as the activities are exposed to the "threat" of matter, the goals are deprived of their teleological character and "turn into fates" (*ibid.*, 631). Thus, the process is the limit of "transparent", intelligible practice, and since the "practice–process" is a more frequent phenomenon than pure practice (*praxis*), the intelligible sphere in historical being remains very narrow.

Inertness is even more harmful to "social practice" (*praxis-commune*). While analysing social practice, Sartre looks for its ties with dialectics. However, the very subjugation of the individual to the collective principle is considered as the beginning of the degradation of dialectical intelligibility. In social practice, various forms of organization of the individuals are singled out, and their freedom of activity is different. Individuals act freely in an "amorphous, short-lasting, casual group" (*ibid.*, 384). In the depths of objectified (self-objectivated, as Sartre puts it) and alienated history, in the abysses of inert collectives and masses, there appear unions into which people unite to struggle "against things which bear fate in themselves" and against "men that have become slaves" (*ibid.*, 428). These are "amorphous groups". According to Sartre, the truly revolutionary and intelligible are only the spontaneous activities of small groups united by spiritual exaltation because here material structures do not restrain personal initiative and objectivity does not suppress the projects.

The group is the sole driving force of history. From his theory of groups follows a tendency to explain the revolutionary as a certain state of consciousness, characterized as enthusiasm and exaltation, ecstasy and "Apocalypses" (*ibid.*, 648). Having no faith in the "institutes", the philosopher believes only in the spontaneity of masses. In "Critique of the Dialectical Reason"

Sartre frequently employs the notion of "class struggle". Class struggle is the "negation of ones by others; in other words – negation, and that is all" (*ibid.*, 223). Class struggle as negation is a perpetual state of mankind: "human society expresses itself through class struggle in all moments of historical development" (*ibid.*, 224). Besides, a class is considered equal to other social compounds, such as groups, collectives, etc. Showing examples of historical actions, he purposefully takes either an individual action (interaction between the pilot and the aeroplane), or an action of a group of people (a football match), or an event (a rebellion) (*ibid.*, 526). J. P. Sartre was "conceiving facts as a set of events", according to J. Piaget (1968, 24).

Sartre maintains that revolutionary movements, on acquiring complex organization, involving large masses of people, become governed by "inert practice" and "anti-dialectics" and thus lose their "transparency", or intelligibility. The more organized the group, the higher its moment of inertia, and creative practice turns into inert practice. This process begins in the group which has taken an oath and ends in the institutionalised group. Already in the group which has taken an oath (*assermentée*), the threat comes from its very members: every one of them perceives in the others a threat, a limitation of his freedom. The oath is aimed at forming a united organism, but because of the oath the group finds itself beyond the state of the spontaneous goal: everybody is engaged regarding the other. Consequently, everyone agrees to fix the limits of his freedom. The group becomes invaded by inertness: as organized group, "a practical multitude in all cases is confronted by its own inertness" (1960, 158).

J. P. Sartre in his conception of freedom combines two components of the social process, which are the internal project of the individual and its embodiment. By doing so he wants to preserve also his initial approach – to explain dialectics as the dialectics of the subject and at the same time not to reject real history. Therefore in "Critique of Dialectical Reason" the existence of men is defined not only by their individual projects, but also the materialized conditions. However, it turns out that it is matter that prevents the subject of action to recognize the results of his action. When the philosopher tries to combine the idea of the objectified activities with the idea of the opposition of the material and teleological moment, in his conception of practice (and freedom) contradictions appear. Because of the dualism of material being and the human world the subject's freedom as the essence of the humaneness of man's being becomes devoid of its real basis. Freedom as pure practice survives in the sphere of man's being that is "not burdened", "not shadowed" either by materiality or inertness, thus again only in self-consciousness. In "Critique of the Dialectical Reason" there is no positive definition of freedom (true, authentic existence of man).

The sphere of the understandable, "transparent" and free practice, as well as of "pure", genuine" freedom and cognition finally remains very limited. Sartre underlines, that "the materiality of a thing or an institution is a radical negation of invention and creation" (*ibid.*, 249), because "any objectivation means distortion (altération)" (*ibid.*, 360). On the one side there is the object, "being in itself", which "is what it is", and on the other side there is the creative subject, consciousness. In Sartre's philosophy, the creative characteristic of thinking essentially disagrees with material activities.

Freedom is left beyond the reach of material, inert spheres. Thus, the possibilities of freedom and cognition in the philosopher's opinion are limited by the whole material culture of humankind and the inert spheres of the social world. Creation, freedom in the individual activities remains in as much as they do not come into contact with inert matter, i.e., only where they are beyond the reach of objectivation, that is, in consciousness.

Instead of providing the subject with a real ground on which his cognition of the world could be based, J. P. Sartre in his existentialistic conception of cognition adheres to the idea that is reality there is no such ground at all. The individual is left to choose the situation on a purely intuitive, voluntarist basis, independently of any objective circumstances. This means that actually he rejects the positive approach to the solution of humanistic problems, because he fails to find the grounds on which man could base the realization of his goals.

Intuition as a Tool of Cognition

As J. P. Sartre emphasizes spontaneity and intuition as the only source of free action and cognition, an illusion of the spontaneity of mental activities arises. He maintains that the subject (treated always only anthropologically and psychoanalytically) in his "free" projects relies on the sphere of human existence that cannot be defined positively. The project, in this respect, is a phenomenon of pre-reflexive consciousness: "the project as transcendence is but an exteriorization of immanence" (*ibid.*, 158). Every man, prior to any cognition, possesses an understanding of his being, – this is one of the main gnoseological postulates of Sartre. Thus, "the project", in his respect, is only an "implication", a perception of "something" which is not yet conceptualised in consciousness, but only a vague relation to the world, a "freely experienced totalization" (*ibid*., 158). The project is understood not as a definite scheme of actions but as a manifestation of "authentic" "being for itself" in man. In the totally "free" project of the individual no objective landmarks or reference points remain.

The project in Sartre's existentialism is not considered beyond "being in itself" and therefore cannot be liberated from inert forces. On the other hand, man's existence cannot be abstracted from traudendence, from "the beyond" or "the extrasensory". Without this relation, according to J. P. Sartre, existence loses is definitiveness and turns into a thing. This is one more reason why existentialism cannot be ascribed to subjective idealism.

When the cognition of nature and social development seems doubtful, when the world beyond man seems non-cognizable, nolens volens it turns into an obstacle for human freedom. Practical activities in this conception are not only considered as a criterion of cognition, but, on the contrary, are treated as an obstacle to cognition. The only way to "overcome" this world is to separate one's activities from the inert world of things and institutes. This would mean that free activities are considered as an act without any real preconditions.

The process of cognition in the existentialist conception is not linked with the cognition of objective reality. Nor is cognition of a human existence in this conception a grasp of the regularities of the history of mankind, its environment or activities. In Sartre's opinion, the rationalistic constructions are artificial; they do not show anything true and only obscure the cognition of reality. Any kind of reflection kills authenticity and throws consciousness back into the alienated, artificial world of "object". Only the consciousness of an isolated subject, free of illusions, can catch the truth. Only the spontaneous, intuitive, primordial perception is still able to bring the lost "object–thing" back to man. Intuitive perception appears when man is "shocked" or touched by a confrontation with the world. "The source of shock, the most important event is danger" (*ibid*., 384). To this type of danger the philosopher ascribes starvation or bankruptcy, as its essence is also starvation. However, in the existentialist approach man perceives not objective reality, but only his own way of existence. Objective reality cannot be recognised, nor is there need to recognize it, as it is nothing to man.

This discrediting of human cognition leads to agnosticism, which in Sartre's existentialism is present also both when he defines the object of cognition and when he explains the process of cognition. What is reliable is only the "pre-reflexive" image of reality, which can be caught by the senses, whereas sensation itself is treated by Sartre in an isolated manner and explained by itself. The act of cognition is considered the act of the individual: "individual practice (…), which is clear to itself, offers quite a clear model and rules" (*ibid.*, 150). The process of cognition is one of images and of experiences that appear in the consciousness of the separated and isolated individual. Existentialism depreciates the possibilities of rational cognition, which it replaces by intuition and "perception".

"Meanings" as Explanation of the World

Since the object, "being in itself", according to J. R. Sartre, is essentially non-cognizable, the subject can endow it with any "meanings" and "senses". "Man creates meanings" (*ibid.*, 96), stresses the philosopher; by endowing the "meaning" the individual explains the world. This is quite sufficient to cognize the world. Moreover, in Sartre's opinion, thereby the significance of the subject is emphasized and the creativity of the individual is stressed. By arguing that matter is an inert substance in which separate consciousnesses personify "meanings", that man is a creature that endows meanings, he absolutes the subjective side of these activities (interaction). Sartre's reasonable declaration that "it is an absurd to identify the meaning of the object with a pure inert materiality of the object itself (…)" (*ibid.*, 95–96), fixes only one member of the interaction. He emphasizes as an essential property of man his negative activity; however, in his opinion this is only the activity of consciousness, not the material activities. The philosopher does not accept one of the essential conditions of human activity – the possibility of adequate cognition of the external world. He identifies cognition as reflection and rejects the notion of reflection as "a useless and misleading intermediate notion" (*ibid.*, 31). Since social practice is not intelligible for the individual, the meanings he imposes on objects and phenomena cannot be adequate. The individual can perceive the historical meaning of social being only as a symbol or abstract sign.

Inert being, according to Sartre, cannot be the source of consciousness. However, he does not claim consciousness to be someone's creation. Thus, consciousness seems to be the cause of its own being. Objective reality is but the predicate of consciousness. Only consciousness endows inert being, which is "identical to itself", with "meanings", "senses". The ability to create *ex nihilo* ascribed to consciousness turns it into activity without content. The act of creation, which is the endowment of "sense" proceeds without any preconditions because no interaction is possible with "nothing", the "absurd". In this approach, the activity of consciousness does not trespass the limits of consciousness itself. The act of rendering meaning is mystified: understanding proceeds without any preliminary activities. Practical activities as a prerequisite of thinking and critical control are rejected. Unreliable knowledge cannot be the ground upon which the freedom of man's activities could rest, either. In this philosophy, man (collective, group) cannot cognize and thus cannot use for his needs the world of things and relations, which he has created himself.

The creative act is by no means programmed in our environment (this is certainly true in the case of a single, anthropologically and psychoanalytically treated individual). Sartre draws a strict borderline between the meaning of an objective situation and the creative act: he tries to escape simplification that man is conceived as the automatic outcome of the environmental conditions, demanding that man should not be limited by "the pure anti-dialectical moment of inert practice". This might be the case when "relations of practical multitudes (relations of individuals – J. M.)

will be defined by mere determining" (*ibid*., 731). However, rejecting metaphysical determinism, J. P. Sartre strictly differentiates between the significance of an objective situation and of the creative act.

Alienation: an "Original" Relation in "Deficient" Conditions

Alienation is based by J. P. Sartre on the action of inert matter: "We will succeed in revealing alienation as a rule of objectivation in historical society inasmuch as materiality (…) predetermines human relations" *(ibid., 224)*.

The notion of alienation in Sartre's philosophy also underwent an evolution. In "Critique of the Dialectical Reason" the notion of alienation already meant not cutting off relations with the world but rather the objectivation of the man's activities in "inert matter". Alienation is regarded as an original relation which, on the one hand, is predetermined by the man's relation with the world and, on the other, turning into its opposite, which happens because practice proceeds on the grounds of inert matter.

By contra posing "being in itself" and "being for itself", Sartre creates the precondition for the non-historical treatment of alienation. When man by his work (which is considered essentially humane by the philosopher) renders objective his forces and creative potency, the product of his work, the external and inert character of this objectivation becomes alien to man and, in turn, alienates man himself. "In the product everyone produces his own objectivation, which comes back to him as an enemy and turns the man himself into the other" (*ibid.*, 224). The standpoint that alienation is eternal and immanent to human activities is based on Sartre's claim that the creative activities of man are inevitably invaded by inert, alien, non-cognizable matter. The fact that one man negates the other man is explained by the philosopher saying that matter itself negates human (*ibid.*, 223). Practice is manifested as "anti-practice", i. e. as practice without the author, as the opposite of free practice. This is how man becomes alienated regarding the other man, or, as J. P. Sartre puts it, "total alienation (…) in the abysses of practical multitudes (solitary individuals – J. M.) with inorganic matter as an intermediate" (*ibid.*, 731).

Alienation is ranked by Sartre as a totality. One becomes alienated with respect to another: a concrete man in society becomes a "counterman", because the freedom of one man is the negation of another's freedom, as "matter brings back against everyone the working power of the other" (*ibid.*, 224). Man becomes alienated also regarding history – social relations. According to Sartre, if one claims that history is created by man, "this implies that he is objectified and alienated here", and history, "the product of the activity of all human, seems to them as an alien force in as much as they fail to recognize their own actions in the universal and objective result" (*ibid.*, 62, 63).

In "Critique of the Dialectical Reason", when speaking about the interrelation of individuals, Sartre uses the notion of "antagonism": antagonistic relations are between any separated individual and any other individual or collective. These alienated relations of men, which can be manifested only as an "antagonistic interrelation" (*ibid.*, 744), are produced by the mediation of matter: "Processed matter produces men as the tools", because "man defined through being beyond himself becomes defined as a vicious sphere" (*ibid.*, 279). Hence follows the conclusion that alienation should be eternal, as eternal is the objectivation of the activities.

To explain alienation Sartre uses the notions of insufficiency, deficiency, "rarity" (*rareté*). Insufficiency produces "need" (*besoin*) and thus stimulates human activity. Mankind is developing in the environment of rarity where deficiency predominates, where there are not enough goods for everyone, and every individual "consumes my (and everybody else's) products of primary

demand" (*ibid.*, 689). Therefore, in this world of insufficiency, of unsatisfied material needs (*exigence matérielle*) man exists objectively as a threat to another man, as a "strange region", as an enemy. However, one should not think "that material need (*exigence matérielle*) inevitably means a specific deficiency (*rareté speciale*)" (*ibid.*, 368). The notion of "rarity" implies that "there is not room enough for everyone" (*ibid.*, 368), that there is a deficiency of resources, relations, association, etc. (*ibid.*, 689). Work, technological inventions could reduce the deficiency. However, according to Sartre, this does not eliminate the deficiency, and rarity (*rareté*), i. e. eliminate neither social tension nor alienation, because rarity is the internal definiteness. Deficiency is treated not historically or as an economic category, but as an a priori ontological category of man's being. Instead of being liberated by his product, man becomes alienated thereby. Processed matter affects the individual by its inertness, as it directs against every individual his own product and the product of everyone else. It is the notion of "the Other" that reflects this alienated man and society.

J. P. Sartre bases himself on the opposition of "I" and "the Other", and their relation he denotes as "We". However, in his philosophy the relation of "I" to "the Other" is one of negation, hostility, struggle. Love itself, which is included in the complex relationships between "I" and "You", is a form of their struggle as subjugation of one to the other: the essence of the relationship among consciousnesses is conflict. His expression: "every man exists as an inhuman man, or else as a strange area" (*ibid.*, 206), expresses the essence of alienated society: alienation of the individual regarding work, its product, another man. "Critique of the Dialectical Reason" states the relations of alienation as "an institution of depersonalization", through constant encroachment upon initiative and the creative individuality of man. However, sticking to man's ontological principle, which is an insurmountable wall between human being and the world of things, Sartre does not offer anything positive to overcome this alienation and clear up human "practice".

Existentialism is a philosophy of alienated society and Sartre's philosophy does not cross the limits of the consciousness of such a society. He regards alienation as a phenomenon immanent to man's being. The result of any activities of man is strange to him as alienation comes together with materiality. The philosopher sees the same also in the alienated social relations; contra-finality (unexpected and unwanted results) presents a constant threat to an individuals' projects. For this reason the estrangement and absurdity of social reality is regarded as something that cannot be removed by any kind of practical action.

The Problem of the Intelligibility of History

In the first volume of the "Critique of the Dialectical Reason", on the "*Question de méthode*", a regressive analysis is given. History is decomposed into its elements: into practice (its levels), groups, institutes, etc. The very elements are studied as a product not of static forces and identities, but of individual human practices (*praxis*) in the conditions of deficiency (*rareté*).

The second volume (1985) seemed promising in the sense of giving answers to the questions that the philosopher had raised to him, but this did not happen. In this volume, the existential issues of philosophy are subordinated to a socio-political explanation of the state of the individual and society in totalitarian society (e.g., to analysis of anti-Semitism, of the ghost [phantom] of Stalin, of the model of Soviet society, class struggle phenomena).

Sartre proceeds with the main topics of his philosophy – the individual's identity and ontological security – when he discusses the possibilities of totalitarian practice. Therefore the explanation of practice (*praxis*) undergoes a change. Sartre's believes that this practice should be

essentially humane as its subject is man, and even were be a slave, his work would be his own, the work of a sovereign doer. However, in totalitarian societies, the individual's practice proceeds in the collective and becomes "purely negative practice" (*praxis negative*) (1985, 67), hiding in itself the lasting profound "fraternity–terror" *fraternité–terreur*) of interrelation. This interrelation should be explained in terms not of opposition, but only of "conflict" (*ibid.*, 12). Sartre concludes that the unity–conflict of the humane and the anti-humane is manifested in every moment of daily life - in society, in a group and in every individual we meet (he points to Stalin as an example of the individual).

In groups and collective's unity is an antagonistic relation" (*ibid.*, 73). A "counter finality" (*contre-finalité*) and collectivism as the "internal cancer of a group" induces inner conflict (*ibid.*, 67). In the depth of the group hostile "subgroups" (*sous-groupes*) endow with hostility even the common work which turns into anti-work. Therefore "anti-work should be called double-antagonistic activity, as each subgroup works to destroy or change the object created by another (…)" (*ibid.*, 105–106). Sartre claims that this double attempt to destroy somebody else's product actually is never a complete success. Thus history can proceed. However, hence follows the other essential problem: how to endow sense history as a totalitarization? Here Sartre's philosophy exhausts its cognitive possibilities, as it is difficult to explain how the hostile individuals and collectives struggling with each other can create common and intelligible history, how the individual can in himself bring into concord humaneness and anti-humaneness.

The Schizoid World of Existentialism and the Philosophy of "the Other"

"Existentialism is the philosophy of split human", wrote F. Jeanson as far back as 1947 (see Jeanson F., 1965). "The world of J. P. Sartre is radically split", agrees D. Kirsner (1985, 212). In fact J. P. Sartre wanted to explain the possibility of subjectivity (the individual's identity) in the dehumanised and radically shred world, as well as the possibility of mutual relations for the individual in a strange social environment (to elucidate "ontological security").

The search for the individual's identity and ontological security, according to D. Kirsner, shows that Sartre's world actually is the world of schizoid disappointment. But this is not solely his problem: the philosopher belongs to his time and this is first of all the age of ontological insecurity. The main relation, who reaches out from the individual us to the macro-social systems, is schizoid, i. e. everywhere there is the lack of fundamental confidence in oneself; this is the general social status.

In this state of a split world and shredded (schizoid) human consciousness the object cannot be humanized, whereas the subject is objectified in as much as it sees itself as the object and cannot perceive itself as the subject. In this situation of double alienation the subject is split into separate roles. Sartre described exactly the crisis of this embarrassed, helpless, passive, void and scared Ego.

As the major problem of the time, the need arose for a new identity. Our identity is related to non-being in the external world, which is our cruel freedom. We can see, but we cannot act; we are free but for nothing. Action means the loss of oneself and the analysis of "being for the Other" confirms this understanding: "As long as I am trying to liberate myself from the influence of the Other, the Other is trying to liberate himself from the mine; as long as I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me" (Sartre J. P., 1943, 474–475). The "original sense of being for the Other" can be nothing but conflict.

In D. Kirsner's opinion, the world describes by Sartre recalls of the Plato's allegory of the cave. Now the cave is the totality of the world itself and is much more complicated then Plato's cave. The world becomes similar to a maze of mirrors that reflects and refracts an immense number of images, though none of them looks real. Only internal individual solutions seem possibly. However, the split and shred world depicted by Sartre is also a kind of a prison, where the prisoners are bound co-operate in order to perpetuate their own slavery. J. P. Sartre, in D. Kirsner's opinion, highlighted the essential crisis of confidence and identity in the schizoid world (Kirsner D., 1976, 174).

All the relations described by Sartre are characterized by sadism or masochism: everyone is trying to "expropriate" "the Other's" freedom or give him his own freedom (see Kirsner D., 1976). However, "the Other is impossible to understand: he runs away when I seek him and governs me when I try to escape him" (J. P. Sartre, 1943, 529). Thus, it is impossible to satisfy the sadomasochistic equilibrium; any relation is doomed to failure. Man wants to "possess" and "assimilate" the Other or to be "possessed" and "assimilated" by him. One is bound to the Other because only relation to the Other can provide recognition, but for this reason man is exposed to perpetual danger and hence is insecure (Kirsner D., 1976, 52–53).

J. P. Sartre's Method

What is important for us is not the content of the split world described by Sartre or the degree of its perception, but rather the manner of its perception and explanation, i. e. the method. D. Kirsner often underlines that this is the individual explained in terms of psychology and psychoanalysis, the world and their interrelation. D. Kirsner asks: "How is it possible to integrate the psychological and the sociological aspects without denying one of them? This is the question, which J. P. Sartre tries to cope with" (1976, 6). In his interview in the journal "L'Arc", in appraising the individual's activity Sartre is guided by a psychological approach.

The idea of the subject's activity (in this case negative activity, i. e. passivity) in philosophy of 20th century has come from Freud:

The idea comes from Freud, who chose an ambiguous place for the subject (…). The Ego has no existence in itself ("*en soi*"), it is a construct, and its role remains purely passive. It is not the actor but the point of intersection, the point where forces come into conflict. An analyst does not force his patient to act; on the contrary, he forces him not to act and to surround to his own free associations (1966, 92).

Sartre acknowledges that "this description is true inasmuch as it is applied to neurosis (…)" (*ibid.*, 92). Then follows a splendid, humane analysis of the subject's active self-creation, but only on the level of psychological analysis:

The subject, or else subjectivity, exists from the very moment when there is an attempt to overcome (*dépasser*) the situation. The genuine problem is the problem of such subjectivity (…), how the subject or subjectivity can become, leaning on the foundation which is external to him in the eternal process of interiorization (*intériorisation*) and re-exteriorization (*réexteriorisation*) (*ibid.*, 93).

The notions used for the explanation conceal a dilemma. As a contemporary philosopher Sartre integrates with philosophy the achievements (and notions) of psychology and

psychoanalysis. He often solves philosophical problems from the standpoint of psychology, while also adhering to the purity of philosophical methods. He seems to be standing on a philosophical crossroad. As P. Trotignon puts it, while Sartre marks the end of the era of metaphysical philosophy, at the same time he opens the door to a new philosophy. This psychological method of explanation was discussed by G. Lukacz for whom "one of the essential principles of contemporary philosophy is to oppose (…) intuition to the rational thought (…), whereas in reality intuition psychologically is part of the whole method of scientific cognition" (1948, 56). On the psychological level intuition is indeed more concrete and synthetic than theoretical thinking whose sphere is abstract notions. G. Lukacz stresses that "intuition is not an opposition of discursive thinking but its complementation, and leaning on it could never be the criterion of truth" (*ibid.*, 57). We should add: depending on it alone and using in philosophical thinking its concepts, principles and methods in non-adapted form.

At the same time Sartre himself was strictly opposed to the pretensions of sciences (even of the humanities – linguistics, ethnology, etc.) to change philosophy.

I do not call in question the existence of structures or the necessity to analyze their mechanism. However, I regard a structure as a moment of "inert practice" (*pratico-inerte*). I don't believe that history can be identified with this external process. History is not the order. It is disorder. As soon as history preserves the order, i. e. structure, it is ready to destroy it (1966, 90).

He claims that in technocratic society no place is left for philosophy, at least if philosophy itself does not turn into technology. Sartre is anxious about the fate of philosophy; he sees "philosophical questioning" degenerating into positivism. "However, this is not any more the positivism of facts, if is the positivism of sign" (*ibid.*, 94). According to Sartre, there is no science to replace philosophy, because the whole of science is adapted to a part of the already "divided" man. The methods of sciences are analytical, whereas philosophical method can be only dialectical: "inasmuch as it (philosophy – J. M.) is the problem of "praxis" (questioning about practice), philosophy is the problem of human (questioning about human)" (*ibid.*, 95).

Sartre's struggle with structuralism manifested a crisis of philosophy or rather its crossroads. However, his own philosophy was a sign that there appeared new methods of "questioning about man", i. e. a sign that the crisis is already half-overcome.

In his evaluation of structuralism philosophy J. P. Sartre was not dogmatic. He maintained only that "I cannot understand, when a stop is made at the structures. In my opinion, it is a logical scandal" (*ibid.*, 95). He defends the philosophy of human subjectivity and identity from the standpoint be defined as Cartesian: "on the one side there is a notion and on the other imagination (l'imagination)" (*ibid.*, 94). Sartre believes that it is reasonable to fight with "alleviated" historicism whose essence be explained by the saying: "human is what history demands of him" (*ibid.*, 93). He defends the subject's creativity from what he calls the mechanical determinism of structuralism, because they "do not see the perpetual opposition of between the "pratico-inerte" structure and man, who opens up under its action. Every generation keeps its own distance from these structures, and this is the distance that allows the structures to change themselves" (*ibid.*, 94).

J. P. Sartre is often called the last genuine philosopher inasmuch as his philosophy is a symptom of a crisis of philosophy in general. Nevertheless, Sartre is more than the last philosopher-classic; he could as well be called the first thinker of the latest philosophy. He is standing on the borderline; he crosses this borderline and enters philosophy that is already

deliberately feeding on the sap of special sciences, searching for answers to "philosophical questioning about human", making deliberate use of the achievements of other fields of theoretical cognition.

Structuralist Philosophy: Human and Structure. Humanism as a Pseudo-Problem

The main task of structuralism which it sets for itself, is to provide the humanities with the status of exact sciences, to create a set of scientific instruments, allowing a scientifically objective orientation in the natural and social structures; that is "to attain the level on which the necessity is highlighted, hidden behind the illusions of freedom" (Lévi-Strauss Cl., 1964, 18). The exact and humanitarian sciences are considered to have already attained this level; they show both the necessity and the way to reject external appearance in cognising the world.

In their search for a new model of humanitarian sciences, structuralism rejected anthropocentrism. This meant the theoretical "death" of man treated in an isolated way. Nevertheless, the problem of man in structuralism survived as a philosophical problem.

In his polemics with existentialists Cl. Lévi-Strauss stressed that "it is exactly structural thinking (la pensée structurale) that today defends the banner of materialism" (1964, 35). In the opinion of the representatives of structuralism, by rejecting the subjective illusions of the individuals' consciousness, anthropology can be supported only by studying objective, impersonal and unconscious structures, as the basis of the whole of human existence. This is Cl. Lévi-Strauss's main idea in opposition to existentialism (1962, 324). "All the situations employed by Sartre to isolate the football match, a queue at the bus-stop", writes Lévi-Strauss, are the "secondary result of living in society, consequently, they are not helpful in an attempt to see its foundation" (*ibid.*, 330).

The theoretical problem of structuralist philosophy is to find the objective criteria of evaluation. The concept the "subject" was replaced by concept of the "structure" and the "philosophy of consciousness" by the "philosophy of concept". According to structuralism, it is not individual experience, the individual's cogito or its projections and choice, but the analysis of the integral structures which should form the basis of scientific investigations. Elimination of "old-fashioned prejudices of traditional philosophical anthropology", a synchronous and integral approach to all manifestations of human culture should be the first and indispensable prerequisite for transforming humanitarian sciences "from he metaphysical sorceries and sentimental poetic twaddle into science" (see T. Jaroszewski, 1970). The criterion of truth also undergoes essential changes. Instead of the possibilities of pure thinking declared by existentialists, structuralism advanced the experience of human consciousness which, employing logical operations and systems of signs, is turned into the forms of rational thinking. The object of rational cognition are not secondary, derivative things, nor what is evident to a subjective consciousness, but the forms of being that endow cognition with objective knowledge and allowing it to restore objectively more profound levels of human being. The goal of structuralism is to explain the individual human consciousness on the ground of the pre-individual, extra-individual and anti-individual structures of human existence.

As a definite scientific method structuralism searches for the profound relations among the phenomena. Rearrangement of the concepts of a concrete science into formalized models undoubtedly means the further penetration into their essence and elucidation of the essential relations of the object under study. However, relying only on concrete sciences or even a

combination of them entails the danger of losing the integrity of the object, which is necessary for philosophical perception.

One should differentiate between the structural method and structuralism as a philosophy, i. e. the concrete scientific and philosophical structuralism (e. g., Sartre regarded structuralism as a new ideology). Differentiating between structuralism as a method and as a philosophical system, J. Piaget comes to the conclusion that a concrete scientific methodological structuralism as such is not a philosophy: "as a whole, structuralism is a method and not a doctrine" (1970, 123). Without denying either the reality of structures or the methodological efficiency of structural analysis, Piaget is against structuralism as a philosophical doctrine. He does not agree that "from the constant attempts of man to cognize and subdue his environment" the subjective principle should be eliminated as "the structures have destroyed neither man nor the ways of the subject's activities" (*ibid.*, 119).

Although, as Lévi-Strauss has noted, structuralism does not claim to become a new world outlook or to formulate a new philosophy of man, representatives of structuralism did engage in solving the philosophical problems (e. g., M. Foucault works in the history of culture). Structuralists enter the level of philosophical analysis and occupy an essentially aprioristic position, when they regard the structures as something absolutely primordial and consider cognition as something absolutely relative and dependent on the a priori forms hidden in the human intellect. The method is groundlessly compared to philosophy in cases when structural analysis is regarded as the only basis of scientific investigation and cultural, historical and psychological universalities are sought. Lévi-Strauss claims that it is both necessary and sufficient to perceive an unconscious structure that underlies every institute and every custom in order to obtain a principle of explanation, that is efficient with respect to other institutes and customs, but only when a rather exhaustive analysis has been done.

Transferring the structuralist methodological into philosophy evokes contradictions between the final goal of structuralist studies, which is negation of an integral objective science of man, and the exceptionally analytic decomposition of their object of studies. It certainly would be inaccurate to oppose the method to theory or doctrine, as the method cannot be isolated from the conception of content when employed as a means to obtain new knowledge. However, when on the grounds of structuralism as a concrete and in certain spheres of cognition, fruitful scientific method extensive philosophical generalizations are made, this philosophy can justifiably be called the philosophy of "man's death", as in this man can be explained only as a puppet manipulated by structures.

The concept of structure as an objective phenomenon independent of the licence of individual consciousness seems to allow one to overcoming subjectivism. Fusing human being in terms of formal definitions should, according to M. Foucault, constitute "the liberation of the history of thought from the transcendental yoke", "getting free of any transcendental narcissism" (1966, 264, 265). Subjectivity understood as transcendental is treated in two senses: as a social and as an individual creative act. It is regarded as a foreign body to the tendencies in Lévi-Strauss' works as he crossed off man as the object of philosophy.

Subjective philosophy searches in all manners for the ability to know the essence of man, while in structuralism the human essence is not regarded as an object of scientific cognition. According to M. Foucault, "man is not an intricate object to think of, he is a non existing object; there exist a multitude of human beings, but man is a mere myth" (1966, 345, 333). Subjectivist interpretations are opposed objectivity and scientific accuracy and free activity by its structures: as subject man vanishes in the structures. Though structuralism rejects the problems of humanism

by declaring that philosophy does not claim to play the role of "philosophy of man", nevertheless, it offers a rather strictly delineated conception of man. Though formally the problem of the subject is eliminated, man and human activities in any case remain in the centre of its attention.

Alongside the problem of relation between structure and history (synchrony and diachrony), the problem of structure and man enters the scene of philosophical disputes. The concepts of structure and man (both as an object of cognition and the subject of historical action) are strictly counter poised. According to M. Foucault, the "'science of man' is not where we speak about man, but everywhere when unconscious norms, rules, groups of tokens are analysed" (1966, 376). Through speech, work and other structures man is highlighted in a scientific investigation as a certain pattern. Nevertheless, as these structures differ essentially from man their analysis fails to reveal his essence. We conclude to the "theoretical death of man", the loss of the "capitalized subject", and the "nightfall of humanism". M. Foucault maintains that notions like "man" and "humanism" today are a mere anachronism: structuralism is supposed to have disclosed the fact that human essence cannot an object of scientific analysis. J. Piaget reproved this extreme: "He (M. Foucault – J. M.) took from static structuralism all its negative things: depreciation of history and genesis, neglect of the subject's functions and unprecedented negation of the subject himself (…)" (1970, 114). He "replaced any systemic methodology by speculative improvisation" (*ibid.*, 112) nor can he accept the annihilation of the qualitative specifics of man.

M. Foucault in turn stresses that "special sciences about man – linguistics, psychoanalysis, ethnology – disagree with belief in the "humaneness" of the individual (as claimed by subjectivism). (…) However, this does not mean that man has died or "is on his way to extinction" (1966, 397). He sees man as an object of investigation to be a rather new invention in history of culture. The man who temporarily appeared in subjectivist (irrational and "humanistic") conceptions, man as the absolute, unique value, as the world-cognizing subject within the limits of his individual consciousness "will vanish as a footprint in sand on the shore". "The world, its order and human beings will survive, but not man" (*ibid.*, 348, 333). Linguistic, biology and political economy will create a totality of models and structures, which will radically change all knowledge "about man". Regarding history as a play of pure and absolute structures, M. Foucault concludes: "The world began without man and will end without him (…) man will disappear" (*ibid.*, 396).

Man as the subject of activity, as the creator of history and culture is eliminated from the social historical. To talk about man and his liberation, to the search for his essence, to the limitation of any cognition by human truths M. Foucault metaphorically opposes a "philosophical laugh, that is silent laugh" (*ibid.*, 354).

Later, in one of his interviews ("La Quinzaine littéraire", 1968, No. 46) M. Foucault gives another explanation of his work. In his opinion, the "man that will perish is not any more the one seen by objective sciences, but the man of the genuine philosophical anthropology "who cannot be utilized any more". He believes that "in this space of the pluralism of theoretical work there will appear a philosophy which has not yet found its unique thinker and its unified language".

Sartre criticized structuralism for denying the role of the subject and practice in history. Considering "refusal of history" as the predominant tendency of structuralism, Sartre considered the ignoring of human practice to be related. He noted that in the system of language and in social structures "traces of the effect of practice" is always clearly seen. In order to understand the appearance of structures, it is necessary to come back to the concept practice (*praxis*) as an "all-embracing process".

Structuralism in turn directed its attacks against philosophical anthropology and the type of historism that eventually sees all social historical phenomena within the limits of voluntarist "projects" of the individuals. According to the philosophical principles of structuralism, the starting point of studies should be not an individual experience, the individual's cogito, its projections and choices, but an integral analysis of the structures. Thus, rejecting historicism as explained by existentialism, structuralism denies any historical analysis altogether and regard social relations as a "thing that exists independently of man": structure is totally alien to man. M. Foucault especially pronounces this "programme" anti-historicism in his works.

In J. Pouillon's opinion, certain contrasts of existentialism and structuralism, for all that, complement one another; for example, that between the "analytical mind" and the "dialectical mind". In the world described by Lévi-Strauss "the world of rules", or the world of culture (contrary to the world of laws, i. e. of nature) there is no pure datum which could be simply recognized and processed by an analytical mind. The rule is something that could as well not exist and that must be formulated in order to exist. The dialectical mind, according to J. Pouillon, "as the driver of culture defines the fields, inhabits them with relations who then could be split by the analytical mind as natural structures. Dialectics creates what is known by analysis. Their difference should be discerned, but it is impossible to separate them" (1965, 56).

J. Pouillon is eager to reconcile the opposite methods: he thinks that this double supplement – of analysis and dialectics, structure and history – is possible. Also, in his opinion, philosophical anthropology should be aware of the results achieved by different sciences dealing with human activities or its products and only then group them into "ensembles of meanings" (ensembles significatifs) (*ibid.,* 55).

However, Sartre and Lévi-Strauss see only the differences in the two approaches. In Sartre's opinion, ethnology as well as sociology or psychoanalysis is a constituent part of what he calls the "auxiliary disciplines" to his anthropology, whereas "'ethnological societies' are "without history" or societies of 'repetition' ". Lévi-Strauss in turn replies that Sartre's philosophy "(as any other) is exactly a first-rate ethnographical document, which should be studied in order to understand the mythology of our times" (1962, 330, note).

To Sartre, perception of himself and of things is revealed in practice (*praxis*), and therefore an understanding of reality: dialectics is a constituent part (*constituante*). In Lévi-Strauss' opinion, the mind, be it the pure or the practical mind, has no such privilege: it thinks that is understands reality, but its truth is but a function. Thus, the mind is always moulded (*constitué*). This antinomy is clearly insurmountable.

Thus, the subjectivism and irrationalism of existentialism were the obstacles, which prevented solution of the problem of interaction between man and history. Structuralism philosophy, for its part, despite its promise to cherish the scientific objectivity of the cognition of reality, also failed to implement its programme because it eliminated from cognition socio-historical practice.

Structuralism does not analyze human acts or socio-historical practice, in the process of which social structures themselves with all their elements and relations are created. Like existentialism, it draws a strict line between impersonal autonomous social structures and the form of human consciousness used to express the essence of social structures: some absolutize the structures while others would render consciousness absolute. Lévi-Strauss says:

Our achievement is, that we can analyze social structures as the objects, independent of the character of their realization in people's consciousness (…); as the objects, differing from the images, that are given to them in man's ideas, exactly like the physical reality differs from our sensual images, related to it and from the hypotheses, created by us (1958, 134).

The anti-subjective principle of structuralist philosophy hinders the solution of the main antinomies, such as structure–subject, structure–history. Elimination of the human subject makes the historical movement incomprehensible, because one kind of static structure is replaced by another. The ideal of social, particularly spiritual, development as a sequence of internal structures, which do not develops, induces the belief, that history is predetermined in advance. Historical investigation of social and cultural structures is rejected as diminishing the value of the structure, as a formal and abstract totality, and as devoid of any additional information.

The conflict between structure and history, between structure and subject remained unresolved. History as a process and structure as a static phenomenon remained irreconcilable opposites. The concrete logic of development remained unclear, because the structure is not understood as a process. The internal movement of history is regarded as an illusion (Lévi-Strauss Cl., 1962). The change of structures is explained as an "explosion of the structure" upon collision with external conditions. History is regarded as a casual chain of unrelated epochs – a motley kaleidoscope (Foucault). Since, according to Lévi-Strauss, historical interpretation is always subjective, since history is never history in general but is "history–aim" (*histoire pour*), diachrony does not motivate a higher level of understanding than the one provided by synchrony.

Cl. Lévi-Strauss opposes "cumulative or warm history", which accumulates findings and inventions for creating great civilizations, and the "stationary or cold" history of archaic societies which, at least in the majority, is content with the achievements of the Neolithic revolution. He refuses to endow history with a privileged meaning. The second, "cold" history, "close to the absolute zero of the historic temperature" (1960, 42) is the object of study of ethnology. The first, "warm" history is the object of social anthropology, as it was "the model of society in which differences among people, when there are those who govern and those who are governed, were used to create culture at an unprecedented and unknown rate" (*ibid.*, 1960, 43).

Structuralism is a controversial phenomenon in the development of the contemporary philosophical thought. Undoubtedly positive is its negative attitude to the subjectivist approach to cognition and its search for objective criteria of analysis. Structuralism deservedly criticizes existentialism for its individualistic conception of man, and its anthropocentric approach to the essence of man. The orientation of structuralism to bringing the methods of humanitarian sciences closer to the methods of natural sciences is a highly positive development. Applied to ethnology and to the humanities structural analysis "works" in psychology, sociology, and history. Analysis of relational structures or myths stimulates investigation of a broader problem, which is human relations and association.

One should not leave out the scientific studies of Lévi-Strauss, which are humanistic in their content and conclusions. He refused to regard the thinking of primitive man as a lower stage than that of contemporary man. He has showed the parallel between primitive nations and the thinking of civilized man by showing that so-called "pre-logical" thinking obeys the same laws. The thinking of primitive nations is not an absolutely different stage in the development of human thinking. Both myths and scientific notions are based on the same logic. The "primitive thinking" (*pensée sauvage*) has its own practical-theoretical logic (Lévi-Strauss Cl., 1958, 255). To argue for the universal nature of human thinking is strongly humanistic when directed against the theories of racism and elitism.

However, the absolute principles of structuralism, when used as a basis for solving philosophical problems, come close to anti-humanism, for man is "dissolved" in impersonal

structures. Cl. Lévi-Strauss accepts the "undoubted primacy of the infrastructures" (Lévi-Strauss Cl., 1962, 173), in which he includes geography and climate (*ibid.*, 124).

According to the structuralist method, when synchrony is isolated from diachrony as strictly as possible, the structure is unchangeable in itself and undergoes transformation only when it trespasses its own limits. The structures, highlighted in the systems of signs, are elementary, partial, closed, devoid of motion and contradictions and therefore can be formalized and mathematized. This approach certainly works for analysing certain objects at a definite stage of research. However, structural research alone cannot explain complicated social processes, because the transformation into a new quality is not elucidated and the tendencies of the development are not shown; the study deals only with the present state, the historical perspective is lost.

In existentialism, each society is treated according to the uniqueness, identity and security of the personality, whereas from the standpoint of structuralism philosophy any approach to sociality means a loss of scientific character. Where Sartre emphasizes "purified" subjectivity, M. Foucault accentuates science without the subject.

There are similarities also in the existential and structuralist approach to the possibilities of cognition. The question of "how man can act in a world" which cannot be cognised more or less adequately receives no sufficiently justified answer in either of the two conceptions. Foucault in his theory of "historical apriorities" relies too much upon the "systematizing force" of unconscious logical structures. In his conception, the systemic nature of knowledge, its inner logic, "syntaxis" so emphasizes the relative weight of knowledge itself in comparison with the object of cognition that it seems doubtful whether in these objective structures and their semantics man can cognize anything and whether in general any objective content is preserved therein.

Inter-individual communication is recognized as the decisive factor predetermining social relations. "Society consists of individuals and groups, who associate with one another" (Lévi-Strauss Cl., 1958, 158).

Society is not the mathematical sum of its individuals, but the activities of individuals in the definite "medium" of historically formed social relations. By changing, restoring and creating them, individuals restore and create themselves and language as the means of communication. Though language is indicative of its users and of the relations under which it has been formed, it would be unfair to reject relations and historical activities as the substratum of language.

Structuralist investigation is directed to a system of signs, which is the mediator for thought to function. Behind a system or structure of signs, an object is supposed to exist; however, this is not necessarily adequate to a sign. This approach that language as a sign or model, does not necessarily reflect the essence of the object and doubts as to the possibilities of cognition in general show the essential anti-humanness of structuralism (not because structuralism rejects philosophical, "theoretical", existentialistically interpreted humanism).

Creative human activity is immanent to historical structures. Man (social individual) is the creator of his whole history, including social institutes, language, mythology, religion, etc. It is possible to abstract from man as the subject of activities only when analysing the whole scheme of social system. Man is revealed in every scheme differently: he is as if split into specific aspects. According to structuralist philosophy, it is analysis of these specific aspects of man that is thought to be scientific, objective and, above all, the only possible analysis. Man as the subject is lost here. Hence structuralism concludes that the theories which are still dealing with the subject are pseudo-humanistic, since man can be analysed in a scientific objective way only as a mechanical combination of different aspects. A truly scientific theory should reject the concept of the subject: theoretical anti-humanism is declared.

Structuralist philosophy is sometimes considered a pseudo-scientific overcoming of philosophical humanism. Investigation of man as an object of philosophical cognition does not coincide with the investigation of man as the object of all other sciences: philosophy analyses man as integral. The object of cognition can be neither man as such nor history as such. It is impossible to single out anthropology while studying the human essence beyond the world and independently of it and ontology as a science of abstract existence without man. Therefore, neither the individual beyond history and with no regard to it, nor the history (structures) in which there is no space for man can be analysed. Historical regularities imply an other sort of quality than do natural regularities.

"The vanishing of man" means that the properties that are traditionally ascribed to human essence, such as abstract universality, subjectivity and psychologism, characteristic of a separate individual turned out to be an illusion. According to L. Sève, "it is not human essence that vanished here but its mystifying ideological form". Structuralism, by rejecting this ideological expression of human essence, rejected also the essence itself.

The great structuralists – both Cl. Lévi-Strauss and J. Piaget – have already presented some examples of the analysis in which the structural method is related to the genetic one. We can maintain that structural analysis can be the first and indispensable stage of any analysis; of course, keeping in mind that this level of cognition is not the only possible one. In the concept of structure we should see a scientific model but not, as Lévi-Strauss himself has put it while approving of P. Ricoeur's formulation, "transcendentality without the subject", and not to endow it with the ontological status in particular. R. Garaudy has stressed that "we are always willing to look for substance behind structure, and we turn a structure into a thing, whereas actually it is action or rather "information" on the action (…)" (Garaudy R., 1967, 115). This is the definition of the first problem of the structuralist method, as well as the limit of its possibilities. Therefore, in the face of the danger of alienation and fetishism, it should still borne in mind that this is a reasonable and productive method.

The other problem is how to move from one structure to the other. M. Foucault even does not claim the possibility of such motion, because, according to him, structure is totally strange to man and separated from him, i. e. the role of the subject is deleted. To substantiate his approach, M. Foucault claimed that man in philosophy, as the subject of cognition and the centre of initiative, appeared only in the 18th century and is "quite a recent creation" (1966, 319). He declared that "since our days it is possible to think only in the void of the man who vanished (…). It is only philosophical laugh that can be opposed to those who are still willing to speak about man, his domination and his liberation" (*ibid.*, 353).

This kind of conception reflects the crisis of the subject, "it has been overrun by reality" (Garaudy R., 1967, 119). Elimination of the subjective aspect and fighting against it, in general, induce the search for the new motivation of the subject. This "subjective aspect" is no more subjectivism in the individualistic sense of Sartre's existentialism. Neither Lévi-Strauss nor Piaget turned their method into a dogmatic or absolute one. Lévi-Strauss regarded structure as "the basis for the analysis of relations among the terms" (Lévi-Strauss Cl., 1958, 40). He stressed the priority of links with respect to the elements and the priority of the whole without respects to the parts.

Thus, without the philosophy of existentialism, as without the philosophy of structuralism, would be impossible to move to the philosophy of new subjectivism, whose outline already is becoming visible.

Today there appear conditions for a new explanation and understanding of the link between the object and the subject. We can note the development of "new subjectivism" – the concept of

man's ability to create in historically formed conditions. Given the new quality of the productive forces and technologies, the new concept of the relation among people, nations and states, the new ecological threats to mankind, man is bound to develop his creative abilities. The sphere of production and real history could seem rather distant from the problem under study. However, philosophy does not spring up from nothing; it deals with the problems of human "situations". The methods of explanation of "split" man applied in structuralist philosophy, reality without the acting subject reflect previous history and the former situation of man in the world. However, these methods are not sufficient to explain the present situation.

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Chapter IV
The Network of Concepts of Social Philosophy

New concepts are being developed in philosophy. New concepts, such as diversity, openness, probability, feedback, dialogue, time vector, entropy, etc. appear and become philosophical concepts. The content of other concepts (free activities, associations, man's and society's health, etc.) are undergoing essential changes.

New Concepts in Contemporary Social Philosophy

The concepts in contemporary systems of concepts used by us often have their origin in another philosophical and social context, therefore their content fails to reflect today's problems. For a concept to be adequate it must change and its content must express the essence of a changing phenomenon. Here two approaches come into clash. In one case, there is the opinion that a concept keeps improving, with its content becoming deeper and deeper, that it gets rid of "non-scientific" coating and finally, on becoming "pure", approaches a perfect idealization suitable for the philosophical language. In the other approach the concepts and the systems of concepts are expanding, with their content changing, or even are being replaced by quite new concepts. Also the problems change with the changing reality they reflect, i. e. with the socio-historical context. In the first case the most important goal of theory is to substantiate or justify the existing theory, conception or notion. In the second case the goal of theory is to solve the problem, maybe even at the expense of the classical, totally accepted "purity" of the former conception This is not only to solve theoretically, but also attaining the desired practical results.

When and to what extent is a concept or a conceptual system transformed? In St. Toulmin's opinion, scientific disciplines are evolving "historical essences" and not "eternal beings" (Toulmin St., 1972, 149). The philosophical ideal of "invariable essences", which has for a long time survived in intellectual history, is being replaced by the concept of "historical essence". "Invariable essences" were understood as remaining identical through all historical changes. The changes always being "accidental" or at least not as significant as "essences". But in the concept of "historical essences" the notions undergo changes together with the problems offered by the changing historical reality. However, at the same time they can preserve their integrity and the continuity of the content so as to make possible their identification and understanding while passing from one epoch to another. For instance, the notions of humanism and personality, on the one hand, preserve the continuity of their content and therefore are recognizable; on the other hand, they bring new problems into their content. In the course of ages, philosophy in various ways solved the problem of humanism, which, as it split into various directions and questions, has always preserved something that is commonly known and could be recognized: "it is possible to cognize the integrity" and "continuity" (Toulmin St., 1972, 28). The new generations of philosophers would reformulate in their own terms partial, specific questions, but the main notion of humanism has survived.

In social philosophy, the process of the evolution of concepts takes place: some concepts become unnecessary, others appear and become rooted in theoretical thinking, still others change their content. Another formulation of this problem is the problem of the conformity of concepts. The evolution of the content of concepts and even their total change takes place not only with the expansion of objective reality as a basis, but also with the improvement of the theoretical system

itself as it becomes more complex. In other words, an historical and logical evolution of concepts takes place in which the new concepts not only modify, but also radically change the structure of social philosophy.

This can also be formulated as the problem of the conformity of concepts. The evolution or even the total change of the content of concepts proceeds not only with changes in objective reality as a basis, but also with the expansion and complication of a theoretical system itself. In short, a historical and logical evolution of concepts takes place as the new concepts not only modify, but also induced essential changes in the social structure of philosophy, its conceptual network and set of tools.

Essentially all philosophers regard man as a creature, which creates itself. Both the philosophers of the age of Enlightenment and contemporary thinkers derive their strength for solving the problems of man and society only in terms of man himself. What distinguishes the philosophy of our times from that of previous epochs is not so much the perception of man and the world itself as the new problems that emerge before man. In this case also the commonly knows concepts acquire a new content, implying a need for new concepts.

For instance, the idea of "human value", which was developed as far back as pre-Socratic times, in contemporary social philosophy is expressed by the concepts of "distinction", "diversity" (both of the individual and society). This means acceptance of the right to be distinct, the right to distinctness, or diversity: of cultures, views, individualities, etc. (see Lévi-Strauss Cl., 1958; Peccei A., 1977). Humanism needs a pluralistic ontology and at the same time a social philosophy that accepts a rich diversity and quality of social institutions and individual personalities (Maziarz E. A., 1981, see Philosophy of the Humanistic Society, 121.). Also the existence of separate humanisms is no exception but not of one global humanism (ibid, 121).

Man's ability to improve himself was known already in ancient philosophy. In the 18th century this idea was not only accepted but attained a new social level: not only human nature, but also society is perceived as being capable of improving itself. In contemporary social philosophy this idea is expressed by the concepts of man's creativity, activity, self-ascertainment, engaged thinking, or engagement.

Even the content of personality presently undergoes considerable changes and becomes problematic. Personality is one of the peculiarities of newest European culture. The manipulation of this concept without revealing its content contributes to its mythization. The myth of personality and freedom are the basis of every modern civilization, and even today the whole political life rests on it. But they are mere myths, maintained Ugo Spirito (1956, 105). The fact that they are merely myths, without the possibility of their logical explanation evoked the most diverse interpretations. The concepts of personality and freedom could become the signboards of various ideologies, and the banner of personality and freedom met the goals of egoism and egocentrism (*ibid.*). The question how this philosophy of ambitious man or man-the-centre-of-the-world could be avoided is significant.

Constantly raised is the question whether in contemporary philosophy the traditional concepts can survive in general or are atrophied, whether it is possible to harmonize the classical concepts with the contemporary ones. O. Gruenwald asks whether it is possible to sum such classical concepts as "free will, good social order, virtual, justice, moderation, soul and immortality" to those of "science, progress and history" that are being presently advanced (see *Philosophy of the Humanistic Society*, 1981, 2).

In social philosophy the following major concepts: responsibility, engaged thinking, creativity, diversity, activities, self-ascertainment, and openness have emerged and presently are gaining dominance (see St. Toulmin, H. Schelsky, M. Wertheimer, M. Bakhtin).

In H. Schelsky's opinion, not only social reality but also scientific cognition should be understandable as it regards to the behaviour and existence of man himself and this includes also the critical reflection of the subject, his consciousness, and his activities. This is "engaged thinking, or self-engagement". Engaged thinking, engagement at present is the essential basis not only of social philosophy, but also of science. For example, A. Maslow dwells upon the conception of vector (purposeful) science. W. Schrödinger spoke about the "physicist's subjectivity". It is characteristic that the philosophers emphasize verification by the way of participation, without the limitations of science to an "objective" approach; science will develop, and the laws of nature will be treated as involving man as individuality (Miller III J. F., 1981, *Philosophy of the Humanistic Society*, 1981, 244).

We can say that there are all branches of humanitarian or social science, each new problem is approached with the guidance of the principle of creativity, and grounded in a new concept of activity. In our cognition, not only is information related to the diversity of models (or to paradigms, or theories of fields), but we acknowledge that as individual human beings we are the creative agents that create this relation. To paraphrase the S. Kierkegaard's idea that "truth is subjectivity", in our times we know that "truth is creativity" (Rhodes W. E., 1981, 233).

Responsibility is becoming the core or main concept in contemporary social philosophy. Formerly the individual was responsible for his actions; he bore the yoke of lonely responsibility. In our new times he has a responsibility for the other, he cannot decline responsibility for the other, he must be capable of and ready for responsibility (see Fromm E., 1976; Losev A., 1988). Only responsibility elevates individuality; without it life cannot have any philosophy but is accidental in principle (Bakhtin M., 1993, 124). E. Morin in scientific philosophy feels the absence of an expanded concept of responsibility, because, in his opinion, good intentions are not enough for one to be really responsible. Responsibility must confront the terrible uncertainty" (Morin E., 1990, 109).

Nor are the concepts of practice, activities new to philosophy. The development of this idea helped the new concept of an "open world" become established in philosophy. Because of man's activities the material world is no longer beyond him but is embodied in the material and spiritual products of man himself, the world can never be completed, closed, rigid in the form of an object or state; because of human activities it is an incessant process of formation, change and development (see Toulmin St., Prigogine I., Wertheimer M., Schrödinger E.).

J. Bahm in his book The Model of the Philosophers' World states that too many philosophers in the past were engaged in solving problems in simple, small, static societies. Today as we live in a rapidly changing, complicated, inter-tangled megapolic and global society, ever more complicated conceptions are needed for understanding. Complementariness, emphasis on the novelty, dynamism and multidimensionality are used both in the synthetic and analytical methods of solving the problems. The new interdisciplinary group work demands comprehensive understanding, which is indispensable in decision-making (Philosophy of the Humanistic Society, 1981, 2). Hence, social philosophy cannot be stiff and absolutistic. In both philosophy and social sciences attempts "to come to agreement with the world of facts and to invent new ideas" are evident (ibid, 2).

The Content of the Concepts: Its Analysis

The conceptual model of social philosophy can be developed through the essential category of "activities". Thus, it is necessary to mark out a minimal but sufficient number of the concepts and their interrelations defining this category. To this end, we should study three subsystems of activities: the conditions, process and subject of activities.

The Content of the Concept of "Free Activity"

The major factor that predetermines the conscious activities of society, i. e., an integral development of every man, is free, creative activity. The possibility of such activities and their content depend on 1) a definite level of development of the conditions of production (material and spiritual or intellectual) and 2) the respective conditions of association (i. e. on social conditions). Free, creative activities depend on both objective and subjective conditions.

The objective conditions – technology. The objective conditions are the technical-technological conditions that provide for creating the sufficiency of material goods and developing or revealing the universal needs of each and every individual (see Moritani M., 1982, 262); as well as for developing the universal abilities: "a system, striving for an ideal, needs resources" (Ackoff R., Emery F., 1972, 233). The conditions can be regarded as minimal but sufficient, when the amount of resources is enough for all who want it to be able to seek together the same goal (*ibid.*). Only this level can be considered sufficient. (The level of development of means of production and technology can be regarded as ideal, when each member of society is liberated from a direct physical involvement in the process of production, i. e. when only the functions of production regulation and control are left for him to perform.)

In the Report to the Club of Rome the well-known ecologists B. Ward and R. Dubos call "resources" the "guarantee of the primary needs" (Ward B., Dubos R., 1972, 211). The consumer who is still tormented in the clutches of poverty and bad living conditions; whose health is poor and who has no way out of his problems will not thank you if offered only fresh air and pure water instead of the solution of his problems. In any civilized society the primary needs must be satisfied …? one hazard the worst of all pollution, that of tormenting, hopeless and neglected poverty (ibid.). (J. P. Marat during the Great French Revolution emphasized that life without the necessary resources produce also a specific scale of values: freedom is of value only to a thinker but is worthless to common people. The only good that is of value to nineteen out of twenty citizens is wellbeing, pleasures, and peace. They do not accept any other kind of goods in this world.)

The guarantee of primary needs is not an abstract idea: one of its fundamentals is social justice. The relative weight of the problem of social justice is the criterion not only of humaneness, but also of the rationality of any social order.

Aurelio Peccei regarded social justice as the main goal of humane revolution, which predetermines the development of the creativity of every man. He stressed that society must incessantly observe that actually all the wealth produced by the system goods and services included could be accessible to all members of society without exception and everyone could have a sufficiently real and equal possibility to reveal all his hidden abilities. A certain guaranteed minimal level of life should become an inherent right of every citizen born into this world (Peccei A., 1977, 217). This social minimum must be justified physiologically and should stimulate the cultural development of a personality. The minimum should be understood as a standard calculated according to needs, worthy of human life, but not a miserable, deplorable existence at the poverty limit. The material conditions must not humiliate the dignity of human person.

The constant historical basis of human progress was and still is the development of the social forces of production. Since they comprise all means and tools of production, as well as the sum total of the productive experience, including all the knowledge accumulated in man, the development of the forces of production actually means the development of the creative forces of the individuals themselves (the aggregate subject), embodied in the form of the objects of material and intellectual culture. As the manifested forms …? man, analysis of these forms is an analysis not of things as they are or of things "in themselves", but of man in the process of his social production and reproduction.

Every new stage in the development of technology changes the place of man in the process of work. We shall not analyse all stages of this change. We shall note that only self-regulating systems and other advanced technologies are in their essence a humane stage of the development of technology, as they bring about essential changes in the character of work and provide optimal conditions for turning work into creative activities (see Kutta Fr., 1970, 165–173). Complex automation lays the foundations of the technological "emancipation" of work.

From the standpoint of the ideal, this is the level of development of means of production and technology that liberates man from direct involvement into the technological cycle: what is strengthened is not the physical energy of man, but his intellect: the traditional manual labourer vanishes (*ibid.*, 172). Only the functions of production regulation and control, i. e. first of all mental activities, are left to him. In the place of accumulating material wealth, of decisive significance becomes the development of human abilities, human wealth (Agh A., 1984, 172) 1 .

As far back as the 18th century the Italian economist-mercantilist, Fernando Galiani, emphasized that the real wealth is man. In the 19th century Thomas Hodgskin formulated the principle of "human accumulation": accumulation of the skills and knowledge (scientific power) of the workers as the basic wealth accumulation, the main result of the previous work and incomparably more important than accumulation of the existing objective conditions, which goes hand in hand with it and only reflects it.

Thus, the development of each individual-producer is a condition of progress and not just a pure and beautiful humanistic ideal. Person substantiates themselves as person through production and not only thanks to consciousness.

The material world (the world of "resources") is a means of human development. However, it is impossible first to create conditions and then to develop man; man creates civilization, i. e. the objective conditions in which man himself is formed and gains more opulent humane (social) properties. Man's relations with the other men and with the environment can be essentially unlimited. Not only have the needs of peace, pleasures, and well-being already arisen, but also the need of freedom, social justice, dignity, responsibility, etc. (This premise explains why the call to "suffer in the name of the bright future" so frequent in some societies is not only inhumane but irrational. If the goal is a lifeless ideal, then only one "resource" – human life – can not be spared: man turns out to be the cheapest "raw material", when he is deprived of everything – education, wealth, relation with other person, - the only "currency" left to him is his own life.

The objective conditions – social relations. It is important to bear in mind that a highly developed technology is but an indispensable condition and economic premise, but not the direct cause that modifies humane relations and the preconditions for a creative personality. The feedback between the material conditions of activities and development of personality always has social relations as the intermediate. The vital activities of man become free, universal and harmonious inasmuch as there is formed both in the sphere of material production is formed as one of its foundations the necessary objective (material) results, and in the sphere of social relations

as the other foundation equal possibilities of appropriation, i.e., "equal chances" for everyone (R. Dahrendorf, 1990). Thus, the other objective foundation of free activities is social conditions, i. e. social relations, and social connections.

From the standpoint of the ideal, it is when every member of society participates in managing social relations, i. e. can solve all issues of social government. Here no place is left for any monopoly. It is here that the desirable humane approach to the ecosystem appears. Only now one part of society is not bound to protect nature and to save the environment from the "activities" of the other citizen. Erich Fromm called this status "participatory democracy". Neither the old nor the new type of bureaucrat can survive in this system, as the bureaucratic spirit is incompatible with the spirit of an active participation by the individual in social life (Fromm E., 1976, 253). Such participation predetermines the formation in the mind of individual agent unified, but at the same time very diverse, individual needs. The unified needs predetermine the unified goal of the whole society – to create equal possibilities for the development of each of its members as a person. The goal of material production in this context also becomes unified, namely to satisfy people's needs.

The process of free activities. While claiming that the conditions of free activity develop a spiritually opulent, talented personality, it is important to note the essential link through which the goal is attained, i.e., the very process activity. Otherwise one could think that the above-mentioned objective conditions are immanently capable of creating both a humane society and the person which would be vulgar materialism. The conditions of free activities are not a mechanic and direct reason for the perfection of the subjects of activities. Such reason is only the activities of the subjects who under those conditions consciously seek the goal: arrangement of the external world according to the laws of nature and society, i.e., management based on knowledge. (From the standpoint of the ideal, this is creation according to the laws of beauty.)

The subjective conditions: the subjects of activities. The above-mentioned objective conditions (technical-technological and social) are but one premise of a progressive society. Of decisive significance for society's development of progress and culture are the subjective conditions, i.e., the acting subject who knows what the objective conditions should be, i.e., who knows the ways and means to attain the goal and through their activities create these conditions. This is the essential feature, purpose, vocation and consolidation of personality: to serve people. They know, they want, and they can. The realized purpose dictates the way of actions.

The subject of activities is the person that has realized himself (i.e., is self-conscious) as a reason for and the result, content and purpose of historical development. His universal creative activities render him free, harmonious and restore his relations with nature, with other men, with himself, – they abolish alienation. He is being moulded as a person through his participation in social life, association, and creative work.

On the one hand, one criterion of the person's development, of its quality (and condition) is the ability to participate in developing one's own essence, i.e., in social life. On the other hand, on the quality of the person's development depends its participation in social life: whether it participates and in which way it does so. Free activities modify mental interests, that is the need to improve both the conditions of activities and the activities themselves. The main feature of these activities is the ability to produce not only things that are useful to man (the objective wealth), but man himself in his social relations (the human wealth) (see Agh A., 1984).

In this kind of system, neither the material, social, nor objective or subjective aspects can be absolutes. The conditions of creative activities and the process of activities itself here are interrelated by a feedback. Neither of the parts of this system can develop without relation to all

the other parts. The result of activities in such conditions is a creative person endowed both with the abilities and the need to act and to create. On the other hand, though the creating personality is a kind of product of creative activities under certain conditions, at the same time it is the initiator of the creative process in which the objective and subjective conditions of activities unite. Improvement of the objective and subjective conditions of creative work can be effective only if the subject of activities knows what these conditions must and can be and what they are at present. Comparison of a scientifically based optimum (ideal model) with the real situation provides the theoretical background on which the ways and means to attain the goals can be revealed (cognized). In other words, it is a comparison of the optimal and the real conditions.

We shall present several examples-relations to illustrate the system of optimal variants. For instance, there is an evident relation between the level of education of the population and that of the technology in the country. In the opinion of M. Moritani, whether the country will succeed or not in modernization depends first of all on the level of education, life and general culture of the majority of its inhabitants, as the technology of a country is a product of its culture (Moritani M., 1982, 179, 145). On the other hand, if the most intricate technologies require a high creative potential, if "culture became in demand", then, in the opinion of M. Moritani, it is evident that for a country to strengthen its creative potential also certain social conditions are required (*ibid*, 142). This kind of approach further dictates also the organization (but not liberalization) of both the process of education and of scientific creative work. On the grounds of the goals whose target is man, it is stressed that the multifarious growth is the end in itself, worth only as much as it is regarded as a condition necessary to provide equal possibilities for the creative work of each man. This approach is based on the premise that creative work, creative activities are not only a privilege of prominent personalities (M Moritani). In this relation, differences among various people are only quantitative and depend on the level of the mentioned conditions and the man's place in them.

One of the indispensable fundamentals for creative thinking, according to M. Wertheimer, is the "social situation", i.e., favourable social atmosphere in which the individual lives. His studies concern the principal structural identity of the creative mechanisms of primitive tribes, schoolchildren and of great scientists (Wertheimer M., 1982, 310–312, 269, 296).

Another example is from the sphere of health care as seen in terms of contemporary social philosophy as a theory of the conditions of the optimal development of man and his environment. Among the criteria of personality it ranks also a harmonious combination of bodily, mental and social health. On one's quality of education and culture, one's state of health depends the efficiency of social production. On the one hand, only educated and healthy inhabitants can optimize the conditions of social life. On the other hand, only a high level of material and intellectual production can provide for the quality of life when a high level of education and health is possible in general. Understood in this way, health becomes integrated into relations of social development both as a condition and as a result.

The Problem of the Conformity of Concepts

The system of concepts expresses a qualitatively new content for concepts that are not new in philosophy, such as universal personality, activities, health, quality of life, etc". The present-day humanistic development of society implies an essential transformation of both the way of production and the activities, i. e. first of all the extinction of the professional division of labour. Thus, the concept "all-round universal personality" acquires a new content, meaning the highest expression of the essential forces of man in creative activities, i.e., an integral personality.

Another example would be the evolution of the concept "activities". The old content meant "activities" as an antipode of "labour". Labour is a form of activities that is "not peculiar to man", as Norbert Wiener noted (1964, 299); labour is but a specific form of activities. Labour in political economy is present only in the form of activities for, as this is an earnings. The sole goal of labour is only direct consumption. Labour is not free activities. In the theories of contemporary social philosophy the concept of labour expresses the essential transformation of the character of labour, when man acts not by compulsion or only for consumption, but for a free embodiment of his creative powers as the end in itself.

The notion of human activities as the end in itself was stated by Aristotle: desirable are only the kinds of activities in which, as in a philosophical observation, man does not seek anything else but the activities themselves, for the activities of the mind are life (see Aristotle. Metaphysics). In his letters to the great warrior, Alexander the Macedonian, he wrote about the need for constant mental, philosophical, and thinking activities, to which a free citizen should devote all his free time. (To recreation Aristotle allotted only an insignificant portion of time. There was almost no recreation, but he allowed devoting time to physical or artistic culture, such as music and poetry. Of course, this concerned only citizens or frees people for whom labour was not a necessity. Certainly, if tools could do their work by themselves, the rulers would not need slaves (see Aristotle. Politics).

In the Renaissance, the idea of leisure as time for free creative activities was a purely practical idea. This is the time devoted to oneself: to sciences, arts, polemics, etc. after all works, i. e. after trade, production, etc.

In the 19th century, the Young Ricardians raised the idea of leisure time for labourers as a theoretical idea. Leisure time and its activities are a space to develop one's abilities. On this development (investment in man) depend not only the efficiency of labour, but also the way of life.

"Free Activity" as a Limiting Concept

It should be borne in mind that the concept of the conditions of free activities is a marginal concept of a high level of abstraction, which contains colossal information. The conditions can be explained in various aspects, so as to reveal the variety of relations. They can be defined as the conditions that stimulate the development of each member of society as a creative, unique, talented, universal personality. They also denote the conditions of activities that make each man the subject of activities. Also, they can be defined as creating the harmony of the interests of the individual and society, dominating alienation. Under those conditions, the target of society is already not production and accumulation of objective wealth, but development of the abilities of each individual, and thus the accumulation of the human wealth. The mentioned conditions also allow one to know and thus to manage the social process, as each (educated, creative) man can take responsibility for the trend of social evolution. All the mentioned and yet unmentioned aspects (definitions) are essentially identical. The highlighted relations are logically of the same kind and they allow for direct comparison; they can be derived from each other or, in other words, to turn one problem into another of equal value. This already lays the foundation for revealing the essential internal relations of the means and the goal of humanization of society, i. e. it provides for the foundation of a theoretical system.

Of course, the concept of the conditions of free activities is by no means final, and social philosophy does not resolve the contradictions, but only provides for understanding the problem.

The concepts themselves should be regarded only as "arrows", "directions" that indicate the qualitative characteristics of real processes. According to E. Morin, theory is not the arrival: it is the possibility of arrival (Morin E., 1984, 328). Contemporary social philosophy does not fetch final solutions, but offers the means to explain the problem and thus the possibilities for solving it.

Note

1. A. Agh notes that at present the developed countries already during 3–4 years reproduce their total national product (Agh A., 1984).

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Chapter V
Contemporary Social Cognition: The Problem of the Method

Only theory reflects the essential ties among social phenomena. An urgent need of a theory and the possibility of its formulation mean that the social conception has attained a higher level of cognition: it ascends from the level of description, the accumulative period of science, to the level of explanation or understanding. This level of the conception already allows the explanation of separate facts and phenomena, revealing their essential rather than casual relations and not diverging to trifles while solving concrete tasks of social life.

Methodology of Contemporary Theoretical Thinking

The new problems and the new basic concepts of social philosophy allow revealing essential relations among the spheres of investigation that formerly have seemed quite independent of one another. This is indicative also of the fact that a mature theory can reject the questions unanswered by previous explanations and replace them by other, more efficient and urgent questions and by new methods of investigation.

K. R. Popper maintained that our cognitive forces actually are adequate to the problem we must solve (1965, 397). Hence, the methods of study should also be adequate to the new problems, new concepts and new goals of study or, according to W. Heisenberg, the method can no longer be separated from its subject (1974, 207).

On the other hand, just as I. Newton's theory had induced the appearance of analogies in politics and philosophy, the methods of contemporary science have their analogies (or they are just emerging) in the science of man and in philosophy. In classical science there was a strict borderline between the simple ant the complicated. For it science was targeted at finding in complicated systems a certain simple level, i. e. the level which is reflected by the deterministic and temporarily recurrent laws of nature, in which both the future and the past have equal rights. At present, science everywhere finds instability, imbalance, irreversibility and fortuity of processes, probable processes and the like. This can be avoided neither by social sciences nor philosophy although they are much more inert. The world has turned on to be "a world of process and not of a dead final equilibrium" (Wiener N., 1964, 314). The world as a process is reflected by theories as processes (open theories). The new problems of social theories, expressed by the new conceptual nations, can be approached only with the aid of a newly created set of theoretical tools. The methods of humanism are first of all modified by understanding that history is incomplete, impossible to be stopped at a certain phase by declaring it the absolute solution of human needs, aspirations and problems. And all this can be reflected only by an open theory.

Basic Methodological Principles of Contemporary Social Philosophy

Systemic analysis of "facts". Attempts to define the interaction of man and society on the grounds of analysis of isolated elements in a narrowly specialized sphere of science and then "to sum up" the result, to present them as a certain arithmetical sum of ethic, political, ecological and other aspects cannot afford the desirable integrated picture of man (society).

Although the principle "to analyse phenomena in their integrity" is mentioned rather frequently, the practice of science (philosophy included) is often reductionistic: attempts are made

to explain a phenomenon by applying detailed analysis of more and more elements. The sciences of man are disintegrated, fragmentary, each one reflecting only one aspect of man (humankind). Today integrity is being rediscovered: the attempt is to combine the ensemble of human manifestations in a unified model (see works by E. Morin). In other words, the problem of man is being integrated in the ecological relation of the world.

Nevertheless, priority is often given to mechanical, non-creative (unproductive) studies, insisting on getting the answer "immediately"; the habit of acting blindly prevails, when solitary, isolated problems are being solved, and the predominant need is an unsubstantiated systematization, i. e. to be rid as soon as possible of contradictions. The most difficult questions are left behind, because to answer them would require enormous energy together with "productive thinking", i.e. "thinking for improving the situation" (M. Wertheimer). It is much more difficult to find a deep, essential relation than a partial criterion of a partial truth. There begin the "trials and errors" of theoretical thinking, which mean blind, accidental and sometimes dogmatic theorization. However, if one makes an error in society, one can hardly correct the mistake by applying a new method. Therefore the special theories that deal with society and personality from the very beginning should be based on the conclusions and criteria of fundamental theories and not on suppositions or "reinventing the bicycle".

M. Wertheimer finds some social and psychological premises to explain why researchers are fond of analyzing separate elements and hastily systematizing them. What a subject will regard as an essential relation depends on various conditions, forces, factors (pressure, career). To these factors can be ascribed also the inertia of habit, the principle of analyze separate elements, and the tendency to find pre-term relations among structurally alien elements. A scientific subject becomes victim to the temptation to simplify a problem or structure and to make ill-grounded systematizations (Wertheimer M., 1982, 279). The opinion is also common that scientists– systemizers, like the mythical Procrustes, is eager to relate everything, even by inventing the missing links and guided by only the desire to escape cracks in their system thereby exhibiting the laziness of their minds. In the opinion of H. Elsenberg, the extreme love of truth of which the scientists are so proud often turns out to be but a weak-spirited fear of vitally important questions, of what is troublesome and important. A system in this case satisfies the need to escape contradictions.

Of course, does not mean negation of the importance of systematization in science. What is actually meant is that a system as a theory or as an ideal model cannot be satisfied by an any-level description of a phenomenon, but should describe (reflect) the optimum level of development of this phenomenon without regarding it as final or eternal, for it has already revealed not only the essential properties of the phenomenon, but also its essential contradictions. According to G. Hegel, a system is the "form" of a fully developed totality.

In the approach that prefers analysis of separate elements, there is a danger on revealing accidental, "blind" relations. Relying on the analysis of separate elements it is impossible to give an adequate explanation of society, which is a complex social phenomenon, whose source is the total social creative activities of the individuals and which modifies the conditions development of the personality.

To reveal the essential causes and internal relations, it is not enough to analyze the arithmetic sum of the variables, even with the precondition that all aspects of the problem have been scientifically cognized to the maximum level. G. Klir calls the summation of this kind the "counter-intuitive trap" in the analysis of a complex system (Klir G., 1969, 80). He thinks that all kinds of conclusions concerning an integral system obtained from its subsystems can to a significant degree

be incorrect and lead to erroneous conclusions (*ibid*.). In his opinion, there is only one way out, namely to find a certain transformation, with the mediation of which each problem could be rearranged into an equivalent problem (*ibid*.).

In complicated, self-developing systems (man and society being the most complicated among them) there exist relations in the presence of which the properties of a whole cannot be derived from the sum of the properties of its constituents. What comprises the essence of a whole is not derived from the elements perceived as separate, kaleidoscopic fragments. Quite the reverse, what is revealed in a fragment of this whole is delineated (predetermined) by the internal laws of the whole. R. L. Ackoff and F. E. Emery are of the opinion, that one of the basic characteristics of a system, which shows why a system is something more or something less than a mere sum of its constituents is the relation between its behaviour (if one considers a system as an individual) and the behaviour of its elements (also regarded as individuals (Ackoff R. L., Emery F. E., 1972, 205). In turn, a social system is a system whose elements are individuals striving for the goal (*ibid.*). M. Wertheimer in an analogous case employs the concept "striving to improve the situation" (Wertheimer M., 1982).

Thus, the contemporary scientific situation (paradigm) can no longer to be satisfied with partial, fragmentary truths; it demands the deep, substantial truth. The most important thing in the development of philosophy is transition from a superficial, kaleidoscopic description to an adequate system of concepts. The whole, i. e. a system of concepts, theory also provide criteria for the evaluation of the partial elements (and facts) and for the evaluation of partial truths. Meanwhile an isolated explanation of partial, solitary phenomena provides no basis for deriving the criteria of evaluation. Experience or practice on the level of everyday consciousness is of no use here. Experience may mean collecting accidental facts and establishing simple factual (cause-and-effect) connections. In M. Wertheimer opinion, as long as experience is expressed in terms of elements and blind relations, it cannot be the magic key to the solution of all problems. Knowing the blind relations, for example, the relation between the switch and the light, differs much from understanding, or from revealing the internal relation between the means and the goal. On the contrary, the cognition of essential relations already allows us to orient in the abundance of facts, to understand their functions not one by one, but in a certain context (here the role of philosophy as a meta-theory becomes pronounced).

When will the elements comprise not a sum, but a system? To analyse a whole does not mean to analyse all the facts. W. R. Ashby stresses that for this purpose it is necessary to select and study only the facts that are interesting to us from the standpoint of a definite goal (1964). In creating an integral and fundamental social theory it is necessary to select and study the relations and facts that are essential regarding the goals of social development.

Changes in the style of scientific thinking are already noticeable. Contemporary social philosophy as a theoretical system of a high level of abstraction is based on theoretical conclusions obtained in different fields of cognition, – both in philosophy and in concrete sciences. It is evident that we have arrived at the need to substantiate and compile a generalized theoretical image of society, which would overstep the boundaries of all partial sciences. The starting point in scientific analysis should become a conceptual analysis of experience as a whole. In this approach, the development of a social system striving for humane relations will be analysed without breaking its integrity (see W. R. Ashby).

The statics and dynamics of the categories. When a conception is mature enough for the subject, aim and method of investigation to be formulated, it becomes a conceptual system, i. e. theory. However, it is not enough to show formally that a system of concepts meets the requirements of theory or, as frequently happens, instead of substantial analysis to limit oneself to a verbal analysis of the concepts.

Representation by static categories of such a complex, self-organizing system as society in its humanistic development sometimes can be rather correct and precise. However, it represents only the status quo of relations, and this automatically entices one to preserve the existing state of things, to conform to the existing social relations. Studies of this kind only describe the phenomena, but they do not rise to their understanding, nor can they serve as a tool to foresee the future. The task is to elucidate the necessity of revealing the new content of the concepts on the grounds of substantiated criticism and constructive analysis of the existing abstract notions. The basic theoretical principle of constructive analysis is to perceive and analyse both the existing state of reality and its reflection in the concepts not as a stiff, static structure, but as an ordinary transitory phase, that is, as a process.

Therefore we shall note two specific features of contemporary social philosophy. The first is open theory, as it explains social movement and discloses the essential internal contradictions of the social process with regard to their peculiarities, i. e. changeability, openness, and incompleteness. Second, philosophical theory is reproduction of real processes in scientific reflection in the form of a theoretical (ideal) model. This model reflects not an examination of any arbitrarily selected state of social relations (or moment of the process of development) for the manifestations or elements of the progress, but an optimal state or, as M. Wertheimer puts it, an illustrious process (Wertheimer M., 1982, 258). Comparison of the existing state of a social phenomenon with the historically possible optimum state expressed by means of a theoretical (ideal) model is helpful in cognizing the peculiarities of this less developed phenomenon and the degree of its maturity, and thus to reveal, cognize and delineate the ways and means to attain this optimum state.

The laws of interaction. Another methodological principle important to social philosophy follows from "dialogic cognition" (Bakhtin M. M., 1993, 363; Maziarz E. A., 1981, 149) when the dialogical activity of the cognizing subject or a continual feedback, which can be enhanced by conscious self-criticism (Popper K. R., 1965, 490), is meant. That is, that the methodology should go into the details of the laws of interaction. Interaction here is understood as the organizing and creating principle. Theories of interrelation are in progress (Morin E., 1984, 182). To characterize the interactions and interrelations, E. Maziarz suggests the concept of polyarchy as antipodal to the concept of hierarchy and hierarchical perception of the world (1981, 121).

Engaged thinking . The methodological principle of engaged thinking is becoming ever more popular in the works or philosophers. The concept of engaged thinking was substantiated and applied in their theories by A. Toffler, J. Piaget, M. Bakhtin, and M. Wertheimer. "Engaged thinking" was called by M. Bakhtin "the moment of fearlessness in cognition".

However, as J. Piaget stressed, "philosophical courage" was needed to reach this quality of philosophical thinking. He pointed out not only the epistemological, but also ideological as well as social obstacles that should be overcome while proceeding to this new methodology (see 1968, 6, 3–4). What "deprive" one of courage are: philosophical schools, philosophical programs, scientific paradigms, conjunctures, and ideologies.

The Paradigm of Contemporary Science and Changes in Philosophical Theories

The concept of accuracy in philosophical theories. In the age of mechanisms, traditional science paid most attention to stability, order and equilibrium. It explained the world from the standpoint of closed systems. Classical science strictly differentiated between the simple and the complex and their task was even in the most complicated systems to find a certain simple level, having in mind the level that is reflected by deterministic and reversible in time laws in which both the past and the future have equal rights.

Nor could other kinds of methods exist in philosophy. Just as I. Newton's model gave birth to analogies in politics and philosophy (for instance, Ch. Fourier based the conditions of a society of harmonious interests and the theory of harmony in human relations on the universal law of gravitation), the methods of contemporary science have their analogies in explaining social processes. At the point at which industrial society is turning into a high-technology society whose resources are information and the new non-mechanical technologies, new methods for cognizing the world are being found. G. Klir notes the appearance of two-dimensional science characterized by the orientation to revealing relations and connections (1969). The rearrangement of science is in progress: at present science everywhere reveals instability, imbalance, irreversibility of processes, fortuity, probability processes, complexity, etc.

The world turns out to be a world of process and not of a final dead equilibrium (Wiener N., 1964, 314). As a process the world is reflected in the theories-processes (open theories) what concepts act in philosophy as methodological concepts?

This process has involved also social sciences and philosophy, although they are much more inert and conservative than natural sciences. A. Greimas wrote: "Over the last three centuries mankind almost exceptionally has been taking care of the progress of natural sciences and the technology of their application. Meanwhile the problems of man and society were left aside as belonging to the sphere of morals or of ideology. Both moral and ideology are formulations of good wishes rather than constatations of realities. This is why in the middle of the twentieth century we found ourselves in a situation in which, taking command of the electronic machine, man is both powerful and helpless. He is strong, because he knows the machine he rules, but he remains the immature child where the knowledge of himself is concerned. This disproportion, inequality between the degrees of cognition of man and of nature naturally poses an enormous danger to the very existence of humankind. Therefore it seems to me that creation of the sciences of man is not only the mission of the twentieth century, but also a necessity that predetermines the fate of the whole humankind" (Greimas A., 1990, 30).

An important methodological precondition is the approach to rationality. The absolutization of the rational principle, which was formulated in classical philosophy (R. Descartes, G. W. Leibniz), and the later image of "technological rationality" served as a strong foundation for the views of scientist, which reached their culmination in M. Weber's "principle of rationality". However, the foundations of such absolute rationality were strongly shaken by K. Popper. In his opinion, the idea of liberation through knowledge is a powerful enemy of fanaticism in itself: it liberates us from our own ideas (because of our critical approach to them) instead of making us identify ourselves with them (1968, 295). He stressed that this is not a concession to relativism. Actually, the idea of error implies the idea of truth (*ibid.*).

Also the criteria of accuracy undergo changes. Rationality is no longer identified with "definiteness" (accuracy) and probability with ignorance. M. Bakhtin stressed that accuracy

implies identity of a thing to itself (1993, 410). In the sciences of man and society, accuracy means understanding the essence, i. e. certain "individualized methods" (H. Rickert). The criterion here is not the accuracy of cognition in the sense of natural sciences, but profound understanding, perception of the essence. Of decisive significance in cognizing the processes of man and society is not the mechanistic (arithmetical) accuracy, but depth on getting to the essence. This means that in social sciences "accuracy" means adequate cognition of the relations and interactions, the more so as the statement "each event has its cause" says nothing about accuracy (Popper K. R., 1965, 513).

In contemporary philosophy, it has been concluded that while studying a whole the knowledge of all its components is not compulsory. The above mentioned projects of the Club or Rome, especially "The Limits of Growth", proved this. Information on even a comparatively low number of variables is a sufficient ground for creating an efficient model, as every phenomenon is guided to a rather considerable degree by unforeseen and suddenly emerging (emergent) factors. In other words, the properties peculiar to a system cannot be derived from a mere sum of the known (observed) properties of its elements. In the opinion of A. Rényi, if we happen to concentrate in the centre of our attention everything that we know and are sure of and subject it to a comprehensive analysis, it would become clear that nothing can be stated unreservedly (1972, 9).

The only difference between the inorganic and organic nature and society is that in the latter the relations are much more complicated and therefore more difficult to perceive (*ibid.*). From the standpoint of contemporary social cognition, a description of any object cannot in principle be exhaustive, final and "objective". Society mostly deals with non-formalized phenomena and processes.

In the opinion of W. Heisenberg, in the theories that explain society and man, in the place of the concepts "correct" and "incorrect" should stand the concepts "possible" and "impossible", because under definite conditions possible is but an absolutely concrete form of social life (1974, 193). Historical possibility, according to him, is an as objective criterion of correctness as experience in science. It is possible to judge about the correctness of a social theory only bearing in mind the long historical process: here only historical facts are proofs. A social theory is correct, if it is helpful in reaching the goal.

Openness of cognition and the possibilities of fundamental philosophical theories. M. Aurelius wrote about two possibilities of cognizing the world: either the world is a huge chaos, or it is ruled by order and justice. In the opinion of M. Rényi, the two statements do not contradict one another; both are true at the same time: the world is guided simultaneously both by chance and by order and regularity which are derived from a multitude of chances according to the laws of fortuities (1972, 39).

Changes in the paradigm are evident when we compare J. P. Sartre's philosophy, which has became classical, with the present day humanistic studies on man and society (most salient among which are works of E. Morin). J. P. Sartre's essential question was "either–or": either a system (dead, self-identical "being in itself") or a process (a live man, "being for oneself"). In L. Althusser's interpretation there is also a dilemma: either theory is a strict system - and then it is science; or theory is something amorphous - and then it is ideology. Both these approaches were preparing the transition from strict determinism, or the "deterministic nightmare", according to K. Popper, which was equally applied to both organic and inorganic nature and society, to what presently is called "both–and": both the process and the system" (E. Morin). In fact this "both–and" method had already been applied by the Enlightenment, which thought that by applying

knowledge and enlightenment it is possible to modulate purposefully both the "environment" and the "opinions". Thus, there would be no contradictions between the two, but an interaction. Thus in their theory they combined two fundamental theses of their doctrine: "the environment moulds opinions" and "opinions mould the environment".

Late in the 20th century E. Morin defined the changes in the paradigm of science: in the course of the last one hundred years the problem of determinism has suffered essential changes. Instead of the notions of the ultimate final laws, which control everything that takes place in nature, laws of interaction became predominant. The problem of determinism turned into the problem of the order in the universe. Order already means not only existence of the "laws" in the world, but also existence of limitations, invariants, stability of relations, this or that regularity (Morin E., 1984, 314).

By rejecting K. Popper's "the deterministic nightmare" (1965, 11), contemporary theories of society and man reject the purely genetic or socio-biological approach to the mysterious or not fully understood phenomena of social behaviour. Much of what was ascribed presently to the effects of biological reasons, or in other words to the deterministic effect of genes, is already being explained by social interactions taking place in the conditions of an open system.

Today it is already evident that we must recognize the authority of G. Hegel, who in the period of the science of mechanical assemblies stood in defence of the specific, qualitatively different nature of the bio systems, socio cultural "organisms" and spiritual creations and emphasized the peculiar character of the sciences of life, of man and society, which instead of explaining things undertook to explain relations and processes. G. Hegel's philosophy is a criticism of the natural sciences of his time in the name of the speculative mind. He opposed dialectics to metaphysics, complexity to simplicity. Hegel thought is not only on universal relations, but also a science of the organic and super organic, i. e. social, being or of the organic process in which the product itself is the producer. He substantiated the total autonomy and specific character of biological and social "organisms" and maintained that the naturalistic thinking of strict determinism cannot be employed to explain them. Therefore for the naturalists G. Hegel's dialectics had for a long period of time been despised and even an object hatred.

The naturalistic methods, at least up to the recent time, would kill the process as soon as they would touch it, as for example M. Foucault's structuralist philosophy. J. P. Sartre's philosophy was in constant battle with the application of naturalistic mechanistic methods to examine and explain society and man. One extreme was supplemented by the other: spontaneous free will and chance and in determination were emphasized as the only principles to explain human activities.

Unfortunately, in social and philosophical theories strict determinism survived even after W. K. Heisenberg, N. Bohr and other physicists ("indeterminists") had shaken its foundations. N. Wiener saw the world as one of "process and not of the ultimate dead equilibrium" (Wiener N., 1964, 314).

Present-day philosophical theories adopt from contemporary natural sciences those methods, which were already sought by G. Hegel: the concept of relations-interactions, explanation of the processes, acknowledgement of the openness of theories. The merit of G. Hegel was confirmed by E. Fromm, who acknowledged that to the radical conception of Heraclitus and Hegel about life being a process and not a substance in the Eastern culture corresponds to the Buddha's philosophy. In Buddhism there is no concept of stable, unchanging substance, things or stable "ego". Nothing is true, except processes. Contemporary scientific thought has become a renaissance of this philosophical "thinking as a process" (Fromm E. 1976, 44–45).

Social systems are open systems, which mean that it is impossible to try to explain them mechanistically as totally complete. For philosophical thought the description of the object in general cannot be final, exhaustive and "objective". The course of events here cannot be stopped or repeated – in the same or in another way – because of the existence of "the arrow of time" (see Prigogine I., Stengers J., 1984, 48).

Our approach is to seek a philosophical theory explaining man based on the principle that neither the world which we want to know nor the sum total of concepts, methods, theories which we develop while understanding the world are historically unchangeable. The world is a process, and theory is a process.

The measure of the openness of each philosophical (fundamental) theory is the variety, exuberance, targeted purposefulness of its problems, as well as its ability to reveal essential relations among the elements and spheres that have seemed quite unrelated before, i. e. to reveal new relations. This means that such theory can pose not only the new questions that need to be studied, but also that it can reject the earlier questions as non essential.

It should be noted that as the main goal of philosophical theories is cognitive; therefore their results are not of direct significance to practice. The instrument of philosophy is concepts, i. e. a system of language and symbols by which theoretical cognition is expressed and explained. Therefore philosophical concepts do not express direct experience. However, without fundamental theories neither research nor applied science can be developed. Social cognition in the absence of meta-theory proceeds by way of "trials and errors".

Social philosophical theories always begin with problems and end in problems. They are open, i. e. only relatively complete. There exists an eternal contradiction between creating scientific abstractions, i. e. idealization (systemization, completeness) and the compliance of theory with practice and process or openness. No philosophical system could be applied directly to a reality under study. Philosophical theory is never a precise image, but an idealization of reality. In order to grasp the essence of the phenomena we must idealize or, as Aristotle put it, "distort" them.

A live process is not simple or incomplex: it severely resists conceptualization. While creating a scientific theory, it is necessary in the theoretical process to "husk" the essence, or "peel off" all accessory, "unnecessary" effects in order to reveal the sole "simple" process and thus to abstract from the facts that are of less significance for this essence. This means idealization, i. e. distortion and simplification. Fundamental social theories still do not kill the process, whereas the special theories of personality, because of their temporally and spatially limited field of investigation, reveal only the morphology or structure, and thus not the dynamics but what is static.

E. Morin maintains that science becomes viable when logic loses its supreme absolute value, when society and culture allow us to question science instead of motivating the belief in taboos, when theory is known to be always open and incomplete (Morin E., 1984, 316).

Openness, variability, only relative completeness of theory rests in acknowledging the newly revived critical tradition or the humanistic principle of thinking which, through its effects on special theories of man and society, relates the fundamental philosophical theory with practical activities, i. e. allows attaining the goal.

Integration as a Principal Method of Contemporary Philosophy

Separate social problems are being dealt with by different sciences and conceptions. However, the arithmetical sum of various approaches cannot provide a desirable integral image of man and the picture of the conditions for the realization of humaneness. Without doubt the solution of the

problems of man and society is a sphere of interdisciplinary studies. Contemporary social philosophy is being moulded in the context of the developing synthesis of sciences, therefore the effect of the method of integration here, as everywhere in contemporary science, is especially obvious. It is important, however, to avoid a straightforward transference of the methods and concepts of natural sciences to a sphere where man and society are explained. According to M. Oelschlaeger, this kind of integration demands a generation of men of the new Renaissance, able to present their assessments in several special sciences and capable of integrating this knowledge into a series of comprehensive systems (1981, 7).

The principle method of contemporary philosophy is integration on the level of conceptual analysis. Integration shows that contemporary theories emerge "in the clefts of the systems", says E. Morin (1984, 328). What is being applied or adapted are the concepts of most advanced sciences, first of all cybernetics, theory of systems theory, theoretical biology, theoretical medicine, social psychology, political economy, etc. as well as the methods of cybernetics, systems theory, etc.

Integration as a method is influenced both by the spirit of contemporary science – orientated to elucidating relations and interactions – and the practical engagement (significance, necessity) of social philosophy. This methodological principle, i. e. orientation towards elucidating the relations, lately has become the principle of science in general. Contemporary science is oriented to finding relations and to experimentation (Klir G.). Its methods are not a foreign body that has accidentally intruded on social sciences, but in social sciences profound understanding of relations and concepts manifests the "accuracy" of cognition. On the other hand, diversity of methods in different sciences should be regarded as neither a drawback nor a merit, but only as the adequacy of the direction and way of studying the essence of the matters under consideration.

In inadequate assessment of the peculiarity of social development may induce an identification of methods of the natural and social sciences; hence social sciences are becoming dogmatic. On the other hand, nature itself is becoming the object of our thought and action together with man himself. As to nature, everywhere and every hour we encounter ourselves (Heisenberg W., 1974, 300). Thus, even in natural sciences the object of study is not nature as it is: "raising questions to nature, man again meets himself" (*ibid.*, 301). Therefore in natural sciences the scientific method, earlier was seen as isolation, explanation and arrangement, has encountered its own limits (*ibid.*, 304).

On the level of social abstraction, we could not find the equivalents of the expansion (explication)1 of concepts. For instance, the content of the concept "creative personality" could be concretized by showing social, economical, political, technological and other conditions of the personality's activities. This is possible only by making use of the language and methods of study of political economy, sociology, psychology and other sciences. In the words of E. Morin, the former anthropological substrate has been joined by the economic network (1984, 328). Besides, in this interpretation philosophy loses its mysterious halo and becomes a "working", open and provisional, transitory theory. G. Hegel maintained that a mature concept needs no myth.

It is obvious that a philosophical theory studying social movement (i. e. a process, evolution) is open. This means that it reflects changes taking place in reality and for this purpose each time employs ever new means of investigation (new methods) revealed by human cognition.

The need arises to integrate (and this is often the case) the concepts of political economy to explain activities2 (work, leisure, surplus product, demand, production conditions and other concepts); and the concepts of psychology to explain the prerequisites of personality (talents, productive thinking, interests, needs). Of significance for the conceptions of activities and

personality are also the concepts of: genetics (natural "background", heredity); theoretical biology (the openness of a system, the comfort of a system); theoretical medicine (physical, spiritual and social health); cybernetics (feedback, management, optimum, model); theory of systems (system, elements) and of other sciences. What emerges is a conceptual synthesis, a "joining", intruding into philosophy of the methods and language of other sciences.

As concrete scientific correlates of the corresponding philosophical categories (concepts), these concepts inevitably become a link between philosophy and special sciences and provide possibility for transition from the general principles to concrete data and practice (as well as to quantitative characteristics). However, the concepts are used in as adapted form.

Though there are no principles common to all systems, each analogy is a step forward. Some of the concepts soon become rooted and do not distort the content of a complex process (for example, entropy) (V. Havel). Others are questioned for a long time before being accepted or rejected. This was the case with I. Prigogine's and I. Stengers' proposition to introduce the naturalistic concepts fluctuation and bifurcation to explain the processes of evolution and revolution in society. It is still a question whether the application of these concepts for this purpose is well-grounded.

We understand the intellectual progress in this process not only as the striving of pure philosophical thought for an adequate understanding and explanation of the world, but also as the evolution of the thought of the concrete sciences, the progress of social sciences, which in its turn constantly exerts an imperceptible but ever increasing influence on philosophical thinking.

The tie that unites philosophy and special sciences by applying the methods of integration have nothing in common with the fact that separate sciences in one way or another mention or interpret the same problems. The unifying work of philosophical thinking takes placer in the process of conceptual synthesis (as one of the methods of integration) as the partial merges with the universal. The final result is the attainment of the highest level of the integration of scientific knowledge in the creation of a new philosophical theory.

Contemporary Social Philosophy as Meta-Theory

In the contemporary paradigm of social thinking the humanistic principle also acquires new tasks. The concept of humanism is used not only to characterize the man's position, but also as a cognitive method. The principle of thinking, i. e. the choice of the goal, raises specific methodological problems. Only with regard to the goal it is possible to note any intellectual or theoretical improvement. The sum total of the methods also depends on the goal. Therefore one of the basic tasks of the fundamental philosophical theory is to create methodological foundations of special theories of man so that the object of study in it would be defined on the principle of humanistic thinking. Without philosophical theory as the preconditions of creation, culture could be perceived only superficially or in special theories inessential or casual things would be emphasized. This is what was meant by J. Piaget when he proposed to restore for philosophy the form of specific cognition that could be called supra scientific or para-scientific (Piaget J., 1968, 6).

Why do we need fundamental philosophical theory? Because man and society are open systems the science of man too should be "opened", That is, an open theory should be created, opposite to the traditional theory of rationalism, according to which accuracy demands closeness. It is closeness that in its turns theory into a doctrine. Philosophical theory in itself is not a solution

of the problems of man and society, but only the possibility of considering these problems. Thus, social philosophy is the methodological basis of the special theories of man, i. e. meta-theory.

Social philosophy presently has found itself in the field of rapid social changes. It can act and become a tool of action only when the principles of philosophy are concretized in special theories of the personality and applied in compiling social programs. This is a way to avoid panlogism, which is eager to embody any idea or philosophical principle absolutely, directly and immediately. In the case of its failure it is theory that is to be blamed.

Therefore one of the ways is to search for the methods to pass from the general principles of philosophical theory to their manifestation in social reality. Philosophical principles can be transferred into concrete social conceptions or programs only through the mediation of special theories of personality and concrete social sciences. Moving along this way, the philosophical model of a progressive society becomes a theoretical prerequisite for compiling the conceptions and programs of the democratization of social activities, education, culture, health care, national security, economics, etc. This was noted, for instance, by M. Oelschlaeger: reflective philosophical investigation will not suffice to create a progressive society. However, through social programs it is possible for the philosophers to take a direct part in the normative process of the creation of society (1981, 5). We can hope that philosophy will acquire "flesh and blood" and will not be regarded as a magic word any more. This requires a further purposeful and integrating "work" of social philosophy, having in mind that the road to both fundamental theories and social conceptions and technologies in each historical period of social life starts from the beginning.

Notes

1. The concept of "practice" on this level is a mere abstraction.
2. G. Hegel was the first to introduce into the sphere of philosophical reflection concepts of political economy (for example, the concept of *demand*), which before him were complete strangers to philosophical thinking explaining what man is. It is impossible to become not only a citizen, but also man *beyond* a social relation. Therefore as a starting point in explaining man G. Hegel considers the organic demands of live organism (see G. Hegel. Phenomenology der Geiste).

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Chapter VI
Revival of the Tradition of Critical Thinking in Contemporary Social Philosophy

One of the functions of social philosophy is to provide foundations for to formulating the object of study itself in special theories of personality from a humanistic approach, or to make humanism the very principle of theoretical thinking. Without this fundamental theory, in special sciences dealing with man and society the prerequisites of the personality, creation, and culture could be endangered by a superficial perception with an emphasis not on what is the most essential, but on incidental things. In practice, this superficial approach leads to a trial and error approach, i. e. society and man become objects for experimentation. In other words, in the special sciences of man, measurement, experiment or observations are impossible without a certain theoretical principle expressed in a fundamental theory (meta-theory). What kind of fundamental theory, in our case of social philosophy, should this be? What is it that predetermines the humanness of the methods of study?

We shall discuss three features of the humanistic method; first, about the significance of the humanistic principle of thinking, which is formed exactly by philosophical theory and which historically becomes manifested as the critical tradition; second, the problem of openness of the theories of society and man, which not only corresponds to the contemporary paradigm of science, but also, third, allow the philosophical theory of humanism, through special theories of the personality, to attain its goal – to exert influence on practical activities. These three features are closely interrelated and could be separated only for the purpose of analysis.

Main Features of the Critical Thinking Tradition

Western culture begins with the emergement of when there appears a close correlation between the advancement of essential, fundamental problems in theoretical thinking and practical activities. The Greeks were the pioneers of this and Western culture is still grounded on this relation. The Greeks who advanced essential problems (e. g., Aristotle with the problem of activities) left for us an example of radical (or critical) thinking. The idea of radical thinking was developed in the early Ionian democracies as a critical discussion. Every new generation would radically revise the teaching of the earlier school and created teaching of their own, adapted to their times and expressing them.

The Renaissance borrowed the above-mentioned critical tradition from the newly rediscovered Greek philosophy and science and the critical tradition returned to life. This tradition or critical cognition of the surrounding world means the recognition of the openness of cognition of the world. Critical approach to the present (also to the present of theory) is a prerequisite of the openness and thus of the progressive nature of philosophical theory.

If the present is approached without seeing its contradictions, or else uncritically, then the whole preceding development is regarded only as approaching the only sole ideal state, i. e. the present is the final goal. This type of theoretical reflection explains the past by looking in it for "hints", "embryos" or "sprouts" of what is developed in the present. All the rest not confirmed by the present (all that is absent in it) is considered as "inessential" and past. Thus, also the previous problems (contradictions), whose interaction just resulted in the present, are considered inessential. In this way history (the past) becomes only a mono-semantic, one-dimensional, non-differentiated

attachment to the present, which is also mono-semantic. This kind of present is devoid of self-consciousness it cannot contain contradictions, nor does it have any future for here the future can be only a repetition of the present. The theoretical reflection gets into a vicious circle: neither did the past offer many possibilities, nor does the present offer many possibilities. All that is left to thinking is to motivate this unique and therefore "objectively" correct status of society. Thus the conditions for solving the problem are alleviated in advance, because here there is no alternative but to use one-sidedly selected facts. This is only criticism, but with a negative sign: it is directed to what falls beyond the set limits adapted "forever".

Thus, there can be two methods of criticism. The first, already mentioned above, starts with the question: how can we motivate or justify our theses or our theory? Everything that shakes the foundation of our theory, that does not fit the a priori schemes is criticized or rejected. The second method of criticism begins with the question: what are the practical results of our thesis or our theory? This begins with the principle of thinking, i.e., with the goal raised by the theoretician.

Principle of Thinking as a Choice of the Target for Theory

"When the arrow is shot from the bow, it follows its way unless it comes across a more powerful force; but otherwise its direction is predetermined solely by the person who is taking aim, and without the being that selects the aim it cannot fly at all", this vivid characteristic is given by W. Heisenberg to the importance of selecting the aim (1974, 36). We shall define the relevance of theories in this case as the conformity of the goals raised and sought by science to the needs of society: without relevance there can be no reliable theory as a compass for action. The very definition of productive thinking, presented by M. Wertheimer, emphasizes not the technical procedures of thinking, intended to solve the already formulated tasks, but the formulation of the goal (task) itself, the raising of the problem. This orientation to the raising of the goal is regarded by M. Wertheimer not as a solely personal characteristic of the individual, but as a tendency, which is created by a certain type of education, a type not only of social but also of scientific approach (1982, 308) Even those processes of thinking that are purely intellectual, in M. Wertheimer opinion, require a certain approach of man – a readiness to analyze the problem in the "open, honest and correct way" (*ibid*., 209). Indifferentness is no longer considered a merit of the scientist. The principles of thinking are being endowed with methodological significance.

The choice of the aim as the principle of thinking raises some specific conceptual problems. It is only with regard to the aim of cognition or theory that one can determine what the intellectual achievements or theoretical improvements are and how effective are the application of the principles and criteria of this theory in a concrete science. The method itself depends on the aim. "The method is the activity thought of by the subject", emphasizes E. Morin (1984, 316). It is often not so important to attain the very goal raised by theory as to understand that the aim sought is not related to real needs or poorly conforms to them, that other goals are more important.

In theoretical thinking how does such change or improvement of goals occur? Traditional logic regards identity as the main rule, which demands that the elements of a discussion, such as concepts, solutions, when repeated should remain strictly identical. "Identity is the internal frame of our mind. That is why it is present in all products of the mind; and actually all science is impregnate with it. However, identity does not comprise the whole science", E. Meierson reasoned early in the 20th century.

In the process of productive thinking, the elements of conceptual systems (concepts, solutions) do not remain strictly identical, but are being changed and improved. "The live processes of

thinking are intended to improve the situation" according to M. Wertheimer (1982, 296). Productive humanistic thinking is manifested in foreseeing or perceiving the deep relations, which accompany the actions intended to change and improve the present state of things. Humanistic thinking is directed by the desire to striving to reach the truth, to notice the essential link, to get to the cause, to switch from the indefinite, inadequate concept to the clear, essential understanding of a situation, phenomenon and contradiction.

In special sciences concerning man, neither measurements nor experiment nor observation is possible without a definite theoretical principle of thinking, which is expressed by a fundamental philosophical theory and plays the role of meta-theory.

The significance of the principle of thinking for contemporary social theories can be seen, for example, in the project of the Club of Rome.

The Significance of the Principles of Thinking for Special Social Studies

The global projects of the Club of Rome. Which direction will our civilization follow; what while is the outcome of man's predominance over nature? What will be the destination of the swift development of science and technology? Will it lead to the unexpected social conflicts or to social harmony? What are the relation between material well being, and the perfection of man's intellect and senses? Will there be a space for spiritual culture in the future civilization? Does the development of science and technology, which created the basis for industrial progress, serve also the purposes of humanism?

Numerous scientific centres and organizations are searching for the answers to these questions and studying the perspectives of the development of Civilization. One of the organizations worried by the aggravation of the world's problems is the above-mentioned Club of Rome, a non-governmental non-commercial organization composed of the outstanding scientists and public figures from more than 30 countries.

According to A. Peccei, the first President of the Club of Rome, the pioneer of these scientific projects and "global truths", the initial goal of the club was to focus the attention of world's society on the increasing difficulties of mankind. He wrote: "there was not a group in the world that would tackle the contemporary problems with regard to their integrity" (1977, 98). The task of the Club of Rome is to give the tendencies of the development of civilization a strict and precise analysis so as to allow a realistic evaluation of the situation and planning measures to prevent global crises. The peculiarity of the global crisis is that they cannot be resolved by the effort of isolated states with regard to disarmament and world security as primary goals, A. Peccei stressed that the global problems are closely interrelated. On the initiative of the Club of Rome, the whole complex of the global problems is studied with respect to a systemic image of the world: "prior to giving a prescription to a sick society, it must be thoroughly examined and the correct diagnosis must be given" (*ibid*., 104).

The scope of the problems studied by the Club of Rome embraces social injustice, starvation, unemployment, inflation, energetic crisis, shortage of resources, disproportion between international trade and finances, illiteracy, environmental exhaustion and pollution, the decay of moral values, etc.

Severely criticized is "the search for consumption and dissipation in the use of resources", as well as "the philosophy of economical growth and material wealth" as the basis for the mania of consumption. Contrary to the assertions of technocrats as to the social harmony in a society of "abundance", Reports to the Club of Rome show that economic growth has lead to even more

pronounced differences between the rich and the poor nations of the world and to a particular worsening of the deplorable situation of those poorest among poorest, presently called "the fourth world" (*ibid.*, 50).

The Club of Rome is worried also by ecological problems. Of course, the ecological crisis is not the only one that has involved the whole world. However, in explaining the ecological crisis its particular causes must be highlighted. For instance, in the first Report the crises are considered to result from the exponential growth in a limited space. The second Report shows that the crises come from the disturbed relations between man and nature, between the rich and the poor. In the third Report, economical and social structures are indicated as sources of the difficulties that mankind has encountered. The authors of the fifth Report are convinced that the crisis ensues from a tremendous incongruence between the short-sighted egoistic goals of the world, the satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of people. In A. Peace's opinion, "the present world crisis directly follows from the man's inability to attain a level corresponding to his new powerful role in the world, in perceiving his new duties and responsibilities" (*ibid.*, 1977, 144).

Since the first Report to the Club of Rome, called "The Limits to Growth" (1972), prepared by a multinational group of researches guided by the American scientists D. H. Meadows and D. L. Meadows, numerous reports and global projects have been prepared. In the Club of Rome's opinion, to convince society of the importance of foreseeing the long-term development of civilization, it was necessary "to shock". To this end, they had to present the possible consequences of what they called "growth without reflection" so as to shows mankind its appreciable danger.

The first Report arises the reaction that surpassed all expectations. It was translated into more than 30 languages. This success can in part be explained by the fact that the authors escaped the stereotypical approach and presented their conclusions in a sensational form. In this report or project, the discrepancy between the number of inhabitants and the growth of the world's economy, on the one hand and the material resources of our planet on the other was analysed. With the aid of the computer model "The World – 3" (elaborated by J. W. Forrester), the team analysed different tendencies in the development of the contemporary world, and the dynamic interaction between the increment of the population and the material resources of the world. The "behaviour" of the global model of the world was analysed for a period of 200 years – from 1900 till 2100. The resulting picture of the future implied a possible universal catastrophe, unless humankind changes the direction of its development and its thoughtless action in the search of a short-term profit, for the increase of industrial production and the number of inhabitants is in clear discrepancy with limited natural resources and the growing pollution of the environment. This discrepancy presses no solution, and technological solutions do not promise to eliminate the crises.

As if in corroboration of these conclusions, eighteen months following the publication of the book "The Limits to Growth" (Dennis L. Meadows et al.), the year 1973 saw an energy supply crisis. This project became a sort of illustration, which explained everything: the crisis is caused by the limited resources. Specifically, the group of Meadows' advanced the idea of zero growth and suggested stabilizing the number of the inhabitants at the 1975 level, the growth of capital at the 1990 level, and to reduce the use of resources per capita to one eighth of the 1970 level. These conditions are indispensable in order to ensure a universal equilibrium. This equilibrium, in the authors' opinion, should be calculated so as to satisfy the basic material needs of every man and to allow everyone equal possibilities to realize his individual human potential.

The project looked convincing also because it was based not on speculative conceptual schemes, but on computer models. The Club of Rome researchers was seeking a reliable set of instruments for investigating the global problems, because the then popular futurology failed to

justify the hopes. The Club of Rome authors did not aim at prognosticating or foretelling the future. Their aim was to verify the alternative presumptions.

The Club of Rome did its best to select and elaborate the models that would enable it to escape the mistakes that usually arise when observational constructions are employed and schemes are based only on logic. The computer models seemed to be a reliable tool of investigation, efficient when analysing such a dynamic system as the contemporary world. According to J. Forrester, here "the strength of the human mind was combined with the power of the modern computing technologies" (1971, 27).

The computer models, however, turned to be not efficient enough to study the prospects of mankind and particularly to disclose the reasons for the world's crises. It became evident that it is not enough "to eliminate the greatest drawback of the human mind – its inefficiency in evaluating all dynamic consequences" (*ibid.*, 27). The importance of the selected factors, hence also their correctness, depend on the goals of the researcher, on his principle of thinking. The researchers can take as absolute some variables or underestimate others or abstract from them. To study the essential links and relations of the real world, it is not enough to analyze the sum of the variables, even if all the causes are maximally involved into the analysis. The problem of the researcher's approach is *that* his principles are already related to the goals of society and the character of the conceptions created on their basis.

Of course, the authors of the above-mentioned project relied not on intuitive images concerning society, but on a certain idea of the preconditions of evolution of society. D. H. Meadows acknowledged that the values that determined the evaluation of computer results (what is "better" and what is "worse") are the personal values of the modeller and his milieu. The pre-model conception was acknowledged to be lacking a more or less precise formulation.

Studies made by D. H. and D. L. Meadows' group, as well as by M. Mesarovic (U. S. A.) and E. Pestel (West Germany) and published as the second Report to the Club of Rome, "Mankind at the Turning Point" (1974) were based on probability models–hypotheses of the world's states, and the computer "replay" of various programmes constructed the situations according to the "what if" condition. These constructions reproduced the present, partially real and partially imaginary, which reflected the existing and the potential tendencies of the development of Western society. The authors, in reply to the critics, indicated that the social factors and human values did influence the result computed by them, but only intermediately, because it is impossible to translate them into the precise language of a machine programme.

After the second Report, the Club of Rome began to change the direction of studies. Attention was focused on social and political aspects of the world's development. In 1976, the third and the fourth Reports appeared: "Reshaping the International Order" (headed by Jan Tinbergen, the Dutch economist and Nobel Prize winner) and "Beyond the Age of Waste" (headed by Dennis Gabor, the British Physicist and Nobel Prize winner). These reports opened a new stage, which is characterized by two peculiarities: the first – qualitative instead of quantitative analysis of the prospects of mankind, and the second – investigation of global problems in the scientific, technological, economical and cultural aspects.

Social problems: from the crisis of humankind to the crisis of man. In the projects of the Club of Rome, that rises to predominance is becomes the idea that "the crisis of humankind" is closely related to the inability of man to perceive his role in the present world: "no one of us has yet finally adapted, either psychologically or functionally, to the changed world and the new role of man in it" (Peccei A., 1977, 204). Thus, according to theorists of the Club of Rome, the crisis of humankind is a consequence of the human crisis, of the destruction of his inner world. A

conclusion is that both internal and external collision and disharmonies should be sought in man himself. It is not the crisis of social being by the crisis of man that becomes the core item of reflection. In the opinion of the Club of Rome, contemporary man is frequently guided by anti-humane values, which often evoke international conflicts and wars. Thus, it seems indispensable to re-orientate human consciousness, to direct it to other values and goals.

Reports to the Club of Rome, as well as other works by members of the Club of Rome, show that the denied values are harmony between man and nature, equality of persons and peoples, social justice, love of a fellow man, solidarity of all the world's citizens in the struggle for peace and social progress.

Each report highlighted a new aspect of the values, but all reports emphasize their humanistic content, which, in the authors' opinion, correspond to the moral nature of man. Members of the Club of Rome never regard man as an asocial and aggressive creature. On the contrary, they are convinced that aggressiveness, violence, hatred, murder follow from the alienated human relations. A. Peccei, rejecting the opinion of an innate aggressiveness of man, regards the destructive bents of man as a consequence of cultural deviation. In his opinion, "the elements of goodness are unconsciously hidden in man and only are waiting for their liberation", and "contemporary society must learn how to liberate these good forces" (*ibid.*, 25).

The third Report, "Reshaping the International Order", advanced as the main goal of the New World: "to attain the life worthy of man and the well-being for all citizens of the world" (Jan Tinbergen, 1976, 85). This goal is justified by the equal rights of every man to a life worthy of man and the right to realize his triple abilities as a citizen, as producer and as consumer. This goal is achieved when the following humanistic values or principles are implemented: justice – as a demand to decrease inequality among the individuals and the countries; freedom – as the recognition of human rights to every man, as a limit to preserve the freedom of another man; democracy – equal participation of men in economic, political and social life; solidarity – as the re-orientation of the process of social changes to enable the majority of inhabitants of the planet to understand the significance of the unanimous struggle for freedom and justice; the variety of cultures – as a necessary tendency in the development of humankind, based on the recognition and preservation of national singularity; cleanliness of the environment – as the preservation of the ecosphere, without violating the external limits delineated by nature.

The humanistic values and aims received a similar treatment also in the fifth report to the Club of Rome, "Goals for Mankind" (1977, headed by Ervin Laszlo), in which the authors, upon analysing material presented by 130 researchers of various specialities from different countries, advance four global goals which, in their opinion, would help to humanize the world and man. These are as follows:

- the global goals of security: the main task is to stop the armaments race, to reduce the possibility of international conflicts and wars;
- the global goals of produce, intended for elimination of starvation; the main task is to raise the productivity of labour in agriculture, to distribute the product equally among and within the countries, to create the global system of products allowing to satisfy the needs of all citizens of the world;
- the global goals of development, oriented toward not maximal economical growth, but the satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of man;
- the global goals of the use of energy and natural resources: to ensure the rational use of natural resources, to use energy so as to make it serve man, not be his enemy.

Analogous ideas are expressed by A. Peccei, in his book "Human Quality". The humanization of the world and man, in his opinion, imply a transition from economical growth for the sake of growth to the development intended for satisfying various human needs and raising the quality of life; transition from the isolation of countries and people to solidarity; from alienation and passivity to involvement in social life; from moral impoverishment and mental dispensability to morally and socially responsible social activities; from dissipation of the human environment to global regulation of the use of the natural resources of the planet. He lists six goals for humankind: 1) to keep to the external limits: mankind can and must use the wealth of nature without violating nature's harmony; 2) to keep to the internal limits: to search for the internal reserves for man to adapt to denaturalization and the tempo of modern life, without violating the human body; 3) to preserve the cultural heritage: not to limit the culture of future to one model, to care for the cultural wealth of humankind expressed by different languages, customs, ancient monuments; 4) to create a global community by adopting socially responsible decisions; 5) in order to preserve the living milieu of man to found a global centre of ecology; 6) to develop a global economic system.

The authors of the seventh Report to the Club of Rome, "No Limits to Learning" (Botkin J., Elmandjra M., Malitza M., 1978) are oriented to studying the aspects of the social development of the world. Here humankind becomes the object of consideration of Club of Rome. While discussing the exhaustion of natural resources, environmental pollution, negative consequences of the scientific and technological progress, the problem of the man's place in the world, of the specific nature of man's being became very acute and, according to A. Peccei, the "Achilles heal" of contemporary man (1977, 55). This reorientation is natural, as all the problems cited require a principle of thinking and an ideological approach. Giving a philosophical sense to the global problems is winning ever stronger positions. The systemic method, which is the guideline of the Club of Rome, provides for studying the world and man as an integral whole, thus man is not "dropped" from the analysis.

The "external" limits are followed by "internal" ones, the human limitations, which are considered as a hindrance to civilization. According to A. Peccei, as the limits of material growth are conditioned by the nature of the internal limitations characteristic of man, the base for the solution of the global problems is "inside man and not beyond him" (*ibid.*, 44). All economic, political, ecological problems are being responded to the Club of Rome through the prism of man: "it is within man that all the sources of our problems rest" (*ibid.*, 183). The starting point of reasoning about man is the thesis that in the epoch of the "global empire of man" his living conditions on the Earth undergo essential changes. Man has in his possession a rather considerable material power, which can be used for both creation and destruction. Man strives for the Cosmos and wants to change himself by employing genetic engineering. However, according to A. Peccei, man understands neither his new role nor his place in the world. The crisis arose because of the man's inability to undertake responsibility: "no one of us has yet finally adapted, either psychologically or functionally, to the changed world and the new role of man in it" (*ibid.*, 204).

The authors of the seventh Report raise the question of how to prepare man to encounter the new situations, to develop his ability to foresee future events and to evaluate the possible consequences, as well as to take an active part in creating his own future. This participation in social life would combine the rights of each member of society and his responsibility for the fate of mankind.

The Club of Rome expanded the scope of the social problem: its first attempt was to show the limits of the material progress of mankind, and then the unlimited internal potencies of man were discussed.

The Image of Man. The theoreticians of the Club of Rome elucidate the image of man, which at present predominates in Western culture. According to A. Peccei, contemporary man is similar to Gargantua with his "insatisfiable appetite for consumption and possession, ever increasing production, and vicious circle of growth with no end in sight" (1977, 37). Here the significance of man depends on his economic status and material prosperity. "In this way", he concludes, that "man has gradually turned into a grotesque one-dimensional Homo economicus" (*ibid*., 17). Homo economicus becomes the starting point for characterizing the activities of man: the progress of civilization is identified with material prospering and he himself with economical activities. In the works of the Club of Rome this approach is regarded as incorrect, showing nothing else but indifference to the spiritual life of man: "Let man be insatiable in deed", says A. Peccei, "however, we cannot identify with all his demands, wishes, ambitions and exaltations" (*ibid.*, 184): homo economicus is considered an outdated image of man. The Club of Rome criticizes the mercantile vision of man and in turn offers another image of man, which conforms with the humanistic principles of a new society. This suggestion is not incidental or exceptional. In the West, there is an ever increasing demand for a new, more humanistic image of man: "the image of man is not a theoretical problem: it is a problem of the preservation of man as man" (Berthalanffy L., von, 1967).

Researchers from the Club of Rome point out the in-authenticity of man's existence in Western culture: he suffers from "cultural schizophrenia", does not see his proper place in nature and in society, and has lost a sense of value. The spiritual world of man is being suffocated, for man encounters a dilemma: he must either change as a person and part of mankind, or become extinct from the surface of the Earth. Latterly there is a need to revise the traditional image of man: "many people do not strive to possess any more, they want to be something more" (*ibid.*, 201). A. Peccei thinks that in the image of the new man the qualitative characteristics ("human features") should prevail.

At present, the crucial problem of mankind, according to A. Peccei, is the inability of people to adapt to the changes evoked by them in this world. The problem is hidden inside and not outside man, thus, according to the author; its solution should be based on man himself, his features and abilities. A. Peccei coins his conclusions in an axiom: "the main thing on which the fate of mankind depends is the features of man" - not those of separate groups of the elite, but precisely the average "features of the billions of inhabitants of the planet" (1977, 45). The only possible way of solving the global problems, or as he puts it, "the way of salvation" goes through the human revolution, "through the new humanism, which induces the highest development of human features" (*ibid.*, 209–210). Improvement of man's characteristics, the change of his value orientations, must cause related changes in the content of such a common notion as the "satisfaction of human needs". The main goal here should become the self-expression of the human being.

He considers changes in the field of "human features" as the "new humanism". This humanism, in its turn, would be able to guide the other kind of revolutions – industrial, scientific, technological and socio-political. In A. Peccei's opinion, the main goal of the "revolution of humanism" should be social justice and a just society based on equality of rights.

The "New" Humanism. Over the last decades, in the West there has been more and more talk about "new humanism", with an emphasis on the ever-increasing need "to awaken within us" the

new man "by a refreshing whiff of new humanism". (Saint Marc Ph., 1971, 421). A. Peccei thinks that the humanization of the world and of man is possible provided people are guided by the values of a new humanism. New humanism itself foresees a way: man must be so oriented as to realize the need to be guided by the other values instead of those presently prevailing in society. Ways to accomplish this transformation of consciousness are considered. For example, Maurice Guernier, the French economist, member of the Executive Committee of the Club of Rome, in the eighth Report to the Club of Rome "Tiers-monde, trois quart du monde" ("The Third World: Three Quarters of the World") writes that at present there are no more talks "about the choice between capitalism and socialism as in the good old times of Marx; at present, the common values that enable survival are discussed" (Guernier M., 1980).

M. Peccei distinguishes three basic aspects of the transformation of consciousness, or new humanism: the global perception of the world, striving for justice, and aversion to violence. Man must look at himself, to understand that it is only within himself are the forces whose liberation can help in resolving his inner crisis and thus the crisis of mankind. By cherishing these feelings within him, man will be able to direct the development of industry, science and technology and social political revolution so as to avoid crisis. The fifth report, "Goals for Mankind", developed a conception of the "world's solidarity revolution", which would start moulding the "global consciousness" on grounds of information, enlightenment and education. By transforming the values and goals (both of individual subjects, especially politicians, and of countries and states) a new standard of humanism will "crystallize" as a standard of behaviour in all spheres of state policy. The transformation of consciousness is regarded as a quite sufficient basis for the humanization of man and the world. This approach shows that the theorists from the Club of Rome highly appreciate the subjective aspect of the purposeful activities of man.

The idea of a revolution of consciousness in general is not absurd. Indeed, it is necessary to realize that in order to humanize the world and man one should be aware of the fact that the conditions of existence must be changed. The problem is quite other: what means and social forces are needed to reshape the inhumane world? Answering these questions would show the real potential of the projects mentioned. Here the vivid examples are the reports "Goals for Mankind" and "No Limits to Learning". According to one scenario, in some societies a high level of self-consciousness should be had by political leaders, for their task is to raise the level of consciousness in the country. According to the other – international – scenario, if a country has no one conscious of world responsibilities this place can be occupied by another country. According to all scenarios, the subjects of the world solidarity revolutions are religious leaders or scientists, businessmen or governments. In the past centuries class consciousness was the decisive world-renovating force, but today this has lost its significance because "people on the both sides of the barricade begin to see better and better the gloomy clouds gathered above the whole human family"; "the consciousness of human beings must rise above the national and class consciousness" (Peccei A., 1977, 215).

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Chapter VII
Philosophy of Social Action: The Problem of the Goal

Objectives of Explanation

The goals of social philosophy change with history. Philosophers who lived in different times and in different cultures had a different approach to the goals of their theories, or to their mission. The task of the present is to define the goals of contemporary social theories, the main problems and to search for the corresponding concepts and methods of studies. In other words, both the problem situation and its expression – the philosophical theory of humanism – have to be delineated de novo. E. Gehmacher thinks that humanistic oriented science should be "a science of the goals of mankind", describing the status of the social system or of a number of possible states that will provide for satisfying all humane objective needs (Gehmacher E., 1977, 112).

However, these goals cannot be postulated subjectively. The problem of the goals appears when the result of human activities is no longer in conformity with the expectations of people. Thus nowadays when philosophy is in crisis it is time for philosophy to reconsider its goals.

The goal of social theories is first of all cognition. From the lasting contradiction between creating philosophical abstractions, i. e. idealization, and the conformity of theory with reality there arises the self-criticism of theory.

What is the goal of contemporary philosophical theories? We shall try to analyse the problems of social philosophy that arise in the context of science and man late in the 20th century. This means that person is open to the world with which it associates, i. e. with another man and society and, last but not least, that its action creates. This means also that theoretical thinking will be regarded as seeking not only to explain the phenomena and situation in an objective and indifferent way, but also to look for ways to attain the goals of the world and man, in other words, involved and creative thinking (Bakhtin M., 1993, 87).

The problem of man and the world in the late 20th century is no longer the Aristotelian problem whose task was to cognize invariable natural essences. Nor is it the Hegelian problem, which claims that, contrary to nature which serves only a static invariable background for man, it is only human mind that generates progress in the course of history, nor the Sartrian problem which maintains that the human mind is limited by inert matter and a hostile environment ("the Others"). At present, this problem calls for a transition from the developing historical interactions between the world of man's ideas and that of society and nature (environment). In place of an invariable mind seeking to explanations of the world through invariable principles, or of a self-developing mind which explains the world through invariable regularities, what now becomes more pronounced are the variable relations of cognition between changing man and the world changed by him. Therefore, also conceptions of social philosophy should be based not on invariable principles or a single ideal of explanation, but on historical interactions between man's activities, his thinking and the world.

Every conceptual system deals with the particular problems of its time. Developing man and his milieu invent more and more problems, according to St. Toulmin, "an incessant genealogy of problems" is taking place (1972, 155). A conception or a theory must make related rearrangements in its system of notions and methods of investigation, to deepen and extend the content of the conceptions, even to address the adjacent theories or the sciences in order to keep up with the demands for the solution of the new problems. Thus, there are many more grounds for identifying

the content of a philosophical conception not according to the object under study, but according to the problems that are raised regarding this object. For instance, classical philosophy raised the question, of how the personality can remain identical to itself, or preserve "mankind in itself" (see Kant I.). The question of contemporary humanistic social philosophy is how the person should so act as to preserve h mankind (the world) beside and beyond itself.

In order to solve the problem, what matters most are not the logic of verbal explanation but the goals of explanation; it is to attain them that theory is needed. Of course, the goals of explanation involve the whole historical experience of a conception. Every human conception deals with the goals and ideals of a concrete period of time, and it is exactly on these goals and ideas that its specific methods and structures depend. Seeking the new goals, a conception needs as adequate means and ways of explanation as are possible; and therefore it specifies the content of its notions or involves new ones. However, first of all in a conception there arise some elements of self-criticism or scepsis. The approach to a conceptual system as historically variable open to further development always implies self-criticism. For example, Th. Gomperz, the researcher of classical Greek philosophy, found the elements of scepticism even in the philosophy of the Ionians. He wrote:

At last the theory of primordial elements contained a seed of scepsis, which sooner or later had to be completely revealed. To Thales himself this teaching meant probably only that all things come from the original mother – water – and come back into it, however, gradually this teaching had inevitable come to express the idea that only the basic form of matter is true and real, whereas all other forms are in essence only ghostly illusions of the senses. And as soon as it had been recognized that, for example, iron or wood actually in their essence are neither the first nor the second but are water or air, how could doubt, once awakened, stop at this point (Gomperz Th., 1911, 44).

K. Popper in his work Emancipation through Knowledge substantiates this idea of self-criticism as the idea of our own emancipation and growth. In his opinion, this is not a concession to relativism: "Actually the idea of mistake implies the idea of truth" (Popper K. R., 1968, 295). K. Popper relates its creation of open society to the openness of cognition and its growth: "To our great historical goal – creation of free pluralistic society – alongside a social system favouring the increase of knowledge and to become liberated through knowledge – there is nothing more important than to be able to look critically at our own ideas" (*ibid.*, 295 - 296). Thus, the theories are "improved" not by rejecting them, but by making the problem clear (Popper K. R., 1968, 267).

A critical position of this kind, i. e. seeking out the weak aspects of theories with the aim of improving them, is the position of the cultivated (cultured, educated) mind. This means that in speaking about the goal of a theory we cannot use of commonplace concepts.

Contemporary philosophy, accepting the historical value and continuity of the problems raised by classical philosophy, already is looking for the solution of the most common problems in the context of social historical knowledge (sciences), rather than in the context of social historical knowledge. Therefore many of the philosophical categories are "transferred" from the philosophical level to that of the special sciences of man, and are supplemented or explicated by the categories of the social and historical sciences (modified, of course). The problems (and notions) of natural sciences also can, and do, play a heuristic role in philosophical studies (e. g., this was the way how the notion of open society was established in the sciences of society). The conceptual integration of the concepts of philosophy and other sciences is in

progress. Only with the aid of such a multifarious set of tools can the essential problems of man presently be discussed.

What predetermines the reliability of the solution of social problems in contemporary philosophy? "Fixed" notions ensure the continuity, at the same time allowing and involving new or renovated concepts (Toulmin St., 1972, 206). In the meanwhile, other notion are eliminated as being incongruent with the new content; they "fade out" or at the best retreat. Thus, to reflect and explain the contemporary problems of man and society, the renovation of the concepts alone is not enough. Quite new notions, ways and methods of solution become necessary. The neologisms reflect both the degree of correspondence between theory and reality and the social order, but first of all the goal of theory.

The Content of the Personality

Conscious Historical Creative Work and Responsibility

The aim of explanation I contemporary social philosophy is self-creation of the personality, development of its content (essence). Personality is defined through responsibility, activities and association. Nowadays personality perceives its responsibility not only in the Kantian sense, or in the sense of classical philosophy, i. e., with regard to itself as a representative of humankind, but with regard to another human.

Presently the aim of the personality is to defend humankind in another personality. Hence follows the goal ad the principal problem of contemporary philosophy: how should the personality act so as to preserve man (mankind) by its side?

In personality are united and live side by side: 1) man the producer, who creates the material world; 2) man the thinker, who creates the spiritual world; and 3) man the social worker, who creates the social world. This is Homo creator. Thus the individual cannot be outlined a priori in an isolated way. One cannot be born as a personality; one must become a personality (A. Leontjev).

We regard the individual in the light of the most recent Times, i. e. as homo pro se isolated from the external world. He has no one to make decisions for him: no supernatural Subject, nor any transcendental Sense or Imperative. The individual is "thrown" into history, into this world and begins to have personal responsibility for the World1 . Alongside the individual's becoming "man for himself", there is something naturally significant – the becoming a personality. This transformation, however, is accompanied by a constant tragedy. The individuality often meant loneliness. The person was doomed to become a burden to itself and often failed to find its place in the alien, unthinkable, threatening world, which should begin to be cognised but it was not clear of which basis. Cartesian doubt was replaced by existential hopelessness, which survived as the existential principle for the entire philosophical epoch. The individual was "thrown" into the hostile world (J. P. Sartre); and for a while was a rebel (A. Camus), schizophrenic (F. Nietzsche), an "thinking reed" (B. Pascal) nevertheless he arose from the ashes, got on his feet, found himself in the world created and being created by himself (H. Shelsky), and found himself in activities (K. Marx, E. Morin). Following the conclusions of the natural scientists (E. Schrödinger, W. Heisenberg a. o.), the new methods of explanation began to be applied to society as well. The main notions have become as follows: responsibility, act, association, activities, openness and dialogue. They not only expand the net of philosophical notions, but also make it possible to explain the new activities, the newly formed relations, and the new goals.

In I. Kant's philosophy, man as a personality regarded his responsibility as duty to himself as the unique moral being. This duty is a formal correspondence between the maxims of the human will and the value of mankind embodied in his personality. Hence, man's duty to himself forbids one to deprive oneself of the need to behave in accord with principles, that is, it is forbidden to deprive oneself of internal freedom and to become a mere toy of one's bents, to become a thing (see Kant J., 1998). The individual is responsible for preserving in his personality and by his personality the internal freedom and the moral values of mankind. I. Kant concludes that as a personality, i. e. as a being endowed with inner freedom (homo noumenon) man is capable of taking responsibilities with regard to himself (to man in his own person) (*ibid.*). In I. Kant's philosophy, man is bound to regard himself not as an individual in general, but as a man with duties of his own regarding himself as representative of humankind. In other words, he should never refuse a high moral evaluation of himself (*ibid.*, 106–108). This is a historical beginning of the individual's becoming an "individual to himself", i.e., a personality.

The appearance of the idea of person, i. e., of an independent, personally responsible and active individuality can be regarded as characteristic of recent European culture. The most recent Times, however, impose further corrections on the content and definition of personality who is the individual not only "for himself", but also "for the others". No more "me and the world", but "me in the world (environment), in co-operation. The "me–individual" expressing an absolute meaning is replaced by "me–personality" claiming the right not only to original thinking, but also to original action. The last instance (imperative, determination) which stood behind the individual vanishes. Personality means man's being man himself, but also involvement in shared relations; one creation one's relations to the others individually; he himself is the mediator no others such dogmas, conditions and the like. According to M. Bakhtin, man has no longer any right to present "alibis", he has no right to extricate himself from this sole responsibility, which is to implement his sole, unique place in existence, and to draw by the unique "act", which all his life should constitute" (Bakhtin M., 1993, 83). M. Bakhtin calls such a behaviour or thinking "non-alibi in being", or advancing thinking, i. e., considering itself as the only one thinking that behaves with responsibility" (*ibid.*, 115). An example of this "non-alibi in being" both in philosophical and artistic creative work is the philosophy of A. Camus, namely, the responsible, involved author's relation to the world. Rationality cannot replace responsibility, because "the act is something more than rationality, – it is responsible. Rationality is but an aspect of responsibility" (M. Bakhtin, *ibid.*, 103).

Activities of the Personality and Association

The personality becomes involved in the environment (the world and society) through objective and reflexive activities and association, which form the basis of its development. Identity between personality and activities, in the sense of both the creation of the environment and self formation, means that the personality can be characterized through its actions, since each of its actions is regarded as based on reflection. The environment (the "soil"), melts into the personality's reflection, and is manifested through activities (action). Personality manifests itself by actions, and it is its actions: like the activities, so the personality.

The personality, having no other ground but itself, becomes responsible for its activities (or passivity: this is also an action); it does not shift responsibility onto others and does not decide for the others in the name of standards, absolute or universal instances.

The personality gives sense and direction to activities, but at the same time is being modified by the activities themselves. In this interaction in general it is senseless to look for which is prior – personality or "history", "opinions" or "the environment". The interaction itself can proceed only if based on knowledge (understanding, education) which at the same time it creates. Impairment of any member of the interaction results in a lower quality of activities and a poorer environment (outcome). The lack of personalities is significant for the level of environment. In turn, a poor environment (soil) means an impaired personality: "If freedom is the original spring of human activities, then slavery must change, dull and corrupt all senses, to suppress all talents, to mix up all differences, to render all estates mercenary, to seed everywhere discord as a source of anarchy and revolution" (Mirabeau H. G., 1834, 102).

From knowledge, or understanding, there follows another significant circumstance. "Lonely" responsibility forces the personality to be true to its ideals in the face of defeat or even destruction (the essence of the drama of intelligentsia of the 20th century). However, the personality which on gaining knowledge and understanding has attained the other level of perception of its responsibility, perceives its responsibility no longer only with regard to itself as a representative of mankind, i. e. no more in the Kantian sense, as attractive and moral, but also with regard to the rest of mankind (people). Defeat or destruction in the name of ideals will no longer justify the personality as it is responsible also for the others and not only for itself (the ideal in itself), even as a representative of humankind. The goal of the personality is to defend humankind in the person of the other, to defend the others. This means that only life (and not death) and activities (action) will justify the personality: it must live and act for the others, for the sake of others. The personality has no right to perish. Non-conformism should be based on knowledge and sound calculation. The personality is not the individuality that does not agree (nonconformist) or criticizes (negatively passive), but the one that acts positively and knows its goals, because, as M. Wertheimer has proven, "the live processes of thinking are intended to improve the present situation" (Wertheimer M., 1982, 296) or, as Ch. Fourier was convinced in his theory of passion, the passions naturally draw man to creative activities.

The personality acts among people in their environment or medium. The personality's world is another personality, and the personality's activities are association. Man strives to be himself and achieves this through association, through his relations to the other, through involvement into the common relation, through activities and through ideas, through the philosophy of association. In this sense every man is a philosopher, and philosophy is not a profession, but the culture of thinking. However, when man is deprived of his individuality, when the latter has no possibility to develop, and there is no possibility to be a personality, then this ideal relation of association among people in expressed by somebody else: the state (ideologue philosophy), institutions (dogmatic philosophy), etc.2 It is exactly because every man is deprived of the possibility to maintain quality relations with the others that philosophers appear as the mediators, or professionals who realize the ability of people to be the individuals. Philosophy cherished by the professionals is but a kind of compensation, a substitute for free and creative thinking, not a luxury or decoration.

Activities, action, association, the sense of involvement, responsibility – all these are the concepts that express and characterize the content of the personality in the most recent philosophy. The person is the individuality that is always directed outwards beyond itself, oriented to the environment, striving for its goals and creating them. Therefore the aim of the philosophical theory is to answer the question how personality is possible in the contemporary world.

Content of the Personality: Physical Abilities, Power of Thinking, Senses

The personality is defined as a universal, harmonious, talented, educated, creative, self-realizing, healthy, sovereign, and integral individuality. The personality is the subject of activities, who knows the prerequisites for achieving its goal, acts and by acting creates itself and its environment. The personality is also the object, i. e. the result of activities. One can see that the definitions of the personality involve the predicates of very different levels of generalization. Besides, these predicates occur in different scientific disciplines – not only in philosophy, but also in sociology, social psychology, theoretical medicine, ecology, etc.

Having in mind the basic goal of the philosophical theory of humanism, which is the solution to the problem of the humanization of human being, we shall consider the personality in one aspect of its content – the development of its abilities. Since the individuality or the personality is defined by interrelation, association, so also the abilities of the personality should be evaluated first of all in its social dimension. Moreover, in the opinion of St. Toulmin, in the spheres like the intellect "even the originality of the personality has a social, or collective, dimension" (Toulmin St., 1972, 52).

The personality is characterized by the quality of its physical, spiritual, thinking and sensual abilities (talents).

Physical abilities. Man is endowed with muscular force, mind and senses. He always has striven to develop all his abilities. Invention of the wheel was the first successful attempt to increase the muscular force, and later numerous inventions were made up to automation, computerization, atomic energy, biotechnologies and genetic engineering. Muscular force, or the physical abilities of man, is being increased by technical and technological means and processes. However, the desired result, which can be called the humanization of nature, is achieved only when the activities do not violate the equilibrium between man and nature, i. e. when nature is influenced not only by muscular force, but also by the force of mind.

Thinking abilities. "Only thinking (thought) keeps pace with the ever-escaping infinity of nature; the Universe embraces and swallows me with space as a spot; I embrace it by thinking"– this idea of B. Pascal is very optimistic (Pascal B., 1954, 1157). Whether accepted exactly as in B. Pascal, or regarded as a remote pioneer of existentialism expressing the awe of man who cannot find his place in the world – unknown, incomparable, monstrous, - it was in his philosophy that the man's greatest foundation and the base and principle of his vitality are revealed. The famous idea of B. Pascal follows:

Man is but a reed, the weakest in nature, but a thinking reed. The Universe does not even need to lean on him in order to crush him: vapour, a drop of water will do to kill him. However, even the Universe crushes him, he would be nobler than the one that killed him, because he would known about his death and about the superiority of Universe, and the Universe would know nothing. Thus, all our value lies in thinking; in it we must rise on our legs and not in space or continuity which we shall not manage to fill in. We shall try to think well: this is the base of moral (Pascal B., *ibid*.)

Man and the Universe are two different worlds, and both are great in their uniqueness. B. Pascal is thus a remote initiator of humanism. What does "to think well" mean to humankind?

The sphere of intellectual activities is reinforced, extended, "expanded" and in the perspective increased several times by artificial intellect. It is not a prosthetic appliance, only substituting for something; we deal rather with a reinforcement and extension. Also, the task is not to copy the human mind. Attempts are made to imitate it, as there is a probability that some of the properties of human mind, such as decision-making when the information is incomplete can be modelled on a non- anthropomorphic example. However, when thinking is isolated from principles and interest, when it is regarded only as an intellectual operation and accumulated knowledge as only information, it is not yet possible to speak about thinking abilities. In M. Wertheimer opinion, the approach in which "thinking is regarded as a mere intellectual operation and is completely isolated from human principles, feeling and emotions is rather artificial and narrow" (Wertheimer M., 1982, 209). In other words, thinking abilities are inseparable from spiritual abilities (spiritual culture).

The main function of spiritual abilities, as well as their peculiarity as a social phenomenon, is creation of the goals of social progress. Only in the presence of an ideal plan of action (theory, model, program, etc.) does the history of spiritual creation begin as the humanization of man. The foundation of the spiritual creation or spiritual abilities of society is laid and its further development is provided by culture and historical consciousness. Spiritual creation embodies and shows the degree of the development of society and the level of humaneness of the subject of activities. Spiritual abilities are expressed by principles or interests. Spiritual creation, as human prerogative, maintains social life: it creates culture, and seeks social goals. It can serve this historical purpose only if the subject of activities intends to find out the needs of society and to create measures to meet them, i. e. if the subject of activities knows the goal and has formulated the inner incentive to attain it.

What is it that predetermines the spiritual abilities and creative principle of the personality (society)? In the broadest sense, it is culture and knowledge (education). However, not all kinds of knowledge can serve as a basis for the spiritual abilities to develop. A. Moles distinguishes between two kinds of education. First, it is erudition, or culture "width wise", i. e., "a mere extension of the field of culture, or else an increase in the number of elements, i. e. words, forms, signs present in the cultural arsenal of an organism"3 ; second, it is "the depth", which, according to A. Moles, is characterized by "associations determined in the process of thinking and then memorized by a social or individual organism, by the "thickness of the "tissue" (Moles A., 1971, 51). In the first case we deal with an erudite or intellectual, and in the second with a creative personality. A. Moles, however, notes that a creative personality is often characterized also by rich erudition. Nevertheless, erudition " not quite necessarily implies an intensive creative work of the thought of its holder" (*ibid*., 51). The stock of cultural ideas can be utilized by a subject who himself does not generate new ideas or relations, because erudition, or the quantity of knowledge, does not automatically stimulate or guarantee its proprietor as a creative personality. The culture "is impossible without a certain minimal width, whereas erudition can be expressed as passive accumulation of knowledge and notions and a rather comprehensive than deep master of a related vocabulary" (*ibid.*, 51)., By differentiating between "erudite culture", or "erudite civilization", and "intensive civilization" as an example of intensive civilization A. Moles points to pre-Socratic Greek civilization, in which "the intensity of thinking and thus the quality of associations had reached the topmost limit" (*ibid.*, 51).

What is it that turns erudite culture into creative, active and engaged culture? Here we encounter another precondition of the spiritual abilities of personality, i.e., social relations in which the individual or social group lives. The environment can either stimulate or suppress these spiritual abilities of man who, according to A. Moles, creates his individual culture on the grounds

of the "socio-cultural table" preserved in the memory of society (*ibid*., 109). However, each individual culture is based only on a limited selection, which depends on rather casual circumstances, e. g., on a person's position in the social hierarchy. The ability of man to generate new ideas, goals, as well as forms, works of art, which in turn enrich the "socio-cultural table" depending on the quantity and quality of cultural elements allotted to him. This is how the socio-cultural cycle proceeds. A. Moles arrives at the conclusion that "creative work . . . is not a rare and amazing privilege of selected personalities, as most people exhibit the ability to create something new in their daily life" (*ibid.*, 108). Creative work, in his opinion, is an ordinary phenomenon, as all people do create, i. e. "rearrange the elements in the field of consciousness in an original way" (*ibid*., 108).

M. Wertheimer, based on psychological studies into the creative process of outstanding researchers, schoolchildren and primitive nations, proved a common structure of the mechanisms of creation in all people (Wertheimer M., 1982, 310–312). Besides, he showed that "the live processes of thinking are directed towards improving the present situation" (*ibid*., 296). This conclusion of M. Wertheimer concerning the direction of the activity of mind is crucial when we speak about the "production" of goals as the main function of spiritual "production". From numerous studies M. Wertheimer concluded that "it is not true that people do not like to think in a similar (creative – J. M.) way or are unable of it in general. This is one of the results of thought activity, which deserves high evaluation. Of course, it is often prevented by strong external factors" (*ibid*., 269). Man is characterized by the desire to raise problems, by readiness to study them with audacity and sincerity, by striving for perfection. M. Wertheimer defines this purposefulness of human thinking – "changing the situation in the direction of its improvement" – as productive thinking and considers it as one of the greatest needs of man (*ibid.*, 278). He also emphasizes that the "live processes of thinking" are not a mere tool to fix the operation or separate casual events. Besides, he arrives to a conclusion, incredible on the face of it, that striving for truth, alongside the other things, needs an honest determination: "without sincerity, our striving for truth is endangered by dilettantism, cheep resemblance of truth" (*ibid.*, 270).

Thus, creative thinking is manifested by principles and actions directed to changing the situation with the aim to improve it: "this means that thinking is driven by desire, striving for truth, getting at the structural nucleus, at the sources of the situation; switching from an indefinite, inadequate relation to a clear, transparent vision of the main contradiction of the situation" (*ibid*., 271). Creativity implies an active determination of man, which means "the desire to raise problems, readiness to study them with audacity and sincerity, striving for perfection, contrary to a casual, involuntary or servile disposition" (*ibid.*, 278).

The desire of the subject with improved spiritual qualities, i. e., as capable of creative thinking, who is also the subject of activities, to perceive the "genuine structure" – the cause, and to realize the deep properties is stimulated by the desire to improve the situation. However, if the desire (interest, need) to understand the, "genuine structure" is poor, one is tempted to simplify, impoverish, vulgarise the "structure" (*ibid*., 279). Not only simplification, but also absolute criticism, scepticism, the desire to accelerate the solution of a problem is indicative of poor spiritual abilities on the part of the subject, an undeveloped culture of thinking.

Senses. Senses are a sphere that is least developed and least studied. Higher senses, such as responsibility, self-esteem, pride, justice, compassion, are the greatest human wealth. "Senses are the systems of behaviour that are not inherited biologically and that cannot by taught", wrote T. Shibutani (1987, 298). Senses are developed.

Studies of senses are impeded by the absence of a related system of categories. An even greater obstacle is the widespread "common-sense" (commonplace consciousness) terminology, which has nothing in common with the essence of senses, as well the misleading associations. T. Shibutani shows that vividly when senses, which are a result of interpersonal relations, are described by such terms as "love", "hatred", "envy". In many cases this is the same as if a chemist would say "water", "air", etc. instead of using terms "oxygen", "hydrogen" (*ibid.*, 299).

There is an opinion that precisely in our times for the first time in history the physical survival of humankind depends on an essential change of the human hearts. This is possible only in the presence of an socio-economic reorganization that would offer the courage and foresight to do it (Fromm E., 1976, 40). To replace E. Fromm's metaphors "heart", "courage", "foresight", one can claim that the main obstacle to courage (responsible personality) and foresight (knowledge, education) is sensual immaturity, underdeveloped senses. Since we do not improve our sensual life, and consider it not only rather unnecessary but sometimes even harmful for the optimal functioning of the subject, the development of senses comes to a standstill and often does not transcend a childish level (see Fromm E., 1976, 204). A. Schweitzer mentioned the fact that for two a three centuries many individuals had been living only as working but not human beings.

Senses appear, are formed and developed when individual human beings "accommodate to one another" (Shibutani T., 1987, 299), i. e. in association. Senses are developed when a one attributes to another the properties that he finds in himself. It has been noticed that those who have no self-esteem, no sense of self-respect, cannot respect others. If a man considers himself unworthy of respect and love, he is worried by the attitude of the others towards him, he does not feel safe, his attention is focused only on himself, and he cannot respect and appreciate others. He unconsciously projects his own meanness on the others and then responds to them in an aggressive manner. The sense of self-esteem of a man is defined not by what he thinks of himself and not by his public statements, but by the way he always acts with respect to himself and to others. The higher the sense of self-esteem in a man, the more sure he is of his ability to take care of the others and does his best to act in this way (a natural feature of the leaders). A direct relationship between self-esteem and attentiveness to other people is a great problem of contemporary humanistic philosophy, which is related to the desire of the personality to preserve the moral imperative not only in himself, but also in the others. In other words, it is through association to improve one's own sphere of sense in which the first and greatest achievement is development of the sense of responsibility for the world, for the other. The developed sense of responsibility manifests itself in conscious historical creative work, in activities directed to the environment (society, other people), in actions.

In the personality, united in one and coexisting are man-the-producer who creates the material world, man-the-thinker who creates the spiritual world, and man-the-maker who creates the social world. If we emphasize only the material and social as well cultural fundamentals of the personality, we kill the process. Of course, the material conditions, historical ground, and socio-cultural surroundings are the place where each individual (and each generation) begins over again creating itself. However, "to create oneself" means to form oneself by passing through oneself (remitting in oneself) both the environment and the ground. Each time there are re-created in a new, special, unexpected mode. This is done consciously because the personality is an incessant choice (see J. P. Sartre), a continuous individual decision.

Thus the personality cannot be defined a priori, in an isolated way. According to A. Leontjev "man is not born endowed with the historical achievements of humankind. The results of the development of human generations are embodied not in him, not in the abilities of his nature, but

in the world that surrounds him, – in the great works of human culture. Only in the process of assimilation of these achievements, which continues throughout the whole of life, does one acquire the purely human features and abilities; this process is on the shoulders of earlier generations" (Leontjev A. N., 1981, 434). While adopting the historical, cultural, social heritage of society, the individual's abilities, needs and goals are formed. (The category of goal is applied only to conscious activities of man.) A. Leontjev shows that " personality is not a genetically predetermined whole: one cannot be born as a personality; one must become a personality" (Leontjev A. N., 1975, 176).

Personality develops under the interaction of three: the subject of activities, the conditions of activities, and the third "member" – activities, because this relation is alive only through activities. The latter predetermines both the spiritual conditions of activities and the quality of the activities themselves. The main property of this kind of activities is their ability to create not only things useful to man (wealth of things), but also the creative, thinking personality itself with developed senses (human wealth). The very process of free activities, i. e. of creative work, is a link that unites the conditions and the subject of activities. The result of this acting link is a perpetual and boundless improvement of the individual and his conditions.

In this system, we can absolutize neither the material nor the social, neither the technological nor the spiritual or some other aspect. The personality can no longer treated only as a product or "expression" of the objective and naturally regular development of history (or technology). No parts (members) of the system can develop without relation to all the other members.

Everything is dependent on the interaction between man and his production, – on the constant feedback. This interaction between human activities and their result enables man to rise again and again above himself, his abilities, and his talent (see M. Wertheimer).

The Human Wealth

Man as the Creator of His World

Today man changes his world incomparably more rapidly and deeply than ever before. Therefore he finds and recognizes himself in the rational – spiritual and material – product he creates. A. Gehlen called this phenomenon of self-recognition "the phenomenon of resonance". W. Heisenberg explained this man's "being-in-history" and thus the new understanding of both man and history itself in terms of the Newest Times. "Presently we live in the world which has been so remarkably transformed by man that everywhere and every hour we encounter the structures that have been called to life by man, and in a sense we encounter only ourselves" (Heisenberg W., 1974, 300)4.

Social philosophy traditionally started with the question: what is man's relation to nature? The level of technology would almost answer this question. However, the new conditions forced social philosophy to seek a new answer, because presently it is not nature that is hostile to man. The traditional solution presently has turned into a problem: politics and technology, embodied in the alienated environment, have taken the place of nature. The new problem is: how can we live in political technological system, which is not fit for man? At present, technology is not solving, but rather generating, problems.

Those who rely on man's self-identification and self-understanding in the historical past, i. e. on the solution of earlier (i. e. obsolete) problems and conclusions, inevitably regard the ongoing processes as destructive of man. Attempts to preserve identity with the past (and the identity of the

ways of explanation) are most often accompanied by the conclusion that man can no longer be explained, since in the present world everything looks absurd, alien, and destructive. Some approaches, applying means of cognition that do not fit man and are inadequate, on the whole prepare man. An example can be philosophical structuralism for which, after methodological procedures, "man is dead". Nevertheless, there is no internal drama here, or, in the optimistic words of K. Popper, "our cognitive forces are practically adequate to the task that has arisen before us" (Popper K. R., 1965, 397).

The contemporary epoch offers man a new basis for self-identification: man can identify himself both in his rational, technological product and in his spiritual constructions. However, in this case, i. e. delineating the approach to man in the new conditions, we must in part reject the philosophical tradition, solve the essentially new problems and seek the new goals of explanation. The old, traditional content of the concepts also must undergo changes, preserving, of course, the continuity, the common historical content embodied in a concept.

The image of man today can be moulded only upon examining his situation in the environment, in the world created by him, i. e. in the industrial technological sphere. But today it is not enough to treat the world as a mere expanded sphere where the working tools are applied, because the natural boundaries of human senses have expanded to the degree that renders senseless all talk about technological novelties (intellect) as the main resource. Inevitably new problems arise and new theories to explain man are advanced. The conceptions of man can be developed only in a new unity with the world created by him. A new dialogue begins, – however, this time not with primordial nature, but with the man-made "nature", environment or world. Nor can we speak about mastering nature, because the mastering subject himself creates a sphere mastered by him. The world of technologies is not external to man, because it has been rather long since man has been encountering his own product of his own (which is certainly not always only good). Man no longer confronts the pure intact world of nature. In contrast to previous historical epochs when we could speak about "alienation" from nature or "ruling" it, nowadays the sphere of rule is created by the ruler himself.

The Conception of "Scientific Civilization"

This new unity of man and world and its new understanding have found a rather vivid representation in the works of H. Schelsky. He stresses that the widely accepted opinion of our supposed subordination to technology is not well grounded: "but technology is not the self-contained absolute existence opposing man: it is man himself, as science and as work. Man here becomes fully dependent on the necessity, which is created by himself as his world and his essence" (Schelsky H., 1965, 459).

Advancing his ontological substantiation, H. Schelsky in history distinguishes two different metaphysical positions. The first, considered by him as common to the whole of earlier philosophy beginning with the Greeks, was predetermined by the existence hidden in itself, by the eternal superhuman laws, by the being that existed prior to consciousness and self-consciousness, against which the lonely psychç could not practically establish itself (cf. J. P. Sartre's "inert" matter). Man surrendered to the supernatural existence of nature and the ever-improving technology, being essentially nothing else but a manifestation of man's weakness, was of a purely defensive character. According to H. Schelsky, the situation became quite different when achievements of physics eliminated the physical reality of what had been persistently called by us "nature" (Schelsky H., 1965, 447). H. Schelsky regards man as the author, the demiurge and the subject of

technological civilization: "The place of the people's political will is occupied by the regularity of things created by man himself employing science and work" (*ibid*., 453).

Changes in the character of the interrelation between man and the environment impose qualitative changes on the character of philosophy. The philosophical tradition in which one is regarded as the sovereign subject dealing only with ideals formulated by consciousness, goals with respect to which technology, whatever its possibilities today, is but "the means", is rejected. Man has liberated himself from natural forces to be entrapped in the laws of industry created by himself. This has acquired a universal character: the regularity created by man emerges before him as a social, spiritual problem, which can be solved only on the grounds of a technological, constructive solution designed by man (*ibid*., 449). H. Schelsky thinks that it is impossible to evaluate man's situation in isolation from his position in industry: we are constantly generating scientific civilization not only as technology, but also, one hundred times more, as "society" and as "spirit" (*ibid.*). This is why H. Schelsky thinks that the social sciences should interfere and turn the "science of man" into the "science of industry". Given the strict and variegated dependence of man on industry, in H. Schelsky's opinion, the solution of the problem of man becomes groundless when civilization is separated between, on the one hand, the mastering of "external" nature by employing technology and organization, and, on the other hand, culture which, according to the tradition, is regarded as a reflection of the formation of independent, purely spiritual and "unpolluted" man and society. In the present conditions, every technological problem and every technological achievement immediately turns into a social and even a psychological problem (genetic engineering, new types of weapons, etc.).

H. Schelsky sees only one basis for growth and progress, which are the new sources of energy and technology. In his opinion, all relativistic, nihilistic, as well as existentialistic arguments rest on disbelief in the possibilities of human cognition and show a poor understanding of "man's situation". Therefore the task of human philosophy is to provide a foundation to the new picture of the world, i. e. "scientific civilization".

We could reproach H. Schelsky in one aspect. The subject of his conception, who actively creates the surrounding world, is shown one-sidedly: his technological intellect is made end in itself. According to H. Schelsky, attention of the epoch is focused only on the "constructive genius of mind", on its technological potential. Self-consciousness is left beyond the objects of discussion. H. Schelsky so emphasizes that self-conditioning production is an internal law of scientific civilization, that the essence of the totality naturally disappears (*ibid.*).

Instead of the 19-century dualism of natural sciences and sciences of spirit (Geistwissenschafften) H. Schelsky offers, in his opinion, a more progressive approach: he suggests separating historical and technological cognition. He optimistically believes in the automatic nature of progress, because the contemporary epoch offers man a new form of identification – self-recognition in his own technological constructions and rational production, whereas historical thinking, trying to preserve the sovereignty of human spirit, groundlessly regards reminiscence about spiritual independence as reality. H. Schelsky quite reasonably maintains that the problem of man in this conception of historical thinking is being solved in an abstract way, as applied to all times it is good for nothing and cannot be solved. It becomes manifested in the historically undefined formof general humanism and can be interpreted poly-semantically, thus being acceptable for all (*ibid*., 468). We must agree with H. Schelsky when be considers the abstract solution of the problem of man as ideological, and calls it the "global belief" (*ibid*.). However, as soon as he claims that the new era requires "total distraction from history", civilization is again isolated from culture.

The Image of the World Created by Man

At present, new methodologies began to be applied for solving the problems of man and society. This novelty can be well illustrated by comparing conclusions made by B. Russell and E. Morin. In B. Russell's opinion, perfect science tries to be impersonal and to abstract from man as far as possible (1948, 87), whereas in E. Morin's opinion, everywhere this need is born of science accompanied by consciousness. The time has came when consciousness is considered in the complexity of the whole reality – physical, biological, human, social, political, – and in the reality of complexity (Morin E., 1990, 127). Presently, not only man's world but also that of nature is no longer regarded as only the object of cognition existing in its natural completeness and independence of consciousness. The world is presently being cognised as a product of practical human activities (cf. G. B. Vico). W. Heisenberg wrote that natural science always implies the presence of man. The object of study in natural science is not natural itself, but nature as the object of human problems (Heisenberg W., 1956, 12, 18)5 .

Thus man again finds himself in the centre of the world. However, he is no longer considered the ruler, the conqueror or the master of the world (and nature), but only the main actor, worker. Man brings novelty into the world as he is not satisfied with himself, but always tends to "improve the situation" (M. Wertheimer). The principle that in the world we deal with no one other than ourselves is a rather new idea. However, we should bear in mind that this way of perceiving the world can be interpreted only as a vector or direction, but not as real state of the world, if we are to escape absolutization of any of the relative truths (the same vector is the ascertainment of creativity in every man).

In other words, the world is man in his material, intellectual, spiritual, sensual form. But the world is not nature in its "intact" form, but as incomplete. Hence there follows the image of the world as being created or open.

The incomplete world or world-process is reflected by theories-processes, i. e. open theories. For philosophers to arrive to this conclusion its theories of the natural scientists E. Schrödinger, W. Heisenberg, M. Born, I. Prigogin, etc. were significant. Material reality (the world, environment) is now perceived and explained not as the finite or given once and for all, which can be better or worse observed and understood, but as an incessant process of formation, change and development, induced by human activities (practice). Thus nature or the physical world is but the possibility of the material world or the world of practice.

In the philosophical theories that absolutizes the alienation between of the world and man, it is impossible to incorporate the category of practice or activities into the image of the world. For instance, J. P. Sartre's praxis denotes only immaterial spontaneous activities. In his philosophy, man as a rational and free being cannot participate in the creation of the world, which is alien and a constant threat to him. The very definition of man in this case should not contain anything related to the material world.

The contemporary approach includes the material world in the definition of man. Which are the spheres of creation of the world in which man participates, by which he is then defined? All: economical, political, material and spiritual culture and others. As long as man's substantiation (also spiritual) is based on economics and politics or both, man first of all is explained by means of economic determinism (for example, K. Marx's philosophy). Both economic and technological determinism (H. Schelsky) is not the historical advantage or drawback of philosophy (and social sciences), but rather its objective state (the ABC of human prehistory). They are the forces that in a concrete period objectively predetermine man's world, as well as the presence of the yet unsolved

problem of arriving at the more fundamental essentials of man's being than only his economic or political existence.

To solve this problem helps the notion of history as an incomplete (non-final) process, i. e. the impossibility of stopping history at any of moment or phases, or to reverse it. Therefore a final explanation of man is impossible. For example, in the contemporary stage of history we find new sources of human development, including new sources of economic development, related not so much to the use of the work force as to the application of knowledge and information. Energy of the future is energy of activity and information directed to the production of ideas (K. Popper). Man, whose activities are based on reason or knowledge, becomes ever more involved in production not as a working (physical) force, but as a scientific, spiritual and social force. Even the nature of property changes: presently it is knowledge (intellectual wealth) that is the priority object of social appropriation; this can be appropriated by everyone – hence, by all.

At this point the questions of human wealth, human investment and human quality arise. This is why contemporary social philosophy keeps developing the idea of everyone becoming a talented personality, because the scope of the abilities accumulated by man is unlimited (Theodore W. Schultz, 1986). We may conclude that expenditures on training, including higher education, should not be considered as current expenses, but as investments and saving.

The philosophical solution of the problem of man and society reveals the need of a material world in which every individual could be subordinate only to the necessity of his own development. This is a very abstract definition, having only the value of a desire, because whole at this point the economic and political determination must be overcome, the existing world does not yet offer such possibilities. Of course, it is impossible to predict the future or to believe that its development will follow Utopian models. However, according to A. Peccei, it is high time to stop "casting looks on the future" and start creating it. Social philosophy fulfils its duty by highlighting the goals of human activities, by trying to find the answer to the question of how man could preserve mankind not only in himself, but also beside himself.

Notes

1. Personal responsibility survives also in the presence of collective decision-making, as in civil society there is no basis for transferring one's own responsibility and decision-making on someone else's shoulders or to make decisions for him.

2. When man himself was building a house for himself – with the windows open to sunrises and sunsets, with a steep root decorated with carved horses, – when he planted an oak by the house – he was a philosopher. When man was beautifying the things that surrounded him in his daily life – he was a philosopher. When he was observing the refined standards of association in his work and feast days – his perception was also philosophical. In the contemporary world man can no longer be a philosopher, as neither is a philosopher the one who constructs concrete cities. Man has lost his natural ability to be a philosopher. Then, as a compensation for the individuality lost by many people, the profession of philosopher arises.

3. In A. Moles' theory as an "organism" is characterize both a separate individual and a social group or society as a whole.

4. The sources of this approach can be traced back to the much earlier history of philosophy. J. Ortega y Gasset wrote: "Man has no nature; what he has is history". Giovanni Battista Vico who in his works hold the principle *certum quod factum* (cognisable what has been done, i. e. the actor can fully cognize only what has been done by himself) and claimed that nature can by cognised

only by God, whereas what has been done by man himself is *history*, therefore it is only history that man can understand (see Windelband W. *Geschichte der Philosophie*. 12 Aufl. – Tübingen, 1928, 441).

5. Artists came to understand this long before. J. Goethe wrote that what an ignorant man considers as nature in a work of art is not nature (from the outside) but man (nature from the inside).

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Contemporary Social Philosophy as a Means of Explaining and Understanding an Open Society

The problem of openness becomes universal. What are the fundamentals on which an open society develops? Which is of primary importance and comes first – open society or open man? By which criteria should one measure openness? The investigation of the features of both open society and open personality or individuality is becoming a task for contemporary philosophy. What does openness or "going back to Europe" means to a European country?

In the case of Lithuania, we have long been in non-Europe. However, in a sense, that was a peculiar state in which we could perceive things that could escape the attention of the free European to whom many things seemed just obvious. He may fail to understand that man is not a natural state or datum, but a state of constant self-creation. Having been deprived of the things that are essential for humanness, we were made more conscious than the European who could and did consider his normally human state as natural. For us, the whole of history could be determined as an "effort to become person": to become an independent state, an open society, and an "open" person. The effort to come to our identity: human, national, social still remains a daily problem.

What gives rise to anxiety about developing and preserving our identity, about becoming open, i.e. coming back to Europe is the present, new-fashioned barbarism. A barbarian was described by the Greeks as a speechless man. The Greeks, however, understood speech as an articulated space of all that is experienced, desired and contemplated; it is created by paideia. In the face of the world man is naked; without society either God or beast can exist (Aristotle). The man can be, that is, one can become a man by precondition that there is a space filled with communicative speech.

The main passion or goal of a man is to realize himself. Unfortunately, "history in most cases is a graveyard of unrealized freedom, unrealized thinking, unrealized honor, unrealized dignity, unborn life", wrote M. Mamardachvili (1988, 205). This is not only a conservative way of thinking, not only a poor knowledge of the world or lack of self-knowledge, but also living in a perpetual lack and shortage of the things essential to man. To achieve self-realization and be born into life is possible only in a live communicative space, in a cultivated, articulated, "tilled" cultural space. The core of the human fate is beyond man's own limits and within this space of human speech that is, culture, association, thinking, freedom, openness. "Man is a very-very long effort" (*ibid*., 5, 205).

Thus, we can find Europe only inside of ourselves. There is no other way to it. Openness begins only inside of us. It would be naive to assume that it can be offered by opened state borders. Neither is openness a magic word: the Sesame will not open on uttering it. The question to what degree our society and citizen is open immediately turns into the question whether our society and citizen has preserved his identity – human, national, social.

But neither is our identity conferred upon us automatically together with nationality or religion. Identity is a process, each generation and each subject acquires it, conquers, preserves, develops, and gain it through much suffering. Here of importance are all conditions in which a man lives, – cultural, social, political, economical. Social identity is socially acquired, supported and consolidated, and it can be socially ruined.

Identity creates an open man as a precondition of open society. Openness demands an "inward" (our own), authentic culture, self-confidence, self-respect, self-realization of society and

of the individual, civil and scientific courage, civil responsibility, and non-servility. The more of the world inside of us, the more original, distinctive, our own or identical we are.

Openness as a Social Problem: Features of the Individual's Openness and Social Identity

Frequently we can hear mention of such basic, essential features of European Community as equality of opportunity; democratic participation, quality of association; a raising educational level for all members of society, and the like. These are not merely good intentions, but the demands raised by the economic and political goals of open society, the indispensable preconditions of the rational functioning of society and of a citizen.

However, nowadays in post-soviet countries there is quite evident systemic inequality of opportunity which some attempt to justify by means of a quasi-philosophy. The differentiation between the elite and the commoners, rich – not rich, is evident. The problem is the attempt to ground such differentiation on the functioning of laws of nature. Worshiping the elite, its differentiation into a separate or peculiar caste and the idolization not only casts society back to the times of a class society, but is also the cornerstone of the closeness of modern society.

Another essential index of open society, association, is also very narrow and limited. Economic decline hampers peoples' mobility; they cannot associate, buy books, subscribe to the press, attend cultural events, study at higher schools, participate in social activities, etc. A distinct isolation of a significant part of society becomes evident.

The economic and social discrimination of most inhabitants leads to a total loss of self-respect, and inferiority in social self-consciousness. Economic decline leads to deficiency, and to poverty. Existence without association, without knowledge, suffering from unemployment, homelessness, poor food, and recurrent diseases deprive people of the ability to associate. They cannot respect the poor who are very much like themselves; their abilities die out without beginning to develop; the individual does not and cannot respect his own body. The unsafe social environment means not only loss of job, but also spiritual and even physical exposure to danger. Even life evokes no respect; desperate life results in desperate behavior and the number of suicides arises.

Thus, the answer could be as follows: we should preserve the individual and social identity, because only identity that ensures openness. To come back to open society means to become an open society, because Europe and World is nowhere but inside us.

Openness as a Philosophical Problem for Karl Popper

The terms "open society" and "closed society" were first used by Henry Bergson. H. Bergson characterized the closed society as human society just coming from the hands of nature. Claude Lévi-Strauss defined such society as a "cold society". According to the definition of Karl Popper "the closed society is characterized by the belief in magical taboos, while the open society is one in which men have learned to be to some extent critical of taboos, and to base decisions on the authority of their own intelligence", because "only the personal decisions may lead to the alteration of taboos" (1995, 539; 173). In other words, an open society is one that is rational and critical. In what follows "the magical or tribal or collectivist society will also be called the closed society, and the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society (1995, 173).

The closed society breaks down, according to K. Popper, when the supernatural awe with which the social order is considered gives way to active interference, and to the conscious pursuit

of personal or group interests. By K. Popper, the transition from the closed society to the open society takes place when social institutions are first consciously recognized as man-made, and when their conscious alteration is discussed in terms of their suitability for the achievement of human aims (see 1995, 631).

K. Popper left for us a web of substantial concepts such as personal decision and the force to make it, conscious alteration, which requires individual will, and the suitability of social institutions to achieve the human purposes.

Dimensions of Closedness

Closedness of a society is revealed in its anomie's. The notion of anomie was used by Émile Durkheim when he wanted to note that because of economic or political reasons – the loss of social values, or the social isolation of an individual, - social standards become invalid. Ralf Dahrendorf added another aspect to such understanding of anomie: the "failure of the cultural structure" which becomes evident when people, because of their social position, fail to accommodate to the values of their society (1990, 163).

What features reveal the anomie's of society or manifest its closedness? The first is the appearance of a marginal class who feel that they have no part in society (*ibid*., 162). They perceive society as something distant, symbolized mostly by police and courts. People who have no part in society are not bound by its standards.

A symptom of anomie is loss of self-respect and thus of responsibility, which is manifest also as a crowd syndrome. In philosophy it is designated as a monological way of thinking, personified by philosophical relativism and anonymity.

A closed society is characterized by the dominance of threat as a feature of existence and as a principle of philosophical explanation. "The Other is always an enemy" (J. P. Sartre). Closedness implies intolerance, aggressiveness, and conflict. A system is closed when it does not feed on the environment and therefore is entropy, i.e. self-destruction (E. Schrödinger, 1955, 8; I. Prigogin, 1984). In society this is "love" for the status quo: according to V. Havel, the order which is meant just to consolidate without improving is "the highest degree of entropy" (1985, 29). Its slogans are "keep patience, wait", sacrifice in the name of better future, sacrifice in the name of the good image of the state. In a closed society the state and its citizen are complete strangers to one another so that self-sacrifice becomes sheer nonsense.

A closed society is characterized by "postponed life" (V. Havel), life "later on", "some time". Vice versa, the richer and more free the life of society, the more deeply it realizes the "dimensions of social time, dimensions of historicity" (1985, 60), including the historicity of man, his significance, value and uniqueness. The "arrow of time" makes no concessions or exceptions. Thus, a live, open society has a history of its own and does not just try on somebody else's.

The quality of life is the total index of openness, both of society and of man. Whether our own history exists nowadays is a problem because of the strength of entropy. Most do not live a valuable life because of the lack of elementary – economic, social – conditions and do not interact with the environment. That's why at times we feel marginal, although we live in the geographical center of Europe. According to V. Havel, "the lively life is mortified, also the social time is stopped, and history vanishes"(1985, 31). The individual's life is postponed to later times, to the future; but now, when we live, everything is closed for us.

First of all, the quality of the individual citizen's life is an indicator of closed society. The time of life stops for a poor man; there is no history of his life, it flows no more. A personal life

degrades to such a historical level when the rhythm of time is marked only by such accents as birth, marriage and death: born – lived – died. Instead of events – false events: one is living from one anniversary to another, from holiday to holiday. Instead of association it is quasi-association: by TV or radio. Life is closed; the flow of life has stopped. It is as if we are coming back to the level of Lévistraussian "cold" history, i.e. moving away from openness. Television, this substitute for the flow of time, still keeps reporting on the events which take place somewhere, but man himself does not participate in anything any more, his social ties have broken.

The flourishing of no formal relations is peculiar to closed society. The consciousness of such society is characterized by a lack of responsibility and the persuasion that the other, more important people know better. Worshiping the elite or separate groups mean closedness or a mythical society of "relatives" or "cousins" society, a "clan" society. The ideology of worshiping the elite as an atavism of class society is the cornerstone of any type of closedness, a distinct indicator of the closedness of social consciousness. In open society an elite, considered as a separate, richest and "most perfect" group of society, is a contradiction by definition (contradictio in adjecto).

In social self-consciousness various complexes, sense of inferiority, feeling of outsider and depression appear.

Openness is not a datum or something created once and forever. Openness is socially acquired, socially supported and consolidated. The spirit of openness can be created and fostered only in man, through the individual, through the personality. Openness begins in every single man.

Investigation of the features of both open societies and open personalities becomes a task of contemporary philosophy. In the philosophical sense, man's openness means human identity. The prerequisites of openness are equal opportunities, involvement, association quality, etc. Openness recognizes the individual's priority over the whole: of an individual over a collective, of a citizen over the state. Openness exalts and accepts diversity. Open society accepts the dialogue, co-operation, "equal chances".

A closed system, on the contrary, means the priority of the common over a separate, of the whole over an individual. Closed society is revealed through society anomies. This is the breakdown of the structure of culture, which occurs when people, because of their social status, fail to conform to the values of their society. When society is closed, the state and its citizen are completely alien to each other.

Nowadays openness is identified with Western civilization. The definition of open society first of all includes the problem of social identity. Social identity means a search for measures and possibilities to achieve the goals of social development and improvement. Today the chief danger to social and personal identity lies in the adverse conditions of continuous underdevelopment.

The modern strategy for ensuring open society and open personality would mainly rely on the principle that every citizen is a part of openness, i.e. its active agent. The evolution from a closed to an open society demand responsibility from philosophy. Thus, philosophy faces the task to explain the modern constantly changing society, to provide the intellectual basis for understanding a rapid and essential transition to a new political, economical and cultural order.

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Social Philosophy and Culture

The Action of Principles of Philosophy in Special Social Sciences

One should differentiate between direct experience and an abstract theoretical system expressed by language and symbols. Social reality cannot immediately and directly be explained by concepts and theories of a high level of abstraction. Relation among them is provided by special theories (concrete sciences) of an ever increasing level of concreteness and a lower lever of generalization1 . On the other hand, reality cannot be explained on the grounds of "common sense" only (ordinary consciousness), neither can theories of a lower level always embrace the whole panorama of relations and causes, especially those deepest and essential. Only the scientific reality of more concrete, lower level of generalisation but not "common sense" (ordinary consciousness), can correspond to the reality under study.

Philosophical notions are intermingled in various programs and declarations. There they lose their depth, as is natural. A strict borderline should be drawn between the philosophical principles and the political, economic and other conceptions. Philosophical principles define the ultimate goals and evaluation criteria. Reality is never perfect with respect to them, but it could be improved by political, economic and other means2 .

Philosophy is certainly the mouthpiece of rationalism; however, in its scientific system it solves this task in another way than in real economic life. For example, everyone agrees that the goal of society is democracy, economic prosperity, clean nature and health. Here the problem of education comes under considered. Some suggest that extended education should be given only to "gifted" and "genial" children, while briefly education to everyone. Which position should be preferred with respect to the goal? Here the theory of the optimal development of a personality is needed. Can society be democratic if only a small part of its member is highly educated? There is no reason to believe that a certain number of trained specialists-professionals will solve all economic, legal and other problems. We can exchange experience and ideas, on the grounds of something already available (conceptions, theories) to work out the general approach, even to invent something new by employing "brain storming". However, this is not yet science, just as a hundred stones thrown from the cape do not make a pier. Purposeful and creative, responsible and honest working professionals of various levels are needed in all spheres of management and production: everyone's efforts are needed on a professional level in one's branch.

Why does society delegate democracy to government; why is the responsibility passed to the managers, thereby actually renouncing democracy? Democracy implies not only a social order, but also a quality of society. It needs the tradition of high quality and social responsibility. The lack of culture and responsibility predetermines the state when illiteracy, envy, deception and mistake become the theoretical categories in which society is explained.

Contemporary philosophy emphasises equal social opportunity as the foundation of democracy, when education and culture are accessible to everyone and on this basis the quality society could be created, the class of intellectuals could be restored, and "re-cultivated". Because of its education and cultural traditions the intelligentsia has a much broader understanding of the essence of social phenomena, and passes on from generation to generation the sense of responsibility. This is not a social layer or a privileged class, but a symbiosis of education, culture and tradition embodied in man. One cannot be born an intellectual; one can only become an

intellectual. In order to define the level of humanness of society, one criterion suffers, namely, its attitude toward the intelligentsia.

From the principle of equal social opportunity follows the opinion that we should not look for those "gifted", but employ a well-ordered system of education and provide equivalent social conditions to everyone to "trigger" the talents hidden deeply within every man. The opposite approach, which sticks to the monopoly of knowledge, advocates selection of "gifted" children and their specific education. This shows the society to be far from democratic. The champions of this approach themselves are victims of a non-democratic society. Considering illiterate, humble people as easier to rule it makes education a privilege.

The priorities and tasks of society should be defined through the needs of a creative personality. Nor should the prognosis be based on the present state by merely expanding quantitatively present-day manifestations of humanism (more democracy, more education, more personality, etc.). A higher level of openness would mean not publishing military secrets, but the expansion of the foundations of public life: this means education of the subject of activities so that one is not dissolved in a mass, but manifests himself as a sovereign personality with one's own opinion and defending its positions.

Neither is the increase of material production or the progress of technology indicative of the quality of life, if not seen in terms of the main goal of social development, namely, to educate everyone as a personality. Otherwise we can "forget" how much of production and technologies, intellect and education, are allotted, for example, to armament, etc.

Contemporary philosophy highlights another, more essential, foundation of the human condition. We shall present several cross-sections of society with regard to the goals of contemporary philosophy.

Philosophical "Monologue" and the Problem of the Cultivated Mind

The victory of a monologue (totalitarianism) in cognition is based on the principle of a unity of consciousness or monism. The core of this principle is to deny the diversity of consciousness or opinion because everything that is correct is expressed by only the one consciousness.

"Common sense" (at the level of common consciousness) cannot resist the pressure of totalitarian, or the "only correct", thinking. Only a cultured, cultivated, educated mind can withstand this pressure.

The interrelation of social philosophy and culture is revealed through an integrated analysis of the personality, an open society, and identity.

Totalitarian Consciousness

A. Maslow in his theory of motivation enumerates and characterises the hierarchy of needs. The highest level human needs for creative work and self-actualisation arise only when the biological and social needs have been satisfied. Maslow's sequel of main social needs is security, love and affection, respect and recognition (1970, 68).

Unsatisfied social needs are the basis on which the totalitarian consciousness or the consciousness of the multitude (crowd) arises. If the needs for security or human relations are not satisfied, man experiences a fear of isolation. Those who cannot rank themselves among any really existing group, who have "I" but have no "we", feel insecure and experience a strong feeling of loneliness and isolation. However, it is not enough to feel oneself only as part in the "we" structure.

One needs also recognition, evaluation, and belief in his significance for the others, – man needs respect. Otherwise he experiences the sense of inferiority. In turn, a one can consider himself a significant, even historical personality, but if he does not feel warmth for anyone and if nobody responds with the same kind of warmth, apathy grows within him. One always wants to perceive oneself as a unique individuality. If one fails to establish oneself and to escape the system in which he is only standard easily replaceable part, he begins to attract attention by aggressive and cynical behaviour.

The fear of loneliness and isolation, a sense of inferiority, apathy, aggression and cynicism, are the oppressive feelings, which cause suffering. One does not want to suffer and tries instinctively to satisfy his social needs. There are two ways to do so and one lead to the crowd.

The need for security, love and human relations can be satisfied, for instance, by belonging to an elite group or by a blind love of the leader. One becomes the same as everybody else, of a type desirable by the others. He fulfils the desires and wishes of the others, driven not only by the fear of isolation, but even more by a direct threat to his comfort, freedom and even life. One would rather surrender to anybody, to comply with anyone who gives him security and liberates him from the doubts. Having become identical to thousands of others, one does not feel lonely or worried. But this is at the cost of his own "I" and self-consciousness becomes impossible in principle. The consciousness that coincides with the mass is a totalitarian consciousness.

A totalitarian consciousness does not appear by itself, but it is purposefully created, encouraged and ruled. First of all, civic consciousness undergoes destruction. A separate individual comes to realise that he will be punished not for what he is doing, but for what he was or is. A potential, ostensible incriminated guilt induces the sense of fear. Although an individual does not feel guilty and does not accept what is imputed to him, this is a prerequisite for the "virus" of fear. It acts like an enzyme and makes the socially and politically organised structures of society amorphous and total, i. e. humble and submissive. The borderline between the good and the evil becomes blurred and the individual moral consciousness collapses. This collapse is intensified by the fact that in totalitarian society an individual can make no decisions, because he is instructed "from above" as to what is good and what is evil. Eventually the shortage of the means of life, material difficulties ruin one's physical existence.

Shaky civic and moral consciousness is good clay for modelling the desired man of the crowd. The ideology of the formation of totalitarian consciousness is directed not to logical thinking, but to common consciousness, "common sense" and feelings (called emotions in ordinary language). The basic statements of this ideology are: the truth is one, because there cannot be two truths; the correct way is always only one; the leader is also one. This is the way to mould the totalitarian world outlook. The Common Cause is to be guided by it, therefore everybody must keep to the Only One Correct Route. Only this is the truth; anything else is a lie. If an individual does not stick to these rules, which are evident to "common sense", he is wrong. If he does not recognise his mistakes he is an enemy. The ideology based on incessant search for external and internal enemies becomes the ideology of "siege", which most effectively blocks not only external, but also internal criticism.

The indispensable element of mass consciousness is a mystic leader, who must be understandable, simple. The leader is assisted by a group, which usually claims to represent "the people", i. e. the majority. The force, and thus the truth, is on the side of the majority. Oppression of the minority stirs the enthusiasm of the majority, because its makes the majority or crowd even larger and more consolidated. An individual that belongs to it experiences the sense of security he has been seeking. Every New Society needs a New Man, who without any doubt is always the

first, "front-rank", pioneer, because before him there have been no events in history, and even if there were some, they all were of no worth. Thus, the entire past is deleted.

Philosophical Monologue

Moving from the sociological and social-psychological to the philosophical approach, the problem can be formulated as the victory of "monologue in cognition". Thus, the totalitarian consciousness or the "common line" has its philosophical foundation whose essence is expressed by the principle of the unity of consciousness, or monism. This excludes the necessity of different types of consciousness because everything that is true is expressed by "consciousness in general", no matter how we call it – "scientific", "class", "national", "party" or anything else. The consciousness of a separate individual can manifest itself only as a fallacy: the only possibility for an individual consciousness to express itself is as a "mistake". To put it in other words – one consciousness is enough for complete cognition. The multitude of different types of consciousness is not only superfluous, but also a priori erroneous. The approving or identical consciousness can only be pointing out the mistakes to the one who does not know or is mistaken (but not a dialog, an interaction of knowledge). All that is correct is contained in one consciousness. Thinking based on the principle of monism, or "monologue" thinking, simplifies the explanation of the world.

Totalitarian society and monistic consciousness recalls, although in a rather distorted way, a pre-individualistic, pre-personality consciousness. In it, the individual is deprived of the understanding of his individual value and is substantiated and exhausted by the Idea, the Leader, and the Ideal. From monistic consciousness also arises the apprehension that history begins only now. Hence follows political shamanism: everything that is taking place under the politician's very nose is said to occur "for the first time". A man that comes to understand at least a little bit of history will notice that "there is nothing new under the sun", that we are standing on the tumuli of the previous epochs and on the shoulders of the heros that lived before us, that we are but a continuation of what has been good or evil before us. The deleted historical consciousness, the interrupted historical memory, the imposed "vacuum thinking" remove all obstacles for cultivating the monistic, that is "the only correct", way of thinking. Man-crowd is first of all man without the past, without history, and hence without the future. This type of man is most susceptible to various kinds of initiative, not only the "international", but also the nationalistic. According to J. Ortega y Gasset, this is a man without nobility, sine nobilitate, snob (Ortega y Gasset J., 1985).

Social Anomie's

A meagre or destroyed culture, a deleted historical consciousness and destruction of its spokesmen, a decomposed civil consciousness are all factors that lead to social anomie (E. Dürkheim) and the "collective loss of immune defence" (Baudrillard J.). Anomie is a state of society or social group when the individuals lose the norms of behaviour and the ideals that have been rendering their life meaningful. The results are terrorism, violence, narcotics, as well as social depression and fascism.

It should be borne in mind that criticism and condemnation alone are not good either for restricting or for eliminating anomie. One-sided criticism is in principle a reactionary activity; by absolutely condemning anything society sinks in its hypocrisy. Criticism often obstructs producing something of one's own, something positive, and pushes to deficiency.

The human organism deprived of immunity falls ill with AIDS. In much the same way society, without a sufficient number of personalities as the subjects of creative thinking, custodians of the diversity of thought, and cherishers of civic resistance, a society can also lose its immunity (resistance) and fall ill. Totalitarian society and totalitarian consciousness are ill. The question for the humanism is how to cure the ill society, i. e. how to overcome this totalitarian-monologue thinking?

The Personality as the Bearer of Cultivated Mind and Creative Activity

To the question why does the personality exist, R. Descartes answered "Because he thinks"; J. G. Fichte and G. Hegel: "Because he has consciousness". I. Kant regarded the personality as a "creature capable of taking up responsibility". The sense of responsibility is the pith of personality, its most significant feature and its most important indicator. With it, man enters a new quality called culture. Only a man that does not fear and feels responsible can express his opinion. However, this is not enough. For a man to have his own, independent position, he must know the essence of the matter, be an expert. (Here we encounter the problem of education. A direct relationship has been established between the rising level of education and the rising level of one's responsibility for society and for the other.)

"Common sense" (on the level of everyday consciousness) is not the institution that could withstand fear, resist pressure or totalitarian thinking; only a cultural and cultured i. e. intellectual, mind that can do this. There is no tautology there. E. Morin calls this type of mind "intelligence/conscience" (mind/consciousness), i. e. capable of recognising and understanding reality and having its own opinion about it, i. e. to evaluate it (1980, 446).

The content of culture (lat. "treatment", "dressing", "processing") implies that culture can never be spontaneous, casual, "naïve". It is always conscious work of spirit, which improves itself and regulates everything in the human's environment. Accumulation of culture – education – develops creative thinking, without which the world (social processes) would be perceived inadequately, that is in a restricted and dogmatic way. Only the individual that already has this world in himself, in his thinking is able to perceive it adequately. In other words, education as an accumulation of culture is a long hard work of the consciousness of man and society: it is culture that is being gathered, accumulated, and achieved through much suffering.

It is exactly understanding the difference between "common sense" and cultured (cultivated, educated) mind that evokes the desire (striving, as M. Wertheimer would put it) not to be limited by "common sense" alone, but to try to perceive the essence of social life and to act accordingly.

A person or personality is homo pro se; it has no other foundation but itself, and is responsible for its activities (action). Its identity with its activities means that the personality can be defined as action. True responsibility can only be personal. According to M. Bakhtin, every thought of an individual is "his individually responsible action, one of the acts that comprise its whole unique life as a continuous action. As the whole life can be regarded as a certain complicated action: I am behaving with my life, each single act and experience is a moment of my life-action" (1993, 83).

The person gives sense to activities, and the latter in turn moulds the personality itself. These activities (reflection) is a peculiar, unique, individual interaction with reality without the mediation of any Universal Instance or the Only Principle, proceeding without any sanction of the Absolute. Therefore only the personality (individuality) is responsible for everything and responsible only to History. The tragic site of this type or personality was shown by J. P. Sartre.

Thus, individuality imposes the tragic responsibility of perpetual choice: individuality is incessant choice, continuous individual decision-making. Every personality (individuality) itself selects its Principle (contra Absolute), its ideal (contra Dogma), – and hence follows the possibility of diversity and tolerance. Rejection of "the only sole Principle" was the theoretical sense of European Revolutions.

Personality is not the individual that only disagrees, i. e. a non-conformist or critic, but the one that acts positively, because "creative and live processes are intended to improve the existing situation" (Wertheimer M., 1982, 296). Therefore the opinion is groundless that the personality becomes dissolved in the multitude. The sum of personalities will never make a multitude. That the personality loses his culture in a crowd is wrong. This is contradictio in adjecto, because culture is impossible to be lost.

Intelligentsia as the Mouthpiece of Historical Consciousness and Keeper of Historical Memory

The problem of the person in social life arises as that of the essence, place and significance of the intelligentsia. The problem of the interlayer of the intelligentsia as the mouthpiece of the multidimensionality of thinking (contra the one-dimensional thinking), as a custodian of historical consciousness and historical memory appears in the period of crises of the 20th century (in the 19th century the custodian of the Lithuanian historical memory was the peasantry). However, during the period of totalitarianism it was the intelligentsia that preserved the memory. (This was not only the dissidents, as it is not enough to negate and criticise, but there is need to affirm and to create under all kinds of conditions). The mind, honour, responsibility were being transmitted from generation to generation; the spirit of the intelligentsia was preserved; historical consciousness was not interrupted; and historical memory was not lost.

No definition suffices to express the content of the intelligentsia. Alongside those mentioned above, one of the most important criteria of the definition of intelligentsia is education. Thanks to its broad universal education, the intelligentsia sees better the goal (direction), and turns meaning into action; knowledge endows thinking with originality and progressive independence. Therefore the intelligentsia represents progressive views and the values such as creative thought, and liberation from conservative and conformist thinking. These values cannot be taken away, but can only be destroyed together with those who hold them. Besides, knowledge of truth, supported by extensive education, evokes and burdens with responsibility. Education provides the possibility to be responsible, and according to Cz. Milosz "be unwilling to keep silence". The cultural significance of the intelligentsia in the most general sense can be expressed as a constant and purposeful striving not to observe life, but to transform it. According to A. Losev culture is always a heroic deed; it is always the readiness to forget the daily needs of egoistic existence; it is not necessarily a fight, but the readiness to being fighting every minute and the spiritual, creative armament for that (1988, 319).

The intelligentsia is not social strata or an estate (and therefore it is not so easy to destroy). Of course, isolated personalities, when not numerous, cannot perform in society the function that is performed by the whole intelligentsia as a collective intellectual and spiritual force3 . The intelligentsia is not a particular part of society, and thus it cannot be called an elite. It originates from all social layers, all classes, all professions, and all social groups. It is the peculiarity of an intellectual that his or her way of thinking and position in life do not depend on the narrow interests of a social layer, class or profession. One cannot be accepted or not accepted, elected or not elected, appointed or not appointed into intelligentsia, but he belongs to it by one's inner essence.

Extensive universal education as one of the essential bases of the intelligentsia evokes the appearance of universal interests and, what is very important, prevents an intellectual from being limited by narrow private, professional, party or other interests. Thus the educated intelligentsia can express the interests of the whole society and defend them without identifying with the narrow interests of a group. Naturally in this case the intelligentsia is the force which maintains an equilibrium (and concord) in society and harmonizes different interests.

An intellectual, because of the adequate perception of his values, does not feel any superiority over other people. The more adequate the level of self-perception, the more care of other people one can afford. T. Shibutani enumerates the criteria that reveal a rather adequate level of self-perception, however modest the person might look:

- he is guided by the rules of his own and at the same time does his best not to harm the others;
- he is not very disappointed, when others do not agree with him;
- he needs no excuses and does not indulge in self-flagellation in the case of a failure;
- he is respectful of other people and treats them as equals whatever their social status; and
- he is sure of his ability to help other people and tries to do so (1969, 363–364).

This self-confidence is based on education and self-education, which last the whole life: one cannot be taught to become an intellectual in a certain period of time or acquire this status with a certain degree or diploma.

It is natural that all dictators hate independent and creatively thinking intelligentsia, which could develop free personalities and would constitute an alternative or confront the regime. Therefore all totalitarian regimes declared a war upon an independent and educated intelligentsia. By destroying the intelligentsia they destroyed the historical consciousness of the nation (then anyone can declare himself the pioneer). In history, the periods when one can be intellectual and at the same time sure of one's total safety are rather rare and have not lasted (Losev A. F., 1988, 318).

The scheme for getting rid of the intelligentsia is common for all totalitarian regimes: first, to disdain it as a third-class social element (after the rulers, businessmen, workers), because it does not conform to the "new" conditions, fails to "earn" money, does not "exhibit a new thinking", – i. e. to reject it as alien to the "new" society. Second, to apply all kinds of discrimination (but not physical), such as allowing the minimum level of material income by offering at either a career that abandons one's own medium, or the status of an intellectual proletarian with all the ensuing consequences.

If the intelligentsia is eliminated, the Supreme Consciousness will be able to treat all other members of society as It wants, as there will be nobody to cure the such society, to take responsibility, to withstand fear, or to go on creating life.

Thus, the destination and purpose of the intelligentsia is not to defend itself and be afraid or to criticise the multitude. The destination of the intelligentsia is to "dissolve" the multitude, to clarify its consciousness, or, in other words, to combine non-conformism with activities, to work by creating rather than by destroying. The intelligentsia has no right not only to criticise, but even to feel offended, as there is no time left for it.

"Common Sense" and Scientific Cognition

The concept of "common sense", which has come into philosophical "circulation", is in need of delineation of its sphere of action and possibility. "Common sense" at the level of common consciousness does not discriminate between wisdom accumulated through the centuries and widespread convictions and prejudice (T. Shibutani). The principle of visual evidence or else "common sense", unfortunately, penetrates also into various conceptions that explain society, and here it often is given scientific status.

The philosophy of "common sense", formulated at Scottish universities, liberates the mind from the necessity of any proofs. Things are justified by stating that "such are the things". If a subject measures the world by common thinking or "common sense", he finds in it only the things for which he is looking. This is the basis on which dogmatism or simplification of the world flourishes, resulting in a negative attitude towards knowledge (cognition).

Non-dogmatic, creative thinking is stimulated by the "primary" accumulation of culture, i. e. education. It is a characteristic feature of man, that in everyday life his feelings object to and do not want to accept the fact, that the road to the essential understanding of the phenomena and situation lead away from the obvious, real notions perceived on the level of everyday consciousness or "common sense". Opponents of scientific abstraction point as obvious to the spontaneous images of everyday life, which are necessary for man to be able to find his elementary way in this world. This problem of the interrelation between common sense and essential cognition by the strangest whims of history has become the most actual contemporary problem. It is not only philosophical, but also political and moral, and arises as the problem of wisdom cherished by the Lithuanian philosopher, Vydunas. The fight between "common sense" and wisdom was described by Vydunas as follows: man "catches but fractions of what the universe is offering him at the experienced moment. Man is too quick at satisfying himself with trifles. He indulges in them. And he enjoys his tiny knowledge, and turns them as quickly as possible into actions or sentences" (1992, 289). However, in T. Shibutani's opinion, "common sense is not always wise, as it does not differentiate between the knowledge accumulated through ages of widespread beliefs and local prejudice" (1987, 13).

Unfortunately, the principle of visual obviousness, or "common sense", penetrates also various conceptions of how to explain society. Here it often acquires a scientific character, although it never rises up to the scientific level or to the philosophical level of giving meaning to reality.

The Philosophical Origins of "Common Sense"

History knows the periods of the triumph of "common sense". This was the eighteenth century with its scientific theories, when "common sense" based itself on what every ordinary man could see with his eyes or on a more or less powerful microscope: "He was measuring the direct data that allowed to be measured, and generalised what could be generalised just on the spot. He generalised, for example, the simple notions of weight and mass" (Whitehead A. N., 1990, 174). In the eighteenth century the conviction prevailed that an end would be put to fallacies, and this would be done by the man's "common sense". In a short period of time science overstepped the frames of "common sense", nevertheless, the notion of common sense was established in philosophy.

The Scotch School

The philosophy of "common sense" got its shape late in the 18th century at the universities of Scotland and was called the Scotch school in philosophy, with Thomas Reid, professor of Glasgow University, as its initiator. It was moulded in the course of polemics with D. Hume's scepticism and G. Berkeley's subjectivism. The basis of the truths of common sense was considered to be the direct reliability from within the individual and personified by God in human nature. The human spirit was regarded as a priori endowed with the principles of common sense, which reliably and adequately explained the world.

In contrast to the basic precondition of empiricism that the human mind as such is a blank page on which only experience leaves its inscriptions, the Scotch school claimed just the opposite: mind as such knows different truths, even those that can be never explained by experience. Besides, only complex and not elementary truths are known directly. At the same the empiricists, before analysing complex truths, tried to find the elementary truths. Thus, to adherents of common sense the a priori known truths were the evident ones, known through intuition. This intuition, or knowledge, is inherent in common sense, which is given by God to every man (seemingly a very humane principle, which, as we shall see later, led to instead ideology).

Thus, common sense philosophy, essentially without any scruples, turned the commonly accepted beliefs and general prejudices into the basis of science, moral and religion. On the other hand, belief was established as the basis of philosophy: it is enough that I believe, for my belief is a priori correct, since my principles were implanted in me by God. For the Scotch school, the proofs based on inborn "common sense" were enough not only to prove the existence of God, but also the purposefulness of the entire reality. Of course, this was the way to protect the material world from scepticism and agnosticism: as Th. Reid has put it, people see the sun and not the idea of the sun.

Global belief in common sense is the essence of the Scotch school, which greatly simplified the task of philosophy: it sufficed to compare the principles of common sense among themselves in order to obtain "evident truths". Another essential feature of the Scotch school is its programmatic dogmatism. The Scotch doctrine, accepting the peremptory predominance of unproven but still reliable truths, turned this dogmatism into the basis and kernel of philosophy. The unproven presumptions, which other dogmatists tried at least to minimize only as an unpleasant and inevitable necessity, by the Scotch school were ostentatiously put forward as the most significant attainment of philosophy.

Because of the a priori and divine origin of common sense principles, also the principle of determinism was considered indubitable. According to Th. Reid, thinking is a pledge of the object's reality, and what is true must have its cause. Sentences of this kind are absolutely true; it would be absurd to negate or doubt them. Such an unconditioned a priori belief on the correspondence between thinking and reality also simulated dogmatism. This was especially evident in the statement that things that are clearly and intelligibly cognised by the mind are also useful as.

The later followers of common sense philosophy, for example, M. Mendelssohn, as well as Th. Reid, thought all extreme contractions in philosophy to be fallacies in the middle of which truth is hidden: as every radical opinion inevitably implies error, another opinion is unwanted.

The French University Spiritualism

The principle of "common sense", which was predominant at the universities of Scotland late in the 18th century, did not remain a solely Scotch phenomenon of philosophy. In France, which

it reached in Th. Jouffroy and V. Cousin translations, was for several decades the principle of the official philosophy.

Thus the ideological stage of the principle of common sense began. It was designated as university spiritualism and was related to the history of the creation of the Napoleons University, the Napoleon's government strong combat against the philosophy of Enlightenment. University philosophy had to serve strictly political goal of combating the philosophy of Enlightenment, which at the time dominated the civil engineering schools. In 1811, the monarchist P. R. Royer-Collard in the Sorbonne introduced the Scotch philosophy of common sense, but this was not a consequence of the pure evolution of ideas. Historians of philosophy often wonder why enlightenment philosophy faded out, vanished, and died. It did not die by itself, but was killed. There were a number of ways to combat Enlightenment philosophy: by banning publications ("*Tribunat*"); at the Academy, the Department of Moral and Political Sciences was abolished, and its publication "La Décade philosophique" was done away with. A. Lalande, who in 1805 was writing his "Supplement to the Dictionary of Atheism" ("*Supplément au dictionnaire de l'athéisme*") was attacked in a semi-official organ: "The member of the Institute, formerly known for his erudition but at present sunk in his second childhood, does not understand that it is high time for him to retire" (Tersen E., 1959, 166). Thus, the Empire struck with almost military methods. Things were the same both in the epoch of the Restoration and in the time of the July Monarchy. V. Cousin, a translator of Scotch philosopher's works, in 1844 while discussing the law on higher education, defended university spiritualism as the state philosophy, which serves the liberalism of new bourgeoisie: "it is only this philosophy that can capture the mind and in particular the spirit, based on its great truths, which are above all systems and, being independent on any system, are only dictated by common sense and are the treasure of the human mind. No religion and no society, be it monarchy or republic, are possible without these truths" (1845, 65). The same emphasis was made by the classic of spiritualism. Th. Jouffroy wrote: "Common sense is nothing else but the sum total of solutions on the issues that concern the philosophers. Thus, it is the other philosophy, primary to philosophy stricto sense, as it is directly the basis of any consciousness, independently of any scientific search" (Jouffroy Th., 1875, 111–112).

In 1852 the course of philosophy, as a weapon of the liberal bourgeoisie was totally abolished. However, Napoleon III was seeking to create the illusion of a liberal empire, and thus philosophy again came into demand. In 1863 the course of philosophy at the universities was renewed. It can be characterized by the aphorism: "Philosophy, i. e. spiritualism", and spiritualism means common sense.

"The other philosophy", based only on "common sense", expressed the desire to present as the absolute starting point of thought, what in reality is its final result, that is, to present empirical conclusions as the a priori principles. From abstract formulas, ostensibly only by the power of pure thought, it "derived" concrete reality. This kind of philosophy can be attractive only because it liberates from any need for proofs. Th. Jouffroy maintained that "the Scotch school depends neither to spiritualism nor materialism: it is just wise" (*ibid*., 144). In other words, one should understand that if the mind is spontaneously inherent to Scots, then Scotch doctrine is clever. (If X is clever, then all his thoughts are clever.) This "just cleverness" was (and nowadays is) an indispensable theoretical basis for elite thinking and also of practical elitism. It is for the elite or, as V. Cousin calls it, the "legitimate aristocracy" that higher education created its philosophy – spiritualism – saturated with the principles of "common sense".

This vicious circle (both theoretical and practical), from which the "legitimate aristocracy" used to derive its primary intuitive images of the existing world and then created the illusion that

the existing world was based on their intuitive images was a milieu in which dogmatism could flourish. The idea of justifying things by saying "such are the things" is in its essence conservative and dogmatic. However, this pre-reflexive kind of philosophy was not (and is not) a solely gnoseological phenomenon.

The concept of common sense in philosophy would appear also later. P. F. Maine de Biran called common sense "the inner sense" (sens intime), Neo-Kantians named it "a priori data", and H. Bergson direct "data of consciousness. Neorealist (G. E. Moore) developed the conception of "direct cognition", formulating the "independent immanence" theory, according to which the object cannot directly "enter" the consciousness.

Contemporary Reasons for Raising "Common Sense"

Should the problem of "common sense" arose only as the problem of everyday consciousness (the way that it exists in sociology), it would be quite justifiable. However, nowadays the concept of common sense amazingly often comes to pretend to the status of a philosophical principle and is involved in the philosophical transformation. On the basis of common sense, on the level of everyday consciousness generalizations are made which are ascribed to the realm of theory. Also emphasized are the evidence or objective correctness of these truths, – and again, as in Scotch philosophy, their dogmatism, conservatism and elitism become evident.

Why do these principles of cognition nearly two centuries old relying upon common sense return now to the scene? They contradict both the general level of the cognition of nature and society and the existing historical situation. We shall hardly find the gnoseological reasons, but there may be historical and ideological ones.

Common Sense Ideology

One whose thinking was moulded by totalitarianism accepts the world as simple and unchangeable. His belief in the world's simplicity means that every phenomenon can be transformed into an easy-to-describe, self-evident combination of primordial, elementary phenomena conceivable by common sense on the level of everyday consciousness. The most important thing is that everything could be easily solved. The psychological prerequisite for the common sense principles is the separate elements of haste and the temptation to simplify the problem in order to get "speedy replies" and to act blindly.

"If the desire to understand the core of the problem is vague, then striving for simplifying the problem gets the upper hand, the clearly pronounced tendency is to combine structurally alien elements" (Wertheimer M., 1982, 279). M. Wertheimer notes that this feature as characteristic not only of natural scientists, but especially of representatives of the social sciences, and most frequently occurs when social problems are considered. From the belief in the world's simplicity there follows also the belief that the solutions intended to improve this world should be also simple – if not technologically, then essentially.

Simplification of the world evokes a number of consequences, not only scientific and moral, but also social. This simplification is the reason for a negative attitude towards knowledge in general and towards the bearers of knowledge. A scientist, an expert or a representative of cultivated mind by his mere existence negates the primordial evident "legibility" of the existing world. By essence unable to agree to the "common sense" way of thinking, even if he is not claimed to be a political enemy, he is all the same regarded as a stranger, and possibly even dangerous.

K. P. Popper gave an example of the "common sense" logic. If two contradicting countries cannot arrive to a consensus, this can mean that either the first or the second country, or both are wrong. This is the logic of a scientific (critical) approach. (However, in the opinion to relativists and common sense adherents, this by no means implies that both countries can be equally right). When one imagines or claims that both countries are equally right, though this approach of common sense at first sight seems humble and self-critical, actually it is neither for it either conceals and justifies a lie, or accepts relativism, or means an apologetic simplification of the world (Popper K. R., 1965). However, ideologically, this approach is very convenient for it helps to blow up and implant into people's consciousness false truths and, on the other hand, treats with condescending scorn those who search for essential truths. For if everything is relative and simple, common sense (not "packed" with various kinds of conception) is more apt to catch everything more correctly and without any doubts. Common sense as a principle of explanation is very useful to ideologists for it glides over the surface of the phenomena.

A classical example of the ideologists' approach to the common sense truths is, according to K. R. Popper, the history of G. Galileo. He emphasized the purpose of M. Copernicus's system as a tool for making calculations. The Church did not object to Galileo's mathematical theory, as he himself had explained its purpose as purely instrumental.

However, Galileo supposed and believed that this system gives a true description of the world. This was more important to him and it was this that the Church (first of all bishop G. Berkeley) could not forgive, as "it saw a proof of the power of the human intellect, which is able without the divine revelation to reveal the secrets of our world – the reality hidden behind the evidence" (*ibid*., 292). G. Galileo had to renounce the second discovery which at the same time, the first one was not regarded as dangerous. For a mathematical hypothesis or a tool for calculations was not considered a correct description of the true reality.

The Dogmatism of "Common Sense"

Perceiving the difference between direct experience and the language and system of symbols used to express and explain this experience is not an evident thing. High semantic and linguistic levels, as well as developed philosophical thinking and a cultivated (individual and social) mind are required here; and these are not attained by common sense alone.

Philosophical reflection is not characterized by summing up the facts of reality, a superficial combination of casual events, phenomena, actions or facts. Common sense is helpless here. Its experience may mean that accidental facts have been collected and a not essential or even false relation has been established. A freely selected sequence of casual actions in practice proceeds only through trials and errors, and common sense only post factum every time describes "historical mistakes".

Establishing the essential relations requires the work of cultivated, deep and developed thought. The history of philosophy shows most convincingly that truly revolutionary and significant achievements arise not from common sense, but from new solutions of new problems, i. e. from new theories. Philosophy, in its turn, in order to be a competent "co-worker" in the concrete sphere of scientific cognition has first to create a system of its own specific notions, as only on their basis can it evaluate the thinking of a lower level of generalization – both common sense and mundane consciousness, as well as the theories of the separate sciences.

How do we jump from a simple observation and description of facts or even from a generalization based on common sense to theory? In scientific cognition, the jump occurs not from

a description of observation to a theoretical generalization, but from a problem situation regarded already with the eyes of theory (from a theoretical approach) and explained by theoretical principles (see K. Popper, M. Wertheimer). A scientific (explanatory) theory is nothing else but an attempt to solve a definite scientific problem (Popper K. R., 1983. 335). It is exactly the problem that forces man to employ all his previous scientific experience as well as to use, wherever possible, both experiment and observation. Scientific cognition begins from problems; this is the sphere of the cultivated mind, not of common sense.

Theory itself can be verified only by way of verifying its remote consequences (*ibid.*, 334) which can hardly be perceived intuitively or understood with the aid of common sense. In other words, according to K. Popper, there is no paradox in the statement that scientific explanation means rendering the known into the unknown (*ibid.*, 286).

At the same time dogmatic thinking (cf. the dogmatism of the Scotch school), an uncontrolled desire to impose reiteration, evident fascination with rites and repetitions as such are peculiar exactly to the savage and to children (*ibid.*, 265). Only the maturity of cognition creates the critical principles both of the process of thinking of a separate individual and of the entire process of cognition. Scientific tradition differs from the pre-scientific one in the fact that the former has two levels. Like the pre-scientific tradition, it dissects a number of theories; however, it critically overcomes these theories not as dogmas, but in an attempt to consider and improve them (*ibid.*, 267).

If a subject measures the world by everyday thinking, he finds in the world only what he is looking for. The world as seen by man is always adequate to the level and degree of development of man as the thinking subject. The "primary" accumulation of culture – the education – develops creative, non-dogmatic thinking. Without this preliminary process the reflexive activity of the subject is impossible.

However, common sense is sure that it is possible to understand everything without knowing anything. A cultured, educated man – an intellectual – understands that history does not start from him, but that he himself is a creation of history. To a common sense thinker, representatives of cultivated mind – the intelligentsia – are quite undesirable and even dangerous, as they do not allow him, with his primordial common sense ideas to be "the first" and "the only", i.e. to be "the elite". Interestingly, all the principles of the Scotch school of common sense and particularly of their followers the French spiritualists are repeated here: self-evidence of the truth, i. e. the principle of simplification of the world, programmatic dogmatism and elitism.

A creative thinker, i. e. one that "has become an exception" (Vydûnas), cannot be an apologetist simply because he understands that that state is temporary. He cannot be a dogmatist, as he is aware of the fact that the world is complex. He cannot and does not want to be guided by common sense only, as he knows that the "archaeology" of the essence of all phenomena is the achievement of the wisdom of centuries and of human generations. Therefore cultivated thinking, "wisdom" is a principle directed towards cognition of the essence of the phenomena, in contrast to common sense, which glides over the surface. These are achieved through man's education, culture, humane principles and creativity, i. e. culture in the broad sense of the world (and not just intellectuality or belonging to this or that group of social elite).

Notes

1. Up to now we have used only the logical notions expressing quality. In order not to stop at the level of only an ideal model, the logical (quality) notions could and should later on be

transformed to the level of scientific reality possible to speak about the quantity of creativeness in work, the indices of an integral talented personality, the level of society's health, etc.

2. Political extremism is unwilling even to take notice of the objective limitations of historical activity; it wants to implement a philosophical principle absolutely and immediately. If it fails, it is the principle that is to be blamed. This is panlogism in action.

3. Cf. R. Ackoff and F. Emery: the properties of a system are not identical to the properties of its elements or to the sum of these elements (1974, 205); also see A. Moles: the culture of a social group by its volume exceeds the culture of an individual (1974, 53).

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Chapter X
The Destruction of Personality as
a Problem of Contemporary Philosophy

"Envy" and "Fear" as Concepts of Social Philosophy

Here the problem of the destruction of personality is not studied in its economic or political reasons but at a level of philosophical abstraction arrived at by elucidating the most common preconditions that allow for the preservation of the identity of the personality. The destructive traits in an individual are shown to be not everlasting and unavoidable, but are formed in an atmosphere of insecurity and uncertainty in society, and in a culture of undeveloped feelings and immature self-perception in the cultural medium.

In the paradigm of contemporary social thinking, the concept of envy is becoming a prominent means of explaining the phenomena of our society. This concept, far from being new, enters even into theoretical treatises where it is used almost as an economic category.

The object of our analysis is not jealousy as a tormenting feeling of doubt, distrust or suspicion regarding the unfaithfulness of the beloved person, but envy as a feeling of bitterness, vexation evoked by someone else's success, well-being. It is a spontaneous desire to possess the goods possessed by somebody else. The content of this notion will be analysed in the context of personality theory.

The difference between the two concepts was defined by F. La Rochefoucauld: "Jealousy in a sense is right and motivated, as it is only apt to preserve the well being that belongs to us or is believed to; and jealousy is a passion, which cannot stand somebody else's well being" (1961, 11–12). One can envy even what somebody else does not possess and thus does not concern only wellbeing. How can the object of envy be sometimes neither material wealth nor social status; where does the feeling of envy come from; is it an eternal and unavoidable evil of man and society?

Authoritarian values can be lost; man is constantly entangled in a situation, which it is up to him to solve. Life demands personal responsibility, which for an individual is a source of tension, vagueness and uncertainty. The burden of responsibility is differently withstood. Attempts are being made to escape it in various ways: either by self-isolation, by accepting someone else's conventional values, or by hiding behind the mask of conceit in order to preserve one's own values. Some subjects, who express discomfort, seek self-preservation by destructive actions and feelings, envy being one of them.

The sense of envy and the corresponding action appear when someone's real or imaginary achievements in acquiring social blessings, as well as someone's personal qualities or success are perceived as a threat to the achievements, well-being, and spiritual comfort of another individual. It is not only material wealth, social status, but also education, a comprehensive knowledge of something, pure consciousness, or even the absence of envy that are envied. In other words, the mechanism of self-defence or self-preservation comes into operation. When, in order to preserve one's own spiritual peace, an individual is happy at seeing someone else's misfortunes or drawbacks, possibly only ostensible as when somebody else is said to exhibit the non-existing vices and to make the mistakes that actually have never been committed, – such an individual is possessed by envy. This kind of attack is in function of the self-preservation of an envious person.

The envious man deep in his heart is not sure of his perfection. He is aware of his helplessness, the superficial nature of his knowledge, in short, he is morbidly unsure of his strength. He avoids

comparisons that are not in his favour. Somebody else's superiority is threatening him not only as spiritual discomfort, but also as unmasking. This fear of unmasking compels him to attack by criticising and thus trying to distract attention from his own flaws. In trying to compensate for his own self-distrust, his attack is a kind of self-justification. Being of low opinion of himself and his worth, he can to raise himself in his eyes if he were to possess the qualities he highly desires. Of course, such an individual strongly believes that he never envies and considers himself a righteous person.

The self-preservation expressed through envy is not only a psychic drama to the envied, but also arouses contradictions and conflicts in society. The tension, which desired to get rid of, increases, because the result of envy and attack is isolation, which in turn evokes envy, which in this case is grounded. Envy exerts a destructive effect on the personality of the envied himself.

In the contemporary world, particularly in conditions of deficiency, a man's value is often stressed and his safety ensured by the value of things he possesses; if one has no things, no "wealth", he is unsafe. Thus, those who possess things are the first targets of envy. Cato Senior said: "Those who utilise their fortune moderately and honestly are never touched by envy: it is not us but our surroundings that are the object of envy" (see Plutarch, 1972). When "I am what I possess" (Fromm E., 1976, 47), the desire to possess is inevitably related to envying what one does not possess and to the fear of losing what one possesses. Material wealth, privileges, and a good post can be lost, because also the others – the same enviers – want to possess more.

For one who respects and possesses wealth and considers himself as a sum total of these things, the more things (money, privileges) he possesses the more significant and thus safer he is. It is usually said that the way in which goods were acquired is not important, but it is for the feeling of envy, for on the way the career was made or wealth acquired, – by himself, honestly, or not, – relations with other people depend. If moral condemnation is expected or disapprobation is experienced, the relation becomes aggressive and one is ready to attack. Here the envy of somebody else's pure consciousness and abilities is already manifested.

The most explicit form of envy, expressed in actions, is the so-called "black" envy. I. Kant called malicious envy "the devilish vice": according to him, envy is "an abominable feature of a sullen passion", which torments a man and strives to ruin happiness of the others not only are thoughts, but also by actions. Guided by "black" envy, a man will ruin the happiness, well being, and joy of another man. As will feel the desire not only to reject or not accept the success of the latter, but also to discredit the latter, disturb him and sometimes, when possible even to destroy him.

In other cases envie is just a malevolent way of thinking, an annoyance caused by the idea that somebody else's well-being will cast a shadow on his own well-being, or at least the inner peace of the envier will be threatened. People of "possessive orientation" (Fromm E., 1976, 108) envy not only a thing that they like, but also want to possess the man (because of his prestige, social status or profit for himself). For an envious individual it is not enough to enjoy another man as a value in himself, but he also wants to possess him as a thing.

Envy is stimulated by the lack of self-expression. An individual deprived of self-expression wants to be exalted by means of some exterior factors such as wealth or acquaintances, but not by exerting his inner powers. We can say that an envious subject, lacking the aim of self-expression, aims not to help "the humble and the deprived", but "to become president", – in other words, only to make a career or at any price to become exalted over the others.

Envy flourishes on the underdeveloped feelings of an individual as a personality, a cultured man who is worried by the question "Who am I?" but not "What do I own?" The world and all

other people are alien to an infantile individual. Therefore he cannot enjoy the victories of other people. On the contrary, the success of other people seems threatening to an individual with underdeveloped and primitive feelings.

Possessing one's own sense of life or aim in life, not dependent upon somebody else protects against envy. Of course, the choice of the aims and the mode of their attainment will depend on the one's system of values, and self-esteem. Here we do not want to say that one should neglect material well being or success. Striving for personal happiness may or may not coincide with striving for a perfect society. It would be not correct to demand that every man consider his happiness to be to serve society or humankind. G. Masaryk inquired: "Humanness, love not only of the neighbours but also of humankind – how should I imagine this humankind? I see a poor child whom I can help – this child to me is humankind" (1936, 271).

The enemy of envy is one's self-respect. Poor self-respect means that the opinion of an individual about himself is low, that he is afraid to be not perfect or great enough. Only self-respect endows man with self-confidence. A man who knows that he is a value in himself, that real value is hidden in himself and beyond him, never envies another man his external well-being. As he is self-consistent, he does not count the achievements of other people. Personality has no the sense of envy. Of course, an individual can seek superiority over the others, but not by humiliating them. I. Kant said that nature wanted to use the idea of a competition that includes also mutual love as an incentive of culture. To acknowledge somebody else's success and to approve it is a stimulus for creative activity and for competitive effort.

Thus, envy does not appear by itself and is not innate to man. Also, we can state that envy is not an eternal and unavoidable quality of an individual. It arises in an atmosphere of insecurity, in a society marked by fear and uncertainty, in a culture of diminish feelings and of a malformed self-conscious. Therefore envy can be regarded as a drawback or flaw, not only of an individual man, but also of an entire culture. This is why the concept of envy has entered the field of philosophical thinking.

Conformist Thinking as a Manifestation of Destruction of the Personality

Aptation to the environment is an index of the normal development of a living being. This is not conformism (conciliatoriness or time-serving). There is no natural (biological) conformism; one cannot be born a conformist. Conformism is a social phenomenon, defined as subjugation of the individual to the group opinion, in contrast to independence.

Conformism is widespread in a society in which man has to conform to requirements that are alien to him for fear of condemnation, punishment, or becoming an outsider. Thus, the first reason for conformism is fear of being blamed, to search for justice, so as not to resist, agreeing to everything in advance, so as to approve of everything.

A conformist becomes similar to the other member's o society. He no longer raises the question of whether the route followed by this society is right, but blindly accepts all its standards. A conformist is always ready to say "yes", even before being asked to. This stereotype of behaviour compensates for his fear and helplessness. He proudly considers himself a normal, true (Arian, khunweibin, patriot etc.), just to conform to the others. At the same time a conformist is extremely intolerant of people who do not share his opinion. Fear gives rise to cruelty: "Cuncta ferit dum cuncta timet" ("He crushes everything for fear of everything").

A conformist lacks the essential features of a personality, such as self-consciousness, self-esteem and responsibility. The principle of his activities is "to guess and to please". Conformism

in his way of life and thinking, and it flourishes in a society, which features the individual's accommodation and senseless diligence.

A conformist subject dissolves in a throng. He most frequently looks sincere: he sincerely supports slogans, sincerely answers to the call to condemn "the enemy", etc. The mouthpiece of conformist or totalitarian thinking is not a separate stratum of society. They are the people of the most diverse social origin, who are deprived of their traditional social niches and afraid of losing their social identity. They are apt to be the first to say "yes!" so as to again occupy comfortable positions.

One more feature peculiar to the conformist way of thinking is the eulogy of the "common people", as only they solve all problems easily and simply. In the political system, simplicity means a unity in the exercise of power; therefore the idea of sharing power evokes irritation and anger. The desirable simplicity paves the way also to belief in a new and just world, which will appear suddenly on the spot and out of nothing, because we so desire. The belief that everything proceeds only in a correct way and meets the highest principles, liberates man from personal responsibility. From a conformist standpoint, to have a sense of responsibility or one's own opinion is even punishable. A conformist believes that he needs only to explain well the course of events to people, and it will become clear, understandable and thus correct. There can be no other opinion there.

However, a conformist is not so cynical as to confess to himself that he is a hypocrite and conformist. Even when left to himself he never takes off his mask, – he cannot take it off. A conformist is hypocrite not only to the others, but also himself. By persuading others and himself that he is serving society, a conformist in a very natural way satisfies his egoistic interests. He is assisted by the myth of the strong hand, of national unity, of love for children, etc.

A. Speer, the architect and minister of armament in A. Hitler's government wrote about the significance of inventing myth: "In the twentieth century in the most majestic are as of technology, people got to invent myth as precisely and for the same purpose as they did machine-guns and bombers. In this respect, the myth of the race, or the myth of blood, or the myth of the Fuehrer actually was a kind of weapon, perhaps even more frightening than a super tank or a gun. It would destroy the sector – man's brain". Myths are needed to intoxicate man, to bring his mentality to the state in which he accepts everything without consideration.

How to withstand, i.e. not to surrender, but to defend one's authentic "I"? A man finds himself, when he says: "No, I don't want this". He defends himself when he is able to choose, not to be subjected to someone else's opinion thrust upon him, to overcome the fear of loneliness, objection, insecurity. Then a man becomes a personality. It is not easy to say "No!" The writer M. Jourcenar calls it intricate form heroism, as there are not many people who say "No!" condemning, hating or just disagreeing at least in their mind.

Who can resist conformism as a way of avoiding isolation, loneliness and fear, but which destroys the personality? Only culture, responsibility, respects for man and the desire to understand him, i. e. the love for man. Such love needs knowledge, work, activity, and fighting with oneself. All other, "easier" forms of love for man (philanthropy, charity, declarations and promises) are false and short lasting.

Cultured people (those who love man) do not protect themselves from the world, but break into it. As G. V. Allport puts it, true interests always induce a man to make his life more complicated and strained. Men of culture are guided not by egoism, envy or fear, but by generosity and creative work. They never simply plunge in inferiority complex, but create well. They do not hide themselves under masks and do not toady, shouting "Yes!" but "strive into the storm".

Nonconformist is not just one significant moment in man's life, as if one day one will unexpectedly become a nonconformist. It is a step-by-step accumulation in oneself of tiny achievements: little daily victories achieved, little fears overcome, as one has forced himself to say "No!" This is a daily victory over oneself, an everyday heroism. "Do not think that there are only as many heroes as there are heroic deeds", wrote the Lithuanian writer Jonas Aistis. Nonconformism means the desire to see man, in Spinoza's words, "under the sign of eternity".

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Globalization and Problems of the Civil Society

Culture of Peace: A New Paradigm of Thinking

The concept of a culture of war is easily understood. Humankind has always lived in a culture of war. Such a culture means that progress in science, technology and communications first of all serves the purposes of violence and war. This is the culture in which intellectual and material resources are intended first of all for the purposes of war.

Criminality, terrorism, Mafia conflicts are the varieties of war. Civil people become targets of violence and aggression, massacres and compulsion. Their bodies are nowadays torn to pieces as if they were bodies of enemy soldiers (of course, killing human beings cannot be justified in any case). The very resorting to force becomes deinstitutionalized, "privatized", and "professionalized". Fear in society is growing.

Thus, the culture of war is flourishing; "The Other is always the enemy" (J. P. Sartre). Defense, or security in a very strict sense, becomes the only strategic goal.

The Problem of the Essence of War

Here one must consider the nature or essence of war, or the preconditions of wars among people, as well as try perceive the nature of man: does it provide the prerequisites to kill one another? Is war universal; is aggressiveness an inborn and essential feature of man?

In the history of thought, pros and cons regarding war can be found, with the pros being much more frequent.

Here are some examples. One extreme opinion is that war is universality, war and sainthood are historically close; just as incest in fiesta, and murder in war acquires a religious aspect.

Roger Caillois maintains that "war is the basis on which nations exist, it determines them; for nations war is the highest moral precept" (1993, 16). War is mythologized, its substantiation is looked for and found in mythology, since "the warrior in combat approaches the divinity", "to a warrior the fight becomes a religious rite and killing turns into a sacrifice" (1993, 21, 23).

"Something in human nature agrees with war", "at war, the long suppressed joy of destroying, the pleasure to render a thing shapeless and unrecognizable come forth. And the highest joy is to destroy the body of one's own image" (1993, 14). Goebbels once proposed that: "War is the most elementary form of the love of life", i.e. it is attractive in itself. (Here I. Kant would say that killing cannot be a universal law of nature, as nature which in its essence is life would contradict itself).

The inevitability and even obligatoriness of war is often given a sociological basis: wars are necessary as a regenerative force. Society must undergo a war, if it wants to renew itself; this is the only way for it to have a history.

The concept of the imminence of wars is closely related to the argument of man's "inborn aggressiveness". The conception that man is aggressive by his nature and only culture renders him a peaceful creature is based on three arguments. First, all creatures are ostensibly aggressive. Thus, this feature is essential by nature in man as in a mammal on the level of instinct. Second, the whole history of mankind is the history of wars. Third, certain parts of brain and certain hormones are connected with aggression.

Thus, is war a universal law? Sticking to the first argument, we could maintain that pottery is an inborn feature of man, because through the century's people of most different cultures used to make pots.

E. Fromm in his books "The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness" (1973, 3) speaks of two kinds of aggressiveness: defensive, peculiar to all living creatures, and evil, peculiar only to man. Defensive aggressiveness helps to defend oneself, to survive in hazardous situations. This feature is innate (and may be called aggressiveness), while evil aggressiveness has nothing in common with biological heritage. Over the recent years the psychologists have confirmed that in most cases the aggressive behavior has no relation to genetic deviations.

E. Fromm offers an essential conclusion: "This type of destructiveness is a consequence (derivative) of not having had one's life" (1973, 108). When the environment, that is social conditions fail to satisfy the existential needs of man (love, recognition, relations with other people), his behavior becomes destructive.

At present, it has been scientifically determined that it would be incorrect to maintain: (1) that man has inherited from his ancestors–animals the desire to fight (the behavior of animals cannot be considered as aggressive in principle); (2) that wars and other varieties of violence are genetically encoded; (3) that our brain has certain centers responsible for violence. (Such a conclusion was made in 1986 by scientists who come to Seville with the aim of putting an end to the myths about the innate aggressiveness of man. Later on this declaration was supported by the American Association of Psychologists, as well as by the Association of Anthropologists).

Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that man is taught to become aggressive. A study performed by American psychologists, which embraced three generations, showed that parents taught children aggressiveness first of all. Besides, the more disappointed children are by the surrounding world, the more aggressively they behave. (Does this rule apply to the whole society?) The aggressiveness of the study subjects had nothing in common with either genetics or biological sources. Biologically, man is not doomed to fight. Violence is not inherited.

Moreover, if man is not biologically doomed to fight, the aggressive activities and violence of people cannot be justified; they are responsible for their actions, since actions are the manifestations of their free will and nothing else.

If "wars start in human minds", as is written in the UNESCO Constitution preamble, then the culture of peace starts also in human minds. If man has invented wars, he is capable of inventing peace.

War is always easier, at least up to the "first sounds of a trumpet". However, this is a sad and disastrous ease, with which the ideologists of war and its commanders send young people to die instead of themselves. If military combat is considered the first and essential defense, it is logical to demand in war maximum devotion and self-sacrifice. However, if we consider war a conflict as a consequence (a secondary, derivative matter, a consequence of evil politics and unstable life), there will be no incentive to regularly allow the youth of a nation to be destroyed. The victory gained at the expense of human lives cannot be considered reasonable. The number of victims needed to gain victory is in inverse proportion to political wisdom.

Peace is not just absence of war. Such would be only negative peace, contrary to peace that could be called positive. Peace is difficult.

The ancient Romans would say: *Si vis pacem – para bellam* (If you want peace, prepare for war). At present this saying acquires the other dimension: if you want peace – make peace.

How can we hope for a culture of peace, if the development of the country is only at its start, when democracy is in the embryonic state, when the basic rights of every man are not yet clear, when the future is ambiguous?

Creation of civil society is an essential prerequisite for a culture of peace.

The price of war is high. However, humankind became accustomed to pay it. The price of peace is also high; but nobody wants to pay it or at least to know what it is. No one has calculated the price of inactivity, since we should be clever enough to act in time and not when it is too late. The arrow of time gives no bonus to anyone.

Culture of Peace – What Is It?

Briefly, it is the quality of citizens, of society. To create a culture of peace means to cultivate the ground on which we live. This implies economic culture (food, roof for all), humanitarian culture (education for all), physical culture (preservation of man's health) and all other spheres of culture which were called paideia by ancient Greeks.

A skeptic will say: what can culture do for us to pass from war as the essence of life to peace as the essence of life? It looks more like another void word, a magic word, a humanistic reasoning.

The reasons for conflicts take much time to ripen through year-long politics of marginalization and alienation. The culture of peace has also a long way to go, because the process of man's self-creation requires great efforts. Man cannot be defined only by his biological nature (I. Kant) or only as a political creature (Aristotle). Man is a product of culture; he creates himself by creating culture.

There is no way to create a culture of peace at a round table, in a discussion club or by any kinds of manifests. Neither can a culture of peace be created by means of philosophical abstractions or by voting or laws.

Nevertheless – "In the beginning was the Word". Therefore it is necessary to speak, to consider, to search for the way out, to create a model of a culture of peace. This is the prerogative of scientists.

Then it is necessary to go a long way in economics and social policy to eliminate poverty, to reduce inequality, to ensure human rights and freedom of self-expression, to guarantee life-long education for all, to invest in science (here I do not mean military technology, but raising the level of life), to invest in enlightenment (Th. Schultz, 1986).

The end of this process can be beyond our scope of life, however, we should proceed consistently, with a good knowledge of the matter, step by step in all possible fields. This is long-lasting, inconspicuous, thankless work. Marches, parades, nice uniforms and patriotic speeches are much more attractive.

It is evident also that people should be taught the concept of culture of peace – through various movements, groups, institutions, involving mass media and individual activities.

However, a culture of peace is created not by campaigns or declarations. This is a long-term program of action. It includes, first of all, social strategy which embraces economics, science and education (continuous education of people in the broad sense). It needs elaboration of long-term social, humanitarian, political, and economic programs, i.e., a planned strategy of the state (which has not been heard of so far). Then also the military doctrine could find in it a proper, delimited and reasonable place. If we cannot foresee the future, we can create it, said Aurelio Peccei, the founder of the Club of Rome. This means that we can create a culture of peace instead of a culture of war.

This is the price of peace. These are the most up-to-date weapons.

National Security: Conception of the Subject

Security is an all-embracing concept like openness, civic society and democracy. Therefore, the starting point of the analysis is the definition of national security.

The Definition of National Security

National security thus far has been regarded as a "military problem", with exceptional attention paid to the possibilities of military and other force structures in protecting and defending the state against open military threats.

On the other hand, it is becoming evident that military measures alone are losing their significance. The more up-to-date and adequate approach to national security encompasses economic, social, ecological and other factors.

Presently, the main value and goal and of national security is the ability to survive and to develop. In this definition, national security has two sides: first, that the aim is to protect the well-being and the very existence of the nation against external and internal threats; second, ways and means are needed to attain the goals that would provide for the nation to develop and make progress, to improve.

Besides, this definition, involving the idea of national survival or the self-preservation of a nation, emphasizes also that national security should be related to certain non-military principles and processes that would ensure the capability of the nation as a political, economic and cultural entity to exist and develop. It is very important to see the difference between the traditional defence perceived by common sense on the level of everyday consciousness and strategy of security, i. e. between the strategy of arms and the new non-traditional strategy based first of all on economic and cultural measures. The non-traditional concept of security emphasizes rather the quality and intellectual resources of the nation (citizens).

The state or nations are preserved and able to develop not only by freedom and independence, but also by ensuring the high quality of the inhabitants, and equal opportunities for everyone. The main precondition for a small nation and a small state to survive and to develop is this up-to-date, non-traditional strategy of security. It uses the non-military means available in the nation and is based on the nation's determination to rely only on itself and its social possibilities, which are based first of all on the development of democracy.

This approach embraces the political, economic and social contexts in which national security resolutions are implemented. The basic idea is that changes in national security appear exactly in this medium, e. g., thanks to the progress, modernization, mitigation of poverty, etc. R. McNamara stressed that the greatest threat to national security is posed by continuous underdevelopment and that security means development (see 1991, 7). According to J. Delors, economics and security are two sides of the same coin (1993, 11). In his opinion, its relation between economical stability and security has never been so obvious (ibid, 12). Hence the problem of the subject of national security arises.

The Subject of National Security

An essential feature of the democratic states of the world is that the vital interests of society and of the individual are not subjugated and sacrificed to the interests of the state. On the contrary, the legal, democratic state itself is a means (tool, instrument) to ensure the wellbeing of the inhabitants, to provide for an adequate quality of life, and for harmony between the interests of the individual and the society. This realises the priority of the individual over the state.

In the present epoch, the most important strategic goal of national security is healthy and educated persons integrated into the nation. This goal of security includes all other social goals; it is the core of the conception, the system-organizing concept. This goal of security requires that the normative conditions of the quality of life should be known and implemented, that the basic needs of people should be satisfied. The conscious, educated, responsible and dignified citizen is a guarantee of internal security. At the same time he is the subject of ensuring national security, since only the educated man knows broadly and deeply enough, is aware of social evolution, can evaluate events and calculate their outcome so as to be able to create progress. (In contrast an incompetent actor follows the way of trials and errors, and experiments with the society. The mistakes made in making decisions concerning society's life cannot be corrected because the arrow of time is merciless).

Only the creative person is capable of managing and directing the events, because his thinking is independent. He has an approach of his own and is not guided by the sole opinion of a leader. He does not think "like everyone", nor surrender to fear and to bribery.

Only the civic-minded person will defend and preserve, not only himself, personally and egoistically, but also as a member of the nation; that is he will defend his nation, its territory and resources, its independence, democracy and justice. He will defend the conditions of his creative existence and ways of activity as of a member of the nation. Thus, the citizen is the main subject who creates and warrants national security, and at the same time he is the condition of security.

The state, in its turn, is also the actor that creates and warrants security; however it is the aggregate subject, empowered by the society. The duties and rights of security organization are delegated to the state.

The subject of national security is the citizens or high quality members of society: they are healthy, educated, creative and responsible. The mass of low quality citizens can be only objects of manipulation. A contemporary strategy to ensure security should first of all be based on the internal strength of the nation (society) and on the principle that each citizen should be active in national security. The contemporary strategy of security moulds an approach that it is based not on the army that guarantees the security of the state by its weapons, but on the citizens who by their will, knowledge, labour, activities, wise politics, material and spiritual production will lay the foundation of security here, in their home. Concretely this means investment in education. Production of new scientific knowledge and its technological application is becoming a process of extended reproduction, in which the individual citizen is the most important target and outcome. Thus, the most profitable investments are in the development of education and science, according to Th. W. Schultz, Nobel Prize Winner (1971, 6). In the absence of natural resources, it is most rational to "produce" of the most important strategic resource of the state – the creative and responsible man.

This is possible by creating possibilities for people's life and activities, the quality of life, and by ensuring the engagement of each man in social life, guaranteeing each individual equal starting possibilities, equal opportunities: "everyone should be able to desire" (J. Habermas). It is these possibilities that determine the quality of citizens when every man as an educated, competent and

responsible personality is ready defend not only himself, but also his nation, state, territory and its resources, independence, not pressed by orders from without, but because of his inner incentive.

Thus, the quality of inhabitants is decisive. The high quality of inhabitants is the main factor of security. The educated, dignified and therefore united nation can rely upon itself and the abilities of the citizens and the state. Self-reliance is necessary also because various subsidies and loans in the absence of a pressing need not only humiliate the nation's dignity and do not stimulate the creative forces of people, their responsibility, self-efficiencies and self-reliance, but also induce moods of dependence and create preconditions for an authoritarian regime. In economic and political ways, a poor developing but subsidized state in the course of time can fell under the influence of a "strong" neighbour. A nation characterized by a low understanding of its value can unconsciously project its negative properties onto other nations and states and then respond in an aggressive way.

However, if perduring under-nourishment of the majority of the state's inhabitants tells on their health and is an obstacle to getting an education (i.e. hampers the individual's abilities and their successful participation in the life of the state), if the present activities give no satisfaction and are only a burden, if threatened or actual unemployment totally ousts them from society and the individuals become "marginalized" or isolated from society, – in this case the poor quality of life will lead not only to the economic, but also to the political and cultural downfall of the nation or even to a catastrophe. It will threaten the national identity, democracy, even its self-dependence, because the very foundation and subject of security, which is the individual citizen, will be undermined. Being deprived of essential fundamentals, a person will cease to be a citizen; he has nothing to defend, or reason to defend anything.

Civil Disobedience

Beyond being the subject of security, the citizen will be also the subject of disobedience. While preparing for civil disobedience, the main task is to develop the spiritual strength of the nation.

The growth of the nation's spiritual strength expressed in its historical consciousness and memory is a historical process, which takes a long time and is measured in decades, centuries and millennia. "It takes time for the fortresses to rise in men's mind and spirit, – they need strong foundations" (see K. Pakštas, 1991). The historical memory and historical consciousness, the cultural basis and the tempo of cultural progress, the development of education, social care and the strengthening of democracy, play the most important role not only in reinforcing the security of the country, but also the will of society to disobey. For the nations that have limited possibilities to defend themselves physically, cultural "armament" is an indispensable condition, which cannot be replaced by anything. Education on all levels is a direct element of national security. The level of education at present is becoming the most important index of a society's progress and security, alongside such criteria as labour productivity, natural resources, production of consumer goods per capita, etc. The educated citizen is not only the integral wealth of the nation, but also the bearer of responsibility for initiative and activity for his nation.

Now that man explores means of disobedience without violence, when he tries to employ the brain and not the muscles for the fight, education is a direct element of defence and security. According to K. Pakštas, "the true ministry of nation's defence is the ministry of education" (see 1991, 187). The newest technologies, democracy and security demand education for all. It is

necessary to provide the maximal possible conditions for every citizen to develop freely his abilities and talents.

The whole society could be involved in disobedience only on the grounds of national values whose appearance is predetermined by both the whole past life of a separate citizen and the culture of the whole society. The nation cannot be made disobedient by force, order, directive or moralization. This is a voluntary, individual process, and its precondition is the will of non-collaboration with the enemy, which is formed by democracy, i. e. the social order that stimulates and supports the freedom, equal rights and equal possibilities of every citizen. The will of non-collaboration as a voluntary internal conviction cannot be regulated by law or any other denomination of duty. It can rise only from the civil preparedness of the nation, from its internal force, – from responsibility for the fate of one's state.

The will to disobey means the will of the nation to live and not to die. The orthodox strategy of security is by fighting; however, in such cases a small nation can lose its identity. The armed fight of voluntary groups of inhabitants, however noble and devoted it might be would mean the death of a small nation and show a low level of the political culture of the state.

To attain security, like any other social goals such as freedom or independence, the desire only of separate individuals (though they might comprise the majority) is not sufficient. This is possible only for a well-developed civil society as a whole, since alongside the desire of every separate person there is need for a reason for their unity in order for the common will to be expressed. Therefore development of democracy should be considered one of the most important bases of national security, as it is democracy that opens the possibilities for the initiative of the whole nation and relies on people, without separating them into "good" and "bad". The civil society as a whole in the conditions of democracy feels responsibility for the fate of its state.

The Dimensions of Social Insecurity

In the "United Nations Development Program" (1994) seven threats to man's security are enumerated. They are as follows: threat of economic insecurity, threat of food deficiency, threats to health, personal security, living environment, culture, as well as threat of political insecurity. None of these aspects of insecurity can be eliminated by force.

Unequal possibilities when incomes and advantages are accumulated by a small group of people, when the nation is divided into the elite and the commoners, when to this differentiation the active principles of the laws of nature are applied, – all these are signs not only of an insecure but of a closed society.

Because of economic insecurity, association is very limited and social isolation becomes increasingly pronounced. The appearance of a marginal class is indicative of the society's anomy, as well as of a threat that has arisen within the society. The marginal class perceives society as something remote, symbolized only by the police and the courts. Moreover, people have no part in society and thus feel free from its standards. "The other" is always the enemy to them. The broken, alienated and thus dangerous relations in essence are "camp relations". Besides, for an impoverished man the time of his life stops, he has no history. The events are replaced by pseudo-events. The TV set, as substitute for the course of time, keeps announcing events, namely, that somebody sells, distributes, and expropriates something. The man himself does not take part in anything: as a citizen – he is dead.

Desperate behaviour corresponds to a desperate life. A closed society is characterized by the prevalence of danger as a trait of daily life and as a principle of evaluation. Intolerance of the

others, aggressiveness and conflict prevail. In this kind of situation, as the state and its citizen are total strangers to each other, self-sacrifice, patriotism, civil disobedience, etc. become senseless.

Attempts might be made then "to establish order", which is already the prerogative of the force structures. If the state is regarded as the subject of safety, which is secured only by the force structures, then it becomes quite possible that the force will be directed inwards, for instance, to suppress disturbances, or that the unjustifiably amply financed force organizations will become a military junta, etc.

How to minimise the increasing flow of emigration, the leakage of minds – intellectuals, artists, and young people? This is possible only through developing economics (not elimination, but creation of jobs), i. e. economic security.

The demographic policy should be based not only on a higher birth rate, but also on a decrease of civil life victims. If military fight is regarded as the first and essential condition of security, it is reasonable to demand maximum self-sacrifice and victims in war and in resistance fight. However, if we regard a military conflict only as a consequence (of ill-managed politics and unwise economics), in this case there will be no demand in the name of military goals to allow the destruction of the youth of the country, i. e. the gene fund of the nation. Victory gained at the expense of human victims cannot be considered wise. The number of victims in the name of victory is in inverse proportion to the political mind of a state.

Social security is usually regarded as "guaranteeing of first needs". The subsistence minimum, understood as a standard calculated from the needs, should not humiliate human dignity or barely maintain existence below the poverty level.

The insecurity, closeness, non-civicism of a society is characterized by the social sickness, indices, according to the criteria of the World Health Organization, namely, the number of suicides, murders, and other self-willed criminal acts, traffic accidents, adolescent criminality, alcohol and drug abuse, smoking, use of tranquillizers.

When the above-mentioned threats gain strength, what sacrificed is not only the subject of security (uneducated man devoid of normal human life, and ravaged by deficiencies), but also its object (land, water, air, independence, constitutional order, etc.). They are sacrificed at the altar of short-lived, egoistic, illiterate ambitions. Decision-making is often blind. In the meanwhile military men are aware of only one way to security, the last one – the armed fight.

Security cannot be provided only by ideas, however nice and true they might sound. Security means first of all elimination of poverty; creation of equal living chances for every citizen; recognition of the rights of every citizen; participation of the citizens in social affairs; ensured education for all; ensured health care for all; and a rising quality of life of each individual.

Security at present is either a fact or a conception. It should also become a right, the right of men to security. "Tomorrow is always too late". It is necessary to start today.

However, in cases when the state is without foundation proclaimed as the only subject of security (the power institution or the military), all attention is allotted to them. Then the national defence program becomes the priority program of a state, and only military or force institutions are regarded as able to ensure security.

Hence follows the conclusion that it is not enough to ensure security. It is necessary to create it. This should be the prerogative of the people who "know how, want and can". The larger number of competent, profoundly educated subjects, i. e. of those who know, the greater the chance that the subjects aware of responsibility, i. e. patriots, will appear.

The subject of national security is the citizen, a healthy, educated, competent, responsible patriot; the state is only the executor empowered by society. If the citizen is regarded as the subject, then the state's priority will be the citizen, and the conditions for his life and development.

The Information Society as Knowledge-Based Society

Humankind has encountered the information revolution, which is more than just new technologies or new information and communication networks. Changes brought about by information technologies are not yet fully perceived and measured; yet, even at present their influence is evident in all spheres of the life of the world community. This absolutely new experience is being analysed by researchers of different fields who try to foresee its possible consequences, achievements and hazards. Some of them regard it as the introduction of progressive technologies, others as the beginning of the greatest differentiation between civilizations. Some of researchers mention the approach of a new age of inequality, new threats to the human spirit, new and even stronger social differentiation into info rich and info poor.

The sudden progress in information and communication technologies is often regarded as a revolution, an important landmark of civilization, as important as the invention of the alphabet, printing machine or industrial revolution. With the invention of the printing machine in Europe there begins the humanism of the age of the Enlightenment, the spread of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, progress in science and the great inventions of the New Ages. The very fact that the individual himself gained access to knowledge and the holy texts was a powerful democratic movement. The book became the vector of the new civilization on where foundation we are still living.

There is reason to believe that digital culture with its information and communication networks also imply huge global changes. Their character is difficult to predict even to specialists. However, it is evident that we have become involved in a new age of inventions: we are learning to swim in the ocean of knowledge, like Columbus's of the virtual worlds. The world is hurling into an endless library, and though no one can pretend to catch all keys (maybe keywords), this library is today accessible only to the insignificant minority.

New Technologies: New Possibilities or New Risk

First of all, new technologies offer immeasurably great possibilities. Exchange of knowledge means that the other individual becomes involved in the interaction not as the predominant or hostile subject, but as a partner and creative source. New technologies should stimulate open, non-hierarchical relations among individuals and groups on the grounds of mutual understanding, i. e. to a maturation of civic society.

However, information globalisation implies also such hazards as isolation of individuals, a lost sense of community, property abuse, and virtualisation of reality. The incessant development of "instant" technologies, virtual reality, "TV-reality" and "TV-being" favour a new state of reality – a possible or ostensible reality. This phenomenon poses a new danger, which might even be called a secret weapon: namely, the dissolution of reality in the fake (only resembling) cybernetic world. One who knows only the "feeling" of reality is doomed to change this feeling and not reality itself, like the inhabitants of the cave described by Plato, who had been living for ages chained in the cave and seeing only shadows, but taking them for reality.

The most important thing is to realize that the means of information and communication – the nervous system of information society – is but an instrument, a tool. Even the Internet is not the archives of the world's science, but only a means to collect and store knowledge. Thus, the essence of the information society lies not in cybernetic space, but much closer to social reality. The development of society of information technologies should follow two paths: first, an investment in information structures as such; second, an investment in education with the aim that every citizen be trained and able to make use of the possibilities provided by information technologies and apply them to obtain knowledge, i. e. to turn information into knowledge.

This first of all implies an adequate education of everyone (beginning with those who believe that the mere presence of a computer can solve all problems). This also means that education should stimulate self-development; critical thought and creativity, and that all these processes take place before working with a computer. Also, this means that the concept of information society without understanding it first of all as a civic society is contradictio in adjecto. Hans Krebs has stressed that scientific tools are important, and the resources are also essential, but after all the true investigation is to see what no one has ever seen, and to think what no one has thought before. Thus, creativity is our greatest wealth and our hope: every human being must be able to use his or her wonderful potentials of (see 1999, 237). Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Williams A. Owens support H. Krebs in their study "America's Information Edge": knowledge, more than in any other period of history before, is power (1996, 22).

New technologies accelerate "global time", but lay the foundations for the triumph of short-lived logic. Thinking, reflection is going out of fashion. Long-term fundamental studies give rise to distrust; results; conclusions are demanded just on the spot. Training and education should combine information with reflection. The instruments, tools, i. e. the new technologies and the Internet should not be isolated from the content (knowledge), and the content from the functions (education, acquiring knowledge). Last but not least, the functions cannot be separated from their purpose (or mission) – from creating a new social order expressed by the world's culture or peace, human rights and civic society. Thus, without any doubt the technologies are needed, but most important is the employment of these technologies and access to knowledge for every member of society, as well as universal, life-long education. Man cannot be enlightened only by information from outside; man must enlighten himself, i. e. become an expert, only through thinking, engagement, and association.

Do Information Technologies Create Parallel Worlds?

More and more information at an ever-quicker rate is the formula for success. The rate of change, of thinking, and of action sounds like the paradigm of the epoch. The following definition seems correct: the information society is the one that best satisfies our needs (though what kind of needs – association, knowledge, or the games, subculture of the Internet – is another question).

Natural obstacles, like geographical distances and political borders, which separate societies, are becoming extinct. Suddenly we have become accustomed to it and do not even realize the extent of the leap of progress. Everything seems okay so far, but only if everyone is guaranteed equal access to information. Equal access to information is the conditio sine qua non of the information society. The present unequal participation in the world of new technologies can be overcome only by the process of civil, i. e. democratic, society. In case we fail to guarantee it at least to a satisfactory level there can be no talk about information society or knowledge society. This is not only because of a social tension between the rich and the poor (on the level of both

individuals and countries), but also because the essence of the information society is "society" (society of a country or the world), rather than an elite club. This is a great problem, but even greater one is that we are not ready to accept this condition. This is most difficult to understand. If society is expressed through a group – an elite - then also information society is expressed through the info rich, the info-educated, i. e. through part of society. However, in this case we cannot speak about information society, since under such conditions it is impossible. Therefore to hope to create the information society in a poor country showing a deep social inequality is a Utopia, and all talk about it are but a beautiful unattainable vision. How many information societies are there then?

Being pragmatists, Americans do not construct theoretical societies, but superhighways. To them the information society is an innovation like any other innovations; if the citizens like it, they will invest money in it. The Japanese do not talk much about information society, either. They talk about how to make things – better, cheaper and more. As they are rather absorbed in doing so, they have no time for prating about that society. Only the Europeans that coin the term "information society" in order to identify themselves with the world context, to ally with the global society.

Are these societies' different information societies? Where is the borderline between informative society and no informative society? The poor countries, similarly as poor, are threatened by marginalization, which isolation creates the parallel worlds. Those with good income, education and progressive means of communication have cheap and immediate access to information. All others have only unreliable, slow and expensive access to information. People in these two worlds compete with one another, however, the advantage of those with access to information enables them to suppress those who are marginalized and impoverished, to chop them off from global communication and from knowledge. It is exactly here that the parallel worlds begin.

Information Technologies and Social Isolation

The vision of approaching to an information society is suddenly broken by a double obstacle – poverty and lack of education. The poor and uneducated could be victims of the information technology society for an ever deepening abyss or social isolation appears.

If a large part of mankind has no access to knowledge and cannot use the new technologies and the new forms of culture because of the lack of education and their social position, then it is not only isolated from the main source of development, but human solidarity and co-operation are destroyed. In the political sense this means an absence or weakness of democracy, a "morbid" civil society. The "marginal culture" or the "culture of the deprived" appears when in essence is one of violence, depression, anger and aggression.

There arises the problem of cultural security, which means the absence of the marginal strata. The goal of the system of cultural security should be to prepare access to life-long training for everyone, that is, a society of knowledge. This means that all can have access to the information infrastructure: to electronic mail, to computer data bases, to scientific and technological information products, etc. The new technologies are a means, a tool, without which the inequality among people and among states can become more pronounced.

The lightning development of new technologies stimulates the rapid growth of a new kind of illiteracy – computer illiteracy, which creates discrimination no less than traditional illiteracy and sharpens forms of social deprivation. Thus, a new type of literacy – information literacy – appears which requires that all members of society be involved in a new cultural paradigm. Otherwise we shall not escape an insurmountable barrier between the "new scripter" and computer illiteracy,

between the info-rich and into-poor. The present unequal participation in the new information society, which is being created by the new technologies, will soon be accompanied also by the appearance of new forms of violence, such as domination and social isolation.

Hazards to the Diversity of Cultures in the World

In information society there appears the notion of "distance culture" sold by "globalizators" to those "globalized". What if this form of culture evokes erosion of culture which leads to a cultural desert because of the expansion of standardized culture which is often one of mass consumption? What would become of the diversity of cultures?

Biological diversity is an object of great concern for humankind. What of hazards to cultural diversity; how to defend cultural identities that are endangered by similarity, "monoculture", and cultural erosion? Even the soil is exhausted by mono cultural agriculture. Most endangered is the linguistic diversity of the world. The languages and cultures inherited from the ancestors become extinct. There are approximately 6,000 spoken languages in the world. Every year several languages die out. Will linguistic diversity perish once and forever, or will their abundance dwindle to a lingua franca, which arose from one culture?

Every man is unique, a Universe which cannot be compared to anything. This endless diversity and uniqueness are the wealth of humankind. Becoming the same would be a step backwards with cruel consequences for humanity. However, the world's community is endangered by cultural erosion. In times when the new technologies flourish the culture that is closest to us deteriorates. Can "distance" culture compensate for the extinction of the culture that is next to or within us?

The Internet should be the main tool in defending the diversity of the cultural heritage of mankind. Meanwhile, at present the revolution of information technologies and communication often means hybridization of culture, erosion of national cultures, and cultural "mutations". It is already becoming evident that the cultural diversity inherited from the past and surviving in the language and ethos of every culture is endangered.

Information Society and Knowledge-based Society: Two Sides of Contemporary Civilization

"Knowledge" and "information" should be strictly differentiated; they are not identical. We live in a world in which the quantity of information becomes accessible through technology. As long as people all over the world have no access to all this information and cannot give it a critical evaluation, as long as they cannot analyze, assort and assimilate it, information, however voluminous and rapid it might be, remains only a stock of indefinite data. Rather more often than not an individual is deprived of this stock, i. e. of education, and therefore cannot assimilate new information. A pile of information without knowledge and assimilation is nothing.

Thus, in the first case we deal with the new information technologies or the information civilization, where digital information is rapid, enormous and global. Often there is an effort to accumulate as much information as possible. However, accumulation of information alone will not suffice: the more information accumulated, the more of it needs to be processed. Without mastering knowledge, a man in the best case resembles an encyclopaedia. This is, as A. Moles puts it, "culture width wise" (1967, 51), for the quantity to be turned into quality, information must be turned into knowledge, which can be applied in one's activities. However, it takes quite a time for a man to realize the specific relations among facts, data, etc. One cannot be educated only through information acquired from the outside as long as it has not become part of him and wisdom: the

spiritual development is slow. It is not that there is nobody to reveal the secrets of being on Earth to a man; but everyone has to perceive them by himself.

An information society or civilization is characterized through the development of information technologies (computers, memory; accumulation of information, volume; the quantity of data and facts, data banks; tempos of intellectual production or expansion of intellectual work; information literacy; access of everyone to information networks and the ability to use them; investment in the development of information structures).

A knowledge society is defined through giving sense to the data and facts, their "humanization"; the ability to use information because of an adequate level of education and culture; striving for knowledge and culture; cultural security allowing to render information into knowledge; investment in education for all; life-long education of the whole society.

If the development of the information society or more precisely of the society of the newest information technologies offers better access to data and facts, and assimilation of information, still its selection, arrangement, mastering and usage require also other fundamentals. The main task of the new society is accumulation of knowledge and its usage. The social and cultural fundamentals of an information civilization are reflected in the European Union Declaration (accepted 7 May 1999 at the 107th UNESCO session) that treats the application of new information technologies to the spheres of culture and education. This is based on such criteria as access to the technologies, the possibility of participation, competence, responsibility, and creativity of individuals.

Thus, the new technologies of information acquire meaning only in the context of culture and education. Computers and other digital appliances may possibly be called the backbone of post-industrial society, but never its heart, soul or wisdom.

For the new knowledge society the strategy of a country is science and knowledge, the optimum level of citizen literacy and education, and a consistent system of national enlightenment. In this conception, means spent on education are not expenses but investment and saving, as understood by economist Theodore W. Schultz, Nobel Prise Winner (see 1971, 27–28). This is the only way to approach another looming problem of the "cybernetic zombies". No information technologies even in abundance can create the knowledge society, i. e. quality, creativity, and richness in knowledge and science. In the opinion of Koichiro Matsuura, Director General of the UNESCO, "our business" is knowledge. It is not the creation of infrastructure or the provision of appliances, but attention to consumers and their human qualities, – through the work of education, science, culture and communication (2001, 1).

Our popular literature most frequently offers the following definitions: "the end of information society is to create the best possibilities for satisfying the needs of every citizen", "creation of information society for the citizens of the country provides optimum conditions for them to realize their abilities", and the like. But who is it that creates this society?

The notion of an "information society" is becoming but another magic word or slogan. It is understood as supplying with computer appliances and teaching how to use them or, in other words, information literacy. This is only a small step towards the society, which could be called a knowledge society. The new, ostensible, virtual world should not allow us to forget that the first and highest duty of us as people is to understand the complicated nature of reality and to manage it ecologically, i. e. harmoniously. We need cultural security or activity to defend the very civilization of virtual reality from engagement in the hyper-consumption of standardized, degraded, destructive products of culture (anti-culture).

Globalization offers challenges or problems that need to be solved. The talk is rather recent about cultural diversity in the globalized world, about the dialogue of civilizations (or rather the dialogue of cultures), about the fundamental and universal education for every man in the knowledge society, and about freedom of expression and the pluralism of the media, etc. This social compact needs renovation, a rethinking of what do contemporary society, the state of welfare, the quality of citizen mean, etc.

Also, we should not forget about cultural security. The goal of the social security system should be to provide everyone with the possibilities of life long study, self-enlightenment and training, as well as to arrange for everyone to become a subject in the information civilization. Without the system of cultural security, whose foundation is the educated society of a country, we shall be unable to withstand the tension: between global and local; between tradition and the present; between the universe and the individual; between the long-term and short-term goals; between competition and equal possibilities, "equal chances"; between the enormous flow of information and man's ability to assimilate it.

Education is the pith of both the person and society. Its mission is to enable all of us without exception to develop all the talents hidden in us, to realize our creative potential with responsibility for our own life and for attaining our personal goals. However, as Immanuel Kant would explain it, first a long process of growth in freedom, duty and responsibility should be covered.

Do enlightenment and education open such numerous possibilities?

The notion of "life-long study" should be reconsidered and expanded. This study should not be treated only as assimilation to the changed character of work, but understood as a life-long process of a person's formation, i. e. improvement of man's knowledge and abilities, critical thinking, skills and ability to act. The study as such teaches man four things, or else enlightenment provides man with four props (see J. Delors, 1996, 5-6).

It teaches how to know. The high tempo of changes, rapid progress in science, the new forms of economic and social activities require profound general education. This is a kind of a ticket to life-long training. Besides, it not only paves the road for further studies, but also develops the "taste" or desire to study.

It teaches how to do. This also follows from man's general, fundamental education. This means not only mastering a concrete job and acquiring definite skills, but also acquiring what is called competence.

It teaches how to be. Everyone's desire to be more independent, requires a stricter sense of responsibility while seeking common goals In this case the common goal should be that not a single talent, which like a hidden treasure in concealed in every person, should be lost.

It teaches how to live in common. This ability appears no sooner than one is able to understand the Others – their history, traditions and spiritual values. This is an incentive for joint work, and for solving conflicts in a wise and peaceful way.

All this recalls a Utopia. But this is an indispensable Utopia, if humankind wants to survive as writes Jacques Delors (1996, 6).

New information technologies, in the strategy of this type, should serve the interest of quality enlightenment. Education should harmonize accumulation of information with the development of thinking abilities. The tool should not be separated from the content and the technologies from knowledge.

The new information technologies provide for distance teaching and studying. However fascinated with such an attractive possibility, we should never forget that the teacher still is the cornerstone of education. It is on the teacher's preparation and responsibility that the quality of

teaching depends; electronic networks are but a tools or means of study. The new connection with knowledge that is accessible through the newest technologies or even through its complete substitution for direct teaching can become a connection of alienation or even dehumanization.

Having in mind that the knowledge society is a synonym of civil society, the major strategy of teaching should be the upbringing of the responsible citizen. As is evident in this case, priority should be given to scientific knowledge, i. e. to the associative processing of information, the finding of relations, penetration into the essence and historical and social understanding. In this approach, the priority subjects become the teaching and studying philosophy and history, i. e. learning to understand the essence of man and society, the innermost roots of social phenomena (1999, 305). This is the warrantee of cultural identity, as well as creative thinking, without which democracy, i. e. civil society, is nothing but an empty word.

Employment of new technologies in the process of teaching does not mean violation of the direct interpersonal teacher–student relations. The essence of teaching is an interaction between people, and their perceptions of the world, principles, skills and values. The teacher cannot be replaced by teaching appliances, and teaching itself cannot be replaced by methods of teaching, as underline J. Delors: "A computer will never be able to replace the teacher surrounded by his pupils" (1996, 12).

It is evident that the creation of a knowledge society is a many-sided activity, which integrates the efforts of researchers of all fields. The task of social cognition is to highlight the most common preconditions of the creation of the knowledge society, such as total access to information and communication technologies and the guarantee of these rights to everyone; support of life-long education; cultural security, which favours the transformation of information into knowledge, etc.

The knowledge society can survive only as a civil society, i. e. a community of conscious citizens, as a participatory democracy. Einstein once said: "The World is one or none". This requires recognition of the global nature of knowledge society and a need of a qualitatively new relation between the implementation of information technologies and the enlightenment of society, on the one hand, and its qualitative improvement on the international level. Knowledge is a force for producing, foreseeing and warning. The ability to employ knowledge for the well being of humankind requires immense wisdom. Only the knowledge possessed by each member of society produces wisdom.

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Conclusion

Our epoch witnesses the creation of a new philosophical image of the world, together with a new social philosophy. The new goals, new concepts and methods, new problems and the newly modified functions of philosophical theory express the contemporary structure of philosophical theory.

The old (classical) anthropocentrism is being replaced by a new understanding of man's being in the world created by him: man is settled in the "centre" only through activities, creative cognition, and the ability to penetrate into processes and transform them by methods never before applied. Therefore also the goals of philosophical theory undergo changes. Stimulated by the new goals, philosophy is searching for most adequate means and ways of explaining social process. Therefore, it upgrades the content of its concepts or introduces new concepts. The newly coined concepts reflect both the level of adequacy of theory and social requirements so that the net of concepts is renewed. The most important philosophical concepts used to explain social problems and the content of personality are responsibility, creativity, activity, action, deed, association, engaged thinking (engagement), self-establishment, and variety.

Thereby the content and definition of the personality undergo correction. It is no more I and the world, but I in the world, in co-operation. Personality means creation of man's relation with others through one's individuality, with himself as the mediator in these relations rather than anything else such as dogmas, conditions, etc.

Social philosophy fulfils a number of functions. First, analysis of the phenomena, or the explanatory function; second, the formulation of principles, which act as the methodological criteria; and third, the function of a fundamental philosophical theory to help formulate the object of study in special social theories from the angle of humanistic thinking. This solution of the theoretical problems of man and society is a sphere of interdisciplinary research, employing the method of integration on the level of conceptual synthesis. Social philosophy is claimed not to be a solution of the problems of man and society, but only the basis on which their discussion should rest.

In retrospect, the development of philosophy in the last decades could be defined as a history of crises. One of the most humanistic philosophies of our epoch, J. P. Sartre's existentialism, was looking for the person's identity in a dehumanised and radically split world and of interrelations in an environment totally alien to the individual. Analysis of "The Critique of the Dialectical Reason" shows that J. P. Sartre often saw philosophical problems from a psychological perspective, but that at the same time be adhered to a purely philosophical methodology. He seems to have been standing at a philosophical crossroad and to have marked the end of the era of metaphysical philosophy. J. P. Sartre's struggle against structuralist philosophy was a sign of a crisis of philosophy. However, his philosophy was a sign that new methods appeared; i. e. that the crisis is already being overcome. J. P. Sartre could as well be considered the initiator of the most recent philosophy, which makes conscious use of the methods of the special sciences of man. Without existential philosophy as well as structuralism it would have been impossible to transit to the philosophy of the "new subjectivism", and a new explanation and understanding of the object–subject relation.

At present, social philosophy is being created in the context of the most recent scientific paradigms and the contemporary development of society. Without philosophical theory, the perception of social phenomena would be fragmentary, kaleidoscopic, and reduced to the

description of isolated facts. The analysis of isolated phenomena and their ethical, political and ecological aspects would be superficial and elucidate only casual relations.

The content of philosophical concepts should be identified according not to a study object but to the problems that arise in relation to this object. For instance, classical social philosophy raised the problem of the way the personality can remain adequate to itself, i. e. be humane and preserve humanness in itself. The question of the contemporary social philosophy is how the personality should act in order to preserve humanness (the world and humankind) by itself.

The elements of contemporary social philosophy have been rather well developed in theoretical reflection and can be systematized. Hence follows the possibility of defining the subject, goals and methods of social philosophy.

Contemporary social philosophy, acknowledging the historical significance and continuity of the problems raised by classical philosophy, seeks the solutions of social problems already in the context of not only the philosophical but also the social sciences and their categories. The methods and concepts of natural sciences also frequently perform a heuristic role in philosophical studies.

Considering the new situation of man in the world created by him, man's ability for creative thinking, his spiritual features, and his feelings take on particular importance. The huge potential of the human intellect, if devoid of creative and engaged thinking and not directed to human goals, often fails to reach this aim, though in our times, human capital is embodied in creative thinking, spiritual wealth and resolution to improve the state of things.

The philosophical social theory advanced in the present work is based on the principle that neither the human world, which we strive to understand nor the sum total of the concepts, methods, theories developed by us are historically unchangeable. The world is a process, and philosophical theory is a process. The main theoretical precondition is that both the present state of reality and its reflection in concepts are not stiff and eternal structures, but ordinary, transient states. Two specific features of contemporary social philosophy are. First, that social philosophy is an open theory. The measure of the openness of a philosophical theory is the variety of the problems raised by it, its purposefulness, as well as its ability to reveal essential relations between spheres that have been considered totally independent. The second feature is that philosophical theory is a reproduction through scientific reflection of real processes in the form of an ideal theoretical model.Thus, it reflects not a random, but the optimal state of social relations.