Community and Tradition in Global Times

Edited by
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Introduction

Denys Kiryukhin

When I started my work on a project exploring society and tradition in the era of globalization, which has been made gratefully possible with the support of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, I was more optimistic about the prospects of the modern world than I am now. Now the book is ready but I am not sure whether I have caught the general mood reflecting the thoughts of all the authors of this book. At the same time, I have no doubt that many of them, if not most, are looking at the future of our world with the same anxiety as I do. Nonetheless, it is my hope that the reader will be able to see that although these authors generally agree that the modern world is in crisis and faces problems, to which we do not have solutions, there are still grounds for hope. The hope lies in the human being itself, in its virtues, in its sense of reciprocity and ability to dialogue.

Anyone who closely follows contemporary debates on international political and economic processes may express bewilderment at the fact that texts about globalization continue to be written nowadays. At first glance, it would seem significantly timelier to refer to the death of the global, or at least a deep crisis of globalization, as many researchers are now doing. However, it is a mistake to accept that the crisis of the current model of financial globalization, which occurred after the financial collapse of 2008, signifies the death or crisis of globalization as such because globalization is not limited exclusively to the global market. Similarly, it would be a mistake to consider the growing geopolitical fragmentation of the modern world the end of the era of globalization. Behind this process, it is not a desire to close one's world off from globalization, but a perception to view the existing world order as unfair and hence to desire to rewrite the "rules of the game."

As pointed out in the present book written by philosophers from Europe, Asia and North America, globalization is the unavoidable context of modern life. For local communities and traditions, this context sets the horizon for a completely new way of existence.

Going back but a few centuries, the Age of Enlightenment came to form the foundation for two long-standing ideas that have prevailed in the theory of globalization. First, the idea of a close relationship between economic development and a fair civil-political arrangement in both the development of technology and the improvement of human morals. The collapse of communist regimes in the twentieth century and the new wave of globalization coming in its wake strengthened the belief of many that we

are witnesses the unstoppable progress in the humanist sense. However, it is obvious that technological progress is not correlative to moral development and the globalization of economic and political processes has not led to a general reduction of inequality and the widespread establishment of justice. It is for this reason that the current Pope Francis calls for the promotion of "globalization of solidarity and of the spirit" to complement technical and economic globalization.

Second, there has been a widespread understanding of globalization as a process of integrating local communities into a single global society. Nevertheless, we see that globalization is a process of both integration and fragmentation, which is quite rightly pointed out by such sociologists as Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann. It would be extremely naive to expect that, in the future, a single social universe will be formed to integrate local cultures and traditions in a single "melting pot," or, at the very least, a global political community will be formed and governed by common universal principles recognized by all. The main feature of the new (global) situation is that the world has become pluralistic forever, although the ability to live in a global world is a practical skill that we have yet to develop. In this sense, a significant part of the book is devoted precisely to the consideration of ethical norms and principles within a global context.

Svitlana Shcherbak's contribution opens Part I "People and Community" with a paper entitled "Populism in Global Times: The Revival of Community." The author seeks to trace the connection between economic, political and cultural aspects of globalization and the rise of populism. Many intellectuals see threat to national sovereignty in the processes of globalization, predicting the erosion of national cultures. This paper argues that neoliberal globalization has genuinely undermined the sovereignty of national states due to the de-politicization of the economy and transferred some state functions to international organizations.

Early theorists of neoliberal globalization imagined a global world as one maintaining the parallel co-existence of, on the one hand, the unbounded world of global economy and the world of bounded, territorial national states, on the other. Hence, globalization was thought not only to involve the spread of technology and the flow of goods and capital, but also the growth of ethnic and cultural diversity. Shcherbak emphasizes that the rise of populism is closely connected with the partial loss of sovereignty and the crisis of the national state, because these transformations contradict the normative requirement of democratic self-government, which underlies the modern democratic form of government. As the claim of populism is to speak and act in the name of the people, it appeals to the violated demand of democratic self-government. The rise of national populism in established democracies requires the restoration of national sovereignty and the revival of national communities.

In "Borders, Membership and Justice," Denys Kiryukhin discusses the forecasts that falsely predicted a global stage deprived of borders because "the modern state is gradually losing its ability to regulate social and economic processes within its fixed territorial boundaries." Today, borders are becoming significant again. For Kiryukhin, the question of borders is posed in the context of not only the state's territory but also in the problems of identity, culture and social unity which express a "trend towards re-bordering in the globalized world." This claim can be justified by the fact that political communities define their own criteria for membership and turn state borders into impregnable walls to protect their identity from immigrants.

In terms of immigration policy, Kiryukhin argues that membership policy should not be a sphere of arbitrariness on the part of the community. In the context of the unprecedented interdependence of the globalized world, borders can act not only as an instrument of protection of tradition and culture but also domination and exploitation. The author disagrees with position presented neither by nationalists, who defend the impregnability of borders, not by liberal universalism which advocates open borders. Contrary to the universalists, Kiryukhin thinks that although we have the right to determine our membership criteria and principles of immigration policy, we have obligations beyond our national communities. These obligations are related to the reality that the walls we are building should not contribute to global inequality and the economic exploitation of other communities.

In his paper "Extinction of the Welfare State: Revisiting the History of Modernization Theory," Artem Gergun focuses on the issue of global social justice. He reinterprets the theory of modernization, which may be useful for solving the problems in the crisis of the neoliberal model of the economy. The author demonstrates that the notion of the welfare state as the goal of historical development has gradually been supplanted by the theory of modernization under the influence of Francis Fukuyama. In this regard, Gergun notes that "in the 1980s-1990s a number of intellectual harbingers of the globalization era continued to promote a neoliberal formula of "advanced capitalism minus the welfare state." Henceforth, the latter was perceived not as an embodiment of modernity itself, but rather a major impediment on the path for its achievement." Thus, for most theorists and politicians, especially in the West, globalization and the development of neoliberalism have become the interrelated processes leading to a construction of a model of the global economy that generates social injustice.

Based on the ideas of Moishe Postone, Gergun shows that the era of welfare state has not sunk into oblivion and in the modern world institutions of income redistribution should be built on a global level, because

"some vision of a global welfare state remains the best defense of rationality and the Enlightenment." It is in this direction that the theory of modernization should be transformed in order to be able to correct the failures of the neoliberal model of the global market and to build a more equal and more democratic global world.

In "A New Anthropology of the Global World: From Self to Singularity," Sergii Proleiev and Victoria Shamrai look for the answer to the question, "How does the new reality of humanness appear in the global society?" They emphasize that "globalization has created and is creating a totally new reality so that we have to create a new logic in order to grasp its essence." From this standpoint, Proleiev and Shamrai criticize four approaches in understanding globalization which dominate the scientific literature, namely, the "world-system approach" (Immanuel Wallerstein), "the conception of global capitalism" (Friedrich Hayek), "cultural theory of globalization" (Roland Robertson) and "theory of world domination" (John Coleman). In contrast to these theories, the authors propose that approaching the globalized world should be a unique example of cooperation and coexistence of different communities and cultures. As a new world it is still in the process of emerging and lack of the system and sustainable guidelines.

 "The main distinctive feature of the global reality is not its community or similarity, but its internal plurality." The plurality of the world is the main resource of human development in the future insofar as it defines a new format of human existence. Proleiev and Shamray have designated the multiplicity and mobility of the global world in terms of "singularity," a term that originates in the work of mathematician John von Neumann. The regime of singularity is associated with the inclusion of modern people in different social networks, with the blurred identities and the instability of traditional communities.

The search for the normative foundations of cooperation in the new global order forms the basis for the work represented in Part II "Ethics for Global Times."

In "How are Moral Interactions Possible in Liquid Modernity?" Mariya Rohozha uses the theory of Zygmunt Bauman as characterize the current state of the world as "liquid modernity" wherein "The main characteristics of the epoch in this formulation are uncertainty, mutability, elusiveness and instability of forms." According to Rohozha, "liquid modernity" is distinguished by the dominant norms and responsibilities of a consumer society, as well as the mutual alienation and loneliness of people. People's idea of happiness is changing and has mostly reduced to hedonistic pleasure. She writes that "the contemporary direction of an individual on happiness is assigned by a hedonistic lifestyle and a factor of luck, which emphasize the contingency of 'hitting the jackpot'."

The theme of moral decline and the loss of moral guidelines is not a distinctive feature of our situation, but the traditional feeling of the past when eras change. The experience of the collapse of traditions and values can be found even amongst the ancient Greeks; therefore, we should not despair. The task is to find values and norms that will be effective in our time. Following Bauman in the search for the moral foundations of social interaction in the liquid era, Rohozha turns to the legacy of E. Levinas. She concludes that it is virtues – sacrifice, recognition of the Other as equal, trust and responsibility – that make morality possible in the modern world.

"Can Muslims retain their specificity while at the same time becoming more integrated?…Do not certain Islamic values, such as the value of Jihad, present a threat to the Westerners?" These and many other similar questions are posed by Sayed Hassan Akhlaq in a paper entitled. "Being a Muslim in Global Times: *Taqlid*, *Jihad* and *Hijra* in the Quranic Hermeneutic." He seeks answers through an analysis of important Muslims concepts such as *Taqlid*, *Jihad* and *Hijra*. Sayed Hassan Akhlaq points out that *Jihad* is not related to war as it is often interpreted in non-Islamic literature, but rather concerns efforts to preserve an individual's own integrity with "the preservation of the individual Muslim's uniqueness and agency in a given community." *Taqlid* is an act of copying, imitation, which is condemned in the Quran. As the author puts it, "the refusal of Taqlid must be remembered in Islam, because it is the rejection of conformity to a given Muslim tradition, authority or context which avoiding to terrors and violence often ensued from a blind trust in a given authority or leader." Finally, the concept of *Hijra* involves abandoning affection for old traditions and gods while, at the same time, displaying an openness to new opportunities. "In this context many scholars of Islamic ethics suggested that a true immigrant is the one who leaves sin behind."

The three concepts are closely related: the rejection of imitation (*Taqlid*) provides uniqueness, struggle (*Jihad*) allows to preserve the community and individual integrity and the ability to change (*Hijra*) enables to get rid of prejudices. According to Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, "Hijrah is thus a medium for renewal. A medium to leave Taqlid and to achieve the true meaning of Jihad." By revealing this universal and humanistic value of Islam the author demonstrates that the combination of *Taqlid*, *Jihad* and *Hijra* can become a principle of building a harmonious global world.

In "Ethics for a Global World: Rabindranath Tagore's Perspective," Asha Mukherjee sets herself the task of finding ethical principles for a global world. In her opinion, Tagore's thoughts on a global well-being based on harmony may be the basis for such an ethics. The significance of Tagore is that he demonstrates how the path from "harmony within,"

which is based on love, compassion and sympathy, leads to the establishment of harmony in the social world, as well as between the East and the West and human and nature. As Asha Mukherjee states, "love provides the most solid foundation for such a global ethics, if love is true then the rest is established without any rules." In contrast to the approach that dominates the West, Tagore offers a different vision of social relations. Using the metaphor "home and the world," Tagore shows that in fact "no one is 'outsider', the distant other is also a part of me – an extension of me." Tagore advocates unity based not on political power that homogenizes society, but on solidarity, which allows to preserve diversity. In this case, the individual's rights are basically "the right of humanity at large in totality." Such an understanding contributes to the harmonization of social relations. As Mukherjee emphasizes, Tagore's values of internationalism and humanism are quite relevant today at a time of growing religious fundamentalism, nationalism and separatism, when "national identity supersede the individual identity."

In "Revitalizing Moral Globalization: A Case for Ordinary Virtues," Anastasiia Sytnytska focuses on Michael Ignatieff's thoughts "The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World" which raises the question what moral globalization could be in the twenty-first century across the globe. Based on his empirical research through his travels in different regions of the world, Ignatieff came to the conclusion that the norms of global ethics did not contribute to the solidarity of societies; rather, globalization has even exacerbated the conflict between universal principles and local social and political practices. As a response to the current situation, Ignatieff offers an appeal to such ordinary virtues as trust, reconciliation, tolerance, resilience, reciprocity and generosity.

After analyzing Ignatieff's theory, Sytnytska argues that "we are always in an existential situation, temporally and spatially conditioned and we identify ourselves only in intersubjective interactions. In other words, in the core of moral operating systems lie the pregiven background assumptions, socio-cultural contextuality and principal subjectivity of its actors." She points out the inconsistency of Ignatieff's argument and, especially his mixing of the normative and descriptive approaches, as well as the tendency of relativism. As Sitnitskaya thinks, although in Ignatieff's theory "no key is given with regard to reasons that explain our entitlement to ordinary virtues." Ignatieff manages to describe accurately how everyday virtues act as an alternative to the universalism of human rights to protect singularity and "otherness." Ignatieff's work reveals the indifference of cosmopolitan elites "to hyper-diverse local identities with their inalienable right to speak and to be heard," as well as the declarative nature of many constitutional principles that cannot be found their embodiment in everyday life. Sitnitskaya's conclusion is that "Ignatieff presents a feasible framework of moral order-making by linking individual

moral validity with the solidaristic concern of community through ordinary virtues. He provides it with an empirical foothold by digging into both the social psychology of political discourse and sociology of moral behavior in day-to-day interactions."

Part III "(Un)Ethical Practices" examines how the practices of exchange and power are developed and transformed in the modern world.

Mikhail Minakov focuses on the phenomenon of corruption as an example of the transformation of tradition under the influence of the forces of modernization. In "Gift and Bribe: Political Ontology of Eastern European Chiasm of Modernity and Tradition." The author points out that corruption in the results of the violation of borders between the private and the public spheres because "the behavior of individuals and communities remain largely archaically motivated and contradicts the structures of the public realm." This approach allows him to consider the problem under study as a complex phenomenon generated by contradictions in the life of modern people and modern political culture.

As Minakov argues, the phenomenon of corruption is revealed in the dialectic of the gift and the bribe. The practice of giving peculiar to archaic societies is a political act "that interprets the Good in terms of recognition of the importance of the Other(s)." It indicates the possibility of a common source of politics and morality. On the other hand, what is common to modernity is the confrontation between the private and the public spheres or, more precisely, the system and the life-world in a sense of Jürgen Habermas.

During the process of the transformation of tradition into the sphere of the System, corruption destroys the balance between the private and the public. The bribe is a destruction of the tradition of the gift. Minakov concludes that "corruption ends up being the main mode of existence for human beings whose activities are aimed at taking rather than giving, appropriating goods by applying short-term strategies." Indeed, many societies with a high level of corruption have found themselves in an impasse. This applies, first and foremost, to post-Communist societies. Minakov suggests that a way out of this impasse should be sought on the path to the decentralization of political and economic activity. This should begin the public discussion on this acute problem.

"Social Credit System as a Panopticon? Surveillance and Power in the Digital Age," Yevhen Laniuk analyses how the new technologies of globalization can be used to achieve social and political goals. The author emphasizes that the influence of digital technologies is "especially profound in the sphere of power, surveillance and control, in which they not only alter or reinforce the existing power relations, but create entirely new power practices." Laniuk points out that the Social Credit System (SCS) is a good example of how information technology is used for a widespread social control in the digital age. The Chinese government has introduced

this system to control the population. In comparison with Jeremy Bentham's "panopticon" as one of the models of disciplinary power for the Modern era the author raises the question "whether digital information technologies reinforce the traditional concept of panopticon by modifying it, or create entirely new forms of surveillance, which outdates this classical concept."

After analyzing how the SCS is organized in China within a framework of Bentham and Michel Foucault's interpretation of power via the instrument of the panopticon, Laniuk demonstrates that although these devices have much in common, they possess important differences. One of the main distinctions is that in the case of SCS, the object of observation faces a dehumanized technology, which eliminates the element of compassion or reciprocity. In the system of SCS the synchronous presence of the object of observation and the observing subject is no longer required. Human life becomes less controlled by the person him/herself, but is subject to political-bureaucratic apparatus. The ability of ordinary people to influence this mode of management is rather limited, on the other. The author concludes that "China's Social Credit System offers a new type of society, in which the state-operated mega-machine of power has swallowed up the citizens' rights and replaced them with a ubiquitous discipline."

Part I
People and Community

Populism in Global Times:
The Revival of Community

Svitlana Shcherbak

Introduction: Neoliberal Globalization and Populism

Populism is a topic of discussion for many people. This topic has never left pages of the press. However, we all signify something different when we refer to populism; most of the media's talk about populism obscures rather than clarifies the essence of this phenomenon. Populism is a contested concept lack of analytical clarity. Researchers note that the high variability of phenomena is treated as populist in different parts of the world. This term is often used with negative connotations to condemn opinions deviating from the ideological mainstream or from "political normality." Nowadays, this "mainstream" encompasses both liberal and neoliberal elements, which support specific institutions and adhere to certain values, such as the condemnation of racism and other types of discrimination. It also supports the neoliberal economic policy, such as market freedom, labor flexibility and budget rigidity.

> The principles of political and cultural liberalism and a fixed conception of economic rationalism are linked together through a vague reference to 'openness', which embraces both adherence to humanist values and acceptance of neoliberal globalization.[1]

This is why, in terms of being treated as populist, protests against austerity measures or pension reform in Greece and in France, for instance, can stand alongside anti-Islam speeches.

The definition of populism remains a subject of hot debates that concern our ideas about what democracy implicitly is, what it should be and what we might expect from it. The debates are no less acute over whether populism as such is a threat to liberal democracy or rather a characteristic feature of democratic politics.

The concept of globalization is also much contested. Its complexity is due to the complexity and ambiguity of the process in its capacity to

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[1] Cathérine Colliot-Thélène, "Populism as a conceptual problem," *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy: Volume 1: Concepts and Theory*, eds. Gregor Fitzi, Jürgen Mackert and Bryan S. Turner (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 18.

embrace so many aspects of the modern world. These elements include the spread of technological innovations and scientific knowledge, the formation of the world economy, the intersection of information and flows of ideas or ideologies, the spread of representative democracies, the enlargement of the liberal international order, flows of immigration and the growth of ethnic and cultural diversity in developed countries. Many intellectuals interpret globalization as a process leading to blurring of state sovereignty,[2] because transition to a borderless economy calls into question the relevance of nation-states as meaningful units of economic activity and the ability of government to "manage."[3]

Populism has also become a global phenomenon and there is plenty of literature on populism in a wide variety of countries, from national populism in Eastern Europe to the third wave of populism in Latin America. However, populism in the European Union and the United States is the focus of researchers. First, it contradicts the prevailing consensus at the end of the 20th century of positive expectations for the future of established democracies. Second, Western societies were perceived for a long time to be the closest to the normative ideal of modernity, but the growth of populism has been taken as a menace to democracy and freedom. The most worrisome trend is the rise of popularity in the extreme right-wing parties.

Within the relevant body of literature, populism is often interpreted as a reaction to neoliberalism, which is a key feature of the current wave of globalization: "There has everywhere been an emphatic turn toward neoliberalism in political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970s."[4] Neoliberal globalization differs from previous waves insofar as it has at its root the idea of the liberal international order and neoliberal economy. Economic openness is a key element of the liberal international order since it contributes to the creation of a common economic space and enables relations of interdependence between different countries.

This neoliberal openness is complemented by the system of international institutions designed to ensure uniform rules needed for the free flow of "goods, services, capital, knowledge and (to less extent), people across borders."[5] As Milton Friedman defines this process,

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[2] Manfred B. Steger, *Globalization: A very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 70.

[3] Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (New York: The Free Press, 1995).

[4] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2-3.

[5] Joseph E Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 9.

it is the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before…Globalization means the spread of free market capitalism to virtually every country in the world. Therefore, globalization also has its own set of economic rules-rules that revolve around opening, deregulating and privatizing your economy, in order to make it more competitive and attractive to foreign investment.[6]

Quinn Slobodian shows that early theorists of neoliberal globalization imagined a global world to be like a parallel universe, which, on the one hand, has come to constitute an unbounded "world of property, where people owned things, money and land scattered across the earth" while on the other, it is a world of bounded, territorial national states.[7] These theorists believed that, in this global context, economies should be out of the control of national governments but organized in a unified space subject to uniform rules independent of the will of single states. To this end, national states are then to refuse governmental regulation of the national economy and partially transfer their functions to international institutions and organizations. This move hence implies the diminishing of national sovereignty in the name of a higher political and geographical unity.

The neoliberal idea of the world order therefore includes the creation of a unified economic space functioning in accordance with its own laws, with an international legal order that would guarantee the unhindered functioning of economy order and enclaves of national states with limited sovereignty and subject to general rules. The idea of a minimal state, or the so-called "neoliberal state," reflects precisely this idea of a state that refuses state intervention in market processes, opting instead to create the institutional and legislative framework for the market to function effectively. In fact, this vision expresses the fundamental depoliticization of the economic domain, being that it obliges the market to operate with rules set by *supranational bodies*, which operate beyond the reach of any electorate. In this sense, globalist neoliberalism is not so much a theory of market or of economics as a theory of law and the state that outlines which institutions and legislation should be applied in order that the market work freely and efficiently.[8]

In fact, such a transformation means the transfer of the center of power from politics to the economy because it is the market that becomes the basic organizing principle of society and "a system of general social

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[6] Thomas L. Friedman, *Understanding Globalization. The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999), 9.

[7] Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018), 10.

[8] Slobodian, *Globalists,* 5-13, 268.

regulations."[9] The goal of an ideal social order is individual liberty, understood primarily as freedom of economic activity and so entailing that there is no freedom outside the market.

Michael Mann notes that "neoliberalism has a vision of capitalism freed from the state – economic dominating political power, the trans-national dominating the national."[10] Neoliberals conceive the state as a sinister power posing a threat to freedom. At best, it is a "night watchman" or a policeman ensuring national security and personal freedom while, at worst, it is a monster-in-waiting run by corrupted politics. The market defends freedom and the state menaces freedom so state intervention in the economy has to be minimized as well as in personal and community life. Thus, state functions have to be reduced according to new legal norms and regulation seeking the maintenance of order.

Such an interpretation of the state leads to the splitting of freedom and democracy and to the depoliticization of democracy. Nadia Urbinati points out that liberalism postulates the duality of *individual liberty and political participation*; if the former is fundamental and principled, then the latter is instrumental.[11] Even if the right to fundamental liberty can be guaranteed equally to everyone, this equality does not apply to political participation, for the latter is not required to be distributed equally for fundamental liberty to exist. Identification of liberty with private freedom and negative "freedom from interference" leads to distancing from political participation, which entails that politics becomes merely a matter of efficient governance. Furthermore, if it is assumed that, in a difficult situation, only a few competent officials can make the right decisions, then democratic self-governance is effectively replaced by technocratic management in some domains.

> The recent substitution of elected executives with technocratic ones in some European countries is indicative of the pervasive belief that democratically elected institutions are incapable of achieving, or too slow in making, rational policy decisions in the domain of finance and the economy. Thus, they are judged destabilizing factors.[12]

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[9] Alain de Benoist, "Hayek: A Critique," *Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary* 110 (1998), 77.

[10] Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 4: *Globalizations, 1945-2011* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 130.

[11] Nadia Urbinati, *Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the People* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2014), 72.

[12] *Ibid.*, 83.

This is not to claim that the neoliberal theorists of the global world order have opposed democracy because, for them, democracy is a convenient way of ensuring the legitimacy of power. In reality, they are critical of both national self-determination and state sovereignty in view of the fact that "nations must remain embedded in an international institutional order that safeguarded capital and protected its right to move through the world."[13] Friedrich Hayek vigorously criticizes majority rule and openly claims that liberalism is only conditionally compatible with democracy.[14] Majority rule can be a menace to economic freedom and civil liberties. More recently, a paper published by Farid Zakaria on illiberal democracies and liberal dictatorships expresses quite the same logic.[15]

Does this framework reflect the general logic of globalization in the last decades of the 20th century? The answer is yes rather than no. The creators of certain international organizations such as the WTO or GATT have been guided by the neoliberal vision of an ideal global world to strive to realize its principles.[16] The globalization process itself is by no means reduced in terms of how neoliberals have imagined it. Instead, the conceptual framework proposed by Arjun Appadurai allows us to consider globalization as a complex process of interaction between various flows linking different points of the world – the local to the global, the North to the South and the West to the East.[17] The result is not only the diffusion of technology amidst the flow of goods and capital, but the growth of ethnic and cultural diversity, especially inside developed countries.

Appadurai shows how imagination works in the modern globalized world in terms of creating deterritorialized identities and communities. He proposes that the delimitation be carried out not along the "global-local" line, but along the "territorial-deterritorialized" line because the reproduction mechanisms of cultural group identity go beyond the borders of nation-states. As a consequence, within the framework of previously closed territorial communities, enclaves of other communities are created differing in terms of their ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic characteristics. The upshot is that the classical nation-state, which was based on the isomorphism of population, territory and legitimate sovereignty, is fundamentally changing.

New complex, non-territorial and post national forms of identity are hence arising, being separated from the nation-state and going beyond its

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[13] Slobodian, *Globalists,* 9.

[14] de Benoist, "Hayek: A Critique," 86-87.

[15] Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (1997), 22-43, https://doi.org/10.2307/20048274.

[16] Slobodian, *Globalists*, 23-26, 223.

[17] Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

borders. For instance, the Ukrainian diaspora of the USA and Canada have influenced the political situation in Ukraine significantly since gaining independence in 1991. Being outside of civil and territorial affiliation with the Ukraine nation-state, diaspora members have promoted their vision of the national Ukrainian idea, along with a policy of memory, culture and citizenship. Appadurai qualifies such cases as "delocalized transnations" and argues that we are witnessing a transition to a post national political order:

> The term post national…has several implications….The first is temporal and historical and suggests that we are in the process of moving to a global order in which the nation-state has become obsolete and other formations for allegiance and identity have taken its place. The second is the idea that what are emerging are strong alternative forms for the organization of global traffic in resources, images, and ideas – forms that either contest the nation-state actively or constitute peaceful alternatives for large-scale political loyalties. The third implication is the possibility that, while nations might continue to exist, the steady erosion of the capabilities of the nation-state to monopolize loyalty will encourage the spread of national forms that are largely divorced from territorial states.[18]

This picture is far from how the early theorists of the neoliberal world order imagined the global world. It contradicts the classical conceptions of the national states which in no way involved mobile and reterritorialized forms of sovereignty. Appadurai speaks in this regard of "translocal solidarities, cross-border mobilizations and post national identities."[19] Other scholars refer to a "global civil society" as a separate area of transnational civic activity, the emergence of which is associated with reduced state presence in the social and economic domains and which differs from the state systems and the global market.[20] They argue that the boundaries of national communities are blurred, which diminishes the significance of the nation-state in its classical form and of the assumed "normality" of party politics.

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[18] *Ibid*., 169.
[19] *Ibid*., 166.
[20] Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993); Alejandro Colás, *International Civil Society: Social Movements in World Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Amitai Etzioni, "The Capabilities and Limits of the Global Civil Society," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 2 (2004), 341-353, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298040330020401.

The populist wave taking place all over the world is often considered in connection with the consequences of neoliberal globalization. Some researchers tend to explain the rise of populism solely in terms of economic factors. In the literature on the "political economy of populism," the following factors are listed: (1) the severity of the Great Recession; (2) the growth of inequality both global and inside of countries; (3) deindustrialization due to the transfer of production to the low-cost countries; (4) waves of immigration to developed countries; (5) a concomitant increase of unemployment and lower wages because of the weakening of labor legislation and the pressure from the global labor market; and (6) neoliberal austerity measures alongside the reduction of social protection.[21] Branko Milanović shows that globalization has been least beneficial for the lower and middle layers of the middle class of the rich part of the world; that is, those who make up the majority in Western countries.[22] The growth of inequality is one of the most important factors because it affects the social structure of societies, which contributes to the erosion of a wide layer of the middle class that traditionally constitutes the true foundation of liberal democracy.

Due to the transfer of the center of state power to the economy and the emergence of new centers of power, beyond any formal constraints or anybody's control – such as international financial organizations and TNCs – national governments have lost the capability to resolve many important problems of society. Hence, a certain menace to democracy from the global economy has arisen or as what Dani Rodrik has called it "the fundamental political trilemma of the world economy: we cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination and economic globalization."[23] Globalization erodes the sovereignty of democratic nation-states, by increasingly subjecting them to economic and financial forces that may be contrary to the wishes of the domestic majority. Decisions are increasingly being made by non-majority regulatory institutions and technical experts who are not accountable to the electorate.

It is the case for many governments that they can no longer determine economic policies on their own in terms of redistributing resources and meeting public needs. Control over financial institutions is now beyond the reach of many states, this has accounted for significant changes in traditional politics and the role of political parties. It is notable that left and right alternatives have moved to the center, which entails that no matter

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[21] Petar Stankov, *Economic Freedom and Welfare Before and After the Crisis* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 136-139. Branko Milanović, *Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2016), 180-210.

[22] Milanović, *Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization*, 194-204.

[23] Dani Rodrik, *The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of World Economy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), XVIII.

what party comes to power, it will have only a limited effect on economic policy. These changes concern citizens directly in reference to the financing of their health care or education or social security, because voters have no corresponding opportunity to influence the political course, no matter what parties they cast their votes for.[24] It makes people feel that their life is controlled by foreign forces, distant and non-democratic. Some scholars interpret this situation as erosion of "the social contract that had previously ensured crucial political support for the order."[25] Democratic institutions are becoming hollow and formalized, losing their traditional meaning and their ability to control capital.

Democracy is a fundamental regulatory requirement in modern society and a basic condition for the legitimacy of power from the normative point of view. Lincoln's words "Government of the people, by the people, for the people" are often cited as a democratic formula in expressing the widespread idea that popular self-government is the most proper form of government. The Pew Research Center study shows that representative democracy remains the preferable form of government for almost all the countries that they have sampled:

> In every nation polled, more than half said democracy is a very or somewhat good way to run their country, despite of openness, into varying degrees, to some nondemocratic forms of government.[26]

Other scientists[27] point out that the leading role in the growth of right-wing populism involves cultural rather than economic factors. They draw attention to the fact that populist voters

> are profoundly concerned about immigration and rising ethnic and cultural diversity and they feel threatened by immigrants and Muslims. These feelings of threat do not stem simply from economic grievances, such as competition over scarce goods like jobs and social housing. More accurately, they appear to stem from a belief that immigrants, minority groups and rising

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[24] Peter Mair, *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy* (London and New York: Verso, 2013), 45-70.

[25] Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, "The Liberal Order is Rigged. Fix It Now or Watch It Wither," *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 3 (2017), 3.

[26] John Gramlich, "How Countries around the World View Democracy, Military Rule and Other Political Systems," *Pew Research Center* (October 30, 2017), https:// www.pew research.org/fact-tank/2017/10/30/global-views-political-systems/?fbclid =IwAR0HobLyGmkOM6lZ8F3aoqDM-adKXSYPPcXRooCgmqXnAkPocQ6uKG oPY.

[27] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

cultural diversity are threatening the national culture, community and way of life.[28]

I share the point of view of those authors[29] who believe that the causes of such a powerful phenomenon cannot lie in just one aspect of social life; in other words, economic, political and cultural factors are closely interconnected, which means that populism did not begin with the 2008 crisis but has a long history. Populism is connected with the history of modern state as such and the current wave of populism is a consequence of the transformation of nation-states under the regime of neoliberal globalization, which has resulted in the partial loss of sovereignty and problems arisen with democratic self-government. To explain and argue for this standpoint, we first need to clarify what we mean by populism.

Debates over the Definition of Populism

As the above has already underlined, populism is a contested concept owing to the lack of analytical clarity. It is difficult to bring this concept under a common denominator in terms of the variety of empirical cases dealing with parties, ideologies, movements and leaders. However, there is a common consensus in the comparative literature that, as a phenomenon, populism is controversial, fluid, culturally related and contextually dependent.

In the literature on populism, it is defined as political rhetoric and a political style (Michael Kazin, Pierre-André Taguieff), a political strategy (Kurt Weyland, Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts), a shortsighted macroeconomic policy (Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards), an ideology (Margaret Canovan, Ben Stanley, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser) and an identity policy (Ernesto Laclau, Jan-Werner Müller). It has also been characterized as a political discourse (Ernesto Laclau, Yannis Stavrakakis, Benjamin de Cleen, Chantal Mouffe), or a discursive frame (Paris Aslanidis), or a discursive and stylistic repertoire (Rogers Brubaker). Finally, populism has been viewed as the conception and form of power (Nadia Urbinati, Jan-Werner Müller) or a type of regime (Takis S. Pappas).

The definition of populism as a political strategy, "through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct,

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[28] Matthew Goodwin, "Right Response. Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe," *Chatham House* (September 1, 2011), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/178301.

[29] Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, *National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy* (London: Pelican, 2018), XX-XXIII.

unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly un-organized followers,"[30] is too narrow. Emerging from the political studies of Latin American populism, it provides for the mandatory presence of a populist leader. In fact, this conception does not contradict other ap-proaches but is easily combined with them in empirical studies.[31] Al-though the presence of a leader is not the key feature of populism, the leader's role is still significant in mobilizing the masses and representing the discontent and expectations of the "silent majority."

The interpretation of populism as an ideology is based on the "mor-phological approach" of Michael Freeden, who treats ideologies as a con-ceptual map of the political world.[32] According to Freeden, ideologies have a threefold structure of basic, related and peripheral concepts. For instance, the main idea of liberalism is freedom, while human rights, de-mocracy and equality are related to the core, but nationalism is on the periphery. "Thick-centered" or "full" ideologies, hence, provide a com-prehensive map of almost the entire political world, featuring a high in-ternal integrity and a rich core. "Thin-centered" ideologies have a re-stricted core and low internal integrity, but they offer a certain perspective on the social world. Thin ideologies embrace a range of political concepts including ecologism, nativism, nationalism, anti-Semitism, feminism, etc. The conceptual framework proposed by Freeden has turned out to be quite suitable for understanding populism.

In his 2004 article "The Populist Zeitgeist," Cas Mudde proposed a new definition of populism based on the morphological approach of Mi-chael Freeden. Mudde defines populism as a "thin-centered"

> ideology that divided society into two homogeneous and antag-onistic groups: 'the pure people' on the one side and 'the corrupt elite' on the other and populism argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale [general will] of the peo-ple.[33]

"The people" and "elites" are groups whose definition varies from one populist movement to another. These categories are not so much socio-

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[30] Kurt Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics," *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 1 (2001), 4, https://doi.org/10.2307/42 2412.

[31] Bart Bonikowski, and Noam Gidron, "Multiple Traditions in Populism Research: To-ward a Theoretical Synthesis," *American Political Science Association (APSA) Compar-ative Politics Section Newsletter 'Symposium: Populism in a Comparative Perspective'* 26, no. 2 (2019), 9, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.287 5372.

[32] Michael Freeden, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2-3.

[33] Cas Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist," *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 4 (2004), 543, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.

logical or political as normative categories where the people are good and elites are bad.

> Populism presents a Manichean outlook, in which there are only friends and foes. Opponents are not just people with different priorities and values, they are evil! Consequently, compromise is impossible, as it 'corrupts' the purity.[34]

Mudde's definition is now one of the most accepted in the literature on populism. Many scholars recognize anti-pluralism, anti-elitism and appeals to the "will of the people" qua the main features of populism. As for other substantive features, such as the presence of a charismatic leader or a direct relationship between the leader and the people, these accompany and underline rather than define the phenomenon of populism. The same is true for the elements that would connect populism to a specific social or economic policy. Some researchers of, in particular, the Latin American type of populism have defined it as a short-sighted macroeconomic policy which is needed only for election goals and ultimately doing more harm than good.[35] However, after the explosion of neoliberal populism in South America in the 1980s, the economic definition is not considered significant. We could take the example of second-wave populists in Latin America. They, led by the IMF, carried out neoliberal reforms by notably using the same strategies of vertical mobilization of the masses and anti-elitist rhetoric as the first wave populists did in pursuing an import substitution industrialization.[36] Right-wing parties like the Alternative for Germany or Austria's Freedom Party have also promoted neoliberal economic programs.[37]

Some scientists argue that the definition of populism *as* ideology proposed by Mudde is also too narrow, because it excludes from the focus of attention a certain number of phenomena to be considered manifestations of populism. It ignores stylistic and rhetorical features of populism, its mobilization potential, organizational forms of populist movements and parties. Besides, this definition involves understanding of populism as a simplified view of the social world. Therefore, in practice, researchers un-

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[34] *Ibid*., 544.

[35] Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, eds., *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Kirk A. Hawkins and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, "The Ideational Approach to Populism," *Latin American Research Review* 52, no. 4 (2017), 513-528, http://doi.org/1025222/larr.85.

[36] Olga V. Varentsova, "Three Waves of Populism in Latin America," *MGIMO Review of International Relations* 6, no. 39 (2014), 153-160 (in Russ.).

[37] Quinn Slobodian and Dieter Plehwe, "Neoliberals against Europe," *Mutant Neo-Liberalism: Market Rule and Political Rupture*, eds. William Callison and Zachary Manfredi (New York: Fordham University Press, 2020), 104-105.

wittingly attribute more coherence to populism, but assume that the political actor either supports populist ideology or not.

The alternative is a discursive approach serving as a more convenient and useful way to interpret populism "not as a constitutive ideology, but rather as a frame through which other kinds of political claims, from those on the far left to those on the far right, can be expressed."[38] Given the heterogeneity of populist manifestations, the discursive approach enables researchers to "capture the discursive, rhetorical and stylistic commonalities that cut across substantively quite different forms of politics."[39] Here, Rogers Brubaker speaks of a discursive-stylistic turn in the study of populism. From this standpoint, we can analyze the degree and frequency of the use of populist rhetoric, so considering populism as a partial phenomenon instead of an essential characteristic: "Populism is thus a matter of degree, not a sharply bounded phenomenon that is either present or absent."[40] Moreover, some elements of the populist repertoire can also be considered part of another repertoire and can so be included in other discourses, which is why the key characteristic of populism is not the presence of a specific single element, but a combination of elements.

The discursive approach defines populism as a special type of discourse that claims to express the interests of the people, opposing the associated identities and political demands that make up the "will of the people" to a (some) illegitimate "elite."[41] Alternatively, as a discursive frame broadly designating "an anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign People,"[42] Brubaker gives an even broader definition to populism, describing it as a "discursive and stylistic repertoire."[43] Such a broad definition allows inclusion of a much larger number of phenomena in the resulting analysis; the consequence here is that any political practice, party, movement, figure or regimes can be analyzed for the presence of populist elements. Moreover, Brubaker refuses to formulate strict logical criteria for determining populism, but instead uses Wittgenstein's metaphor of "family resemblance," that is, a complex system of similarities overlapping and intersecting one way or another.[44] Hence, a discursive

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[38] Bonikowski and Gidron, "Multiple Traditions in Populism Research: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," 10.

[39] Rogers Brubaker, "Why Populism?" *Theory and Society* 46 (2017), 360, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-017-9301-7.

[40] *Ibid.*, 360.

[41] Benjamin de Cleen, "Populism and Nationalism," *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, eds. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 345-346.

[42] Paris Aslanidis, "Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective," *Political Studies* 64, no. 15 (2016), 96, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12224.

[43] Brubaker, "Why Populism?" 367.

[44] *Ibid.*, 361.

approach emphasizes the procedural and contextual nature of populism and its ability to transform depending on circumstances and agenda.

It is worth mentioning that, in their later papers, Mudde and Hawkins and Kaltwasser emphasize the proximity of ideological and discursive approaches and even combine them into one ideational approach. By doing so they interpret ideologies and, accordingly, populism as forms of discourse.[45]

Populism from the Point of View of Normative Democratic Theory

Many more heated debates are now in progress addressing whether populism is a threat or a correction to liberal democracy. Some scientists argue that populism can constitute both an antagonistic force with regard to liberal democracy and the compatibility with the democratic process. Populism can correct the policies of liberal elites who have over-distanced themselves from the people and have forgotten the fundamental ideal of popular sovereignty.[46] However, others see populism as a deadly threat to representative democracy and a constant danger that does not correct but distorts democracy.[47]

Discussions about populism and liberal democracy are ultimately motivated by different approaches to the normative concept of democracy. Though all modern liberal democracies have both liberal and democratic components, a fundamental difference does persist between liberalism and democracy in the modern world, as liberalism is not a natural outgrowth of the process of democratization.[48] In his well-known study of the various models of democracy, Robert Dahl observes that the fundamental principles of democracy are those of political equality, popular sovereignty and majority rule.[49]

However, unlimited majority rule may pose a certain threat to those who, according to certain criteria, are in the minority. This applies primarily to elites who may face requirements for redistribution. In modern liberal democracies, popular components are complemented by liberal

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[45] Hawkins and Kaltwasser, "The Ideational Approach to Populism," 513-514. Cas Mudde, "Populism: An Ideational Approach," *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, eds. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 29-33.

[46] Benjamin Arditi, "Populism as an Internal Periphery of Democratic Politics," *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, ed. Francisco Panizza (London: Verso, 2005), 92-93.

[47] Jan-Werner Müller, *What Is Populism?* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 103. Nadia Urbinati, *Me the People: How Populism Transforms Democracy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2019), 16.

[48] T.F. Rhoden, "The Liberal in Liberal Democracy," *Democratization* 22, no. 3 (2015), 573, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.851672.

[49] Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), 34.

ideas that combine constitutionalism (the checks and balances system) and the rule of law (protection of individual and minority rights). According to Dahl, there is a certain internal tension between liberal and popular components. Liberal principles are designed to limit the power of the majority and guarantee individual freedom, while the democratic principle of political equality implies equal access of citizens to political participation and their corresponding opportunity to influence the direction of public policy.

From the normative point of view, the political will resulting from the democratic process should be limited by liberal principles. Put differently, democracy protects the individual from coercion and the abuse of power on the one hand while, on the other, he or she is protected from democracy by the rights and privileges that liberalism provides to the individual. In other words, liberal democracy makes all forms of non-popular rule illegitimate while simultaneously creating a network of restrictions on the political will of the majority; these are indeed the restrictions that protect people from the "tyranny of the majority." In this sense, the system of checks and balances, the rule of law, human rights and the rights of various kinds of minorities, from linguistic to sexual, are at the center of liberal democracy because they impose restrictions on the "general will."[50]

This basic framework allows different definitions of democracy. According to the minimalist concept, empirically speaking, democracy is simply "a system in which incumbents lose elections and leave office when the rules so dictate."[51] It is so-called "electoral democracy," which involves a certain set of civil liberties necessary for democratic participation and competitiveness to have real meaning. At the same time, the concepts of electoral democracy do not refer directly to the provision of fundamental liberties and do not try to include them in the real criteria of democracy.[52] In contrast, the concepts of liberal (or representative) democracy place a precise emphasis on ensuring rights and freedoms, which are sometimes interpreted very broadly. From the point of view of electoral democracy, a form of government will remain a democracy. Even if it is a bad one where, for instance, the rights and freedoms of minorities are violated, elections and the rotation of power continue to be held.[53]

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[50] Robert B. Talisse, *Democracy after Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics* (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), 6.

[51] Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 54.

[52] Larry Jay Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (1996), 21-22, https://doi.org/doi:10.1353/jod.1996.0047.

[53] Takis S. Pappas, *Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 31-35.

The detachment of the principles of liberalism and democracy, to keep them separate if still related, allows populism to be interpreted as a movement towards the democratic pole of liberal democracy; in other words, populism can be defined as *a democratic anti-liberalism within a liberal democracy*. Margaret Canovan points out that populism contains a conceptual core that refers specifically to the "popular component" of liberal democracy: "democracy, popular sovereignty, the people understood as a collectivity with a common will and a majority rule."[54] Populism refers to the basic principles of democracy, for it promises a better world due to the return of power to people:

> From the Levellers to the Chartists, from 'People Power' in the Philippines to the students of Tiananmen Square, those who struggled for democracy have always believed that what was at stake was a new beginning.[55]

In criticizing populism, researchers tend to focus on the problem of the general will, which is the basic element of democratic discourse closely connected with the principle of popular self-government. In this relationship, populism is treated as a sharp critic of the liberal restrictions imposed on the general will or as an "illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism"[56] that challenges liberal democracy in the name of democracy.

Canovan argues that in populism the main characteristic of "the people" is unity.[57] Populism claims to speak and act on behalf of the people as a "whole" and insists that democracy is government in accordance with the unified will of the people rather than an outcome of agreements and compromises. In other words, populism neglects democratic proceduralism. It turns "the people" from an agglomeration of individuals or groups with different, if sometimes conflicting, interests into an integrity or a certain essence with clearly defined boundaries in a continuously existing "corporate body" which expresses common interests and a general will. In this sense, populism implicitly resorts to the organic metaphor of "the people," contrasting it as a single unit with its "Other." This construction involves a clear dividing line between those who belong to "the people" and those who are beyond its borders, thus creating the prerequisites for

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[54] Margaret Canovan, "Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy," *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, eds. Yves Meny and Yves Surel (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 33.

[55] *Ibid.*, 31.

[56] Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 116.

[57] Canovan, "Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy," 34.

exclusion of the "others" from the imaginary unity of the people. In this sense, *populism is primarily anti-pluralism*.

Jan-Werner Müller also places an emphasis on the anti-pluralist aspect of populism. In populism, he emphasizes not so much an appeal to the "will of the people" as its appeal to morality. In populist rhetoric, "the people" and its "Other" (elites or minorities) are constituted in essentially moral categories of "good" and "evil":

> Populism…is a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified…people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior.[58]

Indeed, according to Müller, populism is a set of ideas that, in general, can be described as a moralized form of anti-pluralism. As such, populism has nothing to do with democracy nor with the principle of majoritarianism in particular, since it is, in fact, a form of identity politics. In claiming that they alone are the true representatives of the people, populists introduce an exclusive concept of the people, one that defines the clear boundaries of a morally pure, good people and dismisses everyone beyond these boundaries as a moral "evil." According to this view, the most threatening and unacceptable is right-wing populism. However, left-wing populism is also dangerous because any populism coming to power sets about changing the political system and constitution, distorting democracy. Under the auspices of the will of the people, populists restrict the activity of the opposition in order to prevent its rise to power; meanwhile, the courts fall under the control of the executive branch and freedom of speech becomes limited. Similar changes took place even in modern Eastern European countries, such as Poland or Hungary, not to mention the Latin American countries of the second half of the twentieth century.

In fact, Müller and some other researchers insist that only liberal democracy is democracy itself and that the expression "liberal democracy" is a pleonasm because "democracy without individual liberty – political and legal – cannot exist."[59] They reject the minimalist concept of electoral democracy and define populism as internally anti-democratic because democracy turns into a fiction when it does not ensure individual freedom and a pluralism of opinion and does not recognize the possible conflict between individual interests (Nadia Urbinati, Jürgen Habermas, Jan-Wer-

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[58] Müller, *What Is Populism?*, 19-20.

[59] Jürgen Habermas, "Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?" *Political Theory* 29, no. 6 (2001), 767, https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591701029006002.

ner Müller). As Canovan notes, the desire to achieve social unity in a frag-mented and controversial society and to build politics as if "the people" were in fact a single whole, that is to eliminate conflict and pluralism from politics, is a project seeking to reproduce the forces completely extrinsic to liberal democracy.[60]

Nadia Urbinati also places an emphasis on anti-pluralism qua the basic feature of populism.[61] She develops normative democratic theory, defining democracy as diarchy, in which "will" ("the right to vote and the procedures and institutions that regulate the making of authoritative deci-sions") and "opinion" (the extra institutional domain of political judg-ments) "influence each other and cooperate without merging."[62] Accord-ing to Urbinati, populism distorts representative democracy because its essence is the intention to eliminate pluralism from the sphere of opinion and to form a single narrative in order to present it as the embodiment of the "general will." In addition, populism seeks to merge the will with opinion in trying to establish a direct transition from the opinion to polit-ical will.

Considering populism as a form of government, Urbinati emphasizes that populism arises *within* democracy, seeking to replace representative democracy with a populist equivalent. Populism does not exclude repre-sentation and constitutionalism but transforms them, by attempting to use democratic tools to build a collective subject on the basis of voluntary consent and to change the social order on behalf of the interests of the people. Populism then seeks to replace parliamentary representation with direct democracy where one leader or party personifies the unified "gen-eral will" of the people.[63] Changes of this kind have occurred, for exam-ple, in Poland after the party "Law and Justice" came to power, or in Hun-gary during the premiership of Victor Orban.

In this sense, however, not every appeal to "the people" can be qual-ified as populism,[64] rather one should make a distinction between populist rhetoric, grassroots protest movements and populism as "a conception and a form of power within a democracy system."[65] If the former are con-sistent with the nature of representative democracy, the latter leads to

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[60] Canovan, "Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy," 41.

[61] Urbinati, *Democracy Disfigured*, 131-137.

[62] *Ibid.*, 2.

[63] Urbinati, *Me The People*, 23, 103-112.

[64] Müller, *What Is Populism?*, 28-31.

[65] Urbinati, *Democracy Disfigured,* 130.

verticalization of political consent, which inaugurates a deeper unification of the masses under an organic narrative and a charismatic or Caesarist leader personating it.[66]

After taking power, populism tends to "centralization of power, weakening of checks and balances, strengthening of the executive, disregard of political oppositions, and transformation of election in a plebiscite of the leader."[67] It uses state authority to punish and discriminate against minorities and replaces pluralism with the rigid polarization of "we-they" in a denial of this very same pluralism. Populism thus can change regimes from democratic to authoritarian, dictatorial or fascist in the long run.

The Problem of Defining "The People"

Such an interpretation raises certain objections and concerns related to the fact that it is difficult to imagine democratic politics without a type of political discourse that would "call upon and designate the people."[68] Every anti-populist discourse demonizing populism ends with the marginalization of "the people" and its demands. Peter Mair shows that the modern theory of democracy seeks to rethink democracy in a fashion that would not require any significant emphasis on popular sovereignty to create, "at the extreme, the projection of a kind of democracy without the demos at its center."[69] He argues that when, at the end of the 20th century, democracy broke up into its constitutional and popular components in established democracies, it was the popular component that gradually lost its position.

Given the decline of leftist movements then, it is now populist actors who give voice to the groups that feel their opinions are not being heard.[70] After all, the "majority" does not necessarily threaten the rights and freedoms of religious, linguistic or ethnic minorities as population groups are located horizontally in relation to the "majority." The "majority" can also protest against child labor and poor working conditions, demand affordable healthcare or education for their children and require lower taxes or an increase in the minimum wage. In this case, "the people" consolidates

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[66] *Ibid.,* 131.

[67] *Ibid.,* 129.

[68] Yannis Stavrakakis, "The Return of 'the People': Populism and Anti-Populism in the Shadow of the European Crisis," *Constellations* 21, no. 4 (2014), 506, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12127.

[69] Mair, *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy*, 9.

[70] Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, "Populism vs. Constitutionalism? Comparative Perspectives on Contemporary Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States," *The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society* (2013), 1, https://www.fljs.org/files/publications/Kaltwasser.pdf.

vertically, while the "lower classes" are united against the "upper." Failure to represent the interests and demands of the "silent majority" leads to the strengthening of elites and, ultimately, to the deterioration of the quality of democracy.

In this regard, populism can serve as a tool for mobilizing the masses within a political struggle. It is not by chance Ernesto Laclau identifies populism with politics in the sense of political contestation rather than administrative policies, as it put "into question the institutional order by constructing an underdog as an historical agent, i.e., an agent which is an other in relation to the way things stand."[71] According to Laclau, populism is not an ideology but a process or a "social logic." The construction of unity is at the same time the construction of an identity that cannot be circumvented or reduced. The populist form contrasts "the people" and "the authority," but both remain empty signifiers, empty vessels, whose content depends on the characteristics of the political context and the cultural instruments applied.

The concept of "the people" in its polysemy can be included in populist or nationalist foreign policy discourse. Brubaker[72] identifies three main meanings of the concept of "the people," which can be constituted as

- *plebs* (the underdog strata of the population opposed to the elites);
- *demos* (the sovereign people, whose power must be resumed);
- *bounded community* (moral, cultural, linguistic, religious or political community, which must be protected). Here populist discourse intersects widely with its nationalist equivalent, opposing those who belong to "the people" and those who are excluded.

Due to the polysemy of "the people," some researchers emphasize the emancipatory potential of populist discourse in the democratic representation of marginalized groups standing against repressive and unaccountable power structures (Ernesto Laclau, Yannis Stavrakakis, Chantal Mouff, Benjamin de Cleen). They have hence sought to "purify" populist discourse, clearly separating it from other types of discourse – notably, nationalist discourse – in order to apply the concept of "populism" exclusively to mass protest movements. They recognize the risks of populism upon which liberal theorists have focused because

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[71] Ernesto Laclau, "Populism: What's In a Name?" *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, ed. Francisco Panizza (London: Verso, 2005a), 47.

[72] Rogers Brubaker, "Populism and Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 26, no. 1 (2020), 56, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12522.

even genuine popular grievances and demands can end-up being represented by illiberal and anti-democratic forces or becoming hostages of authoritarian institutional dynamics.[73]

That is why Yannis Stavrakakis and Benjamin de Cleen turn to Laclau to provide a clear distinction between populist and nationalist discourse, or between "inclusive" and "exclusive" populism.

In inclusive populism, "the people" remains an "empty signifier" without a fixed signified, while exclusive populism refers to a phantasmatic transcendental signified (race, nation, etc.). Hence, the line dividing the political space in inclusive populism runs along the "top-bottom" axis, where the top is the elite and the bottom is plebs, which represents the interests of underdogs in confrontation with the elites. In other words, inclusive populist discourse constructs "the people" as political agent, building it along the "top-bottom" axis, which is open for the inclusion of anyone regardless of his or her religion or ethnicity. In contrast, exclusive populism builds a horizontal dichotomy along the "friend-foe" axis, being a part of nationalist discourse.

With this distinction, populism reflects and expresses egalitarian tendencies and is an integral part of democratic politics. Populist discourse concentrates discontent and protest feelings, constructing the mass as a temporary unity, without any political class or "objective" social group behind it. Thus, in identifying populism with the manifestation of genuine democracy, Stavrakakis and Cleen exclude from it nationalist, xenophobic parties and movements and only consider grassroots protest movements like Occupy Wall Street as genuinely populist. In contrast, those who see populism as a menace to liberal democracy exclude movements like Occupy Wall Street from the category, instead identifying populism with the right-wing xenophobic parties. This is an important point for it testifies to the intrinsic ambiguity of populism.

We can agree with Brubaker that populist discourse is not a one-dimensional style, rigidly structured by the vertical opposition between the "people" and the "elite," but at least two-dimensional, covering both the space of inequality (economic, political and cultural) and the space of disagreement (cultural, value, lifestyle, etc.).[74] In this connection Brubaker points out that the definition of populism proposed by Mudde is too minimalistic because it focuses solely on the vertical opposition between "the

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[73] Yannis Stavrakakis, "Three Challenges in Contemporary Populism Research," *Social Europe* (May 22, 2018), https://www.socialeurope.eu/three-challengesincontemporary-populism-research.

[74] Brubaker, "Populism and Nationalism," 58.

people" and the "elites" and neglects the horizontal opposition between "the people" and external groups or forces.[75]

In practice, nationalist and populist discourse intersect due to the ambivalence of appeal to "the people." Moreover, in its dichotomy, the horizontal opposition can be both external ("the people" as an internal unity opposed to an external enemy) and internal ("the genuine people" and internal enemies, "fifth column"). The combination of nationalist and populist discourse is indeed inherent to many European right-wing populist parties and movements, such as Alternative für Deutschland, Front National or Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party). As Eatwell and Goodwin argue, national populism combining anti-elite and nationalist rhetoric now dominates Europe.[76]

I suppose that the ambiguity inherent to populism is connected not only with ambiguity of the concept of "the people," but to the fact that populism refers to the idea of democratic self-government, which is the basic normative demand of modern democracy. Canovan points this out when referring to the "democratic ideology," which appeals to the unity of the people and the general will. Criticism of populism focuses precisely on the anti-pluralism inherent in it. However, even if we leave aside the question of the formation of the general will, the concept of popular self-government implies two key questions: (1) Who belongs to the people? (2) How is self-government implemented? In other words, every nation should determine how this notion of "the people" is defined, who composes it and who has the right to participate in self-government and for what justification? What are the procedures and mechanisms acting in the formation of the ruling elite; what are the functions and powers of the government; and, as a consequence, how are the governors and the governed interconnected? Both right-wing and left-wing populism deal with the problems of democratic self-governance and both their rhetoric addresses these issues. Nationalist discourse is an integral part of populist discourse as the latter deals with the question of the line of demarcation and the boundary between "those who belong to the demos – and therefore have equal rights – and those who, in the political domain, cannot have the same rights because they are not part of the demos."[77]

The problem of liberal criticism of populism is that it raises the question of equality not in political terms, but in the liberal key, appealing to the principle of individual freedom and rights. Right-wing populists are then accused of rejecting the principle of human equality because they are

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[75] Rogers Brubaker, "Why Populism?" *Theory and Society* 46 (2017), 362, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-017-9301-7.

[76] Eatwell and Goodwin, *National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy*, IX–XXV.

[77] Chantal Mouffe, "Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy," *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London and New York: Verso, 1999), 41.

hostile towards immigrants, minority groups and the increase of ethnic and cultural diversity.[78] However, the real situation is somewhat more complicated, being that political equality is not identical to the principle of human equality.

The question of democracy and liberalism has already been discussed in terms of duality of basic civil liberty and political participation in liberalism. Civil liberty is a non-political form of equality having nothing to do with the right to political participation in self-government, but a democratic concept of equality involves one. However, the implementation of popular self-government presupposes a clear delineation of the boundaries of "the people" who exercise it. The need to draw boundaries and the locality of political participation as a way of exercising political freedom contradicts the liberal universalist rhetoric of human rights and freedoms. There is a reason why national independence movements can be equally difficult to place on the political spectrum.

Populism and the Revival of Sovereignty

Ever since this transformation of "the people" into the political Sovereign in the modern era, the claim that political actors speak and act on behalf of the people has become an integral part of politics. In this sense, populism is always present in representative democracy as a certain option; that is, it is an opportunity, both in terms of liberal or simple electoral democracy. Elements of populism can be found in a wide range of politicians, from Barack Obama to Vladimir Putin.[79] Any appeal to the ideals of democratic self-government is a convenient framework, which, in a sense, is self-sufficient because it allows any policy, from left to right or libertarian, to be carried out under the guise of democratic legitimacy.

Populism encompasses a spectrum of phenomena, ranging from those fully compatible with democratic politics to those threatening the very institutional framework in which democracy per se functions. Benjamin Arditi writes of three manifestations of populism, all of which are associated with democratic politics. First, populism can be a specific way of representation, compatible but not identical to a liberal-democratic understanding of representative government. This mode of representation is brought about by the transformation that party democracy is currently experiencing. The marketization of politics and the increasing role of the

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[78] Matthew Goodwin, "Right Response. Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe," *Chatham House* (September 1, 2011), 12, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/178301.

[79] Liudmila Arcimavičienė, "Self and Other Metaphors as Facilitating Features of Populist Style in Diplomatic Discourse: A Case Study of Obama and Putin's Speeches," *Populist Discourse: International Perspectives*, ed. Marcia Macaulay (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

media in the expansion of electoral support change the role of parties, making possible a direct link between the leader and the electorate. In turn, these changes will lead to a plebiscite transformation of representative democracy when, relatively speaking, the leader receives their personal legitimacy independent of political institutions.

In its second manifestation, populism can appear as a grassroots reaction to the failures of elitist democracy or "politics as usual," which has the potential to both disrupt and resume the political process without necessarily going beyond the institutional conditions of democracy.

Finally, populism can threaten the very institutional structure that provides a precondition for democracy itself. This is what Urbinati and Muller refer to when they treat populism as a menace to democracy. Having come to power as the only representative of the genuine popular will, populists can receive a mandate from "the people" for undemocratic reforms. As such, populism ceases to be an internal moment of the democratic process and turns into its menacing contrary.

> As something of an internal periphery of democratic politics, populism can be a dimension of representation and a mode of participation lodged in the rougher edges of democracy, but also something more disturbing, as it can thrive in political democracies while it morphs into democracy's nemesis.[80]

Populism is not necessarily anti-pluralist, being that its form depends on the circumstances. For instance, in Ukraine, the incumbent president Zelensky came to power by using populist strategies of mass mobilization and proposing an inclusive concept of the people as opposed to the excluding nationalist one, which was promoted by his predecessor. Populism has a dark side and can be a menace to democracy, but even national populism has its own significant core. Eatwell and Goodwin write in this regard:

> National populism also raises legitimate democratic issues that millions of people want to discuss and address. They question the way in which elites have become more and more insulated from the lives and concerns of ordinary people. They question the erosion of the nation state, which they see as the only construct that has proven capable of organizing our political and social lives. They question the capacity of Western societies to rapidly absorb rates of immigration and 'hyper ethnic change'

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[80] Benjamin Arditi, "Populism as a Spectre of Democracy: A Response to Canovan," *Political Studies*, 52 (2004), 143.

that are largely unprecedented in the history of modern civilization. They question why the West's current economic settlement is creating highly unequal societies and leaving swathes of people behind, and whether the state should accord priority in employment and welfare to people who have spent their lives paying into the national pot. They question cosmopolitan and globalizing agendas, asking where these are taking us and what kind of societies they will create. And some of them ask whether all religions support key aspects of modern life in the West, such as equality and respect for women and LGBT communities.[81]

It is crucial then to stress that populism is not simply a political style or rhetoric, or merely a tool for mass mobilization, although it can fulfil these functions. Populism is an inherent part of democratic politics for it is "embedded" in the structure of democracy like its shadow. The rise of populism has been provoked by a crisis of national state and democratic self-government.

Globalization has changed the balance between liberal and democratic principles of democracy in favor of liberalism, especially in its market-driven incarnation. As G. John Ikenberry notes,

across the Western liberal democratic world, liberal internationalism looks more like neoliberalism – a framework for international capital transactions.[82]

This trend is mostly the same across the non-Western world. As Diamond notes, just as in the fourth century BC, the ideals of democracy referred to the ideas of self-government and equality, meaning they were addressed to direct instead of representative democracy. Today the deontology and values of democracy also appeal to the horizontal dimension of politics. However, the requirement of democratic self-government conflicts less with liberal restrictions on the will of the majority within countries but more with the global framework of liberal internationalism, which unifies the neoliberal economy and rhetoric of the individual rights and freedoms. In the established democracies of today, populist voters demand the restoration of lost national sovereignty and hence ask not for less but more democracy and the application of direct forms of participation in significant decision-making.

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[81] Eatwell and Goodwin, *National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy*, XII.

[82] G. John Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order?" *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (2018), 21, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241.

Mainstream centrist parties are on retreat in many parts of the world while a new strand of economic nationalism has emerged that channels resentment towards immigration and international capital simultaneously. Both right-wing and left-wing populist movements are opposed to the globalist mainstream even if their protest is aimed at different outcomes of globalization. Both demand sovereignty but for different purposes. Left-wing populists are worried about declining welfare state and the emasculation of democratic institutions. They object to the technocratization of government where liberal democratic institutions appear to work formally for party competition and elections continue to be free but now prove useless. The absenteeism, electoral volatility and other symptoms about which Peter Mair writes indicate the growing frustration of people in the opportunities offered by political participation.[83] In fact, the institutions of democratic self-government are emasculated because citizens have lost the capacity to influence the direction of public policy.[84] Therefore, left-wing populists demand more democracy in terms of self-governance, majoritarianism and political equality while opposing the persistence of a neoliberal economy as a key component of globalization. Their protest is largely structured in terms of the vertical opposition between the "people" and the "elite."

In turn, right-wing populists also require more democracy expressed in terms of sovereignty. They tend to form alliances with Eurosceptic neoliberals and largely advocate "independent national state" and "healthy, natural patriotism." They are skeptical about immigration and argue that the backbone of community is its ethnic, moral and cultural framework.[85] Hence, European right-wing populist parties combine preoccupations with neoliberal free market and traditional morality. They express conservative and libertarian views, demanding economic rather than political freedom as the basis of personal freedom and national welfare. In this sense, neoliberal populist parties are rather anti-democratic because, for them, labor movements threaten economic freedom and the security of capitalism. The closed-borders libertarianism of nationalist neoliberals is not a rejection of globalism but is a variety of it.[86]

Let us consider the example of the German populist party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD). AfD approaches financial and economic topics from a neoliberal perspective. As a party, they propose to reduce state

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[83] Mair, *Ruling the Void*, 17-44.
[84] There is one good example here. According to various opinion polls, 59-70% of Ukrainians are against the free sale of agricultural land and supported resolving this issue in a referendum. Nevertheless, the law has been adopted without any referendum because its adoption was a condition for the IMF loan.
[85] Slobodian and Plehwe, "Neoliberals against Europe," 93-98.
[86] *Ibid.*, 92.

interference in the economy and to abandon government control and subsidies to business. Instead, they call for the stimulation of competition, a simplification of tax legislation and the abolition of taxes on business and inheritance. This party promotes an exclusive concept of the people and, in this sense, their theses in opposition to Islam and immigration are the most radical. AfD foresees a menace to the national-cultural structure of the German population through increased immigration, the low educational level of immigrants and the formation of what they call "parallel societies" in German cities. In its program,[87] AfD emphasizes the desire to preserve German culture and language alongside the basic liberal democratic order, European values and the legal system, all of which are not compatible with Sharia law. Potential allies of AfD are the right-wing parties of neighboring countries, notably in Austria, Belgium, Hungary, the Netherlands, Great Britain and France where some political parties share a critical attitude towards Brussels, national and European immigration policies and a skeptical view of the role of Islam in Europe.

In sum, national populism is not just a criticism of liberal restrictions on the expression of the general will or a "pro-fascist" rebellion against liberalism. Instead, it is a reaction to the transformation of nation-states under the regime of neoliberal globalization resulted in state's loss of control over the economic and social spheres and the emasculation of the democratic institutions.

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[87] "Programm Für Deutschland," *Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland* (January 19, 2018), https://cdn.afd.tools/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2018/01/ProgrammAfDDruckOnline190118.pdf.

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Borders, Membership and Justice

Denys Kiryukhin

Not so long ago, the formation of a global market, the broad spread of liberal democracy and the new prospects that greeted the end of the Cold War each promised that we would all take a significant step towards building a free, just and cohesive global world. Such ideas seem extremely naïve today. The world has indeed become global, but it has not become fairer or more united. While globalization has brought new opportunities to certain regions, states and social groups, others have faced new threats. Disunity and intolerance have become the dominant trend across various countries or regions of the world, while a sense of loyalty to one's community increasingly dominates the demands made of humanism. We are witnessing the growing influence of nationalist ideas and populist rhetoric on political processes. Meanwhile, the values of liberal democracy are often questioned, even in those states whose political history centers directly on the affirmation of these values. Clearly, "the end of history" is still far away (Francis Fukuyama simply mistook "the end of story" for "the end of history"). Instead, the historical process is largely determined by the influence of forces that should have disappeared forever from the stage of history; this was very much the case and expected as such, thirty years ago.

From the point of view of conservatives such as Patrick Deneen, for instance, what is happening today is a reaction to the problems generated by the liberal project. In his book *Why Liberalism Failed*, Deneen explains how liberalism has had a devastating effect on societies, by ways of isolating individuals from each other, polarizing society and enabling power to reside in a bureaucratic Leviathan because it destroys cultural ties and self-government practices. Hence, for Deneen, "Liberalism has failed because liberalism has succeeded."[1] However, Deneen does not provide convincing arguments to support his argument about the destructive nature of liberalism and why, in his opinion, the solution of contemporary social problems is possible only through an appeal to counter-cultural

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[1] Patrick J. Deneen, *Why Liberalism Failed* (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 2018), 179. The work of Inderjeet Parmar is a good example of a critique of liberalism (liberal international order) from the point of view of the Left, it places the emphasis on liberalism as the source of modern world problems. See Inderjeet Parmar, "The US-led Liberal Order: Imperialism by Another Name?" *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (2018), 151-172.

(nonliberal) communities which are based on conservative values and fo-
cus on the local practices of economic and political life. One can and
should argue with Deneen on many issues. However, there is growing
support in various states for anti-immigration and anti-globalization
movements or, more broadly, for anti-liberal movements. We need to
acknowledge as defensible concern about the social and political trends
expressed by both the supporters and the critics of the liberal political or-
der, such as Deneen.

In this sense, it is unsurprising that in the liberal camp we find indi-
rect recognition of the failure of the global liberal project, at least with
regard to the dissemination and affirmation of the values of civil rights
and freedoms in everyday practices of the population of different nation-
states. Most notably, Michael Ignatieff has researched the values by which
people in different regions of the world are guided in their response to the
following question: "Does globalization draw us together morally?" The
findings of this work are presented in his book *The Ordinary Virtues:*
Moral Order in a Divided World. Ignatieff comes to the important con-
clusion that despite the economic and informational coherence of the
global world, we actually live in a highly differentiated moral universe;
that is, we exist in a world of contextual singularities[2] (which local com-
munities also fall into) and not in the world of a single ethical narrative.
In fact, what really draw us together are not comprehensive doctrines or
rational agreement on the principles of the basic structure of society, as
John Rawls believes, but such simple virtues as tolerance, forgiveness,
generosity and trust that underlie the unity of local communities.

The studies of Ignatieff's and Deneen's vision of the current situation
has stimulated this study. From different angles and on different grounds,
they come to recognize that globalization processes have not promoted
the establishment of a universal morality or the achievement of "moral
globalization" as Ignatieff writes and neither have they helped to build a
global cosmopolitan community of rational individuals (i.e., to implement
the ideals of Enlightenment). Instead, these globalization processes have
stimulated tendencies towards localization, particularization and even de-
modernization.[3] This insight is shared by a number of researchers. These
trends require their own interpretation and are partly explained by the sig-
nificant impact that they have had on modern political and socio-eco-
nomic processes in all the regions of the world and which, in our opinion,
cannot be simply regarded as temporary failures of a modernization pro-
ject. More importantly, the complexity of these trends allows us to clarify

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[2] Michael Ignatieff, *The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World* (Cambridge
and London: Harvard University Press, 2017), 4, 205-206. I am grateful to Anastasiia
Sytnytska for pointing me to this work.
[3] See Alberto Rabilotta, Yakov Rabkin and Samir Saul, "La Démodernisation en
Marche," *Revue Internationale et Stratégique* 4, no. 92 (2013), 40-50.

further one of the key issues of social and political theory, namely, the foundations of social unity.

In the first part of this work I will attempt to describe the turn towards closure that we see in the modern globalized world. I will then consider the problem of forming a political community, outlining its criteria for borders and membership and turn finally to the question of whether borders can be just.

The Return of the Borders in the Globalized World

More than twenty years ago, Albert and Brock published a work in which they noted that the modern state is gradually losing its ability to regulate social and economic processes within its fixed territorial boundaries. Due to the gradual transnationalization of the social relations, the state can no longer ensure the cohesion of the society. The authors used the term "debordering the world of states" to designate, as they put it, the growing permeability of borders amidst a reduction in the ability of states to resist this process (as processes *in* the world of states) and the emergence of new political spaces outside certain territorial demarcations (as debordering processes *of* the world of states).[4] This description of a situation faced by nation states clearly overlaps with Duchacek's idea, as cited by Albert and Brock, that "perforated sovereignty" is a distinct feature of the modern state and reflects theories explaining the demise of the nation state, which proved to be quite common in the 1990s. (One of the most interesting works in this regard is the book of Martin van Creveld *The Rise and Decline on the State*). The concept of perforated sovereignty is further refined, for example, in Joachim Blatter's[5] study of cross-border

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[4] Mathias Albert and Lothar Brock, "Debordering the World of States: New Spaces in International Relations," *New Political Science* 18, no. 2 (1996), 70.

[5] Joachim K. Blatter, "Debordering the World of States: Towards a Multi-Level System in Europe and a Multi-Polity System in North America? Insights from Border Regions," *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 2 (2001), 175-209; Ivo D. Duchacek, "Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in International Relations," *Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units*, eds. Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 1-34; Marthin van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 439p.

The work of Kenichi Ohmae should also be mentioned. Ohmae has even been compared to Fukuyama for his study of the modern economy. His book, which was popular in its time, addresses the irrelevance of the national state for the global market. See Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Global Economy* (New York: Free Press, 1995), 214p. Unlike Ohmae, Susan Strange describes a process of gradual "state retreat" under the pressure of the global market, which case the weakening of the state as a serious concern. See Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 218p.

cooperation which demonstrates the erosion of the exclusive role of states in cross-border policymaking.

Indeed, from the 1990s to the early 2000s, many researches tried to comprehend the growth of interdependence between states and increased border permeability to the flows of capital, goods, technology, labor, information and, finally, liberal and democratic ideas. This permeability started with the development of Reaganomics and Thatcherism but reached full swing with the fall of the Berlin Wall that marked the end of a prolonged conflict between the West and the East. The researchers associated the development of these processes mainly with the weakening of the state and, consequently, with the strengthening of the cross-boundary and transcontinental alliances and actors, for example, the transnational corporations.

However, Blatter is more subtle when it comes to the current condition and prospects of the nation states. When Blatter analyzes cross-boundary cooperation in Europe (based on the logic of space) and North America (based on the logic of flows), he argues that Albert and Brock were probably correct about the process of border erosion, because the continued existence of territory limited by borders is no longer the sole basis for the formation of a political community. According to Blatter, however, it is still too early to give a final farewell to the Westphalian system, since the processes mentioned above are not significant enough to destroy the nation states. Dittgen also supports the idea that we are witnessing a transformation, rather than an erosion, of the nation state; within the global economy the nation state inevitably loses its autonomy but not its sovereignty which ensures by democratic institutions.

The remnants of the Berlin Wall, Hadrian's Wall or the Great Wall of China are, of course, not a political factor but the subject of research by historians, if not tourist attractions. Nation-states and especially so-called Second or Third World countries, do indeed possess significantly less power over their borders than they did fifty years ago. Nonetheless, to conclude on this basis that we are entering a world without borders and national governments would be too soon. Such a conclusion may seem logical at first glance, because of the existence of a sharp conflict between the state's demand to draw clear boundaries within which its monopoly on legitimate power would be exercised and the exterritoriality of the globalization processes eroding these boundaries. However, a critical revision is required of the position of those researchers who believe that in the context of globalization, the powers of national governments are extremely constrained, while national borders (as well as nation states) are

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Herbert Dittgen provides an interesting overview of theories of the end of the nation state. See Herbert Dittgen, "World without Borders? Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," *Government and Opposition* 34, no. 2 (1999), 161-179.

disappearing or their significance, at least, is diminishing. Such a revision is particularly important considering that it is national governments who support and protect the institutions of the global market.

In our present times, hardly anyone would seriously argue that, should replicate the actions of Roman Empire and separate by a wall – as with Hadrian's Wall – the worlds of "civilization" and "barbarism" or that a wall should be built between two competing political systems as was the case during the Cold War. Or indeed a geographical divide should be established between the supporters of different political communities and views, as in Belfast. But this does not entail that societies no longer request the construction of insurmountable barriers for protection. It is just that the nature of threats to political communities has changed and the consequence is that both the geography and political nature of real or potential fences are also changing.

Public sentiment in favor of barriers is aggravated not least by immigration. The main stimulus for immigration in the modern world is the existence of pronounced inequality of income and social conditions across the world, expressing the injustice of the global market as it differentiates between countries. There are undeniably disproportionate social and economic opportunities available to citizens of different countries or so-called "the citizenship premium" (Branco Milanović) when an individual receives certain economic goods only on the basis of being born in a particular country. For instance, the wages for the same work performed in the rich and in poor countries can differ tenfold. Nevertheless, there is no obvious substantiation of fears that immigrants supposedly cause damage to the economy by, for example, taking jobs from citizens or increasing competition in the labor market. Such fears are common in the countries where immigrants are heading to.

> A complementarity in skills, as Milanović claims, exists between some migrants and the local population in the recipient country, resulting in higher incomes for the local population.[6]

In other words, immigration can have a positive economic effect. Moreover, one can consider various tools to compensate for the negative economic effects of immigration. However, these issues receive less attention in political debates today than the threats carried by the migrants.

The negative image of immigration has not been accompanied by the widespread criticism of the global market. Today's idea that the free movement of labor, capital, goods and services necessarily implies "debordering the world of states" is not as obvious as it was in the late 1980s

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[6] Branko Milanović, *Global Inequality. A New Approach for the Age of Globalization* (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 153.

and early 1990s. From the structure of the US trade balance deficit (and particularly the imbalance of their trade with China),[7] we can see that the global market has brought not only benefits but problems, even to those countries through whose efforts it was first formed. For instance, we have measures to protect the national market in the United States under President Donald J. Trump. However, such economic protectionism does not foresee the abolition of the global market and the liberal economy as a whole, as it may seem at first glance. Instead, it is aimed at strengthening a country's position in this global market, as seen when leading world economies defend the preservation and development of the free trade agreements. Once again, this proves that, despite the significant decline in the role of the nation state, its interventions remain in demand.

An ardent defender of both the free market and the policy of "closed borders" the economist Hans-Hermann Hoppe justifies the idea,

> that not even the most restrictive immigration policy or the most exclusive form of segregationism has anything to do with a rejection of free trade and the adoption of protectionism.[8]

His position reflects an influential modern trend towards a convergence of the positions held by neoliberals and right-wing radicals, one that dates back to Friedrich von Hayek. In this regard, it is no coincidence that the question was posed in 2016 at the Institute of Economic Affairs of whether Hayek would have supported Brexit. In the course of this discussion, quite convincing arguments were voiced in favor of Hayek supporting secession (Brexit) because he was an advocate of a free global market. Whereas the contrary is the case in the European Union, where centralization and protectionism are on the rise. Analyzing the debate around Hayek, Quinn Slobodian and Dieter Plehwe then demonstrated that neoliberals, who initially supported the development of the European Union

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[7] For U.S. International trade in goods and services, December 2017, see *U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis*, https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/internatio nal/trade/2018/pdf/trad1217.pdf. See also "The Current Reality, However, Is One of Chronic Trade Imbalances between the United States and East Asian nations," *Creating Social Cohesion in an Interdependent World. Experiences of Australia and Japan*, eds. Ernest Healy, Dharma Arunachalam and Tetsuo Mizukami (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 12.

As Milanović shows, in the period of "high globalization," that is, in the period 1980-2000, the economic development of Third World countries and the former socialist countries almost stopped, while the economies of advanced countries showed very high growth. See Milanović, *Global Inequality*, 165. However, since the mid2000s, the situation has changed significantly. Countries such as China, Brazil and India demonstrate economic growth in per capita GDP exceeding the richest countries. At the same time, in the richest countries today, doubts there are about the fairness of the global economy's constitution.

[8] Hans-Hermann Hoppe, "The Case for Free Trade and Restricted Immigration," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 13, no. 2 (1998), 223.

as an opportunity to implement market freedoms, soon saw the European Union posing a threat in terms of competition between national communities. For neoliberals like Hayek and the authors of the *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, competition is the key to establishing the free market conditions. It is not surprising that they found a rapprochement with the conservatives, for whom the family and traditional morality represent the main pillars of society and identity issues are high priority. Therefore, more and more "exclusionary social romanticism takes the place of egalitarian social policy."[9] In the rhetoric of those who are raising the issue of borders at various levels and in different countries, economic arguments are complemented by the political, cultural, religious and ethical ones. It is the reality that the problem of immigration does not just boil down to the economy that makes it so acute, especially for the European countries who, unlike the United States or Australia, have little experience of integrating a large number of foreigners.

Thomas Neil in the *Theory of the Border* rightfully says that despite the occurrence of globalization in recent years, more new types of boundaries have appeared than ever before in the history.[10] To make it clear, new cultural, social, religious, informational and ideological boundaries have appeared to differentiate communities, for example, as a result of the actualization of the cultural and ethnic identity of their members. But this is not all. In developed liberal democratic countries, defending the internationalization of their political and economic institutions and the universality of basic human values, a distinct political request has been generated for the "old" borders, i.e., state borders, to be transformed into insurmountable barriers, especially against illegal immigrants.

There are many examples of the significance of boundaries being updated. We see it in the speeches by Brexit's ideologues, in the general growth of support for radical conservatism and nationalist ideology and in the right-wing populist rhetoric and intolerance that has emerged in the United States, the European Union and Eastern Europe. The latter group of nations can be appropriately described as "non-liberal democracies," the term suggested by Fareed Zakaria to reflect the authoritarian tendencies growing in these counties. We can also speak of a conservative twist in Russia and China, in the spread of radical Islam in the Middle East, in the crisis of international institutions such as the UN and, more generally, in the crisis of so-called "liberal internationalism."

Today, the fear is of refugees, illegal immigrants and terrorist groups, as well as trepidation on the part of authoritarian governments which are

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[9] Quinn Slobodian and Dieter Plehwe, "Neoliberals Against Europe," *Mutant Neo-Liberalism: Market Rule and Political Rupture*, eds. William Callison and Zachary Manfredi (New York: Fordham University Press, 2020), 89-111.

[10] Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1.

afraid of that undesirable information will penetrate the national information space. These fears compel some politicians and the authorities of a number of countries, as it was back in the times of the Emperor Qin Shi Huang (221-210 BC), to support new wall building initiatives, including virtual walls, as in China's policy towards the internet. Alternatively, nation-states may seek to preserve the existing ones: between Hungary and Serbia; Israel and Palestine in the Gaza Strip; around Spanish enclaves in Morocco; and not to forget the borders between Kenya and Somalia, the United States and Mexico, Thailand and Malaysia.

These processes are mainly viewed in academic studies through the prism of the problems that they cause to liberal democracy and to the liberal world order in general. For instance, since it is right-wing political forces (rather that the Left) mainly voice the moods of protest in various regions of the world,[11] the task of overcoming social and political problems has therefore been taken on by political movements of a nationalistic and right-populist nature (often with the support of neoliberal theorists, such as Hoppe, for example). Meanwhile in the "marginally democratic" (Ronald Inglehart) and non-democratic countries it is authoritarian leaders who rely not only upon the ideology of conservatism but frequently upon overt xenophobia. Today's authoritarian regimes are skillful in using nationalistic rhetoric and speculation about the protection of national political and economic borders to increase their own legitimacy in the eyes of the population in their countries.

The problems of democratic societies are evidenced by the growing popularity of political forces which call for protection from what they claim is the destructive influence of liberal universalism on local cultural

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[11] The only noticeable exceptions were the Occupy Wall Street movement, Syriza in Greece and the Spanish Indignados whom, despite their significant influence on the situation within their countries, tellingly disappeared rather quickly from the political scene.

The question of why the Right, requires special consideration. It would seem that the key political and economic requirement in the current situation would have to be, as it was, at one time during the financial collapse of 2008-2009, the strengthening of economic regulation and the rejection of neoliberal economic policies; in other words, the requirement to restore the state's position in the area where they were most weakened. That is, we should observe not a "Right," but rather a "Left turn," as a kind of return to neo-Keynesianism. Even such vivid spokesmen of protest moods as Donald Trump or populist leaders from Eastern Europe, like Victor Orban, whatever measures they take to protect economic sovereignty, in their domestic economic policy the fundamental positions of the neoliberal economic course are not in doubt – a fact to which Svitlana Shcherbak drew my attention. Colin Crouch has presented an interesting political and economic analysis of why neoliberalism in the economy did not "die" after the crisis of 2008-2009. See Colin Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism* (Malden: Polity Press, 2011), 224p. In addition, it also should be stressed that left-wing political movements in the second half of the twentieth century went from fighting for socio-economic equality to fighting for "existential equality" (Goran Terborn's term). These transformations seem to have had a significant impact on why left-wing movements and (cosmopolitan) liberalism today are both perceived by critics as having an equally negative impact on local communities.

traditions. The problem of "strangers among us" (the precise phrase devised by David Miller as perception of the immigrants within the framework of right-wing political discourse) is regarded as one of the consequences of liberal politics, as well as a revolt against the elites on the part of those who are called the Trumpian Proletariat (or the "silent majority," as Donald Trump's supporters dubbed themselves during his campaign). But even where the Right have recently failed to come to power, as in France or Germany, their substantial electoral support indicates that problems do exist. Democracies are really going through hard times.[12] It is not by chance that a number of researchers are talking about an "illiberal turn" (Ivan Krastev) or "the Populist Challenge" (William Galston) which liberal democracy is facing, or refer to "the End of the Democratic Century" (Yasha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa) as a defining characteristic of the new era.

There are two ideas that have an extremely high potential for mobilization in modern societies. These were expressed lapidary by the right-wing Hungarian politician Victor Orban, who declared that "Elites are robbing us of our own country!" and "There is no homeland any more, only an investment site."[13] The first notion is related to a sense of losing control over arrangement of the political life, with the corresponding belief that the national elites express progressively a smaller portion of interests of local communities but a higher portion of interest of global economic players. The second idea is related to the identity of a community in a globalized world. In both cases, we are talking about reactions to the changes triggered by globalization process and the confidence that only solid walls can solve the accumulated problems. If anything and contrary to these forecasts, the forces of globalization have failed to destroy nation

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[12] A good illustration of this thesis is in one of the most democratic countries in the world; namely, the United States. According to the data cited by Yascha Mounk, "while over 2 in 3 older Americans say that it is essential for them to live in a democracy, for example, fewer than 1 in 3 young Americans share their deep allegiance to the democratic system…20 years ago, 1 in 15 Americans believed it to be a 'good' or 'very good' thing to have the army rule; today, it is 1 in 6." See Yascha Mounk, "Yes, American Democracy Could Break Down," *Politico* (October 22, 2016), www.politico.com/magazine/story/20 16/10/trump-americandemocracy-could-break-down-214383. This explains why, as Jaffrey Sachs shows, a large majority of Americans (71% vs. 15%) "describes the federal government as a special interest group that looks out primarily for its own interests." See Jeffrey Sachs, *The Price of Civilization: Economics and Ethics after the Fall* (New York: Random House, 2011), 11.

[13] See Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 136p. He is echoed by the leader of the French right, M. Le Pen: "Countries are no longer nations but markets. Borders are erased…Everybody can come to our country and this has caused a drop in salaries, cuts in social protection to be cut, and a dilution of cultural identity." See Lucy Williamson, "Marine Le Pen's French Presidential Campaign Goes Lift-Off," *BBC* (February 5, 2017), www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-3887 4070.

state borders. Instead, global interdependence and political and economic convergence have questioned the cohesion of local communities which rely on the practices of exclusion, distribution of goods, recognition etc. These practices define our everyday world and are under threat when economic and political processes have begun to slip out of control of local communities.

Manuel Castells articulates the paradox of the globalized world quite precisely: "The more the world becomes global, the more people feel local."[14] It is more appropriate to refer more to the trend towards a new demarcation of the world that has become global and towards re-bordering in the globalized world to the anti-democratic wave that has risen in the West today. After all, the similar processes are common to both democratic and non-liberal and non-democratic countries worldwide.

Indeed, it is possible to view this trend towards demarcation, the turn towards which is a reaction to the erosion of borders in a globalized world, as it is being associated with a more complex process than a mere protection of national economic interests. Today, the question of borders has evolved in a new dimension as it is not only a question of territory brought up in the clash of conflicting national claims to a particular region, or the question of state sovereignty associated with the problem of unbundling and perforating of the borders in the 1990s. As we can see from the discussion of immigrants, the question of identity has already been raised where the global processes are viewed as a threat to social unity. And the tendency towards demarcation represents an orientation towards or the building of, as Barbieri puts it, "boundaries-between"[15] communities that is, towards the actualization and redefinition of social boundaries[16] and the tightening control over membership in political societies.

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[14] Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity*, 2nd edition with a new preface (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2010), xxiii.

[15] William A. Barbieri, *Constitutive Justice* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 173. In this paper, I consider it possible to use the terms "borders" and "boundaries" as interchangeable.

[16] As Charles Tilly puts it, "people everywhere organize a significant part of their social interaction around the formation, transformation, activation, and suppression of social boundaries. It happens at the small scale of interpersonal dialogue, at the medium scale of rivalry within organizations, and at the large scale of genocide. Usthem boundaries matter." See Charles Tilly, "Social Boundaries Mechanisms," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 34, no. 2 (2004), 213. Tilly focuses on the process of constituting boundaries within political communities as borders between different social groups (gender, professional, etc.). However, when I refer to the question of social boundaries, I am addressing borders between communities in the globalized world.

It is not always the territorial boundaries of the state, "that demarcate a portion of the earth's surface as forming a certain territory," that coincide with the social boundaries of the community, i.e., "dividing lines that run between groups of people, so that they recognize themselves, and are recognized by others." See David Miller and Sohaila H. Hashmi,

The problems of boundaries and migrants are a challenge to democracy. For Arash Abizadeh and other theorists, the re-bordering process is a direct threat to democracy, since a truly democratic policy on borders is only possible from the standpoint of "global demos," i.e., when it is implemented by citizens and foreigners together, the one-sided walling practice is inconsistent with democracy. However, Frederick Whelan takes the contrary view and is convinced that in order to preserve democracy, one needs to establish boundaries as a limit to "their" power and thus abandon the liberal belief in the existence of some ideal cosmopolitan community of reasonable individuals, instead, establishing in its place well-defined boundaries between autonomous actors in world politics (i.e., states).[17] The difference between the approaches applied by Abizadeh and Whelan is based on a long-standing dispute originated in the works by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. This is a dispute between communitarianists and liberals advocating the idea of arbitrarily erected state borders with the primacy of a universal moral community of rational individuals. Abizadeh attempts to remove this tension and to retain both the boundaries and the "global community." Not without the influence of Jürgen Habermas, he claims that this move is only possible if the borders get moral democratic legitimacy. Yet this proposed approach is not convincing, as it leaves more questions than answers.

For example, if, according to Abizade, a discussion of border policy requires the participation of outsiders as democratically legitimate, then why does the border-related question of membership criteria in a community (citizenship in this case) require no such thing, which affects the interests of outsiders in the same way as the border policy does? Another example regarding the legal case of State vs Covell about the rights of foreign citizens during the war, which the Kansas court heard in 1918. The judgment of November 9, 1918 stated that there are different types of foreigners, i.e., "alien friends" and "alien enemies," for which the latter

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eds., *Boundaries and Justice. Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 3-4. Of course, in the idea of an ideal national state these borders and boundaries are identical. Such a coincidence, if achieved, indicates a high social cohesion of society.

[17] As Frederick Whelan puts, "democracy requires that people be divided into peoples." Quotation from Arash Abizadeh, "Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders," *Political Theory* 36, no. 1 (2008), 43, also see 54-55. We would emphasize that Abizadeh does not deny the need for boundaries, his position does not imply that "the only legitimate democratic polity comprises all humanity" but, as he insists, "particular boundaries can and must be legitimized as the outcome of democratic procedures that include those whom the boundary picks out as outsiders." See Arash Abizadeh, "On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism, Democracy and the Boundary Problem," *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 4 (2012), 881.

cannot be viewed on a par with the rest.[18] Does this judgment have both legal and democratic legitimacy or for the border to be democratically legitimate in this case – i.e., in time of war? Should we engage foreigners in discussion of this issue? These difficulties demonstrate that as soon as we start looking for a line to be drawn between the areas where the involvement of strangers is acceptable in the discussion and where they are not in the context of preserving the cohesion and identity of a community, we again face the problem of boundaries. Abizadeh's approach hence seems to defer and not resolve this problem.

In fact, this dispute about borders and immigration supplies the very foundations of a political community. In this case it is not so much the principles of democracy upon which Abizadeh and Carens – and many other liberals who discuss the topic of frontiers – are focused in their normative approaches. It is rather the principles of social unity which should be in the spotlight. Without understanding how a community is constituted and how its membership rules are defined, it would be difficult to understand the reasons for the common trend in the modern globalized world, which we call re-bordering in the globalized world.

Membership and Justice

The concepts common in the 1990s of the demise of the nation state and the inevitable emergence of a unified world order and global society were shaped by two key factors. First, the integration of markets and the role of multinational economic institutions, unprecedented in the world's history, were propelled by the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe and by the reorientation of China's economic policy towards liberal principles. And, second, through the ethical universalism that underlies the European project of Modernity, which presents globalization as a process of integration of communities. These days, however, we are facing the need to adopt a different perspective on the relationship between globalization and the nation-state. As Michael Mann puts it, "the nation-state and globalization have not been rivals in a zero-sum game with one undermining the other."[19] It is equally necessary to question the validity of the position held by John Rawls (who in this case promoted an influential liberal tradition originated from John Locke and Kant) for whom the question of borders – both social and state ones – is secondary. After all, the political unity of a well-ordered society, the normative basis for which is

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[18] Robert E. Cushman, "Judicial Decisions on Public Law," *The American Political Science Review* 13, no. 1 (1919), 104-105.

[19] Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 4: *Globalizations, 1945-2011* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 10.

the object of Rawls' key interest, is ensured by the rationally agreed principles of justice ("background justice," as Rawls writes) that underlie its basic structure. Any individual can potentially be a member of such society, so long as he/she accepts these principles rationally. Accordingly, rational agreement appears to be more significant than any of the factors which stimulate a distinction between "We" and "They," while attention to such agreement brings about a general disregard of the topic of constitutional boundaries by some theorists like Rawls.

Similarly, Habermas opposes the unity of society formed "at the level of democratic procedures and institutions" or under the influence of religion and national history or "hereditary powers" (as Hermann Lübbe puts it).[20] The priority of the first path is obvious for Habermas because, in his opinion, the proper way to form unity is based on the most abstract principles and is to move beyond private ties and local loyalty in order to ensure the integration of a modern pluralistic and a highly differentiated society. It is typical for Rawls and Habermas to stage categorical opposition of a unity based on universal formal principles and norms, to that based on history and culture. Such a position pursues not so much descriptive as normative goals.

Habermas[21] recognizes that we will not find any modern political community (state) whose cohesion is supported exclusively by the market and administrative authority. This recognition applies fully to modern liberal democratic states. In describing a well-ordered society, Rawls also stresses that its institutions support self-respect[22] and discourage the development of such negative feelings as envy. In other words, Rawls also emphasizes the importance of emotions for the social unity.

Hence, it is not unreasonable to agree with Charles Taylor when he argues that even in the Western liberal societies, the liberal institutions are preserved by non-liberal practices, such as republican ones. For the "atomistic modes of thought" (Taylor) present in liberalism (the typical of Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Thomas M. Scanlon) a social unity is based on the ethics of law, whose task is "to regulate and reconcile the competing demands of individuals" without any teleology of social development or any idea of a certain virtuous life that should be supported by social institutions.[23] In contrast to this approach, republicanism under

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[20] Jürgen Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), 132, 129.

[21] As Habermas puts it, "modern states which are functionally integrated by market and administrative power still delimit themselves from one another as 'nations' as they always have done." *Ibid.*, 130.

[22] See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), §82.

[23] Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," *Philosophical Arguments*, Charles Taylor (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1995), 188, 186. Rawls places specific emphasis on the incompatibility of teleology with civil

Taylor's interpretation proceeds from the idea of society as not just a sphere where the interests of autonomous individuals meet, but as a special sphere of general interest (Taylor speaks of "general" as of a dialogical phenomenon) or a common good that cannot be reduced to an individual good and as a joint venture for the sake of a shared goal. Therefore, it is no coincidence that one of the basic virtues of republicanism is patriotism, which serves as "an identification with others in a particular common enterprise."[24] Upon a closer view, patriotism remains an important motive guiding people's actions, even where the dominant attitude does not see it as a key public virtue and, moreover, the supporters of this attitude generally avoid talking about public virtues altogether. In other words, the Canadian philosopher discovers a fact "hidden" from many liberals (such as Robert Nozick or Dworkin) that despite the individualism prevalent in the modern Western society, this society has not in fact transformed into a mechanical union of individuals. The social unity is achieved not so much by legal institutions and bureaucracy, as primarily by practices that appear to be a thing of the past, the motivation of individuals is defined in these societies not only by the commitment to the values of freedom and equality, but also by their emotional engagement with each other. Even in societies such as the America, which is perhaps the closest to the social ideals of Locke and Rawls, social actions are largely dictated by the individuals' attachment to a certain way of life that they are ready to defend and to their faith in the common goals that they pursue. Moreover, this attachment is actively maintained and nurtured, with such a patriotic mode of upbringing encouraged by the state.

To illustrate his point, Taylor provides the example of the "Watergate scandal." This example emphases the fact that people's extremely negative reaction to deception and manipulation of Richard Nixon's administration. Such a reaction proved that their actions affected people's "patriotic identification" which cannot be expressed in terms of egoism or altruism.[25] The cultural and sociological analysis of the President Nixon/ Watergate affair conducted by Jeffrey Alexander demonstrates that this event is closely connected with the ethos of American society and with

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liberties, arguing that "the liberties of equal citizenship are insecure when founded upon teleological principles" (see Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 185), because at any moment these liberties can be fully or partially limited in the name of a "great" goal. Micael Sandel writes about this, saying that for Rawls the "most essential to our personhood is not the ends we choose but our capacity to choose them." See Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19. On the other hand, as Rawls notes, "it is not our aims that primary reveal our nature but rather the principles that we would acknowledge to govern the background condition under which these aims are to be formed" (see Rawls, *A Theory of Justice,* 491).

[24] Taylor, *Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate*, 187-188.

[25] *Ibid.*, 196.

the sense of solidarity of American citizens and a certain emotional feeling of the common good being threatened. Alexander claims,

> Nixon could be criticized and Watergate legitimated as a real crisis only if the issues were defined as being above politics and involving fundamental moral concerns.[26]

Note that such a reaction is unrelated to the fact that people perceived Nixon's actions as undermining the basic principles of a liberal society, as a critic might have argued. In fact, we can argue that it is related, but only because a special attitude to these principles had already been formed earlier in American society when said principles have served as the basis for the individuals' identity. Therefore, the Watergate scandal not only serves as a good illustration confirming Taylor's view, but also demonstrates to what extent the unity of a liberal society depends on republican attitudes, as the Canadian philosopher puts it.

Alexander draws attention to the following circumstance:

> [the] administrative witnesses also tried to rationalize and specify the public's orientation to their actions by arguing that they had acted with common sense according to pragmatic considerations. They suggested that they had decided to commit their crimes only according to standards of technical rationality.[27]

In other words, the camps during Watergate struggled to "pull" public opinion to the rational positions by making it appreciate the necessary pragmatic considerations. Or, on the opposite side, produce an emotional reaction by appealing to the feeling of solidarity in order to imprint upon the public opinion such a description of a situation where the crime committed would look like an existential threat to American society itself. The second strategy eventually won, although it took almost two years. There is no doubt that this victory was not a result of a failure by the White House to "hush up the case" or, when this did not work out, to somehow justify itself by pointing out that what happened was in fact an ordinary incident. The victory stands rather in relation to the efforts to shape a common feeling (or a republican one, as Taylor would say) that has maintained over decades and a certain understanding of the true American tradition, despite the apparent dominance of atomistic attitudes in political thinking.

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[26] Jeffrey C. Alexander, *The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 162.

[27] *Ibid.*, 163.

Even a liberal "atomized" society cannot truly do without the "republican virtues," a belief in social ideals and a feeling of emotional engagement.[28] This conclusion was confirmed in the study by Martha Nussbaum. In a work entitled *Political Emotions: Why Love Matter for Justice* written under the obvious influence of Rawls, she demonstrates convincingly that in any society, there is a need to "sacrifice oneself for the common good" and that "responsibilities to others" have not only rational but public emotional expression.[29] In other words, social unity and cohesion are also nurtured and maintained by involving the individuals in social interaction, not only as rational actors pursuing their goals but also as someone living through this interaction emotionally. Moreover, rational agreement with the rules and objectives of political order as well as a feeling of mutuality (the latter is the result not only of the fair political institutions as emphasized by Rawls) has a varying degree of influence on the formation of a political community.

These examples also serve to question the feasibility of a neutral state, otherwise advocated by many liberals. The best example is Chandran Kukatas. According to him, "the liberal state does not take as its concern the way of life of its members but accepts that there is in society a diversity of ends – and of ways in which people pursue them."[30] In this case, we would be in agreement with Will Kymlicka and Chantal Mouffe about the key problem facing liberalism. This has become even more urgent in the globalized world than ever before, it lies in finding the answer to the question of whether social unity could be achieved, while preserving the pluralism of the conceptions of the good and lifestyles. According to such liberals as Rawls and Bruce Ackerman, this is known to be achievable due to the rational and neutral basic structure of a political society. As Rawls emphasize in the *Political Liberalism*, we should view justice not as a metaphysical but as a political concept that cannot be reduced to comprehensive moral and religious doctrines already existing in society. Even agreeing with the comments of critics as well as with the fact that

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[28] Jack Citron and Matthew Wright, who investigated how ordinary the US citizens understand American identity, make an interesting remark: "Americans may celebrate diversity in the abstract, but when it comes to thinking about the meaning of their national identity, a preference for a common culture and language endure." See Jack Citrin and Mattew Wright, "Defining the Circle of We: American Identity and Immigration Policy," *The Forum* 7, no. 3 (2009), 15. On the republican origins of the American Revolution and the American political culture in general, see Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political* (London and New York: Verso: 2005), 23-25.

[29] Martha C. Nussbaum, *Political Emotions. Why Love Matter for Justice* (Cambridge, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 206. She emphasizes that "the new [political – D.K.] order cannot be stable without revolutionary changes in the hear." *Ibid.*, 18.

[30] Chandran Kukatas, *The Liberal Archipelago. A Theory of Diversity and Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 161.

they will still not be able to take a completely neutral stance with respect to morality, the liberal theorists still claim "that theirs is a minimal theory."[31] However, it is arguable that this statement simply does not hold water.

A liberal state, much like any other, is not neutral but is itself a certain way of life that requires to be maintained and reproduced. Liberals themselves admit it as, for instance, Dworkin, Kymlicka and even Rawls did in his later works about the political culture of a democratic society.[32] It is telling that Kukathas, who interprets state neutrality as impartiality,[33] offers to sacrifice unity for the sake of pluralism, for he is extremely skeptical about the possibility of building a value-neutral state and is convinced that strong social bonds are too high a price to pay for abandoning diversity. Kukathas sees no tragedy in the absence of social unity in the political order. It is enough to appoint a certain arbitrator (its function should be performed by the state) regulating the relations between individuals (or social groups) to ensure their peaceful coexistence because "a political community need be no more than an association of people who recognize the terms of coexistence."[34] In other words, individuals are united in political community by common understanding of the rules and principles of their coexistence. In this regard, Kukatas concludes that the political community is "an association of individuals who share an understanding of what is public and what is private within that polity."[35] However, two points should be made here.

First, the public-private separation mentioned by Kukathas is always performed within certain political boundaries ("within that polity") that assume the existence of a political community. And the latter does not necessarily fall apart when the boundaries between public and private are blurring, as is the case today and as Hannah Arendt points out. It is not the ratio of the private and public spheres but the exclusion criterions – the answer to the question of who "We" are – that determines the boundaries of the political community and its internal organization. People are united in a political community regardless of whether it is a nationally or culturally homogeneous state or an "asocial union of social unions" (as

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[31] Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, 138.

[32] See John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), 6.

[33] According to Kukatas, the role of the state is to serve as a judge, "who attends to questions that inevitably arise in a society," composed as it is of "many communities and associations, and attempts to preserve the order in which these groups can coexist." See Kukatas, *The Liberal Archipelago*, 212-213.

[34] *Ibid.*, 210.

[35] *Ibid.*, 171-172.

Rawls interprets the liberal state) by a common, i.e., shared, understanding of the distinction or the exclusivity criterion. When developing the ideas of Gilles Deleuze, Mouffe notes that

> there is no identity that is self-present to itself and not constructed as difference, and…any social objectivity is constituted through acts of power. It means that any social objectivity is ultimately political and has to show traces of the exclusion which governs its constitution.[36]

An understanding of the distinction criterion will be determined by the prevailing system of power relations or the dominant political discourse with its characteristic interpretation of the just society principles enshrined in the legal system of a state.[37] In fact, Aristotle wrote about this in *Politics*, pointing out that the differences in the interpretation of the criteria for citizenship reflects different approaches to understanding the organization of a polis.[38] For example, it is obvious that cultural, historical and religious ties whose priority is asserted by nationalism (especially in its radical forms) make society much more exclusive and, in the case of culturally heterogeneous communities, more internally hierarchized by the degree to which various social groups can influence political decision-making than is assumed, for example, by the liberal politics. In this regard, any political struggle is always a struggle of how and on what principles the unity will be constituted and where the line between "We" and "They" will be drawn; or, in broader terms, it can be envisaged as a struggle for defining the (fair) distinction criteria.

Second, shared understanding is not a result of either rational consensus (Habermas) or an overlapping consensus (Rawls). In fact, the author of *The Liberal Archipelago* proceeds by interpreting shared understanding as a form of rational agreement. He even argues that his view is compatible with the notion of a political community as a consequence of agreement achieved only under the influence of historical and geographical circumstances[39] and not, for example, behind a "veil of ignorance" or in the context of "ideal speech situation." According to Kukathas and we can agree with him here, the political community will only guarantee freedom to its members if it abandons attempts to make people agree on what

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[36] Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, 141.

[37] As a result, one or another identity becomes coercive for members of the political community.

[38] See *Pol. III*, 1275a.

[39] "This outlook is most consistent with a view of political community as a product of convention. It is the result of accidents of history and geography which have seen the emergence of a settlement or set of compromises…" See Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, 209.

is good and right. Indeed, one should not expect that people, especially members of heterogeneous communities, will come to such an agreement and any attempts to impose it will inevitably be labeled as coercion and even outright violence. However, he advocates the unviable ideal of a political society as a "partial association." This ideal "is essentially an association among people who do not share any significant intentional relationship"[40] and towards which individuals have rather weak obligations. Actually, Kukatas himself in his book acknowledges that "no reason to doubt that political society is a kind of community."[41] This social model is unviable because it is not the weak commitments that unite the individuals into a political society but, as Walzer puts it, the "thick" concepts of justice and welfare relevant to a particular social world.[42] From the day of our birth, each of us is a member of a political community or simply a single community, much like those who, for example, were born in a refugee camp and have no citizenship. Meanwhile, our membership does not depend on the fact that we are taking part in regulation and execution of political power, which was Aristotle's belief.[43] In this case, as Hanna Pitkin points out, only aristocrats will be citizens and further again under a monarchy, where only the monarch is a citizen, "but that is absurd."[44] A membership much depends on the extent to which we share the meanings that are common for the community or, since membership in a political community is not always voluntary,[45] a reality is often forgotten by political theorists, that we are forced to follow the rules and regulations that constitute the community.

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[40] *Ibid.*, 209-210.

[41] *Ibid.*, 169.

[42] Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 20. See also Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), xiv; Michael Walzer, "Interpretation and Social Criticism," *The Tanner Lectures of Human Values VIII, 1988*, ed. St. M. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press; Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 27. Compare with Wittgenstein's understanding of agreement: "'So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?' – What is true or false is what human beings *say*; and it is in their *language* that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life." See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, the German text with English translation by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and J. Schulte (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 94ᵉ.

[43] See, for example, *Pol. III*, 1275b20.

[44] Hanna F. Pitkin, *Wittgenstein and Justice. On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Political Thought* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1972), 215.

[45] Political communities, even the most democratic, are not without internal conflicts and coercion against their members. In other words, the role of political power in maintaining social unity is extremely significant. That is why we say that the criteria for membership are determined by the dominant political discourse. Interestingly, describing the distinction between a democratic state and an empire, Walzer points out that unlike the

As the world of common meanings, the world of community has clear boundaries because a shared understanding always reflects the local experience of life together. Therefore, the claim of political communities to determine their own membership criteria, i.e., immigration policy in the context of this work, is justified. However, recognition of the moral justification for the boundaries does not automatically eliminate the problem of setting the membership criteria in a community (immigration regime). The question remains of whether we can rate the membership criteria set by the community as fair or unfair? From Walzer's perspective, our answer would be negative, unless we rate them from the standpoint of the perceptions of justice shared by community members. In that case, it would be hard to understand why the members of communities not sharing these views would rate them the same.

Walzer stresses that membership in any political community (the author of the *Spheres of Justice* speaks about a nation state) is a primary or a basic good which "we distribute to one another,"[46] and its possession gives us an opportunity to participate in the distribution of other goods such as security, power, wealth, etc. This good is distributed either by birth or as a result of political decisions ("the distribution of membership in American society, and in any ongoing society, is a matter of political decision").[47] Of course, the policy in respect of non-members of a community cannot be called a sphere of utter arbitrary behavior. Firstly, it reflects the understanding of justice and membership shared by the community members and secondly, as Walzer points out,[48] it is limited by the moral obligations that the state has towards those non-citizens who live in its territory and whose expulsion would be unfair in relation to those who have come to work in this country, i.e., who is an economic agent. And, finally, this policy operates for refugees when they acquire this status as

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first one "the empire is not a world of shared meanings." See Michael Walzer, "Shared Meanings in a Poly-Ethnic Democratic Setting: A Response," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 22, no. 2 (1994), 402. Nevertheless, it is hard to agree with that. The fact that, as a rule, pluralism, diversity and individual freedoms are not always maintained in an empire (the question of whether a democratic empire is possible in this case we leave without consideration) does not mean that it is not a community. A shared understanding of good and justice is formed in the case of an empire under the influence of ideology (as an example we can point to the USSR, modern China or a number of Arab states where religion replaces ideology), the ubiquitous dissemination of which is provided by the coercive power of political power. The ideology supported by the state power sets common meanings amongst the members of society and thus ensures the cohesion of the community.

[46] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 31

[47] *Ibid.*, 40. As Walzer writes elsewhere, "Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could not be *communities of character*, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life." *Ibid.*, 62.

[48] See *Spheres of Justice*, Chapter 2.

a result of our actions. Yet the moral obligations limiting the immigration policy are related to individuals and social groups, depending upon us to some extent and so stemming from the circumstances faced by a particular state and these individuals. In this sense, there are no universal standards of justice requiring the states to establish specific membership criteria.[49] After all, standards of justice are formed in a political community as a "community of character" (Walzer) and as such, only a political community can determine the criteria in question. It is not by chance that Walzer notes that "the distribution of membership is not pervasively subject to the constraints of justice."[50] In this regard, the boundaries of the community are the boundaries of justice beyond which relationships between subjects are built on mercy, a sense of mutual aid and charity. Within this context, Walzer logically mentions the story of a Good Samaritan,[51] which is an adequate illustration of individual relationship built upon mercy and a feeling of mutuality. This is no place to demand justice.

In the critical literature, Walzer is usually opposed to Joseph Carens, who presents the opposite view of the problem of open borders and membership criteria. Comparison of these two extreme viewpoints is justified in our case. Unlike Walzer, Carens assumes that it is not our involvement in the relations with others that restricts the state policy on immigration, but the liberal political culture itself.[52] Openness of borders for those who

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[49] Walzer's position is not without contradictions because, on the one hand, he denies the existence of norms independent from the community, and on the other, he speaks of moral restrictions and even demands for justice, in relation to those who depend on the community without being a member. In this respect, Richard Rorty's approach is more consistent. Explaining the "problem of migrants," Rorty would most likely point out that in the struggle between supporters and opponents of open borders there is no conflict between loyalty to a particular community and universal principles of justice, but a conflict between different loyalty to the local community ("We") and other people ("They"). More intense emotional involvement implies that "We" is naturally given priority, and our sense of justice in relation to "They" is increasingly weakened as the differences deepen, especially in crises, between them and "We." Disproving the Kantian and Rawlsian universalism, Rorty notes: "We cannot resolve conflicting loyalties by turning away from them all toward something categorically distinct from loyalty – the universal moral obligation to act justly." See Richard Rorty, "Justice as a Lager Loyalty," *Philosophy as Cultural Politics: Philosophical Papers*, in Richard Rorty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), vol. 4, 47.
  The internal inconsistency of Walzer's views on "immigration justice" is also indicated by Peter Higgins. See Peter W. Higgins, *Immigration Justice* (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2013), 24; Joseph H. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders," *The Review of Politics* 49, no. 2 (1987), 269.

[50] Walzer. *Spheres of Justice*, 61.

[51] *Ibid.*, 33.

[52] Carens considers only the case of North American and European societies. However, this is understandable, since they are one of the main directions of the movement of refugees and immigration flows in the modern world.
  At the same time, Carens is close to Walzer in his theory of "social membership." In particular, he points out that the involvement of illegal immigrants or temporary workers

want to become a member of a political society is not a matter of mercy or care, but a direct requirement of justice, since the idea of moral value of all individuals is characteristic of our liberal culture. As Carens emphasizes,

> respecting the particular choices and commitments that individuals make flows naturally from a commitment to the idea of equal moral worth…What is *not* readily compatible with the idea of equal moral worth is the exclusion of those who want to join.[53]

In this respect, the boundaries for both Carens and Rawls have no basic constitutive role in relation to the community. The boundaries here are nothing but physical obstacles for the people, who wish to exercise their right to live in any area and in any state that they desire. As Carens reminds us, "borders have guards and the guards have guns."[54]

The moral significance of boundaries is questioned by democratic culture. This culture is preserved not by maintaining the borders but, on the contrary, by crossing over them and by potential inclusion of the widest possible range of people in the community. Notably, Carens sees no moral grounds for protecting the democratic community from those potential immigrants who do not share democratic values and ideals, being that the exclusion of these individuals will in itself undermine the democratic ethos.[55] However, he leaves open the question of threats posed to this ethos by those who share other social ideals. Although he admits that even a democratic culture contains morally justified exclusion criteria (for example, related to public safety or economic necessity), generally speaking the erection of walls does, in his opinion, carry much more of a threat to justice and democracy than open boundaries.

In simple terms, one may say that while Walzer is ready to sacrifice justice for the sake of the community, Carens is quite in the spirit of Kant in being ready to sacrifice the community for the sake of justice. Both

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in the social relations of a certain political community suggests that in social terms they are already members of the community. "This social membership gives rise to moral claims in relation to the political community (claims to citizenship – D.K.), and that these claims deepen over time." See Joseph H. Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 158. However, unlike Walzer, he connects the sources of these obligations with democratic principles, but not with a sense of reciprocity.

[53] Carens, *Aliens and Citizens*, 270. In another place he notes: "We cannot dismiss the aliens on the ground that they are other, because *we* are the products of a liberal culture." *Ibid.*, 269. And the citizenship is considered by them as a feudal privilege. See Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 226.

[54] Carens, *Aliens and Citizens*, 251.

[55] Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 176-177.

positions look too radical and can hardly be adopted unconditionally because one gravitates towards relativism, while the other is drawn towards universalism asserting the dominance of a single approach. Global events in recent years speak of utopianism and the danger inherent to ideas about building a global world political community. As Walzer points out in *Spheres of Justice*, Henry Sidgwick wittily remarked that to tear down the walls of the state is not to create a world without walls, but rather to create a thousand petty fortresses.[56] Today we are witnessing such fortresses being built. The only problem is that the restoration of borders and the construction of new walls do not establish justice but only increase the injustice in the world. The implication here is that we need to approach the issue of border fairness and membership criteria from a different perspective than the one adopted by nationalism and liberal universalism.

The re-bordering process that prioritizes the problem of identity makes exclusion a key factor of political order. However, in the age of unprecedented interconnectedness and interdependence, as well as inequalities between countries characteristic of a globalized world, borders often serve as an instrument of political and economic domination. Walzer interprets membership quite reasonably as a distributed good. But the problem with his theory is that Walzer sees political communities as isolated and independent. Under this approach, relations with the Other as community should be based on the model of a Good Samaritan. When guided by humanistic notions, we can help by providing the one in need with access to the good (membership) if that is necessary, but we are not strictly obliged to do so. However, in the modern globalized world, economically developed countries close their borders for immigrants from poor countries (mainly the third world countries) and pursue a policy of economic protectionism, and still take advantage of the opportunities offered by the global market and economically transparent borders with other countries, particularly those countries from which the immigrants come.

Hence, some countries and regions establish dominance over others, where the opportunities and resources are no longer equally available and global injustice therefore deepens. The question of membership today is not that of humanism but of justice.[57] Accordingly, the policy of exclusion will only be fair if it does not contribute to global inequality.

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[56] Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 39.

[57] Iris Young, Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz and many others who address the issue of global justice, share the idea that interdependence gives rise to obligations of justice. The main theme of their works is the justification of the fact that we have strict obligations outside our national communities (states), and the search for the grounds for these obligations, as, for example, Young or Allen Buchanan do, not in state political institutions, but in social structures linking people across national borders. As Young notes, referring to transnational social relations, "all agents who contribute by their actions to the structural

The borders, Walzer is right on this point, are associated with the formation of (political) communities united by a shared understanding of the principles of justice. But, as we can already see, the definition of membership criteria is carried out in the circumstances of justice (therefore we can speak about the injustice of immigration policy), that is, in the conditions that make justice possible and necessary. In this case, we are far from seeking grounds for the principles of just borders on the basis of the liberal idea of equality of rights because we will inevitably face accusations of seeking to establish the domination of one tradition over another which is what we would like to avoid.

These grounds for principles of justice are related to the basic characteristics of human existence. For example, Therborn rightly points out that inequality is what kills.[58] Regardless of how we understand justice, a situation of actual inequality in society or between societies (especially in access to medical goods) can significantly shorten the lives of people or even lead to death. This suggests that the definitional criteria of just membership can neither be the result of the universalization of specific values and norms, nor can it be voluntarism. As Thomas Rentsch[59] shows, we are actually limited in our possibilities of constituting morality by universal and a priori anthropological constitutive prerequisites. They determine social existence to be possible only if certain basic conditions are met as we call fair. These basic conditions not only include belonging to the community, but also adhering to those principles based on which we form criteria for membership.

Conclusion

The actualization of the issue of borders, designated by us as the re-bordering process, has become a reaction to the internal problems faced by political communities in our globalized world. These problems have arisen as a result of the transnationalization and globalization of the political and economic processes. There is also the narrowing of possibilities for the democratic control of political elites by the population and an increase of the colossal inter-country inequalities in living standards and emigration from Third World countries and so the corresponding growth

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processes that produce injustice have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices." See I.M. Young, "Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 23, no. 1 (2006), 102-103. Nevertheless, the question that we pose here is not related to global justice, but to how or on what basis the criteria of membership (or immigration regime) can be just.

[58] Göran Therborn, *The Killing Fields of Inequality* (Cambridge: Polity Press 2013), 212p.

[59] Thomas Rentsch, *Die Konstitution der Moralität: Transzendentale Anthropologie und praktische Philosophie* (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag KG, 1990), 350s. The idea that our moral norms are not arbitrary is also present in Walzer's *Spheres of Justice*.

of ideological and institutional contradictions between states and regions. Against this background, the value of Kant's ideal of a world republic in the theory of global justice is debatable. But there is no doubt that the globalization process has revealed the significance of the community and the constitutive role of borders. No matter how hard we try, we cannot build the global world without borders. We can make existing borders as a place of communication and cooperation or, conversely, turn them into walls impregnable for others. Nonetheless, the impregnable walls often lead to the domination of some states or communities over others in the globalized world and this domination will always create a situation in which millions of disadvantaged people will look for ways to destroy the border walls. In the end, these people will achieve their goal while causing a new wave of social and political conflicts. The 21st century threatens to be no less, if not more destructive than the 20th century.

The globalized world is extremely diverse. The borders of communities (identities) not only have constitutive significance, but also a moral value. That is why the topic of borders so easily become the object of political speculation on the part of right-wing populists. They tend to turn the borders into static markers. Meanwhile, the globalism of the world makes borders and identities float more than ever before. This development present new opportunities for us, but also carries significant threats if these borders are unfair, both in relation to members of the "We" and in relation to "They."

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Extinction of the Welfare State: Revisiting the History of Modernization Theory

Artem Gergun

It is widely believed that modernization theory is an outdated theoretical concept developed by a number of American positivists at the end of World War II. Many researchers view it as a naïve attempt to reconstruct the post-war global order according to a scientifically proven recipe for promoting and supporting liberal welfare states around the world. Indeed, after "the end of history" promise in the beginning of 1990s it seemed that the need for welfarism had faded away. However, recent two decades have proved that neoliberal utopia is not so simply attainable in the beginning of XXI century, because the rise of far-right movements in the West, as well as the failure of democratization in the post-communist East has transformed it into a dystopian mix of nationalism, xenophobia and populism.

Why the laissez-faire concept of capitalism resurrected on the dawn of the XXI century and gained its momentum as the philosophy of history concept, paving the way for the societal change in developing societies? Why modernization and democratization promise of the West ended up with disappearing of the welfare state model in the East? Ironically, these questions stipulate the need to approach the problem of modernity not only as a task for political theory but rather a problem for philosophy of history. I believe that rethinking the relation of neoliberalism to its theoretical predecessor, the modernization theory, sheds the light on some key aspects of these transformations.

From "The End of Ideology" to "The End of History"

In 1989 Francis Fukuyama published his most famous essay "The End of History?" which signified the triumph of the West in the aftermath of the Cold War. There he tried to invigorate, though unacknowledged, the main promise of modernization theory back to the 1950s-1960's, "the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government,"[1] by putting it on a firmer theoretical foundation. All along the 1990s, his aim was to transform a collective effort of a number of American social scientists, who wrote under the general rubric of "mod-

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[1] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), 3.

ernization theory," into the project of "universal history" by invoking Al-
exandre Kojève's interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of history. In fact,
this original theoretical twist allowed Fukuyama to turn an outdated ver-
sion of Talcott Parsons' inspired structural functionalism into a full-
fledged philosophy of history.

Like the modernization theorists of post-World War II period, Fuku-
yama envisaged a universal historical process which unavoidably moved
the world toward a political and social order exemplified by the West and
particularly by the United States. In his view, only scarcity of their theo-
retical apparatus averted American intellectuals from conversion of mod-
ernization theory into a kind of universal philosophy of history. "It is strik-
ing," he wrote,

> that in all the rich literature on democracy and the democratic
> transitions published in recent years…it is difficult to find a sin-
> gle social scientist who will any longer admit to being a 'mod-
> ernization theorist'. I find this odd because most observers of
> political development actually do believe in some version of
> modernization theory.[2]

Since the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union collapsed, there was
good empirical evidence that modernization was a coherent process which
produced a certain uniformity of economic and political institutions across
different regions and cultures and that it was a good and desirable thing.

Fukuyama has shifted modernization theory to the whole new level
by taking its core, "the convergence hypothesis," and transforming it into
a Hegelian philosophy of history. However, originally the convergence
theory had its roots in the functionalist perspective of industrialized soci-
ety and assumed that process of modernization invokes a profound change
of societal values. For modernization theorists, this view was grounded in
Max Weber's thesis of "rationalization" as the only historical process
which leads to modernity and results in structuring social life according
to a certain set of values.

According to Talcott Parsons' interpretation, Weber's main project
was to attack Karl Marx's analysis of capitalism. Weber proposed that
cultural factors rather than economic ones determine the historical speci-
ficities of capitalism. Such approach was not an accident in the intellectual
atmosphere of the Cold War. In Parsons' own words,

> underneath the ideological conflicts [between capitalism and
> communism] that have been so prominent, there has been

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[2] Francis Fukuyama, "The Illusion of Exceptionalism," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 3
(1997), 146.

> emerging an important element of wide consensus at the level of values, centering in the complex we often refer to as 'modernization'.[3]

According to this reading of Weber the "spirit of capitalism" driven by a certain set of religious values, namely of Calvin's and Luther's Protestantism, which stood behind the emergence of modern capitalism in the XVI century Europe. Later such modernization theorists as Lucian Pye and Clifford Geertz followed this reading of Weber and claimed that achieving "modernity" required injecting the spirit of capitalism into traditional cultures of postcolonial peoples.

If modernity is viewed as a fortunate consequence of rationalization and industrialization, then in the long run both pro-West and pro-East camps will "converge" on the same set of modern values to govern the social life. For such fathers-founders of modernization theory as Edward Shils and Gabriel Almond, "convergence" presumes that as nations move from the early stages of industrialization toward becoming fully industrialized, they begin to resemble each other in terms of societal norms and technology. As long as industrialization require technology as the main driver of historical process, conflicting political ideologies can be surpassed by the process of disenchantment of tradition and by removing its syncretic unity with concepts based on rationality and reason as principal motivators for behavior in a society. Although there might be several paths to modernity, eventually, developed countries are destined to look similar everywhere from a cultural and material point view.

As Jürgen Habermas observe, the modernization theorists separated the concept of modernity from its origins and considered it as the description of a specific period of European history and "stylized it into a spatiotemporally neutral model for the process of social development in general."[4] Most of modernization theorists believed that this process would eventually finish ideological and military rivalry between two opposing blocs of the Cold War. That is, industrialized socialist societies would reduce their structural inefficiencies by invoking some of free market practices; whereas liberal democracies would overcome the backdrops of laissez-fair capitalism by balancing market failures with enhancing welfare state and social security programs.

Moreover, modernization theorists asserted that the industrial development would lead to a post ideological democratization of the world. Labeled as "the end of ideology," this process was supposed to be the

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[3] Quoted in Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 103.

[4] Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1987), 2.

direct consequence of the unification of material conditions created by industrialism. In spite of labeling communism as a "morbid path" to modernity, classic modernization theorists didn't view it as a deviation from modernity. As Shils stated,

> There is no straight and easy road to the city of modernity. Whatever the main road chosen, there will be many tempting and ruinous side roads; there will be many marshes and wastes on either side, and many wrecked aspirations will lie there, rusting and gathering dust…Yet, some roads are better than others; some destinations are better than others.[5]

Although modernization theorists rejected communism in general, they tended to see the Soviet Union being increasingly similar to the United States as they both were the manifestations of modernity.

Unlike classical modernization theorists, Fukuyama says nothing about "convergence" as a mutual historical process, in which different roads to modernity meet each other halfway. "History" in Fukuyama's terms consists of the history of an ideological battle between conflicting visions of civilization and social order. As Nils Gilman puts it,

> Fukuyama's outré Hegelian claim was that the United States was standing at 'the end of history', a fact that permitted American intellectuals (i.e., himself) to apprehend the meaning of the historical process, namely that 'liberalism in the classical sense' was the historical calling of mankind. On the contrary, standing at the end of history in 1989, Fukuyama supposed that the ideological outcome of the historical process was neoliberalism. Everyone in the world that mattered could agree, according to Fukuyama, that liberal democracy and unfettered capitalism had become accepted as the only viable, legitimate ways of organizing human societies.[6]

Although Fukuyama claims to be an heir of modernization theory, his vision of modernity is somewhat different. It seems puzzling that standing at "the end of history" Fukuyama did not acknowledge that American modernity itself was a subject to historical change, namely its definition of the 1980s-1990s was somewhat different from the one in the 1950s-1960s.

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[5] Quoted in Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 103.

[6] *Ibid.*, 268.

The End of the Welfare State

Modernization theorists throughout the 1950s-1960s tended to link political liberalism with a basic commitment to social welfare. They agreed upon the inevitability of creating a welfare state in the aftermath of modernization process. In Daniel Bell's words, there was

> a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of *a welfare state*; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and political pluralism.[7]

According to Reinhard Bendix, modernization means

> the growth of *the welfare state* in the industrialized societies of the world, which in one way or another provides a pattern of accommodation among competing groups as well as a model to be emulated by the political and intellectual leaders of follower societies.[8]

Above-mentioned considerations are in line with broader definition of modernity provided by Edward Shils:

> Modern states are *welfare states,* proclaiming the welfare of all the people and especially the lower classes as their primary concern. 'Modern' states are meant necessarily to be democratic states in which not merely are the people cared for and looked after by their rulers, but they are, as well, the source of inspiration and guidance of those rulers. Modernity entails democracy, and democracy in the new states is, above all, equalitarian. Modernity, therefore, entails the dethronement of the rich and the traditionally privileged from their positions of preeminent influence….Modernity involves universal public education. Modernity is scientific. It believes the progress of the country rests on rational technology, and ultimately on scientific knowledge. No country could be modern without being economically advanced or progressive. To be advanced economically means to have an economy based on modern technology, to be industrialized and to have a high standard of living. All this requires planning and the employment of economists and statisticians…. 'Modern' means being western without the onus of following the West. It

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[7] *Ibid.*, 58.

[8] Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*, 16.

is the model of the West detached in some way from its geo-graphical origins and locus.[9]

The welfare state was celebrated throughout the post-war period as the political solution to societal contradictions. The idea of a mixed private-public economy, coordinated by professional economists trained in macroeconomic theory, was widely believed to represent the best way to alleviate poverty and other socio-economic ills. Keynesian economics seemed to promise macroeconomic tools for effective state control over the economy that did not need to involve more radical and direct interventions into the production process. Thus, modernization theory was a point of surpassing the rivalry between different political ideologies as the technocratic state could solve all social problems.

It is important to admit that in post-World War II period the concept of the United States as a welfare state was taken for granted within domestic as well as foreign policy domains. During the 1960s President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration declared an ostensible "war on poverty" with its "great society" programs, including free education and healthcare. However, it is widely believed that these plans were doomed as the United States were dragged into the military conflict in Vietnam. Postwar foreign aid programs also were designed to promote liberal democratic welfare state, in particular, Marshall Plan for Western Europe which exemplified the above-mentioned approach to modernization. In other words, modernization theory as it was articulated in the 1950s and 1960s was the golden age of the welfare state.

The structural components of welfare state were widely considered to limit and mitigate class conflict, to balance the asymmetrical power relation of labor and capital and thus to overcome the condition of disruptive struggle and contradictions that was the most prominent feature of prewelfare laissez-faire capitalism. This seemed to be the converging view of political elites both in countries in which the welfare state was fully developed and in those where it was still an incompletely realized model. Even in the United States, the debate at that time was not centered on the basic desirability and functional indispensability, but on the pace and modalities of the implementation of the welfare state model.

During the 1970s welfare state, which was previously regarded as a device of political problem-solving, became problematic. The sharp economic recession gave the rise to an intellectually and politically powerful renaissance of neo-laissez-faire and monetarist doctrines, according to which the welfare state can and should be abolished so that the resurrection of the free and harmonious market society can take place. The idea of welfare state was subjected to many critical attacks from a wide range

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[9] *Ibid.*, 1-2.

of perspectives: for instance, the right-wing assertions that welfarism is an obstacle to generating wealth and could produce disincentives; and the left-wing accusations on repressiveness of the concept of welfare state.

Such neoliberal thinkers as Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman criticized welfarism for two main reasons. First, the welfare state apparatus imposes a burden of taxation and regulation upon capital which amounts to a disincentive to investment. Second, at the same time the welfare state grants claims, entitlements and collective power positions to workers and unions which amount to disincentive to work, or at least to work as hard and productively as they would be under the reign of unfettered market forces. As Claus Offe puts it,

> taken together, these two effects lead into dynamic of declining growth and increased expectations, of economic 'demand overload' (known as inflation) as well as political demand overload ('ungovernability'), which can be satisfied less and less by the available output.[10]

Ironically, another blow to the welfare state was made by the New Left intellectual movement of the 1960s-1970s. For instance, Herbert Marcuse clearly followed Karl Marx and his view on the idea of distributive justice as "ideological nonsense" in his "Critique of the Gotha Program" back in 1891.[11] In spite of the undeniable gains in the living conditions of wage earners, the institutional structure of the welfare state has done little or nothing to alter the income distribution between the two principal classes of labor and capital. If "the structure of distribution" is completely determined by "the structure of production," those who own land or capital goods will define the balance of power in any society. Thus, the huge welfarist machinery of redistribution will not work in the vertical, but in the horizontal direction, namely, within the class of wage earners.

Moreover, the welfare state is seen not only as a source of benefit and services but, at the same time, as a source of false conceptions about historical reality which have damaging effects for working-class consciousness, organization and struggle. First of all, the welfare state creates the false image of two separated spheres of working-class life: on the one side, the sphere of work, the economy, production and "primary" income distribution and on the other, the sphere of citizenship, the state and "secondary distribution." This division of the socio-political world obscures

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[10] Claus Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, ed. John Keane (London: Hutchinson, 1984), 149.

[11] See the chapter "One-Dimensional Society," Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (New York: Routledge Classics, 1964; reprinted 2002), 3-127.

the causal and functional links and ties that exist between the two and thus prevents the formation of a political understanding which views society as a coherent totality-to-be-changed. On contrast, the symbolic indoctrination of the welfare state suggests the ideas of class cooperation, the disjunction of economic and political struggles and the evidently more illbased confidence in an ever-continuing cycle of economic growth and social security.

Particularly, it is interesting to admit that Marcuse in his claim of the end of class conflict repeats the arguments for "the end of ideology" by such modernization theorists as Daniel Bell. Marcuse, like Bell, takes that the changes in the structure of the labor force as well as the institutions of the welfare state have domesticated the working class and the labor movement. The classical Marxist doctrine of class conflict became inapplicable to modern society. Both Marcuse on one hand and Bell on the other seem to envisage the ending, or at least radical modification, of the conflict between the labor movement and capital as the ending of ideological conflict. Hence, "the end of ideology" doctrine is implicitly and surprisingly accepted by Marcuse.

Suffering from the blows by both the right and the left sides of political spectrum the idea of welfare state slowly faded away from the intellectual debates on the nature of modernity. Consequently, politicians in most developed countries of the West almost unanimously chose the return to laissez-faire liberalism in political theory as a perfect excuse to blame the welfare state for the economic crisis of 1970s. For example, "Labour does not work!" was one of the campaign slogans that brought Margaret Thatcher into the office of the British Prime Minister.

Later, in the 1980s-1990s a number of intellectual harbingers of the globalization era continued to promote a neoliberal formula of "advanced capitalism minus the welfare state." The latter was perceived not as an embodiment to modernity itself, but rather a major impediment on the path for its achieving.

The case of Fukuyama is highly illustrative in this regard. For him, the reason for "the end of history" and universal embrace of neoliberalism and free-market capitalism, invoking Hegel, is that these systems are better suited than any others for allowing individuals to achieve the mutual social "recognition" that is the existential aim of human life. However, unlike classical modernization theorists, Fukuyama suggests that the welfare state does not give as much scope for "recognition" as unrestricted neoliberalism.

In his book on social capital and its role in a society *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* Fukuyama directly blames the structures of the welfare state for "wasting social capital." He argues that it is very clear who are the main enemies for building trust and solidarity among society: to address or to correct social difficulties with tools such

as the welfare state by supporting the weakest will promote a passive dependence on the state and thus contribute to the erosion of their self-help networks (for example, helping young mothers discourages the constitution of new families).

During the second half of the 1990s, Fukuyama envisaged Germany as the main victim of the blindfolded support for the welfare state. In his opinion, the welfare state structures in Germany were liable for

> consuming half the nation's gross domestic product by the early 1990s. German labor had become very expensive, and employers were burdened with the mandatory costs of health care, unemployment, training, and vacation benefits, as well as sharp constraints on their ability to lay off workers and downsize their companies.[12]

Whereas Fukuyama claims that the welfare state is an ominous political tool to be utterly erased from the political agenda, other followers of neoliberal critique of the welfare state, in a much more subtle way, present social capital as a costless proxy to replace the old and expensive welfare system. More accurately, they use the concept as a crucial pillar to support the institutions' and policy makers' need to justify and disguise the transfer of burden of social welfare from the public to the voluntary sector – now glorified as the realm of civicness and cooperation.

In other words, the updated version of modernization theory inspired by such theorists as Fukuyama dethrone welfare as the ultimate goal of history. They put wealth on this pedestal. The illnesses of welfare state are to be cured by giving more freedom for accumulating wealth.

By the beginning of 1990s, the concept of modernization as creating socio-economic preconditions for a welfare state had been completely forgotten. After the collapse of Soviet Union, a laissez-faire path to modernization seemed to be inevitable for newly created post-soviet republics. In line with the concept of "the end of history" Western support of democratization processes in the East was based on neoliberal recipes which proposed to get rid of state-owned enterprises and cut the ineffective public spending and social care systems, which previously were the backbone of the socialist version of the welfare state.

Surprisingly, this understanding of the historical purpose of the state easily settled and flourished in such a post-Soviet country as Ukraine. Starting from the 1990s the structures of the welfare state in Ukraine were gradually dismantled roughly for the same reasons as it was the case in many developed countries of the West, that is, inefficiency and repressive

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[12] Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: A Free Press Paperbacks Book, 1995), 242.

practices were blamed for suppressing economic and political freedoms. The promise of the welfare state was dethroned with a conception of free market as the main tool for mending all the inefficiencies of the state. Eventually, the communist utopia of universal welfare state turned into dystopian mix of oligarchy, kleptocracy and populism, along with the idea of laissez-faire capitalism (not for the many but for the few) behind the scenes to generate the historical dynamic of Ukraine.

As a result, the question of welfare is disappearing from the radars of the government as well as the civil NGO sector in Ukraine. Demanding more wealth for more people is widely believed to be the right path to modernity. Thus, public policy discourse has been rearticulated in terms of extending economic freedoms in order to gain wider access to wealth accumulation rather than extending state networks for supporting "the least advantaged" members of the society.

It is important to know that Ukraine is not unique in this regard. For example, contemplating on the history of Japan's modernization Kenichi Mishima admits the interdependence between the neoliberal modernity and the experience of state paternalism in the past. In his opinion, in times of crisis, the administrative exclusion of public discussion not only prevails the interest of the state to the disadvantage of the weak but also creates a Social-Darwinist mentality. As long as the process of Japan's postwar modernization required rapid state-controlled industrialization, economic competition under such circumstances was widely seen as a law of "natural selection." That is why the idea of the welfare state is perceived as a rigid attempt doomed to failure, because it contradicts the rule of survival of the fittest.[13]

The End of Labor?

As mentioned above leftist thinkers such as Herbert Marcuse despises the idea of the welfare state and ridicules it as no more than charity and almsgiving. From this point of view, the idea of the welfare state is not to support the weakest, but rather to pacify them preventing from revolting against labor-capital system of exploitation. However, to treat welfare as an instrument of social control is at very best a half-truth and a dangerous one insofar as it distracts from concern over welfare. Historically, the institutions of welfare not only could not have come into being without continuous struggle, especially by the organized labor, but were maintained by the continuous pressure.

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[13] See Kenichi Mishima, "Establishing a Social-Darwinist Mentality in Japan's Paternalist State: The Potential of Resistance by a Counter-Public," *Critical Asian Studies* 48, no. 3 (2016), 338-355.

In 1984 Claus Offe claimed the death of the welfare state and wrote about its "embarrassing secret": while the impact of the welfare state upon capitalist accumulation may well become destructive, its abolition would be also plainly disruptive. "The contradiction is that while capitalism cannot coexist with, neither can it exist without, the welfare state."[14] It seems plausible to claim that the enigma of the welfare state's extinction is related to its functional purpose in the system of modern capitalism.

Taking such a view for granted the question of modernity is transformed into more analytically adequate question of the nature of capital in the XXI century as well as its relation to the question of modernity. Recently Thomas Picketty has proved through aggregating a huge amount of macroeconomic data that modern world is returning towards the XIX century laissez-faire "patrimonial capitalism," in which much of the economy is dominated by inherited wealth. The central thesis of his book *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* is that inequality is not an accident, but rather a constant feature of capitalism. Piketty bases his argument on a formula that relates the rate of return on capital to economic growth. He argues that when the rate of growth is low, wealth tends to accumulate more quickly from capital than from labor and more among the top 10% and 1%, thus it increases inequality. According to Picketty, this historical trend reversed only once between 1930 and 1975 due to unique circumstances: the two world wars prompted governments to undertake steps towards redistributing income. Otherwise, it would lead to the same social discontent as back in the XIX century.[15]

Despite showering a forest of numbers on his reader, Picketty's research seems to grasp rather symptoms, not the nature of the illness itself. If modernity is to be understood as a historically specific ontological form of capitalism, then we need to explain what transformations within labor-capital relations generated such phenomena as the extinction of the welfare state and rise of neoliberalism. Moreover, it would be extremely naïve to suppose that these tendencies were instigated by Francis Fukuyama and his thesis of "the end of history" or a number of neoclassical theories of laissez-faire economists from the University of Chicago.

If Offe diagnosed the death of the welfare state in the 1980s why more than thirty years later do we not see any major disruption to the structural relation between labor and capital, which seems to be logical to take the leftist view as a point of departure? Might the extinction of the welfare state be related to a transformation of modern capitalism itself? Not coincidentally, the topic of the forthcoming Fourth Industrial Revolution for a great deal is focused on the transformation of labor-capital

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[14] Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, 153.
[15] Thomas Picketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

relation. For example, starting from 2015 numerous discussions at the World Economic Forum have pointed out that the revolution could yield greater inequality, particularly in its potential to disrupt labor markets. Since the middle 1970s the levels of productivity soared among developed countries of the West, at the same time the number of manufacturing jobs significantly diminished. As automation substituted for labor across the entire economy, the net displacement of workers by machines might exacerbate the gap between returns to capital and to labor.

To my mind, modern capitalism should be understood in its own historical terms and specificity. Likewise, hermeneutics method explores the constituencies of a human lifeworld (Lebenswelt) philosophy of history should understand modernity as a historically specific form of capitalism. As Moishe Postone recently admitted that an adequate critical theory of capitalism

> should not be understood only in terms of a critique of the dominant mode of distribution – namely, private ownership of the means of production and the market – as has arguably been the case with traditional Marxism. Rather, especially as viewed from the vantage point of the present, I suggest that capitalism should first and foremost be understood as a historically specific form of social life, at the heart of which is historically unique abstract form of domination that finds expression in a global historical dynamic…, this form of life is not intrinsically or ontologically Western, but has itself reshaped the West. It cannot, therefore, be adequately grasped in reified culturalist terms.[16]

This departure with "classical Marxism" allows the use of Marxian analytical apparatus of his "mature works" for the critique of political economy without referring to ambiguous concepts of history as class fight or unfolding of dialectic materialism, which are an unattainable part of "traditional Marxism." For Postone, Marxist dialectical materialism was focused excessively on "private ownership," the "market" and "distribution." It had a "transhistorical" view of labor, that is, seeing labor both before and after capitalism in terms that were only appropriate for capitalism. Thereby it repeated classical political economy's "eternalization" of capitalist social relations. Marx was seen as a completion of the labor theory of value of Smith and Ricardo, rather than a radical break with that theory. "Political economy" rather than the critique of political economy was the focal point.

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[16] Moishe Postone, "The Current Crisis and the Anachronism of Value: A Marxian Reading," *Continental Thought and Theory* 1, no. 4, *150 Years of Capital* (2017), 39.

Postone is right claiming that "traditional Marxism" criticized capitalist society "from the standpoint of labor." It saw labor as something "extrinsic" to capitalism; it did not critique the "constituting" role of labor as something unique to capitalism and something to be abolished. "Traditional Marxism" imagined its task to be that of freeing industrial production from capitalist social relations rather than seeing industrial production itself as a capitalist social relationship. On the contrary, a close reading of Marx's mature critique of political economy calls into question the transhistorical presuppositions of the traditional interpretation. In Post-one's own words,

> Marx explicitly states in the Grundrisse that his fundamental categories are not transhistorical, but historically specific. Even categories such as money and labor that appear transhistorical because of their abstract and general character, are valid in their abstract generality only for capitalist society….At the heart of his analysis is the idea that labor in capitalism has a unique socially mediating function that is not intrinsic to laboring activity trans historically.[17]

Unfortunately, I would not go further into details of Postone's argument about the dialectic of abstract/concrete labor in the late works of Marx as the scope of this paper is quite limited.[18] Suffice to mention that this approach of viewing labor in capitalism as a "unique social mediator," its function is not intrinsic to laboring activity trans-historically as it is perceived in "traditional Marxism." Hence, what labor produces, its objectifications (commodity and capital) are both concrete labor products and objectified forms of social mediation, which are characterized by the opposition of an abstract, general, homogeneous dimension and a concrete, particular, material dimension, both of which appear to be "natural" rather than social and condition conceptions of social as well as natural reality. For example, value is historically specific to capitalism, which means that not only that non-capitalist societies are not structured by value, but also that a post-capitalist society will also not be based on value as an objectified result of labor. This, in turn, entails that the secular tendency of capital's development is to render value as well as labor increasingly anachronistic.

What does it mean for structural relations between labor and capital in the XXI century? The drive for ongoing increases in productivity leads

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[17] *Ibid.*, 44.

[18] For more details see Moishe Postone, "Abstract Labor," *Time, Labor and Social Domination. A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 123-185.

to the increasing importance of science and technology in production. It turns out that technology in principle can substitute labor in its relation to capital as the result of historical unfolding of modernity. That is why the welfare state seems also to be anachronistic in the same way as value and labor are to capital. This opens the possibility of large-scale socially general reductions in labor time and fundamental changes in the nature and social organization of labor, which suggests that the abolition of capitalism would not entail the self-realization of the proletariat (as it is the case in "traditional Marxism"), but rather its self-abolition. On the other hand, Postone envisages another possibility:

> because the dialectic of transformation and reconstitution not only drives productivity forward, but also reconstitutes value, it thereby also structurally reconstitutes the necessity of valuecreating labor, that is, proletarian labor. The historical dynamic of capitalism, then, increasingly points beyond the necessity of proletarian labor while reconstituting that very necessity. It both generates the possibility of another organization of social life and yet hinders that possibility from being realized.[19]

In any case, this tension distorts perceived relation of labor to capital, which in turn generates such dangers of "liquid modernity" as rapid growth of precariat, superfluous innovatively of creative class and digitalization of social life.

The promise of neoliberal utopia is about reaching "singularity" and "creating a better world," in which the scarcity of resources as well as labor are not the problems anymore. However, from sociological and anthropological points of view human beings are naturally productive, sociable beings who find fulfillment and meaning in their lives through labor. Thus, if labor is to be substituted by technology, so is the meaning of life. Not coincidentally, Fukuyama's "the end of history" is followed by "a last man" thesis. Social being of a post-labor society would entail the end of human social life as we know it today.

Paradoxically the welfare state could be resurrected in the wake of such post-labor and post-human society. The neoliberals are right about one thing: in a globalized world, a retreat into autarky would be a new equivalent of Luddism. In a world economy, therefore, institutions of income redistribution must be built on a global level. Fukuyama himself recognizes that modernity is not a substitute for letting some people have an opportunity to get rich, otherwise it is difficult to defend it from the

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[19] Postone, "The Current Crisis and the Anachronism of Value: A Marxian Reading," 50.

attacks of populists, far-right politicians or movements like "Occupy Wall Street," to say nothing of ISIL radicals.

Some vision of a global welfare state remains the best defense of rationality and the Enlightenment. Modifying modernization theory around the aim of building global welfare-providing institutions gives a much more compelling justification for "the end of history" than neoliberal denial of an institutional mending of free-market failures. Actualizing the best parts of the 1950s modernization theory might be a good idea in order to create healthier, wealthier, more equal and more democratic world. This can revert the demodernization tendencies for postcolonial and proWestern countries such as Ukraine. The hope for egalitarian inclusion in global decision making and an opportunity for economic improvement as well as access to a greater share of the world's riches should remain alive.

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4

A New Anthropology of the Global World: From Self to Singularity

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When the world changes, humanness also changes and a new anthropology arises. Plato in his Republic had already discovered a way to understand a social order via a type of human which was created by this order. Thus, he divided human beings as oligarchic, democratic and timocratic.

The current situation of humanity is unanimously defined as the "global world." This entails the following question: what happens to humanness in the global world, how does the new reality of humanness appear in the global society?

We shall build our analysis as follows. We will start with the phenomenon of globalization, in order to understand the nature of today's reality and to grasp what the reality of today's global world demands from human beings who live in it. Then we will trace the genesis of today's human type in relation to its previous historical and cultural forms. Finally, we will analyze possible perspectives and potentials of a new condition of human existence created by the global world.

Discourse of globalization

One could assuredly speak about the "global world "after the end of the bipolar world due to the breakup of USSR and the "socialist camp" in the late 20th century (the 1990s). The global world is a historically growing phenomenon; however, the sources and the process of its formation took considerably longer. Numerous views consider globalization as a much older phenomenon, starting from the period of great geographic discoveries, or even earlier. One should distinguish the *development* of a certain phenomenon (the presence of certain analogues or features) and the *phenomenon as such* in the fullness of its meaning.

Globalization was preceded by the bipolar world, which was mostly a competition of liberal and totalitarian social utopias that defined the historical reality of the 20th century. The end of the battle of universal social projects created the situation of various "post-"s, where "postmodern" was the most general concept and "post-humanity" expressed the most

radical worldview.[1] It is clear, however, that the world of "post-" has no meaning by itself but only a sign or a symptom of the exhaustion of previous forms of existence. In fact, "post-" has just one true meaning: the *demand for a new sense*. This new sense of the world was made evident by the process of globalization.

However, it would be insufficient and even erroneous to understand globalization just empirically – as an aggregate of specific economic, social, political and cultural processes. The core of globalization is the question of the sense of human existence and the perspective of world history after the period of great (global historical) social projects. The concept of globalization helps diagnose of our times.

The conceptions of globalization usually are based on a single defining feature, such as intensification and acceleration of life,[2] informationality,[3] risk,[4] etc., as well as the discourse "post-" which ascertains the loss of efficacy of former meanings. Such diverse definitions of globalization are appropriate. Often, they do grasp a truly important, defining feature of the global reality. However, an approach grounded on such definitions has evidence of methodological vulnerability and limitation. It gives us an option to notice and discover an important feature, but not to grasp the sense of the phenomenon as a whole.

The strategies of understanding based on a broader conceptual ground also remain limited in their content. There are four most influential strategies of this sort: the world-system approach, the conception of global capitalism, cultural theory of globalization and theory of world domination. Let us briefly describe their epistemological and explanatory limitations.

The world-system approach[5] considers globalization in its structural and functional dimension. It does not take into account the way the world is united, its grounding cultural values; it basically remains within the limits of the geopolitical game. For the sake of justice, one should add that this view does not apply to the initial theoretical attitude of Wallerstein himself. Numerous epigones of the world-system approach (which exists in several versions) successfully ignore the original theoretical intention of Wallerstein, which he stated at the beginning of his seminal article

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[1] See Katherine Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1999).

[2] Anthony Giddens, *A Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives* (New York: Routledgem, 2000).

[3] Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell*, 1996).

[4] Ulrich Beck, *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986).

[5] Immanuel Wallerstein, "World-Systems Analysis," *Social Theory Today*, eds. Anthony Giddens and Jonathan H. Turner (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 309-324.

where he describes the research strategy he has created: "World-system analysis is not a theory about the social world or its part."[6] For Wallerstein himself, this analysis was primarily a way of methodological protest against disciplinary dissection of a sole social reality (political, economic, social, cultural, etc.). His followers successfully transformed this interesting, although contradictory, attempt at methodological synthesis into rather headstrong historical description. It is similar to the switching from phenomenological attitude back to the natural attitude.

An attempt to interpret the sense of the global world as global capitalism[7] has a flaw which shows itself in semantic overloading of the concept of capitalism. This optics is related to an inertia of explanatory means that does not take into account the profound changes of today's social reality. It is enough to say that since the times of formation and development of social state (which influenced no less than a hundred years of recent human history) it is not theoretically justified to employ a pure concept of capitalism. Also, this concept has mostly economic connotations and does not embrace other, no less important dimensions of human existence. In fact, the apparent worldwide victory of capitalism after the breakup of the USSR and the so-called "socialist camp" does not mean the transformation of all societies (or even all economics) on the capitalist grounds. Rather, we have numerous examples of quasi-capitalism – that is, use of certain principles and methods of capitalist management to build them into a social system which is totally alien to capitalism. China and Russia are the two good examples of this quasi-capitalism. In today's world, there are many social and economic hybrids. It is theoretically unjustified to characterize them as capitalistic societies. Thus, one could speak about universal capitalism in today's world only in the subjunctive mood.

The advantage of cultural theory of globalization[8] is that it considers meaningful grounds of the global world, cultural and historical factors and basic values of human existence. However, there are theoretical limitations for the application of the concept of culture. All reflections are guided by modern European culture which is used as a regulatory idea. A simplified understanding of globalization as the global expansion of European cultural standards and principles (taken as "universal human values") ignores complexity and deep heterogeneity of today's world cultural landscape and underestimates the autonomy of other cultural patterns.

Finally, the way of understanding globalization in terms of power – as a gradual formation of global dominance (the idea of world state or

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[6] Wallerstein, "World-Systems Analysis," 309.

[7] Friedrich Hayek, *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).

[8] Ronald Robertson, *Globalization: Social theory and Global Culture* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2000).

world government)[9] utterly distorts the picture. It confuses and identifies the process of globalization with politics of globalism. This is amazingly widespread and enduring prejudice, persistently evident in various positions – from theoretical frameworks[10] and critical reflections[11] to cultural and political manifestos. The last category could be illustrated by recent (October 2017) Paris statement of intellectuals "A Europe We Can Believe In," which argues as follows:

> …Over the last generation, a larger and larger segment of our governing class has decided that its self-interest lies in accelerated globalization. They wish to build supranational institutions that they are able to control without the inconveniences of popular sovereignty.[12]

Globalization here is tellingly identified with supranational institutions that are securing the new order of dominance. Of course, one should not ignore the realities of globalism, in the sense of striving to world dominance and creation of world institutions or informal structures of economic and political power, such as IMF, WTO, World Bank, UN, G-7, G-20, strong transnational corporations, etc. However, the policy of globalism not only essentially differs from the process of globalization, but mostly contradicts it.

There is also a common theoretical vulnerability of all four mentioned paradigms (despite the differences of their conceptual grounds) all of which consider the global world through the prism of past concepts. The "world-system" works as an invariant of changing historical events and particular configurations of existence created by these events. This concept is scarcely sensitive to content and direction of historical innovations. Capitalism also combines past and present social and economic forms, thus creating an illusion that our world of today is similar to the classical modern world. The idea of culture, as "universal samples of humanness" understood in its modern sense also urges one to consider the present actuality from the position of the former project of the history of the world. From this angle, world domination looks as an inalienable feature of power and world political actors.

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[9] John Coleman, *Conspirators' Hierarchy: The Story of the Committee of 300* (Carson City: American West Publishers, 1992).

[10] Beck, "*Risikogesellschaft*."

[11] Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company Ltd., 2003).

[12] Paris Statement, *Paris Statement of Intellectuals "A Europe We Can Believe In"* (October 7, 2017), https://thetrueeurope.eu/a-europe-we-can-believe-in/.

Of course, each of the mentioned approaches is not just a mechanical application of usual explanatory tools. Each approach considerably transforms a corresponding theoretical vision. However, this is obviously not enough. We should grasp globalization and a globalized world as an utterly unique phenomenon. It is not barred from the previous history, but it is its natural outcome; however, it would be a mistake to reduce the global world to its genesis. The essence of a phenomenon is not identical with its historical roots. With no disregard for historicity and conceptual continuity, we should draw our understanding of the global world from the world itself. Globalization has created and is creating a totally new reality so that we have to create a new logic in order to grasp its essence.

What could be a theoretical starting point for creating a special logic of understanding the global reality?

The New Reality of Planetary Humanity

Let us remark that the very word "global" means "planetary" – that is, something that embraces the whole planet. This may seem as a purely empirical feature, scarcely relevant to the essence of the phenomenon in question. However, it reflects the result of the entire human history. The key concept for understanding the essence and direction of globalization is that of *planetary humanity*.

The concept of humanity is ambivalent. On the one hand, humanity apparently existed as long as human beings existed on Earth. However, for the most of human history humanity did not exist for itself and is rather a common name for different human communities. In this situation, humanity is not a real community united by particular influences and relations; it is a theoretical abstraction and, as such, is an "abstract humanity." Alongside with this meaning, we also use the concept of humanity as applicable to the particular community of people united by certain relations, basic values and common historical life, e.g., Husserl speaks about "European humanity."[13] Such separate humanities exist throughout human history as peculiar ecumenes essentially linked to certain civilization. In this sense, one could speak about Middle Eastern humanity (in the times of the ancient Middle East), Mediterranean humanity (in the times of Pax Romana), Chinese or Far Eastern humanity (during the most part of Celestial Empire history), etc. Local civilizations correspond to local history that mostly does not exceed the borders of great historical and cultural regions.

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[13] Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie. Eine Einleitung in die ph nomenologische Philosophie: Die geschichtsphilosophische Idee und Der teleologische Sinn* (Prague: E-Artnow, 2017).

The situation changed with the appearance of world history. World religions made the first step in this direction (although Stoics with their idea of Cosmopolis also could be considered its precursor). Active prophetism of Christianity or Islam, capable of raising over ethnic boundaries, created supranational Christian or Muslim humanity. (At the present moment, let us leave aside the question of coercion and conquests as means of formation of these religious humanities; historically, weapons proved to be no less effective tool of conversion than preaching). At the same time, world religions constituted humanity at the basis of sacred eschatologies rather than human history.

World history reached the fullness of its sense and success due to modern European civilization. Its ground was the concept of common human nature, developed first by Renaissance humanists and then within the modern European paradigm of natural rights. The important idea was not just that all people have the same essence, despite all ethnic, social, age-specific or sexual differences. Antiphon the Sophist already stated this in the 5th century B.C., basing on the opposition of *physis* (φύσις) and *nomos*. The core idea of European modernity was related to the special character of human nature, which distinguishes human beings from all other beings. The new step was substantiation of the universal position of man in the Universe. The human being appeared as a free creature capable of dominating the world (nature). Since then, world history unfolded as the history of dominating the world.

The history of geographic discovery of our planet shows us the complexity of this process. Starting from the times of great geographic discoveries, it took more than four centuries (we may consider its end the conquest of both poles at the beginning of the 20th century). By the end of the 19th century, the world was politically united by the system of global colonialism dominated by European powers. Just about a century ago humanity discovered the true scenery of its history and could feel its unity in the negative one-sided form of being a part of the global colonial system.

A possible token of this unification of the planet is the unified horizon of meaning of world history which is inspired by European modernity. The sole fact of the physical presence of people at the poles of our planet is not especially significant by itself. After all, snow and ice are the same everywhere. However, the outstanding human actions are to master the world. It is no accident that they are described in terms of power and conquest. The important fact is not just physical presence of people in a certain place but their claim to be "world masters." In the same sense, colonial expansion is not only a pragmatic step in order to gain new resources or find new markets for sales, the strive for symbolic power is no less important than particular profit.

The last mighty act of colonial expansion – the division of Africa between colonial powers at the end of the 19th century – was the struggle rather for possibilities and perspectives than for some particular economic gain. The control over territories became a kind of political competition among the leading Western states. Other nations in this geopolitical game were just a material for political projects, as the natural substance is a material for production. World history was unfolding as a subordination of all humanity to the core values, living forms and projects of the modern European civilization.

In this respect, even collapse of the world colonial system after WWII became a victory of Western civilization, because all new independent political powers appeared as sovereign nation-states, i.e., were created on the basis of the modern European political model. How far this process was successful and which new independent powers actually remained quasi-nation states – this is already another question. At any rate, in the political and legal dimension, the entire world exists today as a community of united nations.

The unity of horizon of meaning of world history makes out of it a project rather than something given. It is not a spontaneous process of development of trade relations, economic and political expansion. In fact, this is the subordination of the human world to a single civilizational sample, so powerful because it asserted itself as universally human, not just one particular example; as an achievement common to humankind, not just a cultural form peculiar to modern Europe. This claim covered engines and industry, modern science, political sovereignty, nation-state, market economy and inalienable human rights.

The unity of horizon of meaning of world history was challenged by totalitarian utopias which pursued their own versions of the development of world history. That is why the 20th century could be called a period of struggle between different models of world history (represented by liberal and totalitarian utopias). As long as this struggle continued, humanity was split between different projects of world history. At the end of the 20th century, this struggle was ended not by the victory and world domination of liberal utopia (as many intellectuals believed – let us recall, e.g., Fukuyama's "End of the history"),[14] but by appearance of the global world as the way of existence of planetary humanity.

The distinctive feature of the global world is not that a specific social order (e.g., Western society, civil society or consumerist society) spreads worldwide and becomes a general sample for all local communities. The true distinction of the global world is different and rather contrary.

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[14] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

First, the fact that civilization is global means that there could be no local community, which is capable of self-determination outside of the global community. Self-sufficient, self-closed existence is no more possible. Autarchy is unrealizable for the most powerful nations as well as for the smallest states. This is a life-changer not only for small ethnic groups or communities oriented towards traditional values. The context of being a part of the global community creates no less important problems, e.g., for the United States. The American politics is known by its propensity to autarchy and this very quality is now under stress in the context of global processes.

Another main feature of a global civilization is that there is no single normative social sample or model for all societies. Instead, there is a recognition of an irreducible difference between existing societies. The global civilization is not a certain social order but a planetary system of cooperation and coexistence of undeniably different societies and cultures.

It presupposes that a global community could exist as a deeply internally differentiated whole. The global civilization is intersubjective unity of planetary humankind and only in this sense, it is a new type of sociality. The model of "global community" is obviously insufficient for this new sociality, as well as an even multicultural unity based on the "policy of recognition."[15]

The current world of human existence (which is usually called global) is not rigid in terms of either structure or meaning. This is a new-born world, which is learning and mastering itself; the world where all fixed (and, until recently, indisputable) configurations of existence become explicitly or implicitly questionable. They either lose their force and gradually (sometimes even rapidly) fall into nonexistence, or are significantly transformed (sometimes beyond any recognition) following the new conditions. In fact, there is a crisis of all social establishments, so that societies now exist in a constant search of new forms of living activities. It is crucially important to take this into account while analyzing self-determination of contemporary societies (e.g., Ukrainian) and their perspectives in the global world.

This self-determination is not really doable within the logic of simple "adjustment to the system," since currently there is no system of stable landmarks. All existing components, norms and institutions of the world order are not safe and secured for the future. They are rather constellations of the currently given than assured perspectives. Thus, to perceive them as stable and irrefutable, without taking into account their latent instability

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[15] Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition." An Essay by Charles Taylor,* with commentary by Amy Gutmann and eds. Steven C. Rockefeller, Michael Walzer and Susan Wolf (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

and changeableness, means to doom oneself to a priori losing position of the one who is always behind the events. The only hope of success is reserved for those societies and persons who perceive the currently existing forms of living activity as certain potentialities, that is, chances for their productive projections in the radically undetermined future. Global humanity has no common horizon of meaning of its existence. Unity of the world, apparently evoked by the process of globalization, is not real. The main distinctive feature of the global reality is not its community or similarity, but its *internal plurality*.

The global world is single only on its surface. This surface is a place of functional interaction according to the logic of survival and standardized successfulness. This peculiar and highly unified cover embraces the entire world by intense movement of people, technologies, finance, information, goods, inventions, etc., thus creating an appearance that the world is single and unified. This feeling is strengthened and solidified by numerous global institutions (UN in the political dimension, IMF, WTO or US dollar as world currency in the economic dimension) and transnational living forms (from MacDonald's and Intercontinental hotels to iPhones, MS Windows or English as lingua franca). However, inside the same informational-technical-consumerist cover and especially alongside this cover, there are powerful, active and utterly peculiar cultural clusters. The unity of the global cover does not refute or destroy the autonomy of active social and cultural patterns. Even active participants of the global cover, completely involved in its activities, are closely connected to their mental and cultural worlds.

Of course, the images of "surface" and "depth" simplify the real picture (all images do). It is important to get rid of some inertial stereotypes, such as attaching certain positive and negative values to the presuppositions of "external" and "internal." One cannot reach a new, heuristically fruitful understanding of global reality while being captive of such stereotypes. Instead, one could easily slide into common conservative criticism against new, unusual living forms and processes. Distinguishing between the common global surface and always the peculiar meaning of various cultural worlds, we do not mean to downgrade global functionality as something "unreal" or "external"; we intend only to accentuate the *heterogeneous character of the global world*, which remains heterogeneous despite apparent (and rather deceptive) functional homogeneity. Irrefutable presence of the Other and Otherness in the common is a general law of existence of the global reality.

To open the perspective of understanding of the global world from within itself, we have to overcome the temptation and illusion of community, unity and uniformity and admit the constant presence of otherness and heterogeneity. The question is not just that global humanity is internally diverse. This is not simply a fact or empirical data – otherwise, the

importance of this fact would be much lower (indeed, what is a fact today could be totally different tomorrow under the influence of global transformational processes). There is something far more important namely, that cultural and mental heterogeneity of global humanity is also a historical perspective of its development. This is not a heritage of the history of nations, but the most powerful resource of further progress. This is the truth not just of today or yesterday, but most of all that of tomorrow.

Let us fix this heterogeneity of the components of the global world by the concept of "undeniable cultural differences." This concept is not just an empirical assertion of the cultural diversity of today's world, but *a principle of understanding and existence of the global reality*. Of course, the real process of globalization (that is, the process of life of global humanity) always transforms particular cultural forms, so that some cultural differences are leveled, some cultural forms gain an advantage over their competitors, etc. The question here regards not these empirical processes as such but the principle of understanding of the nature of global humanity. The essence of it is not unity but irrefutable internal differences. We gain a productive perspective on the future global world only if we consider global humanity as heterogeneous, not a homogeneous unity. Moreover, even if the process of globalization was capable of erasing all cultural differences and creating a single set of the unified forms of global life (which is not the case), we should prevent this, because the diversity of cultural patterns is the most important resource of the future development of humanity.

Whether (and How) the Unity of the Global World is Possible?

The reasons for the possible future existence of the global world are an open problem, which is to be solved in the future history of humanity. Here we have a unity of mutually incompatible requirements, an antinomy in the strict sense of the word. On the one hand, the distinctive feature of the global world as being is that its internal differences of various cultures and identities cannot be eliminated by the specific more general principle of consolidation (including the most flexible and effective of all such principles – the modern presumption of one common human nature). To do justice to the productiveness of the heritage of modern sociality, let us admit that its underlying principle of inalienable human rights, as well as congenial social and political models of sovereignty and the nation-state, preserve their regulatory and ordering role up to the present (e.g., in the sphere of international relations). However, it is clear that today's world is not that of sameness, but that of distinctions and differences.

On the other hand, despite all differences, people of different cultures and social traditions have to coexist in the common global world. Which

grounds could secure this possibility? Thus, the question of the universalism of the globalization age is transformed into the question of the way of coexistence of irrefutable differences.

The presence of an antinomy is an important theoretical signal for thinking. It does not mean that the problem has no solution. It only means that the solution cannot be based on either of the alternatives that jointly make an antinomy. In our case, this means that both substantial unity (= universalism of identity) and self-closed separation are equally impossible. In other words, global humanity cannot appear as either collective identity of whatever sort (that is, any meta-position is impossible), or as a simple aggregate of self-closed identities of separate cultural worlds.

To look for an answer, the first thing we need to do is to reconsider the status of cultural differences. Usually, they are perceived within the limits of a more universal horizon, which can be exemplified in the single normative order. This is what we see in the discourse of multiculturalism, including such a prominent representative of this discourse as Charles Taylor.[16] Unlike classical liberal policy of "equal dignity," Taylor defends updated liberal policy of being "sensitive to differences." The question immediately arises: which differences should be recognized? This is the crucial problem. If we take the diversity of all actual differences, any policy is *not applicable* to them, because it is impossible to create a law for everyone, adjusted to each individuality. After all, a law is always general and cannot take into account the whole aggregate of differences. This leads to the only possible conclusion: the differences to be recognized are those which appear so important in the political competition that one would have to take them into account. However, if this is the case, the policy in question is not that of recognizing the differences, because the principle – policy proper – exists where recognition goes ahead of force and follows the law. Instead, if the recognition follows the force and takes it into account, it is rather forced reaction than recognition as such. And however suitable and precise is this reaction, it does not reach the importance of a theoretical principle of action.

The problem of today's world is that it is basically made of such fundamental differences, which actually force us to take them into account (instead of waiting for somebody to notice them sensitively). The agent who would willingly recognize them and take them into account simply does not exist in today's world. There is *no* such meta-position. It is negated and rejected by the process of globalization. The importance of cultures is not a question of their value and the scope of their achievements. The judgment about them should be *ontological* rather than *axiological* (not to mention axiological bias based on somebody's system of values). All cultures are equal not in their historical achievements, but in that, they

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[16] Taylor, "Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition'," 22-41.

provide a possibility of human existence. They are equal as ways of life of people who participate in them. Each culture provides a possibility of human existence for those people who share it.

This idea cannot appear as long as we stick to the concept of humanness as such (an abstract human being, its genus). At this level, all people are just representatives of a common genus, a certain universality. What significance, if any, they have in their distinctness? However, if we abolish this universality of genus and distinguish "these people" as a reality we think about, we could theoretically establish the statement that culture for these people is their very nature and being. It follows from here that cultures are equal as grounds of people's self-reproduction in the fullness of their humanity (that is, their properly human definiteness). In this sense, no humanness has any advantages over another one. A particular sense of this or that humanness is always different, but this does not matter at all.

This way of reasoning corresponds to the basic modern concept of universally shared human nature. Here it has been transformed into the multiplicity of human natures but preserves its validity within every particular culture. Let us recall that modern human nature is first of all the right to live, the presumption that every human being is a living creature, which has absolute reality and absolute right to its viability. Now cultural determinacy becomes an absolute reality. Simply speaking, if for the classical modernity to be is to be alive, the introduction of the idea of culture means that a human being cannot be alive, cannot exist without being, say, a woman or a man, or a German, or even a professor of philosophy.

What exactly is the content of this cultural definiteness, this is, a separate and always concrete question. The chief presumption is that this definiteness is ontological, not ontic; it is inseparable from a human being as human. Thus, the problem is not to *recognize the peculiarities* (a constant motive of Taylor), i.e., those peculiarities which identify individualities (persons or communities). The real problem is a *coexistence of universalisms*, which are essentially *irrefutable*. This is indeed a great problem and an important task for the theoretical reason.

No positive answer regarding the antinomy is possible because any attempt at such an answer immediately reproduces a common normative order, a common universalism – at least in the form of the language of such reasoning. The common universal order is impossible not only as a reality of human relations, but even linguistically, as understanding and expression of this common normativity of sense. It is appropriate to recall here Gorgias and his triple rejection of reality (when he says that if even, we possessed the truth we could not express it understandably).

If the question cannot be solved positively, via the construction of a new universalism, one should try the negative strategy that is, the strategy of *avoiding*, warning, abstention – so that the position we gain would not

become a way of mutual annihilation of the existing differences. One could label this as an apophatic approach or apophatic philosophy. It presupposes a position of suspension instead of making any positive claims.

The existence of the global world is secured by the common willingness of all participants of the planetary humanity to renounce the claims of universal validity. This means that a common normative order is essentially impossible. There cannot be a common and single global world. However, there could be a coexistence of differences based on mutually agreed abstentions. One cannot grasp the content and number of these abstentions at the level of pure theory. This should be elaborated historically, in the process of coordinated interaction of all participants of the planetary humanity. However, the success here is possible only if this interaction would be directed towards the creation of a safe mode of coexistence of cultural autonomies and autarchies, instead of searching for a universal ground of unity.

Demand for a Human

Evidently, the world is not an accumulation of things or processes; it is a disposition of the meaning of human existence. The world always contains a demand for a particular human who matches its structure of meaning and its dynamics.

The demand of a global world for a specific human type can be characterized by three parameters: (1) the person's attitude to the world; (2) a type of social dynamics; and (3) a method of organization of society and interpersonal relationships.

(1) Since the beginning of modern history, the basis of a person's attitude towards the world and the basic instrument of this attitude is technology. The major product of modern history is a technological civilization. Starting from industrial revolution (from the 1760s till the mid-19th century) machines have become a universal method for human existence and creation of civilization's material body. Therefore, all aspects of life have become technological. Industrial production has radically changed the world of things and environment, while social technologies transformed the world of human relationships, interactions and institutions in a radical way. The spread of technological civilization all over the planet became a foundation for the globalization process.

However, since the end of the 20th century, after the technological revolution, the transfer of technologies to a qualitatively new level has taken place. Usually, several (5-6) technological "waves of innovation" (J. Schumpeter) or "techno-economic paradigms" (C. Freeman) are singled out. The ultimate transformation of our time is about a radical change in the nature of production thanks to information technologies. *Up today, information has become a leading productive force.* Naturally, it is not

information alone. Its transformations embedded in more and more gadgets and programs (reaching the boundary beyond which artificial intelligence creation lies) give birth to a new environment for human existence. Now there are reasons to speak not about technology, but about a higher level of its development, *infonics.* If technology uses the properties of things, infonics employs productive opportunities of meanings. Though the technological world is artificial, in its foundation it is a transformed product of nature. However, the Infoworld is a purely human construct. That is why it exists in the form of various virtual realities where the thingness is only a subordinate and secondary feature. In the new reality of informational civilization (in the all-embracing infosphere) the boundary between actuality and virtuality, between things with their properties and signs with their meanings becomes blurred and finally disappears.

(2) A type of social dynamics which matches industrial society is *mobilization.* The notion of mobilization envisages fast concentration of resources, means, capital and human resources without any limitation to achieve a large-scale goal. For mobilizations to be successful, a person has to morph into the masses. The society able to conduct mobilizations more rapidly and powerfully is the most successful one. This is how the emergence and activity of totalitarian regimes can be explained; allegedly, they are capable of the harvest mobilizations (not restricted by social, cultural and legal considerations existing in democratic countries). Mobilizations can be of varying nature; from the military and ideological mobilization of totalitarian societies to the taste mobilization in mass culture or consumption mobilization in prosperity society. Mobilizations are a way for the masses to exist, submit to technologies and participate in technological processes universally.

After the scientific revolution in the middle and the second half of the 20th century, information technologies started dominating over the industrial the demand for mobilizations disappeared; in the post-industrial age, they become unnecessary. The new situation requires not mobilization but *mobility.*

Intensive migrations of the recent decades have drastically changed the ethnic and cultural composition of the entire world (mostly European societies). Information technologies have created new conditions for the functioning of global markets, i.e., for labor, capital, industry and agriculture. Education and institutions are quickly transforming; the process of socialization and the regime of interpersonal contacts, as well as of work and leisure, have all become different. There is no point to list changes, unfathomable in their diversity and encompassing all aspects of human life. Metamorphoses happen not just in some fields, but have acquired a diffuse and cumulative effect. The common denominator of all these processes is mobility. It establishes one of the main demands for the human being from the point of global reality.

(3) Change in the means of production (substitution of technology by infonics) and proportional transformation of dynamics in human activities (from mobilization to mobility regime) also cause profound meta-morphoses of sociality. The *network* has defined the said change. Usually, society is imagined as a kind of structure. This structurality envisages a variety of elements which constitute a whole and with which the hetero-geneity in the system of relations connect. Instead, the network disavows the structure. Where a diversity of elements which form a whole, a poten-tially unlimited accumulation of similar places, i.e., network entry/exit points, arises. These points are potentially infinite since they are not de-fined by the properties of the network itself but created by the act of par-ticipation in it. The structure is always an order of meaning where the whole (though compiled from diverse elements) dominates over all the components and participants. However, the network is not an "order" by definition; it is just a twine of activities, reactions and challenges (gener-ally speaking, interactions). Even though they are somehow inspired, they are never determined or prescribed. The spontaneity of individual activity is the nerve of network existence.

The network does not have a being like something material, a thing. In other words, it is a sort of paradoxical existence, which is identical to its functionality. All its reality consists in a particular mode of being. Fig-uratively speaking, the paradox is in the existence of a mode of being without being itself. All being (reality) of the network is in the connection of meanings, which it does not only "define" but is identical to. It always arises and reactivates; it never exists. It remains and it exists, in this sense as an accumulation of its active points and their interactions. At the same time, the network has no place in a single given point; it is only the reality of interactions and inclusions. Even the notions of relations and connec-tions become too burdensome; they have too much substantiality and are therefore inappropriate. They are suitable for characterizing the system – for everything which has at least some structure, at least in the form of a rhizome. The network does not possess any being. Therefore, it lacks the structure. Again, figuratively speaking, its mode of existence is flickering. This is how it always arises and never is; it disappears and emerges at the same time.

Now we see how infosphere (life virtualization), mobility and net-works create the conceptual structure of demand for a human from the point of global reality. We will call this accumulation of demands for a human arising from the peculiarities of a global world, a contemporary civilizational demand. The human acquires new features and qualities as a way of response. A new type of human, a new method and regime of his/her existence we call *singularity* emerges. To encompass the meaning and specifics of singularity as a contemporary regime of human existence

required by a global world, we have to first look at it in a retrospective of human transformations from the start of modern civilization.

The Way towards Singularity

Since the beginning of modern times, human evolution has progressed through three stages.

The modern age brought demands for human self, a self-governing personality. According to a classical liberal utopia, the self is a regime (disposition) of human existence. In this regime, each human is a self-aware subject gifted with the unlimited ability to reflect. This enables freedom as a means of human existence. Whatever the person is, is achieved by him/herself. The human is a result of his/her self-determination. In this sense, natural properties or other qualities are not considered defining features. Each one is only something self-made by their effort. Anything else is a precondition of human existence for the human changes to use their own will and determined activity. For a self-aware subject the whole world, the entire reality (including human's corporeity along with the circumstances of one's being) is a material reality transformed according to human aspirations. Naturally, this is no apology to lawlessness. The human radically changes the world (nature) based on objective cognition. This is where the critical role of science in modern human's takeover of the world comes in. The primary social forms of human activity are now free labor and free entrepreneurship. Therefore, the existence in "self" form fully matches the age of establishment for industrial and open civil society. Based on the above, it is clear that self-aware subject, or self, is not a human but instead a specific regime of human existence that emerged in response to the demands of the modern world.

The original embodiment of modern self was the autonomy of a believer achieved and substantiated by Protestantism. Having reached God directly through faith, through the word of the Holy Scriptures and not through respecting church orders, an individual has acquired a solid ground for one's autonomy. In his well-known work *The Sources of the Self*, Charles Taylor singles out three constituting elements of modern identity: the internal human dimension, regular life and inclusion in nature.[17] We will not dwell on those because an entirely different statement is vital in this context, namely that Taylor puts an equality sign between self and identity. On the contrary, with regard to the modern history, they are to be separated.

The development of mass industrial production and social technologies of broad participation in political and social life spurs the mass effect.

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[17] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).

As in the mid-19th century, one could safely speak about the end of the industrial revolution and the victory of bourgeois form of government in Europe. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a new stage of the industrial revolution (the so-called "second industrial revolution") took place when the power of electricity succeeded the power of steam in the industry. As a result, industrial society fully unraveled its potential. In particular, this was manifested in human functioning becoming thoroughly technological – from production to social transformations and life strategies. The domination of industrial and social technologies reimagined the social body. The established social dispositions, ties and traditions gave way to technological feasibility. The social body was losing its permanent structure. The masses became the leading actor of technological society. The measure of society (transforming into mass society) and the defining principle of its social dynamics are *mobilizations*. This type of social dynamics inherent to an industrial society has been described above when we analyzed the demand of global reality for a human.

An individual, a specific human existence in the situation of the masses is defined through belonging to particular communities. That is why human existence in *identity* regime makes it to the foreground. The transfer from self to identity is associated with the change in the nature of historical action and process.

The pattern of self-corresponds to the situation of personality (individual) emancipation, at which all social and strata divisions are denounced. Instead, human nature acquires a fundamental, all-defining primacy. Therefore, society arises as reality re-established by the power of individuals' self-determination. An individual with his/her primary rights, which are in fact rights of the human nature, becomes the basis and the cornerstone of the whole social reality. This is a classical liberal idea which envisages mutual recognition of humans by humans (each by everyone according to the human nature); hence, the self-implicates reflexive self-attribution. The concept of unique nature for human beings becomes a universal understanding of human gist, in aspiration to become all-common and unobjectionable. This is the situation of classical modern.

On the contrary, the pattern of identity envisages the competition of universal projects. Though, paradoxical as it may be, the global understanding of a human is not the only possible one. The closest manifestation of universal projects is constructivist social utopias. Their most telling examples are totalitarian utopias (or, in another case, an imperialist colonial project). In the force field of universal competitive projects, the history is formed in the regime of mass mobilizations.

What is the critical difference between identity and self-patterns? The self arises due to the self-determination; this is where the crucial role of autonomy notion stems from. On the contrary, identity foresees reflec-

tive self-attribution intermediated by otherness, i.e., the presence of significant other. This significance should not only arise within my horizon of meanings but also serve as a way beyond it. That is, from subjectivity principle we move to that of intersubjectivity. The significance is not in something admitted by my subjectivity but instead, something enabling interaction of subjects – their meeting and their compatibility. There is no identity per se; it always pertains to someone and implicates a community. The self is always by herself, even if there are "many" selves. Identity is always multiple, even if it is single. The self is about positing; the identity is about differentiation. Identity is self, which determines itself through the participation in universal projects.

The current situation, i.e., the reality of the global world, disavows the pattern of identity and delegitimizes it. The statement might seem strange, i.e., not in any way relevant to the state of the contemporary world immersed in the crisis of identities and at the same time taken by a fervent desire to acquire them. This is such a telling phenomenon that the present world can be defined as the world of identity crises. The identity looks like something lost or destroyed and ardently sought for as a desirable achievement. We will allow ourselves the liberty to state that such search is futile. In current conditions, identity cannot be found. There is simply no place for it in the present dimension of inclusions with singularity as their core.

This global situation is different from the two previous ones ("age of self" and "age of identity") in the unsurmountable absence of universal horizon of meaning. As a result, not only self-positing and self-determination (i.e., execution of self-pattern) are impossible but also dialogue and recognition as such (i.e., execution of identity pattern). The resistance to not understanding becomes dominant in relations and interactions. The principle of "refraining from…" and non-interference (in the sense of refusing a single universal order and general norms) gains the lead. This is life without ideologies and universal projects. An integral picture of the world disappears; it is replaced with mosaic thinking. Mobility as a type of social dynamics means not simply an acceleration of all processes, high flexibility and adaptive capability of human existence. It is about a specific situation determining the action; all activities are performed on an ad hoc basis. The only common denominator of livelihood is not a particular continuity of meaning but a specific success proportional to the situation. This does not mean that self-practices disappear from the cultural field or entirely lose their operability. The same is correct about identity. However, in the conditions of globalization, they acquire a secondary meaning. The regime of human existence corresponding to the global world is neither self nor identity but a singularity. It embodies the third stage of human type evolution since the beginning of the modern age.

The Domination of Singularity

We use the concept of singularity not because we are trying to avoid just mechanically the well-known concepts of "individuality" and "personality." It is quite clear that personality, related to individual autonomy that makes an individual self-governed, is entirely alien to singularity. Individuality, instead, seems substantially close to singularity. However, even between them, there are essential differences.

Individuality primarily belongs to itself – it is distinguished by a number of its peculiar features. A characteristic feature of individuality is that it is distinct from others and is essentially separate. On the other hand, singularity is variously and constantly included, it is always within some informational and communicative networks. It constantly exists and persists in a network which is the milieu that creates and nourishes it. There is no singularity without a network, no network without singularities. Singularity as a mode of being corresponds to a network as a way of organization of social space. In the optics of networks, a singularity is an access point of a network. In the optics of singularity, a network is a space of inclusion.

As we have already mentioned above, singularity is the third (after self and identity) format of human existence and self-foundation, which arises in the context of the evolution of modern civilization. The concept of singularity stems from Latin singularis, which means "single, alone, unique." Mathematician John von Neumann seems to be the first who used this concept in the mid-20th century in a special research context. For him, singularity is the point where extrapolation starts to produce meaningless results, i.e., gets unpredictable. Various sciences mostly use the concept of singularity to refer to an unpredictability after a certain qualitative change in a process or system. In astrophysics, a singularity is used in black hole theories and some theories of the origin of Universe, as a physically paradoxical point (impossible, according to physical laws) with infinitely big mass and temperature and zero volume (a kind of "everything, which is nowhere").

In humanities and anthropology, singularity refers to a particular state of human existence, when vital human activity enters the regime of entry/exit in relation to various systems of contacts. This is typical for network society, where network usage becomes the basic social feature of a person so that social relations generally exist as network relations. In the world of networks, there are apparently no persons; various networks are the only obvious reality. However, networks themselves appear, develop or decrease only due to the inclusions of their participants. These inclusions are arbitrary and, as such, unpredictable; each person purely individually activates him/herself as a participant in a network and just as uncontrollably opts out. In fact, the only reality – network – is grounded in

something apparently nonexisting: an empty access point which can be transformed by the individual into a particular link of the network. This is human existence in the regime of singularity.

It is evident that singularity is essentially different from classical self. It seems to have no autonomy in the substantial forms distinctive of self. At the same time, singularity is deeply different from identity, because in a network there is no substantial community (an all-embracing subject), whereas the defining feature of identity is its belonging to a community. Singularity belongs to nothing but a spontaneity of its inclusions. At the same time, singularity, being deeply different from self and identity, paradoxically reproduces, in a totally different format, the principle of self-determination peculiar to self and the principle of communal generality peculiar to identity.

To recall the logic of "negation of negation" is a trivial step, but here it is a relevant one. Singularity is not just something quite different from self and identity, it also reproduces their distinctive features in an essentially new way. This creates a radically new format of freedom and creativity, although it does not abolish them as constitutive factors of human existence. Freedom is now that of inclusion/exclusion (this is how a situation of choice currently looks, which is fundamental to the concept of freedom). The focus of creativity now switches to the creation of attractive access points (e.g., popular blogs) and, generally, new networks.

Singularity is entirely free from being forcedly present in this or that network. It does not belong (the mode of identity) but is included. It itself selects the place of its presence. This is its independent, arbitrary, purely individual choice and decision. It may seem that here we face a rebirth of individuality. However, singularity, being a product of the disintegration of human masses, is scarcely similar to the old and known individuality. This is because singularity has complete freedom of participation in this or that network so that it always and necessarily exists in the regime of being included in networks as such. The defining and constitutive feature of singularity is not participation in a particular network, but the readiness for being included in a network. That is why if even singularity happens to be "by itself," "alone with itself," networking remains its peculiar feature and accompanies its existence.

The crisis of expressions like "by itself," "alone with itself," shows how deeply singularity is different from customary self. Self is a natural feature of personality. On the other hand, the singularity can be "alone with itself" or somehow relate to itself only via the network. Only in a network, in a constant process of inclusions, it finds and learns itself. This makes it obvious that network, in fact, is not something external to the singularity, so that singularity "takes part" in it as something independent, as a place it may enter and occupy. The only true network for singularity is a total sum of its inclusions into various networks. This total sum of

inclusions, created by this particular singularity, is its network, its true identity, itself. Thus, singularity is equal to its network, is itself this network. It does not exist outside of network inclusions (that is, outside of contacts with other singularities).

The existence of a human individual in the regime of singularity, that is, its transformation into a singularity, means being in a hidden position towards the world. It would be call as a meta-position if it were characterized by a self-reliant autonomy (as it is the case with self). However, the extra-worldliness of singularity exists in a different mode. It does not persist in a point of looking at a universal horizon of observation and understanding. It occupies a paradoxical place regarding the world, it is nowhere. This nowhere essentially is nonbeing, nothingness. In this sense, the singularity is pure potentiality and nothing actual. Its potentiality is extremely powerful and amounts to being "capable of anything." This totally unlimited potentiality allows us to define singularity via the concept of freedom. However, here freedom has a purely negative sense, that is, it is not an ability for unlimited self-realization, but only an arbitrary (self-initiated) ability to become a participant of any event (network).

This feature of singularity makes it optimal and the most effective mode of existence in the world of mobility. Singularity, being nothing, may become anything. Its ability for being included is unlimited. The only available actual being of singularity is its inclusion in the networks (which are constellations of activities of other singularities). This actual being is expressed in a nickname, which marks the presence of singularity in the world.

Singularity is substanceless; it exists as a totality of nicknames. This apparently reproduces an accustomed way of human existence. Personality always existed via a scope of its roles. However, a role is something certain and has the structure of meaning (scenario of how it should be played). The role also presupposes a certain subject who could play it – like in the list of dramatis personae at the beginning of the play: "policeman, 43 years," "secretary, a young girl, 22 years." Now instead of the role, there is only nickname, which plays its scenario, unexpected and spontaneous.

According to everything said above the epoch of the masses goes out of being. However, this does not mean the restoration of human self-based on the principle of autonomy. The masses are dispersed into atoms of singularities. Links and interactions between singularities are transformed into networks; stable communities and structures lose their effectiveness. A communion of singularities looks like cluster, not community or group. This means that all communities are relative and uncertain. In the global world, they become more and more visibly quasi-communities. This is evident from the crisis of identities in today's world. This crisis applies not to this or that identity (of this or that social character) but to people's

inability to further define themselves in terms of identities. The general failure of identities, their loss of effectiveness undermines society as a whole. Society is replaced by network sociality, where singularity is the main participant, catalyst and backbone.

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Part II
Ethics for Global Times

How are Moral Interactions Possible in Liquid Modernity?

Mariya Rohozha

Methodological Notes

On the Nature of Morality

Morality is a complicated phenomenon. It reflects the spiritual world of a human being and is the way of his/her existence. Morality can be revealed where a human being is among people and interacts with them. In this study, morality is considered in its communicative dimension, i.e., in the light of how morality poses forms and contents of interactions of individuals, their communication and cooperation. Implicitly such views on morality are contained in texts of Hannah Arendt, whose methodological constructions are at the base of this research.

In her studies, Arendt mentions the web of human relations, which is spun in the process of human interactions. She uses the metaphor of web to characterize links, which connect people with each other through words and deeds actual in "human plurality" (the world, inhabited by people).

> The disclosure of the *who* through speech, and the setting of a new beginning through action, always fall into an already existing web where their immediate consequences can be felt. *Together they start* a *new process* which *eventually emerges* as the *unique life story* of the *newcomer, affecting uniquely* the *life stories* of all those with whom he comes into contact. It is because of this already existing web of human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions, that action almost never achieves *its* purpose; but *it* is also *because* of this medium, in which *action* alone is real, that it *produces* stories with or without *intention* as naturally as fabrication produces tangible things.[1]

This web has existed since the emergence of "human plurality," however historical conditions and circumstances define its structure and de-

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[1] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 184.

sign. In the communicative dimension, morality is represented in the concreteness of time and space, which define texture in the web of human interactions. The issue of concreteness of time and space presents ethical problems of universality and contextuality of morality. In the ethical discourse there are different views on this issue. In the most general form, universality is addressness to everyone, off-situationality and off-circumstancesness.[2] Such an issue mostly derives its strength from the ethical discourse in Modernity.

As Zygmunt Bauman mentions, universality of morality is the metanarrative of Modernity and liquid modernity is called upon to depose it.[3] While agreeing with Bauman concerning inefficiency of universalistic morality at the liquid modernity, we are inclined to define universality as ethical minimalism, which was originally presented by Michael Walzer.[4] Minimalism means the monosemanticness and laconism of formulations; it promotes comprehension of basic values irrespective of individual convictions and advantages. However, minimalism has a strictly defined incidence, common space, where mutual recognition of values from different moral traditions is possible. In concreteness of time and space, morality overcomes minimalism and exposes itself in completeness and strength of the definite context. While meeting the challenges of time and space, morality assigns specific spiritual mood of definite persons, who are at the process of interaction and reflects their needs and expectations.

Such contextuality is presented in Arendt's *The Human Condition*. Appealing to Antique, Medieval and Modern forms of human interactions, she mentions that it is a Greek polis in which the web of human relations was best spun. Arendt does not emphasize an especially ethical potential in the web of human relations, although she defines a communicative aspect of morality while uncovering human qualities necessary for civil interactions to resolve polis problems through speech and action.

Morality as the Subject Matter of Studies

As Arendt defines qualities necessary for interactions in concreteness of time and space, she repeatedly refers to Aristotle's *The Nicomachean*

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[2] Ruben G. Apressyan, "Jetiket" (Etiquette), *Jetika: Jenciklopedicheski slovar* (*Ethics: Encyclopedia*), eds. Ruben G. Apressyan and Abdusalam A. Guseynov (Moscow: Gardariky, 2001); Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Richard M. Hare, "Universalisability," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 55 (1955).

[3] Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics* (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1993), 37-61.

[4] Michael Walzer, "Moral Minimalism," *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument of Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1994).

Ethics. On a closer examination, it is evident that the communicative aspect of morality is typical in Aristotelian ethics. Although it is not defined as such by Aristotle, nor by authors who actualized his conception at the contemporary ethical discourse. Aristotle created a science about virtues, qualities necessary for a happy life of a person with "parents, children, wife, and in general…his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship."[5] The life of an Aristotelian man is filled with communicative situations, first in the public space, where Aristotelian virtues are exposed more fully, for example, being friendly, magnificence, magnanimity, etc. How to live in polis, how to get and practice these excellences of character – these were questions Aristotle approached in his ethics.

In the mid-20th century, Gertrude E. Anscombe compared ethical problematizations of Aristotle and contemporaries for her moral philosophers and concluded that since Modernity "the concepts which are prominent among the moderns seem to be lacking, or at any rate buried or far in the background, in Aristotle."[6] Anscombe advanced a claim to ethicists of Modernity who differed fundamentally with the founder of ethics. Though, the Neo-Aristotelian paradigm in moral theory was assigned by Alasdair MacIntyre who turned ethics from learning of principles, norms and rules into integral excellence of character of a human being. The point is that ethics is a theory that focuses on the practice of virtues, i.e., learns the qualities necessary for life among people. It seems that MacIntyre and those after him who represented this paradigm emphasized research of virtues statically, without taking the communicative space into consideration. But it is the communicative space in which the character of a human being as a social creature is exposed.

It is important to note the sources of information regarding moral qualities and the content of interactions. For Aristotle, immediate life in a city-state was such a source, its features as he fixed in *The Nicomachean Ethics.* Recent research is based on the texts of sociologists, in which empirical data, observations of life at liquid modernity are summarized.

Circumstances of Time and Space

"Liquidity" is presented as the primary metaphor of contemporaneity in Zygmunt Bauman's book, *Liquid Modernity.* Without going into complicated explanations of this formulation, Bauman gives enough space to fill it with new senses and interpretations.

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[5] Aristotle, "Ethica Nicomachea," *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. William D. Ross (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1925), vol. 9, NE1097b10.

[6] Gertrude Elizabeth M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," *Philosophy* 33 (124) (1958), 1.

Liquid modernity is a description of our time, which some may prefer to call Postmodern[7] or Late[8] or the Second[9] Modernity. The main characteristics of the epoch in this formulation are uncertainty, mutability, elusiveness and instability of forms. Further, we will pay attention on characteristics, which define conditions of the possibility for contemporary moral interactions.

It is necessary to specify socio-cultural context of liquid modernity presented in this work. The point is who and from what "observation post," does learn it. For the author of this text liquid modernity is observed in prospects of European intellectual tradition, rather implicit for Ukrainian and broader, post-Soviet ethical discourse. Such a vision of liquid modernity is not without eurocentrism. It was depicted exhaustively by Oswald Spengler: Europeans see European history in the world history by which all other cultural practices orbit the world of Western Europe, the pre-sumed center of all world-happenings.[10] But such a prospect is justified because morality deals with values and not with abstract truth. Values are always built according to representations of the person who makes a judgment concerning them.

Logic of the development of the theme assigns the structure of the research. In the beginning, the key value transformations of liquid modernity as conditions for the possibility of moral interactions of our time are defined. Contemporary orientation of an individual on happiness is considered as well as the moral qualities necessary for human interactions. Also, transformations of the quality of interactions in the process of concretization of abstract others as neighbors and distants are examined. The logic in this research derives the analysis of value grounds of interactions of distant people. The general outline is specified in the defining of moral interactions of distant people in global information networks as a symbol of liquid modernity.

"Liquid Modernity"

When uncovering characteristics of liquid modernity, Bauman contrasts it with Modernity, which in prospects of contemporaneity appears solid, respectable and reliable. At the epoch of Modernity, the sphere of production was a formative individual and social factor. It gave work to

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[7] Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massummi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

[8] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

[9] Ulrich Beck, "The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity," *British Journal of Sociology* 51 (1) (2000).

[10] Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, vol. 1: *Form and Actuality*, trans. Charles F. Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), 15-18.

an individual as an undeniable base for individual and social life. Employment regulated life actively and was a reliable base for normative regulation. Re-orientation of economics, from production to service, did not just change location and the content of labor and structure of employment. In fact, the content of labor lost its value in social life, but still, remains the circumstances of individual life inasmuch labor is the source and means for life and employment and defines time for leisure. Leisure per se is inseparably connected with the new integral determinant – consumption.

Consumption is irrational in nature. It appeals to feelings, not reason and it operates through temptations, unstable desires that permanently require satisfaction. The motivational force behind consumption is advertising. Advertising endows goods and services with value and makes them the object of desire. It also directs a person on the necessity of his/her acquisition and informs him/her about happiness of possessing them and promises pleasure during the process of their consumption. "Satisfaction and pleasure are feelings which cannot be grasped in abstract terms: to be grasped, they need to be 'subjectively experienced'– lived through."[11] It is consumption that allows individuals to live through satisfaction, to feel it deeply and at least for a moment. Shortness of emotional experience is conditioned by the quick switching over to a new object of desire after the consumption of an acquired object. Satisfaction of needs is like bright flashes, intervals between which are filled by darkness of dissatisfaction and emptiness.

Essence and algorithm of activity of media have changed. Advertising captures increasing segments of media. Media possess consumption-stimulating functions, propagandize activism in consumers. The traditional Modernity form of address of an intellectual to audience through media was for breeding and increasing the educational and cultural level, as well as communication of public on themes set by intellectuals. Today everywhere gives way to the entertainment of public and also indulges and shapes its whim and desires. The public is provoked, shocked and tempted. Frequently, the media reduces the level of presentation of news and directs informational messages to those who are less educated. Global information networks promote an all-around access to blogs and authors' pages with sometimes an equivocal intellectual level and value content. Critical thinking of the public, which has been shaped by intellectuals since the Enlightenment period, is progressively less claimed in society and, correspondingly, is not taught through the media. Non-criticality in comprehension of information leads to its passive consumption. These features allow us to notice that the public space as the fundamental communicative and decision-making sphere of Modernity has been principally changed. Today, the public sphere turns into a location in which

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[11] Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 78.

privacy and intimate life are exposed. The private lives of celebrities, as well as ordinary people, whom have fallen into the eye of the public, provoke its interest. Watching someone's private life becomes a show and media make them publicly known. Bauman, following Thomas Mathiesen, calls such public watching the few selected "synopticon."[12] Bauman mentions that the show takes place of an integral tool of Modernity management supervision, while keeping its key-disciplinary-function.

> Obedience to standards…tends to be achieved nowadays through enticement and seduction rather than by coercion – and it appears in the disguise of the exercise of free will, rather than revealing itself as an external force.[13]

Forms of coercion are changed and become imperceptible or liquid one, however, their essence is preserved and they are subjected to external rules. Thus, paternalism has disappeared from the public space.

Today it is difficult to imagine the public blame for an individual exceeding the limits of generally accepted rules. Vice versa, protest and otherness are cultivated through propaganda of the consumption of status goods and services and are comprehended by the public as a challenge to general conformism. However, there is no place for different forms of protection from external authority.

> 'Fluid modern' world of freely choosing individuals does not worry about the sinister *Big Brother* who would punish those who stepped out of line. In such a world, though, there is not much room either for the benign and caring *Elder* Brother who could be trusted and relied upon it came to decide which things were worth doing or having.[14]

Thus, submission to standards is achieved through the consumption of the wide range of goods and services available.

All the phenomena discussed above, or rather their axiological dimension, touch the problem of freedom as the key issue in Western culture. In his time, Erich Fromm insisted that people of contemporary culture are concerned with affirming one of two kinds of freedom, that is, *freedom from* external forces, while failing to notice the dangers in the process of putting and achieving the goals within such freedom.[15] While

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[12] *Ibid.,* 85-86.
[13] *Ibid.,* 86.
[14] *Ibid.,* 61-62.
[15] Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Ferrar & Rinehart, 1941).

also failing to develop a conscious sense of life's orientations that fix the positive *freedom to*, an individual falls into a trap of loneliness, fear, self-doubt and finds him/herself weak in front of external forces. As a result, the greatest achievement in spiritual space of Modernity – individualism – today turns out loneliness, alienation of an individual from other individuals and from him/herself.

Today, Fromm's analytics do not lose its topicality. Consumer society evidently demonstrates the way in which freedom is transformed into individual's escape from burden by hiding oneself in consumption. Advertising slogans help to hide the unclaimedness of an individual in social and sometimes private life. What is loneliness in a crowd of foreigns at a metropolis is one more symbol of liquid modernity.

Thus, key transformations in the field of economics (labor, employment, consumption) and public space (media, entertainments, discipline) fix value changes that define social and moral life of the epoch. These are freedom from different Modernity-generated restrictions and commitments, opportunity to escape responsibility and distance from those who are traditionally comprehended as a neighbor.

Happiness as Process and Happiness as a Moment

Questions concerning life goals are a key to understanding the value orientations of an individual. Such questions lead the research regarding happiness, which is the basics in ethics. The Book I of *The Nicomachean Ethics* begins with the reasoning of the good as an aim that all individuals desire to attain. Distinguishing the good that all individuals choose as a means for the sake of something else and the good everyone desires for its own sake, Aristotle considers the later as the aim of desirable for itself, for which all other aims are pursued. This is why he calls it the perfect, final end, chief good. Aristotle mentions that ordinary citizens and people of superior refinement say that the highest of all goods is happiness and living well and doing well are identified with being happy.[16]

Aristotle emphasizes an active character of happiness which is not the possessing of virtue, but its permanent long life practice. He researches conditions for happiness scrupulously. He notes that external goods and favorable circumstances are essential for happiness, however, a happy person is a person who lives in conformity with virtue, skillfully overcomes misfortunes and practices right actions. An individual is not moved from a happy state easily by ordinary misfortunes, but many great misfortunes do not allow the consideration of life of a virtuous person as supremely virtuous and successful.

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[16] Aristotle, "Ethica Nicomachea," NE 1095a15-20.

Appealing to Aristotle in this research is not for the sake of history of philosophy but to introduce the main theme. Aristotle is suitable here because his conception allows us to expose differences in the idea of happiness of his fellow citizens, who are educated Athenians and whose views he expresses and our contemporaries. As MacIntyre says,

> Aristotle takes himself not to be inventing an account of the virtues, but be articulating an account that is implicit in the thought, utterance and action of an educated Athenian.[17]

The historical character of values, sequentially performed by MacIntyre, however, is essentially alien to the Polish philosopher Władysław Tatarkiewicz who dedicates the book *Analysis of Happiness* to the issue of happiness. It is necessary to note that the problem of happiness in its integrity is not very often the focus of ethicists. They have declared for this problem on some occasions, or while researching neighboring problems. Tatarkiewicz considers that his research is almost the only integral work on the problem of happiness throughout the history of Western philosophy. While learning the meanings of the concept "happiness" in ethical and moralistic texts, he distinguishes four primary meanings: happiness as luck; happiness as great pleasure; happiness as eudaimonia; happiness as satisfaction with life.[18] Let us examine these meanings and corresponding kinds of happiness. Without taking in consideration the historical dynamics of axiological consciousness, these meanings are plane and static. Tatarkiewicz's detailed analysis allow us to represent a contemporary idea of happiness.

The first meaning of happiness, as luck and fortune, depends on external conditions and circumstances. Tatarkiewicz connects this meaning exceptionally with ordinary affairs and indicates that it has Antique roots. Aristotle carefully mentions the necessity for external goods for a happy life and emphasizes its activity and character.

The second meaning of happiness, as pleasure, is connected with psychological factors. It is the experience of intensive pleasure and rapture. While noticing transiency of this psychological condition, Tatarkiewicz mentions that intensive pleasure is always fleeting and its position is too small for the shaping of life values.

The third meaning of happiness, as eudaimonia, means the chief good but is limited by Tatarkiewicz to philosophical content. Besides the

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[17] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 147-148.

[18] Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *Analysis of Happiness*, trans. Edawrd Rothert and Danuta Zielinskn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).

active attitude to life-long virtuous practices and pleasures, the whole complex of meanings essential for Aristotle is lost.

The fourth meaning of happiness, as satisfaction with life, is a system of psychological states, moral qualities and material wealth that allows a person to experience a saturation of life and acquire deep satisfaction from it. On the one hand, components of happiness presented here are from three previous kinds of happiness in their integral unity inasmuch they allow a person to experience the sufficiency of life. However, Tatarkiewicz accentuates the subjective character of life satisfaction and considers it as a subjective moral reaction. Such an understanding of happiness is alien to Aristotle, for whom a virtuous life possesses objective character and judgments on happiness are made by an individual and those around him/her on the grounds of personal lifestyle. According to Tatarkiewicz, it is the fourth meaning that reflects the ideas of happiness the most completely in contemporary society.

However, value transformations of liquid modernity assign criteria of happiness differently from both the Aristotelian one and those defined by Tatarkiewicz. Liquid modernity advocates a hedonistic lifestyle, which is directed on the most complete satisfaction of needs and the perception of enjoyment. Hedonism as a behavior imperative is transmitted through media and assigns such lifestyle standards, in which everything is subordinated to getting and feeling of pleasures. This is a main difference in contemporary hedonistic mood from the general human inclination toward pleasures. Life satisfaction cannot be a long period state in liquid modernity because the experience of pleasure that accompanies the satisfaction of a need is limited by time until the desire is turned onto a new object. Happiness is richness of life, or life completeness in the moment when a person is overwhelmed by positive feelings and experiences intensive pleasure and raptures.

Luck is one of the profound factors surrounding happiness in a contemporary epoch. Luck is independent of a person's activity of external forces or combination of circumstances that result in positive effects. It is impossible to influence on luck, to urge or to control it or to take the credit for luck that is due to a combination of circumstances. Ethical literature often refers to moral luck. Such problematic covers the responsibility for actions an individual is unable to control and possibilities of their moral estimation, as Thomsd Nagel argues.[19]

In current research, luck is considered as a morally neutral notion that is a component of happiness. It is an actively popularized directive according to which power, wealth and glory depend predominantly on accidental circumstances. This is why it is extremely important for a person

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[19] Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck," *Mortal Questions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

"to hit the jackpot," and to catch luck in order to be happy. There are lotteries, totalizators, random choosings for raffle prizes and show participations across different spheres of public life. Stories about celebrities and ordinary citizens who use their chance and receive their moment of glory and correspondingly, of happiness are circulated throughout media.

The significance of an accident in the life of a person is raised at the expense of socially reduced values like persistence, diligence, industriousness and striving for aims. It is brightly revealed at contemporary transformation of the directive concerning success as one of the key ideas of Modernity. Such spirit of capitalism as vigor, purposefulness, direction on achievements have then given birth to the directive on success, in which individual and social components are interconnected.

Success is a retrospective estimation of the action the person has taken, in which achievement of definite aims or maximum approximation to them has been demonstrated. Aims are created and achieved in social space in which other persons move in the same order. This is why a person can correlate his/her aims, efforts and results with others' around him/her. Also, his/her superiority will receive public recognition. In the book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber describes clearly the interconnection of the directive on success and the religious convictions of Protestants as the most politically and economically active actors in a society at the age of Modernity. It is an axiologically-normative component of Protestantism that defines the directive on success and achievements through popularization of the idea of vocation and predestination (and rationalization of life).[20]

Secularization processes started at the epoch of Modernity and it was Protestantism that promoted them. Ethical regulation was kicked down from the heavens to the earth, although it was sanctified by religious convictions. Liquid modernity made its correlations in the directive on success. On the one hand, it recognizes the optionality of religious legitimation for those who already obtained secular values of success. At the same time, values of persistence, diligence and industriousness are elutriated from socially meaningful values. This makes success an ethically neutral concept that in its turn directs a person on effectiveness, competitiveness and recognition, without an ethically sanctioned support. On the other hand, initially success is connected with a person's conscious efforts, which direct self-realization, activation of one's capabilities and talents, i.e., the tendency that is directly opposed to luck. In circumstances of liquid modernity, success is increasingly re-directed on the idea "to hit the jackpot" or to use the opportunity. This is about direction on success as ethically neutral and mutually connected with the idea of luck.

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[20] Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* trans. Talcott Parsons (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).

Directives on luck and success, however, are given to a person from outside and need to be interiorized, accepted, comprehended and put into practice and experienced. Lack of deficiency in any of the interiorization components hinder the very opportunity of happiness. A person who does not realize the luck or success would not be able to esteem his/her possession and would consider him/her insignificant or totally invaluable. One who has lost a chance or trampled success is not able to feel happy.

Thus, the contemporary direction of an individual on happiness is assigned by a hedonistic lifestyle and factor of luck with the emphasizing of contingency of the "hit the jackpot" and the directive on success with brightly expressed elements in the use of chance.

I and Other: Grounds for Interaction

The web of human relations is spun in a process of interactions through words and deeds when human qualities that are necessary for his/her communication with other people are shaped. In such a context, moral attitude is a tool with the help of which the web is spun.

In the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas is a statement that only other gives an individual an opportunity to feel oneself as a human being, to break closed on I totality and enter the world in all its infinity: "…to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity."[21] Receiving the Other is specific in relation between I and the Other that doubts I. When I transgress commonness, raise above myself, overcome myself, it is possible to define who is I. Only the Other allows I to do this. "The fact that in existing for another I exist otherwise than in existing for me is morality itself."[22] There is a concept "Other's face" in ethics of Levinas. Anna Jampol'skaja researched his ethics and, in such a way, exposes the content of this concept:

> Face is not another person herself, but something we see when we see in other person the Other. Or more precisely, something that allows us to see him as the Other.[23]

When recognizing the Other, I confirm her and accepts what she testifies. According to Levinas, morality appears where I accept the Other, begin relations with her, where two meet face to face.

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[21] Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis, 2nd ed. (The Hague, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers & Duquesne University Press, 1979), 51.

[22] *Ibid.,* 261.

[23] Anna V. Jampol'skaja, *Jemmanjujel' Levinas. Filosofija i biografija* (*Emmanuel Levinas. Philosophy and Biography*) (Kyiv: Dukh i Litera, 2011), 157-158.

Moral relation shapes verbal communication, conversation of I and the Other. This supposes recognition in the Other in the same way that I recognize in myself. It means to recognize the Other as equal. Here, the issue Levinas outlines correlates with the ideas of the Russian philosopher, Abdusalam Guseynov, who expresses them in the discussion on the topic: "What is at the base of morality: exclusiveness or equality?":

> Morality arises from equality and it is equality. While this is not equality of units but equality of infinities, sun is exclusive, unique and simultaneously it is equal to itself, moreover, it embodies the idea of equality given in the formula 'A is a' the most completely on the strength of its uniqueness. Infinities are equal each other. But there is nothing more exclusive and unique than infinity. To be exclusive and unique is contained in the definition of infinity.[24]

Pathos of this sentence is that there are no problems in the conjunction of uniqueness (exclusiveness) and equality at the abstraction level. Primal exclusiveness of I gravitates toward equality of I and the Other. To start moral relation between I and the Other, some comprehension of unity has to be established. Only on such basis it would be possible to create common space. To communicate means to create common space and to make the world together.

I wish to be recognized by the Other and strives for the creation of the common space. This causes different effects for I. Firstly, such a wish of I indicates the capacity to accept the Other, i.e., to gift or to sacrifice.

> The world in discourse is no longer what it is in separation, in the being at home with oneself where everything is given to me; it is what I give: the communicable, the thought, the universal.[25]

Secondly, sacrificial character of the relation to the Other supposes that for I, from the beginning it is unimportant how the Other treats him/her. For "I," in sacrificing it is not important how he/she treats the Other, but that the Other is the one for whom "I" is responsible. "I" bear responsibility for the Other while recognizing him/her and doubting myself and overcomes myself. Here, the problem of responsibility comes out as the vocation of "I." To be responsible means for "I" to recognize him/her ob-

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[24] Abdusalam A. Guseynov, *Chto lezhit v osnove morali: iskljuchitel'nost' ili ravenstvo?* (*What is at the Base of Morality: Exclusiveness or Equality?*) (2005), https:// iphras.ru/up-lfile/ethics/RC/ed/f/17.html.

[25] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority*, 76.

ligations toward the Other and the volume of these obligations is expended as "I" practices them. Levinas points out the infinity, endlessness and absoluteness of responsibility.

> The infinity of responsibility denotes not its actual immensity, but a responsibility increasing in the measure that it is assumed; duties become greater in the measure that they are accomplished.[26]

Recognition by "I" that his/her obligation does not demand equivalent recognition by the Other in his/her obligation towards "I." Also, when "I" comprehends the obligation to do something for the Other, this does not suppose the right of the Other to receive it. There is asymmetry in moral obligation by which "I" obliges him/herself towards the Other. Thus, while shaping common space, gravitating towards equality, I and the Other are in an asymmetrical relationship.

Such pathos of ethical attitude meets with a response in spiritual strivings of the contemporary individual. Search for spontaneous, immediate and free interaction is activated in circumstances of liquid modernity. Levinas' ethics can offer a constructive model of interaction. When interpreting spiritual situation of contemporaneity, Levinas, as Jacques Derrida says, aims to define morality not as a system of codes, laws, notions, but as the essence of moral relation.[27] Moral relation is a true relation that is able to change two and to imbue their spiritual world with sacrificing, responsibility and love through communication. In such a context, love is love for one's neighbor, *agape*, mercy.

Bauman works actively with Levinas' ethics. His exit from sociology to ethics is stipulated by interests that appeared while he researched specifics of human interactions in liquid modernity. The first Bauman focuses on are spiritual grounds for interactions when all Modernity metanarratives are destroyed. He reveals the specifics of a spiritual vacuum in the conditions of absence of sovereign, universal, external institutions that shape society. Disoriented, the person turns out unable to formulate any universal moral grounds by his/her own strength that is actively done by people of Modernity. Remaining face to face with questions of value orientation, an individual maximum is able to communicate with the Other, face to face, in the immediate moment of meeting.[28]

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[26] *Ibid.,* 244.

[27] Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 1978), 138.

[28] Zygmunt Bauman, *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality* (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 22.

Morality that exists at the ruins of Modernity metanarratives can only be spontaneous interaction of the two. Bauman calls it a primal scene of morality, in which I and the Other are born and grow up while communicating face to face. This moral interaction of the two is unsymmetrical and existentially sacrificial. Primal loneliness of I is overcome in such an interaction. A person is lonely till the appearance of the Other. Commonness and the unity of the two lonely persons who exit the limits of their loneliness in the act of accepting each other is a culmination of the meeting of the two. To be open to the Other means to be ready for communication; it is a condition for the possibility of interaction and it is assigned by feelings and emotions which are born spontaneously in a human soul in the moment of the Other to appear.[29] It is primal loneliness that allows the Other to open him/herself and is a condition for the Other to open him/herself.

Fragility of moral relation can be illustrated through differentiation of moral orders and demands. Moral order at Modernity was clear, transparent, accurate and connected with the universal foundations of morality. Distinct from it, contemporary moral demand, which defines the duty of I is illegible, indistinct. It obliges I to be its interpreter and immerses I into permanent uncertainty regarding the correctness of interpretation.

This kind of moral relation is possible only in the private sphere, which is free from the routine of the daily bustle. Morality is a flash of uniqueness of meeting beyond the daily routine.

> The 'moral party of two' is a vast space for morality. It is large enough to accommodate the ethical self in full flight…But that party is too cramped a space for the human-being-in-the-world. It has no room for more than two actors. It leaves out most of the things that fill the daily bustle of every human being…To be in the moral space, one needs now to re-enter it, and this can be done only by taking time off from daily business, bracketing off for a time its mundane rules and conventions.[30]

Thus, morality is firstly an interaction of a sacrificial mode. It is accessible only to those who are ready and able for such sacrifice and have unlimited responsibility and active love. Secondly, there is an elite mode in moral relation. Only those who have the opportunity to free themselves from the daily bustle can spin the web of human relations.

Responsibility is a basic moral quality actualized in such circumstances. It is the key virtue of liquid modernity. In Aristotelian language,

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[29] *Ibid.* 56.
[30] Zygmunt Bauman, *The Individualized Society* (Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2001), 180.

responsibility is an intermediate state between the opposed extremes of excess and deficiency: primal loneliness of I and reciprocity, an evident lack of which is conditioned by asymmetry of the relation between I and the Other. "I" does not demand reciprocity, the only presence of the Other saves "I" from loneliness in the contemporary world.

The Other: Neighbor and Distant

The world of moral values of a contemporary individual is interesting for Bauman, not only in the aspect of elite interaction of I and the Other. Also, he pays attention to the issues of social justice, human rights, the common good, etc. These factors of interpersonal and social communicative spaces are distinguished principally in the book, *Postmodern Ethics*, which defines spheres of morality and ethics respectively.[31] According to Bauman, morality in its essence is an individual one; it is focused on issues of communication between I and the Other, where the Other is a neighbor. Ethics, unlike morality, covers axiological problems of interactions in the social space, where others are distants.

This prospect, of different axiological communicative spaces supposes the following questions: who are these others whom "I" interacts with? How does the quality of communication with others change and what does it depend on? Are they neighbors or are they distants? Quality and content of interpersonal communication of "I" and the Other in liquid modernity was the main topic of the previous paragraph. Before to clear up the value content of communication with distants in liquid modernity, it is necessary to outline the differences of neighbors and distants at the epoch of Modernity as a starting point in the reasoning of current changes.

As ethical theories of Modernity are numerous and various, for the reference point we define ethical ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche representing toward the end of the epoch. Overturning European (Judeo-Christian) moral tradition, Nietzsche exposes its key positions, particularly those concerning the issue of love to neighbors and distants which is a specification of communication in current research. However, because his texts are predominantly metaphoric and oversaturated with symbolism, the learning can constitute a separate area of research. It is possible for researchers to have completed analytical work of texts of Nietzsche. Russian philosopher *S*emyon Frank is among them. He apologetically comprehends ideas of his contemporary Nietzsche. In the book *F. Nietzsche and Ethics of Love to Neighbor*, Frank treats the problem of interactions with neighbors and distants.

Neighbors for Frank are spatially close people who surround an individual immediately. The moral attitude, namely love to neighbor, is a

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[31] Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics*.

spectrum of instinct feelings such as kindness, gentleness, calm, peaceableness and compassion.[32] Frank, following Nietzsche, calls these feelings "psychological states" and indicates their evident failure in moral regulation of human interactions in social space. Axiological and communicative components are shaped completely by relations with distants. Distants are spatially remote from "I," temporally or psychologically abstract others. "I" does not know them and is not acquainted immediately. To organize interactions with them, "I" has to overcome distance. For that immediate feelings are not enough, more abstract moral impulses are necessary. Moral relation, as Frank says "love to distants," has a more formal character.

At the beginning of the 20th century, love to the distant, according to Nietzsche, announced the appearance of "superman," which according to Frank – starts the revolutionary struggle through sacrificial activity of strong-willed people. Moral qualities, such as strength of mind, courage, self-sacrifice, rebellious striving, permanent restless and ambitious moral greatness, correspond well to the representation of a person of the new epoch, a person who breaks through bourgeois daily bustle and routine for the sake of completeness of life, triumph of creativity and struggle for ideals. For Nietzsche and following behind him Frank, moral attitude consists precisely in these states.

Less than a century later, the misbalance of expectations from the quality of interactions with distants that were formulated by philosophers of Modernity and contemporary social reality became evident. In the global world, according to Bauman, others are the masses of people. Interaction with the masses is built at principally different grounds than Frank outlines. Bauman does not mention moral qualities for a person of the new age shaped in the sacrificial revolutionary struggle for the sake of distants. He also denies the possibility of an elite interaction of I and the Other in social space because the face of the Other is absent in social space. To explain conditions for interactions of distants in the global world, Bauman adverts to Antique tradition of the mask.[33]

In his time, the prominent Russian researcher of Antiquity, Aleksey Losev, argued that the idea of person with his/her inner world as the Western culture since Christianity had been comprehended was not known for people of Antiquity. Losev mentioned that Pindar had used the word *prosopon* (look) to characterize the outward appearance and Demosthenes used the word *persona* (mask). In the Antique world, the one who wears

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[32] Semen L. Frank, "F. Nietzsche 'Jetika ljubvi k dal'nemu'" (F. Nietzsche and "Ethics of Love to the Distant"), *Sochinenija* (*Writings*) (Moscow: Pravda, 1990), 13.
[33] Bauman, *The Individualized Society*, 179.

a mask identifies oneself with the image of a mask with which he/she wears and other people comprehend him/her correspondingly.[34]

Bauman, when actualizing these kinds of meanings in liquid modernity, mentions that in public life, it is the mask that determines whom a person is dealing with. People can wear and take off their masks according to the role others define for him/herself individually, or that other people give him/her according to his/her will. In turn, when interacting with others because of their masks "I" always can be sure whom "I" deals with, what role these carriers play and in what way I should interact with them. Faceless of others determines strict relations with them according to the roles of their masks. Also, "I" wears the mask according to which "I" arranges "my" behavior and others will recognize "me" as a bearer of that mask. Bauman emphasizes that there are no other variants of interactions with others in social space in nowadays, although he mentions that masks are not reliable indicators of human interactions comparing with faces. "I" who wears the mask hides the face, is obliged to trust other masks. In such circumstances, trust becomes a key socially meaningful value.

Thus, in liquid modernity others, neighbors and distants are defined not spatially but axiologically. At the interpersonal level, neighbors act, the Other manifests oneself through humanity and activates the virtue of responsibility. At the social level, others are distant people and their interaction is correlated with activation of the virtue of trust.

Axiological Grounds for Interactions of Distants

Interactions of distants take place in the public space. It is the sphere that is the key platform for public communication and one of topical social questions at the epoch of Modernity. Trust is the basic moral value in the public sphere. Trust is such a moral relation that to a first approximation, can be defined as constrainedness of I to rely prospectively on the moral qualities of other people.

Fukuyama, in his definition of trust, emphasizes the opportunity for qualitative interaction of distant people according to their roles in society:

> Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community.[35]

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[34] Aleksey F. Losev, "Twelve Theses on Antique Culture," trans. Oleg Kreymer and Kate Wilkinson, *Arion: A Journal of Classics*, Third Series 11(1) (2003).

[35] Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues at the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1995), 26.

Trust is not a result of the activity of a separate person, but appears in relations with other people. That is why it is possible to affirm that trust is shaped in social practice in the process of joint adaptation of foreigns to moral standards accepted in a society through comprehension of virtues of honesty and trustworthiness. Trust within a historical process makes possible the shaping of value potential in a society, the so-called *social capital*. The term "social capital" was introduced by the sociologist James Coleman, who defined it as a human capability to work together in one group for a common aim.[36] It is important to emphasize that it is about the interactions of individuals who are bound neither by blood ties, nor spiritual intimacy of interpersonal links.

Thus, trust is a socially meaningful value, a social virtue. It can take place only when members of a society have a moral consensus when common moral norms and values that are circulated through different social institutions are recognized in a society. Contemporary philosophers call the set of such norms and values as the "moral code."[37] An actual moral code promotes the shaping of ethical skill of spontaneous sociability, i.e., the human capacity to take part in the collective life, to create new associations and new frameworks for interactions.

In such a context, Robert Putnam researches public associations that function at the base of social capital. He distinguishes its two forms: bonding capital characterized by close group relations of members of associations; and bridging capital characterized by the externally directed relations of members. According to Putnam, exclusiveness, or the implacability of members of a group to those who are outsiders, is a leading moral factor for bonding capital groups. Whereas inclusiveness, or the wide contacts of group members to members of other groups and a society in general, is a distinctive feature for bridging capital groups. Members of religious associations, church-based Sunday schools and church leisure organizations, ethnic fraternal groups are interacted at the base of bonding capital. Mainly local immediate interests of the group members are represented in such associations. Whereas associations at the base of bridging capital appeal in their activity to broad masses of the population and are engaged in public affairs. Universities, civil rights movements and youth service groups are examples of such associations.[38] Only bridging capital associations can truly take part in the shaping of generally valid moral code and formulate socially important agreements between members of a society.

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[36] James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988).

[37] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality,* vol. 2: *The Use of Pleasure*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books. A Division of Random House, Inc., 1990), 25.

[38] Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York and London: Touchstone Books by Simon & Schuster, 2000), 21-22.

Since Modernity, impersonality is one more basic value in the public sphere. If intimacy of interpersonal interactions is an attribute of the private sphere, alienation and impersonality of communication are components of the public space. With the help of impersonality, regulation of public interactions at the base of moral code is possible. It allows the support of regular, meaningful relations with distants and simultaneously avoids burdensome contacts, troublesome communication and risky compromises. A moral code in its formal characteristics is close to etiquette, which is usually considered as rules of proper behavior in society. Besides its generic features, such as external forms of status and situationally defined behavior, amenity, manners, speech and clothes,[39] etiquette also makes possible the impersonal interactions of foreigns in a society.

Impersonality is actively claimed in liquid modernity because it justifies a widespread directive on evasion and escape from existential sacrifice and exclusivity of interpersonal relations of I and the Other as well as on the domination of short-term and transient contacts. Bauman considers

> [that] efforts to keep the 'other', the different, the strange and the foreign at a distance, the decision to preclude the need for communication, negotiations and mutual commitments, is…the expectable response to the existential uncertainty rooted in the new fragility or fluidity of social bounds.[40]

It is necessary to emphasize that impersonality, which allows one to keep others on spiritual distance, is a value of Modernity in the public sphere, but in the world of liquid modernity, it promotes evasion from emotional and axiological intensity of interpersonal interactions as excessive in the space of communication of distants.

The lack of the value of trust in the public sphere of liquid modernity is really an axiological problem in the interaction of distants. Most researchers mention different modes of social escapism, conscious rejection from the practice of virtues of trustworthiness and loyalty which are components of trust, as well as the virtue of responsibility as peculiar to interpersonal interaction. Scholars see that the cause of such tendencies intrinsic to contemporary persons is to desire to "escape from freedom" into refuge, where it is unnecessary for them to be responsible for their deeds and to build trustful relations. Lack of trust in conditions of liquid modernity objectively provokes anxiety. Bauman is right when he says that today, the role of trust has changed functionally: "Trust is the-way-of-living-with-anxiety, not the way to dispose of anxiety."[41]

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[39] Apressyan, "*Jetiket*" (Etiquette).
[40] Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, 108.
[41] Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics*, 115.

Different strategies to arrange acceptable ways of life in anxiety are offered, techniques of interactions with distants are developed in such a way of transparent, comprehensible and predictable as people practice them as much as possible. These are attempts in the public space to develop etiquette forms and to put them in the rules of public order in the business sphere, to create and implement ethical codes for regulation of behavior in organizations. Here we also mention the ongoing attempts to resuscitate the axiological core of the Modernity public sphere by recruiting citizens to socially important activities and participation in the activity of civil associations.

Contemporary society is complex. Modern and Postmodern prospects are represented in its axiological space. Attempts to arrange the way-of-living-with-anxiety are blended with Modernity coordinates, which cannot completely satisfy liquid modernity. All-around complaints of the public and researchers on the disability of trust and impersonality to provide qualitative interaction of distants reflect exactly the impotence of Modernity values to resolve ethical problems today.

Interactions of Distants in Global Informational Networks: Ethical Aspect

Postmodern philosophy, besides Modernity ethics, is the axiological ground for the practice of virtues. Gilles Deleuze mentions that contemporary philosophy largely lives off Nietzsche.[42] Ukrainian scholar Oleh Khoma, in such vein, considers Nietzsche's Zarathustra as a "dice player" who creates new compositions of desires and pleasures with every new course of the play. Leaving behind himself of the sacred for Modernity sphere of morality, in this game Zarathustra permanently escapes difficulties, which can force him into responsibility and dances at the legs of chance.[43]

This metaphor describes the behavior strategy of the contemporary individual in virtual realities. This is the quintessence of liquid modernity, the symbol of which is the Internet. Internet opportunities today are not limited by globally circulated documents and hyperlinks. There are technical opportunities to create communicative spaces individually, to fill them with contents and senses by using Web 2.0 services. This phenomenon is known as social networks. Researchers of this new sphere of human interactions fix the emergence of specific social relations there. To

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[42] Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London and New York: Continuum, 2002). 1.

[43] Oleh Khoma, *Modernaja i postmodernaja perspektivy v filosofii kul'tury* (Modern and Postmodern Perspectives in Philosophy of Culture), Dis…d-ra filos. nauk (The thesis for doctor in philosophy) (Kyiv: Institute of Philosophy of NAS of Ukraine, 1999), 329.

clarify the ethical component of these relations is necessary to define their principled difference from relations in non-virtual social reality.

Communication in the virtual space is mediated by technical facilities (gadgets). That is why people in global informational networks are usually called "users." They spin the web of human relations in the process of interaction and virtual realities define the structure and design of such a web. Technically mediated interaction allows the user to hide the face. In virtual space, the mask is called an "avatar" and is the graphical self-representation of the individual. With the help of the avatar, the user emphasizes one's peculiarities and makes interlocutors clear what his social status and axiological spaces are. In contrast to the mask, the avatar does not depend on eternal circumstances and does not suppose correlation in users' interactions. An individual hidden behind an avatar is totally autonomous in communication with others who, in view of distance through gadgets, are distants.

It is necessary to fix two important moments here. Firstly, an avatar gives a user an opportunity to construct different identities according to he/she wishes and needs. Contemporary directive on success in such circumstances directs the user on constructing the virtual image, which does not demand verification, comparison with aims, efforts or achieved results of important others. The one who is faint-hearted and helpless in real life, in virtual space, positions oneself as a knight, deficient in communication with the opposite sex, a macho or coquette. Nobody can identify adequacy of such self-presentation and point out discrepancies and non-fitments. In non-virtual space such actions are usually the actual method of social teaching and a reaction of an individual on the critique and one's conclusions concerning such critique it is the evident result of such teaching.

All of this allows an individual not only to coexist with others, who have distinct systems of values and distinct points of view on significant issues, but also to interact and to cooperate with people with different life plans and strategies of their realization. In virtual space, these opportunities are almost inaccessible because of specifics in human communication. This is the second important moment, which fixes transformations of virtual communication. Not constrained by necessity to correlate his/her words and actions with words and actions of others, the user can rely only on him/herself. Here, capacities of moral self-constraint work evidently. If the level of moral culture, learned in the process of breeding and self-teaching, is rather high, a person can conduct decently and suitably in virtual space. If the level of his/her moral culture is conditioned by uncritical adoption of hedonistic and consumer values of liquid modernity and he/she has only a distant idea on moral discipline, then the contact-free and anonymous virtual communication usually is transforming in impunity. The user does not fear being rude and refuses to follow elementary

rules of politeness if physical force does not threaten him/her because of their violation.

Scholars argue that the new style of communication, in Internet, is easily elaborated and comprehended by new users. Such communication does not oblige the long run or deliberate relations; it stimulates fragmentary and superficial contacts among people. "Friendship" and "enmity" have no ethical weight there. Feelings of personal significance become the main pleasure in communication, they are calculated exceptionally mathematically according to the amount of the marks "like" and "repost" and the number of people in a friendlist and so on.[44] These procedures, as well as "add friends" and "remote from friends," do not demand special social skills or spiritual efforts in arranging and supporting interactions. In social networks, it is easy 'to add as friends" a person with whom one does not dare to hope to communicate. As scholars consider, excessive use of anonymity and contactnessless in communication can change the characters of people and decrease moral responsibility, solidarity, humanity and sympathy.[45]

Global informational networks are called alternative reality. They contain features that are not inherent in non-virtual reality. However, they undoubtedly reflect tendencies that take place in contemporary socio-cultural space.

> Not a social network imposes us a format of emasculated and fragmented communication, but already existing social interaction…finds adequate electronic appearance, appropriate protocol. We find the exact articulation of our wishes and thoughts in social network communities with the most fanciful names. Rules of the game in social life within network communities… display in relief regularities of the whole social arrangement.[46]

Thus, fragmentarity and superficiality of social relations in virtual realities reflect processes taking place in the public sphere of liquid modernity which in fact destroys the pre-Modern form of unity (*Gemeinschaft* in words of Ferdinand Tönnies).[47] In an interview with Bauman,

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[44] Vyacheslav V. Kornev, "Social'nye seti: avtoportret govorlivogo bol'shinstva" "Social Networks: Self-Portrait of Talkative Majority), *Likbez: Literaturnyj al'manah* (*Likbez: Literary Almanac*), 109 (2016), http://www.lik-bez.ru/archive/zine_number 5900/zine_clever5905/publication5928.

[45] Aleksey N. Il'in and Aleksey L. Panishchev, *Kul'tura obshhestva potreblenija: filosofskie, psihologicheskie, sociologicheskie aspekty* (*Culture of Consumer Society: Philosophical, Psychological, Sociological Aspects*) (Omsk: Omsk State University Press, 2014), 236.

[46] Kornev, "Social'nye seti: avtoportret govorlivogo bol'shinstva."

[47] Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society*, trans. Margaret Hollis (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957).

Ricardo de Querol called social media "the new opium of the people."[48] This is an apt metaphor because today people escape to social networks from the cruel reality of "traumatic social commitments, ruthless necessity of daily 'earning a living', the coldness of alienated communication at home and at working place."[49] When discussing these tendencies, Russian researcher Vyacheslav Kornev emphasizes that:

> Artificial environment of network communication is opposed not 'alive' communication – on the contrary, it shelters us from the horror of loneliness (especially perceptible among mass of 'living' people), from horrified existential discoveries, abandonment, malady, death etc.[50]

Sociological researches testify that active Internet users spend much less time with relatives and friends and that permanent presence in social networks reduces their involvement in public activities, restricts their circle of contacts, conditions loneliness and depression in real, non-virtual space.[51] That is why an individual in global informational networks is like Nietzsche's Zarathustra. One reproduces hedonistic and escapist directives of liquid modernity by one's behavior, each time combining new design of wishes and pleasures.

Such alarmist pessimistic appraisals of human life in the world of global information networks are not the only possibility. Alternative points of view are also represented by sociologists based on their observations and studies. In fact, the Internet gives additional space for social interactions and provides existing relations and building new relations.[52] In such prospects, "friendship" webs in online-communications are considered "weak links" in a society, i.e., geographically diffused by specialized in themes and it is possible only because of web-services. Sociological data testify the interconnection between using the Internet and improving relations with distants and even the widening of the communication circle.[53] There are publications which suppose correlations between

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[48] Zygmunt Bauman, "Social Media Are a Trap/Interview by Ricardo de Querol," *ELPAIS* (January 26, 2016), https://elpais.com/elpais/2016/01/19/inenglish/1453208692_424660.html.

[49] Kornev, "Social'nye seti: avtoportret govorlivogo bol'shinstva."

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] Yuriy G. Rykov, *Struktura social'nyh svjazej v virtual'nyh soobshhestvah: sravnitel'nyj analiz onalajngrupp social'noj seti "VKontakte"* (*Network Structure in Virtual Community: Comparative Analysis of Online-Groups VKontakte Social Network*). Dis…k-ta sotsiol. nauk (The thesis for Ph.D. in sociology) (Moscow: National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2016), 21-22.

[52] *Ibid.*, 21.

[53] James E. Katz and Ronald E. Rice, *Social Consequences of Internet Use: Access, Involvement and Interaction* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).

users in social networks and forms of social capital. For example, Miki Kittilson and Russell Dalton conclude that online-communities, based on bonding relationships, consolidate interpersonal contacts of their members and online-communities of bridging relationships extend the circle of their contacts of members even to inhabitants of other countries as the representatives of other cultures and religious confessions.[54]

Virtual community is the form of social unity in global informational networks. It emerges in the process of long-run, computer-mediated virtual communications of masses of users who spin the web of human relations. Howard Rheingold, the founder of the term "virtual community," in his book *Virtual Community: Homesteading of the Electronic Frontier*, mentions that practices of virtual communication have the same nature as non-virtual social space. The only difference is that the interactions in virtual environment are realized with the help of multimedia. In this sense virtual communities possess the same features that are inherent in non-virtual communities. To take part in their activity is possible because of free and voluntary users' communication in web-services. Potential features of virtual community are the capacity to unite individuals who have never before communicated and overcome the limits of "friendship" chains in the web-communities.[55]

Such divergence of esteems in global informational networks for communication of distants does not allow to judge moralizingly in negative tone regarding forms and contents of Internet interactions. Moreover, a constructive sociological approach to computer-mediated communication sheds light upon specifics in the web of human interactions in circumstances of liquid modernity and allows us to understand the nature of trust in virtual space. Human capacity to create new associations and to shape new frameworks for interactions in social networks provide the creation of new bonding and bridging relationships in virtual communities, maintenance of communication on the basis of fundamental values of freedom, when communication in virtual space takes place in voluntary grounds.

Afterword

Russian publicist Vladimir Soloukhin, in the book *Stones on a Palm*, describes the following case below, although its authenticity is doubtful, its moral value is unconditional. A member of the British Parliament,

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[54] Miki C. Kittilson and Russell J. Dalton, "Virtual Civil Society: The New Frontier of Social Capital," *Political Behavior* 33 (4) (2010).

[55] Howard Rheingold, *Virtual Community: Homesteading of the Electronic Frontier* (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1993).

when discussing moral issues, read four maxims of different people concerning amorality of youth, future hopelessness of culture in the hands of that generation and death of civilization provoked by the decline in morals. Audience ovations stopped when the orator named the authors of these maxims: Socrates, Hesiod, an anonymous Egyptian pagan priest who lived two thousand years BC and an ancient Babylonian who left a message in the pot five thousand years ago. Soloukhin concludes that all these cultures actually disappeared because of the lack of morality.[56]

Each epoch has its causes to be considered by its contemporaries as crucial and its moral values as corrodible because of the violations of its traditional grounds and the loosing of value coordinates and viable spiritual impulses. Our epoch, liquid modernity, is not an exception. Transformations of axiological determinants provoke changes on axiological grounds of the epoch and condition the spiritual search of its contemporaries. The topic of the decline of morals and loss of moral grounds is as old as human civilization and permanent. This is why, historical in its essence, the web of human relationships can change and has changed, its structure and design during every historical period but does not transform in rags, as moralizers of all times would prefer to represent the situation.

Yet, ethical issues were declared by the founder of ethics, Aristotle and are filled by content and senses according to the spirit of the time in liquid modernity. Today, the idea of happiness has in hedonistic consumer content which emphasizes contingency of the "hit the jackpot" and free from values of persistence, diligence, industry success etc. The basic moral virtues are qualities unknown till the mid of the 20th century (responsibility) or latent for spiritual space of the Western individual till the end of the 20th century (trust). These qualities are necessary for interactions of neighbors and distants in the conditions of liquid modernity alongside the virtues of active life, sacrifice, mercy in interpersonal interactions beyond the daily bustle as well as honesty, trustworthy for social interactions.

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[56] Vladimir Soloukhin, *Kameshki na ladoni* (*Stones on a Palm*) (Moscow: Molodaya gvardia, 1982), 130-131.

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Being a Muslim in Global Times: *Taqlid*, *Jihad* and *Hijra* in the Quranic Hermeneutic

When a person is asked to imagine a particular instance connecting faith with clothing, which of the followings would first come to mind: a Jewish man with a *kippah* on the head; a Hindu man with a turban and long beard; or a Muslim woman with a Hijab? Would we picture a Muslim and a non-Muslim in the same way? What would a Muslim who lives in a non-Islamic community look like? Or a Christian living in a Buddhist community? Or a person of faith in a faithless community? Given our current social and political context, the question of religious identity arises with increasing urgency. One of the reasons for this urgency has been spurred by the recent crisis of Muslim refugees and the difference that they inject in our societies. This difference finds itself exacerbated by the very nature of the Islamic faith and its emphasis on *Ummah,* or community. The question of the Many and the One moves into a social context. Can Muslims retain their specificity while at the same time becoming more integrated? Is the Western value of individualism irreconcilable with the Islamic idea of *Ummah*? Do certain Islamic values, such as *Jihad,* present a threat to Westerners?

This study aims to address these vital concerns by examining the different approaches according to the Quran, especially what the main Islamic resource, the holy Quran, says about the question of religious identity. My aim here is to reach both Westerners and those Muslims who have made their home in the West. To the first group, I intend to sketch out a concise idea of the Quranic worldview in order to provide a clearer understanding of some of Muslim terminology which have been misused. To the second group, I hope to refresh their faith and knowledge of the Quran. I will explain and analyze three fundamental and relevant concepts: *Taqlid*, *Jihad* and *Hijra* as to hopefully illuminate some of the issues mentioned above.

Taqlid and Jihad

The examination of the historical background of a given section of the Quran began quite early in the development of Islam and was recorded in earlier Islamic texts under the name of *Asbab al-Nuzul*, which means the reasons and circumstances for the revelation. This perspective paves

the path for a modern hermeneutic, though it remains rather under-developed throughout Islamic history. The foundational practice for this hermeneutic consists in dividing the Quran into two sections: the verses revealed in Mecca (610-622) and the verses revealed in Medina (622-632). The Meccan verses illustrate the fundamental concepts of Islam such as the Oneness of God (Tawhid), Judgment Day and the missionary calling of the prophets, the Medinan verses touch on the detailed forms of the religious practices including acts of worships and acts of intersessions.

The three terms mentioned above – Taqlid, Jihad and Hijra – originally appeared in the Meccan verses (although they are also mentioned in the Medinan sections of the Quran). These three terms are dynamic and interrelated; it has important implications for our times to understand their characteristics. In other words, these concepts, to be properly understood, must be heard together. We see that Taqlid and Jihad are situated on opposite ends of the spectrum of Islamic theology, yet they are kept in balance by Hijra which is a much moderate concept. To understand the concept of Jihad without a reference to the concept of Taqlid means to have a limited and distorted understanding of what Jihad really entails. This is why, in my view, that this concept resonates in a strange and nonspiritual voice in our times. Moreover, to ignore Taqlid also has the effect of reductively associating Hijra with Jihad, which lays the foundation for a radical and fanatical interpretation of the Quran as an excommunication ideology.[1] A deeper analysis of the meaning of these concepts is needed. Let us first turn to the issue of Jihad and Taqlid.

As said above Jihad and Taqlid are found on the two opposite ends of the spectrum of Islamic theology; the former is associated with struggle and effort, while the latter with lack of struggle and laziness. Taqlid is often associated with not taking responsibility and failing to rise to the challenges at hand. I will discuss Taqlid in more detail in what follows. What I want to mention are a couple of points about Jihad – etymological and exegetical. The first noteworthy etymological point is that the etymology of Jihad by itself has nothing to do with war. There are two close but distinct words in Arabic, which refer to war: Harb (from Arabic root H-R-B) and Qatl (from Arabic root Q-T-L) which appear in different forms of speech. Several times both words are used in the Quran and their most common uses have to do with aggressive fighting.[2] The most common application of H-R-B is for war, warfare and combat and the Q-T-L is for assassination, killing and murdering. Both *Harb* and *Qatl* originally refer to battle and fight, the etymology of *Jihad* is completely different. J-H-D,

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[1] Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, "The Guise of the Sunni-Shiite of Use of Excommunication (Takfir) in the Middle East," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* (Villanova, PA: Villanova University and Pakistan American Foundation, 2015), vol. XXXVIII, no. 4, 1-22.

[2] The Quran, 5:33; 2:190-193 and 217; 4: 75-76 and 89; 8:39; 9:14 and 29 and 36; 49:9.

the word's root, means effort, exertion, struggle and facing a challenge. This semantic meaning reflects most uses of Jihad in the Islamic civilization. Muslims typically utilize the term Jihad in three distinct but interrelated contexts: intellectual, personal and socio-political.

From the intellectual perspective, the concept of Jihad is used to describe the task of the Mujtahid – the individual who deduces Islamic law from Sharia's resources with valid methodology. The high level of exertion and difficult challenge of relating the scholar's modern-day reality to the ancient resources of Shariah is a clear cause to attribute J-H-D to this hermeneutical process. The outcome of this scholarly work appears mostly in the format of issuing new legal perspectives called Fatwa. Here, Mujtahid is synonymous with Mufti, a more familiar title in English literature. The second use of Jihad has to do with the personal effort of the faith to keep his/her independence of character and of agency against the social pressures or trends in his/her socio-cultural environment. To keep one's faith alive and effective inside a faithless, often alienating community needs much effort and struggle. This was the case for earlier Muslims in the time of Muhammad and the revelation of the Quran as I will discuss more below. This form of Jihad, is known as the Great Jihad (Jihad-e Kabir) and the Major Jihad (Jihad-e Akbar) in Islam. The Major Jihad would later be further developed with existential features by Sufis. Most Muslim ethicists use the term "Jihad al-Nafs" (fighting ego) referring to self-examination and self-reform.[3]

It is only in the third context – socio-political – that Jihad is related to war and battle against an enemy. Originally this happened through the use of military force, but in modern politicized Islam Jihad took on such new features as militia warfare and mobilization. Physical fighting in a military context, however, always remained subject to a number of restrictions and regulations bound to various perspectives in the philosophy of jurisprudence. Fighting against an enemy constitutes merely one-third of the Islamic uses of Jihad and even then, this concept remains restricted by the many regulations in Sharia law. What these different uses of Jihad reveal is a profoundly dynamic concept specifically organized around the notions of struggle and of effort. More significantly, this very implication possesses its roots in the Quran.

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[3] Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, "Reflection on Nostra Aetate," *Nostra Aetate: Celebrating 50 Years of the Catholic Church's Dialogue with Jews and Muslims*, eds. Pim Valkensberg and Anthony Cirelli (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 2016), 147-148; Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, "How Muslims and Christians Can Practice *Wilayat* (Support) Toward Each Other? A Response to Nostra Aetate," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* (Villanova, PA: Villanova University and Pakistan American Foundation, 2018), vol. 42, no. 1, 41.

The history of interpretation of the Quran teaches us that the first verses on Jihad belong to the time of Mecca, when Muslims were a minority, lacked personal agency as well as the freedom to form communities of faith and experienced severe discrimination, oppression and boycott.[4] In this context, the Quran suggested the new faithful to maintain their faith and agency in the face of mounting social pressures and oppression. There is a clear emphasis on individual choice, responsibility and ethical values. For example, in chapter 29 (called Ankabut) we find the following injunction: "if they strive hard (Jahado)" for the sake of God, God will guide them to "His Paths" an encouragement to remain steadfast in faith and not give up because of social pressures and discrimination. This encouragement to "strive hard" (Jahado) is sometimes called the Great Jihad (Jihad-e Akbar) which commands the faithful, including the Prophet Muhammad, to not follow unexamined wishes as their ultimate goal,[5] but to apply their reason when making decisions for this is what distinguishes man from the animals,[6] to examine God's signs in the world[7] and to not submit to the unfaithful, but rather "strive against them with the great jihad."[8] In these Meccan verses the concept of Jihad is thus explicitly associated with an intellectual endeavor and effort and is not yet understood as a physical battle.

Having said that, the concept of Jihad would later evolve into its more aggressive form as a physical challenge and battle in the Medinan parts of the Quran where the faithful dwelling in Medina are permitted to defend themselves when under attack as a war target. It is in these Medinan verses that the Quran is first seen as promoting a defensive and military form of Jihad.[9] Still this permission to engage in defensive fighting is clearly justified inasmuch as, in the Medinan context, Muslims were often the object of oppression and discrimination and were often expelled from their towns and villages by wars. There are very secular and reasonable factors to justify the use of defensive force. It is worth-mentioning that this very first Quranic revelation on physical Jihad uses the terminology of Q-T-L (Yuqatalun) rather than jihad. Another verse which justifies the physical Jihad uses again the term Q-T-L, as a defensive mechanism to protect free conscience.[10] Many later Quranic verses also apply Jihad in this context. The current term Mujahid refers to this use (mujahid means

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[4] Muhammad Said al-Ashmawy, *Islam and Political Order* (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994), 69-70.

[5] 25:43.

[6] 25:44.

[7] 25:45-50.

[8] 25:52.

[9] 22: 38-40.

[10] 2:217 and 4:75.

who does practice jihad). All of these verses about the use of force, however, remain subject to the principles of justice and fairness. For instance, "Fight in the path of God those who fight against you, but do not aggress. God does not love the aggressors."[11]

> O faithful, be steadfast for the cause of God and just in bearing witness. Let not a group's hostility to you cause you to deviate from justice. Be just, for it is closer to piety. Have fear of God; God is Well Aware of what you do.[12]

A more comprehensive understanding of Jihad can be attained if we approach it in the light of Taqlid. While Jihad implies exertion, high effort and struggle in order to preserve one's authenticity and integrity, Taqlid is associated with the act of imitation, mimicking or copying. The Arabic root of the word, Q-L-D, appears in various forms of speech to imply echoing, copying, following and imitating. One common use of qalad in Arabic refers to actions of the ape, in contrast to the human intellectual effort. A meaningful form of Q-L-D in Arabic is al-Qiladah, meaning a leash or a rope or similar material attached to the neck of an animal for restraint or control. But human beings also can find themselves to be attached to a "leash." This leash can take the form of society, stereotypes, ideology, power, politics, faith, public figures and traditions. Also, Q-L-D is associated with laziness and lack of responsibility. What leads humanity without its awareness and its conscious decision is a leash or Qiladah. In Western literature, Taqlid can be viewed as a lack of Enlightenment as described by Immanuel Kant, "The Enlightenment is man's mental emancipation from self-incurred immaturity." This Enlightenment is kind of intellectual Jihad. As such, the enlightened one (Mujtahid) proceeds by the light of self-sufficient reason and spreads clarity into his community and beyond.[13] The Mujtahid or the enlightened one uses "the Principle that Good and Evil have a Reasonable Nature" to survey the fundamental concepts of faith in theology and the "Rational Independents" to legislate religious practices in Sharia law.[14] This light also applies

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[11] 2:190.

[12] 5:8. Salehi Najafabadi, *Jihad in Islam*, trans. Hamid Mavani (Organization for the Advancement of Islamic Knowledge, 2012); HussainAli Muntazeri, *Hukomat-e Dini va Huqoq-e Insan* (Qum: Saraii, 1387).

[13] Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, "The Tradition of Rationality in Islamic Culture," *The Secular and The Sacred*, eds. John P. Hogan and Sayed Hassan Akhlaq (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy 2017), 761-775; Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, "Rationality in Islamic Peripatetic and Enlightenment Philosophies," *Philosophy Emerging from Culture*, eds. William Sweet et al. (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy 2013), 71-86.

[14] *Ibid.*, "The Tradition of Rationality in Islamic Culture," 383-406; "A Hermeneutics of the Sacred and Secular in Shariah," 761-775.

to ethics and morals. Achieving the position of Mujahid and Mujtahid, in all ethical, intellectual and socio-political spheres, is not possible except by leaving one's previous state (Hijra) and renewing one's faith (Iman). Let us now examine some Quranic passages about Taqlid.

The Islamic emphasis on the self-examined life is among the critical reasons behind the formation of Islamic theology (Kalaam) and the development of rational schools of thoughts (Mutazilite, Maturidiyyah and Shiite), the welcoming attitude toward the integration of Islam with selective elements of other faiths and worldviews, and the birth of Islamic Philosophy, Sufism and the Principles of Jurisprudence with varied approaches. The principal miracle of the Prophet Muhammad appeared in the form of a book: the Quran.[15] The first verse revealed to the Prophet Muhammad is a command to read.[16] The first revelation portrays God who is teaching humanity with a pen.[17] God takes an oath to penmanship and to the craft of writing[18] in order to show the lofty position they possess in His mind. It is these verses that inspired some early Mutazilite of Islam to consider doubt as the first religious duty. That is every faithful has to follow a Cartesian method of seeking knowledge to make sure s/he is free of all kinds of unexamined ideas. This means that an individual cannot reach the position of the true faith unless he/she doubts everything about individual and social values and views in advance. There are several modern theologians who advocate the same idea. They consider hesitation a fundamental concept of faith, a holy path.[19] This perspective, however, cannot be grasped if the Quranic verses on Taqlid and the unexamined life are not discussed.

There are four types of Taqlid that are condemned by the Quran. They are:

(a) imitating prestigious people and looking at them as an authority of values and views. The Quran states that some people will be questioned on the Judgment Day for their wrongdoing. They may respond that they followed their chiefs and the great ones. This is not a justified excuse according to the Quran[20] as each individual is responsible for his or her salvation/happiness, he/she is responsible for his/her own views and values.[21]

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[15] 2:23-24; 10:36; 17:88; 52:33-34.

[16] 96:1.

[17] 96:33-5.

[18] 68:1.

[19] For example, see Morteza Motahhari, *Majmoe-ye Athar* (Tehran: Sadra, 1394 SH), Vol. 30, 169; Sayed Yahya Yasrebi, *Moqaddeme-ii bar Falsafa-e Siyasat dar Islam* (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1387 SH), 310

[20] 33:62.

[21] 76:2-3.

(b) Copying the previous generations and parents merely because they are before us or older than us. This group of verses contains some of the major passages of the Quran rejecting imitation and Taqlid. The Quran narrates that many pervious people fought against prophets and the messengers of God because they thought prophets and the messengers were destroying established values and views transmitted from parents and elders.[22] Yet, the Quran maintains that tradition is not the criteria for truth; that whether an idea is old or new does not respectively qualify or disqualify it from being true. Whether an idea comes from the East or the West, geography, is likewise not an effective manner to welcome or reject it. For example, many people in the Middle East are radically criticized in Quranic stories and narratives while chapter 30 of the Quran (al-Rum) gets its name from Rome and gives it an honorable mention for its being the cradle of the Christian faith.

(c) Copying religious leaders without examining their validity or looking at their deeds. The focus on the Oneness of God (Tawhid) in Islam has many pragmatic implications. One of them is that there is no absolute authority for truth except God. The Quran criticizes many Jews and Christians because they "Took their rabbis and their monks to be their lords besides God."[23] Thus, Jews and Christians are criticized by most Muslim exegetes for following blindly their leaders instead of the Lord Himself. According to the Quran, however, the priest or the imam or the mujtahid should not think on behalf of the people. People must therefore not try to avoid personal religious reflection while depending on priests and imams to think for them; nothing can replace conscious reflection.

(d) Copying the powerful authorities. Power gives self-confidence and has a way of making people arrogant and lawless.[24] Weakness, by contrast, removes self-confidence and even self-esteem. This feeling of power lays the foundation for associating truth with power and consequently encourages the imitation of the rich and the powerful. The Quran clearly states that many poor and weak people will face the punishment of God along with powerful wrongdoers on the Judgment Day because they followed them for their power.[25] Today, of course, power can take the many faces of modern institutions, large corporations and the mass media.

The significant point here is how the Quran understands the true duty of the faithful: To examine their faith and not copy external values and

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[22] Cf. 2:170; 5:104; 31:21; 37:69-70; 43:23.
[23] 9:31.
[24] 96:6-7.
[25] 14:21.

views. The verse 73, chapter 25, elaborates on the faithful's characteristics: "who, when reminded of the revelations of their Lord, do not try to ignore them as though deaf and blind. Rather, they try to understand and think about them." This is a very explicit command: A Muslim is not allowed to accept the Quran unless it aligns itself with their common sense. Of course, this common sense changes from a place to place, from a time to time. To balance between timebound realities and facts and timeless and eternal ideals and values needs a great jihad and scholarly work. However, the result affects both sides. Regarding our subject, inhabiting in a new community, particularly with a different culture and faith, requires a new stance, not only with regards to creating new social connections and cultural relations but also with regards to one's own faith and understanding of Islam.

To conclude, reducing Jihad to its mere physical form and then ignoring its causes and restrictions misses the spirit of Jihad they which consists in a largely intellectual and spiritual struggle for free consciousness and agency in a non-Muslim context. On the other hand, while Jihad describes the struggle of the faithful in a non-faithful context,[26] the refusal of Taqlid must be remembered in Islam, because it is the rejection of conformity to a given Muslim tradition, authority or context which terrors and violence often ensued from a blind trust in a given authority or leader. This leads us to Hijra which I will show to provide a great opportunity to refresh faith, to widen one's horizons, to grasp Jihad in its true nature and finally, to leave behind poisonous imitation.

Hijra

The severe discrimination, oppression and lack of freedom of conscience caused Muslims to leave their hometown Mecca while Islam was still establishing itself. Two historical migrations (Hijra) happened in the time of Muhammad and of the revelation of the Quran. The first migration was to Ethiopia in 615 CE; the second was to Medina in 622 CE. The Prophet Muhammad was among the second group. Earlier, the Prophet Muhammad gave three reasons as to why Ethiopia would be a good country to migrate to: (1) its king did not allow for unjust actions, (2) honesty was dominant there and (3) it was dream place for comfort.[27] The Quran

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[26] I use the term non-faithful intentionally to refer to that Jews and Christians are considered as faithful, not infidel, in the Quran (see Akhlaq, "Reflection on Nostra Aetate," 146-158; Akhlaq, "How Muslims and Christians Can Practice Wilayat [Support] Toward Each Other? A Response to Nostra Aetate," 28-48.

[27] Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, "Identity and Immigration, A Quranic Perspective," *Building Community in a Mobile/Global Age: Migration and Hospitality*, eds. John P. Hogan et al. (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy 2013), 87.

encourages the faithful to look for both worldly and otherworldly happiness.[28] It counts a safe life and good economy as the bounty of God (106:4). Again, this means that secular and rational values like justice, honesty and a comfortable life are recognized as sufficient reasons to leave the Holy land of Islam and to give up the honor of being a companion of the Prophet. The second group of Muslim immigrants headed to Medina and the Prophet eventually joined them. These two movements gave birth to the new terminology in the Quran and Islam, which divided the faithful into immigrants (Muhajir) and helpers (Ansar).[29] The Quran was welcomed by immigrants because of their firm faith, sacrifice and openness. Despite the different traditions that they bring into the Muslim community, the Quran shows as much respect for immigrants as it does for the original companions of the Prophet.[30] But there are more lessons to learn.

In terms of etymology of Hijrah we find the Arabic root of H-J-R which means to leave, break away, desert, expel and immigrate. It connotes encountering difficulties and overcoming them by taking a risk. *Hijarh* differs from *harb*[31] which often covers the physical state of escaping, fleeing and running from something. Another close concept is *Safar* which implies travel, journey and departure. While *safar* is advised to enrich knowledge[32] and is a matter of religious practice,[33] hijra is more fundamental inasmuch as it is seen by the Quran to develop specific virtues.[34] Such significant virtues are attributed to immigrants as pure devotion to God, honesty and supporting God and His messenger;[35] true faith;[36] patience and trust in God;[37] sacrifice;[38] hopefulness;[39] returning to God after failure;[40] pioneering in good-doing;[41] and being successful.[42] These values are essential to immigrants.

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[28] 2:201.

[29] Akhlaq, "Identity and Immigration, A Quranic Perspective," 83-106.

[30] 3:195.

[31] There are two Arabic terms which look similar in English: Harb (حرب) and Harb (هرب), but their pronunciations and spellings are different in Arabic. There is no English equivalent for the first one Harb (حرب), which means escape and fleeing. It has with a regular pronunciation, which is breathy, strong and heavy with the throat constricted. The second word Harb (حرب) means war and combat discussed above.

[32] 6:11; 27:69; 29:29; 30:9 and 42.

[33] 2:184-185 and 283; 4:10.

[34] 9:100 and 117.

[35] 59:8.

[36] 8:74.

[37] 16: 41-2 and 116.

[38] 9:20.

[39] 2:218.

[40] 9:117.

[41] 9:100.

[42] 9:20.

We discussed earlier that the concept of *Tawhid*, Oneness of God, is the core of the Islamic faith. This oneness is furthermore associated with the idea of liberation and with the annihilation of false gods or of whatever might replace them such as saints and religious leaders. This is why many movements in Islam, including Salafism, emphasize removal, deletion and deconstruction rather than the erection of multiple and constructive institutions. Mutazilite, the most liberal theology which was the most prodigious in the early centuries of Islam, emerged only after the first half of Islamic history centering on the oneness of God. Tawhid is the existential journey to remove all fake gods and ultimately to find favor in God's eyes. Rumi puts this concept of Tawhid at the center of the prophets' missionary endeavor. He says,

> Who is the '[divine] protector'? He that sets you free and removes the fetters of servitude from your feet. Since prophethood is the guide to freedom, freedom is bestowed on true believers by the prophets.[43]

This removal can take place only through a devoted faith. In this light, one might understand Hijra in a religious or spiritual sense as the existential abandoning and leaving behind of idolatry which characterizes all faith in the Quran. Whoever truly and fully trusts in God is devoted to Him and is able to leave previous attachments, idols and gods. In this context, many scholars of Islamic ethics suggest that the true immigrant be the one who leaves sin behind. The total abandonment of the past paves the way for welcoming new possibilities. As such, Hijra is typically contrasted to al-Ta'arrub, literally "desertification." Though al-Ta'arrub has its root in A-R-B which has the connotation of "relationship," here, it merely refers to the mentality and morals of primitive tribes and people. The same meaning is used in the Quran: "The dwellers of the desert are very hard in unbelief and hypocrisy."[44] However, while the leaving behind of an uncivilized and undeveloped place in favor of a civilized and developed one is Hijra, the opposite move is a major sin. Al-Ta'arrub ba'd al-Hijra (desertification after immigration) is a backward move from civilization to primitive life. This shift from the Sahara and the desert to a city or town is not merely a geographical change; it has cultural, educational, ethical and psychological aspects which all reflect on faith. City life and the opportunities and challenges presented by city dwelling are praised even among Sufis who normally tend to prefer rural places and life of a

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[43] Jalal ud-din Rumi, *The Mathnawi of Jalalud-din Rumi*, trans. and ed. Reynold Alleyne Nicholson (Tehran: Research Center of Booteh Publication Co., 1381/2002), 6:4540-41.

[44] 9:97. Sayyed Muhammad Husayn Tabatabaii, *Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Quran* (Tehran, Muasisah Al-Alami lil-Matbu'at, [No Date]).

peaceful and uninterrupted nature. One great example of this is found in Rumi, the lord of love in Sufi Farsi literature. Rumi justifies his view based on a Hadith of the Prophet and also equates living in rural place to the unexamined (imitating, originating from Taqlid) life. Of course, Rumi adds his own Sufi interpretation of the issue as well. This is the story he tells:

> Do not go to the country: the country makes a fool of a man; it makes the intellect void of light and splendor. O chosen one, hear the Prophet's saying: 'To dwell in the country is the grave of the intellect'. If anyone stays in the country a single day and evening, his intellect will not be fully restored for a month. For a [whole] month foolishness will abide with him: what but these things should he reap from the parched herbage of the country? And he that stays a month in the country, ignorance and blindness will be his [lot] for a long time. What is 'the country'? The Shaykh that has not been united [with god], but has become addicted to conventionality and argument.[45]

All of the above shows how much Hijra is celebrated in Islam. We now understand why Muslim jurisprudence talks of al-Ta'arrub as a major sin. This also clarifies why all 24 times that Hijra appears in the Quran and it only does so in the form of a verb. In Arabic, a verb differs from a noun and an article inasmuch as it refers to an action and is bound to a particular subject and time. In contrast, neither the noun nor the article has a sense of time and therefore constitutes static entities. Hijra, in its reoccurring verb form therefore constitutes a dynamic concept and as such, works as a bridge between theory/faith and practice.

In the Quran, the word Hijra appears seven times between the word faith (*iman*) and the word Jihad. These verses concern the believers, the immigrants and the Mujahids alike, all which should have faith, perform hijra and jihad. When Iman, Hijrah and Jihad appear together in the Quran, they cannot be easily added or removed. On the contrary, they create the individual anew, give him/her a new vision and mission. Having faith, immigrating and participating in the Jihad originate from the same individual: a Muslim hopes to renew him or herself through these actions. But the order in which these injunctions appear is also significant. In the Quran the order in which words are written is very important and meaningful to Muslims. Jihad, whether it is physical or financial, always comes after Hijra which, in turn, comes after faith. Jihad occurs only in the third phase and requires that the faithful should have passed the two previous phases (Iman and Hijra). But what is Iman? Iman (faith) is the showering

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45 Rumi, 3: 518-522.

of God's mercy and compassion. The examination of the etymology of Iman (faith) in Arabic leads to the root A-M-N which implies peace, security and safety. The Quranic name of God is *al-Mu'min*, meaning Him who provides safety and security. A Muslim faithful is one who brings safety, security and peace into the community by seeing everything in the light of God's mercy (al-Rahman) and Compassion (al-Rahim). The next step to deepen one's faith is Hijra. Hijra constitutes the removal of all cultural, geographical and historical obstacles, presuppositions and prejudices. It implies embracing new people, new communities and a new life based on a social contract and such values as justice, honesty and welfare. This is how the Constitution of Medina – the contract between Muhammad and the people of Medina – became the basis of Umma, the faithful community and laid the foundation for a new community. Finally, Jihad is founded on the first two – a spirit of compassion (Iman) and openness (Hijra). As such, far from implying hatred or violence against the nonfaithful, Jihad is built on the dual community values of compassion and openness and signifies rather the preservation of the individual Muslim's uniqueness and agency in a given community. The Quran is aware of the fact that a society that enjoys the values of freedom and justice will be more receptive to the spreading of the word of God and of spirituality – this could take place in a completely secular society. In such a context, there is a genuine incentive for the faithful to peacefully negotiate between reason and revelation, secular and sacred values and create a fruitful cooperation between them in order to save humanity without killing common sense and joy.

Assimilation and Uniqueness

Islam asks a Muslim to be simultaneously integrated and unique, the latter being a divine quality: Allah is unique but exists everywhere: "He is the First and the Last, and the Outward and the Inward."[46] The faithful are to imitate God's names and attributes as much as possible. Two very popular attributes of God which often accompany Allah's name often are al-Rahman and al-Rahim. These two attributes appear particularly in Islamic prayer in the opening expression of "Basmallah-e al-Rahman-e al-Rahim." Both names are rooted in R-H-M meaning compassion. Muslims consider al-Rahman a broader compassion which embraces all beings and peoples, regardless of their gender, faith, values, views and nature. All people receive God's compassion inasmuch as they are created by Him and exist. Muslims believe that there is a higher version of God's compassion which targets the faithful specifically. This is called al-Rahim which is given in the context of the particular relationship between the

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[46] 57:3.

faithful and God. Of course, this opportunity is open to everyone since there is no original sin and anyone can become a Muslim. Inasmuch as Muslims are called to imitate the divine, they are to develop both qualities and enact them in their communities. The first attribute of al-Rahman serves to improve social life and coexistence in the neighborhood. The second one, al-Rahim serves to improve spirituality and make life, suffering and struggles more meaningful. A Muslim is one of many people, a faithful, citizen, inhabitant and so on; but still s/he is unique with his/her own opportunities and challenges, with his/her own consciousness, with hisher own approach and relationship to God. S/he has to find his/her own spot in many and to play his/her unique role.

As God is the creator, a faithful must also be creative in order to share God's quality. There are two verses of the Quran which illustrate this: one has to do with God's creative nature and the other with human beings' responsibility to create. Verse 29 chapter 55 (called al-Rahman) states, "every moment He is in a state (of creation)." This verse highlights how God's creation is continuous.[47] A faithful seeking to embody God's attributes will also be creative, not only materially, but also culturally and socially. Verse 61 chapter 11 of the Quran explicitly tells that when God created people from the earth he requires them to build and tend to this earth. Therefore, creativity is not only in God's nature, but also constitutes God's aim for the faithful to contribute in creation.

The direction of this creative impulse is clear, that is, to spread compassion and mercy in the community. There is a Quranic verse which states that the objective of creation by God is that people worship Him.[48] Muslims have traditionally interpreted this verse as equating worship (Ibadah) with knowledge (Ma'rifah). Other verses confirm this interpretation.[49] There is thus a link between worship and knowledge. The Quran is not a book of science written merely to awaken curiosity but a book of wisdom serving to lead people to a pious and spiritual life. One may conclude that the knowledge mentioned above is the knowledge, which is expressed through gratitude and celebrates beauty, richness and glory of life and nature welling up in a feast of thankfulness. It is in this way that we may understand the relation between creation and compassion. Interestingly, the root R-H-M of both al-Rahman and al-Rahim means the mother's womb in Arabic. We are not just to create with compassion and mercy, but the entire creation itself emerges from the "womb" (R-H-M) of compassion and mercy (al-Rahman). I wonder what would happen if people were to invest new technologies and modern industries from a

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[47] See also 5:64.
[48] 51:56.
[49] Cf. 40:13.

place of compassion. Would we have the present climate change and environmental crisis?[50]

Several times the Quran suggests that God created some traditions, ways and principles for the world, both internal and external, which cannot be changed.[51] A thankful scholar could learn from them and improve human life quality based on these traditions. These traditions and ways are unbiased and neutral with regard to place and time. They can help us to be more creative or remove obstacles on the path that we have chosen. One of these traditions is that God created people diverse by intention. At least four verses in the Quran directly touch on the issue that God created people diverse and even with different faiths in order to lay the foundation for free will, conscious decision-making and make possible enhanced knowledge.[52] These many traditions come from one because all people are created from a single being.[53] The foundation of creation is laid upon the one and the many; unity and diversity, assimilation and distinction. They come together to constitute the whole of creation, the sign (Ayah) that God is present in both nature and culture.[54] People are created equally with the same nature.[55]

Although the Quran calls for a common word,[56] differences in religion are not considered as a reason to disrespect them. It is clearly said that God has honored all people with dignity, traditions and devises for life,[57] not only a particular people, race or faith. People are examined under God's Lordship. Though the symbol of the Father is used in the Quran and Sunnah, as well as in some Hadiths, Islam considers all peoples as belonging to the family of God (ahl-lallah). The concept of brotherhood is used in the Quran to highlight how people are from the same family and root and how they are connected to each other. One Quranic tradition states that God created people not merely equally, but in a kind of brotherhood, an emotional and family relationship. This notion goes back to the ideas of compassion (al-Rahman) and merciful (al-Rahim) rooted in the womb (Rahim). A very inspiring note is that the Quran maintains that brotherhood exists between prophets and their enemies, between the highest faithful and the most corrupt sinners – those who reject justice, accountability, truth, reform, piety and the blessing of God. There is, according to the Quran, a general brotherhood among people regardless of

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[50] Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, "Christian-Muslim Cooperation Demonstrating God's Image/Caliph in Ecotheology," *The Ecumenical Review* (World Council of Churches, 2018), 70(4), 788-805.
[51] 17:77; 33:62; 35:43; 48:23.
[52] 4:68; 11:118; 16:93; 49:13.
[53] 4:1.
[54] *Ibid.*
[55] 30:30.
[56] 3:64,
[57] 17:70.

their values and worldviews. This provides the diversity of communities with the opportunity to develop coexistence through the universal values of justice, love, compassion, free will and significant social contract. Of course, there is a specific task entrusted to the faithful to share their religious experiences and spiritual journeys.[58]

To conclude, in the Quran, the world, physical and intellectual, constitutes a space of creation for both God and humanity. Both God and people simultaneously are unique and similar. There is no one like God, but He fills the whole world. Everyone is unique but still they are diverse peoples, creatures and part of a category. Uniqueness requires us to reject imitation (Taqlid) since there is no one exactly like us to be followed. Each individual is a unique treasure and creation of God and has a specific role in the world. God created people diverse, with free consciousness, free will and intellect. Jihad, on the other hand, consists in the struggle for the integrity of the particular self, that of a given community and the high objectives of life based on the common good and universal brotherhood. This understanding of religion (iman/faith) comes true through Hijra. A Muslim is not permitted to project the presuppositions and prejudices s/he has of the given faith or worldview without renewing her/his values and views through the process of Hijra, or exile/immigration. Just as a snake which sheds its skin a person of faith needs to leave his/her previous perspectives, categories and prejudices in order to encounter the true God. The process of leaving includes traditional concepts of God and religious concepts alongside socio-politico, media and money-related judgments. The only and absolute sacred is God, this cannot be reduced to a concept. Hijrah is thus a medium for renewal, a medium to leave Taqlid and to achieve the true meaning of Jihad.

This struggle applies in both public and private life. In the public realm, the Muslim is commanded to build a better family, neighborhood, community, society, nation and globe. And in the private realm, s/he is required to work for the betterment of the self with positive and constructive values and views. When people are encouraged to work together respectfully as equal creatures of God, they begin to learn from each other. They should be open and welcoming to each other and to share compassion with each other. This is the Quran's message to both Muslims and non-Muslims alike particularly in our time of mutual distrust and crisis. Thus, the uniqueness evoked by the Quran is not only meant individually and physically but extends to collectivities which themselves are meant to safe-guard and celebrate their uniqueness to be themselves and to think of

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[58] I discuss in detail how Christians are considered as valid faithful in the Quran and how Christians and Muslims mutually can enrich their faith by each other. See Akhlaq, *Reflection on Nostra Aetate*, 146-167; Akhlaq, "How Muslims and Christians Can Practice *Wilayat* (Support) Toward Each Other? A Response to Nostra Aetate," 28-48.

others. Muslims can and should keep their own understanding of life and faith but also learn from other faiths, values and views. They have to move from Taqlid (being one of the many) to Iman (having their own connection with the Truth), Hijra (leaving prejudices and unexamined presuppositions) and Jihad (physical and intellectual struggles for the betterment of the globe) if they want to be true Muslims. Thanks to technology and media, it is now possible for everyone, believer and non-believer, to practice this great wisdom of the Quran:

> Therefor give good tidings (O Muhammad) to my bondsmen those who listen to the word, then follow the best of it; those are they whom Allah has guided, and those it is who are the men of understanding.[59]

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[59] 39:17-18.

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Ethics for a Global World:
Rabindranath Tagore's Perspective

Asha Mukherjee

The paper aims at working out the foundations for global ethics in contrast with Nigel Dower.[1] I argue here that Tagore's ideas on global well-being based on harmony, love, compassion and sympathy provide such a foundation. I would further argue based on Tagore's writings and his own experiments in Santiniketan that harmony, love and sympathy are extremely important for global ethics and in a sense, Tagore had also developed global ethics and was much ahead of his time. Tagore's emphasis on "harmony within" leads to harmony in the outer world and shows how it works in the field of aesthetics as well as in the field of values. The "harmony within" always leads to social harmony and will spill over to make harmony as a central virtue. Tagore's strong opposition and strong criticism of the unbalanced nationalism of Japan compels him to advocate for The League for Equality of Races. Through his critical writing on World War I, he provides justification for global ethics (especially against Japan), considers solidarity as responsibility for the well-being of fellow human beings.

His essay *Nationalism* published in 1917 makes a distinction between the spirit of the West and nations of the West and argues in favor of India as "individuals with living sensibilities." Based upon the varied and deeper relations of humanity he makes a distinction between the "moral man" and the "political and the commercial man." He says that "we must remember that the spirit of conflict and conquest is at the origin and in the center of Western nationalism." He advocates for pluralism of individuals within the limits of diversity, provides ways of understanding the good along with social responsibility of individuals.

For Tagore these have no place for relativism. "We" is referring to all humanity; "individual" is seen as connected with all humanity and cosmos and as a global plural subject.[2] Love provides the most solid foundation for such a global ethics, if love is true then the rest is established without any rules. For Tagore, "King" (virtue) in *The King of the Dark Chamber* is a symbol of law and order, "King" is a constitutional *apriority*

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[1] Nigel Dower, "Global Ethics: Dimensions and Prospects," *Journal of Global Ethics* 10, no. 1 (2014), 8-15, https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2014.896575.

[2] Rabindranath Tagore, *The Religion of Man* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961).

and "King" exists nevertheless.[3] The "King" is not away from the world, for people can relate to him; the world, transcending its narrow confines imbued with values and transcends beyond the scientific level. The world of Tagore has the value of goodness imbedded in it, if we have eyes for it and we will be able to cooperate with it in the process of existential becoming which can help us establish harmony within and around. Love, that keeps the process alive, is not an isolated or unreal element at the micro level of the individual, but connects us the individuals, to the macro level of the universe as well, so that there is a continuity all the way to emanate from the macro while existentially accommodated at the micro.

To Tagore, an abiding goodness is the *teleos* of the universe, which inspires us to move in the desired direction and makes it our own goal. In the process of evolution, human beings acquire their sense of value for which they have an existential choice to make their own. Tagore dreamt of a world where the human society would rise to a new height to establish the virtue harmony within and to have existential cooperation with this *teleos*.[4] Harmony within provides possibility of a scope for people to react differently to situations depending on the state of harmony an individual is in, this takes place within the frame of the specific orientation of one's nature, as well as taking into consideration the cultural diversity in place.

However, pluralism is nested here in the concept of a general, overall harmony where the good of all is an end as a holistic outlook of well-being that does not isolate nature from its fold and is not measured only in terms of material attainment. In this sense, Tagore subscribes to the virtue harmony within in his views on ethics. I would argue that all the issues related with global interactions and inter connections dealing with global phenomena such as war, peace, trade and development may be addressed on the basis of such a foundation.

Individual and Society

Tagore strongly believes and argues that human beings are essentially connected in various ways with the universe and therefore cannot have any self-interest. The interest of an individual cannot make any sense out of the social context as an individual is never in isolation as the West often sees. His metaphor "home and the world" refers to all the levels of society, private and public, community and the rest and nation and state without any boundaries. No one is "outsider," the distant other is also a part of me – an extension of me. An individual finds her/his meaning in

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[3] Sitansu Sekhar Chakravarti, "Tagore-Wittgenstein Interface: The Poet's Activism and Virtue Ethics," *Tagore, Einstein and Nature of Reality*, ed. Partha Ghose (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), 141-160.

[4] Rabindranath Tagore, *"Oi Mahamanaba Aashe," Gitobitan* (Calcutta: Visva-Bharati, 1960), 865.

fundamental reality by ways of comprehending all individuals; reality is the moral and spiritual basis of the realm of human values. Tagore gives examples of societies that are to accommodate different groups and races within "one geographical receptacle." India tolerated differences of races at its very beginning, spirit of toleration has acted through her history.

> India has all along been trying experiments in evolving a social unity within which all the different peoples could be held together, yet fully enjoying the freedom of maintaining their own differences.[5]

His concept of society is of incorporating all the groups with differences without dominance of power, money and race. Tagore acknowledges the real differences of the groups at the institutional level and yet the need to work for a unity. The rigid bureaucratic system that the state provides may not help us in working out the system similar to the one prevalent in India which has all the differences of culture, religion and languages but all make a commitment towards tolerance. Tagore believes that every group has an inherent dynamism but the bureaucratic system restricts the development of their interchanges. The groups may have boundaries among themselves but they must not be seen as barriers towards community ties and human ties. The affirmation of human ties towards the social good can be seen during famine, religious conflicts, terrorism and other natural calamities. People come forward and join hands in solidarity. To keep such social unity alive, Tagore develops various village fairs that provide opportunities for various groups to intermingle across all the differences. The kind of social unity Tagore emphasizes is not political unity that tries a homogenization process of top-down but a process of solidarity developed through a conscious reflection and maintained through interactions at various levels. Tagore's notion of personality (not person) is rooted in experience as well as in transcendence.

> Hunger, friendship, love and sickness are as real as its relation with others and to the world and its craving for the touch of an infinite personality to which one gives the name God…My personality constantly seeks union with other personalities, and, on the day when I realize a perfection of unity with them, it is glad and is filled with delight. In discovering this special kind of unity with others my personality finds truth. In this craving of my personality for supreme satisfaction exists, my poetic imagination must invent, and my reason demand, a foundation of

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[5] Rabindranath Tagore, "Nationalism in India," *Nationalism*, Rabindranath Tagore (London: McMillan and Co., Limited, 1918), 115.

unity somewhere where my whole being can obtain permanent shelter, where I can feel happy, find contentment and be at peace. In this realm of thought, argument is no longer of much use. Human beings on this earth have from time to time procured or experienced direct evidence of God in and through their own personality. In the world of what they call the soul they have experienced the infinite touch of an infinite personality.[6]

Personality needs to find its fullest expression in love of the infinite, in love of beauty, in compassion for all creatures, to be absorbed in them, because only through such absorption can the individual find and achieve ultimate truth. Our fullest potential can only be realized by breaking all kinds of limitations and the boundaries, social, physical, economic and psychological in order to get new freedom to communicate with others, to come into more intimate touch with an infinite personality, with God. Regarding the importance of love Tagore says,

The one great faculty of the soul is sympathy or love. By the exercise of this faculty we transcend the boundaries of the isolated self. Through love you come into intimate touch with others. Through love you can enter what we term 'the All'. Therefore, love is the one medium which gives you access to the greatest unity we can imagine, the universal soul. All passions which prevent the pursuit of this unifying love, of this universal sympathy, are sins.[7]

In *Ghare Baire* Tagore shows how the concept of the nation-state is used to exploit women for political gains. He argues against the dehumanizing of social arrangements in Indian the context through various writings such as *Gora* and *Char Adhyay.* He is very critical of the social practices that privilege men over women leading to imbalance in society and insists that the middle-class women have every right to participate in public debates and choose their path. He is equally critical of the over emphasis or the privileges granted by society on the name of high status or women being beautiful. The dance drama *Chitrangada* deals with a situation when she becomes disillusioned of her charm as queen and tries to look into her real life as less attractive physically but a successful ruler and a dignified person.

Tagore does talk of freedom, equality, dignity and justice. But his concept of justice is not based on the masculine concept of equality and rights of an individual in isolation. Rather, it is based on the rights of the

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[6] Rabindranath Tagore, *Personality* (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1980), 89-90.
[7] *Ibid.,* 92.

individual who is always connected with society and is part of society. Such a concept may be called a feminine concept of justice based on love, sympathy and harmony as basic human values that are universal and transcending all the boundaries. Men and women are different but are complementary to each other. An individual is constructed through his/her surroundings – a shared interconnected universe, the "feminine idea of just society."[8] Thus, the right of the individual is the right of humanity at large in totality – a shared interconnected universe.

The individual man is not different from the Universal but ever attached. Though they stand together, they are not equal. The individual man is attaining infinite bliss through the realization of the Universal Man who is not simply the subject of Tagore's adoration but the infinite that pervades his thought and feeling. When individual man's thought and action transcend the necessity of everyday life and touch the eternal space and time, he can realize the "Infinite" in himself. This is the "process of becoming" or "self-realization" through the process of self-manifestation. The infinite manifests through the realization of the eternal in man, it is beyond all the provincialism and communalism – the only can it reveal the truth as universal. In the context of truth, satisfaction is secondary; primary is freedom – freedom from the narrowness of the self. Fulfillment of humanity is the highest aim of all religions. And this fulfillment needs the broadness of consciousness. Freedom can be realized through the manifestation of our inner self – the *harmony within* at various levels.

Critique of Nation and State

Nationality according to Tagore is "A Great Menace,"[9] for it is an imported Western category that is not based on any social cooperation but on the spirit of conflict and conquest. According to Tagore, imperialism is an outcome of nationalism and so is cold-blooded nationalist terrorism. Tagore does not accept western nationalism but recognizes for anticolonial struggle, the need of humanism and cosmopolitan internationalism which can be seen as foundation for global ethics. Tagore strongly believes in cooperation as the cure for individuals and India's problems.

He is writing against Japan's imperialism which obtained its power on the name of nationalism. He writes several essays on nation, state, internationalism and the world and recognizes the biological differences. The boundaries are built between the human being and the territorial segregations are made on the basis of religion, gender, caste and language.

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[8] Bandana Purkayasta, "Contesting the Boundaries between Home and the World: Tagore and the Construction of Citizenship," *Rabindranath Tagore: Universality and Tradition,* eds. Patrick Colm Hogan and Lalita Pandit (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003), 52-53.

[9] Tagore, "Nationalism in India," 111.

He objects the narrow movement of independence against the British, He strongly believes in harmonizing the ideal of the East and the West which is the corner stone of internationalism. Tagore's internationalism also advocates for universal humanism and spiritualism. He prefers the interdependence of individual and countries rather than their independence.

> The Nation of the West forges its iron chains of organization which are the most relentless and unbreakable that have even been manufactured in the whole history of man…Not merely the subject races, but you who live under the delusion that you are free, are everyday sacrificing your freedom and humanity to this fetish of nationalism, living in the dense poisonous atmosphere of worldwide suspicion and greed and panic.[10]

For Tagore imperialism is an outcome of nationalism. Hence, he is against both imperialism and nationalism and works for cosmopolitan internationalism. He writes two essays *What is Nation?* and *Bharatbarshiya Samaj*[11] on these issues. His analysis of nation is rooted in the idea of history. He advises the West to share its wealth with other nations. Having full faith in the oneness of the world and the unity of human beings Tagore says "There is only one history, the history of man. All national histories are chapters in larger ones." Tagore's internationalism is spiritualism – the unity of man and unity of nations without any boundaries or nationalism. Here, Gandhi differs with Tagore and believes that there could not be any internationalism without nationalism.

Tagore often questions tradition and the traditional way of nationalist understanding. The question of national identity is important for Tagore. The answer to the question "Who is an Indian?" depends on how one understands "India" and its past. It is well known that in 1905 Tagore joined *Swadeshi* movement, but in 1907 he gradually moved away from the main stream of Nationalist movement mainly due to his gradual realization of unjustifiable nationalism. From the social and moral understanding, he is lead to the futility of political system and then the victory of truth and the power of the self. One may notice that there was a time when Tagore was very close to Gandhi's notion of "*Swaraj*" (Self-rule) when he wrote 1909 *Hind Swaraj.* Tagore's views about poverty, villages and tolerance all are very close to the development of new India, at that time *Swaraj* was without political activism. But in his *Swadeshi Samaj* Tagore rejects this; he writes to Gandhi that we cannot claim *swaraj* from any foreign ruler but

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[10] Rabindranath Tagore, "Nationalism in the West," *Nationalism*, Rabindranath Tagore (London: McMillan and Co., Limited, 1918), 24-26.

[11] Rabindranath Tagore, "Bharatbarshiya Samaj," *Rabindranather Chintajagat: Samajchinta: Rabindrarachana-Sankalan*, ed. Satyendranath Ray (Kolkata: Granthaloy, 1985), 302-307.

from our own apathy, this *Swaraj* (Self-rule) he calls "*Swadeshi Samaj*" (indigenous society).

Tagore like Gandhi advocates for *Swadeshi Samaj* in a constructive way by arguing that Indians should utilize their energies in constructive efforts to spread education and social reforms rather than in destructive activities such to burn British goods. Such a destructive attitude does not make much sense either in terms of economic gain or nationalism, or in terms of social commitment. Tagore is more sympathetic to modern technology and is much in favor of assimilating the best of the West so as to create a self-reliant country that would ultimately be able to dispense with its dependence to alien rule.[12] In a novel *Gahare-Bahire* Tagore deals with these issues. For Tagore Western ideas particularly, science is vital for the Indian development. Though he is critical of the use of machines like Gandhi he sympathizes with the rational spirit behind the development of science of the West. Tagore wants Indians to modernize their farming techniques and with this intention he starts the rural reconstruction program at Sriniketan. Indians must take the best of the West and assimilate it with the best of India.

The views of Gandhi and Tagore have a significant difference on science and spirituality. For Tagore, only modern science and reason could lead to understanding of physical phenomena while for Gandhi spirituality is sufficient for understanding and explanation. We can find explicit differences in epistemology when reacting to the 1934 earthquake in Bihar which killed about 1000 people. Gandhi argues that "A man like me cannot but believe this earthquake is a divine chastisement sent by God for our sins."[13] Tagore did not accept this interpretation and hated "the epistemology implicit in seeing the earthquake as caused by ethical failure." His differences with Gandhi on the physical disaster disturbed him. He wrote,

> We who often glorify our tendency to ignore reason, installing in its place blind faith, valuing it is spiritual, are ever paying for its cost with the obscuration of our mind and destiny. I blamed Mahatmaji for exploiting this irrational force of credulity in our people.[14]

However this does not mean that Tagore was against spirituality *per se*, in fact the very foundation of his thought is spirituality – the ultimate

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[12] Krishna Datta and Andrew Robinson, eds., *Selected Letters of Rabindranath Tagore* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 62.

[13] Krishna Datta and Andrew Robinson, eds., *Rabindranath Tagore: The Myriad-Minded* (London: Bloomsbury, 1997), 312.

[14] Amartya Sen, "Foreword," *Selected Letters of Rabindranath Tagore*, eds. Datta and Robinson, xxii.

unity, the truth in union and harmony and the unity of man and of nations without any boundaries.

Question can be raised as why Tagore who joined *Swadeshi* movement (nationalist movement) at an early age slowly drifted away from it later. It is mainly due to the violent and exclusive attitude in the nationalist movement and the country is no greater than the ideals of humanity. Tagore believes that India has already had her unity as a nation in her tradition of working for an adjustment of races and acknowledging the real differences between them. But the Western notion of nationalism adopted in India has destroyed this unity. Gandhi sees both good and evil in nationalism of Indian National Congress. For him nationalism is not evil in itself but the narrowness and exclusiveness make it evil. For Tagore too, its narrowness is one of the reasons for the rejection of nationalism. Tagore says, "I am not against one nation in particular, but against the general idea of all nations."[15]

Tagore was the first to recognize the dangers of aggressive nationalism that raises the nation at the status of a demigod. He argues that the blind worship of nation – state contains the seed of disasters for human beings. Two world wars within thirty years have proved how tragically correct his reading is.[16] He advocates the idea of harmonizing the East and the West, which, according to him, is the corner stone of internationalism. India in her principle of unity in diversity based on adjustment of races rather than elimination and the distinction between the state and society has much to offer to the West.

Tagore has a deep attachment to the past especially to the India's tradition. For him, pre-British Indian society had a social structure quite unique and perhaps without parallel in history in contrast to the mediaeval societies of European countries. In his novel *Gora* Tagore deals with the contradictions of tradition and modernity. Commenting on Tagore's commitments, Isaiah Berlin writes,

> He condemned romantic over attachment to the past, what he called the tying of India to the past 'like a sacrificial goat tethered to a post' and he accused men who displayed it – they seemed to him reactionary – of not knowing what true political freedom was, pointing out that it is from English thinkers and English books that very notion of political liberty was derived. But against cosmopolitanism he maintained that English stood on their own feet and so must Indians. In 1917, he once more

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[15] See Moolchand, *Nationalism and Internationalism of Gandhi, Nehru and Tagore* (New Delhi: M.N. Publishers, 1989), 166.

[16] Humanyun Kabir, "Social and Political Ideas of Tagore," *A Centenary Volume: Rabindranath Tagore 1861-1961* (New Delhi: Sahitya Academy, 1986), 149.

denounced the danger of 'having everything to the unalterable will of the Master' be he Brahmin or Englishmen.[17]

In 1916-17 Tagore delivered a series of lectures in Japan and America which were published as *Nationalism*. For him the distinction of nation-state is extremely important. He wrote the national anthem for not only India but Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. He never wanted that India should be a nation where nation and state become more powerful than society and culture of India. He says "in India our real problem is not political, it is social." This situation not only prevails in India but almost in every nation. "I do not believe in an exclusive political interest. Politics in the West have dominated Western ideals, and we in India are trying to imitate you."[18] When addressing the problem of race he claims that in spite of the difficulties India has been trying to adjust with races by recognizing the differences and seeking some basis for unity which has come through our saints,

> What India has been, the whole world is now, the whole world is becoming one country through scientific facility. And the moment is arriving when you also must find a basis of unity which is not political. If India can offer to the world her solution, it will be a contribution to humanity. There is only one history – the history of man. All national histories are merely chapters in the larger one. And we are content in India to suffer for such a great cause.[19]

The suffering of the Indian people inspires Tagore to political action and elevates his voice at every critical juncture. He continues his resentment with British colonization on India. In 1919, he recorded his protest by relinquishing his knighthood to the Viceroy of India at the brutal massacre in Jallianwala Bagh when 379 unarmed people were gunned down by the British army and 2000 were wounded.

Freedom as Interdependence and Transcendence

The meaning of transcendence for freedom in Tagore is "breaking through the shells of one's limitations." This shell of one's limitation is at two levels an individual level and a deeper level. At the deeper level human pursuits to achieve truth goes beyond one's needs.

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[17] Isaiah Berlin, "Rabindranath Tagore and the Consciousness of Nationality," *The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and Their History*, Isaiah Berlin (London: Pimlica, 1996), 265.
[18] Tagore, "Nationalism in India," 97.
[19] *Ibid*., 99.

This proves to him his infinity and makes his religion real to him by his own manifestations in truth and goodness.[20]

Kant talks of limits of reason and freedom that lies in transcending the limits of reason. The universal law of causality is accepted in the realm of the scientific idea which is possessed by human mind. But this very mind of human beings has its immediate consciousness of will which is aware of its freedom and ever struggling for it. For both Tagore and Kant it is the freedom of the will in human beings that helps transcending and detachment. Tagore says,

> When a child is detached from its mother's womb and it finds its mother in a real relationship whose truth is in freedom. Man in his detachment has realized himself in a wider and deeper relationship with the universe. In his moral life he has the sense of obligation and his freedom at the same time, and this is goodness. In his spiritual life his sense of the union and the will which is free has its culmination in love. The freedom of opportunity he wins for himself in Nature's region by uniting his power with Nature's forces. The freedom of social relationship he attains through owning responsibility to his community, thus gaining its collective power for his own welfare. In the freedom of consciousness, he realizes the sense of his unity with larger being, finding fulfilment in the dedicated life of an ever-progressive truth and ever-active love.[21]

Like Kant, Tagore throughout in his *Religion of Man* lays a great emphasis on an individual being "disinterested." Tagore states,

> The individual man must exist for Man the great, and must express him in disinterested works, in science and philosophy, in literature and arts, in service and worship. This is his religion which is working in the heart of all religions, in various names and forms…he realizes his own truth where it is perfect and thus finds his fulfilment.[22]

Detachment leads to greater truth in religion of man as well as it is a requirement for seeking ultimate truth. Regarding detachment, Tagore gives an example of a doctor who treats his own son and then reaches a greater

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[20] Rabindranath Tagore, *The Religion of Man* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), 172.
[21] *Ibid.*, 27-28.
[22] *Ibid.*, 11.

truth as a doctor than as a father. But in his intimate feeling for his son, the doctor also touches an ultimate truth, the truth of relationship, the truth of a harmony in the universe, the fundamental principle of creation as a mystery of their relationship which cannot be analyzed. It is love that is a highest truth and the most perfect relationship.[23]

There is another sense of freedom. Obligation towards the other is tied with freedom of the individual. In a society, one lives in relationship with others. One cannot have freedom by disassociating oneself from her fellow beings as all relationships demand obligation to others. Tagore argues that "in human world only a perfect arrangement of interdependence gives rise to freedom," which may sound paradoxical but it is true. Freedom is only possible for those who have the power to cultivate mutual understanding and cooperation. The history of the growth of freedom is the history of the perfection of human relationship. Says Tagore, "All broken truths are evils" and "Death does not hurt us, but disease does, because disease constantly reminds us of health and yet withholds it from us."[24] Freedom is the inward process of losing oneself that leads to it. For Instance, *Boul* sect emphasizes on the eternal bond of union between the infinite and the finite soul, which leads to *mukti* through love, love is the ultimate and an interrelation which makes truth complete. Absolute independence or absolute freedom is blankness which cannot be true, rather it is the interdependence which leads to freedom.

For Tagore, "The conflict between self and not-self leads us to evil, but the realization of the united self-promotes us from the darkness to light." Tagore does not negate evil from his philosophical thinking but wishes to transcend it through the true experience of life. He argues that we know that truth always transcends the utilitarian necessities of life; there must be the factual transformation of evil into good. The harmonious activity of selflessness transforms selfishness into good. Tagore analyzes evil through criterion of truth and places it in the region of selfishness. He suggests the way to transcend it. The journey from ugliness to beauty, from evil to goodness is the journey from dissonance to harmony. Evil is not any fact of the external world but an ego-centric use of a free will.[25] Human being finds freedom in Nature by being able to love it.

> For love is freedom; it gives us that fullness of existence which saves us from paying with our soul for objects that are immensely cheap. Luxury is an evil and so is asceticism, one is demon of the desert and another is demon of the jungle.[26]

[23] *Ibid.*, 63
[24] *Ibid.*, 117.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] *Ibid.*, 111.

How freedom of the individual and society can be practiced in real life is shown in his school in Santiniketan. It is an attempt to develop in children

> [the] freshness of their feelings for Nature, a sensitiveness of soul in their relationship with their human surroundings, with the help of literature, festive ceremonials and also the religious teachings which enjoins us to come to the nearer presence of the world through the soul, thus to gain it more than can be measured – like gaining an instrument in truth by bringing out its music.[27]

Like Kant, Tagore talks of extending the limits of knowledge but he goes few steps further. He also discusses the limits of power and stresses on love, enjoyment and its approach to the universal God or the *Isha*, the Super Soul which transcends these limits. In *Upanishad*, it is said "Find out thy enjoyment in renunciation, never coveting what belongs to others." In *Gitanjali*, Tagore says that "I feel the embrace of freedom in a thousand bonds of delight." In Tagore there is antipathy for cages of the spirit, his young mind could not fit in any group or institution whether it was educational, religious or political and his mature mind could not fit in any school of philosophy or religion. He founded a school and a university where one could be free from such groups. For Tagore religion and secular are not separate – poetry, music, art and life are one and there is no dividing line among them. In *Religion of Man* Tagore puts his faith in the right-thinking people whom he has met around the world in nearly two decades of travelling.

Harmony *within* Leads to Social Harmony

Harmony within provides possibility of a scope for people to react differently to situations, taking into consideration the cultural diversity in place. Pluralism is nested in the concept of a general, overall harmony where the good of all is an end, a holistic outlook of well-being it does not isolate nature from its fold and is not measured only in terms of material attainment. In this sense, Tagore subscribes to the harmony within, as explained above, in his views on ethics. He perceives in his world that this love of comrades like clouds requires no solid foundation, but it is stable and true and is established without edifices, rules, trustees or arguments. …When the mind of a person…moves in a time different from that of others, her/his world does not necessarily come to dislocation, because there in the center of her/his world dwells her/his own personality. All the facts and shapes of this world are related to this central creative power,

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[27] *Ibid*.

therefore they become interrelated spontaneously. One's world has its own consistency…because of the central personal force.[28]

An individual finds her/his meaning in fundamental reality which enables him/her to comprehend all individuals. Such reality is the moral and spiritual basis of the realm of human values. Science is the liberation of our knowledge in the universal reason which cannot be other than reason, religion is then the liberation of our individual personality in the universal Person who cannot be other than human.[29] Perfection has two aspects in human beings: *perfection in being* and *perfection in doing*. The latter is a question of moral perfection when an individual is "true in his goodness." The inner perfection of one's personality is valuable as spiritual freedom for humanity. The goodness requires detachment of our spirit from egoism; we need to identify ourselves with universal humanity. It is not only beneficial for our fellow beings but also valuable as truth itself

> through which we realize within us that man is not merely animal, bound by his individual passions and appetites, but a spirit that has its unfettered perfection. Goodness is the freedom of our self in the world of man, as is love.[30]

Tagore is preaching for spiritual perfection as opposed to mechanical perfection. In order to realize one's unity with universal, the individual must live her/his perfect life which alone gives her/his the freedom to transcend it. We know that nothing lasts forever, it is true that all our moral relationships have their end but we cannot ignore bonds that are real, even when they are temporary. When referring to *The Upanishads* and the parable of two birds sitting on the same bough, one feeds and the other looks on, Tagore explains the relationship of the finite being and the infinite being in human beings. He claims that the delight of the bird which looks on is greater for it is a pure and free delight. "There are both of these birds in man himself, the objective one with its business of life, the subjective one with its disinterested joy of vision."[31] For Tagore truth is a living experience in which pragmatic or practical, the logical or the rational and the ontological are not differentiated moments. For truth is not a point but a polygon. No one of the three aspects is eliminated in an accurate description of nature of truth.

Parameters of knowledge have an interface with him the King (see *King of the Dark Chamber*) out in the open, in love and affection; the

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[28] Chakravarti, "Tagore-Wittgenstein Interface: The Poet's Activism and Virtue Ethics," 148.

[29] Note that Tagore uses "religion" as the substitute for "dharma" – an all-encompassing concept in Indian thought, primarily referring to duties in general.

[30] Tagore, *The Religion of Man*, 121.

[31] *Ibid.*, 86.

confines of our narrow bounds keep us away from harmony within and without. Prior to reaching this state our contact with him (King) is only in the dark chamber where he is attractive from a distance as the beckon calls of values reach us before we are ready to embrace them in their terms. In other words, values are there in our unconscious mind, innate and a priori and waiting to surface at the conscious level only when we are ready. The queen could hear the enchanting notes played on the King's musical instrument "that called [her] through the lone and waiting night" only when she was willing to pay attention. One can respond to "his call any way" one likes, for he is prepared to arrange ways of welcome to suit the various responses to the inner calls. His call is silent, so is his coming. At long last when the queen is ready to receive the King outside of the terms of her imposition, he joins her in her dealings with the world. Certainly, her world "waxe[s]…as a whole" with the values incorporated. The King, we must note, does not impose himself on the queen; he is not shown to physically rescue her when the palace is set on fire by a king from another country, who harbors a hidden desire for her in the physical absence of the King. The King does not abandon her either, for he waits for her to find the way to life existentially herself, ushering in the moment his presence would be truly relevant.[32]

There is an eternal relation between the being and the becoming. At one end it is eternal rest and completion, at the other it is continuous movement and change. It is the infinite rest that gives significance to endless activities. The human being tries to give form to her/his infinite possibilities through her/his various activities which are surplus in her/his. By these activities one is making a bridge between being and becoming. Just like a river which can never be the sea, but it can become the sea; we can only come into relation with the Infinite by union of our whole being. Thus, the principle of harmony or the principle of union satisfies Tagore's main philosophical hypothesis. When the "individual I" says "Ferryman, take me across" – the "Universal I" ever comes to meet him. The individual and the universal are completely reconciled in the eternal love. In the very heart of our activities we are seeking for our end. Thus, there is an infinite idea which once realized makes all movements full of meaning and joy. Tagore's *Sadhana* is an experience or a realization of truth. He finds universal sympathy for life. The most striking point we get in Sadhana is that we are reaching the Infinite here and in this world. Beauty, goodness, existence – all are the experiences of life and are interconnected. They are important in the realization of truth; the truth which is human-truth and present in this experiential life. Man has a universal aspect and he must have a moral basis. The Universal Man, who is the God

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[32] Chakravarti, "Tagore-Wittgenstein Interface: The Poet's Activism and Virtue Ethics," 148.

in Man (*Jivandebota*) or Ideal Human being (*Maner manush*) for Tagore, aspires himself in Truth-Beauty-Goodness; there is the fulfilment of humanity which is similar to the stage of '*Brahmavihara*' of Buddha.[33]

Tagore's concept of man/human being is to find its fruition through the realization of the feeling of intimacy with nature *(Sadhana)*. Tagore believes that the state of realizing our relationship with all through the union with the divine is the ultimate end and fulfillment of humanity. In today's world, the sense of superiority of the human being has led to diverse problems not only between human and nature but also between human beings. When confined within the walls of human self, one loses one's inner perspective. Only perfect harmony between humankind and everything else in nature would enable one's soul to comprehend the mysteries of reality and to realize the Infinite. We must thus cross barriers to become more than human in order to experience freedom of consciousness, to unite with all. Tagore often discusses about the spiritual consciousness of The East and The West. In contrast with the west he thinks that India cultivates her consciousness in such a way that everything has a spiritual meaning to itself.

Tagore uses an example from the *Gayatri* verse, to indicate that we should learn to perceive the essential unity of the world with the conscious soul of humankind through the one Eternal Spirit. The ultimate truth about the world lies in our apprehension of the eternal will. The soul of the west mainly is concerned with extending itself outwards, while the east emphasizes on the internal world. True spirituality is balanced in strength, in the correlation of the within and the without. Tagore is concerned with the restricted consciousness of human self. But he expects the flourishing of human civilization, because he believes that the permanence of civilization depends upon the wellbeing of people and the wellbeing depends on expanding the consciousness of people and on realizing the relationship of one with all. "*Sadhana*" gives the most comprehensive view of life and the moral vision of the wholeness of life.

Unity as the basic principle of Tagore's philosophy is not simply intellectual. Tagore does not claim that unity or harmony is attained by intellect rather a matter of realization. Unity and harmony are not different from each other; they are same in our intuition. Tagore unites dissonance and harmony into eternal love, which is an intimate feeling of our deeper experience and the creative surplus of human truth. The creative unity is our innermost nature which gives significance and unites all the experiences of life. Therefore, harmony as the main principle of creativity maintains the balance in our inner and outer experiences. This principle makes us both universal and unique.

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[33] Rabindranath Tagore, *Sadhana* (Tucson: Omen Communications, 1972).

Human religion must be the repletion of our humanity. It deserves intellect and imagination, thought and action, beauty and hardness and enjoyment and abandonment. The eternity of human religion depends on the universalization of our experiences. For Tagore, religion must be human religion and it cannot be true without her/his experience. Human being is giving the success of the eternal intention within her/him. The personhood of each person is related to the personhood of others and according to Tagore this is the innermost religion of humankind. Sin is nothing but the discord; it lies in the separated feeling of man and the universal man (*Jivatma* and *Paramatma*). The realization of the inner truth which lies in the sense of the well-being can remove all the discords of life and bring the harmonious experience. Tagore's realization of the infinite has been established on the concept of "harmony."

Harmony and Unity as Central Virtue

The principle of harmony is vital to Tagore's thought. At the first level the harmony of relationship includes "natural with nature and human with human society." Tagore mentions that he was longing when he was young to run away from his own self to be with nature. He claims that this "appears to be particularly Indian, the outcome of a traditional desire for the expansion of consciousness." But such a desire is too subjective in its character. There are factors which may disturb the harmony between the Spirit of the individual man and the spirit of the Universal Man. This we give the name sin. In such cases our true freedom in the realm of matter, mind and spirit is made narrow or distorted.[34] Being conscious of self, invokes being conscious of our own individuality of our finite and individual nature. But in our soul or spiritual self we are conscious of the transcendental truth within us, the Universal Supreme man; its enjoyment is in renunciation of the individual self for the sake of the universal. This renunciation is not in negation of but in the dedication of the self. The aim is to realize its unity, objective ideal of perfection and some harmony (not absolute) of relationship between the individual and the infinite man. Unity lies in this harmony of relationship and not of a barren isolation that the *Upanishads* speak about when truth is "revealed." For Tagore the truth is not "revealed" but stands face to face and experiences directly.

Thus, harmony is not simply a self-control that Aristotle talks about as a measure against self-indulgence or intemperance, but an added meaning to the onward flow of life. Harmony in this second sense is a virtue which we prefer to designate as harmony within. Harmony has a threefold aspect: (a) harmony within, which is the virtue; (b) harmony amongst human beings in one's own society and the whole social world, it is a virtue

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[34] Tagore, *The Religion of Man*, 112.

that is meant to and helps promote; and (c) harmony of the individual and every society with the natural world; it is the virtue that the human being looks for and delights in promoting it.

How is the unity formed and reached in life? Answering this question Tagore says it is not merely an aggregation but a mysterious unity of interrelationship, complex in character, with differences within of forms and functions. We can never know concretely what this relation means. "There are gaps between the units, but they do not stop the binding force that permeates the whole." Tagore also grants that the idea of humanity is subjective in character and is an abstraction as the objectiveness of its living truth cannot be proved to its own units. They can never see their entireness from outside, they are one within (individual cell and body). Thus, the idea of the body has no objective foundation –a mysterious reality of cells with gaps which can never be bridged. On the basis of this analogy, Tagore explains how Human Unity comes into existence as truth,

> the fact can never be ignored that we have our greatest delight when we realize ourselves in others and this is the definition of love. This love gives us the testimony of the great whole, which is the complete and final truth of man.[35]

As self-conscious, I represent a personality and the other is also a self-conscious personality which has its eternal harmony with mine, "I" and "other" both are self-conscious persons, part of the eternal harmony of the universe. It is ever extending "I" that one finds in the "other" and leads to respect for the "other" as "person." The unity of "I" and "other" is for a "value of life" and not for any utilitarian end. The unity lies in sacrificing self that is for an individual person, the higher meaning for it transcending one's limited self by exercising freedom from personal self to Universal Man which is greater in its universality than the self with personal needs. It is freedom as the truth of Eternal Man that enables human being to transcend. "I" in our arts and literature the process of transcending one is able to maintain the rhythm of an inner balance that is a blessing. This creative activity is fundamental which is represented in human being. We must find and feel and represent in all our creative work the Eternal Man, the creator. Our civilization is a continual discovery of the transcendental humanity. "Reality is the truth of Man, who belongs to all times, and any individualistic madness of man against Man cannot thrive for long."[36] For Tagore, harmonization is not reached through any analytical argument rather stems from a conviction that human beings are

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[35] *Ibid.,* 30.
[36] *Ibid.,* 84.

endowed with a capacity of forging unity through harmonization in conducting experiments in living. Tagore tries very hard for such experiments in living through building the school, through education in order to establish harmony in life.

Unity through Love and Sympathy as
the Foundation for Global Ethics

Similar to Kant Tagore also discusses of the "relationship of good will" which unites people of all colors.

> Realizing ourselves in others is the definition of love. The largest wealth of the human soul has been produced through sympathy and cooperation and cultivation of intelligence for service that knows no distinction of colors and clime. The Spirit of Love, dwelling in the boundless realm of the surplus, emancipates our consciousness from the illusory bond of the separateness of self; it is ever trying to spread its illumination in human world. This is the spirit of civilization, which in all its best endeavors invokes our supreme Being for the only bond of unity that leads us to truth, namely, that of righteousness unites us in the relationship of good will.[37]

The antinomy of the infinite and the finite of Kant is also presented in Tagore.

> The region of time and space infinity consists of ever revolving finitude. Absolute Unity in multitude is like the beauty in a lotus which is ineffably more than all the constituents of the flower *Advaitam* is *anandam*; the infinite One is infinite Love.[38]

We find the ideal of unity in deeper relatedness. This truth of realities is not in space, it can only be realized in one's own inner spirit. For Tagore truth is both finite and infinite, it moves and moves not, it is in the distant, also in near, it is within all objects and without them. All contradictions get dissolved in truth. The negative, limited individual at one level is positive and expending but dreaming, uniting and universal at other level. By personality Tagore means a self-conscious principle of transcendental unity within human being. It comprehends all details of individual facts of knowledge and feeling, wish, will and work, along with the positive

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[37] *Ibid*., 30.
[38] *Ibid*., 40-41.

aspect of ever extending self towards the infinite through increasing knowledge, activities and love.

In *Sadhana,* Tagore deals with the eternal problem of the coexistence of the infinite and the finite. To express the greatest glory of human existence he accepts the Vaishnava view which boldly declares the infinite (God) has bound itself to the finite (man). Tagore understands that human being is true only if she is nourished by love and justice. Creation and consciousness are identical in her/him. In Tagore's philosophy harmony is the criterion and nature of existence and truth. Love is another name of truth; it is the perfection of consciousness and joy that is at the root of all creation. The conflict of loveless mind leads us only to ignorance. The realization of love as beauty can turn us into truth and the absolute state of freedom. Love by its very nature has duality for its realization. It creates separation in order to realize the union. It is just like a father who is tossing his son. It is not the intention of separation when he is throwing his son, but the longing for union. The human soul is on its journey from separation to union. It is the high function of love to welcome all limitations and to transcend them. The bonds of law can only be explained by love and then the bonds become the form of freedom. Joy expresses itself in law, so the soul finds its freedom in action. The more the human being acts, makes actual what is latent in her/him, the more this vision makes room for freedom. Tagore says,

> Through love that is of the Earth a joy in the abundance and diversity of Creation is felt; through the beauty of the world a deeper beauty is witnessed: this indeed is what I call the endeavor to find salvation. I am enchanted in the world, and in that enchantment, I taste salvation's elixir.[39]

Salvation is in realization of unity. The seeking self is personality and the realization of unity is also uniting oneself – personality.

There are no religious boundaries, they are all man-made. Tagore advocates for the religion of man as against the religion of the book. All religions of the world are religions of the book. Religious consciousness, for Tagore, depends on the level of our inner consciousness; deepness of consciousness creates its own religion and is expressed through one's own religious tenet. Religion is free from any boundary; it helps to manifest the innermost consciousness of "Being." The eternal does not have any specific form because it has the infinite forms. The infinite personality reveals itself through the personality of human being, while the eternal one manifests as many; various creative personality of various people

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[39] Rabindranath Tagore*, Of Myself: Atmaparichay*, trans. J. Winter and D. Joardar (Manchester, UK: Carcanet Press Ltd., 2006), 31.

achieve their fulfilment in the realization of the "One." The ultimate truth pervades everything, but "love for all" is the only way to attain it. Humanity is in the center of our adoration and love can attain its repletion in this world with the self-sacrificing attitude; self-realization is possible only in this human-world with the power of human soul.

Religion satisfies not only our emotions but our intellect; the aim of religion is to spread humanity throughout the world. External rituals create divisions between human beings, reject intellect when practicing religious ceremonies. Hence, they should not be accepted as human religion at all. Tagore takes those ceremonies as religious because they have the strength to bind human beings together and offer them the chance to do something for the well-being of all the people, they can help human beings to give up all the narrowness of self and manifest themselves as a universal man. Religion invites people to attain universal love through the realization of life which includes happiness and sorrow or enjoyment and sacrifice. The purest pattern of excellence which carries the sense of welfare must be the highest ideal of religion. Excellence in consciousness is the highest aim of religion.

Tagore's call is to every individual in the present age to prepare him and his surroundings for the dawn of new era, when each one shall discover her/his soul in the spiritual unity of all human being.[40] The internationalism Tagore talks about is spiritualism that removes the boundaries between nations and would evolve without nationalism. The true freedom lies in accepting ideas from the whole world of commitments and responsibility toward people near and far.[41] In the twenty-first century Tagore's views on internationalism and humanism are still relevant. Especially, Tagore's critique of nationalism is extremely important in contemporary times as we face an increasingly separatist and fragmented India and the world. The "openness" that he values the most is under threat these days. In India we see the growth of Hindu fundamentalism, separatist movements in Uttarakhand, Jharkhanda, North East and Bihar, Terrorists in Kashmir, Eastern Europe and Ireland where the national identity supersedes the individual identity. However, Tagore's ideas should be understood in his immediate cultural context, so that they can be re-contextualized according to our needs today.

Conclusion

Tagore recognizes that we live in communities but under states and nations. He argues against nation which is based on the idea of building boundaries. If there are no boundaries of nations then there will be no

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[40] Moolchand, *Nationalism and Internationalism of Gandhi, Nehru and Tagore,* 138.
[41] Sen, "Foreword," xxiv.

problems of cross-border actions, hence not global concern, love and sympathy as human virtues. Human beings have the responsibility to call for cross-border actions. Tagore's perspective is "forward-looking" in Nigel Dower's sense and "backward-looking" in Kimberley Hutchings' sense. It is a response to any harm in the world. Tagore's ideas discussed in this paper provide a foundation for a global ethic that is to guide our interactions with people outside our own society as well as within our society. Based on Tagore's thought such issues as transnational child adoption, international trade and aid, climate change, refugee rights, terrorism, economic globalization, sovereign debt, migrant workers, global health and medical research etc. can also be worked out with utmost care. Questions of global ethics should be decided by us all and justifiable *to the global public* so that all are relevant in this effort. Reliable values and moral thinking of each person should have a place for due consideration; each person's well-being and agency must be treated with equal consideration.

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Revitalizing Moral Globalization:
A Case for Ordinary Virtues

Anastasiia Sytnytska

The term "globalization" once appeared to convey the firmness of order-making on a worldwide scale, but now it faces the post-imperial downfall. Anti-global political rhetoric is increasing across the political spectrum. On the left it comes from those who require distributive justice and ecological crisis stabilization, while on the right those who object to the decline of traditions, identity policies and sovereignty. The latest utopia of security order, global market economy and human rights universalism, which premised upon the third wave of democratization, has been a precarious resultant of liberal democratic order. However, the exacerbated policy of authoritarianism, capitalism and nationalism has framed the legacy of the 21st century.

Despite being known for the science of muddling through revolutionary change and wars,[1] democracy is in crisis and is often roundly decried today. Some scholars even claim that the world is enduring the most severe democratic setback since the rise of fascism in the 1930s.[2] Components of the democratic world order that can wither away include the rule of law and, respectively, the human rights narrative. Indeed, as was stipulated in the Amnesty International report, governments are reversing decades of hard-won protections. In 2018, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights turned 70, but none can take their human rights for granted.[3] In our days and age, a settled opinion is that the human rights movement has been subject to ferocious tests since its rise in the 1970s as a major participant in the international order.[4]

By and large, it became apparent through faltering democratic development that human rights legalism has to be rethought. Even though the

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[1] David Runciman, *The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 33.

[2] Ronald Inglehart, "The Age of Insecurity. Can Democracy Save Itself?" *Foreign Affairs (*May/June 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-04-16/age-insecurity.

[3] Salil Shetty, "Foreword," Amnesty International State of the World's Human Rights Annual Report 2017-18, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/po1 067002018 english.pdf.

[4] Samuel Moyn, "Personalism, Community and the Origins of Human Rights," *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*, ed. S.-L. Hoffmann (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 106.

doctrine continues to hold a powerful appeal, there are at least *three implicit flaws that call for recalibration*. First and foremost, the assumption can no longer suffice that once legal norms are proclaimed, realities will conform to them piecemeal.[5] The burning insecurity and growing inequalities, coupled with the rise of illiberal powers and political authoritarianism, have made a strong case against teleological dependency between democratization and the rise of human rights. If not connected to a broader egalitarian agenda of economic fairness, human rights "are not enough."[6] Subsequently, it is not only economic grievances that fuel hateful and discriminatory political rhetoric in uneven societies, but also and just as crucially, rejuvenated great moral and cultural questions.[7] Many of those who evangelized politics sought to see ahistorical linearity in the progress of human rights order, but its trajectory has evidenced to be anything but linear.

In a memoir *If This is a Man* Primo Levi things his book would carry the world, together with the sign impressed on his skin, the "evil tidings of what man's presumption made of man in Auschwitz."[8] Later, relatively shortly after the Universal Declaration marked a return to natural law heritage in order to stick to the right thing when law orders to do wrong, David Rieff in his papers from Bosnia prominently writes that Muslims are no longer humans to the Serbs and hence ethnic cleansing *was the right thing* for Serbian murderers who did not think of themselves as violating human rights.[9] Likewise, human rights "foundationalism" struggles to raise humans to their "true human nature" on the basis of moral superiority.

This struggle to impose transcultural high humanism on cultures that are simply *not like ours* was already argued to be outmoded by Richard Rorty,[10] whose claim has to be repeated. Second and related doctrinal mis-

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[5] David Rieff, "The End of Human Rights? Learning from the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court," *Foreign Policy* (April 9, 2018), http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/09/the-end-of-human-rights-genocide-united-nations-r 2p-terrorism.

[6] Samuel Moyn, "Human Rights Are Not Enough. We Must Also Embrace the Fight against Economic Inequality," *The Nation* (March 16, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/human-rights-are-not-enough.

[7] Michael Sandel, "Right-wing Populism is Rising as Progressive Politics Fails: Is It too Late to Save Democracy?" *New Statesman* (May 21, 2018), https://www.newstatesman.com/2018/05/right-wing-populism-rising-progressive-politics-fails-it-too-late-save-democracy.

[8] Primo Levi, *If This Is a Man* (New York: The Orion Press, 1959), 58.

[9] Michael Ignatieff, "I. Human Rights as Politics. II. Human Rights as Idolatry," *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 288. Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality," *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 167.

[10] *Ibid*., 170-171.

conception is that a single account of global justice accords with the egalitarian ethos of polarized societies. On the contrary, the hysterical intolerance of difference and resentment of strangers, together with the demands to banish them, culminating in the most racially, ethnically and class-wise, segregated homogeneous communities.[11] Overall, rather than defending a monolithic vision of the world's democratic development that proved to be woefully inadequate and cast a shadow over the major political forces, it is time to work in some particular here and now with the grain of nuanced local traditions and values.

Finally, in order to make a case against linearity and uniformity, we have to appeal against generalities about human obligations, moral reasoning and correlative duties encompassed in human rights theory. References to cosmopolitan ethics and universal values, sound though they are, do not strike a chord with disillusioned multipolar identities who are massively losing faith in grand narratives. Just as important for reversing the trend towards injustice in a long-term perspective is the recognition of particularity of societal settings. As was remarkably put by Michael Walzer, in order to be able to pursue the maximalist justice which people would never achieve, everyone should first have the justice they need right now. In response to the hegemony of maximalist theories, Walzer elaborates on a minimalist, temporal and local in character – "little" theory – as a corollary of incomplete global society.[12]

Fusing these three rejections together and deconstructing huge narratives in an emblematic tour on humanity's moral order, the human rights foremost proponent breaks new ground in discovering what moral globalization looks like in the twenty-first century across the globe. In his recent book *The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World*, Michael Ignatieff concentrates on three atomized ethical issues of his global inquiry: what happens in increasingly fragmented societies when virtues are put into pressure; how political discourse impacts humans' virtues; and lastly what is the tension – if any – between universal values and ordinary virtues and vice versa. The scrupulous realistic approach of this study focuses on the micro-sociology of virtuous behavior reproduced in disrupted societies and elucidates a wide gap between doctrinal, dogmatic, generalized universal values and non-theoretical, non-ideological, ordinary local virtues.

The author's unparalleled finding is two-fold. He first represents a negative thesis, that is, the global ethics, particularly human rights prevalence and reciprocal duties to refugees and strangers, has *not* made people

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[11] Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 47.

[12] Michael Walzer, "Global and Local Justice," *Straus Working Paper 08/11*, 11, http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/siwp/WP8Walzer.pdf.

more tolerant, forbearing and compassionate in their daily lives or, in other words, moral globalization has not produced moral solidarity across diversified communities. As Ignatieff perspicaciously notes, "Globalization has sharpened, not weakened, the conflict between universal principles and democratic self-rule."[13] The book, thus, tackles a commonly shared institutional bias of our times that liberal institutions and the rule of law are sufficient for holding liberal democratic world order which, meanwhile, becomes less credible.

This political philosopher then substantiates his own answer on how liberal democracy can be revitalized – and this is Ignatieff's positive thesis, that is, it is only by changing the language of rights for the language of gift and thus appealing to national sovereignty and ordinary virtues that people really *do* share, instead of what they *ought* to share, so that the progressive response would not go awry.

The global study, spanning over three years and crossing four continents, quickly came out of the speculative cosmopolitan discourse that germinated its initial inquiry. However, no sooner did Ignatieff step out of a seminar room than he witnessed hundreds of thousands[14] of protesters carrying placards "There's so much wrong, we can't get it all on one poster!" and alike during nationwide demonstrations against corruption, high taxes and other grievances in Brazil in June 2013. Paradoxical as it seems, a while before the galvanized public occupied the streets, Brazilian experts were adamant of the clichéd view that endemic corruption is tacitly accepted by the state's electorate. This vantage point, "the experts v. the people," triggered off a new approach to collecting data. Ignatieff combined site visits to slums, favelas and police stations alongside with ethical debates with academics, judges and politicians, so ultimately the study goes truly global.

Moreover, to be global, it is locality that had to take precedence in this research. Contested though it is, the accounts of shared virtues *do differ* across global polarities. Origin, nationality, language, customs and traditions, religious and moral believes, to name but a few, are momentous clashes that define moral personalism in workaday practices. Under international world order, Chinese officials imply the rule-based order, but Western values (e.g., democracy) are met with overwhelming rejection,[15] while European and US policy identifies its own interests, seen as based

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[13] Michael Ignatieff, *The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017), 22.

[14] Estimation according to Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2014: Brazil*, https://www. hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/brazil.

[15] Hans Kundnani, "What is the Liberal International Order," *Policy Essay* (April 6, 2017).

on universal values, with those of humanity as a whole. The above-mentioned accounts of virtues are particularized, therefore, in empirical contexts of divergent societies.

For these reasons, in order to answer what global moral language looks like since the human rights revolution inaugurated in 1945 and whether the human rights discourse has substituted religious, traditionalist, nationalist languages, Ignatieff digs into a particularistic set of problems within traumatized communities to investigate the following questions:

(1) How governments and institutions remain tone deaf to the castling of racial hierarchies with financial hierarchies in a state which has the world's most democratic Constitution – the South African Republic;

(2) how corruption curtails the societal trust in nominally liberal democratic Brazil;

(3) how reconciliation after antithetical to human rights ethnical cleansing and repair after war crimes became possible in Bosnia;

(4) how the extremist hate-filled rhetoric in Myanmar escalates a massive segregation;

(5) how the non-discrimination principle correlates with mutual tolerance within a heterogeneous Jackson Heights in Queens in New York and equality under the law with the fragility of postracial cosmopolitanism in Los Angeles;

(6) and lastly, how civic resilience after the ecological catastrophe in Fukushima helped to overcome the grim consequences of the state's and municipal inaction in Japan.

Trust, reconciliation, tolerance, resilience, reciprocity, generosity – these are called "ordinary virtues" in Ignatieff's book because they reproduce the moral order in human's reasoning and daily practices. *Ordinary virtues* are defined as acquired practical life skills in moral conduct and discernment. They are claimed to be recognized despite the borders and not requiring translation, to form a "moral operating system" of hyperdiverse cities. "*Moral operating systems,*" inherited from the cultures of origin of divided societies, mean tacit, implicit, unstated characters of ordinary virtues. They create a moral order that becomes a shared public good; in other words, they are iterative social patterns that become imprinted features of behavior and are manifested in human's interactions.[16]

Undoubtedly, the idea that virtues have a *practical* dimension is not new. According to Aristotle's distinction of partial and total virtues, total or complete are those virtues that are taken not in the abstract, but in relation to one's neighbor because they involve the actual exercise in

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[16] Ignatieff, *The Ordinary Virtues*, 54.

relation to others.[17] Just like for Aristotle, for Ignatieff, too, virtues only matter when they arise out of like activities. However, where the latter goes further is that he differentiates practical reasoning from the exercise of moral judgment. Agreeing to the extent of skill analogy, it first sounds controversial that virtues as practical reasoning appear synonymous with moral instincts, unreflective and unthinking. Indeed, the fact that virtues are habituated is not contradictory to the fact that they are intelligent in opposition to the automatic or routine reaction to the situation.[18] Nonetheless, the author sharply extends the characteristics to three dimensions: empirical, "bodily, physical, beyond words" latent inner resource; intelligible, as a future-oriented metaphysical commitment to persevere; and practical, because they are intrinsically linked with political trust in public authorities, civic attachment to the constitutional state and social devotion to network, friends and family.

The utopian idea of bracketing the reality in total, implanted in the Western mindset, is counterfactual. This very idea is embodied in the global norms of the world's most liberal constitutions and international declarations. The universal declaration of *human* rights largely relies on philosophical tradition, in particular, Immanuel Kant's speculative idea of the transcendental subject and John Rawls' theoretical construct of rational choices under the veil of ignorance. Nevertheless, we could not agree more that there is no such a thing as a human in the world; instead, there are French, Italians, Russians, etc.,[19] bound by inherent affiliations. The inconvenient truth is that on a micro-level, people privilege their family over strangers,[20] on a macro-level, states are concerned with welfare as long as it accords with their own selfish national interests.[21] From the ordinary-virtue standpoint, quite the contrary; difference and "otherness" are placed at the forefront and thus the human right's doctrine is "denaturalized." By disputing that a construct of an abstract Man is nothing but a rational thought experiment, Ignatieff claims its secondary status. He reverses the primacy to "this" particular individual in all one's peculiarity, ambiguity and contextuality: "Generalities about human obligations and moral reasoning meant little to them: context was all."[22] This is predicated upon the fact that for ordinary people in their day-to-day interactions,

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[17] Aristotle, *The Eudemian Ethics*, trans. Sir Anthony Kenny (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 54 (IV.1, 1129B27).

[18] Julia Annas, *Intelligent Virtue* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 169.

[19] Joseph De Maistre, *Considerations on France*, ed. Richard A. Lebrun, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 53.

[20] Ignatieff, *The Ordinary Virtues*, 27-29.

[21] Constance Duncombe and Tim Dunne, "After Liberal World Order," *International Affairs* 94 (I) (2018), 41.

[22] Ignatieff, *The Ordinary Virtues,* 26.

what matters is not an abstraction like mankind, but their immediate families and their own reflection in the mirror. In this sense, ordinary virtues are also *anti-utopian* and *non-theoretical*.

Moreover, a profound *locality* of ordinary virtue is stressed throughout. Membership in the moral community is contextual, moral universes are pluralistic. Suffice it to say that a primal devotion to ethnicity, nation and religion causes a more powerful moral appeal than common duties to humankind. Following this line of reasoning, a moral to be drawn from the scholar's voyages is that we are always in an existential situation, temporally and spatially conditioned; we identify ourselves only in intersubjective interactions. In other words, in the core of moral operating systems lie the pregiven background assumptions, socio-cultural contextuality and principal subjectivity of its actors. Above all, it is critical to recognize the different evaluations of social goods prevailing in different communities. Consensus can hardly ever be achieved on what people value in antagonistic societies: *difference* and disagreement are universal features of human life.[23] Ignatieff seems to be on the same page, as he notes, "Moral life is about drawing boundaries," and about acknowledging otherness, together with mutual respect and equal moral standing, to live *side by side*, difference bordering difference.

From this follows a *particularistic* character of ordinary virtues. "I guess I learned not to generalize" – was an answer of a Bosnian Muslim woman who endured ethnic massacre and remained in eastern Bosnia where Bosnians once formed a majority of the population, but now their number has been downgraded to five percent. One outstanding point here is that ordinary virtue appears to be inwardly and outwardly individualistic: reconciliation develops from the cradle of an individual mind; reconciliation also does not make generalizations of this particular person, it takes "one person at a time." Responsibility is kept individual. On the other hand, nationalist ideologies do impose generalized and often perverted claims on so-called "objective enemies."[24] "Claims that the land belonged to 'us', not to 'them', the claim that 'we', by virtue of our faith, language, or superior power were fit to rule here while 'they' were only fit to leave or die."[25]

Surely, Ignatieff's answer on how to rejuvenate moral globalization is not miraculously coherent. Due to the obscuring of the distinction between descriptive and normative, the scholar's interpretivism soon requires normativistic implications. Here, let us digress briefly to give a theoretical insight into Ignatieff's empirical shift. Plato, primarily in the

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[23] Michael Walzer, *Straus Working Paper 08/11*, 9.

[24] See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 423.

[25] Ignatieff, *The Ordinary Virtues*, 114.

history of Western thought, proclaimed the ontological dependency between empirical and intelligible by downgrading the reality of the ordinary world of sensible objects as derivative from and dependent on the form.[26] Ignatieff refers not to Plato but to Aristotle for a subsequent development of such a theory in cogitation. According to Aristotle, non-individual Form (the Good) is individualized in particular substance (goodness of one's character). Ignatieff argues that it might be true that a universal form, the Good, which is grounded in human's nature and shared by all, is manifested through virtuous deeds, but it seems equally plausible to rationalize that we recognize goodness in all its astonishingly contextual singularity.[27]

As Ignatieff rejects the ontological status of the universal notion of the Good, he also has to instantiate that there is no consensus on either what is good or on moral commands of authority. He seems to be saying that there is no categorical good, but only hypothetical goods. In other words, the idea of a good, taken in its conditionality, is claimed to have a relative value. That is where problems arise. As was indicated above, the criterial grounds of virtuous practices as such are not ontologically clarified. Scarcely does the book contain the criteria to differentiate ordinary virtues from ordinary vises under a certain set of circumstances, which demonstrates its contingent and relative nature. To put it simply, what appears to be good for me might be approached binary opposite by another person and thus how one defines these oppositions matters quite a lot. In Ignatieff's earlier text, the perplexity of divergent attitudes to what constitutes a good life is solved by introducing the notion of "right," instead of the notion of "good." This establishes a common ground for universally shared commitments: "A universal regime of human rights protections ought to be compatible with moral pluralism."[28] For ordinary virtues, in turn, such a common ground is not substantively explicated.

The author also diminishes the approach to morality as a matter of unconditional moral obligations, heavily indebted to philosophers who have reasoned in the Kantian tradition. More precisely, from the ordinary virtues standpoint, diversity, multiculturalism and inclusion are of dubious values and duties to refugees and strangers and ethical narratives are also "deessentialized." Therefore, political discourse that refers to what civic society ought to do in accordance with what the norm prescribes turns out to be illegitimate. Yet discourse on ethical matters has to be translatable for the notion of ordinary virtues to be morally resonant. There must be assumed an overlap between background assumptions and

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[26] *The Cambridge Companion on Plato*, ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 11-12.

[27] Ignatieff, *The Ordinary Virtues*, 206.

[28] Ignatieff, "Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry," 321.

practices of diverse communities, just as the implicit idea of agreement in judgment in conformity with humankind is crucial if we are to have a common, or at least universally translatable, language.[29]

Ambiguous as it may be, no key is given with regard to reasons that explain our entitlement to ordinary virtues. It is simply stated, "We also share the ordinary virtues, and we recognize them across all our differences." Likewise, the "denaturalization" of the human rights doctrine, the assumption of natural fraternity, comradeship or local solidarity can easily be questioned on the basis of contradictory moral principles within the exact group. For instance, David Armitage in his book *Civil Wars: A History in Ideas* makes a point that intrastate wars have replaced wars between states as the most common form of organized violence. Thus, fraternity might be local, but how is it shared if in some cases it leads to wars? Furthermore, the notion of "local" remains interpretable. For example, is it our immediate family, our extended community, diaspora, nation or larger social groups? Additionally, a question arises on how is it possible, if all is about context, that a person might prefer to act according to universal maxim rather than established communal practices in one's mundane choices. Finally, by blurring the system of rights, Ignatieff unsettles the normative framework for constitutional democracies within which institutions must operate.

Ignatieff himself looks indifferent to academic rivalries that produce comprehensive pseudo-answers and semi-final justifications. He can certainly be justified by his own words that "ordinary virtue is a strategy for making do, for getting on with life" leaving aside everlastingly unanswered questions. Focusing on the minor observations instead, he intends to find a local answer to bridge the gap between what the norm prescribes and what social life allows. In this Ignatieff makes a powerful point without introducing a full-scale theory, because it is through such minor observations that a cultural mood is best observed.[30]

In the concluding remarks, we should first emphasize that a criterion of healthy moral order stated in Ignatieff's book is not in the ratification of international agreements, not in the membership in transnational unities, not even in the globalization ethics, but in the micro-sociology of human's interactions, domestic deeds and ordinary virtues that are humbly reproduced in daily life. However, the due examination of these settings affords Ignatieff a ground to bring into light *paradoxes* in the ambiguous correlation between a chief language of globalization human rights universalism and his notion of ordinary virtues.

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[29] Christopher Coope, "Wittgenstein's Theory of Knowledge," *Understanding Wittgenstein* (Palgrave Macmillan, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 1972-1973), vol. 7, 261.

[30] Anne Applebaum, *Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camp* (Penguin Books, 2004), 6.

Generally, human rights constitute a political project established, adopted and advocated by state officials and transnational organizations, whereas ordinary virtues are an ordinary alternative to a grand political program of a kind. The conviction that globalization triggered transnational solidarity is assessed as dramatically delusive. At the crux of the human rights doctrine is a notion that its displays commonsensical universality, whereas ordinary virtues are the appeal to moral particularism. Following this further, in universal values "otherness" is annihilated as if it was a morally irrelevant, insignificant construct generated by cultures, histories and beliefs. In terms of entitlement to human rights, no distinction should be made on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin or other status. As far as ordinary virtues are concerned, singularity and "otherness" are the starting points from which the pattern of commonality is negotiated. What is more, in the human rights universe, the very nature of moral duty is to be impartial, whereas ordinary virtues engage in "civic contract" where terms of the agreement are defined by "citizens" and have to be fulfilled by "strangers."

> Everyone – in Los Angeles, in Queens, in Bosnia – turns this [diversity] from a question of fact to a question of value – in other words, into a question of who deserves to be counted as one of 'us'.[31]

Overall, from a human rights perspective, common humanity takes precedence over local attachments, whereas in ordinary virtues perspective "common humanity" is conditional, contingent and homeostatic.

It is indisputable though that the universal language of human rights caused procedural accomplishments in peoples' self-manifestation. Granted, after Magna Carta of 1215, the French revolution of 1789, the decolonization since 1945 and revolutions on individual freedoms, diversity under the premise of equality has become a new global norm of the post-imperial order. Persons now are cognizant of their equal voice in moral reasoning and are ready to stand for the affirmation of their human dignity.

That said, the normative declaration of equality of voice remains in conflict with the harsh reality that everyone is equal, but some are more equal than others. Furthermore, human rights universalism mostly remains a lingua franca of cosmopolitan elites. In their speculative discourse, intellectuals usually turn a blind eye to hyper-diverse local identities with their inalienable right to speak and to be heard. As a matter of

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[31] Ignatieff, *The Ordinary Virtues*, 133.

fact, democratic principles proclaimed in constitutions remain largely declarative, litigations are expensive and unpredictable which lead to bear unnecessary risks,[32] governments are bureaucratized and nations endure the multitude of social maladies that escalate social conflicts with unforeseen consequences.

How then can ethical discourse on the moral order be reaffirmed? Let us not be so naïve as to assume that it can be tackled without an institutional support. Unquestionably, institutions operating by the rule of law shape ordinary virtues toward either repair and renewal or hatred and isolation. It goes without saying that an upward spiral is also relevant – ordinary virtues of mercy, compassion, fairness and solidarity create a better life and afford a basis for the liberal democratic development.

Even more important in maintaining peace and the moral order in times of institutional inaction are ordinary virtues. According to Ignatieff, a response of progressive powers articulated in terms of human rights and duties would not revivify a vanishing democratic order; whereas a progressive response based on the defense of democratic sovereignty and ordinary virtues can persevere. To make this response more elastic and thus morally resonant, the prevailing political language itself needs to be transformed. Hospitality, asylum and tolerance should be approached as *gift transactions* and not merely as the correlative obligations. His minimalist test of moral reciprocity – to judge the fairness of human actions by empathetically deliberating whether we would like to be on the receiving end – is worth the candle. Ignatieff seems adamant that "pure pity has done more real work to save victims than the language of rights."[33]

All things considered, Ignatieff presents a feasible framework of moral order-making by linking individual moral validity with the solidaristic concern of community through ordinary virtues. He provides it with an empirical foothold by digging into both the social psychology of political discourse and sociology of moral behavior in day-to-day interactions. Once Jürgen Habermas downplayed the final justification as both unrealistic and unnecessary. Michael Ignatieff might subsequently argue that his finding is not in need of justification, but of application.

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[32] Andrei Shleifer, *The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 6.
[33] Ignatieff, *The Ordinary Virtues*, 213.

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Part III
(Un)Ethical Practices

Gift and Bribe: Political Ontology of Eastern European Chiasm of Modernity and Tradition

Mikhail Minakov

Globality is a situation which has created a context for all forms of local cultures, including political ones. Globalization has been going on along with modernization. Together they have challenged local traditions and provoked their multidimensional changes. These communities have to adapt to the changing situation and in some cases, to adopt some unusual reactionary forms. One of them is corruption, a phenomenon to which many – including Eastern European populations – ascribe to the "traditional." What makes corruption to be traditional? What stays behind Eastern European culture of corruption?

Corruption is a concept whose definition and meaning emerges with the political and legal imagination of modernity. Corruption appears at the moment of accepting the hypothesis about the social contract that differentiates the whole of interaction between individuals and groups into two halves, the public and the private spheres. Violation of the boundary between the public and the private constitutes the pernicious fault of corruption.

The fact that corruption is related to social imagination does not mean that it does not relate to the real. On the contrary, all of the contemporary social reality is an epitome of imagined entities based on rational, irrational and moral conclusions, or else influenced by simulacra of presuppositions. According to Kant, imagination is a productive force that creates syntheses in which experience and understanding are combined.[1] In the late 20th and the early 21st centuries Benedict Anderson and his followers pointed out that imagination is inherent to political action.[2] The behavior of contemporary humans, our language and optics, our institutions and structures of coexistence are shaped by the long history of modernization, i.e., the process in which we and our imagination were becoming modern while we were breaking with traditional ways of life.

To maintain the reality of this imagined modern order, we need institutions that establish the basic structures of the truth regime of modernity. The behavior, which leads to destruction of the basic principle of distinction between private and public interest, as well as between private

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[1] Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Vg, 1998 [1787]).

[2] See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1991); Chiara Bottici, *Imaginal Politics: Images beyond Imagination and the Imaginary* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

and public instruments, is monitored by specific institutions which guarantee all corrupt behavior to be prosecuted and punished. Thus, modernity demonstrates the non-illusory nature and actual significance of its imagination.

The UN Convention Against Corruption, which is the culmination of modern political and legal perspectives on corruption, provides the generic definition of corruption.[3] The text of this document, written in 2004 and ratified by 172 states, is extremely precise: corruption is a general term for many different types of human behavior aimed at "illicit enrichment" of a "public official." Each particular definition of corrupt behavior (bribing of officials in the public sector, embezzlement of property and abuse of functions or influence by public officials) is based on one simple purpose: to formulate the goals for all contemporary institutions of public authority in such a way that they, simultaneously on the global and the local levels, maintain the functionality and the unquestionable nature of the public-private differentiation of modernity. However, legal rationality is insufficient to uncover the tacit genesis of corruption.

Why is it that lead to the situation in which logical and clear ideas and practices of modernity are under a constant pressure from individual and traditional motivations? Institutional thinking of modernity offers two typical answers to this question, both of which underpin the intolerance of corruption and try to demonstrate what has been omitted by lawyers.

The first answer is related to corrupt behavior as short-sighted economically rational choice: for a rational economic actor, public regulations constitute an obstacle for their achievement of short-term goals; by bribing an official, the actor can ensure that their goals are achieved in the shortest term.[4] The natural human greed is, in this case, stimulated by a range of modern institutions which make the economic actor's activities too complicated. For example, Johann Lambsdorff provides a long list of reasons for the corrupt behavior: the bloated public sector, low quality of regulative policies, overly complicated competition, poorly constructed (from the perspective of actors in the private sector) structure of the state, excessive formalism of democracy and weakened control by anti-corruption structures.[5] Economists see corruption as a result of the unreasonable intervention by public institutions into private activities.

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[3] "United Nations Convention against Corruption," (August 2003), https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf.

[4] See Ajit Mishra, ed., *The Economics of Corruption* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2-4; Johann Graf Lambsdorff, "Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-section of Countries?" ed. Susan Rose-Ackerman, *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption* (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2006), 5; Alena Ledeneva, ed., *The Global Encyclopaedia of Informalities* (London: UCL Press, 2018), vol. 1, 1-2.

[5] Lambsdorff, *Causes and Consequences of Corruption*, 5-15.

The second answer is clearly presented in Marcel Henaff's thesis that under the impact of traditional cultures institutions of modernity may fail and allow for corruption in the form of "mixing of genres."[6] This mixing is precisely the violation of the boundary between the logic of public action and motivations of the private endeavor. In fact, it is the same situation of imbalance between the public and the private spheres, but described from a different perspective.

Although the two answers are different – one refers to economically subjective and the other to the traditional or cultural dimension of corruption – they both point at the same crucial element in the origin of this phenomenon. For many generations, people have been passing through the mechanisms of "production" of the modern subject,[7] and they are being treated today with the same cultural program of multiple modernities in all societies on Earth,[8] the behavior of individuals and communities still remain largely archaically motivated and contradicts the structures of the public realm. As authors of Encyclopedia of Informalities show, this cultural situation of corruption is present in all societies of the world.[9] Neither the length of modernization nor its global reach can guarantee that public structures will function in accordance with the dreams of Enlightenment thinkers, Marxist social engineers and neo-liberal economists. And this is where the need arises for a philosophical analysis of the contradictions of the modern mind.

I strongly believe that philosophical reflection on corruption allows us to see ontological contradictions, as well as their derivative epistemological inconsistencies, of chiasmatic culture of the late modernity. The dialectics of the Gift and the Bribe allows us to understand how the very existential order of modernity leads not just to people's wandering between the public and the private spheres, but also to an incessant struggle and mutual colonization of the System and the Life-World. In order to carry out the philosophical reflection on corruption in this essay, I will consider the political ontology of the Gift and the Bribe and the dialectics of mutual destruction of the System and the Life-World.

Based on this consideration, I will demonstrate that corruption is a phenomenon based on structural contradictions in the life of a contemporary individual and the contemporary culture. It includes both, a perverse form of social co-existence and political communication and an authentic

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[6] Marcel Henaff, "Izvrashchionnyi dar: eskiz k antropologii korruptsii," *Koinonia* 3 (2017), 12

[7] Michel Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," *Power* (New York: New Press, 2000 [1973]), 31-45.

[8] Shmuel Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus* 1 (129) (2000), 14 ff.

[9] Ledeneva, *The Global Encyclopaedia of Informalities*, 1, 16 ff.

rebellion – whether of an individual, of the historically established collective, or of an incidental and temporary group – against an ever more complex and accelerating world.

The Gift's Ontology

First of all, let us consider the Gift in itself. The Gift is an ontological and epistemological act of selflessness and, at the same time, moral self-constitution of a human being. From the ontological perspective, by giving up a part of oneself in an act of gift-giving, a person constitutes him or herself not as a possessing, but existing one, particularly one existing together with the Other(s). Human existence manifests its presence in a solemnly significant self-sacrifice of gift-giving for the sake of the Other(s). The ontological significance of the Gift is that the act of gift-giving reveals an acknowledgement of the presence of many individual human selves. Thus, happens an exchange of acknowledgements, a fundamental act of constitution of the communication-partnership-κοινωνία.

The human being is free. This is why he/she is free to reveal his/her presence in different manners. For example, the human being exposes him/herself by recognizing the Other(s) as equals through gift-giving, friendship, love, forgiveness and/or thanksgiving. Or (s)he can choose for the relationships of domination, subjection, hatred, profit, or identifying him/herself with some inhuman instants (e.g., collective, totemic, good, idealistic etc.). The immensity of choices made by the human beings at present and in the past is constituting the space of human existence. In so doing, with every generation, they make this existence ever more complex and multidimensional. However, this complexity does not abolish the choice we live with.

The chosen mode of action leads to co-creation of the human world and the epochs of humanity's existence. For our topic, it is important to distinguish between two epochs, the archaic and the modern eras, because they differ in their understanding of the Gift and the Bribe, but are similar in supporting humans' confidence in the purity of the former and the corrupting influence of the latter. The Gift in the archaic tradition is an extremely important event, for it refers to the myth of the original Gift given to humans by the Gods. In different ancient cultures, the myth is about the gift of light and darkness, the gift of bodily constitution of a man and a woman, the gift of language, of tools, of fire and so on.

The traditional worldview also stresses upon punishment for the misuse of gifts. Language was given to speak out the truth. For example, the words of the *Adamite* language were directly related to the state of affairs and unveiled aims/reasons of actions. If someone used words, but did not mean what the words were supposed to mean, then (s)he has seen a liar and must be punished for the destruction of the language and the being's

order. In the literature on first encounters of European colonizers with indigenous tribes around the world, at the moment of the encounter between "natives" and Europeans the indigenous collectives experienced many shocks, one of which related to the "corrupt" language of the Europeans.[10] If the preconditions of the archaic order and its exchange-practices violated, such an abuse threaten the very foundations of human coexistence and the cosmos itself in this epoch.

Within this dialectic of Original Gifts, preservation and maintenance of the archaic order is practiced through the rituals of exchange. Marcel Mauss, the scholar of gift rituals, describes the logic of gift exchange in terms of the obligation to give and accept gifts as a ritual of assertion of the world and of the proper order. In addition to its apparent moral and "anti-corruptive" impact, this ritual had its own "shadow side." Mauss fairly notes that in the archaic society, the gift had "the so to speak voluntary character…, apparently free and disinterested but nevertheless constrained and self-interested."[11] The archaic tradition pre-described what and when to be presented and this pre-description was sanctioned by identification of a human being with its own presence in the collective and cultural context. In this way the archaic human was present in being through gift-presentation. Thus, the archaic politics of the Gift asserted a certain equality of human collectives, but also allowed individual humans to possess the obligatory nature of gifts and created opportunities for misconduct in the course of exchange.[12]

Marcel Henaff makes an important observation in this regard.

> [T]he point of ritual is not in the given goods themselves but in achieving social acknowledgement with them, acknowledging the partner as a human being and ally, because what is at stake here is the formation of a stable link between groups. The gifts that are being exchanged primarily serve as the symbolic representation of alliance rather than goods for consumption. They embody the partners' self.[13]

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[10] See Gretchen M. Battaille, ed., *Native American Representations. First Encounters, Distorted Images and Literary Appropriations* (Lincoln, Nebraska and London, UK: University of Nebraska Press, 2001); Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (New York: Zed Books, 2012).

[11] Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 4.

[12] *Ibid.*, 3.

[13] Marcel Henaff, "Izvrashchionnyi dar: eskiz k antropologii korruptsii," *Koinonia* 3 (2017), 17 (my translation from the Russian text).

What is important here is not just how the gift is used to establish alliance between competing groups, but how the collective individuality is understood in the archaic ritual of gift-giving. Exchange of gifts in the archaic society has an additional function, that is, to assert the primacy of the group over an individual in the political communication.

Mauss' research and Henaff's essay demystify the view of the Gift as a moral and free act in the archaic period. The archaic society had its own obligations and ways to fail to fulfil them, it had its own market and its own politics. The political ontology of the Gift in the pre-modern culture had its ways of organizing the order of coexistence of collective individuals and its structures of subjecting individuals to the collective, as well as its own ways of violating the order and its means of "fixing" it.[14]

Political Ontology of Modernity

The launch of modernity is the result of disintegration of archaic structures within every culture. The "breakings" of the archaic social reality on Eurasia's western peninsula is caused by several historical events. (a) The discovery of the Americas (the world turned out to be completely different as the traditional worldview had claimed); (b) the construction of colonial polities and economies (the state can be constructed by human actors); (c) the Protestant movement (the communication with God would be possible outside the control of traditional institutions); (d) the growing importance of money and power as non-symbolic means of communication; and (e) the launch of the printing press (progressively uncontrolled spread of information) proved to be too traumatic for the archaic to maintain its order. These traumas of the traditional ways of life of the pre-modern Europeans became foundational for the new era and the new worldview transformed one of many Eurasian peninsulas into the European continent.

By ways of institutionalizing, these untreated malfunctions of tradition paved the way for the cultures of the modern era. This period of breaking is the time of the ontological shift towards the new actor of modernity, the human subject: it is also the sift to the new relationship between time and space, to the swift social transformations and to progresses. These processes make the human subject the "source of normativity" for the new era.[15] The same process creates conditions for the "crystal" of tradition "to melt" into the progressing modernity, fluid

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[14] On breaking and fixing the social reality, see Peter Berger and Tomasz Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Penguin, 1966), 67ff.

[15] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2001 [1841]), 32.

up to the point of becoming "liquid."[16] And the link between these two features of modernity is rationality.

With the advent of modernity, any culture that becomes immersed in it changes its political ontology. An important note here is that the general, universal structures of political ontology were already described by Aristotle.[17] Let us have a closer look at his definition of politics:

> [1252a] Every state is as we see a sort of partnership [also *communication, community* – κοινωνία – M.M.], and every partnership is formed with a view to some good (since all the actions of all mankind are done with a view to what they think to be good). It is therefore evident that, while all partnerships aim at some good the partnership that is the most supreme of all and includes all the others does so most of all, and aims at the most supreme of all goods; and this is the partnership entitled the state, the political association.

Here, politics is defined fundamentally as targeted communication, which simultaneously facilitates cooperation, exchange of information, competition of visions of the common good and construction of a group of people who recognize each other as legitimate participants both of the cooperation and of the competition. Therefore, political ontology is the sphere of existence of humans together, in dialectic opposition and association around "the most supreme of all goods."

In the description of the Gift which I have provided above, one can notice a connection with what Aristotle describes as ontological foundations of politics. Gift-giving is a political act that interprets the Good in terms of recognition of the importance of the Other(s). In this act, the human existence, the intersubjective environment and the regulatory significance of value are co-present and point at the possibility of the common source of politics and morality. In the archaic and modern circumstances, exchange and gift-giving are interpreted within a complex of different, moral and immoral, acts of co-presence of people and their collectives of various "social contracts."

The political ontology of contemporary cultures stems from the rejection of the archaic interpretation of the social contract and the denial of its participants and change of speed of revising the contract's conditions. Traditional societies has transformed into the contemporary rationally structured world ruled by the confidence of that society, politics, economy

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[16] Zymunt Bauman, *Liquid modernity* (Boston, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).

[17] Aristoteles, "Politics," *Perseus Project*, 2017 (350 bce), http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0057.

and culture can be "constructed." The world is differentiated into the public and the private spheres. Politics is considered to be contained completely in the public sphere, with its own contract. It is possible and even necessary to debate the exact content of this contract, but it is impossible to fail to acknowledge that every individual citizen has a set of inalienable rights and that the role of the government is to serve to its citizens. Thus, public politics presupposes a super-demand from a human to be only partially him/herself to fulfill the requirements of the contract and to swap the "natural right" for the civil right. Everything private, including greed, generosity, kindness, hatred, fatigue and desire, remains in the private sphere. Ideally, the politics of modernity becomes exclusively public and institutionalized; it is disciplined, depersonalized and instrumentalized.

The modernization of culture, the creation of the disciplining society and the production of the modern person are a multi-level and extremely complicated process of changing the human habitat. As a result of this complex set of processes, the space of living becomes complicated and the pace of living accelerates both in public institutions and in the Life-World of privacy. Public institutions, separated from individuals and their simple goals, were detached from their original intent, grow to become a kind of active and extremely influential institutional agglomerate. This agglomerate – in different times termed as Leviathan (by Thomas Hobbes), "the instrumental reason" (by Max Horkheimer), or the System (by Jurgen Habermas) – concentrates its control over epistemological, economic and political resources that allow it to dictate its own goals and logic to each particular individual and to the remnants of tradition hidden in the cultural margins of the Life-World.

This opposition and interaction between the System and the Life-World are precisely the phenomena that articulate the political ontology of modernity. Jürgen Habermas, who researches on the specific character of Western societies, described it as the particular situation of the "colonization of the Life-World."[18] The System is a set of autonomous political and administrative institutions that have become detached from human beings and cultures. Life-World is the sphere of private life and the space of communication between people about the common good; this sphere actually is the public life in its ideal state. This latter world is reproduced and lived by norms, meanings and values of a given society in a given country and it is fundamentally aimed at communication and mutual understanding both within the society and between societies. Individuals express themselves differently in the System, in the ideal public sphere and in privacy, but under conditions of balanced co-presence of these societies, it allows the full self-realization of a person in the contemporary

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[18] Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983), B. 2, 171ff.

world. Hence, corruption is a destructive act of disturbing the balance that targets both the modern life and every living individual.

Eastern European Modernity and the Bribe

The perfect balance of the public and the private spheres is only an ideal of modern imagination. Each of modern culture develops its own imbalance, its own disturbances. For example, due to the organizational and resource power of Western societies, due to the rule of purpose-rationality in these societies, the System interferes both with the public and the private spheres and with the Life-World as such. Habermas worked on his project of communicative philosophy to fight against this colonization of the Life-World in western societies. In such western cultures, corruption is a fundamental crime against the System, but does not change the lamentable state of the colonized Lifeworld.

If one applies the same approach to the understanding of Eastern European contemporary societies, it is difficult to deny that the purposerational modernity grinded our cultures down in the 20th century. Interactions between the two types of modern totalizing imagination, between capitalism, nationalism and communism radically changed the conditions of human existence in the 20th century, as well as small cultural communities and large societies. Nationalist and communist revolutions, civil, class and total wars, European concentration camps and Soviet GULAG, collectivization, ethnic and class "cleansings" and deportations, agricultural "melioration" and many other Systemic "improvements" of the natural environment and cultural rhizome created the structures of co-existence in which human beings found themselves on the verge of survival and beyond moral choice.

But what does not kill us, but make us stronger? The blows survived by our Life-Worlds in the 20th century taught these Worlds to strike back, to subvert the System. An Eastern European Life-World strikes a post-Soviet System back with practices of "systemic corruption" built into our societies. In his essay, Marcel Henaff makes an important comment:

> Corruption rampant in Third World countries originates in mixing of traditions linked to certain forms of mutuality, statutory liege-vassal obligations, economic poverty and lack of administrative deontology. But in developed countries, corruption, in addition to building itself into the local practices of mutual concessions and other illegal advantages, primarily aims to cast this abuse in legal shape, make it invisible, but all the more omnipresent; thus, in the invisible field of financial games, it is primarily driven by the logic of unlimited profit which does not have any other goals except for multiplying itself, regardless of

the negative consequences for the society and the environment.[19]

In this passage, it is important to note the differentiation between corruption in modernizing societies and corruption in societies where multiple modernities have already fully reaped. What is lacking here is the awareness of the fact that "developed countries," in which the logics of modernity have achieved uncontested domination, also differ from one another. North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Western Eurasia, as well as China and many other regions of the Earth are countries of various established modernities. And in each of them, corruption is trying to be invisible – and, at the same time, to be revealed and overcome – in its own particular way.

It is important to understand the differences between structural properties of corruption in modern societies of the world, rather than concentrate on the Western experience as the "standard modernity." Similarly, it is important to understand that corruption in so-called "Third World countries" and post-Soviet "systemic corruption" are different types of imbalance in non-Western modernities. In the case of "developing countries," corruption is linked to the effect of protracted transition from the traditional to the contemporary society. Here, the public sphere and its institutions constantly find themselves under competing pressures by modernization and archaic resistance. Traditional personal and group ties are often more important than institutional rules. The problem is that neither the modern nor the archaic balance can definitively establish itself in any stable form. There is no System and no full-fledged public and private spheres' differentiation.

"Non-Western modernities" are modern cultures whose experience is constantly underdescribed because of the West-centric perspective of social sciences. Post-Soviet and post-communist countries are countries where cultural programs of modernity were realized and dominated (including in the form of totalitarian systems) for several generations. As a result, stable societies of late modernity have emerged, with a stable structure described by the West-centric social science as "systemic corrupttion," a contradictory term. In the societies of "systemic corruption," its System keeps on trying to colonize its Life-World. In turn, its Life-World is trying to irrationalize its System and infiltrate its very core to undermine the principles of efficiency and universal normativity. If the System destroys the sources capable of making life meaningful, then the Life-World responds by subverting the System's efficiency. Revenge, mutual punishment and resentment are at the center of the dialectics of Eastern European modernities.

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[19] Henaff, *Izvrashchionnyi dar*, 18.

The Gift and the Bribe in Eastern European Modernities

In our "systemically corrupt" societies, the Gift and all the moral-ontological consequences of gift-giving lead to more problematic outcomes. Gift-giving, kindness and forgiveness become akin to a heroic feat, an enormous effort. In the daily life of "systemic corruption," the Bribe becomes the normative practice.

The Bribe only superficially seems to be an exception from the social contract of a modernity. An official and a citizen-suppliant agree to "simplify" the solution of the suppliant's problem by exclusively applying exceptions to the rules which are actually supposed to apply to everyone. To improve the grade, to jump the queue to see a doctor, to obtain a contract for road construction bypassing the competitive mechanism, to receive permission to build a house in violation of the law and of any taste – in all these cases the System and the Life-World meet each other wearing the masks of an official and a suppliant.

But beyond the veil of this masquerade interactions, there is a tragedy of authenticity. How can individual humans as well as small and large groups be themselves, if their world is a world of revenge between the two major sides of human existence, the Spirit and the Soul, which have turned into the warring System and Life-World? In this situation, the political-ontological premise of existence and communication is a particular "conflicting individualism."[20] One of the most important characteristics of this life principle is the requirement *to take away*, an idea that you can achieve something only if you take it away from the Other(s). The Bribe becomes an imperative outside morality.

Indeed, bribery is a well-routed practice in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus and there is nothing unusual about it in the long history of our societies. However, it is the experience of modernity in Eastern Europe between 1914, the start of the long war and multiple revolutions of 1917-1924 and approximately 1996, the year when these societies began emerging out of post-Soviet revolutions and crises, which transformed the Bribe from an oblique subordinate's offering to an official into something resembling a cosmic event. In each act of bribing, the System and the Life-World clash in a fight similar to a backstreet mugging rather than a noble duel. And this mutual vile devaluation leaves no place for rationality, or for intersubjective rhizome of traditions, or for the authenticity of the existent, let alone for the common good.

Eastern European polities are structured in accordance with this ontology. The key tension in what should be called the public sphere is a

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[20] Aleksandr Auzan, "Zalozhniki nedoveriya," *Otechestvennyie zapiski* 2 (2007), 4 ff.

chiasm of the formal institutions and the "shadow politics." Formal institutions are the same in Moscow and Ankara, in Baku and Warsaw: a cabinet of ministers, a parliament, a constitution, a judicial system, local governments. But beyond this facade, there are informal, personalized, quickly evolving informal groups that make strategic decisions, which are implemented by official structures for the benefit of these groups. Political science gives them a number of indigestible names: patronal networks,[21] oligarchic clans,[22] financial-political groups,[23] or Eastern European mafia state structures.[24] Whichever term we pick, it signifies a large association of people who care about their particular (non-common) good and maintain a broken, patron-client-style communication.

In the core of these groups there are oligarchic patrons, surrounded by agglomerates of bureaucrats, politicians, managers of state monopolies and private corporations, criminal fighters, paramilitary squads, the media, philanthropic foundations, civil associations, local communities and sometimes even entire social groups.

These informal but influential networks and formal institutions of public administration need an intermediary, a kind of hybrid institutional dispatcher who, on the one hand, has a certain informal status and, on the other hand, evades formalization. Most often, the intermediary is represented by post-Soviet *presidential administrations* (although non-socialist Turkey or post-socialist Poland have their own hybrid institutions). The whole structure works by maintaining the fundamental inseparability and chiasm of power and property and inevitable coexistence of formal and informal institutions.

In this situation, the Bribe is exactly the phenomenon, the analysis of which produces an opportunity to understand the paradox of "systemic corruption." The analysis of the Bribe demonstrates that Eastern European modernities have constituted the self-devouring world. Human creativity and morality, meaning and life-producing humus of intersubjective structures are at the mercy of the dialectics of mean struggle and mutual colonization between the System and the Life-World. In this sense, corruption

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[21] Henry Hale, "Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics. Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia," *World Politics* 4 (63) (2011), 581-617; Oleksandr Fisun, "Neformalni instytuty ta neopatrimonial'na demokratiia v Ukraini," *Agora* 15 (2015), 9-13.

[22] John R. Wedel, "Clans, Cliques and Captured States: Rethinking 'Transition' in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," *Journal of International Development* 4 (15) (2003), 427-440; Anders Aslund, *How Capitalism Was Built. The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[23] Mikhail Minakov, "A Decisive Turn? Risks for Ukrainian Democracy after the Euromaidan," *Carnegie Regional Insight* (February 3, 2016), http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/03/decisive-turn-risks-for-ukrainian-democracy-after-euromaidanitf4.

[24] Balint Magyar, *Post-Communist Mafia States* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2016).

ends up being the main mode of existence for human beings whose activeties are aimed at taking rather than giving, appropriating goods by applying short-term strategies nicknamed in vernacular as "being-in-the-subject" (*byt'-v-teme*) and "being-in-the-share" (*byt'-v-dole*). Those who are "in the subject" and "in the share" find their own place in the hierarchy of informal power structures. And the masses, deprived of their *subject*ivity and of their *share*, integrate into the external boundaries of the patronal networks, accepting the rules of the social contract of the Bribe.

Conclusion

Consequently, our Eastern European post-Soviet modernity seems to be a kind of hopeless dead-end. Our societies are not just experiencing a crisis of modernity, beyond which, according to Habermas and a few other optimists, awaits a better future. Our societies are in a dialectical, self-reproducing dead-end which manifests itself in self-destruction of human collectives and of cultures. The form of struggle between the Spirit and the Soul which is happening here and now, in Eastern Europe of the 21st century, turns even the best intentions into another form of fruitlessness – be it ontological, epistemological, demographic, ecological, moral, political and economic futility.

The above analysis of the Bribe demonstrates that strategies of "fight against corruption" are pointless, because they only reinforce the mutual subversion of the System and the Life-World. Only by constructing balances, focusing public institutions on *small* and *palpable* problems, limiting personalism in politics, emancipating individuals and small communities, decentralization of political and economic activities it is possible to disrupt the dialectics of Eastern European modernity. These steps will not resolve the problem but only stop the self and mutual destruction of our countries and allow to create the conditions for starting a *fruitful* discussion in each society. Restoring the public sphere's original moral and political characteristics and life-affirming possibilities is the way to save our societies.

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10
Social Credit System as a Panopticon: Surveillance and Power in the Digital Age

Yevhen Laniuk

Introduction

In the beginning of the 21st century digital technologies transform almost every aspect of human life. Their influence becomes especially profound in the sphere of power, surveillance and control, in which they not only alter or reinforce the existing power relations, but create entirely new power practices. Among recent examples of the unity between digital technologies and power, the social experiment in China under the name Social Credit System (SCS) particularly stands out. In this experiment the government of China intends to rate the behavior of 1,3 billion of its citizens by using Big Data analysis and social scoring algorithms. Under this system every adult Chinese citizen will be assigned an initial amount of Social Credit points, which will then increase or decrease depending on the behavior. Fragmented information from state agencies, employers, public services providers, electronic devices, CCTV cameras, etc., will be gathered into a single database and converted into a unified index of social trust according to the rules established by the state. The government's aim is to connect this index with a complex system of rewards and punishments and use it as a tool of controlling individuals and the whole society.

The concept of the panopticon, which was first proposed by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century, is still widely used to describe the connection between technology, surveillance and control. In the classical Bentham's design the panopticon was an institutional building, in which the invisible watchman in the central tower could continuously observe the inmates, locked in transparent cells along the perimeter. In the 20th century the French philosopher Michel Foucault interpreted the Bentham's concept as a central element of his theory of "disciplinary power." The panopticon is a technical device that enables this form of power to accumulate knowledge about the subject and to penalize her based on this knowledge. According to Foucault, the panoptic surveillance is crucial to the functioning of prisons, factories, schools, asylums and all sorts of power institutions in the industrial age. The issue, whether digital information technologies reinforce the traditional concept of panopticon, modify it, or create entirely new forms of surveillance to

make this classical concept outdated, is the matter of intense scholarly debate.

The goal of this article is to address this issue by looking at the case of China's Social Credit System. This article is divided into three sections. In Section 1 I will examine key features of the China's plan to establish SCS. In Section 2 I will look at the concept of panopticon and disciplinary power in Michel Foucault's social philosophy. Finally, in Section 3, I will discuss, which elements of the SCS match and differ from the Foucault's interpretation of the panopticon, to what extent and how. While digital surveillance has been extensively studied in academic literature (particularly, in the works of David Lyon, Shoshana Zuboff, Gilles Deleuze, Oscar Gandy, Hille Koskela, Christian Fuchs, Gary Marx and many other authors), only few attempts so far have been made to examine China's SCS in light of the concept of panopticon, despite the fact that by far it has become the most centralized and overarching digital surveillance system in the world. Such an analysis, I hope, will help to shed some light on the features of contemporary digital surveillance and control.

The Social Credit System (SCS):
Chinese Efforts to Harness Big Data for Surveillance and Control

The Social Credit System is the central part of the Chinese government's efforts to build a mass surveillance system, which will scrutinize the behavior of 1,3 billion of its citizens as well as legal bodies and assign them a special "index of trust." This index will largely determine their social and economic opportunities. According to the researchers Yongxi Chen and Anne S.Y. Cheung, it will be an "all-encompassing, penetrative system of personal data processing, manifested by the comprehensive collection and expansive use of personal data." It is an "explicit intention on the Chinese government's part to harness the ambition and power of big data technology."[1]

The Chinese authorities announced its plan to build such a system by the document "State Council Notice concerning Issuance of the Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)," issued on June 14, 2014. This document describes this system as an important tool to "perfect the socialist market economy," "raise awareness for integrity and credibility within society" and "strengthen and innovate the governance of society."[2] The SCS will focus on four areas: "honesty

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[1] Yongxi Chen and Anne S.Y. Cheung, "The Transparent Self under Big Data Profiling: Privacy and Chinese Legislation on the Social Credit System," *SSRN Electronic Journal* (2017), doi:10.2139/ssrn.2992537.

[2] "Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)," *China Copyright and Media* (April 25, 2015), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/

in government affairs," "commercial integrity," "societal integrity" and "judicial credibility." The stated aim is to "provide the trustworthy with benefits and discipline the untrustworthy…[so that] integrity becomes a widespread social value."[3]

The government plans to launch the SCS across the mainland China (except Hong Kong and Macau) in 2020. The system is largely based on Western credit scoring analogues, such as FICO, which has been used throughout the decades by banks in the West to calculate their clients' solvency. However, China's system is different by the scale of the data collected and the scope of its use, since it intends to harness Big Data technology for the measurement of not just the citizens' credit-worthiness, but also their compliance with legal rules, moral norms, professsional and ethical standards.[4] It us to set a comprehensive digital measure of each person's life as a whole. The aim of the system is to remunerate citizens with a high score by priority access to a wide range of social benefits and restrain them for those with a low score. According to the official statement, the SCS will "allow the trust-worthy to roam everywhere under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single step."[5]

The idea to measure trustworthiness of Chinese citizens goes back to the early 2000s. Initially the government sought to develop tools, such as FICO, to calculate their financial creditworthiness. However, the idea gradually expanded to include all sorts of data in respect to contractual, legal and even ethical commitments. It finalized itself in a generalized measure of a citizen's trustworthiness, which could be applied both to economic and social regulation. The plan to create such a measure was first proposed in 2007 in the document "State Council General Office Opinions concerning the Construction of a Social Credit System," which identified it as a "fundamental policy in rectifying and standardizing the market economy order," and established its goals in "attacking acts of promise-breaking, preventing and dissolving financial risks, stimulating financial stability and development." Pilot testing of the system began in 2010 in Suining, Jiansu province. Each resident of this 1,1-million city, older than 14, was assigned with initial 1,000 points. The points were then added or deducted depending on the behavior of the resident. The officials

2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/ (accessed April 15, 2019).

3 Stefan Brem and Nicholas Loubere, "China's Dystopian Social Credit System Is a Harbinger of the Global Age of the Algorithm," *The Conversation* (November 30, 2018), https://theconversation.com/chinas-dystopian-social-credit-system-is-a-harbi nger-of-the-global-age-of-the-algorithm-88348 (accessed April 15, 2019).

4 Brem and Loubere, "China's Dystopian Social Credit System Is a Harbinger of the Global Age of the Algorithm."

5 "China's Digital Dictatorship," *The Economist* (December 17, 2016), https://wwweco nomist.com/news/leaders/21711904-worrying-experiments-new-form-social-control-chi nas-digital-dictatorship (accessed April 15, 2019).

measured the behavior based on a wide range of criteria, including education, online activity, adherence to traffic rules, etc. For example, taking care of one's elderly parents earned 50 points, while drunk driving or attempting to bribe an official resulted in the loss of 50 points. After the points were calculated, the citizens received marks from A to D. A-graders were rewarded with priority for school admission and employment, while D-citizens were punished by denial of licenses, permits and access to some social services.[6]

Today over 30 local governments throughout China test different elements and variants of the SCS. It is supposed that by 2020 or shortly afterwards these efforts will be unified into a standardized nationwide system. These pioneering projects depend on regional laws and vary in terms of what data is collected, how it is processed and how the scores are calculated. Still they share a number of common features.

In essence, in all cases it is a reward-punishment mechanism, which produces a generalized assessment of behavior based on Big Data technology. To say that it is "generalized" means that if trust is broken in one place, the consequences are felt everywhere. For example, not taking care of one's parents may affect the chances to get job or credit. Secondly, the information is procured and assessed under relative secrecy. Unlike banks, the authorities do not require permission from data subjects to procure their information, neither do they notify them when their data is transferred to social credit platforms. Thirdly, the information, which is used in these systems, usually consists of (1) identity information on individuals, e.g., ID numbers or social security registration and (2) credit records generated or acquired by government agencies and public bodies in the exercise of their powers or provision of public services.[7] It includes both positive (recognitions and awards) and negative records about the individual. Common misbehaviors affecting the social credit score range from tax evasion and failure to pay administrative fees to ticketless travel in public transport and academic fraud.[8] In some regions (e.g., Wuxi, Hubei and Hangzhou) information affecting social credit is extended also to non-state service providers and the media.[9]

While the information about data gathering and calculation of scores is relatively scarce, the Chinese government has carefully detailed how it intends to punish trust breakers under the SCS. According to the document "Opinions concerning Accelerating the Construction of Credit Supervision, Warning and Punishment Mechanisms for Persons Subject

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[6] Mara Hvistendahl, "In China, a Three Digit Score Could Dictate Your Place in Society," *Wired* (December 05, 201), https://www.wired.com/story/age-of-social-credit/ (accessed April 15, 2019).

[7] Chen and Cheung, "The Transparent Self under Big Data Profiling."

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*

to Enforcement for Trust-Breaking," these subjects will not be liable for certain jobs. They will be denied credits, subsidies and access to aircraft and high-speed trains. Their children will not be liable to attend high-fee schools; they will be denied permission to build, expand, or costly renovate their property. They will also be prohibited from staying in star-rated restaurants, hotels, nightclubs and other venues, as well as buying many expensive products, including cars (if it is not necessary for work). They will be subject to very strict police and court inspection and their names will be made public through media, websites, mobile user terminals and other sources of public information.[10] Some local governments have come with their own means of punishing trust breakers. For example, limiting their Internet speed or publicly shaming them by installing personalized dial tones akin to: "the person you are calling is a dishonest debtor."[11]

Along with state-run projects in the provinces, the state has authorized eight private IT and e-commerce corporations, which possess a vast volume of data about Chinese citizens, to test the technology of social scoring. Among these projects Alipay's Sesame Credit receives, perhaps, the most attention. The world's largest online payment platform Alipay, owned by the Internet giant Alibaba, introduced Sesame Credit in 2015 as a formal instrument to rate the online shopping behavior of its 450 million users.[12] While Alipay does not divulge a "complex algorithm" behind the Sesame Credit, it has revealed that it measures the behavior of its clients based on four key indicators: social status (education and professional background), credit history, social connections (credit scores of one's friends) and behavior patterns.[13] These indicators are converted into a quantified measure of the person's character. In contrast to Western e-commerce analogues, which usually keep their scoring ratings away from their clients and use them primarily for personalized advertising,

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[10] "Opinions concerning Accelerating the Construction of Credit Supervision, Warning and Punishment Mechanisms for Persons Subject to Enforcement for Trust-Breaking," *China Copyright and Media* (October 07, 2016), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.word press.com/2016/09/25/opinions-concerning-accelerating-the-construction-of-credit-super vision-warning-and-punishment-mechanisms-for-persons-subject-to-enforcement-for-tru st-breaking/ (accessed April 15, 2019).

[11] Meg Jing Zeng, "China's Social Credit System Puts Its People under Pressure to Be Model Citizens," *The Conversation* (October 16, 2018), http://theconversation.com/chinas -social-credit-system-puts-its-people-under-pressure-to-be-model-citizens-89963 (ac-cessed April 15, 2019).

[12] "China Post-80s Spent an Avg of US$17K Online in 2016," *China Internet Watch* (January 05, 2017), https://www.chinainternetwatch.com/19551/alipay-2016/ (accessed April 15, 2019).

[13] Oiwan Lam, "'Orwellian Dystopia' or Trustworthy Nation? The Facts on China's Social Credit System," *Hong Kong Free Press HKFP* (January 10, 2016), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/01/10/orwellian-dystopia-or-trustworthy-nation-the-facts-on-chin as-social-credit-system/ (accessed April 15, 2019).

Alipay openly admits that its Sesame Credit is an instrument of social control.

> Someone who plays video games for ten hours a day, for example, would be considered an idle person, says Li Yingyun, Sesame's Technology Director. Someone who frequently buys diapers would be considered as probably a parent, who on balance is more likely to have a sense of responsibility.[14]

The company rates its clients on 350-950-point scale (with 600 considered trustworthy) and applies different rewards and punishments for high and low scores. Citizens with high scores are remunerated with credits and loans on favorable terms and even fast-tracked visas to countries such as Singapore and Luxembourg.[15] People with low scores are denied access to many of the Alipay's services. Their situation is especially deplorable, because many Chinese firms use the Sesame Credit as a proxy for their own services (for example, the largest Chinese dating website Baihe places its users' accounts to their Sesame Credit score). Sesame's chief manager Hu Tao has warned that people with low scores "can't rent a car, can't borrow money or even can't find a job."[16] An important feature of the Sesame Credit is its close collaboration with the state. Alipay integrated more than 6 million debtors who failed to pay court fines into its blacklist[17] and even appealed to the China's Education Bureau to share with it the list of students who cheated during the examinations.[18]

Perhaps, the most controversial feature of Alipay is that it measures its clients also based on the behavior of their friends[19] and has even launched a mobile phone game, which encourages users to guess the score

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[14] Dom Galeon, "China's 'Social Credit System' Will Rate How Valuable You Are as a Human," *Futurism* (December 12, 2017), https://futurism.com/china-social-credit-system-rate-human-value/ (accessed April 15, 2019).

[15] Masha Borak, "China's Social Credit System: AI-driven Panopticon or Fragmented Foundation for a Sincerity Culture?" *TechNode* (July 24, 2018), https://tech node.com/20 17/08/23/chinas-social-credit-system-ai-driven-panopticon-or-fragmented-foundation-for -a-sincerity-culture/ (accessed April 16, 2019).

[16] Rachel Botsman, "Big Data Meets Big Brother as China Moves to Rate Its Citizens," *WIRED* (January 21, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-go vernment-social-credit-score-privacy-invasion (accessed April 17, 2019).

[17] Hvistendahl, "In China, a Three-Digit Score Could Dictate Your Place in Society."

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] Caren Morrison, "China's Plan to Put Two-faced Citizens on Credit Blacklist Isn't All That Foreign," *The Conversation* (November 14, 2018), https://theconversa tion.com/ chinas-plan-to-put-two-faced-citizens-on-credit-blacklist-isnt-all-that-foreign-51102 (accessed April 17, 2019).

of their friends.[20] In doing so, it intends to punish low scores even further by ostracizing them and breaking their social bonds. The system is designed in such a way that if someone is blacklisted, he goes into a rapid downward spiral. This person's friends discard him as a contact and, thus, lower his scores even further.[21]

Other Chinese IT and e-commerce firms have come up with their own social scores. For example, the creditor Wolaidai, which is part of the Hong Kong financial company WeLab, compiles information from the mobile phone usage to determine creditworthiness of its potential borrowers (with their permission) and Internet giants Baidu and Tencent analyze online shopping habits and search histories.[22] In an effort to create an electronic ID necessary for the Social Credit score, the government initiated an experiment that is to replace citizens' ID cards with their accounts in the country's largest social messenger WeChat.[23] The Chinese Ministry of Public Security launched in 2015 a large-scale project to create an "omnipresent, completely connected, always on and fully controllable" nationwide video-surveillance network as a public-safety imperative.[24] It is expected that one of central elements of this omnipresent network will be the World's largest facial recognition system, which is being developed on the basis of WeChat. It has almost 850 million active users but aims to enroll all 1,3 billion Chinese citizens into a single data-base. This database is expected to be created by 2020 – the same year, when the SCS will roll out.[25]

The efforts to create an all-encompassing system of social control by digital means require the necessary equipment. In 2008 China overtook the US as the country with the largest population online and has remained

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[20] Celia Hatton, "China 'Social Credit': Beijing Sets up Huge System," *BBC News* (October 26, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34592186 (accessed April 17, 2019).

[21] Brehm and Loubere, "China's Dystopian Social Credit System Is a Harbinger of the Global Age of the Algorithm."

[22] Nicholas Loubere, "Cyber Loan Sharks, Social Credit and New Frontiers of Digital Control," *China Story Yearbook 2016* (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2016), 214-23, http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n2543/pdf/ch06_forum_loubere.pdf (accessed April 16, 2019).

[23] Timothy J. Seppala, "WeChat Accounts Could Double as State IDs in China," *Engadget* (December 27, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/12/27/wechat-facescan-national-id/ (accessed April 17, 2019).

[24] "Facial Recognition Spreads in Shopping, Surveillance," *China Digital Times CDT*, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2017/06/losing-face-facial-recognition (accessed April 17, 2019).

[25] Kayla Mattews, "The Biggest Facial Recognition System in the World Is Rolling Out in China," *Singularity Hub* (July 31, 2017), https://singularityhub.com/2017/07/28/the-biggest-facial-recognition-system-in-the-world-is-rolling-out-in-china/ (accessed April 17, 2019).

so thereafter.[26] As of 2016, 730 million Chinese people were Internet users,[27] more than half of the country's population. The Internet penetration levels are lower than the World's average (~ 45%), but in big cities match the level of the most industrialized countries (between 70 and 80%). As of 2018, these levels steadily increased, especially in poorer and rural regions, providing volumes of data for the future SCS . As part of its efforts to build an all-penetrative digital state, China will install some 600 million closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems throughout the nation by 2020, according to some estimates.[28] Many of these systems will be outfitted with complex face and gait recognition systems. The government even equips the policemen with sunglasses, capable of tracking faces.[29]

The Chinese authorities intend to use vast amounts of data generated by hundred million of devices for an unprecedented experiment in social control. Open efforts to build a mass surveillance state and the lack of adequate protection of personal data, according to Yongxi Chen and Anne Cheung, risk to transform China into an ideal social laboratory for big data experimentation, in which individual will be reduced to "transparent selves" for data mining.[30] Under this system, they argue, "the totality of individuals' lives will be captured, the citizens will be monitored and the Orwellian state will become a reality."[31] The combination of transparency, surveillance and forceful allocation of rewards and punishments are key features of the panopticon. But how far the concept of panopticon by Michel Foucault adequately describes China's SCS? Which of its elements fit into Foucault's original theory and which transcend it and require different concepts for their description? In order to answer these questions, let's first examine Foucault's ideas about the panopticon.

"Original" Panopticon: The Unity of Power, Knowledge and Visibility in Michel Foucault's Social Theory

The institutional building, named panopticon (from Greek *pan-* all and *-option* visible), was initially proposed by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th century. According to the original Bentham's project, the panopticon was a circular building with an inspection tower in the center, from which the watchman could observe the inmates

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[26] "How Web-connected Is China?" *ChinaPower Project* (August 09, 2017), https://chinapower.csis.org/web-connectedness/ (accessed April 17, 2019).

[27] "How Web-connected Is China?"

[28] James Vincent, "Chinese Police Are Using Facial Recognition Sunglasses to Track Citizens," *The Verge* (February 08, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/8/16990030/china-facial-recognition-sunglasses-surveillance (accessed April 17, 2019).

[29] Vincent, "Chinese Police Are Using Facial Recognition Sunglasses."

[30] Chen and Cheung, "The Transparent Self under Big Data Profiling."

[31] *Ibid.*

locked in transparent cells along the perimeter. Such a design allowed the watchman to observe all the inmates, who, on their part, had no way of knowing whether they were being observed at any particular moment. Bentham acknowledged the potential of this design for rectifying and controlling human behavior and thought it was applicable not only to a prison, but also to any other institution, which performed a surveillance of its internees, including hospitals, factories, asylums, schools, etc. He wrote: "Morals reformed, health preserved, industry invigorated, instruction diffused, public burdens lightened, economy seated, as it were, upon a rock, the gordian knot of the poor laws not cut, but untied – all by a simple idea in architecture!"[32] However it is primarily due to Michel Foucault's interpretation of the concept that it became widely used in reference to social and political practices as a crucial element of his disciplinary theory of power.

According for Foucault, the panopticon is a general "diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form."[33] It emerged as a dominant form of power in the rational age of the Enlightenment side by side with the advances of science and technology. The main function of the panopticon is to saturate a social unit, regardless whether it is a prison, a factory, a school, an asylum or military base, with the relations of power, so that it is no longer exercised from the outside, but permeates the system from within. It acts upon the minds of its internees and compels them to participate in the relations of power in order to secure their automatic functioning. Foucault calls this kind of power "disciplinary," and argues that it consists of "techniques, institutions for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal being."[34]

For him, the disciplinary power is as a "general way of ordering human multiplicities."[35] It fulfills three basic criteria:

> Firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost; secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible, without either failure or interval; thirdly, to link this 'economic' growth of power with the output of the apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) within which it is exercised; in short, to increase both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system.[36]

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[32] "Jeremy Bentham and the Panopticon," https://www.utilitarianism.com/panopticon.html (accessed April 17, 2019).

[33] Michel Foucault, "Panopticism," *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. A. Sheridan (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995), 195-228.

[34] Foucault, "Panopticism."

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] Foucault, "Panopticism."

The panopticon is both a mechanism of power and a kind of social laboratory, in which individuals can be studied, ordered and measured in order to achieve flawless functioning of a system, as well as its maximum useful output. Several features of the panopticon allow to achieve this goal. Its primary function is to modulate the field of visibility, namely to dissociate the seeing/being seen dyad. The object of power is totally seen, while its subject in the central tower sees everything without ever being seen. Exposure to permanent visibility induces a sense of perpetual control and forces the panopticon's internees to behave according to the rules of the system. Foucault writes,

> He who is subjected to a field of visibility and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.[37]

What is important, however, is not observation alone, but its combination with a forceful assignment of rewards and punishments. The panopticon is a system for rewarding a desired and useful behavior, while punishing the incorrect or "abnormal" one. It does so by dividing its internees into a double mode: normal/abnormal, compliant/non-compliant, efficient/inefficient, etc., and applying correcting measures against the latter. Foucault traces the origin of these tactics to epidemics of contagious diseases in the medieval Europe, namely lepra and plague. Lepra generated a double division into the healthy and the sick and excluded the former, while plague was met with discipline, which prevented chaos and disorder. These tactics (exclusion and discipline) are combined in the panopticon, however, in contrast to life-threatening conditions of the medieval contagions, they are exercised on a daily and routine basis, such as education and work.

Since the disciplinary relations of power have been brought to life through the technologies of observation, the panopticon should be understood in a unity between technologies and social organization. In the original Bentham's design, these technologies included a circular building and a central tower, but it is obvious that the same effect can be achieved by replacing the tower with a camera, or installing a camera in each separate cell. In general, the panoptic effects can be achieved by any technical means, which hide the source of power from the sight of its objects. Though power becomes invisible, it is still present in the attributes of the system – the walls, the tower, or the camera. Bentham was fascinated that the panopticon's inmates would execute orders even

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[37] *Ibid.*

if there was nobody in the tower. No chains, locks or bars were necessary for this purpose. "A real subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation," Foucault argues.[38]

The panopticon is an apparatus of power, nevertheless its ultimate goals lie beyond power, namely in the maximization of the system's useful output. Foucault sees it as an ultimate mechanism of "strengthening social forces – increasing production, developing the economy, spreading education, raising the level of public morality." [39] The panopticon is also a kind of social laboratory – a Petri dish for human beings, – in which different rules and instructions could be tested for their efficiency and performance. The most effective output requires the most intense control. Therefore, the panopticon's archenemy is privacy. The more is known about the subjects, the more capacity there is to set up the best rules. According to Foucault, in order to achieve its goals, the panopticon must be "coextensive with the entire social body," which it transforms into "a field of perception."[40]

He also suggests that the panoptic mechanisms of power originate in the rational age of the Enlightenment. This historical epoch was obsessed with accumulation of wealth in capitalism, knowledge in science, power and territories in colonialism. These advancements generalized under the term "progress" rested primarily on rationalization and order. The panopticon put social forces at work so as to secure these achievements. Though Foucault agrees that the Enlightenment was also the epoch behind liberalism and universal human rights, which seem to contradict disciplines, he regards them as two sides of the same coin. The disciplines are "the political counterpart of the judicial norms" and allow them to operate as long as "on the underside of the law, there is a machinery that is both immense and minute, which supports, reinforces, multiplies the asymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced around the law.[41] David Murakami Wood argues in this context that

> [the] Productive notion of the body as 'docile', trainable through repetitive disciplinary practices, embodied, in particular, in La Mettrie's 'L'Homme-machine' (The Machine Man) appeared along the same period. This is the origin of the modern subject: the malleable, improvable person.[42]

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[38] Foucault, "Panopticism."

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] David Murakami Wood, "Beyond the Panopticon? Foucault and Surveillance Studies," *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*, (2007), https://www.academia.edu/1069337/Beyond_the_Panopticon_Foucault_and_surveillance_studies?auto=download (accessed April 17, 2019).

Therefore, the panopticon became a general technical principle of disciplinary power, which molds together the features of visibility, knowledge, control and social experimentation. It appeared in the rational age of the Enlightenment, but reached its apogee in the 20th century, when the iconic symbol of the all-seeing "Big Brother" from George Orwell's famous novel *1984* epitomized many social practices of the industrial age, especially in totalitarian countries. But does this concept still hold? How adequately can it describe the disciplinary power in the digital age on the example of SCS? How justified is it to apply this concept to this experiment? In the third section of the article I will examine this issue.

Beyond Panopticism: Does This Concept Still Work?
(China's Social Credit System)

Researchers are far from being unanimous if the concept of panopticon in its classic interpretation can describe power and control in the digital age. Peter Seele argues that "we already live in the digital world that could be understood as panopticon."[43] However, many other scholars argue that this concept has significant historical limitations. For example, Matt Hannah questions its ability to operate outside places of continuous confinement;[44] and Oscar Gandy maintains that modern surveillance and discipline have moved outside architectural settings into the panoptic sort of the database.[45] Greg Elmer points to three main lines of contemporary criticism of the panopticon: (1) Moving of surveillance and disciplinary power from the carceral enclosure of the prison to the consumer database; (2) The automatic disciplinary effect of surveillance is put into question, instead it is argued for a more networked and transparent theory of surveillance; (3) Consumers consciously offer their personal information in exchange for perceived personal benefit.[46] Many scholars, however, do not discard the concept altogether. While acknowledging many of its limitations they take it as the basis for further elaboration of what is called post-panopticism.[47] Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon, for example,

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[43] Peter Seele, "Envisioning the Digital Sustainability Panopticon: A Thought Experiment of How Big Data May Help Advancing Sustainability in the Digital Age," *Sustainability Science* 11, no. 5 (2016), 845-54, doi:10.1007/s11625-016-0381-5.

[44] Matt Hannah, "Imperfect Panopticism: Envisioning the Construction of Normal Lives," *Space and Social Theory: Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity* (New York, NY: Blackwell, 1997), 344-59.

[45] Oscar Jr. Gandy, *The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993).

[46] Greg Elmer, "A Diagram of Panoptic Surveillance," *Profiling Machines* 5, no. 2 (2003), 231-47, doi:10.7551/mitpress/5614.003.0004 (accessed April 16, 2016).

[47] Kevin Haggerty, "Tear down the Walls: On Demolishing the Panopticon," *Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and beyond*, ed. David Lyon (London: Routledge, 2011), 23-45.

claim that we live in a time of "liquid modernity," which leads to "liquid surveillance" and requires a different explanatory model than Bentham-Foucault's harsh carceral institutions.[48]

For Foucault, the panopticon is a technical environment for surveillance. But how do we define surveillance in the first place? According to Donaldson and Wood, it is "a mode of social ordering, which concerns enforced categorization,"[49] while, for Anthony Giddens, it is "the coding of information relevant to the administration of subject populations."[50] If surveillance is understood as an enforced ordering of population in a system to achieve its goals and the panopticon is a technical tool, which serves these ends, China's SCS can be well understood in this way.

Another feature of the panopticon, which can be found in the SCS, concerns the general division of its subjects into those who are controlled and those who control. However, in contrast to the classic Bentham's design, the latter function is increasingly performed not by humans, but by the machines. The agency of SCS is targeted not on living human bodies, but on the information about them. Reginald Whitaker argues that "new technologies render individuals visible in ways that Bentham could not even conceive."[51] But it is characterized not only by a quantitative expansion of surveillance, but also by its qualitative transformation into entirely new forms. In this case it is important that surveillance is directed not on living human bodies, but on information about them, accumulated and stored in a database, while the traditional "visibility" becomes side-lined and gradually replaced by data for the automated computer monitoring. Roger Clarke has come with the term "dataveillance" to describe this new form of digital surveillance. In the dataveillance, he argues, humans are defined not holistically, but through traces and bits of information as they live along and use electronic devices.[52] Since these pieces of information cannot fully capture the true characteristics and intentions of human beings, dataveillance inevitably leads to reductionism. The very information, which gets into the focus of dataveillance, is selectively defined by automatic algorithms, which construct a sort of "digital double" of the person in the database. Individuals do not control neither the information which is collected about them nor the way how it

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[48] Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon, *Liquid Surveillance: A Conversation* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).

[49] Andrew Donaldson and David Wood, "Surveilling Strange Materialities: Categorisation in the Evolving Geographies of FMD Biosecurity," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 22, no. 3 (2004), 373-91, doi:10.1068/d334t.

[50] Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016).

[51] Reginald Whitaker, *The End of Privacy: How Total Surveillance Is Becoming a Reality* (Carlton North, Vic.: Scribe, 2000).

[52] Roger Clarke, "Information Technology and Dataveillance," *Communications of the ACM* 31, no. 5 (May 1988), 498-512, doi:10.1145/42411.42413.

is combined and processed to produce scores. According to Jesper Taekke, this selectively created "digital double" is "mobile, comparable, differen-tiable and controllable."[53] He writes:

> Just as the microscope works via protocols, diagrams, columns, the digital media for surveillance work via their programming for what to register and for how to compile their output.[54]

In contrast to the classic panopticon, in which surveillance is directed at a physical person and directly determines its position, the "digital double" is but a proxy to the person and mediates her status. As Simon Chesterman puts it: "We do not produce our databased selves, the databased selves produce us."[55] "Digital selves" may never fully capture the individuals' lives and often (if not ever) distort their true motives and intentions. In China, the Sesame Credit already gives advice how to artificially increase one's credit score, including warning about befriending those with low scores. It may not even be too long when we will see score advisors giving tips about how to gain points.[56]

Gary Marx emphasizes that the feature of new forms of surveillance is that they are "wholly or partly automated."[57] Unlike in the panopticon, the object of surveillance in the SCS faces a dehumanized technology rather than a human being (even endowed with institutional power). Some theorists argue that in the digital age the power of humans over humans has been gradually substituted by the power of the machine, which allows no space for compassion or reciprocity. "It would seem that with modern dataveillance, the grounded, embodied subject is increasingly left out of the story as the world is automatically made and remade around us," Bart Simon argues.[58] The SCS increasingly becomes an example of the system, in which only "legislative" authority (flawed and prejudiced as any human agency may be) belongs to people, while the "executive" has been delegated mostly to a potent, but abstract and faceless technology. In this way, it should be interpreted in the context of emerging social theories,

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[53] Jesper Taekke, "Digital Panopticism and Organizational Power," *Surveillance and Society* 8, no. 4 (2011), 441-54, doi:10.24908/ss.v8i4.4181.

[54] Taekke, "Digital Panopticism and Organizational Power."

[55] Simon Chesterman, "Privacy and Our Digital Selves," *Simon Chesterman* (September 05, 2018), https://simonchesterman.com/blog/2017/09/02/our-digital-selves/ (accessed April 17, 2019).

[56] Rachel Botsman, *Who Can You Trust?: How Technology Brought Us Together and Why It Could Drive Us Apart* (New York: Penguin Random House, 2018).

[57] Gary T. Marx, "What's New About the 'New Surveillance'? Classifying for Change and Continuity," *Surveillance and Society* 1, no. 1 (2002), 9-29, doi:10.24908/ss.v1i1.33 91.

[58] Bart Simon, "The Return of Panopticism: Supervision, Subjection and the New Surveillance," *Surveillance and Society* 3, no. 1 (2002), 1-20, doi:10.24908/ss.v3i1. 3317.

which examine the relations of humans with non-human agents, such as Bruno Latour's Actor-Network Theory or Michalis Lianos' concept of ASTEs (Automated Socio-Technical Environments). A combination of often flawed and biased rules, established by humans and their super accurate, uninterrupted, incorrupt and unbiased application through the machines greatly increases the cost of human indiscretion. Stephen Graham warns that

> the biggest worry is that future surveillant-simulation tech-niques will embed subjective normative assumptions about disciplining within cybernetic computerized systems of inclu-sion and exclusion, where even opportunities for human dis-cretion are removed.[59]

This may result in the situation, in which human behavior is "determinis-tically governed by processes outside human control."[60] An interesting opinion regarding the inability of humans to control the environment, in which they live, has been expressed by Daniel Solove. He claims that an all-seeing gaze of George Orwell's Big Brother is not the only metaphor, which describes power in the digital age, but it is also a "faceless, bureaucratic and bewildering process, described by Kafka in *The Trial*."[61]

Another difference of the SCS from the classic panopticon is its spatial organization. While the original Bentham's design was an institu-tional building, in which its inmates were held in continuous confinement, isolation and immobility, the covers a much larger social space, which is also a place of mobility, social interactions and heterogeneity. The issue of proliferation of panoptic surveillance beyond walls of institutional enclosure has been examined by several researchers. William Staples links it with the development of consumerist economy and argues that "new economy of discipline moves beyond walls as generalized sur-veillance and control."[62] Frank Webster and Kevin Robbins generalize this statement to the claim that not just the prison or factory, but the social totality comes to be part of the hierarchical and disciplinary panoptic

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[59] Stephen Graham, "Spaces of Surveillant Simulation: New Technologies, Digital Representations and Material Geographies," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 16, no. 4 (1998), 483-504, doi:10.1068/d160483.

[60] "The Panopticon Singularity," http://www.antipope.org/charlie/old/rant/panopticon-essay.html (accessed April 17, 2019).

[61] Daniel J. Solove, *The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age* (Fredericksburg: New York University Press, 2006).

[62] William G. Staples, "Small Acts of Cunning: Disciplinary Practices in Contem-porary Life," *The Sociological Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (1994), 645-64, doi:10.1111/j.1533-8525.1994.tb00421.x.

machine."[63] Hille Koskela, on the contrary, emphasizes that the "diversity of both spaces and social practices makes it impossible to compare urban space simply and directly to the panopticon."[64]

I agree with Jean-François Blanchette and Deborah Johnson that "the electronic medium…creates the potential for the old kind of surveillance on even grander scale."[65] A *quantitative* extension of surveillance from small organizations to big cities or even countries should be analyzed inseparably from its *qualitative* transformation into electronic "data-veillance," as long as only modern digital technologies allow to organize surveillance on such a grand scale. They do not confine, but, as Mark Poster suggests, "produce retrievable identities."[66] In this way they allow to combine surveillance with mobility, because a "digital twin" in the database may be defined as Bruno Latour's "immutable mobile." Latour calls a phenomenon that remains unchanged in time and space, but can be manipulated under different circumstances, an "immutable mobile."[67] The invention of writing and the printing press provide examples of "immutable mobiles," as they allow to remove knowledge from its local context and access it under different circumstances. It can be said that digital technologies have transformed individuals into "immutable mobiles," because they allow to retrieve their personal information and integrate it into data-bases, where it can be processed and sorted. In this way, they have created a panopticon, in which social scoring and sorting no longer demands a synchronous mutual presence of subject and object of observation. Precisely this fact has allowed to dismantle towers, walls and other "heavy" attributes of the original panopticon, while preserving its disciplines. And the demise of this "heavy" machinery has brought surveillance onto a much larger scale.

An interesting classification of historic types of panoptic mechanisms has been proposed by Jerome Dobson and Peter Fisher.[68] They call a classic Bentham's panopticon "Panopticon 1." In the "Panopticon 2" surveillance is performed by a computer and is based on data, but is still limited to an organization unit and very specific activities, while in the

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[63] Frank Webster and Kevin Robbins, *Information Technology: A Luddite Analysis* (Norwood: Ablex, 1986), 346.

[64] Hille Koskela, "'Cam Era': The Contemporary Urban Panopticon," *Surveillance and Society* 1, no. 3 (September 1, 2002), doi:10.24908/ss.v1i3. 3342.

[65] Jean-François Blanchette and Deborah G. Johnson, "Data Retention and the Panoptic Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness," *The Information Society* 18, no. 1 (2002), 33-45, doi:10.1080/01972240252818216.

[66] Mark Poster, "Databases as Discourse," *Computers, Surveillance and Privacy*, eds. D. Lyon and E. Zureik (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 186.

[67] Bruno Latour, "Drawing Things Together," *The Map Reader* (2011), 65-72. doi:10. 1002/9780470979587.ch9.

[68] Jerome E. Dobson and Peter F. Fisher, "The Panopticon's Changing Geography," *Geographical Review* 97, no. 3 (2007), 307-23, doi:10.1111/j.1931-0846.2007.tb00 508.x.

"Panopticon 3" it has expanded from institutional sites to any human being outside organizations and become ubiquitous. The expansion of surveillance from closed institutions to urban spaces allows Hille Koskela to claim that "cities do form a space of coercion."[69]

Foucault thinks that the key task of the panopticon is to internalize in its inmates certain social norms. As the scope of surveillance increases from small institutions to a society in general, there is a similar trend of its expansion from simple norms of behavior (like those characterizing a factory or a prison) to more complex social and ethical norms, which operate at the level of society as a whole. *Jean-François* Lyotard *claims that the loss of* (moral) metanarratives of modernity is "replaced with the institutional category of computerized control."[70] According to Lyotard, our present "postmodern" age is marked by the decline of grand systems of meaning, such as religion or ideology, on which the normative assumption were previously based. While it is ambiguous whether a concept from the Western philosophy can be applied to non-Western cultures, such as China, the creators of the SCS obviously cite "moral decline" and a perceived "deficit of trust" in society among main reasons for its installment. A network of artificial constrains, therefore, should refill regulatory gaps, which were once regulated through ethics, culture and traditions.

In this context, it should be emphasized that scholars persistently compare the panopticon with religion. Jespersen et al., for example, argue that "with the panopticon, God's eye was thus transformed into a secular context."[71] As long as it is possible to trace back social sorting in the panopticon to retribution in the afterlife – a key component of almost every religion, one may argue that regulatory mechanisms of religion have been taken over by a technical machinery of the panopticon. In both cases the source of power is invisible and unresponsive. Like God in heaven, a supervisor in the central tower may be there or, maybe, not. Both religious worshipers and inmates of the panopticon internalize its norms out of fear of punishment, which is always uncertain. Richard Hardt and Antonio Negri suggest that in similarities with religion the digital society goes even further. In the same way as it is impossible to escape the all-seeing eye of God in religion, they maintain that the "contemporary control knows no outside. Whereas earlier forms of control had limits, barriers, insides and outsides, postmodern control is an outopia, or no-place,

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[69] Koskela, "'Cam Era': The Contemporary Urban Panopticon."

[70] Jean-Francois Lyotard, "The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge" (1979), https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject_philosophy/works/fr/lyotard.htm (accessed April 17, 2019).

[71] Julie Leth Jespersen, Anders Albrechtslund, Peter Øhrstrøm, Per Hasle and Jørgen Albretsen, "Surveillance, Persuasion and Panopticon," Persuasive Technology Lecture Notes in Computer Science (2007), 109-20, doi:10.1007/978-3-540-77006-0_15.

formed through circuits of movement."[72] This is, obviously, true in the case of the SCS, which with its pervasive control of both virtual and – through CCTV cameras – physical space allows very little space for privacy in which one can escape its all-seeing eye. However, there is also an important difference, which does not allow to mechanically compare the SCS with religion. In the original panopticon (and it is also the case with religion) it is the uncertainty about the presence of the source of power, which compels its inmates, as well as religious worshipers, to internalize its norms and become, in Foucault's words, "the principle of their own subjection." But in the SCS control is continuous and automatic. It, thus, becomes independent from its subjects' minds and, in a certain way, returns to a prepanoptic coercion. Bart Simon writes that as long as

> surveillance operation is independent of the formation of the self-policing subject described in the story of the inmate,… surveillance departs from the Benthamite diagram and power becomes quite 'heavy' again (this time with computers instead of humans).[73]

Finally, in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault argues that the panopticon was born in the age of Enlightenment along with "an explicit, coded and formally egalitarian judicial framework."[74] He contrasts liberalism and its legal systems with the panopticon, both of which do not hierarchize but define every citizen equally; do not constrain but grant the same amount of rights to everyone. The development of disciplinary mechanisms, according to Foucault, "constituted the other, dark side of these pro-cesses."[75] All those "tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms," which are "essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical,"[76] appeared as the systems of micro-power behind the universally defined rights. The Social Credit System seems to reverse the relationships between rights and disciplines. The state departs from its "negative" role, when its power is exercised primarily in response to a violation of justice and assumes a "positive" role, when the stimulation of economic development is performed even at the expense of violation of the principle of universality of rights. Since the citizens' rights and opportunities have become dependent on their productive performance or place in the social system, a combination of panoptic disciplines with the totality of state power, offered by digital technologies, has formed a hierarchical social system, in which citizens

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[72] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 190.

[73] Simon, "The Return of Panopticism."

[74] Foucault, "Panopticism."

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] *Ibid.*

can no longer be considered (at least legally) equal to each other. In this respect the Chinese social experiment is unprecedented in history. Foucault describes a society comprised of many micro-machines of power (schools, factories, military units, prisons), operating in a universal legal field. Instead China's SCS offers a new type of society, in which the state-operated mega-machine of power has swallowed up the citizens' rights and replaced them with a ubiquitous discipline.

Indeed, many features of the SCS cannot be explained by the classic Bentham-Foucault's diagram of panopticon. Gilles Deleuze, in contrast to the panopticon, has come up with a new diagram of power, which he calls a "society of control." "We are in a generalized crisis in relation to all environments of enclosure – prison, hospital, factory, school, family," as he wrote in his seminal 1992 essay "Postscript on the Societies of Control."[77] In the disciplinary society, according to Deleuze, the language of domination is analogical, while in the society of control it has become numerical. What matters in this type of society is code, which gives or blocks access to information. The individual becomes a "dividual," or double entity, which consists of a physical body and its digital representation, or the code. The code stands for the body in the environment, in which it operates, like a password, while the environment is "variable geometry," marked by multiple information inputs and outputs, which may be entered or exited via the code. Deleuze contrasts *enclosures* and *controls* and writes that enclosures are "molds," acting upon the individual, whereas controls are "modulations," "like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point."[78] He exemplifies this as follows:

> Félix Guattari has imagined a city where we would be able to leave one's apartment, one's street, one's neighborhood, thanks to one's electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person's position – licit or illicit – and effects a universal modulation.[79]

Such advanced technologies as facial recognition or biometric authentication in the case of the SCS have carried the Guattari's dream even further. Electronic cards have become unnecessary, because

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[77] Gillez Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control" (Winter 1992) (Boston: The MIT Press), 3-7.
[78] Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control."
[79] *Ibid.*

sophisticated algorithms allow or deny access to places, goods or venues based on biometric information only. This means that individuals live in a fully automated environment, which varies and modulates based on their index of social trust. It seems that the control society does not contradict the panopticism, but rather co-habits with it. For though individuals may be horizontally mobile in an ever-changing environment, they are still sorted, weighed against each other and disciplined. Index of social trust may be interpreted as Deleuze's code, which gives or blocks access, but it also stands in for the individual's position in the hierarchical social order and generalizes his/her usefulness for the system. Perhaps, China's SCS will become the basis for a new model of surveillance and power in the digital age, including further modifications of the concept of panopticism.

Conclusion

The task of this article was to analyze the China's Social Credit System from the viewpoint of Michel Foucault's concept of the panopticon. For this purpose, in Section 1 I examined some basic features of the ongoing Chinese social experiment. In Section 2 I analyzed Michel Foucault's concept of panopticism as it was presented in his seminal work *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison*.[80] In Section 3 I pointed out to key similarities and differences between the Social Credit System and Foucault's idea of the panopticon. The Social Credit System has some crucial traditional features of the Bentham-Foucault's panopticon, including: (1) the forceful categorization of its subjects; (2) the attempt to obtain the maximum possible information, on which the categorization is based and (3) indoctrination of social norms established by the authorities. However, in the implementation of these goals it acquires features, which cannot be explained by the classic panopticon, particularly:

1. traditional bodily surveillance is replaced by electronic "data-veillance";
2. the process of observation and categorization is automated and takes place without human intervention;
3. disciplinary power is exerted over a much larger social realm than closed institutions of the classic panopticon;
4. indoctrinated norms become much more complex and encompass more complex legal, social and ethical practices;
5. the correlation between "rights" and "disciplines" is different, because the Social Credit System, unlike Foucault's panopticon, seems to put "disciplines" ahead of "rights." These differences demand further elaboration of the concept of panopticism in order to explain the attributes

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[80] (Gallimard, 1975).

of surveillance and power in the digital age, possibly a new diagram of power, which may combine the feature of the classic panopticon with Deleuze's concept of the society of control.

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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

Purpose

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one's decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one's culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

Projects

A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

1. *Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations for Social Life.* Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.

2. *Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues*. This series of 10 week cross-cultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.

3. *Joint-Colloquia* with Institutes of Philosophy of the National Academies of Science, university philosophy departments, and societies. Underway since 1976 in Eastern Europe and, since 1987, in China, these concern the person in contemporary society.

4. *Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development.* A study in values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists, social scientists and scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of enriching the moral content of education and character development. This work has been underway since 1980.

The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Columbia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enterprises.

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