Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change
Series II, Africa, Volume 10

Social and Religious Concerns of East African: A Wajibu Anthology

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Gibbons Hall B-20
620 Michigan Avenue, NE
Washington, D.C. 20064

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Social and religious concerns of East Africa : A Wajibu anthology / edited by Gerald J. Wanjohim, G. Wakuraya Wonjohi – 1st ed.

p.cm – (Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series II, Africa; vol. 10)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Africa—Civilization. 2. Kenya—Civilization. I. Wanjohi, G.J. II. Wanjohi, G. Wakuraya. III. Wajibu. IV. Series.

DT14.A374243 2005 2005007044
967—dc21 CIP

ISBN 1-56518-221-9 (pbk.)

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PREFACE

GEORGE F. McLEAN

Twenty years is almost a generation. It permits one cohort to show what it could do and what it passes on undone to the next generation. It provides time for hope, time for hard experience and time to readjust those hopes.

During the last 20 years the review Wajibu in Nairobi, Kenya has been an active force in the life of the nation. Founded by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald Wanjohi and a few others, it has attempted not merely to report on what is happening, but to bring together a broad spectrum of knowledgeable and concerned persons to identify the important issues for the people, to uncover the sources of difficulties, and to suggest the path ahead.

The authors have come from all sectors of the populace and have brought to the task broad experience in school and government, church and civil society. Together and cumulatively they constitute an incomparably rich body of participant observers in the life of the nation, bound together by a deep concern for tis welfare that of its people – their people. There is among theme deep capability for cultural analysis, long experience in public service, and exceptional reflective competency based in the human sciences and the humanities. This is civil society at its best.

The result of their work has always been impressive as people have looked forward to the next issue of Wajibu and its social commentary and prescription. Brought together from over the time span of 20 years, these articles constitute a brilliant diamond of a thousand of faces, each reflecting a new ray of wisdom. For a people in pilgrimage these essays of social commentary provide the wise leadership that no single voice could command.

The essays are divided into six parts: 1. African Culture, 2. Leadership, 3. Education, 4. Human Resources and Their Development, 5. The Individual and Society, and 6. Religion and Dialogue. Together the vision is well rounded, ever serious and insightful.

Part I takes up the issues of African identity, as well as the use and abuse of such terms as: “African identity,” “African culture,” and “the African way.” It examines family as the crucible in which African culture has been formed and transmitted, as well as its present difficulties in fulfilling these roles. Finally, it turns to the symbols in which this identity is expressed in language as well as in art.

Part II on leadership compares the models and resources received from Kenyatta and Nkrumah, the difficulties of wedding tribal with national self-identities and loyalties, and their implications for integrity in politics. All this is then situated in the dynamic, but too slow, expansion of the political power of the women of the country.

Part III studies the great project of every people: the education of its young. This must first of all be a popular effort for the education of all. As such it must be in terms related to life and suffused with confidence in the people and hope that they can progress. This must be enriched by integrating ethical and environmental concerns. A report by a university student recounts her hopes and their disillusionments; it calls upon all to better care for the future generation.

Part IV on human resources looks specifically into the various sectors of the population to examine how they can be integrated effectively into the general society: women, Asians, Europeans, the handicapped and even prisoners.

Part V bring together a series of essays on the individual in relation to society. Some are concerned with the values of therapy in aiding this process of assimilation; others focus on the role

of the family, religion and philosophy. An interesting reflection treats the interrelation between one's special competencies (here those of the university don) to one's life as a citizen.

Part VI treats religion and dialogue. The essays treat the general meaning and impact of religion as empowering the people. They attend to the delicate work of negotiating such sensitive junctures as the relations between different religions and the balance between fundamentalism and functionism. In the end, the continuing public task of religion is the establishment of a deep liberation of each citizen and of peace for the entire people.

In sum the volume realizes excellently the purpose of an anthology: to bring together some of the best writing and thinking of Wajibu over the last 20 years. Few areas are missed, all are treated with deep and wise concern. Despite the many human problems and dilemmas of our times, with authors such as these being given voice through the wonderful and continued work of Wajibu there is real hope for the future. May Wajibu continue, for a thousand years!

FOREWORD

GERALD J. WANJOHI
G. WAKURAYA WANJOHI

This anthology owes its existence to Professor George F. McLean, Secretary of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP), Washington, D.C. (www.crvp.org). He asked the publisher of Wajibu (a journal of social and religious concern) whether we could bring together some articles from the journal for publication by the RVP. He had known Wajibu since its founding in 1985. Though Wajibu had had some good words said about it by some individuals from time to time in the past, this was the first time we received such an important academic and international recognition. Needless to say, we readily accepted the request.

St this juncture, let us inform the reader how Wajibu, the Swahili term adapted from the Arabic "wajib" which means "duty, responsibility and concern," started. Around the year 1984, a group of scholars and journalists who were well known to each other felt the duty to make some contribution to the Kenyan society which was then (as now) witnessing many challenges. After a number of brainstorming meetings, it was felt that a contribution which would benefit the population, not merely materially but intellectually, morally, and spiritually, would be the best. To achieve this, the idea of starting a journal was mooted, hence the birth of Wajibu: A Journal of Social and Religious Concern. This title is two-pronged: on the one hand it addresses those who are more endowed to use their talents and other resources to promote the welfare of their less endowed and less fortunate brothers and sisters; on the other hand it invites everyone – regardless of their educational or socio-economic status – to be concerned with the well-being of their neighbor in all aspects.

Thus, Wajibu was started as a means of education or conscientization of people to be concerned about their neighbor. We hoped that this would, in turn, promote dialogue among all the communities in Kenya. We wished to offer our readers a forum to discuss the various problems identified then as serious: the lack of concern for the members of one's extended family, the diminishing respect for the older members of society, the blind pursuit of material possessions. We also identified the peculiar problems of our modern age: the pollution of our environment, the population explosion, the threat of nuclear annihilation/

Twenty years later these same problems are still with us. But now we have also the AIDS pandemic, the extent and seriousness of which could hardly have been foreseen twenty years ago. In addition, we are becoming more and more aware of the pervading problem of social and economic inequality. Accompanying the inequality, and arising partly from this fact, is the growing insecurity and the violence that is stalking our land nearly everywhere.

One may therefore justifiably ask: in what way has Wajibu made a difference with respect to these various societal ills?

We believe that for the last twenty years Wajibu and its authors have attempted to serve as social analysts for our society. If there is truth to the philosophical dictum that an unexamined life is not worth living, then a society must also regularly examine the values that govern its life. And this our authors have done. They have written on African culture and found that it is slowly being eroded by an increasingly individualistic and materialistic Western way of life. They have looked at our leaders and found that few can serve as role models for a new generation. They have examined our educational system and have seen that it lacks clear policies, guidelines and strategies to prepare the total population for a meaningful place in society. They have studied the

family and have described the fact that, due to accelerated social change, many families are disintegrating and individuals every often do not find the security they crave in the family home.

On the other hand, they have also shown the way forward for a multicultural and a multi-religious society like Kenya. One author quotes the late Julius Nyerer who said that [in the traditional society] "we were responsible for the community and the community was responsible for each one of us." Another author suggests that we ought not slavishly to accept the prevailing political arrangements and with it the commands arising from these arrangements but call them into question when gross injustice or the violation of human rights result from them. He emphasizes that citizens have the responsibility to ensure that integrity prevails in politics.

Still another contributor looks to religion as a unifying rather than a disruptive force. Says he: "True religion is not a social institution to which all must conform. It is a quest for the infinite." God is god for all beings. He dispenses his love and justice to all without any distinction. "Instead of magnifying or multiplying our differences let us pick up the common factors, build a workable mosaic and build bridges of goodwill and understanding between the people of different faiths."

For the last twenty years we have manage to bring out Wajibu regularly. All the issues have aimed at addressing issues of importance to the larger society. The thematic approach has proven useful to people doing research, and has been a great help in the realization of this Anthology.

This leads us to say something about how this Anthology came to be born. Using the given guidelines – the same ones used for the Council's other publications – we set about looking for substantive articles in "Wajibu." In the course of listing the articles, the six themes or sections of the Anthology started to suggest themselves, and were finally adopted. Subsequently, the work became a little easier, for it was the question of placing the previously selected articles into the one or the other category. As it turned out, too many articles appeared in each category, which meant that the resulting anthology would be unmanageable in size. The scaling down which became imperative brought the volume to its present size. Obviously, this means that very many good articles had to be passed over.

The reader will easily notice that a considerable number of contributors to "Wajibu" (which is an African journal) have been non-Africans. This may at first sight look strange. However, our policy in choosing contributors is guided by the principle that truth has no boundaries and therefore one ought to look for it wherever it is. Besides, the topics that we have been treating have a universal character: peace, human rights, justice, religion, culture, family, the aged, poverty, food security, etc., and anyone who is qualified can write about them. It turns out that many of our non-Africa for many years. For these people to express themselves about how they see us Africans is important. Combining the views of outsiders about Africans with those of Africans themselves should produce a more balanced and objective picture.

We take this Anthology as a signal mark of approval of these analyses of our problems and our efforts to evoke responses. It boosts our morale tremendously, and efforts to evoke responses. It boosts our morale tremendously, and gives us energy to forge ahead to know that in this way the great efforts of the people of Kenya can contribute to others who grapple with similar challenges.

CHAPTER 1
SEARCH FOR AN AFRICAN IDENTITY

CONSTANTINE M. MWIKAMBA

INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to deal with a delicate theme: a search for an African identity. The search for an African identity began with Pan-Africanism, a movement, which spread out to take different forms. The younger generation (the youth in their 20's), and perhaps the rural population of Africa, might conceptually know little about the upsurge of the movements for promoting Pan-Africanism, African Personality , African Humanism, Ujamaa, Negritude, Consciencism, etc. This does not mean we ought to ignore these movements. This paper presumes that different disciplines, such as African Theology, African Philosophy, African History, African Literature, African Art, to mention only a few of them, are a historical product of the search for an 'African identity', and are related to Pan-Africanism.

The first part of the paper presents the problem: a search for an African identity in connection with Pan-Africanism. The second part deals with the question of African identity: What is African identify? Can one speak of African identity, or of African identities? The third part of the paper serves as a catalyst. Using the results of a questionnaire, an attempt is made to see where African values and sense of identity stand today. Academicians, and all those involved in human development in Africa, should not forget the resourceful 'walking libraries', in different parts of this continent. It has been presumed in the past, and correctly so, that African traditions and identity have been undermined by modern life. However, such assumptions, no matter from which quarters they may come from, need to be verified. I am aware that the research I have carried out is not exhaustive. But I firmly believe that interdisciplinary methods ought to be applied more in Africa today. The fourth part of the essay draws some conclusions from the previous three sections. This section is a perspective towards an African identity. It is only a vision, and for that matter, an imperfect one; but nonetheless it is a vision. The purpose of 'development' is to foster a people's integral welfare; it cannot and must not be limited to mere economic growth: the spiritual, social, psychological and moral aspects of people ought to be taken into consideration. Communal and personal development in Africa are threatened. Greed for wealth and misuse of power, individualism and so forth, could become the death-knell of African values and identity.

THE BEGINNING OF PAN-AFRICANISM

The constant call by African leaders, that Africans ought to strive after creating a society that respects its cultural values has been heard many a time. To be able to do this, Africans must first discover themselves. This imperative so as to be able to venture into the future as a respected people. Africans find themselves in turmoil, and a painful one for that matter. Africans are searching for a future, based on their traditions, but one which at the same time is open to changes and to a new worldview. The African of today is a modern person and feels the full impact, if not the blast, of modern civilisation Many Africans are torn apart; in some sense, they are "falling apart". The sense of being double, a split personality, of being half, is felt by many Africans who are influenced by such dualities as: two cultures, two value-systems and two worldviews, African and the Western.

The Pan-African Movement sought to find African roots and to restore African dignity and identity, which had protractedly been shattered during the slave trade and the colonial period. This movement started at the end of the last century as a spiritual regrouping of leading black people, who were conscious of their African origin. In 1905, a group of black intellectuals assembled under the chairmanship of Du Bois, to organize themselves for defending the civil rights of black people. Pan-Africanism initially began, partly, as a reaction against the conditions of racial oppression and exploitation of Black Americans. It was a movement for political economic, civic and social liberation. The idea of liberation spread to the West Indies, and soon found a home among emerging African leaders when the continent was still under colonial rule. Besides West Indian theorists like Marvin Garvey (Jamaica), Price-Mars (Haiti), George Padmore (West Indies), African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Leopold Senghor, Sekou Toure, and others joined hands so as to promote the movement towards the government of 'Africans by Africans'.

It is significant to note that most of the leaders destined to conduct Africa to independence grew up in the climate of Pan-Africanism, recognized as one of the contributing factors towards Africa's independence. After independence, most of these leaders became so involved in the nation building of their own countries, that the idea that 'we live together' slowly evaporated.

The different movements for promoting African Socialism, African Humanism, Negritude, Black Consciousness, Ujamaa, etc., definitely have some of their roots in Pan-Africanism. They form part of the inevitable search for an African identity and orientation, that earlier had been emphasized by different African leaders.

THE SEARCH AND CRISIS OF PAN-AFRICANIZATION

Yet, some people have become skeptical about the search for African political unity or Pan-Africanization. The late Okot p'Bitek is one of those who, unfortunately, misinterpreted Nyerere's Ujamaa and Senghor's Negritude as forms of Marxist-Leninist Afro-communism, a movement which started when African Socialism began to show signs of failure in the mid-seventies.1 However, Okot's doubts can be equally applied to the Afro-socialism of Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Madagascar.

On the other hand, however, the drums and the death toll of African traditions, African identity and African religion can be heard at a distance; hence one author, has courageously declared "the death of African traditional religion."2

Any meaningful talk about inculturation, Africanization or indigenization must, and should consider the African identity and worldview seriously, for though history has passed we can learn from it. African traditions convey certain values and some of these values could be useful for modern Africa. Many of African traditions are still active, especially when critical situations arise, e.g. sickness and death.3

The search for Africa's contribution to world civilisation has had a strong impact upon the academic and religious fields. The different disciplines which have cropped up, such as: African History, African Literature, African Art, African Philosophy and African Theology, to mention just a few, clearly underline the point. The Organization of African Unity and independent churches in Africa are also to be understood within this context. Such attempts need to be understood within historical contexts: the pre-independence period in Africa made it necessary to have hopes and aspirations which were, in a sense, expressed in the movements for promoting African Socialism, Negritude, etc.

At stake here is the survival of African values and identities. Some Africans are running away from themselves and from their traditional past. This has been caused by the rapid intervention of some aspects of Western culture. Many Africans today believe that the Western value system and world-view are of universal validity, which, as such, must be applicable also to Africa. Many believe that Africans can catch up, and be like people of the 'developed' countries. Such mental enslavement is the worst side effect of colonialism and of the uninculturated missionary activity. A conscious corrective endeavour is required because: whilst it is necessary for us to tell Westerners to develop a less self-centred view of the world, which inevitably places them in an undue position of superiority, we Africans must struggle to come out of our negative ethnocentrisin.4

During the period of the slave trade, colonialism and missionary activity, as well as in the earlier post-independence era, terms like: 'savage', pagan', 'native', 'primitive', 'tribe', 'uncivilized', 'underdeveloped were introduced and used in references, above all, to Africa and Africans. Such terms, even if they might have had neutral connotation or meaning, are today regarded as being emotionally loaded and as implying a value judgement.

Today, the African continent finds itself in a challenging and critical situation. Pan-Africanism, the OAU, African Socialism, Sensitivity to African Personality, African Humanism, Ujamaa, Negritude, Consciencism, and such like, have lost something of their initial pertinence and thrust. However, I believe that those movements started from a wrong premise and gave false hopes. The wrong premise was, largely, the idealistic belief in the hope of forging an African unity. The myth that African nations could be united has to be evaluated. The fact that a country fought for independence, did not mean that it got united. The fact that Africans suffered under colonialism or slavery does not necessarily engender a sense of continental or national solidarity. If there was an identity, it was a transient one, based on the need to unite in fighting the oppressive situation and the particular enemy.

The ethnic, economic and political groupings ought to have been considered seriously. There must be bases for a common identity, for people of a territory to be able to build a nation. Recognition of one flag does not necessarily form people into true patriots. Due to individualistic ethnicity, educational and economic differences, many Africans disregard the forming of a national identity. They happen to have been born here or there (in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia or elsewhere); some may even wish to have been born elsewhere. Many of such wishes have been due to the fact that most of the African countries have created states, institutions and societies, which, uncritically drew inappropriate policies from the Western world. Franz Fanon was extreme on this issue:

> Come brothers, we have too much work to do, for us to play the game of a rear-guard. Europe has done what she set out to do, and on the whole, she has done it well; let us stop blaming her, but let us say to her firmly that she should not make such a song and dance about it. We have no more to fear, so let us stop envying her ... The pretext of catching up must not be used to push man around, to tear him away from himself or from his privacy, to break and kill him.5

Some Africans tend to identify themselves with their ethnic roots, others with their nations, a few with the African continent, others with their political parties or party, and others with 'religious belongingness'. Many Africans get confused, when it comes to the question of loyalty: should one

be loyal to the state, to the ethnic group, to African traditions, to the family, to a particular form of religion, to 'modernism' or to oneself?

TOWARDS FORMING AN AFRICAN IDENTITY

Who is an African? The answers to this question differ according to which perspective one wants to underline. Some would claim that an African is a person born in or originating from Africa. Others would say it is the colour of the skin which distinguishes and identifies African. Others would trace the African's history to the distant past, including the era of slavery and colonialism. Others would see their Africanness in their ethnic and cultural roots: as Igbo, Akan, Ashanti, Galla, Gikuyu, Ganda, and so on.

One thing is sure: an identity of a particular people implies their sharing of culture. The self, the human *identity,* is a product of socialization of the culture in which a person grows up. It is through the process of socialization that he or she comes to internalize a worldview, a mode of orientation, and thus acquire a certain identity.

Can one speak of an African identity or of African identities? Despite the different languages, ethnic groups, and distances in Africa, there are sufficient affinities and similarities which can warrant one to talk significantly of an African culture and identity.

A few attempts have been made to define the African identity. The African identity and worldview relies on the community and finds its legitimation in myths and rituals.6 Africans, as Mbiti has noted, are 'notoriously religious' and religion permeates all the dimensions of life.7 Just as the Christian worldview cannot be separated from the myth of creation (the Genesis myth), so also the African worldview and identity cannot be separated from African mythology.

The African myths of creation give humankind not only its place in history, but also its identity. The words *mungu*, *mulungu, mu'ungu,* used by Bantu-speakmg communities of Eastern and Central Africa stem from the root-word, meaning clan. Likewise, *Nzambi,Njambi, Tsambi, Dzambi, Zam, Monzam* are Bantu language terms for God, which are used inCentral Africa, apparently originating from *amba,* meaning to speak, to act, or to create. *Mu'umba, mwumba, kabumba* are terms which stem from the root *umba,* which means to mould. 8

There is no doubt that African myths (especially those about creation) give Africans a sense of belonging and of orientation in the local community and society at large. This creates a basis for acceptance, legitimacy, and stratification of positions in society, in the world, and in "the other world". The other world, the abode of the ancestors, plays a significant role in traditional African society. The African world-view takes into consideration the unity of all things in the universe of which people form part.

In African thinking, all human beings and nature are animated by basic principle, a 'vital force'. It is believed that there is no dichotomy between the tangible material world and the invisible world. In short, life is considered as one indivisible whole. In African traditional life, human beings and nature are believed to be bound together, that is, there is a symbiosis between them.

The symbiosis was not only between humankind and nature, but also between God and human beings. In traditional societies God is seen as the one who organizes and integrates humankind and the world. A similar symbiosis was found between the living and the dead or ancestors, the latter being taken as custodians of society or as intermediaries between the living and the dead. People's happiness and identity were considered to be influenced by the ancestors, by various other spirits and by the Supreme God.

Pobee claims that there are three main principles governing the African world-view:

- The African has a deep religious ontology which forms an integral continuum, whereby the living world is incorporated and brought under the spirit world.
- The African identity and world-view have very strong connections. Whereas the
- European thinks along the line of: I think, therefore I exist (*cogito, ergo sum);* the African says: I exist because I belong to a family.
- A human being's sense of finitude, vulnerability and mortality leads many Africans to believe in the power of magic and of the super-beings.9

From what has been said, it is clear that the Western identity and the African identity differ, and that they have different emphases. Friendship, solidarity, respect for nature, respect for human dignity, the right relationship within the community and extended family, which includes both the living and dead, are values regarded with high esteem in African traditional society. However, these values seem to be fading away from modern African society.

Many of the so-called "modern "Africans are strangers to themselves, to other people and to nature. The harmonious and symbiotic relationship between a person and the object, between a person and the world, seems to be breaking down. In the past, the symbiotic relationship made an African world of experience to be personal, for the world could not be separated from the self. The self could not be separated from other people or from the world, and all of them could not be separated from God.

ARE TRADITIONAL VALUES FADING AWAY?

A questionnaire administered to 258 first year students of Nairobi University, in October 1987, indicates the need to evaluate the trends of the impact of foreign influences upon African values.

Question 12 stated: "It has been claimed that modern life has undermined traditional African fairness: how do you feel about it?" Two hundred-fifty-two students answered as follows: 82 (32.53 per cent) felt very strongly, 138 (55.64 per cent felt strongly, 22 (8.87 per cent) felt not very strongly. 220 (88.17 per cent) felt very strongly or strongly about this issue.

This would seem to indicate that university students feel that traditional African values have been undermined by modern life. As to why they thought so, the answers ranged from: there is no sense of solidarity any more, no co-operation, people do not share, many families are breaking up, there is lack of respect, lack of friendship, too much permissiveness.

If one takes question 10: "Do you believe that African religious social values are: very important, important, not very important, not important at all?" As many as 82 (32.53 per cent) believe that African social values are very important, 156 (61.90 per cent) regard them as important, 12 (4.4 per cent) not very important, 2 (0.79 per cent) not important at all. As to why they believe so, different answers were given. Most of the respondents felt that values like generosity, respect, good moral behaviour, stable marriages and solidarity are needed in Africa today.

Another interesting question was: "It is claimed that sexual morals were important in African traditional societies. Do you think this was: very good, good, fair, not good?"

There were 183 (70.90 per cent) respondents who thought that this was very good, 62 (24.80, per cent) good, 5 (2.0 per cent) fair, and none of the students claimed that it was not good. This

means that almost 98 per cent thought that African traditional sexual morals are still reasonably respected. As to why they thought so, the reasons given include: faithfulness, protection of premarital virginity, prohibition of premarital sex, incest avoidance, non-prevalence of prostitution.

SUMMARY OF QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS

African traditional value-system and world-view are remain today a source of influence in Africa. However, some negative trends can be noticed as shown below.

There is a degree of individual powerlessness. People are aware of their individualism, but they are not happy about it. Is individualism induced by unbalanced forms of education, or by modern competition? Self-centeredness or egoism is a real setback to human relationships in Africa today, according to the students. Individual survival is considered by many to be the most important thing, and the cost of survival seems to be high, leading at times to corruption, laxity in morals. Some students claimed that life is more than the satisfaction of greed for money, power and material well-being. The sense of meaninglessness, combined with individualism could be some of the causes of increased rates of suicide in many African societies.

Disloyalty undermines morality. Should one be loyal to the community, nation, clan, family or to himself? Lack of loyalty in particular is leading to an increased rate of marriage breakdowns.

The sense of growing social isolation was pointed out by students as a factor that is undermining the value of togetherness among Africans. In particular, there is breakdown of kinship and extended family ties. In recent years the number of institutional homes, such as "nyumba za wazee" (old people's homes) and orphanages seem to be increasing. This is an indication of social isolation. Could this have been accepted in earlier traditional African society?

CLARIFYING WHAT AN AFRICAN IDENTITY IS

What is 'Africanness?' One's identity, as pointed out earlier, is a product of socialization, which is a process in which an individual becomes integrated within a group and within a given culture. The socialized person internalizes and accepts a particular cultural worldview.

The African worldview differs from the Western one. These two worldviews, which are based upon different mentalities, two modes of perception of the world, ought to be accepted as being different, and each as having a right to exist within its cultural content. However, it is worth comparing the two worldviews.

In the traditional African conception, the individual, the family, the community and wider society interpenetrate and form part of the whole. The individual cannot casually rub shoulders with the group, family or community since he/she is part of it. In Western thought, one can make a clear-cut distinction about how to interact with individuals, family community, and society.

In the Western worldview, the individual has a sense of being outside the pressures of the community, family, group and society.

In order to exist significantly in African traditional society, the individual must relate to the others. Kinship ties, marriage bonds, initiation ties, covenantal ties, etc. are there to guarantee that the individual can relate and communicate with others, and thus "be".

From this sense of responsibility by individuals to group and society and vice-versa, comes the need to share. Nkrumah's famous statement: "We live together or perish together" is to be understood within the context of African identity. Mutual love, affection, spiritual and material

exchange and sharing in African societies form part of the African identity. Life has more meaning when it is shared with and within the community, family and group. Stable marriages and other firms social relationships, expressions of living together, are highly valued in African traditional societies.

In African traditional society people share a lot: time, energy, resources. The individual shares with the group, community and family. A sense of solidarity and of being one with others makes one act in a responsible manner. No wonder Nyerere appeals:

> Our first step consists in re-educating ourselves with regard to our original mental structure. In our traditional society, we were individuals within a community. We were responsible for the community and community was responsible for each one of us.10

In the African moral set-up, an individual is expected to the loyal to the group, family community, society, ancestors and gods. The sense of loyalty is bound to the fact that each person forms part of the whole system.

In some African societies one could be cursed for being disloyal to the group, community, family and society. One could be killed, if one broke an oath.

CONCEPT OF THE SUPREME GOD, MAN AND NATURE

The concept of God, religion, and nature varies in African for Western cultures. The ancestors, who are also considered as the "*living dead"*, are thought to remain part of society and to continue influencing the life of the community. For the African, God is not high up in the sky, the presence of God is constantly felt. God is part of man and walks with man. As Bishop Milingo puts it:

> God is father, because he protects his children and is accessible to them. He is their security and supplier of all human needs. This is the God whom we need in Africa. A God who is a real father, one who cares for his children, protects them, gives them security and is accessible.11

In particular, according to African thought, ancestors are regarded as continuing to be part of the community. The ancestors, therefore, form part of the African identity. Some of the ancestors are believed to be reborn in grand- or great-grandchildren, who are named after them. Generally, according to Western thought, when a human being dies, his or her interaction with the living is believed to cease. In African thought, on the other hand, the dead are believed to remain involved in human events. Perhaps the marked respect for the older people, respect for fellowmen and women has its roots in this belief about the continuous interaction between this life and the hereafter. One has to live in harmony with nature, with the ancestors, and with God because they are all part of the African conception of identity and life.

Western people tend to see nature as being down here, and God as being up there. The African cosmos includes inanimate, human and divine dimensions. Nature is not solely there to be defaced, and sometimes debased, by endless scientific and technological conquests!12

In Western conception, as has been shown earlier, one is "free" and the relationships one forms are not extensively binding because they do not normally involve as many people as those of the

African. Because of interdependence, Africans tend to be more flexible, tolerant and have a higher sense of adaptability than their Western counterparts.

The vast changes caused by modern development in Africa are so drastic that one finds it hard to believe how Africans have faced these changes and accepted or agreed with them. Perhaps the reason behind this is that the African identity, an identity which at times has been ignored and abused, is capable of a high degree of flexibility, tolerance and adaptability. However, future changes and development in Africa ought and should respect the African identity. Africans need to pay heed to some of their prophets and prophetesses.

NOTES

1. Okot p'Bitek. *Song of Ocol*. Nairobi: Heinemann, pp. 83-84.

2. Ong'ong'a, J. "The death of African traditional religion", in *Quarterly Review of Religious Studies*, Vol. II, Nos 1-2 (September-December, 1987), pp.29-45.

3. Milingo, Emmanuel. *The World in Between Gweru* (1985), p.96, points out the fact that a vast number of Christians are ancestor worshippers and, for that matter, proud of it. I have experienced the same thing in my pastoral ministry as a Catholic priest. It is notable that many Kenyans noted a similar feeling during the Otieno case in 1987.

4. Bengu, S., "Colonized Mind", unpublished paper presented during the African Week in Salzburg, 1984, art. 11.

5. Fanon, Franz. *Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grave, 1968, pp. 253-254.

6. African identity and world-view are here taken to mean the traditional African world-view. For the purpose of this paper, Africa refers to Africa South of the Sahara. North Africa is excluded because of its historically strong Arabic influence and identity. Some North African countries belong to the Arabic Organization/Islamic Organization.

7.Mbiti, J.S. *African Religions and Philosophy*. Nairobi: Heinemann, 1969, p. 1.

8. Shorter, Aylward. *African Culture and the Christian Church*. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1973, pp. 53-54.

9. Pobee, J.S. *Towards an African Theology*. Nashville, Tennessee, Abingdon, 1979, pp.43-45.

10. Nyerere, Julius K. *Ujamaa*. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 1.

11. Milingo, *op. cit*., p. 75.

12. Okolo, C.B. *The African Church and Signs of the Times*. Eldoret: Gaba Publications, 1978. (Spearhead no. 55), p. 4.

CHAPTER 2

AFRICAN TRADITIONAL RELIGION AND INCULTURATION

AYLWARD SHORTER

THE CONCEPT AND FUNCTION OF INCULTURATION

Inculturation is a theological concept derived analogically from the human experience of cultural education (enculturation/inculturation). Missionary religions, such as Christianity, which claim to be accessible to people of every culture without becoming exclusively identified with any one of them, are deemed to acquire a culture in a manner analogous to the individual who learns the elements of the culture into which he or she is born. Missiologists also use the theological analogy of Incarnation to express the same idea.

The concept of inculturation has come into prominence as a direct result of the adoption by the mainline Churches of an empirical approach to culture. Since the mid-twentieth century culture has been accepted by them as a plural phenomenon and cultures are deemed to have an equal status in a universal communion that is ideally multiculturall.1 The idea of a single normative Christian culture, identified in practice with the classical culture of Western Christendom, has now been abandoned.2

The term "inculturation" was first coined by Joseph Masson in 1962.3 It was used by Pedro Arrupe during the 1977 Synod of Roman Catholic Bishops and was the subject of a letter which he addressed to the Society of Jesus in 1978.4 It was first adopted officially by John Paul II in the synodal document *Catechesi Tradendae* of 1979, and has since entered into theological currency.5 It is a term popular with African Christian theologians who see African Theology as the foremost instance of inculturation and a means to combat cultural alienation in the African Church.

The ideas that underlie the concept of inculturation have a long history and are indeed rooted in the inclusive approach of the earthly Jesus. It is also implied by the universalist resurrection faith of the early Christian communities, which had first to free themselves from the dominant Jewish religious culture before effectively entering into dialogue with the pagan cultures of Greece, Rome and the Near East.6 The importance of the Jewish diaspora in the Christian history of cultural interaction cannot be over-emphasized, since it was to communities of Hellenistic Jews in the Mediterranean world that Christian evangelists first addressed themselves, and it was the Greek Septuagint which became the Christian "Old Testament".

Inculturation is the logical consequence of effective evangelization. The Good News of Jesus Christ is not addressed to isolated individuals, but to people for whom culture is part of the human phenomenon. Human society is both the origin and the product of culture. Individuals learn their culture from society and culture imparts a recognizable identity to society. Social scientists today tend to view culture as a system of conceptions and norms for behaviour which are expressed in symbols, and which orientate the members of society cognitively, effectively and behaviourally to one another and to the world in which they live. Consequently, culture is a human right, and cultural domination or manipulation is an abuse.

Since the Christian Gospel professes to effect a change of heart in those to whom it is addressed, evangelization necessarily carries cultural implications. It is not only individuals that are evangelized, but also their cultures. Only in the twentieth century has this fact been seen with great clarity.

lnculturation involves therefore the insertion of the tradition of Christian faith into a non-Christian culture and a subsequent ongoing dialogue between that faith and the culture into which it is inserted. Christianity, however, like any other religion, is a cultural system and cannot exist except in a cultural form. The insertion and dialogue must therefore follow upon a process of acculturation in which evangelists with a particular cultural form of Christianity encounter non-Christians of another culture. On the other hand, inculturation represents a further stage in the evangelization process, namely the transcending of mere cultural form of Christianity which nevertheless possesses recognizable continuities with its non-Christian predecessor.7 It is the Christian claim that its teaching contains universal elements which enable a culture to become even more authentic and even more faithful to its truest insights. This claim is expressed theologically in the doctrine of the *Logos* (word), the principle of eternal Truth through whom the world was created. Elements of this Truth or "seeds" of this *Logos* are found in every human culture. This *Logos* has become flesh in Jesus Christ, and in the light of his Incarnation, such "seeds" are able to grow dynamically through the process of evangelization.8

However, faith necessarily constitutes a challenge to culture. The earthly Jesus challenged his own religious culture and died for so doing. The Jesus of faith challenges all the temples of the world.9 In theological terms this implies a tradition of faith which, while it can discover surplus meaning, cannot contradict itself, and which, while it can receive diverse cultural formulation, is obliged to oppose contradictory meanings. Every culture is thus challenged by Christ to die and rise again with him.

"Culturalism" is the term applied by Christian theologians to a situation in which the encounter with a non-Christian culture imposes a change of essential meaning in the Christian faith tradition. Such a situation is to be avoided by the evangelist.

The Christian faith tradition is nevertheless a historical phenomenon, having adopted successive cultural forms and reaching back to the complex cultural dynamic of the Old and New Testarnents in which the originating experience was given. The evangelist, therefore, carries a Christian cultural patrimony. Much of this patrimony is purely relative in so far as it is not the bearer of essential meaning, new to the culture being evangelized. In so far as Christian words and gestures relate to those of the earthly Jesus and the Christ of New Testament faith, these cannot be abandoned without raising questions of literal truth and falsity. This is especially the case with Biblical translation and sacramental rites deriving from New Testament commands or precedents.

In sociocultural terms, therefore, inculturation involves an acculturation which strives to transform the evangelized culture from within, creating a new configuration of meanings and cultural symbols. The effect of this process is intercultural. While the evangelized culture receives new images and meanings and those of its tradition which are in harmony with Christian faith are affirmed, the evangelizing culture also receives and transmits new images and further ranges of meaning to the Christian world. This is the "mutual enrichment" spoken of by Paul VI.10

The problem now to be considered is how the inculturation process affects traditional ethnic religion in Africa. The question is complicated not only by the fact that Christian evangelization in Africa scarcely rises above acculturation or even syncretism (the juxtaposition of non-integrated cultural images and meanings), but also by the presence of a third factor, that of modernization, which affects both Christianity and African tradition.

AFRICAN TRADITIONAL RELIGION AND INCULTURATION

Africa is ethnically multicultural and the traditional religious systems of Africa are structurally linked to ethnic cultures. Most estimates of the number of ethnic groups in Africa are conservative, but it is not always easy to decide where one ethnic group ends and another begins.11 In Kenya more than seventy ethnic groups are listed, and in neighbouring Tanzania more than one hundred. Certain ethnic amalgamations such as the Kalenjin and Abaluhya in Kenya, or the peoples of "Greater Nyamwezi" in Tanzania have come into existence during this century, but the general identification of cultural regions has been a contentious question.12

Although religious conceptions and practices are widely shared among the ethnic groups, they occupy different positions in the varied religious systems. Ethnic religions in Africa offer a spectrum of theological variations, and this gives a distinct character to each. Ethnic religion in Africa is essentially an interaction of human society with a given physical environment.

Cultural interaction between ethnic groups was originally less significant. Consequently, each ethnic group perceived its own organic universe, the physical environment offering not only the symbols of a distinct theological vocabulary, but also a quasi-sacramental experience of divine reality itself.

Religious perception and practice were articulated and controlled through the social structures of autonomous ethnic groups. Individuals acquired a creative perception of the universe through adaptive learning processes, Prayer and religious ritual were channeled through organic links with the world of spirits, such as domestic and cosmic sacrifices or the activities of sacred rulers whose physical existence was deemed to be linked to the cosmic processes. Religious expectations were focused on a single world that was interpreted spiritually and which was the theatre of activity for both the living and the dead.

Ethnic religion in Africa possessed an almost infinite capacity for absorbing new ideas and images through the historical processes of "hand to hand" exchange which typified the precolonial period. Such processes were not threatening so long as these elements could be absorbed on ethnic terms and so long as they were not the products of a change in scale or structure. It is obvious, however, that traditional religion was extremely vulnerable when radical change occurred.

It was the thesis of the late Monica Wilson that enlargement of social scale in Africa brought with it an enlargement of theological scale.13 This has been demonstrated for a number of ethnic religions.14 A theology or cosmology strictly bound to a limited tribal topography could no longer interpret the more universal experiences of long distance trade and the increased mobility of population. This explains the selection of, or emphasis on, more universal images in African religious tradition, particularly those connected with sky symbolism, rather than those linked to features of a purely local physical environment, such as mountains or lakes.

Of itself, however, the symbol system of an African ethnic religion was not usually capable of articulating the enlargement of theological scale dictated by the change in social scale. New forms of discursive symbolism had to be developed.15 For this reason the immigrant religions of Islam and Christianity were welcomed and their doctrine of God and, particularly, their eschatological ideas made an irreversible impact on African traditional beliefs.

Even more profound was the impact of the immigrant religions in the sphere of religious organization and practice. Once the ethnic groups lost their political autonomy and found themselves to be cultural minorities in a multicultural state, traditional religion could no longer be organized through tribal structures and were in the process of being dismantled by colonialism. Sacred rulers were secularized and the education of youth was taken out of the hands of parents and tribal elders. The communitarian, and even the family pattern of traditional religious ritual was jeopardized. Socio-cultural integration became a political priority of "nation-building". At this

juncture Islam and Christianity offered an organization that transcended ethnic, and even national, boundaries. Christianity, although compromised to an extent by division and disunity, was closely identified with literacy, education and ultimately with development. In many ways it was an arm of the central government.

To remain credible, traditional ethnic religion had to discover new forms of expression and organization. It did this to a great extent through liminal cults and new religious movements that reflected the experience of change. Some of these were traditionalist, in the sense that they attempted (not very successfully) to reinterpret the ethnic religious tradition. Many, if not most, of the new religious movements were inter-ethnic and developed sophisticated forms of organization. Outstanding among these are, for example, the Kimbanguist Church of Zaire and the Massowe Apostles, originally from Zimbabwe.16Such movements could be said to represent a form of "inculturation from below". They often displayed a measure of syncretism and of what, in the language of inculturation, is called culturalism, since their faith and practice frequently involved a departure from the "essential" tenets and practices of mainline forms of Christianity in order to accommodate conflicting ideas and customs originating in ethnic religious culture,

Scholars and observers of the African scene in the 1960s believed that the future of religion in Africa lay with the new religious movement, rather than with mission-related Christianity, or even possibly Islam. The latter, supported by oil-rich Islamic states, was able in the 1970s to enter the fields of education and development and to make a greater impact at the national level. Christianity survived its association with colonialism and demonstrated its continued relevance for socio-cultural integration. In the case of the Roman Catholic Church, the renewal of the 1960s made possible a positive appraisal of African traditional religion.17

The afore-mentioned Catholic renewal set in motion new theoretical approaches to the theology of salvation-revelation, to ecclesiology and to the theology of religions and of cultures. These new approaches began to make an impact in the mid-l970s, particularly in the fields of theology and catechetics. At the same time, the more tolerant attitude towards traditional religions, as well as the introduction of a pastoral policy of building basic Christian communities in the rural areas and the new urban squatter areas, helped mission-related Catholicism to become "customary" and to acquire a more popular expression.

However, Catholicism contained many internal obstacles to the implementation of inculturation theory. The Churches of the Reformation (which in itself was an early experience of inculturation) were largely wedded to Western national cultures and traditions, and were not always able to overcome their ethnocentrism. Official Catholicism, on the other hand, clung to the moribund Latin culture of Western Christendom. The theoretical abandonment of this culture is too recent for it to cease operating immediately as a form of ecclesiastical subculture. This is perhaps a more insidious form of ethnocentrism, an ancient Western cultural tradition lodged in the ecclesial "woodwork", as it were. In the Catholic renewal brought about by the Second Vatican council, the development of an empirical approach to cultures lagged behind the refashioning of the liturgy and the new codification of Canon Law. Nor has it been brought to bear on the important concept of "collegiality", the partnership between national episcopates and the Petrine ministry. The structures of universal communion in the Catholic Church remain heavily monocultural. In liturgy, the principle of the "substantial unity of the Roman rite" is strictly maintained.18 The 1983 Code of Canon Law is still the heir of ancient Roman patriarchal law, and still promotes a cultural parallelism in fields such as those relating to marriage.19 Collegiality is still heavily weighted in favour of the papal *magisterium*, often exercised in accordance with a culturally extraneous agenda, rather than in partnership with the local (African) episcopate.20

Quite apart from the misunderstandings which frequently arise about the nature and purpose of inculturation, local Church leadership in Africa often has a vested interest in maintaining the *status quo* and may view inculturation as a threat to its own authority. Liturgical conformity and authenticity are linked to authority in the Catholic Church. Traditional concepts of marriage and of health and healing, for example, are sometimes so remote from the cultural forms which these things have previously taken in Christianity that they appear even more threatening than liturgical change. But perhaps the greatest obstacle to the praxis of inculturation is the prohibition of experimentation. Culture concerns the real life of men and women in community. Without experiment, an experimental dialogue between faith and culture is impossible.

Alongside the incipient dialogue between Christian faith and African religious culture lies the movement of modernization. This movement, to which the mission-related Churches are possibly even more committed in Africa than in the Western world, consists in the dynamic translation of rapidly developing science into a technology of which Africans are the passive consumers. Technological change is linked to the urban social consciousness which is spreading rapidly in Africa. Typically, it promotes materialistic attitudes that are inimical to the values of the Christian Gospel and to those of African religious tradition alike. Modernization opens up a "third front", as it were, in the inculturation process, but it has the positive effect of placing Christianity and African traditional religion in the same camp. Although ethnic traditions in Africa possess considerable resilience, and ordinary people are far from having severed their cultural roots, the question of how successful Africans are likely to be in the redefinition of their culture *vis-a-vis* modernization remains pertinent. It is also questionable whether the visible remnants of ethnic religion in Africa can withstand the pressures of modernization as successfully as organized Christianity. If they cannot, the survival of African religious values within the Christian Church must depend on the extent to which Christians are able, or indeed willing, to practise inculturation.

NOTES

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2. Lonergan, Bernard. *Method in theology.* London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973, pp. 301-302.

3. Masson, Joseph, "L'eglise ouverte sur le monde." *In Nouvelle revue theologique,* Vol. 84 (1962), p. 1038.

4. Arrupe, Pedro. "Letter to the whole society on inculturation." In Aixaia, P. *Other aoostolates today,* Vol. 3 St. Louis, 1982, pp. 172-181.

5. John Paul *11. Catechesi Tradendae.* London: Catholic Truth Society, 1 979. No. 53.

6. Senior, Donald and Struhmuller, Carroll. The *Biblical foundations for mission.* London: SCM Press, 1983, pp. 145-158. Brown, Raymond. *Biblical exegesis and church doctrine.* New York: Doubleday, 1985, pp. 133-134.

7. Arrupe, *op. cit.,* p. 1 72.

8. St. Justin Martyr's notion of the *logos spermatikos* and of the "seeds of the word" were used by the Fathers of Vatican 11. Cf. Flannery, Austin, ed. *Vatican Council 11.* Dublin: Talbot Press, 1975.Ad *Gentes,* Nos. 1 1 and 22.

9. This idea was used very forcibly by Paul Tillich. Cf. Hick, John and Hebblethwaite, Brian, eds. *Christianity and other religions.* Glasgow: Collins, 1980, pp. 108-121.

10. Paul VI. *Evangelization in the modern world-Evangelii Nuntiandi.* London: Catholic Truth Society, 1975. No. 63.

11. Cf. Barrett, David. *Schism and renewal in Africa.* Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1 968, pp. 44-46.

12. Shorter, Aylward. *Songs and symbols of initiation.* Nairobi: CHIEA Monographs, 1987.

13. Wilson, Monica. *Religion and the transformation of* society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

14. Cf. Wilson. *Ibid.* and Shorter, Aylward. *African Christian theology.* New York: Orbis Books, 1977, pp. 61-78.

15. Swanz, Marja-Lisa. *Ritual and symbol,* Uppsala: Gleerup, 1970, p. 357.

16. Martin, Marie-Louise. *Kimbangu: an African prophet and his church.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1975. Dillon-Malone, Clive M. *The Korsten basketmakers.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978.

17. *Nostra Aetate.* No. 2. In Flannery, *op. cit.*

18. *Sacrosanctum Concilium.* No. 38, In Flannery, op. *cit,*

19. Bwana, Steven, "L'effet produit par le nouveau code en Afrique." In *Concilium,* No. 205 (June 1986), pp.133-140.

20. An attempt to produce a balance into collegiality has been the project of an African Council, still officially under consideration although rumoured to have been blocked by the Vatican.

CHAPTER 3
ASPECTS OF SHARING AMONG AFRICANS
KAREGA MUNENE

I have fond memories of some experiences of the noble concept and practice of sharing among fellow Africans that occurred early in my life. It was in the early 1960s when, as a small boy, I accompanied my mother for a trip from our home at Subukia in Nakuru to my maternal grandparents in *Nyeri* via Nyahururu (then Thomson's Falls). On arrival in Nyahururu my late uncle Charles Kuria met us. Although from the clothes he was wearing, I could, in spite of my age, guess he was struggling to make ends meet, he bought me my first *ndazi* and tea at a kiosk at the bus terminus. To a rural boy, this was a major treat. Although I did not see my uncle again until 1995, his generosity stuck in my mind.

The second experience also dates to the early 1960s and concerns one Mzee Ole Maina a Maasai elder who lived in our village at Spring Valley Farm in Subukia. Ole Maina lived alone in his hut; he was a darling of all the children in the village because he was a good storyteller and a very generous man. Although the European settler did not allow squatters to keep any livestock in the village, Ole Maina occasionally slaughtered a ram or he-goat, which he shared with all the children in the village. Thus, although Ole

Maina had no children of his own, he regarded us all as his children and he derived much and happiness from sharing the little he had with us, regardless of our gender, age or ethnic or religious affiliation. The fact that the village was cosmopolitan, with virtually every ethnic group in the country represented, made the sharing unforgettable.

Ole Maina taught us to drink warm blood and to eat raw meat. Although I subsequently lost the courage to consume raw meat and to drink blood, the wonderful memories still linger. Equally unforgettable were the rituals (e.g. circumcision ceremonies) of various communities in the village in which all of us, children and adults, participated. The interaction during such ceremonies was natural because we conversed in each other's mother tongues from early in life. That we were poor squatters with hardly any rights did not bar us from sharing without discrimination. As children we were taught that sharing was a joy; it was, therefore, rare to see a child eating or drinking alone.

In July-October 1990 in the midst of a drought in Kajiado District, Kathleen Ryan, a friend and colleague from the University of Pennsylvania Museum in the USA and I were collecting preliminary data on traditional animal husbandry at Isajiloni in Kajiado District.'. Our instincts led us to the homestead of Mzee Ole Kaaka, a highly respected elder and leader in the area. Our visit to his homestead was met with the legendary African hospitality: he and his family treated us as very close friends or relatives. Within a few minutes, we were sharing sugary black tea with the family.

This brings me to another experience of sharing I had in the course of my field research at Dol Dol in Laikipia District in 1995. While there Mzee Ole Mutunge's family hosted my colleagues and me. On the morning of the' second day of our visit two of Ole Mutunge's grandsons, with whom 1 had struck a rapport on arrival, took me outside the house to show me two goats that they had decided to give me to cement our friendship. On the day I was to return to Nairobi I jokingly asked my young friends whether I could take my goats with me to Nairobi. The boys answered in the affirmative and, happily drove the goats towards our land rover! The boys did not have that many goats, but they had volunteered to part with two of them to share their limited resources with

somebody they barely knew. It was such a touching gesture that it brought back childhood memories of sharing and the joy that characterised it.

Sharing among traditional African societies also provided a form of insurance against total impoverishment, which could be occasioned by loss of a given household's entire herd of cattle due to raids, disease or drought. To guard against such eventualities herding communities like the Maasai have over the years developed an elaborate reciprocal gift system. The system involves the exchange of gifts (e.g. cattle) between age-mates, brothers, distant relatives or neighbours. The gifts might also be from a rich household to a poor household, or from a man to his future father-in-law. When calamity strikes, a man who shared his wealth is able to rebuild his herd by receiving gifts from his age-mates, relatives, neighbours and/or friends.2

Among the Gikuyu, sharing was evident in their traditional land tenure system. Ownership of the land rested in the mbari (a lineage or sub-clan), rather than in specific individuals. The administration of a given *mbari* land was vested in a muramati (guardian or custodian), who granted farming rights to the less fortunate members of the community from outside the mbari, namely the *ahooi* (tenants-at-will).3 In this connection the proverb states: *Githaka gutigunaga muuni kigunaga muhooi* (The land does not benefit the one who clears it but the newcomer/tenant-at-will).4 This sharing of resources did not only guarantee fairness, but also helped to minimise conflict that may have arisen from land ownership and use.

Sadly, some of us, including people who can afford to share with the less fortunate, have tended to abuse this noble concept of sharing. For example, a few years ago an acquaintance of mine, Njoroge, was invited for a harambee in aid of the education of his friend Kimani's children in Britain. The harambee was to be held at Kimani's home in the wealthy suburb of Lavington in Nairobi. On arrival at Kimani's, Njoroge noticed an assortment of expensive cars, including an Alfa Romeo and two fairly new Mercedes Benz sedans. Initially he thought these belonged to some invited guests, but on realising he was the first guest to arrive he complimented Kimani for having such a good taste for cars. This not only won Njoroge a wide smile from Kimani, but also a big "thank you."

Njoroge could not help wondering why Kimani could not dispose of some of his vehicles to pay his children's school fees. Njoroge himself had been paying for his children's education in Britain and Australia. His parents had taught him to shoulder his own burden, always reminding him and his siblings of the Gikuyu proverb, *Njogu ndiremagwo ni miguongo yayo* (An elephant is never overpowered by its tusks).5 As such he occasionally sold some of his assets to pay his children's school fees. To him, the harambee was a blatant abuse of sharing.

In present-day Kenya a young man will starve himself in order to save enough money to buy a car, quite an impressive feat, given that he buys the car without financial assistance from his friends or relatives. Interestingly, the same young man will have no qualms passing on what are strictly his personal obligations to others. When he decides to marry he invites his friends, relatives, acquaintances and even people he hardly knows to a fund raising activity in the name of a pre-wedding party. This provides him with funds for the bride price and the wedding and, if he is lucky, with a sum to cater for his new family's needs over several months.

Once they start to have children, the couple holds regular birthday parties 'which are basically harambees. These are, in turn, followed by harambees to raise funds for their children's education.

When a relative or friend is hospitalised the couple quickly embarks on a harambee, presumably to settle a massive hospital bill. They do this with gusto, although the hospitalized relative-friend may be insured. When a relative or friend dies, the couple organises a harambee for funeral expenses. This is done regardless of whether the deceased's estate or his relatives are

capable of absorbing such expenses comfortably. In some instances, such funds end up being squandered by the couple.

Some of our drinking buddies excel at abusing sharing day-in and day-out. For example, one may walk into a bar with only a thousand shillings on him. At the time, his mind is made up that he will spend half of that money in the bar, saving the remainder for a meal with his family. However, as he is having his drink, a friend or acquaintance walks in. Instead of spending the five hundred shillings budgeted for the outing, he spends the entire one thousand shillings to show off to his drinking buddy, forgetting there is a family that needed to have shared some of it. In some instances, some of us have fallen victim to paying hotel or bar bills that we were not prepared for. A friend or acquaintance orders a drink or meal for herself and others at her table end up passing the bill on to her. She ends up settling the bills because of the embarrassment she is likely to suffer.6

Our political leadership has also not been left behind in abusing the concept of sharing. For example, the reader will recall the 1980s were characterised by an abundance of compulsory harambees, where specific sums were deducted as contributions from the salaries of government employees. The money collected in this way was expended on grandiose projects, some of which were intended to leave personalised physical imprints of the political establishment on the country's landscape. Interestingly, although the monuments in question abound in the country, not many people seem to know what they mean, let alone being proud of them.

One such is the Nyayo the monument, close to the Serena Hotel, Nairobi, which is nothing more than President Moi's name on all sides in concrete and marble. Although ours is a relatively peaceful country, the monument's apex is the President's hand with his club thrust through Mt. Kenya after which the country is named: a symbol of a conqueror rather than of a peace-maker. Given that sharing among Africans is something spontaneous and a custom to be proud of, one cannot help wondering whether any of those who were forced to contribute to the construction of such grandiose monuments would like to be reminded of their forced contributions, let alone be associated with them.

At a personal level, one experience of sharing with friends caused me a lot of unnecessary pain and anxiety. It was on the afternoon of Friday, 19 May 1995, when I loaned a title deed to a friend and her brother. The title deed was to be used as security at the Aga Khan Hospital in Nairobi in order to secure the discharge of the brother's wife. At the time, they assured me that they would settle the hospital bill the following Monday, 22 May, 1995, and return the title deed to me on the same day. However, when the appointed day came they did not fulfil the agreement or call to let me know if there was a problem. Without any reference to me, they converted what was originally a weekend loan into one for three years. My efforts to have the title deed returned were met with stony silence and sometimes with false promises.

Subsequently, I received a letter from the Aga Khan Hospital's lawyer threatening to sue me for failure to settle the bill I had guaranteed. I forwarded a copy of the letter to my friend, but nothing came of it. Consequently, I instructed my lawyer to demand immediate release of the title deed from my friend, but, again, the demand notice was not answered. Finally, I had to file a civil suit to recover the title deed.7 In the words of the magistrate who presided over the case, my friend and her fellow defendants "were absolutely thankless and in fact cruel to a good Samaritan who came to their aid in a desperate hour. The plaintiff can do with better: neighbours. (Note 8). Such is the nature of some friendships and sharing in present-day Kenya. Fortunately, the judgement was delivered in my favour and I did finally get the title deed back.

Originally, sharing in African societies made a lot of sense: it was an activity from which both the giver and the recipient derived pleasure and joy. It cemented their relationship and helped to minimise conflict that may have arisen from skewed distribution of resources. Indeed, many Kenyans in prominent positions today owe their education to the sharing of meagre resources by their relatives, friends and neighbours. Needles to add, such beneficiaries were regarded as "communal assets" and they were expected to contribute to the alleviation of socio-economic problems of the village they came from, which a good number of them have done. Undoubtedly, our country has made major strides in socio-economic and educational development because many of us have shared the little we had for the sake of our brother and sister in need.

But it is evident that fatigue is setting in because of our tendency to abuse other people's generosity and kindness. Yet we all know that losing the noble concept and practice of sharing in our societies will be a great shame. Why lose a virtue for which we as Kenyans are famous? We all know that if one were to receive in New York, London or Paris with the kind of hospitality and generosity that Kenyans extend to visitors, one would be suspicious of the host's intentions! We must stop the abuse of the custom of sharing and begin to seriously educate our children on the value of this virtue so that our country may continue to know for the generosity of its citizens. That is the Kenya that every parent wants to bequeath to his/her children; or is it?

NOTES

1. Kathleen Ryan, Karega- Munene, Samuel M. Kahinju and Paul N. Kunoni. "Cattle naming: the persistence of a traditional practice in modem Maasailand." In *Animal Use and Culture Change*, edited by P.J. Crabtree and K. Ryan, MASCA Research Papers in Science and Technology. Supplement to Vol. 8. Philadelphia: MASCA, University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 1991, pp. 90-96.
2. Ryan et al., *op. cit*, pp. 93-94.
3. Godfrey Muriuki. A *History of the Kikuyu 1500-1900*, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 34-35,
4. G. Barra. *1000 Kikuyu Proverbs*, Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1939, 2nd edition.
5. Barra, *op.cit.*
6. I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Muchugu Kiiru, for sharing these experiences.
7. Civil suit No. 233 of 1998 at the Senior Principal Magistrate's Court, Kiambu.
8. Judgement of the Civil Suit No. 233 of 1998, *op. cit*., delivered on 26 March 1999.

CHAPTER 4

‘THAT’S OUR AFRICAN CULTURE’: THOUGHTS ON SELECTIVE CULTURAL PRESERVATION

VALERIE KIBERA

> Wife (indignantly): So you do admit you have a mistress, you fiend, you twister ... you ...
>
> Husband (defensively): Now, why are you getting hot under the collar? It’s *natural* for men to ... er ... wander. It’s even part of our African culture, you know.
>
> Nice and tidy: here both nature and nurture neatly coincide. Argument over for the moment, till (one hopes) the speechless wife regains her breath.
>
> African culture has a lot to answer for. Or, rather, the way it’s used to win not just marital, but a variety of other battles--political, legal, religious, ethical, social, you name it. You only have to utter the magic words ‘African culture’ and the opposition wavers.

AUTHENTICITY

With this endlessly convenient device you can simultaneously assert your authenticity and purity of motive, put down troublesome upstarts and, generally, claim you’re on the side of the angels. Nothing so trifling as hard evidence is required to prove your credentials and virtue – only those talismanic words: ‘that’s our African culture.’

Take politics: you disagree with your opponent: there is no need to examine, still less answer, his charges. There’s a simpler way to vapourize him: just dismiss his ideas as ‘imported’, ‘foreign’ and your own, by implication, as being of the true, homegrown variety. You come out on top and have your enemy on the hop. Our politicians don’t go so far as to dismiss democracy as un-African. No, that would ‘tarnish our image’, sending foreign investments, aid programmes and the tourist industry hurtling down the drain. All they do is assert that ours is the *African* form of democracy! ‘Debate, dissent are automatically foreclosed.

Not for nothing did ‘African Socialism’, that offshoot of African culture, have such a hard time being taken seriously. In the Looking Glass world of politics, words operate pretty much as Humpty Dumpty said they should: "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you *can* make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master – that’s all."

Yes, African culture has much to answer for. It is made to cover a multitude of sins. For example, earlier this year two hapless alleged thieves – as the news reports carefully emphasized – were subjected to the rigours of mob justice at one of our highest seats of learning. The men were battered and murdered by a motley group of people, mostly students. Then the body of one of the victims was set ablaze.

The astonishing thing about this episode is not just that this appallingly brutal act was done by our country’s future leaders, but by how little reaction the event elicited from the community

of sober scholars. And when there was reaction, it was of the kind that in admiring tones related the bravado of one macho student who lit his cigarette from the murdered man's funeral pyre.

In a tutorial with one of the lecturers soon after this horrific event, the issue of mob justice was raised with the students. There was hardly any comment, except for one charmer who truculently averred that he saw nothing wrong in the deed. He triumphantly declared: "That's the way thieves are punished in African culture." Nowhere is this pious punchline about African culture more frequently and dishonestly invoked than when suppressing women. Claims, which if discussed in logical, rational terms, would be derisively rejected, or conclusively prove the claimant's bad faith and special pleading, assume a certain aura of legitimacy when affixed to their tag 'our African culture.'

Consequently, African women need to be suspicious when they hear cliches such as 'our customs', 'our culture' trotted out because it almost invariably heralds bad news for them. Curly kit hairstyles, miniskirts and slacks on women are vociferously denounced by our self-appointed cultural guardians as un-African.' Since three-piece suits, Benzes, videos, blue movies, etc., don't come in for the same kind of moral self-righteousness, one has to assume they are right in the cultural mainstream. Nothing 'un-African' about *them.* Even wife-beating, a popular male sport world-wide and locally given the more seemly term 'disciplining' by its proponents, is in our country apparently hallowed by reference to its venerable antecedents in – you've guessed it – African cultural traditions.

So too with male philandering; when not being hotly defended on the grounds of it being 'natural' (who can argue with the mysterious ways of Mother Nature?), is sanctified by recourse to' our African customs. Female grazing outside the *boma,* on the other hand, is not so fortunate: it's regarded as a gross neurotic symptom (nymphomania) or a moral one (promiscuity) or, more usually, as evidence of both.

Perhaps the recent S.M. Otieno case most dramatically crystallized for women what we can expect from our 'African culture.' In this topsy-turvy world, not only was the clan (whose leading stars were all men) rather than the widow given the corpse to bury where it chose to, but even female weaknesses were hailed as strengths: one woman claimed at Mr Otieno's funeral that Luo women knew their place, were humble, meek and gentle-voiced. Presumably Mrs Otieno, having none of these ostensibly traditional feminine 'virtues', was suitably punished.

All the examples cited above emphasize one overriding imperative: the need to justify contemporary actions, identity and privilege by using a yardstick from the past. This tendency is reinforced daily by our social, political, religious and educational leaders adjuring us to 'preserve our culture.'

In the colonial and immediate post-colonial years there was an urgent need to 'rehabilitate' the vilified past. African writers and scholars rightly perceived that trying to understand our past enables us to make sense of our present and plan our future. The current call to 'decolonize' our culture is another urgent task that awaits us but one that is only possible within the framework of a more thorough-going decolonisation of our economic, political and educational structures.

But to demand that we 'preserve our culture', adhere to traditional values in drastically changed circumstances, is as futile as King Canute ordering the tide to recede. Firstly, this view misapprehends what culture is and how it 'works.' A nation's culture is not a fossilized remnant capable of being 'preserved' like some Egyptian mummy. Culture is living and dynamic, responding to social and economic changes. It follows the contours of our deepest longings and fears, of our dominant values, of our very lives as individuals, as a community and as a nation-and reflects these back to us. Perhaps our obsessive desire to 'preserve the past' is partly an indication

of our revulsion at the images reflected back to us in unflattering ways by our present confused culture.

Secondly, there can be no meaningful resolution between the kind of lives we lead today and past cultural values. Can we be aggressively individualistic, competitive, manipulative, and corrupt in our business and political dealings, in our private and social lives and then expect our cultural mirror to reflect past values of communal endeavour, harmony and unity? Can the old values be accommodated by current material conditions of our society? Don't we distort the former as we force them to serve the latter? The bride-price, for example, had its function in traditional society: to create a stable basis for the marriage by strengthening family alliances, Today, however, there is a tendency on the part of some people to be exploitative in this matter, thereby causing hardships to the newly-married couple.

Even those traditional values which are desirable in themselves can't work in changing times. Take the traditional extended family ideal when put to work in today's urban situation. A man working in town for a fixed wage is expected to, and himself expects to, not just feed, clothe and educate his own children, – but to do the same for a host of less well off (and sometimes just parasitic) relatives. The result is not family harmony and placating the old gods, but mental stress and deep resentment. If this same worker, in trying to live up to traditional claims of family and clan, resorts to nepotism and corruption, he can expect little sympathy from the modern law. This is just another way of saying that new wine splits open the old wineskins.

Part of the longing to 'preserve our culture' stems, of course, from our need in problematic times to sentimentalize the past as a golden age of human bliss. But that past also had its flaws. Did not African chiefs collaborate and profit off the slave trade? Was not that society susceptible to superstition and irrational fears? Were not women in those patriarchal societies relegated to a subservient role in community affairs? Can we talk of female emancipation today and yet wish to 'preserve' reactionary customary attitudes and practices against women?

WHO DEFINES A CULTURE?

mmunity's culture and. decides what from the past is worth salvaging? Just as the victors write, or more correctly rewrite history, so too in cultural politics, the powerful, by virtue of education, wealth, status, or gender, decide what's 'in line with custom, tradition or culture (everything that shores up their power and the status quo) and what isn't (everything that calls this power into question). The S.M. Otieno saga is a case in point.

We see this at work in other cultures too. Take, for instance, the seemingly never-ending debate in Britain about language: the alleged superiority of Standard English versus the supposed deficiencies of the 'dialects' of English. Linguists pointed out (not that this stilled the debate) that the Queen's English is itself just another dialect, albeit a prestigious one. And its prestige derives not from any inherent virtue it possesses, but because it is the language of Britain's (more properly England's) ascendant classes and their institutions. We face a similar situation in trying to determine what in African culture is worth preserving. The issue, as always, is: *who* is doing the preserving, selecting, evaluating? This is the nub of the matter in politics and economics as it is in the realm of culture.

And so the problem remains: how can we foster a culture which will be true to our deepest human needs for identity and belonging; one that will express our communal joys and achievements, sustain us in our crises and sorrows; a culture that will provide a framework for living, working, rearing our children?

There are no easy answers ‘We see this clearly in relation to language. We would like to use Kiswahili and local languages in all spheres of our individual and national life; yet we also appreciate the practical consequences of discarding English from its central place as one of our two official languages.

There has been much glib talk of ‘cultural synthesis’: mix the old and the new together and from the stew some kind of synthesis will magically appear. But, as we know from experience, it is much more usual for the old and the new to live together as uneasy bedfellows, in conflict, if not in outright contradiction.

The most we can say is that the maxim, "as you sow, so shall you reap" holds good here. If we always look, begging bowl in hand, beyond our national and continental borders for answers; if we hanker and strive after a consumerist society, lack all civic responsibility and continue to sanction the unequal distribution of our wealth; if we ravage our environment for immediate financial gain; if we prostitute our aesthetic forms and craft skills to cater to a spurious tourist culture: if we do all this, then our culture will reflect back, as it increasingly does, the resulting ugliness and emptiness.

But if we desire a more humane culture, one that expresses our national identity; one in which we can find emotional affirmation, ‘a place to be at home’; a culture in which things will count for less than people, where institutions are responsive to human needs, then we also have it in our power, as individuals and as a nation, to make the necessary choices which will give birth to such a culture.

CHAPTER 5
AFRICAN MARRIAGE, PAST AND PRESENT

GERALD J. WANJOHI

Some people tend to think that all that is past or ancient is good, while others think that all that is new or modern is good. These are extreme viewpoints where truth is not likely to reside. As African proverbs have taught us, it is possible to make a synthesis of the two extremes and arrive at a mean or moderate position where truth is more likely to be found. It is from this perspective that I want to study African marriage.

MARRIAGE IN AFRICAN TRADITION

An African proverb says that children are the adornment of the home. This, therefore, is one of the reasons why Africans marry. It is an aesthetic reason. Another reason is that children are an investment, especially in old age; so there is an economic reason for marriage. Then there is a metaphysical reason according to which man (male and female) is called upon by the ancestors to be a chain in the transmission of life.

It is especially the latter which makes African marriage an unavoidable duty, as we learn from the following proverbs of the Ankole and Kigezi:

* *The need for marriage made the dove fly and fly until it lay exhausted.*
* *Sweating and marrying go hand in hand.*
* *No one is too little for a cow, i.e., to obtain dowry* and *to marry.*
* *When ripe, a banana is eaten and a girl is married*

The view of African marriage expressed in these proverbs could lead one to make a hasty conclusion that African marriage is dictated only by necessity, depriving it of any freedom of choice. This is not at all the case, as we once again learn from the following Ankole-Kigezi proverbs:

* *Before marrying, be informed, before arranging* a *marriage, consult a diviner.*
* *Do not, boast to your parents about your hasty* marriage.

In African marriage, therefore, there is both necessity and freedom; necessity as to the fact, and freedom as to how to go about it.

THE INSTITUTION OF BRIDEPRICE IN AFRICA

A very well-known characteristic of African marriage is the payment of brideprice or dowry. Unlike in other cultures where dowry is paid by the parents of the girl, in non-Muslim Black Africa, it is always the parents of the boy or man who pay dowry to the parents of the girl. This practice has been misunderstood by outsiders, especially Westerners. They equate the payment. of brideprice to buying a human being. They are led to this view by taking African languages too literally. Among the Gikuyu of Kenya, for example, to marry a wife is rendered by *kugura* mutimia (to buy a wife), and to give your daughter in marriage is kwendia mwariguo (to sell your daughter).

These Gikuyu terms must not be taken too literally, for they do not represent the true reality. The allegation that in Africa marrying a wife is tantamount to buying a wife is disproved by the following considerations:

Africans are well aware that a girl is not a commodity to be disposed of, for she remains the daughter of her parents and sister to her brothers and sisters as much after marriage as before. Among the Gikuyu, a married woman is referred to either as the wife of so-and-so, or the daughter of so-and-so. These people value their daughters so much they consider their being taken away by young men as an act of plunder, and brideprice as being just a small consolation for this plunder. Hence the proverb: *Igituunywo mwana niikagirio mungu*. (One throws a small green gourd to the monkey when taking away its baby.) Also, these days, on account of rapid social changes quite a number of women remain single. Under these circumstances, some parents are apportioning their land and other property to both sons and daughters, showing that they love both equally.

There is no end to paying dowry. Though at first the dowry may be fixed at so many goats or cows, the parents of the girl always had (and still have) a right to demand a gift from the family of the boy at any time during their lifetime. From this, two reasons for brideprice emerge:

1) It is a way of assuring that the girl is properly treated; in case of mistreatment, she can always return home and be accepted by her parents and other relatives.

2) It is a means of keeping the relations between the two families alive and strong. (On the hypothesis that in Africa one buys a wife, there would be no need to perpetuate this relationship. But since it is the latter which prevails, the claim of wife- buying among Africans is disposed of.)

With few exceptions, African people still believe in, and demand the paying of, brideprice. Due to modernity, however, the mode of discharging this duty has changed. Today, almost invariably, brideprice is paid in cash, not in form of livestock as formerly. The main reason for this is the scarcity or lack of grazing land due to the rise in population and the use of land for growing cash crops. The other reason is that young boys whose traditional responsibility was to look after animals are now in school. As for the town dweller, the question of paying the brideprice in livestock is totally inconceivable.

Due to the individualism and selfishness which have accompanied modern life, some parents ask too much money as brideprice. One very serious result of this is to make nonsense of the original aim of the institution of brideprice, making it degenerate into a form of commodity exchange, a wife-buying activity. In quite a number of cases, this overpricing of the bride ends in elopement. The latter can also be brought about by the high cost of weddings these days. Although eloping and common-law marriages are beginning to become popular among Africans these days, in the past they were hardly tolerated.

AFRICAN MARRIAGE TODAY

Here we shall try to follow very closely the outline established for the traditional marriage in order to see to what extent the current African marriage remains the same as traditional marriage, and to what extent it deviates from it.

Like in the past, the need to marry and to have children among Africans remains as widespread and strong as ever. This imperative is partly to blame for the ever rising single-parent phenomenon, especially as regards women. This comes about because a lot of men – even educated ones – loathe marrying educated women, thus forcing them to get children out wedlock. At the same time some educated women feel secure and independent enough not to want to live under the domination of a husband. Yet they desire to have children whom they get out of wedlock, thus deliberately

creating a single-parent situation. The African marriage today is still characterized by freedom except in certain cases where some selfish parents force their daughters to get married against their will, even at the expense of leaving school.

CHRISTIANITY AND AFRICAN MARRIAGE

When Christianity was brought to Africa, it was well received by many ethnic groups. This was due, surely, to the rich cultural soil it found there. But in the case of marriage, African culture and Christianity clashed almost at the outset. The reasons for this are quite obvious.

The African believes that each individual, male or female, is a channel for the transmission of life, and that it is wrong to interrupt that transmission. The punishment for this could be a curse. For this reason the retired archbishop of Nairobi, His Eminence Michael Maurice Cardinal Otunga, had first to seek approval and obtain the blessing of his mother before he could proceed to study for the priesthood.

Additionally, among Africans, not only must one get married, but one must have children, and as many of them as possible. From this, two important implications follow:

- For an African, a childless marriage is considered as no marriage.
- In order to get as many children as possible, Africans are forced to become polygamous. (In this context, it can be observed that childlessness is only one cause for being polygamous among Africans; that is, it is a necessary but not a sufficient cause for polygamy.)

These two problems give the church in Africa (especially the Catholic Church) a real pastoral problem. Theologians have offered a number of solutions to these problems, one of which is trial marriage. However, Professor Benezet Bujo of Zaire rejects this solution for three reasons:

First, trial marriages traditionally were not universally practised in Africa: Christian marriage thrives better among the groups which did not practise trial marriage. The question is to investigate such cultures in order to discover what made them disprove of it. The ultimate aim is to come up with a universal policy for African Christian marriage. This can be derived from an African ancestor theology.

Secondly, it is against human dignity to see the worth of a woman (or of a man, for that matter) merely in terms of procreation. The latter is only a small part of what it means to be human.

Thirdly, it is against Christian love – and even against the wish of the ancestors – to reject a childless woman. I fully endorse this analysis.

CONCLUSION

As is apparent by now, we need both the past and the present; the former to give our traditions, values, practices, etc. ; the latter to expose the impact of other cultures on our own, in order to arrive at a more satisfactory type of modern African marriage. It is not a question of either the past or the present.

NOTES

1. Fr . Marius Cisternino, *The proverbs of Kigezi and Ankole* (Uganda) (Kampala: Comboni Missionries, 1987), p. 348.

2. Cisternino, pp. 348, 351.

3. Margaret Ogola and Margaret Roche, *Cardinal Otunga: A Gift of Grace* (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa), p.67.

4. See Benezet Bujo, *African Theology in Its Social Context* (Nairobi: St. Publication-Africa, 1992), pp. 120-121.

CHAPTER 6

THE AFRICAN FAMILY: WHERE ARE THE FATHERS?

JUSTUS MBAE

The term "family" no longer means the same to all people. Today, talk about family is likely to elicit the question: What kind of family?". This is because the term ‘family’ has come to mean a host of related, and sometimes unrelated, situations.

Traditionally, family in its narrower sense, was founded on marriage. Family usually meant a man, his wife, and their offspring. This is no longer the case. Family in modern day understanding need not include marriage (at least not in the sense in which it has always been understood). Thus for example, the phenomenon of single motherhood, which has become so commonplace in this country, cannot be excluded from the consideration of familyhood. Here is a situation where marriage may never have taken place or where it may never have been intended or even envisaged or desired. Yet the single mother and her children certainly constitute a family of some kind.

Less common, but just as real, is the single-father family. Whether this comes about as a result of divorce, death, or by choice, the father and his child/children do constitute a family. Few people would have any problems classifying these two situations in the same category with the more common father-mother-and child family group. They may, however, find it a little more problematic to classify a situation where two individuals of the same sex (say two men) live together claiming to have entered a marriage relationship. The situation-gets even more complicated when the two individuals (two men or two women) are ceremoniously pronounced "man and wife" and when some respectable churchman warns that "what God has put together..."

In this article we shall limit ourselves to a discussion of the family as traditionally understood in the African context. Among most African peoples, the family was considered to consist of male and female parents and their offspring. Among the Ameru, for instance, the family was often the standard by which a man’s success was gauged. A man who sought leadership (or who had leadership thrust upon him) was entirely judged by his ability to organize, govern and keep his family together. One who could lead his family, it was believed, could lead the society (which was no more than a wider family). The corollary was also true. If one could not manage a family he could not be trusted to manage the community.

An unmarried man, no matter how intelligent, good or brave, was worth little to society. When such a man died he could not be accorded a dignified burial as he was worth nothing in the eyes of the community. He was a curse and disgrace to the society.

A good man and a leader is first and foremost a good father and husband. A man’s success is measured by, among other things, his success or failure in handling his household. If the family was involved in a scandalous situation, every member of that family was held in scorn by the rest of the community, but it was the father who was blamed most for having failed in his responsibilities. If he had been more careful, had been more responsible, had taken his duties more seriously, the scandal might not have occurred. Although the wife, the daughters or sons maybe blamed for immediate mistakes, in the final analysis, it is the father who must take the blame for the failures of his family. In the same vein, it is also the farther who takes full credit for every family glory.

In the traditional setting, therefore, not only did the husband have to take an active part in the life of his family; he literally sanctioned, directed and supervised its every important happening.

The husband and father was part and parcel of the family. He was an active participant, not an observer, much less an absentee director.

At this point the reader may be tempted to note that the traditional society was characterized by a clear division of labour, and that within that arrangement the wife ended up doing much more than the husband within the family. We cannot but agree with this observation. It is probably true that the wife did much more around the family home than the husband as she still does today. While this may be so, we must remember that in addition to his usual duties, the husband/father had the very special duty to make sure that every member of the family performed his/her duty as assigned. The overall effect of this arrangement was to ensure that no father willingly abandoned his family or left it unattended.

As we contemplate the situation of the family today and wonder about its future, the tendency is to compare the present with the past. In that respect, the subtitle of this article, "Where are the fathers?" takes on a significant meaning. The fact which requires no evidence is that today's husbands (fathers) are no longer as involved in family life as their predecessors used to be.

The idea is sometimes muted of a God as a retired engineer. According to this theory, after God had created the universe and seen that His entire creation was good, He took off from the universe leaving it to develop and run along predetermined lines. Now, there is a striking parallel between the retired engineer-god and many of the fathers in our families today. Like the famed god, once these fathers have sired their offspring, once they have put together a family they do a disappearing act (sometimes physically, sometimes only figuratively) but in both cases their withdrawal and non-involvement is seriously felt.

One obvious area where fathers have been absent is in the upbringing and education of their children. Today, many parents are under the illusion that once they have paid the school fees, taken their children to expensive schools, and provided them with their material needs, they have done their part. They mistake formal education for an all-round education. The truth is that our children need to learn much more than they can ever hope to do at school. Parents need to develop air intimate relationship with their children, get to understand them so that they can guide and counsel them through the difficult stages of growth and maturity, and to demonstrate to them (through examples) the values in which they themselves (the parents) believe.

But this can happen only if parents themselves have something that they value and are committed to. As it happens, there are far too many parents (read fathers) who are caught between conflicting values and who therefore have nothing worthwhile to teach to their children: "nobody gives what they do not have". This partly, explains why parents have delegated even their most delicate responsibilities to the teachers. Few parents have any real idea of what their children are taught at school. Nor indeed do they seem to care.

Presently, a debate on sex education is raging in Kenya. The Ministry of Education has announced its intention to introduce sex education in our public schools. While most parents would not care a hoot what their children are taught, a few have voiced their concern and questioned the suitability of teachers (some of them very immoral) as the source of sex education for their children. The question is not whether kids ought to learn about sex. It is rather what they ought to be taught about it and by whom. This is a good example of the uncertainty in which we of the modern times live compared to those who lived before us. In the traditional society such a debate would have been impossible because roles and duties were very clearly spelt out.

Among the Ameru, as indeed among many other traditional societies, the head of the household knew exactly what, should be taught to whom, by whom, when, how and why. Whether he delegated his responsibilities to another person or carried them out himself, the father was

always in control of the situation. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about today's father. The problem with today's father is that he is unable to lead himself, to be in control of himself - a necessary condition for leading others.

Sadly, many parents have lost touch with their children. It is not unusual to hear parents say that they no longer understand their children. The children in their turn complain that their parents are old fashioned, outdated, narrow-minded, conservative and even sadistic. While the generation gap seems to grow wider day by day, it appears to be particularly the case between and the fathers and the children. It is generally true to say that mothers spend much snore time with their children than do the fathers. Whatever the reason for this situation, it appears that there has been a reversal of roles. The traditional role of the father as the head of the family has been reversed so that even though nominally he still claims headship, his duties are now performed by his wife.

While many fathers are 'kept away from their families by the call of duty such as employment or service for their country, many others have simply absconded their responsibilities for unworthy motives, chief of which is excessive drinking; all of these keep them away from home and contact with their family.

The tragedy of the situation is that the role of the husband (father) cannot be easily substituted. Much has been said about the single mother and the missing father syndromes. We are told that the one-parent child lacks a role model in the missing parent. But the single-parent phenomenon must be more widespread than we at first imagine: the family in which father, mother and children live together but in which the father is hardly ever at home, or where he has no idea about the goings on in the family, is just as bad as the one in which the parent is altogether absent.

Among the Ameru, the child belonged not only to the immediate family but to the entire clan. Every adult was parent to every child. Where a parent was negligent or unable to cater for the offspring, the community was at hand to ensure that the children were well taken care of. Unfortunately, this communal aspect of responsibility has disappeared from our society (even though we need it now more than ever before). The consequence has been the alarming increase in the numbers of street children in our cities, as well as the swelling number of delinquents and psychologically maladjusted youth. As the family detaches itself from the larger society and moves from being extended to being nuclear, the role of the parents becomes more, not less, important. Parents should and must take on a greater responsibility if the family is to have any future. But if it is true that more and more parents, especially fathers, are abdicating their responsibilities, what future can there be for the African family?

In our argument so far, we have tended to suggest that the traditional way of life was good for the family. The reader may consequently feel that we are advocating a return to the past if the family is to have a future. This would be too simplistic and rather naive on our part. Conditions have changed so drastically that we cannot expect the modern family to be rnodelled on exactly the same lines as the older one. There are, however, certain values which constitute the foundation of the family and which seem not to have suffered much change over the ages. These underlying values of the African family must consciously be promoted and preserved if the family is to have a future in Africa. One of the most important, of these values is the sacredness of human life. The family is the main custodian of the life of man. It is here that life is generated and it is here too that life is preserved and nurtured. We all know that in traditional African society life was cherished. Like any other thing, life was believed to be a gift from God. No other occasion caused more joy than the birth of a girl child. Indeed, the very purpose of marriage (and the family) was to procreate. For this reason the destruction of helpless for these was unthinkable. In other words, abortion was virtually unheard of, as was any form of "mercy killing". Human dignity was accorded to all on

the sole basis of being human, that is, of possessing human fife. The respect for human life was not theoretical, but very much a practical affair.

Today, this value may not have changed in the mind of many, but it seems to have been forgotten or at least not to be taken too seriously. Life no longer seems to be treated with the sacredness that it once had. If it were, we would not be witnessing the large number of abortions that take place in our country every year. Some in our midst openly and shamelessly advocate the legalization of abortion – the cruel killing of helpless, innocent children. Whether this is done in the name of women rights, human rights, or family planning, it must be pointed out that it is anti-life, anti-African, and anti-humanity.

The misery of the street children and our general apathy towards their suffering is another indication that we may not be as serious about the preservation and quality of life as we should be. Unfortunately, it appears that in some respects we have joined in the destruction instead of preservation of life. Those who traditionally had the responsibility to ensure that life was respected have now charged sides and are the champions of destruction. There would be fewer abortions and even fewer street children if every adult (especially fathers) behaved responsibly, showed a little more concern for the welfare of their offspring. Life could be different and better if the fathers, instead of taking a back seat or watching the drama from some hideout, were actively involved in trying to uplift the conditions of life, especially of those for whom they have a natural obligation and duty.

Another value which we ought to preserve, uphold and promote is of a metaphysical nature. We alluded above to the importance of marriage for the society, the significance of this institution is entrenched in the African's understanding of reality and being. Very specifically, marriage is tied to procreation and after-life. In the traditional setting, a childless marriage was no marriage. This was the clearest statement of the purpose of marriage, namely to procreate and in the process to keep the society alive.

Traditionally, the, society was considered the meeting point for the living, the dead and those still to be born. The dead never really die as long as we, the living, keep them within our circles. That is the primary purpose and sacred mission of the family. Every new born baby is a reincarnation of some relative who has left the physical world for the "after-life". This conception of the family is extremely important. It removes parenthood from an ordinary "natural", and "instinctive" status, to one that is almost divine. When a man becomes a father of a child he acquires a new status, gains more respect among colleagues and friends precisely because of having made an important contribution to society. What is not often considered is that such a man, by virtue of his new status, shares in God's own act of creation. This is not a Christian doctrine alone, but has deep roots in the African metaphysical understanding of life.

Once we understand the importance of the institution of the family in our lives, we shall also realize what a privilege it is for parents to be entrusted with its custody. Perhaps that will restore the dignity and respect that properly belongs to the family. Therein lies the future, not only of the African, but of the whole human family.

CHAPTER 7

THE UNMARRIED AFRICAN FEMALE: DOES SHE HAVE ANY RIGHTS?

NJERI KANG'ETHE

THE PROBLEM

For quite sometimes now, the plight of the girl child, particularly in Africa, has been highlighted the world over. When there is a shortage of food in the family, it is the girl child who goes hungry because her male siblings are given preference. When money is scarce, it is the girl child who has to stop going to school, so that her brothers may be educated. And in some cultures, it is the girl child who goes through the humiliation of genital mutilation (female circumcision) with its attendant physiological and psychological trauma later in life.

What happens to this girl child when she eventually grows up? Why is there a total blackout on her plight in the later part of her life? Is this apparent lack of interest intentional, or a by-product of societal discrimination?

For most, salvation comes in the form of a wedding ring. If she is lucky and Prince Charming lives up to her dreams, she lives happily ever after, as is said. If she is not so lucky, and Prince Charming turns out to be a crook, she slips into a slightly milder form of purgatory – worse than what she would suffer if she remained single. Her only consolation may be in the children (and the more the better) that she is expected to bring forth. If they are girls, the vicious cycle continues.

In most African cultures, there was no place in the family set-up for the unmarried female. Girl children were promised to prospective husbands at birth and by the time they reached puberty were already married off. The only exceptions were the cripples, the mentally unfit, or in some rare cases those whose families were under some curse or evil spell.

With the advent of education and a change in women's status, more and more women in Africa are opting to finish their education and pursue careers before settling down to marriage. The result is that women are getting married at a more advanced age than previously, and some, due to long years of study and hard work (sometimes in foreign countries) have missed the chance of ever getting married. Others have opted to devote their lives to their careers and professions, and so remain single by choice.

Despite these drastic changes in society, the family and society seem to have been caught unawares by the emergence of the older single woman who chooses to remain single. There are no provisions made for this situation, no checks, no controls, no cushioning available to absorb any attendant cultural shock.

In the final analysis, it is the single woman who is left to take the brunt of the consequences of this state of unpreparedness, her rights as a member of the family are trampled on, her social role in the family is left in abeyance. Her right to ownership of family property is something unheard of. This punitive status exposes her to untold cultural, social, economic and psychological problems.

For instance, in Kenya, amongst the Gikuyu of the Central Province, the phenomenon of an unmarried mature woman, her socio-economic status notwithstanding, is frowned upon and treated with contempt and suspicion. She is at best ridiculed and treated as a source of

amusement. *Githomo kinene uguo ni gia ki, akorwo ari o riiko?* Literally translated this means: What is the point in her great education if she is still in her mother's kitchen, unmarried?

SOME CASES

Ciku's Case

Ciku is forty-three, and single. She is the third child in a family of five – three sons and one daughter. As one of the top consultant paediatricians in this country, she is doing well professionally, socially and financially. However, despite having everything going for her, Ciku is an unhappy woman. Before her father passed away in 1989, he made provision for Ciku in his will. He bequeathed her some property in the city, in the hope that she would develop it into a private nursing home. This was the beginning of hell for her. Her three brothers, all well-to-do professionals, contested the will claiming that their father was not in his right mind when he made it. The clan has come out in full support of the sons on the premise that in the Gikuyu tradition, women do not inherit land or immovable property, the recent repeal of the Kenya Succession Act notwithstanding.

The will was properly drawn and Ciku has more than adequate evidence that it is legally binding. Yet up till the present moment, the case has not been finalised. Although she has put up a good fight, Ciku is at the point of giving up. For one thing, she does not have the time to attend court hearings since she is very busy as a pediatrician, and has often to travel abroad to attend conferences. Besides, legal representation is extremely expensive in this country, and she has a special abhorrence for courts that are manned by men. In any case, she feels she is not really destitute and that the property in question is not worth the psychological and physical trauma she has gone through so far. In fact, the hostility she elicits from her family is beginning to take its toll on her. Her brothers and their spouses see her as a shameless and scheming predator who is trying to steal their rightful inheritance. Her illiterate old mother sees her as a rich, idle troublemaker, who derives sadistic pleasure from rocking the famiy boat. This last fact has especially drained Ciku of the necessary energy to continue the fight.

Nakalembe's Case

Nakalembe's case is slightly different from Ciku's, but equally traumatic. After finishing her undergraduate studies at the then University of East Africa, Makerere College, she and her fiancé (a faculty member in the same university) decided to defer their wedding date until she acquired a doctorate. As fate would have it, a few years later civil war broke out in Uganda. Her fiancé together with other professionals, perished at the hand of the notorious Idi Amin's regime. Nkalembe emigrated to the U. K. where she completed her studies and started to work as a veterinarian. After some time, the lure for Africa became too strong for her, and Nakalembe relinquished a lucrative job and come home to her roots. It seemed like a. dream come true for Nakalembe, now in her late fifties, to come back to Africa. She intended to buy a ranch in her native Banyoro country and practice her profession. It was to be a fitting tribute to her beloved people, the renowned pastoralists of the Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom of Uganda as well as a spiritual homecoming, a reunion with the spirits of her ancestors.

However, several problems faced Nakalembe on her return. The law regarding land tenure had changed drastically since her sojourn abroad. Her family, at one time proud landowners, were declared squatters overnight and had to redeem their land from the crown in order to acquire title to it. This was not a big deal for Nakalembe who had saved a substantial amount of money and

had the added advantage of having access to foreign currency. She redeemed the family land and even bought off several other people who were unable to raise the requisite funds or were unwilling to settle in Banyoroland.

However, fresh shock awaited her when she went to the relevant land office to collect the title deed. She was informed that the title deed for the land she had bought could not be issued in her name because she was an unattached female.

Nakalembe was not going to take that lying down. After a long protracted legal battle and intervention from the Ministry of Women and Culture, Nakalembe has acquired the elusive title deed to her property. The pain and anguish of fighting is long forgotten, but the scars are there and she is still feeling the hurt.

Comforts Case

Comfort has hidden her treasures where they cannot be moth-eaten and her problems have nothing to do with earthly possessions. She is an ordained church minister in one of the major churches in West Africa, as well as a professor of theology in one of the universities in that region. She is the first born in a family of five girls.

Yet in spite of the fact that she is held in very high regard both by her congregation and by the other academics, her own family treats her as a child. When important family decisions are made, her opinions are often ignored. Her own father, a fairly well educated person, makes it a point to involve his nephews rather than her in family decisions. Any opinion by Comfort is not considered as worth much and has to be ratified by her male cousins.

Although Comfort seems to have decided to let sleeping dogs lie on the homefront, she is determined to fight this injustice using other powerful means at her disposal: her pen, and her clerical collar. From her pulpit emanate fiery sermons that go a long way to educating her congregation on the need to he truly liberated from all forms of bondage, gender discrimination included. Using her indomitable pen, Comfort has written volumes on the rights of woman: be she a daughter, a wife, a concubine, a mother, or a grandmother. Her efforts are beginning to bear fruit in that both men and women are becoming sensitised to gender discrimination, and are beginning to address themselves to it.

CONCLUSION

If that is the lot of the educated woman, how much more is the uneducated, average woman going through? It is a long road to travel for the single woman and indeed for any disadvantaged person, and the struggle must continue. It is a battle that cannot be fought by one group alone. Everyone must be involved: mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, etc. A house divided is a house fallen. If a member of the family suffers, the whole family suffers with her.

It is imperative that society address itself to the plight of the adult single woman. The church, which has a great following in Africa today, should be in the forefront of affirming the rights of women. There are several lobby groups in Kenya and other countries, which are addressing themselves to the need for legislation to accommodate the status of the older single woman in the family. Churches as well as governments should support such groups. Private citizens should also join the corporate effort to bring about a change for the better in society. With everyone joining hands, we look forward to the day when no woman, whatever her marital status, shall be deprived of her basic human rights.

CHAPTER 8
PROVERBS FOR TRANSFORMATION WORKING WITH CAREGIVERS

JOHN EYBEL

The Bugando Medical Centre in Mwanza, Tanzania, provides a 16-week training program to pastoral caregivers. During the training program, they serve as chaplain interns in the patient wards and write reports on interviews with the patients. I supervise these reports in group and individual sessions, generally consisting of 10 or 12 persons. About one third are ordained or in training for ordination. In this 16 week program most participants change from offering pastoral care that is a bit heavy on advice and opinion to becoming listeners in a more reflective and responsive mode of being with the patients. In this period, they learn to rely less on giving advice and more on the quality of their presence as a tool for their work as helping professionals, to facilitate this growth in the trainees, Swahili proverbs and sayings are becoming increasingly useful to me. I would like to share some of this experience in what follows.

ACTION AND REFLECTION METHOD OF LEARNING

Accessing their personal experience is difficult at first for participants in this clinical course. Many are used to a more cognitive or directive learning process. The conventional wisdom has been *Ukupigao ndio ukufunzao.* (What beats you is what teaches you.) Now, a more autonomous, experience-based and problem-oriented method of learning (action and reflection) calls for increased activity on the part of the learner: *Kila ndege huruka kwa bawa lake.* (Each bird flies by its own wing.) *Ndege mwigo hana* mazoea. (A bird that imitates others does not get used to a place.*) Asiyeuliza, hanalo ajifunzalo*. (He who asks no questions has nothing to learn.) *Atangaye sana na jua ajua.* (The one who wanders around a lot by day, knows.)

The Learning Group

Am I safe in this group? In this hospital? Will I be accepted? Students ask themselves these questions and tend to avoid risky self-disclosure until they come to value personal growth more than their safety. I have invited self-disclosure with the proverb: *Mficha uchi, hazai.* (The one who hides nakedness will never have a child.) Students come to the course looking for tips and handy advice on dealing with sick people. They come to realize that the course concerns itself with something much more personal and individually authentic, and with what might be unique to one's self. They are thrown on to patient wards and into a human relations laboratory with little to go on by way of instruction. To make matters more difficult, they are then challenged to be personally responsible for what happens, all of which becomes grist for the mill of self-awareness. Gonga *gogo, usikilize mlio wake.* (Knock a log in order to hear the sound it makes.)

Student caregivers have one class together in which they practice helping skills in a workshop format. They present real personal issues to one another for exploration and problem clarification. Sometimes, for the sake of the exercise and to avoid real personal involvement, a caregiver will present something out of the past, for example, a long troublesome bus*safari* from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza. Soon the futility of discussing this as a present problem is apparent and the *safari* is dismissed humorously with *Mavi ya kale havanuki* (Old droppings do not stink) or with *Yaliyopita*

si ndwele, tuga nge yaliyomo na yajayo. (Let's not worry about what is in the past, let's concern ourselves with curing future ills).

The scrutiny brought to bear on personal functioning in the wards and in the training group can be disconcerting to some. It is scary to take a stand on how you see a patient or peer ("he speaks in rambling sentences") or to hear their feedback offered to you ("if I were the patient I would get tired of hearing your advice"). A student who is sensitive to criticism might back down on or change the story about what he/she felt, saw, said or did. In figurative language: *Ulimi hauna mfupa*. (A tongue has no bone.)

Sometimes a student will choose to report on a satisfying interview in which things went smoothly in a helping relationship. I invite them to thank God for the successful ministry and then to turn their attention to difficult relationships (with patients or fellow caregivers) in which they stand to learn new and more challenging ways of relating to others. In action and reflection, problems are their friends encountered in the processor learning. *Kupotea njia ndiko kujua njia*. (To lose the way is indeed to know the way.) *Asiyekubali kushindwa si mshindani* (The ex-ample, a peer in the training group, one who admits no defeat is no competitor.) visor presses patiently: *Hamna! Hamna! Ndimo Kujikwaa si kuanguka, bali ni kwenda mbele*. (It is not there! It is not there! To stumble is not to fall down, but is to go forward where it definitely is.)

In discussing patient interviews together, students discover differences among themselves: strengths and weaknesses to be identified and reflected upon. Strengths are to be celebrated and exploited; weaknesses may be an opportunity for personal growth, or limitations to be accepted. A proverb couches the pain of personal limitations and unfavorable comparisons in the context of a divine plan. *Aliyekupa wewe kiti, ndiye aliyenipa mimi kumbi*. (He who gave you a throne, is the one who gave me a coconut husk (to sit on)

Learning Empathy

More often than not, the problems that a student faces in pastoral care are challenges to greater empathy. The principle is easy to accept: *Kitanda usichokilalia, hujui kunguni wake*. (You cannot know the bugs of a bed that you have not slept on.) *Hucheka kovu asiyefikwa na jeraha*. (The one who laughs at a scar hasn't been wounded yet.)

Students are encouraged to notice non-verbal cues to a patient's feeling or a peer's response (as when a patient covers her head with a blanket when approached by the caregiver, or when a young male caregiver spends a disproportionate amount of time with a young woman patient): *Mapenzi ni kikohozi, hayawezi kufichika*. (Love is like a cough, it cannot be hidden).

Often enough, caregivers see their shadows in the behaviour of patients and peer group members. (The shadow represents behaviour which a person would unconsciously condemn or deny in themselves.) They judge this behaviour in others and so they show up short on empathy with patients and peers. For example, a caregiver meets a sick mother on the ward who is furious that her husband hasn't come to the hospital with food or some other item. The caregiver, confronted with her angry shadow and without adequate empathy, advises the mother against anger. The supervisor's job is to help the caregiver to accept that bit of anger, starting with self to access her own experience of being angry, and then to take another look at the angry mother. Proverbs help a student own up to the shadow in oneself. *Nyani haoni kundule, huliona la mwenziwe*. (A baboon doesn't see his own backside, he sees his companion's). *Ajabu ya ngamia kucheka nundu ya ng'ombe*. (It's amazing that a camel laughs at the hump on the cow.)

A trainee will be surprised that attention has been turned on him or her and away from the case, and will often deny any such shadow behaviour in themselves (anger toward a spouse or close associate, for example, a peer in the training group). A good supervisor presses patiently: *Hamna! Hamna Ndimo mliwamo*. (It is not there! That is where it definitely is.)

Encountering Resistance

Sometimes a caregiver lacks adequate empathy and fails to understand or accept the world of the patient. A caregiver might resist a patient's doubt about whether or not he is getting adequate medical care in the hospital; or resist a woman's long-standing bitterness toward a man who has neglected her. A caregiver's agenda can keep him from really listening to the patient. "How can I get through to this person? She won't listen," a caregiver says, complaining that a patient refuses to listen to direction given by God, the church, or the pastor. A supervisor challenges the caregiver to take a more empathetic approach with a proverb: *Kila kufuli ina ufunguo wake*. (Every padlock has its key.) *Kila mtu kwa mtuwe*. (Every person is reached through another.) *Kuambiana kupo, kusikilizana hapana*. (There is plenty of advice-giving, but no listening.) "I can't help her if she is so argumentative," the caregiver insists. A supervisor will refuse to take part in the blame and might add a proverb as a commentary: *Mbaazi ukikosa maua, usingizia jua*. (When a pigeon-pea shrub has no flowers, it blames the sun.) For success in this caregiver-patient stand off, the caregiver must see the uselessness in insisting that the patient change. The supervisor might want to discourage such a powerless strategy. The proverb says: *Fimbo ya mbali kaiui nyoka*. (A stick which is not at hand does not kill a snake.)

To console a caregiver who is faced with a patient that she would not have chosen, a supervisor might ask: *Ulipendalo hupati, hupata ujaliwalo*. (What you want you don't get, you get what you are granted.) Caregivers do not always meet persons who behave in the way that they would choose, but they can always choose to accept persons in the way that they behave and to look for possibilities there: *Mshoni hachagui nguo*. (A tailor does not choose the cloth.)

Caregivers often attempt to manage patients' feeling and solve their problems for them. Allowing others to learn from their own experiences requires considerable faith. Such faith comes to light in the proverb: *Mwana akililia wembe mpe*. (If a child cries for a razor blade, give it to him.) Sometimes a student will refuse to accept the situation the way it is, and imagines what might have happened so that it would be different. For example, "If Maria had not complained so bitterly about John's coming home at 3 a.m., he would not have beaten her so severely. She should have waited until he was sober." While that is good reasoning when faced with a severely beaten Maria, it is not what she needs in contemplating her next step with John. This point is clear with the proverb: *Maji yaliyomwagika hayazoleki.* (Spilt water cannot be gathered up.)

COPING WITH CONFLICTS

Sooner or later, both with their patients on the wards and in the group with their training peers, students are faced with conflict, and with the option of accepting or condemning it. Proverbs help bring anger, hatred, and enmity out of the shadows. *Vikombe vikikaa pamoja havina budi kugongana.* (If cups are put together they are bound to hit one another.)*Wagombanao ndio wapatanao.* (The ones who quarrel are the ones who reconcile.)

Most of us who are caregivers, pastors, religious and other church workers, tend toward the highly socialized end of the spectrum. We've depended on rules and social conventions to regulate

our lives and we expect that it is the same for others. Only later do we develop the skill needed to negotiate the conflict when, for example, someone in the house plays his radio at 5 a.m. and awakens others, and there is no rule against it.

The skill of self-assertion can be confused with blame. Trouble could well ensue. Or, some might think that self-assertion means forcing their way on others. They might choose to withdraw with shades of resentment. Proverbs help foster the skill of making requests. *Mwombaji siyo* kama mwizi. (Someone who asks is not like a thief.) *Aulizaye hajamkasirishaye yote.* (One who asks has not yet angered anyone.) Eleza *haja upate haja.* (Say what you need, get what you need.)

Accompanying One Another in the Personal Worlds We Create

Caregivers are trained to find out what it is like to be in the world or in the proverbial bed of their patients. In discussing patient interviews with their peers, they have the double task of understanding not only the world of a patient featured in a report, but also the world of their fellow caregiver who conducted the patient interviews, and is presenting the case to the group. The give and take of group feedback and discussion brings to light what everyone sees in the world and what limits, distortions and creations are in a single persons world.

A proverb serves in helping caregivers to become responsible for the limits and distortions of a personal world, especially their own. *Msema pweke hakosi.* (One who talks to himself cannot be wrong.) A proverb also makes clear that what we see on our television screen coincides with the channel we choose: *Lisilokuwapo moyoni halipo machoni*. (That which is not in one's heart is not in one's eyesight.) Heart, which appears in the above proverb, serves us as a seminal word in the process of transformation. We all live out our personal histories in which our vision was acquired according to the choices we have made. Hence the proverb: *Mtoto umleavyo ndivyo akuavyo*. (As you raise a child, so will he grow.)

Caregivers are invited into the worlds of adult people who have grown to see themselves, some as blessed, some as deprived. From their heart they tend to accentuate one aspect or the other. Two proverbs illustrate this psychological phenomenon: *l., Apewaye ndiye aongezwaye.* (The one who is given is indeed the one given more.) 2. *Asiye na bahati habahatiki.* (An unlucky person never becomes lucky.) A caregiver (supervisor or student) who exercises genuine authority, takes the opportunity to supply the heart or the faith intention (as in the proverb below) for an unseen blessing. The proverb says: *Nia njema ni tabibu, nia mbaya huharibu*. (Good intention is a doctor, bad intention damages.) The caregiver brings good news, not for vociferous preaching, but for quiet knowing while present to another. The good intention or heart of a caregiver shows up creatively in the language he uses for another's world. A proverb playfully announces: *Akipenda, chongo huita kengeza.* (He who loves calls a one-eyed person just a squinter.)

A skillful caregiver, faced with another's world of trouble, can create with language a new frame or context in which an overwhelming problem can be seen in a manageable perspective. A proverb suggests a bigger picture perhaps in which to endure a marital dispute: *Mqii ya* moto hayachomi nyumba. (Hot water does not burn down a house.)

In one of our programs, a young novice visiting men-patients who loved to debate with one another on the Bible, was asked for a spontaneous explanation of the first chapter of St. John's gospel. Never having taken a Scripture class, and knowing very little about John's gospel, she went to her supervisor to say that she didn't think she would be able to do this course on pastoral care. She was pleased to know that she would be just fine saying the rosary with dying patients

and that the house of caregiving was bigger than she thought. She put the Bible discussion into the hands of the seminarians in the program.

A wise caregiver, supervisor or hospital chaplain will know when painful past events come to distort the people seen in one's present world. *Mwenye kovu usidhani kapoa*. (Don't think the owner of a scar has healed.) An abused child, for example, might someday have some vengeful feelings to reveal to, or to transfer onto, a caregiver. Resentments for parents, former teachers 'and authorities can also lay hidden in the shadow of a learner. Together with empathy, caregivers challenge growth in the way persons shape their worlds. They will always take a patient's stand for new possibilities that originate from within: *Penye nia, pana njia*. (Where there is a will, there is a way.) *Subira yavuta heri.* (Patience brings blessing.)

This growing mode of being means that persons are freer on the inside and are no longer caught up in reacting negatively to what they see on the surface: *Heshima kitu cha bure.* (Respect is a free gift.) And with a world now filled with possibilities, they are much more responsible for their own feelings and actions: *Kozi mwana mandanda, kulala na njaa kupenda.* (A goshawk is skillful, if it sleeps hungry it is by choice.)

CONCLUSION: CHOOSING PROVERBS

Proverbs have been useful in building awareness of one's presence or mode of being in relationships and in having a chuckle about it. The most effective proverbs for supervisory interventions are the well-known proverbs that students don't have to think about. Not-so-well-known proverbs that I use repeatedly achieve a well-known status in the course and work as well. With trainees I avoid those proverbs which might be easily understood primarily for teaching moral value and which keep me in, a one-up position, a less than desirable model for caregivers. For example, *Kueha Mungu si kilemba cheupe.* (The fear of God is not the wearing of a white turban.) This seems to have more agenda on hypocrisy to it than a more earthy and accepting proverb that allows a place for our human duplicity: *Kuchamba kwingi kuondoka na mavi*. (To wash thoroughly after toilet is still to leave with human waste.)

CHAPTER 9
‘YOU FAKED ME OUT’: SAYINGS OF EAST AFRICAN URBAN YOUTH

J.G. HEALEY

Are African proverbs a relic of the past? Are they merely quaint expressions that will gradually die out with new generations of people? Do African youth, especially in the cities, ignore proverbs? Some people maintain that African proverbs will have a lasting influence. Others say that they are old-fashioned and will slowly pass out of use. For many years I have been a member of cultural research teams in Tanzania and Kenya. In the last three years these teams have conducted research on the use of proverbs in the cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. It has been a particular challenge not just to identify popular sayings and proverbs in general, but those used in particular by young people. African urban youth’s popular sayings, especially their street language, can change from month to month, and even from one section of the city to the next.

Our research in East Africa shows clearly that traditional African proverbs are not so popular with young people, especially not in urban situations. The research also indicates that many traditional African proverbs will gradually fall out of use and be forgotten. But other proverbs and sayings will find new meaning and new life in contemporary contexts in Africa itself and worldwide. Significantly, African urban youth use certain of the traditional African proverbs and sayings in different contexts and with different meanings than adults. At the same time, new African proverbs, sayings, maxims, slogans, and idioms are being created to fit contemporary situations.

SOURCES OF NEW AFRICAN PROVERBS AND SAYINGS

New African proverbs, and saying originate from various situations and environments. We have identified four such environments:

1. Young people coin new proverbs and sayings (or use old proverbs and sayings in a new way) in writing popular songs, plays and novels. Examples, including some titles and lyrics translated from Swahili, are: No problem. The real thing will happen later. The beauty of a wife is her character, not her appearance (on the goodness of a wife). Good behaviour is your defense (best weapon). If you said it wouldn’t happen why has it happened? (part of a song used in a marriage ceremony). If you get a new pot, do not throw away the old pot (advice from a friend in which the pot refers to a boyfriend or a girlfriend). I am the lyrical gangster (a phrase in the popular Kenyan hit song Boombastic).

2. Taxi cab drivers, small van drivers and small private bus drivers make up new proverbs and sayings while chatting together. They have developed a distinctive urban subculture around their vehicles called "daladalas" in Dar es Salaam and "matatus" in Nairobi. Some of these new sayings become slogans and maxims painted on their vehicles. Examples are: Highway to Heaven. Kenyan Roulette. Third World Generation. Street Talk. More than Conquerors. Exterminator. Total Madness. Oasis of Love. High Voltage.

3. Other sources are new sayings on khangas (colourful cotton cloth), T-shirts, posters, drawings and greeting cards.

4. Street language. I will describe the latter two sources in more detail later,

Knowledge of Proverbs among Urban Youth

Over the last three years I have had informal conversations with African young people in their late teens and twenties in both Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Everyone tells me that they have forgotten most of the proverbs in their mother tongue. This is especially true of young people who were born and raised in the city. For example, entering a doctor's office in Nairobi, I heard the receptionist chatting with a patient in the Luo language which is used in both Kenya and Tanzania. Later the receptionist told me that she was born in Nyanza Province, but moved to Nairobi as a young girl. When I asked her what Luo proverbs she knew, the young woman answered: "Oh, right now I can't remember even one proverb in my mother tongue." Certainly a dramatic change in one generation!

What is more serious is that some of these African youth say that the traditional values and wisdom of their African culture do not speak to their contemporary African world, which has become urban and secularized. Several went so far as to say that the teachings of their elders (main1y coming from a rural agricultural society and exemplified in African proverbs) are irrelevant, and are not applicable to today's urban African world.

Research among the Gikuyu ethnic group in Nairobi, Kenya, indicates that the traditional Gikuyu customs and oral traditions are being lost at a rate of 60 percent in each succeeding generation so if a particular generation knew 100 proverbs, the next generation will know 40, and the following generation may know only ten or fewer of these proverbs. Traditionally, grandmothers told Gikuyu stories and proverbs to the young children, but now many of these women live in Nairobi, have a salaried job and have less time to spend with their grandchildren.

On three occasions I interviewed Gikuyu youth in Nairobi in their early twenties. They described the dramatic shifts in three, successive generations: their generation, their parents' and their grandparents'. These youth prefer English and Swahili to Gikuyu. They want modern things rather than the traditions and customs of their African culture and are influenced by Western trends in music, clothes and lifestyle. They also prefer contemporary sayings to traditional proverbs.

POPULAR MODERN SAYINGS AND PROVERBS

In the task of practical evangelisation, we have researched many "modern sayings" ("*misemo* ya *kisasa"* or "*misemo ya kileo"* in Swahili) which appeal especially to youth and to people living in urban areas in Africa. These sayings are usually short, catchy and up-to-date. Some well-known examples of modern sayings translated from Swahili are: Even though I am a simple person, I will not lower myself. My beloved. Freedom and justice. Home is best. I have returned to fulfill my duty. It [marriage] needs patience. The month is at the corner. Refugees are our friends. We are still young, let's enjoy life. Unity is hard.

There are also traditional proverbs that take on new meanings in new contexts. A popular Swahili proverb is: *Heri pazia kuliko bendera*. A good English meaning is: Better a. curtain hanging motionless than a flag blowing in the wind. While this proverb has been used for many years, it has acquired a new understanding in the contexts of AIDS education and awareness. The proverb is now used mainly to caution young people to stay with one partner (one curtain in the house) rather than "play around" with many partners (flag blowing to and fro).

African youth continue to use familiar African proverbs and sayings, especially about personal relationships (boy-girl relationships and between friends of the same sex). Some examples are: Mountains never meet but people do. If you want something from under the bed, you must bend

down to get it. This traditional proverb is used by African urban youth in a specific context. A boy uses this proverb in advising a friend that it takes time, effort and money (buying expensive gifts) to keep a particular girlfriend. To make a mistake is not a mistake; but to repeat the mistake is a mistake. A girl uses this proverb in advising a friend that one mistake or failure by her boyfriend should not discourage her. She should patiently endure in the relationship.

At present there is an upsurge in theatre and drama in Uganda. Plays are being written based on African proverbs. There is a Ganda proverb which says: One who keeps saying 'I will listen (obey)' will be cooked-with the corncob. The proverb is about a grub that feeds on corncobs underneath the leaf. It never leaves the cob so eventually gets cooked with it. The theme is warning against putting off something until it is too late. This proverb is used for a stubborn person who does not accept advice and warnings and finally comes to grief. The proverb became the theme of a very popular Ganda play called *Ndiwulira* about a young man who does not listen to advice about his personal lifestyle and relationships, gets AIDS and dies. The play has been performed throughout Uganda as part of AIDS education and awareness programs. It has been made into a video and shown on national television.

Sayings on East African Clothes

East African khangas (colourful cotton cloth with many designs) use a variety of African sayings, idioms, proverbs and riddles in Swahili and English. They must be understood in their cultural and social contexts. It is important to understand that many of the sayings are intended to be a commentary on the lives of East African women and their complex relationships. Many of the, sayings are messages (hidden or otherwise) that women communicate to each other. Many of these sayings are also used on T-shirts, posters, drawings and greeting cards.

Our Research Committees in Dar es Salaam, Musoma and Bujora (Mwanza), Tanzania, have systematically collected 226 of these sayings. The following are the English translations of some of the Swahili sayings on khangas popular with youth in urban areas in East Africa.

1. *Education is an ocean* (that is, it has no end).
2. *Good luck begins in the morning.*
3. *How did you know this if you did not go behind my back?*
4. *If you give to me, I will receive, I* am not *used to begging.*
5. *If you said it'wouldn't happen why has it happened?*
6. *I knew you would say it.* (Used after a relationship gets out into the open.)
7. *I'm not jealous. I just feel bad.*
8. *Let it happen whatever might* be. (Used by a friend when you lose your boyfriend or girlfriend.)
9. *Lover, turn off the light. The original Swahili is. Shemeji zima taa, and is based on an old popular song entitled: Shemeji, shemeji, mwazima taa, by the Cuban Mirimba Band of Morogoro. Tanzania*. (Used especially by youthful hooligans and "toughs.")
10. *The messenger is not killed.* (Used in passing messages in love affairs.)
11. *The patient person eats ripe fruit.*
12. *Spend money recklessly.* (Used by youth after getting their monthly salary.)
13. *Thank you for your good deeds to me*.
14. *There is no guardian like a mother.*
15. *There is no secret between two people.*

16. *To give is something of the heart, not riches.*

17. *To keep complaining won't help.* (Used by boys and girls when someone has "stolen" their boyfriend/girlfriend).

18. *You are not a loving person; you don't remember good deeds.* (Used especially by girls.)

19. *You will die poor if you rely on relatives.*

20. *You will exhaust the butcheries while all meat tastes the same*. (This crude expression is what one boy says to another boy who is "playing around.")

21. *You will get hurt by talking behind other people's backs.*

In analysing these sayings and proverbs, a clear pattern emerges. As several young people in Dar es Salaam explained to me, many of these expressions concern love affairs and problems in girl-boy relationships: jealousy, envy, hatred, a young couple break up, a young couple coming back together again, etc.

Street Language

There are many sayings, idioms, slogans, local and slang expressions that belong to the contemporary "street language" (referred in Swahili as "lugha ya mitaani" [ital]) of the popular urban youth culture. Some examples are: The government is on vacation. Home of peace. Solidarity (charity) walk. Just hanging around. Fast, fast. Life is exciting. Cool. Fit.

Most street language has a meaning or communicates something in a particular context. Here are five more examples which include the original Swahili.

1. *Umeniacha kwenye mataa*. (You have left me at the [red] lights. Meaning: you left me behind in the dust. You faked me out, that is, you fooled me. A fiancé(e) or a boyfriend/girlfriend who has been left or "dumped" may use this saying. It also can be used by someone who has worked on a joint project with a partner and has been left penniless by that person.

2. *Walala hoi*. (They [those people] sleep exhausted.) Ordinary people who work hard from early in the morning until late at night in the never-ending struggle to survive. This saying is used for all age groups including the youth. It refers to poor working class people who work long hours, have a dull job, get a low salary, have little to show for it, are tired at the end of the day, and have little to relax and enjoy life. An example is a porter who carries heavy loads all day. The saying can also refer to people who have two or three jobs just to make ends meet. These jobs will stretch through the whole day and even part of the night. It can also refer to the "oppressed poor" in a political sense.

3. *Umeme haujakatika*. (The electric wires have not been cut; they are still live.) Also, *Amekanyaga mawaya/waya za umeme*. (A person has stepped on electrical wires). These two sayings are a warning against playing with the "live wires" AIDS (casual "sleeping around" and unprotected sex) because they are packed with enough "voltage" to kill.

4. *Amechacha*. (A person who has fermented and got spoiled.) Used to describe a person who is broke, that is, doesn't have any money.

5. *Amechemka*. (A person who has boiled over or dry). Used to describe a person who has failed achieve his or her goal. This example of street language evolved in the urban milieu of old beat up taxis and rundown small buses. Using the analogy of a radiator that has boiled over, the saying refers to a person who has not succeeded. It also can refer to someone who does not have any money.

TOWARDS THE FUTURE

In analysing the various examples described above, several observations can be made. While East African Youth have their own language, whether it be street language or even "sheng" (a mixture of Swahili and English), they blend the new and the old. Many expressions are their own style of communication, their own "in" language, different kinds of "hip" language that can be superficial and fleeting. But many of their expressions express values, such as those related to the importance of good human relationships.

If today's African young people – particularly in cities – are less and less grounded in their traditional cultures, then a relevant African Christianity is challenged to speak to this emerging culture, to this new generation and to their new African vales. This integrated approach is expressed by a group of African theologians thus:

Inculturation should draw from the traditional African values that continued to influence the people' lives and their worldview. At the same time it must draw from the recent African experience, brought about by contacts, rapid change and the entire socio-economic and political realities in Africa and elsewhere.*

It is clear that urbanization is one of the best possible tests for inculturation in Africa. Towns and cities will be the proving ground for the survival and redefinition of African culture. The traditional African wisdom of proverbs and sayings will continue to speak to universal experience. Various forms of African oral literature, including songs and modern sayings, are an "enduring wisdom". But we are challenged of find new applications to them in our contemporary world.

* *Cast away fear: a Contribution to the African Synod.* Supplement to *New people*, March-April 1994, p. 10.

CHAPTER 10
UNDERSTANDING THE ART OF AFRICA
GEORGE MACINNES

MAJOR THEMES

When we speak of "the arts of Africa", we are referring to an incredibly rich and varied body both plastic (mainly sculptured) and performing arts, Africa is a continent of some 400 million people.

More than 800 languages are spoken south of the Sahara desert, each of them expressing a different culture and experience of life as well as a unique body of artistic output.

Should one attempt to survey all the artistic and performing arts of even one segment of this continent (east, west, central or south), he or she would be overwhelmed by both the diversity and the sheer quantity of output.

For that reason it is necessary for the writer on African art to select and choose. One rnust select certain themes common to large groups of culturally related peoples, themes such as ancestor veneration, initiation rites or masks and masquerades. One must emphasize certain prominent examples which have proven representative of the best works produced in a given cultural area. Such important themes and representative examples may of themselves afford insights into general principles underlying much of African art as well as some of the motives responsible for such prodigious output.

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The student of African art must survey a broad spectrum of prominent examples from the art of nomadic pastoralists to the art of settled agriculturalists. He must treat the palace art of the great kingdoms as well as the religious art of ritual, magic and the secret societies. In this regard it is interesting to note that one of the most popular events in the last International Festival of Black Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in Lagos, Nigeria, was the new competition in traditional ritual. This was the first time that a particular classification was open to all participants, and in fact many countries came unprepared to compete. Yet it was this event which drew the largest crowds and generated the greatest popular interest.

Among the most prominent themes which have inspired artistic output in this continent, one must give pride of place to veneration for t*he ancestors. Images* of the ancestors recur in many shapes and forms. This was to be expected in societies which honoured tradition and looked for inspiration from the past, the ancestors were there, lending the weight of their authority to custom and tradition. Any particular group's myth of origin has also provided a rich source of inspiration for artistic endeavour. Both in the plastic and performing arts, legends represent legitimate source of artistic expression in traditional society.

The theme of religion has played a prominent role in the arts of Africa. Many ethnic groups across the continent adhere to the type of religious belief called "animism". ('Anima' is the Latin

word meaning "life" or "soul".) An animistic religion believes that many objects in nature possess some inner life force or vitality all their own. Animistic beliefs have provided a rich source of inspiration for many traditional African artists. Various objects and forces in nature are personified as nature spirits, water spirits or the reincarnation of long dead culture heroes. Thus we have the spirit of the mountain, the river or the forest grove.

So, for example, the woodcarver, before cutting down the tree selected for an important drum, carving or mask, first begs for pardon and offers sacrifices or pours libations to the spirit living within it. Later on, the finished sculpture itself may take on a life force of its own, something West Africans might call "Nyima" or the power to work its own will in society. It is in these ways that the beliefs of animism have expressed themselves in African art.

On the other hand, the African artist who feels free to portray some idealized ancestor or intermediary spirit, may rarely, if ever, portray God the creator. The creator God in many African myth of origin, is a distant God, one who may have been present at the very beginning but soon withdrew to his own realms and his own interests. He is no longer immediately involved in the affairs of men. There have been ethnic groups in Africa and even classes of people, for example, women and children, who feared to pronounce his name. For reason such as those, God the creator has not been considered a proper subject of African art, and will seldom, if ever, be so portrayed.

One final theme which recurs in the traditional art of this continent is that of the totem animal. The totem of a clan is some animal with which that particular lineage had established a special relationship in the distant past. Somewhere in legendary history that animal may have helped or saved an original ancestor, thus establishing that special relationship between man and animal, which we call totem. Once the totem has become a symbol of group identity, we must expect it to appear in African art as some union or correlation between man and a special animal.

Even a cursory consideration of certain recurrent themes in African art, themes such as the ancestors, the myth of origin, the belief of animism and the clan totem already offers some insight into those major symbols, shapes and correlations in the art of Africa.

THE TRADITIONAL ARTIST IN AFRICA

Who were these master craftsmen at work producing the traditional arts of Africa? In number they were certainly many more than we will ever know. We retain but a small portion of their overall output, in many cases just those works executed in permanent materials or very hard woods. Most traditional artists remain anonymous since it was not the practice to sign their work and the original collector or purchaser often failed to record their names (even in cases where a lineage might have remembered it). The best we can sometimes do, after examining subject matter and style, is to assign a particular work to a specific group of craftsmen producing for patrons in a given society.

If the truth be told, art (like other skills in traditional society) was something of an hereditary occupation. Craftsmen were originally selected because of who they were rather than what they could do. They were chosen because of kinship ties or lineage relationships rather than any particular identifiable skill or talent. In many cases one became an artisan because a certain relative had been one before him. If, for example, in a given lineage, there was a skilled blacksmith, woodcarver or ivory worker, he might undertake to train junior members from each succeeding generation lest the skills and secrets of his craft be lost to the lineage.

Some of these skills such as that of the blacksmith, were so highly valued (in societies which required the tools of agriculture or the weapons of war and the hunt just for survival) that some

lineages married endogamously rather than allow the secret knowledge and "magical" skills of the craft to become known among other lineages. Among those groups which allowed their daughters to marry exogamously, only young men were initiated into the secrets of the craft which they often practised in isolated huts or secret groves that were taboo to the women of the lineage.

Apprenticeship was the normal method for training the majority of traditional artists. Boys might be apprenticed to a skilled artisan while still very young. They were to imitate the master, copy the models he showed them, and execute his orders according to canons of correctness within that society. For long periods of time they might only be allowed to participate in the initial stages of the creation of a work of art. But after some time, through long practice and careful repetition, some of them attained that manual dexterity and fine coordination of hand and eye which resulted in aesthetically correct and highly pleasing works of art. This meant that they had mastered the style of their group. Within the limitations imposed by materials and techniques, some of them evolved as very highly skilled artists indeed. To manual dexterity and coordination they added great personal gifts and talents. Is it presumptuous to think that something of this same process may be observed even to this day among the Akamba and Makonde woodcarvers of Kenya and Tanzania respectively?

In his novel *A Grain of Wheat*, the Kenyan author Ngugi wa Thion'go captures something of the moods and skills of the village craftsman. Gikonyo, the woodcarver, is shaping a new handle for the damaged "long knife" brought to him by Mumbi, a young woman he very much admires.

> Gikonyo bent down, traced the shape of the handle on wood. He chiselled and cut. He took care over the two hole. Then he trimmed the nails for rivets. He hammered their ends into caps. A wave of power swept through him. New strength entered his hand. He brought the hammer down and up. He felt free. The village, the whole world, was under the control of his hand. Suddenly, the wave of power broke into ecstacy – exultation. Peace settled in his heart. He felt a holy calm. He was in love with all the earth.

To the coordination of hand and eye, the master artist adds personal gifts and a refined sensitivity for the aesthetic values of his group.

Coming back to our original question: Just who were these traditional artists of Africa? There is a renewed enthusiasm today in a search to assemble the related works of groups and to try to identify their creators. Art historians as well as anthropologits are now interested in singling the master craftsmen out from among the crowd and focusing on their individual style and creativity. This involves a process of identifying first of all the style of a particular ethnic group, secondly the style of a given sub-region, and finally the individual style of a particular artist. His talent and craftsmanship can betray him as surely as any signature. Several pieces from a particular region during a given era may be so well executed and so stylistically similar as to be attributed to the hand of a single master.

Should it still prove impossible to recover the name of this master, at least a "title" may be assigned which directly relates to the signature of his work. Thus, in Benin, art historians have identified "the master of the lion hunt" as well as "the master of the circled cross". In this way it has proved possible to isolate and identify the great works of certain masters of African art. They are now being offered the belated recognition they so richly deserve.

Part II
The Challenge of Leadership

CHAPTER 11
STRUCTURING THE NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY
JAMES GOOD

From the very beginning of his term of office as President of the Republic of Kenya, President Daniel Arap Moi has spoken frequently of his nyayo philosophy, the philosophy of Love, Peace and Unity. Since philosophy is a critical and scientific reflection on our experience, it is now the duty of Kenya's professional philosophers to structure the philosophy of*nyayoism*1. By this I mean to set forth its underlying assumptions and basic principles, to draw out the practical consequences that follow from it, and to present it to the people of Kenya as a practical way of life.

The philosophy of nyayoism is in the area known to professional philosophers as Ethics, that section of philosophy which reflects critically on right or wrong in human behaviour. Ethics is unfortunately a most difficult area of philosophy to structure in the sense explained above – so difficult in fact that many philosophers have abandoned the project altogether and asserted that it is impossible to find any sound philosophical foundation for a system of ethical thinking, stretching from David Hume in the eighteenth century to A.J Ayer in the twentieth.

It should be pointed out, of course, that not all philosophers accept this negative approach which, if adopted, is destructive of all morality. Many positive approaches have been attempted. The German philosopher Kant constructed an ethical system based on what he called the categorical imperative – the philosophical equivalent of the Golden Rule – that we should always treat others as we would wish them to treat us. Christian philosophers have generally taken the line that there is a purpose or goal in human life, and that if we are to attain that goal, then we ought to behave in a moral way. The word "ought" is perhaps the most important word in the vocabulary of the ethical philosopher. Without it, his system is reduced to a simple sociological or statistical analysis of how people actually behave. Ethics tries to lay down how we ought to behave.

How then can we build a philosophical infrastructure for nyayoism? It would be far too simple a solution to our problem to say that Love, Peace and Unity are Christian concepts, and that they get their foundational support from Christian teaching. While this is partly true, it would be a false and indeed dangerous solution to the problem posed. What we are looking for is a *philosophical underpinning* for the concepts of Love, Peace and Unity, and this by definition must be something acceptable to people of all religious faiths and of none. A philosophical foundation is based on purely rational principles, one which does not require the support of a religious faith, though of course it may subsequently be confirmed and reinforced by such faith. We shall return to this point later.

For the moment, let us make it clear that while many religious faiths support the concepts of Love, Peace and Unity, the philosophy of nyayoism proposes this ideal for *all* the people of Kenya, whether they be Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Traditional religionist or people of no religion. What we require therefore is a philosophical foundation which is independent of all forms of religious belief and acceptable also to people of no religious faith who are possessed of basic intelligence and goodwill.

Putting the matter negatively, we can say that we do not want to ground the philosophy of nyayoism on the teachings of any one religious faith, for to do that would be to run the risk of setting up a theocratic state along the lines of the Iran of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Accepting then, that our problem is basically a philosophical matter, where may we look for a principle which will provide a foundation for the concepts of Love, Peace and Unity? It seems

to me that the best perhaps the only way to this goal is to adopt an insight of the American thinker Frank Buchman and to declare these concepts moral absolutes. This is a term which perhaps needs some explanation.

Buchman was an American evangelist who saw personal moral reform as the only way to national reform. Starting with a slogan "world-changing through life-changing," he set down honesty, purity, love and unselfishness as the four basic principles of his system. They were absolute not merely in the sense that they had to be accepted under all possible conditions and situations, but also that they were so fundamental that they needed no philosophical justification. They were, so to speak, their own foundation.

There were certain weaknesses in some of the positions taken up by Buchman which we need not go into here. His movement, which after several changes of name came to be known as Moral Rearmament (MRA), had rather impressive results in reconciling warring factions in various parts of the world, for instance, in the Congo, now Zaire. What is of interest to us here is his very valid insight that the setting up of moral absolutes is a simple but effective way of establishing morality in a culturally and religiously diverse situation. It may well be the only way of offering basic morality in a country of such diverse ethnic and religious traditions as Kenya.

It has to be conceded, of course, that any theory of moral absolutes has to face strong objections from many quarters. One of the strongest supporters of moral absolutes has been traditional Christian morality, but even here the theory of moral absolutes is under attack, particularly from liberal Christian moralists in America and Europe. Whereas in the past, Christian ethics said: "Adultery is *always* wrong," "direct abortion is *always* wrong," etc., the liberal moralist of today is tending to admit at least the occasional exception. For supporters of the latter view, this is merely the result of using man's intelligence in analyzing moral notions; for others, the abandonment of absolutes is the beginning of a slide into the situation Ethics of Joseph Fletcher and his followers.

Without going into this controversy too deeply, we can point out that what Catholic and other liberal moralists are questioning is the existence of *negative* moral absolutes, i.e. moral commands which effectively begin: "You must never, under any circumstances…" What they are saying is that such an absolute moral prohibition cannot be rationally justified because you can never know all the possible situations in which it might have to be applied.

It would seem that this type of objection does not have the same force when applied to *positive* moral absolutes. In other words, there can be no convincing philosophical objection to a code which says, "you must always and in all possible circumstances work for love, peace and unity," The positive moral absolute is a much more defensible concept than the negative one. One can, I think, point to the substantial success of the MRA movement with its positive moral absolutes of honesty, purity, love and unselfishness as evidence that such a theory is viable.

It is proposed therefore that a philosophical foundation for nyayoism can be provided by a declaration that Love, Peace and Unity are absolutes. But our task is still far from complete. Laying down absolutes is only the first step, like laying down the foundations of a house. There is much more to be done. Each and every religious and ethnic group must now take these absolutes and study them within the context of its own faith or culture. Moral absolutes like Love, Peace and Unity can have a massive impact on every area f our lives. Some examples:

1. Absolute love rules out all racialism in the strict sense, i.e. the view that one race is superior to another and has therefore the right to enslave the other or treat it in any way other than as an equal;

2. Absolute peace would condemn without qualification the cattle raiding, with its consequent suffering and death, which seems to be endemic in some parts of Kenya.

3. Absolute unity would rule out tribalism and nepotism – two elements, which are probably, the greatest challenge to Kenya as a nation today.

Crimes, corruption and theft would stand condemned under all three headings.

These are but a few examples of the kind of anti-scrutiny that should be undertaken by all the different religious and ethnic groups in Kenya. Such a self-reflection is a truly philosophical exercise. We may borrow an insight from the Kenyan philosopher Oruka Odera with his "African sagacity" – the view that you have a truly African philosophy only when you have a wise man who knows his own tradition and feels free to reflect critically on it.2 On the other hand, you do not have African philosophy when a philosopher (even if he is an African) imports from abroad a system of philosophy ready-made, even if it happens to be of the highest quality. If nyayoism is to be a truly African philosophy, it will come mainly from critical reflection by Africans on their own experience.

Such an exercise, of course, is not something that can be completed in a short time and then framed like a Constitution or code of laws. Any ethical system is something living and growing: a system that is constantly renewing itself by further reflection on its sources and by continuing application to the emerging problems of everyday living. While the philosopher can pursue this task at the professional level, the ordinary *mwananchi*3 can apply the three absolutes in his own non-reflective way to the everyday problems he encounters.

Sociologists and political philosophers today generally point to the widening gap between the rich and poor as the greatest threat to democracy. That gap becomes progressively dangerous as it grows, creating a situation so beloved by Marxists – the situation in which the poor, the proletariat, rise in revolution against the rich, the bourgeoisie, and overthrow them. The result is the setting up of a Marxist state which openly professes love, peace and unity, but never practices them, or does so at the costly expense of man's freedom. There have been indications in recent years that some Kenyan intellectuals have been moving in the direction of a Marxist philosophy. The true philosophy nyayoism and the philosophy of Marxism cannot co-exist: they are mutually destructive of one another.

Writing from within my own tradition as a Catholic, I can see that we have much to learn from nyayoism. There are many areas of our tradition where we have not treated the New Testament seriously. We have been intolerant and triumphalist, looking down on other religions and thinking that we were better than they. In matters of justice involving dealing with our neighbours, our record may not compare too well with that of our Protestant brethren. There is still much that we can learn from nyayoism, and this reflection on its principles can only enrich our own moral philosophy and theology. I am sure that other traditions will have the same experience as soon as they apply themselves to reflecting critically on their own cultural traditions. To adopt nyayoism is not to reject one's own cultural heritage. Rather it involves greater familiarity with one's own tradition to make oneself a better citizen of Kenya. Such a process of cross-fertilisation between the philosophy of nyayoism and the diverse religious and ethnic cultures of Kenya should lead to the enrichment of both sides involved in the process.4

REFERENCES

1. "Nyayoism" means following in the footsteps of. The term is derived from *"nyayo"*, the Kiswahili for footstep(s). The term came into being when President Daniel Arap Moi succeeded Jomo Kenyatta, the First President of Kenya. At the time Mr. Daniel Arap Moi assured the nation that he was going to follow in the footsteps of the former president. As the author shows, Nyayoism now stands for love, peace and unity.

2. Oruka, H. Odera, "Sagacity in African Philosophy," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, XXIII, 4 (Issue No. 92), 1983: 386-7.

3. "*Mwananchi"* is Kiswahili for citizen.

4. For further discussion of the philosophy of nyayoism, the reader may consult George I. Godia, *Understanding Nyaya: Principles and Policies in Contemporary Kenya*. Nairobi: Transafrica Press, 1984.

CHAPTER 12

LEADERSHIP: KENYATTA AND NKRUMAH

G. MACHARIA MUNENE

INTRODUCTION

Historians valuate the past for two reasons; to explain the present and to act as a guide to the future. In Africa, what we are actually living with at present is the continent's misery. Different explanations have been offered for this state of affairs. These include divine displeasure, inanimate forces of nature, socioeconomic factors such as class conflicts, and leadership. No single factor can explain everything but leadership plays a major role. In Africa, some of the leaders who stand out are Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

KENYATTA

Jomo Kenyatta has been one of the Africa's most fascinating men. He is as much a historical enigma as he was a complex political force in his life time. His admirers and detractors use him as a reference point. He probably fits into that category of great men who, according to historian William Leuchtenberg, know when to die. Since their successors appear incapable of dealing with problems, the people are forced to wish the dead man were alive since he would know what to do. Kenyatta fits this picture well.

His Career

Kenyatta witnessed not only the coming of colonialism in Kenya but also assisted in its demolition 70 years later. In the 1920s, he took an interest in politics and developed a knack for publicity as editor of *Muiguithania*, The Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) sent him twice to England to agitate against colonial injustices. In England, he was a regular critic of colonialism through the media and he also published two books. He helped to found anti-imperialist organizations and was involved in the Fifth Pan-African Congress held at Manchester in 1945. He returned to Kenya and began political mobilization that partly led to Mau Mau. Jailed for his involvement in Mau Mau activities, he emerged from prison to lead Kenya to independence.

As Prime Minister and President, he supervised Kenya's transition period. Kenya was then a colonial contradiction in which two conflicting policies with regard to the Africans had been followed. First colonial authorities had lumped together disparate people for British administrative and economic interests. Second, the same authorities had striven to divide these peoples along tribal lines so as to make it difficult to challenge British Colonialism. Kenyatta tried to emphasize the unity aspect and to forge one people while mitigating tribal thinking. He was President for 14 years and died in 1978.

Views on Kenyatta

Kenyatta, the man, the anti-colonialist, the Pan-Africanist, and the President has been both praised and vilified. Views on his leadership are determined by the position of the person expressing them. There are colonialist views of contempt and hatred because Kenyatta upset the

making of a white settlers' paradise in Kenya. The anti-colonialists saw him as a hero of Pan-Africanism and nationalism. In the 1960s and 1970s there were charges that Kenyatta had changed and had betrayed nationalist aspirations with his post-colonial policies. Those who liked his post-colonial policies tried to package him as a moderate nationalist and Pan-Africanist who should be accepted by the West. Similarly, other disillusioned people downplayed Kenyatta's nationalistic and Pan-Africanist contributions. More recently, certain nostalgic views have emerged which combine anti-colonialist and colonialist perceptions on Kenyatta.

The colonialist view was that Kenyatta's leadership was evil. He was responsible for the political tribulations in colonial Kenya. He deserved, as missionary John Arthur remarked in 1930, to be hanged along with KCA President Joseph Kang'ethe. To some, he was a diabolical man cajoling hapless African primitives to challenge benevolent colonial rule. Unsuccessfully, colonialists tried to find an alternative African leader and encouraged Tom Mbotela to challenge Kenyatta in the Kenya African Union. To them Mbotela was better than Kenyatta whom Bishop Walter Carey called a "clever rogue" and Governor Patrick Renison described as "a leader of darkness and death."

To African nationalists and their sympathizers, Kenyatta was a heroic freedom fighter who had delivered Kenya from colonialist slavery. Kenyatta, remarked W.E.B. DuBois, was a "valiant, intrepid leader who will not stop until Kenya has attained its independence."1 To some nationalist admirers he was both a Moses and a Joshua since he actually reached the promised land of independence. To such people, the accusation that Kenyatta had managed Mau Mau was a badge of honour.

In post-colonial Kenya some admirers became disillusioned with Kenyatta's leadership. Among these were Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Oginga Odinga who argued that Kenyatta had gone through a political metamorphosis probably when he was in colonialist jails. The new Kenyatta was seen as neo-colonial comprador who had betrayed his erstwhile nationalist comrades. He was not the man who had inspired people to fight white settlers.

This disillusionment led to efforts to de-emphasize Kenyatta's anti-colonial past. His prison mate, Bildad Kagia, started to argue that Kenyatta was peripheral to the Mau Mau movement. This argument was pushed much further by Maina wa Kinyatti who, while claiming that the Mau Mau was Pan-Africanist, downplayed Kenyatta's Pan-Africanist role. The effort to minimize Kenyatta's Pan-Africanism is also clear in the writings of C.L.R. James who in contrast heaped praises on Nkrumah. The Leftists thus tried to distance themselves from the post-colonial Kenyatta.

This distancing suited Kenyatta's new subordinates and friends. Their mission was to make Kenyatta an acceptable moderate to the West and to capitalist investors. Duncan Ndegwa and Anthony Cullen wrote commentaries and edited Kenyatta's *Suffering without bitterness: the foundation of the Kenya nation.* They argued that Kenyatta did not share the radicalism espoused at Manchester in 1945 and that he had been a moderate. And even Kenyatta's best biographer, Jeremy Murray-Brown, portrays a moderate nationalist leader.

Later Kenyatta's leadership once again became a reference point because of the deteriorating economic and political environment in Kenya. As criticism of Moi's Presidency mounted there arose an orchestrated attack on Kenyatta by Moi loyalists as a defense mechanism. These included politicians such as Shariff Nassir, William Ole Ntimama, and Arthur Magugu who ordered Kenyatta's portraits to be removed from public places. In academia, groups of university teachers had started fighting what one team termed "those Mau Mau's", besmirching Kenyatta, and sanitizing Moi. They formed a category which Moi described as "the intellectual home

guard".2 Kenyatta was portrayed by these people as the evil man who created the problems in which Kenya fmds itself; by contrast Moi was portrayed as the saviour of Kenya.

This was actually a throw-back to colonialist views when home guards beat Mau Mau suspects and Kenyatta was depicted as a devilish leader. One of the better known anti-Kenyatta salvos came from Arthur Eshiwani of Nairobi University's Faculty of Law. Delivering a paper at Kenyatta University, he reportedly accused Kenyatta of having created tribalism. The publicity and notoriety he received from that accusation whetted the appetite of the coterie that came to be identified with youth for KANU 92 (YK92). Using the KANU controlled *Kenya Times,* this clique tried to convince readers that, were it not for Kenyatta's misdeeds, Kenya would be a paradise under Moi's leadership. These people tended to go along with Patrick Renison's assertion that Kenyatta was a leader of darkness and death.

In contrast to the anti-Kenyatta campaign, there also arose a certain nostalgia about Kenyatta caused by economic and political hardships. There was a longing for the days when Kenyatta was President. The nostalgia partly manifested itself in the streets with cassettes loudly playing Kenyatta's old speeches, evoking what were believed to have been better days. Comparisoias were made between Kenyatta's performance and that of his appointed successor, Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi. In that comparison, Kenyatta appeared a better leader. New magazines and journals such as the *Nairobi Law Monthly, Society and Finance* emerged to question Moi's policies and performance. *Finance's* Njehu Gatabaki had started his magazine as a money making venture but he gradually entered the political realm. "We have decided to be bold," he once told this writer, and after that he led the way in adversely comparing Moi to Kenyatta. *Finance* became the vehicle through which victims and critics of Moi's rule such as Martin Shikuku could describe Kenyatta as a budder and Moi as destroyer of institutions. There was thus a strong eagerness to return to Kenyatta's type of leadership.

Assessment

Kenyatta was a man of his time. He was an adventurer who was committed to ending political colonialism and he did his best to achieve that objective. When he quit his job in the 1920s for an appointment with the KCA, the political future was uncertain. When the KCA sent him to England twice, it is interesting to note that two better known politicians declined to venture into the unknown: James Beauttah in 1929 and Harry Thuku in 1931. In England, he published anti-colonial articles and became prominent in African anti-imperialist circles. In 1935, he became secretary of the International African Friends of Abyssinia (I.A.F.A.) as Italy prepared to attack Ethiopia. In 1937 he helped to found the International African Service Bureau (I.A.S.B.) and served as its assistant secretary. When in 1945 the officials of the American Civil Rights Organization, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), wanted to know of leading Africans to attend a Pan-Africanist conference, Kenyatta's name was listed. He had become well-known as an anti-imperialist.

The NAACP did not organize a conference because Africans in England, Kenyatta among them, were already organizing what was termed the Fifth Pan-African Congress. This worried NAACP officials; they were afraid that without their moderating influence Africans would radicalize the proceedings. It was also evident that the leadership of the Pan-Africanist movement was shifting from the blacks in the West to continental Africans. The conference proceeded without NAACP input except for the symbolic presence of W.E.B. DuBois.

The planning of the fifth Pan-African Congress, held in October 1945 in Manchester, diverted Kenyatta's attention from political adventurism. He had contemplated running for a parliamentary seat in the House of Commons on a labour ticket; one newsletter described him as "a Kenyan Chieftain and lecturer in Anthropology".3 However, he abandoned the campaign to concentrate on the conference for which he was in charge of credentials.

Kenyatta reported on Eastern Africa and emphasized his pet idea which the conference adopted. His preoccupation was to acquire political power first and worry about other problems later. He argued: "One thing we must do, and that is to get political independence. If we achieve that we shall be free to achieve other things we want. Self-independence must be our aim".4 The conference resolved to mobilize anti-colonial forces to eliminate colonialism and if necessary use violence.

This resolution, including the prescription for violence, was implemented within six years of Kenyatta's return to Kenya. On being elected president of Kenya Africa Union (KAU) in 1947, Kenyatta started mass recruitment of political supporters throughout the colony. Among his recruits was a businessman named Oginga Odinga to whom he emphasized the need to acquire political power first and that economic independence would follow.

He probably was also involved in clandestine organization for possible violent confrontation should negotiations fail; this was in accord with the Manchester dictum. One day at Kaloleni, Nairobi, (so say those who were there) Kenyatta turned to Jesse Kariuki, one of his top KCA comrades and asked in Gikuyu language: "Jesse, andu niaiganu?" This translates to: "Are there enough people?" Before Kariuki could respond, a brash young man named Dedan Kimathi shouted "li Niaiganu," (Yes, they are enough). On hearing Kimathi, Kenyatta reportedly took out his handkerchief, wiped his eyes and asked "Nimukwenda Wiyathi?" (Do you want independence?). And the public responded "Ii nitukwenda" (Yes, we want it). Kenyatta then remarked, "Muti uyu wa wiyathi nduitagiririo mai; uitagiririo thakame. Ningunyita Kiongo-i, nimukumiriria mateke?" This translates: "the tree of freedom is not nurtured by water but by blood. I will hold the bull by the horn, will you withstand the kicks?" "li" (Yes), the people responded. In other meetings, particularly in Nyeri where a young man, Godfrey Muriuki (now Professor of History at Nairobi University) was in attendance, Kenyatta repeated the same points about nurturing the tree of freedom with blood and holding th bull by the horn if the people would withstand the kicks."5 It did not take long before violence broke out in what came to be known as Mau Mau. The final Manchester alternative was thus employed.

Kenyatta was convicted of managing Mau Mau and was jailed but he came out of prison to lead Kenya into independence. He had achieved political power which enabled him to eliminate artificial barriers between races. At Manchester he had remarked: "We feel that racial discrimination must go, and then people can perhaps enjoy the right of citizenship, which is the desire of every East African."6 Those who expected him to dismantle or restructure the institutions were either surprised or disappointed. But they should not have been for Kenyatta had been consistent throughout his political life. He had wanted to end racism and to attain political power, but not to destroy British institutions.

Kenyatta set precedents; some were good but others were not. His effort to build strong institutions was commendable. In his presidency, there was relative freedom of movement and political involvement. The economy was strong as reflected by the stability of the Kenya shilling throughout his 14 years as President. Producers were paid on time and as a result they competed to produce quality crops. Local authorities had freedom to serve their people without central

interference. Meritocracy was valued. Kenyatta, however committed political errors. He started the process of amending the constitution to fit presidential desires.

He banned Odinga's Kenya People's Union (KPU) and detained critics. He started the practice of being unopposed in elections. The most serious shortcoming was that he did not realize that by 1974 he had outfived his usefulness and that he did not have to die in office in order for his accomplishments to be acknowledged. He not only blundered by dying in office, he also did the country a disservice by denying Kenyans a chance to elect their next president. Kenyatta bequeathed Moi to Kenya.

NKRUMAH

Another remarkable African was Francis Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. He is well known in African ideological circles and is popular with leftists, apologists for dictatorship, and anti-West critics. He did not have as full a political life as Kenyatta did. He did not have a chance to bequeath a successor to Ghana since he was overthrown on 24th February 1966 while he was in Asia. He had been in power first as prime minister and then as president from 1957. In the process, he acquired a reputation as an anti-colonialist and a Pan-Africanist. After the overthrow he maintained interest in being seen as a philosopher and poetical theoretician.

His Career

Nkrumah came into limelight in 1945. He had gone to England to pursue postgraduate studies, but he also had a letter to George Padmore from C.L.R. James, Kenyatta's colleague in I.A.F.A. In the letter, James said that Nkrumah "was not very bright but that he was determined to throw the imperialists out of Africa." James asked Padmore to "do the best for him, in other words educate him politicafly as much as possible". Padmore, a dislllusioned former communist', had become an ardent PanAfricanist. He involved Nkrumah in the planning of the Fifth Pan-African Congress and the two subsequently became complements of each other.7 Padmore, as requested by James, set out to mould Nkrumah's thinking.

Nkrumah's administrative involvement and enthusiasm for the conference was noted by many but his contribution to the actual deliberations was not substantial. This was in comparison to the more established activists such as I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson, DuBois, Padmore, Peter Abrahams, and Kenyatta; however, he contrbuted more than Hastings Kamuzu Banda. Listed as representing I.A.S.B. whose chairman was Padmore, Nkrumah spoke on the second day of the conference. He argued that people cannot be "secure as long as imperialism assaults the world." Charging that imperialism was "one of the major causes of war", Nkrumah "called for strong and vigorous action against it.8 That was the extent of his contribution to the deliberations.

In the Gold Coast, his organizational enthusiasm attracted politicians, mainly wealthy lawyers and merchants, who invited Nkrumah to join them in the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). He arrived in Accra from London in December 1947. His arrival coincided with an intensifying militancy on the part of trade unions and mushrooming organizations.

This militancy exploded into the Christianborg riots of February 1948 which helped to promote Nkrumah's name. Neither Nkrumah nor any other UGCC official had anything to do with the riots, but they capitalized politically. Nkrumah demanded an election for a "constituent Assembly" and gained notoriety by sending copies of his telegram to such media as the *New York Times, the Daily Worker* of London, and the *New Times* of Moscow. He also sent copies to the UN Secretary General and to a communist Member of Parliament in Britain. He, therefore, appeared like a communist instigator and since the government wanted a scapegoat, he became one.

Scapegoating turned Nkrumah into a national anticolonial force and the government's designs to isolate him from other UGCC officials only helped to free him from UGCC. The government invited UGCC officials, except Nkrumah, to a constitutional reform commission in June 1948; they accepted. Nkrumah reacted by creating a Committee on Youth Organization in August 1948 whose petty-bourgeois members despised chiefs, colonialism, and the powerful African elite in the UGCC. They helped to mobilize people as Nkrumah espoused Kenyatta's dictum on political priorities. He preached, in March 1949, "seek ye first the Political kingdom, and all things will be added unto you."9 He had become a hero.

In June 1949, Nkrumah created the Convention People's Party (CPP) in opposition to the UGCC leadership. CPP emphasized "Self-government Now". When the constitutional commission produced its report in October 1949, Nkrumah termed it "bogus and fraudulent" and called for "positive action". He, however, tried to maintain negotiations with the government but the negotiations were undermined by events that Nkrumah had nothing to do with. The Trade Union Congress called for widespread strikes which gained a momentum of their own; Nkrumah was forced to endorse a strike that the CPP could not control. He was arrested and sent to jail which in turn transformed him into a political martyr and the CPP gained popularity.

Though a prisoner, so argue Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer in *Ghana: end of illusion,* Governor Arden-Clarke believed he needed Nkrumah in the government. This explained why prison officials helped Nkrumah to present his registration papers for the election of 1951. Nkrumah and his CPP won that election; Arden-Clarke released Nkrumah from prison and asked him to form the government. From 1951 to 1957 Nkrumah struggled to prove that he was safe by cooperating with colonial officials in the Gold Coast.

The fact that a black man was prime minister in an African colony reverberated throughout the continent. Fear of black rule in settler colonies came to be termed Gold Coastism. While white settlers got worried, Africans cheered and appreciated Nkrumah's comitment to anticolonialism in Africa. He became a symbol of African aspirations and unity outside Ghana while serious discrepancies about his home rule raised anxiety. He was overthrown in February 1966.

Views on Nkrumah

Like Kenyatta, Nkrumah has had his admirers and detractors. Many give him credit for advocating African unity, as the first man to lead a colony into self-government and subsequent independence, as an inspiration to others and as a thinker. To others, he was a tyrant, a plunderer, a megalomaniac with aspirations to become the African dictator. He is also accused of being incapable of adjusting to realities, of not being a good neighbour, of having imperialistic designs on other countries, and usurping divine attributes.

The favourable view of Nkrumah as a Pan-Africanist who was selflessly committed to African unity was best propagated by his two West Indian mentors, George Padmore and C.L.R. James. Padmore's book, *The Gold Coast Revolution* was a vote for Nkrumah and on account of this he was accused of tampering with facts. Padmore's "opinion of Nkrumah borders on religious veneration," commented a writer in the *WASU News Service* in 1953, "no adjective is good enough to describe the absolute infallibility of Nkrumah."10 To C.L.R. James, Nkrumah was the "Founder of African emancipation". "After Marcus Garvey", wrote James in 1972, "there is no other name that is symbolical of African freedom as the name of Nkrumah."11Mrs George Padmore also commended Nkrumah for taking the idea of freedom for Africa "a stage further in the call for the unification of the succeeding independent states."12

This drive for unity, however, was not received well by other African leaders, not so much because it was a bad idea, but because they were suspicious of Nkrumah's motives. Yusuf Maitama

Sule of Nigeria, attending a conference in Liberia in June 1960, considered Nkrumah's obsession as sinister. "Nkrumah's individual ambition and greed for power may spoil everything," Sule said, and added, "it will spoil the good work we have done and ruin the good work we are capable of doing in the future."13 *The West African Pilot* depicted Nkrumah as imperialistic in that he wanted to annex Togo and parts of Ivory Coast.

Nkrumah was also seen as unrealistic and imbued with overconfidence. This overconfidence led him, in 1957, to offer Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast a bet on which of the two leaders would succeed in their programmes. According to Crawford Young, Nkrumah "challenged Houphouet-Boigny to a rendezvous of judgement in ten years; history would then tender its verdict on the relative validity of the two pathways."14 Houphouet-Boigny wanted to maintain ties with France, Nkrumah wanted to minimize the colonial past. The two men, however, never met to compare notes in 1967. Nkrumah had been overthrown on February 24, 1966; Houphouet-Boigny still ruled the Ivory Coast.

Apart from being unrealistic, Nkrumah was accused of usurping divine attributes. In August, 1962, the Anglican Bishop of Accra, Richard Roseveare, complained that Nkrumah's Young Pioneers were godless. They confuse, he said, "the work and example of a great man with divine acts which are unique in history. This incipient atheism is quite foreign to the traditional concept of African personality." The bishop was deported and the adulation continued with claims of immortality and infallibility. "Kwame Nkrumah does not die." "Kwame Nkrumah does no wrong." "Nkrumah is our Messiah."15

Accorded such divine attributes, Nkrumah is accused of having become a tyrant, surrounding himself with sycophants and incompetents who sang his praises. Dissenting views were suppressed while judges were expected to issue decisions in favour of the president. This dismayed even staunch supporters such as C.L.R. James who noted that Nkrumah "labelled all those who disagreed with him as fools or crooks," and posed as an authority on all sorts of historical and philosophical subjects."16 Everything good was then attributed to the "Osagyefo", (Saviour). A particular programme, said an MP, was "the product of a master brain, Dr Kwame Nkrumah..., the atomic bomb of the Convention People's Party.17 Such flatterers aimed at avoiding Nkrumah's prisons. When he was overthrown, the same people who had flattered him joined in the celebrations.

Nkrumah has also been accused of importing one party dictatorship to Africa from communist Europe. This was the charge levelled by Timothy Njoya of the P.C.E.A. (Presbyterian Church in East Africa) as he called for an end to single party rule in Kenya since it was dictatorial and fated to an inglorious end just as had been the case in Europe. African dictators who had followed Nkrumah's example, therefore, should abandon the one party rule and adopt pluralism. Implied in this criticism was that Nkrumah was ideologically responsible for tyranny in Africa.

There is a less harsh view of Nkrumah put forward by former American President Richard M. Nixon. To Nixon, Nkrumah was like Nasser of Egypt and Sukarno of Indonesia. These men, Nixon wrote, were "very successful in tearing down the old system, but could not concentrate ... attention on building a viable new one to replace it." Nixon believed this inability was their folly. "These men could not lead their nations as effectively as they had led the revolutions, and their nations – and the world – are still paying the price for that failing".18 Nixon thus saw Nkrumah as a revolutionary, but not as a builder.

Nkrumah's reputation had a nostalgic revival from the mid 1980s. In Ghana, a series of coups and counter-coups made the country miserable. The youth, in particular, looked back to Nkrumah for a theoretical understanding of not only Ghana's predicament, but also of Africa. His purported

theories on neo-colonialism and African unity presented in such books *as Africa Must Unite; Challenge of the Congo; Class Struggle in Africa* and the most ambitious of all, *Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism*, were devoured by aspiring would-be new African liberators. In Ghana, the embodiment of this revival is Jerry Rawlings, the current President who, while avoiding Nkrumah's excesses, evokes Nkrumah's ideals, particularly the revolutionary ones.

Assessment

With all these views on Nkrumah, the real man is a composite of these perceptions. He attracted the attention of C.L.R. James and George Padmore. He became their protegy. He also attracted the attention of rich lawyers and merchants in Accra who hired him. He turned tables on the lawyers and merchants by associating with the petty-bourgeoisie. He was blamed and jailed for things he did not do, but came out of jail as prime minister in 1951.

As prime minister, he initially received a lot of advice from friends and well-wishers. Besides George Padmore who became an official assistant, there was the West Indian economist, Arthur Lewis. Nkrumah tried to implement Lewis' prescription for economic growth which was to offer inducements to western capitalists to invest in the Gold Coast. There was also the advice from black American novelist Richard Wright, who recommended temporary dictatorship if the Gold Coast was to move ahead. "Our people must be made to walk, forced draft, into the twentieth century ... under firm social discipline!"19Nkrumah's actions, in dealing with critics, seemed to be the result of Wright's advice. This became particularly evident when he became president of independent Ghana.

By 1961, Nkrumah had become disillusioned with the policies he had followed for ten years. He became increasingly critical of capitalism and helped to make the term neo-colonialism a household expression. He saw himself as a revolutionary thinker, an African Lenin. As such, he produced a Leninistic tract: *Neo-Colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism.* This was at least the picture he presented outside.

Within Ghana, however, the picture was different as he played the role of Plato's philosopher-king while ignoring Plato's requirement that merit be the criteria for assigning functions. He concentrated power not only in his own hands, but also assigned positions to unqualified people simply because they praised him. He squandered the national wealth and undermined the producers of that wealth, mainly the cocoa farmers. He destroyed those opposed to his views and eliminated meritocracy. He did such things because he believed he was infallible.

But Nkrumah was a great Pan-Africanist and advocate of African unity. He had a vision of a United States of Africa similar to the United States of America or the Soviet Union. His knowledge of the history of how these giants emerged, however, was fuzzy and his impatient drive for unity was unrealistic. He castigated other African leaders for not agreeing with him and tried to silence them by calling them imperialist stooges. In turn, they considered him a megalomaniac. Few leaders disputed the idea of unity, but even fewer wanted Nkrumah to lead them into that unity.

CONCLUSION

Kenyatta and Nkrumah were two outstanding African leaders. The two crossed paths at Manchester in 1945 but they were different types of leaders. Kenyatta was a practical politician whose main objective was to eliminate racism and achieve independence. When he returned to Kenya in 1946, his reputation was solid, he set out to implement the Manchester resolutions. This effort culminated in the Mau Mau violence which paved the way for political independence. The extent to which Kenyatta was involved in Mau Mau is still debatable, but it would be naive to

claim that he was totally innocent. To the Mau Mau fighters themselves, he was their leader. Mau Mau helped to make Kenyatta president.

Kenyatta the president continued with colonial institutions; he changed only the officials but not the structure. He believed that the tactics that had been necessary for fighting colonialism were irrelevant to the new Kenya. He wanted a strong economy and so he encouraged producers – Europeans, Asians and Africans – to redouble their productive efforts. He ensured that they were paid for that productivity and in the process, the Kenyan economy became vibrant. He concentrated his efforts on building domestic institutions.

History will be kind to Kenyatta. He stands out on anti-colonialism and Pan-Africanism, even if had he not become president. He also gets credit for launching Kenya into the post-colonial period, for encouraging national commitment and meritocracy, and for presiding over a healthy and productive economy. He is to be blamed for beginning the concentration of power in the presidency, for suppressing critics, and for dying in office. His overall performance however, was commendable. Whether before or after independence, Kenyatta's place in history is favourably secure.

Nkrumah's place is also secure especially after 1951; had he not become prime minister, it would be negligible. From 1951, he symbolized the aspirations of millions of black people in Africa and the West. He became their champion against colonialism and other manifestations of imperialism.

The trouble with Nkrumah was that, unlike Kenyatta, he did not separate the tactics needed for anti-colonial crusades from those for running a state. He blundered in antagonizing the producers of cocoa who felt cheated, so they turned against him. Politicafly, he became repressive and assumed divine attributes of infallibility. When he was overthrown in 1966, Ghana was economically and politically worse off than when he took over.

But economic and political failures in Ghana pale when compared to the stature he acquired as a great African. His mentors, James and Padmore, were in the forefront of showering him with praises as the saviour of Africa. This view came to be accepted where these men had influence and he himself seems to have believed it.

He was a political visionary, one who had not learned Machiavelli's dictum that a leader should know when to be a lion and when to be a fox. He was an inspirer of African peoples but he was not a builder. His push for immediate African unity was not practical and aroused the suspicion that he wanted to be Africa's dictator. But although he did not live to see African unity, his name is favourably associated with that dream. Certainaly, he did affect the course of African history.

NOTES

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4. "Jomo Kenyatta, the East African picture," in Padmore, editor. *Colonial and coloured unity*, p. 42.

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8. Kwame Nkrumah's comments, in Padmore, editor. *Colonial and coloured unity*, p. 32.

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CHAPTER 14

POLITICS AND INTEGRITY: A CHALLENGE IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

KATETE ORWA

INTRODUCTION

Thousands of years ago, the Greek philosopher Aristotle observed that "man is a political animal." This concept was elaborated by Patrice M. Lumumba in 1956 in support of the Congolese struggle against Belgian racism and colonial domination. He noted then that the view that

> Man is a political animal does not merely mean that man is naturally made for life in the society: it also means that men naturally wish to lead a political life and to take active part in the life of political community (Lumumba, 1962 – 29).

Every human being is born in a political community. Politics is involved in every human activity. It is in recognition of this reality of human living that Aristotle wrote that

> All associations aim at some good; and the particular association which is the most sovereign of all, and includes the rest, will pursue this aim most, and will thus be directed to the most sovereign of all goods. This most sovereign and inclusive association is the polis, as it is called, or the political association (Curtis, 1961:59).

The dominance of politics in the life of humans is what necessitates political association and political leadership. Both are for the greatest good of the political community, because

> Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be isolated from law and justice, he is the worst of all. If man be without virtue, he is the most unholy and savage being, and worse than all others in indulgence of lust and gluttony. Justice belongs to the *polis* (political association), for justice, which is the determination of what is just, is an ordering of the political association (Curtis, 1961:61)

It is within this context that politics and integrity must be examined.

POLITICS

Politics, Quincy Wright has observed, is "the art of influencing, manipulating or controlling … so as to advance the purpose of some against the opposition of others" (Wright, 1955:130). Hans Morgenthau sees politics as a "struggle for power," a struggle in which moral considerations are subordinate to the dictates of power (Morgenthau, 1973:27). Politics can also be seen as "the process by which issues are agitated through negotiations, arguments, discussions, persuasion and application of force" (Ojo et al, 1965:6). When all the foregoing conceptions of politics are taken together, a specific picture of politics emerges. At one extreme, politics is seen as amoral, opportunistic and expedient. At the other, it is seen to be rational, involving occasional conflict and cooperation, but intended for the good of the majority.

Politics can also be presented as "a kind of game with rules, players, competitors, winners and loses". (Wynia, 1979:24). Both formal and informal rules are applied and these regulate the political game and also give the *polis* its basic character. In the political game participants seek to gain such things as political power (control of state apparatus) or increased allocation of scarce resources. Like in all competitive games, the political one involves winners and losers. The game can be stable or unstable depending on whether or not the losers believe that the rules have been complied with and whether or not the rules of the game are such that they give the losers the chance to win at the next round. In this case, the spirit of sportsmanship prevails, facilitating cooperation between winners and losers. This is particularly important in politics because individual political players are motivated by different desires such as material gain, social status and idealism (Wynia, 1979:25). But whatever the motive, they revolve around the allocation of scarce public resources. How resources are to be distributed among competing interests, depends very much on the quality of political leadership. This in turn determines whether resources are used for the general good or for the personal aggrandizement. Therefore, it is the manner in which rules are applied and resources allocated within the political order that raises the question of political integrity.

POLITICS AND INTEGRITY

Ethics and Integrity: Integrity refers to virtues such as truthfulness, sincerity, honesty, etc. In political terms, it means that politicians should not be pretenders or corrupt. Whatever fortune they may acquire should be used for worthy causes, because for the above virtues to be meaningful in a political community, they must be "joined to the appropriate conception of Justice"(Rawls, 1979: 519)

Integrity is related to ethics, because the latter insists that certain standards of behavior or conduct be expected of an individual. This is particularly so because ethics guides human relations, especially relations with those whom we work or deal with. Ethics demand that an individual be righteous and not be corruptible; that power and wealth be used with utmost consideration of fairness and justice. Hence, corruption, bribery, cheating, pride and arbitrariness are inconsistent with integrity.

It is popularly said that for every ten political statements made by an individual, only one is likely to be true. A lawyer friend of mine with whom I talked recently about politics and integrity, asked, "Can the two be combined?" His reaction reminded me of a confrontation between another friend of mine and a lawyer. The former, on learning of the latter's profession, asked rather disdainfully, "Can one ever find a truthful lawyer?" The lawyer, after a brief hesitation, inquired, "What do you mean?" My friend asserted that lawyers go to court to lie that someone is innocent whereas they know pretty well that a crime has been committed. "The legal profession is a profession in which morality plays the least role," he claimed authoritatively. The lawyer, in a calm but calculated response, observed that his profession is guided by a code of ethics and that he works in accordance with that code. He further noted that the duty of an advocate of the High Court is not only to ensure that justice is seen to be done, but that it is done. Whether or not my friend accepted this explanation is immaterial.

Politics and Integrity. The crux of the matter is that there is popular conception that legal practice and politics, on the one hand and integrity, on the other, are like two parallel lines. The conception of politics as a human activity in which morality plays a subsidiary role, has received

advocacy among some of the world's leading political thinkers and theoreticians. Writing to counsel his prince around the 1500s, Nicole Machiavelli advised that:

> A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good. Therefore it is necessary for a prince, who wishes to maintain himself, to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge … according to the necessity of the case. (Machiavelli, 1952:84).

Addressing himself to the issue of virtues, Machiavelli recommends that a prince "must not mind incurring the scandal of those vices, without which it would be difficult to save the state" because in political life it would "be found that some things which seem virtuous… lead to one's ruin, and some others which appear vices result in one's greater security and well being" (Machiavelli, 1952:85).

The late distinguished Professor Hans J, Morgenthau concurred with Machiavelli when he wrote in 1948 that

> There can be no political morality without prudence; that it is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral actions. Realism, then, considers prudence – the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions – to be the *supreme virtue* in politics (emphasis added). While ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges actions by its political consequences. (Morgenthau, 1973:11).

Both Machiavelli and Morgenthau accept prudence and opportunism as consistent with political action. According to them, a statesman must always act to acquire, increase and maintain power without being inhibited by moral or ideological considerations. Thus Machiavelli insists that a political leader must compel obedience if he/she wants to continue holding and exercising political power. Inability to compel or to use force would lead to failure (Machiavelli, 1952:50, 51, 46). This view of employing force goes counter to Aristotle's advice that "some people need to be met with persuasion, others with compulsion" (Aristotle, 1963:65). From this it follows that in the exercise of political power both persuasion and coercion may be applied, but the latter only when it is morally justifiable.

Politics, as already implied, deals with the art of managing the affairs of the state. Not all the citizens of a state can at one and the same time take part in the government of the state. Therefore, at any one time this duty is delegated first to the representatives of the people (politicians) and secondly to the employees of the people (civil servants).

Politicians are those selected few in whom the citizens have faith. To them the citizens voluntarily entrust their collective security and welfare. As long as they hold office they are the rulers, and the survival of the state rests in their hands. This has been so since the rise of the nation-state. Whoever becomes a politician should possess qualities that will enable him to discharge the duties of the state. It is on this account that Plato centuries ago observed that

> The rulers of the city will be chosen – the best of the older men, selected for their devotion to the state by various tests and carefully groomed for office. They will be assisted by the lower class of guardians, the auxiliaries or soldiers. And they will

> not live the life of princes, but the simple life of soldiers, free from the distractions of wealth and luxury (Plato, 1956:120).

If the proposal that rulers act only prudently were accepted, the stability of the political community would not be guaranteed. Politicians have duties and obligations, and those who offer themselves to be elected rulers must be able to discharge those duties. They must show that they have certain qualities that fit them for public life. They must be proven to "be genuinely concerned about public welfare". They should see "a political career as a service to the state," not as a means to personal power, wealth and self-aggrandizement. What this means is that a politician must be a man of "integrity and honesty…He must be a man of clear convictions and have the determination to stand for what he sees to be right and good, in the face of criticism or opposition" (Sharkey 1979:215).

Integrity and honesty in politics should be a criterion in political selection. This is very important because:

> The decisions made, and actions taken, by those who exercise delegated responsibility on man's behalf in national politics affect every citizen. The effect of the political conduct of party officers, legislative representatives, chief executives, cabinet ministers and administrators are bound to reach every citizen. (Spiro, 1969: 141).

Integrity is justice and, as we learn from Plato, "Justice is apparently wise and virtuous" (118). Justice is to be found in the state and in the individual within a state. How then can a political society afford to have men of justice?

Collectively, individuals make up the state, and individuals rule over the state. In the words of the learned judge Patrick Devlin, "the state exists to promote virtue among its citizens" (Devlin, 1970: 89), and a state that is ruled by men and women wanting in virtues cannot promote the same. The state as the promoter of virtues sets the standards of morality that are to be observed, and determines that they are partly through legislation and partly through enforcement by state agencies. Politicians make laws and, to a great extent, appoint those who enforce societal morals and administer state laws. "A man who is seeking a moral law ought also to be in the pursuit of absolute truth" (Devlin, 1970: 93).

Politicians are in positions of authority. To use J. Rawls words, they are and should be "accountable for the policies they pursue and the instructions they lay down." They should issue commands that are just. Where unjust commands are issued, neither the public employees nor the people should acquiesce, because to do so would be to abet in "evil designs" which cannot be rationalized by pleading ignorance or by claiming "that the fault rests solely with those in higher positions." Accountability by those in authority places upon them the responsibility of being men and women of high morals, leaders who are beyond reproach; who are honest and just. They must be ready to answer to the people, because too much autonomy in an individual's actions is "likely to lead to a mere collision of self-righteous wills" (Rawls, 1971: 519)

CONCLUSIONS

If we accept the propositions that "justice is apparently wise and virtuous" and that "Justice is to be found in the state and in the individual" (Plato: 118, 121-22), then we cannot doubt that a

relationship exists between politics and integrity. In a political community "citizens generally are bound by the duty of Justice." Every citizen has a "duty and obligation to accept existing political arrangements" as long as "the principles of right" are seen to apply (Rawls, 1971, 350, 352) Should a situation arise suggesting the existence of "gross injustice or flagrant departure from principles of right," citizens may refuse to comply not only with the prevailing political arrangements, but also with commands arising therefrom.

It therefore follows that those to whom political leadership has been delegated as governors, in addition to their duties and obligations as citizens, should act in accordance with "the principles of fairness" (Rawls, 1971: 350, 352). This requirement puts a further burden on citizens – the responsibility of ensuring that integrity prevails in politics. This they can do by: (a) direct and open participation in politics. Their participation should seek to determine and influence the course of national politics in a manner devoid of sycophancy; (b) by making those to whom the privilege to make public decisions and to take official actions has been delegated, both responsible and accountable to those who have delegated this privilege to them. This is a fundamental requisite for ensuring that political integrity pervades the political association.

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CHAPTER 15
LEADERSHIP: A FEMININE VIEW
AGNES CHEPKWONY

WAJIBU. Dr Chepkwony, in your opinion, are leaders born or are they made?

CHEPKWONY. Both. It is true that certain people are born with leadership gifts and qualities. However, if these talents are not developed and nurtured, they disappear. Society must identify people with such gifts. It is like the gift of music: unless the gift is realized and developed, it serves little purpose. On the other hand, there are people who may not have very specific gifts of leadership but circumstances force them into leadership positions. In such cases, they need more careful preparation, as was the case with hereditary kings, for example. So whether a person is born with specific leadership qualities or not, nurture is critical.

WAJIBU. What about in your own case, did you make a decision to be a leader or was leadership thrust upon you by others, by circumstances?

CHEPKWONY. I think history made me what I am. At school I was a sports leader, a debate leader and a leader in the agricultural society. At university, things were a bit different for I happened to be at university when student unions were proscribed. So I was one of the "interim" student leaders; we operated as a committee. In a way that was a good thing, we learned to practice leadership by consensus.

WAJIBU. According to you, which are the qualities that make an effective leader?

CHEPKWONY. First, a leader must be able to listen, to discern the message which is coming from others. Second, once you have discerned the message, you must relate what you are doing to that message; in other words, a leader should be accountable and answerable to the people. Third, a leader must cultivate the practice of dialogue, not just between himself/herself and the people but among the people, so that the leadership style becomes consultative. Fourth, a leader must be able to give direction. In other words, leaders must be firm and decisive; once they have listened to all views, they must be able to come to a decision; where consensus is absent, they may have to decide on the way to go forward. Fifth, leaders must be transparent. In a way, I do not like using this term because it has become polluted, but it is the right word. It is the opposite of opaque; in the context of leadership it means that the leader's process of guiding and decision making should be open, people should be able to see the process in operation. Finally, a leader should share responsibility. You cannot be a good leader in isolation. Take the case where I am the boss in an office, for instance. If I have to okay everything, if everything is on my shoulders, an office cannot run smoothly. I should be able to share the decision making process with my colleagues, so that when I am not there, work can continue.

WAJIBU. As Africans we often express a certain nostalgia for leadership as it was exercised traditionally. How do you see this traditional leadership?

CHEPKWONY. It is only for certain elements of traditional leadership that I can feel nostalgia. One of them is consultative leadership. In Africa, even kings could not take decisions on their own. Take the example of Ghana. The role of the queen mother there was very important as a check against authoritarianism on the part of the king. The king could even be dethroned if he went against the wishes of the people.

In the Kenyan situation this consultative leadership was expressed through the *baraza*, the holding of a palaver under a tree. The chief (for the societies which had them) was available to the people and they were free to question him. Their participation was taken seriously, the public was

able to vet its leaders. The people would also decide on who was to assist the leader: the leader did not rule alone. And chiefs were chosen on the basis of certain qualities they possessed.

Missionaries have been known to criticise traditional leadership on account of the fact that women were not included in the decision making process. But that is not a true picture of the state of affairs, at least not as it existed among the Kalenjin and the Luyah. I remember what used to happen under the baraza tree in my own village. The inner circle was made up of men but the outer circle of women. Although women would not speak at these meetings unless they were asked to do so (and that was rare) this does not mean that their opinions were not taken into account. Discussions were held but decisions would not normally be taken the same day. There was time for people to talk about the matters under discussion, for husbands to discuss them with their wives, for women to discuss them among themselves while ferrying water from the river. So, although the situation was not ideal from the point of view of women's participation, women were in the picture.

WAJIBU. Do you see evidence of this type of leadership in modern Africa?

CHEPKWONY. Unfortunately, very little of this still persists in modern Africa. The present structure does not make allowance for popular participation. What has been taken over are the negative elements of leadership in traditional Africa; for example, the idea of the paramount chief where the leader alone decides on what is good for the people. In the modern situation it is not personal qualities which count but wealth, your ability to buy or corrupt your way to the top. This has turned into dictatorship. And there is no countervailing power to stop or arrest such leaders. They have amassed all the tools of suppression,

WAJIBU. Why is it that bad leaders (bad in the moral sense) still manage to find followers and many followers at that?

CHEPKWONY. Leaders exploit the poverty of the people. It is the situation of poverty which has rendered the people subservient to the immoral leader. The leader tells them: "Without me you people will perish" and they take this as truth. He will even appeal to their ethnic emotions and yet the leader does not serve his ethnic group; he serves himself and his friends, regardless of their ethnic background. But the people are not aware of this because, in addition to their material poverty, they live in a condition of mental poverty; they have no access to information. And the leader only feeds them with the information he wants them to have. So it is a question of exploitation on both counts, of the material as well as of the mental poverty of the people.

This culture of silence, of the withholding of information is very sad: the result is that when the wolves put on sheep's clothing, the people are not able to discern it.

Then, of course, there is always the presence of sycophants. These have been there from time immemorial; sycophancy knows no boundaries in time or space.

We can also not close our eyes to the fact that Africa, like the rest of the world, is going through a period of moral decadence. Even the church does not escape its effects. Our young people are growing up in a culture of corruption: they have no point of reference, they do not learn about solidarity.

WAJIBU. Would it help if African countries had a leadership code?

CHEPKWONY. Yes, that would be a step in the right direction provided it would not remain a dead letter, but would be widely distributed and discussed in schools as well as among the wider public. I could see it functioning as a check and balance, something for people to refer back to. It could give people hope in the present situation. It would of course have to have the power of law, perhaps be part of the constitution.

WAJIBU. In the world today, whom do you look upon as great leaders in any area of human endeavour?

CHEPKWONY. Nyerere is someone who stands out as a leader. He made mistakes but his positive qualities are predominant. I am also a great admirer of Gandhi. He was someone who tried to bring all people together, he aimed at the peaceful coexistence of people of all races and religions. Look at what he did in South Africa, a country in which he himself was a foreigner.

To me this is still the biggest human endeavour: to fight jingoism, to fight xenophobia.

WAJ I BU. What about women leaders?

CHEPKWONY. I used to think of Golda Meir as a great leader and in a sense I still admire her. She was a person who really struggled but she came to a position of leadership at a very difficult time.

WAJIBU. And in Kenya?

CHEPKWONY. There is a lot of quality leadership among women in Kenya. However, I would not wish to mention names: history will be the arbiter. But on the whole, women in Kenya find themselves in a hostile situation: their leadership is rarely appreciated by men. Look at what happened after the last elections: the fact that after thirty years of independence not even one woman was deemed worthy of a cabinet post is shameful. By comparison, some of our neighbouring countries, like Tanzania and Zimbabwe, who had fewer educated women to begin with have done much better. In Kenya there is simply a lack of political will to give women leaders the positions they deserve.

WAJIBU. Would you say that women have a different style of leadership than men?

CHEPKWONY. In general, women lean more towards a consultative process, that is, if they are not aping the leadership style of the men in order to survive in a male environment. Men are more individualistic, more competitive. Men are also much more ambitious, excessively so. Women are also more concerned with merit. For men the question is whom you know, with whom you associate.

Sadly, the male dominant culture looks upon the female style of leadership as weak. Yet the male type of leadership, which essentially functions by climbing on others, is very destructive. If only women's style of leadership were given a chance, we would have better working relationship and greater productivity.

WAJIBU. With respect to the question of leadership, does the church give you hope?

CHEPKWONY. Yes, in the sense that the church gives one room to function at certain levels. Another reason for optimism in the church [I speak now about my own church, the Church of the Province of Kenya (Anglican)] is that the laity in the church has begun to question the matter of leadership much more. In the Anglican Church there are three houses: the house of bishops, the house of the clergy, and the house of the laity. In principle the three houses are equal but traditionally the bishops have taken on more authority.

The leadership in the church is very complex. It is understood that some power is left to God, but it has not been clear what power is supposed to be given to the people. Lately, there is more openness to the idea that God functions through people, but that people are to be held responsible when they do wrong, the laity is fighting to remove what they call Section 2A1 in the church. We have to realize that the church is a mirror of society, meaning that what goes on in society also goes on in the church.

Just one example of greater democracy in the church is the method of electing a bishop. The bishop used to be elected by an electoral college, that is 12 representatives from the synod, which

is the governing body in the Anglican Church. Since last year it is the whole synod which has the power to elect a bishop.

NOTE

1. The Section in the constitution which made Kenya a *dejure* one party state and which was removed in December 1991, paving the way for a multi-party system.

CHAPTER 16

BEYOND THE WOMEN'S DECADE: WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN KENYA*

MARIA NZOMO

In many ways the 1985 Nairobi Conference which closed the United Nation's Women's Decade marked the beginning of the awakening of Kenyan society to the fact that the issue of women's empowerment was central to the achievement of the triple goals of Equality, Development and Peace. It is true, however, that during the ten years of the Women's Decade (1975-1985), the Kenya government had adopted a Women in Development (WID) policy position and created and/or promoted national machineries to develop and coordinate programmes for women. Hence, it could be argued that Kenya was merely complying with the 1975 United Nation's resolutions that demanded of all member states to make changes and introduce policies and programs geared towards accelerated advancement of women, by creating specific national machineries to serve women and by strengthening existing organizations. This argument notwithstanding, in the post 1975 era, the Kenyan official development policy position changed from one that was completely gender blind to one that at least acknowledged that women are an important element in the development process and should be integrated in that process. However, long after the end of the women's decade, government action on the women question remained at the level of high sounding rhetoric, consisting of sweeping and vaguely worded statements of government commitment and intention on WID, quite unrelated to the actual gender situation in the country.1 This then raises the question of the short and long term impact of the women's decade on the status of women in Kenya, which I briefly examine in the next section.

THE WOMEN'S DECADE AND BEYOND: THE IMPACT ON WOMEN'S STATUS IN KENYA

The major achievement of the women's decade was the proliferation of women's groups which rose from 4,300 with a total membership of 156,892 in 1976, to 16,500 with a total membership of 630,000 by 1984. By early 1988, there were about 23,000 women groups with 1.4 million members.2 However, research into the activities and performance of these organizations has revealed that they did not succeed in empowering women.3 Government interference in their activities -especially the cooption of top women group leaders – and the social welfare orientation of these organisations, conspired to make them toothless bulldogs. Gender based discrimination against Kenyan women in almost every aspect of life, remained rampant throughout the women's decade. Discriminatory laws and practices remained in place on such matters as inheritance, marriage and divorce, custody and maintenance of children, employment related benefits such as housing allowance for married women in public service and maternity leave. Discriminatory practices and punitive action for women and girls who get pregnant while attending government sponsored educational programmes, physical, and psychological violence against women and the manipulation of common and customary law to deny women their basic rights (for example, on such issues as burial rights of a dead spouse4 all these demonstrate the powerlessness and the suppression of womenfolk in Kenya. They are also clear illustrations of the continuing pervasiveness of patriarchy and male chauvinism of Kenyan society.

While the women's movement in Kenya remained weak throughout the decade and government action was largely unresponsive to women's issues, the end of the women's decade conference saw the emergence of a new awareness and self-assertiveness among Kenyan women, both individually and in groups. For example, women started coming out more aggressively to challenge the institution of polygamy. There was also some positive indication of women asserting their rights on matters of forced marriage, which was previously common among some Kenyan communities. Other women began to assert their reproductive rights and yet others, especially women in professions such as law, media and academia, began organising awareness raising seminars, workshops, educational tours and public poster campaigns to publicize the situation of women and to educate women about their rights.5

Despite these emerging changes in attitudes among women and the evident desire on their part to uplift their subordinate status, the political environment remained quite undemocratic and generally hostile to any forces that challenged the status quo, whether on gender relations or on any other issue. And as already noted, despite the dramatic expansion of women's groups and organizations during the women's decade, Kenyan women did not succeed in developing a cohesive and strong women's movement that could lobby for the advancement of women in the country.

In my view therefore, the powerlessness of women in Kenya and their total inability to advance their status derives to a large extent from the undemocratic structures of Kenyan society as is best epitomised by the gross under-representation of women in key decision making and policy making positions, as explained below.

THE MARGINALISATION OF WOMEN IN POLITICS AND OTHER PUBLIC DECISION MAKING POSITIONS

Kenya's record of women's participation in politics and other public decision making posts is pathetic by any standards including our own.

In the Judiciary, for example, the first woman judge of the High Court was appointed in 1982, almost twenty years after independence, the second one in 1986 and the third in 1991. There is still no woman to date who is a member of the highest court in Kenya, the Court of Appeal despite there being some vacant positions. For the first time in 1983, women were appointed to head two of the many public parastatal organizations in the country and fifteen others were appointed in 1986, seven as heads and eight as members of boards of parastatal bodies *(Daily Nation* January 17, 1986:1). During the same year (1986) President Moi also appointed two women to senior diplomatic positions. One was appointed to become the first woman High Commissioner in charge of Kenya's Diplomatic Mission in Britain. However, she was recalled in early 1992, and redeployed as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. The second one was appointed as Kenya's representative to the Nairobi United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), replacing another who had earlier resigned from this post. And in 1987, the president appointed the first ever woman Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. *(Daily Nation,* June 2, 1987: 1). No other major appointments were made in that administration, although from time to time women are given some token representation by being appointed as members of the many ad hoc boards and committees that are regularly set up.

In the political arena, it was only in November 1969, six years after independence, that the first woman was elected into the National Assembly and one more was nominated to sit in that

august legislative body, along with eleven male nominated members. Between 1969-1974, of the total elected members of Parliament, women formed 0.5 per cent and 8 per cent of the nominated members. Except for the period 1974 - 1979, when women's representation improved slightly, the general trend has been one of women's marginalisation in political decision making at the national level. Indeed by 1991, out of 200 elected and nominated members of parliament, there were only two elected women MPs. Of the two women MPs, only one sits on the front bench as an Assistant Minister for Culture and Social Services, along with 69 men Assistant Ministers. Since 1974, when the first woman was appointed to the front bench, the position of Assistant Minister is the highest position a woman has ever held in Kenya's national assembly. Furthermore, there has never been more than one woman holding this post at any one time. More significantly, the lone woman Assistant Minister has consistently been appointed to serve in the "soft" Ministry of Culture and Social Services.

Within the ruling (KANU) party hierarchy, women have had even more difficulty participating at the national executive level; (save for the lone woman who since 1989 has held the position of Director of Women and Youth Affairs at the ruling party secretariat and one woman party branch chair elected in early 1992). Indeed, women's status in the political party hierarchy has consistently been relegated to that of mere rank and file members or officials of the powerless Women's Wing.

My own assessment up to 1991 is that the few women in key decision making positions had not used their platforms to influence national policies in a manner that benefitted other women who had no such a platform. None of these women, for example, had ever made an appeal to the government to remove the many laws that discriminate against women in property ownership, employment, inheritance, marriage and divorce. The increasing violence against women, including numerous cases of child rape, is an issue on which one would have expected women in positions of authority to speak out and, for example, to insist that the law on rape be changed to make it a capital crime and not a minor offence, as is currently the case. Perhaps, because most of these women leaders had been presidential appointees in a single party political system, they feared victimisation if they were too critical of government legislation and practices that discriminate against women, especially when they as individuals were beneficiaries of the system. Furthermore, they must have been aware of the various instances where the government had issued stern warnings to women who had tried to make very modest demands to the government in favour of women.6 As for the token women in a male dominated Parliament, their numbers clearly worked against any efforts they may have made in pushing for gender related policy changes.

However, since the restoration of multi-party politics in December, 1991, the political situation has changed sufficiently to accommodate some freedom of expression, association and assembly, not only to political parties, but also to various groups with a vested interest in the new democratisation agenda. Women have become one of the most vocal pressure groups and are lobbying very hard for gender equity and social justice, especially in political representation as explained in the next section.

WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA: JANUARY 1992 - OCTOBER 1992

In the transition to multi-party democracy in Kenya, a high premium was placed on political empowerment as a means to achieve other goals associated with the advancement of the status of women. The argument here is that, if women are in key decision making and policy making

capacities in large enough numbers, they would exert decisive influence to ensure the repeal of laws that discriminate against women at the social and economic levels and they would participate in designing policies that mainstream, rather than disempower, women.

Since January 1992, women's lobby groups and organizations have been mobilizing to insure that in the forthcoming civic and general elections, women constitute a critical mass of at least 30 - 35 per cent of the total legislative body. One basic strategy to achieve this goal is to sensitize and conscienticize women (who after all are the majority voters) on the power of the vote and on the merits of casting their votes for committed women, rather than for men. The other related strategy is for women's political pressure groups to encourage and build confidence in those women with the necessary political will and commitment to contest for political office in the forthcoming multi-party civic and parliamentary elections. Non-partisan women's pressure groups are already at work to provide necessary moral and advisory support to women candidates in order to increase their chances of being elected to office. For example, in July 1992, the National Committee on the Status of Women (which has been the main lobby group spearheading this particular struggle) organised a national training workshop for women candidates. They brought together about 60 women who had declared their intention to contest political office. Many more women candidates were to join these sixty before the end of 1992, in order to attain something close to a critical mass of women in the next parliament. (Daily *Nation*, July 12 & 18, 1992; *Standard* 12 July 1992). In the meantime, the women representatives from all over the country endorsed Professor Wangari Maathai as the women's choice for presidential candidate in the elections.7 This in itself is an indication of the seriousness and ambition behind the Kenyan women's struggle for political empowerment.

However, to sustain this momentum and achieve the political objectives of the women's agenda, there is need to build and support a common lobbying forum that can serve to enhance the capacity of women candidates to win in the forthcoming civic and parliamentary elections.

My assessment of the current political situation is that, although women have organised various pressure groups with the major objective being to advance women's political participation, there is yet to emerge a well-coordinated strategy, common vision and cohesiveness. As I have said elsewhere,8 the Kenyan women's struggle for their empowerment has tended to be constrained by the absence of a strong women's movement, by the emphasis on social/welfarist objectives and by neglect of economic and political empowerment goals. It is now of greatest urgency to create unity in diversity between the numerous women's groups, organizations and individuals. Only if women adopt a common strategy, informed by a comrnon vision, can they effectively lobby for adequate representation in decision making positions and influence change in the policies and structures that perpetuate their subordinate status.

CONCLUSION

It cannot be overemphasised that the new democratisation process under way in Kenya could again marginalise women (as did the earlier struggle for independence) unless women themselves seize this opportunity to challenge and seek fundamental changes in their subordinate status. They can do this by penetrating the decision making centres of power and control. Women must therefore ensure that they attain high level and adequate political and public decision making representation by committed women and gender sensitive men of their choice in the envisaged democratic arrangement. This is the only way women can be assured of influence in the designing

of future national development policies and programmes. It is also the most effective way of ensuring that laws that discriminate against women are removed from the statute books.

NOTES

* For every woman who is tired of acting weak when she knows she is strong: there is a man who is tired of appearing strong when he feels vulnerable.

1. See for example, Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, *Kenya African nationalism: Nyayo philosophy and principles*. London: McMillan, 1986, p.118.

2. Mazingira Institute. *A guide to women's organisations and agencies serving women in Kenya*. Nairobi: Mazingira institute, 1985, p. 286.

3. See, for example, Maria Nzomo. "The impact of foreign aid on women's projects in Kenya: some preliminary findings: Research report presented at the 30th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Denver, Colorado, November 1987."

4. A classic case is that of Wambui Otieno's 1986/87 protracted legal tussle over the burial rights of her dead spouse. For more details, see Nation Group of Newspapers publication. SM: "Kenva's unique burial saga". See also "SM: Wambui's defeat is a defeat for women" in *VIVA*, June 1987, pp. 16-17, 36.

5. Maria Nzomo. "The impact of the Women's Decade on policies, programs and empowerment of women in Kenya," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, Vol. XVII/2, 1989, p. 14.

6. M. Nzomo. "Women, democracy and development in Africa," in Walter Oyugi *et. al.,* eds. *Democratic theory and practice in Africa*. Nairobi: Heinemann. 1987, p. 124.

7. See for example, *Sunday Standard* and *Sunday Times*. Nairobi, July 19, 1992.

8. M. Nzomo, "The impact of the Women's Decade..." and M. Nzomo. "Wmen in politics: working paper no. 2." Nairobi: AAWORD-Kenya, August l992.

Part III
Education

CHAPTER 17

THE UNIVERSITIES AND INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

CHUKUKA OKONJO

The relations between African and industrialised countries as well as between groups and individuals within African countries are marked by inequality. These inequalities are accompanied by constraints and limitations to the freedom of action of the individual, the group or the nation. Therefore let us, following Galtung, use the two basic variables, freedom and justice and their antonyms, to construct a fourfold classification of societies in the world. The distinction being made here in respect of freedom is that between societies which are oriented either to uniformity or to diversity (collectivism versus individualism) and in the case of justice, that between vertical and horizontal societies or, to put it in other words, between societies where inequality or equality is enshrined as an organisational principle.

This fourfold classification gives rise to four societal models, each with its own internal logic and social grammar so to speak. The transition from one model to the other is not continuous or a question of degree, but represents rather a basic discontinuity and break in the value system, internal logic and social grammar of the society. Table I represents in a simplified form the basic structural characteristics of the four societal models. Examples of three of these four models of society can readily be given.

Thus mediaeval societies in Europe, many Latin American countries (except for some small Model II elite sectors) Japan and pre-revolutionary Ethiopia are classical examples of Model I (conservative or feudal societies). The typical so-called "modern" society, ranging from the United States via Britain, Sweden, Finland, Hungary to the Soviet Union, are structurally classifiable as Model II (liberal) societies. Model II thus contains both private capitalist and state capitalist versions.

Many "traditional" societies in Africa can be classified as primitive versions of Model III (communal or socialist) society the word primitive is used here in a technological sense containing a small Model I and a growing and expanding Model II sector, while countries like China, Cuba and Tanzania are trying to create modernised versions of this type of society. Model IV (pluralist or communist) society, is a futuristic society which does not yet exist. It offers diversity with equality, and not self-realisation at the expense of equality as in the case of liberal Model II society or equality at the expense of self-individuation or self-actualization as in Model III societies.

Depending on the model, to which a given society more readily approximates, the strategy and tactics of modernisation understood to mean the provision of mass literacy, cheap access to information, transportation, communication, cheap, economically efficient and appropriate technology and health) would have to be consistent with the internal logic and social grammar of that model. Similarly, hypothesization, experimentation, analysis, inference, verification as well as the structure of scientific investigation and explanation would also need to conform to the internal logic and social grammar of the model of society. As these are not trivial requirements, but fundamental conditions which must be satisfied if the direction and pace of development of a society is not to be abnormal (as has been the case with the African countries), it is important to elaborate, through examples, some of the implications of conformity or non-conformity with these conditions for individual countries. Our main concern in this paper is the "University and Development" and the positive and dynamic role which African youth can play both in their

universities and societies. We will therefore use the area of education to illustrate the difference in the conceptualisation of the content and meaning of education in the three ideal models of society, which we have outlined and of which we have given concrete examples.

AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES AND EDUCATION FOR A COMMUNAL OR SOCIALIST SOCIETY

Politics, it has been said, is an attempt to shape, society according to a vision of the world. Education, as commonly conceived, is an effort to teach that vision of the world to human beings, particularly to children and the youth. Since educational systems reflect a society's vision of the world, it should be clear that it is not very meaningful to ask which educational system is best. For the question can only be answered relative to an ideology, the particular vision which actuates society of what the world should be. As Caldwell, in discussing the onset of fertility decline and the beginnings of the demographic transition in Third World countries has pointed out, educational systems which are conducive to the operation of one type of society may be disastrous for another type of society, leading to imbalances and fundamental social changes. The systems of education inherited by the African countries from their colonial mentors bear this out. Modelled after the education systems designed for Model II societies (whose goal of life is success and which emphasize individualism) their goals and ideology are not compatible with the norms of a Model III society, which emphasise solidarity and egalitarianism. The imported education systems are consequently dysfunctional in African societies and must be adapted to conform with the goals of African life and ideology.

For education in Model I society, emphasis in training is laid on discipline, obedience and service to the powers that be. In Model II societies, in contrast, while discipline and obedience are still emphasised, premium is placed on training for competition. Thus education in a Model I society is feudal in nature and since the skills acquired by individuals belong to a vertical collectivity, in-service and on the job training are the preferred methods of education. In a Model II society training is elitist, and since it benefits the individual alone, it is usually done before taking on a job and as outside-service training. Further, the competition, which characterises this training, means that the content of education is vertically individualistic. Access to such education is limited, not only because society cannot afford to give education to everybody, but also because the basic image of skill and knowledge is inherently inegalitarian, something linked to a concept of innate ability, which is discovered through examinations and intelligence quotient (IQ) tests. Examinations and IQ tests thus perform a definitive function in such societies, sorting children out, and forming the basis of the allocation of individuals to an educational level and hence to a social and economic level.

Under such conditions, where resources for investment in education are limited, continued rapid population growth makes children an economic burden. For in view of the individualistic orientation of the model of society, the judgment as to whether the additional child is good or bad is influenced mainly by short and medium term considerations. In these circumstances very high discount rates are operational and therefore the value of an additional person is negative, because of the short-run negative externalities for those already alive resulting from transfer payments for social services and the reduction in the output per worker caused by the dilution of capital. Children are also a burden in two other senses: not only must more resources be devoted to their education but most of this investment is wasted since the innate ability of many children will not enable them to benefit fully from the education with which they are provided. Decisions must therefore be taken

into which levels of education the limited resources available should be channeled. Since these decisions are made by the elite, it should not be surprising that they usually result in more resources being channeled to the higher levels of education, thus favouring the elite in education.

One further characteristic of this type of education should be noted. Since such education is expected to prepare children for competition in the world of work, in order to derive maximum benefit from it, children are expected to devote themselves fully to learning during the period of their education and the mixing of work with learning is frowned upon. Parental emotion is centred on enhancing the degree of future competitiveness of their children and therefore both wealth and emotion flows are directed to the children. Children are thus not only an economic, but also an emotional burden.

A poor society, attempting to offer education to all its children as well as to its adults at the same time, usually finds that it cannot afford to do so either economically or emotionally. The answer to such a development normally is, first, to limit the number of people who can have access to education through limiting the number of children born, and secondly, to ignore the need of the many illiterate adults for basic education. In effect then, if education has not been acquired when one is young, it can no longer be acquired later in the life cycle.

Let us contrast all this with education for a Model III horizontal society, where access to all echelons of education is open to all who want and desire such education. As the society is horizontal, surges emotion and wealth are directed not to the individual but rather to the community as a whole, while the judgment as to whether an additional child is good or bad is influenced by long- term, not short-term considerations. All, both young and old, work hard and contribute to the community according their abilities. Education becomes defeudalised as is training in social life, mixing work and learning, engendering a sense of a shared and egalitarian collectivity. As the contribution to technology of each additional individual will some day – though inevitably a long time ahead – lead to income per head being higher than it would have been, all things being equal, under conditions where technical change is a function of the absolute population size, rapid population growth becomes beneficial to the society. The reason for this is that the society will eventually show higher consumption with more rapid rather than with slower population growth because of the cumulative nature of knowledge. Simultaneous as opposed to selective development then becomes possible for all communities in a nation, while simultaneous education for all also become a possibility.

Consider a less developed African country, which is unable to provide education at various levels for all its citizens and which, although still basically approximating our description of a Model III society, contains a small Model I sector as well as a small but growing Model II elite sector. Let us suppose such a country were to introduce an education system run under the following ten operational principles:

* All third cycle institutions including universities in the country double their intake through rearranging the pattern of the academic year and having two intakes of students a year, with each intake completing its work for the year in 24 weeks. Each institution would have a two-week break taken in the period of change-over between the two intakes into the institution in a year; that is, each institution would have four weeks of break during the year;

* Staffing in the third cycle institutions would be increased over a three to four year period by fifty per cent, with each teacher being granted four to six weeks of paid annual leave per year, apart from the breaks of the institutions. A system of rotating research sabbaticals would be

introduced, such that each teacher would be granted one year free from teaching after three years of teaching and research. This year would be devoted wholly to research undertaken in the country;

* A fourth cycle of education would be established with the teachers at third cycle institutions on rotating research sabbaticals forming, with bright and outstanding post-graduate students, both the teaching and student body of such an institution. This fourth-cycle institution could take the form of a centre for advanced studies or a research university;

* National service for two years would be mandatory for all persons who have completed six years of training in second cycle institutions. National service persons would be assigned, for the period of their service, to work in the rural and deprived urban areas of the country in adult literacy, non-formal education, universal primary education, agricultural and industrial extension, public health, public works, agro-forestry and other similar community-building programmes. During the period of their service, their accommodation and food would be a charge on the community they are serving.

* The third cycle institutions would adopt a work-study method in training their students, with students who have completed their year of lectures being set to work in sectors of the economy like education, which are useful for their further training and are critical to national development. Such periods of work would be counted as part of their national service;

* All second cycle institutions would move from the current single shift to a double shift system running two shifts per day from e.g. 6.45 to 12.15 hours and from 12.45 to 18.15 hours. Pupils who do academic work in the morning shift would be required to work in agriculture or small-scale industries daily for two or three hours, e.g. from 15.15 till 18.15 hours, while those who do academic work in the afternoons would similarly work in the mornings from e.g. 6.45 to 9.45 hours;

* All communities which so desire could establish second cycle institutions running a double shift system. The communities would provide the accommodation for the school and the government the teachers. (These teachers would be the students from third cycle institutions, who are absolving their national service)

* All industrial and commercial establishments, with a work force of ten or more persons would pay a 2 to 6% tax on their annual turnover. The purpose of this tax would be to finance the provision of scientific and technological equipment, needed for training in the schools and universities and for training in the skills required by the secondary school graduates, who will work in the countryside and deprived urban areas;

* All citizens would be entitled to 12 years of formal and non-formal education, which can be taken, when desired, over one's life-time and universal primary education would be free and compulsory for all children from age six;

* All communities would participate in the management and development of the schools and programmes which serve them.

It is important for us to pause and note some of the special features of the education system outlined above. In particular, attention is directed to the relationship between the various levels of education, which is now one of educational value flowing upwards from the primary or basic level of education to the secondary and tertiary levels and from there on to the post- doctoral centres of advanced studies, without there being a reverse flow hierarchically. The first five principles of organisation of the system would ensure that there is a flow in the reverse direction, with university teachers who have spent their time in the centres of advanced studies in their home countries going back to teach in their universities, through university students going to teach in secondary schools

or at the basic level of education on a rotating but continuous basis; and through secondary school graduates participating in teaching at the primary or basic level of education or being engaged in essential national services necessary for the rapid development of the country. In each case a short period of training with succeeding periods of further training is built into their work programmes.

Thus not only would massive amounts of high and middle-level manpower be suddenly made available from African nations' own resources to meet the challenges of development but the youth would immediately be faced with the task of engaging in nation and resource building. This vital exercise which is now dependent in great measure on imported inputs and skills would then rest squarely on the available but under-utilised human resources of the nation. Moreover, the universities would no longer be isolated, cut off from the life and realities of the nation which provides for them, but would through their research, their consultancy, planning and advisory services join the mainstream of national life and support the struggle for respect and dignity which is the lot of the majority of the population. This and the activities of their undergraduate students would lead to the universities being transformed from the academic ivory towers, which they are now, into crucial links in the creation of new and relevant knowledge needed for development. Such a system of education would not only create the massive techno-scientific and managerial infrastructure needed for backing up development by training on the job and "*in situ*", as it were, but would also make it possible for everyone in the country, child or adult, to have at least twelve years of primary education, a basic requirement for modernising society. And unlike what is happening now, each African country would be able to afford such an education out of its own resources.

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNIVERSITY DEVELOPMENT AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF AFRICAN STUDENTS TO THEIR SOCIETIES

Universities in Africa, as transplanted from Western society, are essential Model II structures. As such they are not structurally responsive to policies which are typical of model III societies. It is essential, therefore, if they are to fulfil their proper roles in African societies, that they undergo a structural transformation, which would enable them to carry out their primary task of building independent sources of intellectual power based on the cultures of their societies, ensure that the educational systems to which they belong serve indigenous ends and engender intellectual originality and self- respect in the countries that have established them and which maintain them.

To be able to do this they must themselves take on the goals and values of the societies which they have been founded to serve, giving meaning and cultural expression to these values and goals. In other words, they must not only espouse values like self- reliance and solidarity, they must be seen to be implementing these values and showing solidarity with their society. They must individually and collectively be self-reliant. Their intellectual orientation must no longer be that of continued dependence on the metropolitan power centres of learning. But while not cutting themselves off from the intellectual world of the industrialised nations, they must orient themselves towards finding their cultural sustenance from their own societies. They must engage in a reorganisation of their structures so as to permit better internal participation of the junior teachers, students and workers of a university in the governance and running of the university and in setting its goals. If this is not done they will continue to respond inadequately to the pressing needs and problems of African countries. We cannot ask the elite that run the politics and economy of these countries to change their values, goals and direction to conform with the basic values and goals espoused by their societies without also asking the universities to do the same.

The question which immediately arises is whether the type of education system outlined above can in the current financial crisis be afforded by the African countries? To this question we can answer an unequivocal "YES". For our calculations show that, given a society in which the goal of life is solidarity, a society which asks its youth to participate in national tasks which are critical to development, the education system we propose would not cost more than 6% of the gross domestic product of a country. Moreover, in the case of the university, the double intake system costs between 10-25% more in recurrent costs than the current single intake system being operated, while the capital costs amount to less than 10% of current capital costs.

Against any cost increases that might occur must then be set the considerable savings in foreign exchange, which countries would make through immediate delinking from the metropolitan universities. Many Africans who could study in their own countries, have been forced to study abroad because of the so- called lack of space and facilities at their home universities, and this is a constant source of hemorrhage of a country's resources. For example, some 42,000 Nigerians are officially listed as studying in the United States alone, costing a total of $420 million yearly. One estimate of the annual foreign exchange requirement for such avoidable study outside the country, in the case of Nigeria, is some $650 million. This is more than the whole tertiary level of education in Nigeria with 100,000 students is now costing the country.

In the case of Ghana where some 3100 students have in a recent count been officially listed as being provided with foreign exchange to study overseas, only 700 are studying subjects which cannot be taught in Ghana. At the same time only about one-third of those qualified by the very high standards set by the Ghanaian universities can get places in them. Yet if double-intake facilities are introduced into the country's tertiary institutions and only those whose courses cannot be provided in the country are allowed to study overseas, the savings in foreign exchange would total a minimum of some $24 million per annum (if we make the modest estimate that studying in the industrialised countries costs about $10,000 per annum per student). Similar estimates for Kenya with not so recent data give a figure of $34 million, for Tanzania $11 million and for, he Sudan $12 million. And so we have the very curious situation where very poor countries are subsidising university education in much richer countries, while neglecting their own universities, because of a lack of proper organisation and use of already existing facilities.

Apart from this gain in foreign exchange resources, the introduction of a double-intake system would also make it possible for the universities to respond to national emergencies much more readily and flexibly than they do now. For they can then assign those students, who are out on their 24 weeks working vacations, to work in areas of critical need and in the emergency programmes of their countries, without interrupting their normal schedules of work for the year. The case of Ethiopia, where famine relief had in part to be distributed by foreigners, comes immediately to mind. A double-intake system instead of the current single intake would have obviated such costly and yet not so necessary technical assistance.

Work-study at the tertiary and secondary levels also enables a country to take advantage of the demographic profile of the country, whereby, as is the case in Africa, a sizeable proportion of the population between the ages of 11-24, that would otherwise be unproductive and a burden on the national economy could, through their organised efforts, provide part of the means for maintaining themselves at school. At the same time they would acquire relevant expertise in production, which would otherwise have to be imported later or acquired overseas. The participation of students both at the tertiary and secondary levels in national developmental efforts through work in adult literacy, agricultural and small-scale industrial extension, primary health-care activities, etc., particularly in the rural and depressed urban areas would conscienticize such

students as to the real needs of their countries. There would thus be a beginning in the building of that solidarity between those studying and the masses, which is so visibly lacking in the products of the current education system.

Lastly it creates immediately the large number of personnel which are currently unavailable to man the techno-scientific and managerial infrastructure of development in the African countries, without their having recourse to aid from outside, which in any case is available in very limited quantities. One very quick estimate of the of the sums involved for Ghana and Tanzania, where some 8000 and 3400 students respectively are in the university system is that a reorganisation and operation of the universities as suggested would make available resources equivalent to 160 million and $68 million per annum respectively in self-aid (if the cost of importing an expert to work at the secondary level of education in African countries is estimated at $20,000 per annum). And, much more important, the expertise acquired in such work would remain within the country.

There is thus an important and crucial role to be played by the universities and their students in the drive of the African countries for self-reliant and self-sustaining development. Will those who guide our universities and the students who go to these higher institutions recognise the opportunity for service which being at university offers them? Will they perceive that they have a responsibility not only for the future of the institutions to which they now belong but also for the future of their societies? These societies are in the main poor and underprivileged, but all the same they have made it possible for these students, these lecturers, as well as those in charge, the possibility of higher education. A positive answer to these questions would perhaps see the beginnings of that massive transformation of the African continent, based on self-reliant and self-sustaining development, which we all so much desire.

CHAPTER 18
PAULO FREIRE'S DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION METHODOLOGY

FRANCIS MULURA

Paulo Freire's Background

Paulo Freire, one of the most famous adult educationist of the twentieth century, was born in the early 1920s at Recife, in the north east of Brazil. Recife, a small village in those days, was badly stricken by poverty, then prevalent in the country.

Freire was brought up in poor conditions of life; he experienced the consequences of social discrimination, hunger, and lack of freedom of expression. After he struggled to be educated, he managed to enter Recife University. He specialised in Adult Education and later became professor of Adult Education in the same University. This gave him the opportunity to develop a special approach to adult education, one that made it a liberating experience. He was later appointed Chief Consultant in the Board of Adult Education in Recife.

Inspired by his deep desire to liberate his people from social discrimination, economic marginalisation and what he called the 'culture of silence", Freire developed his pychosocial method' based on three major convictions:

- Real democracy should be established in the country;
- Right and access to educational opportunities should be extended to all people equally and should not be the privilege of a small elite;
- The country's economy should be in the hands of the citizens and not of a small minority.

Freire's Psychosocial Method as a Liberating Process

Freire believed that democracy in Brazil was nothing but political propaganda. He claimed that there should be real democracy through which freedom of expression would both be cherished and practised as a virtue.

Freire believed that all people can learn, and therefore education should be for all. He had observed that people at the grassroots had been deprived of this right. The illiterates especially were regarded as too ignorant to learn. Freire, however, believed that nobody is too ignorant to learn; for there is nothing like total ignorance or absolute wisdom. The ordinary grassroots people can learn as well as the elite; not only that, but each can learn from the other. All persons are important and have useful experiences which they can share with others in mutual dialogue.

For the elite, however, education constituted a whole scale of values and certain standards of living associated with the educated. Hence, the elite would expect education to "domesticate" the masses into conformity with the status quo. As seen by the elite: education should make people more obedient to their teachers, masters and leaders; education should make people aspire to the kind of lifestyle practised by the elite; it should cultivate the spirit of competition; it should convince the masses that people were poor because they were illiterate and lazy, that the elite are educated and hardworking and therefore deserve to be rich.

These are the kind of values Freire sought to challenge as he introduced what he called "Education for critical consciousness."

The elite group, usually forming the government, believed that the only privilege of the grassroots was on the terms of "assistentialism". This "assistentialism" gave the impression that the Government owned all the economic resources in the country and could choose to give assistance only to those they wished. But Freire believed that the country's wealth should belong to the citizens, the people themselves because they make up the nation, and without them there would be no nation but only a "country landscape." Therefore, national wealth should be equitably distributed in the society and not concentrated in the hands of a few.

Through the "psychosocial method" people are liberated out of the "culture of silence" and enabled to articulate their rights. In the psychosocial method approach people are motivated to discuss their own life situation in small "culture circles." In this process they identify their problems and plan to act in an effort to transform the situation. In Freire's philosophy, life is not static: things were different in the past and they can be made better in the future. People have the responsibility to shape their life as well as the life of their family, the immediate community and the wider society. People are responsible for their own liberation and shaping their own culture, for participating in the making of history and transforming the world as opposed to being merely spectators.

Freire was motivated and inspired by the day to day conditions of life in Recife where people were perpetually brainwashed by the elite who had made the people believe that disease and poverty was the will of God. Freire had to develop a method, which could help the people to rediscover their lost sense of worth and dignity, a method that would awaken people to the realisation of their potential as creators of culture, people who, unlike animals, would give name and meaning to the world.

For education to develop this critical faculty in a human person it has to have the following qualities:

* Problem-posing: to create critical awareness through experience-based learning (sharing through discussions);
* Analysis: to reflect on people's own situation of life and find out what to do about its inadequacies;
* Implementation: after analysis and decision-making, people have to act in order to change the situation;
* Evaluation: this becomes necessary to establish failures and successes; in turn, this leads to a plan of action for improvement on people's actions.

The Extension of the Psychosocial Method

Freire's anti-elitist views (characterised by deep respect and appreciation of the worth of the human person, regardless of social status and by the participatory approach to learning) has permeated and influenced many adult education programmes, especially in third world countries. Realising the effectiveness of this methodology among the oppressed in Brazil, Catholic and other organisations throughout North East Brazil where quickly adopted it for the purpose of combating illiteracy.

However, when the military took power, following a coup in the country in April 1964, the revolutionary government decided to do away with the now popular adult education campaigns on the grounds that they were subversive. They discontinued all Freire's projects and put him in prison for some weeks before he fled to Chile. The approach was tried in Chile and proved very

successful. In fact, Chile became one of the five countries in the world to receive a UNESCO award for successfully combating illiteracy.

Freire later went to work for the World Council of Churches in Geneva in the department of Adult Education. Here he served until the late 1980s when he retired back to his home country, Brazil where he dedicated his life to writing. He died in May 1997.

Freire's Psychosocial Method and Literacy

Before Paulo Freire's philosophy and approach was introduced, adult learners involved in literacy programmes were subjected to boring, irrelevant, and often childish curricula and mechanisms of literacy learning in which they were compelled by the teacher to memorise the letters of the alphabet and to chant the consonants and the vowels the whole day. Freire developed the hypothesis that adults learning to read and write already knew the words they were learning, they only could not write them. The literacy teacher should simply develop a few words comprising the major syllables in the language. These words should also have a strong meaning in the lives of the adults. Unlike children, adults learning is oriented to problem solving. Therefore the literacy words should define an "existential problem" in the community, they should be words relevant to their concerns, needs and aspirations. This would make the adults more committed to the programme.

THE SPREAD OF FREIRE'S PSYCHOSOCIAL METHOD IN AFRICA

Freire's psychosocial method is more popularly known in Africa as Development Education Programme (DEP). However, each country or region has adopted its own specific name in reference to DEP as described below.

In Eastern Africa Freire's psychosocial method has been known as DELTA (Development Education and Leadership Teams in Action). In Kenya DELTA training has been around for at least twenty years. This grassroots-focused movement for social awareness and action has emerged as one of the most powerful tools for participatory and transforming community development initiatives. The central focus of DELTA is to seek solidarity with the poor and to empower the weaker sections of a community. In particular, concern is focused on those who are economically deprived and those who are socially under-privileged, having minimal or no access to educational and other opportunities.

Since taking roots in Kenya during the 1970s, the DELTA programme, philosophy and vision have radiated far and wide. It has been introduced in various parts of Africa under different names, reflecting its dynamism and local adaptability.

With the advent of contemporary participatory methodologies, PREMESE Africa, a DELTA oriented consultancy in Kenya, has taken the initiative to reshape the DELTA training curriculum. It has attempted to incorporate the lessons gathered from the numerous programme evaluations and has come up with a new package by the name of Participatory Community Development and Leadership Skills (PACODELS).

In a number of West African countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, Liberia and Sierra Leone), DEP has been known as DELES (Development Education and Leadership Service) whereas in Southern Africa (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia), the DEP approach is referred to as Training for transformation. In these areas, it is most popular in church circles.

Altogether, at least 18 countries in Africa are using Freire's DEP Methodology. Since 1990 these countries have come together to form a network known as ADEN (African Development Education Network) whose headquarters is in Harare, Zimbabwe.

The Impact of DEP

By its nature the impact of an awareness raising programme is difficult to measure. DEP is an educational process whose results are often intangible. Efforts have been made to develop qualitative indicators for assessing social change, but this has not been perfected as yet. Some of the observable changes that can be captured through proxy indicators for DEP are presented below. These are observations deduced from programmes such as the DEP of Machakos Catholic Diocese which has been in existence for more than 20 years.

- Consolidated solidarity within groups characterised by collective action to protect individual and/or group interests and rights (signs of more interdependence within DEP groups)
- High degree of openness, transparency and accountability in DEP groups, both to the members as well as to the external partners.
- Ability of group members to speak up in public places, articulating group plans and challenging social evils in society.
- Ability of group members to relate to Government and NGO officers without fear of intimidation.
- Evidence of changing cultural values towards more humane social practices (e.g. women in DEP groups now own property and can speak in public places in the presence of men).
- Respect for each other's ideas and contribution regardless of social status.
- Breaking attitudes of dependency and paternalistic relationships between DEP groups and politicians, influential businessmen or civil servants.
- Improved group management (productive and efficient group meetings, shared leadership, etc.
- Regular democratic elections guided by collectively developed group constitution.
- Ability by group members to manage and resolve internal conflicts on their own. Numerous DEP members and animators having been elected to important and influential positions of leadership within communities.
- Presence of diverse socio economic skills among the membership, with marked decline in dependency on external expertise to manage group activities (great scope of self-sufficiency in skills).
- The social mobility of DEP activists of the 1970s and after, DEP activists having gone up the social ladder in society to become University lecturers, Members of Parliament, Pan-African social development consultants, and employees of international bodies. These are strategic positions in which to influence policies towards equity and justice in society.
- Evidence of rising family incomes as a result of DEP group-based income generating projects.
- Ability by DEP groups to influence or even control village economy through their economic activities within a community.
- Presence of community service projects emanating from the initiatives of DEP groups, e.g. water supply, educational institutions, health centres, etc.

- Evidence of networking and contacts that form wider solidarity within and beyond DEP circles, e.g. through association of groups and DEP animators (for instance, ADEN).
- Evidence of lobby initiatives for social justice among DEP groups, reflecting DEP's deliberate option to target the materially poor.

The foregoing are some of the qualitative indicators to be found within DEP groups that are more than ten years old. It is important to note here that DEP happens to have scored much less quantitatively (economically) than qualitatively (social transformation). This does not imply a failure on the part of DEP since DEP is a process geared more towards human growth than towards attaining higher per capita incomes.

Some Challenges from Field

The Development Education Programmes have had to grapple with a number of challenges or dilemmas in the course of time. These are discussed below.

Indispensability of DEP Animator. After the initial three to five years of inception of a programme, there seemed to be a trend for the emergence of over-dependence of DEP groups and projects on the person of the DEP animator. The DEP animator, has tended to change his/her original role of enabler, sensitiser, motivator and community organiser, to that of "foreign affairs minister" for the community. This entails roaming around all over the region making oral as well as written contacts (and in some cases overseas contacts) for fund-raising on behalf of DEP groups.

It is not that this should not be appreciated, or that one doubts the importance of such a role, but there is concern over the role assumed by the DEP animator as a "patron" through whom resources are channeled from the outside world. In this way, the animators have made themselves indispensable life-lines for the groups, perpetuating the very paternalistic relationships DEP seeks to avoid. They start wielding immense power as decisionmakers on behalf of the groups they represent, thus reinforcing the perpetual state of powerlessness among the target communities.

Challenges of Role Modelling with the Emergence of New Elitism. To be sure, DEP ideals can be most challenging and not everyone can live up to them. A DEP graduate is expected to be a role model in society through his love, his caring and moral uprightness. It calls for religious sensibility for these ideals to be maintained. Development education workers have often been accused of "preaching water, but drinking wine". DEP itself challenges its advocates to reflect the same ideals and values they preach to be seen in their own lifestyles and in their day to day relationships. It therefore demands self-discipline and a process of "Easter" at personal level, whereby old persons and values die allowing the resurrected self to reflect the new values and aspirations. Not many leaders in the DEP fraternity have stood up to this test. Instead, there seems to have emerged a new elitism among the experienced DEP workers, people who see themselves as above-it-all, the custodians of a DEP religion.

A number of experienced DEP workers in the field tend to usurp a lot of power and control in their positions of responsibility, with a tendency to overreact to negative feedback or any form of criticism. This could be explained by the fact that their background of immense experience and relative success in their professional track record has tended to blind their objectivity. They would then tend to see any criticism either as a personal attack or lack of appreciation of what they have helped to achieve.

Inadequate Transparency and Accountability. In the above circumstances, sometimes transparency and accountability on the part of DEP workers may tend to be less than adequate. Often DEP animators did not know that they didn't know. The DEP did not prepare them to be managers. Specifically, they did not have the necessary skills for resource management and financial accounting.

"Arrival Culture". The "arrival culture" tendency manifests itself when DEP workers busy themselves more in "protecting" the methodology than keeping pace with contemporary development of ideas and strategies. Development is a dynamic process and as such, DEP needs to be enriched with new strategies such as Participatory Rural Appraisal, Strategic Planning, etc. How often have experienced DEP workers gone out of their way to acquire such new skills on their own volition remains to be seen.

Conflict of Loyalties. Conflict of loyalties has been another challenge in DEP circles. Most DEP practitioners will either be employees of Non-Governmental Organisations, church employees or personnel from governmental development agencies. The employer organisations have their own interests to protect. This reality restricts a DEP worker as to how far he/she can go in challenging powers behind injustice and exploitation and championing human rights. In other words, restrictions are imposed by the employer regarding how far a DEP practitioner can go in the conscientisation of the public and the transformation of the status quo.

Issues of social justice are part and parcel of DEP mission. However, such efforts, have often put DEP activists on a collision course with powerful blocs in the society, the agents of the status quo. Often these are the same people who form the government of the day. How is it possible, therefore, for a DEP activist to remain faithful to the vision of the methodology and at the same time maintain his/her job? The employer organisation would usually be given two choices, by the civil authorities in power, either to fire the 'radical' animators that are associated with this kind of 'trouble' or to lose certain privileges, or worse, risk the withdrawal of their operational licence. What a dilemma! In such cases the DEP vision has often been compromised to ensure daily bread for the animator's family. Conflicting loyalties can also be extended to DEP commitments versus family responsibilities, DEP work obligations versus other social obligations, etc. These are dilemmas DEP personnel have had to deal with on a daily basis as DEP became a way of life.

High Dropout Rates Among DEP Practitioners. It has been established that not all those who attended DEP training did so simply because they wanted to. Some were coerced into it by their bosses who wanted to stand up and be counted among DEP practising organisations as the programme grew in popularity. Others attended DEP training as a chance to break out of routine work, while others were simply looking for a certificate towards a promotion or a greener pasture elsewhere. On the other hand, there are those who were genuinely interested and keen to make a contribution to social transformation.

Owing to this diversity of motivation and the dilemmas discussed above, DEP training often experienced high dropout rates when it came to the application of the methodology. Research done in a district in *Mwanza* region of Tanzania indicated that only about 25% of DEP graduates remained active after the initial five years of operation. Others had dropped out by either choosing to be inactive (the majority) or out-rightly antagonising DEP itself (the minority).

Perhaps absence of supportive structures coupled with lack of follow-ups may partly account for high dropouts. That is why the emphasis has always been put on sending trainees in organisational teams instead of as individuals.

Some of the DEP protagonists happen to emerge from the middle class professionals. These people often work in difficult circumstances: in remote villages, semi-deserts, slums, etc. where

social amenities and recreational facilities are scarce. They see their peers working urban areas as having all the benefits and niceties of a middle class professional in the city: electricity, decent housing, running water, adequate medical and recreational facilities, good schools, etc. This reality has forced DEP practitioners to make a deliberate choice, often leading to what has been termed class-suicide. The choice to identify with the poor and the lowly has often led to the isolation of the DEP practitioners by both their urban peers as well as by the local authorities whose powers and practises are challenged by the programme. Some times DEP practitioners have chosen the easy way out by withdrawing from the programme.

DEP workers are under constant temptation to give up the hardship and cross the floor. After all, they have the qualification to enable them acquire secure and highly paid jobs in comfortable environments. They cannot expect significant promotions in their often small organisations practising DEP, working long and odd hours, including weekends. However, those who see DEP as their vocation in life persist.

As a result of the multi-sectoral approach of DEP as a methodology, a number of DEP workers have ended-up being general practitioners without a technical specialisation. When it was time to move on and leave behind a young crop of practitioners to carry the banner, most DEP workers found themselves at a loss. Employers were looking for practical skills and not workshop facilitators!

CHAPTER 19
BASIC EDUCATION IS FOR ALL
F.X. GICHURU

When the term basic education is used, certain classes of people think it is for others, not for themselves. The truth, however, is that everyone, a professor included, needs basic education. I mention professors to represent a class of people who have gone to school, who have read many books and have come out with many skills. Yet they could be lacking in basic education. The misunderstanding of basic education arose from the fact that during the 1950s even authoritative institutions like UNESCO considered basic education mainly to cover the early primary school cycle. In the 1970s development theory focused on basic needs and therefore the need arose for defining the content of this type of need. In the Conference of Ministers and those responsible for education in the Eastern and Southern Africa Region, basic education was defined as the minimum provision of knowledge, attitudes, values, and experiences which should be made [available] for every individual and [should be] common to all. It should be aimed at enabling each individual to develop his or her own potentialities, creativity, and critical mind, both for his or her own fulfilment and happiness and for serving as a useful citizen and producer for the development of the community to which he or she belongs.1

When, by 1980, the achievement of this 64 minimum package through the normal school system became unrealistic, the world began to think of basic education through all the available means and in the shortest time possible. This was the subject of the WCEFA (World Conference on Education for All) which took place in Jomtien, Thailand, from March 5-9, 1990. The year 2000 was defined as the target date for achieving EFA as defined.

During the preparations for the conference, we asked the question: "What kind of education should necessarily be given to all people and how?" We went on to note that this education must be an ideal acceptable to all, and it must be easy and practical to dispense.2 Defining it has always been a problem. During the 1950s, UNESCO referred to it as Fundamental Education (FE), in the 1960's as Universal Primary Education (UPE) and since the 1970s, as Basic Education (BE).

Attempts to actualize FE led to the definition and promotion of UPE. But the process of implementing UPE turned out to be illusory due to high costs of formal schooling. The difficulty resulted especially from the institutional and structured nature of the school. In the 1970s evidence of this unrealistic approach led to the definition of the Basic Needs Strategy in the resolution of human problems. Provision of BE was seen as an approach to satisfy education as a basic need.

BE was defined by the Regional Conference held in Kenyatta University, Nairobi, in 1974, as the "minimum package".3 The BE, according to this definition, would be common to all educated men and women. But experience has shown that up till today not many people understand or value this type of education. Formal education has continued to be the attractive model due to the obvious positive implications.

However, in the 1980s universal formal education at the primary level proved illusory. This phenomenon has been observed worldwide. In one sense therefore, the world population is losing confidence in education and the consequences tend to be dramatic. The 1980s, when education suffered a general decline all over the world, were described as a decade of lost opportunities. This is why the WCEFA was seen as necessary at that point in time (Note 4). But the situation has remained the same in the 1990s. Even on the eve of the 20th century BE continues to suffer due to

wars, natural disasters, political and economic policies of countries and the policies of multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Due to the SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programmes) introduced by these institutions, public expenditures on education were reduced, the teachers' salaries being targets in the first place. A good example of this is Kenya by the beginning of 1998. In another article I raised issues underlining the challenge on governments, NGOs, organizations, and communities all over the world, especially Africa, regarding commitment to EFA. The issues touched on relevance, feasibility, replicability, and sustainability of EFA. The fears that I expressed in that article were justified when we look at what has happened on the eve of the new millennium.5

The theme of the WCEFA focused on "meeting basic learning needs", a big correlation having been observed between the ruling concept of BE and the proposed concept of EFA: Meeting Basic Learning Needs. What was new in this concept? Perhaps nothing, only that the new strategy would require being more explicit about the nature of BE, how to measure its achievement, and how to attractively reward it. This was the challenge that experts had to face up to and resolve.6

Considering the nature of the expected EFA, first of all, it was not assumed that a detailed package of Basic Education (BE) could be applied universally. The content of BE had to be defined within transcultural guidelines, leaving room for specific applications in different settings. It was underlined that the principles of BE must be universal; the following are some of the universal principles referred to:

Literacy: Being able to read and write should be a universally desirable value. However, the medium of this literacy can be in any form, for example in any alphabet, depending on the requirements of a given culture.

Functionality of literacy: This principle refers to the usefulness of literacy to the individual and the community concerned. We refer to this as applicability of reading and writing, or functional literacy. Again, this principle would traverse all cultures and stand as a permanent imperative for BE.

Self-confidence: This is critical as a principle of BE. Self-confidence would make the individual put trust in his or her abilities to confront problems courageously and set out to look for their solutions, no matter how or when solutions are possible. The BE must make individuals self-reliant and able to develop their collective environment(s). That requirement of training for self-confidence from the earliest stages of life again is valid across all cultures.

Spirit of co-operation: Once again, a basically educated person must have the need and strength of co-operating with others. A person who does not see the need for positive interpersonal relationships would be lacking an essential attribute of basic education. The principle of co-operation is universally desirable, irrespective of the cultural differences of different communities.

Appreciation of work and desire to be industrious: Positive value of work should be a universal principle of education. The feeling, or the reasoning, that would promote the idea of "more income and rewards for less work" should be discouraged. Expecting to earn a lot out of little work, or for the least demanding work, should be a mark of a very uneducated person. This actually is the spirit behind corruption and theft that we witness in our society. Industriousness then should be an attribute of an educated person or community. All cultures accept the principle of hard work as a positive value to be promoted in the BE.

Need for Recreation: This is an imperative of BE because certain people tend to downplay the need for recreation. The best function of the human organism is guaranteed when the individual is refreshed. Methods of refreshing the human organism are diverse and vary according to different

cultures. The important fact is that the body and mind of the person should not be allowed to degenerate due to over-use or neglect. That must be a universal, transcultural principle of BE.

We summarised the principles stated above by referring to three imperatives that we attribute to an integrally educated person: the mind or the brains of the human being must have certain knowledge and skills for survival; the spirit of the human being must value the need for positive interpersonal relationships; and the body of the human being must be kept active and refreshed enough to avoid degeneration due to overuse or lack of use. This is what I called 'Tripolar Education".7

Discussing the process of EFA, we outlined how to achieve the six universal principles of EFA, as outlined above. The achievement of the first principle, literacy, is usually the ambition of most aspects of modern education. A little enlarged, this covers the sharpening of human intellectual capacities; in other words, the improvement of the cognitive domain. Most schools attempt to do this. For that reason, the only thing we may wish to say here is that in all communities, centres of learning, however simple, are necessary.

In these centres, learning resources are made available for the assistance of learners. Teachers are required to guide the learners to achieve learning in the easiest and most efficient manner possible. The difference between what we proposed and what is usually available is that the learning resources must be simple and accessible to all. That of course requires strict supervision, but this is feasible.

The achievement of the second principle, application of literacy, can easily be attained if teachers will always try, in a creative way, to relate to real life all knowledge that is to be learnt. In other words, the content of literacy must be about what is happening to the learner in daily life. For example, in a pastoral community, numbers and counting must be linked to the animals. Learning geometry must be related to the building of houses or other useful structures. As soon as a learner has learnt anything, circumstances must compel him/her to apply the knowledge immediately.

The third principle, self-confidence, is perhaps what has been most ignored or discouraged by traditional formal education. Undemocratic situations, where a ruler is unsure of himself, have tended to discourage the development of self-confidence and creativity in individuals. This, in consequence, has hindered the development of self-reliance. Self-confidence is trust in one's own strength and resources. This principle helps individuals to surmount most difficulties. Self-confidence must therefore be developed in individuals from the earliest stages of life. Children must be allowed to do things by themselves, with assistance only where necessary; most simple problems and challenges must be allowed to be solved by them. This process of solving one's own problems must be developed into a way of life for all individuals, from the earliest stages in life. Are there adults who have not acquired this attribute? If there are, they need this type of BE.

Developing the above principle of self-confidence must not contradict the fourth principle, the spirit of co-operation. When they co-operate in projects, people are able to do great things: unity is strength. If you teach people to co-operate, you have taught them to liberate themselves because then there is nothing they cannot do. As children are taught to be self-reliant, they must be made aware that this will best happen in a united community effort to solve global community problems. Children must of necessity be made to learn that they live in a community and they must be made to co-operate with the rest of the community for their own individual good. If there are adults who cannot co-operate with others, then they need BE.

The fifth principle, appreciation of work and desire to be Industrious, is a very positive value for education. From the earliest stages children must be made to love work because it produces the fruits of daily life. The more the children work in any project, the more they should be rewarded/reinforced by the teacher. Laziness should be a contemptible attribute and should be socially reprimanded by collective scorn. By the time the children are adults they should have a positive attitude for work and a negative one for laziness.

The sixth principle, the need for recreation, can be achieved through both knowledge and practice. Children and adults should know why they need recreation; otherwise, a habit will not be cultivated. The human organ needs periods of refreshment when, either through physical exercises or though changes of activities, body functions are recreated and a feeling of well-being restored. Physical exercises strengthen the muscles, relaxes the joints, and irrigates the body tissues through an increased flow of nutrients in oxygenated blood; toxins are removed from the tissues as the increased flow of wastes are removed. Body functions are, consequently, better activated after recreation.8 All people, as a matter of education, must be accustomed to recreation. Sometimes, professors, or other professionals neglect this.

What is their attitude on physical education? Did their physical education end with primary school? How can they describe their life routine? Sleep, wakeup, enter the car, drive to work, sit behind a desk till evening, then get into the car, drive back home, sit comfortably on the sofa, eat and sleep, to start the cycle again, every day, every week, every year? Do they engage in regular physical exercises? If not, they are rotting physically and deteriorating very fast. They need BE.

The above six principles can be regrouped into three domains: cognitive, affective, and psycho-motor. As we said earlier, these are the three imperatives attributable to an integrally educated person. This is the type of EFA we need to aim at as we execute I.9

Looking at the actual WCEFA held in Jomtien, Thailand, the concrete goals were expressed as follows:

- To improve primary education and make it so widely available that at least 80% of 14-yearold boys and girls world-wide will be able to equal or surpass a nationally defined level of learning.
- To cut adult illiteracy rate to half its 1990 level, and achieve parity between male and female literacy rates.
- To provide more educational opportunities to meet the diverse needs of youth and adults, including literacy programmes, skills training and specialized education on such topics as health, nutrition, safe water, child care and family life.9

These goals were good but did not explicitly articulate my scheme of integrated education for all, including the youth and adults. More rigorous analysis of the goals could by intellectual gymnastics fit them into a scheme. The achievement of these goals by the year 2000 was beyond hope, but the value of the WCEFA should be seen to extend far into the new millennium. Jomtien aimed at forging a global commitment for Basic Education and at mobilizing worldwide support and resources for achieving these goals. The strategy that was proposed in the New Vision was meant:

- To uphold the primacy of learning achievement over school attendance, ensuring that children really master basic knowledge, acquire the tools of literacy and learn how to think.

- To promote a broader vision whereby learning is not reduced to formal schooling; where the ultimate end of learning takes precedence over financial and material means.

- To include all programmes (formal or informal, for children or for adults) - all channels, and all educational institutions, are now seen as part and parcel of BE, provided they contribute to effective to effective learning achievement.

Rather than uphold the monopoly of formal schooling, WCEFA encouraged a broad and diversified spectrum of BE programmes for children and adults.11 Basic Education was thus made the responsibility of society as a whole rather than of the Ministry of Education alone. An alliance of social forces, mobilised for the purpose of BE was seen to be more likely to furnish the resources, fresh impulses and commitment which EFA was envisaged to require, something more than the formal system of schools, teachers, and ministry of education officials could be accomplished. The responsibility of national leaders was seen to be important and fitting in view of putting together this alliance for education, giving leadership to the alliance and sustaining its work over time.12 The BE efforts must touch on everyone, assuring that all people get basic education on the three dimensions of "Tripolar Education".

NOTES

1. World Declaration on Education for All: "Meeting Basic Learning Needs," Jomtien, Thailand, March 5-9, 1990.

2. Cf. Comments of Dr. Wadi Haddad, the Executive Secretary to the Interagency Commission for the WCEFA, in the*Report of African Regional Meeting on WCEFA* held at UNESCO/ BREDA, Dakar, 22-23 June, 1989, par. 2.

3. See Definition in Note 1 above. UNESCO/UNICEF *Co-operative Programme, Nairobi,* 1974.

4. "Today, education faces a global crisis" (see the release of sponsors): UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO. The World Bank, World Conference on Education for All -*Meeting Basic Learning Needs,* p. l; see also Annex 2 of the executive Director's circular, 15/5189, p.11: (i) What are the aims of the World Conference? (ii) Why this initiative now? (iii) What is the scope of education for all? See also Dieter Berstecher, "Basic education for all: a vital concern" in Basic education forum, Vol. 1, May 1992, pp. 1-3.

5. See Gichuru, F.X., "Which way education for all?" in *Basic education forum, Vol.* 1, May 1992, pp. 5-7.

6. Cf. Gichuru,. F.X. "The concept of EFA", in *BERC Supplement,* Vol. 2, September 1989, p. 4.

7. Cf. Gichuru, F.X. "The nature of EFA" in *BERC Supplement,* Vol. 4, November, 1989.

8. The Kenya Minister of Education, Kalonzo Musyoka, warned schools on neglecting physical education as a subject in the primary schools. He emphasized that physical education is vital for the development of the total person. See *Daily Nation,*June 15, 1998, p. 5.

9. Cf. Gichuru, F.X., "The process of EFA", in *BERC Supplement,* Vol. 5, December 1989, pp. 2-3.

10. Cf. World Conference on Education for All, *op.* cit., Jomtien 1990.

11. See Dieter Berstecher, "Basic education for all: a vital concern" in: Basic education forum, Vol. 1, May 1992, pp. 1-3. Many efforts are being made to achieve this ambition. See, for example, Unesco, *Education, innovation and information,*March 1996, International Bureau of Education,

Geneva. Also see Unesco, Sources, Special Issue, No. 72: Unesco in 1996-97, "Joining Forces for the 21st Century"; *The Unesco Courier*, April, 1996, "Education for the 21st Century: Learning to Learn."

12. Berstecher, *ibid*., p.3. By 1998 it appeared that national leaders were not been able to do this due to competing demands of politics and economy.

CHAPTER 20

TOWARDS A PEDAGOGY OF HOPE[1]

G.A. BENNAARS

The educational situation in Africa today is so beset with problems, particularly in terms of output and efficacy, that alarmists and pessimists would like to characterize it as desperate, if not hopeless. In contrast to this position, we wish in this article to argue for a more positive approach, that is, for a "pedagogy of hope".

When we speak of "hope" in this context, it will be in a philosophical rather than in a theological sense. Hope to the Christian theologian is a divine virtue along with faith and charity. Hope and the other two virtues are viewed as gifts from God. The approach adopted here is more mundane: we locate hope within a purely human context and in so doing view it primarily as a human quality, a basically human virtue. No doubt, one may envisage here a possible link between the natural and the supernatural, but that is not our concern in this article.

THE IDEA OF HOPE

What is hope? This simple question has unfortunately no simple answer. Of course, one can consult a dictionary and find that hope is a) expectation and desire combined, and b) a feeling of trust. Hope, according to Gabriel Marcel, does not belong in the realm of problem, but in that of mystery. Marcel argues that a problem is something tangible, something objective, like a tree that blocks our way; the problem can be solved or removed like any obstacle. But a mystery is different from a problem in as far as the subject is directly involved in it; it is intrinsically interwoven with one's existence; it cannot be solved in an analytical manner, but only be acknowledged as an integral part of me.[2]

For this reason Marcel hesitates to define hope in precise words; he tries rather to describe the very human experience of hope in all its concreteness. At this point one finds that hope does imply expectation and desire, a looking forward to something good; it also implies a belief that what we wish for will actually come true. There is, however, one element of hope which is not normally mentioned in the dictionary: that hope cannot be separated from human trial and affliction, be it individual or collective, such as disease, poverty, war. In such a situation one hopes for deliverance, rescue, improvement, liberation. In this context we could refer to Paulo Freire who asserts that "hope is rooted in men's incompleteness.[3]

Let us elaborate: human beings are constantly confronted with their own limitations. They realize that the love, or freedom, or truth or joy they experience in their daily lives is never adequate: it always falls short. Following this realization, they move out in constant search for a better world, a brighter future, or as Freire puts it, for more humanity.[4] This search, which includes a wish for, and a belief in, something good to come, is at the basis of human life and progress. Hope follows in the wake of trouble and tribulation, of disappointment and disaster; it is the human answer to human incompleteness.

Fundamental to such human hope is that it must be a common search, carried out in communion with other people, requiring dialogue.[5] Hope demands an active orientation, a going out to the other, to the community; hope implies being available, or rather, putting oneself at the disposal of the community. Despair, in contrast, is a form of silence, of refusal, of non-participation.

The above idea of hope stems from a well-defined philosophical anthropology, a philosophy of man that views human beings as consciously acting upon the world in order to change and transform that world. In a climate of hope and confidence humans set out collectively and cooperatively to overcome the limit situations (to employ Jaspers' terminology) such as sickness, death, failure, rejection, etc. and to create a new reality, that is, a new culture, a new world. It is worth noting that both Marcel and Freire share this kind of philosophy, which implies a belief which makes hope possible by providing a trustworthy ground. Hope, then, is not the same as optimism which is often not much more than a sunny outlook without much justification. Hope, however, finds its justification in the human search for a better existence, a more human world.

At this point hope may be linked in a transcendental manner to the supernatural. In doing so, one goes beyond a strong belief in humanity to find the ultimate justification of hope in God's love. But however hope is justified, be it in natural or supernatural terms, despair always remains a distinct possibility. Ultimately, despair is a lack of faith, in humanity as well as in the divine; hope, on the contrary, is a constant affirmation of faith in both.

EDUCATION FOR WHAT?

No society anywhere in the world educates its people without having good reasons for doing so. Education is a serious business, and today it is also very expensive. Obviously, no society or government will spend so much time, energy and money on an activity like education, if it does not serve any purpose at all.6 But having stated the obvious - that education has a goal, an aim, a purpose - we must now try to be more specific when answering the question: education for what?

Within the Kenyan context we must first and foremost refer to the various educational reports, such as the Ominde Report (1964), the Gachathi Report (1976), the Kamunge Report (1988), all of which have attempted to define Kenya's educational objectives. There is no need here to record the different versions in detail, but we may provide a general summary. One may start by clearly distinguishing between collective and individual aims of education. First, several collective aims or goals.7have been stated, such as to foster national unity, to promote national development, to foster international awareness. Second, we mention individual aims, like promoting the full development of talents and personality, equipping the youth with knowledge, skills and expertise to play an effective role in life, promoting social morality, social obligations and responsibilities. All these aims, both collective and individual, remain of necessity rather general, considering that they must serve the total system which includes many modes of education, from primary to teacher education.

When, however, we look at the objectives of primary and secondary education, we find that they are highly specific, such as developing self-expression, logical thought, critical judgement, social and environmental awareness. We may refer here to the objectives of the four-year secondary education of the 8-4-4 system, as stated by the Kamunge Report:

* To provide for an all round mental, moral and spiritual development;
* To provide relevant skills towards positive contribution to the development of society;
* To ensure balanced development in cognitive (knowledge), psycho-motor (manipulative and practical) and affective (attitude and value) skills;
* To lay a firm foundation for further education, training and work;
* To lead to the acquisition of positive attitudes and values towards the well being of society.8

What more can one ask for? By any standards these objectives, as they pertain to secondary education in Kenya, are of very high quality. To substantiate this point in a limited manner, we find that these objectives contain direct references to the important dimensions of education, notably the cognitive and normative dimensions; indirectly they also point to the creative and dialogical dimensions.9

Unfortunately, the excellent quality of these objectives is not reflected in educational practice; apparently there is a gap between theory and practice, or so it seems. Even a cursory glance at schooling in Kenya today will show that educational practice suffers chronically from what R. Dore has called "the diploma disease".10 Both the formal curriculum and its objectives are subverted in order to give way to an entirely new curriculum, informal in character, intended to promote success in the examinations. The sole criterion of educational quality, it appears, is good performance in the examination. Whatever the various education reports have said about the importance of attitudes and values, of practical skills, of an all-round development is being replaced by a very opportunistic theory of education. What is evident is that in Kenya we have two distinct educational theories, one idealistic and another opportunistic; only the second is put into practice, the first remains an ideal.

Given this opportunistic or instrumental theory of educational11 and its subsequent practice, one observes a number of very fundamental problems affecting both society and its individual members. One of these problems is that this informal theory (and practice) has given rise to false expectations, to false hopes. Students, teachers and parents alike wrongly expect and believe that those who perform well in examinations will be greatly rewarded, in the form of high salaried jobs. By contrast, those students who do not perform well will be automatically dismissed as failures. Considering that presently only 10% of the total student population is successful in passing from primary to secondary to tertiary level, one finds that these "failures" are many indeed. When in March 1990, the KCSE (Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education) results were announced they indicated that less than 5% out of 130,000 candidates had scored B- or above – this being the minimum requirement for university entrance. Subsequent to this announcement many voices were heard which spoke of "mass failures". Obviously, when only 2 to 3 students out of a class of 40 manage to enter university, and when this is a nation-wide phenomenon, then one observes failure and frustration everywhere. To many, be they students, teachers, or parents, Kenya's educational system appears to be hopeless, for they notice that the educational system classifies the majority of the candidates as failures. These rejects, or drop-outs, whose (false) hopes are dashed, can only hope to survive in a highly competitive society; at least this is the common opinion. Inevitably, the system is blamed for being elitist and discriminatory and is blamed as well for producing hardly anything but failures. The question may be asked: "Is there a way out of this hopeless situation?" The answer is "Yes".

A PEDAGOGY OF HOPE

From the outset it should be made clear that no miraculous solution is offered to a typically human problem; like the problem, the solution is human too. In this respect, a primary lesson may be learned from the physically handicapped. Many do not expect miracles to happen, they have no false hopes, but they often possess a strong determination which issues from undaunted self-confidence and from hope in their own potential. The story is told by Professor Lea Dasberg of how a person with walking problems went to a driving school and asked to be given driving lessons (Note 12). The driving instructor refused, but the handicapped person insisted, saying: "I have two

arms, two eyes, two ears and a mind that is very alert, so what is the problem?" Smilingly, the instructor accepted and after a while the person in question was driving a car. It is within this context that Dasberg, herself handicapped, first coined the expression "pedagogy of hope". Let us explain this point further.

Contentwise, education is primarily concerned with knowledge, skills and values; this is a reference to the cognitive and normative dimensions of education. Accordingly, education is often defined as being "the acquisition of knowledge, skills and values." What is problematic about this definition is the term "acquisition", which itself remains undefined. How does the student acquire knowledge and skills and values? And how does the teacher facilitate such acquisition? We are inquiring here into the methodology of education not in a very specific sense, but in general terms. We refer here to the teacher's basic approach and orientation, what is called one's pedagogy.

It is our contention that the overall pedagogy of teachers in Kenya's schools, particularly in secondary schools, needs to be reviewed, rethought, reappraised and revised. Based on an opportunistic and a largely instrumental theory of education, the present pedagogy is hopeless in more than one sense. Instead, we propose a fundamental theory of education which includes a positive conception of being human, in the manner explicated by D. Vandenberg.13 From such an educational theory follows a pedagogy that approximates P. Freire's *Pedagogy of the oppressed"* and yet it is different from it in its own unique way. What we have in mind is a pedagogy of hope, a pedagogy which puts strong emphasis on the creative and dialogical dimensions of education.

First, it must focus on creativity, understood here in existential terms; as such it assumes the presence of an acting person who constantly acts upon factual situations, thereby creating a new world and new hope. Such a pedagogy will be action-oriented, as it tries to transform the student into an acting person. All this will have various implications, for both the teacher and the student. As a facilitator the teacher will not be satisfied with mere transmission of given knowledge, skills and values. Rather, he/she will view teaching as a liberating task understood here in a non-political sense. The teacher will be primarily concerned with knowledge, skills and values that are liberating in as far as they create new opportunities, new horizons and a future that transcends both the past and the present. The students, too, will be affected in as far as they become aware of their potential as human beings and of their "power to use circumstances rather than be used by them", as Nyerere once put it.14

Second, a pedagogy of hope is almost by definition dialogical in character. Hope, as we noted earlier, demands an active orientation, a going out to the other, to the community. Isolation leads to frustration and despair, whereas being together with others, which includes dialogue and co-operation, brings about a climate of hope. Teaching, in this context, takes on special significance, as it provides guidance and direction rather than merely transmits knowledge, skills and values to the students. Guidance is basic to teaching, to a pedagogy of hope, since it encourages openness and realistic dialogue. As a result, students will be able to evaluate themselves realistically, knowing their strengths and weaknesses, their potential and their limitations. This self-knowledge will give them self-confidence and hope for the future: realistic hope, not false expectations.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, two points need to be made clear. First, a pedagogy of hope is not an easy way out of the problems faced by the youth, rather it is an attempt to cope with these problems in so far as is humanly possible. Admittedly, problems may be of such magnitude given politico-economic

realities that little can be done, but even that "little" may mean much in a search for a hopeful existence. Second, the pedagogy of hope proposed here is not a grand solution to our educational problems. Rather, it will show its efficacy in the ordinary, day-to-day setting of the classroom. It is there that the teacher will tell "these kids" that they are not failures, no matter what exams results they will get, but that they have potential which can be realized. Maybe at that point teachers and students alike will begin to implement the real objectives of the 8-4-4 system which, despite its deficiencies, offers a unique challenge to the Kenyan nation: to be actively engaged in creating a hopeful future.

NOTES

1. An expression that was first used by Prof. L. Dasberg in her book *Pedagogy for the year 2000 or a tribute to hope* (tr.). Amsterdam: 1980.

2. Gabriel Marcel is a contemporary philosopher who has extensively written about hope, for example in his work Homo*Viator* (1945) where he developed a philosophy of hope. See also his *Etre et avoir*.

3. Paolo Freire. *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. Harmondsworth, U.IC: Penguin Books, 1972. p. 64.

4. *Ibid*.

5. Both G. Marcel and P. Freire seem to concur in this matter.

6. Cf. R. Njoroge and G. Bennaars. *Philosophy and education in Africa.* Nairobi: Transafrica Press, 1986, section 8.2 for further details.

7. In educational documents the terms "goals", "aims", and "objectives" are not clearly distinguished from each other, as they should be.

8. Report of the Presidential Working Party on Education and Manpower Training for the Next Decade and Beyond. Chairman: J. M. Kamunge. Nairobi: Government Printer, March 1988. Section 6.1. p. 27.

9. R. Njoroge and G. Bennaars. *op. cit*. See chapter 6 "Education as a multidimensional concept" for further details.

10. R. Dore. *The diploma disease*. London, 1976.

11. No formal designation exists, but the term "instrumental" has gained more acceptance. Cf R Dore, K. Richmond, *et al*.

12. Dasberg, *op. cit*.

13. D. Vandenberg. "Phenomenology and educational research" in D. Denton. *Existentialism and phenomenology in education*. Columbia, 1974.

14. J.K, Nyerere. "Our education must be liberation," in *The Tanzanian experienc*e, eds. H. Hinzen and V. Hundsdorfer. London, 1979, p. 43.

CHAPTER 21
AUTHENTICITY AND EDUCATION IN ZAIRE

MUHIGIRWA RUSEMBUKA

INTRODUCTION

At a time when experts are speaking of "a world crisis of education", "educational technologies", "the school and informatics", "the economic rationality of education", "the pleasure of knowledge", "the death of the school and "the school as a place of domestication and alienation of young Africans", it seems urgent to reflect on and to understand the phenomenon of education.

Today more than in the past, the philosophy of education is seen as one of the key factors for the development of society. The realization of this development requires the co-ordination of the totality of economic, social, cultural, as well as political factors. Philosophy of education is defined here as the sum total of thoughtful and critical theories used by education for the realization of man's formation. Historically, philosophy of education began with Socrates at a time when education became a serious question for philosophers.

But the great educational theories were elaborated in the United States at the beginning of this century by John Dewey in his book entitled *Education and Democracy.* The main challenge of the problematic in philosophy of education consists in the harmonization, in daily life, of the ideal type of man to be formed and the educational system used for the attainment of this ideal by means of the multivarious forms of scholarly and paraschological formation.

In Zaire around 1975, on a theoretical level, all the mass media were utilized in order to promote the idea of "authenticity" as the engine of development, as well as to emphasize that authenticity as a philosophical doctrine was to penetrate all sectors of the educational system. But in practice, almost all the contemplated reforms related to the integration of authenticity and education were not executed. But before entering into the heart of this problem, let us clarify some concepts.

DEFINITIONS

What Is Authenticity?

Authenticity is a Zairean philosophy or ideology which advocates the liberation of man and society in the present actuality within a world of perpetual change.

Fundamentally, the search for authenticity is prompted by a decision, an ultimate and fervent wish, namely, to be, to be oneself, to be better. As a political philosophy, authenticity takes its place in the area of cultural philosophies, that is to say, those philosophies which put special emphasis on the promotion of culture. Following J. Ladrierè, we define culture as "the totality of disciplines which enable an individual in a society to attain a certain development of his sensibility, his critical sense, his faculties of knowledge, and his creative capacities."1

Authenticity has an effective meaning and is efficacious only to the extent that, in the present multiple and varied situations in which we live, it presents us with a vision of the world where reign happiness (the successful union of peace, justice and work), socio-economic development and freedom. Seen from this perspective, authenticity is not something ready-made, something already here; it presents itself essentially as a dynamic process, a conquest always in the state of

becoming, a goal to attain. That is why it is an individual and collective "doing" which demands here and now the assumption and the combination of the efforts, the qualities and the potentialities of the people of Zaire for the birth of a dignified and proud Zairean nation.

The Nature of Education

We define education as the learning of academic, scientific and technical knowledge. This means that the educator favours the acquisition and the progressive domination of knowledge by the person being educated. Education has as its principal aim the development of the originality and the freedom of the student, it permits him to attain his own proper human maturity and to participate, in a positive, critical, responsible and creative manner, in the development of his society.

Education presents problems at two levels. First, the object of education (the educational programme) elicits questions about its academic, scientific and pedagogical values and about its aim. Secondly, the form of education decided upon by the institution is translated into a hierarchy of social roles and relations between the teacher and the pupil which does not always favour the acquisition of knowledge. Apart from these problems our conception of education turn on two main axes. Beyond its scholarly and university dimension, education must become the business of one's whole life and of the whole society. Formation in school and in university is considered as a stage in this process and places the student at the centre of every educational task. The child-centred tendency occupies here a choice place; the intention is that the person being educated becomes in the final analysis the author, the master of his own educational journey.

AUTHENTICITY AND EDUCATION

Having clarified the concepts "authenticity" and "education", how is the philosophy of authenticity to be applied to education?

Ideally, authenticity of education is one of the keys of an integrated development, both of the individual and of society. The authenticity of education must, in the present critical time, "promote an education which realizes the oneness of school and of life, of action and thought, of matter and idea, of general culture and professional formation."2 Traditional African education used to combine manual and practical with intellectual activities for the purpose of forming complete human beings. In principle, the modern philosophy of education is not different from that of traditional Africa. Today in Zaire there is still a concern to educate conscientious and responsible human beings who are quantitatively and effectively integrated in the development of our country of Africa and of the world.

But when we make a phenomenological study of the Zairean socio-cultural environment asking questions about the philosophy (authenticity) of education in our country find that the above-mentioned educational ideal has been attained? Why is education in Zaire only perceived as the key to social mobility? Why has education up till now not yet been considered as an effective means of bringing the social, political, economic and cultural environment under control? Why have almost all the projects for educational reform remained a dead letter? Without claiming to be exhaustive, we list below some basic causes destabilizing the Zairean educational system.

At the level of conceptualization. A Zairean philosophy of education has never been conceived, elaborated or applied. There exists a manifest ignorance with respect to the type of

person and model of society to be formed. In my opinion, it is imperative to study thoroughly the rich concept of authenticity, to procure for it a clear scientific, coherent and rigorous status and content, and to show how, in practice, the philosophy of authenticity can be applied to education in general and to the different stages (primary, secondary and higher) in particular. The non-existence of a philosophy of education which would define clearly the objectives of the educational system is responsible for the lack of harmony between the philosophy of education and the political philosophy.

At the cultural level. At this level education is characterized by a maladjustment of the teaching programmes, by a "comical and obscene imitation"3 in the manner of understanding and transmitting knowledge, and by the virtual absence of extramural education. As far as the adaptation of educational programmes is concerned, we refer to a decree promulgated on 17th October 1962 which insisted on the need for giving a functional primary education.

At the social level. Here we stress two points: (1) the maladjustment of the school to life and to the needs of society, and (2) the lack of preparation on the part of the educated for their integration in social life. The school should be a centre where the synthesis between knowledge and life is realized and not a place for the acquisition of inappropriate and superficial knowledge which is incompatible with life in the family and in the nation.

At the economic level. We list here the lack of qualitatively and quantitatively adapted formation of the educated for professional life and the non-existence of an economic rationale in the educational sector, causing the squandering of time, energy and competence.

At the institutional level. At this level, the lack of rigorous planning is responsible for the inadequate provision of socio-economic needs. The school is not an appendage to life. It must be, as Decroly has stated, "a school of and for life".4 There is also a lack of decisive, realistic and consistent political will to apply the reforms which are judged necessary and opportune.

At the level of the means of operation. In this area it is necessary to initiate a revision of pedagogic methods, the creation and the revision of teaching material, to adapt the contents of education so that it is in line with the person we wish to fashion and the society we wish to create. The near total absence of libraries contributes to the "development of underdevelopment" of scientific research.5 The decentralization of administration and finance for greater effectiveness was a farce. Today there is greater centralization than before and this centralization is a serious handicap to the proper functioning of the educational apparatus (for example, with respect to the financing of education, study grants, etc.)

CONCLUSION

To reiterate, at all levels, taking account both of its importance and its goal, authenticity requires the urgent adaptation of education to the real needs of society, to the educational objectives of Zaire: the formation of people who are productive, responsible and the principal actors in the development of the nation. We are not simply in need of educational adaptation, or of educational reform; we must rather initiate an educational revolution**.** To our knowledge, this revolution, whose necessity and urgency are acknowledged by our political leaders, has never taken place. The problems of primary, secondary and university education are characterized by "an insufficiency of admission facilities in relation to the number of students, a lack of libraries, of teaching and laboratory equipment, an overabundance of personnel, by a training maladjusted to the labour market and by an increased demand for state subsidies."6 In order to solve the present problems of education in Zaire, it is necessary to plan for a revolution, which will embrace the

orientation, the structure and the content of education. We must completely rethink our educational methods and criteria.

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CHAPTER 22

SOCIAL ETHICS IN KENYA: EDUCATION OR INDOCTRINATION?

JUSTUS G. MBAE

The report of the National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policies (NCEOP) popularly known as the Gachathi Education Commission report of 1976 has been lauded as the first major step towards the formalisation of moral education in Kenya. In fact, what the report did was to call attention to what had all along been a felt need among Kenyan leaders and educators. The report explicitly called for the teaching of moral education as a separate subject in our public schools. Up till then morality had been taught as a part of religious education. The report denounced this state of affairs and pointed out that the teaching of religion could not effectively serve the needs of morality.1 The report therefore recommended the introduction of a new subject whose specific purpose would be to provide young Kenyans with ethical education and training.2 In so doing the NCEOP was taking a definite departure from the earlier Fraser Educational Commission which had advocated the teaching of religion as the only means of moral education.

The English word "ethics" is derived from the Greek "ethos" which means usage, character, custom, disposition, manners. Ethics is thus generally defined as the scientific or systematic study of morals and is concerned with the analysis of such concepts as "ought", "should", "duty", "moral rules", "right", "wrong", "obligation", "responsibility", etc. Ethics may be regarded as the inquiry into the nature of moral actions, while on a more practical level it is the search for the morally good life. This is the conventional meaning of ethics, a meaning, however, which the NCEOP does not seem to have held consistently. Ethics, according to the NCEOP report includes such things as family life education, environmental issues, and national and international understanding.4 These are matters which would not ordinarily be referred to as strictly ethical in nature. They belong not to the domain of moral education but of social studies. In this respect the NCEOP conception of ethics seems to be significantly broader than the usual conception.

The recommendation of the Gachathi commission have now largely been implemented. With the introduction in 1985 of the 8-4-4 educational system, the direct teaching of social ethics became a reality in Kenyan secondary schools. To what extent is the teaching of social ethics in Kenya today non-partisan and to what extent is it or could it become a vehicle for propaganda, for moralising or indoctrination? And what difference does it make whether young Kenyans are conditioned to behave in a desired manner by means of persuasion, coercion, teaching, moralising, or indoctrination? Does or doesn’t the end justify the means in moral education?

The purpose of this article is to draw a distinction between the concepts of moral education and indoctrination, and to evaluate the current teaching of social education and ethics in Kenya in the light of this distinction. The article is accordingly divided into five parts, namely: The distinction between moral education and related concepts, the aims of the course on social education and ethics, the methods of the new course, its contents, and its evaluation.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL EDUCATION AND RELATED CONCEPTS

Moral education must be clearly distinguished from such activities as moral training, indoctrination, moralising, or moral propaganda. Two of the characteristics which distinguish

moral education from these activities are: (1) its objectivity and (2) its dedication to moral methodology.5 Moral education is not a matter of training or instruction in this or that set of moral doctrines. Even though it aims at an important prescriptive function, it does not involve teaching specific rules or codes of behaviour. Moral education is based on the idea that the individual, by means of rational reflection can arrive at those actions, values or attitudes which are considered moral.

The method by which teachers set out to "convert" their students or "sell" their ideas to them is completely alien to the field of moral education. This is so because moral education has little to do with factual or descriptive claims, being rather more concerned with the judgement of values and with rational thinking.6 As such, moral education may be said to be concerned less with right and wrong factual answers and more with right dispositions, attitudes and right reason. Indeed, the best that moral education can do is to teach the student how to reason morally in order to make correct moral decisions and to make him want to abide by those decisions. Understood in this way, moral education differs very significantly from moral training.

Perhaps the main distinction between the two has to do with their goals or aims. Training aims at getting the student to behave in a predetermined manner. It concerns the skills and techniques of achieving a carefully spelt-out goal. Training is concerned with the how rather than the why of things. Being characteristically concerned with the mastery of skills and techniques, training has little interest in reasons. It is more of a know-how than a comprehension. Whereas moral education aims at making the student understand the reasons why a given action is said to be moral or immoral, moral training aims at making students carry out the desired action. It may be said that moral training aims at producing moral conformists or individuals who will exhibit a required mode of behaviour. In this connection, the moral trainer is quite happy with the overt or outward observance of what he regards to be moral rules or principles.

On the contrary, the moral educator is more demanding and expects more than mere obedience or conformity to established rules and maxims. Her ultimate aim is to produce an individual who is morally autonomous. The moral educator will not rest until her subject has become a self-propelling, self-directing, self-governing moral agent. Moral education, like all education implies both comprehension and commitment. It is the presence of these characteristics in one and the absence of them in the other which differentiates moral education from moral training.

Another concept which is related to, but not the same as, moral education is that of moralising. People sometime talk of moral education as if it were some kind of moralising, but this is not accurate. Moralising is the art of criticising the society's moral practices with the intent to change the moral point of view of the members of that society. The moraliser evaluates the existing code of behaviour, adheres to the accepted moral principles and occasionally modifies such behaviour. On the other hand, the moral educator, who in many cases is a moral philosopher, transcends the values and behaviour of particular societies to address himself to the more general and rational study of the nature of moral concepts and problems.

Nor is moral education akin to moral propaganda. The main difference between the two is that the former proceeds by methods which are rational and morally acceptable while the latter often involves emotional appeals, misrepresentation, distortion and outright lies.7 moral propaganda is the attempt to get a certain moral viewpoint accepted at any cost irrespective of its truth value.

Moral education also differs from indoctrination. R.S. Peters has ably drawn the distinction between being educated and being indoctrinated. He presents the educated man as possessing a high degree of understanding, a sense of commitment to his knowledge, and a cognitive perception. The educated man is therefore not just trained or drilled in a given field. He is a man who respects

the evidence and who is committed to the discipline of inquiry and self-criticism. The morally educated person is one who is both willing and able to act in a morally justifiable manner. By contrast, the indoctrinated person tends to repeat standard answers to difficult questions, is only half-committed to the ramifications of his knowledge and reserves to himself some areas of his knowledge which is rationally untouchable, immune to argument and logic. The indoctrinated person having been subjected to instructions comes to the conviction that a given proposition is true without however having any evidence for it.8 The indoctrinated person lacks in comprehension, commitment and in cognitive perception.

Having distinguished between moral education and its related concepts, we shall now concentrate on the activity that goes on in our public schools in the name of moral education. What are our schools doing? Are they really educating our youth in morals or are they subjecting them to moral indoctrination, to propaganda? To be able to answer this question we need to examine not only the concepts of moral education and moral indoctrination but also to compare their aims and methods as well as their content.

THE AIMS OF THE COURSE ON SOCIAL EDUCATION AND ETHICS

We have already referred to the NCEOP's rather broad conception of ethics. It is therefore not surprising that the official title of the new course is "Social education and ethics." It is clear here that two subjects, that is social studies and ethics have been merged into one. Apparently ethics is now being taught via social studies in the same way that it had earlier been taught via religious education. If that is the case, we are here faced with a contradiction. Basically NCEOP advocated the introduction of ethics as a subject in its own right. But what should ethics "per se" consist in?

The answer to this question would seem to take us right back to the old Socratic question "Can virtue be taught?" In the Platonic dialogues the question is raised whether virtue is something we are born with, is something that can be acquired by taking thought, or can be instilled by the kind of instruction that a father gives his son or a master his pupils. Unfortunately, the dialogues do not give a definite answer to the question of the teachability of virtue. As a matter of fact, the teachability of virtue is a problem that continues to be debated up to our own time. Unfortunately, the NCEOP and the Kenya Ministry of Education do not seem to be alive to this problem. They have throughout operated on the assumption that ethics has a content that can be taught in the same manner as religious education, social studies, literature and mathematics. Now, the question of subject content is so central that it must be among the first considerations in planning to introduce a new subject in the school curriculum.

We contend that the ambiguity in the NCEOP's conception of ethics is responsible for the contradictions in the committee's recommendations. While the committee repeatedly calls for the teaching of ethics as a separate subject, it also suggests that such a goal would best be achieved by combining ethics with a subject which covers such social matters as family life education, issues on environment, and matters of national and international understanding.9 Now there is no denying that these issues have some sort of connection with ethics. However, the subjects are not themselves the content of ethics and they are very often taught without any reference to their ethical implications. One wonders why the teaching of ethics should be appended to social studies. What makes social studies a better medium of teaching ethics than religious studies? Why is not social studies taught as one subject and social ethics as another?

The justification of teaching social ethics is beyond the scope of this article whose purpose is to take a closer look at the subject as now established in our secondary schools. As stated in the syllabus10 the aims of the ethics course are to:

* develop a harmonious ethical/moral relationship between the pupil and the home, the school, the neighbourhood, Kenya and other nations;
* appreciate the necessity and dignity of moral education in Kenya and other societies;
* base his [sic] decisions on sound ethical principles as an integral part of his personality development;
* develop a rational attitude and outlook towards life;
* acquire, appreciate and commit himself to the universal values and virtues that cement unity and understanding among various ethnic communities in Kenya;
* rationally sort out conflicts arising from the traditional, extraneous and inner-directed moral values;
* understand and appreciate the social fulfilment and moral rewards accruing from cultivating and adopting virtues and values offered by moral/ethical education.

These are the specific goals of the course. The overall aim is to cultivate "sound ethical behaviour of the individual person, whether alone, or with others at home, school … in the neighbourhood or in a foreign country.11

THE METHODS OF TEACHING THE NEW COURSE

To a large extent the methods of teaching morals will depend on whether we aim at giving moral education, moral training or moral indoctrination. Indoctrination is sometimes equated with a particular method of teaching. Scheffler has argued that teaching requires the teacher to submit his reasons to the students for their critical evaluation.12

The implication here is that no teaching goes on if the teacher simply "tells" it to the student, or worse if she tries to prevent the student from acquiring any support for her belief. In such a case the teacher does not teach, but indoctrinates. If this is what is meant by indoctrination then we must conclude that indoctrination goes on all the time. The teaching of such subjects as mathematics, chemistry, physics and even languages involves a great deal of factual information for which reasons are not always offered. However, most people would not be bothered by this kind of indoctrination.

The situation changes, however, when we come to subjects which treat of religion, politics and morals. Here, indoctrination is considered a major evil. In the case of moral education the matter is further complicated by the fact that there is no body of facts to be mastered. For this reason also there are no such people as moral experts. For all the other established areas of study there are people who are recognised as specialists or experts qualified to teach their chosen subjects. Not so in the field of moral education. Anyone can teach ethics. That, at any rate, seems to be the official stand of the Kenya Ministry of Education. Considering that "Social education and ethics" is a new subject in the secondary school curriculum the government should have taken steps to prepare teachers and to equip them with the skills appropriate to the teaching of moral education. Instead, what has been done is to assign the teaching of ethics to the first available teacher. In some schools the course has been forced on to the teachers of religion. In other cases, the time allocated for this subject is being used for career counselling and other unrelated activities.

It would be interesting to conduct a survey of all the methods being employed in the teaching of social education and ethics. In the absence of such information we can only express our fears that the course as now taught is unlikely to ensure the cultivation of the student's rational faculty, an aspect so crucial to moral education. It is open to serious doubt whether the methods of teaching social education are suitable to the teaching of ethics. It would appear that while these methods are an effective way of teaching about morals they are incapable of instilling virtue in the learner.

THE CONTENTS OF THE COURSE

Is moral education a matter of teaching a given set of doctrines, a matter of cultivating relevant skills, or is it a combination of both? In this article we conceive moral education to consist in the training of the student to think rationally and correctly about moral matters. The syllabus of the new ethics course hardly contributes to this goal. The best that the syllabus can expect to achieve is to raise the student's level of awareness in matters relating to their environment, the community and the outside world. But such an awareness can hardly be called ethical, even though it may no doubt include an element of ethics. It is not the same thing as educating for moral consciousness. Nor can the teaching based on the present syllabus produce autonomous moral beings.

But if our schools are unable to provide moral education, could we perhaps settle for moral training as a second best? In that case, we would expect our schools to turn out students who are properly drilled in and truly committed to a given set of values. Even though these students would not be morally autonomous, they would nevertheless be inclined to lead morally commendable lives as a result of their moral training. But do our public schools in fact provide this "second best?" That is doubtful. The country and hence the educational system lacks commitment to a clearly defined set of moral values. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to produce students who are morally committed to any set of moral beliefs.

Lest the point be misunderstood, we note that over the years there have been many proclamations about "the Kenya we want." There is also what appears to be a coordinated effort to promote and enhance the spirit and virtues of the social philosophy commonly called "nyayoism". However, no systematic groundwork has been done on this philosophy and in the final analysis it may be true to say that we lack a clearly defined moral code. But to say that our morals are not properly articulated is not to say that such values are non-existent.

The lack of a single, clearly articulated moral code is due partly to the pluralism of our society. Our society, consisting as it does, of persons of many different races and ethnic groups who, moreover, profess many different religions, does not adhere to a single moral code. The moral beliefs of one group may in fact be in conflict with the moral beliefs of another group. To arrive at a single moral code for the country would therefore be a difficult proposition.

AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW COURSE

As indicated above, the ultimate aim of moral education is to produce an individual who is morally autonomous. For this reason moral education has to do both with the theoretical knowledge and the practical application of morals. True moral education must insist on the comprehension of moral issues as the necessary prerequisite for the meaningful practice of morality. These two aspects, theory and practice, are wholly integrated in the autonomous moral agent. The morally educated person is one who not only has mastered the theory of morals but has also cultivated the desire, the attitude, the craving to abide by what he considers the moral course

of any action. The result of moral education is the marriage of theory and practice. This is also a sure test of the success or failure in any moral education programme.

In the light of what we have said so far, how can we evaluate the effects of social ethics teaching in Kenya? We must admit that such an evaluation is very difficult. In the first place, the course has not been taught long enough to produce any observable results. Secondly, since the ultimate objectives of the course are unclear it is hard to evaluate the extent to which these objectives have been realized. Thirdly, a comprehensive and accurate evaluation of the ethics course must cover not only the theoretical or cognitive dimension, but also the practical aspects. This is by no means an easy task.

Effective evaluation of any educational activity depends largely on the availability of appropriate instruments for measuring success or failure. In moral education the practical aspect of morality is just as important as the cognitive one. However, the emphasis in the teaching of social education and ethics seems to be wholly on cognition. Nothing indicates this more clearly than the fact that the subject is examined in exactly the same way as other subjects, in other words, it is measured in strictly academic terms. The successful candidate is the individual who knows the facts about morality. The good students are the ones who can faithfully repeat what they have been taught in an ethics class. The sole criterion of success in social ethics thus appears to be wholly cognitive. But then, as Ruskin reminds us, education consists not in teaching people what they do not know, but in teaching them to behave as they do not.13

Kenya's so-called moral education completely overlooks the practical aspects of morality. What justification is there then for calling this activity moral education? Whatever else social education and ethics may be doing, it is certainly not turning out morally autonomous individuals. In spite of the lip service paid to this subject and in spite of its high-sounding objectives, social ethics as presently being taught in our schools does no more than a subject like Kiswahili in producing morally responsible citizens.

CONCLUSION

The course of social education and ethics as currently being taught in Kenya is neither true moral education nor complete indoctrination. However, there is a danger of it developing into the latter and becoming an instrument of moral and ideological propaganda or indoctrination. Happily, this situation can be arrested by taking prompt action now. To put social ethics and education on the true road of moral education it is necessary to overhaul the existing system and revise the aims, methods and content of the course as well as the instruments for assessing its success or failure. Along with these basic changes we must also identify and train special teachers to handle the subject. Unless this is done we are in the very real danger of succumbing (intentionally or otherwise) to taking the easier option, that of moral indoctrination or propaganda.

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CHAPTER 23

EDUCATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS

ASSUMPTA BELINDA REGO
MARGARET GATHONI MUTHOKA

INTRODUCTION

It is increasingly becoming evident that there is only one earth which – in which if life itself is to succeed or flourish in the foreseeable future — needs to be well managed. Management involves conservation of resources for the needs of the present and future generations. Currently, guidelines for sustainable development and a clean environment are being discussed in the deliberations concerning "Our Common Future". The main guidelines were released in June 1992 in Brazil. Various initiatives are being promoted to educate the global community on prevailing environmental issues.

Education is a key process in development. In terms of increasing environmental awareness, it is a dynamic process aimed at improving our knowledge and understanding of the environment. This in turn-should arouse our concern regarding the state of the environment which translates itself into commitment to do something for the environment. The action involves the acquisition of the desired attitudes and behaviour in relation to the environment. The main goal is to make people aware of the processes and consequences of their activities on the environment. There is increasing awareness that human activities alter and are already altering the global environmental system. At the same time, people possess the technical means to halt the damage, to conserve and even to enhance natural systems.

THE ENVIRONMENT

The word "environment" is derived from the French word "environner" which means to surround. The environment can relate to a restricted space with limited horizons such as a home, town, district, country or region. It can also relate to the land, sea, air or anything on earth. In this article environment may be considered as a series of interlocking systems, the atmosphere, the pedo-lithosphere , the hydrosphere and the biosphere which are all inter-related and interdependent parts of a complex whole. (See Figure 1).

The imbalance in any one system will have its repercussions on the other systems. The environment is where we live, work and worship. It provides the resources that sustain us all. Environmental awareness must be considered at all levels due to the complexity and interdependence between ecological and economic systems. The urgency of environmental problems also makes this necessary. For example, chemicals like nitrogen and sulphur oxides released into the atmosphere or into water systems can damage human health as well as hinder economic development.

Figure 1. Interlocking systems of the environment
BIOSPHERE
e.g., plants, animals, people
ATMOSPHERE
e.g., air

PEDO-LITHOSPHERE
e.g., soil, rock
HYDROSPHERE
e.g., seas and oceans

Impact of Human Activities on the Environment

The current situation reflects the impact of human activity on the environment and its resultant consequences. Some of the effects are positive since they enhance human welfare and human achievement. Examples include the building of the Great Pyramids in Egypt, the Taj Mahal in India and space exploration. Negative effects, individually or in combination with others, degrade the environment and impoverish the human spirit, attacking the dignity of a person and the well-being of families and communities. These effects can be observed in serious environmental problems such as pollution in water systems, shortage of usable water, desertification on the African continent, depletion of the protective ozone layer, global warming, soil erosion, the destruction of forests and other productive land through overuse and misuse, and disposal of wastes, especially toxic wastes. These problems heighten the need for each nation to work towards equitable and just distribution of natural resources, the need to care for the welfare of others and to safeguard the respect of human life.

To halt the many forms of environmental deterioration it is necessary to bring about major changes in the ways in which people think, act, govern themselves and relate to other governments and people.

INCREASED AWARENESS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION

There is a great need to educate everyone in the care of all created things, big and small, ugly and beautiful, useful and ornamental. This aspect of caring is embodied in the conservation of resources. The concept of conservation was first introduced in 1898 by Gifford Pinchot, a professional forester and the chief of the United States Forest Service. The term "conservation" may be defined as the optimal timing of the use of resources to provide the greatest good for the longest time possible for as many people as can benefit. This involves the wise use and rational management of the resource if sustained growth and economic progress for all is to be achieved. To assist governments in this conservation effort, the World Conservation Strategy was launched in 1980 through the joint efforts of the United Nations Environment Programme, the World Wildlife Fund and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. This strategy was revised in a Second World Conservation Strategy. The strategy calls for achieving sustainable and industrial societies through:

* Providing a broadly agreed description of what sustainable development entails;
* Identifying the main issues, priority actions and essential tools to achieve sustainable development;
* Setting broadly agreed targets;
* Providing a framework for mutually supportive efforts to meet these targets by communities, governments and organizations at all levels.

On the basis of the World Conservation Strategy, many governments have developed their own national conservation strategies. Conservation is being lived at work, in the home individual level and outdoors such as in the moderate use of water and energy. An example is the slogan: "SOS - NOW!" (Switch off something now).

People are at the centre of all activities and hence the need for equity in the struggle for sustainable development. The contrasts in wealth and poverty among many people, especially in the developing nations, calls for global justice from the affluent, conserver-oriented industrialized economics. In fact, the final report of the World Commission on Environment and Development concluded that economic inequality between nations is the "planet's main environment problem and its main development problem." The debt burden born by the poor nations hampers their development and makes proper use of the environment difficult. One initiative made is the swaps-for-debt program as implemented, for example, in Costa Rica. This helps to solve the debt burden and at the same time improves the environment of the poor nations.

CONCLUSION

People are the problem in the environmental crisis; people can also become the solution. What is necessary is that they be made aware of the environmental issues affecting them in their local, national, regional and global environment. Factual information on environmental problems is now readily accessible in the mass media and is included in the formal education curriculum of many nations. To ensure that the majority in all nations help rather than impede the development process and enhance rather than degrade the natural resource base, will require major policy changes by governments as regards their people and by richer nations towards the poorer nations. Thus international organizations such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Wildlife Fund and the World Bank are all making environmental concerns more central to their programmes. The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted UNEP's "Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond" as the framework for national action and international cooperation towards sustainable development. In the final analysis, it is up to the decision makers to have the decisive, realistic and consistent political will to apply the reforms judged necessary and opportune for a better environment and a happier, healthier people.

To conclude, education for environmental awareness is an ongoing process. Through it, people acquire the knowledge, understanding, skills, attitudes, motivation and commitment to work individually and collectively towards the solution of current environmental problems and the prevention of new ones.

If we each do a little, the environment wil1 benefit greatly.

CHAPTER 24

THE UNIVERSITY STUDENT: EXPECTATIONS AND REALITY

JOYCE WANGUI KIMANI

Mary Muthoni (not here real name) had finally managed to gain admission to the highest institution of learning: the university. During her thirteen years of primary and secondary school education she had set for three very competitive national examinations, during which she experienced great anxiety as she worried that she might not make it from one level to the next. Now that she had proved herself she assumed that the spirit of competitiveness was behind her. She looked forward to the three years at the university, confident that these years would be more enjoyable. Her parents and teachers had always emphasized the importance of getting to the university and the following three years were to be her launching pad to a better life. In her mind she had a picture of the university, and what a beautiful picture it was. She would become an intellectual and learn to understand society and its problems. She would also have an opportunity to mix with students from different backgrounds, giving her a chance to broaden her horizons. Most important of all, she would get a degree, which to her was a passport to a position suitable for a graduate. She also felt sure that in this grand institution her creative abilities would be developed. Mary Muthoni was an eager, hopeful high school graduate, who was ready for the highest adventure and was determined to make a success of her life.

Things turned out not to be quite what she had expected. The vice-chancellor, in his welcoming address, emphasized that they were to work very hard, renounce pleasure and discipline themselves to become good scholars. Mary Muthoni had occasion to reflect upon these words as she settled into her life at the university.

Most lectures were a disappointment to Muthoni. At the hour, the lecturer would enter the lecture hall, arrange his notes and begin. At ten minutes to the hour he would stop and leave. As if to look for inspiration, some lecturers would gaze outside periodically. Others had apparently never heard of teaching methods and they would lecture with their eyes glued to their lecture notes for the fifty minutes they were in class. Still others had a monotonous voice, others were inaudible beyond the first row. Students either took notes or slept. Most of the time, lecturing involved transference of notes from the notebook of the lecturer to that of the student without passing through the mind of either. Luckily, there were a few exceptions to the general trend of poor teaching; lecturers who did have enthusiasm for their subject, a reasonable approach and voice, which was neither inaudible nor monotonous. Unfortunately, when it came to tutorials, Muthoni opted for the ones given by lecturers who were easy markers so that she might get a good grade even if she had done little work.

Most lecturers grew deadly serious on the issue of grades, and thus to Muthoni grades became the most important thing in the world. She developed no positive love for the courses she was taking nor for the learning she was acquiring. Like most students, she did not hesitate to cheat in her essays in order to get a good grade. When she got a good grade, she was happy and content although she knew very well that in most cases she did not deserve it.

She remembered having once read these words: “Learning is not a chore but fun, not a renunciation of pleasure, but a pursuit of pleasure, not self-sacrifice but self-indulgence.”1 After about two years in the university these words no longer held any truth for her. The lecturers through

their classroom technique and over-emphasis on making good grades did not inculcate in her the feeling that learning could be a delight. She saw anything educational as unpleasant.

Muthoni found that most lecturers rarely encouraged creative thinking and often even discouraged it. A student who answered questions in an original manner more often than not found herself getting a lower grade than the one who gave the lecturer back what he had givenher. The students' minds were being filled with information which they were expected to regurgitate in their examinations.

Thus it was little wonder that in the uninspiring atmosphere of the university campus, one rarely heard an intellectual conversation. Instead talks were about how to make money or about last night's date.

Most unfortunate of all, Muthoni did not acquire the responsibility to use her intellectual achievements for the good of the community, the nation and the human race. On occasion she did hear the sentiment expressed that those who were privileged to go to University should have an obligation to serve society, but she took it as a formality since most of the lecturers themselves rarely practiced what they preached. She chose to study a professional course not with an eye to the benefit which that profession would confer on society but simply for its monetary awards. Asked whether she felt any moral obligation to serve the society which had educated her, Muthoni answered – like quite a number of University graduates might – that instead she expected society to serve her, since she had been to the university.

This fictitious story of Muthoni unfortunately is far too characteristic of an attitude prevalent at the University. Why is this so? Quite a few of the lecturers do not appear to consider their teaching as a vocation. To them it is just another job which they hold for failure of getting something better. As long as this is the situation, one cannot expect students to turn out to be responsible citizens? If students end up being responsible, it will be in spite of, and not because of, the lecturers.

There are exceptions to what has been described and I have been greatly inspired by the example of some of my lecturers. Would that there were more of them! Since the University exists to serve society, it would do well in its attempt to educate the younger generation to cultivate attitudes such as some of those suggested by G.G. Williams in his book. Some of my best friends are professors, namely:

- Intellectual and spiritual honesty and courage in the face of the popular and fashionable.
- A humbly democratic attitude instead of the proud and snobbish attitude that so many of the well-to-do and well-educated adopt toward the poor and the uneducated.
- Certain ideals and standards of conduct that will not be sacrificed for the expedient and profitable.
- A sense of obligation to society, resulting in service to society in payment for what society has contributed to one's own welfare.2

If all university lecturers could come to see teaching as a vocation they would promote not only the life of the mind, but through their example influence also the attitude and morals of the youth whom they teach. More should be not only competent in their chosen professions, but also aware and concerned about society's needs and problems.

The Universities…have defended for so long the Truth of the mind that they have almost forgotten that there is also a Truth of the heart. Too many of their professors have become arrogant, self-important, impersonal, unhelpful…

The final ideal is hard to define…. It is the spirit that can recognize the joy that comes from learning, engaging in new intellectual experiences, in new aesthetic experiments. Those who have [this spirit] have learned the magic of converting duty into delight, labor into love, study into creation, learning into adventure.3

NOTES

1. Williams, George. *Some of My Best Friends Are Professors.* New York: Abelard-Schuman, c. 1958, p. 74.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.

CHAPTER 25

CULTURAL ATTITUDES AND EQUALITY OF THE SEXES: FOREVER INCOMPATIBLE?

CIARUNJI CHESAINA

INTRODUCTION

Kenyan society is founded on the cultural traditions on which her sub-nationalities based their human relations for centuries before the birth of contemporary Kenya. It is these traditions which give Kenya her uniqueness, indeed her identity today. Yet in order for Kenya to stand up and claim her place in the modern world, it is important for her to accept change, which inevitably affects these traditions.

Equality between the sexes is an area on which Kenya has to focus if she is to stake her claim in the civilized world. This is a difficult area for the simple reason that, for centuries relations between men and women have been delineated by traditional mores and cultural attitudes.

Kenya has recognized the need to give attention to the relations between the sexes and has joined the rest of the world in working towards eliminating discrimination against women. It was in line with this that Kenya subscribed to the United Nations Women's Decade (1975-1985) which was based on a global concern for uplifting the status of women. As a contribution to the Decade, for example, Kenya hosted the End of the Women's Decade in Nairobi in July and August 1985. During the Decade Kenya took some significant institutional steps towards improving the status of women. A national body, the Women's Bureau, was created to assist the government in handling affairs related to the welfare of women. A further effort was made when the most widespread Kenyan women's non-governmental organization, the *Maendeleo ya Wanawake,*was affiliated to the government.

The question now is: what progress has Kenya made in uplifting the status of women? On the institutional or governmental level, long strides have been made, but on the practical level we are far from attaining the desired goal.

This paper aims at contributing towards the debate on the advancement towards the emancipation of women in Kenya. The paper takes a cultural perspective. The major thrust of the paper is on the need for Kenyan society to recognize and give attention to traditional practices and attitudes which are detrimental to the attainment of equality between the sexes. The examples given are not exclusive but are used to illustrate the extent to which traditional practices and attitudes need to be changed if the disparity between the *de jure* and the *de facto* position is to be closed, and make the dream of equality between the sexes a reality.

TRADITIONAL ROLES AND MODERN REALITIES

Social scientists have observed how difficult it is to effect change on the cultural plane. Nawal El Saadawi contends:

> Time and time again, life has proved that, whereas political and economic change can take place rapidly, social and cultural progress tends to lag behind because it is linked to the deep inner motive and psychic processes of the human mind and heart.1

Every man born into any society finds himself allocated a role and self-image which he feels he must honour to maintain his position and self-respect within that society. The first expectation Kenyan society has of a man is that he should be the sole head of his family and provider of its material needs. This was all very well in the traditional past when, for example, in the patrilineal societies (and most Kenyan sub-nationalities were patrilineal), the means with which to provide were guaranteed. If one lived in an agricultural community he was entitled to land and there were mechanisms of ensuring that before he started a family he had at least a piece of land which could provide his family with sustenance. Similarly a man in a pastoral community was entitled to and was assured of the necessary livestock on which to feed his family. The attitude towards men as providers therefore has a basis, but we have not tried to understand it in the context of changing social circumstances.

Today in both the rural areas as well as the urban areas we are living in a world where — owing to the shortage of resources coupled with the breakdown of the traditional mechanisms of allocating these resources — no man is guaranteed the basic means with which to start off as a provider. Yet time and time again we have ridiculed men who, through no fault of their own, have failed to live up to this expectation. Quite frequently we have heard the sneer: "His children are always sent home for lack of school fees, and yet he calls himself a man!". The point to consider here is how society can expect cooperation from such a man in the area of equality between the sexes. A man in this situation has already been given the wrong signals about what equality between the sexes implies as far as his survival is concerned. To such a man equality with women ultimately implies his emasculation.

The attitude towards men as providers creates problems for women in their aspirations for equality. Kenyan women are known for their contribution to the welfare, not only of their individual families, but also of the nation at large. Kenya's food security, for example, depends largely on the efforts of the Kenyan woman. 88 per cent of Kenya's women live in the rural areas where the bulk of the food for the nation is grown. 60 to 80 per cent of the tasks involved in agricultural food production are performed by women. In the urban areas over 60 per cent of food processing and food marketing is done by women.

Owing to the conflict between society's expectation of men as the providers and the reality that women have had to take up much of this role, there is now confusion and women are placed in an ambiguous position. While it would seem natural that any person responsible for generating material for family sustenance would have some decision-making power over how the resources are to be utilized, this view, when applied to women, directly conflicts with the traditional role of the man as sole head of the household. In Kenyan society it has been assumed that it is normal for the woman to struggle to produce required family resources, but leave the area of decision-making to the man.

In areas where the major means of livelihood is based on cash crops, problems have arisen where a woman handles all the work entailed in this form of agriculture, but is barred from collecting the money gained from the produce. This is based both upon the attitude discussed above of men as the designated head of the household and also upon a prevailing negative attitude towards women as intellectually inferior to men. This self-contradictory view holds that women have the mental capacity to manage a farm but not enough intelligence to decide on how the money gained should be spent.

Faced with this kind of situation, women are forced to do one of two things: either to relinquish their rights to decision-making for the sake of peace in the home or to engage in domestic warfare

if the sustenance of the family is threatened. Neither of these two positions are healthy, for the attainment of equality between the sexes.

Another aspect of the traditional attitude towards men as heads of households also deserves attention. While in traditional social structures it was assumed that every home was headed by a male, this is no longer the case in contemporary Kenya. In both rural and urban areas, a significant number of homes is now headed by women. In urban areas it is estimated that 60 to 80 per cent of families are female-headed. The fact that so many Kenyan women have been compelled to take on the role of the head of the family (and have successfully done so) will inevitably force society to recognize that women, regardless of the family structure, have the capability and therefore the right to a major role in family decision-making.

The traditional marginalization of women in decision making roles has spilled over into our contemporary society and has placed Kenyan women in a difficult situation. In the private as well as the public sector, women get secondary consideration for managerial or other top-level positions. It is shocking, for example, that twenty years after the attainment of political independence, only two female voices are heard in Kenya's Parliament and only one of those is heard in the Cabinet. Limited access to such policy making bodies places women in a vicious circle. The limitation of exposure and experience for women in turn gives society excuses to continue hampering women from gaining access to key decision-making positions.

Resistance to change is not peculiar to men; Kenyan women are often equally responsible for promoting cultural attitudes which impede progress in attaining equality between the sexes. As mothers, women are responsible for handling the formative years of children when the basic character traits of an individual are determined. In effect, this role makes women custodians of culture.

Kenyan women have not yet recognized the need to modify child-rearing methods to erase stereotyped images as role models for their children. In most Kenyan families, regardless of social and economic position, boys are still brought up to aspire to traditional male roles and expectations. In the case of the girls, the situation is even more complex. Where the mothers are not gender-sensitive, the daughters are brought up in the traditional way and therefore they are encouraged to perpetuate stereotyped images to their own children when they become mothers. On the other hand, where the mothers are sensitized but continue to play traditional roles within their family structures, they are handicapped through their inability to act as role models for their daughters. Such children are easily confused by the inconsistency between their mothers' words and actions.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE NOT HELPING THE SITUATION

So far this paper has looked at areas where both men and women are responsible for frustrating equality between the sexes through their adherence to traditional attitudes. We now focus on the way in which our social institutions detract from this endeavour by being progressive only on the theoretical level while acting as handicaps on the practical level.

In any society the judiciary should be the supreme body safeguarding the interest of its individual citizens. It is the responsibility of the Kenya judiciary to ensure that Kenya upholds the concepts embodied in the Declaration of Human Rights whose first article reads: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one other in the spirit of brotherhood."

Every signatory to the convention is called upon voluntarily to uphold its provisions and Kenya does uphold the provisions of this article. Unfortunately Kenya's stand in regard to the

equality of women to men before the law is only on the institutional and theoretical level. A problem which must be acknowledged for the Kenyan judiciary with regard to the position of women before the law is the inevitability that legal practitioners draw on both the English and African customary laws which at times do not synchronize. This problem notwithstanding, however, there is a basic gross discrimination against women, the roots of which are founded on cultural attitudes.

The attitude towards women as subordinate to their husbands, for example, makes it difficult for a woman to gain legal redress when she experiences mistreatment from her husband. The traditional practice of wife-beating has found its corner as a form of normal communication between men and women. It is often disappointing when, for example, a woman undergoes extreme battering and maiming by her husband, and the police (who are agents of the law) dismiss her case as a "domestic disagreement" which is best settled at the home forum and has no place in their agenda.

The agents of the law are not the only culprits of the perpetration of women's oppression resulting from the attitude towards women as subordinate to their husbands. Many of our men genuinely believe, especially after payment of dowry, that they own their wives and therefore have the right to "discipline" them in any way they find fit. The women on the other hand, having been brought up to take a secondary position *vis a vis* men, often do not know their rights as human beings in marital relationships and will therefore not seek legal help when their security is threatened by husbands.

An area in which cultural attitudes are causing women terrible legal discrimination is with regard to property. Although under the Kenyan Property Act women can own property, there is a conflict between the statutes and the practice. In patrilineal traditions, men are regarded as the unquestionable owners of property. It is therefore always assumed that any property owned by a couple is in the name or custody of the man. As long as a women's husband is alive and does not abdicate his responsibilities all is well. However, in a situation which warrants a woman to claim her share of jointly owned property there is no legal mechanism to guarantee her right of ownership. The worst, but not uncommon, case is that of a divorced or widowed woman. Many divorced or widowed women have found themselves stripped of all property at the termination of a marriage simply because it is assumed that the man has the unquestionable prerogative to ownership. Under the law, when a man dies, the wife should inherit his property as his next of kin. Very often, even before the death certificate has been obtained, the male in-laws appropriate all tangible property leaving the woman helpless.

The land issue in relation to widows requires comment as land seems to have a special almost sentiments place in Kenyan society. In the patrilineal traditional setting women did not own land; access to land was through affiliation to their husbands. However, when a woman lost her husband, there were accepted mechanisms of ensuring that she did not lose access to the land allocated to her husband, as the land belonged to the clan and it was in the interest of the clan that the children of the deceased were cared for. Owing to the breakdown of clan control over land and the introduction of individual land ownership, these mechanisms have disappeared and new ones have not been established.

There is a conflict between the established legal statutes and the practice. The tendency for society to oscillate between traditional and modern practices as convenience dictates denies many widows access to land when they lose their husbands. By law, a woman should succeed her husband as owner of his land when he dies. However, the common practice is for the male in-laws to assume ownership using the tradition which bars women from owning land.

Like any modern society, Kenya is devoted to ensuring that her laws cater for the welfare of all her citizens regardless of their sex. It is no doubt for this reason that our laws are constantly being revised to accommodate changing circumstances. From the foregoing, however, it would appear that modifying legal statutes *per se* will not lead to equality of the sexes before the law; changes in traditional practices and attitudes are absolutely necessary if women's legal rights are to be safe-guarded.

CONCLUSION

This paper has discussed the question of equality of the sexes from a cultural perspective. It has been observed that whereas on the national conceptual levels, Kenya is interested in joining the rest of the modern world in enhancing equality of the sexes, her cultural roots tend to deter progress on the practical level. Cultural attitudes from both men and women strongly influence Kenyan society's approach to the relations between the sexes. The traditional dynamics which often place the man above the woman with regard to access to resources, opportunities, decision-making, legal and other rights still determine how an individual is treated, depending on one's sex.

Although gender awareness has been created in Kenyan society, there seems to be ambivalence, for example, in the women as concerns bringing up the future generation. A woman who is committed to the promotion of gender equality is often placed in a contradictory position with regard to bringing up her children. Where she may preach equality on the theoretical level she finds herself promoting stereotyped images for her children owing to the traditional family structure from which she is operating.

What is the future of equality of the sexes in Kenya? It must be understood here that by equality of the sexes it is implied just consideration regardless of gender and not necessarily uniformity or sameness of men and women. In addition, it must be noted that equality negates the question of one sex dominating the other.

There is hope for equality of the sexes as long as Kenyan society understands its benefits and the effort entailed before it can be attained. Equality of the sexes is beneficial to the whole society as it gives opportunities to both men and women to make their contribution towards improving the quality of life in the nation.

It would be a fallacy to expect change to come overnight. As many scholars have noted, culture is dynamic and not static. Culture has the potential to be modified to adjust to changing circumstances. If Kenyan society recognizes this potential and sees the need to evolve a culture of healthy relations between men and women, equality of the sexes will one day become a reality.

NOTE

1. El Saadawi, N. *The hidden face of Eve: women in the Arab world*. Translated and edited by Sheriff Metata. London: Zed Press, 1980.

CHAPTER 26

HURDLES TO MEANINGFUL INTEGRATION OF ASIANS IN KENYA

RASNA WARAH

I was barely ten years old in that fateful August of 1972 when President Idi Amin stunned the world by expelling over 70,000 Asians from Uganda. I remember it as a frightening and soul-searching time for Kenyan Asians. I recall going to the Nairobi railway station with my father to see the trainload of Ugandan Asians arriving from Kampala. The platform was crowded with relatives and friends of the passengers, ready to provide temporary refuge to the dejected souls that descended from the trains. It was a sad scene that will remain forever etched in any mind as a reminder of what can happen to a minority that remains so insulated that only a drastic action such as a mass expulsion can stir them out of their complacency.

For Kenyan Asians, the event evoked fears as Kenyan politicians half-jokingly debated whether Kenya should also 'do an Amin thing' (expel Asians). Although the Kenyan press reproached Amin for what he had done, Kenyan leaders remained silent on the issue. In fact, in all of Africa, only Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia publicly condemned the expulsion.

Although there can be no justification for this terrible act, the one main reason why Amin felt compelled to target Asians for expulsion was their economic visibility, their being an exceptional group in terms of affluence and general progress. They were therefore disliked by the ordinary Ugandan. Amin, realising this, knew that he would gain considerable acclaim if he got rid of them.

This hostility could have been averted if the Asians had converted their economic power into political strength and if they had made a deliberate attempt to integrate culturally and socially with the Africans.

The late Shiva Naipatit in his book *North of South* blamed Asians for not inculcating an appreciation for Asian culture in the African. The reason why Africans find it so hard to admire and emulate Asians, he said, is because they have no idea what Asian culture is about. ''The African, if he wishes to dress like a European, talk like a European, affect European ideas, gain entry into European clubs. He can cultivate Western mannerisms and Western ideals to his heart's content. He can never be asianised in the same way.'

It is unfortunate that even after a hundred years of Indian presence in this country, Africans have to go all the way to India to find out about India's rich cultural heritage. Currently there are approximately 5000 Kenyans pursuing higher education in India. It is possible that these students' exposure to Indian culture may soften their attitudes towards people of Indian origin back home.

Incidentally, ignorance of Indian culture is not confined to Africans. Many Asians in Kenya have never read an Indian classic, learnt Indian history or fully grasped the philosophical meaning of the Indian scriptures. If they learn about India at all, it is from the worst source possible: commercial Indian cinema which tends to be shallow and melodramatic.

But ignorance alone is not the only reason why Africans and Asians don't seem to mix comfortably. Historical, cultural and to some extent economic factors all worked against the successful integration of Asians with Africans. Unlike the British, Asians came to East Africa neither to conquer not to convert. These 'step-children of the British Empire' came to Africa for only one reason: to improve their economic prospects.

If they wanted to proselytise, they might have made greater efforts to introduce Africans to their way of thinking. If they wanted political power, they might have wooed people of other races to their cause. But the Asians wanted neither. All they wanted was to be left alone with their the business of making money. In addition, colonial policies of racial segregation made sure that the races would not mix. Separate schools, separate residential areas, separate clubs all ensured that racial integration would not occur.

On the other hand, racial segregation suited the majority of Asians. The reason that the colonial system was accepted was that defining areas of occupation and activity on a racial basis made it easier for the Asian to identify his role; and as he was an immigrant, unsure of his rights and status, he was probably grateful to be spared the pains of transition and the tensions of racial conflict and competition.

Many Africans construe this to be a manifestation of racism. What most people do not realise is that racism is far too 'developed' a concept for the average Asian whose vision of the world rarely goes beyond caste and religion. Asians are not so much racist as they are communalistic. Their ethnocentricity does not allow room for such broad categorisation as race. Even among themselves, Asians rarely refer to themselves as a race, but as members of a religious, linguistic or caste group. (Asians in Kenya originally came mainly from four areas in India: Punjab in the North and Cutch, Kathiawar and Gujarat in the West. They are divided into two main religions: Hinduism and Islam, each of which is divided into sects. The majority are Hindu: Patels from Gujarat, Lohanas ftom Cutch, two Jain castes (Visa Oshwal and Navnit Vanik) from Gujarat and two Sikh groups (Jats and Ramgharias) ftom Punjab. The Muslirns are divided into Shia Ismailis (followers of the Aga Khan) from Cutch, Khoja Shia Ithn'asaris and Daudi Bohras from Karachi and Suni Muslims from Punjab. Also there is a tiny minority of Christians from Goa and Parsees from Gujarat.

Given the divisions among Asians, it is easy to see why it became so difficult for Asians to transcend racial barriers. Caste, religion and European Social Darwinist theories of human development made the Asian look at the African as a separate and unequal entity.

Caste is a particularly difficult concept for non-Asians to grasp. For most Hindus (who constitute the majority of Asians in Kenya), caste remains an inviolate system that pervades all aspects of life. The system is so ingrained in the psyche of the average Asian that its relevance has not diminished much even after a century of residence in East Africa.

Most Hindu families in Kenya retain a strong sense of genealogy and will have no trouble remembering exactly which village and caste group they emerged from India. (Although the caste system is a characteristic feature of Hinduism, other religious groups which did not traditionally practise castism, have adopted a kind of caste system of their own. Ramgharia Sikhs and Namdari Sikhs, for example, worship in separate temples and do not generally intermarry.)

What is ironical about the caste system is that it is not even indigenous to the Indian sub-continent. It was imported into the sub-continent by the Aryan race which infiltrated Northern India from Central Europe around the 15th century B.C. The Aryans were a tall, fair- skinned pastoral people with a fierce conviction of their own racial superiority. After driving out the darker-skinned inhabitants who were animists, the Aryans devised their own philosophy and religion, which forms the basis of Vedic Hinduism, defined by Khushwant Singh, India's eminent journalist as 'an amalgam of often contradictory beliefs and practices, held together in one by a system of social regulation.'

Hindu philosophy gave birth to a pantheon of gods and goddesses (some adopted from the faith of the indigenous animists) and to that highly symbolic form of literature known as Sanskrit.

It also gave rise to the caste system, a highly oppressive social order which reduced the indigenous population to servitude.

The system divided people mainly into four classes of people known as castes, each of which was assigned a specific function in society. On the top were the creators of the system, the Brahmins, who monopolised the priesthood. Then came the Kshatriyas (warriors), followed by the Vaishyas (tradesmen) and finally the Sudras (workers) who in post-Gandhian India are referred to as 'Harijans' (children of God). The Sudras or 'untouchables' were pushed to the bottom to do menial, unpleasant tasks suchas cleaning latrines. As expected, it was the darker, indigenous inhabitants who were assigned these tasks.

Although many social reformers, including Mohandas Gandhi, have tried to dismantle the caste system, orthodox Hindus still cling to it. Many do not believe that it is an inherently oppressive system. For example, Sudhir Kakar, an Indian social scientist, views the caste system as a harmonious social order. By defining areas of occupation, he says, the caste system helped society to function without much conflict or psychological stress. In his book, *The inner world* Kakar writes:

> Many Western (and Indian) social scientists have interpreted social institutions such as caste and the extended family as oppressive, in the sense of hindering the growth of such personality traits as 'independence', 'initiative', 'persistence' and 'achievement motivation' in the individual. Such interpretations, however, are intimately related to a historically determined cultural specific *Weltanschauung* of the ideal 'healthy' personality cast in the Faustian mould, a world-view which is being increasingly questioned, if not openly repudiated, by certain classes and subcultures of the youth in the West itself.

Nonetheless, the caste system in India today remains a thorn in the flesh of politicians and activists alike. For example, one of the reasons why former Indian Prime Minister, V.P. Singh, lost power was that he tried to reserve more seats for the so-called 'scheduled castes' (a polite term used by secular India to refer to 'untouchables') in the public service.

But caste does not only determine one's economic prospects. It also plays havoc with one's social life. Even today in India, the lighter-skinned Indian of Aryan descent is somehow identified with higher caste background., And judging by the matrimonial columns in Indian newspapers, 'fair-skinned' (an oft repeated adjective used in ads to describe a prospective bride) is not only an indication of high caste background, but is also completely synonymous with beautiful. In fact, for the aesthetically narrow-minded Indian, 'tall, fair and light-eyed' are still considered the essential characteristics of the ideal human body type.

Caste prejudices therefore, easily translates into colour prejudice in the Indian context. This explains to some extent why intermarriage with whites is still acceptable to many Indians, but such a marriage if the partner is African or of darker complexion is not. It also explains why integration of Asians in Africa has been slow compared to integration of Asians in say, Britain or Canada.

Apart from superficial integration at the workplace or at the odd social function (what the late Tom Mboya sarcastically referred to as 'cocktail integration'), meaningful integration of the races has been rare in Kenya.

However, the one place where integration has been somewhat successful is our schools. The desegregation of schools after independence has had a profound effect on the generation of Asians

and on the attitudes of the younger generation of Asians and has, as a result, led to better race relations.

But does integration have to be physical to be real? Is it not possible to be loyal to a system and a government while at the same time restricting intimate relations to members of one's own community?

Sociologists are divided on this issue. Some believe that integration can only come about through assimilation, or what can be referred to as 'the melting pot method'. Assimilation requires complete conformity at all levels of life. This is a radical method that rules out all diversities between groups and requires that all minority groups adopt the culture of the larger dominant group.

Others believe that pluralism is a healthier form of integration whereby minority groups continue as distinct units with their own social and cultural institutions. In such a society, diversity is not only tolerated, it is encouraged. However, conformity may be necessary in other aspects of life such as politics.

In present day Kenya, given that the culture of the 'dominant group' (i.e. the Africans) is itself made up of culturally distinct ethnic groups and considering that in the last fifty years or so these groups have themselves undergone rapid social and cultural changes, assimilation may not be possible because there is no clearly discernible dominant culture. Besides, the Kenyan bias seems to be towards pluralism in which each ethnic group retains its culture while remaining loyal to the political and civic institutions of the land.

Nonetheless, Asians will have to try harder to show that their love and loyalty is to this country and its people, and not merely to the fruits of the land. If they integrate politically and economically, they may be forgiven their social insularity.

This is already happening to a certain extent. In the past decade or so, African participation in commerce and industry has risen dramatically, giving rise to a new class of African elite who no longer feel threatened by Asian businesses. Moreover, having witnessed the decline of the Ugandan economy after Amin's expulsion of the Asians, the Kenyan government is not likely to alienate this minority for the sake of Africanization.

Asians have involved themselves, albeit indirectly, in the economic emancipation of Africans by giving generously to charitable and other organizations. This may not be the best way to show commitment (it is viewed as patronising and elitist by many), but it is a sign that there is a certain level of consciousness and concern among Asians for their fellow Kenyans.

In the long run, the 70,000 or so Asians in Kenya may just dwindle away and become so insignificant numerically that their presence will no longer be noticeable. But before that happens, they must take stock of their present situation and reflect on how they got here. Only then, as author Dana April Seidenberg says, will they be able to 'take courage from their historical legacy and act upon it.'

CHAPTER 27

THE PLACE OF THE EUROPEAN IN KENYAN SOCIETY

DONALD THOMAS

The meaning of the term 'European' depends on who is using it. To Africans it is usually equated with 'whites'. To Americans it is normally equated with those born and bred in Europe, the majority of whom are light skinned. However, in view of the large immigration from the Caribbean, North Africa, India, Pakistan and elsewhere to countries with a colonial history, such as Britain, France and the Netherlands, there is an increasing number of 'Europeans' who are dark skinned and have cultural roots, and probably family ties, elsewhere. For the purpose of this article, 'European' refers to those who are partly or wholly light skinned and who have cultural roots and kinship ties with Europe, North America, Australia, or South Africa.

It is already clear that Europeans are mixed both racially and culturally. They are a diverse group whose origins may lie in many different countries with different languages and traditions.

These differences tend to persist in Kenya, at least during the first generation but become weaker during the second and third generation when barriers begin to disappear under the unifying influence of the English language, local education and sometimes intermarriage. No doubt a similar process is at work in breaking down barriers between Kenyans of different tribes.

Whereas Europeans can be grouped according to their country of origin, they can also be grouped according to their permanence in Kenyan society and the role they play. There are now Europeans of the fourth and fifth generation who have made their homes in Kenya. Each generation has a different outlook to the one before on account of the weakening of links with family overseas which is only partly offset by improvements in air travel and communications.

Europeans are involved in many different occupations including education, farming and ranching, business (especially tourism), professions such as medicine, engineering and accounting, artistic activity, missionary activity and work for international development agencies and NG0s. Many of these Europeans are short term 'expatriates' on contract. Some are volunteers on low salaries who come for the opportunity to share skills and for the challenge and experience they get in the process; others are highly paid professionals enjoying privileges and benefits they might not get at home. Apart from these, there is a substantial number of long term residents and citizens who have a much more permanent stake in the country. Some have property in Kenya and have invested all or most of their resources in the country. A substantial number have retired in Kenya because they have lived and worked in the country for many years and find conditions for retirement both congenial and affordable. There are some who have married Kenyans and there are those Europeans belonging to religious orders or missionary bodies for whom living and working in Kenya is a religious vocation.

Some of the Europeans who have made their home in Kenya, think of themselves as part of Kenyan society rather than as part of a European community, especially if they have taken out citizenship or have married Kenyans. Those with family ties in Kenya have a permanent connection with the country. Inevitably, their perspective is quite different from that of the short term expatriate. Those who have married Africans and made their homes in Kenya naturally look to a future for themselves and their children in Kenya. However, they recognize the difficulty for children of getting employment without a high level of education and training and therefore give this top priority, sometimes sending children for education overseas if they see better opportunities there and have the resources to do so.

Europeans who have married Africans are more closely integrated into Kenya society than other Europeans, but intermarriage is not a prerequisite for integration. Integration involves identification with the country's aspirations and a sense of responsibility for the country's future development and welfare. It comes from close association with Kenyans both at work and socially so that the conceptual framework of 'them' and 'us' no longer applies. As bonds of friendship deepen, issues of race and culture fade into the background. In one instance, an elderly European woman describes her travelling into the heart of Luo country by bus and matatu to pay her respects to an ailing African whom she has known as a friend for more than thirty years. In another instance, a large crowd of Africans gathers for a memorial service to a white woman who owned a ranch and managed it firmly but fairly, with a sense of commitment both to the needs of the people and the needs of the land. In a final example an elderly European priest was given an African name by the Luo community he served and when he died, he was treated as a member of that community because he belonged there more than anywhere else.

Children with European roots, who are born and raised in Kenya, are capable of easier integration with Africans than their parents on account of shared experience in education, sport, music, drama and other activities. They share a common language (English) and some of those with an African parent may be fluent in the vernacular. Although Western culture can be blamed for eroding traditional African culture it has provided a common framework within which young Europeans and Africans communicate with ease. Nor is the cultural influence in one direction only as evidenced by the way in which some young whites take to African hairstyles, food, music and dance.

The question of integration has wider implications. It .is one which has been challenging whites and blacks in South Africa for a long time. The policy of apartheid assumed that there could be no future together. Now, apartheid is out and the nation gropes towards a common future. Questions of colour are part of a wider question of ethnicity which is rearing its head as a major issue for the present generation not only in Africa but in other parts of the world, as for example, in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. At a personal level it can cause great anguish as expressed vividly in the book *My Traitor's Heart* by the South African writer, Rian Malan. Hilary Ng'weno, editor of the *Weekly Review,* in an address to the staff of the Africa Region of the World Bank in 1991 said:

> The hard reality is that most Africans view each other, not as compatriots, but as members of this or that ethnic group, and more to the point, they act accordingly. This has tremendous bearing on the prospect of good governance in Africa, and if good governance is linked to economic development— most of us now think it is— then ethnicity has a profound bearing on the prospects of economic development on the continent.

For Kenya to succeed as a nation, the process of integration between tribes and races has to go much further than it has in the past, and people of European origin will find themselves belonging to an isolated and dwindling community unless they integrate more effectively in the larger Kenyan society. Is this likely or possible?

Leaving aside the short term expatriate who is on contract for two or four years or occasionally longer, it is reasonable to ask if there is indeed a long term future for Europeans in Kenya. The answer is 'Yes, provided that they no longer see themselves as a separate community.' However there are implications to be considered. Those who have come from a society with extensive social

services cannot expect the state to provide them with the same kind of support that they would have had at home. The state provides very limited medical care, no unemployment benefits and almost no security for old age. Those in business or professions may be able to make enough to meet their expectations but those without professional skills or talents to offer may find themselves without employment and unable to maintain the lifestyle and living standard which they themselves enjoyed while growing up and would like to provide for their own children. Those who find themselves in this predicament and still have roots elsewhere will leave. Few, if any Europeans could survive under the conditions of poverty, malnutrition, inadequate shelter and lack of medical care which is the lot of a growing number of Kenyan Africans, especially in urban areas.

At this juncture one may ask if the European has any particular role to play or contribution to make in Kenyan society. Some Europeans played a significant role in the political field in the early years of independence but subsequently, apart from notable exceptions such as Philip Leakey, Europeans have studiously avoided the political field. This can be explained by the wish to make a break with the colonial image, the absence of a natural electorate and the lack of interest in the political game which has involved the collapse of moral principles and the sycophantic allegiance to an increasingly hierarchical system. Lack of competence in Kiswahili precludes some Europeans from greater involvement in public affairs. With the coming of multiparty politics, it is possible that a few Europeans may find a role in the political arena and the appointment of one European citizen to a position in an opposition party is significant in this respect. Undoubtedly, Europeans could make a contribution in view of their cultural traditions which, leaving aside the tragedy of Nazism and two world wars, still provides guidelines for public service involving democratic principles and practices. Europeans may also play a role in Kenya in professional fields, where there is a need, and in starting new and innovative ventures for which expertise and capital are required. There is also a role for certain Europeans in working for human rights and for reconciliation between conflicting ethnic groups. Their ability to play such a role depends on their faith (the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen-Hebrews 1:1) and their commitment to struggle against 'principalities, powers, rulers of darkness and spiritual wickedness in high places' (Ephesians 6:12).

The problem of ethnicity which bedevils Kenya at the moment is part and parcel of a global problem: how can six billion people live together and find fulfilment without destroying each other and the environment in which they live? This is a particularly acute problem for Kenya due to a combination of low and erratic rainfall in 80 per cent of the country (which restricts agricultural production) and population growth and which is likely to continue well into the next century. Although Europeans, like Africans, worry about ethnic conflict, corruption, and insecurity, the one thing which makes them most anxious about the future of Kenya is the unresolved question of how Kenya can support a population which is expected to be around 40 million by the year 2010.

To conclude, there is a continuing role for those Europeans who are integrated into Kenyan society and involved in the development process, in healing the sick, creating employment, passing on skills, and working towards greater understanding of the essential oneness of humanity. What some may need to remember is that there are fundamental differences between the Western concept of a one-directional progress of history and the cyclical African concept which emphasises the importance of interrelationships between the living, the dead and the yet to be born. To the African it is not so much what you achieve that matters, but who and what you are. This is a lesson which is difficult for many Europeans- to learn but one of the most important that African has to teach.

CHAPTER 28

TIHE PLACE OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED IN THE MODERN WORLD

JEAN VANIER

What is the meaning of mental retardation? Do the mentally handicapped have a real place in society? More precisely, do they have a role to play in human history and in the future of the world?

I write as a philosopher but one who for many years experienced the joy of living continually with the mentally handicapped. My collaborators and I have undertaken to look after about sixty mentally handicapped adults for the rest of their lives. A community has thus grown up, consisting of small ‘family’ groups living in a village.

First I would like to express my gratitude to these men who have gathered together from hostels, psychiatric hospitals, and the streets of Paris. So often they have been looked upon as outcasts or as mad; they are despised because they are weak and unable to fend for themselves. They have taught me much about human nature and the real meaning of human existence, the true value of love, of wonder, and even of contemplation.

Those of us who work more or less continually with the so-called "handicapped" are forced to ask ourselves the question: What is a handicapped person? Is such a person a complete human being or not? What is his place in society? Too often these questions are not asked explicitly enough, but here I want to consider them seriously for our attitude to the "handicapped" must depend on how we answer them.

The problem is an old one: Plato, and even Aristotle with all his humanism, affirm that the weak should be loved at an early age. For them, if a man was not able to fulfil himself through the use of reason or to work effectively, there was no reason for him to live. Time, energy and money should not be wasted on the care of outcasts. As in the world of art, for each masterpiece there are some failures and these should be eliminated.

The other side of this restricted view of man, where absolute primacy is given to reason, is another concept, namely, that of more spiritually orientated cultures. A friend of mine, the father of a very handicapped child, told me the other day that an Algerian, a Kabyle, on seeing his son at the railway station said: "How lucky you are to have a child like that!" And seeing the father’s astonishment he said: "Yes, we believe that a family that has a child like that is blessed by Allah!" Anyone who is handicapped either physically or mentally, is considered in some civilizations to be ‘religious" (I believe this was the case in ancient China) and to be more in touch with the spiritual. In Greek mythology, madmen were often thought of as prophets. They spoke a strange language, they were in a way intermediaries between man and the gods. In our day these exceptional characteristics of madness and of maladjustment (for in common parlance the two are often confused, though distinct in psychiatry) have been shown in the films of Fellini, Stembeck, in his book *Of Mice and Men*, shows us Lenni, who lives, in a way, outside restrictive social convention. An extraordinary creature, he becomes terrifying in moments of panic. In drug addiction, L.S.D., and in some forms of art is there not sometimes a feeling for the primacy of madness, of the superiority of madness over cold reason?

Between these two extremes, there is what we may call the western humanist attitude. The mentally handicapped are neither to be despised, nor are they to be thought of as being nearer to God 6r the gods. They are indeed human beings, but incomplete, deficient, weak, infirm,

handicapped. We, the normal, the "non-deficient", have no right to get rid of them. (Even if we do not reject them physically, we unfortunately do not hesitate to do so spiritually and psychologically, treating them rather as objects than as persons). They are "poor things" who must be helped and protected; children who will remain so all their lives. They must be given suitable living conditions. And most important, we must find occupations for them because they can be useful! I have heard someone who specialises in the care of the retarded say that such an individual can only be described as "half a person", a truncated individual who can only half respond whether in terms of work, friendship, or religion. This point of view has produced very good results in the field of work. One has seen quite severely handicapped individuals operating machines, producing quite a good output and earning a reasonable wage. But surely this is not enough!

Then how should we look upon them? Failures to be eliminated? Blessed by God? Paternally with condescension as inferior beings who must be helped? I would like to suggest an attitude which has the advantage of assimilating what is true and obvious in those already mentioned, and which takes account of the attractive qualities which make some retarded people so appealing.

The mentally retarded are certainly failures in the light of reason and responsibility. They are not autonomous, they cannot achieve that freedom which has come to be synonymous with independence. One can go further, as an eminent psychiatrist writes: "The mentally retarded individual is suggestible, naive and easily influenced. His 'self' lacks strength and form. He is weak."

He has undoubtedly a weakness of the "self", that is of the rational and willful self. This rational self is necessary in order that we may be active in society, capable of organizing our lives and those of others. But man is not just a social being who has to struggle to further his place in society and defend himself, he also loves and wants to be loved, to communicate and to share. To be active in society it is imperative to have a strong and integrated self. But the qualities needed to communicate are not the same. To be admired and to be loved are quite different things. We spontaneously love a child, who is happy, pure, simple, laughing; is it not his youth, his weakness, his innocence and purity which makes us love him?

There are men who are efficacious, who have all the qualities needed to organize, to act and to command, but their hearts are atrophied; they have no compassion. They are too self-reliant and independent. They have cut off part of their personality, the capacity to enter deeply into a relationship with other human beings. They tend to regard other people as objects, or at best as inferior and without value. They are more at ease with documents, materials, with "interesting cases" or with men who must be ordered about like robots, than with someone who is suffering or distressed and who is in need of compassion. They are domineering and their consciousness of self is one of superiority.

Others, in spite of their technical and mental capacity have not allowed their emotions to become cold and rigid, they have been able to preserve that sensibility which allows a man to communicate with, and have compassion for someone else. They are not afraid of human relationships. They have preserved that transparency and purity which make them attractive to others. Their open nature is appealing; a feeling of warmth and goodness emanates from them. Their movements, their expression, their smiles, their way of shaking hands, their behaviour, their tone of voice, far from expressing hardness and aggressiveness, breathe forth gentleness, goodness and understanding. These important qualities which enable a man to accept another person and communicate with him, are found not in the rational self, but in a deeper self which corresponds to an aspiration to love which, however, can be suppressed and buried in the realm of the unconscious.

Man, through his reason and his will, takes his place in society and acts according to the norms of that society. But it is his aspirations towards love which open him to other human beings, inasmuch as they are unique and have within them eternal and infinite potentialities whose depth transcends society, with its conventions and even its laws. It is true love which instead of driving us to dominate others, helps us to feel for a man and identify ourselves with him, to communicate with him with a warmth of self-giving, self-effacement, sacrifice and humility.

The mentally handicapped do not have a consciousness of power. Because of this perhaps their capacity for love is more immediate, lively and developed than that of other people. They cannot be men of ambition and action in society and so develop a capacity for friendship rather than for efficiency. They are indeed weak and easily influenced, because they confidently give themselves to others; they are simple certainly, but often with a very attractive simplicity. Their first reaction is often one of welcome and not of rejection to help to overcome and adapt themselves more or less successfully in accordance with conventions and laws. On the one hand, since no man can live in anguish, where love is absent they become angry and violent, or sink into a state in which they refuse all contact with reality. Those who care for the mentally deficient in situations where their instinct for love cannot develop note their lack of vitality or aggressive tendencies, as well as their desire for immediate satisfaction in eating and sexuality. On the other hand, those who are able to live with them in happy, human conditions, where each one is respected, surrounded by love and treated as a unique person having his rightful place and role to play in the community (and even in the world) react to this weakness but in a different way. They see above all how this weakness leads to a flowering of love. They marvel at their ability to give themselves in purity and innocence, simply and with great joy. They appreciate their capacity for work, but above all the friendly atmosphere of their workshops.

In a world which is continually becoming harder, where men are obliged to work furiously to acquire riches, where kindness is not respected and is drowned in a mounting tide of efficiency, the mentally handicapped have an important part to play, because they have time to look and think, marvel and love; they are a continual reminder of the value of community. They are a sign, by their very nature, that peace and joy are not gained by work alone, and do not depend on wealth. Therefore, they pronounce a terrible warning, namely, if men do not use their knowledge and ability to make the world more just, more brotherly, and to bridge the ever-widening gap between the rich and poor, then this world will end in agony, strife and fire. Seen in this light, the mentally handicapped, with their very attractive qualities, are a constant reminder of the poverty and receptivity required by love, but also of the wonderment, joy and peace which radiate from those who know how to receive and to give.

Furthermore, the handicapped, by his very being, is a challenge. His openness, his weakness, his simplicity, his confidence, provided he is placed in conditions that are happy and human, call forth goodness from those who hold power and wealth. For those who are not yet quite hardened, who are still able to receive, contact with the handicapped is often a revelation. They have a strange ability to attract; one cannot be unmoved by their lovable simplicity unless one is extraordinarily hardened. The handicapped can in this way form a breach in the walls which we men of the twentieth century have built around ourselves through fear of others. By his very being he can inspire feelings not of pity, paternalism and condescension, but of true altruism.

The mentally handicapped play their part not in trying to rival each other for power and glory, but in their appeal as weak to help them. In response our world, instead of becoming more and more dislocated and torn asunder, can be on the way to unity and peace.

The mentally handicapped is not an outcast, a failure, but a person of great importance; no person is without importance. Through his weakness he constitutes a challenge: are we, men of the twentieth century, so self-satisfied as not to be revolted by the present injustice; are we too rich, to superior to hear the silent cry of the mentally handicapped?

CHAPTER 29

ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: MUTUAL INTERESTS AND SAFEGUARDS?

JIMOH OMO-FADAKA

THE NEED FOR A CONSERVATION ETHIC

Conservation may be defined as the management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest benefits.

It is generally agreed that conservation is necessary. So the question "Why conservation?" is not at issue. Rather, the question is "Conservation how?" How does one develop a conservation ethic suitable for the purpose of development? This is a very difficult question to answer when all around we see signs of increasing interest in material goods and decreasing interest in spiritual and ethical matters. But the answer requires changes in traditional approaches to solving problems by everyone who is involved: governments, scientists, as well as people in general.

But how is change to be brought about within the established political machinery of society? Experts may agree on a theoretical course of action for legislative and social reform, but their deliberations are meaningless without the support of those affected. And while democracy implies decision-making by the people, it is within the ranks of the establishment that co- operation has first to be established. That is political reality.

The conservation of nature is really, and above all, an ethical matter. It is not only politicians, scientists, technicians, ecologists, environmentalists, voluntary agencies, or individuals of good will alone who will solve this problem, but poets, priests, philosophers and artists as well.

Poets, writers, musicians, artists and religious communities in Africa can contribute to creating a culture that retrieves the communal ethics of traditional African societies. They are the custodians of African culture. They can help to sharpen the inherent feeling in human beings about their place in nature. Only by the development of a conservation ethic or conscience will the political will to solve conservation problems be developed.

In developing a conservation ethic which is suitable and compatible with the purpose of development, the key phrase is sustainable development, that is, sustainable use of natural resources. No long-term gain accrues to either the nation or the people who are victims of a "trial and error" approach to resource development. Inventory assessment, land capability and suitability to sustain certain uses are keys to conservation as well as to rational development.

The list of projects which have failed because this kind of assessment was not carried out is a long one, and local people who have been involved in such projects have suffered tremendous dislocation when the projects petered out.

An appropriate conservation ethic must first of all be reflected in government policies. If only a few upper and middle class people are reaping the benefits of development, it will be difficult to convince the people to have a conservation ethic. If, on the other hand, government policies aim at equitable development and distribution of resources, particularly for the urban and rural poor (who form the majority) then a conservation ethic is possible.

By and large, non-industrial countries (often referred to as "developing countries") possess a conservation ethic within their own cultural setting. The western free enterprise and the Soviet communist industrial models of development usually do not have scope for accommodating this ethic. Hence the need for its re-activation and its re- development.

Such an ethic should be based on those values which have been thrown out of balance by the temptations of increased consumption of manufactured luxury goods (so-called "consumer goods"). Most farmers have positive feelings towards the land; many forest-living people feel themselves to be part of the living forest, each part of which has its own spirit. And most religions contain within themselves the raw materials of a conservation ethic.

This means that a religious movement should be brought to bear upon conservation problems. This is vitally important for development since spiritual reward may be a value to be preferred to material gain. While people must not be brainwashed or hoodwinked by religious hocus-pocus, the answers to the basic questions lie as much within morality as within technology.

REDEFINING DEVELOPMENT

It is now generally agreed that the conventional pattern of development that has been pursued by many of the developing countries for the last three decades has not solved their problems. For example, most African countries have been colonized in the past by European countries. On attaining independence, these ex-colonial countries have, with few exceptions, been following certain assumptions handed down to them by their ex-colonial masters.

Stated briefly, some of the assumptions were that development is hampered by inadequate financial resources and lack of industrialization and technical know-how. The solutions prescribed were to:

* Step up industrialization of urban areas with the help of industrialized countries;
* Import technology from the industrialized countries;
* Mechanize agriculture;
* Arrest population growth.

All this was supposed to produce a high growth rate of the gross national product (GNP).

In other words, development was to proceed within the framework of the political, economic and social institutions that the African countries inherited from colonial rule. Thus the principle of a centralized national state was not questioned, nor the present, often arbitrary frontiers, nor the capitalist market economy, nor the capital-intensive or labour-saving technologies, all of which foreign importations are difficult to reconcile with the indigenous way of life.

Throughout the last three decades (1960-1990), the first, second and third United Nations development decades, the newly emergent nations have striven to follow the above principles religiously. But to what end?

They continue to be poor and become progressively even poorer in relation to the industrialized countries. The net effect of these prescriptions has resulted in what Ivan Illich calls "planned poverty. The United Nations objective of bridging the gap between the living standards of the industrialized and the non- industrialized countries has remained elusive. Actually, the gap has widened. The average income per head in the non- industrialized countries rose during the 1960s by about $40, whereas in the industrialized countries it went up by $650. By 1990 the rise was thought to be $200 and $2,400 respectively. Today, the industrialized countries, constituting 34% of the world’s population, earn 87.5% of the world’s income, while the non-industrialized countries with 66% of the world’s population earn 12.5%.

What, we may ask, is wrong with the prescriptions? After making allowance for corruption and inefficiency on the part of governments, whether civil or military, it must be conceded that

many ex-colonial countries are still the victims of foreign exploitation. The exploitation is practiced not through overt political control, but covertly, through, among other things, industrialization of sorts entailing the transfer to these countries of inappropriate technologies.

WHAT IS COMMON ABOUT OUR FUTURE?

The report of the Brundtland Commission, entitled *Our Common Future* has been widely hailed, also in developing countries, as ushering in a new era of international cooperation in the cause of environment and development. However, even if the recommendations of the Commission were adopted and implemented *in toto*, they would do little to decrease the gap between the industrialized and the non-industrialized countries. The reason for this is simple: the Commission failed to address itself to a fundamental question, namely, whether development is possible within the production strategy of the developing countries, influenced as they are by the "free world market" which is conditioned almost exclusively by the demands of western Europe, the USA and Japan. In gearing their economies to the world market, are the developing countries not thereby denying themselves the ability to achieve a self-sustaining growth which is a precondition for development? The real cause for poverty cannot be understood unless the question is put this way.

It would be too much to expect Ms Brundtland or other liberal-minded people to pose the question in this manner, because to do so would be almost economically subversive. However, this is how the leaders of the non-industrialized countries should feel obliged to pose the question since they are responsible for pursuing a path of development whose success or failure will affect, in one way or another, the well-being of people who constitute two-thirds of the world's population.

Political independence is meaningless unless accompanied by economic independence. For economic independence to become a reality a whole series of measures are required to change the existing institutions. Development cannot be grafted onto a country like a foreign body; it must grow within the country, from the grass roots, that is, from available resources. It must be consistent with the aims and needs of healthy self-regulating societies, not destructive of them.

The non-industrialized countries should look into their past in order to know the present; to know the future, they must look into both the past and the present. Their future course of action should be guided dialectically and must be related to their concrete and indigenous experience.

To grow or not to grow? That is not the question. A return to primitivism is not advocated. What is being advocated is that development, economic growth and technology must be subordinated to social needs and not vice versa, as it the case today. Unless the leaders of the non-industrialized countries are prepared to discuss ways and means for achieving this kind of grassroots development, none of the prescriptions against poverty in use at the moment are likely to improve the worsening situation in their countries.

Any appreciable improvement in African countries is unlikely unless they make a fundamental break with the prescriptions hitherto used in tackling their problems. It is clear that an all-out attempt at industrialization which does not take cognizance of the indigenous milieu and cultural realities is the cause, and not the solution, of their poverty.

The African countries are now poor because they were colonized in the past, and colonialism is a system of "foreign investment" by the metropolitan countries. If private foreign investment caused their poverty in the past, it is equally likely to impoverish them now, even if the political reins are in their hands. Put in this way, the relationship between industrialization (through private foreign investment) and poverty is immediately rendered more intelligible.

The only way out of their current poverty is for African countries to lessen their dependence on the industrialized countries and pursue an independent path of development. If they wish to solve their problems, they themselves must act. They must not wait for a miracle, or foreign aid, or some other external help for their development. They must rely far more on their own efforts and much less on outside assistance. The resources are land and the people. Self-reliance does not mean that the African countries will not need or accept international assistance for their development. Obviously, they will need and seek foreign capital and assistance for particular projects. But there are also many things the African countries can do for themselves. Some things can be done more easily through outside assistance, but African countries should not wait for this to launch their development projects.

What is of cardinal importance in the policy of self-reliance is that African countries should assess the aims and interests of their development plans, and then train enough of their people for the tasks involved. In this way alone will they eventually become independent of foreign assistance and become fully self-reliant.

The change to self-reliance needs a radical restructuring of institutions. This restructuring needs a popular base and popular support. The people as a whole should be allowed to see their cultural experience develop by its own logic. This is vital. When communities discover their own potential for initiating development, the spirit that is engendered becomes their most valuable asset, one that can set them firmly on the road to self- reliance.

We might do well to reflect that poverty as it is known today was almost unknown in pre-colonial Africa. Although the pre-colonial era was not a Golden Age there was no overpopulation in the sense of a rate of population increase greater than the increase in food production. The system of land tenure provided each family with enough land to feed its members. And each family considered it a sacred duty to look after those members who were incapable of looking after themselves. There was no unemployment, underemployment or malnutrition. Colonial rule gave grist to the mill of poverty and overpopulation; the people who suffered most from nutritional deficiencies were those who were introduced into the colonial economy as urban workers. Those who managed in spite of colonial rule to maintain their traditional pattern of nutrition generally remained healthy.

A SUMMING UP

Perhaps the best way to describe what African countries should be is to indicate what they should not be. They should not turn into urbanised industrial societies as they are now doing, where the cities and towns swell up like infectious glands, attracting to themselves a workforce, the number of which cannot conceivably be employed in any productive capacity. They should try to avoid the horrors of rampant urbanization. They should also try to avoid the pollution and other environmental problems that go hand in hand with this urbanization. The emphasis in development should rather be one based on a country's traditional rural culture.

One way to start repairing the casualties of development which have been brought about by the imitation of western development patterns is to outline some strengths of the Third World countries' traditional way of life. It is on the basis of these traditional ways of life that the following programmes of modernization could be carried out:

* The pattern of communal land rights and collective responsibility could form the basis of cooperative work, whether in business ventures or community development projects.

* Decision-making by consensus could be examined by the political leaders with a view to adapting its value for modern parliamentary procedures.

* The philosophy of shared responsibility for the young, the sick and the elderly could become embraced in modern welfare programmes.

* Classless and non-elitist forms of society could be the basis of newly-planned educational structures.

The way out of our modern predicament is the development of a less acquisitive society, a society which takes a holistic view of nature and puts people instead of products and profits at the centre of attention. In other words, the creation of an economy of permanence, stability and survival which makes ecological sense and does little damage to the ecosystem and society.

CHAPTER 30

THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN AFRICA

J. MUNAKUKAAMA NSEREKO

Crime, which may he defined as a grave offence against the law, and punishable as such, has always been associated with imprisonment. There is, however, a growing global trend of changing beliefs about crime control and about the value of punishment by imprisonment. The change is directly linked to the increasing concern of abuses of human rights in general, and of the treatment of alleged offenders and convicted prisoner in particular. The evidence of this concern may be seen in the evolution of United Nations instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules), the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, the Riyadh Guidelines, and the Beijing Rules.

It is significant that instruments specifically relevant to the treatment of prisoners do exist. Apart from those developed under the auspices of the United Nations, there are regional instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Each of them has a specific Article on punishment or on those deprived of their liberty.

VULNERABILITY OF PRISONERS

Prisoners are uniquely vulnerable members of society in that they are completely under the control of other people, i.e., at the mercy of their jailers. It is the prison officials who, on a daily basis, control the most basic human activities and concerns of prisoners. They decide when and how prisoners may eat and sleep, or even when they may perform their bodily functions. They control prisoners' access to medical facilities, to work and to education. They also control the right of prisoners to observe the requirements of their religion and their contact with the outside world, i.e. family members and friends. In addition, prisons are often situated in the most remote or isolated areas. Thus the potential for prisoners to suffer from human rights abuses and maltreatment is very great. In this connection it has been said that one can judge the state of civilization of any country by the way it treats its criminals. Or, as B. G. Ramcharan put it, "the way a society treats its vulnerable members is a reflection of its social health and conscience."1

THE PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

It is a common tendency practically everywhere to impose imprisonment as a principal penal sanction in preference to other forms of punishments. This inclination appears to reflect society's view that unless an offender is incarcerated, justice has not been served. Also, if offenders are not imprisoned, the public feels insecure.

The way a penal system functions with regard to the treatment of offenders depends primarily on the society's philosophy of punishment. Usually, the administration of the penalty for a crime

involves the intention to produce some kind of pain, which is justified in terms of its assumed value. The question then arises: what is the value of imprisonment in crime control?

There are fundamentally divergent answers to this question. Some agents of criminal justice look at the purpose of imprisonment in terms of retribution, others in terms of deterrence, and still others in terms of reformation.

Retribution

Imprisonment in the context of retributive justice implies dealing with offenders according to their deserts, i.e., a criminal deserves to be punished, to pay in pain the debt he owes to the victim and to society for having broken the law. The argument here is that because of the crime one has committed, and the harm one has done to society, one has forfeited one's rights and does not deserve to be accorded the same protection as other members of the society. Thus the retribution which the criminal is made to suffer is assumed to support the moral code and to express society's hostility against crime and criminals.

However, critics argue that retributive justice springs from a human passion for revenge. Revenge should not be permitted to rise above rationality; it should not influence court actions against the criminal or the policy of the state with respect to criminals. To encourage retaliation is to promote destructive motives, to array man against man, to put a premium upon violence, to align the criminal against society in a mutually detrimental process. Moreover, the retributive approach encourages stigmatisation and discrimination against people who have paid for their crimes by the punishment of imprisonment. This undermines the strength of the community and leads to further crime.

If jailers are given the message that retribution is the main reason for imprisonment, they have little cause to restrain themselves from inflicting excessive pain upon offenders and to maintain discipline and order through negative means. As a cynic might put it: if the law serves to satisfy the outraged feelings of society, one may well ask why we should not make punishment as severe as possible, and if it is pain that is wanted, why not as much of it as possible? As long as the principle of retribution dominates the administration of justice, humanisation of prisons through application of the international principles for the treatment of offenders will be difficult to achieve.

Deterrence

When deterrence is considered to be the main justification for imprisonment, the offenders are punished in order to discourage them from committing further crimes after release. At the same time, they are held up as examples of what happens to those who violate the law. The assumption is that punishing offenders helps to curb the criminal activities of others, or to deter those who might be tempted to commit crimes.

Many of those who insist on deterrence base their belief on the doctrine of free will, which ascribes the power of choice and capability for genuine initiative to every normal individual human being. Thus, when one violates the law, it is assumed that one might have acted otherwise if one had so desired. Therefore, offenders deserve to be punished for not having disciplined themselves sufficiently and ought to be taught a lesson so that others, impressed by the offender's experience, will choose to obey the law.

Some commentators maintain that apart from instilling a fear of penalty in those who might be inclined to commit crimes, deterrence also involves the law in the process of education and

training for moral character. Through stigmatizing certain acts in terms of prescribed penalties, attitudes of dislike, contempt, disgust, and even horror for those acts, are engendered. The overall end result is supposed to be the development of attitudes hostile to crime.

In ordinary practice, however, the treatment of prisoners from the point of view of deterrence may not differ markedly from that in terms of retribution. A jailer who is bent on ensuring that prisoners are punished as a deterrence to further criminal involvement and on assuring that criminal activities of others are prevented on the basis of the treatment of offenders, may impose undue restrictions and conditions of pain to the offenders under the pretext of effecting deterrence.

Reformation

With regard to reformation as the major purpose of imprisonment, the underlying assumption is that punishment is a strong means of influencing human behaviour which has a corrective value when used properly. Accordingly, offenders are imprisoned to be reformed or rehabilitated. During the time they are in prison, they are supposed to be helped to realise that committing crime is wrong. More broadly, a prison culture which recognises social adjustment as a primary object of penal policy will particularly favour educative measures in order to encourage the acquirement of desirable forms of knowledge and understanding, skills and attitudes.

In this connection, measures employed to treat convicted offenders essentially serve therapeutic functions designed to bring about changes in behaviour in the interest of their own happiness, and also in the interest of social welfare. The challenge in this regard is that the reformative procedure should not be so pleasurable as to encourage further criminal activities, while at the same time it must he so designed as to produce positive changes in the personalities of offenders, more especially the right sense of values.

Indeed, the reformative ideal of imprisonment is humane and in line with the spirit of current human rights movement in two very important respects. Firstly, people should be sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment. This means that the loss of liberty engendered by the fact of imprisonment — of being taken away from family and community, of being locked away, subjected to routines, rules and discipline imposed by others — is the punishment. It is inhuman and contrary to the essence of democracy to aggravate this punishment or to impose any additional suffering. Secondly, rehabilitation as a penal policy is surely a most desirable ideal for society, in that it is supposed to commence at the very time offenders are convicted and to continue until they are resettled harmoniously within society after serving their prison sentence. Thus, the process of rehabilitation is a learning experience for the agents of criminal justice, for the offender and for society as a whole.

To emphasize the rehabilitative needs of the prisoners is to suggest that the crime, instead of being narrowly looked upon as a wrong committed against society, is a symptom of a bigger depravity of the offender with causal factors entrenched not only in the individual, but also in the entire social system. As modern criminologists hold, in defending the importance of preserving the self-respect of the prisoner, the emphasis is put on the fact that the quantity and character of deviation in any society is indicative of social ills which need both diagnosis and treatment.

CONCEPTIONS ABOUT PRISONERS

It must be understood that views on the purpose of imprisonment and the bearing this has on the treatment of prisoners is intimately related to the views held about the legal status of prisoners.

Broadly speaking, prisoners may be viewed either pessimistically or philanthropically, according to the historical view of criminality and the philosophical orientation of a given social system.

By way of illustration, in 1871 in the State of Virginia in the United States of America, Judge Christian described prisoners as being "civilly dead" and as "slaves of the state".2 That was a typically pessimistic representation of the prisoner. Such a view has negatively influenced and shaped penal policies in many countries over the years. Obviously, prison officials holding this kind of view would hardly pay attention to the need for treating prisoners decently and for respecting their human rights while in prison.

In contrast, the philanthropical view is humanistic, characterized by a sympathetic understanding of the prisoner's situation. In1982, in a case in the United Kingdom, Lord Wilberforce articulated this view when he asserted that 'under English Law, a convicted prisoner, in spite of his imprisonment, retains all civil rights which are not taken away expressly or by necessary implication.'3 Prison officials holding such a view of imprisoned offenders will more easily appreciate the principle that pain produced in the administration of penalty should not exceed suffering inherent in the very nature of imprisonment, i.e., the loss of liberty.

Prisons are an abnormal human environment due to their inherent coercive aspects of the deprivation of liberty. Thus, although the experience of imprisonment may be put to positive use, the fact of imprisonment is in itself negative. It is in acknowledgement of this fact that modern civilized thinking and good practice put a premium on the development of penal systems and prison cultures on the basis of the internationally accepted view of the main requirements for the proper treatment of prisoners in the context of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS

International requirements and guiding principles for the treatment of prisoners cover the following: appropriate accommodation for prisoners; reasonable standards of personal hygiene and sanitary conditions; suitable and adequate clothing and bedding; good and adequate food; suitable provisions for exercise and recreation; proper medical care; opportunity to practise ones religion; safe retention of prisoners' personal property; proper safeguards to protect prisoners against public ridicule and unnecessary physical hardships during removal and transfer; imposition of reasonable conditions of security; maintenance of a level of discipline only necessary for good order in prison; absolute prohibition of torture; lawful and fair punishments; access to education and information; fair provisions for contact with the outside world; categorization and segregation of selected prisoners for appropriate treatment; ensuring that all the rules and regulations apply to prisoners equally; and effective maintenance of ethical standards among law enforcement officials.

The integrity of the person is the axis of the international norms and principles concerning the treatment of prisoners. Of particular significance is the principle that, 'All persons under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be treated in a humane manner and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."4 To crown it all, "No person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."5 No circumstances whatever may be involved as a justification for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." That is, people who are accused or convicted of breaking the law do attract sanctions, but should never forfeit basic human rights to fair and human treatment. The concern is essentially about making imprisonment a less destructive experience in the light of the requirement that "the purpose and justification of imprisonment or a similar measure deprivative of liberty is ultimately to protect society. The end can only be achieved

if the period of imprisonment is used to ensure, so far as possible, that upon his return to society, the offender is not only willing but also able to lead a law-abiding and self-supporting life."6

If prisons are a yardstick for civilization, all legislators, courts of law and law enforcement agencies need to have the greatest awareness and sensitivity towards human rights and fundamental freedoms. In particular, those who are responsible for prisons and for prisoners need to understand how the spirit, norms, and standards of the international human rights are reflected in the rules and procedures that govern their work and why they are expected to abide by such rules and procedures.

PRISONERS IN AFRICAN PRISONS

What is the situation in Africa in regard to the treatment of prisoners? One positive development is that most African countries have agreed to comply with the various international conventions on the treatment of offenders, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Some of them have even embarked on reforming their laws and practices, taking into account those instruments.

Nevertheless, in common with countries in a number of other parts of the world, prison conditions in many African countries fall far short of the internationally agreed standards. Worse still, prisons in Africa "have been, and in some cases still are, very secret, closed institutions."7 At the core of the Pan African Seminar on the issue of prison conditions, held in Kampala, Uganda, in September 1996, was the concern about "overcrowding, poor infrastructure, under-budgeting, high death rates, incidents of torture and ill-treatment of inmates, and other bad practices that at times characterize the African penal institutions."8 "Similarly, a survey of Sub-Sahara Africa has indicated an appreciable extent of unfair and inhuman conditions and practices associated with the penal systems of the majority of the countries in the region."9 Some brief illustrations from Uganda and Kenya will suffice.

Literature abounds in relation to aspects of prison life in Uganda which tend to dehumanise prisoners. One source of information under the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) recently described serious deviations from the internationally acceptable standards, such as overcrowding "where men are packed in dormitories like sardines in cans;" militarized discipline devoid of any "sense of justice and fairness in its application;" a combination of "poor feeding, hard labour and beatings by both warders and privileged prisoners;" virtual absence of provision for education and leisure activities; poor conditions under which prison staff work, which make them a second category of prisoners as well as worsen their handling of offenders.10

In a subsequent FHRI publication, the situation was characterized thus: "In this country (Uganda), we are failing to respect the dignity of prisoners. They go about almost naked, do not have enough to eat, they sleep on the floor without beddings and the overcrowding is such that inmates must sometimes sleep on their sides."11

In his reply to the question about imprisonment, an exprisoner had the following picture of the penal system of Uganda: "It is very bad to be a prisoner. Prison staff hardly recognize you as a person. You lose your dignity and nobody can listen to you, even if you are completely worn out. A prisoner cannot suggest... Most people refer to prisoners as things but not as people."12

An equally grim, but more comprehensive picture has been presented by the Kenyan Human Rights Commission. They cited overcrowded conditions and attendant physical and psychological ills as being "probably the most pervasive problem in Kenya’s prisons."13

The Commission went on to evince the following: the fact that prisoners "often have no clothing or bedding at all; the fact that food in prison is of poor quality, uncooked, spoiled, worm-infested, inadequate, and monotonous; the failure even to meet the most basic minimum standards of care and an appalling lack of medical ethics in prison;" the truth that the acts purported to be disciplinary are actually forms of thinly disguised torture; horrifying and ‘very prevalent use of brutal force on inmates;’ arbitrary transfers and cruel methods of transporting prisoners; needlessly prohibitive conditions and policies governing contact between prisoners and the outside world; totally inadequate recreational and educational opportunities; labour conditions in custodial facilities resembling ‘slave labour;’ the failure "to keep hardened criminals separated from less experienced offenders;" rampancy of ‘discrimination by race and ethnicity;’ the fact that "citizens in custodial facilities are exposed to all manner of diseases and mistreatment such that death is a daily reality;" and the misfortune "that prison warders may be as badly off as prisoners — if not worse off. The Commission was shocked to discover that ‘religion is the only area in which prison policies and conditions are not utterly inadequate."14

Part V
The Individual and Society

CHAPTER 31

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN AFRICAN LITERATURE

HENRY INDANGASI

All genres of literature deal with human experience in one form or another, but the relationship between the individual and society is the specialty of the novel. While there are certain areas of overlap with other literary forms in terms of thematic concerns, in a society which had become increasingly complex the novel emerged as the form destined to tackle the problem of the place of the individual in society.

It should be stressed that the birth of the novel in Europe coincided with the time when the individual had acquired greater distinctiveness as a socio-psychological entity. We are referring to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe.

This view of the individual might at first sight appear strange. Societies are made up of single human beings who can be looked at as individuals. However, in traditional societies these single persons were not clearly defined as psychological beings. It has often been observed that in many pre-colonial African communities a man was an individual only in the sense that he was a member of society. The kind of individual we are referring to, therefore, was the product of the break-up of the communal society.

This perception of the individual can be related to African literature. Pre-colonial oral literary genres: oral narratives, myths, legends and poetry do not deal with the relation between the individual and society. Epic heroes such as Shaka, Sundiata or Ozidi do not in any way challenge the moral foundations of the societies they live in, they embody the values of their societies. The society's foundations are presumed stable and inviolable, and the epic heroes are perceived as the champions and defenders of these values.

Oral literature, with its emphasis on performance, is communal. Since oral society is founded on stable moral values, oral narratives are composed with the aim of preserving these values. The hare and the tortoise, as trickster figures, are used as satirical tools, not to challenge the moral foundations of these societies, but to ridicule deviations which are essentially capable of redemption.

The lyric poem, traditional or modern, focuses on the intimate experience of the poetic persona. Society exists as a background against which the experience is described. But because of its limited scope, and also its orientation, the lyric poem does not have the capacity to examine the relationship between the individual and society.

Drama in Africa probably existed in its most rudimentary form as ritual. We have the example of Yoruba drama which relies on music and dance. And one can argue that various folklore performances, to the extent that they involved elements of make-believe, were dramatic.

It is the literary genre of written drama which can provide us with a view of the relation between the individual and society. Here one is led to think of the plays of Wole Soyinka, Athol Fugard, John Ruganda, Robert Serumaga and Francis Imbuga. These plays dramatize the conflict between the individual and his society. Some of the conflicts are about the uneasy relation between tradition and modernity, and others are about the social and political corruption of contemporary African societies.

Drama, however, has limitations peculiar to itself. The character unfolds through dramatic action built into the dialogue or monologue. There is no room for character description or authorial commentary. Also, the length of the script is limited by the listening span of the audience.

Because of its scope and expansiveness, the novel, as the major prose narrative, is the literary genre best equipped for the treatment of the relation between the individual and society. The novel's capacity for characterization is limitless. It can define its characters through narrative, exposition, description, dialogue, monologue and, of course, authorial commentary. All these technical possibilities mean that a novel can situate a character more firmly in his social environment and define with greater exactitude the nature of his conflict with society.

The novel, as we have pointed out, developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe because the socio-psychological make-up of the European societies demanded it. This was a period of commercial capitalist expansion, and a time of exploration. The new bourgeois class was challenging the aristocracy under the banner of individual initiative and freedom, and the novel became the aesthetic and spiritual medium of this challenge. It is for this reason that critics often refer to the bourgeois origins of the novel.

The African novel evolved during the struggle for freedom and independence. Writers such as Laye, Achebe, Ngugi, Beti, and many others, had acquired an education in colonial institutions and read the works of European novelists. To these African intellectuals the novel must have appeared a powerful tool of social criticism. And it was exactly this tool that they adopted and exploited in their criticism of colonial and post-colonial societies.

Bearing in mind the relation between the individual and society, we can see the African novel in three categories. The first category consists of the novel that deals with the African society in its communal form. Achebe's Things Fall Apart and Arrow of God, Amadi's The Concubine, Ngugi's The River Between and Armah's The Healers, among others belong to this group.

The second group encompasses novels dealing with Africa just before or after independence. We refer to the period of the 1960s when most African countries obtained independence. Soyinka's The Interpreters, Achebe's A Man of the People, Armah's The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born, and Ngugi's A Grain of Wheat, among others, belong to this second group.

The third and last category includes novels of the 1970s and beyond. This is the period of detente in the international sphere and the liberation of most of Southern Africa. The events in Southern Africa created a new kind of consciousness in a number of African writers, leading to the composition of a type of fiction that one may call the political novel.

The political novel takes as its point of departure the political structures and institutions of society, and what is perceived as the need for change. One can think here of La Guma's In the Fog of the Season's End and Time of the Butcherbird, Ousmane's Xala, Ngugi's Matigari and Achebe's Anthills of the Savannah.

Achebe's Things Fall Apart is a prime example of novels dealing with a communal set-up. The tragedy of Okonkwo is the tragedy of a character who conforms unquestioningly to the values of his society: the values of manhood, courage, fearlessness and hard work. He kills Ikemefuna, the boy who calls him father, because the gods have decreed it, and for fear of being thought weak. Okonkwo suffers without bitterness when he is banished to the land of his mother's kinsmen after accidentally killing Ezeudu's son.

Because of his conformism and belief in the sanctity of the values of his society, Onkonkwo is completely unwilling to reconcile himself to the coming of colonialism. The hero of 'Things Fall Apart' is such a conformist that he does not see the contradictions in his society that pave the way for colonia1 conquest. So conservative is he that he does not understand what is happening to his eldest son, Nwoye, who joins the Christians. This is how Achebe explains Nwoye's decisions:

> It was not the mad logic of the Trinity that captivated him. He did not understand it. It was the poetry of the new religion, something felt in the marrow. The hymn about brothers who sat in darkness and in fear seemed to answer a vague and persistent question that haunted his young soul: the question of the twins crying in the bush and the question of Ikemefuna who was killed.1

Okonkwo challenges the new colonial administration by killing the court messenger, and when he realizes that his people do not support him he hangs himself. The tragedy of Okonkwo is the tragedy of conservative conformism to traditional values, and the stubborn refusal to change with the times.

It can be argued, therefore, that Okonkwo is an individual only to the extent that he is a member of his communal society. His individuality is socially circumscribed. *A Man of the People*, by the same author, is a good example of the second group of novels. Independence has come, and the communal society has disintegrated. We now have what we might call a class society. Odili, the hero of the novel, not only refuses to conform, he struggles to do something about corruption in his society. After graduating with a BA in history, Odili retreats to a village school, away from the corrupt city. When he visits Nanga in the city, and sees the luxury, and meets Edua, Nanga's mistress, Odili decides to contest a parliamentary seat. His motives are largely personal, but he does present a challenge to Nanga, his political opponent.

Odili is an introspective rebel, with a well-defined "intellectual physiognomy," to borrow a phrase from Georg Lukacs in Writer and Critic.2 He understands his society, its history, its morals, and in his own way he tries to live a life that is morally irreproachable. Unlike Okonkwo, Odili does not want to conform. He wants to be in his own idealistic way, an instrument of social change.

Ngugi's 'Petals of Blood' is perhaps deservedly the most widely talked about of the political novels of the 1970s. It certainly is a political novel in the sense that its subject is the political structure of the society. But this novel isn't easy to talk about in relation to our theme: the individual and society in African literature. This is because the author changes his conception of the novel within the course of writing it. In the first half or so, Munira is the central character. However, in the latter part, Karega's consciousness is greatly transformed. As a result, then he takes over from Munira as the protagonist.

The theme of the revolutionary transformation in society is realized in the character of Karega. Karega is a populist and trade unionist that believes in a certain rather ill defined type of socialism. We can see in him a build up from the earlier heroes of Ngugi's novels: Njoroge, Waiyaki and Kihika. The point to stress here is that Karega advocates the dismantling of the system, which he does not like.

Karega as a character is comparable in many respects to La Guma's heroes: Tekwane in In the Fog of the Season's End and Ma Tau in Time of the Butcherbird. La Guma's characters are engaged in armed resistance to apartheid.

In terms of the individual and society, we have come a long way. In the communal society, the ideal is to conform. The individual is still ill-defined. Then the communal society breaks down with colonialism and independence, and we begin to have sharply defined individuals. The political novel takes us back somewhat to the values of communalism, although it does this with a difference. The characters we have referred to see their political consciousness as having merged with that of the masses: the workers and peasants. Karega, Tekwane and Ma Tau are, still sharply defined individuals, but it is as if they seek to lose their individuality in order to gain it.

African literature, like any other literature, is open-ended. The novel will continue to define the relation between the individual and society. The three modes of understanding this relationship which I have sketched in this essay, are the ones that are operative at this point in our literary development.

NOTES

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CHAPTER 32

THE CHRISTIAN PSYCHOTHERAPIST AS A CREATIVE ARTIST

LEONIE BOLAND

The role of the psychotherapist in the therapeutic encounter has been variously perceived. Freud himself considered the analyst as the value-free scientist and he viewed the psychoanalytic process after the manner of analytic chemistry. From this perspective, the scientific data are the patient's words, considered as randomised through the process of free association. The psychotherapist analyzes this complex verbal compound into its simplest constitutive elements. Interpretations are the primary resource of the analyst, and the patient acquires insights through acceptance and understanding of the analyst's interpretations. The analytic function is regarded as detached and investigative; any deviation from this stance is considered as an unwarranted departure from scientific objectivity, or in analytic parlance, an unwelcome intrusion of countertransference.

In contrast, much of post-Freudian psychiatry has stressed the interpersonal dimension of the psychotherapeutic process. The degree of emphasis varies from one theory to another and from one technique to another, but perhaps the contrast between the objectivity of the Freudian approach and the subjectivity of post-Freudian psychiatry is most clearly expressed in the language of Martin Buber, who regards the therapeutic process as an "encounter" rather than as an analysis, a personal meeting of the "I" and the "Thou".

Neither of the above-mentioned modes of identifying the analytic situation can claim to be comprehensive. Perhaps the hazard inherent in any creative insight is the danger of absolutizing that insight to the exclusion of other dimensions of reality. Theorists, while often accurate in pinpointing the inadequacies of their fellow theorists' perspective, can be singularly blind to the lacunae in their own. One is reminded of the six blind men of Hindustan who went to see the elephant, each so sure that his little piece of truth encompassed the whole. I still remember the lines that struck me so forcibly as a child: "I see", quoth he, "the elephant is very like a tree"; "I see" quoth he, "the elephant is very like a rope' and so on, each seeker's theory dependent on the angle from which he has reached the elephant.

Aware of the reality that all one can aspire to is a glimmer of the whole truth, nonetheless I think it a worthwhile exercise to consider the therapeutic process from varying points of view. In this paper I would like to consider the role of the therapist as something akin to that of the creative artist, and the therapeutic process as encompassing a dynamic not unlike the analogy experienced in the process of creative art. The analogy obviously limps since the "medium" in psychotherapy is not clay, nor wood, nor stone, but the human person. Yet, the parallels are worth developing, precisely because of the reductionism inherent in the application of a strictly scientific method to a subject as multi-faced as the human person.

In order to give serious consideration to the role of therapist as creative artist, one must first dispel the erroneous assumption that the artist comes easily by her art. On the contrary, the consummate artist has almost always undergone a long and arduous apprenticeship and a highly disciplined training. What appears to the viewer as effortless ease in great works of art, is in fact the fruit of learned skills and scientific knowledge allied to creative gift. Even the 'premier coup' type of art is not the work of a moment, but as one such artist put it: "It took me five minutes and all my life." Creative art tends to demand all of one's life.

And so to regard the therapist as artist in no way denies the need for a wealth of scientific knowledge and a scientific approach to psychotherapy. It implies, rather, that something more is needed: there must also be something of the vision of the creative artist, the sureness of touch, the density the intuition, the call-it-what-you-will that lifts the psychotherapeutic process from the realm of applied science to a work of the spirit. Paul Tournier is surely correct in his view that psychotherapy is more an art than a science, more a question of wisdom than of knowledge.

It would be interesting but beyond the scope of this paper to develop in some detail the parallels between the artistic medium and the client, the artist's tools and the tools of psychotherapy, the creative process and the therapeutic one. Suffice it to say that the artist has to know thoroughly and intimately the nature of the medium in which she works. She has to have a 'feel' for it. Her knowledge has to go beyond the theoretical to the deeper knowledge gained in creative encounter: it is the kind of knowledge that becomes part of her very being.

Similarly, the artist has to gain mastery over a whole range of tools, to know their scope and their limitations; and the care with which an artist treats her tools is no mean measure of her stature as an artist. But medium and tools are not sufficient, the artist must also enter sensitively into the mystery of the creative process. She must know where and when to begin, and even more importantly, when and where to stop, How many a water-colour has been ruined by over-painting; how many a carving has been devastated by a too sharp incision! One is left with one's piece of paper or block of wood or stone unless one has the skill and the courage to use the tools. The difference between a masterpiece and a mess has something to do with a sense of timing allied to the creative touch: how to turn limitations into creative opportunities, how to deal with resistances, how far to go and when to stop.

In all three dimensions, medium, tools and process, the artist has to be aware of the possibilities and the limitations: the possibilities must be embraced by the scope of her vision while the limitations are the challenge to her creativity. As Rollo May puts it: "Creativity itself requires limits, for which the creative act arises out of the struggle of human beings with and against that which limits them."1 The creative artist is one who sees within and beyond the material limitations something more: the emergent form, the flicker of possibility, the spirit to be released. The Christian artist images the creative God in drawing form out of chaos.

I like the story about Michelangelo. One day a little boy stood watching the great sculptor at work with chisel and hammer on a huge block of stone. Fascinated and puzzled, the lad finally asked: "What are you trying to do?" Michelangelo reflected for a few moments, then looked the boy in the eyes and said: "There is an angel imprisoned in this block of stone and I am trying to set him free."

As I see it, setting the human spirit free is at the heart of psychotherapy. World religions, world mythology and world literature through the ages re-echo the theme "Set my people free." Is it fanciful to suggest that the attraction to the demanding and draining role of psychotherapy finds its roots not so much in money, power, or fame, as in the creative urge that impels one so gifted to engage in the creative process of setting spirits free? The Christian psychotherapist worthy of the name must reflect some aspect of the liberating Christ who said: "Stretch out your hand", "take up your bed and walk", "be whole".

To return to Michelangelo's angel, the entrapped spirit is a fairly accurate image of the client in therapy. How many clients appear inert, dispirited, weighed down, soulless. How often are clients described as entrapped in narcissim, tied up in knots of fear and anxiety, locked in egocentricity, imprisoned in guilt-feelings or in hatred or in a poor self-image. The psychic energy needed for living has been bound in one or other of the defence mechanisms: regression,

repression, projection, fixation, denial, reaction-formation or the like. The mechanisms and their combinations may vary from client to client, but the image remains accurate: there is a spirit entrapped and it needs to be set free.

To a degree beyond the scope of Michelangelo's encarcerated angel, the spirit of the client seeks to be set free.

It is the nature of spirit to seek freedom even if in its entrapped condition it no longer consciously acknowledges or recognises this need. Indeed, the fear of freedom is one of the greatest resistances that the therapist will encounter in the endeavour to set the client free.

And so one might rightly consider psychotherapy as 'the art of all arts', for the medium is of surpassing value, the tools are the whole body of psychoanalytic knowledge and therapeutic skills and the creative task is to enable the client to choose life, to come in contact with his true self and so creatively encounter and transcend the limitations that fetter the spirit.

The sculptor knows her stone, traces its lines and seams, tests out its soundness or its weaknesses with tappings and probings. She observes the mass and shape and planes and gradually discovers the emergent form: the spirit that she is to set free. She has long since come to terms with the temptation to hack away and impose on the stone an alien image of her own designing. She respects the given in the material, acknowledges its limitations, but more importantly, she intuitively senses its possibilities.

One of the greatest temptations for the psychotherapist is the temptation to play God by becoming an over-all authority in the life of the client. The therapist worthy of the name resists this temptation and contents herself with a lesser role: to be an enabler, a facilitator. Conscious that she comes to the therapeutic encounter with her own limitations, she is open to receive as well as to give in the therapeutic setting. She is acutely aware that she has no pat answers to the client's questions, no solutions to offer; rather, she is privileged to participate in a liberating process: that of herself and of her client.

As the sculptor engages herself in creative encounter with stone, likewise the psychotherapist through creative listening and keen observation in the therapeutic interview traces the organization of the client's personality, the pattern of its development and the dynamic of present functioning. She tests resistances and uncovers hidden agenda. She tries to discover how the energy meant for living is bound in one or more of the defence mechanisms and therefore not immediately available for response to the call of life.

Rollo May suggests that both the neurotic and the artist live on the edge of vision: the neurotic represses the vision, the artist lives it. Quoting Rank, May describes the neurotic as the 'artiste manqué'.2 I suggest that the 'artiste manqué' who is the client, needs to encounter the enabling art of the therapist in order to recover the courage needed for the risk of creative living.

'Freedom from' posits consideration of 'freedom for', and inevitably both client and therapist alike are faced with the question of meaning. Whatever the presenting symptoms may be, as therapy progresses and hidden agenda surface and transference takes place, fundamental questions come to the fore: "Is life meaningful?" What is life's meaning? Is human nature basically good or basically evil? Is there ground for hope or only for despair? Is life worth living?

In *The Unheard Cry for Meaning*,3 Viktor Frankl discusses the relationship of therapy to the question of meaning and the therapist as a facilitator helping the client to reach this goal. Both Jung and Frankl insist that a sense of meaning is essential to both psychological and spiritual well-being. Frankl points to a related truth: that a sense of meaning in one's life is in itself therapeutic. Perhaps one might logically state the corollary: that the absence of a sense of meaning in life is at the root of psychopathology.

It seems to me that the basic stance of the therapist in relation to the crucial question of meaning is a vital element in psychotherapy. Although the therapist does not in any way seek to impose her value-system on the client, nevertheless she cannot but bring this basic stance into the therapeutic encounter, and like it or not, her role as therapist is essentially coloured by her perception of life's meaning.

The artist, whatever her philosophical affiliation, is by nature an optimist. She has an awareness of the giftedness of life and the goodness of reality. She has an eye for the good, the true and the beautiful, and has the gift of being able to spot these qualities even in the most unlikely places. She has the charism of being able to see, and as Ruskin put it long ago, to see clearly is poetry, prophecy and religion all in one.

The psychotherapist, like the artist, must have reached a certain optimism about the question of life's meaning, whether this optimism be acquired by nature or by grace. It is not that she must have life's meaning all wrapped up as a problem that has been solved, but rather that she has entered into it as a mystery to be lived. Before one dares enter into therapeutic encounter as psychotherapist, one must surely have some hope in one's answers to the fundamental questions: what is the meaning of life? Is life worth living? To put it bluntly, I believe that the psychotherapist without hope in regard to life's ultimate meaning can only be a hopeless therapist. Freud's tremendous insights into human personality, such as its organization and development, the role of the unconscious, the mechanisms of defence, the notion of psychic energy, have tended to obscure how strongly the mechanism of denial has influenced his thinking: denial of freedom, denial of goodness, denial of the transcendent, denial of altruistic love. Indeed, he denied so much of the positive in relation to human beings that he found little good left. In *Psychoanalysis and Faith*, he writes: "I have found little that is 'good' about human beings as a whole. In my experience, most of them are trash, no matter whether they publicly subscribe to this or that ethical doctrine or none at all."4 The mystery is that holding the human person in such low esteem, Freud still considered the stupendous effort of psychoanalysis worthwhile.

It was inevitable that, initially, the new science of psychology and religion should have been wary of each other. Religion seems to have moved ahead in integrating valuable psychological insights; psychology seems rather slower to admit the need for grounding its findings in the wisdom of philosophy and theology. However, there are some hopeful signs that the infant science has moved through the egocentricity of infancy and the pseudo-independence of adolescence to a maturity that seeks integration rather than separation: the fallacy of 'nothing but' may be just beginning to give way to the truth of 'more than'.

One such indication is the Council Grove conference series which have taken place in Kansas, U.S.A. over the past decade. Here physicists, psychiatrists, theologians, mathematicians and physicians have gathered from east and west seeking just such an integration. During the fourth of these meetings, a participant presented a paper entitled "Towards a Science Concerned with Ultimates."5 In this paper the call for the recognition of the transcendent dimension of life was clearly brought out.

Looking back, one feels a sense of poignancy in reading a letter of Freud written to a friend in 1896: "As a young man I longed for nothing else than philosophical knowledge, and I am now on the way to satisfy that longing by passing over from medicine to psychology."6

The intuition of the young Freud was surely sound: any science of the human person, if it is not to endlessly meander in circles, must be grounded in a frame of reference wider than that of the physical sciences, otherwise there is a danger of not seeing the wood for the trees, or to return to my earlier story, there is danger of taking the trunk or even the tail for the elephant.

On a personal note, my own interest in psychotherapy is grounded in my Christian faith. The core of that faith is unshakable belief in the power of love. I believe with St Paul that the human person is "God's handiwork."7 The Genesis story tries to express in human language, and in the literary genre of its era and culture, the notion of a loving God creating a universe out of love. As the evolutionary process moves on, telescoped in the art form of the story into the seven days of creation, we hear the current refrain as God contemplates his work: "and God saw that it was good." On the sixth day, the climax, when God created man, he contemplated his work and saw that it was 'very good.'

I believe that the human person is created in the likeness of a loving God, and that he finds his true freedom in transcendent love, not in libido. However shackled the person may be in egoism, narcissism or even in sheer evil, he still has the potential of reaching a point of reference outside himself in love. In psychotherapy, the psychotherapist — imperfect, shackled and neurotic as she herself might be — is privileged to be co-artist with the Great Artist and with the client in this art of all arts, namely, freeing fettered spirits.

NOTES

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CHAPTER 33
THE THERAPEUTIC JOURNEY
FRANCES RANDALL

IDENTITY AND THE THERAPENTIC JOURNEY

Once upon a time, some 2,000 years ago, there lived twelve men. They had a cause and put most of their energies into it. Their cause was following a man who claimed to be the son of God. This man was much like themselves. He was called Jesus.

At one point, after a busy day of teaching and working miracles, Jesus commanded his followers to take a boat and go to, the other side of the lake. He himself went to the hills to pray. The twelve obeyed, unaware of what was destined for them. The story goes on to say that in the dark of the night a storm blew up. Their boat was tossed about like a brush fire in the wind. They were terrified and lost control. To add to their terror, they saw what they thought was a ghost walking towards them on the water. The story continues: the "ghost" spoke and said, "It is I, (Jesus). Do not be afraid." One of the men, Peter, who was impetuous by nature, shouted, "If it is really you, tell me to come!" Jesus said "Come." Peter leapt over the side of the boat and found that he too could walk on the water. It was exciting; however his mind began to take control, telling him: "This is irrational. Very naive. There is danger here." His mind won the day. His spirit was pushed aside, and he began to sink. Jesus, who loved Peter, grabbed him from destruction and pulled him to safety. The story has a happy ending; it goes like this "The wind died down; then the disciples worshipped Jesus and said, "Truly you are the Son of God!" They had discovered a truth; after a painful shattering, God was in the storm.

In our life journey we are all commanded to go to the other side. That side needs to be discovered. In order to make this crossing we must cross the deep waters of the self. It is a journey into the unknown where we will be forced to confront our own ‘ghost’ until we know its name. This crisis can be anything from a mild shake up to a full blown psychosis. Of course, we do not always intentionally "choose’ at a conscious level to wrestle these things through. But for the sake of our inner ecology, something within us arranges a storm at sea. If we are to become more conscious and awake through these disruptions, then we must work our way out of the impasse. Having passed through such a crisis, we are free to create life rather than to guard against it.

In the beginning of our journey, our ego needs to develop a strong identity: a solid boat. In the first part of our lives, we need to find ourselves, to develop our strengths, to make our individual statement. Clearly we cannot say, "If it is you Lord, bid me to come," until we know ourselves authentically. But at some point in our spiritual quest, the authentic personal and relational self must be able to hear the answer, "Come". At some point, we must be authentic enough to let go and walk on the water.

The journey of life, no matter how uniquely each person embarks on it, always begins with some degree of pain and the awareness of a need for change. The ways by which most of us learn personal identity are often entirely misleading. One way or other, these coverings have to be lifted. Most of us have been told by our parents, our peers, by the world around us, "This is who you are." But few of us have broken free of the myths of our personality and stood through the process of disintegration thoroughly and honestly enough to say instead, "This is who I am."

The confusion of identity which most persons experience during at least the first half of their life is a result of a variety of factors both personal and cultural, but the overall effect of that

confusion is to block one's growth. Many of us are wounded because we don't yet know the person beneath the roles we play. Most of us have not yet asked the question what our real identity is, or how we can be who we are without a need for apologies or rewards.

Since the original blueprint for us is a holistic one, in which body, mind, and spirit begin life together, a major part of our work is to remember how to integrate these forces within us. Somehow, when things get entangled and we forget where we came from and what we are doing, the transpersonal force within us will rally for attention. We will come to all kinds of storms at sea. Some of these storms will be emotional, some relational, and some spiritual; but all of them are like ground swells from one state of awareness (or lack of it) to another. It is only when we have closed our eyes to these swells and deny them, however, that they become dangerous.

No matter what kind of crisis we experience, its impact can often lead us to a deeper experience of ourselves. Somehow the ecology of crisis brings us face to face with our deepest self. When persons complain of the sudden eruption of repressed feelings, depressions, confusion, anxiety, a relational dilemma, a sense that everything is falling apart, undoubtedly it is a frightening experience. Sometimes when persons are experiencing this interior kind of crisis, they feel they are going crazy or sinking in the sea. But the truth is, it is often necessary to feel momentarily crazy in order to open and to lance the wounds from the past. In some cases, it is a divine summons to higher personal and global consciousness. To pay attention to the process is to acknowledge that something holy within us is drawing our attention badly.

There is another story in the New Testament which teaches us about inner healing. It is the story of a woman who had suffered from severe bleeding for twelve years, and no one had been able to cure her. In reflecting on the plight of this Jewish woman, we must be aware of the fact that a woman in her culture was considered unclean during menstruation. Her husband could not go near her. She could neither cook nor partake of any Jewish rituals. She was like a leper, an outcast. She could mingle in crowds, but she had to keep her affliction hidden. She was obliged to live in the shadows while pretending to function normally. When Jesus came to her village she surreptitiously went up behind him and touched the edge of his cloak. Her bleeding stopped at once. Jesus felt the power go out of him, and he stopped and demanded to know who had touched him. The woman saw that she had been found out, so she came forward trembling and threw herself at Jesus' feet. There before everyone, she told him why she had touched him. Jesus did not let her off easily. He demanded that she name her ailment, and that she look at him. No more shadow living! Then he said to her, "My daughter, your faith has made you well. 'Go in peace.' It is not enough for us to want a healing. We must be ready and willing to look at our pain, to name it, to put it before ourselves, to look at God in order to have it healed. Jesus tells us "Ask and you shall receive". We must be specific in our focus, in our asking.

HEALING TASKS

We can identify three levels where persons can get most wounded and therefore be in need of healing:

1) The personal level (the psychological self);
2) The socio-cultural level (the social and relational self);
3) The spiritual level (the inner soul).

Personal wounds and limitations are formed early in life and go back to our family origin. This is where the basic building blocks of the personality are formed. Persons who have had relatively healthy beginnings at the personal level may be wounded at later developmental stages by the social structure in which they have grown up. We can be hurt or feel misused by the ways through which we learned to adapt to the world around us, or by the masks and roles we assumed in order to fit into it. These wounds at the socio-cultural level inevitably affect the spiritual level. When wounded, we often get defensive; and our defensiveness cuts us off from growth at any level. Whatever the nature of the wounds which have left us numbed or unconscious to the truth of who we are, our task is to awaken ourselves at all levels.

Personal Healing

To awaken consciousness, we must not only deal with those attitudes, habits, thoughts and feelings that are conscious; we must also journey into our deeper psyche. Every event from our past is somewhere in the unconscious mind and, at some level, in the body itself.

Healing at the personal level almost always involves some work with the unconscious memories of childhood. Sometimes people block out whole segments of childhood, especially when times of crisis and deep trauma become too painful to acknowledge. We cannot dismiss these memories altogether. However, we simply drive them into the unconscious where they will not be so hurtful. Yet if we do not bring these unconscious impressions to awareness and work them through, either we will eventually act them out or they will act through us symptomatically.

Persons who are living life unconsciously because of some childhood trauma are often persons who have been betrayed by life. Yet, to become conscious of what has made us victims and what holds us in some sort of self-destructive or self-defeating pattern is the first step in our healing process. Clearly the influence of our parents, whether conscious or unconscious, is something that must be dealt with if persons are to move beyond the personal myths that bind them. The key to this initial work at the personal level is to own what behaviours and defenses we may have needed as children in order to survive; to sort through the ways these self-limiting patterns no longer work in the present.

Socio-Cultural Healing

Aside from some of the unconscious parental programming persons must sort through in their quest for personal identity. There are often, at a more collective level, a number of social expectations to challenge. Any part of us which does not reflect the truth of who we are, whether that part is a stereotypic behaviour, a social mask, or an unhealthy attitude, always has to pass through the fire of crisis before it ‘ loses its hold over us. To a great extent we are the product of the society which has shaped us, and as such our identity has been something of public property. Subtly programmed to live according to a fairly collective identity, it takes most of us years to catch on to the fact that the status quo has us in its grips. Without a conscious awareness of our own inner person, persons who adopt a strong social script can begin to feel alienated from themselves.

Spiritual Healing

A spiritual crisis may perhaps best be described as an intense interior shift that involves the total person. Generally, it is the result of some major imbalance that occurs when our personal and relational problems have gone unchecked for too long. At this level we are dealing with the core of the problems that block our growth potentials. When we let these conditions continue until our fears and denials become almost bigger than we are, we lose control over ourselves and become a prisoner of our own fears. Our spiritual crisis inevitably involves a head-on crash right into the very heart of what terrifies us the most: the self.

Whatever the root causes, we must be forced to confront our own demon of insecurity until we are free of it. For some years we may go about life performing roles, perfunctorily fulfilling the obligations and demands of life; then all of a sudden we suffer a crisis, a loss of personal meaning. Why? Because the "false self" has taken up far too much space. We have choked off the vital and authentic self at the level of the soul and the only way it can get through to us is by getting our attention with some kind of crisis. This is where our very foundations begin to be shaken and torn down in order for a new awareness and a new vision to emerge.

Most persons are either forced into the spiritual journey through a personal or relational crisis, or are slowly coerced into wakefulness because of some more chronic problem. Because crisis implies some sort of shifting, unsettling or change, it can be creative. The way in which we greet it, work through it, survive it, and then take the next step can make a profound difference. Those persons who have turned to embrace the crisis, and have managed to integrate it into themselves, are the ones who have the most to show for their trouble. Having refused to be overpowered by it, they have used the crisis creatively and as a result they have become authentic and powerful individuals.

CHAPTER 34

THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: FOCUS ON THE AFRICAN FAMILY

CIRIAKA KITHINJI

The family is a basic unit in society made up of man and woman joined in marriage, and their children. The family may either be nuclear, based on a monogamous marriage or polygamous in which case the marriage is between a man and two or more wives. The extended family includes relatives from both sides.

The family is a very old and ongoing institution. Among its functions, the family has that of procreation and the rearing of children. Individuals are born in families, and their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter are supposed to be met within the family. They are educated, informally and formally, so that they may become useful individuals in society.

In the traditional Kenyan society the functions of the family were simple and clearly defined. Each member of the family had a role to play for the well-being of the family, of the clan and of the society at large. In many ethnic Kenyan communities, the family was a self-reliant economic entity where members worked harmoniously to satisfy their immediate needs as well as to accumulate wealth. The extended family system and the system of mutual social responsibility in which family members cared for each other were also very strong. During the growing-up process each individual was introduced to his or her role in society. He/she was given the necessary instructions and encouragement to master that role and was expected to carry it out with efficiency and commitment. The roles of individual members were assigned according to sex and age. There were roles for men and women, for younger and older children, for young men and women, as well as for family elders and for the aged members of the community.

For the purpose of this paper the focus will be aimed at the role of parents and grandparents in the upbringing of children.

In the traditional Kenyan society, the education of children was a responsibility shared by several family members. Men taught their sons a trade as well as manners and style of life, peculiar to the male. There were also set community mechanisms to discipline wrongdoers or irresponsible young men in society. So a young boy would know what was expected of him in the society, from the time of grazing family animals and being sent on errands, to becoming a man through initiation, to becoming a warrior and an elder in society.

Women were expected to bear and bring up children according to the laws and customs of the clan and community. Women taught girls childcare, care of the house, meal preparation and other feminine chores.

Mothers educated both male and female children by telling them folk-tales, stories and riddles as the food was cooking. Riddles were meant to give mental exercise to the children. This informal education prepared girls for marriage.

This situation has encouraged Grandparents and aunts also to teach children about the growing up process. They told them what to do as adolescents, as young initiates and as adults. Naturally, in this case, the girls were taught by their grandmothers and boys by their grandfathers. Older sisters and brothers also taught their siblings some aspects of maturation. The peer group had its part to play in education as well. This education took place informally during play, dances and communal work. In addition parents, particularly those of the same age group, were collectively

responsible for the behaviour of children. They could administer instant punishment for misconduct by a young person.

All these strict measures ensured that the individual grew up as a useful member of the society, one who understood his role and responsibility to himself, to his family, his clan, and to the community and society at large.

The Kenyan family today has changed greatly: in form, composition and functions. This is due to the introduction of formal Western education and the new religious, economic, political and social structures. In more recent times, these changes have been accelerated by improved means of travel and communication, especially radio, television, newspapers, magazines and movies. The rural urban movement has compounded the change in the family. Changes in occupation and work among family members and the introduction of the money economy have had a great impact on the African family also.

Modern formal education has resulted in young people moving from their families of origin to the urban areas in search of jobs. Young people who have settled in urban areas have started nuclear families which weaken the extended family structure.

In these nuclear families education of the young is left largely to the schools, the church and the society. Each of these agents of education expects the other to be giving certain aspects of education. The result is that education is given piecemeal and a vacuum exists among many of the young people. The pressure of work, socio-economic problems and the fast trend of modern life have made it almost impossible for parents to spend time with their children in order to give them the much needed informal education on their culture and ways of life.

The family is no longer that close knit entity which offered love, security and a sense of belonging to its members. The working mother comes home very tired and wants to be left alone to rest, before assuming her duties in the kitchen. The father either works very hard to support his family and is out of the home for long hours, or if not employed, wastes his time idling around. Communication among family members is often limited to giving instructions on the part of parents or asking for material goods for satisfying their wants on the part of children. This situation has encouraged individualism in society. Brother is no longer responsible for his brother's welfare. Single-life mentality is the order of the day in many families.

The most vulnerable group of people with respect to these changes is youth. Young boys and girls, especially those in urban areas, no longer know what society expects of them. There are no family animals for urban boys to look after. On the part of girls, childcare has been taken over by household helpers. With the breakdown of the informal education given at home and the growing emphasis of formal school education, parents and their children seem to have very little in common. In some instances the young go so far as to claim that their parents are too old-fashioned and do not understand the new ways of life. The parents protest that they do not even understand their children's new language of "Mathe" and "Fathe". Consequently, various members of the family are becoming more and more individualistic in their behaviour at home and within society at large.

During school holidays, young people in many urban homes will sleep up to very late in the morning. After breakfast, they will watch the video or go cycling until lunch time because there is a cook or ayah to prepare lunch and clean the house. If asked to assist in household chores they will categorically say that this is not their work.

Some mothers will also spend long hours at personal care saloons without caring much about what is happening at home. After all, employees should do their work without supervision. They are hired to do so. Fathers, too, may become strangers in their own homes, either because they are

always out on business or because they do not like being within the home, preferring to socialize with their mates in the pub or in sports.

The opposite of the above phenomenon is a situation which is common in many urban as well as rural homes. Family members' roles have been so mixed up that you find men doing what traditionally used to be a female role. Today many family men in nuclear families, especially in urban areas, assist in childcare. This is because there is no grandmother to look after a sick child, for example, when mother is away from home. In rural areas you will see young boys looking for firewood and fetching water for the family, a role which traditionally used to be relegated to girls and mothers. (This role was assumed by boys in families where there were no girls or where they were born much later). All these changes in the family indicate that the need for survival has made people become very versatile. This is a good thing.

What are we to make of all these changes? Obviously, some of them are undesirable and something must be done to reverse them or at least to dull their effects on our culture and society. Individualism in society, when it drives people to think of themselves and their personal gain only, is obviously not a good thing. It can breed an undesirable form of capitalism where the "haves" have more than they can use and the "have-nots" have nothing. Families should fight this type of individualism right in the home. Parents should find ways and means of reviving our culture, especially those aspects that stressed the spirit of brotherhood. Children must be encouraged to think about each other and help each other in little ways, such as serving food to each other, passing a school bag to the other instead of shouting back: "Come and get it yourself!" etc. This will enable them to focus on the other, rather than exclusively on self.

Parents should find time to be with their children, to share ideas and to instruct them about the traditional Kenyan family systems. There is therefore need for those values to be made objects of different literary works. Most of the children born and raised in urban areas are completely ignorant of their parents' origins. Many do not even want to go and visit the village or ushago (to use their slang) because there is no electricity, T.V., indoor toilet or piped water facilities.

Parents should make an effort to take their children to rural homes so that they can appreciate the rural environment. Parents also need to take an active part in the education of their children. The home, which is the first school for the children, should work hand in hand with the formal school, the church and other educational agencies to give children an all round education. Parents should strive to blend traditional and modern technologies in the upbringing of their children, so as not to be labelled old-fashioned by their children.

Western values should be adopted with care. Parents should sieve what is good for their children and family and leave out what is not good. For example, indecent style of dress should be replaced with a decent but modern style. Films or videotapes which are immoral should be replaced with moral ones and so forth. Youth trips which pose a danger to morals could be replaced with short day trips which are educational and social.

Family entertainments should cater for all members. Sometimes, instead of giving children money to take their friends out to restaurants, a meal can be prepared at home and the teenagers meet in one home to enjoy the meal. Parents should know where their children are and, if possible, be invited to collect them at the end of the party or get-together.

Practising religion as a family can go along way towards combating individualism. Praying together at meal times, going to church together can create a sense of togetherness. Also working together in family chores, for example in preparing a meal, or cleaning up after a meal when the household helper is off duty can enhance family closeness.

Encouraging children to be conscious of the less privileged members of the society in the neighbourhood and community, and assisting them, can reduce individualism in families and consequently in society. Self-centred individualism is rampant in our society and time and again we hear leaders in public gatherings, in church sermons, and even in our various media condemning the phenomenon. Yet very little is being done to arrest the problem. We cannot sit still and watch this trend cripple our rich cultural values of mutual social responsibility and communal activities. Each one, whether a parent, teacher, young person, church or civic leader, is challenged to play his/her role to rid our society of the cancer of egoism. If we make this effort we shall perhaps reduce incidences of house fires, because when the mother goes to the garden another adult will be taking care of the children. Perhaps we shall hear less about abandoned, abused and murdered children because brother will be caring for brother, parent for children and neighbour for neighbour.

CHAPTER 35
THE ARTIST AND SOCIETY: SOME COMMENTS
ELIMO NJAU

Two of Wajibu's editors paid a visit to Elimo Njau, one of Africa's most eloquent artists. He talked with them at length about himself as an artist, about the artist's role in society, and above all about art as a vehicle of truth. The following are his comments on these various topics, but not necessarily in the order in which they were given. Also included are some excerpts from an earlier written statement by him.

What is Art?

I see art as a great window into life, through which I can see and understand God, my community, myself and all that surrounds me. I see art as life itself, God's creative power working in man. And as artists we have no other choice but to obey this inevitable creative urge which God continually generates in us.

What is Art? Art is a visual or tangible expression of God's living presence in Man and his community. I believe in art for every man and woman. Art is not the monopoly of specially trained persons. True art permeates every part of our lives.

When we are not painting we are making good homes, making beautiful gardens or parks. When we are not carving sculpture, we are designing furniture, houses, utensils or dresses. When we are not building a house, we are choosing artistic things from shops or art galleries for our own use at home. Art is indeed an enrichment of all the aspects of human life. Art develops one's taste in healthy, creative living.

But what is art, you may still ask? I see art as a language of self-expression. For me, art is a celebration of life through my limbs of creativity, and as my limbs vibrate, they can't help being like me. Instead of using words to express my soul, I use paint, clay, cement or wood. Through art I can talk to people.

Let us express ourselves, not just verbally and in writing. Let us paint, model, sculpt, and construct, using whatever we find in the way of materials in our surroundings. We must encourage ourselves, our children, brothers and sisters towards free self-expression through the various art media, who knows? Some of us are potential designers, architects, painters, sculptors, potters, gardeners, dramatists or musicians. We must give ourselves a chance while there is still time.

We cannot have real art if we do not have real people. And what makes a person real? It is one's emotions, thoughts and faith working together in response to life. Many of us are afraid of our emotions, yet these are our wealth and the greatest source of energy here in Africa.

The Relationship Between the Artist and the Work of Art: Art as an Expression of Truth and Beauty

Art is one way of expressing truth. The path of truth demands our totality, our wholeness and our complete intensity of life. You cannot put your money into two bags and be sure of it. You put it all in one bag and there it is. "Don't put all your eggs into one basket," is the saying. But God says no: "Put all your eggs in one basket." That is the opposite. Because then you have the focus, you have that intensity. A lot depends upon how much we have allowed ourselves to be vehicles of that truth. Then it really catches every part of us and we give ourselves wholly and totally.

Say you are using material like wood or marble to express a certain truth. You must be faithful to the material you are using. For example, if you are carving, you cannot carve against the grain of the wood; you must respond to the natural rhythm of the grain of the wood. The more you are at home with the natural character of that wood, the more fluent will be your expression of the truth in that material. This means that you are being honest with that material and that you are not trying to make wood do what a stone would do. In addition, you must have faith in the material you are using and in the truth you are trying to express. Faith is fundamental, basic. Through faith, the person, the expression of the truth and the material become one. Faith holds it all together and that is when the person, the expression and the material become one. When you produce a great work of art, it is not just great by itself. Because you breathed life into it, it is associated with you too.

The test of the true artist depends on how creatively he uses whatever he finds in his immediate surroundings to beautify the life of the community. The real artist digs into life day by day until he comes face to face with God, the Master of Creativeness.

It is a privilege for an artist to be an avenue of truth, to serve the truth, to serve beauty and to create a demand for it.

The Relationship Between the Artist and Society

Society is the mirror of the artist. When the image in the mirror is blurred, unclear, the artist will protest. This may be the result of the artist having been denied love, of the myopia stemming from miseducation, or the lack of faith in, or harmony with God.

The artist should look upon himself as the instrument of truth and beauty. He is no better than other people, but he has the advantage of being a witness to truth and beauty. That is why he can introduce doubt when other people are not too sure, or bring certainty when, on the contrary, society is plagued with doubt. To achieve this, the artist must be like a little child, simple and innocent.

There are those artists, especially actors, who are capable of suspending their own reality, their own being. They can absent themselves from their own bodies and act the part of other people. Sometimes they sacrifice their own personality for the sake of being able to mirror others and then other people are able to see themselves through that mirror. But now and again they have to return to themselves so that they may become whole and strong again.

The writer may conceal himself in a novel because he does not want to be recognized. It is like masquerading. This is valid because the truth, too naked, can be very crude. Suppose somebody asked you: "is your father a drunkard?" Would you say he is a drunkard? No, you would not. And yet you are being truthful. "Is your mother a drunkard?" "No, she is not a drunkard, she is my mother." "Is your father a thief?" "No, he is not a thief, he is my father." This may sound like a play on words but you are being truthful. You see, truth is not so simple. Sometimes, because of the complexity of society, the truth needs to be masked. The need for the mask depends upon how complex the society is. The more innocent it is, the less need of the mask. Hence the importance of the writer, the creative artist not losing his innocence, not losing touch with the child "in us".

Self-criticism is very important for the artist. When you look at yourself through the mirror, you must trim yourself like you trim the hedge of your garden, like you trim the grass so that wrong things don’t harbour there. The same is true of your language, your expression. It’s really what

you hear with your inner voice, how you want to put it across through the gifts God has given you or the limitations society has imposed on you.

Very often you think of limitations because you look at the scale of what lies before you and you feel so poor, so limited, you feel so frustrated. So you spend much time struggling for words. Sometimes it is our limitation which God turns to blessings. Sometimes you may just have two colours, you may just have a pencil, but if you have a real message and if it is strong enough in you and you have that inner urge to share it and pass it on to those who care enough to receive it, then that life which you put through the pencil makes people forget about the pencil you have used.

I feel that, very often, truth does not need too much assistance, if you are there with it. But if you are old, you are not always there. You have to be, that's why you have to keep in touch all the time with the poor of knowledge. That's why you read the Bible all the time, then you are closer to the faith. If you are an artist, you should keep working all the time so that your material and your style do not become a handicap, that people notice your style and your material more than the message you are trying to get across. If you notice my style more easily than what I am trying to portray it is an indication of my limitation as a messenger of truth, except perhaps in a situation where there are symbols and expressions that one uses that have become kind of landmarks.

CHAPTER 36
KNOWLEDGE OF SELF, RELIGION AND MENTAL HEALTH

PRISCILLA KARIUKI

INTRODUCTION

There is an intricate interaction between the knowledge of self, religion and mental health. It is the contention of this writer that a good understanding of this complex interaction leads to sound mental health. The process of understanding begins with a good knowledge of the self. The self may be viewed both as a structure and a process. As a structure, the self is the image or picture people have of themselves—as they think they are, or as they wish they ideally were. As a process, the self may change because of the context of particular situations which include other people, personal motivation and the interactional environment. Indeed one's personality is the external manifestation of self.

In everyday situations, what a person thinks of himself, i.e. his self-esteem, is of fundamental importance to his behaviour, his happiness and his mental health. If he thinks he is what he should be, then his self-esteem is high. In that case there is little discrepancy between his self-concept and his self-ideal. If, however, he is less than he thinks he can or should be, his self-esteem is low. A large number of psychologists share the notion that one of the most fundamental aspects of all personal development is the development of high self-esteem. Thus we strive for only one goal: that of self-actualisation. This involves becoming whatever one can become through activities determined by oneself. In other words, to actualise is to develop one's potentialities, to achieve an awareness of one's identity and to feel self-fulfilled.

DEVELOPMENT OF SELF

Rogerian theory contends that the self is a somewhat nebulous concept, ordinarily symbolised by such terms as "I" or "me". It is assumed not to be present at birth, but to develop slowly as children become aware of their own functioning. One Rogerian proposition states that:

As a result of interaction with the environment, and particularly as a result of evaluational interaction with others, the structure of self is formed. It is an organised, fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern or perception of characteristics and relationships of the "I" or the "me", together with values attached to these concepts.1 In other words, as an individual receives feedback about himself from others, he incorporates this information into a concept of "self". Most children at a very early age receive signs from parents and others indicating that they are loved and good. Consequently, notions of themselves as being good become part of their perceived self. As a result of receiving high grades, a student may develop a concept of self that includes the belief that he is intelligent. Conversely, he may come to think of himself as being stupid if the evaluational information he receives is negative.

When individuals engage in behaviour that is not completely compatible with their self-image, the resulting conflict may give rise to psychological tension. Studies have shown that a reduction in this tension may often be effected through a partial restructuring of the self. Good psychological health therefore results from being able to incorporate all experiences in a manner consistent with the self. This stage of congruency between experiences and self-image is termed integration. One of the goals of therapy is to bring about the development of an integrated self.

OBSTACLES TO SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-CHANGE

To try to understand oneself is not simply an interesting pastime, but a necessity of life. In order to plan our future and to make choices, we have to be able to anticipate our behaviour in future situations. This makes self-knowledge a practicable guide, not a self-indulgence. Sometimes the situations with which we are confronted are of a defused and clear kind so that we can anticipate and predict our behaviour with reasonable certainty. If someone asks you to drive a car, for example, it is not difficult to assess your skills and experience and to decide whether you can undertake the task or not. Often, however, the choice of the undertaking is of a more complex and less defined nature, for instance, making a success of your marriage. The stranger the situation we enter, the more uncertain the prospects of success, the more we realise that some degree of self-change may be called for in order to rely upon our own character and potentialities.

In situations in which we fail to anticipate our own behaviour we experience guilt. Kelly defines guilt as "the awareness of dislodgement of self from one's core role structure."2 Your core role structure is what you understand yourself to be. Defined in this way, guilt comes not from a violation of some social code but from a violation of your own personal picture of what you are. Looked at this way, one may understand why psychotherapists do what they do. They generally work on the basis that the more the person comes to know himself, the nearer he will come to solving, at least in part, his personal problems. A good self-knowledge, therefore, contributes to sound mental health.

RELIGION AND MENTAL HEALTH

There are many different ways of experiencing religion. For most people, religion is mainly a vehicle of social participation, a way of belonging to a community, affirming a social identity and cementing social bonds: "The family that prays together stays together." For others, religion is a source of comfort, such as reassurance in the face of problems. Still others seek a vague moral uplift and a sense of righteousness. And then there are those who desire a personal renewal, to be "born again" or a feeling of ecstatic unity with the source of religious power or truth.

These motivations combine with, and in part demand, a good understanding and knowledge of self. One may get very confused in any of the above states if he or she is not mentally prepared for them. This understanding helps us in our dealing with others. It takes into consideration factors which influence human feelings and which guide one's behaviour and actions.

Religion also demands that before we make attempts to understand others, we must understand ourselves. Understanding is therefore a process of self-analysis. An individual should grasp the factors which influence human feelings and behaviour and should apply these to her own life. This enables one to recognise the ups and downs in one's own feelings, moods and behaviour. Consequently, it leads one to have a right judgement about oneself. Once this right judgement is achieved the person learns to appreciate the positive values in others. Unless one is able to learn and appreciate the goodness in oneself, it is almost impossible to see goodness in others. "Do unto others as you wish them to do unto you," ought to be the motto of our lives.

Further, religion gives us norms that govern interpersonal relationships. Using religious precepts, a psychotherapist may, for example, help a client to deal with the conflicts that arise from different situations and to point to ways for solving these conflicts.

The connection between religion and mental health becomes more distinct when we consider man's possibilities for development. Man develops by acquiring a relationship with himself, his parents, a partner, his children, his fellowmen, and ultimately his God. Every human being develops in these areas in some form. These forms belong to the reality of ourselves and they have functional coherence. This means that when someone has difficulties in one area, for instance at the work place, this difficulty may be transferred to his partner or his religious community, influencing his relationships there; it may eventually affect his relationship with God.

Benefits of Self-Knowledge

Thus, individuals will have difficulty in facing reality if they are not prepared to face themselves. Facing oneself means being at home with oneself, knowing one's weaknesses and limitations and being willing to deal with them. Persons who try to avoid or deny their own feelings must, by contrast, keep a perpetual watch on themselves lest these feelings spring out unexpectedly. This vigilance not only restricts one's freedom to act, it is also often in vain. While the person is patrolling her defences in one area, the hidden enemy is liable to erupt as an uncontrolled impulse somewhere else.

The integrated person can entertain fantasies which, if translated into action, would land him in prison or in a mental hospital. But such an outcome is not the real deterrent to acting out such fantasies. What really keeps the integrated person from carrying out potentially incriminating or harmful behaviour is the knowledge that such behaviour would do harm to others.

A further benefit resulting from self-knowledge and self-acceptance is that one is able to live comfortably with one's own body, whether it be handsome or ugly, strong or weak, healthy or sickly. This does not mean neglecting it or, on the contrary, being overly concerned about it, but rather to be at ease with it.

Self-knowledge can never be total, and experience of the self contains as many ambiguities as does experience of the world outside oneself. If people are to understand themselves, therefore, they must learn to tolerate internal as well as external ambiguities, not indeed in a spirit of futility but in a spirit of faith in personal growth.

NOTES

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CHAPTER 37

INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS: A REFLECTION ON BUBER'S WORK

GERALD J. WANJOHI

Kamuingii koyaga ndiri.
(Many people can lift a mortar.)
Mahiga,me kiondo kimwe matiagaga gukomorania.
(Stones in the same basket are bound to knock each other.)

The meaning of the Gikuyu proverbs cited here is that whereas an individual needs society, that very need creates a conflict between one individual and another individual in the short run, and between the individual and society in the long run. Thinkers, especially philosophers, have been trying to resolve the individual-society conflict for a long time but without much success. The failure to resolve this conflict is primarily the result of going to extremes: emphasizing the society at the expense of the individual (Marx's position) or emphasizing the individual at the expense of society (the position of Rousseau).

In this paper I would like to come back to this question by using Martin Buber's anthropology, i.e. his theory of man. What I want to bring out is that not only does one individual need another individual and ultimately society, but also that it is possible, through dialogue, to somehow resolve the inevitable tension which arises from the relationship.

Martin Buber (1878-1965) belongs to the school of philosophy called existentialism. This school emphasizes the existence of the individual person, especially with respect to freedom and creativity. Of all Buber's writings, it is the book, *I and Thou*, which has practically become synonymous with his name.

Buber introduces us to his anthropology in this short work by distinguishing two types of attitudes and relations among men. These are: 'I-Thou' and 'I-It'. The 'I-Thou' relationship is characterized by mutuality, directness, presence, intensity and oneness. Although it is only within this relationship that the person really exists, the 'Thou' of 'I-Thou' is not limited to humans, it can apply to non-humans as well. An example of this is found in art. If an artist is not intent simply to analyse and to note the traits of a work of art, but to enjoy and appreciate it, he will perceive an existence instead of a sum of traits, and he will make a genuine response to this existence. (p. 53)

'I-It,' on the other hand, is the relation of experiencing (knowing) and using. Once again, Buber avails himself of an example of art to illustrate this: "A man may simply experience art: see it as qualities, analyse how it is made, and place it in the scheme of things. In this case it remains an It and its potentialities ... remain unrealized." (p. 53) It is the I-It relationship, or what Buber calls the thickening distance in it, which lead people to look upon other beings as objects of observation, an attitude which may lead them to regard other beings as objects to be used and exploited.

What Buber is saying here is that a person can have an I-It relationship with another person. But as he goes on to show, the nature of man is such as to put a limit to his objectification, to being treated as an It. As Buber remarks: "Only as a partner can a man be perceived as an existing wholeness…So long as the other is for me the detached object of my observation ... he will not yield his wholeness and its centre."(p. 27) Thus in order to obtain an intimate knowledge of other

persons we must look upon them from an I-Thou and not from an I-It relationship. That is exactly the attitude of dialogue which will help to resolve the individual-society tension.

What is meant by dialogue is obvious from what has been said so far: it is a relation among humans characterized by the mutuality of I-Thou. Dialogue is the most basic and effective means of securing human solidarity, collaboration and respect. It is one of the best ways of showing what man is and what he is capable of.

ELEMENTS OF DIALOGUE

In order for a genuine dialogue to take place, three elements must be present: affirmation of being, awareness of the presence of the other, avoidance of imposition on the other.

Affirmation of Being. By this is meant that we must not try to appear otherwise than we are either to ourselves or to someone else. We must affirm the being, the person that we are and avoid all affectation, all make-believe. Failure to do so will not allow us to hold a genuine dialogue with anyone.

Buber asks us to imagine an encounter between Peter and Paul, both of whom are unable to affirm being. On the one hand we have 1) Peter as he is, and 2) as he would like to appear to Paul, and 3) as he actually appears to Paul. The same thing holds true for Paul. In addition, the bodily Peter and Paul are present in the encounter. Buber sums up the situation as follows: "Two living beings and six ghostly appearances, which mingle in many ways in the conversation between the two. Where is there room for any genuine interhuman life?" (p. 77)

Philosophers and other thinkers understand and describe truth in different ways. From the viewpoint of affirmation of being, Buber sees truth as the act of men communicating their true selves to one another. This does not mean that a person discloses to the other everything which occurs to him, but only that he/she does not let any pretence creep in between them. (p. 77)

Buber observes (and I think quite correctly) that the crisis of man is the crisis of what is between man and man, between man and society. Buber suggests as the solution to this crisis the freeing of the concept of uprightness from its narrow moralistic connotation and letting it take its meaning from the concept of bodily uprightness. From this he draws an apt analogy: man's outstanding characteristic as an upright creature should be representative of his soul walking upright and conquering all pretence. In this connection, Buber writes: "It is no light thing to be confirmed in one's being by others, and seeming deceptively offers itself as a help in this. To yield to seeming is man's essential cowardice, to resist it is his essential courage." (p. 78)

Awareness of the Other's Presence. Being aware of the other's presence means accepting the other as the very one he/she is, to become aware of him/her, conscious that he/she is essentially different from oneself in the definite unique way which is peculiar to him/her so that in full earnestness one can direct what one says to the other as a person. This does not mean that I necessarily agree with the other person's viewpoint. Even should this viewpoint be opposed to mine, I must still affirm the person as the bearer of a conviction. Nevertheless (should this happen to be the case), I must try and show, little by little, the wrongness of this conviction. But I still affirm the person I struggle with. It now depends on the other—whose being I have just affirmed—whether a genuine dialogue will take place. Buber was quite confident that this will be the case, for "If… I give to the other who confronts me his legitimate standing as a man with whom I am ready to enter into dialogue, then I must trust him to be also ready to deal with me as a partner." (pp. 79-80)

Avoidance of Imposition. There are two types of imposition: propaganda and teaching; both militate against dialogue.

1) Propaganda. The propaganda we have in mind is mostly the one encountered in politics. The propagandist in this case is not concerned with the person he desires to influence: individual qualities are of importance to him only in so far as he can exploit them to win the other person. Political methods, especially where they are exercised with severity, aim only at winning power over the other by depersonalizing him. Although it does not appear so, propaganda is nothing but disguised violence. It is quite obvious that propaganda is totally opposed to dialogue.

2) Education. It is not so easy to see why education is termed an imposition by Buber. But he goes to great pains to explain his view of it as such. An educator is someone who sees each individual as being destined by nature to become a unique, single person, an objective which can be fulfilled through the educator. He sees every person as engaged in a process of actualization, and he knows from his own experience that the actualizing forces are all the time involved in a struggle with counter-forces. He knows what these forces are: they have shaped and are still shaping him. Now he puts himself at the disposal of these forces for a new struggle: that of actualizing the potentialities of others. He does not wish to impose himself for he believes in the effect of the actualizing forces: namely, that in every man what is right is established in a uniquely personal way. But since the role of the educator is to unfold what is right and facilitate its development, he (the educator) does not see anything amiss in influencing the other in his unfolding. This is where the teacher is wrong, according to Buber, for the true elements of dialogue "do not include the demand that one should influence the other in his unfolding."

How then, according to Buber, is personal unfolding to be accomplished if the role of the teacher is ruled out? In Buber's eyes, there resides in every man the possibility of attaining authentic human existence in the special way peculiar to him: the possibility, through nature, of self-realization. If this fact is grasped the need for imposition will not arise as Buber clearly and forcefully explains:

> The glory of the being of man is firstly bodily ... [presence] in the relation between two men, each of whom in ... [accepting] the other also [accepts] the highest to which this person is called and ... [each person] serves the self-realization of this human life as one true to creation without wishing to impose on the other anything of his own realization. (p. 85)

This quotation also points to the unity of the three elements of dialogue. The affirmation of being, making the other present and avoidance of imposition are all explicitly or implicitly referred to in this text.

The Role of Language in Dialogue

The three elements of dialogue necessarily call for the vehicle of language. If genuine dialogue is to take place, everyone who takes part in it must make the contribution of his/her spirit without reduction and without shifting ground. In the faithfulness which is the climate of genuine dialogue, what I have to say at any one time already has the character of something which wishes to be uttered, and since it does not belong to me alone I must not keep it back: it bears the stamp of common possession.

One who dissembles, one who is ruled by the thought of his own effect as the speaker, cannot engage in a true dialogue. If, instead of concentrating on what has to be said, I try to focus attention to myself, I have automatically miscarried what I had to say, and the dialogue fails. On the other hand, where the dialogue is fulfilled between partners who have turned to one another in truth, who express themselves without reserve and are free of desire for semblance, there is brought into being a memorable common fruitfulness which is to be found nowhere else. The interhuman opens out what otherwise remains unopened. (p. 86)

Examples of Dialogue

To give an example of unsuccesful dialogue, Buber relates the following: One day he happened to be in the company of two of his friends, one of whom was a master of conversation and whose skill as a speaker was unmistakable. The other man was someone given more to objective fairness than to the play of the intellect; he was a stranger to any controversy. The conversation between the two men degenerated into a duel, as we learn from Buber: "The friend whom I have called a master of conversation did not speak with his usual composure.... he scintillated, he fought, he triumphed. The dialogue was destroyed." (p. 87-88)

Buber also gives an example of a true dialogue: Around Easter 1914 he was a member of a group consisting of representatives of several European nations. The group had met to discuss how the catastrophe of war, which they saw as imminent, could be averted. The dialogue which ensued was successful.

> Without our having agreed beforehand on any sort of modalities for our talk, all the presuppositions of genuine dialogue were fulfilled. From the first hour immediacy reigned between all of us, some of whom had just got to know one another. Everyone spoke with an unheard-of unreserve and clearly not a single one of the participants was in bondage to semblance. (p. 87)

CONCLUSION

It is by now obvious that the way to resolve the tension between one individual and another within society is through the practice of dialogue in order to establish an I-Thou relationship with every person. At first this will not be easy. But once achieved it will make an individual more free, which is to say more human, and thus be able to lead a more harmonious and meaningful life in society.

REFERENCE

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CHAPTER 38

THE UNIVERSITY DON AS CITIZEN AND AS ACADEMIC

OKOTH OKOMBO

"All that is most precious is most precarious."
— Lowes Dickinson . A modern symposium.

In his novel *The trial of Christopher Okigbo*, Ali Mazrui puts Okigbo, the late Nigerian poet on trial for subordinating the universal interests of art to the parochial interests of his ethnic community. By this accusation, Mazrui seems to suggest that the intellectually gifted have a mission in life which is more noble than their mundane responsibilities as members of narrowly defined communities. Yet it is these communities which provide for the citizens, intellectually gifted or not, in so far as their life-sustaining needs are concerned. The citizens are, in turn, expected to reciprocate by serving the parochial interests of their political communities.

Broadly understood, serving the interests of one's country includes not only the readiness to defend it in the event of an external, or even internal threat, but observing in day-to-day life what constitutes conformist behaviour as conventionally defined within one's country. The citizen's duty to his or her country is usually summarized in the phrase "loyalty to one's country", often condensed into the emotionally charged word "patriotism."

As a citizen of a given country and member of the universal intellectual community, the academic is a tightrope walker, struggling to maintain a delicate balance between loyalties that are not always compatible. It seems to be Marzui's position that if the balance is to be upset it should be in favour of one's intellectual mission. In other words, Mazrui seems to be establishing a hierarchy in which one's intellectual mission constitutes a higher calling relative to one's ordinary duties as a citizen. But is Mazrui's hierarchy acceptable to all of us?

Resolving this problem in one's practical life constitutes the fundamental conflict in the world of the university don, being an academic and a citizen of one country or another. Whereas as an academic, the university don is in principle committed to the search for and dissemination of knowledge, as a citizen he or she is expected to be highly patriotic, always serving the parochial interests of his or her country.

It is perhaps because of this conflict that many people tend to find the behaviour of the university don wanting in many respects. To many people the university professor is almost by definition a non-conformist. In matters of religion, national identity, state secrets, the worship of mammon (the glorification of wealth), and in other non-academic pursuits that satisfy the ordinary citizen's sense of personal achievement and righteousness, the university don often puzzles us with his or her indifference. In a world where practically everyone wants to be a salesman and earn a lot of money, the indifferent stance of a poor professor of marketing is not only puzzling but quite understandably, suspicion-provoking. The professor's students, unable to reconcile his brilliance with his apparent naiveté marvel at the kind of creature he is. For how can one be so clever and yet so foolish in the ways of the world?

In the rest of this article we shall ignore the academic's non-conformity in matters of such worldly achievements as wealth and power, and concentrate on the conflicts related to her thirst for truth and the security needs of her country. In other words, we shall not address the question why professors don't become the millionaires and rulers of the world, but rather the question

whether their search for, and urge to tell the truth, is compatible with their duties and responsibilities as citizens.

We may start by asking whether it is always good or useful to know the truth. Apparently, nature's answer to this question is "no." Reality, we learn in psychology, often threatens our mental, and sometimes even our physical health. This is why the ability to forget is considered good for our health. But can we really conclude from this that truth is not always good to know? Moreover, is not the idea that truth may sometimes not be good for us, if it is true, also a truth worth knowing?

Whatever one's answer to these questions may be at the level of the individual, it appears that at the community level there should be someone who knows the truth about things that could in some way influence the health of some or all the members of the community. For, if all shun the truth and choose to live in the bliss of ignorance, we expose ourselves to avoidable forces of destruction. Since the human mind seems to be uncomfortable with unanswered questions, our refusal to search for the truth leaves our fertile minds free to fabricate myths that will enjoy the status of knowledge in our communities. Some of these myths, as we very well know, can be destructive to human beings. (Cf. the belief in human sacrifice as a means of placating dead relatives.) All this goes to show that the mind must be usefully occupied in the search for truth which really liberates.

Our second question is: should those who know the truth always tell it? The question is relevant to the university don's work because it has to do with her duty to disseminate knowledge. We know from medical practice that doctors often find it advisable not to tell a patient the nature of his illness if this knowledge may make the patient's condition deteriorate. In cases where state security is involved, the argument is usually advanced that indiscriminate dissemination of knowledge may put the security of the state at risk. So we may conclude that in practical life free dissemination of knowledge is unwise both at the personal and at the public level.

If the professor 's duty to search for and to disseminate knowledge is to be respected in a community where he has responsibilities as a citizen, then we find ourselves tempted to look for a compromise in what we may call the Principle of Censored Exposure. By this principle, the state, or some other social organization, allows a well-intentioned minority of its citizens to have access to some knowledge in order to meet their academic or professional obligations on condition that it be not disseminated in such a manner as to threaten the security of the state. Our argument for this principle may be stated as follows: realizing that Knowledge is necessary, it may not be healthy to possess (either politically or medically), but what is known to a well-intentioned minority may benefit the majority, there seems therefore to be some justification in giving the intellectual elite (including academics) the freedom to search for knowledge while controlling its dissemination so that only what is healthy to the state is made common knowledge.

Whatever the theoretical merits of this principle may be, it seems to have some glaring practical problems. First, how does the state guarantee that the intellectual elite are well-intentioned? Being loyal or well intentioned, we are well aware, is not in itself an attribute of genius. In other words, we cannot assume that intellectual beauty always goes hand in hand with moral beauty. Second, who is to legislate on what is healthy or unhealthy for the state? In other words, how do the citizens guarantee that the power elite do not identify their personal interests with the interests of the state as a whole? Moreover, if we assume that both the intellectual and the power elite are well- intentioned, i.e., have the interests of the state at heart in all their activities, then we still have two further questions to grapple with.

First, how do the intellectual elite reconcile their loyalty to the state of which they happen to be citizens with their loyalty to the universal intellectual community to which they are expected to tell the truth, usually in publications and in conference papers? Second, how do we reach a non-controversial definition of what is healthy for the state to make public since this is also an aspect of researchable human curiosity? Suppose that we solve this second problem simply by relying on what our best minds think at any given stage in the history of a state (in more or less the same way in which doctors define health for animal and plant life.) Then we are still left with the problem of who is to arbitrate when such minds disagree since, unlike medical doctors, great minds do not belong to a professional guild with strict rules of conduct and the powers of arbitration.

In a world where states exist in mutual hostility, it appears that the intellectual responsibilities of an academic are not harmoniously compatible with his duties as a citizen. As we have shown above, there are many ways in which the ideals of an academic's life clash with the requirements of "good" citizenship. It is my submission that so long as there exist mutually hostile states, that is, so long as a universal government is not a reality, the university don must continue in his precarious situation as a tightrope walker.

PART VI
VIOLENCE, RELIGION AND DIALOGUE

CHAPTER 39

RELIGION: A BOON FOR UNIVERSAL UNITY

VEDI RAM SHARMA

Today we cannot afford to live in isolation, or to solve our social and political problems by ourselves. Circumstances compel us to have a wider perspective. The great wars have brought mankind closer and perhaps a new kind of humanity and a new type of world are in the making, these wars being only a symptom of labour pains. If people live in conflict and disunity, it is not because Providence has not given them ample evidence of their oneness.

DHARMA RELIGION AND CULTURE

In Vedic theology, the religious conception is expressed by the word "dharma." Unfortunately, this word cannot be exactly translated in any language, just as there are words in other languages that cannot be accurately rendered in an Indian language. The word "dharma" cannot be translated by religion, by duty, or any such word. It represents a world of conception. The nearest meaning of dharma is the true nature of an object, or of a person, or of everything in the world which sustains it. When this true nature is lost, the object loses its true value the dharma of water is the production of cooling effect; the dharma of fire is the sensation of heat. Similarly, we can talk of the dharma of an animal, or the nature of animal life. The dharma of a teacher is to look to the welfare of the students; the dharma of a judge is to be impartial in meeting out justice.

Naturally, the question arises, what is the dharma of a man? What is his true nature? What is the fulfilment of human life? This question is dealt with as "Manu-dharma", or the religion of a human being. Throughout ancient Vedic literature, this dharma refers to human beings without specifying any religious sect. Manu, the great lawgiver of India, calls this "manava-dharma," or the dharma of human beings. In the epics, it is named "Arya-dharma," or the religion of the noble-minded. Therefore this is a universal conception of religion, applicable to every human being. In no scripture is it spoken of as Hindu religion, which was a name applied to it by foreigners such as the Greeks and the Muslims to distinguish it from their religion.

Nowadays, the word "culture" is becoming popular in signifying the unity of mankind. This is because it is free from those factors associated with religion: creeds, rituals, and exclusive claims. Culture does not merely mean music, dance, painting, and literature, it also represents the inner growth and development of a people. How do these people treat strangers: are they hospitable, are they indifferent, or are they inimical? Do they appreciate the point of view of others? What is their outlook on life: do they give more importance to physical and sensual enjoyments, or do they attach greater value to the refinement of their soul, sacrifice for others, love and sympathy.

RELIGION, SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

In some so-called educated circles, it is thought that religion and science are incompatible and that with the progress of science, religion is bound to recede. They think that religion deals with a world that cannot be proven scientifically. Whereas there is much consensus regarding scientific knowledge, there is so much divergence in the religious beliefs of even learned people that the

ordinary unprejudiced man is confused by this conflict and eventually becomes indifferent, if not hostile, to religious dogmas.

Similarly, it is believed that there is conflict between religion and philosophy. Whereas religion is supposed to be mere faith, philosophy is held to be a free intellectual quest after truth and ultimate values. The philosopher, like the scientist, does not accept anything on mere scriptural authority or faith, but he applies his reason and logic and is not afraid of the findings to which his reason leads him. Unfortunately, in Europe, there have been occasions when philosophers and scientists have been persecuted and seen as outcasts because they could not conscientiously accept the religious dogmas held to be self- evident truths at that time. The result was that science, philosophy, and religion were put into separate compartments and no synthesis was thought possible between them. Consequently, a climate of mutual hostility and a feeling of resentment developed.

If we take the Vedic point of view, there is no conflict between science and religion, nor between religion and philosophy. The main problem is to discover truth and goodness underlying this life just as the problem of art and literature is to discover joy and beauty in this world. Truth and goodness are the ultimate values of human life, and they have been the first as well as the last fields of quest ever since man learned to think. In every age, thousands of men and women have dedicated themselves to the disinterested search for truth, and today humankind has the precious legacy of their wisdom and sacrifice. In fact, the real greatness of a nation or a country is not considered to lie in her wealth or in her military power, but in the acquisition of spiritual strength; she is judged by her contribution to human progress.

In Vedic theology, religion, philosophy and science have always been complementary to one another. Philosophy tries to reach the highest truth intellectually, which is an essential element in human life. Therefore, a religion without a philosophy is considered mere superstition and sentimentalism, and a philosophy without religion is seen as an abstract and empty intellectual pursuit. In Vedic thought, religion and philosophy have united and enriched each other. Through the practice of "yoga", the intellect is sharpened to enter more deeply into reality. Similarly, science and philosophy also are not incompatible. Both seek the truth in different ways. Science deals with reality piecemeal while philosophy takes the whole of life into its compass. The human body requires the attention of many scientists, like physicists, chemists, anatomists, biologists and psychologists; but they do not have to inquire into the purpose of human life as a whole, which is the province of philosophy. Science, in its progressive march, practically borders on metaphysics, the atoms and the electrons being reduced to a mere form of energy, which in turn is a manifestation of consciousness, instead of consciousness being regarded as the product of material factors. Ultimately, all ideas and actions rest on truth, on which neither science nor philosophy has said the last word. Both are humble enough to recognize the infinitude of knowledge, and no religious man, nor artist, has ever said that the end of goodness and beauty had been reached.

Let us keep faith in the greatness of human endeavour and go on enriching our life by these great discoveries in the domains of science, philosophy and religion. What the scientist calls inscrutable nature, and the philosopher infinite knowledge, the religious man refers to as the infinite spirit, or God. Thus the difference is merely terminological. Vedic dharma is not afraid of science or of philosophy, whose progress cannot harm real religion. On the other hand, they may do away with false dogmas, superstitious beliefs, and meaningless rituals.

THE MAIN PROBLEM OF DISUNITY

The main problem before religion is: "To which name of God shall a devotee offer his worship?" (*asmai devaaya havisaa vidhemah*) [*Atuavva*-XII.5]. There is no doubt that every religion worships God. But the confusion arises when every major religion offers a historical person as the only saviour and mediator to God, and the common man is bewildered as to which one to accept and which one to reject. I see this dilemma: if we accept our experience of realizing the light or the spirit of God, there should not be any reason why we should reject the experience of others and if we accept all these experiences, how are we to solve the problem of salvation? My view is that what is realized in the experiences or in meditations is the same, but since a devotee born in a certain family has always believed and prayed to God (according to his family faith) he takes that image of his faith as the only saviour. If he is a Christian, he will take the image of Christ, if he is a Muslim, he will link the spirit to his Prophet, if a Hindu to Lord Krishna and if a Buddhist to Lord Buddha.

True religion is not a social institution to which all must conform. It is a quest for the infinite. So the question, "To which God shall we offer our worship?" is answered in the Vedic texts: "That God, who is always seated in the hearts of men, and who is known by the pure in mind and in heart". (*Katha Upnishad*, VI.17 9) "Who is the illuminator of the inner soul, the giver of strength, whose moral government is recognized by all wise men seeking immortality, and who controls death also." (*Athavva-Veda*, Xll. 5)

He is the God for all beings, who dispenses his love and justice to all without any distinction of race, colour or creed. Instead of magnifying or multiplying our differences let us pick up the common factors, build a workable mosaic and build bridges of goodwill and understanding between the people of different faiths.

CHAPTER 40

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FAITH: SOCRATES AND ST PAUL IN DEBATE

GERALD J. WANJOHI

All human societies are menaced by evil-doers, yet every evil-doer who is in his right mind will publicly admit that certain acts are wrong and ought to be shunned and that others are good and ought to be performed. Whence comes this discrepancy: privately or secretly or under different circumstances engaging in an act which one publicly condemns and failing to do that which one approves?

There are three theories which can be offered to explain this phenomenon. The first theory comes from Socrates, the second from St. Paul, and I shall offer a third theory.

THE SOCRATIC THEORY

According to Socrates, one does evil through ignorance. He argues that if one had real and full knowledge of the good, one would never do evil. For Socrates, one cannot know the good and fail to choose it. His view is that in the same way as the mind cannot deny that a triangle is a three-sided figure, the will cannot reject the good presented to it by the intellect. In other words, the will is determined by the good in the same way as the intellect is determined by truth or knowledge. Socrates consequently has been dubbed an ethical determinist.

The solution Socrates offers to the problem of immorality is obviously simple: education. But what Socrates meant by education is something quite different from an ordinary person's understanding. His conception of education is an idealized one. For Socrates, in order to come to the knowledge of justice or courage or temperance, for example, it is not enough to see a just, courageous or temperate act. One has to transcend these particular and temporal acts and see justice, courage, or temperance in itself for there to be knowledge. What we are referring to here as "knowing something in itself" is expressed technically by Socrates who says that to know something is to attain its form. Everything we can speak of is traceable to a form as its ultimate cause. Forms are arranged in a hierarchy, with the Form of the Good being at the pinnacle. This means that in order to attain knowledge in the true sense of the word, one must apprehend the Form of the Good, for it is the latter which governs the other forms and the knowledge related to them.

The Socratic educational programme, therefore, consists in ultimately bringing learners to see the Form of the Good. This requires a long, arduous and exacting process which involves both bodily and mental exercise. Starting with gymnastics, the pupil is gradually introduced to music, astronomy and mathematics, then to the forms of things and finally to the Form of the Good. Unfortunately, for the Socratic method of education, few are able to travel this round and reach their destination. Those who succeed in doing so are referred to as "Philosopher-Kings."

From this account we see that the majority of the people — the ruled or the subjects — do not possess knowledge in the strict sense of the word. They have no choice but to content themselves with semblances or shadows of knowledge. In Socratic terms this comprises all so-called sense knowledge as well as beliefs and opinions.

We now begin to see the limitation of Socrates method of education where only a small number, i.e. the elite, can be educated, leaving the mass of the people uneducated with regard to what is good and virtuous.

ST PAUL'S THEORY

St Paul was also keenly aware of the difference between knowing what is good and actually doing good. For him knowledge - either in the Socratic sense or in the ordinary sense of the term - is not enough to make a person moral: something radically different is required. This is how he puts the matter:

> I discover this principle... that when I want to do the right, only the wrong is within my reach. In my inmost self I delight in the law of God, but I perceive that there is in my bodily members a different law, fighting against the law that only reason approves and making me a prisoner under the law that is in my members, the law of sin. Miserable creature that I am, who is there to rescue me out of this body doomed to death? God alone, through Jesus Christ our Lord! (Romans 7: 21-25)

The inability to accomplish that which we know to be right and the inclination to do that which we know to be wrong, is called moral torpidity or depravity. It is this which St. Paul refers to in the above passage as "a different law, fighting against the law that my reason approves." This moral depravity overrides even the best of intentions and the strongest of wills. Witness the resolve of Peter to Jesus: "Lord, I am ready to go with you to prison and death." (Luke 22:32) Yet Peter denied his master three times before the cock crowed that night. In history we know of people who, faced with the same temptation as Peter, elected to acknowledge Jesus even though, unlike Peter, they had not known him as intimately. Some of these people paid dearly for their moral act of faithfulness: they were martyred.

In later life Peter, too, was martyred: he confessed Jesus as Lord and paid for it with his life. The important question which we have to ask ourselves is: how do we account for the radical difference between his earlier and later behaviour? The key to the answer lies at the end of the above-quoted passage: "God alone through Jesus Christ."

Given our nature which ineluctably tends to nothingness, evil and death, we are sometimes unable, by ourselves, to perform the good that we know and love. To overcome this we need help from outside: God's grace. Now to answer the above question, the earlier Peter relied on the strength of his human nature (which in effect is no strength if we go by its result) while the later Peter and other martyrs relied on God's grace and they triumphed: they accomplished that which they knew to be good and right. Nobody can do any good act without God's grace: "Without me you can do nothing" (Jn 15.5). Grace is the help from God which aids man to do good. It enables the person to match the knowledge of the good and the execution or performance of it. This is what St. Paul hints at after the long lamentation on the moral depravity of the human condition, from which only God can deliver us.

Two of the characteristics of grace are that it is freely given and that it is open to all mankind. Of all people Christians should be those who should enjoy a greater share of grace since they acknowledge that Jesus, the Son of God, came so that "where sin was multiplied, grace immeasurably exceeded it, in order that, as sin established its reign, by way of death, so God's

grace might establish its reign in righteousness, and issue in eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord." (Rom 5:20-21)

But what does experience teach us? That in many instances Christians do not fare any better when it comes to doing what is right, to matching what they believe inwardly with what they declare outwardly and publicly by words and deeds. Why this unexpected behaviour?

THE THIRD THEORY

Above we have considered Socrates' and St Paul's responses as to why there is a discrepancy between our private and public faith. Since our minds were left still unsatisfied with the answers given by the two thinkers, I would like to offer a third theory.

Grace, we have seen, is a free gift; it is not imposed on anyone. Man is created free. Presented with good and evil, man may (and very often does) opt for the evil though knowing perfectly well that he ought to opt for the good. This may seem pitiful, unfortunate and wrong. It has prompted some people to ask why God created man this way, as free. One writer has answered this question by saying: "because it is better thus."

It is better for man to be the determinant of his own actions whether good or bad than to be led to an action, even a good one, willy-nilly, slavishly. Rewards and punishments make sense only on the presupposition of freedom The latter constitutes man's dignity in that it makes him the principle and agent of his own final destiny: whether reward or punishment, a life of bliss or of misery. To sum up, the gratuitousness of grace, man's freedom and at the same time his tendency towards evil, are the reasons why we find a disharmony between our private beliefs and what we do exteriorly.

However I don't want to give the reader the impression that I am totally opposed to what Socrates and St. Paul are saying. If people publicly approved the good out of a personal conviction (cf. Socrates' conception of knowledge in terms of the apprehension of the Form of the Good) and not for the sake of conformity, they would certainly strive to act in accordance with that good or do their best to bring it about. Finding in their "members a different law fighting against the law that [their] reason approves", they would, as St. Paul suggests, call for God's help, his grace, to enable them to accomplish the good that they love. All this shows how closely morality and religion are.

It is lamentable that God's grace being so abundant and so gratuitous, man, in full cognisance of his moral and spiritual weakness, does not take advantage of it, thus resembling a person who starves at a banquet.

CHAPTER 41

"POWER" IN AFRICAN RELIGION

LAURENTI MAGESA

RELATIONSHIPS DETERMINE THE USE OF POWER IN AFRICAN RELIGION

African religion is fundamentally one of power relationships. In the African religious worldview, the moral universe is perceived to consist of powers or forces which constantly and necessarily interact with one another on the basis of primogeniture. This means, simply, that the older, or even more vital, the stronger the power is over other powers; it influences them accordingly. This does not, mean, however, that the lesser powers have no influence over the greater and stronger powers. On the contrary, they are seen have such for two reasons. First, without the lesser powers the greater one is irrelevant for, in a real sense, it obtains its meaning and significance from them. Secondly, just as the lesser powers need the greater powers to survive fully as powers, so does the greater power need the lesser powers.

The relationship between and among the powers here is clear, and it is one not of domination but of complementarity: the greater power does not fundamentally prey on the lesser but is completed by it in its own being, which is a given in the universal order. The lesser power, on the other hand, does not relate to the greater power on the basis of inherent inferiority, but rather on the basis of an expected right: to be nourished and sustained by the greater power.

From this it becomes obvious that "power" in the African moral universe is not an abstraction: it does not exist apart from relationships. Relationships establish power and give it meaning, purpose, and specific identity. In other words, power is correctly specific understood not as a "noun," a state, a quality, but precisely as a "verb", an act, a dynamic reality. Further, it cannot correctly be perceived as coercive, but precisely in terms of interdependence, whereby each "power-reality" has its own independent identity, full and secure.

If we apply this understanding of power to the universal elements of God, the ancestors, spirits, humanity and the world, we may appreciate its dynamic in African religion. African religion considers the existence of these realities possible only because of the power relations they share among them. God is God only because God sustains, most supremely and efficiently, the order He has put in place in the universe, which includes all the other elements. Without God’s sustenance and care of these latter, God is not God.

Conversely, apart from sharing in this sustenance and care according to their own being, all other elements likewise would cease to exist, literally. And what is true of God is equally true of the ancestors, the spirits, humanity, animate and inanimate beings. Power in African religion is, therefore, "incarnated" or "personalized" in the sense that it can only be realized in relationships between and among autonomous realities or forces.

In spite of what has been said about the "abuse of power in African traditional systems of government, the above was the controlling awareness. So what has been called abuse of "power" in Africa should best be understood as abuse of relationships and the right order of existence. And if the maintenance of relationships is the religious imperative, its distortion or destruction is the worst moral evil. It was believed that rulers in Africa who distort relationships by being dictatorial, unjust, and oppressive bring disaster not only to themselves but to the community far and wide. Right power relationships, however, create and nurture authority, the characteristic most admired in a leader.

THE PROPER USE OF POWER LIES IN SERVICE

One of the places where this idea of power relationships, as well as the distinction between abuse of power and its proper use or authority are most clearly expressed is in the Christian New Testament, in the words attributed to Jesus. Jostling for positions of influence among themselves, his disciples seem to Jesus not to understand the proper dynamics of power relationships. Which prompts the remarks and rebuke from him: "You know that among the pagans the so-called rulers lord it over them, and their great men make their authority felt. This is not to happen among you. No, anyone who want to be first among you must be the slave of all." He then gave his own life of service as the best example of true leadership (Mk. 10: 42-45, Mt. 20: 25-28).

We may say then, using the expression in the sense explained in the foregoing paragraphs, that the proper use of power or, in a word, authority, in African religion (as well as in Christianity, it seems clear) consists and lies in service. Power is granted for, and thrives in the process of serving, of enhancing the life of those interdependent with it. Conceived in any other way, it is an aberration, because not only does it annihilate other forces, it destroys itself in the end by rendering itself irrelevant, because nonexistent, since the relationships on which it depends are now themselves non-existent.

QUALITIES NEEDED IN AFRICAN LEADERS

How, then, may we conceive the power of leadership, of knowledge, or even military power in the context of African religion? What "qualities" or attitudes should be brought into leadership prowess and might render them forces of life? Here I can offer only clues.

The most important quality of the leader in African tradition was, according to E.E. Uzukwu, the "big ear." This metaphor implies that for the leader to execute leadership in a proper way, he or she needs to listen. What are the hopes of the people? What are their anxieties and fears? In other words, what kind of relationships exist in this particular world and where and how should they be adjusted? The true leader, the leader who commands authority, must attend to these questions, and he or she can only do so comprehensively through the words of the community heard directly or through its representatives. In listening and acting according to advice the leader not only shares power, but gains authority.

It is easy to see how this is so where intellectual power is concerned. The essence of intellectual power or authority is recognition, which comes through sharing of thought and imagination. Throughout human history there is no intellectual giant who has not shared ideas and knowledge in one fashion or another: by way of oral speech, as African elders did; by way of literature, as many in the West and East have done, including many religious traditions; or by way of invention, as the age of science and technology shows us.

If sharing is at the root of intellectual power, what can be said about military might? Military secrets are not readily shared, even among "friendly nations." To do so is folly. For in military terms, today’s friend is tomorrow’s enemy. Military sands shift quickly. So, how can military power be seen as "authority" rather than merely an oppressive instrument? It is difficult to perceive this and, as is well known, early Christians would not engage in military service nor fight war precisely because it was seen to be exclusively an agent of death, having little to do with life. Yet the inherent ambiguity in war can be overcome up to a point, given the right circumstances and motivations.

The right circumstances refer here exclusively to self-defence against aggression, and the proper motivation has to do with the actual conduct of the war, or the actual use of the instruments of war. The latter must be regulated under the principles of proportionality and non-contradiction. The principle of proportionality in the conduct of war means that only that force is used that is necessary to deter the aggression and keep it in check. The principle of non-aggression is an extension of the principle of proportionality, and implies that the act of self-defence, when successful, should not itself turn into aggression

Much of this is, of course, contained in the classical Western Christian "just war theory." Its particularity in Africa, however, can be appreciated only in the context of the defence, cohesion and development of the life of the community. The ambiguity remains only when both or all the parties in conflict consider themselves as the ones suffering the aggression and thus each being in need to defend itself. But that discussion is beyond the scope of the present concern.

POWER: AN ONEROUS MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

In African religion, therefore, power is ultimately "power of God," and its proper use, known as authority, constitutes "power as God." To the person in authority, the ever present and most important concern is how to use the power of God granted to him or her through the community, to enhance the life of the community, as God would do. Power is thus an onerous moral responsibility which should not be lightly assumed. No wonder, then, that traditionally, among some African ethnic groups, such as the Kung of the Kalahari desert, it was actively avoided.

Thus, as among the Akan people of Ghana, the chief (in Akan, the *Ohene)* symbolizes the values of hospitality, good company, consideration, and justice, all of them characteristics of God. The life of the chief must be exemplary because, as the head custodian of the people's moral tradition, he must be in constant contact with the power of God, ancestors, spirits and the earth to guide and sustain him.

What does all this mean as far as the use of power in contemporary Africa is concerned? To a large extent it is an indictment of Africa's civil and religious rulers who have used power entrusted to them by their communities as an instrument of oppression, injustice, and self-promotion. What aggravates the situation is that in many cases there are no structures in place to replace, with life enhancing authority, power which has been misused. It is therefore necessary for African theoreticians of all branches of knowledge to revisit African religion and discover insights on this issue. When these values are clarified, perhaps people in power in Africa will be persuaded to guide people with authority, not brutalize and alienate them with oppression.

CHAPTER 42

DIALOGUE BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS: How a Better Understanding of History Can Help

LUIGI CLERICI

PRESENT ANIMOSITY

Ten years ago, the author wrote a pamphlet about the so-called 'Mombasa Martyrs' of the year 1631.1 They were unfortunately at one time known only to historians, but at long last seem now to receive a well-deserved publicity.

The pamphlet was intended to be translated into Swahili for wider dissemination at the Coast, to acquaint Christians as well as Muslims with the facts of that human and religious tragedy. The conclusion included an appeal to work energetically on both sides for the liquidation of religious animosities. As the Likoni massacres horribly showed, there are enough economic, tribal and political factors at work to make peace at the Coast a precarious achievement. Mature religious Muslims as well as Christians must work hard at overcoming repressed animosity and hatred of any kind. The last page of the pamphlet contained a prayer in the style of Pope John Paul's prayers on the occasions of his meetings with Islamic leaders.

The prayer was addressed to the God of Mohammed as well as of Jesus, asking Him to bless all endeavours to produce in Christians as well as in Muslims the sound fruits of religious peace, mutual understanding, appreciation, goodwill and civil collaboration. It also asked for forgiveness of past misdeeds by a seemingly Catholic-occupying power which left Mombasa decorated with a colonial bastion paradoxically carrying the most sweet name of Jesus. The Mombasa clergy was, of course, consulted on the appropriateness of such a publication of the almost totally forgotten tragedy of 1631. The following is an excerpt of the reply by the Mombasa spokesman:

> We Catholics living here at the Coast are not keen on this idea. Such a publication would in our view do more harm than good, adding fuel to the very real animosity towards Christianity here. 'Mombasa is becoming more Muslim every day', an acquaintance said the other day. Our Catholic schools are now up to 80 percent filled with Muslim pupils. When a Coast historian published an article on the 'Mombasa massacre', it led to an outbreak of verbal animosity from many Muslim readers. Knowing the local atmosphere, your suggestion, I am afraid, is a dream far removed from reality.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

This advice appears to say: "Sweep such controversial matters under the carpet!" But historical facts, especially embarrassing ones, have the stubborn habit of not going away. For both parties this is an unworthy state of affairs, even if we admit that some members of the public can never he converted to a rational and dispassionate attitude to past tragedies. The right attitude to past tragedies has been shown on a number of occasions by the Vatican II-converted2 church leadership: Paul VI embracing Patriarch Athenagoras on the concluding day of the Council; John Paul II meeting world religious leaders at Assisi and praying with them; the recent self-accusation by the same pope of the centuries-old persecution of our Jewish brethren by Catholic Church

authorities, etc. Whatever one may think of the value of such apologies for the unethical behaviour of past generations, they are encouraging signs as well as stimulations towards personal conversion of ingrained prejudices. Such examples show us to be walking in the footsteps of the compassionate Christ.

To return to Mombasa: Why should the influx of Muslim students into Catholic educational institutions be a matter to deplore? Is it not a providential challenge to prove at least to the open-minded students and their well-intentioned parents (who don't seem to fear any kind of proselytism) how seriously the Mombasa Catholic Church is taking the spirit and letter of Vatican II? According to a Vatican directive, Catholics should open the doors of their educational institutions to Muslim imams in order to give students solid, unbiased Islamic formation. In doing this, we would only be giving Muslims the same religious freedom we are asking for Christian students in nations and regions where Christians are the minority! Objective and dispassionate study of even highly embarrassing facts of history provides a chance for leading religious minds – Christian and Muslim alike – away from emotional stereotyping of the partner and of destroying common 'enemy images.' of the opponent. Any psychologist would recommend such study as a means to lead rational minds away from ever-present temptations to religious prejudice, animosity or fanaticism.

THE 1631 TRAGEDY IN BRIEF

From the time of Henry the Navigator in the middle of the fifteenth century, the deeply religious Portuguese nation was crusading against the Muslim usurpers of Constantinople and the holy lands. Christian Portugal itself had been under Muslim occupation and domination for over six centuries. They were searching for a sea route southwards in order to fall upon the rear of their hated oriental enemy. They also wished, understandably, to finance this costly enterprise by looking for a trade route to the spices of India which had brought such fabulous wealth to the Arab nations. When, in 1498, Vasco da Gama finally succeeded in rounding the Cape, he found a friendly welcome and an experienced pilot only from the Sultan's family in Malindi.

The sails of da Gama's vessel, as well as those of all his countrymen thereafter, bore the cross of the crusader, and 90 percent of all the Portuguese ships were 'baptised' with the names of angels or saints or Christian mysteries: such was their self-confidence in the righteousness of their Holy War against the enemies of Christ. But their ruthless behaviour after a customary deeply religious sending off (after fasting and night vigils and clerical 'processions to implore victory and safe return to Lisbon) was anything but Christian. Wholesale slaughter of women and children in hostile African and Indian harbours was no exception.

It is not for our "enlightened' twentieth century undoubtedly the bloodiest in human history to sit in judgement on the atrocities committed by Christians of bygone ages! But such was the cause of Mombasa's tragedy: for over one century the Western intruders were welcomed in a friendly manner on the East Coast of Africa only by the ruling family of Malindi. So with the building of Fort Jesus in 1592 against the rising menace of the Dutch and English, the Portuguese replaced the ever-hostile Mombasa government by moving to the friendly Malindi ruler. But by an inexplicable intrigue, he and his wife were murdered and their salted heads displayed on pikes in Goa, to the utter disgust of the Portuguese historian, Bocarro, present at this abominably unjust spectacle. Their surviving seven-year old son, Yussuf bin Hassan, was given into the care of the Augustinian priests who shipped him to Goa for military and Christian upbringing. The Viceroy in person gave him his own baptismal name, Jeronimo, and later a Christian Goan wife.

After their marriage, he returned with his wife in great pomp ‘as a second Constantine’ to his Muslim subjects in Mombasa. When, after some time, he found out about the treacherous manner of his parents’ murder, he suddenly rebelled against the commander of Fort Jesus who used to insult him in front of his subjects as "a mere black man.’ In a surprise coup, he killed all the 150 Portuguese in the town, half of them children below the age of twelve, including his own uncle Antonio of Malindi. Another 150 black Christians were given the option of death or a return to the Muslim faith of their ancestors: they chose martyrdom. In addition, 400 were shipped away by Yussuf and sold to Hadramaut and Arabia as slaves because they refused to return to Islam. Yussuf’s war cry is reported to have been: ‘Now we have our own Sharia again!’. He turned to piracy, and lost his life some years later in a battle in the Red Sea.

Recently, there were some rumours of a possible request for beatification or canonization of those martyrs.’ Strangely, the Augustinians at that time requested the Congregation of Rites in Rome to canonize their own three confreres plus the 150 Portuguese, but there was no request for the honour of the altar for their black Christians, not even for Antonio of Malindi, the only one of the local Christian martyrs whose name has been transmitted. The authorities will have to judge the complex background of these martyrdoms. In my view, these Africans would surely deserve to be made known for their fidelity to their newly-found Christian faith. Indirectly, this would also be a proof of the solidity of the methods of evangelisation of those Portuguese Augustinian missionaries, under a very adverse and compromising colonial situation.

LESSONS FOR TODAY’S ENCOUNTER BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS IN KENYA

The recent Nairobi bomb tragedy showed an extraordinary outpouring of human solidarity and helpful-ness beyond any racial or religious diversity. Understandably, when the perpetrators of the violence became known, there was rightly a vigorous self-protestation by various Muslim organizations and authorities of the "well known peacefulness of Kenyan Muslims." However, the unfortunate coincidental burning of Christian churches in Garissa on the same morning (on account of the boiling over of simmering protest against so-called blasphemy against the prophet Muhammad by an American evangelist in Nakuru) was a timely reminder that oversimplification and generalization about Muslim-Christian hostility in Kenya are totally out of place.

The daily press helped to illustrate with photographs how, for instance, Archbishop Ndingi was presented with copies of the Holy Koran by the Muslim Council of Kenya. Such mutual friendly gestures assured even uninformed or suspicious minds, that a national catastrophe like the anti-American bomb blast (meant by totally misled fanatical jihad-liberation fighters as a "Holy War against an intruding so-called ‘Christian’ world power") could bring out in telling symbolic gestures what the real state of Muslim-Catholic inter-religious dialogue is meant to be.

But such symbolic gestures have to be followed up by a general and persistent building up of mutual trust and good human relationships between our two faiths, in order to overcome the deplorable state (if it should still persist) of mutual apprehension documented by the letter from the Mombasa clergy quoted above. Let us use every means at our disposal, including our Catholic educational institutions at the Coast, to educate Christians and Muslims alike in tolerance and goodwill for one another. In our schools, we will thus build a better Kenyan nation, a Kenya which is above the ethnic, denominational or religious interest of any particular group!

NOTES

1. See Clerici, Luigi: ‘Should the 300 martyrs and the 400 confessors of the 1631 Mombasa rising against the Portuguese be canonized: Pros and cons.’ In *African Christian Studies: Journal of the Catholic University of Eastern Africa*, vol. 10, no. 3 (1994), pp. 60-66.

2. The Second Vatican Council was held in Rome from 1962-1965. It introduced many reforms into the Catholic Church and represented a major shift in thinking on the part of the Church hierarchy.

Further Reading

The handiest presentation (albeit outdated in some details) of the Mombasa affair is still to be found in Strandes, Justus: "The rising in Momhasa." In: *The Portuguese-period in East Africa,* Ch. 14. pp. 165-177. Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1961. The most recent scientific presentation is Freeman-Grenville, G.S.P.: T*he Mombasa rising* against *the Portuguese, 1631. From sworn evidence.* Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, London, 1980. Introduction pp. xxi-lvii. Lamentable documentation of the never-ending and inconsequential Royal Inquests into colonial maladininistration, corruption, atrocities and savage disdain of fundamental rights of the local population in Axelson, Eric: *Poriuguese in S.E. Alrica 1600-1700.* Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1960. passim – Yussuf’s own godfather, Viceroy Jeronimo Azevedo, ended his life ignominiously in a Lisbon prison, incarcerated for maladministration.

CHAPTER 43

THE THIN LINE BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALISM AND FANATICISM

CECIL McGARRY

Fundamentalism is becoming increasingly pervasive in the world with dire consequences for the dignity, development and freedom of individuals. It is a wide-ranging, multifaceted, and confusing phenomenon. Is it identical with fanaticism or is there a thin line between them so that they fall on different sides of that line? A difficult question surely, since fundamentalism often appears in the guise of a fanatical pursuit of certain well defused and non-negotiable positions.

In this article I would like to look at two types of fundamentalism which can impinge on our lives in Eastern Africa, namely, Protestant evangelical fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalism. We may then be able to attempt some response to the question about the thin line. There **is** no need, I am sure, to remind readers that among evangelical Protestants and Muslims only a minority are fundamentalists.

PROTESTANT EVANGELICAL FUNDAMENTALISM

Let me sketch briefly what I mean by this kind of fundamentalism. Christian fundamentalism sees the Bible as an encoded message from God, inerrant, infallible, never to be questioned. Its only meaning is the literal meaning of the words. The Bible alone is sufficient and adequate to guide us in all the problems of life, especially religious ones. The only adequate response is absolute and unquestioning obedience to God who is the author of the Bible.

There is a mindset characteristic of Christian fundamentalism. It is explicitly reactionary and vocally hostile against a variety of perceived enemies such as modernity, liberalism, Biblical criticism, ecumenism, Roman Catholicism. It seeks to guarantee to its followers the security of knowing that they are the only true Christians in an embattled world. Questioning can only lead to insecurity, to dissolving the certainty which seems to be an absolute psychological need of fundamentalists. The paradox of this position is that fundamentalism itself is a modern phenomenon, having arisen in the nineteenth century. Indeed in its origins and in its continuing reality it is a psycho-social way of coping with the modern world.

Fundamentalism is antagonistic and polemical against the other Christian churches and is particularly antipathetic to Roman Catholicism, because it sees them as subverting and betraying true Christianity. Probably the central reason for this inimical attitude is that Biblical criticism flourishes in these churches, which are also accused of accommodating too much to the modern spirit. These convictions develop a sectarian, purist and intolerant attitude to all who do not share their views.

The expanded worldview of fundamentalism is individualistic in terms of society, liberal-capitalistic in terms of economics, anti-communist and pro-American in politics, dualist and often millenarian in cosmology, and is usually attracted to bizarre supernatural events. It has a strong doctrine and rhetoric of sin. Because society cannot be redeemed, fundamentalism focuses all its attention on the salvation of the individual. In some cases, as in the gospel of prosperity, it promises that God will bless Christians with material prosperity, which is a sure sign of his favour. It is generally strongly supportive of conservative social programmes and of conservative politics.

American Christian fundamentalism, which has wide influence in Africa, is strongly supportive of American foreign and economic policy, which has such disastrous effects on economic progress and development in our countries. One has only to attend a fundamentalist gospel crusade to discover what a central place extraordinary, supernatural, miraculous and bizarre events have, sometimes in overt and crude ways. As I write, Reinhard Bonnke is conducting a gospel crusade nearby in Kibera. He always finds a ready and credulous audience on his frequent visits to Kenya. Does he help his hearers to help themselves? No, but he offers them miracles and cures and prosperity as a sign of God's favour, if they truly believe and declare themselves for the Lord Jesus, renouncing Satan. And if prosperity does not come in this world it will surely be theirs in the next. Above all they must obey the gospel and endure in patience. It is easy to see why Bonnke and crusaders like him are welcome in Kenya and other African countries, and get every facility from governments.

Compare Bonnke's message with the letters of some of our church leaders in Kenya or the recent statement of the Catholic Church's National Justice and Peace Commission and the reason becomes evident.l The background to much of this is a cosmic dualism in which God and Satan are at war. Fear is a dominant motive; the end of the world is very near at hand. As Bonnke writes: "When Scripture proclaims, 'It is the last hour ...' it truly is. For the message of the gospel, *it is always the last hour.*"2 In other words, the preaching of fundamentalism depicts a world on the verge of destruction by the plan and intervention of God himself. It is hardly too much to say, with James Barr, who offers a balanced and objective analysis of the phenomenon, that fundamentalism is "a pathological condition of Christianity."3

Fundamentalism is obscurantist and regards critical intellectual inquiry as an enemy. It is certainly true that some religious beliefs have retreated before the discoveries of modern science. But it does not follow that critical investigation by human intelligence is hostile to religion, threatening to Christianity, or irreligious in any way at all. Religious people who accept a God who is creator of both the universe and human intelligence cannot see them coherently as being at odds with each other. A God who is constantly breaking into the order which he himself has established with a seemingly arbitrary display of wondrous power, or threatening at any and every moment to bring the whole universe to an end in some sort of final act combining vengeance and love, is unintelligible or at least incredible. Indeed it is difficult to distinguish the wondrous and bizarre aspects of fundamentalist beliefs from childish fantasy.

Christians believe that freedom is the greatest gift of God which makes us in his image and likeness. Fundamentalism does not liberate and empower human freedom for constructive action in the world; on the contrary it imprisons human freedom. God gave the gift of knowledge and freedom to the human race in order that it might continue the creation of the world and accomplish in history God's own design for his children, a design which is only gradually unfolding as we slowly discover the wonders and potentialities of the universe. God's creation and revelation is not for his own sake but for ours. Nor is his revelation just for any one people or nation; it is not only for Christians, it is for the world, for all peoples.

Once one understands Christianity in this perspective, the sectarianism that fundamentalism espouses appears in all its negativity. Creation and redemption are a loving invitation to the whole human race to rejoice with God when he "saw all that he had made, and indeed it was very good" (Gen 1:31), and in his love for the world that was so great "that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not be lost but may have eternal life" (John 3:16). The sectarianism of fundamentalism not only fails to empower human freedom to embrace God's grace and salvation in and for the world, it simply negates it.4

Moreover, fundamentalism in its unecumenical spirit runs counter to a basic value in Christianity in a situation like ours where ecumenism is vitally needed. Fundamentalism takes an aggressive polemical attitude against the ecumenical movement which makes it a counter witness to the values of Christian love and harmony, mutual respect and hospitality. Today, especially on the African continent, we are deeply conscious of the scandal of our Christian divisions. How can we witness to Jesus Christ where Christians stand against Christians? Ecumenism has total support in the New Testament and neglect of ecumenical opportunities contradicts the message of the New Testament as a whole.

Fundamentalism is not African, but largely American; it is not open to inculturation. Paul Gifford has documented the extensive American fundamentalist involvement in Africa.5 It has an intrinsic inability to become contextualised; it is against this in principle. Thomas 0'Meara writes: "The fundamentalist mind says 'no' to incarnating the gospel in new cultures, in new ways."6 Fundamentalism lacks the historical consciousness and the theological method for inculturation, and it is hamstrung by its rigidity, compulsion, fixation, and fear of the world. "Religion must not be open 7 to different interpretations, to new ideas and practices."7

In brief, fundamentalism is against inculturation in principle.

Fundamentalism is not socially conscious. It distorts Christian piety with its individualism and rejects integral human development through its right-wing social involvement. In the twentieth century we have finally become conscious of what Africans have always known, that human existence is constituted as a social reality or phenomenon; that every form of individualism is really an illusion. We have also learned that religion in so far as it assumes any public form is by that fact socially relevant. Fundamentalism's anthropology, on the other hand, its view of salvation, and its conception of Christian life and piety is individualistic. But this individualism is itself a social doctrine that constitutes a preferential option, not for the poor, but for those who benefit from the present condition of society. Bonnke's explanation of poverty and other social evils is very simple, indeed simplistic: "People suffer chiefly for one reason: they are ignoring God's book, the Bible, and then everything goes wrong."8

Fundamentalism is most rampant among the poor, in depressed areas, and among those who have seen nearly every facet of life change around them and are struggling, usually not very successfully, to find a stable footing in fife. I do not, of course, maintain that only the poor or other victims of society are fundamentalists, for there are many motives at work in the movement. But poverty is a major factor.

The fact that fundamentalism cuts across all the major religions suggests that it stems from other reasons than purely religious, such as social instability, cultural transformations, and upheavals within value systems. In other words, the insecurity that feeds fundamentalism is itself socially generated. But fundamentalism precisely does not address the social conditions that feed its own religious system. On the contrary it is escapist. It provides an inerrant Bible as a source of security and an apocalyptic view of history. The apocalyptic of fundamentalism, writes Eugene LaVerdiere, "finds little or no hope in the world as we know it. It consequently focuses very sharply on the cataclysmic end of the world in divine judgment."9 In so doing it reinforces the political, social and economic structures that are in place.

But the God of the Bible is one who empowers human freedom so that we may repair disrupted social relations, make unjust structures just, help the unemployed to find work, and so on. Fundamentalism can exploit these issues only in the measure that our Christian churches do not adequately or credibly attend to them. The challenge of fundamentalism, then, is that it asks Christians the following questions: "How are we going about our own lives as churches; how are

we living the gospel?" "Are we really doing what we should be doing?" "Are we addressing the issues that fundamentalism neglects, and doing so in a way that witnesses credibly to the gospel?"

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Islam today can only be understood in the light of over a century of colonial domination by the West—which it identifies, not unnaturally, with Christianity. Since the 1970s Islam has reasserted itself in Muslim societies and is referred to variously as the Islamic resurgence, Islamic revivalism, or Islamic fundamentalism.10

Islam is a total way of life in which religion and politics form a whole and this is understood to be divinely willed. Islamic life tended to take a more secular path under the impact of European colonisation. This began to be reversed in many countries from the late 1960s with the growth of religious revivalism, which represented a quest for a more authentic identity rooted in an Islamic past. The decisive rout of the combined forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the Six-Day war with Israel in 1967, with the massive loss of territory and especially of Jerusalem, the third holiest city in Islam, brought about a deep crisis of confidence and identity in the whole Islamic world. This defeat could only be a sign of divine disfavour, which led to a critical reaction to the Western influences that were now seen as weakening fidelity to Islamic traditions. The West, which had so strongly supported the State of Israel, became ever more the enemy and this, of course, embraced Christianity too. If Islam were to regain strength and success, it would be by a return to radical fidelity to God's word and the prophet. Thus began a search for Islamic authenticity manifested in a return to the golden age of Islam. Every form of Western lifestyle was seen now as the cause of the loss of divine favour and of moral decline.

Even though the Israeli army was ultimately victorious, the Egyptian successes in the October War of 1973, the Arab oil embargo of the same year, and the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 brought a new sense of pride and enthusiasm to many in the Muslim world and were seen as a sign of God's blessing on the Islamic revival movement. The revival understands Islam as a total ideology that provides the basic framework of meaning and direction for political, social and cultural life. It is a system of belief and law that governs both spiritual and temporal affairs.

According to Esposito, "to restore God's rule and inaugurate a true Islamic social order, Western-inspired civil codes must be replaced by Islamic law, which is the only acceptable blueprint for Muslim society11 Islamic fundamentalists go further and insist that the establishment of an Islamic system of government is an imperative based on God's command, and Muslim governments that do not impose the Sharia are illegitimate. Moreover, Jihad or holy war against unbelief and unbelievers is a religious duty. These fundamentalists no longer regard Christians and Jews as "People of the Book" who can be tolerated in a Muslim state, though as second class citizens, but as unbelievers (infidels) because of their connection with Western (Christian) colonialism and Zionism. The moderate majority of Muslims seek gradual reform through the transformation of Muslim society; the fundamentalists advocate violent revolution. The fundamentalists believe that the refusal of some Muslim governments to implement Islamic law calls for the use of violence and armed struggle, were seen in Algeria and other places. This fundamentalism is strongest where Western influence has been most pervasive. Iran is a good example, illustrated in so many ways since the overthrow of the Shah, not least by the Salman Rushdie affair. In Kenya we are very conscious of this fundamentalism in neighbouring Sudan. Society must conform to God's law fully articulated in the revealed and immutable Sharia which is valid for today and for all ages. If persuasion cannot win over the people, then force is legitimate

so that God's will may be accomplished. We have seen this in the case of the Copts in Egypt and Christians in the Sudan and Nigeria. For Muslim fundamentalists, Christian minorities are generally seen as those who cooperated with the colonial powers, benefited from their protection, and were the fruit of Christian missions in the colonial era.

In most Muslim states citizens, regardless of their faith, may hold any office with the exception of head of state or prime minister. This is increasingly contested by the fundamentalists who argue that non-Muslims should not hold key government, military, judicial or legislative positions responsible for formulating and implementing the Islamic ideology of the state. Esposito remarks that "the unresolved contradictions between the two (moderates and fundamentalists) are like a smouldering fire, barely visible until a strong change in the direction of the wind causes it to ignite and erupt.12 It is for this reason, I think, that Kenyans often cast uneasy glances across the Tanzanian border these days.

This division in Muslim society stems chiefly from different educational experiences, the traditional religious and the modern secular, often undergone abroad. This results in the history of modern Islam being that of two groups who possess quite different outlooks on life, a Western-oriented minority who wish to modernize their countries and a religious leadership which sees Islam and its authority as under siege from Western secularism and materialism. This could be an explosive situation given the conviction of the fundamentalists that they are entrusted with God's cause and have his mandate to use force, if this is the only way of bringing about the conversion of the world to Islam. For it is the obligation of the community to spread Islam by all means available. The world is seen as divided into the "region of Islam" and the "region of war", namely those places not yet subject to Islam. At the end of the world all will be subject to Islam.

FUNDAMENTALISM AND FANATICISM

In spite of the inadequacy of the portrayal of the two types of fundamentalism above, perhaps enough has been said to permit a consideration now of the focus of these pages: the thin line between fundamentalism and fanaticism. It must be evident from what has been said that there are remarkable points of convergence between the two categories of fundamentalism. each rests on the foundation of an inerrant, divinely dictated message, the Bible and the Quran. The obedience required to God on the basis of these scriptures can nullify growth in human freedom and reduce people to infantilism. Each claims to provide guidance for the whole of a person's life so that external obedience is all that is required, not a growth in maturity through the pain of personal discernment and decision day by day. Modernity is regarded with suspicion and generally to be rejected, especially as it impinges on religious beliefs and practices. Critical intellectual inquiry and appraisal of revelation and past life in order to distinguish between revealed immutable principles and historically conditioned laws and institutions is the great betrayal. An exclusivity which rejects others as false Christians and infidels is characteristic of each form of fundamentalism. In each, security is a major value whether based in the certainties of the Bible or of the Quran. Fear is a central motivating force; for God is not to be loved but to be obeyed. Each is intimately tied to essentially right-wing politics and conservative social doctrine.

The identification of Christian fundamentalism with politics is, of course, more subtle and veiled than the open identification between religious belief and political structure proclaimed in Islam as the will of Allah. Islam is also more openly invasive of social life through its institutions and practices, such as traditional Islamic laws and punishments, the veiling of women, separate

facilities for men and women, and the civilly defined status of non-Muslims. Each rejects any form of ecumenism; conversion is the only legitimate goal.

Are all fundamentalists fanatics? Certainly they are generally obsessed with their beliefs and want to draw others to them, often aggressively. How often are we not asked by Christian fundamentalists whether we are saved and, if we reply that we are not, we know the pressure that is brought to bear. We know, too, that whenever a Christian woman marries a Muslim, her conversion to Islam is insisted on. Religious freedom far from being recognised as a basic human right flowing from the dignity and freedom of each individual, would in such a case be seen as a betrayal of Islam. But is this fanaticism?

The term fanaticism is generally applied to that passion with which a cause is served which claims rights for the cause before which the rights of all others must give way. The rights are claimed in the name of a divine inspiration, cause or mandate. It is this claim to divine authorisation which properly constitutes fanaticism rather than simply passionate adherence to a cause. Because of their divine mission fanatics frequently claim also the right to vindicate their cause by force. Can one then characterise the Islamic Jihad as fanatical? In its proper meaning the jihad is the obligation incumbent on all Muslims, both as individuals and community, to exert themselves to realise God's will, to lead a virtuous life, and to extend the Islamic community through preaching, education and force, which should not however include aggressive warfare. But Islamic fundamentalists often constitute the *Jihad* as the sixth pillar of Islam,13 claiming the right to wage war against unbelief and infidels as a religious duty to Allah. For they see the army of God as locked in battle or holy war with the followers of Satan.

This, of course, is fanaticism, as is the practice of issuing fatwa(ital)14 such as that of the Ayatollah Khomeini prescribing the death of Rushdie, or the territorial imposition of the Sharia, which being based on religious conviction is necessarily personal and binding only on Muslims. Many aspects of Islamic fundamentalism, therefore, fall clearly on the side of the line that is fanaticism.

What is to be said of gospel fundamentalism? Certainly evangelical fundamentalists have a cause and a strong sense of their divine mission to spread "salvation", as they understand it. Do they use force to achieve their end? There is a force that is not physical but which can sometimes be as strong and even more coercive. What are we to say of the preacher who threatens with damnation those who do not accept to be "saved", especially when the hearers are uneducated, even illiterate? What of those who promise moral and physical miracles to the crippled, the downtrodden and the ignorant or prosperity to the destitute, if they will confess the Lord in fundamentalist style? What do we think of the fundamentalist teacher who subtly threatens his or her pupils with loss of favour or even failure, unless they join the group of the "saved"? Or the employer who indicates that continuance in work could be doubtful, when work is almost impossible to obtain? Or the friend who threatens to end the friendship? Or the relation or benefactor who will discontinue to help with school fees? One could continue with so many examples of moral coercion in tragic or difficult situations, which are not at all fictitious but are well known to be associated with fundamentalist Christianity. Are they examples of fanaticism in those who perpetrate them? If not, then the line is thin indeed, if it exists at all!

NOTES

1. See *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, January 26, 1994, p. 13,

2. *Evangelism by fire: an initiative for revival*. Eastbourne: Kingsway Publications, 1989, p. 30.

3. *Fundamentalism*. London: SCM, 1981, p. *5.*

4. Someone may object that fundamentalism seems to be empowering many people in their lives. But I speak of empowerment as a movement of ever greater humanization and growth in human freedom that permits a creative life in the world and in history culminating in resurrection with Christ. From this dynamic point of view of creative engagement in human life, the so-called empowerment of fundamentalism can only be seen as an enslavement.

5. "Christianity: to save or to enslave?". *Catholic international* (August 1991), pp. 733-735.

6. *Fundamentalism: a Catholic perspective*. New York, Paulist Press, 1990, p. 45,

7. *Ibid*., p.50.

8. *Evangelism by fire*, p. 54.

9. "Fundamentalism: a pastoral concern", The Bible today (ital.), January 1983, p. 8.

10. See Esposito, John L. *Islam, the straight path*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 162-202.

11. *Ibid*., p. 170.

12. *Ibid*., p.194.

13. Jihad in fact has no such official status in Islam. The five pillars of Islam are: belief in one God, the prayer of worship five times a day, almsgiving, the pilgrimage (hadj) (ital.) and fasting during Ramadan.

14. A fatwa in itself is simply a formal legal opinion or decision of a mufti.

CHAPTER 44

CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN LIBERATION

FRANCIS GICHIA

INTRODUCTION

Today, it suffices to pick up a newspaper or listen to the radio or look at the TV and one hears it all: the misery of mankind in the modern world.

South Africa: Man discriminated against and exploited by man on the basis of the colour of his skin.

The Americas: The cry of millions of Indians (native Americans). A people exploited, harassed, and even sometimes exterminated by other men, yet all in the name of establishing so-called freedom and democracy!

The Middle East: People displaced from their home- land and children growing up knowing nothing but war and the art of war.

Uganda: War! War! War! The vicious circle of tribalism, war and revenge having robbed man of peace for almost twenty years.

Developing countries: Neo-colonial domination! The widening gap between the rich and the poor; the plight of peasant farmers; political ignorance and hence political exploitation.

This misery is an injustice that cries to the heavens for redress. It is something to fight against and to eradicate. Not something to be accepted and used as an occasion to display our charity. Misery and destitution are not accidental. The fact that people are subjected to injustice is not a matter of chance but the result of unjust structures. In order to serve such people, one has to initiate actions for liberation.

THE AFRICAN SITUATION

The existential condition of many people in our continent is a sad one. In Africa, one encounters many whose dignity is trampled underfoot by injustice, poverty, exploitation, hunger, violence and corruption. From a Christian perspective, we can say that in these suffering human beings we encounter Christ who is hungry, thirsty, naked, sick and imprisoned (cf. Matthew 25). People suffer on account of lack of educational opportunities, lack of social services and because of frequent civil wars and coups d'etat.1 Bishop Peter Sarpong was right when he said that:

To see reality in Africa is to see a world in turmoil! Africa is defined by the kind of events ranging from pre-colonial interethnic bloody belligerency and rule of terror by some tribal heads, through colonial white exploitative imperialism characterized by repressive measures, whose depth of evil imposes night on the eyes of countless victims...2

Any realistic analysis of the African situation in relation to the factors that continue to dehumanize man today must include the following:

Problems originating in the life and organization of African traditional society. This includes intertribal strife manifesting itself in tribalism and in civil wars Historical problems. This area would include the consequences of slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Any people whose

history is marked with enslavement and colonial domination continues to suffer from the consequences of these evils long after the latter have been abolished. These evils produce a psychological complex that is difficult to erase from the hearts and minds of the victims.

Socio-economic and political problems. These include the inequality in social and economic structures, corruption, exploitation of the poor and of women, disparity in the educational system, military and civil dictatorships and detentions without trial.

Widespread moral decadence and moral insensitivity. This can be summed up in one word: Sin. Sin is the root cause of all dehumanization. Sin includes actions, attitudes and mentalities; in short, a lifestyle by which we destroy or diminish, directly or indirectly, the lives of those whom God has given to us as brothers and sisters. Sin is "the comprehensive attitude that makes us turn away from others and from God and seek only our own advantage."3 It is sin that in the long run makes life in society impossible. Sin, even on the personal level, is reflected in "egotism, haughtiness, ambition and envy. These traits produce injustice, domination, violence at every level, and conflicts between individuals, groups and social classes. They also produce corruption, hedonism, aggravated sexuality and superficiality in mutual relations."4

The present condition of man is an affront to all those who regard an individual as a unique creature of the Living God. If we believe that man was created in the image of God, we must endorse the sentiment of Nyerere when he says: "I refuse to imagine a God who is poor (destitute), ignorant, superstitious, fearful, oppressed, wretched-- which is the lot of the majority of those he created in his own image."5 The awareness and consequent rejection of situations in which human dignity is trampled upon is the first step in the process of human liberation.

CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

By the term "human liberation" we refer to the setting free of man from all that which oppresses him and from all that which acts as a barrier to his true development or humanization. Liberation restores the process of humanization which, according to Paulo Freire, is the vocation of all men. He says that:

> While both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives. Only the first is man's vocation. This vocation is constantly negated yet it is affirmed by that very negation. It is thwarted by injustice, exploitation, oppression and the violence of oppressors; it is affirmed by the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and justice, and by their struggle to recover their lost humanity.6

A comprehensive understanding of liberation must take into account the three levels of meaning drawn by modern theologians:7

On the first level liberation is an expression of the aspirations of the poor in terms of their economic, social and political freedom. On the second level, liberation is an understanding of history in which man assumes conscious responsibility for his own destiny. In this perspective, the unfolding of all of man's dimensions is demanded: man who makes himself throughout his life and throughout history. Here, the gradual conquest of true freedom in time leads to the creation of 'a new man' and a qualitatively different society. On the third level we lave liberation from sin. It is important to note that these are not three liberations, but three spheres of liberation of the same thing. To limit the term to only one of these meanings is to undermine the strength of the term.

Historical Background

The modern usage of the term ‘human liberation’ originates in the historical experience of Latin Americans. The liberation movement began to make its presence felt in that continent in the 1960’s when theories of development were first disclosed in their true neo-capitalist light. Support for development was intense in Latin America in the 1950’s but the supporters of this development failed to tackle the problem at its root cause. Development schemes in the 1960’s involved rich nations helping poor nations get on their feet by financing grants, loans or by giving outright gifts. There was even a ‘Decade of Development’ sponsored by the United Nations which sought to accelerate such activities, but at the end of the decade the gap between the rich and the poor had widened. The problem was that these development aid programmes were aimed at effecting changes within the formal structure of the existing institutions without challenging the structure itself.

The capitalist view of development is synonymous with ‘economic growth’. Yet the dynamics of world economics leads simultaneously to the creation of greater wealth for the few and greater poverty for the many. When Latin Americans discovered the deficiencies of this system of development, they opted for a change of emphasis in which development would be considered as "a total social process including economic, social, political and cultural development."8 This notion stresses the interdependence of different factors. Advances in one area imply advances in all of them and, conversely, stagnation in one area implies stagnation in the rest.

To view development as a total social process necessarily implies an ethical dimension presupposing a concern for human values. This humanistic approach attempts to place the notion of development in a wider context: a historical vision in which humankind assumes control of its own destiny.

When Latin Americans realized that the common usage of the term ‘development’ was ineffective in the long run and counterproductive in achieving a real transformation in their society, they opted for a different terminology and chose ‘liberation’. For them, liberation expressed the inescapable moment of radical change which the use of the term ‘development’ did not portray. Those who became thus conscious engaged in liberation praxis. ‘Praxis’ here refers to the ongoing interplay of reflection and action; thus when one acts, one reflects on one’s action and then may act in a different way on the basis of the reflection. Where this ‘praxis’ took place among Christians, it resulted in what we call today ‘Liberation theology’.

The Christian Church

Despite the concern the church has had for humankind down the centuries, there have been shortcomings and pitfalls in her history. Attesting to this fact, one modern theologian, Bernard Haering, notes that:

> In many ways and in many places, the church has lived in serfdom to the wealthy and powerful who turned to her not so much to serve the Gospel as to use her influence for their own interests. And although the accusations that the church is seeking power are still coming from all corners today, the powerful and greedy have not yet stopped using the church.9

The delegates to the first Assembly of the World Council of Churches (Amsterdam, 1948) acknowledged this shortcoming and expressed the church's repentance for past failures: "We have to accept God's judgment for our share in the world's guilt. Often we have tried to serve God and Mammon, put other loyalties before Christ, confused the gospel with our own economic or national or racial interests."10 The Latin American Catholic bishops reiterated the same view at Puebla when they said: "We affirm the need of conversion on the part of the whole church to a preferential option for the poor, an option aimed at their integral liberation."11

The Gospel and the plight of the poor challenge the church into action for social transformation. It is true that charity can be an important relief in many circum-stances, but it should be accompanied by changes at the level of structures, institutions and human values. Christians have to learn to speak boldly in Christ's name; to oppose terror, cruelty and racial discrimination; to stand by the outcast, the prisoner and the refugee. They have to make the church in every place a voice for those who have no voice, and a home where every man will be at home.12

CHRISTIANITY'S LIBERATION PRAXIS

We have already noted that by praxis we refer to the interplay of both reflection and action. When Christians reflect on the existential situation of mankind today and on the teaching of the Bible, they cannot afford to remain indifferent. They will have to engage in the process of human liberation.

The first step must be the establishment of a basis on which to anchor the praxis. The Fathers of Vatican council II tell us that "at all times the Church carries the responsibility of reading the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel."13 In reading and interpreting 'the signs of the times', Christians should judge whether the events of their past and present history are in conformity with the divine will. Although this discernment is the task of all men of good will, Christians have a more urgent role and a specific point of reference in their interpretation and accomplishment of history. They have Jesus Christ, his teaching and the Kingdom he announces as their guide in this praxis. It is in Jesus and through him that salvation/liberation is present at the heart of man's history. Hence engagement by Christians in a liberation praxis must be based on Jesus Christ. For them it is only in Jesus that the pre-eminent path of liberation and the most unmistakable basis of human dignity is to be found. On the other hand, the Gospel will become the constant inspiration of the Christians' vision of the world and their commitment to it. This will help them to avoid the temptation and the danger of using a purely political or cultural code of conduct as their driving force.

After establishing the basis for the praxis of the Christian's liberation, we shall now discuss some of the roles of Christianity in the process of human liberation. These include: conscientization, development, reconciliation and evangelization.

Conscientization

One of the ways in which the church can make people aware of liberation is through constant teaching and preaching of the Christian truth in ways that illumine the historical conditions in which men live and the problems which they face. Apart from making people aware of their health, their nutritional and economic problems, the church must also help them to ask vital questions about their society and what is happening therein. Reaching a stage of asking questions marks a significant development in the process of conscientization. It is also an indication of self-

confidence on the part of people. The next step will be to take a firm stand in their endeavour to improve their society.

Conscientization is also vital in eradicating political lukewarmness from among the people. People at the grass-roots level of society have been led by some politicians to place a clear demarcation between religion and politics: one is heavenly, the other earthly; the one holy, the other sinful or dirty, one to be embraced by believers, the other shunned. This dichotomy has created what we can call 'fear of politics', even among Christians. It is important that people be made aware that it is not politics as such which is 'dirty' but 'dirty people' who spoil it. Since Christians have Jesus Christ as their point of reference, they should look to him even in their political commitment. Jesus' supreme commandment of an all-embracing love, service, reconciliation, absolute sincerity, healing and saving justice, suffices to bring the reality of salvation into the political arena.

Lastly, Christian leaders and the church hierarchy must not shy away from playing their role as did the prophets of the Old Testament, of being the conscience of society. In this they have been challenged by none other than the Father of the Kenyan nation, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta when he said:

> One of the services you give to others is to help keep them going in the right direction. We have many distractions and can wander off the path. We do need to be constantly put back on it again. Then, too, most of us are not theologians, and in the complexities of modern life, we may not even know we are going astray, that we are making the wrong decision. That is why we need the church in our midst to tell us when we are making a mistake.14

The church is the conscience of society and today society needs a conscience. Do not be afraid to speak.

Development

The promotion of development for liberation is another sphere of the Christian community's liberation praxis. Many Christians as well as other citizens of our nation are involved in development projects. As they engage in developmental work they should grow in understanding the fact that development is not just a matter of reducing poverty and eliminating hunger. It is a question, rather, of building a world where everyone, no matter what his social status, can have a fully human life, freed from servitude imposed on him or her by other men, a world where freedom is not an empty word.

Reconciliation

Every true reform starts with self-criticism and the putting of one own house in order. This is true all the more so for Christians whose founder warned: "Why do you observe the splinter in your brother's eye and never notice the plank in your own?" (Matthew 7:3) Since an essential aspect of the Christian community is that of being a sign of peace and reconciliation, Christians should first seek to promote these values in their own communities and then in the wider society.

Reconciliation means repairing the damaged or broken bonds of unity and friendship between God and Man and between man and man on a personal and also on a communal level. Christians can do this by initiating dialogue where there is conflict. Dialogue helps to create understanding

and confidence in the search for unity. Dialogue also helps to eliminate recourse to violent means of solving prob1ems whether on a personal or group level.

Evangelization

The work of evangelization is of paramount importance in Christianity's 1iberation praxis. All the injustices in society, the abuse of power and other evils emanate from sin which resides in the heart of man. It is therefore only from a new heart that a new world can be born. Christians have a responsibility to communicate the Gospel to others and to reach out to them in loving service. They must urge all humankind to enter into total openness to God and neighbour. The love-basis of the message of Jesus Christ compels Christians to seek the transformation of human society by propagating the Gospel.

NOTES

1. Magesa, Laurenti. 'Return to the world: towards a theocentric existentialism in Africa", in *AFER*, Vol. 16, no.3 (1974), p. 278.

2. Cf. Sarpong, Peter. "Disunity in independent Africa and the role of religion" in *AFER*, Vo1.26, no. 4 (1984), p. 213.

3. Bakole wa Ilunga. *Paths of liberation: a third world spirituality*, translated by Matthew J. O'Connell. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1984, p. 36.

4. Cf. Puebla, *The Third General Conference of Latin American Bishops*. Official English edition. Washington, D.C.: The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1979. No. 328.

5. Nyerere, Julius K. *Freedom and development*. Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 216.

6. Freire, Paulo. *Pedagogy of the oppressed.* Middlesex: Penguin Books. 1972, p. 20.

7. Cf. Gutierrez, Gustavo. *A theology of liberation.* Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1973, p. 37.

8. *Ibid*., p.24.

9. Haering, Bernard. *Free and faithful in Christ*, Vol.2. Middlegreen: St. Paul Publications, 1981, p. 266.

10. As Quoted in John Desrochers. *The social teaching of the Church.* Bangalore: The author, 1982, p. 443.

11. *Puebla*, No. 1134.

12. Desrochers, *op.cit*., p. 445.

13. Vatican Council II Documents. *Gaudium et Spes*. No. 4.

14. Kenyatta, Jomo. "Opening Address AMECEA Plenary, 1976". In *AFER*, Vol.18, no. 5 (1976). p. 312.

CHAPTER 45
VIOLENCE: CAUSES AND RESPONSES
AYLWARD SHORTER

Violence is part of human experience—part of the human condition. Warfare, violent punishment by the state, interpersonal violence, justified or unjustified, characterise human history in every age. Africa was the victim of violence perpetrated by the European powers during the centuries of the Atlantic slave trade and the period of colonial annexation, which violence was resisted violently in many cases by Africans. Examples can be cited from East Africa like those of the Nandi war, the Hehe resistance against the Germans in Tanzania or the resistance of Kabalega (a traditional Bunyoro king) against the British in Uganda. Much of the violence in contemporary Africa serves the interest of foreign powers and is fomented by them.

Yet pre-colonial Africa was not without its violence. Indeed it can be said that the perpetrators of violence from Europe and Arabia exploited the violence that already existed in Africa, as indeed outsiders still do today. Among the various ethnic groups of pre-colonial Africa, there was violence both internal and external. There were wars between different groups competing for resources and there were dynastic conflicts and raids upon neighbouring groups. In some African ethnic groups violence was endemic. One could even say that a war psychology was part of the national consciousness or of the ethnic culture.

Within the traditional societies of Africa there was relatively little violence when compared to societies in other parts of the world. Where public sanctions and social control were concerned, Africans seem to have preferred non-violent solutions. Unless a criminal was caught in the act, legal procedures usually led to reconciliation and compensation rather than to retributive punishment. People living in the social proximity of a village society could not afford to alienate a fellow citizen or his family. Large-scale and long-term prison systems originated outside Africa and are relatively modern even in Europe.

Violent punishment—hanging, for example, or corporal punishment—survive in contemporary Africa even when they have disappeared in the countries from which they came. Mob justice is also an ever-present reality. This is supposedly a response on the part of the public to the rising menace of violent crime—a reaction caused by an unconscious fear of a deep-seated threat to society's existence. However, there is no sign of fear on the faces of those involved in mob justice. On the contrary, they appear to enjoy beating a suspected thief or housebreaker. Their participation in this activity is an expression of a whole social ethos—an atmosphere of unreality that pervades society. The truth is that the world as a whole is becoming a more violent place. Football hooliganism, vandalism. child abuse, wife-beating—these may be, to some extent, the consequences of the frustrations experienced by individuals in modern, industrial, urbanized society. In some cases they are exacerbated by racialism or other forms of discrimination or antagonism, giving rise to the riots characteristic of inner cities in the West and even to the violence of urban guerilla gangs.

However, the worldwide prevalence today of guerilla warfare and terrorist atrocities is partly due to the impossibility or near-impossibility of total war. Violence is always aggravated by the availability of weapons. It escalates according to the scale and power of available weaponry. Today, in the twentieth century we seem to be at the end of the evolution of weapon power. Nations are rightly fearful of the consequences of a total nuclear war, and the nuclear powers are afraid even of a conventional war that might lead to a nuclear confrontation. Hence they support the so-

called "proxy wars" and certain forms of international terrorism. In many cases also, the victims of oppression and discrimination have no choice. In opposing violently a tyrannical and heavily armed regime, they must resort to terrorism and guerilla tactics. This is often the only option they have. This is the understandable argument of some nationalists.

In order to get to the roots of violence in the modern world, we have to ask ourselves an even more fundamental question: why are human beings violent? There have been many answers to this question. Some, especially psychologists, lay the stress on the natural aggressiveness that is to be found, to varying degrees, in every individual. Yet in itself, this is not an explanation. It is clear that social conditions provide an outlet for innate aggressiveness. Some have pointed to the beneficial consequences of warfare and violence, such as keeping down the population or bringing about social integration through the elimination of groups which pose a threat to society as a whole. Such considerations, besides sounding extremely cynical, must be rarely in the consciousness of individuals. If they are a kind of unconscious. "programming" of society, we are back again at the psychological level which, as we have just seen, is insufficient as an explanation in itself. The most plausible explanation of violence and the escalation of violence is social recognition or approval. People are violent, people fight, people go in for a military career, people even practice torture, because there is a measure of social approval for such action. There is a social justification for what they do. It may be vengeance, it may be the desire to protect the dignity of one's own person or group, it may be sympathy or pride. Whatever it is, it is shared, and allows violence to come out into the open.

Violence is first of all in the mind, and the mind is partially conditioned by society. If violence is on the increase, it is because it has become socially more acceptable. People who have been through the experience of events in post-independence Uganda know the extent to which a whole society can be brutalized or demoralized. In the world at large, the teachings of Marx and Lenin have surely influenced the social consciousness on the subject of violence. Marxism advocates violent resistance to capitalism and imperialism. It teaches that conflict is at the heart of human progress and that there must be a class war if conditions are to improve and a classless society is to be created. It is, to say the least, doubtful whether the violent expropriation of the rich by the poor will usher in an era of peace and prosperity for humankind. On the contrary, such teaching seems to encourage aggression, rapacity and arbitrary, totalitarian government. It cannot be an accident that countries which follow Marxist ideologies have the worst record where human rights violations are concerned. The influence of Marxist-Leninist theory is to be discerned in the growing spirit of militarism and violent resistance which is sweeping the world in which we live.

Let us now consider some of the responses, possible and actual, to violence, One response-especially in cases where governments and the societies they rule accept violence as a matter of course—is simply more violence. Violence then becomes a vicious circle, Another response is that represented by modern peace movements: no violence at any price, unilateral nuclear disarmament, "make peace not war," In Christian terms, there is no doubt that there can be no justification for waging a nuclear war, but Christians differ as to the morality and practicality of the nuclear deterrent. And there is always the question of a violence which is less than nuclear, the violence with which the world is, in fact, saddled at present. Traditionally, there are three Christian responses to violence.

THE CRUSADE, CHRISTIAN PACIFISM AND THE JUST WAR

The Crusade is similar to the Islamic idea of Jihad, or "Holy War." It is not merely a war of religion, but a war to spread religion. The Holy War is waged for spiritual, as well as for material, benefits. Those who die in the cause are "martyrs" and their souls are supposed to go straight to heaven. Although the idea of Jihad has reappeared among some Muslims in recent years in order to justify violent aspects of the current Islamic revival, nobody today seriously advocates the Crusade as an option for Christians, The absolute ethic of love taught by Jesus Christ is now universally understood as excluding the possibility of a Holy War. Among certain Marxist idealists--even among certain Marxist African writers--violent resistance can take on the character of a Holy War. Violence is undertaken almost for its own sake, as something essentially purifying. Such a view, as we have seen above, is contradictory.

The second Christian option is pacifism. Pacifism carries the logic of martyrdom to the other extreme. Not only is it necessary to give one's life in defence of one's faith but it is also necessary to give one's life rather than perpetrate any act of violence--even the violent defence of one's neighbour's rights. According to the Christian pacifist, the only response to violence is a non-violent one. The love-ethic of Jesus Christ is absolute. Such pacifism was the teaching of the Anabaptists during and after the Wars of Religion in Europe and it is still the teaching of the Society of Friends (the Quakers) today.

Close to the position of Christian Pacifism, and indeed largely deriving from it, is that of active non-violence. It is based on the idea that power which rests on violence must eventually collapse. By actively coordinating a non-violent (or "passive") resistance, this collapse can be brought about. In its modern form, non-violence derives from the teaching and life-style of the Russian writer Tolstoy, but its most notable protagonists in this century have been Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Gandhi's contribution to Indian independence and Martin Luther King's championship of civil rights in the United States are undeniable examples of the success of non-violence, but both men were martyrs in its cause. Non-violence necessarily involves the calculated risk of martyrdom.

The final Christian response to violence is that of the Just War. According to this position, the absolute ethic of love taught by Jesus Christ remains the ideal, but there are certain situations in which violence is permitted as a necessary evil. Basically, these situations are those in which the rights of individuals are threatened and in which violent self-defence is tolerated. However, the violent means adopted must be proportionate to the right that is being defended and they can only be lawfully taken when all other courses of action have been exhausted or are impossible. In this connection it is interesting that the Vatican Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation of April 5th 1986 reiterates the position of Pope Paul VI in Populorum Progressio that violent revolution may be pursued against a long-standing tyranny when there is reasonable hope that such a course of action will result in a change of the unjust status quo.

President Kenneth Kaunda is an example of a Christian statesman who, although inclined by conviction to be a pacifist, finds himself in the "frontline" against a longstanding tyranny in South Africa. This situation obliges him to become a reluctant advocate of the Just War.

Apartheid's challenge not only to Africa but to all humanity was so absolute that if there were no other way we must face up, as the free world has done before, to a long hard struggle which cannot exclude the use of force.

We may love peace but it is often self-defeating to welcome peace too soon. Peace at any price - especially peace at the price of justice—is mere appeasement. All human growth entails a struggle and in particular a struggle against evil. Sometimes the evil is symbolized by evil people against whom we are obliged to struggle, even though we desire their conversion and "love" them as enemies. Conflict helps to get rid of injustice and is often involved when we take sides for truth

and love. Conflict may be purifying if it is not sought as an end in itself. It may be a necessary condition for renewal. All of this is evidence, however, of the need to contain violence and to keep a sense of proportion. Peace must remain the objective—but a just peace. That is why we speak today of "Justice and Peace."

Since the chief cause of violence in the world today is a mentality of violence, we must do all we can to promote a mentality of justice and peace. That means a basically non-violent attitude—choosing by preference the non-violent response. Too many people look upon violence as a first, rather than a last, resort. It also means a jealous safeguarding of human rights in the world, punishing—.always non-violently, if possible—every violation. Above all, terrorism, which explicitly involves the killing of the innocent, must be abhorred and resisted. Such responses depend upon the moral education of our society— the creation of what Pope John Paul II recently called a "healthy public opinion" through the right use of the mass media. Much research has been done on the link between violence in real life and the violence portrayed in the media. In the final analysis, it cannot be denied that there is a link. This cause, among others, must be removed if we are to enjoy a "peace mentality."

NOTE

1. Kaunda, Kenneth. *Kaunda on violence*, London: Sphere, 1980, p.178.

CHAPTER 46
ON THE MEANING OF RELIGION
EUGENE HILLMAN

Before entering into formal dialogue with members of other faith communities, Christians have to work out fresh answers to some ancient theological questions about their own beliefs and attitudes. We must decide, for example, whether or to what extent, we really believe that Jesus Christ is the universally efficacious saviour of the whole of humankind, or merely the saviour of individuals who after being exposed to missionary preachers from Europe or North America have accepted him as their own personal saviour.

In other words, our participation in an interreligious dialogue must be based on a credible Christian theology of religion. "We explain the fact that the Milky Way is there by the doctrine of creation," notes Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "but how do we explain the fact that the Bhagavad Gita is there?1

Any effort to construct a positive Christian theology of religion must, in turn, be grounded in a sound anthropological understanding of the meaning of religion. Hence, the following preliminary reflections on the significance of religion and its place in the lives of real people who experience life and seek its meaning always and only within particular historical time frames and limited cultural matrices.2

COMMUNICATING MEANING

Change and pluralism in the realm of languages are generally accepted. When it comes to religion, however, they are often resisted. Yet, both of these cultural realities, language and religion, are similar; they are humanly invented systems of symbols that both constitute and communicate meanings. Languages do this through the articulation and codification of meaningful sounds developed as a collaborative effort of generations of people sharing a common field of human experience. Religions do this through the joint creation of social structures, myths and rituals. By means of such symbols persons learn to convey meaning to other persons.

Commonly shared meanings bind persons together in communities. These groups transmit to successive generations the meanings that clarify or obscure, reform or deform, enrich or impoverish the common meanings and understandings required for the coherence and perseverance of communities. Human communities are not therefore just aggregates of individuals living in the same geographical location. Bernard Lonergan explains all of this at length in his treatment of community as ‘an achievement of common meaning.’ In Lonergan’s words:

> Common meaning is potential when there is a common field of experience; and to withdraw from that common field is to get out of touch. Common meaning is formal when there is common understanding, and one withdraws from that common understanding by misunderstanding, by incomprehension, by mutual incomprehension. Common meaning is actual in as much as there are common judgments, areas in which all affirm or deny in the same manner: and one withdraws from that common judgment when one disagrees... Common meaning is realized by decisions and choices, especially by permanent dedication, in the love that makes families, in the loyalty that makes states, in the faith that makes religion.3

What follows from this line of thought is decisive for the relationship between the culture – through which a people learns to be human – and the religious component of that culture. Their human community, and in some measure the integral humanness of each person, "coheres or divides, begins or ends, just where the common field of experience, common understanding, common judgment common commitments begin and end."4 A culturally integrated religion can communicate meaningful answers to questions about the vast unknown. It helps to maintain unity among contemporaries of the same culture group, as well as continuity between their past and future generations. It also lends coherence to all the other elements of the culture upon which the people's plausible order to existence depends and without which social chaos inevitably breaks in and takes over.

We depend upon symbol systems to provide plausible, if not fully comprehensible meanings for the mysteries of life. An example would be the Judeo-Christian idea of divine providence. God takes his own people by the hand as they walk through the precarious valley of shadows: "God is light" (1 Jn 1:5); His word enlightens everyone (cf. Jn 1:9; 8:12). The Hindu idea of reincarnation, as a way of addressing the anxieties associated with a merely common sense perception of human finitude, is another example. A Sanskrit phrase of three words *tat tvam asi* ("that thou art") is perhaps the most important religious symbol in India for the rich and multiple meanings it conveys to devout Hindus.5

Religions appeal to people because they offer plausible ways of coping not on1y with natural anxieties and mundane miseries but also and especially with uncanny forces and mysterious powers; also with the inexplicable longings and aspirations of the human heart. The symbols of these religions, fragile webs that they are, offer the signs of hope and liberation that every human being needs. Religions also help to prevent terror and confusion from breaking in upon people when, confronted with a "tumult of uninterpretable events," they have reached the limits of their analytic capacities and moral insights.6 Then they cry out, or perhaps whisper, "my God" (*mein Gott, mon Dieu, nkai ai*)! Even the flickering flame of a candle, or a dark cloud in the sky, may convey a hopeful reply.

A culture is a complex of such symbol systems, including, with language and religion, such things as law, ethics, aesthetics, education, science, entertainment, governance, marriage, child rearing, inheritance, security, economics, and everything else people must learn in order to survive humanly. As a complex of symbol systems, a culture embodies, codifies, integrates and communicates humanly constructed and historically transmitted patterns of meaning, perceptions, values, ideas, attitudes, judgments, beliefs, ideals, aspirations, commitments and actions through which life is interpreted more or less coherently and structured more or less consistently, at least plausibly, in accord with its own supportive ethos and world view.7

VARIABILITY AND DIVERSITY OF SYMBOL SYSTEMS

Basically, cultures are made and continuously reshaped by the human creativity of groups responding to the demands of the bioclimatic regions and historical periods in which they happen to find themselves seeking a livelihood with a measure of security and dignity. Of necessity, the cultures of desert inhabitants must be vastly different from those of the people living in arctic tundra, by the sea, in fertile valleys, on mountain slopes, or in centers of commerce. For this reason cultures are not comparable in terms of better or worse, higher or lower. Each culture is a unique

contribution to the human enterprise, a manifestation of the freedom and flexibility of human creativity. Each is an educational and humanizing memorial to the creative genius of our species.

At the same time, like everything human, cultures are all susceptible to corruption; hence always in need of reformation from within. The degeneration of German culture during the period of Hitler's National Socialism is a case in point. The corruption is not intrinsic to, nor typical of the culture as such. It is not that some cultures are good and others evil. All may be regarded as good, although always in need of liberation from the evil inclinations perennially plaguing the human sojourn.

Like the sounds used by a language to communicate meanings to those understanding the language, religious symbols (e.g., a cross for Christians, a fire for Zoroastrians, a crescent for Muslims, a circle for Oglala Sioux) store and convey meanings by making tangible in the symbol a notion abstracted and recalled from past experience. A system of such symbols, embodying ideas, attitudes, values, judgments, longings, ideals, models and beliefs, speaks mightily to the followers of that religion as it makes present the experience, thereby awakening a variety of associated feelings and opening up new vistas capable of transforming human consciousness. Such transformations, as we know from history, sometimes act like sounds of trumpets setting armies in motion. Religions, again like languages, are essentially social constructions intimately connected with the other e1ements making up the whole culture of a people. Re1igions are "as public as marriage and as observable as agriculture," and they are no less pervasive.8

In every culture group (ethnic community, people, nation, class) there are many, sometimes a majority, who do not learn their own language very well. So also with the local religion; it is taken seriously only in varying degrees by its own followers, some of whom may be quite impious or even atheistic. The same may be said of other elements in any culture: laws, morals, customs, aesthetics, etc. Whole societies have been known to abandon their languages as well as their religions, substituting in their stead inventions borrowed from, or imposed by alien groups, usually as a result of enslavement, colonialism or imperialism of one type or another.

BEYOND THE EPHEMERAL

Neither common sense nor scientific thinking suffice to reveal the meaning of the perplexity, pain, tragedy and moral paradox pervading human life, much less the meaning of life itself and the cold definitiveness of death. Pragmatic manipulators of power and their social engineers, functioning empirically on the level of naïve common sense, deny by their deeds the meanings they proclaim in their political prattle about progress, freedom and security. Artists and poets come c1oser to reality with their poignant descriptions, but the full meaning eludes them. The hopeful disclosures sometimes offered in their exquisite articulations are too fragile and fleeting. It is from the perspective of the religious believer that the 'really real' beyond all ephemeral appearances, is penetrated and the authentic meaning of events disclosed through symbols capable of putting to rest, by transcending them, the varied anxieties of the human heart.

"By entering the ritual," David Tracy tells us, "by retelling the myth, even by creatively reinterpreting the symbol, we escape from the nightmare of history and even the terror of ordinary time" Through religious symbols, myths and rituals that use ordinary media (rocks, water, fire, mountains, clouds) people can reach the "other side of the ordinary" and become "saturated with a power that is sheerly given – but given only in the hierophanies and theophanies of the sacred".9 Religious ritual enactments thus contribute to the transformation of consciousness

through which the ontologically real, as distinguished from merely palpable reality, may be glimpsed by mortal eyes.

The Maasai people of Kenya and Tanzania have a traditional story (which is substantially identical with a myth handed down among the Dinka people of Southern Sudan) which explains the meaning, the bafflement, pain and moral paradox felt by everyone and thus helps them to cope with it.10 It is the story of an origina1 fault committed by some people but affecting the destinies of all in relation to one another and to the God of all. Belief in a beneficent divinity, an origina1 harmony and human solidarity, is presupposed and beyond question in these preliterate societies of sub-Saharan Africa. In spite of all the perplexing, painful, paradoxical and tragic events characterizing the human condition, a dramatic story expresses and affirms a hopeful belief that things are really under control and in order, and that there is a believable explanation, a humanly intelligible story that makes sense and provides the meaning of it all.

Because of an original offense, the divinity is no longer close and familiar but withdrawn; yet present in mysterious ways indicated through symbols. Supreme magnanimity is symbolized by the dark clouds that bring rain, hence life; omnipotence is symbolized by the full sky designated by the same word used for the deity: *enkai*, with the diminutive/feminine prefix *en*connoting reverence. It is hard to imagine a more appropriate symbol for that ultimate horizon of hope which Jews and Christians haltingly name *Jahweh* or *Elohim* or God: the ineffable, indefinable, absolute, infinite, incomprehensible, unfathomable mystery and ground of all reality and of every particular existent.11

Doing What Is Signified

For those who have learned to believe, religious symbols make unfathomable mysteries plausible, incomprehensible events explicable, a sense of justice tangible, human life endurable and the future hopeful. Christians cope with the mystery of evil and death through the symbol of the risen Christ. This symbol is at once a pledge of humankind's victory over evil which, on account of Adam's sin, is present actively and passively in the lives of all the children of Adam. On account of the Second Adam, however, 1iberation from enslavement to sin with its sinister consequences is possible for all (cf. Rom 5). In both instances the deliberate act of one human being, standing symbolically for all (corporate personality), embraces the whole of humankind, recalling the solidarity lost through sin yet available through faith in the promises, the "good news," of the one who, in the long run, is victorious by being the person for others.

Faith in the veracity and reliability of the available religious symbol system is tangibly and often powerfully reinforced, if not in some measure also generated by rituals. Recall the moods and motivations sometimes generated in ourselves by funeral rites, even when we may not have known personally the deceased. A liturgical presentation of the Jewish Passover story can also be profoundly moving even for persons who may not share the faith of Israel. The very impressive fertility rites of Maasai women are capable of inspiring confidence, even generating faith and hope, not only among the Maasai but also among people from different cultural worlds and different religious backgrounds.

In this sense, religious faith can be awakened in people as they portray it in drama or rituals. As Christian theologians say of the sacraments: they do what they signify; or, what they celebrate becomes present through them. At the very least, even an outside observer is apt to feel that the fertility chants of Maasai women, sung while they proceed confidently around a massive tree in the forest and offer (just as their mothers and grandmothers did before them under the same tree)

libations of fresh cow's milk sprinkled on the ancient tree trunk with an aspergillum made from a clump of green grass, must certainly be heard above the clouds. The actual participants in the ritual, all in garb signifying a state of liminality, far from having any doubts at all, are confident of having healthy children born to them within a reasonable time. A deep sense of trust and hope becomes palpable through the ritual. Such moods and motivations induce in people what Clifford Geertz calls a "general conception of the order of existence" more firmly established in reality than any conception of order resting merely on an empirically scientific "swirl of probabilistic hypotheses."

"Whatever role divine intervention may or may not play in the creation of faith," Geertz continues…" it is, primarily at least, out of the context of concrete acts of religious observance that religious convictions emerge on the human plane.13 It is not, of course, a few ritual enactments alone that produce faith in a particular conceptualization of a plausible order of existence; it is, rather, a large and public complex of varied symbol systems interacting as a generally integrated cultural performance, celebrating the meaning of reality and thereby shaping the consciousness, understanding and outlook of a whole people. A Zoroastrian wedding celebration might be taken as an example of a ritual enactment that signifies and renews a community's integrated cultural ethos and world view more realistically than all the careful calculations of Zoroastrian shopkeepers.

DEFINING RELIGION

So it is that people need their religions as much as their languages. Religious symbols systems are capable of communicating to them the meaning of the 'really real' in their cultural worlds; and it is meaning that holds things together even on the brink of chaos. Religions, at their best, can do this, as Geertz suggests in his detailed anthropological analysis of religious phenomena. As defined by Geertz, religion is a system of symbols which act to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations …by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and the motivations seem uniquely realistic.14

For George Santayana, the great power of a religion "consists in its special surprising message and in the bias which that revelation gives to life. The vistas it opens and the mysteries its propounds are another world to live in - whether we expect ever to pass wholly over into it or not - is what we mean by having a religion."15

A similar but broader definition is offered by Hans Küng: Religion is a believing view of life, approach to life, way of life, and therefore a fundamental pattern embracing the individual and society, man and the world, through which a person (though only partially conscious of this) sees and experiences, thinks and feels, acts and suffers everything. It is a transcendentally grounded, immanently operative system of coordinates, by which man orients himself intellectually, emotionally, and existentially.16

According to another definition of his (which seems to include the previous ones) "religion provides a comprehensive meaning for life, guarantees supreme values and unconditional norms, creates a spiritual community and home."17

Guidelines for Judging Religions

If religions, like their human creators, are both corruptible and correctable, then assessments must be made about what in them is so deviant that reform is needed. What mora1 parameters do

we have for making judgments about the strengths and weaknesses, the good and the bad, the right and the wrong in any religion?

Relevant indicators, with common characteristics, reflecting a concern for the same values, and suggesting the existence of universal human norms, may be found in various religions. The unity of love of God and love of neighbour, as a criterion of authentic Christian behaviour, is not far from the Confucian ideal of *Jen* which means loving others joyously and with one's whole heart. Nor is the Confucian concept of *shu* other than the golden rule of Christians, or the *Mahabharata* of Hinduism.18

Buddhists put it thus: "As a mother even at the risk of her own life watches over her own child, so let everyone cultivate a boundless love toward all beings."19 These and similar imperatives found in other religions, and their corollaries concerned with equity, would seem to warrant the following guidelines: As a cultural institution intended to serve universal human values by responding to real needs experienced by people in their respective socio-cultural and historical situations, it might be said that a given religion is true or worthy or authentic in so far as it helps give its followers an awareness of what is truly ultimate and most meaningful. In the search for ultimately meaningful reality, the 'really real', people usually follow paths already opened for them by their progenitors, whether these ways lead inwardly to the psychic depths of humankind or outwardly toward a totally other power or source, or incomprehensible ground of all reality, whether left unnamed or called God, gods or spirits.

A second criterion might be the question whether and to what extent this re1igion assists its faithful adherents in loving other human beings as they love themselves. And this, with a love that is founded on respect for human dignity and justice, understood as fairness in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of life. In other words, does this set of re1igious beliefs and practices really help people to treat others as they themselves would like to be treated by others?

A third criterion might be the religion's ability to lead people beyond themselves to new levels of consciousness, freedom, openness, hope and confidence in an ultimate order of meaningful existence.

While all of these guidelines are interrelated and involved* transcendence, each has a particular focus. The first concerns especially the unknown other, usually labeled God or gods or family: the common good and general welfare of all. The third guideline concerns transcendence specifically.

The Same but Different

Religions have common purposes in so far as they meet the same general needs experienced by all human beings and find a place in all cultures, but they are not all just the same. "No two religious traditions are alike just as no two individuals are alike," says Burlan A. Sizemore Jr., "but it remains true that in terms of religious phenomenology the Christian experiences is not radically different from others."20

Again, religions resemble languages which serve the same general purposes but with varied emphases, forms, symbols, styles, and organizational schemes. We do not say that French is a better language than English. Yet we recognize that some thoughts can hardly be expressed as well in one of these languages as in the other. This is why languages borrow from one another.

We know also that most people cannot achieve in a foreign language the same facility they have in their native tongue. Each religion, like each language, and every other cultural creation, has its peculiar strengths and weaknesses. So as outside observers, we do not say that Islam is

better a religion than Hinduism. Each in its own way is a more appropriate symbol system, just as a particular language is, for the people who were socialized into it, and into no other.

A people's faith in an established order or existence that accords with their ethos and world view, as already suggested, emerges from and is based upon an integrated complex of symbol systems, i.e., their particular culture. The religious component of the culture, while being in a dynamic relationship of mutual dependence and interaction with the search for, and expression of meaning in the face of the vast unknown. So the genesis, expression and maintenance of faith is appropriately and commonly attributed to the religious system.

The faith proffered to every person, which each is free to reject, is normally expressed through the material of his or her religious tradition (beliefs, rites, customs, etc.) handed down from those whose generations of experience provided the vantage point and focus of that faith. The faith of Christians, for example, has historical continuity and cultural affinity not only with the faith of Jesus and the Apostles but also with the faith of Israel extending back to Abraham. Through the faith of Abraham, and the wider ecumenical vision of Christians today, common ground with the faith of Is1am is a1so recognized.21There are, moreover, increasing efforts to explore and explicate the implicit commonalities of all religious systems.

A recognition of the validity of each religion for its own adherents does not imply that all faith communities are equal in every way, or that each has nothing to learn from the varied historico-cultural ways in which faith is expressed in different religious systems, or even in the same religion under the influence of diverse cultures and historical periods. As Paul Knitter points out in his carefully nuanced discussion of this point, particular beliefs held in one faith community may offer a more adequate and credible image of the deity than certain beliefs associated with another religion. "Of two religious attitudes," says Knitter, "one advocating the burning of widows and the other the equality of all men and women, most persons would venture the judgment that one is a more adequate and relevant articulation of religious experience than the other."22

So differences do matter, even to the extent of suggesting that, in a number of important ways, one religion might be said to express its faith more adequately than another. At least this suggests that, through dialogue with the followers of other religions, one faith community might be led to re-examine some of its beliefs and to modify some of its practices, thereby improving its own expressions of faith.

COMMON GROUND OF FAITH

In so far as the cumulative religious tradition of a people is the mundane result of their faith in the past and the mundane source of that people's faith today, as William Cantwell Smith argues, every religiously conscious person or community is the locus of a transaction between the transcendent, which is presumably the same for every person, and the cumulative tradition which is different for each people, nation or ethnic-culture group.23 Belief (with everything else that constitutes a particular religious system) is thus distinguishable from faith. Between the two there is a dynamic relationship of mutual interaction. This is analogous to the relationship between language and understanding; each operates only through the other.

As David Tracy says, there is "no purely nonlinguistic understanding." Nor is there a pure faith that remains without a symbol system, usually religious, as its means of expression. As conceptua1ization and understanding presuppose the existence of a language for the articulation of thoughts, so faith needs a belief system for its manifestation. "From the beginning to the end of our journey to understand," Tracy continues, "we find ourselves in a particular linguistic tradition

(primarily our native language) which carries with it a certain specifiable way of viewing the world, certain forms of life which we did not invent but find ourselves within."25

Understanding, as an event of human experience within a particular historico-cultural context, is mediated through, hence shaped and influenced by, the past experience and understanding embodied in each particular linguistic tradition. Analogously, faith is mediated through the inherited belief system of a people. As a language presupposes and serves the common human capacity for understanding, so belief presupposes and serves the common capacity for faith. But this is more than a matter of capacity. In terms of actual human existence in the particularity of history and culture, a people's understanding depends necessarily upon the linguistic system concretely available to them, usually their native language. Likewise, a people's faith depends necessarily upon the belief system concretely available to them, usually their particular religious heritage. Faith and belief are thus inseparable but distinguishable. With due attention to Knitter's cautionary remarks, noted in the previous section, this distinction may be accepted as "valid," "indispensable," and "necessary".26

Christian tradition provides grounds for believing that faith is gratuitously proffered by God to every human being, because God truly wills the salvation of everyone. This faith, at bottom, consists in our radical and free acceptance (or non-rejection) of the rational and historico-cultural human nature that, while defining us, enables us to become what we are supposed to be in relation to God and to one another. To this basic notion of faith, "even in the strictly Christian meaning of the term," must be added Karl Rahner's provision "that this faith should really be understood as being sustained and empowered by the transcendent nature of this very rationality, in which the latter is merged into the incomprehensible mystery we call 'God' with which we inevitably have to do in this experience of our transcendental nature, whether we consciously define that nature or not."27

If Jews, Muslims and Christians, in spite of differences in their respective beliefs, share a common faith with Abraham (and even some common beliefs), then further study, dialogue and reflection may reveal wider commona1ities also with the followers of all the other belief systems. "By distinguishing belief and faith," says Bernard Lonergan, "we have secured a basis both for ecumenica1 encounter and for an encounter between all religions with a basis in religious experience." While religions may differ greatly there is behind them a commonality of faith providing "a deeper unity." In Lonergan's view, like that of William Cantwell Smith, "beliefs result from judgments of value, and judgments of value relevant to religion come from faith."28

NOTES

1. Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, "The Christian in a religiously plural world." In Oxtoby, Willard G., ed. *Religious diversity: Essays by Wilfred Cantwell Smith*. New York: Harper and Row, 1976, p. 16. For a contemporary answer to this question, see Hillman, Eugene. *Christianity and the other faith communities*. Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1988.

2. For a fuller treatment of this topic, see Hillman. *Op. cit.,* chapter one.

3. Lonergan, Bernard. *Method in theology*. New York: Seabury, 1972, p. 79.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Smith, William Cantwell. The faith of other men. New York: Harper/Torchbooks, 1972. p. 31

6. Geertz, Clifford. *The analogical imagination: Christian theology and the culture of pluralism*. New York: Crossroads, 1981, pp. 205-206.

7. *Ibid*., p. 89, 90.

8. *Ibid*., p. 91.

9. Tracy, David. *The analogical imagination: Christian theology and the culture of pluralism*. New York: crossroads, 1981, p. 205-206.

10. For the Dinka myth, see Leonhardt, Godfrey: "Morality and happiness among the Dinka." In Outka, Gene and Reeder, John P., eds. *Religion and morality.* New York: Doubleday, 1973, pp.108-112. The reference to a similar myth among the Maasai is based on my own fieldwork.

11. See Rahner, Karl. *Foundations of the Christian Faith.* New York: Seabury Crossroads, 1978. Chapter 2.

12. Geertz. *Op.cit.*, p. 112.

13. *Ibid*.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

15. As quoted in Geertz, op.cit., p. 87.

16. Küng, Hans, et al. *Christianity and the world religions: paths of dialogue with Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism*. New York: Doubleday, 1986. P. xvi.

17. *Ibid*.

18. See Bluhm, William T. *Force or freedom: the paradox in modern political thought.* New Haven: Yale University press, 1984, pp. 296-297.

19. As quoted in Maguire, Daniel C. *Moral choice.* Minneapolis: Winston press, 1979, p. 76.

20. Sizemore, Burlan A. Jr. "Christianity in a pluralistic world." In *Journal of ecumenical studies,* 13(3), 1976: 416.

21. See Küng, *op.cit*., pp.122-126.

22. Knitter, Paul F. *No other name? : A critical survey of christian attitudes toward the world religions.* Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1985, p.52.

23. See Smith, William Cantwell. *The meaning and end of religion.* New York: Harper and Row, 1978, p.186.

24. Tracy, *op.cit.,* p.101.

25. *Ibid*.

26. Knitter. *Op.cit.,* p.51.

27. Rahner, Karl. *Theological investigations,* XVII. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1980, p.67.

28. Lonergan, *Op.cit.*, pp.118-119, 122-124.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to thank all the people who have made the publication of this anthology possible. We begin with the authors: they contributed to the journal freely because they believed in its purpose. We also thank the Board members; throughout these twenty years, especially at times when finances were low and the pressure of work too much, they shored up the courage of the publisher and the editor. We express appreciation as well to our faithful subscribers and to some generous individual donors, both in Kenya and abroad; they made it possible for WAJIBU to survive. Then there are the many anonymous readers; they also contributed to the journal's survival.

We also wish to acknowledge the assistance of the technical people who through the years have helped with the layout, the printing and the marketing of WAJIBU. In this connection, we wish to single out Pualines Publications Africa for their efficient and generous pre-press work and for agreeing to be the co-publisher of this anthology. We trust that everyone who endorses the aims of the journal will continue to support us in the future.

Finally, we appreciate the considerable work Professor McLean and Hu Yeping have done to make this anthology a reality.