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National Identity as an Issue of Knowledge and Morality

Georgian Philosophical Studies, I

Edited by
N.V. Chavchavadze, Ghia Nodia, Paul Peachey

The council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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Table of Contents

Preface by *N. V. Chavchavadze*	v
Foreword by *Paul Peachey*	vii
Introduction by George F. McLean	1
Part I. National Identity and Nationalism	
1. Rethinking Nationalism and Democracy in the Light of Post-Communist Experience by *Ghia Nodia*	11
2. Person and Democracy by *George F. McLean*	39
3. Democracy and Nationhood by *Claes G. Ryn*	67
4. Reflections on the Nature of Modernity by *David Walsh*	97
Part II. The Liberal Critique of Nationalism	
5. Signs of Contradiction: Nationalism and the Search for a Democratic 'We' by *Michael Foley* and *Matthew Carr*	107
6. Nationalism and the Problem of Democracy: a Response to Professor Nodia by *Stephen P. Schneck*	125
7. Human Rights and a New Regional Order: CSCE as a Framework for Cultural Consensus by *David Little*	147
8. Nationalism and Human Development by *Richard A. Graham*	157
9. Post-Soviet Societies: Chauvinism or Catharsis by *Paul Peachey*	165
Part III. The Critique of Liberalism	

10. Max Scheler's Personalism and Bourgeois Liberalism: A Critique of Liberalism as Ideology 169
by *Stephen P. Schneck*

11. Enlightenment and Natural Rights 181
by *Richard Kennington*

12. Democracy and the Ethical Life: A Philosophy of Politics and Community 203
by *Claes G. Ryn*

13. Representation in Piaget's Theory 213
by *Hans G. Furth*

14. The Status of Principles in Confucian Ethics 237
by *A.S. Cua*

15. Henry Duméry's Henological Reduction and the Human Act 259
by *David N. Power*

Part IV. Epistemological Foundations of National Identity

16. On the Two Systems of the World: Aristotle and Kant 271
by *Kakha Katsitadze*

17. The Primacy of Practical Reason 279
by *N.V. Chavchavadze*

18. The Three Types of Relations between Knowledge and Morals 289
by *Tina Bochorishvili*

19. Morality and Ethics according to Shota Rustaveli's Epic "The Knight in the Panther's Skin" 299
by *Paata Chkheidze*

20. The Moral Aspect of Philosophy 307
by *Ghia Nodia*

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Preface

N. V. Chavchavadze

The first joint conference of American and Georgian philosophers, which materials are published in this volume, is important and significant in many ways. American and Georgian philosophers had met earlier, but this was the first time a group of Georgian philosophers, researchers from The Institute Philosophy of The Georgian Academy of Science, had come to Washington for discussions with their American colleagues. The issue is one of the most important and painful problems of philosophy and of all humanity at the present time, namely, the relationship between knowledge and morals.

We and our American colleagues have lived in different and contradictory socio-political and spiritual contexts. We have been brought up under different philosophies and cultural traditions, and face different daily problems. This raised a question regarding the feasibility of dialogue. For dialogue is not conversation in which both sides do much talking; it is rather when people on both sides listen and understand each other. Fortunately dialogue did take place, and it was a very warm one, full of respect and understanding. This seems to me the main result of our conference and fixed our desire to continue the dialogue, alternating between Tbilisi and Washington. As an old man, this continuation is to me of great importance. With God's help the bridge between our younger colleagues will never break again.

The great success of our conference perhaps was determined as well by its theme. From the very beginning the relationship between knowledge and morals has been one of the greatest problems of philosophy and human spiritual life. In our time this problem has become most acute. Our age has been one of human reason, the triumph of scientific knowledge, in a scientific and technical revolution. But at the same time it has been the age of two World Wars and endless local wars, of bloody revolutions and counterrevolutions, of fanaticism, totalitarianism, hatred and violence. The so-called global problems of ecology, energy, and demography become ever more acute. The common basis of these problems must be sought, of course, in the human spirit and in man's relations with God, nature and other people. There is not only a fissure, but chasm between scientific-technical progress and the present moral condition of humanity. If man is not able to restore balance and harmonize his intellectual and moral dimensions, if people of good will throughout the whole earth are not united which is possible only under the leadership of moral principles our planet will be in danger of disaster.

By strengthening the possibility of such unity our conference was especially important for it gave hope and elicited feelings of mutual human concern and responsibility.

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Foreword

Paul Peachey

According to a directory of Soviet academic institutions, the Georgian Institution of Philosophy, founded originally by a pupil of the phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl, included in its interests the study of personality. There, presumably, in whatever terms, a discussion of personhood, human rights and dignity might be initiated.

So in June, 1984, Niko Chavchavadze, head of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, in Tbilisi, capital of (then Soviet) Georgia, responded to a telephone call from a group of America professors from their hotel, seeking contact with Georgian scholars. Defying orders, he came to the hotel for what turned out to be a spirited two-hour meeting. Thus began a conversation of which this volume is an outcome.

The beginning of the end of the Soviet era, with the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, was merely months away (February, 1985), but the apparatus and mentality of the Cold War were still fully in place on all sides. Though N. Chavchavadze and his visitors were mutually strangers and the conversation was framed by stereotypes, yet the visitors sensed that there was more than stereotype to their "host".

A major point of political contention between East and West during the Soviet era, fought out in the United Nations and other international arenas, was their differing conceptions of "human rights". In the West the accent fell on "civil and political", i.e., individual, rights; in East on "economic, social and cultural" rights as the response needed to be academic. Nevertheless, apart from other difficulties, the human rights question was affect-laden, and could be addressed not directly, but only through the Marxist ideal of "the all-round development of the human person".

Several more years would pass before active planning for a three-year program of exchange visits and conferences could begin. In 1988, Professor Dean Hoge and the writer carried to Tbilisi an invitation from The Catholic University of America, where the Institute for Peace and Understanding was then based. This, in turn, permitted the assimilation of the exchange into the large program of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. This, in turn, brought Professor Chavchavadze and able younger associate, Ghia Nodia, on an exchange visit to Catholic University to complete the agreement. The following year five Tbilisi colleagues came to Washington for the symposium on Knowledge and Morality that makes up parts III and IV of the present volume. Civil unrest in Georgia prevented the completion of the projected exchanges, which, at this writing, await more settled times. Meanwhile Ghia Nodia spent a year at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies in Washington, of which stay, the symposium featured in Parts I and II in the present volume, were a by-product.

The Georgian Institute of Philosophy, deeply rooted in an ancient culture, in which Christianity was nationalized early in the fourth century, displayed remarkable vitality during the Soviet era. Though bending outwardly to the era, it managed to carry forward the classic tradition of Western philosophy throughout the Soviet era. For this the head of the Institute, Niko Chavchavadze, scion of a princely family, deservedly won the respect of scholars throughout the Soviet Union. This volume joins that salute.

Rolling Ridge Study Retreat Community

Introduction

George F. McLean

This volume contributes to the debate on the issue of national identity and nationalism by examining the underlying issues of knowledge and freedom. Part I provides unique access to the Georgian sense of national identity as a key to democracy and to the dynamics of present changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Part II reflects the critique of this sense of nation by Western liberalism, deriving from modern rationalism and the French Revolution. Part III elaborates, in turn, a critique of Enlightenment political theory, especially its epistemological roots and its corresponding sense of freedom. Part IV is a concerted effort by Georgian philosophers to elaborate their own more classical sense of knowledge, meaning and morality which undergirds their sense of nation.

This project was begun with plans for a threefold set of joint colloquia between teams of scholars from The Institute of Philosophy of The Georgian Academy of Science, Tbilisi, and from The Catholic University of America, Washington. The first conference held here in 1990, on "Knowledge and Morality" constitutes parts III and IV of this volume. Changes in the situation in Georgia have impeded thus far the realization of the other two conferences projected on "The Moral and Religious Dimensions of Human Personality" and "Socialization and Culture" respectively.

In the meantime, however, the emergent issues of national identity have assumed unique urgency as the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe emerged from the communist mode of the Enlightenment rationalism with its manipulative and oppressive universalization. Hence, Dr. Ghia Nodia, when a senior research scholar at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, was invited by Dr. Paul Peachey to discuss at the Rolling Ridge Study-Retreat Center his paper on "Rethinking Nationalism and Democracy in the Light of Post-Communist Experience". As this was participated in largely by professors from The Catholic University of America it constituted an application of the earlier more theoretical discussions of knowledge and morality in Part III and IV to an urgent contemporary issue, namely, the identity and survival of the Georgian people as a nation and more broadly whether such a sense of nationhood was favorable or subversive with regard to the realization of democratic ideals in Eastern Europe. These materials constitute Parts I and II of the present volume.

This interchange is especially important in our day, and for both the Georgian and the Western partners to this debate. In the aftermath of the collapse of Communism, the present situation is that of a liberalism radicalized in the Cold War and intent on bending the entire world to its image. Most peoples of the world face this in a particularly weak and confused condition after their long period of suppression under Marxism in one northerly belt from Germany to the Pacific, and under colonialism in a more southerly belt from the Atlantic eastward to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Economically and politically a vast inequality has been created which renders these peoples particularly vulnerable.

This may be paralleled, however, by an inverse inequality in terms of cultural identity and hence of access to moral conviction and commitment. As violence rises in the streets and even in the schools, the liberal democracies need deeper principles for social cohesion to balance their own strong affirmation of individual rights. They need to be open to additional dimensions of knowledge and to the corresponding moral sensibilities. This is required against the economically,

and hence politically, weaker members of the world community both to order their domestic life and to avoid committing cultural genocide through the increasingly invasive policies of international organizations.

Conversely, as the many peoples reaffirm their identity they need to integrate principles of inclusive pluralism and of respect for the dignity of each person in a functioning political order. These several concerns constitute the burden of the present volume.

The prologue to this volume by R. Calinger surveys the history of nationalism in modern Europe. Part I begins with a chapter by G. Nodia stating the main thesis of the volume, namely, the importance of a sense of nation for the development of a modern democracy. It is the fundamental answer to the existential question: "Who are we?", which answer constitutes a nation. This first or existential sensibility is marked by identity, inclusion, inter-subjectivity and responsibility; it corresponds to the term "truth" in Gadamer's *Truth and Method*. Nodia sees this as presupposed for any work on the development of political structures and of modes of public cooperation intended to promote a people in their temporal and spacial circumstances.

The second question concerns these structures, forms and processes; it answers to the question: "What are we?"; What will be the nature of our society, what type of social structures will we develop? At times this question has been reduced simply to the method or process to be followed in human investigations and interactions, as indicated by the second term in Gadamer's title: *Truth and Method*.

The two questions correspond to different modes of rationality. The former is more synthetic and wholistic, and is reflected in the sense of nation; the latter is more analytic and is conducive to the technical clarity, distinction and division important for developing the legal structures of a liberal society. The implications of this difference in sensibilities and capabilities of understanding and their corresponding sensitivities with regard to freedom will be worked out in detail in the following three sections. But it can be seen from the beginning that such a contrast in modes of knowledge may render a society using only one of these modes incapable of understanding another society based upon an other. This provides a key to the intolerance of liberal thinkers to traditional societies.

Nodia documents this by the historical individualism of liberals and their corresponding fear of "the people" as a threat to individual rights. When this is joined to an economic and political imbalance of power in favor of the liberal nations over the developing world the situation can be most dangerous to the national and cultural identities of the economically weaker side of the equation.

In contrast, Nodia notes a corresponding need on the part of ethnic and other unities to sublimate the "illiberal flesh of ethnicity". This, however, is impeded by the liberal's attempt to separate out from the national identity the religious bases for such sublimation. The intent of Nodia in his opening chapter is to point the way to "a real and working balance between the forces of democracy, liberalism and nationalism".

At the same time, Professor Nodia adds a new dimension to national consciousness by pointing not only to its roots in the past, but to its project for the future. The question: "Who am I" must be answered not only on the basis of the lives of ancestors in the past, but by peoples in the present and with a view to the people they wish to be in the future. In this direction he suggests that the desire and hope to be an equal and dignified member of the world community can be a much stronger transforming force than international sanctions.

The chapter by Professor McLean points up the particular difficulty which rationalism and the Enlightenment have had in dealing with what is properly personal. Thus, there has arisen today

real tension between the enlightenment goal of abstract national and universal clarity and its ability to take account of the uniqueness of persons, their creative freedom and the diversity of the cultural unities and national identities this bespeaks. To face this problem he progressively analyses the levels of knowledge to point, with Kant, beyond a first level of empirical and speculative scientific knowledge and a second level of practical knowledge to the indispensability of aesthetic awareness if freedom is to be possible in a world of universal and necessary laws. Next, the chapter elaborates the levels of freedom in order to distinguish, from a first level of ability to choose what we desire and a second level of ability to choose what we ought, a third level at which freedom and its creativity is constitutive of the very reality (the heart and soul, we would say) of persons and community. For lack of ability to take account of this third and highest level of knowledge and freedom, liberal thinkers are trapped in a Hobbesian ideology of conflictive individualism and/or a Kantian set of individual right. In either case it becomes important to suppress the identities of groups, which cannot be accommodated in liberal theory.

The intensive struggles to assert the reality of the person against the oppressive communist and colonial ideologies of the last 50 years has brought to new attention this third level of knowledge and freedom, and with them a new ability to appreciate the nature and role of cultures in relation to human identity in society and history. By analyzing this it becomes possible in the last sections of this chapter to appreciate cultural and religious roots, not as alien factors beyond the ken of reason, but as the highest realizations of the human spirit and the foundations of efforts to face the difficulties of life in a truly humane manner.

The chapters of Professors Ryn and Walsh show the importance of this cohesive, rather than conflictive, sense of freedom. They develop: (a) the importance of directing freedom truthfully, i.e., morally, which goes beyond simply doing what the majority happens to want; (b) that human as well as social rights require bases that transcend mere individual preferences in order to guide democratic choices; and (c) that (a) and (b) have been integral factors in the history of Enlightenment political theory, e.g. in the work of the idealists, though such periods generally are bracketed in the usual ideological employments of Enlightenment theory.

Part II passes to the other, the liberal, side of the debate; it is essentially a critique of nationalism. Here the focus on the individual, understood as a single unit, emerges progressively to challenge and exclude the principles of cultures, the social cohesion of groups, and all but a minimal list of human rights. Professors Foley and Carr trace this dynamic through the history of the French Republics from the time of the Revolution. Professor Schneck illustrates it by the debates between Federalists and anti-Federalists at the beginnings of the American Republic.

Professor Schneck notes that the value to which Madison was fundamentally committed and which ultimately ruled all his choices was creativity and initiative on the part of the individual. To protect this he did not favor protecting the local community and its ability to promote the common good, which he feared might smother innovation. Rather, though a champion of the individual, feeling that national regulation could assure an open field for private initiative and competition, he favored a stronger national government and a stronger pattern of national laws and regulation. Conversely, it was the anti-Federalists who saw the importance of the local community as an essential protection against the oppression of minorities by the national majority and sought a looser confederation and a weaker central government.

Though this may seem ironic, it points to a deep and fatal law in Enlightenment rationalism, which Schneck himself suggests in his paper in the next section. Individualism's lack of ability to take account of the social and community dimension of the person leads to the need for a strong

center. Being less in touch with the individual, however, this tends blindly to manipulate individuals and to trample upon the exercise of social freedom by all intermediate groups between the individual and the all-powerful state.

These issues, which surfaced at the very beginning of the first modern democracy, point to some of the essential truths in the work of Professor Nodia. First, that attention to the identities of peoples, if responsibly exercised, is a requisite for democracy and for the freedom of the individual person, not a threat thereto. Conversely, to reduce the members of a nation simply to the common status of equal citizens is to deprive them of their personal and social identities, to destroy the unities in which people live and voice their human concerns, and to expose persons alone and unprotected to the tyranny of the majority. These are essential challenges of modern democratic life which point to the need for some form of subsidiarity based not on a Hobbesian vision of self-seeking and animosity, but upon a sense of the social character of humankind and hence of the importance of the intermediate social order.

The liberal critique of nationalism reaches its most stringent point in the chapter of Dr. Little which rejects even Isaiah Berlin's oft repeated distinction between non-aggressive and aggressive nationalisms, and claims that all national and ethnic identities, in as much as they bespeak plurality, must be aggressive and even "explosive". One must agree that exclusionary approaches are unacceptable, but it seems strangely onesided to think that individualism will protect, rather than ignore or even suppress other persons. Asocial individuals can be protected in the midst of other asocial individuals only by a central authority which then must be given ever greater power until in the end freedom disappears and all are subjects of a central authority corrupted by its own power.

It seems similarly onesided to consider the ethnic, cultural and religious identities of peoples to be essentially closed and exclusionary, rather than as including as well the elements of hospitality, respect and concern for others which are required in a pluralist society. Indeed, only the goods of the spirit can be shared, whereas unities built upon money, self-interest or power are essentially exclusionary. Authentically religious impulses are not divisive, but both opening and unitive. Hence, to separate out religion from the public forum and to treat it rather as an exclusively private possession is to oppress peoples by undermining the religious center of their cultures, by destroying their bonds of unity and morality, and by condemning them to manage ambition by ambition in a Hobbesian war by all against all. In the end the attempt to promote creative freedom is reduced to its constraint, as freedom comes to be seen not in terms of the social dynamism of love, but as a thread which we nonetheless require for merely utilitarian purposes and in relation to merely material goals.

Professor Peachey's paper observes that the weakening of communal bonds that is associated with the citizen isolate in the building of centralized polities overloads the democratic state with the emotional or communal deficits arising from that weakening. This has possible chauvinist outcomes and in such situations, the challenge of the religious community is to initiate catharsis rather than reinforce chauvinism. His thrust is more cautionary than supportive of the atomistic liberal paradigm. What Karl Deutsch called for in 1950, is in some measure emerging: feverish nationalism, Deutsch proposed, called for the national state's overload of affect to be transferred in part, both upward, to supranational levels, and downward to infra-national levels. The latter corresponds, in effect, to Peachey's emphasis in the Introduction on the "unities in which people live and voice their concerns"

The paper of Professor Graham is distinguished respectively by intense commitment to equal rights for all citizens, in the first case, and of religious freedom, in the second. Both of these are important statements of the goals to which Professor Nodia directs us, as dynamic and

transforming principles for the development and/or redevelopment of nations in the aftermath of their totalitarian and colonial experiences.

But it is important to ask whence these universal rights and the commitments to equality, fairness and justice are to be learned by the coming generation. Obviously, if these values are to be learned they must be found in the small communities of family and neighborhood in which people are raised. To marginalize the life of the spirit as focused upon by religion from education and public life abandons the community and its offspring to material proclivities of selfishness and acquisitiveness while excluding the sources for learning personal control, responsibility, community commitment and sacrifice. To celebrate and take pride in the religious heritages of a nation, to remember the role these have played in times of deepest trial, and to evoke their spirit for building the future is an essential part of enlivening a people and its freedom to live fully its identity. On the one hand then, churches should be intensely concerned with the progress of their people and nation; on the other hand, governments need to protect and promote this spiritual dimension of their culture as their definitively precious heritage. This cannot be abandoned under the banner of protecting an absolutized and isolated individual, for to do so is to subvert the foundations of human dignity and social cohesion.

Part III returns the baton to the first side of the debate, once again for a critique of liberalism. Where in Part II the unifying, but uncriticized, point of reference was the work of E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, applying the liberal point of view to the issue of nationalism, Part III is a critique of the understanding of knowledge which undergirds the liberal movement. It reflects work begun two years earlier, as noted above, in the colloquium on "Knowledge and Morality". Liberalism, which can be traced from seventeenth century rationalist roots in Descartes, developed in two lines: the empiricist line shaped the thought of the Encyclopedists in pre-revolutionary eighteenth century France and reflects the success of British empiricism of Hobbes and Locke on the Continental thought of the time; the formalist line is reflected by the thought of Kant.

S. Schneck begins Part III by listing four points of Sheler's personalist critique of the four modes of liberalism. (a) In its rationalist mode, all authentic thought is reduced to reason so that any work of the will, and hence of freedom, as it exceeds rational calculation, is considered rational and less than fully human. (b) In its individualist mode, as reason was considered by Descartes to be the work of the solitary individual, any factors of group commitment arising from the community must be subversive to authentic human development. Family, cultural and religious commitments are looked upon as particularly threatening. (c) In its Kantian formalist mode, liberalism develops universal laws, but does so at the expense of the uniqueness of the person: the laws state what is required of any and all "Xs" capable of rational action, but ignore that by which each "X" is a unique concrete person with unique relations to other concrete persons and to the community. (d) In its empiricist mode, all motivational considerations must be reduced to calculable utility; hence political structures and interactions must be conceived in terms of some form of national self-interest. In these terms, the social and political sciences consist of calculable structures insensitive to the properly personal, social and cultural (ethnic) dimensions of life. Further, whereas liberalism has structures for containing self-seeking individuals (containing ambition by ambition), a group built upon not conflict but cohesion is a totally alien creature thoroughly threatening to rational calculations of self-interest; hence it must be stamped out at all cost. This is the major threat to the emerging peoples of our times.

Professor Kennington traces the liberal view to the seventeenth century's skeptical rejection of the notions of nature and of teleology. Having rejected the classical ordering of human life to the highest good, liberalism in a Hobbesian manner then reorders life in relation to the highest evil, namely physical death; all in life is ultimately an attempt to flee this evil. At the same time, as empiricism is limited to sense knowledge, all striving is directed to material acquisition. Being limitless, however, this implies not only unbridled competition at home, but the colonial subjection of other peoples.

The chapters of Professors Cua and Furth, through not treating the Enlightenment, show ways of preceding beyond it, both internally in the development of the sense of moral principles in the child and externally by the development of principles and virtues by persons, families and communities.

The chapter of D. Power carries this path of human growth further in terms of the work of H. Dumery, pointing to the need of human freedom to be grounded in the divine. He does this with special concern to protect freedom by criticizing any appearance of rationalism in religious thought and stressing the use of negative terms for referring to the transcendent.

Part IV points to the types of knowledge which make possible the sense of nationhood. These are elucidated by the Georgian professors and reflect the third level of knowledge freedom (see chapter II) which they found it necessary to articulate in their defense as a people against the oppressive Marxist mode of the Enlightenment. In this light their concerns provide special insight into the perennial bases of national and cultural traditions and identities of peoples.

Professor Katsitadze begins this task by contrasting the two world systems in a way that opens the way to the central significance of human consciousness. Professor Chavchavadze then points to the way in which this was channeled by modern rationalism into a fascination with theoretical reason, which he illustrates by tracing the principles for the destruction of the human person backward from Stalin, to Lenin and to Marxian theory. On this basis he points to the importance of Kant's addition of a second level of reason, practical reason, which opens a path of knowledge to God. This echoes Plato's notion of a Transcendent which was used subsequently to think through the Christian religion. For Kant it meant also going still further, beyond practical to aesthetic reason in his third critique.

Professor Bochorishvili carries this line of thought further by contrasting it to scientific knowledge concerned with the physical world. Whereas that knowledge proceeds by abstraction, and hence exclusion of what is proper to human life, by contrast she points to the importance of metaphysics as more truly universal because inclusive as well of that creative human freedom whereby the religious culture of a people is formed.

Professor Chtheidze shows the central character of this awareness by taking us back to the classical Georgian epic, Shota Rustaveli's "Knight in the Panther's Skin" so central in the formation of Georgian culture. He traces the roots of the epic to the neo-Platonic perspective of Pseudo Dionysius with its openness to the Transcendent. In this view, life is seen in terms, not of evil which is a negation, but of overarching goodness. This is the context for the Georgian moral vision. This makes clear why Professor Nodia looks to the resulting sense of nation in a positive light and sees it as the basis for community and democracy.

In this light G. Nodia concludes this work with a chapter on the role of the philosopher. It is not, he would insist, that of developing a utopic vision of the future, or of defining the right choice to be made by the body politic. That would be a work of ideologies and totalitarians with very limited views of knowledge and correspondingly low levels of human freedom. Rather, he sees the task of the philosophies as consisting most basically in keeping open the full sense of the

Transcendent in which human unity and society, goodness and freedom are founded. In this he joints the project of D. Power above and reflects an earlier statement by N. Chavchavachze: not to have a Transcendent is to be inescapably a slave.

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Chapter I

Rethinking Nationalism and Democracy in the Light of Post-Communist Experience

Ghia Nodia

What has happened in, or to, the formerly communist countries, and what is happening there now, is not something restricted to a particular region of the world, but is part of the common experience of humanity. I do not have in mind the specific impact the collapse of communism has had upon the global strategy or regional relations, the creation of new political and economic alliances and the dissolution of older ones. The unity of the world is mediated not only and, I think, not so much by mutually targeted warheads and economic cooperation/competition, but by participation in the common realm of ideas and values. Thus, the impact of the counter-communist revolution (or capitalist counter-revolution) on the rest of the world involves first of all the need to rearrange the principal reference points, to rethink basic ideas and values on which the Western civilization is grounded.

A major attempt of this rethinking was proposed in 1989 by Francis Fukuyama in his much noted philosophic work entitled *The End of History?*[1] The main idea of the article, later developed into a book, *The End of History and the Last Man*,[2] consisted in an assumption that Perestroika and the later complete collapse of the Communist system meant that the liberal democracy no longer had any viable alternatives, and that this, in turn, indicated the advent of the post-historic stage of human development, boring as that may be. If "liberal democracy" is the embodiment of the highest political values, then, according to Fukuyama, the collapse of Communism urges us to rethink the world in new terms that are optimistic at least, optimistic from the liberal point of view now that there is no threat to the reign of liberal democracy.

From the very beginning, I will admit to sharing this general attitude so that Fukuyama’s outlook will provide a kind of starting point. What I do not share, however, and what I hope gives some sense to this paper, is a different assessment of the role of nationalism in the advent, spread and victory of liberal democracy.

The controversy may be outlined in a simple way. Fukuyama shares in general the idea, predominant in Western political thinking, that "democracy" is one thing, or one idea, while "nationalism" is another thing, or another idea, and the latter usually presents itself as a kind of alternative to the former. If "democracy" wins, it does so at the expense of nationalism, and vice versa. The two ideas usually bear opposite value labels: the word "democracy" is usually linked to words "good", "civilized", "progressive", "rational", etc., while "nationalism" is associated with "backwardness", "immaturity", "barbarity", "irrationality", "mythological way of thinking", etc. The discussion is in this case between optimists and pessimists: while Fukuyama optimistically presumes that "irrationalist" nationalism does not present any viable alternative to democracy, so

[1] "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 16 (Summer, 1989), 3-18.
[2] New York, *The Free Press*, 1992.

history has come to a safe end,[3] others argue that nationalism, not liberal democracy, is the real successor to communism, which means that history continues.[4]

My point consists in an opposite assumption: nationalism and democracy are not two separate things, but two sides of the same idea or, more precisely, nationalism is a component of the more complex idea called "liberal democracy". The idea of nationalism is impossible and incomprehensible without the idea of democracy, and there never exists democracy without nationalism. The intertwining of the two forms a sort of complicated marriage: the spouses cannot live without each other, but find themselves in an almost permanent state of conflict. An attempt to divorce seems a very attractive solution for a Western liberal mind scared by the twentieth century experience of European nationalism, but proves to be a piece of wishful thinking once real political forces come into motion.

The manner in which the breakup of communism, and of the Soviet Union, has occurred demonstrates the validity of this approach. The failure of mainstream Western political science to catch up with developments in the former Soviet Union is at least partly due to a one-sided understanding of the phenomenon of nationalism and its relation to democracy.

This one-sidedness derives at least to some degree from two features predominant in modern Western social science when handling issues of democracy and nationalism (whether separately or in their relationship to each other). The first is economic determinism; the second is value-laden judgments. It is presumed that in order to explain social developments in a really "scientific" way, they should be deduced from, or at least tied to, some economic realities. This is the presumption of the "modernist instrumentalist" doctrine of nations and nationalism, according to which nations and nationalisms emerge as a result of (a) industrialization and (b) mass manipulation undertaken by certain social elites pursuing their own ultimately economic interests. The same "scientist" attitude, however, does not prevent many from using the terms "democracy" and "nationalism" as evaluative, rather than descriptive terms. The presumption is that democracy is the "good guy", and it is a disgrace for it to have anything in common with the "bad guy", nationalism.

Of course, any social scientist cannot completely avoid his or her value preferences. I, for instance, following Winston Churchill, think that democracy is quite a poor political system, but has the one very good justification that all others have proven to be even worse. However, having assumed a theoretical attitude, I have to forget what is "good" and what is "bad". An evaluative attitude is incompatible with a theoretical one, and political theory is no exception to that. I am not

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[3] Fukuyama (1992), pp. xix, 201-202. In reality, Fukuyama's attitude to nationalism does not seem to be quite consistent and well thought through. In general, he treats nationalism as opposed to liberal democracy as an irrational form to a rational one. Elsewhere, discussing developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, he says that "there is no inherent contradiction between democracy and at least some of the newly emerged nationalisms" (*ibid.*, p. 37), or that "Nationalism in these cases is a necessary concomitant to spreading democratization" (p. 272). In another place, he goes even further: "For democracy to work, citizens need to develop an irrational pride in their own democratic institutions, and must also develop what Tocqueville called the wart of associating,' which rests on prideful attachment to small communities", which "are frequently based on religion, ethnicity, or other forms of recognition that fall short of the universal recognition on which the liberal state is based" (p. xix; see also p. 215). This comes close to endorsing nationalism as a positive force which democracy actually needs: why "small communities" and not political nations, on behalf of which democratic institutions are created? Thus, in fact we have three statements: "nationalism contradicts liberal democracy", "nationalism does not contradict democracy" and "democracy needs nationalism". These are difficult to reconcile.

[4] Shlomo Avineri, "The Return to History: the Breakup of the Soviet Union." *The Brookings Review*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 30.

interested in whether nationalism is "good" or "bad"; what is important, is that it is. On the other hand and in this I once more agree with Fukuyama one feature of social reality is that not everything there depends solely on objective data; subjective human attitudes cannot always be reduced to the latter and this is what we ought to have in mind for a proper understanding of both democracy and nationalism.[5]

Preliminary Distinctions

I shall begin to attempt to understand the relationship between the two by making certain distinctions. Without them any reasoning on the proposed subject tends to be abstract and vague.

First of all, it is usually taken for granted that "democracy" is the same as liberal democracy. But the latter combines two ideas, liberalism and democracy, the fusion of which is not as trivial as it may seem today for an average Western citizen. There is some difference and even tension between the two, and, crucial for our topic, they have different attitudes to nationalism.

Second, in viewing different countries from the perspective of modern democratic societies, the important difference between emerging democracies (which often have to form themselves in newly emerging states) and established, balanced, stabilized ones those that exist in states with a long uninterrupted traditions of statehood is usually overlooked. Some social forces, namely nationalism, work in a different way in those two cases. These two outlooks could be linked: one could say that the test of mature democracy consists in this fusion or some proper compromise between liberal and democratic principles, while the birth-pangs of emerging democracy represent an effort to find this formula of blend or compromise.

The third distinction here is between "original" and "imported" liberal democracies. The model of modern democracy first emerged in a specific part of the world, namely, in the North-Western Europe and North America. There exist a number of theories about the preconditions which made this possible and\or necessary. Later, the democratic model was disseminated throughout the world and now, after victory in the Cold War, seems to have won almost universal recognition. But are the preconditions and mechanisms of emergence of the democratic model in the first place the same as preconditions and mechanisms of its dissemination? Is the relation between liberal and democratic principles the same in "home-bred" and "imported" democracies? And is the role of nationalism the same in both cases? I think it is not, and having this, too, in mind will also be helpful.

Finally, we are now witnessing something that has never before occurred in history: the transition to liberal democracy after communism. All previous transitions were from traditional societies. Does this make any essential difference for the role of nationalism in democratic transition? I think it does.

Democracy and Nationalism

By "democracy" I understand a principle according to which government is legitimized only by the will of people governed by it. Historically, as well as logically, democracy as a principle of

[5] Liberals are often disinclined to admit this simple idea, labeling it to be too "vague" and "metaphysical"; "real", or "instrumental", practical democracy consists in procedures of restraining the power, which claims to govern "on behalf of people" (See K. Popper, *Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. 1 [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957], p. 120-121). Perhaps, there is also a semi-conscious reluctance to admit real dangers in democracy proper, real controversy between the principle of democracy and the principle of freedom.

legitimation of power "from below" is opposed to the system of power made legitimate "from above", which means to one having divine legitimacy. In the latter case (I have in mind mostly absolute monarchy) the power governs on behalf of God (real mechanisms of power struggle notwithstanding); democracy, unlike that, governs on behalf of the People.

This general principle has to be distinguished from the procedures of democracy which are there to embody the general democratic principle, or to discern what the People really wills. The main procedure, largely identified with democracy in general, is, of course, elections. There are other sets of procedures, preventing democracy from degenerating into the dictatorship on behalf of the People those which restrain elected rulers by such measures as separation of power and term limits which make it difficult for representatives of the last majority to overturn everything done on behalf of previous majorities, and so forth.

Democracy is supposed to be a highly rational enterprise. It is not by chance that it was based on the rationalist philosophical tradition, and the most vivid expression of this idea consists in the notion of social contract. People themselves have to decide, based on rational considerations, after calculating the interdependence of individual and group interests, the best possible ways of reconciling or harmonizing these interests. Democracy is a system of rules, made legitimate only by the will of the people, and supposed to serve in the best possible way the interests of the people.

That is why everything non-rational, or not sufficiently rational, be it irrationalist philosophy or the irrational sentiments of the people, is traditionally understood as contrary to the idea of democracy, or at least unable to be related to it in a positive way. Nationalism is only one example of irrational theory and irrational human sentiment; therefore it has to contradict democracy, or at least finds itself outside that realm.

Thus, arguing in favor of the existence of necessary positive links between nationalism and democracy, I argue in favor of the existence of a necessary non-rational component in the foundation of the democratic enterprize.

To inspect this non-rational component it would be helpful to compare the democratic enterprise to a game. Democracy, like a game, is just a set of rules, the validity of which depends solely on the willingness of a certain community (political community, or community of players) to observe these rules. This analogy corresponds well to both the aspects of democracy we mentioned: the general principle of popular sovereignty, and the fact that this sovereignty expresses itself and is meaningful only as far as some system of specific rules (Constitution and laws) are created in its name. Popular sovereignty consists in the claim that "We the People" are going to play only by rules set up and validated by ourselves, and nobody else is going to impose any other rules on us. Yes, these rules (unlike rules of the game) usually are supposed to have some moral justification, which in its turn may be based on certain religious beliefs (In God We Trust). But the concrete manner of interpreting those universal values (or the will of God) depends on individual believers and, respectively, on "Us the People".[6] This is the difference from traditional political systems, where it was rulers (Monarchs, or whoever) who interpreted the Divine Will (in the case of Communism the Laws of History) and made Us play by Their rules.

It is this game aspect of democracy which is (or is supposed to be) completely rational. But if we try to draw this analogy further, we run into non-rational aspects of the democratic enterprise. Besides a set of rules, play necessarily requires two components: a community of players and a playing field. In the case of actual play, these are exactly as conventionally and arbitrarily set: a player decides himself, with whom, against whom, and where, to play. The composition of the

[6] Of course, this is the major point of intersection of Protestantism and democracy.

playing teams, or the borders of the playground, for whom and within which rules of the game are valid, depends solely on the will of the community of players.

Not so in the democratic enterprise. Whereas the set of democratic laws are conventional and depend on rational decision of the polity, the composition of the polity, and the concrete territory ("playground") on which these laws will have validity, cannot be defined that way. Democracy has standard forms for shaping these components of itself: citizenship and state borders. But the criteria for solving the issues themselves are beyond the logic of the democratic enterprise. Yes, We the People must obey only laws set up by ourselves; but who is included (and excluded) in this "We"? And how far in space may the power of these laws be extended?

These are issues whose solution is indispensable for democracy, but the rational logic of democratic action has no inner resources for solving them. This rational logic has to find them pre-solved. Here we may draw another, this time more "serious" analogy and compare the democratic enterprise to building a house ("building democracy" is a quite common expression). In order to build a house, not only is the project needed, but also a team of workers and a building site. These are problems which the most skillful architect or engineer may be incapable of solving; but without settling them the construction enterprise will never begin.

By this, I do not mean that democracy is not involved in solving the issue. It provides some formal principles and procedures according to which they may be solved: these are the principle of self-determination and the procedure of plebiscite. It does not matter how well these principles and procedures work in reality: the fact is that they formally correspond to the democratic ideal. The political community defines its own composition through the universal democratic procedure of the vote. What, however, the rationalist logic of democracy does not provide are specific criteria for which way to vote, whom to include in the team of "democracy-builders" (or players), and whom to exclude from it. Why should or should not a given unit of people secede from any larger body, or unite its effort with some other unit(s)?

Since the idea of democracy is universal, it would be only natural if the principle of popular sovereignty were embodied in some world-wide polity. But this presupposes, that (1) the democratic transition should be world-wide in the first place, and that (2) the "People" Itself wants it that way. But neither premise has turned out to be feasible. Historically, democracy has emerged in separate communities; and the force which claimed to provide some kind of criteria and settle the problem of defining those political units for democracy has been nationalism. "Nation" became another name for "We the People".[7]

Traditional, or I would say utopian, European nationalism tried to provide some objective criteria of nationhood, compliance with which could enable any given unit of people to justify in a rational way its demand for "self-determination". This could be language, common origin, an historical tradition of statehood, or whatever. If this kind of criteria were relevant and operational, the edifice of democracy could find a completely rational foundation. There would exist some universally valid objective criteria of "fair" distribution of land between the peoples to whom it "really belongs"; in case some group or individual had any doubts about membership in a given nation, just and impartial judgment would always resolve them. But the practical history of

[7] Presumably, the word "nation" has two different meanings which do not have much in common: the legal-political (the totality of citizens of a given state) and ethnic (people of the same origin, language, culture, etc.). But this division, even if useful in a lexicographic sense, would be unacceptably simplistic if recognized as an absolute one on the theoretical level. The point of democratic nationalism consists in overcoming that division: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." E. Gellner (1983), p. 1.

nationalisms, and the later theoretical critique of nationalist utopianism undertaken by H. Kohn, E. Gellner, and others, has shown that these objective and universal criteria were unattainable. It has become clear that evolution of pre-modern ethnic communities to modern nations was mediated by historical contingency and by conscious political effort. Thus, the contention of nationalist utopianism, that there preexisted national entities with their national territories, molded by nature or God, and that borders between democratic states could and should be drawn in compliance with these naturally or divinely defined national borders, has turned out to be futile.

However, this discovery has undermined only the claim of utopian nationalism to provide universally valid rational criteria. It has not changed the function of nationalism, that is, the function of molding democratic (which means: self-determining) political communities. Yes, nations are not preexistent non-historical entities, with which any democratic enterprise should comply. Yes, nations as politically-minded communities striving for "self-determination" are essentially a modern phenomenon, and national cohesion is to a greater degree the result, rather than the precondition, of this movement to self-determination, i.e. nationalism. But still, democracy works only in political communities, which "determine themselves", that is, make decisions about their compositions; and when they determine themselves, they call themselves "nations". The criteria they base their decisions on may not pass the rationalist test of universal validity,[8] but they do work in every concrete case, and only through them is achieved the cohesion of polity necessary for political action.

Of course, the insufficiency of the nationalist principle makes the national foundation of democracy not just shaky and nonrational, but sometimes quite bloody. The absence of universally valid criteria of nationhood gives birth to conflicts, which cannot always find rationally justifiable "fair" solutions. It is hard to find even an island nation that has not some record of border conflicts with its neighbors over some piece of land which both sides regard as "historically ours". The most usual and logical means of resolving those kinds of conflicts is war.

Many nations have to convince some marginal ethnic groups that "you are our kind", while the latter claim that "we are different and should be independent", or "we belong to others". Almost every emerging nation has to deal with ethnic minorities, which are viewed with suspicion as potential traitors and which in their turn consider the majority as would-be oppressors. There are different means of resolving these majority-minority conflicts: radical "final" solutions like genocide or expulsion; gradualist solutions, like assimilation; compromise solutions, like different degrees of autonomy within a given state.[9] On rare occasions, solutions are found without pain, violence and blood. This makes it quite clear why one could wish to avoid the nationalist principle in molding modern democratic polities. But the difference between wish and reality is valid even in the social science.

Failure to acknowledge this reality stems from reluctance to admit that the democratic enterprise, supposed to be the embodiment of rational political behavior (and "rational" is usually regarded as synonymous to "good"), is based on a nonrational foundation, and that it cannot be otherwise: at least in the initial stages of democracy-building, a nonrational act of defining political "We" of "the People" is a necessary precondition of rational political behavior. This failure

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[8] It is another issue that the non-rational, arbitrary character of these decisions is often exaggerated by "modernist instrumentalist" doctrine. There is always some space for rationality and common sense in handling any particular issue. An analogy could be drawn with human communication: it can never be fully rational, but admitting that does not necessarily lead to a statement that it should be fully irrational.

[9] Secession may be regarded as a solution for a given minority, but usually not for the minority problem in general, inasmuch as the former minority becomes a majority for others.

precluded the majority of Western intellectuals from understanding what was really happening in the Soviet Union (or, rather, to the Soviet Union) during "perestroika". Dogmatic statements appeared, like "nationalism is a main obstacle to democratic reforms", while in fact all real democratic movements were at the same time nationalist. Irrelevant questions were addressed to political leaders from the independence-minded republics, like "what specifically (or economically) are you going to gain if you become independent?" while the would-be nations themselves viewed independence not as means, but as an end in itself.

The interdependence of democracy and nationalism expresses itself in one more way. Much is written about the artificial character of nation, but the modern democratic polity is artificial in exactly the same sense. Pre-modern democracy is exclusively that of the *polis*, of the city. This democracy was essentially commensurate with human personality: the site of democratic enterprise was observable for a member of the polity, and he could meet any other member on the city Agora. Modern democracy, which had to overcome the city boundaries, required a new kind of site and polity, which was no longer observable by human senses. This meant, both site and polity ("We the People" and "Our Land") had to exist in the human mind or imagination. This is what Benedict Anderson speaks about in his book *Imagined Communities*.[10] Under "Imagined Communities" he means nations; the title of this book is usually mentioned when one wants to stress an illusory, arbitrary, mythological, etc. nature of national cohesion. But in reality, his reasoning may and should be applied to the mechanism of building any democratic polity whose scope exceeds city boundaries.

The same may be said of another famous and provocative title "Peasants into Frenchmen".[11] The point here is obvious: by the time of the French revolution, from which the French nation in the modern sense stems, not many rural dwellers of the country (who clearly formed the big majority of a would-be nation) had a distinct self-consciousness of being "French", and many of them did not actually speak French. Thus, national cohesion had to be enforced through a deliberate and centralized political effort, which means that the French nation is more "artificial" than "natural". But the title of the book could as well be *Peasants into Citizens*. This would sound even more paradoxical because the word "citizen" in all languages means "city dweller", and it is something extremely artificial to turn a peasant into a city dweller without taking him to the city. But, artificial or not, this is what the possibility of the modern democracy is based upon. Democracy, which is a city phenomenon in the first place, had to be spread throughout the "country" (which included also "country" in the sense of "countryside"), and this could be accomplished only through a conscious political effort (undertaken by government bureaucracy, cultural elites or whomever). In fact, making peasants into Frenchmen and into citizens is a single process which could just be viewed from two perspectives: "peasants" could be made into "Frenchmen" only through becoming citizens, and vice versa. These two aspects can be divided only in our minds.[12]

Thus, it may be said that democracy is based on nationalism, and, at the same time, it is the necessity of molding democratic polities that provides incentives for molding nations out of

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[10] *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

[11] E.J. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France. 1870-1914* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976).

[12] E. Hobsbawm, who by no means tries to underline positive relationships between democracy and nationalism, also finds "the very act of democratizing politics, i.e. of turning subjects into citizens, . . . hard to distinguish from a national, even a chauvinist, patriotism". Hobsbawm (1990), p. 88.

preexistent ethnic material. If "nationalism engenders nations",[13] then, in exactly the same sense, nations are engendered by democratic transitions (not just industrialism or a capitalist economy). That is why in emergent democracies, the movement towards democracy and movement towards independence (another name for "nationalism") are hard to separate. Both are covered by the word "self-determination": We the People (i.e. the Nation) are to determine our fate; we are going to observe only those rules which we set up ourselves and we will not allow anybody (absolute monarch, dictator, foreign enemy) to impose his order on "Us".

Whatever is said in the last paragraph, however, refers mostly to emerging democracies. Nationalism is usually needed for starting a democratic enterprise, but its role in sustaining it is different. Perhaps once democracies feel stable and secure in their own borders, these borders themselves will gradually lose any meaning and "die away" together with the nationalism which produced them. Maybe yes, maybe no but that is another issue.

Liberalism and Nationalism

What one usually has in mind when denouncing nationalism in the name of democracy can be classified more precisely as a controversy between liberalism and nationalism. Under liberalism is usually meant (and I shall mean here) a doctrine of individual human liberty as the foremost political value. Nationalism, in contrast, is understood as a doctrine giving preference to collective rights based on race, culture or whatever. Liberalism is the champion of a person's right to choose, while nationalism gives preference to something that does not depend on personal choice.

But the controversy is supposed to be focused not only on value preferences. The main point of the liberal critique of nationalism is that the nation is something "unreal" ("imagined", "created", "concocted", etc.), while the human person is "real". Thus, an appeal to inalienable individual rights is "rational", while nationalism is by definition "irrational". Fukuyama presents the differentiation this way:[14] "The distinction between human and nonhuman is fully rational: only human beings are free, that is, able to struggle for recognition in a battle for pure prestige. This distinction is based on nature, or, rather, on the radical disjunction between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom. The distinction between one human group and another, on the other hand, is an accidental and arbitrary by-product of human history".

I think this passage shows how shaky is liberalism's claim to be rationally grounded. The distinction between human and nonhuman is really "rational" in the sense that it is evident and may be described in "natural" terms. But the tricky thing is, the claim for universal recognition for man as a man (which for Fukuyama and myself is the core of liberalism) is based not on mere acknowledgement of the disjunction between the realms of human and nonhuman. What personal "dignity" demands be recognized is not just the fact that man is different, but that there is something in this difference which is of absolute value, and this value is no longer empirically "evident" or "natural". Fukuyama himself admits, following Hegel, that this claim for universal personal recognition is based upon Christianity, which he calls a "slave ideology" (unlike "master ideology", which would imply recognition for masters only).[15] It was Christianity that ascribed exclusively to the individual human soul a sort of intransigent value. If Christianity is just an "ideology", which means that it is by definition false, then its claim for universal human recognition is based on a false, illusory premise and certainly cannot be called "natural" or

[13] E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 55.
[14] Fukuyama (1992), p. 201.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. l96-198.

"rational". Of course, it is not necessary to be a Christian believer to be a dignified human personality, but neither is it indispensable to claim that my demand that the value of my personal freedom be recognized is based on some "rational" considerations, which may be scientifically proved.

The fact is that, though real victories of liberal democracy may have become possible thanks to progress of scientific rationality, neither democratic nor liberal principles are based on a rational foundation. Both may be described as "non-rational", or "pre-rational" (but not necessarily "irrational", for the latter term is usually associated with hostility to rationality). Value preferences in this case (as, I think, all other cases) may be ultimately based only on faith (Christian faith is one of the instances) rather than on rational knowledge.

On the other hand, the "instrumentalist" doctrine of nation, which insists that the latter "is an accidental and arbitrary byproduct of human history", has really done a very good job in exposing the nationalist myth of nation as a non-historical entity directly stemming from natural and/or divine order. But that does not make the nation "unreal" for an individual man born into a specific society, culture, state, and obliged to make concrete choices not only on existential, but also on social and political levels. There is no necessity that a nation to be "rational" in order to be "real".

Anyway, these arguments do not affect in any way the conventional wisdom that liberalism and nationalism are mutually exclusive principles, and do not diminish the need to make a choice between them. There is some positive link between liberalism and nationalism, as well as between the ideas of human personality and nation. The empirical fact that both principles are tied to the same historical epoch (which could be called "modernity") is not a random coincidence.

I have in mind a set of ideas, which in different theories could also be called a "paradigm", "epistheme", "*Vorverstehen*", "transcendental system of categories", etc., which has created the socio-cultural realm known as "modernity". The central place in this "paradigm" is occupied by the idea of the autonomous human personality, which in itself bears an intransigent value (in Kant's language this means that it is always the end and should never become a means) and is willing to follow only rules endorsed by its own personal verdict (the idea of self-determination). This in no way means that this idea is necessarily atheistic. Historically it is based on the Christian tradition and may theoretically accept an Absolute Divine Order, but the monopoly of legitimate interpretation of that order and deduction from it of specific incentives for human actions belongs to individual rationality and moral conscience rather than to any community or institution.[16]

The modern idea of nation belongs to this "set". It is this intrinsic link to the idea of personality what really distinguishes it from the "primordial", non-historical notion of ethnic.[17] The ethnic phenomenon consists of extending the idea of family to the macro-social level. Community is "imagined" as a big family, stemming from the same ancestor. If, however, the nation "imagines itself", it imagines itself as a personality. And if the nation is what it imagines itself, then it is a personality.

The self-understanding of a nation is cut out according to the blueprint of individual human personality from two points of view. First, the nation is a community of people organized around the idea of self-determination. The nation is a personality, because, like a modern individual, it is

[16] Some aspects of this attitude are presented in my "Humanism and Freedom", in Paul Peachey, John Kromkowski, George F. McLean, eds., *The Place of the Person in Social Life* (Washington D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1991), pp. 33-43.

[17] "Non-historical" not in the sense of immunity to historical change and\or ideological manipulation, but in the sense that ethnic does not owe its existence to history; it had existed in the prehistorical era and can survive history if the latter is ended.

willing to observe only those laws which it itself endorses, denouncing any rules imposed by an external force. This is just another interpretation of the thesis mentioned above that nation is created by nationalism (i.e. through an effort of self-determination), and not vice versa.

Another aspect of the nation-personality consists in the idea of activity. The nation is active; as a whole it is an agent of activity. Thus the nation requires an arena, which is the history of mankind. As a subject of history, it also requires partners for interaction and mutual recognition, and these are other nations. A nation can only imagine, understand, or recognize itself in the perspective of humanity an idea completely unthinkable for even the most advanced ethnic consciousness. The idea of nationhood is the idea of membership in humanity which may find formal expression in joining, for instance, the United Nations. Humanity as a "family of nations" is the ideal of liberal nationalism.

Insofar as the idea of nation follows the idea of personality, it does so also in one very important aspect. Nation demands self-determination (independence) not as an exclusive privilege, but as a particular case of the general principle, the principle of nation-state (if you are a nation, you deserve a state of your own). I do not understand why Fukuyama thinks that nationalism is by definition *megalothymic* (demanding unequal recognition), while liberal individualism is by definition *isothymic* (demanding equal recognition). Nationalism in its proper sense does not "extend recognition only to members of a given national or ethnic group".[18] This attitude is better covered by such terms as "racism" or "ethnicism". What nationalism does demand is recognition for the "nation" as a whole, which means acquiring a general standard of nationhood: legal status consisting of independent statehood (comparable, in the case of individual, to the legal status of citizen), being accepted in the "family of nations" as an equal member. Rejecting this attitude as based on the "unequal recognition" is exactly the same as mixing up "individualism" and "egoism" as criticized by Karl Popper:[19]

Proclaiming the value of individual personality does not imply that I demand some privileges for myself (although I may use individualist ideology to justify my selfish conduct). The initial idea of nationalism is at least as much *isothymic* as that of individualist personalism. On the other hand, nations also share with individuals the *megalothymic* danger.

Sharing dangers, liberalism and nationalism also share accusations. Both are charged with being divisive. Liberal atomistic individualism divides the community; nationalism divides humanity. The accusations are quite accurate in both cases. But this is not where the similarity ends: practically, both liberalism and nationalism have proven to be most effective unifying forces. Yes, liberal individualism is emotionally divisive, but only those societies which accepted liberal ideology have achieved a stable civil state, while "warm" communal ideologies often end up in bloodshed. Attempts of universalist ideologies like Christianity (I mean Christianity as a political force) and Communism to unite the world have led only to international hostilities.

Although plenty of blood has been shed in the name of National Interests, still the first organization that embraces almost the whole World is called "United Nations", and in fact it is based on the ideology of *isothymic* nationalism ("respect for national sovereignty",[20] accepting the

[18] Fukuyama (1992), p. 266.

[19] Popper (1957), vol.1, pp. 95-99.

[20] Modern international relations based on liberal-democratic ideology do not regard the principle of "national sovereignty" as absolute: human rights abuse is considered a good excuse for intervention. But this by definition only involves the attitude of liberal states to non-liberal ones, which makes it unapplicable

principle of "inviolability of borders" the direct analogy to "personal immunity"). The general principles of nationalism seem still more universally accepted than "pure" liberalism or any other ideology.[21] The part of the world which invented nationalism Western Europe has also outrun the rest of it in finding a new pattern of international unity. The latter was reached not through neglecting nationalism, as it is broadly believed, but through respecting its isothymic aspect. Independent states voluntarily gave up larger and larger parts of their sovereignty because it was respected. The borders between them are gradually losing practical significance because their inviolability was proclaimed a sacred principle of international relations. The movement from *megalothymia* to *isothymia* is possible not only on the individual, but also on the national level.

The Liberal Attitude To Nation And Nationalism

Thus, if democracy was founded on nationalism, in the case of liberalism it is nationalism which finds itself dependent: the idea of nation follows the blueprint of human personality. Nationalism substitutes the nation for the individual person, but understands (and creates) the former in terms of the latter. But what about the reverse relation? What does liberalism think about its offspring?

After World War II the liberals denounced nationalism as "barbarity", actually declared it the enemy no. l (preferring nationalism to communism was supposed to be "right-wing", hence anti-liberal). But the attitude of classical liberalism was more complicated. Theoretically, it did not need the principle of nation at all. The autonomous human personality, on which idea liberalism is based, had borrowed all its basic attributes directly from the Christian God. Thus, it was supposed to be as indifferent to divisions between human beings as the Christian God had been. God makes only one division: between those who love Him, and those who do not. For liberals, the only difference that mattered was between freedom lovers and freedom-haters.

Liberals (as well as Christians) had to meet nationalists not on the level of general ideas, but when trying to implement the idea in social reality. What social order corresponds to the liberal ideal?

It is most natural and appropriate for a liberal to endorse anarchy or the "state of nature". Any state organization is based on repression, something that the true liberal should dislike. The state is acceptable only because its absence would be even worse for the individual, because in practice that would lead to the unchecked dominance of sheer force, or to the complete enslavement of a

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to postwar Western European relationships. Even in the case of repressive regimes, these interventions do not exceed the level of moral pressure or economic sanctions. Only an apparent exception, the defense of the Kurds from Iraqi regime, was not intended to change the regime or state borders. The attitude of the international community to state-citizen relations in sovereign countries is similar to the attitude of society to family relations in liberal states: society may intervene only if something really outrageous is happening, and the intervention is made only on a minimal scale.

[21] "Nationalism not only holds together the histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, showing them to be part of a continuing crisis. It has also brought the histories of Asia, Africa and the Pacific into relation with European history, making them part of a universal history". E. Kamenka, "Political Nationalismthe Evolution of the Idea", in E. Kamenka, J. Plomenatz, eds., *Nationalism. The Nature and Evolution of the Idea* (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), p. 3.

person by a collective (community).[22] Thus the liberal, whether he likes it or not, has to make a deal with the state the only force, capable of guaranteeing individual rights.

Thus, the real question is: what kind of state? Now, it seems self evident that the liberal must prefer a democratic state to any other kind. But liberals did not come to that conclusion right away. Why should it not be a decent enlightened monarchy? After all, the social base of liberalism has always been elitist-aristocratic: if not aristocracy of blood, than at least one of soul. Liberals have always had a fear of His Majesty the People, because there was never a guarantee that the new sovereign would care much about personal freedom.[23] The tyranny of the majority and of mediocrity is an inescapable threat for democracy. But, if liberals accept democracy as the lesser evil when compared to the tyranny of blood over soul and the arbitrariness of dynastic rulers, they have to respect, and even to some extent follow, the General Will. However, as I think we have seen, this General Will is and cannot help being more or less nationalistic.

A more vivid and consistent expression of this liberal dilemma may be found in the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century, namely, in the works of John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton. John Stuart Mill, as I have earlier mentioned, was not an emotional nationalist; but, being clearly and consistently for democratic liberalism, through practical reasoning he came to the conclusion that "free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities",[24] and therefore "it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities".[25] Having endorsed democracy, he had to proceed to endorsing nationalism.

Lord Acton, on the other hand, was an outspoken opponent of the nationality principle, which he rendered incompatible with personal liberty. Contrary to Mill, he thinks that "the combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination of men and women in society".[26] This logically led him to accepting the principles of imperialism[27] and racism.[28] He did not openly reject democracy; but he came close to it, denouncing the Rousseauean principle of equality as an example of a false doctrine side by side with those of communism and nationality.[29] The elitist attitude, however, had to lead to the rejection of democracy, or to approving the latter on a rather limited scale. Practically, it had to lead to its complete rejection, because the "Peoples" themselves, when it is up to them, usually begin building democracy by creating an independent nation state. This rejection does not contradict liberal aspirations: a quite benign ancient regime may be much friendlier to personal freedom than unrestricted and unbalanced democracy.

It is no longer appropriate for a twentieth century liberal to approve imperialism and racism. The "People", having turned into the "middle class", no longer seems as dangerous as it used to be. Still, liberals reject nationalism more strongly than ever. Why?

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[22] On this see Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974) .

[23] For example, "the Founding Fathers [of American Democracy] thought that the liberty with which they were most concerned was menaced by democracy". Richard Hofstadter, *American Political Tradition* (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), p. 10 .

[24] *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), p. 230.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 232-233.

[26] *Essays on Freedom and Power* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1948), p. 186.

[27] "We must conclude that those states are substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian Empires, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them". *Ibid.*, p. 193.

[28] "Inferior races are raised by living in political union with races intellectually superior". *Ibid.*, p. 186.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

There are, of course, different factors. The unhappy experience of the period between two world wars, when nationalism emerged in the brutal form of fascism and ethnic hatred, has had its emotional impact. The stabilized system of nation-states with "inviolable borders" established in Western Europe completely removed the problem of "self-determination" from the political agenda. It remained urgent only in the Third World countries, which reinforced the association between nationalism and "backwardness". In the advanced countries, the national agenda was reduced to the "Soviet threat" and "traditional values" pressing that was considered "right wing". The liberal cause in nationality issues, on the other hand, is predominantly identified with a real problem of protecting "ethnic minorities", which are, or may be, in trouble vis-a-vis the nationalism of majorities.

Still, I think, there is more to it. Fear of "the People", is still there, even if in a latent form. Since the option of enlightened absolutism seems to be dead, a liberal can no longer afford the luxury of being openly anti-democratic, so fear of the People takes the form of an aversion to nationalism. However, when the choice between a benign ancient regime and forces of emerging democracy reemerged in the world of collapsing communism, liberal preferences expressed themselves once more. They were displayed in the way the Western World for a long time preferred Mikhail Gorbachev an enlightened liberal communist monarch, never endorsed in power by his own people to Boris Yeltsin, a popularly-elected democratic leader as unpredictable as the people that brought him into power.

Anti-Liberal Nationalism

However, all that has been said about the attitude of nationalism toward both democracy and liberalism definitely calls for reconciliation with empirical historical reality. Even if dependent on liberalism and providing a basis for democracy in theory, real nationalism has often been illiberal and sometimes anti-democratic.

Nationalism is a kind of two-faced phenomenon. One of the faces is political, the other is ethnic. There have been attempts to present those two faces as two kinds of nationalism, thus making a division between its "good" and "bad" versions.[30] But these are only ideal types; in reality, nationalism is always both political and ethnic, although either component may predominate. The relationship may be expressed as one between body and soul: the political-nationalist soul embodied in ethnic flesh. Or, it would be more precise to speak about a form-matter relation in the Aristotelian manner: a formal principle of nationhood creates the reality of nation out of ethnic matter. The liberal effort to overcome ethnicity is of the same nature as the effort of a Christian ascetic to subdue flesh: both are frantic and vain, if they understand their task literally.

The illiberal flesh of ethnicity cannot be subdued, but it can be tamed, if dealt with reasonably. A common pride in ancestors, glorious history, great traditions, language, culture, etc. (which form the essence of ethnicity) may be sublimated into pride in the order of things (institutions, economic prosperity, way of life) created by a democratic, not just an ethnic "we". The American nation presents a pattern of this sublimation: national pride consists in having built free institutions, the

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[30] Lord Acton distinguished between bad (French) and good (British) doctrines of nationality; in the first case, state corresponds to nationality, in the second, nationality is derived from the state (1948, pp. 183-184, 187). Anthony D. Smith makes a distinction between "territorial and ethnic nations", which corresponds to difference between political and ethnic nationalism. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford-New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 134-138.

"American way of life", and being "leaders of the free world". Glorification of all this may still be annoying to many individualistic liberals, but this at least contains no threat to ethnic minorities. On the contrary, being tolerant to minorities can also become an element of national pride (and has actually become it in the case of many Americans or representatives of other democratic nations).

It is the failure to tame the ethnic flesh of nationalism that leads to fascism, racism, "bad" (ethnic) nationalism and other social disasters because of which nationalism is usually so much feared. By underlining the word "failure", I want to stress that the nasty side of nationalism comes not as a result of excessive ethnicity, but because of the lack of a political element, or political muscle, in nationalism. When nothing is created by me to take pride in, then I have to take pride in something that has created myself (the race, the language, "blood and soil", etc.).

Here I am approaching the point mentioned in the beginning: the different role of nationalism in "original" and "transported" democracies. I have earlier tried to demonstrate that the democratic enterprize needed for its implementation some principle of molding the body politic, and that this principle was provided by nationalism. But in "original", North-Western European and North American cases a certain set of political institutions which we now call "democracy" came as a result of centuries-long gradual developments in culture, society, human consciousness, and economic life. The liberal ideas or their social-economic (private property) and cultural (the Protestant Reformation) preconditions preceded the advent of political democracy; the latter was viewed more as a means of restricting power, then as an end in itself ("Power to the People"!).[31] The ethnic-national factor in molding the new body politic played its role in a latent rather than explicit way: mainly it provided a unity of basic values, on which the new democratic order had to be based (the "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant" background of American democracy could be mentioned). In the case of France, the existent population subject to monarchic rule was proclaimed the "people", which is the "nation", and nationalism had only later to play its role as the force "turning peasants into Frenchmen".

But did, and could, other nations follow similar paths to their own democracies? Does there exist some common scheme of democratic transition, followed independently by different countries? In his book, Fukuyama provides this kind of scheme: industrial progress, based on scientific rationality and capitalist economy, "gets us to the gates of the Promised Land of liberal democracy, but it does not quite deliver us to the other side". What makes humankind take that final step is "desire of recognition" or, in other words, a sense of human dignity.[32] Economic prosperity may be achieved without showing respect to personal freedom, but the person cannot tolerate disrespect, and makes use of the preconditions beneficial for establishing the liberal order. Thus, first some social economic preconditions make a country "ripe" for democracy (and "a strong sense of national unity" is supposed to be one of those preconditions);[33] then a desire for individual, personal recognition takes it to the end.

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[31] It is not surprising, that the United Kingdom, the core of European liberalism, has not even formally completed its democratic transition: the ancient regime was never overturned there, but deprived of power in a gradual way, and the country still lacks such basic attributes associated with democracy as a Constitution and citizenship. These shortcomings are usually overlooked, as plainly symbolic; but perhaps it was this gradualism and compromise between old and new political systems that enabled Britain to avoid some extremes characteristic of more consistent hence more nationalistic democracies of continental Europe?

[32] Fukuyama (1992), p. l34.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 216.

In general, this scheme is quite convincing. Industrial society with a free enterprise system is a necessary basis for firm, stable, balanced democracy. But are all countries so "consistent"? Do they wait until they are quite "ripe" for democracy to take the final step? I am not sure. The right-wing dictatorships in East Asia or Chile, which first prepared everything necessary for democracy, i.e., an advanced economy based on free market and private property, and then just threw away their dictatorial regimes as no longer necessary scaffoldings, are not very typical examples. Rather, democracy spread in a much less rational way like an infection, or the latest fashion from Paris. Having sprung up first in some concrete portion of the world, it gradually became attractive to other peoples (why this is so is a different issue). The democratic nation-state was accepted as a blueprint for political systems that others (first in neighboring regions, than throughout the world) felt compelled to follow.

In this enterprise of "importing" democracy, nationalism played an extra and crucial role, which has been as two-fold as nationalism itself is. It is most certainly what Fukuyama calls "*thymotic* pride", and in particular its *isothymic* aspect, that provides the final incentive for making a democratic transition. But it is a matter not only and maybe, not so much of individual dignity, but rather of national dignity. After the liberal democratic blueprint gains recognition, success or failure in following it becomes a measure of a nation's "political maturity". The failure to implement it becomes a national disgrace. Only as an independent state with a stable liberal-democratic order can a nation be admitted to the international "high society", a club of "advanced", "progressive", "normal", "modern" nations. Otherwise, a country may (at best) be feared (like the former Soviet Union), but not treated with genuine respect. In this case, nationalism happens to provide society with incentives for creating not only a democratic, but also a liberal order.

However, this kind of sensitivity to "national disgrace" is not expressed in the same way by all strata of society. Usually, it is characteristic for elites participating in the world movement of ideas and having the idea of the "normal", "civilized" order. These are mostly intellectuals; but this kind of sentiment may be felt by anybody who has been in touch with "the blueprint". This explains why not only intellectuals, but also liberal communists of high rank supported substantial changes in the former Soviet Union, even if by doing so they were undermining their own positions.[34] With the development of an international media, even broader masses become sensitive to being "politically backward". It was a sense of national, not only individual, dignity, that sent many Russians to the barricades against the die-hard communist putschists who symbolized "barbaric forces" in August of 1991.

However, in the case of "imported" democracies the lack of the social, economic, spiritual or cultural preconditions of democracy could create an especially deep gap between the liberal elite bearer of the "politically correct", "progressive" ideology and the "people", still living in obscurity. The opposition "Intelligentsia and the People" emerged. It found its classical and especially dramatic form in Russia, but became quite universal for many "backward" countries trying to "succeed". The liberal elite itself was too thin and weak to lead the transition movement; there was no strong middle-class to make a deal with. And since, according to the blueprint itself, the transition to modernity had finally to be done on behalf of the People, first of all the People had to be enticed into political activity. But classical liberal values, the foundation of the first Western democracies, could not possibly bring wide masses into movements. As to the gradual preparation of society for their acceptance, this was something "backward" societies could not afford: they

[34] The same mechanism of "feeling disgrace" may explain the attitude of liberal elites in the Republic of Georgia, who supported the military ousting of the democratically-elected president, which put the republic in the position of an international outcast.

were in a hurry to "catch up". The accelerated politization of "the People" needed more focused ideologies, which could be understood in terms of everyday life.

This role had been played by two off springs of Western liberalism: socialism and nationalism, and "Progressive" Western ideology had a chance to inspire popular movements either in the form of socialism or in the form of nationalism. The outward hostility of those two resembled that of competing retailers, trying to sell the same merchandise ("Progressive Western ideas"), though packaged in a different way, to the same customers. Both were religions of the People, but the same Deity in one case was addressed as "class", while in the other case it was "nation".

However, having become the locomotives, rather than the carriages, of the modernization movements, and appearing in a different milieu, these ideas changed their behavior. The concrete difference depended, and depends, on specific social, economic, cultural, psychological conditions of a given society. On the level of general tendencies, however, one can say that in "backward" countries the populist and anti-individualist messages of socialism and ethnic nationalism were no longer balanced by traditions of civil society, enlightenment, economic freedom, political liberties, understanding and respect for law, sometimes different religious attitudes in short, something usually covered by the somewhat vague term "political culture". This lack of "political culture" transformed the initial socialist ethos of fairness into sheer envy; while the failure to master the means of political behavior transformed nationalism into the doctrine of "blood and soil".

When blended with the above-mentioned intrinsic difficulties of the nationalist doctrine, this lack of "political culture" and sense of political failure carries the national idea away from its democratic and *isothymic* origin to the most outrageous expressions of racism and fascism. However, denouncing any kind of nationalism as would-be fascism is not much wiser than rejecting any religious movement as ultimately leading to fanaticism and inquisition. The point is that problems of nationalism are nothing but the indispensable components of democratic transitions. As nationalism and socialism have usually been tools of accelerated modernization, so fascist and communist totalitarianism were expressions of strain and political impotence.

Nationalism after Communism

What is there (if anything) in the post-communist situation that makes Nationalism-Liberalism-Democracy relations significantly different?

Usually, the transitions to democracy, coinciding in general with the modernization effort, implied a transition from traditional societies. Some elements of the latter were preserved and in a sense provided a basis for modernity,[35] so that the sense of historical continuity was thus maintained, and the whole development was regarded as a forward movement to what now turned out to be the "end of history". Communism, however, is far from being a traditional society; being in fact a blind by-path of history, it proclaimed itself to be the end of history.[36] That is why destroying communism implies not a forward-to-the-end-of-history, but a back-to-history movement.[37] Returning from the journey beyond history, people carry with themselves only a

[35] "Liberal democracies, . . . are not self-sufficient: the community life on which they depend must ultimately come from a source different from liberalism itself". Fukuyama (1992), p. 326. "Stable democracy requires a sometimes irrational democratic culture, and a spontaneous civil society growing out of pre-liberal traditions". *Ibid.*, pp. 334-335.

[36] Perhaps only communist China promises to fulfill that scheme in the end.

[37] "Far from seeing an end of history, Eastern Europe now goes through a massive return of history and to history." Sh. Avineri (1992), p. 30.

belief that communism has created nothing worthy of being retained in a "civilized" life. The predominant attitude is that of building something from nothing.

The reason for this does not lie just in rejecting the eschatological vision of communism. Being totalitarian in its essence, the ideological regime penetrated and mediated all structures of social life: all elements of civil society (any which existed in pre-communist past) were destroyed. Thus, rejection of communism means in its turn not just rejection of the political and economic system, but demolishing the whole way of life. This makes it like returning to the "state of nature" and building state and society anew.

That is why Fukuyama's above-mentioned scheme, according to which in order to make a democratic transition, a country should first be taken to the gate of the Promised Land through economic development, becomes quite irrelevant for post-communist reality. Of course, the notion that nothing created under communism could be carried to the liberal democratic world should not be taken literally. Communism did accomplish some tasks of modernization: society was urbanized and educated, railways and highways were built, etc. All this should and could not be reversed or destroyed.[38] Moreover, the fact that the strata of urbanized and educated people is larger in today's Russia and other post communist countries than at the beginning of the century, gives the attempts at democratic transition much greater chances of success.

But when one speaks of the social-economic preconditions of a free society, the crucial thing is not just education and urbanization, but private property.[39] It is an economic system based on private property that establishes in personality a balance between freedom and responsibility, or freedom and order, on which the democratic enterprise is also based, and which can never be learned through theoretical education. Urbanized and educated elites clearly are supposed to be the driving force of the democratic transition, but what may it be based upon?

When there is nothing real to lean upon, the movement tries to be based on ideology. Having returned from a journey beyond space and time, the nations try to resume their history from the point at which it was interrupted by the communism. The rejection of communism throughout Eastern Europe is at the same time a series of restorations.[40] Communism strips both peoples and nations of their identities, and the only means to regain those identities seems to be through self-recollection. On the other hand, the post-communist nations also return from a journey beyond space: having destroyed the Berlin Wall, they have to join the world. But the world has gone forward quite a distance after the unlucky nations fell victim to communism. Thus a movement to regain one's own self and the movement to join the world come into contradiction: the "true self" exists in the past, while "the World" to be joined exists now. This produces severe identity crises and aberrations of time in the post-communist nations and lack of understanding on the part of "the World". The former make a tremendous effort to rejoin history only to discover that history has already ended.

This continuous identity crisis makes oversensitivity to national issues unavoidable. But since the structures of civil society were destroyed by the totalitarian regime, the latter left behind itself a rubble of atomized individuals who look frantically for a common principle on which to base the building of their new lives. In this situation, nationalism emerges as the major if not the only

[38] However, the largest part of the economy has to be destroyed, even in a literal sense: even the best enterprises, which seemed to do well under the socialist system, are no longer competitive once they join the world market, while an attempt at "technical modernization" or "conversion" in practice means preservation of old factory buildings at best.

[39] At least, this was what Hegel, the main source of Fukuyama's vision, thought.

[40] This point is very well elaborated in Avineri (1992).

principle capable of holding society together. But since the political tradition is interrupted, its ethnic element becomes especially strong. This does not mean, that no other social forces and ideologies exist; there is religion, there is pro-Western liberal elite. But everything is somewhat blended with nationalism, or defines itself in relation thereto. What is called the "cultural revival" is definitely more national than cultural in the proper sense. Religious revival is more of a national religious revival: it has to "unify the nation" and help it to overcome the legacy of atheistic and cosmopolitic communism, rather than bring salvation to an individual human soul. Appeal to liberal-democratic values takes the form of appealing to "our political traditions", to "our" identity as "Western", "European" and/or "Christian" culture. Without these connotations, liberal ideas have next to no chances of exerting influence on political discourse. I have already spoken of another aspect of this, namely, being able to assume the liberal-democratic model and joining the free world as a matter of national dignity.

Nationalism thus becomes a major destructive force (destructive for communism) as well as a constructive one (providing unity in the world of disarray); a major menace (for building the liberal democracy), and a major hope (for achieving the same goal). It is far from being uniform; but almost all political discourse finds itself inside the paradigm of nationalism. Saying of a person living in that world that he or she is a "nationalist" means saying next to nothing, because while being a "nationalist" one may be liberal or fascist. A pronounced rejection of nationalism also does not always mean the same thing as it could in the West; it might imply the rejection of one-sided ethnic nationalism, but not, for example, the necessity of political independence for his/her country. A British activist of the liberal international once complained to me that the organization had some problems with Eastern European liberal parties which seemed to them too much "right-wing" and nationalist. Still, I do not think that Eastern European liberals are necessarily less liberal than the Westerners. What is really different, is the place of nationalism in the political discourse. An ardent rejection of nationalism is possible, but what the post communist intellectual cannot afford is indifference to national issues.

There is one more significant aspect which I think it important to mention here: the difference between Russians and other former members of the "Socialist camp". Russia was the first to install the communist system; the spread of communism in other republics of the former Soviet Union, and later in Eastern and Southern Europe, came as a result of the Russian-Soviet conquest. Communism was regarded as not only a politically, but also (if not in a predominant way) a nationally hostile force, as a part of foreign occupation. Accordingly, overcoming it meant overcoming the occupation. Of course, to some extent this was an illusion: even forcefully exported communism has penetrated all levels of society and made getting rid of its legacy a matter of generations, rather than one of a political revolution, whether "velvet" or bloody. Still, this helped nationalism become a driving force of the anti-communist movement. From one point of view, this was good because it helped to destroy communism; but it also had its negative side, because the source of evil is seen as an external force, thereby obscuring the deeper problems of the communist legacy in one's own society. Depicting communism as something "foreign" encourages an effort to project the responsibility for the totalitarian sin onto a definite strata of society, which expresses itself in a witch hunt, a tendency to understand the political realm in conspiratorial terms, etc.

As to Russia, the national aspect of post-Communism is even more complicated. The tradition of Russian statehood has been the tradition of an empire; in the Soviet period, this tradition merged with the role of the leader of the communist world. The spread of communism and the expansion of the Russian Empire were almost synonymous (only later did some communist states begin to

defect from Russian domination), and it was thanks to communism that the Empire reached the historical peak of its might and influence. So the imperial-nationalist tradition found itself not in opposition, but rather in convergence with the communist principle, which in its turn lead to a controversy between liberal democracy and nationalisms of any kind.[41] That made an identity crisis even more painful. Russian ethnic-cultural nationalism formed itself as openly anti-Western (i.e. anti-liberal) and, although it initially considered communism as a Jewish virus aimed at contaminating and extinguishing the Russian people, it ended up in a logical coalition with hardline communists. As to the Westernizing democrats, up to this time they have failed to produce any viable and consistent concept of Russian statehood. There is much frantic and irregular movement between self-denigrating images of a country of slaves which is organically unable to succeed, and renewed national pride, which too rapidly took on openly imperialistic and authoritarian overtones leading to defections from the "democratic camp" to "patriotic forces", and to demanding resurrection of the Russian-Soviet Empire. A small group advocates the idea that even the Russian federation continues to be an empire and should not preclude its smaller autonomies from seceding. The government tends more and more towards a pragmatic vision of a "united and inseparable" Russia within the borders of the existing Russian Federation, but from time to time cannot help making territorial claims on the Ukraine. A non-imperial concept of Russian statehood has yet to be created.

The preoccupation with national issues in the absence of deep democratic and liberal traditions raises legitimate fears of nationalist authoritarianism in post-communist countries. The danger is real; but, as I earlier mentioned concerning the illiberal tendencies of nationalism in general, the source is not nationalism as some isolated force, a crazy devil which must be tamed in itself, but the general weakness of democracy. The transition from nothing to something creates a real, objective necessity for strong executive power. Almost all post-communist countries display that course. This naturally creates a fear of authoritarianism and few post-communist leaders avoid accusations of dictatorial style. On the other hand, lack of a strong power leads to anarchy and disarray, the backlash of which may be even more bloody and repressive. Since the most operative ideology is, as I have said, nationalism, it is only natural that authoritarian tendencies lead to a nationalist, and in particular an ethnic nationalist, kind of authoritarianism. Almost all post-communist countries with sizable ethnic minorities face painful problems between unstable and insecure majorities and even less secure minorities. Almost all governments in such countries face accusations of following a not quite liberal minority policy, which in most cases is true at least by Western standards. I do not see any hope of satisfactory solutions for the numerous ethnic issues in these countries for some time to come.

All this raises quite legitimate fears that the post-communist world is going to plunge into a series of wars and repeat the history of Europe between the two world wars (according to the psychological mechanism of self-recollection, that is where all the post-communist countries now exist). The only counterbalance to that is the presence of the Western world, which is of another historical era. I have underlined the world "presence", because I have not much hope of direct international involvement, or in attempts at mediation, economic sanctions, etc. These measures have proven to have very limited effect (although in some particular cases even that limited effect can wholly justify them). The real counterbalance of nationalism based on "recollecting" the

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[41] This controversy, however, exists on the ideological level. I would argue that to a significant degree the psychological, emotional source of rejecting communism for Russians consisted in a sense of a deprived national dignity, in weariness of having the image of embodiment of the world evil, of the big but clumsy one that everyone fears but despises.

historical past is an alternative version of the nationalist sentiment: an effort of "joining the civilized world as an equal and dignified member". Sense of international isolation is much more painful than any international sanctions. This world provides the blueprint not only of the flourishing market economy, but of a real and working balance between forces of democracy, liberalism and nationalism. The possibility of just observing this is the greatest help for young emergent post-communist democracies in their effort to succeed.

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Chapter II
Person, Cultural Identity and Democracy

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The first thing to note is how much I agree with Prof. Ghia Nodia in his rethinking of nationalism and democracy. His paper is extremely rich as it stands, and fully justifies indeed, demands development into a book length manuscript.

At the present juncture we face a particularly exacerbated form of the tragic tensions between what Paul Tillich would refer to as the polar elements of self-identity and relation to others, whether individual and group, group and the larger nation, or nation and the Family of Nations. After a half to three quarters of a century of attempts to supplant the natural bonds of human community by a notion of class constructed scientifically in parallel to the triumph of the machine age, many peoples have now been freed to seek their own identity and destiny once again. Suddenly, ancient frictions and more recent and unresolved grievances have emerged. Often these have been created or exacerbated as the result of the forced transport of peoples in cruel and despotic attempts at social engineering and territorial expansion at the expense of the lives of massive numbers of people either physically through genocide or spiritually through the forced suppression of their cultural and national identity. All of this must be faced in the bewilderment of new found independence, before the civilizing factors of the various cultures have been able to be rearticulated and structures rebuilt. The challenge is historic in its proportions, whether looked at in terms of territory or economic structures, personal and cultural identity or social relations.

Professor Nodia's paper is uniquely sensitive to this. Of particular note are his progression from identification of the rationalist bias of much of the present discussion, to his distinction, relation and contrast of the notions of liberalism, democracy and national identity (rather than "nationalism", a term now often used in a reductivist sense in continuation of the above universalist attacks on cultural identities); to the distinction and relation of the ethnic and political contents of national identity; and finally to his attention to the importance of situating peoples within the family of nations.

If Professor Nodia is correct in citing rationalism as the root factor in the communist suppression of individual rights in the past, this bears frightening implications, namely, that liberal theory which has the same rationalist roots tends to an equally inexorable suppression of cultural and national identities. In these days of renewed and violent examples of the endemic inability of the Western nations to understand the nature and importance of ethnic conflict and respond effectively thereto, this contains a sober warning and a crucial suggestion for the theoreticians of polity in other regions, both north and south.

At the beginning of his paper Nodia cites an impressive list of examples from the recent post-communist period of this generalized inability to comprehend the issue of nationality and the negative value judgements this entails. They illustrate how pervasive is the blindness to the compounds of this issue, the way in which this controls public policy, and the danger of becoming the unwitting surrogates of past totalitarians in enforcing the suppression of peoples witness not only our stand with Gorbachev against Yeltsin, cited by Nodia, but the menacing posture of the West toward Slovenia and Croatia when they first were attacked by Serbia, and the subsequent paralysis of the Western democracies as the moral underpinnings of civilized life have been

trampled there with a most flagrant brutality. There is, then, desperate need for a broader and deeper understanding of peoples.

On the part of the emergent nations, Professor Nodia is hopeful that two factors will exert strong persuasion:

(1) communication: the television sets now open homes everywhere to the world at large (though parents wonder what effect this will have on their children); and

(2) a desire to share in the general democratic life of Western Europe.

But he notes the actual process of assimilating new values is very volatile and subject not only to the highest, but also to the lowest aspirations. Though it is not desirable to so program developments that human cynicism and collusion in evil is not possible that would destroy life as an exercise of human freedom nonetheless it is urgently necessary to identify available constructive elements and promote them. These may be effectively available less as values to be imported from alien contexts than as lessons regarding the gerence and quality of life in terms of the foundational and distinctive sense of human dignity and sociality embedded in the culture in which one is born and raised.

This does not imply a fractured world of diversity without unity, for such sensitivity to values is a movement from within, beginning with the human heart and hence proper to each person and people; it is not unrelated to the experiences of other peoples. Much less is it a divisive force which presages only conflict. The transnational character of historical movements shows clearly that peoples move ahead in terms that are massively shared; this is the very essence of the formation of historical periods. Hence, basic aspirations in any one period, such as the Renaissance, are more shared between peoples and nations than they are proper to just one. Further, though an idea may emerge first in one place, in order for it to mark a period it must appear desirable or necessary to most others at the same time. Finally, these sensitivities to meanings and values do not appear in random sequence, but in an order which enables them to be codified chronologically in a history.

This leads one to suspect that, well-understood, cultural emergence can correlate and support, rather than undermine, the democratic progress of peoples and peace between nations. This path in urgent need of exploration is the burden of this chapter. It suggests that an enriched sense of knowledge and freedom might make possible a positive appreciation of culture which, in turn, could provide not only deeper more adapted foundations for minimal human rights, but a richer sense of democratic interchange within and between peoples.

This requires a number of steps: (1) to identify the felt need for renewed attention to the person in the face of its suppression by modern rationalism; to follow out the implications of this for the rediscovery of (2) new levels of knowledge, and (3) higher modes of freedom; (4) to show how awareness of these new levels of human consciousness makes it possible to appreciate the resurgence of attention to cultures as patterns of values and virtues; and (5) to see how this, in turn, can not only found basic human rights in the time honored commitments of peoples, but promote and indeed constitute progress in democratic interchange.

Making Room for the Person in a Rationalist Age

Along with its contributions, there is an inherent danger in technical reason. This appears from the history of philosophy, where time and again a philosopher achieves a brilliant new breakthrough, only to turn it from a creative achievement to a destructive weapon by attempting to reduce thereto all understanding. Thus, Marx's renewed awareness of matter engendered a materialism, while Hegel's brilliant insights regarding idea engendered idealism. Perhaps the

ultimate temptation is to turn reason itself from a manner of opening to or in Aristotle's strong term, of "becoming" all things to a mode of closure soon followed by suppression of all else.

Something of this perverse dynamism was found in no less genius a thinker than Plato who inverted Parmenides' relation of thought to being into a restriction of reality to what was clear to the human mind. This invited the human mind to soar, but where it met its limits as in taking account of concrete realities and the exercise of human freedom Plato generated a classic blueprint for a suppressive communal state.

The temptation of all-controlling reason is characteristic above all of modern times, beginning from Descartes' restriction of the work of reason to the achievement of clear and distinct ideas. The effect in his own philosophy was to split the human person between the extended substance or body and the nonextended substance or spirit. The natural next step would seem to be the reunion of these in the human person, but Descartes was correct in seeing that, much as he tried, this could not be done in the clear and distinct terms to which he had restricted the project of human reason. As a result philosophers and then whole cultures proceeded according to either body or spirit, so that the public view was polarized between the atomisms of discrete sensations and individuals which has characterized Anglo-Saxon philosophy and public sensibilities and ever greater unities perceived by spirit which have characterized European philosophy.

What is particularly frightening is the way in which theoretical philosophical games in either of these isolates are carried out by a fairly mechanical pattern of reason and then translated into public policy. It is fine for a thinker to employ a kind of game-theory to explore the constructive possibilities of his or her mind by saying, e.g., "Let's suppose that all are isolated individuals in search of survival" and then see what compromises and what rules would make survival possible. But when this was done by a Hobbes (or a Rawls), people began to look at themselves as wolves to other men and then to act according to some variation of that theme. Over time we may become accustomed to that game and forget the nature of the base instincts by which it is played, but we should listen to others when they perceive the resulting system in the very terms originally used by Hobbes, namely, as predatory, brutish and mean.

Similarly, it could be helpful for a thinker to hypothesize that all is matter and then see how its laws can shed light on the process of human history. But when this was done by Marx and Lenin society began to repress the life of the spirit and term irrational everything except the scientific historicism. As a result, the freedom of individuals and peoples was suppressed and creativity died.

These are parallel cases of theoretical axioms become metaphysical totalities the vigor with which some decry metaphysics (the effort to keep open the full range of reality) is but the measure of how unwittingly they do this. It is not surprising that the result for much of the last half of this century was a bipolar world armed to the hilt and subsisting by a reign of mutual terror between the liberal democratic republics of the self-styled free world and the people's democratic republics as opposing camps. What is surprising is that the internal collapse of one of the partners in this deadly game should give popularity to the notion that the parallel road taken by the other partner can now be followed without fear that the wolf has been transformed into a lamb for lack of a mirror in which to observe the effects of its own root problem. Professor Nodia rightly calls for a return to history, but the call will not be effective, nor will the suppression of the identities of peoples cease unless the reductionism of that other rationalism, namely, individualistic liberalism, be overcome.

This directs attention to the awareness of the person which has been emergent in this century and which has moved people to reject the totalitarian rationalisms. This can shed light on the new awareness of cultural and national identity by which individualistic rationalism feels threatened

and can suggest ways in which, instead, this can provide more adequate bases for democratic life and progress.

It would be wrong, of course, to underplay the contribution to the notion of person by Aristotle's notion of the *autos*(independence) or substance, or more essentially by the medieval Christian notion of the dignity of the person as child of God and indeed as image of the shared life of knowledge and love of the Trinity, or by Descartes and Kant who intensified the sense of human subjectivity in modern times. But it is the history of mankind in this last half century which could fairly well be described as essentially the abutment of the notion of person (and hence of peoples) against the rationalistic ideologies of liberalism and communalism as they existed in the first part of this century. From the overthrow of an oppressive fascism, to liberation from colonialism, to increased recognition of minorities, to the collapse of communism, the history of the major accomplishments of this century consists of a series of successful campaigns for the liberation and affirmation of persons and of peoples as such.

In this context it is essential not to continue merely to play the same ideological game with the same rationalist tools; that promises only to leave the real opportunities unaddressed or even to resurrect or recreate old problems. Rather, one needs to open one's awareness to the full range of reality as manifested, not only in the abstract simplifications of reason, but in the person in its concrete complexity and richness where freedom operates, social life is built and history is created. One needs to delineate more carefully the levels of knowledge in order to understand the proper realm of technical reason upon which modern times have focused so as to be able to reap its fruits without violently reducing to it all of one's life, body and soul. Finally, one needs to be able to learn from the experience of all dimensions of human life, especially those of creative personality, of family and communities at various levels, and of nations with their multiple dimensions of education, production, commerce and church. This has come to form the various cultures as bearers of mankind's long experience in of life in its many personal and interpersonal relations. We must enable these to evolve in terms of the new personal sensibilities (e.g., to women and to minorities) with emphasis upon freedom and creativity.

Some may argue that every community must have an identity, and that as this does not include all others it must be divisive. Since Plato they have argued that the family must therefore be suppressed to varying degrees and all education removed from it and other intermediate communities and handed over to the state. These are the totalitarians of our day though they may term themselves liberal. They do not see that it is precisely in terms of the identity and dignity of persons, families and neighborhoods that the next generation is educated not to hate others, but to recognize the human dignity of the other, to have mutual respect and to work to develop the concrete modes of sociability: all this would be jettisoned in favor of assertion of abstract rights by and for individuals.

In order to overcome this we need to transcend the confines and capabilities of rationalism and open to those newly remembered modes of human sensibility with which through the ages each people has interpreted its world, generated its culture, and mobilized the immense dynamism required for the projects of humanization which have characterized the last 50 years. We need to grasp more effectively the sources and processes of human action from which these personal and social forces emerge in order to be able to move responsibly and creatively into the twenty-first century. This points to yet higher reaches of knowledge and freedom: more to aesthetics than to science, more to a hermeneutic interaction with other peoples than to manipulation based upon personal or national interests, and to the importance of attending to the multiple levels of

consciousness and creativity through approaches of the human sciences, literary theory, symbolic structures, rhetoric and hermeneutics.

In this light the importance of the subsequent sections can be seen: the levels of knowledge and freedom in order to situate the new personal, cultural and national awareness in relation to classical political structures and to work out their mutual contributions.

Levels of Knowledge

Professor Nodia rightly points to the limitations of rationalism as a key impediment in appreciating and working with issues of national identity, aspirations and values. Descartes' norms of clarity and distinctness pointed modern philosophy toward the fixed and necessary, whereas human life and relationships transcend neat categorization. Freedom is by definition not necessitated and love as self-giving is essentially unique and spontaneous. If freedom and love are the highest of human realities then the search for what is required for them, and hence manifest by them, promises to be an especially penetrating exploration into the heart of being itself and hence of human persons.

Of special interest here is that this search when taken up by Kant led him inexorably (and by surprise) to an aesthetic context for reality and for thought. Hence, an investigation of Kant promises to provide a way of discovering the importance of a new level of human awareness and hence an ability to appreciate a deeper sense of creative freedom and of the culture it generates.

To look at this we shall follow summarily the sequence of Kant's *Critiques*, with special attention to the role therein of the creative imagination, namely:

(1) his construction of the universal and necessary laws of science (*Critique of Pure Reason*);

(2) his discovery of the reality of freedom transcending the realm of necessity and universality (*Critique of Practical Reason*);

(3) freedom's need for an aesthetic understanding to integrate the orders of necessity and freedom, of science and politics (*Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*); and finally beyond Kant

(4) the requirement that the transcendent order this implies be real, rather than merely hypothetical.

His discovery of the aesthetic realm in the third critique will open our road to the importance of culture and hence of national identity and their essential role in the positive development of democracy in a pluralist age.

The Critique of Pure Reason

It is unfortunate that the range of Kant's work has been so little appreciated. Until recently, the rationalist impact of Descartes directed almost exclusive attention to the first of Kant's critiques, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which concerned the conditions of possibility of the physical sciences. Its rejection of metaphysics as a science was warmly greeted in empiricist, positivist and, hence, materialist circles, as a dispensation from any search beyond what was reductively sensible, and hence phenomenal in the sense of being inherently spatial and/or temporal.

This reductionist empiricism goes back to the earlier seventeenth century enlightenment when John Locke perceived it as a crucial condition for a liberal democracy. If decisions were to be

made not by the king but by the people, the basis for these decisions had to be equally available to all. To achieve this Locke proposed that we suppose the mind to be a white paper void of characters and ideas, and then follow the way in which it comes to be furnished. To keep this public he insisted that it be done exclusively via experience, that is, either by sensation or by reflection upon the mind's work on the materials derived from the senses.[1] From this David Hume concluded that all objects of knowledge which are not formal tautologies must be matters of fact. Such "matters of fact" are neither the existence or actuality of a thing nor its essence, but simply the determination of one from a pair of sensible contraries, e.g. white rather than black, sweet rather than sour.[2]

The restrictions implicit in this appear starkly in Rudolf Carnap's "Vienna Manifesto" which shrinks the scope of meaningful knowledge and significant discourse to describing "some state of affairs" in terms of empirical "sets of facts". This excludes speech about wholes, God, the unconscious or *entelechies*; the grounds of meaning and all that transcends the immediate content of sense experience are excluded.[3]

Kant himself, however, quite insisted upon going further. If the terms of the sciences were inherently phenomenal, then his justification of the sciences was precisely to identify and to justify, through metaphysical and transcendental deductions respectively, the sets of categories which enable the phenomenal world to have intelligibility and scientific meaning. Since sense experience is always limited and partial, the very universality and necessity of the laws of science must come not from things encountered, but from the human mind. Such *a priori* categories belong properly to the subject insofar as it is not material.

Here we are at the essential turning point of the modern mind at which Kant takes a definitive step in identifying the subject as more than a wayfarer in a world encountered as a given to which one can but react. Rather, he shows the subject to be an active force engaged in the creation even of the empirical world in which one lives. The meaning or intelligible order of things is due not only to their creation according to a divine intellect, but also to the work of the human intellect and its categories.

But if the forms and categories with which we work are from our mind, how we construct with them is not arbitrary. The imagination must bring the multiple elements of sense intuition into a unity or order capable of being informed by the concepts or categories of the intellect and this with a view to making the necessary and universal judgments of science. The subject's imagination here is active, authentically one's own and creative; its work, however, is not free, but is ruled by the categories integral to the necessary and universal judgements of the sciences.[4]

The Critique of Practical Reason and the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals

In the above terms the human mind remains in the end an instrument of physical progress. Hence, in his second *Critique* Kant goes beyond that set of universal and necessary laws of matter

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[1] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (New York: Dover, 1959), Book, chap. I, vol. I, 121-124.

[2] David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Chicago: Regnery, 1960).

[3] Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath, "The Scientific World View: The Vienna Manifesto", trans. A.E. Blumberg, in *Perspectives in Reality*, eds. J. Mann and G. Kreyche (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 483.

[4] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A112, 121, 192-193; Donald W. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 87-90.

and points to the reality of human responsibility in the realm of practical reason. If man is responsible then there is about him a distinctive level of reality irreducible to the laws of physical nature. This is the reality of freedom and spirit which characterizes and distinguishes the person.

In these terms he recasts the whole notion of law or moral rule. If freedom is not to be chaotic and randomly destructive, it must be ruled or under law; yet in order to be free the moral act must be autonomous. Hence, the law or maxim must be something which I as a moral agent and no other give to myself. I am free because I am the lawmaker.

In legislating, however, I cannot be arbitrary, for if the moral order must be universal, then my maxim which I dictate must be fit to be a universal law for all persons.[5] On this basis freedom emerges in a clearer light. It is not merely self-centered whimsy in response to circumstantial stimuli; nor is it a despotic exercise of the power of the will or the clever self-serving eye of Plato's rogue.[6] Rather, it is the highest reality in all creation; it is wise and caring power, open to all and bent upon the realization of "the glorious ideal of a universal realm of ends-in-themselves"; in sum, it is free men living together in righteous harmony. This is what we are really about; it is man's glory and his burden.[7]

This has undoubted grandeur: inclusiveness and universality henceforth will be a requirement for human sensibilities in the political order. But there are important problems in the way in which this is done. When it is taken up by the empiricist and individualist liberal ideologies, it comes to mean only that all individuals have the minimal right to human dignity and protection written into international conventions; when it is taken in Kant's properly formal mode it means that all are covered by the universal laws I give myself. This, however, does not extend to the aspects of one's life which are properly personal, but only to those which one shares with all others when treated not but abstractly. That is, it applies to them as Xs or human, but not to his or her concrete relationships where the creative freedom of individuals and peoples, and hence their cultural identity, is to be found. It protects what pertains to me in common with the all humans, but not what pertains to my concrete personal and cultural identity. Such considerations, being outside the law, come to be considered as without value, irrational, disruptive and hence to be suppressed as soon as, and to the extent, possible.

The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement

Hence, Kant himself had a third step to take which provides a much needed corrective that only now is beginning to receive close attention. For if the free person is surrounded by the alien and necessitarian universe of the first critique, then the freedom in the second critique would be entrapped and entombed within one's mind; all actions would be necessary and necessitated. If this is simply not so, then the universe must not be alien to freedom. If there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws, indeed if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be directed toward a goal and must manifest throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, even in its necessary and universal laws, nature is no longer alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom.

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[5] Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. R.W. Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), Part II, pp. 38-58 [421-441].

[6] Plato, *Republic*, 519.

[7] Foundations, III, p. 82 [463].

How can a free person relate to an order of nature and to structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating? In the *Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment*, Kant points out that the imagination, in working toward an integrating unity, is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts as in the first *Critique*. Rather, it ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see where relatedness and purposiveness can emerge. This ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities. Unrestricted by any *a priori* categories, it can integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and therefore creative production, and scientific universals within its unique concrete harmonies. This contribution of creative imagination is a work of the free human person in this world.

To extend the realm of human freedom to the entirety of this all-encompassing harmony and all its full range of possibilities our focus in the final analysis must be directed not to universal and necessary social structures, nor to the beauty and ugliness of empirical realizations or even to beauty as an ideal in itself. Our focus must be rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images which we imaginatively create as manifesting the many facets of beauty and ugliness actual and potential that is, we must look precisely to the cultural traditions which have been created over time, in which we are born and by which our general human sensibilities are refined and shaped. In these terms we experience concrete instances and evaluate them in terms of the free and integrating response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion which they generate most deeply within our whole person.[8] This is the type of knowledge that provides our basic sensibilities which direct the efforts of our political structures and correct them when they fail, for a legislative, judicial and executive body may fail, to articulate justice in a society, but the aspirations of the culture of a people, enshrined, e.g., in a Lincoln Monument, remain a point of higher appeal.

Levels of Freedom and the Social Commitment of a People

We began this chapter by identifying the problem of making room for the conjoined senses of person and cultural identity as bases for modern democracy. The first step in fashioning a response to this was to review the levels of human awareness and to find that only the first and the second levels had been actively engaged in enlightenment social constructs. The identification of a third level of awareness, typified by Kant's third critique which, not incidentally, is presently attracting great attention, opens the way for positive attention to the cultural identity of peoples. Does this have significance for democratic life? If democracy is precisely a way in which a people can live their freedom, to answer this question it will be necessary to look into the levels of freedom. In doing so it becomes clear that there are, in fact, three levels of freedom, that they correspond to the three levels of knowledge described above, and that the third exceeds the senses of freedom attended to in enlightenment ideologies.

A Topology of Freedoms

Here we shall draw especially upon the work of Mortimer J. Adler and the team of the Institute for Philosophical Research which was published in two volumes entitled *The Idea of Freedom: A*

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[8] See Kant's development and solution to the autonomy of taste, *Critique of Judgment*, nn. 57-58, pp. 182-192, where he treats the need for a concept; Crawford, pp. 63-66. See the paper of Wilhelm S. Wurzer "On the Art of Moral Imagination" in G. McLean, ed. *Moral Imagination and Character Development* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992) for an elaboration of the essential notions of the beautiful, the sublime and taste in Kant's aesthetic theory.

Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom.[9] Their corporate examination of the main philosophical writings throughout history identified three correlated modes in which freedom has been understood, namely, circumstantial, acquired and natural. To these correspond three modes of "the ability or power of the self in virtue of which freedom is possessed, namely, self-realization, self-perfection and self-determination."[10] This yields the following scheme:

Mode of Possession Mode of Self [11]
1. Circumstantial <> 1. Self-realization
2. Acquired <> 2. Self-perfection
3. Natural <> 3. Self-determination

To this schema political liberty could be added as a variant of circumstantial self-realization and collective freedom as a variant of acquired self-perfection. Using the above scheme the Institute team categorized the positions on freedom of the main bodies of philosophers (see following tables).[12]

Through their dialectical search of these positions for the answer to the question: what is freedom, the team of the Institute for Philosophical Research found that the theories of freedom found in the thinkers they surveyed could be distributed into three categories, namely:[13]

(a) *Circumstantial freedom of self-realization*: "To be free is to be able, under favorable circumstances, to act as one wishes for one's own individual good as one sees it";

(b) *Acquired freedom of self-perfection*: "To be free is to be able, through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as one ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature"; and

(c) *Natural freedom of self-determination*: "To be free is to be able, by a power inherent in human nature, to change one's own character creatively by deciding for oneself what one shall do or shall become";

(d) *Political liberty appears a form of (a)*; and

(e) *Collective freedom appears as a form of (b).*

Note that each of these statements is not a generic statement over and above which the particular theories in the category add specific difference. Rather, they are analogous statements of the common content of the theories in that category in a manner sufficiently open to embrace the different instances in the category and yet sufficiently distinct to enable these to be contrasted to the theories in another category.

This process of winnowing out the breadth of philosophical literature to identify certain basic categories of freedom and then to draw out a general analogous statement of freedom was not a theoretical or deductive procedure, but a dialectical one. It looked historically for the various

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[9] (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958), 2 vols.

[10] Adler, I, 586.

[11] *Ibid*., p. 587.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 592-594. The modes of self correspond to the modes of possession, thereby constituting a class; e.g., self-realization (as permitting an individual to act as he wishes for his own good as he sees it) will always relate to the circumstantial mode of possession. It is possible, however, that a mode of self might correspond as well to an additional mode of possession. Thus, the circumstantial mode of possession is significant not only for self-realization, but also for self-perfection and self-determination.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 606.

human understandings of freedom and from them drew a sufficiently open description of freedom to include though not in explicit detail the positive content of this basic and shared human project and experience.

If we now reverse the field and look into the philosophical basis from which have arisen the various theories of freedom identified in the above process of generalization we may be able to draw out the bases, modes and goals of each level of freedom. What appears immediately striking is that, if one takes, not the ways in which some theories overlap and include a number of types of freedom but the pattern of those which are focused upon only one type of freedom, or if one looks to the highest type of freedom which a theory can take into account, one finds that each of the three types of freedom delineated by the Institute of Philosophical Research corresponds to a specific epistemology and metaphysics. (a) Circumstantial freedom of self-realization is the only type of freedom recognized by many empirically-oriented philosophers; (b) acquired freedom of self-perfection is characteristic of formalist and essentialist philosophers; while (c) natural freedom of self-determination is developed by philosophers who are open as well to the existential dimension of being.

This suggests that the metaphysical underpinnings of a philosophy control its epistemology, and that this in turn especially in modern times controls its philosophical anthropology, ethics and politics. With this in mind the following review of the types of freedom will begin from their respective metaphysical and epistemological contexts as sorted out in the previous section on the three levels of knowledge and in that light proceed to its corresponding notion of freedom.

Circumstantial Freedom of Self-realization and Liberalism

In the threefold division of levels of knowledge above we saw how John Locke, in order to assure the universal availability of the basis of decision making, restricted knowledge to sense experience and reflection; that David Hume concluded that all objects of knowledge must be mere matters of fact, i.e., neither the existence or actuality of a thing nor its essence, but simply the determination of one from a pair of sensible contraries; and that for Rudolf Carnap this came down to empirical "sets of facts", excluding speech about wholes or God and all but the immediate content of sense experience.

In brief, all that concerns the culture and commitments of a people or nation are outside the range this first level of knowledge, and hence can be only matters of blind and arbitrary will. This restriction of knowledge constitutes an extremely limiting and intolerant ideology, no matter how hard its practitioners strive within these limits to achieve openness and pluralism. For their condition for such a pluralism comes inevitable pervasive elimination from public discourse of all such notions of wholes as nations, peoples, or cultures and all such grounds of meaning as spirit, self, community or God. Though proposed as the condition for tolerance, this relegates commitment, meaning and values to the private domain; public life then must be a battle of self-interests in which self-ambition will have to be depended upon to check self-ambition, for nothing else can be allowed public standing. Freedom will be nothing but the right to be a wolf to the rest of humankind in the cause of self-protection and all is sacrificed to protect this "right".

It is amazing that this is proposed as the desirable pattern for social and political life, for in such terms it is not possible to speak of appropriate or inappropriate goals or even to evaluate choices in relation to self-fulfillment, much less to social well-being. The only concern is which objects among the sets of contraries I will choose by brute, changeable and even arbitrary will power, and whether circumstances will allow me to carry out that choice. Such choices, of course,

may not only differ from, but even contradict the immediate and long range objectives of other persons. This will require one to compromise his or her freedom in the sense of Hobbes; John Rawls will even work out a formal set of such compromises.[14] Throughout it all, however, the basic concern remains the ability to do as one pleases.

This includes two factors. The first is execution by which my will is translated into action. Thus, John Locke sees freedom as "being able to act or not act, according as we shall choose or will";[15] Bertrand Russell sees it as "the absence of external obstacles to the realization of our desires."[16] The second factor is individual self-realization understood simply as the accomplishment of one's own good as one perceives this in the empirical and hence material, terms of the senses.

In these terms one's goal can be only that which appeals to one's senses, with no necessary relation to real goods or to duties which one ought to perform.[17] "Liberty consists in doing what one desires,"[18] and the freedom of a society is measured by the latitude it provides for the cultivation of individual patterns of life.[19] If there is any ethical theory in this it can be only utilitarian, hopefully with enough breadth to recognize other people and their good as well as one's own. In practice, over time this comes to constitute a black hole of self-centered consumption of physical goods in which both nature and the person are consumed; it is the essence of consumerism.

This first level of freedom is reflected in the contemporary sense of "choice" in North America. As a theory this is underwritten by a pervasive series of legal precedents following Justice Holmes' and Brandeis' notion of privacy, which recently has come to be recognized as a constitutional right. In the American legal system the meaning of freedom has been reduced to this. It should be noted that this derived from Locke's politically motivated decision (itself an exercise of freedom) not merely to focus upon empirical meaning, but to eliminate from public discourse any other knowledge. Its progressively rigorous implementation, which we have but sampled in the references to Hume and Carnap, constitute an ideology in the sense of a selected and restrictive vision which controls minds and reduces freedom to willfulness. In this perspective liberalism is grossly misnamed, and itself calls for a process of liberation and enrichment.

In sum, in the context of the Enlightenment and in order to make possible universal participation in social life, Locke limited the range of meaning to what was empirically available. This assured one sense of freedom, but limited it to choices between contrary qualities. The effort was well-intentioned, but he would seem to have tried too hard and compromised too much in a single-minded pursuit of freedom of choice. As a result, the very notion of freedom has not been able to sustain itself, but over time has turned gradually into a consumerist black hole.

Acquired Freedom of Self Perfection

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[14] *The Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971).

[15] *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, A.C. Fraser, ed. (New York: Dover, 1959), II, ch. 21, sec 27; vol. I, p. 329.

[16] *Skeptical Essays* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), p. 169.

[17] Mortimer J. Adler, *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1958), p. 187.

[18] J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, ch. 5, p. 15.

[19] Adler, p. 193.

The second sense of freedom, namely, acquired freedom of self-perfection, was introduced above where we saw how Kant in his second Critique opened a new and much needed dimension of reason, namely, practical reason. Here freedom is founded in law precisely as I assert for myself (autonomous), a law which is fit for all men (universal). One is "able through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as one ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature."

Freedom here is then the ability to do, not as I want, but as I ought according to formal principles. An extensive branch of enlightenment theory now is based upon working out in theory what is dictated by this "ought"[20] and how much of this can and should be formally agreed to in international conventions in order to be converted into a set of internationally recognized human rights. Certainly one would want no less and the considerable strength of the position lies in fear that this minimum not be strongly protected.

But this is exactly what happens when this second meaning of freedom is placed at the service of the first for then it is turned into a set of individual human rights which protect the right to choose. At the same time to promote this same right of private acquisition and initiative all intermediate communities and identities are rejected and the state is enlisted in the task of defending and enforcing these individual rights. Minorities and the weaker peoples of this world beware!

Existential Freedom: Natural Freedom of Self-determination as the Life of Democracy

In the previous section we saw how the aesthetic sense of Kant dramatically enriches the pursuit of freedom. It integrates body and spirit, opens all to high ideals and locates in one's free and creative response to the beauty and harmony of the whole the norm of creative human engagement in reality. This greatly enriches the Enlightenment effort at constructing freedom by raising its goals and locating the exercise of human freedom, not only in terms of the abstract essences of autonomous individuals, but within our aesthetic response to a sense of beauty and harmony which transcends all, inspires awe and delight in the good, revulsion at what is evil and ugly, and the energy to transform one's personal and social life.

If structured in terms of an appreciation or feeling of harmony, freedom itself at the height of its sensibility serves as a lens presenting the richness of reality in varied and intensified ways: freedom thus understood is both spectroscope and kaleidoscope of being. Freely, purposively and creatively, imagination weaves through reality, focusing now upon certain dimensions, now reversing its flow, now making new connections and interrelations. In the process reality manifests not only universal scientific structures and their potential interrelations, but its power to evoke our free response of love and admiration, of hate and disgust, of love and commitment.

In this manner freedom becomes at once the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluator and the arbiter of all that we can imaginatively propose. It is goal, namely to realize life as meaningful and free in this world; it is creative source for with the imagination it unfolds the endless possibilities for human expression; it is manifestation because it presents these to our consciousness in ways appropriate to our capabilities for knowledge of multiple and limited realities and relates these to the circumstances of our life; it is criterion because its response manifests the ability of things to be variously desirable or not in terms of a total personal response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion; and it is arbiter because it provides the basis

[20] John Rawls, *Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

upon which our freedom chooses to affirm or reject, realize or avoid various ways of self-realization.

This is progress indeed, but in his own philosophy Kant both pointed out in theory and illustrated in practice the potential this opens for a serious undermining of the sense of freedom. For if the required context for freedom is based upon proceeding hypothetically, 'as if' all is teleological then its very reality is compromised. If its exercise is restricted to the confines of the human imagination then freedom becomes, not only self-determining, but self-constituting. Again one has tried too hard and become trapped within what he or she can make or do.

One needs instead to go beyond issues of nature or essence. Freedom is not only the articulation of a law however autonomous and universal this might be in the pattern of Kant's second *Critique*, or at whatever stage of universalization of the sense of justice in the pattern of Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning. Freedom is not merely a nature reflected in moral judgements, it is human life and action. It is to *be* humanly and to *live* fully; this pertains not to the order of essence, but to that of existence.

Progress in being human corresponds to man's development of his sense of being. Its deepening from forms and structures, essences and laws in Plato, to act in Aristotle and especially to existence in Christian philosophy definitively deepened the sense of human life with its triumphs and tragedies. This is the drama we are living in our days as we are called insistently to humanize the application of our technological abilities and indeed our realization of life itself. This cannot be done simply in terms of essence, that is, of a moral law or an ideal befitting human nature; rather it must be in terms of existence, that is, of deciding for oneself in virtue of the power inherent in human nature to change one's own character creatively and to determine what one shall be and become. This is the most radical freedom, namely, our natural freedom of self-determination.

This takes us far beyond freedom as external choice between objects in our world and beyond the internal selection of universal principles for the direction of our action. It is rather self-affirmation in terms of our orientation or teleology to perfection or full realization. This implies seeking when that perfection is absent and enjoying or celebrating it when attained. In this sense, it is that stability in one's orientation to the good which constitutes a broad culture and people and which in classical instances has been termed holiness. One might say that this is life as practiced by the saints, but it would be more correct to say that it is because they lived the life of their culture to perfection that they are called "holy". It would be radically insufficient to think in these terms of a human person in isolation from others, as merely self-centered and self-concerned, for then life would be limited to the vision or hopes of only one person or a set of persons taken serially. Indeed, such person would have closed off the realization of being which should rather be open to all of nature and especially to other persons. One's concern for perfection should extend to other persons beyond what I could determine as my participation in being, and even beyond what I determine for them as their participation in being, for such an exercise of freedom on my part would return to me and remain limited within the confines of my being. Instead, by opening to others as free, that is, as they uniquely determine themselves, my engagement in being extends definitively beyond myself to their lives and self-realization of all both singly and in community their community, all humankind and indeed all creation.

But persons are still limited, whereas their minds and hearts are open to being without end. Situated in an existential context the pointer of Kant's third Critique toward an infinite telos takes on further meaning. For it directs us toward that infinite, self-sufficient and properly creative source of our being. Corresponding to that act of infinite freedom by which we live, and breathe, and have our being, we unite with the act of being by which we are made, the act of love by which

we have first been loved. Human growth in freedom is the process of self-correction and self-perfection to the point at which we are fully opened to that infinite act of freedom from which we come and to which we tend. The achievement of this openness is the state of Hindu and Buddhist Enlightenment and of Christian and Islamic Mystical Union in the divine in which God loves himself in me: "I live now not I," says St. Paul, "but Christ liveth in me." Kant himself would only say that to be authentically human, life had to be lived "as if" all is teleological. But then its exercise would be restricted by the limitations of the human imagination and freedom, more than self-determining, would be self-constituting and thus self-limited. In contrast, if the deepest striving of the human spirit is what is most real in this world, then the transcendent principle it requires must be the most real in heaven and earth; if freedom presents us with a limitless range of possibilities, then its principle must be the Infinite and Eternal, Source and Goal of all possibility. The Transcendent is the key to real liberation: It frees the human spirit from limitation to the restricted field of one’s own slow, halting and even partial creative activity; It gives absolute grounding to one’s reality; It certifies one’s right to be respected; and It evokes the creative powers of one’s heart. This is the reason why religion is the heart of culture.

Hence, to treat all this as a divisive force to be excluded from civil life and identity, as something to be rendered bloodless till it disappears, is fundamentally subversive of public life in the name of openness to abstract rather than concrete persons; it would destroy multiple concrete peoples in favor of an ideologized pluralism.

Rather, the religious sense of transcendence makes much needed contributions to modern life. To the liberal sense of freedom as arbitrary choice, awareness of the transcendent Creator adds that life is not only a matter of selecting between which physical realities we will consume, but of *being*, with its characteristics of self-identity, communication and sharing, justice and love.

To the aesthetic awareness of Kant as described above, awareness of the transcendent as the context of human life grounds the intuition of human meaning, dignity and rights.

To the enlightenment egalitarian search for universal participation in social decision making, this aesthetic sense tempers the aggressive excesses of self-centered personal identity with that broad sense of harmony both with man and with nature needed in our ever more complex and crowded world.

This indeed is freedom writ large. Beyond issues of procedure or balances of interests, it is the reason why such a divine Person provides a dynamic center for free and constructive human efforts; it gives dramatic impulse to the very essence of democracy as personal participation in social life; it is the transforming presence in the heart of everyone who suffers injustice; it is the source of new life for person and society. This is the real key to the liberation of a people, indeed it is the issue of the foundation and extent of reality and hence of human life itself. As with family and smaller community, to exclude this from nation building or to attempt to erase religion from the identity of a people is to condemn them to subservience to the state and its predominant political power. It is no accident that the statement of Pope John Paul II in Victory Square in Warsaw which unleashed the thrust which constituted the liberation of Central Europe in 1989 was: "Christ will not be erased from the history of our Poland". Despite the claims of Colonel Pilsudski cited by M. Foley below the state never defined that nation, rather the nation survived all despite the state.

Culture as the Work of Creative Freedom

A major fear in the search for the relation between the sense of cultural and national identity, on the one hand, and the work of democracy, on the other, is that the former will delimit the working of the latter which is seen as the mode of exercising freedom in our day. This concern stems from an earlier view of tradition and culture as a matter of blind will, fixed and unchanging content, which conflicts directly with pragmatic and experiential enlightenment rationalism and its sense of the exercise of freedom restricted to the first and second level. That this is no longer acceptable in our day reflects the development of the new sensibility to the person and a reawakening of the higher (third) levels of knowledge and of freedom as detailed in the previous two sections.

On the other hand, if the new sensibility to the properly personal dimension of human life with its consciousness, freedom and creativity are applied as well to the understanding of the notion of cultural heritage and tradition these become not only conciliable with, but the inner dynamic principles of change in our times. This has given birth to the explosion of interest in hermeneutics and to the vast advances made in that field in the last decades. This progress makes it newly possible to understand national identity as the work of freedom, always in a process of free and creative response to the requirements and challenges of the historical circumstances. It provides the capabilities for humane progress by endowing a people with the unity of vision and goal required for the corporate decision making which shapes this efforts to build their future.

Hence, a major step in considering the realization of the person in our day is to examine the grounds upon which a people develops its identity as a nation and the process by which, in concert with others, it advances into the future. To do so requires at least some brief attention to four specific issues:

1. the nature of values, culture and tradition;
2. the moral authority of this cultural tradition and its values for guiding a people’s life;
3. the creative shaping and developing of the tradition in each age in response to contemporary issues; and in the following section;
4. the implication of this for democratic life in our day;
5. the religious and cultural roots of national identity.

Values and Cultural Traditions

Living things survive by seeking the good or that which perfects and promotes their life. Thus, a basic exercise of human freedom is to set an order of preferences among the many things that are possible. These are values in the sense that they "weigh more heavily" in making our decisions than do other possibilities. Cumulatively, they set the pattern of our actions.

Together the values, artifacts and modes of human interaction constitute an integrated pattern of human life in which the creative freedom of a people is expressed and implemented. As practiced it creates special capabilities or virtues on the part of a people. The pattern of values and virtues is the heart of a culture.

Tradition is the cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values of a culture through time. It is at once both heritage or what is inherited or received and new creation as we pass this on in new ways. Attending to tradition taken in this active sense allows us to uncover not only the permanent and universal truths sought by Socrates, but to perceive the importance of the values we receive from the tradition, and to mobilize our own life project actively toward the future. We shall look more closely at each of these.

Cultural Traditions and Moral Authority

As received, tradition is not against freedom but is rather the cumulative freedom of a people. Persons emerge from birth into a family and neighborhood from which they learn and in harmony with which they thrive. Through experience, horizontally one learns from experience what promotes and what destroys life and makes pragmatic adjustments. Vertically, and more importantly, one learns what is truly worth striving for and the pattern of social interactivity in which this can be richly lived. This, rather than all that happens good or bad (history), is what is passed on (*tradita*, tradition). The importance of tradition derives from the cooperative character of both the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience even of failure and from the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have defined, refined, defended and passed on through time the corporate life of the community.

Cultural traditions attain their authority not by the arbitrary imposition of the will of forbears, but on the basis of what has been learned from horizontal and vertical experience and passed on. Through history there evolves a vision of actual life which transcends time and hence can provide guidance for our life, past, present and future. The content of that vision is a set of values which point the way to mature and perfect human formation and thereby orient the life of a person. Such a vision is historical because it arises in the life of a people in time and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. It is also normative because it provides the harmony and fullness which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing, in a word, liberating. For this reason it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged.[21]

This is called the culture of a people or the context within which the life of a specific nation or people is cultivated or promoted properly as human. Hence, to destroy this in favor of some generic supposedly universal human brand is literally to dehumanize the life of a people and to render it incapable of forming its younger generation. The words of the gospel have special sense in our times: fear not those who can kill the body, fear those who can kill the spirit.

Tradition and Creativity

As an active process tradition transforms what is received, lives it in a creative manner and passes it on as a leaven for the future.[22]

Taken diachronically the process of tradition, as receiving and passing on, takes time seriously. It does not stop with Plato's search for eternal and unchangeable ideals, with the work of *techné* in repeating exactly and exclusively a formal model, or with rationalism's search for clear and distinct knowledge of immutable natures by which all might be controlled. Rather, in the application of a tradition according to the rich distinctiveness of persons and their situations tradition is continually perfected and enriched. It manifests the sense of what is just and good which we have from our past by creating in original and distinctive ways more of what justice and goodness mean. J. Pelican's distinction is important: "Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living."[23]

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[21] H.G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroads, 1975). 245-258.

[22] *Ibid*., 281-286.

[23] Jaroslav Pelican, *Vindication of Tradition* (New Haven: Yale Uni, versity Press, 1984), p. 65.

Application of the tradition requires prudence (*phronesis*) or thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means for the circumstances. It must include also the virtue of sagacity (*sunesis*), that is, of understanding or concern for the other. One can assess the situation adequately only inasmuch as one, in a sense, undergoes the situation with the affected parties. This is more than an indifferent respect for their rights; it is an active empathy and a positive concern to promote their welfare.

Such a reading of the tradition is less a matter of appreciation and conservation than of original, creative and free expression, for it is impossible to read an ancient text with the eyes long closed of their author. This is so not least because to the very degree in which that were to succeed it would destroy the text written as a vital expression of the process of life. Attention to a culture does not seek to reiterate old times in remembering the lives of our forebears. Rather, it is a recognition that in new times with new horizons and new questions, we inherit and are shaped by the experiences and cumulative responses of our forebears. This enables them to speak new meaning to us, and in so doing the tradition is not dead but living and therefore the more true. In this sense it is in the tradition that we can situate an effective struggle to face the problems of life and build a future worthy of those who follow.

It is true that in the past values of stability prevailed over those of progress, and undoubtedly, according to the needs of society, at times they will again in the future. But whether the search is for stability or progressor, more likely for stability in progress the culture of a nation founded in its proper religious and human values and articulated in the symbols proper to a people will remain essential.

Some, of course, many opt not to draw actively upon all of a culture no one could do so fully, in any case. Culture is liable to be appreciated more as the sense of pluralism evolves with the intermixture of people and the expansion of horizons through the media. But to weaken or attenuate a culture in the hope that this will increase understanding and tolerance is to attempt to build understanding on ignorance and generosity upon self-centeredness.

Democracy as Dialogue in the Tradition of a Culture

We have seen how the emergent sense of person has directed attention to aesthetic awareness and creative freedom, and how these in turn have made it possible to be newly attentive to the cultural identities of peoples. Many fear that this increasing awareness of broader group identities will militate against recognition of every individual and equal rights for them to complete in the liberal's Hobbesian war of all against all. It is more likely that the humanization of life depends upon the substitution of such a war by peaceful interaction. There is good hermeneutic reason to say that this can be precisely the contribution of the new sense of cultural identities to democratic life.

If we take time and culture seriously then we must recognize that we are situated in a particular culture and at a particular time; hence all that can be seen from this vantage point constitutes one's horizon. This would be lifeless and dead, determined rather than free, if our vantage point were to be fixed by its circumstances and closed. Hence, it is necessary to meet other minds and hearts, not simply to add information incrementally, but to be challenged in our basic assumptions and enabled thereby to delve more deeply into our tradition and to draw forth deeper and more pervasive truth.

Hence, a hermeneutic mode of openness does not consist in surveying others objectively, tolerating them with passive indifference or even simply juxtaposing their ideas and traditions to

our own. Rather, it is directed primarily to ourselves, for our ability to listen to others is correlatively our ability to assimilate the implications of their answers for delving more deeply into the meaning of our own traditions and drawing out new and even more rich insights. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that our cultural heritage has something new to say to us and that interaction with others who differ can enable our culture to speak.[24]

Here the hermeneutic of tradition, national identity and a democratic attitude converges. The attitude is not one of methodological sureness which imposes its views, nor is it a mere readiness for dialogue, conversation, compromises or new techniques of social organization for these are subject to manipulation and critique on the horizontal level. Instead, it is readiness to draw out in open interchange new meaning from a common tradition. Seen in these terms the heritage of our culture and values is not closed or dead, but through democratic interchange becomes more rich, and thereby enables life to remain ever new.

In this light the cultural heritages or identities of the people(s) of a nation and their ability to be transformed in the face of new circumstances are brought by democracy into a coherent and mutually promotive relationship. Rather than the task being one of establishing a surface coherence or tense balance of divergent self-interests, divergences begin to appear as new modes of access to the genius of peoples enabling them to provide the creativity needed to face new challenges. Culture as a treasury of past experience and invention, rather than being an impediment to contemporary creativity, becomes its resource. The multiple heritages of a nation, rather than fettering progress, direct people to discover related values and virtues in response to present needs, energize intensive debates about the future, and enable these to be resolved on the basis of a deepening sense of aspirations and concerns. Such a people has not only a horizontal multiplicity of interests and a succession of circumstances in time, but is in a process of deepening their wisdom and discovering convictions which bind them together and enable them to take advantage of new opportunities to accomplish democratically agreed upon goals. This is the key to empowering Kant's ideal of a society of free men living together in righteous harmony.

Religion, Nation and Democracy

What then should we conclude regarding the root of the sense of the good or of perfection in which a people has been raised, which gives it dominion over its actions, and which enables it to be free and creative: Does this come from God or from man, from eternity or from history? Is it a human or a religious affair? Chakravarti Rajagopalachari of Madras answered: "Whether the epics and songs of a nation spring from the faith and ideas of the common folk, or whether a nation's faith and ideas are produced by its literature is a question which one is free to answer as one likes. . . . Did clouds rise from the sea or was the sea filled by waters from the sky? All such inquiries take us to the feet of God transcending speech and thought."[25] It is characteristic of human life that it transcends selfishness for service, and of community that it not only tolerates others, but is intentionally open and concerned for the good of each in the context of a broader common weal.

If culture is the key to national identities and religion is the key to a culture, then the ability of religions to avoid conflicts and to contribute to democratic life is of special importance to our theme of cultural identities and democratic life. For reasons seen under the section on freedom above, religion is the culmination, and hence the norm of the success or failure, of his mankind's overall endeavor. At the same time it challenges humans to measure themselves against the

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[24] Gadamer, 225-340.
[25] *Ramayana* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1976), p. 312.

perfection and holiness of the divine. If responded to properly this opens and energizes the individual and the community, the citizens and their leadership. Given the human ability to fail however, it also tempts the state to usurp supreme power by manipulating or even blocking access to the divine, and tempts the Church to confuse itself with the divine and usurp power, both sacred and state.

This may hold a number of lessons, opportunities and challenges. In the history of the Christian Church the emergence of the liberal emphases at the beginning of the Renaissance seemed to require a Reformation from without before there occurred reformation in the form of the deep personal renewal from within (e.g. in the Carmelite Order by a Theresa of Avila). Even the main Protestant denominations may not have appreciated the liberal character of their Reformation, as witnessed by the difficulties and the dramatic founding of the Anabaptists as a reformation of the Reformation. This suggests that the history of the Church may model the dynamic of the basic factors in the political debates regarding national identity and liberalism and their need for reconciliation in an open *oecumene*. Conversely that Church can learn, and indeed has learned, from the democratic progress made in the broad public domain.

If one takes as a thesis the long national tradition of a people then this would be the Church prior to the Reformation. In relation to this, the liberal assertion of the person would stand as antithesis. In that case, the deeper ecumenical issue of a synthesis that enriches and transforms all would correspond to the question of the relation between national and liberal traditions. It would be nice to be able to say that we have but to look at the practice of the religions in order to be able to see how this can be achieved. In reality, the lesson learned might be rather how difficult it is liable to be even, or especially, when men's deepest concerns and preoccupations are concerned. Nonetheless, some hard lessons have been learned and much progress is being made; this must not be forgotten.

Positively, the initial and longstanding reaction of the counter-Reformation, led by the founding of the Jesuit Order by Ignatius of Loyola, focused upon a broad effort to integrate the new sense of human freedom and personal identity within the long theological and practical tradition of the Church. Nevertheless, as the term "counter-Reformation" suggests, the effort was not entirely positive.

More recently, the Second Vatican Council in a new ecumenical age was more positive. It attempted to overcome the negative elements by its declaration of religious liberty, based not on theological premises but on what had been learned from modern democratic practice. Though subsequent progress has been slow, nevertheless, in Vatican II the new attitude of attention to the person was taken up, discussed at length and the directions for its assimilation were traced out. It was a special instance of reform taking place not by imposition of authority, protest in the street or conflict, but by rational debate and consensus building. This could not have happened in the past; that it has happened in the present is a hopeful sign of the times.

Finally, the most successful mode of action by the Church in society has proven to be not its declarations or even its studies, but the opening of public debate on the moral implications of such issues as armaments and the economy. This suggests that the new sense of personal and hence social responsibility can be engaged. If so, this means that evoking attention and thought, and interchange that leads toward insight and consensus, might be the new democratic mode of religion and Church in society, as well as for society at large.

Negatively, what has not yet happened that could hold helpful pointers for a democratic political order? It would appear that the reforms of Vatican II are still far from fully implemented. Here fear of change, lack of trust that the individuals would act responsibly, inadequate creativity

in developing political structures, all have played their impeding role. These impediments must be resolved in order for the conditions of progress to prevail. This directs our attention beyond structures to the human initiative from which needed structures emerge. Further, there is need to develop appropriate modes of interaction between the churches as articulating some of the rich resources of the culture and the political order.

Together, these suggest the need and the possibility of new attitudes in both the political and ecclesiastical structures. These are reassessing themselves in terms of the broader comity which operates less by decree and definition than by evoking the response of human freedom. This requires a rich plurality of intermediate societies, which are largely in place. It requires also a mode of public expression and communication in which public opinion can emerge and within which each person and people is free to shape its own personal and social commitments. The means for this are newly present in our communication age. We need to think of how this can replace closed structures and walls of separation, and promote instead new forms of consensus and cooperation.

Finally, these modes of interaction now reach across cultures and provide the basis for the hope on which the paper of G. Nodia concludes, namely, that people will hold themselves to higher standards as these emerge from within or from other cultures, are demonstrated to be feasible, and exercise their own attraction. In this way Professor Nodia's paper points the way to progress in free and democratic life beyond any yet experienced.

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Chapter III
Democracy and Nationhood

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Democracy, we are told, is conquering the globe. Contemporary Western democracy is widely thought to represent the culmination of mankind’s long struggle for enlightenment and well-being: It is the "end" of history. All that remains is for the progressive forces in the world to bring down such backward, non-democratic regimes as still exist. Democracy is the triumph of universal values, of morally obligatory "human rights." It alone among system of government can claim legitimacy. As democracy takes hold it not only replaces totalitarian, dictatorial and authoritarian political systems, but begins to phase out such other impediments to human progress as old national, ethnic, cultural and religious identities. The peoples of the world will find unity instead in the celebration of democratic and egalitarian ideas. The ideology of popular rule may be called democratism. It has numerous adherents among American intellectuals and politicians, many of whom also believe that the United States should lead an effort to bring democracy to areas of the globe that have been under communist or other non-democratic rule. The peoples of the world are assumed to crave democracy and to welcome American assistance.

It is noteworthy that euphoria about the triumphs of democracy should be a prominent feature of public debate at a time when the Western democracies themselves are beset by internal problems of unexampled severity and scope. So serious, persistent and pervasive are those problems that they even raise questions about democracy’s ability to survive. Just a few examples will illustrate an apparent broad decline of Western civilization: A growing lack of personal self-discipline and responsibility, rampant crime and drug abuse, erratic law enforcement, sexual promiscuity, the crumbling of the family, a burgeoning underclass, poor and deteriorating education, tastelessness and decadence in the arts and entertainment, the infantilization of public opinion and debate, brazen political and economic partisanship, social fragmentation, political demagoguery and opportunism these and many other signs of marked and seemingly inexorable social decline are surely reasons for worry. But what say the promoters of democracy to all of this? Western-style democracy should be bestowed on the entire world. We encounter in the celebrations of democracy a flight from reality or a cynical exploitation of Western moods of escapism.

The spread of democratism exemplifies a virtual collapse of philosophical discipline and of the historical sense among large groups of Western intellectuals and politicians. Fondness for ill-defined abstract ideas and a neglect of concrete historical realities are typical of public discussion. Uncritical and superficial assumptions about popular rule, human nature and the world play a powerful role in shaping the actions of entire countries. Rarely was there a greater need for distinctions and other philosophical clarification.

Discussions of popular rule usually ignore that democracy has sharply different meanings. Perhaps the most influential of those meanings, the one toward which the democratists gravitate, is in substantial conflict with the old classical and Judaeo-Christian view of human nature and society. Contrary to loosely made assumptions, that meaning is very hard to reconcile with the U.S. Constitution. Little attention is paid to the fact that popular rule of the American constitutional and representative type has highly demanding ethical, cultural and intellectual preconditions. It cannot simply be assumed that all peoples are capable of that kind of government.

Another questionable assumption among the democratists is that certain abstract ideas the ideas of democracy and human rights can take the place of old national, cultural and religious identities as sources of social cohesion and inspiration. Democratism typically treats historically evolved allegiances as anachronisms and as obstacles to the progress and liberation of mankind. Nationalism is often seen as posing a particularly serious threat to enlightened rule. That nationalism can be a very dangerous force hardly needs proving, but it too can appear in very different forms. Like democracy, it has opposed potentialities.

Any meaningful discussion of either democracy or nationalism or of the relationship between them requires that contrasting types of democracy and nationalism be differentiated so that their strengths, weaknesses and dangers can be properly assigned and assessed. Chapter XII of this volume will distinguish more fully between two very different forms of popular government to which the term "democracy" is applied. *Constitutional* democracy assumes that human nature is flawed and that individuals have different abilities and qualifications for governing. This form of rule places restraints on the popular wishes of the moment and fives representatives the responsibility for articulating the long-term interests of the people. Constitutional democracy implies the desirability of limiting and decentralizing power. Plebiscitary or majoritarian democracy assumes that people are essentially good and equal. Placing decisive authority in the hands of the numerical majority, this form of government seeks the speediest possible implementation of the majority will. The natural dynamic of this kind of popular rule is to expand and centralize government.

Constitutional and plebiscitary are not different versions of one and the same form of government. They are ultimately incompatible. They assume and generate radically different societies. Only the constitutional form can be reconciled with the classical and Judaeo-Christian heritage. To grasp the contrast between them is to understand better their practical implications. Whatever the theory of plebiscitary democracy, in practice it becomes rule in the name of the people by a central authority. The constitutional form, while placing limits on the momentary majority and giving considerable independent authority to elected and non-elected leaders, tends to spread self-rule widely throughout society. But constitutional democracy cannot be realized by simply proclaiming it in a particular country. It may be the most demanding form of government. It has a chance of success only if certain moral, cultural and intellectual predispositions are strongly present in a people and its leaders. Today, it is no longer clear that those predispositions are sufficiently strong even in the United States.[1]

Inattention to these and other basic issues of popular rule explains the confused and uncritical nature of so much current discussion of democracy. One result is that populist and generally utopian sentiments carry great weight in thinking about the future of the world.

The Ideology of Democratism

It is desirable to take a closer look at the ideology of democratism and the effort to replace traditional loyalties with adherence to universalist ideas. To justify making the United States the instrument of democracy around the world it is often claimed that democracy is quintessentially American. Champions of the democratist cause have been able to draw intellectual support from

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[1] For an extensive discussion of constitutional and plebiscitary democracy and their implications, see Claes G. Ryn *Democracy and the Ethical Life*, 2nd. expanded ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990). See also in this volume my chapter entitled, "Democracy as an Ethical Problem".

academic writers who have presented America's so-called "founding" as providing an early model for the democratic transformation of the world. The work of the Founders has been reinterpreted in recent decades as representing the same egalitarian historical movement as does Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the French Revolution. According to Allan Bloom, for example, the principles of America are "freedom and equality and the rights based on them." These principles are intrinsically for export. Bringing out their global implications, Bloom insists that these principles are "rational and everywhere applicable."[2] A large number of political commentators today express the same ideological sentiments. Ben Wattenberg wants the United States to be "a powerful global organizer" in behalf of "American values." It may not be necessary "to *conquer* the world," he writes, but the world must be made "hospitable to our values."[3] Charles Krauthammer urges a "robust" interventionism.[4] Among the politicians, President Bush may have thought of himself as a pragmatist, but his rhetoric about a New World Order often had the same ideological ring. His Secretary of State officially and explicitly committed U.S. foreign policy to "Enlightenment ideals of universal applicability." Mr. Baker advocated "a Euro-Atlantic community that extends east from Vancouver to Vladivostok." This community, he said, "can only be achieved on a democratic basis." The enormous size and diversity of the region in question did not give him pause. The United States should promote "common . . . universal values" in those parts of the world and "indeed, elsewhere around the globe."[5] The surge of globalist political-ideological aspirations is further illustrated by the draft of a Pentagon planning document leaked in March of 1992 to *The New York Times*. Besides less problematic specific proposals, that document sets forth the goal of a world in which the United States is the sole and uncontested superpower and acts to spread democracy and open economic systems. The United States should have "the preeminent responsibility" for dealing with "those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends. . . ."[6] The Pentagon plan was quickly endorsed by influential commentators like Krauthammer and by *The Wall Street Journal*, which published a lead editorial promoting "Pax Americana."[7]

Even if the most charitable interpretations are put on these opinions, their element of political-ideological imperialism is hard to miss. Many of the advocates of "democracy" and "human rights" resemble the French Jacobins with their calls for "liberty, equality and fraternity." Both the new and the old Jacobins want to remake the world. They demand acceptance everywhere for an allegedly virtuous ideology.[8] The deeply rooted preferences and habits of traditional societies that are at variance with the new democratic order must yield. It is troubling to recall the intolerance and suffering that has been inflicted on mankind in the last two centuries by the moral and intellectual fervor of Jacobinism in various forms. One of its most pernicious manifestations, communism, is now disintegrating. But another panacea, a world safe for "democracy" and "capitalism," spearheaded by the United States, seems to be taking its place. The new vision of

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[2] Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 153.

[3] Ben Wattenberg, *The Washington Times*, August 8, 1991, December 1, 1988.

[4] Charles Krauthammer, *The Washington Post*, March 22, 1991.

[5] Secretary of State James A. Baker, speech to the Aspen Institute in Berlin, Germany, June 18, 1991.

[6] *New York Times*, March 8, 1992. The Pentagon planning document was produced under the supervision of Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

[7] "Pax Americana," lead editorial, *Wall Street Journal*, March 16, 1992.

[8] These similarities and their disturbing implications are analyzed in Claes G. Ryn, *The New Jacobinism: Can Democracy Survive?* (Washington, D.C.: National Humanities Institute, 1991).

humanity redeemed may be less obviously utopian, but in its desire to overturn traditional, "authoritarian" societies the new Jacobinism is not unrelated to Marxism.[9]

Responsible Nationhood

If the current wave of political universalism contains highly dangerous elements, it should not be assumed that the proper remedy is to reject universalism of every conceivable kind. For example, it would be misguided for particular peoples to isolate themselves and to cultivate only what is distinctive to themselves. It may be suggested instead that the desirable approach to both domestic and international affairs is one that avoids both utopian globalism and national self-absorption. Call that approach responsible nationhood. It is possible to conceive of an affirmation of nationality that is not only compatible with a cosmopolitan fondness for diversity, but indistinguishable from it. Responsible nationhood can be defined in contrast with two equally unacceptable possibilities: One is an abstract universalism that wishes to replace religious, cultural and regional identities with an allegedly virtuous homogeneity. The other is a nationalism that is so full of itself that it has difficulty tolerating anything else.

Serious dangers are posed by a pseudo-universalism that scorns historical realities and craves unlimited power for itself. Yet, in criticizing this mind-set, it would be a mistake to denigrate universality in every sense. Some dismiss universality in favor of national particularity as the defining feature of political and cultural life. At the extreme, the assertion of nationality becomes self-absorbed and intolerant. Paradoxical though it may seem, unbounded nationalism has a good deal in common with abstract universalism. Both tend to hate whatever challenges their uncontested hegemony. But both of them clash fundamentally with universalism of an entirely different type. That universalism, which is marked by a strong historical consciousness, needs to be explained at some length. It is compatible with national self-regard in a higher sense. The latter is perhaps best called patriotism.

In explaining the meaning of non-abstract universalism it is helpful first to indicate a general outlook to which it is opposed: that of unchecked partisanship, nationalistic or otherwise. One of the pioneers of Western nationalism as of plebiscitary, majoritarian democracy is Rousseau. What he calls the general will unifies only a particular people. There is no moral authority beyond it with reference to which conflicts between peoples might be mitigated. In his book on Poland Rousseau advocates inculcating an ardent nationalism in the citizen. "The newly-born infant, upon first opening his eyes, must gaze upon the fatherland and until his dying day should behold nothing else." And in *The Social Contract* he insists that the citizen should receive from the general will his very "life and being." This collective identity must supplant every other membership and be the sole source of personhood.[10]

For Karl Marx, social and political existence is defined not by nationality, but by class. But Marx too splits humanity into separate camps. His notion of unrelieved and inevitable conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat actually denies that groups of mankind, whatever their divisions, have a common humanity. Marx excludes the possibility of reconciliation. He denies, in effect, that people of different backgrounds might resonate to the same poetry, art, music, or moral example. Had Marx admitted the existence of a shared human frame of reference, he would have had to allow for the possibility of a muting of hostilities .

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[9] *Ibid*., especially Ch. X.

[10] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), p. 19, and *The Social Contract*(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), Bk. II, Ch. 7, 84.

The criticism that can be directed against nationalism or Marxism on this score applies to any social and political analysis that treats a particular attribute or membership nationality, class, individual, tribe, sex, state as salient, distinct and self-enclosed: Life becomes a struggle of "me" or "us" against "them." Individual persons or collective entities must confront each other as belligerents. Whether of a materialistic, nationalistic, or biologistic cast, this kind of analysis creates philosophically artificial categories by trying to separate the particular from the universal.

Responsible Nationhood and Universality

A particular human being, like a particular society, is and remains unique, but personhood develops within family and other associations and within civilization as a whole. True civilization always carries the person beyond tribe, region, nation and time period. Although it is in the nature of genuine civilization to discriminate against whatever threatens its central values, it is never idiosyncratic and self-enclosed. Its sense of the good, the true and the beautiful connects it, however tenuously, with mankind at large. The great figures of morality, thought and art speak, at least potentially, to all of humanity, however difficult it may be for particular individuals or peoples to absorb their achievements. In times of acute domestic or international strife, passion may dim the universal in the minds of the most intense partisans so that they pursue the foe with unrestrained intolerance and viciousness. In more civilized persons not even violent conflict will obliterate the awareness that behind the warring interests of the moment lies our common humanity and that today's enemy is a possible future friend.

True civilization embodies the quest for universality in the historical particularity of individuals and peoples. Although made distinctive by the needs and opportunities of historical circumstance, the particular tradition points beyond itself. It has a cosmopolitan dimension. By virtue of the element of universality in his own background, the civilized person can, to some varying extent, be at home in other cultural settings. He may be acutely aware of the flaws of other societies, but he also recognizes the universal in them, even if that family resemblance be faint, undeveloped or distorted.

The same higher values can be realized differently depending on time and place. The civilized person delights in the diversity and richness of human life and in what other societies can contribute to his own. The mutual dependence of universality and particularity is as significant within the particular society. The phrase *e pluribus unum* (our of many one) as applied to the intent of the American Framers does not mean that the desirable unity was to obliterate the diversity. On the contrary, the union would *harmonize* diversity and draw strength from it. What holds the national union together is the self-limitation and mutual respect of different interests. The ordering of society is made possible by recognition of a moral authority that transcends diversity while embracing it.

Jacobin ideological unity, by contrast, is centrally imposed homogeneity. It can be achieved only at the expense of diversity. Like nationalism of the bad kind, Jacobinism produces an artificial unity that is inherently hostile to everything but itself. In fact, as it tries to extend its monopoly on right to other parts of the world, Jacobin ideological fervor becomes difficult to distinguish from imperialistic nationalism.

There is plentiful historical and philosophical evidence to connect nationalistic expansionism with plebiscitary democracy. Both exhibit an unwillingness to place restraints on the presumed will of the people. It is only to be expected that a people full of its own superiority will be

disinclined to grant a hearing to others. Especially under irresponsible leadership such a people will sooner or later want to throw its weight around.

To nationalists who stress what separates them from the rest of humanity, the word "cosmopolitan" has the distasteful connotation of cultural rootlessness. By a "cosmopolitan" they mean one who resents traditional religious and cultural identities and opts for radical universalist schemes. People fitting this description are common today, but they should not be called cosmopolitans. They are actually Jacobins in spirit, and they are typically provincial in their intellectual and cultural prejudices.

The real cosmopolitan is hard to distinguish from the patriot. He looks for universality not in abstract principles, but in concrete historical achievements. Like the patriot, the cosmopolitan is rooted in the best of his own heritage and ready to defend it. Affirming that heritage against subversion, the cosmopolitan may appear to the Jacobin pseudo-universalist to be a fervent nationalist or "nativist." But his pride of country is not of the self-absorbed, idiosyncratic, bullying kind. Patriotic pride, as distinguished from nationalistic self-glorification, flows from a sense of the universal good and of the merits of one’s own country under that same standard. The patriot, therefore, is not blind to the failings of his own people, but is the first to want to repair them.

There is an affinity between patriotism and constitutional democracy in that both recognize the need to order the collective and individual self with reference to a standard beyond partisanship. The cohesion and inspiration provided by patriotism is a great asset to popular government. But the constitutional temperament also is a support for responsible nationhood. Patriotism can obviously flourish outside of constitutional democracy, but if the two are joined, the self-restraint, respect for diversity and sense of common purpose that are characteristic of each can become a powerful harmonizing influence.

Those who treat nation, class, or other entitles as ultimates and view conflict as the essential truth about politics like to think that they are cutting through moralistic verbiage to the power realities. In the fragmenting societies of the West and elsewhere thinkers like Machiavelli and Hobbes do offer important lessons about the requirements of political order, but a political philosophy is deficient that does not fully recognize the reality and political significance of what transcends particularity.

A reductionistic stress on partisanship reveals too narrow a conception of politics. It often results in a preoccupation with "practical politics" that is less than hard-nosed in that it does not fully understand the meaning and sources of power. Often missed is the decisive influence wielded by those who can shape man’s innermost aspirations and fears, those, in short, who capture and hold the imagination. Whoever dominates the culture and inner life of a people dominates the well-springs of action. Practical politics as commonly understood is to that extent an epiphenomenon. To take an example, the prerequisite for any real and lasting change in the floundering Western societies of today is a moral-cultural quickening of the spirit that redirects the people’s imagination and reduces the appeal of Jacobin schemes.

Heavy-handed assertions of particularity, national or otherwise, that neglect or deny universality can accomplish no genuine renewal of national character. A healthy reinvigoration and development of the national heritage along the lines of responsible nationhood would treasure and cultivate national identity, but not as pitting "us" against the rest of humanity. A properly restored national character would in a sense strengthen the bond with mankind at large, for such a restoration would be inspired by a love of one’s own that also transcends the particular. Nationality would be cherished as the particular lovable manifestation of resurgent universality.

Conclusion

A renewed quest for the universal must not be confused with fondness for ideological abstractions and an indefinite outward push for power. Especially in a time like ours, when the moral center of the West is barely holding, the universal must be sought first and foremost in a deepening of the ethical life of the individual in his own communities. True moral universality manifests itself first and foremost as personal character, not as nice-sounding "principles." Urgently needed is a rediscovery of our primary duty, which is to shoulder responsibilities that are near, immediate and concrete. Our chief, if not exclusive, obligation, as individuals and societies, is to remedy our own most glaring flaws. To set out instead to remake the world according to an ideological blueprint reveals not only moral conceit but a flight from responsibility. The Jacobin blending of presumed benevolence with the will to power is always dangerous, but in the morally and intellectually disoriented Western societies the susceptibility to escapist appeals gives the democratists the potential for enormous mischief. Many who shudder at the talk of a New World Order do so because, to a considerable extent, that order is being defined not by cosmopolitan realists but by power-seeking ideologues.

The new Jacobinism presents itself as a moral response to the crisis of "liberalism" and relativism, but it is likely to aggravate rather than mitigate the deterioration of constitutional democracy and national character. Its "virtue" of abstract "principles" and "values" bypasses the central need of all moral and political life, the shaping of character and the fostering of self-control. It inspires instead an arrogance of power. A salutary defense of constitutionalism and proper national self-regard would deflate, not fan, democratist ambitions and utopian schemes.

It is neither possible nor desirable for any country, especially not a world power like the United States, to isolate itself. All countries derive indispensable benefits from contacts with other countries and nationalities. But domestic and foreign policy must be bounded by urgent and basic needs at home and by the self-restraint and realism of cosmopolitan patriotism. The present, we keep hearing, is an era of great opportunity for mankind. The appetite for ideological imperialism and international adventurism shows that it is also an era of great peril.

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Chapter IV
Reflections on the Nature of Modernity

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The question of the nature of modern civilization is the most fundamental one we confront today. Yet it is almost universally neglected by the world of scholarship. There is no specialization concerned with modernity as such, although we have a wealth of studies of its component periods and parts. Whether it is the Baroque or the Enlightenment, Revolution or Renaissance, there is no difficulty in identifying competent studies of the specific epochs. It is only when we wish to comprehend them all together, with a view to unearthing the significance of the modern age as a whole that we come up empty. Part of the blame is attributable to the increasing necessity for historiographic specialization, but surely not all of it. Why, for example, is the search for a theory of modernity not itself a separate field of study? The answer of course lies in great measure in our inability to distance ourselves from the historic unfolding of the age in which we live. Modernity has not yet become a question for scholarship, precisely because our scientific investigations are so much part of it. The assumptions of our world are too deeply imbedded in our scholarship.

This I would suggest is all the more reason for making the effort to break free of the tyranny of conventional perspectives. Without such detachment we run the danger of misreading or misrepresenting the import of the prolific historical studies available to us. So long as we lack a critical context in which to locate the German Peasants' Revolt or the rise of nationalism the objectivity of our studies is vitiated. But of far greater consequence are the dangers that arise for public policy based on such undigested scholarship. If we have misunderstood the essential core of the civilization in which we live then we will continue to develop social and political policies that bear little relation to the magnitude of the problems confronting us. At best the responses are ineffective, at worst they aggravate the disturbances they seek to alleviate. Indeed the elaboration of inappropriate solutions has itself become such a constant that we may regard it as one of the characteristics of modernity.

Unless we wish to continue this pattern it is incumbent upon us to seek the necessary understanding. For it makes all the difference in the world if the movement that has given birth to our civilization is rooted in a disorder of the spirit, or in an advance to autonomous rationality, or in both at the same time. Our response to the problems before us will vary accordingly.

Modernity as Secularized Christianity

It is because this question is of such crucial importance to us that any attempt to confront it, however, imperfect, must be warmly encouraged. In recent years the work of Hans Blumenberg has performed such an invaluable service. His *Legitimacy of the Modern Age* provided a welcome opportunity for reflection on the issues of civilization.[1] Significantly, he framed his reflections as a response to the previous occasion when a searching reconsideration of modernity was undertaken. This was the "crisis" generated by the totalitarian convulsion of the Second World War. It had provoked Karl Löwith and others to develop the thesis that modernity is essentially

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[1] Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, Robert M. Wallace, trans. (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1983; German original 1966).

formed by a secularization of Christian eschatology and cannot be regarded as a movement distinctly different from the preceding spiritual traditions.[2]

Blumenberg has chosen to oppose this conception by defending the legitimacy of modernity as a *sui generis* civilizational form. It is not, in his view, necessary to take cognizance of the derivation from Judaism and Christianity in order to understand the modern secular world. Nor is there any clear indication of a progressive redirection of the transcendent impulse of religion toward an intramundane fulfillment. Instead, the rational secular ethos of man's self-assertion, of self-confidence in the exercise of his own autonomous reason, has few historical antecedents.

What there is of quasi-religious extrapolations, e.g. from progress in knowledge toward the ultimate perfection of human nature and the conditions of existence, are merely the residual effect of earlier spiritual forms. The new secular orientation continues to feel the need to occupy the outmoded position of religion and metaphysics. Once we recognize that such attempts are no longer needed they will gradually disappear. We will be left with the essential core of modernity in the autonomous exercise of reason.

Blumenberg's argument has attracted widespread notice and occasional emulation. He has stimulated recent scholars to reflect on the implications of their work for the emerging conception of modernity, or to at least give voice to their previously unspoken assumptions concerning the nature of our world.[3] It has also been a godsend for those of us who wish to test critically the received self-understanding of the modern age. So often the difficulty with any examination of conventional wisdom is that it is nowhere coherently articulated. It exists as a pervasive mood or orientation, not as a theoretical statement. Blumenberg remedies this by providing us with the best defense of the uniqueness of modernity that can be cogently constructed. He not only asserts the legitimacy of modern civilization, as a phenomenon to be taken purely on its own terms, but also attempts to forestall the likely objections to this thesis. It is to this latter aspect of his work I would like to direct the focus of this paper.

The dismissal of the opposing evidence, of the continued utilization of religious forms by secular thinkers, is one of the two key elements of Blumenberg's analysis. Much turns on his ability to persuade us that the persistence of spiritual symbolism within a secular world is merely a transitional phenomenon. Once the absence of any need for "occupying" such comprehensive metaphysical positions is recognized, they will evaporate to leave the core of finite rationality behind.

Blumenberg does not deny the influence of religious forms on secular intellectual and political movements. He even acknowledges that the drive to extend the range of man's power arose in reaction to the medieval experience of the omnipotence of God and the contingency of creation. But he nevertheless insists that the quasi-religious trappings bear no essential relation to their

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[2] Although Blumenberg focuses principally on Löwith's presentation (which is not without deficiencies), the understanding of modernity as a secularization of Judeo-Christian eschatology was more extensively elaborated in the works of Eric Voegelin, Jacob Taubes, Ernst Lee Tuveson, Carl Becker, Jacob Talmon, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Albert Camus, Norman Cohn, Hans Jonas, Carl Becker, Henri de Lubac and others. This is to confine ourselves only to those who wrote about it in the immediate post-war period. More specific recent studies will be noted further below.

[3] See for example, Bernard Yack, *The Longing for Total Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), which argues that the "longing for total revolution"(*sic*) by Marx and Nietzsche can be explained as a self-contradiction between their conception of human freedom and their recognition of the incompleteness of any institutional realization. This is a step beyond Blumenberg's concession to the lingering influence of Christian positions that require to be "reoccupied".

content as expressions of human "self-assertion". It is, I hope to show, a difficult if not impossible position to defend.[4]

The problem is not only the preponderance of evidence concerning the "religious" character of the ideological mass movements, or the extent to which the various "isms" (Communism, Positivism, Racism, Freudianism, Fascism, and so on) function as substitute religions. Much more difficult to sustain is the rejection of the self-understanding of the major thinkers responsible for their creation. Blumenberg has to maintain that they were all mistaken in the interpretation of their own intentions. He and his supporters have to maintain that the thinkers most intimately involved with the formation of a modern mythology, such as the romantic poets or the idealist philosophers, fundamentally misconceived the nature of their project.[5] It is not merely enough to express disagreement with their endeavor. Blumenberg *et al* must demonstrate that it did not truly represent the innermost convictions of the participants themselves. He has to defend his interpretation in the face of explicit disavowals within the materials of his investigation. When Marx or Comte or Nietzsche proclaim the necessity for man to become God, Blumenberg has to maintain that this was not at all what they meant or, if they did, that it was not what they ought to have meant. With thinkers of this stature it is a formidable undertaking.

His task is somewhat easier with the pre-Revolutionary generation of Enlightenment *philosophes*. Their espousal of deism appears to fit Blumenberg's suggestion of a desire to "reoccupy" the position vacated by traditional Christian theology. As a religion of reason deism eliminated the transcendent and mysterious dimension of faith. Religion becomes the product of finite reason and is intended to serve a utilitarian social role. It is not long, as we know, before the transparent artificiality of this "reoccupation" becomes evident and deism yields to a straightforwardly atheistic rationalism.[6] The same may be said of the enlightenment faith in the progress and perfectibility of human nature. It is so clearly a residual continuation of Christian salvation history that it too has little to sustain itself, once the lack of a foundation becomes apparent. A similar fate overtakes the new spiritual movements of the Enlightenment, especially Freemasonry. The Masonic lodges emerge as alternative churches for the social and intellectual elite in the age of reason, but eventually come to function largely as new modes of communal association.[7]

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[4] The other line of criticism would consist of an examination of the early modern spiritual movements, in which the transcendent impulse of Christianity is progressively redirected toward an innerworldly fulfillment. See Walsh, *The Mysticism of Innerworldly Fulfillment* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1983). Stephen A. McKnight, *Sacralizing the Secular: The Renaissance Origins of Modernity* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press forthcoming). Frances Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); *idem*, *The Rosicrucian Enlightenment* (Boston: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1972); D.P. Walker, *The Ancient Theology: Studies in Christian Platonism from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1972); *idem*, *Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella* (London: Warburg Institute, 1958); Henri de Lubac, *La posterité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore*, 2 vols. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1979, 1981).

[5] In a later study, *Work on Myth*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985; original 1979), Blumenberg reveals greater sensitivity to the supra-rational dimension of myths. Yet even while acknowledging the continuity of myth into the modern world, he conceives of it as undergoing a rationalization in light of the requirement for autonomous human responsibility.

[6] Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation* (New York: Norton, 1966, 1969).

[7] There is, for example, little of the mysterious or divine within the Masonic world depicted in Mozart's "Magic Flute". Ritual and symbolism are all fully in accord with enlightened rational harmony. The

In stark contrast to this marginalization of religion is the romantic reaction to the Enlightenment that begins at the end of the eighteenth century. Spiritual symbolism, together with the reality and power behind it, are no longer a residual influence from earlier times. Experiences of the awful and mysterious become the essence of the romantic quest. A change as dramatic as any that have occurred in modern history marks this shift. What had been of ancillary and incidental interest to the enlightenment becomes focal and absorbing concerns to the romantics. Spiritual forms that had been of diminishing significance within the age of reason suddenly became of central concern. Religion across the whole spectrum of its manifestations was no longer a declining cultural influence. The search for spiritual illumination now seemed to displace the light of reason.

It is the dramatic intensity of this transition that shows it is no mere product of attenuated religious influence. A generation that had grown up with the age of reason and was thoroughly familiar with its achievements had found the entire project sadly deficient. This is not to say that they were unsympathetic to the aspirations of the Enlightenment. They shared the scientific quest for knowledge of nature, and the political quest for emancipation from the shackles of all outmoded authority and tradition. The French Revolution is both an Enlightenment and a romantic phenomenon. But the rising generation had become convinced that reason alone is an insufficient means of accomplishing these goals. A true knowledge of reality and man's true liberation are possible only by undergoing the kind of profound inner transformation that is the result of spiritual illumination. Far from becoming a peripheral element within modernity, a particular form of the religious quest had become its essence.

The drive for specifically spiritual transformation, not a continuation of the Enlightenment program of rational self-interest, became the distinguishing feature of a wide variety of movements. Following the French Revolution the growing consensus concerning the limits of reason had become a commonplace. In part this was a result of the very success of the critical spirit of the Enlightenment; its attention had eventually been directed toward reason itself. Kant represents the definitive articulation of this philosophy of reason. Reflecting on what he had accomplished through critical philosophy he observed, "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to leave room for faith." In part, too, the return to the spiritual dimension was a response to the failure of the Revolution, its decline into terror and the dictatorship of Napoleon. A widespread perception emerged that it had, after all, been only a*political* revolution. What was needed was a more profound transformation of human nature. The process had to be completed with a truly spiritual revolution.[8]

A search for new spiritual forms became the preoccupation of the age. The sheer variety of attempts bears witness to the extent and intensity of the movement. Already within the Revolution there were the various efforts at developing a public cult, from the Cult of Reason, to the Cult of the Supreme Being, and finally Theophilanthropy. Saint-Simon created a new scientistic creed by joining science and Christianity; this form was to receive its most elaborate expression in August Comte's Religion of Humanity. A more pietistic response was contained within the commitment

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connection between the occult and materialistic trends is well explored in Margaret C. Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981).

[8] Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution* ed. John Hallowell (Durham: Duke University Press, 1975); James Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith* (New York: Basic, 1980); *idem*, *The Icon and the Axe* (New York: Vintage, 1970, Ch. 4; Gerhart Niemeyer, *Between Nothingness and Paradise* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1971).

of the Holy Alliance to the principles of Justice, Charity and Peace, as the means of transforming social and political order and resisting the destructive excesses of the Revolution.[9]

Even the counter-revolutionary movement as represented by de Maistre became a call for the restoration of religious order first; in this case the proposal was for a return to papal theocracy. The influence of Masonic and spiritualist groups is well known in all of these examples, but what is less well recognized is the extent to which the lodges themselves underwent a profound change. From the simpler, more rationalist variety of Masonry that preceded the Revolution, one suddenly encounters the flowering of the more mystical-speculative variety associated with the Scottish-Rite lodges.[10] Romanticism itself springs from this search for higher spiritual truths that are inaccessible to reason alone. The nature mysticism of the poets functions as a new spiritual form, containing within its concrete imagery the power of spiritual transformation for society. Numerous evocations of a romantic utopia, calls for a national religion, or a return to a renewed Christendom all spring from this source.[11] The list could go on and on. There occurs such an explosion of interest in the mysterious and the extreme, the mystical and the miraculous, that there is scarcely a major figure who is not touched by them.

Far from a continuation of the Enlightenment goal of extending man's autonomous rational power, there seems to be a decisive reaction against it. Instead of an expansion of the domain of the secular, there appears to be a retreat toward the earlier forms of spiritual or experiential faith as the unifying force within society. Reason and abstract freedom had become discredited; only contact with the great spiritual forces of reality could restore the organic order of human existence.[12]

Hegel and the Socializing Character of Modernity

Nevertheless, all this profusion of spiritual interest must not simply be taken at face value. To what extent was it a revival, to what extent a distortion of traditional spiritual forms? Was the search for spiritual illumination genuine or a continuation of the secular impulse for domination

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[9] The title of Franz von Baader's text, which was instrumental in the formation of the Holy Alliance, summarizes the requirements rather clearly: "Uber das durch die französische Revolution herbeigefuhrte Bedurfniss einer neuern und innigeern Verbindung der Religion mit der Politik" (1815). See F. Büchler, *Die geistige Wurzeln der Heiligen Allianz* (Freiburg, 1929), pp. 53-60.

[10] The standard study remains August Viatte, *Les sources occultes du romantisme, 1770-1820*, 2 vols. (Paris: Champion, 1965; original 1929).

[11] Ernst Benz, *Les sources mystiques de la philosophie romantique allemande* (Paris: Vrin, 1968); Ernst Lee Tuveson, *The Avatars of Thrice Great Hermes: An Approach to Romanticism* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1981); M.H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (New York: Norton, 1971); Renée Winegarten, *Writers and Revolution* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1974).

[12] "Let the true beholder contemplate calmly and dispassionately the new state-toppling era. Will not the state-toppler seem to him like Sisyphus? Now he has attained the summit of equilibrium, and already the mighty weight is rolling down the other side again. It will never remain on high unless an attraction toward heaven holds it poised on the crest. All your props are too weak if your state retains its tendency toward the earth. But link it by a higher yearning to the heights of heaven, give it a relevancy to the universe, and you will have in it a never-wearying spring, and you will see your efforts richly rewarded. I refer you to history. Search amid its instructive coherency for parallel points of time and learn to use the magic wand of analogy." Novalis, "Christendom or Europe", *Hymns to the Night and Other Selected Writings*, trans. Charles E. Passage (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), p. 56.

by other means? Perhaps the romantic and revolutionary incorporation of quasireligious symbolism is no more than that, a rhetorical deception to heighten the spirit of human self-aggrandizement that still inspired them. Such are the difficult questions presented by this complex of phenomena. Upon our answers to them hinges our conception of modernity and our assessment of its independent legitimacy. Is the Prometheanism that emerges so clearly from the romantic era merely another formulation of the faith in man's power of autonomous self-determination? Or does it have its roots within the Christian faith in man's ultimate transfiguration through the grace of God in eternity?

In order to answer these questions we must turn to the work of a representative thinker of the period, preferably one whose own self-interpretation will clarify the issues for us. On both counts the outstanding exemplar is G.W.F. Hegel. He was thoroughly familiar with the Enlightenment project, especially as it had reached its definitive theoretical expression within the philosophy of Kant. At the same time Hegel was a child of his own age; he sought the universal contemplation of all things within the divine Spirit. He looked forward to a new epoch in which "spirit can venture to hallow itself as spirit in its own shape, and reestablish the original reconciliation with itself in a new religion, in which the infinite grief and the whole burden of its antithesis is taken up."[13] But what makes Hegel's construction unique is the extent to which he sought to remain faithful to both the Enlightenment and romantic components. Rational speculation and mystical unification were blended in one symbolism. For this reason he clearly reveals the point of demarcation between the two. Hegel is the one who can best guide us in understanding the motivations of the age, because he is the one who understood them most profoundly and sought to realize them most completely.

ln his earliest writings we find him struggling to synthesize the Kantian categorical imperative with the life of Jesus. While fully accepting the critical philosophy of Kant he had also recognized the need to go beyond it, to restore the unity between subject and object, the individual will and the process of reality as a whole. His own efforts at constructing a "national religion" on the basis of an experiential or mystical Christianity were soon rejected.[14] Any such purely "romantic" or subjective reconciliation would entail the abandonment of the rational independence that man had so recently attained. Finite consciousness would inevitably be submerged in its union with the All or Absolute which it experiences without truly comprehending. Hegel's strictures against Schleiermacher's surrender to the mystery of the Absolute, as no more than an admission of "the night in which all cows are black", are well known. His own objective is best expressed in one of the earliest formulations of his 'system-program': "Absolute freedom of all spirits who bear the intellectual world in themselves, and cannot seek either God or immortality outside themselves."[15]

But to be "God and immortality" they cannot be wholly identified with the reflections of the finite self either. Hegel was in search of the transcendent divine reality that alone can save man from the secular "boredom of the world" or create the ethical substance of society. This was the core of his critique, and that of his generation, concerning the emptiness of Enlightenment rational freedom. Man had been abandoned to the resources of his own finite reason and they enabled him neither to understand the larger process of which he is a part, nor to furnish any substantive

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[13] Hegel, *System of Ethical Life* trans. H.S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press 1979), p. 185.

[14] Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. T.M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). See also Lewis Hinchman, *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1984).

[15] Hegel, "The Earliest System-program of German Idealism'" in H.S. Harris, *Hegel's Development Toward the Sunlight, 1770-1801* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), p. 511.

guidance to the life he ought to lead in society and history. What was needed was a "reconciliation" in which these dire options would be overcome through unity with the higher reality beyond them. The difficulty was to preserve the independence of the finite pole, human self-consciousness.

A breakthrough occurs in Hegel's grappling with these problems when, shortly after his arrival at Jena (1801), he begins to think in terms of a dialectical resolution. By shifting from the perspective of man to that of universal Spirit he could conceive the finite and infinite both as moments within the one unfolding movement. The finite world is a necessary moment because infinite Being would remain an abstraction without it. Spirit is the underlying reality that is moving toward self-consciousness, toward its self-realization as Spirit. To become aware of itself it must encounter another reality outside itself by means of which it can return to knowledge of itself. Concretely, however, this is possible only so far as consciousness is a reality and that consciousness has grasped the necessity for its own existence, as the vehicle by which Spirit arrives at self-consciousness. This is the stage that has historically been reached at the conclusion of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. It is not the identification of man and God, but the point at which man has transcended his finite consciousness to enter universal self-consciousness, just as God has quit the abstraction of his transcendence to become the concretely self-conscious reality of Spirit. "God is God only so far as he knows himself: his self-knowledge is, further, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge *of* God, which proceed to man's self-knowledge *in* God."[16]

The reconciliation between God and man occurs when finite consciousness recognizes the necessity for its own existence, as the indispensable means by which absolute Spirit realizes itself as Spirit. Hegel could maintain that he had not identified man and God, but merely denominated both their natures as self-consciousness. This is what makes their "reconciliation" possible. For just as self-consciousness is the essence of what it means to be human, it is no less crucial to the nature of God. Once this is acknowledged then we recognize the necessity for finite existence as precisely that which is to be transcended in the formation of self-consciousness. It is no more possible for divine self-consciousness to exist alone than it would be for human self-consciousness to arise without a consciousness of something. Therefore, it is only through the movement of finite consciousness toward universal self-consciousness that Absolute Spirit can become an actual reality. In apprehending this necessity the gulf between the divine and human has been overcome.

Hegel regarded it as the resolution of the "unhappy consciousness" of all religious longing, which seeks unity with a God who is beyond experience. Such a quest was doomed to frustration precisely because the "'other' was beyond, something that cannot be found".[17] In contrast, the God whose essence is apprehended as self-consciousness, as Spirit, "is no longer *beyond*the picturing consciousness or beyond the Self".[18] Yet, it cannot be emphasized too much, this is not the idea of God proposed by Hegel. If it were it would be equally vulnerable to the charge of one-sidedness, that it is no more than the subjective assertion of unity with the highest reality. What makes it a genuine unification is that the Absolute itself has effected it. This is the significance of Hegel's shift toward the perspective of Spirit, for the apprehension of necessity from man's point of view has become identical with the self-realization of Spirit. It is "not only the intuition of the divine but the Divine's intuition of itself".[19] This is the new meaning of science within Hegel's system.

As such it preserves the rationality so essential to the Enlightenment conception of science. Hegel had found the means of attaining the higher spiritual knowledge sought by the romantics,

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[16] Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind* trans. M. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), par. 564.
[17] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 131.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 476.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 483.

without surrendering the autonomous freedom of finite human consciousness. The unification between divine and human occurs not on the level of feeling or of mystical intuition. It is the result of a rational necessity that is grasped by man. The reconciliation remains fully transparent to the finite experiencing consciousness; no surrender of freedom or reason before the ineffable mystery of the Absolute is required. Hegel had accomplished the goal of both Enlightenment and romanticism: a systematic comprehension of reality as a whole.[20]

He also articulated what such absolute knowledge must signify. It meant that the transfiguration of reality had been accomplished with the publication of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. For Hegel's apprehension of necessity is, as we have seen, not merely his own construction. It is the medium through which world-Spirit emerges to recognizes itself as Spirit. This is the transforming event, the self-revelation of absolute Spirit within time, that occurs nowhere else than within the self-transcending finite consciousness of the author and reader of the *Phenomenology*. From there it spreads its transfiguring light over all other reality, as the necessity for their various respective conditions are apprehended and transcended. In this contemplative transfiguration history has reached its fulfillment. Absolute knowledge would not have emerged if the movement of Spirit in history had not made it possible; now that it has, it denotes that the work of "actual history" is over since Spirit has reached "its consummation as self-conscious Spirit". With Hegel's system of Science we have "the last shape of Spirit the Spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of the Self and thereby realizes its Notion as remaining in its Notion in its realization this is absolute knowing."[21]

The identification between human and divine self-consciousness is, thus, no merely incidental feature of Hegel's construction. It is its essence. Without attaining the perspective of absolute reality, the knowledge acquired would have remained incomplete; without a rational comprehension of its structure, such reality would have remained irrevocably beyond man. The apprehension of necessity within the self-knowledge of God is the core of Hegel's system of science. There are no indications that he ever conceived of his absolute knowledge as a way-station on the road toward secular incremental science. It was rather the reverse. Moreover, Hegel was eager to assert both his personal orthodoxy as a Lutheran, and the capacity of his system to absorb all the strands of religious tradition. Philosophy, in his formulation, expressed in conceptual form the content that was figuratively represented by religion. And while much has been made of the tendency of philosophy to replace religion within this scheme, that was clearly not Hegel's view. He regarded philosophy and religion, together with art, as equivalent expressions of the Absolute, and for good reason. The authority of his own philosophic construction is derived in large measure from the divine authority of religion. His absolute knowledge must recognize itself as the absolute knowledge of God.

It is within this enormous interpretive work of absorbing the history of philosophy, religion and art into the system, that Hegel identifies his own most significant predecessors. This is an indispensable key to the interpretation of his construction. Invariably it is the tradition of speculative mysticism that is singled out, within the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* and the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, as the line of thinkers who have most noticeably advanced the movement toward absolute Spirit. Within the ancient world this role is occupied

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[20] This was the intention outlined in the famous preface to the *Phenomenology*. "The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title 'love of knowing' and be actual knowing that is what I have set myself to do" (p. 3).

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 485; see also pp. 487, 488.

particularly by the Neoplatonists, both Plotinus and Proclus, together with the mysterious creations of the Gnostics. In the medieval context the German mystics, especially Eckhart, are quoted with approval. By the time of the Renaissance this Neoplatonic gnosis, Hegel recognizes, is in the hands of such adepts as Giordano Bruno and Pico della Mirandola. But none hold his interest as much as the speculative theosophy of the Silesian mystic, Jacob Boehme. Hegel devotes an entire chapter of the *History of Philosophy* (more pages than to any other modern thinker) to Boehme, and counted him, with Francis Bacon, as one of the two great fountainheads of the modern world.

What Hegel admired in Boehme was the ability to go beyond the merely figurative understanding of religion, to penetrate the inner necessity of God's relationship to the world. Boehme had recognized that the divine "All" would be a "dark Nothing" if there were not a reality outside of itself by which it might become self-conscious. God must project outside of himself the harsh fiery principle of self-assertiveness which creates a separate existence. The struggle within creation is between this self-centering force and the opposing divine principle of love or surrender, by which the divine light is reflected back to its source. Boehme had elaborated the dialectical process of God's *self*-revelation. Now whether Hegel was influenced in the formation of his own conception of *Geist* by the Boehmean construction is in its nature a difficult question to settle. There is strong evidence that Hegel passed through a "theosophic phase" during those crucial early years at Jena.[22] What is certain, however, is that, despite his differences over the figurative mode of Boehme's expression, he remained an admirer of the theosophic speculation itself.

Hegel understood his own work as a continuation and culmination of the speculative mysticism of his Silesian predecessor:

He is called the *philosophus teutonicus*, and in fact through him philosophy first entered Germany with its characteristic nature. . . . In the idea of God to apprehend *the* negative, to comprehend God as absolute identity this is the struggle that he had to endure; it had a frightful appearance because Boehme was so far behind in intellectual development. On the one hand there is the completely rough and barbaric representation; on the other hand one recognizes the deep German disposition (*Gemüt*) that associates with the innermost and therein exercises its might, its power.[23]

Here, as always (apart from his brief "theosophic phase"), Hegel is careful to distinguish himself from Boehme's representational language. The theosophy had not achieved the clarity of conceptual understanding and therefore remained tied to a still transcendent Godhead. Yet despite

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[22] Hegel's first biographer, Rosenkranz, is the source for this conception of a theosophic phase. It is significant, however, that it is also supported by the most recent comprehensive study of his life by H.S. Harris, especially in the second volume: *Hegel's Development: Night Thoughts (Jena 1801-1806)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). Harris is "inclined to believe in Boehme's influence upon Hegel from 1801 onwards" (p. 85n), and includes one of the most elaborate theosophic manuscripts preserved by Rosenkranz, "The Triangle of Triangles", as an appendix (pp. 184-88). See also Walsh, "The Historical Dialectic of Spirit: Jacob Boehme's influence on Hegel" in Robert Perkins, ed., *History and System: Hegel's Philosophy of History* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), pp. 15-35. On Hegel's relationship to illuminism and Freemasonry see Jacques d'Hondt, *Hegel Secret* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968); the influence of speculative pietism is explored in Reiner Heinze, *Bengel und Oetinger als Vorläufer des deutschen ldealismus* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Münster, 1969).

[23] Hegel, *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte* Bd. 9, *Vorlesungen Über die Gischichte der Philosophie,* Teil 4, ed. Pierre Garniron and Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), p. 80. See also the letter of gratitude to his former student, van Ghert, for sending Hegel an edition of Boehme's collected works. *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 573-74.

these reservations Hegel continued to pay him the highest compliment of employing Boehmean language to express his own understanding of God.[24]

ln other words, Hegel did not regard his own speculative philosophy as the occupation of an outmoded theological position. His relationship to the history of Christianity and, in particular, to the line of theosophic mysticism within it determined the essence of his project. It was precisely because the self-revelation of God within history was already moving in the direction of its dialectical fulfillment, that this consummation could be effected within his system. That is why he could continue to express his insights in theosophic language, as a means of underlining the continuity with this tradition. For his interpreters it means that we are on safest ground if we regard his construction as a variant of Neoplatonic-Gnostic speculation within the Christian mystical tradition.[25] We have Hegel's own assurance that this constituted his purpose. In the 1827 Preface to the *Encyclopedia* he wrote that he was in essential agreement with the efforts of Karl von Baader, to transform the theosophic speculation of Boehme and other mystics into the foundation for rational idealist philosophy.

Difficulties and uncertainties of interpretation arise precisely because of the ambiguity of this conception. God and man have become wholly identified with their manifestations within the system; they no longer arise from a reality in depth beyond their self-revelation. As a consequence the conception of Spirit that unites them revolves around an essential ambiguity. Is it immanentist or transcendent, secular or religious? Is God simply reduced to his self-understanding within man? Does man definitively transcend the finite condition of his existence? Hegel's genius consisted in preserving this ambiguity, so that his construction could be interpreted both secularly and religiously. He insisted on the preservation of both dimensions at once.[26] Among his successors, especially the Left Hegelians, the tendency was to dissolve the ambiguity in favor of a purely rational immanentist construction of history.

Yet even there, in the most militantly secular ideologies, the transition is made not by rejecting the divine but by absorbing it more radically. Marx in essence extends the direction already indicated by Hegel, to insist that the absolute Spirit is wholly identified with the unfolding of the human spirit within history. From a Hegelian perspective this is a rather crude assertion, particularly when it becomes the basis for the expectation that man can transform his own nature. With what nature will this transformation be effected? Nevertheless this was the assertion of Marx, and he leaves no doubt that the faith sustaining his effort lay in the absorption of the divine creative powers into man. His revolt against God, he explained, arose from his Promethean rejection of "all heavenly and earthly gods who refuse to recognize human self-consciousness as the supreme

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[24] Hegel utilizes Boehme's conception of God, as a unity of the opposing forces of love and wrath, when he identifies this as the highest achievement of representational Christianity. "Picture-thinking takes the other aspect, evil, to be a happening alien to the divine Being; to grasp it in the divine Being itself as *the wrath of God*, this demands from picture-thinking, struggling against its limitations, its supreme and most strenuous effort, an effort which, since it lacks the Notion, remains fruitless." *Phenomenology*, p. 470.

[25] This is certainly how his own contemporaries understood the system. See Ferdinand Christian Baur, *Die christliche Gnosis* (Tübingen: Osiander, 1835), who located Hegel along a line of Christian Gnostics extending back to ancient times. Many of the Young Hegelians arrived at an understanding of the universal self-reconciliation of Spirit through the same avenue of esoteric and ecstatic mysticism. See John Edward Toews, *Hegelianism: The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Jürgen Gebhardt, *Politik und Eschatologie: Studien zur Geschichte der Hegelschen Schule in den Jahren 1830-1840* (Munich: Beck, 1963).

[26] See Eric Voegelin, "On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery" *Studium Generale* 24 (1971), pp. 335-68.

divinity."[27] In an almost identical manner Nietzsche reveals the secret of Zarathustra, from which the entire elaboration of the will to power springs: "if there were gods, how could I endure not being a god?"[28]

With Marx, Comte and Nietzsche the dimension of revolt against God together with its motivation comes into the open. Again it is of the essence of their common project, because without the death of God the apocalypse of man cannot take place. Hegel did not express it so bluntly because he understood that its impossibility would become self-evident. He sought to accomplish the same result by maintaining the ambiguity of the divine-human identification. In either case, however, the difficulty remains the same. How can man raise himself up to the Godhead through his own autonomous self-assertion? Even more significantly, how is belief in this transparently impossible project sustained? For clearly the open declaration of the quest for self-divinization has shattered the illusion of a rational foundation, along with any possibility of remedying it through the appeal of persuasion.

On the broader front it has also exploded the misconception of the purely secular character of modernity. It becomes increasingly difficult to maintain that it is to be identified with the expansion of rational science, or that any quasi-religious symbolism is merely the residual after-effect of centuries of faith. In the revolt against God of the leading nineteenth-century thinkers we witness the point at which the intramundane religiousness of modernity eclipses the rational-scientific component within it. The quest for self-divinization has proved superior to the more self-disciplined authority of reason. We are left with no alternative but to acknowledge the sacralizing character of modernity. Far from being a legitimate or distinct age in its own right, the modern world can ultimately only be understood as a convulsion within the larger movement of Christianity. It is to the unfolding of the Western spiritual traditions that we must look for the roots of the disease that afflicts us, just as it is to those same traditions of philosophy, Judaism and Christianity that we must search for its remedy.

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[27] This famous passage is from the preface to Marx's doctoral dissertation, when he was most under the influence of Hegel. Quoted in Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, p. 273. See also the equally revealing discussion in the "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts", where Marx explains why we should not raise the question of the ground or source of all things. "[S]ince to the socialist man the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the begetting of man through human labour, nothing but the coming-to-be of nature for man, he has the visible, irrefutable proof of his birth through himself, of his process of coming-to-be." Robert C. Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 92.

[28] Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1978), p. 86. For an extremely useful survey of the *Übermensch* idea see Ernst Benz, *Der Übermensch* (Zurich: Rhein Verlag, 1961).

Chapter V

Signs of Contradiction: Nationalism and the Search for a Democratic 'We'

Michael W. Foley & Matthew Carr

The search for the elements of stable democratic government may take one of two distinctively different trajectories.[1] The first asks, "Under what circumstances is the democratic form of government most likely to succeed?" Searching for the optimal "conditions" for successful majoritarian government, this approach draws on the experience of established democracies and on the idea of democracy itself. It is essentializing and its analysis is static. Conflict and division are problematic the more deeply rooted the more problematic. Relative social and cultural homogeneity, shared beliefs and attitudes on substantive issues, and a common democratic "political culture" are not only "conditions" but "preconditions" for the success of democracy. Democracy is thus delicate and rare, requiring hardy doses of socialization, or careful management of mass sentiment, to succeed under all but the most fortunate of circumstances.

This is the classical view, but it is also the one which received social scientific standing in the atmosphere of embattled freedoms of the 1950s when Robert Dahl and a host of colleagues and competitors elaborated an "empirical democratic theory" on the basis of a profound suspicion of the "mass politics" and perfervid nationalisms of the first half of the twentieth century.[2] It was "empirical" mainly in its search for the sociological preconditions of democracy and in its appeal for evidence to survey research, mostly in Britain and the United States. Out of these beginnings grew the Social Science Research Council's project on political development (which pictured the development of democratic institutions as the culmination of a long and uncertain struggle to overcome five "crises") and a variety of studies of "nation-building" and the problems of dealing with social and political "mobilization" in the "new nations".[3]

The more historically oriented of the studies of the emergence of the modern nation-state argued persuasively that the centralization of state power preceded, and was in some sense a condition for, the developing sense of "nationhood," which, in any case, did not assume its modern

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[1] Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).

[2] Dahl's *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) is still one of the most thoughtful efforts to work out a democratic theory in sociological terms.

[3] The five crises were crises of "identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration, and distribution." See Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph La Palombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). For studies of "nation-building" from this period see, for instance, Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York: Wiley, 1953; rev. ed. MIT University Press, 1966); Seymor Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: Wiley, 1965). Implicit in all of these was a concern for "stability" and "political order" which quickly became the basis for a sharp critique of the "optimistic equation" of socio-economic modernization with increasing prospects for democratization. See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies/University of California, 1979).

form until the nineteenth century.[4] Indeed, Stein Rokkan recognized a necessary tension between what he called the "National Revolution" dictated by a "central nation-building culture" and "the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and the peripheries."[5]

Hobsbawm likewise points to the dangers inherent in the centralizing project of promoting a "national" consciousness in the age of popular participation, because the modernization of the state itself, especially the spread of its administrative and educational reach, could provoke counter-nationalisms.[6] "Nationalism," in these accounts, while intertwined with the spread of participatory forms of government and pressures for democratization, was never a straightforward "pre-condition" for democracy, but stood, in much the manner emphasized by Ghia Nodia in this volume, in complex tension with democratizing tendencies.

The second approach asks, "What are the incentives which drive political actors to choose democracy over the alternatives?" It treats conflict as the heart of politics and the decision for one or another form of government as a decision about the terms under which conflict will be carried out. It assumes that democracy is the answer to fundamental conflicts and asks why people would give such an answer. As the authors to a recent study of the Spanish transition describe it, "The fundamental task facing the founders of the new regime was to create a political system capable of managing deep-seated conflicts through institutional channels."[7] In Giuseppe Di Palma's words, democracy is a matter of "coexistence" and struggles over democracy force an "ultimate question," namely, "Can a country afford not to have coexistence?"[8] In this view, the absence of objective "preconditions" is precisely the problem democracy is constructed to deal with. The only question is how and why do groups come to see democracy as the way to do so, and having done so, what keeps them to their agreements to observe democratic forms?

It would be tempting, but wrong, to speculate that these orientations do little more than reflect the biases and vantage points of the ages in which they were posed, the more pessimistic presentation of the classical and "empirical" schools flowing from periods in which autocracies and mass-based dictatorships seemed better equipped to deal with the manifold difficulties of governance, the more optimistic view of democracy as somehow essential to conflict management in the modern world springing from a setting in which democracy and democratization seems almost everywhere the rage. While there may be some truth in this reading as to the origins of these approaches, it is important to note that they represent not only distinctly different intellectual strategies, but they spring from different empirical bases, as well. The first is analytic, spinning out the supposed presuppositions of democracy on the basis of a static analysis of the "idea" of majority rule. Its empirical bases are the established democracies, particularly Britain and the

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[4] Gabriel Almond, "Approaches to Developmental Causation," in *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development*, ed. by Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 3; E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 84.

[5] Stein Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development* (New York: David McKay, 1970), p. 102. We will be centrally concerned with one such struggle in our analysis of French nationality, below.

[6] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 93.

[7] Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Skabad, *Spain after Franco* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), p. 7.

[8] Di Palma, p. 29.

United States, in a sometimes idealized version of their "modal patterns".[9] The second, by contrast, is process oriented and more interested in the empirical processes by which countries have become democracies than in the logical "prerequisites" for democracy. As DiPalma notes, it is apt to focus on outlying cases, where the prospects for democracy seem slim in "objective" terms; but it has been able to draw on a wide range of recent democratizations, from Southern Europe to Latin America, to bolster its sense that democracy, however contingent, is nevertheless a solution to problems of conflict management rather than an inevitable victim of conflict.[10]

Our approach, while drawing on some of the insights of earlier work on nationalism and nation-building, is much more in tune with the second camp, and this choice necessarily colors our view of such supposed "preconditions" of democracy or political development as a democratic "political culture," a relatively homogeneous population, or a sense of nationhood. Since these will be crucial issues in what follows it seems a good idea to begin our discussion with a brief explanation of the factors which we think make for the successful installation and maintenance of democracies. We follow this with a look at one of the first of the so-called "nation-states" of Europe, France, and at its own struggles over the concept of "nation". In section three, we look at the ambiguities surrounding the accoutrements of national identity in relatively successful nation-states. In the concluding section, we attempt to draw some lessons for democrats and nation-builders.

Democracy: The Minimalist View

We start from the premise that democracy is the institutionalization of a certain uncertainty, in the sense that, given democratic rules, no political outcome is definitively foreclosed.[11] While there appears little doubt that in the late twentieth century the democratic form has taken on a quasi-mandatory character, something more is needed for the parties involved, particularly those wielding the power to block its installation, to come to agree to the uncertainties that democracy entails. Where major parties do not readily see mutual advantage (whatever their antagonisms) in democratic rules of the game, democracy appears to be out of the question unless one of the following conditions is met: 1) the power of the party or parties intent on blocking settlement must itself be seriously in question (as in the case of certain of the Communist parties of the former Soviet bloc or Salazarist forces in Portugal in 1974); or 2) conservative forces facing protracted resistance from oppositions move to save what they can (and risk losing all: the Gorbachev reforms

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[9] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963) was an early attempt to extend the net, but its normative anchor remained Great Britain, whose citizens seemed to Almond and Verba to combine just the right proportions of civic mindedness and submissiveness.

[10] The relevant literature is vast, but must include Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) and the four volumes edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, especially the final statement by O'Donnell and Schmitter, volume 4, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Di Palma's book, cited above, lays out the distinctions sketched here and develops an argument along the second line. An early statement is Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," *Comparative Politics*, 2 (April, 1970).

[11] Adam Przeworksi, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 58.

perhaps represent an example; the Brazilian *abertura* is another); or, finally, 3) political forces reach a stalemate in which each side agrees to institutionalize conflict under the pacific rules of a democracy (El Salvador is a prime example).[12]

In any case, unless democracy is imposed forcibly by a conquering power, internal or external, the parties to a democratic settlement will always strive to insure that their interests will be guarded in two ways: through substantive agreements about the limits and pace of policy change; and through agreements on procedures designed to maintain as level a playing field as possible for all significant parties to the agreement. Such political pacts go beyond the transition and what Linz calls the *Eruptura pactada*; they are implicit in any functioning democracy. Insofar as any "allegiance to democratic principles" counts, it will rest, in the last analysis, on satisfaction or desperation. In this respect, democracies do not differ from other regime types.

Thus, we differ with Ghia Nodia's presentation in this volume in one important respect: the first step in forging a democracy is not the formation of a "political 'we'" in the sense today associated with nationalism, but only, if at all, in the narrower sense that significant actors come to see the arena within which they struggle and the opponents they face as more or less permanent features of their political landscape. The sense of political "we" is not a "precondition" for democracy, but its long-term product, often won in protracted struggle. The first step is some common recognition of the arena of struggle and a sense, on the part of important actors, that this arena must be permanently shared. Today the arena is provided in part (in most cases) by the bare fact of international recognition and the territorial boundaries established thereby. By and large, absent some tremendous effort to shake free, the territorial entity accorded sovereign statehood by the international community defines the boundaries of domestic conflict and of the possibilities for its resolution, or rather, management. Without doubt, tremendous efforts to redefine those boundaries are possible, as recent events proclaim; but such cases are exceptional and do not provide us with much insight into the relationship between the elements of nationalism, as usually understood, and democratizing projects or democracies.

Second, it is important to emphasize the term "significant actors." Not all actors in the process of installation, consolidation, and maintenance of a democracy are equally significant. In many respects, the mass of a population plays little role in the crucial decisions affecting the future of democratic arrangements. They may or may not bear the full panoply of "democratic attitudes" usually thought necessary for the success of a democracy. They may or may not think of themselves as a "political 'we'". They may or may not have any very extended, or appreciative, view of themselves as constituents of a "nation". In sum, whether or not the mass of the population shares any of these attitudes and understandings may or may not be salient for the success of a democracy. Whether and to what extent they are salient depends largely on the ways in which the elements of the population, their organizations, and the various elites put these attitudes to use.

Finally, just as "democratic attitudes" are neither necessary nor sufficient for the successful launching of a democratic polity, so too are nationalistic sentiments[13] neither necessary nor sufficient for the constitution of a political ;we'. Not necessary because we can cite more than one case of a democracy founded around distinctively different understandings. Not sufficient, because recent history is full of tales of "national" groups unable to forge the sort of political 'we' necessary

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[12] For a comprehensive catalog of possible political dynamics leading to democratization, see Alfred Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative," in *Transitions... Comparative Perspectives*, pp. 64-84.

[13] In the contemporary sense; we will discuss the origins of the notion of "nation" below.

to constitute an effective revolutionary or national movement. That said, we can proceed to a closer look at the roles which nationalism has played in the forging of a democratic political 'we'.

France: The Question of the Nation

Is the establishment of a coherent national identity crucial to the sort of sustained elite consensus and popular acquiescence necessary for stable democracy? Or does agreement on the contours of "the nation" follow on a political settlement? The history of France, birthplace in many respects of the modern idea of citizenship, provides some support for both arguments. For the source of the persistent volatility in French public life, from the Revolution to the Fifth Republic, lay not so much in the lack of a conception of nationality as in the seeming impossibility of reconciling competing conceptions of French nationhood. For close to two centuries, through the Revolution, two empires, five republics, a restored Bourbon and an illegitimate Orleanist monarchy, and the quasi-fascist Vichy regime, the central issue of French political life, the question of republican versus other forms of government, revolved around the character and implications of French nationality.

Superficially, at least, France appears to possess the quintessential characteristics of a unified nation-state common language, culture, religion, traditions, territory, and history. Why should a country enjoying such advantages suffer such chronic instability? The answer lies in an evolving struggle over the meaning of French nationality for the governance of France. At the heart of the political struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a deep disagreement over how France was to be defined in terms of participation and citizenship. At first a question of citizenship and loyalty versus older notions of station and obedience, by the end of the nineteenth century the struggle took on racialist and chauvinist overtones which were only superseded (and then not completely) by more straightforward battles over the form popular government should take.

The radical democratic notion of French nationality arose from the Jacobin concept of citizenship, which entailed the adoption of a set of commitments, including (usually) knowledge of French and the acceptance of a host of values and precepts associated with loyalty to the Republic. It was voluntarist by and large, relying on the individual to choose to become "French" by adopting the revolutionary values encapsulated in the revolutionary mantras of *liberté*, *egalité*, *fraternité*. The Jacobins made no attempt to exclude any group from assuming French citizenship, provided they remained loyal to revolutionary France. Even an outsider like Tom Paine, who spoke no French, could be elected to the National Convention on the basis of his political ideals. Arguments about blood, race, or even linguistic preferences, were of no concern to the Jacobins.

The French Revolution sharply challenged the legitimacy of traditional political arrangements of the *ancien régime* by offering a cogent alternative based on the sovereignty of the people, rather than on God or the monarchy. No longer content with the passivity of the population as subjects, the Jacobins instructed the French people to become participatory citizens and to defend the republic from domestic and foreign counter-revolutionaries. This meant that the citizen would replace the subject; France belonged to its people, not to the royal family and its functionaries. If this left open the question of how "the people" is defined and delimited, as Professor Nodia suggests, that problem was solved practically by the scope of French territorial claims. Jacobin France was state-based, and the Jacobins advocated a popular-revolutionary patriotism which idolized the state as the instrument of popular sovereignty. The republic, not the ethnic nation, was the object of the Jacobins' veneration and loyalty. The Jacobin revolutionary patriotism rallied

segments of the population to defend the fatherland against the counterattacks of the European monarchies in 1793. As E.J. Hobsbawm observes, "'patriots' in the sense pioneered by the Americans, the Dutch revolutionaries of 1783, and the French" were not ethnic nationalists: ". . . the *patrie* to which their loyalty lay was the opposite of an existential, pre-existing unit, but a nation created by the political choice of its members."[14]

With the revolution and the empire, France was identified with democracy, patriotism (as embodied in the defense of the fatherland), and military greatness, throughout the continent. The legacy of Napoleon is particularly ambiguous, since his own imperial reign was hardly the epitome of democratic republicanism. And yet, on the continent, among radical democrats and republicans, the Napoleonic invasions were celebrated, at least at first, for the damage they wrought on the traditional social and political order and for the possibility they presented for a renewal of public life on democratic bases. The Napoleonic Wars reawakened Spain, Germany, Italy, and Russia, and gave hope to forlorn ethnic groups like the Poles. For many Europeans, the Napoleonic era was remembered more for its ignition of democratic and "national" aspirations heavily tinged with democratic sentiment than for the wars or French conquest.

The French nation was born in the French Revolution; however, its meaning was still fluid enough to permit both right and left to appropriate it for their own purposes. Those purposes were radically opposed. The restored monarchy of the Bourbon Charles X fell as a result of the July Revolution of 1830, an expression of "uncontrollable forces" set loose by the French Revolution. In Charles' place, the Orleanist Louis Philippe declared himself "king of the French," that is, of the people of France rather than the territory, thereby implicitly accepting the revolutionary notion of citizenship in an effort to legitimate his "Bourgeois Monarch". As Hobsbawm notes, after the American and French revolutions, "such traditional guarantors of loyalty as dynastic legitimacy, divine ordination, historic right and continuity of rule, or religious cohesion were severely weakened, [and] all these traditional legitimations of state authority were, since 1789, under permanent challenge." Even monarchies "as secure from revolution as George III's Britain or Nicholas I's Russia" felt the need to provide a popularly-based legitimation for traditional rule.[15] By and large, the monarchs merely succeeded in buying time. Louis Philippe's time ran out in the Revolution of 1848, which created the short-lived second republic. By 1851, Napoleon III had become a democratically elected quasi-dictator and the Second Empire was proclaimed. In 1871 his empire came to its ignoble end with the occupation of much of the north by the Prussian military and the revolt of Paris under the radical Commune.

The political dynamics which led to the birth of the Third Republic are particularly interesting for our purposes. The defeat of the Commune by the forces of Thiers in May of 1871 set aside the "social question" represented by the left and their radical republican sympathizers in the Commune. With that the political struggle returned to center, with a renewed battled between republicans and the conservative dominated Assembly over the form of government. Under pressure from the Legitimists, Thiers offered the last Bourbon pretender, the Comte de Chambord, the crown. The Comte's insistence on reigning under the white flag of the Bourbons, opposed even by his own party, was decisive. He would not rule under the *tricolore*, and the Assembly would not renounce what had become a symbol of popular French nationality. France would have no king.[16] The situation was exacerbated by divisions among the monarchists (besides the Legitimists,

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[14] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 87.

[15] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 84.

[16] Robert J. Mundt, "The Republic Which Divides Us Least: The French Crisis of 1870-75," in *Crisis, Choice, and Change*, p. 266. The potency of the *tricolore* as a symbol of the French Revolution and its

the Orleanists and the Bonapartists claimed to represent traditional forces). But perhaps most important was the new legitimacy enjoyed by the moderate republicans, who had supported Thiers' invasion of Paris and thus could represent themselves as the "party of order." The Republic was no longer a threat to the Right, so the argument went; the republicans were replaced by the (now defeated) workers' movement as the chief threat to order and property, and they had shown that they were capable of containing the latter. Thus was the Third Republic born; despite continuing opposition to republicanism on the right, the Republic had become a viable choice, indeed, the only viable choice, once again.

With the virtual extinction of the traditional monarchist forces after the bungled attempt of General Boulanger to seize the government in 1877, a new antirepublican opposition was forged, drawing support from the right and left and representing a Bonapartist politics which amalgamated nationalist, antiparliamentary, personalist, and plebiscitary tendencies. *Action Française* undoubtedly represents the best example of this new political phenomenon. Led by the atheist Charles Maurras, *Action Française* articulated "integral nationalism," whose program called for the restoration of the monarchy, the maintenance of the aristocratic social order, the use of the Church as a bulwark against social radicalism, and the exclusion of Jews and other foreigners in an effort to restore French national solidarity. Based on racially determined arguments of blood and birth, *Action Française* helped propagate ideas for political forces on the extremes while attracting a declining middle class and peasantry still tied to the Church and the remains of the aristocracy.

The dominant struggle during the Third Republic was between the clericals and the anticlericals. At the heart of this fight was the question who should control education; but behind this concrete political issue lay the deeper one of how France should define itself as a sacred state or a secular republic. Vitriolic conflicts between the Roman Catholic Church, which had allied itself to the old monarchist-royalist right, and the republicans paralyzed much of the political life of the republic. Similar struggles were repeated throughout Catholic Europe and the religiously divided polities of the Rhine basin and old Hapsburg Empire, as Rokkan points out. "The development of compulsory education under centralized secular control for all children of the nation came into direct conflict with the established rights of the religious *pouvoirs intermediaries* and triggered waves of mass mobilization into nationwide parties of protest" and "religious defense".[17] Here again, then, the imperatives of "nation-building" aroused the ire of adherents of older systems of authority, generating intense disputes over the character of the nation being built. By this time, however, the methods, if not the democratic principle, of mass politics had been adopted by all contenders.

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concomitant slogan of *liberté, egalité, fraternité* was of such a magnitude that the Comte de Chambord chose to eschew the throne rather than swearing allegiance to the revolutionary standard. This incident points to the power of the flag as a symbol for defining both political and national identity. Indeed, flags have been used to engender a sense of identity and community by movements across the entire political spectrum and often without reference to actual state power. From the French Revolution, nationalist and radical democrats throughout Europe and the Americas adopted the *tricolore* as a model for their own national flags. The red flag of socialists and communists and the black standard of the anarchists were also derived from flags used during the French Revolution. Forces on the right, on the other hand, up to the rise of fascism, favored flags with symbolic roots in the monarchist and aristocratic tradition, reflecting dynastic lineages rather than "national" symbols based on notions of popular sovereignty or plebiscitary legitimation. The fascists' claims to the latter were symbolized in flags that combined the *tricolore* with the symbols of national might or imperial pretension.

[17] Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties*, p. 103.

When the Dreyfus case exploded into the public eye at the end of the nineteenth century, the political forces allied to *Action Française* and those of the anticlerical republicans, radicals, and socialists entered into mortal conflict. This *cause célèbre* crystallized the conflict over the meaning of French nationality because, as it came to be interpreted by both sides, it represented a fundamental assault on the Jacobin notion of citizenship. If a Jew could not be a Frenchman, then revolutionary citizenship did not define French nationality. This profound attack on the revolutionary conception of French citizenship solidified republican-radical cooperation by forcing the anticlerical agenda into the forefront for both parties. The culmination of this new alliance came in 1905 when the Act of Separation definitively disestablished the Catholic Church as the official religion of France, effectively settling the education question while relieving the French state of the temptation of meddling deeply in Church affairs.

The arrival of World War I brought about the restoration of the *Union Sacré* of France. During this war there was no fifth column collaborating with the Germans. However, the unity of the war was elusive and ephemeral. Intriguing by the right and violent demonstrations by militants of *Action Française* led to the formation in 1934 of the Popular Front government which temporarily allied the socialists, communists, and the remains of the radicals in one government under Leon Blum. The Front collapsed in 1936, and France drifted, unprepared for war with Nazi Germany because the pro-German right and pacifists on the left had blocked centrists plans to build up French defense.

The Nazi *Blitzkrieg* in 1940 overwhelmed the French in six weeks. But in contrast to the situation in World War I, the Germans encountered no united opposition. The government of Marshal Pétain and Admiral Laval in Vichy concretely illustrated the persistence of deep divisions within French society. Their regime, committed to a "National Revolution," appealed to notions of fatherland, solidarity, and corporatism. The Vichy regime was "Bonapartism with Bureaucracy" conservative, Catholic, and ostensibly neutralist. While collaborationist elements within the regime did play an increasingly vital role in the governance of unoccupied France, the Vichy government in fact embodied the aspirations of an important segment of French society. Indeed, it attempted to formulate a new French nationality on the lines of earlier rightist movements, particularly *Action Française*.

During the first eighteen months of the German occupation of the remainder of France, moreover, there was little resistance. In fact, for the most part there was active collaboration with the Nazi rulers. It was not until the beginning of 1942 that the vast majority of the French with the German-ruled occupation zone started to oppose Nazi rule. Nothing can easily account for this nearly wholesale acceptance of German rule. Unlike many on the Eastern Front, who welcomed the Germans as seeming liberators from the tyrannical grip of Stalin, the French were not oppressed by a totalitarian dictator; yet their behavior belied a genuine antipathy for the milieu of the Third Republic.

Competing for the loyalties of the French people were the various resistance groups. The most vital faction of the resistance was made up of the Communists, whose Leninist party organization provided them with the organizational structure, loyalty, and discipline needed to successfully prosecute a guerrilla war. The other major faction, the Free French, were led from exile by Charles DeGaulle. Allied with Catholic resistance forces within France, the Free French became the most important non-Communist formation with the resistance, enabling DeGaulle to head a provisional government whose purpose was to draft a new constitution following the defeat of Nazi Germany. The Communists, Socialists, and the Gaullist/Christian Democratic-MRP were the leading parties. Despite DeGaulle's efforts to dictate key provisions, the new constitution, which provided the

foundation for the Fourth Republic, promised to suffer from many of the debilities of the Constitution of 1875. DeGaulle withdrew from politics, and in his place a disloyal right rallied and plotted, often behind his name. The Communists quickly went into opposition at the end of 1947, when their trade union, the CGT, sponsored widespread strikes which the Socialist interior minister forcibly put down.

On the left, thereafter, the Communists were in permanent opposition, and with the emergence of a Gaullist political party, the PRF, nearly half of the parliament was dominated by anti-Fourth Republic political parties. DeGaulle's major goal was to contain the French Communists, but several factors conspired to devalue the importance of the "Communist threat" by the mid-1950s: the success of the MRP made a Communist victory unlikely; Khrushchev's famous attack on Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956 helped reduce the power of the old conservative lodestone of Stalinist terror; the suppression of the Hungarian revolution in that same year discredited French apologists for the Soviet Union in the eyes of many; and the French Communist Party itself made its intense nationalism a central element of its propaganda. These changing circumstances made the possibility of an elected Communist government at once more remote and less unpalatable to many.

On the surface, the issue which brought down the Fourth Republic had its roots in the civil war in Algeria. The intensification of the Algerian crisis culminated with the 1958 *coup de main* which ended the Fourth Republic and ushered in the Gaullist Fifth Republic. Behind the conspiracy that put DeGaulle into power, and indeed behind the political conflicts which plagued the Fourth Republic throughout its short life, was the continuing battle over the meaning of French nationality and, in particular, over the legitimacy of the republican heritage. As in the crisis of 1871-75, the defusing of the threat from the left at once gave new life to conflict over the form of government and new legitimacy to republican formulas. DeGaulle embraced republicanism while forging a strong central executive. Both moves proved crucial to overcoming at last the divisions of nearly two centuries of French nationalism. The new Gaullist state was hardy enough to weather the storms of the decolonization of Algeria in 1962, the student protests of 1968, and the ascent of a Socialist-Communist government in 1981.

What changed with the Fifth Republic which put an end to the extensive anti-democratic opposition which had plagued all French republics heretofore? In the largest terms, the answer seems to lie in the acceptance of a unified French national identity which draws its life from the mainsprings of the French Revolution. While it is true that the Revolution has received extensive critical reappraisal in the last few years, this would seem to be more of a sign of the strength of the *mythos* of the Republic and the republican tradition it spawned than of an open rejection of its principles. Behind the apparent "consensus", however, lie the stark political facts that the major conflicts which fueled the old debate have been resolved, and resolved largely in favor of the republican tradition. The monarchist alternative is clearly dead. The old battle over education was essentially settled with the Act of Separation. The Church embraced, definitively by the Second Vatican Council of 1964 if not before, the democratic forms of the Republic. In these senses, clearly the Republic, and the Revolution on which it is founded, have triumphed. Their more inclusive, radical democratic notion of French nationality has also triumphed, at least in important long-standing practices. Alsace, Brittany, and Occitania are safely ensconced in "great France," despite folkloric "nationalist" revivals here and there. The Republic, in short, and the more inclusive notion of citizenship on which its conception of the nation was based, has outlived the alternatives. And without alternatives, even the most questionable of regimes may appear

legitimate.[18] Consensus on political forms, won in hard struggle over alternatives, has become the basis for consensus over national identity.

No doubt, the shadows of the old struggle have reappeared in the racialist and chauvinist sentiments behind the growing popularity of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front. Its anti-immigrant stance portends a larger agenda of anti-republican themes which, thus far, have not manifested themselves. As even the optimistic developmentalist theorists of the 1960s discovered on examining the historical record, "even the most stable kinds of political situations contained conflicting tendencies and potentialities."[19] In this respect, Adam Przeworski's observation that conflicts are rarely resolved, only temporarily and to one degree or another "terminated", seems apropos.[20] If the evolution of such issues up to now is any indicator, however, Le Pen's movement, like Maurras', will eventually dissipate.

What will make all the difference, we would contend, will be the interests to which alternative versions of French nationality are attached and the degree to which those interests resist reconciliation. The resources of nationality may unite or divide; everything depends upon the uses to which they are put. What can be extracted from the French case is a clear sense of the difficulty of arriving at a coherent conception of a political "we". For two hundred years, the French have struggled with what their identity means and how this decision should be manifested in their political system and their social relations.

The development of national identity and of democratic political forms may be correlated with one another, if only imperfectly. Both arose from the expansion of participatory politics at the end of the eighteenth century. But, despite seductive examples from the age of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and from the current breakup of the old Russian Empire, both processes usually start with the solidification, centralization, and expansion of state power within boundaries set by international circumstances. Nationalism, both state-centered and oppositional, is a response, as Hobsbawm has shown, to that process in a context in which popular participation is presumed to be vital to the legitimacy of the state. The idea of nation is explosive in divided polities; it is equally fraught with consequence in those polities where it provides a basis for common political identity. In the following section, we explore some the implications of national signs, stories, and what Hobsbawm calls "proto-nationalism" for national identity.

Signs Which Unite, Signs Which Divide

One of the characteristics of 'nation' most often cited as the basis of common identity is language. While linguistic identity is by no means primordialmany national languages are the self-conscious products of nation-buildersthe acquisition of a common language (or dialect) is an important sign of citizenship even where radical democratic notions of nationhood prevail (Revolutionary France, the United States). Even where bilingualism is tolerated, the command of both national languages or of the "official" national language as well as the "other" language is widely seen, by populace and elite alike, as a sign of willing participation in a polity defined as a commonweal over and above the cultural distinctions within it. Common language is as much a sign of political union for many people as it is a means to that end; it is hard to account for the "English Only" movement in the United States in any other terms.

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[18] Przeworski, "Some Problems", pp. 51-2.

[19] Gabriel A. Almond and Robert J. Mundt, "Crisis, Choice, and Change: Some Tentative Conclusions," in *Crisis, Choice, and Change*, p. 620.

[20] Przeworski, "Some Problems," p. 56.

National languages nevertheless represent significant exclusions that cannot always be ignored in discussing the formation of a political 'we. A national language is generally built on one among a number of variant dialects or languages. These may be relegated to the position of bearers of the "little tradition" as opposed to "high culture" ("Hochdeutsch" expresses it well). Their speakers are often automatically disadvantaged over against those raised in the prevailing tongue. The excluded language or dialect may in turn become the basis for self-conscious dissent from the political domination of an "alien" tradition, as the revolts of Catalonia, the Basque country, and Quebec attest, and as revolutionary nationalists have recognized throughout the last century-and-a-half. On the other hand, the national tongue itself may carry important political implication: the Croatians' choice, at the end of the nineteenth century, of that dialect which united them with the Serbs both deprived "Croat nationalism of the convenient linguistic justification, and . . . provid(ed) both Serbs, and later Croats, with an excuse for expansionism."[21]

Closely related to the question of national languages are the politics of place names and capital cities, the symbolism of the flag, and the emergence of a national poetry. Place names may play an important symbolic role in relating a specific city or region or geographic feature to both a particular nation and sometimes to a historical or fictive past. For example, the campaigns throughout the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union to change place names into local languages served as an early and seemingly innocuous means of promoting *glasnost*. The Popular Fronts which were founded as grass-roots civic organizations in 1987 and 1988 combined cultural and linguistic revivalism with support for *perestroika*. They evolved into more assertive "national fronts" by the close of the decade. Cultural and linguistic concerns gave way to wider themes of political empowerment and greater economic self-determination. One of the most interesting aspects of the nationalist campaigns in the former Soviet Union and its relationship to language was the concerted effort on the part of Ukrainian nationalists and their supporters to detach "the" from "the Ukraine" in English because it was surmised that the definite article made the historic Ukrainian nation simply one more region of Russia.

Throughout the Soviet Union, cities and regions attempted to rejoin their pre-Communist histories by restoring street, city, and regional names. As might be expected, the nomenclature of post-Soviet geography has been seriously complicated by the complex ethnic admixtures in many regions. For example, the western city of Lviv has a Ukrainian, Russian (Lvov), Polish (Lwow), and German (Lemburg) name, each corresponding to a particular epoch in the city's history. The decision to restore Leningrad to its pre-Communist name, St. Petersburg (its name was briefly changed during World War I to Petrograd because St. Petersburg was too German) reflected, it appears, the desire to readopt the Westernizing legacy of Peter the Great. Wholesale name changes have occurred, e.g., Byelorussia to Belarus, Moldavia to Moldova, Kirgizia to Kyrgyzistan.

As the response of the Comte de Chambord to the *tricolor* suggests, the evocative power of the flag as a symbol of competing conceptions of the nation continues to this very day. Under President Gorbachev, the restive nationalities rallied around their respective pre-Soviet national flags as a means of manifesting their discontent with the Soviet Union and their desire for autonomy, sovereignty, and finally independence. The Baltic Republics resurrected the suppressed flags of their independent predecessors of the interwar period; the blue and yellow standards featuring the national symbol, the trident of Saint Wolodmyr, waved in Kiev and Lviv; Moldavians rallied behind the Romanian national *tricolore* (and alienated many Russians, Ukranians, and Gagauzians); and the green flags of Islam were seen in the capitals of the Muslim republics of Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The importance of flags appears to arise from their role as symbols

[21] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 55.

of both statehood and nationhood, of both political and popular identity. No state lacks a flag, and emergent or potential states always create a standard as a concrete manifestation of their intention to seek and procure independence. With the French Revolution, flags ceased to represent an aristocratic or royal line and came to stand for popular sovereignty. Ironically, several recent national movements have chosen ancient monarchical standards to represent their claims for independence (the Quebec separatists' blue and white, and even the Russian reversion to the Czarist standard), raising fears in some cases of a rise to power of nationalist-chauvinist elements.

Many new nations or modernizing regimes have made deliberate choices to eschew tradition in the choice of a particular location for a capital city in an effort to escape from other centers of power or the heavy burden of history in the process of building a new national identity. Washington, D.C. was made the capital of the United States because it was a sleepy backwater, distant from the economic and financial power of New York City, where the capital had temporarily resided. Bonn was likewise an acceptably sleepy backwater for the temporary West German republic. Brasilia was built on the Amazonian frontier, a utopian city for the New Brazil, far from the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro and the powerful governors of Sao Paolo and Minas Gerais. The Turkish nationalist reformer, Mustafa Kemal "Ataturk", established the capital of the new Turkish republic on the Anatolian plateau, far from the cosmopolitan and historical city of Istanbul, so that his westernizing program would not have to contend with the traditional and transnational representatives of the Ottoman Empire who still dominated the ancient city. Similar impulses drove the Meiji reformers to move the capital of Japan from the historical center of Japanese politics at Kyoto to the eastern fishing port of Edo (now Tokyo).

Poets and composers adopt geography in a different way to forge a common identity out of diverse materials. Rooted in the Romantic celebration of nature and of folk life, nationalist poets celebrated the landscape of, their homelands, often as part of deliberate attempt to extend andelaborate a national self-identification. Walt Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* is perhaps the most self-conscious of the genre; but composers, too, often combined traditional folk melodies in lyric celebrations of the natural beauty of their homeland (Smetana's "The Moldau") or recollections of peasant life (Antonin Dvorak's "Slavonic Dances") or evocations of a historic or myth past (Franz Liszt's "The Ride of the Huns"). In doing so, each welded together elements whose "natural" relations were questionable or in dispute. "Walter Scott thus built a single Scotland on the territory soaked in the blood of warring Highlanders and Lowlanders, kings and Covenanters, and he did so by emphasizing their ancient divisions."[22] The keepers of American history and the historical landscape of the United States similarly join Confederate and Union forces in a single celebration of national glory on the killing fields of Gettysburg or Antietam. Local words and customs and beauties; historical struggles, internal and external; fictive and real ties of blood and politics; all are woven together in often unforeseen combinations to feed national identities and supplant local loyalties and rivalries with the more encompassing *mythos*.

Religion likewise may serve as a basis for national identity where it is not, as in the United States, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, overwhelmingly representative of "the principle of civil society, the principle of division" (Marx). The trouble with the world religions is, of course, precisely their rejection of tribal identifications. As Hobsbawm points out, world religions provide the basis for national identity only where the entity in question is surrounded by countries identified with other confessions. Where that is not the case, as in most of Western Europe, religion itself loses much of its power as a source of national identity, though it may certainly provide one pole in internal struggles over the character of the national state, as we saw in the case of France.

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[22] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 90.

Nevertheless, national religious symbols do sometimes play an important role in the development or maintenance of national self-consciousness. The Virgin of Guadalupe, while undoubtedly accessible to all Catholics, is closely identified with Mexican nationalism. The persistence of a Mayan secret tradition in Guatemala, by contrast, despite the overlay of Catholicism, is enough to differentiate "Indian" from white and mestizo (*ladino*) society. The Virgin, however, is just one of hundreds, even thousands, of local venerations. What propelled *this* Virgin into Mexican national history? The development of the political symbolism of the Virgin of Guadalupe suggests some of the difficulty of achieving such a national symbolism and some of the ambivalent possibilities inherent in it. The apparition of the Virgin in 1531 to the Nahuatl-speaking Indian, Juan Diego, immediately produced a cult, encouraged by the bishops of Mexico City, which attracted converted Indians not only because of Juan Diego's origins, but because the Virgin whose image appeared miraculously on his cloak was dark-skinned.[23] According to national legend, however, what ensconced the Virgin of Guadalupe in Mexican history was the appearance of her banners at the head of the creole and Indian army led by the liberal priest Miguel Hidalgoy Costilla in the first of the Wars of Independence. Nevertheless, it took the figure of the "Indian" president, Benito Juarez, and the social upheaval of the Revolution of 1910 to insure that Mexico's "Indians" and "their" Virgin would have a place in Mexican nationalism. Even then she could be appropriated by antirevolutionary forces when elements of the church led the *Cristero* rebellion against the secular state in the 1920s.

The political apotheosis of the Virgin of Guadalupe was a contingent political act, whose peculiar valence for Mexican nationalism depended more on the figures and forces which triumphed over the centuries than on the specific content of the symbol. The dark Virgin, finally, patroness at once of the Mexican nation and of that nation's all but excluded indigenous peoples, is herself a principle of exclusion for the country's growing Protestant minority, whose nationalism is automatically subject to question, by peasant and priest alike, on the basis of their "rejection" of the Virgin.

While a common language may have a purely pragmatic and "universalizing" appeal for "nation-builders", religious symbols and allegiances and other "proto-nationalist" foci of popular identity always bear the risks of their exclusivity. As Hobsbawm observes of nineteenth century nation-builders, "the merger of state patriotism with non-state nationalism was politically risky," since the latter substituted exclusive criteria for comprehensive ones, thus fostering both the alienation of citizens who could not or would not be assimilated and the potential that they, in turn, would seek protection in a counter-nationalism of their own.[24]

One counter to such dangers is the construction of a comprehensive national myth. Rousseau felt the polity should be endowed with a common religion, and he enjoined his wise Legislator to choose one carefully. Plato, without the experience of the Protestant Reformation behind him, was nevertheless more circumspect. He was convinced that the Republic would have to be founded on a lie, and he crafted a myth to suit his creation. Stories of founding, stories of founders, foundational stories capture a nation's sense of itself and teach its lessons to politicians and people(s). The *Marseillaise* sets the sons of "France" against the tyrants and itself is enshrined in the story of valiant soldiers marching from the port city of that name to defend the Revolution in Paris. Washington's refusal to become king suggests both the precariousness of the founding and

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[23] On the early history of the cult, see Robert Ricard, *The Spiritual Conquest of Mexico* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966). Ricard notes that the Virgin who appeared to the Spaniards during their desperate flight from the Aztec capital a decade earlier, by contrast, gained no such following.

[24] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 93.

its first principles the refusal of pre-eminence and the choice for a rule of law over the rule of princes together uphold the egalitarian and constitution-bound political order of the American imagination.

Other, less political, stories may likewise define a nation. The Statue of Liberty, with its promise not only of freedom, but of opportunity as well, enters into an archetypal story of flight, arrival, and dreams consummated, if not in the first generation, then invariably in the next. Horatio Alger is part of that story, despite his Anglo-Saxon monicker, or perhaps because of it, since assimilation is the means to success in the national myth. Ellis Island, swindles and seductions, prejudice and poverty, big city machines and murderous working conditions are not. What makes "America" is opportunity; the "national" stories insist on that moral even more than on the unspoiled innocence of the continent. The quintessential American myth, like the faith of the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century generally, is not cast *in illo tempore*, in some lost Golden Age, but in an ever renewed present, pregnant with an ever hopeful future.

In many respects, an eschatological national narrative of this sort is essential for a democracy, for a political order, that is, which constantly claims the ability to make and remake itself. Revolutions, insofar as they embody a faith in progress, make equally compelling founding myths. The French Revolution, in claiming to achieve everything at once, lost much of its claim to the future. That claim could only be upheld by invoking the specter of "counter-revolutionary forces" (of which there were many) who systematically blocked the Revolution’s aspirations for *liberté*, *egalité*, *fraternité*. The Mexican Revolution claimed more: it was not just, said President José Lopez Portillo, the last of the bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth centuries but the first of the social revolutions of the twentieth. As such, it would continue (this was 1976 and Lopez Portillo was as counter-revolutionary a figure as any of his predecessors in the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution) to provide the framework within which class struggles might be worked out and social justice for all sectors of Mexican society achieved. If the "revolutionary" rhetoric of the Mexican state has more than once alarmed business interests, that rhetoric has nevertheless provided a powerful cement to hold together one of the most unequal societies on earth.

These are all, in many respects, radically democratic national myths. They invite one and all to participate in the benefits of "liberty" or "the revolution". The revolutionary myths exclude those most likely to be identified with the trampled foe; but they also provide a broad basis of popular support for a strengthened state. This, in turn, may move to satisfy just those excluded interests, so important to what are, despite the growth of state power and privilege in each case, liberal capitalist societies.

Other sorts of founding myths, those which hark back to a lost historic identity, may more readily become the basis for a ‘we’ opposed to some neighboring ‘them’. The patriots of the French Revolution declared themselves the descendants not of the Franks, but of the Gauls, neatly excising themselves from Germanic Europe and carving out an exclusive place for themselves on the continent. Italian nation-builders, from Dante onwards, have envisioned Italy as the continuator of the Roman Empire. In each version, the resulting entity took on different possibilities the basis for world government (Dante), a crucible for the re-creation of Roman virtue (Mazzini), a renewed imperialism (Mussolini). The destructive potential of such myths is evident in the recent disintegration of Yugoslavia, where the story of Serbian resistance and Croatian perfidy justified both years of Serbian dominance and fierce resistance to Croatian independence.

The dangers of the radical democratic narratives are generally other. The elisions that make these narratives work the omission of slavery and indentured servitude, the mistreatment of immigrants, the swindles and exploitation in the American story also provide fuel for the

discontented and the excluded, particularly as the promised future fades from grasp on a larger scale. As "liberty" or "the revolution" ages, a body of experience, evidence and thought grows to contest their claims and challenge their veracity. The more self-consciously the national myth is repeated, the more distrust it seems to generate. Here, for once, control of the educational system is not sufficient. Certainly, generations raised on the national narrative will continue to give it some credit, even as they challenge it. But its rote repetition, its official and ritual character, its very obviousness must sooner or later arouse suspicion. Cartoonists and satirists exploit its simpleminded affirmations and crafty avoidance of contradiction virtually from its inception. Intellectuals revise or revile it. And the excluded, those among them, that is, who are able to achieve organized dissent, turn its claims against the society which rests on them. The greater the promise, the more radical and rapid the counter-demands appear; the deeper the disappointment, the greater the questioning. Exclusion dogs identity even at the heart of democratic national consciousness.

By way of conclusion two observations seem worth stressing. First, by and large we would underline the historical accuracy of the notion, put most succinctly by Colonel Pilsudski, the liberator of Poland: "It is the state which makes the nation, not the nation the state."[25] The "democratic state" emerges at the confluence of international recognition and the acceptance by key players that they have nowhere else to go and no better recourse than the democratic game. As Emilio Ponce, Chief of El Salvador's armed forces explained to a group of election observers in March 1991, the Salvadoran armed forces supported a negotiated settlement (read: democracy), not because they could not defeat the guerrilla forces but because it would be too costly to try any longer to do so. Out of such unpromising beginnings, we would argue, are democracies usually built. In such cases, that is, in which profound differences, and at times profound suspicions as well, divide the country sources of national identity which significant sectors of society might share may be powerful resources. But in general they will only serve as such to the extent that basic agreement on democratic "rules of the game" is already in place.

Second, the elements of national identity are fraught with political consequences, and those consequences are always mixed. The effort to forge a national identity always excludes and omits. To say this is not to deny the importance of arriving at decisions about a national language, of settling questions surrounding the character of the educational system, of formulating a worthy national self-image. None of these, of course, can be accomplished quite "from scratch," but must build on existing materials, subject to all the limitations that entails. But among those limitations is the unavoidable circumstance that the very signs, images, and stories which build national identity provide as well the basis for dissent and disruption. In this sense, the problem of minorities and their rights is most decidedly not simply a "liberal" problem; it is a profoundly political problem for democracies, precisely because democracies provide unique opportunities for such voices to be heard, if not always heeded. The "nation-builder", accordingly, who builds on division, unites by dividing, in remembering chooses to forget, and in speaking chooses to pass over in silence wields a power the nation may come to regret. May the Legislator be wise, for today, whether we like it or not, some such power does rest in human hands.

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[25] Quoted in Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 44.

Chapter VI
Nationalism and the Problem of Democracy: A Response to Professor Nodia

Stephen Schneck

There is an inherent tension between democracy and nationalism leans toward the sentimental and volitional. Its inclination is to mold citizens' hearts and souls while fogging their capacity for critical reflection. It nurtures intense communal ties that inevitably foreclose or limit possibilities for difference and choice. Moreover, as it is usually understood, legitimate democracy requires these same capacities for critical reflection, difference, and free choice. Can, then, democracy and nationalism be compatible?

Professor Nodia's argument is that they can. Indeed, his implication is that some measure of nationalism serves to promote a deep civic virtue without which democracy itself could not subsist The response to Professor Nodia offered in this essay argues that nationalism and the powerful civic virtue it promotes all to easily overwhelm the capacities of the citizenry for legitimate democracy. Claims that the potent forces of nationalism can be sufficiently domesticated for democratic purposes must be viewed with suspicion Thinner and more bloodless mechanisms of civic virtue are to be preferred.

At least since Aristotle, students of democracy have recognized the irony that enduring democracies seem to require an undemocratic foundation. Democracy suggests unconstrained citizen rule, for example, but an enduring democracy must in fact constrain citizens from ruling in a manner that would endanger democracy itself. Any constraints on citizens' rule {*demoskratia*}, however, can hardly be called "democratic." Yet, would democracy subsist without those constraints on citizens (sometimes called "rights") and on their government (sometimes called "constitutions") that preserve democratic procedures themselves?

Probably not. On this point there exists little dispute among democratic theorists. There remains dispute, however, about the legitimate grounds for these sorts of constraints. The classic argument finds grounds for such constraint in a "common good" that references a substantive community of citizens. Hence, essential to the classic argument is the premise that democracy requires a vital and cohesive community in view of the common good.

Aristotle

Aristotle's *Politics* outlines one such classic conception of democracy. It begins with a fundamental division between true governments and false governments along an analytical line determined by the common good. In true governments, sovereigns govern in pursuit of this good. In false governments, sovereigns govern in pursuit of their own desires. The exterior forms of true and false governments may be the same. Monarchy, rule by one, is a true government when the single sovereign pursues the common good. If the single sovereign does not rule for the common good then such rule is, in contrast, the false government Aristotle calls "tyranny." True democracy (*politeia*) is government by the many citizens wherein each seeks to enact the common

good.[1] False democracy, according to Aristotle, occurs when the many individuals pursue self-interest rather than the common good.

For Aristotle, true democracy stands forever on the verge of devolution into false democracy. Of all forms of government, he argued, democracy is most prone to such decay. Sovereignty residing in many individual citizens, opportunities are multiplied for the virus of self-interest to infect and spread. The common good is easily lost. Furthermore, because so many sovereigns are involved, democracy when false is the most difficult form of government to bring back to pursuit of the common good. A working, true democracy, thus, requires powerful means to keep citizens' focus on the common good and to weaken the centrifugal pull of individual interests.

Accordingly, Aristotle elaborated what becomes a time-honored list of mechanisms necessary and useful for legitimate democracy; each item in the listing works (sometimes subtly, sometimes not) to canalize the sovereignty of citizens in order to preserve democracy itself. The list, of course, is familiar to almost everyone, since it is repeated in so many versions in the history of political thought. Democracy, it is claimed, needs a small but intense community. Democratic polities should be relatively homogenous in tastes, values, ideology, and wants. Indeed, one of the chief reasons behind Aristotle's dislike of democracies in general was his belief that democracies lack the stability of harmonious, differentiated parts and demand the enforcement of a pervasive sameness among citizens in order to work. So, naturally, there should exist no sharp conflicts within the community in class, ethnicity, occupation, or religion. Citizens should be encouraged to perceive the priority of the community over their individuality, and the priority of the common good over self-interest. Indeed, individuality, whether one's own or another's, should be perceived in corporate fashion as different parts of a larger whole. Frequent and active participation in the affairs of the polity, moreover, would be helpful to refresh the political bonds between citizens and between each citizen and the common good. Patriotism, ethno-centrism, and nationalism are obviously advantageous. Laws should be sanctified by tradition and a constitution such that rapid, political changes are avoided.

A powerful civic virtue is created by such mechanisms, such that democracy can be trusted to remain true. By its character, the argument goes, the government of democracy is a weak one. There being insufficient external authority in democratic government to impel citizen adherence, citizens must be disciplined within their own hearts to pursue the common good. As Aristotle put it:

The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution, if the laws are democratical, democratically. . . .[2]

Without the insinuation of civic virtue by these means learned long ago from Aristotle, democracy would surely devolve into its false version.

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[1] Some liberty is taken in calling *politeia* "true democracy". Aristotle contends that it is a mixed form of government that contains elements of oligarchy. Nonetheless, Aristotle argues that it "inclines toward democracy" (IV, 8, 36) and that what he calls *politeia* has been called democracy by most others (IV, 13, 24-5). Moreover, the element of oligarchy Aristotle prefers to mix with democracy to form the *politeia* is election of limited term legislators on the basis of merit. Aristotle's *politeia*, then would seem to fall in the genus of democracy as the term is popularly understood.

[2] *Politics*, Book V, chap. 9 (15-18).

False democracy, moreover, is the first step on a slippery path of devolution, according to the classical argument. False democracy, or rule by the many in pursuit of self-interest, becomes anarchy literally, for Aristotle, a political vacuum begging for immediate order. A vacuum of authority in a democratic culture breeds demagogues and demagogues become tyrants. Any collapse of true democracy slides quickly into tyranny. Clearly, for the classic understanding of democracy, there is a profound imperative at work within their concern for the common good in democracies.

James Madison

The problem with the classic argument for common good constraints on democracy is that the powerful civic virtue created likely undercuts democracy's ostensible legitimacy. Consider a democratically governed *polis* as imagined by Aristotle. Do the citizens' truly rule? Are citizens free to govern as they deliberately and reasonably choose?

Usually, answering such questions begs the old debate about positive freedom and negative freedom, wherein those who like Aristotle will claim that his *bios politikos* is the condition through which human happiness can be achieved. And, since happiness is the whole ball of wax, then "guiding" citizens' choice toward the common good with this powerful civic virtue only enhances and does not undercut citizens' free rule or does it?

One of the more interesting historical manifestations of the debate about the legitimacy of common good constraints on popular sovereignty occurred during the so-called "framing" of the government of the United States. Although the intellectual lines of the debate were somewhat muddy these being practical politicians it was the Anti-Federalists who tended to champion the Aristotelian understanding of democracy. Against Aristotelian common good and civic virtue were James Madison and the Federalist proponents of the 1787 constitution.

The Anti-Federalists, people like Luther Martin and Richard Henry Lee, recognized the endemic potential for republics to slide into anarchy and then into tyranny. To enable any vaguely democratic government to work, appealing to classical authors and Montesquieu, the Anti-Federalists emphasized that government must have its basis in local, small, and intense communities. Such communities alone were capable of tempering the self-interestedness of citizens in order that the vision of the common good might be sustained. More strongly committed to democratic ideas than the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists saw civic virtue as a necessary glue for democracy's operation. Civic virtue educated and tamed the passions of individual citizens rendering them fit to govern. As might be expected, unlike the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists tended to emphasize the importance of religion, of local patriotism, and of common values.

In contrast, Madison and the Federalists placed a greater premium on individual liberty and feared the smothering effect of intense communities. For this reason, where the Anti-Federalists sought to constrain democracy *internally*, by educating the hearts and souls of citizens through civic virtue, the Federalists sought to constrain democracy *externally*, by placing limits on anarchical or tyrannical extremes of citizen behavior through laws supported by the coercive power of the central government. As one well-known scholar of the period puts it . . .

It is no surprise that the framers rejected the classical case for the small state. Madison was hostile to the "spirit of locality" in general, not only in the states. Small communities afforded the individual less power, less mastery, and, hence, less liberty than do large states. Moreover, the small community lays hold of the affections of the individual and leads him to accept the very restraints on his interest and liberty that are inherent in smallness. The classics urged the small

state in part because it might encourage the individual to limit and rule his private passions. Madison rejected such states because he rejected that sort of restraint. Small communities limit opportunities and meddle with the soul.[3]

There is an Hobbesian ambiance about such thinking. The Federalists judged that the political community was incapable of overcoming selfish passions and individual interests. The pursuit of such passions and interests would derive inevitably from the free choices of human beings possessed of liberty. For the Anti-Federalists' solution to work, Madison reasoned in Federalist #10, it would require a civic virtue that overwhelmed liberty itself and that was too high a price, even for obtaining democracy. For Madison, "the first object of government" was preserving "the diversity of faculties among men."[4] The classic constraint of democracy that utilized a common good inculcated by civic virtue endangered this "first object." Overt, lawlike constraints on the democratic spirit enforced by the coercive power of government were preferable to the tacit and insidious mechanisms of civic virtue. Laws and similar formal procedures are promulgated widely, are subject to deliberation and public review, and are thus *objects* exterior to the sensibilities that are able to be accepted or resisted in the minds and hearts of citizens. Exterior constraints, furthermore, create walls of an arena within which pluralism and citizen difference are granted "free" expression. Madison wanted exactly this.

At the heart of such reasoning, is a pragmatic appreciation of pluralism and liberty. Anticipating the utilitarianism of the political economists and drawing from the same Scottish Enlightenment sources that inspired them, Madison wished to design a system of competing individual passions such that a transcendent political rationality would result. As he reasoned in a well-known phrase, "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."[5] From the interplay of many differing and conflicting individual interests and passions, checked only in the extreme by efficacious laws, results an harmonious calculus. Those same individualized passions that otherwise may endanger a republic are regulated by their own competition such that the system itself is rational and ordered.[6]

There is a kinship here, too, with the utilitarian notion of the free market of ideas. Good policy will out, thought Madison, from the interplay of free individuals each engaged in what Madison's confidant, Thomas Jefferson, called "the pursuit of happiness." The polity succeeds by promoting and protecting the diversity of interests and the liberty of individual citizens. Civic virtue is limited to rather insipid values like tolerance and civility. Those undemocratic elements that preserve the democratic spirit itself, in Madison's case, have the character of public laws buttressed by the strong arm of a vigorous, but limited, government.

Nationalism

Aristotle's consideration of the problem of democracy predates nation-states, obviously, but Aristotle was clearly aware of the value that nationalism offered his appraisal of the irony of

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[3] Wilson Carey McWilliams, "Democracy and the Citizen: Community Dignity, and the Crisis of Contemporary Politics in America", in *How Democratic is the Constitution?*, ed. Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), p. 89.

[4] Federalist #10.

[5] Federalist #51.

[6] The author has argued elsewhere that the market-like operation of this system would engender its own subtle and effective civic virtue. Michel Foucault argues, for example, that liberal democracies and the so-called free market are extremely effective instruments for disciplining and repressing individual autonomy.

democracy. In the *Politics*, Aristotle takes great pains to detail the various national characteristics of the peoples of his world. The Europeans of the Balkans [and Georgians], we are told, are hot-headed and high-spirited. Persians are portrayed as docile, submissive, and inclined toward order. Phoenicians are described as untrusting and self-interested. Egyptians are found to be phlegmatic and dispassionate. Cretans are offered as miserly. Constitutions, moreover, are expected to "fit" these national characters. Some nationalities, the Persians for example, are better adapted to monarchical rule for reasons of size as well as temperament. Others [Aristotle is vague here.] might be better suited for democracy.

Nationality itself, however, regardless of national character, is an important element in creating the civic virtue that binds citizen to *polis* in Aristotle's estimation. Nationality is exclusive and sharply distinguishes those within a national community from those without it. It is also comprehensive, touching each member of the community and imposing a blanket of sameness over each and shared by all and, thereby, paving over one level of those spaces of difference between citizens which distinguish the borders of their autonomy. Most importantly, though, nationality grips the hearts of citizens with an intensity sufficient to replace the passions of self-interest. Nation, *patria*, can be loved by citizens as if it were one's father. In such a view, the common good could be identified, not with the banality of mere common interests, but with an enduring, transcendent, and person-like life. That life, moreover, is embodied in the symbolic and tangible worlds of everyday existence: in land, language, ancestry, religion, history, custom, culture, and so forth.[7] National passions, therefore, within the Aristotelian vein, offer extraordinarily potent media for the civic virtue that is believed so necessary for viable democracy.

It might be expected, given this estimation of nationalism, that the sides between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists would be clearly drawn. Madison, who recoils from intense community, might be expected to recoil as well from nationalism. The Anti-Federalists, accordingly, given their appreciation of the civic virtue/common good solution to the problem of democracy, might be expected to embrace the glue of nationalism. Curiously, however, things are somewhat reversed. The issue is basically one of size.

Madison and the Federalists believed that a participatory government based on popular sovereignty would be prey to parochial loyalties and their corresponding narrow prejudices. A vigorous national government was needed to balance and regulate these local loyalties. Supplementing that national government, in addition, was needed an overarching national loyalty. This results in an odd nationalism. It was to be a nationalism of the head, rather than of the heart. An ardent critic of passions in politics, Madison believed that a bloodless and rational nationalism could be derived from overlapping individual interests. Speaking precisely to this thin nationalism, Madison noted in his famous Federalist #10:

The operations of the national government . . . falling less immediately under the observations of the mass of citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come home to the

[7] I am reminded of a story Emmanuel Mounier told in his journal, *Esprit*, of a village in the champagne region of France. After the fall of France during the Second World War, the villagers went to the two chateau wineries in the area and systematically destroyed bottle after bottle of champagne so as to "save" these bottled spirits of the French nation from being defiled (read "being drunk") by the Germans. That is the thing about nation, it can infiltrate and overwhelm almost every aspect of citizens' lives.

feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment.[8]

The Anti-Federalists, however, perhaps owing to their keener appreciation of civic virtue itself, doubted the Federalists' ability to create such a bloodless nationalism. The Anti-Federalists judged that citizen attachment to nation would rival that of local loyalties in passion and intensity. Herein, of course, lay the danger. Even more than Madison, the Anti-Federalists feared what has come to be called the "tyranny of the majority." In Madison's analysis, such a tyranny resulted from a confluence of individual interests. For the Anti-Federalists, however, the feared tyranny resulted more from sentiments. In creating a national sentiment, the Anti-Federalists argued, the Federalists were laying the groundwork for the emergence of a "tyranny greater than any king."[9] All the power of local loyalties would be concentrated to great effect at the level of nation. No medium of civic virtue, especially not nationalism, could be bloodless. Security for individual liberty could only be protected by the promotion of diverse local communities. No individual citizen, it was reasoned, could stand against the enormous potency of the sentiments of a national polity. Resistance was only possible in communities of a much smaller scale. Without the possibility of such resistance, the Anti-Federalists reasoned, democracy was not possible, and tyranny was inevitable.[10]

The Irony of Madison's Thought for Democracy

Clearly a mixed message results from this analysis of the value of nationalism for democracy. Madison's fear of the intensity of the glue of local ties is intriguing. As anyone familiar with the so-called politics of a small community can attest, it is seldom politics at all. Small scale and intense communities seem to engender clan-like leadership structures wherein the space (or individual liberty) needed for politics is closed. The sort of authoritarian governing that results is not only not conducive for democracy, it cannot even be called politics.[11] Realizing this and drawing upon his own considerable analysis of the failures of previous participatory governments in history, Madison was convinced that only a politics of competitive interests coupled with nationalism could maximize and secure the basic liberty that was necessary for legitimate participatory government.

In retrospect, however. the Anti-Federalists' fears conceding Madison's solution to the problem of democracy and nationalism have proven to be warranted. The arrangements of the 1787 constitution have worked in conjunction with other factors peculiar to the history of the United States to yield a potent nationalistic civic virtue that potentially confirms the Anti-

[8] Madison, Federalist #10.
[9] Patrick Henry, Speech before the Virginia Ratifying Convention.
[10]It is worth noting that it was the Anti-Federalists who demanded a Bill of Rights as an addition to the U.S. Constitution. These rights, they perceived, were a defense against the peril of powerful national sentiment.
[11] This is one of the few widely accepted "facts" of the social sciences. Weber, Durkheim, Parson -- every luminary among classic writers in the social sciences has been intrigued by this point. Recent research suggests an anthropological, if not a biological, origin of such patterns in human organization. See, for example, Frans de Waal's *Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes* for a fascinating comparison of the authoritarian structure of small human communities and similar communities among apes (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).

Federalists' fears. As early as the era of Jackson, for example. foreign visitors like Alexis de Tocqueville were writing with concern about the inordinate nationalism found here.[12] Tocqueville associates the emergence of this nationalism with the tastes of the majority of citizens enforced by the market-like operation of the "open society" and America's democratic culture. Tocqueville's oft cited "tyranny of the majority" that he discovered in Jacksonian America is really more akin to Adam Smith's "invisible hand." This realization offers an insight into an irony in Madison's thought that was overlooked by the Anti-Federalists.

That irony is that the admixture of market-like mechanisms and nationalism that Madison promoted can foment a more thoroughgoing civic virtue than anything imagined by Aristotle or the Anti-Federalists. The "market" at stake in this, of course, goes far beyond economics. In Madison s own estimation it is a market of interests, of ideas. of values, of tastes of fashions and so on. And, like all markets, the results of these forces are given normative value. Markets are "fair," the claim goes; they are "free," "natural." "harmonious," and even "ineluctable." Mixing such market-like mechanisms with nationalism weaves a singular civic virtue that binds citizens' hearts and souls in the manner of nationalism's sentimentality, while demanding citizens' rational approval by invoking the normative claims made by all markets. The final fabric of this weave is a civic virtue that is scarcely resistible.

Madison's own fears of intense civic virtue come back to bear on the results of his own thinking at this point. His argument in the Federalist Papers was that a totalizing civic virtue would undercut the possibility of the rationality in politics that was required for legitimate participatory government. It would also eliminate the range of difference and pluralism among the citizenry that he believed to be the motor of civilization and of responsible politics. The famous tenth Federalist paper is illustrative. Madison did not wish to destroy factions; he wanted a permanent system of diverse countervailing factions designed to secure space for the differences among citizens that enabled and promoted liberty. Sadly, the conjunction of nationalism with markets that he proposed to maintain such a system, has worked in a wholly opposite direction to create a monolithic and near totalizing civic virtue that imperils the very legitimacy Madison sought to preserve. All of which signals, once again the inherent tension between democracy and nationalism.

Conclusion

So, what can be concluded from the muddle of these arguments? Three points. First, Madison offers telling criticism of common good\civic virtue solutions to the problem of democracy. External, formal, public laws are preferable to the tacit controls on democracy offered by civic virtue. To be sure, some minimum civic virtue is necessary to engender support for law, but that civic virtue ought to be limited to values like tolerance, procedural due process, and pluralist equality. Second, nationalism probably cannot be made sufficiently thin and bloodless such that it might serve as the medium for inculcating the indicated values. This means, it seems, that nationalism endangers the legitimacy and durability of democracy. Hence, third, the Anti-Federalists' insistence on much smaller communities for the working of democracy makes much sense. While Madison was correct in being fearful of the potential of small communities to smother the autonomy of individuals that is necessary for democracy, the Anti-Federalists were correct to perceive that a nation-state coupled with nationalism is no less likely and is even more capable of such tyranny.

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[12] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Bk. II, chap. 13, *passim*.

Contrary to Professor Nodia's thinking, it does not seen that nationalism can be sufficiently domesticated for democracy's purposes.

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Chapter VII
Human Rights and a New Regional Order: CSCE as a Framework for Cultural Consensus

David Little

Opportunities

Ms. Catherine Lalumière, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, made the following comment at the CSCE Symposium on Cultural Heritage in Cracow last summer:

We are in a key period in the history of European unification. For the first time [in] many years Europe is taking on a new shape without war. For the first time [Europe is becoming culturally unified] now that the ideological frontiers have collapsed and pluralist democracy and human rights have been generally accepted as the central reference point, not only for political and social, but also for cultural legitimacy.

It is Ms. Lalumière's point about human rights and pluralist democracy as the new focus for European *cultural* unity that is so relevant to the attempt to explore whether there is a 'new cultural consensus' within greater Europe, though we also want to consider North America. If there is such a new transatlantic consensus, what might it be, and how might it be utilized as a basis for peace and cooperation in the future?

Given this concern, is Ms. Lalumière's proposal right, not only for greater Europe, but for European-American relations as well? Is it, in fact, correct to say that the "ethical values" of Europeans and North Americans (namely, their basic normative beliefs concerning how people should treat one another, and how power and wealth should be organized and distributed) are at present converging around a common cultural commitment to human rights and pluralist democracy?

From across the Atlantic one is inclined to answer Yes to this question, although the response is somewhat tentative and uncertain. That is partly because of some special circumstances currently affecting both advanced and potential democracies. It is also because Americans are hardly close enough or sufficiently well-acquainted with contemporary European realities to pass final judgment on such a big question. The verdict of others is indispensable, and I eagerly await your evaluation of my suggestions.

On the one hand, there are, I believe, strong reasons for supporting Ms. Lalumière's thesis. The "human rights revolution," which filled in part of the sketch for a New World Order after World War II, was particularly potent for Western Europeans and Americans. Because of their heritage and their experience in the war, Western Europeans and Americans showed singular enthusiasm for basic human rights principles: that governments are not at liberty to treat their citizens as they see fit; that they are accountable to universal standards respecting the "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family"; and that each state's compliance with those standards is the business of all states.

In the post-war period, some Western Europeans have been more faithful than Americans in living up to the radical implications of the principles of human rights. The United States exerted singular leadership in the human rights field immediately after the war, but its devotion to the cause of international human rights "virtually disappeared" during much of the Cold War, from

about 1953 until 1973.[1] In the early 70s, a temporary thaw in US-Soviet relations, together with widespread American revulsion toward governmental abuses at home and abroad, caused Congress and then the Carter administration to reactivate latent commitments, and to give human rights an explicit, if still variable, place in American foreign policy.

Even there, however, the US has tended to implement only one part of the human rights imperative. Until very recently, it has resisted surrendering its sovereign prerogatives to international authority by refusing to ratify the major UN or relevant regional human rights treaties.[2]

By contrast, the Western Europeans modified their claim to sovereignty, not only by ratifying the UN treaties, but also, and more significantly, by adopting the European Convention on Human Rights in 1953, with its provisions for supranational legal institutions. While the record is not flawless, it provides some salient guidelines for the effective international administration of human rights.

The European experiment is of great importance culturally. The Preamble to the European Convention specifies as a condition of membership being "like-minded" and sharing "a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law." Disallowed are any acts or practices, whatever cultural warrants they may have, that violate the provisions of the convention. Discriminating on grounds of sex, religion, ethnic origin, membership in a national minority, etc., or inflicting "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" is not excusable just because there happens to be religious or other support for such conduct in a given tradition. By imposing definitive standards of this sort, human rights principles mandate a significant degree of cultural consensus.

That consensus was markedly, if unexpectedly, expanded by the Helsinki Final Act, adopted in 1975 by the US, the Western Europeans, and the Soviet bloc. The act, which established the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), contained a revolutionary section on human rights. Contrary to the intentions of the Soviets, or the expectations of the US, the provisions in favor of freedom of movement, information, cultural exchange, and education became the rallying point for dissident movements, like Charter ‘77, throughout Eastern Europe, as well as inside the Soviet Union.

It could be argued that as the result of the exchange of information and of ideas and ideals, the primary benefit of the Helsinki agreement was a reconstituted sense of cultural interdependence among the states of greater Europe. In the recent words of one commentator:

As one totalitarian regime after another toppled in Europe, each of the emerging emancipated leaderships pointed specifically to the Helsinki process as a critical catalyst in the drive for democracy. When Czechoslovak President, Vaclav Havel, a man who one year earlier stood in a Prague jail because of his political beliefs, stood at the Paris Summit and endorsed CSCE as

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[1] Kathryn Sikkink, "The Origins and Continuity of Human Rights Policy in the U.S. and Western Europe", CSCE Symposium on Cultural Heritage (Cracow, 1991), p. 2.

[2] Some twelve years after President Jimmy Carter signed the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and submitted it to the Senate for approval, the Senate, in an unheralded act, finally ratified the convention in early April, 1992, together with a list of reservations, understandings and special declarations. Accordingly, the US is now subject to the jurisdiction, such as it is, of the Human Rights Committee, mandated under Articles 28ff. of the Convention. Along with a few minor human rights treaties, the US has also ratified the Genocide Convention and the Convention against Torture. The relevant regional treaty would, of course, be the Inter-American Convention.

instrumental in bringing about his country's Velvet Revolution, no one could doubt his qualifications for making such a judgment or his sincerity.[3]

At present, CSCE consists of about 50 membersWestern and Eastern Europeans (among them, the Holy See), the US and Canada, and the FSU Republics. With its emphasis on human rights as central for building cooperation among the members, it provides the very sort of framework for cultural consensus we are seeking. Although membership rests on purely political, and not legal, commitment, the organization has in fact made an important, even path-breaking, contribution to human rights thinking in the process of developing standards that are sensitive and pertinent to the difficult conditions currently confronting the members.

For our purposes, the most significant advances have come as a result of the Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow (1991) meetings of CSCE. The Copenhagen Document for the first time adds provisions for political pluralism to the human rights repertory. Never before has a human rights instrument stated so explicitly that "one of the basic purposes of government" is "the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms" (Par a. 1), nor enumerated at such length provisions for the rule of law, the separation of powers, representative government, and electoral procedures (Par as. 5, 6, and 7). The guarantees of the rights of political parties, and of individual access to public and political office without religious, ethnic, or other forms of discrimination (Par a. 7.5 and 7.6) are particularly innovative.

The other noteworthy contribution concerns the lengthy list of protections for national minorities (Par as. 30-39). Of special interest is the assertion (Par a. 30) that "questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law, with a functioning independent judiciary. This framework guarantees full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, [and] equal rights and status for all citizens. . . ."[4]

The Moscow meeting, held as it was in the immediate aftermath of the failed Soviet coup of August, 1991, produced some particularly dramatic results. Above all, it broke decisively with the earlier Helsinki principle of non-interference. There was a strong tone of cultural and political relativism in the agreements of 1975 that obviously reflected Cold War realities. Parties to the Helsinki accords agreed to disagree about one another's domestic polities and internal practices. But by late fall of 1991, all parties, including the FSU Republics, agreed to the "Moscow Mechanism," which was an elaborate, and potentially quite intrusive, supranational human rights monitoring system (Par as. 1-16). The Preamble to the Moscow Document states:

[Participating States] categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned.

These ringing words deliver a serious blow to the old doctrine of absolute state sovereignty and its related assumptions of political and cultural relativism. They presuppose stringent standards of cultural consensus.

Perplexities

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[3] Erika B. Schlager, "Does CSCE Spell 'Stability' for Europe?" *Cor, nell International Law Journal*, 24 (1991), 505.

[4] Provisions for the protection of minorities were further elaborated in the *Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities,* Geneva, July 1991.

There are numerous challenges and threats to the new CSCE framework. Indeed, I would suppose that these challenges and threats constitute the central issues with which CSCE members will have to deal in the foreseeable future. Most importantly, for our purposes, these issues call into question the putative cultural consensus on which CSCE rests.

Explosive Nationalism

Nationalism is not necessarily a threat to the cultural and political unity implicit in the CSCE process. The impulse of a "people," whether they are defined by religion, language, genealogy, geography, or whatever, to organize themselves politically may take "nonaggressive" as well as "aggressive" forms.[5]

It seems clear, though, that the distinction between a form of nationalism that is benign and pacific, both within its borders and outside, and a form of nationalism that generates hostility and resentment at home and abroad, rests precisely on the degree of compliance with prevailing human rights norms.[6] Accordingly, all forms of ethnocentrism, insofar as they inferiorize outsiders by sanctioning the distribution of civil, economic, and other privileges on grounds of gender, national origin, religion, etc. would qualify as "aggressive nationalism." As such, they would constitute a direct threat to the CSCE cultural consensus we have been describing.

The problem is, there seem to be segments of strong support within the countries that make up CSCE for one or another kind of aggressive nationalism. Some people appear to believe very strongly that religion or language or gender should restrict access to political office, public facilities, educational opportunity, religious practice, citizenship, etc. Nor is aggressive nationalism limited to segments of the populations in Eastern Europe, and the FSU. There is also a resurgence of xenophobia and anti-immigrant feeling in Western Europe.

A related problem concerns questions of cultural and political self determination. Given the social and political context in which the Moscow meeting took place, there was special poignancy in the document's reaffirmation of the right of the self-determination of peoples. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had just been seated as members of CSCE, increasing its membership to 38, and the membership rolls were about to expand again with the admission of the former Soviet Republics.

In his opening address at Moscow, US chief delegate, Max Kampelman, reflected apprehension about the process of political fragmentation. He feared that the character and spirit of CSCE itself would be altered by the proliferation of members, and he also worried that endless agitation for dividing and subdividing nations would not, in the long run, benefit anyone.

More importantly, it troubled Kampelman that aggressive nationalism seemed to be advancing in the name of self-determination. What should be done if a people "determines" *against* the

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[5] The distinction is suggested by Isaiah Berlin in an interview with Nathan Gardels published under the title, "Two Concepts of Nationalism," *The New York Review* (November 21, 1991), p. 19.

[6] Though Berlin advocates a nonaggressive form of nationalism as essential to human identity, and severely attacks the ideals of cosmopolitanism and universality as contrary to the need for specific communal identity, even he (somewhat inconsistently, I think) affirms "a new set of common values--ecological rights and human rights--that can to some degree unite all these erupting cultures without cramping their style" (Gardens' words). Says Berlin: "Unless there is a minimum of shared values that can preserve peace, no decent societies can survive" (*ibid.*, p. 22). It is not clear why the common values (including human rights) he advocates as constraints on nationalism (with a high probability of "cramping the style" of certain cultures) are not themselves "transnational," that is, cosmopolitan and universal. If so, it is not true that human identity is derived exclusively from particularistic communal experience.

cultural and institutional consensus associated with CSCE? Of course, so long as a deviant nation remains a member of CSCE, it is presumably subject to the "Moscow mechanism," and other sanctions that might be devised against it.

But aside from whether such corrective measures would work, there is a still more vexing question that is especially relevant to our concerns: Is the existence of aggressive nationalism so deep and so widespread as seriously to threaten undermining and frustrating the cultural consensus on which the CSCE framework depends? This is, I would suppose, a central issue for our deliberation in this conference.

Intolerance Based on Religion or Belief

Though I have touched in passing on the religious aspect of "explosive nationalism," allow me, in closing, to focus the matter a little more explicitly.

In my work at USIP on our Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance project, I have come to the tentative conclusion that the only effective way to implement the protection of freedom of conscience guaranteed in the CSCE documents, and elaborated in UN instruments like the Declaration against Intolerance, is that religious and other forms of basic belief be both distinguished from citizenship or civil identity, and at the same time at least partly compatible with it.

On the one hand, in a polity consistent with CSCE norms, a citizen may not, for example, be required to espouse any particular religious beliefs, or have any special religious identity, as a condition of access to political office, public facilities, or to citizenship itself. This condition protects citizens from undue religious control, but it also protects religious bodies from domination and manipulation by the civil order.

On the other hand, it seems unlikely, as a simple matter of fact, that pluralist democracy of the sort mandated in the CSCE documents can thrive without an important margin of indirect support, particularly from the preponderant religious bodies in a given country. I believe, as an illustration, that whatever difficulties still remain in the US in respect to church-state relations, the fact that there existed a vigorous "free-church" tradition within American Protestantism worked to legitimate and encourage the efforts to liberate civil identity from religious control, and thereby to open the door to fairer civil treatment for religious minorities. That kind of encouragement no doubt improved the operation of pluralist democracy in the US.

Again, the problem appears to be that substantial numbers of people throughout the CSCE countries are not committed to the prevailing human rights formula for reducing intolerance. They do not share the disposition either to distinguish civil and religious identity, or to provide encouragement for the culture of plural democracy. Just how substantial and how influential such people are I am interested to hear.

It does seem clear that without significant cooperation from the religious communities, the prospects for a cultural consensus vital and pervasive enough to support the human rights objectives of CSCE are dim.

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*Remarks delivered at a conference on "The New World Order and Emerging Ethical Values among the States of Europe and North America," at the US Embassy to the Holy See, April 22-23, 1992.

Chapter VIII
Nationalism and Human Development

Richard Graham

A philosopher once said that, in order to understand the central doctrines of an original thinker, it is necessary, in the first place, to grasp the particular vision of the universe which lies at the heart of his or her thought, rather than attend to the logic of his or her arguments.

I have tried to do this in reading Ghia Nodia's papers and it has helped that, while he has argued both sides of several issues of nationalism and democracy, he has seemed consistent in his vision of the place of man in God's s design. I too believe that considerations of democracy and nationalism are founded on concepts of human nature and on the prospects for human and social progress. I believe further that the prospects for democracy in a society I would prefer to think in terms of representative government depend for the most part on the present state of "progress" of that society and its prospects for short-term future progress. I propose that the "progress" of a society be measured, as it has in several past analyses, by the stated intent and efficacy of its government and social institutions to assure equal opportunity for education, employment and political office, without regard to race, sex, or religion.

A profile of distribution within a society of the several well-defined patterns of reasoning about justice which are found in every society, along with a profile of distribution within the society of the customs, traditions and beliefs which do much to shape individual and national self-identity, would help in assessing the prospects for future social progress. Such profiles are not hard to come by, but the cost and controversy associated with them probably make assessment of present progress a sufficient indicator of continued progress in the near future. The present state of a society is probably a sufficient predictor of future progress, for there is strong evidence that progress will continue where there is equal opportunity for education and employment in a society that broadly requires abstract reasoning for its industrial and social functioning. This assessment of the prospects for progress in the short term is, I think, backed up by evidence of human progress over thousands of millennia and by assessments or progress over the past three millennia by Isaiah Berlin, Leonard Hobhouse and others.

This seems a somewhat different "vision of the universe" and its driving force than the view seen by Fukuyama. Nodia begins his argument by citing Fukuyama who sees the desire for recognition as the "motor of history". Nodia seems to agree by saying that "social-economic preconditions make a country 'ripe' for democracy (and a strong sense of "national unity" is supposed to be one of these preconditions); then desire for individual personal recognition takes it to the end." He goes on to say, "But it is a matter not only and maybe not so much of individual dignity, but rather of national dignity."

Isaiah Berlin agrees that desire for recognition and dignity is associated with nationalism for he concludes *The Crooked Timber of Humanity* with the observation that "hunger for recognition . . . more than any other cause, seems to lead to nationalist excesses; . . . nationalism . . . expresses the inflamed desire of the insufficiently regarded to count for something among the cultures of the world."

In considering the issues of nationalism and democracy in post-communist society, I have drawn upon the work of E. J. Hobsbwam and Paul Goble for nationalities; on *The Federalist Papers*, Charles Lindblom, and J. S. Mill for democracy; on John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and

Lawrence Kohlberg for the development of individual human reason; upon Eric Erikson and Jerome Bruner for the development of self-identity; upon Strephen Jay Gould, Ernst Mayer and John Maynard Smith for evolutionary biology; upon L. T. Hobhouse, Donald Elfenbein, Jurgen Habermas and Clifford Geertz for the development of societies; and upon Oliver Sacks, Israel Rosenfeld and Gerald Edelman for the development of the human brain.

I do so in the belief that theories such as that of the progress of societies, as well as that of human development upon which the progress of societies must depend, should be tested by the criteria of Lakatos, not just from the perspective of the discipline upon which the theory is based, but from the perspectives of several other related disciplines as well.

Evidence from each of these perspectives suggests a course of human and societal progress that is not of the character of Condorcet or Comte, nor of Hegel or Marx. There is no evidence of an inevitable path of progress; rather, in the development of the individual human brain, as in the evolution of human societies, as in the evolution of species it is a matter of contingency that is nether random nor preordained. Still, there is a measure of predictability, and brain research suggests a pattern.

Gerald Edelman, in *Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection*, reports on his Nobel Prize-winning research and describes how, during gestation, the human fetus begins to develop the fundamentally alike, but extraordinarily unique, interconnections in the brain upon which the phenomena or concepts and categories depend. They are interconnections which have much to do with the latter development of reason and personality. Similarly, Jerome Bruner and others, in their research on early childhood development, describe the child's efforts that begin shortly after birth to make sense of things, to find order and predictability in the world and to establish his or her own identity separate from all others. It is, in effect, an effort to establish the rudimentary concepts, categories and structures of reasoning which act upon and are acted upon by all subsequent information and experience. What seems clear from all of this is the interconnection, from the very beginning, between the development of reason and the development of self. It is this drive to know and to understand, rather than the desire for recognition as Fukuyama would have it, that is the motor for human development and for history.

In the development of human beings, as for all life on earth, there appears to be a natural force for the preservation and progress of the individual which acts to preserve and improve the species. For *homo sapiens* this force manifests itself in a drive to know the self, to know the world and to know God or Nature's intent as a means of preserving the self or the soul. When reason and passion for preservation of one's imaginary self are in conflict, whether passion stems from sympathy or selfishness, "reason", as David Hume observed, is and must be but the "slave of passion." As strong as the force of reason may be, the force for self-preservation is stronger. It is a self or soul that is self-defined in terms of nationality or faith or social expectations or self-assigned responsibility. It is a self, the preservation of which is more important than life itself. It is a self that for many, though by no means all, is assured by the recognition of others, as Hegel, Hamilton and Fukuyama have observed. And for the preservation of this sense of self, many individuals sacrifice their lives. They do so for their sense of self in their children, their nation, or their faith.

Nodia questions whether one's sense of nation or nationality can be thought of as imaginary as Hobsbwam asserts. Yet each person's sense of nationality is a self-constructed, one-of-a-kind concept that is to some degree different from that of any other person. Indeed, for the same reason, the "self" is imaginary and, in this sense, the only thing that is real is the imagination; all else is imaginary.

Hobsbwam's observation that an individual's sense of nationality tends to differ with social class is supported by the human development research conducted by colleagues at the Center for Moral Development and Education at Harvard University, although that research focused on differences in patterns of reasoning about justice which probably are a better predictor of reasoning about nationality than is social class. One of the more proactive findings of these studies confirms the earlier conclusions of the Russian psychologist, A. S. Luria, that as a society changes from peasant to industrial the reasoning of its members becomes more abstract. It becomes more capable of dealing with the abstract concepts and categories of an industrial society and a society that is guided by abstract principles of equal rights and opportunities. Thus, a change in reasoning, Berlin believes, is manifested, among other things, in the changes in the concept of heroism since the time of Homer.

Thus the evidence of human progress that can be found over the course of the past 100,000 years can also be found in the course of the past 1000 years. And, if a pattern of growing protection of the rights of minorities and of women and greater assurance of legal justice in modern societies are indeed valid indicators, evidence of progress can be found in the history of the past 100 years. The pace has been uneven, but it appears to be quickening both in its short term advances and in its retrogressions.

Perhaps the greatest evidence of progress in the short term can be found in the declining importance of nationalism. Less and less is justice thought of as might makes right or as defined by the conventions of one's society whether that society be an ethnic group, a street gang or a nation. More and more justice is seen as defined by laws fairly arrived at and based upon principles of justice that equally protect the rights and opportunities of all persons.

Hobsbwam concludes his *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* by noting that, "The declining significance of nationalism is today concealed not only by the visible spread of ethnic/linguistic agitations, but also by the semantic illusion which derives form the fact that all states are today officially 'nations', though many of them patently have nothing in common with what the term 'nation-state' is commonly held to mean." He goes on to say that the world history of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is much less likely to be written in the manner of Eugene Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen*, than "As the history of a world which can no longer be contained within the limits of 'nations' and 'nation- states' as these used to be defined, either politically, economically, culturally, or even linguistically. It will see 'nation-states' and 'nations' or ethnic/linguistic groups primarily as retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by the new super-national restructuring of the globe."

Last fall while the fighting was going on near Zagreb, our Croation hosts made clear that their hope for the future was not in Croation independence, but rather in membership in a European community of nations that would better assure the rights of the person than would a Yugoslavian federation. David Little's paper, "Human Rights and a New Regional Order: CSOE as a Framework for Cultural Consensus" gives hope that in spite of many obstacles, the history of the early twenty-first century will be written as Hobsbwam anticipates.

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Chapter IX
Post-Soviet Societies: Chauvinism or Catharsis?

Paul Peachey

Mr. Mayor, the problem for all of us for you as for us is: what do we do with our memories? We must deal with them or they will crush us. --Elie Wiesel to the Mayor of Kiev during a Babi Yar visit.[1]

Can the formerly Soviet peoples of eastern and central Europe advance from totalitarian rule to political nationhood without lapsing into "pre-political" nationalism and *revanchism*? Events already indicate that the threat of the latter outcome is real. Much will depend on the ability of these societies to absolve the traumas of the Soviet past. Meanwhile the tasks of economic and governmental reconstruction compete for center stage. Without bread on the table and order outside the door, there can be no renewal. Yet binding up the spiritual wounds of whole peoples cannot wait. *Chauvinism* looms where *catharis* dawdles.

This paper, after some preliminary remarks, will elaborate briefly some distinctions between political and pre-political nationalism. It will then address the problem of political *ressentiment* and its absolution. Finally, in essaying the resources of healing, of *catharsis*, it will turn to the religious heritage of the European peoples of the former Soviet Union.

But first some disclaimers. I am not a "Sovietologist" nor an expert on east European affairs, but nonetheless have been involved for several decades in a variety of sustained conversations with religious and academic persons in Soviet lands, and have travelled many times to the Soviet Union and the countries under Soviet hegemony. It is my impression that geographic, historical, and geopolitical factors outweighed the ideological in the former superpower contest. Moreover, I hold no brief for either socialism or capitalism as ideologies. Alike, they are descendents of the Enlightenment and rely excessively on economic determinism; in their disagreement on the priority of the "individual" and the "collective" each abstracts and absolutizes a half-truth.[2] As historical "experiments," however, the societies juxtaposed since the "October Revolution" present an enormous challenge to the social sciences. On the human plane, modesty if not indeed silence is indicated for outsiders with regard to the sufferings of those subjected to the Soviet debacle.

Ethnos and Nation

Our human social nature appears to be primordially grounded in the solidarities of blood and soil. The propensity for secondary, rationally-constructed social configurations, vastly wider than clan and village, appears to be likewise inherent in the scheme of things. To some indefinite extent, however, these two modalities, one primary and the other secondary, appear incompatible. Wider loyalties in some measure dilute and surmount the claims of groups close at hand. That is, with the advance of civilization, local solidarities and cultures recede. But thereby deficits of affect,

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[1] Quoted by Robert McAfee Brown, *Elie Wiesel: Messenger to All Humanity.* (Rev. edition; Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1989), p. 20.

[2] I developed this point more fully in "Person and Society: the Soviet-American Encounter." *Soundings*, 67 (1984), 140-153.

affiliation and support arise in the population; for these the larger social configurations cannot fully compensate. Some degree of anomie, of social disaffection and alienation, seems inevitable in modern societies.

In the modern world, as we know, the "nation-state" has become the terminal community; that is, it encompasses all lesser groups within its scope while resisting supra-national incorporation. In recent centuries, nationalism has been the standard mobilizing concept worldwide in the creation of larger configurations, transcending the manifold associations, districts, provinces and the like, which it presupposes. Hans Kohn, whom I follow here, regards nationalism as the first motivating force "which acts to organize all peoples (who once lived in dynastic or religious states, tribal agglomerations, or supranational empires) into nation-states," nationalism providing "the foremost and predominantly emotional incentive for the integration of various traditions, religions, and classes into a single entity, to which man can give his supreme loyalty."[3]

Nationalism as "emotional incentive," however, has been both source and symptom of ambiguity and paradox. Anticipating Nodia's distinction between "modern" and "primordial" notions of nation, Kohn distinguishes "political" or "territorial state" nationalism from "romantic" or "ethnic linguistic" nationalism. Political nationalism rests on citizenship, democracy, and popular sovereignty. Individual citizens rather than solidary groups (families, clans, etc.) are the building blocks in such nationalism. As Kohn observes, this corresponds in some measure to the Toennies notion of *Gesellschaft* associations of autonomous individuals. Action in such associations, Max Weber held, consist of "a rationally motivated adjustment of interests."[4] According to Kohn, political nationalism of this sort appeared in Britain, France, and Scandinavia.

Romantic nationalism, on the other hand, as Kohn continues, is rather more *Gemeinschaft*-like. It rests on "prepolitical, prerational foundationsmother tongue, ancient folk traditions, common descent, or the 'national spirit.'" Here the political criteria noted above are subordinate to "the ties of inheritance and tradition." "People speaking the same tongue or claiming a common ancestry," it is thus proposed, "should form one political state." Or, again to speak with Max Weber, *communal (Gemeinschaft)* action of this sort is based on "a subjective feeling of the parties . . . that they belong together." Romantic nationalism, according to Kohn, appeared in Germany, in Italy and among the Slavic people of eastern and southern Europe. The writings of the German romantic, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), are cited as a literary source (his discovery of *Volk*) of such nationalism.

On the surface all this is familiar enough. Yet, as recent events around the world demonstrate, history has yet to disclose its solution to the basic enigma: How is the balance between the dynamics of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* to be struck as societies modernize? Though the form of the problem is always situation-specific, it appears at all stages of modernization, from the earliest to the most advanced. Admittedly, ideal typical polar typologies of the *Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft* sort have long since revealed their empirical inadequacy. In any case, these are not contrasting historical forms, with a life of their own, that groups or societies may assume. As analytical distinctions they refer rather to contrasting modes of social interaction that commingle in endless combinations, rather as variegated threads woven into fabrics.

Gemeinschaft modes are the identifiers, the markers, that are given, inherited, "unwilled," ancestry, family, name, gender, language, race. *Gesellschaft* modes are "willed,"[5] achieved,

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[3] Hans Kohn, "Nationalism." *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, Vol. III:324-339.

[4] Max Weber, *The Theory of Economic and Social Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 136.

[5] Norbert Elias, "Toward a Theory of Community", in *The Sociology of Community*, ed. by Colin Bell & Howard Newby (London: Cass, 1974).

deliberately chosenoccupation, friends, partners, activities. Though analytically distinct, each mode is present in the other. When I "will" an act, my "unwilled" traits clothe my action. One or the other energy may dominate in a given instance, appropriately or inappropriately. Nonetheless, as modernization advances, the center of gravity in the social process tends to shift increasingly toward the "willed" pole of the continuum. In political nationalism, *Gesellschaft* tempers *Gemeinschaft*; in romantic nationalism, the preponderance flows in the opposite direction.

National boundaries, for the most part, result from the accidents of geography and of history. Contemporary nation-states typically include populations of diverse ethnic descent. In some instances, ethnic groups are mutually at odds within common national boundaries. In other instances, individual ethnic groups do battle with the societies and/or states that seek to absorb them. Around the world, the question arises repeatedly: when is an ethnic group entitled to such autonomy? And who shall decide?

Finally, though analytically, nations may be ranked on a continuum from romantic to political nationalism, their position may well shift from one to the other with events or crises. Kohn's distinction between the two types of nationalism must not be reified. The response of the American public to the 1991 Gulf War, for example, is a sobering reminder of the psychological vulnerability of the modern nation state. Questions regarding the validity of US action and achievement aside, it would appear that the public response, notably the victory celebrations, vastly exceeded the geopolitical significance of what transpired. Instead free-floating anxieties and frustrations were vented and manipulated, as, for example, in the slogan, "kicking the Viet Nam syndrome."

The Politics of *Ressentiment*

In sublating the lesser loyalties of clan, village, and region, nation-states appropriate, and hence become responsible for, aspects of the identities of their individual citizens. In so doing, however, as already indicated, they acquire psychological burdens that they cannot fully discharge. Moreover, in partial response, and by means of a curious alchemy, national "egos" emerge in the process. Through their governments, nation-states appear as actors in the international arena, wearing their respective egos, as it were, on their sleeve. Officials acting on behalf of states are compelled accordingly to speak and act in ways that in interpersonal relations would appear both irrational and immoral.

As the humiliation of the United States and the Soviet Union in Viet Nam and Afghanistan, respectively, demonstrated, the wounding of national "egos" may have important domestic and foreign consequences. Identifying the parallels can importantly aid mutual understandings among the several societies. The suffering of the peoples of the former Union under Soviet rule, of course, was incomparably more traumatic than the US humiliation in Viet Nam. The litany of gulags, of espionage, of betrayals, in the Soviet instance is familiar, and needs no elaboration here.

Resentments against Marxist-Leninist rule have long smoldered in the Soviet lands. Grievances are complex, profound, and varied and have hastened the breakup of the old Union. To refer to those grievances, I shall use the original, more robust, French term, *ressentiment*, originally proposed as a technical term in another context by Friedrich Nietzsche, and later refined by Max Scheler. The latter used the term early in the present century to refer to deeply repressed "emotions and affects . . . (of) revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to distract, and spite."[6]

Both the concept and the condition to which it refers deserve greater specification than is possible here. In any case, *ressentiment* consists of deep-seated and persistent rancor and thirst for

[6] Max Scheler, *Ressentiment* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 46.

revenge. The Soviet regime originally seized control of, and extended, the multi-national, czarist empire. The non-Russian peoples in the Union were thus doubly-yoked by both an ideologically alien and an imperial rule.

In his paper (chapter I above), Ghia Nodia notes one specific dimension of the resulting trauma, namely the loss incurred in seventy-year interruption in the historical development of peoples of the former Union. But beyond the seventy-year loss, "Communist rule does not provide anything useful to be kept in the period of transition to modernity and leaves after itself a kind of social desert. There is nothing real on which an attempt to build a modern ('democratic,' 'free market,' etc.,) society may be based." This contrasts, in his view, with modernization elsewhere that "occurred on the basis of elements which emerged in traditional societies." Instead, formerly Soviet societies "can only be founded on ideas: recollection of national past and imitating pre-given models" (presumably, other already-modern societies).

Questions may be raised regarding so sweeping a verdict, though Nodia presumably refers specifically to the salient features of the communist system, rather than to the whole life of the era. In any case, the democratic energies now exploding in the former Soviet sphere had been growing for decades beneath the Soviet burden. Mikhail Gorbachev did not simply fall unannounced from the sky, a fact that he recognized from the outset. In that sense, modernization in the Soviet sphere, as modernization in the West earlier, "occurred on the basis of elements that emerged" in the existing society.

In the end, though acknowledgement of positive achievements during the Soviet era is part of the healing process, unspeakable trauma remains, and in some respects recurs. Nico Chavchavadze, head of the Institute of Philosophy in the Georgian Academy of Sciences, on his first visit to the United States in 1989, stated publicly that a moral renewal must precede any political rebirth in what then was still the Soviet Union. Subsequent Georgian turmoil appears to confirm his assessment. Nor is it merely or primarily a Georgian problem. Reports out of Czechoslovakia, for example, indicate new and persisting forms of distrust, recrimination, and revenge, despite the nobility of spirit articulated by Vaclav Havel, the dissident turned president.[7]

Catharis or Chauvinism?

Can the monstrous wounds of the Soviet era, indeed of this century generallythe wars, the *gulags*, the genocide, the recriminations, the *ressentiment*, be absolved? In this regard, the Jewish holocaust has often been treated, as it were, prototypically. Elie Wiesel, himself a survivor, has emphasized, that the victims of that obscenity are in some sense doomed to silence. When we speak, Wiesel observes, we describe by means of comparison. An event, hitherto unknown, is explained in terms of another of which we have some knowledge. But the Holocaust is *sui generis*, beyond anything comparable. Wiesel writes: "By its uniqueness the Holocaust defies literature.[8]

If obscenities, such as the Jewish holocaust or the traumas of the Soviet era, defy our communicable grasp, absolution of the resulting *ressentiment* may be similarly handicapped. Without presuming to resolve the conceptual problem, I here employ two "shorthand" terms: chauvinism, for the venting of *ressentiment* in pre-political ethnic nationalism; *catharis* for absolution and healing.

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[7] Jeri Laber, "Witch Hunt in Prague", *New York Review of Books*, April 23, 1992, 4-8. This gloomy account was challenged, however, by representatives of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group in a letter to the editors, *ibid.*, May 28, 1992.

[8] Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

Chauvinism derives from the name of Nicolas Chauvin, a French soldier during the Napoleonic wars, a superpatriot who came to typify the cult of military glory among Napoleon's veterans. In dictionary terms, chauvinism refers to "invidious attachment for a group or place to which one belongs or has belonged" (*Webster's Third New International Dictionary*), in effect, to any kind of ultra-nationalism. Thus defined, chauvinism appears as part of the primordial energy underlying romantic nationalism (Kohn). Usage of the term, however, has been more popular than academic or scientific.

Catharsis, originally an Aristotelian term referring to the purging of emotions in the experience of tragic theatre, denotes "any act of purgation that brings about a spiritual renewal or a satisfying release from tension." Normally a wide range of activities, beginning with the daily, weekly, monthly, and annual rhythms of living, and including an endless variety of recreative experiences, provide relief from ordinary tensions. But the wounds here before us are far deeper, usually beyond the reach of regular rhythms of life.

The "God Question"

Catharsis, healing, is clearly a multi-dimensional process. Three distinctions appear useful: (a) the spontaneous energies in life, just noted; (b) deliberate measures in the various institutional spheres, above all, political; and (c) therapies engaging the deeper layers of the psyche. While "religion" may be involved in all three dimensions, the "God question" arises primarily on the third level. Richard Rubenstein's dictum, that *After Auschwitz* the denial of God became morally mandatory, has been widely noted. Rather more profoundly, Elie Wiesel comments "How strange that the philosophy denying God came not from the (death camp) survivors. Those who came out with so-called God-is-dead theology, not one of them had been in Auschwitz." It is not God, but Wiesel's 'faith' that is consumed by the flames, Brown comments. What has been "murdered," Wiesel continues, is "my God and my soul," the God conceived by the pious Hasidic child of fourteen years. Brown continues: do not assume, Wiesel reminds us in every book, that it is consolation to believe that God is still alive. Rather than providing a solution, that awareness simply states the problem. Ever since the first night at Auschwitz, Wiesel has struggled with two irreconcilable realities the reality of God and the reality of Auschwitz.[9]

Among the European peoples of the former Soviet Union, for historical reasons, the religious question arises primarily in Christian terms. Those peoples were formed as nations under Christian cultural hegemony. That fact is of highly ambiguous import at this historical juncture. Renewed engagement with their pre-Soviet legacies, includes a re-encounter with Christian affirmations. Accordingly, signs of spiritual renewal are already evident.

On the other hand, the tradition of the centuries weighed heavily, sometimes imprisoning the churches in the culture they had helped to create. Soviet oppression reinforced the tendency in many quarters to identify church and nation. Meanwhile the integrity of church life was often jeopardized by the manipulation of the Soviet or Soviet-style regimes. Thus, it remains to be seen to what extent the Christian communities can transcend, rather than reinforce, the chauvinist tinder awaiting ignition in many quarters.

The Armenian Example

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[9] Vigen Guroian, "Armenian Genocide and Christian Existence", *Cross Currents*, 41 (1991), 322-342.

An emerging discussion among Armenian Christians may well serve as an illustration and a case study. Christianity was adopted in Armenia by royal decree early in the fourth century, and may well be the oldest "national" Christian church. Meanwhile many Armenians have been dispersed (cf. the Jewish diaspora) in the United States and elsewhere. An important chapter in that dispersion was the Turkish genocide of the Armenians ("Armenocide") in 1915. This was followed shortly by the imposition of Soviet rule. Inevitably, parallels to the Jewish holocaust have been noted.

Vigen Guroian, a dean at St. Nersess Armenian Seminary in New York, has begun to address the burden of the ressentiments left by these catastrophes. He cites an oral history done among the survivors of the 1915 Turkish atrocities, which "documented patterns of denial, rationalization, resignation, reconciliation, rage and revenge in the lives of survivors and their children." During the last twenty-five years, Guroian observes, literature on the Armenocide has grown dramatically. "Conspicuously absent, however, from this flush of artistic and scholarly work has been theological reflection on the event and its consequences for religious belief . . . ; the crisis of faith and morality which became the legacy of the Armenocide (has) not been addressed forthrightly" by either the church or its theologians. . . . (M)ost Armenian church leaders," he maintains, "have refused to recognize that the Armenocide brought Armenian Christendom to an end."[10]

Instead of engaging the Armenian legacy of suffering theo-logically, church leaders have invoked the nation-building role of the Armenian church. "The spiritual and psychological wounds (of the genocide of 1915) are still open and bleeding, festering with self-pity and vengefulness."[11] Having "served Armenian nationalism in the past," Guroian writes, "the church lacks the theological tools needed to distinguish faith from patriotism and to develop an ethic grounded in its christology."[12] Guroian quotes a recent (1989) statement by the Catholicos, Vazken I, before a gathering of leaders in Holy Etchmiadzin: "The national identity of the Armenian, the national ethos . . . (and) the national ideology of the Armenian people have been forged here. . . . The Armenian Church for the past seventeen centuries has been the author and leader (of Armenian nationhood." In effect, *ressentiment* is thus reinforced rather than absolved.

To all this Guroian replies:

The Armenian church should be articulating a new model of a national church, one which confesses Christ in an Armenia 'come of age.' It must come to terms with what it means to be its own 'diaspora' among the people to whom it once gave an identity as a Christian kingdom and nation. A church in the habit of sacralizing the existing social order and naming it Christian must learn how to critique the secular orders in which it finds itself and provide vital communities of faith and reconciliation from which persons in public life can take the inspiration, conviction and courage to temper Armenian nationalism and set moral limits to the use of power.[13]

All this, of course implies a greater distance, as it were, between "church" and society/nation than formerly national churches assumed. It takes seriously the freedom, decision and commitment that are innately Christian. It must be noted as well that to call for forgiving, reconciling and healing is not to trivialize the issues of justice. Precisely because crimes were committed, that must be dealt with, a post-occupation, post-totalitarian, or post-war era is always excruciating. Yet

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[10] Guroian, *op. cit.*, see above, p. 12.
[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 337.
[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 328.
[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 328.

Shakespeare said it well (*The Merchant of Venice*): "And earthly power doth then show likest God's When mercy seasons justice." Renewal, not vengeance, is the challenge.

Conclusion

Guroian further expands on the great symbols of biblical faith, and more particularly as on the Armenian theological legacy. The necessary elaboration cannot be undertaken here. Instead I underscore the paradigmatic significance Vigen Guroian's summons to the churches in Armenia for the European nations comprising the former Soviet Union. These nations were all built by the royal enlistment of Christianity. In all of these formerly national churches, the temptation of what we might call *ecclesial irredentism* seems almost irresistible. Insofar as churches succumb, they in fact apostatize, and abet the relapse of these nations into pre-political nationalism and *revanchism.*

Meanwhile, of course, times have changed. Ruling national churches as a means of social control are no longer an historical option. And while that fact alone already precludes a return to state-sponsored "Christianity," only by intrinsic rejuvenation can the faith communities recover their identity and mission. The Gospel must be engaged in its ultimacy, rather than as means to other ends. This will include a theological reassessment of the nation-building history of Christianity in Europe. Otherwise, in the words of Wiesel, our memories will crush us.

Rolling Ridge Study Retreat Community

Chapter X

Max Scheler's Personalism and Bourgeois Liberalism: A Critique of Liberalism as Ideology

Stephen Schneck

The legitimacy question facing contemporary political theory is quite different than the question of political legitimacy in past times.[1] All previous eras were faced with the puzzle of fashioning a polity which was attuned to the character, or the essence, or the end, or the nature of man. The unknown element to be discovered, the missing answer, was the formula for the good, correct and workable polity. To make the chains of political life legitimate, the polity needed only to reflect the soul of the philosopher, or draw together the wills of its citizens, or unite the worker with his artifice.

Today, posing the legitimacy question solely or primarily in terms of the legitimate polity is insufficient. Although the resolution of this question has never been more imperative, it has become obvious in our times that the quandary of the polity rests on a deeper quandary. Who is the person that is the philosopher, the citizen and the worker? What is he? How is he? Where is his place? It might be objected that such questions have been asked of ourselves since antiquity, that such questioning is inherent to human character. Yet the questions have never been asked with the urgency that marks them in our era. The crucial question of today is the question of being human. The dilemma of the legitimate polity, bound up with this crucial question, cannot be answered in abstraction from the deeper query. Rather, every inquiry into the polity must begin with and continually return to the endeavor to clarify our understanding of man.

In agreement with the foregoing, Max Scheler, philosopher, sociologist and cultural and political critic, considered the problematic of the liberal politics in our century. His thought is a rich, but little tilled ground for the social scientist whose concerns turn upon questions of the human situation. Indeed, the question of man his character, existence and destiny is the very nucleus about which the whole of Scheler's thinking revolves. Of interest to the social theorist, he rejects outright the individual ego as an acceptable starting point for understanding man, and from the first presents the web of acts which is the person as always and essentially an expression of the intersubjectivity which is the community. It is a sad irony, therefore, that it is only recently more than fifty years since his death in Weimar Germany that social and political theorists have begun to consider Max Scheler's works seriously in their own endeavors to comprehend the social and political world. In this vein, the present essay aims at reviewing Scheler's assessment of bourgeois liberalism (the dominant political paradigm of our day) in light of his broader treatment of the more basic question of being legitimately human. On this basis bourgeois liberalism is ultimately revealed to be: 1) untenable as a theory for understanding politics, and 2) normatively unacceptable as a guide for political action.

Scheler's treatment of liberalism is an ongoing, peripheral theme throughout the corpus of his works. It is linked tightly with the core theme of his philosophy, i.e., the deeper quandary of contemporary man. While liberalism itself is seldom directly addressed, it nonetheless remains consistently in the background of his thought and writings. Scheler sees liberalism (with

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[1] *The author and the editor wish to thank SUNY Press for permission to excerpt elements of this Chapter from Professor Schneck's book, *Person and Polis* (Albany: SUNY, 1987).

capitalism, positivism, scientism, and a host of other "isms") as an epiphenomenon of the emergence of a new type of man during the late Middle Ages, a type he terms the *bourgeois*. This new man, he argues, is the product of a self-inflicted evolution.[2] Christianity is stripped of both its sense of communal solidarity and its teleological linkage and hierarchical structure of world > man > God. Bourgeois man is thus left with irresolvable breaches between himself and others, and between himself and the world. Recognizing this alienation and fueled by the passion of *ressentiment*, man's attitude becomes one of domination toward both the world and others. He seeks frantically by way of force in this regard to reestablish a semblance, however artificial, of the earlier world-man-God linkage.[3] The frantic scurrying leads to a boundless acquisitiveness and, with the loss of hierarchy, to a blind and indiscriminate greed for quantities of objects.

Concomitant with this self-inflicted evolution is the emergence of a conceptual, normative framework by which the world view of the bourgeois is rationalized and all questions of self, world and others are resolvable. It is within this framework that Scheler unearths some of the key structural conditions of liberalism. Four of these conditions are of special value for present concerns: 1) formalism, 2) individualism, 3) needs/utility motivation and 4) rationalism.

Formalism

Theoretically, liberalism posits the conception of civil society as a network of contracts, covenants, rules and procedures. Its conception of government is one of laws, not of women and men. That the liberal paradigm of politics in large measure depends upon formal structures is apparent. Early liberal thinkers erected their politics on the idea of the social contract, wherein members of society are bound together in association on the basis of formal *quid pro quo* agreements among themselves. In the theories of later liberal thinkers, where the operation of the polity is in some sense more concrete owing to the consideration of actual utility or pleasure, the process remains in large part formal when the motor of political action is reduced to a formal, mathematical aggregate of individual human desires. Clearly writers arguing for a categorical imperative, to the extent it can be interpreted as a maxim for the political order, can also only be seen as furthering the notion of formalism.[4]

Practically, liberalism counsels political actions according to a table or formula of methodological principles. Political actions are legitimate, regardless of outcome, if the proper method has been followed. Political practice is considered "good" if it is in accord with such formal principles a point applicable for society as a whole and for individual political actions within the liberal schema. There is no acknowledgement of the legitimacy of social goods or values apart from adherence to formal procedures. Hence, political practice can never be more than *ad*

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[2] A common theme, see "Zur Idee des Menschen" in Scheler's *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 3: *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, ed. Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1955). See also "Man in the Age of Adjustment" in *Philosophical Perspectives*, trans. Oscar Haac (Boston: Beacon, 1958). Note accordingly that the idea of self-inflicted evolution pictures man as possessing at least a moment of freedom in history. Even, however, in the radical sense of self-inflicted evolution, freedom is constrained and conditioned by history for Scheler; cf. "Man and History" in *ibid*.

[3] As will become clear subsequently, Scheler is not here urging a romantic return to the medieval world view or community structure. The concepts of self, other and community were equally incomplete in that period, if only in different ways.

[4] This point will be considered in greater depth subsequently.

hoc actions and the polity itself is in the last analysis no more than an *ad hoc*, formal tool devised by its citizens as a means toward their separate ends.

Max Scheler's most thorough investigation of "formalism" appears in his masterwork on ethics, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values.*[5] Taking Kant's formalism, "a colossus of steel and bronze," as his starting point, Scheler demonstrates the possibility and necessity of a flesh-and-blood, substantively human approach to questions of normative significance. Despite the impressiveness of Kant's colossus, and while acknowledging much of its conclusion, Scheler finds the colossus to be inadequate precisely because formalism offers no "down-to-earth" value for real men faced with real normative dilemmas.[6] This inadequacy of Kant's and all formal approaches to normative issues lies in the chasm which is drawn between formal procedures and material facts. Scheler remarks that the character of such procedures (general, abstract, inflexible) is itself illustrative of its inapplicability to the uniqueness of each person and each human situation. More particularly, by way of convincing phenomenological presentation, Scheler reveals that special material "facts" are directly perceived in every normative experience. These facts are values which are immediately given and which offer concrete guidance for action. The proper course of action is that on which lies the "higher" value. When possible, for example, and all else being considered equal, one ought to pursue the relatively higher value of social welfare over the lower value of individual utility.[7] Hence, Scheler contrasts the formalism of liberalism with his nonformal, direct perception of values. In place of liberalism's process of politics in terms of artificial constructions, it would seem that Scheler holds out the possibility of a politics based on actual, though normative, "facts."[8]

Liberalism is formal, however, in more than merely the manner in which it structures civil society. Beyond the concerns which Scheler voices over the formal methods and procedures of liberal political theories lies a more disquieting implication. In Scheler's estimation, liberalism inevitably reduces actual, human persons to less-than-human abstractions of themselves. The formal character of liberalism requires that unique personal needs and talents be ignored in order that individual women and men might be more efficiently handled by the political process. In a democratic liberalism, people would be treated as radically equal units of political demands and inputs, as identical faceless digits in the counting of numbers which constitutes policy-making, or as interchangeable cogs in the vast machine of civil society. Even a formalism which claims that persons must always be treated as ends and never as means, is in the final regard a depersonalizing construction. Scheler agrees with Immanuel Kant that the person "must *never* be considered a *thing* or a *substance*," and asserts along similar lines that the person must be the "immediately

[5] Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, trans. Manfred Frings and Roger Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974). See especially his section "Formalism and Apriorism," pp. 45-110, and his section "Formalism and Person," pp. 370-595.

[6] *Ibid*., pp. 5-6. N.B. Scheler agrees with Kant that "goods" are relative to the experiences of men. Scheler claims, however, that Kant errs by assuming that goods and values are identical. Values and their order, for Scheler, are the objective and universal basis for ethics because they, unlike goods, are not relative to men's experiences.

[7] This is not the place for a review of Scheler's ethics. Suffice it to say that Scheler finds values such as usefulness, nobility, holiness and so forth, to be directly perceived by men. In recognizing a value, we also are immediately aware of the relative rank of that value vis-a-vis all possible values. Using "a priori" in an odd manner, it can be said that we recognize man in an*a priori* manner, a rank-order of all possible values. Scheler's ethics, thus, demands simply that when possible one ought to choose the higher relative value. The noble must be chosen over the useful, the holy over the noble, and so on.

[8] The quotations in this passage are taken from Scheler's *Formalism, op. cit*., pp. 371-72.

co-experienced unity of experiencing." Nonetheless, he contends that efforts by Kant to overcome the objectification of the other by dutifully considering all others as identical to oneself in regard to possessing the same structures of reason ironically leads to a conception of the other as less than the full person he or she is. Kant's formalism, like all formalisms, ineluctably can conceive of women and men only as "the X of certain powers" or "the X of some kind of rational activity." The depersonalization occurs, therefore, because the X, "that 'something' which is the subject of rational activity, must be attributed to concrete persons indeed, to all men in the same way and as something *identical* in all men."[9] Regardless of its intentions, it seems that formalism unavoidably reduces the human being to a ghostly caricature of his or her full personhood and distorts the possibility of politics by relegating normative decisions to cold-blooded procedures removed from the reality of the world and, especially, from the reality of values.

Individualism

As with formalism, individualism is not so much a causal factor in the development of liberalism as it is an aspect of the conceptual and normative framework of bourgeois man. In that liberalism emerges as the predominant paradigm of politics within this framework, liberalism is by and large erected on the idea of individuals being the elementary particles of society and government. Thus, liberal political theories divide the political community into standardized chunks of rights, liberties, duties and so forth chunks that are individual men and women. Because liberalism looks at the polity in this fashion, because it seeks to explain politics and guide political practice in accordance with this model, there can be little doubt that liberalism is "individualist."

Scheler himself illustrates the modern notion of individualism and its relationship with liberalism by contrasting the ideal of the liberal society with the dominant ideal of society existing prior to the emergence of the bourgeois type of man. The previous conception was one of a natural community wherein members partake of social rights and responsibilities proper for each member's determined place in the social order. Much different from this, Scheler's portrayal of the liberal society finds rights and responsibilities relative not to one's proper place in the political order, but to a real or heuristic understanding of one's rights and responsibilities without the political order indeed, outside all association with others. In this picture, responsibility for others can only be a secondary consideration that follows and is built on a primary concern for unilateral self-responsibility. In the same way, rights are no longer to be understood as "social rights" (the only manner of understanding them prior to bourgeois man). Rather, rights in the liberal paradigm are understood as wholly lodged in the individual. As a result, the polity is "not a special reality outside or above the individual." It is, in fact, "only the similarity or dissimilarity of *individuals*' interests . . . [a] fabric of *relations* that represent 'conventions,' 'usage,' or 'contracts,' depending on whether they are more explicit or more tacit."[10]

Scheler's response to the concept of individualism is not romantically to hearken back to the so-called natural polity or to an organic community. Individualism in many ways must be seen as an improvement to the stultifying, static hierarchies of the previous medieval conception. Neither, however, does Scheler champion the notion of individualism as it is presented within the framework of bourgeois man. While he acknowledges that both the earlier conception of the polity *and* bourgeois individualism offer valuable insights into the context of our social life,

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[9] Scheler, however, goes beyond Toennies to chart a four-tiered typology of sociality, including: the herd, the life-community, society and person community. See *ibid*., pp. 526-35.

[10] *Ibid*., p. 529.

Scheler believes both conceptions ultimately fail to encompass the full range of human sociality and individuality. Both too narrowly delimit the possible relationships between person, other and the community. In addition, Scheler contends that neither the individual nor the community can be entirely understood by isolating one from the other. For Scheler, both are merely separate and incomplete manifestations of man's anthropologically based sociality.[11] Both, moreover, are subject to the destiny of man.[12]

The gist of Scheler's position is best revealed by turning to his typology of human sociality. He begins in this regard by focusing first on the ontogenetic development of sociality in men. In his work, *The Nature of Sympathy*, Scheler combines empirical studies of child development and linguistics with his most rigorous phenomenology to demonstrate that the earliest experiences do not include an awareness of self.[13] A person's first world, so to speak, is undifferentiated between ego and alter ego, or between self and social whole. Instead, it is "an immediate flow of experiences, *undifferentiated as between mine and thine*, which actually contains both our own and others' experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another."[14] It is only subsequently curiously, by means of objectifying his environment that one is able to detach his individual personality from the social milieu about him.

In what is plainly a parallel analogy, Scheler proposes a typology of sociality in a similar *phylogenetic* sequence of stages. Going beyond Ferdinand Toennies dichotomous division of sociality into *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, Scheler's is a four-tiered typology. As presented in his *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, the bottommost level of sociality is the "herd," at which level the individual is totally submerged in a beastlike social organism.[15] Above this, at the next level, is the "life community," where the barest shadow of the individual can be discerned. What small measure of individuality is afforded in the life community, however, would be an individuality determined as necessary by the community. Scheler describes such individuality as an appendage of the community, much as one's hand has an individual character but is meaningless without the whole body.[16] At the next level of the typology, the "society," which Scheler likens to the individualism of democratic liberalism, more completely differentiated individuals appear. Individuals at this level succeed in transcending the understanding of themselves as only objects or means for the various ends of the community. However, in so doing, the community ceases to exist in its own right and becomes merely a means to the many ends of the individuals. These individuals, similarly, by asserting the primacy of the self, isolate themselves from their fellows who at best become objectified means for the ego's ends. In denying the community to assert the self, Scheler contends that the individuals of the society surrender a fundamental aspect of true individualism, i.e., the personal dignity and respect for the self which

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[11] See, among several sources, Scheler's remarks concerning Aristotle's "political animal" in *ibid.*, p. 524.

[12] Cf. Scheler's *Gedanken zu Moral und Politik*, edited by Manfred Frings (Bern: Francke, 1973), pp. 5-6; his *Formalism, op. cit.*, p. 525; and his essay "Man in the Era of Adjustment" in *Philosophical Perspectives, op. cit.*, *passim*.

[13] Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. Peter Heath (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String, reprint, 1970), pp. 244-52.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

[15] See his *Formalism, op. cit.*, p. 526, and his *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge*, trans. Manfred Frings (London: Routledge, 1980), p. 48.

[16] *Formalism, op. cit.*, pp. 526-8.

is only freely given in the eyes of one's fellows. By viewing others as objects, the society individual is himself objectified in the perspective of each of his fellows.[17]

"Person community," the highest level of sociality, envisions a transcendence not only of the self as an object of the community, but of the community and others as objects of the self. In this instance, the community which disappeared as a separate existence at the level of the society, is reformed and transformed. While accepting the personhood and inherent dignity of others, in one sense, eliminates the subject/object relationship between the self and others, in another sense personal individuality is most deeply affirmed in the acceptance of one's own personhood as it is reflected in the eyes of others and in the embrace of the community. In familiar terminology, Scheler here is presenting an intersubjectivity involving the self, other selves, and the communal self. It is inherently political in that each self freely partakes in constituting the communal self and freely accepts being constituted by the communal self. The person community is a circle of free and individual persons in community engaged in ongoing mutual acceptance and respect for the unique personhood of each other as individual and part of the social whole.[18]

The parallel characters of the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of sociality are reaffirmed in a further, very important respect: a fully developed person is one aware of his ever present roots in the enveloping community. Despite these same roots, the relationship between person and community is not one of simple dependence. Acknowledging that the community delimits the boundaries of the person, Scheler yet wishes to retain avenues for the expression of some measure of individual freedom. The fully developed person, thus, is one who freely affirms and acknowledges the roots of his freedom in the community, and who as a free individual chooses the community. In the same way, phylogenetically, the individuality of the person community has its roots in the lower types of sociality, but the communality of the person community is not so rooted. This highest communality is reflective of the free choice of the individual person. Man's individualism occurs only in community, in other words, but the highest community is constituted by free individuals. Man's individual freedom is an achievement of his sociality; man's highest sociality is an achievement of his individual freedom.[19]

Returning to the question at hand, three counterpoints to the individualism of liberalism can be derived from the foregoing. First, because the background of the individual is the community, liberal individualism is incorrect in viewing the individual as prior to the community. Although only by order of foundation, Scheler demonstrates that the social experience is primary and the individual, secondary. Liberalism errs in regarding the individual as the theoretical ground and most basic building block of society and politics.

Second, individualism fails to do full justice to the individual. True individuality requires the mutual acceptance of the unique personhoods of the self, the other selves, and the communal self. Because the liberal scheme sees the community as dependent upon the parallel but separate actions of distinct individuals, the dignity of the unique personhood of the others and the community is precluded. Denying the subjectivity of the community and others undermines the possibility of the individual's own subjectivity.

Third, individualism in the liberal scheme is substantively unachievable.[18] Because each individual discovers himself only against the backdrop of the community, any conception of the individual as isolated from the community would be but an illusory abstraction. Although Scheler does not claim that there is a causal dependency between the individual and the community, or

[17] *Ibid*., pp. 529-33.
[18] *Ibid*., p. 533ff.
[19] *Ibid*., pp. 531-33.

even a circular interdependency, he does assert that both the community and the individual are necessary for a full understanding of the person. As illustrated by these counterpoints, Scheler rejects the simplistic individualism of the liberal paradigm.

Motivation

In the liberal paradigm, two differing explanations for the motivation behind the polity and behind all political action have figured prominently among theorists. Typically, however, the difference between these two explanations of motivation is often blurred by these liberal thinkers. Even at best, distinctions between these motivations are only vaguely noted. Yet, from the perspective of Scheler's phenomenological studies on values, a sharp line must be drawn between liberalism which is motivated by the *negative* value of "need" and liberalism which is motivated by the relatively low, but *positive*, value of enhanced utility or pleasure.[20]

Need-motivated liberalism would conceive women and men as motivated in their political actions by an effort merely to escape from a present great evil toward a future condition with potentially less evil. In this pessimistic portrait of human existence, the *status quo* is perceived to be forever a situation of woeful circumstances which is tolerated only out of fear of degeneration into a worse situation. There is no tranquil, resigned acceptance reflected in whatever toleration might be granted to the present. Indeed, the circumstances of the present are an eternal goading for individuals to seek progress to predicaments of lesser evil.[21] All political actions must therefore be understood as directed at minimizing or blindly avoiding the discomforts of existence. Hobbes, in this vein, sees individuals acting politically due to fear of violent death, Spinoza out of fear of aimless anarchy.

It might be objected that Scheler's identification of a pure needs motivated liberalism is itself an abstraction, that no liberal thinker completely ignores motivation from positive values. Hobbes, for example, might also be cited for his stress on the desire for a commodious life. But, while it will be acknowledged by Scheler that a number of needs-motivated political theories also consider some minor positive values in motivation, such positive values are very much secondary motivations for these theories. Moreover, when present in these schemes, such positive values pleasure, physical satisfaction, etc., remain values of the lower levels in Scheler's own hierarchy of values. Thus, a needs-motivated liberalism might discuss a motivation such as pleasure in the context of values, yet it plays a role of lesser importance in the explanation of motivation than a negative motivation such as fear or anxiety. Indeed, more typically, such thinkers despair of truly positive values and come to name that which fulfills a need as a "positive" value. Whatever the particulars, all needs-motivated liberalisms operate according to the principle of ameliorating the deficiencies of existence which can never be wholly overcome.

Scheler, surveying all other theories of liberalism, concludes that what is not definable in terms of needs motivation can be roughly categorized under the general heading of "utility

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[20] It is tempting to refer to this distinction as one between early and late liberalism, or between classical liberalism and utilitarianism. In his work, *Ressentiment*, trans. William Holdheim (New York: Free Press, 1961), Scheler comes close to making such a conclusion. However, since Scheler does refrain from making such a division, utilitarianism and classical liberalism are treated under the generic term "bourgeois liberalism" in this essay.

[21] *Formalism, op. cit.*, pp. 352-53. Note also the inherent notion of material progress which is characteristic of liberalism.

motivation."[22] Under this heading, political practice is motivated by a recognition of only a narrow range of what for Scheler are the lower, materialistic values. Due to the materialistic nature of such values, motivation in such liberalisms aims toward the amassing of greater and greater quantities of those things which carry these values, i.e., property.[23] Unlike needs-motivated liberalism, which pictures women and men engaged continually in seeking (though never completely finding) easement of the evils of life, utility liberalism finds the basic motivating factor in human action to be an attraction to perceived values such as "pleasure." They operate not on negative values, therefore, but on positive ones. As with the needs version, however, there are seldom pure examples of this utility-based explanation of human motivation. Most liberal thinkers in this category also admit the negative value of "pain" and assign it a secondary role in the motivation process. Some more complex examples of utility liberalism contend that negative values predominate in the operation of civil society until a certain level of civilization is attained at which point utility values come to dominate.[24] Despite its various guises, utility liberalisms remain based upon the notion of "utility-seeking" as the primary motivation of individuals and the purpose for politics.

Scheler's evaluation of these two different explanations for motivation in liberalism, as noted previously, varies with each. In regard to needs-motivated liberalism, Scheler begins by investigating the feeling of need itself. He contrasts the feeling of need with instinctual impulses such as hunger, terming it an experience of displeasure which accompanies the perception of a lacking.[25] Although such an experience occurs just as well in hunger and thirst, Scheler notes a profound difference in that "needs" are not a physical, natural experience of lacking, but rather are in some sense an artificial product of our minds and cultures. He supports this point by way of very convincing examples, noting that a starving tribe of primitives does not "need" the fish in nearby lakes if their culture has not come to consider fish as food. Similarly, pre-Columbian American aborigines did not "need" the horse, despite the fact that their children's children of the American plains truly, in fact, did have this need. Needs, thus, are not innate, but are developed in psychology and history by human actions.

Scheler's thinking in these regards cuts to the heart of the needs motivated concept of liberalism. If needs are a product of psychology and history if there are no common "innate" needs then needs can hardly be taken as the foundation of culture or the motor of historical progress. Needs cannot be the basis for explanation of civilization or political practice when they themselves arise in history and in reference to human acts.[26] Furthermore, needs are certainly incapable of explaining true progress. Progress is measured in the attainment of new heights, in the coming to

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[22] Scheler does, in fact, argue that utility, pleasure and advantage are all merely different aspects of the same phenomenon. See *Ressentiment*, *op. cit*., p. 152ff.

[23] Scheler in passages such as this seems clearly to be referring to the likes of Bentham who plainly treats all pleasures as equal and additive. One wonders, however, how well Scheler was acquainted with the works of J. S. Mill who proposed that there were qualitative differences between pleasure and that pleasures were not additive at the highest levels where they could only be truly appreciated by superior people. Also, consider that progress here would be conceived only as a quantitative, continued aggregation of more and more things.

[24] J. S. Mill is an example among several. See the introductory chapter to his *On Liberty* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958).

[25] *Formalism, op. cit*., pp. 350-51.

[26] In *Formalism*, Scheler claims that the more primary factors upon which needs are based would be the vital, natural impulses of life. As we shall see subsequently, however, these also are unacceptable for other reasons as the cornerstones of civilization and politics.

know that which was previously unknown. Yet, as Scheler makes evident, one can only *need* what one has known or experienced before. As negative, reaction-like feelings focused on what are perceived as the deficiencies of the present, needs are unable to truly look forward; they are unable to guide action in anticipation of the new "heights" of progress. Because the needs-driven model of liberalism is characterized by a state of constant agitation due to an individual's continual reaction to the inadequacies of the status quo, such a scenario would result not in genuine forward-looking progress but rather only in aimless, incremental flux. To suppose that the polity arises haphazardly from such a process is to deny it positive purpose and to reduce its existence to the status of "happy accident."[27]

In opposition to this understanding, Scheler contends that all actions by men have their basis in the perception and subsequent pursuit of positive values. More than this, he argues that the subsequent pursuit of positive values itself has its "source in a surplus of positive feelings at the deepest stratum."[28] Human action springs, accordingly, not from need, but from surplus. True progress occurs when the present situation is not only "tolerable," but when there exists in the present a great enough overabundance of positive value so as to begin reaching for that which is greater than the present. Civilizations do not begin where humankind is in greatest need, but instead where there exists a great surplus of resources. Polities do not arise out of needs, but out of vision freed from the ball and chain of necessity. Politics is properly a pattern of human actions, not reactions.

At first glance, utility liberalism would appear to be in concurrence with Scheler's response to the needs variety. The needs model, after all, fails in Scheler's estimation precisely because of its blindness to positive values. In contrast, utility liberalism finds the pursuance of positive values, in this case utility values, to be both the mainspring and the proper end of human action and progress. Oddly, however, it is exactly because utility liberalism finds *utility* to be both the motive behind individual action and the ultimate ends of human sociality that Scheler utterly rejects such liberalism as an explanation and normative guide for social life and politics. Utility liberalism, he claims, rests upon an "inversion" of man's hierarchy of values. Thereby, Scheler sees it as only a "perversion" of the proper means and end of the social order.

Scheler traces the historical grounds of this inversion in a number of early works to the feeling of *ressentiment* which comes to predominate the constitution of man as he emerges as the *typus* of the bourgeois. Like Nietzsche, Scheler finds *ressentiment* to be a self-poisoning of the psyche issuing from the suppression of the smoldering hatred of a lesser man for one greater.[29] *Ressentiment* in time undermines the normative framework of the greater man-lesser man (master/slave) relationship. If only by the weight of their numbers, the masses as filled with *ressentiment*, come to subvert the hierarchy of values which marks the greater, exceptional man as superior to themselves. The common virtues of the multitude are extolled while the secretly-envied virtues of the superior man are held up for ridicule. The proper order of values is overthrown through appeals to the most base values (i.e., "utility"), and lower values are placed in ascendancy over the higher. Usefulness is celebrated over nobility, quantity over quality, homogeneity over creative diversity. Moreover, Scheler argues that the art of ruling is thus rendered as "economics"; science becomes "technology"; progress becomes not growth but

[27] *Ibid*., p. 351-52.
[28] *Ibid*., p. 349.
[29] Scheler does not agree with Nietzsche that Christianity is the result of *ressentiment*. Rather, he believes the *ressentiment*emerges with bourgeois man and subsequently has perverted all modern institutionsincluding Christianity.

"gluttony" and truth itself becomes merely "pragmatic truth."[30] "But the *most profound* perversion of the hierarchy of values," Scheler writes, "is the *subordination of the vital values to utility values*."[31]

The significance of this becomes clear in considering the hierarchy of values which Scheler divides into four modal levels: the agreeable (from which utility values are derived), the vital, the spiritual (*geistliche*), and the holy.[32] From the agreeable as lowest to the holy as highest, each level corresponds to its own distinct sphere of acts and values. At the same time, Scheler implies that there is a covert teleology in this order where the values of the lower levels are to be considered as directional signs pointing toward the highest levels. Utility liberalism, therefore, greatly errs in its consideration of the value of utility (pleasure, agreeableness) as the proper end of the polity or as the ultimate goal of political action. The implicit teleology of Scheler's hierarchy of values requires that every positive action be done in consideration of the highest values, or, as he states elsewhere, in consideration of the "destiny of man."[33] Although Scheler certainly does not object to the intrinsic importance and independence of each modal level, in a situation of conflicting values the lower must give way to the higher; the utility values must be subordinated to the vital, the vital to the spiritual and the spiritual to the holy.

Utility liberalism's selection of utility as the means and immediate motivation of political and social action is also rejected by Scheler. Indeed, this is the point of "the *most profound* perversion" mentioned previously, for it is here most clearly that vital values are subordinated to utility values. The nature of utility, explored in phenomenological fashion, is determined by Scheler to be particularistic and individual. Utility is such, he finds, that it can only be privately pursued by men and women as individuals. Even thinkers who subscribe to utility liberalism are able to refer to the "utility of the social order" only as a mathematical majority of individual pleasures. Because the vital values, however, are concerned with the whole of a given life and not the particular pleasure of a specific part, they are seen to encompass the whole of the community's life.[34] On this basis, therefore, the proper motivation for political action is not the pursuit of utility, but rather the pursuit of the vital values of the whole community, e.g., its commonweal and growth always, of course, in light of the highest values for mankind.[35]

Rationalism

According to Scheler, the interpretation and understanding of reason also undergoes profound change with the emergence of the bourgeois man. Where previously reason was somehow understood as very much intertwined with faith, love, man's ultimate values, goods, ends and so forth, with this new type of man reason is stripped and isolated from such heady concepts. Reason being conceived in a much more narrow and restricted sense, Scheler contends that with the bourgeois man it "*emancipates* itself from both emotional and organic-schematic guidances."[36]

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[30] See *Erkenntnis und Arbeit*, in Scheler's *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 8: *Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft*, edited by Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1960), pp. 212-39.

[31] *Ressentiment, op. cit*., p. 154.

[32] *Formalism, op. cit*., p. 154.

[33] *Gedanken zu Moral und Politik*, *op. cit*., p. 5.

[34] Space does not permit a complete exploration of vital values; see *Formalism, op. cit*., pp. 338-42.

[35] *Gedanken, op. cit*., pp. 16-20.

[36] *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge, op. cit*., p. 124.

Reason, thus, becomes estranged from the world and others: theory is distanced from nature and practice; facts are thoroughly severed from values.

Two somewhat different but essentially interrelated versions of this new interpretation of reason are evident within the general paradigm of liberalism. According to the first, reason is rendered a mundane, instrumental and calculative tool serving the interests of individual needs and utility. This "reasoning" is, therefore, only an instrument of the underlying motivations which were earlier considered and rejected by Scheler. Indeed, Scheler only sketchily treats this particular version of the new understanding of reason.[37] The second version, however, attracts his closest and most engaging scrutiny. Perhaps in awareness of the inadequacies and dangers of establishing ethics and politics on a foundation of utility or need, this second version of the new reason takes the "purified" reason of the bourgeois man itself as a guide and starting point for practical action. Liberal thinkers in this "rationalist" vein would stand approvingly with Scheler in opposition to the claims of other liberals regarding a universal need or utility motivation. Such rationalists contend that needs or utility motivation belong in general to the world of sensible experience. For that reason such motivations and all that is derived from them are subject to individual psychology and experience and thus are dangerous grounds for political principles and untrustworthy bases for the legitimate polity. The rationalist skirts the problems of such empirically-based social and political theories by claiming that "the ground of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man or in the circumstances in which he is placed, but sought *a priori* solely in the concepts of pure reason" [Kant].[38] In other words, Scheler's rejection of those liberalisms which operate on the assumptions of need or utility motivation is inapplicable to liberalisms based on the a priori imperatives of universally-shared reason. Rationalism here, a derivation of rules for action from reason itself, becomes the explanation of, and justification for, society and politics.

Operationally, this understanding conceives women and men as molding the sensible world, through the innate processes of reason, into general categories with which reason itself can subsequently work. Rationalism contends that the raw world is unsuitable as a location from which to make social and normative judgments because it is particularized and individuated. Indeed, so much is each bit of experience in the everyday world understood as an individual and unique occurrence, that the world of these experiences is taken to be only a meaningless chaos of disparate phenomena. To make normative decisions in the midst of such an unsettled state of affairs and on the basis of such incoherent data, the rationalists reason, would be folly. To establish a political community on a foundation of this sort the chaotic, raw facts of the sensible world before reason has digested them would be absurd.[39]

Similarly, the rationalist liberal thinker looks to reason for a common frame of reference by which each individual can acknowledge and act in accordance with others. Without reason as such a frame of reference, the rationalists argue that each individual man, being isolated from his fellows by space and time, would perceive an utterly different world than that of his fellows. It is in this sense that people are individuated. Without reason, they contend, this individuation would be such that every individual would be radically alienated from every other man. Politics and ethics are possible, therefore, only where this radical individuation is circumvented by the possession of the faculty of reason among all women and men. Because both the empirical perception of values and

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[37] See *Formalism, op. cit.*, pp. 274-77.

[38] Cf. Kant's preface to *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. L W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 5ff.

[39] In this vein, see John Rawls' *Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Belknap, 1976), especially the separation from world by way of his veil of ignorance.

the derivation of the "good" from nature are dependent upon the relativity of human experience in a suspect world, normative choice is seen to require some more firm footing. The rationalists find such "footing" in reason itself; the ultimate ground for norms and action must be found in reason. By reason, therefore, the world can be dealt with, society with others can be possible, and human actions can attain normative significance.

Political institutions and structures for political practice follow upon these rational suppositions. Since politics involves the exercise and conditioning of choice, its domain is that of the will. The rationalist position conceives of will, however, only in terms of it being merely a creature of reason. Reason determines the ground of will, constituting the objects to which choice applies. For politics, reason thus posits practical principles which generally determine the conditions of political practice. Inasmuch as such principles are established on and through reason, the rationalists contend they are valid and binding for every *rational* being they are, in other words, "universal." The ultimate criterion of the validity of political practice, the ultimate test of the legitimacy of any political institution is therefore the measure of its universality, its generality in regard to all rational beings. In this context, it follows further that there are no political goods in themselves, "good" being only those principles which stand the test of being rendered universal. General rules and procedures would follow from such principles. Yet, the farther such rules and procedures stretch from the universalized principles toward the particular situation in the world, the less valid they become. Hence, an apparently liberal political landscape emerges.

Scheler raises serious objections to this whole process, objections which go beyond his previously considered rejection of the formalism implicit within it. He questions the very applicability of such reason to practical affairs. He claims, first, that the rationalist conception rests upon an antiquated, static understanding of man which wrongly assumes all people in all times possess equal access to reason. Second, he questions whether reason is the secure haven from the world of experience that the rationalists seek. Third, he denies the assertion of the *a priori* place of reason in normative concerns.

Beginning with the first of Scheler's points, he notes that the rationalist pictures mankind to be something firm and stable in its possession of certain faculties. Though most rationalist writers contend that they are concerned not with human reasoning, but with reason itself, their works offer little evidence to support the possibility of reason existing outside of human beings. (Even were artificial intelligence achievable, one would hope the rationalists would not allocate human choice to a computer; here the heart would murmur within them it seems.) With scant exceptions, to be a man is seen to be a rational man regardless of personal development, culture and so forth. As Scheler writes, in the rationalist view "the concept of man was, in a way, involuntarily idealized, and a real species was subsumed under this ideal concept as a correlate, which today seems possible only on the basis of insufficient knowledge of the fact. This resulted in the 'universally human', 'humanity', and the 'all too human'."[40]

Scheler cites a growing body of empirical evidence which undercuts this rationalist position. People differ from one another across time and space. Mankind evolves genetically and anthropologically. Just as the child grows and changes in reason, so too do men in culture and mankind as a species. "Mankind is, like any race, people, or individual, changeable in principle, and its constitution is a product of the universal development of life."[41] Suspicion is therefore warranted for the rationalists' effort to utilize the human faculty of reason as a secure and universal base. Since mankind itself is no unchanging thing in the world, but is instead a dynamic,

[40] *Formalism, op. cit.*, p. 275.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 271.

developing thing, any assumption that access to reason is identical for all men and women is hard to accept. Fire might burn equally in Persia as in Athens, but the rationality of the Persians was suspect even in ancient times, and little imagination is required to speculate on the Persian conclusions regarding Athenian rationality. Scheler rejects, on these and other grounds, any notion of an unchanging, factual unity of human nature and rejects, therefore, any "notion that there is a certain fixed, inborn functional apparatus of reason given to all men from the beginning the idol of the Enlightenment as well as Kant."[42] There is no fixed and frozen human nature, and rationalism cannot disregard this fact by pontificating on the universality of reason. Reason may or may not itself be always and everywhere the same, but the human faculty of reason is locked with his dynamic and developing character. The mere possession of the faculty of reason does not avail the hopes of the rationalists for finding in reason a ground for norms and actions.[43]

The second objection which Scheler raises against the use of such reason as the primary guide to practical affairs radicalizes the first. For not only, he argues, does the faculty of reason change, but reason itself changes. The key to Scheler's claim is what he terms the "functionalization of essential insight" [*Funktionalisierung der Wesenseinsicht*].[44] As Scheler explains the concept, reason exists much more intimately with man than the rationalists would admit. Reasoning affects reason, on one hand, and the objects of reason affect reason, on the other. Reason itself is pulled and stretched to accommodate both forces. Subjectivity/experience constitutes the conditions of reason; reason becomes what it is required to be by both man and world. It develops and grows. "The *functionalization of essential insight* enables us to understand that there can be an *evolution and growth of reason* itself growth, that is to say, of its property in a priori rules of selection and function."[45] Contrary to the hopes of the rationalist, reason is not immune from the flux of experience. Nor is it immune from the actions of men and women. As Scheler puts it, reason "grows and diminishes, 'evolves,' and 'regresses,' because certain of the essential insights by whose functionalization its progress is controlled are attached to this or that particular locus in the concrete world-process and are possible only at those points."[46] Ironically, adding insult to injury, Scheler concludes that the particular reason upon which the rationalist liberal seizes, is but the peculiar reason of the European Enlightenment and only a *cul-de-sac* in the development of reason in Western civilization.[47]

The third point which Scheler raises against the utilization of reason for practical matters concerns the rationalists' assertion of the primacy of reason. As noted, rationalism utilizes reason as both the guide to action and the justification for action. The will follows reason and depends upon reason for its legitimacy. Reason, for the rationalist conception, is thus the *a priori*source of acts. Scheler, of course, denies this.

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[42] *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge, op. cit.*, p. 40-41. Note that Scheler is here rejecting two different versions of rationalism. He rejects a rationalism of human reasoning and a rationalism based on an objective and universal reason.

[43] See Scheler's *Man's Place in Nature*, trans. Hans Mayerhoff (New York: Noonday, 1961), pp. 69-70, where he discusses the nature of man as becoming humani.e., actively participating in the unfolding of being's self-awareness.

[44] See *Erkenntnis und Arbeit, op. cit.*, pp. 201-202, 231-33 and Scheler's *On the Eternal in Man*, trans. Bernard Noble (London: SCM Press, 1960), pp. 198-213.

[45] *0n the Eternal Man, op. cit.*, p. 202.

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207.

[47] *Erkenntnis und Arbeit, op. cit.*, pp. 197-200.

Scheler's rejection of the priorness of reason in regard to action and norms does not succumb to the voluntarist charge that a blind, unknowing will is primary. Both will and reason for Scheler are inherently in the domain of the individual ego and, as discussed previously, the individual is itself not primary. He admits freely, concurring with the rationalists, that all willing is a "striving for that which is known." Yet, is the "knowing" which precedes willing a rational knowing? Scheler thinks not. Examples can be imagined which illustrate a "knowing" unknown to reason. Such "knowing" can lend itself to willing and action beyond articulation in terms of rational purpose. The stereotypical hero always exclaims, "I'm really not sure why I did it." The television reporter on the scene nods in appreciation, retells the unreasonableness of the hero's act, and underscores his interview with a "knowing" glance to the camera by which his "understanding" is conveyed to us. Thus, actions are done, "knowledge" is transmitted, and norms are invoked, all of which can only lamely and subsequently be explained by reason. Clearly, in at least this one sequence of events, will and reason follow some sort of prior "knowledge."

Scheler, however, does not establish his rejection of reason's primacy on a single class of examples. He claims that at its deepest root, knowledge is a relationship of being, specifically, the relationship of one being partaking in the essential character [*Sosein*] of another being without incurring any change in the character of either the knower or the known. What is thus presupposed in knowing is a primal act of abandoning the self in order to come into experiential contact with the world. As a relationship of being, knowledge follows the peculiar act of transcending the self in order to reach out for something perceived in the world. At this deepest stratum, the perception which precedes rational knowing is a perception of value. Rather than reason constituting the conditions of will, as the rationalists claim, Scheler convincingly argues that the conditions of reason are constituted by the perception of values.[48]

Even the perception of value, however, cannot be seen as sufficient grounds for reason, for there must be a tendency in the knower to rise beyond itself to participate in the known. There must be an "evaluating" or "taking interest in" that which is becoming known. In the most mundane sense, Scheler refers to this tendency as "interest"; in the highest sense, he calls it "love." It is only by way of this fundamental tendency that man is able to overcome the self, in order to reason. He claims that man "before he is an *ens cogitans* or an *ens volens*, is an *ens amans*."[49] Reason is, therefore, not as the rationalists see it. The bedrock of our relation with another is always the perception of the inestimable value of the other and the tendency to deny the self to partake in the other's essential character. The root of our relation to the world is always interest. Reason cannot be the primary ground of normative choice and action; reason follows the "knowing" of the heart. The rationalist liberal errs, therefore, by establishing the legitimacy of politics on the priority of purified reason.

Person and Political Legitimacy

Considering the thorough rejection of the conditions of bourgeois liberalism in the foregoing, it may seem puzzling that the historical Max Scheler was something of a liberal in the last years of his life. More oddly, his support for liberal politics waxed while the liberal Weimar republic found its public support being eroded by non-liberal political movements of the right and the left.

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[48] *Ibid*., pp. 203-205. See also "Liebe und Erkenntnis" in his *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 6: *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, ed. Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1963).

[49] Scheler, "Ordo Amoris" in *Selected Philosophical Essays*, trans. David Lachtermann (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 110-11.

In his youth and early intellectual life, Scheler clearly opposed liberal political theories. Indeed, while generally supportive of the Reich and Kaiser, he had little liking even for the "mechanizing" of the state which he saw with the Prussians. For the initial engagements of the First World War, Scheler was a vigorous apologist for the German cause, often portraying the struggle in terms of preserving Germany from the forces of liberalism and cosmopolitanism. By 1916, however, Scheler reversed his support for the war. Deploring its brutality and horror, he hoped that its experience the common, soul-jarring experience of the war shared by all of Europe would serve as the basis for a unified European community. As with most German academics, the establishment of the Weimar regime saw Scheler lending the republic only lukewarm support. He doubted whether the seeds of England and America liberal democracy, capitalism and Edisonism were suitable for German soil.[50] By the mid-20s, however, Scheler's support for the Weimar government was firm. He remained adamantly opposed to any politics based upon materialism, the lower values, formalism, individualism and so forth; yet it is clear that he was and considered himself a liberal.

It does not seem that Scheler's "liberalism" represents a turning or reconsideration of his theoretical position. In the mid-20s, he does attempt to sharply delineate his own philosophy from *Lebensphilosophie* and all blind emotivisms.[51] Moreover, he does attack the German youth movements (the *Wandervogel*, etc., whose spirit he had previously admired) for their growing mysticism, irrationalism and unquestioning obedience to their leaders. Yet, he continues to applaud the youths' rejection of the bourgeois value system of their parents.[52] Bitterly rebuking the growing influence of radical politics of the left and the right, and critical of the burgeoning mass society which he saw as promotive of such politics, Scheler nonetheless sustains his rejections of the bourgeois conditions of liberalism. Indeed, he contends that the mass society, the breeding ground of fascism and bolshevism, is itself only a consequence of the emergence of bourgeois man.[53] The more interesting puzzle, therefore, is not why Scheler increasingly accepts liberal politics, but rather how, on what grounds, a liberalism which rejects the formalism, individualism, motivation and rationalism of the bourgeois is itself possible? If bourgeois liberalism is not legitimate politics, then what liberalism could be legitimate?

For Scheler, as indicated earlier, such questions are perhaps wrongly put. The question of political legitimacy is not merely a question of the political order. His considered rejection of bourgeois liberalism is not simply reflective of it being incorrect or bad government. The failure of the predominant political paradigm of our era does not stem from liberalism itself, but rather from the inadequacy of the bourgeois conception of man and the accompanying conceptual and normative framework within which liberalism finds its source. As Scheler sees it, the bedrock of political legitimacy lies in a more basic legitimacy. To inquire about legitimate politics presupposes an inquiry into legitimately being human. The politics of bourgeois liberalism, in other words, fails to attain genuine legitimacy because the bourgeois man is not himself fully

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[50] In regard to Scheler's changing position on the war, see his *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 4: *Politische-Pedagogische Schriften*, ed. Manfred Frings (Bern: Francke, 1982), especially the essay "Der Krieg als Gesamterlebnis." Regarding his doubts concerning German liberalism, see his essays "Christliche Sozialismus als Antikapitalismus" and "Von kommenden Dingen" in *ibid.*

[51] Scheler, "Weltanschauungslehre, Soziologie und Weltanschauungssetzung" in his *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 6: *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre, op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

[52] Scheler, "Jugendbewegung" in *ibid.*

[53] Scheler, "The Forms of Knowledge and Culture" in *Philosophical Perspectives*, trans. Oscar Haac (Boston: Beacon, 1958).

legitimate as a person. In accord with his own counsel, the puzzle of Scheler's own liberalism must find its resolution in Scheler's efforts to clarify the image of man. His image of man, moreover, both begins and finds its end with the concept of the person. Hence, Scheler's own personalist liberalism is inextricably linked with the criterion by which the liberalism of the bourgeois is rejected namely, with the elusive dynamic, the person, which is truly man.

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Chapter XI
Enlightenment and Natural Rights

Richard Kennington

The Enlightenment is the primary point of orientation for modern political and philosophic thinking. By the "Enlightenment" I mean not the eighteenth century age of Voltaire and Diderot, but the doctrines of nature, personality, and political society by which the seventeenth century philosophers established the foundations of a new humanity.

Modern thinkers take their bearings from the Enlightenment in one of three different ways. First, they characteristically endorse the goals and doctrines of the Enlightenment, although often seeking to strengthen or clarify its foundations. This first group includes, of course, Bacon, the first of the several co-founders of the Enlightenment, and Kant, who placed an epigraph from Bacon on the title page of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; but also such twentieth century figures as Dewey and Bertrand Russell.

All the later groups reject the Enlightenment's sense of consciously making a break with tradition either by the "universal doubt" of Descartes or by some other methodological means. How then did the Enlightenment itself understand the tradition with which it broke? As a hybrid of two traditions: it confronted the still powerful medieval scholasticism, on the one hand, and ancient classical philosophy, on the other. The distinction between the two traditions is made quite forcibly by Bacon and Descartes, for example. Did the Enlightenment seek to break with both antiquity and the Middle Ages? Such a double breach in the seventeenth century is regarded by present day "revisionist" scholars as moot: think only of the ambiguity of Descartes' theocentric metaphysics of substance. But by the end of the eighteenth century, that is, with Immanuel Kant, the double breach with the tradition is quite clear.

We can then distinguish a second group that rejects the double breach with tradition and endeavors to synthesize parts of the tradition, ancient or medieval, with the modern doctrines. Here the major examples are Leibniz, Rousseau, and the supreme instance, Hegel, for whom the first questioning of the legitimacy of the moderns takes the form of a partial restoration of the pre-moderns.

For a third group, the Enlightenment in its entirety is rejected. Its defects are attributed to the grand tradition of western metaphysics originating in antiquity, especially in Platonic philosophy. Here the very distinction of ancient and modern loses its importance. This third group consists primarily of Nietzsche and Heidegger. We could even add a fourth group which makes the alleged errors of the Enlightenment, especially Cartesian rationalism, into solemn warnings against any attempt to philosophize.

The Concept of Enlightenment

We now ask: why is the Enlightenment such a universal point of reference, long after its alleged doctrines have come under formidable attacks? We limit ourselves to two or three suggestions. The Enlightenment explicitly modeled itself, as we know from Bacon, on the Platonic model: evil will not cease in the cities unless philosophers rule or kings philosophize. From the start, the Enlightenment endeavored to remove the obstacles that made the Platonic proposal a dream and never an actuality. It sought to exclude the merely speculative and to adhere to the

effective and useful. And it succeeded: to an amazing extent the Enlightenment succeeded in establishing the power of modern knowledge in society. It is the first and the only philosophy to have laid the foundations of an age; but that means that in some sense it is the first philosophy to have brought a prior age to an end.. We can now make more precise our two-sided relation to the Enlightenment. Since our modern sciences and technology are primarily of sixteenth and seventeenth century origin, and our dominant political form, the representative democracies of the West and Japan, is also of seventeenth century origin, the Enlightenment is the abiding source of our dominant institutions. I return to these two cases below.

On the other hand, although these two dominant forms of Enlightenment have great and undeniable benevolent aspects, they are not informed by a predominant morality or wisdom. We do not have an Enlightenment or a modern morality or wisdom that can justify the benevolence of the Enlightenment. Still less do we have an Enlightenment or modern morality or wisdom that can carry out the critique of the imperfections of Enlightenment or of contemporary society which is so obviously needed. Instead of a critique made from the standpoint of modern Enlightenment reason, we need a critique of modern Enlightenment reason itself. The obstacle to this critique is just the benevolence of the Enlightenment itself. Our gratitude for the rights of the individual, including the right to freedom of speech, which have been effective bars to the tyranny of the one or of the mob makes us hesitate to scrutinize too closely the intellectual pedigree of Enlightenment.

But what compels us to this inquiry is the dire extremity of our situation: here I speak primarily out of the American experience. A grave corruption, a creeping nihilism, corrodes American institutions in the 1990s on a scale never hitherto imaginable. It attacks our educational institutions, our national representative government and our state governments. It is visible in family life, with the horrendous statistics on divorces, parentless children, and homeless individuals, and in the psycho-sexual problems of human identity. Above all it shows in the lack of confidence in the capacity of human intelligence to guide our lives and our government.

From the outset the Enlightenment knew that it required a moral justification, but it knew also that it did not possess one. The Enlightenment was, as it was called by Bacon and Descartes, a project, that is an incomplete program. Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes and Locke, all these co-founders of Enlightenment wrote treatises on methodology meant to give rules for seeking knowledge in all branches of knowledge. But these methodologies apply to physics or to human knowledge that does not include morality or human virtue. Bacon says his method was meant to apply to moral and civil or political knowledge, but he did not achieve this, which is the reason why his *New Organon* seems to be a fragment. Virtually all of the Enlightenment methodologies are only fragments, probably for the same reason. Descartes, in his *Discourse on Method*, lays down a provisional morality; he never attained any doctrine that he called, or that scholars think, is a definitive morality. The moral basis on which Bacon and Descartes rely is a combination of a judgment that traditional morality was impotent to protect human freedom, and a recognition that all men agree that bodily wants, and freedom from the interference of others, are goods that must be satisfied. For example, Descartes says that the "preservation of health is without doubt the chief blessing and the foundation of all other blessings in this life" (*Discourse* VI). Descartes offered also a wisdom of the life of the passions, a hedonistic analysis that does not yield any account of justice or of moral duty.

To consider the initial situation of the Enlightenment more fully, I would distinguish between two kinds of Enlightenment, one whose core is natural philosophy or physics, and the other the human or political philosophy. The great exponents of the new natural philosophy are Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton; they do not write political treatises. The great exponents

of political philosophy are Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau; they accomplish little or nothing in natural philosophy. The implication is clear: the route to political philosophy is not through natural philosophy. There is, however, this common ground between the natural and political philosophy of Enlightenment: nature, so far from being a standard of goodness, or a limit of evil, is something to be mastered, as in the methodological writings of Bacon and Descartes; or nature is something evil to be fled, as is the state of nature for Hobbes. We can identify the difficulty that leads to the abyss between the natural and the human: the science of nature aims at laws of nature, such as the law of inertia; but there are no laws of human nature known to the Enlightenment.

What then was the strategy, the successful strategy, pursued by Hobbes and the political philosophers of Enlightenment? The starting point is the great axiom of all Enlightenment science, natural and human: all final causality must be excluded. The attack on final causality begins with Bacon and Machiavelli; it continues in our day in the methodological writings of Ernest Nagel, the pragmatists and positivists. What is excluded is final causality in nature including human nature; what is not always excluded is final causality in the so-called historical process.

Final causality is denied because it is anthropomorphic, arising from human nature, but especially from man's religious nature. Man attributes purposes to nature because of his desire to see nature as benevolent to man, as a divine benefactor. In Book I of his *Politics*, Aristotle says that "nature does nothing in vain." He is confusing nature with God, according to Francis Bacon. The thesis that nature is good and hence a standard is the premise of the morality, personal and political, of the classical tradition of natural right and law, from Plato and Aristotle through Thomas Aquinas. All pre-modern natural theories known to me presuppose final causality as the premise of morality; and all modern natural right theories presuppose the denial of final causality. This engenders the peculiar solitude of the Enlightenment individual as an atom without natural relations to the whole of which he is a part, whether that whole is political, or whether it is the universal whole.

The Concept of Natural Rights

Consider now Thomas Hobbes, the founding father of Enlightenment political philosophy. Hobbes is the discoverer of the natural rights of the individual. These rights are prior to all duties; the individual has perfect rights, he has no perfect duties. These rights are anterior to government; government exists for the sake of guaranteeing that rights, or legitimate claims, are made actual by society. This is the most influential political doctrine ever discovered, gaining in recognition decade by decade all over the globe. It has been repeatedly denied and refuted by philosophers, not only by Marx and his followers but also, for example, recently by Alasdair MacIntyre. However, examples of its being denied by politicians or statesman are exceedingly rare. The universal claim to human rights has become an autonomous fact of political life, invulnerable to all merely rational refutation. The doctrine of rights has been an instrument used to establish the independence of nations, and a defense against tyranny within nations. We might exclaim, "What does it matter if the philosophers find it questionable?" as discovered and justified by a philosopher, Thomas Hobbes. We must endeavor to understand it.

Hobbes excluded final causality from nature; therefore, we might suppose, he excluded the *summum bonum*, the ultimate or final end, from his account of human nature. But according to the most authoritative accounts of his philosophy Hobbes does not in fact argue from scientifically known nature to human nature. It is of the utmost importance that his denial of the*summum bonum* is argued solely from human experience, for the denial of the *summum bonum* is the

negative condition of his doctrine of natural rights. The importance of this fact is that the authoritative weight of natural science is not placed by Hobbes on the side of the modern natural rights doctrine. Accordingly, the denial of the *summum bonum* rests on what is accessible to humans as humans, on ordinary human experience. There is no *summum bonum*, says Hobbes, because whenever we do attain the object of our desire we always seek something more, or different, or at least the secure possession of what we have. And we try to imagine that one good which would give us secure and permanent satisfaction of all our desires. Thus far, Hobbes is laying down the skeptical premise of his politics: reason, indeed no human reason of any individual, can know the good for man. Therefore reason cannot rule over the desires and passions; instead, reason is the instrument of the desires and passions.

But the strongest passion is the passion for life, or what is the same, the fear of death: man cannot help pursuing life or fleeing death; therefore there is a right to life. There is no *summum bonum* by nature, but by nature death is the *summum malum*. In this way Hobbes expresses the fundamental hostility of nature to man, which in his view justifies the fundamental hostility of man to nature; this he expresses in the goal of philosophy: the mastery of nature. Thus the primordial human right, the right to life, arises from a nest of assumptions in which man's mutual tension with nature is the predominant thesis. Within this tension, nature is the initial aggressor and man the sufferer.

Since there is no knowledge of the good for mankind, any one man's good is as good as any other's. As Locke put it, each man has his own *summum bonum*, or his own pursuit of happiness, just as men have different palates. Just as one man's taste runs to cheese or lobsters, apples or plums, so another man's taste in the highest good may run to riches, or bodily delights, or virtue or the contemplation of truth. But since no man can have the support of knowledge for his choice of the good, each man's life is shadowed by the knowledge of the groundlessness of his choice. Life is uncertainty as regards the end.

The means to the end, therefore, assumes unusual importance; for most men the means to the end will be wealth. Precisely because there is no knowledge of the human end, the dominant end of human society tends to become the pursuit of wealth. The pursuit of a happiness which is outside our power because unknowable, turns into the pursuit of wealth which may be only a means, but is at least within our power. Thus the pursuit of wealth tends to become an end in itself. As Montesquieu observed, the ancient republics were primarily devoted to virtue as their end or goal, whereas the modern republics are devoted to commerce and money. Locke had legitimated the pursuit of an unlimited amount of wealth, but not on the ground of a labor theory of value. Rather he believed that the acquisitive desire of the entrepreneur would be the engine that would produce an increase of the standard of material life for all. A rising tide will lift all boats, in the words of President Kennedy. This argument was taken over to support the American Constitution in the *Federalist Papers No. 10*; the protection of the different and unequal capacities to acquire property is a first object of government.

Enlightenment and Transcendence

From Rousseau, the severest critic of the Enlightenment, we learn that all the defects of the Enlightenment are to be referred to its lack of transcendence. Moreover, all attempts to remedy this lack involve the concepts of nature, of human nature, or non-human nature or both. Finally, we learn from Rousseau's example, that if we limit our reform of the account of human nature by accepting modern natural science as the standard, we do more damage than good to the

Enlightenment model. These observations, here adumbrated in brief and cryptic form, suggest the key points of the following reflection on the example of Rousseau.

Rousseau recognized that the primary human right of the Enlightenment, the right to life, or self-preservation, presupposes that life is good in and by itself, or naturally. But nothing is naturally good, according to the Enlightenment; Enlightenment morality needs the support of a nature it has repudiated. The human individual must transcend its own needs and passions, by recourse to nature, if it is to discover the good. Rousseau turns to the study of nature in the *Second Discourse*. He places on its title page a passage from Aristotle, which says that we must learn from nature about good and bad. Rousseau studies man in the pure state of nature, prior to the development of human reason, language and sociability. He discovers that natural man is guided by the sweet sentiment of the goodness of his own existence: life itself is naturally good. This original and natural sentiment can be recovered by civilized man through inner meditation.

This rediscovery of the goodness of nature suggests that Rousseau returned to a teleological account of nature. But this proves far from the truth. Rousseau accepted the mechanical, non-teleological natural science of Descartes and Newton, according to which the evolution of human nature is the blind consequence of chance and necessity. Therefore reason and imagination which emerged in the historical evolution do not belong to the higher nature of man, but rather to the artificial and utilitarian. In his book on education, *Emile*, Rousseau experimented with nature as supplying the telos or end for the nurture and education of men and women. But the telos of men and women is to be married to a member of the opposite sex; no higher telos is suggested. Why this low ceiling? Because Rousseau is using teleology as a heuristic device to solve a political problem: marriage has the function of overcoming the asociality of man. Rousseau accepts from Hobbes that man does not need political life to achieve his natural end. For just as in Hobbes man has no natural end.

The Enlightenment began with the quest for perfection, a quest that would transcend every prior attempt at perfection, ancient or medieval. Bacon gives us several reflections on the ancient practice of apotheosis, the elevation to divinity of the supreme benefactors of the human race. Similarly, Descartes, in the original title of his book, the *Discourse on Method*, sought a method that would raise mankind to the highest perfection of which it was capable. The god-like perfection of supreme benevolence is the Enlightenment goal.

But to achieve perfection as benevolence, it would have been necessary to recognize that human perfection is not the auto-achievement of the solitary individual, however grand his genius. The possibility of human perfection of whatever kind must be grounded in the divine whole which is the source of the being of man. The final cause of the excellence of man cannot be desire for superiority to one's fellow man, but the excellence of the whole: to be is to be a part.

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Discussion

One way of contrasting pre-Enlightenment to Enlightenment thought, especially in England and North America, is to see the former as specified according to the laws of nature and thus within a context of a teleology, whereas the latter is precisely against a teleology. This might derive from the skeptical character of late medieval nominalism which, to restrictive, considered the notion of a *summum bonum* to be too exalted, or to the new aspirations of human freedom which considered any human conception of a supreme good or teleology to be too restrictive. At any rate, Hobbes' experiment attempted to rearticulate all on the basis of a type of *summum malum*, namely, nature as a threat to man.

In this context the urge to survive becomes central and the basis for the right to life. All then becomes a series of artifices and compromises for the exercise of this right in a situation of multiple persons, groups and positions. Further, the lack of a goal shifts the emphasis to means, such as the pursuit of wealth, which then become all important.

Rousseau reflects a continental critique of this Enlightenment vision, especially of its lack of a sense of nature. To state nature without teleology he turns to an originary pure condition of men. This launches him upon a critique of subsequent scientific and social development, which can only compromise the original goodness. Consequently his aspirations for man are low, for they concern healing the fissures in originary nature.

What seems lacking is a perspective which transcends the individual human and his passion for superiority over others. For this one must look to a divine source or ground as the basis for an excellence of the whole within which all parts can thrive together.

Eventually, this points to the need for a metaphysics, for while other dimensions of human thought make important contributions they become destructive when left to themselves to carry out the entire task of providing understanding for human life. Thus, for example, the formalism of Kant can be an important help in decentering our concerns from egoism, but is not sufficient positively to motivate and engage a person's life.

Further, the foundations of the American Revolution in its protest against tyranny and its proposition that all are created equal are important points of departure. Indeed, as bench marks which must not be rejected or compromised they seem often undervalued in our day. Nonetheless, they leave the great challenge of actually living one's freedom. Critical theories and propositions of justice may help in conflict resolution, but are not sufficient to respond to requirements of family, community and nation which can be articulated, if at all, only in terms of sacrifice and love. For these most important and formative dimensions of our life we need another calculus which does not ignore but transcends the issue of rights.

There is in this a real test for the sufficiency of a philosophy. Empirical and materialist philosophies can look at talk of purpose only as magical because it goes beyond the confines of the senses. As such an attitude leaves one without sufficient guidance for truly human life in community, it is necessary to reassess the limitations they have placed upon philosophy in their reductionist search for clarity and control. By attempting to say that reality is "nothing but" what is clear to the senses, the urge for survival, etc., one may be carrying out an interesting pattern of conceptualization. Unfortunately, as philosophy influences living, reductionisms become brutal mental lobotomies which shrink people's lives.

In this light metaphysics can become important if it itself can avoid forcing all into a limited view of reality as idea. For Aristotle metaphysics was precisely the treatise which defied restriction

to specific sectors of man or of reality; for Thomas it was initiated by a negative rather than positive judgment, i.e., the sedulous removal of any and all limitation in order to enable the science to take account of all that is or can be, and in whatsoever manner. For the personalists it is this open character of the human spirit that suggests beginning from human intentional openness and following this transcendent mode to a foundation of beings which both in principle and in fact is unlimited. Metaphysics alone provides this liberating context for philosophy; without it philosophy becomes a restrictive ideology.

Chapter XII
Democracy as an Ethical Problem: A Philosophy of Politics and Community

Claes Ryn

Western constitutional democracy is beset by deepening problems. Its ability to counter foreign threats and internal corrosion is in serious question. One of the reasons why it has great difficulty asserting itself coherently is its failure to articulate its essential identity, a failure which is not merely intellectual, but symptomatic of a larger inability to satisfy the moral and cultural prerequisites for this demanding form of government. The Western democracies are torn by contradictions. Within a system of government that is singularly dependent on a realistic view of man and the world, utopian notions of politics enjoy great influence.

It is widely overlooked that democracy can be defined in radically different ways. The same term is used for ideas of government that are in effect incompatible and that imply sharply contrasting views of man and society. Both in academic and journalistic discussion a fundamental distinction is usually lacking, one between what may be called constitutional democracy and plebiscitary democracy. The former is in important respects a modern manifestation and development of the old classical and Judaeo-Christian traditions. Popular government as it has existed in the United States is inextricably intertwined with those traditions.[1] Plebiscitary democracy, on the other hand, has its main theoretical origins in the eighteenth century and is based on assumptions that clash with the older view of man and society. The blurring of these forms of government is causing endless intellectual confusion that spills over into the formulation and conduct of public policy. The purpose here is to make the distinction between constitutional and plebiscitary democracy and to demonstrate the relevance of the distinction for democracy's ability to rule, specifically, to handle the most basic responsibility of government, that of national survival.

Constitutional Democracy

Recalling a few elements of the classical and Judaeo-Christian traditions will help in making the distinction. The civilization inspired by ancient Greece, Rome and Christianity recognizes both lower and higher potentialities in man. It stresses the existence of universal values to which man needs to adjust for the sake of his own happiness. It also discerns the chronic presence in man of a perverse self-indulgence, the lure of which is a constant threat to his humanity. Just as there are types of action and contemplation which tend to lift man's spirit and satisfy his innermost longing, so are there types of action and contemplation which, despite the temporary pleasure they may bring, tend to poison human existence. The central problem of life is to limit man's lower inclinations so that his higher nature may develop.

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[1] The origins of the American constitutional order in Hebrew, Greek, Roman, Christian and early modern civilization are summarized in Russell Kirk, *The Roots of American Order* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974). See also Forrest McDonald, *Novus Ordo Seculorum. The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1985).

To achieve genuine well-being man must try, above all, to realize moral goodness, the supreme value in which he finds his deepest satisfaction and in relation to which all other goods are therefore measured. Moral goodness is the power behind truly humane relationships. It is the basis for community. This ethical principle for individual and social harmony is referred to in the Western traditions variously as "friendship," "love," "charity," or the like. Today words like these carry predominantly sentimental connotations. They were originally terms for a state of character achieved through protracted moral self-improvement and education. Within the Western religious traditions, the principle of ultimate good is closely associated with a personal God, but it is possible to conceive of it in a non-religious manner.

A second imperative recognized by the Western traditions is the pursuit of knowledge. A special type of community, an intellectual affinity, develops among those who genuinely search for and respect the truth. The Western traditions cultivate reason because the intellectual illumination of life is indispensable to the realization of man’s ethical end, but also because reason makes possible a more general improvement of the human condition.

A third imperative is the creation of beauty. Human beings enrich their common life through a wide range of aesthetic activities. In their highest form, poetry, painting, sculpture, music, and other arts contribute indirectly to the ultimate goal of moral goodness by their intuitive penetration of the core of man’s existence. More generally the arts serve to refine and expand the sensibilities of the human community.

Because material well-being is a desirable means to the ethical, intellectual, and aesthetical enhancement of life, Western civilization has also promoted virtues of thrift and energy. In the modern world with its unprecedented economic growth and heavy stress on material production, the classical and Judaeo-Christian traditions are reminders that a higher standard of living is not an end in itself.

Human nature being imperfect and prone to lower inclinations, no final triumph is possible for the universal values that define a truly humane existence. In many parts of the world, achieving or maintaining even elementary social order has proved difficult, to say nothing of creating the conditions for a flourishing culture. But here and there societies have appeared whose norms and practices have restrained man’s tendencies to evil, ignorance and ugliness and helped him participate in a life that is truly worth living. In society at its best men’s diverse activities are, as it were, symphonically harmonized by the purpose of moral good. Through an integration of personal and social life men realize their higher nature. The great purpose of civilization is to promote the deeper and wider sharing in the values of goodness, truth and beauty, and in economic well-being as a means to these.

For the truly civilized person universal values come to count more than even individual survival. It is life of a certain quality, not mere existence on any terms, that commands final allegiance. The willingness of the civilized individual to risk personal existence for what has enduring value is rooted in a serenity of life that must not be confused with religious or political fanaticism.

From the classical and Judaeo-Christian traditions there emerges, thus, a view of man and society and the values that define the good life. Obviously, this consensus is not without tensions and disagreements. Over the centuries Western civilization has incorporated elements into its traditions that have revised and developed earlier ideas. It has done so while maintaining a basic continuity regarding the nature and purpose of life. That core of beliefs and corresponding patterns of behavior make it possible, even in our own century, to speak of ideas and practices that promote or undermine Western civilization.

One may view modern democracy, *in its constitutional form*, as an outgrowth and continuation of the classical and Judaeo-Christian traditions, although with the addition of some distinctly modern ingredients, such as a deepened appreciation for the freedom and importance of the individual. In this perspective, democracy is seen as based upon and structured to advance the social purposes just discussed. Constitutional democracy attempts to make the values of civilization more widely accessible and to enlist the largest possible number of people in the effort to advance those values. No assumption is made that, regardless of historical circumstances and experience, the great mass of people have a deep thirst for civilization. In some situations popular majorities may pose a powerful threat to civilized standards. Not only does sound democracy presuppose considerable ethical and cultural maturity on the part of the particular people, but the health and survival of this form of government is entirely dependent on keeping the values of civilization strong and widely shared, a task whose difficulty makes democracy perhaps the most demanding regime ever attempted.

The traditions of political thought that were founded by Plato and Aristotle and developed by Rome and Christianity nourished a sense of the necessity of subjecting political thought to other action to ethical scrutiny and direction. Politics in the broadest sense should serve man's moral end, the good life of community. To approximate this goal, society must first of all maintain order and protect itself against foreign enemies, but it must also encourage in the citizens the moral discipline without which there can be no real harmony in either personal or public life. Ethical education and self-education are primary tasks for a society that wishes to be civilized. The classical and Judaeo-Christian traditions have stressed the desirability of trying to rid politics and life in general of arbitrary or merely self-seeking action while acknowledging that man's divided nature makes the goal unattainable. Man must have modest expectations of what can be achieved through government, but society advances its high purpose partly through the restraint and guidance of law. Legal norms convey both what society abhors and what it treasures. The ethically inspired respect for and reliance upon law that has characterized constitutional democracy at its best is one of its many ties to the old Western traditions.

Plebiscitary Democracy

An optimistic view of man's capacity for goodness predisposes political thought to giving the great mass of men a good deal of influence, perhaps unlimited power, over not only their personal affairs but the governing of society as whole. Such is the strong inclination of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1717-1778), a decisively important influence behind the French Revolution. Rousseau provides an ethical justification for what is here called plebiscitary democracy. Discarding the Christian doctrine of original sin, as well as every other notion that there is some chronic flaw in the human soul, he proclaims the natural, spontaneous goodness of man. He condemns all existing societies for having enslaved man's true nature by means of laws, norms and other expectations. To recover his original goodness while remaining in society, man must overthrow the oppressive structures of traditional civilization. Rousseau propounds a radically different, egalitarian political order that gives the mass of the people, or, more precisely, the majority, unlimited power to follow its will of the moment. His hope for the future is the virtuous rule by equals, a vision that, in one form or another, is found at the root of the plebiscitary ideal of democracy.[2]

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[2] Rousseau's idea of popular sovereignty is developed in *The Social Contract*, which should be read together with his two *Discourses* and *Émile*. For an extensive analysis and critique of Rousseau's ideas and

In contrast to the ideas of Rousseau, a deeply pessimistic view of human nature is likely to produce distrust of man's capacity for self-government and a preference for some sort of authoritarian political rule. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) sees human beings as wholly egocentrical creatures who are unable to contain their passions without the threat of force. He rules out moral self-improvement in the traditional sense. In the *Leviathan*, Hobbes explains that men are strongly prone to a war of all against all. They can be saved from this intolerable state only by subjecting themselves to unlimited political sovereignty, preferably placed in the hands of a single ruler.

The classical and Judaeo-Christian view of human nature is that man has both higher and lower inclinations. Man is worthy of self-government to the extent that he is able to overcome selfishness and ignorance. It is ethical responsibility and wisdom that qualify the individual to rule himself and others. Plato attributed that potential to few men and hence regarded democracy, at least as he understood it, as an inferior form of government characterized by popular whim and demagogic leadership. Other representatives of the same tradition in political thought have been more sanguine about the ability of the larger population to participate, at least marginally, in the higher life of society and thus to qualify for full citizenship. Aristotle saw the possibility of a popularly oriented regime that would not undermine the noble purpose of politics. Significantly, Aristotle, too, is sharply critical of rule by the majority of the moment on the basis of an indiscriminate extension of political rights. What he believes to be the best practicable type of regime, the polity, has a substantial popular ingredient, but it also counteracts the danger of partisan majoritarian rule, for example, by trying to balance the interests of the poor against the interests of the propertied classes and by incorporating aristocratic elements into the regime. The polity should have a strong middle class whose habits of prudence and moderation provide stability. Nothing was further from Aristotle's mind than prescribing a particular form of government regardless of circumstances. The polity presupposed favorable social conditions. The leading political thinkers of traditional Christianity recognized the responsibility of rulers to the people, but never advocated democracy in the sense of universal suffrage and majority rule.

A dualistic view of man, taking into account both the higher and lower potentialities of human nature, may lead to acceptance of constitutional democracy in favorable historical circumstances. That form of government does not rest on a belief in the unfailing virtue of the great mass of people. As John Adams has said, the people can be as tyrannical as any king. Although constitutional democracy requires a people of considerable ethical and cultural maturity, it fully expects, and in its institutions reflects, that ordinarily most men will pursue their self-interest. It trusts enough the character and judgment of men in general to give them influence over government, but it also distrusts them enough to limit and channel their power by means of constitutional restraints and representative institutions.

The plebiscitary ideal of democracy calls for the quick and faithful implementation of the current wishes of the people. Rousseau argues in *The Social Contract* that the people must be subject to no constitutional checks. The opinion of the present majority must itself be the law. The people may select officials to carry out their decisions, but representation in the determination of the popular will is unacceptable. Legislative representation is seen by Rousseau as depriving the people of their rightful authority and freedom. Genuine popular sovereignty is possible only in a small republic where all the citizens can personally participate in the making of laws.

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a general theory of the ethical basis of constitutional democracy, see Claes G. Ryn, *Democracy and the Ethical Life*, second expanded ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990).

Descendants of the Rousseauistic spirit in the large societies of today usually recognize the need for elected representatives who can act for the people, but they also believe that precautions must be taken to ensure that those representatives will faithfully carry out the wishes of their constituencies. Anything less is a betrayal of popular sovereignty. Among the ways of guaranteeing adherence to the current popular will are short terms of office for elected representatives, the possibility of recalling or censuring public officials, and referenda on issues of public policy.

If plebiscitary democracy in the full Rousseauistic sense has never been realized in practice, it is for radical reformers still an inspiring ideal in comparison with which all existing governments are insufficiently democratic. Today's plebiscitary democrats may not agree with all of Rousseau's ideas, but they share with him a dislike of institutions and practices that limit or dilute the influence of the popular majority. It is assumed that the great mass of men have an instinctive virtue, a wholesome sense of what is best for society, although more comprehensive reforms than removing constitutional obstacles may be necessary to release the people's goodness.

A large literature of plebiscitary inspiration portrays the traditional American constitutional order as a thinly masked attempt to thwart or circumvent the rightful wishes of the people. The title of a representative but now somewhat dated book, The *Deadlock of Democracy* by James MacGregor Burns, conveys the plebiscitary impatience with American constitutional structures.[3] In the past, sentiments of this type were most often expressed in the United States by "progressives" or "liberals," who want more ambitious government, but more recently individuals calling themselves "conservatives" have also spoken as if the healthy instincts of the common people were being thwarted by cumbersome institutions and elected leaders. Many reasons can be advanced in today's Western societies for regarding government as bloated, misdirected and intrusive, but an assumption that "the people" always know best finds little support in the older Western tradition.

Constitutional democracy does not identify the will of the people with the opinions of the current numerical majority. There is little reason to believe that the long-term interests of the people find expression in the most recent opinion poll. The majority of the moment may be dominated by narrow prejudice, ignorance or blatant self-seeking. Perhaps it is under the influence of superficial mass media or demagogic politicians. Constitutional democracy assumes some awareness on the part of the people themselves that such flawed opinions are common and that they pose serious dangers. In keeping with this self-knowledge, constitutional democracy adopts popular rule under self-imposed restraints. In that kind of democracy the people do not desire to be governed according to their wishes of the moment. They support laws and institutions that will promote responsible, well-informed decisions. The people endorse constitutional restraints and representative institutions in part to arm themselves against their own moments of weakness.

In a constitutional democracy, representation is not seen as undermining popular rule but as a desirable way of discerning and articulating the best interest of the people. This view of representation is integral to the original American Constitution. It is expressed in the *Federalist Papers*. In the well-known words of James Madison, the purpose of representation is:

. . . to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of

[3] James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves.[4]

In a constitutional democracy there is nothing inherently objectionable about elected or non-elected public officials not following present public opinion. The American Constitution gives many officeholders considerable independence in relation to the popular wishes of the moment, partly by giving them rather long terms of office six years for Senators, four years for Presidents. Members of the Supreme Court are shielded from public opinion and other political pressures by their life-time tenure. In the constitutional form of democracy, representation is not a matter of carrying out the instructions of the majority. A representative owes his electorate every consideration, but he also owes them his best judgment as to what is in their best interest. In deliberations on policy he must in addition consider not just the good of his own constituency but the good of the whole. He would betray his trust, as Edmund Burke insists, if he allowed his conscience and insight to be overpowered by the partisan passions of the moment.[5] A genuine representative is prepared to resist what he considers to be misguided popular opinion. He does so in the hope that by the time he must face the voters again they will have recognized his foresight or at least come to admire his courage and integrity in resisting their pressures. But the representative must be prepared to sacrifice his office.

Modern constitutional democracy has a much wider popular base than any ancient or medieval government, but in so far as it still has roots in the classical and Judaeo-Christian heritage, it retains a belief that there should be between government officials and the people at large a sense of shared responsibility, a partnership in the purposes of the good society that assigns different responsibilities to the people and their leaders. Popular representatives must serve the voters, but the latter owe their public officials some considerable leeway as they try to articulate the best interest of the people.

Constitutional democracy, in sum, does not aspire to making government policy a reflection of whatever popular opinions predominate at a particular time. The current majority has no monopoly on virtue or wisdom and may indeed be dangerously wrong. Constitutional democracy is designed rather to articulate and be guided by the people's "deliberate sense." Important issues need to be discussed in a calm, judicious and prudent manner and in the light of conscience. The enduring popular will is seen as emerging over time through a partnership between the voters and their representatives, all participating in governing but playing different roles. In the United States a preference for popular rule under self-imposed limitations and procedures has itself been an expression of the long-term, deliberate sense of the people.

It might be suggested but left for later discussion that, although the American people have lived under their Constitution for over two centuries, today its spirit or ethos may increasingly be respected more in substance.

U.S. Democracy as Constitutional Rather Than Plebiscitary

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[4] Hamilton, Madison and Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), No. 10 (Madison), p. 82.

[5] For the classic definition of the proper role of a representative, see Edmund Burke, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol," quoted in *Edmund Burke: Selected Writings and Speeches*, ed. Peter Stanlis (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983), pp. 186-87.

It is important to add another dimension to the distinction between plebiscitary and constitutional democracy relating to their respective understandings of the popular will. Rousseauistic democracy requires complete political equality. For the virtuous popular will to manifest itself, the people must form an undifferentiated mass of individuals, all counting the same. To use a currently popular phrase, there should be "one man, one vote," so that the will of the numerical majority can be obtained. Genuine laws, Rousseau insists, spring equally from all and apply equally to all, a notion that implies the desirability of removing social conditions that make the citizens different or give any special political powers to groups of them. Rousseau is the enemy of what he calls "sectional associations" in the state. Social subdivisions and groups are for him partisan, conspiratorial entities that divert the citizens from the good of the whole. The common good has nothing to do with the needs and interests of human associations. To become a part of the virtuous *volonté générale*, the individual must be wholly autonomous, "think only his own thoughts," which means being free of the influences of groups and organizations.

Rousseau's idea of popular government is a frontal attack on society's subdivisions and private groups. Whereas the classical and Christian thinkers assumed that man has a social nature and that he manifests his humanity in groups, ranging from small and intimate to large, Rousseau believes that it is social entanglements of that type that destroy his natural goodness. Rousseau would consequently abolish the social entities between the individual and the state, making qualified exception for a quasi-familial unit. He is at once an uncompromising individualist and an uncompromising collectivist. The individual becomes the state, the state the individual.

Rousseau's attack on the sectional associations is not incidental to his work; it is a logical and necessary result of his view of man and society. Man does not need social groups to become fully human, as the old tradition had argued. Rousseau understands well that the historical evolved associations, most especially intimate groups like the traditional extended family, foster and transmit norms and practices that are antithetical to his dreams for man. Existing Western civilization cannot be eradicated unless the habit of forming and living in groups, from which that civilization is indistinguishable, is also destroyed.

Far from undermining man's sectional associations, American constitutional democracy has encouraged and protected them. Traditionally, American democracy has shown little or no interest in the people understood as an undifferentiated mass of individuals. The "people" in this sense is not recognized by the Constitution. In the American tradition more generally the people consists of persons who belong to groups of various kinds and who receive their identity in large part from these memberships. The citizens are given political power only as members of sectional associations. They share in government, for example, as residents of a state, of a particular congressional district, state legislative district, county, city or other political subdivision. The principle of "one man, one vote," which would give the same voting power to each citizen, is blatantly ignored by the Constitution, as if on purpose. In spite of populations of vastly different size, the States of Wyoming and California send the same number of Senators to Washington. The residents of Wyoming thus have many times the voting power of residents of California. Even in elections to the House of Representatives voting power is weighted in favor of sectional interests, for each State, regardless of the size of its population, is entitled to at least one representative.[6]

There is no channel through which the undifferentiated mass of the American people could express its will, if it had one. American political structures in general seek to ascertain the will of

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[6] This conspicuous disregard of "one man, one vote" did not stop the U.S. Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, from discovering in the Constitution a mandate in favor of this principle. See Reynolds v. Sims (1964).

the people only as organized in groups and associations of various kinds. Whether by design or spontaneous evolution, America's decentralized and decentralizing political structures empower countless subdivisions from the local to the national sphere, extending political privileges to them to ensure their viability and independence. Man, American tradition proclaims, is a social and political being needing associations to develop his essential nature. Americans have shown themselves to be in this respect far more the descendants of Aristotle and Christianity than followers of social atomists like Rousseau, or, for that matter, John Locke. The popular will in American constitutional democracy does not belong to a disembodied, atomistically dissolved people, but is socially and historically derived and grounded.

Strong plebiscitary, majoritarian tendencies in the Western democracies have weakened the decentralized and group-oriented society in favor of large collectives and most especially the central government. These developments have been induced in large part by the opportunities for power that lie in promising economic and other advantages to popular majorities. Under these pressures, many functions that traditionally belonged to social and political entities close to the citizens and that were under local or private control have been absorbed by an administrative state which has gathered unto itself ever new responsibilities and powers. It is highly suggestive of the essential nature of plebiscitary democracy that the practical consequence of these tendencies toward plebiscitary "people power", i.e., government according to the wishes of the numerical national majority, has been a huge transfer of power from the people in their localities and private groups to politicians and bureaucrats far removed from individual citizens and communities.

Democracy, Morality and Power

If constitutional democracy is viewed as a democratic form of the old Western attempt to make political rule conducive to the good, the true and the beautiful, it cannot neglect moral and other training of its citizens. On the contrary, it presupposes a greater effort of that type than any other form of government. The reason is that democracy gives the entire adult population some significant influence over the making of public policy. To be compatible with the purposes of civilization it must successfully prepare its citizens for the high responsibilities of governing. Only those are capable and worthy of self-rule who have achieved some moral and cultural maturity. Individuals dominated by ignorance, capricious impulse or blatant partisanship will govern themselves poorly, to say nothing of ruling others. Without strong and widespread respect for the universal values of civilization, constitutional democracy will evolve in the direction of a majoritarian system in which demagogues in politics, journalism and elsewhere play a major role and in which partisanship overpowers the common good.

In view of certain habits of mind common at the end of the twentieth century, it needs to be stressed that creating or maintaining the ethical and cultural prerequisites of constitutional democracy is not a simple matter of having government and other institutions propagate a democratist ideology. It was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the exponent of egalitarian, plebiscitary democracy, who wanted the allegedly virtuous will of the people to be expressed in and reinforced by an approved civic doctrine. This idea merely brought into the open the anti-traditional and totalitarian implications of his thought. Constitutional democracy as here understood forms part of a larger moral and cultural ethos. It is made possible by a living civilization which vitally shapes its members in diverse ways according to their individual circumstances and abilities. Government promulgating a set of democratist tenets or "values" signifies the loss of authentic civilized standards and habits and their replacement by an ideological mind-set.

Popular government needs to justify itself as conducive to maintaining or promoting the widest possible sharing in the works and fruits of civilization. From that point of view, features of American democracy like universal suffrage, constitutional checks, separation of powers, due process of law, legal protection for individuals and groups, and freedom of speech and association are seen not as providing a value-neutral, wholly open-ended freedom, but as political means to the ends of civilization. By definition, the civilized society has a sense of the general direction in which goodness, truth and beauty are to be sought, but these values are never definitively attained and are inexhaustible. They must be pursued in forever changing historical circumstances by unique individuals who face particular problems and needs. No single individual or group of individuals has a monopoly on understanding the common good. Most citizens have some capacity, however limited, for improving society's quality of life, and they need freedom to exercise their creativity and assert their personality. Tolerance is a fundamental need of the civilized society. Sometimes universal values are advanced in unexpected ways that initially offend convention.

What has here been argued about higher ends that constitutional democracy should serve, must not be construed as meaning that this form of government could be primarily a method for producing ethical, aesthetical and intellectual progress. It should be underscored that all governments, if they are to survive, must first of all be able to handle power effectively. No less than other forms of government must constitutional democracy protect itself against threats to its internal and external security. It must be at home in a world where conflict between more or less ruthless wills is pervasive. It must be prepared to employ means that correspond to this reality. The earlier discussion of the ethical and cultural prerequisites and purposes of constitutional democracy was not intended to discount the importance of this side of politics but only to define the ultimate goals to which power is properly directed.

A Public Philosophy

It is often suggested that democracies are at a distinct disadvantage as compared to authoritarian or totalitarian governments when it comes to conducting foreign policy and using military force. Principles like the consent of the governed, freedom of debate, openness of information and due process reduce the effectiveness, speed and continuity with which democracies can act. In particular, the dependence of democratic governments on public opinion is said to complicate their task.

This subject was dealt with at length by Walter Lippmann (18891974), who was a notable scholarly writer as well as a leading journalists. A student of the challenges facing the modern Western democracies, Lippmann gave particular attention to the role of public opinion in the making of foreign policy before, during and after the Second World War. In *The Public Philosophy* (1955) he diagnosed "a sickness of the Western liberal democracies." A deep social and political disorder with roots in moral confusion and decadence prevented the democracies from perceiving the seriousness of the external and internal threats to their continued existence and made them unable to act effectively against these threats. Western society was abandoning its "public philosophy," a term that is largely synonymous with what has here been called the classical and Judaeo-Christian traditions. Nowhere was the precariousness of democracy more evident than in the growing fickleness and superficiality of public opinion and in the increasing subjection of governments to that opinion. Politicians of genuine knowledge and foresight who warned of dangers were unwelcome and likely to be drowned out by the escapist rhetoric of self-serving

demagogues. Winston Churchill's repeated warnings regarding the nature and intentions of Hitler were long overpowered by soothing themes of accommodation or pacifism. Churchill's warnings were heeded only when no doubt could remain about Hitler's plans and about the naivete of previous ways of dealing with him. Fighting a world war was now the sole available course of action.

In Lippmann's view, unfortunate developments within the Western democracies are discouraging the wise and knowledgeable from speaking out. "The general rule is that a democratic politician had better not be right too soon. Very often the penalty is political death." It is safer to keep in step with the parade of public opinion. Because of the decline of political culture, public men are forever in danger of their political lives. "With exceptions so rare that they are regarded as miracles and freaks of nature, successful democratic politicians are insecure and intimidated men. They advance politically only as they placate, appease, bribe, seduce, bamboozle, or otherwise manage to manipulate the demanding and threatening elements in their constituencies." This servitude to popular pressures is symptomatic of a malady of civilization that may have the gravest consequences. This illness may be "deadly to the very survival of the state if, when the great and hard issues of war and peace, of security and solvency, of revolution and order are up for decision, the executive and judicial departments, with their civil servants and technicians, have lost their power to decide."

The heart of democracy's problems was for Lippmann the erosion of the public philosophy, a development that has continued in the decades since he published his book. One result is the further unleashing of partisanship in various forms and the fragmentation of society. Without a widely shared and deeply rooted sense of society's higher end to moderate the self-indulgence of individuals and groups, government has become more and more the servant of clamoring pressure groups. According to Lippmann, politicians rationalize their servitude by saying that "in a democracy public men are the servants of the people," but this democratic posturing really signifies a betrayal of public trust. The pandering by politicians to interest groups with a view to their own careers is a political manifestation of the destruction of democracy's ethical and cultural foundations.[7]

It is a weakness of Lippmann's analysis that he made public opinion seem an almost autonomous force operating independently of political elites and restricting the ability of the latter to act for the common good. But popular representatives are far from being always merely the victims of these pressures. Often, and increasingly, they help to create them, in more or less formal alliance with journalists, activists, authors, artists and others who play a role in shaping the popular imagination. People already in power generate plebiscitary pressures to justify expansion of their power. Partly because of the progressive centralization of national life, including news media and communication, public opinion is as much a reflection as a source of central power. In the environment of mass appeals there is little room for real deliberation and responsible leadership.

Since Lippmann published *The Public Philosophy* a media and cultural establishment has become deeply entrenched whose general attitude toward traditional Western ethical and cultural norms has seriously weakened the foundations for the kind of leadership that he deemed necessary. Lippmann worried about the inability of the executive to carry out necessary policies because of the pressures of public opinion. But increasingly government leaders and experts and people in general disagree sharply among themselves, not just about means but about the larger purposes of society. Deepening tensions within Western society regarding "first principles" are dividing political institutions against themselves. The American constitutional system deliberately created

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[7] Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy* (New York: New American Library, 1955), pp. 28-29.

some checks and balances and was designed to promote a functional consensus out of contending interests, but the Constitution presupposed an underlying civilized ethos embraced by virtually all citizens that would set the general direction of society and limit the range of acceptable interests. Many of the present divisions are due to major departures from that ethos and are so sharp that the compromise induced by the system often produces not consensus but either paralysis or the triumph of the lowest common denominator.

It has been suggested here that constitutional democracy does not exist to enact the wishes of the most recent popular majority. The difficulties just described are those of a popular government that still maintains some of the forms of constitutional democracy, but is substantively sliding in the direction of plebiscitary democracy not plebiscitary democracy as envisioned by Rousseau but as it might look in the actual world. If Lippmann is right that democracy must have a capacity for decisive, effective and coherent action, especially in foreign affairs, only a constitutional form of popular government can be expected to meet the need. But that form of government is possible, in substance and not just in form, only within a vital civilized consensus that enables the citizens to live up to the high demands placed upon them. A sense of higher obligation is basic to the responsibility and integrity of popular leaders. It is also necessary if the citizens are to give their representatives some considerable freedom of action in the handling of controversial issues. A relationship of mutual trust between government leaders and the great mass of people presupposes a shared belief in enduring higher values with reference to which it is possible to transcend personal advantage and partisanship. Unless the people in a democracy are able to recognize in their leaders a superior competence and dedication to the common good, they are unlikely to tolerate deviations by the government from their own present opinions and desires.

Conclusion

One may imagine a democratic society in which the citizens are chronically unsure of the meaning of their lives and of the purpose of society as a whole. Upbringing and education do little to encourage prudence and self-restraint. The whims of the citizens are catered to by opportunistic politicians looking to advance their careers. The citizens are easily swayed by demagogic appeals to their appetites and fears. A social and political condition of this kind could not sustain a constitutional democracy as here defined. There could be in such a society no higher partnership between the people and their leaders. Indeed, partisanship would undermine political order. In Plato's analysis, rule according to the popular wishes of the moment prepares the way for a regime that is even worse than what he calls democracy, one that replaces democratic irresponsibility and license with ruthless despotism.

Plato could not have imagined a modern mass democracy administered by a huge and proliferating bureaucracy. It is still possible to argue that in important respects the Western democracies, including the American, have transformed themselves into something resembling the social and political condition that Plato feared. Plebiscitary practices and sentiments have increased the role of partisanship and of opportunistic politicians looking to score political gains. The old Western consensus regarding a good beyond particular interests is eroding. Traditional notions of moral responsibility are being replaced by a subjectivist ethic or a sentimental-utopian ethic of "universal values" that conceals a desire for power. Enlightened self-interest, aided at least in the United States by sturdy constitutional arrangements, still stands in the way of anarchic conflict or majoritarian tyranny, but enlightened self-interest that is less and less guided by older notions of the common good has great difficulty providing the long-term direction and permanence

of effort that is desirable in domestic politics and essential in foreign policy, especially in times of danger.[8]

To survive in the long run, constitutional democracy must be exceptionally attentive to the need for moral and cultural education and self-education among the citizens. Because of the special danger that lies in the possible abuse of democratic freedoms and rights, neglect of that old task of civilization threatens democracy with extinction. Popular self rule, it should be repeated, is not the least demanding, but the most demanding form of government ever conceived. Its prerequisites cannot be supplied, as an afterthought, by government programs or decrees.

Since the strong plebiscitary currents in America and elsewhere are themselves symptomatic of a widespread abandonment of the traditional supports of constitutional democracy, one may well wonder whether recovery is possible. The democratic elites are not even inclined to believe that Western democracy is in any serious trouble. In fact many speak and behave as if democracy exuded radiant health and were a formula for global well-being. Defining democracy, beyond formulating a few generalities like "human rights" and "democratic freedom", appears not to be a priority. That democracy can be defined in radically different ways is understood only vaguely, if at all. How typical of the present intellectual confusion and irresponsibility that "one man, one vote" is proposed for societies around the world, although this principle was never adopted by the largest Western democracy. Most revealing and disturbing of all, utopian enthusiasm is obscuring that popular government in a meaningful and acceptable sense has important moral and cultural prerequisites. The point is not that specifically Western norms and habits are necessary for popular government to succeed. The point is that there *are* preconditions and that efforts to spread democracy without a careful definition of the term and without regard to the circumstances of particular countries may be destructive not only of civilized ends, but of the prospects for good government of any kind.

It is possible that Western civilization has the resilience and creativity sufficient to save constitutional democracy. Should that be the happy outcome, it will not be because of boosterish democratist crusades, but because Western man is able to recover his bearings through a moral, intellectual and aesthetic revitalization of his civilization.

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[8] The sharp difference between Plato in Book VIII of *The Republic* and Rousseau in the *Social Contract* regarding majoritarian, plebiscitary rule reflects their almost antithetical views of the nature of man and of society.

Chapter XIII
Representation in Piaget's Theory

H. Furth

The word "representation" was coined by philosophers around 1600 when the medieval theory of intentionality was no longer a viable model for describing the nature of human knowledge. It referred to the human ability "to re-present" (*rem praesentem facere)*, that is, to a knowledge of objects not present as sensorimotor objects-of-actions. Thus representational knowledge was distinguished from sensory knowledge, the concept from the percept.

Today, this distinction is no longer so meaningful, yet the word "representation" continues to be used, especially in connection with the flourishing new computer-oriented cognitive science, information processing and cognitive brain research. It is implicitly part of a crude "copy" or "correspondence-theory" of knowledge, in the sense that (internal) knowledge is conceptualized as an internalized model of (external) reality. Representation is then conceived either as something psychological, a covert act, a fractional, abbreviated response, or as something neurological related to specific brain circuits or synaptic connections. Usually these two levels are not sharply distinguished: many scholars feel quite comfortable with the idea that knowledge is "in the brain".

Apart from this philosophical connotation, there is also the everyday use of the word in the legal and political arena, and above all, the ordinary meaning of a pictorial, figurative likeness: "This picture or this play is a representation of. . . ." Compare this with the copy-theory mentioned above: "(Internal) knowledge is a representation of (external) reality." Clearly, "representation" in ordinary language has many different meanings. When it is used in the context of describing or explaining knowledge processes, it seems incumbent on the investigator to bring some conceptual clarity to this word. This is probably not possible without a fairly comprehensive theory of knowledge within which the function of representation can be clearly delineated.

Piaget's Theory of Symbol Formation

Piaget's is nothing if not a comprehensive, all-encompassing theory of knowledge. How does representation fit into the theory? In his book on symbol formation (Piaget, 1951), he stated it as follows: in the wide sense representation is identical with thought, that is, all intelligence beyond the sensorimotor stage; in the strict sense, it is a mental image of an absent reality. He goes on to say that the image is a symbolic evocation. As a symbol the image is a signifier that refers to thought; that is, representation in the strict sense has its meaning in representation in the wide sense.

Whereas other scholars use representation to "explain" thought, for Piaget, on the contrary, thought "explains" representation. Moreover, thought itself is explained as an object (of knowledge) which develops during the first two years from the infant's original object-of-action. Knowledge for Piaget is never conceptualized as an image (remember that the word idea derives from the Greek word for image!), but is always linked to action. Sensorimotor knowledge is the coordination of a present action within which there is a sensory or perceptual component. But perception at this level is not an isolated taking-in of sensory information. Rather, it is sensorimotor and has meaning to the child in terms of action. In Piaget's terminology: an object-of-action is assimilated to the child's action schemes, at the same time as these schemes are accommodated to

the object. There is no initial "pure" perception which then leads to further processing in terms of action, somewhat like a temporal sequence of (incoming) sense impression-perception-(outgoing) action. Only later in development, through progressive assimilation-accommodation differentiation and integration, do infants come to understand that the source of assimilation (the subject acting on the object) and the source of accommodation (the object impinging on the acting subject) are separable. This is the origin of what Piaget calls the "permanent" (i.e., stable) object.

Once object understanding is fully achieved around age two, children experience a new psychological reality, namely, the world of objects-of-knowledge. These objects, as said above, derive from previously encountered objects-of-actions. They are separable from a present action, but still they are linked to action; you can call them objects of a *possible* action, in contrast to sensorimotor objects of a *present* action. Note that object understanding is not a particular knowledge of a specific content, rather it is a general logical achievement, the culmination of sensorimotor logic. It is the transition from the logic of action to a qualitatively new kind of conscious logic. Four to five years later this initial logical achievement will lead first to the logic of concrete operations with its concomitant awareness of logical necessity and subsequently to the full-blown logic of formal operations.

The immediate consequence of the logic of the permanent object is the ability to make absent objects psychologically present. Driven by the pleasure experienced in the object and desirous of re-living past satisfying interpersonal relations or defending against unpleasant anxiety, children after age two use this new ability. This can be observed first in external gestures and play and it is followed quickly by internal images, imagination and fantasy. There is also a new form of socially shared communication, namely, societal language. These then are the three major forms of what Piaget called the "symbolic" function: symbolic gestures, internal images, and shared language. He later changed the name to the "semiotic" function so that he could put language as a conventional symbol system apart from the first two more idiosyncratic symbol forms. Leaving aside this last distinction (which unfortunately lends itself to the very misinterpretation concerning the symbol-thought connection Piaget wanted to avoid), I want to stress the common features and the new psychological experience across all symbolic forms. In symbol formation the present action world is enlarged in the direction of the indefinite openness of possible actions. To the *presentation* of present actions is added the *representation* of possible actions.

Consistent with this view, I would suggest that representation is equivalent to what Piaget calls symbol and that both words can be used in exactly the same way (Furth, 1981, pp. 51-59). A child in play pretending to be an airplane can be said to symbolize or to represent an airplane. Likewise the same child daydreaming of airplanes is said by Piaget to have internalized previously external play gestures. The internalization of external symbols is the origin of mental images or, what is the same, of internal representation. One might not like to call language a representation (for a symbol) if you distinguish, as Piaget later did, between a conventional sign and an idiosyncratic symbol. However, when language is internalized (in silent talking within oneself), there should be no objection to refer to inner speech or to mental images as internal symbols or representations.

Elaborating further on Piaget's theory, consider that external symbols in themselves derive from the accommodation component of knowledge. Consequently, there is a built-in figurative-imitative correspondence of sorts between the symbol and the object symbolized (e.g., between the child's play and the airplane's configuration and movements). In symbol formation this original accommodation component (adjusted to a present *non-symbolic* action) is turned into a symbol (of the *symbolized* object of the action). But this turn is not an automatic, self-explanatory

act. Accommodation becomes symbolic *if and only if* there is assimilation to the operative scheme of the (permanent) object. This object assimilation gives meaning to the symbol, and where there is no object there is no symbol. For that reason object formation is the prerequisite to symbol formation. A (previous) accommodation provides the material component of the symbol as a signifier, a (present) object assimilation provides the meaning component, the signification of the symbol. Together they form the symbol. Where the symbolic accommodation is overt, there is an observable gesture or spoken (or signed) and written language; where the accommodation is covert and internal-schematic, there is a mental image or inner language.

Symbols and Logic

From this perspective it follows that the meaning of a symbol is as good as (and cannot be better than) the available schemes of assimilation. Further, there is no built-in correspondence between a particular symbol *type* and meaningful understanding such that linguistic or internalized symbols automatically would be superior to gestures or external symbols.

This is not to say that for a particular task at hand a particular form of symbol or representation may be required or advantageous or simply better than another form. In fact, flexibility in the choice of symbol-type (as in the choice of instances) frequently is a mark of superior knowledge. Undoubtedly there are great individual differences and personal strategies in the availability and use of representation; educators and researchers are beginning to be aware and take account of this diversity. Here is one reason for the great variability in each personalized understanding of the same "fact", insofar as different representations may implicate different and perhaps better ways of understanding.

What then is the relation between logic and representation? It was said earlier that there is no automatic relation between the two, except that object logic is the minimum prerequisite for symbol knowledge. Symbols signify objects-of-knowledge. This is in contrast to sensorimotor signifiers, such as signals, cues, index, that signify objects-of-action. Sensorimotor intelligence includes signal communication, perceptual cues, reward learning, recognition memory; in each case the signal, the cue the reward and the memory are part of present actions (for present bodily needs). This signifying situation can be expressed as a familiar sensorimotor accommodation, where familiar implies an acquired habit with its comfortable corresponding assimilation. In sensorimotor signifying acts there is therefore no need to postulate mental representation or images. Furthermore, the logic of action coordination is shaped and constrained by the physiological properties of the body and senses and the physical qualities of the world.

The symbolic world of representation, however, has no such constraints. The sky is the limit, or rather more factually, the desire is the limit and that is precisely what happens. The symbolic world that children after age two construct is at first, from the viewpoint of logical development, a sort of regression. Symbolically children will play or imagine situations they know could not happen in sensorimotor action, for instance, cars racing up a vertical wall. Two- to five-year-old children who have the new ability to form symbols, have yet to develop instruments with which to put some logical order into their representations. These logical instruments are nothing else but Piaget's operations. First there are the concrete operations around age six when children for the first time experience the constraints of logical necessity; then, around the onset of adolescence, formal operations come into play and with it the limitless opening toward new constructive possibilities.

Consider the difference between pre-operation children who, undisturbed by logical considerations, seem free to construct whatever symbols satisfy their fancy, and adolescents who experience the constraints of logical operations. Which of the two has more freedom? Surely, the adolescents who can use the very constraints of logic as a firm basis for the construction of new knowledge forms and new realities. Clearly the "freedom" of the young children is an illusion (for which there are probably good evolutionary reasons in terms of person- and group-formation). From an adult viewpoint we would say the children are not free, but are driven to construct mental representations. The inevitable result is the construction of a symbolic world (Furth, 1987) according to the desires and pleasures of the "I" (which the child is only just beginning to recognize as the counterpart of the "object" within the polarity of subject-object, I-other). And equally inevitable is the chaotic nature of this world. It is chaotic from an emotional angle due to mutually conflicting desires and pervasively ambivalent attitudes; but it is chaotic and contradictory also from a logical angle.

In this connection there arises the need for logical coordination. This need is nourished by the very attachment to other people that fueled symbol- and fantasy-formation in the first place. In the course of the development of pre-operations and its concomitant symbol formation, children come to realize that in order to share their own psychology with others they must make sure that their most general framework of reality coincides with the logic of others.

Operations are, in fact, the least common denominator that can be assumed to prevail between any two people, regardless of the greatest imaginable personal differences. As Piaget would put it, "Whether you are rich or poor, socialist or capitalist, clever or slow, the logical structure of numbers, classes, etc., is the same". Just as sensorimotor intelligence is called by Piaget the general coordination of present action, operatory intelligence can be described as the general coordination of possible actions. But what is the status of possible actions, where are they found? Are they real? That depends on your definition of reality. A psychologist need have no hesitation in saying they are as real as the psychology of symbol-constructing persons; in other words, possible actions are psychologically present in the form of symbols or representation.

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Chapter XIV
The Status of Principles in Confucian Ethics*

A. S. Cua

Principles as Personal Rules

Modern moral philosophy presents both meta-ethical and normative challenges to Confucian ethics. The meta-ethical challenge may be met by a reconstruction of a coherent conceptual scheme, with the ideal of *tao*[a] (the Way) as a unifying perspective for viewing the interdependence of basic aretaic notions (notions of virtue), i.e, *jen*[a] (benevolence), *li*[c] (propriety), and *i*[d] (rightness).[1] Given this scheme, one may proceed to deal with questions concerning ethical language and justification via a conception of argumentation as a cooperative enterprise aiming at a reasoned solution to a problem of common interest among concerned and responsible members of a moral community. Recently, based on *Hsün Tzu*[e], I offered a profile of Confucian argumentation, consisting of a characterization of desirable qualities of participants, standards of competence, phases of discourse, diagnosis of erroneous beliefs, as well as uses of definition in overcoming difficulties in communication.[2]

According to that account, justification is a phase of discourse, a reasoned response to a challenge to the acceptability of one's thesis. This response is chiefly anchored in ethical knowledge, that is, in the participant's "understanding of an ethical tradition's significance for coping with novel or exigent circumstances. Since there are no formulas or rules for resolving these hard cases, the task of justification in the final analysis lies in the unification of the participant's understanding of the actuating force of his ethical knowledge with judgment arrived at through a critical and informed deliberation of matters at hand. This judgment is essentially the product of the reasoned exercise of one's sense of rightness in response to changing circumstances (*yi-i pien-ying*[f]), and not derived from the application of so-called principles of conduct.[3] While

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[1] *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 16 (1989), 273-296.

Unless otherwise indicated, *jen* is used in the narrower sense of extensive benevolence, and not in the broad sense of *jen* as functionally equivalent to *tao*, the ideal of the good human life as a whole. In this narrower sense, *jen*, along with *li* and *i* are the specific terms (*pieh-ming*[ao]) or fundamental specifications of the concrete significance of *tao* as an abstract, generic term (*kung-ming*[ap]) Since this distinction, adopted from Hsün Tzu, is relative to the purpose of discourse, in context, *jen*, *li*, and *i* can also be regarded as generic terms amenable to specification, say, by way of particular aretaic notions such as filiality, loyalty, courage, etc. Note also that parenthetical terms are convenient focal indicators of meaning rather than translations, and occasionally are used for distinguishing homophones, for example, "*li* (ritual rules)" as distinct from "*li* (reason)." For further discussion of *tao* as a generic term, see A. S. Cua, "The Problem of Conceptual Unity in Hsün Tzu and Li Kou's Solution," *Bulletin of Chinese Philosophical Association*, 3 (1985), 465-495; (also *Philosophy East and West*, forthcoming); and "Hsün Tzu and the Unity of Virtues," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 14 (no. 4, 1987), 381-400; Chinese translation by Hsü Han[aq] 12, no. 12 (1985). For the distinction between the two senses of *jen*, see Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Confucian Concept *Jen*," *Philosophy East and West* 4 (no. 4, 1955).

[2] See A. S. Cua, *Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsün Tzu's Moral Epistemology* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). Hereafter cited as *Ethical Argumentation.*

[3] This is one reason for my preference of "reason" rather than "principle" for capturing the epistemic significance of *li* in the works of Hsün Tzu and Wang Yang-ming. See *Ethical Argumentation*, pp. 20-

there is indirect guidance provided by knowledge of accepted applications of *li* (ritual rules) and other aretaic notions, it is the special function of *i* (sense of rightness) to interpret and judge their relevance or irrelevance in a concrete and ethically perplexing setting.[4]

This conception of justification does not appeal to the notion of principle that possesses the status of objective validity and universal applicability, an appeal that is deemed requisite by most contemporary ethical thinkers (e.g., Kantian, utilitarian, and contractarian). Nevertheless, it seems proper to me that when principles are construed somewhat along the line of Kant's notion of maxims or "subjective principles of volition," i.e., as personal rules of conduct, they can have an important role to play in ethical deliberation and/or justification indeed, even for the conception of justification sketched in the preceding paragraph. These personal rules of conduct may be called "perceptive principles" or "first-personal precepts." As Aiken points out, their authoritative status is "contingent entirely upon the conscientious submission of the persons who adopt them."[5] More importantly, for a reflective Confucian agent, the adoption of such principles involves a reasoned assessment of his purposes, preferences, and desires in relation to the ideal of *tao*, the vision of the good human life. The *Analects* (*Lun Yü*[g]) provides an ample source for the adoption and development of personal rules of conduct. Most of the recorded conversations of Confucius and his students may be viewed as counsels to doing one's best (*chung*[h]) in the pursuit of the realization of *tao*. For example, one may recall his stress on respectfulness, courtesy, trustworthiness, kindness, generosity, and concern for, and consideration, of the well-being, feelings and desires of one's fellows. These remarks are more than mere counsels of prudence in the Kantian sense; they are intended notably as pointers to the constitutive means for the realization of *tao*.

Perceptive principles, though dependent on personal acceptance, may serve to articulate the significance of the agent's commitment to *tao* in his or her own life. When habitually adhered to, they may even be considered as a counterpart of the *li*(ritual rules) of the ethical tradition. In other words, these personal principles are rules of self-discipline and may well be quite in accord with the spirit of Confucius' teaching that to attain *jen*, the person must possess the ability to overcome or restrain those seemingly ungovernable passions that obstruct the compliance with *li* (ritual rules) (*Lun Yü*, 12:1). Possessing such personal disciplinary principles entitles the person to commendation. Indeed, self-mastery (*k'e-chi*[i]) is a Confucian virtue. But as Mencius points out, there are many paths to *jen*. If one attends to the difference in personal circumstance, it is unreasonable to expect all agents, particularly the paradigmatic individuals (*chün-tzu*[j]), to behave in the same way (*Meng Tzu*[k], 6B:6).[6]

As personal rules of conduct, principles can also have a valuable role to play in representing a committed agent's interpretation of the *perceptive* import of particular aretaic notions. Conceptually considered, Confucius's use of such notions as trustworthiness (*hsin*[l]) and

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24; *The Unity of Knowledge and Action: A Study in Wang Yang-ming's Moral Psychology* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1982), pp. 28-30. Hereafter cited as*The Unity of Knowledge and Action.*

[4] The foregoing merely highlights certain aspects of the complex activity of justification. For detailed discussion, see *Ethical Argumentation*, pp. 51-101.

[5] Henry David Aiken, "On the Concept of a Moral Principle," in *The Isenberg Memorial Lecture Series, 1965-1966* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1969), p. 114; I. Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), pp. 16-17; and J. Kovesi, *Moral Notions* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 93.

[6] For the notion of paradigmatic individuals and its application to *chün-tzu*, see A. S. Cua, *Dimensions of Moral Creativity: Paradigms, Principles, and Ideals* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), chap. 3-5. Hereafter cited as *Dimensions of Moral Creativity.*

respectfulness (*ching*[m]) are open to individual interpretation regarding their practical import. Since *tao* is the unifying perspective, these principles, as the outcome of the exercise of reason (*li*[n]), may properly be construed as ethical principles, as suggested by Wang Yang-ming's notion of *tao-li*[o]. In the light of *tao*, these principles are ideal-embedded, oriented toward the actualization of *tao* in human life. Again, they make no claim to universal validity nor to prescription of absolute or fixed rules of conduct. In elucidating Mencius's saying that "holding the mean without allowing for special circumstances is like holding on to one particular thing," Wang Yang-ming[p] remarks that "the mean is nothing but the change. It changes according to the time. How can one hold it fast? One must have a sense of timing in determining what is the appropriate thing to do. It is difficult to fix a pattern or action in advance."[7]

Of course, when the agent is acknowledged as a paradigmatic individual by his fellows in the community, his principles can have a projective significance for others. But whether his perceptive interpretation of aretaic notions deserves attention from other agents remains an open question. An agent may publicly advocate his principles, but this advocacy is subject to critical consideration and acceptance by others. These principles cannot be proffered as self-certifying, authoritative pronouncements.

In argumentative context, personal, ideal-embedded principles may also be an articulation of the participant's understanding of the inherited core of common ethical knowledge, that is, the knowledge of those operative standards of conduct plausibly presumed to be a matter of conventional wisdom. Since such a presumption is defeasible, each participant carries a burden of reasonable persuasion in advocating his or her principles as "the" correct or sound interpretation of what is deemed implicit in common ethical knowledge. It is to be expected that there will be an absence of agreement or even disagreement among competent participants in their understanding of the import of ethical knowledge for a case at hand. Given that argumentation is a cooperative undertaking to resolve a problem of common interest, the absence of agreement should provide an occasion for transforming it into one of agreement. In the larger view of the ennobling function of *li* (ritual rules), i.e., the promotion of the virtues of nobility and goodness,[8] a Confucian would endorse Collingwood's view that "being civilized means living, so far as possible, dialectically, that is, in constant endeavor to convert every occasion of non-agreement into an occasion of agreement."[9]

In the case of disagreement, a concerned and responsible participant would adhere to the cooperative spirit in investigating alternatives congenial to the pursuit of a common enterprise, rather than hold on tenaciously to his own view. For his view may be the product of obscuration of mind (*pi*[q]), rather than an impartial exercise of reason (*li*).[10] While disagreement may not be transformed into agreement, personal principles, when sincerely espoused in argumentation, are not without value, for they can function as critical instruments for the transformation of the ethical tradition. They provide a range of possible options in interpreting the living significance of tradition in dealing with present problematic situations. As one eminent historian of the Christian

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[7] See Wing-tsit Chan (trans.), *Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Essays by Wang Yang-ming* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), sec. 52 (with minor emendation). For further discussion, see *The Unity of Knowledge and Action*, pp. 35-45.

[8] See my "The Concept of *Li* in Confucian Moral Theory," in Robert Allinson (ed.), *Understanding Chinese Mind: Philosophical Roots* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[9] R. G. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan: or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 326.

[10] See *Ethical Argumentation*, pp. 138-59.

tradition puts it, "Ultimately, . . . tradition will be vindicated for us, for each of us as an individual and for us as communities, by how it manages to accord with our deepest intuitions and highest aspirations," which are themselves "imbedded in the tradition."[11] A living tradition is enriched by its historical past and interpreted by members of the community as having a present significance.

Seen in this way, Confucian argumentation may be considered properly as an exemplification of a Roycean community of interpretation, an ongoing dialectical process that has no terminus.[12] While the goal is to seek agreement, the claim to the interpersonal significance of personal principles is essentially contestable by fellow agents. The exercise of *li* (reason) has no single voice that commands allegiance of all agents. The search for a monolithic account of the use of reason appears to be a delusion (*huo*[r]), a condition to be rectified by cultivating the clarity of mind (*ming*[s]) to dispel the varieties of factors that obstruct the mind's cognitive task. I suggest, then, that in argumentation, the claim to interpersonal significance for personal principles is best construed as a claim to an experiment in moral change, as an attempt to endow renewed significance to ethical knowledge. Were such a claim accepted by all the participants and become a basis of teaching, personal principles would acquire a *de jure* status and become part of the content of an established tradition. In this manner, personal principles may be transmuted into impersonal principles. But they remain subject to further critical interpretation of their significance in dealing with future issues of human conduct.[13]

The preceding observations on the role and status of principles as personal rules of conduct presuppose a critical appreciation of the internal point of view of Confucian ethics as an ethics of virtue that stresses the value of principles in contributing to the cultivation of the virtues of self-discipline and of cooperation.[14] Notably, it is an ethics that is preoccupied with cultural renaissance or the continuing vitality of a cultural tradition, but makes no claim to certainty nor universality in interpretation. As set forth in Chang Tsai's[t] powerful essay entitled "Western Inscription" (*Hsi-ming*[u]), the vision of *tao*. or *jen* in the broad sense, is indeed universal, in that it expresses an ideal of human care and concern for the well-being of all existent things, an ideal of the unity and harmony of humans and all things in the world. Implied in this vision is not a norm to be spelled out in terms of a set of universal principles of conduct, but something more like *a theme* that admits of a diversity of interpretations of its concrete significance and crucially depends for its realization on a serious regard for an operative ethical tradition.[15] Moreover, in this *tao*-oriented conceptual scheme, the application of aretaic notions and their correlative principles is essentially culture-bound.

For a philosopher who does not share this orientation and is impressed with ethical objectivism, doubts may be raised on the plausibility of Confucian ethics as a universal ethics. Although its vision is universal in the sense that it encompasses all things in the universe, its focus on the continuing significance of a living tradition smacks of provincialism or relativism. Also, the implicit conception of practical reason as an exercise of *i* (sense of rightness) in dealing with

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[11] Jaroslav Pelican, *The Vindication of Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 60. See also, Alastair Maclntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). chap. 14.

[12] See Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. II (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1968), esp. Lectures IX and X.

[13] See note 10 above. Also, *Hsün Tzu, chieh-pi p'ien*.

[14] This discussion of the status of principles is a restatement and elaboration of the terse remarks in *The Unity of Knowledge and Action,* pp. 36-37; and *Ethical Argumentation*, pp. 100-01.

[15] For the distinction between ideal norm and ideal theme, see *Dimensions of Moral Creativity*, chap. 8. Also, Dorothy Emmet, *The Moral Prism* (London: MacMillan, 1979), chap. 1.

exigent situations suggests that some ethical judgments are *ad hoc* judgments. It may be questioned whether such judgments are rationally defensible without an appeal to principles that have the status of moral truths, truths independent of human thought and interest. A Confucianist may rejoin by pointing out that such a critique is proffered from the external point of view of an observer. It is not denied that an observer can have an insight into the merits and defects of Confucian ethics, but such an insight must be based on an appreciation of what it means to take the internal point of view of Confucian ethics, rather than on a deduction from an abstract doctrine such as objectivism, which is itself a product of *a* philosophical tradition, and thus can hardly be said to be representative of consensus among moral philosophers.[16] Arguably, by imaginative anticipation of the evaluative purpose of the use of a Confucian concept, an observer can have an insight into its use without endorsing it. But in so doing, "He cannot quite stand outside the evaluative interest of the community he is observing and pick up the concept simply as a device for dividing up in a rather strange way certain neutral features of the world."[17]

Nor can an observer understand practical reason in Confucian ethics without appreciating the internal point of view of those operative standards of argumentative competence and the guidelines provided by language and culture. Or more generally, it is plausible to maintain that there is a "social practice of reason" that comprises such activities as deliberating, explaining, justifying, reasoning, and choosing. Associated with this practice is a set of general guidelines provided by tradition and culture. The aim of these activities and guidelines is to enable the members of the community "to achieve better solutions to their problems than would be possible without the help of these publicly available guidelines."[18] Any claim to the acceptability of a thesis may be challenged and assessed in terms of its being a good or adequate solution to a problem at hand, with due regard to the operative standards of argumentative competence. The appeal to moral truths does not shed much light on this use of practical reason.[19]

In sum, a just critique of Confucian ethics presupposes an appreciation of its internal point of view. This does not mean that the external point of view is irrelevant or unworthy of attention from sincere and critical adherents of Confucian ethics. Indeed, for a reflective Confucian agent, the shift from the internal to the external point of view is indispensable, if he is interested in improving or reforming current practices. His position here is analogous to that of a reviewer of a court's decisions, who asks external, critical questions, not merely for the sake of obtaining an accurate

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[16] Perhaps, more strongly, a Confucianist can rejoin that the external critique presupposes an internal point of view of a different philosophical tradition. Consequently, it can claim to be no more privileged than the internal point of view of the Confucianist. For further discussion, see A. S. Cua, "Morality and Human Nature," *Philosophy East and West* 32, no. 3 (1982), pp. 379-82. Chinese translation by Li Teng-hsin in *Che-hsüeh yü wen-hua* 13, no. 7 (1986).

[17] Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 141-42. For the distinction between internal and external point of view, see H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); and my *Dimensions of Moral Creativity*, chap. 6; cf. Royce's "Provincialism," in John McDermott (ed.), *The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce*, vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 1067-88.

[18] Kurt Baier, "Rationality, Reason, and the Good" in David Copp and David Zimmerman (eds.), *Morality, Reason and Truth* (Totawa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), p. 200. This appropriation of Baier's insight is independent of his controversial thesis on the unity of practical reason. For a critique see Kai Neilson, "Must the Immoralist Act Contrary to Reason" (*ibid*., pp. 222-23).

[19] For further discussion on this issue regarding explanation and justification of ethical theses, see my "Some Aspects of Ethical Argumentation: A Reply to Daniel Dahlstrom and John Marshall," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 14, no. 4 (1987), pp. 501-516.

description of an operative legal system, but for the purpose of advancing proposals for the change of legal rules and rulings.[20] Perhaps it is in this context that the challenge of ethical objectivism, quite apart from the issue of philosophical plausibility, is valuable as an external challenge, when this challenge is construed as a reasonable demand for a statement of principles that have the status of objectivity independently of personal commitment. A rationale for changing a current practice has a greater persuasive force when it employs the language of objective principles. When seriously entertained in Confucian discourse, these principles, unlike the conventional *li* or rules of proper behavior, are emphatic, i.e., they present claims to priority of attention in resolving a problem of common concern among participants in ethical argumentation.[21]

Of course, these principles have to compete with those of others that have a similar claim to objectivity, and thus cannot be considered self-evident. In this way, the language of objective principles performs a valuable service to understanding individual efforts at modification or qualification of the substantive content of an existing Confucian practice. Like those personal principles that acquire interpersonal significance, these objective principles, when accepted, may become a part of the Confucian tradition, and again be subject to critical interpretation of their import in exigent situations. For a contemporary Confucian philosopher, the major challenge of normative ethics is the problem of objective principles.[22] This is the problem of incorporating objective principles within Confucian ethics, compatible with its emphasis on the centrality of virtue. In the remainder of this paper, I give a tentative exploration of this formidable problem.

Objective Principles and Confucian Virtue

For pursuing this problem, some remarks must be made about the concept of objective principle and the absence of this concept in Confucian ethics. I assume that an objective principle is a basis for evaluation, invested with a privileged status or authority, quite apart from personal endorsement.[23] This suggests that the concept is a context-variable concept. Different spheres of human activity, whether thought or action, will have distinct objective principles relative to the purpose of the enterprise. In an ethical context, one primary employment of an objective principle, in contrast to that of personal precepts, consists in the aim of arriving at a conclusive determination or settlement of disputes that arise out of human conflict. While any determination may be a subject of further dispute, the invocation of objective principles, say, of moral obligation or of rights,

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[20] In an earlier work, the importance of this shift from understanding creative agency was discussed in general terms apart from Confucian ethics. Also, the notion of moral principles, in the non-personal sense, was used in the sense of basic and superordinate rules of a moral practice. This use is indicated by italics. "In this sense, a *moral principle* may not be accepted by an agent as *his* moral principle." My present remarks, though making use of the same analogy with judicial review, pertain to the issue of the objectivity of proposals for moral change in Confucian ethics and should not be construed as a thesis on the nature of all ethical systems. See *Dimensions of Moral Creativity*, pp. 83-86, 160nll.

[21] Cf. Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 26; and *Law's Empire*(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 81.

[22] See my "Reflections on Moral Theory and Understanding Moral Traditions" in Eliot Deutsch and Gerald Larson (eds.)*Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Chinese translation by Li Teng-hsin[as] in *Che-hsOeh yl wen-hua*[at], 13 (no. 8, 1986). See also my "Tasks of Confucian Ethics," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 6 (no. 1, 1979).

[23] Cf. Aiken, "The Concept of a Moral Principle," p. 107. Note that in adopting Aiken's notion of principle, I do not embrace his controversial thesis that all moral principles are first-personal precepts (*ibid*., pp. 122-23).

serves as a purportedly impartial means for dispute-resolution. Underlying this use of principles is a legalistic model of ethical discourse. In this model, ethical disputes are to be *adjudicated* by principles which play the role of an impartial judge, deciding the right or wrong of the conduct of contending parties.[24]

The lack of Confucian concern with objective principles may in part be explained by its attitude toward legal adjudication. Recall Confucius's saying, "In hearing litigation, I am no different from any other man. But if you insist on a difference, it is, perhaps, that I try to get the parties not to resort to litigation in the first place" (*Lun Yü*, 12:13).[25] A person genuinely committed to *jen* is one who finds repose in abiding by *jen*, one who cultivates virtuous dispositions, not for self-glorification, but for bringing peace and security to his fellows.[26] Implicit in this attitude toward human conflict is a model of personal relationship, wherein disputes are seen to be a subject of voluntary *arbitration* or mediation, rather than adjudication, within a moral community.[27] At issue in arbitration is an impartial resolution of disputes, oriented toward the reconciliation of the contending parties in the light of the concern for harmonious human intercourse. The arbitrator, chosen by the parties in dispute, is concerned with repairing the rupture of human relationship (*lun*[v]) rather than with deciding the rights or wrongs of the parties. The task of an arbitrator is not only to interpret the meaning of a current practice,[28] but also to shape the expectations of the contending parties along the line of mutual concern, to get them to appreciate one another as interacting members in a community. An appeal to objective principles, just as an exaggerated emphasis on *li* (ritual rules) as mere formal prescriptions, is likely to alienate people from one another, instead of encouraging them to maintain or develop relationships.[29] For a Confucian philosopher, the translation of "ethics" as *lun-li hsüeh*[w] is quite apt, for it conveys the Confucian conception of ethics as an inquiry into the *li* (rationales) of human relations, leaving entirely open the question whether the *li* are to be construed as objective or personal principles.

Closely tied to the Confucian attitude toward human conflict is its focus on the exercise of *i* in particular circumstances, rather than on compliance with rules or principles. For Confucius, a well-

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[24] For an explicit avowal of the legal model in defense of universal prescriptivism, see Bernard Mayo, *The Philosophy of Right and Wrong* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), chap. V. Cf. R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); and *Moral Thinking* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

[25] D. C. Lau (trans.), *Confucius: The Analects* (New York: Penguin Books, 1979).

[26] See *Lun Yü*, 4:2 & 14:42. For an insightful discussion of this Confucian theme, see Ch'en Ta-ch'iat, *P'ing-fan te tao-te kuan*[au] (Taipei: Chung-hua, 1976).

[27] For further discussion, see my "Confucian Vision and the Human Community," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 11 (no. 3, 1984).

[28] Lon Fuller, *The Morality of Law* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 228.

[29] In this connection, one may also understand why traditional China failed to develop laws based on the idea of human rights. As Hsu points out: "In the Chinese philosophy, the interpretation of law is based upon human feelings and situations, not upon absolute standards. Disputants do not turn to lawyers who argue a client's case in abstract-terms joined with appeals to legal precedent. Instead, they look to a middleman or peacemaker. . . . The Chinese middleman does not uphold one party against another or insist that one is completely right and the other wholly wrong. His mission is to smooth ruffled feelings by having each disputant sacrifice a little, whether the sacrifice involves principles or not." See Francis L. K. Hsu, *Americans and Chinese: Reflections on Two Cultures and Their People* (Garden City: Doubleday Natural History Press, 1970), p. 361. For this danger in exaggerating the importance of *li* (ritual rules) and the possibility of accommodating the notion of human rights in Confucian ethics, see my "*Li* and Moral Justification: A Study in the *Li* Chi," *Philosophy East and West*, 23 (no. 1, 1983).

cultivated person (*chün-tzu*), "in dealing with affairs of the world, does not form any preconceived opinions. He simply acts in accord with *i*" (*lun Yü*, 4:10). Confucius said of himself, "I have no preconceptions about the permissible and the impermissible" (*lun Yü*, 18:8).[30] This attitude of neutrality is essential to appreciating the nature of a concrete situation prior to judgment and decision. In the context of arbitration, it is especially important for the arbitrator to preserve her independent sense of *i*. An appeal to objective principles may distract the arbitrator from a careful examination of the merits of a particular case and thus may lead to a failure in rendering an equitable decision. If objective principles were acknowledged in Confucian ethics, there would be a danger of "the tyranny of principles" over the exercise of *i*. Even in a case where general rules are deemed relevant, we would expect an arbitrator to be reasonable and sensitive to the demands of the parties before applying these rules to a case at hand.[31]

The above preliminaries serve as a basis for construing the problem of incorporating objective principles into Confucian ethics as an ethics of virtue. The problem of objective principles is to be viewed against the background of the concern with adjudication rather than arbitration of human conflict. The difficulty is to develop a thesis that is compatible with the emphasis on the exercise of *i* and with the spirit of the Confucian doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action. As a matter of abstract theory, there are at least four different options: (1) subordination, (2) double-language, (3) coordination, and (4) complementarity.[32]

For a Confucian theorist, the subordination thesis, i.e., subsuming objective principles under aretaic standards, is not an appealing option. For it is unclear how such a subsumption can be explicated without collapsing the distinction between arbitration and adjudication. A Confucianist is likely to approve the latter process only when arbitration has failed to achieve the desired result. Quite properly, aretaic notions have an essential role in arbitration as a reminder of the importance of maintaining personal relationship. But when the parties in dispute cannot agree to the arbitrator's recommendation, a recourse to adjudication is necessary in order to obtain an authoritative decision that settles the conflict in issue. And here objective principles can play a crucial role quite independently of the characters of the parties. Moreover, embracing the subordination thesis would amount to a dogmatic rejection of the independent role of objective principles in the justification of those moral rules which cannot plausibly be reduced to aretaic standards. On the contrary, it is arguable that the interpretation of the content or concrete significance of some aretaic notions in part depends on an acknowledgement of relevant moral rules and their justification. Consider Mencius's remark: "It is contrary to benevolence (*jen*) to kill

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[30] Lau, *The Analects of Confucius*. For the notion of *chün-tzu*, see *Dimensions of Moral Creativity*, chap. 5.

[31] For an insightful discussion of the importance of equity in law, ethics, and public administration, see Stephen Toulmin, "The Tyranny of Principles" in Norman Bowie (ed.), *Making Ethical Decision* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985); and Jerome Frank, *Law and the Modern Mind* (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 168-69.

[32] For suggestions of these options in contemporary moral philosophy, see (1) Harold Alderman, "By Virtue of a Virtue," *Review of Metaphysics*, 36 (1982); Edmund L. Pincoffs, *Quandaries and Virtues* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 105-106, 145-146; (2) G. Warnock, *The Object of Morality* (London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 86-88; (3) H. A. Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake," *Mind*, 21 (1912); and Robert B. Louton, "On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 21 (no. 3, 1984). We may note that our problem of the connection between principles and virtues does not occupy the center of attention of most recent works on virtue ethics, see for example, the lack of this concern in the instructive survey by Gregory E. Pence, ""Recent Work on Virtues," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 21 (no. 4, 1984).

one innocent person" (*Meng Tzu*, 7A:33).[33] This suggests that *jen* cannot be properly understood without paying heed to the moral injunction against killing the innocent, an injunction that has force and justification independently of the concern for cultivating *jen*-disposition.[34] Of course, *jen* is open to non-perceptive interpretation, e.g., kindness (*hui*[x]) and generosity (*k'uan*[y]), but such interpretation can hardly be said to be consistent with the reasoned exercise of *i* (sense of rightness) if it ignores the injunction against killing the innocent, against cruelty, or against ruthlessness.[35]

The double language thesis maintains that the notions of virtue and objective principle are alternative expressions of the same ethical concern. But this thesis pays no serious attention to the distinction between the concern for human relationships (*lun*) and the concern for impersonal human intercourse. As in the case of the subordination thesis, it fails to recognize the divergence of purpose in arbitration and adjudication. Also, as earlier noted, adopting this thesis may lead to "the tyranny of principles" over the exercise of *i* in doing justice to the merits of the claims of parties in dispute. It is difficult to see how an appeal to aretaic standards can help toward the resolution of human conflict that constitutes the subject matter of adjudication.[36]

In stressing the irreducibility of the concepts of virtue and objective principles and their equal importance in ethical inquiry, the coordination thesis is an attractive option. For these concepts are, so to speak, partners in the same enterprise of conflict-resolution. However, for a Confucian theorist, this cannot be taken to imply an exclusiveness on the part of independent unrelated concerns, which hardly comports with the notion of *tao* as a unifying perspective of ethical discourse or as a vision of things in the universe as forming a moral community (*t'ien-jen ho-i*[z]). Perhaps even more important, the suggestion of a conceptual dichotomy forecloses the inquiry into the possibility of establishing the connection between virtues and objective principles. As earlier remarked (Part I), there is a likely historical scenario according to which personal principles, representing perceptive interpretation of aretaic notions, become transmuted into impersonal principles through communal acceptance, whereby these principles may contribute to the promotion of the virtues of cooperation, and may also be rationally justifiable from an external point of view. If this possibility obtains, impersonal principles in an established practice may

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[33] See D. C. Lau's translation, *Mencius* (Baltimore: Penguin books, 1970), p. 189. For the same theme in Hsün Tzu, see *ju-hsiao p'ien*[av].

[34] More generally, as Gewirth points out, "When the criterion for a quality's being a virtue does not include the requirement that the virtue reflect or conform to moral rules, there is no assurance that the alleged virtue will be morally right or valid." Alan Gewirth, "Rights and Virtues," *Review of Metaphysics*, 38 (June, 1985), p. 752. For the priority of moral rules in the pursuit of ideals, see *Dimensions of Moral Creativity*, pp. 116-17, 135-36.

[35] See *Mencius*, 4A:3, 4A:8, and 7B:l. For the role of *i* in understanding the ethical significance of particular aretaic notions, see the insightful discussion in Ch'en Ta-ch'i, *Kung Tzu hsüeh-shuo*[aw] (Taipei: Cheng-chung, 1964).

[36] Perhaps the double language thesis is a misleading, compendious statement of two other, not necessarily connected, theses: correspondence and logical equivalence; and both seem to be suggested in Warnock's *The Object of Morality*. The correspondence thesis would hold that "for every virtue of character there is a corresponding principle of duty." To the principle of beneficence, for example, there is a corresponding virtue of benevolence. The equivalence thesis, on the other hand, would hold that any statement of virtue is logically derivable from a statement of principle, and conversely. For the reasons stated in the text both the correspondence and equivalence theses, as in the double language thesis, are not viable options for a Confucianist. Cf. Tom L. Beauchamp, *Philosophical Ethics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), pp. 163-66.

properly be regarded as objective principles that are intimately connected with the cooperative virtues. Likewise, the virtues of self-control can also contribute to the performance of duties which may be deemed justifiable in terms of objective principles. The conceptual dichotomy inherent in the coordination thesis implies an a priori injunction against the pursuit of the reasonable question concerning the relation between virtues and objective principles.[37]

I believe that the complementarity thesis is the best option to explore, and, to some extent, may be elucidated by pondering a hint in *Hsün Tzu*. I have in mind this passage: "*Tao* embodies constancy (*chang*[aaaa]) and embraces all changes" (*chieh-pi p'ien*[ab]). The notions of virtue and objective principle may be viewed as complementary ways of interpreting the concrete significance of *tao*. The former expresses a steadfast concern with the promotion of virtue in arbitration, the latter with adjudication, with those problematic cases that cannot be handled by arbitration. Nevertheless, the ultimate aim of both arbitration and adjudication, in the light of *tao*, is the same. It is to inculcate an attitude of mutual care and concern among conflicting parties as members of an ethical community. While objective principles have their proper function in adjudication, they subserve the same end as that of arbitration in promoting a constant concern for *jen* in human intercourse. From the Confucian point of view, the acknowledgement of the propriety of adjudication, in the event of failure in arbitration, does not entail the irrelevance of the primacy of concern for *jen*. Rather, adjudication is considered to be a complement of arbitration. Likewise, the failure of adjudication is deemed consistent with a renewed effort at finding further objective principles that have the promise of securing agreement or at urging the conflicting parties to transcend their private stations for the sake of harmony implicit in the ideal of *tao*. Also, in the case of successful adjudication, a Confucian would remind the parties that the agreeable settlement of an issue at stake may well be an occasion for developing personal relationship within a moral community. Of course, we have no assurance that acceptable objective principles are forthcoming, nor, when these are found, that they will always promote *jen*-realization.

Nonetheless, the complementarity thesis is worthy of further investigation. As compared with other options, the thesis provides a viable avenue for incorporating objective principles in Confucian ethics. The thesis, unlike that of subordination, calls for no subsumption of objective principles, for these principles are accorded a status independent of aretaic standards. Nor does it abolish the distinction between the two concepts as in the case of the double language thesis. And unlike the coordination thesis, there is no suggestion of two exclusive and unrelated goals of ethical inquiry. The complementarity thesis is, so to speak, a *yin-yang*[ac] thesis. In arbitration, aretaic notions play the role of *yang*, and objective principles the subdued role of *yin*, and the reverse in adjudication. The primacy of either depends on the nature of the human conflict at issue. And it is the reasoned exercise of *i* that determines the appropriateness of the desirable process in conflict-resolution. Since the *yin* contains a seed for the generation of *yang*, and conversely, the dominance of either virtue or objective principle is not a question to be determined in advance of confrontation with particular circumstances. In the words of Wang Yang-ming, "The significance of *tao* cannot be exhausted with finality."[38]

Arbitration and Adjuration

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[37] Cf. John Waite, "Virtues and Principles," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 48 (no. 3, 1988).

[38] Chan, *Instructions*, sec. 64.

Suppose we adopt the complementarity thesis, how can we develop this? What more can be said about the nature and status of objective principles? How do we formulate these principles in a manner that is coherent with the Confucian conception of ethical argumentation as a cooperative enterprise aimed at securing agreement among participants, and yet at the same time avoid the pitfalls of the subordination and double-language theses? In what follows, I offer a clarification of these vexing questions with the intention to suggest a direction for further inquiry, rather than conclusive solutions to these questions.

As a first step, let us take note of the consequence of accepting the complementarity thesis. It is entirely unproblematic to incorporate objective principles for the purpose of adjudication within Confucian thought and practice, quite independently of critical challenges from an external point of view based on a different ethical tradition. These principles provide an impartial method for settling disputes within Confucian argumentation. We can now broaden the context in which these principles function, independently of the issue of plausibility of Confucian ethics. I suggest that we regard this broader context as the context of conflict between peoples belonging to different cultural, ethical traditions. In this way, objective principles may be conceived as *ground rules* for intercultural ethical discourse, wherein conflicting ideals of the good life or substantive normative proposals compete for universal acceptance, and thus call for adjudication. Differently put, these principles are *transcultural principles* serving as ground rules in impartial adjudication. The basic function of these principles, in fact, corresponds to the delimiting function of Confucian *li* as a system of formal prescriptions of proper conduct.[39] They serve the purpose of defining the boundaries of proper behavior, without prejudging the value of the content of different ethical traditions or ways of life. In this respect, they are like the negative precepts of the Decalogue in providing limiting conditions or constraints upon human action. But unlike these precepts, they imply no value judgment on the desirability of the conduct of contending parties.

At issue in intercultural ethical conflict is not the convergence of substantive values, and thus the irrelevance of any appeal to culturally specific aretaic standards. Rather, the issue is the problem of accommodating diversity of goods, the problem of striking a balance between the claim to justice or fairness in adjudication and the claim to the integrity of contrasting ways of life.[40] While our approach presupposes the existence of cultural diversity, it does not deny that there is a common human nature; nor does it embrace the view that distinctive cultural ways of life are incommensurable.[41] On the contrary, a Confucian theorist can accept the idea of a common human nature in the sense that all humans possess the same natural capacities, e.g., those capacities that underlie feeding, locomotion, and mating; but these capacities are developed "and*exercised* in specific cultural contexts and forms."[42] Even more important, from the ethical point of view, our basic motivational structure, comprising native feelings and desires, as Hsün Tzu points out, constitutes the "raw materials" for transformation (*hua*[ad]), much like the potter's clay or the

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[39] For further discussion, see my "The Concept of *Li* in Confucian Moral Theory."

[40] Cf. Charles Taylor, "The Diversity of Goods" and Stuart Hampshire, "Morality and Convention" in Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams (eds.), *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[41] Cf. Renford Bambrough, "The Scope of Reason: An Epistle to the Persians" in S. C. Brown (ed.), *Objectivity and Cultural Divergence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), esp. pp. 22, 223, and 278.

[42] See Ted Benton, "Biological Ideas and Their Cultural Uses" in Brown, *Objectivity and Cultural Divergence*, p. 122.

carpenter's wood in making vessels or utensils (*hsing-o p'ien*[ae]).[43] These elements of common human nature are historically shaped and reshaped by different cultures in different ways; and in themselves, they can hardly serve as impartial determinants for conflict-resolution in intercultural intercourse. This does not mean that different ethical, cultural traditions are incommensurable. Appreciation of cultural diversity is consistent with the acknowledgement of transcultural principles of adjudication.[44]

The deeper Confucian problem is to specify these principles in a way that is consistent with the Confucian conception of ethical argumentation as a cooperative venture. The general and more difficult philosophical problem is the ancient Greek problem of nature versus convention. In the language of Aristotle, our problem pertains to the specification of the idea of universal political justice, of what, in contrast to convention, is "Just by nature," viz, it has "the same force everywhere and does not depend on what we regard or do not regard as just."[45] Without joining in the issue over the adequacy of some version of the Natural Law Theory, I think we can appropriate this notion of political justice in the present context. Natural Law theory can be taken as embodying the idea that any system of positive law or morality is subject to an external critique, i.e., a critique of its limitations which are, in some sense, reasonable to accept regardless of the culturally specific demands of different ways of life.[46] In this light, the problem of specifying transcultural principles is a problem of seeking consensus among reasonable peoples with their distinctive and cherished ways of life.[47]

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[43] For further discussion, see my "Morality and Human Nature."

[44] More likely a Confucian theorist may consider the issue of commensurability as a purely speculative question; focus, instead, on actual differences between particular ways of life; and explore areas of common interest as a basis for developing the ground rules for resolving intercultural conflicts. This inquiry is consistent with accepting Ruth Benedict's view, apart from her incommensurability thesis, that cultural diversity is a diversity of configurations. In understanding a culture, she urges us "to imagine a great arc on which are arranged possible interests provided either by the human age-cycle or by the environment or by man's various activities. . . . Its identity as a culture depends upon the selection of some segments of this arc. Every human society everywhere has made such selection in its cultural institutions. Each from the point of view of another ignores fundamentals and exploits irrelevancies." See Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, p. 24. See also her paper entitled "Configurations of Culture in North America," in *Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

[45] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), 1134b.

[46] Cf. Paul Forrier and Chaim Perelman, "Law, Natural and Natural Rights," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, Volume III (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), esp. pp. 23-26.

[47] In terms of normative ethics, the Confucian task, though not designed to yield a general doctrine, may be seen as a contractarian rather than utilitarian problem. As Scanlon has incisively shown, any account of moral wrongness must appeal to some notion of reasonableness in the sense that excludes "rejections that would be unreasonable given the aim of finding principles which could be the basis of informed, unforced general agreement." A similar theme is found in Rawls' emphasis on exploring "overlapping consensus" in seeking a conception of justice that will provide "a reasonable way of shaping into one coherent view the deeper bases of agreement embedded in the public culture of a constitutional regime and acceptable to its most firmly held convictions." This notion of reasonableness and focus on overlapping consensus is congenial to the Confucian notion of reasonableness. See *The Unity of Knowledge and Action*; T. M. Scanlon, "Contractarianism and Utilitarianism," in Sen and Williams, *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, p. 111; and Rawls, "Justice and Fairness: Political and Not Metaphysical," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 14 (No. 3, 1985), p. 229.

By reflecting on the style of performance, that is, on the main desirable qualities of participants in Confucian argumentation, it is possible to find a guide to dealing with the problem of formulating transcultural principles. According to Hsün Tzu, it is expected that a scholar or a superior person would manifest three qualities in discourse: (1) "a humane mind" (*jen-hsin*[af]), (2) "a receptive mind" (*hsüeh-hsin*[ag]), and (3) "an impartial mind" (*kung-hsin*[ah]) (*cheng-ming p'ien*[ai]).[48] Typically, a humane (*jen*) person has an active and affectionate concern for others, but, more importantly, he respects others regardless of whether they are worthy or unworthy of personal association. A desirable participant is also one who is "receptive" or open-minded in displaying a willingness to listen to other's normative claims and impartial or fairminded in his judgment or decision, who seeks to achieve consensus rather than to attain personal gain or glory.

These characteristics of desirable participants suggest that a Confucian theorist can expand and deepen some indigenous notions such as *jen* (humaneness), *hsüeh*[aj] (receptivity), and *kung*[ak] (impartiality or fairness) in formulating certain transcultural principles consistent with its conception of argumentation.[49] I suspect that any list of transcultural principles would include integrity or non-prescriptivity, reciprocity or mutuality (*shu*[al]), and justice as fairness or equity (*kung*). The principle of integrity would focus on one's unwavering commitment to respect for the significance of one's ethical tradition and enjoin the parties in dispute to respect differences in living traditions without pronouncing any judgment on their worth. In other words, it is a principle of respect for the diversity of goods, for various experiments of living in different cultural forms of life, thus encapsulating an aspect of humaneness (*jen-hsin*). The principle of reciprocity (*shu*) expresses another aspect of *jen* as mutual regard or consideration (*Lun Yü*, 6:30), enjoining the disputing parties to exercise sympathetic imagination in appreciating the internal point of view of an alien ethical tradition and to endeavor, whenever opportunity arises, to transform disagreement into an occasion for exploring the possibility of convergence of values. Consistent with the notions of *kung* (fairness) and *hsüeh* (receptivity) is the principle of justice, which may be elucidated along the line of, say, the notion of procedural due process in American constitutional law and the idea of rectification (*cheng*[am]) of wrong conduct. The former focuses, for example, on fair hearing of grievances, the latter on compensating the aggrieved party in impartial adjudication. It is obvious that these brief remarks amount to no more than a sketch of a line of exploration in developing a Confucian moral theory. As to the question of incorporating other substantive normative principles, the task is not just a matter of critical reshaping of Confucian notions, but also of introducing new ethical concepts, for example, moral rights or fundamental human rights.[50] While this task is difficult to carry out without engaging in contemporary discussion, I do not think it insurmountable. For the introduction, even invention, of new concepts is quite consistent with the exercise of *i* implicit in the Ancient Confucian doctrine of rectification of terms (*cheng-ming*[an]).[51]

In this paper, I hope that I have succeeded in showing that principles can be incorporated into Confucian ethics without leading to internal incoherence. Other Confucian thinkers would perhaps propose quite different directions for further inquiry in the light of their interpretations of the spirit of Confucian ethics. Nevertheless, on the basis of the considerations presented here, the

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[48] Note that these qualities of participants can also be used as themes guiding arbitration. For further discussion, see *Ethical Argumentation*. pp. 11-13; and my "The Possibility of A Confucian Theory of Rhetoric", presented at NEH Conference on "Rhetoric: East and West", East-West Center, June 12-17, 1988.

[49] See Hsieh Fu-ja[ax], *Lun-li hsüeh hsin-lun*[ay] (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1973), pp. 185-86.

[50] For a tentative approach, see my "*Li* and Moral Justification," pp. 5-7.

[51] See *Ethical Argumentation*. pp. 101-37.

complementarity thesis appears to be a viable option in the development of Confucian moral philosophy. Moreover, the thesis has also practical import for the issue of intercultural conflict today. The thesis suggests that failure in adjudication via objective principles should not be regarded as a deadlock, as an insoluble problematic situation that inevitably calls for the use of might. Rather, the situation is best viewed as an occasion for renewed effort in arbitration, in seeking possibilities of reconciliation. Given the Confucian emphasis on *jen*, concern for coexistence and harmony of diverse ways of life, and the reasoned exercise of *i* in coping with changing circumstances, there can be no absolute or fixed determination of the priority of either adjudication or arbitration. In the end, which approach is the most effective in intercultural discourse depends on the situation at hand.[52]

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[52] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Philosophy Seminar, Wake Forrest University, on April 23, 1987 and at the International Symposium on Confucianism and the Modern World, in November 12-18, 1987, Taipei, Taiwan. In preparing this final version, I am grateful to Daniel Dahlstrom, David Wong, and Win-chiat Lee for valuable suggestions on earlier versions.

Chapter XV

Henry Duméry's Henological Reduction and the Human Act

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Henri Duméry wrote at a time when existentialist philosophers asserted the absolute freedom of the human person and in the name of that freedom excluded the existence of God, finding this incompatible with the authentically human. He wished to respond to this critique by a profound avowal of Christian faith, which at the same time allowed for a rigorous philosophical critique of religious experience and its expression. As an advocate of human freedom in its most creative forms, it was his persuasion, both philosophical and religious, that human freedom was in fact impossible without God and that no materialistic human system could succeed, of whatever philosophical or economic stripe.

At the same time he shared the philosophical critique of Western philosophies of word and being, and of the onto-theology which they inspired, and felt that the pursuit of error within the Catholic Church, even in this century, had gone to ridiculous lengths, that were the very contradiction of the God whom they sought, as it were, to protect and of the human freedom which is essential to Christian faith. Consequently, he anticipated some of the moves of deconstructionism, as it applies to philosophy, to religious and cultural institutions, to the retrieval of meaning from the past, and to claim to truth. This anticipation is found in the moves he made to meet the desire to give sound philosophical basis to the freedom of faith in Jesus Christ as God's revelation.[1]

I will present an outline of Duméry's thought under three headings; the human, the role of philosophical critique in its employment of a Husserlian-type reduction, God and revelation.

The Human

The human person is the one who has been given the possibility of self-determination, both as an individual person and in a communal enterprise. In face of multiplicity in the efforts of human creativity, human persons are always in search of unity, of some ideal one, in communion with which freedom is ultimately realized in its fullness and to which communion all enterprise aspires. Human acts and human achievements are either intelligible in terms of that quest for oneness, or they are deviations from it and hence in the end derogations from true freedom. In this quest for the One, there is the recognition that though the human is "causa sui", the source of this possibility is not in the human itself. While religious faith and religious experience are of course specific acts in themselves, they are privileged in the sense that they are at the core of human self-realization and something of their nature is reflected in every authentic human act, at the service of self-creation.

At the same time, humans must realize that they are nothing of that which gives rise to their being as self-creative. There is no ultimately transcendental human in which all participate. Nor

[1] In this essay, I rely principally on *Faith and Reflection*, edited and with an introduction by Louis Dupré (New York: Herder & Herder, 1968). The French philosopher/theologian, Stanislas Breton, on the basis of what he styles "meotology," very similar to the henological reduction, has developed a more elaborate theology of Christian revelation.

must human persons see themselves as images of God, as though they could look to themselves and their own freedom for images of the divine, as of the cause in its effects, or as exemplar of human reality.

Duméry did not think that knowledge of human nature could give rise to a natural philosophy of God, that is to theodicy, which speaks of God in terms of essence and being, to which analogy is the base. Nor did he think that reflecting on human nature as such could be employed in building an onto-theology as an explanation of divine revelation. He claimed that philosophy of religion, and Christian theology, appealed too much to abstract notions and to an abstract faith, ignoring the factual and historical realities of religious experience, and indeed in thus doing failed to keep in touch with the essence of religious experience.

Duméry describes the essence of consciousness, which is discovered by phenomenological reduction, as "Act-Law," or the determining act whereby the human person is freed through self-created necessity. In search of unity and the intelligible, human act mediates itself through mathematics, esthetics, ethics and religion. These constitute created order and intelligibility, which serve to realize common value and common purpose. As systems and necessities, they come into being through the self-constituting acts of human freedom. Act-Law, however, while it may realize an intelligible order and a unity, is transcendent to the created order, and always capable of other intelligible realizations. It is not however the ultimate transcendent, nor can it be said to participate in the ultimate transcendent, which is beyond human conception. It is the realization of unity at the level of the multiple one. It is not the One. It is not participation in the One, though it does owe its constitution as self-creating freedom to the One.

It is in the service of this concept of the human as creative freedom, with its quest for its source in the One, but also in the humility in recognizing that it is not in itself a manifestation of this One, that Duméry employed the reductions of the phenomenological movement in philosophy. These reductions, and particularly what he himself developed as the henological reduction, were used by him as a philosophical critique of the exercise of human freedom, whatever the broader worldview with which it is associated. At the same time, he did not cringe from using it as a critique of religious experience, and of philosophies, theologies or institutions put to the service of religion or in particular of the Christian faith.

The Henological Reducation

For the sake of brevity, I will borrow the description of the four reductions espoused by Duméry from Louise Dupré:

> In the first, socalled eidetic reduction, the mind eliminates all factual, contingent elements from the phenomena of consciousness in order to grasp their universal essences. A second reduction, called transcendental or phenomenological, "brackets" all reference to existential reality to concentrate exclusively on the phenomena in their relatedness to the transcendental subject. The phenomenological reduction is the awareness of the subordination of the essences to the act which mediates itself through them, which expresses itself in them and reconquers itself upon them.
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> A third, egological reduction views the phenomena of consciousness as not merely related to, but also produced by the transcendental subject. The study of the constitution of mental phenomena thus becomes the study of the transcendental ego… Duméry feels the need for a forth, henological

reduction, grounding the transcendental ego itself in the absolute One. Without this final reduction the mind's striving for unity is not sufficiently founded.[2]

Duméry found the inspiration for this henological reduction in the philosophy of Plato and of Plotinus. The inspiration from Plato comes from the relation of Plato's logos to myths. The dependence of logos on myths, its eventual return to myths, the need to appeal to myths to express what is before logos, expresses a reality which cannot be expressed rationally and which precedes human rationality. From Plotinus, Duméry took much of his expression of the relation of human existence, knowing and freedom to the One. He describes Plotinus as "the most religious of the philosophers of antiquity," and thinks that which is most authentic in Christian tradition finds an inspiration in him. While Plotinus "seeks salvation only through the mediation of the intellect…he insists that the intellect acknowledge itself as dependent, that the passage to the intelligible is only a stage (although an indispensable one) towards the One, towards ecstasy."[3] Of relation to the One he continues, "since the One is transcendent, the final ecstasy presupposes a grace…a religious experience beyond the intelligible order…an entrance into the supreme indetermination."[4]

This also gives rise to a particular understanding of faith, as an exercise of act-law, a free adoption of a self-given necessity. In the first place, faith is a response to the consciousness of the need to acknowledge what is beyond the intelligible; it is a free openness to ecstasy. In the second place, it chooses the factual order in which human creativity in its quest for the multiple-one is to be exercised. For a Christian, it is a commitment, in the community of the church, to the advent of God in Christ.

God and Revelation

God

As far as God-language is concerned, the henological reduction postulates a language that is apophatic through and through, and one that avoids the language of participation in speaking of the world's relation to God:

> If God is the One, pure simplicity, absolute spontaneity; if he is neither an order nor a plane, but that by which planes and orders are possible; if he escapes, by dominating it, the distinction between essence and existence, as well as the subject-object distinction; if, in a rod, he is not Being, but, according to a neologism taken from Dionysian languages, Super-Being, it must no longer be said that the terms proceeding from him receive a part of him…Strictly speaking, he communicates nothing to them. Thus with respect to being, we can follow certain mystics and call him Nothingness or Nothing.[5]

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[2] Louis Dupré, "Duméry's Reduction of Experience," *A Dubious Heritage, Studies in the Philosophy of Religion after Kant* (New York: Paulist, 1977), 116.

[3] *Faith and Reflection*, 99.

[4] *Ibid*.

[5] *Ibid*., 154.

Duméry finds this a departure from theodicy, from the traditions of Western philosophy, whether they speak the language of essence and existence and analogy. He distinguishes what he calls his own *processionist* ontology from *participationist* ontology, to which he sees his own as antithetical:

…It could simply be said that ontology has henology as its contrary, defining them as follows: the first holds that the inferior borrows a part of what it is from the superior; the second holds that the inferior receives from the superior the means to be what the superior is not. In the one, there is communication; in the other, there is literally position of self-position.[6]

Reflection

Before moving on to his understanding of revelation, against this henological background, it is helpful to see the role which Duméry gives in general to philosophical reflection, given that it cannot establish knowledge of the One, beyond the affirmation of the henological reduction which traces the source of the exercise of human freedom, or of act-law, back to a totally transcendent.

Reflection in the first place captures the essence of the act-law in its fourfold mediation, mathematics, esthetics, ethics and religion. It can be inspired by past realizations of culture and philosophy, and from such reflection it is possible to set up some norms for human freedom in its creation of the multiple-one. Because however this multiple-one is but a human realization, reflection subjects it to the critique of authenticity. Authenticity demands the respect of freedom in its creativity. Any system, especially religious or philosophical, has to build into itself the recognition that it is not a participation in the ultimate, not a manifestation of the One, but an order which mediates the possibilities of ecstasy. In other words, reflection prevents us from confounding the realizations of 'multiple-unity', achieved by the determinations of self-creating freedom, with the One itself, or from giving any realization an absolute quality. It is possible for something to be unique without being absolute, but religious history has tended to confuse uniqueness with absolute.

Hence the highest moments of true reflection are found in the mystical tradition, with its apophatic quality and its sense of the limits of the multiple-one of human achievement, and the beyond of any realization of being. Within the philosophical tradition, Dumérygives particular attention to Plotinus and Scotus Eriugena, and within the theological to the Pseudo-Dionysius, Meister Eckhart and John of the Cross. In employing either the egological or henological reduction in examing religious experience, much more attention needs to be given to mystical experience.

Revelation

Behind Duméry's explanation of revelation, there lies these two principles. The first is that the gift of revelation is humanity's capacity for self-realization, its creative freedom. The second is that communion with the One is through negation, or rather that the human person is opened to the gift of ecstasy only by passing through the via negative with regard to even the highest intelligibility of culture and philosophy.

In discussing the Judeo-Christian tradition he puts to the fore the notion of "ad-vent', and finds its presence in religious experience. The henological reduction of faith in Jesus Christ, of the

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[6] *Ibid*., 156.

experience of the Spirit in the church, leads to awareness of the advent of God, of a coming which is at the same time a disappearing, a presence which is simultaneously an absence.

In Jesus Christ and the Spirit, God does indeed give humanity an otherwise unknown and unexperienced possibility of self-creative freedom. The religious forms which are genuinely faithful to what is given in Jesus Christ do indeed acquire a certain normativity, a value which accrues to them because ethey do proceed out of an act, or a capacity to act, which is totally and utterly gift. The source of act-law as exercised in the church is found in the coming, or advent, of God, in Jesus Christ and the Spirit.

On the other hand, even this faith has to be subjected to critique and guided by reflection. The understanding of revelation must respect that it does not pretend to give a communication of God/one, or a divine intelligibility, which is beyond human intelligence's potentiality, even passive or receptive, or what scholastics call obediential potency. The force of Christic revelation lies in the love which it brings into the world, a love which centers on the desire for the One who constitutes the human in its own self-creative capacity, and which respects and supports the freedom of all. This cannot be done without embracing the via negative. The Cross is at the very core of revelation; it is its very essence, because it is total openness, in the total embrace of the limit of the human. The hymn in the letter to the Philippians about Christ's self-examination is a key to myths whereby to express the essence of Christic revelation.

Theology

In looking to the theological tradition, or even to Christian philosophy, if one accepts that term it is necessary to distinguish three factors. First, there is the genuine reflection on the multiple-one, or the order of things, which is the achievement of human persons who live by the love of God and in fidelity to Jesus Christ and the flow of the Spirit of love. This does indeed bring to the knowledge of an intelligible order, to a knowledge of human acts and their value, and thus opens up some normativity to future projects, in virtue of this tradition.

Second, there is the tendency to make of the order, I admiration of its exquisite intelligibility and aesthetic form, a participation in the one, a manifestation of the godhead as of the cause I the effect, as of the self-communicator in that which is communicated, of the giver in the gift. This is to risk giving absolute value to a realization of human freedom, which however noble is always this-worldly. This is at the source of the church's own tendency to search out error where there is simply freedom, and to block the way to new enterprise in excessively treasuring past achievements.

Third, there is the mystical tradition, the apophatic, the via negative. It is the absence of attention to this which causes the deviations of an otherwise genuine reflection on intelligible orders, born out of love. The final criterion for pronouncing on any historical or cultural realization in the Christian tradition is that of its embrace of the apophatic, of its intrinsic humility, of its capacity to allow freedom, even a freedom which goes outside or beyond its own realization, provided it is not an imperialism which imposes itself on others.

Concluding Reflections

Duméry is of interest because within the turn of philosophy to the human subject and the act of knowing, he seeks an understanding of the human and of the world which is truly open to the transcendent, while at the same time avoiding excessive claims about the knowledge which we

have of it. Indeed, by his pursuit of the method of reduction he finds this openness within the human act itself, since it cannot be said to contain within itself its own starting point.

On the other hand, he is suspicious of the western metaphysical tradition, of the order which it imposes upon the universe and upon the human, and of its claims to a knowledge of God. He wants to satisfy an understanding of human nature which is fully attuned to human freedom. There can be no understanding of human freedom which is not appreciative of it as a capacity to determine the order which human beings give to the world and to their own destiny. This, for him, is the full implication of saying that human persons act according to their nature.

Criticism of Duméry can indeed be levelled against the account which he gives of the philosophical tradition, and in particular of ontology. Some of what he says about the idea of participation as "borrowing" from God reads like caricature. There may in fact be more affinity between his respect for the negative trend in philosophy and theology, and the theology of Thomas Aquinas than he realizes. This would be important for any future retrieval of the metaphysical tradition. What he seems to ignore is the fundamental position of Aquinas that dependence and participation are in being, that is, the very existence of created things is received and dependent and does not belong to their nature as such.

A number of recent studies have examined the influence of Proclus on the work of Aquinas, in his attempts to resolve the issue of the one and the many. Much of Aquinas's treatise on God is an attempt to reconcile the divine simplicity, which for him holds pride of place, and the divine attributes which seem consequent on God's creative activity, as well as between the simplicity of the divine nature and the revelation of the trinity of persons. There is a highly negative connotation inherent to the use of analogy in discussing the attributes of God. Respect for this might well lead us more on the way of negation in our knowledge of God than on the way of affirmation. In following the intuitions of Proclus or other neo-Platonists, Christian writers such as the Pseudo-Dionysius or Scotus Eriugena have kept alive the notion of the "imparticable." That is to say, even in affirming the causality of the Supreme One in giving rise to the existence of the finite many, and so in espousing a theory of participation which focuses on esse, one does not have to allow a movement from the qualities or attributes of creatures to a knowledge of divine attributes. Some uses of Thomism have moved too readily from that which participates to an ontology of the participated, whereas a Proclean influence would allow for the prior affirmation that the godhead, the source of all existence, cannot as such be participated.

A more serious difficulty to which Duméry may alret us is that which comes from the idea of order in the universe. Not only is action according to the nature of things, but the form of the multiple-one includes the ordered relation of things among themselves. It is the intelligibility of this created order which seems to exaggerate the content in the predication of divine attributes, and to lead some to see the mirror of divine intelligence in the order of the universe. Both the new physics, which introduces the element of chance into the functioning of the earth and of the cosmos, and Duméry's accent on the constitutive quality of human freedom, enable us to appreciate the limits of this order and of its necessity. It is one thing in face of a more human future to appreciate the dependence of humans and of all things on God in being and act, as this was stressed by an earlier ontology. It would be quite false to try to retrieve the Aristotelian or medieval notion of order. Indeed, one might say that it was this emphasis on order that prevented a Christian dispensation for so many centuries from drawing the consequences of its own teaching on the dignity of the human person and the human act. Duméry allows for the intelligibility of a humanly achieved order, but he will not allow us to see any historical realization as a unique or even privileged ordering of human affairs and of humanity's relation to the world.

Hence, on the positive side of Duméry's contribution to the philosophy of the human act and the understanding of divine revelation, there is his attempt to consolidate a ground for human freedom and creativity within a belief-system and without resorting to a denial of God. There is secondly his attention to the via negative that runs through philosophical tradition and constantly needs to be restored to its place. Thirdly, there is the concreteness of his account of religion and religious experience, which he examines in its concrete and historical manifestation rather than as an abstract idea. Fourthly, in the field of religious phenomenology, there is his attempt to go beyond the strictly phenomenological or even ego logical reduction to the ultimately transcendent source. Fifthly, in what he says about philosophical or religious systems, there is perhaps the possibility of finding truth and value in them, and hence inspiration for the future, even while on the other side taking them as necessarily limited, historically bound realizations of creative freedom. Sixthly, there is his way of defining the respective fields of philosophy and of theology, without confusing them and yet without setting them in opposition or totally separating them.

Within Duméry's perspective, one can retrieve the benefits of Kantian philosophy and of the Enlightenment, with the former's attention to the subject and the latter's appreciation of rationality, without subscribing to the technological cultures which have since arisen and which claim their grounding in reason. The Christian ages in Europe, up to the Renaissance, had failed to enhance the dignity of the human person and to grant all individuals a part, in freedom, in the ordering of human affairs. From the age of modernity, one can reclaim several points which must continue to guide us in the future.

There was a necessary thawing of cultural traditions, that had in fact become too coercive and favored the privileged. In the wake of Kant, historical conditioning of human enterprise was gradually realized, as well as the authentic individuation of human persons. It is not so much an a priori reason, as the reasoning process which allows the normative use of truth, justice and freedom, in the face of public and private actions. There need be neither excessive appeal to freedom, nor coercive insistence on absolute truths.

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Chapter XVI
On the Two Systems of the World: Aristotle and Kant

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Aristotle summarized the development of the ancient philosophical tradition according to Ptolemy's geocentric system. In 1634, Galileo published in Florence his contrasting *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*. Both, along with purely scientific problems, concerned being as well, but there was a very important difference between them and each system understood the problems differently.

Philosophy is the study of Being as was noted by Parmenides' thesis: "The same are the Being and that for which thinking exists." The problem lies in correctly understanding the notions "thinking" and "being", for neither being nor thinking is self-evident. Every interpretation of being contains an inner differentiation, which itself implies the existence of constitutive elements. As a complete transcendental deduction (in Kant's sense) of all the constitutive elements of a system would be impossible, we shall attempt only to state an empirical description of these elements in order to be able to distinguish them.

World and Nature

World. For Aristotle "world" meant cosmos, but in a sense different from the present interpretation of the term. Aristotle meant the hierarchic whole of elements: the hierarchy of things based upon the variety of their internal differences. His concept of *to ti en einai* presupposes that everything becomes what it is, i.e., what the thing is meant to be by nature.

Kant elaborated a different understanding of the term "world" as the mathematical whole of things (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A418-B447). This has not only an arithmetic meaning, but primarily is object constructed of quantitative specifications (see IAID, pp. A714-715: B742-743): in Kant's understanding "world" has only quantitative dimensions.

This constitutes a first difference between the Kantian and the Aristotelian views: For Aristotle, "world" means the unity of non-homogenous qualities; for Kant, on the other hand, this notion means the world of homogenous things.

Nature. For Kant "nature" differs from "world". "Nature" in Kant's *Critique* denotes the dynamic unity of objects. In Kant's philosophy the "dynamic consideration" understands objects under such principles as substance and accident, cause and effect, possibility and impossibility, real and unreal, etc., not as internal qualities of things in themselves, but as modes of unity of objects in human understanding. Clearly, Kant's dynamic approach does not deal with qualitative character of the things in themselves, but with differences within human understanding.

For Aristotle, on the other hand, "nature" does not denote any sum of possible objects, either a mathematical or a dynamic sense. It means the internal force by which things are attuned to their own essence. This is the exact meaning of the ancient word *physis*, a meaning of "nature" which existed in the Georgian philosophical tradition until the seventeenth century and was adopted from Byzantium. The Georgian lexicographer, S.S. Orbeliani, interpreted the essence of nature on the basis of St. John Damascene's theory as follows: "Nature is the origin of every motion and stillness; the way the earth makes plants grow".

Thus, the meaning of the word "nature" in ancient and modern philosophy is absolutely different. The ancient interpretation of "nature" presupposed internal principles of variety and a hierarchy of objects. But in modern philosophy "nature" implies a homogenous approach to things and takes account of what is specific: homogeneity takes on specificity exclusively by human understanding.

Worldview. Modern philosophy sees the world as a system based upon the homogeneity of the principles of knowledge. This is what Galileo means when he speaks of two models of the world that differ in a manner corresponding to the different positions of the subject. Hence, the systemic analysis of objects in the philosophy of modern times is a result of the activity of the subject. Galileo realized the importance of thus distinguishing the principles of the analysis of objects and the objects in themselves.

This new approach was set firmly by Kant's well-known thesis that the object of knowledge is built upon the process of knowledge. In the modern age the system of the world was transformed into a picture of the world. "The world as a picture" implies not that there is both the world and its reflection, but that the world itself is transformed into a picture. The system of the world is now transformed into the various models or world-systems based on the position of the subject. In this light the main question of Kantian philosophy is how the subject can establish rules for objects.

The middle ages did not employ a model approach, but a hierarchy of analogies. At that time, from the thesis that God created man in His own image no one would conclude that man is a model of God.

Heidegger wrote correctly in this regard:

What belongs properly to the essence of the picture (the picture of the world - K.K.) is standing together, system. By this is not meant the artificial and external simplifying and putting together of what is given, but the unity of structure in that which is represented (in *vorgestellten*) as such. A unity that develops out of the projection of the objectivity of whatever is. In the Middle Ages a system is impossible, for there a ranked order of correspondences is alone essential and indeed this as an ordering of whatever is in the sense of what has been created by God and is watched over as his creature.[1]

Being

The Greeks distinguished things in themselves by their internal nature. This is seen for example in Plato's philosophy that, side by side with good persons, goodness exists in itself. The expression "in itself" here means a qualification of things which gives them very specific existence.

For the ancient attitude objectness implies the unity of different qualities and the existence of the thing beyond quantitative determination. This theory of immanent qualities is connected with the Aristotelian theory of space. He thought that everything "seeks" to reach immanently determined coordinates in space. The stone, for example, must "find" its place downward because heavy things *a priori* are determined to go down. Space or place (for Aristotle these concepts are the same) has a highly hierarchical structure, each element of which is *a priori* determined by nature: the universe has an upper, lower and middle region.

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[1] M. Heidegger *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, W. Lovitt, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 141.

Kant's position is different. For him, "thing in itself" means not an immanent qualification of objects, but everything a subject poses beyond his understanding. Predicates of the thing in itself are absolutely undefined, except for "existence" which for Kant is not a predicate. In Kant's philosophy space is a form of sense perception. No object is determined by this form, which is an *a priori* possibility of perception. From this it follows that the lower or middle regions have no objective character, but are based upon subjectivity (as is true also of time).

The theory of motion is connected to the theory of space. Aristotle, following his theory of space and his hierarchical understanding of movement, held three main forms of movement: (1) circular, (2) mixed, and (3) straight. The highest value among these forms is attributed to circular movement because, more than others, it "imitates" eternity. The hierarchy of movements is determined by their internal nature. For example, only those things move circularly which contain fire-ethereal nature. For the Galileo-Newtonian tradition (including Kant), on the other hand, movement is measured only by straightforward movement, of which all other forms of movement are modifications.

Completing this exploration of ontological principles, we would note the relation of the general and the particular in these systems. Every individual thing for Aristotle somehow contained the general; the ontological status of things is provided technically by the theory of ideas which also are inner qualities of things. Kant's theory of understanding generally regards not the inner qualification of objects, but the subjective rules of analysis. Events are wholly subordinated to these subjective rules, which we accept instead of an immanent nature for things.

Thinking Being and Ethics

Thinking being. Though understood differently, both consider reason an instrument for thinking about being. For Aristotle reason is directed toward the most general, the genera: *Definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam.* These genera may be those of which Plato spoke in the *Parmenides*, for example, being, identity, etc. For Aristotle the objects of the intention of reason are these genera, not the essence bound to them.

Kant, in contrast, considered reason to be the ability to deduce the particular from the general (B674). Of course, from this it does not follow that for Kant reason is the ability to grasp the general existent in the particular in itself. Instead, reason is an instance of *a priori* principles and the deduction of the particular from the general means subordinating the particular to *a priori* principles.

The concept of understanding is another important point of comparison. In ancient times it meant the analysis of being. For this the Greek concept was *dianoia*, meaning thinking being through. Kant's corresponding notion is *der Verstand, which* is the ability to understand being, for example, causal relations. The rules of understanding do not, however, provide us with information about the inner nature of an object.

Ethics. The difference between these positions is revealed in the field ethics. For Aristotle, the main aim of ethical behaviorgoodnessis directed finally toward the individual. Kant, however, grounded his ethical conception solely upon formal rules, namely, upon the categorical imperative.

These two systems also understand differently the relation of philosophical theory to contemplation. For Aristotle, as philosophy is the mode of knowledge which presents the essents in the way they exist in themselves, the difference of philosophical disciplines is determined by the differentiation of essents. Thus, the object of metaphysics is determined by the existence of

unique and supreme essents. This later tradition comes from the Aristotelian distinction of the two forms of metaphysics: "metaphysica generalis", about the essent in its totality, and "metaphysica specialis", about its principal divisions.

Kant considered "metaphysica specialis" (the science of God, freedom and immortal spirit) to be impossible. In view of what constitutes these as problems for human beings, Kant thought that philosophy must be, first of all, "metaphysica generalis" the theory which explores the rules that determine the emergence of essents. We may conclude then that there is a distinction between the two systems in philosophy.

Underlying Unities

Though we have been talking solely about the differences of the two world systems, there are elements which both share. Abstractly, we may say that what is common is the general thematics of philosophy; concretely, we can point to a very specific philosophical phenomenon common to both, namely, the force of imagination as the center of human beings. Both philosophers share the view that the human being is based totally upon the imagination through which man transcends himself towards the existence of essents. It has been the merit of such American philosophers as Feuerab end and Kuhn to point out that the imagination is as important for scientists and philosophers as it is for poets.

Here the words of the twentieth century Georgian poet, G. Tabidze, are relevant:

For highest inspiration it will call.
The harp of poetry, or of history, or of chemistry.
The highest inspiration nourishes and gives hope.
To both, to Rustaveli and to Archimedes.
When knowledge is by passion marked
It is the same inspiration that is the inspiration
Of poetry.

Such "inspiration" or "imagination" is the basis of Aristotle's wonder and amazement before totality, which is the origin of philosophizing.

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Discussion

A number of contrasts between the ancient and modern world views were noted, e.g., (a) the physics of Ptolemy to that of Copernicus, (b) God-centered to the man-centered, (c) heterogenous to homogeneous, (d) ontology to subjectivity, and (e) impersonal to personal. Reductionist materialism would take (a) as basic and interpret (b) and (c) in its terms; in contrast, personalism would take (e) as basic and in its terms interpret (b)-(d). This, as suggested by N. Chavchavadze, is the more basic issue.

The first or physics-based approach interprets what is truly real as physical and sensible. Hence, the understanding of the whole of meaning is controlled ultimately by one's integrating view of the physical universe: metaphysics becomes astronomy and vice versa. In this view the basic intellectual fact becomes the change from Ptolemy's vision of the universe to that of Copernicus.

For a number of reasons, however, this appears to invert the order of human understanding. First, the vision of the universe which locates man and the world at the center is Ptolemy's not Copernicus'. Second, the reduction of speculative propositions and theoretical insight to the empirically observable is characteristic of a sector of the modern, rather than of the ancient world. Third, the special importance of the telescope in providing a new view of the world was due not simply to the sensible evidence it provided, for it had been available earlier, but to the change in consciousness which decided to use this for scientific purposes.

Similarly, the issues of unity and its principles had been under consideration since totemic times. Once philosophy was initiated, it drove the development of pre-Socratic philosophy rapidly through its various physical models, then to the mathematical level of Pythagoras, and shortly thereafter to the metaphysical level of Parmenides. There reason found its basis in the understanding of being, the principle of contradiction and the requirement for an absolute One, eternal and unchanging. This remained the ultimate matrix as Plato and Aristotle worked out the relation of the multiple thereto. In turn, thought provided the philosophical tools for developing the religious insights of both Christianity and Islam, and analogous metaphysical content is found in the Hindu *Upanishads* and *Vedanta Sutras*.

All of this suggests that the second, or metaphysical, approach based upon that which is personal will allow for greater progress in both theoretical understanding and practical action. That approach points to the spiritual, to understanding and love, as the principles of reality or being and of understanding or meaning. This awareness was found before philosophy in the ancients' mythic interpretation of all in terms of gods, which provided the basic structure of the cultural world views from which philosophy arose. It is reflected in the midst of Aristotle's search in the *Metaphysics* when his pursuit of the meaning of being becomes the question of substance. By *Metaph IX* he can see that he must redirect his search explicitly in order to be able to take account of that which is beyond the senses, which in book XII finally brings him to the "Knowing on Knowing" as his prime analogate in relation to which all else is called being.

Beyond this, others would add the importance of the Jewish experience of a providential God as recounted in the Old Testament and the Christian account of an incarnate God in the New Testament. Both set absolute Wisdom and Love as the source and goal of all. Hence, the understanding the nature and meaning of all is found ultimately in personal terms. This would explain the seeming paradox of Descartes' search for certitude in which objectivity found its basis

in subjectivity (as Kierkegaard would finally be bold enough to state) and in geometrical symbolization whose content depended essentially upon mind.

If this be true then the oft cited contrast between ancient and modern vision in terms, respectively, of hierarchy and homogeneity may be in need of some reevaluation. Dewey's claim that the imagination is emancipated once all is seen as homogeneous stuff at the disposition of human creativity provides at best a negative explanation. It says nothing about the dynamism of the creative mind, the purposiveness of human and other reality which brings human creativity to life and provides the passion and dedication needed for success, or the dignity of the person and his or her engagement in community which make possible human choices with respect, care and even sacrifice for others. The imaginative or creative exploration of new life-giving relationships must go beyond the indifference of homogeneity and the rigid patterns of formal order to the apperception of lived world in a context of being and love which transcends any present reality. It is this relation which invites and inspires creative response in love and in freedom.

Chapter XVII
The Primacy of Practical Reason

Niko Chavchavadze

Echoing Kant, I would like to examine knowledge and morals, and the types of relations between them. Kant sees this as the relation between theoretical and practical reason or, more precisely, between the theoretical and practical applications of human reason, and between the transcendental conditions of these applications and their results. By the term "knowledge" Kant means science, or more precisely mathematics and the natural sciences, but not the practical, mythological, magic, religious or artistic. "Morals he would understand as the system of human consciousness and of free and responsible actions, but not the different customs and habits characteristic of various cultures. This is the context in which I will treat knowledge and morals.

Reference to Kant seems justified by the fact that, although his understanding of the relation between the transcendental principles of knowledge and morals is quite particular, nevertheless, it situates the different philosophical solutions of this problem.

Theoretical Reason

In knowledge, theoretical reason grasps what is and how it is, while in morals practical reason deals with what should be or how it is to be done. Theoretical reason determines the universally valid laws of being, whether physical or psychological, real or ideal. In other words, it becomes aware of the order it has introduced into the chaos of sense data and deals with the world of phenomena which it itself has confined to limits determined by the intuition of time, space and the categories of understanding. This is nature or the empirical world of physics which theoretical reason, due to its own structure, cannot transcend.

Practical reason, since its function is not to be satisfied with what is but to act according to what should be, must go beyond the domain of experience. As it cannot find principles and maxims for its activity in the empirical world, that is, in the domain of theoretical reason, it is obliged to transcend the world of necessity or of physics and to enter the sphere of freedom or of metaphysics. True, this transcending does not imply obtaining knowledge of the metaphysical world, because knowledge is a matter only for theoretical reason; but this transcending implies an acknowledgment, a faith, which breaches the limits to which man's theoretical reason is confined.

In other words, the problem of the relationship of knowledge and morals in Kant's doctrine is, at the same time, that of the relationship between empirical and metaphysical reality, or more precisely, between nature, on the one hand, and God or the realm of the Divine, on the other. This problem may be and is expressed in different terms. It is the problem of body and soul, matter and spirit, real and ideal, the provisional and the eternal.

But it is essential to stress something else. Kant argued that metaphysics is impossible as a science: science is possible only in the pattern of physics and the natural sciences based upon mathematics. Of course, it is possible to broaden the sphere of the natural sciences so that this would not be limited to Newtonian physics and its earthly and heavenly mechanics; it is possible to study life, society and the human psyche. But if they are scientific, the results of this inquiry will remain knowledge about the mechanics or physics of life, society and the psyche. Scientific

knowledge of such realities as God, the immortality of the soul, and freedom, is impossible, not only because of the psycho-physical structure of the human being, but because of the transcendental logical structure of scientific knowledge. The thing in itself cannot be known or grasped by human theoretical reason, which cannot serve as bridge between man and things in themselves.

Does this mean that Kant has torn the human person away from metaphysical reality; that he has deprived men and women of freedom, the hope of immortality or divine grace; that he has confined them to the realm of empirical phenomena? Certainly not, for otherwise they would remain objects in the natural system of objects, mere elements of the system of nature, and thus would lack any ability for theoretical reasoning. The person is able)and therefore obliged) to retain ties with the realm of things in themselves and capable of this thanks to a freely chosen, but not naturally imposed, faith. Morals consist in accomplishing this duty. A moral person is one who fulfills his or her human duty because of respect for this duty, and not from any other motive; this is real human dignity. Only a creature with dignity possesses the ability to grasp the value of the realm of things in themselves and to choose them as motives for decent, moral actions, i.e., acting as one should. Virtue implies good action, which is an expression of good will; pure practical reason is good will or the will to behave morally.

Practical Reason

But to act morally one must know what is good and evil in a particular case; one must distinguish between genuine and illusory goods. Could good will be blind; if so, how could practical reason find its way in the permanent strife between good and evil which pervades the whole life of humanity and of every person in particular.

It seems that theoretical reason must take some part in the activity of practical reason, but what kind of theoretical reason might this be? It is not that which we have in the natural sciences based upon mathematics, for such reason lacks any ability to distinguish between good and evil. It can only make out the positions of objects in space and time, which one is the cause and which one the effect, which one is substantial and which accidental, etc., according to categories of understanding which have nothing in common with discerning values. With the help of what manner of theoretical reason then has Kant determined the difference between theoretical and practical reason, for it does not seem possible to use for that the intuitions of time and space or the categories of understanding. Nor does his *Critique Practical Reason* seem to lack theoretical value or truthfulness. And if, in the domain of practical reason one has to do with a different kind of truth, may we not infer that Kant had revived in a peculiar form the medieval double truth theory?

This seems quite possible. The theory of double truth made a strict distinction between the knowledge obtained by man and knowledge through divine revelation. This theory was correct, at least insofar as knowledge obtained through human experience deals exclusively with the mode of existence of different phenomena (e.g., the different moral norms in different cultures), and one cannot deduce from this kind of knowledge what should be and how it should be, what is good and what is evil.

Knowledge gained through empirical experience is knowledge about facts and factual circumstances; it reaches the level of truth only after the one who obtains it sees them completely neutrally, unbiasedly, disinterestedly, i.e., when he sees facts from the position of the transcendental theoretical subject. Knowledge through revelation as a rule includes moral principles which, unlike the moral customs accepted in different cultures, are never given in

empirical experience. A different ability is needed for their apprehension, which ability is called practical reason in Kant's doctrine.

The medieval theory of double truth proclaimed, of course, the priority of the truth of revelation, for at that time philosophy was a servant of theology. In modern European philosophy, however, from Bacon and Descartes till Hegel and his various followers, the idea of the omnipotence of human reason gradually got the upper hand.

Philosophy is being emancipated from theology. This means a conscious or unconscious acknowledgement of the primacy of theoretical reason, of which the most perfect expression has been Hegel's panlogism. The only place he grants for morals in his system is in the stage of objective spirit, while in the domain of absolute spirit religion stands on a lower level than philosophy.

In the philosophy of the Enlightenment—with regard to whose negative aspects I completely agree with Professor Kennington—certainly there existed some attempts to resists the reduction of the human spirit to theoretical reason, such as those of Pascal, Malebranche, and in a way also Berkeley. Nevertheless the dominant tendency was that of rationalism understood as a general world outlook. This presupposes belief that the vocation of man is the domination of nature with the help of knowledge and according to its own interests or, in more modern terminology, with the help of scientific-technological progress, the concept of technology including here the biological, socio-technological, and psycho-technical.

Kant discerned quite well the danger in that tendency to deviate from the Judeo-Christian and ancient Greek roots of European culture. Though himself an offspring and one of the more prominent representatives of the enlightenment, he radically opposed this tendency and carried out a Copernican revolution in philosophy. His intention, however, was opposite that of Copernicus, for he aimed at restoring the Judeo-Christian and ancient Greek understanding of human nature and of man's place and destiny in the universe. The Main point of this revolution was to found the primacy of practical reason. It is not difficult to see that Kant's doctrine of the person, according to which one's spiritual life is determined by good will (i.e., through free choice) is but a translation into philosophical language of the Judoe-Christian and Socratic-Platonic ideas of man.

According to the Bible, humankind's earthly life begins with Adam and Eve's original sin: the eating of the fruit of the forbidden tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Note that this meant not simply the ability of knowledge, but the ability to distinguish good and evil, i.e., the ability of free choice. For Socrates and Plato, man's main distinction and dignity was integrity of knowledge and virtue according to the primacy of goodness and of acting in a good manner. In the platonic system goodness is also the highest idea, the idea of ideas.

The nature of the truth attained by Kant's practical reason seems most comprehensible in the context of the Christian notion of truth. Note that Christ does not answer Pilate's question, What is truth? Because He Himself is the truth. In the literal meaning of this word, He is the embodiment of the Lord's love of human beings and is ready to sacrifice Himself for their salvation, to free them through directing their concerns to the highest values. The truth of practical reason is salutary, liberating, immortalizing; it makes a person a true human being and prepares him or her for eternal life. It is so because this truth can be freely chosen, rather than forced by the objective rules of empirical reality; it is the truth, which is fulfilled in love and respect for the highest values.

Basing theoretical and practical reason, human knowledge and morel relations, upon the primacy of practical reason ensures, on the one hand, the integrity of the theoretical mind, the authenticity of its work, and the rootedness of man in the sense of being, for empirical knowledge is then based on transcendent knowledge and the physical on the metaphysical. On the other hand,

it provides for the autonomy of the moral consciousness, its independence from empirical reality and the absolute character of its principles and criteria. That morality must be founded on necessary criteria is evident; morality based on relative principles would be absurd inasmuch as the difference between the moral and the immoral would then become relative.

Acknowledging the primacy of practical reason and making it the main principle of life ensures also the integrity of the spiritual life of man. This is true not only of a Christian, but of anyone who has a religious or non-religious world outlook according to which the highest value is transcendent and can be grasped not through abstract reasoning, but through an integrated mind. This is the general humanistic value of the idea of the primacy of practical reason, although admittedly Kant proceeded from the values embodied in the Greek-Judeo-Christian traditions of European civilization.

Recent Lessons

Unfortunately, Kant's attempt to save the values which enliven European culture did not completely succeed. European civilization preferred mainly an orientation based upon the primacy of theoretical reason and scientific-technological progress. Just as Kant was overcome by Hegel, moralists and theologians have been overcome by political scientists and technocrats.

This kind of orientation did not turn out to be so dangerous for the West. First of all, due to its rich democratic traditions, forces emerged which succeeded in surmounting the "Decline of the West" (Sprengler) and the existential crisis (Husserl). The East, however, went its own way. The scientific tendency of the Enlightenment struck a most server blow at the Soviet Union through its attempt to build its life anew based on the primacy of theoretical reason. On this foundation it tried not only to become European, but to undertake the mission of saving the world; for more than 70 years it attempted to build a new world following a priori theoretical prescriptions. It is acknowledged now that adhering to that prescription led to an impasse and that the attempt to find a way out provides a basis for concrete criticism of the theoretical views of those who wrote the prescription and directed its application. The progress of the critique is, as it were, retrospective; we begin with the recent leaders, then proceed to their predecessors—to the teachers and to the teachers of the teachers. Of course, one can discriminate, so that the heaviest criticism is due to Stalin for his is the greatest contribution to the creation of that social and political system. But he was a faithful disciple of Lenin, who thought that the idea of socialism had to be introduced into the labor movement from the outside. In turn, Lenin borrowed this idea from Marx, to whom this retrospective extends.

Justice demands, further, that we delve into the responsibility of Marx's teacher, Hegel. He initiated the primacy of theoretical reason, according to which being develops only according to rational pattern through a transformation of what preceded. Marx took over this idea and, having learned the objective laws of social progress, elaborated a recipe for building a happy future for humanity, a Paradise on Earth. He then exhorted his followers to adjust the present unreasonable social reality to a highly reasoned communist framework. Lenin thought that this could be done on the basis of the scientific analysis of the social reality, and began to do so. Stalin carried forward this enterprise with great success. It did not matter that he had to destroy all who did not fit into the Procrustean Bed of the new social idea because of evil will or some other factor: how else could he transform the idea of socialism into a valid, i.e., reasonable, reality?

It is true, of course, that Hegel had his predecessors as well. He did no more than lend perfectly consistent expression to the main tendency of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment took much

from the Renaissance, which was indebted, in turn, to ancient Greece and the Old and New Testaments. Thus, we could turn also to Plato, Moses, Christ…and, in the end, to Adam and Eve. Certainly, if the last would have behaved decently and not lost Paradise, we all would be there still and not in need of building a new one. Thus, in seeking the roots of our contemporary probles one might criticize the Enlightenment, the Renaissance, or Plato.

But this kind of critique is insufficient for solving the urgent problems of our life. The point is not to find a particular culprit, but to understand what kind of life men should and should not lead. In this regard, the main outcome of the Soviet social experiment is final confirmation of the thesis that the mode of human life, the social order, should not be based on scientific theories, and in this light Hegel, Marx, Lenin and Stalin really deserve to be criticized. While the scientific analysis of real facts is relatively true—a completely true scientific theory is impossible in principle—the main consideration is that any science is a theory of objects. It is a theory of reality deprived of freedom, value and dignity, whereas human beings are endowed with value, dignity and freedom; they seek kindness and immortality. Persons can lead decent lives corresponding to their sense of dignity only when their mode of living is determined not simply by the objective laws of nature and society (which really exist and thus must be studied), but by religious and moral principles. Only when these principles underlie relations between person—friendship, erotic love, law, politics, etc.00will the primacy of practical reason be embodied in human life.

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Discussion

N. Chavchavadze recounts how in the aftermath of the Cartesian search for clarity with a view to constructing a universal science, Kant's three Critiques presented a schema for identifying and restoring—though perhaps not adequately integrating—additional dimensions of human reason.

The first critique, that of speculative reason, as treating not all that is, but only what is available to the senses, is thereby constituted of necessary spatio-temporal relations. Such reality, however, does not include the human source of theoretical knowledge itself or the parameters of human life as transcending and as free. For this Kant had to proceed to a second critique which added not more theoretical knowledge, but an acknowledgment of God, the soul and freedom. It is here that one can treat free choice and what ought to be freely chosen, or value. The second critique or that of practical reason, with its realm of freedom, religion and morals, is essential for a truly human life. He sees this as having been demonstrated negatively by the attempts of Stalin, Lenin and Marx to establish life in an exclusively scientific basis.

The above thesis is contested in two ways: one approach would attempt in various fashions to do all in terms of the first or theoretical reason; the other would focus upon enriching the exercise of practical reason.

1. It was noted that while the strong separation between the two levels can be important in order to focus distinctive attention upon the importance of practical reason, in recent times many in the sciences have drawn back from so pure or abstract a sense of theoretical knowledge. In part this might be due to a sense of responsibility on the part of scientists regarding the employment of their discoveries such as atomic energy for the atomic bomb, and to a general broadening of human sensibility during the 1960s. But it is due as well to increasing doubt about the feasibility of pure objectivity as a human goal. This corresponds to the increasing appreciation of the importance of the role of subjectivity in all human activity, including that of the sciences. As a result, it seems no longer realistic to attempt to realize science simply in terms of the necessitarian universal laws of the first critique. Attempts are now underway to resituate that within the broader human context where one can recognize the pervasive role of spirit and freedom

Some, however, would argue that pluralism calls for restricting thought to the first critique. For if values emerge in the course of time according to the experience and commitments of a people and form a tradition and a culture, will these not prove oppressive when extended from one group to another or even within one group from the past to the present and future?

But this problem seems characteristic of theoretical knowledge as described in Kant's first critique as held firmly to what is universal and necessary. To the degree, in contrast, that there is increasing recognition of the role of subjectivity in the development of such knowledge, universality will be less a problem, for it will be increasingly possible to allow for the positive role of subjectivity, freedom and creativity in our own knowledge and to leave more room for it in that of others. Universals are abstractions from the concrete exercise of freedom. To recognize and attend to freedom one needs to proceed beyond univocous universal thought to analogous thinking—which is precisely to proceed beyond the realm of science to that of metaphysics.

2. Some would suggest the opposite step, that is, rather than enrich the universal type of knowledge by adding the concrete existential dimension, they would reject even the content of the universal and turn simply to formal procedures. This would be the ultimate triumph of method which had become so predominant in the sciences and now would be applied to the practical order as well. This is used in some ethics, e.g., that of Rawls, and in some programs of moral education, namely that of Kohlberg's just society. Its supposition is a skeptical epistemology according to

which nothing of the nature of being of things can be known. This direction results in the self-centered vision of Hobbes and Adam Smith in which life is the war of all against all. In other words, it goes beyond relativism to suppose a completely amoral reality and hence a dehumanized person; then it attempts to work out a mode of survival in such a situation. This is the worst of the capitalist ideology, the reason why it is broadly distrusted as basically vicious and exploitive. In the United States it has generated so litigious a society that, e.g., the probability of being sued for malpractice is fast placing obstetric care not only out of reach as too expensive, but simply out of existence as doctors are driven out of that field.

In fact, formal procedures can be of help only where there exists some basic value context—e.g., agreement to respect other persons, fairness, etc. For procedures to work there is needed also a sense of brotherhood and love which founds, not only a society, but a community. Kohlberg, surreptitiously and probably unconsciously, imported a whole culture when he used the term just community for his moral education programs in the schools.

3. All the above points to the need to go beyond attempts to make everything work simply in terms of Kant's first critique of theoretical reason—that is, in terms of necessary theoretical knowledge with its artifices of universality and procedure—and to proceed to practical reason and the dimension of freedom about which the second critique is concerned. Indeed, it is the thesis of N. Chavchavadze that the value-free character of the first critique, rather than being normative for human life, needs to be at the service of morality understood as the free and responsible exercise of life that is worthy of the person in community.

It would seem also that we must go beyond the formalism of Kant's second critique, for what must be respected is not reason or laws, but persons and one another. Thus we need to consider all in the concrete and to take account of the actual exercise by people of their freedom. Morality is the direction or exercise of freedom by a person or group; and culture is the organization of the empirical or factual realities according to human values.

This, of course, necessitates taking account of the being or reality of those involved, and of their free exercise of their being. Both require that we transcend or go beyond simply factual existence to understand ourselves as dynamically related to action which does not yet exist. In a word, we need to take account of action as free along with its motivation. This needs to be recognized in others as well. They must be seen not simply as objects to be manipulated for personal gain as if community were simply a set of atomic—or, a fortiori, mutually exploitive—individuals. We need then a basis for the unity or brotherhood of humankind.

In this way both freedom and unity direct our attention beyond ourselves toward that which transcends any individual reality or set of realities, any circumstance or se of circumstances. It is here that metaphysics is required in order to extend the horizons of controlled philosophical reflection to the source and goal of human life, and thus to the inspiration and motivation for amoral public life. This points back to the ancient Greek and to Plato's sense of the good. N. Chavchavadze ponts out, however, that it is not sufficient for this to be a supreme idea; it must be a Being which speaks the word in love and sacrifice. In this it meets the content of religious traditions regarding a personal, provident and redeeming God.

Chapter XVIII
The Three Types of Relations Between Knowledge and Morals

T. Bochorishvili

The relationship between science and morality has often been a subject of discussion. Today, this question is topical once again. Is this interrelation negative, positive or neutral? What is the nature of this relationship: is it an inner, essential relation; an "external", "incidental" one; or some third kind?

Disjunction of Knowledge and Morals

Jean Jacques Rousseau's conception offers a typical example of a negative answer to the above question: "Our souls have been corrupted as science and art have improved." This disaster characterizes not only one epoch, but "is observable at all times and in all countries."[1] Rousseau strives to prove that the negative influence exerted upon morality by science and art derives from their very nature, i.e., science and art *per se* are directly responsible for the degradation of morals. This forces one to choose between morality, on the one hand, and science and art, on the other.

Where does Rousseau's error lie? Rousseau establishes the fact that morals do not improve with the increase of knowledge; on the contrary, the greater the increase in knowledge, the faster the degradation of morals. On this basis, however, we cannot conclude that moral degradation is caused by increase of knowledge. Rousseau made the logical error: "after that, hence, because of that" (*post hoc, ergo propter hoc*.) His premise, however, may be helpful: knowledge does not automatically bring about an improvement of morals, there is no inner, logically determined causal relationship between an increase of knowledge and moral improvement. We too would assert that there is no direct positive relationship between science and morality, that the essence of science does not include morality, that science per se cannot create morality. But could science exert a negative influence on morals?

A neutral relationship to the person's moral activity is equally characteristic of physical and mathematical sciences and of the humanities. Ethics itself, being a doctrine about morals and morality, offers no exception to the rule: it reduces itself to the study of right and wrong in human behavior, establishing what is virtuous and what is evil. The mere knowledge of ethical truths and ethical norms is no guarantee of a person's moral behavior. Knowing moral philosophies and being an expert in ethics alone does not make a person moral. One who becomes interested in ethics may attain a certain level of ethical consciousness when he or she knows and understands moral maxims and standards. Yet this kind of knowledge is not sufficient to strive to implement them; for this it is necessary that the person have a positive attitude towards these moral standards. Conversely there are people who, even if non-literate, can struggle to implement moral values and principles, though they may not have the slightest idea about ethics as such.

To put it more directly, an expert in ethics may be an immoral person, while an illiterate person may have high moral principles and offer a standard of good behavior. Knowledge *per se* does not motivate to morality in human activity. Those concerned with moral philosophy have a much better knowledge of ethics than those who are nonliterate, yet they do not attempt to use ethical knowledge in order to instill moral values and principles. If knowledge by itself directly motivated moral behavior it would suffice to take a course in ethics or to provide education and intellectual

knowledge in order to form moral personalities, rather than striving to instill in them moral values and standards, and to foster the will and its aspirations.

An evil-doer knows the difference between good and evil, virtue and vice, yet does evil for which he or she is liable to punishment, both moral and legal. An evil-doer who cannot and does not know what evil is, may not be considered an evil-doer as he bears no moral responsibility for his evil act. Socrates maintained that "no one having knowledge would ever try to stand in the way of good, only an ignorant person would do so", but in his *Ethics,* Aristotle said that "this statement is inconsistent with reliable facts."[2] Socrates' neglect of the will and its crucial function in moral behavior leads logically to intellectualism as its logical consequence in ethics.

Science or knowledge stops working and considers its mission fulfilled when it has clarified the position of things or has said that which is. In order to live, a person must direct his or her actions in this world. Even a most detailed knowledge of a train schedule will not be much help if we do not know where we want to go.

Here a second question comes to the fore: is science apt to be applied to benefit moral education? Certainly it is apt for this; it can and should be used to this end. When seeking improvement of moral standards, the knowledge of what is morally high and low is indispensable. Yet, this kind of knowledge is not enough to make a person eager to improve his moral standards. There must also be a will to do good, an urge towards higher moral values. The knowledge of morality and the will to be moral are not the same thing. To know the laws of the will is a prerequisite for efficient moral education, yet it is hardly possible to employ these laws in order to determine the direction of education, its goals, etc. These are determined in another manner.

Science or truth can be applied for furthering moral progress, yet truth is indifferent to its employment, it does not tend to it. Truth is not transformed into anything else, and will remain itself even if it finds no application whatsoever. However, the person's life in general, and his moral evolution in particular, must be aided by knowledge. Science itself is so indifferent to application that it may serve all purposes with equal "pleasure", even opposite ones, i.e., both the moral and the immoral alike. From this standpoint, there is no principal difference between the sciences: both the physical sciences and the humanities may be used to serve opposite purposes. It is not difficult to cite numerous examples today which graphically confirm the above.

If knowledge and ignorance alike are apt to be the cause of both positive and negative moral behavior, we can conclude that *per se* knowledge and ignorance are morally neutral.

Finally, it is necessary to specify that the word "scientist" used in this chapter implies a subject of knowledge or a person as characterized entirely by knowledge. (This abstract understanding of the word enables our discussion to be scientific and justified. Should the word "scientist" be taken in terms of an entire personality, with all the social responsibilities, moral duties and *Weltanschauung* involved, our topic would lose its problematic character and cease being a subject of discussion, for such a man would be not only a subject of knowledge, but also a person.)

Pragmatic and Value Relations Between Knowledge and Morals

Many philosophers distinguish spirituality and outlook from rational intelligence. The well-known German philosopher, Max Scheler,[1] asserts that the rational side of man may regulate his behavior, but the decisive impulses of his creative capacity go above and beyond the merely rational intellect. Thus, it was incomprehensible to him when the Neo-Kantians, in their logic, found it necessary to bind everything to "consciousness in general" (*Bewsstseinüberhaupt*), which Scheler regarded as a pure fiction.

For Scheler, knowledge is an ontic form of communication between existents. It is not an end in itself, but its aim is that to which the communication is directed. The formula "knowledge for knowledge's sake" is as nonsensical as is its aesthetic counterpart "art for art's sake". Knowledge, like all other things we love and seek, has value and ontic teleological meaning; that it serves the formation of the person is its justification or meaning. Hence, the forms of knowledge are differentiated according to those of formation which, in turn, has three main goals: cognition, education and independence or liberation. There exist then three forms of knowledge: cognitive, educational and liberating. Knowledge that serves man in conquering nature is represented in the form of science. This is but one of the forms of knowledge and not the only one, as pragmatism would suppose. The second form of knowledge serves to realize the person's potential or abilities. Liberating knowledge also called metaphysical, in Scheler's terminology is meant to foster the formation of the world in the sense of species formation, the conception of time being ruled out.

These knowledge forms are arranged in a hierarchical series of objective steps ranked according to their significance. The lowest step in his ascending series of values is occupied by knowledge which aids in our practical work and in general serves our interests. Of higher value is educational knowledge, which is aimed at bringing the person's development to a level where the person becomes a microcosm and thinks in terms of the structural unity of the universe. An educated person will not be the one who is rich in knowledge of incidental features, but rather the one who has come to occupy a place in a personal universe, having transformed in himself his multiple and manifold relations to the universe. In this sense education is concerned with "style", rather than "erudition" and "scientism".

The highest value is had by that knowledge whereby the person's self participates in the highest form of being. This kind of participation in the Absolute can be realized only if the Absolute itself takes part in this process. Through participation in our metaphysical knowledge, the Divine is achieved in our formation, which is its goal. For it is not only man who seeks God but likewise, God needs man, the latter being the only point in the universe where the Divine can be imaged.

Pragmatism is correct when it sees "positive" knowledge as furthering man's scientific accomplishments; it errs, however, when it states that all types of knowledge are pragmatic. Even when the subject of study has been chosen on pragmatic grounds with a view to further application to practical needs, the truth about the subject remains and one must be consistent with it. Scheler, indeed, would reject the "new" pragmatic theory of truth.

The truth that practical results may be gained from knowledge is based on the fact that he who knows shares in that which is known and that true participation assures true and efficient action. Pragmatism, along with positivism, is characteristic of the Western mentality in giving priority to the scientist's practical, technical and utilitarian qualities. Such an understanding and evaluation of knowledge would deprive philosophy of its independence, for the pragmatic and positivist definition of knowledge leaves no space for metaphysical forms of knowledge, i.e., for knowledge of the highest rank which provides the form of knowledge most important for philosophy.

From the above, it is obvious that the motivation behind the thirst for scientific knowledge is different from that behind the urge towards philosophical knowledge: the former is determined by man's vital needs, while the root of the latter, as Aristotle put it, has always been curiosity. Permeated with utilitarianism, science tends to consider all phenomena in terms of profit and loss; only from this standpoint does it become interested in the analysis of phenomena: it does not attend to phenomena which are personally neutral. With this attitude phenomena are viewed as existent or non-existent for man, not in themselves. What we see as important for us in a phenomenon, be

it positive or negative, is, however, but incidental to the phenomenon *per se*. Still worse, for pragmatism, every new fact constitutes a danger for it is a potential rebel against the established or conventional order. Hence, so-called "economic reasoning" seeks to adapt to the old system everything that is new.

Philosophical Knowledge

Philosophical knowledge, in contrast, wants every subject to be for itself, for the subject. It is a specific feature of this thought that it considers the subject only for itself, as a subject *per se*, and grasps its basis and its constitutive factors. Only philosophical knowledge can elucidate this fully and clearly. Philosophy is interested in facts inasmuch as they provide an opportunity to come into contact with the eternal. Philosophy begins at the point where practical, utilitarian reasoning and the so-called "technological principle" upon which the choice of the subject of study strongly depends are consciously and deliberately ruled out.

Because scientific knowledge is specifically human and seeks to preserve the vital basis common to all human beings, it is done from the standpoint of life itself. In contrast to scientific knowledge, philosophy strives also to gain knowledge which will not be connected with life and its possible value. This thought lies hidden in Plato's formula defining philosophy as a process of systematic death, i.e., suppressing man's vital existence in order that the mind might flourish. Asceticism which also is a human characteristicis associated positively with the human's thirst for philosophy. Thus, questions which cannot be solved with precision through induction and mathematics may not be viewed as scientific questions; and vice versa, a problem that can be solved in the above manner still will not belong to the problematics of philosophy.

The three types of knowledge: scientific, personal and metaphysical are so specific and differ so greatly that they cannot substitute one for another. Each one has its own irreplaceable function. Scheler adds that modern civilization with its technology, industry and communications is based on precision regarding size and quantity, on the formation of "labor science". The Einsteinian sciences are titanic both in the scale of their goals and the grandeur of the results they achieved, which already have visibly affected man's living conditions.

Each of the above forms of knowledge focused the life of a civilization: metaphysical knowledge has been given special attention in ancient India. China focused on educational knowledge. Western Europe became the center of scientific knowledge.

If we consider the above types of knowledge as an ascending series of steps toward increased knowledge, then mature and perfect knowledge is that which has passed through all the three steps and constitutes their highest synthesis. This will be the process of cognition, starting with scientific knowledge that provides some first grasp or possession of reality, then passing through the stage of knowledge which is necessary for personal development, and finally, at its highest point, reaches knowledge of the absolute or God in metaphysical knowledge. For Scheler every knowledge eventually proves to be holy knowledge or knowledge of, and for, the holy.

An integral part of Scheler's philosophy is his notion of the ranked order of values. He recognized four classes of value, of which knowledge is one:

(1) values of the senses;
(2) values of life;
(3) values of the spirit, such as the aesthetic values of the beautiful and ugly, the correct and the incorrect, and the intrinsic value of knowledge; and

(4) religious values.

Morality itself is not included in this list because to be ethical is, in fact, to implement one of the above values. These values form a qualitative hierarchy from the religious, which are the highest, down to the senses. Rank is given phenomenologically based on criteria of duration, extent, self-sufficiency and other qualities.

Scheler considers that we have an immediate "certainty of the priority" of the higher over the lower values, for example, that the spirit is superior to the body and that love is higher than intellectual accomplishment. These judgements in their value-content are given to us as preferred qualities in what Scheler calls the "*a priori* of love", i.e., a knowing in which the subject is prepared to love the object. Only a true analysis of phenomena can express the essential value of any entity; Scheler demonstrated this "analysis of essences" through many examples. His *a priori* method is not restricted to the formal conditions of knowledge, as with Kant, but refers to objective or "material" contents as essences which by their very nature are known only in an *a priori* manner. He refers to this as the "material" *a priori* in contrast to Kant's "formal" *a priori*.

In sum, according to phenomenological ethics, moral behavior takes place when the person, choosing between two values, gives preference to the higher one in the hierarchy. In this, one thereby rejects that which is lower, although of itself, the one rejected may also be a value and be of certain interest in some case. In other words: Morality is orientation to higher values.

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Discussion

The paper laid out an important contrast between different understandings of the relation between knowledge and morality. In the first understanding, knowledge was morally neutral for it could be had without morality and vice versa; further, knowledge did not provide the motivation required for morals. If, however, with Scheler, one adds a teleological dimension, then knowledge too is differentiated according to its goals. Scientific knowledge works with necessary laws and is oriented to pragmatic and utilitarian goals. Philosophical knowledge, in contrast, is shaped by its origin in wonder and looks beyond to a transcendent and inclusive horizon characterized by the *a priori* of love. This is holy knowledge or knowledge of the holy: in this sense, Aristotle understood philosophy, as the science of wisdom, to be a theology.

Two problems emerge. One is the tendency of sociological knowledge to chart a morphology of types, e.g., of relations in the family, noting the changes from an earlier, more stable and uniform interrelation of husband, wife and children to a much more varied situation of divorced and remarried couples with various groupings of their children, of single parent families, homosexual unions, etc. This presents a dilemma. Should one simply abandon moral evaluations in order to work with the new variety of forms? If so, then one ignores other statistics regarding the endangered condition of children raised without a stable relation to mother and father. Longitudinal studies show that for such children an escape from a pattern of crime, drug abuse, alcoholism or family instability is notably less probable than for those raised with both parents. On the other hand, to employ in public policy a negative moral judgment regarding these alternate forms seems prejudicial to the rights of those in such situations.

A second problem in employing teleological judgments is that of relativism. To one who accepts only factual knowledge based upon empirical data, moral judgments must appear to be without rational basis and related only to custom. This is looked down upon as lacking in reason, subject to arbitrary and changing whims, and ultimately relativistic. This problem of relativism is not escaped by turning to supposedly "value-free" empirical knowledge. If etymology traces ‘moral’ to *mores* or customary behavior, what happens when statistics begin to show a decrease in the threefold relation hitherto characteristic of family: mother, father and child? Do alternate patterns become moral simply by becoming increasingly common? If morals are simply the prevalent behavior patterns, which vary with time, morals would be the prejudiced imposition of the majority upon minorities.

In view of this the importance of a teleological dimension for knowledge and for being begins to emerge, and hence the significance of what is and is not good. To the objection that this would establish a relativism it would seem that one should distinguish between relativity in truth and in values. If the former be the case and truth were to be relative, then each group, and indeed each person, would be trapped within him/ herself. If pressed, nothing would inhibit this from becoming a solipsism or even an atomism of moments with no foundation for meaning and no possibility for reasoning. Life would be, as in Shakespeare’s words, "a tale told by an idiot." That this is not the case means that truth cannot be simply relative, but must be able to transcend the moment and the individual both in time and place. Communication, if not always a simple matter, is possible; indeed it is a key to planning and cooperation to taking charge of our destiny.

But life is a matter not merely of knowledge, but of values as well. The most frightening thing about our day is that values seem to be so largely ignored, as is reflected in the rising crime statistics, in public apathy and in the lack of care. This gives rise to the socio-economic conditions from which crime springs. In responding to these it was suggested that science and philosophy

should be considered allies rather than antagonists. Despite its proximate utilitarian goals, science is integrated within a broader human purpose, namely, to discovering how the world works and the place of man therein. In order for the appropriate choices to be made however, it must be possible to distinguish between different kinds of realities, i.e., to grasp the natures of the realities involved and how they interact. This is required in order to be able to make appropriate choices and to guide our activities accordingly. Science can play an important, even essential, role in much of this.

However, to appreciate the significance of nature, not merely as a formal set of possibilities, but as the dynamic process of realizing being in our day, it is necessary to ground our awareness of nature in that of being. Life is not merely a matter of formally correct alternate models but, for Aristotle, happiness means living well, that is, being well and doing well. In turn, this brings one to love as the specific mode of conscious human self-direction toward the good. Primarily and ultimately, this is the absolute or self-sufficient Good, which is thus Love Itself. Derivatively, it is constituted of the bonds of love we build with others, with our family and, in ever broadening circles, with our social and even physical world.

In this one can find an important place for the pragmatic as, moved by love, persons seek to respond to the concrete challenges with which life confronts them, their intimates and the broader society. Thus, the overarching human purpose to which philosophy is sensitive is worked out differently in the various groups as we depend upon the experience of earlier generations of our family and nation in shaping our responses. These become cumulative through time, gradually constituting a culture and a tradition. In this light the step pointed out by the paper beyond the merely utilitarian horizon of the sciences to philosophy as attentive to goals and values is not to embark upon a relativism, but to escape from the relativism implicit in reductive utilitarianism. Philosophy does this by being attentive to the fullness of the human experience of the good as constantly unfolding in the richly varied strivings of the multiple cultures.

In this it is important to spell out one's nature and one's rights as minimal requirements, which must not be denied; science and law can do much in this regard. When, however, our nature is seen within the total dynamism of being as our appropriate mode for imaging the divine and when our rights are seen as the minimal requirements for our response to that love by which we have been loved, then the full importance of nature and rights can be appreciated. For nature and its laws then appear as enlivening rather than as restricting. Respect for rights then emerges as essential in promoting both the exercise of freedom and the realization of love.

Chapter XIX

Knowledge and Ethics According to Shota Rustaveli's Epic "The Knight in the Panther's Skin"

Paata Chkheidze

The great Georgian epic, *The Knight in the Panther's Skin*, belongs to the twelfth century. In one chapter of the epic, "The Testament of Avtandil While He Stole Away", the protagonist of the poem, Avtandil, proclaims:

> If the deed is carried out, what sense is in the knowledge
> of philosophers' wisdom.
> That's the way to learn and join the heavenly hierarchy.

These lines present not only the world outlook of the author, Shota Rustaveli, but the moral attitude and stance of its spiritual life of the whole Georgian nation.

Avtandil is presented as a king's general and spouse of the king's sole daughter. On a hunt with the king who raised him, he encountered a stranger, a young knight, and tried to make his acquaintance. But the slaves sent to invite him for a meeting became the victims of his anger; he killed all of them and fled. According to the desire of the King and his daughter, Avtandil undertook a long search for the lost knight. He encountered and promised to assist a stranger, named Tariel, the prince and heir of a kingdom in India. Tariel was an unhappy spouse in search of his sweetheart, the daughter of the supreme King of India, Nestan-Darejan, who had been kidnapped by the evil souls, the Kajis. With the help of their third friend, Phridon, the two attacked the castle, won the battle and liberated the beauty. That is the plot of the epic.

The "Testament" under discussion deals with the text, written by Avtandil, after his decision to begin a second journey to assist Tariel, and all that is done against the will of his own king.

The study of the philosophical basis of Rustaveli's poem dates from the early decades of the twentieth century and still continues. During this period a number of counter opinions have developed, among these the idea of a Neo-Platonic influence upon Rustaveli calls for the most attention.

A number of aspects appear to link Rustaveli's poem with the European Renaissance. These include the Neo-Platonic theory of the emanation of the universe, the overcoming of the rupture between the earthly world and the other world, the value of earthly life, the enjoyment of the beauty of the material world, and humanitarian ideals.

The influence of Neoplatonism upon Rustaveli's world outlook was brought out first by an outstanding Orientalist, Niko Marr. This was inspired by stanza 884 where Tariel, exhausted after his fight with a lion and a panther, addresses Avtandil in the tone of a hopeless lover:

> The death's approaching, leave me alone,
> I have too little time left,
> All my connections are broken,
> I am joining the range of spirits.

Niko Marr tried to explain the idea of the stanza with the help of the great Georgian philosopher Ioane Petritzi, the translator and commentator of Proclus' *Connections* (The Basis of Theology). Marr pointed out the presentation of Death as a break of connections (Earth, Water, Fire, Air) and the liberation of spirit from the world, its ascent to heaven. This opinion is strengthened by stanza 1304, where Nestan-Darejan on the brink of a nervous breakdown, sends a letter to her beloved from her imprisonment:

Pray to the Lord in order to free me
from the worldly torture, to leave the fire,
water and earth and air.

In Neoplatonic thinkers, and the commentaries of Ioane Petritzi, the four elements frequently are mentioned as components of worldly existence. The division of the creator into four elements exists also in other religions and philosophical trends, but Marr's choice of Petritzi is based on the word "sira" used by Shota Rustaveli. In Greek philosophy the term means an order, rank or range and often is used in that sense in Petritzi's commentaries.

That was the point at which Marr stopped. Later a Georgian philosopher, Shalva Nutsubidze, pointed out that the Neoplatonism in Rustaveli's epic is of a specific Christian form. Its source is attributed to pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite. According to the opinion of Nutsubidze and Ernest Honigman, a Belgian researcher, pseudo-Dionysius was Petre Iberi, the fifth century Georgian theologian, and Bishop of Mayum.

Stanza 1492 of *The Knight* points directly to pseudo-Dionysius' influence on Rustaveli's world outlook:

Dionysius the sage has revealed the following wisdom to us:
God is the giver of good and not creator of evil.
Evil is short-lived and transient while good endures forever.
He, the supreme and Perfect, makes His Perfect self more Perfect.

These lines not only present the name of the thinker, whose ideas were used by Rustaveli, but illustrate the soul of the Areopagitic philosophical system in the shortest and most skillful manner.

According to pseudo-Dionysius, the Lord is Goodness Itself, which dawns on each existing substance. Evil is not derived from the Lord. but belongs to non-substance. In all conditions it is opposed to goodness, not as a self or independent substance, but as Goodness which is subject to a privation. The contemporary Georgian philosopher, Shalva Shikashely, writes on the problem as depicted in *The Knight*:

The basis for the victory of Goodness over Evil is the reality of the former, its eternal existence and substantial being, in contrast to the unreality of Evil, its chance, temporary and its accidental character. Goodness itself is the substance, "the existing one", while Evil does not exist by itself, it is "non-existing".

The Areopagitic view on the interrelation of Evil and Goodness is itself the source or starting point of Rustaveli's moral principles. It is significant that Basil the Great was one of the early authors of the formula on the nonsubstantiality of Evil and the presentation of its existence as a

privation of Goodness. His works were translated into Georgian in the twelfth century and though Rustaveli must have known them, he mentions only pseudo-Dionysius.

Now let us return to Avtandil's testament:
If the deed is not carried out,
what sense is in the Knowledge of philosophers!

These words not only present an ethical standard to Avtandil, but are the principal basis of his philosophical world view, his most important definition of worldly existence.

The philosophical aspect of the world view should be underlined because "The Testament" begins by mentioning Plato:

Permit me, O King, to recall to your mind the teaching of Plato:
Falseness and double-dealing are destroyers of body and soul.

Of course, this aphorism is not an exact citation of Plato, but Rustaveli was right in attributing these words to Plato, whose name and prestige meant a great deal to him. For him Plato was the greatest sage, the patriarch of the wise men he considered to be his teachers. In this case the protagonist of the epic points not only to the premise of his own opinion, but in addition declares that the wisdom he acquired from his teacher was interpreted by him rather in a distinctive manner and converted into a program of action.

The aim of learning and the result of action is given in the following line:

That's the way to learn and to join the heavenly hierarchy.

Thus, learning with subsequent corresponding action draws a man closer and "joins" him to the heavenly order.

According to Avtandil communication with eternal Goodness or the Lord is possible only through the force of Love which must bring us to the divine hierarchy. That constitutes pure Christian love which is especially underlined in "The Testament", that is, the Love of which the "apostles write" in their books.

It should be noted that certain researchers are suspicious of the Christian foundation of Rustaveli's world outlook; they reject also the influence of pseudo-Dionysius upon Rustaveli. Their reason is the total absence of the Trinity in the poem, whereas it occupies one of the main places in the works of pseudo-Dionysius as a genuine Christian thinker. But it should also be noted that there is no point in searching for a complete religious and philosophical system in this epicwe would not find it there and there is no need for it. *The Knight* belongs to creative literature, to poetry, and in it can be traced the spirit of the epoch.

Shota Rustaveli is the child of a Christian epoch and a Christian country; accordingly, his world outlook is fed with Christian sustenance. The fact then that not all points of Christian dogmas are found in the poem, for instance the dogma of the Trinity, does not prove Rustaveli's non-Christianity. To strengthen our position we would note that this absence of the Trinity is true also of the Anglo-Saxon epic *Beowulf* or of the poem *Percival*, written by Wolfram von Eschenbach who was a poet contemporary to Rustaveli, although it certainly belongs to the Christian period and is written in a Christian cultural environment.

The Lord mentioned and characterized in aliphatic and cataphalic ways in the epic is the creator of all: He bestows upon man the ability to "overcome foes"; He is "the helper", "the invisible", "the immortal" the one who can turn one into many, and many into one.

Besides all this we find the Christian point of view regarding the creation of the Universe. On that are based the ideas of a personal God and His will, the creation of this world, and the existence, life and fate of men. All are in God's hands, everything depends on His will, that is Avtandil's belief:

What the Lord will not desire, not a deed
will meet its end.

Human fate is premeditated and what is determined cannot be changed. Though from this there follows the idea of man as a toy in the hands of fate, Avtandil proclaims not blind fate, but the will of God. He asserts also the human will:

No point there is in where I am, unless free will
for me provided.

This is not against the will of God, on the contrary, the two wills coincide. The Lord creates only Goodness which, after making a circuit, returns again to its source. When a man exercises his will and begins the struggle against Evil, he carries out God's will. In the environment of medieval centuries the problem of the relation of God's will and human action is connected to the general problem of the Absolute will and the free will. This problem is solved in a special way in Rustaveli's epic. When a man's action is directed to Goodness, its fulfillment becomes the result of God's will and its fate is determined by that will conjointly with the person's own subjective action.

Human unhappiness is brief; patience and struggle are needed to overcome it. The basis for this struggle is knowledge or enlightenment and the highest moral categories.

In the struggle against Evil one of the main supports is the courage and bravery of the knight. These features determine Rustaveli's philosophy of action. Death and life are too close to each other; death is the lot of every being. This proves Rustaveli's famous slogan on the preference of heroic death to nameless existence:

Better die with fame, than to live with shame!

Death in the struggle against Evil and fame that follows such death is one of the conditions for return to the eternal source.

According to Avtandil's will, upon his death his property is to be distributed among the meek and the poor, to free the slaves, and to build bridges and nursing homes for the sick. Besides, he asks the king to pray for his soul and asks for forgiveness. Satan is mentioned and fear is expressed of being defeated by him:

Thus I pray my soul to take it, letter'll tell you won't deceive,
And the lie will destroy me, so the Satan can win.

Thus, the "Testament of Avtandil" begins and ends with the curse of the lie and the praise of truth.

This short part of the great epic presents an apology for knowledge, truth, love and morals. The term "knowledge" in the poem relates neither to obtaining information, nor to learning some profession, but to "philosophical wisdom" which moves a man closer to truth and helps him discern it and reject falsehood. Lies affect drastically not only the flesh, but the soul as well. Besides lies, inactivity and fear are manifestations of the evil which prevents the victory of Goodness and the ascent of the spirit. Action and struggle are means for carrying out the moral categories identified by philosophical wisdom. Thus, according to Rustaveli, man's ascent to heaven is like stairs. Knowledge or philosophic enlightenment and love, moral empowerment, action and struggle against any kind of evil lead humanity to the Heavenly Hierarchy.

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Discussion

The poem of S. Rustaveli, "The Knight in the Panther-Skin", constitutes a basic document for Georgian culture analogous to the *Mahabharata* in India, the *Divine Comedy* in Italy or Shakespeare's writings for Anglo-Saxon culture. Its sources can be traced back to the Christian Neoplatonic tradition of Pseudo Dionysius and others, though the poem does not present detailed philosophical or theological structures.

The cultural content of Rustaveli's epic is a vivid presentation of the humanitarian ideals of love and friendship. Its image of the knight brings to life the value, dignity and responsibility of the person. Presented in epic form this work has been the basic bearer of the self-understanding and values of the Georgian people.

A characteristic feature of this work is its ability to move freely between the concrete, sensibly observable world and the metaphysical world of immortality, heaven and God. This raises the question of whether and in what ways such metaphysical vision is and will remain viable in the present times.

The very question, however, may reflect a situation of reductionist humanism which is already past. As noted in the chapter of Professor Walsh the attempt to explain all simply in material and human terms rather than in terms of the spiritual and, by extension, the divine is not characteristically modern; it is but one phase of the recurring human *hubris* by which a creature attempts to become God as in the Bible story of the Fall, first of the angels, and then of mankind in Adam and Eve. Similarly, the initial humanist phase of the enlightenment was followed by a recognition of its inadequacy and in contrast of the essential importance of the spirit. The present situation has strong similaritic to this second moment. After seventy years of the harshest oppression in which all the modern techniques of educational, social and political controls were applied to a campaign of materialistic reductionism, its utter failure and radically dehumanizing effect impels people toward a rediscovery and reaffirmation of human freedoms and their spiritual bases. This is truly resurrection and new life.

It has meaning not only for opening attention to such trans-physical realities as the soul, immortality and God, but, mediated through metaphysics as a science of all things, it brings a renewed valuation of all both physical and non-physical in broader, deeper and richer terms. At this moment in history our particular vantage point is the person as free. On this basis it can be seen with new and special clarity that the human spirit is not limited according to Kant's necessitarian laws of temporal and spatial phenomena, but lives rather in terms of the possibilities of the limitless truth and love that is God. The point of entry is the person; the point of arrival is the plenitude of life itself; and between these two lies the field of creative freedom.

This, in turn, gives renewed importance to culture and tradition. These are the product of free and creative human choices in response to the concrete challenges of personal and social life. Tradition is constituted of these choices which continually have been reevaluated and reaffirmed through time, and thereby constitutes the trove of discovery by a people regarding the meaning and means of human life. This provides materials and content for metaphysics, whose task is to apply the most open and effective means to bring this into the full light of being as true, to leaven it with present insight and carefully to draw out its implications for truly humane progress in the good. This constitutes a continuing dialogue between the sense of person emerging from contemporary struggles and that of the divine foundations of human life, between public life and

theology, mediated by a metaphysics in which the human understanding of both poles will be enriched.

This has important implications for our day. Some who are trapped within the Cartesian search for clarity and unity reject any effort to attain an overall and integrated vision as merely a selection of some factors to which all else is reduced. Such a reductionism would be an ideology by which all that is concrete or free would be discounted, excluded or repressed. They interpret in this light any attention to an absolute foundation or to a national identity which they see therefore as repressive and totalitarian which, if not materialist and Marxist, must then be Fascist. As a result, they are reinforced in a lobotomous positivism without mind or in a universalism without heart. But can such life as then remains be human in any real sense?

Such a position is itself an ideology and reflects the fatal limitation running through the modern history of man's search for clarity, which in its exclusiveness and under the impulse of *hubris* becomes a search for control. Just as today one begins to find the importance of "fuzzy" logic, so one needs to recapture the wisdom in a life that lives concretely, because only thus can one encounter existence lived freely. Without discounting clarity we need a broader appreciation of being and meaning and of the multiple modes in which this is discovered, envisaged and expressed. We need philosophizing that does not begin by rejecting the human experience of free commitment, but values it as the mirror in our world of the life and meaning of being. This will enable us to look deeply into our traditions as the mother lode for our discoveries about human life.

Read in this context, national epics such as Rustaveli's inspire neither an exclusive self-centeredness that has no room for others nor an abstract universal that has no room for concrete freedom. Rather, they reflect meaning which has been drawn from deep within the searchings of a people, but which transcends any particular life or lives, and thereby can be an inspiration and guide to all.

Chapter XX
The Moral Aspect of Philosophy

Ghia Nodia

When one speaks about the knowledge-morals relation, it is usually scientific knowledge that is implied. Philosophy, however, is a kind of knowledge as well, and a very special one. The moral aspect of philosophy is even more crucial for human existence, and more complicated, than is scientific knowledge.

The morals of science became a problem when science became sufficiently powerful to threaten human life. As philosophy has to do with the universal dimensions of being, if it becomes powerful enough to inflict danger, this danger may be as universal and as deep as is philosophic intent.

What is the classic moral dilemma in science? Science reveals to man the structure of the world; it discloses hidden mechanisms of real events. The process of this discovery, scientific research, satisfies the natural curiosity of man and is a pleasure in itself. Moreover, it expresses of man's openness to the Universe, as a mode of one's self-realization as oriented to all being; it is part of one's ontological vocation. On the other hand, having understood how natural processes work, man can influence their course and thereby derive benefit. Though scientific investigation is a pleasure, its result can be a weapon, even in the military sense. But after the weapon is created, the scientist loses control over its use; should it fall into immoral and/or unreasonable hands, it may become harmful to humans.

Till the twentieth century, however, the results of science were not sufficiently dangerous to destroy humanity or to uproot the foundations of human life. The benefits of science seemed far greater than its possible harm, and a scientist would not feel himself responsible for a casual misuse of his achievements by other men. But in the twentieth century the situation has changed. Some scientific discoveries, especially in physics and biology, have supplied man with means sufficiently powerful to endanger both his physical existence and spiritual identity. The danger has now become so universal that scientists can no longer avoid their responsibility for it. A conflict has emerged between freedom of scientific research and moral responsibility for its results, and the question has been posed: in some cases should a scientist go against his nature and forgo the pure pleasure of research in order to evade possible dangers to humanity? This is a conflict between the divine and universal nature of man, as expressed in pure scientific curiosity, and his finiteness and fallibility as expressed in his social behavior.

The Goal of Philosophy: Three Positions

The moral dilemma of the philosopher was exposed by Plato in his *Republic*. Philosophy is the contemplation of pure essences, of perennial and perfect ideas. This contemplation frees a person from the power of the imperfect, finite world. Spiritual involvement in the world of perennial ideas brings the human spirit to the state of bliss. Thus, it is only natural that a philosopher must strive to alienate himself from any kind of earthly affairs and dedicate himself to man's highest ontological vocation to the contemplation of ideas. But alongside this ontological vocation there exists moral obligation to the State which enabled the person to reach the spiritual summit. Having had the privilege of contemplating the perfect truth, the philosopher is the only

person who can *construct* reality, namely, human life, society and State, in accordance with that truth. The philosopher is the only person who can organize and rule the State in full conformity with the absolute models. As there is nobody else to do that job, he must do it. Moral obligation compels him to give up the happiness of pure contemplation and to become a servant of society. Only in old age is he permitted to retire, to move to some distant island and lead the life to which he is called from within.

Plato’s doctrine implies a clear notion of the philosopher’s social role and moral obligation. The image he has in mind may be called the "Philosopher Constructor" or the "Philosopher King". It is the philosopher who knows the Ultimate Truth, and society must be constructed and ruled by the person who knows it.

ln modern times this tradition took a new turn in Marx’ philosophy, as formulated in his famous proposition, "The Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." The moral dilemma of Plato’s philosopher disappears. According to Plato, philosophy was by its intrinsic nature a contemplation of what already is, but the moral obligation induced the philosopher to be active. In Marx’ doctrine, the inner sense of philosophy consists in being an element of the social praxis.[1] It does not just contemplate the object, but constructs it; it has the form of praxis from the very beginning. Knowledge is construction, not only in an ideal sense, as Kant and German idealism have put it, but also in a material sense: philosophizing has its meaning only if it is a beginning point of social praxis. Social praxis, in turn, is philosophical, that is universal. When Marx speaks about changing the world, he means really *changing* the world and not merely correcting it through a set of particular interferences in the course of events. For him social praxis is the *embodiment of Philosophy*, making philosophy real; it fuses together the ethical and the ontological, the earthly and the divine.

A third prominent figure, strikingly different from both Plato and Marx, thought that the highest goal of philosophy is not just to understand what is, but to build the New Being: that was Martin Heidegger. ln Adolf Hitler he saw the wise philosopher-king for whom Plato had been vainly seeking. The Nazis represented for him not a political, but an ontological movement: "National Socialist revolution is not simply the taking of power in the state by one party from another, but brings a complete revolution of our German existence".[2] That is why Heidegger welcomed enthusiastically the Nazi movement, joined the National Socialist party and became, as Rector of Freiburg university, an active propagandist of Nazi ideas. After a while the Nazis disappointed him and he stopped being their ardent supporter, but this did not mean refutation of the general principle: the moral calling of the Philosopher or of Philosophy consists in taking part in creating the New Being with the help of earthly power.

Plato’s drama was that he could not find the philosopher-king ready to realize his ideas. Heidegger’s drama was that his philosopher-king turned out to be the wrong one. The tragedy of Marx was that he succeeded in producing plenty of philosophizing kings who really ruled in his name. The history of the communist world was an excellent historical test not only for the credibility of the Marxist doctrine, but also for the idea of the social incarnation of philosophy. The communist countries were (and some still are) states in which the whole of life had (has) to conform to a certain philosophical doctrine. Therefore, every citizen is obliged to be a philosopher. One cannot graduate even from a high school without learning the three laws of dialectics and the

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[1] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 5.

[2] M. Heidegger, *German Existentialism*, Dagobert D. Runes, trans. (New York: Wisdom Library, a Division of Philosophical Library, 1965), p. 32.

six pairs of categories; after completing all stages of education a person has to renew his/her philosophical training in numerous seminars and meetings organized at his/her working place.

On the other hand, the political leader of the country is at the same time the Main Philosopher, who must determine the philosophical ideas obligatory for his citizens. Every political report of the Leader becomes the most recent philosophical classic, subject to study during political seminars and obligatorily quoted in philosophical dissertations. This is a most perfect and universal realization of the philosopher-king's idea, with just a slight difference: it is not that philosophers become kings, but that kings become philosophers; kings do not obey the advice of philosophers, but philosophers become obedient servants of kings and propagandists of their ideas. The king-philosophers, in their turn, only pretend to behave in conformity with the highest philosophical truth in reality they adapt their pidgin-philosophy to the everyday requirements of the power game. Any realization of the philosopher-king idea cannot avoid becoming a parody of itself.

Dagobert D. Runes, who translated into English Martin Heidegger's speeches and articles glorifying the Führer and the National Socialist party, said Heidegger "betrayed by doing so German philosophy in particular and philosophy in general".[3] Could we say the same about Plato and Marx, had they found their Führers in their lifetime? I think the problem is not so simple. The twentieth century experience of totalitarian regimes has called into question not the personal moral position of Martin Heidegger or the political philosophy of Karl Marx, but the particular idea of the philosopher's moral calling and his social role, namely that of the philosopher knowing the Ultimate Truth and being obliged by the fact of this knowledge to be socially active, to bring the real world into conformity with this Ultimate Truth. How this Ultimate Truth is called the Perennial Ideas, Communism or the Authentic Being is a minor question. Plato's and Marx's utopian constructions or Heidegger's direct collaboration with the fascist regime are just the utmost expressions and consistent results of the common philosophical faith. These cases only corroborate the general idea that a universalistic activism by the philosophical mind leads to enslavement of the human being and to blocking the way to genuine truth.

Negative Responses

Thus, philosophy has turned out to be a field of knowledge no less dangerous than physics or biology. This has caused a change in society's attitude to the philosopher's role in it. Society not only no longer wants to listen to philosophy in order to learn an Ultimate Truth of Being, but has taken up an aversion for it and seeks ways to render it harmless. One mode for its neutralization is represented by the positivistic trend in the philosophy itself. Philosophers give up metaphysics, i.e., philosophy, and this profession of self-renunciation becomes the main point of philosophical reasoning. This corresponds to the idea of voluntary giving up of a "dangerous" field of research in the natural sciences.

The comparison seems risky and somewhat arbitrary since the positivistic way of thinking does not necessarily presuppose any clear consciousness of the concrete totalitarian danger philosophy brings to humanity, and is much older than experimental verifications of this danger. Positivism emerged as a reaction, whether right or wrong, to the arbitrary manipulation of ideas, devoid of satisfactory logical grounds, present in many metaphysical systems and which already contained the seed of future king-philosophers, bloody dialectics. In contrast, the submission of the particular to the whole, especially stressed in Hegel's philosophy, included a very evident

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

threat to personal freedom. It has not been fortuitous that from the very beginning the thinking was based mostly on positivistic philosophy (John Stewart Mill having been the classic representative of both).

On the face of it, positivism was preoccupied with quite particular problems of scientific language and the credibility of scientific knowledge. But it proposes its own notion of the philosopher's morals of intellectual honesty and intellectual asceticism. It is best expressed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, the most openly moralist among the positivists: "What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent."

The meaning of this moral can be understood only as a polemic against the universalistic claim of metaphysical philosophy and as defensive methodology against it. But this safeguard is never sufficiently reliable because it runs counter to man's inborn need to find a rational expression for his ineradicable striving to transcendence. This attitude is also self-contradictory, because the aspiration for absolute intellectual honesty and absolute clarity is in itself an expression of a longing for the realization of the absolute values in empirical reality this time, in the reality of human intellectual work. This turns the absolute claim of metaphysical philosophy inside out and raises demands no less severe and uncompromising. The same role of the philosopher is preserved: he knows the truth (this time it is the strict criteria of the intellectual clarity and credibility); and the empirical reality, that is, man's intellectual activity, must obey absolute laws. The entire order is imposed and controlled by the Philosopher. The main principles of the totalitarian structure are thus retained, but reduced to the domain of rational activity where its possible harm is neutralized because luckily it does not possess any ability to impose its will by force.

But, as I have just mentioned, the human will to transcendence is ineradicable and will find some manner for rational expression. ln order to render this metaphysical propensity harmless the modern pluralistic society confines it to special reservations, namely, universities, where it is to stew in its own juice. Here philosophers can have money, leisure, ability to travel, to organize meetings and seminars, to publish books for each other and to argue as much as they want about the ultimate truth they are seeking. Society is ready to pay them for its right not to listen. Philosophy has no choice but to accept its paradoxical position as a particular profession, incongruous as this is to its preoccupation with universal values. Philosophers have become teachers without disciples; students of philosophy are future teachers of future students. The pluralistic society does not consider a philosopher's advice to be binding; it prefers to be ruled by lawyers and economists, who are not interested in the ultimate truth and ultimate meaning, but understand well the real everyday interests of people and know ways of reconciling them.

This is the position of philosophy in modern Western societies. In the ex-communist countries the same tendency is becoming predominant. The classic communist society is, as we already have said, nothing other than an incarnation of an absolutist philosophy. Thus, it was perfectly logical that in the era of classic totalitarianism all personal philosophizing was strictly prohibited, because the word of the leader was the only possible philosophy, and the occupation of learned philosophers consisted precisely in commenting, distributing and praising that word. It goes without saying that this kind of "philosophy" could be only a "pidgin philosophy"; it did not express the human aspiration to transcendence, but was merely a tool for keeping the human soul from even ideally transcending the existing social reality.

As totalitarianism loosened gradually into a period of "stagnation", some chinks or niches were created in which a microbe of philosophy could survive, though in disguised or severely restricted form. Now the restrictions and the need to disguise oneself are lifted, but the new freedom does not bring a feast of philosophy, for philosophy has lost its credibility. Philosophers

have suffered enough from the older regime alongside all others, but the regime itself had been projected by philosophers; this resulted from acknowledging the primacy of a general idea over everyday human needs. Society no longer trusts one who says that the idea of communism was wrong, but that what the people need now is some new, right and well-thought-out general idea. People feel they need mostly some common sense. Philosophy is no longer prohibited, but seems to have become useless.

Philosophy as Openness to Meaning

The theme of this paper, however, is not "The Role of Philosophy in Contemporary Society", but "The Moral Aspect of Philosophy". Are the morals of philosophy ruined by its position as "teacher without disciples?" What seems basically wrong is the dualism between philosophical insight and the moral obligation of a philosopher, as expressed in the Platonic dualism described at the beginning of this paper. That dualism presupposes that philosophical insight is alien to morality itself, but there exists a moral obligation of the philosopher to turn to public benefit the specific achievements of the philosophic mind.

But what can be done if the public ignores the possibility of deriving benefit from the philosopher's ideas? Two ways remain: either the highest Good must be imposed on an ignorant society by force, or every moral obligation must be abandoned and philosophy becomes just a spiritual play at best the most noble one. The Marxist attitude that philosophy must "change, not interpret the world" did not really overcome this dualism: philosophy acquired an inner intention for future incarnation from the very beginning.

The moral aspect of philosophy must be sought *in* philosophy, not outside it. An act of philosophical insight must be regarded as a kind of *moral deed*. The choice of a philosopher's position in the world is not founded merely upon psychological propensity or practical expediency; it is the choice leading out of the psychological and the practical. The "bracketing" of reality, which is the precondition not only of Husserl's phenomenology, but of the entire philosophical attitude, demands that in philosophizing a person also "bracket" everything that binds him to reality. It is an act of intellectual courage, running counter to the natural course of events and to one's own psychological nature. One who ventures to adopt a philosophical position has to abandon the reliable ground of social conventions and predetermined practical and intellectual schemes, to give up the guaranteed minimum of truth obtained through everyday experience and book-wisdom. Philosophy is readiness to begin from nothing every time.

A spiritual effort necessary to overcome the natural attitude toward the world is the only element of the philosophical act by which it may be considered as a moral deed. The philosophical act is one in which a person constitutes him or herself as a free, spiritual being which means as a human being. It is in this that the universal meaning of the philosophical act really consists. Being human implies obtaining some distance with regard to the natural course of events and determining oneself in relation to absolute being and absolute meaning. But it does not imply that a philosopher is an expert on absolute meaning and ready to teach it to anybody else. He just *exposes* the absolute dimension of being through the philosophical act itself, that is, makes evident the insufficiency of the natural attitude to the world. This role is not to say *what* the absolute meaning is, but *that* it is. The philosopher cannot monopolize absolute meaning: that would be to claim a monopoly over being human. What the philosopher really knows and can teach is the *language* in which the absolute meaning or rather the striving toward it traditionally is expressed. He can be a good guide

in the complicated system of rational concepts and ideas created by humanity seeking the foundation of its extranatural and spiritual essence.[4]

This implies that a philosopher does not necessarily need to do something in order to be a morally responsible person. Pangs of remorse on being preoccupied by abstract ideas and forgetting real life reveal lack of an understanding of what philosophy is about. The philosophical act is an act of freedom. A society which reproaches the philosopher for the abstract character of his work lacks an appreciation of freedom and of the extranatural dimension of the human existence. A philosopher may avoid direct participation in the political life, but a society which leaves a place for a philosopher differs seriously from one which does not tolerate a philosophical position: a society without philosophy is a society without freedom.

I do not want to say that a philosopher *should* avoid participation in politics if he wants to be true to his calling. But if he does participate, he does not do it *as* a philosopher. He is also a citizen, and may feel himself morally obliged to think and act politically. This problem becomes especially pressing at turning points of a society's and nation's history. ln these periods society becomes thoroughly politicized and every person has to find his/her own way of meeting the challenge of the epoch. We are now experiencing such a turning point in our country. These are difficult times for the spiritual activity of man, for philosophy, the arts, and I think also for religion where the over-politicized atmosphere obscures the perspective of Absolute meaning. But these also are the times when historical choices are being made; every person, philosophers included, has to take some part in that choice.

When I say that a philosopher does not participate in it *as* a philosopher, I object to the idea that, thanks to his philosophical insights, he knows better what the right choice is and can teach it to the rest of society. But that does not mean, that the philosopher's spiritual experience plays no role in his political activity. In this domain he does not begin from nothing: the spiritual experience of the philosopher is the experience of *understanding*, namely, of understanding things in the dimension of Ultimate Meaning. Even considering some very particular problems from an empirical, world-focused viewpoint, a philosopher still cannot but regard them from the position of Ultimate Meaning. He is, as it were, not Philosopher the Constructor, but Philosopher the Understander. He introduces a different dimension into the horizon of the political life: not only that of *function*, but that of *meaning* as well; not only the functioning of social mechanisms, but the general meaning of the process.

I want to repeat that I do not have in mind that the philosopher *knows* what the general meaning must be. His idea of it is just a subjective notion existing in the consciousness of a finite, fallible person. The attempt by intellectuals, based on such notions, to subject real life to their control is a sure route to totalitarianism. The Philosopher's real contribution may lie rather in a different sphere. Without a consciousness of meaning playing a role in political consciousness, the whole political choice makes no sense. What the philosopher can do is to *expose* the dimension of meaning and to *remind* society thereof.

In sum, unlike the natural sciences, the moral aspect of philosophy does not imply giving up philosophical thinking when it comes into contact with some "dangerous" domains of the human existence. That danger may be present in a certain understanding of the philosopher's social position and moral calling, in his claim to possess exclusively the ultimate truth of being and to demand that the whole society conform to his idea of the truth, and his claim to be the only

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[4] L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1949), p. 27.

representative of the Ultimate Meaning in this fallible world. The comprehension of this danger and of ways to avoid it is a task of philosophy itself.

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Discussion

Three roles for philosophy were modeled in this chapter: The first sees the philosopher as constructor: because only the philosopher has access to the ideal models of Plato, he alone can appropriately understand and direct human life. This was seen as tending to generate a totalitarian outlook and to engage the philosopher in its implementation. The second role would renounce the above metaphysical claim in favor of a more tentative and empirical approach, but its search for absolute clarity through reducing all to its own empirical criteria results in a reductionist order being imposed and controlled by the philosopher. Fortunately its totalitarian implications are balanced by the lack of any real possibility to enforce this order, even in the scientific community. The third role is more existential and phenomenological in character; it opens the understanding of things to the dimensions of ultimate meaning. It is not that the philosopher possesses or controls this in a way that gives him answers to the questions mankind must ask, but that he can remind society of the dimension of ultimate meaning in terms of which mankind must make its choices.

1. The prevalence in the U.S. (and indeed in the broader Anglo-Saxon world) of the second model for the role of the philosopher was noted as contributing, or at least corresponding, to a native antipathy to totalitarian perspectives and ideologies which might be derived from the first type. Its reductionist effect upon all meaning to that which is able to be sensed, to the surface and the pragmatic, is somewhat moderated by the country's Christian roots, their reflection in the deism of America's Founding Fathers, and the predominance of theological training for the members of its black leadership. All of this has helped to keep some openness of the public horizon beyond that of the material order to the spiritual foundations of human life and meaning.

At the same time, the strong Protestant heritage of the country has set this spiritual sensibility within the context of a notion of human nature as fallen. This implies that access to the meaning of human life can be had only on the basis of faith in contrast to philosophical reflection. The philosopher may control the logic, but has no proper access to transcendent meaning; metaphysics is not considered possible. Thus reflection upon the foundations of meaning must be carried out on the basis of faith and without the benefit of the philosophic reason. Public discussion of issues concerning values in a pluralistic society becomes difficult, to say the least. There may be certain parallels here to the position of the paper not in its claim that it is the task of the philosopher to keep the mind open to the transcendent foundations of human meaning, but in its hesitancy to see any special contribution by the philosopher to reflection upon the meaning of such foundations for human life.

2. The first model for the role of the philosopher posed important questions regarding the totalizing orientation of classical philosophy's search for unity and for integrity of meaning. It can and indeed should be said that Plato marked Western thought with this orientation. In his view of the role of the state in the ideal community there is a basis for real concern that he had lost sight of the concrete and personal dimensions of human life. Further it should be noted that by *hubris* man is moved to employ such insights for constructs of domination and control. Thus, freedom needs to be reasserted. The development of phenomenological and personalist philosophies in this century is doing much that is of great importance in this regard.

On the other hand, it should be said that it is not the Platonic insights of the first model themselves, but the particular combination of the first model with the goal of mathematically clear reasoning that has unleashed the particular combination of power with *hubris* which has produced

the pervasive and brutal totalitarian regimes of the modern age, as well as the corresponding ideologically oriented political science. To this the appropriate human response, rather than being the abandonment of the Platonic search to articulate the relation of things in terms of unity, truth and goodness, might be to investigate Aristotle's effort to make more room here for the concrete, the contingent and the free, while at the same time providing them with a firm metaphysical foundation and context. This led him to develop a logic and set of sciences in terms of forms and natures, but, in contrast, to develop his ethics not upon necessitarian deductions, but upon the role of prudence in human life. The result is not a political theory subject to reductivist abstractions, but an ethical view of a democratic *polis* and public life with full richness of the expression and exercise of human freedom.

This would make it possible to integrate the positive contributions of the empirical without the restrictions of empiricism, and to retain the value of seeing all in the whole or the total without a reductive totalism or totalitarianism. If so then the philosopher would not only keep open the dimension of the ultimate, but have a continuing role to play in the articulation of its meaning in ways for which the other sciences are not adapted. Common sense can be perfected through the human capabilities for reflection when applied with the care and control of a developed and critical metaphysics.

3. In this light it was suggested also that the paper may set too modest a goal for philosophy. Certainly, all human capabilities, scientific and other, must be integrated into the task of human life, and no thinker or dimension of thought is plenipotentiary. The exercise of freedom must be the free work of persons and peoples, and none can preempt or substitute for this. But it would seem insufficient to say that the philosopher only points out that there is an ultimate basis for meaning and then abandons all work regarding its nature and its implications for human life. For the metaphysician, to keep open that dimension of ultimate meaning should mean to play a special role in the human response to this meaning by attempting to unpack its implications for human consciousness and articulate the special significance of human life in view of this foundation.

This is done by the philosopher not merely as a person, but with the means and concern proper to philosophy. In this way it was suggested that the philosopher must do more than avoid the *hubris* of the position that the philosopher knows all and can decide all. It is important also that he or she contribute his or her philosophic competencies and insights to the many dimensions of the human search to develop a social life worthy of mankind.

This may have a number of dimensions. First, it can mean that part of the general educational process includes liberating persons from "the natural attitude," understood as a reduction to an interpretation of the world in terms of a mechanical model or simply through the physical sciences. Philosophy must contribute to opening the horizons of the mind to the multiple dimensions of being and its transcendent foundation, as well as to the implications of this for the moral life.

Second, philosophy may best be carried out in terms of concrete challenges. That is, rather than being quintessentially an attempt to develop a unified theory into which all is made to fitwhich could give rise to the reductive ideologies such as those which in the last century have wreaked such devastation upon mankind it may be better to begin from the points of current challenge and discovery. These might be, for example, the experience of the person in the last fifty years and the more recent liberation from Marxism in Eastern Europe. If richly appreciated and deeply reflected upon, these should constitute in our day an important enrichment of our appreciation of the meaning of being human, and indeed of being itself. Similarly, facing the dilemmas of exercising freedom in a complex society should constitute a situation of wonder (in Aristotle's sense) beyond anything to be found in the movements of the planets, and thereby to occasion philosophical

reflection about that divine life in which Aristotle's metaphysics culminated (*Metaph XII*, 7, 1072b, 14-29) and about the nature of human existence.

Thirdly, if it is important to think of the person not as an atomic whole, but as participating in a broader reality, then it becomes important to think seriously upon the whole in which the person participates. Is the absolute in which it is founded a blind force or a wise and loving source and goal of all? The difference is central not only to Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal orders, but to our understanding of the exercise of human life. For there is a maximum gulf between life when seen as a manipulation of blind physical and perhaps social forces and when seen as the mobilization of a free and loving response to God and to one another. The explosive celebrations of freedom in Eastern Europe during the last half of 1989 and the deep aspirations for human freedom they bespoke would seem now to make it possible and necessary to reflect more adequately about the corresponding characteristics in the absolute foundation of reality.

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