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Language, Values and the Slovak Nation

Slovak Philosophical Studies, I

Edited by
Tibor Pichler & Jana Gaparková

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Preface

Jana Gašpáriková, Tibor Pichler, Marta Zágoršeková

The present volume provides the reader with accounts and interpretations of aspects of Slovakia's past and present, indeed with certain aspects of its "cultural heritage and contemporary change".

To say that we live in a period of change is so painfully true as to have become commonplace; at times it is experienced with considerable apprehension. The changes inaugurated by the *annus mirabilis* of 1989 made it possible to identify ourselves as persons and nations and to make decisions regarding the manner of our existence. In the wake of this process of personal and collective self-identification and self-determination new nation-states have been constituted out of multinational or binational states or, put otherwise, some multinational states have broken up into their component parts. The map of Europe has been redrawn. In some regions this process went on peacefully and institutionally, in others it was accompanied by an outbreak of violence previously thought impossible, which alarms individuals as well as the community of nations.

Nations are modern forms of collective existence and their growth has not followed a universal pattern. The ways of nation-building were and are manifold due to historical conditions and concrete situations. The chapters of the present volume--different as they may appear, and for various reasons may indeed be--reflect the Slovak experience. They attempt to give a picture of key sets of ideas and concepts in the intellectual history of modern Slovak nation-building within various political and state contexts.

Part I concerns "Language and Culture in the Slovak Nation Before 1918". Here the framework is historic Hungary of the Habsburg monarchy, describes the main ideological and philosophical arguments in the formative period of modern Slovak nation-building. These drew upon the romantic Herderian philosophy of language and Hegelian philosophy of history in order to justify the process of nation-building philosophically. The crucial problem remains the transformation of the romantic national conception into positive action. Attempts at cultural and political institutionalization of the nation had failed, and in consequence romanticism and wishful thinking reappeared with new strength. These were subject to critique at the turn of the century.

Part II is entitled "Nation and State: The Czechoslovak Republic and the Slovak Nation". The great divide in Slovak nation-building is the year 1918. The establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic defined Slovakia territorially and administratively and transformed an ideal entity into a political reality. At the same time the discussion of Slovakia in Czechoslovakia was opened. The way in which Czechoslovakia had been constructed and ideologically justified turned out to be problematic. The chapters of this Part identify the different political systems in the context of various, often tragic, stages of general European history. This reflects the process of diversified ideological and political argument on this topic until mid 1992.

The ideology of the Slovak state, as well as discussions on nation and nationalism during the period of its existence, 1939-1945, are dealt with in a special chapter.

Stepping back into history does not mean finding a key for the future, but it may generate insights which may make us more sensitive in our construction of the present and future. The insights of the contributors reflect their conviction that the values of human rights and dignity,

democracy and cooperative integration are requisites for successful response to the challenges not only of regional, but of global change which we face as persons and nations.

Part III treats "The Persistence and Variability of Values in the Slovak Culture". The philosophical reflection of the present is always historically based. This is not only because it draws on history for its foundations and inspiration, but mainly because the values which motivate and coordinate the present participants in the life of society have been constituted historically. The present continues and revitalizes these values with greater or lesser innovative energy. Hence, philosophical reflection upon the present can contribute to better understanding and direction of this energy by revealing the errors of the past and helping to overcome them in thought and action.

The presented contributions by philosophers are to be seen from this universalistic point of view, articulated in modern philosophy by Kant and Hegel. At the same time they are enriched by the historical and present experiences of intellectuals living in the heart of Europe at a significant crossroad between Western and Eastern European cultures.

Characteristically, their view includes an undisguised bitter aftertaste of living behind the Iron Curtain, this has oriented their intellectual views towards the universal human values of liberty and human sovereignty. The selection of themes indicates that, in spite of a significant socio-political chaos concomitant with the current transformation of Central and Eastern European Societies, intellectuals think in terms of universal characteristics of human civilization, which are the persisting values, past and present, in Slovakia.

Part IV surveys "The Changes in Values and Present Situation in Slovakia". Slovak society today is passing through a difficult transition. From an abnormal state under the strong Marxist ideological influence which held the society static for forty years, it is passing now to a normal state (*Sociologické aktuality*, [Prague, 1991]). As this requires social, economic, cultural and axiological transformation, it is important to depict their special laws and characteristics, and especially the way of life represented by the system of values.

The issue of values involves, for instance, the struggle of traditionalism with postmodernism, which reflects a struggle within the European model of culture. There is also the conflict between the past collectivistic understanding of values of Marxism and the contemporary liberalism stressing noncoercive activity on the part of the individual in the political, economic and social sphere.

These conflicts, reflecting two strata of the problem of values: one is temporal, historical and changing in character; the other concerns the real hierarchy of values which is more stably accepted in our society and directs its change.

In characterizing contemporary society in Slovakia we can begin from a pattern of values typical of a rural and traditional society because the process of industrialization in Slovakia took place very quickly and only recently has begun to have real impact on the social atmosphere: the traditional values of strong religious feeling, emphasis upon national identity, and integrity of family remain.

Now postmodern values emerge which stress creative and independent individuality, international European citizenship and participation, and a new understanding of humanity. This change in values is taking place at an accelerating pace, which will be more and more turbulent due the political and economic changes in our social system. The understanding and acceptance of postmodern values will be modified and shaped in new and unexpected ways connected with the change from an industrial to a postindustrial society.

As the recent ideological preferences for liberal values conflict with the hierarchy of values of the previous communist system, it has become very difficult recently to identify and formulate a hierarchy of values and there is continual cultural movement in Slovak society.

With democratization public opinion has become important. It is influenced by the difficult social situation and unemployment which did not exist in the previous era. Hence, there is need to recall the humanist traditions from the previous historical period.

This cultural heritage is also very important for solving the problem of European integration. Such unity requires that each find in him or her tradition and sense of humanity the appreciation of human dignity and human rights which can lay the foundation for political and social balance for structures and institutions.

Our special thanks are extended for Professor McLean who made the publication of this volume possible and whose intellectual vivacity, organizational talent and effort in editing the manuscript for English style we highly appreciate.

Introduction

George F. McLean

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Marxist program of scientific universalism, issues of nationalism now come to center stage. That this is not simply a subject for economic analysis and resolution becomes painfully evident as economic possibilities are wantonly pushed aside or definitively destroyed. Nor is it only a theoretical or aesthetic question, as the often intractable and at times even genocidal conflicts from Bosnia to Kurdistan, to Cambodia and beyond attest grotesquely. Finally, it is not that these conflicts were put in cold storage during the 40 year Marxist hegemony in Central Europe so that today we return to the *status quo ante*. We now know that working out inter-personal and inter-people relations is the authentically humane center of human life. Attempts to manipulate or even suppress this effort perverts and erodes the human capacity to open to others in peaceful cooperation. Today we reap the harvest of such short sighted manipulation and suppression.

In this light, the present volume has a special place in this series: Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change in Central and Eastern Europe. It studies carefully one specific case of the emergence of the sense of nation--that of Slovakia--from the mid seventeenth century, analyzing issues of language, ethnicity, culture and constitutional structures and interrelations. This detailed account of the hopes and realizations, the excesses and critiques involved in this process over the last 350 years lays out munificently deep human issues, the pitfalls and the achievements, in the on-going saga of one people's emergence through time--our time.

Parts I-III are the work of the Institute of Philosophy the Slovak Academy of Science, Bratislava. Part I on "Language Culture and the Slovak Nation" reaches back to the root inspiration of the development of the national identity of the Slovak people. Chapter I by Maranna Oravcová analyses the related literature of the two centuries beginning in 1647 and identifies there a three step process. The first raises the issue of Slovak identity in terms of literature and history, the second moves to issues of language and nation. The third unveils the basic tension between, on the one hand, the tendency toward a larger more open context of the slavic peoples and, on the other hand, the tendency to stress the distinctiveness of this particular tribe or nation. In this are subsumed the related tensions between the universal and the particular the humanistic and the political, ethnicity and culture.

Ján Bodnár's chapter looks especially at J. Kollár's effort to distinguish these elements as embedded in the distinction between Czech and Slovak. This explains the importance of language as an identifier and the shows how external political challenges, such as the threat of Magyarization, can intensify the internal sense of ethnic identity.

Tibor Pichler carries the argument for the importance of language to its culmination in the work of Ludovít Štúr for whom it is a manifestation of the self-hood of a nation. He shows, further, the way in which this can prove truly life giving as this sense of identity unfolds as self-responsibility for one's own life and the developing a public spirit.

This trend was not, however, without its critics. Chapter IV by Elena Városová analyses Ján Lajčák's liberal critique of the cultural conservatism inherent in the above tendencies. He noted the potentially stifling character of their romantic tendency and stressed the need for objective scientific analysis joined with a deeper, dynamic sense of culture as a human artifact constantly

under construction. This takes the search beyond language to culture and raises the issue of whether it is possible to inform this dynamic sense of culture with the romantic sense of the self-identity of a people and its deep commitment to humanizing values. Though this may not be possible in Lajčák's own objectivist terms, it is the special opportunity which phenomenology has opened for our times. It is reflected in H.G. Gadamer's hermeneutics of culture based metaphysically upon Heidegger's existential sense of being emerging in time.

In Part II on "Nation and State" Karol Kollár shows how this critique of romanticism was carried forward by M. Hodža under the inspiration of Masaryk's effort to create a viable modern central European state. This directed attention to a realistic assessment of the concrete situation and responses thereto. But the dangers of such "realism" begin to appear in Hodža's later work as he moved, Kollár would think, too opportunistically, to embrace a Czechoslovakism. This was politically pragmatic in the atmosphere of the Post World War I Versailles treaties, but may have built upon foundations which, in terms of more fundamental issue of national identity, showed themselves in the long run to be unrealistic. The disastrous effect of this would appear only too soon, as is made clear in the following two chapters.

Vladimír Bakoš reviews the importance of the step by Hodža, beyond language which can be retrospective and narrowing, to culture as a more open and dynamic space. He follows S. Štúr's effort to keep a balance in negotiating this dangerous terrain by arguing for the importance of a full range of nation-building values including, not only the specific Slovak cultural identity, but also the importance of a broader human value base. Czechoslovakism, however, provided to be too artificial a base. Without roots in either the transcendent or the concrete, it was too weak to withstand the absolutization of Slovak nationalism in the 30s.

Teodor Münz analyzes this process in the debates of Catholic thinkers. There the tension was between, on the one hand, the sense of Christian universalism whose respect for all persons lays the foundations for freedom and democracy; and, on the other, the passion for realizing the Heavenly Jerusalem in terms of rationalist conviction, exclusivist clarity and dictatorial will. Chladný-Hano seems to have effectively united principle with action, whereas the extremism of the right in J. Tiso and S. Polakovi led the nation down the slippery slope to political and moral disaster in the period before and during the World War II.

The chapter of Andrej Kopcok takes up the relay baton to recount developments between 1945 and 1949. He shows the totalitarianism of the left to have been not merely a refrigerator which held the national question in suspended animation as many have suggested, but rather a positively destructive process. This had a number of facets: the first and perhaps the most fundamental was the instrumentalization of the properly human and humanizing character of the self-identity of persons and peoples. This insensitivity of materialism to the properly human became particularly destructive in its mode of scientific reason which tended to centralize all at the expense of the distinctive identities of persons, peoples and nations. In Czechoslovakia this was uniquely explosive for it meant centering all in Prague, which was perceived as placing the Slovak nation under strong Czech tutelage. By evoking a long-standing sense of inequality this contributed much to the impetus which would split country apart soon after the velvet revolution of '89.

Jana Balázová analyzes this in greater detail showing how Czechoslovakism, which may have been strategically helpful in 1919, led Czech dominance. Pragocentism, which seemed reasonable in terms of the socialist theory of a centrally managed economy and helpful in the political context of a restive Slovak people, would prove over time to be alienating and destructive.

Part III on "Values in Slovak Culture" traces the above to its foundations as a matter of human values. Ján Uher points not only to the utilitarian character of the development of Czechoslovakia in 1919, but to the failure to build this union democratically in terms of a federation rather than of a centrally administered state. Whatever be said for scientific rationality and the efficiencies to be gained by centralism, by ignoring the self-identity and freedom of the Slovak people the union of the two peoples was foredoomed to failure. In this light the subsequent impact of fascism and communism, though damaging indeed, may only have exacerbated the earlier, deeper and more fatal flaw.

This, however, does not mean that the issue is past and merely a matter of history. The independence of the two nations as two states now side by side means that they must learn to cooperate one with the other. This will require a new level of mutual respect and a new willingness to cooperate in matters of mutual concern--events in the former Yugoslavia as too close for their lessons to be ignored.

Finally, to those who would say that the present situation of independence is retrogressive and contrary to the general unitive current of Western Europe, Professor Uher notes that the present period is marked by two, not one, tendencies: national emancipation and integration. These are not contradictory, for effective integration can be achieved only by its responsible and committed actions on the part of truly free people. In this light emancipation is the condition, not the antithesis, of integration. Diversity need not be suppressed, but must rather be respected if it is to provide the conditions for complementarity.

The chapter of Tatiana Sedová, certainly one of the most beautiful works of our times on the role of intellectuals, begins by acknowledging the betrayals or *trahison des clerics* on the part of intellectuals willing to play the role of apologists for past oppressive regimes, left and right. Yet the need for values means that the work of deep intellectual penetration to the roots of the culture cannot be dispensed with. This being the case, thinkers must turn away from the seduction of simple and suppressive wholes or totalities and undertake the more difficult task of national critique. Beyond this their work is needed for the two essential creative steps: opening the way for a rich pluralism and integrating the new diversity as a richly humane and progressive democratic life.

Marta Zágorská carries this a step further by providing a value strategy for the constitution of Slovak society. This is directed specifically against the functionalizing Slovak culture seen as the human center of its people. Instead, by articulating a rich sense of culture she is able to distinguish in the life of a people two levels of time: one is historical or diachronic; the other, where values reside, synchronically leads development to perdurance which allow that incremental growth in values in which truly humane progress consists.

In view of this, toleration becomes a newly important value. If, contrary to totalitarian suppression, a rich and authentic pluralism is to be developed then its psychological dynamics must be recognized, and a negative or disjunctive attitude toward other's values as alien must be replaced by a positive, conjunctive attitude which seeks out the synergies required for harmony and true progress.

Part IV, by the Center for Social Forecasting of the Slovak Academy of Science treats present value transformations in Slovakia, joining empirical research to expert projection and wise council. The chapter by Jiri Suchý studies the character of the transformation from a communist to a free society and its implications for future relations with Western Europe. In this context he uncovers the importance of values as foundational for individual responsibility.

Jana Gašparíková studies present changes in terms of the discovery and promotion of human potential. This is a two-fold notion. Its inner dimension is freedom, which relates to creativity; its outer dimension is participation in social life. The former corresponds to the values of a person and a people; the latter provides the political context for human interrelation. The two must be linked together for social balance.

This analysis is carried further by the statistical analysis presented in the chapter of Edita Bauerová. She recognizes the shifting character of value preferences and identifies the strong impact of present economic and social crises upon the choices between post-material and material values in the society.

Erika Kvapilova writes of the difficulties in achieving a balance between the free and creative, on the one hand, and social participation, on the other, in our days. She notes the long-standing tendencies of the people to look for strong leaders. Unaccustomed to independent personal initiative, they are concerned especially for social welfare and hesitant about reforming structures on which they are accustomed to depend. As her analysis is borne out not only by polls, but by elections throughout the region, an understanding and response to this phenomenon is an essential condition for future progress. Professor Kvapilova focuses her study upon the changing appreciation of work in present circumstances. Dialectical materialism, reading all in economic terms, looked upon work and worker instrumentally in function of production. Now, economic productivity and hence human work are being thought of also in terms of self-appreciation and self-fulfillment. In this context human values become more central than the laws of the market place. From to the example of the United States she finds such liberal values as freedom to be central to public progress. Her analysis carries this insight forward in a sophisticated comparative analysis of the styles Japanese and American management as focused respectively upon work groups and individuals, noting that both reflecting a basic appreciation of people and their values. Her study draws a number for the development Slovakia.

Above, the introduction to this Introduction suggested the potential importance of a detailed analysis of the national emergence of Slovakia not only for itself, but for an understanding of the national currents now at work in central and Eastern Europe. The brief summary of the individual papers, by uncovering their thematic richness, close sequence and thematic integration, suggests that the task of this volume has been amply realized: it is a particularly well done work on an exceptionally important topic. With the two volumes of this sense from the Czech Republic: *Traditions and Present Problems of Czech Political Culture* edited by Miloslav Bedná and Michal Vejražka, and *Czech Philosophy in the XXth Century*, edited by Lubomír Nový, Jirí Gabriel and Jaroslav Hroch--indeed the series volumes from the other Central and Eastern European countries--it provides exceptionally important insight for understanding the present and moving toward the future.

Part I
Language and Culture in the Slovak Nation Before 1918

Chapter I

The Ethnic and Cultural Dimension of National Emancipation

The Evocation of the Slovak Nation

Marianna Oravcová

Problems of nation and nationalism, which currently are topical for sociologists, political scientists and historians, had emerged by the end of the eighteenth century and later became part of philosophic thought only of some authors. In the German tradition, especially with Herder, these issues developed into the theory of self-determination; in Britain, with Mill, they were directed toward the theory of self-government.¹ Especially, however, they set the agenda for political theory with both a prologue and an epilogue in literature.

A hundred years before Herder's historical praise of the Slavs, a tradition of apologetic works had been developing in Slovakia from its own sources. This became the most important contribution to efforts towards national emancipation. Originating from indigenous conditions and in direct relation thereto, it anticipated the main line of Herder's thought with the following ideas:

- The challenge to spread humanism by overcoming animosity, first, through understanding other nations and by national and personal tolerance, then through positive and productive coexistence, the rejection of violence, and the substitution of animosity by collaboration in culture and in education as goals of humanity.

- Stress upon the particular cultural qualities of nations--including the Slovaks--which for one reason or another could not assume their place "in the picture of humankind."² These works anticipated Herder's stress on the specificity and unique characteristics of such nations, even though they lacked the power and political structures of other nations and justified respect for each nation and its equal rights and privileges with other nations.

- Emphasis upon the democratic character of natural law as a counterpart to historical law, thereby acknowledging the right of a nation to choose freely its political destiny.

This literary tradition took on the characteristics of an apology, namely, of praise for the Slovak nation and of pleas for its rights. The literary tradition had articulated the fundamental problems connected with the nation's existence. Slovaks represented a nation, though awareness of this national identity was expressed through neither institutional self-determination nor political self-government.

Obviously, these apologies expressed the values whose bearers were people, hence their taint of popular linguistic nationalism. The concern of this paper, however, is not primarily with definitions³ but to describe the fact of national consciousness as found in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

¹ Cf. A.D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (Duckworth, 1971), 10 and 171.

² J.G. Herder, *Zur Philosophie der Geschichte. Band II* (Berlin: 1952), 485.

³ Our Position on this point is based especially upon Smith (1971); E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Basil Blackwell, 1988); C.J.H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966); B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1990).

Slovaks lived for centuries as an ethnically distinct part of the Hungarian kingdom without an institutional structure for their own protection and promotion. Their characteristics were those of a feudal state: a vertical structure, low social mobility, hierarchy of loyalties to religion, local authorities, crown, etc., cultural differentiation without lateral communication.⁴ All are considered to be incompatible with nationalism. Two types of structures coexisted, each with its own limits.

The first structure was imposed by the heterogeneous nature of the kingdom, heterogeneity being present both in the political organization of the individual regions and at the social level comprising natives (Slavs), newcomers (Madjars) and *hostes* (Germans). This structure was further supported by the officially declared *natio hungarica*, comprising the nobility of all the nations of the kingdom and running across its ethnic structure. Last, but not least, these heterogeneous structures were combined with Hungarian patriotism which called for numerous sacrifices by all ethnic groups.

The second structure was reflected in the self-consciousness of individual ethnic groups. In the case of the Slovaks, their consciousness of being different from the Madjars and the Czechs survived both feudalism and Madjarization. It had been preserved through the centuries within the Hungarian political realm.⁵ Historical documents⁶ show that it was nurtured by the economic and political disadvantages for Slovaks who nonetheless were also able to distinguish themselves culturally.

Awareness of ethnic difference became apparent especially in towns where economic interests originally were connected unambiguously with the national culture, e.g., certain economic activities were granted exclusively to the German *hostes*. But because of its nature and goals, and despite contrary indications, national consciousness did not amount to nationalism.⁷ The failure to develop into nationalism was due more fundamentally to a lack of the very possibility of political ambition. Any claims and conflicts were manipulated by the authorities to preserve the heterogeneity inherent to feudal society. This corresponded to the theoretical principle that, "in an agro-literate society, the political unit is not defined in terms of cultural boundaries," for "the factors determining political boundaries are totally distinct from those determining cultural limits, power and print-language mapped different realms."⁸

These two simultaneous structures were reflected in pleas for the vested rights of the Slovak nation in the form of patriotic arguments for lessening internal tensions in the Hungarian state. These were aimed at the preservation of cultural diversity based upon national equality. Congruent

⁴ Cf. E. Gellner, 8-18.

⁵ Another proof of the awareness of the difference between Hungarian patriotism and national consciousness is contained in the indigenous evaluations of conflicts in nationally mixed provinces or at universities. The division of power was claimed on national bases as the expression of self-determination. Its representatives were accused of "vitium nationalitatis." Cf. B. Varsik, *Narodnostny problem trnavskej university* (Bratislava, 1938), L.S. Danisovic, *Dejiny minoritov* (Bratislava, 1934), papers of J. Markov, *dejinam zakj. Cl. 13 (1608 a. cor. V Banskej Bystrici 1609-1614)* in *Pocta sestdesiatym narodeninam dr. Karla Lastovku* (Bratislava, 1936), *Naborenske a narodnostne spory v Banskej Bystrici v XVII. A XVIII. stor* in *Historicky sbornik Matice slovenskej V* (1947). An identical situation is described in Bohemia in S. Sousedik, *Scotisticka filozofie v ceskych zemich v 17 a 18. Stoleti*, in *Studia comenianna et historica*, 17 (no. 33, 1987), 67.

⁶ *Privilegium pro Slavis* granted by the King Louis the Great in the town of Zilina in 1381; decree of King Matthias Corvinus against the national conflicts in Trnava in 1486; laws on national equality, e.g., 13/1608, 1609; *Puncta seu postulatae* of the inhabitants of Banska Bystrica appealing to these laws.

⁷ Cf. Smith, 167-168, 173; Hayes, 5; Gellner, chap. I.

⁸ E. Gellner, 12; Anderson, 75.

with the real situation, the praises and pleas in the literature expressed attitudes prevailing among Slovaks: pride in one's nation, advocacy of its interests, belief in its intrinsic excellence and the claim to an equal place among other nations.

Although the apologetic character of this literature reflects reactions to the real situation rather than a new and future-oriented concept, these writings managed to form a bridge from the past to the present and to create and mediate the inner continuity of the national consciousness. Thus, they underline the continuity and identity of national history.⁹ To various degrees they capitalize upon the tension between the concrete historical facts and events and the subjective projection of desirable horizons--past or future. In some cases this is followed by a mythicization: with an imaginary people, the Slavs, the first and only state, Great Moravia, is shifted to the mythical lever and the national consciousness is preserved in mythical time as well. This sort of subjectivism must not be condemned and does not disqualify them as a sort of voluntarism, for it is widely acknowledged "to refer to independently verifiable characteristics or processes."¹⁰

Consistent with Herder's line and the traditionally ethnic and cultural post-revolutionary national awakening, Slovak national consciousness has been evolving in the form of ideas on nation, language and culture, as anticipated by the praises and pleas argumentation. This is the first specific feature of the apologies which evolved a specific tradition. Its second feature is that it was not a gradual, linear and cumulative pursuit of emancipatory goals, but consisted rather in solving problems in the form of usually two ontradiictory and competing modalities. These proceeded from the social heterogeneity mentioned above and were conditioned by the historical and cultural contexts and addressed to different horizons.

There are questions regarding the origin, character and effects of this tradition. It was not a genuine tradition for it operated dysfunctionally in the emancipatory process. Thus far, the term 'tradition' has been used in two ways:

-In the sense of a historical tradition which was all the more important in the absence of a political dimension to national life. National consciousness was absorbed decisively into the historical tradition; to a certain degree the lack of factual knowledge of the nation's history was compensated by maintaining traditions. Further, besides positive and generally accepted forms of historical traditions, others came into being which were distorted by exaggeration or underestimation, mutual contamination of various events expressed in different traditions, or the idealization and politization of past historical events.¹⁰

-In the sense of national consciousness which, seen retrospectively, reflects in a certain perspective ideas of nation, language and culture.

Chronologically, the apologetic writings can be divided into three periods:

First Period: 1642-1700—Literary and Historic Tradition¹¹

⁹ From the historical point of view the pleas and praises have been discussed especially in J. Tibensky, *Chvaly a obrany slovenskeho naroda* (Bratislava, 1965); J. V. Ormis, *O rec a narod. Slovenske narodne obrany z rokov 1832-1848* (Bratislava, 1872).

¹⁰ P. Horvath, *K niektorým otazkam historických tradícií na Slovensku*, in *Slovensky narodopis*, 1-2 (1986), 60-65.

¹¹ Historically based are: J. Jacobeus, *Viva gentis Slavicae delineation* from 1642, lost, but known from secondary sources; P. Rewa, *De monarchia et sacra corona regni Hungariae* (Frankfurt, 1659); Proemiun from B. Szollosi's *Cantus Catholici, Tyrnaviae* (1655). Literary and linguistically oriented: D. Sinapius-

These can be discussed under Herder's motto, "The Slavic nations occupy more territory than history,"¹² expressing rather precisely, although poetically, their real political situation.

The basis of the argument found in the praises and pleas is the vague idea of Slavs as defined by their origin, the size and extension of territory, and the idea of the rights and use of language. The argument proceeded from ethnic and geographic issues to cultural and moral ones. The cultural issues point out the importance of the merits of the bearers of culture, as well as the positive characteristics of Slavism as a whole. On the other hand, Slavism was seen through the optic of the national character, and the moral issues were derived from a profound religious feeling. This was expressed in the vernacular and their own writing (hlaholika) rather early, during the brief period of the emergence of a distinctive state. To these occasional historical justifications of nationhood such as the ancient origin and autochthonous existence of the Great Moravia and to the principle of natural right that founded the historical and social thought in Slovakia when the legal and political ones were still simply missing, we must add the elaborated idea of language.

The first pleas for language were devoted to the inhibitions in using and cultivating the language (Horčička, Piscatorius). Later, the right and the usefulness of using the language was defended and supported by historical argument (the Golden Bull of Charles IV, old Slavonic as the fourth language of the Bible and liturgy, etc.). The vernacular as the main subject of the argument was analyzed more subtly. Finally, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the differences between the Czech language (used according to the norm of the Karlická Bible in Protestant liturgy), Slovakized Czech (used by the intelligentsia in writing) and the Slovak language (used in everyday communication) were articulated. Praises then turned into pleas for language education and for publishing linguistic text books.¹³ All these efforts helped to justify the cultural and linguistic content of the notion of the Slovak nation as an ethnic whole.

Second Period: The Eighteenth Century--Linguistic and National Bifurcation

The transition to the new quality of pleas and praises continued, but some new issues appeared.¹⁴ The fuzzy notion of "natio Slavica" as one organic whole, was substituted by the more defined contours of the new understanding of Slovaks and of the Slovak language. Slovaks were considered a separate tribe within the Slavic nations. The idea of the Slovak language as a specific dialect of the Slavic language to be cultivated replaced the previous idea of one common Slavic language. The remote imaginary Slavic horizon was replaced by the much nearer horizon of Hungarian patriotism. Slovak national consciousness, still lacking support of its interests from the

Horcicka, *Neoforum latino-slovenicum* (Lesno, 1678); J. Fisher-Piscatorius, *De origine, iure ac utilitate linguae slavonicae* (Wittnebergii, 1997); D. Krman, *De slavorum origine*; lost.

¹² Herder, 482.

¹³ T. Masník, *Zprava pisma slovenskeho, jak se ma dobre psati, cisti I tisknouti* (Levoca, 1996); M. Miris, *Curiosum de lingua Slavonica commentariolum*, lost; J. Simonides, *Vysvctleni krestianskeho uceni* (Zitava, 1704); A. Macay, *Panes primitiarum aneb chleby prvotin, Lacnejicim slova boziho dusem predložene* (Trnava, 1718) and others.

¹⁴ The most important apologies are J.B. Magin, *Murices sive apologia pro inclyto comitatu Trenchiniensi* (Puchov, 1728); S. Timon, *Imago antiquae Hungariae representans terras, adventus et res gestas gentis Hunicae* (Kosice, 1733); see also parts in J. Severini, *Commentatio historica de veteribus incolis Hungariae Cisdanubianae* (Sopron, 1767) and M. Bel, *Notitia Hungariae novae historica-geographica* (Wien, 1735-42).

part of the state, did not acquire a centrifugal character but, in reaction to Madjar nationalism and to the exaggerated arguments of illegitimate historicizing, appeared clearly anti-nationalistic.¹⁵ In relation to the Hungarian state, the arguments, taken partly from the preceding century, acquired an anti-ideological function. For one hundred years the authors of apologies did not cease to discriminate strictly what was national from what belonged to the state, and thus to defend national equality before the state.¹⁶ This can be illustrated with Balthasar Magin's question: "Is it true that the Slovaks inhabiting the vast regions of Hungary should remain forever serfs and renters on this Earth?"¹⁷ He answers by defending the freedom and equal rights of these peoples, who, by their sacrifices for the common state, can legitimize their claims of origin and right to the country of which they are natives. Magin is very sensitive to the difference between civic equality and national equality vis-à-vis the political nation--*natio Hungarica*--equality, while preserving linguistic and cultural specificity. An anonymous author¹⁸ emphasizes that from factual coexistence it is necessary to develop a conscious sociability which promotes the state.

The idea of national equality was supported also by an historical reconstruction of the glorious past. All forms of this reconstruction, which concentrated upon the Great Moravian empire and the mission of Constance and Methodius,¹⁹ (different as they were), emphasized this historical legacy of the Slovak nation as its contribution to a common Hungary. In these authors, the idea of state took precedence over the idea of nation, thus preferring Hungarian patriotism to national pride. The authors appreciated language as an irreplaceable value, an attribute of a nation and a tool of national growth. The cultivation of language was considered a humanizing mission.²⁰

To sum up: in the apologies, the tendency, emanating from the ethnos, if not the nation, deepened the idea that a nation as described by all its characteristic features, especially the vernacular, is more important than the state. This idea serves to form the national consciousness of the ethnic community. The argument is carried on without any political claims, except the legal arrangement of existing relations. But towards the end of the century, when the praises and pleas seemed to be reaching their finest form, instead of focusing concisely and unambiguously upon the problems, a gap developed so that, since that time, each relevant problem appears in at least two differently profiled competing and irreconcilable modalities. This dichotomic character of approaches to solving the problems connected with national emancipation has become the decisive tradition until the present day.

The Linguistic Bifurcation

While the seventeenth century and early eighteenth century writers already differentiated the Slovak from the Czech, in the last two decades of the eighteenth century the tendency to prefer one to the other was clear. Some of the authors²¹ established and maintained contacts with

¹⁵ Cf. Magin, Timon, Bel et al.

¹⁶ Until G. Rohonyi's work *Palma ... indicate* (Zagrabiae: 1832).

¹⁷ Magin (1728) in Tibensky (1965).

¹⁸ This anonymous apology is in *Egytemi Konyvtar* in Budapest *Collectio Kapriniana*, tom. XXIV, 11.

¹⁹ After S. Timon to be found also in J. Papanek, *De regno et regibusque Slavorum. Historia gentis Slavae* (Quinque Ecclesiis, 1780); G. Sklenar, *Vetustissimus Magnae Moraviae situs* (Bratislava, 1784).

²⁰ In M. Bel, for instance, in the same sense as in A. Macay.

²¹ As J. Hrdlicka or J. Ribay, cf. Hrdlicka's articles in *Stare noviny literneho umeni* (1785-86), Ribay being the author of the project *Projectum institute seu societatis Slova-Bohemicae*.

enlightened Czech authors and aimed at bringing the Czech language into general use in Slovak literature and culture, beyond its use in the Protestant liturgy.

On the other hand, Anton Bernolák and his generation, members of the *Societas Excolendae Linguae Slavicae*, implemented the use of the West Slovak dialect as an independent literary language by the codification of its first norm in 1787.²² Thus, the earlier efforts of Trnava as the center of Slovak culture came to usage because the Catholic intelligentsia was not committed to the Czech linguistic norm as were the Protestants. This shows how ideas connected with the national existence were bound primarily to confessional positions. Although not generally accepted, this first Slovak literary language became the language of the enlightened works of Juraj Fándly and the poetry of Ján Hollý, to mention but the most important representatives.

The National Bifurcation

The seventeenth century knew only the notion of *natio Slavica*, considered to be an organic whole. During the eighteenth century two ideas emerged and competed: one is that of Slovaks as an independent tribe within Slavism as advocated earlier by Magin and afterwards by Papánek and Fándly; the second is the notion that Slovaks belong to the Czechoslovak tribe of Slavism. The representatives of this latter notion were Bohuslav Tablic, Juraj Palkovic and Ján Kollár. Authors Ján Belnai and Štefan Tichý contributed the democratic ideas of civic equality, of equal access to education and to all public offices which traditionally were reserved for the representatives of the *natio hungarica*, that is, only for the nobility.²³

To complete the characteristics of this period, two catechisms of Ignác Martinovič's secret *Societas Reformatorem* should be noted. Encouraged by the secret efforts of Leopold II and especially by the ideas of the French revolution, Martinovič called for a "holy insurrection" to change the Hapsburg monarchy into the Hungarian Republic. His political ideas were very clear and well defined: a federation of national provinces with their own constitutions, forming a union by contract. Each nation was to be granted the right to use its own language, to cherish its own traditions, customs and religious liberty. At the time, his criticism and proposal were ahead of the real situation. In his second catechism he defined the principles of a civic society: parliamentary democracy, rule of law and protection of rights based on natural law. In the liberal tradition he upheld the rights of man to life, liberty, property and equality. His position was that of a Hungarian patriot, "defending with all his force the integrity of the Hungarian republic."²⁴

Third Period: 1820-1843--Double Orientation

This last period of pleas and praises inherited the traditional problems connected with the position of the Slovak nation, on the one hand, and the conflicting tradition of their solution, on the other. It opens with Kollár's work on the philosophy of history⁽²⁵⁾ whose theoretical innovations continue the argument of the seventeenth century and do not pursue those of the eighteenth century. That is why his theory of Slavic reciprocity delineates an unclear, fuzzy and

²² In his *Dissertatio-philologico-critica de litteris Slavorum* (Bratislava, 1787). Followed by *Orthographia* (1787), *Grammatica Slavia* (1790).

²³ J. Belnai, *Reflexiones cunctorum Hungariae civium non nobelium adversus illud...* (Bratislava, 1790); S. Tichy, *Philosophische Bemerkungen uber das Studienwesen in Ungarn. Pest Ofen und Kaschau* (1792).

²⁴ Both catechisms are published in J. Simoncic, *Ohlasy Francuzskej burzoaznej revolucie na Slovensku* (Kosice, 1982). Cf. also K. Benda, *A Magyar jakobinusok iratai. I-III* (Budapest, 1952-1957).

elevated vision of Slavism, theoretically supported by Herder's ideas of including Slavism in the picture of all people embracing humanity. Kollár's conception of the interrelationship between Czechs and Slovaks proceeded from the old aim to slovakize Czech under the new aim of one common Czechoslovak language, that of one united, though non-existent, Slavic tribe. The consequences of Kollár's conception, compared with those of the eighteenth century, are not political. His conception was neither oriented toward the attainment of national independence through linguistic or cultural self-expression, nor was it state-oriented. ("All Slavs have but one fatherland" . . . "a Slav bears his fatherland in his heart"). It was antinationalistic because of the subordination of nationalism to humanity and had huge cultural and humanistic impact. Cultural and linguistic reciprocity binds the Slavs over and above actual political boundaries. These ideas, however, were contradictory to the real historical situation and could not be implemented. They provoked, however, "a European political ghost" named panslavism. Curiously enough, since Kollár the superiority of the national over the state has been stressed in different modalities, recalling Kollár's deeds (e.g. collecting of folk songs).

The national revival activity of Bernolák's co-workers ran parallel to Kollár in the first decades of the nineteenth century, but in the opposite direction. They not only advocated the linguistic, cultural and national specificity of Slovaks as an independent nation in the family of Slavic nations, but they also managed to manifest this idea by continuing to write in literary Bernolák's Slovak.²⁵

The stream of praises and pleas strengthened in response to the open Madjarisation when, by law, the Madjar language was introduced in multinational and multilingual Hungary as the only language of public administration, education, etc.²⁶ Unlike the older pleas, these comprise the complete register of cultural polycentrism.²⁷ Its aim was "to conceal the discrepancy between the national and the dynastic realm."²⁸ The parliamentary session in 1832-36 discussed the reform claims expressed by the gentry, together with liberal ideas and a new concept of a nation. "But their identification of the supranational state Hungarian nation" with the totally unilingual Madjar nation, whose ethnic boundaries were soon to become identical with those of Hungary, produced a justified anxiety among the non-Madjars. The apologies became one of the manifestations of this fear."²⁹

Unlike older apologies these³⁰ cover the complete register of cultural polycentrism. Characteristically, all were published anonymously and abroad. The official Hungarian

²⁵ J. Kollar, *Ueber die literarische Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Stammen und Mundarten der slawischen Nation* (Pesth, 1837).

²⁶ They published also posthumously Bernolák's dictionary of five languages in six volumes *Slovar slovenski cesko-latinsko-nemecko-uherst*, ed. J. Palkovic (Budin, 1825-27).

²⁷ See note 16. G. Rohonyi and P. Senicky, *Eine Stimme aus Ungarn* (Hamburg, 1832); S. Hojc, *Sollen wir Magyaren warden?* (Karlstadt, 1833); L. Suhajda, *Magyarisierung in Ungarn* (Leipzig, 1834); J. Chalupka, *Verbreitung der madyarischen Sprache* Basel, 1834); O. Soltys, *Aplogia...* (Budin, 1841).

²⁸ Anderson, 103.

²⁹ J.V. Ormis, *O rec a narod. Slovenske narodne obrany z rokov 1832-1848* (Bratislava, 1973), 27.

³⁰ 1. *Etwas uber die Magyarisierung der Slaven in Ungarn*, in *Ueberlieferungen zur Geschichte unserer Zeit. Gesammelt von J. Zschokke (1821)*. Aarau bei H.R. Sauerlander, 552-558. Published anonymously by J. Kollar. 2. *Eine Stimme aus Ungarn* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1932). Published anonymously by Pavel Senicky. 3. Juraj Rohonyi, *Palma Quam...vindicate. Opus posthumum G.R...y* (Zagrabiae, 1832). 4. Samuel Hoic, *Sollen wir Magyaren warden?* (Karlstadt, 1833). 5. Jan Chalupka, *Durch welche Mittel lust sich die Verbreitung der Magyrischen Sprache unter den Einwohnern Ungarns am sichersten erzielen?* (Basel: Bei J.N. Prettnner, 1824). 6. Ludovit M. Suhajda, *Der Magyarismus in Ungarn* (Leipzig: Bei C.

nationalism, on the other hand, could make use of state means for manipulating its inhabitants. Thus, it spread through the state administration, school system, church, legal system, etc., as its channels, using thereby:

- Legislation (a continuous flow of language laws were passed, such as laws No. 16/1791, 7/1792, 4/1805, 8/1830, 3/1836, and finally 6/1840, which introduced the Madjar language as the sole and universal official language).
- Setting up of new journals and newspapers published in the Madjar vernacular.
- Censorship (as mentioned above, all Slovak apologies as differing from the official nationalism, had to be printed abroad in different languages).
- Instructions of the state administration directed, e.g., to the Protestant church or schools by their inspectors, but also decisions about parliamentary sessions (none between 1812-1829). All these measures came unambiguously under the motto "only by bonding with the Madjars will the Slavs be able to secure their own religion, liberty and education."³¹

Without ever being able to name it, the apologies of this period expressed the vantage point of popular nationalism as a counterpart to the official nationalism of the Hungarian state. That is why they described their position as "sober patriotism" (J. Melczer). Therefore, "where their own defense will not be strong enough, they will request the king's help for protection,"³² for "not only have the nations of Hungary their nationhood or national characteristics, but also they love it and hold to it because . . . it is the condition of the existence of every nation."³³

An exceptional place among them belongs to L. M. Šuhajda's *Magyarisierung in Ungarn*. Traditional historical arguments concerning the origin of a common state through military alliance rather than by conquest aim not at confrontation but at the defense of national equality:

Slovaks, the people, differing from all their neighbors by their language, thought, customs and in other ways as well, have all the attributes of a nation, even though the state is not named for them and the country is multilingual; it is not a mass without history but an important element building the state.³⁴

In the theoretical part of his plea, Šuhajda differentiates between the political and ethnic concepts of fatherland, which difference corresponds to the situation of Hungary and to the position of Slovaks therein. Of four types of state, he considers the national state to be the best

Drobisch, 1834). 7. Jan Chalupka, *Schreiben des Grafen Carl Zay* (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1841). 8. Jan Poval Tomasek, *der Sprachkampf in Ungarn* (Agram: Bei L. Gaj, 1841). 9. Jan Caplovic, *Slawismus und Pseudomagyarismus* (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1842). 10. Josef Melczer, *Szozat a slav nyelv erdekeben F. Machold Besztercze—Banyan*. 11. L. Stur, *Die Beschwerden und Klagen der Slaven in Ungarn uber die gesetzwidrigen Ubergriffe der Magyaren* (Leipzig: R. Binder, 1843). 12. Samuel Hoic, *Apologie des ungrischen Slawismus* (Leipzig: Von S.H.F. Volekmar, 1843). 13. Jan Pavol Tomasek aks. Bekesy Pal, *A nyelvbeke Magyarorszagban* (Locsen: 1843). 14. M.M. Hodza, *Der Slowak. Beitrage zur Beleuchtung der slawischen Sprache in Ungarn* (Prag: 1848). All these apologies were collected, translated and published in Ormis, 1973.

³¹ Ormis, 563.

³² *Ibid.*, 476.

³³ *Ibid.*, 608.

³⁴ Published anonymously without place and date, included in Ormis.

type of congruence between a nation and a state. But where history seemed to ordain differently, it is necessary to protect by legal norms the relations of various nations within one state.

Against Madjarization and history, appeals not only to natural law, but also to international law; "when Madjarization offends international law, it cannot have political importance." He considers loyalty to the state to be dependent upon the justice of a state governed by the rule of law. His brief and modest proposal for change consists in the introduction of a union of national states based on mutual consent. According to him, one cannot neglect the fact that the Slavs in Hungary developed a national consciousness and are a nation of their own.

Šuhajda was right in disguising the ultimate aim of Madjarization as exclusively political (hegemony), and not literary (aiming at education and improvement), "welding together the new national and the old dynastic principles"³⁵ without proposing or backing any political change. On the other hand, Šuhajda's apology--despite his use of the term "the people" in an ethnic rather than a political sense, and despite his not very elaborated federalist proposal--was misinterpreted by Madjar historians as aiming at the territorial fragmentation and cultural atomization of Hungary.³⁶ Both these evaluations prove that both parties, Slovaks and Madjars, "were quick to realize, that the right to have one's own language, courts, newspapers, indigenous literature and art, local institutions and proper customs has immediate political consequences."³⁷ The Madjar part, moreover, realized that it was ideologically fruitful not to discriminate official from popular nationalism, for this makes it possible to slander the other party regarding the same objectives and methods one has oneself. As Štúr wrote:

By our enemies all of these are called panslavs. That is, what the Madjars consider to be their highest virtue, love of their own nation, they condemn in us as our deadly sin. Does this virtue, then, belong only to *one* nation; is it impossible for others?³⁸

It would be quite natural to expect that the dichotomous character of the national emancipation would disappear with the generation following Štúr. Its representatives were reared on Kollár's humanistic ideas and Hegel's theory of state; they accepted the understanding of nation coined in Bernolák's camp. But the unity was attained only as far as the codification of the second norm of literary language is concerned (1843), which was due to the fact that the solution had been found outside the dichotomy of Bernolák's and Czechoslovakists' views. In this way, the Slovaks abandoned the fifty-year old tradition of the first literary Slovak language and abandoned for the time being the linguistic, as well as national, conception of one Czecho-Slovak tribe. The Štúrians, however, failed to realize their political program in the revolution of 1848.

Kollár's romantic conception, as a projection of values and goals completely different from the actual needs and possibilities, operated dysfunctionally and was abandoned in the 40s. This all-Slavic conception reappeared later, permanently in the metamorphosed form of Messianism motivated by the situation of a defeated small nation in 1960s or as a prelude to the First Republic at the turn of the nineteenth century, etc.

The struggle for liberation proceeded in a paradoxical manner: the defense against Madjar domination was not bound to an unambiguously formulated Slovak distinctiveness, but in some cases was allied with the prospective of participation in larger or smaller Slavic aggregates and

³⁵ Anderson, 127.

³⁶ G, Szekfu, *Magyar tortenet* (Budapest: V. Kotet, 1939), 366-67.

³⁷ Smith (1971), 172.

³⁸ Ormis, 538.

with messianism. In the nineteenth century, the idea of determination in the direction of Slavic horizons reappeared to unify Kollár's anti-Šúruian work, *Voices for the Need of a Common Language for the Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks* (1846), with Messianic variants reflecting upon national problems in the 60s and 70s, as well as the *fin du siècle* initiative of the journal *Hlas* (Voice), encouraged by T.G. Masaryk.

Thus, two separate orientations concerning the concept of nation continued to co-exist:

1. The idea of the common Czechoslovak tribe combined with the humanistic attribute of Slavic reciprocity. The differentiating mark of the modern nation--the state--was dissolved through an abstract dialectic of whole and parts into a non-existent Slavic universalism, and in the twentieth century into the idea of artificial Czechoslovak unity. On this basis, the second concept was criticized as particularism or separatism.

2. The idea of an independent nation (in the nineteenth century referred to also as a tribe) stressed the primary obligations of a nation to itself, i.e., the obligations which a nation as an organic part of humankind must fulfill as belonging to historical nations. The nation can come alive only in terms of its own identity as a real functioning unit, in contrast to an abstract notion of supra-national understanding. In this conception, cultural and humanistic ideas clearly aim at the political articulation of national aims. In the twentieth century they formed successively the background of the political strivings for autonomy within the monarchy, then within the Czechoslovak Republic, and grew into the idea of an independent Slovak state.

It seems that the bifurcation mentioned above was the turning point at which the historical opportunity for necessary minimal consent on fundamental common aims was lost. These aims were articulated in an unambiguously political manner, in a nationalist doctrine calling for a national state--as was the case at that time in most European countries--that makes a national community vital and active. This gives the nation a consciousness of its indisputable identity that can then function as a part of modern nationalism.³⁹ A division of the nation into Catholics and Protestants played a role in contrasting the units, thus contributing to the persistence of the dichotomy.

Until the present day, *mutatis mutandis*, the idea of national distinctiveness (seen in the European context as too narrow and interpreted pejoratively) competes with the idea of identification with broader units, diachronically with the Czechoslovak context, Sovietization and finally Europeanism (thus as the opposite of the previous idea, i.e., as openness, inclusion, compliance with either social progress or the trend of the present day).

Some results of this dichotomic development can be summarized as follows: Slovaks have developed a distinct culture and achieved a common literary language, but have not formed a common national consciousness nor a common understanding of the place of the Slovak nation in the state-political and, state-legal sense. The national interests and aims are traditionally contaminated, linguistically and culturally. This is a result of the need to confirm the national identity. This desire for a national identity continues despite the bifurcation of its articulation. Though the cultural and social structures and a fragmentary national consciousness are present, the definite shape of a national unit in the form of a political national program is still missing.

³⁹ That this development strengthened the fragmentation of national consciousness is another problem and is not to be identified with the pluralism of political views, as it concerns a deeper level, that of national existence. This fragmentation has persisted despite various modalities of the state and of legal regulations of relations within the Czechoslovak Republic.

The question arises whether this dichotomic, and, on the whole, ambiguous, character of national emancipation is to be blamed for a misunderstanding of its decisive phases (the national revival, the origin of the first republic, the federalist efforts and current attempts to define the Czecho-Slovak relations) on the part of non-Slavic and non-Slovak power centers as well as on the part of the broader milieu, and eventually for their resistance.

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Chapter II

Philosophy and National Identity in Slovakia

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Two conceptions of national revival were formed in the course of the nineteenth century. Their common element was their link with the ideas and heritage of the European Enlightenment and Romanticism and, within that, with the so-called organic principle as a philosophic category. Slovak revivalists tried to define, by means of the latter, the contents of the notions; "national individualism" and "national sovereignty", in the context of the notions "Slavic Nation" (as a whole of Slavic nations) and "Czechoslovak Nation" (as all Czechoslovak tribes together). The aim of the present study is to show that the contrast between the two conceptions stems from a different philosophic interpretation of the above organic principle, in correlation with a characteristic of the relation "whole and part" with respect to the relation: "national-supranational." The conflict between interpretations and resolutions of the so-called Slovak question arose against the background of one or the other conception, which survive until today.

It is the historic merit of Štúr's generation, above all of Štúr himself, J.M. Hurban and M.M. Hodža, that they managed to integrate the foregoing revivalist ideas into a well-rounded, internally consistent conception which could become the foundation for a nationwide ideology. Thanks to this, national life began to pulse in the course of the nineteenth century as an individual, internally developing organism, in spite of ongoing unfavorable conditions for the attainment of state and political sovereignty, and in spite of the growing homogenizing efforts of the reigning Hungarian groups.

Theoretical reflections on the essence, sense and aim of this national revival were took place in an active atmosphere of broad-branching national revivalist activities, which intensified mainly in the last decades of the eighteenth century.

Their stimulant was an unprecedented boom of patriotically-oriented literary activities and the development of linguistic, historiographic, ethnographic, and philosophic writings primarily concentrated on the elucidation of Slovak national history.

National revival activities took on intensity and quality in the eighteenth century after some work in the seventeenth century. Their aim was to prove that a nation existed in Upper Hungary whose origin had reached back to Samo's empire and then to Greater Moravia (M. Běl), a nation developing its own culture in its original territory and preserving its own language. Consequently, it had the right to live in the family of nations settled in Hungary as an individual and independent nation possessing equal rights. However, this ambition had to face two barriers. The first was the fact that the Hungarian national element began to assert itself more intensively in the common Hungarian state, as well as in the assimilation policy of the "ruling" Hungarian nation. The second barrier was the confessional division of Slovaks produced by the Reformation and Counter Reformation movements. This division hampered the formation of a unified national ideology so necessary for the struggle against Magyarization efforts. It was specifically reflected as well, as we will see later, in the creation of national revival conceptions.

Language is among the basic attributes of national identity. As its spoken form is an inevitable basis of communication among people, as is its literary form, it is a determining supposition for national cultural development and for the establishment of ethnic identity. It was a misfortune of

the Slovaks that, due to known circumstances, they were not able to work their way to their own literary language. Nevertheless, the spoken language or "Slovak village way of speaking," to which Dobrovský referred, provided a link among the population and fulfilled communication needs through its various dialects. It would have been natural to form a national literary language, parallel to the effort to raise national awareness, in order to develop national culture and Slovak spiritual life. This effort, however, was hampered by confessional differences and different approaches to the formation and use of literary language. This was the case not only of the literary language; more fundamentally, it reflected a different grasp of the substance of national revival itself and the assertion of different national ideologies which should unify the national organism as a whole. While Slovak Protestants adopted and established Czech as a literary language, Slovak Catholics at first concentrated on the Slovakization of the Czech language; later on, they preferred "cultural Slovak" in the form of the Westslovak dialect.

The penetration of the Czech language to Slovakia, especially to its western parts, its use beside Latin, German or Hungarian as the official language in times before the Reformation, contributed significantly to the development of a spiritual culture and to the penetration of currents of thought from the West. The Reformation decision to use the national language for ritual purposes supported the adoption of Czech among Slovak Protestants at first as the ritual language ("Biblical language") and then as the literary "national" language.

The assertion of Czech as the literary language culminated in a certain sense in the literary activities of Ján Kollár: his engagement is the more significant since he connected--conceptionally and theoretically on the basis of philosophic reflection on the whole-part relationship--language unity with cultural unity and, as a final consequence, with national unity. The examination of this process shows that this is a case of the "dissolution" of Slovak national identity in an imaginary Czechoslovak (in effect, Czech) tribal grouping.

As regards specific terms of the Counter Reformation in Slovakia, one important fact is worth noting. The Catholic cultural community refused--whether from the need to express difference from the Reformation literary efforts, or due to such deeper views as its relation to the Christian tradition of Ss. Cyril and Methodius--to accept Czech as a literary language. The initial effort to Slovakize Czech texts to the maximum was replaced by a purposeful and well-considered intention to introduce a new literary language. It had to be "cultural Slovak", i.e., an enhanced Westslovak dialect. Unfortunately, this was far more distant from the Central or Eastslovak dialects than Czech. The codification of literary Slovak by Ant. Bernolák took place on just this language basis.

Throughout his whole life, Kollár was active in literature, research and education, and these activities are incontestable proof of his patriotism, his deep relationship to his own nation, and his effort to activate the national awareness of the Slovaks to fight for their national freedom. He purposefully proceeded in his efforts with a well-advised conception of national revival.

It is not necessary to mention the philosophic sources of European Enlightenment or Romanticism, or links to domestic sources of thought directly influencing the working out of this conception of national revival. An important role was played in Kollár's philosophic considerations by the so-called organic principle and the resulting interpretation of a mutual relation of whole and part. The principles of a development process, irreversibility and direction, helped him in applying this organic principle to national problems, in explaining the historical mission of the Slavs and, within that, of Slovakia as well. This he saw as an inevitable phenomenon that, apart from bringing freedom and equality of rights to the oppressed Slavic nations, would signify the achievement as well of the major ethical project, namely, the realization of "pure" (all-human) humanity.

The Slavic nation is, according to Kollár, an organism constituted by tribal structures, one part of them being Slovakia. Only within a united Slavic whole can its individual organic components exist, thrive and develop. Kollár writes: "Consequently nothing but solidarity will show us the greatness of our destiny among many nations and centuries, and work out how to gain it: it will unify and elevate the forces of our nation, provide confidence and courage to individual tribes who will dare to think liberally and act in the bosom of a great nation."¹

J. Kollár had an opportunity to acquaint himself with two interpretations of the relation of the whole to the part during his studies in Germany. J.C. Herder was the author of the first: its basis is the organic principle stating that a whole is not composed of amorphous parts which do not lose their identity or independence within this whole, but serve as a means for the working of the whole. If the whole represents mankind and community is a concrete application of this principle, then its parts represent concrete national communities. In other words, even if a nation is a part of a universal organism, it preserves its specificity and identity, because only through them does it become functional and, simultaneously, contribute to the whole as well. It is, therefore, necessary for the nations to develop all those characteristics of confirming and preserving their identities--national historical memory, traditional customs and the like.

The author of the second interpretation was G.W. Hegel: the basis here is the so-called dialectical comprehension of the relation whole-part. A whole is only functional in a sense; its components are only means or instruments for the attainment of the aims intended by the whole. In Hegel's words, an individual and, figuratively, a nation, as well, can only be viewed "from the visual angle of a category of means".

J. Kollár seemed to decide between the two interpretations. He claimed that "a nation must pass through history instead of allowing history to pass through it" (1. c., p. 144). In other words, a nation must preserve its identity and specificity at each stage of its development in any social whole. The aim of Magyarization is, indeed, the liquidation of the Slovak national specificity, to assimilate the Slovaks within the Hungarian state, and to begin to create its programme. The awareness of weakness and disintegration of Slovak resources brought him, on the other hand, to the idea of seeking rescue in a supranational whole, in a fictitious Slavic nation, even at the price of sacrifice. "We are becoming people and nations only through the idea of a human whole, without which individuals remain children, nations and tribes, barbarians". From that he deduces, "We must know how to unite small and large, tribes with nations or, in the worst case, we must have the courage to sacrifice a part in order to gain the whole". This already is a Hegelian interpretation of the relation, whole-part. It had negative effects, not only in Kollár's reflections on the Slavic nation, but also when he worked out the conception of Czechoslovak tribes. There he argued in favor of Czech as the literary language of the Slovaks and was enthusiastic about a "united" culture.

If the idea of a great Slavic nation, in reality, was a mere construction of thought and, as such, did not awaken any response from other Slavic nations, the idea of a Czechoslovak tribe implied far-reaching conclusions: it aimed at the basic attributes of national identity. That is why it conflicted with the main mission and sense of the revival efforts characteristic of the earlier and contemporary revivalist generations. The implication for the Slovaks was to give up their striving after a national literary language and, in the final analysis, even after their own national culture as the price of a more or less fictitious unity.

We will try now to summarize the above reflections and trace a general image of the situation in Slovakia in the new Štúrian generation. In spite of the situation, complexity and unfavorable conditions of the national life of the Slovaks in Hungary, it is possible to state that the Slovak

¹ J. Kollar, *On Literarcy Mutuality* (Bratislava, 1954), 137.

national awareness quickly worked its way to an ethnic identity of its own at the break of the eighteenth century, and that a need developed to separate from the centuries old dependence upon the literary language. The growing resistance against Magyarization efforts and the heartening effect of Slavic cooperation had a great share in this. But, first of all were the broadly developing national revival activities on which concentrated all literary, scientific, educational activities, i.e., the entire creative potential of the nationally-aware Slovak intelligentsia. All this contributed to the formation of a national unity and an adequate national ideology. A new nation was on the way to entering into the community of European nations and was quick to develop all the activities of its national identity.

The ongoing split over the solution to the key question regarding national identity no longer corresponded to this question of literary language reform. No small role was played here by a division of ideas emphasizing the confessional division of the inhabitants of Slovakia. Integrating power and strength were required to unite the previous revivalist thought projects and offer a conception corresponding to the actual situation in the movement of Slovak national liberation. This task fell upon the generation of Štúr, closed the language-integration efforts of the previous generations on the basis of a national revival conception of their own and, thus, gave impulse to a qualitatively new dimension of the development of Slovak national life.

The Štúrian reform of literary language, i.e., the appointment of Slovak to the cultural functions of national life, signified the beginning of a new stage in the formation of national consciousness. The fact that Slovak as literary language took hold in so short a time, that it was accepted by both Catholics and Protestants, proves that an optimal variant was found. And yet, it was primarily the confessional division that became a source of further complications on the way to the national unity so necessary under the increasing pressure of Magyarization. The political aspects of the confessional appurtenance came to the fore in the question of Czecho-Slovak relations in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The all-round situation of the Czech countries within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy enabled them to develop further a national consciousness and to exert the rights of national liberty. Events towards the end in World War I provided opportunities to gain sovereignty and statehood. As the decomposition of the monarchy was taking place and, consequently, the possibility of national freedom and independence was growing, the "Slovak question" began to appear in a new shape in Czech political circles. Slovakia was no longer regarded as an oppressed brotherly nation that should be helped in its struggle against Magyar national chauvinism, but rather as a part of the Czech regions that had to be freed and attached to the Czech countries. The idea of one nation was revived again, within which Slovakia should have the character of an ethnographically specific territory rather than as having national independence of its own.

These ideas were fully accepted by the Czech ruling stratum and became its programme, the core of the Czechoslovak ideology. They enable us to understand why Masaryk so pressed the Slovak intelligentsia not to accept Štúr's solution of the Slovak question, to return to Kollár's conception of Czechoslovakism and to disseminate this in Slovakia. The idea of Czechoslovakism became a cornerstone of Masaryk's successor, E. Beneš, as well, and predominated in nationally-orientated Czech circles until recently.

The question of Czecho-Slovak relations had been in the epicenter of national life, even in Slovakia, since the second half of the last century. The aspect of conceptualizing dominated till the rise of CSR; while the political aspect became more important after 1918. An important role was played by the confessional division in the process of conceptualization. The Slovak Evangelicals also adopted Czech culture, having accepted Czech as the cultural language. Various

currents of thought coming from the West across Bohemia to Slovakia and works by Slovak authors writing in Czech also found a fertile soil in Czech countries. Thus was born the idea of Czecho-Slovak mutuality, leading the process of the union of both nations.

However, with revivalist ideas, modern western currents of thought began to be diffused in Bohemia, calling for democratization, liberalization, tolerance, and, with them, free thought, even atheism and materialism. This fact understandably did not comply with the conservatively disposed Slovak clergy who were called to defend religious truths. Czechoslovak unity began to be problematic for fear of Czech influence going in this liberal direction and attention beginning to fix upon imperial Russia. The ideological programme of such a reorientation was described by Štúr in his work "The Slavs and the World of the Future" Štúr's critique of the West and orientation to the Russian Slavic empire became a platform for Slovak ideas of messianism. Its propagators were many significant personalities of the Slovak national revival, such as M.M. Hodža, Bohdan Hrobo, P. Kellner, Ctibor Zoch, Pavel Hecko: the conservative Slavophil and messianic trend in the Slovak revival movement was crowned by S.H. Vajanský.

The growing influence of modern western currents of thought, deriving mainly from Bohemia, drew resistance in the Slovak Catholic camp. Slavophil and messianic ideas did not find so fertile a soil there as among the Slovak Protestant intelligentsia. Even greater stress was laid to domestic traditions, national history and Christian values as basic cornerstones for the preservation of national identity. They were propagated by the Slovak People's Party, headed by A. Hlinka since 1919, which brought together nationally conscious Catholic clergy and the intelligentsia in general, and gained the sympathies and support of the general public by its resistance to violent Magyarization. However, it did not manage to get rid of the ties with the "sisterly" Hungarian People's Party. Evidence of this is the activity of Frantisek Jehlička, co-founder of the Slovak People's Party, a priest in Bratislava, and professor of the Faculties of Theology in Budapest and Warsaw.

Unlike Jehlička, Andrej Hlinka agreed with the idea of creating a common state of Czechs and Slovaks in the last years of World War I. He proclaimed in a session of the National party held in Martin on May 24, 1918: "The time for deeds has come. It is necessary for us to determine whether we will continue going with the Hungarians or with the Czechs. Let us not ignore this question; let us say frankly, we are for the Czechoslovak orientation. The thousand-year marriage with the Hungarians was a failure; we must break up." However, the Czechs were free thinkers, free-masons and atheists; and later on, when Czech hegemony began to assert itself in Slovakia, he steered his party towards the struggle for the autonomy of Slovakia. This he connected with the effort "For Christian Slovakia", for "Slovakia of old traditions and values". The Slovak People's Party resumed the tradition of struggles for national identity, freedom and independence. This orientation, essentially to the right, was lessened by union with the radical Slovak "Populists" during World War II.

The increasing impact of Magyarization could not stop the growth of the nationally-awakened Slovak lay intelligentsia. Many Slovaks studied in Bohemia and in western states, as well. They not only adopted progressive currents of thought, but were aware also of deep democratic changes brought about by a developing and thriving capitalism and a general liberalization of life connected thereto in those countries. A movement arose from the ranks of this intelligentsia in Slovakia--the "Hlasists"--with their own programme of Slovak revival. Its important representatives V. Šrobár, P. Bláha, A. Štefánek, M. Hodža, and others, began to issue a periodical of their own Hlas (Voice, 1898-1904); the line of its ideas was later followed by the periodical *Prúdy* (Streams, since 1909).

The Hlasists had not only adopted the national revival programme of the Štúrists (in its revolutionary form), but they tried to extend it to the economic, social and educational development of Slovakia. It was this part of their programme that brought them to a Czecho-Slovak orientation.

The Slovaks cannot be saved by a belief in salvation from the "central Sun" according to their opinion: the Slavophil orientation, the idea of a great cultural mission of the Slavs, and also the "philosophy of returns" to idealized tradition, to "eternal" values, appeared to them harmful and reactionary. Slovakia needed economic, social, and educational development: it could be helped, not by a backward half-feudal and conservative East, but by alliance with the prosperous Czech countries.

In our opinion, the Hlasists introduced new, suggestive and progressive aspects into the national revival movement in Slovakia. They understood the nation as a living, dynamically developing organism; they accepted the need to preserve and develop national identity, but not to reduce its substance to language and cultural attributes. The economic and social aspects have the same essential signification for the development of the national organism. Only a nation that is independent in this world can defend its sovereignty; it can be a partner to other nations only when it has equal rights. It is only in the economic sphere that Slovakia needs help. This can be offered only by fraternal, economically and culturally more developed Czech countries.

It is to be regretted that the Hlasists did not manage to assert this prospective programme of "Czechoslovak mutuality" when the conditions existed for a common life in a common state. They became instead leading propagators of Czechoslovakism, promoters of a hegemonistic policy against the Slovaks.

Summary

The philosophic origins of the two conceptions of Slovak national revival, formulated in the course of the nineteenth century, became a basis for the solution of the "Slovak question" in the twentieth century, as well. Their common connection is the link-up to the heritage of the European Enlightenment and Romantic ideas, first of all to the so-called organic principle of the relation of a whole and its parts, of the individual and universal. The content of the notions "national identity" and "national sovereignty", as applied to the problems of Slovak national revival, was developed in the context of the notions "Slavic Nation" as a whole of Slavic nations and "Czechoslovak nation" as a whole of Czechoslovak tribes. The difference between the two conceptions has its origin in a different philosophic interpretation of the organic principle, in correlation with the explanation of relations between a whole and part, respectively, the national and supranational. From these interpretations, the idea of Czechoslovakism developed, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, there developed, as well, the idea of "Slovak nationalism" represented by the ideology of the People's Party.

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Chapter III

The Idea of Slovak Language-Based Nationalism

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The purpose of this chapter is to present the idea of the Slovak national movement as it bears the character of being language-based. Indeed the codification of the Slovak literary language is to be considered the constitutive moment of a distinct Slovak national consciousness and identity. In the following, I will attempt to show why in two stages: (1) the historic background, and (2) the significance of Štúr's declaration of the "need" to write in Slovak, this act constituting a declaration of Slovak national self-being or individuality ("svojbytnos") as an idea and constituting the beginning of its implementation.

Historical Background

The Slovak nation-building process was part of the modernization process which started with the enlightened, absolutist reforms of Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II, who exceeded his mother in the scope, speed and daring of his reforms. Their aim was to homogenize the culturally, socially and politically heterogeneous Habsburg Empire, to create a common "imperial" identity through unified legislation, centralized administration, new systems of education and the introduction of German as the over-all official language of the empire. This attempt failed. It proceeded uncompromisingly and unconstitutionally, and came into conflict, therefore, with strong, local vested interests, unwilling to yield to imperial dictate and pressure. These enlightened, absolutistic bureaucratic reforms clearly demonstrated the inevitability of the transformation of the empire but, at the same time, also the impossibility of achieving it instantly and solely by means of imperial decrees. Meanwhile, an historic event of European significance and paradigmatic value occurred, the French Revolution. This presented a new, revolutionary type of social and political transformation, based on the reversal of the relation between ruler and ruled.

Under the influence of the French Revolution, a contrary, though at first invisible, process was triggered in which the heterogeneous parts of the empire began to homogenize themselves, building separate culturally, and later politically, self-conscious national units. A nation-building process began in Central Europe which can be called revolutionary if its outcome is taken into account. In Western Europe, the modern nation-building process went ahead in already homogeneous areas, as in the case of France. In the heterogeneous Habsburg Central Europe (especially in its Slavic parts), the same process had been started, not from a political, but mainly from a cultural base. The idea of building a nation was born from the fact that various leading groups or the upper strata of ethnic units, under the impact of historic events, became conscious of their own roots and interests, which they could promote only through asserting themselves or their particular identity.

In the Habsburg Empire, the nation-building process, an offspring of the modernization process, went ahead only indirectly under the aegis of the individual rights of citizens. Because in its framework many national groups lived under alien rule, there existed an ethnic divergence

between rulers and ruled.¹ Thus, national freedom was the foremost concern and, in the given circumstances, a national catchword.² This applied to the Slavic nations of the empire. A special case was the multinational Kingdom of Hungary,³ the constitution of which was never totally suppressed and annulled; it had a sizeable record of anti-Hapsburg insurrections.

The dependent national groups "revived" themselves according to the following pattern: "remembering the ancient (i.e., pre-Hapsburg) glory for present inspiration", language reform or the codification of a new literary language, articulation of political demands claiming national equality and safeguards for the unrestrained development of national identity or individuality. The fundamental right claimed was that of cultivating one's mother tongue⁴ in school and using it in local public business. Nevertheless, the usefulness of a "diplomatic language"⁵ in dealing with matters of general concern was not questioned.

Language became a fundamental issue of politics⁶ in the Habsburg Empire, as language was linked to the issue of emancipation. To live means, among other things, to use language: to speak, to read, to write. Is it not a violation of a human right if one is forced to use an alien language? Answering the question "What is Enlightenment?" Immanuel Kant closed with the words "Dare to use your own intelligence!" The most natural way to do so is to do so in one's mother tongue. The conclusion was that emancipation could not be achieved, if one was not allowed to use and cultivate one's mother tongue, the natural medium of communication among the members of the same language group, of acquiring knowledge and, thus, of enhancing the level, not only of professional, but also of social performance.

For our presentation of the Slovak language-based, nation-building process, it is important to remember that the enlightened-absolutistic reforms, though promoting German as the language of empire-wide administration, did not suppress but encouraged the use of the vernacular as a means of spreading practical knowledge, especially in the lower strata of the population. In this connection, it is worth noting the social type of the Josephian priest whose public activity consisted not only in pastoral, but also in educational work. Needless to say, his work could be effective only on condition that the population he addressed understood him, which was the case when he used the vernacular.

¹ Cf. Josef Jirasek, ed. Ludovit Stur, *2442 Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft* (Bratislava: Ucena spolocnost Safarikova, 1931), 177.

² On nationalism see Hans Kohn, *Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century* (rev. ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Collect Books, 1967), orig. ed., 19-44.

³ Magyar nationalism identified two adversaries: 1. The Vienna-based centralizing bureaucracy, loyal to the dynasty; 2. The reviving nationalities. From the former it strove to make itself independent; the latter it sought to assimilate, embarking upon a course of forcible linguistic homogenization, instead of trying to find a creative political formula affirming multinationalism.

⁴ See the article of Ludovit Stur, "Kde lezi nasa bieda?" (Where Does Our Misery Rest?) in *Dielo v piaticich zvezkoch*, Vol. I *Politicke state a prejavy* (Works, Vol. I *Political Articles and Speeches*) (Bratislava: Slovenske vydavatelstvo krasnej literatury, 1954), 312-319.

⁵ Samuel Hoic, "Sollen wir Magyaren warden," in Jan V. Ormis, ed. And trans., *O rec a narod. Slovenske narodne obrany z rokov 1832-1848* (For Language and Nation. Slovak National Defenses in the Years 1832-1848) (Bratislava: Vydavateistvo SAV, 1973), 206; Daniel Repant, *Dejiny slovenskeho povstania 1848-49*, Vol. I *Slovenska jar 1848* (*The History of the Slovak Insurrection 1848-49*, Vol. I *The Slovak Spring 1848*) (Turciansky Svaty Martin: Matica slovenska, 1937), 123.

⁶ Language became invested with antagonistic political symbolism, rulers and ruled spoke different language.

The Josephian priest could be characterized as a "social awakener", in contrast to the later national awakener, because the national aspect was not dominant at that time. He made to function the modernization and enlightenment which was prescribed, in an absolute manner, in Vienna. The emperor in Vienna gave the impulse, but he needed collaborators. These he found in the intelligentsia which was often of "folk" origin and, therefore, had "organic" links to the peasant population. In the Habsburg Empire, Josephinism represents a special kind of revolutionary tradition which deeply influenced the mind as well as the conception of the social role of the intelligentsia. In that region, the third estate was relatively weak and not in a position to be a history-shaping factor. Hence, it was the intelligentsia which came to play the role of initiating and implementing the endeavor of nation-building. The factors conditioning this nation-building process on the concrete level were the impact of such historic events as the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.

Language Based Nationalism: The Context

Nationalism means nation-building. Why was the Slovak nation-building language-based? All nationalisms in the Hapsburg Empire had a very strong language ingredient, but Slovak nationalism was entirely language-based. This reflects a number of peculiar characteristics. Generally, Slovaks were considered a national group, but without an independent national political history. They inhabited a cohesive geographical zone, but without forming a distinct administrative unit of the historic Kingdom of Hungary. The nobility of Slovak origin and language had been spiritually Hungarianized long before it exchanged Latin for Hungarian (Magyar) as the language of public business. Further, its self-interest somehow to secure its age old privileges, which were threatened by modernization, prevailed over the tendencies to effect a shift in political loyalties, to join fortunes with the Slovak ethnic population and to develop a Slovak national consciousness.

As Milan Hodža (1878-1944), publicist, politician and Czechoslovak prime minister in the 1930s, correctly observed, the Slovak national group consisted of the folk, with a thin layer of intelligentsia, primarily of folk descent. From a sociological point of view, the intelligentsia were mainly priests and teachers⁷ with a predominantly theological education. But, simultaneously they were engaged in various fields of interest and social activities. It was in this group that the feeling for Slavic roots arose; they were the bearers of the national consciousness. Unfortunately, they did not form a cohesive unit, but were split confessionally between Catholics and Protestants.⁸ They used different literary languages: the Catholics, since the end of the eighteenth century, wrote *berňolákovina*, a western Slovak dialect, while the Lutherans wrote *biblitina*, the language of the Czech *Kralická Bible*. They Slovakized this intensively, arriving at a Czecho-Slovak language. The confessional split indicates that there was no common national church to guard the nation's interests and anchor its identity.

The intelligentsia, in their effort to awaken the Slovak ethnic group to national consciousness, had at their disposal no public institution worth mentioning. The one exception was the Lutheran

⁷ Jan Hucko, *Socialne zloženie a povod slovenskej obrodeneckej inteligencie* (Social Structure and Origin of Slovak National Revivalist Intellectuals) (Bratislava: Veda, 1974), 372.

⁸ The Catholic intelligentsia were being educated in Trnava, Vienna and Rome, the Lutheran intelligentsia mainly at north German Protestant universities which conditioned and influenced their intellectual orientation. Cf. Vendelin Jankovic, *Historicky o nasich konfesiach* (Historically about Our Confessions) (Ruzomberok: Obroda, 1944), esp. 18.

Lycée in Bratislava in the first half of the nineteenth century, where a Chair of the Czecho-Slovak language and literature had been established in 1803. This institution had become the seedbed of general Slav and Slovak consciousness. It had formed generations of national awakeners, among them the Czech historian, Frantisek Palacký. Its tradition had been discontinued in the 1840s upon the intensification of Magyarization to which it fell victim. Magyarization meant the forcible introduction of Magyar as the language of public business and administration on all levels. It pursued the goal of transforming the multilingual historic Hungary, where Latin had served as the official language, into a Magyar nation state. Though a kind of linguistic imperialism, Magyarization was not strictly racial, for it aimed at the linguistic assimilation of all non-native Magyar speakers. The willingness to become a Magyar speaker was rewarded; it opened the door to all kinds of higher professions. Many "linguistic Magyars" of non-Magyar ethnic origin succeeded and made their way to high positions.

The pressure of Magyarization intensified the Slovak national movement, although one cannot say that it was the cause of its emergence. The Slovak national movement or revival already had gathered momentum quite naturally during the Age of Enlightened Absolutism which, for practical ends, institutionalized the vernacular. The need to use the vernacular for the spread of knowledge and skills went hand in hand with the need for its cultivation and systematization (the above mentioned *berňolákovina*, codified in 1787, can be seen in this context).

The Slovaks are mentioned in the literature dealing with the history of the Habsburg Empire as a national group without independent political history.⁹ In no way can this mean that they were an "unhistoric people," without any history at all.¹⁰ Had this been the case, the Magyarization process would have been an easy and natural thing, meeting with no resistance on the Slovak side, but this just was not the case. There was no cultural vacuum in Slovakia; there existed a budding Slovak culture, although linguistically and confessionally split. In this context, it is worth mentioning that Slovak revivalist thinking gained European renown, for instance, in the person and work of Ján Kollár (1793-1852), author of the poem "Slávy dcera" (Daughter of Sláva, 1824), awakening Slavic consciousness in Central Europe. Kollár also authored a very influential treatise on Slav solidarity (1836). In hindsight, one can state that the wider Slav consciousness of Slovak intellectuals proved instrumental in fostering the development of a distinctive Slovak national consciousness, the Slovak national emancipation process, and the consciousness of adhering culturally and spiritually to a community of numerically very strong, though, with the exception of Russia, politically powerless, "Slav nation". Herder's ideas nourished a vision of a bright future and a cultural mission highlighting humanity and freedom. This, in turn, gave them confidence and vigor in withstanding attempts to keep them culturally alienated. This general Slav consciousness can be regarded as a transitional state in the development of a genuine Slovak national consciousness.

Slovak consciousness originated in the intelligentsia, which became a nation-building force. The onslaught of linguistic Magyarization threatened the culture whose roots had originally been in church life. The situation became extremely grave, especially for the Slovak Lutherans in the 1840s, when, under the pretext of the union of all Protestant churches in Hungary, the attempt was

⁹ Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire. Nationalism and National Reforms in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918*, Vol. I *Empire and Nationalities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), 271.

¹⁰ Oscar Halecki, *Borderlands of Western Civilization. A History of East Central Europe* (New York: Ronald Press, 1952), 279.

made to introduce Magyar into church services and, in this way, to Magyarize them.¹¹ This explains why, in that period, the Lutheran Slovak intelligentsia took the lead in the Slovak national movement and eventually succeeded in nation-building by initiating the codification of the confessionally neutral¹² Central Slovak dialect as a literary language to which both wings of the Slovak intelligentsia eventually gave their assent--although at first this initiative was not uncontested.¹³ In the end, this successful creation and codification of a Slovak literary language, upon a second attempt after *berňolákovina*, represents a fundamental event in the history of the Slovak nation-building movement. It unified the Slovak intelligentsia linguistically and this strengthened their position in relation to the politics of Magyarization. The intelligentsia fought for its right to use and cultivate its mother tongue. R.W. Seton-Watson commented, "A distinctive language of its own was well nigh the intelligentsia's sole weapon of defence against national extinction."¹⁴ Language was indeed a rallying point for resistance, but more than this, it was the Foundation of the Slovak nation-building process and constituted the Slovak national identity.

Ludovít Štúr: The Theoretician of Language and Nation

Ludovít Štúr (1815-1856), the founder of the Slovak folk-oriented, folk-emancipating, democratic nationalism and the initiator of the codification act, derived a whole philosophy of life from language. Inspired by Herder, he considered this an "inner", "organic" principle of social and political association. In his view, language "is a mark of individuality; the nation manifests through its language that it belongs to itself, that it obeys its intellect, that it is, in the realm of mind, self-reliant. As the outward expression of mind, language is sufficient for the development of human dignity."¹⁵

Štúr's metaphysical views on language as a manifestation of the selfhood of a nation, as a unique organism, point to his romantic ideological background and can, of course, be disputed. Nevertheless, this metaphysical justification of the constitution of Slovak nationalism served its end well. Language, conceived as a means not only of communication for a given language community, but of the expression of a unique Slovak national character, substantiated the right of the Slovak ethnic community to constitute itself as a separate nation. In his booklet called *The Slovak Dialect or the Necessity of Writing in This Dialect* (written in 1843, but published in 1846), his arguments reveal one fundamental motive, namely, the will to be a nation. According to Štúr, this contained willingness to accept responsibility for one's own life, as well as to work for the

¹¹ Mihály Bucsay, *Der Protestantismus in Ungarn. Ungarns Reformationskirchen in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Part II *Vom Absolutismus bis zur Gegenwart* (Wien-Köln-Graz: Bohlau Verlag, 1979), 72-74, 76.

¹² Cf. Vendelin Janković, *Historičky o našich konfesiach*, 23; Ludovít Štúr, *Narečja slovenskuo alebo potreba písanja v tomto nareči* (The Slovak Dialect or the Necessity of Writing in This Dialect) (Prešporok: Wiggand, 1846), 70.

¹³ Jaroslav Vlček, *Dejiny literatury slovenskej* (The History of Slovak Literature) (Turčiansky Sv. Martin: Matica slovenska, 1933), 111-114; *Hlasové o potrebe jednoty spisovného jazyka pro Čechy, Moravany a Slováky* (Voices on the Necessity of Unity of the Literary Language for Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks) (Prague: Kronberger a Riwnacek, 1846).

¹⁴ Robert W. Seton-Watson (pseudonym, Scotus Viator), *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London: Archibald Constable, 1980), 81.

¹⁵ Ludovít Štúr, "Die Beschwerden und Klagen der Slaven in Ungarn über die gesetzwidrigen Übergriffe der Magyaren," in Jan V. Ormis, 523.

nation. Instead of being objects of history, Slovaks should, at last, become its subjects.¹⁶ The intention of Štúr's booklet was to present the idea of a self-conscious Slovak nation--self-conscious both in the context of Slav nations and in the context of multinational Hungary.

Milan Hodža rightly observed that Štúr "not only deduced from metaphysics, but walked upon the earth."¹⁷ His thinking demonstrated a strange *mélange* of romanticism and realism. The broader intellectual background of Štúr's nationalist thinking can be found in his Hegelian romantic reflections upon the course of world history. He conceived history as a process to which peoples possessing a state organization of their own made the predominant contributions. Hence, the political emancipation of the Slavs in general and of the Slovaks in particular became an imperative if they were to gain respect and assume a dignified role among the nations to which, he felt, their creative cultural potential and number had predestined them. His thinking about history, being rather philosophic than strictly scientific, displayed a futuristic tinge; things past were, on the one hand, a source of distress but, on the other hand, a source of motivation, not only to hope, but to work, for a brighter future. The new Slovak literary language was a prerequisite for this.

The task which Ludovít Štúr set for himself and his group of followers was to translate into reality the idea of a self-conscious, self-reliant Slovak nation, which had an identity of its own and would not be an "appendix of others" (e.g. of Czechs and Magyars). He hoped to achieve the codification of a Slovak ethnic unit (the folk) into a self-conscious, integrated life, i.e., into citizenship, by making the Slovak ethnic group a communicating and cohesive unit through newspapers, books, enlightened activities and cultural institutions, but mainly through civic education.

He had discovered that the cardinal deficiency of Slovak life was the lack of public spirit, an insufficiently developed sense of social life.¹⁸ Traditional Slovak lifestyle had a very narrow scope and did not transcend the boundaries of domestic life. The sense for the concrete prevailed over the abstract, but the building of a nation required the development of a consciousness of a whole (namely the nation). This could not be experienced concretely, but was held together by a community of interests, information and behavior, namely, by the will to form a unit. Awakening meant, therefore, instilling a wider sense of community in the Slovak ethnic population. Awakening can be defined as civic education in action. Its ultimate goal was to transform an ethnic community (the folk), existing as a "natural fact", and insufficiently conscious of its own interests, into an integrated modern nation.

The process of Slovak nation-building had started from a cultural point of departure but, in the long run, it could not avoid and, in fact, did not want to avoid becoming political in character. This came to the fore rather abruptly in the revolutionary years 1848-1849, opening up, so it was thought, un hoped for possibilities and opportunities. In May 1848, the first Slovak national program, *The Demands of the Slovak Nation*¹⁹ was drafted and made public. This manifested the will to be a nation, not only culturally, with Slovak school system up to university level, but also

¹⁶ Ludovít Štúr, *Narečja slovenskuo alebo potreba pisanja v tomto nareci* (The Slovak Dialect or the Necessity of Writing in This Dialect) (Presporok: K.F. Wigand, 1846), 75ff.

¹⁷ Milan Hodža, *Ceskoslovensky rozkol. Prispěvek k dejinám slovenčiny* (The Czechoslovak Split. A Contribution to the History of the Slovak Language) (Turčiansky Sv. Martin: Published by the author, 1920), 305.

¹⁸ Ludovít Štúr, "Život domáci a pospolity," (Domestic and Communal Life) in *Dielo*, vol. I, 112-127.

¹⁹ Cf. Frantisek Bokes, ed., *Dokumenty k slovenskemu narodnemu hnutiu v rokoch 1848-1914*, vol. I 1848-1867 (Documents to the Slovak National Movement in the Years 1848-1914), vol. I, 1848-1867 (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo SAV, 1962), 23-35; R.W. Seton-Watson, *Racial Problems*, 96.

politically, with, e.g., a separate national parliament and a Slovak national guard, with Slovak as the language of command, all this aimed at a recognized equal national status within the defeudalized multinational Hungarian state. The Slovak national endeavor, then and later,²⁰ strove for an institutional and administrative-territorial structure for its will to be a nation. This aim, for the fulfillment of the nation-building process, was not achieved during the nineteenth century.²¹ The lasting and truly great achievement of that century's Slovak national movement was the generally accepted codification of the Slovak literary language, which served as the lighthouse of national identity and as the ever present foundation awaiting its institutional superstructure.

The Slovak nation-building process was one among many in Central Europe. The Habsburg Empire was not homogeneous but a heterogeneous form of social and political life. Modernization could not be started from a common ground of political interests because the population had not previously been homogenized. There was not one people, but many peoples of different traditions and languages. Their uncoordinated and, perhaps, unconsiderable emancipation endeavors led to conflicts of interest, mutual obstruction, and the first signs of power-thinking and power-politics.

The nation-building processes in Central Europe can be described as emancipation movements by national groups aimed at liberation from the alien cultural and political domination. The goal of such emancipation was to secure self-identity, self-determination and self-government. In these cases, language was the tool and foundation of self-identity. The case of a language-based nationalism in a multinational state is very instructive: it shows that the introduction of civil rights suffers serious set backs if the right to cultivate one's mother tongue and to use it in local public business is excluded.

Conclusion

The interest in the constitution of Slovak nationalism in the nineteenth century is not purely academic. It has a bearing on our present situation and concerns our cultural heritage. Indeed, the national-emancipatory thought forms a significant part of the Slovak cultural heritage.

Our times and the part of the world in which we live are characterized by rapid change and a need for personal, social and, it seems, even national re-creation. The past, to which we have dedicated our interest, was also a time of structural change; the revolution of 1848, as Hans Kohn has stated, being the beginning of the nineteenth century among the peoples of Central Europe. It signaled the doom of absolutism and the beginning of a long journey towards parliamentary rule and democracy. In the end, this emancipated politically subjugated peoples and persons. This journey proved to be thorny and not without considerable setbacks.

The formation of the Slovak nation provides a basis for critical reflection. A new role had, and remains, to be learned: that of being a citizen, a person with a sense for community larger than the immediate neighborhood. To the question of the meaning for our time of the nineteenth century's Slovak national-emancipatory thought, the answer can be found in its importance, not only for the study of emancipation problems, but also for emancipation politics. Today we are faced with the following problem: emancipation from 40 years of Communist totalitarianism in thought and action brings the need to find a new self-centered and self-reflective place in the context of nations bound to principles of freedom, democracy and personal dignity.

²⁰ See "The Memorandum of the Slovak Nation," June 1861, in F. Bokes, vol. I, 313-319; cf. also R.W. Watson, *Racial Problems*, 120-122.

²¹ The Matica Slovenska (Slovak Academy) and the three Slovak gymnasia founded in the 1860s fell victim to the onset of a second wave of Magyarisation in 1874 and 1875 respectively.

Communist totalitarianism did not acknowledge free nations and persons. Eventually, it saw them as tools of a depersonalized historical process which, according to "iron laws", allegedly headed towards an abstract and distant chimerical "realm of freedom". The present was degraded into a mere function of a persistently vague future. The richness of man's life was reduced to his capacity for work. The person lost dignity and became a function. The power-holders conceived themselves as functionaries of history rather than as persons responsible for "history". Therefore, the great task of our time is the reinstatement of free thought, free action, personal dignity and responsibility, and democratic institutions. The history of Slovak nation-building and of Slovak national-emancipatory thought presents an interesting and topical case study regarding the formation of a society of conscious citizens. The social message inherent in Ludovít Štúr's booklet is still valid: self-reliance, responsibility, ethics of work and a community-oriented social imagination. These remain topical even today.

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Chapter IV

Ján Lajičák and the Criticism of Cultural Conservatism

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In 1905 at the time the young Slovak, Ján Lajičák, returned from his studies in Erlangen, Berlin, Leipzig and Paris, Slovakia was going through fundamental changes regarding its culture.

The National Revival Movement

The large and decisive group of Slovak nationalists, the so-called "*national group*" in Turiansky Svätý Martin, reflected traces of the Romantic, marked by a shift towards realism. According to their concept, culture essentially merged with intellectual work, or, to be more precise, with literature, poetry and educational activities of a nation-preserving character. Cultural production was understood, theoretically, as the product of the objectifying activity of the *Slovak national spirit*, the *articulation of its specific archetypal creativity*. This conception was elaborated by the representative of the Romantic generation, Ludovít Štúr, who began from a general definition of art based on the philosophy of the spirit: "Art is the representation of spirit in an object in matter. The materials in which spirit is represented are various, and the manner of materialization varies accordingly."

This was influenced by Herder's praise of Slavonic folk literature and the beauty of the Slavonic languages. A central role of the Slovak language became the defence of the Slovak National Revival, reinforced by the theme of individualization introduced by Štúr and his followers. The Slovak revivalist thinkers developed the conviction that *word and language* are the basic form given to material in Slavonic art. Logically, they concluded that the main art representing the Slovak spirit is *literature and poetry*. These art forms were not understood as narrow genres, but as a whole complex of reflexively creative expressions in which the Slovak national spirit elaborated its creations on the basis of the needs of the *objective reality of the life* of the Slovak nation.

In the broad spectrum of possibilities offered by Štúr's definition of art as "the embrace of spirit and objectivity", the spiritual cultural production of the Slovak Romantic generation represented also the high point of the revolutionary national democratic movement before the revolution of 1848-1849. This took various concrete forms: in the celebration of the Slovak national past; in the theoretical working out of arguments for the national distinctiveness of Slovaks and their language within the body of Slavonic nations; in the defence of the Slovak struggle for their national rights as well as civil and social freedom from Hungary; in sensitive poetic fables and in elegizing the Slovak character (Andrej Sládkovi, Ján Botto); in the heroic, tragic and satirical shaping of the individual lot of the Slovak people against the background world drama (Samo Chalupka, Janko Krá); and in emphasizing the ideals of good, beauty and humanity by which the Slovak nation is to obtain the right to enter among the culture-forming nations in Europe, and to move forward in the process of the humanization of mankind (Štúr, M.M. Hodža, J.M. Hurban, *et al.*).

This generation did not explicitly raise the questions of cultural theory. For them, spiritual culture emerged as a problem in the philosophy of art and history; thematically, it served the ideas solicited by the national life of the Slovaks. The general attitude toward the sense of mission of a

creative work was imbued with the historical optimism of the members of a nation that was just finding its "ego" and which, with Herder, believed it was finding its place in history through the authenticity of its art and culture. In this historically decisive stage of the Slovak national development (i.e., during its modern revival), an imposing cultural "*reality*" was formed, namely, Slovak national poetry, literature and a democratic-humanitarian conception of life.

After the failure of the revolution of 1848-1849, in the Austrian monarchy there was no improvement in the freedom of the oppressed nations. The limits of optimism and of trust appeared in the rationality of Štúr's philosophical-historical postulates regarding the legal succession of the "Slavonic epoch" and "Slavonic spiritual-cultural principles".

After Štúr, his partisans and followers continued to constitute the main current of thought; their conception of future national development perdured, as well. Their messianic expectation of the deliverance of the Slovak nation by Slavonic Russia worked in an especially conservative manner. The revival of cultural activity at the time of the memorandum of the Slovak nation (1861) and the foundation of Matica Slovenská (1863), were central to the philosophical ideals of the Štúrian group in the field of adult education and the creation or expansion of literacy. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the situation of Slovaks worsened rapidly in politics, culture and society. The antinational Magyarization efforts and the official denial of the existence of the Slovak nation in Hungary constituted a serious menace to the results already attained by the Slovak national movement. At the same time, there appeared serious social contradictions in the national organism, combined with the development of capitalism which, from a certain point of view, changed the idealized image of the unity of interests in the national community. The disintegrating Hegelianism was no longer strong enough to resolve the whole network of issues which this situation introduced and it became necessary to analyze these by new methods. These contrasted with the overriding task of the Štúr group to awake the nation and form its consciousness by means of a great and noble philosophy. Literature began again to delineate culture, for it provided a more realistic aesthetic and stylistic form for national life, but its first task was the ideological defence of the national idea. Sv. Hurban Vajanský, who upheld ideas regarding national representation, claimed, "From the whole of public life nearly nothing remained to use except the language and temple of literature. The Slovak idea took refuge there under the aegis of the muse."

Ján Lajičák

Since the end of the nineteenth century, in reaction to rapidly changing cultural patterns and conceptions in European countries, cultural conservatism, along with rejection of new ideas and of the more liberal movements in spiritual life, began to appear in Slovakia.

It was more than evident that a new generation was emerging in the field of cultural ideas and taking a leading social and national role. In 1898, the first issue of *Hlas* was published, in which appeared the opposition national group's first echo of positivist scientific efforts in Slovak culture. The "Hlas Group", called after the name of the journal, associated themselves theoretically and philosophically with the realism of the Czech professor, T.G. Masaryk, and his idea of the need of a fresh spiritual and cultural revival of the Slovak nation. Hlas members (V. Srobár, P. Blaho, A. Stefánek, N. Hodža, etc.) no longer considered the nation to be a homogeneous cultural and social body, but approached it as a social organism divided by interests and functions. It was an organism which, in functioning as a national entity, needed an adequate knowledge of its different social activities, ranging from small work and contemporary social and political issues to the highest problems of religious life, culture and science. Their criticism of the traditional conservative

cultural position, aimed at the "national group", did not mean national indifference. Their teacher, Masaryk, in his struggle with the formal patriotism of the Old Czechs returned in his philosophy to the core of the national revival. Analogically, the Hlas group tried to connect Slovakia with fresh and inspiring ideas and aimed at national revival on the basis of modern ideology.

Ján Lajičák joined this dispute about culture on the side of the Hlas group. In his work, *Slovakia and Culture*, he identified this dispute as a struggle of "conservatism and modernism". By modernism he meant a demythologization of the nation and the literature about it. By culture he meant the real needs of Slovak life which are not deduced from the phantasies of the spirit but rather are empirically induced by scientific activity. Compared with the Hlas group, who studied these scientific cultural topics rather sporadically and who were influenced by Masaryk, he himself had systematic research interests in this sphere, intricately programmed, following several European trends.

At the time of his studies in Germany and France, there were interesting interdisciplinary confrontations in the field of sociology, historical philosophy and cultural history. These were, especially, the work of several "heirs" of Comte and Spencer, who employed a post-classical anti-Hegelian historical philosophy perfected by modern empirical study of culture and its history. In addition to Spencer, thinkers from whom Lajičák benefitted most in working out his theoretical basis were H. Aine, E. Renan, L. Gumplowicz, T. Linder and K. Lamprecht. Their opinions appear in his work as the inspiration and methodological support for otherwise independent and original study. *Slovakia and Culture* is the first analysis of the relationship of the Slovak nation and its culture without nationalist pathos. Its intention is to contribute to the confirmation of the specific national, political, cultural and social character by scientific study of their existential manifestations. The objective and systematic character of Lajičák's critical analysis consists in a matter-of-fact analytic language describing inductively and, as if from a "doctor's" distance, the state of affairs of cultural life in Slovakia and its anamnesis. However, this does not result in a neutral relationship to the Slovak nation and its culture. He shows the Slovak nation to be a complex social organism and with new facts wants to provide a tool to reorder its cultural consciousness in order that it be broader, more profound and more realistic. Moreover, he wished to inspire new cultural activities. In his view, their absence rendered Slovak culture inferior on a world plane and the Slovak nation weaker as a political subject.

Evolution and Culture

The axiomatic starting point, which provides the foundation for Lajičák's scientific effort, contains two essential moments: an explanation and strong support for the principle of evaluation and a clarification of the notion of "culture". "My firm foundation is evolutionism", he claims at the beginning. He uses this principle most frequently in the sense of Spencer's socially determined concept of development. This is important for the notion of culture, which he considers not to be a stable phenomenon, not even in a relatively constant entity such as a nation. It is not possible to formulate an absolutely isomorphic definition or define its fixed signs. As for its genesis in general, Lajičák asserts that it appears as the result of natural developmental needs of the human race at a stage when people have lost their primary link to nature and replaced their limited instinctive utilitarian life circle by communities integrated by conscious social, political and cultural organization.

Hence, the more complicated the structure of the social organization, the more differentiated the life needs which appeared. As can be proved by ethnographic research on nations at the lowest

stage of development, as well as on those with advanced cultures that have not constituted a state, *cultural needs* count as basic needs. Following German culture specialists (Lindner and Lamprecht), Lajičák considers these to be the most dynamic elements for social development. However, these needs cannot become the driving force of society until they reach the level of *idea*, i.e., until they are formulated ideologically. It follows that there is a greater variety of ideas where everyday social activity is livelier, that is, in spheres of individual and collective interest and where, by harmonizing needs and ideas, a lively system of culture is constituted.

By the notion of culture Lajičák intends to make, following Lamprecht's views, a synthesis and a hierarchy of all aspects of the national social life and to defend the inner developmental unity of its groups of vested interests, classes and historical existence. "Culture is the content of human life and creating it is the task of an individual as well as of the whole nation." "All our striving, struggles and sufferings are nothing but a cultural struggle." Lajičák did not strictly divide civilization and culture, nor spiritual and material culture, seeing them as almost always complementary in the global cultural system of certain nations. What he emphasized is the qualitative difference in the ability of individual nations to create culture, which he thought could be proven by scientific, empirical and sociological methods.

By referring to a single evolutionary law, Lajičák identifies culture as an historically developing system in which, on the basis of impulses from the sphere of social needs, is initiated the creative cultivating activity or "cultural energy" of a given social group, nation, or particular individuals. According to the importance of the ideas with which they correspond, he lists the manifestations that can be included in the notion "culture". This was quite new in Slovakia. He is not satisfied with the analysis of traditional cultural spheres--literature, religion, history. Rather he starts with the ideas which prevail in Slovakia, shows how they are important for Slovakia, and considers whether, on their basis, Slovak culture can be considered a specific phenomenon of the human spirit. He attempts to explain why there is such invariability of ideas, who creates them, and what impact they have upon the everyday conduct of the national masses, their leaders and their circumstances--civil, family, ethical, sexual and philosophical. In a word, he studies the field of cultural ideas through the prism of all the criteria articulated in the contemporary sociological and psychological European research.

Critique of Conservatism

When analyzing individual aspects of Slovak cultural life, his evolutionary point of view appears in his criticism of ideological conservatism, especially the narrow nationalistic and clerical type which he calls Slovak orthodoxy. In this respect, he argues that both these directions distract attention from focal, social and civic issues, as well as those of a philosophical and emancipating nature, namely, democratism and socialism that point inevitably to a new type of culture. The Slovak nation can assert itself in future struggles on the sole condition that it enter its history with more self-confidence and aspire to the task of becoming a serious factor in the history of the nations. State and political independence is, in his opinion, a powerful factor of cultural development, but it is not an inevitable condition. In considering what gives nations the strength to develop their individuality he considers not only their inner spiritual dynamism, but the new ideas they learn and the general development into which these are incorporated.

As has been mentioned, Lajičák sees ideas as "thoughts of the recognized needs of an individual, or a collective mass rooted in certain social conditions". Therefore they are relative and must meet the development and the requirements of new social practice. Cultural ideas both reflect

this evolutionary movement and anticipate it. When living conditions fossilize and the social milieu moves in the circles of old needs, culture stagnates and becomes traditional. Studying Slovak cultural ideas, Lajičák reached the disappointing conclusion that in Slovakia since the time of J. Kollár the central position has been held mainly by certain unchanging specific ideas which absorbed all cultural activities, i.e., the idea of Slavism or the Slavonic world, the idea of the nation or Slovakia as a specific and particular unit, and the idea of the language or the struggle for the Slovak language. Lajičák considers this priority to be ideologically justifiable considering the time of their origin and, in part, the constantly persevering threat to which the nation and the language were exposed. However, none of these ideas--not even the defence of the nation and the language--can be a sufficient goal for the meaning of life and the culture of a nation. Such a goal can be seen only in the creation of culture in a specifically human sense. "Not language, but culture, should be the slogan of the struggle of the Slovak nation for its existence." Language is an element, a serious part of culture, but on its own it cannot defend itself, for even a Hungarian governmental newspaper could be carrying out an anti-Slovak campaign in perfect Slovak. Only culture can prevent the disappearance of the nation and language; only culture can shape the facts that characterize a nation in its complexity and give it a characteristic value, individuality and civil political status.

Lajičák reproaches the conservative leaders of the nation for a "false" concept of culture, its reduction to individual elements and to specific features that narrow the field of cultural activity and isolate Slovakia from the flow of fresh ideological movements. Especially on the basis of difficult material conditions and the unfavorable political situation in Slovakia, they conclude to a one-way causal nexus on what to do and how to proceed in matters of national salvation, without admitting other possibilities. They operate with the proverbial poverty of the nation, but they have not developed "scientific expertise" regarding its actual state-of-affairs.

Drawing upon Gumpłowicz and Spencer in analyzing sociologically the existential and cultural morphology of Slovakia, he is rather ambivalent as to the fainthearted cliché regarding its insignificance and poverty which echoes until today. He does not deny that the most obvious, significant negative sources of the majority of its deformations, life frustrations and cultural backwardness are its economic and social conditions or, to put it simply, Slovak poverty. He shows this through examples of the way of life and methods of work of Slovak peasants and workers: their minimal labour productivity, the phenomena of "alcoholism and emigration, the capability of quick national assimilation" of the Slovak population, the prevalence of instinct and impulse and the lack of stable rational conduct and behavior, the moral weakness and lower values, the consciousness formulated mainly by the conservative theological attitudes of the Slovak people, the typology of the Slovak intelligentsia as sincere, hardworking patriots, honeyed nationalists, figures twisting according to advantage, etc.

On the other hand, as a theoretician involved in the study of Spencer's theory that ability to control the social world is connected with the subjective quality of acting individuals, he puts the weight of responsibility on the subjective factor. He claims that the capability of a nation to create culture is causally dependent, not only on objectively determining circumstances, but also on the inner mental strength or "moral energy" that irresistibly drives an individual, as well as the mass of the nation, to implementing cultural ideals. In individual cases, it is possible that unfavorable conditions and obstacles can be the cause of "forced" cultural activity, observed not only with talented individuals but also in the cultural upsurge of the mass of the nation.

Naturally, a small nation whose cultural energy and inner moral strength is not sufficiently developed, as in the case of the Slovak nation, can hardly find within itself such a creative source

without catching up and assimilating the ideas that make a nation active, self-assertive and self-confident. As an evolutionist, this seems to Lajičák to be possible only by Slovakia opening its gates to modern cultural and scientific streams of thought and accepting them. In this point, we come across the above mentioned allusion that, although Slovaks lacked the state independence which is a powerful factor of cultural development, that is not an indispensable condition.

In modern life, which moves forward so quickly, Slovaks must avoid wasting precious time; this is a *conditio sine qua non* of cultural development. In Lajičák's opinion the persistence of traditional weeping over the Slovak misery, searching for its causes in external factors or foreign enemies, criminally enhances the Slovak deficits. The truth is that we cannot even analyze this misery in its naked truth, but only in half-truths dressed in the beauty of folk embroidery and folk songs, i.e., by idealizing it. This "idealization" of the nation's misery is the greatest danger, because it contributes to its conservation.

Cultural Development

With a socially evolutionary and differentiating analytical methodology, Lajičák's view acquired another significant feature: the ability to see the national organism in individualized and pluralized configurative relationships. Thus, in his work the needs and their corresponding ideas are studied, not only in their different stages of development, but also in view of their different degrees of social and cultural significance, generality and profundity (i.e., on the axes of conservatism versus progress, basic versus partial features, truthfulness versus fantasizing). What then are the positive and negative criteria, if it is true that they are socially conditioned and, therefore, qualified by their surroundings? On this issue, Lajičák draws upon all the theoretical resources of the evolutionist idea of the temporal coincidence of cultural ideas with the most central needs of a social organism or given group. What or who guarantees that it is a correctly recognized need or a developmental goal? In Lajičák's view it is clearly science--positive, empirical, inductive science.

Within this problem, the author developed yet another topic often discussed in contemporary sociology and philosophy of history: the relationship between the individual and the collective in the creation of culture and knowledge. Lajičák rejects Gumplowicz's extremely collectivist opinion that, on the basis of his interests, an individual associates himself with a certain group, collective or mass and no longer thinks for himself, but rather lets this be done for him by the "social community he belongs to, the social element he originates from, or the social atmosphere he breathes." In Lajičák's opinion, the mass cannot be the author of ideas; this is always done by individuals, subjects capable of, and prepared for, the objective tasks of perception and understanding. Nevertheless, ideas themselves are abstractions of a collective, social experience, because individual psychological development is anchored in the needs of a wide, collective environment and, as such, has cognitive aims convergent with its group, nation or mass.

Thus, the relationships of individual versus mass are often composed of many contradictory layers. For example, the masses often determine the acceptance or refusal of ideas. They are indifferent to many ideas which evidently are in harmony with their general needs (such as in Slovakia the idea of evolution, a free political system, democracy, parliamentarianism, social emancipation). They do not feel the need for them because their consciousness is inert to new ideas. On the other hand, they easily accept others (e.g., religious sectarianism, nihilism, passivism, light-heartedness, and Oblomov-like attitudes) because they are convergent with the structure of ideas fixed in their consciousness.

Very interesting and related to the most painful spot in Slovak life and culture is Lajičák's criticism of clericalism, i.e., the orthodoxism which he considers the enemy of all free thought. This applies to both Catholic and Protestant orthodoxy, both to individuals and the masses, because we are dealing here with a single common source that Lajičák considers to be the greatest ideological enemy of Slovakia. From the philosophical point of view, he identifies it as a theistic, theological and historical opinion.

According to this theory everything in the world should serve God's glory. Everything that can be related to this idea is historically justifiable; that which cannot be brought into harmony with it, is not. This standpoint must not be too assertive, because then man becomes a mere figment. The contemporary, objective historian does not trust this view, and it has no significance for the historical development of science.

Lajičák asserts, with a large amount of pessimism, that this view, which has been shaping the Slovak consciousness for centuries, "has entered their blood and their way of thinking." In his opinion, it is the source of the ideological passivity, fatalism, and insufficient individual and human self-awakening of the Slovak people, including its "lack of a sense of political action." In his opinion, Slovaks, as individuals, do not think freely because they are not led to think independently, to take up an active political struggle or scientific argumentation. Moreover, science often is presented as something quite alien and dangerous to the Slovak spirit, formed mainly by the orthodox theological view of the world. According to positivist and evolutionist Ján Lajičák--who was also a Protestant theologian and liberal--one brought up in this way is not fully developed; he can be manipulated, held by prejudices, and deprived of the happiness and difficulties of the natural struggle for his own life, whose creator he is.

Nonetheless, in his sociological studies, Lajičák did not come to the conclusion that the Slovak nation is culturally inferior as regards its wealth of personality, talents, gifts, bright minds, inventiveness, and its natural tendency to art, beauty and hard work. He sees in these potential values a rich source of cultural energy. In this respect, it is necessary to break the invariability of the system of ideas, the inertness to new ways of thinking, in other words, to give a scientific reason for the needs and ideas that are found in weak traces in the nation. The Slovak people, even when thought of as a mass, are not an amorphous body, a quantity without quality. As a quantitative factor the mass has some significance as a background for the genuine development of the nation. In the qualitative sense, Lajičák suggests that the mass be considered as a summary of "various elements and psychological individualities" capable of integration and of being merged into various groups according to interests and social roles. This produces undiscovered talents and so-called "strong individuals" who emerge generally from the masses thanks to their qualitative plasticity.

Positivism and Progress

Lajičák's work, *Slovakia and Culture*, is, undoubtedly, an outspoken ideological manifestation of Slovakia for the beginning of the twentieth century. It grew out of the converging trends of the first phase of European positivism and the consequences of evolutionary theory for sociology, cultural philosophy and the humanities in general. He wanted to use the impulses provided by these trends in Slovakia, as Štúr once used Hegelianism to encourage a lively national democratism and spiritual awakening of the Slovak nation. However, where Štúr's heritage was taken up mainly by literature, Lajičák showed the weakness of Slovak literary writing and publication in failing to uplift the spirit and in narrowing itself to attempts mere at fiction. In and

through the field of literature other layers of spiritual efforts and discoveries, such as philosophy and science, were not evolved. Such activities require a "total involvement in the process of discovering the laws, phenomena and universals which require a systematic and highly controlled approach."

Enthusiasm for the great success of the natural sciences led Lajičák to the conviction that social science will follow suit. "Science is learning about the essence of matter; this is significant not only for natural sciences, but also for the humanities". Science, like philosophy, is the climax of cultural development; it is the highest ethical and sacred duty of man, and a prerequisite for the improvement of his social and moral life. As a positivist and evolutionist, he sees the increasing poetic value of science in the process of making it more exact, in abandoning metaphysics for ever more verifiable evidence and experiments. (Thus, for example, Wolff's psychology, working with metaphysical notions, has a lower cognitive value than the modern psychology of Wundt, etc.)

In the positivist spirit, Lajičák defines the method of philosophy as "a discipline generalizing and unifying the knowledge of individual branches of science. Therefore, in scientific evolution, philosophy takes the highest rank, and the degree of respect for philosophical issues within a national community is decisive."

Lajičák's pessimism has its origins in the fact that he could not foresee in the near future scientific philosophical development in Slovakia. His opinion was justified by his own destiny in the national community and the sociological *parcours* that confirmed the great constancy of the ideological state-of-affairs in Slovakia. However, there were other phenomena: the highly appreciated women writers: T. Vansová, E.M. oltésová, L. Podjavorinská, Timrava, H. Gregorová, H. Turcerová, M. Horváthová; the signs of modern political, social and economic vision in the Hlas and Prúd movements; the gradual transformations in the social situation in Slovakia; these he interpreted in an Heraclitean manner as indicating that Slovaks will cease to forever enter the same river. In the end, evolution lends great significance to chance, which brings qualitatively new stages of development.

Summary

1. The issue of cultural development and the theoretical concepts reflecting the general characteristics of culture and its importance in national life have not been studied in a sophisticated manner in Slovakia. The reason for this situation is connected, in Lajičák's opinion, on the one hand, with the historic and political destiny of the Slovaks as a non-independent nation and, on the other hand, with the invariability of the cultural and spiritual ideas fixed in its life forms.

2. The introduction mentioned Štúr's concept of national revival as an example of gradual cultural fossilization caused by unchanging ideas that became a hindrance to the appearance of new cultural horizons. The highly dynamic factor of the Slovak national life before the 1848 Revolution (although theoretically a romantic, speculative concept) had turned into a conservative, stubborn, self-sufficient system in the course of changing social and spiritual needs.

3. The core of the present study is an analysis of J. Lajičák's work in the spirit of the modern evolutionary social and philosophic concepts and methods of Spencer, Taine, Renan, Gumplowicz, Lindner and Lamprecht. This taught that a new upsurge of national life depends upon the acceptance of fresh cultural ideas corresponding to the needs of the developing national organism as a socially differentiated and pluralist civil unity. The Slovak nation, like any other nation in the world, cannot move forward as long as it is trapped in the circle of its specific invariable ideas

concerning nation and language. Progress can be achieved only by creating culture in a specifically human sense.

Lajičák investigates individual forms of Slovak life and draws out the essential ideas from the everyday life of the masses, as well as from the highest religious, artistic, philosophical and scientific dimensions. His criticism of Slovak conservatism was unacceptable in official circles and restricted his appearance in public.

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NOTES

1. Ján Lajičák, born July 25, 1875 in Pribylina, died October 28, 1918 in Vyná Boca; a significant Slovak scholar, orientalist-philologist and historian; translator from the Greek and Hebrew languages; by profession a Protestant parson. He obtained his doctorate of philosophy in Leipzig in 1902, for the work "Terminations of the Plural and Dual in Semitic Names". Its significance is emphasized in one of the most known works on comparative Semitic linguistics, Brockelmann's *Vergleichende Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen*. Comp. S.S. Osuský in: J. Lajiak, *Slovensko a Kultúra* (Slovakia and Culture), (Myjava, 1921), pp. 12-13. Similarly French critics appraised Lajiak's Paris dissertation, *Ezekiel, His Time and Learning*, as an original work dealing with the theme against the background of the socio-historical and ideological cultural developmental situation of ancient Israel. He obtained a doctorate in theology for this work, which was published in Paris in 1905.

In Slovakia, Lajičák's evolutionary critical method of cultural phenomena was not received with understanding. He died nearly forgotten, leaving an excellent library and manuscripts from which *Slovensko a Kultúra* was published after his death.

2. Ludovít Štúr, *O národných piesniach a povestiach slovanských plemien* (Folk Songs and Tales of Slavonic Origin) published in Czech (Prague, 1853), p.7.

3. Andrej Sládkovič, Ján Botto, Samo Chalupka, Janko Kráľ were the most significant Slovak Romantic poets of the Štúr era and founders of Slovak poetry in the mother tongue (modified in 1843). Each accomplished in a different way Štúr's ideal of the Slovak poet.

4. Triad of the most significant personalities-thinkers in the era of the formation of national ideology, political program and conception of culture and art between 1838-1889. For Štúr, see other texts and notes, J.M. Hurban (1817-1838), moving spirit of the struggle for the literary Slovak language and organizer of Slovak insurrections in 1848-1849; in his young years he was a follower more of Fichte than of Hegel, with a stress on the active will in the Slovak movement; later a militant patriot-nationalist, Slavophil and defender of the Slovaks against Magyarization. M. Miloslav Hodža (1811-1870), thinker-messianist with an inclination to Schelling's religious accentuation of the resolution of life and national problems; author of the apocalyptic poems with a symbolic hue: "Matora" and "Vieroslavín".

5. Svetozár Hurban Vajanský, *Collected Works*, I, Introduction (Turiansky Svätý Martin, 1907). The quotation shows how half a century later, Štúr's conception of Slovak culture (language, literature) was repeated in a quite different situation by Vajanský.

6. *Hlas*, a monthly for literature, politics and social questions published by the new realist movement in opposition to the old "national school", 1898-1905. Its first editor was Pavel Blaho

in Skalica, later Vavro Srobár in Ruomberok. Both manifest the common characteristics of the Hlasists.

7. Ján Lajiak, *Slovensko a kultúre* (Bratislava, 1957), pp. 28, 47-48.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 29.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 29.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 79.

18. *Ibid.*, p., 25.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

Part II
Nation and State
The Czechoslovak Republic and the Slovak Nation

Chapter V

The Idea of Nation in the Work of Milan Hodža

Karol Kollár

There are times in the development of human thought when the spiritual powers of man not only lead to the creation of great philosophical systems, but also begin to examine the concrete problems of social life. These periods require one to leave purely theoretical investigations in order to engage in the sphere of politics, ethics, and mankind's socio-cultural projects. This statement applies not only to the analysis of most personalities in Slovak philosophical thinking, but also to many of the latest movements in contemporary philosophy, which often find their expression in literary, political, sociological and psychological works.

One such person by his activities left a distinctive mark on the sphere of social and philosophical thinking in Slovakia during the first half of our century. This was Milan Hodža (1878-1944), a Slovak political figure of European standing. He was a journalist, theoretician, and a socially and philosophically oriented thinker, as well as being a political scientist. During the years of the totalitarian regime his contributions to the Slovak national culture were constantly suppressed and rejected. Only critical analyses of his work were allowed, which, in turn, provided the only official opportunity to study and publish his essential theoretical ideas.

Life

Milan Hodža was born to the family of a Protestant minister on the first of February, 1878. He was educated at grammar schools in Banská Bystrica, Sopron and Romanian Sibiu. From 1896 to 1898 he studied law at the University of Budapest; and from 1916 to 1918 he studied philosophy at the University of Vienna. At that time, he also was active as a journalist in the Austrian Press Office in Vienna. In 1921 he was appointed full-time professor of modern history at Comenius University.

As early as 1897 to 1898 he worked for *Slovak Letters*; later he became Parliamentary Correspondent of *The Budapest Evening News*. In 1890 he established *The Slovak Daily*, where he worked from 1903 to 1914. At that time, he was already a deputy of the Hungarian Parliament as representative of the Slovaks from Baka. In 1914 he was sentenced by a Hungarian court to an eighteen-month imprisonment for his political activity. In 1918 he was appointed Envoy of the Czechoslovak Government in Budapest, and served as Minister for Unification from 1919 to 1920. His service continued from 1926 to 1929 as Minister of Education, 1932 to 1935 as Minister of Agriculture, and 1935 to 1938 as Prime Minister.

In sum, Milan Hodža was one of the most capable Slovak journalists and publicists. Before the turnover in 1918 he had established himself as an influential politician. In 1903 he became a deputy in the Hungarian Parliament. This opened wider possibilities for activities reflecting his political, social, and especially social-philosophical ideas and opinions.

After the establishment of an independent Czechoslovakia in 1918, Hodža continued his political activity as one of the prominent politicians of the first Czechoslovak Republic. In 1919 he was appointed a member of the Czechoslovak Government and in 1935 became its Prime Minister.

Eventually his three year term as Prime Minister ended in failure. Under his leadership, the Czechoslovak government, facing the threat of German fascism, made concessions whose tragic climax was the acceptance of the Munich Treaty.

In September, 1938 Milan Hodža resigned and left for France. In 1939 he founded the Slovak National Council in Paris and became its chairman. The political aims of the Slovak National Council, as proclaimed and formulated by M. Hodža, differed from the official policy of the Czechoslovak Exile Government in London in many respects.

After the defeat of France, he left for the U.S., where he was active in promoting the establishment of the Danube Federation. The core of this concept was the need to create, after the Second World War, from the newly reconstructed democratic states a so-called Union of Central European Countries in the area between Germany and the Soviet Union inhabited by approximately one hundred million people. His vision of this federation is summarized in his last book published in London in 1942 under the title, *Federation in Central Europe*.¹

Many of his ideas related to this theme could be called prophetic in today's terminology. They survived their time and are, to a certain extent, timeless. In 1944, less than two years after the publication of this book, Hodža died in Chicago.

Milan Hodža was the author of several hundred journalistic articles, a number of journal reflections and a host of public political speeches. His collected works are contained in seven volumes totaling more than 4,000 pages. Hodža also wrote a large monograph, *The Czechoslovak Split*, published in 1920, where he dealt with the historical development of the relationship between the Czech and the Slovak languages. He studied this against the background of mutual Czech and Slovak relationships and in the context of solutions to a whole complex of issues related to the nation. From the beginning of his theoretical and political activity right up to its end, Milan Hodža analyzed and clarified, step by step, the peasant class, the Slovak village, land reforms, the relationship between town and village, and the relationship between educated people, workers and peasants. This work gradually led him to the study of agrarian issues which, at the time, were vitally important in the Slovak economy. This is reflected in his theoretical interest in rural sociology. Despite the wide scope of his theoretical and pragmatic interests, the issues of the Slovak nation were the focus of his attention throughout the whole period of his creative activity. This orientation of Hodža's interests derived directly from his membership in the Hlas movement which began in Slovakia in the 1890s.

The Hlas Movement and T.G. Masaryk

The Hlas movement was a group of young, nation-conscious members of the intelligentsia, formed under the influence of the European liberal and democratic movements that were spreading at the turn of the century, particularly under the influence of T.G. Masaryk's ideas and political attitudes. T.G. Masaryk initiated the appearance of the journal, *Hlas*, in 1898. Although the Hlas movement cannot be called a philosophical movement in the narrow sense of the word and none of its protagonists were philosophers by profession, it can be stated explicitly that the philosophical basis of the Hlas concept, nevertheless, had an intrinsic link with a wide philosophical movement. This movement in Western Europe found its orientation in the revival of philosophy by means of science and in its new, realistic orientation.

As one of the supporters and young representatives of the Hlas movement, Milan Hodža based his social, political and theoretical work on its essential principles: he emphasized the principles

¹ M. Hodza, *Federation in Central Europe, Reflections and Reminiscences* (London, 1943).

of concretism, activism, and small work, aiming at the future democratization of the semi-feudal conditions in Hungary. In accordance with the Hlas movement, he joined the efforts to revitalize and invigorate the national, political, cultural, and economic life in Slovakia long before an origin of an independent Czechoslovak Republic. In essential principles, he identified himself with Masaryk's philosophical realism which was, in fact, the source of the whole Hlas agenda.

From the Štúr generation and members of the Hlas movement, Hodža also assumed the idea of humanity as a defining component of the movement towards national revival, democratic rights and freedom. In 1903 he wrote in the Hlas periodical:

The character of thought of the Slovak nation, as shown by its remnants, originates with Štúr. A follower of Hegel, he adopted the Herderian idea of nationality. This happened by the efforts of humanism when the darkness of feudalism was disappearing under the clear beacon of an awakening human consciousness. Humanity also was a fighter against feudalism, overthrowing its rule over the laboring population. With the liberation of the population from feudalism, there developed a cultural ideal because democratic progress is not possible without a cultural one.²

In this way, according to Hodža, the "national ideal" of a free nation rose gradually from the ideal of "humanity" in the spirit of Herderian ideas.

Unlike other Hlas members, Hodža did not, however, consider national freedom to be an end in itself, the final aim of all endeavors. It was only one of the stages leading to a higher aim, i.e., to the settlement of contemporary political, cultural and social problems in Slovakia. On the other hand, he insisted that "because of this higher aim, nationality may drown in humanism, and in this way the real treasures of humanity would disappear."³

National Identity

The question of national identity should be situated within the complex of socio-political issues. According to Hodža, its importance is beyond dispute, but it must not outgrow the limits of its significance. If this happens, national egoism can easily arise from an altruistic idea of patriotism. It is necessary to mention here that Hodža was well aware of the fact that:

A lack of appreciation and an oppression of national individualities resulted from the recognition of national individualities. There appeared Chauvinism, fabrication of oneself, oppression of others. . . The national ideal, which used to be a means to a higher aim, became an aim itself. National egoism suppressed the ideals of humanity. Since rationality became the aim, all other things invigorating humanity were disappearing, such as the principles of social equality and social equity.⁴

Hodža developed a social theory in articles published in the first decade of the twentieth century. According to it, nationalism was the reason for social differences and social inequity. Hodža asserts that "nationalism forgot the needs of the population" and, under its influence, it was forgotten "that deep social chasms are opening in mankind, and in the meantime, great differences

² M. Hodža, *Clanky, reci, studie*, I (Praha, 1930), 208.

³ M. Hodža, *Clanky, reci, studie*, I (Praha, 1930), 208.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 209.

are arising in education and welfare."⁵ In other words, the hypertrophy of nationalism, according to Hodža, is the main culprit of social inequity, the reason for economic backwardness and the cultural decline of society.

In rough outline, Hodža's attitudes came very close to those of Masaryk, especially in the second part of his theoretical and political activity, i.e., in the years from 1906 to 1918. Particularly in the period before World War I, Hodža's ideas regarding the issue of a small nation were almost identical with Masaryk's. Of course, it would be difficult to claim that Hodža consistently and from the beginning based his ideas on Masaryk. The truth is that Hodža drew from several sources. His approach to contemporary social reality, however, clearly corresponded to Masaryk's attitudes. Hodža was particularly concerned with the problem of Masaryk's realistic concepts which he analyzed in detail in an extensive article, "Realism in Our Country," published in *Hlas* in 1904.

He wrote about three influences in contemporary political thinking: conservatism, liberalism, and socialism. All three influences were rejected by Hodža, one by one, as inappropriate for the Slovak nation in view of its social, and more importantly, its economic progress. In Hodža's opinion, conservatism and liberalism are basically impossible to incorporate into the "Slovak way of thinking."

He claimed that a more suitable alternative would be socialism. At first sight it would seem to provide a "refuge to provide shelter for the Slovak poor." This vision, however, is not applicable because Slovaks have not yet managed to form themselves as a nation. They have no fixed image about their national base and lack national self-consciousness:

As a nation, we have not yet started living, so to speak. Our nationality is not developed, our national talents have not been validated. Only nations with a developed national culture can join internationalism. We have to go through the distillation process of the national struggle; we have to take up the national mission given to the Slovak people: this mission can be modest but also wonderful--but until the nation has fulfilled it, it cannot join the international concert which does not tolerate any dissonance.⁶

Hodža claims that insufficient maturity or a certain lack of adulthood in the Slovak nation is the reason why socialism, which has an international character, is not suitable for it. In Hodža's opinion, the Slovak nation must first form its individuality in order to be able to share in such international movements of thought as are found in contemporary socialism.

Under these historical circumstances, Hodža strongly rejected the "ivory tower democracy" as well as "folklore lyricism", claiming that realism in national matters must be based predominantly upon realism in economic matters, especially in the sphere of the organization of production and economic life. Affinities with the attitude of T. G. Masaryk are obvious. Hodža's outrage is voiced in a "realistic" spirit. For example, he speaks of the permanent backwardness and poor organization of Slovak agriculture, which lacks a basic sense of concrete and realistic solutions for small, everyday problems.

The principle of activism associated with Masaryk and the *Hlas* movement was not alien to Hodža, but was the basis of the "realism" which dominated his views on society. For Hodža "realism" or the realistic philosophy of Masaryk's type does not represent a kind of "alien form,"

⁵ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 223.

as S. H. Vajanský would characterize Masaryk's philosophy. Hodža's standpoint was very distinct from that of S. H. Vajanský, as Anton Štefanek observes:

Hodža wrote his first piece in *Hlas* with an obvious slant against Vajanský who was promoting blind Rusophilia in Slovakia that was identical with reactionism and cold hostility toward every kind of freedom, including the national one. In this way it is not possible, of course, to promote the Slavonic unity that is so happily emphasized in Martin.⁷

In Hodža's as well as Masaryk's opinion, this view is exactly the idealism which is dangerous for the Slovaks and only a step away from "utopism and naivety in practical life."

These and other ideas of Hodža reflect Masaryk's idea of small, concrete work and a pragmatic approach to the solution of social problems. In this spirit he called for a reassessment not only of the Slovak present, but also of its past, insisting that the past be precisely "studied in view of the ruthless truth." He demanded that the "motives and pragmatic causes of our history be directly, anxiously and pedantically investigated, as well as all those efforts aimed at establishing a national culture."⁸

In Hodža's opinion, an objective and realistic study of the history of one's own nation should help find a political direction which would flow from our national traditions. This direction would be suitable to the specific national characteristics and make it possible to preserve the unique national character, while assimilating some modern views of social life from the richness of world culture. In this sense, Masaryk's ideas, especially those published in *The Czech Issue*, and *Havlík and Our Present Crisis*, were, on the whole, accepted favorably by Hodža who eagerly studied them, as we learn from his biographer Anton Štefánek.

A result of this study was an awareness of the importance of historical criticism. Hodža agreed with Masaryk's claim that it is not possible to work for the nation without an authentic knowledge of its past. In his work, *The Problem of a Small Nation*, T. G. Masaryk wrote:

It is not possible to love the nation without a clear view of it; know all its faults, our faults, as the nation is us, after all. There are people who do not want to know themselves: self study is clearly difficult. However, to know others is even more difficult. What is needed is criticism. . . . How would you work for the nation, if you do not know its needs? What does it mean to love the nation, if I cannot and do not know how to work for it?⁹

Following these lines, Hodža also intended to study systematically and consistently the Slovak past and make critical comments on the work of his predecessors. It should be noted that the study of the past had a special significance in the specific Slovak cultural environment determined by the Martin Centre. Hodža associated a critical approach to the nation's past with Masaryk's principle of concretism as the starting point for confronting specific contemporary problems in Slovak political life. Milan Hodža differed from the majority of his contemporaries in Slovak public life because he explicitly and strongly expressed his opinion that it is not possible to reduce the struggle for national rights only to language problems, nor to idealize the nation in romanticizing studies of folklore.

⁷ A. Štefanek, "Hodža: osobnosti a práca," *Hodža: His Personality and Work* in Milan Hodža, publicista, politik, vedecky pracovník (Praha, 1930), 71.

⁸ M. Hodža, *Clanky, reci, studie*, I (Praha, 1930), 233.

⁹ T.G. Masaryk, *Humanistic Ideal* (Prague, 1990), 78.

A Small Nation and Humble Work

Regarding the problem of the nation, Hodža fully agreed with Masaryk on the issue of a small nation. It was on Hodža's invitation that T. G. Masaryk came to Budapest in 1911 to give a lecture on the small nation concept and Slovaks. This lecture had a significant impact on the further development of Hodža's ideas in this sphere. Masaryk emphasized that the highest ideal of a man is service for the welfare of his nation through a concentrated effort in all spheres of human activity, including work with realistic aims. He underlined that, until then, efforts had been predominantly in the sphere of the *belles lettres* and that it was necessary to change this. Literature on its own cannot greatly change the nation; it is necessary to put emphasis upon the economy.

"The importance of work had not been thought of before", Hodža recorded among the essential ideas of Masaryk's Budapest lecture:

One has always seen work going on, but had failed to appreciate inconspicuous work and its system. Now, whoever thinks of the nation's future must first think of work and of the economy. What we need is concentration in all spheres-- in culture, economics, literature, and politics--so that we can attain everything on which nations live.¹⁰

To reach this goal Masaryk had specified the essential principles of organization, the influence of one's personal work, the need for objectivity when assessing the good and bad qualities of the nation, and the rational determination of tangible goals.

Hodža agreed with these views, analyzed them and applied them to the Slovak situation. He claimed the Slovak environment had internal conditions which could be conducive to the growth of realism.

He strongly rejected the widely spread attitude at that time that Masaryk's philosophical realism was alien to the Slovak way of thinking and had been transferred to Slovakia from a hostile, even alien, ideological environment:

There is probably no more inappropriate insinuation than the one which states that realism is a graft transferred from alien soil. . . . The fact is, we are trying to formulate a program to make our view correspond not only with the general principles of philosophy, but also with the real needs of life, real conditions. Moreover, we are trying to direct a line of thinking to the past, in order to bring the past and the present into harmony and to construct a world-oriented attitude on the basis of both ancient history and present events, as well as the nature of the nation.¹¹

In the realism of the Hlas movement and Masaryk's work, Hodža was seeking inspiration and a guideline on how to overcome national passivity in Slovakia. He was looking for possible ways to implement the principles of active politics in Slovakia. Although Hodža essentially accepted the attitude of Masaryk and the Hlas movement and used their terminology, he distinguished himself from them by putting greater emphasis on the peasant class and the Slovak country regions, especially in seeking support for "small work."

Hodža, Masaryk, and the Hlas movement agreed that in contrast to metaphysical idealism, which appreciated revolutionary deed and historical gestures, it was necessary to emphasize

¹⁰ M. Hodža, *Clanky, reci, studie*, II (Praha, 1931), 202.

¹¹ M. Hodža, *Clanky, reci, studie*, I (Praha, 1931), 226.

specific factors that help create the everyday life of a society. Concretism and the principle of "humble work" in Masaryk's thought appealed to Hodža for other reasons as well, since they rejected social revolution as a dangerous upheaval in the life of society. They both shared the view that the genuine development of human society takes place only through evolutionary changes, through small work, and that the usefulness and fruitfulness of such small work is in sharp contrast to the empty uselessness of grand revolutionary deeds. T. G. Masaryk himself wrote about this in his book, *The Social Issue*:

Small work is really practical, for it is the genuine lifetime mission of so-called great deeds. Heroic deeds as well as the heroism of revolution are greater in the imagination than in reality. Utopism can be overcome by humble work, and through small work, revolutionism is overcome as well.¹²

In this regard, Hodža especially appreciated the fact that Masaryk pointed out values that can be found in small as well as great nations. He also liked Masaryk's rejection of the possibility of a revolutionary transformation of society which was advocated by Marxism. In Masaryk's "realistic" philosophy he saw, among other things, the theoretical elaboration of the potentialities of the Slovak nation.

"Our scientific thinking has long been governed by the cold logic of western philosophy," said Hodža at the meeting of the Czechoslovak Agricultural Academy in 1925. "The breakthrough into this system had been brought about by Masaryk's work which, on the one hand, introduced Hume, and, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of religion in the philosophy of the Slavs."¹³ Although he stressed that religion is not a public matter but a matter of conscience, Hodža considered religion a source of morality and never doubted its place in the life of an individual and of society in general.

Hodža thought that Masaryk's views on the specific qualities of the Slavic nation needed to be developed further. The results of studying these specific features would be important for politics, science, and art. Indeed, he asserted that it is necessary not only to continue to elaborate Masaryk's attitudes, but to go even further toward a type of LeBon psychology in order to be able to "know one's own people not only from the outside, but also from the inside."¹⁴

When studying Hodža's later works, one cannot help but think that, for Milan Hodža, Masaryk's views were the starting point and seed for crystallizing his own theoretical and political attitudes. Hodža's socio-philosophical conception, his idea of the revival of the Slovak nation, especially emphasizing the need for close cooperation with the Czech nation, were indeed very close to the Hlas movement to which he claimed allegiance. However, he took a relatively independent road in the political sphere and, consequently, understood the issues of nationalism, national history and Czech/Slovak unity to be in close connection with problems of a political, economic, cultural, and linguistic nature.

Political Independence and Political Unity

The opinion that a nation must be economically independent to reach its political freedom was perfected by Hodža throughout the whole pre-war period of his political and journalistic activity. From the beginning of his political and journalistic activity, he had considered cooperation with

¹² T.G. Masaryk, *Otuzka socialni* (The Social Issue), II (Praha, 1946), 305.

¹³ M. Hodža, *Clanky, reci, studie*, IV (Praha, 1931), 32.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

the Czechs inevitable, even essential for the national struggle of Slovaks for liberation from the yoke of national oppression associated with greater social poverty. In the period before the first World War, it was possible to evaluate Hodža's views on the need of the association of Slovaks and Czechs as progressive because they contributed objectively to the spiritual and social-economic revival of the Slovak people, as well as to a more distinct national awareness.

The idea of the "single Czechoslovak nation", at the time of the first Czechoslovak Republic, resulted in Czechoslovakism as a political platform. This movement contributed to the ambiguous and pragmatic interpretations of Hodža's views on the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks as a single nation, which can be found in Hodža's work at the end of the last century. In a column in the newspaper, *The Political Horizon*, published in the first volume of the Hlas in 1899, he formulated his platform: a "single ethnographic nation" will be necessary. Although this is a very confused notion, its essence can be found in his reflections on the close affinities of the Slovak and the Czech ethnic groups.

His idea was to illustrate the viability of the Slovak existence as "part of the Czechoslovak national entity." "Outside the borders we have only one ally," writes Milan Hodža, "or, to put it better, one cultural protector; we form a single ethnographic nation with the Czech, Moravian and Silesian parts of the Czechoslovak nation. Our future is in the strength supported by both our political and cultural allies."¹⁵ In Hodža's views, from the turn of the century, Slovaks and Czechs form a "single ethnographic nation."

At the same time, Hodža simultaneously did not want to give up the vision of the Hungarian state unconditionally. His efforts to win favor with the successor of the Austrian throne would not allow this, nor would his vision of a federalized Hungary. At that time, neither Hodža nor the great majority of politically active Slovaks expected that in the near future an independent Czechoslovak state could appear, and he was trying to resolve the so-called "Slovak issue" within the existing state and legal arrangements.

He found the answer in the following theoretical compromise: Although there exists a single Hungarian nation, nevertheless, as a political nation it is united merely on the basis of state organization. This single political nation has not much in common with the single ethnographic nation. They differ in terms of essential principles, i.e., on the basis upon which they are created and sustained. Obviously, from this scientific point of view, the use of the term "nation" to replace "single political nation," was inappropriate and incorrect.

After the establishment of an independent Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, Hodža had to answer various problems due to his high social and political posts. These questions consisted particularly in the coexistence of the Slovaks and the Czechs in a single state unit. He asserted that the idea of a single political nation can justifiably be applied to Czecho-Slovak relations in the independent state with "political and propagandist success." During this time, he supported the idea that the "ideological construction of the Czechoslovak unity must come to terms with the moral, historic, and psychological prerequisites of all those to whom it intends to provide a national and political structure."¹⁶ However, he also points out that there are a great number of differences between the Czech and the Slovak national development and that the Slovak nation has its specific cultural and psychological features which contain the germs of several misunderstandings between the Czechs and the Slovaks.

¹⁵ Ibid., I (Praha, 1930), 93.

¹⁶ M. Hodža, *Article, Speeches, Studies*, VII (Bratislava, 1934), 28.

In Hodža's view which culminated in the 1930s, the Slovaks may be an independent nation, but only in the sense that they form "a historically determined moral entity."¹⁷ As he said in one of his lectures in 1934, this means also that the "Slovaks have to go through all the developmental stages of national construction. Therefore, it is necessary to have Slovak literature, Slovak art, and active participation in one's own civilization, including its technical dimension."¹⁸

In this speech, Hodža may have accepted the concept of an independent Slovak nation, but this was always only in the abstract form of a kind of moral principle:

Constructive Slovak nationalism is not an enemy of the state, but rather its co-creator. Importantly, it is not formulated in political terms, because that would, indeed, lead to political separation and talks about Slovak national sovereignty which is simply a frivolous game within Slovakia. Thus, there is Slovak nationalism as a moral principle, despite which there remains a single political nation. In practical political terms, this means neither centralism nor autonomy, but rather state, political, and national unity, with the regionalism of an administrative self-government.¹⁹

Hodža's understanding of the nation as a single ethnographic entity or a single political entity did not satisfy the conditions that determine a nation as a specific, social, cultural and historical phenomenon. To a certain extent, this was influenced by Masaryk's approach to the problem of the nation, especially his view that the origin of an independent Czechoslovakia should not open space for the coexistence of two equal nations, but rather provide a way for Slovaks to return to the "bosom" of common life within the "single Czechoslovak nation."

To support this approach to the issue of the national relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks, Milan Hodža elaborated a theory on the "split of a single Czechoslovak nation into two individual national characters." This was published in an extensive study, *The Czechoslovak Split* in 1920 with the subtitle, *Contributions to the History of the Slovak Language*. There, he tried to support actively the contemporary idea of a single Czechoslovak nation.

In *The Czechoslovak Split*, Hodža acknowledges the importance of the Slovak literature and the development of the *belles lettres*, but he did not promote these for the further development of the nation because they are ends in themselves. In this spirit, he considers even Štúr a separatist who wrongly conceived the position of the Slovak nation within the context of the Czecho-Slovak relation. He broke this relation and infringed upon historical traditions hundreds of years old. What is more, Štúr's act also meant the decomposition of the moral foundations of the Czechoslovak nation.

Hodža's argumentation in favor of a theoretical construction of the "Czechoslovak nation" is laden with factual incorrectness and subjectivism in evaluating some historical facts. Unfortunately, it seems that Hodža was not able to understand the process of constituting modern European nations, among which the Slovak nation undoubtedly belongs. He did not grasp that it was not the arbitrary will of some chosen individuals, small groups of people, or even the outstanding leaders of the nation, but rather long-term spiritual and material activities spanning many generations which influence the process of forming modern nations.

Milan Hodža, together with other followers of the ideas of Czechoslovakism, tried in *The Czechoslovak Split* to promote actively the contemporary conception of the single Czechoslovak

¹⁷ M. Hodža, Lecture given on May 9, 1934 in the Present Club on the theme "Against Centralism and Autonomism and for Regionalism in a Single Political Nation."

¹⁸ M. Hodža, *Clanky, reci, studie*, VII (Bratislava, 1934), 32-33.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

nation. However, the universal judgement of historical development has not confirmed the validity of the hypothesis of Czechoslovakism and the theoretical construction of the "single ethnographic" or "single political Czechoslovak nation", nor the "single Czechoslovak speech" joined with it.

Concluding Summary

This study has reached the conclusion that, it may not be possible to claim explicitly that since the beginning of his theoretical work Hodža drew consistently from Masaryk's conception. Nevertheless, those views were a starting point for a constructive crystallization of Hodža's theoretical and political attitudes. In reality, Hodža was seeking inspiration and guidelines on how to overcome the national passivity in Slovakia. He joined the historical critical approach to the national past with Masaryk's principle of concretism.

Hodža's social and philosophical concept of the evolutionary revival of the Slovak nation closely corresponded with the ideal of Masaryk and the Hlas movement. However, his approach was specific in the sense that he always considered the issues of national history, nationalism, and Czecho-Slovak coexistence in close association with political, economic, cultural, and language problems. Later theoretical constructions of a single "ethnographic nation" and a single political nation that appear after the foundation of the First Czechoslovak Republic were pragmatically conditioned and contrived.

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Chapter VI

Two Concepts of Nation and Two Forms of Nationalism

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The Czechoslovak Republic originated in a time which was characterized by Hugh Seton-Watson as "President Wilson's Age". It was assumed then that states would embody nations and that the people of each state would create a nation. The accepted conviction was that in the golden age of self-determination every nation would have its state.¹ These postulates and their multiple interpretations were destined to be projected into the foundations of the Czechoslovak state and the justification of its existence. This state, too, was constituted on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination, and it was built up as a unitary national state. Czechoslovakia as a nation state was favorably accepted by its western allies, above all due to strategic and political interests and aims of their own.

Czechoslovakism: When a State Should Be a Nation

The Problem of Nation and State

Czechoslovakia, nevertheless, was not a national state, even when it acted as such on the international political level. The proclamation of a unitary political and, in this case, also ethnic nation was inevitable. Otherwise, it would have to be admitted that a multinational state, or a state with minorities, had arisen. The justification of the existence of such a state would be very complicated according to international law--especially the inclusion of more than 3 million Germans. Hence, since its origin, the conception of a unified nation has served the basic justification of the new unitary state on international and internal levels. Paradoxically, even this multinational state should become a "shining manifestation of the triumph of nationalism at the end of the World War I."² The doctrine of the unitary state/nation was not only state-creating, but could not be abandoned *de iure*, lest the existence of this new state be rendered fundamentally problematic.

Every state has to build upon a constructive, state-creating idea of itself in order to possess a deeply motivating justification of its own existence and continuity. Every such idea, however, becomes a basis for a state ideology through this very "functionality". However, ideology has also the specific feature of not being only a set of certain ideas, but above all the expression of a certain world view, the expression of concrete interests and aims--while at the same time veiling and mystifying them. This is a view of the world in a distorting mirror, whose victims are its authors themselves. Such an "ideologization" process took place in the formation of the foundations of the Czechoslovak state: its state-creating idea issued from the conception of a unified Czechoslovak nation which should have been anchored in a sense of spiritual and cultural mutuality and cooperation of Czechs and Slovaks.

¹ Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States. An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of nationalism* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1971), 1.

² Owen V. Johnson, *Slovakia 1918-1938. Education and the Making of a Nation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 53.

Although the Czechoslovak idea should have been the originating idea of the new state, it had not been explicitly formulated before the state. As O.V. Johnson pointed out, the creation of the new state had not been accompanied by a clear delineation of the term "Czechoslovak", even though the idea of the common Czechoslovak nation had been discussed before World War I by T.G. Masaryk and his followers. Some interpreted it as a description of the given phenomenon, i.e., Czechoslovakia as a unitary nation state; others considered it a prescription for a linguistic-national unity which was under construction.³

As a specific ideological phenomenon, Czechoslovakism wanted to build upon the tradition of mutual relations between the Czechs and Slovaks. The elements upon which Czechoslovakism wanted to build its own justification were: (a) the traditional feeling of mutual closeness deeply felt by the Slovak Protestants, (b) and the inevitability of cooperation after the break down of Austria-Hungary as the only way to preserve national existence. However, neither Czecho-Slovak solidarity nor common statehood as the result of a purposive decision of both national representations should or could really suffice as the basis for the Czechoslovak national unifying efforts.

It should be noted that the friendly relations between Czechs and Slovaks were, in the Slovak mind, a part of the conception of a higher Slavic whole and solidarity. D. Rapant, too, called attention to this important circumstance when he wrote "the principle of the Czecho-Slovak integration programme is not Czechoslovak but Slavic."⁴

On the other hand, the decisive step of the Slovaks at the rise of the common state in 1918 usually is not sufficiently appreciated; when they voluntarily united their own sovereignty with that of the Czechs, the Slovaks saw in this step the only real possibility to realize their own political will. Slovak representatives saw in the act of declaring the Czecho-Slovak state-political union a logical step on the way to the Slovak national and political emancipation.

The common state should be a space for the assertion of the Slovak nation as a partner with equal rights in a common life with the Czech nation and other nationalities. Soon after the creation of the Czechoslovak state, mutual cooperation became questionable due to the unwillingness of Czech policy to work on the principle of equal with equal, as supposed by the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. The possibility of cooperation on equal terms was put aside by the tendentious activity of Czech politicians and supported by the loyalty of their Slovak seconds. The idea of a common state was deformed by politicians, including those from Slovakia, in their keen endeavor to stabilize the new state along the lines of the ideology of Czechoslovakism, which should be justified by a conception of Czechoslovak national unity.

Hodža: A Language Response

This conception stemmed from the traditional linguistic and cultural idea of the nation that had begun here in the time of National Awakening: Jungmann on the Czech side, Kollár on the Slovak side. From this tradition, nation was seen as a linguistic-cultural community, its primary sign being the language and national culture being its organizing principle. Nation as an organic whole should manifest its own specificity in its own national popular culture and language. As an objectively given entity, nation was considered a logical, inevitable result of the process of self-

³ Ibid., 50ff.

⁴ Daniel Rapant, "Vyvin slovenskeho narodneho povedomia" (The Development of Slovak National Consciousness), *Historicky sbornik*, V (1947), 12.

consciousness, a manifestation of the "Spirit of nation." This notion had been diffused in the region under the influence of German Romanticism.

One of the sources of the Czechoslovak national concept was this traditionalist concept of nation. Substantial differences between the Czechs and Slovaks were denied on its basis and the partisans of the construct tried to testify to their original linguistic and literary unity by piling up learned arguments.

Hence, the Slovak national emancipation movement appeared, from the point of Czechoslovak unity, as a voluntarism inspired by Hegelian idealism with a political orientation toward so-called Hungarism. The decisive step in the development of the Slovak national identity--the codification of literary Slovak--appeared, thus, as a wilful decision "to break-up the Czechoslovak language unity."⁵

Language continued to be considered an identifying sign of the nation. It is characteristic that not the Czechoslovak nation, but the Czechoslovak language as state and official language was legislatively anchored in the Constitution of the first Czechoslovak Republic in 1920. On the other hand, positivistic scholars, confronted with the historical fact of the existence of a Slovak literary language and literature, tried to support Czechoslovak unity in history and literature by scientific argumentation (mainly A. Praák and V. Chaloupecký, professors at Bratislava University). They spoke of two branches and languages and, hence, had also to accentuate the spiritual and cultural attributes of the unified Czechoslovak nation.

Hodža and further "Czechoslovakists" only apparently overcame the narrow language frame within the concept of a unitary Czechoslovak nationality by considering the rise of a literary Slovak language as an historical fact (according to them, Slovak rose by a separation from the common literary language). Milan Hodža did not see independent literary Slovak as an essential step on the way to Slovak national emancipation and national identity formation, but only a "purely linguistic creation."⁶ He supported his point of view by attributing nearly unconditional validity to the principle "of our organic coherence with Czech spiritual life." In this view, one of the main points of the Slovak national emancipation movement--the codification of the Slovak literary language--appeared as a fatal act on the politically motivated road to the Czecho-Slovak "separation". Hodža saw, in the independence of the Slovak language (as an "external" expression of the Slovak national individuality) "a matter of political purposefulness" and in the Czecho-Slovak "split", not an internal necessity, but a political intention (Štúr's Slovak was a "politicum hungaricum".)

The conception of Czechoslovak national unity should be a synthesis of a linguistic cultural sense of nation with its self-conception as a voluntarily formed self-conscious civic community. In this concept, nation was a politically-conscious, active community of citizens, whose organizing principle was its political institutions and whose integrating factor was a political idea and, above all, an elaborated group-consciousness. This reflected the element of active co-creation by a nation as a national and political community, surpassing the narrow borders of ethnic wholes delimited by language and culture. Such a comprehension of nation did not have, however, a sufficiently strong basis in Slovak tradition.

Anton Stefánek: A Scientific Response

⁵ Albert Prazak, "Hegel a Slovensko" (Hegel and Slovakia), V (Bratislava: 1931), 373.

⁶ Milan Hodža, *Ceskoslovensky rozkol. Prispevky k dejinam slovinciny* (Czechoslovak Schism. Contributions to the History of Slovak Language) (Martin: Nakladom vlastnym, 1920), 13.

An attempt to form the above synthesis can be found in the writings of the sociologist Anton Stefánek who devoted extraordinary attention to these problems. From the beginning of the 20s he expressed his opinion on the Czecho-Slovak question in several articles and studies discussing what he called "homoethnology" from the scientific sociological point of view.

Stefánek endorsed a multidimensional grasp of nation, considering it an historically-shaped phenomenon. In his concept, nation is an organic whole, a "collective organism" with a dynamic rather than static character; it is a permanently developing "organism". He saw the development of nations as leading "in a concentrating or dissolving direction" and paid special attention, mainly from a sociological view point, to the problem of "association and isolation", to the historical process of "national integration, disintegration and reintegration."

Social development takes place in "differentiation and integration, which are conditioned by the tendency of ideal harmony, socialization and individualization."⁷ Stefánek stressed the negativism of isolation and pointed out that unifying, "acculturating, assimilating" forces acted against individualizing efforts. He saw the basic developmental tendency of human society to be a successive accumulation of social units into larger wholes. The process of social integration, which has a natural and spontaneous (but not rational) character, is valid for nations, as well.

He stressed the will in the formation of social structures and, hence, endorsed the voluntarist concept of nation mainly from the aspect of the will to national unity. The nation-building process as an integrating one is initiated by the will and group-consciousness: a feeling of community coherence or in-group feelings represent one of the central ideas of Stefánek's sociological conception. Cooperation, acculturation, congeniality (or syngensis), and consciousness of community should help to overcome isolation, particularity, and a sense of tribe, just as romantic emotional nationalism which stresses the diversity of languages. Stefánek recognized stress upon language as an objective sign of a nation, but he assumed that overcoming language differences would bring a solution to the difficulties of the separation of related wholes. Thus, for him, Czechoslovak bilingualism was the way to overcome isolation.

He constructed his formulation of the Czechoslovak national ideal of unity upon the conviction that development aimed at greater social wholes by an associative universalistic "instinct", whereas, nationalism expressed an individualizing instinct. His ideal of unity was based, also, on an internal articulation and a certain "gradation of national wholes", and upon group-consciousness in the presupposition that the unitive process was spontaneous. Similarly, like others who held this position, he stressed that it was founded on rational, scientific knowledge; the thesis of the integration of smaller social units into the larger ones being among the fundamental theses of his social theory. He would not found it on sentimentality, regionalism and particularism, without scientific explanations by rational knowledge--he ascribed this to those who preached Slovak national distinctiveness. Yet his own nearly systematic effort to justify this idea in a scientific way conflicts with his own criticism of tendentious science and his effort to demythologize the concept of nation. All the same, he made an essential contribution to the theoretical construction of the concept of a fictitious Czechoslovak nation.

He advocated an active "evolutionist view", according to which the Czechoslovak nation was an organism in formation. He examined the possibilities of this "aggregate" and justified the legitimacy of this artificial construction in a series of papers. Stefánek wanted to approach the problems of nation and nationalism scientifically from a sociological point of view and, simultaneously, to find a solution for the "Czechoslovak problem". For him, these were the themes

⁷ Anton Stefánek, "Slovenska a ceskoslovenska otazka" (Slovak and Czechoslovak Question), *Prudy*, VI (no. 1-7, 1922), 24.

of his studies of Štúr's philosophy: Slovak autonomism and conservatism, as well as the problem "of isolation and association in the national sense," etc. He was convinced his own activities were promoting objective development toward a Czecho-Slovak "synthesis" or "integration".

He was partly aware of the deficiencies "of the new creation of Czechoslovak nationalism" and conceded that it was "too rational configuration, practical and utilitarian, with nearly no traditions in its present form." Yet, he was convinced that it already existed and "were it not to exist, we must create it and graft it into the hearts of future generations."⁸

According to Stefánek, the Czechs and Slovaks are one nation from a sociological, historical, linguistic, and ethnographic point of view, the historical continuity of which "was only seemingly interrupted". Social development in the direction of integration should be a basis for Czecho-Slovak efforts at unity. As a political body a nation has to crystallize "naturally into a unitary ethnic whole and this must be our ideal for future centuries." According to Stefánek, "apart from the purely tribal Slovak nationalism, we must love, cultivate and create Czechoslovak nationalism, i.e., the organic synthesis of all the elements of Czech and Slovak national culture."⁹

Stefánek tried hard to motivate the conception of Czecho-Slovak national unity on the basis of his own interpretation of tendencies toward social development and, thus, to promote the formation of a Czechoslovak state. In this spirit, he was an active participant in the political events of the pre-Munich Republic. "The idea of Czecho-Slovak national unity became the basis of our new state. This is its *raison d'être*, which contains everything required as a basis for the national Czecho-Slovak state. The moment we become estranged from this, the disintegration, including that of the state, will follow" he proclaimed by the Parliament in the Prague.¹⁰

Actual social development, however, showed that in practice the attempt to promote the Czechoslovak idea as a higher integrative principle of the new state had no success. Like the theory of a unified Czechoslovak nation, it remained an unsuccessful attempt to synthesize two conceptions of nation: one linguistic-cultural, the other state-political. Besides, as Jan Patoka showed, the tragedy of the Czechoslovak state was "a tragedy of democratism not being thought to the end", because it failed to raise elemental democratism to a supranational state idea by placing it above the narrow linguistic nationalism of individual nationalities.¹¹

Svätopluk Štúr: An Unanswered Response

Other representatives of the intelligentsia, grouped around the revue *Prúdy* (1922-1938), also defended the conception of the unitary Czechoslovak nation. Svätopluk Štúr acknowledged Masaryk's philosophy and stressed its ideas regarding the problems of nation reflected in his collected lectures: *Národní filosofie doby novjí* (National Philosophy of Recent Times, 1904). The objective characteristics of a nation, according to Masaryk, are language, state, and the political, economic, and social situation, along with the personal components of spiritual culture, above all morality. For Štúr, these surpass national borders and point in a properly universal dimension.

He saw language as an important component of nation, not only as a means but also as a "rare instrument with many strings." Correspondingly, speech is "the expression and content of our soul

⁸ Ibid., 30.

⁹ Ibid., 86.

¹⁰ Karol Sidor, "Slovenska politika nap ode prazskeho snemu: 1918-1938" (Slovak Politics in Prague Parliament), *Knihlaciaren Andreja*, II (1943), 62.

¹¹ Jan Patocka, *O smysl dneska. Devet capitol o problemech svetovych I ceskych* (For the Sense of the Present Times. Nine Chapters about World and Czech Questions) (Prague: Mlada fronta, 1969), 148.

in its totality."¹² As such, language overcomes national barriers and the sphere of the interest of a nation. Upon superficial examination, language appears to be a primary sign of nationality, but this would be to regard it abstractly, for, with the help of language, we also attain universal aims.¹³ Other spheres, such as art, science and philosophy, are also an expression of tendencies towards universalism. They, too, are expressions of permanently transcending the borders of a nation and have a human basis. He wrote, "If art can perhaps be national in a certain case, science and philosophy must always be universal without fail, because they lose their scientific character the moment we make them national."¹⁴

First of all, morality stands above nations and nationalities as a "firm, all-human, unitive force." Štúr stressed that "ethics is decidedly antinational, because it is all-human". Morality cannot take on a national standpoint, because this standpoint always contains an element of "national egoism." "Ethics must not know differentiation by nation differentiations; it is the highest, most comprehensive human value, a universal value that most powerfully breaks the borders and manacles of nationality today."¹⁵

By stressing the ethical standpoint, Štúr wanted to show a possible way to harmonize national and moral principles on the basis of universal humanism. "If we work out ethics as a criterion of human life and its highest values, we come necessarily to the negation of nationality differences as values and toward the unity of the whole of mankind."¹⁶ He moved, however, on a level of ideas, postulates and projects, but not of genuine life conditions, thus rejecting Radl's view of the phenomenon of nation as socially conditioned. He rightly criticized the romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century and its new variants, but did not comprehend the consequences of the modernization processes taking place in Slovak society and in the dynamics by which the modern Slovak nation or nationality was formed. Hence he sharply rejected contemporary Slovak nationalism and political autonomism, describing it as Romanticism based upon a destructive dogmatic tendency.

For him, the soil for national activism and the "content of our new life" were the spiritual spheres of art, science and ethics. Nationality "must be lived honestly to the very foundations!" Pathetically, he proclaimed and invoked the birth of a new nationality issuing from a sense of the unity of the human race, and of the fate of all mankind. It is no longer thinkable that a "nationality would not be suffused with universal human ideals;" chaos and disharmony should be overcome in a grandiose synthesis. In such a hope, he pronounced the conviction that "there are no longer borders between nationalism and universalism; they merge together and cover each other in a mighty initial agreement on a new, painfully conquered harmony and unity of the whole world."¹⁷ He postulated a principle of wholeness and synthesis for this sphere. That is why he stressed several times that "the question for us today--with all of its seriousness--is the synthesis of individualism and collectivism, of nationalism and universalism."¹⁸

From his global view of modern development, Štúr believed that the dusk of Romanticism and the platitudes of rationalism had been surmounted by a "new European spirit." "We realize fully that we have to carry to completion the process of democratization which English empiricism

¹² Svatopluk Štúr, "Narodnosti ako problém" (Nationality as a Problem), *Prudy*, XIV (no. 5, 1930), 286.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 289.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 289.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 291.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 294.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 296.

¹⁸ Svatopluk Štúr, "Slovensko hľadajúce" (Slovakia in Search), *Prudy*, XIX (no. 5, 1935), 262.

inaugurated early in the eighteenth century and find a synthesis between reason and sentiment, between nationality and humanity."¹⁹

According to Štúr, in the Czechoslovak Republic, national language and cultural preservation should no longer be considered morally significant patriotic deeds. Speech and art could be diverted from their mission of national awakening and inspiration; culture should find itself new ways to develop. It is important to absorb the modern European spirit and, at the same time, to express "the genius of the race."

We feel that the year 1918 has not merely brought us national freedom, but also has laid upon us the duty of recasting all our national ideals and interests in a European mould. . . We must emerge from behind our narrow national frontiers and become conscious members of the European commonwealth.²⁰

In spite of the fact that Štúr felt very intensively the disharmony of contemporary contradictions, he did not succeed in overcoming the abstract character of his own humanism. As a variant of secularized humanism it refused to strike root in the transcendent; in this, he was estranged from Masaryk and his synergism. Štúr turned away from the real contradictions and referred to the ideality of what should be. Such a humanism can be appreciated for its purity and appeal: the formation of a modern democratic society as an open pluralistic community is inseparable from its foundations in universal human values. Their validity and moral force, however, must be projected to the level of concrete relations and the real life of individuals and of the national community.

As a nation, Slovaks and Slovak society were creatively engaged at that time not only in cultural and spiritual manifestations of their own capabilities, but also in the development of political institutions. Slovaks entered a new stage in the dynamics of the modernization process and were challenged to form a developed national and civic community. This community had to create new value structures, open to human values and, simultaneously, to create the specific forms of these within their own national culture.

The intelligentsia, working in terms of Czechoslovakism (Stefánek, Štúr), seemed to underestimate this challenge. Their attempt at a new creation of a higher Czechoslovak national whole was not successful. The postulate of universal humanism, not having been artificial, projected into the topical needs of the national community, had not to justify the construction of an artificial "Czechoslovak nation"; in the end, they served the ideological aims of Czechoslovakism.

Supporters of Czechoslovakism proclaimed the need to fulfill this ideology. Although at heart most of them were just as good Slovaks as were the partisans of Slovak nationalism, the idea of Czechoslovak nationality rendered questionable the identity of a distinct Slovak nationality and undermined the possibilities for success of the Slovak national-emancipation movement.

A Slovak State

Liberal and democratic ideals often have been associated with Czechoslovak statehood and with the "state-forming" idea of a Czecho-Slovak national unity. Consequently, a rejection of all the components of the official ideology of the pre-Munich republic arose in the opposing Slovak national group. At the end of the 30s, after Munich and the rise of the Slovak State, liberalism and

¹⁹ Svatopluk Stur, "Slovak Music," in *Slovakia Then and Now. A Political Survey*, ed. R. W. Seton-Watson (London: Allen and Unwin; Prague: Orbis, 1931), 163.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 162.

democracy were rejected together with that part of the intelligentsia which was its supporter and propagandist.

With the rise of the Slovak state the national idea was perverted into a state-creating ideology. The rejection of Czechoslovakism and political autonomy required a positive national programme. The Slovak State, defining itself as a national state, needed an idea warranting its existence and political identity. But a state ideology or doctrine had to be constructed on other foundations than the ideology of the pre-Munich republic, since democracy had been rejected along with Masaryk's formulation of the humanistic ideal as the bearer of the idea of the Czechoslovak state.

Nationalism Absolutized

In order to avoid the one-sidedness of individualism and of étatism the basis of this ideology was an absolutized idea of totality. The totality of the nation (not the state!) and concentration upon the principle of unity were to be the leading motifs of the organization of social life and of political practice. The Party should be the exclusive representative of the Slovak nation and the bearer of Slovak nationalism, or, as J. Tiso had already written in the 30s, "one nation, one party, one leader for a unified progress of all forces in the service of one nation."²¹

The function of state-creating ideology had to be fulfilled by a nationalism associated with the ideals of Christianity. The ideologist of the Slovak State, . Polakovi, often paraphrasing statements of the "Leader of the Nation", J. Tiso, proposed that nationalism was an organic component of the Christian worldview. He saw the natural mission and sense of the Slovak State as able to offer a model of Christian nationalism.²²

The declared linkage of the national idea with Christianity was projected in the effort to provide this nationalism with a transcendental dimension. The vision was that of service to the whole, the nation, with an aim that projected into the transcendent. Such a Christian totalitarianism could no longer put the nation or state at the centre, but an "everlasting person" and, by its intermediary, God. To eliminate the negative totalitarian elements, this perspective had to be based on the Christian tradition of the Slovak nation and provide an authoritative socio-political system.

The Slovak intelligentsia, raised in the atmosphere of the liberal-democratic regime, was confronted in the 30s with an official form of Czechoslovak nationality, as well as with the task of forming a distinct Slovak nationality and its manifestation in politics and ideology. As a consequence of the unsolved Slovak question, a noticeable group opposed the policy of the Prague centralism and the ideology of Czechoslovakism. Nevertheless, because they accepted the ideas of democracy and humanity, they did not enter "into the service of the leadership of the New Slovakia" at the time of the Slovak state.²³

The part of the intelligentsia which did acknowledge the regime of the Slovak State was confronted with the task of formulating the problems of nation and nationalism on a theoretical level. Along with studies and papers by several authors, such as . Polakovi, M. Chladný-Hano, A. Jurovský, *et al.*, special attention was paid to all those problems by the representatives of the Slovak philosophical community in the workshop of Matica Slovenska's Philosophical Department held in Nitra on June 5, 1943.

²¹ Stefan Polakovic, *Z Tisovho boja* (From Tiso's Fight) (Bratislava: Nakladatel'stvo HSLs, 1941), 146.

²² Stefan Polakovic, *K zakladom slovenskeho statu. Filozoficke eseje* (On the Foundations of the Slovak State. Philosophical Essays) (Martin: matica Slovenska, 1939), 136ff.

²³ Vladimir Clementis, *Usmernovane Slovensko* (Losvaskia Regimented) (London: Williams, Les, 1942), 47-48.

Several interpretations of the notion of "nationalism" are encountered in this discussion. A. Jurovský, a psychologist, defined nationalism as an ideology, i.e., a practical, personal, lived philosophy of an individual determining his views and activities, his relation to the nation, his thinking, feeling and willing in relation to the "given facts of nation", in various spheres of social life. A.J. urjanský, a Neo-Thomist, stressed the ethical aspect, understanding nationalism as a multiform activity arising from the love of nation. A. Hirner, a sociologist, defined it as a matter of principles of sociability occurring at two psychological levels: subconscious experience, inclinations, and feelings, including mottos and the passive reception of practical consequences; and conscious regulation, programmes, points of view, feelings and activities in favor of the nation. J. Dieka, a philosopher, saw that nationalism is a summary of the tendencies a nation evokes in us as a value. He distinguished between a natural and a totalitarian or extreme nationalism. Thus the nation was considered a sociological, actual, empirically-given fact; nationalism was seen as a reality we experience above all psychologically.

The leitmotif of the discussion was the questions of the relation between nationalism and Christianity, between the national idea and humanism. Representatives of the more or less official Christian philosophy were obliged to formulate their relation to nationalism as an ideology, as well as to humanism as a universal human idea. They tried to bridge and harmonize the contradictions with love of nation linked with Christianity, which was universal and consequently supranational. But they did not reject national values which also were a work of the Creator and a form of implementing Christian love of neighbor. The religious philosopher, A.J. urjanský, considered this to be the main object of nationalism ("národovectva") as active love of nation.

The question: "faith or nation?" was replied to in various ways. Some considered religion a higher value than nation or nationality, which some were willing to "sacrifice" for religion. A. Hirner insisted that this was the case of "adjoined values." urjanský, seeing religion as a higher value than nation, wrote: "The Christian worldview includes natural national values, too, but it does not destroy them. On the contrary, it puts them on a higher basis, giving them a supranatural objective within the whole of human life"²⁴

The participants in the discussion stressed the non-contradiction between nationalism "as an ideology" and Christianity as a world outlook, considering nationalism or "národovectvo" as love of nation to complement the more universal love in Christianity. Such a distinction and supplementary relation, no matter how understandable and justified, did not examine the actual problem of the relation of nationalism and humanism.

Extreme Nationalism Relativized

If this problem became a topic at a theoretical level, it was still more pressing at the level of practice with regard to the relation between nationalism as a state ideology and democracy. The contradiction reappeared repeatedly in the political and social practice of the authoritarian Slovak regime. This appeared in its tendencies towards: (a) a national chauvinism, e.g., the justified criticism of Czechoslovakism became an extreme rejection of all that was Czech; (b) an exclusive monopoly of ideas and a related intolerance, e.g., rejection of Masaryk's realism, while the positivism, relativism and skepticism of modern thinking and science, as well as nonreligious tendencies in thought were pushed to the margin; and (c) strengthening the authoritative counterdemocratic mode of government, e.g., not only were liberalism and individualism rejected but a principle of authoritative leadership was constituted against any pluralism in the exercise of

²⁴ *Filozofický sborník Matice slovenskej*, vol. IV (1943), 192.

power. Threats to nationalism were seen in such ideologies as liberalism, socialism and Communism which menaced the Christian worldview, whereas the promotion of nationalism as a state ideology was seen to support that worldview. All these factors contributed to the intensification of trends towards totalitarian nationalism, which depended upon a supposed superiority of the values of the nation and state.

J. Dieka challenged the absolutizing of the nation as the highest value, examining it from the point of view of ontology and value theory. The value of the nation, like all else, is determined by its relation to the absolute value as the highest norm. The value hierarchy ranks from individual to nation, then to mankind, and finally to the Absolute. Hence, the nation is not the highest value, and nationalism should be surpassed, for humanity is a broader basis of human community. "We, therefore, consider the struggle against humanity equally antichristian as the struggle against a natural nationalism."²⁵ If Jurovsky classified the idea of pure humanity as "abstract" and, consequently, gave preference to nationalism over humanity, urjanský showed that the idea of being human is a higher value than that of nation. Mankind can reach this "through the historical reality of national differentiation."²⁶ Other authors, too, objected to the exaggeration of the national over the human, though convinced that a moderate nationalism is a natural component of a Christian worldview, and, thus, was ethically possible, useful and even necessary.

However, in implementing the national idea in practical life they were even confronted with the question of morality and obligation at a time when, under the aegis of national ideology, humanitarian principles and Christian humanism were being restricted in political practice. The question arose whether and how it was possible to overcome the contradictions between the maxims of humanism included in Christianity and the egoistic particularism connected in thought and deed with nationalism.

It was pointed out by A. Hirner that to a certain degree nationalism was a sort of egoism. It is a socializing factor which makes the individual a part of a larger whole, but it is limited by its own interests, often opposed to those of other national groups. Nationalism depends upon the specificity and individuality of a nation and, thus, inevitably arrives "at the experience of foreignness in contrast to all that is not nationally homogenous". That is why a humanitarian "arbitrator" is necessary in order for national individuals to be brought into line. "It is only natural that this cannot be the hegemony of one nation, even if strong."²⁷

National egoism is a phenomenon which accompanies totalitarian nationalism and is not far from chauvinism and racial hatred, noted J. Dieka. All participants in the discussion rejected this kind of nationalism as the sole exclusive norm of human social practice. It examines the relation of individual and society only "sub specie nationalitatis", pursuing the welfare exclusively of its own nation. It attributes to the nation a special historical mission and a privileged status among nations, which puts the nation into incessant conflict with the ethical principles of true humanity. The rejection of a totalitarian view of nationalism reflected the conviction in the meeting that extreme nationalism was fundamentally incompatible with a Christian worldview.

Conclusion

The open articulation of critical reservations at the time when the international and domestic political situation was controlled by totalitarian leaders had particular significance. The official

²⁵ Ibid., 200.

²⁶ Ibid., 187.

²⁷ Ibid., 194.

ideology in practice set about synthesizing nationalism and totalitarianism. But one should not underestimate the efforts of a part of the intelligentsia to harmonize the ideas of nationality and humanity. This manifests not only a "colorful totality", but especially further rifts in the "leaky totalitarianism"²⁸ of the ruling regime.

A tendency towards totalitarianism is inherent in extreme forms of nationalism. Nevertheless, there is now, once again, a need to seek ways to harmonize, on the one hand, high regard for national uniqueness, the values of a nation and its culture, and, on the other hand, universal human ideas, norms and values. The idea of nationality has become once again one of the decisive factors of our history. It provides a feeling of solidarity between individual and group, active participation in political life, and closer creative cultural contacts, allowing at the same time for both distinctiveness and unity.

Nationality, however, must not be conceived as an absolute value, the center and source of all human activity and life. Its horizon needs to broaden to include supranational, universal human interests and values, cultural and spiritual ideas aimed at strengthening the liberty and dignity of man, and better and more humane relations between peoples.

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²⁸ Clementis, 48.

Chapter VII

Catholic Theologians and the National Question (1939-1945)

Teodor Münz

Nationalism vs. Internationalism

On March 14, 1939, the Slovak State came into existence, with the Hlinka Slovak People's Party at its head. When the Slovaks acquired independence, issues of nationality, statehood in general, and Slovak statehood in particular entered into the limelight. These issues were studied almost exclusively by Catholic philosophers and theologians. In the complicated situation of the times, these theologians sought historical, political, and social ideas that would motivate, justify and explain the need for the rise of an independent state. The problems they had to consider were quite varied and contradictory.

On the one hand, they came under the pressure of German Nazism. Its expansive and aggressive nationalism was accepted by none of them--with but one exception. Nazism did not respect Christianity; it even turned against it. Pope Pius XI call it "neopaganism" in his encyclical, *With Burning Concern*, in 1937. It was racist in raising the German nation above others, and chauvinist in launching World War II into which the Slovak State was dragged.

The main ideologist and president of that State, Joseph Tiso, a Catholic theologian, was the one exception. He tried to justify and explain it in a Christian manner, without admitting it to be chauvinistic. He called Slovak National Socialism "Christian," a term taken over from the German. Tiso's follower, Štefan Polakovi, developed Tiso's ideas, but did not join in his consent to German expansionism.

On the other hand, there was the equally dangerous influence of Communist internationalism. Its philosophy was materialistic and, consequently, atheistic. It professed the superiority of the socio-political interests of the international proletariat over national interests, for nationalism was considered a barrier to the unification of the proletariat and was suppressed. It is not surprising that Communism was rejected by Slovak Catholic writers.

They also rejected the wider cosmopolitanism which, according to them, was professed primarily by freemasons. Freemasonry was as unacceptable to Catholic authors as were the foregoing systems because it professed deism as well as cosmopolitanism, and rejected Christian beliefs.

There were, however, additional unacceptable systems. Liberalism was considered by most authors to be the main cause of modern evils. Catholicism rejected it above all for moral reasons, because it atomized society, was unscrupulously egoistic and exploitive, defined the function of a state unacceptably, and gave birth to ravenous capitalism. This estimation was accepted by Slovak authors, but Tiso and Polakovi added a national point of view as well. In their opinion, liberalism and democracy entailed a split of national unity into political parties, associations and interest groups, setting them one against each other. Thus liberalism weakened the nation, denationalized it, and placed it at the mercy of various external and internal enemies.

Internal problems pertaining to the Christian solution of the national question emerged as well. Catholicism accentuated its religious originality, authenticity, universality, and hence supranationality, while nationalism was a national and particular phenomenon.

How could these two antitheses tolerate each other? Is love of one's own nation Christian at all? Is nationalism admissible, possible, or even useful in a Christian manner? How can it be justified? Where does the Bible speak of it? What does it result from? Such were the basic questions our authors asked themselves. Even if nationalism could be justified, they continued, there is no justification for chauvinism, i.e., exaggerated love of one's own nation that degenerated into hatred of other nations. This contradicts the commandment of love of one's neighbor, who is every man.

Further, is the love of one's own nation a definitive state, or will it evolve and direct itself towards all mankind? What is the relation of nation to state? Does the state stand above the nation as professed by Italian Fascism of the time, or does the nation stand above the state, as professed by Nazism, but also by Catholicism? And what is the correct relation of the nation towards nationalities in a primarily Slavic state? Is it possible to defend the nation against invaders, even with arms? How does one understand the Christian principle of non-resistance while confronting evil with force?

There were many questions of this kind which were dealt with at the religious theological, and philosophic levels. Such inquiries arose almost coincidentally with the rise of the Slovak State. Polakovi published his main work, *The Foundations of the Slovak State* as early as 1939. In 1940 he launched and at first edited *The Philosophic Miscellany*, the very first pages of which were devoted to national questions. The third issue, published in 1943, contained a long discussion, "Nationalism as Ideology," previously held in Nitra. And even before that, in 1941, there appeared another important work dedicated to these problems--*Love of Nation* by Maximilián Chladný-Hano. While Polakovi began from the philosophy of life of the contemporary French Catholic philosopher Maurice Blondel in dealing with national questions, Chladný-Hano based his on neo-Thomism. Although both directions in Catholic philosophy differed little from each other in the theological and philosophic justification of the nation, they differed in political ideology. While Polakovi advocated Slovak National Socialism and with it, ideas of nationalism, politics, and dictatorship, Chladný-Hano retained the position of Catholic universalism to which he subjected Slovak nationalism; he did not speak of national socialism and did not seem to accept it. These two authors represented the two main views in examining the national question during the Slovak State. Chladný-Hano's orientation prevailed with the possible exception of some authors who were closer to the Slovak neo-Thomism.

Joseph Tiso

Many ideas professed in Christian nationalism by J. Tiso, himself a neo-Thomist, were adopted by Polakovi and Chladný-Hano. Tiso was studying the national question as early as the first republic. He became vice-chairman of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party in 1930, and after Hlinka's death became chairman and president of the Slovak State. As such, he was its main ideologist and the most prominent person in the effort to solve its national question.

In Tiso's opinion, nations have been created by God. Tiso mentioned "Christ's nationalism" hinting at the idea later elaborated by other authors that Christian nationalism could be deduced from Christ's love of his own nation. But in his opinion, the love of one's own nation arises partly from the commandment, "Love your neighbor as yourself" and is primary. Love of other nations arises from this commandment, too. It is a duty, and he who does not fulfill it is a traitor, says Tiso; what is more, he who loves only his nation and not others is a chauvinist, un-Christian nationalist. Internationalism is un-Christian since it does not include love for any nation. Christian nationalism

is pacifistic as well, "It must not clash with the interests of other people, nor infringe upon the rights of other nations."¹ In the end, it creates a coexistence of various nationalities in one State.

Although all nations are equal, Tiso considered that they were then living in bondage and slavery; this is not natural, but an historical phenomenon. Nations have a natural right not only to life, but also to freedom and independence: God did not create man a slave. The apostle Paul fought against slavery, and, if freedom is an essential characteristic of individuals, this is true also of a nation. A nation becomes free in a state of its own which is also a creation of God. As the nation is prior to the state, however, the state must serve the nation, not vice versa. In this way, Tiso and others fought étatism, i.e., the "cult" of the state, found, e. g., in Italian Fascism.

God, however, stands above the nation. His will on the Earth is expressed by religion and the Church. God delineated the natural rights of individuals and nations as recognized by conscience and reason. Through the intermediary of the Church, religion and especially morality speak on state and national affairs. In Tiso's opinion, only Catholicism is primary; other religions are sects lapsed from the Church. Consequently, God is the creator of both nationalist particularism and Catholic universalism, which for that reason, cannot contradict but complement each other. A genuine nationalism develops finally towards universalism, and thus Tiso came to accept "humanism" or love of all mankind, as later authors expressed it. Here secular and religious universalisms join.

The term "Christian" or "Catholic universalism," was used often in the period of the Slovak state. The neo-Thomist, Ladislav Hanus, spoke even of "Catholic pluralism" and "integral humanism." These things were discussed earlier by Tiso. God, he said, created a varied world of nations and races. But one must not lose sight of the whole in attending to its parts, indeed universalism intensifies interest in the particulars. Universalism is represented first of all by Catholicism as the original, universal religion given to man by God himself. It does not exclude nationalism because it does not destroy individualities, but connects them. Universalism is reflected in the fact that Christ's original teaching penetrates all sciences, even those that are secular, for all that is good in them stems from Him. This penetrated into the motto of the French Revolution: "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" and into the Marxist call for social equity. It penetrated even into some ideas of Hitler's national socialism, such as the idea of gathering members of a certain nation into one territory. Medieval Europe was a Catholic-universalism, and he interpreted contemporary developments as pointing toward such a pattern for Europe in the future. Liberalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism will fall and Catholic universalism will rule in a new Europe. Socially, it should be set up in accordance with the encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*. Catholicism stands upon the eternal laws of the world, the moral laws in man which are comprehended through conscience and formulated by reason as morality. Because of this, the Church must rule over politics and nations.

Tiso went even further to emphasize the need for Slovak unity during the First Republic. In his opinion, all political, economic, and other dividing lines split and weakened this unity, introducing political parties and social classes. These ideas were directed against liberalism, democracy and communism, which were criticized by Catholicism for moral and social reasons. Tiso, however, saw also there danger for Slovak national unity, though Catholicism did not speak of it because, being universalist, it implicitly was against a particularistic nationalist alternative.

Here Tiso succumbed to the influence of the German national-socialist ideology and admitted that this had been followed by Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (HSLs) as early as the First Republic. For national reasons the German national socialist ideology condemned liberalism,

¹ S. Polakovic, *Tisova nauka* (Tiso's Learning) (Bratislava, 1941), 26.

democracy, communism and other movements, and placed the unity of the German nation above all else. It condemned Catholicism, as well, for its non-nationalist universalism and introduced a cult of old German gods. Tiso seemed not to take this into consideration. When, as leader of the party-state, he came under the direct influence of German ideology, dissonant chords began to sound in his Christian nationalism. Where he had previously declared "Slovaks belong together," he now began to extol Hitler as a "world actor."² He claimed that, through his invasions, Hitler tried to unite dispersed European nations and unknowingly followed the Christian principle of natural law that all that belonged together should be put together. Tiso then made a statement on "ethnic unification" which would transfer inhabitants of a whole territory to a "trunk nation."³ In this way, he approved Hitler's nationalist invasions, being unwilling to recognize Hitler's real goals.

In accordance with the German model, the Slovak State became a dictatorship with one ideology, one party and one leader. This state preferred its Germans, though it tolerated Hungarians and Ruthenians; but it displaced Czechs to the Protectorate and deported Jews to concentration camps. It is possible that Tiso did this for reasons of "ethnic consolidation," which he frankly admitted. However, this was against several humanistic principles of Christian nationalism and betrayed the Catholic universalism and internationalism he had so often proclaimed. The historical sense of the Slovak State was in his opinion "a new assertion and organization of the nationality principle,"⁴ and was based upon the fact that "there must not be any division between nationally-based socialism and Christianity."⁵ He did not see, or was not willing to see, that the new assertion of the nationality principle was rough, rude, chauvinistic, Nazistic, and unchristian. It is upon just this point that the Slovak State during the Second World War has gone down so badly in history.

Štefan Polakovi

Polakovi took up and philosophically systematized Jozef Tiso's opinions, in deference to Tiso, publishing selections of his works in *Tiso's Teaching* and *Tiso's Struggle* in 1941. Although he built a "Slovak state philosophy" upon Tiso's positions,⁶ he did not follow Tiso in glorifying Hitler, and in characterizing him as fighting for a Christian ethnic unification of European nations and in claiming that he definitively and equitably was changing the conditions of nationality in Europe. On the contrary, towards the end of the war in 1944, he published a pamphlet "Warum Eine Freie Slowakei?" (Why a Free Slovakia?) where he defended the principle of Christian nationalism and condemned the theory of a mission by one nation to rule over the others due to its physical superiority, the substitution of the right by power, and other opinions advocated by Nazism.

Polakovi continued to follow Tiso on many other matters on which others were silent. In fact, Polakovi expressed Tiso's idea of national totalitarianism, party unitarianism and other anti-democratic stances with more force than did Tiso himself. In Polakovi's opinion, ideology is a summary of directives regarding the sense of human life. It is created through philosophy which observes life and directs it from its point of departure to the final destiny of all existence, i.e., to a transcendent God. This form of human life holds true only if it is directed by the right ideology

² Ibid., 372.

³ Ibid., 180-18.

⁴ Ibid., 176.

⁵ Ibid., 177.

⁶ S. Polakovic, *K zakladom slovenskeho statu* (The Foundations of the Slovak State) (Martin: Turciansky Sv., 1939), 8.

corresponding to life and respecting the natural rights of man given by God. Polakovi saw the causes of the crises in democracy, liberalism, communism and other systems as due to their lifeless ideology. In his opinion, this applied to the First Republic, which had to disintegrate.

Polakovi made every effort to give Slovaks a true ideology for life. Its basis was the idea of an independent Slovak nation and of a restored Slovak State of Prince Svätopluk. First of all, a nation is a spiritual organism kept alive by a rich cultural tradition, as is the case with the Slovaks, and which must be cultivated. He accepted too a love of nation motivated by Christianity which teaches one to love everything that is natural. He condemned chauvinism and advocated the need to love other nations. All of them were created by God; each of them was given something great and beautiful; and love of them is a love of the whole of mankind. Man is to be loved by virtue of being a man. Therefore, when modern nationalism develops appropriately, nations surely will create larger wholes. Polakovi condemned racism as well. As present nations already have been highly mixed genetically, it is no longer possible to speak of a "pure race." "All races and all nations are equal, and this on the basis of natural law."⁷

Polakovi rejected liberalism, which he saw as the contemporary evil conception which gave birth to egoism, individualism, democracy, and "at root, corrupted the true love of nation."⁸ Further, he rejected communism and cosmopolitanism which consider the existence of nations to be an evil, while constituting an étatism themselves, a cult of the state originating in Hegel. Finally, he rejected liberal democracy as spawning "party pools"⁹ and the "poison of partyship"¹⁰ that splits nations. Such democratic freedoms as freedom of thought he saw as able to cause much evil in the uneducated masses and in the nation in general. Democracy as a false, lifeless ideology weakened the Czechs and the French; in contrast, Polakovi turns to the totalitarian states of modern Germany and Italy, and to Ancient Sparta. He made these contrasts seeing in the totalitarian position the only salvation from the democratic diversification of the day and the degeneration of nations. He held that a genuine democracy can rise only when man has deprived himself of his passions.

That is why Polakovi, too, wanted a one-party system for the Slovak State. In his opinion, a small nation cannot afford the luxury of multi parties as in the great and rich democracies of the West, and consequently should strive to be homogeneous, to have one ideology and one aim. It has to form a "very solid whole";¹¹ it is to be led by one party representing its will and be headed by its highest leader, who at the time was J. Tiso. He should be simultaneously head of state, premier and chairman of the Party.

In Polakovi's opinion, members of a nation are not quite uniform, but they are persons in the Catholic sense of the word. They exercise natural rights to life, to bodily integrity, to the necessary means for life, to grow freely in God, to associate and to own private property. Basically, they have equal views and equal will. Freedom of thought is to be admitted in a nation only when it is in harmony with conscience and religious convictions, and promotes constructive thoughts. Otherwise, life will sweep it away and kill the deviate. In very hard words indeed, Polakovi acknowledged such freedom and called this a "Christian totalitarianism."

Both Polakovi and Tiso recognized a so-called democracy of quality, selection, and confidence only within this framework. They called the system they were promoting an

⁷ Ibid., 61.

⁸ Ibid., 57.

⁹ Ibid., 17.

¹⁰ Ibid., 101.

¹¹ Ibid., 25.

authoritarian and directive political system and excluded any system in which the uneducated masses would have a big say in parliamentary democracy and be able to misuse its freedom. Indeed, besides party functionaries the whole nation was to be excluded from government. If a nation is to be led by one party, with one leader whose hands hold "the most concentrated and unlimited power to perform the highest good,"¹² then there is no democracy to speak of.

Finally, Polakovi considered that the mission of Slovak statehood was to create a model of Christian nationalism and "prove that Christianity and nationalism complement each other."¹³ However, the Slovak State proved a failure at just this point; Polakovi himself failed as well at this point because he betrayed his own Christian principles.

His proclaimed love of other nations, love of people because they are people in general, stopped short of the Czechs and Jews in the Slovak State. He considered them to be an estranged element, hostile to Slovaks, and destructive. The Jews he considered to be even a pernicious and thievish element. He rightly proclaimed that "Love does not exclude punishment,"¹⁴ but the punishment had been changed into vengeance when the Slovak State expelled the Czechs and Jews shortly after its emergence. In the case of the Jews it infringed especially upon all the natural rights proclaimed by Polakovi, not only for the Slovaks, but for people in general. Not only did Polakovi not protest, he even justified the anti-Jewish policy of the Slovak State ironically on the basis of natural rights doctrine.¹⁵

Maximilián Chladný-Hano

Tiso and Polakovi were the leading theologians during the time of the Slovak State. They began from the principles of Christian nationalism, but slid to positions of socialist and nationalistic chauvinism, and consequently contradicted themselves. Other authors examining national problems at the time supported a more consistent line of Christian nationalism in a less contradictory manner. They did not forget Catholic universalism, and for that reason, they did not accept national socialism. They could not be deluded by any superficial parallels between it and Catholicism. With the exception of a few laymen, they were theologians and like the others, all were neo-Thomists. Mostly they were orientated to the past, to the Catholic and universalist Middle Ages that had not yet known national problems. Nevertheless, they welcomed the Slovak State and were actively interested in Slovak national questions. But they did not promote this interest in any extraordinary way, nor did they deal with political, economic, or social problems in Slovakia from its point of view. They were not engaged in politics and saw Nazism and Communism as manifesting the deepest degradation resulting from the moral laxity of the modern age which had estranged itself from Christianity. They criticized this as chauvinist and totalitarian nationalism, and rejected its Nietzschean morality and superman theories. In general, they moved on a more abstract level than Tiso and Polakovi. They spoke evasively regarding Czechs and Jews, although most of them, in the spirit of the times, had ideological reservations in their regard.

The orientation of these authors was best expressed in the book of M. Chladný-Hano, *Love of Nation*, whose point of view is explicitly confessional. He tries to find out what can be said of national problems from the standpoint of orthodox Catholicism, invoking Catholic authorities,

¹² Ibid., 31.

¹³ Ibid., 139.

¹⁴ Ibid., 101.

¹⁵ "Pravo na Kulturu" (The Right of Culture) in *Filozofický zborník*, 3 (Martin: Turciánsky Sv., 1941), 119-120.

from the New Testament up to the theologians. He scrupulously classifies what they said of nations and patriotism, emphasizing that his orientation is "even apologetic, i.e., aiming at the defence of our Christian world view."¹⁶ Above all, he wanted to defend Christian nationalism against the current of opinions at the time and there is question of whether he did not defend it even against domestic deviates.

He suggests a definition of nation as "a human community that expresses the will to be explicitly considered an individual nation on the basis of cultural unity."¹⁷ Nations are created by God, who expresses his infinite internal wealth by creating an infinite quantity of various things and beings. The "principium indiscernibilium" applies to them; there are not even two that could not be distinguished one from another. Thus there exists a number of nations differing from one another, not only physically, but also by their cultural characteristics. Since no individual can live without a nation today, the nation gives him all he needs for developing as a cultural man. It does not, however, give him eternal moral values which originate from God through religion. As man was created by God and returns to him, universal religion extends beyond a single nation.

Chladný-Hano deduced all the values of Catholic nationalism from this point of view. A nation, as originating with God, is natural and holy, the same is true of love of the nation and endeavors to improve it. On the other hand, national indifference, rebellion, or denationalization of other nations is unnatural and deserving of condemnation; it is necessary to protest against the move, even with arms in hand. Since nations are creations and children of God and each of them is different, specific and divine in origin, all are equal and their diversity is desirable for several reasons, for culture and spirit are more alive in a multinational state, which stimulates progress. That is why it is necessary to respect nations inside and outside one's own state.

Love of nation can devolve into a detrimental passion and become chauvinism, an exaggerated nationalism that is neither Christian nor human, as was the case in Germany, where "love of nation . . . is very high,"¹⁸ notes Chladný-Hano quoting the encyclical of Pope Pius XI against Nazism. Love as a feeling can be lost and replaced by cool intellect, to which patriotism is a stranger. Intellectualization gives up such feelings due to various "reasonable" ideas, as is the case with communistic internationalism, the freemasons, and other cosmopolitan movements. On this point, Chladný-Hano turns against liberalism and other such ideas, not only as enemies of Catholicism, but above all because of their stances toward nations.

He does not speak of democracy, parties, unions, and their splitting nations because he does not emphasize the need for unity. On the contrary, national diversity better corresponds with his standpoint in this respect. He refers to fascism and Nazism only marginally as contemporary national movements. He does not speak of Slovak national socialism at all and does not emphasize the need of Slovak national unity with one party and one leader. The mission of each nation (including the Slovak nation) is to manifest divine wisdom and richness and to transform itself in accordance with the ideal of the good, not, as emphasized by Polakovi and Tiso, to give the world a model of Christian nationalism.

Chladný-Hano also reflected on the nature of statehood. While man is internally enriched by his nation, his state protects the whole society externally. It looks after public welfare and builds up civil life. But ultimately a nation does not need the state because its mission is cultural and not political. Slovaks did not have a state for thousands of years, yet they created a specific culture.

¹⁶ M. Chladny-Hanos, *Laska k narodu* (Love of Nation) (Martin: Turciansky Sv., 1941), 212.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 103.

True, a nation with its own state fulfills its cultural mission more rapidly, but it is only more useful, not absolutely necessary, to have one's own state.

The discussion of "Nationalism as Ideology", in the *Philosophical Miscellany, 1943*, was born out of the spirit of Chladný-Hano' opinions. Anton Jurovský considered nationalism to be an ideology, seeing Christianity, national conscience, character, and love of nation primarily as mental experiences. Anton Ján urjanský called attention to the fact that the word "nationalism" had a pejorative meaning in that time because many people thought it synonymous with national egoism and the haughtiness of one nation over the other. He called it totalitarian nationalism, too, and refused to discuss it because it is at variance with reason and humaneness. Thus he replaced the term "nationalism" with that of "patriotism" which he termed "the active love of the Slovak nation,"¹⁹ and deemed both useful and Christian.

The psychologist Jurovský, the sociologist Alexander Hirner, and the philosopher Jozef Dieka also took part in this discussion. As a layman Dieka brought new themes to the rather monotone theologians. Hirner had asserted a year earlier that religion was not superior to patriotism, but they joined each other in calling attention to the fact that nationalism was a sort of egoism, and that stressing one's own nation prompted feelings of estrangement towards all that was incongruous with the nation. If a moderate nationalism is acceptable for Christianity, a certain socialism is also acceptable--a Christian socialism or even Communism, but only as social movements and not as worldviews.

Dieka also pointed out that due to totalitarian or exclusive nationalism, the national question has shifted to the fore even in Slovakia, to the extent that everything was being judged *sub specie nationalitatis*. Slovakia came under the influence of foreign ideologies which improperly understood what it meant to be a nation. Totalitarian nationalism puts state and nation in the place where God alone rightfully stands, and this is dangerous. In Slovakia too, the slogan "All for the Nation" could often be heard. The idea of totalitarian nationalism contains a fundamental hostility toward the Christian world view, and every attempt at compromising with it is vain. Dieka wrote, "I see difficulties in conjuring up conceptions of Slovak national socialism."²⁰ This was a clear rejection of the Tiso-Polakovi line of Slovak nationalism for the Slovak State. Dieka recommended emphasis upon the ideas of humanity, i.e., of mankind in general, and placing them higher than nationalism and Christianity. He ended by noting, "in the past, nationalism and humanity were propagated in our country by Kollár, afárik, and Štúr."

Other authors expressed their opinions on this theme only marginally in treating other topics. Jan Rybár condemned "egoistic nationalism" that becomes a curse when a nation is elevated as an idol above other nations; he condemns racism as well. In his opinion, there are no pure races in Europe any more than the so-called Nordic race is superior to others. The members of this race form a dwindling minority among the Germans. In Cyril Dudá' opinion, racism is "practical Darwinism," along the lines of Štefan Nahála's opinion that race and class are "small stained glasses" deforming one's perception of reality. In his postwar work, *Struggle against War*, Alexander Spesz points out that democracy is Christian in its substance in that it has "reverence for freedom and the dignity of others,"²¹ which results from the commandment to love your neighbor. The Church does not refuse democracy; quite the contrary, it would see it perfected.

¹⁹ A. J. Surjansky, "Narodovectvo ako suciastka svetoveho nahladu" (Patriotism as Component of World View) in *Filozofický zborník*, 3 (1943), 182.

²⁰ J. Dieska, "Filozoficke zaklady nacionalizmu" (Philosophical Principles of Nationalism) in *Filozofický zborník*, 3 (Martin: Turciansky Sv., 1943), 182.

²¹ A. Spesz, *Boj proti vojne* (Struggle against War) (Trnava, 1948), 47.

This discussion could continue, but it is apparent that only the work of Chladný-Hano on Slovak nationalism during the Slovak State reflects "the golden mean". It recognized the reality of the Slovak nation, which it avowed and wanted to perfect. Yet, it did not emphasize Slovak unity to the detriment of the natural differentiation of all the components of life. It did not succumb to the nationalistic ideology of the HSLS which it had taken over from Nazism. Chladný-Hano recognized that the party only tried to cover this with the cloak of Christianity, which it thereby compromised. Because the Chladný-Hano line did not succumb to any political ideology it was able to preserve the character of Christian nationalism.

On the other hand, the Tiso-Polakovi line, attempting to promote a Christian nationalism by stressing the unity of nation from the very beginning, put that above all else. By emphasizing a unified will and preferring one party, it restricted freedom and curtailed the natural diversity of life. This provoked nationalism and chauvinism and led the nation astray. Consequently, the nation struggled against it in the Slovak National Insurrection. Thus, the genuine values of Christian nationalism were created only by the Chladný-Hano line, along which alone one can build even today.

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Chapter VIII

The Slovak Nation and Communist Totalitarianism (1945-1949)

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The aim of the present paper is to clarify the scientific inadequacy and practical failure of the conception of nation within the theory and practice of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1949. The application of these theories did not lead to an end of the struggle of the Slovak nation for its identity and sovereignty, but complicated the entire process. Instead of granting equal rights to the Czechs and Slovaks, it made their mutual relations worse.

Even experts on the so-called socialist countries were surprised by the unexpected extent, dimensions and intensity of national movements and conflicts in East and Central Europe. Later they were surprised also by the crisis of "perestroika" in the Soviet Union after the fall of many Communist regimes. The surprise was all the greater, because it followed a half century of proclamations by the official voices and the highest representatives of these countries that national problems had been definitively settled. Eternal friendship and brotherhood among nations and nationalities in their countries, it was claimed, had been established upon socialist internationalism.

The proclamation of the renowned Yugoslavian Communist politician, J. Broz Tito, is typical: "We have solved the question of nationalities so fundamentally that it really can be an example, not only for countries with unsettled national questions, but even for the Soviet Union." He went on to say, "In our country, we have solved the question of nationalities in the best possible way, in accordance with Marxist principles."¹ The above statements are remarkable in that they were pronounced by a communist leader who officially broke with Stalinism immediately after World War II. Further, he had oriented the political, economic, and cultural development of his country in a "distinctive socialist" way. This militates against reducing contemporary national processes in the post-Communist world to "Stalinist deformations", rather than being connected with authentic Marxist or Leninist teaching.

Earlier political attempts to interpret the new ethnic problems in Central and Eastern Europe, however, are more symbolic than theoretically adequate. Jacques Rupnik is often cited in this respect, comparing the totalitarian Stalinist and neo-Stalinist regimes to an icebox in which ethnic problems and contentions were frozen, so that now, after its breakdown, we again have everything before us, only all is spoiled.² Adam Michnik notes that the urgency of human rights, mainly that of equality, results from the fact that the Communist system was a barbarian form of feudalism in the twentieth century and made apparent the need to struggle to establish democracy.³

Such views, however, reflect only some events rather than the essential and genuine reasons. First among these reasons derived from Communist political and socioeconomic practice itself is the implementation of the Marxist-Leninist theory and formulation of national relations. This practice not only froze contemporary problems and conflicts among nations in several countries, but also founded and developed many of them in such a way that they could not be settled for a longer period. Numberless and endless campaigns against bourgeois nationalists and separatists

¹ K. Cavoski, "Sporno boljsevicko masledje," *Theoria*, 30 (no. 3-4, 1987), 37.

² J. Rupnik, *L'autre Europe* (Paris, 1990).

³ A. Michnyk, "Svedocanstva, ka novom demokratskom kompromisu, Razgovor sa Adamom Mihnjikom," *Theoria*, 30 (no. 3-4, 1987), 140.

were provoked through an internally conditioned centralism resulting in open oppression of national identity and sovereignty in the name of universal and international interest. An explanation of contemporary national processes in the Central and Eastern European countries in the post-Communist period must be sought first of all in Communist theory and the practice of the past decades. This not only put national hatred and xenophobia under taboo, but, ironically, often committed these "sins" by offending national self-conscience, by oppression in various forms, by direct physical persecution, and by liquidation of individual nations.

Hence, the life of the Slovak nation under the conditions of the Communist Party government for nearly half a century can be qualified as a further unsuccessful stage of a difficult, hard, complicated, and until now, unfinished emancipation process. During this time, mistrust and conflict increased in relations with the Czech nation, but were muffled and concealed in various ways by official agencies.

Where does one seek the reasons for the failure of the Marxist-Leninist model for settling national problems in general and, in Czechoslovakia, in particular? Which aspects of Communist theory and practice merit special attention in this respect?

Instrumentalism: The Characteristic Feature of Marxism and Leninism Responsible for The Persistence of National Problems

From the very beginning of Marxism, the historical materialist interpretation of society and its history led its followers to a general conclusion regarding the historical character of nations, national movements and values. On the basis of its historical, economic, anthropological and other scientific theory, all nations, national movements, ideas, and feelings were considered to be historical phenomena and products of modern history, i.e., the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The more recent history and practice of the Communist movement, however, showed that a critical view is necessary not only of the general Marxist explanations of national conflict, but of the Marxist program for overcoming them and of settling relations among nations. The statement that "as soon as contradictions among classes disappear within a nation, mutual hostility among nations will disappear as well,"⁴ sounds at the very least, utopian today. But it was the basic Communist policy for settling ethnic problems for decades. A definitive settlement of the national question was tied tightly in Marxism to the assertion of proletarian dictatorship and the definitive introduction of Communism.

A second, and even more essential aspect specified the position and function of nationality within the process of social change: this is the reduction of nationhood to politics and its subordination to the idea of a proletarian revolution and dictatorship. In this light, the value of nationhood was a direct or indirect function of its role in the preparation of the proletarian revolution. This reflects the instrumentalism of the Marxist approach to communities, nations and individual lives. Hence, national questions were never seen as able to be settled independently of basic political aims, but were, at most derivative of the proletarian and socialist revolution, the conquest of power and its preservation. There are many such examples in history, beginning with Marx and Engels' negative evaluations of the national liberation movements of the Slavic nations in the middle of the past century and extending to Communist involvement in the emancipation efforts of colonial nations in this century.

⁴ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Manifesto komunistické strany) (Bratislava, 1983). 55.

The basic principles of national policy in the Communist movement were expressed unambiguously by J.V. Stalin. In spite of certain differences with Lenin, due to his opinions in this very sphere, he was rightly regarded as the official interpreter of Lenin's opinions on nationalities. His speeches teem with characteristic statements in which even the implementation of the right of nations to self-determination, which was recognized and propagated by Communists, was made conditional, not only upon strategic but also upon tactical political considerations: It is necessary to keep in mind that besides the right of nations to self-determination, there exists as well the right of the working class to the reinforcement of its power, and that the right of self-determination is subordinated to this right. The right of self-determination must recede before the rights of the workers' power. Such a situation obtained in 1920, when we were forced to send an expedition to Warsaw in order to defend proletarian class power.

When analyzing Marx's letter on national questions in an article on self-determination, Lenin concluded: "For Marx, the subordinate significance of the national question is indisputable in comparison with the 'workers question'" which determines "the decision in all questions."⁵ This standpoint reflects not only Marxist instrumentalism in settling national problems, but even the claim of a right "to export revolution", as applied practically by the Communist movement without respect for state sovereignty.

National movements lack a characteristic requirement for a Communist movement, which gradually makes them into its own instrument of revolution and power. It finds rich sources of energy for its political and class struggles in a justified displeasure and embitterment of oppressed nations; but this often is connected with vehement fanaticism.

Thus, the most noble-minded proponents of the national rights of oppressed nations, who appeared under its banner, experienced dramatic disappointments and frustrations. For pragmatic and instrumental reasons, they are required to make sudden and unforeseen reversals in national policy, often at variance with genuine and evident national interests.

At the same time, there are cases in history when the Communist movement became a support for nationally and politically oppressive movements and regimes. Stalin explained that, "The struggle of the Afghan Emir for the independence of Afghanistan is an objectively revolutionary struggle in spite of the Emir's monarchistic opinions and those of his followers, because it weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism."⁶ This standpoint confirmed Marxist instrumentalism in the settlement of national problems and provides a key for understanding the activities of Communist states once they conclude alliances.

In our opinion, a deeper explanation of the lack of success of Communist theory and practice in the sphere of national relations is to be sought primarily in an inadequate reduction of nationhood to political and economic elements. One can say truthfully that the Marxists never got rid of certain economic rules of thumb in spite of frequently declared efforts to settle problems on both levels by chosen political means.

In this connection, Lenin's interpretation of the well-known thesis in the *Communist Manifesto*: "Workers have no country" is significant. He writes in a letter to Iness Armand: "A worker has no home country--this means that his economic standing is not national but international, his class enemy is international and likewise the conditions of his liberation; the international unity of the worker is more important than the national one."⁷

⁵ J. V. Stalin, *Spisy*, zv. 5 (Bratislava, 1952), 263-264.

⁶ *Ibid.*, zv. 6 (Bratislava, 1952), 150.

⁷ V.I. Lenin, *Zobrane Spisy*, zv. 49 (Bratislava, 1989), 359.

Consequently, the preparation of the revolution and for the "dictatorship of the proletariat," etc., is international in substance according to Marx and Lenin. This is why international considerations were always further reaching and were weighed as more important than national ones. It was the basis of the instrumentalization of national movements in the interest of attaining Communist aims. Accordingly, members of the Communist movement in individual nations were advised alternately to promote national movements and to be indifferent in order to weaken and oppose them. Such is the judgment of several political scientists, historians and philosophers.⁸

In view of the "whole-part" relation, in which all is mainly a function of a whole, Marxism interpreted nations as functions of the international order, rather than as independent, free active subjects developing a whole by their activities. The national was reduced to the political and economic, as was noted by T.G. Masaryk in his critique of Marxism. He pointed out that Marx and Engels had subordinated ethnic reality to economic conditions from the standpoint of historical materialism, just as the Jewish nation had been reduced by Marx to a special economic egoism. Differences among nations were reduced to economics; the notion of nation had been understood by Marx in a solely political sense.⁹ Such a stance results from a philosophical underestimation of the nation as a value in its own right. This existential value is described by D. Tatarka: "A nation, however, is a vivid organism, a superstructure. It is like a leaf of a tree or a human body. That is why a nation behaves and reacts as an organism, in a sort of quiet mutual understanding with all differences in manifestations in various historical situations."¹⁰ In contrast, in the Marxist understanding, the nation is mainly an instrument to achieve the political aims of Communist movements.

Depending on circumstances, such instruments can be national movements and programs of oppressed nations as well as those trying to attain independence. These instruments can be used also for suppression of differences and conflicts as required by the unity of the proletariat. The pragmatic standpoint of its authors and partisans results shape the instrumental grasp of the international relations as well as of questions of organization and state law.¹¹

Just as it postpones the settlement of all social problems, Marxism postponed the settlement of the national question as well, until the time of a so-called proletarian, socialist and Communist democracy. This was to be embodied in one political party, namely the Communist party, whose operation could be expressed best by the notions: monolithic, monopoly and monologue. "It is a monolith because of its internal structure based on strict discipline, a monopoly in view of its claim to exclusive political power, and a monologue in view of the structure of its rhetoric."¹²

On the basis of historical facts, from the "socialist" stage of development of several countries, the above attributes of their former political systems appear historically to have been the main reason for their failure to settle national problems in their territories. They often led to the elimination of proven constitutional practices or to calling federations "pseudo federations", and the like. "Since this party was strictly centralized, there was no context for a practically functioning federalism that supposed political pluralism, because that would mean a 'unity of the different'."¹³

⁸ K. Cavoski, "Sporno boljsevicko nasledje," *Theoria*, 30 (1987), 41-44; L. Liptak, *Slovensko v 20. Storoci* (Bratislava, 1968), 299.

⁹ T.G. Masaryk, *Otazka socialni* (Praha, 1947), II, 153-154.

¹⁰ D. Tatarka, "O veciach tusenych, krasnych a nesmierne dolezitych," *Narodna obroda* (Jan. 16, 1991).

¹¹ K. Cavoski, "Sporno boljsevicko nasledje," *Theoria*, 30 (1987), 40.

¹² A. Djilas, "Komunisticko jugoslovenstvo," *Theoria*, 31 (no. 3-4, 1988)

¹³ "Istina I ideologija socijalisma. Razgovor sa Ljubomirom Tadicem," *Theoria*, 25 (no. 3-4, Beograd, 1982).

The analysis of Slovak national history in the years of Communist totalitarianism leads to similar considerations and conclusions. National problems in Czechoslovakia and relations between the Czechs and Slovaks in particular were settled at that time by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in accord with its principles.

The Primacy of the Center in the Organization of a Multinational Totalitarian State

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) always approached the settlement of relations between the Czechs and Slovaks and the situation of the Slovaks in the republic according to its long-term aims for political power.

Although it recognized the existence of the Slovak nation as early as 1924, it refused the ideology of Czechoslovakism, and its representatives called for the equality of both nations. Yet for decades it did not manage to prepare a consistent national program which would guarantee equal standing for the Slovak nation under constitutional law. The "Slovak question" had to be settled mostly by overcoming economic and social problems, limiting bureaucratic activities of the unitary state, etc. This can be explained by the ethnic composition of the Communist party and its leaders, and by its central organizational structure in which, for a long time, national and territorial principles were not applied. Nor can the policy of the international Communist movement, or of the Communist Internationale be forgotten. As late as the 30s, especially in connection with the growing danger of German Fascism, there was an essential change in the attitude towards national movements at the heart of the world Communist movement: henceforth, these movements were to be used for the defense of the Soviet Union. That is why great attention was paid by the Communist parties in individual countries to national factors during World War II. In time this would lead to the dissolution of the Communist International.

The coquetry of the Soviet Union and personally of Stalin with the Slavs and Slavic idea fits well into this description, as is illustrated by a purely rhetorical statement of Stalin: "We bolsheviks, or we can say Communists, have a different view of the Slav. We wish for all to be allies regardless of being small or large and for each of them to preserve their independence, shape, and internal life according to their ideologies and traditions--whether well or badly."¹⁴ The Panslavic Committee began to act in the spirit of this proclamation in Moscow, and the Soviet press began to publish many articles on the heroism and bright future of the Slavic nations. As we know, this train of thought came to a grinding halt quickly after the war, as soon as European non-Slavic nations, especially Hungary and Romania, set out to found peoples' democracies. The idea of Slavism then was replaced by that of proletarian and socialist internationalism.

The change of the Comintern's attitude towards national movements and its attention to the creation of "national" programs within the Communist party was expressed in the aims of the Czechoslovak Communists during and after the war. Such phenomena as the rise of the Communist party in Slovakia and the political slogan "For Soviet Slovakia" during World War II are understandable against the background of these aims. Their common denominator was a marked effort to make use of national efforts for the political aims of the Communist forces. The Comintern's leading representative, G. Dimitrov, advised Czechoslovak Communists in 1944 in accord with the overall interests of the Communist movement. He wished, also, to satisfy Slovak Communists who were worried by the irresolution of their Czech partners regarding a settlement of the Slovak question, especially of the constitutional relation between the Czechs and Slovaks, because this interfered in their effort to attain a dominant position in Slovak political life:

¹⁴ K. Cavoski, "Sporno boljsevicko nasledje," *Theoria*, 30 (1987), 44.

I think that the best relation between Czechs and Slovaks in the liberated Czechoslovakia would be an equal position of the Czechs and Slovaks, a Czech government in Bohemia, a Slovak government in Slovakia, and a common federative Czechoslovak government; the existence of a Czech parliament, of a Slovak parliament, and likewise, a common Czechoslovak parliament.¹⁵

Kl. Gottwald, as the head of the Moscow CPC center, accepted the idea of a federation after certain hesitation. Allegedly, he could not decide whether he wanted a federation or Slovak autonomy in February 1945, but as we know, he postponed the concrete regulation until a later time when the whole country would be liberated and the Slovak National Council would already be exercising its legislative and administrative duties. The hesitant manner of Kl. Gottwald and of his Czech and CPC agents to the solution of the key national problem in Czechoslovakia resulted from the accustomed pragmatic Marxist-Leninist interference in national issues, as G. Dimitrov states.

While Dimitrov dealt from the universal interests of the Communist movement, Gottwald and his leading group within the CPC were already having difficulties in their own country. Significantly marked by Stalinism, they also acted under pressure from the Czech national socialists and populists. According to J. Fierlinger, Stalin advised Czechoslovak forces, including Dr. Bene, in December, 1944 that "it will be necessary for the Slovaks to be firmly held in hand."¹⁶ All these circumstances surely prompted Kl. Gottwald to oppose a federation in the future Czechoslovak republic in April, 1945. "He no longer wanted to support a federative settlement. . . . On the one hand, he apprehended a break with circles around Bene, on the other hand, he supposed that such a standpoint of the CPC would be misused by Bene's followers for nationalist agitation against the party among the masses of the Czech people."¹⁷ The instrumental Marxist-Leninist element in nationality issues decided the fatal question for the Slovak nation in a single moment which echoed for a very long time. It pragmatically subordinated the nation to the aims and interests of the Communist movement in general, especially in Bohemia which became the deciding power in the CSR after World War II.

Under such circumstances, the settlement of relations between the Czechs and Slovaks became a chain of contentions and conflicts on various questions of constitutional law, the respective competencies of the center and the parts of the country, between the central government and the Slovak National Council, and even between the central committee of CPC and that of Slovakia (CPS). All this concealed a deeper struggle of the Communist party for power and for the dictatorship of the proletariat in the shape of a people's democracy. This framework also hid the penetration of Stalin's concept of socialism in Czechoslovakia with its typically centralist form of social life connected with oppression and terror. This was the painful birth of the political system headed by the Communist party.

This raises the question, "What actually is the above mentioned center and how was it formed?" First of all, it was the Czechoslovak government that defined itself as central in its relation to the Slovak National Council. The Czech National Council never "tried to become an organ similar to the Slovak National Council, for its representatives preferred getting into the government." When formulating the functions of the central government the voices that came from Slovakia were not taken into consideration. "Like the Slovak nation, the Czech nation too should have its legislative and governmental organ; the central legislative and governmental power should clearly differ from the representations of national organizations 'by its central and state

¹⁵ E. Taborsky, "Benesovy moskevskie cesty," *Svedectvi*, 30 (no. 8990, 1990), 82.

¹⁶ S. Faltan, *Slovenska otazka v Ceskoslovensku* (Bratislava, 1968), 178.

¹⁷ J. Barto, *Riesenie vziahu Cechov a Slovakov* (Bratislava, 1968), 11.

character."¹⁸ That is why it was soon dissolved and replaced by regional national committees similar to those previously constituted for Moravia. Since these committees had neither legislative nor governmental power, an asymmetrical state organization came into being. In a certain way, it had already been founded in the Koice Governmental Programme according to which relations between Czechs and Slovaks were shaped until 1968. Whatever the reasons and aims of this act may be and whoever the author, the significance of this event lay in the fact that the statehood of the Czech nation merged into Czechoslovak statehood from that moment and increasingly influenced it.

This was due to some further circumstances: the central government increasingly formed political policies on the basis of the experiences and needs of the more numerous and influential Czech nation, whose center was in Prague, and the dissension with the Slovaks took on a Czech-Slovak character. This new situation closely resembled that in Czechoslovakia before the war: Slovak participation was modified and reduced, not only in the Czechoslovak government but also in other state institutions. This is confirmed by the data published by S. Falan.¹⁹ A similar situation arose within the Communist party as well, where there was inadequate representation of Slovaks at the highest level, etc. As a consequence of these conflicts in the political sphere, conflicts between the Slovak Communists and the central government, which was formed mostly of Czech Communists, were frequent.

Two historical events, one from 1945 the other from 1946, were characteristic. The first serious conflict between the central government and Slovakia arose in July, 1945. In the CPC Central Committee, fear of certain successes of the democratic party (i.e., in its inner consolidation and organized resistance to the Communists in Slovakia) evoked a sharp criticism of Slovak Communist activities. At a common session of the CPC and CPS, the representative of CPC, V. Kopecký, resolutely asked his partner in Slovakia to lean on "the progressive policy of the central government." The discussion stressed the need for consequent implementation of the formerly agreed upon measure, which meant practically the first weakening of the Slovak National Council. After the Communists won the election in Bohemia and the Democratic party won the election in Slovakia in May, 1946, the conflict between Prague and Slovakia became more sharp. It had far-reaching effects, weakening the competency of the Slovak national organization in view of the needs of the Czechoslovak communist movement. V. Kopecký described V. Lettrich's request in October, 1945, to establish a Czech National Council as a form of separatism and proclaimed, "The Czechoslovak government, in fact, reigns in Czech countries only; Slovakia is governed by the Board of Commissioners representing a certain continuation to J. Tiso's regime."²⁰

As a consequence, the Slovaks were punished for their resistance to Communist pressures in the realm of constitutional law. The Slovak National Council was restricted in fulfilling the functions of a national organ and its national significance was diminished. From then on, it could no longer make important decisions without the consent of the central government. The need of the council's consent on nationwide decisions was abolished, and the activities of the Board of Commissioners and individual commissioners became directly dependent on the Prague government and its ministers. The whole series of events and their culmination is a lapidary example of the reduction and sacrifice of Slovak national rights to the interest and aims of the dictatorship of the proletariat. A paradigmatic example of the situation was increasing domination by the central government, not only of Communist, but also of Czech forces in general, including

¹⁸ G. Husak, *Svedectvo o Slovenskom narodnom povstani* (Bratislava, 1969), 597.

¹⁹ J. Barto, 44-45.

²⁰ S, Falan, 254, 257-259.

Czechoslovak forces with their characteristic negation of the independence of the Slovak nation. The central government became more or less the only place for the formation of natural Czech statehood and also the place of the formulation of nationwide politics, marked more by the perceptions and aims of the Czech nation than by a grasp of the needs of Slovaks.

Both of these events were not only a beginning, but also a pre-figuration of what would happen on a domestic as well as an international scale in the whole of Central and Southeastern Europe. The way for a settlement of the nationality problem, including the relation between Czechs and Slovaks, by the typical methods of the Communist totalitarian system, opened in Czechoslovakia after the *coup d'état* in February 1948 when a proletarian dictatorship was introduced and Czechoslovakia became a part of the "socialist block."

The extreme centralization of political, economic, and social processes projected its characteristics over the whole process on the international and domestic levels. All local and national differences were wiped out on the basis of the application of the "general legitimacy of socialist construction" and in the interest of the "unity of the people", "blocks" and individual countries. An ideological aspect of this process is the rejection of "bourgeois nationalists." The bearer and supporter of unification is a special social power which, after having been trained in socialist conditions, takes its place above the society. The party-state bureaucracy gradually comes to direct all events in society. "History changed this party from the reigning one into the only one and contributed to the coalescence of the party apparatus with those of the state and the economy. There arose a great independent force in the society."²¹

This power was to secure the interests and hegemony of the Soviet Union in individual countries in the name of internationalism. It formulated the universal Communist interests to which all was subordinated, including the national issue. Historical facts show that this took place in multinational states at the center of the party-state bureaucracy. The formulation of national politics consequently was situated at the seat of the politically, economically, and culturally most influential nation.

Under these circumstances, when issues arise from the interests and needs of a given nation in the formulation of national policies especially when social control is weakened by restricted parliamentary activities--the whole process takes on the concrete form of a conflict between the center and parts. This creates the basis for an endless "struggle against bourgeois nationalism," separatism, etc. Such a situation was found not only in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In past decades, national politics was formulated mainly on the basis of the needs and experience of the Czech nation and subsequently asserted in Slovakia. The phenomenon was present in a marked form in the above-mentioned asymmetric model, but it existed in a more veiled form in the federation, because it had its continuing basis in the activities of the ruling CPC.

Inequality in the Rights of Nations and the Back of Opportunity for the Slovak Nation

The approach to settling national problems between the Czechs and Slovaks according to methods typical of Communist totalitarian systems began in Czechoslovakia mainly after the coup of February, 1948. The dictatorship of the proletariat then took specific form and Czechoslovakia became a part of the "socialist block."

The pragmatic and instrumental approach of the Communist party to the issue of nationhood took on a new form in Czechoslovakia after its rise to power. No longer was it seen as a source of social energy and means for the class struggle; rather it appeared as something negative, a barrier

²¹ J. Barto, 165-166.

to be identified and surmounted as quickly as possible. The settlement of national problems through an overestimation of the economic factors in social life can be formulated as follows: "The equality of rights of both nations consists in creating conditions for the economic, cultural and social life of both Czechs and Slovaks."²² In a matter-of-fact way, this is defined as the cultural and economic compensation of Slovakia mainly by its industrialization. The concrete form of this activity, its management and effects were conditioned by two circumstances, the process of a general and strict centralization of the country and the fusion of Czech statehood with Czechoslovak statehood.

Slovak politics was reduced to directives formulated at the center regarding Slovak conditions. Slovak politicians participated in discussions on directives in central organizations, it is true, but their influence in decision-making was small due to their small numbers. As a consequence, the main principles and directives were transferred through collective organizations where the Slovaks could give their comments, but to a decreasing degree. The social and economic structures of both parts of the republic, their traditions, psychological and political experiences were different. National politics was asserted in the two parts, but it was formulated on the basis of the conditions of its most influential part. Slovakia was taken into consideration only in looking for methods to realize principles already approved and based upon Czech conditions even in the eastern part of the republic.²³ It is even possible to say that the Communists, while recognizing the existence of the two nations, created, by their centralist practices, the space for the revival of Czechoslovakism.

In such a situation, what happened to Slovak political organizations and the constitutional sphere? National emancipation processes culminate there because that is where a nation attains or loses the means necessary to make decisions regarding its lot. Thus, Bolshevik centralization of the whole of Czechoslovak social life naturally started at the source of power, the CPC. The Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) had been constituted during the war in view of the new situation of the communist movement after the rise of an independent Slovak state and the abolition of its independence.

The chairman of the CPC central committee decided on July 26 and 29, 1948: "On the principle that the working class and working people of Czechoslovakia should have sole political leadership in the sole nationwide CPC, the presidium of the CPC central committee decides:

1. The next session of the CPC Central Committee will decree that the Communist Party of Slovakia cease to exist as an independent party and become a part of the CPC.
2. From now on, the party organization in Slovakia will bear the name of the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS).
3. The CPS Central Committee will be subordinate to the central committee of the CPC and will follow its directions and carry out the policy of the CPC in Slovakia.²⁴

Towards the end of September, 1948, the CPC central committee decreed that "CPS become a part of the CPC." Since that moment, the function of its central committee was reduced to enforcement of Prague central policy.²⁵

In the following decades, Slovak governmental and legislative organizations were objects of incessant pressure and manipulation; instead of being representative of their own nation, they

²² G. Popov, "Diskusija o problemach bjurokratizma," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (no. 12, Moskva, 1988), 3.

²³ S. Faltan, 260.

²⁴ L.Liptak, *Slovensko v 20. Storoci* (Bratislava, 1968), 298.

²⁵ S, Faltan, 260-261.

became instruments for the implementation of central policies, which often did not respect important Slovak interests. The result was a limitation of Slovak rights for twenty years. The Marxist-Leninist way of settling problems between the Czechs and Slovaks culminated in the liquidation of Slovak national organizations.

This process was often justified by such paradoxical arguments as both the jeopardy and the success of socialism. The constitution of May 9, 1948, which was issued immediately after the Communist rise to power in the Slovak National Council, restricted many activities of a national and regional character. The position of the Board of Commissioners and of the Commissioners themselves in relation to the Prague government was partly strengthened after the twentieth convention of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But the rigged process against Slovak "bourgeois nationalists" in the Communist party was a warning and punishment for resistance of some Slovak Communists to the disrespect of Slovak national interests. The competencies of the Slovak National Council were again reduced to predominantly normative activities in the 1960 constitution which proclaimed the victory of socialism in the country. After the fusion of legislative and governmental powers in the national council and the disestablishment of the Board of Commissioners, the Slovak National Council ceased to fulfill national functions and became only a regional executive organ within the unitary state.

Slovak historians, political scientists and economists provide many facts leading to the conclusion that the way of dealing with the Slovak question in the Communist totalitarian system could not and did not lead to equal status for the Slovak nation in Czechoslovakia. Let us note the most important of these facts and conclusions:

1. Economically, there was a lessening of equality of Czechs and Slovaks in the economic sphere. Overcoming backwardness in Slovakia offered possibilities for willfulness on the part of the central government, especially when the identity and self-respect of the Slovak nation were fundamentally challenged.

2. Economic activities, beginning with industrialization and aimed at economic balance between Slovakia and the Czech areas, were not effective since they were directed by the central government according to its own interests and without a sufficient consideration of the Slovaks. Even when a certain constructive effect cannot be denied, Slovakia as a part of the Czechoslovak economy was not made sufficiently autonomous, but remained often a source of raw material for the more developed Czech economy, with great sacrifice and loss to Slovakia. In many cases out of date technologies were transferred to Slovakia restructuring Czech industry according to the needs of the "socialist block." When deciding on the sites of new production plants, the interests of the Czechs were often hidden behind the interests of the central government.

3. A frequent reduction or cancellation of power in Slovak national organizations, and at times even their liquidation under various pretexts, led to a permanent elimination of the hope of Slovak national sovereignty, accompanied by oppression of national self-confidence and pride, e.g., in the campaign against Slovak "bourgeois nationalism," etc.

4. The nation and national values underwent a characteristic "ideologization" in cultural events, frequent falsification of recent historical facts (e.g., the Slovak National uprising during the World War II, where the Slovak nation specifically expressed its identity and its decision to be the architect of its own in democratic life), a pragmatic selection and interpretation of national traditions, and an ignoring of the national-religious tradition.

Finally, the federal organization of the country was at variance with the wishes of the Czechoslovak-oriented powers and with the wishes of the Soviet political leaders in the reformation of 1968. This was developed especially under the pressure of Slovak Communists striving to strengthen their positions in the Slovak environment, but it was not a form of genuine sovereignty for the Slovak nation. In the very first years of normalization, this federal organization of the country was formally negated by several laws and caricatured by the renewal of the activities of the centralized Communist party whose efforts at "symmetrization" were "nipped in the bud" after 1969. The disestablishment of the bureau of the CPC central committee for party work in the Czech nations followed.

In sum, the emancipation of the Slovak nation, even after one hundred and fifty years, did not reach its natural culmination as a democratic state of its own during the years of Communist domination. Nor did the next generation experience well-rounded national development. Disappointment and disenchantment often were experienced by those who had related the attainment of national aims to the implementation of Communist social changes. The Slovak nation experienced a double pressure at that time: "the twin influence of Stalinist dictatorship in Slovakia,"²⁶ and of Communist dictatorship in general.

In view of the above internal situation, the different conditions of the Czech and Slovak nations in relation to the central government and to internal and external events, such as the rise and reinforcement of the Communist dictatorship, affected both nations in different ways and to different extents. Although Communist oppression befell both nations, the Slovak nation "did not obtain the minimal space of independence possessed by the Czechs,"²⁷ and consequently suffered a double oppression. The noble mottoes of proletarian internationalism and the brotherhood of nations hid a division of nations and a double oppression of one of them; its consequences were distrust and even hatred. This came fully to light after the fall of the regime when the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia not only artificially froze the existing national problems and conflicts, but also significantly contributed to their inflammation.

Earlier, it was mentioned that the inadequacy of the Communist attempts to remedy national problems resulted mainly from its pragmatic instrumental underestimation of the nations, their national movements, and national values in general. As can be seen from the second part of our considerations, Marxism ignored also such values and principles of society as plurality, freedom and equality. That is why it was not able to formulate and implement the genuine interests of a multinational whole. Hence, the present renewal of modern democracy in post-Communist countries takes place in the name of human rights and the renewal of values in civil society. In these circumstances, national movements are to be understood as deeply human and democratic, as directed against phenomena of hegemony, and as aimed at restoring the identity and independence of nations which previously had been denied full rights.

What can be deduced from these reflections upon nations, and what are the possibilities and suppositions of peaceful coexistence?

1. Because hegemony can become a basis of malignant nationalism, a nation should not be considered the highest good. However, it is not possible to ignore, underestimate or negate in the name of some higher interests the phenomenon of nation or that the national feelings of citizens are an important quality of their life. We witness a surprising resistance on the part of national identities which even the brutal oppression during Communist regimes could not liquidate. This is

²⁶ L. Liptak, 298.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 312.

because nations are the optimal form of human existence at this stage of human development. The following view can be accepted in this context without the slightest reservation:

A nation is human flesh; it is a natural organism, as self-evident as mountains and rivers, as people and life itself. No one had devised a more suitable environment for communication among people, for social coexistence and the rise of cultural values. These are the only imperishable values proper to civilization. The world of feeling and the awareness of nationality are as unique and unrepealable as are one's identity and individuality. There always comes a time--usually one of anxiety--when subterranean rivers burst to surface, when a nation breathes in one breath and sounds in one sound, when the awareness of a common fate is so mighty that under it all barriers break down, when deposits of dogma and fabricated values are washed away and the depths are laid bare: there is something in these depths that unites all members of a nation.²⁸

The present time of the collapse of totalitarian Communist regimes seems to be such a time.

2. Historical experience shows that the peaceful coexistence of nations can be attained only under the conditions of a modern civil democracy: the classical motto: *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, expresses its essence, namely, that the bearer of political power is a free citizen, that law does not recognize "higher" and "lower" strata or classes, and that the national social dimension be respected. Brotherhood is the basis of contemporary national feeling, expressing a close spiritual connection of citizens in language, culture and history. Civil society makes this possible by projecting the civil and national into state-forming action in order to obtain the desired harmony between the state and the nation.

Such a harmony could not be attained in the former Communist states, because their creators were not citizens fulfilling the double task of citizens and members of national communities in a multinational state, but a centralized social power, the Communist party, pushing through its ruling interests. Stagnation in the development of the structures of civil society is usually a basis, not only for tensions and conflicts among citizens, ethnic communities and state, but also for inequality and conflict among nations. This is because the absence of the civil dimension leads to the end of the nation and, hence, to the loss of connection with the other nations which partake in the creation of a world culture.

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²⁸ VI. Minac, *Duchanie do pahrieb* (Bratislava, 1972), 151-152.

Chapter IX

Slovaks on the Road to National Self-Determination

Jana Balázová

Introduction

The complex problem of national identity including issues regarding the rights and status of nations, relationships between them on the level of nation states or within the frontiers of one state, and the nationalism remains despite their having been kept secret for decades in countries of the former socialist camp. With the weakening and final disintegration of political, ideological and economic ties between these states themselves in relation to the U.S.S.R., the semblance of the unity between the socialist countries as well as of the nations within particular countries has proven false.

The Marxist theory of the origin and development of nations and of national movements was based on an historical analysis which contained many stimulating ideas. But it did not succeed in explaining the tension and disagreements among nations; the Marxist practical-political program for overcoming national conflicts was a failure. It was apparently a case of erroneously replacing phenomena belonging to the national sphere with those of class struggle, dividing the people into two main antagonistic classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. National identities and national interests were to have been replaced with an international or supra-national unity of the working class. National feelings and nationalism were considered strange and hostile to the idea of unity. T. Nairn, formerly a Marxist expert in the theory of nationalism, wrote:

‘Nationalism’ is the pathology of modern developmental history, as inescapable as ‘neurosis’ in the individual, with much the same essential ambiguity attaching to it, a similar built-in capacity for descent into dementia, rooted in the dilemmas of helplessness thrust upon most of the world (the equivalent of infantilism for societies) and largely incurable.¹

Nationalism was to have diminished in the historical process of unifying the world proletariat.

The socialist countries, whose policy was rooted in Marxist ideology, had originally been built upon national principles and the nations preserving the characteristics of their identity.² On the one hand, national feelings emphasized in internal affairs; on the other hand, manifestations of national identity were not acceptable from the Marxist ideological point of view. The national was understood to be a lower, earlier stage in the historical process--something that should be overcome. The national was interpreted according to its political-economic aspects. Such fundamental transformation of phenomena of one type into another formed the ideology of each socialist country and deformed the interrelations among members of different nations. Officially, national problems did not exist, but they were only hidden under the sediment of Marxist terminology; they existed latently and were growing to an explosive stage. The failure to resolve

¹ T. Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, 359, cited in B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1990), 14-15.

² Anderson asserts the existence of strong, militant nationalism in these countries as a consequence of the twisted Marxist ideology. *Ibid.*, 11-14.

the problems in principle, and the responses which were only partial due to political-economic theory, constituted a time bomb for these societies. This exploded upon the loosening of political, ideological and economic ties, when the satellites broke free from the Great Power. This showed the Marxist interpretation of the fundamental antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and its application to the problems of nations, to be deceiving. The emerging period of democracy provides an opportunity for nations to attain the natural aim of every national effort, the achievement of self-identity, self-determination, authenticity and sovereignty as a nation. On the other hand, the same process is perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of those nations which had the advantages of full national development connected with their own national statehood. These two contradictory attitudes towards the problem cause national tension, a growth of nationalism and the rise of related militarism.

Some Aspects of the Slovak National Way to Self-Determination

The world of the twentieth century is divided into nations and actual policy has been national in character; this is the reality. Theoretical attitudes towards the nation vary from the negative to the exaggeratedly positive, that is, from underestimating this phenomenon to dealing with it as something absolute. Many criteria, starting points, and intentions actually used in practice remain to be justified. We accept the real existence of the nation, with its specific role in the life of human beings. The complexity of the problem is suggested in A.D. Smith's definition:

National identity and the nation are complex constructs composed of a number of interrelated components--ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political. They signify bonds of solidarity among members of communities united by shared memories, myths and traditions that may or may not find expression in states of their own but are entirely different from the purely legal and bureaucratic ties of the state.³

Each of the components of this complex plays its role in the creation of the picture of the nation: historic territory (homeland), common history (including myths, memories), common culture (language, education), common economy, and the rights and duties of the members of the nation both legal and customary.

Every nation tends to self-determination, a fundamental phenomenon of which is political emancipation. The concept of nation is connected closely with the element of political power. M. Weber asserts that the national represents the specific stratum of pathos of a group of a people connected by a common language, religion, habits or destiny. It is connected with the idea of its own organization of political power, actual or desired.⁴ There has been a natural tendency (since the French Revolution) for the nation to attain full emancipation and to exercise its right of self-determination:

Almost every year the United Nations admits new members. And many 'old nations', once thought fully consolidated, find themselves challenged by 'sub'-nationalisms within their borders--nationalisms which, naturally, dream of shedding this sub-ness one happy day. The reality is quite

³ A.D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 15.

⁴ M. Weber, quoted by S. Grujic, "Politics as the Sphere of Alienation," *Praksa*, 1 (1989), 129-130.

plain: the 'end of the era of nationalism', so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.⁵

Nationalism--a concept frequently used in the theory of nation--is the expression of national feelings, a developed consciousness of national identity. It is both weak and strong. It plays a positive role in that period of a nation's life when strong efforts need to be mobilized in order to defend national interests, mainly at the time of establishing the nation or when it is attacked from the outside. This finds expression also as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population, deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'."⁶ The sensitive point in the working of nationalism as an ideology is the prevailing negative, even militant attitude towards actual or supposed enemies when threatened with the loss of national freedom.

The world at the end of the twentieth century is relatively small and it is very hard to keep national conflict within the borders of the rival nations. Hence, the fragile balance among nations in a threatened area should be defended. One possible way to secure the stability of the political situation is to draw up treaties based on a non-national vision of world order, where the supranational would prevail over national tendencies, where the "national consciousness" would be replaced by a "consciousness of citizenship". Supra-national associations are based on the fact that each of their state members gives up part of its national sovereignty and transfers it to the supranational so that the influence of the nation states will gradually diminish.

On the one hand, the role of regions will increase in the future, mainly in the spheres of culture and education. Indeed, successful cooperation in economy, common attitudes towards important political events in the world scale and common decisions on global economic/political questions are evident in such associations. On the other hand, there are strong efforts to defend particular national interests, and generally there is strong resistance to threats of losing national identity, self-determination, and national sovereignty. Both nations which are only struggling for their rights and those which are fully developed tend to defend their sovereignty.

The period of democratic changes in the countries of the former socialist camp is also understood as a chance to realize the right of all nations to self-determination. For the Slovak nation, this means a fulfillment of the right to exist both *de jure* and *de facto* for the first time in its history.

Nearly 70 years of coexistence of the two state-nations, Czechs and Slovaks, document the complexity of the outer and inner influences and conditions which formed the actual shape of their interrelations. The complicated political situation in Europe and throughout the world deeply influenced the inner situation in the Czechoslovak republic and its national state policy.

The Czech and Slovak nations joined in a common state constituted upon the ruins of the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, with the aim of realizing the goals of both nations. But, "in contrast to the Czech nation which in the Czechoslovak state found its full national and state realization and became a ruling nation, the Slovak nation in the common Czechoslovak statehood not only did not attain an equivalent position in the quilt of Czechoslovak national ideology, but saw its very existence to be threatened."⁷

The gradual development of mutual relations between Czechs and Slovaks in the independent Republic was deeply and negatively influenced by the idea of Czechoslovakism, which became a

⁵ Anderson, 12.

⁶ Smith, 73.

⁷ S. Faltan, "Slovenska otazka v ceskoslovensku," *VPL Bratislava*, 1968), 5.

state doctrine. This was rooted in the historical Czech-Slovak interrelation which dated back to the period of "national revival" in the nineteenth century. One part of the nineteenth century Slovak national revivalists were Protestant intellectuals who endeavored to resist the Hungarian assimilationist tendencies through an orientation towards Czech lands. This reflected their deep ideological ties, rooted in the Reformation. The proximity of the Slavonic tribes offered mutual help and support to preserve the identities of both nations in a time of oppression. This appears even in the acceptance of Czech as the Slovak literary language. Thus, at that time, progressive ideas contributed to the mutual enrichment of the spiritual life of both nations. Stúr, the firm supporter of the idea of Czechoslovakism among the Slovak intellectuals, notes that "the Slovak revival movement is united with the Czech into a higher organic spiritual unity--Slovak revivalists are also Czech revivalists and vice-versa--they are completely synonymous: the general process has been based upon the same themes in both Bohemia and Slovakia."⁸ The main representatives of those trends in the Revival Movement were Kollár, afárik (Slovaks), Dobrovský or Palacký (Czechs). The ideas of Czech-Slovak mutuality had strong influence upon the next generation of Czech and Slovak intellectuals and was transferred, as well, to the socio-political situation of the Czechoslovak republic. The most influential representative of modern ideas of Czechoslovakism in both the theoretical and the political spheres was the first President of Czechoslovak Republic, T.G. Masaryk,⁹ whose views found their followers among both Czechs and Slovaks (e.g., V. Srobár and groups of intellectuals associated around the theoretical journals *Prúdy* and *Hlas*).

This idea played a quite positive political role in the very beginnings of the independent Czechoslovak state, when the national shape of the state took form, but it could not pass the test of time. The idea of Czechoslovakism was misused on behalf of Czech political and economic hegemony; it fully ignored the needs and interests of the developed national consciousness of Slovaks. It is not surprising that T.G. Masaryk was present at the preliminary negotiations between the Czech and Slovak participants and that he also signed the Pittsburgh Treaty (May 30, 1918), which followed the ideas of the Cleveland Treaty (Oct. 25, 1915), in which both parties were regarded as independent nations. On behalf of "higher interests", the idea of Czechoslovakism was deformed into that of one homogeneous nation with two branches, one of which, the Slovak, as weaker and underdeveloped depended upon the economic, political and intellectual strength of a self-appointed protector. In this light, the Slovak nation was understood to be an ethnicity with a specific language, particular habits and rural culture; but it was not understood to be a nation with its own homeland, history and culture, with a developed national consciousness which was embodied not only in literature, but also in policy (e.g., as with Stúr generation in the middle of the nineteenth century).

Czechoslovakism, when transferred to the social-political order, led to a disproportion in the development of the two nations and to the hegemony of the Czech part. Though civil rights, worked out under the principles of democracy, were equal for all citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic, and there were visible positive results from the new type of statehood as the rough national oppression no longer existed, other much more hidden mechanisms were at work.

From the philosophical point of view, the main negative feature of Czechoslovakism was that it deformed the attitudes of a great part of Czech society towards the Slovaks and led to a misunderstanding of the aims of the Slovak nation. The doctrine made impossible a sound coexistence of both nations. Falan characterizes the negative effect of Czechoslovakism as follows:

⁸ S. Stur, *Smypel slovenskeho obrodenia, Tranoscius Lipt. sv. Mikulas* (1949), 131-132.

⁹ T.G. Masaryk, *Idealy Humanitni* (Praha, 1990); *Ceska Otazka* (Praha, 1948), 131-132.

Czechoslovakism abused the close relationship of the Czech and Slovak nations. It endeavored to incorporate Slovaks into the Czech nation by force. It weakened and deformed the inner national development on both sides by searching for a common national progressive platform. The progressive Czech influence that had really helped Slovaks, lost much of its value and attractiveness because of ignorance of Slovaks as a nation.¹⁰

The mutual relationship of both nations was deeply influenced by: 1) a fundamental non-understanding of the claims of Slovaks, who were put into the position of chronic malcontent separatists and chauvinists in the prevailing estimation by most of the Czech nation; and 2) the feelings of ignorance of the interests and needs of the Slovak nation which prevails among Slovaks. Even now residues of Czechoslovakism and its negative influences are present in the social consciousness of both nations.

The other negative element was rooted in the mutual relations of both nations after World War II in the period of the socialist build-up when the interior and foreign policy of the state was fully dependent upon the decisions of the Soviet Communist party committee. Due to the Stalinist conception of the role of the center as the highest institution and of the supreme power of the state in the spiritual, political, economic and social spheres, the principle of centrism was introduced in Czechoslovakia. According to this, state and party policy grew together, creating an homogeneous center in Prague. This was the paradoxical solution of the potential Czech problem, whose core was the possibility of the Czech nation being tied to the Western democracies. To eliminate such a possibility, the Czech state and party representations were merged within the Czechoslovak one. With the lapse of time, as the central and particular representations merged in Prague, the Slovak representations acquired the characteristics of regional offices of no importance.

In the meantime the Slovaks had their representations in both state and party spheres but, paradoxically, disappeared from the epicenter of both state and party affairs. No fundamental changes took place in understanding the "proper place" of both nations. The center became a specific ruling body in the state, putting itself somewhere above national interests. So-called Pragocentrism--the actual state and party policy--was dangerous both to the Czech and the Slovak nations, although in many mediate ways the Slovak nation felt itself to be attacked the more fundamentally. Pragocentrism held its power also after the declaration of the federal state settlement: the principles of federation were never realized, and representation of the nations' interests in state and party decision-making spheres remained asymmetric.

The Pragocentric phenomenon reflected an independent supranational governmental and party decision-making body ruling both the state and party affairs of the republic. Its most important element was the merging of the central and the Czech. In fact, Pragocentrism served as a defence of the interests of a relatively narrow ruling group who maintained a center oriented towards the defence of the interests of the nation with which it was closely connected. In reality, Czechoslovakism and Pragocentrism played the same roles in relation to the Slovak nation. It can be said that the unpublished reactionary program of the Memorandum about Slovaks (worked out by Department of Scientific Policy of the Czech National-Socialist Party in 1946)¹¹ paradoxically found its expression in the actual policy of the Socialist country in home and foreign affairs as well as in the economy. Its aim was to make the Slovak nation fully dependent on the Czech one, to weaken Slovak national consciousness to such extent that it would be unable to develop a Slovak national policy of an authentic, self-determined, sovereign nation.

¹⁰ S. Faltan, *Slovenska otazka v ceskoslovensku* (Bratislava, 1968), 242.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 248-252.

Democratic processes in socio-political life resulted in the differentiation in the political scene between the two parts of the republic. Due to political and economic interests, working out a national program became inevitable. The attitude towards the status of the modern nations in a common or divided republic was the core of the most important differences, disagreements and tensions in the broad political-ideological spectrum. This was affected by the heritage of Czechoslovakism and Pragocentrism both negatively and positively. A judgment upon their validity depends upon the aims and the analysis of that historical experiences. The Slovak political scene itself also includes different attitudes towards this crucial question, from federalist, through relatively cautious silence, to strong separatist views. Still, elements of Czechoslovakism and Pragocentrism have a negative effect upon the national consciousness of both nations, which in some cases are disposed to separatist tendencies. Czech premier Pithart admitted that the exasperation of some Czech people results from fundamental incomprehension of the Slovak nation's efforts to attain its authentic national identity and recognized this to be a consequence of the traditional Czechoslovakistic and centristic attitude towards Slovaks deeply rooted in the Czech consciousness.¹² In Slovak national consciousness, the same heritage has a negative effect, directing people to a negative search for some outer enemy responsible for all failures and misfortunes.

Conclusion and Summary

The disintegration of the former socialist camp has freed the nations living in its states to search for their authentic national identity. The Slovak nation is one of those that confront the duty and right to delineate new limits of their self-identity and self-determination.

Over several decades coexistence in a common state with the Czech nation and a number of national minorities appeared unfavorable to the full development of the abilities and aims of the Slovak nation, which felt itself oppressed. Two main factors have deformed the mutual relationship between the Czech and Slovak nations: the ideology of Czechoslovakism and the policy of Pragocentrism, both of which till today have deeply influenced the coexistence of the two nations.

The revived national movement resulted in consequences which surpass the framework of nation and pose the question of how to establish a more sound interrelation between the nations and to secure fulfillment of national self-identity.

The new conditions of the split Czechoslovak Republic have given both nations the chance to develop independently due to their own aims and desires. On the other hand, the split shows the inability of the political representatives of both nations to search for and find positive solutions within the given framework. From this narrow point of view the split reflects a failure.

The *Charter of Human Rights* declares the right of self-determination or sovereignty for all nations to be among the most important human rights. Except for the special conditions of the six-year existence of the Slovak state during the World War II, the Slovak nation never had the opportunity to legalize this right and in this manner to attain its authentic national identity. Seventy years of coexistence with the Czech nation in a common republic did not provide the chance to realize the national program. The wrong national policy, both in the Czechoslovak republic represented by Czechoslovakism, and in the 40 years after the World War II, deformed by Pragocentrism, not only impeded the emancipation of the nation, but also served to spoil the sound relationship between the Czech and Slovak nations.

¹² P. Pithart's speech on the th session of Czech national council (April 9, 1990).

The democratic principles of the reconstruction of the new state expressed themselves also in democratic national movements aimed at full emancipation, self-determination and the attainment of authentic national identity. Democracy cannot be realized when nations are forced to surrender their rights to an idea. This is the case even if a nation surrenders a part of its rights in order to be better able to secure the full development of its members. From this point of view, the Slovak national movement can become a test of democracy.

The political situation has been rapidly changing, not only on the global world or European scale, but also in the case of the former Czechoslovak (Socialist and the Federal) Republic, which no longer exists.

It can be discussed whether the split of the Republic expressed a deeply rooted desires for self-determination on the part of the Slovak nation and the parallel desires of the Czech nation to restore its old historical independence, or, on the other hand, as a negative consequence of the hostile separatist tendencies existing equally in both nations.

The final conclusion here underlines the inability of the political representatives of both nations to search for positive solutions of the existing problems within the framework of a common state. This may be the local expression of a global process of disintegration of the greater units on the world political map. Only the test of time can prove the correctness of the chosen way. But it now is the time to prove the ability of the nation to develop in a democratic way by democratic means and in the new conditions of a sovereign state. It is the time to think about establishing a rightful civic society.

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Part III
The Persistence and Variability of Values in Slovak Culture

Chapter X

Democracy in Relations among Nations: Emancipation and Integration

Ján Uher

A brief review of the history of the Slovak emancipation process, mainly with regard to practical social activities, raises a very serious question or series of questions: namely, what can be deduced from reflection upon our times? How should one treat the past heritage in the present? Which of its elements should be used in the midst of contradictory social currents of this historically complex and critical period? For now systems are being overthrown and empires reshaped, state and territorial groupings are under change and a new community of relations, nations and states arises on their ruins or on new foundations. All this is taking place not only in Central and East Europe, but in all of Europe.

The History of the Problematic: Diversity in Unity

Let us try to outline at least some of these problems in present Czech and Slovak relations.

The first and most important task faced by former totalitarian (post-communist) states is the application of democratic principles to all spheres of social life and, consequently, to national and nationality relations as well. Democratic principles must be developed and applied not only within the social organism aiming at the civic pluralism in given states and communities, but also in relations among nations and ethnic groups, insofar as they are (or feel themselves to be) independent, historical subjects. Without this, democracy would be incomplete--even impossible--in these states and unsolved relations among nationalities would remain a source of incessant contention and conflict.

The historical experience of the preceding 70 years in the Czechoslovak Republic fully confirms this fact. It shows vividly that the main reasons for the previous tensions in the relations of the Czech and Slovak nation, as independent historical subjects coexisting in a common state, consisted in the fact that until now this problem has not found a satisfactory solution: the principle of democracy has not been applied to their coexistence in a single state. There was no possibility freely to choose the form of coexistence on a democratic basis and with equal rights, in the spirit of the natural right of self-determination. In fact, no form of coexistence could be found which would implement these principles. Finally, this is witnessed by the experience not only of Czechoslovakia, but also from such other East European countries as the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, with heavy historical consequences today.

First of all, this experience results from the fact that totalitarian systems ruled in these states for a long time without respecting democracy in any sphere, making it only logical that this fact be projected not only in civil relations, but also as regards nationality. For the former Czechoslovakia there were additional reasons in an insufficient and essentially instrumental grasp of nationality in relations at the rise of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 and immediately thereafter--long before the totalitarian regimes. Many sources of later conflicts can be traced to the constructions worked out in the founding of a multinational state. The entire complex of nationality relations was underestimated and instrumentally subordinated to other, so-called higher and more general state interests, whereas the whole complex should have been grasped as a matter of equal

components and solved in terms of common interests. This is clear from the entire historical development of Czechoslovakia up to the present day.

The First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1939), established by the will of both nations and built upon the humanistic ideals of T.G. Masaryk and his associates, was, no doubt, a democratic state from the point of view of civil and human rights. For people living there it provided an essential civilization and progress in democratization, compared with the situation in the former Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. Surely, it was incomparably more democratic than its immediate neighbors, such as Horthy's Hungary, Pilsudski's and Beck's Poland, Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy or Stalin's Soviet Union. This is undoubtedly true, even when it is necessary to differentiate between democracy as an ideal and the everyday reality.

It is true that, in comparison with the former Austria-Hungary, the First Czechoslovak Republic brought many positive things, mainly in the sphere of culture and education, by its universal civil democratization for the Slovak nation after 1918. Slovakia then had better possibilities for its development, historical formation and self-consciousness even though it did not attain the equal (or autonomous) position with the Czech nation which had been promised in several agreements before the war.

Regardless of these undoubted positive elements, a stumbling block appeared immediately and proved to be a source of contention and mutual misunderstanding. Upon analysis we find that it consists in the fact that the universal principle of democracy was not applied in the civil sphere. Equal rights were not applied to relations among nations living in the Republic: there was no acknowledgment of their independence immediately after 1918, nor was this taken into account in regulating their independence in the internal organization of a common state. Instead of democratic relations among nations, the Czechoslovak state began to be constructed in a centralist manner as a unitary state with a dominant position for the largest, reigning nation. In the formation of the state the specificity of the Slovak nation was not recognized constitutionally, or in any other way.

This was not only a great historical error but also a fundamental political blunder. Instead of realistic participation, it produced an inviable and instrumental doctrine of a so-called "unitary Czechoslovak nation" (known as "Czechoslovakism"). This was a non-existing nation, existing only in the minds of its authors, which was gradually to arise through administrative processes of assimilation in the future. Of course, it did not arise, because in history nations do not rise in such instrumental ways but form themselves from their centuries-old historical presuppositions.

This basic factor had unfortunate consequences for all subsequent development. It has, of course, several complex historical reasons, but this does not justify erroneous theory and harmful political practice. Even without taking out of context the reigning ideology and national practice, clearly it was one of the main sources for the lengthy contentions and, finally, for the disintegration of the first Czechoslovak Republic in 1938.

As is evident, the issue was not the idea of a common Czechoslovak state, which mostly was accepted, but, especially, the idea of a "unitary" nation, whose idea never existed. This simply did not take hold as a vital force in historical development. As an independent historical subject and in the interest of its own identity, the Slovak nation, becoming increasingly self-conscious, did not accept the artificially constructed idea of an ethnic Czechoslovakism. This was rejected as a non-viable and essentially non-democratic force directed against its own existence.

At the beginning of the common state, circumstances had not yet crystallized in this regard. Not only Czechs, but also Slovaks and their political representatives enthusiastically accepted the idea of living in a common state after the long period of national oppression in former Austria-Hungary. Initially, they accepted the idea of an unarticulated Czecho-Slovak state for pragmatic

reasons, especially when motivated by the cogent international circumstances which were used as arguments at the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War. This also explains several ambiguous formulations of the primary Czech-Slovak relations from that time. We can understand why the Minister of Foreign Affairs, E. Beneš, argued, for pragmatic reasons, for a unitary Czechoslovak nation and not only for a state at that conference. He needed to prove to the great powers the existence of a dominant majority, of a "unitary" Czechoslovak nation, against the conglomeration of other minorities, especially German and Hungarian, which remained in the Republic. Nevertheless, even then some Slovak representatives, e.g., A. Hlinka, protested against such formulations. However, very soon these political tactics became a petrified doctrine upon which an undemocratic practice was founded in the interest of the more powerful reigning strata of the dominant nation.

It is true that after 1918 several Slovak political representatives voluntarily accepted the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation, as a political basis for a common state. But from this it cannot be concluded that the existing nations began to disappear, for they had been formed for ages and often continued to form themselves regardless of the oftentimes contradictory view of certain politicians. Nor can this be concluded from the fact that a common hybrid nation began to arise, for it was rooted in a lifeless construction, not only of a state but also of ethnic Czechoslovakism.

The primary notion of Czechoslovakism was differently grasped, to a certain extent, in Slovakia and in Bohemia from the very beginning. Those who accepted this notion in Slovakia grasped it mostly as an historical level of their own development and self-conscious emancipation, and of a final shaping of the nation in more favorable terms. On the contrary, in Bohemia this notion was grasped mostly as suppressing Slovak specificity, a damping and oppression of Slovak identity, in spite of warning voices of some outstanding personalities among the Czech intelligentsia and the growing resistance on the Slovak side. This was not done with malicious intention or purpose, for at that time utopic ideas of eliminating differences and fusing nations had already played their role. Nor can systematic and rough pressure in this direction be denied on the part of a centralistic state power, developing a purposive effort for a centrally governed state without the possibility of the Slovak nation having its own organs.

This provoked understandable resistance in Slovakia and was a source of contention during the entire 20 years of the existence of the First Republic. It remains a great unsolved problem and a bad heritage today, specifically augmented by the four decades of Communist totalitarianism and the Nazi regime before that. If the problem had been settled in a democratic way or, at least, begun to be settled earlier, there would not be so many problems and regrets today.

It is argued often against the above that, as a consequence of the long oppression, at the rise of the Czechoslovak Republic the Slovak nation was not sufficiently advanced in its civilization and its cultural development and self-consciousness to be able to manage its affairs within the newly created common state. Consequently, only a unitary state could

arise which was accepted by the Slovaks as well. This it is suggested is why a unitary state and an ethnic conception of Czechoslovakism was pushed through, which in practice issued not in two independent nations, but only in two branches of the one nation.

This standpoint is questionable both in itself and from an historical point of view. Even if accepted, it would not pass democratic review, for, if we accept the fact that in 1918 the Slovak nation was not administratively prepared to take into its own hands the management of its affairs, these capabilities were soon developed with Czech help. Even after the Republic was sufficiently firm and advanced and even when the Slovak intelligentsia developed the capabilities to administer its own national affairs, the reigning political group of the centrally governed state unfortunately

did not find the prudence, courage and democratic sentiment to offer Slovakia adequate self-government, or to initiate it when the democratic principle of mutual relations among national subjects should have been applied in practice.

Indeed, the opposite happened. The reigning group of the centrally governed, although otherwise civil-democratic, state was dominated by the fictive idea of a unitary nation, to which it had become accustomed. Hence, it did not apply the principle of democratic relations among nations on the same level as it was applied in the remaining civil sphere. Instead of giving autonomy to Slovakia and helping it become a more developed partner, which would have been not only an expression of good will, but a truly democratic deed, it reinforced the unitary state. Naturally, conflicts resulted from this situation which survive today in multiple forms.

In recent history, there have been several half-hearted, even decidedly bad, attempts to solve the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks. The problem had not been settled during the First Republic. In 1938, the Munich dictate intervened and Czechoslovakia disintegrated under the direct assault and pressure of Hitler. The so-called Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was created in the Czech part under direct occupation by Nazi Germany. In Slovakia, a distinct state organization, the Slovak Republic, rose under the assault and initiative of A. Hitler on March 14, 1939. This state, although externally and internally it had the basic signs of an independent state and was recognized by several other states, was nonetheless a vassal dependent in every way upon the government of Hitler's Germany. It rose under pressure in an extraordinary war situation and had an undemocratic authoritarian internal regime as well. As a subordinated and very small vassal state, it became involved in military adventures, especially against Poland and the Soviet Union, but also against the U.S.A. and Great Britain. For these reasons, the national anti-Fascist and Communist groups rose against this state and its totalitarian regime before the end of World War II, in a general armed Slovak National Uprising, in August 1944. In this insurrection, power was taken by the Slovak National Council which proclaimed a renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic, drawn up, however, upon new and essentially federative foundations.

However, the idea of the equal position of both nations was not fully applied in the renewed Czechoslovakia after World War II. First it was thwarted by the government of Beneš and Gottwald and replaced by a half-hearted solution in the so-called Kościuszko Government Programme of 1945. On the basis of this programme, legislative and executive organs in the form of the Slovak National Council and the so-called Board of Commissioners, constituted in the Slovak national uprising, remained in Slovakia; similar organs did not rise in Bohemia where they were replaced by a unitary legislative power and government. It even abolished the Czech National Council constituted in Prague's anti-Nazi Insurrection at the end of the war in May, 1945. This act created a so-called asymmetric model in the common state of the Czechs and Slovaks, instead of a balanced federative relation. Its symmetry consisted in the fact that Slovakia had its national authorities on the basis of its national uprising (though gradually restricted, thereafter) whereas such institutions were not established in Bohemia, where they were replaced by the centralized power of the unitary state with the dominant position of the larger and more developed nation. This situation, of course, produced new struggles and conflicts. The nationality question remained unsettled from the point of equal democratic principles.

Gradually, conflicts increased in proportion, on the one hand, to the development and strengthening of the bureaucratic machinery in the centrally governed state and, on the other hand, in proportion to the restriction of the administrative power of the Slovak national authorities. This development was complicated by the fact that, under the growing influence of the Soviet Union and Stalinist ideology, the democratic regime of the first postwar period was replaced in

Czechoslovakia by a totalitarian Communist dictatorship after February 1948. This regime strengthened and petrified the centralist state in relations among nationalities, as well as in directly regulating all spheres of social life.

From the point of view of national relations centralist practice went so far that the jurisdiction of the Slovak national organs, already curtailed, became more formal in the asymmetric model, because everything in state and society was directed by the Communist party and its organs, according to a stringently centralistic principle. Since 1960, the Communist party held "the leading role" anchored directly in the Constitution of its state. As a result, Constitution 1960 (with Ant. Novotny President and Communist party First Secretary, and called the Constitution of "the Developed Socialist state") entirely liquidated the previous national organ of executive power in Slovakia and left the Slovak National Council nearly without competence.

This development of a generally undemocratic government by a totalitarian party, with economic and moral decay, afterwards became one of the reasons for the outbreak of the 1968 "Czechoslovak Spring" in an important reform movement under the leadership of A. Dubek and his followers. The application of the democratic principle in relations among nations and nationalities was an inseparable part of this movement. The centralist state was transformed into a federation. This was not yet a sufficiently democratic federation for, besides arising in a Communist regime (though already reformed to a certain extent), it did not stem quite from the bottom--from national subjects delegating a part of their competencies to federal authorities. It arose rather in a contrary way, by the fact that the originally unitarian state loosened its ties and left a part of its (formerly unconditional) competencies to the national republics. As a consequence, this federation still was too tight, with excessive central competencies, especially in the economic and political spheres. Nonetheless, this was indisputable progress compared with the foregoing unitarian state.

However, as we know, this attempt failed, being liquidated by military intervention of forces from five Warsaw Pact countries in August 1968--with all the consequences resulting therefrom. By brutal armed intervention the totalitarian Communist party was renewed and even amplified with a whole centralized power structure. Consequently, the federative state organization essentially degenerated into a dysfunctional formal affair.

A further twenty years had to pass in order to achieve change from the very foundations. The revolutionary events of November 1989, supported by the powerful democratization movement in the whole of Central and East Europe, including the Soviet Union, dismantled the forty-year-old Communist regime in Czechoslovakia and opened the way for its deep transformation into a pluralistic democratic society on the West European model. The name of the state, too, was soon changed into the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and then the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic. This reflected a new mode of coexistence of national subjects. The process itself and the coexistence of both national Republics left the task of how to fully apply democratic principles, beyond their general application in civil pluralist society, in relations between nationalities as well and within the new and broader emancipation processes running throughout the whole of contemporary Europe.

The Present Emancipation of Slovakia and Its Integration into Europe

The form of the new Slovak State is not yet complete. At present, it is the subject of broad public discussion as well as of intensive negotiations of democratically elected parliaments and governments; the whole process will need a long time to crystallize. Nevertheless, the basic lines

of this process are more or less visible. They consist in the principle of a natural and vested right of self-determination on the principle of sovereignty for national states and respect for their will freely to associate in mutually profitable integrating relations. Here again we are concerned with a democratization process--with the problem of applying democracy in national, state and international relations with full respect for historically formed national subjects. Only in this way can voluntary integration be built on a democratic basis and for mutual benefit.

An inevitable supposition for this, however, is an internal democratic and pluralistic political system, respect for basic human rights and liberties within every community, as well as the settlement of all issues in an exclusively peaceful way; that is, by dialogue and agreements in a legal constitutional way without the use of armed force and such other forms of compulsion as blackmail or economic dictate. Only in this way can we patiently arrive at a differentiated and successful European and more broadly worldwide, community of mutual cooperation, within which there will be place for larger or smaller regional groupings as well. The contrary alternative is incessant conflict "settled" by pressure and force which cannot lead to lasting results. The aim is not to extinguish the specificities and positive characteristics of national subjects, but to develop their democratic coexistence and free cooperation: a "unity in diversity".

The enemies here are not diversity, national identity and specificity--these make our world richer and more diversified--but feelings of superiority, tutelage and chauvinism, limited outlooks and the other similar blights of autocratic and undemocratic regimes. It can be supposed theoretically that free nations and communities founded on democratic relations will be more capable of cooperation and coexistence, as well as of voluntary and pacific integration based on mutual respect and benefit, than vassal nations and those without equal rights.

Various sides of one and the same process often and unnecessarily are counterpoised in arguments between opposite political forces and conceptions. Some theoreticians, but especially politicians, rigidly argue in an "either/or" fashion: e.g. "either" civil "or" national principle! For example, in 1991 the former premier of the Czech government, P. Pithart, rather surprisingly and inconceivably declared in an address to the organization of the Czech and Slovak Republics: "As the constituting, organizing principle of society, either the national or the civil principle can hold true, both together are not possible."¹

This exemplifies dogmatic argumentation which cannot endure because it forces two sides of the same process into irreconcilable antithesis. Full-blooded and complete democracy must be applied in civil as in national relations. Only thus can the coexistence of equal republics really be voluntary and consequently firm and lasting.

An Objection

As several authors remark,² many superficial observers often look with astonishment, but also with lack of understanding, at the internal release processes among individual parts of some hitherto rather compact wholes, not only in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, but also in Czechoslovakia. They ask whether these are not consequences of an incorrectly grasped democracy after the overthrow of totalitarian Communist regimes, and whether simultaneously it might also be an anachronism since a generally contrary process is taking place in western Europe where individual states and nations are striving for integration and not for division and separation.

¹ *Lidove noviny*, no. 206, 1991.

² Milos Mistrik, *Literarny tyzdenik* (Literary Weekly), no. 31, 1991.

In response it is necessary, first, to distinguish between West European states where the situation is not everywhere the same. It is one in Spain with the emancipation efforts of the Catalans and Basques, other in the states of Benelux, and other again in the British island with problems of the coexistence of the English, Scotch, Welsh and Irish. Two processes are going on here simultaneously: the national emancipation process and that of integration. This happens in spite of the fact that--in contrast to the post-Communist countries of Central and East Europe--the system of democratic civil pluralism has been at home there for decades, if not for centuries. That is why both systems--civil and national--and both processes--emancipation and integration--cannot be set against each other but, on the contrary, must be taken as two components of the same process. This applies in multiple measure in the post-Communist states of Central and East Europe because a civil society is arising there simultaneously with the final formation of these states. As a consequence, it is necessary to approach this process very sensitively and with much understanding.

Secondly, it is necessary to see that this process takes place in a specific historical situation at the end of the twentieth century, and under specific conditions as well. It is a time when great changes are taking place in this regard not only in the vast territories of the states and nations of the former Soviet bloc, but also in all Europe--and to a certain degree in the entire world. Sooner or later, these changes will have to be taken into account. Within these changes questions regarding emancipation, integration, centralization and decentralization, small and large states, smaller and larger national and territorial groups rising from below on the basis of democratic will and benefit, all will emerge in a new light, and new relations will form according to voluntary decisions and the free will of independent nations and their states.

This is the only way to peaceful and lasting coexistence for the huge and diversified kettle of national interests and states, and simultaneously to a systematic search to improve new institutional forms and mutually beneficial integrative cooperation. A contrary alternative could only be a coexistence dictated from the position of force and superiority. That, however, could lead not to peaceful and durable results, but only to growing contentions and conflicts. It is necessary to avoid this from the very beginning by adopting as our aim not the extinction of ethnic heterogeneity and nations, but their enriching cooperation.

Thirdly, it is necessary to take into consideration that this process is going on in a new situation of information and communication, essentially different from the past and aimed at the twenty-first century. The main difference from the past consists in the fact that individuals and even small independent nations and states no longer need to communicate with foreign countries through higher centers of economy, culture, science, politics, and diplomacy. Modern mass media make direct communication with the world possible. In practice this means that, e.g., Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia or the national states of the former Soviet Union no longer need to conduct their foreign relations through the earlier headquarters in Belgrade or Moscow; they can communicate immediately and without any mediation. The same pertains to the nations and independent republics of the former Czechoslovakia. The example of the ministates in East Asia, such as Singapore, show clearly that, with the present possibilities of commerce and communication, prosperity does not depend on territorial frontiers but on those established by production and economics.³ We suppose that with present information and communication possibilities this can be applied also to small nations and their states in Central and East Europe in creating new democratic European communities. There new forms are being sought and formulated. To endure, they must be founded and constituted in a peaceful and democratic way, that is, on the basis of

³ M. Mistrík, *op.cit.*

self-determination and respect for all other civil and human rights and liberties. They must be sought patiently and over longer periods without dictate or violence because, as in other spheres, although the implementation of democracy is not always perfect, it is the safest road to success.

Conclusion

This chapter has tried to formulate a summary of the issue of national development in the modern history of Slovak philosophy and politics. On the basis of that development it sought to identify the important issues for the period after the communist systems ceased to exist in Central and East European countries and attempted to suggest some principles for a new system of democratic states.

It examines how the principle of democracy was applied and broken in this region, not only in the sphere of civil and human rights, but also in that of national relations. The question is analyzed concretely in the development of Czecho-Slovak relations since 1918. From the fact that these relations were not settled on an equal and democratic basis, conflict emerged at every important historical turn and after the fall of the Communist regime culminated in intense discussion.

At present the situation is crystallizing. Dramatic confrontation confirms that these questions can be settled durably as long as democratic principles are applied consistently in the sphere of civil and national relations. This development takes place in new conditions. In the post-Communist countries of Central and East Europe the process of the emancipation of nations and national states is taking place simultaneously with the process of their integrations into larger complexes and the gradual integrative process in the whole of Europe. Many views of institutional organization of mutual relations have been significantly changed and will change still further. The paper suggests how this process can develop through the new communication and information possibilities for an open European and world-wide market at this transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century.

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Chapter XI

The Spiritual Function of Intellectuals, Culture, Values and Power

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Attempts to define the meaning of some words apart from their syntactical context, in order to make them more lucid, recall the vain efforts of Sisyphus or Danae pouring water into barrels without bottoms. "Intelligentsia" is such a word. In Slovak, as well as in German, the situation is complicated by the fact that the same word *inteligencia* is applied to mental capabilities, on the one hand, and to a professional and/or social stratum, on the other. In the English language, the distinction is clear: "intelligence" is used in the first instance, "intelligentsia" or "intellectual" in the second.

The concept of intelligentsia derives from nineteenth century Russia. There it defined a not very numerous, but cultured group of men of letters, writers and university professors aspiring to adapt West European values and education for Russia. In the course of the century, this term was adopted in European sociology and epistemology. Whether the term "intelligentsia" defines occupations and professions separate from the entire society depends upon the concrete economic, social, cultural and political situation of each country.

If we suppose that any society, like any stage on the scale of civilization, is, somehow, structured and hierarchically ordered and that its particular stratification is a matter not only of the distribution of material and spiritual values, but also of a division of power and prestige, as well as of access to them, then there is an immediate question about the position and functions of the intelligentsia in the social system. From an historical retrospective, the prestige and mission of the intelligentsia at the dawn of history was connected with magical powers and generated a caste. Another way of gaining prestige was connected with writing and the development of the state on the basis of which intellectuals became members of the ruling group.

In our account, we shall understand intelligentsia as a multilateral formation, a functional mechanism whose individual components, represented by professions and special occupations, are integrated by a cultural principle connecting groups in the material and spiritual spheres of culture. This focus on culture, in which a dynamic flows toward and from the intelligentsia, helps to describe its function in a society and its very essence.

By progressive specialization and professionalization in the context of the division of labor, this principle gains increasing layers of morphologic functions, so that, in comparison with more homogeneous professional groups, the heterogeneity of intellectuals appears to defy any definition. Nowadays, there are three large groups of intelligentsia: cultural, technical and scientific. The term "culture", with which the functions, status, character and essence of intellectuals are connected, opens an historical approach to historical forms of creating intelligentsia as a distinct sociological category. This is traced to the medieval clergy by J. Le Goff, G. Santini, J. Benda, and by the Czech thinkers, E. Rádl and J. Patoka. Even Marxist philosopher, A. Gramsci, claims that the constitution of an intellectual elite arose along with such institutions as medieval towns and universities in the twelfth century. Giovanni Santini also underlines the importance of urbanization and the birth of universities as essential factors in constituting an intellectual elite: "The division of labour in towns was a precondition for creating the intellectual as a new sociological type; the precondition for the birth of universities was a common, general, cultural space, in which these

‘cathedrals of knowledge’ could be freely established in order to work and to interact with one another."

The geographical and spiritual dispersion of West European Christianity was overcome by a new universalistic climate at the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries. The development of towns and monastery schools made possible the development of universities and this, in turn, enabled the propagation of ideas as a kind of goods. True, the social, professional and intellectual progress was controlled by the Church. Theology ruled in the spiritual dimension as final arbitrator of education and knowledge. The power of education was joined to military and economic--political--power, the two legitimate sources of power in medieval feudalism.

Nevertheless, the way of thinking cultivated at universities, whose character was modified according to the geographical situation, represented, in general, a shift from "sapientia" to "scientia", which, during the Renaissance, was replaced by a philosophical humanism. Its spirit, which created the atmosphere of universities, was one of discussion, of aversion to the *status quo*, and of stress on individual reasoning. This development is fully analyzed by Jacques Le Goff in *Les Intellectuals au Moyen Age*, though it lacks an analysis about the relation of such intellectuals as Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas to the literary environment of the thirteenth century, as represented by Dante.

An argument against assuming the clergy as the origin of the intelligentsia in these times was introduced by J. Patoka. He drew attention to the fact that, if we take independent reasoning as a criterion, then we should look rather to the opposition in medieval thought, i.e., to the medieval heretics, rather than to the university clergy, who confirmed and legitimated the given legal circumstances. From a different point of view, Patockas's opinion is supported also by Gramsci's term, "organic intellectual", to reflect the connection of the intelligentsia and power. "In this way, groups specialized in intellectual efforts are created historically, emerging in all social groups, but first of all in the most important ones; the most thorough and deep are connected with the ruling group."¹

This peculiar link between intellectuals and power is the leitmotif of the history of the formation of the intelligentsia. In the time of Galileo, ideological and doctrinal pressure was used by those in power. But this was gradually replaced by economic and political pressure, as manifested through the fate of the intelligentsia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Fascination by power, on the one hand, and the effort to keep one's independence and critical aloofness, on the other, are the extremes between which has swung the pendulum of the fate of the European intelligentsia.

But what constitutes the character and essence of an intelligentsia? We have already stated that the key to the apprehension of the identity and status of intellectuals is culture. Hence, the answer to the question of the nature of culture is by no means trivial. According to A.L. Kroeber, there are nearly 160 definitions of culture in terms of anthropology, psychology, sociobiology, sociology and philosophy. They can be divided according to certain topological symptoms into: 1) enumerative-descriptive, 2) structural, 3) normative, 4) psychological, 5) historical, or 6) genetic. Kroeber, together with C. Kluckhohn, claims, that:

Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour and transmitted by symbols constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts: the essential core of a traditional culture is historically derived and selected ideas and

¹ A. Gramsci, "O inteligencii a culture," in *Spolocnost, politika, filozofia* (Bratislava: Pravda, 1988), 273.

especially their attached values; culture systems may be considered, on the one hand, as products of action and, on the other hand, as conditioning elements of further action.²

Bearing in mind a certain schematization and simplification, it can be stated that the palette of approaches and definitions of culture varies between an instrumental biologizing view which sees culture as an instrument of better adaptation or direct continuation of evolution, and a spiritual conception which considers culture as a superbiological or even antibiological phenomenon.

If we place side by side Freud's, Huizinga's and Wittgenstein's understanding and description of culture, do they manifest a common denominator? It is typical of Freud that culture in all its forms is always violence against the biological nature of the human beings. Nevertheless, it raises the human person above the natural and animal conditions of this life. This has two facets: one includes the knowledge and skills acquired by humans to control the powers of nature, to gain material possessions and to satisfy these needs; the other includes the facilities needed to organize human relations, especially with a view to the division of one's possessions.³

J. Huizinga locates the origin of culture in play as an autotelic activity: "In the binary relation of culture and play, the primary, objectively perceivable reality is play, while culture is but an added label by our historical judgments."⁴ According to Wittgenstein: "A culture is like a big organization which assigns each of its members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole, and it is right for his power to be measured by the contribution he succeeds in making to the whole enterprise."⁵

We believe that, despite different starting points, these interpretations of culture are related by a direct or indirect reference to values as the deep basis of culture. These values, understood either as the Platonic universe or as the result of subjective evaluation and experience, make it possible to speak about culture as the *conditio humana*, in spite of historical changes and multiple forms. Though each scale of values is characterized by a specific palette, culture includes also some fundamental values in response to the existential and anthropological situation of being human; these constitute the foundation for a certain universality of cultural phenomenon.

Each scale of values has its own characteristic hierarchy, but each has some general universal values reflecting the interests and needs of all natural animal forms of life. The good and the beautiful are pillars of each cultural system, although they differ in their expressive forms which constitute the structure of a cultural tradition in spite of the historical metamorphoses and existential heterogeneity of any human population and its needs.

Values are described by H. Arendt as instruments of transcendence. She contrasts the spontaneous life of natural forms, which follow a metabolism of consumption, to culture rooted in lasting things in spite of the destructive ravages of time. Ideals, though they cannot be realized as entities because each such attempt ends in a blind alley, determine the stream of life and orient actions by granting them a meaning. Values influence our thinking, our structures of experience, feelings and the aims of our actions. Our images, wishes and longings are oriented according to some value systems and the norms derived from these systems. At the same time as universal values articulate the existential dimension of human life, this founds their universality. This existential moment of the creation of values has been veiled by civilization.

² L.A. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, Vo. 47, No. 1, 1952), 181.

³ S. Freud, *O cloveku a culture* (Praha: Odeon, 1991), 275.

⁴ J. Hnzinga, *Hono Indens* (Bratislava: Tatran, 1990), 225.

⁵ L. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 6.

The concrete actualization of values in an empirical world depends upon the needs and reflected interests of the time, though the relation between them is not one-way and direct. Thus, for example, the idea of freedom presented differently in liberal and totalitarian conceptions and, hence, obviously is connected with different interests and motivations. Ideas turn on values, which make them legitimate or doubtful, because values make the world an object of our interests in either a positive or a negative sense. Values as ideal entities are autotelic in the sense that, even though a value may not find its immediate actualization, nothing changes in its attractive character and its creative function. But neither truth, nor beauty, nor the good are the final purpose: they serve rather to orient action. Values themselves appeal to us and call upon us to do something: they prohibit something and warn against it.

Tensions develop between values and the topical status of needs or interests, especially in their established institutionalized forms. The binary character of ideas and values and the ambivalent relation between the ideal and the real, generate a discrepancy between meaning and purpose. This unsolved antinomy influenced the atmosphere of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.

From this tension, which from time to time led to extreme relativism accompanied by a corresponding nihilism, new attempts at a radical reappraisal of all values were born. Groups of intellectuals noisily proclaimed the rejection of superannuated values and musty traditions. These radical thinkers, from Nietzsche to some postmodern philosophers, concluded, from the fact that there existed no sole obligatory well-ordered value system, that no order existed at all. Even more, this reappraisal of values arose from the spontaneous interplay of power and force.

With regard to values and culture, the intelligentsia fulfill an integrating, homogenizing, assimilating and cooperative function. Because no society is uniform with regard to the plurality of value orientations and the variety of interests, the intelligentsia acts as the integrating power by developing, maintaining and protecting those values which unify society as a whole.

In contrast to the broad range of activities which decentralize life through the diversity of their purposes, the intelligentsia in their activities pursue aims which are beneficial to all spheres of social life; this is the essence of their homogenizing influence. Values are not simply diffused by themselves; it is necessary to defend them against the degenerative tendencies of uncivilized powers hidden within every person. Further, it is necessary to stem the asocial and anticultural tendencies endangering the cultural system of society by supporting productive traditions and new successes of the spirit: here the intelligentsia fulfills an assimilative mission. Finally, a social mechanism, with its varied levels and immanent standards, requires harmonization and cooperation: here the intelligentsia fulfills a cooperative function. The bitter experience with the behaviour and attitudes of the intelligentsia in the interwar period shows what often is willingly forgotten, namely that values cannot simply be preached but must be defended and fought for. Intellectuals must not identify themselves with the momentary condition of national culture, but transcend this to suggest solutions of new problems, though not in a charismatic or autocratic fashion.

The nineteenth century was marked by the motto "progress", that is, by a purposeful rationality advanced solely according to reason. Certainly, this instrumental reason introduced revolutionary changes, to the conditions of human life, though its benefits later came to be doubted. In any case, this century drew its faith from the residues of romanticism which appeared in the attempts to revitalize religion, and in moral and political aspirations. But a broad range of thinkers from Mandelstam to Whitehead consider the main result of intellectual efforts to have been the discovery of method. This emphasis led to efficacious, specialized knowledge being considered to be solely

effective. This was reflected in the stratification of the intelligentsia according to the ideal of narrow specialization and professionalization. Bacon's "knowledge is power" became true.

The fascination with science and technology opened a Pandora's box of complicated problems without solving the old ones. The century began as a promise of paradise but ended with nihilism infiltrating all pores of society. The social, political and moral crises of European culture were, in fact, the nightfall of those values which had created European civilisation. The loss of a sense of orientation and struggles between those striving to preserve the status quo and those intent on destroying it took place also among European intellectuals. It was no accident, but quite symptomatic, that most intellectuals on both sides of the confrontation enthusiastically welcomed the outbreak of World War I. This was attested to by Sigmund Freud himself, who for a very short time succumbed to that sirene lure. The war, with its resulting transformation of the map of Europe, did not resolve the cultural contradictions, clashes and tensions, as would become manifest in a short time.

Since the dawn of civilization, mankind has witnessed misuse of power, apotheosis of barbarous strength, periodic decline in the arts, treachery toward values, and mercenary acts by its intellectual elite. These tendencies were fully developed during the twentieth century, regarding which Ortega y Gasset laconically stated that its passions were politics and collectivism. A decisive majority of intellectuals gave vent to their passions. From preaching the gospel of progress, they changed to that of violence: class and economic struggle along with worship of power and instinct. The triune god of science, technology and state required its sacrifice, which the intelligentsia brought sedulously to the altar. Mottos such as nation against humanity, party against law, power against spirit, reflect the values many intellectuals tried to promote. Though these ideas and attitudes can be found also in the past, the intelligentsia never dared to defend them with such vehemence and moral pathos. Marinetti, d'Annunzio, Barres, Kipling, Doyle and Spengler, promoting the worship of strength and power, illustrate the environment of that period. The embellishment of war in Nazism, the politization of culture in Marxism, the propagation of antiliberal attitudes, abandonment of critical reflection and distance, the promotion of centers of power as centers of truth, hand in hand with the celibacy of the specialized intellect, all that provided the background to the rise of the totalitarian movements--Communism and Nazism--in which the intelligentsia became actively involved.

Voices pleading for freedom of spirit and appealing to the conscience and responsibility of intellectuals to defend critical reasoning against authoritative doctrinairism, to defend universality against the particularity of political interests, and to defend humanity against narrow-minded national interests could not reverse the course of events.

The twentieth century was inevitably a century of adventurous ideas, remarkable discoveries and new knowledge; but it was also a period of uncurbed barbarism, unbelievable primitivism and specious ideologies. Under these circumstances it is not too surprising to discover that those whose professional duty and ethos was to defend the rights of reason against darkling instincts joined openly the opposite side of power. Attracted by violence and a leader, they blessed even the most perverse ideas. German physicists Lennard, Obert and Stark, avowed an Aryan physics; professor Heydl organized euthanasia in Germany; such charlatans as Lysenko, Lepeinskaja and groups of "scientists" and other representatives of the intelligentsia in the Marxist-Leninist countries rejected as "bourgeois socialism" genetics, cybernetics, sociology, etc. Regretfully, it is such Koniases of culture and achievements of civilization who constitute the image of the intellectual in the twentieth century.

This historical debacle by those charged with carrying the light of reason into the darkness resulted from their betrayal of independent thinking, their inability to define social serfdom, and their resignation to prevailing social currents. They endorsed the irrational attitude of the mob and its prejudices, and thus sacrificed for a plate of lentils their birthright of critical reasoning and spiritual freedom.

The devaluation of such values as truth and justice which were proclaimed musty and superannuated, along with the rejection of spiritual culture and the soul, prepared the return of the barbarians--the decline of intellectuals led to the decline of all. The failure of the intelligentsia was not a failure of reason, as some thinkers claim, but only evidence of the time-serving, conformity and corruptibility of the cultural elite who preferred, over the creative work of intellect groping in doubt, anything promising clear direction supported by an imperative power.

With the lapse of time, it is now obvious that this call for certainty voiced vigorously by intellectuals was in fact a call for direction. Experience with two forms of totalitarian regimes, Communism and Fascism, is clear evidence that "any security or securities not based on education and culture are either acts of personal despair, of total nihilism, or expressions of instinctive, blindfolded and essentially dehumanized barbarism." (K. Capek)

On the stage of history Fascism and Communism have demonstrated tellingly that the horrors and madness of which man is capable do not except intellectuals. Marxism and Leninism, the unconquerable ideology of our times (J.P. Sartre), and its epistemological breakthrough (Althusser), created unprecedented forms of enslavement and subjection under the motto of radical liberation. Inequality was concealed under ideologically declared equality; the creation of a nationalized society was hidden under the motto of the cancellation of the state. Though it can be stated that, after 1989, Communism as an economic and political system was brought to its knees, it has not been eliminated as an ideology or false consciousness. Each distinct ideology leaves behind the remains of its Bonapartists (J. Kpiski). The inability and unwillingness of some Western intellectuals to understand the real essence of Marxism-Leninism is a warning signal of a certain fatigue on the part of democracy. Its rights of individuals was thought by Western leftist intellectuals to be pure camouflage, especially in the 60s, whereas the opposition intelligentsia in the East saw, in the liberal rights of individuals, the guarantee and precondition of freedom of thought and creativity. Recall the reaction of the Western press to trials in Moscow in the 30s, the aversion to Eastern block dissidents especially among German writers and peace activists, the unpopularity of Solzhenitsyn, etc. It is understandable that a certain attraction could be found in Marxism-Leninism, which for a long time seemed the only counterbalance to colonial and metropolitan capitalism. The revolt against the establishment in the 60s was inspired by intellectuals: the attitude of A. Davis, professor of philosophy, toward political prisoners in socialist countries, and the elegies of Russell Jacoby on the disappearance of the intellectual from public life in America (automatically identifying intellectual with a Marxist-orientation, as his opponents justifiably objected). All these phenomena are not accidental, but more likely a syndrome of a large part of the Western intelligentsia. It is the inclination to Utopia and a bookish attitude, combined with a stiff-necked conviction that a problem solved on paper is also settled in reality.

At the present time, we are witnessing attempts to look at reality in a new way, critically and without illusions; but there are other attempts as well to squeeze the old and outdated into the new, to build a new building on old ground. All this signals the residue of ideological myths being preserved mulishly in spite of historical lessons and changed circumstances. The present postmodern world is pervaded by global problems which sever the very roots of human existence

as a species and threaten democracy; according to L. Koakowsky these are nationalism, terrorism, criminality, bolshevism, poverty, a mentality of unsatisfied expectations, theocratic aspirations. In the midst of this, new horizons are opening for intellectuals both East and West. At this historical crossroad for mankind, the intelligentsia must face up to its new identity and social mission.

The postmodern way of thinking and feeling rejected unity and legitimated a heterogeneity of forms of thought and life styles; a vision of plurality was put against absolutes of any kind. This principled, antitotalitarian feature of postmodern thought should lead those still trapped in the utopian dream of a unity dictated by antiquated mythology to reappraise the validity of the elements of their faiths. The elimination of the market is a fiction that generates nonsense. But this does not mean that production and consumption, though inevitable for the functioning of society, are the final aim, the highest value and the meaning of human efforts. Bitter experience with totalitarian regimes should discourage the intelligentsia from aspiring to be prophets and preachers. Fate demands from the intelligentsia neither scathing repentance nor a change to another faith, but unprejudiced understanding of its own situation.

At present, as is daily realized in the post-communist countries, more than ever before the intelligentsia must struggle with itself, with the environment demanding its attention, and with the powers promoting uniformity and conformity. Even if such ideas be dressed in national phraseology and presented as the highest values, the intelligentsia must struggle with ideas which aspire to become dogmas and demagogic mottos. It must fight against its own group and individual interests, against everything that veils and limits good sense. Not to understand and catch the historical opportunity offered the intelligentsia would be not merely a mistake, but a betrayal dictated by cowardice and laziness. A personal union between the values of independent reasoning and of intellectual responsibility demands a clear-sighted understanding of Th. Sowell's thought that "Enthusiasm for matter can rightfully demand sacrifice of personal interests, but never sacrifice of reason or conscience."

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Chapter XII

The Function and Value "Strategy" of Culture in the Constitution of Slovak Society

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The phrase, "value of strategy culture", might seem rather strange at first sight, as it is not usual in philosophy to think about culture and values in terms of "strategy", that could evoke a too political, even militant atmosphere unsuitable for contemplation in our *scientia humana*. On the contrary, many philosophers and intellectuals in Europe speak in a post-modern language about crises or about the definitive disintegration of the value system in modern as well as in recent culture. For them the above mentioned words could create the impression of claiming that progress in culture will save "human nature". They consider such ideas about the essence or development of *Homo sapiens* to be fetishes. I will avoid such onesidedness.

In this paper, I would like to test only one of the possible ways to articulate the problem of cultural values, namely the effort to link knowledge from the theoretical paradigm of cultural anthropology with the social concern to constitute a civic society in Czechoslovakia after November 17, 1989. This paper will attempt to reflect phenomena, in the face of European and world culture, as the roots, foundations and tendencies of our culture turn become manifest with the destruction of the totalitarian system and the beginning of a general reappraisal.

The Roots of Culture

Let us begin with some notes regarding the roots of our culture in order to be able to outline in a more clear way its present state and future strategy. Historically, Czechoslovakia's geopolitical situation in the heart of Europe determined its spiritual culture. First of all, in whatever way political regimes and related cultural influences have changed in history, none ever succeeded in isolating for long the people in this area from multilateral European and world spiritual currents. Though owing some to backwardness, their influence was not immediately evident in comparison with other cultural centers; there was continuity and specific transformations in the domestic milieu. From the point of view of spiritual culture there has existed an unambiguous continuity in Hegel's two "forms of absolute spirit,"¹ religion and art.

Religion

Endowed by Christianization in the ninth century, this continuity has been so powerful that till today it could not be disrupted either by the numerous heretical doctrines, Enlightenment reason, or the occupying armies from West and East. The persistence of Christianity can be explained by the fact that the individual ethnic groups and nations at this crossroads of European spiritual currents identified themselves interiorly and morally with the value system of Christianity, which for centuries provided the only road to cultural advancement through the creation of writing and the diffusion of education, European artistic styles, and political and legal system.

¹ G.W.F. Hegel, *Phanomenologie des Geistes*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Leipzig, 1949).

Another, though partially paradoxical, evidence of this fact is that attempts to Christianize, accompanied at times by efforts to Latinize or to Germanize or to Hungarize, in the end always strengthened the domestic ethnic and later the national emancipation progress. This emerged with surprising power after November 17, 1989, when citizens of Slovakia enthusiastically put down the totalitarian regime. The paradox here is that conflicts between the two majority nations of Czechoslovakia or among majority and minority ethnic groups had never arisen from Christian values. There are, of course, other causes, economic, state-law, and international, but in spite of these national differentiation seems irrational because the spiritual essence of particular ethnic groups rests upon common European cultural foundations.

Besides the different Christian faiths (Roman, Greek, Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, official and lay church), Judaism is the second largest continuous religion in Slovakia. Its spread into Central Europe can be traced as early as the expansion of the Roman Empire. During the Middle Ages, stronger and inwardly more compact enclaves were created, coming mostly from the German Jewish diaspora. These were joined in the territory of Slovakia by groups relatively assimilated into the Hungarian majority. In spite of the fact that almost to the present the Jewish minority was perceived as a foreign element in the Slovak environment and did not possess the same rights as the majority population (*The Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms* was passed only on January 9, 1991), its cultural continuity is significant. Though not often publicly spoken about today, Moses' *Old Testament* imperatives remain one of the attributes of European and, within this framework, of Slovak cultural continuity. But in the national emancipation process which created the inner strategy of Slovak culture, Judaism as religion was not an initiator, but participated rather in supra-national and universalizing tendencies.

The coexistence of Judaism and Christianity in the Slovak spiritual culture reflects a duality between a universal and a specific value system, the first tending toward the universal, the other to specific and mostly national aims. Both supported the continuity of Slovak culture with a more than two thousand year old value system and regulated the public private life of the people. This happened in spite of official ideological doctrines which caused fatal breaks in the natural life of the population of this territory.

The totalitarian regime, on the one hand, continued in a fascist manner to differentiate people into those bearing the "objective" historical characteristics and, on the other hand, wanted to enforce a "unity" of spiritual culture as a brutal culmination of its ideology. Fortunately, that movement from plurality to unification which was against human nature, was rejected even by the strategy for continuation of the spiritual culture. Mankind has had this knowledge at its disposal since the Biblical picture of the creation of the world: when the Creator filled the universe with plurality he enjoyed a feeling of satisfaction and saw, "that it was good."

Art

Another sphere which sustains the centuries-old continuity of Slovak culture is art. This has obvious similarities to the function of religion. First, the propagation of religion was always accompanied by a complementary development in art. Second, since the Enlightenment, a bifurcation concerning the medium of national emancipation evoked considerable shifts in the hierarchy of cultural values. The affirmation of a national identity gradually became a cardinal question, whereas universal values interpreted in a Christian or philosophic and anthropological context were made secondary. This change in the hierarchy of cultural values is typical for most of the European nations where the Enlightenment-Statist view considered an independent national

state to be a precondition for a national culture to flourish while nation states were being constituted. Till the present day our culture self-assuredly lives on this illusion which was made absolute by Hegel.

That is why universal cultural values were expressed in Slovak art mostly by means of the idea of national emancipation. This is one of the inner aspects of the value "strategy" in our cultural tradition.

Value Strategies

Among its external characteristics is the fact that steps toward self-definition were initiated by increased cultural activity from outside European and Euro-American sources or on the frontiers of the hoped for or real state. This became evident in periods when the inner mechanisms generating culture had been exhausted. The reception non foreign cultures, provided it took place in an informational and non-militant way, contributed to the end of isolationist conceptions; at the same time, it enabled and accelerated the self-identification of the Slovak nation itself. These are the root causes of the contemporary flush of nationalist sentiments in central and Eastern Europe; we must wait, however, for their artistic expression.

The long experience of the cultural tradition indicates that it is useful to see this transfer as a living dialogue, rather than as simply onesided reception. This can be illustrated for the history of the official and marginal lines in the development of Slovak culture by three forms of reaction to outside influences.

First, vibrant dialogue by revitalizing inner spiritual sources contributed to the birth of structures for communicating of universal meanings. The period in which the Czech and Slovak gothic styles flourished in architecture, painting and sculpture is a good example.

Second, there were the assimilation and amalgamation usually occurred in the marginal areas of spiritual culture and art, for example the culture of comedy (M.M. Bachtin),² carnival art and folk production. These spheres, like official stylistically crystallized art, participated in the continuing strategy of the spiritual culture in the universal as well as the national context. In contrast to the normative character of the official style, they respond more autonomously to foreign models and achieve more picturesque forms of mediating between the domestic and foreign cultures. Language, especially that of urban slang, the life style of minorities, the change in various conventions in the behavior of individuals are some of the dominant areas of such kinds of reaction. We find evidence of these phenomena in literature, where they are used as means to identify novel characters, as meaningful metaphors, as projections of everyday speech in opposition to the aesthetic canons, etc. A good example is Bratislava's urban slang, which, on the one hand, is a product of heathen, Jewish-Christian religious culture and, on the other hand, reflects serves the language context of all cultures which have crossed this territory (e.g., Bohemian, German, Hebrew [Yiddish], Hungarian, etc.).

Third, hibernation, which usually is a response to a militant invasion by a foreign culture, temporarily kills the inner mechanisms generating national and cultural meanings or, if you like, their authentic possibility. It shifts its center of gravity into defensive demarcation and, in extreme cases, can lead to total destruction. But, as our Czechoslovak experience shows after World War II, when a militant invasion by an ideologized model of totalitarian "culture" from the USSR (i.e., an anti-culture *par excellence*) took place, especially after 1948, the hibernation form of response

² M.M. Bachtin, *Tvocerstvo Fransua Rable I narodnaja kultura srednovjekovaja I renessansa* (Moscow, 1965).

by the domestic culture saved it total destruction. The more than 40-year hibernation of authentic culture under the ice flow of socialist realist norms did not produce a fatal discontinuity, but paradoxically made possible an accumulation of the ethical foundations for continuity. After November 17, 1989 this became one of the sources for the revitalization and resurrection of artistic production and its cultural context.

This concrete experience of the "special" value "strategy" of culture, raises some doubts concerning the semantic irreversibility of processes in human society. The hibernation "strategy" of our culture enabled it to adapt the immanent mechanisms of continuity according to the changing historical circumstances of the totalitarian regime, awaiting the reversibility of cultural time and a return to the natural everyday life of human existence. In analyzing continuity in culture, it is important to distinguish cultural and historical time. In contrast to historical time, cultural time i.e., periods of political, social, technological and other civilizational changes, is noted for its slow progression and its reversibility. Over its extended horizon the living human experience of thousands of years enters into social memory so that various systems are revitalized at appropriate moments. This is the *tempus* outside of any time sphere which popularly is called "the mills of the gods". Cultural time resists political as well as technological revolutions; it can flow a long time without external manifestations or even can be hidden by the mimicry of an era. The development of European culture through Renaissance, Neo-gothic, Neo-realist and Postmodern styles proves this character of cultural time. A bipolar ethos, oscillating between good and evil, as universal value attribute of cultural time is a factor in the continuing strategy of culture.

The three phenomenal forms, outlined above, of the response of Slovak culture to outer influences are, of course, only abstract models. They serve only as a means to outline the contours of possible tendencies in Slovak cultural development under the circumstances of a democratic civic society. In the new emergence of these circumstances we find ourselves wishing to return to the continuity of European culture by means of permanent connections. The values of authenticity, identity and freedom are mile stones of this culture. What can we already observe?

In the sphere of spiritual culture intensive informational activity arose after November 17. Everything which had hibernated for a half century in a totalitarian freezer (J. Rupnik) suddenly came back to life and began to transmit information about itself. Together with this information came rivalry in gaining a dominant cultural position. The whole spiritual culture was significantly restructured. Our culture gathers the energy for restructuring from its immanent strategy for continuity; at present, this is the source of ethical self-reflection in society.

In the rivalry between various spheres of spiritual culture, a dominant position in Slovakia is preserved by religion from the point of view of faith-- Christianity and, within this frame, Catholicism. This is manifest by quantitative criteria as well as by "cultural continuity". But several transformations of the cultural functions of religion have occurred. First, the system of universal values codified in Christianity or in the Jewish religion has significant political expression in powerful parties and movements; the Christian-democratic movement, the national parties and the civic movement, "Public Against Violence". The difference among them consists in whether or not they avow programmatically their Christian or Jewish roots. Only leftist-oriented parties (former Communists or Social Democrats) or some radical liberal parties oriented to economic emancipation proudly disregard religion, but for the time being they are only marginal in Slovakia.

Second, besides the obvious "politization" of religion, its cultural and anthropological function is changing. Attention is shifting from theological, ontological and ecclesiastical questions to problems of individual human existence and to a search for axiological certainty in an ambiguous, chaotic world. This function has its source in the very genesis of religion, but in our

century in European Christianity it has had a dominant position only periodically and in periods of great confusion and crises, when ideas about the real path of progress have failed. At other times, Christian religion turns back "from God to man", to look for certainty in an uncertain world. Such a situation existed in European spiritual life before World War II, and also from about 1975 till now. We may view them as enormous crises; their consequences will extend beyond the third millennium.

However, here I will not pursue the causes of these crises, but only their consequences which lead to a strengthening of the "anthropologization" of religion or, if you like, to theological anthropologization. It is not necessary to list the evidence for so obvious a tendency in European Christianity. It was already noted in the mid-30s by Peter Wust in his book *Ungewissheit und Wagnis* (1937). But Wust could not anticipate the kind of catastrophe toward which Europe was rushing and refused to accept the prospect of an extreme collapse of ideals. Nevertheless, he felt the massive burden of "contingence consciousness" and of how human certainty had been undermined by "an envious demon, which treacherously . . . tore everything noble down into dust, to allow what was of low value to triumph."³

If we compare the European tendencies to "anthropologize" Christian religion with Slovak spiritual culture, we must regretfully state that, even nowadays, no indications of such development can be seen; on the contrary, the cultural-anthropological function of religion is nearly eliminated from public life. But it is quite possible to hope that various religious communities will come into existence in a democratic society, laying emphasis not on orthodoxy and politics, but on moral virtues and, by means of these values, the strategy of cultural continuity will be strengthened. The time for philosophical reflection on these phenomena is now.

In contrast to religion, where no plurality can be expected, individualization and plurality quickly assert themselves in art of which they are immanent attributes. Heterogeneous outer influences in artistic production gradually meld into the authentic Slovak environment, and it is quite possible to expect that there will be a gradual shift from a unilateral preference for national to universal anthropological thematization. This expectation is based on the fact that, in spite of local and national determination, Slovak art did not lose its relation to European and world currents and still preserves its inner strategy for continuity. A bridge to strengthening this strategy could be an awareness of the importance of European culture in the context of the future megatrends of human civilization and, simultaneously, the effort to protect this cultural heritage in Central Europe.

It is true that these visions refer to a distant future; however, it is not premature to voice them today as we dispose of the relics of the totalitarian political regime. Lest it be nonsense, negation necessitates a perspective. Efforts at national self-identity cannot be the only or absolute foundation for spiritual culture in Slovakia. Were democracy to come into existence only on a national base (which is itself a paradox), isolationism as the "reverse side" of the national emancipation movement would be strengthened, and culture would die in isolation.

Universally oriented intellectual efforts whose ethos is rooted in the spiritual history of humanity can provide an adequate basis for a continuing strategy of spiritual culture. Only on such an ethical foundation can a democratic civic society be imagined.

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³ P. Wust, *Ungewissheit und Wagnis*, ed. Kosel (Munich, 1937), 43.

Chapter XIII

Toleration as a Value of Society and Personal Development

Vladimir Seiler and Dozena Seilerova

Toleration as a Paradigm of Value in Post-Totalitarian Societies: The Case of the Czech and the Slovak Republics

Questions of tolerance were a main issue in the European cultural region, especially during the phase of liberalism. Its value center is the human individual, with equal rights, making free decisions according to his or her own mind, and not impeding others from doing the same. In liberalism, however, tolerance of the convictions and culture of another person is considered external and indifferent.

The idea of tolerance in the twentieth century adds a new and explicitly ontological dimension, because the world market, creating an economic system of humankind as a whole, is now enriched by the international division of labor and a universal means of communication. Due to these processes, relations among different cultures, the exchange of values and mutual enrichment are not only intermittent, but permanent. The variety and diversity of cultures and opinions have been discovered to be an important source of the intellectual wealth of nations.

Since the mind-twentieth century, humankind has established its mutual solidarity, not only in these positive senses, but also through the negative consequences of weapons of mass destruction and the rise of global ecological problems. The corresponding generalization of the values of the existential interaction of humankind, with attention to the human individual is contained in the Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948.

The resulting tension between the humanitarian development of a unified system of humankind expressed in the human rights declaration, on the one hand, and the totalitarian political system which curtailed these rights, on the other hand, led to a broad movement to change the totalitarian system for a system of pluralistic democracy, which came to fruition in Czechoslovakia in 1989.

Of the historical determinants of the political system in Czechoslovakia after 1948, the year when the process of liquidating pluralistic democracy began, the salient fact is that, in the bipolar division of powers in Europe after World War II, Czechoslovakia belonged to the sphere of influence of the USSR. Hence, the communist party was in power for 40 years and reflected all the steps of the Stalinist and Neo-Stalinist era—all of which were reflected in the political and intellectual lives of the citizens.

In 1968, the democratic socialist reform movement, which gained power and was supported by the citizens, considered human rights to be an inevitable condition for the realization of a socially just system. The reform-minded intelligentsia, who followed K. Marx's theoretical message, aimed at agreeing upon a humanistic platform for saving people from the threat of the atomic bomb and for solving the urgent problems brought on by the twentieth century's technological civilization. This was a first demonstration that citizens benefit from dialogue and gave birth to the idea of tolerance as a relationship between people which enables, not only the intellectual enrichment of those with diverse opinions, but even a synthesis of those ideas.

The Neo-Stalinist leaders of the communist party of Czechoslovakia, after suppressing the reform movement for democratic socialism in 1968, were intolerant toward the political, economic

and philosophical thinking of their former colleagues, who were labelled revisionist and right-wing opportunists. Almost 500,000 communist party members (out of 14 million Czechoslovakia) and tens of thousands of other citizens who condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops were forbidden to practice their professions, to teach in the schools, to perform leading economic and cultural functions, or to publicize their socio-scientific and artistic achievements.

A glance at the mottos and documents of the political forces participating in the 1989 change (e.g., the students' motto: propriety, understanding and tolerance) supports the idea of tolerance as one of the paradigmatic value judgements of the political and ethical convictions of those working for anti-totalitarian political changes. In contrast, the totalitarian political system was noted for its intolerance toward convictions and activities which, in the view of those in power, seemed contrary to their position.

The importance of tolerance in these events in 1989 is manifest, first, in the fact that for the people of Czecho-Slovakia the way leading to a pluralist democracy was opened by the politics of *perestroika* in the Soviet Union. Its initiator, M. Gorbachev, tolerated East European countries deciding freely the direction of their future development. Second, it appears in the fact that the parties replacing the former communists abandoned their world outlook and intolerance in favor of a political program aimed at the realization of human rights.

Third, from the very beginning, the way the anti-totalitarian political coup was realized was called the "velvet revolution." A call for peaceful change toward a system based on a democratic pluralism was issued by representatives of a broad democratic movement for human rights, headed by representatives of the Charta 77, as well as by some representatives of the previous regime during the so-called round table talks. A "Government of National Understanding" was formed, which prepared for free elections to the Czechoslovak Parliament. The idea of tolerance became the political and moral paradigm of a consensus between the political powers for the formation of a pluralistic democracy. This idea remains a sort of social regulator for non-violent social change even today.

Nevertheless, pluralistic democratic formation is not immune to tendencies toward intolerance, even in those citizens who are sincere in their fight for democracy. The press often stresses the psychological inertia of totalitarian thinking and praxis. It can be supposed that there are psychological mechanisms of certain types (according to the typology of E. Fromm) within which intolerance, as well as tolerance, have their natural place, and that these are developed within certain social relations and cultures. This had already been noticed by a great proponent of tolerance in the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill:

The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as follow citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power.

During a period of sudden social changes that bring both winners and losers, some six interpretations of the term "tolerance" appear in the sphere of social relations. The first four are based on an asymmetrical relation in the power between two subjects, where one subject dominates; in others instrumental rationalism appears.

1. A winner is strong enough to be tolerant; he is able to define the limits of his tolerance toward a loser. On the other hand, he must be tolerant to eliminate unpleasant reactions such as different forms of resistance, including civil war.

2. A winner is strong enough to be tolerant; he is able to define the limits of his tolerance toward a loser. On the other hand, he must be tolerant to eliminate unpleasant reactions such as different forms of resistance, including civil war.

3. A loser, eventually the weaker, is tolerant toward a dominant subject, as intolerance might make his position even weaker.

4. Mutual tolerance between the subjects in asymmetry of power is one of the conditions for consensus; it enables the formation of a pluralistic democracy and a mutually desirable existence for both subjects.

5. The first case goes behind the horizon of power; instrumentality and relationship built on tolerance is understood to be an aspect of human natural rights, especially if one's own outlook and freedom of speech is considered.

6. Tolerance is connected with an effort to understand a person who has a different opinion, this being a condition for the development of dialogue as the means for knowledge and for the humanistic cultivation of a people. The variety of opinions and inclinations does not include unwanted, that is, only connived or so-called disjunctive tolerance, but is rather the positive enabling synthesis and mutual intellectual enrichment.

The possibilities mentioned above in points 4 and 5 can be found among representatives of political powers which form the pluralistic democracy of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. The coherences mentioned in point 6 are crystalized in the current intellectual life of humankind.

The Disjunctive Tolerance: The Object and Borders of Tolerance

Tolerance comes from the Latin *tolero*. From a psychological point of view, this is patience toward somebody or something that is unpleasant and which we would prefer to be rid of. The objects found here include practical happenings, symbols, objectivized ideas, evaluative judgments, behavior, and habits of individuals and/or social groups.

In several definitions of the term tolerance, the stress is put upon the negative psychological aspect of the subject of tolerance. According to many authors, tolerance is defined as that aspect of a relationship which is unwanted by a subject, who nonetheless does not strive to get rid of it or to change it in spite of having the means to do so. This definition might hardly be acceptable for a teacher and/or a parent bringing up a child, for there are situations when the teacher can use intolerant means to keep a child from doing something that might endanger his or her life, health and/or morals. The teacher can even make a child engage in activities which lead to the child's physical, intellectual and moral development. This example can be generalized and called intolerance in the name of the future well-being of people. Intolerance that follows a noble aim can be found commonly in social movements which doctrinally are aimed at a change of social circumstances and person; it appears also in less use ways of introducing the positive achievements brought by the industrial civilization to a community of people who live by pre-industrial methods.

A Polish author, I. Lazari-Pawlowska, defines a negative evaluation of the relationship based on tolerance by the term negative tolerance; a tolerant behavior is psychologically extorted as a person either lacks courage to express a different evaluation of an object or is indifferent toward

it. A different opinion would be expressed if he or she had the necessary strength. This form of tolerance can be called disjunctive tolerance, considering that only a lack of power disables one of the subjects from expressing his or her intolerance toward the other. On the other hand, intolerance which cannot be objectivized is objectively tolerant; it is intolerance which is “bridled-in” where the bridle can be norms of behavior. Here there appears a coherence of the objective and subjective aspects of tolerance. In an ethical system in which tolerance toward a certain object is a positive value, such behavior cannot be expected only on an objective basis, but one’s outlook and motivation must also be considered.

In evaluating the moral aspect of an intolerant relationship, it is important to differentiate between a symmetrical and an asymmetrical relationship between people. In the asymmetrical relationship one of the individuals dominates the relationship, e.g., the boss in labor relations, or the one in the higher social or power position. From the point of view of morality and of the humanistic cultivation of inter-human relations, it is necessary that the dominating position of an individual or social group not be used for intolerant behavior.

The definition of the object and borders of tolerance depends on the hierarchical system. Consensus is sought and rationalized within a coexisting group of people who believe in different hierarchical systems. For example, John Stuart Mill explained that the incitement of public opinion among the Mohammedans against eating pork need not have been perceived to be religious intolerance as nobody is bound by his or her religion to eat pork. Mill solves the problem by a more general hierarchical system which differentiates between the private and public area: society should tolerate what is done in private life and not directly linked with public life.

Another example defining the borders of tolerance is connected with freedom of printing. During the 1921 civil war in Soviet Russia, Lenin’s comrade, G/ Mjasnikov, in accord with liberalism, spoke for “the freedom of printing, ranging from monarchists and including anarchists.” V.I. Lenin limited the freedom of printing by a different hierarchical system when he responded: “What sort of freedom of printing? What for and for what class?”

The borders of intolerance for certain behavior by an individual are limited also by judicial laws; if they are neglected, the enforcement power of a state is applied. Mill tried to formulate a simple principle which was to adjust the society’s means of enforcement against the individual. There are two principles; for the first, only self-defense entitles people individually or in a group to restrict the freedom of others; for the second, violence can be applied against a citizen only to protect others from evil.

In the Czech and Slovak Republics, where systems of pluralistic democracy are being formed, there appears repeatedly in the mass media the idea that democracy must be learned. This idea is perceived in connection with the protection of the values of the UN Declaration of Human Rights as achieved by humankind on its way to the emancipation of the individual. Respecting them in state legislation is creditable; it is more difficult to respect them in such moral institutions as public opinion and conscience. The learning of these values by an individual can be a result of education and humanistic cultivation in such social structures as family, school, church and interest groups, and under the influence of political institutions, mass media, and the arts. The same institutions may also instigate political, religious, world and nationalistic intolerance. Public opinion can tyrannize the individual, asking him or her to accept only certain opinions and customs and being intolerant toward other opinions. This intolerance need not be explicit; it can be as latent as silence or isolation of an individual by a social group.

Disrespect for the rights and the freedom of differing opinions is connected with socio-psychological mechanisms present in the subconscious structures of the human psyche. Therefore,

Mill asserts that *intolerance is natural* for people in everything they really care about. This assertion is the result of observing the psychic nature of people, where opinions which are exposed to punishment or praise are conditioned at times by reason, prejudices and superstitions, envy, jealousy, and most of all, by concern for oneself. Following Fromm's typology of characters, we presume tolerance as a productive character-orientation to be most desirable in a market economy. Not accidentally, the perception of tolerance found its place first with salesmen and nations dealing in the market, though in the form of indifference. As for the productive orientation of human nature, Fromm writes that a person wants to realize his abilities, and that this productive thinking is marked by an effort to understand other people and to respect what they consider to be valuable. These coherences form the basis of another type of integrative tolerance, namely, conjunctive tolerance.

Conjunctive Tolerance

From the middle of the twentieth century, there has been a tendency to overcome disjunctive tolerance in the literature devoted to ethical problems. This is true particularly for Indian culture which measures every conviction by the same values. According to the Hindu religion, every person is original and has his own manner of changing his life and, therefore, his own experience. This, then, should not be raised above another person's experience.

Tolerance, with respect to other people's ideas and convictions is developed by many authors (O. Hoffe, R.M. Hare, M. Ossowska, O.J. Salij, R.B. Brand, and P.J. Saher), as well as by many representatives of cultural relativism. They consider the values of different cultures to be of the same hierarchical status and, therefore, propose that the ways of life in different cultures should be respected according to their ethnic norms.

The tendency to develop conjunctive tolerance can be traced to the logic of what is called the extension of the borders of tolerance: one system, tradition or world outlook, or on current of thinking within this system, includes certain thoughts or values of another world outlook toward which the system was intolerant. The intolerance of some Christian traditions during the Church Reformation and the following two to three centuries is well known. An outstanding politician of one of the most tolerant nineteenth century countries, the English kingdom, denounced tolerance in religion between Christian religions, though not between Christians, on the one hand, and Hindus and Mohammedans, on the other. At the beginning of the twentieth century, an Arabic theologian, Al Cheikh Muhammad Abduh, in his book *Islam and Christianity*, stressed that "The Bible, the Evangelium, and the Koran are three equal books, three sermons creating the whole." The logic of his assertion can be extended by the assertion that different religions represent different forms of tended by the assertion that different religions represent different forms of man's anticipation of absolute power. In this sense we can explain the thought of the Indian thinker, Swami Vivekananda, who wrote at the end of the nineteenth century: "I accept all religions which existed in the past and I join those ones which celebrate God. I celebrate God together with each of them, be this celebration of God whatever."

Due to the fact that the idea of all-embracing tolerance to religions is accepted in Europe only in the twentieth century we would like to mention the fact that the all-embracing tolerance to religions was philosophically explained by cardinal Nicolaus Kusanus in the fifteenth century. Although he is dealing with tolerance between various religions his opinion on the unity in variability is a rich source of inspiration for the ontology of tolerance in any area of relations between people. In his book "De Pace Fidei" he declares how the common religious principle is

demonstrated in variety because the religions are based upon the same human essence. He does not demand, therefore, the abolition of differences and order of only one religion.

This all-embracing tolerance to religions still does not include atheists. That gap was filled by K. Barth and Bonhoeffer within dialectical theology. According to their theory, the atheist can be more Christian (more humanistic) than those who consider themselves to be Christians, if they help others and if they feel affection toward other people. Similarly, within his interpretation of religion (based on morality), T.G. Masaryk expressed the idea that “a lot of skeptics, even atheists, are more religious than the religiously churchman” who is indifferent and cynical. Because “skepticism is not blasphemy, the real enemy of religion and the blasphemer is indifference and cynicism.” To extent the borders of tolerance in a religion which stresses morality. Masaryk comes to the logical conclusion that tolerance is real humanity. What he reproached in the liberalism of his time was tolerance perceived as ignorance; nor did he acknowledge the laissez faire principle. In tolerance, as Masaryk perceives it, there must be a living interest and participation. His opinion that tolerance is a modern virtue and true humanity leads us to a conjunctive form of tolerance. This is situated in a hierarchical system implying such values as participation in someone else’s fate, respect for another person’s individuality, and respect for values implied by interpretations of humanism.

Extending the borders of tolerance, i.e., finding a common value accepted by various hierarchical systems, is the process of opening values, world outlook, and scientific systems to a new reality, e.g., to new social relations and new feelings by large groups of people. Extending the borders of tolerance results in a higher tolerance between increasing numbers of people and social groups, so that tolerance becomes a natural norm of the cultural behavior of people.

Extending the borders of tolerance as a value that regulates relations between states is supported by the tendencies incorporated in the existential basis of humankind.

1. The international division of labor reinforces the mutual coexistence of humankind.
2. Science as a qualitatively decisive source of material wealth causes a process of weakening and, in some countries, even extinguishing those material conditions which reproduce antagonisms between the interests of the working classes and their ideological expression.

Since the middle of the twentieth century, there has existed a mutually connected natural and social system of humankind, together with a global power for producing arms. This renders dangerous for the very existence of humankind intolerance in relations between nations: a political praxis directed by hateful paradigms of ideologies expressing class, national and religious antagonisms. Consideration of these factors brought on the Copernican ideological coup of Perestroika declaring the superiority of universal humanitarian interests over the partial interests of class or nation.

Synergic Tolerance and Personal Development

The conjunctive form of tolerance was characterized by means for extending the borders of tolerance through opening systems of opinion and conviction to elements which reflected other systems of opinion as well. The emphasis is placed upon seeking what is common in the different outlooks and interests of people. This coherence is looked for by means of a method of classificatory analysis. Seeking what is common in heterogeneity is indicated even in the dialogical nature of ideational relations between people. In this sense we understand a dialogue between, e.g.,

Marxists and Christians, as a process of incorporating provisions of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedom into systems of laws in particular states. Thus, the new political thinking regarding the USA and the USSR, called for by A. Einstein and B. Russell, came into existence and, along with it, the end of the cold war.

We suppose that dialogue following the method of classifying analysis leads to the compromises and consensus that is required in order for pluralistic democratic systems to work. Dialogue and conjunctive tolerance have other dimensions as well: the acceptance of heterogeneity and, in that sense, of tolerance toward other people as well as longing for something else based on knowledge that heterogeneity in relations, opinions, and activities provides the source of wealth of an individual. The first explication of this idea can be traced to essays by W. Humbolt on a person's individuality. His idea that various conditions and freedom expression of individuality was completed by Mill's assertion that a free expression of individuality is the moving power of social progress. His essay "On Freedom" specifies in human nature and social relations conditions which keep individuality from making progress. These include public opinion which is pleased with mediocrity and hates individuality. It includes also the despotism of habits that caused the backwardness of formerly powerful nations. China serves as a warning, with her many talented people who are not allowed to express themselves because education is directed toward the elimination of differences of personalities. As for the development of European nations, he writes that different cultures, personalities, states and nations developed in different ways and that this brought them some values which were accepted also by the others, in spite of hatred and efforts to make others follow their principles.

A different ontology of tolerance is indicated in these ideas, one which has been emphasized especially during the twentieth century. Other opinions and cultures are no longer perceived as neutral but vice versa; heterogeneity of material and intellectual culture is considered an intellectual wealth and the heritage of humankind. The pioneers of this idea were the ethnographers who put a great deal of emphasis upon the coexistence of different cultures in a context of a mutually-connected humankind and developed the term "genetic social code." According to Michael Nowak, an ethnicity or nation is a bearer of that code and, in an "information society," its tendency toward unique self-realization is reinforced. The development of individuality is considered a source of intellectual wealth for by means of the heterogeneity of individuals and social groups the practical and intellectual universality of humankind is realized. This tendency contradicts the type of unity in which the specific was melted down as in the mode of integrating human societies in the industrial era.

The view that structural differences and even contrasts contribute essentially to the development of the various branches of human activity was common in discussions of works of art and various cases of scientific development. The conclusion was reached, especially since the Renaissance era when originality was accepted as the highest aesthetic value, that new artistic initiatives expressed new senses of life and drew out new aspects of human existence. But what is new in art is not immediately accepted by most people; the new is refused; indeed, most people express intolerance. But the new can also be perceived positively: we prefer a certain manner of artistic expression and nothing else appeals to us. The history of art teaches us to see a new aspect of a human existence through new development in art.

Also, the intensive progress in physics in the twentieth century, which transformed it into a new classical science during the span of but one generation, demonstrated empirically that different and even contrasting opinions provoke the development of knowledge. Scientists began to call for hypotheses contradictory to theories accepted until then.

K. Popper's theory of falsification represents a synergic form of tolerance. According to this theory, verification of a scientific assertion is possible only when other scientists try to disprove it. Only after an assertion goes through the fire of falsification can we consider it truthful. Therefore, a scientist should be interested in and even seek out contradictory opinions. By the method of falsification, the scientist enters a dialogue in which he himself is his counterpart. Different opinions are, thus consciously incorporated into a never-ending dialectical movement of knowledge. From this viewpoint, there are various interpretations within the one Hegelian idea with its philosophical theories and its multiple aspects of the development of truth.

This approach to one's own and also another's opinion forms a certain culture of thinking which is of both gnoseological and moral value. It is a moral value because bearers of opinions are always people who have certain interests and are bearers of interpersonal and social relations. But is a positive relation to someone else's opinion still tolerance? Perhaps it goes beyond disjunctive tolerance, which historically was the first form of tolerance to emerge as a political and moral value. Within a positive relation toward another's opinion (which does not eliminate criticism), cooperation is very important; which is why we call it synergetic tolerance. Another question is whether we can speak of synergetic tolerance if a scientist unmercifully reveals the weak points of a certain scientific conception or hypothesis. We think that it can be synergetic tolerance if the opponent reconsiders his opinion and recognizes that different opinions can lead to a synthesis and to more universal knowledge.

The connection between the truth and error in relation to tolerance is made impressively clear by Mill. As he sees it, freedom to express one's own opinion is important not only for an individual, but also for humankind which can acquire this opinion. Thus, the person who prevents others from expressing their opinion impowers humankind. These connections are concentrated in a famous statement; "If all humankind minus one were of one opinion, humankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing humankind."

But synergic tolerance is based not on the right of a citizen to express his/her own opinion, but on knowledge that there exists the possibility of synergy, of synthesis of the heterogeneous. This is true not only of scientific hypotheses, but also of different hierarchies of values, especially one that enables people to seek the common points of different hierarchies of values (e.g., saving a life) and incorporates new integrating phenomena between nations, cultures and regions as universal values.

Synergic tolerance, therefore, is characterized by the unity of its gnoseological and aesthetic aspects. Criticism is connected with the dialectical nature of the process of knowledge and of truth. This connection is clearly expressed by V.S. Bibler:

If I am not restricted to pointing out the weak points of your arguments during my discussion with you, and vice versa, if I try to reinforce your point of view and think about arguments you could use against my reasons, then I act in accordance with the deepest logic of creative thinking.

We can consider synergic tolerance to be an attribute not only of individual creative thinking but of human creativity as a whole. It is an inseparable feature of an individual striving for progress, for intellectual, moral and emotional improvement, which probably is the highest goal of human creativity. Creativity is, in fact, openness toward humankind and its world. This extends as well to one's systematic thinking and to one's understanding of other people. Conjunctive and synergic tolerances can be considered aspects of human openness. As a means of accepting and

understanding human dignity, this is, perhaps, only a form of what E. From called productive love which aims at a certain interpretation of the contents of love in the Christian Gospel.

Epilogue

We began this essay with a political and intellectual outline depicting how pluralistic democracy was born from a totalitarian political system. The process of birth has its critical periods. Of course, the problem of tolerance is actual also in traditional democratic societies where there exist also shifting forms of intolerance, as described by one of the authors of *Criticism of a Pure Tolerance*, H. Marcuse, in his essay, “repressive Tolerance.”

At the same time, we would like to note one relationship which could be read on a student banner in 1989: “Decency, Understanding, Tolerance.” The connection between understanding and tolerance indicates conjunctive tolerance (respect for human rights) as well as synergic tolerance, namely, that only in a heterogeneity of nations and dialogue can society and the individual develop. This slogan could suggest to political groups how to solve the political and economic problems of a pluralistic society. In the student’s slogan one can find strength for solving the problems of social praxis.

In this connection we would note one fact: the totalitarian regime in Czecho-Slovakia was dissolved under the aegis of human rights. It was to protect human rights that Charta 77 was founded and it may have been part of the aesthetic intuition of its leader, Vaclav Havel, when he recommended that the movement continue its activity.

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Notes

1. This philosophical current is a tradition among Marxists in Slovakia, as can be supported by the words of a poet and politician L. Novomesky in his Christmas speech in 1945, quoted in a magazine, *Narodna obroda* (National Revival). On the words of Jesus taken from the *Evangelium*, “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” he commented as follows: Jesus preached about equality between people; in his era and the era that followed he taught a new solidarity between the social strata and interdependence between peoples; he asked not to cause any harm to others nor to take so much that it could be misused to humble and even humiliate others. That is why there should be no personal profit from the detriment, harm or even ruin of the others – L. Novomesky, “Christmas Speech,” *Narodna obroda* (December 22, 1990).
2. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1981), 73.
3. A. Hartmann, *Toleranz und christliche Glaube* (Frankfurt am Main, 1955), 119.
4. I. Lazari-Pawlovska, “Trzy pojecia tolerancji,” *Studia filozoficzne* (Nr. 8, 1984), 106-109.
5. V.I. Lenin, *The Letters to Comrade Mjasnikov*, 5, VIII (19-21), 116.
6. Mill, *op. cit.*, 68.
7. *Ibid.*, 67.
8. Lazari-Pawlovska, *op. cit.*, 1.
9. Morsy Zaghoul, *La tolerance: Essai d’anthologie* (2nd edition, Paris: UNESCO, 1988), 283. Textes choisis et presents par Zaghoul Morsy.
10. *Ibid.*, 285.

11. K. Capek, *Hovory s T.G. Masarykem* (Praha: Československý spisovatel, 1969), 230-231.
12. Mill, *op. cit.*, 137-139.
13. *Ibid.*, 78.
14. V.S. Bibler, "Myslenie a tvorva 'cinnost' alcho o potrebe tolerancie," *W. Osiatynski: Labyrint aveta* (Praha: Mlada fronta, 1984), 183.

Part IV
Contemporary Value Changes in Slovakia

Chapter XIV
The Democratization of Slovak Society and
the Value Orientations of Its Citizens

Jirí Suchý

The velvet revolution of 1989 in former Czecho-Slovakia opened a process of democratic change which is more than the restitution of the prewar democratic and humanistic heritage of Czechoslovak culture. The democratization of Czech and Slovak society has become a very complex process of building up legal states and creating new and open democratic societies.

Political scientists who had foreseen the inevitable doom of totalitarian oligarchies in Middle and Eastern Europe reflected realistically upon the chances of a conversion to liberal democracies. While in search of substantial differences between totalitarianism and democracy, they recognized, as early as the 1960s, that even liberal democracies are subject to the strains of emotion, fear and self-interest. This led to the adoption of techniques or, temporarily, even of objectives more characteristic of totalitarian dictatorships than they would care to admit. "In the world today," they insisted, "both the tasks and organization of the government are at all times complex, highly-demanding, and absolutely vital to the future of any modern society."¹

In spite of the deficiencies and tensions within democratic societies, the difference between a liberal democracy and a totalitarian dictatorship is obvious and clear: in a totalitarian dictatorship the power exercised by its governing group is unlimited and unrestrained, and its authority extends into every aspect of the life of the individual. In a liberal democracy, by contrast, the exercise of political power is limited by a constitutional framework or a convention which protects certain areas of life from governmental interference and insures that the powers allowed the government shall be exercised according to established rules and procedures: "In democracies, what is not forbidden is permitted."

Behind these differences lie two contrasting conceptions of political society. The first, shared by both Communist and Nazi totalitarianisms, is that the community is an entity with a specific purpose of its own, which may be something quite different from the immediate purposes and desires of its members. This view is linked in turn to a belief in historical inevitability. The second conception is built on individualism. The advocates of this conception do not deny that there is meaning in history, but they insist that there is not one meaning, but several meanings and many senses of history. There is no inevitable fate; individuals have the opportunity to shape their own futures within the limits of environmental conditions and their cultural experience.

Liberal democracy as a political heritage in the twentieth century raises two sets of questions regarding whether it can work. On the one hand, charges arise against the machinery of democratic government, the communication of information, the party system, representative institutions and the making of policies. On the other hand, there are questions that probe democracy more deeply and ask if the modern conditions of economic problems, international tensions, racial and ethnic conflicts, have not destroyed the reasonableness, tolerance and responsibility necessary for the voluntary peaceful agreements needed for a democratic way of life.

¹ G.M. Carter and J. Hertz, *Government and Politics in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 217-219.

The eco-social effects of the "fourth technological revolution" (D. Bell), demographic changes in the population of America, new qualitative characteristics of economic growth, and changes in the structure of "modern mass society," demassify it and turn it into a highly individualized "mosaic society" (A. Toffler). The changing socio-cultural conditions of individual life require a renewal of the precious cultural heritage of values, structures and techniques in a liberal democracy. This must begin by overcoming the plebiscitary form of democracy, grounded in the ideas of Rousseau as practiced during the French revolution, and the Russian socialist revolution by the Bolsheviks. This form of a representative democracy must be turned into a participatory democracy with much more respect for the basic needs and human rights of individuals and with a greater ability to protect the interests of the minorities against the power of the majority.

European Integration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century

The trend for future development in Eastern European countries aims at their integration with the rest of Europe by overcoming totalitarian regimes and making an economic transition to free-market mechanisms and competitive enterprise. The end of the Cold War left open many problems of security between European nations but created a basis for their effective solution through negotiation and cooperation:

You can refer to the new socialism and to the new capitalism. You can play all kinds of games with different names. But why are we moving toward democratic free enterprise? . . . Democracy is indeed a very efficient political form for accomplishing economic goals. It is certainly much more effective than Communism, as demonstrated over the last decade. However, beyond these pragmatic reasons, there is a growing desire around the globe for freedom - political and economic. This trend will gain force as we move toward the 21st century.²

Foreign policy overcame this shadow by starting an East-West dialogue which led to the CSCE process. Its evolution over the past 15 years has led to several satisfactory achievements relating to the security and peaceful cooperation of European nations at this turn of the century. The success of democracy over the postwar political and ideological divisions of Europe was the condition *sine qua non* for the successful attempts to integrate the economic, social and political life in Europe. "Eastern Europe is heading in three directions: political pluralism, free-market economics, and in the longer term, integration with Western Europe,"³ wrote John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene in *Megatrends 2000*, devoted to the investigation and description of 10 millennial directions for global development in the 1990s.

The Active Role of Values in the Revitalization of Democracy in Slovakia

The Czecho-Slovak Velvet Revolution was historically inevitable as well as an exception to the course of many other political events, thanks to the unanimous will of the citizens to implement the intrinsic democratic values denied them in the totalitarian Communist state. As a consequence of this will the revolution took place, not through violent struggles, but as a victory of the spirit

² D.B. Bostian, Jr., "Paradigms for Prosperity: Economic and Political Trends for the 1990s and Early 21st Century," *The Futurist* (July-August, 1990), 34.

³ J. Naisbitt and P. Aburdene, *Megatrends 2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990s* (New York: Morrow, 1990), 417.

over political power and oppression. In this it can be considered an historical anomaly. This anomalous course of the ten November days in Prague and Bratislava during which the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia was overthrown is the reason the world coined it "The Velvet Revolution."

These events were the result of the changing political climate in Europe after the Helsinki process had reached a turning point in mobilizing human rights. After that, the idea of European reunification as a political concept became effective, expressing the desires of the European nations to live in peace and security.

For Eastern Europe this is a first step out of the shadows in half a century. It is both remarkable and regrettable that very few concepts, perspectives or visions are being elaborated concerning the possible future of the continent. The concept of a "Common European Home" existed alongside that of a "Social Europe". There is an arms control process and a more inward looking European Community, but the countries have not developed blueprints for the future of Europe. Apparently for historical reasons, only the Germans have created a network of political, cultural, humanitarian and economic ties with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Perestroika and *glasnost*, the end of nuclear confrontation, the notion of a Common European Home, and the integration of a common market have generated hope, but future planning in Europe contains many traps and dangers. One is that economic conditions in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe will become worse before they become better. The second danger lies in the perceptions of East Europeans that prevailing conditions and attempts to restore Stalinism will cause instability in society. At the same time such a perception could be reason to accelerate and intensify economic and social reform in Central and Eastern Europe.

The European Community, now in a phase of consolidation, has become more forward-looking and active in planning the future of its members. The number of would-be members has increased.⁴

The success of democratic changes and the peaceful way in which they succeeded in Czechoslovakia pointed out the paramount importance of values in the regulation of the social behaviour of individuals during the transformations of social development. Recognition of this is the intellectual and spiritual precondition for the optimal management of its epochal transition from economic and political democracy into a pluralistic individualized society based on liberal culture and free enterprise. Such an innovation in Slovak society not only will bring its members more freedom and civic liberties for social interaction, but also will require more initiative and social responsibility for their actions.

The recent disclosure of errors in economic theory and practice and the ecological and social rethinking is part of a general tendency to overcome the cultural horizon of modern mass society and modernity at the end of the twentieth century and to lay the foundations for the post-modern culture of the twenty-first century.

Hazel Henderson summed up the meaning of the economic, political and environmental changes in the social life of contemporary man:

"They mean", she wrote, "nothing less than a social, economic, and philosophical revolution that has hardly begun. . . . The implementation of . . . new environmental insights and goals will require

⁴ H.V. Schierwater, "Europe—Quo Vadis," *World Futures*, 29, no. 3, Special Issue: "The Future of European Integration," 160.

a greater restructuring of today's industrial societies, even greater than the extraordinary restructurings we witnessed in the late 1980s."⁵

In Slovakia the crisis of industrial society has already reached the limits of stability within the natural environment and has tripped over into an ecospasm decreasing the quality of life and reducing the life expectancy of individuals. The transition of Slovak society to democracy is, therefore, closely connected with the ecological movement, its new ethics of ecophilosophy and the green politics of the younger generation. This was one of the initial driving forces of the democratic upheaval in society.

The transition of Slovakia as an industrially developed society to a democracy with a free-market economy is a complex process of sociocultural transformation with many dimensions. It raises several specific problems, above all the combination of a political revolution with radical economic reform, an ecological renaissance, a constitution for civic society, social reform and the spiritual rebirth of the personal.

The difficulties in privatization of state ownership, the liberalization of prices and the reconstruction of a command economy into a free-market mechanism are the result of the limitations of the macro-economic approach to the transition, which neglected its preconditions and consequences in the social infra and suprastructures of Slovak society as a post-Socialist country. Particularly, privatization and restitution of state-owned enterprises collides with the socio-cognitive maps and the intrinsic values of a people, which humanistic, democratic and social ethos had been the impetus to the changes of the Velvet Revolution.

Successful transition in Slovakia must move into an open sociocultural time and space framework situated at the border of the modern and the post-modern world. This not only requires respect for the cultural heritage of the Slovak nation, but its innovation and revitalization as well. Intrinsic values, as a psychological moment in the cultural heritage, play an important role in the further development of the Slovak nation and in its cultural contribution to the integration of Europe. This positive contribution depends upon the fulfillment of both social and cultural conditions.

Now, in Slovakia, we witness the triumph of traditional values. But the deep and complex social changes which await us require a flexible value orientation and the creation of new socio-cultural values, not only in the perspective of the post-modern spiritual culture, but also regarding post-economic environmental strategy. We must cross the frontiers of industrial production and modern mass society, towards computer-integrated manufacturing and a highly individualized information society for the twenty-first century. Values can take on double meanings in their actual development: they can slow down the development of Slovak society, or intensify and accelerate it toward future prosperity.

The Revaluation of Life and Social Responsibility

The crisis of the industrial paradigm of civilization became evident in European countries to different degrees and in different ways. But its main characteristics were: the globalization of economic expansion, pluralistic democracy, homogenization of culture, and primarily the increasing level of information and change in society. These transformed the significance and meaning of the individual personality as a producer and consumer of products and of information.

⁵ H. Henderson, "From Economism to Systems Theory and New Indicators of Development," *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 37 (1990), 216.

These changes demystify the industrially developed Slovak society. The revolutionary democratization of Slovakia changes its political culture and has a broad impact on socio-cultural forms of everyday life. The constructive facts of this process are mediated through the destruction of the social relations and structures which the Communist state established in the name of Socialism.

As a result of this social shock, the social responsibility of individuals decreased. Through responsibility in and to such primary social groups as family, relatives, neighbors, or peer groups, a certain feeling of solidarity with the community consolidates and is nurtured, but this is only a minimal form of social responsibility. Contemporary society as a complex, organized secondary social system is in need of selective, particular responsibility of the person to the community of which one is a member. This must be binding, yet responsibility would not be a moral category and a democratic value if it were a matter of coercion and violence. Further, it is the general responsibility of the individual to the social whole of which he is a member. This connection between individuals in the common needs of their life is very complex, being grounded upon the exchange of activities and properties in the course of the fulfillment of growing human needs.

The decline in the social responsibility of Slovak citizens began with alienation and the subordination in social life of the vital needs of the citizens, due to the dysfunctional character of Socialist society. It could be viewed as their silent criticism of the problems and abuses of the totalitarian dictatorship of the Communist party.

The critical voices which condemn deficiencies in scenarios of economic reform should be seen as a continuation of the demythologization of the previous perversion of social reality. This criticism is necessary if we are to overcome the gap between the social ideas and the life experience of the citizen, thus putting an end to the cultural schizophrenia of their private opinions and public activities.

The restoration of the confidence of citizens in society and of their responsibility thereto is one of the most complex strategic tasks of the democratization of Slovak society. Change in the socio-cultural attitudes and actions of its members is an urgent precondition for the successful functioning of society as a developing social system of individuals. It must not only construct a legal state with a democratic political culture and enable its transition to a free-market economy, but also generate liberalization in the intellectual and spiritual cultures and a deep reform in the social conditions of individual life.

Such democratic revolution and radical economic reform in Slovakia cannot succeed without qualitative changes in the minds and value orientations of its citizens supporting the innovative changes in their social life. The shock to the personal social security and the uncertainty of life in a time of complex transformation within society troubles the majority of the population. The frustration of the aspirations of individuals and the breakdown of their social relations evokes social isolation and a reevaluation of previous ways of life and stimulates the search for a new sense of life. Oppressed citizens who trusted Socialist ideals and whose commitment to Socialism took on a form of secular faith in spite of experience and critical judgement, now show discontent. This is not only an effect of their sensibilities, but a consequence of the decline in the social conditions in which they live.

The creation of modern nations in Europe in the nineteenth century brought people along a road to civilization which irreversibly changed the spontaneous relations between individuals in communities into formalized cultural relations in complex, organized social systems. The busy interaction between national societies in Europe during the twentieth century reduced the distinctiveness of each nation, and the interplay of international relations in Europe complicated

their socio-cultural problems and cooperation between them. Hence, the process of European integration calls for a new wave of cultural identity and sovereign due to the need to construct supranational structures for European security and cooperation.

These problems reveal the real barriers and opportunities for the economic, political and socio-cultural development of European nations, the Czech and the Slovak Republics included, and heighten demands for responsibility by citizens not only to the community, but to society. The responsibility of the individual as a moral category and the democratic value of human life are based on an understanding of the coherence of the individual and social whole.

Therefore, restoration of the confidence of citizens in society and their responsibility toward it is a substantial part of the restoration of liberal democratic culture in the Slovak Republic and an urgent moral, juridical, cultural and political condition for productive Slovak participation in European integration which is the function of massive globalization processes which now change our world in the post-modern era.

The most striking effect of all this interactivity is the loss of sovereignty for every nation, with national leaders no longer able to deliver their customary promises to protect their citizens in time of war, to shield them from pollution and environmental hazards, to maintain full employment or to "manage" their domestic economies. The variables needed to control these conditions have now migrated beyond domestic reach into the global arena. Furthermore, all this interactivity is accelerating change and is clearly irreversible, and this requires a shift of our knowledge--structures, curriculum, and research methods--which is now under way. In recognition of this disarray, diverse grass roots movements are expanding their successes of the past.⁶

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⁶ Ibid., 216.

Chapter XV

Human Potential and Social Equilibrium

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Human Potential

Personal Responsibility and Creativity

The tumult of Slovak social life reveals social problems previously hidden under the surface. One such important problem is a dimension of individuality called human potential.¹ Noting the recent special behavior of our people, social scientists point out the change in social values and in their acceptance caused by the new social stratification of society. These recent social changes make major claims on the human potential as new social conditions begin to require new types of behavior by individuals. From this point of view we can speak of human potential and of the way people use their abilities in work, which we consider to be the basic pillar of human activity in any society.

Due to the current chaotic economic situation, new demands are made upon the individual in work and everyday life. We note a rigidity in the way people behave and react, and a lack of

¹ For the term human potential I rely on the definition elaborated by F. Gal, P. Fric and M. Timoracky in their work, *Starting Points of Research and of Possibilities of Development in Society* (Bratislava, 1991). Human potential means the system of human dispositions and inclinations to activities, as well as the relations which develop the human internal forces and also the forces in society. Human potential reflects the life activities and relations of people due to which they can be active as individuals and in society and can change this society. The development of human potential is at the same time the result of human activities and relations, because only in the active setting of claims and relations can these human dispositions and inclinations be created.

People are especially active in the process of interiorization where they integrate the material and spiritual result of human activity through human knowledge and judgement. These results change into dispositions and inclinations of people, that is, into human potential. Such human dispositions and inclinations form a solid platform for future human activity resulting in the creation of new objects and artifacts.

Human potential involves the creation of the health, knowledge, values and social participation as potentials of individuals. Here, I concentrate first of all on the potential of values, because this type of potential provides the possibility for understanding the real picture of our everyday life and the patterns of mind which influence the social behavior of our people. Value potential is the inclination to concentrate only on those life activities which harmonize with one's interiorized hierarchy of values. This potential is based on the ability to attach importance to everything connected with one's life and to choose with respect the circumstances extending one's individual human existence.

Also important is the socio-participative potential, which is one's disposition to embark on broader social relationships and to assert one's claims within them.

Both types of human potential are very important for everyday life in the Slovak Republic. The first type of human potential helps to depict more clearly the different attitude toward such important social phenomena as work and family; the other type of human potential illuminates the real political situation and the hidden-dimensions of future social development based on socio-participative potential.

flexibility in social life. This is a sad heritage of the communist era which caused insufficient development of human potential and left people unable to find the stimuli for participation in new possibilities. This is further exacerbated by the troubles and stresses of everyday life.

I use the term insufficient human potential in order to stress the inability to solve the everyday problems to which people recently have been exposed, caused by new social stratifications. Further, disasters in the work sphere reflect these basic social problems. Hungarian sociological research in this regard can be indicative because that country is passing through similar economic and social development. The data reveals a not very positive picture of society in the previously socialist nations. First of all, due to the prior Communist system in the former Czecho-Slovakia, as in Hungary a centralized type of management existed in economic life and in the work sphere. As a result workers were not truly motivated for this type of management which prohibited development of flexibility and adaptability of human potential and purposefully oriented people to avoid creativity in their work. Creative work was not appreciated by the workers, who feared that spontaneous changes would lead to disaster in the workplace. People could not often use their professional skills and abilities because the social and political conditions did not encourage it: there was no evident stimulus for better results in one's work. All these negatives produced a type of man who did not seek independence for decision-making in work, was not autonomous, avoided conflicts, lacked creative initiative and lacked a sense for hard competition in business. Rather, it was customary to rely upon the official decisions of the work group and work without individual creativity. Hence, the activity of the employees was not very creative and the values which were, and still are, accepted by the people, do not support changes which could lead to new and prosperous social conditions.²

Stress on the creativity of the human potential is the first condition of a new prosperous era. It is important not only for the cultivation of individuality and its autonomy, but also for the development of abilities and initiatives in work, business, etc. Such motivation is an essential condition for productive and hence prosperous work by the individual in society. According to Milton Friedman, "The sense of freedom as nearly without coercion is based upon competition of individuals, but does not defend or protect special interests against somebody else's. Freedom is accepted as a general principle, whose application to particular instances requires no justification."³ This principle stimulates a market economy and helps people to be free of limits and uncoerced in their economic activities.

The main goal here is not political liberty for the common man, but the liberty to free one's inner individual will and power for competition and enterprise. Freedom, in this sense, is connected with taking advantage of one's own abilities. It is the premise for a successful and fruitful attitude toward work.

As can be seen, this motivation and stimulation for the creativity of the human potential is concentrated first of all on concept of work, which is different in Western and Central Europe. The results of empirical sociological research help us understand the different nature of individualization in Slovakia and the West. The work activity of our people was not promising in the era of socialism and the values accepted by the people were not conducive to the changes now required for prosperity. The real value of work was depreciated, because there was no related social or financial evaluation. The simplest reason for this was that the results of work were not financially rewarding. In general, workers were accepted not for their abilities, but for their

² Gy. Marosan, "Ertekek, modellek, változások," *Valóság* (n. 7, 1988), 61.

³ F. Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, vol. I *Rules and Order* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 12-13.

political status. Financial reward was differentiated not accordingly to the quality of the work, but according to political criteria and measurements. In consequence, the most important criteria was not economic, but political or social.

Today, the situation is different. The social situation is oriented to an active type of employment supported by the state. There are job centers which, during this transitional period, are needed to help people find jobs--for it is important to have a real job. In the Communist era there was a generally accepted need to work; now there is the need to find a proper job. This is an important social change in society requiring people to change their behavior and thinking. People must become more flexible and active in the field of work and use their own abilities for economic competition in society.

Currently, there are problems with unemployment in Slovak society. It is difficult to predict the real number of unemployed people, but this is very high and on the rise. This is a dangerous trend which portends other negatives and even a social crisis.

Therefore, it is important to have an efficient social policy to enable people to be more flexible in changing their social position and situation. One such related social policy is the reeducation of workers. These courses must be organized professionally and with an understanding of future economic and social development. These courses must take into account the future development of the Slovak economy and the possibility of developing new professional positions in the field of social affairs, banks, the private sector, etc. Such possibilities create a new trend of social policy, whose most important aim now must be to support people during this period of unemployment.

People must behave more flexible recently during this transition period. They must take into account their real social possibilities and potentials, which can help them respond to situations of everyday life. In view of the potential manifested in current social behavior, one cannot be optimistic regarding rapid social and economic progress.

In the final analysis the most important thing in the present situation is to stimulate the inner human potential, not merely to promote changes in economic competition, but to cultivate the human values needed for social cooperation.

The Political Context

Secondly, in the current political situation in Slovakia there is a tendency toward so-called socialist ideas, nationalism and greater political authority. The unfinished process of the individualization of people in social and political life subjects it to the rising influence of political authority and an increasing tendency toward nationalism. These are obstacles to cooperation with the Czech Republic and with Central Europe at a regional level.

Why are these tendencies so typical of political life in Slovakia? Before the revolution in 1989, people were used to being influenced in their thinking by official ideological principles and were not independent either in their thinking or their activities. In the current political situation, when Marxist ideology is still very strong, and when the changes in our political and social life have been too abrupt and far from being fulfilled, understandable many people still seek an authority. Authoritarianism is filling the vacuum of social ideology which began after the breakdown of the totalitarian regime, because support for liberal thinking was not really strong. People were and remain used to thinking in a very concrete one-dimensional way, so that ideas and influences from political authorities are more acceptable and have many supporters.

The influence of authority is connected not only with the people's way of thinking, but also with the problems of a strong political personality, a strong state and nation. The tendency towards

a strong state is the legacy of socialism because, after the many years of socialist domination, people have come to identify the existence of socialism with that of the state. They still believe that the state must influence all important political, economic and social decisions. This was possible when its organization and administration were centralized; now in a period of decentralized government there is confusion about the real role of the state in society.

Many are influenced by a centralist model and would support it in political life.⁴ Other social and political institutions do not appear in public opinion to be so powerful in the social context. People want to see some personification of power in the political foreground as a basis for political authority.

Political authorities have broad influence in political life. People do not believe in political programmes, but look to strong personalities. The principle of authority is not so compromised in political life as are the more radical dogmatic, political movements. It is childish to think of political authority as the only way to promote political freedom and movement toward democracy. The democratic principles of free society contradict, on the whole, the principles of political authority, because the very principle of authority suppresses the process of individualization and the cultivation of human potential. Yet, without these features it is not possible to imagine an open democracy, parliamentary or participative. On the one hand, it is inevitable that there be political personalities on the state, but, on the other hand, politicians who are too powerful and influential can concentrate too much power in their own hands and endanger democracy.

National Identity

The greatest obstacle to cooperation at the international level with other countries of Central Europe and beyond is rigid nationalism. It is dialogue on the regional level that opens the possibilities of political cooperation between various nationalities with historical enmities. Rigid nationalistic tendencies in the Slovak Republic and in other states of Central Europe prevent cooperation among the new democratic states. When political dialogue on this regional level is no longer possible, societal cooperation becomes more difficult along with cooperation on the other levels with Western Europe.

While dangerous for the development of democracy in Europe, perhaps these tendencies cover other important problems from the history of our countries, as is the case of the former Yugoslavia. Such problems include political and ideological movements and issues connected with the history of economic development. These differences generate dissatisfaction among peoples and tend to lead to troubles for centralized government and nationalism.

Rather than reflect real national problems, they may reflect the problems of the political emancipation of large groups of people who want to express their own political opinions and attitudes. In this the tendencies reflect what, in established democracies, is called public opinion. After 40 years during which our people officially accepted only some ideas or principles about politics and nation, they now feel free to express their own attitudes. This raises issues typical of an open society regarding how to channel public opinion and attitudes. This is a question of political education through which people must become more familiar with the principles of democratic discussion and accept other political opinions.

Social Balance

⁴ Ondrej Dostal, "Is There a Tendency to Open Society?" *Echo*, no. 21 (Bratislava, 1991), 40.

We see here, primarily, the success of the open society--the development of the individual is necessary through the cultivation of one's abilities and the possibility of cooperation at the social level. All these stages and levels of personal activity are important for the social and political stability of our time.

But, in reality, it is necessary to unify both tendencies--the trend toward the cooperation essential for social stability, and the trend toward political cooperation. When both these tendencies are unified, we can speak of the political and social balance necessary for a prosperous life for the European community. The situation is one of feedback for it at once both influences society and depends upon the cultivation and inner development of a suitable political situation for stimulating the life of the individual and securing its economic, political and social prosperity. A good political situation helps create a positive atmosphere in everyday life and abandons ideological instructions.

The first requisite of a stable political situation is political balance. For this there is need of active and appropriate cooperation between the various political parties. As a political way of solving problems democracy supposes the participation of all social classes and groups in the formation of the political scene. The necessary condition for this participation and cooperation of each legitimate political party is that each does not strive to claim its own particular interests absolutely, but limits its political claims in order to enable other political parties and directions, social groups and classes to achieve their political aims. Thus, taking into account the political interests and aims of various political parties makes it possible to create democratic political stability within the framework of our republic and all Europe.

This political cooperation, which is required for democratic political stability, creates also the bases for social stability. For this it is important to concentrate not only on the macro-economic, but also on the micro-economic level. To do so the most important requisite is social cooperation among people. This cooperation constitutes the norm of social activity and integrates the system of moral values.

It is necessary to stress the importance of moral values, because they support this cooperation and participation among individuals and between social levels; for such participation in the microsphere of society is possible only when we respect our own social interests as well as those of others. The importance of a balance in social interests which respects and is respected by all members of all social groups, and its implementation under a general principle of subsidiarity, transforms their interrelation and determines the microstructure and the forms of cooperation among individuals.⁵

This makes possible recognition of the value of individuals and their participation in work or political groups with respect to both their interests and those of the whole group. In this way it is possible to reconcile the world views, systems of values, and ways of thinking of various social groups and individuals, not only in the microspheres of society, but in society as a whole including both the work sphere, and those of economic and social life based on individual activity. When these liberal and humanistic values become common in our society as a whole and in the world view of all individuals, they can begin to influence the social atmosphere of society and provide norms for human behavior.

In this way it is possible to develop stable social cooperation based on fairness and trust by all individuals in all spheres of society. This cooperation is based on the need for political and economic stability in the social system, which is the foundation upon which individuals can

⁵ T. Fricz, "Az europai tipusu felodes uj paradigmaja; az egyensulyelv modern europai tarsadalmi rend korvnoalai," Valosag, no. 7 (1991), 50.

develop and creatively exercise their abilities. This entails participation at the microspheres of society by the individual whose work is recognized as essential in the office or company. This need for social stability enables one to coordinate the interests of the various social stages, from the social macrosphere to the microsphere.

Social stability must be realized through the historical and social conditions we create. For this the first and most important condition of an open society is the development of the inner potentials and abilities of individuals. This, in turn, is related to the development of social and political stability and thereby to the realization of an open society.

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Chapter XVI Present Value Changes in Slovak Society

Edita Bauerová

In the current historical situation of the Central and Eastern part of Europe the importance of values is becoming increasingly evident. One system of values is perishing, a new system is arising; some old values survive and those previously kept at the deepest levels of motivational structures are being actualized in the quite new contemporary situation of the person.

The relative character of values appears forcefully. Values formerly thought to be of little significance, such as national identity, captivate a very wide section of the population. Other values such as civil liberty appear not to have been anchored in the people to the extent assumed and for everyday life appear to be of little practical significance. There is a whole series of similar paradoxes in the realm of values.

Research on values in the 1980s consistently showed a worsening of the value climate, with many contradictions between goals and means. Individuals set their goals under the pressure of everyday reality, so that they served above all to legitimize the continuation of behavior, actions and efforts. Family and caring for children became the central "legitimatizing" value and in everyday life preference was given to activities which ensured the operation of the household. Intra-family communication and care of the children--which could provide cohesive strength in the family--was attended to very little in comparison with the time spent on shopping, cooking, and other menial household activities. On the average in Czechoslovakia, women devoted 23-28 minutes to caring for the children, while men spent 9-14 minutes. On the average intra-family communication took 13-19 minutes of the daily time of men and women at the end of the 70s (Viteckova, 1985).

A further paradox in the realm of values was the growing dissatisfaction with social processes, on the one hand, and on the other hand, an increasingly wide acceptance of the "rules of the game". These were based on the toleration or acceptance of negative instrumental values which led to a sporadic sanctioning of approaches which otherwise would not have been accepted.

Despite all the shortcomings of values research, it is apparent that the climate of values in society is rapidly changing for the worse. Among the alarming results of the values climate is the fact that people are giving up their life goals very early, at the age of 40-45, and transferring them to their children. Thus, in many cases, unnaturally strong ties of dependence are developing between the creditor and the debtor generations.

Table 1. Instrumental Values of Slovak Society (Percentages)

<i>1981</i>	<i>1988</i>
1. political activity 19.4	political engagement 19.3
2. work ethic 18.0	work ethic 6.0
3. relationships 17.8	relationships, family 35.3
4. intelligence 17.0	intelligence 16.10
5. education 13.9	education 5.4

- 6. luck 13.5
- 7. abilities, qualities 4.7
- 8. do not know 5.4

- luck 2.4
- entrepreneurship 5.1

(Bauerová 1990)

For a population which in most cases had proceeded along a predetermined course, the significance of values for orienting life has gradually been lost due to the fact that choices between many possibilities have become very infrequent. This corresponds to the defensive life attitude of a majority of the population. This is indifferent to public affairs, based on the conviction that the activity of the individual does not influence the direction of social processes. Activities focusing on conditions of life and family became the central concern of everyday life and the extent of this has much increased in proportion to the decreasing effectiveness of work.

In a stagnating society, this situation affected everyday life which was already barely tolerable by intensifying the stresses that individuals faced in maintaining their current standard of living. This has shaped social developments since the middle of the 70s.

While people hoped for basic changes since the mid-80s, few believed that they would live to see them. The basic changes at the end of the 80s, however, found the great majority of the population in a condition of moral devastation, completely unprepared for the possibility of a worsening of their economic standing and of radical social changes.

At the same time there was a "silent revolution" of values in Western societies (Inglehard, 1977). This was affected by the times and the cycle of generations, and led to the paradoxical development of an orientation towards material and postmaterial values.

Normal measures to distinguish between those oriented towards material values and those oriented to postmaterial values in a given age group hide the fact that the strongest orientation towards material values joined with a strong orientation towards postmaterial values is found among the youngest age group. It was among the oldest age group that there was clearly the strongest orientation towards postmaterial values, though a prevailing orientation towards material values survives. Among the middle generation which according to research surveys was materially most well-off, the orientation towards material values was relatively weak, but at the same time it had the least intensive orientation toward postmaterial values.

Table 2. Orientation Towards Material and Postmaterial Values (percentages)

Age	Groups	20	21-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	56-60	61--
Material	Values	50.3	43.8	47.9	42.3	46.5	47.6	47.8
Postmat.	Values	29.5	25.0	24.4	16.3	24.7	21.9	35.2
Difference		+20.8	+18.8	+23.5	+26.0	+21.8	+25.7	+12.6

(Bauerová 1990)

This difference in pattern from Western societies is conditioned by several factors: on the one hand, the overall lower and currently decreasing material welfare of the population; on the other hand, a long-term lack of quality consumer goods and a strong homogenization of the consumer potential of the larger part of inhabitants. As a result of the "generational sequence" reorientation from material to postmaterial values appeared among the weakest age categories. It was relatively intensive among the youngest, but at no age was it more important than the orientation towards material values. These results show relatively clearly an alarming social state of affairs and development.

The radical changes in society caught the majority of the population unprepared. It had a devastated and in many cases desperate system of values, especially among the middle generation who, for the most part, had a passive approach to life.

The broad sense of slow social changes in comparison with that in the political and economic order seems justified. After the euphoria over the expected societal change, the strong pressure of long suppressed ethnic and confessional problems has deepened the disorientation of large and smaller groups in the population and increased their feeling of uncertainty and vulnerability. But the social difficulty in which the population finds itself appears to come first of all from the fact that the basic parameters of the standing of the individual have changed so that one constantly is confronted with new social situations for which models of behavior do not exist. This leaves one generally disoriented.

New parameters for the social standing of the individual are related to everyday practical life which in various ways they shape and determine. Thus, a significant worsening of the economic conditions of the great majority of the people--a 40 percent growth in living expenses with a 30 percent drop in the value of real wages in 1991--and the rapid growth in unemployment, generated a feeling of uncertainty about the future. Except for a few of the oldest citizens, these are all phenomena which the economically active population has never confronted.

The radical change in the amount of freedom and the possibilities of forming an active life remain in principle for the majority of the population an unused possibility. In the Slovak Republic 80 percent of those questioned a year after the radical social change considered a free choice of alternatives for their life concept to be only a possibility. (In the Czech Republic this share was only a little more favorable--75 percent.) In this respect, the effects of the November Revolution was not felt by about half of the respondents.

As the population remains under the pressure of everyday concerns, for many a higher degree of freedom remains out of reach. Some openly manifest their dissatisfaction as the euphoria passes and they fall into pessimism as a result of the non-fulfillment of immediate expectations and of any wide-ranging and all-encompassing positive changes.

For the great majority of the population the most burning problems are social and economic, with worsening living conditions for individual groups in the population. These are cited with a significant sense of emergency.

The definition of the parameters of the actual social situation clearly determines the framework within which actual values are manifested. In a stabilized social situation this influence probably would be significantly smaller. But with the radical change of the social environment, accompanied by uncertainty and disorientation among large groups of the population, the sense of values is considerably influenced by the negative changes in the surroundings.

Differences between the inhabitants of the Czech and Slovak Republics are becoming significant in this respect. Confronted by social problems of various intensities the inhabitants were differently prepared for the negative implications of the economic reform and differ in their self-

definition and sense of their own standing. Several differences in the value attitudes of the Czech and the Slovak publics illustrate this.

The significant social orientation of the Slovak population is conditioned by regional differences of a social and economic nature. The Slovak Republic is economically in a disadvantaged position as a result of the collapse of the Eastern market, the conversion of the armaments industry and excessive agricultural production. Notably, a social orientation is supported also by part of their own political parties.

Furthermore, the development of an increased national identity on the part of Slovaks is intensively linked with economic and social matters. In these circumstances value structures are subject to change resulting in a significantly higher sensibility, variability, and relativity of values than in other times and places.

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Chapter XVII

The Humanization of Work and the Problem of Values

Erika Kvapilová

Introduction

This paper has the following aims:

1. to describe, in brief, various views on the humanization of work and show how this term was used in technical and Czecho-Slovak literature;
2. to define positively the term "humanization of work" as it will be used in our considerations;
3. to point at the relation of present day changes in work to the development of technology, the organization of work, and the existing economic system of a particular society;
4. to underline the importance of values in the behavior of people and their attitudes toward work; and
5. to direct attention to the positive and negative aspects of recent political and socio-economic changes in the Slovak Republic with respect to the process of the humanization of work.

This paper does not seek definitive answers, but rather to reformulate basic questions concerning the place of man and his work in the contemporary world, particularly as applied to the transformation of Slovakia. We are convinced that after 40 years of official philosophical and sociological literature, a revival of these basic questions has become necessary.

Although the term "humanization of work" may sound paradoxical, it is used with various meanings and in various relations in specialized literature, newspaper articles and everyday communication. In spite of its paradoxical nature it seems to have many good reasons.

1. First, it is a reaction to the consequences of the industrial revolution, when man began to be treated as an object or thing both in reality and theory. The activity of man soon lost its "human" character and came to be understood as the quantifiable performance of one element in an industrial system (the power of work) comparable to the performance of a machine.

Work as action was reduced to manual labor. The "science of work" concentrated on the search for a law that could define the relationship between the physical energy spent by a worker, his fatigue and a quantifiable physical performance in the course of time. F.W. Taylor, in the *Principles of Scientific Management*, defined the place of man and work in the process of production, saying that whereas once man held the first place, in the future the system would take his place.

Persons ceased to be the decisive subject of production and became a supplement to the developing technology. The expression, "humanization of work", arose as a reaction to the inhumane exploitation of the work force and as a criticism of Taylor-type methods of "scientific management" aimed at maximizing the worker's physical performance in a limited unit of time.

Hence, the term "humanization" is related neither to labor (an economic notion) nor to work (a cultural notion). We shall return to the differences between these two notions later.

2. Often we come across the term "humanization of work" in relation to: (a) the improvement of the material environment and conditions of work; (b) the creation of a favorable psychological climate in the workplace; or both.

Although there is here a certain shift of interest to man, the main aim is to prove scientifically that the creation of a pleasant work environment, as well as appropriate socio-psychological conditions for work, is an important prerequisite to high productivity, quality, and effectiveness in work. The worker is still considered to be an object of management and not the subject, prerequisite and goal of production. This understanding of humanization of work prevailed since the early 60s in specialized literature in Czechoslovakia.

3. The term "humanization of work" occasionally appears also in psychological and sociological literature, especially that with an anthropocentric orientation. In the Marxist tradition, this term was especially linked with a qualitative change of work into a means of self-fulfillment and self-confirmation, where terms such as dignity, satisfaction and happiness related to questions concerning the relation of man and his work to nature and society. In this tradition, man sustains himself as a subject, as a creative rational being, capable of self-development. "Work" is used here as a cultural notion in a sense later to be explained.

However, there are other conceptions concerning the humanization of work, e.g., the change of work into a game, or the denial of self-fulfillment and the development of character through work, by dividing human activity into a sphere of necessity (work) and a sphere of freedom (non-work), etc.

In the last decades, under the influence of the development of technology as a substitute for manual labor, great emphasis has been placed upon the intellectual performance of a worker, his creativity and inventiveness; what previously had been different conceptions began to converge through, e.g., joining the demand for an increase in productivity with the creativity and self-fulfillment of the worker. In the dynamically changing conditions at this end of the twentieth century there is acute need to explore this relation of man to work.

The fact that this is not just a theoretical problem is proven by government financing of research projects in the field of the humanization of work and its conditions, carried out at the turn of the 70s and 80s in West Germany, Scandinavia and the U.S.A. Recently, in Japan and the U.S.A.,¹ as in some other European countries, so-called human management began to develop within a framework in which one can find various attempts to approach the worker as the subject of production, rather than merely as an object of management.

In this paper the humanization of work will be understood as:

1. the process of the gradual change of a worker from an object of management into a subject of self-management;

2. the process by which the conception of work is transformed into self-fulfillment and/or the development of a human being (where the horizontal relations of cooperation dominate over the hierarchical relations of management, and where cooperation prevails over competition);

3. the process resulting in satisfying the needs of as great a number of individuals as possible and of such social (rather than merely the consumer), needs as the ecology, etc.

¹ E.g., in the 1970s and 1980s the international project "Humanization of work in West Europe and the USA" by the Swedish Center for Working Life and financed by the Swedish government.

This assumes:

1. a great degree of development in socially and ecologically designed technology, substituting tiresome physical and psychic work and allowing for the enlargement of individual creativity and initiative on the part of the worker;
2. acceptance of certain values of society, especially those respecting the individuality of every human being as the greatest value;
3. considering work as an activity by means of which man creates his own human dignity and happiness.

Two Approaches to Work in Social Research

Social Research

In the framework of the social sciences, work can be explored from various points of view (some of which are diametrically opposed one to another): different contents, different relations to the social environment, different definitions of functions in social reproductions, etc.

With a certain inevitable degree of abstraction in scrutinizing the phenomena of social life, it can be said that these different conceptions arise from contradictions within two lines of social research, which differ in their understanding of man as either *homo economicus* or *homo sociologicus*.

The first direction of social research on work was initiated by Adam Smith. In his view, an individual is an agent whose activity is result-oriented, aimed at future returns; in the interest of the improvement of future returns he is always willing to adapt to changing circumstances. He is an egoist who, by pursuing his own interests, creates the welfare of all.

This attitude requires a certain type of rational instrumental behavior. Its proponents are especially among representatives of liberal economics which they justify as the natural base and most fitting for the capitalist economic system. Work is the construction of an individual who, due to his specific qualities and behavior, and determined by his own interests, becomes a functioning free market. Other qualities unimportant for the function of this element in the system are not taken into account. In this way an individual becomes equivalent to other elements in the industrial system and thereby is deprived of his subjectivity. By means of his result-oriented activity he reproduces the system, but does not reshape it.

In the other direction, represented above all by Emile Durkheim, *homo sociologicus* is not so future-oriented; his primary orientation is not to outcomes, but to social norms. These social norms can be regarded as the "internal" forces guiding and harmonizing the behavior of man in society. They are generated by society and their task is to create and maintain an habitual social balance. That is why they must be shared by other people and sustained by their approval. Most of them do not pursue direct profit for anyone in particular, though this does not mean that they do not express interests.

Although there are many conceptions and classifications of social norms in recent specialized literature,² most authors agree on their negative definition, e.g., that they cannot be identified with ethical, legal and individual norms of behavior. Further, it is agreed that social norms also have a stimulative influence on behavior, and do not stand for some alternative mechanism of result-oriented behavior.

² E.g., J. Elster, 1989, "Social Norms and Economic Theory," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 4 (1989), 102: "Social norms are 'nothing but' instruments of individual, collective or genetic optimization."

In reality the particular behaviors of people are influenced to an equal degree by instrumental rationality (derived from the specific interest of an individual) and by social and other norms and values, etc. Both *homo economicus* and *homo sociologicus* are but abstractions having importance only from the standpoint of research on a particular type of social system.

For our consideration of work, it is important to know which type of behavior in a given system is more accepted and sustained by ethical, political and other means.

The Understanding of Work

The two approaches to understanding man and his place in a social system are the basis for two different conceptions of work. In the case of *homo economicus*, work is understood as a means for the achievement of individual interests, as a creator of material values, as a means for exchange among free individuals in the market, and as a creator of a specific historical form of wealth. The decisive criterion for judging work is chronological, not historical, time.

When work is looked at from the standpoint of *homo sociologicus*, it is a social regulating force by means of which man as a subject justifies his relations to his surroundings and to other people. Work is a means to man's self-affirmation and self-fulfillment in society. It is an incessant process that thoroughly penetrates the existence of man. Its criterion is first of all qualitative--the degree of harmonization with the above-mentioned relations and in historical time.

From the standpoint of this abstract division, it can be said that in the first case we must consider work in terms of the economic conceptions of work, while in the other, we must consider work as a cultural notion. Therefore, we suppose that these are not two aspects of work, but rather two different approaches to its understanding. They neither exclude nor complement one another for they deal with work from different standpoints. However, ignoring one or the other approach leads to misunderstandings in the field of the theory of work and also to various social conflicts in reality.

Here, it is necessary to underline that, by introducing just two lines of social research on work and two approaches to its understanding, we purposely simplify in order to stress the contradictory implications deriving from them. This simplification is functional in view of the following consideration.

Values

The Importance of Values

Values concentrate within themselves social norms, result-oriented behavior and individual interests. If we want to analyze the changes that took place in the man-work-society relationship in the last decades or even more recently, we cannot ignore the problem of value-orientations and preferences. However, we shall not try to analyze the sources and forms of these various value systems completely, but only to suggest possible problems which can occur in transforming society (the case of Slovakia) when predominant topical value systems are not respected.

The traditional foci in the education of people in values have always been family, community and church. In Slovakia these values have disintegrated to a considerable degree, not only as a result of 40 years of political totalitarianism and the rise of "real socialism", but most of all as a consequence of the historical development of industrialization. The destruction of traditional

values is a problem not only of the former "socialist block", but, as will be shown later, for all modern societies (not excluding such a traditional country as Japan.)³

It is apparent that the formation and changes of values in the present world have been influenced most of all by the mass media, systems of education and the activities of various official institutions. These form man's notion of the world and his place within it, and they influence to a considerable degree his behavior and hierarchy of values. They form notions of the system of which man is a constitutive part by supporting the formation of values important for the survival and reproduction of a given system.

The preceding socio-economic and political system in Slovakia favored such values as collectivism, duty to work for the welfare of the nation, patriotism and proletarian internationalism. But in reality it led to the suppression of individual abilities and the freedom of the people to choose their own way of life. In the field of work, it led to egalitarianism in job-rewards.

In spite of this, there was a discrepancy between officially proclaimed values and reality. Social equality did not relate to "representatives of the nation" who, at public expense, built their own wealth. This stimulated negative reactions by the people to abstractly formulated values, which became manifest in the Velvet Revolution at the end of 1989. Nevertheless, some of these values became a constitutive part of the value system (e.g., social equality on the basis of work as an expression of social justice).

Although for the majority of Czechs and Slovaks the post-revolutionary changes brought a real "turn for the better", our time is not free of problems and many of these emerge in the sphere of values. In Slovakia nowadays the most highly proclaimed value is freedom. However, due to the political changes in our country, "freedom" is not represented by freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc. These are already taken for granted and relate rather to the preceding regime in which these forms of freedom were suppressed. The notion of freedom now is understood as self-assertion and especially as free enterprise. This "liberal" notion of freedom is officially supported as a value which can help in overcoming economic and technological backwardness. This result-oriented behavior (that of *homo economicus*) which until recently had been suppressed promises positive results and has brought some countries to their leading position in the world. In reality, however, it also causes various value discrepancies and even social conflicts.

Holding to the "objective laws of the market" (e.g., recognizing its superiority over everything so that governmental interventions only smooth over some imperfections within the market) means disclaiming responsibility for social consequences by a government representing a given system. This attitude much resembles the attitude of the preceding regime that talked about "objective laws of social development" inevitably leading to the downfall of capitalism while bringing socialism to the just communist society. Liberalism propagates a very similar "lawful" mechanism, but for a quite differently understood social justice.

Nowadays phenomena such as unemployment, apparent differences in income, social differentiation, and contrasts between wealth and extreme poverty are regarded as natural, whereas

³ The decline of the Japanese GNP to 3-4 percent yearly in the 1980s and the crises of the early 1990s, compared with the 1960s when the increase of the GNP in Japan amounted to 10 percent, leads many theoreticians to look for ways of overcoming the "crisis." In this connection, the exclusiveness of traditional paternalistic values, which in the opinion of many was responsible for the "Japanese economic miracles," began to be doubted. There is an increasing number of voices calls for an enrichment of Japanese "groupism" by the values of American individualism and for changes in value preferences.

but a few years ago our society in building "real socialism" boasted that the "negative phenomena" were unknown in our country.

People living hitherto with a centralized government--with a paternalistic attitude of state to citizen which suppressed freedom in all its forms--are not prepared for the quick turnover in behavior and value systems required by "freedom". The result of this conflict of values is a renewed disbelief by many citizens in officially proclaimed values and in the present representatives of the state and of economic reform. This is a natural reaction of people who do not want to be manipulated any longer, but have not yet decided what to do with the liberty they have gained.

This conflict of values, as a manifestation of changes in the political system, is a matter of time and wide social transformation within a single generation; it is not a matter of one, quick political change. As long as the reformation processes are approached only in terms of the most rapid implementation of the "objective laws of the market", as long as "extra-economic" factors such as values and the will of the people are not taken into account, it can hardly be supposed that this exceptional attempt in history will be successful.

From what was said thus far we support a rather holistic and evolutionary approach to social change and consider present values as important for the development of a social system. This factor is being ignored by the present government as one of the greatest dangers to the reform.

To illustrate an evolutionary relationship between values and the general progress of a society we shall use the example of the U.S.A. We want to draw attention to the following:

1. The development of values and preferences in the U.S.A. is closely connected with the economic development and economic effectiveness of the country;
2. The mechanical transplantation of values developed in the U.S.A. in an evolutionary way during its history can be dangerous ;
3. especially in Slovakia there is a predominately Catholic tradition, rather than a Protestant one, and this has been influenced by 40 years of official propaganda for so-called communist values;
4. The history and present economic level in the U.S.A. and in the Slovak Republic are not comparable one to the other;
5. We are convinced that we would profit by the historical as well as the present day experience of developed capitalist countries, but we should not try to repeat that history in the Slovak Republic.

The Evolution of Values in the U.S.A.

The formation of so-called liberal values in the U.S.A. was greatly sustained by a Protestant work ethics which promoted diligent work habits as a way of better serving God. This was dominated by such values as modesty, virtue, humility, strength and education.

With regard to work, the Protestant work ethic is sometimes reinterpreted as "industrial theology", i.e., as a conscious reflection of the historical realities of rising capitalism. However, some voices doubt this opinion or even reject it, claiming, on the contrary, that the Protestant work ethic arose as a result of a misunderstanding of historical realities accompanying the rise of capitalism, especially the role played by poor towns people in this process. The fact that some people did not work was not understood as a consequence of historical realities, but as an unwillingness to work. This contributed to the formulation of the Protestant work ethic based on God's prescription to work. Man should work as rationally as possible in order to gain as much as

possible (self-interest). This was regarded as a realization of God's plan. In this sense work becomes both an aim in itself prescribed by God, and a way of providing for the material needs of people.

No matter what the causes bringing about the rise and development of the Protestant work ethic, undoubtedly its values became an inseparable part of the existence and development of industrial society. They provided the grounds for the "rational" way of life of capitalist societies based on work as diligent toil and seen as a confirmation of the earned position of a person in society. The "rightness" of the rational, result-oriented behavior of an individual was in great measure supported by Adam Smith's conception of the "invisible hand" and by Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian conception of human needs.

In the course of the Industrial Revolution, the scope of the traditional values of the Protestant work ethic was spread by values such as industriousness and thrift, while the accumulation of money became a profession pleasing to God. By the end of the eighteenth century, freedom in all its forms became the greatest value of the "capitalist spirit" (Max Weber) as manifested in such important documents as the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. These guaranteed the right to freedom and the right to the pursuit of individual happiness, once again a realization of self-interest for every individual citizen. Many authors assume that these are the values which helped America to become the leading country of the world and that this American "exceptionalism" is still the bearer of a message of great moral importance in the world.⁴

By the end of World War I economic development supported by the above-mentioned "liberal" values brought about further changes in the value preferences in the U.S.A. It contributed to the formation of so-called "consumerist values", which can be characterized as striving for the universal satisfaction of material needs. Preference for consumerist values was accompanied by a change in relation to work, which no longer was toil on behalf of someone else, but a means for satisfying one's own increasing need to consume. More and more Americans are demanding that work be something more than just earning a living; it must provide an increase in leisure time, satisfaction and self-fulfillment.

Most theoreticians consider contemporary liberal values (e.g., freedom of choice) to be a great achievement in the mutual coexistence of people, and contemporary consumerist values (universal satisfaction of consumers' desires) to be a logical step in the development of western civilization-though they may contain also a threat for the future. Other contemporary theoreticians claim that these changing values have decisive importance for the creation of the social order and consider them as a factor in determining the future of mankind. They take for granted the need to scrutinize the type of behavior preferred in a given society and supported by various ethical, political and other "official" public or state means. They see as leading to economic and ecologic disaster freedom of choice that implies uncontrolled satisfaction of material needs by a system of moral values and social norms, integrated within the activities of official institutions.

Therefore they advocate a return to traditional Christian values (E.F. Schumacher), or pin their hopes on a re-emergence of spiritual values (R. Rubenstein, P. Johnson, A. Toffler), or call for the creation of social control systems that would prevent the expansion of individual freedom. At the same time, they realize the unpopularity of their proposals which can be looked upon as threats to the traditional values of capitalist society, understood in a utilitarian way as freedom of choice (G.R. Funkhouser).

Theoretical Reflections of Value Problems in Economic Literature

⁴ D. Bell, "Znovu o zmerickem excepcionalizmu," *Spektrum*, 69 (1990), 9-14.

The great importance of values for building a socio-economic system is underlined in a great number of books and papers dealing with the problem of the creation of a so-called ethical economy, or conceptions of a "workfare state" appearing in the U.S.A. and Western Europe. This is in reaction to the crisis of liberal political approaches to society, to the negative consequences of joining traditional liberal values with consumerist values, and to the conception of "the welfare state" which leads also to social differentiation and everything connected with it: e.g., unemployment, increased expenditures for the social sphere, and a rise in such pathological phenomena as illiteracy, criminality, etc.

The above-mentioned attitudes call for the creation of a new socio-economic paradigm. This would be based on ethical values, to solve such problems as unemployment, inequality of incomes, and pollution of the environment; it would give priority to moral rather than economic problems.

Nearly all liberal conceptions reduce society to an economic system guided by the market. To some degree they differ among themselves in their attitude toward the functions of the state with regard to the market: elimination of imperfections within the market, breakup of monopolies, creation of artificial markets, etc. This is marked by the static view that movement is just a matter of changing the balance of the system and is caused by extra-economic factors.

It is worth mentioning that needs, as a basis of interests, are understood here in the Benthamian sense, i.e., from the standpoint of usefulness, in relation to man as a consumer (*homo economicus*). Needs other than those of the consumer are not taken into account; nature and technology also are excluded from economic analyses (the negative results of this exclusion are manifest, e.g., in the devastation of the environment).

This over 300-year-old liberal and mechanistic (R.D. Harmin) paradigm marked the industrial period characterized by an atomized attitude to the social whole in which *homo economicus* can be isolated as one of its elements in a kind of social physics. As a matter of fact, this paradigm excludes any moral considerations; it approaches the solution of political and economic problems with no ethical basis for solving technological problems. ("There is no dirty or clean money, there is just money" - V. Klaus, author of the Czechoslovak economic reform.) However, it is important to stress that this mechanistic attitude is typical not only of liberal conceptions, but of so-called central planning, as well. They are one and the same paradigm realized from two different ideological and political positions.

Many authors point out that for building a new socio-economic paradigm based upon ethical values it is necessary to reformulate the question from "how much economic growth?" to "economic growth for whom and for what?"⁵ To answer these questions presupposes a change in attitude toward treating man as a complex being with various interests, needs, values, etc., transforming man from a servant of the system into its master.

Modern Management

Some modern solutions in the field of management for practical reasons accept topical values and the wishes of the people in the marketplace, far beyond the limits of F.G. Taylor's "scientific" management. Their common denominator is a shift in preference from the "technological system" to the most progressive element of production--man. We shall look briefly at the development of Japanese and American management as an illustration that the acceptance of topical values in a particular society is closely connected with economic efficiency.

⁵ R.D. Harmin, "Ethical Economics," *Futures* (Dec. 1989), 608-618.

Development of Japanese Management

The development of Japanese management after World War II may be divided into three phases corresponding to the paternalistic, cooperative and active approaches to "human sources" which have coexisted until now.

The first of these was dominant in the first decade after World War II and led to the revitalization of the Japanese economy. Ideologically, it was based on modern family and paternalistic values, the principle of seniority in wages and promotion and life-long employment.

However, the higher training of young workers led to a conflict within the rules of seniority and to the rise of a joint labor-management consultation system as an attempt to overcome the negatives within the principle of seniority.

This intervention in the traditional social value order in relation to work brought about a search for alternative mechanisms for the mobilization and integration of workers: shop-floor, small group activities and such systems of direct participation in management as, e.g., quality control circles, quality circles, *jishu kanri*.

These forms of direct participation were connected with the so-called transmittable participation at the intermediate level of management and indirect participation at the top level, institutionalized in the labor-management joint consultation system. This gave rise to so-called cooperative management.

At the beginning of the 80s, under the influence of the development of new technologies, patterns of management cooperation began to change toward even greater cooperation between top management and workers. The need for effective adaptation of firms to the changing environment (changes in the structure of industries, changing needs and interests on the part of consumers, the development of technologies and competition, legislative changes, etc.) caused an enrichment of traditional values--the principles of seniority and collectivism were "enriched" by the principle of individualism.

Many authors suppose that for a successful revitalization of Japanese firms it is necessary to accept values related to liberal conceptions of freedom, respecting at the same time traditional paternalistic values, in order to protect the future well-being of firms and the people working in them.

The support of individualism and of the new understanding of collectivism derived from it leads to changes in views on the relation of man to work. Although Japanese management is not unified, it can be characterized by its attempt to respect the needs, wishes and abilities of the individual. This philosophy is: (1) a result of the penetration of liberal values into the value system of the Japanese, and (2) an expression of the discovery of strategies directed at activating human resources in the interest of long-term survival. This is also the core of so-called evolutionary management which virtually does not admit any sudden changes and reforms.

Contemporary American Management

We have said that there is no uniformity as far as Japanese management is concerned, the same holds true of American management. However, some characteristics are distinctive of American management.

Japanese management developed from traditional values stressing "group", subordination and principles of seniority, whereas American management was based from the very beginning on

opposite values: individualism and freedom, stressing "the better" not the senior. This manifested itself in different organization, structure and strategies in firms.

In a sense American firms behave as "free individuals" with the strategic aim of being successful in the market (achieving as great a profit as possible) and in this way standing up to the competition. According to a group of Japanese authors who, since 1979, have been systematically studying the differences and common characteristics in the organization and structure of the American and Japanese firms,⁶ Japanese firms try to cooperate for the purpose of survival (they create networks), whereas the American firms behave in the opposite way, that is, competitively, even at risk of a crash or bankruptcy. This kind of behavior is characterized by readiness for quick changes, in distinction to the Japanese model of management which can be characterized as readiness for long-run, gradual changes.

These contrasting preferences result in different ways of formulating strategies. It is typical of American firms that their strategies are formulated in a narrow, specific way by top management, whereas the Japanese strategies are formulated in a broad way by as many workers as possible (middle-up-down management).

However, in the last few years some changes have been taking place in American management. Taylor or Ford patterns of controlling work behavior of workers fit the period of industrialism, are no longer tenable today. People cannot be managed and controlled anymore; they must be given space for self-management and self-control. That is why individualism as a value is sinking from the top management to the "ground floor": people expect the system to enable them to realize their individual needs in work, e.g., self-fulfillment, participation in decision-making, etc. This results in the rise of various approaches to the worker, e.g., the signing of individual contracts which take into account specific situations in the family of the worker (a mother with children, single people, elderly people, etc.), and respect their individual requirements (e.g., various types of working hours, flexible working hours, sharing work hours and work place, training within the organization, etc.). These changes reflect also the formation of a new type of worker cooperation where hierarchical relations (superiority and subordination) play an ever smaller role and are being replaced by vertical relations of cooperation. (It is interesting that this process is accompanied by a decrease in the authority of trade unions in the U.S.A.)

Both the Japanese and the American attitudes are marked by interest in people: in the first case by interest in cooperating working groups and in the second by interest in individuals. Having realized the importance of "human resources" as the most progressive sources of production, more and more firms concentrate on satisfying the needs and interest of their employees.

Conclusion: The Case of Slovakia

We have dealt with the problems of the humanization of work in the Slovakia only marginally. This was due to the following reasons.

1. Solving problems of the humanization of work does not have any tradition either in former Czechoslovakia, or in present Slovakia, at least in the above sense.

2. Systematic empirical data is lacking from various fields of research, e.g., from studying the development of values and changes in value systems.

⁶ T. Kagono, I. Nonaka, K. Sakakibara and A. Okumura, *Strategic vs Evolutionary Management—A US-Japan Comparison of Strategy and Organization* (Amsterdam, Holland, 1989).

3. The present stage of economic and technological development has not yet provided much incentive to theoreticians to deal with these problems and for this reason there has been no proper theoretical management in Slovakia.

4. The present social aim supported by the present governing power in Slovakia is the creation of a liberal market economy; hence problems of ethics, values, humanity, etc., have only marginal importance.

Despite these reasons and some others, we suppose that in the near future Slovakia also will have to solve problems characteristic of the most developed countries in the world, which undoubtedly will include that of the "humanization of work". It is important to study in advance the preconditions and limitations of this process.

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