# Eastern Europe and
# the Challenges of Globalization

Edited by
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# Introduction

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Globalisation is one of the phenomena most frequently discussed by economists, sociologists, political scientists and philosophers. This comes as no surprise. Globalisation is a world-wide process which involves revolutions in all spheres of social life, rapid transformation of existing economic, political and social structures, as well as changes in views, attitudes and modes of operation. While theorists of social phenomena attempt to explain all this, practitioners such as politicians, economists, etc. try to influence, control and give it a direction. Up to this point, neither the former nor the latter have scored major successes. The principles governing the processes of globalisation have so far eluded discovery, and attempts to subject such processes to the institutions of democratic control have failed.

Notwithstanding the vagueness and complexity of the processes constituting globalisation, the four most general phenomena can be distinguished:

1. Universalisation – involving the propagation of some patterns over the whole world either by their outright expansion or by evolution of local patterns as these are increasingly assimilated. In this way that the free market is spread in manufacturing, finances, modes of thinking, behaviour, as well as in high and low culture.

2. Holisation – consisting in creating one vast social, political, economic and cultural entity on our planet. Within this one entitycultural and political particularities continue locally or regionally as components or subsystems, having been subordinated and reduced to a subservient role within the global whole.

3. Planetary Consequentialism – consisting in the growing number of phenomena and local events which generate results of planetary importance. For example, local government crises, epidemics or financial crises trigger upheavals in international politics and the world economy affecting the attitudes of millions – indeed billions – of people across the globe.

4. The acceleration of innovation, structural changes, trade and mutual interactions between various entities: states, regions and organizations. This process has entailed increased efficiency in all spheres of social life.

These processes of globalisation have positive and negative results. On the one hand, they contribute to an increase in production, a lowering of prices, technological progress and growth of inter-human communication. On the other, however, they provoke unemployment, radical increase of economic inequality, ever greater impoverishment of the destitute, damage to the natural environment, a weakening of bonds within communities and the decline of democracy. It is the poorest countries and nations which the most painfully experience the destructive effects of globalisation.

The predicament of the post-communist countries is particularly acute. In the modern age they developed along a different path than the countries of Western Europe. They only selectively adopted modernisation which was making rapid advances in Western Europe; consequently, their politico-economic structures and legal institutions were not equal to the new challenges. The peculiar fossilisation of traditional values, norms and customs which took place there, made those countries resistant to foreign influence. The result was the emergence of a peculiar culture and

religiousness which are still valued, but hamper a Western type modernisation processes. Communism was a failed attempt to accelerate the processes of modernisation in Central-Eastern and Eastern Europe. Its collapse was the result of the new challenges created by globalisation.

Today the countries in this part of the world face even greater challenges. Firstly, they have to deal with the accumulated arrears of work from the past. Secondly, they have to modify, and often radically change the structures, modes of thinking, attitudes, values and norms imposed by communism and entrenched in institutions, customs and popular mentality; these still persist through the force of inertia. Thirdly, the processes of modernisation must be accelerated to meet the new global challenges. This is all the more so, because the countries are joining the economic and political structures of the European Union, thus making a quantum leap from the second to the first world. Fourthly, they must take care to preserve their own identity, a task which is not easy in view of the magnitude of the transformations now underway. Yet without preservation of identity it is impossible to ensure social cohesion, or to make a cultural contribution to the global world.

So far these complex Central European processes have not been reflected upon adequately in scholarly literature. The present study was co-sponsored by the Institute of Philosophy of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan and The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) in Washington. Its sought to determine more closely the peculiarity of the situation of the post-communist countries. In particular it focuses on two questions: (1) "How do the processes of globalisation affect the countries of Central-Eastern Europe?" and (2) "What kind of contribution can those countries make to globalisation?"

Philosophers, sociologists and political scientists from various countries of the region (Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania) as well as from western countries (Austria, Ireland, USA, Belgium, England) seek to describe and explain the specific phenomena and related problems taking place in the region in relation to the processes now underway around the world. They take account also of the proper historical and axiological background of the region. For as Western Europe move into a post modern world, Eastern Europe which was less effected by the rationalism of modernity may retain cultural elements now being newly appreciated. The result is not only insight into the important problems those countries are facing, but also analysis of the broad ideological, axiological and intellectual situation prevailing in the region which constitutes the cultural backdrop and bear witness to its distinctive character.

It is with this individual culture that the countries of the region enter the global stage. In some ways their cultural background makes it more difficult for them to succeed in economic terms, but simultaneously it may enrich the global culture. Perhaps the culture originating from Central-Eastern Europe, though it has suffered so much from wars and the oppression of totalitarian regimes, will have its own contribution to make to the global future.

This is because the one-sided, mercantile, utilitarian character of the West is conducive to economic successes, yet it has increasingly become an object of criticism. The charges include impoverishing the spiritual life of people, destruction of the traditional bonds of community, institutionalisation of the natural substantive relations between people and promotion of consumerism.

The countries of Central-Eastern Europe have found themselves between a rock and a hard place, between the processes of adjustment and acceptance of some models of the Western world, on the one hand, and the efforts to preserve and continue their own way of life, on the other; between the exigencies of globalisation coming from the west and aspirations to preserve their own identity. Only time will show how they respond to the challenges they are facing. The present

book aims to help towards a better understanding of the complexity of the present decisive situation in which as inhabitants of the global village we now find ourselves.

After a Prologue by George F. McLean, "Cultural Identites and the Hermeneutics of Globalization," it proceeds in three major steps or parts: first on the post-communist context proper to countries of Central and Eastern Europe, second on the concepts and norms which might guide the path ahead, and third on the dilemma of simultaneously both redeveloping the identities of the many nations and introducing them as full partners in the newly global context.

The Prologue, by George F. McLean, "Cultural Identities and the Hermeneutics of Globalization," argues that the new phenomenon of 'globalization' can offer an unprecedented chance for horizontal relations (between peoples, cultures, etc.) to strengthen verticality (individual subjectivity), and vice versa. Deploying insightful contributions from Parmenides through Nicholas of Cusa to the modern hermeneutic tradition, McLean shows how globalization need not foment aggressive competition and conflict, but rather, a structure of complementarity whereby each person or culture supplements what the 'other' lacks.

Part I, "Globalization in a Post-Communist Context," identifies the distinctive challenge of globalization to nations which until most recently had been submerged by a universalist and homogenizing ideology.

Chapter I, by Tadeusz Buksinski, "The Challenges of Globalization for Central and Eastern Europe," maintains a guarded optimism in the face of widespread institutional breakdown, shrinkage of the middle-class, increasing crime-rate, and other problems besetting the region. Buksinski rejects the claim that the post-Communist European countries must either 'westernize' and adapt neo-liberal values, or die. He argues that in the former '2nd World' a "new cultural core is being fashioned, comprised of individual freedoms, rationality and utilitarianism," but that it shall succeed only if "a moral culture of public activity" develops concomitantly, which moral culture needs to be "compliant with our [endogenous] tradition."

Chapter II, by Joseph and Monica Rice, "From Totalitarianism to Universal Participation: Globalization and the East/Central European Experience," regards the post-Communist countries as uniquely positioned in that they are 'old' enough to know first-hand the radical defects of totalitarianism yet 'young' enough – in their present historical 'fresh-start' – to avoid the "consumerist-individualist" character of "certain Western societies." The Rices urge Central and Eastern Europe to cultivate authentic participatory democracy, based on a Personalist anthropology and operating according to the social principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. If these countries succeed, in time they can become models for the world.

Chapter III, by Magdalena Dumitrana, "Globalization: Between the Tower of Babel and Jacob's Ladder," sees two understandings of globalization in the world, both driven by political *hubris*: one identifies globalization with absolute power and the other with neo-liberal 'freedom'. Both induce "negative transcendence," i.e., non-satisfying consumerism. Citing Eastern Orthodox and Catholic writers and Church documents, Dumitrana urges that religious people not shrink from the heroic task of publicly denouncing materialism and celebrating, instead, the precious values of "Jacob's dream-soul."

Chapter IV, by Gennadiy Korzhov, "Globalization as Exportation of Western Values: The Post-Communist Ukrainian Experience," discusses why the Urkraine in the last decade has financially gone into deep decline and politically failed to develop democracy. Korzhov explains that profiteering foreign nations on their side and a complicit elite on the Ukranian side, have combined to cripple the Ukranian majority. Moreover, the flaunted images of oligarchic wealth

and the lack of means – for the overwhelming majority – to achieve this wealth, induce widespread deviant behavior and crime. But Korzhov persists in the "modest hope" that gradually the Urkraine will move towards a more patriotic and Europe-oriented society.

Chapter VI, by Chibueze C. Udeani, "The Value of the Eastern European Communist Experience for the Process of Globalization," maintains that the former Communist system ("state capitalism") and the ongoing Free-Market system ("private capitalism") are remarkably alike, despite Capitalist claims to the contrary. Under both – state-planners and corporate executives – the majority of the population is not served, but rather the power and greed of the elite. In fact, there is demonstrable evidence that there is less real freedom for post-Communist societies now than in the former state-capitalist system; and the Third World likewise is becoming continually poorer and more manipulated. Udeani proposes that no one economic system should function as the model for the whole world.

Part II, "Normative Projections," searches for directions and principles which might guide and evaluate the steps which can now be taken in the development of the life of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

Chapter VI, by Stefan Symotiuk, "Directions in the Reconstruction of Civilization," advances several proposals as "therapy" for a dysfunctional world: (1) a legislated use of modularization in manufacture, so a broad-base of smaller manufacturers can maintain complicated products which nowadays become prematurely obsolete; (2) direct democracy on the local and national levels; (3) neutralization of Muslim unrest by introduction of agriculture into their largely nomadic cultures; and (4) establishment of an authentic "Parliament of the World" to replace the United Nations, since the latter has proven to be a dictatorship of the seven richest nations.

Chapter VII, by Romuald Piekarski, "Many Civilizations and One World Parliament: Reflections on Globalization in its Civilizational and Political Áspects," urges, much as does Symotiuk, a "World Parliament." Piekarski argues that neo-liberal Capitalism changes economic activity from an *instrument* into an *end*, thus subverting traditional religion-based cultures around the world. An authentic World Parliament would be able, hopefully, to arrange 'civilizational compromises' so that current American domination of global culture via economic and military force can be abated and restrained.

Chapter VIII, by Dariusz Dobrzanski, "The Concept of Solidarity and Its Properties," seeks a definition of 'solidarity' as a normative principle, in order to rescue it from its present ambiguity and ensuing inapplicability. Dobrzanski's aim is to formulate solidarity as a positive and universal norm regulating relations among interdependent states. Towards this end, he suggests a list of its formal properties, and carefully distinguishes it from 'charity'. He also insists on its positive relation to justice, despite the opposition he recognizes from neo-liberal definitions of social relations as primarily 'negative', i.e., as primarily protective of so-called 'free-choice' and 'individual autonomy'.

Chapter IX, by Michael Katafiasz, "Common Theological Foundations for the Peaceful Emergence of an Acceptable Religious Pluralism: A Prerequisite for Globalization," aims to identify the existing 'global' problematic, which is that of religious people realizing that 'other' religions also preach much truth (and this, even though other religions may be very different from their own). Katafiasz calls for more 'official' inter-religious dialogue, so that an "independent and impartial" philosophy can be elaborated which can function as a "compromise," showing "the diversity of religions as a common heritage. . . ." He calls for "non-sectarian" but "competent" lay individuals to "mediate" among religions in the discussions.

Chapter X, by Dominik Kubicki, "Globalization as Christianity's Engagement with the Cultures and Historical Religions of the World," draws upon the Catholic theologians M.-D. Chenu, J. Dupuis, C. Geffré, and others to argue that Christianity must reformulate its theology of dialogue and evangelization so that (1) other religions can be appreciated in their otherness, and (2) when/where the Holy Spirit so ordains, the 'founding Christ-Event' can be inculturated into a diversity of cultures. The Greco-Roman 'metaphysics' of God were, Kubicki argues, a unique inculturation of the Christ-Event into European philosophy, and should not be canonized for export to other cultures. Kubicki devotes much of his paper to dialogue with Islam, and a quest for the normative Islamic way of inculturating its own 'founding-Event' into diverse cultures.

Part III, "Between Globalization and National Identity," takes up the challenge of diversity in unity. In what way can the post-communist nations of Eastern Europe simultaneously regain their proper identity after the forced uniformization of the communist ideology and enter the community of nations required for life in global times.

Chapter XI, by Diana Janusauskiene, "Baltic Identities in the Process of Globalization," examines results of scientific polls ("European Value Research Study," 1990 and 1999) conducted in the Baltic states and across Europe, on the question of identity. Janusauskiene explains the factors causing the populations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, during the post-Soviet era, to move towards both stronger hybrid identity (mixed national and pan-European) and stronger local identity (town, or region of nation). She also supplies meaningful comparisons with other European populations, and with a sense of 'world citizenship'.

Chapter XII, by Jurate Morkuniene, "Globalization Processes and Problems of Civic Society in Lithuania," examines two problems introduced by 'global forces'. The first is the threat to national community caused by reactions such as ethnic conflict and organized criminality. A global 'culture of war' can only be effectively counteracted by a 'culture of peace', and Morkuniene argues that only a good educational system can change the human heart. The second problem is radical upheaval caused by *informatique* and the new techno-society. Here, to avoid class conflict, he argues all citizens must have equal access to information technology.

Chapter XIII, by Alexei Lalo, "Belarus at the Junction of Americanization or Russification," analyzes how Belarus is caught between the two "messianisms," that of the U.S.A.on the one hand, with its cultural and politico-economic imperialism; and that of Russia on the other hand, with its rhetoric of 'sacred struggle' against Western narcissism, consumerism, and secularism (the Eastern Orthodox Church playing a large and often justifiable role in this anti-Western agenda). As an insider, Lalo supplies fascinating glimpses into post-Soviet life, – how the structure of 'westernization' functions to suppress third world intellectuals, and how Russia's new tycoons cynically manipulate 'anti-western' rhetoric for their own aggrandizement.

Chapter XIV, by Aida Savicka, "Rationalizing the Relation of Globalization and Nationalism: Rationalizing," dissects two theories which attempt to explain why nationalism has been growing in proportion to globalism. The first argues that globalization has no value-content other than 'unity-in-diversity', so globalism actually encourages nations to affirm their 'difference'. The second theory argues that globalization is 'values-inclusive' in the sense that it encourages the "exchange of values" among national identities. Savicka finds that proponents of both theories are inconsistent and in bad faith because both sets of theorists in fact assume the superiority/ultimate triumph of a 'western' capitalist model.

Chapter XV, by Yaroslav Pasko, "Ukrainian National Identity in the Context of the Processes of Globalization," describes how the sad history of the Ukraine largely accounts for its present

extreme difficulties with 'globalizing forces'. Pasko shows how, ironically, the Ukraine was more democratic and independent before the seventeenth century than after, due to the subsequent successive "enslavements" at the hands of the Polish-Lithuanian state, then the Russian Empire, and then the Soviet Union. In each period of enslavement, a collaborating Ukrainian élite betrayed the Ukrainian masses; and Pasko argues the same is true today in the Ukraine, which now is a "client state" of Russia, on the one hand, and of the 'West,' on the other.

Chapter XVI, by Jarema Jakubowski, "How Globalization Affects Justice in Poland," studies the fate of "distributive justice" during Poland's transition from the "welfare state" to a "free-market system" which rewards according to personal achievement. Due to the collapse of solidarity during the new global age, the "distributive justice" whereby free-market nations share national wealth with their less-accomplished citizens, is fast disappearing. Jakubowski argues that in Poland the negative and positive anti-capitalist mind-set absorbed during the Soviet Period lingers, so distributive justice in this "hybrid" stage is not working. The author's hope is that Poland's accession to the European Union (2004) will enable a competent form of democracy.

Chapter XVII, by Makary Krzysztof Stasiak, "Between the Heritage of Solidarity and *Homo Sovieticus*," describes the current desperate Polish situation. The Solidarity Movement was led by genuinely heroic Poles, but too few of their compatriots have been willing to carry through with further reform since Liberation. The attitudes of the *Homo Sovieticus* continue: civic cynicism, assumptions of automatic entitlement, and self-absorption in one's own family concerns. The author urges a break-through to bold self-reliance (personal risk-taking and achievement) and an authentic civic consciousness.

Chapter XVIII, by Wlodzimierz Kaczocha, "Social Powers Countervailing Against the Globalization of the Economy and Cultural Media," sees two dominant notions monopolizing 'global forces' today: freedom in the context of 'survival of the fittest', so the richer or more powerful justify their success as ethically merited; and the free market, interpreted in terms of 'survival of the fittest', so all relations among people are translated into material goods, and profit is the final objective. Using John Kenneth Galbraith's idea that "countervailing powers" arise spontaneously (to oppose oligarchy) whenever oligarchy is pervasive, Kaczocha examines countervailing power in today's Poland, e.g., (1) political parties opposing the free inflow of foreign capital, (2) trade unions demanding that profits be more equitably shared, and (3) private associations (similar to Italy's Slow Food movement) fighting to keep small family businesses alive.

Chapter XIX, by Anne Rose Topolski, "The Past as a Possible Obstacle to Poland's Future: The Need for Forgiveness, Reconciliation and a Dialogue with the Jews of the Diaspora," argues that the new Poland has unfinished business with the past, that even now most of its citizens fail to come to terms with Polish anti-Semitism and with the crimes committed by Poles against Jews in the 20th century. Topolski analyzes the reasons conscious and unconscious which deter Poles from assuming moral responsibility for past anti-Semitism despite public acknowledgements and apologies by their government. She argues that Poles have yet to adjust to the new moral order which affirms ethnic and religious diversity and mutual respect.

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Prologue
# Hermeneutics of Cultural Identities in the Global Whole

*George F. Mclean*

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## From Unity to Diversity, and Back

It is characteristic of the human person to transcend, to reach out beyond oneself in knowledge and in action marked both by unity and by diversity.

Whereas a rock remains passive in itself and changes only if acted upon from without, a plant is active in absorbing moisture and nourishment in order to grow and multiply. Beyond these two levels an animal can be aware of other things even at a considerable distance and undertake related action of self-development or self- defense.

Human persons surpass all these. They do so by being able to transcend themselves horizontally in a series of integral horizons, from that of the room in which one sits, to one's nation, and now to the entire globe. They transcend also vertically by being able to enter ever more deeply into themselves, to their own freedom and to its source and goal in the divine life.

*Unity*. This sense of the unity of being and the integration of the human perspective and concerns is not new. Now, however, it would appear to be shifting from being only the broader context within which life was lived, to being the central and determining concern in terms of which each thing and event has its meaning.

Historically, the ancients pursued this transcendence horizontally through the political and military expansion of their territory: hence, the great empires of Darius of Persia, Cesar of Rome and Ashoka of India. They also pursued transcendence vertically appreciating the One to be the key to the unity and meaning of all. Thus the thought of the earliest tribes was characterized by a totem in terms of which all was understood. In time they developed creation myths that provided a more elaborate interpretative context for all things and experiences in which all was interrelated in terms of gods and families of gods, all subordinate to one that was highest.

Philosophically, when the Greeks moved beyond myth to begin metaphysics, Parmenides immediately grasped the basic truth of being as one and unchanging.[1] In this light Plato was able to understand the true importance had by the many beings as participations, images or expression of this One.[2] Similarly, the Hindu *Vedanta Sutras* begins by describing the divine or Brahman as that One from which, in which, and into which all is.[3]

*Diversity*. Of this emphasis upon unity, the modern period is a decided inversion. The ancients had envisioned reality as subsisting in the One, upon which all human endeavors were axised so that in principle all was harmonious, and conflict was deviant. In contrast, Bacon would smash the idols which bore the ancient traditions of unity; Locke would reduce the mind to a blank tablet; and Descartes would put all under doubt. Thereafter one would proceed only in terms that were

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[1] Fragments 2-8, G.F. McLean and P. Aspell, *Readings in Ancient Western Philosophy* (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), pp. 40-43; A. Mourelatos *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophy*(London: Oxford, 1967).

[2] Plato, *Sophist*, 259; *Republic*, 509.

[3] *Vedanta Sutras*, I, 2.

clear to humans as physical beings. Such clarity could be had only regarding the material order and in quantitative terms, which in the economic order is profit, while in the political order it is power.

To secure this clarity Descartes added the note of distinctness: the sign of clarity was that an idea was clearly distinct from all others. As a result the focus shifted from the one to the many, from the whole to the parts, precisely in as much as the parts are contrary one to another. Moreover, because the physical goods possessed by one cannot belong to another, competition (and then conflict) became the central concern. The economic order was systematized and structured in these terms by Adam Smith; the social and political orders were shaped to this matrix. The ultimate denouement appeared as the cold war in which the entire world was divided between the two clearly distinct mega-economic systems: capitalism and communism.

*Global Unity*. Now after 400 years of modernity, with the end of the cold war and its bipolar world, we experience a new resurgence of unity in the form of a global world. This is manifest in the economic order by the World Trade Organization (WTO), in the political order by the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), and in the information order by the web.

Given this dramatic reversal from diversity to unity the greatest danger at this point is to continue to understand all as in the past in terms of distinct atoms only externally united in a process of competition; this is the fatal temptation for both liberal and neo-conservative. With Rawls the liberal would relegate to behind a veil of ignorance all unitive religious or cosmic visions; only formal legal structures without content should figure in public debate and direct worldly affairs. The neo-conservative would supplant such a vision by a return to the *Real Politik* of peace through power. Neither is possible for they hold only an unacceptable choice between progress without peace – which can hardly be called progress – and peace without freedom – which suppresses the humanness of life.

In this situation Martin Heidegger's notion of 'retrieval' is suggestive. He points out that at each juncture in the history of humanity a choice is made between alternative paths: one path is chosen and exploited; the other is left unexplored and undeveloped. True progress is to be found not in further steps along the path long trodden for that promises only small incremental or arithmetic progress. For geometric progress it is necessary to return to that early juncture and begin to explore the alternate path which had been left undeveloped.

In this light the point of repair is not the beginning of modernity, for that would leave us still within the Western paradigm with two already explored and exhausted alternatives, the liberal and the conservative or neo-conservative. Instead, we need to return to Plato as the father of Western thought and to his decision to focus on objective reason. As Aristotle would work it out, the basic cognitive model was that of "subject vs object," and the thrust of Western thought would subsequently be an exploration limited to the object. In these terms, as Gabriel Marcel and others have pointed out, in order that anything be known it would have to be converted into an object. Hence, the subject as such and subjectivity remains imperceptible – or worse, suppressed – for whenever it is made an object of knowledge its essential subjectivity is lost. All – even subjects – are broken down into objects arranged horizontally one against the other.

Thus, for our new times it is necessary to search out a new path. Looking inward or vertically will enable an exploration of human subjectivity, and hence promote the essential and characteristic human ability to transcend and reach out. Paradoxically, this enrichment of the horizontal by the vertical promises to enable us to gain that positive and cooperative global

perspective which eluded our too exclusive concentration upon horizontal relations and competition between peoples.

In sum, today globalization challenges thought to open new horizons. These cannot be merely horizontal and quantitative as in the past, reading all in terms of the subject-object dualities of economic profit or political power. Now a vertical dimension opens which adds to the earlier Western focus upon objectivity a new attention to human subjectivity and interior consciousness. This, in turn, enables us to see others not merely as juxtaposed horizontally and possibly conflictually, but as constituting with us a truly global unity.

## Hermeneutics

Surprisingly, this new awareness of subjectivity emerged in efforts to uncover the foundations of objective knowledge. Ludwig Wittgenstein began his *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*[4] in an effort to understand knowledge as a picturing of the external objective world. There, like our eye which never appears in what we see, he marginalized that very human consciousness which did the picturing. Later, however, through his *Blue and Brown Books,* he came in his *Philosophical Investigations*[5] to recognize that it was the distinctive intentionality of consciousness that played the central relational role in which human knowledge consists.

In a somewhat parallel phenomenological sequence, Edmund Husserl began to search for the foundations of mathematics as the key to that radically objective realm, only to find that it in turn depended on this same interior intentionality of human consciousness or subjectivity. Lest, however, this remain a consciousness only of consciousness itself and thereby trap the person in an idealist "hall of mirrors," Martin Heidegger pointed out the metaphysical roots of this intentionality, seeing its achievement of truth to be an unveiling or *aletheia* of Being itself. His successor, Hans-Georg Gadamer, brought out the hermeneutic character of this unveiling as taking place in a human community and cultural tradition.[6]

With this shift of attention from the horizontal field of objects standing over against (ob-ject) the subject, to a more interior and reflective process, a new set of terms emerged in philosophy and the social sciences. What became central was not "interests" in the sense of things or objects which we seek to possess or have under our control, but the search for perfection or fulfillment according to our nature. Moreover, as human beings through imagination and intelligence can pursue this goal in myriad fashions far beyond biological structures or animal instincts, how a person or more generally a people rank or give special preference or weight (*valere*, "value") to these alternative modes of pursuing one's fulfillment takes on more central importance. The resultant scale of values is then a work of human consciousness aware of objective relations.

To this there corresponds the set of *virtues* or "strengths" which a people develops in order to be able to implement its values. For some peoples, e.g., for those who value harmony above all, this calls for a special complex of virtues in which patience plays a key role. Another people might consider competitiveness as a higher value and see as ideal a pattern of virtues in which courage and initiative precede patience.

In both cases the complex of values and virtues constitutes a special way of educating a new generation or of cultivating the soul – whence the term "*culture*". Over time as this is passed on actively, that is, as continually reassessed and adjusted to changing situations, this constitutes

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[4] John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
[5] *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, by C.K. Ogden (London: Methuen, 1981).
[6] *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).

a*cultural tradition* (from '*tradere*,' meaning "to pass on"). In their larger reaches these are whole *civilizations* as complex modes of providing for the physical and social needs of a people, and extend through lines of blood and culture. Samuel Huntington would describe civilizations as the largest "we,"[7] and notes that each is built upon a major religion.[8]

If an horizon is all that can be seen and valued from a particular vantage point then as we enrich our objective knowledge with awareness of subjectivity and hence of cultural self-awareness and identity, the root dynamic can no longer be a mere interplay of profit or power. It becomes rather the relation of the horizons of the different peoples of the world, each horizon being the point or culture from which all, including profit and power, are interpreted.

In hermeneutics the exemplar case is the reading of a text. I come to a text from my own horizon and hence with my own fore-expectation or pre-judgement about the meaning of the text: whether it is about economics, medicine, etc., for I cannot interpret the meaning of the first part – whether a phrase, paragraph or chapter – except in some understanding of the whole. On the other hand, I cannot understand the whole except in terms of the parts. Hence, the reading the text entails a continual effort to adjust my horizon of expectation to that of the text. The goal is then not competition leading to conflict – though disagreement and critique can follow. First, however, the goal must be to interpret and hence to understand, and this requires a fusion of my own horizon with that of the text or, in our case, with the culture of another people.

In this light one can begin to suspect how great is the new opportunity not only in a meeting other cultures, but in doing so in a truly global unity. For now the global horizon or horizon of the whole is not one or more other cultures with which I seek to fuse. Rather, the whole is a distinctly new horizon of a quite different order within which all can be newly and more richly appreciated as not merely juxtaposed, but as essentially interrelated and complementary. This is a new and distinctly contemporary dimension of the perennial metaphysical issue of the one and the many which we are challenged to mine afresh for these new times.

## Diversity United in the Global Whole

Hermeneutics has been concerned with interpreting texts or cultures in a world as composed of multiple cultures, each in need of retrieving its own heritage and of finding a way to understand and live with others. It has struggled with a sense of cultural heritage as something realized in the past to which fidelity means turning back and/or attempting to retain the past in the present. Both of these are conservative in character; in the extreme they constitute what Jaroslav Pelikan would term a traditionalism: "the dead faith of the living."[9]

The phenomenologies of the last century have enabled hermeneutics to move ahead to an interpretation of tradition in the more active sense of its Latin root, *tradere*, to pass on. This requires adapting the content of the tradition and applying it in new ways for new times. This is Pelikan's sense of tradition as "the living faith of the dead."[10] In a pluralistic society with its multiple cultures this effort to renew and apply one's own tradition can be implemented by encountering others not simply as suggesting some external additions, but as occasions for delving more deeply into one's own tradition and enabling it to speak afresh in our day.

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[7] "Civilizations are the biggest 'we'," Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 43.

[8] *Ibid.*, 47.

[9] Jaroslav Pelikan, *Vindication of Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 65.

[10] *Ibid.*

But the challenge and opportunity of a global horizon surpasses both of these senses of hermeneutics, for it is not that of one horizon different from and along side others, or even of an accumulation of horizons, but of one horizon which includes all others. This entails a new vision of the whole and the parts, of the one and of the relation between the many cultures.

The global whole no longer appears as an accumulation of objects in a horizontal continuum, nor is it the globe seen as an object from the moon by the astronauts. Rather, it is the whole experienced from the inner consciousness of the subject now propelled into a global awareness by economic, political and especially informational forces. Moreover, it is the whole seen not as an assembly of parts, but precisely as a whole. A metaphysics for this was developed in the early 1400s by Nicholas of Cusa, often called both the last of the ancients as he saw all as one in terms of its absolute divine origin, and the first of the moderns as he saw the many through the new sciences of mathematics and astronomy. He bridged the two eras by centering his vision not upon discrete parts as externally connected, but on the whole in terms of which all else has its proper reality and meaning.

Rice[11] exemplifies this by citing the vision had by a traveler passing through a valley to whom each item, each rock and bush, emerges separately and as it were unexpectedly or by surprise. For that person the valley is made up of a disparate multiplicity of objects which have meaning only as the traveler joins them together. To this he contrasts the vision had by a person on a hilltop overlooking the valley who can see all synthetically, not by discursive reason but by the power of intellection. This person who sees the valley as a whole not only knows where the streams flow, but being aware of the pattern of hills and trees knows why some sections must be dry and desert while others must be lush with vegetation. It is such knowledge or intellection in terms of the whole that gives true understanding.

This means that a person is not merely a part of the whole, or concerned with others if and only if one happens to intersect with them physically or socially in time and space. Cusa thinks rather in terms of the whole on which basis the reality of anything whatsoever is to be understood and interpreted. The whole is the reality in terms of which all has its being and meaning, whether this be considered the divine One as by Cusa or the global whole of our day.

This experience or horizon of the whole is not alien; indeed, it might be stated even more strongly that as I am the whole contracted this horizon of the whole is essential to my deepest self. Nicholas of Cusa develops this ontologically by speaking of the human as the maximum-minimum in that the human person includes within him/herself the whole of the material levels of existence and joins to this the spiritual dimension as well. Thus human self-consciousness gives central access to the whole range of the hierarchy of being.

W. Norris Clarke has developed how the exploration of this range of being can be carried phenomenologically by the human consciousness in his article "To Be is to Be Self-communicative."[12] He describes how one can experience consciously the different levels of material existence by omitting from one's consciousness first what is lived specifically as intellect and will in order to experience "from within as it were" or be self-aware of a merely animal existence; beyond this by removing the elements of sensation one can experience "from within" the plant or biological level of existence. Finally by bracketing even the specific life elements one can experience from within the inorganic level of existence.

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[11] Eugene Rice, "Nicholus of Cusa's Idea of Wisdom," *Traditio*, 13 (1957), 158.

[12] W. Norris Clarke, "To Be is To Be Self-Communicative: St. Thomas' View of Personal Being," *Theology Digest*, 33 (1986), 441-454.

Conversely, not by adding limitations but by removing them, in one's consciousness one can imagine progressively the angelic life by imagining oneself as freed from dependence upon the processes of abstraction from sense date and the corresponding multitude of ideas, and hence as able to grasp ever more content in ever more simple ideas. This can proceed upward to a transcendent being that is identically subject, object and act of both intellection and love: this is the divine truth, realized eminently as love itself. This was Cusa's first or highest level of unity and the key to the meaning of the other three levels, namely, second the global whole, third a compilation of single identities, and fourth a single entity in itself.

Clarke's suggestion of how the realm of being can be explored from within and at all levels presents each people with an infinitely rich palette with which to delineate its culture not only as wishful imagery, but as concrete engagement with being at all levels. In this light it is suggestive that Mircea Vulcanescu in *The Romanian Man*, and in *Real Existence in Romanian Metaphysics* describes Romanian culture as the result of his people's positioning the mind at the level of possibility rather than of actuality, which opens the culture to the multiple possibilities of a never finished world.[13]

Thus, the present development of global awareness is more than that of an amorphous whole. Rather each culture can now be appreciated from within not only as a selection of values, but as a distinctive human and humane participation in being, a unique exploration and elaboration of this graded hierarchy of being. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin in his *Phenomenon of Man*[14] shows how at each step this can be more unified both by differentiation in the material order and by simplification of ideas and commitments in the spiritual order.

Hence cultures, like persons, are not reducible to the status of invisible specks of dust, as when Neil Armstrong looked back from the moon upon the globe as an object. Rather, each part is a particular contraction of the whole. Hence, I see myself and all others not as infinitesimal fractions, but with the dignity of the whole contracted and reconstructed by the efforts of my people through time. My heritage and dignity, my sense of self as well as of my responsibilities to others are now seen in this global and sacred sense, rather than as merely partial or secular. In classical terms this would be somewhat comparable to seeing all with the eyes of God or in the light of eternity (*sub specie aeternitatis*).

The implications of this are impressive for relations between persons and peoples in our newly global times. Religiously, in the convocation of the Second Vatican Council Pope John XXIII spoke of restoring the face of humankind in the image of Christ who united matter and spirit, man and God. Speaking more generally, it would mean not suppressing or exploiting others, but respecting all and even having particular compassion for the poor or those in difficulty.

Philosophically, in the sense of Nicholas of Cusa, appreciating myself and others as contractions of the One means seeing the other as imaging a part of the whole which is lacking to, but an important complement of, the particular contraction that I am. Thus, in wholistic and global thinking the other is truly part of my own definition, just as son is of father, with all of the positive implications this entails for relations between cultures and civilizations.

This has special meaning for the hermeneutics of a pluralistic culture, for if the ability to delve more deeply into my own culture depends on being able to appreciate that of another then Aristotle's virtue of *sunesis* – of being able to enter into, truly share and even suffer with, the experience of another – is crucial. Such understanding of the other is intended not to control, but to be able to share and to help.

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[13] See *Dimenciunea Romaneasca a existentei*, vol. 3, Editiona Eminescu, Bucharesti, 1996.
[14] *Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper, 1959).

While important for hermeneutics in any pluralist culture, this is intensified in global times. The earlier hermeneutic, stated phenomenologically by Gadamer as a fusion of horizons, now in global terms becomes a new ontological sense of one's reality or identity. Thinking in terms of the whole and of its contractions enables us to appreciate how we are essentially and existentially related to all others. For the global future into which we now enter, the fusion of horizons enables us to bring into convergence our cultures as our cumulative freedom. This is now not only a theoretical model or even a creative but optional consciousness; rather it is the real process in terms of which looming disasters can be avoided and life made possible.

# Part I

# Globalization in a Post-Communist Context

<center>**Chapter I**</center>

# The Challenges of Globalization to Central and Eastern Europe

<center>*Tadeusz Buksinsk*</center>

## The Issues of Economy and Technology

The global stage of historical development has two distinctly new characteristics: the fairly definite turning-point which history reached between the 1960s and the 1980s, and the global quality of the new situation. In the past, similar turning-points occurred only in the evolution of selected nations and cultures, and subsequently the new forms of social activity spread among other nations and cultures at a somewhat slower rate; such new phenomena typically did not apply either to the entire planet or even to all the areas of social activity in the regions which they did affect. The fact that this is no longer the case in the present period of globalization has far-reaching consequences, because various nations, societies and macro-regions are entering this new era of history while representing different stages of historical development: some of them are still at the pre-modern stage, others at the early modern stage of the manufacturing workshop, while others still may be at the beginning or in the middle of the stage of industrialization, or they may even be developing modern institutions. Globalization requires from underdeveloped nations and affirms a historical leap, the bypassing of certain steps of development which have occurred in the nations setting the pace of globalization. Such underdeveloped countries are forced to adopt the condition of globalization starting from various positions, e.g., they must affirm the value of industrialization, a natural emergence of institutionalized civil rights, a tradition of free market, or an established ethic of political compromise. These differences and peculiarities in historical development may well affect the mentality of the contemporary communities and give distinct local or regional traits to the processes of globalization, triggering tension and conflicts, and in the future they may become much more significant and influence the general pattern of globalization.

While globalization is a challenge to all nations, the challenge is the most formidable for those societies which are not in the vanguard of globalization, including the post-Communist nations. This is because they are facing *a dual task*: On the one hand, they must bridge the gap which separates them from the most developed nations, and on the other, they must face the issues resulting from the emergence and continuing presence of the global systems and phenomena. Both types of issues have an internal as well as an external aspect, i.e. the underdeveloped nations must cope with them inside their own territories, but while settling them, they must also have recourse to external assistance; in certain cases, the manners of solving such problems will impact the general patterns of the global processes and trends.

We now proceed to review the essential areas or sectors of social activity and the distinctive transformations that they are currently undergoing, in order to identify the principal challenges which globalization issues to the post-Communist nations. Due to limited space, we are going to discuss selected issues only, and to describe the identified challenges very briefly.

The press, the radio and the television devote the most attention to matters of economy, which are also the focus of the activity of the post-Communist administrations. No wonder, as they are of the most vital importance to the people, whose lives and opportunities for activity in other areas are often contingent on the successful solution of economic problems. Still, it is impossible to define unambiguously the scope of the processes and phenomena belonging to the realm of

economy. Economy is usually associated with the processes of industrial production, trade, consumption, the organization of management, the nature of the market and the market-related institutions, the processes of technological development and the related hazards, and even with the armament industry. We will now discuss some of those areas of activity, beginning with the issue of technological modernization.

The rapid development of new branches of industry, including atomic power, microelectronics, genetics, information technology and intelligent ("smart") weapons, is certainly a characteristic of the economy of the global epoch. High technology (Hi Tech) is the gauge of the technological advancement of the contemporary world. Actually, it is often postulated that among the causes of the collapse of Communism was its inability to face the challenges of the new stage of technological development: While its weapons, machines and industrial products became obsolete and lost their competitive value, the fossilized administration was not capable of fostering initiative and creativity, which are necessary to develop and manufacture Hi Tech products. There is much truth in such postulates, since the application of high technology is a measure of a society's civilizational advancement.

Now, after the collapse of Communism, a certain quantity of Hi Tech products is being transferred to Central-and-Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, the development of new technologies is basically limited to the importation of finished products. Factories manufacturing such products are only seldom built in the post-Communist countries, and even these usually represent the "dirty" branches of industry, e.g. the automotive or the chemical industry. In this sense, globalization is not raising these countries' technological level to that of the developed nations. The post-Communist countries are facing the task of bridging this technological gap. This is a vital issue, since the manufacturing of Hi Tech products teaches a new quality of thinking, forces progress in other areas, and sets up scientific and industrial benchmarks. As it is, people who have acquired marketable Hi Tech skills, must seek employment abroad; obviously, they cannot establish their own companies manufacturing such products, as this requires enormous investments. Accordingly, at least one path of technological progress becomes inaccessible to Central-and-Eastern European countries. We may console ourselves with the thought that the underdeveloped countries may use certain imported equipment compliant with the standards of high technology (provided they can raise appropriate funds), e.g. medical equipment.

Due attention must also be given to the extremely rapid development of computer networks, telephony and television. These media offer new opportunities of communication and the acquisition of information. Still, dangerous attempts at monopolizing such media and subordinating them to the interests of political parties are visible in these areas. Groups which are exercising power use the mass media for their particularist interests in order to misinform the nation and manipulate the audiences. Besides, great capitalists, who sponsor the mass media, are increasingly influencing the content of communications. Local broadcasting stations and newspapers are losing their importance to the national or even global ones, which are the only ones capable of developing global systems for the acquisition and processing of information. All small broadcasting stations and newspapers are now largely dependent on such sources of information.[1]

Under Communism, information was circulated in two systems, the official and the unofficial. The latter was more important. An efficient system of "grapevine" or circulation of rumors had developed, which fairly reliably informed the citizens of the developments in their countries and abroad. This system is currently disintegrating, superseded by a democratic and open system of

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[1] J.E. Green, *Nowa era komunikacji* [*A New Era of Communications*], Warszawa, 1999; B. Barry, *Culture and Equality*, Oxford, 2000.

mass media. The latter, however, is not always capable of performing its task of providing objective information, and thence it is facing the challenge of developing procedures for the supervision of the public mass media. Reliable information has become a valuable commodity, and free access to it must be ensured.

Another threat results from the commercializing of the information transmitted through the Internet. Impecunious citizens of the post-Communist countries, and in particular young people, cannot afford to pay for the encoded and commercialized information which in many cases they need for their studies. A universal implementation of cheap computer solutions is an urgent priority for the post-Communist nations.

Economic development produces such threats as pollution and the emission of poisonous material. In this case, the Central-and-Eastern European societies have to cope with problems of a twofold nature. Firstly, the pollution and degradation of the natural environment which constitute the heritage of Communism must be remedied. The wasteful exploitation of the mineral resources, the focus on the increase of the quantitative volume of production, the emphasis on the heavy industry and the armament industry, the frugal outlays for the protection of the environment, and the ignoring or neglecting of the environmental issues by the authorities – due to all of these factors the environment is now damaged, and in some areas even devastated, and requires re-cultivation (e.g. in the Polish region of Silesia). As pressure is exerted from the outside (by the European Union) and from the inside (by environmentalist organizations), attempts are made at renovating the environment by means of installing filters on smokestacks, setting up sewage treatment plants, etc. Many toxic or "poisoning" factories have been closed down or simply gone bankrupt, unable to face the competition from more advanced rivals. In this way, the weaknesses originating from the times of Communism are gradually being overcome. It must also be remembered that such countries as Poland boast regions that according to the criteria of the international environmentalist organizations are among the purest in Europe (e.g., the lake region of Masuria).

At the same time, new hazards are emerging, deriving from the globalization and imported from Western Europe. As national borders are opening and trade is being liberalized, West European factories are dumping enormous amounts of industrial waste (mainly toxic and radioactive) in the post-Communist countries. In view of the lack of relevant regulations and adequate border control, as well as the corruption of the customs officers, these countries are turning into veritable dumping grounds of hazardous substances. There are even companies which specialize in the importation of such substances in order to store them without appropriate prior treatment. *Improving the environmental awareness* of the people, and a modification and implementation of regulations in this area constitute the minimum of action, without which radical change will never take place.

An even more serious problem is how to cope with the pollutants and impurities that are not classified as such in the West European countries. These are, in particular, the chemical and radioactive substances and preservatives which contaminate food, and the genetic deterioration of grain, fruits, vegetables and, especially, of meat.[2] The developed countries are struggling against natural impurities and set severe requirements in this field to importers and producers (particularly the Eastern European ones), while their criteria for the assessment of human-made pollution are very lenient. In the interest of an abundance of cheap food, products which are evidently noxious, are allowed to be sold. People in the Western countries are growing fat, and not because they eat so much, but because their food is unhealthy. The incidence of cancer and of allergies is

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[2] . U. Beck, *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*, Frankfurt/Main, 1986; U. Beck, *Gegengifte. Die organisierte Unverantwortlichkeit*, Frankfurt/Main, 1988.

augmenting (e.g., 70% of the population of Germany suffer from allergies). Such increasingly frequent scandals as the bovine spongiform encephalopathy, the swine vesicular disease, and the chickenpox are mere symptoms of the notorious excesses of the allowed content of poisonous substances. Although virtually all food produced in the West is poisoned, it is freely exported to Central-and-Eastern Europe, while limitations are imposed on the volume of food exported from the latter region. People in those countries are particularly susceptible to poisoning due to human-made pollutants, as their agriculture has been and still is retarded in terms of the consumption of pesticides and artificial fertilizers. Nevertheless, the volume of production remains high due to the large number of people employed in this sector of the economy. The agriculture of the Central-and-Eastern European countries is a chance for Europe, as it is by definition environment-friendly, and must be used for the production of healthy food. Unfortunately, the West European agricultural lobby in the administration of the European Union is aiming to ruin the East European agriculture, as short-term profit is deemed more important than human health. In fact, it would suffice to abolish the direct subsidizing of agriculture in the countries of the European Union, and to open its borders to produce from Eastern Europe. This is an objective to strive for, as it serves the interests of the peoples of the entire of Europe.

Another category of issues pertains to the external and internal liberalization (deregulation) of the economy. The former consists in opening the economic borders for a free circulation of capital, goods, services and taxes, while the latter, in relinquishing the regulation of the prices of goods and services, privatizing the industry, and abolishing or liberalizing the regulations which protect the employees and ensure minimum wages, appropriate working conditions, etc. Both have disastrous results. The former brings about the well-described phenomenon of the leakage of capital expenditure funds and tax revenue to countries offering more convenient capital expenditure regulations and lower tax rates – Asian countries or such tax havens as Luxembourg, Gibraltar or the Bahamas.[3] The post-Communist nations cannot compete with such countries in this respect, as they have inherited from the Communist systems complex schemes of social security which protect the employees, extensive and expensive bureaucratic administrations, and a profusion of regulations which often are unclear. Also their trade unions are strong and experienced due to their tradition of the struggle against the Communist systems. The citizens of the post-Communist countries simply are not yet ready to accept such drastic limitations on social security as those observed in certain Asian countries, or to tolerate the employers' disregard for the workers' opinions on the conditions of work and on wages. Such a tradition is not conducive to foreign investments, while it must be emphasized that it protects the employees against immoderate exploitation. A system of social security might be effective if it is implemented worldwide. In fact, unfortunately, it is being abolished even in such highly prosperous countries as Germany, since in the present period of liberalization it makes the expansion of business activity an excessively expensive and unsatisfactorily competitive venture.

Accordingly, unemployment is growing (in Poland, it amounts to 3 million people, or 18% of the entire population of potential employees) and poverty is spreading in the post-Communist countries. To make things even worse, more and more manufacturing enterprises are going bankrupt as a result of both the competitiveness of foreign goods and a purposeful policy of bringing about their insolvency, which is being pursued by prominent officials of the administration. The latter development has arisen from the strategy of privatization at any price: National enterprises were deliberately brought to a condition of insolvency in order for their managements and employees to be forced to agree to a rapid privatization, which in fact amounted

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[3] E. Luttwak, *Turbo-Capitalism. Winners and Losers in the Global Economy*, New York, 1998.

to being sold at a trifling price to foreign companies, which, having acquired such enterprises, liquidated them instead of investing in them, as this was an easy way of disposing of competition. Obviously, unemployment has consequently been increasing. The administration has not attempted to improve the National enterprises and to make them able to compete with the Western companies. Confining the poverty and unemployment is another major challenge which the post-Communist countries are facing.

As we can see, the issues discussed in this section result from a combination of the peculiarity of the transformations in Central-and-Eastern Europe and the impact of the global trends. These problems can be solved only if countries cooperate on a global scale. It will not be possible to remedy them unless all the countries of the world adopt a global regulatory system governing the compulsory payment of taxes in the country of manufacture, the protection of the employees and social security. While tax havens are already being abolished within the European Union, other regions of the world are not following suit in this matter yet.

**The Civilizational Gap?**

The term "the civilizational gap" is used by certain sociologists to emphasize the adverse social and civilizational effects of the Communist system in Eastern Europe.[4] It is not our purpose to assess all the civilizational successes and shortcomings of Communism. Still, it must be asserted that these deficiencies do not constitute merely the aftermath of Communism, but on the contrary, are the heritage of the entire history of the region. This is because the Central-and-Eastern European countries have been lagging behind the Western nations since the 18th cent., or since the period of the intensive industrialization.

The civilizational gap accounts for, on the one hand, differences between the levels of the application of certain techniques of public and everyday life in Western and Eastern Europe, and on the other hand, the whole realm of the organization of social institutions and social activity, and the function and role of individuals in the social-and-political system.

The average level of the technology of everyday public life, the services and the infrastructure remains conspicuously low: hospitals use obsolete medical equipment, telephone systems are defective, there are potholes in the streets, houses are dirty, and public lavatories are either dingy or altogether non-existent. This results not only from the lack of money, but also from the individuals' and the institutions' neglecting certain issues, a lack of a sense of responsibility, or improper organization of work.

On the social plane, the civilizational gap is manifest in, e.g., bad organization of work, inefficient use of labor and careless performance of duties. Symptoms of this problem are the exceedingly authoritarian and centralized economic and political system, and institutions, companies and organizations, which discourage people from independent thinking and actions. Inefficient and inflexible, they are not able to respond to challenges. Beside the methods of management, our assessment takes into consideration the organization of society. Contemporary modernized societies are disjointed, and consist of numerous fairly autonomous layers or classes, and independent institutions. The organization of post-Communist societies remains obsolete because it lacks a middle class and such techniques of management as would reconcile an efficient exercise of civil rights with a promotion of socially advantageous civil initiative.

As a result of the long tradition of the old-fashioned ideological organization, the behavior of civil servants and workers who attend on clients is also characteristic of that past period. Careless

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[4] Cf. W. Engler, *Die zivilisatorische Lücke. Versuche über den Staatssozialismus*, Frankfurt/Main, 1992.

performance of duties is notorious, and instances of it include apartment superintendents who do not keep their buildings tidy, buses and trains departing behind schedules, employees who work badly or merely pretend to work, bad quality of service, cheating on clients and customers and lack of superiors' control over their employees, not to mention corruption, mafia activity and crime. All this shows that the dominant mentality is that of one's own particular interests, and that the public good is being neglected. The particularist mentality is typical of totalitarian and ideological systems, where decision are made by an élitist central administration, while the rest of the society is supposed to carry out the decisions without being allowed to discuss them or to show any initiative. Such systems produce passive individuals who are indifferent to the public good. Incapable of internalize the norms of the law and of public activity, people under such systems observe the norms only as long as they are afraid of the authorities or under the pressure of tradition and society. When tradition loses its importance or when the authorities become inattentive, the norms cease to be observed. Consequently, the public sphere becomes privatized and turned into an instrument of the egoistic opinions and interests of the prominent politicians as well as communities and individual citizens. The political élites of our countries must replace the techniques of external coercion with mechanisms for self-control and spontaneous initiative. Still, it will be very difficult to dispose of the mental heritage of the pre-modern period and of Socialism in a short time. Nevertheless, the global free market and the global political system favor individuals who are on the one hand active and enterprising, and on the other, capable of self-restraint, i.e. who carry out terms of contracts, observe the law, and are willing to compromise and to acknowledge the interests of others. An efficient market and a viable modern political system will not emerge without such people.

Thus, there is much truth in the postulates advanced by the proponents of the theory of "the civilizational gap." After Max Weber, such scholars identify the processes of social differentiation and of institutionalization as the essential agents of modernization.[5] Such processes are expressions of functional rationality. We do not subscribe unreservedly to this opinion, as our view is that not every instance of institutionalization or differentiation must express progress. M. Weber himself observed that an overly extensive bureaucracy hinders civil initiative and social development. Conversely, an excessive disjunction of business corporations or scientific institutions, and leaving them without administrative support, are not conducive to efficient action, either. At the early stages of modernization, and often at more advanced ones as well, a strong and resourceful central administration is necessary to effect the primary accumulation and to provide a basis for industrialization: the legal basis, a protection of profit and exploitation, an assistance in trade, and finding markets for sales. Such was the part played by the central administrations in France and England in the 18th cent., and in Germany in the 19th.

Perhaps instead of invoking the concept of "the civilizational gap," one may provide a more adequate explanation of the differences between the East and West European social organization and mentality by assuming that modernization in the Central-and-Eastern European countries is simply retarded under many respects. The differences that we have discussed, are symptoms of this retardation. The patterns of social organization and mentality that we now observe in the post-Communist countries, appeared in the past in all the Western countries that were undergoing modernization, and duly disappeared at subsequent stages of the modern. Thence, all of these factors must be considered components of a stage in the process of historical evolution. Some of them also result from the peculiarities of the historical development of Central-and-Eastern

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[5] M. Tatur, *Solidarnoœæ als Modernisierungsbewegung*, Frankfurt/Main–New York, 1989; J. Staniszkis, *The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe*, California, 1991.

Europe, where strong pre-modern and early modern communities are still persisting, having taken over the functions of the institutions that emerged at the stage of the late modern (in the 19th and 20th cent. in Western Europe). Weak institutions have been and still are complemented by the action of the communities and the initiative of private groups: thus, e.g., as the West developed a formal system of care for handicapped people in the 20th cent., in Eastern Europe such people traditionally were the responsibility of families, relatives, groups of neighbors or cloisters. The view that all institutionalization is a sign of modernizing progress, is arbitrary. Studies of deserted children prove that it is easier to bring them up in surrogate families than in orphanages. Traditional communities give to individuals a better mental support than artificial institutions, especially in difficult predicaments. Now the dilemma is whether to solve social problems through establishing new, inefficient and expensive institutions, or rather through encouraging civil initiative and community action within the framework of the existing organization.

Let us note that according to the standards of modernization of the classic theories of M. Weber and T. Parsons, the contemporary post-Communist societies are extremely modern under many respects. These include: the rate of school attendance and education, geographic and social mobility, literacy, familiarity with technical skills, coping with predicaments, and independence in problem-solving. Professionals and workers from these countries are competitive on a global scale. In this sense, East European countries are superior to those of Western Europe, and it cannot be said that they are not contributing anything to the globalization .

**Political Challenges**

Political developments are usually reported on and construed in terms of two interrelated areas: the patterns of institutional organization and individual activity. Modern institutions have never been very strong or extensive in the Central-and-Eastern European countries, and one of the consequences of this fact was the continual collapse of the national states in this region. Although the Communist system strengthened institutions, after its collapse criticism of the state and its institutions (bureacracy, system of law, police, army, medical system, mass media) has become even more marked. A common phenomenon in the period of globalization is the disintegration of modern institutions, and particularly of the nation-state, due to the economic liberalization, as funds leak abroad and great global monopolies assume the *de facto* power. As the state weakens, the prestige of the law, the legal institutions, and the central and local administration is also damaged. The norms and rules which they have established are ceasing to be observed, as witnesses, e.g., the increasing incidence of various types of crime. These processes, combined with the Central-and-Eastern European societies' traditional enmity toward the state and institutions, contribute further to undermining the latter. Communities and their action are not always able to replace them. In many instances, we observe mere conflicts of values between communities and institutions. This is because the process of the undermining of institutions results, among other factors, from communities and para-communities overtaking them and subordinating them to their groups' interests. Such developments further reinforce the common citizens' skepticism about institutions. As citizens follow the example of prominent politicians, the disintegration of institutions continues. The important aim of the Eastern Europe societies is to strengthen the institutions. Certain democratic reforms have been already effected, and a system of democratic procedures seems to have been permanently implemented. After all, it is the people's achievement, won by many years' resistance against the totalitarian system, and constitutes a value in itself. The human and civil rights are also observed and firmly supported by society; political parties operate

along similar principles as the Western ones; nations have renounced their mutual animosity and territorial claims; and self-government is gradually emerging.

The movement of non-governmental organizations has become a significant factor and replaces the state when solving numerous problems, e.g. providing shelters for the homeless. An increasing number of non-governmental and self-government organizations is establishing relations with foreign institutions and organizations, and procuring funds for regional and international programs. In this sense, such organizations are acquiring a global status.

At the same time, the issue of the states' and national institutions' dependence on international and global institutions and organizations is becoming increasingly acute. As countries are preparing for the accession to the European Union, their law and institutions are being made compliant with those in Western Europe. This process is both advantageous and detrimental: On the one hand, it reinforces the civil rights and the importance of the law and the legal institutions in general, while on the other hand Western institutions and laws are often merely mechanically imitated without being adapted to local conditions, the results of which are often contrary to the expectations: e.g., granting excessive rights to defendants in lawsuits brings about an increase of the crime rate, as criminals take advantage of their rights to intimidate witnesses and victims and to suborn law enforcement agencies and judges. As we can see, this process of the "fine tuning" of the East European democracies with a view to making them conform to the example of the Western ones is not always beneficial for the societies and for the democratic system itself.[6] One may fear that democracy is ceasing to be a value in itself and becoming an instrument for the promotion of the interests of strong Western lobbies. Political reforms will succeed only if a solid foundation is ensured for democracy, one which beside implemented procedures features also an *ethic* of contract, compromise, moderation, the observance of the law and a disinterested adherence to the policy of joint rule. This requirement entails yet another challenge, which is bringing about a recognition of the opinions and interests of the Central-and-Eastern European countries as equivalent to those of the Western nations. In practical international relations, the views and opinions of the Eastern European countries have been given too little weight so far, especially on the European forum.

## Regional Cultures in the Face of Globalization

"Culture" is an ambiguous term, used in at least three essential senses:

1. Everything which humankind has added to nature and whose continuing existence it sustains. In this sense, culture is the total of the conditions of human life produced by humans. If culture is defined in this way, it may be further broken down into the material culture (material artifacts) and the spiritual culture.

2. The artistic creations of the fine arts: painting, sculpture, literature, journalism, museums, etc.

3. The sphere of those products of the human groups whose symbolic layer of meaning is more important than the material layer. It comprises general ideas, values, moral standards, religion, philosophy, science and learning, customs and rites. This culture makes the lives and activities of human groups meaningful and defines the identity of human beings.

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[6] T. Buksiñski, *Modernoœæ* [*The Modern*], Poznañ, 2000, pp. 97–118.

Defined in the third sense, culture is the peculiar manner of the existence of a human group, which has a significant meaning for it, imparting to it an identity which sets it apart from other groups. Huntington lists eight cultures (or "civilizations," in his terminology) of the world. It seems that every large and creative social group has its own "culture" in the second and third meaning of our definition, a culture which is manifest both in the works of art and in all the other areas of everyday life. Therefore, one may justifiably speak of the culture of everyday life and of the culture of public activity, of personal culture and even of culinary culture. All of these are components of "culture" in the third sense, which is now the subject of our following discussion.[7]

In the present period of globalization, there are evidently at least two principal cultural currents: on the one hand, the Americanization, which often is also called the making of a "McWorld," and on the other hand, the multiculturalism, or the tendency toward maintaining the identity and specific quality of all the inherited cultures, and toward recognizing their global importance through a codified system of protective rights. Thus, beside processes of homogenization we also observe revivals of regional cultures, as the South American and African carnivals are becoming increasingly popular, religious activity is reborn in Islamic communities, and Oriental religions are spreading. These phenomena are expanding along with other components of the processes of globalization, making the latter more colorful and kaleidoscopic, and at the same time they claim equal rights for themselves. These trends are also visible in the post-Communist countries. During the first decade after the collapse of Communism, the mass culture of entertainment was dominated by unilateral Western, and especially American influence (the jeans style or Hollywood cinema). Although its impact is still strong, a certain resistance to it has been stirred up. At first, it is noticeable in the appeals for preserving the nations' own identities and traditions. At present, we are witnessing the emergence of a growing number of cultural programs which consciously base on the nations' own traditions and criticize the culture of consumption and mindless imitation of foreigners: restaurants offering Slavic food are being opened again, theatrical plays by native authors are produced, and the significance of the nation's own religious tradition is being publicly recognized. Although this is still far from an emancipated international cultural exchange, the awareness of the importance of a nation's own culture and tradition for the maintenance of its collective identity and for social integration is spreading. Having gained an insight into the foreign cultures, the people of those countries are recovering from their insecurity complexes, as an appreciation of their own heritage turns out to be more interesting than a homogenization. Such at least is the case in certain areas of culture, and particularly so in the fine arts, which have reached a very high level in Eastern Europe. The situation is worse in such areas as the culture of business, public life or everyday life.[8]

Many theoreticians assess culture basing mainly on the criterion of whether it promotes or facilitates the processes of economic, social or political modernization. Thus, M. Weber, T. Parsons and T. Elias assume that only one culture, viz. the Western culture, is highly favorable for modernization, providing such axiological premises for its processes as the theory of progress, or the ideas of the rationalization of individual freedom, secular happiness, tolerance and laicization. In this way, Western culture is conducive to the emergence of new organizational and institutional

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[7] H. Schnadelbach, "Filozofia w nowoczesnej kulturze" ["Philosophy in Modern Culture"], [in:] T. Buksiñski [ed.], *Filozofia w dobie przemian* [*Philosophy at a Time of Changes*], Poznan, 1994, pp. 45–64; S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, 1997.

[8] R. Legutko, *Czasy wielkiej imitacji* [*The Times of a Great Imitation*], Krakow, 1998; A. Mielczarek, *Europejska metamorfoza Polaka* [*The European Metamorphosis of the Poles*], Warszawa, 2000.

solutions: democracies, contracts, divisions of power, and rights which release new creative forces. As the most rational, it should be adopted by all the modernizing countries, while traditional communities and culture must be eradicated, as they hinder modernization.[9] Let us remember that many elements of traditional folk and community culture still persist in Eastern Europe and the followers of Weber accuse them of hindering progress.

The criticism which this view has aroused among non-Western cultures is, in our view, justified.[10] On the one hand, the very broad spectrum of cultures is in fact compatible with the global economic and political globalization, and to substantiate such an opinion it is enough to consider the plurality of cultures in the Western countries. It was only in the 19th century that liberal permissivism became widely spread in Europe, and even this took place in selected countries only. The continuing heritage of the pre-modern times still exists and includes for example the ethic of the gentleman in England, the Socialist ingredients of the political culture in the Scandinavian countries and the institutionalized solidarity in Germany. A culture's idiosyncrasies are often based on the pre-modern tradition and still provide strong bonds which ensure social integration and make a culture unique. While imposing certain limitations on the liberty of the individuals, they also produce mutual trust which facilitates efficient action. The positive feedback between non-Western cultures and the processes of modernization is particularly conspicuous in certain Asian countries (e.g., Japan, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, mainland China and Iran), whose economy is thriving because it is based on the traditional community values and bonds, which in fact contribute to an efficient management of enterprises. Thus, e.g., Japan has preserved its feudal customs, strong traditional communities, and – what is the most important – family communities, and its pre-modern symbols, rites and morality. Modern economic and political systems have been adapted to the traditional culture, and a viable symbiosis has resulted. Japan has avoided the Western individualism, materialism, liberalism, skepticism and laicism. Democracy functions there on a limited scale only, but the state has an efficient administration.

On the other hand, it cannot be claimed that all cultures are equally favorable for the processes of modernization. In fact, certain cultures hinder them at some stages. The cultures of such Asian countries as Pakistan, Burma (Myanmar) , as well as of some Arab and African countries, do not seem suitable for the implementation of certain more advanced forms of economic and political modernization. In their cases, modernization is only a partial phenomenon imposed by foreign powers, its implementation is difficult, and its results are sometimes contrary to the expectations. Most importantly, these countries are not capable of initiating and effecting the internal transformations which would allow them to improve independently the next levels of modernization. As the tribal spirit opposes systems, such cultures are not conducive to the modern.

The principal practical difficulty of countries which are 'behind the times' in terms of modernization, seems to be the reconciliation of their own cultures with modernization. This need not imply that countries which are now opposing modernization, would modernize themselves more rapidly if they renounced their own cultures and adopted the Western culture. Nobody and nothing can guarantee this, and the example of the Latin American countries may in fact prove the contrary: Although many of the Latin American nations have imported the Western modern culture

[9] T. Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, New York, 1975; T. Parsons, *Structures and Process in Modern Society*, New York, 1967.
[10] Cf. T. Okere, *Identity and Change. Nigerian Philosophical Studies I*, Washington, 1996; A. Przeworski, *Europa und Lateinamerika. Spiel mit Einsatz*, Frankfurt/Main, 1990; B. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*, New York, 1995.

(the entertainment, music, restaurants, individualism, permissivism, negative freedoms, the equality of the genders, materialism, instrumental rationalism and a preoccupation with success), economic modernization and civilizational progress are developing at a slow rate there, and their political systems are unstable. This is because the economic and political system and the local culture must undergo certain mutual adjustments in order to produce an effective whole which is being modernized. Such is an essential prerequisite to modernization.

Our answer to the question of whether the post-Communist countries are capable of coping with the challenges of globalization (understood as a new period of globalization) will depend on how we classify the cultures and societies of Central-and-Eastern Europe: as favorable or unfavorable for modernization. There seem to be several criteria for such a classification. The first one is the hierarchy of values and priorities. In a culture which is favorable for modernization, the norms and values ensure an equilibrium between the striving for the good of the individuals, of particular communities and of the whole. It is the core of the culture favorable to modernization. Modernization is hindered by excessive particularism of small groups, which consists in neglecting such medium- and general-scale factors as values, norms, laws, rules, and national and governmental institutions. The actions of both individuals and institutions must take the good of the whole into account. In the case of institutions, they must pass such generally applicable laws and regulations which will serve the achievement of the common good. The norms of honesty, justice and legal equality must be accepted to some degree in public life. The second criterion of whether a culture is favorable for modernization is its tolerance, or openness to variety, criticism and creativity of individual, community and institutional action. Finally, a culture must be flexible, i.e. it must agree to certain changes, if only superficial (in behavior, rites and customs). Culture must allow from one side a certain functional modification required by technological, economic, and in certain cases political development, and from other side be capable of adjusting political and economic systems to its own essential values and norms. As we can see, cultures which are favorable for modernization, are paradigmatic, in the sense defined by T. Kuhn.[11] Their complex structure consists of : (a) a fixed core of essential values and norms; (b) a flexible protective layer of aims, norms of behavior, customs, methods of action, rules of interpretations of action and; (c) a constantly evolving set of definitions of typical behavior, important facts, problems. The essential values and norms are separated from the changing facts and problems by a series of indirect aims, rules and techniques of interpretation. The evolution of the protective layer should strengthens the core of the identity of a culture, as it responds to new threats and prepares for new situations. For example, the core of the present Western cultures is made up of the rights of the individuals, the negative freedoms, moral permissivism, and utilitarian rationality; the protective belt consists of norms of democratic consensus, compromises, contracts, peaceful agreements.

Cultures which are unfavorable for modernization typically have simpler patterns and structures of content. They are characterized by a total identity and lack autonomous components. All of their ingredients combine to produce a uniform system governed by a few simple values, norms and ideas in a total direct way. All the ingredients are equally important for the whole, and modifying one of them may undermine the whole, as it entails a modification of the core, or a modification of the cultural identity.[12]

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[11] T. Kuhn, *The Essential Tension*, Chicago, 1977.
[12] On systems of totalitarian identity, cf. T. Buksinski, "Morality and Politics in the Postcommunist Countries," [in:] P. Kampits, K. Kokai, A. Weinberg [eds.], *Applied Ethics*, Kirchberg, 1998; T. Buksinski, *Modernoœæ*, pp. 118–128.

The borderline between paradigmadic and total-identity cultures is not identical with that between the modern (Western) and pre-modern (community-based) cultures. A community culture may be also paradigmatic, which is, e.g. the case of Japan. Neither are we implying that a culture of total identity is always hostile to any form of the modern and of modernization. Such cultures may well accept, petrify and sustain certain forms of modernization, or even promote their implementation; thus, e.g., the Russian Empire under Alexander II supported the industrial modernization. Still, such activity is always a mere imitation, since cultures of total identity are incapable of producing new forms of the modern and of modernization spontaneously and based on their own ideological foundations.

The division into the two types of cultures is obviously a relative one. A culture may be identity-based or paradigmatic to a varying degree. In certain situations, a culture may also evolve from one form into the other: Thus, e.g., the Japanese culture changed from an identity-based one into a paradigmatic one when it was threatened by foreign powers in the period of the Meiji reforms, while many of the Central-and-Eastern European cultures strengthened their traditional identity-based components under Communism, protecting themselves against the Communist ideology.

Are the present Central-and-Eastern European cultures favorable for global modernization? They seem to be standing at a crossroads. In varying degrees, they are transcending the stage of the identity-based culture and approaching the paradigmatic culture. A new cultural core is being fashioned comprising of individual freedoms, rationality, utilitarianism. The are more tolerant and less nationalistic. And yet, the choices of the paths of development are often in danger, when systems of mafias and cliques emerge. While certain elements of permissivism and formal civil and political rights are incorporated or renewed in these cultures, the prestige of law and order, and the observance of the principles of quality, security and moderation is waning. As nationalism and xenophobia are disappearing and a tolerance of *Weltanschauung* is flourishing, the moral norms and values are violated. Parasitic para-communities are in power. They have taken control of the economic, political and cultural systems, and now they are manipulating the systems and the people to promote their illegal particularist interests, which are detrimental to the whole. Particularism has gotten the better of the general values in private lives, in public activity and in the organization of the whole. The equilibrum between general values and norms and particular ones is not assured any more.

As we can see, post-Communist countries are finding it difficult to face the challenges issued by globalization, just as it is the case of the African and Latin American countries. In particular, the growth of the crime rate and the criminal activity cause plenty of problems. These factors are becoming the integral parts of our culture understood in the broadest sense. Although they are observed worldwide, their scale seems much larger in the post-Communist countries than in the West. The number of assaults and robberies increases each year, and they are becoming more and more brutal and ruthless. The citizens have ceased to feel secure, and fear is spreading. It is becoming increasingly difficult to apprehend criminals, whose ties with the organizations of the administration and legal business are strengthening. The high crime rate is a facet of the more general processes of the corruption of the public and private sphere, which paralyze the law, institutions and organizations, undermine the economic system and discourage foreign investment. The scale of some of those phenomena may dwindle after certain Central-and-Eastern European countries have acceded to the European Union, although this will not provide the final solution of the problem. One may construe these pathological symptoms as effects of the accelerated transformation, but they may nevertheless take root and become a fixed feature of our

societies. *One of the most formidable challenges that countries transforming their political-and-economic systems must take up, is to develop a moral culture of public activity which will be compliant with our tradition*. This must become the fixed core of our cultures, necessary if the transformation is to be beneficial for the societies. And the flexible protective belt has to be built to defend it. All the undesirable factors may be remedied only by a conscious effort of the political and police élites and agencies, initiated by the administration and supported by the people.

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# From Totalitarianism to Universal Participation: Globalization and the East-Central European Experience

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The tide of history turned decisively against Soviet communism in 1989. Signs of its eventual rollback had been seen earlier, perhaps beginning with the liberation of the Caribbean island nation of Grenada in 1983, and, even more profoundly, with the election of the Cardinal Archbishop of Kraków to the Papal Throne in 1978. For a while thereafter, as with many a shifting tide, that of history appeared to stand still. The world seemed to bask in the sunlight of a new opening of relationships which had been obscured for half a century or more. A flourishing world economy (which one may suppose was at least partly caused by the sudden opportunity to turn real swords into real plowshares), unprecedented international peace agreements, and the commercial opportunity to rebuild the economies and infrastructure of East-Central Europe all contributed then (although not exclusively) to reverse the tide and to send it rolling in favor of a steady acceleration of the appearance of the phenomena of globalization.

Perhaps emblematic of the hopes for a new beginning that have accompanied this acceleration has been the statistic – valid until fairly recently – that no two countries with a McDonald's restaurant had ever gone to war against each other.[1] This statistic has been symbolic of a great hope that accompanies the present tendency of our world toward the formation of a global community. The hope is that the globalized world that is fast upon us will be, as it appears, a world of unprecedented economic and social participation, a world of expanding opportunities, and a world potentially without war. More worrisome to some, however, it also appears, potentially, as a monocultural world, a world in which the economic concerns of one or a few nations dictate political and cultural solutions for the rest.

Across the threshold of this new world, the nations of East-Central Europe have advanced as survivors of a difficult past. They have crossed not only into a world of cultural conflict, but also into a world of shrinking boundaries and expanding opportunities. They have entered into a situation of openness and participation which was literally foreign to them for half a century or more.

One might examine many factors in relation to this new situation, but we will here consider only one: the implications of the past experience of totalitarianism for the future participation of these nations in this new globalized community. We will do so by first taking a look at the inimical nature of totalitarianism for the possibilities of participation in a society. We will then briefly consider the nature of an authentic community and its characteristics, as well as the potential for

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[1] "The second indicator of McDonald's global significance is the idea developed by Thomas J. Friedman that 'no two countries that both have a McDonald's have ever fought a war since they each got McDonald's.' Friedman calls this the 'Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention.' Another half-serious idea, it implies that the path to world peace lies through the continued international expansion of McDonald's. Unfortunately, it was proved wrong by the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, which had eleven McDonald's as of 1997." George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society* (Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, 2000), 7, citing Thomas J. Friedman, "A Manifesto for the Fast World," *New York Times Magazine* (March 18, 1999), 84.

the formation of such a community within the phenomenon of globalization. Finally, we will draw conclusions for the prospects of the participation of the nations of post-Communist East-Central Europe in a global community, to see how these nations might best benefit from membership in that community and also contribute to its authentic formation.

**Totalitarianism and Participation**

Totalitarianism may be described as a systematic attempt to achieve total domination of all aspects of the lives of the members of a body politic.[2] It is a reflection and concrete application of an ideology, that is, of an absolute certainty that one possesses a truth that explains the world, from a to z, such that once one begins from an asserted premise, it is no longer possible to avoid reaching all of a given set of conclusions. As with all ideologies, that behind totalitarianism ultimately reduces to something strangely reminiscent of Gnosticism, in that one possesses a knowledge that redeems one from the imperfect conditions of earthly existence, with the added characteristic that one must also possess the right and the duty to impose that knowledge, or at least its consequences, upon others. In totalitarianism, it is the idea itself that saves; the individual is never important. In Gnosticism, *mutatis mutandis*, the correlate of "salvation" is ultimately achieved through the absorption of the individual into some variation of an oversoul, or other pantheist principle.

Chesterton once observed that the gnostic/pantheist (or, in the specific case of which he spoke, the theosophist) seeks unity in the world not by loving his neighbor, but by being his neighbor.[3] All pantheist devotions ultimately end in the annihilation of the concrete individual. The totalitarian variant on the theme is the reduction of the individual to an atomized particle of a greater, rationalized whole. This atomization is achieved in practice through the indiscriminate application of terror; just as love inspires love, and overflows to unite all those who are touched by it, so terror, when it is total, elicits radical separation and withdrawal from community. The precision of terror, moreover, lies in its randomness, which seals its assault on the personhood of its victims.

Totalitarian systems – which are not really societies, for to the extent that a true society exists, one must say that totalitarianism has not yet been achieved – isolate men and women, uprooting

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[2] In general, we wish to appropriate the conclusions and some of the analysis made by Hannah Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, new edition with added prefaces (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), and in "On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding," *The Hannah Arendt Papers at the Library of Congress*, Series: Speeches and Writings File, 1923-1975, n.d.

[3] G.K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy* (London: Bradford and Dickens, 1908), 224-225 (responding to Annie Besant [1847-1933], third president of the Theosophical Society): "A short time ago Mrs. Besant, in an interesting essay, announced that there was only one religion in the world, that all faiths were only versions or perversions of it, and that she was quite prepared to say what it was. According to Mrs. Besant this universal Church is simply the universal self. It is the doctrine that we are really all one person; that there are no real walls of individuality between man and man. If I may put it so, she does not tell us to love our neighbours; she tells us to be our neighbours. That is Mrs. Besant's thoughtful and suggestive description of the religion in which all men must find themselves in agreement. And I never heard of any suggestion in my life with which I more violently disagree. I want to love my neighbour not because he is I, but precisely because he is not I. I want to adore the world, not as one likes a looking-glass, because it is one's self, but as one loves a woman, because she is entirely different. If souls are separate love is possible. If souls are united love is obviously impossible. A man may be said loosely to love himself, but he can hardly fall in love with himself, or, if he does, it must be a monotonous courtship. If the world is full of real selves, they can be really unselfish selves. But upon Mrs. Besant's principle the whole cosmos is only one enormously selfish person."

them from a sense of their origins and making them superfluous, that is, separating them from a vision of their ends. Citing Arendt, "To be uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world at all."[4] The resulting sense that one is adrift on hostile seas is described as the decidedly inhuman state of loneliness:

What makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one's own self which can be realized in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the trusting and trustworthy company of my equals. In this situation, man loses trust in himself as the partner of his thoughts and that elementary confidence in the world which is necessary to make experiences at all. Self and world, capacity for thought and experience are lost at the same time.

The only capacity of the human mind which needs neither the self nor the other nor the world in order to function safely and which is as independent of experience as it is of thinking is the ability of logical reasoning whose premise is the self-evident.[5]

Those under the heel of totalitarian systems – to the extent that a system is really totalitarian – experience not equality, but only randomness. In the mad logic that stands behind totalitarian thought, true equality cannot be permitted, for it would stand as a semblance of the principle of identity. In its place, there is only randomness, the principle of endless division, and a bland kind of sameness which is a mere caricature of true equality. It is as though one were to build a society – or even a thought – not on an original One, but merely on an Indefinite Dyad.[6] The drive toward a semblance of "equality," however, is based not on a recognition of the original unity of persons, but is instead sublimated into an attempt ever further to divide persons – both from each other and within themselves – until a kind of least common denominator has been established which would permit their thorough aggregation as parts of a whole.

In the end, the true enemy of totalitarianism, as with any ideology, is being itself: being – experienced as true, in relation to the intellect; as good, in relation to the will; and as one, in relation to the deepest aspirations of the human spirit. Totalitarianism brooks no contradictions, either in theory or in practice, as any contradiction to its creed would represent the first rising of a human soul toward independence. The person under its yoke is lost in a matrix of alternate reality from which he or she is not allowed to escape. Its ice-cold reasoning, its self-evident logic, is experienced, by its minions, as their last support in the face of an ever-resilient reality which constantly threatens to encroach upon their ideological terrain.

Any recognition of a fundamental human dignity, coupled with a recognition of the true equality of persons in relation to their first origins and their last end, is the greatest threat to the successful formation of a totalitarian system. The energy of totalitarianism is therefore always directed, ultimately, at two focal points. One is the core of the family, as the repository of the

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[4] Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 475.

[5] Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 477.

[6] In passing, it seems ironic that deconstructionist attempts to deny the unity of thought in reaction against the super-logic of totalitarian thinking may actually invoke an epistemological methodology similar in one aspect to the anthropological methodology of totalitarianism. Deconstruction, at its heart, can be argued to involve a radical diversification of meaning into discrete units, and this diversification would seem similar to the radical diversification of persons that is a key to the establishment of totalitarianism. This possibility, which is here proposed as no more than a general suspicion, would require a separate study in order to be properly verified.

experience of one's origins as good in themselves. The atomization of society is achieved only by the subordination of family bonds to the needs of the greater society. Each person, reduced to being a part of a rationalized whole, can have no prior allegiance, and certainly cannot be permitted any prior support.

Most threatening, from within the family, to the rise of totalitarianism is the figure of the father. Totalitarian dictators typically usurp for themselves the role of universal fatherhood over all atomized members of society, reducing authentic fatherhood to impotence, and with it reducing the individual experience of one's own origins in a family, a people, or a given community, to merely accidental significance. These false fathers also falsify the individualized experience of human work, which is properly understood as a liberating occasion for exercising personal responsibility within the universal experience of human causality. They generate rootlessness and superfluousness as their deliberate results. Unresponsive, totalitarian bureaucracies intrude, moreover, into the inner lives of persons, destroying not only their privacy, but also every semblance of personal initiative. The disconnection of ideology from reality that drives the whole process destroys the dignity of human actions.[7]

The second focal point is the human conscience, the font of the interior life of each person. Conscience, more than merely a judgment about right and wrong according to a moral law (which is a correct, but incomplete, definition) is the privileged locus for the discovery of truth in the interior life of persons. The ethical meaning of conscience is derived from this deeper, existential meaning. By separating the person from the voice of conscience, even though this is only possible for a certain time and under a certain aspect, totalitarian systems seek to dominate even the interior of man. The person, thus emptied, becomes simply a functional vessel of the ideology.

In keeping with this denial of the interior life, the "vital sign" of complete totalitarianism may be said to be the silencing of the arts. The artistic dimension is a dimension in which the human person most evidently returns to the role of Adam, the primordial man who has received creation into his hands and must choose – must embrace personal responsibility – to give form to that creation and to participate in it. Art imitates life, and human life is replete with opportunities and occasions to practice this embrace of personal responsibility for oneself and for others. Along with the silencing of every creative impulse, totalitarianism foments two manifestations of a passivity of profound alienation, the twin attitudes of conformism, on the one hand, and evasion, on the other, when faced with the prospect of engaging other persons in an experience of community.[8] Once persons have been reduced, after all, to atomized parts of a whole, these parts may be sacrificed for the sake of the whole, and this sort of sacrifice becomes the stuff of quotidian experience.

Arendt notes,[9] curiously, the need of totalitarianism to do away with all activities which are autonomous in relation to the ideology. "To do something for its own sake" – and not for the sake of any reason connected with the ideology – is ultimately to do something for the sake of oneself. This is the role that games play in the life of a child, for instance. She cites Himmler's dictum to the Schutzstaffel, "There is no task that exists for its own sake," and the indoctrination pamphlets that emphasized to its members "the absolute necessity for understanding the futility of everything that is an end in itself." To engage in an activity that is an end in itself, is ultimately to affirm

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[7] Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 9.
[8] Wojtyla, Karol, "Osoba i czyn," in *Osoba i czyn, oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, third edition, ed. Tadeusz Styczen, et al., Czlowiek i moralnosc, 4 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1994), 43-344: 326-329.
[9] Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 322-23.

oneself as worthy of choosing one's own ends. It is to affirm oneself as spiritual. It is also to affirm that one is not, oneself, superfluous, existing only for the end that is the state.

Adolf Hitler, in *Mein Kampf*, praised the virtues of the Aryan commitment of the individual (as a part) to the state (as a whole) in a passage which is here worth quoting at length:

The Aryan is not greatest in his mental qualities as such, but in the extent of his willingness to put all his abilities in the service of the community. In him the instinct of self-preservation has reached the noblest form, since he willingly subordinates his own ego to the life of the community and, if the hour demands, even sacrifices it.

Not in his intellectual gifts lies the source of the Aryan's capacity for creating and building culture. If he had just this alone, he could only act destructively, in no case could he organize; for the innermost essence of all organization requires that the individual renounce putting forward his personal opinion and interests and sacrifice both in favor of a larger group. Only by way of this general community does he again recover his share. Now, for example, he no longer works directly for himself, but with his activity articulates himself with the community, not only for his own advantage, but for the advantage of all. The most wonderful elucidation of this attitude is provided by his word 'work,' by which he does not mean an activity for maintaining life in itself, but exclusively a creative effort that does not conflict with the interests of the community. Otherwise he designates human activity, in so far as it serves the instinct of self-preservation without consideration for his fellow men, as theft, usury, robbery, burglary, etc.

This state of mind, which subordinates the interests of the ego to the conservation of the community, is really the first premise for every truly human culture. From it alone can arise all the great works of mankind, which bring the founder little reward, but the richest blessings to posterity.[10]

This passage conveys chilling connotations to us today in light of the evil accomplishments of the Third Reich. Indeed, a few paragraphs later, Hitler insists that "The mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew. In hardly any people in the world is the instinct of self-preservation developed more strongly than in the so-called 'chosen.'"[11] The motto, "*Arbeit macht frei*," which marks the entrance-way to the Auschwitz concentration camp, indicates the focus of both his hatred and his project of racial purification with regard to the Jews. The very presence of the Jews, who were continually aware of both their origins and their destiny, was a threat to the foundation of a truly totalitarian regime based on Nazi ideology. The 'creative' *Arbeit* that would free the Jews from themselves and free the society from the Jews consisted in those conditions of living and working that could be imposed so as to separate them from their own consciousness of the dignity of their origins and destiny as such. This meant degrading them (and other groups or individuals which were designated for such treatment) to subhuman conditions while they would be used for the material benefit of the state, and, ultimately, it always meant killing them.[12]

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[10] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin [Mariner], 1999), 297-98.
[11] Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 300.
[12] Rocco Buttiglione comments that Auschwitz was "a place constructed for the destruction of man, for the annihilation of his dignity. . . . [B]y the programmed destruction of his spiritual personality it is scientifically demonstrated that he is not a bearer of any superior value but that he is merely a slightly more evolved animal than the others. . . . From this point of view, humanity is not what is most profound in man, but what is most superficial. . . . The ultimate purpose of the extermination camp is, in a certain sense, metaphysical: it shows that authentic human values in the name of which it would be right to defy power do not exist,

Soviet totalitarianism, in its Marxist ideological foundations, was equally neo-gnostic, although arguably even more crude in its approach and in its random application of terror. In the Soviet paradigm, the denial of the importance of personal origins and personal ends was expressed in the march of social history toward the realization of communism through a series of stages in which the protagonists would always be not individual persons, but social classes. The neo-gnostic element consisted in the denial of the value of the individual and his or her absorption into a social whole (ultimately, the neo-gnostic element in every totalitarian system is connected to its denial of the natural dignity of each concrete person). In practice, this meant that individual dignity, goals, freedom, and lives could be, and often were, sacrificed for the sake of the march of history. It also meant, for the nations of East-Central Europe that passed from Nazi to Soviet rule, that the targeting of the family and the individual conscience for totalitarian ends would continue unabated.

Regardless of the specific contents of the ideology on which it is based, every totalitarianism is always all about possession, the possession of human lives even to the point of their ultimate consumption. Its insatiable appetite for consumption extends inevitably – if it is really totalitarianism – to the conquering of the entire human race. It is thus essentially expansionist, in a way that the old empires never were, for it seeks to expand not only in time and space, but even into the interior space of the human spirit. It necessarily tends to the atomization of communities into fragmented, isolated units from which a new social whole, one that absorbs the individual, is constructed. Totalitarianism is itself, therefore, opposed by its nature to the kind of free participation in a common good which makes the true integration of persons in a community possible.

Ultimately, totalitarianism fails as a governing ethos because it fails to recognize the truth about the human person. Maritain once said,

The tragedy of the national totalitarian states consists principally in this: while they require the total devotion of the person, they lack and even repudiate explicitly all understanding and respect for the person and its interior riches. In consequence, they are impelled to seek a principle of human exaltation in myths of outward grandeur and unending efforts toward external power and prestige. Such an impulse tends of itself to generate war and the self-destruction of the civilized community.[13]

In the aftermath of totalitarianism, any prospect for the reconstruction of the civilized community will depend upon its faithful recognition of this truth, the truth that each human being has a greater dignity and worth, in concrete, than any state could ever have, even in theory.

## Authentic Community Is Founded on a Vision of Origins and Ends

We therefore contrast, to the experience of totalitarianism, the authentic experience of participation, to which we may here refer by the use of the term, *communio*. The term *communion* refers both to the act of coming together around a common good, and to the fact of the community

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because man is only matter, which can by material means be coerced to any end. If, therefore, there is neither truth nor justice in man, if these are only empty words, then in principle the root of all opposition to totalitarian power disappears." Rocco Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, trans. Paolo Guietti and Francesca Murphy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans), 1997, 13.

[13] Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 96-97.

that is formed as a result. The root meaning of *communis* is derived from *cum munus* – or from similar variants in all the Indo-European languages, that have to do with a coming together to achieve a common good, task, or end, which is public and involves a dimension of trust. This common good, if it is authentic, flows back not only upon the whole but also upon each participant in it, such that each person stands not in a part-whole relationship to the community, but in a whole-whole relationship. The common good, in turn, confers equality on all in the relationship. True equality is thus achieved, not according to a mathematical or distributive measure, according to goods received, but by an authentic commitment of oneself to others through and in relation to a common good.[14] The logic in play is the logic of the gift, the logic of the good as *diffusivum sui*, which is only experienced in *communio*.[15]

It is worth going into some detail here on the foundations of true human equality in relation to a common good. Equality under a conception of law or rights presumes a common good; it is the common good that is the principle and condition of all social equality. What arises from human existence as such is not merely equality, as if "humanity" were an abstract, accidental designation shared by all members of a particular species, but also the uniqueness that is the font and warrant of the inalienability of rights. Human persons have rights, not only because they are human, but also – and only – in so far as they are human beings. Put another way, humanity has no rights; only human beings have rights. Rights exist at the level of the actually existent. The being of the man – or woman – is prior to his – or her – designation by reason as a member of this or that species. Human being is, after all, a kind of being, not an abstract category. What exists is not "humanity," but individual human persons.[16]

Both the inalienability of rights and the foundations of equality depend on a recognition of the uniqueness and inviolability of each concrete human person as such, in relation to the ultimate Source of those rights and that equality. The greatest equality is that which is found in relation to the common good of all. The consideration of any other human being as a thou to be affirmed[17] leads inevitably back to a Source, a Source of Personhood, of the powers of intellect and will, and therefore of their ultimate objects, of Truth and Goodness, that is, it leads back to an Absolute Person. Further approach – always through beings – to this Absolute Person will lead to the perception that the Being that is absolutely present (that is, in act) is an Absolute Thou, and the resulting interpellation of the human person by this Absolute Thou is the foundation of all religious affirmation. Religious freedom, the freedom to approach one's Source in the way in which one's own conscience dictates, is thus recognized to be among the most inalienable of rights.

The experience of true religious freedom always involves the experience of a perceived invitation – never a compulsion – to a personal encounter with the Absolute. Such encounters seem to be able radically to commit persons to make choices about their own lives and about their relationships with others. Ideally, the free exercise of religious expression can foster a sense in society of responsibility for others (through the individual discovery of the Absolute as the

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[14] Cf. Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, 47-89, on the nature of the authentic participation of the person in society.

[15] The notion of *communio* is not at all opposed to distributive justice. Distributive justice is a necessary result of a commitment to an authentic common good. Nevertheless, what we might call "distributive" equality is only one dimension of the greater equality that results from such a commitment.

[16] In common language, we can speak of the "rights of humanity," or even of "crimes against humanity," but then we are always referring to rights, or offenses, involving a totality of individual persons.

[17] By this affirmation we mean the wish that the other person *be*, the recognition of the good that the other person *is*. *Volo ut sis*.

common good of all). Freedom and truth are thus able to meet, in this experience of responsibility, against the horizon of the Absolute. This sense of responsibility is manifested, in turn, in the civic virtues of solidarity and a will to participation, which predispose the person to a commitment to a relative common good.

The experience of equality among persons follows from such an experience of commitment to a common good. The common good renders equal all participants in the relationship relative to that good. The most fundamental equality, the foundation of all human rights, is experienced in relation to the Absolute Person as the ultimate, transcendent source, and the common good, or last end, of all persons. There is an absolute equality of all persons which depends on a reference to the absolute good, or last end, of all, and there is a relative equality which comes into play when forming a given community around a relative common good. Authentic communities are those communities in which the relative common good, and the relationships built around it, are consistent with the orientation of all persons toward the Absolute as their last end.

Various philosophers of dialogue have referred to the paradigm of an I-Thou or I-Other relationship at the foundations of human community.[18] In these largely phenomenological perspectives, based on universal human experience, the I, the self, is constituted as a "self" by its experience of others, and also constitutes that experience as well. There is a mutual interdependence of persons in the very experience of their personhood. Husserl, the father of Phenomenology, saw the beginnings of this constitution in the somatic pairing of oneself and another.[19] That is, the individual selfhood of the human person is first experienced in a concrete relation, and not in the kind of rationalized atomization that is typical of totalitarianism.

The deepest experience of the I-Thou relation that is had in human experience is the experience of the religious fact, the realization that there is an Absolute Person on whom one is dependent as a being, as a creature, and as a person, together with the experience of one's own interpellation by that Absolute Person. The foundations of the deepest meaning of human freedom, in fact, are found at the level of this interpellation. Freedom, more than a physical lack of restraint or coercion, is always properly spiritual. It is experienced as a threefold capacity: first, the capacity actually to make a choice at all; second, the capacity to specify that choice; and third, the capacity to carry it out. Freedom, however, does not end there.

The greatest freedom is the freedom of the one who is actually on the path to the attainment of that, which he is seeking in the final analysis, that is, his last end. It is in this respect that freedom is dependent on the truth about the good. One is truly free only to the extent that one realizes himself as a person, and one realizes himself as a person only to the extent that he achieves his last end. The freedom of a given society also depends on its openness to the truth about the good that it seeks as a society, its common good.

Now, admittedly, this appeal to a definite truth about the good as a criterion for human freedom begins to sound a little like totalitarian thinking, which itself seeks to assert a central truth about the purpose of the body politic and to organize its entire life according to that truth. Appeals to an all-explaining, absolute truth, after all, are typical of the siren songs of totalitarian temptation. The existence of a notion of absolute truth, when poorly understood, may appear to be in itself an

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[18] Cf., e.g., Martin Buber, *Ich und Du* (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1923); Emmanuel Lévinas, *Autrement qu'être, ou, Au-delà de l'essence*, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1974); and Karol Wojtyla, "Osoba: Podmiot i wspólnota," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24, no. 2 (1976): 5-39. We are here following, especially, the approach of K. Wojtyla.

[19] Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995), 89 ff. (Fifth Meditation), and especially, 109.

occasion of totalitarian temptation. When properly understood, however, it is clear that the existence of this notion can never be the cause of such a temptation. The totalitarian temptation is rooted above all in the failure of charity. When we fail to see other persons as persons, as endowed with a natural and inalienable dignity, when we fail to perceive other persons as the greatest good we can encounter in life and as the greatest wealth of society, we naturally see them as threats, as obstacles to be overcome, or, as ultimate units to be isolated and organized, for the further benefit of a rationalized whole.

The fundamental difference between forced, totalitarian aggregation and free, authentic community is also better understood in reference to a distinction between humiliation and humility. Both terms come from humus, earth, and they are often wrongly equated, as though humility consisted in denigrating one's accomplishments, or claiming to be less than one is in reality. Actually, humility consists in recognizing the dignity of one's origins and all of the consequences that follow therefrom. Man came from the earth, but he did so by an act of creation, that is, he was loved into existence. Man's dignity stems from his Source. Humility is thus, in the famous Carmelite expression, "to walk in the truth."

Humiliation is, instead, the reduction of man to the mere earth from which he was created. It is the denial of one's true dignity. Where existential humility implies a dependent dignity, a reference to a transcendent Source, existential humiliation seeks to impose an impossible state of rootless contingency in which the person is severed from his origins in Esse, isolated from his context as a free creature, and denied his true place in the metaphysical order. The humiliation of totalitarianism consists in such a reduction of the person, who is naturally a whole, an end in himself, to the condition of a part, a mere means to an end. Humiliation, necessarily false, is without value for achieving true freedom. Humility, on the other hand, is essential to it.

True participation in community requires humility, because it requires that persons embrace a common good, and that they embrace that good as true. Humility is the guarantee that one is dealing not in ideology but in reality. The only way to do that is to refer one's actions, and oneself, to one's Source, i.e., to the Absolute Person. Faith, the attitude of religious experience that seeks to experience the most profound, absolute Truth, Goodness, and Unity at the root of one's own being, to serve this truth (especially in other persons, who are the most vivid image of it), and thus to affirm this Absolute Being as one's own Source, is an attitude of humility. Ideology, the attempt to possess an all-explaining truth and to impose it on others, is ultimately a desire for consumption of persons, a desire for that which is to be affirmed and never consumed. It is an attitude which is necessarily linked to humiliation, including the humiliation of oneself.[20]

As humility is a way of truth, and as truth is fundamentally encountered in conscience, the formation of consciences is essential to a society recovering from any experience of totalitarianism. That human relationships are not merely the effect, but above all the foundation, of culture[21] is important to see, lest culture absorb all human relationships and the individual remain essentially alone. The most fundamental relationship at the foundation of all human experience is the relationship with the Absolute that is manifest to each person in the domain of conscience, the privileged locus for the discovery of the truth about the good.[22] Conscience, the

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[20] On the relation between faith and ideology, cf. Maciej Zieba, O.P., "The Temple in the *Polis*: Faith is not Ideology," *Crisis* (January, 1994): 41-45.

[21] Cf. Maciej Zieba, O.P., "Two or Even Three Liberalisms," *Dialogue and Universalism* 5 (1994): 89-97, 91.

[22] Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Message for the 50th Anniversary of the Permanent Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO),* December 11, 2002. In this

inner witness about the good, thus both forms a culture (as a proximate cause), and is also formed by it (as a proximate occasion, or at most, a condition, but not as a cause) through that culture's own witness to the good, that is, through the experience of its values. The authentic formation of each human conscience – something so individually personal that it is not ever possible to coerce, constrain, enforce, impose, or otherwise achieve by any other mass, impersonal solution – is particularly and paradoxically susceptible to the authenticity of the witness to the truth which is found in the values of a given culture. Every culture, for its own sake, must therefore insist on fomenting the conditions for the free and authentic exercise of freedom of conscience among its members.

Also essential to any society recovering from totalitarianism is a return to one's origins, both as a society, and as persons. In part, this return is also effected through the conscience. In the realm of conscience we can discover our end, paradoxically, in our beginning, in the Absolute Person who is our Creator, and we can thereby discover our origins. In the realm of ordinary experience, however, those origins, and a profound dimension of our relationship to the Absolute, are discovered in and through the family.

It is often, surprisingly, overlooked, when we speak of creation and our Source, that we are not created as adults. We learn to be persons, even as it is also correct to say that we are persons from the very first moment of our existence. That the human soul exists from the very first moment of the life of the human organism, that is, in the single-celled fertilized ovum, is philosophically evident from a consideration of the soul as that, which gives being and life to the body and which is the source of all its possibilities.[23]

The soul is there from the beginning – and since it is spiritual, it is there forever – or else we would have not the growth of an identical substance, but a mere series, involving the generation and destruction of successive substances. We are, therefore, persons, from the very beginning. Yet there is also a way in which we learn to be persons. Human maturity is a slow, gradual process, a worthy project, and an arduous task. It takes place, first and properly, within one's immediate family, which is the place in which one first and properly develops a sense of oneself. When one grows in family with the experience that one is affirmed, loved for oneself, one grows into a healthy human person. When part of this experience is lacking, the person starts out, as Buttiglione has observed, on a mistaken path, from which only the intervention of God, the Absolute Source, can save it.[24]

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message, the Pope emphasized that the nation "is the forge in which the sense of the common good is created, where one learns what it means to belong to a culture, through language, the transmission of family values and formation in the common memory," and he further emphasized the importance, for an authentic globalization, of reaffirming the person in his origins and his ends: "Building bridges between human beings, and, even sometimes rebuilding them when the folly of war has worked to destroy them, is a long-term, never finished project that entails the formation of consciences, the education of youth and the change of mentalities. This is a major opportunity for a globalization that will not produce a homogenization of values or reduce everything to the laws of the global market, but rather bring about the possibility of pooling the legitimate treasures of each nation in order to serve the good of all."

[23] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Malo*, 4, 4, obj. 6, et ad 6: "Anima secundum suam essentiam est forma corporis, dans ei esse et vitam" and "etiam est principium potentiarum."

[24] Rocco Buttiglione, *L'uomo e la famiglia* (Roma: Dino, 1991), 14-15: "Quando fin dal principio il rapporto tra figli e genitori è vissuto nella prospettiva dell'obbligo e del debito, piuttosto che in quella dell'amore e del dono, la vita di chi viene al mondo si avvia per una strada sbagliata, dalla quale solo la potenza di Dio può riscattarla, una strada che chiude la via originaria attraverso la quale l'uomo giunge a divenire consapevole di sé e del senso della propria esistenza." English translation (Joseph Rice): "When

Just as the totalitarian state lays a false claim to universal fatherhood, so also totalitarianism seeks to affirm the state as the origin or source of the person. One form such an affirmation takes is the usurpation of the divine decision about who will or will not temporally come (or cease) to be, or about what form their temporal coming (or ceasing) to be may take. It is no accident that totalitarian regimes, typically, begin by fostering practices such as abortion and euthanasia, and end by requiring them through coercion.

Here it is worth noting a curious parallel. Often, politicized discussions about ethical issues involving life's beginning and end, and who should be allowed to live or to die, are framed, in Western democratic societies, in the language of choice.[25] There is an apparent difference, for example, between a society that engages in forced abortion, and one that permits free abortion, just as there is an apparent difference between a society that engages in forced euthanasia, and one that permits free euthanasia. At a deeper level, however, a level that considers the person who dies, the difference is found to be only apparent, and even so merely accidental as to be almost insignificant. In fact, when it is the weak and defenseless who are exposed to danger, attitudes more properly associated with consumerism, in which the clamor of individual appetites becomes a social criterion for action (even, as is the ideal, in an enlightened fashion), are found to be strikingly similar to explicitly totalitarian attitudes. The totalitarian openly falsifies freedom as a right to conform; the consumerist merely reduces it to a 'right to choose,' and, yet, with the practical effect that this 'right' will always b wielded by the more powerful at the expense of the less powerful.[26]

The totalitarian state openly absorbs the freedom of the individuals under its control; the radicalized consumerist society quietly usurps the freedom of persons who are marginalized and denied sufficient relevance such as to deserve the protection of the greater part of society. This radical consumerist attitude toward others as unworthy of rights can be widespread within a

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right from the beginning the relationship between children and parents is lived within the perspective of obligation and debt, rather than within that of love and gift, the life of the one who comes into the world starts out on a mistaken path, from which only the power of God can rescue it, a path which closes off the original way through which man arrives to the point of becoming conscious of himself and of the sense of his own existence."

[25] This example is in no way meant to deny the sincerity of many persons who take positions in favor of abortion or euthanasia, nor is it to polemicize or trivialize the difficult decision of a woman who decides to carry a child to term, or of a person in the monotonous throes of terminal illness, and all of the social and other pressures that may be brought to bear with regard to their decisions. Nevertheless, it is a useful example, because it provides a clear occasion for distinguishing between different, but equally reductive approaches to what should essentially be only a moral and scientific argument: if abortion, or euthanasia, does not involve the taking of a human life, it should no more be regulated than orthodontia; if it does involve the taking of a human life, then the community will only be authentic if it affirms the paramount value of that life without exception (leaving intact the possibility of merely apparent exceptions, such as the application of the principle of double effect, or the legitimate withdrawal of extraordinary means that prolong life or increase pain without just cause). Again, the example is not used to polemicize the issues involved, but to show how totalitarianism and consumerism both tend, *in extremis*, to endorse an unchecked operation of the will of the most powerful, whether characterized as "creative force" or as "personal choice," without reference to the truth about the good.

[26] One must distinguish between consumerism as an inauthentic attitude of some persons toward other persons, and consumerism as the organizing ethos of a society. True consumerism as an organizing ethos cannot be said to exist wherever – or to the extent that – individual rights are explicitly recognized, affirmed, and protected. Not every "consumer society" is yet "consumerist."

culture, for instance, manifesting itself in business practices which put at risk the integrity of the natural environment or the long-term health of persons, but nowhere is it so clearly seen as it is with regard to those weak and defenseless persons who dwell in the realms where life meets its origins and the approach of its temporal end. Decadent consumerism results then in the absolutization of the "choice" of the powerful and the nullification of the "choice" of the powerless.

Radical consumerism thus, left unchecked, tends even to the consumption of persons, that is, to the appropriation of prerogatives and rights which are theirs by nature and inalienably. The choice for those post-communist nations who seek to develop as authentic communities is not, therefore, a choice between totalitarianism and consumerism, as competing ideologies, but a choice, free of ideological tinges, between the affirmation and the negation of the inalienable dignity of each concrete person. In fact, the fundamental difference between totalitarianism, on the one hand, and what most people call consumerism, on the other, consists not so much in their attitudes toward persons, which are ultimately similar, as it does in the presence or absence of a systematic, organizing ideological principle. Ordinary, practical consumerism is limited in the damage that it can do, because its organizing principle is by nature individualized, depending on personal appetites, and thus tending naturally to fragmentation. Certain structures, however, may conceivably grow out of a cultural void left by the gradual ideological acceptance of consumerist attitudes (and the consequent loss of the foundational affirmation of persons that is the fundamental premise of community), and these structures may not only lend institutional credibility to consumerist attitudes, but may even encourage the coming-to-be of totalitarian regimes.

One imperative for the nations of East-Central Europe will thus be a negative imperative: to avoid adopting the consumerist-individualist attitudes of certain Western societies, while also turning away from a totalitarian past. The fundamental errors about the human person and the formation of human community that stand at the center of totalitaria thinking can also be found, in a different way, in consumerism.[27]

There is also, however, a positive imperative for the peoples and nations of East-Central Europe, and that is to bring to the nations of the West a thirst for a common renewal of both Eastern and Western societies, based on a recognition of the dignity of the human person in his origins and ends. Such a renewal would involve reestablishing and strengthening the primacy of the family in society, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, and within an ambience of freedom of

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[27] Cf. Pope John Paul II, *Discorso alla Conferenza Episcopale della Romania in visita "Ad limina apostolorum."* March 1, 2003: "The process is taking place of Romania's integration into the larger ambit of the European Union and of the institutions of the Continent . . . . It is, undoubtedly, a positive fact, although the risk exists of certain ambiguities. . . . The impact, with a vision under certain aspects conditioned by consumerism and egoistic individualism, can imply the danger that your fellow citizens will not know how to recognize the values and anti-values of Western society, and will end up by forgetting the Christian riches present in their tradition . . . . In becoming part of European structures, the Romanian people must remember that not only do they have something to receive, but also a rich spiritual, cultural and historical heritage to offer in benefit of the unity and vitality of the whole Continent . . . . Forged by harsh historical and recent trials, your communities must know how to maintain solid their adherence to the millennial heritage of Christian values, which they have received from their forefathers and in which they have been established." [English Translation by *Zenit*]. Earlier, in the Encyclical Letter *Centesimus Annus*, John Paul had already indicated an alternative path, in which the need for consumption would not become a drive to consumerism: "It is therefore necessary to create life-styles in which the quest for truth, beauty, goodness and communion with others for the sake of common growth are the factors which determine consumer choices . . . ." – *Centesimus Annus*, 36. Cf. et *Centesimus Annus*, 42, in which John Paul issued a measured call for economic freedom balanced by a recognition of the dignity of the human person.

expression (especially religious expression) that will help persons to recognize their dignity in their Source, a healing recognition in itself. Note that this affirmation in no way implies support for a confessional state as a reaction against atheist totalitarianism.[28] In fact, for the reasons stated above, it can only be valid within a framework of true religious freedom, including freedom of religious expression.

## Meeting the Challenge of Globalization

Globalization essentially involves the potential formation of an inclusive community par excellence. One essential difference between this community and other communities is not merely that this one is larger, but that this is one from which there can be no escape, in practical terms. It is not immediately clear how it is necessarily the result of a free commitment of persons to a common good, nor is its authenticity in any way guaranteed, as its correspondence to the truth about the human person remains open to question.

The term "globalization" is also used to refer to what is perceived as an inexorable process toward the formation of such a community, especially in the economic and political sectors. Ethical principles that must govern the formation of this community in order for it to remain faithful to the dignity of each concrete human person include, for example, the principle of the universal destination of goods, the principle of solidarity, and the principle of subsidiarity, especially in reference to the family. Likewise, it is essential that there be a just appreciation for the unique contribution that each cultural dimension can make to the wider community. Individual cultures must not simply be absorbed into a greater monoculture based on political or economic conerns, any more than persons should be absorbed into the state.[29]

To the extent that an affirmation of the dignity of each concrete human person – and not merely of abstract humanity – is made the focal point of globalization, the potential will exist for an authentic human community to be formed through it. Ideological abstractions from this dignity, on the other hand, such as those typical of any sort of utopian thinking, make it impossible for such an authentic community to be formed.

Globalization represents, for the nations of East-Central Europe, both a challenge and an opportunity. It is a challenge, because there is no guarantee that the new, global community to be formed will in fact be authentic in its approach to the human person. It is an opportunity, because these nations have a particular contribution to make to the global community, based on their

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[28] Cf. Maciej Zieba, O.P., "What Sort of Open Society? Political Community in the Light of *Centesimus Annus*," *Dialogue and Universalism* 7-8 (1997): 107-22: 113; and "Ten Monastic Observations on the Toils of Exiting Out of Communism," presented to the conference, *A Case Study for Cuba's Freedom: The Transition from Socialism to Capitalism in Poland*, Miami, 1998.

[29] A multicultural approach is essential to the successful formation of a global community. Equally to be avoided, however, are the two extremes of monoculturalism and extreme multiculturalism. A radicalized multiculturalism – in which diversity is the greatest value, for its own sake – actually militates against the formation of a greater community. As both Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, X, 3, 1054b, 23ff.) and Aquinas (*De Potentia Dei*, 3, q.7, a.3, r.2) have pointed out, "diversity" is a state of absolute otherness, in which there is no possibility of any relation among beings, while difference is a state of relative otherness, in which there yet exists a relation among beings. Unity is found only in difference (with its relation), and by definition, never in diversity. In other words, the successfully multicultural approach is one in which what unites us all as human persons takes precedence over that which distinguishes us culturally. Such an approach, paradoxically, also supplies the greatest guarantee that the integrity of individual cultures will be appreciated and preserved for future generations.

experience of totalitarianism and its aftermath. The essential contribution of the nations of East-Central Europe to the successful globalization of the communities of the world into one will be the clarification of the authentic good, the good of the person, that must be affirmed. This contribution will, one can hope, be felt in the economic and political spheres, but it must be felt, above all, in the cultural sphere.

The gradual coalescence of a globalized community should be a project more than a process. More than a mechanism, the formation of a global community is a public task, a good to be sought for the sake of oneself and others. It has, in potential, all of the characteristics of a legitimate common good. The real danger in globalization for societies exiting from totalitarianism and seeking to recover or reestablish a lost or damaged sense of community, is that globalization may be taken out of focus. The focal point of globalization has to be, in all respects, the dignity of the human person. Because of the essential totality that already belongs to the globalized community, the step to totalitarianism can be indeed a short one, once this focus on the dignity of each concrete person has been lost.

The nations of East-Central Europe can ensure that the dignity of the person is consistently reaffirmed by adopting two fundamental positions as prerequisites for their participation in the project of globalization. The first fundamental position is that this dignity must be reaffirmed in relation to the origins of the human person, through the strengthening of the family. The family will be strengthened, in turn, to the extent that society reaffirms the value of fatherhood[30] and the integrity of the parent-child relationship. This reaffirmation will lead to a consideration of the fundamental human right to life, including the right to be respected in one's coming-to-be and in one's reaching the natural term of one's life, as paramount, at all stages, but especially at those stages at which the person is naturally most dependent on others.

The second fundamental position is that the dignity of the person must also be reaffirmed in relation to the true last end of the human person, through the positive fostering of conditions conducive to the integral formation of individual consciences, including the safeguarding of the necessary economic, legal, political, and cultural conditions that will confirm the freedom of the individual person in his or her search for the truth about the good. Conscience, by its nature, can never be forced, but it must, also by its nature, always be formed. Just laws and customs tend to reinforce the formation of a just conscience, just as unjust laws and customs may often prove occasions of its perversion. The public witness of the nations of East-Central Europe to the truth about the human person can be a powerful force toward the reconciliation of all consciences to the recognition of that truth.

Outwardly, the phenomenon of totalitarianism appears as a reduction of persons for essentially administrative purposes to some partial dimension of their existence. Radical consumerism itself also tends exclusively to quantify the person, for example, with its fundamental message that human happiness is to be found in the possession of finite material things, and not in the possession of an infinitely greater Good. Similarly, one danger in the formation of any all-encompassing global community is that it might tend to deal with persons in a merely quantified fashion. While there is nothing wrong with quantifying anything, including persons, in a just context, there is something wrong with reducing the person to quantity alone, without any respect for the essence of human personhood, the free, human potential for goodness and truth. It will therefore be necessary for all nations to strive to ensure that economic concerns not be allowed simply to dictate choices in the political or cultural spheres, thereby potentially reducing the participation of persons

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[30] Here the term "fatherhood" is to be taken also in its widest and most inclusive supposition, as embodying the value of every exercise of *parenthood* as a free undertaking of responsibility for another.

in the greater community to a merely commercial or quantitative dimension. It will also be necessary for all nations to detect and reform bureaucratic structures and methods which are inconsistent with the dignity of the human person. It is particularly imperative that the nations of East-Central Europe, with their totalitarian past, sincerely assess, and where necessary, utterly reform their own social and governmental structures to the extent possible so as to be able to see clearly enough to prevent inauthentic structures from forming at the global, or even continental, level.

One final, particular contribution that these nations can make to the just shaping of the emerging global political, cultural, and economic configuration, is the contribution of a profound and prudent realism about the potential of global governmental structures both for good and for ill. Unless informed from within by a true sense of the dignity of the origins and ends of each concrete human person, such global structures can tend to glide toward the establishment of totalitarian policies. Any authentic blueprint for the future must emphasize and reinforce the positive role of the family as the most fundamental of all natural communities. Against those who would claim that "it takes a village [to raise a child],"[31] it must be remembered that it will always take families to raise the children who will give authentic form and meaning to any such global "village." Likewise, each nation must preserve its own heritage, and resist economic and political pressures that tend instead to a kind of bland monoculturalization. Each nation must endeavor to participate fully in the formation of a global culture, yet without sacrificing its own cultural integrity or its own valued traditions.

Just as totalitarianism, in its policies and attitudes, attacks the transcendent value of the person, in his origins and in his ends, thereby seeking effectively to destroy his potential for participation in an authentic community life, so the nations of East-Central Europe, which have admirably surmounted totalitarianism, enjoy now a particular opportunity to inject a greater appreciation for the value of the human person, in his origins and in his ends, into the dynamics according to which a global community is being formed. Theirs, however, is an opportunity, not an inevitability. Theirs is also, in some ways, a profound mission. To the extent that it is actually accomplished, it may be expected to contribute to the creation of conditions conducive to rendering that global community truly authentic.

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[31] Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Address to the Democratic National Convention*, August 27, 1996. Cf. idem., *It Takes A Village: And Other Lessons Children Teach Us*. New York : Simon & Schuster, 1996. The original, complete phrase ("It takes a village to raise a child") is an African proverb, and, within the context of the extended family structures of Africa, there is probably no contradiction at all between the position that "it takes a village" and "it takes a family." Outside of that context, however, and especially in Western societies, in which the family is not only no longer extended, but has become virtually fragmented, the phrase loses its original meaning and becomes a slogan for the social engineering of alternative structures designed to replace the family as the foundation of society. In such social engineering there is a discernible echo of the totalitarian temptation to remake our origins and our ends. A possible antidote to this temptation can be here applied by endeavoring to ensure that the global village bears the characteristics of an extension of the family, including the family of nations, rather than permitting the family – or any given nation – to be reduced to being a mere, functional unit of the global village.

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**Chapter III**

# Globalization: Between the Tower of Babel and Jacob's Ladder

*Magdalena Dumitrana*

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Slogan, menace or benefit, the world *globalization* seems to have become an indispensable part of the political, social and intellectual discourse and by ricochet even a part of the social-religious speech. This word is prepared and forecasted by the word *integration* and used many times, purposefully of course, as a synonym for *communication*; not a few times globalization is seen as an essential trait of both modernity and future. On the other side, globalization, is considered different in the different discourses; the concept is either accepted or rejected. Both positions seem to lack coherence within. The banker equalizes the globalization with the extension of the financial power, while the philosopher's or literati's only dream is to rediscover the "language of birds" which would allow for universal communication. Similarly, the opposition to the globalization differentiates itself by a different argumentation. References are made to the independent state; to the cultural preservation of the nation and its archetypal roots; to the necessity of the safe-keeping of the groups' and communities' individuality and creativity against the aggressive globalising homogenisation.

Presented as an (almost) accomplished fact, the globalization is contradicted by the crumbings, opposition and different world conflicts. Additionally, this concept, exhibited as being universal, as an objective aim to which the "good" forces are tending to, is actually an almost complete unknown notion to the large world population. The globalization paradise is far from being a matter of concern for common people.

## The Vocation for Globalization

Globalization is not an invention of the present times. It is not even the exclusive product of expansionist tendencies of any kind. Since the moment man became at all aware of his limits, he nurtured the wish to surpass them. Beginning with the paradisiacal couple, the history of earth is a long illustration of the disparities between excessive aspirations, disadapted actions and justificative theorizations. The human being's need for fulfilment, for integrality which comes to light periodically, mainly in the philosophers' and great believers' thinking, is an objective necessity. That is why it is so believable and accepted at any level of communication. Man's openness to completion and fulfilment made him at the same time vulnerable to the utilization of the idea of integrality for goals aiming to partial benefits. The empires gained by the army force were all built on the desire to dominate and 'civilize' if possible the *entire* world. However, the declared wars being a costly way with not always satisfactory results, the political and the financial methods were eventually preferred, due to also, their discrete techniques; in this way the possible attempts to prevent their effects were precluded and the last ones to become visible. Though the scenario is mainly the same, it continues to have the same efficiency.

Therefore, in the simplest way, the individual's calling, deeply rooted in his spiritual being, for regaining his lost part and expressed differently according to the culture and history, this vocation for integrality is found more and more functioning only on its lower levels: conquest, domination incorporation, communication (in a technical sense) over the larger and larger communities, finally over one single community.

In this way, the initial circle of creation is reconstituted, but at this time at the first floor and not at the ninth floor of a building ambitiously high, the elevator inside being out of work. The divine integrality is represented only by its farthest and least loving step-sister – the Earth Empire called globalization.

It is noticeable that those who were firstly anxious about this phenomenon were not the politicians, financiers or the philosophers. Cassandra's role concerning the predictions on globalization was assumed by writers. Passing from 17th to 18th century, Jonathan Swift utilizing the magic abilities of the inhabitants from Glubbdubdrib, was laughing while deploring a mankind which were rapidly degradating itself. Confessing that the modern history was most despicable; he was also noting, as an example justifying his opinion, the official document that was established the grandeur of the all powerful emperor of Liliput – the king dwarf, the relish and the terror of the universe, monarch of monarchs, whose feet reach the centre of the globe and the top of his head reaches the sun (1, pp. 48; 232-237).

Two centuries later, at the beginning of the technological era, another English writer, H.G.Wells, abandoned the bitter and boring description of the megalomania of his present times for a vision of the 21st century: one single cosmopolitan social organization dominates everywhere and everywhere its rules are to be observed. The whole world lives in cities and is civilized. The whole world is one property. People have lost their faith in God, keeping in exchange the faith in private property. English will be the language spoken by two thirds of people of the planet. One single political power has everything under control, though the appearances of the political organizations and parties are still preserved. Their good intentions are weak and easy annihilated by way of bureaucratization of the system and corruption and in that manner the political parties become, all of them, just exchange-agency offices (2, pp. 332; 337). It seems that in this summary account of the vision, the English writer proved not that much of intuition but of premonition, even clairvoyance. Unlike the theoretical systems of any kind addressing an extremely restricted audience, literature has a wider range of receptors and a remarkable power of conviction when compared to philosophies and ideologies. For this reason, an important part of the writings established under the umbrella of science-fiction induce in the reader what has to be induced. The great Science Fiction authors, among which Isaac Asimov is the most convincing by his literary ability and apparently rational discourse, take over the "gene" of integrality, skip Wells' shadows and present the globalization as already accomplished. Moreover, they amplify the respiration of the globalization, extending its breath over the planetary system and beyond. Asimov's Foundation saga is typical. Presenting an earth without borders, ruled by one single and rather invisible power – an earth with a homogenized population, still divided in small groups by unnatural criteria, this kind of books displays a strong resemblance to many of the present day political discourses. The ones and the others consider the globalization as a necessary aim of mankind, as a phenomenon almost fully developed; the human events are discussed as behaviours, being determined by a central imperative nucleus; the language is full of alternatives and choices but the implicit content is only one: there is no alternative for the "golden era" of globalization and a possible refusal will implacably end in some unfortunate consequences.

The almost predetermined road toward an absolute unity of mankind is a common place of both the political discourse and so-called "S.F. novels." The difference is that the first type of conveying the message gives birth to opposition and confrontations while the same message, using the second type of vehicle is entirely accepted on the imaginary plane, preparing in this way the agreement in a real context.

A second common trait is the transition of an emotional and behavioural insecurity whence the weakening of will and nondiscriminative acceptance of the counselling. The "walk on the sand" is accompanied – and this fact is not at all unimportant – by the abolishing of any 'trance' of faith or religious sentiment. In the real life, the Church is just another bureaucratic institution in a state; in the imaginary life, offered by books, mass-media, etc., the Church is completely absent; or when however from some narrative reasons one of its representatives appears, he fails usually in his mission. Therefore, the only support of the "global" man is the City-earth with its downtown in West. In the Eastern Science Fiction literature the globalization is represented mainly by reference to the science and technology, secondly by the extension of the socialist ideology over the whole earth, with, however, borders still existing.

In the last years, the utilization of the imagery for the preparing of the globalization is directed progressively to younger ages. Literary representation is replaced by the visual one; children and adolescent absorb so called "ecologic" cartoons presenting global problems solved by witchcraft and/or violence.

In this way, man's fundamental need for integrality both of himself and of the world, a need involving coherence and emotional security, is efficiently fulfilled with the help of the poorer sister of integrality, viz., globalization. The absence of the interior liberty is copiously compensated by the promise of all kind of external freedoms.

The removed of borders, the communication using high technologies, liberty and joy – these are some of the refrains of globalization that certainly have their correspondence in the genuine human demands.

## The Phenomenon

The "slanting" use of the different means of influencing people in the way that their opposition to the mondial politics for globalization to be diminished or extinct makes that this whole history to not sound too sincere. Still, not too many proves can be brought: from the receptor position is difficult to appreciate if the transmitter is fully responsible for the message; on the other side, the boat even bent over by the wave of the suspicion, may be actually a safe vehicle. Therefore, though the predicted consequences of the globalization do not seem too pleasant, one ought to ask himself: is globalization really a phenomenon that has to be avoided?

With all the doubts, perhaps the first pertinent opinion belongs to the Lucid Politician. There are, declares this Politician, in the contemporary world, two main visions: the political hybris of the total control and the opposite disequilibrium, the one of the minimal control. As a consequence of the arrogance to detain the full control, the metamyths and megakillings were developed. The idea of God was replaced by the secular fanaticism that claims to build the heaven on the earth, subordinating for this goal, both man and nature. The failure of a totalitarian attempt to create coercive utopias did not mean an awakening to reality, but it provided only arguments for another illusion about the world construction; the new vision rejects almost completely any kind of control, due to the ideological affirmation that all values are subjective and relative: "In brief, this century has seen mankind more from experimentation with coercive utopia to the enjoyment of permissive cornucopia, from a passionate embrace of absolutist metamyths to careless toying with relativistic agnosticism" (3, p. 27).

The more and more complex interaction between different regions of the world, due to the technology, education, to the fast travelling and modern communications, has totally determined the redefining of the meaning of time and distance and has generated rapid alterations – on the

subjective level: in the social mores and on the objective level: in the social context. To this, is added the lack of some shared philosophical criteria able to concentrate the society energies on every level and to define the direction and the beneficiary of the progress. This important absence gives free scope to the exercise of the political power motivated mainly by self – interest but presented as a democratic exercise of freedom. It is likely that in the period to come these data to lead to unpleasant consequences by the submission of the society to a haphazard game dominated by the dynamic interaction between technological power and philosophical sophistry. Adding an active political life having to confront the rising social frustrations, it is very probable the birth of new meta-myths, characterized by the same relativity (3, p. 29). Needless to say that this mega-meta-myth is already born and its name is globalization. But the main promoter of the globalization – USA, could not be credible – specifies Z. Brzezinski, former National Security adviser (Carter administration) as long as it will be maintained the inclination toward a cultural hedonism that prevents the development of a shared language with those major parts of mankind that are called to share, the American concept of a "new world order". Instead of feeling themselves as an active participant in a global society building, they have the feeling of exclusion. This, even though America will remain for some time to come the peerless superpower, its effective global sway may lack authority. Another fulfilled prediction (of the literates) related to the megamyth of the globalization is the uniformity of the most of the political actors' discourse, relying on the same cliches, almost the entire global dialogue being "suffused with ostentations reference and fervent proclamations of fidelity to the democratic ideal". Obviously, the rhetorical uniformity cannot be mistaken for the philosophical consensus. However, it is the task firstly, of the Western already established democracies to promote the conditions of the globalization. The main obstacle in this promotion belongs not to the poor countries, but depends to the attitude of the rich West: "Much of the West's political rhetoric about the world reflects that attitude: the less developed countries are viewed as politically primitive, economically backward and religiously fanatic. And while there may be same justification for such feelings, they also tend to betray a patronizing and parochial attitude, insensitive to the historical and cultural factors that prevented other societies from pursuing the same path as the West" (3, p. 30).

The essential error that lies underneath of these reasoning and attitude belongs to the philosophy of history and is the assumption that historical development is unilinear and that imitation of the West is the only positive option open to others. A second major obstacle undermining the West capacity to legalize its role of leader of the globalization is the exclusion of religion that can reach extreme accents: "The prevailing orthodoxy among intellectuals in the West is that religion is a waning, irrational and dysfunctional aberration" (3, p. 31). Or, in most of these cases, people see religion as defining for life in itself. The global phenomena constitute a reality, unfortunately at this stage, mainly in their negative side. However their power and extension certainly surpass the power of the nation-states to solve the situations; without self-denying, these states have necessarily and even urgently to cooperate for coping with the global aspects: peace, welfare, environment. In the context, globalization means that the states must work together in the setting of a larger community reflecting what unites them and within which the rich states to restrain considering themselves, as are tempted to do, as models to follow; at present ,the rich countries cannot offer a coherent absolute model.[1] The reductionist mode of thought, imposing on

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[1] In this context, Z. Brzezinski observed the same negative traits in this country: "The American society cannot be the model for the world – both morally and as a matter of practical economics – if a predominantly cornucopian ethic defines its essence, while a sizable but impoverished minority is simultaneously excluded from meaningful social participation. Preoccupation with the satisfaction of material desires that are

another states doctrinal and technical solutions has to be replaced not only by a cooperative attitude but also, by a conscious change both in values and in conduct which includes a cultural and philosophical re-evaluation. Starting from here only considers Zbigniew Brzezinski, the real global solution can be foreseen.

Still, this expectation cannot be fully accomplished. There is collaboration, there is a strong cooperation, however they are realised only at the level of the political will. The important opposition, in many countries, against the decision for globalization demonstrates enough that the finality of this process is not concerned with the benefit of the nations as a whole, but is related to the exclusive power over these nations.

**The Philosophy**

The pertinent opinions of one single politician, even of an important one, are not the opinions of the politicians and do not have the force to change the direction in which mankind seems to be driven. However, the politician's lucidity together with the call to philosophy (implicitly to religions), increase the credibility of existence at least of one alternative in the tarnished landscape of the discourses on globalization. Therefore, a question might arise from here, if and to what extent philosophy can determine consistent and common sense changes in the ideology of power. Even from the beginning an answer can be obtained: yes it is possible. The argumentation is founded not on what philosophy effectively does but on what it does not. This absence is due to the hindrance philosophy meets in materializing its models of conscious thinking and *Weltanshauung*. There are, however, few exceptions – when parts of philosophies are converted into ideologies. The simplest method is to take over the excessive subjective literature and to utilize it as a *disorganising* philosophy. That explains why, from time to time, Nietzsche comes back 'in fashion', as a reliable permanent source of nurture and motivation for the vanity of human weakness. A. MacIntyre predicted otherwise, a periodical return of the Nietzschean prophetical irrationalism, the absurd solutions of which perpetuate – actually – the problems addressed: every time the people sink into the bureaucratic culture of our times they try to think about the moral fundaments of what they are. Therefore, it is possible to predict surely enough that in the apparently so different context of the modern societies, bureaucratically administered, there will periodically appear social movements characterized by precisely that kind of prophetical irrationalism proceeding from Nietzsche's thinking (4, p. 134). The "weak thinking" is a such (non) philosophic product unifying Nietzsche's ideas with the powerful current of the contemporary spiritual dissolution (facilitator, as a matter of fact, of the pragmatic globalization). Its main herald, Gianni Vattimo, proclaims as a peak of knowledge, exactly the non-knowledge. He promotes convincingly, not only the consequences of the Nietzschean affirmations, but even many of the common people's opinions, the non-philosophers' beliefs: with the announcement that God is dead, Nietzsche annuls the fundaments, the principles, the prime essences and the ultimate finalities; these ones are only forms for quietening of the thinking in epochs when the technique and social organization did not allow people to live, as is happening today, in a more open and less magic horizon. The fundamental categories of metaphysics – as the ideas of the world totality, of a unitary sense of history and so on – are only means to discipline and quiet and they are no longer necessary in this present time of 'technique'. The announcement of God's 'death' finally becomes touchable and it will fulfil the future centuries (5. pp. 15; 19). Therefore, 'weak thinking' is the

growing more and more out of control can only perpetuate and deepen the objective and subjective gulf that is already dividing mankind" (3, p.35).

future of thinking, precisely because it does not think in categories, but is involved in the movement of these categories toward their own dissolution, driving the thinking subject, too. Between subject and experience, the parts, the proportion are continually changing by means of a figure, of a style, of a shade. The subject is shrinking while the experience is thickening. Does the subject disappear? Or rather the subject's smallness makes him finally able to recognize himself in his own experience? Does the experience multiply, merge, become illegible? Or, on the contrary, does it become so full of echoes that it is possible at least, to be heard? And how is it possible for this dissonance to be like a silence ? And moreover: does the subject unravel, break up, disseminate himself? of course, not. By becoming imperceptible, he recognizes himself, that he comes into a direct contact with himself . (6, p. 45).

About forty years earlier, Erich Fromm foresaw this kind of negative game and warned against the coming phenomena of disdain of metaphysics and relativeness of truth until its annulment as being a matter of taste. He predicted also the actions of destroying of any kind of world structured view together with the inducement of an 'outlook' composed by juxtaposed facts, lacking a value hierarchy (for example, the news about the bombing of a city is shamelessly placed in a TV broadcast next to soap or wine advertising); these facts lead to the decomposition of life into separate parts and the individual is left alone with these pieces, as a child having to solve a puzzle; but unlike the child, man does not see the signification of the broken whole. The disconnected pieces are called 'liberty of information'; this liberty is linked to the authority issue: during modern history development, the Church authority (and information) was replaced by the one of the state, the state authority was replaced by the authority of the consciousness and finally, the last was being substituted by the anonymous authority of the common sense and public opinion as instruments of the conformism. What follows from here is easy to infer: the paralysis of the capacity to think critically, the individual's alienation from the real facts, his attitude toward what is going on in the world becoming more and more boredom and indifference; the liberty of information is transformed into the aggression of information. Sadder, the person moves away from his own self; the lost self increases the necessity for conformity, since man begins to doubt about his own identity: one can be sure of oneself only by living according to the others' expectations. Thus, the modern man lives in the illusion that he knows what he wants though, in fact, he wants only what he must want. He conforms himself to the anonymous authorities and embraces an Ego which is not his. Therefore, the danger threatening the modern culture in its very human basis is the configuration of a disposition to accept any ideology and any ruler only because of the promise of a political structure and symbols that apparently give sense and order in an individual's life and some emotions related to these (7, pp. 209-215; 221).

It is not difficult to notice that the phenomena signalled by Fromm are already 'at home', facilitating the exercise of the ideology of the globalization over an important part of the world population, using intensely the already lost sense of self-integrality. Alasdair MacIntyre sees another aspect of the disintegration – the problem, he observes, does not consist only in the fact that we spend too much of our life in the middle of a diversity and multiplicity of scattered concepts, but also, because these fragmented concepts are used for expressing opposed and incompatible ideals and social politics and for offering a pluralistic rhetoric of which role is in fact, to hide the depth of the existent conflicts. An extreme acute conflict is the one between the political monopolizing ambitions on one side and what is called virtue on the other side; this virtue is submitted to the deterioration and disappearance in a society dominated by the pursuit of external goods; in exchange , the simulacra of virtues will proliferate (4, pp. 257; 205). At this moment, one can ask, rhetorically certainly if this society of simulacra and ambitious competition, still

circumscribed within every country borders, would be already globalised – as it started to be – what would be the chances of a normal, genuine way of life ?

A second aspect of contemporary politics which increases the degradation of the virtues is the manipulation of the moral categories for promoting economical and ideological interests, all of these under the banner of a progressive democracy. The pluralism results in the disintegration of another virtue, crucial for communities – that is, the patriotism: either by its attachment to a temporary government or by compromising it by the equalization to the chauvinism or, in fine, by its presentation as a derisory standard in an epoch of universal values, Patriotism, as loyalty to the country, to the community, looses its quality as central, incorruptible virtue; and thus, a new confusion is introduced .In the situation of too many and too dispersed moral concepts existence, driving a conflict between the genuine content of virtue and the deviant one ( imposed at present), it is very unlikely, in MacIntyre's opinion that solution will come from culture or philosophy: the moral philosophy, as commonly understood, reflects so closely the debates and disagreements taking place in culture, that its controversies prove to be as insoluble as political and ethical debates are. In this barbarian period, in which mankind has already embarked for a long time, the only modality of salvation is the building of local forms of community, within which the moral and intellectual life can keep its authenticity (4, pp. 205; 257-266).

One can see very clearly that the American philosopher has profound doubts concerning the effects of the economical and political actions for globalization, as long as these actions are not grounded in a moral consensus but, on the contrary, build their power on the dissolution of values and misappropriation of their genuine significations.

From a total different point of view, Jurgen Habermas thinks that the danger is not that imminent; all that is needed is opposition against the' planners of the ideology' who find motives and conflicts for perpetuating a negative movement for building of a material, non-metaphysical and opposed to the reason mentality by which the happiness and emancipation are equalized to power and production. Similar to MacIntyre, Habermas, too, sees the source of the constructive opposition in the local power as it is represented by nationhood; the path toward the universal passes through the nation tradition. If not in nation, then in what ground could be rooted the values with an universal character? – the German philosopher asks himself rhetorically. The fulcrum of the organized resistance consists in the existence of autonomous public spheres, that is – out of the financial and political power; these spheres appears spontaneously in the different sectors of the quotidian praxis and are sustained by the interior subjective cohesion, that is by solidarity. These forms of self-government, developing, will consolidate the collective capacity for action and will restrict the negative consequences of the political and economic (8, pp. 340-343).

Comments on the Utopian character of this solution are not needed. It is nonsensical for the 'non-metaphysical' power to allow the 'building' even spontaneously and temporarily, a zone out of its political and/or financial controls. The authoritarian control will exterminate this zone, the democratic one will help it to amplify itself; this last formula, promoted under the head of democracy is the most sure way to help the respective form to commit suicide, namely by bureaucratisation. It is a menace pointed out by Habermas, who shows how the goals of the organization begin to be detached by its members' orientations and attitudes, starting in exchange to depend on imperatives of conservation and extension of its patrimony; for reasons more affective than rational. The philosopher believes that this danger could be avoided.

On the other side, accepting that the creation of autonomous structures of opinion could come true at the local level and their actions could have some efficiency, still the question remains to what extent these independent self-organized forms could preserve their functionality and

adequacy within a globalised world. The independent opinions directed against the local political authority, lacking power in itself and almost totally subordinated to a more or less visible centre, would be just wasted energy in a battle against soap balloons. The "global" world has no specific centres of reference except the bureaucratic structures in which the office workers are just workers. The central authority power in such a world is visible mainly by the effects of its action – at the financial and economical level but especially from the ideological point of view and change of mentality. On an earth where the whole education and instruction system belongs to the same single source of influence, it is almost impossible to find completely independent individuals able to set up simultaneously and spontaneously in different parts of the world that kind of autonomous structure. Taking part in a discussion (as shaped by Habermas) with arguments including only social (political, economical) and rational categories, within which the culture refers mainly to science, philosophy, ethics and aesthetics of illuminist origin; a discussion considering the state resulted from the French Revolution as the only successful identity formation at the historical level that could be able to conciliate without coercion, the general and particular (8, p. 342) – on such grounds of debate it is difficult to find a path out that – being followed – does not lead to a *cul-de-sac*. The German philosopher's reference system lacks the spiritual category without which man's autonomy in society is very much like the fly's independence from the spider, while caught in its cobweb.

It seems that, whatever the adopted position and whatever the answer given to the questions of mundane contemporaneity, all the philosophers remark the same characteristic of the world, namely the slide towards a non-wished zone of life – the worship of body under all its aspects, from the particular to the general ones, manifefsted by the appetite for 'goods consumption', for the only goal of capturing *power* (of any kind). These material non "metaphysical" needs grow in intensity accordingly, as they extend their territory of influence. Started in this direction, visibly bent to the depth, the globalised world cannot live for long; based on force (not necessarily military) and excessive expansion, it already announces a world of more or less local conflicts and events getting out of control. Another source of conflicting anxiety is manifested among the power-*owners*, even. Built on an essential inner disequilibrium, the act of getting material gain, offering a transient pleasant disposition, determines at the same time and by this very relief, a secondary state of spirit – an unbalanced concern urgently requesting the preservation of this satisfaction; from here, a need also urgent for new material acquisitions. The phenomenon begins again, indefinitely, constructing step by step a ladder going inversely to the ascending direction. The non-metaphysical equilibrium cannot be a 'real' equilibrium even speaking in the terms of relativity; it constitutes only the model, the ideal towards which the downward movement tends; however the gods live both over and under the earth; the progression to the negative perfection is just a *hybris* of the mundane person: Babel, perceived as a tower towards heaven, is only a reflection of the real construction descending to the bottom of the water. Globalization, in the sense of negative transcendence, is nothing but an expression of the human *hybris*, generating (as it already has) the expected effects.

On the other side, the good intention and honesty in the correct projection of the objectives and means for achieving a balanced and fair, lawful globalization can have just partial and temporary results so long as only the 'tangible' categories and values (from material goods to ideologies) are taken into consideration. The philosophy that sees the history of the world only as a history of the human will and forgets, even for one instant, that behind all there is another Will and Intelligence (to speak the language of reason), has only two ways of thinking: the melancholy, despair and the abandon; or the philosophical, – substantiation of the *hybris* of the human illusion.

A man fallen into a pit projects his salvation 'inside' but totally related to the height. A rational but non-spiritual philosophy as well as a philosophy considering the transcendent but not identifying it 'inside' apparently disorganized phenomena are both subjected in the end, to the same fantasy developed during a sleep with bright dreams, but always still at the bottom of the pit.

Mircea Vulcanescu, a Romanian Christian philosopher, observed that despite the different modifications and all kinds of progress, man's attitude remains actually the same , from the beginning of times to modernity: the disconcerted mind which has lost its faith in the power of the intellect over the world, considered as manufactured by man, determines a feeling of the emptiness of abstraction', the fruits of which are the 'fall' into concrete, the thirst for experience, the adaptation to fragmentary life. Man loses also in this way the sentiment of transcendence, the idea that he is on this earth for a meaning surpassing his precarious life down here. Man organizes his effort for his terrestrial life acquisition, substituting it for the transfiguring vision of salvation brought by Grace. Today's man, as the man of the beginning of the modern times, is threatened firstly by his own success.

The Romanian philosopher does not address mankind. He speaks only to the Christian man, being at present, in a state of confusion and interior splitting. That is why his arguments are shaped in a Christian spirit: there are epochs which are more Christian and others which are less. But the most Christian of epochs means just 'time' and not 'in the times' that the Christian finds the world which will save him. The Christian man's relations to the modern time are not and cannot be anything else but relations to this world. And the earthly tragedy of the Christian is that he is forced to live split between two worlds, that his life is necessarily, an opening of wings, each of them fluttering in another world. This interior tear, this distress of man's heart till he will rest in God, is the price paid for our human face but also for being His creation struggling to not be lost (9. pp. 38; 40). Therefore, the Christian philosopher ought to be the model of a detached attitude toward the world but not equalising this disposition with non-implication. The Christian's life, divided in two planes, fulfils its aim and mission in the visible, but on the grounds of the invisible criteria. From this point of view, the globalization is not more than another temporary phenomenon of the world, or a perennial one, but still, a *passing* event.

## The Church

The anxieties of the discontinuities which man lives as they are being eternal in a world of the relative, are explained by Hans Urs Von Balthasar (in his theological use of a 'dramatic' scenario) as a confusion man made between God's 'stage' and the world's 'theatre'. In the first case, the decisive content of the actions is what God does. He acts on man, for man and then together with man. The world theatre, in exchange, is a stage of ambiguities. On the human stage, God 'plays' through human beings similar to a dramatic author; as St. Justin said in his *First Apology*, one can observe something similar in poets: an entire work has a single author, whereas the persons he causes to speak are several (10, p. 66). Every man interprets his role in this play, but what is essential is the man's need to recognize himself as playing a role. Being aware of this he is continually delivered from the sense of being trapped. Man, through the theatre, should acquire the habit of looking for meaning at a higher and less obvious level (11, pp. 20-22). In this way, "the closer a man comes to this identity, the more perfectly does he play his part. In other words, the saints are the authentic interpreters of Theo-drama. Their knowledge, lived out in dramatic existence, must be regarded as setting a standard of interpretation not only for the life dramas of individuals but ultimately for the history of freedom of all the nations and all the mankind". The

reference point for establishing the actual existence of continuity and value validity, irrespective of the historical epoch, is the Church. In this respect, Von Baltasar quotes Jacques Maritain: "The (pure) Church is the only one on earth who carries out the role she presents (le rôle de son personnage), because, in her, both role and person come from God. The world, by contrast, is a stage on which the roles and what they embody (rôles et personnages) are rarely in harmony" (12, p. 13)

And if the tendency for globalization is simply a scenario on the world scene, perhaps the Church, according to its role of being coherent with itself, should detect the criteria of the succession. Much more likely, it is not the expansion which draws attention, but the content. Ignace Berten (professor of theology in Brussels) identifies three temptations "which the Church confronts in its attitude toward globalization: [1] *indifference or absence* – globalization is a marginal phenomenon without a special signification for the Church and its mission; [2] *enthusiasm* or *canonization – mondialisation*, via its economic aspects, will lead to a new universal development, anticipating, in a way, the universality of humanity expressed by the catholicity of the Church; [3] *condemnation* or *demonstration – mondialisation* is a Machiavellian economic system that leads to the destruction of the societies, especially of the third world countries" (13, p. 71).

The Church's 'indifference' has to be interpreted in nuances, as long as the different religious centres keep their relative autonomy and especially, they act in very different socio-economic and political conditions. A second factor to be considered is signalled by another theologian, Paulo Suess (priest and professor of theology), who observes the "ecclesiastic discourse" of the globalization; the promoters of the trans-national capital interests utilize a language kindred to the one of missionary discourse, presenting their activity as an "international solidarity" an "integral deaconate". Even the marketing slogans take the forms of pastoral and missionary imagery (14, p. 65).

On the other side, the modern capital expansion has already determined negative consequences, visible for all attentive minds. Consequently, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger defines the modern epoch as a second Enlightenment, postulating for the future a rational goal called the new world order. But this rationality is exclusively founded on technicism and scientific measurability; this criterion of the 'number' seems to cover any domain of life in its integrality, obviously the moral sphere included: in an evolutionist thought-out world, it is naturally obvious that it is impossible to state the existence of absolute values – the ever-good and the ever-bad; the only way for the moral/norms distinction is the 'calculation of goods'. The criterion of the quantity as well as the one of the relativisation by which any human and spiritual value is annihilated, except temporary hedonism, will determine (if they gain absolute authority in a global world) the new types of aggression which shall be undertaken against man's dignity. The future projection of this society's Utopian structures will be a Utopia of Horror (15, pp. 522-523).

Even if *mondialisation* will not reach such an end – it is not to be forgotten that the world scene is only a play within another cosmic play, a finite plot subordinate to infinity – it has already shaped with exactitude its directions: a) the reference point is the market economy, the one that operates in the stronger countries situating itself in a position of force vis-a-vis the other markets of the world; b) the globalization sets up a new form of imperialism, in which, the important powers (economic, financial, political), though in competition, manifest homogeneity and community of interests which in turn determines a cultural rapprochement of the developed countries; c) there appears an international disintegration of the less developed Southern countries: here the privileged groups detach themselves from the rest of society, getting closer to the privileged groups from Northern countries; at the same time in the rich countries of the North, a

strong differentiation develops, between the rich people who become even richer and the poor people who plunge even deeper in misery; d) the cultural domination of rich countries becomes manifest, "integrating into the world" the poor countries, via the communication media, mainly (the new technological models produce a sort of 'proximity' at the level of socio-cultural relations) – a new "colonization" takes place, by means of the models of conduct and consumption;. e) against these phenomena, a reaction of the "colonized" zones arises, for the regional values reappraisal, manifesting nationalist and even fundamentalist traits (16, pp.13-18).

Beside the primacy of the mundane in the human world, another obstacle met by the Church in its attempt at direct pronouncement on the *mondialisation* phenomenon, is the silent exclusion of God from this world, the replacement of the divine love with the market economy rule and the ousting of the signification of the belief (and religion) from the social domain. The market-competition places "outside the law' values such as fidelity, responsibility, moral solidarity. The profound cause of the social exclusion on all its faces is precisely this exclusion of God (14, p. 69). In this context, the Orthodox Church has a more complicated position. Being, compared to the Catholic Church, more isolated regarding 'politics', today it is obligated to analyse the 'globaliziation' phenomenon and to express its position. Undoubtedly, this globalization is recognized by all the Orthodox Churches as a reality already structured on political, juridical, economic and cultural dimensions. The first which has made its voice heard is the Russian Orthodox Church, which elaborated recently an official document on contemporary development. In this act, the Russian Church draws attention to the dangers born from the concentration of power, mainly financial, in the hands of a few trans-national corporations and especially, how forced cultural homogenization through the mediation of the technologies of communication and travel imposes a single conception upon the world, and it is a non-religious conception: "As a result [of the globalization] the tendency has appeared to present as uniquely possible, a universal culture, emptied of any spirituality and founded on a conception of liberty which nothing can limit, the liberty of the failed man, presented as the absolute value and the true standard. The Christian world compares such evolution of globalization to the building of the Babel tower […]. In regard to efforts of non-religious people and their right to influence the social processes, the Church cannot sustain a secular world in which the human being, darkened by sin, is the centre of all" (17, pp. 264-266). The document of the Russian Synod is a salutary novelty for Romanian Orthodoxy too, which lives in similar conditions of the post-communist reality and which has to confront now a second reality– the globalization expansion (18, p. 374). One of the answers of the Orthodox Romanians is Christian ecumenism. For this reason, the Orthodox Romanian Church is deeply involved in the contemporary ecumenical movement, which has the aim of realizing fraternity between people. No revolution was able to achieve this brotherhood, precisely because it lacked a Christian ecumenical foundation (19, p. 107).

At the present time, the Christian Church has reached the conclusion of the necessity of a structured Christian activity within the globalization phenomenon. The next question therefore refers to the means; here, however one can easily discover that the instruments of action are far from being sufficient in number, adequacy and power of influence. On the other hand, the consideration of their number and power in the mundane world is insignificant as related to the infinity and power of the One who is served by Church. Certainly the Church has a difficult mission – to modernize itself by carefully avoiding 'modernity'; that is, to find new paths for reaching the contemporary man's heart without any compromise that will lower spiritual dignity to the weak level of the man of today.

**The Distorted Balancing-Scale**

We live, no doubt, in an epoch of (almost ) perfect *hybris*. It is manifested in local exaggeration as well as in the thirsty lack of measure. As a matter of fact, one could say that the whole history of mankind develops under the sign of *hybris*. The vanity, the incorporation, the external extension and from there, the remoteness from the centre, are the lines of force of social, political, and economic history. The more deprived of self is man, the more he utilizes the 'possessives'. As Pascal said: "Mine, yours. This dog is mine, the children say; this is my place under the sun, say the adults. I see in these utterances the beginning and the image of the whole usurpation of the earth" (20, p. 15).

Despite the Tower of Babel's lesson, mankind continues to build on this reverse Jacob's ladder, driving the generations of people and the spiritual continuity into a bag of illusions; transferring the sentiment of the sacred and wandering into a phantasmal zone, people assure their intangibility by the magic of the incredible and by manufactured 'tangible' proofs.

The European or Global family replacing the state-parent is just another role, not at all new – a simple variation of an old plot; the fear of aggression and the need of belonging in the weak are exploited in the context of the same expansion of the powerful. To the inner sentiment of hope is offered an apparently new object to relate. To the people accustomed to the happy ideal of Communism spread over the whole earth, now is offered the saving image of a globalised market-economy. If communism displaced the ultimate goal of human life from the divine light to the electric one, the market-economy idolatry completes the work, – wiping out the faint glimmers of the light, that is, the spiritual values. The dissolution of the values in a mixture of material elements, the suggestion that these values do not have a real existence and anyway, not a perennial one, and the hypnosis exercised upon the people made more and more vulnerable by the abolition of the discriminating sense: – these are the many concerted actions through which the scales as a sign of justice become an 'antiquity', useful perhaps to some isolated contemplatives.

Talking so much about globalization, the impression (suggestion) is created that *mondialisation* is very close to being realised, if not already accomplished in many of its characteristics. A short and lucid look around shows that, despite the visible uniformities (buildings, shops and supermarkets, certain manners, advertising and so on), the world map is far from being unified, despite the political, economic and financial actions of force. The reactions against the subordination (under any name this one would be) go from passive resistance to violent actions that seem to be without justification. On the other hand, however, in a world from which God has been ousted and the moral-spiritual domain distorted, who could be justified to represent the norm of 'rightness'? Not globalization in itself is a doubtful event from the point of view of justice, but its content and its consequences. The uncertainty about the beneficial effects appears immediately when the taboo related to globalization (understood only by the initiated) comes into the lucid conscience. The "mystique" of *mondialisation* becomes suddenly just another authoritarian rule when facing independent opinion. The world picture is an imperial one – in every historical epoch there were empires; but even this name – empire, contains the seed of its own destruction and the repetitive confirmation constitutes a visible proof .To a certain extent, the need of a power incorporating everything is explainable: The will of a person, Kant said, is always prone to confront other human wills which are encountered, striving continuously to reach an unconditional freedom; wishing not only to be independent, but to extend its domination over all other similar beings (21, p. 268). This domination does not always have a character of force; on the other hand, not to have this force is the mark of evil. The negative or desirable aspect of

*mondialisation* is determined by responsibility. The 'technical' thinking lacking the sentiment of being responsible, the business numbers not considering the number of people – are the "black" dominants of the expansion. The disregard for the human lives, more specific for the future happiness of the souls in the name of a future universal happiness on earth built up by globalists, *this*deliberate ignorance is the most profound and painful offence, the absolute *hybris*; rationally aware or not of this, the people feel it and react.

Facing the quick rise of the 'golden era', of the new ideology, it is difficult to believe that for an individual or a community another activity than a melancholic meditation is possible. More and more obvious, there are two ways of life for an integral person, that is, a person possessing mind and heart: either the equilibrium of a spiritual isolation or socialised alienation. To the economic and cultural homogenization, the individual, sustained only by his own personal force, can oppose an intellectual and national-traditional insularity. Being alone, it is very likely that he will end by being finally homogenized.

Once again, globalization, as a historic phenomenon, has no particular importance. But to individuals and especially to communities, this *mondialisation* is primarily, an exercise of spirituality. The existence of the photographic negative supposes logically, the existence of the original, too. To live in the negative is to live in a mirror, that is, to live in the reflection of life and not within the life itself. The spiritual exercise consists precisely in this: to come out from the mirror and to live in the world; to leave the embarrassment to speak out and to believe in God and in the Holy Spirit; it is to understand that the ziggurat of Babel, the massif and unsafe building, ordering the things from the bottom to the height in conformity to man's rules, cannot replace in any respect the common ladder descending for Jacob's dream-soul (v. Jacob's ladder).

It seems absurd to discuss the financial, economic and political questions from a spiritual, even mystical position. Perhaps now is the time of action for the genuine spiritual devotee: the one who exposes himself to public opprobrium for proclaiming the Holy Spirit; the one who does not fear to replace the mundane gigantic phenomenon – namely 'globalization' – assessing the latter as no more than 'perishable sand' in God's Plan.


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# Globalization as Exportation of Western Values:
# The Post-Communist Ukrainian Experience

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Since the early 1990s, Ukraine, like many other countries of the former USSR, has become more open to the processes of planetary scale leading to the growing interdependence of all the states in the world in various realms of social life – first of all, economic and financial, as well as political, social, cultural, communicative, etc. Globalization is rooted in the economic processes of integration and interdependence of various countries across the world. However, globalization has not only the economic dimension but also political and socio-cultural ones. Due to the development of communication systems, mass media, economic ties, New Democratic States are affected by the Western system of values. Globalization implies active exchange of ideas, material and spiritual values among various communities and societies. As a result of these processes, globalization is supposed to create the common rules of co-existence for all the nations or at least for a sizeable part of the humanity. These values and norms of living are believed to be generally accepted either voluntarily or by force and lead to the emergence of an 'all-humane' civilization and an adequate economic and political system.

This paper discusses the issue of cultural impact which globalization has upon the countries of the former "second world," taking Ukraine as an example of newly globalised society. The majority of authors studying globalization consider the issue in terms of the standardisation and unification of cultural symbols, orientations, models of behaviour under the influence of Western patterns, or, in Ulrich Beck's terms, the "convergence of global culture" [2: p.81]. The most famous articulation of this approach is contained in the conception of the Macdonaldisation of the world, which means the continuous universalisation of life-styles, culture symbols, and norms of conduct.

The purpose of the article is to find out how Ukraine's involvement in these processes affects the cultural landscape of the country, the system of socio-cultural values and norms. Is the same tendency towards standardisation observed in Ukraine's society? Is this influence of cultural globalization, mostly critical, of the greatest consequence for contemporary Ukraine? Or is this society's development is determined, to a greater extent, by other factors? Globalization is considered as a modernisation project for pre-modern or incompletely modern societies that is supposed to successfully transform them into full-fledged, developed modern nations. The focus of the given study will be on the internal social organisation of the society as well as on the values and norms that are inherent to such type of social organisation. I shall try to determine how globalization processes influence the internal structure of Ukrainian society.

It is very important to note that processes of globalization were expected to advance the quick transformation of Ukraine from society of soviet type to a new democratic and market-based country. The formation of new institutions had to be paralleled by the creation of a new system of values, political and economic culture pertinent to developed, fully modernised societies. However, reality proved very different from expectations. It turned out that the exportation of values and institutions was not a task easy to fulfil. Moreover, changes in Ukrainian society at various levels of state functioning and everyday life of its citizens were cosmetic, decorative, surface, and superficial by their nature and changed very little in the fundamentals of social life. Let us consider the issue in more detail.

Transformation in Ukraine started as a project of modernization to achieve the level of the mostly developed European states. Now more than decade later one can unquestionably state that the country became one of the poorest in the Old World, and the gap between Ukraine and the EC is widening (e.g., the ratio of Ukraine's GDP per capita to the average EC figures equalled to 22% in 1996 and only 16% in 1999).[1] Paradoxically, deeper involvement in global processes results neither in the socio-economic advancement nor in the maturation of democracy. Ukraine remains a basically non-democratic society where modernization is incomplete. For this society the following features, among others, are typical: the lack of interconnection between official power, state and everyday life of people, underdevelopment of the political representation of usual people's interests. It creates and reproduces a specific model of social organization.

Soviet society and its Ukrainian successor are characterised by the dualism of official and unofficial norms, the incongruence of norms regulating people's everyday life and norms officially sanctioned by the state [7]. Ukraine's social reality is almost exclusively regulated by informal or infra-legal norms typical of pre-modern society. The same refers to the extreme narrowing of the sphere of public life and fragmentation of social space. Atomisation and excessive individualisation are emblematic for the everyday existence of Homo Post-Sovieticus.

This situation is explained by the nature of power relations that some authors call the "imposed power" [7]. The imposed character of political power is predetermined by the chronic weakness of civil society, the dominance of despotic and authoritarian political regimes, the exclusion of the masses from any kind of political participation, except for revolutionary situations, as well as parochial and subservient types of political culture. This assertion has very important implications, notably: the importation of democratic and market institutions in conditions of globalization will press forward the socio-economic and political development of country only if there is correspondence between democratic institutions being imported, on one hand, and endogenous value orientations, norms, and political and economic culture regulating people's life, on the other. Otherwise, these institutional innovations are destined to fail. By the same token, if imported norms and values generate the relevant analogies with already existing mental constructions, one can say about the congruence of official and unofficial norms.

In most cases attempts to import institutions and associated with them a system of values and norms turn out to be fruitless, unproductive. Why then are they so numerous? First, those who export them try to spread their sphere of influence, make national power structures global, and to widen a seller's market for goods and services. Second, the authorities of country that imports them (and in case of Ukraine this tendency is particularly noticeable) have their own, mostly mercenary motives. By means of the importation strategy they decline all further responsibility and conceal the real interests of reformers. Thus, this strategy helps politicians preserve their power and discard all the responsibilities.

This strategy perfectly describes the attitudes of contemporary political elites in Ukraine and rooted in the character, nature, and origins of post-communist elites in power. They have primarily (neo-)nomenclature and oligarchic social origins. Many independent Ukrainian and foreign observers tend to talk about the creation of an anti-democratic and cleptocratic political system in Ukraine in which political elites serve the interests of criminogenic oligarchs [9: p.33 and others]. Oligarchy creates informal structures of power – closed and powerful clans which are associated with certain regions and which in Ukrainian political discourse are euphemistically called financial-political groups. These clans are deeply in-built in formal power structures, exploit them and state resources, i.e. budget, in their own private interests. In fact one can posit that oligarchy

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[1] *Week's Mirror*, 2003, №2.

became the most powerful political force in Ukraine, a major subject of politics. Such situation leads to the exacerbation of economic crisis, to the growth of authoritarianism in political life, to the further estrangement of people from political and social life, and to the deepening of social inequality. Oligarchic regime contributes to the moral depravity of society, to the spread of cynicism, apathy, egoism, bigotry, corruption and other anti-social mental tendencies and behavioural patterns that constitute grave danger to the very foundations of society existence.

The ruling establishment of Ukraine represents a typical example of how words and acts do not correspond and even contradict to each other. The contemporary political establishment actively exploits democratic phraseology, talking a lot about human rights and freedoms, giving oath to civil society and the rule of law, etc. In reality their decisions and actions demonstrate completely the opposite – the full disregard to all democratic norms and procedures. The most visible examples of such attitudes were given during the last presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 1999 and 2002.

The normative dualism finds its further expression in the existence of two completely different models of behaviour – one in relation to the members of one's own community, "ours", the other – with respect to the strangers, "others". This is a major feature of incomplete modernisation, since the important tendency of modern society development is the gradual removal of barriers and differences between members of different groups and communities. This tendency takes its full-fledged form in the principle according to which market functions – the equal treatment of all the actors. People in such society tend to support and trust only the members of their own group and express enmity in relation to everything lying outside of this entity. For post-soviet Ukrainians this community has reduced to extremely narrow circle of family members, relatives and close friends. All the rest are positioned outside and distrusted.

The excessively spread distrust in contemporary Ukrainian society is a consequence of the incomplete modernisation of soviet and post-soviet times. Ukrainians are lacking in the so-called social capital as a set of informal rules and norms that are shared by all the members of society and that help them to efficiently interact with each other. The most important role in the creation of social capital is played by interpersonal trust. However, this social resource of utmost importance is in great shortage in today's Ukraine. For example, 89,2% small and medium-sized entrepreneurs believe that "one can only trust people whom you know well" (55,7% strongly agree, 33,5% agree), while only 10,8% tend to trust also people who do not belong to relatives and friends [5]. Norms and values that uphold the formation of social capital are similar to traditional Puritan morals, which determined, by M. Weber's opinion, the foundation of modern capitalism. They include reciprocity, obligation, honesty, self-restriction, and rationality [11].

Another typical value of post-soviet Ukraine's society is what Edward Banfield calls amoral familialism [1]. It is typical of those societies which are based on the particularity rather than universal standards. In such societies people tend to help only those with whom they have close relations and personal obligations. As Weber stressed, the principle of personal loyalty and market are incompatible (unable to coexist) [11]. Amoral familialism characterises such cultures which lack communitarian values but at the same time support tight family bonds. People in such cultures do not care about social interests and disrespect norms of socially orientated behaviour, altruism, and reciprocity. This familialism impedes the formation of universal ethical norms. In Ukraine one can observe very similar conditions.

Dualism also results in the spread of the shadow economy and alternative social structures, analogies of which are difficult to find in history. People in their everyday life follow those norms which are in complete opposition to the officially proclaimed. Moreover, the state itself and power

structures do not fulfil their own officially sanctioned rules and norms. Values and principles on which contemporary market is based are perceived through the analogy with the shadow market. Freedom is conceived exclusively as a negative condition, freedom *from*. This was defined by Sir Isaiah Berlin as "the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity … the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others" [Cited in: 10]. Positive conceptions of freedom endorse 'enabling rights' that make it possible for individuals to achieve their own aspirations as well as avoid constraints imposed by the state. This also is the freedom to influence the state by creating of and participating in institutions of civil society. Data on Ukraine bear witness that the sphere of positive freedom is drastically narrowing.

There is a tendency towards the privatisation of the public sphere. Post-soviet people are unable to make the state serve their interests, and hence negatively depend on the state authority. But even this negative freedom has its limits. Post-soviet Ukrainians appreciate negative freedom only if it guarantees individual benefit and advantages. Otherwise, they demand state protection (this tendency is observed even in the case of entrepreneurs who insist on state protectionism). Additionally, aspirations for individual independence lead to the ultimate atomisation and a-socialisation of post-soviet people. Society becomes increasingly fragmented and morally deregulated. Studies of post-communist societies show the constant weakening of the individual's sense of belonging and identification with almost all social groups and categories, and tendency towards the alienation of the individual from a wider social environment [4: p. 125]. This feature is universal and identifiable among both underprivileged, excluded and privileged, prestigious social strata. For example, nascent entrepreneurs, who are generally considered "winners of transformation", have a very narrow identification basis and feel closeness mostly to the family, relatives, friends, and colleagues at work. By the same token, their involvement in social and political activity remains at an extremely low level [5]. Thus, even those social strata which have achieved success and prosper are socially passive and disinterested in social activity. Moreover, they make every effort to stress their peculiarity and "choosiness" and to erect artificial boundaries between themselves and the rest of the population. One can witness the gradual "ghettoisation" of Ukrainian society, its existence in several planes that do not intersect and exist almost autonomously.

Under circumstances where social institutions fail to regulate social behaviour and social networks are deteriorating; the only resource that reinforces social ties is capital, i.e., money. In post-soviet society the deserving and esteemed place in the social hierarchy is ensured and guaranteed almost exclusively by substantial financial capital. Money becomes a major fundamental value, while all the rest are subordinated to them. The society starts to live in the condition of 'tyranny of economic wealth'.

Globalization makes many authors talk about the tyranny of the market that imposes its own logic upon all the other realms of human activity. The danger of "market fundamentalism" and the denial of the multidimensional character of human life were repeatedly stressed by several western thinkers. However, the situation in the Ukraine at face value resembles what is going on in the developed world. In reality there is an essential difference between these two contexts. The expansion of the market in the West is the result of its maturity, while in Ukraine it is the consequence of weakening all the non-market ties and mechanisms of socialisation. The overwhelming importance of the value of economic wealth is taking place at the expense of other modern values. The dictate of wealth inhibits the processes of modernisation of consciousness and society, and destroys social capital. The human being is gradually transformed into a one-dimensional creature existing in economic space.

The all-embracing economisation of social life leads to deep restructuring of value system and hierarchy of social and individual values. Contemporary Ukrainian society is strongly oriented to economic success, but at the same time it ignores the fundamental principle of the equal opportunities and lacks communitarian values. Cultures with such value orientations tend to make societies which are highly corrupt [6]. In Ukraine people tend to highly appreciate individual success. On the other hand, vast majority of them have no access to the legitimate means of achieving such success. Thus, there is a big gap between means and ends that are sanctioned by culture. Such conditions create basis for the development of socially deviant behaviour and to the spread of anomie. The most efficient instrumental values become aggression, dishonesty, cunning, slyness, extreme individualism, etc.

Some socio-economic values typical of Western liberal democracies are supported by a substantial proportion of the Ukraine's population. For instance, private entrepreneurship and wealth are gradually becoming socially legitimised. Younger generations tend to discard paternalistic and 'etatist' values and show more individualistic orientations. However, while some changes from social dependency to individual self-efficiency can testify to the formation of a more mature social consciousness, other shifts concerned with the spread of anomie, alienation, egocentrism as well as the lack of trust and solidarity play anti-social role and lead to social disintegration. This is not to say that these negative transformations are caused by globalization. However, mass culture and consumerist society promotes those cultural patterns that encourage severe competition, lack of empathy, extreme forms of individualism, etc.

Today's Ukrainian society is characterised by the domination of materialist or survival values. Many factors uphold such a tendency, namely: the growth of consumerist society, mass culture, official policy, etc. Post-industrial countries make their own contribution to this process. Their policy towards Ukraine is determined by primarily economic and geopolitical interests to exclude the very possibility of the appearance of new competitive actors at the international arena, as well as to preserve the low quality of life and semi-peripheral, dependent position of the country. The West is also interested in the creation of a "shadow zone", or "sanitary belt" on the territory of Ukraine that would separate the so-called "golden billion" from the dangerous East and help solve the problems of illegal immigrants, trafficking, and others. Such policy provides Western societies not only with negative freedom from the undesirable elements from the outside, but also with the elements of positive freedom. This relates to the tendencies to occupy new markets for selling goods, to gain cheap natural resources, and to obtain highly qualified specialists in the high-tech sphere. The "brain-drain" from Ukraine became possible only due to the high disparity in the level of life between the core and periphery which emerged during the last decade and the maintenance of which is in the interests of the core countries. The Western world is ready to tolerate post-communist oligarchic, semi-criminal, antidemocratic, authoritarian regimes as long as they ensure the minimal level of social stability and predictability. They seem to be more desirable for Western powers than the creation of new authentic democracies based on the national values for the above reasons. The dominant position in contemporary Western thought is that national-liberation movements and national ideas in Eastern Europe, in contrast to that of Western Europe, play negative roles and should be avoided.

One could expect that more openness of the Ukraine to global community, particularly to foreign labour markets of more advanced countries, would positively contribute to the changes in work values and ethics of post-soviet citizens. For example, each year several millions of Ukraine's citizens have left their home country to work abroad, including in Western nations. Working and dwelling in European countries could introduce them to a completely different model

of life and encourage them to learn the values of independence, methodical work, diligence, self-confidence, self-reliance, and social efficacy. However, a decade long experience of labour emigration makes obvious the fact that highly qualified professionals do their best to stay abroad for good. Most of labour migrants occupy marginal positions and have semi-legal or even illegal status. Living in very unfavourable conditions and experiencing humiliation they fail to adopt Western values. For a vast majority of people living in the near-border regions cross-border trade serves as the only or a major means of life-provision. In fact this category of Ukrainians lost all the professional qualifications, cannot and do not want to do anything else. The level of the demoralisation of these illegal traders is spectacular. Such a form of acquaintance with the European way of life and values can hardly lead to the growth of civilised habits, since the "ants", as they are wittily called by the Poles, interact with the semi-legal Polish and other speculators who are *not* the bearers of the Weberian-type spirit of capitalism.

At the same time, despite the globalization impact, Ukraine's society remains at the margins of informational global society. Internet is accessible only to a small number of people (around 1% of the whole population which amounts to around 0,5 million individual Internet users). In other words, only a tiny proportion of the population has opportunity to have access to information and the mass media, which are independent and uncontrolled by the authoritarian regime, and to obtain knowledge – a major productive source of post-industrial society. The consequences of this are very dangerous, leading to the erection of another, cultural and anthropological border and the creation of incompatible worlds. This may well result in an even deeper gap between civilisations and conservation of social relations and institutions in the Ukraine characteristic for a society of 'incomplete' modernisation.

The enduring exclusion of Ukrainians from positive impulses of globalization has very negative consequences for the society and leads to the preservation of unfavourable tendencies in political, economic, and cultural spheres. As the world development testifies, the most globalised countries of the world at the same time belong to the most developed and "open" societies (in terms of K. Popper). These societies support social norms and values that are typical of the so-called "productive economic culture", namely: rationalism, pragmatism, individual responsibility, the respect of law as the only way of resolving conflicts, social partnership, systematic efforts, and self-discipline. At face value this value-orientation pattern in the realm of production is at odds with hedonism in consumption typical of the developed consumerist society of Western nations. However, the long history of the maturation of market created a socially accepted balance between purely market and broader social forces. Tendencies towards hedonism and ever-lasting expansion of material needs imposed by the market are restrained and tamed by socially and culturally developed mechanisms in the sphere of labour ethics. In other words, consumerist freedom came to birth in conditions of a full-fledged modern society when patterns of behaviour characteristic for the productive economic culture were deeply ingrained in the social tissue. Owing to these restrictions the liberty of consumer choice did not turn into an unproductive self-indulgence and pure pleasure-seeking. In contrast to the above situation, the post-soviet condition was overburdened by the distorted system of labour motivation produced by the inefficient soviet model of (almost) equal payment at the working place, and further deteriorated in post-soviet times. As a logical consequence, one can observe the severe degeneration of the system of work motivation and the dominance of values typical of non-productive economic culture.

In this context the processes of globalization have unpredicted consequences for a society of incomplete modernisation. The state of dependency typical of post-communist Ukraine and, by the same token, the imposition of norms and values from the outside leads to the exacerbation of

the situation and increases the normative dualism. This imposition of norms may well be conceived by mass consciousness as intrusion into internal affairs, as hostile action. Under such circumstances the dualistic opposition "we"- 'they" strengthens and ethnocentrism takes an upper hand over tolerance. It is not accidental that the level of intolerance towards the representatives of Western nations in Ukraine substantially increased during last few years. Tolerance belongs to one of the basic values of democratic and advanced modern societies, one of the major principles according to which social life is organised and coordinated. As a rule, the more modernised society, the more tolerant it is. After the collapse of the communist regime, the formation of new political entity, liberalisation of political regime, widening of opportunities to travel and interact with people of other nationalities, beliefs, and ways of life, one could reasonably expect an increase in tolerance. However, sociological polling for 1994-98 demonstrates the systematic decrease of the level of tolerance towards all nations included in the questionnaire – both Western (Americans, Canadians, French, Germans) and Eastern European (Poles, Belorussians, Romanians) [4]. The level of prejudice in attitudes towards various ethnic groups, i.e., the overall level of xenophobia among the population of Ukraine, has risen steadily over the ten-year period of national independence.

Another important attribute of pre-modern society is the lack of clear boundaries between different realms of social life [7]. Modernity transformed simple, homogeneous traditional society into a complex one where various spheres of everyday life are mostly autonomous, functionally differentiated and based on their own specific normative subsystems. The separation of politics and the economy, political power and economic property is of particular importance. A free market is supposedly not restricted by political or traditional influences. Soviet and post-soviet societies substantially differ from mature modern society in terms of social organisation, notably: political, administrative, and economic functions are merged into one single entity. In Ukraine we deal with the crystallisation of oligarchic capitalism and the wide distribution of value orientations and norms typical of this model of social organisation. Oligarchy is characterised by the symbiosis of political power and economic property. The economic might of oligarchs is based on their political position. They convert money into power and back into bigger money. Oligarchs themselves as a socio-cultural type of personality gives us indicators of what kind of values are instrumental in achieving success in a post-soviet society. A leading Ukrainian political analyst, D. Vydrin, who has big experience in communicating with this category of people, describes oligarchs in the following terms: lack of obligations and discipline, impudence and lack of moral principles, pathological greediness.[2] One can safely add some other typical characteristics such as negligence of public opinion, social negativism, egocentrism, demonstrativeness in behaviour (particularly, in ostentatious consumption), low cultural level, etc.

There is another significant boundary, which is typical of modern society, – between private and public areas. In post-soviet Ukraine these spheres are not entirely separated which leads to the personification of relationships as a necessary condition of successful activity in public sphere. One of the most expressive examples of how the private and public intermingle with each other is the choice of partners for socio-economic activity. This choice depends on personal ties. In fact, all social relations are limited to the interaction between the members of closed and vary narrow community based on the relations of personal dependence. Therefore, civic and economic relations also adhere to the same logic of personal, family-like relationships. Such symbiosis, though rather efficient on the local level, becomes internally conflicting and instable in a broader, societal,

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[2] *Week's Mirror*, 2002, ¹12.

macro-social context. This peculiarity leads to the destruction of interpersonal trust in the society which is particularly distinctive of today's Ukraine.

To briefly summarise, the exportation of western institutions and values affected Ukraine's society only at the surface, exterior, superficial level and did not change the internal nature of its social organisation. Global impulses did not alter the nature of the society that still remains a society of incomplete modernization. Little change caused by globalization in Ukraine is explained by the fact that Ukraine's society is not ready to make use of globalising impulses to a full extent, and its ruling elite is interested in monopolising those benefits which globalization brings. In terms of its social structure and value orientations of its citizens, Ukraine remains a poor, polarised, and dreadfully atomised society of incomplete modernisation. Today's regretful state of affairs in Ukraine was caused mostly by the selfish and non-patriotic position of ruling elites interested in the preservation of their own power and indifferent (or even adverse) to the strategy of the modernisation of Ukrainian nation. On the other hand, rank and file people are acquainted with the achievements of Western civilisation and its values indirectly through mass culture and consumer society as well as the anti-Western propaganda of official mass media. This provides the population with the distorted and superficial image of the Western world and prevents Ukrainian people from the authentic and creative usage of Western experience. There are no favourable conditions for the cultivation of authentic and positive Western values that could help to modernise Ukrainian society and make it healthier.

Does it mean that hope for the better is lost and Ukraine is doomed to disintegrate, lose its social nature, and, finally, transform into asocial jungles? The threat of this is really big. However, a modest hope still remains: – Hope for the rise of a new political elite at the central and local levels, patriotic and Europe-oriented, open to global challenges, as well as capable and willing to build the state edifice in accordance with the fundamental values of European civilisation.

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# The Value of the Eastern European Communist Experience for the Process of Globalization

*Chibueze C. Udeani*

## Introduction

It was Mark Anthony, in Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar," who at the beginning of his funeral oration for the murdered Caesar declared that he had not come to praise Caesar but to bury him. In a similar sense it is my intention to indicate that when I am treating the issue of the value of (eastern European) communist experience for the process of globalization it is not my intention to sing the praises of communism but rather to see if, through this way, the inherent problems and dangers in the process of globalization could be highlighted.

Since the communist system collapsed in its opposition to the capitalist system, a new set of developments have been in process. The post-communist societies are finding themselves in the same relation to the capitalist western world as do third world societies. They have been reduced to a third world status directly dependent on the capitalist western world, which controls the global economy. Retrospectively the communist system can be viewed in a way as only an interlude of opposition to global capitalism. Hence the need for searching for values in and of the communist experience to construe how the increasing challenge of a globally spreading capitalism could adequately be addressed.

During the time of co-existence (communism and capitalism), interesting comparisons were made between the western economic system and the communist economic systems, both being centralized planning systems. The communist system was public or state capitalism under the control of people devising plans with public scrutiny both at home and abroad. The western system was mainly private and much more hidden from the public eye, but no less real and effective for being hidden.

"This private sector planning system consisted mainly of an interlocking system of directors among a few large financial and a larger group of industrial firms that could control over 90 percent of what was being produced. They were not much more numerous than their counterparts in the inner core of the communist parties devising their own plans. The planning and domination on both sides of this competition between two large centralized economic systems was of the same nature."[1] The western model won because the communist model was more inefficient, collapsing as a capitalist system from within. The capitalist system still functions and shows more signs of increasing its totalitarian grip on the world economy.

## Globalization and Hypocrisy of Capitalism

Globalization promotes the blooming of capitalism whereby the capitalist principles are very central here. The creation of the global market is embedded in the concept of capital. Hence it is

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[1] Blanchette O., "The Problem of Human Identity in the face of the global 'free market' economy." In: Golubovic Z. and McLean G.F., eds., *Models of Identities in Post- Communist Societies*, *Yugoslav Philosophical Studies*, I. 1999. http://www.crvp.org/book/series04/iva-10.htm.

justified to talk of a global market or a capitalist global system. The engine or moving force of globalization is after all the accumulation of capital.[2] From its present economic side Globalization is a "model of a global economy which looms over us all and is experienced as oppressive and as a threat to their human identity by people throughout the world. This model must not be ignored in contending with other less ominous models in striving for a more human society, though it tries to mask itself as an open society or free market system. It is intent on exercising universal control over human affairs in seeking its own particular end of profit-making. This model is not unlike the former communist power, except that it shuns the public light of devious ways, whether countries rich or poor."[3]

This capitalist model is not new. Was it not Adam Smith who identified it already then from its very inception as being oppressive of people's identity; hinting at the dangerous effects of high profits on wage earners, and of the inequalities arising from the nature of wage employment as well as monopolies as conspiracies against the public? Karl Marx on his part analysed its effect on the proletariat in Europe who, though they were essential to its development, were never supposed to benefit from the economic system. Frantz Fanon later in his book *The Wretched of the Earth* analysed the same system for what it did as colonialism in Africa. In Latin American Enrique Dussel who switched from developmental to liberation thinking examined the system. This system still remains and should continue to remain the object of analysis not only in developed countries but everywhere in the world by people conscious of its oppressive nature and of how it exploits many who are defenceless and marginalized even in supposedly well developed countries.[4] Hence the place and role of such efforts like it is being made in and through this piece of work.

Watching the trend of global economy within the process of globalization, it becomes evident that the "system is constantly on the watch to implant itself in new places, … by what is called investment. In reality this becomes a means of dictating what is to be done in countries where it takes hold through what are called structural adjustment programs."[5]

There is an increasing idolatry of money and market, which characterises the process of globalization. Money in the sense of capital is the real insignia of this process. Money produces a sort of uniformity of diversity for the fact that it makes measurement at different levels possible. This notwithstanding, it equally erases the existing societal and inter-societal differences/ diversities. It would then seem as if the way towards a global society has already been given. This is not the case. Here is an issue of fundamental deception, because money or capital is not evenly distributed and cannot be so distributed under dynamics and laws of the market.[6]

The proponents of Globalization preach the gospel of free market and free trade around the globe. The important question, which often comes up here, asks for whom the 'free' market exists and under what conditions. Another similar question is, – How free are the market and trade in themselves? These questions added to other bundles of questions on other issues are pertinent because in this global market not everybody can participate, only the few – the global players are free to operate as they see fit: not the rest who lack the means and the avenue into this market. These global groups are really supra-national in their power, though when they are in trouble they can count on the help of national governments because they are so large that they have become

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[2] Altvater E. Mahnkopf B. *Grenzen der Globalisierung (Ökonomie, Ökologie und Politik in der Weltgesellschaft)*. Münster Westfälisches Dampfboot Verlag, 1996., p. 45.

[3] Blanchette O., *ibid*.

[4] *Ibid*.

[5] *Ibid*.

[6] Altvater, p. 47f.

essential to the economic system of the particular nations. Hence it be rightly maintained that the economic well-being of the nations is reduced to the survival of the oligopolitic system, even to the detriment of their people.[7]

Even when it comes to the free market and free trade in the real sense of the word, it is the global players – oligarchs – who are against all barriers and for whatever advances free trade, because they know that only they, the oligarchs, are in a position to take advantage of such anti-barrier agreements. Furthermore their business philosophy and practices show little concern for the consequences of their practices on the social good and welfare of the workers, communities and other important factors like environmental protection where they operate.

Competition is the central attitude in the process of globalization. It is becoming more and more being dictated by the global market. This development makes it difficult if not impossible for such dispositions like co-operation, consensus and finding respect and recognition among the participants in this process. This dynamics of competition in the global market logically supports the two mechanisms of selection – inclusion and exclusion. A market society can function when and as long as the losers in the process of competition vanish and those who are successful get the chance to rightly enjoy their success. The successful group hence determines the tone of the music for all and sundry. Regions or nations (and not individuals and small groups) as it has also been the case are found among the losers. The bankruptcy implies the disintegration of the societal foundations and networks.[8]

"This is all part of an ongoing process that is truly supra-national in the sense that it is something above nations. Nations themselves, large and small, are caught up in the ebb and flow of this system around the globe which dictates who is up and who is down and who is reduced to stagnation in the backwaters of the system. Everywhere the economy prevails over every other aspect of human life.

In other words there exists the primacy of the market. The process of globalization does not consist only of economic initiatives in the different national and regional markets, which extend, create and fill global space, but also of important institutions that are "demiurgically" created for the market. The problem here is that the global market is more than an abstract neutral place for the diverse economic transactions. It is more than just a place for exchange of products – goods, services, capital, money and labour. The global market is also a social regulative instance and a collection of political, social and other institutions.

A central characteristic of the process of globalization is the logic of the market that strives to control the global society. In this process the market is the dominant system. This steering system has of course its own logic with which it comes in contact with other systems like politics, culture, ecology, etc. It tries to instrumentalise every other system for the process of the market. These other systems are constantly under pressure to adapt to the market processes. This development leads to depriving or robbing these other systems, which have been instrumentalised for the market, of their meaning.

The exultation of the market and market institutions as basis for the consideration of other components leads to a clash among institutions that represent different interests. It is risky and controversial to give the logic of the market priority beyond other issues of human life. The market represents a certain economic logic that leaves no room for organising or structuring economy on a base that allows for taking consideration of other factors. On the contrary this logic understands

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[7] Blanchette O. ibid.
[8] Altvater, p. 47f.

the market as a primary fundamental, a prerequisite and frame for the consideration of other systems.[9]

It is not an economy that benefits the poor as well as the rich or the common good of nations as well as the private good of large corporations. Rather it is the oligopolistic economy that grows at the expense of the poor and the marginalized for the benefit of an ever shrinking number of large multi-national corporations. The majority of nations have lost and many more are losing more and more of their sovereignty and their ability to act in view of their own public good and social welfare. The important thing is to recognize that there is this global economy that operates as a system in the world and that this system is quite supra-national. It is in the hands, not of public, but of private interests seeking their own private good, whether it is their own enrichment or the perpetuation of their power to control assets, and thereby to control entire populations. This system spreads its influence by what are euphemistically called investments, which are deemed necessary for the underdeveloped parts of the world, but which are also a means for maintaining a flow of wealth from the economic periphery to the centre. Investments and financial aid, especially as organized by gigantic corporations and the IMF are ways of binding the hands of those on the periphery ever more tightly to the demands of the central power. Worse still, they are ways of reducing everyone to economic pawns in a gigantic monetary chess game and robbing them of their human identity.[10]

Due to the dynamics of totalitarian monoculturalism and ethnocentrism which are in force in this system, nations, states, groups and communities with different identities around the world must become conscious of this threat to their identity in order to maintain and preserve their own human identity.

Perhaps, one way to look at the consequences of adhering uncritically to the principles enshrined in the tenets of globalization is to look at statistics from the United States of America, the model economy of globalization as it is being presented to the rest of us. Industry leaders and US politicians are fond of citing principles such as free trade, free speech and democracy, which are held to be universally beneficial. However in practice their actions may not seem to support such principles. Free trade is restricted to protect uncompetitive industry, e.g., the imposition of tariffs on steel of up to 30% in March 2002 or earlier examples for agricultural products. Democracy is undermined by the American support for repressive regimes and other actions as described above. Furthermore as our minds occupy themselves with such terms as "deregulation", "liberalization", "privatisation" and other clichés in terms of globalization it is good to remember the concrete negative sides of the model economy (American economy) for the proponents of globalization. It is known that the richest 1% of American households own 40% of the total national wealth. The top 20% of American households owns more than 80% of the national wealth. During the 1980s, 75% of the income gains and 100% of increased wealth went to the top 20% of American households. In spite of its tremendous wealth, as of 1995 one out of every five children in the U.S. lived in poverty. Half of the Americans living below the poverty line are elderly, between 250,000 and 3 million Americans are homeless and families with children make up as much as one third of the homeless.

**Value of the Eastern European Communist Experience for the Process of Globalization**

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[9] Altvater, p. 142.
[10] Blanchette O., *ibid*.

The essence of the foregoing part is to demonstrate that globalization as a process works within a system that has negatively a lot in common with the defunct communist system and that there is need for a more critical approach to the whole than the proponents of the process are ready to admit. "As human beings we do not have to give in to this global economic process. There are still ways, economic as well as ethical, to get around its efforts to control human beings around the globe for its own private benefit. In poor countries as well as rich there are ways of entrepreneurship that can be found, in Eastern Europe as well as in other parts of the world. There are ways of fighting back locally against the economic and cultural invasion of the oligopolistic system. It is for different communities to devise these ways by their own initiative, so that the economy of each country serves the good and the prosperity of its people, as well as that of large multi-national corporations."[11]

The intention here has been to underscore some of the problems and dangers which eastern Europeans in general have to face as a group of diverse human communities with regards to the globalising capitalist economy. It would be a mistake to think that there is no freedom in a socialist economy and that there is only freedom in a market economy. In fact there could be less freedom for former communist societies in the so-called free market economy than in the former state capitalist systems. All will depend on how weakly they act as human beings in the world economy.

In the globalising capitalist economy of the western world, what is found is not an open society, but a closed society of relatively few groups of people taking over throughout the world. It is not a free market for all, but rather a very expensive market for most people in human terms: only for the few who try to control all the strings from the central core is it free. What is entailed is not a "natural unity of national identity and internationalism" (Miloslav Bednar), but an international totalitarian oligarchic system that has already started reducing all national identities and values to a least common denominator, namely the oligarchic market economy.[12]

If one then analyses this model from the standpoint of the eastern European societies in transition from a communist to a post-communist era, one must be cautioned against the mistake of thinking of the whole process as movement from a totalitarian into an open society or a free market or free trade system without any semblance of domination. "Rather, the post-communist societies are only moving back into a more universal market system, a more universal trade zone already occupied by economic forces bent on seeking their own advantage in a way that is no less totalitarian than the defunct Communist forces."[13] A value of the communist experience could then be seen in the fact that it serves as a base for raising the consciousness about these forces in the global economic system among these post-communist societies. They should relate to the present system with a similar disposition of opposition that was used against the communist system, especially where similarity between the systems abound. This is necessary, among other reasons, to enable them to emerge with their own identities and values in the sense of 'world history' and hopefully escape the fate of the third world countries who suffer so much at the hands of the oligarchic capitalist western world. The growing together of the world or the human community is worth striving for. But we cannot just accept the globalization of the western oligarchic capitalist world as the norm. For a truly globalised world of the human community no one system is qualified to serve as model. This implies the urgent necessity *not* for a globalised economic westernisation, but an authentic global *human* and *humane* globalization.

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[11] *Ibid*.

[12] *Ibid*.

[13] *Ibid*.

# Part II

# Normative Projections

# Directions in the Reconstruction of Civilization

*Stefan Symotiuk*


The relationship between "diagnosis" and "therapy" when considering civilization is such that the latter does not always result unambiguously from the former, yet the latter always "results" in the former. Thus we will prefer here the postulate-like thinking referring to the civilization of the beginnings of the 21st century, only touching upon a discussion of "the state of affairs" for which we are trying to find a remedy. This is not a commonly applied methodology – yet it seems effective. It is only the "therapy" that "lights up" the diagnosis.

*Against "The Holocaust of Things"*


Every year the population of our planet increases by 80 million people. At the same time over 2 million used vehicles are thrown into metallurgical furnaces. In Poland only an individual produces ca. 369 kg of the so called "rubbish". The chances of achieving "general welfare" in the world, with such waste of things, are scarce. Shoddy and transitory items undermine the value and dignity of the man who created them.

Even if A. Toffler's euphoric visions of consumption were to be fulfilled in the future, at present it is indispensable to stop the avalanche of garbage, so that the resources of durable goods ensuring a relative civilization order could increase.

However, this is not a case of any conservative attitude referring to the present state of technology. It is necessary to improve things. This does not mean, however, that facilities with partial improvements should appear and the existing appliances become immediately "technologically aged". Customers are thus encouraged to get rid of them in favour of "novel products".

The goods already possessed could be retained only when construction "novelties" were able to complete or replace the existing and properly working unit. Modularising the objects in such a way that their single constituents could be replaced by improved elements is an effective remedy to achieve long durability of our machines and facilities. A car whose every important module was replaceable, which would require the standard character of the "joints" linking one element of the machine with another, would be progressively improved and usable for a longer period of time. Small manufacturers of spare parts would gain immense opportunities to increase their sales and develop individual inventiveness. At present such fields of individual inventiveness are destroyed by big corporations whose new series are constructed in such a way that spare parts producers must develop their modules from scratch, with limited demand for such modules. Such a simple idea of "standardisation" should be thus enforced on manufacturing tycoons by the state or international institutions.

*On the Necessity of a "Democratic Parliamentary System"*


Social apathy, the decreasing number of "daredevils" in democratic societies leads to indifference, low creativity and passivity in contemporary communities. It has become popular to oppose "representative" democracy in the form of the "elections strike" (the absence amounting to

40% of citizens). Indeed, with the power of the state finance (up to 80% of the value produced by the society taken over in fiscal systems), the elected machinery of the government undergoes immediate alienation. Even the elections are carried out by hired advertising companies. The range of "direct democracy" as an opportunity to participate in administration is almost none. Social passivity is the horrifying price paid for the "over-activity" of small groups of politicians supported by some rich economic elites.

To such elites, "sharing the authority" means passing some of their competence to "satellite elites" (local self-government, government agencies, public associations), which is followed by financing the latter. To an average citizen, there is no increased share of "co-governing". The division of the state into the "central authorities" and satellite authorities where new candidates settle down to take over governmental offices provides, however, a chance to complete the "parliamentary system" with quite significant resources of "direct democratisation". Namely, with the society of a double taxation system, e.g., transmitting 80% of taxes to the "government centre", while leaving the citizen the right to distribute the remaining 20% and to address it strictly at the satellite subjects if they manage to present socially attractive visions of spending the money, which would be sufficient for extensive "subjectivising of the masses". Pretenders to authority, social activists, various social movements would gain financial resources "at the bottom line", without "licking the door-knobs" at the Headquarters. Citizens-sponsors would be able to strengthen or weaken their support for individual programmes in a yearly cycle.

People do not want to pay low taxes. The party led by J. Korwin-Mikke cannot find support in Poland. At the same time people are willing to give money, even out of their own pocket, to the Great Orchestra of Christmas Aid (which raises funds to support medical aid for small children). Such a state of affairs reveals a lot about social expectations and our need to complete the "parliamentary centralism" with "the democratic ideas of lower ranks".

*On the Value of Communist Ideas Referring to "the Clashes of Civilisations"*

The political order of the world is being shaken by the rising wave of revived Islam, which is a traditional religion of shepherding peoples. Its fanaticism is accompanied by the mentality of individuals accustomed to masterful actions in relation to animals, and by their conservative family structure which eclipses "the state" as a "charity institution" interfering with economic and civilising processes. The turmoil among those shepherding peoples cannot be suppressed by means of military pressure or imposed "parliamentary democracy". It is hardly probable that Islam should become weaker, either.

It is worth remembering that already in the 20s, Communist Russia undertook a gigantic civilisational effort to assimilate economically and mentally the numerous nomad tribes of Central Asia. There were even attempts to change the course of large Siberian rivers, to build a network of canals in order to turn the barren shepherd regions into agricultural areas, and to impose a farmer's mentality onto their inhabitants professing Islam. Cultivation of cotton wool, watermelons and grapes was made popular. Although it seems that the decline of the Empire followed the drainage in the resources in the political Centre rather than some decentralising aspirations of the peripheries, the very idea of limiting the martial mentality of the shepherds seems to be highly inspiring for contemporary times. The major problem is water. Thus a programme which would continue the enterprises of Stalin's Russia should be determined with a slogan, "Let each Afghanistan have its Assuan". Rich industrial countries are able to make such a technological effort.

*On the Necessity to Create a new "Parliament of the World"*

The United Nations organization is coming to an end. The failure of the great international congress in Johannesburg, called "The Earth Summit", became a fact in 2001. The world entered the stage in which international politics is steered by a little oligarch group of the seven richest countries of the world (plus the weird presence of Russia). Humanity needs a body which could determine at least some most general intentions and requirements of billions of people. Such a body cannot be organised mechanically by "the representatives of the countries" since China, India, Brazil, etc., would easily achieve "over-representation" among the delegates. An alternative organisation for representing "the world's opinion" is needed, different from "national representations."

A situation can be thus imagined when most of the political parties of classical programme profile, viz., liberal, socialist, Christian (Muslim etc.), join and form "internationals" presenting their plans and visions of the world. Furthermore, the citizens of all countries are presented with such universal visions and reform programmes. The citizens vote for those political bodies that are willing to carry out some definite restructuring of the world's order. No doubt that in such a situation the thousands of millions making the Chinese electorate would break into proposals of votes that could be even typical of much smaller countries.

The authority of such a parliament that might be initially construed by public opinion surveys in individual countries and not by full elections would be significant, and the principles of the actions of such authorities – at first consultative only – would comply with the principles of the politics which have been functioning in democratic countries for over two centuries.

**Chapter VII**

# Many Civilisations and One World Parliament:
# Reflections on Globalization in its Civilisational and Political Aspect

*Romuald Piekarski*

The subject-matter of globalization belongs to the type of problems that still occupy the pages of those newspapers and periodicals which are regarded as most serious and those which try to make comments on some weighty changes of the contemporary world. From time to time, politicians at the national and regional levels (particularly in the practical context of Polish integration with the European Union) refer to the pressure of the globalization process.[1] Despite that, and partly thanks to the rhetoric of the pro-liberal media, globalization is regarded as the simple continuation of free enterprise and the free market developing on a global scale.

### Globalization and Philosophy

The section of philosophy where the risk of involving some very practical disputes (political, attached to an idea or even ideological) is admissible is certainly 'political philosophy'. However, even this perceptional discipline is obliged by a certain reserve or restraint towards the fever of fighting sides and extemporary (political – and – partisan) involvement. Moreover, it seems that the philosophical theory of civilization is one of the ways to reconcile the matter of cognition with the co-responsibility of the philosophy – for which it is dependent on mankind. I would like to touch this 'borderland' of philosophical discipline here. But because of the occasional character, to a certain extent, of my remarks, I would like to use the form of 'commentary', a kind of discourse in which I find it easier to formulate some practical conclusions.

*Capital Must Remain Serviceable, Not Officious*

The civilizational dimension of globalization means that the technical and economic forms of activity – its products – are changing their status and are transformed from instrumental values to other values to which they were subordinated earlier as instrumental. The end of the so called "cold war" era and the end of the rivalry between capitalism and socialism have caused a gathering of strength and spreading of the process responsible for the renewed world's trade system, part of which is to be the global market.

But it is important to ask to what extent, and under what conditions, can an article be exchanged on the global market. Among others, John Gray[2] declares that, besides a certain episode in England's history, markets were usually local and regional, and they were subordinated to the pre-existent cultural and social whole, the national state for example. The matter discussed in that context focuses on the supreme existence, the 'state' and its normative and political (perhaps cultural and moral) institutions or a free initiative and trade-market system. This question could

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[1] See *Globalizacja i my. Tozsamoœæ lokalna wobec globalnych trendow rozwojowych*, (eds., Romuald Piekarski and Michal Graban), Universitas, Krakow 2003.

[2] "From the Great Transformation to the Global Free Market," in: John Gray, *False Dawn. The Delusions of Global Capitalism*, Granta Books, London 1998, pp. 1-22.

also be transformed into a problem of the new world order. It is then possible, without abandoning a civilizational aspect, to focus attention on the political dimension of globalization.

The United States, which has always declared its attachment to freedom and anti-colonialism, seems to drift involuntarily into the original kind of world's empire status,[3] when in the name of basic values (security, individual freedom and human rights with an unfortunate and not always official inclusion of unlimited trade freedom) it is ready to make severe judgments on complex civilized communities leaning against engagement in international trade system, based on profitable rules both for the U.S.A. and global corporations, patronized along with international financial organizations (such as World Bank and International Monetary Found) by the United States. This coincidence of interests decorated by slogans of allegedly universal civilization or "the best-ever" civilized Euro-Atlantic alliance, seems to provoke serious doubts, both in Europe and other parts of the world.

Even the most obvious and universal material needs such as aiming at prosperity, avoiding poverty (overused arguments of globalization advocates) cannot give serious explanation for destroying long-lasting communities of other than American provenience. De Soto's[4] statement with its pretended moral indignation (accompanied by another saying that the poor can still work) is highly muddled in the sense that it was made to prove a one-sided practical conclusion – indispensability of establishing normative regulations that include the poor ("dead capital") in the trade circulation of the international market. Whoever thinks that it is possible to heal poor African nations (their postcolonial devastation) by corrupting their tradition-based elite in order to emancipate them from out-fashioned or even barbarian tribal structures and make them represent western civilization (by conspicuous consumption), in fact repeats, despite outward rejections of colonialism or imperialism, the operation that destroyed the old French monarchy, establishing then on its rubble, a bureaucratic, centrally managed 'people's democracy'.

*A Few Remarks on Theories of Civilization: Huntington, Koneczny, Nicolai Hartmann*

A Polish philosopher of history working in the first half of the 20th century, Feliks Koneczny, has firmly stated that civilizational blends make a hybrid form, unable to achieve a long-lasting existence. Koneczny adhered to the Latin civilization, which was partly included in Polish history and culture.[5] At first sight, when observing changes whose accelerated and magnified form seems to be the globalization process, we are coming up with a sudden conclusion that Koneczny was wrong in a fundamental way. If a certain extent of the world being modernized was taken for granted – the percentage of urbanization, the level of technical improvement of an everyday life, transforming people to a buying mass-audience and electorate – it needs to be said that in the meantime, some old tradition-based civilizations in regard to religious faith and separate local habits, are breaking down and decaying. But on the other side when considering the dynamics of

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[3] On this see essay "Brzemiê imperium" by Michael Ignatieff, that was edited first in *The New York Times Magazine* (in Poland – *Rzeczypospolita*, from 25-01-2003).

[4] Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capital, Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*. Here, I used the polish translation of this book published in: Fijorr Publishing and Polish-American Foundation for Economic Research and Education, Chicago – Warszawa 2002, pp. 78ff, chapters 1-3.

[5] Compare the notions of civilization by Feliks Koneczny and Samuel Huntington in the article of Jan Skoczynski, "Huntington and Koneczny (an attempt to compare)," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Jun 1999, Vol. 41 Issue 2, p207, 10p.

the last two decades, this mistake does not seem so obvious. After the totalitarian systems have broken down and the confrontation between capitalism and socialism has disappeared together with ideology devaluation, (as if in another dimension) the national or ethical communities have eventually been reborn, accompanied by some parts of the presumably gone great traditional civilizations.[6]

It would be interesting to show how old civilizations and the process of understanding them is being transformed. It is easier with Huntington's analysis starting from the famous essay "Clash of civilizations?"[7] At this point it is important to focus on a few things limited to probably irreversible (at least partly) civilizational changes that we tend to link with globalization.[8]

In order to maintain a distance from Huntington's, Fukuyama's and other contemporary theorists' terminological proposals, I would like to outline a slightly different comprehension of those complex forms which civilizations are and used to be in the past. Since I would like to put stress on the axiological aspects of cultures and civilizations, I will refer to Nicolai Hartmann's phenomenological and ontological analysis.[9] Although Hartmann had never referred directly to civilizations (to the best of my knowledge, he never used such a word), his "collective spiritual being" gives us in my opinion a great starting point to construct civilization theory appropriate for our needs.

*What are Civilizations?*

They are highly complex forms, having both an organic and personal character, because they exemplify humans. Civilizations are higher-order communities with no other clearly shaped community above them. Such terms as the world's public opinion and international community draw their reality only from civilized communities of nations and people. There is only its geometrical totality, and after deducting humanizing civilized communities, just means "a world population", a rather quasi-economic than biological structure which could also be called a post-

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[6] In Poland, Piotr Klodkowski wrote on the topic, *Wojna swiatów? O iluzji wartosci uniwersalnych*, ed. Znak, Krakow 2002. It is a pity, that he did not know works of Alasdair MacIntyre, especially *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?;* he is too dependent on Huntington.

[7] Samuel P. Huntington, *Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy ksztalt ladu swiatowego* (translated into Polish by Hanna Jankowska of *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order),* Warszawskie Wyd. Literackie MUZA, Warszawa 2001; "The Clash of Civilizations?," in:*Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993; "If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World," in: *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1993; see also his answer to Pierre Hassner's objections in: *National Interest*, Spring 97, Issue 47, p. 97, 6p.

[8] Certain changes are invertible partly because of the obvious profits they bring like the rapid communication, growing possibilities of helping the sick, the cooperation and exchange of scholars and scientists. But this does not mean that there is a necessity of formulating a stronger thesis about the objectivity of globalization, seen as an historical fate. I wrote on this topic: Romuald Piekarski, "Uniwersalizm czy zamaskowana oligarchia: Obawy i nadzieje w obliczu procesow globalizacyjnych," in: *Pieniadze i wiez. Kwartalnik naukowy* Lato 2002/4, Sopot 2002. This article will be also published in a book titled: *Globalizacja i my. Tozsamosc lokalna wobec globalnych trendow rozwojowych*, (edited by Romuald Piekarski and Michal Graban), which will be published by Universitas in 2003.

[9] The most inspiring seems to be the text of Hartmann "Systematyczna autoprezentacja," in: Nicolai Hartmann, *Mysl filozoficzna i jej historia. Systematyczna autoprezentacja*, translated to Polish by Jan Garewicz, ed. Comer, Torun 1994, especially pp. 115-126.

civilization bankruptcy estate.[10] Up to this moment there is no universal civilization and homogeneous world economy and presumably there never will be one (despite the imagination of some influential global finance theorists).

We could use De Maistre's famous sentence by saying that it is only possible to be civilized on a 'local' civilization scale: to be a European (practicing Christian or only shaped in a Greek-Judeo-Christian and Latin tradition) or representative of Muslim civilization, American, Japanese or Hindu. It is also possible, of course, to be a man and a cosmopolitan but in order to avoid being barbarian it is necessary to sign up to one or two civilized communities and consider it at least as a place of origin and moral education (to follow A. MacIntyre).

*A Few Conclusions*

Pushing down to the dead-end of hardly surviving necessity – that's what remains from the cyber-business and rivalry on the global market.[11] There is a substitution: instead of traditionally inherited values, instead of choosing values in a complex organic and self-defined community-patterned order, some hardly hidden commands are diffused together with a 'historical necessity' rhetoric that in one word could be called compulsion adorned with hedonistic freedom, 'plastic gadgets' advertisements standing next to the gigantic production of junky articles. All of this seriously affects local competition[12] that had been giving a normal, wealthy life to local communities and civilizations.

It is common that the political aspects of globalization are occurring in a schema presuming that the polar opposite of globalization has to be the national state. Quoting Kapuscinski, Huntington and others tell us that some globalization processes affect destructively the national state, and transform civilization's patterns and historically shaped institutions, those responsible for the life and thought of big communities.

Let's repeat that multilayer and multidirectional processes called globalization have their civilized dimension. On one side they are breaking down the old civilized 'whole', and on the other, they have an effect on small and weak organisms. Moreover, these processes cause serious tensions between certain civilizations. The center accelerating this process is of course so called "western civilization," impelling and extorting the technological transformation. There is another disputable matter: is this tendency to shape one, almost global, market and global economy exchange going to magnify? Is this process going to reverse, giving back the strength to local and regional markets? Finally, are we going to witness a gradual becoming of universal civilization or is it rather the international political organizations that are going to mediate and preserve the balance between separate civilizations?

**A Few Simplified Scenarios**

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[10] There is a fear that a current, strong tendency, seen in a process of privatization of some of the state and governmental agendas as well as in promoting mass consumption, entertainment and the phenomenon of the "lonely crowd" points at the fact that the planetary society is not bringing about optimistic hopes for the future but reduces to a sort of bankruptcy after the fall of the old traditional civilizations.

[11] As a Swedish writer puts it: 'Huge capital funds are thrown into cyberspace chasing/ looking for the best dividend.'

[12] See my essay: "Uniwersalizm czy zamaskowana oligarchia...," *op. cit.*

*An Elite of Producers (Corporations) and the Masses of Consumers: Populist and individualistic with Growing Inequality*

The laxity of borders between nation-states and associating into bigger civilizational macro-regions can take place in many directions. The first could be connected with 'consumption' individualism, assuming further dispersion, severing, or even turning into dust the community bonds which still currently survive as remainders of the traditional societies, ethnic communities, etc.

In the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville warned against such a 'tyranny of the democratic majority', pointing at the partial antidote in the form of bottom-up self-government movements, social associations, uniting and strengthening the dispersed individual interests, leanings, and aims. Nowadays, the supporters of the global civil society refer to similar ideas. As it seems, this orientation has some chance of opposing the most bothersome weaknesses and dangers signaled in this scenario of events. But the chance will be greater if the supporters of the global civil society don't erase the civilizational differences of their origins and if, which is equally important, they don't fight the structures of the nation-states, but rather reform them, thus 'ennobling democracy'.

Those who put their trust in democracies that are supposed to revive (under the pressure of suffering, shortages, and feeling of harm) and weaken the trends of the global market launched by the quasi-monopolistic practices of international corporations, unfair competition, which eliminates the national producers of the simplest goods of everyday use and undermines the relative equilibrium of regional markets, seem to fall into a vicious circle.[13] Democracy mediated by the media of information and communication sponsored by obscure interests of the rich is itself not in the best condition. Hoping that it will be reborn like the Phoenix from the ashes (like in Karl Marx's slogan about the strengths and solutions born out of historical necessity itself) is the persistent fever of indignation and feeling of injustice, out of which many revolutions have emerged. But in this way we will not move closer to generating either the global civil society, or the international political institutions at the inter-civilizational level, which are necessary for keeping peace in the world and the just exchange of values among civilizations.

For the shareholders and beneficiaries of the big corporations and enterprises of a new type, which reach the highest gains in the rivalry on the globalised market, identification of globalization with capitalism and the free market is quite comfortable. They can then portray their opponents as 'antiglobalists', a caricature of the descendants of socialism and muddy utopians, who are not able to present any serious and real alternative to 'capitalism'. However, even if there is a meaningful portion of extreme leftist, Marxist utopians, or even collectivists (communitarians), or on the other hand, libertarian individualists, among the anti-globalist movements, the opposition between globalism and anti-globalism does not necessarily spread out along these somewhat obsolete divisions.

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[13] It seems funny to keep discovering again and again the lessons given us by Adam Smith, in order to oppose capitalism, and defend the local markets (how it was shown by Korten – see. next footnote). Even though Smith was a moralist and one of the first to theorize about the global market, and notice the beginnings of the growing pathology, we should keep searching for the cure to these problems somewhere else. This cure has to be more civilizational than economical. It seems that Thomas Pangle proposed the right assessment of Smith's, Hume's and Locke's roles. Compare: *Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism. The Moral Vision of the American Founders and Philosophy of Locke*, The University of Chicago Press, 1990.

David Korten[14] proposed opposing capitalism (identified with big corporations and their monopolistic interests on the globalized market) to the free markets, which function more locally. Though the opposition of regional markets to the single world market seems to make some sense, the juxtaposition of Adam Smith's thought (even if too freely or selectively interpreted) and capitalism as such seems rather peculiar. More persuasive seems to be the narrower conception of globalization, fencing it off from capitalism, or at least considering it as a particular form or phase. Such an approach characterizes, e.g., John Gray's theory.

*Restoration of Regional and Ethnic Movement*

Also this scenario certainly has a lot of contradictory options. Anyway, a lot of the options are only fictional,[15] aiming to scare globalization's opponents. The others are, in fact, coming into reality. Regeneration of local patriotism, vitalisation of traditions, cultures and religions (such as the great world religions) may eventually mean something good, valuable and safe, though only if moderate. This moderation can seem more likely only if people won't fear their own ethnic 'belonging': from the civilizing to the religious and national to the ethnic. Those who imagine that only crushing ties and developed national state's structures, and instead privatising public life, putting it under the mega-corporation wings, can lead to the world's welfare ("a safer and more peaceful world"), e can be called the "errant knights of the European Enlightenment".

The additional check on the freedom of international corporation investments, the attenuation of competence and rights of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and other international financial organizations, should be a right response to the weakness of national states. That won't be possible until a strengthening of state structures and the creation of the World Senate or parliament is completed (I address this idea below).

Of course, the freedom of floating capital, of investments, or even global trade should be preserved, but they should be done selectively, without destroying the local and regional markets. To maintain a balance of proportions and inner stability it is necessary to put some international (and inter-civilization) lawmaking rights into hands less self-interested and more credible than those of the WB and IMF. The existing, partly used up, international security organizations are insufficient, but their experience and abilities should be used to construct an International Parliament based on some form of elections and representation. The aforementioned financial organizations and global corporations could still exist, but they should be controlled by credible and competent authorities representing each civilisation. At that point, the international government can gain credibility and confidence if any contact with particular interests is strictly *prohibited*.

Going back to current dilemmas and continuation of the analysis shown above, on a more public level, I would like to add that there is also a division of perspective[16] in the more ambitious

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[14] David C. Korten, *Swiat po kapitalizmie. Alternatywy dla globalizacji (Post-Corporate World. Life After Capitalism)*, trans. into Polish, Hanna Goworwska-Adamska, ed. Stowarzyszenie Obywatel, Lodz, 2002.

[15] Among those 'fictions', I would count also the fears of a revived fascism or nationalism in the form with which they appeared at the beginning of the 20th century.

[16] Here I have in mind the opinions of Bronislaw Wildstein and Ryszard Kapuscinski, which can be found in the monthly "Znak" (2002/1). They are related to the discussions started by Polish orientalist Pawel Klodkowski, O *Wojnie cywilizacji*. There is a clear difference in those attitudes, which relates to the differing amount of knowledge about non-European societies as well as the character of the diagnosis of the situation of the Western civilization regarding the issue of Europe's potential for creating a political

Polish political publications that are being modeled (by Huntington's and Fukuyama's dispute) as a modernised and multi-civilisational perspective. Let us look at the argument of Ryszard Kapuscinski,[17] who is taking a rather Huntingtonian starting point, a 'scientific' perspective (slightly modified when one considers the thesis of "clash of civilisations,"[18] which Kapuscinski finds not inevitable, and finds artificially stimulated by the media). For Kapuscinski, globalization occurs on at least three levels:

- official (free capital flow, free market access, communication, supra-state companies and corporations, mass culture, mass article, mass consumption)
- negative (disintegrating globalization of the criminal world, Mafia, drugs, gun trade, dirty money washing, avoiding taxes, financial swindling)
- the third level contains: international non-governmental organisations, movements, sects, this level of globalization visualises that old traditional structures (such as state, nation, church) do not deliver satisfactory answers for new challenges and needs. It is a source of a hardly avoidable weakness of the state and the revision of local communities.

Kapuscinski's interesting analytic provokes some quite serious doubts. I am not sure about his reasons (is they stated on purpose or by accident?) for delimiting the first and second levels as if they didn't match. In the meantime, the second globalization is possible only as a certain developing and continuation of the first one. Casino capitalism, faking financial outcomes, unfair competition, tricky damaging of the weaker competitor – all of the above are corporate practices (not all of them of course) and, I'm afraid, also practices of the governmental structures serving not only the civic majority but also private interests of the super rich. Showing their interests in the world civilisation or at least a highly civilised world with the United States 'on the top' – this is an ongoing and diligent ideological task for liberal publicists identifying globalization with capitalism itself, with free enterprise, and one global free market.

Kapuscinski warns us against private armies in Sierra Leone or Congo, linking them to globalization in its third meaning. But still, it appears that the international outlawed underground, organised criminality with financial misuse and abuse ('creative' accounting) is present in a world of great, modern and "highly competitive" business, global corporations or partly state structures. The last one functions not only legally, but also has a significant impact on lawmaking.[19] This brought about the resulting horrible process of damaging a public sphere and its defensive power

community. Has the alliance with the U.S.A. a strong base in 'common values' or rather is it only a defense alliance? Is the modern West, which went through the phase of a so-called Enlightenment, in good condition? Are 20th century problems the result of progress or are they the logical consequence of Enlightenment, science, technology and liberalism? Depending on the character of the answer given we look differently at the current situation, at its political and social tensions, as well as the scenario of unifying Europe. One of these scenarios, within either the framework of the global world or as an alternative: a chance for civilizational progress or a withdrawal to the Christian roots of one of the world's civilizations.
[17] "Nasz kruchy œwiat. Rozmowa z Ryszardem Kapuscinskim," in: Artur Domoslawski, *Swiat nie na sprzedaz. Rozmowy o globalizacji i kontestacji*, Warszawa 2002, pp. 220-21.
[18] Interesting critics of Huntington's and Fukuyam's opinions can be found in an essay by Pierre Hassner, "Koniec pewnikow, zderzenie tozsamosci: nieprzewidywalne stulecie w: [tegoz] Koniec pewnikow. Eseje o wojnie, pokoju i przemocy, (La signification du 11 septembre, " in*Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie*, Paris 2001, and *Par-delà le totalitarisme et la guerre* by Editions du Seuil, Paris 2000) Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego and Sic!, Warszawa, 2002, translated by M. Ochab.
[19] In Poland we have lately witnessed – as journals call it – 'Rywingate'.

and could only be opposed by enforcement of independence of the lawmaking government in order to prevent any kind of contact with the economic interests' sphere, starting from self-governmental, central and international. Capital must remain a servant, after all, and pay adequate taxes, not cultivate half-legalised lobbying.

It seems that the most barren are the Enlightenment's modernising and post-cold-war schemes, enforced by Fukuyama's Hegelian perspective. Also Kapuscinski sometimes reproduces this kind of thinking when he says that "the world is going forward (...) – there are a lot of cars, television, roads, aeroplanes – everything."[20] Probably not everything when there is a gigantic deficit of a meaningful life, community ties, spiritual values, virtues, important occupations, etc... The fact that inequality, dissatisfaction and conflicts are growing[21] can lead us to an original kind of "democracy, free market, American values triumph – as a fulfillment of history,"[22] but the aforementioned cannot be so easily divided one from the other.

As far as the "Cold War" era was concerned, any global conflicts and post-colonial emancipation trials (Africa and the Middle East) were treated by the American 'analytic' as fragments of one central conflict and the socialism-capitalism rivalry with a significant participation of the so-called 'Soviet conspiracy'; nowadays, this black and white scheme is renewed as a simplified projection of an exterior enemy or enemies. That's how the declarations of liberty, freedom of self-definition, and pluralism that the U.S. democratic ideology is filled with, become a politically correct patterned personification of the 'beautiful American', and the values of its 'official' allies.

That is why the relatively unorganised, not numerous (not to say elite) Polish Anti-globalization movement[23] is regarded as perpetrated by America's enemies, by spies and socialist 'relics', and by the followers of terrorists and fanatics. But it is also possible to regard the U.S.A. as our friend and that's why it is said that we have doubts about America's actual nervous (self-interested, corporation- servile) foreign policy. It seems that the U.S. government and, what's most important, the American civic community, should have an alternative which is more effective in reversing the bad aspects of globalization. Instead of conclusions, I offer some hints and a postulate: we need to tame spontaneous elements through a world parliament.

The questions must recur: What is globalization? In what direction is a unifying Europe going? Is Huntington right when he encourages us to tighten the alliance of Europe and the U.S.A. within the framework of the Atlantic Pact, with the United States as the leader? Wouldn't it be better if the U.S.A. decided to get involved in the creation of the world parliament, where the best forms of representations could have a chance to check/verify actions for world peace? The military leadership of the U.S.A., as well as the role of the world's policeman, punishing terrorism and trying to avoid chaos and criminal regimes does *not* have a good platform either in international law or in a fragile European consensus. There is a need for something more, the civilizational compromise,[24] which could be reflected and proved by the world parliament with democratically

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[20] Op. cit., pp. 216-217.

[21] Somewhere else Kapuscinski says more precisely that he did not only mean the inequality of distribution since that is the result of structural inequality.

[22] Op. cit., pp. 216/17.

[23] For Kapuscinski (p. 219) it is important as a herald of great dissatisfaction, the signal of a change in the atmosphere of the western world.

[24] In a speech on February 26, 2003, President George Bush said: "We meet here during a crucial period in the history of our nation, and of the civilized world. Part of that history was written by others; the rest will be written by us." Between the phrases 'our nation' and 'civilized world' or 'the rest will be written by us'

elected representatives of different countries and continents as well as religions. Of course this plan is highly complex and would mean a gradual and time- consuming creation of the so-called world civil society. But is there any other good alternative?

Even if big companies are not as dangerous for the national economies and the balance of regional exchange and the environment as is assumed and described by anti-globalists, in order to get the mutual trust between nations, countries, and civilizations, we need something more that the strict financial and accountant law in the U.S.A., where the big percentage of those corporations has its locations. There is a need for some representative body taking shape like a Roman Senate where there are senators with the high authority and a mandate of trust given them by the political and cultural local communities from which they stem. They should also be open to planetary justice and spiritual universality.

The way to achieve universal civilization is a long road, though. What I have in mind is a form, which would be something more than a mere planetary society of mass consumers, a mixture of businessmen hoping for huge profits, without looking back at poverty and the destruction of the local communities and devastation of traditions. A way which is long and full of risk which has to go through the phase of mutual respect and appreciations which should find institutional reflections rather than the current international organizations, which deal primarily with the safety of corporations. It all depends on whether or not the system of a mutual exchange between local communities can be rich and more complex than the commercial trade of material consumption. As Michael Walzer[25] correctly pointed out, cultural people have more values and mutual enrichment to exchange: they want to exchange knowledge for knowledge, fascination for fascination, respect for respect, justice for justice, – justice in all spheres, so everyone gets what s/he deserves and what s/he is really interested in.

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appears no ambivalent sentence: 'civilization equals the U.S.A. and its military alliances'. Cleary, Bush does not know anything about the development of many civilizations in the future and their complications, those things which Huntington claims to know! Bush's vision is closer to the simple (naive?) reasoning of Fukuyama. I am afraid that is a very bad prognostic indeed.

[25] Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin. Moral Argument and Abroad* (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame – London 1994) and *Spheres of Justice. Defense Pluralism & EqualityBlackwell* (Oxford UK & Cambridge USA 1993).

## Chapter VIII
# The Concept of Solidarity and Its Properties

*Dariusz Dobrzanski*

Anyone who starts to examine solidarity – the word, the idea and the concept – is bound to notice that in the literature of the subject this term occurs in two fundamental senses: descriptive and normative. What we usually have in mind when we refer to solidarity in the former sense is the description of actually existing bonds and the types of such bonds occurring between individuals, groups, communities, professions, trades, etc. We mean thereby the actually existing solidarity of a family, a tribe or a class. On the other hand when we employ solidarity in the normative sense of the word, it is used as a postulated and the most frequently positively valued model of relations (bonds) between social entities. In this context, solidarity is a postulated good, a value on which the relations between the acting entities should be based. This implies that by having recourse to solidarity in the normative sense of the word, we simultaneously express a critical attitude to the existing foundations of the social order and we are postulating its change in a new direction, where solidarity would be not only a concept employed on and off at times of crisis but it could also be used to make up for the shortcomings and correct the deficiencies of modern liberal democratic societies.

The question of justification of the postulated norms, values, and goods is the fundamental problem which all normative postulates and concepts encounter irrespective of the sphere of their application. This is also true in case of solidarity interpreted normatively. The more so that, as we will indicate later on in this paper, the concept of solidarity is semantically fuzzy and even the acceptance of the most general definition –characterising solidarity as a bond – entails a range of implications limiting its use. In their quest for justification of solidarity as the postulated good or value most advocates of normative solidarity point to the natural characteristics of our species. Against the Hobbesian 'realistic' portrayal of the human being – the natural egoist – they oppose the image of a co-operating altruist, who realises his or her own individual aims through natural co-operation with other people. It is an interesting fact that advocates of very dissimilar positions resort to that kind of justification. It is to be found both in the concept of man and his nature of the anarchist Peter Kropotkin and in the contemporary analyses of the feminist movement by Caroll Gilligan.[1] Finding the answer to the question of natural vs. conventional character of altruistic motivation for solidarity-induced co-operation appears to be in our view one of the most important tasks which the future theory of solidarity should take up.[2]

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[1] What I have in mind here is the book by P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid. A Factory of Evolution*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, in which Kropotkin opposes Darwin's theory of struggle for survival and outlines a theory of his own illustrated by examples according to which disinterested co-operation among people (and animals) makes evolutionary sense. Caroll Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[2] The problem of altruism vs. egoism in human nature has returned as the topic of scholarly debates. This happens in the wake of advances made in genetic engineering, DNA research, and the discussion stirred in the scientific community by the book by Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, in which the writer restates the old thesis that selfish behaviour is typical of human nature and presents new arguments in favour of it. The book by M. Ridley, *The Co-operative Gene: How Mendel's Demon Explains the Evolution of Complex Beings*, 2002 is the latest response to this thesis. Ridley contradicts Dawkins's claims and maintains that it

In this paper we shall take up the problem of solidarity in its normative sense, yet without getting involved in the problems connected with its justification. What we are particularly interested in is the formulation of the essential elements of the definition of solidarity and the reviewing of implications it entails. This is because there is no agreement as yet among the students of solidarity about the sufficient and necessary components of a fairly unambiguous concept of solidarity and its scope of application. We treat our task as a beginning of an inquiry leading to the construction of the theory of solidarity. This is why the objective of our paper is the possibly broad formulation of the principal problems and questions which the future theory should deal with. At the end of our considerations we will propose the four defining elements of the concept of solidarity – elements which in our opinion can be useful in investigating the problems related to the problem of co-operation. Our reflections are the result of an analysis of solidarity and the concepts to be found in the sociological, philosophical and legal literature.[3] The question which will accompany our inquiry concerns the problem whether solidarity has a chance of becoming a universal normative concept. This question is also important because in the practice of political and social life and the processes of globalization, solidarity – if one may say so – is taking off. The references to and applications for the concept of solidarity can be found in such important documents as national and even supranational constitutions. The preamble of the future European constitution, for example, is going to include a reference to solidarity as the principle of co-operation between the states. The situation is new in so far that in the legal discourse the status of solidarity as a concept is incomparably less than, for example, that of freedom and equality, which as statutory rights regulate the actions of and relations between citizens and institutions. Solidarity has already found its place and application in morality and morals – but not in the practice of law. Yet it should be borne in mind that it has its origins in the Roman law where it was connected with the so-called community obligations (obligations of solidarity). What is more, the ongoing processes of globalization naturally call for a reflection on and quest for non-antagonistic values and bonds likely to facilitate and humanise the co-operation between the social entities originating from various cultures. This is as necessary today as it will be in the future.

## The Formal Properties of the Concept of Solidarity

The first corollary from an inquiry into solidarity and its applications is that, as a rule, solidarity and community are connected genetically and semantically. Irrespective of whether one understands solidarity as some type of feeling between people, the principle describing the course of action to be followed, a value or a virtue – it is the community which determines the shape,

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is not egoism but co-operation inscribed into the human genetic make-up which has been a major factor behind the survival of the human species.

[3] The books I used include Kurt Bayert, ed., *Solidarity*, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1999. Solidarity, its history and contemporary problems connected with it are discussed in it from various perspectives by legal scholars, philosophers, sociologists and economists. I have also drawn from the corollaries formulated in his work by Michael Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity,* University of California Press. Berkeley / Los Angeles / London, where the problem of solidarity is examined from the standpoint of the questions posed by the theory of rational choice. From this standpoint solidarity arguably justifies the rationality of co-operation. The interrelationship between the community and solidarity is examined, among others authors, by Andrew Mason, *Community, Solidarity and Belonging*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. On the other hand the role of solidarity in Christian theology and the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church is discussed by Marie V.B. Bilgrien, *Solidarity*, Peter Lang, 1999.

character and strength of the bonds of solidarity. Although the semantic dimension of the links between solidarity and the community is obvious enough, the genetic connections between solidarity and the community are not. In terms of semantics, if one is a member of a family for example, one is connected with the other members by the natural semantic relationship – one is a father, a son, a husband, etc. But in terms of genetics, one can imagine a community, a soccer team for example, which is the result of common actions rather than their cause. This is also the case with conventional communities which arise from deliberate purposeful activities of individuals, and that is why the description of the character and nature of the community is very important for this type of solidarity. Both terms – solidarity and community – belong to the language of values and are valued positively by many standpoints in social, political and ethical questions.[4] Although there exist many descriptions of community, we will employ here the one which bears out the moral dimension of solidarity. We will do so because the moral dimension implied by solidarity is in our opinion an indispensable semantic element of this concept. Following in the footsteps of Andrew Mason, we shall call it the moralised concept of community.[5] From this standpoint a community is not merely a group of people bound by the shared values and way of life and who identify themselves with the customary practices and recognise one another as members of the group. Community is also a collective whose members are bound together by solidarity, which means that they are motivated in their actions toward one another by axiological and not instrumental rationality[6] and unfair distribution of goods cannot be found among them. We can turn to two traditions in philosophy when approaching the problem of the relationship between solidarity and community, that of Aristotle, who emphasised the natural origins of socio-political bonds and communities (*koininia*) in which people function, and that of the Sophists, who insisted on their conventional character. The later modern divisions introduced by F. Tonnies: *Gesellschhaft* vs. *Gemeinschaft*, and by E. Durhheim: mechanical solidarity vs. organic solidarity, derive from this opposition.

A fact is being pointed out, which can be accepted as another rule, that the durability of the bonds of solidarity is a function of the size of the group, the latter understood most frequently as a collective of people working together for their shared advantage. The goal – its achievement for the benefit of the group members – is what keeps the group together and, as we have said, group solidarity diminishes with its increase in size because the more numerous the group, the more difficult, it is argued, to agree on common goals and implement them. We should make a reservation, though, that if every community is a group then not every group is a community, because it lacks the constituent elements listed above. It remains an open question what other factors determine the durability of a community.

Another property of solidarity and the concept of solidarity to be underscored is the fact that solidarity implies the moral obligation to act or at least verbal commitment to do so. The moral dimension of solidarity can serve as a criterion for drawing the distinction between altruistic solidarity and self-seeking solidarity. The former can be illustrated by the situation in which the benefits of an action do not go to the person who took it but to somebody else. Another hallmark

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[4] I am thinking here mainly about the so-called Communitarians: Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, and others.

[5] Andrew Mason, *Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance*, Cambridge University Press, 2000 and Tadeusz Buksinski, *Racjonalnosc Wspoldzialan (The Rationaliy of Co-operation)* WNIF, Poznan 1996.

[6] I employ here the term 'axiological rationality' in the sense defined by Tadeusz Buksinski in his work: *Racjonalnosc Wspoldzialan (The Rationaliy of Co-operation)* WNIF, Poznan 1996.

of altruistic solidarity is the selfless motivation of the acting person, taking care of the interests and values of other people as opposed to one's own. For example raising money for a sick child among Internet users can serve as a good example of altruistic solidarity. On the other hand the self-seeking solidarity is characterised by mutual co-operation with one's own interests in mind. It is this concept of solidarity that is used by the trade unions for example, when they defend the individual and simultaneously collective interests of the workers. The justification for the moral dimension of solidarity of individuals and groups is sought the most frequently in the fact that they belong to and participate in larger entities such as a family, a nation or a state. It is by this virtue that we have some natural moral obligations to mutual co-operation and helping other members which stem from the fact of being a part of a community, such community being a significant contributing factor to the development of an individual.

The problem of exclusion that the concept of solidarity implies is another characteristic particularly attracting the attention of contemporary critics of solidarity as a normative concept.[7] As such it is quoted as one of the reasons why all claims of the notion of solidarity to universality should be rejected. In the contemporary pluralist world of attitudes, lifestyles and world-views the concepts presupposing or implying exclusion encounter criticism, in particular on the part of those ideologies or philosophies which draw from the traditions of liberal culture. It is argued, moreover, that modern organisational forms of social life, like the states for example, do not need to fall back on the terms characteristic of the vocabulary of pre-modern tribal societies, solidarity being in the opinion of critics one of such terms. It is also claimed that the idea of substantial solidarity – tribal or national – can easily become a tool for manipulation and inciting ethnic conflicts. The growing phenomenon of exclusion and marginalisation of many social groups, which leads to the creation of social peripheries of poverty and crime, can be far more effectively held in check by the principle of universal citizenship. Far from antagonising through exclusion, the principle of universal citizenship embraces the rights, obligations and the membership in a community; without being burdened with particular, local connotations – as is the case with solidarity – it can more effectively induce active participation in public life.

Another point raised by the opponents of the idea of return to normative solidarity are the cultural, scientific and technological achievements of the modern liberal culture of the West, founded as it is, on the principles of individualism and autonomy deemed by those critics to be incompatible with solidarity. The principles of individualism and autonomy have found their practical expression, for example, in the institution of the human rights, which became not only the norm regulating the internal relations of states but also the standard of conduct in the international relations between the states. In this view the prosperity of the western culture stems from an ongoing process of ethnic, national and communal de-solidarisation. A particular kind of ethnic solidarity, described as *Asabiyah* by Ibn Khalduna in the 14th century, and understood as the principle of territorially and ethnically limited solidarity-motivated co-operation which determines the economic actions and mutual moral obligations of a closed community and its members still persists in many places of the globe. It is deemed to constitute the principal obstacle to progress.

Solidarity, whose properties we are analysing here, is often linked to and sometimes erroneously equalled with another concept to be found in similar social and moral contexts involving the public good, namely with the concept of charity. Charity occurs in two basic

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[7] N. Capaldi, "What's Wrong with Solidarity*?"* In: K. Beyertz, *Solidarity*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht / Boston / London, 1999; K. P. Rippe, "Diminishing Solidarity," in: *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, v. 1. 1998, pp. 355-374.

meanings: a/ religious, where it denotes Christian love (*caritas*) and b/ secular – where it denotes beneficence.[8] In the former sense love (*caritas*, charity) is understood in the writings of the fathers of the church and St. Thomas Aquinas as the most profound of the theological virtues, the object of whom is God and one's neighbour with a view to God.[9] On the other hand charity as beneficence is present in the ethical reflection and most frequently understood as charity duties. It is in the latter sense that I will employ it in my analysis,[10] which comes to the point. When Allen Buchanan characterises charity duties, he lists their four principal properties: a/ they are positive duties, i.e., most frequently they call for taking actions as opposed to negative duties which call for refraining from actions; b/ charity duties cannot be imposed for example, by force or legal sanction, c/ charity duties do not have a perfect character, which means that they are neither determined by a specific norm nor by the person at whom they are directed – the kind and amount of help given as well as the choice of the beneficiary may be accidental; d/ charity duties are not a matter to be dealt with by the law. Buchanan emphasises that it is not clear how the four mentioned properties interrelate with each other, and thus it is not easy to determine what makes given duties justice duties, for example, and not charity duties. He indicates, however, that the term duty is usually understood in such situations in the broad Kantian sense of a moral imperative. It should be borne in mind that Kant himself used the example of charity when illustrating the generalising power of the categorical imperative.[11]

One cannot fail to reflect on conclusions to be drawn from comparing charity duties on the one hand and solidarity and its properties listed earlier on the other. Firstly, both obligations have a moral character – the failure to undertake them does not entail legal sanction, only a moral one. Equally, both have a positive character, which is to say that they call for taking actions in order to achieve the intended good. It is this positive appeal which is often used to account for the absence of solidarity in modern political and ethical thought. Modern liberal culture is said to have an essentially negative character, i.e., it is dominated by concepts, norms and duties which do not encroach on the horizon of choices of individuals as it protects the fundamental principle of the autonomy of individuals. Both solidarity and charity duties involve actions of helping others. Both strive to achieve goals benefiting those social groups and individuals who are deemed disadvantaged. Thus it would be difficult to imagine a situation where pressure is exerted or force being used in order to discharge one's own duties resulting from solidarity or charity. The acting individual himself decides about taking such actions each time. Secondly, both terms presuppose an altruistic intention of benefactors or those who undertook solidarity-motivated actions, at least if what we have in mind is the normative standpoint and not the descriptions of specific situations. Nevertheless, it should be underscored that the altruistic character of charity duties is more pronounced than that of solidarity. In spite of their common properties, there are also differences

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[8] We translate the English term 'charity' following the *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, where it features both as: love – Christian *caritas* – and in the sense of beneficence and benevolence. In contemporary editions of the Gospels, love is translated by the Greek term *agape*.

[9] It should be added that the theological virtues or the gifts of the Holy Ghost presuppose a significant distinction between those who are just (Christians) and those who are not. In the view of Marie V. Bilgrien, the recognition of solidarity as a virtue in everyone by the pope John Paul II relates solidarity more to love (*caritas*) than to justice.

[10] Allen Buchanan, *Justice and Charity, Ethics,* 1997, 558-575. Charity as the public good is examined by Jeremy Waldron, "Welfare and the Images of Charity*," The Philosophical Quarterly,* vol. 36, 1986.

[11] I. Kant, *Uzasadnienie Metafizyki Moralnosci (The Vindication of the Metaphysics of Morality)*, PWN, Warszawa, 1971, p. 54.

between the analysed concepts, the fundamental one being that an expectation of reciprocity can be involved in case of solidarity. This is clearly visible in particular in situations when the word solidarity is used pejoratively, for example when one refers to the solidarity of gangsters, solidarity in the conspiracy of silence etc. – in sum, when talking about solidarity of people involved in unholy alliances. On the other hand charity duties do not presuppose an expectation of reciprocity. The selfless character of charity duties excludes by definition in a way both the expectation of reciprocity and the advancement of the interests (goals) of the benefactor. An example of charity duties can be found in the biblical character of the Good Samaritan, whose earnest help and care were neither linked to any expectation of reciprocity nor to the advancement of the Samaritan's own goals. One more difference which should be mentioned here is that solidarity emerges where there is a common basis uniting those who mutually help one another, such basis being constituted by common origins, values, interests, and ideologies. Charity duties, on the other hand, are not predicated on this condition; we can give help to people (or not) when we have nothing in common with them or are not close to them in any way.

## Solidarity as a Principle of Co-Operation

Approaching the conclusion of our thoughts on the properties of the concept of solidarity, its assumptions and the corollaries to be drawn from it, we are bound to attempt to formulate such a definition of the concept of solidarity which could be useful in analyses of the problem of co-operation. To begin with, solidarity can be understood as an attitude of people toward one another, of a single individual towards a group, community or other collective. Solidarity as an attitude involves two components – a cognitive and an emotional one – which means that it is directed the most frequently towards people who are disadvantaged, excluded, rejected etc. and at the same time it implies disapproval or protest against such a situation and involves the intention of changing it for the better. The third component of solidarity as an attitude is its relation to praxis, which can be seen for example in appeals for actions of solidarity with the victims of natural disasters, wars and other calamities.

In other cases solidarity has been understood as a feeling between the members of family, community and, less frequently, of a group. It was characterised then as a positive unconditional emotional bond which found its expression in supporting or helping the relatives and acquaintances.

Nevertheless it seems that the most appropriate interpretation of solidarity in the context of problems and issues related to co-operation is approaching it as a principle. Solidarity understood in such a way is a basis or norm, underlying the co-operation undertaken by people deliberately, also for altruistic reasons. Additionally, those people are bound by a sense of belonging to a community, which may be broadly understood, and they do not envisage such goals and do not employ such means in their pursuit, which could be considered morally wrong from the vantage point of the so-called decent person.[12] By the very virtue of being a principle – and thus something elementary, fundamental and primal – solidarity shorn of its ethnic or national limitations can become a universal concept. In the world of growing interdependence there is a need, in our opinion, for construction of a new vocabulary in order to communicate effectively. By describing solidarity as a principle and not a feeling or an attitude (though both of them play an important role in inter-human encounters) we mean to underscore a belief that solidarity can and should find

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[12] "On the Morality of the So-called Decent Man" – see: T. Buksinski, *Modernosc* (Modernity), Poznan, 2001, WNIFUAM.

its place and application in public institutions, becoming a value recognised publicly. Some types of actions and co-operation, derived from the principle of solidarity are already noticeable in many non-governmental organisations, associations and charitable foundations. Education can become a major field of its application and development, where solidarity as an ideal should become an objective. It seems that as democratic institutions develop and advance, the opportunities for solidarity will grow with them.

The need to build a theory of solidarity has already been signalled. Such a theory will face the challenge of finding its rightful place in the hierarchy of social virtues and principles and in particular that of determining its position with respect to justice, which J. Rawls has recognised as the first among such principles.

# Common Theological Foundations for the Peaceful Emergence of an Acceptable Religious Pluralism: A Prerequisite for Globalization

*Michael Katafiasz*

The civilizational phenomenon of globalization is based on a gradual convergence of all the existing societies, their economies, cultures and religions. This process requires new legal regulations and a joint development of general principles of peaceful coexistence. Globalization creates the necessity for revising the values of local organizations and acknowledged paradigms, or for refashioning something that seemed finished and ready. Although this is by definition a general condition, it also affects the existential situation of the common citizens in the broadest sense of the term. The process of globalization is beginning to make an imprint even on the highly private sphere of personal religious beliefs. Contemporary common people more and more often have to face the presence of exotic and previously alien forms of religious activity in their lives. Accordingly, it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to sustain their naturally acquired belief that the spiritual interpretation of the reality provided by their own sphere of culture and religion is the only revealed truth. Contemporary people feel increasingly confused in the area of the spiritual order. This frustrating feeling is additionally strengthened by the fact that the various theological systems and religions that are now publicly confronting one another, are often mutually hostile. When common people, who do not have a thorough and objective knowledge of religions, encounter such situations, they usually assume that this dualistic attitude that pigeonholes persons based on their concepts of the religious truth, has a doctrinal foundation within the religions themselves. As one examines the great religions of the world, noticing only the superficial layer of their rites and concepts, which have developed within their native cultures, one may indeed conclude that each religion professes an entirely different truth and speaks of a different God.

Within the religious awareness of the contemporary people, the monolith of monotheism, which is comfortably rooted in history, has recently begun to tremble. The monotheistic view of the world is being superseded by a view of "savage polytheism," depicting a pantheon in which various gods are competing for the highest throne. Furthermore, both the faithful and the high-ranking priests of the various religions show by their attitudes that they are wary of the rival creeds and do not truly wish to understand their essence. The general spiritual and religious order of the world is gradually turning into a global disorder. The market policies of competition are now applied in the sphere of the spirit, and the souls of the faithful have become the subject of an increasingly aggressive and ruthless rivalry. In certain cases this is degenerating into a murdering struggle: People are killed over the ownership of a piece of land, and terrorists (who are not exclusively Islamic religious extremists) threaten public security. In Poland, a Christian radio station broadcasts disgusting and untrue statements about other religions, uttered by priests with professorial degrees. In fact, the present writer, who is a practicing Buddhist, may mention himself as a victim of profound religious intolerance. Probably all of us can add many more facts that we have personally witnessed and that prove conclusively that the relations among religions must be practically regulated. The regulation must consist in developing theological specifications that clearly and accurately define a religion's attitude to all the other creeds. Basically, the faithful should find answers to the following questions in such specifications: "While the God of the various religions is a revealed truth to which the various cultural and philosophical circumstances

have given various forms – is He nevertheless always an equally valid truth of one and the same true God? Does the single truth of one God speak to all the people with the same love and wisdom, and do the differences result from the fact that it has been told to us by various prophets in various languages and cultures? Or is the opposite the case – is the truth of the only true God heard only in the voice of the founder of a single religion, which has a priori ennobled the inhabitants of a single geographical-and-historical region of our planet? And when the same God spoke to the faithful of other creeds, did He tell them only about lesser matters? Or were other religions not established by the truth of the only true God?"

The increasingly numerous phenomena which result from the rivalry among religions and which have dangerous consequences, suggest that legal – i.e., secular – regulations of this issue, regulations which incidentally have already been adopted, are utterly insufficient. We must realize that clear regulations of the religious relations among various creeds must be incorporated in the theological layers of all the religions. Such a peaceful regulation must provide the religious law observed by the faithful of all creeds. The issue of the spiritual order is becoming increasingly urgent, yet, unfortunately, the religious leaders are not willing at all to address themselves to the essential task of a comprehensible specification of the spiritual policy of the coexistence of the numerous creeds. While in their theories and in external public declarations they speak of ecumenism and peace, the internal statements of all religious leaders without exception still teach their believers that in fact only their own faith constitutes the best and most complete spiritual path to the absolute truth. In practice, the lofty declarations of peace and tolerance are juxtaposed with utterly incongruous deeds, and the global spiritual order is now being based on hypocrisy and insincerity.

In this situation, when the spiritual heads of religions do not provide their faithful with clear instructions on what doctrinal forms of the ecumenical attitude to other religious systems to adopt, individual believers must develop their personal attitudes themselves. Sadly, it turns out that it is the easiest to deny the validity of the other, or "alien," creeds and to assume a hostile attitude to them. Certain more sensitive individuals are trying to construe the theology and liturgy of their religions as resulting from the cultural background of the revealed truth, and begin to realize that their creeds may be imperfect. In most cases, however, neither does the latter attitude admit that the other religions may also be products of the revealed truth. As such theological views are espoused, people lose their universal, ageless and fundamental spiritual sense of security. Religious fundamentalism and religious relativism of culture do not offer more spiritual support than the current balance of a bank account. If such attitudes are assumed, the global religious order may not be achieved as the intended and controlled result of a divine intervention. In this case, the power and extent of the absolute sacred quality may degenerate into market games and commercial competitions, which obviously will not enable people to improve their relationships with the Supreme Authority in a peaceful and comfortable manner.

Thus, the spiritual condition of contemporary people is highly frustrating: people are required to consider and make choices in matters to which they have not devoted any thought before, and for thinking about which in a mature way they have no time now. Accordingly, people prefer to adopt consumer attitudes and lose their interest in religion. Let us remember that action intended to improve the global quality of life is much easier to carry out in the context of the emotionally neutral laws of economy and the market than in the sensitive area of religious beliefs. Therefore, the rulers of the world still devote their attention only to developing such principles of coexistence as are related to the lower, or essential human needs. It is obvious to everyone that the needs of food, dwelling, financial income and leisure must be satisfied, and thence it is much easier to arrive

at a joint opinion in this matter. Cooperation in this area is made additionally easier by the fact that throughout history, basically all the people, regardless of their geographical location, ethnic origin, race, gender or religion, have always agreed to an ongoing improvement of the qualitative factors which allow them to satisfy the needs of this type.

One can think of yet another reason why the secular practical politicians, when laying the foundations of the process of globalization, fail to arrive at a definition of the peaceful coexistence of the various forms of religion. This matter is much more serious than mere tact or the difficulty of forming an opinion about religion. Namely, politicians limit their activity to those aspects of globalization with which they feel competent to deal, and over which they can exercise practical rather than theoretical control. Accordingly, the delicate issue of the relations among religions must be settled not by the leaders of nations, businesspeople and politicians, but by religious leaders, the only ones who are qualified to rectify this omission. The latter must shoulder the responsibility for controlling the evolution of the spiritual sphere, which is so important for the improvement of the global quality of human life. The religious leaders may follow the example of the secular ones and hold regular conferences on the impact of the unavoidable and ongoing process of globalization on relations among creeds. So far, only two such events have taken place, both organized by Pope John Paul II: The joint prayer for peace in the world in 1984, and the meeting of the representatives of twelve religions in Assisi in January 2002. Incidentally, the aim of the latter event was not to transcend the seemingly irreconcilable theological differences, but to condemn the terrorist attack against New York on Sept. 11th, 2001. Thus, at both meetings the religious leaders addressed themselves to developing a common and peaceful doctrinal opinion on a secular and material aspect of the world rather than to defining their mutual attitudes in terms of the faith and arriving at a joint truth that would trigger a peaceful evolution of the unified global spiritual order. Such a cross-denominational dialog contributes nothing to a collective and mature development of a program of the coexistence of the various religions, which the current global situation of each religion demands from its head. After all, united humanity wishes to have complete control over the ongoing process of globalization.

Man shall not live by bread alone (an abundance of which is in fact supplied by the politicians supervising the process of globalization), but also by spiritual food. Hopefully, all the members of the present audience agree with the findings of contemporary psychology, history and archeology, which demonstrate that the more sublime needs of the human species distinguish it from animals and have been impelling its evolution. The entire history of religion also tells us that all humans have always felt the need of being a part of not only the secular and relativist order, but also of the absolute and religious order. This is particularly true about the citizens of the post-Communist countries, where during forty years the ideology continuously attempted to replace the religious needs of the people with the arts and science. Since there can be no doubt that it is a universal human need to participate in religious rites, any discussion about the global improvement of the quality of life which ignores the issue of the improvement of the quality of religious activity, must be considered deficient.

In the light of these two factors: the universal human need of satisfying more sublime needs, and particularly the religious ones, and the religious leaders' failure to influence the process of globalization in a practical manner, I consider the process of globalization in its present form a danger to the common future of the humanity. If the élite of the world's religious activity wishes to participate in the fashioning of the future in a responsible and mature manner, all of its members must join the procedures which determine the process of globalization, obviously not in order to

discuss the details of economy or the accession to the European Union, but to develop a common theological foundations of a viable and peaceful religious pluralism.

To summarize, it is my view that a total omission of religious matters in the ongoing process of globalization is not an acceptable strategy, and neither can we expect that a divine intervention will settle this issue. Silence about such an important subject is an illogical and irresponsible attitude, which is detrimental to the humanity. One can think of several possible dangerous consequences of this failure to regulate the matter. A religious war may break out in a more distant future, if a single religion considers itself to be the sole voice of the only truth and decides to impose its ideological dictatorship on the followers of the other creeds. Secondly, if the process of globalization continues ignoring the matters of the mutual relations and influences among religions, people may neglect the observance of the traditional religious services, and eventually the existing creeds may gradually vanish as their congregations disappear. This would amount to the people disowning their own human nature, which after all must also live by spiritual food. In the long run, this scenario may conclude in an extinction or degeneration of the human species due to spiritual starvation. A third possibility is that a natural evolution will produce a uniform global religion, similar to the contemporary New Age movement, which will take over the scattered congregations and peacefully implement a single religious view of the world among all the believers.

Let us note that not only the first two scenarios, but also the third one amount to repudiating the joint heritage of the unique variety of human religions, and relinquishing all of the proven techniques of satisfying the human need of the sacred. This would be a very unwholesome situation, because it is contrary to the very logic of need to offer only one way of satisfying a need of any type, without granting a freedom of choice. Let us remember that the sublime needs may be described using the same pattern as the lower ones: When satisfying the need of food, the charm and pleasure of this activity is not in the fact that we have to eat but in the choice of the menu. Likewise, freedom of choice must be ensured in religious matters, where people expect to find a system which appeals to them and which they can voluntarily adopt. As long as people have a free will, any form of dictatorship in any matter will be contrary to the human nature.

Religion, which is an area of enormous importance and complexity, offers an excellent opportunity of action to philosophers. Right now, the situation in the "spiritual market" is such that the religious leaders and their theologians are involved, in terms of both emotions and habits, with their own religious organizations and truths of faith. The historical context, mutual prejudices and theological shortcomings of all religions make it practically impossible to hold effective meetings of religious people of various creeds with a view to establishing a viable spiritual community deriving from a common root. Since the representatives of religions are spiritually unable to cooperate and since the process of the mixing of nations, cultures and creeds cannot be stopped until the time when the spiritual leaders learn how to control it, I propose the following solution of the dilemma: A series of philosophical conferences must be held, devoted solely to this matter. Let the learned people from the whole world work out a theological compromise that preserves the differences among religions and shows the diversity of religions as a common heritage rather than a bone of contention. Once such a theological specification has been developed, it will be presented to the highest-ranking religious leaders of the world, in order to initiate the acutely needed series of cross-denominational meetings on this issue. I will not venture to describe such an independent and impartial theology, or the subjects of the discussions. A specific proposal of this type would go beyond the scope of the present paper, which wishes to limit itself to identifying an existing problem, naming it and emphasizing its weight. However, before possible solutions are

proposed and discussed, the concerned parties must first be convinced of the absolute necessity of a compromise, and of the collective and personal responsibility of working out a compromise. I have only one specific recommendation: In 1989, during the Round Table talks in Poland devoted to the good of the country, the Church successfully mediated between the secular Solidarity and the secular administration. By the same token, I hope that lay people will dare mediate among representatives of various spiritual denominations during negotiations for the good of the entire humanity. I emphasize that the adjective "lay" must not be construed as "atheistic," "non-religious" or "incompetent," but merely as referring to people acting in their capacity as non-sectarian individuals interested in the common spiritual good.

# Globalization as Christianity's Engagement with the Cultures and Historical Religions of the World

*Dominik Kubicki*

The dilemma to proclaim or not to proclaim the Good News about salvation in Jesus Christ, the Gospel, beyond the community of the elect occupied the thought of the Savior's followers for a quite short time.[1] It was solved due to recognition of universality of Christian Testimony, i.e. the Gospel turns towards each human being. However, the universality of Christian revelation was then understood in different ways. Since it is a well-known fact that the establishing of Christian world in the 4th century had contributed to gradual identification of Church culture dominating at that time, i.e., Western culture (or the uniform culture), with Christianity. Also, everybody knows that Hellenization of Christianity, especially the expression (in a way of addressing to the contemporary in those days) of evangelical Testimony in categories of rationality and concepts of Greek philosophy contributed to the loss of some essential notes and the exaggeration of others.[2] The problem springs from the fact that the Jesus-Christ Event, the Word revealed in history assumes the definite form, incarnates, not existing in a pure state. Overall, the Word incarnated will require and release the believing evidence (the New Testament) in the believing subject within the Church community if at the same time the Good News can be received exclusively by means of a defined culture.

The history of Christianity and the testimony of Salvation in Jesus Christ, especially all the efforts to understand its fundamental experience of salvation which occurred in Jesus Christ, gradually intensified over consecutive generations (in different civilizations in the course of twenty one centuries of Christianity). Christianity became convinced that every culture could be reconciled with Christian Revelation, providing that cultures would not close themselves but would allow themselves to be inspired and would make their way towards increasing that, which is genuinely human.[3] A similar possibility seems to be dawning these days. The globalization-orientated and globalization-orientating information/communication civilization places in an unprecedented way the individual person living within their local community *face à face* with many other human subjects staying within their local communities. This fact means that today's civilization at the beginning of the 21st century places the believer in a facial meeting with new realities which demand a new praxis of human life. All this in turn places Christianity into an encounter-relation with non-Western cultures which are directly connected to great religious traditions, the historical non-Christian religions.

The following is the problem: to what degree does the encounter between Christianity and non-Western cultures, essentially formed and connected with historical religions, influence the Savior's followers and, in turn, how do His followers influence them? At the same time: to what

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[1] Compare Dz 10, 34-47.

[2] The so-called great subjects of Paul's theology, e.g. grace, and the idea of Logos, or the subject of unfinished Creation, especially precious to Fathers of the Geek Orthodox Church. See Gregory of Nyssa, *De hominis opificio* (PG 46, 912-913). At the same time, from a historic perspective the contemporary issue of Christianization of Hellenism was taken up.

[3] Compare Z. Ferry, *L'Homme-Dieu ou le sens de la vie*, Paris 1996.

extent does Christianity's *face à face* with the other great historical religions enable it to understand in a new way the Word of revelation, Jesus Christ's experiences as the redeeming event, the heart of Christianity? And how can Christianity have an effect in a globalizing world of human communities, until now separated from each other within their pluralism by the barriers of distance and the difficulty in accessing to information?

It is taken for granted that this orientation of problems connected with the present refection causes the following text rather to reveal the problems than solve them – since we are at the outset of the global comprehension of the Gospel message. I intend to present this issue in three stages. First, I start with analysis of traits characterizing contemporary life, those which share the historical experience of the Church of Christ at the turn of the century. Then, I shall discuss the capability of increased understanding of the Word revealed in history, referencing the dimension of culture/religious 'collision' with the other historical religions of the world. Finally, I shall undertake reflections on the contemporary presence of the Church of the Word interpreting the fundamental experience of the redemption that occurred in Jesus Christ in the context of the testimony of these great historical religions.

## The Church of the Word in Human Community and Civilization

The fact of the matter is that in the 20th century for the first time the Church experienced a break with a dominant culture, i.e. Western culture, which for ages before had been its own culture. Although it was rather difficult for the Church to understand why Christianity was not identifying itself with the outlook of Western culture and Eurocentrism, it is certain that the source of this definite break and lack of identifying of the essence of the Christian Testimony with European elements of culture (regarding morals and intellectual thought – to simplify) is in the transition from the conception of metaphysical theology to the 'historical' conception (for simplicity's sake). This transition in the bosom of Catholic theology was initiated rather unexpectedly in the first half of the 20th century, expressing and intensifying the contemporary comprehension of the contents of Christian doctrine by the Second Vatican Council.[4] At the same time, the Christian thought

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[4] At the beginning of the 20th century the Catholic theology practiced since the Tridentine Council realized the concealing of theological error in its structure under a seemingly imperceptible methodological error (compare M.-D. Chenu, *Une école de théologie: le Saulchoir*, Paris 1985, p. 136; at the same time it should be added that certainly there was not more relevant diagnosis than Chenu's diagnosis regarding the state of theology's incapacity in its capability in the form of neo-scholasticism and in consequence assuming a position of 'anti-' in relation to everything which was not connected in a deductive way with itself or with metaphysical theses of Divine Absolute). The crucial moment turned out to be the events of the so-called modernistic crisis (compare E. Poulat, *Histoire, dogme et critique dans la crise moderniste*, Paris 1962; Id.,*Modernistica*, Paris 1982; Id., *Critique et mistique. Autour de Loisy, ou la conscience catholique et l'esprit moderne*, Paris 1984; C. Tresmontant, *La crise moderniste*, Paris 1979), arisen in (Catholic) theology when the followers of this theology made an attempt to make use of achievements of other sciences in theological research together with 'reaching' the contemporary life in its problems within practicing theological reflection. However, the then situation of Catholic theology was not totally determined by modernism – as it is sometimes assumed – and reaction to that within the Church. The reality of Christian life at he beginning of the 20th century was extremely abounding with initiatives and movements that contributed to the revival of Catholic theological thought. Among biblical studies, patristic, development of philosophical thought inspired with Christianity, liturgical revival, and new ecclesiological awareness and initiated movements within the frame of Christianity, the need of direct study of St. Thomas Aquinas was emphasized. Just due to placing Aquinas's work in the original historical context together with

realized its absence in the modern development of science and philosophical thought. Further, recovering the effectiveness of theological reflection church is sharing more intentionally the historical experience of modern times, i.e. fears and hopes of human being, who since the moment of landing of the manned space ship on the moon is able to observe from afar their own face and experience simply directly their spreading over the surface of the whole planet.

In contemporary experience, within the frame of globalization I shall restrict myself to articulate three challenges to which the awareness of the [Catholic] Church must become more sensitive: (1) the challenge of globalization with its opportunities of communication (physical/ information) and new technologies, miniaturization and processing together with gathering information in databases, (2) the challenge of religious pluralism and (3) the challenge of that, which I would call a pluralistic culture incorporating the tendency towards working out pluralistic reason.

*Inevitability of Global Standardization*

It is difficult to deny the universally expressed opinion that the information/communication civilization unexpectedly faces the human communities that until now have appeared to be separated with a barrier of distance physically difficult to cross for an individual man or being devoid of information on life or existence of the other community next door. In today's civilization of the mobile telephone, localization by GPS and Internet, i.e. the ability to send and receive text and image information, and increasing calculation capabilities together with production of words

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emphasizing the originality of his thought (with his conception of *Theology as a science*) enabled theology to prepare to take up dialogue with the modern and contemporary philosophical thought. However the most important result turned out to be intensive studies taken up by Francophonic theology – since the nineteen thirties – intensive studies in the nature of *Theology as a Science*, works of mediaeval authors (Eudes Rigaud, Alexander of St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventura and others) with St. Thomas Aquinas at the head.. Especially they contributed to so-called conciliar '*Revival' of Vatican Council II*. However, before they led to it, they allowed via historical perspective new insights into the struggle of Christian thought,– *fides quaerens intellectum*, especially in the perception and observation of the differences between Aquinas's theology and neo-scholasticism, the baroque theology mistakenly identified with Aquinas's conception (compare M.-D. Chenu, *La théologie comme science au XIIIe si cle*, 2nd edition, Paris 1943). The above allowed Catholic theology to make an enormous progress in overcoming the model of neo-scholastic theology and preparing its position, allowing to work out the conception of theology responding on the one hand, to requirements of the present state of knowledge and science, and on the other, to the fresh determination of the theological subject within the frames of the proposed and worked-out conception and theological model of reflection. Thus, the conception referring to various hermeneutics had appeared (compare R. E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics. Interpretation theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer*, Evanston 1969; L. Geldsetzer, "Hermeneutik", [w:] *Wissenschaftstheorie*, Bd. I, Hrsg. W. Rombach, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1974, p. 77-78; J. Wach, *Das Verstehen. Grundzüge einer Geschichte der hermeneutischen Theorie im 19. Jahrhundert*, Hildesheim 1925n; H.-G. Gadamer, *Vérité et Méthode. Les grandes lignes d'une herméneutique philosophique*, Paris 1976, p. 1-99), among which the theological conception of realism of the Incarnation seems to prevail in the Theology being practiced in Western Europe, going back to the perspective of theological thought determined by mediaeval authors of *Theology as the Science* (connected with concepts of rationality subject to changes, thus taking up the concept of understanding as *Verstehen* formed by nineteenth-century social-historical sciences) and assuming the shape of incessantly new and incessantly repeated 'interpretation' of *Jesus Christ's Event* owing to the critical interrelation between *fundamental* Christian experience (Tradition) and historical experience, taking place 'today' in modern times.

(text), the previous barriers separating the communities and people, one man from the other man/men unexpectedly have been removed easily, i.e. the barriers of physical presence have been removed, with the new access to the globalized data-information bases. This happened to be gradually possible, especially since the moment when man's technological capability had increased, and a certain stage, when mankind examined themselves in the mirror, determines the steady presence of international crews in orbit round the Earth allowing mankind to examine their 'integral face' in detail. But this is not the end of the technological potential of modern civilization.

Overall, the fact is that technical/technological potential in some way imposes and supports the process of unceasing *mondialisation*, occurring in different spheres of human communities' lives on each continent. The globalization means the extension of the same economical, political, and cultural rules and standards of human life over the whole planet. It is taken for granted that this development would favor the coming into existence of global ethics beyond the ethical and cultural particulars of historical religions and all the other local religious cults and beliefs. However, the question remains of the source (origin) and the shape of such global ethics – would it be born as a some kind of syncretism of great religious traditions and small local beliefs or rather, would it produce the domination of one of them over the others?

Although the globalization provides an unrestrained opportunity for humankind, and simultaneously for the individual human subject within the community, it yet constitutes the object of growing contestation regarding the susceptibility to imperialism of the market and maximum profit, releasing the increasing poverty among three-quarters of mankind (rigid/absolute economical rules – for simplicity's sake) by the world economical system, growing potential of easy dissemination by means of teletransmission networks, and a more and more universalized model of human being with simple morals and 'average' striving for development of one's 'own' personality. Moreover *mondialisation* of essential spheres of human life undoubtedly offers the challenge of spreading the Gospel to the ends of the earth. All that is left is the question: how should one understand that global vocation of the Gospel? In what way should that globalization of the Good News about salvation, Jesus Christ's experience as the salutary event originating from God, be accomplished?

*Challenge of Religious Pluralism*

The growing importance of globalization make us aware that religious pluralism has become one of the essential (if not the most important) challenges for the Church's missions in the first half of the 21st century.[5] However, it is necessary to distinguish the multitude of new types of religiousness, multiplying – especially in so-called the First World (Europe and United States) – from the multitude of great historical world religions. It must be understood that awareness of the religious pluralism is linked with the process of globalization spreading to all local communities all over the world. Simultaneously, the lingering of some of them in the background causes irreversible damage, – living in ghettos, or backwardness of civilization – which leads to backwardness in the sphere of community life that demands scientific/technical exchange (cultural/technological/scientific). Whereas, a more and more intensive and totally spreading globalization in the present form contributes to setting up some world supermarket that offers also

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[5] J. Dupuis, *Vers une théologie chrétienne du pluralisme religieux*, Paris 1997; C. Geffré, *Le pluralisme religieux et l'indifférentisme, ou le vrai défi de la théologie chrétienne*, [w:] Revue théologique de Louvain, 31 (2000), pp. 3-32.

religious products to more and more numerous consumers, like various esoteric traditions within the scope of myths, beliefs, practices and initiation secrets, healing techniques for soul and body.

Going into raptures about "religious" aspects is accompanied by a lack of an authentic religious culture in many of today's communities. Is it an effect of devaluation, or sometimes of radical rejection of previous erroneous understandings of the Christian Testimony (especially in contemporary history)? Is it a rejection of the theology of the 'metaphysics of God's Being' and its practical realization in the shape of a Christianity which for a long time guided the communities in the dominant culture? It is a well-known fact that the *aggiornamento* of the 2nd Vatican Council put an end to the Catholic Church conceived as a monolithic community (*christentümliche Gesellschaft*), a community which had marked Christianity with a Romanocentric stamp. Thus, the secularized society and Christianity stopped coinciding any longer.[6] And although it is possible to make a thorough study of the process of gradual search for this contemporary return (undoubtedly forced by the human community) to the quasi-initial state of the original Church,[7] does this ideal state of life really constitute the Word revealed in history by the Community of Christ's followers? Could the Church in this new 'minority' form still supply a presence from which the human community could really derive inspiration and assistance?

Moreover, the Church in globalizing scientific/technological civilization ceased to be the only depository of the '*Sacrum*'. If the Church in the First World (from the 4th till 20th century) was an exclusive creator of religious reference to human communities and national communities, then the communication/information civilization managed to bring to light and also give the floor to other great historical religions, until now relegated to the shadows in the West together with their worlds of culture and civilization. It does not seem possible to challenge their presence or the contents of the religious testimony supported by traditions of many centuries. Do they not then constitute some challenge to the Church (already not Christianity) . . . and do they not demand some re-working of what is appropriate for the Church's evangelization "to the ends of earth"?[8]

However, the fact is that independently from interpretation of contemporary history in the bosom of the Church there appear new types of religiousness on the globalized stage, and the communities uniform up till now (considered Christian monoliths) have become the ground for implantation of new adepts from the side of great historical religions, e.g., France with its growing numbers of Buddhist followers and North America inclining towards the wisdom of great

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[6] It concerns the earlier situation of the dramatic unities: the world and the Church – times when they overlapped. Compare P. Berger, *La religion dans la conscience modern, Paris 1971*.

[7] The fact is that the division (Lutheran reform of the Church) in the Western Church in the 16th century and the religious wars that occurred afterwards caused the collapse of European culture. Christianity was not in the position to guarantee the unity for Europe, as it was during a quite long period of the Middle Ages, but also it was the reason for dissension and separation leading European community towards total ruin. To save the community, religion was declared a private matter, and the necessary fundament of standards for the community was erected on the common 'human nature' and the mind order appropriate for all the people. The Enlightenment interpreted the process proceeding in this time in categories of liberation (emancipation) and as implementation of 'own' understanding. It resulted in privatization of religion with simultaneous secularization of the society, thus occasioning the process of diversification. In consequence, the world (of European culture, so-called the First World) became the world without (Christian) God and the world was deprived of religion. Compare W. Kasper, *La théologie et l'Église*[*Theologie und Kirche*, Mainz 1987], trad. J. Hoffmann, Paris 1990, s. 193-195.

[8] Mk 16, 15.

traditions of the East.[9] Is it merely the result of the migration to more advantageous conditions of living by members of the communities from these poorer parts of the continents, whose culture was formed by Islam, Hinduism, or Buddhism? It does not seem possible that the formation of a certain religious syncretism or eclecticism (where the authenticity of the subjective experience searching for salvation in the sense of better existence of the soul, the mind and the body is taken into account) from out of several religions is sufficient to solve the most important problems of to-day's 'globalizing' civilization. The reason is in that not even all the great religions or great religious traditions of the East reached the same understanding about the challenges of contemporary global civilization, nor did they come to a mutual understanding in regard to the role of rationality.

*Challenge of Pluralistic Culture*

We can assume that the most important discovery of the past 20th century was the consciousness of the fact of thinking and perceiving the reality of the world and man by means of mental models and conceptions. The mechanism of interrelation between Plato's domain *doxa* and the dimension of external actions was somehow rediscovered,[10] where on the one hand one can observe the aspiration towards how to describe reality, including the human subject, according to a communicative understanding or perception of the world and human ego in reference to what is not 'I'; and on the other hand, the selected model of perception and the conception of applying the reflection/understanding seems to determine the result obtained, or the image or the vision of the reality.[11]

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[9] The fact is observed, that in Africa and South America, new Churches or new communities on the margin of the Catholic Church or historical Protestant Churches have been formed. It is obvious that we cannot identify these new believing communities with sects because they peaceably join together believing and practices belonging to very different religious traditions. Compare M. Introvigne, *L'explosion des nouvelles religions*, [w:] La Documentation catholique, 1-15 VIII 1999, nr 2209, s. 732-744.

[10] In reference to the Act of Faith of the human subject from the *mystery* of the Divine Subject of the unity of so-called theoretical reason and practical reason in the sense of Aquinas. See M.-D. Chenu, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la théologie*, Paris 1957, s. 74.

[11] It seems that the same concerns theology in Christian antiquity struggled continuously to introduce, understand and communicate, viz., the *Event of Jesus Christ*, appear in the *Theology as Science* by mediaeval authors (with St. Thomas Aquinas at the head). Theology of Science became a disciplined thought, deepened/ studied within the new-established university. It included the struggle to understand the saving God's intention in forming the man of integrity. The development of science and the impairment of religious significance became the reason for coming into existence and then propagation of the modern empiricism. The progress made in natural sciences led to the development of technology; which was followed by the development of industry, agriculture, exchange that consequently caused the production of consumer goods to increase. The increase in productivity, organizational efficiency, improvement of production facilities… led to a still higher significant technological/scientific domination of the countries, regarding their culture and economy, already belonging to so-called First World, and at the same time forming the current information/communication civilization together with its vector globalizing all the spheres of human life. It is also advisable to raise a question of negative effects of the progress in civilization on Nature, the environment and the human health regarding the hazards connected with nuclear energy, environmental pollution, introducing new biological health hazards, and recently even the existence of human population as the result of experiments with cloning the human being. This interesting phenomenon in the present time is also noteworthy, especially in the period of post-Enlightenment, of severe and ruthless

Indeed, is it so that the reason of this interdependency lay behind the real inspiration from Christian doctrine of Greece philosophy in its development, which effects in a way have been expressed in modern civilization? It seems that it is possible to gain some feedback from ancient philosophy's influence on Christianity and their mutual development, where Christianity provided Greek rationality not only with the subject-matter of 'entity', "This, Who Is" (or Christian God, I am, Who I am) but also the wherewithal to convicie them of the entity "That, which is."[12] Christianity also fed the impulse to create the grounds for the whole science of man and its essence in consequence of theological/dogmatic discussions instigated since, more or less, the 4th century.[13] It is the fact that implantation of Aristotle's categories of knowledge into organized scientific disciplines within the structure of the University contributed not only to the creation of theology as science (converting the previous tuition of faith in the bosom of the Church), but also orientated the future development of 'university' disciplines.

However, it did not take a long time, when from this harmonious and systematic development of science, theology itself was excluded unexpectedly, due to limitation of its starting point to the 'metaphysical' theses on the Divine Absolute. The loss of chances in the bosom of Christianity of the mature Middle Ages is proved by the fact that mediaeval authors of theology, strenuously working out the conception of micro- and macrocosm, would have been extremely surprised if they had heard that pagans (in a medieval sense) eight centuries later, i.e. at the 19th century, in the period of industrial revolution, would discover the spirituality of human labor. Irrespective of the above, the fact remains that theology did not take part in a modern elaboration of the categories of the rationality and a scientific progress (*re* the domain of praxis), limiting itself merely to keeping the catholic thought under lock and key, in a peculiar ghetto, and at the same time forming the uniform and monolithic Christian society.

Considering the above, the contemporary concept of comprehension owes its current form to that which earlier constituted the topic of investigations in the sense of 'text contents'. In other words, the contemporary concept of understanding (*Verstehen*) came into being because of the diffusion of hermeneutics (in its contemporary form of *prima philosophia*),– becoming through the way of cognition the way of existence of human being.[14] At the present, the critics of traditional limitations of the reasoned presentation and rationality seem to be smoothing the way for creation of the pluralistic reason, i.e. multiform, multidimensional reason, not restricted to the closed rationalities.[15] Simultaneously they smooth the way for creation and action of a new *noesis*, able to go beyond *ratio*.[16]

Therefore, does the assuming by Christian theology of a shape incessantly new and a concomitant repeated 'interpretation' of Jesus Christ's Event (owing to the critical interrelation between fundamental Christian experience [Tradition] and historical experience, really enable it (1) to make reflections on the "now" of the world being globalized, and (2) to participate in development of the current categories of rationality? Can a new Christian theology contribute to the progress of science – naturally, above all concerning the spheres of human praxis where the globalization of individual local cultures is intensified? Simultaneously, should it not be

depreciation of the mind (and also the reason) in a theoretical dimension (compare T. Buksinski, "Dwa rozumy filozofii", [w:] *Rozumnoœæ i racjonalnoœæ*, (red.) T. Buksinski, Poznañ 1997, p. 188).

[12] É. Gilson, "Bóg i filozofia", [w:] *Bóg i ateizm*. Kraków 1996, p. 19.

[13] It concerns the origin of psychology by introducing the concepts of 'person', nature, will.

[14] A. Bronk, *Rozumienie, dzieje, jêzyk*, Lublin 1988, p. 53 (especially p. 11-55).

[15] T. Buksinski, "Dwa rozumy filozofii", p. 201.

[16] *Ibidem*, p. 202.

investigated whether the other historical religions and great religious traditions of the East reveal a similar ability?

**Christian Testimony as Experience of Salvation in Jesus Christ**

The above has been an attempt to outline the situation, or rather vectors of the present, globalizing civilization which make the [Catholic] Church stand more directly face to face with cultures growing into one with historical world religions; and which make the Catholic Church accept the challenge of philosophical thought concerning the elaboration of the [new] rationality, i.e., 'pluralistic reason'. Thus, on the one hand it would concern the elaboration of the rationality of cultures and historical religions coming into prominence during the *mondialisation* of human communities and spreading the economic, politic, and cultural principles of human life on a world scale. On the other hand, it would seem to be logical that all the world religions – not only the Church/Christianity – have looked at the content of the message and checked the authenticity of 'the representation" of the moment founding a given religious tradition. However, it is a very difficult task to estimate the chances of the above in the present reflection. Thus, I shall limit myself to a sketchy reflection on the chances of new prospects of understanding the Event of Jesus Christ and the Word revealed in history where it is possible to refer the Christian revelation to the other religious traditions.

*Cultural Tradition, and the Universality of the Word Revealed in History*

Theological reflection applied currently is far from regarding the record neutral with respect to the conception/culture subject to inculturation at the beginning of Christianity.[17] Unquestionably, the recognition that Christianity at the outset was not a testimony but an experience has raised new prospects of understanding the Word revealed in history. Therefore, which prospects of understanding the Word seem to be opening when we consider the Word revealed as the '(initial) apostolic experience'? The interpretations depended on the mental patterns, and different cultural models including the particular demands of the Church at any particular era of time. From that point of view, the aspiration of the theological reflection seems to be fruitful, especially when trying to recognize the Word of God existing exclusively in the Incarnate state and in the shared state.[18]

If the first means that Revelation is history before it will become the Word, then the second emphasizes the recognition of the Word state, when the Bible is cited and preached within the believing community. This sort of recognition leads to the other recognition: the Church as the community originated simultaneously by the gift and the adoption of the Word of God. An increase both, in the recognition and the understanding of the Christian Book of the Bible as the place where the Christian Community becomes aware of its deepest nature can be obtained due to delineation between the inculturation and the incarnation of the Word into the humanity of Jesus.[19] The

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[17] E. Schillebeeckx, *Christ. The experience of Jesus as Lord*, New York: Crossroad 1983, p. 62.

[18] C. Geffré, "Le christianisme face la pluralité des cultures" ["Chrzeœcijañstwo wobec wieloœci kultur", translated by A. Pilorz ], [w:] *Chrzeœcijañstwo jutra*, Lublin 2001, p. 609.

[19] Compare C. Geffré, *Mission et inculturation*, [w:] "Spiritus" 1987, nr 109, s. 406-427.It would concern the fact that in the process of the initiation of the fundamental Church/ Christianity's *texts* the adoption of some cultural elements regarding the thoughts and the language happened to occur. What results from that is that Christianity was inculturated yet *in statu nascendi*. Consequently, the encounter of Christianity with

prospects for investigations create the present-day, globalizing praxis of human communities where Christianity stands *face à face* with non-Christian religions. Due to that, the Christ's Church/Christianity is in some way forced to determine the relation with the other world religions and cultures.[20] Simultaneously the determination of this relation helps us to understand the Word revealed in history, stimulating the Church to the more extensive and mature understanding of its identity.[21]

*Between the Tradition Interpreting the Word of God and the Literal Record of the Direct Word of God*

Just as Christianity is *not* a 'religion of the Book', Islam is not a religion of the Holy Book of the Koran either: despite the widespread and prevailing beliefs, Islam does not constitute the religion of the [Holy] Book, nor does Christianity. From the viewpoint of the general typology of religion, both Islam and Christianity are recognized as religions having their founder differentiated from traditional religions which are not necessarily (not always) linked with historical events or refer to (some) individual historical event. Therefore, the foundation of Islam, like that of Christianity, refers to the basic (the founder's) event, which coincides with an appearance of an inspired prophet. Thus, it is said (1) about the Event Jesus-Christ that includes the life of the Virgin Mary's Son, His work (of redemption and salvation), his (evangelic) testimony and (2) about the advent of the Koran that should contain, on the one hand, the life of the Prophet and, on the other, the different stages of the realization of the Koran as the Book of the (written) Word of God.[22]

The inaugural event refers itself to some kind of initial absence – or to the Word (of God), the word of the God himself or to the Will of God itself, that is the revelation of His behavior towards

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new cultures would mean the encounter between two cultures. It seems to be also obvious that the recognition of the relation between the Judaism and the Christianity will be helpful in determining the relation between the Church/Christianity and historical world religions. First, it would be important to determine the difference between the Christian Bible and the Hebraic Bible on the grounds of a correct assessment of the fundamental category of fulfillment. N. Moingt, *Une théologie de l'exil*, [w:] *Michel de Certeau ou la différence chrétienne*, red. C. Geffré, Paris 1991, s. 131-156. Simultaneously we should supplement acc. to C. Geffré that 'promises' for the peoples of God find their fulfillment among the peoples of the New Testament and yet the Church does not substitute for Israel. Compare C. Geffré, "Le christianisme face la pluralité des cultures", p. 611.

[20] Of course, it could be done on the grounds that the necessary and mutual connection of the two Testaments does not stand in the way of updating the Word of God for people all over the world. Thus, the relation of the arising Church/Christianity to the Judaism seems to have the paradigmatic value regarding the present relation of the Church to word religions and religious cultures.

[21] The other possible determination of this relation could be given by the comparison of the moment of the Word incarnated in the Christian and Koran revelation (compare H. Teissier, "Une histoire sainte dans la Maison de l'Islam (*dâr ul-islam*)", [w:] *Concilium* 116 (1976), s. 69-74). Since the Christian revelation has emphasized two moments; the Incarnation of the Word and searching for the unity in transcendence of the *Revealing in Jesus Christ,* revealing the savior's intention, the behavior towards the world, the mankind, and the individual human subject within the human society, it is therefore helpful to distinguish the contribution of the inculturation from the moment/fact of the incarnation seems to be the revelation of the Koran, identifying itself as the Word of God, direct and genuine.

[22] The Koran for Muslims is only the partial reconstruction of the 'original' situated in heaven (umm al-kit b, literally "Mother of the Book"), eternal, not created, and incomparable with any human writing. Compare G. Ribe, "the Scripture in Islam", [w:] *Lexicon of religions*, ed. H. Waldenfels, p. 337.

the world, mankind and a given man/human subject, the communication of its salutary Will to man in the bosom of the mankind, bringing the whole creation to its fulfillment. It is a matter of course that the inaugurating event is included in history, and actually it should be described as the event inscribing in history, in its social/historical space where historians can always recognize some number of advantageous 'circumstances' (political, ideological…) that can contribute or are contributing to the occurrence at a given 'here' and 'now' of the founding event. Simultaneously, only faith itself is able to recognize that trace of God, the omen of that characteristic time, as a unique, unusual 'now': that event can also be interpreted as the word of God, the Word directed to man, in the face of the community of faith.[23]

A fact worthy to note is that both the first and the second religious tradition lacks adequacy between the unapproachable reference to the Word of God/God's word and His objectivization in the Scriptures – because the revelation flows out from the inexpressible mystery of God. Therefore, an attempt to absolutize the letter of the Scriptures – treated, as it was quite identical to the word of God – leads to the destruction or erasure of the transcendence of that Word. If in the case of the Judo/Christian revelation one can emphasize the 'theandric' character of the Word of God – in the sense of its incarnation in the human word, then referring to the Koranic revelation it is impossible and the distance of the transcendence of the Word of God, recognized as direct and authentic, should by all means be retained.

It is rather impossible in the present reflection to take up the subject of the incarnation of the word, but only indicate the chances to give the comparative consideration of the incarnation in the conception of the Koranic revelation and the Judo/Christian revelation, or the Christian revelation (in reference to the Event of Jesus Christ). Thus, we only would like to emphasize the far-spread perspective of distinct comprehension of human rationality (1) from the moment of recognition and acceptance of the Koran as the authentic and direct word of God, and (2) from the moment of recognition of the Bible as the testimony of faith of the Community of the Resurrection in the face of the Event of Jesus Christ, the Bible, – as one of two sources of the Christian revelation together with Tradition.

The above recognition of two possible moments of the incarnation of the Word in comparison with the Christian revelation and the Koranic revelation seems not so much to emphasize as enable to recognize and solve the one fundamental problem: how can the authentic and direct word of God not lose its authenticity or directness and at the same time be accessible to man in his language, although it uses this or that one of many possible human languages, as it takes place with reference to the language of the Koran or Arabic language? Is it possible to be the total incarnation, even *kenosis* of the Word in human expressions, so as not to lose anything from the Divinity because of the human weakness and imperfection of the expression? Imperfection not only in the recording but also in the act of reading?

Undoubtedly, we face here the problem that is 'past human understanding': the process of transformation of the Word of God into the authentic and direct Word and then into human expression; how can it remain the Word of God and be specific to the Arabic language specific for the community, the 'today' and 'now' in which Muhammad lived. Maybe instead of incarnation we should rather talk about something like *visio beata* of the authentic and direct Word of God through the Prophet that afterwards he with some help of God's grace or an Angel transmitted into the expression of human language, the Arabic language he used in his living 'now'. The other

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[23] Both Islam and Christianity should be perceived as religions of the Book because we find three essential elements in both religious God's experiences: (1) Inaugurating *event*, (2) *text* of primary testimony and (3) *community* with its own hierarchic structure used for interpretation of the holy text.

possibility is a certain and radical modification of our comprehension and understanding of incarnation. Accordingly, the understanding of the incarnation should be more flexible and also include the Word of God as the authentic and direct Word in human expression, the Arabic language of a given time and a given region (a given human community, a given historical time). However, what sort of incarnation it should be, *kenosis* of the Word was such – that it would survive the directness and authenticity of this Word in human expressions? And simultaneously, is it not an unquestionable challenge in the face of Christianity and Judaism, to raise the issue of incarnation as the inflexible conception of incarnation?

Thus, I have only outlined above the issues related to a more extensive and mature comprehension of the (Christian) Address or the Message (of the other historical religions) and following from the globalistic perspective of perception, both Christianity and the individual historical cultures and religions of the world. It is obvious that they need to be analyzed and examined thoroughly. However, the following question should be formulated: whether and how do they contribute to intensification and maturation of the globalizing process itself of modern civilization? This also requires further, more extensive studies, but it is rather certain that the deepening refection on the issue of the Word incarnatd (comparative or intrinsic, applied simultaneously to the Islam and the Christianity) may initiate and more effectively stimulate works on "the development" of the idea of rationality in order to work out the plane of mutual intellectual /religious discussion which will contribute to the instrument allowing the international corporations to control more efficiently, "rationally" the developing process of globalization.

## Maturation of Humankind as the Privileged Place of Incarnation of the Word Revealed/ Revealing in History

The fundamental question seems to be that of the place and the role of the Word revealed in history whose witness and depository (and interpreter as well) is the Community of the Church's faith (interpreted as *communio*). The history of human communities reveals quite distinctly that the relations of reciprocal exclusion and violence between the cultures are marked by characteristic feature. Should similar 'competition' for domination of globalizing culture characterize the dialog between the great historical word religions, including the Church of Christ? Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the present inculturation of the Gospel cannot coincide with the impact of the dominant culture, because – as the history of Christianity reveals – the dominant culture is not able to guarantee the universality of Christ's Testimony, and, on the contrary, in relation to expectations may even cause *distortion*.

Certainly, the newness of the testimony of Jesus Christ, Son of God, and Savior, which contributed to conceptual transformations of the Greek thought, might be evidence of the capabilities of Christian Testimony to inspire and stimulate philosophical thought in the present times too, by developing a 'pluralistic reason'. However, it cannot become the argument for authorizing a domination over other historical world religions and traditions of spirituality. It seems that increased understanding of the Word revealed in history, many times through the false realization of doctrine, allows us – the Christians – to stand on our feet again at the present time and understand the essence of the evangelic vocation.

Should not Christ's Church as the eschatological Community give evidence of/for the Word incarnated and transcendental, – for that which is Love? Is this not properly called the 'word' vocation of Christ's Church within the globalizing civilization? Shouldn't the evangelical Message forming the Church of the Word revealed in history be understood as the orientation or inspiration

for human communities, penetrated by cultures and religions; shouldn't it guide the world towards a qualitatively more mature way, a way more conscious of the *Sacrum*? Should it not be understood as the inducement towards authentic realization, in the bosom of their religious culture, of what they are apprehending, that it is beyond the finiteness of this physical reality of the word and mankind? In fact, it would concern, similarly as in the Community of the Church's faith, the maturation for the personal *face à face* with the Coming in Glory. Then, shouldn't the Church of the Word revealed in history inspire them to head towards the culture and sense of *Sacrum* within individual historical religions (in the sense of engrossment in *Sacrum*)?

Overall, this inspires maturation in the bosom of one's own religious culture, or the tradition of 'meeting face to face with the Coming in Glory', where this personal Meeting with God in Eternity goes beyond the reality 'here' and 'now'. Therefore, it would concern the bearing in one's womb (in the sense of testimony) of a sort of eschatological aim beyond that which "happens" in the "here" and "now": the aim is not restricted by eternity, but transcendending and overstepping it, finally constitutes the reference of man.

It seems that just such a presence of the Church within the human communities in to-day's globalizing culture constitutes the practical realization of the Church as the sacrament of the future kingdom, in its role as "the sacrament, which means simultaneously the sign and the center of the unity of the whole of mankind."[24]

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[24] The Second Vatican Council, *Lumen gentium*, 1.

# Part III

# Between Globalization and National Identity

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**Chapter XI**
# Baltic Identities in the Process of Globalization

*Diana Janusauskiene*

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The post-communist transformation in Central Eastern Europe embraces social, political, economic, cultural, and other changes. In a larger context, it merges with the processes of globalization – the integration of different cultures. In addition, the contemporary world enters the post-modern era of 'life in fragments' and 'detached and moving' identities.

The transformation in the Baltic States holds one more important aspect, that is, democratic state building under the conditions of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism was always present in these countries. Yet, the contemporary ethnic composition is the result of Soviet ethnic politics.

The aim of this study is to analyse the changing identities of the Baltic people. In general, four major problems are investigated: the transformation of identities under the conditions of globalization, the general tendencies of Baltic identities, the identities of national minorities in the Baltic States, and the premises and impacts of globalization on identities in the Baltic states.

## The Transformation of Identities During the Process of Globalization

In general, formation of identities and their change is influenced by many factors. Among the most important factors that influence identity change in the societies of post-Communist Europe are the change of regime, the revival of nationalism, and migration and openness to the 'World'. Yet, the role of globalization in changing the identities of the Baltic peoples is the most crucial. Globalization has a pluralising impact on identities, producing a variety of possibilities. Identities are less fixed and unified. They become 'here and now', situational (Hall 1992:309). Thus, each situation may produce a different identity. When a person watches news about water pollution near the Spanish coast, s/he may develop a global or European identity, while when s/he thinks of buying coffee in the nearest shop, s/he can identify with the locality in which s/he lives. Thus, the general tendency is the formation of overlapping and situational identities. On the other hand, "cultural flows and global consumerism between nations create the possibilities of 'shared identities' – as 'customers' for the same goods, 'clients' for the same services, 'audiences' for the same message and images – between people who are far removed from one another in time and space. As national cultures become more exposed to outside influences, it is difficult to preserve cultural identities intact, or to prevent them from becoming weakened through cultural bombardment and infiltration". (Hall 1992:302).

The extreme version of identity in the global era would be a cosmopolitan human being, in Bauman's words a 'nomad' without any fixed identity moving through time and space and through identities. Even if the identification with one's own state and nation still predominates, other forms of identification become apparent. Summarising, it could be said that as a result of globalization national identities may transform in the following ways:

1. "National identities could be eroded as a result of the growth of cultural homogenization and global post-modernisation;

2. National and other 'local' or particular identities could be strengthened by resistance to globalization;

3. National identities could decline but new identities of a hybrid kind could take their place". (Hall 1992:300).

So far, the idea of homogenization of cultures and identities has been of limited use: despite the influential effect of globalization there still persist predominantly local, ethnic, cultural and national identities. The second possible outcome – the strengthening of local identities as a defensive mechanism – is more realistic and could be illustrated by the example of France. French identity is strengthened and opposed to the English-speaking global influence. The third outcome – the appearance of 'hybrid' identities – seems to be the most probable. Thus, one of the possible approaches in dealing with the dichotomy 'local/global' would be "instead of thinking of the global replacing the local, . . . . to think of a new articulation between 'the global' and 'the local'. (Hall 1992:304). This is the overlapping of identities. As will be shown later, the Baltic societies manifest the same phenomena – the arising of overlapping identities. On the other hand, the importance of local identities versus national identities is growing too.

**Comparing the Identities of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian People**

During the years of post-communist transformation, identities of the Baltic people underwent a serious challenge. Two factors appeared to be crucial in this process. On the one hand, the first years of the transformation were marked by the rebirth of nationalism and a need to get back the national and cultural uniqueness, which the communist regime had tried to destroy. On the other hand, the collapse of the 'iron curtain', which used to 'defend' the 'communist culture' from the influence of the outside opened the gates for global influence. Because of this reason, the processes of globalization in this region could be thought to be even stronger and more quickly accepted.

The sociological data clearly support the argument that during the first years of transformation the national identity was dominating. Yet, further development followed the Western model. According to Conover and Hicks, "across Europe, national identities are being challenged from below by the growing potency of regional and ethnic identities, and from above by the emerging reality of European integration" (Conover, Hicks 1995:11). The local and regional identities as well as European and global identities become more and more important for the Baltic people.

The 'European Value research' undertaken in 1990 and 1999 among many other issues measured the changes of identity in the Baltics. As the research data show, during the nine years from 1990 to 1999 there occurred several important shifts in the attitudes of the people (see Table 1). To consider the first choices of the respondents, a big change occurred in the identification with the country. In 1999 in Lithuania, the identification with the country diminished from 66% in 1990 to 37%; in Latvia it diminished form 55% to 39%, and in Estonia – from 56% to 21%. Thus, the most radical change occurred in Estonia where self-identification with the country decreased by 35 points, followed by Lithuania (29 points), and Latvia (16 points).

Table 1. Self-identification with Various Geographical Regions in the Baltic States in 1990 and 1999, in *Percent*. Question: "Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?"

| | Lithuania | | Latvia | | Estonia | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1990 | 1999 | 1990 | 1999 | 1990 | 1999 |
| The town, locality in which I live | 25 | 51 | 34 | 41 | 31 | 61 |

Country 66 37 55 39 56 21
Europe 1 3 1 2 1 1
The whole world 5 4 4 5 4 4
Number of interviews 1020 1018 903 1012 1008 1005

Source: *European Values Study*, Matulionis, Juknevicius, Mitrikas (2001:266-7).

The other important shift concerns the identification with the locality. To consider the first choices of the respondents, on average the number of people identifying with their town or locality doubled. The biggest changed occurred in Estonia, and the number of people identifying themselves first of all with their town or locality increased by 26 points (from 31% to 61%). In Lithuania the changes were quite similar. A number of people identifying with their town and locality increased by 26 points (from 25% to 51%). Differently from Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia did not experience a big change. The number of people identifying themselves first of all with their town or locality did not change dramatically. It increased just by 7 points from 34% to 41%.

In general, the patterns of identification in the Baltic states do not differ much from other European countries (see Table 2). The most similar patterns of identification are shown in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Croatia, France, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Greece, Finland, England, Northern Ireland, Island, and Belgium. Citizens of these countries tend to identify themselves firstly with town or locality, secondly with their region, thirdly with their country, then with the whole world, and finally with Europe. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were the most distinct since the identification with the country and the whole world was more important than identification with the region.

The data of another international study on identities show that the identification with Europe was the least important for the majority of the European people in 1995 (see Table 3). Yet, a more important finding is that similar to the situation of 1990, in 1999 East Central Europeans still tend to hold strong identification with their countries. Thus, one of the possible conclusions would be that the 'European fashion' of local identities came to Central East Europe after 1995, when the feelings of nationalism started to gradually diminish.

Even though the above-discussed studies show that the identification with Europe is the least important both for the people of the Baltic states and for the majority of Europeans, the results of another sociological study – *Eurobarometers* – point to one more important tendency. Due to use of a different questionnaire, *Eurobarometers* were able to measure the existence of overlapping identities. Many people tend to identify both with their country and Europe. According to data obtained in 2000, on average 60% of citizens of the European Union associate their identity with Europe. In 2001, in the candidate countries,[1] on average this number reaches 52%.

In the Baltic States, the share of the people that associate their identity with Europe vary from 51% in Latvia and 50% in Estonia to 44% in Lithuania. In comparison to Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania has more people who associate themselves with their nation only. These people constitute 44% in Lithuania and 39% and 37% in Latvia and Estonia correspondingly. Importantly, people of Latvia are most likely to feel European only (8%). In Estonia 5% while in Lithuania 3% of the people share this feeling. In the EU, this percent is very low too. On average only 4% of the EU citizens identify themselves with Europe only.

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[1] In 2001, 13 candidate countries were researched: Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey.

The most important finding, though, is a presence of overlapping identities. On average, 56% of EU citizens and 48% of the citizens of 13 candidate countries manifested the overlapping national-European identities. In Lithuania, people with overlapping identities made 41%, in Latvia – 43%, and in Estonia – 45%.

The study of national and European pride provides another important basis for the analysis. As the data of *Eurobarometer* of Candidate Countries in 2001 show, the national pride and European pride are both very important for the Baltic people and people of EU. Yet, national pride is a little bit more important than the European pride (see Table 5).

There are some differences in the evaluations of national and European pride among the citizens of the Baltic States. In comparison to others, people of Latvia are the most proud of their country, while people of Estonia are the least proud of their country among the Baltic people. Interestingly, the citizens of the European Union hold a very high attitude of national pride too (83% say they are proud of their country). On average, 56% of the citizens of the Baltic States are proud to be European, while 62% of the citizens of EU hold the same belief. On the other hand, 65% of the Baltic people say that they are proud of their country, while the EU average is 83%.

## National Minorities: Differences of Identification

The issue of ethnic origin is very important when analysing the identities in the Baltic States. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are multicultural states. The proportion of people representing national minorities reaches 15.6% in Lithuania, 31.6% in Estonia, and 42.1% in Latvia (see Table 6).

Importantly, the international comparative studies first of all analyse the attitudes of the societies as a whole. Yet, in the case of multicultural societies, differences among ethnic groups could be even larger than those observed among the different societies. Thus, in addition to general trends within the society, it is important to study the attitudes of different ethnic groups too.

As the sociological data shows, various ethnic groups tend to develop different identities in the Baltics. According to the data of Klingemann and Titma, during the first year of the democratic transformation in Latvia and Estonia the geographical identities of people of titular nation and national minorities differed (see Table 7).

People of titular nations first of all tend to identify with their republic, while the identification with the Soviet Union was very important for the people of national minorities. In 1990, 66.9% of ethnic Estonians and 72.8% of ethnic Latvians identified themselves first of all with their republic. The percentage of people with such identity was less by twice among the people of national minorities (37.3% in Estonia and 38.5% in Latvia). On the other hand, only a tiny minority (less than 1% if one considers the first choice, and less than 2% if one considers the second choice) of ethnic Latvians and Estonians identified themselves with the Soviet Union. The proportion of non-Latvians and non-Estonians with such identity was much higher (21.5% of non-Estonians and 10.6% of non-Latvians said that this was their first identity). Importantly, there were no differences along the lines of ethnic origin in the identification with locality.

The data of the 'European Value Study' gathered in 1999 supports the argument about differences of identity of various ethnic groups. In Lithuania, more ethnic Lithuanians than ethnic Russians or ethnic Poles identified themselves with their country (39% of ethnic Lithuanians, 28% of ethnic Russians and 32% of ethnic Poles said that Lithuania is their first identification). On the other hand, ethnic Russians feel more European and global than ethnic Lithuanians and Russians (see Table 8).

**The Premises and Impacts of Globalization**

In general, globalization "refers to those processes, operating on a global scale, which cut across national boundaries, integrating and connecting communities and organisations in new space-time combinations, making the world in reality and in experience more interconnected" (McGrew in Hall 1992:299). Due to the political, economic, cultural, and technological development and especially the spread of modern means of communication (Internet, global mass media, developed means of transportation), the world is becoming more and more interconnected. Knowledge of foreign languages and visits abroad make people more open to other cultures. The contacts with other cultures influence the attitudes and the every-day lives of the people.

In comparison to other researched candidate countries, the Baltic States manifest very high rates of people who can carry on a conversation in a foreign language. From all candidate countries only Slovenia could boast a similar number of people fluent in a foreign language.

In 2000, on average, 47% of the citizens of EU can take part in a conversation in a language other then their mother tongue. In the Baltics, the average reaches 86% for all foreign languages and 33% for major European languages. Definitely, Russian language is the most popular among the citizens of the Baltic States. It was obligatory to learn Russian during the Soviet period. In addition, large Russian minorities influenced the spread of knowledge of Russian too. The politics of Sovietisation led to the high proportion of people speaking Russian. 83% of Lithuanians, 59 % of Latvians, and 53% of Estonians speak Russian as a foreign language. In addition, due to historical connections with Poland, Polish remains a popular language in Lithuania. 19% of people speak Polish as a foreign language.

In general, the contacts with foreign countries increased tremendously after the change of the regime in the Baltic countries. On average, 44% of the citizens of the Baltic States in 2001 declared that they have been to a foreign country during the last two years and on average 6% worked in a foreign country (see Table 10).

Proportionally, more Estonians and Latvians have been abroad then Lithuanians. Yet, Lithuanians show the highest ratio of people who worked abroad. The same high ratio was found only in Slovakia and Slovenia.

**Conclusions**

The debate about the influence of globalization on national cultures is still open. There is no agreement "whether culture and all forms of social activity are becoming more standardised, or whether multiple cultural contacts lead to an ever increasing variety of new forms" (Albrow 1996:92). Thus, homogenisation and hybridisation of culture are two extreme alternatives of the development.

This article aimed at analysing the general trends in the identities of the Baltic people during the years of democratic transformation. The most important conclusion of this research is that there occurs a shift from national towards local identities on the one hand, and overlapping and situational identities on the other hand. Similar tendencies are observed in the other European countries as well. The research also shows that the Baltic societies show much real promise of a successful accommodation to the changing realities of the Global World.

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<center>**Chapter XII**</center>

# Globalization Processes and Problems of Civic Society in Lithuania

<center>*Jurate Morkuniene*</center>

Philosophers and social scientists are searching for the philosophical foundations of national security, and the optimizing of civic society in Lithuania; and they are considering the importance of a scientific approach to solving contemporary problems arising from the process of rapid globalization. Questions come to the fore such as the future of nations in the global society, the danger of globalization to cultural identity, and the impact of information technologies on global culture. Issues of peaceful international coexistence and a 'culture of peace' as the basis of a new paradigm emerge as well. I will touch on only two problems facing the Lithuanian people and scientific society in relation to the challenges of globalization.

Behind the intensive debate about globalization and its impact lies the question of how far, and to what extent, Lithuanian national community is being transformed by global forces. In so short a paper it isn't possible to provide a detailed account of these influences. However, it is necessary to specify some of the key domains of activity and interaction in which global processes are influenced.

In this new universe in which we are destined to live, the main problems under consideration in Lithuania's society and scientific community are (1) national security and (2) the building of an information society as the knowledge-base. These are the inevitable conditions, as foundation, for increasing the quality of life. However, these considerations often:

- lack precise and consistent conceptualization;
- their arguments are empirically thin;
- discussions usually emphasize one aspect (for example, political – in first place, or ecological, or legal etc.) rather than drawing these dimensions together and searching for the foundational level, solving the problem in its meta-theoretical dimension.

At the beginning of the 21st century, humanity has suddenly definitely realized it exists in a very varied, fast globalizing world. A lot of reasons more and more link up the people of our planet to one community, one "global village". New problems and threats shower down on modern man. The United Nations' "Millennium Declaration" proclaims: " We think the main question faced today for us is to ensure globalization as a positive factor for the people of the whole World. Though globalization is affording ground for huge potentials, these advantages as of now are distributed unequally."

One little 'pointer' can show the pace of globalization and evolution of global consciousness.If in September 2001 in the telecasts from the USA we saw the slogan"God bless America!", after a year, in September 2002, we already were seeing postersproclaiming "God bless the World!" A perception of social space inclusive of the whole World is forming. Next to theconcept "society" as society of the state, in the mind of many people the idea of "society" as 'macrocosm' is developing, according to which the wholePlanet is a "global village".

However, more and more often the use of the word "globalization" remains absolutely indefinite. For common sense (for everyday consciousness), globalization means only deterritorialization, or 'openness'. Others describe globalization as liberalization, meaning the

creationof an "open", "borderless" expansion of world economy.The other conception equates globalization with universalization, meaning "a planetary synthesis of cultures","global humanism". Another definition has equated globalization with westernization, or modernization, especially in an "Americanized" form. "Globalization" in this sense is sometimes described as an imperialism of McDonald's and Hollywood.

Globalization is an inevitable process. And it is the most important fact of contemporary history. For example, accepting Philadelphia's Liberty Medal in 1994, Vaclav Havel suggested that whereas previously war provided the chief stimulus to social transformations, today forces of change emanate mainly from globalization. The problem arises: how to escape the evils brought by globalization, how to make this process favorable for Lithuania and how to integrate painlessly into the world community? The positive consequences of globalization for countries that have escaped totalitarianism are also clear: the values of globalization may be more valuable than isolation from the world.

*The Problem of the Culture of Peace*

The main theme, which emerges today in Lithuanian society as well as the scientific community, and encompasses various aspects of globalization, is the security problem in the broad sense. The problem can be expressed this way: does globalization encourage protection or danger, stability or uncertainty, well-being or misery, social integration or alienation and marginalization, hope or fear? First of all, this question is connected to Lithuania's headway in joining NATO and the European Union.

From the pessimistic perspective globalization has bred intolerance and violence – as manifested in ultra-nationalism, racism, religious fundamentalism and international terrorism, organized criminality, breach of human rights, ethnic conflicts. The technologies of globalization have produced a barbarism of techno-war. It is the fear that globalization undermines national, cultural and intellectual security. It is clear, from this point of view, that peaceful global process is at a dangerous limit.

As often as not the conception of globalization is expressed by saying, "The West and the Rest", or "We" but not "Them". However the threats against security and peace are not a military problem. The main threats are the degradation of environment and living conditions. Ecological changes have reached global dimensions. But ecology in the contemporary World – it is not the harmony between man and nature, because the nature untouched by man doesn't exist any more. Ecology – first of all – means harmony between people, balance and peace in society. So, the problem of national security turns into a problem of contradiction between the culture of war and the culture of peace.

The traditional focus of security has been on peace and violence. "Peace needs only culture", and vice versa: "Culture needs only peace" – is the phrase that ran through many of the considerations. The world needs global peace because the time has come to choose life rather than to fight for life. Questions are inquired: how to progress from the "culture" (or cult) of war, currently ruling the world, to a culture of peace. Whether war is universality, a universal law? Is man biologically condemned to battle? The concept of the "culture" of war is easily understood. Mankind has always lived in the context of culture of war. Such a "culture" means that progress in science, technology and communications first of all serves the purposes of violence and war. This is the "culture" in which intellectual and material resources are intended to be used for the purposes of war.

Criminality, terrorism, Mafia fights are the varieties of war. Civil people become targets of violence and aggression, massacres and compulsion. Their bodies are nowadays torn to pieces as if they were bodies of enemy soldiers (of course, killing human beings cannot be justified in any case). The resort to force becomes de-institutionalized, "privatized", "professionalized". Fear in society is growing.

Thus, culture of war flourishes: "The other is always the enemy" (J. P. Sartre).

*The Problem of the Essence of War*

The concept of the imminence of wars is closely related to the argument of man's "inborn aggressiveness". The conception that man is aggressive by his nature and only culture renders him a peaceful creature is based on three arguments. First, all creatures are aggressive. Thus, this feature is essential by nature in man as in a mammal on the level of instinct. Second, the whole history of mankind is the history of wars. Third, certain parts of the brain and certain hormones are connected with aggression.

Thus, can war be considered the universality, a universal law? With respect to the first argument, we could maintain that pottery is an inborn feature of man, because through the centuries people of most different cultures used to make pots. At present, it has been scientifically determined that it would be incorrect to maintain:

(1) that man has inherited the desire to fight (the behavior of animals cannot be considered as aggressive in principle);

(2) that wars and other varieties of violence are genetically encoded;

(3) that our brain has certain centers responsible for violence. (Such a conclusion was made in 1986 by scientists who came to Seville with the aim of putting an end to the myths about the innate aggressiveness of man. Later on, this assertion was supported by the American Association of Psychologists as well as by the Association of Anthropologists).

Thus, we arrived at the conclusion that man is taught to become aggressive. A study performed by American psychologists, which embraced three generations, showed that children were taught aggressiveness first of all by their parents. Besides, the more disappointed children are by the surrounding world, the more aggressively they behave. (Doesn't this rule apply to the whole society?) The aggressiveness of the study subjects had nothing in common with either genetics or biological sources. Biologically, man is not doomed to fight. Violence is not inherited.

Moreover, if man is not biologically predisposed to violence, the aggressive activities and violence of people cannot be justified; they are responsible for their actions, since actions are the manifestations of their free will and nothing else. Since "wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed", as is written in the UNESCO Constitution's preamble: then the culture of peace starts (begins) also in human minds. If man has invented wars, he is capable of inventing peace.

War is always easier, at least up to the "first sounds of the trumpet". However, this is a sad and disastrous easiness, with which war ideologists and commanders send young people to die instead of themselves. If military fight is considered the first and essential defense, it is logical to demand in war maximum devotion and self-sacrifice. However, if we consider a war conflict as a consequence (a secondary, derivative matter, a consequence of evil politics and unstable life), there will be no incentive to allow regularly the youth of a nation to be destroyed. The victory gained at

the expense of human lives cannot be considered reasonable. The number of victims needed to gain victory is in inverse proportion to political wisdom.

Peace is not just absence of war. Such would be only negative peace, contrary to peace that could be called positive. Peace is difficult. The ancient Romans would say: *Si vis pacem – para bellam* (If you want peace, get ready for war). At present this saying requires the other dimension: if you want peace – create peace. Creation of civil society is an essential prerequisite of a culture of peace. How can we hope for a culture of peace, if the development of the country is only at its start, when democracy is in the embryonic state, when the basic rights of every man are not yet clear, when the future is ambiguous?

The price of war is high. However, mankind is used to paying this price (... has become accustomed to pay it). The price of peace is also high: however, nobody wants to pay it or at least to know what it is. Nobody has calculated the price of inactivity, since we should be clever enough to act in time, and not when it is too late. The arrow of time gives no bonus to anybody. So, a model for a culture of peace should be designed first of all.

Culture of peace – what is it? Briefly, it is the quality of citizens, of society. To create a culture of peace means to cultivate the ground on which we live. This implies economic culture (food, shelter for all), humanitarian culture (education for all), physical culture (preservation of health) and all other spheres of culture which were called 'PAIDEIA' by the ancient Greeks. A skeptic will say: what can culture do for us to pass from war as the essence of life to peace as the essence of life? It looks more like another void word, a magic word, a merely 'humanistic' reasoning.

The reasons for conflicts take much time to ripen through long years of the politics of marginalization and alienation. Culture of peace has also a long way to go, because the process of man's self-creation requires great efforts. Man is a product of culture; he creates himself by creating culture. here is no way to create culture of peace at the round table, in a discussion club or by any kinds of manifestos. Neither can the culture of peace be created by means of philosophical abstractions. The culture of peace cannot be implemented by voting or by laws.

Nevertheless – "In the beginning was the Word". Therefore it is necessary to speak, to consider, to search for the way out, to create a model of the culture of peace. Then it is necessary to go a long way in economics and social policy to eliminate poverty, to reduce inequality, to ensure human rights and freedom of self-expression, to guarantee life-long education for all, to invest (investment!) in science (here I mean not military technology, but raising the level of life), "to invest in education, in enlightenment", as proposes Theodore Schultz, Nobel Price laureate. In the global society the future belongs only to those nations which have a good educational system.

The attaining of this goal can be beyond our individual scope of life: however, we should proceed consistently, with a good knowledge of the matter, step by step in all possible fields. This is lasting, inconspicuous, thankless work. Marches, parades, nice uniforms and patriotic speeches are much more attractive. However, the culture of peace is created not by campaigns or declarations. Rather, it requires a long-term program of actions. It includes, first of all, social strategy which embraces economics, science and education (continuous education of people in the broad sense). It requires the elaboration of long-term social, humanitarian, political, economic programs, which are a planned strategy of the state. Then also the military doctrine could find in it a proper, delimited and reasonable place. "If we cannot foresee the future, we can create it", said Aurelio Peccei, the founder of the Club of Rome. This means that we can create the culture of peace instead of the cult of war. This is the price of peace. These are the most up-to-date weapons.

Questions about the culture of peace in the process of globalization expressed deep concern over the proper structure of a civic society. What is a citizen worth in a world that is becoming

global and cosmopolitan? Is civic awareness a necessary and pursuable value? In order to survive, any nation has to utilize its civic resources, to develop a civic conscience. Do we become citizens of the world only to the extent that we become citizens of Lithuania? In the global society, the future belongs only to those nations that have a good educational system and cherish their culture.

*The Information Society as Knowledge-based Society*

Theproposedproblems involve society in the field of intensive information technologies. The new society, which uses high technologies, is been formed. It is common to call it the "information society". It is a global phenomenon. The time of fast changes bears along the its own shake-ups and crises: we fall behind in conceptualizing what is actually happening. Globalization is regarded as a multiple objective world-wide process caused mainly by the development of information technologies and influencing vast areas of social life. The process is expected to provide new perspectives of scientific, economic and cultural development. On the other hand its effects threaten the traditional patterns of personal and national identities. These effects are accompanied by the emancipation of individuals from many traditional dependencies upon family, relationship, and community, thus weakeningsuch fundamental dependencies as nationality and citizenship. At the same time, new kinds of dependencies are emerging. As a result, relations of individuals and communities are characterized by an increasing individualization.

The sudden growth of the information society requires understanding the specificity of development of the information society in Lithuania. The key question is: how far is our state on its way towards participation in the information paradigm? First of all, this requires the creation of the infrastructure of the information society. The new tools of communication and information are neutral instruments. Only promotion of equal access to the new information and communication technologies can guarantee the right of every individual to seek and to obtain information and ideas. A question arises concerning the welfare state and the quality of life of its inhabitants. Without this indispensable condition, information technologies will lead to an increased cultural segregation of the poor countries and the poor, uneducatedpeople. Second, the national cultures will suffer erosion because of expansion of standardized culture.

Another question, essential for the Lithuanian society andscientific community, concerns the development of information technologies and its possible consequences, especially contributions of the new information technologies to national cultures and the related threats to the destruction of the national cultures, cultural identity and self-determination. Global culture and global consciousness is spreading several languages throughout the whole world. To become uniform would be a backward step with terrible consequences forsmall nations first of all, and the for the whole of humanity.

Furthermore, there are questions about the ambiguous relationship between information technology society and the knowledge-based society.Scientists are mostly concerned about the education of the members of a new society, as only a prepared and educated individual may participate in the development of knowledge-basedculture, which is aculture of peace as well.

In summary, globalization is regarded as a multiple objective world-wide process caused mainly by the development of information technologies and influencing vast areas of social life. The process is expected to provide new perspectives of social and cultural development. On the other hand its effects are expected to threatentraditional patterns of personal and national identities. The issues I have laid out are the ones which we shall all have to deal with: the future of the nations in a global society, dangers of globalization to the identity of cultures, the impact of information

technologies on global culture, peaceful international coexistence and the culture of peace as the basis of a new paradigm of thinking.

## Chapter XIII
# Belarus at the Crossroads Between Americanization or Russification

*Alexei Lalo*


I would like to begin by quoting Samuel Huntington's rather casual comment: he argues that the only three "civilizations" that were able to "resist the onslaught of the West" or "Westernization" and never became fully subordinate to the West at almost all stages of their history were Russians, Japanese and Ethiopians. For Huntington, what he calls the "rise of the West" is but a one-way street: there exists an active "West" that influences and engulfs everyone else (apart from those Russians and the other two) and a passive "Rest" or remainder that is becoming westernized/modernized, however slowly and unwillingly (3, 50-51). As Edward Said so convincingly showed us shortly after the attack of 9/11, Huntington's thesis is not only inelegant and unscrupulous but also fallacious:

Most of the argument in the pages that followed [Said is referring to Huntington's initial thesis about the "clash of civilizations" defining "world politics" today] relied on a vague notion of something Huntington called "civilization identity" and "the interactions among seven or eight [sic] major civilizations," of which the conflict between two of them, Islam and the West, gets the lion's share of his attention. In this belligerent kind of thought, he relies heavily on a 1990 article by the veteran Orientalist Bernard Lewis, whose ideological colors are manifest in its title, "The Roots of Muslim Rage." In both articles, the personification of enormous entities called "the West" and "Islam" is recklessly affirmed, as if hugely complicated matters like identity and culture existed in a cartoon-like world where Popeye and Bluto bash each other mercilessly, with one always more virtuous pugilist getting the upper hand over his adversary. Certainly neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to spare for the internal dynamics and plurality of every civilization, or for the fact that the major contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive possibility that a great deal of demagogy and downright ignorance is involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilization. No, the West is the West, and Islam Islam. (6)

In other words, whenever we try to start talking about the "common heritage of the entire humanity", we mainly mean the contribution of the West to it, without any accounting for the contributions from elsewhere (Russia, India, China, Middle East, Africa, etc.). Furthermore, "the West" in this sort of approach looks like something indivisible and monolithic (almost mono-cultural), consisting only of WASPs and their likes, without any dash of non-Westernness.

One does not have to be an Edward Said to see the shallowness and shortsightedness of Huntington's analysis. He is denying other "civilizations" (he is confused both as to their number and as to what he means by the term) the right of projecting their own modernity, of trying to locate their own ways out of "global risk society" (Ulrich Beck), that is, although Huntington assumes the "danger" of the non-West and the urgent need of the West to become stronger in the face of this threat, he is denying the non-Western civilizations their co-evalness with the West or their right to modernize in the way(s) they feel like. It is very unfortunate, as Said argues, that Huntington's doctrine became even more powerful after the attack on the United States on 9/11 (his book immediately turned into almost a byword for strength of cultural and political analysis

for such "international luminaries" as Silvio Berlusconi and Benazir Bhutto ready to launch yet another "crusade" against Islam or whatever was deemed hostile to the West). (6)

In Wallerstein's world-system, Huntington's line of thought makes Russia (Japan and Ethiopia notwithstanding) a rather unique semi-periphery that is indeed profoundly different from the West in that it has been fully exempt (almost like in Daniel Bell's phrasing, America being exempt from history!) from Western colonization and is in certain ways pre-colonial and even pre-modern. However, being resistant to Western influences, Russia has often been a colonial and imperial power itself, playing a dubious role of the regional leader at different stages of its history. Nowadays, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and the other newly independent states have become (or are becoming) full-fledged members of the "Third World" and, along with China, India or Africa, should be seriously thinking of their own way out of "tradition" along the road of their own "modernities" and "modernizations". Ideally, those would incorporate selected appropriate elements of Western modernity (to which the entire humanity has been contributing) but would involve their own patterns based on local value systems and mentalities. For instance, it is extremely difficult to impose individualism or "*laisser-faire*" on a Russian population that is traditionally governed by such notorious values as *sobornost* (communalism, collectivism) and *smirennost* (submissiveness, resignation).

Another important position that I would like to highlight is that it is an open question whether Russia or such ex-USSR country as Belarus can actually benefit from the third stage of globalization, or U.S. imperialism, a sequel to "Christianization" (Portugese and Spanish empires) and "Civilizing Mission" (British Empire and French Colonization): I am quoting a chronological classification suggested by Walter Mignolo (4, 36). Mignolo considers one of the main epistemological strategies of colonial / imperial expansion what he calls the "denial of co-evalness" and argues that today, thanks to globalization, the removal or denial of this strategy (spatial rather than Hegelian chronological thinking about modernity) creates an opportunity for what he calls "barbarian theorizing" of and by third-world scholars for the first world. In his opinion, "economic globalization is facilitating the intellectual task of denying the denial of co-evalness, in the removal of the civilizing mission and in the conceptualization of the civilizing process as one to which all of humanity contributed and is contributing" (4, 37).

Bearing in mind the traditionally high level of education that Russia and other ex-USSR countries have inherited and now pride themselves for, one would argue that once the ideological restraints have been removed, we have a unique chance to become one of the principal participants in the intercultural dialogue, or pluri-logue, on such issues as culture, civilization, modernity and postmodernity. Unfortunately, so far this opportunity has hardly been used by most Russian and other post-Soviet scholars working in humanities and social sciences.

Addressing the Belarusian political and cultural realities, it would be fascinating to explore the clash of "Russification" (i.e. Russian cultural, linguistic, economic imperialism) and Westernization (Americanization). While being a productive field for intellectual speculation, this clash of major influences may arguably entail further aggravation of the Belarus's dubious and weak national identity. As we speak about trans-nationalism and globalization, we must always bear in mind that "one man's imagined 'community' is another man's political prison" (Arjun Appadurai). Obviously, "Russianization" is Appadurai's much "greater fear" for a post-Soviet country than any other remote influence, be it even globalization (also known as 'Americanization').

Incidentally, despite Russian economic backwardness, the civilization clash between Russia and the U.S. continues to exert a formative influence upon the contemporary post-periphery

"world-system". Interestingly, Russia is definitely one of the few (semi)-peripheries nowadays that still deems itself the core or the center. It would be quite challenging to try to define the position of the ex-USSR countries within this framework, to juxtapose Russian "messianism" and cultural/military/political expansionism with the worldwide exporting of "American Exceptionalism" (i.e., 'Americanization').

Once we start talking about the global and the local in a post-Soviet context, we should also benefit from employing Partha Chatterjee's classification of the types of nationalism and reflect upon what he calls, quoting the case of Russia, "official nationalism" or "Russification," i.e., the imposition of cultural homogeneity by the imperialistic state "from above" via governmental measures (1, 165). This is a painful and largely unexamined issue in Belarus, a country with profound ties to Russia and extremely dubious national identity but at the same time an obvious victim and a testing ground of Russian imperialism. There is a paradox here as well: one of the things that Russian government since Peter the First has been trying to impose on the population "from above" was actually "Westernization", that is, all kinds of liberal reforms in the economy and political sphere but they all mostly failed due to resistance "from below". One of the key factors in this resistance has always been the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in propagating certain values, mentalities, and behavior patterns, i.e., the cultural "epistemicide" of the hegemonic Russian Orthodoxy. Quite predictably, the Church is also a source and major enactor of what Chatterjee calls "official nationalism" and/or "Russification". It is quite symptomatic that the major force advocating "tradition" and personifying resistance to globalization is very much an agent of Russian influence and Russianization in the region.

After 9/11, Putin's Russia became part of the "antiterrorist coalition" and began to be seen by many in the West as a "Westernist" society (this is a hasty assumption, of course). The tensions between Russian and Western value systems began to be overlooked as tensions and religious conflicts between Islam and Judeo-Christianity have been mounting. Once Russia is assumed by many to be almost part of the West, this creates another serious problem inside that country and other newly independent states. Moscow has received a nearly unchecked right to act as part of the "civilized world", as a full-fledged member of the Great Eight, and so forth, and this new status and sentiment is undoubtedly employed against its inside adversaries – most notably, in genocide against the Chechnya people (who are now, of course, all 'terrorists' linked to Al Qaeda – within this logic the notorious Colonel Budanov who raped and killed a teenage Chechen girl could easily become a national hero!) and in imperial policies toward the neighboring countries: Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and others. Bearing in mind that political power in Russia belongs now to a group of rather xenophobic and belligerent careerists, most of whom have a background in the KGB, this tendency of overlooking Russia, quoting Vaclav Havel's recent adage, as a 'Eurasian country with its own idiosyncrasy' is conspicuous. This is very unfortunate for both Russia and the West as it stifles social and economic reform inside Russia. As I hinted above, all the successful reforms ever carried out in Russia were geared toward imposing democracy and free market "from above", while the population was constantly resisting it "from below". Nowadays, as Russia is ostensibly "part of the West", it is more problematic to productively employ the sentiment of a usual "lagging behind", and society has been increasingly belligerent and "solidarized" around the figures who advocate war and violence in resolving inherently political conflicts. At the same time, the moods of the intellectuals (or "intelligentsia") these days are echoing Joseph Conrad's thesis in *Under Western Eyes* that "the spirit of Russia is the spirit of cynicism" (2, 82).

As was hinted above, the relationship between globalization and Americanization is of primary importance as we approach post-Soviet social and cultural realities. Why are the anti-American (anti-western, anti-global) moods so effectively employed by political, religious and cultural figures to enhance social solidarity and launch "witch hunts"? What kind of a simulacrum of the United States are we exposed to (through mass culture, televised news and other media-related and cultural encounters)? What are the major prerequisites and causes of anti-American (anti-western, anti-global) moods in Russia or Belarus? Is it just a problem of the generation gap and anachronisms of the cold–war mentality or something deeper ingrained and more persistent in the ex-USSR cultures, or, rather, is it a manifestation of resistance to globalization and a desperate attempt to persevere in offering some kind of an ephemeral and merely speculative alternative to globalization and Americanization (Russian national messianistic mythology of a "God-bearing people" and a "world savior" not only survives these days but is developed and elaborated. It is still proclaimed here and there that Russians are a God-chosen people who have a special mission to teach the rest of the world, i.e., to save the West from its lack of faith, cynicism and worldliness).

In other words, being a semi-periphery that still deems itself to be the center, or the core, Russians would like to "sacralize" not just themselves but the rest of the world. I would argue that "Russianization" is as imperialistic and counterproductive for the NIS of the ex-USSR as is overwhelming uncritical "westernization" or "Americanization". It is arguably extremely difficult for such countries as Ukraine and Belarus to balance between these two major messianistic ideologies and tendencies as the result is always one and the same: being epistemologically dependent on either of the two, we suffer from a sort of "inferiority complex" and prove to be unable to gain any political or intellectual autonomy or indigenous discourses of liberalism, secularism, modernity, postmodernity, and the like.

The "American Dream" in its Puritan ambivalence and ambiguity (both a dream of freedom and a dream of limitation) becomes a battlefield for militant advocates and not less belligerent adversaries of "Americanness" and Americanization worldwide. The American "Towering Selfhood" that Emerson would so convincingly speak about finds itself in an existential deadlock, stuck between its narcissistic "self-reliance" and utter inability to relate its values to other cultures, or to "translate" those to the so-called "the rest", or the 'Other', the non-Western nations and cultures, unless the language of this "translation" is violence (including epistemic violence or "epistemicide"), or hegemony and cultural supremacy.

The current invasion of Iraq is an apt example of how "neoconservatism" in the current U.S.'s politics functions. It is accompanied by quite a number of clumsy attempts at theorizing the ever-important need for American involvement in all the parts of the world, where "liberty" and "democracy" are not reigning yet. Here are some quotations from a manifesto of a pro-government U.S. organization called "New American Century" (it is very aptly entitled "Power & Duty: U.S. Action is Crucial to Maintaining World Order"):

The unavoidable reality is that the exercise of American power is key to maintaining what peace and order there is in the world today. Imagine a world in which the U.S. didn't exercise this power. Who would handle a nuclear-armed North Korea? Who would prevent the one-party state of China from acting on its pledge to gather democratic Taiwan into its fold? Who would be left to hunt down Islamic terrorists increasingly interested in getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction? Who could have contained, let alone defeated, a tyrant like Hussein, preventing him from becoming the dominant power in the Middle East? Who can prevent the Balkans from slipping back into chaos? Who is going to confront regimes like those of Iran, Syria and Libya as

they rush to get their own weapons of mass destruction? Given how little most of our allies and critics spend on defense, certainly not them. (7)

The author of this piece, Gary Schmitt, goes on to characterize the US impact upon the Middle East achieved through the attack on Iraq:

But change also brings opportunity. The president's decision to remove Hussein from power and his work to create a viable, democratic Iraq has already led to a number of positive steps in the region. In Iran, moderates, emboldened by the possibility of a democratic Iraq, are again pushing to reform that cleric-dominated state. In Saudi Arabia, the homeland of 15 of the 19 terrorists who carried out the attacks on the United States, the royal family has for the first time begun serious deliberations with reformers on how to transform and democratize the country. In the Palestinian territories, Yasser Arafat reluctantly agreed to give up much of his day-to-day control over the Palestinian Authority to a new prime minister. And in Egypt, the government has just released its most vocal human-rights advocate.

 None of these steps amounts to a revolution in the region. Nor do they mean that positive political transformation throughout the Islamic world will happen easily or without fits, starts and dead ends. However, the early signs suggest that the president is right to believe that the instinct for liberty is not missing from Middle East genes (7).

What I like about this argumentation is, firstly, the use of the indefinite article "a/an" in talking about the country with its own traditions, mentalities, value systems, etc.: "we will build an Iraq that", we are sure of the possibility for "a democratic Iraq", what would be "an Iraq" without the tyrant, and so forth. Secondly, it is hilarious and astounding at the same time when someone like President Bush (or one of his neoconservative aides who wrote this speech for him) starts talking about "genes" and the "instinct for liberty" (almost like "Basic Instinct") embedded therein. Who else but Bush is everybody's ultimate expert in popular genetics?

Unfortunately, the epistemic component of Western/American hegemony and supremacy often functions in such a way so as to suppress and silence voices of intellectuals from the Third World who would dare to criticize or question the legitimacy of this sort of rhetoric. For many reasons, we simply don't count and our voices are seldom raised and heard by our Western colleagues. Indeed, as Walter Mignolo suggests, we are now in the Third World responsible for producing "culture", while the First World is of course in charge of the "science", i.e., the objective truth for everybody else to thoughtlessly follow (4, 47). Westerners, in this scheme, are turned into some visitors of a huge "global Zoo" (somewhat similar to Desmond Morris's "human Zoo" (5) but quite different): the "tourists" walk around studying all kinds of exotic cultures in cages and animal houses getting fascinated by their "non-westernness". It is not very hard to locate confirmations for that: whenever one thinks of a program of any international conference on some aspects of cultural studies, philosophy, literature or whatever, presenters are usually grouped by the nationality/home country principle: 3 Estonians in the morning, 4 Georgians in the afternoon; 4 Belarusians in the morning, 4 Ukrainians in the afternoon, etc. Nobody really cares about their subject matter (one Estonian can speak of globalization in Africa, whereas the other may dwell on recent Estonian presidential elections – this is about the same for the audience as their country of origin really matters, not their intellectual input) or whatever they have to say about global issues; their assigned role is to relate stories about their own culture, i.e., in the imperialistic E.U. and U.S.

jargon, they are "native informants" whose job is to entertain the audience with the exoticism of their cultures.

On the other hand, the Third World intellectuals are often simply pulled out of any conversation in the humanities and social sciences for purely "economic" reasons: not having any funding for professional development, they cannot afford to attend conferences and seminars held in the West, buy Western books, and basically interact with their colleagues in any meaningful ways. Their Western peers are often too "busy" or arrogant to pay attention to this issue, preferring to neglect it, to pretend that it does not exist. As a result, the dialogue in the West becomes self-contained within the West itself, so to speak: some international scholarly forums often remind one of elite clubs for the wealthy "New Russians" in Moscow, not like truly global "pluri-logues" of intellectuals. Taken to its extreme, this also results in a recurrence of some kind of the "Frankenstein syndrome": Gary Schmitt (see large quotation above) deciding what is good and what is bad for the Iraqi people and jointly with his pals creating "a perfect Iraq".

This lack of meaningful cultural "translation" works both ways: anti-American, or anti-Western moods and deeds in today's "Third World" build upon biases and stereotypes, that is, thoughtless "received ideas", as Flaubert would say, about the U.S. and the West in general. A good example of that in recent Russian pop-culture is the 1998 movie Brat-2 (Brother, Part 2). In the film that became a cult for many ex-Soviet youngsters and part of the intelligentsia, a young Russian desperado becomes an incidental witness to a Moscow murder of a friend of his and his "investigation" into the crime leads him, of course, to Chicago where powerful and merciless gangsters operate and pull the strings in Russia through their partner – a corrupt Russian businessman. The desperado goes to Chicago, briefly sleeps with an African-American newsmaker whom he seduces immediately after she hits him driving her car and, shortly afterwards, the Russian hero makes an improvised shotgun and starts to methodically kill everybody – and finally this murdering binge takes him to the office of the business tycoon who is in charge of cheating Russian hockey players who play in the National Hockey League and who supposedly organized the Moscow murder at the very beginning. There he delivers a monologue, extremely meaningful in its characteristically Russian stance, before actually shooting the tycoon:

Now, you, American, think that he who has the money also has the power? But I for one think that he who has the Truth is more powerful.

It is very ironic that this statement by the movie character was recalled in January 2003 by the popular TV host, Leonid Parfyonov, to describe a conflict between the director of "NTV", the only mildly oppositional federal television channel and Mr. Putin that obviously resulted in Putin ousting Boris Jordan, an American manager of this channel. Who can doubt that although Jordan was a good manager and saved the channel from bankruptcy, he is a priori much less powerful than those who are in the possession of the truth?

So, as I see it, there are a lot of problems in intercultural dialogue between post-communist countries and the West that we are facing and, luckily, starting to discuss. We are challenged by the need to project and implement our own modernization, and in doing so, we do not necessarily have to ape Western (Eurocentric) epistemological paradigms. We must treat Western modernity and postmodernity as belonging to the common heritage of the whole of humanity and, borrowing heavily from and largely relying on those, learn to think of our own, private solutions to global and local challenges.

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# Rationalizing the Relation of Globalization and Nationalism

*Aida Savicka*

This paper deals with two phenomena of modernity – globalization and nationalism – which are appearing widely in the contemporary world. Their simultaneous appearance has provoked a lot of thought for social scholars since globalization and nationalism are commonly perceived as quite incompatible forms of social integration, the former fostering cultural intimacy and intercultural tolerance while the latter, manifesting itself as intolerance for cultural differences. There has been a lot of effort to elucidate causes of their coexistence. Among a great variety of rationalizations of the relationship between them, two main lines of argumentation can be distinguished. One of them treats nationalism as one of the ideas spread by values-indifferent globalization; meanwhile the other sees nationalism as a contraposition to values-encompassing globalization. However, both of these rationales have internal contradictions, which the present paper tries to point out.

## Territorial and Supra-Territorial Social Integration

The contemporary world witnesses the competition of two opposing forms of social integration, that is, national and global integration. Social integration comes into being as a result of social interactions. Since interactions might be, but not necessarily are, tied to territory, social integration might be territorial or supra-territorial. As the opportunities for supra-territorial interactions are rapidly increasing, lately one can witness the growing supra-territorial, or global, integration. Still, these developments do not suppress national integration. What is more interesting, national integration is also gaining greater significance. Since the two forms of integration seem to be quite oppositional, this phenomenon draws attention of social scholars who try to interpret the relationship between the two processes. What are the most popular rationales of this concomitance? To answer this question, let us first see how the two phenomena are defined.

The process of cultural, political and economic globalization can be observed in most places. Recently, its study became one of the most fashionable enterprises among social scientists. They are involved in the discussions on such issues as an emergence of international and supranational institutions, 'global division of labor', internalization of political, economic and social life, etc. Definitions of globalization usually emphasize increasing cultural intimacy among distant places of the world. For instance, Anthony Giddens claims that:

Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very distanciated relations that shape them. (Giddens 1990, p. 64)

Similarly, Roland Robertson insists that 'globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole' (Robertson 1992, p. 8); and Hans Holmén pictures it as a process when 'norms and attributes of

various sub-cultures tend to spread internationally to more, and more distant, places' (Holmén 1997, p. 79).

Along with the phenomenon of globalization, some opposite processes manifest themselves and are discussed by scholars in a number of controversial ways. First of all, it is observed, that simultaneously to the increasing cohesion of different areas of the world, fragmentation and localization are taking place as well.

For instance, in this respect Barry Smart notices that:

There is talk and there are signs of the erosion of the sovereignty of nation-states following the increasing internationalisation of socio-economic and cultural life. Here we encounter the possibility of transnational socio-cultural and political forms, 'supranational' communities and pan-nationalism. But at the same time there appears to be a proliferation of the modern nation-state as regions and ethnicities pursue modern nationhood... (Smart 1994, p. 149)

Thus, contrary to expectations, manifestations of nationalism did not vanish after World War II but reappeared with a new force at the close of the century. As Anthony D. Smith describes contemporary conditions:

. . . we are witnessing a rebirth of ethnic nationalism, of religious fundamentalisms and of group antagonisms which were thought to have been long buried. Ethnic protests for autonomy and secession, wars of national irredentism and explosive racial conflicts over labour markets and social facilities have proliferated in every continent. (Smith 1995, p. 2)

Looking for the future prospects, Smith concludes that 'the number and intensity of current and potential ethnic conflicts hardly suggests a global diminution of the power of nationalism or the hold of national cultures in the next few decades' (Smith 1990, p. 185).

Thus, globalization and nationalism are widely witnessed contemporary phenomena. As Jonathan Friedman notices, 'ethnic and cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenization are not two arguments, two opposing views of what is happening in the world today, but two constitutive trends of global reality' (Friedman 1990, p. 311). To better understand their relationship, it is worth inquiring into their origins.

**The Issue of the Origins of Globalization and Nationalism**

Even though scholars have not reached agreement in their opinion as to the dates these two phenomena originated, it becomes clear at least that the debates in both cases cover more or less the same period. Scholars usually closely relate the globalization process to modernity and modernization. For instance, Giddens (1990) claims globalization to be a direct consequence of modernization since modernization involves capitalist mode of production, industrialization, surveillance (or coordinated control over a population), and world military order, all of which are universalizing tendencies. In quite the same line, Ulrich Beck (1992) treats globalization as a response to modernization, in general, and to global risks that are products of global industrialization, in particular. According to him, fighting global risks, such as threats from radioactivity, toxins and pollution, requires supra-national solutions, which fosters global consciousness.

However, some scholars argue globalization to have its origins in a more distant past than commonly thought. One of them is Robertson. According to him, the beginnings of globalization could be traced back to as far as the 15th century. Robertson divides the path of globalization into five phases, the first of which, the germinal phase, he dates at 1400-1750 and relates to such European happenings of the period as the dissolution of Christendom and the emergence of state communities, introduction of a universal calendar in the West, colonialism or drawings of the first maps of the planet.

Quite similarly, the issue of the origins of nationalism raises controversial opinions. Some scholars think nationalism to be a specifically modern phenomenon. For instance, Ernest Gellner treats nationalism as a response to the demands of industrial society since he claims that modern economy 'depends on mobility and communication between individuals, at a level which can only be achieved if those individuals have been socialized into a high culture, and indeed into the same high culture' (Gellner 1983, p. 140). Some others, however, look for the beginnings of nationalism in much more remote history. Here one can turn to Smith for exemplification. He stands in sharp opposition to Gellner and insists that nationalism is rooted in 'pre-modern ethnic symbolism and modes of organization' (Smith 1995, p. 7).

Thus, not going into details one can already see that even though it is difficult to establish the exact period of the origination of both globalization process and nationalism, it is valid to assume that they have appeared more or less concurrently. One question arises inevitably in this respect, that is, how could it happen that such opposing phenomena appeared almost simultaneously? Some scholars would argue that this was a coincidence. However, they are in a minority since such an answer seems to be an attempt to ease the task.

Another solution is presented by scholars who question the existence of the very phenomenon of globalization. They argue it is not grounded enough a concept to talk about it and propose the usage of the concept of 'internationalization' instead. The proponent of this point of view is Holmén. He maintains that:

. . . we should be very cautious in our assumptions that the world is becoming increasingly homogenized economically and culturally. However, modern communications and production systems have led to increased internalization of economic life. (Holmén 1997, p. 76)

He rejects the concept of globalization since he feels that the so called globalization process is not all-encompassing but rather geographically limited and not observed in large parts of the world. Because of the latter reason, Holmén claims:

. . . this increased internalization will not result in a 'globalization' at all but rather regionalization, i.e., that different parts of the rich world will band together in rather closed (and, possibly, antagonistic) economic-political 'fortresses' like EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, etc., while the rest of the world is locked out. (Holmén 1997, p. 79)

Still, this solution is not a popular one either. The majority of scholars believe that one has to look for an intrinsic, essential relationship between globalization and nationalism. Otherwise, how could it happen that the two phenomena appeared independently each of the other in the same places more or less at the same time, that is, more or less under the same circumstances, which are so opposed to each other? If this were the case, one could trace no explicable course of the events. The question arises then how could the same circumstances give rise to so contradictory events?

If they could, does not it mean that these circumstances were not the actual reason? But what was the reason, then?

The answer given most often when interpreting this relationship is that globalization gave rise to nationalism. For instance, one of the most celebrated students of globalization, Mike Featherstone, claims that 'while this increasingly dense web of cosmopolitan-local encounters and interdependencies can give rise to third cultures and increasing tolerance, it can also result in negative reactions and intolerance' (Featherstone 1990, p.11). In a similar manner, Giddens perceives globalization as 'a process of uneven development that fragments as it coordinates' (Giddens 1990, p.175). This point is echoed by Smart who does not only claim that some degree of localization survives globalization but that localization is, in some ways, the consequence of globalization. He maintains that 'new forms of cultural heterogenisation are as much a consequence of processes of globalization as manifestations of cultural homogenisation' (Smart 1994, p.153).

However, this situation does not mean that all of them interpret the relationship in the same way: some of them claim that globalization made it possible for the nationalistic ideas to form and spread (for instance, by making the idea of nation universal); meanwhile the others maintain that globalization coerced the formation of nationalism as a contraposition. Why is the relationship between globalization and nationalism interpreted in different ways? It is so probably because of the differences in the conceptions of the content of cultural globalization. Here it is possible to distinguish two main viewpoints. One of them contends that cultural globalization has no value content; meanwhile the other perceives globalization as values-encompassing. It is interesting to examine what are consequences of adopting one or the other of these approaches for the interpretation of the concomitance of nationalism and globalization. Still, it has to be remarked first that neither of these two perspectives is present in its pure form in the majority of conceptions; scholars usually do not declare their stance as to this issue lucidly and their speculations involve arguments coming from both of these contradictory perspectives. Therefore, we will have to reconstruct their reasoning from the hints they give indirectly, rather than report neatly presented viewpoints.

## Nationalism and Values-Indifferent Globalization

According to one perspective, globalization has no value content at all; it does not carry any cultural values with it but one, namely, unity in diversity. The latter notion became extremely popular during the last few years and is present in almost every piece of writing devoted to the issue of cultural globalization. One of the proponents of this viewpoint, Featherstone, states in this respect that 'the binary logic which seeks to comprehend culture via the mutually exclusive terms of homogeneity/heterogeneity, integration/disintegration, unity/diversity, must be discarded' (Featherstone 1990, p. 2). This point is shared also by Ulf Hannerz who insists that global culture 'is marked by an organization of diversity rather than by replication of uniformity' since he feels that:

The world culture is created through the increasing interconnectedness of varied local cultures, as well as through the development of cultures without a clear anchorage in any one territory. These are all becoming sub-cultures, as it were, within the wider whole; cultures which are in important ways better understood in the context of their cultural surroundings than in isolation. (Hannerz 1990, p. 237)

These are only two of a great many scholars claiming that globalization enables the uncontrollable flow of a great variety of ideas from culture to culture rather than imposing certain cultural patterns of some countries on the others. How is this assumption combined with the need to interpret the causes of modern nationalism? Let us turn to Robertson's conception for a deeper inquiry from someone who is one of the most celebrated scholars in the area of globalization studies.

As Robertson perceives it, globalization designates 'the form in terms of which the world becomes united, but by no means integrated' (Robertson 1990, p.18). The most essential in this process is formation of the 'consciousness of the global whole'. As has been already mentioned when we discussed the diverse opinions concerning the historical beginning of globalization, Robertson traces it back as far as the 15th century. According to him, the process of globalization was gradual and has already passed through five phases by now (Robertson 1990, 1992):

1. The first was the germinal phase which lasted from the early fifteenth to the mid-eighteen century and was confined to Europe. During this phase, such processes as growth of national communities, beginning of modern geography and introduction of heliocentric theory of the world, acceptance of the universal (Gregorian) calendar took place.

2. The second phase was the incipient phase during which globalization manifested itself through the spread of the idea of the homogeneous (national) state, introduction of the idea of formal citizenship, increase in international regulations and agreements, discussions on the issue of nationalism-internationalism, etc. This phase lasted from the mid-eighteenth century to the 1870s and was observed exclusively in Europe as well.

3. The third phase Robertson calls the take-off phase and dates it between the 1870s and the mid-1920s. He relates it to such events and developments as sharp increase in global forms of communication, introduction of global competitions (e.g. Olympics, Nobel Prizes), the First World War, concern with the ideas of national and personal identities, and so on.

4. The struggle-for-hegemony phase was the fourth one and lasted from the early 1920s to the mid-1960s. During this period global international conflicts have intensified (World War II, Cold War), and the universal nuclear threat has appeared; besides, the organization of the United Nations was formed.

5. And the last phase is the uncertainty phase which began in the 1960s and lasts until the present. It is characterized by the formation of supra-territorial world communities, consolidation of global media system, recognition of global environmental problems, rapid increase in world-wide institutions, etc. Robertson calls this phase 'uncertainty' because there is no confidence as to the direction of future developments.

Even though Robertson finds the origins of globalization in a very distant history and refuses to treat it as a direct consequence of modernization, he claims that accelerated globalization is intimately related to the modernization.

To summarize, for Robertson, globalization is a compression of the world so contemporary nations do not only interact among themselves but constitute a global context, a singular place with its own processes autonomous from the happenings in any individual nation. His basic point is that global developments have their own logic and are independent of the internal dynamics of individual societies rather than are an outcome of intra-societal or inter-state processes.

When coming closer to the issue of the relationship between globalization and nationalism, one finds that Robertson sees nationalism as a response to globalization in a certain way. According to him:

In an increasingly globalized world there is a heightening of civilizational, societal, ethnic, regional and, indeed individual, self-consciousness. There are constraints on social entities to locate themselves within world history and the global future. (Robertson 1992, p.27)

Because of this, it is the process of global compression which causes intense cultural contests over 'the definition of the global situation'. Therefore his expectation is that 'the problem of globality is very likely to become a basis of major ideological and analytical cleavages in the twenty-first century' (Robertson 1990, p.22). This is a quite widely shared feeling. However, what is more original in his conception is the idea that 'the prevalence of the national society in the twentieth century is an aspect of globalization' (Robertson 1990, p.26). To his mind, the very idea of the national society could spread partly due to the process of globalization, in the same way as the expectation of identity declarations did.

Generally, it is difficult to interpret the relationship between globalization and nationalism and to explain how the former could provoke the latter once accepting the thesis of values-indifferent globalization. Therefore, Robertson's reasoning is not consistent, which is typical rather than exceptional for this kind of thinking. First of all, he is inconsistent in arguing in favor of the conception of globalization as values-indifferent. For instance, when describing the phases in the evolution of globalization, he clearly relates its origins with exclusively Western happenings. Even more important is his associating of the accelerated globalization with modernization and even with 'postmodernization' which, again, clearly ties it with Western developments. Thus, one can even question the validity of Robertson's assumption of globalization as values-indifferent and contextless on the grounds of the evidence he himself presents.

His belief that the idea of nation could have been spread precisely because the process of globalization was taking place is very interesting and original and might provide us with a unique perception of the nature of intimate relationship between globalization and nationalism. This may well be considered the most thought-provoking of his statementa. However, it is not compatible with his conception of values-indifferent globalization either, since nationalist ideas are values.

## Nationalism as a Contra-Position to Values-Encompassing Globalization

According to another viewpoint, cultural globalization means exchange of values between cultures. This assumption about values-encompassing globalization is characteristic for modernization theorists and their approach to globalization that prevailed until quite recently. Since it claims that every society has to become modernized, imitating – in this sense – developments of Western societies, the conclusion was drawn that they would mirror Western cultural patterns, ideals, values and norms as well. Therefore, this approach equaled globalization with Westernization, Europeanization, or Americanization. However, this point of view is losing its popularity lately, as scholars attempt to appreciate the uniqueness of non-Western societies. But is there another possible scenario for the outcomes of globalization, once one has accepted the assumption that globalization is values-encompassing?

It seems that this assumption inevitably leads argumentation in the following direction. Some values have more effective institutional establishment than others, providing them with better

possibilities of consolidation. Usually, these are values promoted by stronger 'civilizations'. Because of unequal distribution of power among societies, some of them have more resources to exert their influence than the others do, and the vulnerable others become more exposed to external influence. That is, the real situation is not that much an exchange of cultural values but rather the expansion of the values of stronger civilizations. One can even speak of the fight of values. In this fight, members of some cultures feel they are being harmed and feel frustration and, consequently, the desire to resist. This leads to the formation of nationalist feelings. Smith advocates this interpretation when he answers the question:

Why do such myths and memories retain their hold, even today, to fuel the nationalist project? ... The first is the role of ethno-history, its myths, values, memories and symbols, in assuring collective dignity (and through that, some measure of dignity for the individual) for populations which have come to feel excluded, neglected or suppressed in the distribution of values and opportunities. (Smith 1990, p.180)

To his mind, intensification of intercultural contacts does not necessarily produce greater tolerance for other cultures but equally well can lead to 'cultural prestige' competitions. That is what makes Smith speak of 'new cultural imperialisms'. Thus, leaning on this perspective, one can treat nationalism as a direct response to globalizing tendencies, as an attempt to ensure the feeling or sense of one's dignity.[1]

There are two main difficulties in accepting this viewpoint. First of all, the strongest criticism to this line of argumentation points to the facts of anti-globalizational moods and rising nationalism not only in the 'periphery' but in the very cultures which are successful in promoting their values. As this issue has been addressed extensively in the debates on the relationship between globalization and nationalism, we will leave it aside. We will rather concentrate on another point which has not received adequate treatment. Specifically, the neglected problem is the fact that the implications of this point of view about the probable outcomes of the competition of cultural values, the increasing dominance of the cultures of powerful nations, are so far-reaching that they have caused resistance even among the scholars that accept the assumption that globalization does have value content. For instance, Smith, whose notion of cultural imperialism indicates his perception of globalization as values-encompassing, tries to avoid this conclusion by emphasizing essential difference between earlier and contemporary cultural imperialisms. To his mind:

Earlier imperialisms were usually extensions of ethnic or national sentiments and ideologies, French, British, Russian, etc. Today's imperialisms are ostensibly non-national; 'capitalism' and 'socialism', and in a different sense 'Europeanism', are by definition and intention 'supranational', if not universal. (Smith 1990, p. 176)

This means that for him global culture, all in all, is 'tied to no place or period' and that it is rather 'context-less, a true melange of disparate components drawn from everywhere and nowhere, borne upon the modern chariots of global telecommunications systems' (Smith 1990, p.177). And

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[1] It must be noted that this is not a conclusion to which Smith arrives. Rather, his position is more complicated and controversial as he maintains at another instance that 'it is possible to see nationalism, paradoxically, as one of the main forces for global interdependence' (Smith 1995, p.viii), – Which means that to his mind, nationalism might be a cause for globalization equally well as vice versa.

this position is rather symptomatic than exceptional in recent theorizing on globalization. Therefore, one can say that when talking about globalization it is becoming their fashionable practice to emphasize the disparity between the terms of globalization and Westernization.

An even better example of this kind of inconsistent reasoning is Nikolai B. Genov's perception of the concomitance of globalization and nationalism. The scholar claims explicitly modern nationalism to be a reaction to globalizing tendencies. According to him, the rise of nationalist movements in the beginning of the 20th century was undoubtedly provoked by rapid changes brought on by industrialization. And more recently, to his mind, 'the rise of fundamentalist religious movements and the establishment of regimes based on traditionalist values can at least partially be explained as reactions against the spirit and the practices of Western industrialism' (Genov 1997, p.413). Echoing Smith's idea, Genov explains these reactions as efforts to preserve personal identities through establishing, or re-establishing, groups identities along traditional lines. Even though the scholar does not address the issue of the relationship between globalization and nationalism in more detail, his conception is very illustrative for our purpose. As is already obvious, it leads to the expectation that outbursts of nationalism should take place in the periphery areas, which is the first common fallacy of the conception of nationalism as contraposition to values-encompassing globalization. Besides, in his argumentation Genov does not escape another typical inconsistency of this conception we mentioned, which is worth discussing more extensively.

Genov's conception is of interest here since he is among the few who inquire specifically into the content of global trends that penetrate all contemporary societies. Genov singles out four such trends; these are: (1) spreading of instrumental activism, (2) individualization, (3) upgrading of organizational rationality, and (4) value-normative universalization. It seems to be clear from the first sight that the origins of all these phenomena are found in Western European culture. But let us postpone the diagnosis and examine what does Genov himself mean by these terms and where does he find the springboards of these trends.

By spreading of instrumental activism Genov means the increasing importance of instrumental goals and their dominance over ultimate ends. The term of instrumental activism he has borrowed from Parsons (1965), who used it to describe the American value system. Genov remarks, however, that:

. . . Instrumental activism is by no means only a Western value-normative and institutional phenomenon. It is part and parcel of everyday life all over the world and throughout history. The difference lies in the degree and manner of coordination of instrumental goals with ultimate ends. (Genov 1997, p. 412)

Still, he admits that 'it was the instrumentalization of ends which secured the civilizational advantages of Western Europe' (Genov 1997, p.411) and, therefore, does not deny that spreading of instrumental activism means prevalence of Western culture.

The second global trend Genov is speaking about is individualization. It is conceiving of individuals rather than groups as major actors in social life. Even though Genov insists that 'individualization is a universal phenomenon which evolves in all societies', he has to admit that 'individual human rights first occupied a focal status in Western European and North American value-normative systems and institutions' (Genov 1997, p. 411).

Upgrading of organizational rationality is another trend he submits to consideration. Genov relates it to Western-type bureaucracies that proved themselves to be more efficient than traditional

social organizations in many respects and could hardly be avoided in the modern world of rapidly growing complexities. Here, again, Genov admits that the key elements of the phenomenon have originated in the European Reformation.

And the last global trend is value-normative universalization. Genov relates it very closely to the trend of individualization, in general, and cultural and institutional endorsement of universal human rights, in particular. According to him, one can speak about increasing global cultural homogenization which is especially manifest among young people, but observable among older cohorts as well. It results as the aggregate effect of an attempt to keep up with the latest fashion that, alas, come 'from the centres of modern civilization', to use Genov's phrase, or, to put it directly, from Western countries.

As becomes obvious from this short review of Genov's conception, he does not deny the Western origin of the four global trends; just the contrary, he himself explicitly points it out. Therefore, it is even more unexpected that the scholar adheres to the fashionable tendency to avoid the straightforward identification of global trends with expansion of Western cultural patterns. He solves the issue in the simplest possible way in that he does not address it at all and escapes the usage of the term 'Westernization'. Thus, even though Genov does assume that cultural globalization has value content and even makes an effort to investigate it in more detail, he rejects recognizing the results to which his line of argumentation brings him.

The conclusion made in respect to Genov's conception holds perfectly true for other conceptions of the relationship between globalization and nationalism which assume that globalization *does* have value content. However, once accepting this premise, it is difficult to come to a theoretical conclusion different from the conclusion that globalization would promote Western ideas, life-styles and values. And the practice seems to be supportive of such expectation. So far, one does not come across any strong factual evidence demonstrating that globalization reinforces other then Western values. One can wonder if this is a probable scenario for future; however, it is hardly true for the present moment. If it were true, it would be much easier for the proponents of values-encompassing globalization to explain manifestations of nationalism that are observed both in the centers and in the peripheries of the world power system. However, since it is not the case so far, advocates of this viewpoint fail to explain convincingly the coexistence of the manifestations of globalization and nationalism.

**Conclusion**

It is difficult to disagree with the popular diagnosis expressed directly by Johann P. Arnason, who states that 'the relationship of nations and nationalism to the global background is thus a complex, ambiguous and changing one' (Arnason 1990, p.226). Still, a great many scholars try to interpret it in one or another way. Quite often they confine themselves to the discussions of the process while neglecting or paying only passing attention to the problem of the content of globalization. My feeling is that raising the question specifically about the genuine content of cultural globalization is vital when trying to comprehend the relationship between globalization and nationalism and that it makes the analysis more structured. Still, after reviewing a number of theories we have to conclude that such efforts are rare if not absent. In the great variety of attempts to interpret relationship between globalization and nationalism two main lines of reasoning were distinguished, one of which is based on the conception of globalization as values-indifferent and the second, as values-encompassing. However, neither of them provides a satisfactory solution for the problem since they are inconsistent and evoke internal contradictions. It seems that the issue

is solved only in the case when globalization and nationalism are claimed to be two independent phenomena, which again hardly is a satisfactory solution.

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# Ukrainian National Identity in the Context of the Processes of Globalization

*Yaroslav Pasko*

This paper is devoted to the issue of the Ukraine's national identity, one of the most important projections of national character. National identity is understood here as forms and processes within the framework of which the individual's self-identification with certain national (ethnic) community takes place. It is evident that any society cannot exist without the mechanism of identification, i.e., the means of interrelatedness between human being and society. One of the most significant parameters of identification is national identity. Owing to national identification, the nation's self-determination in cultural-historical dimension (social, economic, outlook, geopolitical, juridical, etc.) is achieved. According to A. Smith, national identity includes the following five elements: 1) historical territory; 2) common myths and historical memory; 3) common mass and civil culture; 4) common juridical rights and duties of citizens; 5) common economy with opportunities to move within the national territory [1]. National identity is a broader phenomenon than an act of self-consciousness. The former implies the individual's identification with national community. National identity is an ontological phenomenon. In the wide sense, it encompasses all the forms of ethnos' self-expression, its ability to realize national and civil ideals.

All the above parameters can be applied to the Ukrainian realities. The problem of historical territory is intrinsically connected with the history of the Ukrainian nation. We should bear in mind that the main part of Ukraine was incorporated into the Russian Empire where since the beginning of the XIX century there were the following main principles: autocracy, orthodoxy and nationality, where society was dominated by the state, and initiated the priority of Russian culture over the colonial peoples, the Ukraine one among them.

From the XVIII to the XIX centuries the Ukrainian society was seriously destructed both in national and civil bases. The Ukrainian legal traditions of the Lithuanian statutes, the Kiev-Mohyla Academy's educational traditions, and the national traditions of the Ukrainian Cossack and gentry were gradually abolished. Up to the middle of the XVIII century Ukrainian society was more democratic than the Russian one. The Lithuanian statutes separated slavery status from free person status, defending a free man from slavery. Legislatively, Ukraine markedly differed from Russia with the latter's traditionally unlimited despotism, illegality of ordinary peasants and nobility. At the same time, according to the Lithuanian statuses, the Ukrainian society possessed personal rights. And not until the last decade of the XVIII century did the reforms of Catherine II modify the Ukraine's 'autonomy status' in Russia, and minimize Ukrainian originality.

Since the end of the XVIII century the Ukrainian distinctive culture was in an ambiguous state: on one hand, the Ukrainian forces took part in forming of Imperial Russian culture, making and developing an all-Russian literature, culture and science, entering into all-European cultural space and partially influencing the development of the Ukrainian society. On the other hand, one can see that the Ukrainian national culture had become less refined and more popular. Unfortunately the Ukrainian culture could not become a high culture – partially it was the Ukrainian society's fault, because of loss of national identity; and partially the Russian Empire's fault, because of its laws that had narrowed the Ukrainian culture. The best proof of this was the Emsk decree of Alexander II. There were such kinds of negative tendencies on Ukrainian culture

throughout the XIX century. Negative processes led to the destruction of Ukrainian society. The Middle Age's and Modernity's traditions were both lost.

At the end of the sixteenth century almost all of the Western countries (except for Germany) liberated peasants from serfdom. Peasants were liberated with or without land, absolutely or conditionally legal, quite patriarchal, but nonetheless this emancipation had taken place. What is more, Western history since the tenth century shows a gradual emancipation of local peasants. Some relic of serfdom remained until the French Revolution of 1848, and even up to the twentieth century in some out-of-the-way places, but in the main features of his social existence, a peasant was already emancipated.

Here in Ukraine the direct opposite process took place. Actually, the world which we now call "Ukraine" did not know serfdom until the sixteenth century. This world knew of an institution of free, or half-dependent peasantry, but not serfdom. Serfdom appeared in Galicia, with its annexation to Poland. At the end of sixteenth century serfdom was established in the entire Ukraine. Which was, at that time, an integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian state. The Polish-Lithuanian code of law of 1596 was the first terrible sign of the enslavement of the Ukrainian people [2].

The Ukrainian elite assisted in this enslavement. In the seventeenth century a rebellion began in which all of the democratic segments of the Ukrainian people fought against this enslavement. This period of Ukrainian history is called the epoch of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky, or the "Ruin." The Cossacks were the shock military force of the Ukrainian masses at that period. As a result of this rebellion, serfdom disappeared in the western part of Ukraine. During the seventeenth century serfdom attempted to return in some absorbed forms, but for the most part the western part of Ukraine at that time was without serfdom. In 1783 this land was enslaved again, only this time not by the Polish-Lithuanian state, but by Russian Empire.

In the beginning it did not look like enslavement. The administrative tools that allow for the enslaving of a nation in a short chronological period did not exist at that time. This process was extended until the 1840s. The epoch of the second enslavement of the Ukrainian people lasted from 1783 to1861.

Let us recall what happened with the Ukrainian peasants in the twentieth century. We have a lot of both historic materials and patriotic rhetoric about the collectivization. Finally, we must frankly say that in the Soviet Ukraine, between the years 1929-1933, there was a third enslavement of the Ukrainian people. I can prove it by some special means of historiography. It was incredibly reactionary, tragic, even 'obscurant', returning to archaic forms of dependence of one person on another.

The third enslavement of the Ukrainian people brings us back to the chronology of the previous ones. We also should not forget that in the eastern side of the Ukraine serfdom remained in one form or another from the sixteenth century to 1861. That is to say, serfdom has always existed where *haydamaks* did not fight Polish lords. The third enslavement was over in 1934 and it is still relevant for us today. This is a strategic characteristic of our present social and historical existence. We have peasantry, which is enslaved by administrative, economic, and technological means. As a matter of fact, the forms of this new enslavement are not different from the forms of the enslavement of the previous centuries [3].

We remain enslaved even now. Talking honestly, all our problems come down to this basic fact of our national history. What has actually happened to the Ukrainian elite? There was a very strong aristocratic elite in the Ukraine in the sixteenth century. At the end of the sixteenth century there was feudalism in the Ukraine, represented by nobility and aristocracy, but at the end of the

sixteenth century a catastrophe occurred. This catastrophe was that Ukrainian national aristocracy had been absolutely incorporated into the Polish and Lithuanian nobility. It remained there until the beginning of the twentieth century, right up to the time when an outstanding Ukrainian historian and politician Vyacheslav Lipinsky suddenly remembered and began to say that he was Ukrainian. But it was too late. That is, we see a period of a giant collaboration of the Ukrainian elite.

After that, since the beginning of the Khmelnitchina in 1648, almost all the old elite was annihilated and its place taken by a new generation. Primarily all the energy of this new elite was directed to an adaptation to the empires which they were under the control of (whether the Polish-Lithuanian, the Turkish, or the Russian empire). On one hand, this elite wanted to reserve all its basic privileges, and on the other hand it magnificently integrated itself into foreign structures.

Such an elite during the nineteenth century was unable to have any positive influence on our national culture. When the Ukrainian *raznochinetzes* in the nineteenth century began to create national culture, the elite stood aside from it. There actually were some representatives of the elite in the Ukrainian national culture, but not many of them. The Ukrainian culture of the nineteenth century was created by the *raznochinetzes* Kotlyarevsky, Kulish, and the peasant Shevchenko, but not by the Ukrainian elite at that time. Finally, Hetman Skoropadsky put an end to this situation in 1918.

Nothing has change in the twentieth century. With great social events came the complete enslavement of the Ukrainian peasants from 1928-1929 to 1933-1934. Administrative forms of this enslavement could not even be imagined by the previous regimes because it was already the era of technology.

There is a lot of rhetoric about how the Bolsheviks oppressed the Ukraine. Let us think of the concrete morphology of this oppression. Old imperial Russia was physically unable to solve the problem of nationalities. The Bolsheviks with their "internationalism" which actually turned to the policy of an empire, also were able to solve it, but they played an ingenious trick, and no sociologist paid attention to it. From 1918-1919 the Bolsheviks began to create not merely a nation, but purely ethnic elites throughout the entire territory of the empire which became their "property." Extraordinary mobile groups of these elites were created. These groups became the main instrument of the Bolshevist "Centre."

The creation of these groups was a very interesting and dramatic thing. Ethnic Russia from 1919 was indoctrinated in such a direction that one could have been executed for words like "patriot" or "motherland", yet at the same time the whole space of national-communism existed around*ethnic* Russia. There has been a lot of talk about the 1920's – whether it was a provocation or, as one Russian historian says, "a kind of misunderstanding". In fact, it was a policy of the highest class, a policy of bringing up ethnic elites. This policy was conducted step by step and in different ways. Originally it was oriented to idealists and fanatics, like Mikola Khvilevi or Mikola Kulish. We later see Skripnik, then Vladimir Zatonsky, and finally – then finally the obedient biological 'masses', which fulfilled all the orders of the "Centre," combining it with its own ethnic character. By the middle of this century we see an incredibly archaic state, which is expressed both in the third enslavement and in the power of the ethnic elite. Here we may find some parallels in history, but they are difficult and too exotic.

One may recall the Ukrainian history of the middle of our century. Two elements met here – enslaved peasants on the one hand, and a steward, manager, landowner or a Cossack captain on the other hand. Even today if one looks at sessions of our Parliament on TV we see that nothing has changed. We see the two main characters of Ukrainian history arguing in the present context.

There were practically no changes during the independence period in Ukraine in the 1990s. Unfortunately, contemporary Ukraine is a 'clientalist' state. Interrelations in such a type of state are not strong and durable. An example of a clientalist state is the *Cosa Nostra*. A clientalist society is a society of the past which strictly conserves the past, both in the public and private spheres.

In soviet times the public sphere and civil society (magazines, newspapers, independent associations, etc.) were reduced to the minimum. Intercommunication between state and society was altered into state's dictates. Public horizontal ties were dismantled. Only at the beginning of the 1990s did there appear a hope for the revival of real nationalism and the reanimation of the European idea of civil society. But this hope was not realized. On the whole, the level of the civil society's development and its influence on the state were minimal. On the one hand, it is probably necessary to change the ineffective structure of state power. On the other, it is necessary to revive the economic, political, legal, moral traditions of civil society, and the traditions of a law-abiding state. The middle-class traditions should be supported. The welfare of society should be increased. The level of rights and freedoms of citizens should be elevated.

The second element of national identity – common myths and historical memory of Ukrainians – is concerned with an important issue of the Ukrainian person's self-definition. It was strongly influenced by archetypes of the collective unconscious as a major factor of Ukrainian mentality. The most significant archetypes of the Ukrainian collective unconscious are the cult of Mother-Land, the statelessness, and the dominance of the archaic, – irrational bases all of which are reflected in historical epos and folklore. Archetypes dramatically influenced the tradition of Ukrainian statelessness, the weakness of civil society, and the prevalence of subjective factors in the XIX century (the tragedy of the Ukrainian people in the 1920-30s).

The third element of national identity is the common people's culture. A major feature of this culture is its everyday character, which much affects the development of society. The Ukrainians' character substantially differs from the European one. Here the type of the self-made man, the model of the profane, active man has not been shaped. Instead, the type of the passive executor of alien will, dependent, subordinated to the common entity, has been formed.

The 'national identity' problem has become rather topical at the end of the twentieth century. The Cold War period's termination, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the appearance of new states of Central Europe have actualized the meaning of a contemporary properly *national* factor in modern social philosophy:

The transformational model of the Ukraine into an independent state is not classical. To understand the whole complexity of the historical process of the Ukraine, one should come back to past socio-cultural tradition. The Ukrainian nation's origin has been progressing simultaneously with a civil society's origin. The creation process of the Ukrainian national identity was rather complex and dramatic. Because of some reasons the Ukrainian national formation had not been finished either in the XIX or in the XX century. Even after a decade of independence the Ukrainian national identity has not been formed to a full extent and the majority of Ukrainian society remains alienated from power. This is natural since there were not formed the institutes of civil society and the law-abiding state; equal juridical rights and duties for all the members of society were not ensured. Under such circumstances the realization of the idea of 'nation' was impossible. This historic task remains topical nowadays. There are some factors that influence the contemporary Ukrainian national identity and Ukrainian national ideal. First of all, the unfinished urbanization of urban population and, in most cases, pre-national self-consciousness of the rural population. They make complex enough already the formation of Ukrainian national identity on the basis of united

language and culture. The second factor, the weakened civil society and dysfunctional, formless, non-structured state, also significantly complicates the formation of Ukrainian national identity on the basis of general civic idea [4].

The given problems are paralleled by the all-European problems of globalization, namely, cultural globalization and authenticity of the local Ukrainian tradition, the appearance of completely new ways of mass media, the formation of new sub-cultures of both national and non-national nature. The above-mentioned factors influence the nature of the modern Ukrainian society to a greater or lesser degree.

The development of the Ukrainian national identity and Ukrainian national self-consciousness is not, probably, the problem of just one century and depends upon various social factors that can be determined by the necessity of the development of a strong civil society in Ukraine. For the time being Ukraine does resolve these tasks. Unfortunately, Ukraine still remains a pre-modern state with strong totalitarian tendencies. This can be proved, first of all, by its feudal clientalist economy, the non-separation of property and power, the lack of a law-abiding state, the absence of a real distribution of powers, as well as by the traditional and ethnic identity of the majority of Ukrainian citizens [5].

The last element of national identity pointed out by A. Smith as a determining factor of national character is the development of national economy. In this context the most important thing is not so much the economy itself but rather the productive economic rational activity that can advance the modernization and integration of the Ukraine during today's 'globalization'. Unfortunately, this problem is far from being resolved due to the weaknesses of religious roots and the traditions and ethos of entrepreneurship. The Ukrainian 'businessman' does not resemble Weber's ideal type and Ukrainian society is far from democratic. Both tendencies are determined by historical heritage.

The weakness of lawful, juridical traditions in the Ukraine is the next factor negatively influencing Ukrainian society. Apparently European and Ukrainian national and legal traditions substantially differ. In the European tradition there is interdependence of civil society and the law-abiding state. The State establishes the legislative basis for civil society. At the same time, civil society existing within a legal framework influences the development of a properly lawful state development by adopting the latter to the interests of the strongest components of society. The Ukraine is in the opposite situation: the state still does not support the development of the civil society, and restricts its possibilities; whereas the civil society is not able to clearly formulate and accumulate its own interests.

In this framework, the lack of civic traditions and the 'uncivilized' model of interrelationships between society and power negatively influence the national language and culture of Ukraine. The inexperienced Ukrainian society is under the influence of the mass culture. The Ukrainian society cannot find it positive to orient towards the national culture but perceives 'mass culture' as real and necessary during this period. The same tendencies can be traced in the attitude towards the 'high' civil values. Such values as freedom, democracy, civil society, and the law-abiding state were not deeply rooted in the Ukrainian national tradition and are devalued in contemporary Ukrainian life. At the same time Ukrainian society conceives of the values skeptically and superficially because of the complicated history of Ukraine and due to the influence of the Russian historical tradition.

At the same time, the 1990s allow us to understand the fact that the Ukrainian national identity and its development are impossible without the forming of a European identity and an idea of

united Europe. This idea of a 'united Europe' is able to protect the historical identity of each nation, its history and tradition and simultaneously create a united European self-consciousness. The Ukraine is a part of Christian, united, European civilization and should be incorporated into European space and territory. But there are some complicated problems to be solved: especially important are the revival of the values of a civil society, the purification of power, and the confirmation of goodness and beauty.

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# How Globalization Affects Justice in Poland

*Jarema Jakubowski*

*Introduction*

Justice is a principal value of Western civilization. The quest for the principles which define justice started at the very beginning of philosophical thought and has been continuing during the many centuries of its history. Even if we assume that there exists an eternal and immutable idea of justice, its particular content and definition will always depend on the historical situation and the internal rationality of an epoch.

The concept of justice may be considered from at least two points of view: that of the human agents and that of the principles on which the social system and the economic system are based. The justice of the human agents is an individual virtue manifest in the individuals' actions, which in itself controls relations among humans; therefore, it is largely of a moral nature. Conversely, the justice of the system (or of institutions), beside having a moral purpose, is also expected to ensure a stable society, efficient economy and the protection of the citizens. The justice of institutions determines the policies of the exchange of goods and services, of the distribution of wealth and of the punishment of criminals.

Radical transformations of the social, economic and cultural system include transformations of the concept of justice. This is particularly visible in the case of the collapse of the communist system and the transition to a capitalist and liberal system. These two systems are diametrically opposed, constitute mutual negative reference points, and their essential principles cannot be reduced to a common denominator. A social change cannot be effected overnight, as a social system is more difficult to change than a person's clothes (although one may also grow fond of one's clothes). Society is a complex whole made up of the people's mentalities, patterns of behavior in social roles, and a set of common values, including the concepts of the good and just. Only in a symbolic sense can one specify the exact date of the renouncement of communism, while in fact this process lasts many years, nay, generations.

During a period of fifteen or twenty years Poland will have gone through three stages of the evolution of its social and economic system: the communist, the post-communist and the global. The year 2004, or the date of the country's accession to the European Union, may be considered the symbolic date of Poland's transition to the global stage. Let us note that since the process of globalization is complex and lengthy, the date is merely a symbolic one.

When discussing a global age, one must take several aspects into account. In the present paper, I wish to focus on one of its facets only, i.e., on the evolution of the concept of distributive justice in the system "Poland – Europe – the global world." The policies of the distribution of wealth in a society are not merely temporary or 'emergency' legal regulations that may be altered in accordance with the circumstances or requirements; on the contrary, they are fairly long-lasting social values and norms.

It is my fundamental assumption that the processes of globalization are tantamount to the collapse of the welfare state and a transition to the economy of 'free-competition capitalism' on a global scale. This, in turn, means that systems in which the distribution of wealth was largely independent on the individuals' market success or otherwise, are relinquished, and the principles

of the justice of achievement are adopted, where distribution is contingent on the individuals' efficiency, effort, creativity and actual accomplishments.

This principle of the justice of achievement is now being confronted with the reality of Polish social activity. This is because both in the communist and in the post-communist Poland an individual's prosperity was independent of the same individual's actual accomplishments. This has resulted in the emergence of the post-communist system, neither *Real-sozialismus* nor western-style capitalism, but a hybrid which is hardly viable.

Poland's accession to the European Union and opening to the processes of globalization is not a threat, but a chance for establishing a stable system compatible with the best standards of the Western civilization. Such a chance must not be missed, as it may never occur again.

*Justice Correlated to Achievement*

During the last couple of centuries, the social, economic and political evolution of the Western states was strictly contingent on the existence of the nation states, which had precisely defined territories with fixed external borders. Such states were usually fairly homogenous in terms of the ethnic composition of their populations, and politically independent. A component of the processes of modernization was a gradual political and social democratization. The democratic procedures enabled large social groups in West European countries to gain numerous rights and privileges, which process culminated in the emergence of the welfare state.

The global stage of modernization entails the collapse of this model of society, as the essential conditions for the emergence and existence of the welfare state are becoming irrelevant. The concept of the nation state hinged on the broad idea of national solidarity, which in the economic sense amounted to the successful people's willingness to share their wealth with those members of the community who did not manage to accomplish much in the free market. This type of solidarity was additionally reinforced by weak international competition due to the policy of economic protectionism. During many decades, the Western states recorded a continual and marked economic growth, which made it possible to satisfy the constantly growing and multiplying needs, and produced the wealth that could be distributed.

Furthermore, the nation state was strong enough to enforce a redistribution of wealth among people regardless of their individual achievement in the free market. The enforcement took the form of the purely democratic process of political decisions made by groups interested in a certain policy of the distribution of wealth.

All of these prerequisites to the existence of the welfare state are disappearing or being considerably undermined in the present global age. Globalization shifts importance from the old nation states to supra-national political and institutional organizations, and above all, to economic systems and institutions. The previous structures of the nation states will be only partly reconstructed on the supra-national level.

Globalization is also the end of a uniform community protected by the border and by the state's administration. Societies which have been closed until now are being exposed to external competition; the privileges of the members of national communities are being abolished, and individual qualities which allow certain persons to compete successfully with others, are acquiring primary importance. National solidarity and identity are being gradually diluted. The division of labor relates individuals to geographically and ethnically alien persons rather than to their own neighbors and fellow nationals.

In addition, the nation state sheltered in its territorial borders seems to have exhausted its potential of growth and development. Empirical proof of this postulate is the aggravating economic depression in Germany and other countries that used to be economic giants. Globalization entails also a gradual weakening of the government administration and of the importance of democracy as the rule of the people. This, in turn, limits the redistribution of wealth which is independent of the market achievements of the individuals. The European Union is also facing the task of an extremely far-reaching transformation of its system by means of relinquishing the idea of the welfare state and adopting a system of a global free market.

The processes of modernization and globalization consist in the emergence of autonomous persons and in individualization. The relations among people are to an increasing degree based on the division of labor rather than on common norms and consciousness. The bonds of community are losing their quality of a moral obligation which urges people to share the fruit of their success with other members of the community. The prestige of individual accomplishment and success is growing, and the market and economy provide the arena of success.[1]

All of those factors and circumstances warrant the postulate that in the global age, the concept of justice will refer to the accomplishments which individuals make in their own interest rather than to achievements which are conducive to the prosperity of a community or a state. We are going to call the former type of justice "the primary justice of achievement." The entrance of Poland into the global area will constitute a confrontation with an entirely alien system, since neither the communist concept of justice nor the principles of post-communist justice take the actual accomplishments of individuals into account.

*Communist Justice*

The principles of communist justice contradict the budding global principles in at least two ways. Firstly, the practice of communism was based on a policy of the secondary justice of achievement, i.e., individuals were rewarded for their efficiency and effort only insofar as they served the good of the whole, or the good of the communist state, and contributed to the promotion of the cause of communism. Privileges were granted not only to the activists of the party and the secret political police, but also to the professional groups which enabled the economy of the *Real-sozialismus* to operate: thus, e.g., in Poland there were special stores for miners, where attractive consumer goods were always on sale.

At the same time, the ideal that was pursued, was a maximum redistribution and equality of wealth. Thus, the individuals' material prosperity was largely independent of their jobs, abilities, initiative, etc. Social prestige had been separated from the individuals' accomplishments and economic success, and attached to their arbitrarily ascribed status.

Secondly, the communist justice harshly condemned capitalism and the primary justice of achievement. The attitude of Karl Marx himself to the justice of capitalism is a complex issue, as his concept of justice was a narrow one, his response to the legal policy of a given epoch. In this

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[1] See R. Münch, *Otwarte przestrzenie: integracja spoleczna w ramach panstwa narodowego i ponad jego poziomem*, in T. Buksinski (ed.), *Postkomunistyczne transformacje*, Poznan 2002, *passim* (R. Münch, *Open spaces. Social integration within and beyond the Nation State*, in T. Buksinski (ed.), *Postcommunist Transformations*, Poznañ 2002).

sense, capitalism was 'just' according to its own internal rationality. Slavery would be unjust in capitalism, though, because it did not comply with the logic of the system.[2]

Marx's main reason for condemning capitalism was that it offered opportunities for exploitation and alienation. A direct consequence of Marx's doctrine was the postulate of the liquidation of the market economy and of civil society. In the Communists' view, the market economy and civil society were merely an arena for the promotion of particularist interests, egoism and the accumulation of riches by individuals. Accordingly, capitalist economy was destructive for society as a whole. It had to be abolished in order for individuals to work not for themselves, but for the direct good of the state and the achievement of the future goal, which was communist society. Individual accomplishments and a preoccupation with personal prosperity were scorned and condemned.[3]

Most members of the society rejected the communist system as a condition imposed by a foreign power, an anti-democratic dictatorship, a source of economic poverty, and a factor contrary to the national tradition and the aspirations to independence. Still, during the almost fifty years of the *Real-sozialismus* the essential left-wing values, standards of thought, patterns of roles, expected social behavior and a particular type of attitude and mentality became institutionalized. The period of communism has left a lasting imprint on the Polish society and done irrevocable damage. The reformers who started to implement the market economy in 1989, were facing a society for whom private property amounted to theft, the idea of private trade was disgusting, and the exemplary citizen was an average person honestly working in a National enterprise. Private property was perceived as an instrument for satisfying the greed of individuals rather than of the good of the state.

At the moment of the collapse of communism, society started to expect, quite irrationally, that prosperity similar to that in the Western nations would ensue and simultaneously all the privileges of the Real-sozialismus would be preserved; that virtually everybody would be wealthy without having to strive for the wealth. The élites of capitalism and modernization were confronted with enormous social groups who harbored egalitarian views and most of all wanted a continuation of the system of social security and of communist privileges.

*Post-Communist Justice*

The history of the Polish transformations and reforms which followed the collapse of communism, is a complex and unclear issue. Very few observers of the present condition in the country remember that the anti-communist opposition before 1989 had only a negative program, limited to overthrowing the régime, and altogether failed to formulate a positive program of reforms, and particularly of economic transformations. After 1989, no clear and comprehensible system emerged in Poland, and instead a social and economic hybrid hatched. The reality basically fell short of the expectations and the normative standards.

The principles of the distribution of wealth which have developed in practice, contradict all the possible models of market economy. A brilliant success in post-communist Poland has nothing in common with individual achievement measured with the outlay of work, ability, creativity or

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[2] See A. W. Wood, *The Marxian Critique of Justice*, in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 1 (3), 1972 and A. W. Wood, *Marx on Right and Justice*, in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 8 (3), 1979.

[3] See T. Buksinski, *Spoleczenstwo obywatelskie a spoleczenstwo rynkowe*, in T. Buksinski (ed.), *Filozofia w dobie przemian*, Poznan 1994, pp. 275-276 (T. Buksinski, *Civil Society and Market Society*, in T. Buksinski (ed.), *Philosophy in the Period of Transformation*).

resourcefulness. Even at the most general cultural level, we observe no uniform set of social values, or no concept of a desirable type of society. On the contrary, we notice several contradictory sets of social values, from the concepts of the national, ethnic and religious community to a set of individualistic and universalistic values; from a justice which rewards the contribution to the prosperity of the community and disinterested altruist action, to the justice of individual achievement. The latter is the normative standard of the élites of modernization and globalization.

At the level of the social system, we can see a destruction of the patterns of social roles. Most patterns, and particularly that of the entrepreneur, are disintegrating. There are no durable and stable expectations of how an entrepreneur should act in the market: it is difficult to establish whether contractors will discharge their obligations or not, whether they will act honestly or deceive. This, in turn, makes it impossible to plan economic activity in the long run.

At the psychological level, only one requirement of the capitalist system is fulfilled: profit is desirable. And yet, as Max Weber very convincingly explains, the mere psychological desirability of profit does not suffice to produce a modern capitalism, which may emerge only if human agents have such virtues as reliability, frugality, honesty and patience.

A social system must incorporate durable standards of social roles, defined by credible and unchanging expectations; a failure to meet such expectations must result in moral and legal penalties. Frauds, corruption and breaches of contracts, even if they are the common practice, may not become the norm. Finally, a common system of general values must be in place, including a concept of social (community-based or individualistic) relations and the principles of a just distribution of wealth.

At the initial stages of the transformations of the system in Poland, deliberate attempts were made at accelerating the emergence of capitalism. It was acceptable to accumulate riches quickly by means of large-scale smuggling, tax fraud, failure to repay enormous credits or taking over National enterprises. The icon of the businesspeople who "steal their first million" was almost officially promoted. Communists were not prosecuted in any way. It was expected that these measures would produce a middle class overnight. At the same time, such prerequisites to modern capitalism as durable market institutions or a good law were not provided. Even if there are codes of the law, they apply only to common citizens, while large-scale economic criminals are exempt from legal liability and responsibility, and if they are members of the parliament, they even enjoy parliamentary immunity.[4]

In present Poland, large-scale economic and social success is not a matter of actual achievement. Rather, success may be accomplished by means of:

- good relations with the administration;
- suborning civil servants;
- relations with the former Communist élite;
- relations with former members of the communist political police;
- personal depravity and ruthlessness.

Instead of the common good, political activity serves the control of the most profitable branches of the economy, which are at the interface of the National economy and private business.

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[4] Cf J. Jakubowski, *Racjonalnosc a normatywnosc dzialan. A. Schutz a T. Parsons*, Poznan 1997, pp. 188-200 (J. Jakubowski, *Rationality and Normativeness of Actions. A. Schutz and T. Parsons*).

Legislation passes laws which are advantageous for oligarchal groups or for the strongest individuals.[5]

Paradoxically, Poland has also inherited from communism a complex system of social security and an enormous heavy industry. Large part of Poland's National budget is allocated for the payment of various benefits, and billions of dollars are allotted to insolvent mines and steel mills which nobody dares liquidate.

The élites of capitalism and modernization must operate in these conditions. We are witnessing a juxtaposition of large social groups adhering to anti-capitalist values and mentalities with the post-communist reality of a mafia capitalism where the most successful winners are former Communists, or the most depraved rather than the most enterprising persons.

*The Imminent New Forms of Democracy*

The accession of Poland to the European Union seems to be a breakthrough in the nation's ascension to the level of global interaction. Modern capitalism (or "post-capitalism") cannot function without a clear and solid institutional and legal sphere. The accession to the European Union will offer to Poland an opportunity for producing such a sphere. Let us hope that relentless pressure exerted on Poland by the European Union will force our country to take this step. The alternative is the expansion of the post-communist system onto other countries, which would create a deadly danger to all of our cultural areas.

As we have said, the social and economic transformation is a lengthy and multi-leveled process, which certainly will not conclude with the mere placement of new machines in old factory buildings. The global (post-industrial or post-capitalist) age will be a time of individualism and the justice of achievement. The new age and its new principles will require new forms of democracy. The focus of the concept of democracy will shift from the area of political decisions to the level of judiciary democracy, or from the dictatorship of the strongest groups to the protection of the individual's rights. The law and its courts will protect free competition, and ensure free access to the market and exchange of goods.

The global society is an information society, in which traditional manual labor loses its importance, and innovation, creativity, knowledge, science and new technology are of primary significance. In order to ensure equality in such a society, the educational democracy, or general access to information, science and knowledge, will have to be established. The emergence of an information society entails the abandonment and liquidation of large branches of the economy inherited from the previous century: the heavy industry, mining and agriculture. The time of this type of economy has ended, along with the time of independent nation states.

One can validly claim that post-communist Poland is a state where the system resorts to violence, i.e., where the administration thwarts the opportunities for expansion and development. Budget reserves and the revenue generated by privatization are allocated for the agriculture and the sustaining of the National heavy industry. Attempts at reforming the educational system and making it compliant with the new times, are sabotaged. The funds allocated for science and research-and-development studies are ten times less than in the West. Poland may soon fall victim to "information-technology exclusion," if it fails to bring its information systems up to the standards of the developed countries. As it is, even the Internet cannot be freely accessed, as a monopoly on telecommunications continues.

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[5] See T. Buksinski, *Modernosc*, Poznan 2001, part 1 (T. Buksinski, *Modernity*).

The present Polish democracy has adopted the formal procedures of political democracy. Still, the Poland of the global age must also develop new forms of democracy at the legal and educational level. It is very unlikely that the country will spontaneously initiate such transformations; on the contrary, the reforms will most probably be imposed by the processes of globalization.

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## Chapter XVII
# Between the Heritage of Solidarity and *Homo Sovieticus*

*Makary Krzysztof Stasiak*

Poland has had to face yet another serious crisis; we are undergoing an economic crash. However, it is not nearly as severe as the crisis resulting from the lack of a notion of how to act further, – the lack of an idea around which we could organize our social, economical and political life. One notices rapid processes of degradation in Poland: the pauperization of the major part of our society and the attendant degradation of the country. Rather than stimulate the development of the country, organize its life and support the life of individual citizens, the institutions of the state act against them. This is exemplified in the raising of taxes and numerous other payments, excessive growth of the state apparatus, an increasingly repressive attitude on the part of state institutions instead of support towards the citizen, and finally the disintegration and disappearance of social ties. More and more often we face corruption elevated to the status of a 'reasonable' and acting policy of numerous representatives of social and state organizations. The sphere of economy is growing weaker and constant impoverishment of the society is observed. A parallel degradation of social and political organizations is also noticeable.

There is a certain hope within the society that upon entering the European Union the saving influence of other countries will divert the aforementioned negative tendencies in Poland. Nonetheless, it is easy to predict that this hope is unrealistic. The EU community does not have the right or the power, apart from opinion-giving, to alter the internal social relations or state structures.

Bearing in mind the above status quo and concerned with our country's future, the Founder Members of the EU have offered to hold a debate in the form of several meetings. These are supposed to enable a diagnosis of the present situation and the proposal of solutions, which could become the vehicle for changing the self-destructive tendencies into a more positive and development-oriented thinking.

We propose that the starting point of the discussion be a reflection on man. It seems significant that the space of our national experience comprises on the one hand the Heritage of Solidarity, and on the other the heritage of 'homo sovieticus'. Over the last few decades, Poles have experienced the influence of oppressive systems, totalitarian and authoritarian, imposed from outside. They promoted and coerced the 'homo sovieticus' attitude: that of a passive man, devoid of initiative and responsibility, wholly dependent on the authorities. The initiative of 'homo sovieticus' was restricted to ensuring the existence of his own and that of his closest family; remaining "on the surface" required much effort. The life of exiles in labour camps was more than most ordinary people could endure; that difficult existence strengthened the attitude of egoistic survival, inasmuch as only the most basic needs could be satisfied, and that barely. What is more, people who were forced to live in these inhuman conditions (e.g., for many years in the Soviet Union), lost their hope altogether and perished without a word of protest. The situation was somewhat better in Poland, as we managed to win a higher level of freedom, and consequently a higher level of well-being. Riots and fully voiced public outrage expressed after Stalin's death brought about the first signs of the approaching loosening and broadening of freedom. Social resistance grew in strength and expressed itself in subsequent liberation-oriented activities in 1968, 1970 and 1976. 1980 saw the birth of Solidarity. It appears to have brought a new way of viewing oneself, a new

attitude. Man gained the awareness of his subjectivity; he stopped treating himself as an inert object, entirely at the mercy of nature or the authorities. We contend that the awakening of the Solidarity man consisted in treating himself as a subject, equipped with means to decide his own fate, also in the area where the state or its institutions operated and prioritized values.

A new man awoke in the Solidarity movement; a man who transcended fear and gave himself the right to manage his own fate; a new, liberated person, willing to pay for his freedom even with his own life. Such is our evaluation of the past. From it, we intend to derive certain conclusions, which will later serve in an evaluation of the present. The conclusions are as follows:

1. We would like to see the Solidarity movement not as a singular phenomenon, but as a new idea of understanding oneself, as a new notion of man. We intend to reconstruct what we believe to have been a new image of man. At the same time, we wish to leave aside the historical party divisions and distance ourselves from the ever present political hostilities. We see Solidarity as a more general notion, which needs redefining in order to extract from it the quality which then came into being. The recognized idea can later be used in multiple instances. The Solidarity movement turned out to be immensely effective; it was then that Poland regained its sovereignty and the political map of a considerable part of the world underwent significant changes. It must be stated that the Solidarity revolution, while marvelously rich in consequences, incurred almost no life losses. The political consequences on the other hand were as far-reaching as if they had happened as a result of a long fought war, encumbered with millions of lost lives. A typical hero of the Solidarity movement was someone who opposed the repressive, totalitarian state. This hero took his life in his own hands, reached for responsibility despite the violence he was subject to; he acted according to his values, even if it meant risking his life.

What soon became clear was that there were many such uncompromising people. They began helping and supporting each other, while the police machinery failed more and more often, becoming increasingly helpless. Human solidarity and responsibility turned out to be stronger. Soon the system of total violence – communism – practically came apart and was abolished.

2. The other pole, and at the same time the other source of evaluation of the present is the model of man shaped before the advent of Solidarity – the 'homo sovieticus'. This was someone who surrendered to state violence and saw the meaning of his life in the values and goals given him from outside. Such a person feels dependent on the state and similar sources of power; he perceives fulfilling obligations and orders as the correct way of realizing his life.

3. To 'homo sovieticus' the state appears all-powerful and sentient. Such people are the perfect subjects for cynical rulers; devoid of all scruples, those in power pad their nests of specific privileges; with full awareness, they organize situations in which they can hold the "more equal" status, and in which they can acquire goods, disregarding law and priority. These are criminal organizations, mobs, closely allied with the world of politics. These are also civil servants, who erect a screen of "acting for the good of citizens" around certain privileges, concessions or quality commissions, by means of which they are able to easily extort bribes, preferential treatment and dependence.

Under fascism and communism, people were subject to enormous "disinterested" violence and evil. After that time, the choice of good was no longer natural or inadvertent. There are still people who choose good naturally, but they are few and thus do not constitute a significant social potential. The majority of people are aware of the moral value of their actions, but it does not necessarily follow that they choose good; there is no longer the fear of punishment for evil deeds.

All deeds have become possible, and many cynically and intentionally choose actions that bring immediate individual benefit, disregarding moral losses and degrading the individual ability to feel responsible.

We estimate that contemporary social reality is located between the heritage of solidarity and the heritage of 'homo sovieticus'. The respective poles of this space are two types of people, who perceive themselves and the surrounding reality differently. The heir of solidarity is someone who has taken the responsibility for his fate and is fulfilling that responsibility with dignity and to the best of his abilities. He firmly believes that his life depends on his individual choices. The heir of solidarity undertakes virtuous deeds of his own will, struggling against hardships, even if those deeds incur losses for himself. However, the deeds performed by him lead to the improvement in the produced work and to their author's growth in subjectivity. The main principle for the heir of solidarity is the primacy of ethics over politics. Ethical behaviour which leads to improving his work and his development is more important to him than immediate benefit.

'Homo sovieticus' constitutes the other pole of the contemporary social space. He is cynical and concentrated on satisfying his individual needs; he surrenders, accepts every situation and treats it as if he had no choice in the matter. He makes cynical decisions which lead to promptly satisfying his individual needs at the simplest level, regardless of the moral consequences that his decisions have for himself and others. He is responsible neither for himself nor for anyone else; he is ready to forsake his children for comfort and to betray others for an immediate benefit. Moreover, he organizes various situations of privilege for himself, by means of which he can extract additional undeserved profit.

'Homo sovieticus' is on the one hand a reactionary, dependent on fate and the situation that surrounds him. On the other hand, he treats other people as objects or tools. He is not above organizing benefit for himself and extracting it from others in a cynical way, without compunction or vision concerning further consequences of his deeds. 'Homo sovieticus' treats both himself and others as objects, acting on the premise that influencing those around him is of no moral consequence. A person of this sort prioritizes instant benefit over long-term losses and puts politics before ethics. He focuses on the immediate effects, leaving aside the wherewithal of their gaining and the emergent consequences for himself and other people.

Both attitudes coexist in the contemporary Polish society. In the period immediately following the acquisition of sovereignty, the subjective attitude seemed to dominate; however, with the advance of time and numerous government changes, a rapid increase in the number of people representing the 'homo sovieticus' stance has been noted.

Józef Tischner writes:

The fall of communism means that the market stall ... collapsed. Another one is being erected in its place, with different assistants, different goods and different promises. However, does the collapse of the stall mean that the customers will be different? Do they not still expect what communism promised? One can easily imagine that although communism and communists are gone, the customers of communism remain, still asking for the same goods at another stall. And if one has imagined it at least once, how can he not ask: does the image of customers in front of a collapsed stall not somehow fit our reality? (Tischner, 1992, p. 175)

It seems that in recent years there are more and more "customers" searching for privileged positions. Simultaneously, what is missing is a reflection on values in social processes, i.e., a reflection allowing the perception of the described process. Nowadays it appears that all deeds are

somehow possible and that one does not bear responsibility for them. We are aware of the fact that a great deal of evil was inflicted over the last century and only a few of the culprits have been punished. Within the society it has become common knowledge that one can easily avoid punishment for misdeeds, and as a result few fear actual penalty. Despite a reconstruction of the system, people's attitudes have somehow withstood change. On the contrary, there are increasingly many practical supporters of the previous system, even though they may be wearing different colours on the outside. A reflection on the deeper consequences of man's behaviour and a broadening of the scope of the reflection is in order.

*A Proposed Solution of the Dilemma*

The space between the heritage of Solidarity and 'homo sovieticus' is positively marked. A man conscious of his subjectivity can effectively influence his behaviour, enhance it, improving also its moral quality. 'Homo sovieticus' is devoid of will, determined by his pursuits; he treats himself as an object at the mercy of the world's determinism; what is more, his needs discredit him. In the light of the above, it is apparent that expecting a subjective attitude from the elites is the way towards transcending the present social and economical crisis.

We suggest initiating a series of meetings dedicated to a discussion and development of the above-mentioned problems. In our estimation, this is the basic way to overcome the present economic and social crisis, an overcoming which is vital to us and our families.

**Reference**

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## Chapter XVIII
# Social Powers Countervailing the Globalization of the Economy and Cultural Media

*Wlodzimierz Kaczocha*


### The Axiological Base and Features of Globalization

The development of a global economy and a media of 'low culture' is grounded on two ideas which accept the individuals and groups of people creating worldwide phenomena and processes without a trace of criticism. The first one is the idea of freedom that dates back to the Enlightenment and gradually permeated the consciousness of people of "the Western civilization", as Samuel P. Huntington labels it. The heroes (founders) of globalization understand this idea of freedom in a common-sense way, lacking any philosophical interpretation, as the freedom of free actions in the world using all existing technical and technological means in order to achieve their individual or collective goals, – for example, wealth or power over other people (both kinds of goals are jointly accepted).

The advocates of this 'common sense' idea of freedom do not recognize any geographic or cultural boundaries for their actions. Moreover, they do not even take any ethical responsibility for the negative consequences of their actions. Such a freedom may also be called a particular one which I interpret as the state of thinking and acting oriented toward achieving wealth and power by choosing and using suitable technical means as well as the values of low and high cultures. The particular freedom assumes the maximization of production, distribution and consumption of goods (globalization of economy) and its followers are in permanent pursuit of multiplying the values of low media culture and its worldwide influence (globalization of media culture). And even if they spread ideological slogans about free market, cultural pluralism, etc., they always aim at expanding their power over others which means they act of set purpose to delimit these peoples' freedom of choice among these goods and values that they create and sell by themselves. Commercial advertisement is the means by which people are being forced to chose the consumption of certain goods and values. The same commercial advertisement, paradoxically, disguises the globalists' aspiration after taking control of other people by a variety of means which in reality delimit freedom of choice. Furthermore, it creates low culture and imposes it on the majority of people to an incomprehensible extent and at the same time it trivializes high culture, people's ways of life, their ambitions and goals. Sooner or later, as K.-R. Popper insisted, there must be legal decisions introduced to facilitate delimitation of particular freedom in media culture. For without such decisions, all the appeals made by the elite of high culture related to at least partial elimination of low culture's influence and control over television programs will fail. In the meantime, however, i.e., before some legal, and in my opinion necessary, regulations come into being, the fight against low media culture has been undertaken by a social countervailing power that seeks to stop people from falling into the state of media barbarity. I shall return to this point later on in my article.

The second idea holds that the free market gives the opportunity to bring forth the particular freedom – this idea is accredited by the authors of global economy without the slightest hesitation. George Soros writes that "abstract empire – world capitalism" has control over people's consciousness since it engendered the ideology of free market, among other things, which the

author calls "market fundamentalism" and its main norm posits that everything is for sale – material goods and cultural values, including religious values and services. Soros holds that global capitalism creates the wealth for the privileged but it never guarantees freedom, democracy, rules of law nor does it contribute to the development of cultural values. And that is why values and democracy must be protected against the free market by a state policy that acknowledges "social values" as its principle and must aspire after common welfare. Those who accept fundamentalist ideology create "transactional society" instead of democracy.[1] In such a society, we must add, all relations among people are estimated taxonomically as 'goods'. To put matters strongly, in transactional society also politicians may be bought by 'selling' democracy.

In relation to Soros' remarks on 'particular' freedom and his opinions about market fundamentalism we must say that this freedom is fully embodied in the material sense within the frameworks of the global free market. Let me illustrate the above-mentioned state of understanding and realization of the particular freedom by the co-authors of both global economy and media culture who – nota bene – ignore cultural values and do not accept any of the ethical responsibility for the consequences of their actions, by the following perfectly suitable example from Kapuscinski's *Heban* (Ebony) devoted to African people and cultures.

In the course of the eighties Philips had produced its special series of battery-fed television sets of which a great amount were sold throughout these regions of central Africa where people lacked electric power and had this great opportunity to watch the moving images of the so far unknown world for the first time in their lives. The author sadly describes how the down and out African people who conceived their way of life as a standard suddenly saw on television a remote, extremely rich and exotic life. Only then did they realize their material poverty, the austerity of life in a village, the 'ugliness' of old people that you don't have to respect any more and the uselessness of 'taboo' in the world of moving images. Therefore, by means of the banal television set and trivial images, the values of indigenous culture and centuries-old relations among people became unessential for them.

In the light of this particular event, the opinions of some thinkers – commentators on the globalization processes – we may conceive of as quite perfunctory. Anthony Giddens, for example, states that globalization enhances social relations in the world in general which is expressed by the fact that some local events are shaped by decisions and actions of people being "thousands miles away" and that even being local they themselves "reversibly" influence[2] the world. I myself cannot imagine how the people's way of thinking and the relations among them changed by media culture and the moving images about white peoples way of life can bring about any good effect on social relations in the African village world.

In this and the like examples I do not observe any reversible influence of the local societies on decisions and especially on changes in relations within the society creating the phenomena and processes of economic globalization and media culture. I will repeat my question, how the relations (to date patriarchal or matriarchal – or recently gradually modified into partner relations) between, for instance, children and their parents living in the African bush affected by the moving images may have their reciprocal effect on the social relations of the huge television environment. However, such a reversible influence of local events may occur but only in an individual case when the globalist (the manager of global economy or of media culture) meets "face to face" with

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[1] George Soros, *Kryzys Œwiatowego kapitalizmu, Wydawnictwo Naukowe* (PWN, Warsaw, 1999) [*The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered* (New York: Public Affairs, 1998)].

[2] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: CA: Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1990), p. 64.

either the negative or positive consequences which result from his global organization's interference in local society. Such a man needs to be disposed to at least a minimal moral receptiveness. For if he is a morally 'neutral' globalist working just to accomplish his corporation's material goals or, in other words, if he is "morally cold", then the destructive consequences of his corporation's performance, be it in the African bush, in Poland or wherever in the world, he will see just as a 'necessary' side-effect.

Jürgen Habermas is absolutely right when he writes that "administrational and economic systems tend to enclose within themselves before their environment and obey only their own imperatives: money and power (...)".[3] It is widely known that both material and media products of these systems influence the consciousness and behavior of the people living in local communities but their indigenous values and ways of life do not penetrate in turn into these very systems.

The particular freedom and the ideology of market fundamentalism – in their relation to the accepted aims of action – require from globalists the formation of a specific rationality useful for planning and realization of accepted aims. We are able to distinguish the following two versions of rationality formed within the background of education and necessary for the authors and servants of globalization:

1. A short-term rationality required while putting into effect the decisions of the global organizations' management bodies; this enables selection of relevant means and methods of actions in particular sections of production and distribution of goods and values; this version of rationality is useful for the middle level managers.

2. A long-term rationality is formed by the managers of global organizations within economy and media who lay out the purposes and strategies of the whole organization's performance as well as its respective departments within the head office and foreign branches; all elements of the organization must be functional in their relation to the assumed purposes.

Both kinds of rationality serve as an indispensable tool serving global economy and media expansion. Thus, we may say that the particular freedom and the ideology of market fundamentalism create a functional rationality in both versions.

In reference to the above considerations I would like to recall the views of two thinkers who analyzed modifications in the ways of understanding and forming rationality in culture as well as its meaning in social progress. Max Weber proved that the institutionalization of human cognition originated in the Enlightenment. Science and education gradually merged with the social and economic organizations and from now on the purpose of science is to provide theories facilitating modifications of the fragments of social life, work and nature resources, etc., instead of a disinterested search for truth. Thus, both the authors and holders of the theory accept "a functional rationality" that distances itself from ethical values.[4] During his series of lectures in Columbia University in 1944 Max Horkheimer presented his critique of "an instrumental reason" that captured the consciousness of people in the course of the twentieth century. Such a reason, formed on the ground of exact sciences, accepts the pragmatic conviction that every cognition must be useful for people but withdraws the former research on traditional questions of the meaning of life, and of truth. Instrumental reason projects the fragments of social life (in economy among other

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[3] Jürgen Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Disskurstheorie des Rechts und des democratischen Rechtstaats* (Frankfort-on-Mein: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992), p. 23.
[4] Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1922).

things) but it still remains neutral in its relation to the ethical goals of life. It can either serve evil or good.[5]

Leaving behind the differences in the two views of these philosophers and Horkheimer's extremely radical critique of pragmatism (which is especially related to John Dewey, whom he conceived of as the co-author of the idea of the 'instrumentalization of science',[6] we must say that both the functional rationality in the Weberian sense and the instrumental reason analyzed and criticized by Horkheimer rule the modern globalists' consciousness and determine their ideological points of view on the function of cognition in general as well as on the function of science in the wider understanding of culture.

I shall confine myself to one example which, as I reckon, unquestionably verifies my conviction that the authors of economic empirical sciences knowingly accept both the functional rationality and the instrumental reason when they treat people as objects, i.e., as a material means to accomplish an economic effectiveness. Professor M. Armstrong entitled his volume, *A Handbook of Human Resources Management* (Kogan Page 1977 – and seven further editions). Having read the book I must admit that its author's narrative skills and the precise construction of the theory of human resources management meet with my approval. But I must also express my painful irony by stating that rational and instrumental use (!) of people in order to accomplish the assigned economic purpose was already practiced on a mass scale in the 20th century in both totalitarian systems: the Nazi German Reich and Soviet Russia as well as in many other totalitarian states after World War II. There is no doubt, however, which I firmly stress, that the author radically criticizes totalitarian states and their ways of putting people to death by labor. My irony refers rather to the title of the work that in a remarkably awkward way evokes, unfortunately, painful memories of history.

## Social Countervailing Powers

In reference to the above-presented consideration we must ask two questions: are there any social powers that would revise the processes of globalization so they do not contribute to negative results? And, on the other hand, are there any values and ideas which would withstand the 'particular' freedom? Before I outline my proposition of answers, I shall state that it is impossible to stifle the globalization of economy unless there is this specific circumstance, world war – for instance, which destroys all centers forming the processes of globalization. Thus, there is only the revision of its processes at stake. In my opinion, control over economic and media globalization may take place – as it already is – by social *countervailing* powers and some democratic organizations acting throughout the world or the continents (like the European Union).

The answer to the second question is obvious. An opposition to the particular freedom and low media culture is a philosophical idea of positive freedom that funds democracy and formation of civil society as well as ethical values of the high culture and the value of rendering responsibility for negative consequences of actions especially. Likewise in the case of the global economy I state here that only some specific circumstances may stifle the development of global media culture.

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[5] Max Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie. Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vernunft* (Frankfort-on-Mein: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968).

[6] Since the beginnings of his philosophical thinking, Dewey held that ethical values are an indispensable base for democracy and should determine the economic and cognitive actions of people. Dewey's view of the meaning of ethical values I have presented in my *Truth, Meaning, Culture* (a reconstruction of Dewey's Thoughts) (Warsaw: Studia Filozoficzne, 1987), no 8.

Let it develop and spread the humanistic values of indigenous and high cultures of Europe, Asia, America and other parts of the world. In such a phase of progress there will emerge pluralistic 'high' global media culture.

John Kenneth Galbraith had elaborated his theoretical concept of "countervailing power" in the course of the fifties by analyzing the progress of American capitalism from the late part of the 19th century until the nineteen-fifties of the 20th century. His analyses were published as *American Capitalism. The Concept of Countervailing Power* (1952). His title says it is just a concept but in his work he often writes about the theory. However, it certainly is a theoretical concept instead of an explication of an empirical theory and its statements explain a group of economic, cultural and social phenomena. His theoretical assumptions – some partially presented and some to be reconstructed from his declarations by his reader – can be applied in explanation of certain social and economic phenomena that occur within globalization. We may then say that his concept still preserves its theoretical (explanatory) function.

Galbraith writes that in the free market there are dominating powers – monopolies – that destroy the competitors within the weak economic entities where there is a strong dominance of manufacturers over consumers and the employers impose their own pay conditions. Since there is a need to support the material interests of the weaker entities (wholesalers, individual entrepreneurs) as well as employees and consumers there is also "a need", writes Galbraith, "and a good opportunity that it will be profitable to create a countervailing power on its opposite side" (within the free market). This statement is thoroughly grounded on the silently accepted assumption that a worse economic position of people on the free market generates an individual psychological attitude (formation of a need to enhance someone's position) leading to an active *resistance* against the prevailing economic powers. The necessary condition of bringing such intention to balance the weaker and stronger powers into being is a minimum of favorable circumstances as well as organizational and rallying skills. The author again stresses the meaning of psychological dispositions (organizational skills) and political conditions. For when he writes about favorable circumstances he certainly means that only in a democratic state, where the positive and political freedoms exist, is the organization of countervailing powers possible. The author further writes that his statements are formulated based on the "the assumption" that the dominant economic power is held "in check" by the countervailing power of those who find themselves in its sweep (reach). The first power generates the second one (i.e., the dominant power generates its countervailing power).

In his work Galbraith describes the birth and performance of the countervailing powers in the USA. His research reveals that (which was not foreseen by the economists) the *purchasers*, i.e. wholesalers and consumers' organizations, began to *participate in* the formation of the product prices; and further, workers' trade unions protested against their low wages: all this resulted in opposition against the manufacturing monopolies on the free market. The appearance of grocery shops, chains, and malls had begun to determine the 'production profile' of the huge food industry. The author goes further and says that we can always expect "the countervailing powers to appear in order to control the economic force's temper" and calls them "inborn powers" that emerge in order to demarcate the dominance of strong economic entities in the free market.[7]

Galbraith's theoretical concept exposes a certain regularity or the recurrent interdependence of phenomena and events occurring within the free market and social phenomena. Therefore,

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[7] All quotations taken from *Spoleczenstwo dobrobytu. Panstwo przemyslowe* by John Kenneth Galbraith (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawaniczy, 1973) [*Affluent Society*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987 and *The New Industrial State*, New American Library, New York, 1986].

following the intentions of our thinker, I shall now introduce the notion of the countervailing social powers. The regularity explains the causes of events and the appearance of phenomena in a structural sense, namely that the countervailing powers participate in the formation of free market; in a broader sense – they create economic and social processes. Based on the described assumptions and detailed statements of Galbraith, we may specify this regularity in the following way: in the course of the advanced progress of capitalism, when the free market is dominated by the enlarged structural economic organizations there appear the countervailing powers, spontaneously and always as the dominant ones, which in an organized form oppose the domination of the stronger powers and bring about a counter-balance in the market. Then the free market and general economic progress are subject to at least the partial control of the organized structures of the countervailing powers.

Such a formulation of regularity we may, as I previously mentioned, relate to the contemporary phase of globalization of economy and media. Against the great powers, and in terms of wealth, against the advanced organizational structure as well as against the economic power's sweep, oppose the spontaneous (in Galbraith's terms – "inborn") *countervailing* powers. The economically or ethically motivated individuals declare themselves against the dominant powers and shape their own psychological attitude to rally strong support to the opposition (this is an individual attitude). People use their abilities and organizational skills as well as both positive and civil freedom provided by democracy and organize themselves to create social countervailing power against economic and media globalization. The organized countervailing powers act against the particular fragments or the elements of global free market and against certain corporations participating in the globalization of economy and media.

The phenomenon of contemporary countervailing powers requires separate considerations and sociological analyses. In my article I shall describe some of the examples of the countervailing powers performance. Thus in the course of the eighties in France and Italy there appeared first individual protests and later on an organized, social-economic countervailing movement against the so-called 'Macdonaldization' of food. Many people across France and Italy, including restaurant owners, declared against the expansion of the MacDonald's chain and the widespread fast food: thus they spontaneously entered upon establishing a new habit of "slow food," which meant the actual return to the regional tradition and local cuisine.

In 1986 in Italy, Pertini established an association of "good living." His idea of returning to traditional cuisine and taste was a great success also in America. Nowadays the association (Slow Food *Arcigola*) gathers around 60 thousand members, and publishes its own magazine and gastronomic guides on tastes and peculiarities of national cuisine. It also holds its annual Taste Room in Turin. The opponents of 'Macdonaldization', presently being an institution, are aware that their power withstood a fragment of globalization by delimiting the dominant huge corporations on the free market. In this case the countervailing power is a social and also an economic movement for it undertakes its own economic actions. The association annually awards its prizes for the economic initiatives aiming at revival of local craft traditions or regional ways of food production. In 2001 the prizes were awarded to a Moroccan collective farm manufacturing cooking and cosmetic oils, a Mexican farmer for making chocolate according to the original Mayan recipe, a Portuguese biologist who established his own company producing the salt of a specific propriety of taste in a traditional way.[8] Furthermore, owing to this countervailing power many people found new jobs thus reducing the number of the unemployed.

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[8] All information on Pertini's association come from M. Jedrysik *Œcieta szyja starego porto* (The *Cut Neck of an Old Porto*), Gazeta Wyborcza. Magazyn, 2001, no 48.

The countervailing power is also formed by political parties of the so-called Greens. First there were individual and group protests, then we witnessed an emergence of the organized political actions. The Green Party's representatives in political power rectify the economic processes in their countries; they also influence the processes forming global economy. This social and party movement has its undeniable merits within the field of imposing restrictions on production which destroys natural habitat as well as the social environment of human beings.

Social countervailing powers in politics exist also permanently in an unorganized form. Tadeusz Buksinski writes that the role of "subpolitics" increases, created by "a new political class", or the authors and servants of globalization who – despite lacking formal rights – influence the decisions of political authorities. It is against this class that young people "practice anti-politics (...) politics from the ranks, competitive to the politics of huge concerns, monopolies and political parties. Thus they create a new type of democracy. It is a spontaneous democracy without any regular program, an open one (...)".[9] In my opinion, the antipolitics as the social movement of the youth – so far distracted, without a form of regular association and showing its presence by protests against globalization – is just this kind of an inborn countervailing power against economic and political globalization. This movement is slowly modifying into an organized countervailing power. An illustration to this is the meeting held last year in Porto Alegre by a variety of antiglobalist groups that entered into the next stage of their activity – an organized form based on the clear program.

Artists and youth circles create the so-called counterculture as an inborn countervailing power against the low culture of global media. Within the counterculture the old values are brought back to life, new values emerge, the associations act and new fellows groups are formed. Such actions contribute to the development of the high culture and the specific values of youth culture that though difficult to be classified are still overtly opposed to the trivialized values created by global media institutions.

## Polish Society in Relation to the Globalization of Economy and Media Culture

Marek. Ziólkowski, basing his assertion on his and his associates' sociological research on modifications of values in Polish society in the course of the 1890s, states that "the general orientation of Polish society is directed (...) toward material interests and values. Social-cultural values as regulators of everyday behavior are given a distinctly minor meaning". The author writes that correspondingly we face a formation of a new attitude toward "postmodern postmaterialism and libertarianism" but only in "some few (though sometimes socially perceptible enough) circles, within the intellectuals, variety of minority groups and other groups aspiring after realization of the so-called alternative values".[10]

We may venture an opinion that the social acquiescence to material values must have taken place in the situation of comparing the levels of affluence in Poland to the countries of the European Union (the relation of gross national income per head in Poland and the European Union country was 1:5). The aspiration after material values is a primary motive of enterpreneurial progress in Poland. Thus the values can play a positive role and point out the aims of individual and collective actions. It seems that, by way of digression, Polish people's declaration of attraction to Americans (sociological research proves that around 60 percent of Polish society shows its

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[9] Tadeusz Buksinski, *Modernosc* (*Modernity*) (Poznan: Instytut Filozofii, 2001), pp. 246-247.

[10] Marek Ziolkowski, *Przemiany interesow i wartosci spoleczenstwa polskiego* (*Modifications of Interests and Values in Polish Society* (Poznan: Humaniora, 2000), pp: 139-140.

positive attitude toward Americans) is motivated by their recognition of material achievements in the USA.

A half of the adults do accept the inflow and presence of foreign capital in Poland because of the general materialist orientation in life and only 20 percent hold that foreign capital and modern technology threaten the job market and contribute to the increase of unemployment. This opinion is mostly expressed by the people in their fifties with elementary or professional education who virtually lost their jobs. But as much as 90 percent of young people (up to 25 years) with secondary or college-education as well as managers of state or private enterprises accept foreign capital in Poland. As for the preferences in the nationality of the capital owners, then around 45 percent of people indicated the investors from the USA.[11] We must assume that those accepting the global principle of economy – free flow of capital – because of their background and knowledge in the world economic mechanisms accept the progress of global economy for they understand it as a plausible opportunity of gaining profits for themselves and Poland.

To date there has not appeared, with an exemption of farmers and conservative social groups, any Polish social countervailing power against globalization of economy. In the light of the referred to sociological research, we may give form to an opinion that at least half of Polish society and nearly all young people with their secondary and college-education together with almost all managers do accept the process of economic globalization. But at the same time, as the sociological survey reveals, 80 percent of the population is for the *control* of foreign capital: Will the investments increase the number of the unemployed? What profit quantity is to be exported from Poland? Is foreign investment a threat to Polish enterprises?[12] They all want the capital and investments owners (the owners of wealth) to recognize the norm and the value of the ethical and social responsibility as the result of their actions. I think that the common demand of responsibility betokens not only the fear of material threat from global economy but also acceptance of a substantial level of applied ethical norms.

Polish young managers working for foreign branches in Poland, unfortunately holding the idea of 'particular' freedom, form their positive attitude toward functional rationality, and their actions are directed by the instrumental reason. In order to satisfy their ambitions they treat the employees as objects (as human resources), as means useful to accomplish the economic goals of their corporation. This group is not big in numbers but it possesses a real power over others. Janusz |niadek (the chairman of the "Solidar no|" [Solidarity] Trade Union National Committee) expresses his opinion of the work "of the new generation of managers" who act in an anti-union way (...) Their ideological phobias generate conflicts". The author postulates the necessity of educating the managers and enterprise owners within the field of "carrying on a social dialogue".[13] In my opinion, in order to carry on such a dialogue, managers must renounce their instrumental freedom and treat employees as authentic subjectivities, i.e. in the manner of partners. In the same way they should understand trade unions and local authorities when there are social consequences resulting from an enterprise's performance.

**Countervailing Powers against Economic and Media Globalization in Poland**

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[11] Adam Szymaniak, Spoleczna percepcja kapitalu zagranicznego w Polsce w latach 90 w Stary kontynent w nowym tysiacleciu ("Social Perception of Foreign Capital in Poland in the Nineties" in *The Old Continent in the New Millennium*), (ed.) Zbigniew Drozdowicz (Poznan: Humaniora, 2000), pp. 135,145.

[12] *Ibid*., p. 140.

[13] Janusz Œniadek, "Wywiad" (Interview), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 2003, no 47.

In my opinion, the social countervailing powers against economic globalization appear in present day Poland in three forms:

Political form, firmly organized within two parties – Samoobrona (Self-Defense), members of which are recruited from farmers; and Liga Polskich Rodzin (Polish Families League), a conservative Catholic party. The programs of both parties oppose the free inflow of world economic organization to Poland and opt only for the acceptance of limited and strictly controlled (financial and technological) support of foreign entities.

The Second form of countervailing power, also firmly organized, are trade unions, including "Solidarno"; in some degree they follow the tradition of the historical "Solidarno" of the 1980s. Trade unions accept global economic progress under the condition that, firstly, Polish economy takes part in it, or that the legal equality is maintained on the world market; secondly, half of Polish shares are involved in establishing companies with foreign capital in Poland; and, lastly, that permanent tax control is provided by our state over foreign capital.

The last, arbitrary and the most spontaneous one, is the short-term form, namely, associations of people emerging mostly in small and middle-sized towns that oppose the existence of huge mercantilist branches as well as to the construction of malls by Polish owners. The associations are formed by the retailers and their members protect their own material interests. Sometimes they find support from those who do not accept foreign supermarkets' expansion at all (though they buy the imported goods) and do not recognize the anonymous standardization of huge malls.

Hitherto, as previously stated, in Poland there is no such countervailing power as has already been formed in France or in Italy which opposes with its own economic action the domination of global economic markets.

The countervailing powers against global media culture are not organized in a social sense. In Poland we may observe the actions of particular, individual powers who are individual human beings, that is, intellectuals and artists, as Marek Ziókowski put it, identified with 'postmodern postmaterialism' who accept the values of the high culture or create their own values blatantly opposed to the media culture though they are still using the same technical means.

We need to state generally that the global media culture is recognized by the majority of Polish people and its values are shared by the youth especially. Primitive commercial advertisements and their images, what is called "Newspeak," shape the lower esthetic level of viewers and shape an instrumental, taxonomic language that cannot serve carrying on a dialogue on ethical values and even precludes the criticism of the low culture. In social groups, especially among young people, amusement as a way of life is widely accepted. Neil Postman has perfectly described it in his work.[14] According to him, amusement hermetically veils all the problems of the world – be they war, peace or all important problems in life of an individual and a group, the pursuit of a 'meaning' for life or even approval of kcommon welfare, etc.

My conviction that the individual human being constitutes a particular countervailing power against global media culture I shall evidence by two examples taking place in Poland. In recent years the outstanding film producers, Andrzej Wajda, Jerzy Hoffman and Jerzy Kawalerowicz, produced four epic movies based on the poems widely recognized as great by the Polish history of 19th century literature. Generally speaking, the works are about the significant meaning of religious, ethical and social values for people. The movies were seen in Poland and abroad

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[14] Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1985).

including the USA by a couple of millions of viewers. I shall refer to two movies of Andrzej Wajda: "Pan Tadeusz" ("Mister Thaddeus") – an epic poem by Adam Mickiewicz, and "Zemsta" ("Revenge") – a comedy by Aleksander Fredro. I shall not go into a detailed analysis of axiological strata of both works. Instead I confine myself to the statement that their Polish viewers, who read the poem-movies at schools, again asked themselves the question: can the ethical and social values, both positive and negative ones, of nineteenth-century aristocratic culture motivate the modern behavior of people? Among the viewers there were many technocrats and the low culture participants who rarely consider the question of cultural values. Wajda, Hoffman and Kawalerowicz created a given axiological and social pattern and thus contributed to the birth of a large audience composed of individual beings who learnt about the ethical values of a Polish nobleman's culture. Since they learnt such values they learnt to think about values at the same time. In my opinion, they are in some degree ready to carry on the discourse among themselves on social values in general.

In the light of the above example, and many others which are similar, we must conclude that each artist creating his works within the high culture but addressed to all people, especially to the participants of the low culture, by means of material technique *plays the role of an individual countervailing* power against global media culture. Through his work, an artist provokes in an esthetic way and encourages his addressees to question, criticize and sometimes even to reject the low media culture.

My second example, or rather examples, of creating certain social patterns appeared in Poland two or three years ago when the price of personal computers and Internet access decreased. In dozens or even several hundreds of small town and villages (the phenomena is not officially reported) particular persons, mainly young people, with writing skills and journalist flair were very successful with establishing their local newspapers on the web. Apart from being journalists they also organize social actions of people in order to solve actual problems important to the inhabitants of a certain town or village. They are also trusted by the people, helping them find jobs, and lastly they write about the values of local or regional culture. This example confirms my view that the individual countervailing powers, acting within local communities, oppose the media globalization of the low culture. These people are not professional artists but they still serve their role as social promoters of revival. They establish indigenous social relations based, as I have mentioned above, on ethical norms and local cultural values.

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## Chapter XIX
# The Past as a Possible Obstacle to Poland's Future:
# Dialogue and Reconciliation

*Anne Rose Topolski*

The title of my paper may seem both out-of-place and out-of-date at a conference focused on the challenges of globalization encountered by Eastern European Countries. Nevertheless, this topic is of the utmost importance at this particular time and place in history. There are certainly many obstacles such as the financial, agricultural, linguistic ones that the 10 countries preparing to join the European Union will have to face. However difficult these challenges may be, there is a much greater challenge – faced by every individual, every community, and every nation . . . and that is the past. The greatest obstacle to globalization for many of the countries being discussed is the past. It is crucial that now, when these countries are trying to 'move forward' they do so with a 'clean slate', with an honest and fair understanding of their history, both positive and negative'. This is needed is not bickering or blame. After so much imposed silence and censorship, as these nations are free and slowly joining the rest of Western society this topic must be re-considered. According to Professor Stanislaw Salmonowicz of the University of Torun "the greatest mistake of the past thirty years [1957-87] has been a peculiar silence" (Brother's 54).

In an interview between Ewa Berberyusz, a Catholic Pole, and Stanislaw Krajewski, a Jewish Pole, both expressed this same feeling. It would appear to be a widespread feeling among Poles and Jews. Mrs. Berberyusz said, "What I would wish is that encounters between Jews and Poles could be more normal, by which I mean that I wish that the two parties could at least speak to each other in a simpler and more natural way". Mrs. Berberyusz has clearly understood that there is something unspoken which prevents free and open dialogue, as Pan Krajewski confirms, "everything becomes more complicated. The situation is much simpler with the Germans. They are responsible for the Holocaust and they do not deny it… and are able to talk about it directly. This point has not, however, been reached between Poles and Jews, even though Poles were not guilty of the genocide of Jews" (Brother's 102).

Pan Krajewski shares with us what Poland means to the Jews of the Diaspora: "It represents something important to them, in a positive and negative sense" (Brother's 105). Their shared history prior to 1939 is full of culture, tradition, shetlt life – but all these memories and stories are scarred by the events that followed. Sadly, the young Jews of the Diaspora have not learnt about the more captivating past, so the Shoah often defines their identity in a negative way. Kostek Gebert sees Sinai – and not the Shoah – as the source of Jewish identity (Depicting 2). Many Jews would like to return and begin to understand their Polish roots in the same way as many young educated Poles have shown a remarkable interest in the history of Polish Jews. Although there may be very few Jews in Poland today, there are certainly many Jews in the Diaspora who have roots in Poland. In addition, with the enlargement of the EU, many Poles have to reconsider their thoughts, myths, and prejudices concerning Jews. In a contrastinc position Professor Andrzej Bryk, a lecturer at Jagiellonian University, holds that "the Jewish chapter in Poland as an ongoing presence and contribution to Polish history is closed forever. It has been brought to an end by the evil deeds of others. And that is why the Polish-Jewish dialogue cannot truly be reciprocal. The Jewish people are making their future and their history elsewhere" (Brother's 177).

Although he recognizes the fundamental need to return to the past for the sake of Poland's future, he fails to understand that this is equally necessary for the Jews of the Diaspora. His statement, which follows, ought to apply to both communities: "The recent Polish search for the lost-history of Polish-Jewish relations is not an abstract intellectual exercise. It is morally legitimate and necessary, and long overdue. At stake is the Polish people's choice between freedom, which requires as full a recognition as possible of history, and imprisonment as a people desperately committed to nationalistic myths" (Brother's 161).

Yet, at a much deeper level, this topic represents something much greater; it signifies Poland's openness to Otherness as well as humanity's openness in general. The significance of this dialogue has been clearly recognized by those outside of Poland, responding to Jan Thomas Gross' Neighbours: "This book has already had dramatic repercussions in Poland, where it has single-handedly pryed open a closed and painful chapter in that nation's recent past. But Neighbours is not only about Poland. It is a moving and provocative rumination upon the most important ethical issue of our age" (Neighbors 263). In the same way, the dialogue that is being called for is of universal significance although it is one that must begin in Poland. As a nation with a mixed history, both of tolerance and anti-semitism, Poland today has a choice to make can Poland opens its borders, heart and mind to Otherness. Or will Poland choose not to overcome its internal obstacle? I believe it can overcome its past but it will not be easy. Communism closed Poland. Globalization is now opening Poland, but is Poland prepared? As a relatively homogenous country, do Poles have the compassion and understanding to aid the refugees presently flowing into Europe from all over the third world? Over 800 hundred years ago Poland opened its borders to the Jews and for 700 years Judaism flourished… do Poles know what went wrong in the 20th century? For Poland to open itself to Otherness it must first turn to itself and to learn from its past. Afterwards, this knowledge must be maintained and further diffused through proper education. As expressed by England's Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks "To defend a country you need an army. But to defend a free society you needs schools" (Bo Sedra). With proper dialogue, understanding and education, comes change, innovation… and now Poland can choose to open itself to Otherness and to the gifts brought by difference. One only has to think how much the Poles and Jews of the past millennium have learned from each other to conceive of how much more can be learned by diversity within a population.

The necessity of returning to the most difficult period of Polish-Jewish history is that dialogue has to do with two (or more) interlocutors and the present debate seems to me to be internal to Poland rather than between Jews and Poles. Jews in Israel, in the USA, and in Europe have been discussing the Shoah since it occurred. However, as of yet, there has been much more than factual bickering and finger pointing between Poles and Jews of the Diaspora. For example, each year hundreds of young North-American Jews participate in 'The March of the Living' – a trip paid by the state of Israel consisting of a visit to Poland, presented as the Jew's graveyard and to Israel introduced as the Jew's paradise. Those who return from this trip are – in my opinion – brainwashed. Without realizing that I identify with Poland, many participants in 'The March of the Living' claimed that Poland is full of anti-Semites, a terrible place for Jews, etc. It is difficult for me to accept that they did not learn about the 700 years of Polish-Jewish history, of the stories of the Polish Righteous Gentiles presented at Yad Vashem, or of how much Polish culture has pervaded the Jewish faith. Parallel stories can be found in Polish textbooks. To quote an eighth grade history text, published in 1984, "The overwhelming mass of the Jewish people during the occupation were passive…. When in 1942 the Germans began the liquidation of the ghettos, the terrified and deceived Jewish people allowed themselves to be taken without any resistance to the

concentration camps. When the Home Army headquarters gave orders to rescue the deportees, and the fighting units – with heavy casualties – liquidated the German guards of the transports, the Jews transported to death did not want to escape" (Brother's 181). The point of both of these 'educational' devices is that they are shockingly one-sided. It is important for both sides to recognize the other perspective and to initiate a true dialogue. This is even more urgent today since in the next twenty years, almost all those who witnessed these events, and who can share their stories, may no longer be here to do so. Without this dialogue both Poland and the Jews of the Diaspora will forever live in the shadow of the past. Poland should mean much more to Jews than the location of the Shoah and Jews should mean much more to Poles than a people of the past, or a problem.

Unlike some who say "since the Jewish issue is clearly irrelevant to the real problems of the country-widespread unemployment, joining NATO, etc. – who has time to care about the Jews anymore?" (Poles 1), I believe that this period – the last half century – in Poland's history represents one of the most difficult obstacles faced by any country and that the story of the Polish and Jewish peoples over the past century has (to use Hannah Arendt's expression) "exemplary validity"[1] for people everywhere. "The destruction of the Jews is insolubly embedded in European history as a whole. It is only by recognizing that the Jews were singled out by the Nazis that the [notion of a] crime against humanity appears, [that is, humanity against itself] and it is precisely because of this particularity [tragic failure of humanity] that the experience of the Jews as Jews is important for all humankind" (Jew 46). As such, 'the Jewish Question' is not in fact 'a Jewish Question': it is a question that all human beings must address. This sentiment was also more recently expressed by Jan Blonski at a conference in Israel "The Holocaust compels us to look at ourselves differently, in other words at our past, at our identity as human beings and as a nation, made up of individuals" (Brother's 189). Because of the oppressive communist regime, it is understandable that many countries have not had the opportunity to address this question; yet, dialogue is a necessary step in preparing to join Europe – a community created as based on respect for difference, diversity and harmony.

The Jews' story sheds light on the history of the twentieth century in two distinct ways: first, the reality of anti-Semitism in the twentieth century tells us something about the nature of the world, or humanity; and second, the sense of worldlessness or world-alienation experienced by the Jews, and many others, speaks about an important existential experience (or condition) of individuals within this century. The fact that anti-Semitism returned to Europe in the twentieth century, and continues to return to this day, carries with it a message that goes far beyond that of the Jews. It tells us that the world, or humanity, is neither ready to accept itself, nor prepared to accept the reality of differences among individuals. In other words, anti-Semitism is only one of many forms of modern escapism. One only has to read an international paper to find particular examples, whether it be the hatred expressed by Vlaams Blok in Belgium, the injustice perpetrated by the US against African Americans, or the ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The flipside of this statement is that those individuals, not accepted as equals because of their differences, suffer from a sense of extreme alienation. However this alienation is not internal to the self, although this is certainly a bi-product; rather, this experience is one of worldlessness, a constitutive alienation from humanity. Both of these aspects of the Jews' story

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[1] Perhaps it is worth noting here that 'the Jewish Question' is exemplary in that it is the first time in human history that humanity has been systematically reduced to the state of an animal, concluding in genocide.

point to the same thing – the alienation between individuals and the world, or humanity, creates a denial of responsibility and a lack of participation in the realm of politics. For Poland to truly join Europe it must address this question and therefore its own past – as must every other nation which has not begun to do so. Yet it cannot end with an address – this is only the beginning – from a dialogue must come discussion and education. "Distortions – evident in [Polish] school textbooks" (Brother's 171) must be corrected. This is not an issue that can be dealt with overnight. It will take many generations.

Although this topic does not seem to have been explicitly discussed during the 'Accession Negotiations' between Poland and the European Community, it is there between the lines, and should not be let to slip through the cracks, for its ugly face will soon rear itself... this is a lesson we have all learned from history. The first EU requirement, as stated in the pre-accession negotiations held in Copenhagen in 1993, is "stable democratic institutions, rule of law, respect for human rights and for the protection of minorities" (Government 11). Implicit in this requirement is that each country, in its own manner address its past breaches of human and minority rights, and correct the injustices in order that the past does not haunt the future of Europe. For Poland, this calls for a dialogue with the Jews of the Diaspora and the recognition of moral responsibility, which as clearly pointed out by Blonski is distinct from any form of criminal responsibility. This notion will be further discussed in the final section of this paper. This generation of Poles is not to be held accountable for the tragedies of the past. Nevertheless, they must be aware of them. Awareness, through dialogue and education, is the way to address this first EU requirement. In addition, this issue relates to points two (free movement of peoples), thirteen (social policy), eighteen (education and youth), and twenty (culture)… of the screening process. "Polish culture, Polish education need to enter the Jewish Pardes of the Holocaust to recognize its tragic emptiness and insanity, because the holocaust is in fact a universal phenomenon and cannot be reduced to the issue of the relationship between the Jews and the Poles" (Brother's 175). Although many people may wish to let the past rest, this topic is imperative to Poland's future.

Furthermore, Poland may be in an unique position, one begun by Blonski's 1987 article printed in Tygodnik Powszechny, to demonstrate to Europe and the world that it has the potential to be a proud and politically powerful nation. By accepting moral responsibility, Poland can begin a new tradition, one that is greater than simple tolerance or acceptance of otherness. Poland can choose to demonstrate the ability to learn from its past, to correct its sins and to begin to educate its youth with regard to the value and dignity of minorities and difference. "For such recalcitrant issues as the acceptance by one ethnic religious group of another, education is required" (Brother's 163). This process has already begun. Perusing the Polish papers it is clear that there has been a slow but striking rebirth and questioning of the Jews past in Poland. Many groups have begun to rebuild Jewish cemeteries, engage in correspondence with Jews of the Diaspora and to create museums and memorials. These events symbolize a new beginning in Polish-Jewish relations – one greater than tolerance of difference. These each represent an interest in learning from others as well as a belief in inclusivism rather than exclusivism.

This dialogue is indeed necessary and relevant today and has necessary pre-conditions for the re-education that this dialogue will call for within Poland and within the communities of the Jews in the Diaspora. There is a powerful parallel between his thoughts – on behalf of the Polish community – and those written by Hannah Arendt in 1943 – on behalf of the Jewish community. Both stress the importance of moral responsibility, a responsibility of all parts of humanity, regarding the Shoah. According to Arendt, by allowing the Jews to be murdered, humanity itself committed 'crimes against humanity'. In essence this crime is one of denial, a denial of our

responsibility as human beings to each other and to the world we share. We (or at least the 'allies') seem to have recognised this in defining the crimes of the Nazis as 'crimes against humanity' in the Nuremberg trials. Yet, paradoxically, humanity, or the world, seems to have misunderstood the nature of the crime. The fact that the Nazis, a part of humanity, were able to commit such horrific atrocities implies that humanity failed itself, that we each, as members of the world failed to take responsibility for the world. In January of 1943, when Arendt accepted the reality of the 'rumours of the existence of the death camps' she wrote the following:

If we [Jews] should start telling the truth that we are nothing but Jews, it would mean that we expose ourselves to the fate of the human beings who, unprotected by any specific law or political convention, are nothing but human beings. I can hardly imagine an attitude more dangerous, since we actually live in a world in which human beings as such have ceased to exist (Jew 65).

Although Arendt was called an anti-Semite, she stood behind her belief that the Jews themselves, by avoiding reality, politics and the public light, were not innocent of moral responsibility for the failure of Humanity. Her comments, addressed to the world, including the Jews, serve as a reminder of the true nature of 'crimes against humanity', the denial of humanity or a shared world. According to Arendt, only when the most persecuted and alienated among people are included, accepted, and respected – and experiences this feeling – is there hope for peace and an end to the crisis of humanity made visible by the Shoah:

When we recognise the human background against which recent events have taken place, knowing that what was done was done by men and therefore can and must be prevented by men – then [can] we rid the world of its nightmarish quality. (Jew 174).

It is this reminder, of our personal responsibility and the necessity of a commitment to humanity that the Jews' story exemplifies, a reminder at the centre of Arendtian politics.
What is remarkable about Blonski's article is that it recognises this same responsibility:

Instead of haggling and justifying ourselves, we should first consider our faults and weaknesses. This is the moral revolution which is imperative when considering the Polish-Jewish past.… Its precondition is a change in the social awareness of the problem.... We should, however, first acknowledge our own guilt, and ask for forgiveness.… This means for the Polish side the acceptance of responsibility.… Participation and shared responsibility are not the same thing. One can share the responsibility for the crime without taking part in it.… A question arises immediately whether this could be said not only of Poles, but equally well of the French, the English, the Russians.… Yes, indeed it can. This responsibility is, indeed, our common responsibility. (Brother's 45-6)

Blonski's thoughts have been heard and echoed in many parts of the Diaspora. Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of England often calls upon his community to understand that responsibility is the basis of Judaism. "According to Judaism we are not tainted by original sin and therefore incapable of doing good without God's grace. To the contrary, we are a mix of good and evil and everything depends on our choice. … Judaism is not Judaism if we dissociate our duties to God from our duties to our fellow human beings; if we cultivate heaven only to disdain our responsibilities down here on earth." ("Renewal to Responsibility" Lecture). According to Paul Johnson, author of The

History of the Jews, "Jews have managed better than anyone else the delicate balance between responsibility for myself and responsibility for others… collective responsibility". Part of the latter requires hearing other's stories and trying to understand that we must all care for humanity, not only for ourselves, families, communities, or nations. This means we are each called to act on behalf of those being persecuted whether it be next door or across the globe.

Both Poles and Jews, in their own way, at their own time, have understood that humanity must accept moral responsibility for the crimes of its past. This recognition is the pre-condition for the openness required for a dialogue in which both parties can present their stories, experiences and understanding to the other. Facts cannot be compared; suffering cannot be quantitatively defined or reduced, but it can be shared. We, humanity, can learn from it. Even if it is difficult for Jews to consider that Poles also suffered, we must listen, it is our responsibility as human beings to do so. This was Polanski's point in the film The Pianist, in which the stories of good and bad Poles, Germans and Jews are told. All must try to respect each other's experiences, stories and their interpretative product in memory. If this is understood then it is possible to properly listen, respect and learn from others. Pan Krajewski grasps this in his comment, "I think that a tragic story, a report or a film which a hearer/viewer can identify with, might have the deepest impact (Brother's 107)." According to Rafael Scharf, a Jew of Polish heritage living in England, "the Jews have no need of statistics, they know how it was. Poles generally, do not know, they cannot know, perhaps they do not want to know" (Brother's 193). But in fact both sides lack awareness of the other, both sides need to listen and learn – especially those of my generation who do not know how it was. This first step of accepting moral responsibility will allow for the past to be re-opened, for truth to re-appear, for people across the world to begin to listen to each other. Another incredibly powerful aspect of this acceptance is that the shame and guilt buried in the unconscious of Jews and Poles across the globe will be released. The future will be free of the pain buried in the unconscious past. Jews and Poles will be able to deal with their troubled identities if the memories that create these identities are no longer buried in shame and guilt. For as we know memory and identity are inextricable… this is equally true for the past as for the future.

Following Blonski's article, many Poles expressed the need to free themselves of their unspoken guilt. One such woman, Mrs. Janina Walewska said, "We can only say: 'We ask for forgiveness'. Nothing else. Because it is we who want to be cleansed and, therefore, if we do feel guilty (as I do, independently of my other 'I' that keeps reminding me of Jewish wrongs) we must ask to be forgiven" (Brother's 126). The same is true – although at a completely different level – for the Jews of the Diaspora who express their own guilt or shame at having failed to believe the truth of the Shoah (North American Jews), at having failed to act (whether in words or action), or at having complied with the Nazis (Judernat) through anger directed towards Poles and Germans (three generations later). "The issue is that only the liberating feeling of shame – the recovery of the moral significance of the joint historical experience – may once and for all exorcise the spectre of the holocaust, which continues to haunt not only Polish-Jewish relations, but also the ethical self-identity of the Poles and the Jews alike, to this very day" (Brother's 26).

Yet this acceptance is not an easy thing to ask for. This is clear from the amount of discussion raised by both Arendt's and Blonski's writings. There are parts of the Jewish and Polish community that refuse to accept the contributions of members of their respective communities. An admission of guilt, asking for forgiveness and understanding, desiring reconciliation are difficult things for anyone – much less an entire nation or faith. Is this why it has not yet been possible? Now that Poland has been freed from communism; that Israel is struggling with its own internal dealings with difference (Brother's 206); that Jews in the Diaspora are experiencing an increase in

anti-Semitism; and that North-American Jews are slowly accepting the idea of 'survivors guilt'… perhaps with all these global reminders of the need for moral responsibility we can begin to understand that this admission is a pre-condition for political dialogue and that there has now been enough time and distance to begin to address the notion of collective moral responsibility.

As a conclusion, there are three signs that this dialogue is possible. On behalf of the Jewish community, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks expressed the following: "It takes courage to forgive – because forgiving means letting go: letting go of our pain, letting go of our feeling that we or our people have been wronged. I know how hard it is.… And yet I must, for the sake of my children and the future.… I honour the past by learning from it … we must answer hatred with love, violence with peace, and conflict with reconciliation. It takes physical courage to fight a war; but it takes moral courage to make peace; to forgive" (United Synagogue Lecture). Only a few days later, Poland's President Alexander Kwasniewski courageously claimed "the black stains in Polish history which we will no longer be able to ignore … with all the pain, they must be exposed and not plastered over … there must be heard from our mouths, the mouths of the Poles, a request for forgiveness and pardon from the Jews" (Jedwabne 9). And again, this same message, communicated by Pope John Paul the Second, who in April 2001 went to the Western Wall in Jerusalem leaving a note that said, "Forgive us Christians for what we did to the Jews". All three of these signs give me the hope required to engage in a dialogue that is difficult for all sides. If is possible for these three men – each from their particular perspective – to return to the past, to learn in the present and to hope for the future, then it is also possible for Poland and the Jews of the Diaspora to do so.

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