Diversity and Dialogue: Culture and Values in a Global Age

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The general title of this series is "Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change". The process of change in which we now find ourselves is marked by the confluence of progress on two of the most basic human concerns. On the one hand, there is a new level of attention to human subjectivity and intentionality, and hence to the way people think and decide. We have become doubly self-aware and hence more consciously set their path in life. This in turn directs attention to engagement with others not only in family and neighborhood; but beyond even nation and international interchange to participation on a global scale.

While the surprising range of topics addressed here bears the mark of the diversity of their authors and the various professional fields, they converge in their concern to rediscover the rich cultural heritage of their peoples and to apply this to the challenges they now face. Thus they share both the specific topic or theme that joins these volumes together, as well as a common source of inspiration in the work of The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP).

Part I "Culture and Values," begins with Chapter I, "Cultural Heritage and its Contribution to Human Development" by Zagorka Golubovic, and reflects her sociological perspective. She sees as the essential feature of a global cultural heritage that it not only encompasses but is constituted of diverse cultures and civilizations. In examining multiple cultures to establish this thesis she is able to shed light on the role of cultures in the constitution or construction of our present world.

Chapter II, "Tradition in Modernity" is by Leon Dyczewski. Building upon his earlier values in the Polish cultural tradition in this series, he establishes the importance of a people's heritage and of the values they have established as the basis for building the future. This he terms "a reflective modernity".

Chapter III, "Two Formulations of Modernization in the Movement of Reforming Islam" by Niyazi Mehdi, illustrates the way in which a culture is an ongoing project. This is true also of a religious heritage in its attempt to live a revelation. Thus the process of adaptation is not a betrayal of religious inspiration, but an attempt to live it fully in all the concrete details of daily life. This generates an inherent complementarity of the various religious traditions this encounters.

Chapter IV, "A Philosopher's Journey towards the Spiritual Goal of Man" by Magdalena Dumitrana, illustrates the way in which this effort might be approached through philosophical research. This must delve deeply into philosophical psychology and an archeology of concepts in order to uncover deeper structures so that the ground of being is unveiled. This, in turn, can lead to a renewed social awareness in time and to a process of eternal return.

Part II "Diversity." While the study of culture and values in Part I sought common characteristics, Part II is concerned with the way in which these do not reduce all to a least common denominator, but rather enable a unique creativity on the part of every human heart and mind.

Chapter V, "Ethnic and Religious Revival: Religion as a Ground of Ethnic and National Identity" by Vassil Prodanov, takes the lead in exploring how the development of a greater self-awareness points equally and necessarily to the religious wellsprings in which all share or participate. He examines how support for national endeavors in the most trying and perilous times bonds the identity of an ethnic community and nation to their respective religious roots and generates religious identities, whether Christian, Moslem or Hindu. This provides important insight into the religious upsurge in our day.

Chapter VI, "Bulgarian Intellectuals and Communist Nationalism (1984-1989)" by Plamen Makariev, explores the challenge which this relation to national identity presents. He studies how the sense of *Gemeinschaft* by F. Toennies tended to constitute a solidarity between leadership and community in some countries, that it is difficult to dissociate from this, and the historical and cultural conditions of the distribution of power which support this and can play a role in the "Regeneration Process."

Chapter VII, "Bridging Gaps through Dialogue and Solidarity: Addressing Issues of Diversity in a Global Era" is by Chibueze C. Udeani. He takes this issue a step further by identifying not only the principle of solidarity upon which the transformations of Eastern Europe were based, but also the method of dialogue which this entails for a free and newly empowered populace.

Chapter VIII, "Why World War?" by Vessela Misheva, constructs a sociological research project to investigate the sources of conflict on a global scale. In one sense this should have proceeded the previous three chapters, but it leads to the entire Part III by noting the role of evil, diversity and even potential enmity, as well as their disastrous consequences for unity between peoples from the local to the present global scale.

Part III, "Diversity and Dialogue," opens a new horizon. Here the change in scale from the national to the global illustrates Marx's thesis of how a change in quantity can become a change in quality. Indeed it would appear to require new thinking in terms not of multiple nations, but of the now unified global whole.

Chapter IX, "How to Overcome the Prejudice of Euro-Centrism?" by Jurate Baranova, takes a first step in identifying the experience of globalization by tracing it back in part to Gottfried Herder. She then introduces the diversity of nations which she sees in the end to be expressive of unity.

Chapter X, "The Traditions of Eastern European Countries in the Period of Gobalization" by Tadeusz Buksiński, recognizes the present weakening of tradition, but proceeds to explore how this can be rectified in the development of a new culture. He calls for a reconciliation between the old and the new which will require not only a modernization of tradition but recognition of an explicit traditionalism and ritualism proper to Eastern Europe.

Chapter XI, "Globalization and the Importance of Future Studies" by Jana Gasparikova, reminds us that globalization is a project rather than a reality. In this light she directs attention to what we desire to realize newly in the age to come and hence to the need to project into the future. This is made difficult by the recognition of the complexity of the eco-system and requires a co-evolution of both humanity and of nature. The challenge is to achieve a perspective in which both can be included without setting limits to their common advance?

Part IV, 'Diversity in Unity," turns to the effort to reintegrate the diversity of peoples and especially their cultures into the global unity established in the economic, political and communicative spheres.

Chapter XII. "Education for Cognitive Thinking -- A Basis for Intercultural Education" by Alexander Andonov, introduces a cultural point of view on the process of education. In contrast to cognitive thinking which is ever open, discovering, and by implication intercultural, the common focus of education has turned to logical thinking which is closed and by implication exclusive. This absolutizes diversity and fragments society.

Chapter XIII, "The Hope for Philosophy in a Global Age" by Jelena Djuric, studies how philosophy can be a means for pursuing the integration of peoples by transforming ethics so as to integrate human experience and its progressive development of a set of values in order to become ever more sensitive to the human good.

Chapter XIV, "The International Criminal Court as a Topical Human Rights Issue from a Critical Kantian Perspective" by Miloslav Bednar, moves the issue further along the path from theory to practice. He examines the development of the International Criminal Count (ICC) as a test case inasmuch as the exercise of jurisdiction as an exclusive exercise of power tests national rights and duties. Here, Bednar contrasts a pluralist republicanism to a more communitarian sense of solidarity and social justice.

Chapter XV, "Fault Lines within Fundamental Ontology and Beyond: Suggestions for Further Discussion of Heidegger's Thought" by Andrew Blasko, takes the above discussion much further by tracing it from law to an undergirding ontology and then metaphysics. In this he sees Heidegger opening beings to Being itself and hence potentially enriching human life. In his effort, however, one fatal flaw would appear to be a separation of the sense of being itself from religion. This left Heidegger with only the German Volk and its historical destiny as a normative

principle, thereby closing it to "the other". As such thinking is exclusive in terms of my people, the danger can be an inherited selfishness without a sense of sin. From such a closure, Blasko concludes with Heidegger in his *Der Spiegel* interview: "only a god can save us."

Chapter XVI, "The Misleading and Overwhelming Infinity Separating God and Human Beings -- From the History of the Reconciliation of Religions" by Niyazi Mehdi, carries Blasko's conclusion an important step further. For while its conclusion that "only a god can save us" is true, in our present culturally pluralist condition this makes it necessary to rethink the terms of our religious response to God. It is Medhi's important suggestion that our tendency to do so in simple terms of the true/false dichotomy does not do justice to the richness with which the infinite can inspire the finite and be unveiled by the finite so as to be infinitely revealing of the truth and meaning of life.

George F. McLean

PART I

CULTURE AND VALUES

CHAPTER I

CULTURAL HERITAGE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

ZAGORKA GOLUBOVIĆ

Human beings develop within a socio-cultural heritage that is accumulated from history (in the sense that only humans have history) and transmitted to new generations and to every man and woman when they are born. In such a transmission every individual newborn baby acquires the necessary social/cultural stamp by which it is constituted as a human being and as a member of a given society/culture.[1]

The significance of social influences has been widely described and explained by sociologists and psychologists in reference to social institutions and to the social roles played by the individual members of a given social structure.[2] However, the role of culture in human/individual development has only been partly examined by anthropologists, and even then from the perspective of philosophic anthropology or, to a certain extent, within the American tradition known as "culture and personality."

The fact that without culture there would be no social (human) organizations and unique human activities is very often ignored, and more often than not the social sciences (economics, sociology, political science) do not consider that culture resides in their domain. There is thus a need to examine the role that culture plays in the process of becoming human and in the further development of humanity.

The expression that culture is the "grammar of social life" very well indicates that culture represents the basic matrix of being human. As grammar orders phonetics and the structure of language, so does culture establish a structural foundation for social organization and human experience. It symbolizes the world around us as a human interpretation and provides meaningful rules for human/social communication, without which human existence in its unique sense would not be possible.

One may also accept an additional definition of culture as a "way of life" insofar as it includes all the specifically human elements that Edward Tylor suggested when he wrote that culture is "a complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, law, morals, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society in many cultures."[3] A similar but more expressive definition is provided by Charles Ellwood, who writes that "Culture is a collective name for all behavior patterns socially acquired and socially transmitted by means of symbols; hence a name for all the distinctive achievements of human groups, including not only such items as language, tool-making, industry, art,

science, law, government, morals and religion, but also the material instruments or artifacts in which cultural achievements are embodied and by which intellectual cultural features are given practical effects, such as buildings, tools, machines, communication devices, art objects, and so forth."[4]

In other words, culture represents a complex transformation of nature, in which human beings live and which they mediate through their creative activities. This transformation assumes "a progressive liberation" whereby "man discovers and proves a new power, the power to build up a world of its own, an 'ideal world.'"[5] That is to say that culture is a process of humanization that transcends the biological level of man's development, introducing a trans-biological domain as a *conditio sine qua non* of human existence. As such, culture involves tradition (sociocultural heritage) as well as learning from the experiences and practices that determine how people live (Ralph Linton, Margaret Mead). It is not a physiological product that is automatically reflexive and instinctive.[6] The distinction between culture and society may thus be defined in terms of Herskovits' statement that culture is the way of life of peoples (how life is ordered and practiced), while society is an organized aggregate of individuals who follow a given way of life.[7]

The most distinctive feature of culture as the milieu of human existence is the realm of ideas and values in respect to which human achievements come into being as goal-directed products that are realized through the imagination of not yet existing things and thoughts. Stated otherwise, creation by choice is what characterizes human activity, by which human self-liberation is attained. This is the opposite of merely instinctive reaction since it is possible for reflexive thinking to make use of liberty. This also implies that human development is constantly confronted with new problems for which solutions are needed, along with the need for constant learning, the results of which are stored in a "great building of accumulated knowledge." White emphasizes another characteristic of culture when he writes about the peculiar faculty of the human species to use symbols.[8] This gives rise to yet another definition of culture as a symbolic universe, a fundamentally human phenomenon in which we express our relations to the external world through the process of symbolization. Clifford Geertz argues that culture is a "totality of a systematic organization of significant symbols," a "symbolic programme which is written in the time and space of social life," and an "organization of schemas of thoughts."[9] Culture thus enables people to reflexively experience their lives and change them, in contrast to those species that are biologically programmed. Symbolization as the foundation of culture therefore represents a process that transforms facts into concepts and ideas, making it possible for human beings to understand their meanings as they reduce facts to their essential characteristics. This comprises the alteration of empirical experience into abstract ideas, whereby a specifically human reality is revealed and can be acted upon.

The cultural nature of man and cultural heritage are thereby preconditions for the development of human beings and their social organizations.[10] What characterizes human society as unique from the "societies" of certain other species is that it is culturally ordered by a variety of norms and customs or laws, which in the earliest period of history included various beliefs, as has been evidenced by the discovery of early human graves and magic rituals. Imagination is thus a specifically human faculty by which the natural environment is transcended and a new (human) world is opened up. In this sense we may speak about a "reconstruction of reality" (Peter Berger) that is a human creation and not given *per se*.

Human individuals are socialized within particular cultures, but many diverse cultures have been created by human inventiveness. Unlike the early history of mankind, which consisted of so-called primitive cultures that were fairly isolated and closed in themselves, the civilized history of man has been characterized by an ongoing diffusion of cultural elements. Moreover, basic human innovations, such as stone tools and implements made of ivory bones, have been found in all cultures, both in Europe, Asia, as well as Africa.[11] One may thus speak of the exchange and mutual impact of diverse cultures across the world, which demonstrates the thesis that every culture creates the image of man in a universal manner.[12] This is why cultural heritage is to be taken as a complex of mankind's universal achievements that provides the foundation for the continuous development of innovations and of human potentialities. It is therefore necessary to study different civilizations along with the mutual influences pertaining between them in order to comprehend that the contributions of different cultural achievements comprise a common cultural heritage that is the universal background of human history.

This means that the concept of culture should be examined both in the singular, as a general and unique environment of man, and in the plural, as the expression of the specific innovations of different peoples. That is to say that culture, as a unique faculty of human beings, should be studied both as an expression of the universalizing image of man, and as the diversity of ethnic and national cultures that manifest the particular points of view of individual differentiation. (It should be noted in this regard that different cultural objects often have similar functions.)

The concept of culture thus has to combine both its universal and relative components in order to overcome a one-sided image of cultural superiority, such as Eurocentrism. Jacquetta Hawkes rightly points out that humanity as a universal phenomenon develops on the basis of an acknowledgement of cultural diversity and of the need for interaction directed towards cooperation. A new dilemma arises in this respect, namely, how can we reconcile a particular cultural heritage or tradition with the historical legacy of different civilizations?[13] This issue becomes particularly significant in the era of globalization.

Samuel Huntington's hypothesis regarding the changes that have taken place after the end of the Cold War proposes that superpower rivalry

has been exchanged for a clash of civilizations, which means that the differences between cultures are of paramount importance today. Stated otherwise, states are now determined by the interests of their civilizations, with the West falling behind in the race against Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, and so forth. In addition, a global crisis of identity has emerged in the various forms of fundamentalism. The latter have come into existence, however, out of resistance to the still ongoing efforts of Western civilization to dominate the entire world, not from an animosity towards cultural differences. And Huntington's own statement that the world today is Arabic, Asian, African, as well as Western, contradicts his primary thesis concerning the clash of civilizations insofar as globalization has given rise to coexistence as the very condition of development in the modern world.

Huntington himself suggests an answer to the above mentioned question concerning the reconciliation of different cultural traditions with global trends in the course of cultural development. He states that world security demands the acceptance of global multiculturalism, that is, cultural coexistence in search of the shared contributions of various civilizations, in order that every culture have the opportunity to participate in "world culture." Without denying the differences between Western and other civilizations, which are primarily expressed in terms of such dichotomies as individualism/collectivism, individual egoism/solidarity, and secular/sacred, all civilizations now share both a greater possibility for intercommunication, as well as an urgent need for mutual recognition. In other words, diverse civilizations are compelled in the age of globalization to learn not only how to live next to one another, but also to live in an active interaction through the exchange of their cultural achievements.

Global culture is today the possession of all people thanks to the advanced means of electronic communication, which transmit information and cultural goods throughout the world in an instant. In such circumstances, the term "cultural heritage" has acquired a new meaning, no longer indicating tradition simply in local terms, but embracing the entirety of mankind's creations. When the latter fact is taken into account, the possible impact of cultural heritage on the improvement of human life through diverse cultural products becomes more clear. But there is one important condition in this regard, namely, that people are free to choose what they prefer to accept from the rich treasury of mankind's creations. That is to say that the practice of imposing the values of a dominant "super-culture," under the pressure exerted by the latter's own interests, must be eliminated. Only then can the global cultural heritage be used for the benefit of all.

Moreover, it is necessary to change the common approach to cultural achievements and adopt an open-minded outlook in respect to the existing diversity without having a narrow interpretation of cultural tradition. An individual or a people should be in the position to combine the accomplishments of different cultures according to their needs and preferences in terms of enlarging their capacities when transcending the

boundaries of their local cultures. It is important to rid ourselves of ethnocentric and Eurocentric conceptions of culture, and we must abandon the idea that there is one superior civilization whose model all other cultures must simply follow. The millennia-long experiences of such great civilizations as the Chinese, Hindu, and Islamic, to mention only a few prominent examples, should be carefully reinterpreted in order to reveal what can be learned from them and be included in the concept of global culture.

There are several cultural traits that stand out as prominent in the writings of well-known authors and may be added to a new conception of cultural heritage. For example, Max Weber indicates that one of the important characteristics of the Chinese socio-cultural environment was that the position of individuals in the Chinese society, even as early as the twelfth century, was more dependent on qualification and education than on wealth. That is to say that education was the main criterion of social prestige, and that the leading elites (mandarins) came into existence through education, not birth.[14] Their prestige was based on a knowledge of writing and literature, not magic rituals, and "free license" intellectuals, or philosophers, existed as the bearers of a homogeneous Chinese culture. Not only were schools open to everyone, colleges and the first academy were established as early as the eighth century. The goal of education was to provide a general knowledge and prepare individuals to accept the "way of thinking of a cultural man." Since this was primarily secular in nature, involving the provision of a "rational system of social ethics,"[15] the educators were private tutors and teachers, not priests. This inspiring approach represents, even today, a positive alternative to the style and content of education in modern Western cultures, which comprises primarily specialized learning with a reduction in the scope of general knowledge. And, insofar as official theory maintained that education, not birth, was the decisive factor in social life, Confucianism represented the codex of moral norms, political maxims, and rules of behavior for "cultural people."[16] Education thus comprised primarily an effort to improve one's own nature and what was good in oneself.

Joseph Needham also informs us that the issue of primary importance in Confucian ethics was the improvement of individual nature, and that the goal of education was to strive for what was good in oneself.[17] Needham concludes that "Cultural man is not a tool but an end in itself, that is, he is not a means for useful objects."[18] He also argues that Confucian thought declared people's prosperity and happiness to be the true goal of the state, something that is sanctioned by natural right and can be realized by good customs. However, the ability to rule is not associated with birth, wealth, and position, but depends exclusively on character and knowledge, that is, on the qualities developed by proper education. Consequently, there must be universal access to education. Needham adds that Confucianism spoke in favor of intellectual democracy by making it possible for people themselves to become the judges of truth by means of education.[19] There is

thus no distinction in early Confucianism between ethics and politics since such a doctrine implies that rulers derive their power and mandate from the will of the people, who have the "right to rebel" if the ruler does not act in accordance with this principle. As Needham indicates, "What is the satisfaction to be the ruler if nobody dares to question what he has chosen?"[20]

These ideas, which are very much missing in modern Western thought, certainly have a proper role in a global conception of culture. This is the case regardless of the radicalized "enlightened patrimonialism" of late Confucianism, which served as a pragmatic philosophy on the basis of a "cult of ancestors and family duties." These and other creations of Chinese culture, which have developed over thousands of years and still comprise masterpieces of human innovation, are much closer to the human soul and mind than the modern, predominantly technological creations that are devoid of spiritual flavor and merely serve pragmatic ends. There is no doubt but that they are worthy of being adopted in a global culture.

When Weber writes about India, he first of all observes that Hinduism has an anti-dogmatic character, which suggests that it is more a philosophical than a religious doctrine. Indeed, Hinduism involves a freedom of thought and a degree of religious tolerance greater than has ever existed elsewhere.[21] Although the Indian social structure was (and still is) based on the caste-system, with strictly determined rules for each caste (*dharma*), Hinduism declares that men determine their destinies after reincarnation, including the castes into which they will be reborn, by their own actions.[22]

The role of knowledge is also very much valued in Hinduism. Even the charisma of noble scholars, although basically connected with magic and rituals, is based on knowledge since true knowledge is the source of magic power and thought itself has a magical force. Ignorance, or the lack of knowledge, is in fact treated as a source of all evil.[23] While the *Rig-Veda* provides a codex of rituals, the *Upanishads* speak in terms of such fundamental virtues as forbearance, freedom from envy, purity, peace, a correct life, and freedom from desire (the role of *nirvana*) as providing the means for a complete liberation from the bondages of *karma* and as leading to a state of transcendence above ritual.[24]

Weber argues that Buddhism is also not religion in the proper sense because it is not interested in whether or not god exists, but rather deals with salvation as the personal act of individuals that involves neither religious grace nor predestination.[25] Salvation is an absolutely personal act because it is attained through knowledge and meditation that liberate the individual from passion.[26]

And in light of the fact that the basic principle of Indian society is inequality, it is most interesting that an early idea of women's "equality" appears in the *Mahabharata*. This is clear from the following script: "A woman is half of man/ the best friend/ the source of three life goals/ even the man in great rage/ should not be crude to woman/ for remembering that

it depends on her/ joys of love, happiness and virtues/ because woman is a field which continues/ in which I is born."[27] Furthermore, women also have the right to education.

It has been demonstrated that intellectual life in India was both intense and diverse as early as the sixth and seventh centuries. Moreover, the sophisticated philosophy expressed in the *Vedas*, the *Upanishads*, the *Mahabharata*, and the *Ramayana* has not only existed for five thousand years, it continues to have great power and high artistic quality today. Hindu civilization has consistently placed great value on art and cultural life (*kama*) as well as spiritual freedom (*moksa*). This is one reason why the fundamental end of Hindu philosophy is enlightenment of the soul and liberation from the earthly bondage that hinders the realization of one's own spiritual being.

The point of this brief discussion of the ancient Chinese and Indian civilizations is to illustrate why we must not neglect the rich accumulations of different cultural heritages as we consider the idea of multicultural cooperation in the age of emerging global culture. This is particularly the case in light of the fact that Western civilization has come to display symptoms of decline in respect to the spiritual insofar as it is primarily a technological civilization oriented towards pragmatic objectives. Certain writers thus state that Euro-American culture "has lost its soul" because of the predominance of material objectives. The race for profits, with a basic emphasis on economics and daily politics, has forced culture into the background. The sole exception in this regard is mass culture, which is treated more as an arena of consumption than as a realm of cultural improvement for both individuals and society.

Even the heritage of the period of Enlightenment in Western civilization must be reassessed in order to discover the genuinely universal creations and values that should be included in a global culture. This can be accomplished only in respect to a more productive cultural interaction between different civilizations whereby we escape the danger that globalization become "Westernization" and the cultural instrumentalization of Euro-American civilization.

Cultural heritage must involve a plurality of alternatives. We must avoid imitating the "American way of life" as well as the unilateral absolutizing of Western values, including the latter's notions of human rights and liberties. If we succeed in doing so, the globalization of culture will abolish the borders between diverse civilizations and transcend ethnocentrism through a dialogue between different cultures. The latter can strengthen empathy between the various peoples around the world, providing everyone with a much better understanding of the sufferings of others. In this respect, education based on common principles and knowledge from our global cultural heritage can play a very important role in opening up the world horizon.

One must not ignore, however, the actual trends in the world today that continue to move in the opposite direction. The transnational

integration of cultural heritages still goes hand-in-hand with national disintegration because the process of globalization comprises a challenge to the question of identity insofar as it demands great changes in the patterns of everyday life. Not only does this makes it more difficult for people to identify themselves on both personal and collective levels, but an alternative model of communality cannot be seen under the banner of the "Global World."[28] For this reason, a national foundation of identity has been revived as a primordial collectivity that provides the sense of belonging lacking in the idea of an abstract (global) identity. Huntington's distinction between the conditions of civilization (as a global framework) and cultural conditions (as a particular tradition) is thus significant. But the question still remains concerning how we can reconcile these conditions without being cast into an empty abstraction in which national diversity is lost and common memory disappears as a significant element of identity.

The harmonization of common cultural values and diverse traditions must be the mainstream goal of the process of globalization in respect to culture if the latter is to indeed, become a "world phenomenon." That is to say that cross-cultural communication is a *conditio sine qua non* of this project. As Charles Taylor remarks, "When we come to know other cultures, we get insight into the limits of our own culture."[29] Consequently, if culture in a global sense is to represent the common ground for a permanent humanization of the "global world," each culture must to be open to the impact of others. Moreover, learning from other cultures helps to promote the progressive development of each culture insofar as it serves to undermine both the division between dominant and subordinated cultures as well as discrimination against so-called marginal cultures.[30] It is important to keep in mind Taylor's saying that we are obliged to respect all cultures that have shaped a society over a long period of time since they have all had something important to say to all human beings. And we must remember that we are all human beings, regardless of our physical and socio-cultural differences, which enables us to communicate and make use of all of mankind's contributions.

In conclusion, the essential feature of a global cultural heritage is that it encompasses diverse cultures and civilizations so as to enrich human life by the use and implementation of everything positive that we human beings have accomplished in our long history. Only in this fashion can globalization be of benefit to all, being transformed from a one-sided, neo-liberal distortion of society into a democratic and human-oriented worldwide development. Cultural heritage would thus acquire the full meaning of being the foundation for humanity's further progress.

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NOTES

[1] The term "transmission" does not indicate an automatic process in which socio-cultural norms and demands are accepted in terms of a passive identification. It should be emphasized that from the very beginning there is a selective accommodation to what the process of socialization offers insofar as human individuals are unique beings that arise within a long-lasting continuous development.

[2] See, e.g., Gerth and Mills 1965.

[3] Tylor 1963, p.81.

[4] Ch. Ellwood, in Kroeber and. Kluckhon, pp. 65-66.

[5] E. Cassirer, in Kroeber and. Kluckhon, p. 59.

[6] A. Kroeber, in Kroeber and Kluckhon, p. 91.

[7] M. Herskovits, in Kroeber and Kluckhon, p. 97.

[8] L. White, in Kroeber and Kluckhon, p. 137

[9] Geertz 1973.

[10] This does not raise the troublesome question that has been discussed in the social sciences concerning what comes first – society or culture – because historical evidence shows that social groups have appeared parallel to cultural creations. Nevertheless, the former could have not appeared unless certain cultural products had not already been discovered/created, such as the use of fire, the ability to make tools, learned behavior, and acquired habits.

[11] Hawkes 1963. See also such museum collections as those of La musée de l'homme in Paris, the Museum of Natural History in New York, and so forth.

[12] See Jacquetta Hawkes' "Introduction" in Hawkes and Woolley 1963.

[13] The concept of civilization is used here in terms of the great cultural heritages that have had a long-term history, such as Chinese civilization, Hindu civilization, Islamic civilization, and so forth. There are, however, various other interpretations of this concept.

[14] Weber 1959, p. 108.

[15] Ibid., p. 121.

[16] Ibid., p. 152.

[17] Needham 1962.

[18] Ibid., p. 160.

[19] Ibid., p. 8.

[20] Ibid, p. 11.

[21] Weber 1958, p. 21.

[22] Ibid., p. 120.

[23] Ibid., p. 139.

[24] Ibid., p. 178.

[25] Ibid., p. 207.

[26] Ibid., p. 213.

[27] Basham 1956, p.182.

[28] Bauman 2001, pp.125-127.
[29] Taylor 1992.
[30] See Kymlicka 1995.

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CHAPTER II

TRADITION IN MODERNITY

LEON DYCZEWSKI

DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF TRADITION

The word "tradition" is ambiguous in respect to its usage in colloquial speech, journalism, and scholarly texts.

In colloquial speech it is normally understood as all that is old, lasting, useful for a given community, and, consequently, handed down from one generation to the next. In journalism, on the other hand, tradition is usually contrasted with modernity, whereby it is taken to mean what is obsolete, old-fashioned, and stagnant, while the modern is associated with what is topical, progressive, and developed. Modernity thus supposedly supersedes tradition in every domain of life. This meaning of tradition has been taken from Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, Ludwik Krzywicki, and Max Weber. Many sociologists, psychologists, and publicists continue to understand tradition in this way even today, and they believe that it should be eliminated. Those who think in this fashion call those who support tradition either traditionalists in the pejorative meaning of the word, or fundamentalists in the sense of people who live in the past. They connect tradition with a definite attitude that they consider to be wrong.

Historians in general, along with many representatives of the social sciences, particularly sociologists and political scientists, primarily connect tradition with times gone by and with definite forms of both social relations as well as consciousness. These include barter economy, strong bonds within an extended family, neighborhood bonds, the authority of older generations, developed forms of religious expression, and the direct transmission of culture. Social scientists divide societies on the basis of such criteria into the categories of traditional (agricultural, pre-literate, tribal, religious, closed) and modern (service-industrial, democratic, secular, open, and with developed political and cultural institutions). Tradition is understood in this respect as a peculiar form of individual and social life that does not involve evaluation, instead being linked with the past and with something that is decaying.

Tradition may be understood in two ways in the social sciences, namely, either as the process (act) of transmitting, or as the contents of transmission. Tradition understood in the second sense is the same as cultural heritage, which includes values, norms, laws, beliefs, psycho-social states, behavioral patterns, artifacts of symbolic and material culture, events, historic characters, habits and customs, and institutions recorded in the culture of the given society and handed down in the processes of socialization. These elements are taken from previous generations on the

basis of their historical permanence and importance, and although they were formed in the past, they continue to function in society today. Tradition is thus everything that has been created in the past and is still alive today. Its core contents are values, the image of its own society, and a vision of its society's development. Tradition undergoes change in historical development, particularly in respect to its products, but above all in respect to social institutions, which adjust to the ever-changing political, social, and economic conditions in order to protect what is constant in society, that is, its basic values.

Tradition as the process of transmitting is the act of taking something from the past and transmitting it to the present. This is comprised of two crucial elements: 1) An emotional as well as rational attitude towards the past whereby the past is recognized and evaluated such that elements which are useful for the present and the future may be selected. 2) The peculiar ability of both individuals and the society as a whole (including the smallest social groups) to read and transmit heritage, whereby it is connect with its present and with its vision of the future. Societies master this ability to varying degrees. It may be significantly developed in a given historical period, but in another it may be weakened to the point of completely disappearing. This depends on many factors, but of primary importance in this process are the political, intellectual, and media elites.

These two ways of understanding tradition together form tradition taken as a whole. Tradition is a dynamic phenomenon, which means that it is not something ready-made that is automatically inherited from our ancestors. On the contrary, if a community or any other group wishes to have a tradition, it must create it, which often requires a great deal of effort. This begins when a given social group assumes an attitude of respect and appreciation towards the past, which at times may even comprise admiration. However, the group also has to evaluate the past critically, experience it anew, make a selection of its elements, and draw conclusions for the present and future. This is accompanied by a constant tension that exists between the present and the future, the present and the past, and different generations, which also involves changeability, permanence, and continuation. It must also be noted that the more rapidly a given society changes, the greater care it generally takes of what is constant.

In respect to such an understanding of tradition, the question of the truth or falsehood of its particular elements plays no great role. Changes may even be introduced in order to emphasize the specificity of a society. For example, royal pageantry was greatly developed during the twentieth century in Britain. While it did not exist in the past in any similar manner, today it has become not only an attractive spectacle and a profitable commercial venture, it also very well illustrates the specific character of the socio-cultural identity of British society. A contrary example is provided by Poland, where much of the behavior that was formed during the Solidarity period, which symbolized such human values as mutual aid, social justice,

solidarity, and responsibility for the common good, were later discarded. What is worse, those who profited the most from the political changes brought about by the Solidarity movement also played the greatest roles in eliminating them from the Polish cultural tradition. They even destroyed both the places and the people with whom the movement was most closely associated.

Tradition, understood as the transmission of certain issues, particularly values, as well as the process of transmission based on the ability (aptitude) to transmit, is extremely significant for both individuals and society. It records the establishment of social bonds, places them in order, and stabilizes them. It is also an important element of and a significant factor in the formation of individual and collective socio-cultural identity. Moreover, the persistence of society is expressed in tradition, which is consequently an important factor for the further development of society.

EVERYTHING HAS ITS PAST

Everything that exists has a past, and nothing can escape its grip. This is especially true in respect to culture and social life. Although the modern world in which we live seems to look only towards the future, even it cannot do without those who lived before us – without their values, beliefs, norms and patterns of behavior, events, and artifacts. Indeed, the past has likely never been as cared for in history as much as it is today, when almost everyone speaks about modernity and desires it so greatly. In the most modern societies not only have institutions been established in order to protect the past, new ones keep appearing. Magnificent museums have been built to preserve both the simplest objects of everyday use as well as masterpieces of art, including the so-called Skansen museums and reserves that have been established to protect villages. In addition, international organizations have been established in order to protect the most valuable artifacts of various societies and prevent any change to them. This is the case with the old towns in Kraców, Toruń, Zamość, and even the Wieliczka salt mine, all of which have been included in the list of Polish sites under the care of UNESCO. We clearly do not want to lose anything valuable that was created by our predecessors.

But why do we modern people wish to preserve the past within us in this manner? Does this not hinder us in building the future?

Tradition understood as both content and the process of transmission is always someone's particular tradition. This means that a particular subject, who may comprise any social group as well as society as a whole, recognizes the past, evaluates its contents, chooses certain of those contents, includes them in his own life, and then popularizes them in his community. Both the contents transmitted from the past and the very process of transmission are extremely important for a given society insofar as they ensure stability, integration, identity, persistence, a sense of value,

and the proper functioning of processes that select elements from other cultures and include them in one's own. Tradition is thus an important factor for the development of society, and it is by virtue of tradition that a society remains the same even though the people, events, and artifacts belonging to it change. And it is thanks to tradition that the basic reactions and actions within a given society remain similar over centuries. For example, it is highly likely that the Warsaw insurgents of 1944 would have participated in the November Uprising of 1831 or the January Uprising of 1863 if they had then been alive. It is also very likely that today's youth would fight for the independence and sovereignty of their country if they were endangered.

Every society that has existed for centuries has something to hand down to coming generations, including verified values and beliefs, norms and behavioral patterns that secure social order, the noble attitudes of numerous people, magnificent works of art, and memorable events. But let us imagine that the ability to hand down the comprehensive creation of previous generations has somehow been impaired or is generally evaluated negatively in a given society. This type of situation may lead to the formation of two quite different attitudes in the generations alive today.

The first such attitude constitutes not merely admiration of the past, but virtually its adoration on bended knees by certain groups. This means, of course, staying in one and the same place since one cannot go very far on bended knees. If such an attitude is dominant in a particular society, the latter is doomed to stagnation since tradition in its full meaning is not functioning and thereby lacks the dynamism needed to drive forward those who live in accordance with it.

The second attitude comprises looking solely to the future since it is supposedly only the future that counts. The past is either not studied, or only studied in a highly selective fashion, but it either case it is judged negatively and cut off from the present. This is the typical attitude of revolutionaries towards the past. A society in which this attitude is dominant sinks into chaos and is ultimately doomed to utter destruction. Representatives of social elites who popularize such an attitude, primarily intellectuals, writers, journalists, artists, teachers, and politicians, are like those naturalists who wish to observe only the crowns of trees in order to see the new shoots emerging. They refuse to look down and see that the entire splendor of the crown depends on the trunk and, even more so, on the roots.

Since tradition as a whole, understood as both heritage and the process of transmission, connects all that the past has produced with the present and the future, it is distinct from the two attitudes that have only a partial view of tradition. Tradition as a whole is characterized by a dynamism that is displayed in the fact that respect, appreciation, and, if necessary, admiration of the past is coupled with a critical appraisal whereby the past is experienced anew and conclusions are drawn from it for the present and the future. Tradition understood in this way assists those

alive today to judge the generations that have lived in the past, take from them what has been verified and approved of as good in their lives, and make mature decisions for the future. This element of maturity arises from the knowledge and experience of not only the generations now alive, but also of those that have lived in the past over the course of centuries. Decisions thus made are less exposed to mistake and failure, and the actions based upon them generally produce the anticipated results that are beneficial to society.

In contrast, actions that do not take the past into consideration and are based solely on consideration of the future merely lead to change, not development. Change that is not based on the heritage of the past of a given society is generally not well thought through, brings about chaos and uncertainty, introduces uncertainty, and ultimately does not contribute to integral development. On the other hand, holding on to the past impairs the will to build something new for the simple reason that the image of the past is more certain than the vision of the future, and man as a rule prefers keeping to what is more certain. Consequently, it is necessary to join together harmoniously the past and the future, tradition and modernity. Actions based on such a fusion ensure not only change in the present state of affairs, but its integral development as well. It is in this way that a better quality of life is created.

VALUES AS THE CORE OF TRADITION

The past and the future, tradition and modernity, constancy and development are thus not opposing states in the life of society, but are rather complementary.

Here we touch upon an issue that is extremely important for society, namely, there is something in society that is inviolable, unchangeable, and identical, which one generation hands down to the next, and deliberately wishes to do so, even though people and their living conditions change. But how far may such changes extend? Is there a limit to them, and if so, what determines it? What would happen if such a limit were crossed? Would society continue to be the same, or would it thereby have become a different society, even though it would live in the same area as before and use the same material resources?

While answers to these questions will appear through our further considerations, we must first examine precisely what is handed down by tradition from one generation to the next. This is certainly not everything that a given society has produced, but only that which determines its identity. This involves an integrated set of core cultural values and the artifacts in which they are recorded. In addition, this includes the patterns of emotional reactions, mental structures, patterns of interpersonal contacts within the society, and patterns of contacts with other societies that have been formed in relation to the other factors just mentioned. This set of values provides the basis for the integration, constancy, and development of

a given society. It not only determines a particular view of the past, present, and future in respect both to society as a whole and to the individuals and groups that comprise society, it also directs and evaluates actions and experiences. It is in relation to this set of values that individuals and the society as a whole evaluate everything that is new and strange, including both internal processes as well as changes that take place in other societies. It also determines which elements may be taken from another culture as well as those against which it must defend itself.

We most often connect the tradition of a given society with the people who have been most meritorious in its history and with the habits, rites, customs, events, and objects that have become most memorable. If one does so, however, s/he is often charged with calling that tradition into question insofar as such elements are usually interpreted in different and perhaps even contradictory ways. For example, we may well be charged with arousing controversy if, within the contemporary tradition of Polish history, we stress the significance of Józef Piłsudski, the Warsaw Uprising, and Lech Wałęsa, and not the values they expressed or fought for. While there are people who love Piłsudski and Wałęsa and consider the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 to be an act of the most fervent patriotism and heroism, there are also those who like neither of these two leaders and judge them as wrong from both military and political points of view. But if one would emphasize the values that underlie these people and events, one would have a better chance of achieving social consensus insofar as the general Polish public highly values the independence and sovereignty of their country, their language and fatherland, as well as social justice and concern for the common good. Values indeed form the core of tradition, followed in importance by the psycho-social states associated with them. Only in third place come events and artifacts, that is, habits, customs, individuals, and objects.

When these elements of tradition are taken very broadly, we identify them with culture. Let us now briefly examine the elements that exemplify Polish tradition and culture.

Polish culture contains within itself the entire history of the Polish nation, society, and state, that is, all that they have produced. It is preserved by the mechanism of tradition, or by that ability of the Polish nation to hand down everything that previous generations have achieved to those who come after them. Culture is a manifestation of identity and constancy and an omen of the future. It unites into one society everyone who acknowledges that culture and hands it down, making them Poles. Elements of Polish culture and the mechanisms of its transmission have been formed throughout Polish history, but they were most clearly crystallized in those difficult periods when the Polish state was erased from the map of Europe. During these periods values were deliberately defined and typically Polish cultural products and psycho-social features were deliberately cared for. It was also during such periods that Polish culture became the foundation of

the existence of Polish society, when Poles, wherever they were, rallied around it.

People who created and transmitted culture came into prominence as those who took care to transmit all that "makes Poland" when Poland was partitioned, during the Nazi occupation, and in the years when Poland was subjugated by the totalitarian Soviet system after World War II, that is, when the Polish nation had no sovereign authorities and administration and could not pursue its own policies or economy. The centers that created culture then became the basis of social life since only they could exist and act more or less independently. When even these were closed down, the role they had played was taken up by the Catholic Church. In such circumstances people of culture belonging to both the clergy and the laity, who handed down the basic Polish values, events, customs, and objects, became the most valued personalities. They also often played the role of politicians, such as was the case with Adam Mickiewicz, Henryk Sienkiewicz, Ignacy Paderewski, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, and Cardinal Karol Wojtyła, the late Pope John Paul II. In this respect it should be no surprise that many actors and writers became Members of Parliament in the Third Republic of Poland through the first democratic elections to be held after World War II.

Culture and tradition have frequently assumed an ideological and political role in the history of the Polish nation. They in fact replaced the government when Poland was partitioned or subjugated by an alien state. Care was taken of the role they played so that Poles, conscious of their culture and tradition, could decide upon that basis what was consistent with the Polish character and what was contrary to it. At such times it was culture and tradition that supplied the basic criteria needed to make actual decisions, form patterns of both everyday and solemn behavior, and evaluate events, people, and both political and economical systems. For example, Polish culture and tradition motivated both nobles and peasants in the Prussian sector of partitioned Poland to defend their land and till the soil with such care that the Poznań region became the granary of Prussia in spite of the fact that the soil was poor. Polish culture and tradition made people establish cooperatives and farmers' banks so that they could not be ousted by the Prussians. It was culture and tradition that made Polish women in all three sectors go into mourning after the defeat of the 1863 January Uprising, as if they had lost their dearest loved ones. They attended parties and dances wearing black clothes, and they replaced their gold and silver with iron jewelry. It was Polish culture and tradition which determined that Poland did not give up in its struggle against the totalitarian regime of Nazi Germany, regardless of the brutal violence and the overwhelming number of casualties. And after the establishment of the Communist regime, Poland waged war on it, too.

One could even say with justification that it was largely thanks to Polish culture and tradition that the fall of the Communist regime began precisely in Poland. For example, it is commonly accepted that Communist

rule was facilitated in the German Democratic Republic by what could be called the cult of the state in the former Prussia, along with the respect established in society for its organs and officials. There was less opposition in the GDR than in the Polish People's Republic, and loyalty was stronger. Such differences were decided by the differing cultures and traditions of these two nations.

Values are important in tradition as far as heritage is concerned. Events, individuals, habits, and customs, all of which are products of spiritual and material nature that express and record values, are clustered around them. This means that although values are constant, artifacts as their derivatives are changeable, being formed over and over again as they respond to the spirit of a given time. Such changes manifest the creative vitality of a society's culture, for they do not change the culture, but rather bring it up to date. A change in culture happens either when values themselves change, or when the relations that had existed between them, along with their interpretations, change significantly. The following is an example that illustrates this phenomenon.

Customs connected with Christmas Eve are exceptionally numerous and widespread in Polish culture, being charming and moving as well as full of profound meaning. They express and actualize such values as the continuous renewal of life, Jesus Christ as the one who restores life and is the life of man, cordiality and openness to other people, the family, children, peace, and joy. Polish families maintain many customs that express these values in various ways and continuously hand them down to their children. Research conducted in the 1990s by the Sociology Department, Catholic University of Lublin, concerning the meaning of objects and symbolic behavior connected with Christmas Eve revealed that a given family feels greater satisfaction in connection with Christmas Eve and Christmas Day the more they cherish such customs and are conscious of their significance. However, if the values that are contained in these customs are not realized, the customs themselves are abandoned. The discovery of this correlation illustrates that it is not the beautiful Christmas customs that are important, but rather the values that underlie them. It is the awareness of the values expressed by these customs that determines whether this important element of the Polish Christmas tradition is continued or abandoned.

Analyzing the way tradition functions in a society calls to mind the following line from Stanisław Wyspiański's drama *Wesele* (*The Wedding*): "It is not the time to feel sorry for roses when forests are burning." Roses are beautiful, make one happy, and introduce a certain mood, but they may be replaced by other flowers. This in fact is happening today, with tulips and chrysanthemums becoming popular. But forests cannot be replaced. They are an irreplaceable value as well the basic element in the environment of life. Eliminating them brings upon us the danger of death.

Customs are like roses, and values are like forests. Just as forests cannot be replaced by anything else in nature, values are the basis of

identity and permanence in the life of societies and manifest the most profound meaning of life. The life of society falls apart without values. Customs enrich that life, making it more beautiful, pleasant, and joyful. And just as every country must protect its forests, not allowing them to be cut down and destroyed, it must protect its values and the relations that embody them. But customs may change, just like flowers, and it is such change that manifests the vitality of a given society's culture.

THE PAST AS THE BASIS FOR BUILDING THE FUTURE, OR REFLECTIVE MODERNITY

The past, present, and future, the old and the modern, permanence and development, all are contained in tradition understood as the transmission of something and as the act of transmitting. While development is expressed in the appearance of new spiritual and material products, values and the interrelations between them that are specific to a given society remain intact. The ability of each living generation to read, formulate, interpret, experience, and realize the values they find in their society is of the greatest importance. Each generation is also called upon to create new customs, events, and objects around them, thereby actualizing and recording values that do not undergo essential change. Tradition understood in this way is a mechanism that protects society against stagnation and chaos and stabilizes its development.

The attitude towards the past plays a very important role in society. Today it is shaped above all by people who participate in public life, primarily politicians, intellectuals, and people of the media. If they evaluate the past of their society as wrong, or, even worse, falsify, deform, or ridicule it, they weaken the social will to learn about the past as well as the ability to hand down even its most precious elements to the next generation. Tradition itself is then weakened, which leads to an intensification of the conflict between generations and to the destabilization of cultural and social identity. This produces chaos and halts development.

The past does not demand that living generations kneel before it in admiration. This would be too easy to do as well as too little. The past rather demands that we reflect on it personally, making evaluations, experiencing it, defining which values are essential to it, and drawing conclusions from it for building the future. Generations living in the present are then firmly identified in respect to the past, but also strongly involved in building the future. When such an attitude is dominant in a particular society, then its harmonious development is secure. Even if rapid political, economic, or social changes would occur, the culture of the society in question would maintain its specificity. It would thereby be preserved as an important element in the culture of a particular cultural circle and of human culture as a whole.

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CHAPTER III

TWO FORMULATIONS OF MODERNIZATION IN THE MOVEMENT OF REFORMING ISLAM

NIYAZI MEHDI

Not only is the movement to reform Islam centuries old, but intellectuals and reformers from a number of different traditions within the faith have taken part in it. However, the arguments in favor of modernization that have been put forward by the supporters of secularization have been and continue to be received by both ordinary believers and the ideologists of religion as the intrigues of people who are secretly atheist. This fact is evident from the experience of contemporary Turkey. But certain deeply religious intellectuals, such as Sheikh Afgani and Ahmed Agaoglu, have also taken part in the efforts to reform Islam. It hardly seems plausible to accuse such figures of covert non-belief.

Muslim religious leaders have one quite cogent objection to the expression "modernization of Islam," namely, Divine Revelation cannot grow obsolete and is always actual. But this objection appears to be well-grounded only in regard to those supporters of a secularized society who tend to ignore human religious experience.

But there is no question that the issue of modernization can also be expressed from the viewpoint of theology, albeit in a somewhat different formulation. In this case, the objection just mentioned loses its sting insofar as the expression "modernization of Islam" could be replaced by "modernization of the understanding and reception of Islam." The eternal actuality of the Divine Book is thereby postulated in relation to the fact that the human perception of Islam may become outdated and obsolete as circumstances change.

Clerics can of course judge this formulation to be merely another trick of secular minds. That is why it is has become quite necessary for people in the Islamic world to understand the following situation: There are supporters of secularization for whom religion occupies an insignificant place in spiritual life, and who may in fact be atheists. However, there are other supporters of secularism who are deeply religious. Both types have historically been present in the Muslim world, even though the widely held opinion is that all supporters of secularism are secretly atheists.

But the ideas of reform in Islam are still actual, and perhaps popular opinion among Muslims will finally come to appreciate them as productive during the twenty-first century. In order for this to happen, however, the position of religious intellectuals who support the secularization of society must be strengthened. This can be supported by a

number of lines of argumentation, of which the following is a significant example:

1) The secularization of society weakens the authoritarian or totalitarian understanding of Islam. The humanization of Islam requires a narrowing of religious spiritual activity in the horizontal dimension in order to open up and expand the vertical space of Islam as a channel for the transmission of spiritual energy from the Transcendent (Geib Alemi). Indeed, a situation of infinite reproduction that profanes sanctity could come about precisely through horizontal expansion.

2) It is necessary to revitalize the classic ideas of such Muslim philosophers as Al Farabi, Nassireddin Tussi, and others concerning the plurality of religions. Different religions should be viewed as alternative ways to the One God, and they must not be judged as true or false, moral or immoral. God gave religion to all peoples taking into account their differing natures and spiritual situations.

3) The Muslim thus does not need proof of the superiority of Islam in order to love his religion. This view has been particularly developed by the contemporary Azerbaijan philosopher Rahman Baydalov. Does love for one's own country and language need to rely on arguments for their superiority over all others?

4) The various religions are different "languages" that express the Transcendent in their various different ways. Indeed, that which a given religion expresses might not be capable of expression through another. This does not imply, however, the absolute superiority of one given religion over another since every developed religion is characterized by both advantages as well as deficiencies in respect to such expression. For example, Judaism and Islam express the monism of the Transcendent more clearly than all other religions. The relative "deficiency" of Christianity in this respect is compensated for by its maximization of the emanation and incarnation of the Transcendent. The importance of this emphasis for religiosity is evidenced by the fact that Sufism in Islam and Cabalism in Judaism are directly concerned with this aspect of expression.

5) The inevitable branching out of all developed religions into sects may be viewed as the result of a Divine design. That is to say that a specialization takes place within a given religion by means of a plurality of sects such that it becomes possible to address spiritual problems and tasks that cannot be expressed within the systems of other religions or other sects.

The religious experience of mankind has not been adequately studied in regard to its original contributions. Today, for example, we do not even have a clear grasp of the specific importance of Islam for human spirituality, that is, we do not clearly understand the new types of spiritual problems and tasks that Islam has presented to the world. Many theologians when speaking of the specific spiritual merits of Islam often ascribe to it features that it in fact shares with other religions, such as the morality of abstinence and the denial of pride.

6) A dialogue between religions creates conditions favorable for identifying their differences and commonalties. In addition, other religions, as languages expressing the Transcendent, can foster the maturation of elements implicit in one's own. For example, to read Islam from the perspective of Judaism or Christianity can reveal meanings that are not accessible through the system of reading or decoding that is typical of Islam, and conversely. This type of process has always taken place in history, but it has frequently been used as a means for criticizing the "other" religion. There is indeed much criticism of Islam from the viewpoint of Christianity, and from the position of Islam against the latter. Nevertheless, one unintended variation of this process has been the emergence of readings that did not comprise criticism, but were rather the development of new meanings.

7) Freedom of religion in society may lead to the stimulation of religious thinking and thereby generate renewal within individual religions.

This line of argumentation could be continued at some length. It suffices at this point, however, to reiterate that such ideas can serve to support a reform in our understanding of Islam and a modernization of the ways in which it is received by Muslims.

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A PHILOSOPHER'S JOURNEY TOWARDS THE SPIRITUAL GOAL OF MAN

MAGDALENA DUMITRANA

> The task of our time is to provide direction and motivation for life; to inspire meaning for the many technical and communicative human creations; to provide norms and balance for interaction with the local, global and indeed galactic environment; to explore the true dignity and creativity of personal and social life in our time; and to do all this by renewing and unfolding the import of the divine origin, sacred meaning and transcendent goal of all.
>
> George F. McLean, *Ways to God,* p. 3.

The present discussion will investigate the work of the American philosopher, George F. McLean, as presented in his *Ways to God*.[1] This text exemplifies his constant endeavor to find the meaning of humankind's development, primarily in the philosophical thinking of the various historical civilizations. Professor McLean's intention has not been to construct a comparative philosophy, but rather to search for what is common in today's global interaction between religiously-based civilizations, insofar as this may help to identify a shared goal and contribute mutually to efforts at its attainment. We might thus become more aware of our final aim, namely, reunification with and in the Divine, as the primary Source of the world reveals Itself with greater clarity to the human mind.

This philosophical pilgrimage begins with Professor McLean's meditation upon the ideas of Mohammad Iqbal, an Islamic thinker of the first half of the twentieth century, which have accompanied him in his inner journey as both companion and guide. He states that "the long road to the other side of the world had brought me finally home to the foundational truth of my own philosophical tradition.... This recalls the history of Abraham, our common father in faith. Here, I would like to investigate the possibilities of such an approach for the thought of Mohammad Iqbal, following broadly his three stages: (a) faith or belief (b) thought or rational understanding and (c) personal discovery and assimilation" (13).

AT THE CROSSROADS OF TIME

McLean affirms that the human mind now finds itself on a threshold where a decision must be made concerning not only the further

path of reason, but the very path that mankind as a whole must take. Mankind has already traversed two millennia according to the Christian calendar and is beginning a third. If in the first millennium man directed himself to the divine criteria that he took as a guide for both mind and soul in philosophical meditation, religious observance, as well as daily life, the second millennium was lived to a great extent in a quite different fashion, whereby man increasingly transferred the place of worship from the cathedrals of God to the cathedrals of the mind (1). The measure of all things was thus given a substance and a name, namely, human reason. But as the great thinkers of the second millennium built rational and credible models and sowed trust in and admiration for the human mind, the attention paid to reason eventually became absolute as well as absolutist. Reductionist rationalism thereby came to reign with strong authority over human spirituality, and in conquering the mind it subordinated the person, forcing him/her to leave the Divine.

This line of thinking leads us to the conclusion that this irrational adventure of philosophical rationalism has totally compromised the idea of progress. The final implications of this reductionist rationalism became clear in the closing century of the second millennium, which was marked by wars hot and cold, pogroms and holocausts, and the destructive exploitation of both humankind and the environment (2). But this situation has now begun to change insofar as people, refusing to walk any further on a road that has proven itself to be destructive, are now experiencing a desperate and urgent need for a new way to proceed. Humankind understands that progress can no longer be designed in the exclusive terms of the material support of life.

The new model that is needed can obviously not be provided by the second millennium with its failed sense of progress, for it has forgotten both God and nature. But neither can we return to the attitude of the first millennium, whereby we would concentrate upon God but be less aware of the human quality of mankind. As we face new challenges on the threshold of the third millennium, we are in fact facing new opportunities as well. McLean argues that these new possibilities reside in a zone of simultaneous cooperation within humanity, on the one hand, and, on the other, between mankind, nature, and God (2).

The starting point and fulcrum of this new direction in development must be God's creative power. Man must reunite himself with God, and the path leading to this reunification is necessarily constructed by the interweaving of good and beauty through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Religion will in this way strengthen its transformative value, enabling man to become both more holy and more social as well.

But nothing from mankind's experience can be left behind. The first step forward can only be the revival of the experience of the sacred as it is expressed through history by the various cultures and civilizations of the world.

PATHS OF RESEARCH

The third way or modality that is required in the third millennium represents a new instrument for searching, verifying progress, and finding. However, one must be cautious not to repeat the error of the previous millennium, whereby the research tool was taken to be the object that exclusively fulfilled rational and material conditions. To understand better what this means in McLean's conception, it is useful to assume for a moment the Oriental philosophical perspective insofar as it simultaneously considers the object, the context, and the movement. This means to see the fulfillment and the fulfilled in one and the same brush stroke – the path, the traveler, the movement, and the finality taken together. McLean also specifies that both the instrument of finding and the finding itself must subordinate themselves to God without any attempt to include or use Him. He explains the characteristic features of this research method as follows:

1) It connects from the past in order to bring forward the achievements of humanity, particularly its discoveries concerning the deepest meaning and furthest horizons of life;

2) It displays the ability of mankind to pioneer and create new realms;

3) It points forward, thereby revealing an active, dynamic newness;

4) The way that is sought leads not to alien places, but to our true home in which we find our deepest peace, contentment, and fulfillment

5) It leads to God, Who not only is immanently present in our inner hearts, but Whose transcendence opens before us both limitless possibilities and the prospect of definitive fulfillment (4).

In this conception the philosophical mind implies God, but does not use Him. It rather follows Him and even absorbs His manifestations, that is, the diverse ways through which He makes Himself known in different civilizations. However, the philosophical mind also both analyzes and contemplates the similarities between these diverse paths, viewing them in convergence and not in parallel or juxtaposition.

However, the philosophical mind must avoid the trap of descending into the abstract, into essences. The essential, the necessary, and the universal are to be converted into a discourse that expresses what is existential and unique in the free creative exercise of life (5).

Proceeding in this manner requires research and meditation on many different levels and on many different paths, composing a single way to God by fusing the one with the other. These include the following:

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN BEING

McLean views Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development, his and Lawrence Kohlberg's theories concerning the stages of moral development, and James Fowler's application of these theories to religious

development as not only significant for understanding personal psychological development, but also as being of value for understanding the progression in a people's consciousness of God and His manifestation in their social life. We should add that what may be termed psychological diversity facilitates the comprehension of cultural diversity.

The stages of cognitive, emotional, moral, and religious development are visible in both the individual and in the community (nation). In this respect, it is valuable to follow the ways in which earlier and simpler modalities of awareness are subsumed in the later and more elaborated modes, as well as the fact that these modalities are able to understand a certain content for which they are appropriate and not another that belongs to a subsequent stage of consciousness. For example, a people grows in successive steps from the primary forms of the intuition of the Divine to the stage of a philosophical understanding of God, and earlier stages of this awareness are not adequate for grasping and expressing the later.

To know these cognitive and religious phases of development in an individual or a people makes it possible to have a genuine understanding of the different modes of religious response that have been developed along the road of human progress. But focusing on mankind's capabilities must not lead to the affirmation that God is a creation of human beings, for, like a mirror or a microscope, we do not create what we observe. We rather develop multiple modes of observation in order to respond to and thereby live with, in, and by the Divine (54, 64).

THE ARCHEOLOGY OF HUMAN THOUGHT

In this regard, McLean stresses the importance of totemism and myths as stages in human religious knowledge that comprise a pre-philosophical way to the Divine. The central image in these earlier stages or paths of knowledge is the Prophet. His message to the people and their response to his message are milestones in the comprehension of the movement of thinking and the attitude toward God.

There are two major implications of such research into the relations between a people, the prophet, and God.

First, there is a new level of consciousness and self-awareness. Divine revelation through a great prophet manifests itself not as a foreign affirmation that has been imposed, which thus initiates a conflict, but rather as a revival of the community's own thinking and traditions. Divine help does not remove or supplant that culture, but purifies and strengthens it. This special help comes through the Prophet's message, evokes the spiritual life within, and enables communities to steep themselves in their own cultural traditions, thereby discovering new and somehow different meanings for enriching their present lives on a new level of self-knowledge. In this fashion, the Prophet's voice has nuances to which one can respond fully and freely.

The reinterpretation of tradition as a response to the divine message conveyed by a prophet does not take place only on the emotional plane, without any cognitive contribution. Indeed, it brings about a greater self-understanding and a more profound grasp of the genuine essence of one's own freedom in a new awareness (146-147).

Second, there is a new attitude in the appreciation of otherness. This implication of the pre-philosophical stage of the road toward God is an effect of the actualization of the interior-exterior relationship within a community. The times in which we live demand a particular emphasis on the intensification of communication and interaction between peoples. Within this context it is important to have a correct understanding not only of the roots and the development of traditions, but especially of how civilizations that derive from prophets and religious traditions can establish relations with each other. A particularly valuable role can be played in this respect by hermeneutics, not only in order to reformulate our own expressions within our own horizon, but also to receive new formulations that emerge from the points of view of other cultures regarding the common truths about our divine origin and divine goal as part of God's plan.

As this takes place, exchanges between different traditions will lose their initial and superficial character as a threat to one's own identity. On the contrary, the cultural pilgrimage that encounters such new reformulations will be able to structure new forms of cooperation and understanding.

SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHICAL WAYS TO GOD

a) After an examination of Greek philosophy through the eyes of the Church Fathers, who discovered new paths to spiritual understanding through their discovery of the existential character of being, McLean gives closer consideration to the thought of the Middle Ages, particularly from within the dwelling built by Thomas Aquinas, whose philosophy is the classic expression of an *a posteriori* way to the Absolute. By organizing the different degrees of participation in the Divine, Aquinas succeeded in approaching life through a philosophical modality that locates it within a systematic structure of participation in the Transcendent. McLean analyzes each of the five ways of reasoning he identifies in Aquinas' utilization of the metaphysical method for the development of an *a posteriori* form of argumentation that paradoxically opens the way to *a priori* reflection and insight. He points to the following implications of the Thomistic approach as being of particular significance:

1) In a global sense, the creative Source transcends the effects created by all aspects of His existence. The beings created (composed) as diverse and distinct participants are not, however, in competition with each other, but rather cooperate in such a way as to be able to express together in this world the Divine. God's power is manifested not in making up for any deficiencies in His creatures, but by endowing His creatures with the ability

to seek both their perfection and His glory to the full extent of their natures (203).

2) Only God possesses absolute perfection, thereby being self-sufficient. But man is not abandoned to his imperfection, for his autonomy and integrality are founded in his Divine source, which he in turn must reflect. Having received these gifts, man has the duty to identify and manifest them, both as individual and as community. There is no doubt that all humans are precious beyond question, and it is the duty of people to act together in consort as a society in order to protect that dignity and promote those rights, both individually and socially (206).

The aim of life is transcendent. This does not mean that man appears as the ultimate goal in relation to which God is his Source and Support. It rather means that God is man's Aim and ultimate Goal. Man's relation with God is no longer to be mediated through other beings, such as the prophets, but is rather a face-to-face relationship, the context for which is unity and harmony through love.

This approach makes visible a way of a dialogue between religions in which all are invited to debate the goal and meaning of life. By gaining an awareness of the relation between life and a transcendent Good, Who is the infinite Source and Aim for everyone, man as both person and social whole will be able to act freely in the endeavor to gain perfection. This unites and gives life to all in the exercise of their freedom. This is most significant for the transition to democratic modes of life in that it enables a sense of harmony to become the dynamic basis for civic responsibility and social cohesion (7).

b) However rich Western philosophy might be, it strives to attain the same spiritual existence as Oriental philosophy. Islam thus finds itself today facing similar issues, which need to be analyzed in a particular way on the basis of its own specific and unique resources.

One of the greatest figures in Islamic thought is the jurist, theologian, and mystic Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, who provided Islamic theology with a philosophical foundation. Familiar with both Neoplatonism and Aristotle, whose works on logic impressed him greatly, he constructed a personal philosophical way that was founded on the path to Divine indicated by Islam. Although one of the greatest Sufi mystics, Al-Ghazali carefully emphasized the profound meaning of external action, examining the interior link between ritual purity, devotion, prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, social life, and acts of destruction. He argued that control over these elements facilitates the development of mystical life on the road to salvation.

What drew McLean's attention to Al-Ghazali's Sufi mysticism was, first of all, the threefold hierarchy of knowledge of the Divine, namely, knowledge by faith on the basis of one's trust in his spiritual master, indirect knowledge acquired by reasoning, and direct knowledge through inner belief in God beyond any exterior knowledge.

A second important issue was the "infusion" of prophetism at all three levels of knowledge, with the Prophet having experienced most completely the direct link with God, which is the goal of Sufism. Deepening this aspect of his philosophy, Al-Ghazali refers to three elements concerning prophecy, that is, its possibility, its existence, and its realization by a particular person.

In analyzing Al-Ghazali's theological and mystical conceptions, McLean finds connections of both time and space between Arabic Islam and Europe. This created a common field for the manifestation of spiritual thinking, within which an exchange of questions and answers to common problems took place. However, this dialogue developed not only in the historical past, but also resonates even in modernity:

> In modern times attention to reason has degenerated into rationalism, accompanied by a desicating lack of adequate attention to the life of the spirit. Indeed, the triumphs of rationalism in the 20th century have been characterized by an oppressive totalitarianism and a deadening consumerism. These deficiencies of rationalism call for Ghazali's clear proclamation of the distinctive character of the spirit and of the way which leads thereto... But healing our times must begin with the spirit and the Way... This suggests, then, that the goal of Ghazali for our times would be that reason be inspired by, and directed to, life in the Spirit. This, in turn, would enable the progress of reason truly to serve men and women not only as images, but indeed, as intimates of God. This is the central message of Ghazali, if not for his day, then certainly for ours. Perhaps not surprisingly then, at the end of this millennium it is precisely the message of the Encyclical of John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio* (263-264).

The general conclusion drawn from Al-Ghazali's work and life refers to the mode of living in society within God.

Another great philosophical mind from whom Professor McLean has drawn inspiration is Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Din Muhammad al-Shirazi). If Al-Ghazali represents the archetypical Islamic mystical path to God, Mulla Sadra constitutes the archetypical existential way (235). While the first departs from philosophy, the second corrects it, criticizing it as having been focused excessively upon essence. Mulla Sadra thereby offers philosophy a way forward through a revival of the sense of existence.

Uniting philosophy with Shi'ite theology, Mulla Sadra constructed what he called "metaphilosophy," beginning with existence as the sole constituent of reality. Although reality and existence are identical, existence nevertheless has different degrees of intensity, a gradation that Mulla Sadra terms the "systematic ambiguity of existence." That is to say that while

existence occurs in all things, the latter differ as anterior or posterior, perfect or imperfect, and so forth. In addition, substantial motion, which is another essential concept, is continuous and always directed towards perfection. As an epistemologist, Mulla Sadra also examines the identity of the intellect with the intelligible as well as the identity of the intellect with existence. He argues that as knowledge acquires successive intelligible forms, the human intellect moves towards identity with the transcendent Active Intellect.

But the philosophy of existence does not deny mystical experience insofar as both are aspects of one and the same thing, together constituting the intellectual content of philosophy. McLean views Mulla Sadra's philosophy, with its strong metaphysical character, as comprising a vital inspiration in the search for answers to the challenges facing mankind today. He summarizes as follows the ideas that can be most beneficially applied to the tasks we must now carry out:

1) Mulla Sadra's philosophy of existence focuses attention on the concrete particular person;

2) His integrating sense of finality as orientation to the Absolute Good gives a sense of purpose, for God's creative act is both efficient cause, making us to be, and final cause, drawing us to him in love;

3) His dynamic movement in substance enables an intense sense of development and progress;

4) His systematic ambiguity opens new horizons of diversity and unity in this age of cultural globalization (281).

c) Within the Way developed by systematic philosophy, modern and contemporary philosophy has introduced a third direction or method in the analysis of the path taken by the human spirit (reason, sentiment, moral value).

McLean observes that although the great philosophical systems at the beginning of the twentieth century were constructed in the terms of the intellectual tradition, philosophers have gradually come to understand the inadequacy of the objectivist approach and now display a renewed interest in the valences of subjectivity. Of the figures in question, Heidegger, with his discussion of homecoming as a specific feature of the path to God, is especially significant for McLean. He also finds Martin Buber, with his dialogue of liberty between man and God, and Gabriel Marcel, who opens up the problem of participation as communion with God, to be particularly valuable. Indeed, insofar as modern scientific thinking neglects the human being as such (as internal spirit), there is a need to develop further and enrich Martin Buber's "I-Thou" path of investigation.

SYNTHESES

McLean's philosophical pilgrimage brings to light questions raised in a particular time and space as well as probable answers founded on other

space and time coordinates. It thereby stimulates lines or methods of meditation that remain continuously actual or are capable of being reactualized. These methods may be synthesized in three interrogative aspects: 1) What are the conditions for the use of these (systematic and hermeneutic philosophical) tools? 2) How can they develop the heritage of wisdom regarding the Divine, including human participation in the Divine, in order to aid people in finding their way in today's period of intensive development? 3) What implication does the new interpersonal sensitivity have for the philosophical undertaking? (316)

Answers to these interrogations require:

1) The coordination of philosophical resources that assist the person not only in re-founding him/herself in the One, but also in connecting life to the Absolute and in developing the meaning of that life for social cohesion, justice, and progress.

2) The new awareness of the person and of the interactions between human beings must be extended to include the very scientific and technological capabilities that threaten to depersonalize the human being (as their creator). Consequently, the real problem is whether and how this order of nature actually relates to the area of freedom one has in the Divine and, in addition, the degree to which one can exercise a creative freedom in imaging the Divine in the technological area. This involves no contradiction insofar as humanity, in striving towards further self-realization, is always striving towards a new participation in the infinite perfection of the Divine (317-319).

3) The philosophical thinking and experience of each person cannot reach their goal in God without the other's thinking and experience as well. This communion has different forms of expression in different temporal spiritual life experiences, including the self-assumed mission of a Bodhisattva and the Christian concept of participation, which involves the appreciation of all human beings as children of the same Father.

Philosophical thinking, as expressed by Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel, leads to the development of the I-Thou relation as participation in the Absolute in at least three modes: 1) I-Thou relations require and participate in an I-Thou relation; 2) The I-Thou relation is achieved in I-Thou relations; 3) Living is not sharing in God and returning to Him, but rather sharing His truth and goodness with our neighbors.

This last aspect uncovers the present mode of human realization. Moreover, this type of response may serve as a criterion for the authenticity of a contemporary philosophy of participation in the fullness of being (321-322).

FROM PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION TO SOCIAL REFLECTION

The human mind's movement from philosophy to life is realized by the intermediary of the social community. If the I-Thou relationship renders the I-You (They) relation intelligible and capable of being utilized, things may be altered concerning participation in the We.

Once one understands the moral autonomy of being in the Kantian sense, the question becomes how this autonomy-freedom reflects itself in the interior of a particular cultural tradition. A given cultural tradition can mediate the exercise of freedom in such a way that, on the one hand, the secular rebellion against God is avoided and, on the other, the installation of either chaos or authoritarianism in civil society is prevented. Stated otherwise, the question is whether the culture of civil society is capable of constituting a harmonious context for a democratic freedom as well as a foundation for the exercise of a person's autonomy in his quality as a creature of God.

If the values and virtues of a people construct the pattern of social life, or culture, through which freedom is develop and exercised, is it then possible that this cultural tradition also constitutes another path to God? (339) The answer is an unequivocal "yes" due to the fact that a cultural tradition is not merely an accumulation of facts, but rather what is significant for human life. It reflects the cumulative achievements of a people in discovering, mirroring, and transmitting the deepest meaning of their lives (341). Harmoniously unifying the synchronic and diachronic aspects of life, tradition makes it possible for social groups to determine by themselves their direction of movement and to activate social consensus towards the progressive construction of the community. Moreover, cultural heritage offers to society the criteria for evaluating social life, which enables it to pursue its true good and avoid what is socially destructive (359).

Civil society is also founded upon the structure of the cultural tradition, upon which it develops its specific traits of sovereignty in governance, solidarity, and subsidiarity.

These two important levels on which social life develops, namely, cultural tradition and civil society, have today determined a new nucleus of tension upon whose resolution the harmony of social movement depends. Consequently, a most important issue is to make people capable of finding inspiration within their own heritage, which is constituted through personal and social assessment, or through free decisions elaborated through the ages. It is through the mediation of that heritage that people construct responses and resolutions for concrete circumstances. This mode of thinking means that a nation takes up its own history and becomes a part of it (361).

But in order to make full use of these capabilities for vitalization and free social movement, certain indispensable elements must be in place.

The first prerequisite is the dimension of transcendence, whereby tradition does not remain merely something that belongs to the past, but becomes a background for new applications. A tradition highlights the religious character of human life to the extent that the dimension of transcendence reflects the Creator and His Goal.

It thus follows that modern civil society, in order to avoid external dependence as well as that which is destructive in its course of development, needs to discover once again its rootedness in the corresponding cultural tradition, to re-interpret meanings in agreement with the concrete context, and, without abandoning the force lines that form the framework for the specific identity of any community, to view progress as fully accomplished in the transcendent dimension. It is most significant that the transcendent may be best experienced by opening towards the other. This opening, as participation and sharing, contains two essential aspects:

1) Respect for and participation in one's own culture, in that the deprecation of oneself and of one's own traditions cannot provide solid ground for a genuine openness. Without an appreciation of one's own worth there would be nothing to share, no way to help, and not even the possibility of acknowledging the good of the other.

2) An approach towards cultural exchange that involves an acquisition of common values. Although the elements of one's life when viewed in isolation may seem to be local customs, they must be considered as modes in which a person lives within essential human values, which include truth and freedom, love and beauty. Moreover, one comes to realize that a genuine reception of these transcendental gifts resides in sharing them in loving concern in order that others may realize them as well (376).

Living within the transcendent that resides in mankind's life in, with, and towards God, which comprises the religious reconstruction of life in the present, is the only secure means for violence to give way to peaceful transformation, or to a transformation of reconciliation and forgiveness.

McLean observes that this may well provide the means for Isaiah's prophecy to be realized, whereby each and every nation, with its own culture, takes its own path to the Holy Mountain where God will become All in all (377).

THE ETERNAL RETURN

Many voices raised during the second half of the twentieth century claimed that philosophy lacked both power and reality, and, in fact, no longer existed. There are more than a few examples of this attitude.

In contrast, however, it has apparently been demonstrated that the philosophical mind is inherent in human cognitive development (psychologically speaking) and cannot cease its activity. That is to say that philosophy cannot disappear for the simple reason that it is a function of the human psyche. But at the same time it is obvious that philosophy today must change in respect to both its content and approach. Even metaphysics

must develop new aspects of its investigations if it is to continue attracting the interest of the human mind. McLean maintains that there is a need today not so much for a philosophy of the transcendent as for a philosophy of life in close connection with the Transcendent.

In order to be both intelligible and accessible, a philosophy of life in the contemporary world must first reconcile two positions that are too often seen as being in conflict. These are: 1) The Self as indivisible in itself and distinct from all else. It is unique, irreplaceable, unrepeatable, and cannot be exchanged for another. 2) The World as the polar element of the Self, situating the individual in time and space, directing his/her life, and providing the framework for participation in the process of knowing, both as knower and as known. The reconciliation of the Self with the World thus seems to be the key to human success or failure (385).

A second condition for an "adequate" philosophy refers to methodology. In order to extract the essence of human thinking and to utilize it in its universal signification as applied to the present, philosophical thinking must be diachronic as well as synchronic. And this is the method of argumentation McLean utilizes in his work. As he examines man's relationship with God, he utilizes both the diachronic approach in studying life from the past toward the future, but also the synchronic approach in investigating the various temporal aspects of space. McLean explains his method as follows:

> The overall order of this work is at once diachronic and synchronic. It is diachronic from the past, depicting a sequence of stages each opening its own new mode of relating to God... This sequence of ways is also synchronic, for it is not simply an account of what is past... Rather, what once was seen, remains and cumulatively provides a theoretical and practical base for what is yet to come. Moreover, as subsequent forms of thought can never adequately express all that was vividly conscious in the previous forms, the earlier ways must be retained, even in being superseded. Each remains as a building block or, better, a part of an organic system. Diachronic means not only the paths from the past to the (our) present but also the paths to the future. They give life and hope for persons and society in facing the decisive choice of good or evil in private and public life. In the past the great civilizations developed their distinctive identities precisely through such choices which constructed in the same stroke both its history and its culture. In the present global context each has its own integrating contribution to make to the cooperation between civilizations from which the future of humanity as a whole is emerging (8-9).

The third condition that essentially determines the character of "life" in a philosophy of life is the indication of the goal towards which man, as a person and as a society, must progress. The goal determines both the motivation of human activity as well as its direction, as both interior and external action. But it is also obvious that human activity, from locomotion to philosophical reasoning, is a product with an external expression that generates other products. An example of McLean's philosophical originality is his perception of the trap into which not only the body but also the spirit can easily fall. This trap resides in the fact that the goal is placed at a distance in respect to human judgment. And if it is transcendent, it can appear to be at an even greater distance, at the level of the ideal, which makes it seem intangible. McLean, however, re-directs the external image to its real dwelling place in spiritual interiority.

From this point forward, the combined diachronic-synchronic method acquires a more active significance. Once the goal and the path are established, this method allows for a strong reactualization of the values of the past as well as the present in the permanent liberty of future progress. That is to say that humankind would thereby be continuously renewed. McLean thus writes that "the ways to God are redemptive as the restoration, reorientation and recommitment of one's freedom in God" (9).

The next step forward is a similar re-commitment of society on the basis of a new understanding of its own cultural tradition, a renewal of this tradition in civil society, and an authentic dialogue between different cultural traditions. But social renewal profoundly depends on the relation of civil society with the transcendent, the vital nucleus being the reconstruction of social life upon religious foundations. Building a religious consciousness means looking for and finding an answer in respect to the present context, which needs to reintegrate heaven, humankind, and nature in order to foster the harmonious development of society's future in the third millennium (9).

Philosophical thinking now turns toward the interior as religious thinking, finally reaching its goal in the free fulfillment of creativity. Adopting a thought of Paul Tillich, McLean emphasizes that the homecoming is the final end of any philosophy, of any religion, and of human progress. The entire development of human life in all of its aspects, both diachronic and synchronic, is essentially a process of homecoming in God.

In this way generation after generation, in different spaces and cultures, do no more than repeat the same pilgrimage in search of the way back home. Supporting humankind in its restless outer movements and peregrinations through time is the deeper and increasingly conscious inner return of heart and mind to God as Source and Goal. Beneath the surface phenomena that happen only once, this is the perduring and essential that endows all with ultimate meaning. Seen in this light, individual ways are not simply alternate paths, but rather comprise a coherent texture of mankind's foundation. This provides the inspiration that consistently

encourages our creativity and supports our sacrifices, redemptively transforming both into ways to our true home. This is religion as homecoming (9).

By using the road to the self as a path to God, McLean establishes the philosophical concept of homecoming in its universal dimensions. In addition, the notion of "gift" acquires philosophical status. The meaning of history, though lived and in a great measure driven by man, is not determined by man, and this is even less so with social development. Everything, including one's very existence, is in fact a received existence, a gift. But once such a gift has been received, it is not possible either to return it, or to return its equivalent value. And the very attempt to think in terms of reciprocity signifies remaining centered upon oneself. Human nature is indeed called to a creative generosity that reflects the generosity of its Source (375). In the plane of human exchange, this means above all that others and their cultures are to be respected simply because they, too, have been given a gift by the one Transcendent Source (43).

Participation, sharing, giving, and homecoming are key notions in the philosophical pilgrimage from the sources to the Source. This is a journey under the sign of a gift, or a journey received as a gift. It is a journey that discovers and uncovers the value of man: "Let man be man; indeed, let all creatures be, for they glorify God, the Infinite and the Almighty, the Munificent and the Merciful" (197).

Bucharest, Romania

NOTE

[1] McLean, G. F. (1999) *Ways to God. The Personal and Social at the Turn of the Millennia*. Washington, DC: CRVP. All further references to this work will be indicated within the text by page number.

PART II

DIVERSITY

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS REVIVAL: RELIGION AS A GROUND OF ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

VASSIL PRODANOV

Although religious, ethnic, and national identities appear as different phenomena, they are interconnected through the participation of the person in their respective communities. In addition, these identities are intertwined, and there are rules for their interrelationships. There are times when religious identity can weaken ethnic or national identity, but they also frequently reinforce each other. Such interdependence, which has been particularly noticeable since the 1980s, finds expression in the two coincidental processes of religious and ethnic revival, which feed upon and reinforce one another. As ethnic revival or nationalism use religion as a supportive force, religion uses ethnic and national identities in its struggle to survive and regain territory.

In order to investigate these processes, it is necessary that we have preliminary definitions of ethnic group, nation, and religion. These are as follows.

An ethnic group is characterized by: 1) Cultural distinctiveness, including a common material and spiritual culture, customs, morés, rituals, dress, language, dances, cuisine, and so forth. Not all of these characteristics are present in all particular cases, but manifestations of cultural distinctiveness are always present. 2) The awareness of a common ancestral origin, a common descent, and a shared history and heritage. While this common heritage may not be demonstrable, it is sufficient that there be a belief in it, at times supported by myth or a partly fictitious history. 3) Predominantly endogamous relations and, consequently, common physical characteristics. In this sense ethnic affiliation is perceived as being "by blood." 4) The self-identification of people with an ethnic group having a proper collective name shores up a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.

The nation is a product of modernity which derives from the modern idea that a people's sovereignty is the highest sovereignty. A nation is a community that has its own state or is striving to attain some type of autonomy or independence on a territory and within borders that are perceived as the "fatherland" or "motherland." In addition, it is connected with a unified economy and a legal code concerning common rights and duties.

What is the relationship between ethnicity and nation, so defined, and religion? This depends on the definition of religion. Nationalism is a

kind of religion in respect to one type of definition, while it is something different in respect to another.

FUNCTIONAL MODELS OF RELIGION AND NATIONALISM AS A CIVIL RELIGION

There are two well-known approaches to the definition of religion, namely, the substantive approach and the functional approach.[1]

The substantive approach arises from the theoretical tradition of German phenomenology and has been most notably developed by Max Weber, Rudolf Otto, Gerardus Van der Leeuw, Joachim Wash, and Peter Berger.

According to this model, religion should be defined by what it is, that is, by the "meaning content of the phenomenon," whereby religion is the meaning system that emanates from the sacred. In principle, the substantive model delimits religion to the range of traditional theisms, such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and so forth.

The origins of the functionalist approach reside in French and British structuralism as represented by the works of Emile Durkheim, Bronislaw Malinowski, A. R. Radcliff-Brown, Talcott Parsons, Milton Yinger, Robert Bellah, Thomas Luckmann, Mary Douglas, and others. In this model, religion is defined according to what it does, that is, its role and its consequences for individual and social existence. From this perspective, religion is any phenomenon that provides a meaning system, delineates the moral coordinates of the everyday life of the individual, and justifies institutional arrangements that generate social integration. Defined in this way, a deity is not a necessary element in religion, which is then largely synonymous with such terms as cultural system, belief system, meaning system, ideology, and worldview. This wider approach covers both such well-known "religion surrogates" as Confucianism and Theravadin Buddhism, as well as all possible new sects, denominations, and religious movements, which could thus be considered as the "functional equivalents" of religion. This approach to the definition of religion has been accepted in recent decades by the American legal system so that the guarantee of religious freedom provided by the First Amendment can be extended to non-theistic ideologies.

Robert Bellah, beginning with a functional approach, developed his idea of "civil religion" as a set of meanings uniting the American nation in his now classic essay *Civil Religion in America*, as well as subsequent writings.[2] He observed that God has been invoked in every Presidential Inaugural Address with the exception of George Washington's, and maintains that there is a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals that both legitimate and limit political authority in the United States. He states that "Just as Thanksgiving Day... serves to integrate the family into the civil religion, so Memorial Day was created to integrate the local community into the national cult."[3] Bellah argues that Americans who come from

different parts of the world desperately need an active symbolic milieu in order to form and further a common national identity. The Utopian millennial expectations and the popular conviction that America was God's New Israel were important factors contributing to the transformation of the colonies into a nation. The Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address thus loom as sacred political scriptures, and the rights of the people are presenting as deriving from a transcendent source beyond the state. The ultimate transcendent ground is God, and it is no accident that even the most unorthodox Founding Fathers were religious believers, even though they used such more general and indefinite terms as "Almighty Being" or "Infinite Power."[4]

While Bellah's ideas have provoked a long series of debates, comments, and criticism, transcendent sources have indeed been used to substantiate the notion of the American nation and to legitimize the activity of the political power. This has been the case even more openly and actively in the years since Bellah penned his famous article. For example, Bill Clinton's first Inauguration Day began with an impressive ecumenical prayer service, and the President was surrounded throughout the day by religious leaders.

The similarities between religion and nationalism and the ability of nationalism to assume the place of religion were observed long ago. During the secularization process, for instance, traditional religions were pushed aside while nationalism assumed functions earlier realized by religion. It could be said that the domain of the sacred was transferred in this way from the traditional gods to the nation, something that was already evident in the French Revolution. The latter declared itself against religion, which it considered to be a fraud, but at the same time it established a cult of the "Higher Being" within the context of a nascent secular nationalism.

Nation and nationalism have a number of characteristics that are similar to those of traditional religions and perform the same functions.

1) Both traditional religions and the nation play the role of the highest and transcendent sources of normative systems, legitimizing both the political power of the authorities and the moral behavior of the people. For example, the "will of the nation" and the "popular vote" legitimize political power as religion earlier legitimized the rights of kings. At the same time, duty and loyalty to the nation override all other duties and loyalties. Sacrifice for the nation is even more urgent than sacrifice to God because, at least in Christianity, God does not demand that people die in His name.

2) Both traditional religions and the nation have similar symbolic and ritual systems that connect everyday profane life with a higher sacred or transcendent reality. The organization of many national holidays, for instance, resembles traditional religious holidays. In addition, the symbols of religion are included in culture and interact with all other symbols, including the symbols of national and ethnic identity.

If a religion is strongly rooted in a culture, it plays an even larger role in ethnic and national identity. Religion and nation then exchange their symbols and mutually support each other. When there is a drive to inculturate religion, the latter becomes a means to support national or ethnic identity. Nationalism then utilizes traditional religious symbols in the effort to develop strong national loyalty and devotion.

But major religions go beyond nations, being included in cultures before the rise of nations. Religions can thereby serve as the ground for the development of national identity, but not conversely. Religious distinctions and conflicts not only precede national distinctions, they may even identify the boundaries between different nations.

3) Such important religious characteristics as the notions of "chosen people," captivity, golden age, promised land, and so forth, are included in the self-perception of nations. A. Smith points out that:

> In a world of nations, each nation is unique; each is "chosen." Nationalism is a secular, modern equivalent of the pre-modern, sacred myth of ethnic election... Chosen peoples were formerly selected by their deities; today, they are chosen by an ideology and a symbolism that elevate the unique and the individual and transform them into a global reality. In former days, peoples were chosen for their alleged virtues; today, they are called to be nations because of their cultural heritages.[5]

Members of an ethnic group thus feel themselves to be members of a unique community with irreplaceable values. Myths of distant origins, memories of captivity, and a golden age of former glory nurture a sense of uniqueness and mission, of ethnocentrism and pride. This is inseparable in many cases from a certain degree of religious justification. For example, the Jewish idea of "Egyptian captivity" appears to refer to a universal type in the process of nation-building nations. The Russians have their "Mongol captivity," the Balkan Slavic nations their "Ottoman captivity," the Americans their "British captivity," and so forth.

And the Jews were by no means the only people to have believed that they were "chosen." Various versions of this myth can be found almost everywhere insofar as it provides a sense of cultural superiority to aliens. For instance, the Armenians cultivated pride in being the "first Christian nation" after their rift with Byzantine Orthodoxy. This belief in ethnic election and divine mission was an important factor for the survival of the Armenian ethnic group, including the Armenian diaspora. Russian nationalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was nurtured by the idea of Moscow as the "Third Rome." The building of Soviet identity and Soviet national pride was grounded in the idea of a nation that had made a unique breakthrough in world history and became the homeland of socialism. The Welsh myth of election is rooted in the idea of being a

community of descendants of the lost tribes of Israel. The Puritan feeling of being a chosen people and living the sacred history of a "new Israel" exercised strong integrative force in the development of the American nation. These are but a few examples of this phenomenon.

4) In Tonnies' classic distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, nation and religious community are two larger *Gemeinschaften* that transcend the direct relations characteristic of family and kinship. However, they resemble kinship relations and offset family as well as kinship relations. Both church and nation are presented as large families, and they bring the warmth associated with communities of brethren. They have common predecessors, forerunners, and ancestors, and give prominence to realizing the ideal of fraternity. The discourse of these two communities is in fact a language that describes family. For example, the Church is the "bride" of Jesus Christ; Muslim fundamentalists call themselves "Muslim brotherhoods"; the form of address between people during the struggle for national liberation in the Balkans was "brother."

Nationalism is a type of faith in an everlasting life through membership in a nation that represents the continuity of the extended family from one generation to the next. In an age when both traditional kinship and family relationships are in crisis, when people move into towns and in the process of industrialization lose their traditional roots, when religion with its belief in an after-life is in decline in the face of secularization, nationalism has a special appeal as a secular transformation of fatality into continuity and of contingency into meaning. It serves as a way to regain one's deep grounding, to see in the myriads of unknown people of the growing industrial civilization the old kinship relations that perhaps have already disappeared.

5) Both traditional religions and the nation place a strong emphasis on the roles of past, tradition, and history as factors for identification. Through them people live in history and with history. The idea was very popular in the 1960s that modern societies and persons change their orientations, that their behavior is governed less by customs, rules, and images from the past than by images of the future. Tofler described in his now famous *Future Shock* the bewilderment, disorientation, and dismay of persons who have been overwhelmed by the rush of the future into their lives. From the 1970s to the 1990s appeals to the past and to tradition, embodied in religion and nationalism, become ways to deal with such "shock" and rediscover a sense of balance that had been lost.

6) The major causes for religious revival, such as the disruption of other communities, social insecurity, the rise of non-material values, and so forth, have evoked ethnic and nationalist revivals as well.

The replacement of traditional religions by nationalism, which has assumed the functions previously carried out by religion, is notable in strongly secularized or multi-religious societies. The "civil religion" of nationalism has taken the place of traditional religion, filling the void created by the absence of a common religion. For example, the Bulgarian

king Boris I forcibly introduced Orthodox Christianity into Bulgaria during the ninth century in order to homogenize and unite the various Slavic and Bulgarian tribes into a single community. Mobutu's regime had a similar goal when he attempted to propagate and inculcate a common "Zairian" symbolism and religion in a conscious effort to weld disparate ethnic groups and ethnic categories into the new nation of Zaire that would be free of the previous ethnic strife.[6]

Religion and nationalism play similar roles when viewed through the prism of functional definitions. Official secular nationalism in fact takes over the functions of traditional religions when the latter have been isolated from the state and are ignored.

A SUBSTANTIVE MODEL OF RELIGION AND TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RELIGION AND NATIONALISM

The substantive model of religion includes all traditional deistic religions, but leaves aside nation and nationalism. It is from this point of view that the issue of the interrelationship between nationalism and religion, between national and religious communities, arises.

Each person has many roles and identities connected with different social groups, institutions and realities, such as family, gender, religion, territory, class, religion, culture, and so forth. National identity is also always multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to merely one element, which is why it is such a controversial phenomenon. One element comes to the fore in one case, while others are more important in others. Accordingly, religion could interact with a nation's consciousness and nationalism as something different, but it could also become a major element in national identity.

Ethnic and national movements use religious identifications and symbols in order to strengthen their positions, and religion uses ethnic and national movements in order to strengthen its position. This provides one of the best available opportunities for their inculturation. Different types of relations between religion and nationalism may be formed, however, during different periods of time.

The first such type is that of separation, whereby religion is separate from the state given a secular society and a secular national movement. Nationalism will divide itself from religion when the main characteristic of the nation is to be a community that desires to support and identify itself by means of its own state. The case of Kemal Ataturk, the Father of modern Turkish nationalism, is typical. Ataturk separated the state from Islam, thereby creating a secular nationalism.

The second type of relationship between religion and nation is one of relative independence and interaction. In this respect, religious identity may foster national identity in certain situations and within certain limits. For example, when a Bulgarian compares his national identity and culture with Turkish national identity and culture, he commonly thinks of himself

as a Christian and views the "otherness" of the Turks as comprising, above all, the fact that they are Muslims. In this case, religious identity becomes part of national identity. But when Bulgarians compare their national identity with that of Serbs, with whom they share the same Orthodox Christian religion, religious identity is not included in national identity. Various other non-religious characteristics then become more important.

Religion becomes the foundation for the construction of ethnic consciousness and national identity in the third type of interrelationship between religion and national identity. The extent of the involvement of religion in nation-building, as well as the coincidence of religious and ethnic identity and the role and place of a religion in the manifestations of nationalism, depends upon the following five major factors:

1) *The degree of coincidence of ethnic and religious boundaries.* An ethnic religion was specific to a particular group in the case of almost all ancient societies prior to the birth of universal and trans-ethnic religions, and this religious history and uniqueness were intermingled with ethnic and national history. Indeed, religions of this type were the most important factors supporting ethnic identity in such ancient societies. In respect to contemporary nations, Judaism guarded Jewish ethnic identity for thousands of years without there being any common Jewish political unit. Similarly, the Anglican Church has been powerful transmitter of nationality from one generation to the next in the British Isles.

2) *The extent to which a religious community is surrounded by different opposing and conflicting religious groups and involved with them in a protracted war of survival.* The "us-them" opposition, which is an important factor for the development of group consciousness and group identity, is built upon the foundation of religious identity in this case. Religion then becomes a central factor for ethnic and national self-identification. There are two possible variations in this regard.

The first is where two intersecting ethnic groups have different religions. Religion then strengthens ethnic identity and plays a major role in the preservation of a given group and in the development of its ethnic identity. For example, Poles maintained their Catholic Polish identity in their struggles with the Russian Orthodox Christian state in this manner, and the case of the Armenians is similar. The unusual strength of Serbian nationalism may be explained by the fact that they struggled for survival for hundreds of years confronted by Muslims on one side and Catholics on the other. The Spanish nation was constructed on the basis of strong Iberian Catholic resistance to Muslim conquests. Indeed, Muslim-Christian divisions correspond to national divisions in many instances throughout the world, such as in the Azeri-Armenian, Abkhazi-Georgian, Cypriot-Turks and Cypriot-Greeks cases.

The second is where religion becomes a factor either for the unification into one nation of different ethnic groups, or for the construction of different nations from one ethnic group. Christianity was thus the major force uniting different Slavic and Asian tribes into a single Bulgarian

nation. On the other hand, the hostility between different religions has been the basis for the development of different national identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina among people with the same ethnic origin. In this case religion has been the cause of national differentiation.

It may be argued that nationalistic feelings are stronger in areas of contact between different religions. In this respect it is no accident that the strongest nationalistic excesses in Europe are found in the Balkans, where three major religions encounter one another. There are indeed a host of cases throughout the world where what began as a purely religious community ended up as an exclusive ethnic community. One such example are the Druse, a schismatic Muslim sect that became an ethnic community.

The opposition of "us" and "them" between two groups in a situation of conflict has been the most important factor in the process of "national awakening" and nation building for several hundred years. When this opposition takes place between two different religious societies, religion plays the primary role in the process of nation building, maintaining national identity and developing a specific religious-ethnic identity. In principle, when the national as well as religious identities of two conflicting groups are different, the tension and strife between them tend to be very severe and harsh, since they involve a unity of the two most important identities of the person. Indeed, one embraces identity very strongly when two groups in conflict have not only different national but also opposing religious identities. Moreover, when such an integrated religious-ethnic identity emerges, threats to this type of identity are felt very strongly, and the battle to defend it may be very furious and bloody. It is no accident that most of the so-called ethnic conflicts and wars in the contemporary world are in fact religious-ethnic in nature. Regions in which ethnic and religious identities coincide, where ethnic communities retain strong religious bonds and symbols, are places of enhanced danger in respect to ethnic and nationalist conflicts. A mixture of religious and ethnic contradictions can have the explosive effect in society of an atomic bomb.

3) *The relationship between church and state and the extent of secularization of society.* Any nationalism is a form of struggle to build and preserve an independent state for a given community. Accordingly, proximity between state and church conditions the extent of involvement of religion in the process of nation building. In the case of transnational churches and transnational religions, such as Catholicism, it is more difficult for religion to be connected with and subjected to nationalist goals. It is easier to do so when the church is national and closely connected with the lay political power and state structures, even if the religion in question is transnational in character. This is the case with the Orthodox, Muslim, and Jewish churches as well. The state is then able to use the church to reinforce both state power and the sense of national identity. Indeed, religious leaders are often prominent in nationalist movements.

If church leaders and authorities are also state leaders and authorities, as was the case in traditional Islam, or if a given religion has a

strongly developed legal system, as is the case in both Judaism and Islam, the state can more readily utilize them for nationalistic purposes.

4) *The relationship between religion and culture*. Ethnic and national identities are inseparable from specific ethnic and national cultures. Insofar as the uniqueness of an ethnic group or nation resides above all in the uniqueness of its culture, ethnic and national particularities are the particularities of different cultures.

Consequently, the more a religion is rooted in a given culture, the greater is its ability to carry ethnic significance and to support and confirm the corresponding ethnic and national identity. Any religious revival will thus be ethnic and national in character as well, and conversely, any ethnic revival will also be religious. Religion could thereby maintain the culture of a given community and preserve its ethnic identity even in radically changed circumstances. This was the case with the Orthodox Church during the five hundred years of Ottoman Muslim rule in the Balkans.

The major element in the official cultures during the Middle Ages in Europe was in fact the religious cultures that had been created by people educated in the religious spirit. Although virtually any examination of the past could find a strong connection between religion and culture, there are nevertheless differences in the extent of involvement of religion in culture. For example, there is in principle a separation in the Christian tradition between lay and religious culture, or between the laity and clergy, which was widened after the Renaissance and in the eventual process of secularization.

One should also make a distinction concerning the relationships between religion and three types of culture, namely, traditional folk culture, the high culture of the educated and ruling elites, and contemporary culture as disseminated by the media, or mass culture. Contemporary mass culture is in principle quite distant from religion, but the extent of religious involvement in folk culture and high culture differs. For instance, while Bulgarian folk culture has little connection with Orthodox Christianity, it is deeply involved in the traditional official culture. At the same time, the musical folk culture of Afro-Americans is not only permeated by religion, but their gospel hymns are one of the important elements in the identity of the American nation as a whole. Each religion and ethnic group has its own specificity that must be scrutinized.

5) *The availability of strong secular ideologies as rivals of religion and as sets of beliefs and values that can be linked with nationalism*. The preponderance of the two major secular ideologies of liberalism and communism during the twentieth century paved the way for the proliferation of secular forms of nationalism. One result was that national liberation struggles in the Third World against colonialism were typically carried forward under the umbrella of secularized ideologies. Secular nationalism was in the foreground even in the Muslim world until the 1960s. It was the demise of communism and the crisis of Western liberal and socialist ideologies during the 1970s and 1980s that created a place for

religion. A religious revival is now underway as the corresponding atheist or secular ideologies have lost their reputation as effective responses to people's urgent problems. This has been expressed on a massive scale in the replacement of secular by religious nationalism in Muslim countries and of communism by religiously inspired and supported nationalism in the former-communist world.

As a result of the interaction between religion and ethnicity, or between religious and ethnic identities, two main types of religious-ethnic identities are possible, namely, mono-sided and poly-sided identity. A nation has a mono-sided religious-ethnic identity if this identity defines the nation only in opposition to one or several other nations, but not to all. For example, Roman Catholicism is an element in the national identity of Lithuanians when they compare themselves with Lutheran Germans or Orthodox Russians and Belorussians, but not when they compare themselves with Catholic Poles. In contrast, a given nation has a poly-faceted religious-ethnic identity if its religion is specifically ethnic and not universal. Their religion then distinguishes them from all other nations, making their identity stronger and more closed. Typical cases include Japan, where most people associate themselves with the Shinto animist religion, and China, where the specifically Chinese semi-religious teaching of Confucianism is widely adhered to.

A distinction may also be drawn between partial and complete religious-ethnic identity. The former develops in cultures that are secularized to such an extent that traditional religious cultures do not permeate the culture as a whole. National and religious identities coincide only partially in such cases. It may be noted that the more religion is separated from a given profane culture, the more partial and insignificant will its role be in the development and maintenance of national identity. Complete identity, in which religious, cultural, and national identities are virtually congruent, indicates the absence of clear-cut borders between the sacred and the profane, the religious and the mundane. From this perspective, Protestantism supports only a partial religious-ethnic identity while Islam provides the ground for a complete identity. The Orthodox Christian Church lies somewhere between these two extremes.

Different religions thus play different roles in the process of nation building and in the development of ethnic self-consciousness. Today's major religions, including Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, have different experiences and traditions as well as different possibilities for being intertwined with ethnic and national identities. Their separate roles in the ethnic and nationalist upsurge that plagues the contemporary world need to be examined in respect to the five factors indicated above concerning the interaction between religious and ethnic identities.

CATHOLICISM, ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM

Catholicism today, for various reasons, has a diminished internal potential to endorse ethnic and nationalist identities in comparison with other world religions.

1) Catholicism is not an ethnically or nationally confined religion, and it appeals to all human beings regardless of racial and ethnic differences. It is rather associated with the birth and development of universal beliefs that overstep any social, state, group, ethnic, or class boundaries. This non-ethnic and non-national character has two dimensions. The first concerns the dimension of the religious creed and beliefs, which are universal in nature and addressed to all human beings. It is true that Catholicism lays claims to universal but exclusive truths, that is, to truths that transcend all other truths insofar as they are God's final revelation to mankind, but they are truths for all who are prepared to accept them. The second dimension concerns the universality and non-ethnicity of the Church and its structures, which constitute the only worldwide international organization that has survived for two millennia. This fact makes it difficult for a given state to use Catholicism for limited nationalist goals. It is no accident that the nationalist forces of many different countries have regarded the Catholic Church as an anti-national force that cannot be kept under the control of the government. Such suspicions can even be found in certain periods of United States history.

2) In respect to the extent of secularization and the relationship between church and state, Catholicism also demonstrates restricted possibilities for use in nationalist excesses. Christianity crops up between outcast people who are in conflict with or are persecuted by the state. The famous passage in Matthew 22:21, where Christ says "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's," is revealing. Even when Catholicism was an official religion during the Middle Ages, a certain division between lay and church authorities always existed. The terrible religious conflicts that ravaged Europe from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries gave birth to the idea of secularism, that is, the notion of a state in which religion enjoyed no special privileges or role. John Locke wrote in 1689 in his *Letter Concerning Toleration* that "neither Pagan nor Mohammedan nor Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because of his religion."[7] This idea was first given legal and constitutional force in the United States, where the state did not depend upon religion to underlie, reinforce, and extend its authority. This also means, however, that the state was unable to use religion to reinforce and extend nationalism as a phenomenon connected with the state itself.

The separation of church and state is the official position of the Vatican today, which helps to maintain its transnational and universal character.

3) With regard to the relationship between religion and culture as a factor in ethnic and national identities, it could be said that the Catholic religion served for centuries to homogenize the populations of Europe and other parts of the world. Christian culture made it possible to overcome old tribal divisions after the fall of the Roman Empire and to unite the Jewish, Greek, and Roman cultures with the culture of the barbarians. This served to create a common Judeo-Christian European identity in which Catholicism was the major Western European component. Indeed, the development of new nations in Western Europe between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries is associated with the decline of Catholicism as an integrating force in Western Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. This "disruption" in Catholicism's integrative function opened the door to division, conflict, war, diversity, as well as nation-building.

The rise of secular culture after the Renaissance, and particularly the development of the mass culture of industrial civilization, separated religion from culture, which diminished its opportunity to influence national and ethnic identity. However, the content of the Catholic religion renders it more able to be part of a Pan-European or a world identity than of local ethnic and national identities.

During the twentieth century, and especially after Vatican II, the principle of "unity in diversity" was strongly emphasized in the activities of the Catholic Church. Within this context, the issue of inculturation, or the interweaving of Christian faith and local cultures, came to the fore and assumed great importance in missionary activity, particularly in Africa and Latin America. In contrast to the diffusion of secularized Western mass culture through the media, which eradicates local traditions and cultural heritages, the inculturation of the Catholic Church is intended to preserve the latter. At the same time, evangelization serves as a means to overcome local divisions.

4) The historical fate of Catholicism set it in opposition to secular and other nationalist ideologies. The birth of nations in recent centuries, and of the national ideologies that accompanied this process, were commonly justified by secular or rival religious forms of nationalism.

The dominant type of nationalism that developed in the Western world was connected with the idea of a "political nation" (sub-divided into "classical," liberal Western nationalism," "nation by territory," or "social nationalism").[8] The political existence of the population upon a given territory under one government is a central requirement of this type of nationalism. The establishment of this type of nationalism, defined upon the basis of the state and citizenship, coincided with the rise of secularism, or laicism, in Europe and America.

The crisis and decline of communism and of liberal welfare ideology in recent decades has opened up a space for religion. This vacuum was filled in developed Western countries by various Protestant denominations, some of which have a strong nationalistic potential in both their traditions and activities. Even in America, Protestant denominations

have often been associated with both nationalism and a missionary role, while Catholicism maintains a more universal and transnational spirit.

5) The major participation of Catholicism in the endorsement and development of national identities often occurred in conflict with rival religions. Strong religious contradictions that pre-dated the birth of nations came to the fore during the process of nation-building.

Religious differences have indeed been important in this regard, playing a central role in the development of the "us-them" opposition that is important in any identity. This first appeared in Europe during the period of the *Reconquista* in Spain and Portugal, after Catholicism served as the ideology of Iberian liberation during centuries of struggle with the Muslim world. It must be noted that a "Catholic-Muslim" opposition became the basis for the development of national identity on the Iberian peninsula, serving to integrate the variegated ethnic population in the two nations.

Similar developments have taken place in many other cases at the borders of Catholic world communities. In Poland, for example, Catholicism opposed Orthodox Christianity as the ideology of the foreign oppressor and of Russian nationalism. In Croatia, nation-building took shape in the struggle of Catholics against both Muslims and Orthodox Serbs.[9] In Ireland, the opposition of Catholicism and Protestantism was central.

The areas where Catholicism has been in conflict with other religions have been those in which there was a particular involvement and use of the Catholic religion as a factor of integration, inspiration, and support in the process of nation-building and nation-development. The most important element in this respect is that the respective Catholic populations had a history of occupation by foreign powers associated with other religions. As a result, the Church participated actively in the struggles for liberation that are of particular significance in the birth of a given nation. It then became a pillar of national consciousness, and its symbols and values assumed a foundational role in the process of nation-building.

In this regard, the Catholic Church played a specific and important role during the communist period in the countries of Central Europe. On the one hand, its structures were the only autonomous institutions within society, whereby they were able to become centers of opposition that could also be used to defend dissent. On the other, the Church supported the nation against "socialist internationalism." These factors enhanced the political significance of the Church and prepared the ground for a religious revival. This was perhaps most strongly manifested in Poland, where the struggle against communism was interpreted through the prism of the traditional opposition between Catholic Poles and Orthodox Russians.

The fall of Communism destroyed the particular need for opposition that had given rise to the growing role of religion in general and of the Catholic Church in particular. In response, the Church attempted to use the new social and political space that emerged in order to back a specific social agenda. New contradictions thereby appeared, perhaps most

clearly evident in Poland in respect to the ban on abortion. This raises the question of the future role of the Church. Many now ask whether Poland will become the Ireland of Central Europe, with Christian values and Roman Catholic dogma enshrined in its laws, or whether it will evolve similarly to modern Italy or Spain, where Roman Catholicism remains important for the nation's cultural identity although the observance of religious precepts is a matter of personal choice. Answers to these questions depend on the success of economic reform, as well as on the possible emergence of foreign threats that would solicit a growing nationalism and, consequently, increased support and endorsement of the role of religion.

At the same time, the rapid development of a market economy and of a crude form of capitalism reproduced the conditions for secularization that earlier characterized Western Europe. The conclusion of the Polish philosopher Fr. Josef Tischner concerning the role of Catholicism in Central Europe is worth noting within this context:

> It would be a simplification to work from the premise that in recent decades, it was only these two ideas – Christianity and Communism – which confronted each other on the stage of time. From the beginning there was a third player in this confrontation: the idea of freedom. Admittedly, freedom at first stood on the sidelines in this arena. For a while, it looked as if it was the communists who should be regarded as the true champions of freedom, and this brought a lot of kind-hearted liberals under their spell. Then the church stepped forward as the mainstay of freedom, and this brought the liberals over to the church's camp. But now doubts are spreading in the church's camp as well. Before our eyes, there is a turning away from the church – both Christianity and religion in general have to accept a sharp drop in the number of followers. Might it be that liberalism will prove to be the only idea that is victorious?[10]

These conclusions find support in developments in certain other countries as well. For example, one consequence of German unification in 1990 is that hundreds of thousands of Germans gave up church membership in the subsequent three years because they no longer wished to pay the "church tax" that is administered by the government. The Roman Catholic Church, estimated to have had 28 million adherents, suffered a net loss of 143,530 members in 1990, and estimates are that even greater numbers left in each of the two following two years. Annual membership losses were less than 75,000 prior to the mid-1980s.[11] Such facts demonstrate that although the Catholic Church played an important role in periods when there was a need to shelter dissent and perform various other functions that

strengthened national identity, it began to lose its influence when the direct need for and causes of strong national identity receded.

The Church might be able to preserve its role if it takes up the fight against the new, post-communist threats to national identity that are connected with the negative features of the market economy, the progressive impoverishment of large parts of the population, and the collapse of values. In some sense this would involve maintaining the "us-them" opposition in respect to the new dangers that have emerged.

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALISM

The traditional role and place of the Orthodox Church in respect to ethnicity and nationalism are quite different from those of Catholicism insofar as the Orthodox Church used to be a much stronger bearer of ethnic and national functions.

1) On the one hand, the Orthodox Church is connected with the universal teaching of Christianity. In addition, the specificity of rituals and religious practice do not have an ethnic character but are shared by all Orthodox countries. On the other hand, the mediator of the creed, the Church itself, does not have the transnational dimensions of the Catholic Church.

2) In regard to the relationship between church and state, it should be said that the Orthodox Church is in some sense a "statist" church., which is the most important element predetermining its role in the endorsement of national identity. This has two significant implications.

a) The borders of the Church as an institution or organizational structure coincide in principle with the borders of the state or nation. The independence of the national church is in fact one of the most important criteria of national independence. It could even be said that the Church mirrors the rise and decline of the state. For example, the Bulgarian struggle for national liberation from Ottoman rule began as a struggle for an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The struggle for political independence began after Church independence was achieved.

b) In spite of its own independent structures, the Orthodox Church is in various ways dependent upon and subordinated to the state, in fact serving the latter's political goals. Not only is the state involved in the election of the most important offices in the Church hierarchy, it also demands loyalty. When one of the Medieval Bulgarian kings came to doubt the loyalty of the Patriarch, he simply beheaded him and put another person in his place.

3) There are significant differences between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches concerning their relations to ethnic and national culture. In contrast to the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Churches have traditionally been much more closely connected with the development of national cultures. For example, the spread of Christianity in Orthodox countries coincided with the spread of the alphabet, and the Gospel has

always been preached in the national language, something which did not even begin to happen in the Catholic Church until the Reformation. The cultural traditions of the Orthodox countries have thus comprised a unity of ethnicity and religion. While it is true that much of folk culture retains pre-Christian customs, the overall tradition of national culture and education has been inseparable from the role of the Orthodox Church. Even the communist regimes acknowledged this fact. Indeed, when the Bulgarian government began to emphasize national traditions, history, culture, and identity in the 1960s, it felt the need to involve the clergy in the process. And bishops were always included in foreign delegations headed by Ludmila Zhivkova, the Minister of Culture and the daughter of the party leader.

4) In general, strong liberal nationalist ideologies did not develop in most of the Orthodox countries. Communism as an ideology marginalized the Orthodox Church for many years, but when it began to place an emphasis on national elements and the first manifestations of communist nationalism appeared, it could not avoid the role of the Orthodox religion in the endorsement of national identity.

There have been no strong secular nationalist ideological rivals to the Church after the demise of Communism, and almost all political forces, both nationalist and secular, have attempted to use Orthodoxy for their own purposes. For example, each of the two major opposing political coalitions that were represented in parliament since the 1991 elections in Bulgaria, headed respectively by the Socialist Party (the former Communists) and the anti-Communist Union of Democratic Forces, included various Christian parties or movements. This, too, closely connects the Orthodox Church with any expression of national identity.

5) While only certain Catholic countries developed within the context of a strong "us-them" conflict with neighboring opponents, the churches in all Orthodox countries have long known the feeling of being threatened by hostile rivals. The most obvious such threat has been historically posed by Islam. Not only do all Orthodox countries have borders with the Islamic world, they have the experience of centuries of struggle against foreign Muslim domination in which national history is inseparable from Church history. Let us consider only two figures from Bulgarian history, namely, Patriarch Evtimii and the monk Paisii Hilendarski. Evtimii was one of the last defenders of the besieged capital, Turnovo, before the country fell under 500 years of Ottoman rule, while Paisii is universally regarded as having begun the struggle for a national revival almost four centuries later. The growth of national consciousness has in fact taken place entirely within an "us-them" context in which the opposition that defines the national identity is inseparable from the Christian/non-Christian opposition.

The Orthodox churches have behaved as institutions that have been not only menaced for centuries, but forced into retreat by both Islam and Catholicism. As millions of Orthodox Christians were being Islamized,

hundreds of thousands more became members of the Catholic and Uniate churches, with virtually no converts to Orthodoxy. The Orthodox Church has long existed with the insecurity of one who has been defeated, and this feeling has grown after the collapse of communism. Virtually all proposals put forward in an ecumenical spirit are perceived as attempts to obtain certain advantages or split off even more Uniate parishes. It is significant that the 1992 Istanbul meeting of the patriarchs of the Orthodox churches passed a tough declaration accusing the Vatican of proselytizing and "agitation" among Orthodox Christians, warning that this would render impossible any inter-church dialogue. Moreover, since this feeling of being under siege is intertwined with national identity, threats to a given Orthodox Church are perceived as threats to the respective nation, and threats to the nation are perceived as threats to the Church.

Since these issues are expressed differently in the various Orthodox countries, let us briefly examine certain of the former communist countries.

Russia. The development of Russian nationalism is so thoroughly intertwined with Russian Orthodoxy that even Stalin was compelled during World War II to appeal the patriotism of the Russian Church. Sergei Lezov, a Russian religious studies scholar, observes the following:

> I think that our Orthodox Christianity has lost the character of Evangelium, that is, joyous message, the "good news." Instead, it has become the "core of Russian culture." The fabric of our Orthodoxy is woven of distinctive political, national and spiritual urges. Something very simple has happened after the new forms of self-understanding (for example "communist, internationalism") were smashed; the previous forms of mass consciousness, which had almost been squeezed out, have begun to return: the "religious" and the "national." There was no need to go far to find an ideal: it was at hand and ready to use... The "religious" and the "national" in our Orthodoxy have merged to such an extent that it is impossible to "isolate the Christian basis in the pure form" and anyway nobody is trying.[12]

With the loss of the old communist symbols, the state has once again begun to rely on the symbols of religious belief. Indeed, Russian television might now broadcast even more religious programs than is the case in the United States. Boris Yeltsin, the former top party official and atheist, took to visiting religious services and making appeals to the Russian people in the company of the Patriarch during his tenure in office. A mass restoration of shrines and monasteries has also begun.

At the same time, the separation of new Orthodox countries from the former Soviet Union has generated a movement for the separation of the

churches as well, such as took place in the Ukraine. Division between the various Orthodox churches simply follows division between states and nations.

Romania. The Romanian Orthodox Church is considered to be one of the chief repositories of traditional national consciousness. In spite of accusations of collaboration with Ceausescu, it is now experiencing both a revival as well as a strengthening of its unity with the state. The new leadership has clearly sought to use the Romanian church in order to legitimize and endorse its power. Television often bypasses news from the rest of the world in order to highlight various religious activities at which the President of the country is followed by army chiefs and by Orthodox priests in flowing robes.

A typical manifestation of Romanian nationalism can be seen in the relationship between the Romanian Orthodox and Uniate Churches. Three hundred years ago, when Transylvania became part of the Hapsburg Empire, large numbers of Orthodox clergy were compelled by circumstances to swear a new allegiance to Rome, resulting in the development of the Uniate Church. When the Communists came to power in the late 1940s, however, they handed Uniate religious property over to the Orthodox Church, insisting that the faithful convert to the Orthodox Church if they wished to stay within the religious fold. When the new provisional government overturned the ban on the Uniate Church in late 1989, the latter requested the return of their former property. This led to growing hostility and intolerance on the part of the Orthodox Church, which considered the request as a Catholic attack.[13]

Serbia. The Serbian Orthodox Church, for various reasons, is among the most nationalistic churches, being accused during Tito's rule of extreme nationalism. It has always considered any attempt by the Catholic Church to establish ecumenical relations as an attack upon both Orthodoxy and the identity of the Serbian people.

Orthodox theology during the twentieth century gave prominence to the ideas that Catholicism threatens Orthodoxy, that Serbian Orthodoxy forms the heart of Serbian national identity, and that the Serbian nation from an historical perspective has been under constant threat from Muslims, particularly in Kosovo, and from Catholics in Croatia.[14] For example, the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church issued a number of declarations protesting against alleged discrimination against Serbs in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia long before the outbreak of civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Islamic fundamentalism was blamed for discrimination against Serbs in Kosovo, and the Roman Catholic Church was accused of providing support to what was viewed as a neo-Fascist Croatian state. It is noteworthy that the war-zone after 1991 straddled the old fault-line separating Western and Eastern Christendom that was established in the fourth century by the Council of Nicaea. Consequently, it is justifiable to

say that the civil war assumed the features of a religious war as well, so much so that all Catholic churches were destroyed on over one-fourth of Croatian territory. The destruction of religious property and symbols was even more extensive in Bosnia-Herzegovina since they were considered to be major instruments of the rival nationalisms. And although all of the people involved in these wars were of essentially the same ethnic origin, different religions transformed them into different nations. It is ironic that this reflects administrative practices characteristic of the Islamic Ottoman Empire.

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church also is deeply rooted in Bulgarian national identity. Between the ninth and thirteenth centuries it was a major factor for integration, creating a new culture and new values that united different tribes and traditions into a common ethnic community. Later, during the period of Ottoman rule, it was a major factor in preserving national memory and identity. In addition, priests and monks were among the main participants in the process of national awakening, nation-building, and national liberation. Today the entire symbolic and ritual system of the Church is accepted as part of national culture and identity. After liberation from Ottoman rule (1878), the Church retained a very strong position in society and enjoyed close relations with the state, with priests being treated as state employees and their salaries paid from the state budget. Church statutes ruled all types of family relations, and the Orthodox Church was also the largest charitable organization.

The Church was pushed into the background after 1944, when an atheistic ideology acquired official status. According to the law concerning religion passed in 1949, religious propaganda and Church charities were forbidden and a significant part of Church property was nationalized. In addition, the director of a special state body, the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs, had the right to propose dismissal of any cleric. Religion was also officially viewed as a phenomenon that would soon disappear. From the 1960s, however, a gradual change in attitude towards the Orthodox Church began within the context of a growing emphasis upon patriotism and national identity. The Orthodox religion and the institutionalized church came to be viewed primarily through the prism of their cultural and educational roles during the many centuries in which they served to preserve Bulgarian national identity.

The fall of Communism led to a revival of Orthodoxy and the reestablishment of various types of relations between state and church. Christmas and Easter have once again become official holidays, and all major state rituals and celebrations are accompanied by religious services. The army and the police have made certain religious holidays their own official holidays as well. And not only are there now long lines at shrines for such religious services as baptisms and weddings, the President and members of the government appear in the television broadcasts of solemn

Christmas and Easter masses. A host of Christian parties and associations have also been established.

The 1991 Bulgarian constitution, in contrast with the United States constitution, includes an article stating that Orthodox Christianity is the traditional religion of the Bulgarian people. This both reflects the fact that 87.5 percent of the population identify themselves in relation to Orthodox traditions and identity, and also indicates the extent to which Islam as well as the current influx of Western sects are perceived as threats to Bulgarian national identity. (Approximately 10.5 percent of the population are Muslims, 0.9 percent Catholics, and 0.5 percent Protestants.) At the same time, the new non-Communist government attempted to use communist laws and practices to replace the Patriarch and certain bishops by its own loyal supporters. After the President protested against such governmental interference in church affairs, the Church became divided by strong political struggles between the old synod and the new one that had appointed by the Director of Ecclesiastical Affairs. This both greatly diminished the possibilities for the Church to be an active force in displays of nationalism, and also expanded opportunities for various religious sects and movements to appear. It must be said, however, that nationalism has not assumed such an extreme and influential form in Bulgaria as it has in other Orthodox countries. The religious revival has in fact assumed more official and external forms, while religious elements of national identity have weakened.

ISLAM, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM

Islamization almost always means a change in national or ethic identity. Indeed, Islam has been one of the strongest forces in history for the assimilation of differing groups, much stronger than the so-called "melting pot" of American civilization during the twentieth century. Not only is the potential of most other world religions to create and support national identity weaker in principle, the process of secularization has weakened it even further. As a consequence, it is easier for Islam to use nationalism as a means of Islamization than for Christianity to do so for the purpose of evangelization.

The factors at work in Islam determine a specific synthesis of religious and national identities.

1) Like Christianity, Islam is a world religion that oversteps the borders of states and ethnic groups and exists on all continents. Most of its over one billion adherents (estimates vary from one to nearly two billion) are concentrated in Asia and Africa, but their numbers in Europe and the Americas are growing rapidly. And while Christians in other cultural milieux are relatively easily converted to other creeds, it is very difficult if not practically impossible for Muslims to change religion.

While Islam is a trans-ethnic religion, it also has the ability to change and design ethnic identities. It is capable of altering the ethnic

consciousness of people such that they come to acquire the identity of the strongest and most influential ethnic or national group in the respective region. It thus comprises one of the most successful forces in history for ethnic integration.

2) Christianity and Islam entail different types of relationships between religion and state. In Christianity, for instance, insofar as Christ is the Messiah and the Son of God, His actions have nothing to do with the state. Indeed, Christians have often been persecuted by the state and have viewed the state as an alien force. This has always generated within Christianity a certain separation between religion and lay power, between church and state authorities. Mohammed is also considered to be the Messiah by his followers, but, on the other hand, he is also a military leader and a statesman. Consequently, there is an inseparable unity of spiritual and state power in Islam such that the extension of the state also means the extension of spiritual power and the extension of spiritual power constitutes a widening of the scope of lay power. That is why war has historically been one of the major means of conversion to Islam.

For Christians, Caesar was a man while Christ is the Son of God. For the Muslims of earlier times, in contrast, God was Caesar and the sovereign caliph or sultan was His vice-regent on earth. Accordingly, the state is God's state, the army is God's army, the enemy is God's enemy, and not only is the law God's law, in principle there can be no other law. In traditional Muslim society there was no church as an autonomous institution separated from the state, no active professional men of religion, no priesthood distinct from lay men. Church and state were entirely one and the same entity. That is why Islam demands from believers not belief that is accurate to the text, but rather loyalty to the community and its leader. There are no authorities to prosecute deviations from beliefs and punish for schism or heresy. The issue of importance does not concern crossing the border between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, but rather the distinction between Islam and apostasy.[15]

It is noteworthy that a hierarchical organization of Muslim religious dignitaries having territorial jurisdictions was developed only in Ottoman times as a result of the encounter with Christianity. This differentiation between the priesthood and lay power, albeit not to the extent typical in Christian countries, eventually made it possible for Ataturk to undertake the development of a secular state. But even in Turkey, which has long been regarded as the model for the secularization of a Muslim state, the separation between clerical and lay authority is distinct from the situation in Western countries. In spite of the fact that secularism was proclaimed in 1937 as one of the fundamental constitutional principles, the Turkish state has retained control over mosques, the training, appointment, and payment of Muslim prayer leaders and teachers, and the religious education of Muslim children. At the same time, however, non-Muslim communities have been left to finance and organize their own activities.[16]

The traditional unity of Islam and the state has led to the fact that even today nearly every country with a majority Muslim population specifically refers to Islam in its constitution as the religion of the state or, as is the case in Syria, of the head of state. The upsurge of contemporary Muslim fundamentalism may in fact be viewed as an attempt to restore the original inseparable unity of the state and Islam. The traditionally Christian world as a whole, including the West, has been rather painfully forced to learn that its separation of state and church, along with its model of the secular nation-state, are not as universal as it presumed them to be, and that other forms of political organization are not only possible, but are accepted as valid.

3) The unique abilities of Islam to assimilate differences are most strongly expressed in the relationship between religion and culture. The underlying principle that fidelity to the Islamic community is more important than adherence to a strictly formulated creed leads to the result that Muslim identity consists of identification with a concrete Muslim community. The ethnicity of this community thus coincides with its Muslim identity and entails the inseparability of the religious from the specifically national (or ethnic). To be converted to Islam means to become a member of a new community, and religious conversion comprises national conversion or national assimilation insofar as the Islamic community is traditionally inseparable from the state.

Conversion to Christianity as such does not entail ethic or national conversion, but Islamization means a change in one's entire way of life and practically always leads to a change of ethnic or national identity. When a non-Muslim population converts to Islam, they tend either to affiliate themselves with the identity of the closest Muslim nation, or, if communication with them is difficult, to develop their own specific Muslim ethnic or national identity. This is the identity not merely of believers in a specific religion, but rather the identity of persons who are inseparable from a shared community. This is true throughout the world. In Bulgaria and other parts of the Balkan peninsula, for example, Christians who became Muslims during Ottoman rule are inclined to identity themselves as Turks because Turkey is the nearest Islamic nation. This is true even for the so-called "Pomaks," Muslims who retain their Bulgarian language and customs just as they were practiced by their Christian predecessors several hundred years ago. In addition, the Muslim descendants of Christian Serbs and Croatians who continue to speak what we may still call Serbo-Croatian identify themselves as a specific Muslim nation, namely, Bosniaks. Even if they are not particularly religious, religion has left such a deep mark on the national character that they were prepared to wage the bloodiest civil war in recent European history. In the former Yugoslavia, to be Bosnian means above all to be Muslim, and to be Muslim means to be Bosnian. This is similar to the case in Malaysia, where many consider it axiomatic that to be Malay is to be Muslim.

4) The revival of Islam as a basis of nationalism is closely connected with disillusionment concerning the rival secular forms of nationalism that have been influential in various countries of the Muslim world since the 1920s. Neither pro-Western models of modernization, nor those claiming to be socialist were sufficiently successful. While Islamic fundamentalists often take over the very modernization programs that the previous nationalist regimes devised but were unable to carry out, they unite them with Islamic rule and translate them into religious terms. As a result, the growing wave of Muslim fundamentalism in recent years in the Middle East and North Africa has attracted thousands of militants who had political experience in the nationalist, Baathist, Nassarist, or Mossadeghist parties and became disappointed by the latter's inability to keep their promises.

Islamist activists now tend to come from university campuses rather than from among illiterates, and many have had some access to a Western-style education. While this had once given rise to a tendency towards liberal, secularized thinking in the first half of the twentieth century, disenchantment with the current regimes and with the role of the West in the Islamic world has promoted turning to Islam in the search for solutions.[17] Even in Turkey, once considered a fortress of Kemalist secularism, the military regime reintroduced religious education in the 1980s. This has led to the rapid upsurge of Islam in all areas of social life, as well as to a tendency to replace the secular nationalism of Ataturk with a religious nationalism identifying Islam and ethnicity. Moreover, the long-standing distinction between Turk, which means Muslim or a descendent of Muslims, and Turkish citizen has been maintained. While non-Muslims may become Turkish citizens, they cannot be called Turks. For example, a Bulgarian citizen who does not know the Turkish language but practices Islam may be treated as a Turk, but a non-Muslim Turkish citizen is not a Turk.

5) The "us-them" opposition also has an important meaning for the endorsement of Muslim national or ethnic identification, which displays a near-global opposition to the Christian and Western world. Relations between the Christian and Muslim civilizations have been characterized for fourteen centuries by war, *jihad*, crusade, conquest, Islamization of European Christians, and the colonization of Muslim peoples. The conflict between these two civilizations still continues in most areas where they meet today, from the Philippines, through Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Middle East, and Cyprus, to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sudan, and Nigeria. In the former Yugoslavia, mercenaries and volunteers from Muslim countries fought alongside the Bosnian Muslims, while those from Christian countries fought with the Bosnian Serbs. All of this has boosted a growing nationalism.

HINDUISM, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM

Hinduism has always been considered quite unique in comparison with the two great monotheistic traditions of Christianity and Islam, not least of all by virtue of its deeply rooted tolerance and inclusiveness. For example, Louis Renou states that in Hindusim "tolerance, nonviolence [are] considered an active virtue; this is a manner of acting which must be respected – even in the political sphere – *regardless of the attitude of others*. In this perhaps is to be found the most spectacular contribution which India has made to the modern world and the most worthy reply to Marxism and its materialism."[18] One of the best examples in this regard is Gandhi, a devout Hindu who exemplified the ideal of nonviolence. After India won its independence, secularism became the basis of the new state, reflecting the plurality of religions, ethnic groups, traditions, as well as an attitude of peaceful coexistence. In spite of the fact that Hindus were by far the majority of the population, secularism and tolerance were enshrined in the constitution, which spurned the idea of a Hindu identity for the country. This brought to the fore hopes for common economic and social progress.

However, religious and ethnic conflict in recent years, along with a growing opposition to secularism and outbursts of violence, have called into question the prevailing view that Hinduism is indeed characterized by tolerance and nonviolence. Perhaps events have changed its "traditional nature."

1) Hinduism, with roughly one billion adherents, is one of the three major world religions after Roman Catholicism and Islam, both of which have between one and two billion members.[19] However, it is not a world religion in the same sense as the latter two, not only because its is restricted almost entirely to the Indian subcontinent, but also because it does not claim to be the only true religion. It acknowledges the truth of all religion, endeavors to include that truth within itself, and has never sought to become a world power.

Hinduism is fundamentally polytheistic, allowing for the coexistence of widely differing beliefs and practices which themselves have changed over the ages. Even the meaning of its gods, who coexist as parts of a variegated whole, have been different in different places and times. Although philosophers have attempted to identify something common in all this variety, such as belief in one supreme principle, which at certain times is personified as the Lord and at others conceived of as an impersonal Absolute, ordinary believers have formed their own communities with their own chosen gods, the diversity and the number of which is enormous. Hinduism is thus the specific unity of a great number of different sects. These are neither exclusive groups, nor hostile denominations insofar as they comprise parts of a whole, not deviations from an orthodox creed.

But the coming of industrial civilization with its homogenizing influence has led to a decline in this diversity. The "revival" of Hinduism at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the gradual growth of Indian

national sentiments formed the basis of this process. As Renou remarked, "A necessarily Indian phenomenon, Hinduism could not fail to display both the virtues and the excesses of any nationalism."[20]

2) Hinduism appears at first glance to be disinterested in the problems of politics and the state insofar as it has traditionally been preoccupied with the ideas of renunciation and personal self-development. While its conception of relations between religion and state is in fact rather obscure, its pluralism and inclusiveness in practice presuppose the existence of a state that supports such pluralism. From ancient times, however, it has characteristically tended to view spiritual power as superior to all other. This is reflected in its traditional division of society into four classes. The highest are the Brahmin, who exercise spiritual power, followed by the Kshatriya, the warriors who wield secular power, the Vaisya, who represent economic power, and the Sudra, peasants and those who perform menial labor that is not unclean.

In a certain sense the position of Brahmin is even above that of kings. The calls today for the creation of a Hindu state that have been raised by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the major Hindu revivalist political organization, are grounded to a certain extent in this traditional attitude concerning the role of the clergy in the Hindu community.

3) The polytheistic and pluralistic character of Hinduism enables it to penetrate Indian culture as a whole in the various forms of myths, legends, poetry, novels, philosophy, art, and customs. The line between the sacred and the secular is in fact often very finely drawn. The host of gods are not isolated in towering cathedrals or remote shrines, but are everywhere, with their images found in shops, taxis, kitchens, and offices. Every stage of life from birth to death is accompanied by sacramental rites. Hinduism presents itself as a way of life prescribing such everyday actions as bathing, diet (which may extend to fasting), posture, gestures, breath control, and so forth. In addition to numerous divine cults, the worship of trees, serpents, and various spirits, along with magic and astrology, are included in Hinduism.

It can be argued that Hinduism is closely connected not only with Indian culture, but also with the overall diversity of the culture. It should be noted that this diversity of tendencies, dimensions, and aspects in Hinduism give rise to its mutability, which enables it to adapt to changing circumstances and generates a strong force for integrating diversity.

4) Hinduism has developed over the ages as a religion that strives to integrate other religions and gods. The relation to it from the outside, however, is not the same. While millions of Hindus have converted to Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity, encounters with other religions have often been destructive.

The lack of developed Hindu social and political doctrines that are adapted to the contemporary age, along with the heightened status of modern secular ideologies after the liberation of India, have somewhat marginalized Hinduism as a factor in political life. It was expected that

secularism would serve to overcome differences between religious and ethnic groups in the process of development. This has clearly not been the case in India, however, where the modernization process has instead made the traditional divisions in society stand out in sharper relief. Large numbers of the population have been thrown into a competitive market society in conditions of an enormous shortage of resources, which has inexorably transformed diversities and disparities into contradictions and serious conflicts.

Greater diversity and tolerance were possible in a non-competitive society characterized by poor communications between different communities. But diversity in India has generated inequality and conflict as mobility has increased and a competitive life-style has become dominant. Moreover, the process of modernization in India has generally been less successful than in other Asian countries. As a result, the cities have become filled with millions of rural poor wanting to have the same opportunities as the upper classes, and these hungry migrants are resentful of corruption and are seething with bitterness and frustration. The secular model and secular ideologies have largely fallen into disrepute, apparently having given way to a search for political solutions in simplified and nationalistic forms of religion. The Industrial Revolution in Europe is often cited as an example of what is taking place in India today, associated as it was with injustice, mass impoverishment, rioting, violence, religious intolerance, and nationalism.[21] Time will tell whether recent political developments mark a significant change in this regard.

5) Market competitiveness, improved communications, and insecurity have driven many millions of people into a vigorous search for identity that has involved both aggression towards other groups as well as the search for scapegoats. Within this context, the "us-them" opposition has manifested itself above all as conflict between Hindus and Muslims. If one is inclined to search for a justification for such strife, history provides a sufficient number of facts for this purpose. These include the occupation of Indian territory by Islamic rulers during the past one thousand years, the slaughter of half a million Muslims and Hindus in the partition of Pakistan and India in 1947, the continuous hostility between these two countries, Pakistani support for Muslim separatists in the Kashmir Valley, and even certain privileges now enjoyed by the Muslim minority in India. The list goes on

A return to Hindu identity beckons as a panacea for the contradictions, disparities, corruption, and lack of effectiveness on the part of the existing political system. In this situation the fundamentalist and Hindu nationalist slogans of the BJP have gained a growing number of supporters. The BJP has fed upon the humiliation generated by the backwardness and second-rate position of a country that could instead be one of the world's great powers.

TWO MAJOR TYPES OF RELIGIOUS UPSURGE TODAY AND THEIR CONNECTIONS WITH ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM

In order to understand the various combinations of religious and ethnic revival, along with the inter-relations between religious and nationalist upsurges in the contemporary world, one should keep in mind that these processes have taken place within the context of two opposing and in some sense mutually exclusive forms of religious revival, namely, fundamentalism and pluralization.

Fundamentalism is the dominant form of religious revival today, particularly in countries that are undergoing severe crisis, such as various third-world countries and those of the former communist bloc. It has also appeared in the developed countries, but in general among social groups experiencing insecurity as a result of some particular challenge or change, not in the mainstream.

There are a number of particularities that enable fundamentalism to transmit enhanced feelings of traditional nationalism. These include the following:

1) Fundamentalism is primarily connected with a search for support from the existing mainstream religions, that is, Protestantism, Hinduism, Catholicism, and Orthodoxy. This is why it is always some type of conservatism that looks to the past for solutions to today's problems. It shares this emphasis on past traditions with nationalism, for which the past ("roots") has always been an important factor.

2) The effort to desecularize political power in theocratic states, along with relatively weak forms of desecularized culture, are also connected with major factors concerning national identity and the active involvement of religion in national identity.

(3) Nationalism is at the center of the social, political, and moral agenda of all fundamentalist movements today in the sense that religion is put forward as a means to strengthen the nation and to endorse its most important values. Moreover, the perception that the "nation is in danger" underlies fundamentalist proposals concerning moral renewal and the regeneration of the nation.

(4) Fundamentalist religious nationalism is highly intolerant, with the majority of the measures it proposes consisting of interdictions.[22]

(5) Religious fundamentalism and nationalism are inclined to uniformity, that is, to a restriction of diversity for the sake of certain general goals and values.

Pluralization in respect to religion, which prevails in the developed countries, particularly the United States, has a quite different character.

1) Pluralization reflects a tendency in post-industrial society to dismantle the huge structures and hierarchies that have been passed down from a previous age in all areas of society, from the economy to cultural life, leading to the establishment of flatter organizational structures. This

has had a significant effect on centralized church organizations with their more professional staff. Gallup studies of long-term trends indicate that for over fifty years there has been a steady movement away from monolithic religious views.[23] But the United States is not merely becoming a less Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation and a somewhat less Judeo-Christian nation, for there has been a clear increase in the level of interest in religion. That is to say that new denominations have grown at the expense of mainstream churches. For instance, the United Methodist Church dropped from a high of 11 million members in 1965 to 8,904,824 in 1991, and during the same period the Episcopal Church declined from 3.4 million to 2,446,050 members.[24] The number of Catholic nuns fell from 176,341 in 1968 to 99,337 in 1992, with 5,577 nuns leaving religious life in 1987 alone.[25] However, the total number of believers in the United States has not declined because new religious groups, sects, and movements have been born. Indeed, the increase in the proportion of Americans who declare their religion to be "other" is one of the most significant religious trends of the last half-century.

2) There has been an attempt to overcome the traditional separation between the clergy and the laity by means of new forms of participation in religious life. These include the adoption of popular music, an increased emotional emphasis in church services, and even the deliberate use of psychological group dynamic techniques. There has also been a new focus upon the welfare activities of religious communities, a broadening of the social role of religion, the proliferation of denominations with no clear organizational structures, and a sense of being religious that reflects the functional rather than the substantial definition of religion.

3) Such changes are connected with growing tolerance on the part of different religious denominations and sects. The lines of tension and conflict in the United States are no longer between different churches, religions, and denominations, which coexist peacefully in spite of growing pluralization. The distinctions that matter are above all cultural in nature, and they cut across denominational lines.[26]

4) All this is connected with the growing value attached to diversity in all areas. There is a value shift from supporting uniformity to supporting ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, and other types of diversity.

5) Religious pluralism is connected with a growing, broader pluralism, including ethnic pluralism. But in developed countries these types of pluralism often do not coincide, leading to decreased tension between them.

What is important is that while the tendencies of fundamentalism and plurality have all too often intermingled, they are the results of different reasons and conditions. As a result, their relations to ethnicity and nationalism are varied and complicated. It is impossible to transfer models and policy between them if in one case nationalism and religion tend to coincide and in others to diverge. Particular cases thus demand specific analyses and proposals.

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NOTES

[1] Hunter 1991, pp. 255-262, 378-379. Also see Berger 1974.
[2] Bellah 1976. Also see Bellah 1975.
[3] Ibid., p. 11.
[4] Steinfels 1993.
[5] Smith 1991, p. 84. See also Smith 1992.
[6] Ibid., p. 113.
[7] Locke 1976, p. 160.
[8] See Gellner 1983, pp. 88-109; Smith 1991, pp. 54-68; Kellas 1991, pp. 51-54.
[9] See van Dartel 1992, p. 279: "It is of course true that Croatian history too provides examples of strong identification between religious and national identity. This was the case both in the regions where Croats lived under the Ottoman regime and in regions within the Hapsburg empire where, from the end of the seventeenth century, Serbs and Croats lived together and where religions functioned as a distinctive feature of their respective national identifies. It was, however, never to the same degree in the northern (Zagorje) or western (Istria, Dalmatia) parts of Croatia. And although such an identification existed and the Catholic church was one of the most important elements in the formation of Croatian national identity and its preservation in time of crisis, it is untrue either that Catholicism in Croatia is seen as the fundamental or exclusive basis of the nation, or that the Catholic church played or had any intention of playing a decisive role in politics as the ultimate political representative of the Croatian nation."
[10] Tischner 1992, p. 331.
[11] Whitney 1992.
[12] Lezov 1992, p. 46.
[13] See Gallagher 1992, p. 272: "The danger is that the Orthodox-Uniate quarrel may enter a new stage of intensity at a time when relations between these two churches are already badly strained in neighboring Yugoslavia as a result of its effective breakup, putting mainly Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs in conflict."

This growing tension also exists in Russia. See McTernan 1992, p. 279: "The Moscow Patriarchate... accused Catholics of proselytizing in the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. Orthodox fears and suspicions were fed, and to some extent justified, by the intensive behavior of some over-enthusiastic Catholic groups which saw the collapse of the Soviet system as an opportunity to expand their own field of operation and to recruit Russian members. Metropolitan Kirill, the Orthodox Archbishop of Smolensk and the chairperson of the Russian Orthodox Church's Department for External Church Relations, complained in an article in the

Moscow News (February 1992), that some of these groups 'seems to think that they are among pagans who are to be converted into Christianity, and behave accordingly.' In the light of their approach, he questioned, 'Are we continue to believe that the ecumenical principles upheld by the Vatican II Council are still abided by? If two churches are equal before God and are equally teaching souls eternal salvation, then the conversion of Orthodox Christians into Catholicism is pointless.'"

[14] van Dartel 1992, pp. 276-278, 281-283.

[15] I here follow Bernard Lewis' excellent discussion of Islam and Christianity. See Lewis 1992.

[16] Mortimer 1991, p. 9.

[17] Salami 1993, pp. 22-26.

[18] Renou 1962, pp. 55-56.

[19] *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2008*, pp. 681-82.

[20] Renou, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[21] Desai 1992.

[22] In a discussion of the role of religion in the American presidential campaign and the behavior of certain fundamentalist circles, Bill Clinton stated in 1992 that, "Like so many Americans I've been appalled to hear voices of intolerance raised in recent weeks. Voices that proclaim some families aren't real families, some Americans aren't real Americans.... One even said, what this country needs is a religious war." See *Journal of Church and State*, 34 (1992), p. 725.

[23] Gallup and Jim Gastelli 1989, p. 44.

[24] *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1993*, pp. 719-720; Naisbitt and Aburdene, pp. 273-297.

[25] Steinhauer 1992.

[26] Hunter argues that "the politically relevant divisions in the American context are no longer defined according to where one stands vis-à-vis Jesus, Luther or Calvin, but where one stands vis-a-vis Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, and Condorcet and especially their philosophical heirs (including Nietzsche and Rorty). The politically relevant world-historical event, in other words, is now the secular Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and its philosophical aftermath. This is what inspires the divisions of public culture in the United States today." See Hunter 1991, p. 132.

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BULGARIAN INTELLECTUALS AND COMMUNIST NATIONALISM (1984-1989)

PLAMEN MAKARIEV

CHALLENGE

The purpose of this paper is to suggest an unconventional explanation for a peculiar paradox in Bulgaria's contemporary history and also propose a corresponding methodology for conceptualizing similar phenomena. The paradox consists of the following. In winter 1984/85 the Bulgarian authorities conducted a campaign that had no precedent in European history. Within the span of only a few months the ethnic identity of 850,000 people, more than 10 percent of the country's population, was nominally changed. World history knows countless cases of assimilation campaigns conducted by the authorities in one country or another. We have also witnessed ethnic cleansing as well as the extermination of hundreds of thousands of people only because of their ethnic or religious identity. What happened in Bulgaria is neither the largest-scale nor the most brutal undertaking of this kind, but it is one of the most bizarre.

Up to a particular point in time the authorities recognized the existence of a relatively large population within the country whose ethnic identity differed from that of the majority. Although Turks in Bulgaria were not officially recognized as a minority in order to prevent them from claiming minority rights in compliance with international standards, their ethnic identity was not called into question. Furthermore, the authorities themselves published bilingual (Turkish and Bulgarian) newspapers and magazines at the national level, there were Turkish-language broadcasts on national and local radio, and so forth.

But at a certain point it turned out that everyone had supposedly been mistaken all along about the identity of these people. They were not Turks, really, but rather descendants of Bulgarians forcibly converted to Islam during the "Turkish yoke" (end of the fourteenth to the mid-nineteenth century).[1] And somehow everybody suddenly realized this, and 850,000 people submitted applications to the authorities in the course of just a few months declaring their desire to change their Turkish-Arabic names to Bulgarian ones (with the typical Slavic surname suffixes "-ov", "-ev" and "-ski"). It was taken for granted that this meant they would stop speaking Turkish. There was initially a degree of confusion about the question of religion, but within a year or so it was generally agreed that they could remain Muslim, provided that they practiced Islam in a discreet and publicly non-intrusive way.

The paradox in question is that this unbelievable brinksmanship on the part of the Bulgarian Communist Party and its government met little if any resistance from the Bulgarian public. Admittedly, those who were directly affected by the so-called "Regeneration Process," that is, the Bulgarian Turks, staged protests, and several persons died in the resulting clashes with the police and army (exact figures are not available even today). In any case, however, opposition to this flagrant violation of human rights was incommensurable with its scale. Even leaving aside the legal and moral aspects of the deed, the sheer absurdity of the doctrine that was supposed to justify it – that there was supposedly not a single Turk in Bulgaria, and that all of the nearly one million people who had thought that they were Turkish suddenly realized that they had been wrong all along – ought to trigger a true revolt of reason. Claiming anything like that publicly and officially is a blatant violation of the standards of rationality and fairness in public life ("what we officially claim is absurd and we know you know that, but we want you to pretend that you don't, and that you believe us"). If such a brazen show of arrogance on the part of the authorities goes unopposed, the authorities are given a totally free hand to do exactly as they please in the future. From then on, as Paul Feyerabend puts it in another context, "Anything goes." That is why reacting with some form of resistance to such a challenge should presumably have been a matter of self-respect on the part of the Bulgarian public, not to mention an act its self-preservation precisely as a "public."

The conventional explanation for this paradox is that such a situation is "normal" in a totalitarian society. Incidentally, the sparse literature on the "Regeneration Process" that is available to date does not even raise this question – as if nothing paradoxical had occurred, and as if people had no choice under the circumstances.

This presumption could be challenged by at least three arguments. First, this is a case of the abuse of power on an extraordinary scale. No matter how effective the mechanisms obstructing resistance might have been, it would be logical to expect some form of public reaction to such a strong "stimulant." Second, we should keep in mind that the historical period in which these events took place, the mid-1980s, was quite removed from the age of savage repression. The last forced labor camp of the communist regime in which killings had taken place was closed twenty years earlier. The "Regeneration Process" was launched in an otherwise peaceful political situation in which there was nothing particularly threatening to any possible dissidents. Last but not least, there had been recent precedents of large-scale and relatively successful opposition within the so-called "socialist camp." By the early 1980s, for example, Solidarity had asserted itself as a formidable opposition to the communist party in Poland.

So how could we possibly explain the non-reaction of the Bulgarian people – of both ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Turks – to the scandalous assimilation campaign undertaken by the authorities? What

could have prevented someone from doing something – from holding, say, a protest demonstration, albeit a small one, in the nation's capital? What could have stopped some public figures with high moral authority from speaking to foreign media, or from establishing a human rights protection committee that would issue a protest declaration? Hardly anyone could have feared that if they became involved in some action of this type, they would be sentenced to death or to years in prison, that their family would be harassed, their dwelling confiscated, and so forth. Incidentally, protest actions of this type took place in 1989 when, in the spirit of "*perestroika,*" the issue of redressing the monstrous injustice done in the "Regeneration Process" was placed on the agenda. And except for demonstrators injured in physical clashes with police, nothing particularly terrifying happened to the organizers and participants in those protests. The situation would have hardly been very different if the same protests had been undertaken in 1984/85. Why weren't they?

The logical continuation of the conventional explanation – and the reason which was in fact most frequently cited in informal discussions and comments on the events in question – is that the Bulgarian nation is probably very submissive by nature and prepared to "swallow" any injustice, even if those holding power do not bring extreme pressure to bear upon them. I will here attempt to find an alternative and not so culturally deterministic and humiliating explanation for the Bulgarian public's passivity in this case.

First, a comparison between the events of winter 1984/85 and of spring 1989 would show Bulgarian intellectuals in a very different light. In the first case they took no action, while in the second, as we shall see below, opposition organizations launched protests and placed the "Regeneration Process" on the agenda of concrete human rights campaigns on the European level. I believe that any explanation for the Bulgarian public's passive attitude to the 1984/85 assimilation campaign should proceed from the position of the intellectual circles. Why did they fail to launch initiatives that would generate, conceptualize, and subsequently lead some kind of resistance, or at least some kind of protest movement?

Where does this difference in the behavior of Bulgarian intellectuals in 1984/85 and 1989 come from? An explanation that refers to the forthcoming changes in the late 1980s would sound implausible to someone who has lived through the events in question. It cannot be claimed that people plucked up their courage in spring 1989 because they were expecting communism to fall at any moment. Insofar as political changes were predicted at all at the time, they were expected to be on an entirely different scale and in an entirely different direction. People expected reform, not abolition of the communist regime. The actual course of events took almost everyone by surprise. That is why I will look for another possible explanation and endeavor to demonstrate that the communist forms of totalitarianism are characterized by a community-like[2] pattern of relationships between the ruling and the intellectual elite. The extent to

which intellectuals in a given communist country accepted the "offer" and integrated into these community-like relationships depended, I believe, on cultural factors. However, the impact of those factors can be better understood if we analyze the mechanism of their operation rather than if we simply assume, say, that one cultural environment produces conformists, whereas another produces dissidents.

In other words, I will attempt to justify the thesis that Bulgaria's intellectual elite resigned itself to the injustice of the "Regeneration Process" not so much out of fear or from an *a priori* acquiescence vis-à-vis the regime, but because it had been integrated into the activities of the country's communist leadership for decades. The motives for this affiliation did not boil down to a desire for material gains and privileges, ambitions to exercising some sort of intellectual power over society, or the temptations of vanity. All these motives did exist to one extent or another, but I believe that there was also something else that cannot be reduced to instrumental considerations, namely, attitudes specific to *Gemeinschaft*-type relationships. These include loyalty, an ingroup-type of solidarity, and a sense of a common mission and historical responsibility.[3]

Such attitudes might not have a place in political life in one given cultural context, but in another they might well be an essential component. I will try to indicate certain cultural prerequisites for such community-type relationships between the intellectual and totalitarian ruling elites that existed in communist Bulgaria and which, as specific traits of national culture, have continued to have an impact on politics in Bulgaria right up to the present day. These specific cultural traits are not typical of all former-communist countries, which could explain why there was a strong dissident movement in some countries but not in others.

In summary, instead of an explanatory scheme along the lines of the "passivity of the public in regard to the arbitrary acts of a totalitarian regime – culturally determined conformism of the nation," I will offer a hypothesis that is considerably more complicated. This hypothesis attributes the reluctance of the Bulgarian intellectual elite to initiate and head a protest movement to the existence of community-type relationships between the intellectual and ruling elites. These relationships *are* culturally determined, but in a way that permits an analytical conceptualization of the situation and a drawing of conclusions that are also valid for post-totalitarian political realities. This hypothesis of community-type relationships between the intellectual and ruling elites obviously presupposes a significant over-simplification of the picture, that is, essentialist generalizations concerning the type "Bulgarian-intellectuals-in-general." In reality the processes are characterized by a far greater diversity. At the level of a basic assumption, however, such over-simplification is inevitable. An addition, this is only an initial methodological schema that is yet to be filled with content, something that will result from further concrete research.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

My hypothesis is that in 1984 there were community-type relationships involving the intellectual elite and the power holders that had collapsed by 1989 because of the ongoing process of *perestroika* in the Soviet Union. More generally, communist party rule presupposes in principle community-type relationships not only among the power holders themselves, but also between the power-holders and other social circles upon whose cooperation they rely.

This model, as I will endeavor to show, stems from the very content of the communist ideology. However, its full-fledged realization in one country or another depends on the traits of the respective national culture. I believe that such cultural prerequisites existed in some of Europe's former-communist countries, but not in others. That is why the ruling and intellectual elites ultimately formed a community-type unity in certain countries, and why dissidence in those countries was weak, while there was no such community in others and, consequently, opposition attitudes and actions there were stronger.

By "community" I mean social relationships of the type defined as "*Gemeinschaft*" in F. Toennies' famous work *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*. In this type of group life the relationship with the Other is valuable *per se* and is not taken to be a means for achieving particular ends. The community is characterized by unconditional solidarity between its members and a more or less discriminatory attitude towards "outsiders." Community-type relationships are regulated – if we use Max Weber's later terms – by value rationality, not by instrumental rationality. The community that the communist party strove to build within and around itself is of the "community of spirit" type, which Toennies discusses alongside the "community of blood" and the "community of place."[4]

The prerequisites for such an affinity with the community are vested in the communist ideology itself. For example, the communist party's mission is to spearhead the struggle for the liberation of the proletariat, using the true theory of society that was created by the classics of Marxism and Leninism. Yet the proletariat cannot liberate itself unless it liberates all of humanity and resolves all social problems in principle. Consequently, how could a conscientious person who knows all these truths possibly fail to join the communist cause?

This does not apply to people who belong to the bourgeois class and whose dominant position is threatened by communism. Intellectuals, however, are commonly considered to be people who are not affiliated with a particular class and are thus exempt from this restriction. The central idea in this argumentation is that conscious and conscientious persons do not have the right to choose. Their reason and their conscience cannot help but recruit them to the cause of communism, for freedom is a recognized necessity.

Your political commitment thus ultimately proves to be your destiny. Joining the undertaking, you end up within a circle of people who, just like yourself, are there by predestination. This is not a free association that may be joined or left voluntarily. Moreover, the very fact that your circle is restricted, and that not all people have committed themselves to the common cause attests that not all have recognized their duty, and that you who have so committed are superior to the others in some way. Your community is united not only by relationships of conspiracy, although they are important, too, but also by the consciousness of a universal historic mission.

The organizational life of a ruling communist party is community-like in many ways, For example, the procedure of admitting new members has the typical features of initiation. By rule, communist party statutes do not provide for a procedure comprising the voluntary termination of membership. You can leave the party only if you are expelled. While this can be done in practical terms if you stop attending party meetings and paying membership dues, even that requires a special decision on your expulsion at some point. In addition, relationships between communist party members and others are characterized by esotericism. Communication within the party is confidential in character, but not only in respect to internal party affairs. The presumption is that only communist party members can be told the whole truth about problematic issues in social life. They alone can be counted on to treat with understanding the difficulties through which building socialism must inevitably pass – without losing faith in ultimate victory and without developing incorrect or inimical ideas. That is why communist party life abounds in practices that demonstrate the party leadership's special trust in the members, such as the circulation of secret newsletters, closed-door discussions, confidential meetings with representatives of the central leadership, and so forth.

Every totalitarian regime in fact attempts to construct an all-encompassing social structure of the community-type. It leaves out only those who are excluded, such as Jews, communists, or capitalists, that is, precisely those against whom the population is mobilized into a "mega-community." As a rule, every regime of this type tries to win intellectuals over to its side (except those who belong to the excluded categories of people), offering them preferential treatment. In addition, the totalitarian community has a hierarchical organization that can involve special relationships within the community. Moreover, the community relations that unite (or ought to unite) totalitarian society into a monolithic whole are reinforced in many cases by a combination of totalitarianism with nationalism.[5]

However, all this does not mean that every totalitarian regime is necessarily characterized by a community-type relationship between the intellectual and ruling elites. At the very least, historical facts demonstrate that this was not the case in those socialist countries that had strong dissident movements. Consequently, our analysis proceeds to a more

specific problem, namely, why was such a relationship realized in Bulgaria but not, for example, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary? It is in this respect that cultural differences, which will be discussed further, might provide the explanation that is needed.

What could actually attract an intellectual to such community-type relationships? By "intellectual" I here mean a person involved exclusively in the production, elaboration, and dissemination of ideas, a view that is in line with the view commonly held in the literature. In this sense, the category of intellectuals also includes Karl Mannheim's "intelligentsia," which he requires to be free-floating (*freischwebend*) in regard to particular social interests.[6]

This last point provides another criterion for who may be regarded as an intellectual, namely, one must be ideologically non-affiliated. Certain authors interpret this impartiality as a concern only with "the validity and truth of ideas for their own sake."[7] Others, such as Mannheim himself, tend to regard this as an affinity with the interests of society at large. The extent to which those distinctions are theoretically coherent is a complicated question that cannot be explored here. (After all, every ideologist claims that his/her cause is the only correct alternative, and that s/he defends the interests of the whole of society). For the purposes of the present discussion, this stipulation only means that in examining the relationships between the intellectual and ruling elites under communism, I exclude from the former those theorists who are involved in the ideological justification or critique of the regime.

The attitude of intellectuals to power is universally regarded as ambivalent. First, their inherent ambition is to rationally govern social processes, for which political power is a *conditio sine qua non*. According to Zygmunt Bauman, for instance, a distinctive feature of modernity is that it combines the power of the state, which strives to subordinate reality to its planned control, with intellectual discourse, which generates models of such control.[8] On the other hand, intellectuals as exponents of self-reflexive attitudes are critical of the actions of power-holders by definition. "Theorists have, at various points, defined intellectuals as detached vanguards, ... as outsiders or rebels alienated from the dominant culture."[9] Intellectuals are the typical moralizers of contemporary society. "The evolution of intellectuals in Western societies as a critical and moralizing elite is a by-product of secularization, of the decline of the virtual monopoly of the moralizing function, held by the clergy."[10]

I would add a third function of the intellectual elite in relation to power. As prestigious figures in the public sphere, intellectuals have great possibilities to influence public opinion, to legitimate or delegitimate the regime in the public sphere. Be it formally or informally, by public statements or comments before friends, or even by their behavior alone without making any statement whatsoever, intellectuals can interpret, conceptualize, and evaluate the actions of power.

All these issues are motives that prompt intellectuals to affiliate with power in any modern society. In the conditions of totalitarianism, especially in its socialist form, such motives are augmented by other specific factors. As is known, socialist society is plan-based. It is organized on the basis of the modernist presumption that social reality can be governed rationally. This creates the alluring semblance of "an opportunity for the social scientist for direct influence on social reality, and for direct scientific and expert advice to be transformed into a programme of practical action by politicians."[11]

In addition, it is generally difficult under socialism for intellectuals, especially if they are employed in the sphere of the humanities and social sciences, to remain aloof from power and uphold a politically neutral position. The rule that "you are either with us or against us" applies under totalitarianism. In the conditions of total control over political and cultural life, "... intellectuals actually have no choice whether or not to become political intellectuals; they either accept the official ideology, or join the opposition, because it is impossible in such regimes to conduct any intellectual activity outside the political realm."[12]

On the other hand, the regime needs the cooperation of intellectuals in order to actually effect total control over society. Intellectuals must not create alternative sources of legitimacy, but rather assert the dominance of the state ideology by all means possible, including literature, visual arts, journalism, and social science.[13] This necessity motivates power-holders to closely control the intellectual elite by means of a "carrot and stick" policy, that is, by using combinations of privileges and threats. Consequently, the power-holders also stand to gain from winning intellectuals over to their cause.

In its turn, total government control over the resources that are essential for intellectuals' professional activities stimulates flirting with power. If the quality of your creative work depends on the funds granted by the respective ministry, you will naturally try to be on good terms with the political elite. Totalitarianism also creates conditions for the monopolization of intellectual activities. That is to say that it is very tempting for technocrats, as well as academics and artists, to achieve easy professional success through privileges granted by the authorities. "It does the unimaginative researcher no harm if a certain scholarly topic can be investigated only in his institute. An incompetent director will not grieve if a state grant saves his theater from closing, while a competent university theater group is banned."[14] Real competition for the benevolence of power-holders thus flares up among intellectuals.

This list of motives for the intellectual elite's affiliation with the regime in communist societies can be easily extended. But this will not help us answer the question that we raised above. Why were community-type relationships between the ruling and intellectual elites stronger in some communist countries and weaker in others? Why was the community-type style of interaction, dictated by communist ideology, welcomed by

intellectuals in some countries and not in others? As noted above, I believe that this largely determined the degree of dissidence in the countries in question.

There were, of course, many historical and cultural differences between the countries of the former communist bloc. The pictures of cooperation between intellectuals and the regime painted by authors reflecting on the political reality in the different countries are far from identical. For example, technocrats play the role of a link between intellectuals and power in Konrad and Szelenyi's scheme. The authors' explanation is that although the professional activities of technocrats are very dependent on governmental political decisions, they are also much more necessary to those in power, who readily provide considerable material incentives to managers and technical experts in order to secure success in the economy. The critical and anti-authoritarian actions of intellectuals in the arts and humanities can only upset this almost idyllic situation.[15]

An entirely different picture is painted by V. Sklapentokh, who maintains that Soviet intellectuals in the natural sciences and technology were far less conformist than those employed in the social sciences and the humanities. Shlapentokh's explanation is that the latter included many obedient mediocrities whom the state had deliberately placed there for its convenience. But the state could not afford to do the same in the natural sciences and technology since that would lead to economic collapse.[16]

There is no contradiction between these two accounts since Shlapentokh describes the situation in the erstwhile Soviet Union while Konrad and Szelenyi primarily refer to Central Europe. In all likelihood the situations were indeed different. In this respect, Irina Culic compares Romania and Hungary and argues that the difference in the scale of dissidence in the two countries is due to the different types of control that the authorities exercised over society. "While in Romania it was mainly symbolic-ideological and resulted in the total atomization of society, the 'silence' of the intellectuals, 'bottom-drawer dissidence' and extreme centralization, in Hungary control through consumerism – 'material control' – made possible independent forms of organization and a radical critique of the regime."[17]

Without questioning those interpretations in principle, I believe that at least one other factor ought to be taken into account. If in a particular national culture community-type relationships are by rule an essential element of social life, then the communist party-imposed, community-type paradigm of government may be expected to go down well with the intellectual elite. In other words, the affiliation of intellectuals with the regime will not be driven only by gain or by fear, but also by another, more stable motivation. The "magnetism" of the elitist community and the honor of being among the chosen few whose calling is to solve the country's grand problems are factors whose allure is hard to resist, even for those who neither crave for privileges and honors, nor would give in to intimidation

and threats. In such conditions the regime will win over, with few exceptions, the true intellectual elite, that is, those who are genuinely talented and have deservedly won prestige through their artistic or academic achievements. And once they support, or at least do not distance themselves from, the policy of the authorities, even when this policy is obviously problematic, as in the case of the "Regeneration Process" in Bulgaria, everyone else becomes disheartened.

In such a situation the "conformism-dissent" dichotomy is replaced by one of "insiders-outsiders," as discussed by Robert Merton,[18] or of "established-outsiders," as described by Norbert Elias.[19] In the first case, when the dissidents include creative individuals who are universally acknowledged regardless of efforts taken by the authorities to discredit them, taking a position on a par with them is prestigious. Enduring material privations and other repressions are then seen as martyrdom. The sufferer gains the moral support of the public, while those who take the opposite position and collaborate with the oppressors are treated as traitors. In the second case, when the publicly visible figures in the country's intellectual life are affiliated with the regime while the majority of opponents to the regime are intellectuals of mediocre quality, the latter's position is not taken seriously by the public and they suffer the blows of the authorities in moral isolation. The people naturally do not view their fate as a role model.

Such a division among intellectuals – established figures who are integrated with the ruling elite and outsiders who might be dissident-minded – contributes to the legitimizing of totalitarian rule. Totalitarian power can then be exercised further without the use of overtly repressive methods of control. Moreover, the rulers gain in self-confidence and become inclined towards risky actions, such as the "Regeneration Process" of 1984/85.

CULTURAL CONDITIONS

What cultural conditions support the community-type element in social life? The most obvious answer – but which is just as obviously inadequate – is "collectivism." It is evident that both individualist and collectivist cultures are to be found in the world, but it would be a gross over-simplification to claim that this cultural specificity in and of itself can explain the above-mentioned differences in political life in the former communist countries. In general, the mechanisms of cultural determination of political processes have not been the object of convincing studies in contemporary social science. I do not intend to fill this gap, but will rather attempt to illustrate how it may be possible to seek an explanation along the lines I have indicated for the phenomenon of community-type relationships between the intellectual and ruling elites by taking note of certain relevant cultural traits that have been discussed in contemporary studies of intercultural communication. I refer particularly to the work of G. Hofstede and E. Hall.

In the early 1970s Geert Hofstede conducted a large-scale survey of the values exhibited by employees in IBM's branch operations in more than fifty countries.[20] His analysis of the data collected revealed differences between those countries' national cultures in at least four parameters, namely, power distance, individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity. Later surveys identified a fifth dimension of cultural difference, the attitude towards the future.

I will here examine as relevant the first three types of cultural difference. In countries with high power distance, for example, it is "normal" for power to be concentrated in the hands of certain members of society to the detriment of others. Those who are in a subordinate position accept that it is in the order of things to fulfill the directives of their superiors. This is not simply a matter of discipline and respect for order since the latter are also found in societies that Hofstede rates as characterized by low power distance. Specific to high power distance, however, is submission to the power of the respective individuals.

Power distance is manifested in the family, in school, at the workplace, and in political life. Power distance in a given culture is manifested in the dichotomies of the cultivation of obedience or independence in a child's relation to her/his parents, authoritarian or "liberal" education, centralized or decentralized management of the enterprise, and despotic or democratic government of the state.

Where this distance is large, the difference in the status of individuals is perceived by the latter as predetermined (this also includes the paternalistic duty of power-holders to protect their subordinates). In countries with low power distance, on the other hand, the position of individuals in the official or political hierarchy is seen as partly resulting from coincidence and also as reversible ("I'm your boss today, but you might be my boss tomorrow"). Respect for the rules of behavior as objectively valid norms, and not merely as they regard one individual or another, is of pivotal importance for social order.

The difference between individualist and collectivist culture is much more commonplace, a fact also evidenced by the results of Hofstede's survey. As is well known, there are societies in which people live in close interdependence. However, there are also societies in which the autonomy of the individual is regarded as more valuable than solidarity among members of the family (in the sense of the so-called "extended family") or of any other community whatsoever, including work and ethnic groups. In the first case the fundamental values are closeness among people and loyalty to the group, while they are freedom and rationality in the second. In an individualist culture people comply first and foremost with abstract rules of behavior, while in a collectivist culture they comply with the roles assigned to them in a particular community.

This also determines whether priority will be given to justice or to the welfare of one's own community, a point in respect to which individualism and collectivism differ significantly. The collectivist person,

in contrast to the individualist person, indeed aspires towards harmony with the social environment rather than towards dominance, but this is only within the bounds of the so-called "in-group." In collectivist cultures the discriminatory attitude towards the "out-group" is more pronounced than in individualist ones.

The third type of cultural difference that Hofstede identifies is manifested in the attitude towards uncertainty, that is, the degree of uncertainty avoidance. This may also be termed the fear of uncertainty. Hofstede expressly notes that this is not a fear of risk or of danger in general. If the respective risk is characterized by a certain probability, it is not a severe problem in the cultural context of uncertainty avoidance. What is seen as threatening is uncertainty itself.

Cultures with high uncertainty avoidance are distinguished by a significant regulation of life by means of numerous rules that are both formal and informal (prescribed by customs and traditions, for example). It is interesting, however, that in countries with low uncertainty avoidance the rules are obeyed more strictly, even if those rules are fewer in number. It appears that in high uncertainty avoidance cultures the regulation of life tends to have more of a self-seeking, ritualistic character.

The problem of cultural difference has also been examined by many researchers in the fields of anthropology, social psychology, and other social sciences. The American anthropologist Edward Hall, who thematizes the difference between what he calls "high context" and "low context" cultures, has made a major contribution in this respect. Hall's books, which include *The Silent Language*, *The Hidden Dimension*, and *Beyond Culture*, as well as studies by other authors devoted to the same problem, such as R. Brislin's *Understanding Culture's Influence on Behavior*, distinguish two levels of difference between high context and low context cultures. In the more literal sense, these are two alternative styles of communication. One is more explicit in the sense that everything is explicated, and that the articulated message can be understood in itself. The other leaves much of the meaning of the statement implicit, and it thereby depends on the context.

In a deeper sense, this difference in communication is associated with the overall image of cultures. Hall advances the thesis that individual behavior in high context cultures depends on a complex system of inter-individual relationships, traditions, and customs. Since this system is not explicitly regulated, however, compliance with it tends to rely on an insider's sense or intuition. Low context cultures, on the other hand, give considerably greater freedom to the individual, who follows only universally known, abstract, and formal rules.

As a result of this difference, high context societies are more static and linked with traditions, or with the past, while low context societies are dynamic and future-oriented.

The countries of the former socialist block were not among those Hofstede examined. Consequently, we can now only speculate concerning

what the concrete values for Bulgaria might be in respect to power distance, individualism, or uncertainty avoidance. A clue may be provided by the data for Yugoslavia and Turkey, two neighboring countries that are not very different in cultural terms from Bulgaria. For example, Turkey ranks 18th and Yugoslavia 12th among 53 countries in Hofstede's table concerning power distance, which indicates a fairly high power distance.[21] They rank 28th and 35th respectively in the table for individualism, which indicates they are rather collectivist,[22] as well as 16th and 8th in the table for uncertainty avoidance, which reveals a high degree of uncertainty avoidance.[23]

These data are in accord with widely held opinions, which would indicate that Bulgarian national culture, to use Hofstede's terminology, is quite collectivist and is characterized by a relatively high power distance and by quite high uncertainty avoidance. If we approach Hall's parameters in the same way, Bulgarian culture would be revealed to be a high context culture. Consequently, my hypothesis is that Bulgarian culture, being characterized by such a combination of traits, provides a favorable environment for the establishment of community-like patterns of public life. If we add the "patriotic" motivation of the majority of Bulgarian intellectuals, or the high degree of ethnocentrism that is "normal" for our region, we would obtain an explanation for the paradox: that the intellectual elite of the country preferred to side with the ruling elite, and not with justice, human rights, and other universal values, during the "Regeneration Process".

Cultural factors of course act in conjunction with others that could diminish their effect. In this regard there were socialist countries in which historical circumstances were not favorable to community-type relations between intellectual and ruling elites, regardless of the cultural background. For example, there were nationalist internal tensions involving certain intellectuals in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia that made it impossible for them to accept the policy of the federal leadership concerning the national question and radically prevented their affiliation with the government. In other countries dissidence was nourished by the existence of significant differences within the ruling elite itself, as was the case with the purges within the Communist Party in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and later. The community-type connections that we have been discussing were also hindered by anti-Semitism, with discrimination against Jewish intellectuals serving to cultivate dissidence. All of these factors diversified relations between intellectual and ruling elites within one and the same "cultural zone."

It could also be argued that Hofstede's and Hall's findings are not sufficiently reliable to provide us ground for drawing such bold conclusions. It could be claimed that they need to be interpreted in respect to the specific civilizational "constellations" in the region we have discussed, where "power distance," "individualism," "collectivism," "uncertainty avoidance," and "high" and "low context" cultures may have

somewhat other dimensions. Perhaps a more detailed analysis would illustrate that these cultural traits have been conditioned by the interaction between "Occident" and "Orient" in the Balkans. Consequently, the hypothesis outlined here aims not so much at a direct contribution to resolving a controversy as at provoking a discussion concerning both the more concrete issue of the "Regeneration Process" as well as the more fundamental question concerning the cultural conditioning of political activities.

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NOTES

[1] A more subtle thesis advanced by certain more serious theorists of this campaign claims that the majority of Bulgarian Turks are descended from the Bulgars, or Proto-Bulgarians. These were the people who, together with a number of Slavic tribes, founded the Bulgarian State in the seventh century. The commonly held view among historians is that the Bulgars were of Turkic origin, which could explain the anthropological similarity between Turks from the ethnic minority in Bulgaria and those from the Republic of Turkey.

[2] In the sense of "*Gemeinschaft*" as used by F. Toennies.

[3] It was precisely these relationships that began to crumble on the eve of the 1989 changes. I believe this explains the activization of intellectuals in defense of the rights of Bulgarian Turks in the spring of that year.

[4] Toennies 1979, p. 12.

[5] The question of the sources and the mechanisms of communist nationalism is in itself an enormous theme that demands much more attention than can be afforded in the present discussion.

[6] See Mannheim 1936

[7] Montefiore 1990, p. 201.

[8] Bauman 1989, p. 2.

[9] Boggs 1993, p. 1

[10] Hollander 1987, p. 69.

[11] Kurczewski 1990, p. 82.

[12] Szacky, 1990, p. 124.

[13] Shlapentokh 1990, p. 10.

[14] Konrad/ Szelenyi 1979, p. 213.

[15] Konrad/Szelenyi 1979, p. 211.

[16] Schlapentokh 1990, p. 6.

[17] Culic 1999, p. 55.

[18] See Merton 1972.

[19] See Elias 1994.

[20] The first monographic publication concerning the findings of this survey is Hofstede's *Culture's Consequences*.
[21] Hofstede 1994, p. 26.
[22] Ibid., p. 53.
[23] Ibid., p. 113.

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CHAPTER VII

BRIDGING GAPS THROUGH DIALOGUE AND SOLIDARITY: ADDRESSING ISSUES OF DIVERSITY IN A GLOBAL ERA

CHIBUEZE C. UDEANI

The phenomenon of globalization cannot be simply a matter of economics and politics, the flow of information and capital, or the transfer of goods, services, and technological know-how. It rather includes the movement of human beings, thereby leading to cultural encounters. This means that chances abound for a new awareness of human subjectivity and a new development in hermeneutics that will manifest, and even constitute, new dimensions of relatedness between peoples as well as the need for new ways of understanding them.

The present reflection is intended to illustrate certain of the problems posed by cultural pluralism and globalization and also indicate how dialogue and solidarity can serve as means to deal with them. It must be noted that globalization generates opportunities in addition to problems. One example resides in the fact that where previously the issue was one of a contrived or instrumental cooperation between people for external purposes, people are now obviously and inherently related in terms of a global whole. That is to say that the welfare of one must now be the concern of all, and conversely. This indeed is the fundamental characteristic of the new cultural universe in which we are destined to live.[1]

Human life as an enterprise is conducted within a surrounding culture. Consequently, the activities of human beings are always influenced by their own particular cultural environments and traditions. Today we are confronted with what may be termed the pluralism of cultures and patterns of life, among other issues. This involves such questions as: What possibilities do individuals from different cultures have to engage in meaningful encounters if human life is culturally dependent? Are they in a position to break the chains of ethnocentrism and step forward to encounter each other? Are there limits to what can be achieved?

In order to understand an individual, one must understand the nature of the cultural influences of which one is to some extent a product. This means to acknowledge the essential role of the cultural context of a particular society without becoming entrapped in cultural relativism. In addition, not only has the need for dialogue become more pressing today than ever before because of the phenomenon of globalization, but the waves of movement of people around and within the world also generate more opportunities for dialogue.

Today all human endeavors are challenged to assist in making the best of globalization. The role of philosophy in this respect must be more than merely "describing what actually or effectively is... and what, given the logic or dynamics of the process at work, is likely to be."[2] It will clearly not be appropriate to restrict philosophy to the epistemological approach, which has often been the case in respect to globalization. This is even more the case when we are confronted with questions concerning the priority of human, communal, and spiritual values in the face of the overwhelming force of a monolithic or oligopolistic economic necessity that now reaches to the most remote regions of the globe and seeks to reduce all diversity into a monetary or financial form. Is there still an opportunity for liberation and humanization within a system that encompasses all of us for its own benefit, regardless of what happens to the less advantaged members of society?[3]

Consequently, "It is the task proper for philosophers beyond any others to understand and explain [globalization] so that truly humane, peaceful and cooperative decisions can be made in and for the future."[4] In this respect, philosophy must incorporate its social and moral concerns as it becomes actively and adequately involved in the process of globalization. Judging from its "historic search for unity in diversity... its task is (among others) to deepen the search in each tradition for the prospects of dialogue in which each cultural identity is respected, protected and promoted, while being called to respond from its resources to urgent shared needs."[5]

Attention must be focused on the issues of diversity, dialogue, and solidarity. This is a result of the fact that while the proponents of globalization are busy singing the praises of the goals they have already attained, it has become evident that human beings today are confronted with ever more sophisticated forms of economic, political, and cultural manipulation and hegemony. "Writ large in these global times is the issue of the freedom of peoples vs. a hegemony which subjects all peoples and nations, politically or culturally. Further, if Huntington is correct in seeing civilizations as religiously based, the possibility of the dialogue of religions is also key to clash or cooperation between civilizations. What then is the role of philosophy in enabling such inter-religious and inter-civilizational dialogue?"[6] Today there are few questions facing philosophy that are more important than this.

DIVERSITY

Today more than ever before there is a multitude of diversity that is so immediate in daily encounters that one cannot but address it as a vital element of our global age. Dealing with diversity has not always been an easy task, as is witnessed by the various conflicts that are part and parcel of recent history. There is, unfortunately, an abundance of violence, riots, and civil wars, with the consequent negative impact on society and on entire populations. Most such conflicts are essentially connected with the failure

to handle adequately the issue of diversity, which, for one reason or other, has often been perceived as a threat.

Diverse cultures respond in differing ways to issues, questions, and problems of human existence. One of the fundamental problems in understanding other cultures concerns how we are to understand the basic differences in worldviews that underlie the divergent ways in which human beings respond to their social environments. One of the tasks of philosophy today is thus to promote the understanding that the rich diversity of cultures can be a source of improvement and growth. This need is rooted in the fact that insofar as conflicts begin in human minds, it is in the mind that the efforts to prevent and or resolve them must be focused. It is consequently necessary to develop a consciousness of diversity that, moreover, has to be rooted in an overarching global civilization based on shared values of dialogue and solidarity.

The different forms of human community give rise to the following question concerning the nature of their mutual interrelations. What can the philosophical experiences and creativity of many different peoples contribute to the political idea that all nations, both large and small, can live together? This involves the ability not only to bring together in harmony various minorities within one large group, but also to practice tolerance.[7] Dialogue is required for this to succeed, for without it there can be no balanced and peaceful diversity.

DIALOGUE

The need for dialogue arises from our human nature as well as from the diversity that is present in and around our human existence. Since dialogue as a venture worthy of its name is a difficult challenge, philosophers must be aware of the nature and extent of the task awaiting them. A challenge in principle presents us with new possibilities and opportunities, but we can only reap the fruits of dialogue if we accept the challenge of dialogue.

Dialogue between cultures, and hence between human beings, is one of the central issues concerning a type of globalization that will be able to serve as a factor for integration in contemporary societies. The practice and success of true dialogue, which must be "global, open, and circular," are among those elements needed in order for a worthwhile global cooperation or solidarity to be formed. Conflict emerges where hegemony in any of its different forms is practiced instead of dialogue.

Dialogue entails the ability to think interconnectedly from a global perspective and to be interested in views other than one's own. At times this involves tension and uncertainty, but it must be coupled with the ability to persist when it might seem that the only alternative is to quit. A questioning mind or disposition is also called for. But this cannot be merely questioning with an ethnocentric character, for it must be characterized by respect and by the consciousness of trying to learn from the other. Dialogue practiced in

such a fashion provides individuals with the opportunity to go beyond their respective horizons towards a common and collective diversity consciousness. It can be said with justification that this leads to a fusion of horizons, which in turn leads to the development of new ways of viewing life and reality in general, particularly other peoples and their cultural traditions. This obviously presupposes the ability to develop and maintain a reflective, questioning, and self-critical, disposition.

SOLIDARITY

Today we are living in a world that is highly divided. This is a fact regardless of the common impression concerning globalization, namely, that we are living in a very unified, homogeneous, and egalitarian world, or some type of global village. Indeed, the notion of global village appears to be more of a dream than a reality, not least of all because globalization itself has given rise to new dividing lines between peoples and nations. In this respect it suffices to call to mind the expression "global players," which implies that all others are non-players or spectators. The majority of the world's population in fact belong to this group of non-players, and they have been marginalized to the point of living on the periphery. And although such non-players can be found throughout the world, it is obvious that the greater number of them live in non-western countries. There is clearly an asymmetrical relationship of power between global players and non-players, so much so that the forces of globalization may well drive various groups and communities to the brink of extinction.

Within the context of dialogue that is promoted in the present discussion, solidarity constitutes one possible response to the issue of cultural relativism, which is an intrinsic element of the phenomenon of globalization and of the challenge of cultural pluralism. In principle, our common humanity disposes us to have a greater awareness of our common human values, but today this must lead us to action for the sake of the majority who have been marginalized by the major global players. This call to action must be understood as an appeal to our sense of solidarity with human beings, no matter where and under what conditions of life they may find themselves. One of its primary aims must be to put the riches of our diverse cultures and traditions at the disposal of us all, particularly the already disadvantaged majority of our global age.

Globalization may yet be transformed into a process that will work to realize the positive, creative potential of our different cultures and cultural traditions. But in order to serve this purpose, it must become sufficiently humanized so that it can utilize our common human values as an orientation showing the way to the collective human good that can arise from the diverse capabilities, interests, and needs of all the inhabitants of the world. We must become able to manage diversity constructively through dialogue and solidarity in our culturally plural and globalized world. We cannot afford to remain unconcerned about the marginalized

majority of the global population since, if for no other reason, we need others and their wealth of experience in order to comprehend the truth of our own human existence and achieve the fullness of our common humanity.

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NOTES

[1] McLean 2003, p. 193.
[2] Madison 1999, p. 85.
[3] Blanchett 1999, p. 14.
[4] McLean 2003, p. 193.
[5] Ibid., p. 3.
[6] Ibid., p. 10.
[7] Ibid., p. 193.

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CHAPTER VIII

WHY WORLD WARS?[1]

VESSELA MISHEVA

> There are now two great nations in the world, which, starting from different points, seem to be advancing toward the same goal: the Russians and the Anglo-Americans... Each seems called by some secret design of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world.
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (1835)

INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that the end of the Cold War, which dramatically changed the geopolitical map of Europe, was the greatest event of the second half of the twentieth century. As the distance from the turning point of 1989 has increased, coupled with the possibility to grasp the phenomenon as a whole, it is becoming ever more clear that the Cold War as an object of study is characterized by a greater complexity than any of the World Wars of the last century. Even a cursory examination of the magnitude of the emotions it created, as well as its intensity, scope, and consequences in virtually all social spheres and for all peoples and nations in the world, makes it evident that the Cold War deserves to be termed a "world war" more than any other war. Indeed, certain scholars have even called it the "Third World War," while others have referred to it as "a long peace." There is certainly some degree of truth in both of these descriptions.[2]

Like no other war, the Cold War forced all peoples and nations to declare openly their attitudes and to define themselves as either for or against each of the parties involved. Only a limited space was left for "go-between roles," vacillating loyalties, and covert "neutrality." What Shakespeare used as a metaphor to describe an individual's place in the world, namely, that the whole world is a stage, came to apply to entire nations and peoples in the twentieth century. That is to say that all nations were involved in one and the same action and had particular roles to play.[3] To state this in the language of systems theory, we could say that the twentieth century transformed the social system of politics into the dominant social sphere that united the entire world in one single action on a global scale with only two interaction parties. None of the social systems that had dominated previous historical periods succeeded in constructing such a huge theater stage, not even religion.

Regardless of the fact that students of the Cold War have dramatically increased in numbers since 1990, there is still not even a single question on which historians, political scientists, and political analysts have reached consensus. Perhaps the main difficulty for making progress in the field is that the object under investigation has no clearly defined beginning. It is certainly impossible to write a comprehensive history of the Cold War without being able to say precisely when it began, but how can we understand it if we cannot say why it began? And history as a science cannot give us an answer to the latter question because it will never be found in the archives of declassified Cold War documents. We are thus trapped in a vicious circle. We cannot say why the war started if we do not know when it began, but nor can we say when it began if we do not know why it started in the first place. For that matter, we are not even in a position to be certain who the winners and losers were since we do not know which of the conflicting parties began it and who should finally be "charged" with the ultimate historical responsibility for it.

Some scholars have already apparently decided that it would be better simply to choose a day, define the temporal boundaries of the period in which one is interested, and then concentrate on what is essential and work further down into the very heart of the problem. However, I am convinced that such a strategy will not work, at least not for those who want *to understand* and "put the pieces together," although it may bring to light many invaluable facts. The point is that we must have a theoretical framework for interpreting such facts, for no historical fact can acquire a meaning without such a framework. Accordingly, my view is that it makes an enormous difference whether we choose as the starting point of our analysis the day when the US began to "import" German rocket scientists in order to develop their domestic rocket industry in 1945, or the beginning of the Berlin blockade that the Soviets initiated in 1948, or the creation of the NATO military alliance, or the closing of the border between East and West Germany in 1952, or the beginning of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

A similar problem emerges when it comes to reaching an agreement concerning the precise day or year that should go down in history as the "day the Cold War ended." For a certain period of time there seemed to be a consensus that the end of 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and the communist regimes in a number of East European countries collapsed with a surprising simultaneity, was "The End" of the epic conflict. But the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, which marked the political and economic disintegration of the Eastern Bloc and of the USSR as well, might be just as good a candidate. The following years of economic and social crisis that rocked Eastern Europe, along with the extremely unstable political situation that permitted no reliable predictions concerning the direction that would be taken by the dramatic social changes underway, gave rise to legitimate skepticism as to whether we should call off the celebration of the "end of history."[4] Furthermore, the war in Kosovo, in particular, provided certain observers with the means to realize that Berlin

was perhaps not the best vantage point from which to judge the "temperature" and status of East/West relationships. Even the accession of the first three East (but more correctly Central) European states to the NATO military alliance in 1999 did not provide a completely adequate reason to celebrate the end of the Cold War, although there are growing expectations that the summer in East/West relations is here to stay.[5]

It was only in March 2004 that the mass media proclaimed the Cold War as having formally come to an end as they discussed the ceremony welcoming yet another group of one-time Warsaw Pact members into NATO, including the two Balkan countries, Bulgaria and Romania.[6] As BBC correspondent Jon Leyne deftly put it, the acceptance of these countries into the Western military alliance meant that "the last vestige of the Cold War" had finally drawn to a close.[7] Although questions about the future of the alliance and about possibilities for strong partnership between Russia and NATO remain, and although the term "cold war" may outlive the primary phenomenon that it came to designate, now being used to define situations in other parts of the world, there is no doubt that at least what was known as an East/West Cold War, or the communist/anti-communist war, is over and that its analysis may begin.

As one observes the great variety of opinions that exist in respect to virtually all possible Cold War issues, one may say that the Cold War is not merely one single "puzzle," but rather a number of puzzles that are mixed up together and impossible to separate from each other. It is then perhaps only natural that neither scholars, nor politicians have been able to reach a consensus or obtain any certain knowledge about who won the war and who lost it. All that we have are subjective opinions of such a range of diversity that we cannot even use "majority rule" in deciding the issue. Nor is there any agreement concerning which science or methods might provide the best results and should therefore be used in investigating the Cold War, or which science should be put in charge of this complex enterprise. The main problem, in my estimation, is that all previous Cold War studies have suffered from the lack of a grand theoretical framework capable of accommodating the lesser puzzles. It is my conviction in this regard that the only science today that has in its possession a sufficiently elaborated theory capable of handling such a complex issue is sociology. The theory in question is the grand theory of society conceived as a self-producing system of communications launched by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann in the second half of the twentieth century. History, political science, and political philosophy all lack theories of compatible scope. Sociology thus has no competitor capable of challenging its claim that the Cold War is *first and foremost* a sociological issue, and that it is the responsibility of sociology to take up the task of analyzing it.

There is in fact one issue concerning which experts in the field have come to agreement, namely, the Cold War comprised an *historical era* whose nature and consequences have no match in modern history. But where does an historical era begin and where does it end? Can we say that

the First and the Second World Wars belong to a different "era"? Looking at the way in which the beginning of the Cold War was rooted in the end of World War II, which in turn can be taken in many respects as a continuation of World War I, one may rightly wonder whether it would not be more legitimate to speak about one World War that lasted an entire century and had a number of different stages. The Cold War would then not even be a puzzle by itself, but rather one piece of a *master puzzle.*

RESEARCH DESIGN

The present analysis has a complex methodological and theoretical design. In order to attain its goal, namely, an understanding of the origins of world war, of which the Cold War was merely one but perhaps the most important element, a synthesis of three complementary methods will be used: social-psychology (symbolic interactionism) enriched by the psycho-historical method, the historico-sociological comparative method, and third-order cybernetics. Niklas Luhmann's macro-sociological systems theory, complemented with middle range sociological theories, will be used as the grand theoretical framework.

Theoretical Framework

Systems theory as a branch of sociology is concerned with the study of social forms or structures.[8] The theory that will be employed here is the macro-sociological theory that presents society as a self-producing (auto-poietic) social system comprised of communications. The main forms that it identifies are interaction systems, organizations, and the system of society as a single all-embracing system of communications. The societal system is further viewed as differentiated into many different functional subsystems, such as politics, science, religion, law, education, sport, and so forth.[9] Because all of these systems are equally important and equally legitimate "observers of society," none of them provides a superior position from which the system of society as a whole can be observed.[10]

All social systems have self-defined communication boundaries. One system that is an exception to this norm is the system of politics, the only apparent "relic from the past" that still uses territory to define its borders. Another exception is art, which can be described from one perspective as a system, but as a systems medium, or a system's content, from another.[11]

But what this grand sociological construction lacks is a theory of "sociological matter" of comparable complexity, which systems theory in fact deliberately left outside of consideration. The philosophical concept "matter" has been translated as "medium" in the language of systems theory.[12] But insofar as systems theory received little help in its attempt at defining the essence of "medium" from the philosophical discussions leading back to Kant, the concept of medium as a legitimate systems

counterpart remained undefined and obscure. A grasp of the essence of medium apparently cannot be found at the level of abstract philosophical analysis. One must instead search one level lower in middle range social theories, such as role-theory, social constructivism, symbolic interactionism, the theory of the public sphere, and others, in order to gain an understanding of "sociological matter." These theories should be considered as comprising a level of theoretical structures that, while not having forms of their own, may readily be utilized and shaped by a host of possible investigations. Furthermore, they also have the remarkable ability to join together or "communicate with each other" in the construction of complex theoretical frameworks. It is not surprising that such theories are viewed from the height of Luhmann's theoretical construction as loosely connected and formless identical substances, but this is also the reason why they serve as the most useful sociological theories, while the usefulness of grand systems theory is still being questioned. The hope is that when we begin to join these theories together and accommodate them within the grand theoretical framework of systems theory, they will not only take shape through the mutual pressure they exert upon each other, but will also prove the usefulness of systems theory itself.

Sociological Reliability

History is not only the oldest of all sciences (with the exception of geography), but also the one whose dignified scientific position is unharmed by its lack of a legitimate method. However, this lack of a method is precisely why philosophers reject the scientific status of history, as if science begins where philosophy begins. From the perspective of philosophy, history cannot be a science in the proper sense of the term, because there are no general laws of history that can be discovered and no possibility to know the true causes for events.[13] History for its own part appears to be quite content with its position of a narrator, reporting when things happen and in what sequence.[14] But when reputed historians passionately argue about the purity of their science, they forget, or perhaps try to conceal, the fact that history is a science with "two Fathers," one who wanted to know "when and in what sequence" and another who wanted to know "why." Indeed, we may not be able to find explanations for why things happen when we read such books as that of Herodotus, but we certainly find them in Thucydides' unique historical study.[15]

Sociology shares to a certain extent the fate of history insofar as it has been viewed as an "outsider" whose scientific status has time and again been challenged. Much like poetry, sociology feels compelled to defend its right to be a citizen of the "republic of science" and proceeds to write its "defense," which is the case with no other science.[16] Sociology is generally understood as occupying a position between philosophy and history, perhaps containing some of the features of both and yet being identical with neither.[17] As soon as sociology begins to narrate and use qualitative

methods, its scientific status is quickly questioned and it is accused of subjectivism, although history then looks upon it with approval. This type of sociology is in fact nothing other than the history of the present, and it thus paves the way for historical work to begin. When, on the other hand, sociology begins to count and is concerned with statistical regularities and tendencies, its social status is reaffirmed and its "prophetic skill" is legitimized. While quantitative sociology does not claim that certain general laws of history exist, it nevertheless claims to have the means to discover the particular "private law" of each phenomenon by which one may predict social events on a short-term basis. In respect to this type of sociology, every sociological object has its own "law" or pattern that is capable of being discovered. It is by using its appropriate skills in this regard that sociology has gained a certain legitimacy as a socially useful science, even though this by itself has not been enough for sociology to be accepted as an equal in the kingdom of science.

There is also a third type of sociology that occupies a sparsely populated area on the very border with philosophy, where its grand theorists reside. It is perhaps not so much the applied aspect of sociological quantitative research, but rather this elevated sociological enterprise that prevents philosophers from unabashedly "looking down" on sociology. It is true that history has never enjoyed the possibility for this type of legitimization, but neither has it ever had the "inferiority complex" from which sociology has always suffered. The strange position that sociology holds, squeezed as it is between the two majestic sciences of history and philosophy, implies that sociology will have to satisfy the requirements of both of its scientific guardians regardless of the particular interpretation of reality that it produces. That is to say that it should be both philosophically sound and historically true.

METHODOLOGICAL APPARATUS

Second-order Cybernetics. A common feature shared by systems theory and cybernetics is that they both study *forms without contents*. Modern cybernetics is sometimes defined as the science of complexity, but its most distinctive feature is perhaps its instrumentality, something which systems theory lacks. This is why cybernetics will here be used as a method of critical thinking that can be applied fruitfully to studying how the social system functions as a communication process that produces communications from communications. That is to say that the point of interest in this regard is how forms are produced, how they relate to each other, and how they function to produce new forms. The particular method that will be used here is so-called "second-order cybernetics."[18]

The present study will not only consider history as a source of reliable facts, but every fact will itself be taken as a form that has its own constructor. History in this sense emerges as a social constructor of past reality that "packages" raw observations and historical material into

linguistic forms. It will then also be necessary to observe the observer. However, this will not be done with the aim of "deconstructing" the observer since it is impossible for sociology to perform a "dissection" that separates form from its content. What will be done is instead to compare forms constructed by different observers so that, by an observation of both forms and their observers, we may finally attain the possibility of drawing conclusions concerning the "substance" to which these forms were attached. We may thus finally be in a position to construct a more complex form that takes into account different observation positions.

This means that historical facts will be taken not as pure evidence of how things were insofar as the identity of the observer must also be taken into account. Stated otherwise, who the observer is is not without importance, and every truth is relevant to the observer. Discovering the truth in this example means taking into account both observation perspectives and finding what it was that made such contradictory interpretations possible.

Some revealing examples of why such a method needs to be utilized can be found in the history of the Cold War itself. For instance, future generations will perhaps be quite puzzled as to what the real history of science was during the twentieth century. The history of science in the Soviet Union contained the names of scientists who were responsible for discoveries and inventions of civilizational importance, but who are not mentioned in the history of science as written in the West, and conversely. This was as much the result of deliberate propaganda as of the restricted flow of information due to the existence of the Iron Curtain.

The Psycho-Historical Method. Psycho-history is a relatively new science that has struggled for scientific legitimacy since its very beginning. Its efforts continue to meet with strong criticism, but this has not prevented it from being institutionalized and having its own research centers and periodical publications. Psycho-history's claims for legitimacy are still quite controversial. First of all, it claims for itself the status of a type of natural science, on which grounds it distinguishes itself from history. It is perhaps less difficult for historians than sociologists to accept its proposed "anti-holistic philosophy of methodological individualism."[19] What seems to be more difficult to accept from the point of view of hard-line historians is psycho-history's pretension of being able to discover "lawful propositions" and both construct and falsify "scientific paradigms," just as any natural science does.[20] It is equally difficult for historians to accept the existence of an historical science that, while still being history, aspires to correct the "ills" of history by adding to it a method.[21] Moreover, while history narrates using ordinary language, psycho-history attempts to construct its own specialized language.[22] To draw clear boundaries between itself and neighboring sciences is necessarily a primary condition for the constitution of any science. But the task of psycho-history seems to be more

difficult than that of other new sciences in that it involves the creation of a specialized language that avoids the most useful sociological terms.[23]

There are also points in respect to which the opinions of historians and sociologists concerning psycho-history may differ. For example, the main question that psycho-history attempts to answer is *why things happen and what were the true motives* of the actors. Such a question sounds quite "un-historical" to professional historians, who consider that any type of historical study should be interested solely in when things happen and in what sequence. In contrast, sociologists have no problem with recognizing the legitimacy of a science that defines itself as the "science of patterns of historical motivation."[24] For one thing, it resembles sociological causal analysis, which has been promoted by most of the fathers of sociology. On the other hand, social psychology as a specialized branch of sociology is itself interested in the discovery of the profound *motives* of actors in the present. This would apparently tend to support the legitimacy of a science that would instead explore the past in a somewhat similar fashion, not least of all in light of the fact that history often reads from a sociological and socio-psychological point of view as a collection of stories that not only do not "ring true," but are also sociologically false.[25] This creates the impression that historians are concerned with passing on to posterity only one particular kind of "truth," and that they rarely spell out the real or profound motives for events. And how could they do so? Ever since the time of Plato, the Father of Philosophy, telling the truth about what you are doing is taken to be irrational and a sign of unreason insofar as only that which makes sense in a social context deserves to be heard in public.[26]

The difficulties in finding out what people really think and what their real motives are are well known from qualitative interviewing, which was developed for the purpose of correcting the "ills" of quantitative studies. One of the basic principles of qualitative interviewing is precisely that the question "Why?" should never be asked directly, and that we must develop other strategies to get the answer.[27] We receive only a rationalized and acceptable answer when, for example, we ask someone *why* s/he voted in a particular way. While the person will give us his/her *reasons*, s/he will not speak his/her *mind*. The true motive might simply be that the candidate was a relative or a neighbor, or that the person voted as everyone else was apparently voting.

But sociology may find it difficult to accept psycho-history's "philosophy," or rather professional ideology, which at present is its weakest point. It, in fact, might be a bit too late for the emergence of a science that competes with philosophy and sociology on theoretical grounds and presents itself as a new "psychogenic theory of history." If psycho-history indeed attempts to compensate for both of the "disadvantages" of history, namely, the lack of a supporting theory as well as a method, then what is historical about psycho-history? Instead of striving to obtain legitimacy with such an apocalyptic disciplinary design, it would be much better for psycho-history to examine the history of how sciences other than

sociology were institutionalized. Hybrid sciences are not rare, but they normally take their theory from one science and their method from another. But while psycho-history obtained its method from psychology and psychoanalysis, history itself has no theory to offer. This does not mean, however, that psycho-history should attempt to invent one itself.

From the perspective of the sociology of science, psycho-history currently possesses not so much a "philosophy" as a professional ideology, which is meant to gain a social and not scientific legitimacy for it. And precisely because this is a *professional ideology disguised in a form of philosophy*, it has such a remarkable quality to irritate.[28] Its attacks on neighboring sciences for the most part are "blind" and without focus, which in fact serves to illustrate that psycho-history lacks a "foundation." But even though the latter cannot be gained by imitation, it seems that psycho-historians are still too busy with politics and the struggle for survival to take the time needed for serious explorations and for growing "scientific roots." It should be noted, however, that distinguishing ideology from philosophy has always been a difficult task, particularly after World War II.

What may gain legitimacy for psycho-history and strengthen its listless "philosophy" perhaps might reside in the distinction that Thucydides, one of the Fathers of History, drew between the "immediate causes" and the "profound causes" of historical events. While history is the science that tells us everything about immediate causes, there is still room for a science that will engage itself in the discovery of the profound causes of historical events, those not found in books. When Durkheim speaks of the difference between "determining" and "efficient causes," apparently unaware of Thucydides' work, he in fact translates into sociological terms the supposedly "historical" difference just mentioned that the enterprise of history never cared to acknowledge.[29] But if this is the case, should not psycho-history be knocking on the door of sociology instead of history?

Lloyd deMause, one of the fathers of psycho-history, provides a striking parallel between, on the one hand, history and psycho-history and, on the other, astrology and astronomy.[30] This parallel is striking not so much because the metaphor was happily chosen, but because just as the reader is prepared to decide that psycho-history is not quite a science, wondering what kind of species it might instead be, the author himself provides the word the reader was searching for in order to best describe it. Psycho-history is indeed a hybrid science in an embryonic stage of development with a confused philosophy and an enigmatic language, but it is nevertheless a science. deMause's entertaining narrative about astronomers "who came along and found astrologers" is quite irrelevant for describing the relationship between history and psycho-history. The difference between them is not that they are searching in different places, but that the astronomers observed while the astrologers did not. It is an unassailable historical truth that astronomers did not "buy" from astrologers their interpretative frameworks and their "philosophy," which was constructed upon obscure, pseudo-scientific language. I will thus suggest a

different narrative about sociologists coming across psycho-historians and realizing that the latter have something that they have not, namely, a method for sociological explorations into the past. And having a method in the "republic of science" immediately provides an "entry visa" to all realms. The fact that one still lacks a supporting and sufficiently mature interpretative philosophy is not a cause for alarm.[31]

It appears that deMause has been misled by the wisdom he found in Einstein's words that inspired his "Preface" in the *Foundations* ("It is the theory that decides what we can observe"). If one assumes that one is on the "cutting edge of science" and preaches scientific revolution, one should rather consult Thomas Kuhn than Einstein. Einstein's words are a-historical, bound to a particular point in time when a new master-theory came to replace an old one. It is surely the case that theory decides what should be observed in a time of paradigm change, which does not in any way challenge the legitimacy of scientific methods. But in a time of what Kuhn termed "normal science," when we already have grand theories but are lacking the methods to verify them, it is the method that decides.

The present discussion is not concerned about psycho-history's supposedly revolutionary theoretical background but rather its method of analysis. The psycho-historical method in fact makes it possible for sociology to realize one of its program ideas, namely, the idea that sociological knowledge, as a knowledge of the present, can be applied to a study of the past. Historico-sociological analysis is a theoretically well-founded sociological approach that nevertheless remains a theory without a method. That is why most reputable sociologists at the end of the twentieth century have observed that although Weber has provided the means for us to know what historical sociology should theoretically look like, this type of sociology still does not exist. The emergence of psycho-history brings the awareness that we know why this is the case. It is not the theory that decides in this particular example since it is the method that has been lacking.

The psycho-historical method allows for what might be called "qualitative interviewing of the past." It guides us in the search for arguments in support of our sociological hypothesis in both written and oral traditions, making it possible for us to ascribe equal status to both types of records in folk memories, poetic revelations, and archives. It provides a purpose and a goal to the sociological inquiry that wants to dive into the past insofar as it directs the search for motivational patterns, although not towards "prior personal events," as in psycho-history, but rather towards prior social events. Furthermore, it is not only macro-sociological analysis that may profit from this method. Social-psychology may also borrow psycho-history's method of the "self-observation of the emotional state of the researcher as a prime tool for discovery," lifting from his/her "shoulders" the burden of having to explain what scientific intuition is. There is no much that social psychology would disagree with in deMause's

statement that "nothing is ever discovered 'out there' until it is first felt 'in here.'"[32]

In addition, when this unique method of the "self-observation of the observer" is introduced into cybernetics, it indeed revolutionizes the field by raising it to a higher level. The result is a "third-order cybernetics" that has the advantage of integrating three different observations into one, namely, that of the primary observer, that of the observer who observes him, and that of self-observation. Consequently, and regardless of popular opinions and the balance between the friends and foes of psycho-history, the latter is a science and is here to stay.

Comparative Historical Sociology and Social Psychology. Scholars have observed that the interdisciplinary union between sociology and history prescribed by the fathers of sociology has so far failed to produce the desired "convergence."[33] And this is not because of any lack of enthusiasm or effort on either side. Neither have these sciences been kept apart, as has sometimes been argued, by an insistence on the part of sociologists on "the scientific foundation of their research," their elevated theoretical abstractions, their "present-minded empiricism (quantitative survey studies of present social patterns)," a "commitment to explicit testing, formulation, and application of social theory," or the "privileging of comparative analysis."[34] The point is neither that there are no sociologists "who now conduct primary research in ways that are indistinguishable from their colleagues in a history department,"[35] nor that sociologists should be converted into historians much as a Christian can be converted to Islam. The real meaning of interdisciplinarity is not convergence, but rather a type of synergy in which both interaction parties bring the best they have to offer into the unity. And insofar as this in fact comes about, systems logic indicates that the resulting "third" should be more than a simple sum of parts.

I would rather argue that the convergence of sociology and history was halted not so much by any different "understanding of what life is" that the two sciences *had,* nor by any other conceptual feature that they *had*, but rather by what they both *did not have*. More concretely, both lacked a "glue" or medium capable of linking them together. As far as the history of science is concerned, it is only a scientific method that could link together the operations of two autonomous sciences, two social systems, or even two scientific universes. Within the context of the present discussion, sociology and history were kept apart by sociology's lack of a method to explore the past. Its present-based methods could not lead it all the way to an interaction encounter with history.

My argument, the full development of which pertains to another study, is that historical sociology still remains a legitimate sociological theory without a method, regardless of the apparent renaissance that it apparently is undergoing today.[36] Sociologists time and again dove into endless efforts at classification, apparently being unaware of the nature of

the problem they faced. The method was supposed to be "comparison," but how can a theory indicate what should be compared and how? Weber suggested the concept of "ideal type" in order to improve on the situation, but while this notion can now be found in almost all sociological works, it has never yet left the realm of scientific speculation and rhetoric. What are the theoretical guidelines that one should follow in order to identify the essential and typical characteristics of an objectively observed social phenomenon? It seems that we, in fact, are left with no other guide than our intuition as we endeavor to determine why some things are important and others are not. That is to say that we have no instructions for how to construct ideal types. The former are apparently to be found in the process of self-observation, in which nothing other than our personal experiences in respect to a given phenomenon are to guide us. It is not necessarily the case, however, that researchers have a privileged position for articulating what their real criteria were for choosing which characteristics do and do not pertain to an ideal type. There is no guarantee that what researchers know in the form of personal knowledge can succeed in acquiring an articulated form. It might simply remain in the form of an intuition or an experience of *déjà vu*, such as what might happen when we read an historical text about events separated from us by millennia. The situation in which social scientists find themselves at the beginning of the twenty-first century is thus quite the opposite of that in which philosophy began. Unlike Socrates, who knew that he did not know, we know that we know. The only problem is to find out what we know.

And there are further obstacles facing any attempt to apply our "tacit knowledge." It is a sociological principle that one cannot reflect on a given situation while one is in it. Self-observation can only begin when one has exited the situation and adopted a temporal/spatial distance from it. It is only then that personal experience may begin to take an objective form or, stated otherwise, become an object. From the perspective of socio-psychology or, more precisely, symbolic interactionism, the "I" cannot observe itself as an actor who acts.[37] But neither can it become an objective observer of "me." All that the "I" can do is become involved in an "I/me" interaction that will be sufficient for having a *consciousness of the world* and *thought*. In order for symbolic interactionism and its design of the self to be capable of supporting not only a sociological but also an historico-sociological analysis, an essential anthropological dimension is necessary. Such an extension of socio-psychological theory requires that we define the conditions under which, for example, anthropologists come to grips with their object of study. Since this discussion will be left for a further work because of its more theoretical character, it suffices to state here something discovered by anthropologists "that everybody knows": We can begin to reflect upon and comprehend what has happened in the past only after we have adopted an adequate distance from it. Moreover, this knowledge must be coded in the language of social-psychology, or, more precisely, symbolic interactionism, in order to be useful. It will then take the following form:

The "me" loses its status as an interaction partner as soon as the world it came from is no longer there. The "me" then loses its "voice" and its ability to talk to the "I," becoming nothing other than an object of contemplation. The internalized world thus remains present in a form of a "dead" self that thereby becomes available for internal observation.

Given the premises of this theoretical background, it appears that the lost world of the Cold War can still be found in those who have lived through it, particularly in the selves of the post-World War II generation, or the revolutionary "baby-boomers." This can be stated in yet another way that expresses one of the basic beliefs of symbolic interactionism: "In order to know, you have to have been there." Declassified documents and "dead history" will not help those who did not see it to understand the events. It is thus necessary to specify further the self-observation of researchers indicated by psycho-history. And while not everyone can be a Cold War specialist, it is not only the researchers that know. We all know provided that we have been there. All that is left is merely to find out what in fact we do know.

In light of the above discussion, it is not necessary in the present methodological and theoretical design to take "on board" the psycho-analytical and "individualistic" orientation of psycho-history. I instead wish to keep to a sociological "holistic" orientation, all the more so in that my principal concern is with the provision of a holistic vision in which the world "as a whole" can be explained, not merely one or another of its parts.

HOW DOES THE FUTURE BEGIN?

One of the chapters in Luhmann's *The Differentiation of Society*, which discusses the temporal structures of modern society, has the provocative title "The Future Cannot Begin."[38] The question about how the future begins has acquired a particular urgency today in view of the political instability of the world, both East and West, and the continuing agony of certain East European countries as they attempt to build a new present upon the ruins of the Cold War. Political scientists in the West have described this crisis as "the end of history," while it has instead been viewed in the East as "a return to history."[39] But what should we abandon as belonging to the past, what should we preserve, and what should we return to? It is as if time had "collapsed," leaving us trapped between a present past that cannot withdraw and a present future that cannot begin.

However, the task of the sociologist is different from that of the political scientist or philosopher. Sociologists are not in a position to answer the question "What?" unless they engage themselves in a purely philosophical enterprise. But even if they do so, their final goal is not to answer this question, which they consider to be only a stage on the way to another question. On the two opposite sides of their polarized micro-macro science, sociologists are searching for answers to two quite different questions, namely, "How?" and "Why?" While the function of macro-

sociological theories is to answer the former question (How does society function?), micro-sociology's qualification lies in the finding answers to "why" questions (Why do people do what they do? or Why do things happen as they do?). That is why the "prophets" are normally found on the macro side of the sociological enterprise, while the experts in human motives and souls are on the micro side. That which keeps them together in one and the same science and makes interaction between them possible is that both questions share a common denominator. That is to say that they both are engaged in one or another type of *causal analysis*.

This enterprise is also different from that of the historian. The historical sociologist does not study "the past" but rather what Luhmann defined as the "past present," that is, the past that is still "alive" and resists becoming history. The study of this past has its own peculiarities and difficulties. For example, while an historian may know that the future of the Greek *polis* lay in the Roman empire, which necessarily helps him to define what was essential for the future and what was not,[40] the historical sociologist has no such advantage. S/he instead enjoys the advantage of approaching the past with an "unbiased mind." The only thing that saves her/his enterprise from becoming voluntaristic and grants it scientific legitimacy is the peculiar sociological pattern of thinking that causal analysis represents: Z is caused by Y, Y is caused by X....

From a micro-sociological or interactionist perspective, the present becomes a past when we begin talking not *with it* but *about it*.[41] From a socio-psychological perspective, the present becomes past when we lose our passion for it, when we feel it no more, when it neither hurts nor brings joy. These changes indicate that it has become an object of contemplation and analysis, having been separated from the self and become an *object*, an *object to itself*. But when does the past in the present become a past in a macro-sociological perspective? "How can we make the present independent of what brought it about and still is at work in it?"[42] Stated otherwise, how can society become independent from its memory so that the future can begin?

Luhmann suggested that this was possible through historical research.[43] A proper reading of the "instructions" would direct sociologists to turn their backs to the future that they hope to bring about and engage in historico-sociological investigation, the final goal of which is to change our conception of the past.[44] The way to the future thus does not lead forwards but backwards, at least for sociologists.

TELLING SOCIOLOGISTS WHAT THEY ALREADY KNOW

Luhmann viewed society as a single system that has no Other. Consequently, all observations of society can only be made from within. This fact inevitably led Luhmann to formulate the macro-sociological puzzle: Modern society cannot be objectively observed.[45] We can certainly observe modern society, but how can we separate what is modern from

what is not? How can we choose between the different "subjective" perspectives that each social subsystems offers? Political systems now clearly dominate society, but how could we claim that the observations of other social systems, such as science, contain a lesser truth?

It must here be kept in mind that since a functionally differentiated society has no "systems center," a single perspective is impossible.[46] It is even more inconceivable from a theoretical point of view to observe society as a whole insofar as this type of observation would require an inside/outside perspective. But how could it be possible for a member of society to first exit society for the sake of observation and then return to it?[47]

My main argument in this regard is that the Cold War divided the world as a whole into two different parts or two autonomous social systems, each of which was "another" in respect to the opposing system and thereby comprised an "outside" social space. This development provided something that had been impossible in previous historical periods, namely, the opportunity to observe society as a whole. This of course could not happen during the Cold War itself, but rather became possible during that period of time after the Wall separating the two social systems collapsed but before the Iron Curtain had been lifted. It would thus be incorrect to equate these two Cold War theater attributes, for the Wall collapsed in the final action of the play in just a matter of seconds, so to speak, although raising the Curtain required significant additional time.[48] In this sense it could be said that what had appeared to be more difficult in fact turned out to have an easier resolution.

But this does not solve our problem, at least as far as systems theory is concerned, in respect to finding an objective observation position from which to observe society as a whole. A detailed theoretical argument that supports my claim comprises a topic that must be reserved for another discussion. What can now be said is that Luhmann's work makes it clear that no systems position can provide such a possibility. The one alternative that remains unexplored is that the necessary position may reside in a systems medium. In certain of his early works Luhmann described the peculiar double status of art, which appears to be a system in one respect but in another seems to be a systems medium. My earlier explorations of this question led me to conclude that sociology is not so much the "queen of sciences," as Durkheim put it, nor even the "*scientia scientiarum*," as Lester Frank Ward stated in his *Pure Sociology*. I instead defined sociology as the *medium of the system of science*, which perhaps translates what the above metaphors meant to express. This is not, of course, an advantageous position. On the contrary, this is the most disadvantageous position in science in that it presupposes not only an identification with two opposed and conflicting sides, but also an "identity crisis," to use Berger and Luckmann's terminology. Consequently, such prominent sociologists as Horowits (1993) and Giddens (1996) were compelled to undertake the

effort to "plead the cause of sociology" in the court of science, which traditionally had been a task for poets.

And while this situation might justify the pretensions of sociology to be more interdisciplinary than any other science, it nevertheless leaves open the question concerning how one might be able to observe society not only as a social system but also as "life"? It has been known since the time of the German philosopher Rickert that philosophers must first kill life, dissect it into isolated segments, in order to study it. But they are then not studying "life" as such. Sociologists, however, do not have to operate in this fashion. They neither have to conduct experiments, as psychologists do, nor do they need to dissect life or use tools in their work. They themselves are the tools, they themselves "register" the observation data. What further makes it possible not only to study the present-present but also the past-present, that is, the past that is present because it is within us but is past because it is no longer "out there," has already been discussed.

We might say that sociology is like a treasure of unique precious stones, each of which shines with its own light and has its own beauty. But something that appears to be as dead as a "stone" from a macro-perspective reveals itself to be a beautiful flower from another, closer point of view. And yet sociology, more than any other science, is a *collective enterprise* and not the achievement of individuals, however brilliant they might be. Indeed, sociology has never even been able to decide how many fathers it has had. But how can all the various perspectives be brought together? How can there be a science in which it is impossible to "stand on the shoulders of giants" because they are so many in number? It is just that the sociological enterprise has a different working pattern, one that resembles that of a bee, collecting nectar and pollen from many flowers and producing honey in order to cure even the most resistant social diseases.

SEARCHING FOR THE SOURCE OF EVIL

There is perhaps no more passionate explorer of the past in search of the source of evil than the political philosopher Hannah Arendt. She first focused upon totalitarianism as it had emerged in both West and East and attempted to find a common root for the modern Nazi and Bolshevik ideologies. Students of her work have admired her ability to see their sameness, but have also criticized her for not providing an in-depth analysis of their differences. Arendt herself, apparently feeling that the source had evaded her, plunged into the history of European civilization as far back as the emergence of the ancient Greek *polis* in order to investigate the origins of social and political life. This exploration further led her to study the source of violence and revolution, and finally to *The Life of the Mind.*[49] This latter stage of her work in fact comprised not so much an analysis of mind as an attempt at the self-thematization of reason. But how can reason know itself when self-reflexivity is denied to the philosophical enterprise from the very beginning?[50] Insofar as Arendt was a philosopher and a

political scientist, she followed in the footsteps of Kant, not those of Mead. This means, however, that her conclusions concerning the source of evil and the source of World Wars cannot be utilized in sociological investigations without further appropriate interpretation.

Totalitarianism and the East/West Cold War may have come to an end, but war as such still exists, and the question concerning the source of violence and war is more actual then ever. If wars are evils that befall humankind, are they ultimately a product of some type of "primary evil"? Perhaps, following the Aristotelian tradition of philosophy, Arendt first assumed the existence of a type of ultimate, un-caused cause, something that Aristotle termed the "unmoved mover." Her initial question might thus be stated as follows: Is there a primary cause for such evils as violence and hatred, something that will cause bloodshed, genocide, and war regardless of how civilized we become? Are wars a necessary or unavoidable evil, or are they sheer contingency? And although Arendt found the idea of the contingency of process as quite alien to philosophical tradition, she seems to have finally given up her initial project, being inclined to the conclusion that there may be no single or ultimate cause that explains world wars. It may well be that contingency itself, or the simultaneous action of many different causes in producing a single event, is the reason for what happens.[51]

In respect to the logic of systems thinking as Luhmann presents it, the growing complexity of the world is itself not so much the reason why things happen, but rather the reason for the difficulty encountered when we attempt to discover the primary cause. Stated otherwise, the rules of systems functioning that lead to events would be the same both in the simple social world of a single undifferentiated social system and in the modern world. In the modern world, however, there are a host of additional factors, each of which represents a modified version of the primary factor that has been obscured as it has been multiplied. That is to say that the *spark* and the *fire* are of one and the same nature, but there are evident differences in respect to their size, magnitude, and the light and heat they produce.

Our world is so very difficult to study by virtue of its complexity, but this complexity is just another form of the manifestation of its basic nature. What Arendt observed to be true for philosophy is also true for sociology. That is to say that the idea of contingency is quite alien to macro-sociological analysis, which is normally conducted on the very border between philosophy and sociology, at times even creating the impression that there is no such border. This does not mean that sociology must necessarily search for some type of social laws analogous to natural laws that constrain our lives. If we accept that social events are contingent upon an endless number of factors that, in their compound action, make things happen, just as historians sometime describe World War I as having simply "gone out of control," we must abandon our aspirations to locate a position that would enable us to decide our own fate as well as that of the

social world. To know how the social works means also to know what the alternatives are and to make possible new social choices.

THE GREATEST WAR OF ALL

Wars are not modern inventions. There apparently have always been people who fought over things that they wanted to possess, including land, wealth, and even beauty. If European civilization began precisely with the creation of security for a settled form of life, being distinct from barbarian life by its adoption of a relaxed and luxurious lifestyle, perhaps even being the first in the world to give up carrying weapons,[52] then why do we still have wars? From a certain perspective the dramatic change brought about by European civilization was not that wars became extinct, but rather that their character was changed: Wars became more "civilized" as they became more dependant on technological innovations, and they also thereby became more costly in terms of the human lives lost. As Thucydides describes, however, the emergence of civilization also made it possible for the world as a whole to be involved in a war when the world itself became divided by some insurmountable *difference* into two rival parties.[53] Our modern world wars are not a specific product of modernity, and their ultimate cause does not reside there. World Wars should rather be viewed as phenomena connected to European civilization as such, at least to the extent that Thucydides tells us that there previously had never been anything similar.

The social-historian Thucydides presents the Peloponnesian War, a long war between democratic Athens and communist-like Sparta characterized by a number of active stages interspersed by periods of truce, that is, an interaction vacillating between hot and cold poles in a somewhat unusual manner. He indicates that the profound cause of the war was a struggle for power, but he also mentions that the envy of other peoples towards the Athenians played a not insignificant role. Some conclusions are in order. First, the struggle for power is apparently as old as European civilization. The coming of civilization did not bring peace, but rather enriched the range of things people would fight and die for. Second, the emergence of the *polis* with its self-determined boundaries and rules of citizenship, which distinguished between Greeks and barbarians, insiders and outsiders, and those who were interactionally present from those who were interactionally absent, even though physically present, lead to the establishment of a new type of relationships, namely, social relationships that were materialized in the new medium of power. And the creation of ever newer manmade *media*, such as belief, money, justice, and truth, did not change the rules of the game.[54] However, the heart of the puzzle resides not in the emergence of new forms of media, but rather in how this process began. Where did Athens' enormous accumulation of power, which caused the envy of the entire world, come from? Historians still cannot provide a plausible answer to this question. One would have imagined that peoples

who were in possession of enormous treasure, such as the Thracians, would have been those who progressed in history. But it instead appears that the Thracians were the weakest of all, being incapable of uniting themselves for the achievement of any common goal.[55]

This having been said, one cannot help but wonder whether, after the end of the Cold War, we have not returned to the period of time at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Perhaps we are beginning to comprehend that our ancient ancestors knew something about "human nature" that we have yet to learn.

> It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the interest of an immediate public, but was done to last forever.[56]

Thucydides, although having had no philosophical schooling, apparently did not believe that there were contingency causes for the Peloponnesian War. Nor did he accept that there were mythical reasons for it, as we might have expected from someone who followed in the footsteps of Herodotus. But Thucydides in fact followed in no one's footsteps, instead taking a unique path in explaining the war that few others, if any, have ever found when speaking of war.[57] This father without pupils believed that world wars would happen again and, furthermore, that his message would reach the future. If he happened to be right in both cases, might he not also be right concerning *human nature*, which comes into focus in our further study of the source of evil?

WHY WORLD WAR?

Regardless of the date that is accepted as the beginning of the Cold War, there is no doubt that the immediate reasons for it lie in the contradictory interests of two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, and even perhaps of two empires or centers of civilization that held quite opposing political views. (Exploring the reasons why the Soviet Union did not take the path of capitalism but preferred to fashion a completely new way in which to organize social life for itself will be left for a further discussion.) The emergence of the cold relationship between East and West can be presented in systems terms as the struggle of two social systems to impose their own forms of organization upon the world as a whole. This definition from a systems perspective of the essence of the Cold War corresponds to what political scientists present as the struggle of two political powers for world domination. The exploration undertaken here into the causes of the Cold War will not emphasize the events that took

place at its beginning, but will rather follow the causal thread that leads to the reasons why World War II happened in the first place.

Most historians today accept that an analysis of World War II cannot be separated from an analysis of the consequences of World War I.[58] However, if we are to find an answer to the question "Why world wars happen to the world?," we must go further than the end of World War I and consider its beginning. In their efforts to underline the meaninglessness of this war, which had neither a legitimate cause, nor even consequences worth fighting for, historians have presented its beginning as an emergent event against the background of social harmony, cooperation, and economic prosperity on a European continent that had been renewed at the beginning of a new century. We are thus presented with an idealized picture of a pre-war world devoid of contradictions, as it surely might have seemed to be from a Western perspective.[59] In such Western conceptions, what World War I destroyed for no good reason was the benevolent and optimistic culture of the European continent.[60] But if we consider the other side of the continent, the supposed optimism of the new century was merely an illusion. The "other Europe," where gloomy, frustrated, and pessimistic nations were faced with the meaninglessness of their centuries-long struggles for freedom and self-determination, exhausted by war, and dissatisfied with the Western arrangement of their fates, had no good reason to celebrate a new age. The "harmony" existed on only the one side of the border that always had separated West and East as two branches of one and the same civilization.

The puzzle represented by the beginning of World War I is well known, and debates about it continue among historians and political scientists even to this day. One of the major unresolved problems is who must bear responsibility for the war, in which there were too many losers and no winners. World War I, the War to end all wars, is described more than any other as a "cataclysm and catastrophe" that apparently resulted from a chain of deliberate decisions and "suicidal" risk-taking.[61]

The facts are well known. The war "began" with the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Franz Ferdinand, on 28 June 1914. The assassination itself was, in current terminology, a terrorist act carried out by a member of a secret organization comprised of what historians defined as "nationalists," the Black Hand. That the plotters were young students without any political culture or vision, who never thought their actions might cause a war, and who could not clearly explain their own motives, was taken to mean that the event was to a great degree incidental. But when historians accept that the "spark" for the war was something that might not have happened had these youths not decided to "play with fire," they must go further and explain why Austro-Hungary declared war on Serbia on the 28 July 1914, apparently not taking into account what they in fact seem to have known, namely, that the Belgrade government had nothing to do with the killing. General Karl von Bülow, a leader of the invasion of Belgium in 1914, confessed that "Although the

horrible murder was the work of a Serbian society with branches all over the country, many details prove that the Serbian government had neither instigated nor desired it. The Serbs were exhausted by two wars. The most hot-headed among them might have paused at the thought of war with Austria-Hungary, so overwhelmingly superior."[62] And so it is clear that the killing was supported by a social movement, that is, by the passion of two peoples, Serbs and Bosnians, who wished to live together in a common state. It is reasonable to assume that this passion would have found a way to express itself, one way or another. The only way in which the War could have been avoided would have been for the West not to oppose such a "marriage."

The majority of historians have often ascribed similar types of motives to both the Great Powers and the Balkan peoples. For example, it was widely recognized that the Great Powers struggled with each other for power, leadership, and control over territories, and that they were driven by feelings of nationalism. But what were the motives that drove the "unenlightened" Balkan peoples, who were just emerging as nations from the Ottoman Empire, to create secret societies with clearly terrorist, not political, intentions? Was it "nationalism," as some historians assume, that drove them into new wars? In view of the theoretical considerations presented above, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of motives that are equally capable of guiding social actions, namely, reason and passion. Taking psychological issues as legitimate motives for historical events, however, does not necessarily mean that we take an "individualistic" approach towards history.

Psycho-historians such as deMause might perhaps insist on exploring the childhood of the assassin in order to throw additional light on the event, thereby revealing aspects of the truth that traditional historical study perhaps cannot see. Social psychologists would take a different path, pointing out that world wars cannot be explained by reference to individual actions and personal biographies. What should rather be considered is that individual actors are social products as well as the groups or informal organizations to which they belong. From a sociological point of view, terrorist organizations such as the Black Hand emerge in order to channel feelings that cannot acquire a political articulation and cannot point to a "reason." Many people in Bosnia-Herzegovina had assumed that the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war would enable them to obtain the freedom to decide their fates for themselves, but they were instead assigned by the Great Powers to what they considered to be a foreign country with a foreign culture. They were permitted no voice at the Congress of Berlin, where the Great Powers assembled in order to "correct" the Treaty of San Stefano, which many people in the Balkans had viewed as reflecting their just concerns.

The decisions of the Congress of Berlin, which did not take into account the feelings of the Balkan nations, provoked the passions that spawned two Balkan wars. These two wars, which still resist description in

rational terms, are also part of European history. The decisions taken in Berlin made the Balkan peoples painfully aware that their cultural particularities, their ethnic and linguistic boundaries, their feelings and desires, were not issues at all in the Great Power game. These peoples were viewed as no more than empty territories waiting to be shaped. This was not the "return to Europe" they had been dreaming of. It is only by acknowledging that there are, and always have been, two different perspectives from which not only Europe but the whole world can be viewed that we will be able to understand the historical legitimacy of the motives of the Balkan nations and of their right to be subjects in European interactions, not objects.

It must be recognized that the Balkan peoples emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century as very complex nations where many different languages, ethnic traditions, and cultures had been virtually fused for centuries. That is why none of these nations can be studied as a nation having only a single passion or feeling. In each of them can be found social groups, sub-groups, and societies with their own social ideas and loves. For this reason it is hardly possible to identify a social form sufficiently complex for their complex national character. Indeed, even the most sophisticated and civilized social model of "nation state" would have been no more than a Procrustean bed for their international natures. It can be argued in this respect, although this will be left for a further discussion, that it was the *internationalism* of Marx's teachings rather than anything else that made the Balkan peoples first perceive it as an acceptable social alternative.

A closer look at the theory of nationalism may provide further support for this claim. For example, one cannot even speak of nationalism in regard to a people who do not even have a nation state, which is defined as the minimum necessary condition for the emergence of this feeling. Reflecting on the fact that the definition of "nationalism" is dependent upon the notion of "state," Ernest Gellner wrote that "nationalism emerges only in milieus in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted. The existence of politically centralized units, and of a moral-political climate in which such centralized units are taken for granted and are treated as normative, is a necessary, though by no means a sufficient condition of nationalism."[63] Another tradition associates nationalism with language, but no expert in the field of political science would agree that language is sufficient for anything more than the acquisition of national consciousness. Many historians have apparently built their hypotheses by taking for granted either this second tradition, or the notion that what holds true for the West should also hold true for the East. However, while truth in the natural sciences is identical throughout the world, truth in the social sciences is plural and depends on the position from which it is observed.

The motives for the frustrations in the Balkans after the Congress of Berlin have not been discussed in Eastern Europe in terms of what in the West is understood as nationalism, but rather in terms of a "struggle for

self-determination." This latter term emphasizes the fact that peoples are not simply environments without any right to determine the actions of social systems upon them, but rather should be defined in terms of systems theory as conscious "matter" or "media."

Systems theory, however, has never sufficiently elaborated the concept of medium, and, even from Luhmann's perspective, media and environments are virtually identical. His perspective provides no means for us to grasp how *media* may reject the form that the system attempts to impose on them in that it grants no agency to media. The above interpretation of historical events requires that we change the theory, insofar as it is a "map that does not fit the territory" which it is supposed to describe.

Theories are languages that describe the world from particular observation positions. But as Luhmann himself always insisted, sociologists should ask, "Who is the observer?" and not take anything for granted. We need to apply this principle, however, even to evaluating the validity of macro-sociological systems theory itself. When the observation perspective of systems theory is taken for granted and internalized, it helps us to see the world, but not necessarily "as it is." It, in fact, enables us to see the world only through "Western glasses," that is, as only one type of socially constructed reality. The principles of second-order cybernetics encourage us to go even further and observe the observer, or rather examine his "glasses." Sociology is not concerned with how the world has been constructed for the purpose of deconstructing it or building it anew. Its aim is rather to improve construction technology, which may eventually lead to a "socio-technological revolution" and paradigm change.

Improving our observation "technology" will make it possible to see that different peoples are sociological units of different types, some of whom attract each other and some of whom do not. Not every two peoples can be put together in one and the same state, just as not every two different chemical substances can be mixed together without causing an explosion. It is the author's conviction that improving our sociological conceptions rather than our political programs or decisions may result in the improvement of our social technology, thereby helping us to control the "sparks" and "fires" that can lead to global conflagrations. Habermas may have been right when he wrote that the Project of the Enlightenment, that grand construction of European civilization, is not yet finished. And how could this have been otherwise when an essential half of it is still missing?

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NOTES

[1] This article is written to express my respect for Professor George F. McLean, the person with the greatest sense of mission for enlightenment whom I personally know. It could not be dedicated to a better person. Since this is the first sketch of a project that I had never previously felt completely prepared to begin, it is still "fresh" and unpolished. I apologize for its "rough edges."

[2] John Gaddis initially conceived of the years after 1945 as a "long peace," taking into account the roles of the nuclear deterrent and of containment in respect to the preservation of peace in a "fragile" world (Gaddis 1992). Eventually, however, he came to re-evaluate this conception in *We Now Know*, in which he states that it was "not so much wrong as short-sighted" (Gaddis 1997, 279).

[3] This is a reference to Shakespeare's *As You Like It*, which inspired certain cultural-anthropologists and sociologists in the middle of the last century to launch so-called "role-theory." This theory adopts a dramaturgical approach to the social world whereby it analyzes the latter as a theater stage on which everyone has a role (Linton 1968, Ruddock 1969, Popitz 1972, Griese 1977). Individual behavior is thus prescribed not only by individual peculiarities and external circumstances, but also by the role and the duties and responsibilities that pertain to it. It differs from a real theater in one main respect, namely, there is no audience and all people are participants, belonging to the one or the other interaction party (Goffman 1990).

[4] See Artaud 1992 for a discussion of this point.

[5] The three countries in question are Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

[6] The seven countries whose aspirations for NATO membership were granted in 2004 are Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Other East European countries, such as Serbia and Macedonia, are still "waiting in line," while Albania and Croatia are the newest members of the club.

[7] BBC News, Monday, 29 March 2004.

[8] F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn and V. Turchin 1999.

[9] Luhmann 1982, 1984, 1990.

[10] Luhmann 1992.

[11] Misheva 2002.

[12] Luhmann 1990.

[13] This view, most clearly articulated in the work of the Western philosopher Carl Hempel (Hempel 1949), clearly contrasts with the view of history that had been upheld by the Marxist tradition in Eastern Europe (historical materialism). The latter maintains that history not only operates in accordance with objective laws, but also progressively moves towards a particular goal. Although this Marxist conception of history, which had originated in Eastern Europe, was presented as philosophy, it is more

appropriately classified as sociology in the form of the philosophy of history and in its best "prophetic tradition" (Boudon 1993). Consequently, it was not philosophy that took the brunt of the damage with the collapse of the Marxist bastion in Eastern Europe, but ironically sociology, which was not even recognized in the communist world as a serious science.

[14] Barzun 1989, p. 13.

[15] There have been many long and heated debates throughout history as to how historians should deal with their two "fathers," the one whom they love and understand and the other whom they do not. Certain scholars have recently proposed that "ostracizing" the author of *The History of the Peloponnesian War* from the science that has given him refuge for more than 2000 years would resolve this "schizophrenic" state. The author has elsewhere addressed the place of Thucydides in science and his unfortunate and mistaken identification as an historian. See Misheva 1998b.

[16] Giddens 1996.

[17] In the words of the Polish sociologist Pjotr Sztompka, "Sociology is an illegitimate child of history and philosophy" (Sztompka 1994).

[18] "Second-order cybernetics," which was initiated in the 1970s by the work of Pask, von Foerster, and Maturana and Varela, is still perhaps a scientific movement rather than a science. It draws the important distinction between a "cybernetics of observed systems" and a "cybernetics of observing systems." For a more detailed explanation of the principles of sociocybernetics, along with an extensive bibliography, see Scott 1997, pp. 824-836.

[19] deMause 1982, p. 132.

[20] Ibid., p. 131.

[21] In his *Clio and the Doctors: Psycho-History, Quanto-History, and History*, the renowned historian Jacques Barzun not only opposes the need for a distinctive name for this new pretentious "science," he questions whether it is even possible for the sciences of psychology and history to be fused together in some way. In addition to disparaging this particular type of interdisciplinarity, he also clearly states that history does not need a method. The question he poses is whether "historians should allow the substance of their work to be changed by an intrusion of [any] 'method' whatsoever" (Barzun 1989, 14). As far as Barzun is concerned, psycho-history is one of those "would-be-sciences" to which our culture generously gives support for no good reason. Indeed, the most irritating thing for the true historian is that this pseudo-science now wants to put itself in the position of being the "doctor" who will "cure" history of its supposed "congenital defect."

[22] Barzun 1989, p. 13.

[23] This problem ironically becomes obvious in the work of the same Lloyd deMause as he argues for the need to replace such "holistic" and even "tautological" terms as "society," "culture," "structure," and "power" by such more "individualistic" terms as "group," "personality,"

"government," "group-phantasies," and "force" (deMause, p. 133). Only two pages later, however, deMause is unable to locate the proper psycho-historical words and returns to holistic language, stating that one of the reasons for psychogenic evolution is "culture contact" (ibid., p. 135).

[24] deMause 1982, p. 131.

[25] Misheva 1998 presents and develops this point of view.

[26] This refers to the passage in the *Apology* where Socrates explains how none of the people in Athens, neither poets, politicians, nor even craftsmen, were capable of answering him when he asked them why they do what they do.

[27] Trost 1997.

[28] Good examples of ideology in the form of a new theory are provided by the following statements taken from deMause, who seem to be the leading ideologist in the field. For instance, he states in *Foundations* that "all of history has childhood determinacy and group dynamics." He also openly parodies Durkheim's *Rules*, declaring that all phenomena have psychological explanations, and that there are no such things as "'external social forces that act upon the individual."

[29] The classical scholar Michael Grant ascribed to Thucydides the status of being "a creator of political history" for having drawn this distinction (Grant 1989). Durkheim's comparable distinctions are to be found in *The Rules*. See Misheva 2000, pp. 84-85, concerning both of these issues.

[30] deMause 1982, p. 85.

[31] We should keep in mind that *sciences-methods* without a language, theory, or philosophy of their own are well known phenomena in the natural sciences. Contrary to popular belief, it is not necessary to know how and why a method works in science. It suffices that it works and gives results. It is only in the social sciences that methods always demand theoretical justification. However, this situation in the natural sciences seriously hinders knowing what the consequences of applying a given method will be.

[32] deMause 1982, p. 133.

[33] Bonnell and Hunt 1999, p. 5.

[34] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[35] Ibid., p. 30.

[36] This is evidenced by the emergence of socio-historical research programs, such as the historical sociology concerning concept development, which question the status of Durkheim's "social facts." They instead view concepts as relational objects, taking into account the historicity of the culture that produces them. They then propose a reflexive turn of the social sciences back upon themselves in order to explore the historical process of concept invention (Somers 1999, 121).

[37] Mead 1962.

[38] Luhmann 1982, p. 271.

[39] Filitov 1992.

[40] Luhmann 1982, p. 321.

[41] Misheva 1993.

[42] Luhmann 1982, p. 315.

[43] Ibid., p. 319.

[44] Ibid., p. 272.

[45] Luhmann 1992.

[46] See Habermas' critique of Luhmann in the last chapter of his *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*.

[47] Luhmann 1992.

[48] One of the unique characteristics of a cold war is that it does not have a precise beginning and end. It rather takes a certain period of time for the relationship between two interaction parties to freeze, as well as to eventually warm up again. That both the end and beginning are processes, not events with particular dates, is obvious from the fact that political analysts have not been able to agree on the dates needed for us to record the duration of the Cold War conflict.

[49] One of the reasons why Arendt remains a controversial figure in the history of political thought is her work *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, which leaves the impression that she was convinced that there is something in man himself that somehow solicits what happens to him.

[50] See Misheva 1998 and 2000 concerning the impossibility that reason may come to know itself.

[51] Arendt wrote in *The Life of the Mind* that "We need only think of the libraries that have been produced to explain the necessity of the outbreak of the last two wars, each theory picking out a different single cause – when in truth nothing seems more plausible that it was a coincidence of causes, perhaps finally set in motion by one more additional one, that 'contingently caused' the two conflagrations" (Arendt 1981, p. 138).

[52] See Thucydides 1975, Book One, Chapter One.

[53] Thucydides 1975.

[54] Luhmann argues that no system can exist without a medium. While there are such media as language and script, there are also symbolically generalized media that make communications in different social sub-systems possible. For example, power is the medium of the system of politics, truth is the medium of the system of science, belief is the medium of the system of religion, justice is the medium of the system of law, and so forth. Luhmann also maintains that assets are a form of media, and even love, although he did not specify which of the existing social systems has love as its medium. In modern society it seems that the family is the best candidate for this, but family love is itself a modern phenomenon that one cannot find at the beginning of civilization. This does not mean that love in antiquity did not exist. It rather means that we find the discussion about love confined to the love of the slave for his master, as in Aristotle, or the love of the male pupil for his male teacher, as in Plato.

[55] In his *History* Herodotus wrote that "The population of Thrace is the largest in the world, after the Indians of course. If they were ruled by a single person or had a common purpose, they would be invincible and would be by far the most powerful nation in the world, by my opinion. This is completely impossible for them, however – there is no way that it will ever happen – and that is why they are weak" (Herodotus Book 5, 3).

[56] Thucydides, Book One, p. 22.

[57] The only contingency he was ready to acknowledge was the fact that the plague broke out during the war, thus reinforcing the tragedy. But even in this case he dismissed the possibility that any prophet could have predicted such a thing happening. Today we can find many rational causes for why such a disease is more likely to emerge during a war than in peacetime.

[58] Keegan, for example, wrote that when the guns of the First World War "at last fell silent," they left "a legacy of political rancor and racial hatred so intense that no explanation of the causes of the Second World War can stand without reference to those roots. The Second World War, five times more destructive of human life and incalculably more costly in material terms, was the direct outcome of the First" (Keegan 1999, p. 4).

[59] In a chapter entitled "European Harmony," Keegan wrote that "Europe in the summer of 1914 enjoyed a peaceful productivity so dependent on international exchange and co-operation that a belief in the impossibility of general war seemed the most conventional of wisdoms" (Keegan 1999, p. 10).

[60] Keegan 1999, p. 4.

[61] Stevenson 2004.

[62] *The First World War* (http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/A3FWW.htm).

[63] Gellner 1983, p. 4.

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PART III

DIVERSITY AND DIALOGUE

HOW TO OVERCOME THE PREJUDICE OF EUROPEAN CENTRISM?

JŪRATĖ BARANOVA

HOW TO EXPERIENCE GLOBALIZATION

How can a professor teaching philosophy to students in Lithuania, a small Baltic country, respond to the challenge of responsible intercultural cooperation? What is my own personal experience of my cultural heritage and theoretical background?

Globalization is an ever more popular word in our culture today. But how often do we understand what it means? One day I received a phone call from a young television program director, Ingrida, who produces a very serious (and thus not very popular) program entitled "Five Evenings," in which a famous young writer, a woman named Serelyte, speaks with various guests. These have included a writer, a priest, a doctor, and so forth. Now they wanted to invite me to appear as well. When I asked on which topic I would be expected to speak, Ingrida answered that it would be globalization. This somewhat surprised me, and I suddenly felt as if I knew nothing about globalization, as if it had nothing to do with me. I suddenly forgot my experiences of visiting Japan, Argentina, Egypt, Morocco, Great Britain, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Germany. I even forgot my common project with The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. "You know," Ingrida said, "we could avoid using the word globalization. When we invite someone for a discussion and say it will concern globalization, people usually refuse."

We decided not to avoid the term, and instead conducted a professional academic discussion with a number of students. We addressed the end of art and history, using the Lithuanian translation of Fredric Jameson's *The Cultural Turn: Selected writings on the Postmodern*. We also considered the end of geography, relying on the Lithuanian translation of Zygmunt Bauman's *Globalization and Its Consequences*. The students who could read English also referred to *The Philosophical Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization*, edited by Oliva Blanchette, Tomonobu Imamichi, and George F. McLean. We also discussed the end of ethics and the end of love, examining the argumentation of Baumann's *Postmodern Ethics*, *Liquid Love*, and *Liquid Modernity*. It became apparent that some of the students had not only a theoretical understanding, but also a personal experience of globalization. For example, one of them, Gediminas, studied in Rome for two years, sharing a room with some African students whose language he intends to learn some day. He now knows Italian and French

and is preparing textbooks in these languages. He is also translating chapters of my *Ethics: Philosophy as a Practice* into Esperanto. Gediminas has tried to persuade me to learn Esperanto as well, and to present my book at the World Esperanto Congress. He is simply attracted by the charm of different languages. When I asked him about his experience of living in Italy, he answered that he never loved Lithuanian as much when he lived here. This is an example of an openness for productive dialogue, providing one possible answer to Professor McLean's question concerning how to experience diversity in unity. Language as such is the realm of unity for Gediminas, with a given language providing a path to diversity.

Another student was married to an Italian and had lived in Italy for some years. She has now moved back to Lithuania with her husband. Why? First of all, Lithuania is not as globalized as Italy in the economic sense. While the gap between rich and poor has now appeared in Lithuania as well, it is larger and ever more visible in Italy. There is also the beauty of Lithuania itself, along with the freedom to feel as you can in your own country. Can the consequences of globalization be such that we would travel the world searching for a place untouched by globalization? And could we ever find it, even in our own country?

Globalization has its positive and negative aspects. While Bauman has emphasized the negative in his *Globalization and Its Consequences*, Professor McLean has always sought to focus on the positive. Although he does not dramatize the situation, he has nevertheless used some very moving examples, such as looking at our earth from the perspective of Neil Armstrong, the first man to walk on the moon. Professor McLean writes that "What [Armstrong] saw there was of little interest – a barren rocky terrain, alternating between great heat and frigid cold. But what he saw from there was of the greatest consequence. With a few of his predecessors in space exploration, he was able for the first time in human history to look at the Earth and see it whole. Throughout the millennia humankind had always seen fragments, piece by piece; now for the first time the earth was seen globally."[1] From such a perspective one can immediately experience the sphere of the Earth as one's home. One can feel that one's identity does not come from Venus or Mars, but precisely from Earth, an identity that is shared with all those who inhabit the Earth.

This view reminds us of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), who proposed in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-1791) that we approach the history of mankind by beginning with the heavens. In the first chapter, entitled "Our Earth is A Star among Stars" ("*Unsere Erde ist ein Stern unter Sternen*"), Herder reminds the reader that man lives on Earth, a heavenly bodies that rotates on its axis, surrounded by mist and influenced by the other heaven bodies.[2] In approaching the world from this perspective, Herder first of all sees not man but rather his "older brothers" the plants and animals ("*Der Menschen altere Bruder sind die Tiere*"),[3] which do not always behave in a very brotherly fashion. Godlike

man is threatened by the snake and frightened by the tiger, which is ready to swallow him whole.

Herder asks why nature treats man in this way. He observes that nature wanted as many different creatures as possible to live on our small planet. Nature wanted equilibrium, but Herder concludes that man is the central creature in this equilibrium. He is the most perfect creature, having brought together all the best qualities of all the creatures of the world. Man's main feature, which distinguishes him from the other animals, is his ability to stand and move upright. This ability has influenced the structure of his brain and the features of his mind since man is free, beautiful, and creative when he stands upright on his feet. This enables him to develop feelings, language, and culture, while the animal is like a slave pressed to the Earth, longing for freedom, whose soul is not made for freedom. Because man walks upright, he is the only creature on Earth who can weigh good and evil, say what he wants, and is free to choose: "*In der Sache selbst aber in der Natur des Menschen wird dadurch nich geandert. Er ist und bleibt fur sich ein freieis Geschupf, onwohl die allumfassende Gute ihr auch in seinem Torheitem.*"[4]

Kant was not fond of this romantic outlook towards humanity insofar as it sees no essential difference between nature and mind, viewing freedom as one of the developed stages of nature. He in fact criticized the work of his student Herder as comprising dogmatic metaphysics. Kant states that man's reason cannot be explained by his constitution or by his ability to stand upright. Nor can we understand the secret organic forces by which Herder sought to unite everything, both the organic and inorganic aspects of nature, into one single whole. Kant argues that such a view transcends the possibility of human reason. If one wants to reason critically, one must very carefully discern the limit between organic and inorganic, defend concepts, and grasp the limitations of the critical mind. Kant is certainly more correct in some sense, but the romantic Herder, as much a philosopher as Kant, attempts to articulate a new type of global awareness. Herder sought to broaden not the critical mind of his reader, but rather his ability to grasp the unlimited possibilities of the imagination and to feel in a global way. Indeed, his aim was quite similar to the task that Professor McLean sets before us, namely, to see the diversity in unity.

HOW TO APPROACH THE DIVERSITY OF NATIONS?

Herder introduces into discourse a new way of understanding diversity. In chapter six of *Ideen*, for example, he begins to investigate how geographical conditions and genetic factors influence man's bodily structure and, through the body, the physiological and psychological features that constitute national characters (*Volkgeist*). Jean Bodin (1530-1596) had earlier addressed this influence of geographical factors in his *Method for the Easy Comprehension of History* (*Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* [1566]), arguing that the defects of every nation

depend on climate. One should thus suspend malignant gossip and judge the history of each nation strictly on the basis of its customs and inclinations. We should no more praise the moderation of Southerners than we should condemn the hard drinking Scots insofar as the internal nature of each is molded by the physical environment that surrounds them.

Herder appears to follow the path taken by Bodin, but he instead begins with the exterior features of a given nation. He judges the particular bodily features of nations living in different regions of the world with a sophisticated aesthetic eye, but he does not say that every nation is attractive in its own specific way. On the contrary, Herder claims that the more southerly a given nation is, the more beautiful is the structure of the body. He states that the most beautiful men live in Kashmir, while describing the Lapps as being particularly unattractive. Herder also attempted to analyze the correlation between climate and the "inner energy" of a nation, but his insights are the opposite of Bodin's. For example, he argues that northerners are characterized by an inner warmth, while southerners rely on the heat of the sun.

But neither Bodin nor Herder based such ideas on empirical anthropological investigation. Did their views concerning national diversity thereby lead to new prejudices, or did they somehow articulate an objective approach to diversity? Are their proposed criteria for evaluating nations as value-free as they had hoped, or did they simply express the standards of European academics? It is obvious that Herder was interested in the individual features of each nation, and that he sought to avoid the use of abstract historical schema. He instead attempted to explain the uniqueness of a given nation in reference to the time and place where it emerged. Herder argued that no nation is superior to any other, and that no nation is to serve merely as a means for some other to develop further.

Herder rhetorically asks, "*Warum waren die aufgerklarten Griechen in der Welt?*"[5] He answers that the Greeks were enlightened for the simple reason that they could be nothing other than enlightened Greeks in the actual circumstances in which they lived. Herder further asks, "*Warum zog Alexander nach Indien?*" He answers that Alexander went to India because he was Alexander, the son of Philip, and he followed in the footsteps of his father. He was spurred on by the deeds of his nation, his own age and character, and a fascination with Homer. Herder finally concludes that Alexander knew of nothing better that he could do ("*nichts Bessers zu tun wurte*").[6] In proposing such sociological criteria to explain the diversity of nations, Herder sought to avoid explaining events by supposed mysterious forces of history or fate. In this respect he was an historicist in the same sense as Leopold von Ranke, Niebuhr, or Buckhardt.

Herder's conception of *Volkgeist* was further developed and critically discussed by Fichte (1762-1814) and Hegel (1770-1831). G. A. Wells, the noted interpreter of Herder, argues that Hegel gave a metaphysical meaning to *Volkgeist*. At the same time, however, Herder's conception of *Volkgeist* as the soul and a character of a nation has a more

inductive origin, signifying the psychological traits that are developed in the process of a given nation's accommodation to its surroundings. This is the type of meaning he sees in the apathy of Lapps and in the tenderness and patience of Indians.[7] Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) was the first to oppose the notion that the character of a nation is a metaphysical force. He argues that such a conception makes it possible for certain nations to feel superior to others insofar as they may be more receptive to symbols of culture, civilization, and the generous features of the mind. He adds, however, that this does not mean that they themselves are more generous. Herder's concept of *Volkgeist* was also criticized by Eduard Meyer (1855-1930), Wilhelm Wundt (1982-1920), and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911).

Dilthey, for instance, observes in *Introduction to the Human Sciences* that such concepts as nation (*Volk*) or soul of the nation (*Volkseele*) can be useful only in an analytical explanation of various aspects of a nation, such as its language, religion, or art, in order to explain how they influence each other. But he argues that it would be better to suspend the use of such mystical and romantic expressions as *Volkseele* because they encourage us to view nations as independent organisms.[8]

Karl Popper went still further. As he searched within the European philosophical tradition for enemies of the open society, he found that Herder's views led towards a "dangerous irrational romanticism," and that they constituted a theoretical contribution to nationalism. In order to illustrate this point, Popper quoted one of the most controversial of Herder's ideas, to which the idea of *Volkgeist* finally leads: "The most national state is a state composed of a single national character... A people is a natural growth like a family, only spread more widely... As in all human communities...so in the case of a state, the natural order is the best – that is to say, the order in which everyone fulfils the function for which nature intended him." Popper found it significant that Kant had immediately realized the threat posed by Herder's ideas.[9]

But in fairness to Herder it should be mentioned that he himself viewed the state as neither inevitable nor necessary for controlling irrationality. Much of Machiavelli's work apparently anticipated the spirit of Hobbes' view that *homo hominem lupus est*, while Kant wrote of the dual nature of man that prevents him from living in harmony with his fellows as it also encourages the development of culture. Herder, on the contrary, maintained that man is by nature a social being. He does not accept the view that man behaves like a wild animal with other human beings, but rather emphasizes that he is created in the embrace of love, is nourished by love's breasts, and he is brought up by people who give him much more than he deserves. Peace, not war, is the natural state of humanity: "*Nicht Krieg also, sondern Friede ist der Naturzustand des unbedrangten menschlichen Geschlechts.*"[10] Herder, anticipating Marx and Engels in this respect, concludes that humanity will learn to live without the state. He also enters into critical discussion with Kant, who did not believe

that men would ever be able to overcome their hostility to each other without the institution of the state.

In addition, Herder becomes openly critical whenever his romanticism gives rise to notions of European superiority. Herder in fact cautions Europeans to be very cautious in light of their prejudices and not judge Africans or savages as being inferior in nature. He also criticizes the inclination of Europeans to extend a code of honor to only selected nations, since there may well be more warmth and respect for the foreigner in the hut of a savage than in the finest European homes. Furthermore, Herder reminds Europeans that their military power does not indicate that they are more clever than so-called primitive peoples, for the Polynesian native can make his boat with his own hands and navigate it himself. I would argue that Herder viewed the Earth as a house large enough for all nations to make it their home and command respect. And Herder neither seeks more living space for his own nation, nor does he demand that it be shown more respect. He is indeed quite critical of the Germans, a martial nation like the Persians and Romans insofar as the most negative feature of a nation is its aptitude for war. Herder argues in chapter sixteen of *Ideen* that the permanent state of war in which Germans have come to live has caused various virtues either not to develop, or to be suppressed. It could even be said that they have abandoned cultivating the earth and have come to roam in military groups quite like the Tatars. I would argue that Herder's fundamental values are very distant from and even opposed to warlike nationalism. He deeply believed not only that *Humanität* is the true goal of mankind, but also that we are steadily progressing towards it.

Professor McLean is not as openly optimistic as Herder. But although he does see the contradiction and strife that constantly occur in human history, he untiringly raises a question very similar to that which Herder posed for humanity, namely, how is it possible for humanity to become more humane? And he also maintains, just as Herder does, that humanity can rely on its cultural traditions. Professor McLean argues that cultural traditions consist of what particular peoples hold to be significant, even life-giving, which they actively transmit to the next generation. A cultural tradition is thus not an object in itself, but a broad and flowing river from which multiple themes can be drawn according to the motivations and interests of the inquirer. In this regard, the emphasis is placed neither upon the past, nor upon the present, but rather upon the fact that a people lives through time.[11]

Herder believes that history teaches by example, and that nature exacts its revenge from those who have offended her. The rights of nations, and of humanity as a whole, cannot be trampled upon with impunity. We must live together in tolerance of each other in the home that we all share, Earth.

We could say that Herder sought diversity in unity, which Professor McLean also views as a goal. But Herder is very far from Professor McLean in one important respect, namely, he is too Euro-centric,

thereby betraying the concept of "diversity in unity." Most paradoxically, *Ideen* reveals how the hidden prejudice of Euro-centrism can at times overshadow the most open and cosmopolitan intentions. Towards the end of the book we unexpectedly encounter a section entitled "Foreign Nations in Europe" *(Fremde Volker in Europa)*,[12] which discusses Arabs, Turks, Jews, and Gypsies. Herder is most tolerant of Arabs insofar as they have been historically useful to Europe. In Spain and Sicily they even converted to Christianity and became an organic part of European civilization. But Herder has no use for the supposedly "illiterate" Turks. Herder rhetorically asks, with a quite uncharacteristic aggressive intonation, how Europe could possibly have any need for these Asiatics who, after so many centuries, still want to be Asiatics? ("*Denn was sollen Fremdlinge, die noch nach Jahrtausenden asiatische Barbaren sein wollen, was sollen sie in Europa?*")[13]

Moreover, Herder considers Jews to be parasites, even though no European nation could manage without them insofar as they have made important contributions to the development and spread of science, medicine, and philosophy. Herder has nothing at all good to say, however, about the other "foreign" nation in Europe, the Gypsies. He again rhetorically asks, "Where do they come from?" (*Wie kommt er hieren?*)[14] The answer, of course, is Asia, which is not only the original home of Arabs, Jews and Turks, but also the cradle of mankind. Herder himself maintains that the first human beings appeared somewhere in the mountains between China and Tibet, relying on the legends of these nations. He further accepts that not only has Asia given many useful things to humanity, including letters, domesticated animals, and agriculture, but that Europe itself has invented nothing of significance. One can thus bluntly ask Herder why Europeans should accept from Asia all the benefits that it finds useful, but reject as idolatrous and foreign everything that does not correspond with its "civilized" style of life?

The closing sentences of *Ideen* reveal that Herder's biased comparison of various nations paralleled his approach to history. He asks what the primary interest of European historians should be, and he answers his own question by stating that it should be the ways in which European culture developed since it is this honor that distinguishes Europe in respect to all other nations. ("*Wie kam also Europa zu seiner Kultur und zu dem Range, der ihm damit vor andern Volkern gebpuhret?*")[15] Are Europeans today free from this hidden but cherished prejudice? Do we outwardly express openness and tolerance while secretly harboring a sense of superiority? Can this sense of superiority be considered as necessary for a sense of diversity?

Professor McLean, who seeks to provide the key to effective cooperation between religions and cultures, with a particular emphasis on relations today between Islamic and Christian cultures, is aware of the danger that emerges when a commitment to one's own cultural tradition traps one in an insurmountable opposition to the interests and strivings of

other traditions. He asks whether it is possible to overcome such opposition. "Indeed, can the commitments we have to our own cultural tradition become a means for other peoples to look into their own tradition?[16]

DIVERSITY AS EXPRESSIVE OF UNITY

It might appear that the idea of *Volkseele* has fallen completely out of fashion, but this is not at all the case. The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor relies greatly on Herder as he elaborates his communitarian conception of social reality. In *Hegel and Modern Society* Taylor interprets Herder's romanticism from within the Aristotelian tradition, which views life as a self-organizing, self-maintaining form that operates within and is inseparable from its material embodiment. Moreover, we are thus encouraged to think of living things as "taking into account" their surroundings precisely because of their intelligent adaptation to novel situations. But this understanding of life is inconsistent with dualism, whose modern form Taylor views as connected with the Judeo-Christian tradition, insofar as its nature is to bridge the gap that dualism opens up. He maintains that modern dualism is fed in part by a notion of the will, foreign to Greek thought, that underlies the modern idea of a self-defining subject. Taylor states that these notions, including dualism, are "bound up with the modern preoccupations with pure rationality and radical freedom."[17]

In order to overcome such dualism, Herder developed an expressive theory of language as an essential element of the expressive theory of man. Taylor indicates that Herder views language as not simply a set of signs, but rather as a medium for expressing a certain way of seeing and experiencing. There can thus be no thought without language, and the languages of different peoples reflect their different visions of the world. Taylor in fact sees a parallel between Aristotle's concept of the indivisibility of matter and form and Herder's theory of expression, in which thought is inseparable from its medium.[18]

Professor McLean's position is quite close to the hermeneutical approach to tradition. He states that "tradition was built out of experience, consisting of the free and wise acts of the successive generations of a people in revaluating, reaffirming, preserving and passing on what has been learned. The content of any long tradition has passed the test of countless generations. Standing, as it were, on the shoulders of our forebears, those who come after are able to discover possibilities and evaluate situations with the help of the vision of their elders because of the sensitivity they developed and communicated to us."[19] He also discerns that tradition consists of historical and normative aspects. It is historical because it arises in time and presents the characteristic manner in which a people preserve and promote human life through time; it is normative because it presents a basis upon which to judge past ages, present actions, and options for the future. The fact of human striving reveals that every type of humanism, far

from being indifferent, is committed to the realization of some classical and lasting model of perfection.

Can such different models of perfection support and not conflict with each other? How can we create a dialogical culture in a globalized world? Professor McLean responds that the person is the meeting point for different cultures,[20] and that respect for the person could possibly resolve conflict between cultures. A valid reply to Herder's latent European superiority is that we do not meet a Jew or a Turk as a member of a foreign group but rather, and above all, as a person.

A WORD OF WELCOME TO THE FACE OF THE OTHER

Emmanuel Lévinas has elaborated a significant philosophy of dialogue. Adrian T. Peperzak, in his "Introduction" to the English version of Lévinas' *Basic Philosophical Writings*, states that Lévinas' thinking displays more affinity with Kant than with any other modern philosopher. However, Lévinas is "far from being neo-Kantian, his style is post-modern, post-phenomenological, and post-Heideggerian."[21] His main ethical concern, which is rooted in the phenomenological tradition, particularly Husserl's fifth Cartesian Meditation, involves meeting the other as an *alter ego*. Martin Buber was one of the first to consider that ethics begins as we encounter the exteriority of the other, and Lévinas extended this approach by saying that ethics resides in respect to the face of the other. The other's face engages my responsibility by its human expression, which cannot be held objectively at a distance without being changed and immobilized.[22] In *Totality and Infinity* Lévinas discusses ethics, without which theological concepts remain empty and formal, as a metaphysics that is enacted in inter-human relations. He views such inter-human relations as comparable with the role that Kant attributed to sensible experience in the domain of understanding, that is, it is from moral relationships that every metaphysical affirmation takes on a "spiritual" meaning. Lévinas states that "When I maintain an ethical relation I refuse to recognize the role I would play in a drama of which I would not be the author or whose outcome another would know before me. I refuse to figure in a drama of salvation or of damnation that would be enacted in spite of me and that would make a game of me."[23]

Lévinas is indeed close to Kant in his recognition of the priority and autonomy of the moral subject in respect to all other factors in the world. Respect for the person as the first postulate of practical reason draws both philosophers together in spite of the fact that the underlying principles of their ethical views are quite different. While Kant sets off from the powers of universal reason, Lévinas does so from our meeting the other, from our seeing the face of the other as a revelation of Infinity that shakes the ego-centeredness of my existence. In this regard, Derrida observes that Lévinas' thought is inspired by messianic eschatology. This is never mentioned literally, however, insofar as "it is but a question of designating

a space or a hollow within naked experience where this eschatology can be understood and where it must resonate."[24]

Jacques Derrida chose the word "welcome" *(accueil)* to describe Lévinas' politics of hospitality in *Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas*, written in commemoration of the first anniversary of Lévinas' death. Lévinas wrote in *Totality and Infinity* that "to welcome... is therefore to receive from the other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: you have the idea of infinity. But this also means to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Discourse, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed, this discourse is teaching... [I]t comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain."

Derrida, as he indicated himself, took the liberty of emphasizing the word "welcome" in this statement. Also important for the notion of hospitality as it is presented in *Totality and Infinity* is the idea of dwelling. One can welcome the Other not only in discourse, but also at home. One can open the door of his home just as one can open himself, although this alternative always indicates that it is also possible that one close his home to the Other. But in order to open the door to the Other, I must first have a home, a place for dwelling. The one who welcomes is first welcomed in his own home, and the one who invites is invited by the one whom he invites. He receives the hospitality that he offers in his home from his own home, too, which in the final analysis does not belong to him. The dwelling opens itself to itself, to its "essence" without an essence, as a "land of asylum or refuge." Derrida sees in this idea an echo of Franz Rosenzweig's insight in his discussion of withdrawal, whereby the "owner" is expropriated from what is primarily his own, thus making one's home a place or location one simply passes through.[25] As Rosenzweig states, everyone who dwells is also a "stranger and a sojourner," for God says that "this land is mine."[26]

Derrida made a distinction between Lévinas' ethics of hospitality (ethics *as* hospitality) and a law or a politics of hospitality, such as what Kant refers to as the conditions of hospitality "with a view to perpetual peace." The question for Derrida is whether Lévinas' ethics of hospitality could serve as the basis for law and politics beyond the familial dwelling, that is, within a society, nation, or state. It has always been a problem to find an equilibrium between morality and politics insofar as they are quite different in and of themselves. In contrast, Lévinas' ethics of hospitality offers an alternative to the prejudice of European superiority that has marked modern Europe from at least the time of Herder.

Lévinas' conceptions of ethics as first philosophy call to mind Professor McLean's insight that attention to the person enables us to be more aware of the different formative patterns and religious foundations of our various human cultures.

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NOTES

[1] McLean, G. F. "Globalization as Diversity in Unity." In Blanchette, Imamich, and McLean 2001, p. 447.
[2] Herder 1965, Band 1, p. 17.
[3] Ibid., p. 63.
[4] Ibid., p. 145.
[5] Herder1965, Band 2, p. 152.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Wells 1959, p. 203.
[8] Dilthey 1989, pp. 92-93.
[9] Popper 2002, p. 282.
[10] Herder 1965, Band 1, p. 313.
[11] McLean 2001, p. 5.
[12] Herder 1965, Band, 2, p. 283.
[13] Ibid., p. 286.
[14] Ibid., p. 287.
[15] Ibid., p. 484.
[16] McLean 2001, p.5.
[17] Taylor 1979, p. 17.
[18] Ibid., p.18.
[19] Herder 1965, p. 484.
[20] McLean 2001, p. 5.
[21] Peperzak 1996, p. xii.
[22] Lévinas 1994, p. 35.
[23] Lévinas 1998, p. 79.
[24] Derrida 1979, pp.129-130.
[25] Derrida 1999, pp. 41-42.
[26] Rosenzweig 1971, p. 188.

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THE TRADITIONS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE PERIOD OF GLOBALIZATION

TADEUSZ BUKSIŃSKI

Discussions concerning the role of traditions in the period of globalization usually concern three basic problems. These are: 1) The danger that many local and regional traditions will disappear. The Westernization and, particularly, the Americanization of culture have caused the weakening of ancient customs, norms, moral values, and rituals in many parts of the world. The problem concerns how to preserve them insofar as they are valuable in and of themselves.[1] 2) The danger that conflicts will arise between different cultures and civilizations. The representatives of small or weak cultures feel compelled today to fight for their survival, at times using violent methods. How can such conflicts be avoided? The task facing intellectuals and politicians is to resolve misunderstanding and bring people together in order both to begin and to prolong dialogue.[2] 3) It is necessary for many cultures to be transformed so that they become more open, more tolerant of foreigners, more friendly to processes of modernization.[3]

Processes of globalization are influencing the cultures of different countries in both negative and positive ways. On the one hand, they bring about the destruction of traditions, cultural values, religions, and spirituality, imposing so-called universal (in fact Western) values and norms. On the other, they make it easier to spread the various cultural heritages of nations and, more importantly, to eliminate the rusty, backward, prejudicial, and injurious components of cultures and social mentalities. Each culture undergoes transformation at a slower or faster pace. We ourselves are witnesses to the revolutionary cultural changes now underway in the post-communist countries under the impact of globalization and Europeanization, the consequences of which will be far reaching. I here will characterize certain aspects of these processes, beginning with the negative influences and the reactions to them.

THE WEAKENING OF TRADITION

The cultural tradition of communities living in communist countries was inclusive, that is, it had a very rich content consisting of an extensive assortment of properties, truths, stereotypes, values, norms, and principles with which the agents of action could identify themselves in an enduring and ongoing manner. Almost everything that the agents did or said

outside their public lives was significant insofar as it expressed the notions and beliefs that they considered to be important and distinctive for their spirituality and culture. The moral, religious, national, and cultural truths, with their accompanying norms, principles, and values, were considered to be unique and irreplaceable. According to traditional morality, the common good was superior to the good of the individual; people were obliged to provide generous help to their neighbors who were in need; honesty, frankness, and sincerity were appreciated; and the values, norms, customs, and rules of the community were to be adhered to. At the same time, egotism, showing off, careerism, and the quick accumulation of riches to the detriment of others were condemned.

This type of morality had a religious sanction in Poland, while in other Communist countries it was justified by the importance of tradition. Tradition ensured a disinterested coherence of families, communities of villages, cities, friends, ethic groups, and nations. It regulated their ways of life and efficiently united people in their resistance to the communist system. The traditional culture supplied agents with a depth of spirit that could be glimpsed only in their physical properties and behavior patterns. Communities, comprising the family, the Church, and groups of friends and neighbors, were united by links of consanguinity, friendship, or socializing. Such communities epitomized a nation's ethos and resisted the prevailing materialistic ideology, which it deemed to be hostile and alien to traditional national culture and forcefully imposed from the outside. The community and the communist system thus struggled against each other.[4]

The victory over the communist system entailed a manifestation of the genuine, inclusive tradition and culture along with a rejection of the former official public communist culture. It was a demonstration of reverence for tradition, religion, national and local customs, and moral norms. Nations and individuals affirmed, both for themselves and for others, their immutability and the age-long continuity of their traditions. The struggle for the past restored the importance of ideals and values that were significant for nations and individuals. When the inclusive tradition of the community was able to express itself, the borders between states and nations were obliterated. The East European nations felt themselves united to all free and democratic peoples, and they considered their culture and tradition to be essentially akin to that of Western Europe.

Nevertheless, the long-awaited encounter of East and West turned out to be a disappointment. It appears that the extended period of liberal freedom in West European countries has destroyed the traditional communities and the traditional culture that were based on ethnic heritage, customs, religious principles, and romantic ideals. Western popular culture thereby became merely formal, enlightened, pragmatic, or utilitarian, and when liberal freedom was implemented, it jeopardized traditional identity and traditional community. In the present period, after the collapse of Communism, we are witnessing a weakening of tradition, which is weaker in comparison with the culture of Western countries, as well as with the

processes of modernization now being promoted in Central and Eastern European countries. Tradition is being increasingly renounced by businessmen, politicians, public figures, and even many ordinary citizens, particularly the youth. The expanding free market strives to control communities by subordinating spiritual life to material life, and it destroys both tradition and the family by challenging moral norms and assigning to humans a passive status in respect to action, not the status of agents. In this respect the market is more efficient than the Communist state since it works from the inside, being our "own" acceptable creation. The liberal political system, in turn, tolerates and even encourages the immoral and selfish attitudes that undermine the links of family, community values, a sense of solidarity, and of responsibility for other people and for communal possessions. The liberal system entails a new type of personality, morality, and culture insofar as it needs people who are successful, active, and ruthless, and who strive for profit without any moral or religious inhibitions. Tradition, morality, and religion are valid only insofar as they are conducive to political or economic achievements. The new social and political circumstances thereby recreate the conflict between the traditional community of post-communist countries and the requirements of the new economic and political system.[5]

Under the influence of Europeanization, ever more sectors of society are becoming indifferent to moral norms, traditional religious principles and rituals, and national traditions, for which people were once willing to sacrifice their lives. The ties of neighborhood, friendship, family, and religion are weakening, and the sense of responsibility for the entire community and its traditions is disappearing. Indeed, public freedom seems to have exempted individuals of any responsibility for common spiritual assets. The "self" thinks that "since we now have our government, the government should look after the whole of society and its culture."

People are ignoring their memories, refusing to remember the histories of their lives, nations, and communities. Rather than being rooted in the past, they focus only on the future. Under communism, people considered their significant values to be shared in groups, rooted in the past, constant and obvious, always valid, and in some cases always sacred. Now, however, they select their aims, values, attitudes, and beliefs in an arbitrary manner, feeling as if they assume no obligations by doing so. Allegiance to values and beliefs has become a transitory condition that entails no obligations.

Another characteristic of the contemporary changes in Central and Eastern Europe is the prevalence of materialistic interests over spiritual values. The pursuit of material profit is becoming the ultimate motive of action, and the possession of goods will soon be the main criterion for judging the value of human beings. What matters in this situation are formal rights and legally sanctioned individual freedoms, not the norms of substantial communities. Moral norms, religious principles, and cultural rules have been reduced to issues of personal choice within the limits of the

law. This new type of public culture is being developed by individuals rather than by the community as a whole. And not only do individuals no longer define themselves by the acceptance of certain traditional community values, but they regard themselves as entities independent of any community. In addition, they view themselves as the focus of pre-established rights and liberties upon whom social agencies and organizations should be based and developed. Public and state institutions, as well as traditional communities and their values, are thus being transformed into instruments that satisfy individuals' material needs. This new culture is also spiritually deficient. No specific properties or features (other than transitory interests) permanently unite one individual agent with another. Moreover, individuals are coming to be indifferent to the common good, regarding all attempts to base society on an inclusive tradition as acts of fanaticism.[6]

In the period of mutual influences and the opening the borders, demoralization is spreading. Such pathological social phenomena as organized mafias and cliques are becoming ever more widespread, controlling increasing areas of public, political, and economic activity. The incidence of theft and fraud is growing. Public figures are becoming increasingly guilty of corruption, bribery, nepotism, and criminal operations, and the number of robberies and crimes is increasing. People feel less and less secure insofar as unemployment and the impoverishment of society create an environment favorable for such pathological phenomena. Traditional communities have thus opened themselves to a new economic and political system that is in fact undermining them. The "para-communities" of organized crime groups have begun to develop a "para-morality" of their own. Such organizations are becoming among the most important active players in the economic and even political arenas. In their internal affairs they observe certain norms of traditional morality, such as honesty, sincerity, and mutual assistance, but they are ruthless to the extreme when dealing with "outside" individuals, official institutions, or the state administration, which they regard as mere tools for multiplying their material profits, prestige, and authority. They have taken control of many institutions and organizations, thereby limiting free competition and the freedom of action of others, upon whom they impose their own order.

Criminality has increased to such an extent that crimes are treated more like civil litigation between the parties involved. The liberal penal system has also become one of the causes of poor law enforcement. Policemen, victims, and witnesses for the prosecution are afraid of defendants since they know that the latter will be released and become a danger to them. The ideas that underlie the liberal penal code are very humane, including respect for the dignity of those accused of crimes, recognition of their right to as much freedom as possible, and the provision of the opportunity for them to live within society. Unfortunately, these ideas are reflected in a most impractical manner in the dimension of material justice. They have consequently led to a growth in crime and the

demoralization of society in post-communist reality, and the laws in fact have come to protect criminals from the administration of justice. Legal codes do not provide protection, security, and justice to victims and to witnesses. On the contrary, the police and prosecutors are frequently unable to provide evidence of the crimes committed in the manner stipulated by the liberal regulations. In addition, sentences often depend on the opinion of experts, but the expert opinions are often ambiguous and give rise to doubts. As a result, criminal responsibility becomes blurred and knowledge concerning evil is changed into ignorance. Everyone may very well know who a particular culprit is, and some may even testify in public, but this is not enough to sentence the criminal to prison. Since the law is thus not adapted to social reality, morality, culture, tradition, and a sense of justice, it has no authority among the people. The political elites indeed treat the legal system as a means for realizing their political interests in a way that destroys the very values which the laws were supposed to protect.[7]

THE PROMOTION OF THE NEW CULTURE

Globalization influences East and Central Europe both directly and indirectly in many different ways. The most acute and evident influence is experienced in the form of Europeanization. Western European countries view the European Union as a political and economic structure to defend Europe against the anarchy of the global market and the competition of American corporations. It has indeed been repeatedly stated that "we must compete effectively, retaining profits for our citizens." It was argued that only the political unification of European states could limit and control the large international and American corporations in an effective and permanent way such that a competitive economy and technology could be developed. Such integration was viewed as a strategic accommodation to necessity and as a response to the requirements of the global economic system. Western European countries gradually united in one political organism because they wanted to control and direct the processes of globalization, thereby laying down the laws and rules regulating the new types of economic and political activity. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, both ordinary people and many public persons view the processes of globalization and Europeanization as identical since they have had similar consequences and demand similar transformations. Both of these processes have in fact arisen in Western countries.

While the discussion in the previous section concentrated on the negative impact these processes have had on domestic traditions, we will now attempt to examine some of their more positive characteristics. In general, two types of changes play the most important role. These are 1) the creation of a new European culture and tradition and 2) the democratization and modernization of traditional culture. A question arises in light of the weakening of national traditions and national states, namely, what form is needed for social integration and identity to keep pace with economic and

political changes? In addition to economic and political interests, the notion of a common European identity and tradition has expanded over time in Western and Eastern Europe, and the view is ever more common that belonging to Europe is not merely a matter of large-scale political participation. Regional policy and institutions depend on political commitments and social solidarity, which in turn depend on a common collective culture, identity, and tradition that produce strong feeling of specific solidarity with the members of a macro-regional community. Political and economic Europeanization in fact presupposes an effective internalization of certain new norms, values, attitudes, and ways of thinking. That is to say that the project of political union of the region requires not only common economic and political interests, but also a common culture and mutually interdependent social relations that underpin the creation and reproduction of laws institutions and organizations.

European intellectuals and elites are endeavoring to establish a common civil society and public life as conditions for a common political and economic life. Civil society, comprising the sphere of citizens' non-political and non-profit activity in the pursuit of the common good, plays an important role in this respect because it is in this sphere that the new political and social culture is created and European social solidarity is constituted. The emergence of a transnational civil society can be observed in the cooperation of NGOs across national borders, in the self-organizing relationships of citizens of different countries, as well as in the creation of a European public opinion by means of common disputes and discussions in the public media. Step by step, the elites of both Western and Eastern European countries are together developing a common European politics, a democratic public culture, and an open view of the world in their public discourses. Moreover, the so-called ordinary man in the street in post-communist countries accepts democracy, human rights, economic prosperity, negative freedoms, and tolerance.[8]

We are able to witness how the cultural, economic, and political differences between the nations of Western European countries are shrinking by virtue of the fact that each particular nation is now adopting elements of the ways of thinking and being of other nations that it recognizes to be valuable, such as ideas of justice and freedom and the style of education. Similar processes of assimilation are taking place in Central and Eastern Europe as well. A synchronization of the problems and themes of discussion is also a specific dimension of Europeanization, and all countries in both Western and Eastern Europe now discuss the same topics at the same time. These include agricultural subsidies, the European Constitution, the spiritual foundation of unification, ways in which to preserve cultural differences within the new entity, the ethical and cultural conditions necessary to make the new political constellation stabile, and the ways in which democracy should be changed in order to respond to the new transnational challenges.

Many positive trends are evident in the transformation of tradition in Eastern Europe, one of the most important of which is the formation of a new political or constitutional identity. People had never highly valued the law and the rules of political systems in Poland, Ukraine, and many other former communist countries. However, Europeanization involves the rule of law, the observation of rights, and strong institutions. Strong laws and institutions regulate public behavior and limit corruption, nepotism, and mafia activities in both public and political life. Such institutional changes have an impact upon people's mentalities and bring about a new political identity and a new tradition that involve respect for law, rights, and established public rules. People internalize these norms and incorporate them into their ethnic and national traditions. Regionalization in fact grants citizens new instruments to use in fighting for their rights since they thereby acquire the means to appeal rulings from internal or state courts to the European Supreme Court. Such changes create an attitude whereby people are more closely attached to the legal framework and better able to fulfill their functions in institutional life. They are also thereby more open to the cultural differences that exist between small cultural minorities as well as to those that between large groups.

Another positive aspect of the transformation of tradition and identity may be termed rationalization. Many components of traditional identity that were always accepted as given and sacred are now intentionally called into question as being too inclusive and too particular, which leads to them being changed. This comprises a process in which components of tradition are exchanged, not merely abandoned: spontaneity in behavior is replaced by calculation, emotional reactions by rational ones, friendship to foreigners by kindness, naiveté by cautiousness, and ever greater attention is paid to material prosperity.

Tradition thus becomes increasingly open and universal, and the changes in question concern not only the substance (content) of the tradition, but its form and structure as well, whereby it becomes more abstract and more thin. Individuals and societies are now more aware that the thick components of different traditions have only a relative value and cannot be imposed on other societies. The universal elements of tradition embrace freedom, toleration, openness, solidarity, justice, and equality.

Tradition is coming to be accepted as something that can be freely changed by both persons and communities. Individuals and groups now have an increased possibility to choose new components for traditions from within a new context, and they are more independent from traditional native groups. They are able to use this opportunity to create new personalities that are more elastic and more ready to adapt to the global situation than are the traditionalists.

These considerations illustrate that speculation concerning the danger of nationalism in Central Europe, which has been so popular in recent years in the West, are unproductive as well as unjustified. The mentalities, traditions, and identities of post-communist nations are

changing faster than anyone expected. Joining the European Union may in some ways be more difficult for the countries that were once constituent republics of the former Soviet Union because they highly value and wish to preserve the sovereignty of their new national states, for which they have long fought. Nationalism is thus a strong component of their current traditions. Perhaps another reason for their strong national feelings and attitudes is that nationalism is needed by these societies in transformation as the successor states of the former empire. Nationalism provides the background and glue for the necessary degree of common feelings and community solidarity once the empire has collapsed.

THE DIFFICULT UNIFICATION OF TWO TRADITIONS

Such considerations do not mean that the differences between the nations now joining the European Union are disappearing. Indeed, the process of joining the EU conceals many conflicts, not the least of which are the new problems that have emerged in discussions between Western European governments and representatives of the post-communist countries. Inequalities between capital income and wage income have increased, and there is growing unemployment. The gap between winner and losers in regionalization and globalization is widening within all countries, even though the differences in wealth between particular European countries has apparently narrowed in recent years.

In addition, as was noted above, certain sections of the population view the expansion of Western European ways of thinking and being as a threat to their traditions, national cultures, religions, and spiritual life. They are thus either opposed to globalization and Europeanization, or seek to influence and change European identity by adding to it elements or components from Eastern Europe traditions. For example, Polish bishops and politicians want the European constitution to explicitly refer to the Christian heritage of Europe as a common value, although Western societies and elites are more indifferent to religious tradition and oppose such suggestions. Values and ideals may obviously clearly differ between nations and communities in spite of the convergence of many norms and rules.

The trend towards a common Europe is being advanced by elites acting as entrepreneurs, administrators, managers, politicians, intellectuals, and by the youth as well, all of whom have established transnational networks, institutions, and cooperation. Peasants and workers counter such activities with economic arguments, while traditionalists do so with cultural and nationalistic arguments. Opponents treat the process of Europeanization as responsible for the rise in unemployment, increased differences in the material prosperity of social classes, and the weakening of tradition.

The process of unification will take a long time to reach its goal. The national elites of various countries have suggested that specific national definitions within Europe, along with divergence in the numerous positions

and opinions concerning common problems, are now growing. But as long as the discursive process continues to take place, there is hope that the vitality of the EU can be maintained after the most recent wave of expansion into Eastern Europe. The confrontation of national perspectives may very well produce a nationally specified European view as well as a national view of the world enriched by European elements. It is not out of the question that a future Europe will consist of one government with many nations.

The outlook on the spiritual level involves the possible reconciliation of the two types of traditions, either through the synthesis of a single tradition, or else through the demarcation of their complementary limits. In the latter case, the life of the community (families, religious groups, or friends) would fashion and enhance traditional identity, while within the context of economics and politics individuals would function efficiently in the present international circumstances and traditional values would not generate excessive moral obligations. Perhaps this could curb the mafia-like practices that exist in economics and politics and also lead to the development of a rational system of law and sound rules of efficient action. It is obvious that the values of traditional communities cannot be entirely eliminated from the political and economic systems, although it is important that they do not interfere in an arbitrary manner with industry and with decision-making procedures. However, this kind of separation between the two traditions itself appears to be arbitrary and not altogether efficient.

The most pertinent problem concerns the manner in which to change traditional identity in order to ensure its further positive evolution, which would facilitate the modernization of society as a whole in the period of globalization. Western Europe itself underwent a long process of modernization that lasted several centuries whereby individuals came to internalize, on the one hand, the modern standards of honesty, integrity, justice, impartiality, equality in the context of public activity, and the observance of law and, on the other, planning in terms of long-range individual interests and profits in conformity with collective profits. This was the case in respect to both their private lives (attitudes and patterns of conduct and of thinking), as well as the activity of communities (institutions, laws, and procedures). It was the blending of these two attitudes (the deontological and the utilitarian) that produced the bourgeois ethos and tradition that replaced their communitarian counterparts. This ethos permeated societies with the bourgeois morality and mentality characteristic of the modern age, which is distinguished by honesty in business, dependability in matters of finance, frugality, industriousness, love of order, foresight, planning in terms of long-range usefulness, and moderation in the expression of one's emotions, aspirations, and goals. This morality of moderate individual egoism, which is compatible with the egoism of a given community as a whole, is an essential part of the Western tradition. It still inheres in the attitudes and patterns of both conduct and thinking of the citizens of Western European and North American

countries, providing an axiological foundation for democratic and free-market activity.[9]

Eastern Europe, however, cannot boast of an internalized bourgeois morality and tradition. Both in Poland and in other East European countries, traditional (pre-modern) community life is still more extensive than in Western countries, and it cannot be dismissed as a mere personal pastime. Indeed, an axiological and normative vacuum appears as it is called into question. Local and regional traditions must be recognized as elements of public life if societies and their institutions are to avoid becoming depraved by the pressures of modernization, which now threatens social order as mafias, the black market, nepotism, and violence flourish. The standards of this variety of tradition, construed in a somehow "modern" and more "global" or "European" manner, may very well be able to promote the democratic system. It is obviously not always easy to reconcile the community with the global system, which would be reflected in a reconciliation of the Eastern and Western traditions. Both individuals and entire groups are affected by internal conflicts and tensions, and differing principles and moralities prevail within many families at home as well as in the public actions of politicians and business people. Although we can observe a mutual infiltration of the principles and rules of the old and new (Western European) traditions, nevertheless, the only rational solution of the problem in the present circumstances appears to reside in their reconciliation, which in practice means to transform and modernize the pre-modern tradition. However, if this tradition is to be utilized in the process of developing a contemporary political and economic order in Eastern Europe, we must expect that a peculiar form of the social system may well appear in the region. It will be peculiar in its explicit traditionalism and ritualism in the realm of public activity, something which many Western European and American liberals still so diligently seek to eradicate from the public and political domain.[10]

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NOTES

[1] Wiredu and Gyekye 1992; Okere 1996; Dyczewski 2002.
[2] McLean 2003.
[3] Blanchette, Imamich, and McLean 2001.
[4] Buksiński 1999.
[5] Bednar and Vejrazka 1994; Prodanov, Davidov, and Blasko 1994.
[6] Mielczarek 2000.
[7] Siemaszko, Gruszczynska, and Marczewski 1999.
[8] Mueller 2002; Jakubowski 2002.
[9] Ossowska 1956.
[10] Buksiński 1998.

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GLOBALIZATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF FUTURE STUDIES[1]

JANA GAŠPARÍKOVÁ

Mankind is now facing many challenges, including threats from the future. In order to understand the anticipated dangers, we must first identify and understand the social, economic, and environmental forces surrounding us. It is important not only to outline the near-term future, but also to understand and predict the changes that accompany our present existence.

The focus of our attention in this discussion is concentrated on the destiny of Europe. This involves how the situation is viewed by those philosophers and futurists who analyze the forces driving the globalization of the world today. Among the most prominent thinkers concerned with this topic are Professor Pentti Malaska of the Institute for Future Research, Turku, who is also member of the Club of Rome, and his teacher Georg Henrik von Wright, the well-known Finnish-Swedish philosopher.

As Malaska and von Wright discuss the process of globalization and related events, they focus primarily on the concepts of progress, nature, sustainable development, and sustainable technology. They argue that it has become necessary to formulate a new idea of progress that is based on global and holistic thinking and emphasizes the emancipation of the human individual as a moral unity. This understanding of the globalization process relies predominantly on environmental ideas, concerned with the modern relationship between nature and mankind that are based on the concept of sustainable development. Problems concerning the preservation of civilization refer to a notion of sustainable development that points to a balance between progress, nature, and technology in the modern world.

Both Malaska and von Wright view the globalization process as having substantially changed the ways in which we live today. Technology is the driving force of this process, which has changed customs, institutions, and views of the future on a global scale, insofar as it is a resource primarily devoted to economic profit and the exercise of power. The system of technology as it exists today forces us to regard everything, nature and human beings alike, solely in terms of their utility. This has given rise to environmental degradation which threatens to destroy nature. Indeed, the perspective of human existence itself has been narrowed by the technological imperative to concentrate on economic and political utility.[2]

Progress as one of the main concepts underlying the problems of the modern world and the forces of globalization also reflects the problem of technology. The concept of progress in fact consists of two related concepts, which may be termed an ascending notion and a descending

notion of development. The descending notion of progress reflects the Judeo-Christian idea of a coming day of judgment that the divine order has predetermined for mankind. Stated otherwise, once paradise has been lost, it is reserved for those deemed worthy of it on the day of final judgment. This is also somewhat reminiscent of the Greek notion of progress in respect to organic nature, which develops through the stages of birth, growth, and death, thereby making a new generation possible.

The ascending notion of progress, which emerged during the eighteenth century Enlightenment in Europe, has been shaped by technology and modern scientific knowledge. Key to this modern Western European myth of progress is an unrestricted belief in the scientific and technological order, in the steady improvement of the material conditions of life, and in the moral maturity of mankind. The modern idea of progress was not based on the divine order, insofar as progress was regarded as dependent on human action upon the basis of science and technology, political equality, and human freedom. But even though this view of progress was secular in nature, it was still deterministic in the sense that human material, social, and moral advancement was considered to be not only possible, but also inevitable.

However, it is evident that progress in the modern sense of the term on the basis of industrial and economic growth and formal democracy has not brought true emancipation to mankind. The modern value dilemma concerning progress at the conceptual level resides in the fact that rapid economic growth without solidarity, a developed system of democracy devoid of friendship, and freedom without dignity and respect cannot lead to genuine progress, that is, improvement in the conditions of life for all in more than merely material terms.[3]

Malaska and von Wright have endeavored to articulate a new dimension of progress in respect to what they term the late modern period, not the postmodern period. Their use of this term emphasizes that there has been a continuation of dominant structures and relations in a particular form that indicates that they have not been overcome but rather atomized.

The view of nature plays a crucial role in the articulation of a notion of progress and of sustainable development, as Daniel Botkin has illustrated in his discussion of various ideas of nature.[4] Both ancient and modern conceptions of nature share the belief that nature represents a highly organized, unchanging order that has the internal ability to bring forth and renew all the characteristics necessary for life. Indeed, nature supposedly manifests a perfect order in its structural symmetries and in the organization of elements in natural organisms.

Two dominant metaphors existed in human social memory prior to the Industrial Revolution, namely, 1) nature understood as an organic phenomenon and 2) nature understood as a perfect divine order. The first of these was perhaps most clearly expressed in the works of the Roman philosopher Lucretius. The most important shift in our European understanding of nature occurred during the Enlightenment, when the belief

emerged that nature was the embodiment of a perfectly functioning machine. The notion that nature was a machine had unexpected consequences in that it gave rise to the view that nature was a kind of unchanging *perpetuum mobile*, a kind of eternal machine with an inborn capacity for perfection.

More recent knowledge, however, is strongly opposed to such opinions. For example, nature understood as an ecosystem is evidently a complex entity that in and of itself is constantly changing, even without human intervention. In scientific terms nature is a complex, dimensional system far from equilibrium that is subject to the solar and cosmic energy constraints of the Earth. It consists of multiple processes with various rates of change, including growth, decay, coherent fluctuation, and chaos in an evolutionary sense.[5]

Botkin identifies three dominant views in respect to nature understood as this type of complex system: 1) Nature is taken as a locally functioning ecosystem that continues to exist until some external force destroys it. 2) Nature is taken as representing life, and in this sense it ensures the conditions of life on earth, such as proper surface temperature and adequate moisture. 3) Nature is understood as a biosphere that both changes constantly and also contains the capacity for self-organization. This self-organizing capacity in itself represents the main reason why life is able to continue on our planet. And, insofar as nature operates in accordance with its own rules and laws, it is characterized as a complex evolutionary system, not as a machine.

The only principle viable today for a view of nature that is commensurate with the problems facing us must involve a co-evolution of humans and the environment, whereby the environmental and technological systems are structurally and functionally inter-related in a manageable way. We have in fact now entered a post-natural, human-based era in which the ideal of sustainable development has come to the fore. This ideal apparently indicates that we have taken upon ourselves a new responsibility, namely, a responsibility for ourselves and for the entire Earth as well.[6]

Insofar as the modern concept of technology was derived from the classical Greek notion of *techne*, it involves creation, originality, and craftsmanship, as well as art. The original Greek term referred not only to instruments, but also to a principle of sustainable human activity that both revealed reality and manifested human possibilities. During the period of scientific and technological development, when progress was considered to be the imperative of technology, the understanding of technology was narrowed such that the latter was taken to be the source of economical and political necessity. This view resulted in the uncoupling of the concept of technology from all other sustainable human activities and from all other values.

The new understanding of technology that is taking shape today has emerged upon the basis of environmental concerns, particularly the questions concerning whether nature itself is able to withstand human

impact and the kind of protective feedback that is promoted and supported by such an understanding. In this regard the problem of technology has grown in complexity. Insofar as nature is a complex and dynamic system, the future challenge facing technology is that it must serve to safeguard the existence of nature and not work to destroy it.

This highlights the importance of sustainable development in respect to technology. Environmental management has only recently come to be influenced by the ideas of sustainable development involving risk assessment management. This complex outlook, which is based on the two concepts of environmental management and of technology taken as technosystem, involves a number of new qualities, such as mutual non-linear relationships and bonds between ecosystems and technosystems, and the irreversibility and simultaneity of events and causes. The consequences of this view are clearly visible in the area of values, particularly insofar as the rationality of an adequate set of values stresses the importance of an appropriate choice of not only instruments but also goals.

Technologies supporting this kind of sustainable development depend on a complex understanding of nature, historical time, culture, people's understanding of human progress, and their orientation towards nature. Such development must involve at one and the same time both human progress as well as sustainable interaction between human beings and nature. Sustainable technology in the late modern era must necessarily become nature-oriented technology, capable of promoting human progress while at the same time safeguarding the sustainability of social and ecological systems.

Sustainability is an ecological imperative for human adaptability, reflecting principles of management that establish an equilibrium between economic growth and the environment. It involves the assimilation by the ecological system of the effects of human activity, provision of the means for the biological support of life, and the assurance that humans are able to adapt to the changes in the environment so induced. Consequently, the qualitative character of nature and the quantitative rate of increase in human welfare must be in balance with the demands of resource management, sustainability of human life, the support of biodiversity, and protection of the biosphere.

The new understanding of progress that has emerged has been applied in the work of Pentti Malaska and other futurists, including various members of the Club of Rome. They have utilized a holistic and global type of thinking not only in the pursuit of scientific discoveries, but also to examine their social, political and economical implications. Indeed, science came to be increasingly oriented towards policy issues during the course of the twentieth century, particularly in the last two decades, when the term "policy sciences" was introduced and the social sciences were redirected towards the future, which is in fact another dimension of freedom. And scientists themselves became ever more concerned during this time with the social consequences and policy implications of knowledge. In contrast,

policy scientists have often aimed to secure a certain path of future development through the implementation of specific technologies, laws, and policies, thus countering our feelings of increasing insecurity and "defuturizing" in a certain sense what is to come.

Futurists, for their part, seek to determine which expected developments may have to be simply accepted because they are beyond human control, along with those that can be brought under human control. In addition, they seek to discover the unanticipated, unintended, and unrecognized consequences of social action. Futurists thus endeavor to clarify goals and values, describe trends, formulate alternative images of the future, as well as to create, evaluate, and select policy alternatives. This includes the evaluating and proposing of probable and preferable futures. As Toffler puts it, futurists attempt to create new alternative images of the future through a visionary and systematic investigation of the probable and the moral evaluation of the preferable. While futurists in this type of activity are for the most part consumers and synthesizers of knowledge that has been created by other scientists and scholars, future studies also involve the utilization of creative and lateral thinking in order to see realities to which others are blind.

Futurists agree that images of the future comprise an important factor in guiding human behavior. Moreover, such images contribute to shaping the future itself by means of the roles they play in behavior, regardless of whether the latter is primarily intended for adaptation or control. Purposeful action is indeed always based upon what may be termed an anticipation of the future. Futurists must therefore study and apply both human goals and values. They must concern themselves with the nature of the good society and with the standards of judgment and evaluation that they use. In addition, they must use different approaches in respect to such evaluation.

Planning may be described as long-range thinking that affects action in the present. In order to do this properly, it is very important to be able to understand both the present status of different events, as well as the consequences of social actions. In designing social action, futurists transform themselves from passive observers into active participants in policy processes. They thereby become social architects who both synthesize knowledge and formulate policy. Insofar as such activity bears much social and ethical responsibility, futurists must concern themselves with the concerns of good society and with the standards of judgment and evaluation that they use. They must also formulate responses to such questions as Why is a sustainable society better than an unsustainable one? and Why should present generations care for the well-being of future generations? In this respect it must be noted that fostering a deep sense of care concerning the freedom and welfare of future generations is one of the most significant aims of future studies.

Most futurists maintain that the goals of future studies include increasing democratic participation in the processes of imaging and

designing the future. As Manermaa has argued, future studies that have neither a direct, nor indirect impact on the development of society are both useless and unworthy of the name. Insofar as futurists aim to contribute to human improvement by translating knowledge and values into action, proposing action is an important element in their work.

The aim of future studies is in fact to discover or devise both probable as well as preferable futures. Futurists seek to know what could be (the possible), what is likely to be (the probable), and what ought to be (the desirable). Those involved in future studies endeavor to create new alternative images or visions that can serve to guide systematic investigation of what is probable and promote the moral evaluation of what is preferable.[7]

It is thus important to focus on prediction, which may be defined as a statement about the expected occurrence of some future event, outcome, state, or process, as a key term in future science, insofar as the latter is concerned with the possibility of alternative futures. Various writers use different terms for such statements, calling them forecasts if they deal with concrete and calendar-bound predictions, projections if they are based on the quantitative extrapolation of time-series data, and prophecies if they are either broad holistic statements about the future or refer to self-prediction. The fact that there is no single predictable future means that we must produce scenarios that depict different futures. As many futurists say, there are three paths into the future, namely, disaster, drift, and design. In this regard, ethical implications provide an important element upon which futurists base their views. A fundamental principle underlying their work is that one should endeavor to instill a positive and active attitude in people concerning reality, since it is necessary for people to create the future in line with positive values. Indeed, a fundamental aim of futurists is to teach people how to create the future in precisely such a way. Consequently, futurists not only must study, evaluate, and apply human goals and values, as was mentioned above, but they must also investigate human nature, as such, and the larger natural world.

The key notions on which the idea of sustainable development are based, namely, progress, nature, and technology, are also behind the ideas of the Club of Rome, which has influenced future studies in many ways. Its emphasis on a holistic, global, and multidisciplinary approach, along with its advanced environmental thinking and activism, have in fact become characteristic of the field. Moreover, its research into questions of global importance, including the possibility of world collapse, has constituted an important corrective to the various overly optimistic views of the future that have been current.

Insofar as the future is associated with the possibility of creating the future, future studies clearly have policy implications. That is to say that social sciences and futurists are concerned about the social consequences and policy implications of knowledge. This has led to evaluation research, which aims to assess the consequences of various organized social actions,

has now become an aspect of policy sciences. Evaluation research has steadily become more future-oriented, the reason being that the evaluation of any particular project has its greatest implications for projects that will be put into place in the future. From the perspective that I have endeavored to present, program development is viewed as a series of interactive cycles composed of planning, implementation, and evaluation with feedback to planners.

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NOTES

[1] This essay is dedicated to Professor George McLean, a pioneer in a new era of free philosophical and spiritual thinking. He has substantially influenced both the philosophical thinking of many scholars in Central Europe, as well as their understanding of their own cultures. Professor George McLean's efforts have helped many of us not only to see a new future, but also work to make it real.

[2] Malaska 1994, p. 531.
[3] Ibid., p. 534.
[4] Botkin 1990.
[5] Malaska and Kaivo-Oja 1996, p. 51.
[6] Botkin 1990, p. 304.
[7] Bell 1997, p. 73.

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PART IV

DIVERSITY IN UNITY

EDUCATION FOR COGNITIVE THINKING: A BASIS FOR INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION

ALEXANDER ANDONOV

This article discusses certain problems addressed by Professor Matthew Lipman in his book *Thinking in Education*.[1] Teaching thinking is the main challenge facing the transformation of the current educational system. From the point of view of intercultural education, however, teaching thinking is not enough. I argue that we need to teach cognitive thinking, which allows us to utilize the possibilities of caring, creative, and complex thinking more broadly. I wish to thank Professor U. Nortman and the University of Saarland, where I enjoyed ideal conditions for preparing the present text.

WHAT IS THINKING?

Thinking requires a subject or actor. The main features of thinking arise not from thinking itself, but rather from the possibilities of the thinker, the actor, the agent, the subject.

Living reality is a self-producing reality, which means that it can change in place and time, in matter and size. It becomes, grows, develops, and, of course, suffers, ages, and dies. The main point here is that when we wish to understand some particular type of thinking, we need to keep in mind that thinking itself arises from living and is itself a type of living.

This position differs from the traditions that derive from Aristotle, in which thinking is not treated as a particular reality with an ontology of its own. These traditions examine thinking in respect to what thinking is about. As Heidegger, for example, has put it in *What is Called Thinking?*, "we have learned to see that the essential nature of thinking is determined by what there is to be thought about: the presence of what is present, the Being of beings."[2]

We can consider thinking to be a process that involves the connection of distinct elements, but the process of disconnection should also be called thinking. In addition, we usually differentiate between thinking and doing because in doing we may have changed something in some respect. In thinking, on the other hand, we do not change anything since we are in "the thinking reality," in a world of images, so to speak. It is in fact a common understanding to view thinking as a process that operates with images. This reminds us of the saying "Measure thrice, cut once," which could be paraphrased as "Think thrice, cut once."

Something that exists only in thought may be taken back since it is not real in a certain sense. What is done, or even said, however, is done, and we cannot say that it is not real. We could thus state that thinking is connected with unreality as well as reality insofar as it is a process of transforming thoughts into reality and reality into thoughts. This points to the well-known distinction between theory and practice, which should be maintained since it is not the same thing to have been thinking about something and to have been doing it.

In order to understand thinking what thinking is, however, we need a concept of how to think since it is not adequate to define thinking as holding something in images. Thinking is obviously not merely having images, but something different, and it is clearly a specific type of action. In addition, that type of human action we call thinking is usually qualified by the predicate "conscious," which typically means that humans know what they are doing.

What does it mean to know what you are doing? This likely means to be responsible for the action to the greatest extent possible, which is possible only if we control it as a whole. In this sense we are conscious when we are acting in respect to our activities. To continue acting in respect to acting is in fact human activity.

How is it possible that the specifics of human thinking are the specifics of human action? From the point of view of science, this involves "the second signal system" (in I. P. Pavlov's sense) and the use of language. This means that it is possible to use language if one has images, memory, imagination, and organizes one's activities in accordance with them. We have done something or performed an action and, keeping this in mind, we do something else in coordination with it. We thus perform more than one activity. From this point of view, if an animal uses a stick in a given action and thereafter does not throw it away but keeps it, then it is no longer a "mere" animal. Our activities and our lives depend on the meaning of the tools we use, on the fact that they are usable and may be used again. Our lives are thus organized not in accordance with impulses from the body, but rather in accordance with the organization of the activities we have carried out.

The human subject, the agent or the I, is not directly dependent on the body, but rather develops as a self-creating process, as the organization of activities. Reason, self-understanding, self-control, planning the future, and so on, arise from this organization. That is to say that in order to be an agent (an actor or a subject), you must produce yourself.

Thinking, taken as acting concerned with acting, can involve real as well as imaginary activity. Furthermore, thinking can be a type of acting concerned with acting that transforms activity itself. Acting concerned with acting permits you to change the action, create a new reality, or transform the given. Even though such acting concerned with acting is carried out in the mind, or in images, it is capable of transforming "external" reality as well.

When we have organized an activity, we repeat it to the extent that we require or need its result. This indicates that thinking is involved in every action and in every aspect of the lives of human beings. Thinking is thus the process whereby we change, transform, and create action by acting in respect to activities. We can thereby say that thinking is a reflective action.

From this perspective it is obvious that different cultures are based upon more or less different ways of thinking insofar as they are different ways of life. When we respect cultural differences, we consequently respect different ways of thinking.

DIFFERENT WAYS OF THINKING

Thinking as the process of establishing activity can be classified in accordance with the main differences in the types of activity that we perform. It would be fruitful at this point in the present discussion to do so in respect to certain primary classifications that we already utilize in philosophy, whereby we classify activities as cognitive, logical, practical, and emotional in nature. In accordance with these distinctions, we may also classify thinking as either cognitive, logical, practical, or emotional in character. Although these are obviously not absolute distinctions, a person can be primarily involved in one or another type of thinking and develop specific abilities that are appropriate to a given profession or way of life.

From the point of human development, thinking as such can be divided into caring thinking, establishing thinking, corrective/critical thinking, creative thinking, and complex thinking. Each of these divisions is valid for cognitive as well as logical, emotional, and practical thinking. Lipman more or less discusses all of these with the exception of *establishing thinking*, a term I use to indicate the manner of thinking that people utilize as they understand the pattern of life in which they are involved. While establishing thinking can be cognitive, logical, emotional, and practical in nature, it is neither creative, regardless of the apparent similarities with this type, nor critical/complex. Its specific characteristic is to grasp reality without any preliminary action being performed. We should note that establishing thinking, in respect to logic, originates from Aristotelian logic.

CARE AS THE CORE OF THINKING

As an action concerned with action, thinking is acting for a purpose. And not only does purpose include care, any change as such involves care. Nor is it possible to want without caring for what you want. It is thus obvious that care is involved in the essence of humanity. It arises from wanting something and from the process of life in which people produce and reproduce themselves. Moreover, every act of human thought is a human action, and all human realization arises from wanting, which is

thereby meaningful. However, what type of wanting and need does thinking satisfy?

CARE AND THE CYCLE OF LIFE

If we consider care and, consequently, caring thinking in respect to the periods of life, we can see that the newborn child is in the care of her/his parents. S/he lives by virtue of that care, and the entire process of growing up is nothing else but emerging from that care and becoming sufficiently prepared to care for oneself, one's family, and one's world. Indeed, both John Dewey and the UN Charter for Children's Rights maintain that being educated is nothing other than governing oneself and taking care of oneself.[3]

From this point of view, we may say that children enter school from the world of caring thinking in which they have lived, being governed by others. The entire process of education should be developed in such a way as to prepare children to take care of themselves. In this regard, families and schools are responsible for the caring thinking of children in two ways: 1) to continue caring for children until they grow up and 2) to prepare children to govern caring thinking themselves. We consequently need to understand the role of caring thinking in logical and cognitive thinking. For the moment we will set aside the problems of practical and emotional thinking.

COGNITIVE AND LOGICAL THINKING

I am convinced that we must clearly distinguish between logical and cognitive thinking, which are not one and the same thing even though they are closely associated with and usually involve one another. They each have their own specific features, and it is a categorical mistake not to recognize them as distinct from one another.

In cognitive thinking we face a reality that we do not know. The aim of cognitive thinking is to know that reality so that we understand how it came into being, what kind of reality it is, what properties belong to it, how it can be destroyed, how it can be transformed, whether or not (and to what extent) it is dangerous, whether or not it is useful (and for what), and so forth. The concepts we need for this type of thinking, and the process in which we are involved, are not the same as in logical thinking. In order to construct a logical concept, one needs not only to know the objects one will cluster according to their similarities or differences, one must also know the objects in question before they can be clustered.

But if the process of education is organized along the lines of logical thinking, who will educate children concerning how to know reality? This type of education cannot comprise the primary process of cognition since logic without cognition is meaningless. "Logicized" education would be of little use in improving our skills in caring,

critical/creative, and complex thinking. Indeed, as Glazersfeld observes, we can listen and understand only if we already have a concept and knowledge of the subject under discussion.[4]

Education that focuses on logical thinking as the basis of education in fact constitutes a danger in respect to both the education and health of children. It cannot attain the goals of caring thinking because it does not address the origin of meaning in the cognitive process. Not only is such education an administrative burden, there is no way to animate it without including the actual cognitive process.

THINKING IN EDUCATION

We are very well aware that something is wrong with traditional education, but we are likely unclear concerning how the problems have arisen. We obviously need to specify the main features of traditional education in order to identify and eventually resolve the problems it presents.

I argue that the problems in question arise precisely from the "logicizing" of the process of education, which has taken place primarily through the influence of formal Aristotelian logic. It is understandable why Aristotelian logic was placed at the foundation of traditional education insofar as it is highly efficient in keeping the community in order and in providing exactness, clarity, and the possibility of control. But this is not the only reason. The underlying assumption is that cognition is useful only as a means for attaining knowledge, which in fact is what is considered to be useful. This means not only that the acquisition of knowledge is the overriding goal of today's type of education, but also that we would have no need of the cognitive process if we already possess knowledge.

This assumption is wrong because knowledge without the process of cognition is meaningless and cannot be understood. It is possible to study and teach knowledge without the process of cognition, but this is a most unsatisfying type of activity. The authorities may wish to use this type of teaching and studying, but the cost would be the loss of physical and social health on the part of both children and teachers. Moreover, it would exclude future generations from the process of cognition, the process of caring for the creation of knowledge, and the process of caring for their own lives.

TEACHING COGNITIVE THINKING

In the light of UN documents concerning human rights, we could say that the legislation needed to improve the situation in education already exists. The problem is how to recognize what is wrong and to determine the extent of the problems. I maintain that the point of greatest concern is how to exchange the roles that logic and cognition now play in the process of education. This is clearly a philosophical responsibility since philosophers have been responsible for the position that logic now holds in this regard.

My suggestion is we should accept our responsibilities as philosophers and reorganize education in order to highlight the role of cognition.

Professor Lipman deserves our gratitude for accepting the enormous responsibility of placing philosophy in school curricula. His efforts, along with those of others, have clearly been successful in defending the role of critical thinking in educational programs. While this is very important, it is not sufficient from the point of view of philosophical knowledge, for philosophy involves not only the creation and development of knowledge, but also the development and establishment of the tools and skills needed for this purpose. The latter are first and foremost cognitive in nature from the perspective of the cognitive process, while being logical on a secondary level. Although they consist of philosophical categories, they cannot be taken in a primarily logical sense because they are, on the one hand, the form of cognition and, on the other, the form of human agency or subject-ness.

This is not merely my opinion. No less a figure than Hegel illustrated how the thinker not only discovers through the process of cognition the object he is studying, but also creates himself as a subject of the process of cognition.[5] This is a double-sided process. If children are not permitted to involve themselves in the process of cognition, they are excluded from the genuine becoming of humanity. No type of logical or critical thinking can replace the process of cognition and the development of the skills it needs. While Hegel insisted that the development of the human individual follows the basic steps of the development of mankind, the question at hand is not merely a problem of philosophical speculation. As John Dewey forcefully states, children have the right to inherit the cultural treasury of mankind,[6] and the skills to do so are provided by cognitive thinking.

I do not believe that there is any special problem associated with teaching cognitive thinking insofar as the methods for doing so rely on a *community of inquiry*. Doing so in respect to philosophical curricula will require the use of narratives, as is the usual case in the teaching process discussed in Lipman's *Studies in Philosophy for Children*. The main differences in this respect concern logic and cognition. What is important is that children be supplied with the mental tools needed to have a proper understanding of a given reality. For instance, one cannot really understand the differences between Aristotelian and Galilean physics if one cannot think with the concepts of non-being and becoming. The reality of inertia is simply not understandable without these two basic concepts, which involve both ontologically articulated reality and thinking skills. The point is that in order to think a theory of this type, one needs to comprehend a new ontological reality as well as develop the skills necessary for doing so. This clearly involves a process of self-development. No type of logic can achieve such results, not even Hegelian critical or dialectical thinking.

Moreover, thinking in education is not simply a process of inquiry, for it must be a process of investigation and cognition. The reason for this is

that there is no place and time other than during the process of education where children can be cognitive, inventive, and creative. It will likely be too late for them to do this after they have grown up and left the educational system.

Plato was perhaps the first philosopher to describe (in *Philebus*) the cognitive method, which the myth claims Prometheus gave to people after he stole both it and fire from the Gods.[7] The issue in this regard is that the discovery of an idea or concept gives us the power to do what we want with reality. Cognition thus makes it possible for us to be free, happy, and empowered. But it is important to note that we cannot acquire the skills required for cognitive thinking by mastering formal, logical reasoning since the latter develops skills only in respect to formal reasoning. Cognitive skills, in contrast, are developed as one manages to construct a cognitive concept.

It is fruitful as this venture to consider the story of Harry Stotlemaier, who is a character from Lipman's program *Reasoning about Reasoning*.[8] As is well known, Harry became a victim of his teacher's practice of using education as a tool for punishment. The teacher, a certain Mr. Bradley, asked Harry "What is it that has a long tail and revolves about the sun once every seventy-seven years?" Harry did not know the correct answer since his mind had been wandering and he had not followed the teacher's presentation. He provoked the laughter of the class as he struggled to find the answer, inferring that "Because all planets revolve about the sun, that thing should be a planet also because it revolves about the sun too." Harry realized his mistake after school when he discovered a logical rule concerning the use of "all" and "some."

The problem in this respect is not whether discovering such a rule should have helped him solve cognitive problems concerning planets. Indeed, it most certainly would not have been useful in this respect since Harry made a logical, not a cognitive investigation. But Harry could obviously have done something else, namely, investigate what a planet is and how it differs from other objects in space. Doing so, however, demands that one have a proper concept of a planet. This cannot be merely a logical concept of a planet, but must rather be a cognitive concept whereby we can grasp how a planet came to be real and how it can preserve that reality even in transformation.

It seems at first glance that such a cognitive investigation would not be philosophical in character since it results in knowledge concerning astronomy. But this is not the case since Harry would indeed be able to make use of the philosophical experience of how we construct cognitive concepts. For example, we know the reality of a thing when we realize how and from what it comes into being. Harry would then have had to realize that the unknown object was probably not a planet insofar as planets do not have tails because they rotate on their axes. The only objects in space that can have tails are those which do not rotate. Consequently, the object about

which Mr. Bradley asked was probably not a planet but something that does not rotate on an axis, which in this case is a "comet."

In this type of investigation the student is involved in a cognitive thinking process, regardless of whether or not it is profound. In Harry's case he already had sufficient information to make the statement that the object in question was not a planet, although he did not do so because he did not utilize cognitive thinking.

The difference between logical and cognitive investigations is that the latter involves teaching students types of activities and skills that help them to improve their cognitive achievements. This can be done even without particular reference to philosophical knowledge. Logical investigations improve our skills in logical thinking, but these skills must be adapted to cognitive thinking if we want to follow the truth.

In another case, Harry proudly interrupted a lady, insisting that she made a wrong inference in stating that a man who frequently goes to a shop to buy alcohol is a drinker. Harry is logically correct in insisting that the fact of frequently buying alcohol does not prove that one is a drinker, but he is also wrong in insisting that the man is not a drinker. Indeed, the fact that a man frequently buys alcohol neither proves, nor disproves that he is or is not a drinker. The problem in this regard is that logical inferences are formal, and it is a well-known fact that a sentence which is logically correct may very well not be true.

I do not intend to argue that it is a waste of time to study logic. I instead wish to say that logical thinking is a particular type of thinking, and that it is wrong to reduce all types of thinking to this one type. I could make similar comments in respect to each of the characteristics Lipman has put forward in describing the differences between traditional education and education in thinking, or reflective education. For example, Lipman insists that the traditional educational paradigm is dominated by the assumption that "Education consists in the transmission of knowledge from those who know to those who don't know."[9] If this were indeed the case, the situation would not be so difficult. The problem is that if one has no concept of the reality about which knowledge is concerned, then s/he has no understanding of what is taking place and in no way can actualize knowledge. For one who has no concept of reality, knowledge is not knowledge but only particular words and statements that must be memorized.

In contrast, the paradigm of reflective education is organized according to the principle that the student is to attain "understanding and good judgment." This is an attractive statement, but there must be no doubt that understanding involves the construction of a cognitive concept. I am not convinced that Lipman's position on this point is sufficiently clear. For example, he insists in respect to reflective thinking that "students are stirred to think about the world when *our* knowledge of it is revealed to them to be ambiguous, equivocal and mysterious."[10] This statement contains a hidden cognitive position, but there is no indication that we can make progress in thinking through cognitive achievements. I doubt whether Lipman would

agree with Plato that we become free, happy, and empowered by virtue of making a discovery, and that this gives rise to the greatest pleasure one could ever have.[11]

The position I have presented in this discussion should be understood as an attempt to go further in the same direction as the *Philosophy for Children* programs. The foundations of this movement are in fact sufficiently broad to involve teaching cognitive thinking. Teaching through the cognitive process is a must in intercultural education. We cannot understand cultural differences if we do not know them, and we cannot understand them by following formal logical operations.

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NOTES

[1] Lipman 1991/2003.
[2] Heidegger 1968, p. 244.
[3] Dewey 1964.
[4] Glazersfeld. "Radical Constructivism and Education."
[5] Hegel. "Introduction" to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.
[6] Dewey 1964.
[7] Plato 1990, 16d.
[8] Lipman 1982.
[9] Lipman 2003, p. 18.
[10] Ibid., p. 18.
[11] Plato 1990, 15e.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE HOPE FOR PHILOSOPHY
IN A GLOBAL AGE

JELENA DJURIĆ

The features of a common perspective vital for future philosophy are expressed symbolically as the emergence of a "bright new worldview." In contrast to the cynical consequences of Aldous Huxley's notion of a "brave new world," this attempt seeks to find a way to integrate these ideas into a conscious vision. To see the world as wonderful is not to flee from its horrors and pains, but to hope that a further evolution of humanity is possible upon the condition that we initially view it positively. This point focuses upon the constitutional roles of the seer and of vision.

The effort to concentrate philosophers throughout the world on contemporary global issues has generated a basic ground for the possible emergence of a new paradigm. Claims that such work is eclectic may in fact be connected to a narrow perspective insofar as it might well be possible to view these ideas as pieces in a global puzzle if a broader perspective is adopted. An intuition concerning which parts of the puzzle are already in place could lead one to recognize the potential improvements associated with the quest for a "bright new worldview" instead of ignoring it or criticizing it as a vain undertaking.

"The world is now unifying itself from the local contraries to one globalized culture in order to create a new philosophy of humanity. We are no longer semi-human but human, and are initiating a creative philosophy for all of humanity in its present technologically cohesive situation."[2] However, organizing the ideas of different authors into a meaningful and cohesive philosophy or worldview is not a painless venture. Different ideas disperse in many directions, and merging them together into a properly formulated text is a challenging editorial task. This is accompanied by the obvious risk that the result might be immature or diverge from the intentions of the author involved.

Regardless of the insights of postmodern thought, many principles of rationality remain uncontested, and a worldview assumes a level of precise discourse as a precondition for communication. There is also the dilemma concerning the acceptability of treating other people's texts as raw material, whatever their future philosophical purpose may be, insofar as the creation of a collage is not as widely accepted in respect to printed texts as it is in the visual arts. The requirement of seriousness is still in force, although it makes us repeat not only procedures and rules, but also ideas that have been expressed many times before. As we seek to express ideas in an authentic fashion and thereby be original, we often actually reaffirm the

"identities" of our own little egos. We speak of similar things, but fail to reach the agreement necessary for the development of shared values, general aims, and universal interests. Each one brings into their expressions not only their own passions and ideals, but also their weaknesses and illusions. We do not facilitate mutual enrichment and perfection merely through the multiplication of concepts and representations. Consequently, the accumulation of humanistic knowledge remains problematic, while philosophies emerge as hermetically-sealed, speculative creations that, except for hermeneutic fertility, fail to keep up with changes in reality and therefore become – or remain – inoperative.

In the spirit of the debate initiated in the cyber-sphere concerning "copyleft vs. copyright,"[3] the implications of the right to change "software" freely in order to make it more adapted to the needs of its users, under the sole condition that it remains open for further change, have not been sufficiently explored. This is clearly not accidental since the potential revolutionary nature of such freedom destroys established proprietary relations and subverts routine patterns of power. Philosophers have been called upon to face this issue, at least at the level of ideas. Being aware of the importance of fundamental changes, philosophers should indicate what they in fact are and, by the same token, perhaps help them come true. McLean has described this historical *spiritus movens* in the following words: "The aspiration of freedom has electrified hearts, evoked great sacrifices and defined human progress in our age."[4]

In accordance with a "present socio-economic paradigm,"[5] which is "the imperative of political and cultural freedoms" and "the force of the postmodern mentality," humanity should overcome "strategies of self-interest and control" while transcending the ruling concept of the modern world "as an order of possessions" in order to reach "a spiritual disposition" without which it "is impossible to visualize an inclusive human horizon."[6] When we relate these words to ourselves, however, we easily encounter an important problem. Because of the ubiquitous need of the human ego to be and, at a more subtle level, to be right, it is difficult to overcome manifestations of human nature as transformations of the will to power. We do not need to search far in order to become aware that underlying the principles and symbolic structures of our societies are "linguistic games" that are "essentially power games." We only need to look sincerely within ourselves for evidence of this.

At the beginning of the new millennium, when "the exaltation of scientific-technological devices," of "hypertext, cybernetics and epistemology, leaves us blinded by the footlights," philosophers are once again confronted with "the challenge of the metaphysical dimension."[7] An awareness is growing that "the decision in metaphysics concerning the nature of reality and the corresponding decision in epistemology determines our understanding of the nature and meaning of freedom and indeed of human life. The results of the exclusions made by the empiricists are devastating for human life and meaning: there can be no sense of human

nature and hence no freedom of self-perfection; there can be no sense of human existence and hence no natural freedom of self-determination."[8]

That directs us towards a superior evaluation of philosophy. "The link of man to philosophy makes of this discipline, at the same time, knowledge, attitude and, above all, passionate testimony to life, and finally a path towards truth."[9] Moreover, we are tempted to create a philosophy for today's global age. "Philosophy must now take an independent role, trying to state its own identity, aiming to collaborate with all branches of human knowledge to promote peace and human welfare... It has the ambition of bringing all human knowledge and experience into one perspective and explains all human interest under one perspective: global philosophy or philosophy of globalization."[10] Since the magnetism of philosophy is strong, the danger is that we are inclined to forget that "love" for the "love for wisdom" (philosophy) is not self-sufficient. We must also be attentive to the lessons of history, which are supposed to have taught us that the age of speculation should end, and that the world should enter the age of an operative spirituality so that we not be given over to obscurity.

There is evidently great hope that a genuine metaphysical quest can be recovered. However, there is no guarantee that distancing ourselves from reductionist scientific exactness, taken as "a symptom of the spiritual weariness of Reason that emptied knowledge of meaning," would reward us with "reflective conscience" and "existential commitment." But there is faith, and longing is present in many cases, such as in the words: "Desacralized knowledge has made man spiritually homeless, he has become a stranger to himself... As one man put it,... 'A purely scientific civilization destitute of ideals and values, devoid of the humanizing and mellowing influence of religion, philosophy and art, would be as cruel for the soul as the pre-scientific civilization was for the body.'... The greatest need of this age is a great prophet who can accept the facts of science and at the same time give inspiration to fill the great spiritual void."[11]

Keeping in mind that the sphere of philosophy is less characterized by calls to wait for a prophet than by efforts on the part of philosophers to locate the *telos* of humanity, it is fruitful to consider the following argument. "If there be truth to the commonplace that the first millennium was focused upon God and the second upon man, then this beginning of the third millennium should be the opportunity to unite both... True progress must be... implemented by the development of human dignity, creativity and responsibility; and it must be centered upon what is ethically good and aesthetically moving because inspired by the Spirit. Precisely in these terms new and exciting ways open to a life with meaning and value for all."[12] It is very important that this basically Hegelian approach be enriched by a sense of the particular. Consequently, "...the concern is to look not only for what is essential, necessary and universal, but especially for what is existential and unique in the free and creative exercise of life."[13]

Hegelian provenance is also present in Dei's "philosophy of postmodern *Aufheben*." Together with E. Hobsbawm, Dei emphasizes the

apparent failure of all modernity programs that deal with the issues of humankind. His philosophy, however, which is "anchored in a living metaphysics," was not primarily directed to personal improvement, regardless of his proposal that philosophy be "an openness to truth, not the possession and legitimization of one truth above the other." The key to this is "to discover that we confront not problems, but questions of meaning." And the goal is "...a leap in consciousness... In this way the dystopic experience of modernity reflected in postmodern culture can be thought of as the human possibility of a free decision to exist in the world according to an identity which is not one of appropriation, grasping or consumption."

A comprehension of questions related to identity on the individual level may permit a better understanding of their general and universal principles related to the consciousness of the whole. Globalization would thus "lack its own identity" without "giving priority to a planetary conscience." Relying on "the mechanisms of supremacy" that exclude the other, "the so-called phenomenon of globalization" "may continue as a tragic imitation of instrumental reason... anchored in the fragmentation and isolation of populations and human beings." If that type of "instrumental reason can find in globalization its universal meaning, this universality... is a universality without identity."[14]

But the complement of this gloomy view of globalization is a cheerful version that presumes *Aufheben* as well as the rise of global consciousness. This comprises "today's challenge to achieve a comprehensive vision whose integration is not at the expense of the components, but their enhancement and full appreciation." This process transcends particular concerns "not to deny them, but to respond to them from a more inclusive vantage point." "This is the heart of the issue of globalization and cultural identities.... If a global outlook be evolved in which unity is promoted by diversity, then the progress of world unification could be, not at the cost of the multiple cultures, but through their deployment and interaction."[15]

Discovering insight into questions of global thinking in the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, McLean revives ancient principles of the mind that have been forgotten in modernity, principles that view diversity as promoting, not negating, unity. By means of a detailed analysis of Cusa's philosophy, which culminates in the power of intellection joined with imagination, McLean clearly shows the disadvantage of modern discursive reasoning and "knowledge constructed on the basis of multiple limited beings understood as opposed one to another", which "proceeds essentially in terms of parts... without taking account of the overall unity." He points out that in Cusa's global view not only is the realization of each required for the realization of the whole, but that "the reverse is also true, namely, it is by acting with others and indeed in the service of others or for their good that one reaches one's full realization."[16] And since knowledge as such "is directed toward an ordered reality – ours and that of the entire globe – the

central questions are not merely epistemological, but ontological and ethical...”[17]

Without a doubt, ethics involves the most actual question today, namely, that of “the meaning of the human dimension in a globalized world.” Ghislaine Florival argues that “issues of the human person which underlie ethical responsibility” are in principle “tied to a practical anthropology which enfolds from the center of action.”[18] “Therefore, ethics can no longer be only a theoretical science, a reflection either *a priori* on the essence of action or *a posteriori* on acquired human experience, but must begin to carry out work on new matters, yet unexplored, which have an immediate impact on the life of individuals, cosmic possibilities, the protection of peoples, or socio-cultural life.”[19]

These words clarify the values that underlie analysis since the “Radical transformation of individual and social life raises new ethical questions [about] becoming conscious of the philosophical urgency of redefining all in terms of a destiny which now has come to be shared universally.”[20] As B. Kirti thus reminds us, “the time of change calls... for a change of value base. The appropriate value base must respond to the characteristic needs of globalization. Globalization means... that we must learn how to live in the globalized world as our ancestors lived in a village. Surely we need an appropriate philosophy...”[21] Insofar as Kirti views philosophy as the source of a globalized culture, he proposes a “contemporary paradigm” that would lead to responsibility, collaboration, trust, mutual understanding, and peace. “Only by deliberately engaging in breaking down the walls of distrust can we open the way to the trust on which friendship is based. History has brought us to the brink of a ‘high-tech’ global society... The pressing task is to learn how to collaborate with sincerity.” The way to such collaboration passes through “both a *kenosis* and a *metanoia*. *Kenosis* means emptying oneself of the ‘old man.’... This emptied self can then be filled up through a *metanoia* to open the eyes to a new way of seeing: the contemporary way or paradigm. With this new outlook, we can become a ‘new man’ that sets no limits on love.”[22]

Kirti views these considerations as giving rise to “a serious program of education for preparing humanity for the culture of the global village.” But, if “education” is to become operative, it must go beyond the level of words and their interpretations. In so doing, it will become an issue of personal self-discipline rather than intellectual education directed to future global humanity. We, of course, should neglect no aspect of the world as we to compose an order for the human collective. But the “metaphysical question of choosing a new way... must refer explicitly to the tremendous task of reformulating the symbolic universe that has sustained the history of humanity up to this day.”[23] We might thereby hope to find a way in which to “prevent global solutions” that “aim unilaterally at the benefit of developed states” and of plutocracies. This indeed depends on human concern for “the dimension of totality” that fuses solutions of scientific rationality with the “reasonableness”[24] of human reason. This

holds true for virtually every domain, but particularly for the socio-political sphere.

"Science and democracy have been the watchwords of modern history. ... But wherever there are two the problem of their unity and harmony becomes central to the realization and value of both. So it is at the present moment that we are in search of an adequate context which will enable both science and human freedom to be realized under the title of democracy in our day. If this can be found, it will enable scientific capabilities truly to implement a humane and free life and our democracy to become, not a well-ordered tyranny of the majority, but a context for personal and social realization."[25] That "adequate context" might very well be found in the "bright new worldview," and the worldview we are searching for might very well provide the appropriate context for the future "self-perfection" of the individual and society. And perhaps even for the global order.

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NOTES

[1] http://www.crvp.org
[2] Imamichi 2001.
[3] http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/philosophy.html
[4] McLean 1996.
[5] Dei 2001.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] McLean 1996.
[9] Dei 2001.
[10] Bunchua 2001.
[11] *Proceedings of the Eighth Session of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress*. See also Siddiqui 1998.
[12] McLean 1999.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Dei 2001.
[15] McLean 2001.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Florival 2001.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Bunchua 2001.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Dei 2001.
[24] Shen 1995.

[25] McLean 1996.
[26] Ibid.

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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A TOPICAL HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE FROM A CRITICAL KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE

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The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2001 on the basis of the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* of July 1998.[1] The latter statute was adopted as a result of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. The general aim of this document was to establish "jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole," that is, "in relationship with the United Nations system."[2] The *Rome Statute* specifies such crimes to be the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.[3]

The vision and core concern underlying the ICC was lucidly expressed by United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, as follows:

> In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of universal justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision. We are close to its realization. We will do our part to see it through till the end. We ask you... to do yours in our struggle to ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity. Only then will the innocents of distant wars and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep under the cover of justice; that they, too, have rights, and that those who violate those rights will be punished.[4]

These grand words in fact reveal the crucial issue in the current and increasingly conflicting interpretations of human rights, which turns upon the *de facto* extension of state jurisdiction to illegal and illegitimate bodies, such as juntas. An argument critical of this position could find support in the "Preamble" of the *Rome Statute*, which emphasizes "that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be *complementary* to national criminal jurisdictions" [italics added].[5] In addition, one accepted interpretation of the key word "complementarity" indicates that the ICC may act only if the state in question has failed in respect to investigation and prosecution. The *Rome Statute* specifies, however, that complementarity in this respect is subject to the discretion of the ICC alone, which means that the ICC has a monopoly over decision-

making concerning whether or not the state in question has handled a charge properly. Consequently, if the ICC comes to the conclusion that a state has acted inappropriately in this regard, it may attempt to punish the persons indicted on its own without any consideration of their official status.

This amounts to a radical change in the understanding of international law. A precedent for this is supposedly provided by the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal after World War II, which was established in order to bring the captured leaders of the German Nazi regime to justice. Indeed, the Nuremberg trials have become viewed as the first significant example in which an international body superceded the priority of state jurisdiction in terms of criminal law.[6] However, this type of interpretation after the fact in favor of the legitimacy of the ICC obviously suffers from serious flaws. For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal never ascribed to itself such a radical meaning. It was instead established in terms of the rights of the Allies to conduct legislative, judicial, and executive activities on the conquered and occupied territory of Germany by virtue of the unconditional surrender of the German Third Reich. It followed from such terms of surrender that the German state no longer existed at that time, and that all its formal and actual prerogatives had been legally assumed by the combined Allied powers. The Nuremberg Tribunal was thus the only possible option for legally punishing the criminal leadership of the former German Nazi totalitarian regime.

Other supposed precursors of the ICC, which have been officially described as such, are the two *ad hoc* international criminal tribunals that were established to deal with recent events in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.[7] Both of these tribunals were established on the basis of binding resolutions issued by the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. The particular reasons given for such measures were quite exceptional, consisting of an obvious collapse of law and order on the territories of two states in question. Such exceptional conditions implied that both of these extraordinary tribunals were strictly limited in their juridical competencies. The ICC, on the contrary, goes far beyond such understandable limits of exceptional international jurisdiction insofar as it has a permanent status with substantial and far-reaching competencies.[8]

It is remarkable that attempts have been made to derive theoretical legitimacy for the ICC from the outstanding German philosopher Immanuel Kant since his writings provide no sound basis for doing so.[9] Indeed, Kant neither articulated, nor proposed any concept whatsoever of a global superstate. He instead put forward a preliminary outline of the basic conditions required for guaranteeing a future enduring peace among the world's sovereign states.[10] Moreover, Kant was prudent enough to warn explicitly against any temptation to establish a type of authority that would merge together existing independent states. In one sense his argument was based on extension in space insofar as "the force of laws diminishes step by step with the enlargement of governmental extent. A spiritless despotism

thus falls into anarchy in the end, after it has annihilated the origins of good."[11] And while Kant emphasized that it was "the requirement of every State (or its head) to bring about an enduring state of peace in such a way that it, wherever possible, governs the entire world,"[12] he concluded that all such aspirations and endeavors are futile and doomed on the evident grounds that *nature* will have it otherwise.

Kant indicates in respect to nature that "she employs two means to prevent nations from intermingling and to keep them separate. These are the diversity of *languages* and *religions*, which bring with them an inclination toward mutual hatred and a pretext for war. Nevertheless, the growth of culture and the gradual approach of people to one another may lead to increased consensus concerning the principles of concord and peace."[13] Kant argued, moreover, that a peace which arises from nature is the exact opposite of a type of peace that can be equated with "despotism (on the graveyard of freedom) through the enfeeblement of all energies."[14] An enduring peace arising from nature in fact results from a "balance of energies in their most vivid competition."[15]

Kant's description of a future agreement among states that gives rise to an enduring peace on the basis of their natural diversity reveals the influence of Johann Gottfried Herder's original conception of the philosophy of history.[16] Similarly to the way in which Herder arrives at his concept of how the diversity of nations creates a "garden of humankind" that produces the "richest architecture of human concepts, the best logic, and the metaphysics of sound reason,"[17] Kant comes to envisage that an enduring peace can be established among sovereign states on the basis of international law in the form of republican principles that arise from the very diversity of existing states.[18] Consequently, two interconnected issues need to be clarified. First, what do republicanism, federalism, international law, confederacy, peaceful confederation, and global civil law specifically mean to Kant? Second, what do these Kantian notions have in common with the current ambitions of the ICC?

Kant adopts the classical meaning of republicanism as one of two basic constitutional ways in which a given state may exercise the fullness of its power. He defines a constitution as "the act of general will that transforms a mass into a people,"[19] and identifies the two corresponding forms of constitutional government (*forma regiminis*) as republicanism and despotism. Republicanism is equivalent to the state principle whereby the executive is separate from the legislative power, while despotism, in contrast, is the principle "of a high-handed executive of laws which has been promulgated by the state itself." This provides the grounds for Kant to view despotism as the public will, even though it is exercised by the ruler as his own private will.[20] In addition, Kant's notion of democracy is highly significant within the context of the present discussion. He states that democracy in the proper sense of the term involves despotism insofar as it establishes an executive power in the name of all on the basis of a majority

that excludes the minority who do not agree. All are in fact not all, which is a contradiction of the general will and of freedom.[21]

Kant's interconnected concepts of federalism, international law,[22] union of nations, peace confederation, and global civil law can be specified and understood only within the appropriate context, which is in fact provided by federalism as the basis of international law. Its philosophical legitimacy provides the reason why the behavior of states, even in cases of war, may be explained in terms of the concept of *right*. Furthermore, "an even greater but now slumbering moral foundation is discernible within man that is able to dominate the evil principle within him... which can be hoped for in other human beings, too."[23] This is why Kant argues that peoples as states can and must demand of each other that they enter into a civic-like arrangement in which the rights of each can be guaranteed. Such an arrangement "would be a *confederacy* (*ein Volkerbund*), not a state of peoples (*kein Volkerstaat*)."[24] This provides the grounds for Kant to deduce the notion of *peace confederation* (*Friedensbund* or *foedus pacificum*),[25] the purpose of which is not to assume state power, but only to maintain and safeguard "the *freedom* of a state for its own sake and for the sake of the other confederated states as well, without any state thereby being made subordinate... to public laws or to any compulsion from other states."[26] Kant's concept of federalism thus provides the basis for his subsequent deduction of international law as the condition for the freedom of sovereign states.

Kant states that federalism begins to develop "when, by a stroke of luck, a powerful and enlightened people constitute themselves as a republic, which must by its own nature tend to an enduring peace. This provides the center around which other states may affiliate themselves in a federation, thereby guaranteeing their freedom in accordance with the idea of international law, which may gradually be extended and to enlarge gradually more and more through ties of this sort."[27] There is no doubt but that Kant views the republican form of constitution as the only type that is fully appropriate to human rights.[28] It serves as the theoretical source for Kant's outline of the idea of *global civil law*, which follows from his conception of a *federation of free republican states as the only possible basis for international law*. Kant was firmly convinced that in his lifetime "the (closer or broader) community of peoples on earth has developed to such an extent that a violation of rights in but *one* location is felt in all places. The idea of a global civil law is therefore no fanciful and exaggerated sort of image, but rather the necessary completion of an unwritten codex of both state law and international law that protects human rights for all and, thereby, enduring peace as well."[29]

Kant's sincere conviction that it was feasible to implement global civil law, including global justice in support of a lasting peace, has many energetic proponents today. Moreover, in contrast with Kant's time, they have even established various institutions for this purpose, one specific example being the ICC. Still unanswered, however, is the second question

mentioned above, namely, What do Kant's concepts of federalism, international law, union of nations, peace confederation, and global civil law have in common with the current ambitions of the ICC?

As the discussion to this point has demonstrated, Kant's notions of international law as well as global civil law are unequivocally based on his concept of federalism as an association of independent republican states on the grounds of their shared republican values. Kant's notion of republican federalism as the basis for international law and global justice is the explicit opposite of despotism taken as the fusion of legislative and executive powers. The Preamble of the *Rome Statute* at first appears to subscribe to such principles. It states, for example, that "it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes."[30] It also emphasizes that "nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene... in the internal affairs of any other State."[31] However, these statements are in fact undercut by the interpretation given to the principle of complementarity, whereby the ICC may act when the state in question has failed at investigation and prosecution.[32] The crucial point in this respect is that such a decision is entirely at the discretion of the ICC. We must thus examine the character of this discretion on the part of the ICC in respect to complementarity.

The first occasion on which the ICC was able to present its interpretation of the principle of complementarity was provided by the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, that is, *Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Belgium*.[33] The majority of the ICC refrained in this case from making a pronouncement on the principle, even though the separate opinion of its three judges stated that the Court was inherently able to rule on questions of international law. Judge Oda expressed in his dissenting opinion, however, the opposing view "that the Court should not take any stance on this issue due to its uncertainty in international law as well as because it did not form part of the request before the Court."[34] Nevertheless, certain Judges of the ICC "noted that the issue of jurisdiction is inseparable from ruling on immunity – because the former needs to be established in advance of any declaration that immunity from jurisdiction exists – and deemed it necessary to discuss the point in their separate opinion."[35]

The verdict of the President of the Court highlighted the distinction between two sorts of universal jurisdiction, namely, universal jurisdiction as jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes committed by foreigners present on the territory of a state and universal jurisdiction by default. Universal jurisdiction by default is "asserted by a state without any link with the crime or the defendant, not even his presence on the territory, when that jurisdiction is first exercised." The President of the ICC "held that universal jurisdiction by default exists, under customary international law, only for the crime of piracy."[36] But the three dissenting judges

distinguished instead between universal jurisdiction properly so-called (jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by foreigners over foreigners without the accused being present on the territory of the state); and territorial jurisdiction over persons present on the territory of the state who have allegedly committed crimes abroad. In contrast to the President, however, the three judges expressed the view that customary international law, in addition to authorizing universal jurisdiction properly so called over the crime of piracy, does not prohibit such jurisdiction for other offences subject to a set of specific conditions.[37]

More specifically, the three dissenting judges declared their opinion in this respect as follows:

> The immunities enjoyed under customary international law by incumbent or former Ministers of Foreign Affairs do not bar criminal prosecution in four particular circumstances: there is no criminal immunity in one's own country; immunity from foreign jurisdiction ceases if the State which the minister of Foreign Affairs represents or has represented decides to waive that immunity; when a person is no longer Minister, there is no immunity for events either before or after holding the ministerial post as well as for acts of a private nature while minister; or where prosecution is being conducted by international criminal courts.[38]

These differing views within the ICC concerning the issue of international versus national law are highly significant in that they clearly express the opposing interpretations of the principle of complementarity as the pivotal element of the ICC Statute. On the one hand, the view of the Court's majority, represented by the President of the Court, is that universal jurisdiction is limited to extraterritorial crimes committed by foreigners present on the territory of a given state. In addition, it recognizes that there is only one type of jurisdiction by default under customary international law, involving the crime of piracy, that can be exercised by a state with no link either to the crime, or to the defendant, who need not even be present on its territory.[39] In other words, the currently prevailing view of the ICC subscribes to the interpretation of the principle of complementarity that upholds the primary sovereignty of jurisdiction of individual states. The currently prevailing view of the ICC thus expresses a standpoint that is congruent with Kant's concept of federalism.

The present dissenting minority of the ICC, on the other hand, supports an entirely different view. They maintain, in contradiction with the

verdict of the ICC, that universal jurisdiction in the proper sense of the term means jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by foreigners over foreigners without the accused persons being present on the territory of the state in question. They also disagree with the ICC's concept of universal jurisdiction on the grounds that its definition as jurisdiction over persons present on the territory of the state in question who have allegedly committed crimes abroad is in fact the definition of territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events. Moreover, the dissenting judges are opposed to the verdict of the Court that customary international law authorizes universal jurisdiction properly so-called only over the crime of piracy. These judges assert that customary international law does not prohibit universal jurisdiction proper for other offences subject to a set of specific conditions.[40] One such condition is that there is no criminal immunity for Ministers of Foreign Affairs in cases being prosecuted by international criminal courts.[41] Consequently, the opinion of the more radical, dissenting judges of the ICC is that the proper meaning of customary international law, and the resulting meaning of universal justice, consists of and coincides with the unequivocal and unconditional supremacy of international courts and their rulings over the jurisdiction of any particular state.

It is evident that the dissenting group of judges of the ICC support a concept quite opposed to the accepted understanding of principle of complementarity that comprises a completely different conception of customary international law and universal jurisdiction, or global justice, than that upheld by the majority of the Court. Indeed, the minority view would overturn the principle of complementarity understood as the primacy of jurisdiction of individual sovereign states. The current minority view of the ICC thus expresses an opinion that is, by virtue of its despotic juridical nature, incongruent with Kant's concept of federalism as expressed in his political philosophy, which is reminiscent of Montesquieu and the Classical tradition of political thinking.

Briefly stated, the conflict within the ICC between these two juridical positions comprises a conflict concerning the interpretation of the Kantian concepts of federalism, international law, union of nations, peace confederation, and global civil law. At stake in this conflict is, within the context of Kant's thought, nothing less than the significance and proper meaning of the basic law. This involves the political and moral value of republicanism for international law and, consequently, for universal or global justice. This is the very substance of the conflict over interpretations of the concept of customary international law.

The core issue in this respect, which closely pertains to the topic of the authority of human or civil rights, involves the emerging twofold relationship between international and national criminal law. As Ferrando Mantovani has stated, international criminal law is, on the one hand, being "'nationalized' through the integration into international law of the general principles of criminal law common to the major legal systems of the world,

especially in terms of the 'general part' of international criminal law. On the other hand, a sort of 'internationalization' of it is emerging as both customary and conventional international law are being integrated into national legal systems."[42]

In respect to the prevailing interpretation of complementarity, whereby the jurisdiction of state courts takes precedence over the jurisdiction of the ICC insofar as state laws contain provisions for the crimes indicated in the *Rome Statute*, state legislatures in general now feel the need to "also provide for the crimes under the ICC Statute, as well as the penalties attached to them, so that the principles of *nullum crimen sine lege* and *nulla poena sine lege* are upheld."[43] The following particular emphasis appears within this context: "The adoption in national legal systems of specific provisions on international crimes is thus a specific obligation incumbent upon the State Parties, an obligation that comes even before their general obligation to cooperate with the Court."[44] However, such an obligation can have a rational meaning only on condition that the ICC's current interpretation of the principle of complementarity continues to be the dominant view. If the present interpretation is maintained, then the specific obligation of states to legislate provisions for the international crimes listed in the Statute of the ICC is entirely appropriate. But the currently prevailing Kantian interpretation by the ICC of the principle of complementarity could very well be replaced by the opposing interpretation, which may be labeled a type of juridical despotism in Kantian terms. If this were to take place, no state legislation could effectively prevent the ICC from imposing its rulings on a given state whenever it decided to do so.

And it is by no means out of the question that such a radical step might be taken. This possibility is evidenced by exhortations for "international sentencing to engage with its perceived audience of offenders, victims, communities or states" by virtue of the presumed need "to clarify concepts and provide mechanisms or structures for this transformative enterprise."[45] It is useful in this respect to consider the way in which the term globalization is often used. For example, one philosophical interpretation of this popular term claims that the effects of globalization "concern the extent to which international criminal justice policy is morally relative and the extent to which international penal structures are capable of facilitating the development of democratic principles of justice."[46] Within the Kantian tradition of political and legal philosophy, however, it is symptomatic that *republican* as a primary concept is steadily being replaced by the ambiguous term *democratic*. Along this line of rather vague reasoning, broad issues such as *human rights* or terms such as *international community* are regularly employed. Such typical attitudes reveal an obvious tendency to interpret international law and universal or global justice in terms of juridical despotism. This is in direct contradiction to the way in which they are discussed within the context of Kantian republican federalism.

Permit me to demonstrate this point by means of the following example. William Schabas argues that various individual international tribunals have been brought together through a "process of encroachment by the international community on national processes with a view to ensuring criminal prosecution of human rights abuses."[47] Ralph Henham maintains that such an interpretation obviously emphasizes

> that the internationalization of criminal trial process is also intimately connected to issues which relate to global governance and accountability. These may include, more particularly: (i) The universal criminalization of behavior irrespective of context; (ii) The right to assert modalities and techniques for penal repression; (iii) The determination of the means for allocating responsibility for criminality irrespective of the different historical, social and cultural contexts in which punishment norms are applied; (iv) The relative autonomy of internationalized trial processes which have developed outside institutional mechanisms of accountability.[48]

This more particular clarification illustrates the proper meaning of Henham's general finding that "a significant paradigm for conceptualizing the activities of international criminal tribunals is to regard them as structural mechanisms concerned with the legitimation of hegemonic power, authority and control."[49] Consequently, what is at stake in the current debates within the ICC concerning the nature of international criminal justice is the very legitimacy of such justice in terms of republican (Kantian) federalist principles. This conclusion also emerges in Henham's analysis within a more specific context. Henham concludes that

> the punitive dynamic of the international criminal trial process raises... significant questions regarding the legitimacy of the international sentencing process exemplified by the ad hoc tribunals. Schabas has noted that the recent focus on prosecution and victims' rights and punishment in the international trial process has been at the expense of defendants' rights, and that a 'culture of conviction' appears to have replaced the 'the culture of acquittal' at the expense of fair trial norms. This reflection of the international community's emphasis on retributive punishment (rather than protection and deterrence) is clearly evidenced in the development of substantive and procedural norms.[50]

Henham adds that "providing rationality of purpose would forestall the tendency for international sentencing to be subverted towards

discriminatory procedural practice."[51]But what is the character of the rationality of purpose that should characterize the key issue of international law and universal justice?

Henham would say that this rationality of purpose should involve "protection and deterrence,"[52] and he is on the right track in his search for why it is absent. He argues that

> existing international criminal trial structure and procedural codes reflect a democratic deficit in the accountability of international institutions which not only hinders the prospects for the development of universal standards of international criminal sentencing process, but also undermines locally negotiated settlements. This deficit is manifest in the failure of international norms to account for discrete individual contexts and a concomitant failure to integrate international mechanisms and procedural standards providing the source of such norms (such as the ICC) with those of democratic (that is, state/non-state) governance. This structural weakness facilitates further the promotion of the international community's focus on retribution over utilitarian objectives, and the general obfuscation of trial process at the expense of defendants' and victims' rights.[53]

Henham concludes that this essential failure concerning the institutions of international legal institutions, including the ICC, consists in their identification of consistency and parity in the development of international principles based on articulated goals, such as the rationality of purpose he emphasizes, with legal formalism. This mainstream tendency in the discourse concerning universal or global justice amounts to an "analysis of mechanistic issues concerned with technical interpretation and deviation from norms which themselves exist as consolidations of current retributivist practice."[54] This obviously distorts the existing framework of universal criminal justice and underlies the attitudes that currently come forward when justified and well-founded "concerns regarding the relevance and impact of concepts such as proportionality, complementarity and amnesty are addressed without reference to the wider purposes and contexts of international sentencing."[55]

But what might such wider purposes be? In what should the broader context of international justice consist? Stated otherwise, how are protection and deterrence to be conceived of within the context of global justice? Moreover, do deterrence and protection represent the genuine core of universal justice and its penal implications?

Significant in this regard is Henham's conception of international sentencing as the source of interpretation and established practice that allows for the possibility that a linkage be constructed "between the

recognition of law as a representation of morality and the existence of forms of expressed morality in civil society which exist in notions of communitarianism."[56] Although Henham's specification of the notion of rational purpose does not ascend to the level of Kantian federalism upon a republican basis, it at least arrives at the notion of pluralism in terms of social meaningfulness. He states that

> the moral legitimacy of the international penal regime is constituted through its capacity to reflect socially meaningful (that is, pluralistic) conceptions of morally unacceptable behaviour. This in turn requires an acknowledgment that it is in the international sentencing *process* itself which provides for the transformative mechanism and supplies linkage between moral purpose, legal norms and social behaviour.[57]

Henham's communitarian social philosophy of international criminal law promotes an ideology of restorative justice[58] that "implies an approach to punishment which is tolerant of the diverse contexts of criminality and capable of accommodating and realizing its implications."[59] In the context of such stately words, however, the key word "tolerant" has rather condescending connotations. Indeed, Henham immediately eliminates any political implications that such communitarian tolerance might have for "the largely unfettered judicial discretions" of international criminal courts when he indicates that the latter should focus on resolving "the tensions between the rights of the accused and those of victims and victim communities which concern reparation and reconciliation."[60] He emphasizes that these fundamental issues remain unresolved even though the ideology of restorative justice appears in the wording of the instruments that establish the ICC. It is only in the sense of this socially understood communitarian interpretation of reparation and reconciliation that he subscribes to Morris' call for uniformity and consistency.[61] The same limited approach pertains to his reception of the republican utilitarian theory of criminal justice supported by Braithwaite and Pettit, who deal with a maximized notion of dominion in which "punishment should promote liberty and be applied only in circumstances where individuals have violated the rights of others."[62]

It is thus in respect to the social interpretation of the communitarian context that Henham attempts to develop the point of rational purpose concerning the international penal regime. He arrives, in general terms, at the rather promising and indeed rational conclusion that "it is necessary... to relate the justifications for punishment within a unitary paradigm which connects the global and local."[63] That is to say that Henham is critical of the rulings of international criminal tribunals insofar as they do not recognize the "relationship between legal reasoning and punishment" in terms of both legal formalism and sociology.[64]

Henham's contextual usage of the term sociology makes evident his reception of socially conceived communitarianism. Unfortunately, it is this socially limited framework that provides the true meaning of his otherwise hopeful and philosophically sound general conclusion, which may be stated as follows:

> Acknowledging the relativity of context and process also recognizes the plurality of legal interpretations and the temporal and cultural relativity of conventional accounts. Philosophical justifications provide the moral context for developing the normative potential of sentencing law through the process of discretionary decision-making. The legitimacy of process depends on the capacity of international sentencing to connect with pluralistic notions of morality within conflict societies, thereby investing internationalized punishment with a sense of moral security; a context of meaning rooted in communities. The recursivity of international process will also ensure that its sentencing jurisprudence develops exponentially the moral bases of law's authority and its reflection in punishment will widen and draw increasing attachment between global and local conceptions of truth and justice.[65]

There is a simple reason for why Henham's arguments and the above, rather feeble statement are worthy of discussion, namely, that they represent the prevailing mainstream intellectual views concerning a specific type of criticism of the present attempts to establish global justice. One substantial shortcoming of this highly popular type of approach is its selective and ostensibly non-political nature. Although it promotes rationality of purpose in order to prevent and deter gross violations of human rights on a global scale, it in fact focuses on the social or socio-cultural aspects of this crucial issue. It leaves completely untouched the complex issue of state sovereignty from the point of view of its republican legitimacy within the tradition that descends from Kant. Moreover, it conspicuously ignores Kant's philosophically grounded notion of republicanism as the necessary basis for a legitimate global federalism of free, independent, and politically sovereign states as a precondition of universal justice.

The academic and intellectual mainstream is thus indeed quite political in a negative fashion insofar as it implicitly replaces the Kantian precondition of pluralist republicanism with a judicial despotism that is to be implemented on as broad a scale as possible. It then seeks to justify the latter by means of a type of social legitimacy in terms of reparative justice that emphasizes the communitarian objectives of social justice.

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NOTES

[1] The *Rome Statute*, as the document establishing the International Criminal Court, came into force on 1 July 2002.

[2] "Preamble" of the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*. www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/estatute.htm, p. l.

[3] Ibid., p. 2.

[4] http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm.

[5] *Rome Statute*, p. 1.

[6] http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm, p. 2

[7] Ibid., p. 3.

[8] *Rome Statute*, pp. 1-2

[9] Heffe, O. (2002) *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*. Munich: C. H. Beck, pp. 373-375.

[10] Kant, I. (1984) *Zum ewigen Frieden*. Leipzig: Reclam. All quotations from the German are the author's translations.

[11] "...die Gesetze mit dem vergrιssertem Umfange der Regierung immer mehr an ihrem Nachdruck einbьssen, und ein seelenloser Despotismus, nachdem er die Keime des Guten ausgerottet hat, zuletzt doch in Anarchie verfallt." Ibid., p. 34.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

[14] Ibid., p. 35.

[15] Ibid.

[16] *J. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit mit Kants Rezensionen der „Ideen" und seiner Abhandlung Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht*. (1914) Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, passim.

[17] Ibid., p. 109.

[18] Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden*, p. 22.

[19] "...den Akt des allgemeinen Willens wodurch die Menge ein Volk wird." Ibid., p. 17.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[22] The original terms in Kant's text are "Federalism" and "Federalität." Ibid., pp. 19, 22.

[23] Ibid., p. 21.

[24] Ibid., p. 19.

[25] Ibid., p. 22.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., p. 33.

[29] Ibid., pp. 26-27.

[30] *Rome Statute*, p. 1.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] *Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Belgium*, International Criminal Court of Justice, 14 February 2002.

[34] Bourgon, St. (2003) "Judgments, Decisions and Other Relevant Materials Issued by International Courts and Other International Bodies on Human Rights." *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, No. 1, p. 245.

[35] Ibid., p. 246.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., p. 247. See also *Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Belgium*, note 1, Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, paragraph 61.

[39] Bourgon (2003), p. 246.

[40] *Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Belgium*, note 1, paragraphs 59-60 and 79-85.

[41] Ibid., paragraph 61.

[42] Mantovani, F. (2003) "The General Principles of International Criminal Law: The Viewpoint of a National Criminal Lawyer." *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, No. 1, p. 37.

[43] Ibid., p. 38.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Henham, R. (2003) "The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing." *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, No. 1, p. 72.

[46] Ibid., p. 75.

[47] Schabas, W. (2002) "Towards a Universal Criminal Justice System? Paper presented at the conference entitled "International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Practice and Prospects" held at Universiteit van Amsterdam, January 2002. Quoted in Henham (2003), p. 67.

[48] Henham (2003), p. 67.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[51] Ibid., p. 72.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid., p. 74.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid., p. 80.

[57] Ibid., note 82.

[58] Ibid., p. 80.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid., p. 81.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid., pp. 81-82.
[63] Ibid., p. 83.
[64] Ibid., p. 84.
[65] Ibid., pp. 84-85.

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CHAPTER XV

FAULT LINES WITHIN FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY AND BEYOND: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT

ANDREW BLASKO

The connection between Heidegger's political sentiments and position and his philosophy is an issue of singular importance. It is fair to say that the combination of a thinker of his stature – perhaps the most influential thinker of the 20th century – with a political movement that can be described as an incarnation of evil itself is without any known historical precedent. This begs examination, not least of all because of Western philosophy's persistent claim, ever since the time of Socrates, that philosophy has a necessary and intrinsic relevance to both personal virtue and the good society.

The link between Heidegger and Nazism has been known, at least in part, for many years. The main discussions of this connection began in France (relatively few writers in Germany have much to say on the subject), where Heidegger's thought has been in steady ascendancy ever since 1946 by virtue of his *Letter on Humanism* addressed to Jean Beaufret. The two earlier episodes of this discussion – during 1946-1948 in *Les Temps modernes* and in the mid-1960s in a number of publications culminating with François Fédier declaring himself to be the defender of the true faith – illustrate the four main strategies that have been taken in subsequent years.

The first such strategy turns on the thesis, originally advanced by Karl Löwith as early as 1939, that there is an intrinsic connection between Heidegger's thought and Nazism. The second is the contingency thesis put forward by Alphonse de Waelhens (and long defended by Fédier) that the connection between Heidegger and Nazism is merely and completely transitory. The third is a more learned from of the second, also articulated by de Waelhens, which emphasizes that only those who fully comprehend Heidegger's thought – the initiated, so to speak – are able to criticize him. The fourth and newest strategy, associated with Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and others, including Jacques Derrida, admits that there is an essential connection between the two, but maintains that those philosophers whose thinking is not bound to Heidegger's own are not able to grasp the full importance of the latter's philosophical position.

The "official" version, which is very flattering to Heidegger in light of the seriousness of the issues under discussion, includes the claims that there was no principled connection between Heidegger and National Socialism; that the connection, such as it was, was at most a short-lived

compromise; that Heidegger assumed the rectorate in Freiburg in order to defend the German university; that he severed links with the movement when he saw its true character and later criticized it in his writings; that he was never a racist; that he never abandoned disciplined philosophical investigation for the sake of a political goal. If this were an accurate description, Heidegger would have been at worst naive. But even so, how could such an undeniably great thinker turn to a social movement of the greatest evil as a means for the realization of his views concerning human existence, history, and the meaning of Being?

The basic position I will adopt in respect to the above question – and it will not be possible here to do more than suggest the general lines of only certain stages of the argumentation – is that Heidegger not only turned to Nazism on the basis of his philosophy, but that an important element in his later evolution was a continuing concern with what he viewed to be the true aims and essence of National Socialism. I do not wish to say that Heidegger's views conformed to the public face of Nazism. I do wish to say, however, that Heidegger's Nazism must be understood in terms of his philosophical thought, and his philosophy must be seen as not only reflecting its own social, political, historical, and philosophical background, but as dependent on it.[1] The position which I outline can be shown to be consistent with Heidegger's philosophy itself, especially in light of his fundamental ontology and the discussion of *Dasein* as presented in *Being and Time*. There he repeatedly stresses the primacy of existence over cognition and insists that theory is meaningful only in time within the framework of the practical dimension. In addition, the basic concerns of Heidegger's earlier thought that underlay his turning to Nazism remained consistent into his later writings, and his further development must be read against this background.

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As we begin to examine these points, the position of Karl Löwith, a former student and eventual colleague of Heidegger, merits some brief attention in respect to Heidegger's Nazism even though it is limited to the period dominated by *Being and Time*, including the *Rector's Address*. Löwith's observations are of interest not only because he considered Heidegger to be a friend and was thus not driven by malice, but also because he addresses virtually all of the main points that later come up for discussion concerning the view that there is an intrinsic connection between Heidegger's philosophy and Nazism.[2] It is also noteworthy that the statement Löwith was required to make to the French military authorities in 1945 – continuing to feel himself Heidegger's friend – provided the basis for their decision to confiscate Heidegger's property, deprive him of the right to teach, retire him from the university, and restrict his pension.[3] Löwith's relevant views may be summarized as follows: *Being and Time* puts forward, in the final analysis, a theory of historical existence. While the fundamental ontology developed in *Being and Time* does not

necessarily lead to National Socialism, it represents principles that can be seen as underlying Heidegger's turning to Nazism in order to realize the authentic existence of human being and show forth the meaning of Being. Primary among these principles which lead to political action, and especially to the turning to Nazism, is Heidegger's understanding of the question of Being in relation to human being, especially the issue of how the notion of the authentic existence of *Dasein* in time is intrinsically related to the concept of historicality.[4]

<center>* * *</center>

A few words need to be said about the concepts of authenticity and historicality in respect to human being. It is difficult to provide a brief summary of the concept of authenticity in particular, even though we seem to have a certain intuitive understanding of the opposition of the terms authentic and inauthentic in relation to our lives, not least of all because Heidegger's own discussion of authenticity, which draws upon that of Kierkegaard, is spread throughout much of the text of *Being and Time* and is one of its key concepts. We will then try to focus on only those aspects of authenticity which are most relevant for the present discussion, leaving aside the larger structure of the text.

Although Heidegger develops the notion of authenticity in respect to a number of basic traits of *Dasein*, such as disclosedness, thrownness, projection, and falling,[5] perhaps the most important issue in respect to Heidegger's political turning is that his aim is clearly not to leave us with a speculative or contemplative view of human nature. The phenomenological description of authenticity as a possibility of *Dasein* is not a merely abstract consideration, for authenticity is a question of *Dasein* choosing to be what it is in its own being. It is a matter of concrete existence in the practical world of things, not a matter of philosophical knowledge or cognition in some more general sense.

Authenticity may be spoken of as a conception of self-realization through the choice of oneself.[6] As Heidegger's says, "*The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence*," or in its possibility to choose itself.[7] When *Dasein* determines itself as an essence, it does so in the light of a possibility which it itself is, and which in some sense it already understands.[8] Moreover, since the essence of *Dasein* can be spoken of as lying in the future or as a possibility, the issue is whether *Dasein* will choose to be its essence not only in the here and now, but tomorrow as well, so to speak.[9] This is a choice which always faces *Dasein*, from which it can never escape, for Being is always the concern for *Dasein* through its concern for its own being. And it is clearly a matter of choice. *Dasein* must decide whether or not to realize what it is and take up the possibility of its own being, that is, whether or not to "win" itself or "lose" itself.[10] The issue to be decided is, in fact, whether or not *Dasein* will choose to be what it is: Will human being choose to exist as an authentic person?[11]

Authenticity thus has a practical role in respect to *Dasein*'s existence. It is forward looking and projects a sense of "what must be done." Heidegger's eventual detailed examination of the beginning of Greek thought is not done for the purpose of looking back into history. On the contrary, we look back to the beginning so that we can retrieve that beginning, rethink that beginning, and retrieve the meaning of Being in Time as we move into the future. Grasping the authentic meaning of the essence of human being is to "prepare the way" for a transformation of human being from its current state of fallenness into existence in the true sense of the term.

Authenticity thus has a political role as well, politics being understood in a larger philosophical sense.[12] The central role of authenticity in Heidegger's fundamental ontology draws him to politics in that *Dasein*'s essence can be realized only in time and in community, issues which are made more explicit in his discussion of historicality in respect to *Dasein*. But Heidegger's concern lies far from the realization of Dasein's essence for its own sake. His concern rather lies with the realization of Dasein in order that the meaning of Being may be thought. Political activity becomes the order of the day in 1933 because favorable political circumstances promise, first, an end to the despair and fallenness of the German people and, second, the creation of an authentic community in which the meaning of Being can be thought.[13]

It is significant that Heidegger provides no concrete criteria for determining authenticity. As he has moved beyond traditional European Christian philosophy into the world of radical fundamental ontology,[14] so has he left behind any possible discussion of values and standards insofar as they represent mere metaphysical concerns.

For any further indication of what Heidegger has in mind concerning the relation of ontology to politics, particularly revealing is the famous discussion of historicality in *Being and Time*, section 74, "The Basic Constitution of Historicality," which we will now briefly consider.[15] An important issue in this section is the resoluteness of Dasein, whereby Dasein discloses its possibilities for authentic existence "*in terms of the heritage* which that resoluteness, as thrown, *takes over*."[16] The possibilities for authenticity are handed down to human being, within the very turning back to itself, from the heritage in which one lives. The good for human being, the possibility for authentic existence, is given only through the tradition in which one lives. This is the fate of Dasein.[17]

The fate of human being as Being-in-the-world, which exists "essentially as Being-with-others," is a co-historizing as destiny, which is the historizing "of a people." Stated otherwise, the fate of Dasein is that its full authentic existence is given as possible only within the destiny of its people.[18] The Dasein that has-been-there hands down possibilities for authentic existence that are to be realized in the repetition of that which is given by a tradition. It is thus within the explicit repetition of a particular, given tradition that Dasein finds the possibility for its authentic existence.

Dasein inherits the possibility of authentic existence, which appears to it as its historical fate, from Dasein that has-been-there.[19]

The notion of the authentic existence of human being cannot be separated from the notion of historicality in that the question of Being only arises in Time through a Dasein existing in community. There is no authentic existence possible for Dasein outside of the history and heritage of a given community. Self-realization is necessarily living within a heritage, and to exist authentically is to carry forward a tradition – "my" tradition or the tradition of "my" people. To resolutely seize the most intimate possibility to be myself in authenticity necessarily means to extend the past tradition of my people and to seize their historical destiny.[20]

The repetition of tradition as a mode of resoluteness is the mode in which Dasein exists explicitly as fate, and this fate is the authentic historizing of the future, which appears in a moment of vision. This is also the ground for destiny, which is how fundamental ontology understands Being-with-others.[21]

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It would be useful at this point to speak at length both about the general situation in Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s, and about developments in Heidegger's personal political stance at that time. However, the difficult and even tragic combination of hope, political weakness, economic crisis, social malaise, and collapse into Nazi rule which the Weimar Republic represented is well enough known for purposes of the present discussion.[22] And it suffices to note that there can be no doubt on the basis of the record that Heidegger's political views reflected the social atmosphere current in the last years of the Weimar Republic's decline and the strongly conservative political tendencies of the day. Indeed, within the context of the perilous situation facing the German people in the waning years of the Weimar Republic, it is not difficult to read the question of Dasein's possibility for authenticity in a moment of great need as reflecting the in many ways dreadful conditions in which *Being and Time* was conceived and written. It can thereby be seen to comprise an important precipitating factor in Heidegger's turning to Nazism.

For example, Heidegger was opposed to the Bolshevik-led developments in Russia and sought an alternative to them. He was also sympathetic to desires for, among other issues, the return of German greatness, the rectification of the weakness of the German government, and finding a "cure" for the degradation of German society. A sense that something needed to be done to save the situation had come to be felt throughout German society, and the university community was no exception. Not only was Heidegger not unique among intellectuals and philosophers in respect to his views, but he was apparently more or less typical of a rather large number of university professors who shared the conservative political tendencies prevalent after World War I.[23] What is unique, however, is that a philosopher of his great importance became

involved in the National Socialist movement in an effort to attain the political aims he shared with others.

Perhaps key to understanding Heidegger's turn to National Socialism is that he did so precisely as a philosopher, viewing Nazism as an opportunity to call the German people back to the thought of Being. This stance should be viewed against the background of the European philosophical tradition, which claims that philosophers have a unique role in society by the very fact of being philosophers. Stated otherwise, this tradition concerning the social role of philosophy claims that philosophy as a discipline is uniquely capable of producing an insight into reality which is a necessary condition for the good life. The claim is that the good life is not possible without philosophy, and that philosophers alone are capable of leading human beings forward in the attainment of the good life.[24] This is one of the basic pillars uniting European philosophy with politics.

It must be noted that *Being and Time* is not political in the sense of texts that present specific political systems or prescriptions. It rather is political in a much more basic sense, namely, it brings to attention fundamental concerns of existence that must be addressed and fundamental problems that must be rectified in order to "decide what becomes of the earth and of the existence of man on this earth."[25] Indeed, fundamental ontology is intrinsically political in the sense that it seeks to demonstrate how and why authentic existence is the good for man. Man must exist authentically, listening to the call of Being, if he is to exist to the fullness of his being. That is to say that concern with the question of Being is indispensable to the realization of human good. *Being and Time* is thus political in the sense that Plato or, better yet, Aristotle uses the term.

Perhaps the best example of this approach is the *Nichomachean Ethics*, in which Aristotle presents politics as representing the pursuit of good for its own sake as the end of all human action. From this perspective, that which is good for man is the aim of politics in the truest sense of the term, and *Being and Time* has political implications precisely because its main thrust is to demonstrate how human beings can and ought to exist in the fullness of their being precisely as human being. The problem of Being is thus no mere speculative affair since one of the primary goals of fundamental ontology is to bring to light how human being "may be itself, or not be itself."[26] We are not to dawdle in some Hamlet-like fashion before the possibility of authentic existence, but rather must realize our essence as human beings by existing in the light of Being. Fundamental ontology demands that we do so.

Fundamental ontology is thereby intrinsically political not only in the sense that it seeks to demonstrate how and why authentic existence is the good for man, but it also seeks the realization of that good. It is true that Heidegger's interest in human being in *Being and Time* is restricted to showing how it may provide access to Being. However, he develops this interest in a way that is intended to demonstrate that human being must both seek and have access to Being in order to exist authentically ("to be

what it is"). This is decidedly not a passive posture in respect to human being for the sake of a speculative grasp of the meaning of Being.

And, when coupled with Heidegger's conceptions of plural authenticity and historicality as they are presented in *Being and Time*, this not only comprises a call to a way of living in the light of Being, it specifies that authentic existence can occur only in a community in history within a given heritage, for Being reveals itself only in time and not to isolated, ahistorical individuals.

Heidegger turned to Nazism in order to realize German authenticity. His resigning the rectorate at Freiburg University and the subsequent turning in his thought means only that he had come to the judgment that the actual leadership of the National Socialist movement was ill-adapted to the task of retrieving the meaning of Being. Heidegger abandoned neither the aim of German authenticity, nor the conviction that philosophy had a privileged role in leading the Germans to that end. On the contrary, Heidegger held fast to his obsession with thinking Being, his concern with the realization of the historical essence and destiny of the German people, and the insistence that his thought was a key to attaining these goals.[27]

Heidegger's fundamental ontology drew him to politics in the deepest philosophical sense of the term, and he remained loyal to his political concern with the fate of the German people throughout the subsequent years of his life.

* * *

In *Being and Time* Heidegger still holds to the idea that an existential analytic of *Dasein* is necessary to have access to Being. He has not yet "turned" in his thinking such that he attempts to think Being without human being. That is to say that Heidegger has not yet "turned" in his thinking such that he supposedly does not need to be concerned with human being in order to think the meaning of Being.

However, Heidegger's political turning is not a consequence of his existential analytic of *Dasein*, which even in the earlier period of his thought is not his primary object of concern. It is his underlying concern with the meaning of Being that leads Heidegger to politics, as well as to the existential analytic of *Dasein*. And as his concern with Being persisted after the so-called turning in his thought, so too did his concern with the political aims that he understood to be the true aims of National Socialism even after he moved beyond the existential analytic of *Dasein*. Even after he turned away from the question of *Dasein*, he maintained a political commitment to Nazism, which he understood in some ideal form as a way to think the meaning of Being.

There is a progression of ideas in this respect which can be roughly summarized as follows: 1) the problem of Being demands the authentic existence of *Dasein* in time; 2) the authentic existence of *Dasein* requires the realization of a heritage or tradition; 3) the realization of a heritage is in

fact the realization of the essence, or destiny, of the German people; 4) the realization of the essence of the German people – now unrealized, with the German people existing inauthentically – can now take place through National Socialism, which has inherited the promise of the history and tradition that is Germany; 5) Nazism must be led by the genuine thinking of Being, now represented by the philosopher (in the person of Heidegger); 6) philosophy and totalitarian politics, hand-in-hand, are to lead the German people forward in the realization of their historical essence and destiny so that the meaning of Being can be made manifest.

* * *

Why was Heidegger's turning to National Socialism not successful? In respect to Heidegger, this issue is not to be discussed in terms of the actual policies of the National Socialist government led by Hitler and the S.S., for it is instead a question of metaphysics. It is supposedly to be examined in terms of Heidegger's discussion concerning the withdrawal of Being.[28]

Heidegger appears not to have regretted his commitment to Nazism for purposes of 1) realizing the essence of the German people and 2) retrieving the meaning of Being. Heidegger's adherence to Nazism obviously did not lead to the desired results, but within the context of ontology this was not due to the failure of National Socialism itself. It was rather the particular leadership that finally became dominant who failed the National Socialist movement. And since Heidegger's commitment was based on metaphysics, he could say that the leadership failed the movement because of the withdrawal of Being. History consists of the actions or events of Being, which conceals itself as it reveals itself.[29] After 1935, Heidegger apparently came to be ever more convinced that we live in an age dominated by the withdrawal of Being, a condition best expressed by Nietzsche's conceptions of the death of God and the Will to Power. It was the fact of the withdrawal of Being which underlay the failure to retrieve the meaning of Being through the (still as yet unrealized) essence and destiny of the German people.

The fate, essence, and destiny of the German people were to have been realized by the historical promise of the National Socialist movement. Historical circumstances had begun to bring together the German people such that their essence would be retrieved in authentic existence at a new stage in history. This possibility was rooted in the heritage that was Germany, and it was reflected in the National Socialist movement. However, Being withdrew and remain concealed, the Nazi leadership did not begin to think the meaning of Being, even with the so-called aid of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, and the German people did not succeed in retrieving their essence at that given juncture in history. But the aims that were to have been attained through Nazism remained of the utmost concern, and the promise of an authentic Nazism remained rooted in the destiny of the German people.

Against the background of the events of the time, it seems likely that Heidegger's deeper concern with the withdrawal of Being – with the movement of the revealing of Being as a concealing withdrawal – is a reflection of the failure of National Socialism to realize the essence of the German people and think the meaning of Being. The "turning" in Heidegger's thought, with its increased emphasis on the withdrawal of Being and the historical dominance of technological thinking in respect to the metaphysical tradition, would then be one result of a reflection on how and why the promise of the historical moment, as an inheritance of the promise of the German heritage and destiny for the authentic existence of the German people, was in fact not realized.

<center>* * *</center>

We have indicated certain issues in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, as it was presented in *Being and Time*, which provided a philosophical underpinning for his turn to National Socialist politics. These center on the theory of Being in relation to the authentic existence of *Dasein* and historicality. It is now necessary to indicate in what respect there is a philosophical continuity on issues relevant to Heidegger's philosophical views between the period dominated by *Being and Time* and the period after the "turning." Once again, because of the complexity of the issues involved and the copious number of both primary and secondary sources, we can now only suggest how a fully developed line of argumentation might be developed.

For the sake of brevity, we will now consider only certain relevant passages in the *Contributions to Philosophy* (*From Enowning*), written in 1936-38 and first published in 1989.[30] This text is arguably the most important work of Heidegger's later period that has been published to date.

The main issues in *Contributions* in respect to Heidegger's political views are that he maintains the political role of his thought of Being, and that he continues to be concerned with the destiny of the Germans as Germans, although the latter is now clearly subservient to the former. This is against the more practical background of having abandoned transcendental phenomenology, along with the attempt to further his career through National Socialism by serving as the Rector of Freiburg University in a philosopher-king-like fashion. He no longer proposes that National Socialism be grounded in fundamental ontology, and he no longer offers his philosophy to the "movement" in order to provide guidance to the leaders.

But Heidegger does continue to insist that his thought can serve to realize the destiny of the German people, at least indirectly, not least of all by having uncovered the prophetic role of German poetry. Stated otherwise, philosophy is no longer put forward as the sole means by which the German people will realize their essence and destiny, but it continues to be viewed as an important means to this end. Philosophy is at the very least necessary to grasp the historical deformity of human being as it is epitomized by the legacy of metaphysics, the death of God, the Will to Power, and

technological thought. Philosophy also serves as a means by which other useful, and even necessary, means for thinking Being are to be identified and clarified. For example, it was by examining the legacy of metaphysics, especially through a reading of Nietzsche (whom, Heidegger argues, was poorly understood by the Nazis), and encountering the limitations of fundamental ontology for leading social change, in particular through the failure of the Nazi leadership to accept its guidance, that Heidegger was convinced that a more original beginning had to be sought. Heidegger now begins speaking in terms of the grounding of *Dasein*, and he indicates that there are ways to it other than philosophy, such as poetry and thinking, along with (most curiously, in a period when war was approaching) deed and sacrifice.[31] However, the end remains the same, namely, retrieving the meaning of Being, and grasping the historical destiny of the German people remains a means for doing so.

One of the more obvious (if this word can be used in reference to *Contributions*) threads binding together Heidegger's politics before and after the turning in his thought is his concern with *das Volk*, with the Germans as Germans. An important difference in contrast to his earlier work is that this concern is not now an end in itself, but rather a way to ground Being.[32]

And while there are a number of passages scattered throughout *Contributions* of more or less oblique criticism of *Volk* ideology as representative of various aspects of metaphysical thinking,[33] it becomes clear that what Heidegger has in mind here is a metaphysical form of *Volk* that amounts to what he terms "Platonism for the people."[34] He is perhaps referring to how *Volk* ideology was restricted to a mere worldview by the National Socialism leadership instead of having its true meaning retrieved within the framework of fundamental ontology. But, significantly, he goes on to speak of how the crude Nazi form of *Volk* ideology can be overcome such that man is "allotted an unambiguous place," a return is made to a first beginning, and we are led to an "historical decision of the widest dimension."[35]

The first presentations of these qualifications are made in a rather Platonic spirit.[36] Heidegger speaks, in a rather unsystematic fashion, of how the "last ones," the "mace bearers of the truth of be-ing,"[37] will usher in the end of the age of metaphysics. As Heidegger leaves behind his fundamental ontology, it seems clear that he is saying that we must look in some new direction to see the light of Being and listen to new voices.

Most interesting in this respect, however, are the consequences that his new way of philosophical questioning will have for the lesser mortals who live next to the "ones to come," for "today there are already a few of those who are to come." And these consequences include nothing less than the retrieval of the authentic existence of the people. Through the "ones to come," the people will realize their "ownmost" and *Da-sein* will be grounded in truth. The decision that must be made in order that this event come to pass is not merely a "moral-anthropological" decision, but rather

has a "space-time" essence and takes place in history.[38] The knowledge of those who truly know begins in actual historical knowledge, for it is a knowing that is aware of the occurrence that history is actually building.[39] This line of discussion may be taken as a restatement of the view, first put forward in detailed fashion in *Being and Time*, that authentic existence takes place in a community, and that the authentic existence of that community, through the realization of its historical destiny, realizes the meaning of Being. While there is here a change in emphasis insofar as the authentic existence of the *Volk* is not an end in itself, but only a means for realization the meaning of Being, nevertheless, concern for the fate of *Dasein* and for the destiny of the German people remains founded in the theory of Being itself.

Heidegger writes that Germany in the late 1930s is still at the beginning of this movement.[40] The people have yet to realize the meaning of their history; they have yet to exist authentically and realize their destiny in greatness.[41] The focus now comes to reside on the need to realize authentically the essence of the *Volk* after the end of the age of metaphysics, for the historical moment that presented itself in 1933 as a possibility to realize the destiny of the people has not succeeded in thinking the true meaning of Being. Those who followed this historical moment have remained only at the level of worldview and have not retrieved their essence as grounded in truth.

The authentic existence of the people, as *Dasein* seizes its fate and the people seize their destiny, will come about as they hear the voices of those few who are listening to the voice of Being, whose poet is Hölderlin, speaking across time from the future of the German people.[42]

These few initial observations concerning *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* should be sufficient to indicate that all comments concerning a turn in Heidegger's thought such that he broke completely with the political and national concerns of 1933-1934 should be subject to the most careful examination.

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The renowned "turning" in Heidegger's thought in fact lays no basis for any consideration that the later evolution of his thought led him to criticize Nazism in any significant way. Quite on the contrary, there is an obvious continuity in his thought and the turning amounts to a deepening of Heidegger's theory through the introduction of a new beginning beyond the original beginning. Moreover, there are certain important elements in Heidegger's thought which remain constant even as it continues to develop, elements which are crucial for an understanding of the link between his thinking and his Nazism. Perhaps the most important of these is the idea of the German *Volk* as an authentic community. While Heidegger apparently took this over from the popular German *Volk* ideology, he provided it with a philosophical foundation in *Being and Time* through his conception of plural authenticity.[43] Another such issue concerns the view, first clearly

stated in 1933 in the rectoral address, that philosophy (later "thinking") possesses a cognitive superiority whereby it alone is worthy to lead society forward into the new future.

These two views come together and mutually support each other through Heidegger's efforts to overcome metaphysics taken as an inauthentic form of ontology. The authentic thought of Being requires authentic existence, conceived as the acceptance of one's being as defined by the concern with Being. But since the only metaphysical people are the German people, German *Volksideologie* becomes merged with the concern for the thought of Being which defines Heidegger's thought throughout his career. Even after the abandonment of fundamental ontology, Heidegger's theory of Being can only be realized by an authentic subject who lives in an authentic community, and the only example of a possible authentic community he ever provided was the German people.[44] Furthermore, only those who, like Heidegger, give themselves over to the thought of Being are capable of showing the way forward into that authentic community.

In addition, the idea that the *Letter on Humanism* somehow indicates a fundamental break in Heidegger's thought, which Heidegger himself suggested for various reasons,[45] is fictitious.[46] For example, the paramount issue continues to be the history of Being, not the lives and histories of human beings; we must be concerned solely with the history of Being.[47] And this issue has such ontological status that no "metaphysical" approach, such as history or ethics, is capable of grasping it. Such disciplines, which extend over the entire European humanistic tradition, miss the point of thinking, and thereby miss the point of existence itself.[48] This latter point is seen as carrying such weight that Munier, the editor and translator of the standard French version of the text, declares that not only is it superficial to try to derive any moral sense from *Being and Time*, the "thought of Being" should be spoken of as "against humanism" in any usual sense of the term.[49] Heidegger himself declares that "Humanism" has in fact lost its meaning,[50] so much so that he rhetorically asks whether it is really necessary to preserve it at all.[51]

Perhaps the most upsetting aspect of this type of discussion concerns not the issue of European humanism itself, which surely is not above critical examination, but rather what appears to be a lack of concern with human well-being and suffering within months of one of the most horrifying periods in modern European history. The tenor of the discussion, with its obvious rhetorical character, seems to mock what Taylor has referred to as the moral imperative associated with, for example, Bacon's articulation of the new science, namely, How does such an approach make human life better?[52] The impression is certainly made that Heidegger's thought has no concern with the lives of human beings.

There is no reason on the face of it that we should not listen to the call of Being as it develops itself in Time. But is there any good reason why we should not pay heed to the disclosure/concealment of Being without paying due respect to what we might call the common good, especially in

an age of totalitarianism, after one of the most evil episodes in recorded human history? If "humanism" in some sense refers to the "human sciences," then does not even a rhetorical attack on humanism amount to an attack on all those disciplines that are traditionally held to be concerned with the events in human existence, both the problems and the achievements, with the aim of understanding human life so that it can be made better? Regardless of Heidegger's intent to focus on deeper, more fundamental issues in order to retrieve the truth of existence, it is difficult not to view his discussion of his own thought in the terms of anti-humanism as amounting to an attack on the traditional means that have long been used by human beings in order to understand themselves and their own communities in a more adequate fashion and thereby move forward in some sense.

And what possible lack of sensitivity and insight could drive Heidegger to do so in 1946, not least of all in the German language? Is it not justifiable to suspect that it was his thought which led him to express such disregard for those mere mortals who do not survey human being from the heights of authentic thinking, such as Heidegger, perhaps alone among philosophers, is capable of doing? Might we in turn not rhetorically state that while Heidegger's thought indeed displays fundamentalism in respect to ontology, it may perhaps also display fundamentalism in relation to politics in the more pejorative sense in which it has come to be used today in ordinary speech?[53]

Such considerations raise the suspicion that there is a fundamental flaw in Heidegger's thought, however great it might otherwise be, a flaw that is revealed in the very choice of rhetorical language used in his claim that the authentic thinking of Being is an anti-humanism. This may be particularly true of Heidegger's philosophy after the supposed "turning" insofar as his thought becomes, by virtue of the "turning," ever more firmly rooted in an anti-humanistic subordination of human being to Being. Heidegger himself practiced such subordination to Being throughout his career after his first philosophical turning to radical phenomenology in the form of fundamental ontology.[54] Moreover, Heidegger's understanding of the question of Being required him to reject any philosophical consideration of values as in principle incompatible with genuine thinking, limited as such thinking must be to the contemplation of Being. In Heidegger's understanding, any concept of values is thoroughly metaphysical in nature and falls below the level needed to attain a genuine thinking of Being. Heidegger's approach to philosophy thereby appears to lack the conceptual resources necessary to both discuss and comprehend human being and human values, along with the human suffering that arises from the exercise of evil. His limitation of philosophy to a preoccupation with the problem of Being renders his thought conceptually unable to understand the values and concerns of human life, not least of all the pressing social and political concerns that were brought about by the effort of certain people to "think

Being" within the framework of National Socialism, even if only in some ideal form.[55]

Perhaps it is more than ironic that Heidegger puts forth the notion that Being conceals itself as it reveals itself. What I mean to suggest is that the way taken by his own thought of Being, beginning with *Being and Time* and continued into his later works, blinded him to the reality of Nazism as it surrounded him and prevented him from ever coming to terms in any meaningful way with his own involvement with National Socialism. The only criticism which he ever directed towards Nazism, such as can be found in his Nietzsche lectures or in the *Contributions to Philosophy*, is restricted to statements describing it as an inadequate, metaphysical thought of Being. Is that indeed all that one of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century can find to say, on the basis of his thought, about the National Socialist period in the history of his own people, that it did not attain a genuine thinking of the meaning of Being?

In consequence, might it not be said with some justification that, if we assume the Socratic position that the function of philosophy is to examine life, then Heidegger's thought fails the test? Not only does it reduce human life to a secondary theme that is to be sacrificed for a deeper concern, it apparently failed to grasp the most pressing concerns of the day for the nation whose destiny was supposedly to realize the meaning of Being.[56]

A POSSIBLE CRITIQUE: HAS FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY FORGOTTEN ITS ORIGINS IN RELIGION?

It is a fact that Heidegger's thought has had a great effect on contemporary theology and religious thinking. Perhaps this can provide us with a hint as to where we might look in order to identify those areas in his thought which give rise to troubling political considerations, even if we can do no more here than raise certain general doubts and suspicions about important underlying issues.

I mean to propose that if we view certain basic issues in Heidegger's thought as arising against a theological background, not least of all in light of his own scholarly background and preparation in medieval Christian philosophy, we may view fundamental ontology, at least in part, as an effort to translate basic concerns of Christian philosophy and theology into new terminology and new concepts.[57] But what would we accomplish by doing so?

We would then have the motivation to consider fundamental ontology as a type of thinking which longs for the Divine, and which needs the Divine in order to be fulfilled, but which has been deprived of its necessary religious foundation by virtue of an eventual philosophical turning that left human values behind. We would then be able to consider Heidegger as a concealed religious thinker whose thought perhaps conceals from sight that which is most significant, just as Being conceals itself even

as it reveals itself. We could then investigate whether the conceptual structure of Heidegger's thought has in fact been carried far enough in the sense that it has not fully retrieved its own origins, lacking the conceptual apparatus necessary to find the more original source which it seeks. We could ask whether Heidegger has forgotten where the origins of his own thought lie, even as it has set off to find a truly first beginning. Is his thought still able to imagine and recollect from where it has truly come?

There are those who would point to Aristotle and then to the earlier Greeks as primary sources of inspiration for Heidegger, and they would seem to be right, with apparent support from Heidegger's own publications. But Heidegger became a Greek, so to speak, by first becoming a Christian. His first entry into the world of Greek thinking came through the world of Christian Aristotelianism as it existed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[58] Heidegger's seminary preparation made him a citizen of the world of Thomistic theology and philosophy, his close study of Duns Scotus in his Ph.D. dissertation made him a citizen of distinction, and even his entrance into phenomenology came by way of the phenomenology of religion.[59] His close and direct study of Aristotle himself begun in 1921, under whose influence he grasped that Being is presence, in fact came about from a need to address the poor theological preparation of his students.[60]

Moreover, Heidegger's first paradigm for his phenomenological research was religious experience – and it was his own religious experience that was under examination. He turned to the spirit of the first Christian communities in order to find a way beyond the dogmatized words of the Scholastics into a more profound sense of religious faith. He sought to examine the nature of religious belief and practice in light of the fact that it could not be uprooted from the communities and the traditions in which it emerged and grew. He came to the realization that the living spirit of Christian faith could only be grasped through the heritage in which it had come to life and matured.

But it was the ontic reality of his own Christian facticity that gave rise to the questioning concerning the meaning of a more fundamental existence. Heidegger's thought was decidedly not divorced from the concrete concerns of a particular religious being within a given tradition, but was rather an encounter with his own most heartfelt concerns.

This issue should not be taken lightly. It is well documented that Heidegger was deeply concerned with religious thought and practice, on both personal and professional levels, throughout the period in which the basic lines of the future development of his thought were taking shape. Kisiel, for example, describes how Heidegger's commitment with rejuvenating a Christian theology that had become rigid in its dogmatic expression was one of his most serious concerns during the war years.[61] Heidegger had in fact anticipated for several years being named to the chair of Christian philosophy at Freiburg and was shocked when this had not happened after having prepared his habilitation work.[62] Perhaps more significantly, he became a "question to himself," an issue we cannot help

but associate with later discussions of *Dasein*, through biblical studies, and he even taught a course on the dynamics of "becoming a Christian," drawing inspiration from St. Paul and St. Augustine, as late as 1921, well after his turn to phenomenology.[63]

These points, merely sketched out as they are, which do no more than show a possible way to study the genesis of Heidegger's mature thought, can here only pique our curiosity, raising our suspicions, as it were, about the fuller significance of certain statements and ideas. And there is no doubt that Heidegger underwent a genuine philosophical turning in the early 1920s which transformed him from a competent specialist in theology and Christian thought into a revolutionary thinker with one of the most unique and powerful philosophical voices in our times. However, I would still maintain that it is Christian thinking which had at least as great an influence as Greek sources upon Heidegger by virtue of it being an early and continuing source of inspiration through some of the most important periods in his career as a thinker and writer, even into his revolutionary turning. I would suggest, for purposes of discussion, that important elements of Heidegger's thought can be opened up to significant criticism insofar as they may be viewed as philosophical translations, or developments, of truths that he had first learned elsewhere.

This in itself is, of course, a fairly commonplace notion. However, it calls forth a great problem that Heidegger was not the first to encounter: Can religious thought, myth, or teaching in fact be adequately and fully translated into rational or secular terms? If not, does fundamental ontology then suffer from having been "deprived" of its religious roots, thereby losing something essential and necessary in the process? If so, what are the consequences for the project of fundamental ontology that Heidegger's thinking has undergone such a deprivation?

Within the context of the present discussion, the question comes down to this: Are certain "control mechanisms" missing from fundamental ontology? Does fundamental ontology thereby distort the sense of authentic community necessary for the authentic existence of *Dasein* and transform what should have been the gift of grace into the "destiny" of a people?

Was Heidegger's thought deprived of an appropriate religious foundation to the extent that it came to look to the wrong source as the source of good? Did it thereby take the call of the German tradition as the voice of Being when it should have taken heed of the call of faith as revealing the need for a type of spiritual renewal that would be meaningless if not shared with other people? Did a deprivation of religious commitment lead a great thinker to put his faith in the destiny of a people rather than in spiritual redemption? Did fundamental ontology in effect, at least to a degree, amount to an effort to transform a "more primitive" religious reflection into sophisticated ontology, thereby losing in the process a certain mollifying influence necessary to control an arrogance inherent in secularized rationality? Is Heidegger's thinking a prime example in our

time of a rational superstructure that has forgotten its roots in faith (or even in myth)?[64]

Stated otherwise, I propose for consideration that the language and concepts of Heidegger's thinking of Being lack the means necessary to control a misplaced faith in the historical destiny of a people, a faith which is buttressed by a certain sense of self-importance exhibited by philosophical thinking whenever it presumes that it is uniquely necessary for the good life. This, in fact, leads to a tendency whereby fundamental thinking would become closed to – perhaps not even allow – an openness to those others who might be considered strangers.

Fundamental ontology in fact has a strain within itself, whether it arises from a faith without God or a faith in the king anointed by philosophy, whereby it functions as a type of "missionary ontology" that disregards the voices to which those from other traditions listen. When authenticity is no longer a state of grace but the destiny of a people, and when it is then coupled with an historicality that calls for the realization of the destiny of *my* people, there is a strong temptation to listen to only what Being speaks in the language and voice of my people.

Sadly, there seems to be no standard within Heidegger's theory of Being by which to define who "my people" are and where "my destiny" lies. It apparently does not contain the means for me to be open to the possibility that strangers, who are not my people and have another voice, may share a common destiny with me. With what basis am I left, other than my parochialism, other than my "homeland," upon which to decide where the border lies between those whose *ethnos* carries the meaning of Being and those whose destiny does not?

Heidegger's theory calls me to give myself to the destiny of my people, but it does not tell me that my destiny is tied to the destiny of strangers. Indeed, it even excludes the possibility that those who are not "my people" have a destiny to exist authentically since it does not tell me that *strangers*, that other people, *are "my people," too*. The sense of *Dasein* that has-been-there is restricted to the heritage of a given people. It is not extended to other peoples, and it apparently does not include relations between peoples. It is squarely focused on one particular people, and the focus is apparently never shifted away from this point. This is as true of the discussion in *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* and various texts published in the 1940s, 1950s, and later, as it is true of *Being and Time*. We are not called to think globally, but are rather only shown the way to think in terms of "my own."

Heidegger's thinking speaks only in the language of *my* people, as if exhibiting an inherited selfishness without the sense that sin is possible. But did Heidegger himself not say in the (notorious) *Der Spiegel* interview, so carefully crafted to direct attention to his work after his death in carefully chosen way, that "only a god can save us"?

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NOTES

[1] See Rockmore 1992, p. 5.

[2] The primary reference here is Löwith's 1946 article in *Les Temps modernes*, "Les implications politiques de la philosophie de l'existence chez Martin Heidegger."

[3] This initial decision was later mollified some years later, resulting in restoration of the right to teach, which Heidegger eventually resumed doing on a less than full time basis.

[4] Rockmore 1992, p. 42.

[5] *Being and Time*, paragraph 44, provides a detailed discussion of these traits within the context of *Dasein*'s existence in the truth. There is a useful summary on p. 264.

[6] Rockmore 1992, p. 44.

[7] *Being and Time*, paragraph 9, p. 67. Heidegger's emphasis.

[8] Ibid., p. 69.

[9] Ibid., p. 67.

[10] Ibid., p. 68.

[11] Rockmore 1992, p. 45.

[12] This point will be examined below.

[13] At this point we can only note that there are direct connections between the concept of authenticity and the discussion of alienation in the Marxist tradition. For example, no less a figure than Lukács comments in the "Introduction" to the 1971 edition of *History and Class Consciousness* on the fact that Lucien Goldman understood *Being and Time* to be in part a polemical response to the original edition of Lukács' book, with specific relevance to the Hegelian inspired discussion of alienation. See Lukács 1971, p. xxii.

[14] See the discussion below in the concluding section, "A Possible Critique: Has Fundamental Ontology Forgotten its Origins in Religion?"

[15] See Heidegger 1962, pp. 434-439.

[16] Ibid., p. 435. Heidegger's emphasis.

[17] Ibid., p. 436.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., p. 437.

[20] Ibid., pp. 437-438.

[21] Ibid.

[22] A great deal of detailed information concerning this period, with an eventual relevance to a philosophical examination of Heidegger's political turning, can be found in Rockmore 1992, Farias 1987, and Ott 1988. These sources also contain abundant bibliographical information.

[23] Rockmore 1992, pp. 31-35, provides a good summary of the social and political tensions of this period in Germany history as they relate to Heidegger in particular.

[24] Even without investigating what specific philosophers have written and done in this vein, the very least that can be said is that this

general view lends itself to an anti-democratic conception of political life and political action.

[25] See Heidegger 1957, pp. 210-211. Within the context of the present discussion, it is worth noting that Heidegger wrote these words thirty years after the publication of *Being and Time*. Heidegger obviously never abandoned practical political concerns which were basic to his earlier period and underlay his turning to National Socialism. See also Rockmore 1992, p. 41, for discussion of this aspect of Heidegger's thought, which remains a constant concern throughout the body of works beginning with *Being and Time*.

[26] See *Being and Time*, section 4, p. 33.

[27] See Rockmore 1992, pp. 120-121 for a further discussion of these issues.

[28] Many of the themes associated with these topics are developed in Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures after 1935. The most relevant publication is *Nietzsche* 1961, but various articles appear in other publications as well.

[29] See George 1999, p. 224: "*Dasein*'s experience of the world is in fact his experience of Being. The world history experienced by *Dasein* is the history of Being."

[30] We here follow various of Rockmore's (1992) general suggestions for finding a way useful to the present discussion through the challenging territory of the *Contributions*.

[31] See Heidegger 1999, paragraph 45, p. 66.

[32] One example of a discussion at some length of the truth of Being on the ground of *Dasein* that is typical for Heidegger's later period, with reference to the presentation in *Being and Time*, can be found in Heidegger 1999, pp. 207-214.

[33] See, for example, paragraphs 7 (pp. 18-19), 45 (p. 66), 69 (pp. 93-94), and 72 (pp. 96-98), to name only a few such passages.

[34] *Contributions*, paragraph 110, p. 153.

[35] Ibid., p. 154.

[36] Ibid., paragraph 196, p. 224: "This *voice* does not speak in the so-called immediate outpouring of the common, natural, unspoiled and uneducated 'man.' … The *voice* of the people speaks seldom and only in the few – and can it be made *at all* to resonate?" Perhaps, among other issues, Heidegger is here expressing his disappointment at the failure of his offer of guidance to the Nazi leadership. See also Section VI, "The Ones to Come," pp. 277-281, for a number of statements in the same unmistakable spirit of philosophical elitism.

[37] Ibid., p. 277.

[38] Ibid., paragraph 49, p. 71.

[39] Ibid., paragraph 250, p. 278.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., paragraph 254, p. 285.

[42] Ibid., paragraph 252, p. 281.

[43] The theme is suggested in *Being and Time* throughout much of "Division Two: *Dasein* and Temporality," Section 5 "Temporality and Historicality." It is most explicit in paragraph 74, "The Basic Constitution of Historicality."

[44] Rockmore 1992, p. 287. In addition, there are a number of examples in his publications in which he speaks of the Germans as the only possible authentic community because of their unique connection with the origins of Greek thinking. We assume that one indication of this singular connection across time between the Germans and the Greeks is provided by the body of Heidegger's own publications and teaching. There is also the remarkable discussion in *Introduction to Metaphysics* concerning how the German language is singularly capable of capturing and expressing the deepest meaning of classical Greek. Heidegger's unique writing style is thus based on how the truths of metaphysics must be expressed in terms of syntax and grammar.

[45] The pertinent reference in *Letter on Humanism* may be found in Heidegger 1957, p. 69.

[46] Rockmore presents a pertinent and insightful discussion of the supposed turning (or lack thereof) in Heidegger's thought as regards his political views. See Rockmore 1992, pp. 284-285.

[47] Heidegger 1957, p. 103.

[48] Ibid., p. 107.

[49] Ibid., pp. 14, 17.

[50] Ibid., pp. 47-51, pp. 116 ff.

[51] Ibid., pp. 33-34.

[52] See Taylor 1992, p. 104.

[53] Such doubts are made even more pointed in light of the associated discussion of ethics as a philosophical discipline. Heidegger speaks at some length on the question of the essence and history of ethics in *Lettre sur l'humanism*, condemning it on the grounds of ontology. This merits detailed consideration in light of Heidegger's apparent failure to find a place in his thinking for human values, but we will now only direct the reader to the source. See Heidegger 1957, pp. 139 ff.

[54] Rockmore 1992, p. 290.

[55] Ibid., p. 291.

[56] Ibid., p. 292.

[57] For example, we might try, at least for the purposes of discussion, to see parallels between authentic existence and living in the state of grace, between the withdrawal of Being and the original sin of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Paradise (which we have inherited), and between existing in the light of Being and the experience of the Divine.

[58] Heidegger apparently continued to read sources from this period well into his later years. Andre Schuwer once remarked to the writer that upon a visit to Heidegger's Black Forest retreat in the early 1970s he noticed a well-used edition of Duns Scotus on the writing table.

[59] Kisiel addresses in detail Heidegger's somewhat torturous path as a thinker during this period – reading Luther, Eckhart, Schleiermacher, Augustine, Reinach, Otto, Bernard of Clairvaux, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and Teresa of Avila, to name but a few sources – in order to come to grips with the need to clarify his faith and deepen his understanding of religion. See Kisiel 1993, pp. 69-115, "Theo-logical Beginnings: Toward a Phenomenology of Christianity."

[60] See Kisiel 1993, p. 227.

[61] Ibid., pp. 71, 73.

[62] Ibid., p. 71-72.

[63] Ibid., p. 218-219.

[64] Even in *Beitroge* we can find references to thinking the divine being. See, for example, Heidegger 1999, paragraph 254, p. 286.

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CHAPTER XVI

THE MISLEADING AND OVERWHELMING INFINITY SEPARATING GOD AND HUMAN BEINGS: FROM THE HISTORY OF THE RECONCILIATION OF RELIGIONS

NIYAZI MEHDI

This paper is addressed to the followers of Islam. However, it should also be brought to the attention of the followers of other religions since it may illustrate to them certain examples of the religious-intellectual considerations and spiritual quest within Islam.

* * *

As do representatives of other religions, the Muslim faces a quite dramatic issue that can be stated as follows: If I, according to the ways of my religion, link my awareness of God with the depths of my spirit, I am thereby led to an understanding of the truthfulness of my religion. But I am also thereby brought to a consideration of the untruth and falsity of other faiths and religions. And if I regard other religions as untrue, how can I accept their existence as equal to that of Islam?[1]

For centuries this question has troubled not only Muslims, but also the representatives of all developed religions, many of whom either did not know how to respond to it, or found some formal answer. But there were also others who acknowledged the right of other (alien) religions to exist. In this regard, the German scholar Bruno Heck reminds us of a remark by Goethe, namely, "If Islam is subjection to the will of Allah, then we all live and die in Islam."[2] Goethe uses this idea, which is an example of the recognition of Islam within Christianity, in order to illustrate the fact that Islam, as a religion of subjection to the will of God, cannot be alien to the true believers of any faith.

Jalaleddin Rumi, the great historical figure of Islam, bases an argument that supports recognizing the rights of all religions upon another point, namely, the nature of their very diversity. All religions are essentially in unity insofar as "the differences concern their modes of movement, and not the truthfulness of their ways."[3] Gölpınarlı writes that even a Christian priest from the Istanbul region was a *murid* (spiritual student) of Rumi. This illustrates that Rumi acknowledged and respected the rights of other religions in both words and deeds. He accepted that a Christian priest could become the spiritual student of a Muslim teacher even as he remained a follower of his own religion.

It should be recognized that such great Muslim philosophers as Al-Farabi and the Azerbaijani Nasireddin Tusi were against the separation of religions into those that were true and those that were supposedly false. Both of these important figures wrote that God is one, and that the various religions are simply alternative paths to Him. God directs each people to the way (the religion) that matches its spirit and mentality.

Kabir provided the first example in India of the reconciliation of religions. It is said that although his mother came from the Brahmin caste, he himself was brought up as a Muslim. Kabir later attempted to synthesize Hinduism with Islam, and he named the resulting religion "*Sahadja Yoga*" ("Simple Unity"). He preserved in this religion the Hindu teaching of metempsychosis as well as the concept of Karma. Kabir refuted idolatry, asceticism, and the caste system, taking from Islam the idea of strict monotheism and the equality of all before God.

Kabir's idea of synthesizing religions, which became popular, had a significant influence on the founder of Sikhism, Guru Nanak Dev, who sought to utilize the dynamics of various symbols taken from both Islam and Hinduism in his religion. For example, he referred to the Creator by the Muslim names Huda and Sahib, as well as by the Hindu names Hari and Rama.[4]

It should also be noted that the revered Ramakrishna successively prayed according to the prescriptions of the basic world religions, in which he saw no differences of principle. This fact is well-known.

Examples of recognition extended to other religions can be seen also in Judaism. Abu Issa, for example, the leader of an eighth century messianic movement in Palestine, proposed that the Prophetic missions of Jesus and Muhammed should be recognized and that both be acknowledged as true Prophets of the Gentiles.[5] This idea would serve to reconcile Christianity and Islam.

The Special "Invention" of Democracy

Although democracy was influenced during its formation by the religious ideas of Christianity in general and of Protestantism in particular, it proclaimed the freedom of conscience and religion and refused to give preference to any specific religion. Moreover, democracy as a political order has created "rules of the game" for religious reconciliation, whereby all religions and faiths that do not profess the ideas of evil and violence enjoy equal rights. They may also proselytize for new members.

The creation in society of equal opportunities for all religions comprises the political and legal component of the democratic freedom of religion. If from the position of Islam we approach the equal rights that have been granted by democracy, and if we regard these rights from a religious and not a political viewpoint, we may conclude that the rights in question have a positive significance in this respect as well. That is to say that Muslims must accept other religions on equal terms in conditions of

competition in order to develop an Islamic understanding and view, attain a sense of spiritual generosity in our religion, and acquire moral (spiritual) energy.

Those people who are irritated by the missionary propaganda that is found in Azerbaijan today should take into consideration this aspect of the problem. Our rivalry or competition with the missionaries should proceed in a peaceful way, that is, we should develop our understanding of Islam in such a way that it would not be alien to the spiritual world of the youth and it would not be at odds with the rights and freedoms of women. Only in this case will young people be able to find in Islam that which missionaries offer them in Christianity, Krishnaism, and Buddhism.

The Transition from the Idea of Misleading Infinity to the Problem of Non-Interference in Religion

And now let us turn to seeking an answer from the position of Islam to the question posed at the beginning of this paper. I shall paraphrase it as follows: Can we separate religions into those that are true and those that are false? In our opinion, just as it is not appropriate for science to assess Euclidian geometry as bad and Gaussian views as good, the Aristotelian understanding of the "truth/falsity" dichotomy is not adequate to the relationships pertaining among religions. To qualify Krishnaism as a false religion and Judaism as true, or to praise Islam as a true religion and Christianity as false, would inevitably lead to conclusions that are meaningless from the viewpoint of science.

If someone who is overly committed to his/her own religion be irritated by our words, we would refer to the following issue, which might appear to common sense as a paradox.

The Aristotelian conception of truth has been compromised in contemporary science in many specific cases. For example, Aristotle maintained that if a thought in our head corresponds to the object, or reflects it adequately, then it is true. The English philosopher Alfred Lord Whitehead demonstrated the vulnerability of this thesis within the context of a renowned scientific debate regarding the new situation in science. The issue in question involved Galileo's claim that the Earth moves and the Sun does not, while the Inquisition insisted that the Earth remains in one place and it is the Sun that moves. Newtonian astronomers, in contrast, upheld the absolute theory of space and considered both the Sun and the Earth as being in a state of motion. Today we say that all three of these claims are equally true. The question of the motion of the Earth and the Sun reflects a real fact concerning the Universe in respect to which all the parties mentioned above stated important truths. However, these truths seemed incompatible in respect to the knowledge characteristic of their respective times.[6]

It is obvious that we should not apply scientific principles to religion without serious reservations. But in light of the relativity of what has been mentioned above, we should note that every religion is true in its

self-development, ready to thrive and blossom, when it remains committed to its fundamental principles.[7]

In order to develop further what we have just stated, we will make the following step. Many people, consciously or unconsciously, regard religion as a system of symbols. In this sense we may say that every religion is a particular "language system," serving a communication that conveys in various ways transcendent information. Insofar as thoughts expressed by words, that is, by signs, mean something to us, religions comprise a type of special language that reveals the Transcendent, Hidden World to us by means of codes or symbols that refer to it. We wish to put the following question, however, to the acceptance of the communicational, code-status of religion: Can we justifiably compare languages in respect to the "better/worse" ("lower/higher") dichotomy?

Languages can clearly be compared in various ways. For example, a given language might have a complex architectonic, like that of a Gothic building, while another one might resemble an unpretentious house in old Baku. If someone would praise the "Gothic cathedral" to the utmost on the basis of this comparison, in the final account s/he would become entangled in meaningless contradictions that stem from the very same comparison. For example, one might discover in the architectural style of the Baku house indicators of ancient architectural styles that are of immense value. Should we wonder when we hear that the price of a fragment of a porcelain cup that has come to us from the depths of many centuries, carrying in itself information about some forgotten world, is much higher than that of a Mercedes limousine?

Indeed, there are certain levels of the spirit that can be expressed more adequately by means of a primitive language than by highly-developed English. The situation is the same with religions. A given religion might be able to express certain information coming from the Hidden World precisely because of its multilayered and complex structure. It is also true, however, that primitive totemism displays an almost unimaginable potential for expressing the Transcendent in certain cases of transition from the level of nature to the level of spirit. We Muslims who regard other religions from the positions of Islam must remember that.

Let us make one further step towards a new understanding of the compatibility of religions. If we proceed from the position of a theological system, we may say that the relations between God and man are built on a misleading infinity. And why does infinity overwhelm us? Because demonstrating that something is an ultimate instance also demonstrates that it is not such. Even the sky, which is clearly not infinitely far away from us, often plays with us the misleading game of infinity.

As far as the relations between God and the human being are concerned, here actual infinity places before us innumerable and misleading snares. For example, in order to assimilate the idea of Allah, the true Muslim develops a chain of enchanting and charming thoughts that make it seem as if he has found him. After some time, however, this refuge that he

has found, which resides in his soul as an ultimate truth, begins to lead him astray from God. It was for perhaps this very reason that Sumun, a contemporary of the Sufi mystic Juneida, wrote in respect to Sufism as one of the forms of piety that "*Tasavvuf* [Sufism] is the absence of domination over anything. And at the same time it is a denial of one's subservience to anything."[8]

If we examine this formulation in relation to what I have termed misleading infinity, we can see that piety cannot have as an idol of worship some given single idea, even the most wonderful one. It is precisely because people do not want to be the slaves of concrete ideas that sects appear within religions and, more generally, that there are people who cannot find peace in what they have already achieved. It thus follows that the Muslim, without ceasing to be a Muslim, should not consider the symbols of his faith as the final harbor. He should also be aware of the ways of other religions, embracing perpetual change as he steadfastly remains faithful to his own religion. This is the new perspective that is now opening for Islamic consciousness.

Remaining within the framework of our own religion, and conceptualizing the numerous questions of Islamic religiosity in terms of the misleading infinity, we find arguments in support of other religious quests as well. Ferideddin Attar, the great Sufi saint and poet, said that every grain of sand has its own door, and that from every grain of sand another way leads to Him.[9] The moral of this thought is that we must always remember that every religion has a door of its own, and that a unique path leads to Him from every religion.

The misleading and overwhelming infinity that constitutes the foundation of the relations between God and human beings has given rise to quite strange events in our world and in our cultures. For example, the people who have been misled by this infinity begin to think in terms of true and false when they find inconsistencies in religious texts. When they read of the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham and of Ismail by Ibrahim in the Torah and Koran respectively, they may well think that one of the stories must be false. One then speaks about an error in the Koran, and another about a distortion in the original texts of the Torah. But the religious intellectual, being aware of the misleading infinity and endeavoring to break out of its grasp, puts the question in another way. If God admits of a discrepancy between the Torah and the Koran, then it must be for some purpose, then it must contain a message for us from Him.

This type of discrepancy is not the simple result of a "truth/falsity" dichotomy, but rather challenges us to think over two different vectors of the same line. For example, the idea of "vocation" has had a great influence on people's consciousness in Protestantism. It indicates that to fulfill one's duty in respect to one's occupation constitutes a high level of moral and spiritual life. The word "vocation" (*beruf*) became the focus of people's attention through Martin Luther's translation of the Bible, particularly the book *Jesus, the Son of Sirah* (Ecclesiasticus).[10] And although Luther's use

of "vocation" did not altogether adequately represent the corresponding idea in the original text, it in fact initiated a great transformation in culture, playing a significant role in the generation of the spirit of capitalism. This example demonstrates how an element of a religious text that in a certain sense is a mistake or misunderstanding in respect to an older version can, indeed, act as a constructive and creative factor in the development of religion and culture.

What I term the primitive "truth/falsity" or "higher/lower" dichotomy cannot be applied with justification to religions. We must allow no place for an ironic attitude towards any alien or strange element in other religious cultures.

INAM Center for Pluralism
Baku, Azerbaijan

NOTES

[1] The clarification of this dramatic issue is closely connected with "Globalization as Diversity in Unity," one of the important themes in the work of Professor George F. McLean. In particular, see volume 22 in *Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change. Series I, Culture and Values*, available online at http://www.crvp.org/book/Series01/I-22/contents.htm.
[2] *Religion in Culture, Law and Politics*, p. 13.
[3] Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı 1959, p. 193.
[4] McLeod 1968, p. 167.
[5] *Social Life and Social Values of the Jewish People*, p. 22.
[6] Whitehead 1990, pp. 244-245.
[7] There is an analogy in this respect to Popper's idea that all new knowledge is a modification or transformation of previous knowledge. See Popper and Eccles 1977, p. 425. We could say in a similar spirit that a newly discovered truth may be considered to be a modification of a previous truth.
[8] Abdülbaki Gölpınarli 1969, p. 11. Author's translation.
[9] "Ferideddin Attarş Mantık at-tayr." Ibid., p. 6.
[10] Weber 1990, p. 98.

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INDEX

THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH
IN VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY

PURPOSE

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one's decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one's culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Studies in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

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A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

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2. *Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues*. This series of 10 week crosscultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.

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4. *Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development*. A study in values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists, social scientists and scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of enriching the moral content of education and character development. This work has been underway since 1980.

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