

Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change  
Series I, Culture and Values, Volume, 2

# **The Knowledge of Values A Methodological Introduction**

By  
Alfonso López Quintás

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

**Copyright © 1989 by  
The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy**

Gibbons Hall B-20  
620 Michigan Avenue, NE  
Washington, D.C. 20064

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication**

López Quintás, Alfonso, 1928-

The knowledge of values : a methodological introduction / Alfonso López Quintás.

p.cm. — (Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series I. Culture and values ; vol. 2)

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Values. I. Title. II. Series

BD232.L55 1989

121'.8—dc19

89-5597

CIP

ISBN 0-8191-7419-X (pbk.)

## Table of Contents

Preface	iii
Introduction	v
Chapter I. The Current Renewal of the Study of Values	1
Chapter II. Overcoming Objectivist Schemas and the Study of Values	13
Chapter III. A Relational Methodology for the Knowledge of Values	39
Chapter IV. Methodological Clarifications on the Knowledge of Values	59
Chapter V. A Creative Aesthetic Methodology and the Characteristics of Values	81
Notes	99



## **Preface**

*Alfonso López Quintás*

One major need of the present day is to clarify the role of values in social life. toward responding to this need a series of consultations and planning meetings were held by philosophers from many nations.

They stressed the need to elaborate a style of thought truly adapted to the distinctive character of values. Any error in the manner of developing such an analysis entails high costs in personal and social confusion, discouragement and despair. In contrast, the development of human dignity, social harmony and peace requires a sense of values rich in the heritage of the past and open and creative toward the future.

Consequently, I was invited to develop a methodological introduction to the study of values as a prelude and, in a certain sense, a foundation for the studies to follow. This work has been written in response to that request. Its intention is not to constitute an exhaustive study of the topic, but to open a new adapted and potentially rich approach to the study of values.

I wish to express my warm gratitude to Professor George F. McLean for the invitation to develop this work and for his unstinting help in the preparation of this English manuscript for the first publication of this work

*Universidad Complutense, Madrid, Spain*

*Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences*

*Board of Directors, International Federation of Philosophical Societies*



## Introduction

George F. McLean

The study of values, both in depth and in detail, is one of the most pressing and promising tasks for current philosophy. During the first quarter of this century the special attention paid to the subject created considerable enthusiasm for this little explored but evocative area. Max Scheler,<sup>1</sup> Nicolai Hartman,<sup>2</sup> Louis Lavelle<sup>3</sup> and Xoaquin Xirau<sup>4</sup> marked the peak of this growing concern for axiological research. Later, philosophical investigations turned to other matters, largely abandoning the analysis of values before it had fully matured. Despite its brilliant beginnings, therefore, axiology never developed the firm foundations and appropriate methodology required to avoid serious misunderstandings.

Values are by nature ambiguous: they lack clearly defined structures and overflow set limits; as such they are difficult to reduce to precise and rigorous analysis. For lack of a clear notion of the intellectual approaches required due to their distinctive nature, one could conclude that a sufficiently refined philosophical language for reflecting upon values is not feasible. Hence, in dealing with values philosophers often use expressions which at first seem better suited to poetry or pious literature than to philosophical research. Though rich in methodological discoveries, recent philosophical thought still lacked methodologies adapted to the precise needs of the various aspects of reality. Hence, highly accurate observations often were expressed in mental categories and schemas so inadequate that they occasioned dangerous equivocations.

Now, however, various currents of thought challenge us to elaborate a philosophical methodology adapted to the inner richness and constituent ambiguity of values. Among the undeniable achievements of recent philosophical research has been its stress upon: the importance of "relational thought" and "inobjective realities" (Jaspers, Marcel); the links between knowledge and commitment, and being and value; the discovery of values, human creativity and personal development; the opening to the other and the notion of encounter; and, in this context, the birth of meaning. The contribution of these discoveries has been limited, however, due to the lack of a corresponding mode of thought adequate to this new vision of reality. Those held captive by the model of scientific rationality have difficulty perceiving that the union of knowledge with existential commitment, action, and love is rigorously rational in nature and should not be considered "irrational," emotional, pseudo-romantic or vaguely sentimental.

Unless the specific nature of relational entities is clarified--the "between," in M. Buber's words--the bond of values to human beings will continue to be misunderstood as a form of common relativism. Though many claim that values have an "objective" or "real" nature, failure to recognize relational modes of reality restricts them to considering any connection of values with the human creative processes to be a lapse into a dreaded subjectivism. For security, they settle into an objectivist realism which ignores the relational basis of values that becomes manifest in the interplay between persons and their environment. To those looking for an "objective" nature similar to "things," values appear as absolutely dependent upon the human individual, and thereby as drifting towards subjectivism.

Such extreme one-sidedness prevents adequate or even fair treatment of a genre of reality as rich in shades and contrasts of meaning as is that of values. Therefore, a critical review is needed of the methodological foundations of the study of values. In this it soon becomes clear that the relation between persons and values is governed by a logic of participation. In order to take a close look at this, the present study will treat the following:

- 1) the current development of interest in the subject of values;
- 2) its methodological progress in overcoming objectivist schemas;
- 3) access to values through the experiences of participation, encounter and ecstasy;
- 4) a relational-ludic methodology for understanding values; and
- 5) the characteristics of values which appear in the light of this aesthetic-creative (or ludic) methodology.

Though the complexity of these subjects calls for the detail of explanation which is possible only by a cumulative procedure, space allows merely for the basic guidelines of a hermeneutic of values. Hence, I shall endeavor to unravel the question of value "spirally," treating the decisive methodological issues from different perspectives and at increasingly radical levels. Though implying some repetition, this will facilitate progressively sketching out a more mature and incisive approach to this rich and complex subject.



## Chapter I

# The Current Renewal of the Study of Values

Today, the study of values needs to be taken up again at a level which is at once more radical and more systematically coherent than ever before. As often happens in the history of philosophy, in their enthusiasm those who discovered the world of values became intoxicated by their first and somewhat hazy intuitions. They did not bother to situate these in a balanced manner within the organic pattern of philosophical thought. Some placed values in open opposition to being, others made them fully autonomous, while others underlined their ties either to thinking, willing or sensing. This lack of balance resulted in divergent and one-sided interpretations.

For lack of a suitable methodology for treating relational beings philosophy has often swung like a pendulum between two opposed stances: objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism considers values to be exalted objects, autonomous and sharply differentiated from the usual understanding of "beings": beings and values are different things. In contrast, axiological subjectivism takes the individual as the foundation of value and of the criteria of evaluation. Both interpretations are far from adjusting to the phenomenon of value and, by their inner inconsistency, give rise to myriad ambiguities.

1. By being granted "objective" autonomy, independence and, at times, even primacy over being, values are rendered exterior and even distant from the human person. In this case, one who adheres to a value, seen as external, distinct and distant, would thereby be alienated and estranged.

2. Against this objectivist tendency, experience shows that one who is sensitive to value plays a decisive role in their discovery and hierarchization. The different modes of evaluation suggest that values depend upon the aware individual. If no other form of dependence were known than that between creator and creature, one would have to conclude that values are the fruit of particular attitudes in certain people and lack any consistency in themselves. Thus, the phrase "value exists in relation to the individual" is misinterpreted as being identical to "value is produced by the subject and undergoes the same changes as his/her attitudes." As it was usual for centuries to consider the model of permanence to be that of substantial things, considered as rigid and unchanging, in contrast, the relational nature of value was interpreted fatally as a sign of inconsistency. Hence, subjectivist relativism had a devastating effect on aspects of human life, such as ethics, whose fate depended upon the permanence of values.

3. The open character of the concept of value led certain authors to identify it with the ancient notion of the good and to reduce modern axiology to a mere critical reaction to Kantian formalism. This approach was blind to the peculiar nature and distinctive significance of the theory of values.

Cumulative intellectual indecision on this subject, together with certain socio-cultural and political circumstances, directed the attention of thinkers toward such other fields of research, apparently far removed from axiology, as: the person as a being in the world; the phenomenology of perception, meaning, intersubjective encounter and the constitution and development of human personality; the "non-objective" nature of the human beings; language and silence; creativity and play; and the contribution of ordinary experience to philosophical reflection.

Without expressly setting out to do so, these philosophical investigations notably enlarged the field of human experience in close relation to one's creative capacities, and refuted the inveterate reductionist tendencies to limit the human capacity to understanding highly complex realities.

Released from such reductionist ideological pressures, new forms of value and unsuspected meaning were discovered in everyday reality. Due to its highly creative nature, so-called natural or daily experience assumed a prime place in the manifestation of value.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, through philosophical research which apparently had been related only marginally to the question of value, today we return to this field with new impetus and--what is more significant--at a more radical level and with more refined hermeneutic and methodological tools. This greater refinement is due above all to the development of the conception of reality and, consequently, of the human person, of knowledge and of truth. From a somewhat rigid substantialist idea of reality (*ratio realitatis*) modelled on the analysis of objects and things, we have moved to a "substantivist" (Zubiri) idea of reality. This is relational and constellational; it is both firm and flexible, and is modelled on the study of "in-objective," that is, of un-measurable, non-delimitable and un-verifiable reality.

In order to adapt one's mode of thought to this basic concept of reality one must employ "thought in suspension" ("Denken in der Schwebe," Jaspers). This does not proceed in linear fashion from one point to another, but at one and the same time contemplates the diverse aspects of reality integrated in a single phenomena. This synoptic mode of thought is extraordinarily efficient in grasping the subtle phenomena which come into play in creative processes. These mingle diverse aspects of reality which philosophical thought tends to dissociate by confusing what is merely "contrasted" with what constitutes a "dilemma"--the "different" with the "opposed." A thinker who becomes accustomed to distinguishing diverse aspects in reality, and to seeing them in their multiple possible inter-relations without rushing into insurmountable disjunctions, gains thereby a surprising freedom of maneuver for developing a genetic understanding of creative phenomena. For example, a musical interpretation integrates diverse modes of reality and of time and enables the interpreter's creative power to respond to a certain appeal. In order to integrate these diverse aspects, the mind must be alert and open to "thinking in suspension." In turn, an in-depth knowledge of the logic of creativity enables one to grasp in detail the logic of participation and encounter by putting one on the right track toward the discovery of meta-objective realities.

Contemporary thought, particularly the dialogical-personalist movement and the existential and other branches of the phenomenological movement, strongly contrasts "objective" to "inobjective" forms of reality. "Objective being" ("Das gegenständliche Sein") is counterpoised to "non-objective being" ("Das ungegenständliche Sein") in Jaspers and Marcel, to mention two of the most representative authors in this respect. "Objective" realities can be grasped, measured, pondered, delimited and verified by anyone. "Inobjective" realities manifest a higher spatio-temporal quality than do the empirical and cannot be delimited, weighed, located, grasped, etc. As they cannot be situated at a distance from the knower whom they "include" by offering him/her possible fields of play or action, they cannot be made objective or projected at a distance. Nevertheless, they are able to be known through a type of knowledge by participation which joins knowledge with love, creative action and an active-receptive immersion in realities which constitute fields of play.

The somewhat negative form of the term "in-objective" or non-objective has led many critics to misunderstand the intention of the thinkers who stress its importance. These were considered "nihilists" and scorned as "men of letters," "poets" or "mystics" because others commonly took the term "objective" as a synonym for "real."

A painstaking study of this question suggests that it would be fitting to speak of the "super-objective" in order to stress the degree of eminent reality displayed by the so-called "inobjective" entities.<sup>6</sup> In my most recent papers, I prefer to speak of "ambital realities" ("ambits") and

"dialogical realities" in order to stress the importance of reality which is not closed in upon itself but open to creative interaction. "Ambits" are those realities which make up "fields of reality" by being endowed with creative initiative and being without the rigorous delimitation of objects. In the German-speaking world, some authors use the expression "dimensionale Räume"<sup>7</sup> in the same sense. In French, there is no adequate term to express the reality that makes up a field of possibilities for action or play--a "ludic space". Fh. Fauré Fremiet speaks of "non-dimensional realities" to suggest the type of higher spatiality displayed by "ambits."<sup>8</sup>

Though persons do present objective aspects which can be grasped, measured and pondered, they are not reduced thereby to "objects," but are "ambits." Though they can be measured and weighed, no one can specify what they entail as human beings, how far their influence over others reaches or that of others over them, or the breadth of their ethical, aesthetic and religious life. Even the persons themselves cannot delineate this precisely. Objectively, human beings face certain precise limits, but on the creative (ludic) plane are open to the beings of their environment, endowed with diverse possibilities of action or play and have the capacity to take on the ludic possibilities offered by other beings. Rather than being closed objects made once and for all, they are "possible existences" (Jaspers) who entail a certain field of reality and are called upon to enlarge this radius of action in diverse directions. Viewed integrally, human beings are ambital beings who are destined to develop through constant relationships, encounters or fields of play.

This creative activity of ambits is carried out by persons with other human beings and with all realities which offer possibilities for interplay (ludic possibilities). A boat is an object, for it is measurable, delimited, able to be grasped, pondered and situated in time and space; but it is also an ambit, a field of possibilities for interplay for one can converse, walk, sleep, fish or sail in it. The sea likewise offers both aspects: it is an object for it can be delimited, touched or located, but it is also an ambit of reality because it offers diverse ludic possibilities such as swimming, fishing or sailing. The breaking of a bottle of champagne at the launching of a ship is therefore a collision of objects but a blending of ambits--an encounter--and its luminous, beautiful, symbolic, festive condition is derived from this nature. For the cleaning woman a piano is a mere object--a piece of furniture to be dusted--but it is also an ambit for those who know how to play the aesthetic game of interpreting piano compositions and who therefore are in position to take on the ludic possibilities offered by the piano as a musical instrument. The blending between the pianist, the piano and the score, seen as a sheaf of possible configurations of musical forms, gives rise to an encounter in which the work in question is born.

In a similar way, a home, in contrast to a mere building, is an ambit or living-space founded by a couple. In this sense Heidegger states that "living" precedes building and is a foundation of thought.<sup>9</sup> The school too is an ambit or field of possibilities for co-existence and training. The same may be said for the landscape, village, or language when these are considered as fields of meaning which open up indefinite possibilities of understanding and expression for persons.

All forms of play and work are ambits or fields of possibilities for action with meaning. Consequently, the roles people play in their lives are ambits, and as such give rise to literary types and artistic themes: a waiter, a servant, a king, a prince, a soldier, a mother or a priest.

Likewise, events or happenings which imply a complex world of meaning constituted by the confluence of diverse realities and opening up fields of possibilities are also ambits: for example, the "Last Supper," the "Crucifixion," the "Breaking of Bread at Emaus," the "Death of Julius Caesar" or "Napoleon Crossing the Alps." Those events are also ambits which weave the web of social life: the inauguration of a road network or a building, the consecration of a temple, the proclamation of a president or the act of passing a judicial sentence. A mutual promise is a firm

mode of ambital blending pregnant with consequences, even though this promise be formulated by so elusive a word as "yes." When acting as the living vehicle of a blending of ambits, this word becomes charged with the highest meaning.

Similarly, we should consider also as ambits those realities or ensembles of realities which make up a field of interaction: a shipwreck, a sower, a pair of lovers, the arrival of spring, the decline of autumn, a field of olive trees, a group of tumblers, hands in prayer, or an old man meditating next to a burning candle.

One should consider as ambits also those cultural works realized dialogically with the environment and which express the fields of meaning deriving from blending such diverse realities as a garden, temple, house, square, street, city, bridge, monument, chair or peasant's clogs. (The reader will have imaged a few famous paintings that record such ambits, for art tends not so much to reproduce figures as to record ambits). Persons often turn natural spaces into ambits by means of a dynamism which enlightens diverse possibilities of action and meaning. Thus, during an air show air-space becomes a field of play--an ambit, a creative (ludic) space.

As characterized by not having exclusive limits, but offering diverse possibilities which can be taken up by other realities, ambits have a peculiar capacity for blending with one another and providing new possibilities in their fields of action. In this positive sense, M. Buber states that "the thou does not limit"; this applies not only to the 'you' or human being, but to any reality which offers certain ludic possibilities. By not limiting, these realities may blend their ambits and found relevant modes of unity which are qualitatively more elevated than are fusional modes of union.<sup>10</sup> Objects are juxtaposed and can attain only a low degree of mutual presence or interaction, however intense they may seem at times. Ambits can blend, open new possibilities for play and intimately unite. Here "intimacy" means not an inner redoubt as against an exterior space--fortunately, the schema "interior-exterior" is not valid at the ludic level--but two people being in the same field of play which provides for their creative interaction. Thus, relationships between "here" and "there," "mine" and "yours," "inside" and "outside" lose the mutually exclusive meaning they usually would have in terms of our manipulative attitude toward objects, and acquire instead an integrating meaning.

When objectivist habits of thought are overcome so that thought is adapted to the demands of relational realities, one can appreciate--at first with a certain dismay and later with enthusiasm--the intense dialectics of an encounter as the place in which values are born and established. For this the encounter must be seen as the blending of super-objective realities which are not "objects," but "fields of reality" or "ambits." In order to understand values it is necessary to analyze with the greatest care these diverse modes of reality--the objective and super-objective or ambital realities, as well as their possible interconnections.<sup>11</sup>

This revitalization of the study of values responds to a change of mentality from the objectivist to the super-objectivist, ambital or ludic which does not manipulate objects but finds ambits of reality. Only by the creative realization of this change in the style of thought can theory be opened to the full resonance and reverberation of values.

The fecundity of this interrelational, ambital or ludic methodology inevitably is linked to a disconcerting ambiguity. The knowledge of super-objective "ambital" realities, of ethical and aesthetic events, of ludic experiences of all kinds does not provide the conditions of accuracy and delimitation characteristic of scientific knowledge. Far from being a defect, this is a privilege, for the goal to which philosophical thought aspires is the attainment, not so much of "accurate," as of "profound" knowledge. Rather than seeking "security," the philosopher attempts to probe more deeply into the ever-evasive enigma of reality. Ambiguity which springs, not from a lack of

intellectual clarity, but from fidelity to the super-objective ambital nature of the objects-of-knowledge is a condition of philosophical thought which must be cultivated with care. The Cartesian demand for "clarity and distinction" must be moderated according to the ontological protocol of each object-of-knowledge.

By not recognizing this and taking accurate "objective" knowledge as a model, the objectivist mentality sets an extremely dangerous trap, for it leads one to believe that by this type of thought one masters reality. In the end this distracts one from what is truly real--errors of philosophical perspective are paid for dearly. If one's thought is framed within objectivist coordinates, even a very penetrating thinker who desires to be faithful to reality can never manage to elaborate a theory adjusted to the relational events which make up the web of one's personal life. His or her intellectual battle will be fought on enemy soil and, being subjected to reductionist strictures, inevitably he/she will fail. The only chance of surpassing the objectivist stumbling-block is not to engage in it, but to soar above it by deliberately adopting an interrelational, ambital or ludic style of thought.

This change of methodologies already has been carried out to a great extent by such thinkers as M. Blondel, J.H. Newman, F. Ebner, K. Jaspers, E. Brunner, K. Heim, A.N. Whitehead, M. Heidegger, L. Lavelle, G. Marcel, A. Brunner, X. Zubiri and A. Amor-Ruibal, who offer extraordinarily efficient methodological suggestions. However, we still lack a systematic study of values carried out integrally in the light of a ludic methodology, that is, one elaborated on the basis of the analysis of creative events rather than of mere objects. Despite its inborn ambiguity, this analysis will display a peculiar solidity because adapted to the flexible and evolving nature of reality.

Once an appropriate and sensitive axiology has been developed the inferiority complexes vis-a-vis the supposed rigor of scientific knowledge will vanish, as will the fear that the "ambiguity" inherent in values may make their knowledge irrational. It suffices to state fairly the question of values in order to feel secure in their study and to discover that as a relational style of thought responds to the needs of this particular object-of-knowledge such knowledge is of appropriate rigor. Nothing authorizes us to single out one type of intellectual rigor as the unique model and to consider modes of knowledge which do not adjust to this model to be superficial, banal or spurious. True criticism regarding knowledge consists in approaching each of its objects with appropriate categories and mental schemas, without extrapolating from one to the others.

This fidelity to the objects-of-knowledge demands of the philosopher a highly refined sensitivity to the conditions of each reality and an adjustment thereto of his or her mental coordinates. At the beginning of his work, *La pensée et le mouvant*,<sup>12</sup> Bergson warned that philosophy made its most serious mistakes by neglecting its duty to think each reality "to size." Philosophical methodology can acquire rigor and total flexibility only if we accept in principle and without hesitation all the richness and complexity pertaining to each object-of-knowledge. The tendency to reduce the value of objects-of-knowledge by interpreting the superior by the inferior, the complex by the simple, the irreducible as a sum of components, leads philosophical thought to adopt unrefined methodologies which are too coarse to do justice to human events.

Contemporary thought, above all the phenomenological, existential and personalistic-dialogical movements, underline the need to discover and evaluate justly those aspects of reality which do not focus upon the characteristics of objects, but are concerned with more eminent forms of reality. Attention to the "super-objective" or ambital opens up unexpectedly rich possibilities for understanding values

## Chapter II

# Overcoming Objectivist Schemas and the Study of Values

If it is to be efficient, the study of values must be carried out in the form of an integral, holistic and synoptic vision which clarifies as clearly as possible the connection of the many aspects of reality in the phenomenon of value. In contrast, a partial analysis, covering only certain aspects of the subject --however well this might be done--would entail serious risks for a relational mode of reality is revealed only through "thought in suspension."

Any solidly developed theory of values must include: (a) the dynamic nature of reality, (b) the existence of "objects" and "ambits," (c) the concept of play as the foundation of ambits or fields of possibilities of action under certain norms, (d) the relation between creative play and the birth of meaning, (e) the mutual empowerment of the relations of immediacy and distance in the phenomenon of presence; (f) the possible integration of "objective" and "super-objective" modes of reality, (g) the harmonization of objectivist and the ludic attitudes in the face of the real, (h) the connection between opening to the real, participation, love and language, and (i) the blending of ambits of reality and the blossoming of beauty.

A synoptic approach to the study of philosophy demands a commitment of one's entire being, not merely an exercise of intellectual power. Only this integral mobilization of creative human resources enables one to grasp the radical unity of objects-of-knowledge which, considered hastily, would appear alien and distant: unity lies at the heart of creative activity. In order to know value and its many implications, one must employ a creative mode of knowledge which progressively and genetically reassembles the diverse aspects of the real.

If this creative attitude, which links understanding, will and feeling, is not to be dispatched expeditiously to the realm of the "irrational" but valued as strictly rational, it is necessary to elaborate a methodology suited to the more dynamic, flexible and interactional modes of reality. Lately, the theory of creativity has stressed the fact that any type of play--understood strictly as a creative activity of "ambits" or "ludic spaces" under certain norms--is carried out in a light which it itself sheds: play is a source of light.<sup>13</sup> To engage values one must fulfill the demands imposed by "ambits of reality."

In contrast, inadequate approaches so disorient the thinker as not to allow him/her to engage the object-of-knowledge and thus to clarify its meaning. If the subject of values is posed at the objectivist, infra-ambital and hence non-ludic level, the possibility of total knowledge of values is cancelled at the outset. Further, as language is the medium in which human attitudes are rendered incarnate and made operative, any inadequate use of language--through strategic abuse of its expressive resources or through the extrapolated use of other categories and schemas--has a perturbing effect on the knowledge of values.

### **Methodological Extrapolation**

Objectivist mental schemas are adequate for the expression of the relations which arise between realities which are "objective" in the above-mentioned sense of measurable, delimitable or ponderable. Their application to the analysis of events pertaining to "super-objective," that is, to non-measurable, non-delimitable or non-ponderable realities restrains one's capacities for

research by preventing one from understanding the creative possibilities entailed by ambital realities. This leads to their impoverishment as well as to highly dangerous reductionist attitudes.

Contemporary research on language and on the "theory of contrast"<sup>14</sup> sheds decisive light on this point. We articulate our mental discourse around a series of contrasts or schemas among which are the following:

1. subject - object  
subjective - objective
2. inside - outside
3. immanence - transcendence
4. interior - exterior
5. autonomy - heteronomy
6. liberty - channel
7. liberty - obedience
8. liberty - norm
9. liberty - values
10. action - passion
11. introspection - objectivation
12. that which belongs to oneself - that which belongs to others.
13. the same - the different
14. the intimate - the strange
15. the intimating - the alienating
16. the near - the far
17. the former - the latter

Thinking in objectivist fashion, one tends to consider the dash which separates the terms of each contrast as a sign of distancing and, in certain cases, of opposition. If one applies the above-mentioned schemas in an objectivist spirit to the analysis of the relations between super-objective realities and ludic or relational events of all types--a person, a work of art, an ethical norm, an institution, a religious reality or an encounter, artistic interpretation or dialogue, etc.--extremely violent and perturbing distortions result.

At the level of objects, the "objective" (schema 1) means that which is projected at a distance from the subject; "outside" and "exterior" (schemas 2 and 4) are opposed to "inside" and "interior"; the values and norms (schemas 8 and 9) which channel man's freedom (schemas 6-9) are seen almost automatically as something exterior and alien (schemas 4 and 12) to human intimacy (schema 4). At this level man's conduct, when adjusted to "exterior" norms and values (schemas 8, 9 and 4) that are not only different from, but alien to, the individual (schemas 13 and 14), should logically be considered as heteronomous (schema 5) and governed by laws which the individual does not lay down for him/herself. This desire to shape one's personality according to the decisive stamp of external instances is an obvious alienation, "objectivation" (schema 11) or estrangement; abiding by the transcendent (schema 3) is thus anathematized as alienating (schema 15).

Careful analysis of a "super-objective," ludic experience--as, for example, the experience of musical interpretation, carried out with creative spontaneity and unfettered by the submission of real phenomena to inadequate mental schemas--enables us to discover the fallacy latent in interpreting one's opening to the transcendent as an alienating phenomenon. When I sit down to interpret on the organ a previously unknown Bach chorale the chorale is different and distant,

external and strange to me; it is transcendent in the sense of alien. If through groping practice I bring out its forms and gradually enter into a relationship of presence with it, it ceases to be distant, external and strange; though still different from me, it becomes intimate. At the ludic or relational level intimacy does not mean interiority as opposed to exteriority, but participation in a field of play in which the categories of "here" and "there," "inside" and "outside," "mine" and "yours," "one's own" and "others" are not diametrically opposed, but are contrasted to each other; they strengthen each other in the manner of musical harmony. On the creative plane, delimitations which mark the individuality of beings lose their status as opaque veils that divide and become instead living places of integration.

This inversion of perspective enables one to solve the cognitive problem posed by the theory of empathy ("Einfühlung") without the risks and aporias entailed by applying the mental schema of "entering-into-myself" and "coming-out-of-myself" to events which fortunately overflow the empirical circumstances of time and place. My access to a musical work does not imply leaving myself, but co-founding a field of aesthetic interplay. Within this field, the ludic time and space established are festive and superior to merely empiric time and space. The relationship founded by the schemas "here-there," "inside-outside," "near-far" lose their distancing nature (schema 16) and take on a function of distancing-of-perspective that is necessary for founding fields-of-presence.<sup>15</sup> An analogous semantic transmutation occurs with the temporal relationships of "before-after," and "the former-the latter" (schema 17).

Thanks to this fortunate circumstance, the dashes which mediate between the terms of the schemas acquire a sense of contrast indicating a counterpoint rather than an opposition between aspects of the real. The human attitude in the face of these contrasted pairs should be not one of division or dilemma, but of integration.<sup>16</sup>

Aesthetic experience is particularly helpful in clarifying these methodological questions because it does not allow one to divide human experience with a consequent conversion of contrasts into dilemmas. A musical work is "ambital" and valuable insofar as it offers a field of possibilities for aesthetic play and serves as a normative channel for my re-creative activity as interpreter. Considered statically, this channel is opposed to my freedom which it restrains, coerces and alienates. Seen dynamically in the light of my re-creative process of interpretation which takes up the work as my own, the norm of the work is not exterior but my inner voice; the work sings in my "interiority," that is, in the field of play which the work and I jointly co-found in the act of interpretation. By obeying this inner voice, I do not leave myself or allow myself to be coerced by anything alien: I am not alienated. Faithful adherence to the structure of the work introduces nothing heteronomous precisely because the work is no longer external and strange to me, but intimate. It is "more intimate than my own intimacy," for there is nothing more "intimate" to the person than that which impels one to found fields of play. This passage from the different-distant to the different-intimate marks the threshold of authentic human experience in aesthetics, ethics and religion.

In this light it is possible to establish personal relationships with "transcendent" (schema 3) realities and instances, without losing oneself in an alienating exteriority. Such loss inevitably occurs when a person delivers him/herself to superficial, valueless realities that cannot offer fields of possible interplay and are unable to found ambits of personal growth, ludic interchange or fulfillment. This is the process of vertigo which, along with its counter-pole, the phenomenon of ecstasy, should be analyzed with the greatest rigor.<sup>17</sup>

From this methodological analysis of mental schemas one may infer how serious are the errors deriving from the indiscriminate use of the schemas "subject-object," "subjective-objective."



## Diverse Meanings of the Terms: "Subjective" and "Objective"

In thought and speech the following diverse contrasts are constantly utilized:

1. (personal)	-	subjective	objective (pertaining to non-personal realities)
2. (sentimental)	-	subjective	objective (cold)
3. (committed)	-	subjective	objective (disinterested)
4. (pertaining to peculiar mode of reality)	- to	existential man's reality)	objective (pertaining to mere objects)
5. arbitrary	-		objective (adequate to the real)
6. inauthentic	-		authentic
7. inobjective	-		objective (able to be grasped, measurable, ponderable)
8. unreal	-		real
9. ideal	-		real
10. abstract	-		concrete
11. eidetic	-		factic
12. interior	-		exterior
13. spiritual	-		material

It is easy to superimpose these schemes upon the pattern of thought and speech, to interchange diverse meanings by repeating terms with multiple meanings, and indiscriminately to generalize the meaning they acquire within the schema. At first sight terms which are repeated appear identical and, as two terms equal to a third are equal to each other, there is the risk of identifying even counterposed terms.

The term "subjective" in schema 1 has the overall meaning of "belonging to the person who acts as a subject." In schema 2 it means what is personal and consequently is modified by diverse feelings; in certain cases this may impede corresponding to what is real. From this meaning of the term "subjective" it is easy to slip into schema 5 and, in turn, to superimpose this on schemas 1, 2 and 7. In this manner the terms "subjective" and "inobjective," without due clarification of meaning, are abruptly counterimposed to "objective" in its positive sense of corresponding to the real (schema 5). The terms subjective and inobjective thus become tinged with a somewhat negative meaning, which has serious consequences.

Through the tendency to superimpose the terms within each column, it is easy surreptitiously to identify objective with real, and subjective (hazily understood on account of the above) with unreal (fanciful, not in accordance with the real, non-objective, non-universal, non-necessary, non-rigorous and non-scientific).

In schemas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 the terms of the first column (subjective, existential, arbitrary, inobjective) are easily identified with the term "unreal" (schema 8); the term "objective" which

appears in the second column is taken as a synonym of "real." The repetitive identification of these terms has the effect of semantic contamination by which the diverse meanings of the terms "subjective" and "objective" are diffused, obscured and almost annulled through a transfer of meaning. Aspects of reality whose description differs from corporeal entities come to be considered unreal. On the other hand, those aspects of the real which can be delimited in empirical time and space acquire the status of models of reality. In this respect, see N. Hartmann's theory of modality and strata, partly derived from the ontological conception of the "second Scheler," according to which "any force comes from below" ("alle Kraft kommt von unten").

By being counterposed to "real," the ideal is associated with the terms subjective-arbitrary-unreal, and loses its status of being eminently real.<sup>18</sup> As schema 11 suggests the character of being tangible, homely and grossly verifiable, facts are often taken as model real entities. By implication, the eidetic then runs the risk of being indiscriminately included within the area of the unreal and ideal.

Likewise, the "exterior" (schema 12) is seen as akin to the factic-material-real (schemas 11, 13, 9) and is taken as the "real" par excellence. This is counterposed to the "interior," which takes on a merely subjective meaning which is not open to the real, but closed, blocked and arbitrary. (Note that the so-called "critical problem" was often posed as a problem of "going out to the exterior.")

Sometimes the terms "exterior" and "factic" are indiscriminately superimposed (schemas 12, 11) and, as delimited, easily paired with the material and the objective, so that the exterior becomes counterposed to the inobjective, the flexible-constellational and the spiritual (schemas 7, 13). One may thus consider the spiritual to be a matter of mere interiority--a serious distortion that is reflected in diverse questions of ethics, theodicy and philosophy of religion. For example, beliefs and certain moral events when exteriorized are considered by authors as alienated and lacking in authenticity. This automatic link between exteriorization and alienation occurs when one does not realize that matter, corporeality, institutionalization and external expression are, if seen adequately, elements which "mediate" the process of total fulfillment in one's personal life, and therefore, in the life of faith. Current anthropology sees the corporeal and the spiritual structurally as closely linked. A proper concept of structure suggests the need to avoid misunderstanding these "contrasts" as opposed in a contrary or contradictory fashion for reality has extraordinarily subtle modes of unity.

The influence of this extrapolation of meaning in the history of the Protestant Reformation, the pattern of "interiorization" which characterizes certain representative authors of the Modern Age, and the struggle of Idealism to link the interior and the exterior, form and matter (or content), depend to no small extent upon interpreting the dashes of the above schemas as signs of opposition. From schemas 1, 4 and 7 comes the possibility in certain cases of considering the objective as non-personal. When in schema 5 the objective is understood as adequate to the real, it becomes difficult to understand this mode of objectivity as pertaining to personal acts and, correlatively, to the so-called sciences of the spirit. Current philosophical anthropology is undergoing a wide debate on this delicate and decisive problem. Upon its correct resolution hangs the very possibility of developing rigorous knowledge of super-objective or ambital realities, among which are values.

## **Interpretation of the "Subject-Object" Schema in Terms of "Ambits" and "Interrelatedness"**

When the "subject-object" schema is used with an objectivist approach, both subject and object are "reduced" in value. The "object" is seen as a mere object, and the subject is considered as a delimited, completely finished reality which, due to its faculties for knowing, feeling and loving, is capable of relating to its environment.

When the "subject-object" schema is mobilized with a ludic, creative approach and directed not toward manipulating objects, but toward developing a co-creative relationship with ambits of reality, the subject and object appear, not as higher or lower objects, but as fields of possibilities for interplay. In this light they are not completely pre-defined, but are called to realization through the co-creative establishment of broader ambits. In ludic relations individual realities gain a special diffusion and extension. Objects of knowledge become ambital realities offering the subject possibilities of play, that is, they give one the initiative for taking up (or entering into play with) the possibilities offered by these objects.

Viewed from this perspective, the "subject-object" relationship is not reduced to a linear, one-directional projection of one reality towards another as different and distant. Rather, it expresses quite rigorously the blending of ambits and the institution of a field of play. In this field of interaction higher modes of reality are created and more intense forms of unity achieved, in which creative "ecstatic" process the spatio-temporal categories are transformed and elevated. Relationships of immediacy and distance cease to be opposed and come together to constitute presence.

This relationship of eminent immediacy called presence gives rise, in turn, to participation.<sup>19</sup> Understood in its full depth, this relationship implies a highly intense form of ludic unity which, as with all play, is a field of enlightenment. Values take on body within this field of interaction, in which they are brought to light and made known. Participation in values surpasses the "subject-object" opposition, without annulling this relationship in favor of one or another of the terms in which it consists. Rather, this relation is raised to its full potential for implication and meaning, placed in its correct situation and granted its proper function.<sup>20</sup>

Seen in terms of the dynamism of participation, the "subject-object" relationship has the following characteristics:

1. It is governed, not by a one-directional schema of "action-passion," but by an inexhaustible, bi-directional, reversible or "circular" schema of appeal-response.<sup>21</sup>

2. Understood in a balanced relational way, the subject-object relationship does not degenerate into the extremist positions of objectivism and subjectivism, but maintains a constant and fertile creative tension between the appealing reality and the one appealed to, the objective and the subjective poles. The seriously one-sided and even extremist positions we call "subjectivism" and "objectivism" arise when, through lack of creativity, one moves on the objectivist level which Kierkegaard considered to be the "first stage along the path of life." There "subjectivism" and "objectivism" give rise to each other intermittently and in pendulum fashion. The insufficiency of one drives us to seek a solution in the other, and vice-versa, in a never ending course of tense dissatisfaction. A real solution can be attained only through a change of approach: through rising from the objectivist to the ludic level, from the manipulator of objects to the co-founder of ambits. This "leap forward" (Heidegger) to the super-objective plane is a true conversion to the "existential" mode of reality which is initiated, developed and blossoms through encounter.

3. Between the subject and the object lies not distance or detachment, but perspective or collaboration, "mediating" the most intense and productive modes of union between persons and the real. Creative dynamism turns the "mediatizer," which is an opaque element that intervenes between the subject and object, into the "mediational" which is a transparent element that makes the object present to the subject.

4. A fusion of subject and object is not, as often is held, the highest or model form of unity, but a regressive step in the subject-object relationship because it nips in the bud any creative possibility. As already stated, in order to set up a field of play one must match a mode of immediacy with one of distance, for by annulling the distance of perspective between subject and object the attractive nature of the phenomena of fascination and seduction prevents creative participation, thereby giving rise to vertigo.

It is a serious error in the development of the human personality to take for granted or uncritically that, due to the advent of spirit, subject and object are bound together only at a pre-conscious level before the supposed split between man and the rest of reality.<sup>22</sup> Since the rise of vitalism in Europe between the wars it has been asserted repeatedly and without due clarification that "the spirit inaugurates distances" and breaks the serene unity maintained by the animal as "a being of secure instincts" vis-a-vis its environment.<sup>23</sup> Failure to specify sufficiently the diverse possible forms of immediacy and distance has caused a great confusion in contemporary thought and has given birth to nostalgia in philosophy, art and literature for the animal, vegetable and even inanimate kingdoms. Camus makes Caligula exclaim after having abandoned authentic creativity<sup>24</sup> "Ah! If only instead of this poisoned solitude of presences that is mine, I could taste the true presence, the silence and the quivering of a tree!" The experience of the root in Sartre's *La Nausée* exemplifies this yearning for the infra-creative attitude of fusional unity with the environment seen as a pure "medium" (*milieu*, *Umwelt*). From this experience of extreme reduction comes his intuition of the absolute contingency and absurdity of existing realities ("We are all superfluous"). Vertigo fuses one with the realities of one's environment.

Hence, today the theory of participation in values has the important task of showing clearly: 1) that this descent to the infra-creative level means a fusion of subject and object, and annuls that relationship of closeness-at-a-distance required for the constitution and development of the human personality; and 2) that perfect unity between subject and object is attained through ecstatic experiences of all kinds--aesthetic, amorous, sporting, religious--where the limits of the individual are surpassed without diluting one's personality.

As the experience of values begins to appear ecstatic, it must be distinguished carefully from other apparently analogous phenomena: the false abandonment of oneself typical of vertigo and the projection of one's own interiority upon the contemplated object which gave rise to the aesthetic technique called empathy (*endopathy-Einführung*). The ecstatic relationship between a subject and object understood in their full ambital sense<sup>25</sup> consists in the foundation of a common field of interplay which, as relational, is ambiguous--though not indecisive and hazy as was typical of the day-dreaming of the much criticized Romantic enthusiasts (*Schwärmerei*). The foundation of a field of interplay implies immersion of the subject in realities which call one to take up new possibilities.

To understand fully what is implied by participation in values one first must specify carefully the different genres of reality which appeal to the person and the diverse modes of one's active-receptive immersion in them by taking on their ludic possibilities.<sup>26</sup>

5. To sum up the above points, we could say that the authentic subject-object relationship is correlative to the autonomy-heteronomy relationship understood as a "contrast," rather than as

a "dilemma." In the light of the theory of play it is manifest that the mental schemas of "subject-object," "inside-outside," "to leave oneself-to enter oneself," "interior-exterior," etc., are quite insufficient for reflection upon values. Our analysis of the logic of creative play discovered that opening to values does not mean falsely leaving oneself with a consequent loss, estrangement or alienation from oneself. Values are distinct from the person but not always distant, external or strange; they may become intimate to the human being as a sort of "inner voice." At the creative level interiority denotes not an "inside" in counterposition to an "outside," but the creative power of authentic dialogical relationships.

To enter oneself, to reflect interiorly, to retreat into oneself is equivalent to renouncing contact with superficial things and events in order to let oneself be overcome by things of value. These realities, which offer possible fields of play, oblige one to react--"ob-lige" meaning to bind a person by virtue of the values offered. This type of "obligation" neither restricts nor coerces, but promotes human freedom to the extent directly proportional to the quality of the values offered. Their appeal is an invitation to the exercise of creative freedom. This can be understood in terms of the schema "appeal-response;" whereas the schema "action-passion" obviously is inadequate for reflecting the peculiar type of "causality" between persons and those realities which, rather than being objects, are "ambits of reality": persons, works of art, institutions, languages or values of all kinds.

The object-of-knowledge proper to such disciplines as ethics, aesthetics or the philosophy of religion demands setting in motion highly flexible mental schemas which can be adapted to the interactional dynamism of creative processes. The adoption of such schemas is not an easy task, but once the mind becomes accustomed to them everything in one's intellectual life becomes clearer, more coherent, more convincing and more solid.

6. By not reducing the scope of the object man's natural field of development is not impoverished, whereas liberty, knowledge and total fulfillment of the different values is made possible. The more dense the meaning of the environmental reality with which a person enters into a relationship of creative play, the more one is appealed to and ob-liged. From this appeal and obligation springs one's impulse to fulfill his/her duty, for duty is based on the value displayed by those realities which appeal for a co-creative response. To fulfill one's duty does not mean to give in to coercion from some external instance, but to oblige oneself to a valuable reality. Similarly, to know a value is not to assimilate an external object, but to blend one's own ambit of reality with the field of possibilities for creative interplay offered by the "object." In this ludic context "interiority" and "exteriority" imply, not an empirical spatial reference, but a co-creative intermingling.

7. The subjectivity to which thinkers like Kierkegaard grant a certain primacy in asserting that "truth lies in subjectivity" is not the first term of the schema "subject-object" understood as a dilemma, but the integral reality of the person immersed actively and receptively in the valuable realities which make up one's authentic environment. Here, the subjective is not opposed to the objective, but creatively counterposed to it in play. In this light, Kierkegaard and such existential thinkers as Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and Berdiaeff make an eminently constructive critique of subjectivism, objectivism of things and self-interested abandonment to "immediacy" or to the cajolery of the superficial.<sup>27</sup>

8. By differentiating between modes of objectivity and subjectivity and by verifying that certain types of objects-of-knowledge are not mere objects, but ambits or fields of possibilities for play, one is prepared for an appropriate response. In this one conceives the subject-object relationship as a dynamic and creative dialogical interchange far superior to the unity of fusion

typical of experiences of vertigo. By entering into this field of play, one can surpass the "aesthetic" attitude of the "first stage along the path of life" which, according to Kierkegaard, consists of taking the human environment as a complex of manipulable objects. It is at the second or "ethical stage," characterized by a ludic, creative, dialogical attitude, that realities unfold their possibilities and clarify their total meaning.

As the living vehicle of this creative process of ambits, language is charged with meaning proportionate to the degree of creativity in the ambits it expresses. This nuclear relationship between linguistic expressivity and creativity opens rich horizons for an ethic, aesthetic or metaphysical and religious language that is full of meaning. In all philosophical disciplines it is crucial not to restrict oneself to speculating or to manipulating concepts, rather than devoting oneself to setting up eminently unitive ambits of reality. In these interactional and dialogical ambits one can understand values, for these appear where subject and an object mutually blend and promote each other. This, in turn, constitutes a field of play in which exteriority is united to interiority by the strongest link, namely, by participation in a common field of play.

Lavelle mentions this form of ludic union when he asserts that one must "idealize the object" and "fulfill the ideal" in order to make the profound transparent.<sup>28</sup> This transparency is attained when language becomes not merely a means for passing on concepts, but a place in which ambits are set up and values are born. In order to communicate values and arouse enthusiasm for them one needs a "poetic" language that creates fields of play. Only language "in its incipient state" as the living vehicle of human creativity constitutes a place of encounter, for it alone has the symbolic power to refer to profound realities and events that are super-objective, meta-sensitive and ambital. Language which has been worn out by routine usage detaches one from value by placing one at an infra-creative level. Thus, demagogic or strategic uses of language as a means to dominate people are frontal attacks on value, for they collaborate in blinding the very source or birthplace of values, namely, the event of encounter.

In order to undertake an analysis of values one must overcome the fear of going beyond the limits of "objective" reality. Such transcendence appears to launch one into an open, weightless space in which humans have no footing. We must take up calmly this awe-inspiring challenge in the spirit of Rilke's conviction that the only possible shelter for man lies in "the open" (Das Offene), in the dialogical and the ambital. Submission to a different and distant reality, which surpasses us but could become intimate, does not alienate, but personalizes. Alienation occurs when the object which attracts a subject remains distant through lack of creativity and by failure to collaborate in the constitution of a field of interplay.

Numerous authors state that value is born when it is "identified" with man, when the object is freed of its individualistic status and "interiorized" within the subject. In this precariously objectivist language, based upon empiricist spatio-temporal, rather than upon ludic schemas, both subject and object must surpass their separateness to found a common field of play,<sup>29</sup> for at the objectivist level beings display an inseparable opaqueness which renders impossible any interaction and creativity. In contrast, at the ludic level, as has been pointed out since antiquity, the basic attitude is one of disinterested open generosity as an indispensable condition for the experience of ecstasy.

## **Surpassing the Schemas: "Action-Passion," "Activity-Passivity," "The Act-The Given," "The Set-The Received"**

The theory of ludic participation substitutes the schema "activity-passivity" by that of "activity-receptivity." This is far more flexible because bi-directional, reversible and circular. The subject who takes up a valuable object is not restricted to undergoing actions from outside, but immerses oneself actively in the field of possibilities offered by that distinct reality, which becomes thereby an intimate co-founder of a field of interplay.

This methodological clarification enables one radically to surpass two extremist approaches, according to which: 1) value is received passively by the subject, so that the sole criterion for specifying the existence of values is the subject's affectivity, or 2) value is the fruit of a reflection on the given object by a free, rational subject. The theory of participation sees in suspension, that is, it sees synoptically the subject's activity and the fields of possibilities offered to one by a reality. It grants primacy to neither of the two poles of the participatory event, but understands them as a dialectic of appeal-response. The subject feels appealed to by an object; the response, if it is an authentic and hence creative bond, is in turn an appeal to the object. This possibility of appealing to "objects," which are really "ambits," is heightened in the experience of musical interpretation. With its range of unlimited possibilities for aesthetic play, the piano appeals to the interpreter. In beginning to play the interpreter demands from the piano a certain response, certain quite specific subtleties of sound. By offering them, the piano once more arouses in the pianist new projects of rhythm, intensity, volume and gradation of contrasts.

This surprising interchange of repeated appeal and response is a dialogical encounter in which, as on a playing field, countless ambits or possibilities of meaningful action are woven. At the higher levels of existence, one receives nothing gratuitously and inactively; everything must be achieved through a dialogical, co-creative process of participation. Even contemplation is open to the realities that nourish it insofar as they offer it fields of possible intellectual and spiritual play. Hence, it is dangerous to speak of an "object" of contemplation without due qualifications.

When it is said that "only liberty transforms affection into value"<sup>30</sup> the necessarily active nature of the reception of value is inferred. Hence, the great "virtuosi" of ethics, aesthetics and religion always have been humble and grateful, but not lax--rather, they are highly demanding upon themselves. Any value is a gift which one must conquer creatively. The theory of ludic participation teaches one to overcome the apparently paradoxical nature of this phrase and to grasp its profound logic. Beethoven was fully conscious of his exceptional value as a musician and demanded to be treated accordingly. At the same time he was profoundly humble and grateful, for he saw his genius as the fruit of his bond to the ultimate roots of the real, the Creator.

When the subtle balance of the logic of creativity and participation is rent, the result is fateful extremisms which are different modes of vertigo. Values based upon mere sense feelings lack creativity for they are reduced to the vertigo of sense fascination. Values derived from coercive attitudes or inspired by the will for power are but exalted and fleeting flashes of the vertigo of ambition. In such cases it is only in a very vague and inadequate sense that one can speak of values.

However, if the equilibrium of creative processes can be maintained an extraordinarily fecund horizon of ecstatic experience is opened, in the light of which it can be seen clearly that activity and receptivity constitute not a dilemma, but a contrast. In ecstasy, one feels not just swept along, but surpassed, transformed and raised to levels of greater development and authenticity. Hence, great works surpass their creators whose innermost being is, at the same time, faithfully reflected in these works.<sup>31</sup>

## Surpassing the Schema "Individual-Universal"

Universal validity is often demanded as a guarantee of authenticity; thus, in knowledge what is universally valid is recognized as solidly based. Does the same occur with value? As one asserts value by adhering to it through the experience of participation, value is born in personal encounters, independently of whether it be accepted as valid by other people. Is the criterion of value therefore reduced to an individualistic arbitrariness on the part of each subject?

Just as values are born in the field of interplay or encounter but are not produced thereby, value is objectivized in each concrete realization of the same but is not objectified thereby, that is, it is not subject to the empirical conditions of mere objects. A musical work does not exist in a score, but in the diverse interpretations of the score which it nevertheless transcends. In order to realize or incarnate a value a series of requirements must be fulfilled. In the case of music, one must have a musical gift, possess a rich store of technical knowledge, and take a respectful approach to the works, not attempting to adjust them to one's own criteria. As many people are far from fulfilling these conditions, it is not possible for values to obtain universal approval at each moment. Nevertheless, this does not imply that acts of evaluation by adequately disposed people are merely subjective in the sense of arbitrary, or merely sentimental or non-objective in the sense of not being adequate to the real.<sup>32</sup>

One judges value at the same time, and insofar, as one allows oneself to be judged or "measured" by it. Value cannot be recognized from the outside by a "spectator," for it is not imposed coercively but validates itself by appealing to one's creative freedom. To acknowledge a value is always a personal act--though one which is not merely subjective, but dual. Accepting and taking on a value is more complex and rich than merely forming an arbitrary opinion; it means adopting a stance of availability to the value, seeking it lovingly, sympathizing with it and adjusting oneself actively to its demands.<sup>33</sup>

In principle the act of recognizing a value is universalizable insofar as it can be made by all, but each must do so through a creative and personal commitment. This is not the automatic, ineluctable acceptance that occurs with objectivist objects-of-knowledge which, as Jaspers points out, are "coercively knowable" (*zwingend wissbar*). The welcoming attitude to values is propagated through the force of their appeal and by the invitation which certain persons may make to others to mutual participation.

One must free oneself from the prejudice that the truth lies only in the universal, in relation to which the value of concrete individual reality is but a derivative or implication: only too often the individual is interpreted as a mere case of the universal. Certainly, the individual being takes on its meaning by entering organically into a constellationally woven whole, but this whole is concrete. In order for us as individual beings to rise to this we must gain perspective through universal concepts, but these serve not as goals in themselves but as mediators.<sup>34</sup>

All incarnations of a specific value depend upon one instance which surpasses and nourishes them in the manner, not of an universal "model" from which individual beings arise through simple multiplication, but as a source. One cannot say, for example, that there is a universal "Ninth Symphony by Beethoven" of which each particular interpretation is an individual case; instead, the diverse performances are nourished from a concrete source. This explains why one and the same work may have diverse interpretations, all of which are legitimate to the extent that they enrich the original work to a certain degree. Each act of interpretation is an experience of dialogical interpretation in which a field of play is set up. The light which is shed in this enables the better



endowed interpreters to discover in the work aspects and details hitherto unknown, even at times to the composer himself.<sup>35</sup>

By participating in one and the same value, we unite in the common task of giving concrete expression to the multiple virtualities of an ambital reality. In this task of unity in diversity persons attain a form of untarnished union: "To love is not to gaze at each other, but for both to look in the same direction."<sup>36</sup>

The criterion of value does not lie in universal acceptance, but is born in each act of participation, which is always personal-dual. In acts of ethic, aesthetic and religious participation, persons always are engaged intimately insofar as they are immersed actively and receptively in a reality which offers them diverse possibilities of action. This intimate nature of participation does not imply the subject's withdrawal into some supposed opaque interiority, but a creative opening and committed bond to a value which is not exhausted in its concrete realization but continues to reverberate. To accept a value which needs my cooperation if it is to be realized in concrete form in my life means to create a source which can light up others' creative enthusiasm.

Each person is offered values in a unique and non-exchangeable form. But this uniqueness entails, not exclusiveness or primacy, but a will for communion because participating personally in a value implies adhering to a possible community of people who are willing to establish it. Universality is earned not by mere repetition, but by committing oneself to a creative task which requires putting into play one's deepest personal powers.

The origin of value then lies not in our individual being as an independent center of initiatives, but in our ambital nature by which we surpass the limits of individuality and integrate into the common play of our universe. According to current biology and anthropology human beings are constituted, developed and perfected by means of encounter. One shapes one's personality through devoting oneself to the task of creating ambits which surpass the strictly individual.<sup>37</sup> One fulfills oneself by constantly transcending oneself ("L'homme dépasse infiniment l'homme," Pascal), not towards the universal seen as a sort of model for the individual, but towards an ambit or field of creativity unfolding before each being. "The most profound in myself does not come from myself." (G. Marcel)



### Chapter III

## A Relational Methodology for the Knowledge of Values

After underlining certain methodological deficiencies in raising the issue of values, it is necessary and indeed urgent to provide the bases for an adequate methodology for the study of super-objective relationships and creative phenomena as the prime place of birth for values. In fact, pointing out the existence of values alongside being understood ecstatically stresses the super-objective, ambital-dialogical or constellational aspect of reality.

The elaboration of this relational or ludic methodology requires drawing upon all the resources of contemporary research regarding "inobjective,"<sup>38</sup> "atmospheric"<sup>39</sup> and dialogical<sup>40</sup> realities; the events of play,<sup>41</sup> encounter and participation;<sup>42</sup> experiences of ecstasy and vertigo; the anthropology of sense and of the absurd;<sup>43</sup> and other subjects linked to the realization of the person through creative immersion in the real. At present it is not sufficient to compare or contrast the notions of value and duty or value and human subjectivity; one must pursue the genesis of value within the dynamism of the creative processes and ultimately of reality.<sup>44</sup>

This analysis can be carried out completely only if one possesses a style of thought at once extraordinarily both flexible and rigorous in order to adhere faithfully to the peculiar conditions of each object of knowledge. This implies not only correspondence to objectively given realities, but also active collaboration or co-creative immersion in realities which offer possibilities for interaction. In order personally to realize what this collaboration demands, one must discover the genetic nexus between meaning and the real experience of participation and ecstasy which is the birth of meaning and value.

### **The Experience of Installation within the Real**

A person is not automatically in union with the real; one must contribute to such union by co-creating ambits or fields of play. This creative activity depends basically upon the adjustment between man and his environment, and this creative dovetailing is possible only between ambits, not between objects. Only the former enters into the person, and vice versa, even though they be different and in principle distant. The question of whether the human environment is of an "ambital" nature has divided contemporary thinkers into two divergent paths which we could call the philosophy of meaning and the philosophy of the absurd.

Those thinkers according to whom man is "thrown" into the environment understand it to be hostile, ineluctably different, external and strange; hence it does not offer a field of possibilities for play and for the birth of meaning. To them existence seems nonsensical or "absurd." The distance of perspective, which the person as spiritual may take with regard to one's environment, is interpreted, e.g., by some vitalists as a distance of detachment which annuls the "security" had by animal life--hence, their nostalgia for fusional forms of unity with the real.

On the contrary, if perspectival distance is a necessary condition for founding a field of interplay with the real in which the distant becomes intimate and creatively adjustable to man, one tends to see persons as "installed" in the world and as gradually illuminating and thereby increasing the meaning of any reality. In its basic position, the philosophy of meaning--the personalist, dialogical, phenomenological and existential movements--points out that in the man-world relationship all manner of unheard possibilities may arise. Where the philosophy of the absurd limits human possibilities in principle by considering from an objectivist perspective that these

must be observable after the manner of an object, in a philosophy of meaning one achieves authentic closeness to the real when one finds a relationship of immediacy-at-a-distance or mediated immediacy.

As we have stressed repeatedly, rather than being interposed like a veil between man and the real, mediation is the means by which one enters into a relationship of presence with the most relevant realities. To achieve this form of encounter is the goal of the experience of ecstasy at all levels and in all aspects of human activity. According to the philosophy of the absurd, in contrast, proximity with the real can occur only through fusion: this surrender of one's self and clinging to the fascinatingly immediate is the experience of vertigo.<sup>45</sup>

## **Experience of Vertigo and of Ecstasy**

### Experience of vertigo

The philosophy of the absurd usually takes for granted that one is thrown into existence. To be thrown means to be placed in a hostile environment to which one cannot adjust creatively for it provides no possibilities for creative interplay. By not adjusting, no play is founded; consequently the divisions between here and there, the inside and outside, mine and yours, subject and object are not overcome. The environment always remains external, distant and strange to persons. As such it may either dominate them or be dominated by them, it can either cling to them like lumps of wax or detach itself, it may collide or remain indifferently at a distance. What it cannot do is blend with persons, that is, create fields of interplay in which, without the need to fuse one with another, all gain relevant modes of union. When a different and strange reality becomes highly attractive to the absurd man, that is one for whom the detachment between man and the environment is unsurmountable, one has only a single alternative: to grant primacy either to the ego and dominate the attractive reality, or to the attractive reality and be fused thereto. Though opposed, the two solutions remain in the same objectivist, non-creative line.

Thus, they respond to one and the same attitude of fascination or vertigo. The first alternative is the vertigo of ambition or mastery; the second, the vertigo of the dissolution of one's individual identity. One is carried away by desire either for immediate mastery over the other as an object of possession, or for dissolution in sensible reality seen as an amorphous ocean in which to lose oneself. This selfish, two-sided attitude leads to the abandonment of oneself to a process of vertigo. What exactly is the inner nature of vertigo?

If we look at the ground from a high tower, the void seems to suck us down: we feel dizzy and unless we hold onto something firmly we run the risk of being catapulted to the ground. There is a similar fearful form of vertigo in one's personal life. When one polarizes one's existence around one's ego and focuses upon immediate gains--whether mastery or diverse sense pleasures--one usually is carried away by fascination when confronted by a powerfully attractive reality.

To fascinate means to seduce, to suck away, to sweep away, to cling to. At first, the sweeping away may inflame us and bring on a peculiar exaltation. But when joined to clinging, this quickly becomes a devastating deception. By taking us euphorically out of ourselves fascination seems to lead to experiences of amazing richness, but this union or clinging does not leave the freedom which derives from the distance found in a field of play. From the theory of creativity we know that by entering into play with the realities of the environment one sets up all manner of ambits. In proportion to their quality one increases one's creative liberty to discover the overall meaning of the realities and events which weave the pattern of one's existence. In fascination, feeling taken

out of oneself and at the mercy of the seduction of reality, one becomes aware of being estranged or cut off from personal fulfillment and asphyxiated in any ludic sense.

The experience of fascination, however intense and moving it may be psychologically, leaves one out of play and stripped of all that one needs to exercise one's creative potentialities to shape one's personal reality and thus attain fulfillment. Realizing that one is not on the path to fulfillment, one feels a sadness which follows a sense of becoming impoverished and being no longer a person. When this impoverishment reaches the stage of annulling one's personal life, one experiences a lack of all meaning and, through this void experiences the existential vertigo called anxiety.

When one cannot overcome the attitude of passivity and self-surrender to which vertigo draws us and to some extent recover one's creative capacity and initiative, anxiety becomes despair. This is a mortal disease which, according to Kierkegaard, blocks life in the spirit but does not extinguish the light of consciousness, thereby enabling one indefinitely to suffer spiritual asphyxia. This feeling of despair leads to one's own destruction in suicide or to that of others in murder.

### *Experience of Ecstasy*

The experience of ecstasy occurs when a valuable reality, that is, one which offers possibilities for creative play, attracts a person who is sensitive to values--and who is inclined not so much to master one's environment as to create ambits of ludic interaction. The person who has no desire for immediate gain usually does not turn attraction into fascination, but understands it rather as an appeal to creative liberty--an invitation to enter into play with reality that is valuable and thus actively to take up the ludic possibilities it offers. To enter into play is to enter into a relationship of encounter with others, blending the ambits of life, the possibilities of action and the initiatives each possesses. These possibilities give impulse to one's own activity, so that one feels impelled by a special inner dynamism or singular form of energy which did not originate in one but nonetheless has become something intimate. In principle, all the realities of the human environment are, with regard to persons, different, distant, external and strange; it is through creative contact that they become intimate, albeit still different.

This is particularly manifest in the intercourse of friendship and in musical interpretation. A musical work, which at first was unknown and strange, gradually becomes a sort of "inner voice." By following its dictates one does not leave oneself, become alienated or estranged, or lose one's power of initiative or personal configuration; instead one is elevated to the best of oneself and gradually achieves the ideal state of one's being. This progress towards the goal of personal fulfillment causes in the human spirit a feeling of joy which accompanies the awareness of having attained some fulfillment or of being on the path thereto.

The peak of joy is enthusiasm, the feeling of overflowing fullness experienced when one is creatively immersed in a reality which offers strong possibilities for personal fulfillment. Etymologically, to be enthusiastic means to enter the ambit of the divine: more accurately, to be immersed in, and welcomed by the divine. In its current sense, enthusiasm could be said to arise when one actively takes on certain possibilities of valuable interplay which elevate one or another aspect of one's personality to a high point of maturity. If I interpret on the organ a Bach chorale rich in peace and depth I feel enthusiasm because I see myself internally impelled towards the dialogical configuration of a perfect world in which I begin to participate creatively: I configure the chorale and the chorale configures me. This type of reversible experience leads to fulfillment in one's personal life and to the same extent arouses feelings of enthusiasm. The enthusiasm of the

ecstatic experience responds to an inner sensation of richness totally opposed to the void brought by vertigo.

This explains why enthusiasm inspires and impels the person to activities which lead to the edification of both one's own personality and that of others. This feeling of enthusiasm is not a mere moving and fleeting overexcitement, but the blissful sensation of founding an authentic overflowing personal life through a rich encounter. When two fields of relational or ludic possibilities blend their potentialities they give rise to a new ambit of greater scope, a field of free play. When this occurs, time and space take on a festive character. Such an encounter is the very root of the fiesta, which because it implies the foundation of a field of play is luminous in itself: its light shines from within. For this reason, it overflows with symbols and is linked to the origins of peoples and cultures.

Let us look once more at the two experiences of ecstasy and vertigo. The process of fascination or vertigo does not pose any demands upon one, for it responds to an easy attitude of surrender: it invites one merely to allow oneself be swept away. Though it exalts, inflames, gives one a first euphoric impression of power and seems to offer rapid fulfillment, in reality it puts one out of play and asphyxiates any ludic-creative sensitivity.

Ecstasy, on the other hand, is highly demanding; it places one in a night of long and patient purifications which seem to void one of oneself--to annihilate one. By losing the support of all one usually considers fundamental and indispensable in life a person feels anxiety or a diffuse sense of existential crumbling. Yet this anxious feeling of instability is finally exchanged for a supportive impression of great security when, after overcoming fusional or reductive modes of unity, the person creates higher forms of integration--outstandingly fruitful ludic relations--with the realities one finds appealing.<sup>46</sup> Vertigo is the result of the fascination produced in one by the flattery of immediate gain, whether intellectual or sensitive, whereas ecstasy results when primacy is granted to the creation of something valuable over and above one's own selfish indulgence.

Vertigo is alienating because it surrenders one to a different, distant, external and strange reality. To this extent, it leaves one outside oneself, dispersed and lacking the unity which derives from a creative bond to the valuable. Pascal's theory of "divertissement" should be borne in mind here. Ecstasy, for its part, demands withdrawal or recollection in order for there to be awe before that which entails value. To the extent that it creates links between persons and relevant realities, ecstasy shapes one's personal identity. Experiences of ecstasy are the stepping-stones along the course of human development; experiences of vertigo are degenerative moments which block the unfolding of personality. Ecstasy shelters persons by opening them to authentic forms of encounter as risky as they are fruitful; vertigo, after the first moment of exaltation, leaves persons spiritually dismantled.

Ecstasy produces a healthy unrest in the human spirit, an inner tension which drives one's action and enables one to unfold fully as a person. This unrest engenders not uneasiness, but the peace of those who know themselves to be in truth and are aware of being nourished continually by the reality they seek. On the contrary, a passionate self-surrender to experiences of vertigo brings on an unshakable restlessness, for it sweeps one along, sucks one down and places one outside the play of an authentically personal life. Contrary to what might appear at first glance, vertigo engenders not dynamism, but mere agitation. Once abandoned to the frenzy of vertigo in any of its modalities, persons can only spin on their own axis without advancing, and once aware that this agitation has been merely a squandering of energy such persons experience bitter disappointment.

Vertigo engenders this disappointment and pessimism due to the disproportion between the magnitude of the expectations it arouses and the catastrophic results to which it leads. Ecstasy arouses joy through the fulfillment it implies; it inspires realistic optimism because it opens horizons full of meaning and values which, understood in their profound sense, depend upon creativity and particularly upon the events of interplay and encounter.

Ecstasy stirs up melancholy as a deep sense of valuable realities not as yet fully attained, but merely glimpsed: the ecstatic person lives in hope. Vertigo arouses passion, for it intoxicates with the ephemeral flattery of the present moment. As a result persons are obsessed by immediate gain; they live in expectation of a joyful moment and exclaim with Lamartine: "O temps, suspends ton vol."

Vertigo promotes resentment towards such realities as human love, religion and great art. Not being easily reducible to objects to be possessed these do not provoke an attitude of fascinated self-abandonment, but appeal rather to one's creative freedom. Ecstasy, on the contrary, arouses gratitude, for the one who responds creatively to the appeal of realities which produce enthusiasm tends to welcome them as a gift.

Ecstasy promotes attitudes of generosity and respect. Ecstatic persons open up and offer others creative possibilities in a common field of play. This is a gift to the creative power of others which one acknowledges and accepts. Vertigo, on the other hand, is a source of both sadism and masochism, for it sweeps along those who suffer from these as if they were mere objects and induces them to see others as no more than manipulable objects. Prisoners of vertigo tend also to dominate and let themselves be dominated: on the one hand, by absorbing into themselves surrounding realities they deny those realities any independence; on the other hand, by losing themselves in such realities they nip in the bud their own capacity for personal initiative. Vertigo makes a person both dominating and indolent: the vertigo of totalitarianism and gregariousness are really two aspects of the same basic error, namely, the adoption of a reductionist attitude. To feel safe and even in charge because up-to-date or because "everybody thinks alike" is the radical ingenuity of the gregarious person, who interprets his vertigo as personal energy.

As a result of reductionism, in many works of literature and films eroticism and violence follow one upon another, linking apparent tenderness with insane cruelty. I say apparent, because eroticism implies the reduction of a person to a mere object of fleeting satisfaction and to this extent is a violent mode of inter-relation. In contrast one who experiences ecstasy respects the condition of each reality, both one's own and those who make up one's existential environment. Fundamentally, this is because one begins from the conviction that personal life is creative; such creativity is possible only between realities which are not mere objects but centers of initiative offering possibilities of interplay with whomever is able to take them up. Persons reduced to objects can no longer participate in play.

Because it is reductionist and does not found authentic encounter, the experience of vertigo does not give birth to meaning, but blinds people to values and orients them towards the absurd. As the source of authentic forms of interplay and encounter, the experience of ecstasy sheds light, places people in truth and is a source of deepest beauty. Since antiquity this has been defined as the splendor of order, understood positively as coordinating or blending diverse aspects of reality. In contrast, by preventing the foundation of fields of play, vertigo dislocates one from one's true setting, plunges one into darkness and submerges one in ugliness--thereby engendering disorder.

## **Polar Opposition Between the Experiences of Vertigo and Ecstasy**

It is very important in one's humanistic training to learn to differentiate clearly between experiences of vertigo and of ecstasy. This task is made extremely difficult by the likeness which an unwary eye might seem to perceive between such human phenomena as sweeping away and attraction, fascination and admiration, exaltation and exultation, the unbridled and the enthusiastic giving up of oneself, and fusional unity and unity of integration. In everyday conversation it is often said that something fascinates us in order to denote that it powerfully attracts by its value. We really mean that it arouses our admiration and at times even awes us. If we do not specify accurately the meaning of these and other similar terms, we run the risk of taking the experiences of vertigo and ecstasy as similar events, whereas when viewed properly they are totally opposite.

In order to clarify these concepts it is useful to compare such phenomena as the vertigo of pure competition to ecstasy in sports, the vertigo of electrifying rhythmic intoxication to the ecstasy of immersion in a musical work of value, the vertigo of eroticism to the ecstasy of oblation love, the vertigo of ambition to the ecstasy of generosity, and the vertigo of giving oneself up to destructive forces to the ecstasy of personal union with the Foundation of all reality. Careful comparison enables us to discover, beyond any apparent affinity, a sharp qualitative difference between the phenomena of fascination or vertigo and those of creative play or ecstasy. To a greater or lesser extent the former bring about the collapse of one's creative capacity, whereas the latter lead to diverse peaks of achievement. Vertigo and ecstasy are comparable in taking one out of oneself, but where the former alienates by leaving one at the mercy of different, distant, external and strange realities or forces, the latter--ecstasy--elevates to what is best in oneself, to the state of fulfillment attained by relating to valuable realities which, through creative play or intercourse, become intimate while remaining distinct.

The opposition between vertigo and ecstasy seems to be refuted by the fact that such a significant phenomenon as married love displays both sexual attraction, which at first sight implies a movement of vertigo, and personal encounter, which is an ecstatic event. Certainly, married love may entail a moment of fascination, but this should be taken up by the creative dynamism of a personal friendship which is both generous and lucid. The sexual instinct produces vertigo when one decides to treat it as an autonomous, autarchic, dis-solute power detached from one's integral dynamism. This instinctive energy, which can threaten to sweep people along and launch them over the precipice of sexual frenzy, takes on a peculiar value and a serene equilibrium when consciously undertaken and integrated within the foundation of an amorous field of play as a space of encounter. That which when left to itself bespeaks vertigo, in this creative context acquires a dimension of ecstasy. This transformation responds to a radical change of attitude by humans from fascinated surrender of oneself to the free and deliberate foundation of ambits.

Viewed accurately, the experiences of vertigo and ecstasy display opposite natures, respond to totally diverse human attitudes and lead to quite disparate consequences. Lately, however, both types of experience have been confused either unwittingly--doubtless on account of a faulty appreciation of the true essence of both phenomena--or deliberately and for far-reaching strategic reasons which we must submit to rigorous analysis.

Examples of possibly involuntary confusion are the approaches of Unamuno, Ortega and Sartre.<sup>47</sup> In other cases, the confusion of the experiences of vertigo and ecstasy seems to entail a deliberate attempt to subvert the values which are the backbone and give meaning to western culture. Radical subversion of values occurs when people become cut off from the real. Cultures as the foundation of relevant modes of union with reality are erased by experiences of vertigo



which diminish or annul in certain cases any creative capacity in humans and leave them existentially uprooted. This disconnection from the real narrows human beings and prevents the total development of personality.

The installation of the person within the real is achieved through experiences of ecstasy, for these are the bases for creative interplay, that is, for encounter between humans and the realities of the environment which offer creative possibilities. People attain true unity with the real when they relate, not to objects, but to realities with which they are able to enter into play. If I touch the piano as an object or piece of furniture I have a superficial immediacy with it. If I play the piano, if I run my fingers along the black and white keys and, in unison with both instrument and score, bring forth certain well-tempered musical forms the mode of immediacy I establish with the piano is much deeper and quite different in quality.

One challenging task for current philosophy is to study the diverse modes of unity which people can establish with the different realities of the environment seen, not only as objects, but above all as fields of possibilities for creative interplay. Modes of high unity structure the human being, give energy and root one in the real. This structuring and shaping foundation is a source of joy and optimism in life because it increases one's sensitivity to values, that is, to all those realities which offer persons possibilities for creative play. On the contrary, giving oneself to vertigo blinds one to values for it polarizes the attention of the one who is fascinated by immediate satisfaction.

To induce people to think that the orgiastic exaltation of vertigo is to be identified with the serene exultation of ecstatic enthusiasm is the worst snare could be set for unwary persons today. This colossal fraud, this gigantic philosophical trick, leaves people, particularly the young, disoriented forever in the ambiguous play of life where, if one is not alert, it is easy to consider these two opposite phenomena to be identical, or at least to be of the same type.

A person or human group is considered civilized when they are able to enjoy the products of culture. They are cultured when they know how to found qualitatively higher modes of union with the different realities of the environment, which in turn gives birth to profound knowledge of beings. In vertigo, being left outside of play one is displaced from one's culture, even though one may be evolved as regards civilization. The current crisis of culture has its roots in the loss of the relevant forms of unity with the real which are created through ecstatic experiences. Thus, one attempts to substitute integrative modes of unity by fusional modes of vertigo through fascination in which one clings to seductive things unable to achieve the necessary distance of perspective required to develop fields of play.

To a great extent present-day nostalgia for fusional modes of unity and consequently for infra-creative forms of existence determines the current course of culture, particularly its artistic and literary creation. Often it is stressed that current artists hardly relate to the general public. The two lack a common language, doubtless because the artist often tends to individualistic withdrawal and shuns spontaneous participation in the community's fields of play, that is, in valuable realities which nourish people's spirit and open rich humanistic horizons. This lack of communication is reflected in an absence of emotion which corresponds to a distance from the valuable, even though at times this tendentiously may be interpreted as a return to a serene, anti-romantic objectivity.

To encourage experiences of vertigo is the most efficient--and most sinister--way of reducing people's creativity to a minimum, of distorting language and thus of facilitating the massive manipulation of people. The most dangerous form of this is fraudulently and artfully to confuse the purpose of experiences of vertigo and ecstasy. With this apparently harmless distortion, values which lie at the roots of the best of western culture are subverted leaving people and human groups helpless in the face of those who desire power.

There is no other solution to this subtle form of manipulation than to be alert, to know in detail the resource of language and to encourage creativity. A people which is not very creative and has scant knowledge is easily manipulable, whereas one that is creative and well informed knows how to confront successfully the tide of manipulation. To encourage creativity means to promote experiences of ecstasy in all its aspects and to disregard the voices of those sirens which incite one to vertigo. This is a broad, difficult and fertile program for an educational undertaking with vision for the future.

### **The Experience of Participation**

All forms of experience of ecstasy serve to clarify the logic of creativity and, consequently of participation, but on account of its accessibility and clarity the aesthetic experience of musical interpretation stands out. If one can grasp from within the dynamic nexus established between interpreter, instrument, work, composer and the cultural atmosphere of his/her time, one is in position to offer a clear-sighted genetic reading of the profound works of diverse contemporary authors on the subject of participation and values.

The interpreter enters the work to the extent that it becomes present in him as a principle of musical performance shaping the activity of interpretation. The work is the goal and principle of the activity of the interpreter, who gains in freedom by mastering the work. Paradoxically, this is done by allowing oneself to be mastered by that work, for at the level of genuinely human activity the only suitable form of mastery is interactional or dialogical. The interpreter's participation in the work is active-receptive so that the performance is an encounter or blending, not of two things, but of two ambits. As involving and nourishing, the work does not submerge the individual who is actively immersed in it. It does not annul one's power of initiative and liberty, but encourages these in direct proportion to its own perfection.

In order for such an encounter to take place at the deepest levels both of the work and of the artist a series of "media" are needed to channel this encounter. The score as an ensemble of signs which refer, not only to the meaning latent within it, but to the instrument which enables one to give sound to these musical ideas, and to the muscular and nervous resources of the interpreter's body as a physiological basis for performance. When one begins the study of an unknown work these mediational elements come to the fore, while the work seems to remain at a distance beyond the signs of the score. As the performer masters these expressive media he/she gradually makes the work emerge or flower out of notes which at first appeared as amorphous foliage. In this process the means--without disappearing or at any moment being neglected--become a discrete background enabling the artist and the work to enter into a relationship of immediate-indirect presence with each other. The interpreter who "masters" a work is in direct contact with its forms through an eminently immediate dialogue projected by the technical expressive means which have become fully transparent and docile to artistic creation. This docility and transparency engender the gracefulness of the performance, that is, the peculiar lightness or transcendence of the one who, as in a trance, is attentive to the objective expressive means in the very act of transcending them towards that which they express.

This experience of artistic participation has been reconstructed at the metaphysical level by several thinkers, notably L. Lavelle. With the same intensity with which interpreters actively give themselves to participating in a musical work which nourishes their artistic impulse, Lavelle felt that at all times the life of a person is sustained, supported and encouraged by the Being which, like a nourishing atmosphere, surrounds one. This implies flexibility and dynamism that is absent

when things are seen as rigid, delimited and interrelated only externally in empirical spatio-temporal terms. The musical work, mastered by the interpreter, is no longer exterior but becomes the intimate principle of the interpreter's actions. Similarly, human participation in Being consists in becoming intimate with it through personal actions committed to the creation of ambits of reality through which being is "interiorized" and turned into a principle of life at the spiritual level.<sup>48</sup>

The logic of this experience of participation displays a surprising similarity to the logic of the experience of value. It would be easy to show this in detail, but let us stress merely one fundamental point. The aesthetic transfiguration of an expressive media is carried out by the creative impulse which stamps upon the interpreter a work which he/she had glimpsed from the beginning through the foliage, as it were, of the signs on the score.

This reversible relationship between seeking and finding, between being appealed to and responding, explains the possibility of moving from a one-sided, objectivist attitude concerned with manipulating objects to a ludic attitude creative of ambits. Once installed on this plane and entering into play, all the realities of one's human environment are transfigured, acquire an unsuspected dimension, gain a new power of intercommunication and increase their significance by blending with others. Life thus becomes a place of encounter, and takes on a sense of exultation, festiveness and luminosity. In this light, one discovers progressively the value of unity, which arouses one's creative enthusiasm, until finally the realization of higher modes of unity emerges as a goal which must be achieved at all cost.<sup>49</sup>

Hence, through ecstatic participation we discover the profound reason why there is a strong sense that love and the word, understood strictly as vehicles of creativity, are the nuclei of all value.

There are two facts, no more, in spiritual life, two facts which occur between the I and the you: the word and love. In them lies man's salvation, the liberation of his ego from its self-reclusion. The word without love: What an abuse of the gift of language this is! Here the word struggles against its own meaning, spiritually annuls itself and puts an end to its own existence.<sup>50</sup>

All moral values have their very touchstone in the love of charity or "agape" which corresponds to the experience of ecstasy.<sup>51</sup> Analysis of the implications of this essential nexus between participation, ecstasy, unity, value and language opens up a hermeneutic horizon which enables one to clarify several decisive points with regard to values:

1. It is not mere chance, but according to a perfectly sinister logic that there now exists an attempt to subvert values of all kinds: moral, aesthetic and religious, by a massive encouragement of experiences of vertigo, that is, by ambition for power, drugs, intoxication, gambling and eroticism.

2. Training in values and the attainment of authentic humanism can be achieved only through the cultivation of experiences of ecstasy.

3. The ontological status of values cannot be stated in terms of an objectivist mentality which takes as a model the reality of objective beings. One needs an ontology of the "between," the relational and constellational.

4. The characteristics of values and the diverse possibilities of ecstatic participation can be made clear if they are carried out authentically and studied with a proper methodology.



## Chapter IV

# Methodological Clarifications on the Knowledge of Values

A methodology adequate for an analysis of the genesis of values places upon the knower several requirements which have emerged above and must now be expounded systematically and concisely. If these are borne in mind one will be able adequately to treat the basic topics in a theory of values.

1. Thought structured in terms of an appeal-response schema is the most suitable for expressing creative events.

2. In order to grasp the interaction between appeal and response, we need to adopt a relational and "analectic" thought style,<sup>52</sup> with equal attention to the horizontal and vertical links between the various aspects of the real and value: objective and super-objective realities, objects and ambits, craftsmanship and aesthetic creation. Creative, ludic processes always are impelled and sustained by concrete realities as both "objective" and "super-objective" or "ambital." This, rather than an aversion to the universal, is the basic reason for the return to the concrete in contemporary thought.

Because value becomes incarnate in the concrete realities through which it is expressed, while surpassing the place of its expression or incarnation, one must catch it in flight or in suspension, as it were. In each valuable reality, value is at the same time both present and absent; like meaning in language, it is objectivized but not objectified. Hence, thought in suspension is needed in order to grasp values as realized concretely and to take account of their different degrees. If, in order to overcome the precarious character of the objectivist level of reality, we escape to an abstract universal place, we miss the super-objective or ambital level of reality; this is the place of the phenomenon of creative play in all its modalities: sporting, aesthetic, ethical and religious.

3. To adhere to the super-objective, ambital aspects of reality implies an attitude of commitment by the aware individual in his or her entirety. It is not sufficient to look at or to listen to an ambital reality in order to know its truth. One has to create an ambit of interaction or "deal with it." In this sense the most profound realities are made present to the person if one adopts a receptive, active attitude, that is, if one takes up the possibilities for interaction offered by the reality by which one is confronted, appealed to and invited to creative encounter.

The means of access to such super-objective, ambital and dialogical realities must be ludic and "experiential," which integrates knowledge with love and committed action. This bond must not be superficial, for authentic unity is had only in depth. The radical unity of aspects of human reality, studied by such different philosophical disciplines as the theory of knowledge, ethics and metaphysics, is not a spurious extrapolation, but the natural integration of multiple human dimensions converging in a common task: creative activity engages all dimensions of the human being.

Far from being irrational, experiential knowledge displays eminent rationality, for it reveals the highest aspects of the real in adequate conceptual forms. "Rationality" has diverse modes and degrees; the tendency to restrict it to scientific knowledge discredits diverse philosophical disciplines, relegating them to the field of the "irrational." In the face of science philosophy and particularly ethics need be under no inferiority complex. Strictly understood, philosophy has its own mode of rationality with its own specific rigor which establishes intelligible forms that reveal distinctive aspects of the real.<sup>53</sup>

4. Experiential knowledge is not attained through mobilizing infra-intellectual, merely sentimental or affective resources. Hence, the adjective experiential denotes one's active-receptive

immersion in realities which offer fields of possibilities for creative play and invite one to give a committed response. This event of ludic creativity involves authentic knowledge attained by following the configuration of the object of knowledge from within, whence the human experience of value occurs. In this, high modes of unity are attained which by their great potentiality for contributing to the development of human personality show the great importance of the events of participation and ecstasy. Values base modes of authentic proximity-at-a-distance between persons and the real.

The theory of ecstatic participation as the intensive encounter of the most profound aspects of reality brings to light those aspects which Scheler stressed in his theory of "affective perception" or "emotional intuition" of values. This protects his position from being interpreted as mere backsliding into irrationalism. Valuable realities by their highly tentative character demand that the knower adopt an attitude of commitment and creative interplay. Yet, this sympathetic reverberation of one's whole being by no means annuls the rational nature of knowledge; rather, it endows one with power to penetrate realities which cannot be rendered objective, projected at a distance, or understood as indifference on the part of the knower.

According to Scheler, the emotional aspect of the human spirit entails a priori content which does not come from thought and which endows ethics with a clearly defined independence from logic. "A priori" is an ambiguous expression, normally used to indicate that a reality is different and independent from those realities given to us as objects and able to be known by non-committed, "spectators" (G. Marcel) and non-ludic knowledge. The fact that such knowledge does not discover values, does not mean that they elude all forms of human experience. They are not given as objects because they are born in the dialogue of ludic interchange. But they are the object of the creative experience of fields of play. This form of creativity, which is dialogical in nature and realized by taking up fields of ludic possibilities, in turn entails an elementary measure of love; hence Scheler's statement that in order to know values one needs to love. This bond between ethics and knowledge brings us to the important issue of the nexus between value and feeling.<sup>54</sup>

5. Ecstatic participation brings about feelings of joy and, at its limit, of enthusiasm. There is a pressing need for a balanced and soundly realistic reevaluation of emotive feelings in order to surpass the reductive tendency to consider as the sole modes of feeling forms of pathos which prevent the serene exercise of thought. The irreflexive, contemporary tendency to disqualify any form of feeling as mere romantic day-dreaming undermines the bases of a sound methodology for knowledge of values. The indifference or even aversion in diverse artistic circles today towards the emotively beautiful, the awe-inspiring, the sublime, the profoundly expressive and that which is dense in meaning implies a frontal attack, whether conscious or subconscious, on the world of values. Nothing is more urgent than to denounce the methods presently in use for radically subverting values, for today the ideological struggle concerns what is most basic. The nineteenth-century dilemmas of "faith or science," of "religion or its denial," have been substituted by a more radical issue: "to build or destroy the human." Only an extraordinarily refined methodology will enable a full and convincing grasp of values in a socio-cultural climate which, through language, attempts to nip in the bud any endeavor at axiological revitalization on the grounds that it is childish and retrograde.

This reductionist strategy can be fought efficiently only in terms of a creative ludic interrelation between values and feeling. The highest forms of human feeling are subjective, but they are also relational-dialogical because they consist of the particular emotion produced by ecstatic immersion in valuable realities. These offer a field of possible interplay to those to whom they appeal. If the latter responds positively and creatively, a common field of play is founded in

which the inviting reality becomes present. In this presence one feels emotions of transcendence, joyful excitement and festive exultation. The person immersed in the valuable reality is moved to inquiry into values in order to fulfill his/her personality. The awareness of this fulfillment generates a sense of joy. This joy and fulfillment arise in the meeting of value and person. The climate of vital exuberance based upon that meeting is the fiesta, an event which overflows with symbols and inspires enthusiasm and love.

All these feelings are linked to each other by the logic of ecstasy--one of the highest human events because it founds the highest and most valuable ambits of encounter. As the spiritual resonance from a blending of ambits, feeling is a luminous expression of value. Because this is not hidden within the individual, attempts to be strictly realistic by drowning one's feelings, as if they were hedonistic subjective evasions, will not support serious methodological analysis. We are interested in feeling, not because it is satisfying to the individual, but as a herald of value.<sup>55</sup> Feelings have a peculiar "intentionality" which refers back to a reality, or rather reflects the result of the creative blending of two or more realities. They are governed by the logic of creativity, and are not alogical, amorphous, arbitrary, or "subjectivist." Their peculiar logic is adjusted to a process which creates new and more comprehensive modes of reality. Hence a "metaphysical" function is exerted in contemporary philosophy by feelings of fidelity, love, joy, enthusiasm and their opposites: rupture, hate, sadness, tedium, nausea and despair.

This intentional nature of feeling as open, dialogical and ludic requires that we conceive knowledge of values in a relational, bi-polar and ambital manner. The feeling which collaborates in this knowledge consists in responses to the invitation or ludic appeal to co-found fields of play and enlightenment. The responses are modulated according to different appeals manifest in the field of play. This is by no means a matter of arbitrary evaluation by the knower in view of his or her individual preferences.

As a criterion of value feeling has its particular mode of rigor as interior to the creative encounter with reality in a manner similar to musical interpretation. As this cannot adhere to external norms, it always entails some ambiguity and risk. A person may feel that something is highly valuable and obtain a closer knowledge of this value. If, however, one wishes to pass on this knowledge to others, he or she may be puzzled to observe that it cannot be demonstrated or universally verified. In order to know it, each human being must create with it a field of play and enlightenment. The feeling which reveals values is not universalizable because it springs from a process of ludic participation. Paradoxically, this "limitation" is its greatest glory. It is, therefore, misguided to state disparagingly that in ethical, aesthetic and religious matters evaluation is a matter of "mere feeling." The authentic modes of these feelings entail such a complexity of nuances and bear with them such an accumulation of demands that the adjective "mere" is quite out of place. Feeling arises as the fruit of a ludic encounter in which value is born, but this does not mean that the value depends entirely upon such an event. One must "see in suspension" that, though values are not created by humans, they cannot be established or take on expressive form without human collaboration. The value of a musical work is revealed in the field of play between it and a good interpreter--to a great extent it depends upon this ludic event--but this value is not exactly engendered by it. We are on a relational, not a relativistic level of thought: value is revealed in ludic events of encounter, but as transcending each act of revelation.<sup>56</sup>

6. Because they are "atmospheric" and hence not de-finable or delimitable in any precise way, values appear to be hidden from intellect, which seeks exact knowledge on the level of objects. As arousing particular feelings in the aware individual, values often are considered to be peculiar, "originary" phenomena revealed only as an "affective perception" or "emotive intuition." This

bond of value with feeling raises suspicions that values are "irrational" and cannot be known in any rigorous manner. As inability to be known would discredit values--especially in view of the "talisman"-like nature which reason and the rational have had for centuries--certain authors following Pascal eagerly pointed out that there may be a peculiar rationality in faculties other than understanding.

In order to avoid misunderstanding this form of rationality as a mere sentimental projection of a subjective human act, values were attributed an "objective" nature. Against the risk that someone might interpret this "objectivity" as mere "formality," values were held to have a "material" nature, that is, a concrete content. This could be reduced to a mere sensorial stimulus which in each time and place has an automatic sense response, but such subjection to particular time and place would rule out any universal validity for values. It is in order to reject this reductionist version, that values here have been considered a priori entities.

All these proposed and rejected interpretations reflect a linear conception of the human-reality and the subject-object schemas. As this does not allow for the richness of the possible interaction entailed in "object" and "subject" taken as ambits, there is a tendency to grant primacy to one or the other, resulting respectively in an objectivism or subjectivism.

A ludic methodology of values does not attack the interpretations it considers erroneous, but simply makes a point of posing the subject of value in an authentically realistic manner. This approach enables one to point out the following characteristics of values:

- They are real or "extra-subjective," but this does not mean that one should go to the other extreme of considering them "objective." In fact, they are relational, super-objective and ambital.

- They are not merely formal or reduced to mere norms of behavior without content, but neither should one classify them as "material," for then one runs the risk of placing values too close to the "objective" and the "non-spiritual." The void of formalism is filled by the relational-ambital without risk of slipping back into the rigidity of the "objective."

- They are not mere sense stimuli, subjected to the narrow field of present action, but have a far wider radius or validity. Yet they do not possess this breadth in an "a priori" manner which frees them from adherence to experiential discourse, but gain it through the creative experience of ambital interchange. This experience supposes empirical modes of space and time and hence submission to an objectivistic here and now. It does this without falling into an imprecise a priorirealm or risking loss of losing contact with the real. Values can be protected against reduction to the sensible level by acknowledging their power for founding special modes of reality, ludic spaces, which increase the reality of human beings and of the entities in their environment.

This co-creative, dialogical action has reverberations in the whole person. There is no sense in attributing the knowledge of values to "pure emotional intuition" in order for access to value to be independent of the organic structure of the knowing individual. This Schelerian residue of Husserl's fear of psychologism disappears of its own accord by merely noting that all the elements which mediationaly intervene in the foundation of the fields of play in which values are born become transparent and turn into places for the living presence of value. One should not fear the realities taken on in a creative, expressive process, for they are thereby redeemed of their objectivist character and endowed with amazing flexibility and a correlative capacity for linking up with other realities.

For example, the heart is attributed a decisive role in one's access to value and is said to have "reasons" that reason does not understand (Pascal). In contrast to a cold, detached, non-committed knowledge of mere objects, "heart" means here the vibration of the whole human being which occurs upon entering into creative play with a reality which invites one to found together an ambit



or field of companionship and light. If one does not situate the origin of knowledge in encounters, one tends to place it unilaterally within either the knowing individual or the object. Then a recognition of "heart" or of any form of feeling in the process of knowledge appears to be a spurious intervention on the part of the individual that perturbs the accuracy of the knowledge in question. Thus, the logic of the heart is opposed insolubly to the logic of understanding.

On the contrary, once one observes that objects of knowledge very often are not totally delimitable, but are constituted through creative encounter with the individual, it becomes apparent that the only manner of knowing them is integrally to commit oneself to them in the interplay of existence. The logic of the heart shows itself to be a logic of creativity and participation, which is not opposed to any rational knowledge. It is counterpoised to the knowledge of objects only as a richer, more complex form is contrasted to one that is simpler and more elementary. The experience of encounter does not lie outside the scope of understanding, but it does surpass the possibilities of a spectator's understanding (Marcel) for which objects of knowledge are mere objects or external realities submitted to non-committed analysis.

"The task of the 20th century," wrote Merleau-Ponty, "consists of integrating the irrational within a broadened notion of reason." It consists in showing that it is possible to know realities which cannot be rendered objective and therefore have been considered erroneously to be irrational by those who abusively restrict the scope of human intellectual power. This task requires the clear elaboration of a phenomenology of creative events, which must not be hindered by "critical" prejudices or limited to knowledge of pure essences. It must concern realities which are formed and developed as constellations and revealed only to the individual who enters into their interplay. Such a phenomenological orientation transcends as inadequate the diverse and disruptive mental schemas of "rationalism-irrationalism," "a priori-a posteriori" (experiential), "universal-singular," "formal-material" and "the set-the given." This transcendence is attained through the conviction that knowledge attains universal value, not by leaving to one side the empiric individual, but by intensive participation in creative events. To be universally valid, knowledge should be "pure" in the sense of being independent of the private conditions of one or another individual. "Pure" knowledge is acquired when one enters into a relationship of presence with the object: This relationship is annulled, however, when the expressive elements, which should make it possible, instead stand in its way. Here we come to a crucial point, for if it cannot be seen how the expressive elements of a complex concrete experience, such as the interpretation of a musical work, can mediate the work and make it present without blocking its expressive power it will not be possible to integrate knowledge of essences and experience.

Due to the transparency derived from the dynamism of their creativity, the mediational elements do not come between the individual and the expressive reality, but act as a luminous place of revelation.<sup>57</sup> This is an immediate-indirect mode of giving oneself. "Immediate" implies not speed or instantaneity, but profundity. From the moment one comes into contact with a reality, one is present to the whole of it, but not to all its aspects and nuances. "Indirect" means mediated. Reality is present to us through diverse expressions and after fulfilling numerous difficult requirements. But here "through" and "after" do not indicate a lapse of time or a spatial distance which would remove men from the reality sought. At the level of ludic interaction these adverbs have an analectic nature; they imply not detachment, but the perspective appropriate to a field of play. Thus, when a great musician performs a work, he/she enters into the work through the score and the technical elements of interpretation. This is a mediated, albeit immediate, form of presence because all the mediational elements sink into the background and become transparent vehicles for the presence of the work. Nobody adheres more faithfully to the technical details than the good

interpreter, while seeming to do without them and to concentrate their energy in the immediate dialogue with the work.

If the categories of immediacy and mediation, distance and presence are not properly articulated, it is understandable that, on the one hand, "material" objects as endowed with content will be avoided in favor of the formal in order to insure the universality of knowledge. On the other hand, one would resort to "pure a priori intuition" for the multicolored richness of the concrete and to attain knowledge of essences in person ("leibhaftig-gegenwartig," Husserl). Such methodological failures give rise to unavoidable inadequacies which justify the repeated criticism of phenomenology.

By using certain more or less novel terms, philosophers often try to solve problems which arise from an initial misunderstanding of basic experiences. I realize that when I listen to a musician I am made present immediately to the work, to its essence and to the essence of the style to which it belongs, and that I can disregard all the mediational elements because they are transparent. Hence, I do not need to state that my access to such essences is a priori and independent of the experience itself. This access comes through a highly complex experience, which it transfigures and makes into a translucent vehicle of my presence. The expressive reality becomes present analectically during and through the experience, but as detached from--and hence not contaminated by--the elements which constitute the experience. Meaning is expressed in a phrase, it is "objectivized" and becomes the object of attention; but it is not "objectified," that is, it is not reduced to the objective state of the phonic elements of the phrase.

If the logic of creativity is properly analyzed, one realizes that what is most profound is most mediated and made intensely present to whomever fulfills the rules of play. The decisive factor in the theory of knowledge is not to shun mediation, but to know how to make the mediators truly mediational. Such a conversion frees knowledge from submission to the empirical conditions of time and space proper to "objective" realities. This was precisely the goal in considering the knowledge of essence to be a priori. Yet this is a somewhat negative and fallacious approach for it is based on the supposition that by disregarding the mediation of experience one automatically obtains immediacy of knowledge. The theory of creativity enables one to distinguish diverse modes of immediacy, and shows that higher modes are not attained by the mere annulment of distance; they are the fruit, not of negation, but of careful creative work. This means that in elaborating a methodology for the knowledge of values, it is more fitting to speak of creativity than of affectivity and emotivity whose function is integrated within creativity.

From the foregoing it may be inferred that to clarify the possibility of knowing values, one should point out first that human intellectual intuition is not, as is usually asserted, an immediate-direct, but an immediate-indirect vision of an object of knowledge. The adjectives "immediate" and "indirect" are not opposed to each other; in finite knowledge they are mutually required. Indirect intuition may be at the same time immediate thanks to the "mediational" and not "mediatizing" nature of the expressive elements: the mediational elements do not come between the object and the knowing subject, but are their place of encounter. Fear of mediation blocks the dynamism of philosophical research, above all in the field of ethics and aesthetics; it leads thinkers to extremist, unilateral positions in which they are unable to do justice to the complexity of the objects of knowledge.

7. Because of its many links to the different aspects of man and reality, value must be studied with a spiral method. One begins by contemplating as a block the constellation of concepts connected to value: being, ambit, disponability, creativity, existential commitment, play, participation, encounter, birth of sense and beauty, truth and goodness. Secondly, the analysis is

broadened in ever widening circles, each tied to the subjects already considered at the outset and to others which arise during the personal experience of values. This spiral method insists upon what is already known, but places it in a different and more comprehensive perspective, without for a moment losing sight of the bonds which link the subjects studied constellationally. The human manner of delving deeply into matters is to proceed spirally in attaining the "ring of concepts" postulated by Heidegger and which marks the beginning of true philosophizing as a synoptic mode of knowledge. We are able to know in detail diverse facets of reality, but until we grasp genetically from within the profound bond which links these, we do not cross the threshold of authentic philosophical experience. This is particularly relevant as regards value because of its intensely relational nature.

This synoptic and analectic mode of reading value phenomena is possible due to the human power to think with perspective, soaring above each of the contemplated realities to situate them dynamically in the constellational web in which they acquire their full meaning. Synoptic knowledge may be achieved by analyzing the experience of values reflected in philosophical and literary texts, a co-creative reading of which can be a source of light for discovering the constellational web of the phenomenon of value.<sup>58</sup>

8. Values should be sought, co-established with care, and respected as always transcendent, that is, as unable to be possessed as an object. The creative attitude which co-establishes values is always allied to the attitude of "reverence" which, according to Goethe, nobody is born with but which is required in order to become fully human. This elevates empiric time and space to the level of ludic interchange so that the distant becomes intimate and what is far off in time and space becomes near. This transformation is at the basis of the phenomenon of the symbol, which is a key to the configuration of diverse cultures. It makes historical discourse, beyond its flowing and evasive nature, a field of play and enlightenment with all that this implies for the establishment and knowledge of values.

9. From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the establishment and understanding of values does not take place automatically, mechanically or infra-creatively whenever certain circumstances are had, but that it demands human collaboration. In order to accomplish this, persons must fulfill certain conditions, among which are the following.

9.1 One must overcome the attitude of indifference and avoid whatever brings about the dreaded phenomenon of "blindness to value": devotion to satisfying immediate-sensitive desires, the will to manipulate and control surrounding realities, confusion of the exulting with the exalting, of vertigo with ecstasy, and of fusion with integration.

9.2 One must overcome the tendency to inactivity and encourage desire for self-improvement through the different modes of creativity.

9.3 One must cultivate sensitivity to values, allowing oneself to be appealed to by their inner force, that is, by their power to arouse admiration and inflame one's creative capacity.

9.4 One must learn to listen to the "voice of conscience," that is, to the resonance produced by the blending of ambits. As in any kind of play, this produces light as well as sound; it makes itself heard by the expressive power of its capacity to create new ambits and give birth to meaning.

9.5 One must refine one's sense of "responsibility" or capacity to "respond" to appealing realities and oblige oneself with them in a common creative task.

9.6 One must sharpen the awareness that it is in this type of obligation that true human freedom is developed, namely, liberty for creativity.

9.7 One must make a habit of constantly bettering oneself by transcending the closed boundaries of individualism and attaining creative openness. The creation of new modalities of

reality and the birth of an integral meaning for man as a "possible existence,"--that is, as a reality which is not quite completed but must be accomplished through time--takes place in the phenomena of encounter.<sup>59</sup> In order to place oneself at the level at which this encounter takes place, one must overcome the tendency to gravitate towards objectivist attitudes and "spring" upwards to the level of ludic encounter.<sup>60</sup>

All this demands that one should both withdraw and be awed.<sup>61</sup> To withdraw does not mean to encloister oneself in a solitude of seclusion and rootlessness, but to enter into a dialogue with what is valuable and appealing. This surpasses alienation in irrelevant and non-valuable beings which are incapable of appealing to man or co-founding fields of interaction, intimacy and interiority. Hence it is logical that philosophies which seek the authenticity of the ego in relation to transcendence should demand the practice of interiorization. Saint Augustine asks people to seek truth in "interiority," understood as the capacity actively to transcend oneself in search of the Infinite. One withdraws to free oneself from the temptation of fusion with the immediate and common, and thus is able to be awed by the profound which, as different and distant, may become intimate.

To be awed is to oblige or commit oneself to the realization of a field of play which promotes human liberty. As we already stated, obligation to a valuable reality does not imply coercion, but is a response to the appeal which appears as an inner voice inasmuch as it comes from a reality that is both different and intimate. In awe as a field of intimacy, one who is open to values feels at one and the same time both withdrawn and transcended. This endows the human being with a singular relevance and plenitude, an ecstatic fulfillment, awareness of which arouses, in turn, a sense of spiritual enthusiasm.

Enthusiasm or--according to its splendid etymological meaning--"immersion in the divine" occurs when one feels obliged to all that mediates the total fulfillment to which one is basically called or "sent." As X. Zubiri points out, man's life is a "mission"; and in these terms value is that reality which serves as a mediational element in this process of enthusiastic fulfillment.

9.8 To understand value one must see it in close connection with meaning. A reality or event has meaning as ordered towards the unity in which it attains fulfillment. A human action has meaning when it is carried out, not in view of the whole as sometimes is asserted, but within those valuable realities whose ambits are blended with those of man to perfect his creative capacity and set him on the path to personal fulfillment. In order not to cling to the immediate and to be open to the valuable, one must have the distance and hence perspective needed for the foundation of fields of play. This distance mediates creativity and enables one to unite with ambital realities. For ethical values this mediational task is carried out by norms of conduct which distance one from the immediate so strongly condemned by Kierkegaard. These norms leave one unfettered for what can be given only in the union-at-a-distance characteristic of creative play.

9.9 One must probe deeply into the bond of being and value. If, as current science and metaphysics teach us, reality is structural and relational and is dynamically constituted as a constellation of mutually dependent notes, then it is clearly axial or dense in meaning and relevance.<sup>62</sup>

Within this radical bond of being and value lies the possibility for considering all elements in the human environment as ambits by situating their objective aspect in a common creative field of play. Living experience of the nexus between being and value is had by persons when they encounter and are present to reality through ludic participation in values. In creative play reality is heightened and value is born, for both are implied in the dynamic-creative processes inasmuch as value demands to be fulfilled: it is a "has-to-be."<sup>63</sup> In this fulfillment one is established both in

one's personal and in one's communitary aspects. By adhering to value, human beings experience their individuality as caught up in a web of relationships which opens them to all manner of transcendent realities. This enables them to ascertain something which is as ambiguous and difficult to specify as it is pregnant in consequences for one's life, namely, that the human being is both surpassed and configured by the values which they take on and fulfill.

There is no sense in trying to specify the place in which value is to be found: super-objective realities are not subject to empiric, spatio-temporal conditions. What is important is to experience the reversible relationship between realities which mutually need and enable each other: persons shape language, while language nourishes spiritual life; the player plays the game and the game offers the player the possibilities of ludic action; the interpreter "masters" the musical work insofar as he "lets himself be mastered" by it.<sup>64</sup> This experience enables us to see that the complementary aspects of reality sustain a mutual relationship which is both ambiguous and efficient.

To have an integral experience of values one must neutralize the impeding influence of ideological prejudices in order to attend to the appeals of reality at all their strata or levels.

10. The methodological demands for knowledge of values can be fulfilled only if one begins with a relational conception of reality, along with a well-refined theory of participation and play capable of clarifying the different possible modes of union between persons and their environing reality.

The methodology for knowledge of values questions many traditional philosophical premises. It was not without profound reason that those contemporary thinkers most interested in the subject of axiology carried to the extreme their desire to make ontology more flexible by stressing both the nature of "act" displayed by being and the dynamic, open nature of personal reality.<sup>65</sup> As far as the former is concerned, sound steps are currently being taken with a view to inserting dynamism, relatedness and historicity within the very ratio of reality, but without reducing its definiteness and falling into a facile historicist relativism. As for the second, current science, above all biology and anthropology, are pointing out more and more energetically that man is a "being of encounter"--a being who is shaped, developed and perfected by founding ambits of rigorous encounter with other personal beings, institutions, cultural realities, landscapes, traditions, and languages. The encounter does not imply mere juxtaposition or physical proximity; it demands the blending of ambits, the integration and mutual facilitation of fields of possible interplay, for it is in play as a creative event that higher modes of unity are attained.

When human life is viewed spontaneously, without the blindness of philosophical prejudices, one realizes that its fundamental value is the mode of unity founded in the encounter, which in turn responds to an attitude of love; hence, at their ultimate root love and value interpenetrate. As the living vehicle here is language, a word spoken without love destroys itself and becomes anti-language; the word spoken with love founds the value of friendship. Love, value and language are bound in a single nucleus.

11. From the above specifications one may infer unequivocally that a methodology for the knowledge of values demands above all an adequate use of language. Rather than being a means for communicating what is already known, human language is a medium for creative interplay of the ambits which make up the web of human existence. As a field of play, authentic language is a field of enlightenment or of the birth of meaning. If, in order to manipulate or defeat others without needing to convince them one uses language strategically, then one annuls its capacity to give birth to meaning and to clarify values. Currently, values are artfully subverted by using the resources of language so subtly and surreptitiously to distort the meaning of realities and events that people are given the impression of being raised to high peaks of freedom when they

are being submitted to the worst type of bondage: that of the intelligence.<sup>66</sup> If there is no efficient counterpoint to this solvent effect of the strategy of language upon ethical, aesthetic and religious values, it will not be possible to offer today's person a plausible and convincing experience of values. The subject of values is highly complex; it obliges one to refine one's concepts, to perceive diverse elements as an ensemble, and to catch the meaning of integral phenomena. In principle the demagogic spirit of those who use language strategically avoids attending to the nuances of meaning in terms and concepts. Instead, they use them opaquely and unilaterally to create dilemmas which prevent people from grasping the meaning of complex phenomena as integrating contrasting elements in an original unity of meaning.

## Chapter V

# A Creative Aesthetic Methodology and the Characteristics of Values

As an illustration of the above methodological perspective, let us see how it would approach the analyses of two major questions related to value: 1) the relation of value to historicity, and 2) the genesis of values in the blending of ambits. As examples, we shall analyze the intellectual value of meaning and the cognitive value of the symbol.

### History as a Field of Enlightenment for Values

Historicity implies: 1) temporal discourse, 2) opening diverse possibilities for creative action, 3) society's assumption of some of these possibilities, and 4) future projections on the basis of the fields of possibilities opened by the past.

The fundamental category of historicity is not the mere fact, but the event; the subject of history is not the individual, but society. Historical activity depends not only upon one's personal powers, but also upon the fields of possibilities which, as integrated in society, one receives from the past, creatively increases and transmits to future societies.<sup>67</sup>

Taking on these fields of possibilities implies two distinct, but related forms of temporality. The schema "temporal-intemporal" is inadequate for understanding historicity because to be historical is not reduced to being changing or becoming. If change is historical, far more than mere alteration, it is creative and overflows with all kinds of possibilities. To perdure is not merely to withstand time and oppose all manner of change; more positively it implies exercising creativity in the possibilities offered through time. Because human duration implies a creative change, one can avoid misunderstanding the contrast between change and permanence as a "dilemma."

The best defense against historical relativism is a well articulated theory of historicity which does not conceive values as non-temporal entities which, in a way that cannot quite be imagined, soars above the temporal process and each human action. Instead, values as supra-temporal entities are at once different from, and intimate to, the realities which participate in them, and which they in turn endow with their full meaning. With too hazy or rigid a concept of permanence and change, one is unable to elaborate a theory of value which has due solidity and flexibility and is plausible and suggestive for our times.

Viewed at the ludic level, history is a huge field of play which at times of high creativity can be a field for the establishment and enlightenment of values.<sup>68</sup> In a relational methodology there is no risk of misunderstanding this founding activity as a mode of absolute creation for, though in their diverse forms values are made incarnate and clarified throughout history, they surpass the temporal process and found fields of possibilities which make up the web of history. In history, values are objectivized in the sense of taking on expressive form, but they are not objectified or reduced to merely objective elements by being submitted to the empiric conditions of space and time.

Diverse modes of temporality are integrated within historical discourse. This makes it possible to give due importance to the historical and the transcendent, to whatever displays a singular mode of validity and perdurance as it emerges in the thread of history.

Within a ludic-creative conception of historicity, both the absolute nature and the historical condition of truth and value are compatible. The fact that certain truths and values are perennial

does not imply that they elude history, for precisely because they are rich objects of knowledge they demand proportionate human commitment throughout the flow of time.

The subject of historicity requires a high level of anthropological and metaphysical meditation if it is not to lead to the superficial extreme of relativism. This requires in metaphysics that the sense of the real (*ratio realitatis*) be enlarged sufficiently to view historicity, not as common change which dis- solves the substance of the real, but as a web of events realized through taking on possibilities. Relativism should be avoided at all cost because it subjects one to each changing situation and impedes one's realization of immutable truth. But one attains knowledge of immutable truth through history, that is, through multiple acts of creativity carried out through time by taking up the sheaf of possibilities to which different human generations have given birth.

As historicity and truth are articulated jointly and fruitfully through creativity, enlarging this field would broaden philosophical experience, for to the same measure in which people can create they and the limits of their cognitive capacity are extended.

### **The Genesis of Values in the Blending of Ambits**

Various contemporary thinkers are inclined to interpret axiological phenomena relationally in order to avoid the difficulties which derive from a style of thought that adheres to rigid, opaque, monolithic categories. Some employ the category of encounter as the most fitting for articulating the understanding of such interactional phenomena as the emergence of beauty, friendship and "religatio" to the divine. Undoubtedly, grasping human aesthetic and religious values demands a flexible but intense style of thought; and to a certain extent this is demanded and encouraged by analysis of the phenomenon of encounter. Yet this does not seem a sufficient methodology for an integral study of values because the encounter between people does not suffice as a model event, inasmuch as some realities, though not strictly personal, are ambital and give rise to a very fruitful ludic blending. Because relational modes of reality are founded in them, they transfigure the categories of immediacy and distance.

Besides offering all the advantages of the category of encounter, that of ambit, when linked to the similar categories of play, creativity, presence and analectic relationship, opens a wider horizon of possibilities for understanding relevant phenomena and events.

#### *The Ethical Value of Friendship*

A ludic-ambital methodology enables one to clarify friendship as a value which people simultaneously participate in and found. Without their creative activity friendship cannot be born, although it does not originate as the fruit of human activity. When two people live the experience of falling in love, they gradually discover this phenomenon, and found a concrete loving relationship. One may give oneself to an experience either of amorous ecstasy or of erotic vertigo with total freedom and lucidity. These characteristics of one's action give one self-confidence and often lead to feeling oneself the master of one's acts, as if one were giving birth to the phenomenon of love or eroticism for the first time. This is a serious error, for in fact one is governed either by the logic of ecstasy or by that of vertigo which discretely and efficiently inspire different human attitudes.



## *The Intellectual Value of Meaning*

As the complexity of the notion of meaning is analogous to that of value, a ludic-ambital methodology can help jointly to clarify both concepts. Meaning is born in the blending of ambits precisely because that is where value is founded. "Meaning expresses the direction which value stamps on our existence. Value founds meaning and not vice-versa."<sup>69</sup> Let us look schematically at the bond between meaning and value.

The scope of the term "meaning" is far wider than that of "significance." An action may entail very precise and even outstanding significance and still not have meaning because it is not integrated within an overall value horizon. Action endowed with significance may acquire positive or negative meanings in different contexts. Thus, negative meaning is had by any action not related to attaining a model type of existence; positive meaning is displayed by actions which collaborate in founding forms of existence that imply fulfillment. When we speak of the "meaning of human life" we refer to a positive form of meaning.

To have meaning is to be installed within a process of fulfillment, which is achieved through ecstatic immersion in valuable realities that invite one to co-found ambits of creative interchange. One's authentic environment is thus made up of realities which in some way are endowed with a certain appeal. If one responds to such an appeal, a dialogical experience of participation and encounter takes place. In this genre of experience meaning appears as something real--not the static reality of objects, but the flexible and dynamic reality of relational ambits. When one sets about the task of founding valuable modes of encounter, one discovers that which gives rise to unity and experiences one's existence as taking on undreamed-of quality and depth. This enigmatic depth implies a proportional measure of value and meaning.

Listening to a word spoken in love as an appeal to an encounter which must be responded to in generosity is the indispensable starting-point for the birth of the meaning of life. This, in turn, will be the fruit of ceaseless and varied participation approaching the original creative power of the word as an ambit or capacity to respond to appeals. One lives within the word as in a field of enlightenment: "words are dwelling-places," wrote Cayrol with foresight. For to express a thought through the word is not to alienate it, but to involve it in a fertile climate of spiritual community which should carry it to its fullness of meaning. To insert a thought into the field of play of language implies both renouncing any elementary form of individualistic possession and a will to collaborate with the powers of fulfillment which pulse in the heart of community.

One experiences integral meaning when one actively enters the field of play of the word which brings an infinitely rich message and founds an encounter with the Absolute. If one has this experience at least once during one's life this is opened to an horizon of meaning which constantly invites one to surpass all that is precarious and fully to unfold one's natural possibilities.

Through the inner logic of reality, meaning is coupled to fulfillment and value and, more originally, to a creative appeal of the environment. The counterpole to an existence full of meaning and value is one that is absurd--a disarticulated, existential crumbling that results from a lack of creativity and consequent inability to found worthy relationships with one's surrounding realities.<sup>70</sup>

The philosophy of language is cultivated by currents of thought interested in reviving the reductionist spirit and in restricting as much as possible a person's ability to speak meaningfully on ethical, metaphysical and religious subjects. Application of the theory of creativity to cognitive questions enables us to confront this minimizing campaign in the only efficient manner, namely,

by articulating a rigorous methodology which enables one to move securely in the ambiguous world of such super-objective realities as language, love, encounter, meaning, beauty and symbol.

### **The Cognitive Value of the Symbol**

The concept of symbol is currently employed in order to enlarge the possibilities of human knowledge beyond the restricted field of "objective" realities. Though praiseworthy as a goal no solid basis is provided for the commonly asserted power of the symbol to refer back to other realities. Symbols are almost always described in suggestive terms, but their contours are imprecise and more akin to pseudo-Romantic day-dreaming than to rigorous philosophical analysis. This lack of precision is serious for, since the experience of positivist reductionism, it has become necessary to speak of the most complex human events in a realistic, well-articulated and precise way, despite the conditions of ambiguity typical of super-objective, ambital, dialogical and ludic realities and events.<sup>71</sup>

The symbol arises when value is founded through an intermingling of ambits; this interactional dynamism founds the symbol's capacity to refer to other realities. Symbolism is not a quality which adheres statically or objectively to a reality; instead, a reality becomes symbolic and refers to other realities when it acts as a living vehicle for an interactive event between the field of reality made up by said entities and the human being who relates to them. When a host regales his guests by pouring wine, the wine becomes "ludified" and ambitalized. It becomes a gift, a ludic, relational reality which emerges from an ambit of hard strife with the land and plants and goes towards an ambit of community founded upon love. Between these two interlinked ambits the wine is a sensitive incarnation of a meta-sensitive blending. This activity of positive mediation couples the two worlds of work and friendship; in doing so it refers back to both which it makes present in the area opened by the mediating reality, which thereby takes on symbolic power.<sup>72</sup>

In this context, it would be highly instructive to analyze the twin nature of the image when it is not reduced to a mere superficial figure and deprived of its innate expressive power. It has this power as a place of encounter for the diverse levels of reality which it integrates, thereby making possible their respective fields of interplay.<sup>73</sup> If the symbol arises in the interaction of ambits and if the person always is appealed to by ambital realities to found new ambits and to turn life into a huge field of play, one can understand why the human being is surrounded by symbols of which he or she is the co-founder, and sees the symbolic aspect of reality flower at the most intensely creative moments of existence. As the human person is an open reality who pervasively transcends him/herself, it is perfectly logical that the person should be defined as a "symbolical being."

Through this creative openness to symbols one is manifest as a speaker, homo loquens, for since symbols arise in the interaction of ambits they are shaped in the matrix of language. This is the living vehicle for the foundation of ambits and their interaction, and it is in this ludic blending that symbol is born. The symbolic power of the phenomenon of encounter endows language, as a creative ambital event, with its capacity to give birth to meaning.

It is extremely important to analyze the origin of those relationships we call symbolic, such as that which mediates between the dove and peace. In contrast to a "sign," as a form of relationship artificially established by humans, some authors postulate as characteristic of symbolic relationships the fact that they arise naturally by virtue of a certain likeness or contiguity. This characterization is without doubt insufficient, for the luminosity of the symbol requires a certain blending of ambits. In order for the dove to be a symbol of peace two ambits of meaning must be related: the ambit of harmony, serenity and good will among men, and the ambit of the dove's co-

existence with the beings of its environment. When these ambits are blended, one sees the figure of the dove illuminated in symbolic splendor. Its figure becomes transparent in a manner similar to the technical means in musical interpretation and becomes a place of manifestation of peace. As a place for the presence of something profound and valuable which transcends it, the figure becomes an image of which symbolism is a typical dynamic-relational quality.

When two people embrace, two personal ambits are intermingled in an open attitude. The gesture of opening one's arms to offer one's body to the person approaching creates an ambit of trustful gift of self. By founding a field of interpersonal harmony the embrace symbolizes friendship. One could consider in a similar way the gesture of holding out one's hand: extending one's open, empty, bare and defenseless right hand-- the one used for defense and attack-- establishes an ambit of willingness for encounter.

In F. Fellini's *La Strada*, the image of the road takes on a symbolic value expressing an uprooted, stateless existence. The two protagonists, Zampano and Gelsomina, return time and again to the road, which becomes the point of union of their wandering paths. Yet the road is not a place of being, but one of transit: the ambits of two rootless lives are intermingled on the road. Thus, the ever-changing, incomplete image of the road takes on the symbolic value of a defenseless life.

Symbolism then is based upon one's openness<sup>74</sup> which is understood as creating ambits: both one's own personal being and the web of ambits founded among beings. Symbolism is an event governed by the "appeal-response" schema.

## **Features of Values**

Within this study it is not possible to do a detailed analysis of the different features displayed by values. That task has already been carried out quite exhaustively by such contemporary authors as M. Scheler, N. Hartmann, L. Lavelle, D. von Hildebrand, R. Le Senne, A. Forest,<sup>75</sup> J. Xirau, L. Cencillo, G. Bastide.<sup>76</sup> However, using a ludic-ambital methodology, one can give a precise account of such features and thus avoid the one-sidedness, extremism and misunderstandings found only too frequently in theories of values which lack proportion between the refinement of their style of thought and the complexity of their object. I will underline merely a few basic features of values in order to show that from the methodological perspective of this paper one can achieve in depth suggestive insight regarding the characteristics of values.

Values are difficult to characterize precisely because of their "inobjective" condition; as unable to be delimited or situated, they have great flexibility, subtlety and ambiguity. Though value cannot be delimited and located unequivocally, as occurs with mathematical entities and thing-like beings, daily experience shows us in diverse manners and contexts how fully real and endowed with a peculiar effectivity value is. Rather than trying to define it precisely, one should narrow down the field in which it manifests itself and makes its presence felt. Let us do this schematically.

1. Value suggests relevance, importance, dignity, excellence, the power to shape and the capacity for ludic impulse. Through value, realities stand out from the normal level of "objective" realities and are distinguished from what is "auxiliary." They shine forth and manifest an inner meaning in contrast to the "neutral" mass of undifferentiated realities. In a similar way, value endows certain human acts with the rank of events and elevates them above ordinary facts which do not make history.

2. Value is offered to man not as a mere object of contemplation and analysis, but as demanding admiration, reception and fulfillment. Value appeals to man to collaborate with it and to make the possible real. Once incarnate in a concrete reality or event, value bears witness to itself, to its inner decision to be and to the play it can offer in the web of events of which human existence is woven. Value is the ludic aspect of being as a field of play or "ambit," something worthwhile doing. When the ideal figure of our personal being is being sketched, being and value are two different and complementary moments of that reality.

3. As something to be accomplished which is possible and relevant, value is both a measure and goal for being. If it is to be justified and have integral meaning, the real must be measured by value, toward which it tends and according to which it is shaped. Anything contributing to the realization of this value configuration of our personal being in turn acquires value. Realities which by themselves are neutral or indifferent to value may become charged with meaning and valuable if they are actively inserted into a creative field of play. By entering into play a reality or fact makes itself valuable by revealing the ludic virtualities it entails and offering them to people. Values are made possible in the light which springs from ludic events. For this reason values always are linked to life in the spirit; this is a life of creative interrelation, and hence of participation, love and authentic language.

4. The term "value" comes from the Latin "valere," to be strong, to be in good form or to have possibilities of vital play. To evaluate a reality or event means to insert it into a web of forces and lines of meaning, to make them enter into play as one does with land that is idle or a talent that has not been used.

5. The act of evaluation is one of participation in the genesis of the valued reality or event. In order to evaluate people we must leave aside an attitude of mere external consideration in order to participate in their fields of play and view them in their original state as capable of taking initiatives for which they feel responsible.<sup>77</sup> In this light, a person not only has value, but is valuable. This perspective implies a conversion or leap forward from the objectivist to the ludic level, from the attitude of manipulation of objects to that of co-founding ambits.

On account of its relational--not relativistic--nature, value occurs only in people, and not in things. The value of things depends upon their natural powers being assumed into the human creative processes. A person gives birth to values by treating the realities of one's environment as ambits, playing with them and drawing them into "intimacy."

6. As this demands participation, value is revealed only to those who make creative decisions and will to achieve the great goals of life by turning obstacles and drawbacks into possibilities. This transfiguring impulse means an outright yes to life, a radical confidence in the meaning of reality. Value is offered not as the fruit of exercising one's natural powers, such as those of the senses, but as the result of collaboration between one's powers and tendencies and the fields of possibilities offered by the environment. Values arise in the dynamic confluence of nature and liberty; they are neither purely natural nor totally artificial, but have a relational, ambital, ludic and dialogical nature. The values displayed by a person measure one's degree of insertion in reality and, consequently, of one's perfection as a person.

7. This ambivalent nature of value is a guarantee both of realism and of super-objectivity. Being rooted in reality, value cannot be reduced to a mere projection of human desires. Further, reality is not rigid and opaque; it gives of itself and is open to the human capacity to found ambits of encounter to enrich its virtualities. As the fruit of this enrichment is value, its nature is strictly real, albeit relational for "any true life is encounter."<sup>78</sup>

Confusion between the fact of being the indispensable pole of a relational process with being the cause of the result of that process leads one to think that the human person is the origin, source and measure of value--and consequently that one can submit values to one's own, arbitrary ends and purposes. This "humanistic" perspective is surpassed by the experience that in order to orient themselves towards fulfillment humans must adjust their activity to diverse values as ideals, and sacrifice to them a myriad of private desires and immediate gains. Value is at one and the same time both a gift and something merited. The desire to perfect one's own liberty and autonomy becomes the will actively and receptively to give oneself to realities which transcend oneself, for they differ for each individual and affect many people in different times and places. They may become also one's inner voice--the impulse and goal of one's acts. This combined transcendence and intimacy of values is made manifest dramatically when one feels disillusioned by the concrete circumstances which surround one. To become disillusioned, one has to contrast reality with the "ideal," that is, with a value which demands fulfillment.

Once the relational nature of value has been clarified, one should not consider things and facts as "supports" for values. This objectivist perspective disorients investigations of the mode of origin and being of values because it implies some well-delimited entities reposing statically upon others.

10. Through their creative activity, values appear to persons both as normative entities insofar as they demand fulfillment and channel one's action, and as super-objective entities because they surpass empirical time and place. If objective realities be taken a-critically as a model of reality, one ends by crudely opposing the ideal and the real without any clarification whatsoever. As a result, because they are considered inobjective and more akin to the ideal than to the objective, values are coupled to the unreal. Hence there is need to differentiate diverse modes of objectivity and reality.

At first it is disheartening to specify what ontological status should be attributed to those realities born within a relationship to which they are superior and independent. They can be grasped only within this relationship, but are the principles of its fulfillment; they are different from us, but urge that we assimilate them as the stimulus of our acts; to a great extent they depend on our capacity for play and clarification, but are not "created" by us. At moments of withdrawal we recognize them and are awed by them both as transcendental and as relational. When we adapt our mind to the logic of creative events, our initial disappointment becomes enthusiasm, because with unsuspected strength we feel a peculiar adjustment between our highest aspirations and the complex and ambiguous instances we call values.

The serene enthusiasm which derives from active immersion in the valuable is characteristic of the different modes of ecstasy in which value and the individual's intimate ego are integrated ludically; this is far removed from any fusion, impersonal causal dependence or alienating servility. In ecstatic experience values enable the person to vibrate intimately with the transcendent in which one's highest personal possibilities unfold.

11. The ludic-ambital concept of the relationship between person and value enables one to specify precisely the nexus between values and the different forms of desire, melancholy and anxiety, tendencies, drives and preferences. What is decisive is the realization that desire is not the arbiter of value. What is valuable-desireable exerts great magnetism over human activity. It acts as an ideal that is never totally attainable, but which raises one to higher levels of fulfillment and endows one with the energy to raise oneself thereto. Desire reveals value through the feeling of nostalgia in persons who realize that they are in a field of reality which they still do not know and which has not been assimilated because they have not yet entered into play with it. Through reflection people need to free themselves from fascination with an object, assume the distance

required for perspective and learn to distinguish between the desirable and the desired, between what will enable them to perfect their personal being and what will merely pander to their instinctive tendencies.

Desire is the first indicator of what is valuable because it urges persons to step beyond themselves. If what is desired does not lead to fulfillment through ecstasy, the step beyond oneself is false: it will be an experience of alienation through vertigo. If what is desired offers possibilities for interplay, the person does not go out of oneself, but is raised to a higher self-realization in the experience of ecstasy, by which one achieves one's total identity.

The desirable par excellence is the being that uncompromisingly promotes human possibilities; this is the ultimate radical Good, the Supreme Being, the Absolute. To desire values is to desire this absolute foundation of all value.<sup>79</sup> There is implied here an eternal anxiety due to the ever unsatisfied character of the search for those values which most approach the essence of value. This ambivalence of concrete values, at once relative and absolute, founds the person's search and constitutes the foundation of astonishment, admiration and the loving search for wisdom that is philosophy. Such an intensive direct search rejects any relativistic or non-relational conception of value.

### **Creativity and the Birth of Value**

From the above analysis of the characteristics of values it can be inferred that values are never offered to people statically as objects, but are born as modes of committed relationship are constituted. This creative commitment is one or another form of ecstatic experience. Vertigo, on the contrary, annuls one's capacity to enter into play, that is, to integrate personally into the world of realities whose values offer ludic possibilities.

Giving in to experiences of vertigo leads to an annulment of values and a consequent qualitative neutralization of human existence. Contemporary literature of the absurd shows how reality is viewed as absurd when creativity has been destroyed. It is not the high risk from nuclear energy that brings man tragically to the absurd; rather it is giving in to vertigo that annuls the fields of play in which the meaning of things, persons and events is born. Vertigo makes people cling to that which fascinates, but does not unite; it deprives them of their ambit or nourishing bond to the real and radically narrows the source of authentic culture.

The theory of values must be realistic but not objectivist, personalist but not subjectivist, relational but not relativist, committed but not sentimentalist, experiential but not empiricist or experimentalist, flexible but not without backbone, ludic but not arbitrary, developmental but not evasive.

It would be extremely fruitful for philosophical research to ascertain whether any contemporary axiological orientation fulfills these conditions of the philosophy of value. Without doubt in phenomenology, in dialogical and personalist philosophy and in the existential movement values have been treated in accord with the "non-objectivist" style of thought postulated in this paper. But in the current climate of fascination with objectivist language and the systematic disqualification of the suggestive language of ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics, it is essential to articulate philosophy with care so as to attain maximum rigor within the ambiguous nature of the subjects being treated.<sup>80</sup>

The attacks of neo-positivism and analytic philosophy should be warded off through the elaboration of a methodology rigorously adjusted to the demands of super-objective realities. If one wishes to discover values and properly found their study in a devalued world which makes a

virtue out of need and exalts as heroic giving oneself to the absurd, one's attitude should be neither dreamily optimistic nor fatally pessimistic, but simply realistic. That is, it should be adjusted to the conditions of reality and independent of ideological dictates or prejudices of any kind.

This cannot be achieved from the outside, but only through the experience of value. Any experience of ecstatic participation implies a blending of ambitions or creative adjustment between persons and the real. Value attracts persons, appealing to them to participate in the co-creative task of shaping their personality and drawing them toward fulfillment. Given the bond between human fulfillment and happiness, value is the medium in which the person becomes happy: hence the disinterested and generous nature of the doctrine of life as directed to personal well being (eudemonism). Values should not be considered objectively as a means for achieving one's individual interests, however noble these may be. Values are fields of fulfillment for a human, just as music is the musician's field of fulfillment. They are both the starting-point and the goal of life's most personal and creative activity.<sup>81</sup>





## Notes

1. Cf. *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Berne: Francke, 1966). General descriptions of Scheler's axiological thought are found in the following works: M. Dupuy, *La philosophie de Max Scheler. Son évolution et son unité* (Paris: PUF, 1959); J. Llambias de Azebedo, *Max Scheler. Exposición sistemática y evolutiva de su filosofía* (Buenos Aires: Nova, 1966).

2. Cf. *Ethik* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1949); *Das Problem des geistigen Seins* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1949).

3. Cf. *Traité des valeurs* (Paris: PUF, 1951-1955), 2 vols.

4. Cf. *Amor y mundo* (Mexico: F.C.E., 1940).

5. On the subject of philosophical experience and ways of understanding it deeply and creatively, see my works: *Cinco grandes tareas de la filosofía actual* (Madrid: Gredos, 1977); "La experiencia filosófica y la necesidad de su ampliación," in *Realitas, II* (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1976). The pressing need to revalue natural experience is underlined by A. de Waehlen s, *La philosophie et les expériences naturelles* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961). On the structure and scope of religious experience, cf. J. Mouroux, *L'expérience chrétienne* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1952); X. Pikaza, *La experiencia religiosa y el Cristianismo* (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1982).

6. Cf. my *Metodología de lo suprasensible. Descubrimiento de lo superobjetivo y crisis del objetivismo* (Madrid: Nacional, 1953).

7. Cf. Karl Heilmann, *Glauben und Denken* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957).

8. Cf. *L'univers non dimensionnel et la vie qualitative* (Paris: PUF, 1948). Obviously, the term "dimension" and its derivatives are taken by Heilmann in the "in-objective" sense, and by Faureé-Fremiet in an "objective", empirical sense. Hence, the latter uses the negative form.

9. Cf. "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken," in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959<sup>2</sup>), pp. 145-163.

10. A broad exposition of the concept of ambit and its rich meaning in the field of aesthetics may be found in my *Estética de la creatividad* (Barcelona: PPU, Universidad de Barcelona, 1986<sup>2</sup>).

11. The schema "objective--super-objective, ambital" offers a greater flexibility than the schemas "material-spiritual," "material-formal," "real-ideal," "real-unreal" or "objective-subjective," and gives greater freedom of manoeuvre for clarifying the relationship between the diverse modes of reality. The use of the schema "real-unreal" entails a high risk because, if one expressly or tacitly identifies the real with the "objective" in the above-mentioned sense--which is the technical sense defined by the existential thinkers: Jaspers, Marcel and Heidegger--all super-objective, unmeasurable, non-conceptual, un-delimitable realities are automatically considered as "unreal." This unfair devaluation perturbs the analysis of all human phenomena: aesthetic, ethical or religious.

12. (Paris: PUF, 1941), 12, page 1.

13. In *Estética de la creatividad* (especially pp. 33ff.) I expound this idea fully. It has been present more or less expressly in writings on hermeneutics from the time of W. Dilthey.

14. See, for example, R. Guardini, *Der Gegensatz. Versuche zu einer Philosophie des Lebendig-konkreten* (Mainz: Grünewald, 1955). On the meaning of this work within the philosophical, pedagogical and hermeneutic writings of R. Guardini see my *Romano Guardini y la dialéctica de lo viviente* (Madrid: Cristiandad, 1966).

15. The relationship of presence between two realities which encounter each other occurs not merely by cancelling distances, but through founding a common field of play. In order to do so a form of immediacy must be possible through a form of distance. At first sight, fusional modes of immediacy would seem the most perfect. In reality, they cause the most intense psychological disturbance because they give rise to fascination typical of vertigo. But in contrast to ecstasy, vertigo does not allow one to found a field of free play with another reality; it does not enable one to encounter it and thus develop a fully mature human personality. The distance of perspective does not detach one from reality as so many authors fear, but enables one to enter into play with it and attain a presence which is the fruit of experiences of ecstasy. Any distancing carried out with the aim of founding ambits of play is a "mediational," rather than a "mediatized" presence. The categories of immediacy, distance and presence, whose articulation constitutes the "hermeneutic triangle," play a decisive part in the knowledge and fulfillment of values. Thus they should be submitted to detailed analysis, to which a first approach may be seen in my *El triángulo hermenéutico* (Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1977<sup>2</sup>). The concepts of vertigo and ecstasy will be explained in Chap. III.

16. Thought by dilemma, which is widely cultivated in the contemporary era, may obtain brilliant results in demagogic campaigns in favor of certain out-of-date ideologies, but it uproots the profound unity of the real and splits the inner context of human thought and life.

17. A confrontation of both phenomena may be seen in my *La juventud actual entre el vértigo y el éxtasis* (Madrid: Narcea, 1982), pp. 108 ff.

18. Cf. N. Hartmann, *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie* (Meisienheim am Glan: Hain, 1948<sup>3</sup>), p. 244.

19. On the level of ludic activity, the terms and schemas take on a new, broader and more flexible meaning and are more open to other contrasted meanings. This fecund inner freedom of the concepts is not possible in a mode of thought concerned exclusively with objects which supposedly are closed in on themselves.

20. Because it ignored or left to one side this semantic transformation of the "subject-object" schema, modern and contemporary hermeneutics often found its research entangled in a web of aporias which were false at heart and prevented the solution of the basic problems of philosophy.

21. In my work *Cinco grandes tareas de la filosofía actual*, pp. 43 ff., there are further clarifications of circular thought and the "hermeneutic circle."

22. In *El triángulo hermenéutico*, pp. 287-316, 333-366, I study this question fully with regard to the theory of "ideas" of Descartes and within the contemporary Spanish philosophy of Angel Amor Ruiba I. A well balanced means of stating this subject fairly is provided by another Spanish thinker, Xavier Zubir i, for whom the primary union between man and the real stems from the fact that man "is in reality" because he is intelligent: logos and reason are founded in intelligence. Therefore, the basic unity between man and reality is given at the pre-logical and pre-reasoning stage, but not at the pre-intelligent one. Cf. *Sobre la esencia* (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1952); *Inteligencia sentiente* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1980, 1982, 1984), 3 vols.

23. Because of lack of rigor in the use of philosophical categories and schemas, this highly risky idea is at times shared even by thinkers far from a vitalistic position. See, for example, L. Cencillo's otherwise splendid work, *Experiencia profunda del ser* (Madrid: Gredos, 1959).

24. Cf. Calígula, *suivi de le malentendu* (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), p. 83. A detailed analysis of this work, and of *La Nausée* by J.P. Sartre, is to be found in my *Estética de la creatividad*, pp. 367-454.

25. In his *Wahrheit* (Zurich: Benzinger: 1947), Urs von Balthasar takes pains to elaborate on this fulfillment.

26. Cf. *Cinco grandes tareas de la filosofía actual*, pp. 70 ff., 99 ff.

27. Cf. *La enfermedad mortal o De la desesperación y el pecado* (Madrid: Guadarrama, 1960); *Etapas sur le chemin de la vie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1948). A detailed description of "immediate" man as adopting the infra-creative attitude of the "first stage along the path of life" may be found in my *Estrategia del lenguaje y manipulación del hombre* (Madrid: Narcea, 1984<sup>3</sup>), pp. 40 ff.

28. Cf. *Traité des valeurs*, I, p. 207.

29. Cf. L. Lavell e, op. cit., I p. 211.

30. Cf. L. Lavelle, op. cit., I, p. 214.

31. The sense in which this occurs in musical and literary works was explained in the light of the theory of play and ambits in my *Estética de la creatividad*, pp. 127-150.

32. In his work, *What is Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1962), D. von Hildebrand took great pains to clarify that the objectivity of the knowledge of certain realities does not depend on universal assent.

33. "When I am free, I do not want such and such a thing because I want it, but because I have persuaded myself that it is just." "The conquest of certainty . . . --freedom--demands that vulgar opinions be surpassed." "What is decisive is inner liberty. This lies in the fact that, when I see clearly, I stop depending on an exterior reality entirely, but it cannot be completed unless this be in loving agreement with reality. This is what in the end constitutes knowledge." Cf. Karl Jasper s: "¿Qué es Europa?" in *El espíritu europeo* (Madrid: Guadarrama, 1957), pp. 291, 299.

34. It is useful to recall in this respect that the contemporary return to the concrete responds to a will to return to the place in which creative phenomena occur. It is not dictated by a feeling of aversion to any universal whatsoever. This may be verified by reading attentively the works of the authors studied by J. Wahl in his *Vers le concret* (Paris: Vrin, 1932).

35. Cf. *Estética de la creatividad*, pp. 112 ff.

36. Cf. Saint-Exupéry, *Tèrre des hommes*, in *Oeuvres* (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), p. 252.

37. An exposition of this suggestive subject with bibliographical notes is to be found in my *Estética de la creatividad*, pp. 163 ff.

38. Cf. my *Metodología de lo suprasensible*.

39. Cf. R. Le Senn e, *Obstacle et valeur* (Paris: Aubier, 1934), pp. 175 ff.

40. An extensive bibliography on the personalist-dialogical movement (M. Buber, F. Ebner, F. Rosenzweig, Th. Haecker, R. Guardini, M. Nédoncelle, E. Brunner, F. Gogarten, etc.) may be found in my *Pensadores cristianos contemporáneos* (Madrid: BAC, 1966), and *El triángulo hermenéutico*, pp. 415-16. Attempts to clarify the meaning of this movement are to be found in the following works: B. Casper, *Das dialogische Denken* (Freiburg: Herder, 1967); P. Laín Entralgo, *Teoría y realidad del otro*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1961); D. Langemeyer, *Der dialogische Personalismus in der evangelischen und katholischen Theologie der Gegenwart* (Paderborn: Bonifacius, 1963); G. Schröder, *Das Ich und Du in der Wende des Denkens* (Göttingen: 1951).

41. A bibliography on play may be found in my *Estética de la creatividad*, p. 159.

42. Apart from well-known works by C. Fabro, L.-B. Geiger, Ulrich and Artola on the Thomistic conception of participation, I would point out here, on account of their original treatment of the subject, the entire philosophical work of L. Lavell e and G. Marcell.

43. Cf. R. Lauth, *Die Frage nach dem Sinn des Daseins* (München: Barth, 1953); J.E. Hengstenberg, *Philosophische Anthropologie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1957). On the absurd, cf. A. Camus, *Le mythe de Sisyphe* (Paris: Gallimard, 1942).

44. On the relational-dynamic conception of reality, see a broad bibliography in my *Cinco grandes tareas de la filosofía actual*, pp. 134-35.

45. A more extensive exposition of this subject may be found in my work, *Las experiencias de vértigo y la subversión de valores* (Madrid: Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, 1986).

46. The anxiety which leads to ecstasy is a form of void which becomes a growth trauma; whereas the anxiety which leads to vertigo is a kind of void that gives rise to a dissolution trauma.

47. Cf. my "La concepción del amor y la soledad en Ortega," *Estudios*, 143 (1983), 455-465. A detailed analysis of J.-P. Sartre, *La Nausée* may be found in my *Estética de la creatividad*, pp. 367-411.

48. For further details on this subject see *Cinco grandes tareas de la filosofía actual*, pp. 160 ff.

49. The theory of play and ambits opens up an extraordinarily rich humanistic horizon inspired, not by the mastery of objects, but by the creation of all manner of linkages. The human environment then appears in a new light. Seen in their "ambital" aspect, the beings in the human environment are no longer reduced to mere objects of knowledge, manipulation or mastery, but become collaborators of persons in the great play of existence. This transmutation is the starting-point for Franciscan humanism, in both its spiritual and intellectual aspects. Cf. F.A. Merino, *Humanismo franciscano, Franciscanismo y mundo actual* (Madrid: Cristiandad, 1982).

50. Cf. F. Ebner, *Das Wort ist der Weg* (Vienna: Herder, 1949), pp. 112, 142.

51. Cf. G. Gillemann, *Le primat de la charité en théologie morale. Essai méthodologique* (Brussels: Desclée, 1954<sup>2</sup>).

52. The term *analectic* refers to the simultaneous attention that man should give to phenomena which, although different, are linked and hierarchically related, e.g., the relationship between a meaning and the voice that utters it.

53. On the specific rationality of art, see my general study "La racionalidad propia del arte. Creatividad y acceso a lo real," in *Realitas III-IV* (Madrid: 1979), pp. 181-228.

54. M. Dufrenoy, in his work *La notion d'a priori* (Paris: PUF, 1959), shows amply the need to understand realistically the concept of a priori in the light of integral human experience.

55. Cf. Th. Haeckeler: *Metaphysik des Fühlens* (Munich: Kösel, 1953); J. Bofill: "Para una metafísica del sentimiento," "Note sur le valeur ontologique du sentiment," "L'admiration," in *Obra Completa* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1967), pp. 107 ff; A. Roldán, *Metafísica del sentimiento* (Madrid: C.S.I.C., 1956).

56. Cf. L. Lavellé, *Traité des valeurs*, I, p. 158.

57. R. Frondizi reproaches the phenomenologists with having cut the connection with experience after having extracted their concepts from reality, and with transforming these concepts, which are of empirical origin, into immutable, a priori essences. Cf. *Qué son los valores?* (Mexico: FCE, 1962), pp. 104, 112). Pintor-Ramos points out that the phenomenologists do not disconnect their analyses from all experience, but from "inductive-mediatised" experience. Cf. "La filosofía de los valores de M. Scheeler," in *Estudios* (Madrid), 27 (1971), p. 187.

58. An application and, at the same time, an approval of this nexus between the birth of value, the foundation of a field of play and syneidetic thought is the "ludic-ambital" method of analysis of works of literature which makes each reading of quality texts a splendid lesson in ethics. The

deepest humanistic values are seen in their full light in a genetic reading in which even those considered destructive because of their bitter defense of the absurd and their nihilism may, despite themselves, have some constructive function. An extended exposition of this method may be seen in my *Análisis estético de obras literarias* (Madrid: Narcea, 1982), and *Análisis literario y formación humanística* (Madrid: Escuela Española, 1986).

59. Cf. K. Jaspers, *Philosophie II. Existenzerhellung* (Berlin: Springer, 1932).

60. This category of "leap," which is central to Kierkegaard and to the existential thinkers inspired by him--above all Jaspers--should be understood in the "analectic" or bipolar sense, for ludic activity transfigures the mediational elements through which it occurs, but does not annul them; it takes them on and transcends them.

61. Cf. my *Diagnosis del hombre actual* (Madrid: Cristiandad, 1966).

62. Cf. L. Cencillo, *Experiencia profunda del ser*, p. 249.

63. This demand is made luminously manifest in the needy state of musical scores. In the score the work exists only virtually, for latent in it are certain values, certain fields of possibilities for aesthetic play that demand being put into act. If an interpreter capable of listening to such an appeal gives a creative response the work emerges into act.

64. In my *Estética de la creatividad*, pp. 128 ff., I discuss in detail the meaning which the verb "to master" assumes at the ludic level.

65. Remember the approach to this by authors such as R. Eucken, M. Scheeler, A.N. Whitehead, L. Lavell, G. Marcel, R. Le Senne, X. Zubiri, A. Amor Ruibal. Cf. H.E. Hengstenberg, *Philosophische Anthropologie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1957); L. Cencillo, *Experiencia profunda del ser* (Madrid: Gredos, 1959); L. Cencillo, *Tratado de las realidades* (Madrid: Univers, 1971); C.A. Van Peursen, *Wirklichkeit als Ereignis* (Freiburg: K. Alber, 1965).

66. Some of the strategic resources mobilized today are discussed in my work *Estrategia del lenguaje y manipulación del hombre* (Madrid: Narcea, 1965). The interpretation of language as a vehicle of the creative activity of ambits is treated fully in my *Estética de la creatividad*, pp. 291-357.

67. Cf. X. Zubiri: "La dimensión histórica del ser humano" in *Realitas*, I (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1974), pp. 11-69.

68. Cf. P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Introduction à une théologie critique* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1967).

69. Cf. L. Lavell, *Traité des valeurs*, I, p. 23.

70. The linkage between the absurd, "nausea," lack of creativity and modes of extreme relaxation which fuse man with circumstantial reality is shown in my interpretation in *Estética de la creatividad*, pp. 367-442 of *La Nausée* by J.P. Sartre and *L'Etranger* by A. Camus. The feeling of anxiety brought about by limit-situations such as the death of a loved one, failure to love, bankruptcy, etc., should not be confused hastily with despair or with nausea, that is, with the upheaval caused by the abundance of swollen, excessive, useless beings who are "superfluous" because they lack any meaning. Anxiety is the feeling of not being able to retain one's balance brought on by the crumbling of the "objective" world to which one had clung in the certainty that it was a model reality and, as such, unshatterable. Cancelling this security may lead either to coming to terms with the nonsensical character of this situation of crisis by surrendering to the absurd, or to taking the leap into the "transcendence" of super-objective realities which invite one to a creative commitment. This second reaction turns anxiety into the starting-point for an authentically human life which surpasses entities so as to live on the plane of being (Heidegger); it implies a "leap" from an "objectivist" to a "ludic" attitude.

71. After describing the current movement towards "a fecund reevaluation of the cognitive power of symbols," J.G. Caffarena states that "a gnoseology of the symbolic" has not yet been elaborated and points out the pressing need to structure a theory of the symbol as an adequate means of knowledge of elevated aspects of reality. This "symbolical realism" as an approach to knowledge differs from the "realism of sciences" or "the simple imaginative formulation or oblique expression of emotions or evaluations." Cf. *Filosofía de la religión* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1975), pp. 305-306.

72. Further details and examples of the relational-ludic interpretation of symbolism may be seen in my *Estética de la creatividad*, pp. 269-271, 322-326. It is interesting to recall here the relational interpretation of the "thing" offered by Heidegger in his article "Das Ding" and his description of the temple, the pitcher, the bridge and the house. Cf. *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954); *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1950).

73. On the creative nature of the image and its difference from the figure, cf. my work *Análisis estético de obras literarias* (Madrid: Narcea, 1982), pp. 83-89. As to the relationship between image and metaphor, cf. *Söhngen: Analogie und Metaphern. Kleine Philosophie und Théologie der Sprache* (Freiburg: Alber, 1962), p. 104.

74. Cf. J.G. Caffarena: *op. cit.*, p. 144.

75. Cf. *Consentement et création* (Paris: Aubier, 1943); *La vocation de l'esprit* (Paris: Aubier, 1953).

76. Cf. *Traité de l'action morale* (Paris: PUF, 1961), 2 vols. In the works of these thinkers one finds valuable details on the relationship between values and love, good, time, duty, liberty, will and feeling, truth and reflection, creative fidelity, the development of human personality, participation in being and the nexus between the real and the possible. The contribution of these authors, if organically assembled by means of a well articulated methodology, could constitute a very sound and broad axiological structure.

77. "Where there is no participation, there is no reality," M. Buber, *Die Schriften über das dialogische Prinzip* (Heidelberg: L. Schneider, 1954), p. 66.

78. Cf. M. Buber, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

79. In his posthumous work, *El hombre y Dios* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1984), X. Zubiri shows that one's journey towards God is a search for the ultimate foundation of the development of one's personal life and that it is carried out by the energy one has from being situated within reality.

80. It would be sufficient to analyze closely the theory of "ideal entities" in Husserl and Hartmann in order to realize the insufficiency of axiological currents which stress the "objectivity" of values against the different genres of subjectivism and psychologism, and which consider value as a sort of "ideal entity" in order not to slip back into "objectivism. How is the ideal to be tied to the normative-real? How can one avoid the ideal entity becoming a mere abstraction? These and other difficulties which could be cited show that it is just as insufficient to use a "suggestive" language which more or less vaguely denotes the subtle phenomena which constitutes the world of value, as to resort to an already coined philosophical language which does not transmit all the nuances of the experience of value and draws one's attention to issues which are notably different, though not completely alien, from values.

81. The founding of the theory of values requires a carefully considered study of all forms of creative relationship between man and the real, a relationship which R. Boirel has called "dynamology of the spirit." Cf. *Théorie générale de l'invention* (Paris: PUF, 1961).