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Morality and Public Life in a Time of Change

Bulgarian Philosophical Studies, I

Edited by
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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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Preface

The present volume is the first work of Bulgarian philosophers and ethicists to be published in the US. It reflects the way in which the basic problems of morality, politics and spiritual life are conceived by scholars formed under the Marxist paradigm as they face the spiritual and cultural transformations of an Eastern European country.

This work should be situated in the tradition of ethical research in Bulgarian. Until the Communist takeover in 1944 those studies were influenced mostly by the German school, mainly by ethical concepts of Remke and Kant. The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by a strong ideologization and politization of scientific work in ethics which was forced to serve the political practice of the time and hence inclined to an apologetics. The 1970s marked the beginning of a tendency towards a "deideologization" of ethical studies, which turned to a structuralist-functional approach to research in the field. The 1980s were marked by a sociologization of ethical interest, with research on the borderline between psychology and ethics and the development of bioethics. This volume, though not totally representing these recent trends, is influenced by them.

One should keep in mind that the present papers are marked by the crucial changes taking place in the East European countries. Thus, they reflect the beginnings of a period of deep social change and represent an attempt at critical analysis of the development thus far of morality and public life and of a methodology of this research. Thus, for example, some of the authors take as a starting point in their analysis the concepts of totalitarianism, which only recently have been taboo for Eastern European philosophers, and then evolve a much broader conceptual estimation of the problems.

This volume is not a systematic monograph, but a focused mosaic by authors employing different methods and levels of research. The papers center around the following topics: the changing interrelations between morality and politics; trends in socio-political change in the countries of the former so-called "real socialism"; moral values in their relation to culture, social psyche and upbringing.

Thanks are extended to Professor George F. McLean who has evoked the writing of this work, and to the authors for their original contributions.

Introduction

George F. McLean

If morality consists in the direction of freedom, then it is to be expected that, with the breakdown of the centrally controlled systems of Central and Eastern Europe and the opening of new dimensions of freedom, the issue of morality would become of central importance. This is indeed the case in Central and Eastern Europe as reflected in the present volumes by authors from Bulgaria. They treat issues which emerge from the recent experiences of suppression and renewal in the region and look for the key to the ability of Bulgarian many peoples to assume responsibility for their lives in the future.

The volume analyses this situation in three parts. The first part treats the relation of the political and the moral orders. Chapter I by V. Prodanov considers how it is possible for the moral to become all engrossing to the extent of disregarding the broad and concrete responsibilities of the political to find a practical way for people to live together. Recent experience, however, has been to the contrary, as centralized political power became absolute to the extent that it determined the moral order; morality in public life became identical with following the decision of party leaders. Hence, the task of our time is to identify authentic values and to seek their effective realization in concrete life. This will require a logic not of contradiction, but of analogy in order that relations between the various groups and their diverse interests be identified and mutually provided for.

In chapter II Professor Mirchev analyses this from the point of view of the psychological dynamics of conformism. In this light he treats the origin of the totalitarian state as a paternalistic effort, its development in the vain pursuit of a utopia, and hence its eventual disintegration and decline. Throughout, the moral is effectively absorbed by the political.

For Professor Vichev in chapter III constructive efforts do not require a total jettisoning of socialism. Many of its ideals live on, as has been reflected since the fall of Marxism in the pattern of socialist election victories. Hence he would see rather a purifying of the political process by removing the idols of the past.

Part II takes up the project of the moral renewal of public life by focusing on the issue of values. Professor Neshev in chapter IV reaches deeply into the notion of tradition and culture to find the roots of civilized political life in universal human values, compassion, patriotism and discipline. Professor Georgiev in chapter V describes the ways in which values reflect nature.

Should values and their normative character be regarded functionally as merely a support for stability through change, or are they more directly related to the good. Further, should this good be seen as subject to man, as in pragmatism, or should human life be a reflection of higher goals and ideals?

Chapter VI by Professor Lazarov suggests a response to some of these questions, by first distinguishing a hierarchy of values. In that light he opens the issue of innovation and change, pointing out that though M. Weber's change is in the service of stability, there may be a more radical sense of change which would allow true progress.

Part III considers how such progress might take place. Professor A. Marinov in chapter VII approaches the issue of change in personal terms by studying the sense of social achievement. This is central to the person and to his or her personality development. In a time of rapid change this correlates with the ability and willingness to innovate. Chapter VIII by E. Marinova points again

to values as mediating between the ideal and the real, though their realization proved difficult. This had different reasons in socialist and liberal countries. In the former, political ideology impeded true moral education. In the liberal context efforts at moral education have codified the stages of the development of moral reasoning but, as these do not coincide with moral growth, moral development theory based on cognitive development seems inadequate.

Chapter IX by Professor Stankov shows the cultural importance of morality. He brings out the place of the heart in overcoming rationalism and in opening the dynamism of human life, while still recognizing the directive importance of mind.

In the epilogue Professor Davidov reflects upon the proper role of the intellectual in this. He finds a peculiar paradox in that the intellectual's critique of the culture must also be a self-criticism. This implies a degree of guilt which intellectuals can neither escape nor repair for attempts to construct new views are subject to the same criticisms. In this situation the proper contribution of the intellectual may be precisely not to construct a new integrating framework, but rather to point always to the divine as transcending human life and therefore holding it open to new possibilities.

Part I
The Political and the Moral Orders

Chapter I

Morality and Politics in a Changing World

Vassil Prodanov

Every crucial social change alters the essence of the activities in the different social spheres, and is manifested in new interconnections between those spheres. The changes in Eastern Europe and the global processes of democratization in the contemporary world lead, firstly, to alterations in the concept of morality and politics. For when, in both spheres, there begin to prevail elements which are common to all mankind, new elements appear in values and their regulation. Secondly, they lead to changes in the structure of the interrelations between politics and morality, and vice versa. All this revives the ancient problem of the relation between morality and politics.

Both morality and politics serve to regulate or direct human behavior. They differ, however, in the strength of their regulation and demand different, though related, personal qualities. Groups, classes and separate persons are interrelated morally. Depending on the concrete historical political peculiarities of this interrelation, some moral qualities of a politician can be easily developed, while others, which concretely and historically conflict with his policy and political goals, could cease to develop and become rudimentary and opposite qualities.

As a regulator, morality is directed towards the other: it concerns interpersonal relations and interrelations between the person and group. In contrast to morality, politics regulates mainly relations between the groups and the state and between the different socio-political organizations; directly or indirectly these are connected with the function of state power.

Therefore, the boundaries between the spheres of morality and politics are very flexible. In some periods particular relations can be regulated by moral mechanisms, which in other periods are ruled by political ones. The interaction between those mechanisms depends on the particular social contradictions and the objective possibilities of achieving class, national and state goals by acting in accordance with, or neglecting, respective moral values and norms.

The flexibility of the boundaries between morality and politics generates the differentiation between private and public morality in social life, between the morality of individuals and the political morality of groups. On the one hand, nondemocratic centralized political regimes tend to broaden the sphere of action of politics and its related morality while restricting correlatively the range of the moral sphere related to the life activity and interrelations between separate individuals and between individuals and groups. On the other hand, the relation between the private and the public spheres of human life has an historical character. (Marx held that "the abstraction of the private life is characteristic only of modern times".)¹ This abstraction reflects the growing individuality and autonomy of the person and at the same time is an expression of the peculiarities of individualism, with its connotation that each individual himself freely pursues specific inalienable rights and freedoms, that he makes decisions which, if they do not interfere with other persons, should not be subject to their control and sanction.

On the one hand, there is the individual with his private interior life which does not concern anyone else. On the other hand, there is the public life connected with politics and the state; this refers not to private goals and interests, but to those that are common and concern everyone. In this way morality is divided into private and public, the morality of the individual and political

¹ K. Mapmc, *Ehranc* (Cih. T. 1), p. 247.

morality. Because the relation between the public and the private spheres of social life is historical, their separation and contrast is very clearly outlined in modern times. As ancient theories of morality and politics do not contrast these two spheres, politics is directly related to morality. Thus, Aristotle does not make any difference between private and public morality; ethics is at the same time politics. The same is true of Plato. The contrast between morality and politics and the tendency to subordinate morality to politics and to give public morality the leading role becomes dominant with the rise of capitalism. The most characteristic views in this regard are those of Machiavelli and Hobbes.

The Subordination of Morality to Politics and Vice Versa

The mutual subordination between morality and politics depends upon additional factors as well. The deeper the contradictions between persons, classes and nations the more real the possibilities of separation, contradiction and conflict between morality and politics. In such a situation the health and life, as well as the satisfaction of the ordinary needs of single persons, easily could be neglected in the pursuit of political goals. The main mechanism of the contradictions between morality and politics are the politization of morality and the moralization of politics. The moralization of politics consists in disregarding the specific character of the political sphere and the tendency to use morality to explain political goals and to solve political problems although this remains objectively impossible for a given historical stage or definite social group. The politization of morality consists in the introduction of political principles and criteria for the regulation of the relations between persons and between groups and persons through a replacement of morality by politics. In spheres where morality should have a relatively independent role, it is identified with politics or its influence is restricted to situations in which there is no danger that it can conflict with politics. Such a politization is characteristic of periods of revolution and great social clashes where the individual person faces the need to join actively in the life-and-death struggle for the defence of the global interests of the class and the nation.

When political theory, ideology and practice come into sharp contradiction with the morality of the people, they lose their efficacy and in the end are doomed to failure. Therefore, every political theory, ideology and practice seeks moral justification and arguments in order to be accepted by the masses. But when political theory contradicts to some degree the morality of people or masses, then politicians seek to camouflage this contradiction with political demagogy. The higher the stage at which the politics of a definite organization, party or state contradicts the moral values of the people, the stronger the need for demagogy and the greater the use of different means of propaganda for this purpose.

The moral feelings of the popular masses are the most direct early indicators of whether the actions of the political system are justified. That most people begin to accept certain political actions and organizations as discordant with their moral feelings indicates an emerging crisis in the society. A political system which takes morality into consideration does not in principle go beyond certain moral boundaries. Moreover, through its functioning the system it strengthens those bounds and forms appropriate moral qualities in the persons. All this means that political and moral goals, means and actions can contradict one another only within certain bounds; if those are trespassed the political system is threatened by instability and failure.

No socially important action is without a positive or negative moral dimension. All political actions are carried out by persons and concern relations between persons. Relations between separate persons in the political sphere are based on a certain moral code which is produced

spontaneously in political practice. This can also be made public officially and serve as one of the bases for evaluating politicians on behalf of the populace as well as on behalf of the different political institutions, units and representatives of the political hierarchy. Depending on the peculiarities of the political goals, means and practices of a certain group or organization, the moral code which influences the behaviour of the politicians will correspond to or contradict in some degree their moral demands.

Morality and Politics in Times of Stress or Calm

The interrelation between morality and politics, between moral and political actions, depends also upon the peculiarities of the structure of the society, upon whether this is in peaceful and calm evolutionary change or in an extreme situation connected with an abrupt change of social relations and the need to confirm and defend fundamental social principles. Revolutionary periods and times of war require the person to defend or confirm directly the most important group or national interests. In situations of danger for the destiny of the group, society or nation a person should be ready to give up his personal interests and orient himself towards common interests. Then the sphere of the political regulation becomes wider, and to a high degree private life becomes subordinate to political goals. In such extreme situations moral and political evaluations come closer together and the eventual conflicts between morality and politics are solved in favor of politics. In times of mass social cataclysms and upheavals, in times when the fate of millions is decided, the suffering or tragedy of the individual could be put aside. When one is on a barricade and people are dying all around, one has to fight the enemy without looking after oneself. Evaluations become then in many respects bipolar and mutually exclusive: of the type "friend" and "foe", "free" and "enslaved". These become stereotypes which manifest themselves subsequently in completely different situations. Until the 1950s and 1960s in Bulgaria the kind of trousers one wore and whether or not one had a beard carried ideological and political meanings and were perceived in terms of "friend" or "foe".

In calm, peaceful times, the sphere of the relative autonomy of moral regulation expands. The value of separate persons and individual life increases and normally need not be sacrificed in the name of great political goals. Individual goals and the main political problems are correlated in a much more indirect manner. Although contradictions between morality and politics are not an exception, a person could serve certain political goals without sacrificing and giving up what is required by a revolutionary or military situation. This creates conditions for developing a variety of concrete goals, abilities and qualities on the part of separate persons which make them rich in individuality and distinct from others. Reality becomes much more diverse. In the more varied reality of everyday life the person begins to consider more detailed and personal circumstances. In this flow of "little" things it is often difficult to use political criteria directly for evaluation, as these would not be adequately precise. Designed for more significant social relations and events, it would be like using a cannon to shoot small game. In the diverse nuances of the personal relations in a rich individual life, morality is a more precise and exact regulator. Because the correlation of each separate case with larger group and national interests in peaceful times is not so direct, their relations become more subtle according to their particular circumstances.

The relations and conflict of the moral and political qualities of the political activity of persons reflect the contradictions between morality and politics of a certain class or group (and their political organizations) in concrete historical conditions. Depending upon the conditions, some moral qualities can easily be formed and can be useful for the political success of a certain

politician, while others are formed with difficulty and do not provide direct political success. Depending upon the class or political organization to which a politician belongs, the circumstances under which he acts and the degree of democratic pressure upon him, politics could corrupt him or dull his moral sensitivity; other cases could be favorable to the development of one's sensitivity and promote the consideration of moral criteria. The more narrow and egoistic the goals to which the political system is related and the weaker the mechanisms of control by the masses upon the politician the more the system will encourage its representatives to reach for success on the basis of self-seeking, without principles or honor.

"Real Socialism" and the Relation of Morality and Politics

The different stages and patterns of "real socialism" were characterized by different types of interrelations between the moral and political spheres and their specific values. Political interference by the party and political authorities expanded. The inefficiency of the economic stimuli was replaced by moral campaigns and appeals which presented moral obligations as also political requirements in the labor sphere. At the same time wage-levelling created a sense of moral justice which reacted against every differentiation whether or not based on personal work and ability. Any differentiation generated envy and ill will: even Plato argued that in societies dominated by equality, without taking into account the personal abilities and results of one's activity, envy easily flourishes.

Domination by state property and its related alienation led to a decline of a work morality that had a destructive effect upon the other spheres of the moral regulation of the human behaviour. Ideology tried to compensate for the lack of efficient stimuli and motivation for work by ideologized symbols and honorary titles, distributing a growing quantity of decorations, medals, banners, flags and charters. But in the course of time the increase of such titles as "hero of socialist labour", etc., became directly proportional to a fall in motivation for work. The clash between the myth about distribution "according to labour" and the reality of wage-levelling and distribution "according to position" in the hierarchy led to a lack of initiative and a low quality of work done and hence to a decline of the moral authority of labor. "Class ethics" favored industrial workers and led to neglecting intellectuals. Physicians, teachers, engineers, scientific workers, artists and journalists in most cases received for their work the same as a worker with average or low qualification. The individual economic initiative suppressed could be expressed only in the "second" or "black" economy.

In the revolutionary changes through which societies of "real socialism" pass, there is no practice of democratic decision-making on the part of the majority, but violence of some social groups towards others. Violence even in the name of high humanistic ideas and values tends to be generalized in the name of "social progress", history and common welfare. But, as the analyses of the French revolution by A. de Tocqueville and E. Burke show, every use of violence and terror in the name of goodness has in itself at least a potential boomerang effect, carrying with it the danger that the means used will render the goal meaningless. Forced compulsion in the name of the "common good" easily turns into totalitarianism.

In the strongly centralized political systems there developed a one-sided dependence of morality on politics in which morality was subordinated to politics. Morality, its reasons and justifications, were tied to political goals and interests. This is synthesized in Lenin's famous phrase: everything that serves the "cause of communism" is moral. In the "moral code of the builder of communism", set up by the Soviet communist party during the time of Khrushchev, the

highest moral principle is "devotion to the cause of communism". But in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes politics loses its real essence, namely, to be a manifestation of the interests of larger social groups, classes and nation. Where political authorities are not controlled by society, the conditions exist for their own alienation and that of their bureaucratic interests. These begin then to impose themselves as political and moral demands upon the citizens. Thus, everything the centralized authorities demand becomes moral because their activity and prescriptions are identified with the "fight for communism". At the same time insufficient openness on the part of the political authorities creates the conditions for them to neglect the moral feelings of the masses. Thus, authorities remain beyond the control of mass popular moral consciousness; they impose criteria upon it but do not allow it to influence them.

The ethics of a totalitarian regime has some important characteristics. First, the political system is proclaimed to be directed towards attaining the "common good"--national interests, the "good of the working people," etc. Second, it is supposed that separate individuals and social groups might not be aware of their "true interests", which can be known only by the Party, which therefore plays the "leading role" in all spheres of social life. Third, the relative autonomy of the different spheres of society, particularly those of morality and politics, are neglected as are the possible contradictions between those spheres. Thus, the Party begins to realize in practice its "leading role" in morality which it subordinates to politics in a one-sided manner.

Fourth, it is supposed that the "new society" creates a relatively uncontradictory unity of personal, group and social interests, though in practice the personal interests of citizens deprived of the right to own, utilize and take care of the state-owned property are alienated from state interests which are proclaimed as national interests. In this way the political sphere lacks a concrete mechanism through which the individual will of the citizen could be reflected in the common will, which should be expressed by the authorities. As the interests of the separate persons and social groups cannot find political expression, only the interest expressed by party and state authorities have legitimacy. These are imposed as the common good and are not subject to criticism.

Fifth, because the separate individuals and social groups could not appreciate the interests of the authorities proclaimed as the common good, and because of the real alienation of personal interests from this common good, the main means for its imposition becomes the economic, political and ideological monopoly. Alternative patterns of "real interests" of the citizens and the social groups are totally excluded; violence is done in the name of the "common good".

The top criteria of morality, namely, "national interests", "public welfare", "communist ideals", all are projected in time. They are diachronic dimensions expected to be achieved in the process of building socialism and communism. From their manner of presentation, however, they can begin to contradict general human values and moral norms which are valid for different periods and social groups, for they exist not only in the future but also at present and in the past as well. Thus, general human values and norms are discarded theoretically as they cannot serve as practical criteria for political activities, but neither can existing political mechanisms. The high centralization and its monopoly formed during the first decades of the development of socialist countries and the lack of sufficient control on the political hierarchy "from below" appear to open the way to a loss of moral guidelines for party and state personnel. This became strongly apparent in the period of classical Stalinism and its rude repressions until the 1950s, but also after that period within the milder system of Neo-Stalinism in Bulgaria, political leaders experienced conflicts between morality and politics.

In the administrative and command socialist system political institutions constantly faced the problem of popular confidence and hence of the moral image of the staff working in these

institutions. Conditions for the mutual alienation of these institutions and their staff, on the one hand, and the citizens, on the other, remained until the 1980s and were a factor in the failure of the control mechanism for the morality of politicians. They also hampered legitimizing the political system in the popular mass consciousness. The mechanisms for a more efficient moral control upon the political staff developed parallel to the reduction of red tape and of centralized management structures, as well as with the spread of openness and democracy in the actions of the authorities.

Democratization and the Relation of Morality and Politics

From the middle 1980s on turbulent processes and changes began to take place in the USSR and in Central and Eastern Europe. The crumbling of previous structures was accompanied by processes of social democratization of the Communist parties. The difference in Europe between the social democrats and socialists on the one hand and the communists on the other hand, dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century, began to narrow. There began to be envisaged in the economic sphere a pluralism of forms of property, a free market economy with social guarantees for the socially weak strata of the population, and a narrowing the scope of centralistic state regulation of economy. In the political sphere attention turned to multi-party systems, parliamentary democracy, separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers and free elections. All of these changed the relation between morality and politics.

In the first place there was a clear orientation towards a more human, just and moral system of social life. The moral movement itself was seen to have an important place in the platform of political forces.

Democratization and openness came to be acknowledged as prerequisites for a more active penetration of morality into the political sphere. If earlier politics, which was often carried out in favor of group bureaucratic interests, tried to subordinate the moral consciousness and impose its own criteria, now the two came to be seen as equals, and moral consciousness could very actively influence political life. Politics, too, in a sense was moralized and ethnitized through taking into account the mass moral expectations and demands.

Democratization is the most favorable political ground for the progress of morality. Both democracy and morality ensue from the citizen's autonomy, from his right of choice and tolerance of differences. The more thoroughly a democratic regime regulates the citizen, the less the opportunity to enhance such moral categories as honor, conscience, dignity, responsibility and charity. Democracy has as its first principle the citizen's freedom, choice of alternatives and the assumption of personal responsibility. Democracy implies not only a distinction between civil society and the state, but also the development of its own regularities, with relative autonomy of the different social spheres and of mechanisms for the regulation of behaviour. Where totalitarianism relies upon the monopoly and unification of society, democracy puts forward variety and makes everything, everybody and each action commensurate with its own individual measures rather than with the same criteria applied elsewhere. In this sense democracy is a means of limiting the field of action of politics and political criteria, whereas the criteria of morality are much reinforced.

The development of a mixed economy and the freedom of citizens in managing the various functions of property--ownership, management and use--is a favorable basis for crucial changes in morality and motivation regarding work. The moral evaluation of enterprise and initiative in the economic sphere has been changing.

Along with "loyalty to the building of socialism", a basic principle in the "moral code of a builder of communism" is "socialist collectivism" as opposed to "bourgeois individualism". In fact, however, this "collectivism" is not a community of individuals having equal rights and joint interests; on the contrary they are equal only in their economic alienation from state property and their political alienation from the authorities. Collectivism without actual economic links among the individuals of the social group who lack proper political rights and freedoms is a moral shell for totalitarian subordination depriving the citizen of individuality. Economic and political freedoms promote the development of individualism. When this individualism produces socially positive results, it has indisputable moral advantages in comparison with recent collectivism. Only a free person with developed individuality can take an active part in different social groups to consolidate their unity as well.

The fundamental political principles of the societies of "real socialism" was the division of social and professional groups in terms of their capacity to take part in public progress and contribute to the positive development of society. It was thought that the working class engaged directly in productive labour and that in particular the working class in industry possessed a socially privileged position which made it the leading power and the avant garde for the rest. Its moral values and perceptions of common interests and welfare were considered much more precise and truthful than those of other social groups. The working class was considered politically and, all things considered, morally more complete.

Such a division turned out to be without justification. As epistemological subjects, intellectuals were first, while from the point of moral ability the members of society are to a certain degree equal and could not be separated mechanically in terms of the social group to which they belong. In former periods of human civilization the boundaries between the separate social estates, casts and groups were relatively stable and difficult to overcome so that important differences between the moral values and norms of those groups could develop. In industrial and post-industrial societies, with their dynamism and the flexibility of their boundaries between social communities, the differences between social values and norms are not so great.

The most essential change takes place in the logical argumentation and justification of moral values and the norms which guide people's lives. In the former societies of "real socialism" the main criteria for the justification of moral values and norms were future ideals, namely, the goals of the communist party. Some political systems now are emerging which give the first place to universal values and norms which are the achievement of human civilization.

A political morality is developing for the democratic evolution of society. Its starting point is tolerance towards differences and the freedom to express all kinds of views. The moral image of a politician becomes very important for his or her political survival and success. Under the circumstances of political pluralism and a multi-party system the following are of essential importance: civilized dialogue, mutual respect, readiness for compromise and cooperation between the different political forces; in contrast, the following are disvalues: attitudes towards others as "enemies" and tendencies to anathematize, abuse or defame them.

Changes from totalitarian to democratic and market society are accompanied by new tensions between morality and politics. If a totalitarian system is connected with the politization of morality, the process of social change is connected with a moralization of politics. In the transitional period the old political system does not work, while the new is but emerging. The people want to carry on politics directly, but, as they are not politicians, they too easily replace real politics with morality: mass moral consciousness begins to dictate to politics. While this is accepted as purifying corrupt totalitarian politics, the replacement of politics with morality is full of danger. Morality

also can kill people; in the history of mankind it may have killed more people than have the police. For moral evaluations and decisions employ an "either-or" logic, while politics uses an "and-and" logic that is more flexible. Where morality could search for absolutes, politics finds compromises. The tragedy of every revolution is the replacement of politics with the uncompromising moralism of a highly excited mass consciousness. Maximillian Robespierre had the aura of an "Unbribed" or moral man, but he created the politics of terror. When morality entirely replaces politics it could become an executioner.

There is another contradiction between morality and politics in the time of changes in Eastern Europe. On the one hand, the newly emergent political forces under the circumstances of the multi-party system declare their ambition for a more human and moral society. Democratization forces politicians to consider the demands and concepts of justice, and the moral evaluations of the broad layers of the population. The moral evaluations of politics and the moral pressure of the people in political life find much greater opportunities for public expression. On the other hand, the movement of the economic sphere towards market relations under the circumstances of an acute deficiency of goods and the economic imbalances created over the course of decades lead to increasing social differentiation, corruption, increasing inflation and an expansion of the number of people living under the poverty level. Mass moral consciousness in which the traditional egalitarian stereotypes are relatively strong reacts very violently against those processes and resists increasing differentiation. As the experience in such countries as China and Poland shows, the mass moral consciousness reacts violently as well against the processes of increasing corruption which are inevitable under the circumstances of a deficient economy in which the opportunities for individual initiative increase sharply and in which there still are no efficient mechanisms for control. Reaction against such corruption and differentiation so that they gain political expression may become a prerequisite for stopping or slowing down economic reforms.

Morality as a Separate Sphere Imposing Its Criteria upon Politics and Other Spheres of the Society

This is a prevailing model emerging during the last two decades in the most developed countries where so-called "postindustrial" or "information" society is arising and some characteristics of postmodernity are emerging. In this process the political and cultural maps of the modern period have been redrawn so that the old oppositions--science versus art, facts versus fictions, Left versus Right, high culture versus low culture, morality versus politics, morality versus economy, and morality versus art, no longer hold. No values prove "timeless", "authentic" or "oppositional" forever.

At first the separation between economy and morality which was characteristic of the industrial age loses its rigor. There is a big shift to post-materialist values as the motives and the basis of the work ethic come to the fore. I agree with A. Toffler who wrote in *The Third Wave*:

Throughout the second wave era corporations have been seen as economic units, and attacks on them have essentially focused on economic issues. . . . Today's corporate critics start from a totally different premise. They attack the artificial divorce of economics from politics, morality and other dimensions of life. They hold the corporation increasingly responsible, not merely for its economic performance but for its side effects on everything from air pollution to executive stress.²

² A. Toffler, *The Third Wave* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1980), p. 234.

That is why in only twenty years "business ethics" became one of the most active and fast growing disciplines.

In various fields old centralized social and power structures are replaced by new "flat" and horizontal networks. The civil society enlarges its boundaries and the morality of this civil society imposes its criterion on the state and on politicians. This is connected with a transformation of the old power structures, the status of the politician, and his place in society. The dictate of moral precepts on the politicians has become much stronger after Watergate. One of the most important achievements of the industrial society--the separation of public from private life loses its strength. Society burst in upon the politician's private life, which in turn becomes especially significant for his career. Laws, codes, commissions, parliamentary ethics committees, and so on, are set up so that an ethical concern over a political or judicial nominee could become the most important national event over several months.

All this is related to the fact that in an over-centralized mass society the old type of politics is out of date. In a society where the horizontal structures are so important there is a:

Deepening breakdown of the ability to make timely and competent decisions . . . charging the deepest power relationships in society. Under normal non-revolutionary circumstances, the elites in any society use the political system to reinforce their rule, and further their ends. . . . Today the elites can no longer predict the outcomes of their own actions. The political systems through which they operate are so antiquated and creaky, so outraced by events, that even when closely "controlled" by the elites for their own benefit, the results often backfire.³

In a more decentralized and participative society the strong, older divisions between politicians and constituency disappear, and the participation and control of citizens over the power structures become much stronger, thereby imposing their moral precepts on politics. When increasingly the government is not a representative of the majority but of different minorities and the consideration of their interests comes first, morality enters actively into politics.

A signpost of this new unity of morality and politics was *After Virtue* by Alasdair MacIntyre, published in 1981. Acknowledging the failure of the old divisions between facts and values, person and society, he went back to the Aristotle's ethics of virtue. In a similar context other criticisms of the liberal idea of neutral government have appeared manifesting a shift toward more humanistic and adequate relationships of morality to politics. But it is important to underscore that these relationships could be optimal, but not applicable to every kind of society, that is, they could be only for the highly developed societies with new technological, economic and social structures underpinning definite power structures.

If one tries right away to introduce these new relationships between morality and politics in Eastern European societies where all social structures are of an industrial or preindustrial type with an exceptional degree of centralization, massification and state property, it would be a manifestation of, or a path to, neototalitarianism. Max Weber wrote that in a radically transforming society an ethics of ultimate ends in politics is most disastrous and a direct route to bloodshed and dictatorship. Moralization in a time of revolutionary changes almost always gives rise to some kind of dictatorship.

Thus democratization reveals the contradiction between morality and economy, between the moral feelings for justice and the economic realities of increasing differentiation; through politics this would hamper the changes in economy. This example shows that morality, represented by the

³ *Ibid.*, p. 395.

moral feelings and inclinations of the masses, can be considered also an expression of absolute values and be the only factor by which politics is controlled. Mass moral consciousness could be conservative and play a hampering role.

We must not suppose that in the interrelation between the political sphere and the moral consciousness of the masses the political sphere must have priority at all costs. But we must not suppose the opposite either, namely, that the priority should belong at all costs to the moral consciousness of the masses, for morality and moral behaviour are not equivalent to mass consciousness or to what the majority in democratic societies and communities consider moral. Quite often it is not the majority but the minority which is the bearer of more moral views and values for it acts more in accord with the perspectives of social development. Therefore, democratization is not in all cases a guarantee of more moral points of reference. The moralist, Socrates, was sentenced to death in an ancient democracy. The dictatorship of the majority under the circumstance of democracy could turn out to be no less immoral than the dictatorship of the minority, or of separate persons under an oligarchy or autocracy.

Overcoming the dangers of sharp contradictions between morality and politics, between the mass moral consciousness and the real needs of society, is connected with the development of democratic mechanisms, political means, balances and counterweights. This is a prerequisite for making it impossible for any social group to gain absolute power to the detriment of truth for a society. First, the common good which should be defended by the state loses its absolute significance before something proclaimed by a group of people as an exclusive truth. Political pluralism means the opportunity to criticize certain notions about the common welfare and interests and to seek consensus and compromise. Second, developed democratic mechanisms are a prerequisite for the transition from the individual will of separate citizens to the level of a common will carried out by the political institution and the state. Third, the separation of the powers and the existence of a political opposition are counterforce to the corruptive influence of unrestricted power. Politics becomes much more moral as values begin to play a more significant role in social life and become stable moral regulators, which in turn confirms limits in the political sphere.

Naturally, this process is not without its contradictions. Democratization removes some contradictions between morality and politics, but it can also open new contradictions. Since morality and politics are relatively independent spheres in social life every elimination of certain contradictions between them and constitution of a new unity itself opens the way for a new contradiction and a new unity.

There exist also certain global prerequisites for a change in the interrelations between morality and politics. These are connected with the global processes of democratization in the contemporary world. These include a greater number of people in political life whose moral criteria, evaluations and consciousness influence more politicians. Strengthened by the contemporary mass media, they can mobilize world public opinion and exert an influence over political events even in most remote parts of the world.

The internationalization of public life and the serious global problems at the end of the twentieth century greatly raise the significance of moral and political values which are universal to all mankind. Morality, which in principle accumulates the more stable achievements of a civilization and is connected with the regulation and establishment of more stable human interrelations, bears in itself elements which are universal to all mankind. The growth of the impact of morality upon political institutions leads to a stronger trend in the politics of different groups to include in their essence values common to all mankind. As one of the main characteristics of the

new historical essence of the world, democratization makes international political life more human and imposes certain moral limits upon politics. Through democratization there is growth in the sense of mutual dependence and mutual commitment, of the need for new thinking, new values and new ideas of a world in which there is a place for us all.

Chapter II

Political Conformism in a Totalitarian-Bureaucratic Society

Alexandar Mirchev

Introduction

The stability and transformations of conformism in a totalitarian-bureaucratic social organization are the focal point of a number of essential questions. Most important among them, for the time being at least, are the following:

What are the social meaning and the forms of conformity?

What are the grounds and salient features of political conformism in the transition through the building, replication, decline and disintegration of a totalitarian-bureaucratic society?

What are the specific modes and the functional characteristics of conformism and its transformations?

The existing paradigms of social psychology, despite their unquestionable potential for the analysis of conformity and conformism, seem highly inadequate in discussing such issues. They fail to describe accurately what exactly happens in conformism in the totalitarian-bureaucratic organization of social life.¹

This study employs as a more suitable means the views on conformism in modern socio-philosophical thought, taking into consideration the findings of social psychology as well.² These views can be summarized as follows: conformism is a specific, uncritical, generalized value orientation of the individual, determined by the dominant standards of thinking and behavior. It includes also a hypertrophied readiness to follow (obey) precisely these social requirements and expectations.

Conformism

To say that conformism is manifested in a variety of forms could mean practically nothing. The manifestations of conformism are so diverse indeed that the first and most banal question is: what do they all have in common?

The common element in this diversity can be compared to the dependence determining the action, or inaction, of a strange and enigmatic musical instrument that German romanticists loved-

¹ There seem to be two explanatory models: a socio-psychological one and a socio-philosophical one, "hidden" in the research approaches employed by the different social sciences. One is related to the study of the influence of social groups on the behavior of the individual; the other concerns the dependence of the individual upon society as a line of thinking and behavior--a specific "non-critical" orientation of the individual, and a conformist reaction--a susceptibility and a yielding of the individual to the influence of the social group.

² The wide range of approaches and micro-theories of conformism in the neobehaviorist and cognitivist, interactionist and other approaches in modern social psychology are of major importance for this study. The underlying concept, however, is that conformism is the specific yielding on the part of the individual to the social influences or pressure of the group in the process of social-group interactions.

-the Eolian harp. Its sounds are seemingly arbitrary because they are the result of many unpredictable factors. There is no human interference here, the music depends on where the harp has been placed, the direction of the winds, etc.

This leads to the inevitable conclusion that conformism is a possible "mechanism" of all the social interactions that can emerge in any social sphere. It is a mode of behavior that is fixed not to a certain social sphere or area, but to certain circumstances. Based on this assumption the scope of the manifestations of conformism is virtually unlimited. This virtually boundless field includes conformism's antipode--anticonformism or conformism turned upside down as an explicitly negative reaction to social influences. The limitations of conformism also should be mentioned here. These are the conscious and unconscious reflections of "the observed requirements and standards of thought and behavior"; their viewpoint is to do as required or desired, as is generally accepted, etc.

Conformism is a mode of thinking and behaving that is more or less directly and overtly determined by others. These others, however, are not a surrealist crowd of eccentric dictators who commit outrages on the basis of their individual wills. The situation seems to resemble much more the "harmonious" relationships between the musicians in a symphony orchestra and the conductor. But habitual dependence is not the only element which comes to the fore in this case. Rather, dependence seems to be turned upside down: the musicians determine the conductor's behavior. The others not only propose and impose certain requirements, they are the carriers of the ultimate grounds for conforming; they are also the common grounds for the individual and the contrasting "others". It is worth noting here that in the case of conformism the others are not only one's world, but the most important thing for the individual. The forms and methods by which pressure on the part of others is exerted crystallize in the absolutely simple formula of the behavioral pattern: "That is as it should be". This is meant to answer, above all, two questions: "What do others do?" and "What will others say?"

Conformist self-consciousness and experience is, though with a number of reservations, a specific split of the ego. The ego somehow manages quite easily to bridge the gap between "we" as a tendency to unification and "they" as a tendency to separateness. In other words, conformism is virtually a continual and simultaneous experience and thinking of the "we".

Why? It seems that conformism's fundamental characteristics and place in social life are conditioned by individual separateness which opposes and contrasts the individual to society. This is made concrete as the common viewpoint of being incorporated and united with something to which the individual does not "automatically" belong.

This incorporation of the individual is seen in everyday life "through" various social communities. The internal viewpoint of conforming interactions is a continual integration with, and hence reaffirmation of, the stable and important features of "one's own" and/or social communities that are important for the individual.

These communities are not necessarily restricted in time and space, but cover a variety of correlated values, actions, etc. It is hardly worth describing the whole range, starting with children playing Red Indians, through professional, political, and deviant groups, to various imaginary entities and those related to one or another ideology. Consequently, conforming actions are preliminarily fixed (and oftentimes legalized) possibilities for the natural, uncritical, self-

understood observance of social rules.³ These rules, however, are seen by the individual as social communities and their personifications.

Most simply, when proceeding from conformism the individual views reality through strictly fixed communities: he sees the world through them, or the world is what they are. Its structuring and destructuring not only is done by them, but also passes through them. They are like motley-colored pieces of glass that make up the individual's world, tingeing it in one color or another, or in a gamut of colors.

Following the metaphor of the mostly colored glass pieces, let us see what picks them out and makes the individual see through them; what is it that makes his world to be what they are rather than something else? What are the hidden "mechanisms" that transform certain rules into regulations of special significance for the individual, and hence generate conformism?

The social mechanism here is basically an important aspect of fetishization and ritualization. Through them conformism in social interactions is not merely materialized, but also is guaranteed. In other words, the fetishization of the rules of certain communities and of the typical modes of their realization lies behind conformism, making these rules seem natural and self-evident. The individual's views are shaped according to the whole web of relations which reflect these rules.

The specific potential of ritualization is the other side of the coin. Ritualization provides the social form of conformism, by regulating the practical materialization of the conformist interactions as with the part of a king in a theater play, the message is conveyed especially through the attitude of the other actors to the king. Ritualization not only guarantees the link with the respective social entity, but through it individuals are "dissolved" in the communities that require their respective actions. In addition, fetishization and ritualization transfer the grounds for such behavior "far, and beyond". Because the requirements upon the individual are not stated explicitly in the social situation, which assumes a conforming reaction or action, regardless of their "absence" the conforming interaction should take place. Hence, the grounds for conforming actions are actually external to the immediate, concrete joint activity.

This has the quite ironic effect that though often no one forces people directly to act in a conformist way, this is what they often choose to do. This means that they simply act in the way they "should", even when it runs counter to common sense. Indeed, under the "should be done like this" requirement, absolutely absurd ideas and actions are presented as the quintessence of common sense.

Thus, the life worlds that conformism creates and reproduces offer certain standard rules that delineate the repetitiveness of human interactions. In other words, the life worlds of political conformism provide certain general values or meanings. Conforming actions create, reproduce and develop these meanings as the world that is given and self-evident. As self-understood, the reality which results from such interactions is the stuff of common sense. Thus, the horizons of conforming interactions set the rules which provide for successfully coping with problems solely from the point of view of the rules themselves. The interactions become new confirmations of these very rules, the circumstances that have caused and supported them, and their cultural background. In this way the layers of reality which result from conforming actions are locked within such action.

The world of conformism does not need the support which normally accompanies most models of thinking and behavior for they have an innate ability of reproduction. Their grounds far

³ Conformist communities determine and are determined by their respective standardized behavior. This does not happen at random, but through and in the form of actions that correspond, in the main, to habitual pattern.

exceed the immediately given world. Indeed, it is precisely this quality that makes them create and reproduce the immediately given world.

Political Conformism and Totalitarian Bureaucratic Organization

Origin

This concept of conformism can still be linked with a relatively high autonomy of the individual if this be viewed in relation to the possibilities and interactions defined by civil society. Conformism is grounded upon the fact that the individual masters the most developed universal patterns which rule him as an external necessity. These social links are manifested above all (and sometimes only) as a means to the individual's private goals. Theoretically, the core of such conformist behavior is that it is one of the major practical forms of social self-fulfillment.

The emergence of the totalitarian-bureaucratic organization of society is connected with an attempt at the political realization of certain ideas of social progress organized as a complete social utopia. This is reflected in various instances of fanaticism, emerging through fetishization and ritualization of the desire to speed up social progress, which is to be achieved by political means from outside and from above. In the long run these relate to the political means used to enforce the new social order for the dominant forms of conformist action are focused and refracted through the integrating and dominating prism of the political element. The political characteristics of conformism not only are an integral part of the consolidation of the new order, but being included in the political transformations they set the parameters of the new social reality. The propagation of this model of conformism facilitates the transformation of the political into being the main social link in the new society. Insofar as this world does not pre-exist but is created in highly personal terms, however, conformism in strictly hierarchized social structures is manifested as authoritarianism.

A small digression is necessary here in order to analyze further some of the key aspects of the conformism of the totalitarian-bureaucratic organization of society. Conformism seems to be a uniform type behavior, common to all societies. It becomes manifest, however, with respect to viewpoints differing from the universally accepted social order. Here what is distinctive of conformism is that the individual, who is essentially not a separate unity and/or cannot think himself outside this common order, is not in a position to realize or take advantage of such divergent possibilities.

Interactions similar (or even identical) to conformism can result from other social mechanisms. The similarity consists in an arrangement of the world which automatically produces standardized behavior as a consequence of the typical "general order of things". Proto-conformism as standardized thought and behavior is typical of so-called traditional societies such as the feudal and Asian.⁴

The traditional social regulators--religion and direct physical coercion--elevate the fetishization and ritualization of set rules to standardized behavior with their own goals and meaning. Thus, the political enforcement of a "utopia" in extremely underdeveloped societies generates protoconformism. In totalitarian-bureaucratic societies the dominating model of conformism is developed by political control over the structures of the traditional society. The

⁴ Consequently, external features which can be similar to conformism have other grounds and, finally, another meaning. The above description of proto-conformism is solely from the point of view of already crystallized social forms of conforming interactions.

cultural background of this process, the "interim" geopolitical situation, the relative underdevelopment of these societies, and the authoritarian political culture, together, generate a new mode of this phenomenon. This is neither protoconformism, nor that which could or would emerge in an industrial society. Thus, for example, in totalitarian-bureaucratic structures the mechanisms of a patriarchal social organization acquire particular importance as paternalism makes natural, validates and popularizes the political authoritarianism of conformist social forms.

Development and Reproduction

The development and consolidation of the totalitarian-bureaucratic organization of society generates a relatively uniform model of conformist political action. This is based on the presentation of social life as a movement toward a practically attainable utopia. This uniform model is backed by a general consideration of this movement as important and attractive for society as a whole and for all members. It is further consolidated by the isolation of all possible deviations.

This uniform model of political conformism reflects a monopoly of political power, a final and global *étatisme* of society and the corresponding "monolithic nature" of culture and intellectual life. Its development is based on the logic of bureaucratic hierarchization as a leading principle in society which conformism "sees" as the administrative function in society. When bureaucratic hierarchization is combined with political authoritarianism based on paternalism, different forms of conformism emerge as modifications of the bureaucratic hierarchy in various spheres. Society's expectations of the individual as well as one's own expectations are dissolved into the logic of bureaucratic hierarchization.

Further, processes of fetishization and ritualization take place within this interaction itself and not only in its "substantive" structures. It acquires a significance of its own, which naturally is not described by society or its members as conformism. The field of conformism becomes rather ambiguous, for the borderline is blurred between the "true" and the "untrue". This ambiguity stems from the emergence of mass social forms geared to "achieve" the social whole, which imitations, in turn, support the reality and the need for a uniform conformist model.

The continuation of the totalitarian-bureaucratic organization of the entire life of the political society sets in motion a mass reproduction of the uniform model of political conformism, becoming thereby the motor for the system's reproduction. This single model has both the prestige of power and the power of prestige. What is new here is the wide range of the model in the various social areas and their processes of integration and differentiation. This facilitates political regulation and its forms of bureaucratization and hierarchization.

These characteristics are present even away from the centers of public life. Since the totalitarian-bureaucratic organization encompasses the entire life of society, political conformism becomes not only a single, but practically a universal, model of social interaction; it subsumes the main principles of all interactions reducing them to all too simple forms. Thus, the above-mentioned ambiguity of the conformist field becomes even more visible and even becomes public.

This labyrinthine social organization becomes a household reality; it is what is understandable and right. It is the organization of social life, from the lonely shepherd high up on the mountain to the persons in the centers where political power is exercised; everywhere the single method of conformism appears to be the universal method of social interaction.

Decline and Disintegration

The decline of the totalitarian-bureaucratic organization as a result of internal and external contradictions shakes the entire uniform and universal model of political conformism. This seems to be the result, as well as the prerequisite for the surfacing of relatively autonomous areas and layers of the quasi-civil society. The division of society into public and private sectors becomes an open possibility.⁵

The bureaucratic model tends to fall into danger for failure to effect significant social changes. The impairment of its absolute social legitimacy leads to a number of changes, including the modification and liberalization of its social forms and a transformation of the manner of their implementation. What are the elements of this change?

On the one hand, the uniform model proliferates in many, though not very different, modifications. Though on the whole, these are identical with the general model, they present themselves as corresponding to certain communities which are only a fragment of the political or social whole. At the same time, as they manifest the "mechanisms" of the political or social whole they also restrict social diversity.

On the other hand, the implementation of the single model is fragmented, as different salient features create corresponding social interactions as the ritual aspect of social order. Conformism then assumes the form of a ritualized sketch of "required" behavior.

The disintegration of the uniform model of conformism is an expression of the disintegration of the totalitarian-bureaucratic political organization of life in society. The paradox is that the political entity disintegrates into "fragments" which are supported by the totalitarian-bureaucratic organization, whereas the corresponding structures of quasi-civil society disintegrate into "independent" and "free" totalitarian-bureaucratic structures: they declare themselves as cooperating with or opposing the political whole, gradually preparing thereby the grounds for a civil society.

Political conformism comes to life again and links up with the public aspect of social life and its totalitarian-bureaucratic organization. What is new is the relative autonomy of certain social areas. To be more precise:

-Conformist social forms manifest the relative independence of various hierarchies. This is an emancipation of hierarchies from the point of view both of the political social whole and the observance of their own principles.

-Conformist social forms are also treated as forms of private life. What matters here is that ethnic-type social links become particularly important in the new self-organization of society. In other words, the conformist orientation becomes linked with the regulators of traditional society. In modern societies these regulators are not able to guarantee sufficiently firmly the stability of the line of political thought and action, but that is another matter.

-Conformist social forms "legalize" duplicate social structures hidden behind the official layers of the utopian reality. This reflects the change in the balance between what is declared and non-declared in society.

The list can go on, with varying degrees of cogency. What really matters here is the disintegration of the monolithic nature of the uniform and universal model of political conformism.

⁵ Utopianism is still a characteristic feature of the declared and undeclared in the social interaction, as well as of the universal bureaucratization and hierarchization and of the authoritarianism they breed. The elements of the political social link are balanced up through pseudonalism ; conformism is related to political rationality and a special parlance.

Naturally, what remains of it is not outside the cultural background of the totalitarian political hierarchical-bureaucratic relations that engendered it. On the other hand, an amazing change is taking place; conformism's inherent viewpoint is changing and in both directions--from the political whole to the component parts, and vice versa. This is a revolution in individual viewpoints, but a revolution in society as well, for in one way or another individual conformist actions are always oriented by certain social factors. What matters now is that traits expressing the diametrically opposite viewpoint of the individual's "own" communities come to the fore, rather than features describing the social whole.

The Universalization of Conformism

The worlds that conformism creates and reproduces offer certain standard rules that describe the repetitiveness of human interaction. In other words, conformist worlds offer general meaning; actions create, reproduce and develop these meanings as given and self-evident. Hence, the reality which results from such actions is susceptible to practical explanation and common sense. Its horizons set the rules which provide for successfully coping with problems solely from the viewpoint of these rules themselves. Interactions become a new confirmation of these very rules, of the circumstances that have caused and supported them, and of their cultural background. In this way, the layers of reality result from conforming interactions becoming locked within them.

The worlds of conformism do not need the ordinary support required for most models of thinking and behavior. They have an innate ability for reproduction, and their grounds far exceed the immediately given world. On the other hand, it is precisely this quality that makes them create and reproduce the immediately given world for what has "no place" in them, is insignificant and in a certain sense does not or should not exist. This suppression and ignoring of the non-typical from the point of view of conforming worlds is their immune system.

Thus, totalitarian conformist worlds are dominated by the socially accepted political rationality, which, in turn, is subordinated to political bureaucratization and hierarchization and to the pseudo-ethnic forms of relations of personal dependence. A brilliant illustration of what happens is the principle that "all animals are equal, but some are more equal than others". Conformist action produces and consolidates precisely this type of rationality. Conformism here is perhaps the core of endeavors to realize the utopia which, in schematic form, models its content. All this presupposes not only the value of such a way of thinking and behaving, but the emergence of a proper language as well.

Here, the formulas of rationality and language ultimately express the political effect achieved through bureaucratic hierarchization. They express, above all, the intention of the new social organization, as well as the means for achieving political domination. The new language becomes the main instrument of the concrete realization of the new conformist actions.

The social worlds of conformism create, and actually constitute, the imaginary reality of the totalitarian-bureaucratic society; they create as well the reality of individuality and of the private, intimate world, for reality is locked in forms of individualization which are standardized to the utmost. The intellectual and moral level cultivates, in accordance with totalitarian-bureaucratic standards, conformist qualities on the part of the person, in which sense we can also speak of a conforming personality.⁶ This has the stability of the intellectual and moral argumentation which accompanies this line of thought and action. Conformism is an instrument for neutralization by

⁶ In this sense only we can probably speak of a *conforming personality*.

overcoming inter-subjective and/or intra-subjective differences and conflicts. It is also a dignified escape from the uncertainty and hazards of freedom.

The hermetic character of conformist worlds has already been discussed, but these worlds are also "open" and oriented to other worlds. They resemble ports which belong to "closed" societies, but in a certain way are also open to foreigners and strangers in that the worlds of conformism "conquer" other worlds. The mechanism for the automatic expansion of the totalitarian-bureaucratic organization is set in motion, and with it the proliferation of the uniform model of political conformism. Conforming social forms not only discover the totalitarian-bureaucratic hierarchization in every interaction, but also impose it as an organizing principle of social interaction.

In the long run, however, the worlds of conformism follow the rules of their "own" communities, and hence of the global social whole by which they were engendered. In this sense, they are always among the regulators of the self-organization and self-reproduction of this global whole. Their dynamism is directed exclusively to maintaining the *status quo* and sanctioning uniformity. Hence the conclusion that the normal development of the uniform model of political conformism, including the mastering and enforcing of social content and the politization and depolitization of certain social spheres, is actually non-development. Visible changes are all within the framework of the uniform model. Though quite striking, they are kaleidoscopic in nature, for the motley-colored pieces of glass mentioned above are only rearranged in different ways--the new configuration does not change them in the least.

The Conformist Coincidence of the Moral and Political

Based on the universality of morality and politics, conformist action can be imposed as the social form of every interaction.⁷ The domination of conforming worlds under totalitarianism virtually blocks moral and political socialization, development and fulfillment. The personality remains on a conventional level of development based on the rules of the community. Hence, the one-sidedness of the moral world is due not to lack of diversity, but to the uniformity and one-sidedness of viewpoint. An irresponsible observance of moral standards is the logical consequence of conformism.

For instance, the sphere of moral choice is locked within bounds and drastically reduced to mere procedure. Loosely linked fragments remain, for the individual is always faced with possibilities which differ at least in nuance. These possibilities are maximally abridged and contextually maimed variants of moral choice; indeed can they be called moral choices at all? Perhaps in some external features, but the procedure of making such moral choices strikingly resembles the script of an erotic film in which the story is of no importance whatsoever. It is clearly understood that the script serves only to facilitate the rapid transition to over-simplified sexual patterns. Analogously, moral choice here provides maximum speed and effect in conformist subordination.

The visible possibilities for free moral choice are there, but they are not utilized. The totalitarian-bureaucratic society organically encompasses the conformism which guarantees its political regulation. In one way or another such communities all have a political nature and

⁷ In totalitarian conformism the meanings related to morality and politics overlap. This is due to the fact that morality and politics do not have their own separate subject matters. This makes them a possible aspect, ground, effect, etc. of every social interaction. As a result, politics is pseudo-moralized and morality is pseudo-politicized in every conforming interaction.

conformism is among the leading mechanisms for turning private into public interest and modelling the political principles of society.

This means that the moral and political life of the individual is limited to the point of view of his or her community. Restrictions come not only and not so much from the possibility of having closed communities, but mainly and above all from the fact that their life has been reorganized along conformist lines. Thus, conformism is among the "social mechanisms" that guarantee coordination and concerted action in the life of the people and their associations. It produces a stagnating and degrading influence on the development and self-fulfillment of the individual and social communities. Such negative effects can be overcome by "copying" conformism's regulative potentials in other, more humane forms of human activity. This places under the individual's control all the conditions for free action which have emerged in the course of the natural development of civil society.

For individual action and development, the elimination of such "regressive" characteristics of conformism is an integral part of the desire of the person to identify with the best models of human freedom and dignity.

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Chapter III

Socialism and Modern Civilization: Old "Idols" and New Realities

Vassil Vichev

"Truth is the daughter of time, not authority." Francis Bacon

The British philosopher, Francis Bacon, one of the forerunners of modern European philosophy wrote the idols of the human mind in order to explain the "true" and "false", the "objective" and "subjective" components of consciousness. His "purgative" propaedeutic to the doctrine of the method of cognition retains its relevance today as we must confront the difficult and unpleasant task of inventorying the ideological and theoretical legacy of the cold war, totalitarianism and command-and-administer socialism. The difficulties we are faced with arise not only from economic backwardness or the dire legacy of Stalinism, but also from the need resolutely to demolish the constructs of reasoning generated by that legacy.

A dialectical analysis of the new historical content of the world inevitably results in the formation of new world views. This requires a total break with old dogmas and stereotypes, and the establishment of a new coordinated system in the social and individual consciousness for evaluating the development of modern civilization. These sweeping qualitative changes are entering the "problem space" of social consciousness and with them come two fundamental ideas.

First, there is recognition that the contemporary world is a single integrated whole. Despite its contradictory character and the diversity of social forms of life, it constitutes a common civilization facing serious and hitherto unknown challenges caused by thermonuclear weapons and other increasingly pressing global problems. Socialism remains as an organic part of modern civilization. While remaining committed to social concern, it must work in cooperation and interaction with capitalism.

Second, according to recent thinking, universal human values are prior to all else. It is vital now to struggle for a world free of violence and wars, to recognize the legitimacy of social progress and related values, to seek dialogue and cooperation for the sake of the advancement and survival of civilization, and to realize a new world order based on a balance of interests.

Idols in Past Socialism

Many elements of the Marxist-Leninist world view are gone: class struggle, violence as a midwife for the birth of a new society; dictatorships directly based on violence,¹ that capitalist institutions must be destroyed and replaced by entirely new ones;² and state ownership as organically linked with the people of power. The greatest enemy of socialism was the unfounded, unscientific and sectarian-dogmatic attributes ascribed to it by authoritarian theory.

In many aspects the ideology associated with the life of the bureaucratic administrative system proved not only unscientific and non-dialectic, but also self-blinding. Instead of shaping independent convictions by indoctrinating consciousness, it generated a mistrust which made people skeptical about everything in textbooks and lectures, even useful and interesting

¹ Cf. A.N. Yakovlev, *Glorious Date in Human History*, *Pravda* (July 12, 1989), p. 2 (in Russian).

² Cf. O. Bogomilov, "The Changing Face of Socialism", *Komunist* (1989), p. 84 (in Russian).

information. The terms "communist world view", "ideological conviction", etc., came to be identified with ideas and formulations proclaimed ostentatiously "from above". The hallmark of this world view, cultivated by daily propaganda, proved to be intolerance of other world views, denial of the right to doubt, and class-based hatred which inevitably numbed not only the flair for scientific debate, but also man's moral conscience.

The human mind, said Francis Bacon, affords scope only to the will; in contrast, passions are prone to give subjective coloring to things and to be subservient to idols. Such idols as those of the Cave or of the Tribe express the capacity of the mind to extend the notions of "the little world" or "the tribe" to humanity in general; to consider them as the only truth; to suppose greater order and regularity in things than there actually are; to use fallacies and abstractions in which what is transient poses as being constant.

Common traditions, habits and upbringing form a peculiar cave (*Idols of the Cave*) of one's own which diffuses and distorts the light of nature.³ Now, in rebuilding we are becoming increasingly aware of how long we have been trapped in our own "cave", of how long we have been slaves to misconceptions. For years on end our social science has been developing in an "intellectual prison" walled in by dogmatic formulas, categories and rules which did not permit the infusion of knowledge. Any new pieces of information or different ways of thinking were seen as coming from the "alien" world and were measured according to the idol of the "cave": if they did not fit into the tribal "conceptual framework", they were branded as heresy or nonsense. It suffices to recall the fate of genetics, cybernetics, the theory of commodity-money relations, the attitude toward psychoanalysis and western studies of man: every new thought running counter to the "idols" was anathematized as idealistic thinking or ideological subversion.

The sectarian intolerance of dissent can be explained philosophically by a non-dialectic approach to the concrete, understood as an identity rather than as a unity of opposites, by the disruption of the dialectical unity of the theory and practice of abstract opposites and a disregard of the intermediate links between them. As G. Lukacs pointed out, the break of dialectical links resulted in an erroneous polarization in both theory and practice. At one pole, principles were turned from "directives for action" into dogmas; at the other pole, the quality of contradiction inherent in life processes seemed to disappear. This gave rise to two interrelated and false poles: dogmatism and pragmatism. The dogmatic-sectarian world view was unable theoretically to rationalize socialism. An example of this was manifested in Stalin's two mutually exclusive formulations, namely, steady escalation of class struggle and the almost immediate proximity of the second phase of socialism--communism.

Marx, Engels and Lenin proceeded from the fact that economic formations were complicated active systems, the essence of which could be revealed only by unravelling their key characteristics. In Stalin's view, general laws were trivial and incapable of producing any scientific explanation, but they could give some people the illusion that they already had the truth.⁴

Dogmatic subjectivism was incapable of turning practice into a touchstone of theory. Moreover, the dogmatic world view required that subjective dogmas should by all means be "confirmed" by real-life practice. But if confirming facts were not available in reality, subjective dogmas had to make tremendous efforts to create the false appearances that they did exist.

There came a growing self-critical awareness of the fact that the world view of several generations had been shaped under the influence of "developed Stalinism" which trifled with certain dogmas and inculcated intolerance of all except those truths deemed to be "the only correct

³ Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum, Works*, II (Moscow, 1972), 19 (in Russian).

⁴ "The Epistolary Heritage of G. Lukács", *Filosofskie Nauki* (no. 6, 1989), p. 104 (in Russian).

ones". Whoever had any doubts about the omnipotence of "that which alone was correct" was branded an enemy or revisionist. "The sole correct" dogma inevitably was personified by the leader, the authority: when there is only one correct view it can have but a single prophet. Thomas Mann wrote: "The totalitarian statesman is the founder of a religion or, to be more precise, of an infallible inquisitorial system of dogmas which, being based on legends, suppresses by violence any heresy and to which truth must ascetically submit."

It is well known that the emergence of Marxism was not unrelated to the advances of science, but that it developed as a result of the dialectical and materialistic elaborations of social science and natural history. Hence, it should not have been intolerant of other scientific positions. Unfortunately, the socialist principles proclaimed to be the sole correct ones were a maximally idealized single variant without a wide-ranging scientific discussion of alternatives and without sufficient proof. This not only led to intolerance of the latest achievements of science and social practice, but resulted in violence and repression.

One of the most persistent "idols" in the resulting social philosophy, organically related to the prevailing disregard of universal human values, was the absolutization of the broken continuity, the spiral course of historical process. It was stressed invariably that every new formation has an entirely different type of relation to production, a new superstructure which is the absolute negation of the previous one, etc. This absolutization was carried to extremes in evaluating the capitalist and the socialist mode of production. It ignored another equally important aspect of the actual historical process: the unity and continuity which unveils the nature of man in the course of his historical development.

A state committed to the rule of law could not be built under the dogmatic "idol" which proclaims that those people and social groups, who have not arrived at "proletarian virtues" and are still unaware of their "real" interests, should have a leader to "guide" them towards their future happiness. It is impossible to engage in free constructive discussions or to promote individual liberties if past or present cultural achievements are denied and if any new phenomenon in the field of art and culture is declared to be decadent just because it is "alien". We should not forget that such human acquisitions as constitutional states, civic rights and freedom of speech, will and religion were inherited from bourgeois society. Judging by historical experience, societies preserve the productive forces of the previous society and the achievements of its culture. In addition they preserve and seek to enrich all anthropological dimensions of man: physiological, psychological, emotional; and all the social institutions typical of a civilized society: law, family, education, art - in a word, all universal human values and goals.

A dogmatic understanding of the class-based approach led to serious errors and to the adoption as idols of oppositions imprinted in people's minds for decades: public vs individual interests, the future vs the present and the past, scientific thinking vs both everyday and religious consciousness, collectivism vs individualism, etc.

Theory and practice still underrated the problem of human individuality and the factors which de-individualize public life. The idolization of the collective "we" led to an invasion of the sovereignty of the "I", sapping the initiative and creativity needed for social progress. The result was mediocrity which was far more dangerous for intellectual development than intellectual excesses, because it obliterated quality.

Changes for the Future

The most important problem now is to decide which economic, social and psychological mechanisms give or can give man an impetus to engage actively in productive activity, i.e., an activity which will increase man's material and intellectual resources. It is precisely here, between "my" and "our", on the borderline between the personal and the public, between the material and the spiritual, that the most grave distortions, the most fatal delusions, the most painful and under-researched problems have built up and await new approaches and radical practical action.

Many dogmatic, self-blinding concepts and formulation concerning the personal profit motive, which is actually the basis and the primary source of labor and social activity, have had to be resolutely abandoned. Individual initiative and impulse, along with man's need for self-development and self-assertion, are the bases of production. The personal profit motive is neither an "anachronism" nor the inevitable antithesis of public interest. It is a constant driving force of human behavior which changes its content, develops and is enriched depending on the overall change of social relations, axiological systems and, above all, the nature of material production. There is no propulsion for development except on the basis of people's personal interests. The historic mission is to overcome the antagonism of interests, not to regimentalize or level them.

Under the bureaucratic administrative system, attacking egoism and individualism became a favorite sport. At the same time, conditions were created for parasitic manifestations disguised in generalities as extolling fraternity, justice and love for man in the abstract. Egoism was denounced as an immoral bourgeois habit. But it was never asked whether man could have a pronounced individuality if he is denied personal feelings, the right to an opinion, etc. A.I. Herzen said "of course people are egoists, because they are persons":

How could we be what we are if we are not fully aware of our own personality? To deprive man of his self-consciousness means to deprive him of his integrity and turn him into a mawkish, trite and spineless creature. We are all egoists, that is why we aspire for independence, prosperity, and recognition of our rights; that is why we long for love and seek action. We cannot deny these rights to others without obviously contradicting ourselves.⁵

The command system, while paying lip service to "universal altruism" and rigorous moral virtues, actually disregarded personal interests and wishes to mold the individual's singularity into a general impersonality beyond the control of the individual. Now the top priority has become to tap into the personal profit motive, to find ways or to use those tested by history to harmonize this motive with public controls, always subordinating it to the common interest. Lenin recognized that this had always been "the stumbling block" for socialist systems; in the end, it proved to be its Achilles' heel. Dogmatic and unscientific interpretations of this key problem led not only to mass alienation from labor and to wage levelling, but also to a disastrous de-individualization in public life, to mediocre levelling of education and culture, to hazardous unprofessionalism, to ostentatious "ideological principles" and to "collective idols" in productive, administrative, scientific and other sectors.

The following major macrosocial conditions stimulate productive activity and should reshape any renewal of socialism for a new society: diversity of forms and objects of ownership (state, cooperative, private, mixed) along with wide-ranging diversification of all social structures on this basis; realistic economic relations with equivalent commodity exchanges, market regulators and competition; active participation in the international division of labor; establishment of a civil society with guaranteed free expression of different interests, a state committed to the rule of law, and the enjoyment of political pluralism and intellectual freedom. This requires also a total break with all bureaucratic administrative methods of management and a broader use of the achievement

⁵ A. I. Herzen, *Collected Works*, (Sofia, 1955), p. 376 (in Russian).

of universal civilization than that made by capitalism, adding to market mechanism the law of value, democracy, civil society, etc.

The battle against market economy and commodity-money relations fought under the banner of a "pure" class-based approach inevitably led to brinkmanship, to abridgment of individual rights, to degrading human dignity, and to giving the command-and-administer apparatus absolute power. It is necessary also to destroy the "idol" of unending "sacrifices" on which socialist theory has been constantly insisting for the sake of "the bright future". Even human desires as natural as those for an increase in material wealth, better housing, better appliances, etc., have been considered a philistine, "bourgeois" anachronism.

The misconceived and deified socialist image-of-the-future inevitably resulted in skepticism about the present, in neglect of all immediate concerns and vital human values. The unrealistic propaganda of the communist ideal had an opposite and negative effect on human consciousness; it diverted people from their daily meaningful work, turned all reform into an end in itself, broke the links between past and present, and deprived people of any sound and stable criterion for good and evil.

In actual fact, there is nothing "super historical" about the communist ideal as professed by Engels. "It means creating living conditions for all people under which man will be given the opportunity freely to develop his human nature, to maintain decent relations with his fellow men and to live without fear that his welfare could be forcibly destroyed." Leaving aside any elements of utopianism and ethical perfectionism, along with any manifestations of negativism and skepticism, a realistic analysis should be made of the real place and the effect which the law of value has on the moral life of society. First, commodity-money relations are an objective economic and social reality which could not be abolished by decree, just as physical or chemical laws could not be invalidated. Indeed, if wrongly applied they inflict not only ecological, but also moral damage on society. The market place and its inherent economic laws are an objective regulatory mechanism which develops along with the advancement of civilization. Second, the existing alienation from labor was a product of the dogmatic theory and practice that personal interests are always self-seeking and egoistic, and therefore should be entirely subordinated to the interests of the state. Their "depersonalization" led to apathy and lack of motivation; in the final analysis they undermined public interests. Moral values exist and operate in a concrete historical and cultural context; they are not suspended in midair.

Redevelopment does not replace morality with economic efficiency, but reveals that inefficiency, mismanagement and professional incompetence inflict not only economic, but moral damage on society. In each nation and society there always are people of differing competence, professional skills and abilities. Things decline when incompetence is no longer regarded as a disgrace, and social morality accepts it as natural. Unfortunately, the command-and-administer system, egalitarianism and the other serious "defects" of the old model of socialism inevitably "legitimized" and "exonerated" professional dilettantism. They did not guarantee or protect "the law of the craftsman" but, on the contrary, encouraged "pulling strings and lenience" in appointments and job grading.

The identification of duty and good solely with subordination to state interests inevitably alienates the personal interests and inclination of the laborer; it strips them of moral meaning when they should have been strengthened. Duty severed from personal drive or impetus is stillborn, unproductive and excluded from man's private life. In reality, true impetus has the moral element of duty, and each duty presupposes the presence of drive, affection, and "personal meaning". Morality would be powerless if it were merely represented and protected as an invisible

"intellectual policeman", a kind of abstract "no man's" interest, which required only subordination, restriction and disregard of personal interests in the name of some "ultimate objectives".

In the theory and practice of individual interest, freedom, independence and enterprise must be addressed in a new way. The terms "interest", "success", "prestige", "career", etc., are not an anachronism or forced departure from "noble ideals", but a vital condition for the achievement of a high quality of labor, efficiency, initiative and creativity. Man cannot adopt a socially useful orientation if he is not proud of his professional work, lacks the courage to take risks and act independently in his work, or cannot put his skills and talents to good use.

Bureaucratic conformism, sycophancy, worship of higher ranks, fear and toadyism must be replaced by a self-awareness which will help one reveal one's own potential and defend intrinsic human values and rights. A person who defends his interests, who has a heightened sense of honor and dignity is more capable of the cooperation and action which depend not on instructions given "from above", but upon real individuality.

Conclusion

Since the changes of '89, people have not radically rejected socialism, but have shown some electoral preference for those who profess to promote its social ideals and concerns while eliminating their reduction to the idols which Bacon rightly observed must be removed if progress is to be made. It is essential then to identify such idols and to make clear how they are to be removed and the principles of human conduct by which they are to be replaced.

The "idolatry" referred to was a product of the dogmatization of Marxism; it varied directly with the extent to which society operated along command-and-administer lines. Freedom of thought was restricted and an authoritarian style of thinking took hold. Blind obedience to authority supplanted thinking for oneself and forced one to conform to "the sole truth" formulated by authority. The top level in the bureaucratic hierarchy held the monopoly on truths and moral evaluations; the lower ranks took authoritarian formulas for granted and demonstrated their loyalty. This hierarchy of consciousness was caused not only by an innate "slave psychology" on the part of the people, but was deeply rooted in the estrangement between the "lower" and "higher" levels in the social pyramid and in the absence of democratic institutions.

The authoritarian consciousness made a cult of the leader's personality. It idolized texts, formulas and slogans not as orientations for life, but as oaths of allegiance and incantations for toeing-the-line. Dogmatists appreciate only texts which have an authoritarian blessing; they worship "the letter" of theory and turn every living thought into lifeless formulae.

The rebuilding of society requires a decisive attempt to eradicate dogmatism and parasitism not only from the economy but also from the people's consciousness. The values and ideals of "so-called" real socialism should therefore be cleansed of all totalitarian and authoritarian holdovers which paralyze man's creative powers and check the progress of society as an integral part of modern civilization.

Part II
Values and Public Life

Chapter IV

Moral Values and the Post-Communist Person

Kiril Neshev

Democratization of any post-totalitarian society would be impossible without radical changes in the social role and function of morality in educating and molding the person. In a way, the process of democratization is above all a change in the realm of moral values, moral criteria and moral estimation of the individual and society. In the sphere of moral culture this transformation is represented by a reevaluation of the place and importance of moral values in the construction of society thus far, an evaluation of the future, and a discovery of the correlations of such important moral and social categories as society, person and justice.

Here the problem of the democratization of our society has a central place. Democratization itself is closely linked to the search for a new position of the person with respect to human rights and dignity, and with the guarantees for adequate personal realization. Hence, the person has proven to be the major and fundamental "problem topic" of the democratic processes in our country. Morality as an evaluative study of man should give expression to these main trends of democratization; it should manifest the basic parameters for the rationalization of the changes taking place and of the search for an adequate place for everything concerning the human being.

Past Inhibitions

To begin with, a distinction arose between the outmoded, unrealistic normative model and the actual morality of society. Many norms, values and goals, though still unattained but desirable and promising, were declared achieved in our social reality; reality was substituted by what was desired. According to the model of morality described above, the realities of crime, corruption, bureaucracy, social inequality and many other phenomena were considered non-existent. Morality seemed to lose its critical function, while the normative model with its prescriptions for appropriate consciousness and behavior clouded not only the study, but the very existence of true morality in society. In many respects non-actual problems, varnished reality, insincerity, a one-sided stress upon certain results and achievements turned morality and its values into a function of utopianism. This resulted in stagnation and estrangement from real moral problems and the tasks of moral education, in moving away from reality and losing touch with contradictions and conflicts. The moral contradictions and the moral problems were resolved only verbally; as often as not this was done in the spirit of a happy-ending film. In the process true morality was dissociated from its evaluative and educative function; its purpose in most cases was to sing the praises of certain alleged achievements, e.g., the myth of the "harmoniously developed personality".

In many regards morality all but lost its independent character and was subjected to intensive ideologizing and politicizing. Moral values acquired an instrumental and applied character; they related to the performance of a task instead of revealing the principles and the phenomena of the development of true morality. That fact found expression in the practice of proclaiming political truths and aims to be moral values and moral ideals. In this way politics began to appropriate the social functions of ethics and a strong politicizing of ethics stood in the way of isolating specific moral criteria. Without doubt, morality as a function and as a value should be set apart from politics; it must recover its universal criteria of good and evil, of just and unjust, of right and

wrong. Of course, the process of eliminating the political elements as a basic evaluative context could not yield instant results. A sufficiently long period of time will be needed for the social and individual moral consciousnesses to restore universal and national traditions as criteria.

The strong politicizing of morality reflected mainly its treatment as a particular social instrument for achieving aims and ideals, the latter having above all a class significance that bred alienation among people. The instrumental character of morality saw it as a means of reaching a "bright future", with obscure horizons and an unspecified program. A moral criterion was considered to be "all that" helps to strengthen the position of a certain social order, to enforce a particular class truth. This attitude not only limited the function of morality as a social phenomenon, as a propagator of moral values, and as a criterion of thoughts, feelings, actions. It was directed above all against the person *per se*, as a value and a goal of social progress. The devaluation of individual moral values is one of the greatest damages inflicted by the normative model on morality in our former "socialist" society. Thus the illusion was created that only one truth could possibly exist, namely, that appropriated by one ideology and that it is valid absolutely for everybody, most of all for future society and future people. In this way the doubts, the struggle of contradictory ideas, the individuality of each one simply disappeared. A logical consequence of this absolutization of the future and of the "sole ideal" proved to be moral alienation among people. Neither ideal nor relativized values, nor appeal for the common and the collective could hide the absence of moral criteria in themselves or of true personal moral value.

The stultifying of human life and of individual biography is the best proof of social and moral alienation, for how could we strive for the sense of human life without personal presence, universal values, moral equality and justice? How could we strive for the sense of human life if there is no differentiation between individual human paths towards universal value, or if such movements of conscience as compassion, repentance, and sympathy did not exist? Moral alienation is a result of the omnipotence and monopoly of an instrumental model as all-embracing, imposed by force, and therefore breeding fear. Levelling in payment and labor, violence in political life and the relativization of moral values--these are the true roots of the moral alienation of people in our society. The visible sides of this alienation are rudeness, indifference, apathy and cruelty, because the distraction of old and proven traditional means gave birth not only to a spiritual vacuum, but also to the forced introduction of values and norms which do not correspond to the real social conditions in our society.

A second characteristic feature important for understanding the socialist normative model of morality is that it presupposes an untrue, distorted interrelation between personal and public interests, between the person and society. It is reckoned that public and personal interests ought to coincide, that morality ought to express first of all a "total" or approximate coincidence of public and personal interests. Actually, whatever the circumstances, personal interest flawlessly and categorically conformed to the public interest, as the latter was not clearly defined theoretically while in practice often it represented the interests of a particular group, of the administrative-bureaucratic machinery or simply of an upstart official and his henchmen. The flawed dialectic between public and personal interests caused damage which affected the attitude of the socialist worker towards state property, labor stimulae and the value of labor itself.

State property in many aspects proved to belong to "nobody". As public property it actually had no particular owner and was available to everyone. This stimulated embezzlers, people not only unconscionable but "enterprising" enough to serve only their personal interests. A socio-moral paradox appeared: the existence of "no one's" property stimulated consumer attitudes. The embezzling and use of state property for personal goals, rather than its being managed,

preserved or developed, became a source of personal gain. Now the restoration of different forms of property--collective, cooperative, municipal, personal and private--makes it possible to react more adequately to contemporary conditions and circumstances without emphasizing or favoring only one of the forms, such as state property. Thus a flexible, grounded and balanced attitude of the working man towards state property could be developed and the ambition to profit from the state property could be terminated by creating the attitude of an owner which changes the consciousness of the worker and provides a different stimulus and meaning for his effort.

Incentive. The stimulæ to work could not serve their purpose. Often they were based on a deficit in labor reserves and an increase of production funds. Thus, labor stimulæ were marked by levelling: no matter at what one worked, how one worked or what effort one made, one received the same payment as the careless, undisciplined or lazy. Wages were guaranteed regardless of the quantity and, most of all, of the quality of labor. The general feeling reflected the widespread view that social justice meant equal payment for unequal labor. This affected mainly the conscientious workers and qualified specialists. Finally, it had an unfavorable impact on professionalism in the different spheres of labor. The guarantee of an equal right to work should not mean equal payment for unequal labor. The levelling tendencies, both as a psychology and as a morality, contributed a great deal to ignoring the stimulæ from a just inequality in payment. The moral damage from levelling affected even the main principle of socialism, namely, the value of labor itself as a central pillar of the socialist way of life.

Work. Thus labor lost some of its most characteristically attractive aspects for the socialist man. In many respects it melted into idleness and uncertainty, and encouragement of quick and easy profit. Preferences for lucrative types of work, mainly in the service sphere, increased sharply. Whence came these results, especially as morality could not be imagined without labor as a fundamental moral value?

Obviously, the relationship between labor and morality changed through the years so that they cannot always be defined one by the other: labor is not always a matter of morality, nor is morality based on labor. This gap between morality and labor is also one of the results of the normative model of morality. The devaluation of labor in our case is due to a number of factors: oversights in education, beginning with family upbringing; negligence in the creation of working habits; changes in the style of living; and preferences for intellectual work. Most important are the still unsettled problems of stimulæ, namely, the low payment in some professions of great social importance, levelling, the decreased responsibility and work discipline, the alienation from property and labor.

The person. In the third place, the normative model of morality affected the moral image of the person as well as the assessment of personal roles in the further development of democracy. The basic social unit for the development of morality was the collective body, and collectivism became a moral principle. But the collective body and the collective spirit quite often ignored individual differences and the formation of personality and of persons richly unique whose opinions are not always alike. Thus, collectivism sometimes proved to be a hindrance to a pluralism of views; it preached unanimous consensus which often imperiously impeded points of view and ideas of great social importance and moral significance. Thus the personal right to one's own point of view, different from that of the collective body, was not guaranteed. Another fault could be traced to identifying individuality and personal uniqueness with individualism: the

individual lost many of his rights as a moral agent such as the guaranteed right to make a choice and even to be mistaken in that choice. There could be no harmonious and well-functioning collectivity without the existence and the activity of strong, versatile individualities, of personalities with individual opinions, prepared to back them no matter what the circumstances or the opposition.

Sociality as a feeling and as a moral principle becomes pointless without a diversity of views and the conflict of different ideas. This should be a moral way of resolving conflicts aimed at the development of all people and of each person.

That is why in the process of renovation moral values also mean a search for the moral truth for all phenomena and for an adequate expression for those values concerning the person. Social recognition and individual self-realization are most important in the process of change and renewal. Change in social structures, democratization and pluralism, development of forms of property and the search for adequate stimulæ can be aimed at only one goal, namely, the progress of the person.

The moral values for renewal originate both spontaneously and as theoretical generalizations in the science of morality through studying the development of moral regulation, the struggle between good and evil, and the growth and dynamics of a social mentality and of concepts about social progress. Renewal values develop democratically, for they are a continuation of the best achievements of the past, an application of universal and national ideals, and a criticism of what has already occurred.

Moral Values for the Future

Universal Moral Values

Moral values reflect the pressing needs of development in the form of ideals or goals which act as a stimulus and motive for action and evaluative criteria for consciousness and behavior, views and deeds. Moral values are a lived unity between consciousness and behavior; they are a lived realization of ideals. Hence, they are complex, socially determined ideas, and reflect a need in the development of society for personal choice directing the active participation of the personality. The real existence of moral values is impossible without persons and personal choice, attitudes and activity in response to the processes taking place in society. That is why moral values always have reflected the degree of social freedom embodied in the individual conduct of each one of us--for moral values always presuppose a personal concern or attitude. Personal commitment on the part of the individual is proof of the social reliability and significance of moral values. At the same time, moral values are the humanitarian expression of social truths at a certain stage in the historical development of the society.

Because of that, moral values act as a barometer of the level of personal interest in social renovation in all spheres of social life. Nowadays, traditional virtues and merits are being reassessed, thereby revealing new dimensions, claiming new places in the moral structure of society and new interrelations with social needs and interests.

Universal values represent the achievements of the world's moral culture, a generalized social experience concerning the nature of man and his existence. These values acquire great and crucial importance in this age of global problems, when the questions about peace and war, about ecological danger, hunger and demographic growth, about life and the rights of man must be settled in every part of the planet. Universal values guarantee and reflect the rights of man, the respect for

human dignity, solidarity, and sympathy, compassion and defence of children, older people and women. The preservation of peace, the search for common goals and the interests of humankind--regardless of ideology, religion or view of life, regardless of the color of skin and social status--constitute the most important dimensions of universal values. Thus, we could divide universal values into two large classes:

--those which deal with the preservation of peace, of nature, etc., which concern all peoples and turn the latter into co-masters of one united home;

--those that concern the individual and the guarantees of the personal rights of freedom, choice, work, religion, etc.

Universal human values are closely linked with human freedom. What is more, they are both a starting point and a result of a centuries- old social experience; they are the achievements of a world culture which makes possible the existence of morality, moral choice and moral criteria. This is the great, concept-forming significance of universal human values--without them a truly moral person would be impossible.

However, another problem of a theoretically applied nature is of great importance: if universal human values do not represent by themselves a universal moral criterion, then the "point" of responsibility disappears: moral values and goals are relativized and acquire an instrumental character. But universal human values are an abstract achievement of human experience and human thought. Their application requires a situational consideration, appropriate compromises, and tolerant dialogue when views do not coincide. It is true that universal human values should not and must not be imposed by force; indeed, they are opposed to force. But it is also the truth that they should be asserted in every day actions and practices of the individual as well as of the larger communities which often differ in customs, traditions and manners, in ethnic self-consciousness, religious beliefs, and political parties.

Although universal human values are the sole and constant criterion of morality, if they are not realized in deeds and actions, they will remain just a wish alienated from education, culture and history. They are called upon to make people equal in terms of justice, compassion and sympathy, namely, morality. Universal human values are a true guarantee for freedom. They are not only an appeal and a call, but a real means for the recognition of human freedom, human rights, human conscience and faith.

Universal human values are of extreme importance not only because they are one more proof of lasting force of humanism, but also because they add new value and dimensions to morality in society. The issue is how to find a more adequate way to express the values which have originated in the ancient history of mankind.

Universal human values today represent the transcendent principles that guard, preserve and help the progress of human life. The unity and uniqueness of humankind are their source. Nowadays it is hard to imagine nations separated from one another by impenetrable walls, or free from the ecological menace or the negative "echoes" of scientific-technological progress, or who would direct the fate of other nations. What is most important, man and his right to work, his beliefs, freedom and progress, are the core of the contemporary concept for universal values. Love of mankind is today the universal value; the individual and mankind are the two indispensable poles of this value which reveal the simplicity and greatness of morality.

Marxist ethics has taught that universal values possess an historical origin and nature. Quite often they have proven to be the form of appearance of values with a social context or a call for

their realization through a revolution. Universal values manifest the independence of morality, not the other way round. This fact explains the great need for universal values today, the social interest in them, as well as the need to proclaim these values as the supreme criterion of moral norms and ideals. The social core of morality calls attention to them.

These are the first and most general reasons for the existence of morality in certain social circumstances. It is as if morality reveals the already forgotten values which marked its appearance in the far removed prehistoric ages. Love of mankind, respect and esteem for human life, human dignity and honor, personal rights and freedom, and personality as a social and moral value constitute the--not long, but rich--list of universal values which could not be distinguished from morality. Morality could not develop if it did not reflect and realize universal values.

Compassion

To define compassion, most probably we should look for its source in our relations with other persons. The other, however, is in a peculiar situation of every day needs, tensions, discomforts or conflicts. He needs, obviously, not only compassion and sympathy, but definite and active help: here and now, and, if possible, immediately. That is why compassion actually combines the features of kindness, sympathy and co-understanding. These are all feelings and elements of empathy and sympathy without which the civilized person, civilized society, and spirituality as a practical presence of culture among us would not be possible.

For a "classification" of compassion as regards its degree of social activity we could approach it as both social and personal: social insofar as without the support and stimulæ of the community it would not be possible, and personal insofar as without our individual participation it could not be realized. From a social point of view it is of the utmost importance to encourage compassion, which depends on us, with our renovated and renovating consciousness. Not long ago, even professional ethicists held that compassion could not be a virtue for it was based on pity and sympathy, and those who offered pity and sympathy to other people were thought to demonstrate superiority and haughtiness. Thus, compassion was argued to be a disguised form of superiority among people. Today, this absurd moral argument has proved in practice its shortcomings. It is obvious that a lack of compassion within the gamut of our human interrelations actually gave way to rudeness, cruelty and disrespect for human dignity. Compassion is a personal virtue, not because it demonstrates any superiority over another human being through offering help and attention, but because in this way the moral person defends a right and duty of human communication with another person; human beings thus manifest moral equality in love of mankind. Compassion does not turn one into an "agent" of mutual help, but into the moral creator of ethical equality as a right.

Compassion is a traditional universal moral and cultural virtue: a specific unity of motive and deeds, of choice and action. That is why only the morally free person could offer compassion, for the conduct of the compassionate person reveals a specific moral power, helping the other and linking with the anxiety, tension and misfortune of the other. What is given to the other is not only respect for his well-being, but most of all for his need, although this is often a misfortune, failure or unhappiness.

Compassion is not an innate human feature; we achieve it through education and upbringing. Of course, this education is based on that initial kindness which reveals itself in human interrelations and guarantees the sincere, undisguised and trusting "temperature" of communication. Goodness and kindness provide compassion and nourish its growth. Compassion,

however, also contains elements of behavior that is due, for it takes into consideration the imperative forms of duty, without which it would remain empty.

Unfortunately, the time when compassion will be an inalienable characteristic of our way of life still is not near. We should not believe that we could reach this higher moral virtue merely by appeals and slogans. It is imperative that here, as in all socio-cultural initiatives, we teach ourselves to communicate with other persons. The renovation of traditional Bulgarian virtues such as good will, neighborliness, mutual help, trust, and respect of the other person are sources of compassion in every day life. What counts most are not the deeds only, but the long lasting value attitude. This is especially so when it comes to evaluating the people around us, because compassion itself acts as a kind of universal reflex marking the most important element, namely, respect for human dignity.

Tradition and Custom

National values reflect the centuries-long social experience of Bulgarians in all spheres of everyday life. They are traditional values which identify the Bulgarian people as an original social community, manifesting its authenticity and distinctiveness among other nations by its customs and manners. National values reveal the unity of a nation, its ethnic self-consciousness, moral virtues and characteristics, as grounding its continuity through generations. Thus, national moral values guarantee at one and the same time the continuity between the different generations of Bulgarians, the present unity of our people and the future of our nation. National values are elements of every day consciousness and communication; they constitute a specific behavioral culture and consist of customs, traditions, manners, and love of one's country.

The sphere of application of customs is quite large. In a specific way they "legitimate" those positive elements of social experience which make possible the unity between the individual and the social community; they are the means for the incorporation and identification of the individual within the national community. They have been assimilated and turned into everyday habits of conduct, which constitute a distinguishing feature of the ethnic community. In a specific way customs integrate recurring elements of the working and everyday life of the collective body, group or community, and constitute a perduring stable link between daily actions. That is why continuity in customs is of the utmost importance to the community.

Tradition itself is an active reflection upon the everyday relations between people in the social community; it constitutes a recurring view of life which gives a general orientation to behavior. Thus, tradition helps education and strengthens the community; it helps respond to new creative needs by drawing on the collective experience of past generations; it is a specific way of developing human culture by employing customs as a basis for participating and acting in the social community. Customs and traditions are at the base of the widespread, spontaneous and non-formal influence on the individual which marks the beginning of one's socialization. Customs are the common means of everyday communication between people, which informational exchange is of social importance; tradition is the generally accepted, widespread, compulsory form of specific communication between generations. Through them, communication as interrelation and interaction between people becomes intelligible for different generations as well as for members of the same generation.

Morals (*mores*) are "designs" for action as well--they outline the forms of human conduct which function in a particular society and are subjected to moral evaluation. The core of *mores* is the characteristic value system of the society in terms of which some actions are considered to be

of particular importance. This is generalized in norms, which guarantee that they be taken into account. *Mores* (morals) then are the characteristic accepted values of the community; they settle relations whose main criteria are human dignity, honesty and fairness--not in words, but in deeds. As a social institution, satisfying mostly the requirements for stability, perdurance and continuity in the interactions between people, customs, traditions and *mores*(morals) participate in the process of change and development of the community. The new interests which turn into well-defined goals people require enforce changes in the communication network constituted by customs, traditions and *mores*.

The process of democratization in a country's customs affects traditions and *mores* (morals). On the one hand, there is a process of actualizing more or less forgotten customs and traditions; on the other hand, there appear new customs and traditions, corresponding to the spiritual potential of the society.

Traditional Bulgarian virtues such as diligence, hospitality, honesty, good will, fairness, and trust gather new value meaning today in the new conditions of social change. Diligence has lost some of its old features as motivation for a flawless and unselfish drive for work. Instead, nowadays, one needs progress and certification as regards one's qualifications, social recognition and suitably high payment for job satisfaction. The contemporary Bulgarian refuses to work for the sake of the work itself, but takes into account its results with regard to the workers, their families, and their social status.

Certain changes are observed also as regards hospitality; this has become selective, with preferences being given to friends and relatives. Honesty, faithfulness and fidelity with regard to one's word of honor are also changing and in ways which are not always for the better. In the complex conditions of contemporary work and the anonymous mode of contemporary life the traditional Bulgarian virtue of truthfulness changes into a certain confidence found mainly among a definite circle of friends and relatives, but not socially. The same changes are observed as regards trust in man, in our compatriot, in our colleague, whose personal dignity should be accepted and respected without preliminary conditions and doubts.

These changes in traditional characteristics and virtues seem to be due to a decline in paternal morality, to the loss of the moral authority of older persons, and to the fact that new value relations between people have not yet been established.

The Bulgarian people, however, possess other traditions in which they take pride: the centuries-old feeling of social freedom and justice, of equality and dignity. These traditional values have guided Bulgarians during their complicated and dramatic history; quite often they have been the only moral grounds for hope and faith in the future. They gave birth to kindness and to feelings of equality, mutual help and compassion in personal relationships. These values have been adopted by all Bulgarians no matter what their religion. Today the unity of the Bulgarian people is gaining enormous ideological and patriotic significance. This should not depend only upon religious affiliation, but should develop national ethnic self-consciousness which flawlessly reflects a moral-value dimension.

There are three ways of identification of the individual with the national community: nihilism, patriotism and nationalism. Nihilism is the negation of national values by the person, while nationalism demeans the achievements of other nations and countries. Though ancient, patriotism nevertheless represents the contemporary sense of personal belonging to a national community, while the person himself preserves his or her own self-identity. In feeling and practice, as a conscious value attitude towards the community, patriotism does not transform people into a

faceless and nameless mob. By definition, in respecting the dignity of one's own nation it includes a respectful attitude towards other peoples and excludes fanaticism.

All this turns patriotism into a universal value which recognizes the achievements of its own people as compatible to those of other nations. Patriotism as consciousness, feeling and practice has four layers: emotional, in that it reflects an attachment to one's native place, to all that has created us as the persons we are; moral, in that it manifests attachment to our homeland, the feeling of co-belonging with a community of people; operative, in that it reveals unity in active co-participation in the enterprises of the people and the nation; and ideological, in that it consists of such main values as a social and national ideal, continuity of tradition, dignity, the basic virtues, and a critical attitude towards past, present, and future. Patriotism is the main value attitude towards the national community; it is both the way and the means for the formation of the person in freely adopting the achievements of his or her people.

In search of a highly effective patriotic education we should direct our efforts to the development of the person, for only one who is truly personal is able to think for himself, to be immune to suggestion and to ignore both nihilism and nationalism. Young people are particularly susceptible to patriotic feelings; but to morally enhance their convictions, they should know the truth about their national history, its recent past and the present. Only on the basis of those truths can a national ideal become the goal and purpose of one's individual life.

Discipline

Today more than ever, discipline in work proves to be the criterion of our attitude towards society, towards daily duties and towards increasing the quantity and quality of our efforts. Attention is focused now on the quality of production, which presupposes an appropriate organization of the productive process and a strict adherence to agreements and to realizing a plan. Discipline is basic for the complex interrelations between companies and working teams. This is not only subordination to regulations, technology and the inner organization of the working space; most of all it represents one's personal rational and motivated attitude toward these. In the process of renovation, work continues to be the foundation of the way of life, and discipline in work is one of the criteria for the development of a person.

Discipline, however, means not only work but also civil order: security and peace of mind in our towns and villages and in public places. This element of social discipline shows that legality and the requirements of jurisprudence are inherent to the norms and values of morality; social discipline as a moral requirement is without doubt one of the characteristic features of democracy.

The human person is the general goal and core of our development. The goal of an harmoniously and universally developed person requires an evaluation of the conditions for its formation, development, and prospects for self-realization. The person should not be torn between deeds and thought; the gap between words and deeds, promises and real achievements, equality and privilege is one of the reasons for hypocrisy and inertia, for the widespread moral mistrust and alienation between people, and for the rudeness and even aggressiveness in our daily relations, in strong contrast to the theoretical professions of the harmoniously and universally developed person. The person today is formed and educated in social conditions characterized by contradictions and negative phenomena which push us backwards and downwards, humiliate and alienate us. The person who accepts the challenge to fight against all of this is himself a creator within these circumstances as well as a subject of moral activity characteristic of a future democracy. That person is bound by universal values.

Equality and personhood are the core problems of contemporary morality. What is the sense of a personal equality from a moral standpoint, and why, therefore, should persons not be levelled? From a moral point of view persons are equal in their capacity for the realization of the good and just; they are equal in responsibility for actual deeds and actions; they are equal as objects of evaluation, and equal in the face of the requirements of universal values and conscience. Only in this sense are persons considered equal. But from here begin the differences which clearly and categorically divide us into heroes and common people. People are not equal according to their moral power, moral conviction, moral stability and trustworthiness; this is the crucial moral problem for all times and peoples. This does not mean that we should condemn people by putting them beforehand into categories and classes. Persons are morally equal because all possess rights and freedom, and all are addressed by certain moral duties. The recognition and realization of these obvious universal facts is one of the great achievements of democratization in our time.

Today, freedom and democratic equality are the great social and moral hopes for better and more secure guarantees of our human nature and existence. The psychology of freedom and equality, which is found everywhere in our renovating society, reflects principles and norms of a legal state and social guarantees, but also of social differentiation and justifiable inequality. Henceforward, Bulgarian society will develop new moral concepts which originate from concrete forms of the universal values and their accepted criteria of good and evil, just and unjust, regarding persons and society.

Chapter V

Moral Values and Social Relations: The Objectivity of Values

Dimitar Georgiev

Values emerge as objectifications of social relations, but as Marx put it in his Paris Manuscripts of 1844, as values, they exist for man only when he transforms them through actions which unleash one's versatile abilities or essential forces.¹

Human action is in a sense a continuous "assimilation" of lesser forms of being into the world of human relations. Here purely physical actions, chemical substances, living organisms--independently of their nature--become suddenly "loaded" or "overgrown" and move into subjective human ties. As natural objects are humanized and woven into social relations a world of animated objects is born.² This is particularly manifest in the present context of social upheavals, computer information and scientific revolutions.

Humanity draws into this active social interaction ever more remote areas of "pure" nature, thus continuously extending the internal and external boundaries of human beings, and reaching even to outer space. This aspect of the subjectivization and socialization of objective realities presents us with one aspect of values, namely, the capacity of external objects to be bearers of value relations as they are burdened by social meaning.³

There is yet another and opposite tendency in this interaction with nature, namely, the objectivization of mental activities or consciousness. This objectivization of the ideal or subjective image is a universal ability of the human spirit: certain human ideas are objectified in social objects, while others, such as, moral ideas, are objectified in the social behavior of persons. The world of values is both humanized external reality and human ideas objectified in social behavior. This unity of external and internal was understood by Hegel and Marx to be not a dead identity, but one of dialectical opposition, engendered by being and copied in reality. The opposition is always temporary and continually conditions and supposes itself.

From this point of view value, including moral value, is the subjective moment of the human being in each social relation; it contains in itself the unity of man with the world of other people and hence with the entire external world. Value then is to be the essence of man projected in other men and in social relations. This crystallization of action as maturing and being realized here and now while never being realized completely is one of the secrets of the elusive essence of values. In them man's capacity for self-realization and self-discovery are actualized across the spectrum of probable actions. In this sense values are a social measure of the free and unlimited self-development of man.

Normative knowledge is related to value relations. Knowledge of objective interdependence and its human meaning form two organically connected layers of human awareness. People undertake an infinite number of multifaceted qualitative interactions and are in touch with a boundless series of processes and phenomena. This activity requires intellectual discovery of an

¹ K. Marx, *Economic, Philosophical Manuscripts 1844* Marx and Engels from early works (Moscow, 1956), p. 566.

² O.G. Drobnitsky, *World of Revived Things* (Moscow, 1967), p. 311.

³ V. Prodanov, *Ethics and Values in Human Life* (1986), p. 14.

ever deeper sense of the nature and interrelations of uniquely individual events. This is the object of the systematic intellectual effort aimed at reaching the essence of things.

However, the social activity of man does not need the "entire result" of an intellectual grasp of the world. An auxiliary apparatus of assessments, rules, methods, and practical consequences is built up through logical and imaginative ideal reflection. Essential elements of intellectual content regarding the object fall away for a longer or shorter period from the theoretical, imaginative, abstract and symbolic "image of the world". Thus, a system of fixed meanings and formal rules for practical action is worked out on the basis of an abstract logical "model of the world".

People turn back to this time and again because of the need to reproduce their individual being in a relatively stable framework of time, space, substance and process. But the content of knowledge is never used in full as that is neither necessary nor socially justifiable. Rather, the content is shrunk, "socially encoded" in assessments, rules, norms, and prescriptions, which "retain" only definite results, while reproducing neither all the content nor the process of past intellectual discovery.

This is so for two important reasons. Social interactions are impossible without "personification" of social relations, which always unfold in a vortex of multiple personal interests and needs, where there takes place an infinite interweaving of subjective aims, personal plans and intentions. On the other hand, in society there circulates a huge river of knowledge which one must continually maintain at an optimum level, sift out and reprocess in order to facilitate action. Because part of this knowledge with its full descriptive content is not needed for every action, it is necessary to sift out only those aspects which are "meaningful" in this context, thus consistently crystallizing purely operational, functional and active ideas. In this way the social object, the human relation, the intellectual capacity, and the moral or scientific idea combine to form a value which accumulates the most general meaning and the strongest pragmatic messages.

Values are connected to the practical intellectual realization of relatively closed circuits of human interrelations, with social components and processes which function in a slightly modified form in other social situations. The cyclical nature and stereotype are "caught" or set by the value orientation in order to simplify, minimize and increase the effectiveness of human actions. This engenders opportunities for the unification of social actions in social environments of the same type, for reduction of the time interval, and for "extension" of the social space of activity.⁴

In sum, this approach to the analysis of moral values in the field of social relations opens up the following possibilities for the philosophic analysis of moral values:

- to study value as an intellectual measure of the free action of man through his orientation in the cyclical, stereotypical and reflexive social activity;
- to study values as social relations "caught" in a state of "personification" when the anonymous and impersonal social processes turn it into a unique destiny for the individual;
- to study the leap, as yet unexplained theoretically, from cognitive-descriptive to value-normative reflection, i.e., the constitution as values of what is relatively uniform and, at least for the time being, immutable in social experience.

This is of special importance in view of the fact that modern societies are subjected to the action of contradictory, and sometimes harmful, tendencies toward intensification of the conflict between creativity and freedom, on one hand, and stereotyped social unification, on the other. Due to other forces and conflicts, the antinomies of value and creativity, of norm and freedom and the

⁴ M. Marinova, *Values and Social Innovations* (1989), pp. 108-133.

like are now regaining the importance for intellectual life and philosophic studies which they had in the time of Kant and Hegel, of Feuerbach and Marx.

Chapter VI

Values and Social Innovations in the Contemporary World

Maxim Lazarov

Social development is realized in the form of certain social innovations. In the process, one of the most delicate moments related to the state and the human factor is the impact of the innovations upon the system of values found in society and in persons. Conversely, the spread of social innovations has an impact upon the conduct of a people. In this sense, the success of a certain social innovation depends not only on its pragmatic benefits, but also on its adoption by the existing value system as perceived by the general consciousness. Hence, a study of the establishment of this system promises to provide clues to the origin and behavior of many moral and psychological barriers which stand in the way of social innovations.

Structural Layers

In speaking about the relationship between values and innovations, we must keep in mind first of all the "layered" structure of what we call a value system. In each such system three comparatively isolated levels of values can be distinguished: the instrumental, the terminal, and the universal. To the instrumental level belong the so-called ends and means, which are related mainly to the activity and problems of everyday life. Terminal values result from goal-oriented activity as a whole, and are related to moral norms of conduct and ways of living. Humanistic ideals and universal principles belong to universal values.

This distinction is necessary, not only for concrete analysis, but also because in literature we often come across views that maintain a value indifference or even harm to values from innovations. Those ideas are perhaps best illustrated in the classic work of Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. According to the author, one begins innovations when one's own values are threatened; in other words, the new comes to preserve the old or the *status quo*, both for the individual and the social order.

In such a formulation innovation obviously is deprived of its power for development and change, and is placed in the unenviable position of implacable ambition. Weber's thesis is correct when innovations are planned and realized for purely protective motives, but such innovations naturally lose their transforming qualities which often are concealed by statements professing improvement and progress.

In interpreting the idea of the innovative "value freedom", we must bear in mind the damage that has resulted from rapid innovation in social practice during the last decades. Lack of discrimination between the different value layers allowed common values of quick gain or rapid results to obscure universal values. For instance, only ecological dangers enabled us to understand that rapid industrialization is not related solely with well-being and progress. The scientific and technological revolution, which certainly reduced the distance from desire to fulfillment, stimulated the human call for happiness "here and now". It remains difficult for the general consciousness to forget the illusions of those instrumental values. Despite its nostalgic note, we may accept the conclusion of the Austrian sociologist, W. Kraus, that:

When the storm of optimistic innovations is no longer attractive despite all its sensationalism (it doesn't matter so much to the non-specialists whether there is a Moon, Mars or Saturn-landing)

then perhaps it would be easier to understand values and meaning, which influence through allegories, symbols, comparisons, consideration of ideas, and beauty, and a way of life that prefers values like goodness, tranquility, meaning.¹

If, however, nostalgia is brought to a higher ideological level, it may grow into retro-thinking in which beauty and the good belong to the past, while the present and the future are perceived to be full of threats, instabilities and dangers. This gave rise to the various theories pleading for the restoration of old values and virtues. Once again, as in Weber's ideas, there is a variant in which the approach to the new is formed by the aim of reproducing the existing value and normative order, even in the new conditions. Therefore, future projections are based not so much on the real significance and role of the new, but rather on the impression that the future makes in one's mind. Essentially, this is the principle defect of all conservative and traditionalistic social theories and political doctrines.

In order to explain more adequately the relationship and interaction between values and innovation, we must trace two basic viewpoints on the problem: the place of the new in the concrete value system, i.e., the new as a value, on one hand, and what takes place in the system as a result of its appearance and influence, on the other hand.

Conservation and Innovation

Innovation is looked upon from conservative and traditionalistic positions in terms of their preoccupation to preserve the existing *status quo*; in this light the role of the new is quite limited and its meaning is mainly instrumental. In this case the new is placed in the paradoxical situation of working against itself, i.e., of rejecting not the old, but itself. Innovations carried out on this basis have limited life and limited social effect.

At the same time, the practice of limiting innovation is more or less restricted in time. Sooner or later change becomes inevitable when too many innovations accumulate. We cannot fully and profoundly apply the scientific and technologic innovations if we do not change the political structure, the governing methods, value thinking, forms of relations, and so forth. In many instances in history thinkers and politicians have demonstrated a dual attitude toward social innovation: on the one hand, they had tried to realize it, and, on the other, to limit its effect. In such a position, we easily find the dual value attitude regarding the new: both consciousness of its necessity and usefulness, and fear of the change it entails. In any case, the perception of the innovation presupposes a certain reevaluation of the present value arsenal.

We come to the second essential aspect of the problem: the effect of innovation upon a system of values. Francis Bacon had noticed that innovations change living conditions; they must then introduce changes in the sphere of values, the moral ideas of the people, their understanding of good, etc. Of course, how far an innovation enters into the sphere of values depends upon its power and the dimensions it effects. Pitirim Sorokin says that only events that lead to a great change or serve as turning points toward such great events are what truly matter for the life of society.

As a rule, important innovations successfully run through all the layers of the value system, producing serious changes in the value hierarchy. Certainly, the dynamics and form of the effect vary at the different levels. At the higher levels change becomes more difficult: ideals have always been hardest to break, and any change must be connected with a full reevaluation of the whole value arsenal. This is normal, because the ideals are the most consistent and the broadest grounds of the value system; they are the basis for constructing the life strategies and projections of the entire

¹ W. Kraus, *Kultur und Macht* (Wien, 1987), p. 172.

social consciousness. An actual revaluation of values, as Nietzsche had pointed out, begins from destabilization and destruction on the level of ideals. That is why it is the slowest and most agonizing change on both the individual and the social scale. Both the person and society suffer deeply as they acquire new ideals.

On the instrumental level there are greater opportunities for dynamic change, and innovation is more rapid and more naturally accepted. This is the case because the level of values here is connected mainly with the daily needs which are variable as regards both our preferences and their pretensions. The best example of these changes are different fashions where the new (even though sometimes a disguised old) is sought and desired. However, if we shift to the complex level of tradition and custom, changes might turn out to be slow and difficult. This is the case when daily objects and occurrences are "at hand" (Heidegger) and possess personal meaning and significance.

Eventually it seems that the hesitant attitude towards contemporary change is more on the level of opinion and estimation than on that of actual behavior. Most of the time we would speak rather of our emotional change of attitude toward the new than of its real perception and actualization in the structure of our life activity. The obvious discrepancy between the common mood towards the new and the willingness to actually employ it interests many sociologists, psychologists and ethicists.

As a result of that dual value standard towards the new, fragmentation is often observed. For instance, innovation can be introduced in the operational sphere while the old value models are retained in the style of living and human relationships. In this way the integrity of activity is broken into fragments, each working separately and for itself. The moral and psychological status of a person is fragmented respectively, which may entail negative emotional states.

The conclusion might be that even when realized in distinct spheres of activity, sooner or later the innovation influences other spheres as well. Values are related both to the different sectors of activity and to the whole. In this way a continuum of values is formed, and the integrity and homogeneity of the person are expressed. An innovative change in the value system has a "chain effect character", related not to a separate section but to the whole complex of the value system. Today this is most clearly seen in the conditions of scientific and technological progress. As wittily described in the book by J. Simons, *Silicone Shock*,² the popular use of computers changes the adoption of values, effects the psychological state, corrects the self images of contemporary man and reflects personal expectations, motives and convictions. This is true for many other modern innovations as appears from the need they generate for readjusting certain value structures.

Of course, innovations have always existed in life, but they have never demanded such quick readjustment of value orientations as they do now. Through long periods of time, people ordered their life style and activity according to well-fixed value complexes, with but minor corrections. This situation has totally changed since the scientific and technological revolution turned innovations into facts of daily life. The first moral and psychological reflexes in assimilating the new situation reflected a romantic stupor and an indiscriminating trust in the capacity of science and technology. For an extended time the illusion that scientific and technological progress inevitably would bring us to the temple of abundance and prosperity and a number of serious social theories led the mass consciousness. When it was realized that this was not a one-way street and that there was a movement in both directions, when society clashed with the negative consequences of technology and urbanization, there emerged certain phobias, anti-technological moods, nativistic movements, theories about "zero sums", etc. Buffeted between those two extremes, the

² J. Simons, *Silicon Shock* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).

understanding of the essence and role of innovation slowly but surely approached a more realistic and sober perception.

The flow of contemporary innovations has influenced not only the content of values systems, but also the mechanisms of their transfer from generation to generation. Before the industrial revolution people's reaction to innovation was a limited change in their life style and list of values. The novelties did not radically change the values of everyday life; nor had they much to do with the formation of one's life project. As far back as we can go in history, innovation seems never to have strongly inspired people to reconsider their order of norms and values. The transfer mechanism of cultural experience retained its logic and capacities, as is seen in highly normed societies. Margaret Mead concludes from her long study in the Polynesian Islands that "in traditional societies old people rarely express theses or skills in words or rules--they show instead what should be done. . . . Most of a child's education is accomplished in real life situations where the meaning is derived from the situational context."

It is clear that this kind of mechanism for transmitting cultural experience would guarantee its complete reproduction and that following generations would stubbornly pursue the fixed value trajectory. Strange though it may seem, the improvement of the cultural superstructure does not much affect this mechanism. In the course of history, written testaments and magnificent rituals may turn out to be as strong as the new things and changes in life. Sometimes the power of the fixed value order is so strong that for a long period of time it does not permit the new to be assimilated and function as a social and transformational factor. In this sense, the greatest possible gift to the following generations would be to understand the need for change and to respect innovations which free human capabilities and multiply their forces.

Problems and Innovation

Changes in the mechanisms of the transfer and assimilation of cultural experience pose exceptionally serious and pressing problems for educational practice and the processes of socialization. Nowadays, almost globally, the educational crisis is being discussed. Not only have educational aims, forms and means changed, but also the logic of this complicated and multifaceted process. As Soviet researcher Igor Kohn observes:

In the past the old people measured the success of their educational work mainly by the extent to which they had transferred their knowledge, skill, habits and values to their children. The children were prepared for entering a society which, as was quietly supposed, would look generally like the world of their parents. Nowadays, the situation is one of changed--scientific and technological, life-style and cultural--that is so swift and significant that no one harbors any doubts but that today's children will live in a world which will be fundamentally different from the one in which their parents lived.

In such a case, it is possible to imagine the difficulties with which a given educational system will be faced when guided by the effort wholly to embrace the life styles and actions of the younger generation. The achievement of such an ambition would presuppose total concord between all the elements and spheres of the educational system, which is practically impossible. But there is something of still greater import. Even when this ambition is motivated by the best of intentions, it leads to a deformation in the sphere of values itself because it underestimates and eliminates the core of the socialization process, namely, self-initiative. In such a case, it is not original thinking and action that is valued by the younger generation, but rather, conformist attitudes and obedience.

Every deviation from the established norm will be met with skepticism, and in the relations between teacher and student conflict and misunderstanding will slowly and inexorably enter.

In this connection there is often a heightened interest on the part of the younger generation in informal contacts as a counterpoint to officially laid down educational practices as a source of values and as an opportunity to express freedom. Modern communications and the mass media have uncovered virtually limitless possibilities and opportunities to open informal contacts. Fashion, literature and art are becoming common property in an amazingly short time. Perhaps Alvin Toffler has a point when he says that "the new technologies make variety as cheap as uniformity".³ From this comes the possibility for the quick rise and dissolution of informal patterns. The centrifugal force of standard values is distinguished by a heightened dynamism and radiance, but this does not mean any lessening of the attraction of informal contacts.

Intercultural exchange also renders problematic the choice of standard values. More and more often modern man is placed in the difficult position of choosing that which he desires to make his possession. Respectively, feelings of dissatisfaction with one's present moral and psychological status increase, which in turn stimulates rapid change in value preferences, as well as a lack of discrimination in what is accepted. American sociologists use the term "opportunity costs", which denotes the fact that no matter what I choose I still miss out on something, at least that which I have not chosen. The rate of innovation sharpens one's awareness of dissatisfaction with what is achieved, exists or is acquired. That is not a manifestation of the well-known mania for possessions, but of inner psychological personality states in the face of ever more varied and diverse life opportunities. The absence of firmer ties between the separate levels of values may lead to a peculiar "omnivorousness" in interests and spiritual needs, to permanent groping from one thing to another, to the egoistical pretension of "let's try everything".

The clash between innovation and such commonly shared value stereotypes as traditions and customs is also characterized by a particular drama. When traditions determine the behavior of large groups of people, their passing will be connected with considerable efforts and large-scale changes in the cultural levels. Even when a tradition seems to have been outlived and eliminated, latently it can influence the actual lifestyle of people, and, should the necessary prerequisites be supplied, it can be revived. In every generic or collective memory there lie dormant such forces which, under certain conditions, can be actualized.

However, the "innovations-traditions" problems should not be studied in only one dimension, i.e., only on the plane of opposition. Experience in Japan manifests an ultramodern manufacturing society where change is a daily occurrence, where new inventions and innovations are a professional duty motivated exactly by the national tradition and the stereotypes of a lifestyle. Therefore, we must always keep in mind the particular socio-cultural context of such mechanisms, which often contain the prerequisites for their implementation in innovative processes.

Furthermore, the "innovation-tradition" problem should not be studied only un-dimensionally because overcoming the latter is, as a rule, a painful process, often leading to a distressing readjustment and a re-evaluation of values. It can happen that overcoming a given tradition or stereotype may give rise to a devaluation of certain values and generate mass psychological tensions. The forceful divestment of a large number of people of their habits, forms of life, activities and attitudes, which were firmly established through the years, always has a certain negative effect.

Most obvious are the changes in the sphere of interpersonal relationships in the day-to-day contacts between people. Some scholars have begun to talk of a life "with open doors". The

³ Alvin Toffler, *Previews and Premises* (New York: South End Press, 1983), p. 32.

question frequently asked nowadays concerns the limit of the human capacity for conflict-free and adequate adaptation to an ever increasing rate of social innovation. Alvin Toffler put forward the concept of the "module contact", according to which not only objects, but people as well, pass through our lives at an ever increasing rate. The contact is mainly on a functional basis and they do not remain long enough even to leave a trace on our conscience.

It is quite clear that the speed and scale of contemporary social innovation brings about serious disharmony in the sphere of interpersonal relationships. To a large degree this is dictated by the nostalgia for the old, for the well-known and established things in life. We can suppose that we are dealing with the familiar feelings of nostalgia and an urge to return to the past. But along with this, we have to admit, that notions such as Toffler's are not entirely groundless. The discrepancy between a number of well-established forms of contact, and even more so the absence of adequate substitutes is a painful experience. On this basis, such pessimistic assessments as Erich Fromm's become possible, namely, that "we are gradually drawing close to the development of a quiet but chronic schizophrenia which is manifested in the separation of feelings from the mind. The result is not only a hostility, but an indifference to life".⁴ In this respect it is no coincidence that there is constant interest in modern fiction's fate of contemporary man "hurled" into the "raging" stream of change.

The dynamism of modern innovation forms, as well, a specific strain in relations between different generations, a problem which recently has actively engaged the attention of scientists, writers and public figures. This is no longer a matter of "traditional" misunderstanding between parents and children, but of different life styles, of a different culture between generations, of different values and outlooks. Nowadays, with the span of only one generation, so many new things develop that the initial values of existence often prove to be totally inadequate. The new generations acquire knowledge, principles and mentalities which are seriously discrepant from those of the preceding generation.

In the famous "Toynbee-Ikeda Dialogue" these two great humanists of our time came to the conclusion that, due to the rapid development of science and technology, "things change so quickly and can take such a frightening turn that it makes the younger generation afraid that, before it is able to take things into its own hands, the middle generation may let an irreversible catastrophe befall mankind."⁵ If we follow the development of the various waves of innovation we shall see that, as a rule, they have always been accomplished by some cultural or intergenerational tension.

In this instance we are not talking about existing phenomena. In opposition to the famous saying that "the new is the well-forgotten old", modern innovations force us to forget much of the old. Naturally, a generation with richer and more durable values, ideas, and stereotypes will find it much harder to do so. In their own turn the new generations, unburdened by accumulated experience and set ways of life, will overcome more easily and without conflict the challenges of innovation. It is clear that intergenerational tensions are not just "fate" in the relations between the "old" and the "young", but the process of the objective prerequisites of the contemporary stream of innovations.

These tensions can grow into conflict in a paternally-oriented social culture, when the younger generation is deprived of any social initiative, and its participation in the exchange of social activities is curtailed. The result is the deformation of the entire socialization process and the formation of a consumer attitude towards life and reality. At times this can even check the entire development of society.

⁴ Erich Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays* (New York: Harper, 1984), p. 145.

⁵ A. Toynbee and D. Ikeda, *The Toynbee-Ikeda Dialogue* (Tokyo: Koclansha, 1977), p. 137.

It should be noted that the search for compulsory symmetry in the relations between generations can corrupt even the most progressive ideas. The painful ambition entirely to reproduce "us" in "them" imposes a social and moral conservatism into the connections between the generations. The rigidity towards all that is new rests upon a mistaken aspiration for stability and security. It is said that all things new carry dangers and risks which are hard to predetermine and which can have sudden and dangerous results. It is precisely from this that negative attitudes towards innovations arise. As the American researcher D. Horaffas points out, "for a long time safety stood at the head of the list of human attitudes. Most countries are still looking for safety in stability. But stability is not safety; it is stagnation."⁶

In this connection, the famous sociological "Znanetssi Principle" explains resistance towards whatever is new by fear of undesirable results if it be applied. Thus resistance towards novelty should be related not only to some characterological peculiarities, but mainly to the social status of each individual and group. The changes in the social status, the need for the adoption of new models, values and ways of living, at a certain level turn out to be unsurmountable obstacles for innovation. Social and mental inertia is mainly a result of a firmly established set of values or life-style. In such cases we have the famous psychological "halo effect" in which the adoption and application of the existing norms and order of values is seen as the sole possibility, as right and eternally valid.

Interpersonal Aspects of Innovation

Attempts to penetrate into the world of innovation without the necessary values, provisions and mental attitude lead to the development of a number of interpersonal and internal conflicts and clashes. The rate of innovation generates a corresponding need for swift change in the attitudinal system which, in turn, often leads to an identity crisis, to depersonalization and to a conflict of roles. In consequence it is possible for aberrations to arise due to the requirements of the social norm, plus a turning of behavior toward "inadequate realization". According to Zimbardo, deindividuation is connected especially with "decreased interest in social evaluation". It can be characterized as a loss of identity, individuality and distinction.

The sense of a loss of identity finds additional motivation in modern working conditions where the swift changes brought about by innovation put qualitatively new specifications ahead of the work process. Especially strong and significant are the changes taking place in the structures of work which had been set down long ago. From the end of the last century to the middle of ours, the structure remained quite firm and included about 600 professions. Today there are close to 1000. In this dynamic world there is a growing need to specialize the human work force. The well-known French specialist in culture, A. Mol, describes the situation in the following ironic way: "Modern knowledge should revive the past sociological knowledge of the secret because of the need always to depend on the help of specialists. Nowadays, they are the main active persons--every field has its own 'specialist'. From now on the culture will not lie in what you know, but in that you know who must know." The author's conclusion is that modern man cannot look upon and think of phenomena as a whole, but that his thinking is always specialist-oriented. "Mosaic culture" and "tunnelthinking" express this fragmented approach to reality.

The appearance of narrow specializations and their presence in the field of labor constitute great difficulties before man as a universal being. The individual is evaluated from the point of view of his activities in separate domains of activity and in his social role. Quite often individual

⁶ D. Horaffas, *Capitalism, Science, Technology* (Moscow, 1987), p. 198.

and role so fully coincide that when the role withers the individual "vanishes". In such cases, a man looks upon himself not as a person, but as a function who possesses certain role features.

Of great concern to psychologists is the so-called "interface" or interaction between man and machine which certainly changes the psychological features of individual working relationships. There is a considerable quantitative increase in the objects and processes which a man needs in order to do his job. Quite often man loses touch with the final product of his efforts because between him and the product stands the might of modern technology. The very environment of the work process changes and quite often has nothing to do with the natural conditions of life. All this constitutes serious obstacles to man's ability for "constant adjustment" (H. Selier), personal adaptation and re-arrangement.

A new working structure is formed in which the most important problem seems to be the coordination and interdependence of people compared to the machine. This increase in interdependence in work inevitably demands higher responsibility and mental tension. Mastering modern technology prestructures the whole motivation of work. Quite often habits and acquired skills stand in the way of adapting to new professional working conditions and acquiring new professional roles. Toffler is right to say that "the key to the future work is to understand that routine, repetitive work is no longer effective."

These, and other moral and mental effects of the modern innovative situation inspired the appearance of the theory of the "technical man". This is not, as is often thought, about representatives of the scientific and technological intelligentsia, but a specific mental organization in the conditions of accelerated scientific and technological innovation. Through psychological observations the theses of this concept have been made precise and reflect the real problems of daily existence.

But the general impact of scientific and technological progress, as with any other type of progress, is connected mainly with positive changes in the lives of people. The best example in this respect is the spread of mass scientific and technological creativity. This is a phenomenon unprecedented in the history of mankind and gives proof of actually freeing natural human powers and unfolding the entire mental potential of a person. On a large scale, creativity ceases to be the privilege of a chosen few, and becomes a dominant feature in the lives of great numbers of people.

In the mechanisms for mapping out life projects, expectations and hopes are changing as well. The disappearance of many taboos and out-dated social and cultural bans broadens the temporal perspective of the individual. A sense of the future transcends the boundaries of age, and thinking in this perspective follows.

Finally, value attitudes towards innovation are changing. All that is new no longer poses a threat to security; it ceases to be a source of risk and uncertainty. Change gains firm place in the mental world of the person and in society. In such a manner the innovations and the moral and mental effects that accompany them bring about not only large-scale but radical changes in the overall life style and consciousness of modern man.

Part III
Morality and Change

Chapter VII

Dilemmas in Striving for Success: Social Achievement and Role Conflict

Alexander Marinov

The world is changing ever more rapidly and profoundly. The modern person is facing new challenges with respect to his or her capacity to change him or herself and to adjust to new life conditions and to new social environments. Completely new opportunities have arisen for creative activities, original decisions, autonomy and independence in exploring and mastering society and nature. But with this come new requirements and responsibilities for knowledge, qualification, social and psychological qualities and a new balance between the "give" and "take" in relationships between persons and society.

The main distinctive factor in the changes of modern society facing the person is not merely their speed, but their acceleration. In the whole history of mankind there have always been technological and social innovations, but until the last decades the rhythm and acceleration of changes made it possible for the person to adjust to them. In this sense different societies developed through multiple processes of mass and individual adjustment: by changing beliefs, values, attitudes, motivations and behaviors (more or less frequently), or by leaving to the next generation a recognition of the need to change.

Today, as Russell Ackoff puts it, the pressure of changes experienced by the person is extremely high; this is why it attracts our attention. Growing wiser, we realize that a slow, inadequate reaction to changes in our personal and social lives means a total lack of any effective reaction whatsoever.

The only real way to understand and rule our environment is to spread intellectual and practical activities through time and space so that we can gather more information and come into closer touch with reality. But social activity, closely related to and performed by, persons in their social roles, is possible only when we have the motivation to learn and play roles. Striving for success means most often gaining more and better social positions and roles. On the other hand, multiple role performance always brings the risk of role strain, of failure and incapacity to manage the growing field of relationships and interactions.

This paper will examine the mutual interdependence between motivation for achievement and some problems in the system of personal roles defined as role conflicts.

Multiple Roles and Role Conflict

Society is becoming increasingly complex; with this comes an intense process of development, differentiation and co-evolution of types and subtypes of human activities. Although new technologies tend to replace men on production lines and offices, in general social institutions and human relations become highly differentiated in their functioning and require multiple new professions. As the degree of the required personal specialization rises, the huge variety of activities and occupations makes it impossible for one person to remain tied to a single social

role.¹ Performance in occupational roles is combined with participation in political, leisure, familial and friendship role structures. Since Leonardo da Vinci, most humanistic views have stressed the importance of an harmonious and multilateral development of the human personality.

The logic of social progress requires that many individuals and even whole communities engage in multiple social activities by learning and performing complex sets of social roles. From the personal point of view, performance in various roles means better opportunities for achievement and public appreciation, for self-actualization and future development, as well as for satisfying all human needs.

But, taking on multiple roles raises the problem of structural changes in the status of the person. Many activities and their corresponding social roles are incompatible, or generate strong incongruity between different elements of one's social status.

There are two general interpretations of multiple role performance. R. Linton, R. Merton, R. Hunt and R. Turner see in the increased role repertory an inevitable source of role strain and conflict considered as a totally negative fact of a person's social life and consciousness. Their systematic understanding of a personal role repertory delineates the more complex nature of the process of learning and enacting various social roles. Pointing out that the simultaneous performance of two or three roles generates role strain, D. Gradev notes, "Such strain is due to the possibility of preference of one role or another . . . [which] by itself calls for an elaboration of a personal strategy for the distribution of resources needed to accomplish the multiple role expectations."²

Despite the complexity of multidimensional role behavior, some psychologists stress the positive effects of enlarging one's personal role repertory, above all in relation to opportunities for a complete and rapid adjustment to social dynamics. N. Cameron pointed out that a member of each well-organized society must develop a great number of roles if he wants to maintain effective relationships with his partners. A person whose repertory consists of numerous well-performed and realistically understood roles is better prepared to deal with a critical situation than one with a repertory that is small, poorly learned, and unrealistic.³

Obviously, taking and performing multiple roles means that one must pay special attention in order to find the best possible number of those roles and an appropriate distribution of temporal, physical and psychological resources. This process depends not only on social norms and patterns, but also upon the strength of personal motivation and ambitions. The same is true when there is already a role conflict and a choice must be made of the best strategy to resolve it.

Sociologists and psychologists take for granted that different types of personalities from various social categories have different levels of motivation which reflect on the nature of role taking and role enactment. In turn, we suppose that as social groups and individuals engage in more independent and creative social activities, performed through corresponding roles, they will demonstrate more clearly the relation between achievement, motivation, large role repertory and role conflict.

Success and Role Conflict in the Artistic Field

¹ R. Car notes that whereas in traditional societies occupational roles are limited to 40-50, in the U.S. today there are at least 20,000 such roles. Cit. by Rocheblave-Spenle, *Le notion de role en psychologies sociale* (Paris, 1962), p. 127.

² D. Gradev, *Social Roles of Personality* (Sofia: Partizdat, 1984), p. 15.

³ N.A. Cameron, "Role Concept in Behavior Pathology", *American Journal of Sociology*, 55 (1950), 61-63.

In one of our studies 145 well-known Bulgarian artists responded to a questionnaire about the sources and effects of role conflict: some questions were included in order to reflect personality traits (achievement motivation, non-achievement, anxiety, introversion-extroversion, etc.). All of the subjects showed very marked symptoms of role conflict in the simultaneous enactment of multiple roles, along with a strong tendency to strive for success in all of them.

The interdependence of achievement motivation and role conflict is important because this makes it possible to understand a basic source of role conflict, namely, the failure of activities aimed at satisfying human needs. Sometimes, and for some kinds of people, the frustration of some biological or physical need is far less painful than the frustration of the need for self-actualization and other so-called "personality needs".

Here we shall discuss a wider understanding of success and achievement, which goes far beyond classical academic or scholarly investigation and has to do, rather, with a wide range of social areas of personal performance. Hence, more points of successful or unsuccessful behavior are involved and viewed as being closely related to fulfilling the need for self-actualization.

First of all, every successful outcome makes it possible to fulfill a given human need. But the feeling of satisfaction and the experience of success are due only to the fulfillment of that given need. What generates satisfaction is not only the positive outcome, but also the fact that the person him or herself is the author and creator of the successful act. The localization of the need for success and its fulfillment in direct function of the experience of a positive outcome is relatively irrelevant to the content of the given outcome; this is an important argument for classifying their need for success as a "personal need". Personal needs are based upon the need to maintain and perfect one's personal identity as the "supreme coordinator" of human behavior in various situations.

We may argue that, as an identity between performed behavior and a settled goal, success is a direct expression of the personal capacity of self-regulation. Therefore success means fulfillment of the core of the personality which integrates its different elements and aspects in an organic unity. The need of success is in some sense a need of the personality itself.

The study found that artists show a significantly higher level of need for success compared to other social, socio-professional and age groups (gifted pupils, skilled workers, inventors).⁴ In searching for a better understanding of the general sources and tendencies of role conflict I. Paspalanov notes that:

The link between non-achievement and other personality dimensions does not have a single meaning. It depends on the individual's socially significant and recognized achievements, as well as upon the place of socially recognized success in the life activity of the personality. For persons of different social positions, with respect to success non-achievement would have a different motivational meaning and would integrate in various ways with other dimensions of personality.⁵

Some respondents made interesting reflections on the nature of success and its importance in the social roles and role conflict of the artist:

Everyone discovers, sooner or later, his own ambitious thoughts and dreams. I remember youth: striving for recognition and fame. But all of us--as young artists--felt the same way. Usually,

⁴ I. Paspalanov, "Interrelation of Nonachievement, Extroversion, Emotional Instability and Level of Anxiety in People with Different Social Status and Success", *Sociological Review*, 4 (1985), p. 51.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

ambition is blamed; it is widespread and sometimes may require a prophylactic procedure. But never ignore the fact that ambition is in the nature of man and there is no better stimulation to activity, especially when one enters the professional field.

The artist has the right to dream about glory--it is natural for his profession. He needs people for his art; the wider the circle of his admirers the better his conditions for creating art. But it is most important to keep an eye on your ambitions; you must consider them with some irony. . . . I would call that the prophylactics of the artistic personality.

Without doubt a high level of achievement motivation influences artistic performance far more than any other role, for example, that of a professor in a music academy or a leader of a professional club. Artistic performance is directly personified or "brighter", whereas success in teaching comes as the result of the long and difficult formation of a new creative personality and shows itself "indirectly" through the student's performance.

The impact of non-achievement in different situations and different people is felt clearly along the whole scale of the role system of personality; the need for success is an integral character trait of personality. This is why the reduction of achievement in one area always brings compensatory reactions in other areas of social behavior in order to guarantee the same or even a higher level of success.

Another dilemma is that the need for success has its own "dark" side, namely, the fear of failure in one's undertakings. There are people who, in the face of even an insignificant probability of failure, refuse to try or abandon the undertaking, despite the obvious attractiveness of eventual possible outcomes. They are intimidated, not so much by any negative consequences related to possible failure, but by an unpleasant presentiment of "defeat", by the thought of being disgraced in their own eyes.

The study showed that fear and embarrassment before eventual failure had great impact on motivation and behavior in our "artistic" sample. This is what a well-known musician said:

The artist, at the stage of creative maturity can be compared to a ripe fruit: everyone expects from him a better taste. The experienced master knows that, as a matter of fact, he has no right to any real artistic failure. The more famous he becomes, the higher his professional reputation and general expectations rise. This is realized suddenly and in very painful way.

Once role conflict has arisen there is a new problem: how to manage it? What different personal strategies could help to reduce stress and tension? Analysis of various forms of behavior under the conditions of role conflict shows three main personal strategies.

The first can be called a "strategy of isolation". This is an active behavioral strategy, usually performed by people with the best scores as regards non-achievement. It consists in dividing or differentiating the conflicting roles or incompatible elements of a role. The strategy includes dividing or alternating roles in time cycles in order to eliminate the attitude or behavioral patterns involved in transition from one role to the other, the psychological *mechanisms* of an inner moving "away" from a given role, and so on.

The second strategy may be labelled "compromising". Here we find mostly people with a medium degree of non-achievement and beginning stages of role conflict. The strain from the role may not be sufficiently unsupportable to force decisive action. A strategy of compromise reflects attempts to solve the problems by "diplomacy", i.e., by reconciling conflicting expectations or tendencies. People who choose this strategy try to put off action in a given role, hoping that a

change in the situation will eliminate the contradiction. It is possible to try to "redefine" role expectations and to persuade members of the role set that the conflict is over. Some who demonstrate incompatibility between roles aim to provoke help from the part of the institution or of the small group. This is a way of leaving the decision to someone else.

A third strategy is employed by those who want to escape from a conflict situation by withdrawing from one or more social roles. We found this strategy in people with relatively lower degrees of non-achievement but with prolonged and "chronic" role strain.

Our findings confirm that the stronger the need for success, the more that personality tends to seek any opportunity to maintain or even to enlarge his role system, despite a significant investment of resources. There is a critical point beyond which failure becomes more and more frequent, causing withdrawal from actively fulfilling a role. In turn, reduced social activity sets a new context for the motivational impact of non-achievement and for its interrelations with other personality traits which motivate human behavior.

Obviously, there is an optimum level for the drive for success, with a corresponding repertory of roles on the part of the person. Till now, we have considered only the "quantitative" aspect of the dilemma, namely, when the drive motivation for success forces an enlargement of the role repertory. Another issue relates to the process of change and innovation in the role system of a personality: the number of roles may not change or may even decrease, but social achievement may be found through a creative transformation of role structures, expectations or outcomes of role behavior. This points to the relation between achievement motivation, innovative role behavior and role conflict.

Success as Innovation of Roles and Its Dilemmas

There is discussion about the capacity of role analysis to describe and explain the innovative activity of a person in renewing his own social roles and in ameliorating the innovative potential of numerous roles. Creativity and innovation may effect human behavior only through the enactment of social roles of a person, or through breaking the rules and norms of these roles. But here we find a very crucial dilemma: if innovation of, or through, the role means breaking its rules most of the time, does this always give birth to role conflict?

Critics of further development of role analysis answer "yes", partly because of the "dogmatic" interpretation of interrelations between norms, rules and role behavior. In this case, any act which does not correspond strictly to fixed role expectations is classified as "deviant" behavior. In fact however, without understanding the nature and tendency of the behavior in question, we cannot state its deviance and its contribution to the genesis of role conflict.

In the context of the rapid and essential changes in the modern world as described briefly above it may be argued that necessary innovation in social roles cannot be carried out by a powerful role structure. A person becomes the permanent innovator of his own social roles, and author of its continuous everyday life changes. This creates the need for a totally new hierarchy of personal qualities and a new structure of motivation and behavior. The person must be ready and able to change his own values and patterns of life. A deeper understanding of the mechanisms of social roles is needed, including intuitions of what, when and how to affect changes in role structures. Perhaps most importantly, the person must appreciate a permanent change by incorporating it as a basic social achievement. Today, at least in most cultures and most social roles, to innovate means to achieve.

It is possible here to distinguish two aspects. The first concerns the relation between the personal ambition to change one's role and eventual role conflict. Our studies, among both artists and young managers, show that readiness to innovate a role and real innovation sometimes coexist with role conflict. This is true especially in cases where favorable external conditions are lacking and where innovation meets opposition from within the group. But in the range and scope of its consequences role conflicts in the innovative person are much more restricted in comparison to people who deny the need of possibility of innovation.

The following example concerns the relation between the motivation of achievement through innovation and role conflict in young managers. Generally, managers reporting successful steps toward innovation in their roles, including role expectation and standards of role behavior, declare a more positive attitude regarding their role as a whole and the specific changes during the last year in their personal lives. The main difference between them and managers without a successful innovative balance is found to be in the area of their respective evaluations of the scope and importance of the creative decision-making process. Innovative managers report an increase in decisions requiring creative thinking; this is the main source of their satisfaction with their work and work relations. Managers who could not or did not desire to make any change in their roles reported a considerable increase in routine tasks in monotonous and boring work-related activity.

As a whole, innovative managers evaluated the recent changes in their business and personal life as "good" or "very good" and reported that their main ambition to succeed during that period was fulfilled. The evaluations of non-innovative managers ranged from neutral ("for better or worse nothing has changed") to deep dissatisfaction with their personal career.

The second aspect of the problem is related to the different opportunities that various social roles offer for innovative activity in the scope of a large social system or in society as a whole. Some social roles have remarkable innovative potential--a manager could install a new technology which might change the way of life of a whole nation, scientists may give birth to a new idea or theory, artists to a famous book or symphony that deeply changes men's minds and emotions.

The understanding of the great innovative potential of their own roles as artists and managers is closely related to the higher level of achievement motivation and social aspiration. In fact, they pursue a different standard of success. But this cannot be examined in terms only of classical achievement questionnaires and models. A prolonged research strategy is needed in order to compare standards of success in different social categories and in different situations, from routine academic achievement to extraordinary situations of creativity and innovation.

One thing is beyond any doubt. Relations between social roles, levels and models for personal achievement and changes in the modern world are going to become more and more important for all. In order to change the world successfully we must succeed in learning and ruling our needs and motivations for change. It is time to lay the cornerstone of the whole process of socialization: a rational and enlightened striving for success must replace the wild *bellum omnium contra omnes*, as Thomas Hobbes put it centuries ago. Success is not only a personal issue; it is central to finding new stimuli for the progress of all mankind.

Chapter VIII

Social Change and Moral Education

Emilia Marinova

The view that moral development takes place in function of the formation of a political outlook originates from certain social deformations. In fact, the spirituality of both society and the individual can be morally deficient and the moral crisis is rather one of values. This is due to the fact that morality pushed to the fringes of the spiritual life of man and society and was subordinated to politics and its value system. With the development of social activity and relations, society's value system is restructured and enriched. In these processes morality plays a key role: compared to religion, politics and law, it is the bearer of the greatest human potential. Therefore, the processes of humanization and dehumanization in society are related to the change in the place and the importance of morality in the structure of public values.

Moral Formation and the Political Order

The process of moral formation takes place within the framework of action where religion, law, politics and the arts together exert moral influence. These forms of public consciousness intertwine, each being the bearer of particular values which may be reciprocally complementary, incompatible or contradictory. Their adjustments show to what extent morality, politics, law, the arts and religion, as intrinsic values, orient, regulate and shape the personality.

Where one is oriented by a particular kind of value as a norm or ideal (whether moral, legal, political or other) one or another value becomes dominant in the hierarchy of values. Religious, legal or moral forms of social consciousness, which are the bearers of concrete values, "move" either to the center or to the fringe of spiritual life.

Depending on which consistently gives meaning to human activity we may speak of "religious righteousness", "political maturity", "law-abiding person", or "moral maturity". Political maturity may be defined as a stable political orientation, and moral maturity as a stable moral orientation. Such stability comes as a result of the qualitative changes in one's entire development: in one's system of values, needs and motivation, and character traits.

When politics comes to be the nucleus of the social value system the formation of a definite political orientation assumes particular importance and the person's political evolution is stimulated. This creates a situation in which moral development is seen as minor and subordinate to political development and its natural follow-up. Criteria for the moral evaluation of social processes and of personality become politicized. Such politicization of the spiritual life of society stimulates the shaping of a personal world outlook in which political norms, ideals, evaluations, principles and notions are central.

Together, political and moral values essentially orient the person towards socially important targets and are mutually complementary. But does this mean that by molding political views, a person comes to a higher moral level? Does the political evolution lead to moral perfection? The significance of political values should not be belittled, all the more when the activity is oriented to such highly human political objectives as revolutionary restructuring, abolition of slavery, liberation from national and social oppression, etc. The molding of political views and the person's

political activity are of essential importance above all to the development of social and class moral values. They create a true sense of social justice, public duty, and the like.

The most turbulent historic processes and the most sudden changes in moral outlook are associated with social and class relations. Motives are of central importance for moral evolution, whether these are moral motives of personal expression or such utilitarian motives as ambition for power, material wealth, social prestige, etc. This rule is valid also for political activity and relations: political evolution is a positive factor in the person's formation when accompanied by a respective evolution of moral values, motives, and virtues. When political goals are achieved at the cost of mass repressions, moral deformation marks the social atmosphere, the harmony between universal and class attitudes is broken in favor of class oriented values, and moral ideals lose touch with real life. Under such conditions, the moral sphere becomes idealized and stimulates normative behavior; the moral norm is raised to a cult and any deviation is rejected. Moral criteria of evaluation are substituted by the political and the universal criteria of a class; the balance between goals and means is disturbed in favor of the former with the result that acts which contradict universal morality are committed in the name of lofty social goals.

These common features of the deformation of the social values effect social moral ideals, evaluative norms and principles. Moral ideals, and social moral patterns in particular, are adapted to the cliches of the deformed conception of the priority of class values over universal ones. The estrangement of these patterns from the truth about society both originates from and intensifies the lack of correspondence between the ideal and the social reality. The absolutization of social values is amplified and becomes total: ideals turn into idols. The principle of social equality is raised to the level of a social value, whereas in social practice inequality is the case. The privileged position of certain strata breeds such immoral phenomena as bribes, protection, etc. In economics there is a slogan that says "everybody gets what he earns," but in real life this principle is substituted by another one: "everybody is paid according to his political and social status."

Personal Development and Moral Growth

Deformations of social values affect the processes of personality formation. In social practice a number of alarming facts emerge: crime among youth is on the increase; a greater part of graduates from schools and universities is not prepared to participate in real life; skepticism is on the rise among young people, along with estrangement from the ideals of society and the pursuit of social activities outside social life (hippies, rockers, punks, etc.). All these bespeak serious perturbation in personal value systems and show that political stability is not a criterion for personal morality.

Investigations show that, when there is a discrepancy between ideals and reality, formalism on the part of elders in the upbringing of young people engenders in them deep personal conflict. They are torn between, on the one hand, what is inherent in the age as they strive towards fulfillment in the "elders' world", and, on the other hand, a negation of the concrete patterns found in the ideals and idols. This causes feelings of insincerity and estrangement from actual social life. Striving towards social activity is expressed in informal groups formed by young people between fourteen and twenty-four on the basis of common interests and activities and is oriented towards an alternative way of life. The rejection of social values may also assume such undesirable forms as in the absence of an ideal regulating behavior. Decisions are taken on the spur of the moment and impulsively. This implies a step backward in young people's personal development.

One-sidedness and inadequacy in one's concept of values cause a deformation of the regulative aims and their impact on the person. If certain values of universal importance are not moulded, one's system of values remains internally contradictory and underdeveloped; this, in turn, affects one's motivation, the development of inner needs and the peculiarities of moral character. Deformations in personal values are usually associated with immaturity in the moral motivation along with the formation of mercenary or other attitudes. The human character acquires such negative traits as hypocrisy, indifference, cruelty, arrogance, a proclivity towards a symbolic solution of real problems, despotism and irresponsibility. Steady changes set in and are expressed in both individual activity and social behavior in critical situations.

Personal values can specifically regulate behavior only when they are woven into the inner motivations which influence the formation of the human character. Ontogenesis requires change, both in content and inner structure. The most prominent of all expressions of structural development in the sphere of motivation and needs is the building of a hierarchy of motivations. According to A.N. Leontiev, this formation is due to two circumstances. First, in one's activity one is involved in complex social relations--with objective reality, other people with whom one works, one's social group and society itself; thus an activity may have several motivations. Second, these motives have unequal functional weight within the framework of a concrete activity so that one motive may be meaning-forming while another may be an incentive only in a given activity. The hierarchical structure of motives is formed not according to the scale of their proximity to biological needs, but according to their functional significance in a particular activity. In hierarchical relations the meaning-forming motive has higher status than does the incentive power.

Inclusion of personal moral motives in the motivational hierarchy introduces an entirely new meaning. When the moral motive takes a leading place in the activity, it becomes the bearer, not only of an incentive, but also of a meaning-forming function. This has the highest status with respect to other motives, for the aspiration to the good, to moral perfection, justice, etc., gives meaning to activity and lends it moral value.

The formation of the moral purposefulness of behavior is an important step in the moral development of the person. At the same time, for a complete moral formation, it is necessary to take yet another step towards stability in moral behavior. Every time a person is placed in new, untypical conditions he or she must make a decision governed by the socio-moral requirement that already had been assimilated as an inner motive. Thus, moral behavior involves building of a strong, variable and super-situational system, which makes possible decisions in specific situations that correspond to moral social requirements but, nevertheless, are not immediately and one-sidedly determined. Such value-factors are present in the decision as a genetic source of its moral charge. These characteristics of morality suggest that the process of moral formation is above all the creation of an approach to the solution of moral problems in concrete situations and is not reduced to the adoption of ready-made formulas for behavior.

Moral motives are stabilized during the process of development. The unfolding of this tendency contributes to building a so-called "moral approach" to life. The stabilization of moral motives, in turn, is built on the basis of the development of a personal system of values. This would be impossible without the development of moral ideals, norms, and values, as well as of moral thinking and concepts of good (versus bad), duty, responsibility, justice, etc. The formation of a steady moral orientation is possible due to the transformation of moral values into motives of behavior. This is the personal mechanism which ensures the formation of a "moral approach". Without development of this motivational system, which includes personal moral motives as part of the hierarchy, moral values cannot have a tangible effect upon the personality, for moral values

and moral motives cannot be stabilized in the motivational hierarchy. While behavior reaches for the ideal, values "come down to earth", to real behavior, in order to "meet" and "construct" a moral orientation. This orientation of behavior turns into a general orientation--what we called a "moral approach"--as soon as the person "breathes" life into his or her intentions and convictions and desire becomes reality. In this process man's moral character occupies an important place.

Morality unites in itself to the highest degree those universal human values which reflect both man's and mankind's value; this is the most intimate point of the human soul. The shift of morality to the fringe of social life is soon followed by negative social and personal aftereffects. Almost irreversible moral deformations set in for the person, social institutions and public sensibilities.

Cognitive Development

The transformation of morality into a spiritual center of personal development is not a theoretical abstraction. Its foundations are laid as early as preschool age when the need of the child to be a "grownup" is being formed. This need has its moral dimension, for in the eyes of the three-year-old and six-year-old, "grownup" and the "good" are synonymous. An elder's model behavior stimulates the development of the personal system of values in the child, its evolution of both motivation and needs, and hence, its whole shaping as a person. Therefore, we may assert that morality is the nucleus of the evolution of the person.

Social development can create particularly favorable conditions for the establishment of morality as a center of spiritual development. Democratization of society liberates morality from the power of political objectives, assessments and criteria, from political intolerance and lack of compromise, and from subjection to the political positions being defended. Thus, universal human moral values and morality as a universal human regulator of social behavior are being revived. The social prerequisites in order for morality to take a worthy place in the life of man and society are being created.

Moral upbringing suffers yet another weakness, namely, the prejudice that problems are solved mainly through intellectual development, which would be the function of education. In fact, the primary task of education is the accumulation of knowledge and erudition as reflected in high grades. In this process, moral education is shifted into the background of seminars or class instruction and is reduced to a moralizing lecture.

In its place, cognitive psychology becomes the theoretical criterion of moral development. Both Jean Piaget and L. Kohlberg investigated the capacity of persons at different ages to carry out moral reasoning regarding norms and prescriptions. They studied reasoning regarding respect for moral norms ("behavior criterion"), and the feeling of guilt when violating the moral requirements ("emotional criterion"). Essentially, we may speak of behavioral and emotional criteria only approximatively, since they have been studying not a real behavior and emotional experience, but moral reasonings with specific content.

Piaget¹ and Kohlberg present two types of reasons for introducing intellectual criteria in the analysis of moral development: theoretical and experimental. By means of parallel analysis of the intellectual-cognitive and motivational-need spheres they sought a direct correspondence between intellectual and moral development. The Russian psychologist, D.B. Elkonin notes,² rightly, a number of basic defects in this naturalistic approach to psychic (mental) development:

¹ Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgement of the Child* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1948).

² D.B. Elkonin, On the Problem of Periodization of Mental Development in Childhood in "Questions of Psychology" (New York, 1971), pp. 6-20.

- (1) The child is looked upon as an isolated individual, in relation to whom society is considered to be only its surroundings.
- (2) Mental development is interpreted as a process of adaptation to the conditions of society.
- (3) Society is divided into two separate spheres: "the world of things" and "the world of people".
- (4) The mechanisms of adaptation to "the world of things" and to "the world of people" are totally different.

Piaget's and Kohlberg's approach to the experimental study of moral reasoning in search of parallels between the development of the reasoning and morality of children, relies mainly on the child's intellectual insight into unaccustomed spheres of knowledge. The complex of notions used in this analysis of children's morality depends upon an integral philosophical conception. Analyzing the development of the child as a component of the "child-society" system, Piaget and Kohlberg evolve the thesis that human development consists in the elaboration of mechanisms of adaptation to the "world of things". This adaptation unites the multiple aspects of a child's development and is the law or universal mechanism of human development. The axis of this adaptive mechanism is one's logical development which implies the introduction of intellectual criterion into the investigation of morality. Their method of investigation is in full harmony with this.

Integration of the Intellectual and the Motivational

In D.B. Elkonin's hypothesis regarding regularity of the processes of mental development, he examines the formation of personality in a "child *in* society", not a "child *and* society" system. This new vision radically changes the connection of "child-and-thing" and "child-and-grownup". From two independent systems, they are transformed into a unified system, within which the content of each is changed. The system "child-thing" becomes in reality "child-social object", and "child-social grown-up" represents a united process of forming the child's personality.

Analysis of primary activity and its psychological essence indicates that during mental development there are regular periods of the predominant development of the motivation-need sphere which alternate with periods in which the formation of operational-technical abilities of the child are primary. The process of personality development follows an ascending spiral, rather than being linear.

D.B. Elkonin's hypothesis shows, in the first place, the inconsistency of a parallel analysis of the intellectual-cognitive and the motivational-need development of the personality. Secondly, this is important for critical analysis because it shifts the accent from intellectual development as the center of all personality development--including its moral aspect--to the specific characteristics and changes of the social situation in which one's personality is moulded.

Regarding moral development as strongly linked to the development of the intellectual processes it should be noted that this is based on certain irrefutable facts concerning the early evolution of the child's moral reasoning. But to what extent can the maturity of separate moral phenomena be a criterion for the moral maturity of the personality; and more concretely, to what extent could intellectual development in the sphere of morality be an indicator of the entire moral molding of the personality? In our opinion, the early development of a child's moral reasoning is not the key to one's overall process moral development.

The functional, genetic and historio-heterogeneity of the processes characterizing the complete molding of the personalities determine the heterochroneity of physical, mental and social development. Heterochroneity is a characteristic feature not only of the integral and harmonious development of the person, but also one's physical, mental and social aspects. Thus, for example, B.G. Ananiev focuses on the heterochroneity in mental processes, and I.S. Konn shows it to be a characteristic of the person's social development.

Experimental data in psychology³ provide grounds for assuming that the separate phenomena typical of morality also are formed in a heterochronological way. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the development of a separate moral phenomenon such as moral reasoning, on the one hand, and moral maturity as an overall feature of the moral development of the person, on the other.

Moral reasoning is one of the earliest moral expressions of the child. In the communication process a child appraises his or her own deed and the deeds of the others, his or her own personality and that of partners; in game situations the child evaluates the performers.

A main conclusion of our investigation⁴ is that reasoning regarding an action is differentiated from personality in the child's moral thinking. Experiments show that moral reasoning about the person is built on the basis of the maturity of moral reasoning about actions. It is proven convincingly that estimative moral reasoning reaches its maturity at a later stage, though some forms of estimative moral reasoning (e.g., regarding the deed) are being shaped at the end of preschool and at the beginning of school age, when personality is still in its initial stages of moral development. As this comparatively early formation of children's moral reasoning is an adequate indicator of the development of moral thinking and of moral intellect, the heterochroneity in moral development devalues estimative moral reasoning as a criterion for the overall moral development of the personality.

Moral development could be characterized by only one criterion, namely, the intellectual, if the functioning and development of the cognitive and moral processes were parallel or if the cardinal issues regarding the functioning and development of morality were resolved in the intellectual-cognitive sphere.

However, the heterochroneity there is an indicator of a rather complicated structure of morality, which is reflected also in differences in the phenomena of action, interpersonal relations, values and thinking, language and mentality. Morality is reflected throughout all these moral phenomena, each of which appears to store in itself the richness of the moral phenomena. The reason for their intermingling in any one moral phenomena should be sought in their proper requirements. Thus, development in moral thinking is inconceivable without a corresponding development in moral action and social relations. Specific moral problems and situations of conflict stimulate the rationalization and analysis of values, the elaboration of moral estimative capabilities, and the development of personal moral reasonings, conclusions, conceptions, etc. Each new step in the development of moral thinking and understanding contributes to a further development in the other moral phenomena.

Such interrelated character of the phenomena in the moral sphere is the main reason for the illusion that, by analyzing one of them, morality as an over all phenomenon is also being analyzed, as with Piaget and Kohlberg. In the sphere of moral thinking, personal motives, moral feelings and experiences, personal values and phenomenon in the world of morality are all reflected in moral

³ J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgement of the Child* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1948).

⁴ E. Marinova, *Personality and Actions in Children's Moral Judgements* (1980); *Moral Judgements of Children Preschool Age and Its Congress of Psychologists of Bulgaria*, (1977).

language. Similarly, they are reflected by and through thought or cognition without being reduced thereto.

Because moral and cognitive processes do not develop in parallel, we cannot study the sphere of morality by analogy to the intellectual processes. Analysis and synthesis, deduction and moral conceptualization, etc., are necessary moments of shaping moral behavior, social relations, moral motivation and personal value systems. The study of moral motivation reveals the cognitive processes to be of primary importance, for moral thinking and intellect determine the possibility for knowledge of moral values. At the same time, just knowing moral motives and an ability for value analysis are not sufficient to provide moral motivation for human behavior. Intellectual development alone in the sphere of morality cannot bring about the formation of the moral convictions which will provide steady motivation for the person's behavior.

Thus, the significance of the cognitive processes in the moral development of the personality could be characterized by the following specific features:

- The development of social relations and social activity, of estimative characteristics, and of value orientation in the concrete situation result in advancing intellectual development in the sphere of moral thinking. General intellectual development, the formation of moral knowledge, the development of moral reasoning and conclusions, etc., give new meaning to moral values.

- The development of the moral intellect, in turn, is instrumental in the further development of each moral phenomenon. For this reason it is a necessary condition for moral molding of the person.

- At the same time, intellectual development alone is not enough to shape the person morally. Hence, an intellectual criterion is not an entirely reliable indicator of the person's moral formation.

- The interrelation between intellectual and moral evolution is determined by the development of social activity and social relations, where the person is situated due to its overall evolution as a social being.

To overcome the purely intellectual orientation in the moral upbringing we should transform the entire system of education, which should be turned into a formative system, using educative means. The fact that in any moral activity choice is free in no way implies that moral upbringing does not have its own subject matter and its own tasks. It must overcome its own dependence on politics and intellectual development; it must overcome its lack of specific definition and find and defend its specific moral character and "identity". Undoubtedly, the theory of moral education has cultural and social value of its own.

Chapter IX

The Moral Culture of the Person

Dimitar Stankov

Morality is a visible indicator of human culture, a mirror of the nature of individuals and peoples. The "characters" of Theophrastus and La Bruyère are still alive among us, though fashionably dressed, more educated, acting in different circumstances, and possessed of different value orientations and attitudes. Morality is a universal measure of the spiritual and cultural perfection of humans as the supreme goal and absolute value. Morality is an aspect of human culture, the touchstone not only of what an individual is, but also of what one should be as a person and citizen. The individual is a moral being whose social nature reveals itself through the notions of good and evil, virtue and vice. It is by knowing a person's morals that one can best understand him or her.

Humans are the only moral beings; no other living creature on the Earth--and perhaps in the whole Universe--is endowed with mind and reason, with consciousness and self-consciousness, with personality, free will and conscience. The most universal among all those features is one's moral strength, making the person as a thinker, worker and creator, responsible not just for his physical and intellectual perfection, but above all for the harmony of the world. Human development along the spiral of progress becomes possible and effective only when meeting the more humanitarian than technological condition that one's inmost human feelings, thoughts, ideas, goals and means, words and deeds correspond to morality.

Otherwise, humankind would be confronted by monstrous destruction, for the "non-humanized" technological sphere, which does not possess the features of a real sphere, contains within itself forces capable of destroying human civilization and culture. The revolutionary changes of the contemporary world challenge us to create a global morality which recognizes universal moral values and develops a contemporary moral culture.

Man is the only moral being (*homo moralis*) whose intimate world, consciousness and conduct function in terms not only of utility, but also of beauty and good. Since the formation of *homo sapiens* in prehistoric times, its nature has acquired a moral essence. No other creature can be held responsible for all its deeds. For man this extends not only to the behavioral but to the intellectual as well. Charles Darwin wrote that the moral creature is able to reflect on its past deeds and their motivations, to approve of some and to condemn others. Man is the only creature that could be so defined; it is the greatest difference between humans and lower animals.

Morality is the most noble feature of human nature and culture: it leads to infinite perfection--but could lead also to fanaticism and superstition. Man is a moral being not only potentially, but actually as well; the moral is as characteristic of man as is the aesthetics. At the same time, the human properties of mind, speech, work, creativity, aesthetic attitudes, laughing, desires, will, temperament and conscience undergo historically determined changes which differ in their cultural meaning. This raises the concrete question of the nature and main characteristics of moral culture.

The Concept of Moral Culture

The notion of "moral culture" is related to the concepts of human civilization and culture. What today we call culture, the ancient Greeks called upbringing. Although the terms differ, the

problems of barbarousness, civilization and culture are treated in Tacitus' work, *About the Origin and Living Places of the Germans* (98 B.C.). At that time words like "civis" (citizen), "civitas" (society) and "civilis" (civic), which expressed the characteristic features of urban life, its virtues and merits, morals and customs, cultural *mores* and sophisticated conduct, entered into circulation in Rome. It is widely known that the word "culture" originated from Latin as a derivative of the verb "colere" which initially meant cultivating land and growing plants--hence, the notion "cultus agri" or "cultura agri", i.e., agriculture. Gradually the word "culture" assumed also a figurative meaning, expressing the process of systematic upbringing and education or the process of physical, intellectual and moral formation and development, of the perfection and self-perfection of the individual, of one's endowments and gifts, attitudes and abilities, aptitudes, features and properties. For the celebrated Roman tribune and philosopher, Cicero, "Cultura animi philosophia est", thereby underlining the rational-volitional and moral specificity of human nature. This motto may have been the first attempt to mark the content of the notion "spiritual and moral culture". The term "culture" gained a new sense and meaning, namely, the development of the human spirit through the formation of certain mental abilities, intellectual properties and moral virtues. It meant concern about the ennoblement and purification of life. In the middle ages the expression "cultura mentis", i.e., mental or spiritual culture, spread widely.

It is necessary to point out that a number of scientists as well as scientific schools consider the notions "civilization" and "culture" to be synonyms, and to include morality in their content. This tendency is expressed by E. Taylor: culture ethnographically comes from knowledge, beliefs, arts, morality, laws, customs and adopted by society. Thus, French literature mainly uses the term "civilization", whereas Germanic and Anglo-Saxon literatures use "culture".

Without doubt, morality correlates not only with civilization, but also with culture. In this context morality and culture are main conditions and forms of a human way of living with its activity, communication and conduct. The genetic correlation between them emerged in the early days of human history and civilization as moral phenomena showed themselves to be among the most essential elements of human culture.

As an organic part of human culture morality is an active and universal socio-cultural phenomenon. It develops as man sees "the laws of good" as laws of his own will and conscience. As a culture it consists mainly in the active attitude of human beings towards the world--both natural and social: a human virtue is a specific moral and psychic ability to create good in the form of certain good deeds. In the same way, vices are not mere feelings or thoughts, but cause evil deeds. Man deals only with those moral values which are involved in his activity or behavior and makes them part of his culture. Thus, the construction of the world of moral values and phenomena is a real historical process based on the dialectics of the objectifying and de-objectifying moral consciousness and behavior as essential elements in the human assimilation of the world.

Morality without practical implementation and a corresponding culture would not only create a conflict in one's mind, but actually alienate the individual from the world; a morality defined only as a dimension of mind or consciousness would have nothing in common with the real world. Hence, the link between morality and life is one of the most important factors constituting morality as a socio-cultural phenomenon.

Morality is a treasure house of human culture which promotes humankind. It characterizes the individual, not in the isolated sense of an Adam or Robinson Crusoe, but in his quality as a cultural-historical personality and a citizen of society. It is the richness of man's social relations in a particular ethnic group, social class or cultural unity.

In a certain sense, moral culture creates man, for it reflects the moral principles and values of human society and community. It is the quintessence of the spiritual power of man and is most manifested in philanthropy and compassion. But it is a sophisticated value, complex with many faces which reflect that actual morality functions as a real, not an imaginary, cultural phenomenon.

Because its main forms are the moral culture of personality, on the one hand, and the moral culture of society, on the other, its theoretical analysis leads logically to the question of the social dynamics of moral values, their cultivation in the consciousness and behavior of people as well as of each person. Hence the challenge of our time is not only of a political, economic and spiritual renovation, but moral renovation of personality in society. A totalitarian society as a synonym of the uncivil "has everywhere denied the personality in the individual" (Karl Marx).

In our crisis situation, not only society, but the individual must seek moral and cultural revival in order to avoid further moral decline. The recent situation as characterized by new political thinking, revolutionary upheavals, impetuous development of the technological sphere and the ecological menace, makes the problems of personal moral culture of utmost importance. The following sections focus upon two of these problems, namely, the culture of moral feelings, and knowledge and beliefs.

Culture of the Heart

The contemporary understanding of culture, based more on the rational than on the emotional nature of man and overlooking their harmony, is quite one-sided. This understanding differs basically from the ancient concept which associates the person with spiritual perfection and the moral self-development.

Since antiquity Eastern peoples have coined the notion "culture of the heart", in the sense of a culture of feelings. It is often forgotten that the greatness of the human spirit reveals itself not so much, and not only, in thoughts, ideas, and knowledge, but also in feelings, attractions and passions. That is why it comes as no surprise that Eastern culture devotes so much attention to purity of mind, feelings and experience. The notion of culture is understood more as a culture of heart than of mind: spiritual harmony could not be achieved only through a culture of mind and intellect; one needs the other inner culture of heart and feelings.

In this sense the culture of the heart characterizes above all our moral feelings. Hence, the Cambridge Platonists chose, from among all human abilities, one peculiar "seemly ability" which was called by them "a feeling of virtuousness". The English Enlightenment pointed out the essence of moral feelings as an ability to differ between good and evil, between virtue and vice. Feelings and mind were looked upon as different cognitive abilities, moral feeling being called "an inner eye". Usually they considered it unnecessary to analyze moral beauty, for one was struck by it at a first sight. The good caused admiration and love without question and was accepted even by those who do not work intellectually or construct precise notion.

The eighteenth century French materialists considered man outstanding because of his intellectual and moral abilities. According to them, mind, genius and virtue all were the result of human upbringing and the influence of surroundings. First among natural human inclinations was the ability of sensation and feeling "which give birth to all intellectual and moral feelings." In his *System of Nature* P. Holbach wrote that our moral ideas are more real than theology, but are not innate, but are based on experience as the only adequate indicator of what is useful virtuous, honest or dishonest and deserving respect. Or which is the same, man learns to evaluate people

according to their actions and the feelings such actions awake in him. In this way, he forms his images and feelings of good and evil, just and unjust, virtue and vice, moral and amoral.

Indeed, we could hardly define morality without the notions of experience and feelings. Moral culture presupposes not only a certain knowledge and good education, but also emotional richness of personality. In his famous *Letters on Aesthetic Education*, Schiller wrote of the damage which derives from a disparaging attitude towards emotions and feelings. What we need is a "sound" or "kind" mind, and that prudence which expresses the harmony between mind and heart.

Culture of heart reveals the power of human feelings aimed at good and goodness, at love and compassion, at justice and humanity. It reveals the narrow-mindedness of the abstract and pedantic, deprived of impulses, attractions and desire. To live only according to the prescriptions of mind would be boring and weak. For rational and moral creatures true culture lies in the harmony between heart and mind, feelings, thoughts and intentions, ideas and beliefs, words and deeds.

Man is born to be free, joyous and happy, to bask in optimistic warmth and pure feelings. As positive feelings are natural to man, he can be cheated and deceived, and thus made to pay a high price for his mistakes. Dostoyevski wrote that bewilderment of mind disappear more quickly than that of heart, which are the most important. Errors of heart cannot be corrected by facts and knowledge for processing such facts, mistakes of heart absorb and infect them.

Culture of the heart is without excess and wastefulness; it excludes the extremes of emotion and feeling, of affectation and passion. It reflects the tendency of the human spirit towards perfection and harmony, encouraging noble thoughts and actions by wise moderation, discipline and self-discipline. Culture of the heart saves human dignity by making impossible unrestrained rudeness, impudence, arrogance, hard-heartedness, violence, callousness and any indifference, no matter to whom.

Culture of the heart expresses that most intimate emotional and psychological relation of man which is love towards people as human beings, towards oneself and towards the world. It embodies the uplifting power of moral feelings which represent the basic matrix of human life, the essence of human existence and communication. Its supreme expression is the unselfish and all-forgiving human love revealed in the Ten Commandments, whose deepest sense is compassion as good heartedness and good deeds. Thus, the "best ruling principle" for our conduct is the pursuit of such deeds as will ensure for us "the love of our fellowmen".

Culture of the heart elevates us above the intolerable living circumstances which we are forced to endure. Man does not willingly surrender in the face of these circumstances. The sculpture of the three monkeys-- the talisman of Mahatma Gandhi--symbolizes human victory over the blind, deaf and dumb elements of life. The first of these monkeys has covered its mouth to keep from foul language, from blasphemy. The second has closed its ears so as not to listen to bad language which could harm its soul, and the third has covered its eyes in order not to see anything ugly or bad. These symbols appeal, not for self-isolation from the world in which we live, but for mastering the most sacred impulses of the heart, keeping in mind that the worst thing for man is to be inhuman or amoral.

What is more, under the impact of scientific-technological progress, emotional crises grow deeper and more complicated. The loss of emotional and psychological direction increases. In the state of transition the individual experiences an acute emotional crisis due to which he changes his attitude towards people. He is susceptible to alienation; the disturbance and the destruction of one's self-image and of the image of the other lead to the painful feeling not only of a "lost soul" (T. Shibutani) but of a "lost heart" as well. In consequence personal self-confidence decreases into

apathy and indifference towards life, into total despair and even suicide. Culture of the heart rejects the emotional "blindness" and "deafness", the heartlessness, unscrupulousness and inhumanity which easily could turn our world from a heaven into an inferno. It is manifest as ability to overcome despair, anxiety, unrest, apathy, melancholy, depression and other negative aesthetic feelings and moods.

This is not so much the result of education as it is an end in itself. It is a result of appropriate upbringing which does not inhibit the natural tendencies in man, but elevates them aesthetically and morally. However, this would not be possible without the culture of mind which, in its ethical aspects, consists of personal moral knowledge and beliefs.

Moral Knowledge and Beliefs

The emotional and the rational coexist in a state of productive contradiction: feelings urge the mind to greater alertness, whereas mind purifies feelings. Hence moral culture does not exaggerate the importance of the emotional elements of morality at the expense of the rational, but organically unites knowledge and feelings, affects and passions, with temperament, character, personal will and conscience. Knowledge regarding ideas and ideals, norms and rules, requirements and duties which express the value of the good does not exist as impersonal information. Between moral knowledge and deed always function the corresponding beliefs without which it would be impossible to grasp one's personal view of life, value orientation and civil position. From this point of view, moral culture consists in harmony between "heart" and "mind" and in negation of "laziness of spirit", "atrophy of will and conscience", "emotional deafness and blindness", and rational frigidity. In the structure of social and individual moral consciousness, knowledge of values exists not as impersonal information, but in the form of ideas and beliefs. The link between moral consciousness and moral conduct is based not only on the emotions and feelings, but also on knowledge and beliefs.

Moral knowledge is the "fruit" of the "tree of knowledge of what is good and what is evil." This functions on three levels. The first is the sphere of traditional human relations, which function in the form of manners and customs. Traditional moral relations provide us with knowledge on the common sense level, which implies that each nation makes its ethics. Common sense accumulates everyday experiences and wisdom over many generations; by this it corrects individual delusions and wandering in life through the socialization and formation of man as a moral being. However, common sense is effective mainly in stereotypical situations, insofar as it symbolizes the traditions and moral principles which have been proven true over time. These are vitally necessary for every human community because they ensure a healthy moral and psychological atmosphere. But in the case of problematic situations which exceed the boundaries of everyday life, common sense often prescribes wrongly and becomes a prejudice. Thus, the competence of common sense in the sphere of moral decisions is quite limited.

The second level of moral knowledge is that of "practical reason". While criticizing Kant's apriorism, we would agree regarding the leading role of practical reason in the moral regulation of human actions. Its task is to formulate the basic moral principles and norms which constitute the so-called "categorical imperative" or imperative of morality. His notion of a genetic link between the categorical imperative and mental culture, and the development of the whole system of human culture, are quite fruitful. This tendency to exalt, or at least to recognize, the rational aspect of morality was further developed by Hegel, according to whom man seeks both his freedom and the grounds of morality through meditations.

The third level of moral knowledge, namely, moral beliefs and views provides the ideological content of human activity and conduct. Moral views are characterized by such features as rationality, tenacity and distinctness. Their principles and norms can be stated and rationally argued. By rationalizing the adopted principles of conduct, one ensures their more profound assimilation, so that moral beliefs develop late into moral views. As ordered into a system these constitute the individual's moral outlook on life, which is the most important component of his general view of life, nature and society.

Knowledge is the initial step in the formation of individual moral consciousness. It helps provide the individual with orientation regarding good as opposed to evil in the maze of interpersonal relations. However, Socrates pointed out the paradox that, a man could be very well-informed regarding what is good and what is evil while, at the same time, acting amorally. This "paradox" reveals that, without transformation into corresponding beliefs, the knowledge of good and evil, of virtue and vice, remains but a prerequisite for human actions, conduct and relations.

Moral beliefs, which are the ideological foundation of virtuous conduct, develop through the recognition of the vital importance of the directive force of moral values. These are internalized, they merge organically into emotions and feelings, thereby linking feelings, knowledge and practical action. Such beliefs represent moral knowledge that is deeply rooted in human consciousness. At the more conscious level they directly influence the choice of motive, decision-making and its execution. Thus, moral norms manifest not only an informational, but an algorithmic character. Based on certain beliefs, they have a special place in the hierarchy of models, uniting the "tactical" and "strategic" elements of human activity and grounding the contemporary concept of the functional organization of human behavior. Value orientation as the highest model of motivation implies an active civil role by the person.

Moral knowledge could function only if and when it develops into the corresponding beliefs of the person: when transformed into moral beliefs ideas about good and evil become a great moral power. Ideas captivate our thoughts, subordinate our beliefs and direct our consciences. They are bonds from which man cannot free himself without tearing out his heart; they can be defeated only by being subject to them.

Moral beliefs are the subjective grounds of sanity and responsibility, of control and self-control of the person which realized themselves with the help of personal will and conscience. The fact of the existence of the so-called "pangs of conscience" bespeaks the acute realization and painful acceptance of the gap between personal moral beliefs and individual actions; between feelings and thoughts, on the one hand, and activity, on the other; between the words and deeds of the individual as a person and as a citizen.

Unfortunately, contemporary civilization emphasizes mainly the rational powers of man, ignoring his emotional side so that gradually one becomes immune to the joy of communication with other people. Social mobility, automation and computerization, the enormous use of mass media (tv, radio, films, video, press) hinder emotional sympathy between people so that we remain indifferent to the pain, sorrow, suffering, joy and exaltation of others. Many authors conclude with anxiety that development of mind and intellect are matched by the decrease and neglect in emotionality and sentimentality. Knowledge about good and evil, if not united with emotions, feelings and personal moral beliefs, cannot ensure moderation of mind, drives, desires, intentions and actions, and hence of spiritual good will and equilibrium.

Epilogue

The Guilty Spirit: Crossroads for Post-Totalitarian Intellectuals

Asen Davidov

"You will see now. Now, when the intellectual - how many times in history - will disappear or rather dive as deeply as a loon. In its real sense, the depth is silence." (Jose Ortega Y Gasset, *The Intellectual and the Other*)

The Spiritual Nature of Today's Crisis

"History is not dialectical. Socialism had not succeeded capitalism." (Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*)

The amazing disintegration of the Soviet bloc has raised a set of critical problems for both ordinary and global politics. The contemporary world faces new and grave difficulties of an economic, political, and national nature; on the threshold of the twenty-first century quite a new culture is being shaped. One of the most critical issues in Eastern Europe today, and in Bulgaria in particular, is the urgent need to adopt new values and radically to change people's totalitarian mentality in a truly democratic, rather than simply a post-totalitarian, fashion. Along with direct theoretical challenges to the traditional understanding of the political and cultural spheres, one faces the specific problem of the role of intellectuals under so called post-totalitarian conditions. This is the problem of the guilt and responsibility which intellectuals in the post-totalitarian age prescribe for themselves, and which society too attributes to them. Under these unprecedented conditions, what could be the fate of the Spirit and of its bearers, the intellectuals?

The collapse of the "World Socialist System" has been linked throughout the world to a revival of the humanist traditions and of the significance of the free individuals. This has been compared by some thinkers and politicians to the glorious Renaissance of post-medieval Europe. By others it is termed a victorious "end of history" (F. Fukujama), in that the ideals of democracy and freedom are realized irrevocably.

But this glorious epoch is described as an age of deep crisis, of dangerous loss of the established world equilibrium, of outbursts of destructive forms of nationalism, economic upheavals, migrations, and inevitably of striving for a new partition of the world. Not only visions of Balkanization and new dictatorships, but the horrible possibility of world omnicide haunt the imagination.

However, a crisis does not necessarily mean implacable tragedy and decline; it may signify growth leading to a new quality of life. The creation of the new always involves crisis, which is not only a setback, but can be also an advance by stirring up burning questions. It thereby requires re-direction and, eventually, re-unification. In this respect, the whole history of humanity can be regarded as a transition from one crisis to another.

This does not mean that one should be masochistic about the present situation, which is marked by inadequacy and growing bewilderment. This is not just an ordinary crisis such as those through which all societies pass periodically and which is of no lasting importance, nor is it in Pitirim Sorokin's earlier description the death agony of Western culture and society in general.

The main issue of our critical time is neither democracy *versus* totalitarianism, nor liberty *versus* despotism, nor cosmopolitanism *versus* nationalism, nor pacifism *versus* militarism, nor, as Sorokin put it, "any of the current popular issues daily proclaimed by statesmen and politicians, professors and ministers, journalists and soapbox orators."¹ The essence of the present crisis is rather the end of an old type of culture and transition to another so that, "the tragedy and chaos, the horrors and sorrow of the transition period being over, they will evolve a new creative life, in a new integrated form."² Thus, the crisis itself is "but the birth pangs of a new form of culture, the travail attending the release of new creative forces,"³--one could add, a sort of spiritual revolution.

But how can one be that optimistic about an allegedly bright future of human culture? Does not culture contain potentialities which are entirely negative and destructive? As Walter Benjamin noted, "there is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of barbarism." Every cultural form, every type of culture and culture in general can be disintegrative.

It is a commonplace that every revolution destroys traditional value systems, for revolutions are interruptions of the natural social, political, economic and cultural evolution of a society. In noting that the men of the American Revolution thought of themselves as 'founders', Hannah Arendt pointed to the deepest grounds of such revolutionary eruptions. In a revolution, what matters is the very act of foundation. The source of revolutionary authority is neither transcendent nor "historical"; what is "absolute" is the very act of beginning. But:

It is in the very nature of a beginning to carry with itself a measure of complete arbitrariness. Not only is it not bound into a reliable chain of cause and effect, a chain in which effect immediately turns into the cause for future development, the beginning has, as it were, nothing whatsoever to hold on to; it is as though it came out of nowhere in either time or space.⁴

There are, of course, critical differences between the revolutions of the Modern Age. Even if one agrees with Arendt's assertion that violence is not inherent in all revolutions, such as was the case with the "unique lesson" of the American Revolution which "did not break out but was made by men in common deliberation and on the strength of mutual pledges,"⁵ nevertheless, it would still be incorrect to deny the emergent nature of a revolution: it leads somewhere, but it stems out of nothing. To a great extent, it is senseless to speak of a "revolutionary tradition" inasmuch as the pure act of beginning excludes the very principle of tradition. In this respect, the more than half a century of prolonged Communist experiment clearly proved that slow progress, sacrificing the lives and happiness of millions of human beings in the name of progress, is even more problematic and dubious.

Moreover, over seven decades after those "ten days that shook the world," all post-Communist countries today are facing the problem of transition to a stage already transcended by developed societies. In his vision of a dynamic economic revival of one post-Communist society, Elemer Hankiss put it thus: "The values and ideology necessary for such a revival, those of a 'new Protestant ethic' which is based on discipline, responsibility, rationality, efficiency, frugality, and

¹ P. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age. The Social and Cultural Outlook*. (New York: Dutton, 1957), p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

³ W. Benjamin, "Eduard Fuchs: Collector and Historian", A. Atrato and E. Gebhardt, eds., *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* (New York: Urizen, 1978), p. 233.

⁴ H. Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Pelican Books, 1987), p. 206.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

accumulation (and not consumption) orientation, have not yet emerged."⁶ Though this is said especially about Hungary, it is valid for all post-Communist societies as well. Today, their former system of values has been proven to be totally confused and these societies have painfully disintegrated.

As long as ten years ago, in an analysis of the deliberate destruction of culture and humane education in Czechoslovakia after 1968, the pseudonymous Vaclav Racek⁷ observed that to substitute free cultural life with a "poor residue of substandard art and literature" (the so called "cultural policy" of the totalitarian rulers) was a major concern and aimed at dominating the "ideological vagueness" of all spheres of life.

By this, the conditions for creative activity independent of the official ideological canon were eliminated. This fitted the bias of people for ideological vagueness, abdicating all personal responsibility for their lives. According to the totalitarian sophistry, since vagueness and all-pervasive relativity constitute the proper meaning of one's life, one is not to blame for being too obedient. But on a broad scale, the most significant result of the cultural policy in question was that totalitarianism embodied and carried to fruition "spiritual uncertainty" on a massive scale. Thence, as noted Racek, there follows a most serious effect, namely, that the modern totalitarianisms express a total "crisis in belief which threatens our entire civilization," and that this is a logical development of the secularized world of modern democracy."

The quest for new paradigms in post-Communist countries is now too frenetic to permit one to be optimistic about democratic processes in Central and East European countries. Neither progress of the formal rationality of classical capitalism, nor the triumphant instrumental reason of post-industrial societies are capable of providing the values to guarantee the motivation needed for any kind of revival. In addition to the general confusion in the field of values in today's post-totalitarian world, there is a psychological obstacle. As Karl Mannheim said: "People who are conditioned to accept values blindly either through obedience, imitation or emotional suggestion will hardly be able to cope with those values that appeal to reason and whose underlying principles can and must be argued." That is why "in order to create a law-abiding citizen whose obedience is not solely based upon blind acceptance and habit, we ought to re-educate the whole man."⁸

Yet, for a great part of the world, this century is too unstable to believe that some organizational principles could be dominant, or even clearly formulated or re-formulated in the observable future. There is real disintegration for both underdeveloped and highly developed societies. Advanced capitalism and post-capitalism cannot harmonize various organizational principles in order to provide a comparatively stable social configuration. Some components of the required model can be congruent, while others seem incongruent or even entirely incompatible within a given configuration, so that their alleged complementarity is far from self-evident.

A lot of contemporary thinkers have been scrutinizing such discrepancies and incompatibilities between numerous social, economic, political, and cultural sub-systems of developed Western societies. Raymond Aron, one of the de-ideologists, recognized the contradiction between egalitarian ideals and hierarchically organized structures as one of the most long lasting and inevitable contradictions of industrial society.⁹

⁶ E. Hankiss, In Search of a Paradigm B, *Daedalus* (Winter, 1990), p. 209.

⁷ V. Racek, "Totalitarianism in 1983", *The Salisbury Review* (Spring, 1983), pp. 30-32.

⁸ K. Mannheim, *Diagnosis of Our Time. Wartime Essays of a Sociologies* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 166.

⁹ R. Aron, *Eighteen Lectures on Industrial Society* (London: Weidenfeld, 1967).

From this point of view, the contradictions which are of greatest concern are those which Daniel Bell called the "cultural contradictions of capitalism," such as decay of traditional bourgeois morality and the so-called "Protestant ethic" (Max Weber), the irrationality of the efficiency principle, the collapse of "functional" reason, and so forth. In the long run, these are the most serious challenges to contemporary society as instinct, hedonism, and irrationalism gain the upper hand over the traditional (though now disintegrated) value subsystems of contemporary society.¹⁰ To Claus Offe there is deep discord between institutional and symbolic systems in highly developed societies.¹¹ Juergen Habermas' attempts to systematize crises and the methodology of systematic crisis research have convincingly revealed how a crisis arising in motivation in a socio-cultural system can endanger the traditional ideal of the individual.¹² Thus, one of the favorite subjects of post-modernist authors has become, as Fred Dallmayr puts it, the "twilight of the subject."¹³

Despite all the conscious disagreement, Habermas *nolens-volens* had to follow Adorno-Horkheimer's thesis about the death of the "bourgeois individual" and of the prospect of discovering the road to total, valid human happiness. After the crash of the Enlightenment project, there would be no self-decisive illusions.

This being the case, what ought the intellectual do in order to promote a new humanity and individuality? How should one regard the role of the Spirit in this new world of ours, with all the contradictions in the dramatic tensions between the new integrity and the old hatreds?

In this respect, one must not underestimate the fact that the roots of destructive disintegration originated from the deepest strata of values themselves. Such an approach would overcome some of the shortcomings of the objectivistic (naturalistic, positivistic, Marxist and the like) perspectives which reduce the crisis of the value system to economic, sociological, political, in a word, "measurable" and "calculable" factors. Karl Mannheim, for example, was entirely sure that the urgent need to begin discussion on this topic could be specified on a sociological and functional, as well as on a qualitative, level. To him the two seemed complementary.¹⁴

This was a typically positivist illusion, for it would be a *contradictio in adjecto* for a functionalist perspective to have room for the qualitative, that is the axiological, aspects of culture. Jürgen Habermas has shown cogently that the objectivistic point of view (as, for example, systems theory) is unable to encompass the crisis dimension of a system in collapse. Insofar as it is not systems as such, but only subjects who are involved in the crisis, any effective crisis analysis must be one in which "the connection between normative structures and steering problems becomes palpable."¹⁵

The perspective in question should combine two different dimensions of values: that of subjective (free) choice and that of objective, socially imposed norms. Social changes lead either to new limitations or to a release of the activities of individuals in accord with their preferences, predilections, and personal wishes. It is at this level of analysis that an adequate role for intellectuals in the present situation of crisis can be identified.

¹⁰ Cf. D. Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

¹¹ Cl. Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State* (London: Hutchinson, 1984).

¹² Cf. J. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 1-8.

¹³ Fr. R. Dallmayr, *Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory of Politics* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981).

¹⁴ Cf. K. Mannheim, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁵ Cf. J. Habermas, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-130.

It seems only natural that, in days of economic and political deficiencies, social and ethnic tensions, and spiritual misery, people would care first and foremost about their physical and social survival, rather than about the spiritual, transcendental, and "philosophical" dimensions of their being. But without exactly judging the contemporary situation *sub speciae aeternitatis*, one should recall that "man does not live on bread alone" (*Lu.*, 4:4). On the other hand, the process of stocking peoples' minds with new knowledge and attitudes comes up against a stubborn totalitarian mentality and a solid stratum of old prejudices and habits of mind and heart which can be difficult to surmount. Collectivistic communist ideology so fatally eroded the paths which might lead the post-Communist pseudo-subject to the effective fulfillment of the values of a free, independent, and responsible individual that, in the long run, the all-embracing diffusion of values contributes to general confusion.

Hence, there is need for a growing role of such cultural and, to be more specific, spiritual and intellectual factors as religion, the arts, philosophy and the sciences. These can be preserved and further developed by a specific social stratum relatively unattached to *the hic and nunc*, temporal and limited economic, political, and social interests. This is the group of the intellectuals, who have a unique ability to break through the ideological framework of any society, both totalitarian and, even more, democratic. What role should intellectuals play in such a situation?

The so-called post-totalitarian situation of East European intellectuals proves too ambivalent to be regarded as some final spiritual victory over an obsolete, but not innocuous, totalitarian mentality. Not only are there drastic national, traditional, historical, cultural, political, and social differences between post-Communist countries and their representatives in high office. Czech President Havel differs so greatly from Bulgarian President Zhelev as to make one doubt whether they are comparable even in terms of their former dissent. On the other hand, even greater similarities may be traced between such different types of intellectuals as Vaclav Havel and Jean-Francois Lyotard. *Le tombeau de l'intellectuell* and *Les Differend* of the latter, and the plays of the former, both call for a radical pluralism of world views and aversion to any universal projects of emancipation.¹⁶

The contemporary post-totalitarian situation is not unique as regards the problematic nature of intellectuals in society. The "crisis of the intellectual" can well be applied also to post-Hitlerist Germany, post-Revolutionary Russia (of 1917 and of 1905-1907), and the Restoration period in nineteenth century France.

According to Bernard-Henry Levy, today's loss of self-confidence, decline of mutual trust, sense of guilt and helplessness, decay of earlier orientations and lack of new ones, all reveal the current spiritual disintegration of the West today.¹⁷ How could it cope with the hope and zeal of East and Central Europeans to become "just Europeans," or even "just Westerners" (the West being taken for the ultimate incarnation of the civilization whose traditional values had been uncritically identified with human values in general)?

The Guilty Intellectual

"In short, the intellectual is raw material for a verdict, a sentence, a condemnation, an exclusion. . . . And I catch a glimpse of the radiant city in which the intellectual would be in prison or, if he were also a theoretician, hanged, of course." (Michel Foucault, *The Masked Philosopher*)

¹⁶ C. Bayard, "The Intellectual in the Post Modern Age: East/West Contrasts", *Philosophy Today*, (1990).

¹⁷ B.-H. Levy, *Eloge des intellectuels* (Paris: Grasset, 1987).

Today, the status of post-totalitarian intellectuals is proving to be rather unclear and problematical. The collapse of the so-called Socialist World System and the bankruptcy of its official ideology has challenged almost all intellectuals in the former Communist countries. On the one hand, they bear the shameful mark of having been a handmaid of a totalitarian party and one of its "engineers of human souls" (Maxim Gorky). To a great extent, it was by virtue of their efforts that the traditionally free Spirit turned into a suspicious form of ideology. On the other hand, a great many new possibilities for pluralistic development and for exchange of ideas have developed. An open, free and creative (rather than the compulsory "fight to final victory") dialogue has begun with those formerly labeled as "bourgeois ideologists". One can witness this fact now in the publishing and teaching policy in post-Communist societies.

This being the case, the next question is to what extent the intellectuals are to be praised for the moments of upsurge of humanity and to what extent are they to blame for its moments of degradation? Even if one considers the latter to be of no importance since there is general progress in history, one cannot avoid the problem of guilt on the part both of intellectuals and of their notorious "Spirit".

One can agree, from this point of view, that there is both shame and glory for modern intellectuals--not only for those from the East, but for those from the West as well--for they were responsible for fighting "Philistine injustice" and for maintaining social and political regimes which generated such injustices. As Peter Viereck put it, "Glory of the intellectuals: the fight against the persecution of Dreyfus and later the fight against fascism. Shame of the intellectuals: the lack of an equal fight against the Moscow trials of the 1930s, where not one Dreyfus but thousands of Dreyfuses, thousands of Saccos and Vanzettis, were persecuted, tortured, slaughtered."¹⁸

The problem remains valid, but takes acute forms in transitional periods, especially in, so to say, "post" periods, when the deeds have already been done, the glory distributed and consumed, but the horror of crimes still cries out for revenge.

It is necessary to move in a new direction. It is an inherent feature of the intellectuals' Spirit consistently to go back, aiming at a scrupulous investigation and interrogation of its own foundations. Even the adepts of the so-called post-modern ideology, despite all their noisy strictures against any sort of foundationalism, are inclined to hold forth (negatively) on the deepest grounds of the social and cultural role of the intellectual.

Their jeremiads are a seemingly inevitable ingredient of the cultural life of any society. This phenomenon may be traced back either to the so-called generation gap or to the level of depth psychology. For Freud, two feelings of fear constitute the sense of guilt: on the one hand, "fear of authority" and, on the other hand, "fear of the super-ego". While the former regards an external factor whose love one would hate to lose (hence, the renunciation of instincts), the latter is truly fatal in nature. There is no escape from the fear of interiorized external authority represented by the super-ego. Instinctual renunciation is never enough, "for the will persists and cannot be concealed from the super-ego." The outcome is tragic, because one is doomed always to be haunted by one's unsatisfied wishes. To put it in Freud's own words, "a threatened external unhappiness--loss of love and punishment on the part of the external authority--has been exchanged for a permanent internal unhappiness, for the tension of the sense of guilt."¹⁹

¹⁸ P. Viereck, *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals. Babbit Jr. vs. the Rediscovery of Values* (New York: Capricorn, 1965), xx.

¹⁹ S. Freud, *Culture and Its Discontents, Standart Edition*, Vol. 21 (New York: Norton, 1961), p. 83.

This is the more characteristic of intellectuals because it is culture, as interiorized society, that is the cause of such permanent tension. The stronger the identification with culture, the more acute the fear of the super-ego and, consequently, the sense of guilt. Moreover, inasmuch as all cultural creativity transcends a given cultural "reality", the creators of culture are at the same time the ones who negate it: from the point of view of the crystallized culture, cultural creativity can be regarded as cultural nihilism. On the part of the creators themselves, this appears as unforgivable guilt which cries out for severe punishment so that by the very nature of their cultural involvement, intellectuals cannot but be masochistic. In every case of the intellectuals' social and cultural criticism, there is a deep feeling of being constantly self-accused and self-reproached, as if the very existence of the world depended on this comparatively thin, unstable and, at the same time, absolutely indispensable stratum.

But it seems not to be useful either, on the one hand, to take too seriously their declarations that they are "the salt of the earth", or, on the other hand, to ask whether they are to blame for almost all the world's "faults". Instead of dwelling upon such questions, I would suggest another facet of the problem, namely, whether there is any basis for the well-known confidence of intellectuals that they are the privileged instruments or spokespersons of the Spirit and of culture, through which claim they exercise their rule.

An inferiority/superiority complex is immanently linked to the guilt-complex, and in turn is the existential root of one well-known feature of intellectuals, namely, their restless vacillation between a hyper-responsible Sartre *engagement* and an allegedly irresponsible Nietzschean-Adornian *ressentiment* and resignation. Intellectuals appear always to be doomed to answer for something and before someone, as if they were habitual criminals. Here, it is of no great importance whether the intellectuals' posture is defensive or offensive, for their problem of guilt and responsibility is neither a simple metaphor nor a matter of juridical casuistry. It is for them "the latest topic," a complex that is constantly actual. The degree of intensity to which they feel this guilt may be regarded as the degree of their intelligence. In this view society more than once has killed its prophets, but new ones obsessed by a feeling of "sacrifice for humanity" (Thomas Mann) always have taken their places. Thus, it is a stubborn and petrified mankind that is to blame for the intellectual's suffering.

How is such a typical sadomasochistic situation of the intellectual possible; can it somehow be avoided? These are nightmarish questions, related, first and foremost, to certain basic conceptions of guilt, responsibility, tolerance, intelligence, social stratum, and social activity. Each of these can be analyzed in metaphysical, socio-cultural, and socio-historical perspectives. Here, I can only indicate some aspects which I regard as the most significant.

When an ordinary consciousness faces the problem of guilt, it usually means a condition which results from violating or overstepping certain rules and moral norms (and naturalistically-oriented philosophy and ethics try to ground it theoretically).²⁰ In this respect, guilt is a moral relation of a person towards other persons or towards society as a whole. That is why it is not enough to realize this condition in order to overcome it. It is overcome mainly through some "good" redeeming deed and actively stepping back into the "normal circle." In some religions, for example, this redemption or clearing away of one's guilt (sin) is attained through the sacrament of confession and through *iijui*, the latter eventually following the former. In society, different sanctions regulate the redeeming deeds on the part of the guilty: judicial (sentences, penalties, etc.), moral (censures, reproaches, etc.), and individual (conscience, remorse, etc.).

²⁰ In some Slavic languages (e.g. in Russian, Bulgarian, etc.) the very term "crime" (*prestuplenie*) originates etymologically from "stepping over something" (*pere-stupat, re-stapvam*).

The concept of responsibility, linked to the above-mentioned understanding of guilt, specifies a person's relation to society as regards specific moral requirements. These are crystallized in a set pattern of moral behavior, which is usually sanctioned by tradition, moral codes, training, education and the language itself. That is why the problem of responsibility is usually situated in its practical dimension, which reduces the problem to how much a person realizes his/her moral duties; how strictly he/she fulfills them; and how adequate, from this point of view, are his/her activities.²¹ Hence, responsibility is always quite concrete and individual. Guilt differs from responsibility in that, though graded, it also may be collective.

Despite its brevity this introduction to the problem suggests a latent ideological content whose roots can be traced back to the vision formulated by Marx in his famous thesis: "Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations."²² Here the tendency is to reduce the individual entirely to a function of society, which, in turn, is the basis for the value of one's social activity. Precisely because of this, however, the conception becomes entirely inadequate, at the very least because, on a phenomenological level, the individual feels guilty (if at all) without gradation: if there is any sense of guilt, there is guilt in its entirety. That is why the sense of guilt is always dramatic, and sometimes even tragic. On this level, when there is such feeling, different individuals' experiences of being guilty are always identical.

To unveil the "ultimate grounds" of guilt and correspondingly of responsibility, we must remove from this notion any social and even psychological shell, as well as any concrete historical content which generates anxiety and "bad conscience." The very possibility of feelings of guilt lies beyond such horizons; it is free of any close relations between the individual and society. As Heidegger put it, "Being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness [*Verschuldung*]; . . . on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only 'on the basis' of a primordial Being-guilty."²³ In this respect, guilt is a primordial phenomenon [*Urphaenomen*] which makes possible feelings of duty and responsibility, as well as of human communion itself.

The next question is why intellectuals, who are morbidly inclined to make their sense of guilt a constant "theme," try to impose guilt on society, which at times can undergo a dangerous moral crisis. Savonarola, the late fifteenth century Florentine, is but one typical representative of such an obsessive and risky stance. In a word, who is the intellectual that he/she should judge people and the world and make them (him/herself included) responsible for anything whatsoever? Later I will return to this God-like inclination of intellectuals.

There is need now to distinguish between intellectuals and the so-called intelligentsia, a concept that one often meets in sociology and the history of culture. This will cast more light upon the ambiguous role of intellectuals in society in general, and especially in a post-totalitarian society. Here, we shall proceed from the socio-historical and metaphysical to the socio-cultural dimension of the problem.

Intelligentsia vs. Intellectuals

²¹ Obviously, it is not a sheer coincidence that in the modern European philosophical tradition shaping the modern individual went hand in hand with an identification of the practical with the moral. Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* is certainly most representative in this respect.

²² K. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" in Marx-Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 616.

²³ M. Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 329.

"Stop baiting intellectuals." (Peter Viereck, *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals*)

Profound ambiguities are rooted, first and foremost, in the indefinite nature of the very notion of the intellectual. Their nature obviously is conditioned by their inherently contradictory socio-cultural genesis and role. This was described cogently by Karl Mannheim in his famous inquiry into the social *habitat* of intellectuals, whom he calls unattached and/or detached.²⁴ By its historical nature, the "relatively unattached intelligentsia" adopt a way of life that is "in a state of suspense without final certainty." The intelligentsia is fated, so to speak, to endure and even relish "continuing exposure to the alternatives inherent in a culture." "To a large degree, the intellectual process was a by-product of historical decomposition"; freedom of thought was "but an episode between periods of institutional culture." In today's larger, highly institutionalized societies, however, the existence of such "outsiders" becomes ever more precarious and trying.

It is no coincidence that Mannheim prefers to use the Russian term *intelligentsia* to mark the specifically sociological aspect of a classless aggregation of people who, by their very social origin, can neither establish their social identity (and who are keenly aware of this fact), nor are capable of concerted action. Though in the Western tradition it is more usual to speak about intellectuals, the two categories in question share certain common features. While the term 'intellectual' emphasizes the individualistic stance of these people of knowledge, the *literati*, *les savants*, *les hommes de lettre*, or, as Friedrich A. Hayek says, "second-hand dealers in ideas,"²⁵ the term 'intelligentsia' draws attention to the social self-awareness of this interstitial stratum. Often, however, the terms are used interchangeably.

The content of the notions has been shaped from the dawn of the modern age in the formation of a specific new stratum, that of paid professional state-officers or the bureaucracy. This has a wide range including paid state-officers, writers, artists, actors, lawyers, educators, engineers, professional military men, physicians, scholars, professional politicians, and the like. Besides the specifically sociological reasons, there are ideological and world-view considerations as well. The new bureaucrats were supposed to fulfill functions requiring high education, namely: to compose reports and decrees, to count and balance, and to make relevant decisions. This role fitted best the modern "enlightened" intelligentsia. Hannah Arendt was correct in identifying the career of the bureaucrat as that which was "discovered by and first attracted the best, and sometimes even the most clear-sighted, intelligentsia."²⁶ Perhaps from this origin of the intelligentsia come their specific and ambivalent interrelations with the powers that be.

The word 'intellectual' was coined as a badge of honor in France in the "manifesto of the intellectuals" by Emile Zola and others in their fight against the unfair military and legal system, specifically, in direct connection with the notorious Dreyfus Affair. In America William James introduced the word intellectuals in this perspective.

On the other hand, direct political activity did not appear to them to be entirely substantial, especially in terms of their *differentia specifica*. Even if it was not regarded as a sort of "betrayal of the vocation of the creative and cultured personality" (as was the case with Mann, Hesse, Zweig, and the like), being "without a political mandate", such work could never turn into a profession,

²⁴ K. Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Culture* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956), pp. 91-170.

²⁵ F. A. Hayek, *The Intellectuals and Socialism* (Fairfax, Va: Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University, 1990), p. 3.

²⁶ H. Arendt, *The Origin of Totalitarianism* (New York: A Harvest Book, 1973), p. 186.

as was noted by Max Weber.²⁷ Indeed, for Weber such a transformation would be a real disaster because then "sterile excitation", which is not a genuine passion, but only a "romanticism of the intellectually interesting" which was peculiar to, e. g., a certain type of Russian intellectual, would replace matter-of-factness, or the "feeling of objective responsibility."²⁸ Here I will try to delineate only two aspects of this.

The sociological genesis of the intelligentsia and their lack of cohesion shapes their mental attitude. From the socio-cultural point of view, "intelligentsia" can be regarded as a generic notion, and "intellectuals" as a specific one. Both share certain features: predominantly mental work, usually higher education, lack of social homogeneity, classlessness, lack of mutual political and economic interests, inability to form a party, informal or club-like types of inter-communication (or, as Max Scheller called it, "intimate groups of unique individuals"), pluralistic openness and mental dynamism, and higher empathic abilities.

Intellectuals share these features with the intelligentsia, but at the same time play a highly creative role in culture. Intellectuals not only make use of values, but also create new meaning. In Oswald Spengler's terms, the intelligentsia corresponds to the realm of Spirit, while intellectuals represent the realm of Soul; the latter belong to Culture, while the former belong to Civilization.

What deeply involves intellectuals with culture is that, unlike the intelligentsia in general, they are not only potentially, but actually "beyond." They cannot comprehend themselves as bearers and spokesmen of given social interests, social programs, and the like. They feel at home not with realities, but with ideals. In a sense, intellectuals belong neither to their time, nor to their nation: they do not belong at all.

In a word, intellectuals form that part of the intelligentsia which Nikolai Berdyaev associated with the "all-human" or those who do not belong to any "circle." He distinguished intellectuals from the so-called intelligentsia, or, as he put it, the "intelligentsia in quotation marks" or the "intelligent masses" which is always devoted to particular class interests and professes social change. To Berdyaev, this formed a kind of intelligentsia engaged in a false "circle" of activities (*kruzhkovaja intelligentsia*) which finally deviated from its own original spiritual roots. At the turn of the century it was constituted of half-educated, incohesive and "strange" groups of people.²⁹ This type of *literati* was described by Hayek as that judging "new ideas not by their specific merits, but by the readiness with which they fit into his general conceptions, into the picture of the world which he regards as modern or advanced."³⁰ The intellectual would have nothing to do with such "intelligent" dogmatism.

Bearing in mind this distinction, let us turn to a feature of the intelligentsia which K. Mannheim termed *schizothymia*. The intellectuals' capacity for introversion puts them in critical tension with this world; in extreme cases it impairs their capacity to maintain "normal" social contacts. Mannheim reaffirms for today Max Weber's position that whenever a stratum of *literati* emerged it has shown "an inclination towards private intellectual ecstasies, as contrasted

²⁷ Cf. J. Habermas, *The New Conservatism, Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), pp. 72, 77-79; P. Viereck, *op. cit.*, xix-xxi.

²⁸ M. Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 115, 127.

²⁹ N. Berdyaev, *The Spiritual Crisis of the Intelligentsia* (St. Peterburg: Obshtestvennaja Polza, 1910), p. 61 (in Russian).

³⁰ F. A. Hayek, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

with the communal rapture of peasants". This is connected with their "estrangement from the public realm of reality."³¹

Only those not concerned with the unresolved tension between their existential isolation and their inability to resolve it would deliberately "plunge" into professional (or quasi-professional) political activities. Only those who feel socially engaged and are inclined to act accordingly, could be labeled *intelligentsia* in a socially meaningful way.

This does not at all mean that intellectuals live a sectarian life. Living *tête-à-tête* not just with truth, but with its meaning, the intellectual strives after a universal, all-human consciousness. It is precisely the latter that is connected by Berdyaev with human dignity and the growth of human culture, since knowledge itself is assessed by the intellectual not by its social and practical applicability and usefulness, but by its own value alone. In this respect, namely, with regard to "the absolute meaning of man," truth can be posed above interest, and not *vice versa*. Later, in the 1930s, Berdyaev developed this perspective in a definite sacred direction. Maintaining that the prophetic is not characteristic of religious life alone, for Berdyaev a true intellectual would represent freedom, meaning, value and quality, rather than state, class, social interests, or quantity. To Berdyaev, the substantial, rather than merely formal, connection of the intellectual with the outer world is God.³² The "inner voice" of the intellectual should be dedicated basically to this divine direction. Though solitary, the prophet is sensitive to the destinies of people and humankind precisely because he has given up listening to the voice of society; the intellectual is devoted fundamentally not to *voce populi*, but rather to *voce Dei*. But is not God also an Absolute? . . .

In any case, the intellectual is engaged with ideals and values, not in an organized social and political manner or formally, but substantially. That is why his/her responsibility is conditioned neither from outside (socially), nor from inside (psychologically), but existentially.

It is the intellectual who has direct access to the so-called ultimate grounds which make human life meaningful. In a certain way, the intellectual is constantly living a frontier life; he is, so to say, in a permanent *Grenzsituation* (Jaspers). That is why he is exposed constantly to the highest type of guilt, which Karl Jaspers has labeled "metaphysical." In Berdyaev's terms, one may say that this kind of guilt springs from the solidarity or "mutual responsibility" of human beings as human beings. This has nothing to do with "irresponsible equality," or with a "slavish dependence of the person on his [social] environment", for where there is "victory of quantity over quality" one can hardly speak of real responsibility.

Joining a side means exactly the tendency towards quantity. The intellectual then no longer remains alone with his truth; its meaning is no longer substantially his and for him. In his analysis of the case of Heinrich Heine, Juergen Habermas observed that both intellectual "mandarins" (such as Hesse, Mann and Jaspers) and theoreticians oriented to *Realpolitik* (like Max Weber and Heuss) opposed the "politicization of the mind." From both sides there is constant "fear of the intellectual's mixing categories [mind and power] which would better remain separate. . . ."³³

It is tragic to live on the borderline. The individual is incapable of envisaging all the consequences of his own activities. Yet he ought to know them since otherwise he could not act at all. Awareness on the part of the intellectual of this tension between pure activity and responsibility for its effects makes him/her feel primordial guilt from which there is no escape. Jaspers revealed the horrible fact that neither a court sentence, nor political ostracism, nor economic expropriation

³¹ Cf. K. Mannheim, *Essays in Sociology of Culture*, pp. 162-163.

³² N. Berdyaev, "The Crisis of the Intellect", *Kultura* (Sofia: No.19, 1991), p. 3 (in Bulgarian).

³³ J. Habermas, *The New Conservatism*, p. 78.

could plead innocence for the intellectual.³⁴ In this perspective, all social activism turns false and perhaps even harmful insofar as it draws us far away from the authentic roots of guilt. It is suspicious also in that it generates an inadequate feeling of redemption, which is essentially foreign to the outsider. There is no indulgence for the intellectual; for him the fact that "the very thinking turns to be a guilt" (J. F. Mora) is in the end his ultimate ground.

On the other hand, being socially associated with the intelligentsia, intellectuals cannot avoid thinking; it would be absurd to hold them responsible for their thinking. Not only Bolsheviks and National-Socialists who can hardly be suspected of being much in favor of the thought process, but even Sartre and many other intellectuals have appealed often to concrete social, political and, in a word, external engagement and thoughtless activism. If I may invert a wellknown imperative by Karl Marx into an interrogative, the question here is: must ideas always be turned into reality?

This raises the problem of the responsibility of intellectuals. Here this can be formulated not as a question concerning the intellectual's responsibility before his/her own nation, nor even before mankind as a whole. Rather, it how he/she is responsible not as a functionary of society, but as a bearer and creator of human meaningfulness, as the one who makes sense of *le condition humaine*?

Responsibility and Tolerance for Post-Totalitarian Intellectuals

"Growing deaf from the cries, from the earsplitting roar of the politics, the ears of men become senseless to a tenderness of the undertones, to a quiet and penetrating irony. . . . This is the dictatorship of the intolerance." (Stefan Zweig, *Erasmus of Rotterdam*)

The cultural dimension of the problem of the intellectuals becomes crucial in a situation of qualitative social transition and radical change in its value attitudes and normative systems. This is even more valid for our epoch, which has been called, not very helpfully, post-totalitarian. If we think of totalitarianism not as an "ideal type" of social, economical, political, and cultural order, but as a hellish reality we have to accept also that the respective mentality of people living under totalitarianism could be nothing other than totalitarian. In a truly totalitarian society, even the intellectuals under totalitarian rule cannot save the intelligentsia from the totalitarian mentality. Totalitarianism made it clear that Alfred Weber's and Karl Mannheim's "free-floating intelligentsia" is but another liberal dream that would never come true.

Mannheim himself felt forced to define further the concept in question. His use of the term "relatively uncommitted intelligentsia" does not even hint at "an entirely unattached group free of class liaisons." What he had in mind was that though "intellectuals do not form an exalted stratum above the classes and are in no way better endowed with a capacity to overcome their own class attachments than other groups, certain types of intellectuals have maximum opportunity to test and employ socially available vistas and to experience their inconsistencies."³⁵

This is quite important in itself, especially in comparison with professional politicians, unscrupulous partisans, and noisy spokesmen of so-called class interests--those who have been in the professional service of the *Agitprop*.³⁶ Objectively speaking, however, the intelligentsia seems doomed to be "in the service" of society, even when certain representatives of that stratum

³⁴ Cf. K. Jaspers, *Die Schuldfrage* (Heidelberg, 1946); *Philosophie*, Bd. II (Berlin: 1956), p. 264.

³⁵ K. Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, pp. 105-106.

³⁶ A Russian abbreviation for the Communist Party committees and its members who were specialized to work as ideological agitators and political propagandists.

deliberately give up (at least at the level of their own self-awareness) any kind of active participation in the power structures.

It would be an even worse idea to put the "people of Spirit" at the top and make them rule society. Here, I refer to the ambiguity of the Spirit itself. Plato's *Republic* is a classical example in placing philosophers at the top of his Utopian social pyramid. Promising as it might sound, this dream would be fatal if it were ever to come true. Read closely, this Utopia turns into a terror, due not merely to the military support which Plato ascribed to the Philosophers Kings of the Republic, but also to the way his *Laws* present a typically totalitarian description of man as just a "doll". I have in mind also the special cruelties of judicial penalties and the absurdity of the rules of daily life, the obligatory marches and apologetics by which only the "ideal citizens" are supposed to express their high spirits, aspirations, and happiness with the existing order. And, last but not least, I mean the initial inclination of Plato, being himself a genuine true-believer in Ideas as general plans, to a quite dogmatic belief in the possibility of organizing and exercising their power. Thus, it is not enough to hate tyrants in order to be against any sort of tyranny whatsoever.

This is very far from casting a stigma upon Plato for all his (anti) Utopian bloodshed and cruelties. As the late eminent Russian philosopher, Alexei Lossev, put it, Plato was a most tragic figure in Ancient Greek philosophy, as was his great philosophy.³⁷ Indeed, Plato qualified his own best and most beautiful dream as a tragedy.³⁸ But if the Utopian role of intellectuals turns out to be tragedy, what is left for real life? . . .

The intellectuals always had something to do with power, as constantly and latently inclined to leadership of the "masses". They have been inherently subversive of mass movements, especially as the latter were by-products of (and perhaps a reaction to) the progressive atomization of the individual in highly institutionalized and organized societies. Hannah Arendt³⁹ demystified the alleged paradox of the inner affinity of the individualistic intellectuals, on the one hand, and the mass man, on the other. Here, and not only in a nebulous and perverse "self-hatred of the spirit" (Arendt), lie the roots of the attraction which totalitarian movements exert on the intellectual elite.

There is, however, no full symmetry in the perverse relations between intellectuals and totalitarian regimes. As far as the latter is concerned, its perfidiousness consists precisely in that not only mediocre and otherwise harmless people, but sometimes really talented ones find themselves participants in totalitarian barbarism. Gyorgy Lukacs was right in his statement that, but for totalitarian "social instruction", Auschwitz would hardly have been possible.⁴⁰ Indeed, by a bad irony of fate, Lukacs himself could not overcome the temptation to join in such teaching. Leszek Kolakowski's apt metaphor, qualifying Lukacs as "reason in the service of dogma",⁴¹ is an excellent expression of the situation of intellectuals in a totalitarian society. What would Lukacs' own answer be if one were to ascribe to him the argument he used in his fight against irrationalism, namely: "There is no irresponsible philosophy"?

But this coin has two sides. While the intellectual finds some compensation with the "masses", the latter and its political spokesmen, the totalitarian ruling class in general, always looks down

³⁷ A.F. Lossev, *Philosophy, Mythology, Culture* (Moscow: Political Literature, 1991), pp. 336-373 (in Russian).

³⁸ *Laws.*, VII 817 b.

³⁹ Cf. H. Arendt, *The Origin of Totalitarianism*, pp. 316-317.

⁴⁰ G. Lukacs, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft. Der Weg des Irrationalismus von Schelling zu Hitler* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1955), p. 264.

⁴¹ L. Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism. Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution*. Vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 253f.

upon the intellectual as deeply suspicious. This is the more valid for those intellectuals who happen to be truly talented and refuse to play the fool for the regime or to collaborate with its banal frauds. Moreover, in their morbid inclination to grand narratives, the intellectuals and the totalitarian rulers somehow have been rivals. The case of Napoleon, the usurper, *versus* his former friends and supporters, *les ideologues*, is rather indicative of the complicated links between the intellectuals and tyranny. This is manifest in the permanent purges amongst the intelligentsia itself so typical of the bolsheviks, national-socialists, and the like. Usually, as Hannah Arendt points out, courtships between totalitarianism and truly talented intellectual elite are more than sporadic. Besides Lukacs, the examples of Oswald Spengler, Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, Walter Frank and many others are quite significant.⁴²

This is far from making fun of thinkers like Lukacs, Heidegger, and the like, whose fate was too dramatic not to be taken seriously. It would be equally meaningless to appeal to certain "objective" political and social conditions, to the "historical situation," or to biographical and/or psychological factors. Any "objectivism" here would promote irresponsibility, voluntarism and totalitarianism; no matter how horrific history be its pages cannot be closed without being read: indeed, its pages must not be altogether closed. "What has happened - has happened; there is nothing to do about it" means that it will stay with us forever. It is worth paying more attention to the words of a former *Wehrmacht* officer who later become President of Germany, Richard von Weizsaecker, in a speech dedicated to the fortieth anniversary of the victory over fascism: "Those who refuse to remember inhumanity, become susceptible to new contamination; a vigilant memory is of utmost importance. A Jewish proverb runs, 'those who strive to forget just prolong their own banishment.' The key to salvation is called memory."⁴³

In this context, it is the vocation of the intellectual to stare the truth in the face, however horrible it be, as if he were staring at the face of Medusa. Even if innocent with regard to the world of horrors, the intellectual is responsible for keeping this horror ever alive before the face of the mankind. But how could one stay with horror without turning himself into horror, without becoming a dead stone; how could one preserve one's primordial guilt without paralyzing one's own responsibility?

The intellectual, inasmuch he/she is an intellectual, ought to find the answer by him or herself; in the situation of crisis, it is his/her duty to answer: no prescriptions are valid for everyone. W. Lipman said, "If an epoch takes the wrong path, some would storm barricades, others would join a monastery." But there is at least one lesson of history which people should never forget: regardless of how much one dislikes the modern critics of modernity, one could not deny them at least the one contribution of drawing our attention to the problem of the future responsibility of intellectuals. This is of great importance, especially for post-totalitarian intellectuals.

After realizing the striking failure of the so-called Project of the Enlightenment, intellectuals are inclined radically to give up their traditional pretensions to hold the absolute truth, to be a spokesman of the "totalizing unity," or to speak on behalf of the "Universal Subject" (Foucault). On the other hand, is not Bernard-Henry Levy, in his criticism of structuralism, existentialism and Marxism, correct in saying that "if intellectuals are still necessary in any way, it is only in order to express this [absolute] truth" that losing an all encompassing perspective is the road to destruction of thought and of all the abstract principles of justice and humanism; this is a road to the decay of culture itself. If he is right, how could the post-modern intellectual fulfil the "unfinished project of the Enlightenment" (Habermas), if any social and political activity, according to Levy, is but a

⁴² H. Arendt, *The Origin of Totalitarianism*, p. 339.

⁴³ R. von Weizsaecker, *Novoe Vremja* (Moscow: No. 40, 1990) (in Russian).

"vanity fair," a trap, and a source of permanent blackmail for the intellectual since no one can guarantee that humanity will never be caught again and again by some new horror?⁴⁴

If post-totalitarian discourse is only a variety of the grand narratives of totalitarianism is there no way out--if not an Exodus, at least a touch of one?

Such a hint seems encoded in the memorial which, according to Lyotard, the intellectual has raised above his own grave. From his grave the crushed intellectual is pointing out that there is no sole, one and only road to truth; that there is more than one sole narrative; more than but one project, more than one and only one "*famille de phrases*"; in a word, that the only real tolerance consists in toning down one's own voice in order to hear different voices.

In the realm of the new politics, this would lead to a situation where "East and West may learn from each other's families of phrases," while "they will also have to use different ruses for warding off crushing homogeneity, for sharing silenced voices."⁴⁵ It is senseless to discuss who had the upper hand in history, whose civilization won final victory-- who, whom. There is neither better nor worse history. Even if one try to imagine an ideal social and human order, a sort of a new Golden Age, the horrors and victims of history on both sides would bar one from unblemished happiness: the burden of the victims of all the great projects which constituted the intellectuals' "substantial contributions" through human history weighs upon the conscience of humanity. In this respect, going beyond Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* and *Minima Moralia*, Herbert Marcuse sharply pointed to the simple fact that "even the ultimate advent of freedom cannot redeem those who died in pain. Their remembrance and the accumulated guilt of mankind against its victims darken the prospect of a civilization without repression."⁴⁶

There is nothing, nowhere and no-one, to boast about. The intellectuals of the post-totalitarian age, both East and West, North and South, should repent once and for all the crimes in which they have participated, directly or, in most cases, even indirectly and unawares--and even for those crimes with which they had nothing to do, nor even heard of. Let them never forget that the first and primordial sin is *hubris*, the supreme superciliousness that caused Satan to think himself equal to God. To paraphrase Freud, their danger is that the pride of individuals and nations in their own exclusiveness will fuse with that of being as great as God.⁴⁷

This is the way to let the different voices of the victims win their right to cry out. To accept this radically pluralist ethic of post-modernity is the highest responsibility of the post-totalitarian intellectual of today, East and West: resistance against superiority is his only policy.

Getting rid of the traditionally elitist complex of superiority may open new perspectives for the intellectuals. It would be much more instructive to consider their significance from a different perspective, one that is horizontal rather than vertical in angle. Cultural creativity is first and foremost intimately personal and therefore communicative, rather than subordinative. It is an insurpassable and unique component of man's life-world.

From this point of view, a truly intellectual community would not be some type of social institution, but rather a kind of invisible college--something too far away from any *idola fori* to be "real". This is the right way for the Spirit to survive, especially in a time of crisis. Perhaps it is the right way for intellectuals to continue (if I may use Hegel's expression about philosophy) to paint with gray paint over gray background, completely aloof from the bright projects of the mundane evolutionary and/or revolutionary world.

⁴⁴ B.-H. Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 41f, 135.

⁴⁵ C. Bayard, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

⁴⁶ H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (London: Sphere Books, 1969), p. 188.

⁴⁷ Cf. S. Freud, "Moses and Monotheism", *Standart Edition*. Vol. 23 (London-New York), 139.

Aloof thinking, hidden niches, silent voices. The intellectuals. . .

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