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**THE STRUGGLES
AFTER
THE STRUGGLE**

Zimbabwean Philosophical Study, I

Edited by
David Kaulemu

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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This book is dedicated to Simon Zvinaiye Mawondo, our friend and colleague who tragically died while struggling, like many other Zimbabweans, to fend for his family in teaching philosophy in Lesotho. This is a great loss to philosophy.

Introduction

Philosophy in Zimbabwe: Investigations and Reflections Of the Struggles after the Struggle

David Kaulemu

Philosophy is a product of individuals and communities eager to study and understand themselves, others and their environments. It is a product of rational human desire of individuals and communities to deal with internal and external threats and to find opportunities for their growth and happiness. Philosophy in Zimbabwe is not an exception in this search for knowledge and wisdom that will facilitate better lives and help create a better world of peace, justice and development. Its critical nature is informed at a number of important levels. Zimbabwe as a nation in the making is informed by different cultural traditions. Each one of these traditions is deeply philosophical in so far as it tries to explain, for its members, the meaning of life, birth, death and many other physical, social and political events and processes. Within each cultural tradition, there are many debates and unresolved issues. Yet there are also positive values, institutions and practices that ensure the survival and flourishing of each of its members and cultural groups as wholes. But when cultural traditions meet others in space and time, they have opportunities for comparing and contrasting with them. In many instances they identify their weaknesses and strengths more clearly. Hence processes of appropriation, mimicry, cataclysis and ambivalence are witnessed. Yet the same situation is known to enhance essentialist exclusivism, marginalization, binary oppositions and even wars and racial and tribal cleansing.

The meeting of several cultural traditions in the country called Zimbabwe, means that each tradition is forced to go beyond itself. More importantly, each culture is forced to work out how it can contribute positively to the common good in Zimbabwe and to the world at large. Thus the meeting of several cultures in one place at the same time is itself a deeply philosophy enhancing context, where very little can be taken for granted. Some unfortunately attempt to resolve philosophical questions “by other means” using power, violence and sometimes scarcely thought out fast-tracked laws. This is not the approach taken in this volume of essays written mostly by young people who come from different backgrounds and are keen to open up discussion on issues important to Zimbabwe and the building of a spirit of cooperation and solidarity.

Very few texts, if any, have been presented and published as Zimbabwean philosophy. The only book published as a Zimbabwean African Philosophy text, so far, is Professor Stanlake Samkange and

Tommie Marie Samkange's *Hunhuism/Ubuntuism: A Zimbabwe Indigenous Political Philosophy*, which was first published in 1980. Most other texts have been anthropological and historical explaining the views and beliefs of the different cultural groups in Zimbabwe. Most of these works have focused on the Shona and the Ndebele thereby limiting the cultural richness of Zimbabwe and cutting out potential philosophical debates on identity, citizenship, nationhood and the common good. There also has been little attempt to synthesize the different cultural traditions of Zimbabwe into some Zimbabwean culture. Neither has the debate on multi-culturalism in Zimbabwe started in earnest. The poverty of the philosophical debate on these issues has been reflected in the narrowness of our policy development informed by narrow political interests and the perpetuation of old parochial prejudices. A joke goes round in the country of how a prominent politician described the form of cultural unity desirable in Zimbabwe. He was to have said, "There is no more Shona nor Ndebele, neither Kalanga, Zezuru, Manyika nor Korekore. All of us are now Karanga!"

Since 1890 till today, different government authorities have found it difficult to break away from the *laager* mentality instituted by the colonial settlers and genuine fear of the Other, expressed by different African cultural traditions. Thus it has been difficult to embrace all the constituent communities of what we now call Zimbabwe into some larger cultural experience. This is one of the major struggles at hand. As Peter Marcuse (Quoted in Sandercock, L., 1998:165) points out, "we need walls that welcome and shelter, not walls that exclude and oppress." We need a Zimbabwe that welcomes and not one that excludes. Bourdillon's *The Shona Peoples* (1976) is frequently referred to as an authority on Shona culture. Michael Gelfand and Gordon Chavunduka have done some useful work on the traditional ideas of the Shona cultural groups, discussing concepts of health and healing. Terrence Ranger, Michael Bourdillon and Gordon Chavunduka have described Shona peoples in the context of modernity. The former is well known in raising issues on ethnicity. However, sustained, systematic philosophical critique of Shona ideas and traditions are few and far between. The first serious attempt is found in *Hunhuism/Ubuntuism* which tried to establish the foundation of Zimbabwean national culture in common aspects of Shona and Ndebele traditions. But the debate has not been pursued further. Other local cultural traditions are completely ignored by the Samkanges. The traditions of those Africans who came to Zimbabwe through migrations are assumed to be alien to Zimbabwe. *Hunhuism/Ubuntuism* does not even make an effort to relate what it identifies as Zimbabwean philosophy to the traditions of those Zimbabweans whose ancestors came from Europe and Asia. It is assumed that they are and will always be aliens. And yet this book is offered as the basis for building the new Zimbabwe.

It is the thesis of this book that Zimbabwe has an indigenous political philosophy which can best guide and

inspire thinking in this new era of Zimbabwe. This philosophy or ideology, the authors endeavour to show, exists and can be described as Hunhuism or Ubuntuism. (Samkange and Samkange, 1980:2)

Most texts offering serious discussion on some Shona and Ndebele cultural concepts do so in the context of Christianity. For example, the issue which is probed by Joseph Kumbirai in his “*Kurova Guva and Christianity*” has sparked some debate on inculturation, a topic of some great interest to Professor Paul Gundani and Fr. Chidavaenzi among others. However, serious philosophical debate on the nature and implications of traditional ideas of the different cultural groups making up Zimbabwe and how such ideas could influence contemporary society is yet to be understood. To be fair, there have been some television and radio programmes dedicated to discussing some of these issues. Claude Mararike’s *Nhaka Yedu* and *The Zimbabwean Ethos* are examples. However, the political nature of these programmes precluded genuine dialogue on many philosophically interesting issues. *Mai Chisamba Show* is entertaining and may even be educating, but its debates are neither systematic nor sustained. Thus philosophical discussion has been scanty. Part of the reason is in the history of the subject in the country. On the one hand, in colonial education African concepts were not considered worthy of philosophical discussion. On the other hand, those who advocated for African ideas discussed them as if there were no different meanings and interpretations of those ideas. Moreover, those who were politically inspired by nationalism had a monolithic concept of African culture which was detrimental to healthy philosophical discussions in African philosophy. For instance, the concept of Zimbabwe that is shared by many Zimbabweans is informed by what is described by Stan Mudenge in his book *A Political History of Munhumutapa c. 1400 to 1902* when he wrote that “The present Zimbabwe, therefore, is not merely a geographical expression created by imperialism during the nineteenth century. It is a reality that has existed for centuries, with a language, a culture and a “world view” of its own, representing the inner core of the Shona historical experience.” Mudenge’s concept of Zimbabwe which is based on the “inner core of the Shona experience” is even narrower than that of the Samkanges’. The debate on such issues as modern African identities could have benefited more from a rigorous philosophical debate on traditional ideas and their implications. These debates were indeed rife within African traditional societies. Yet contemporary traditionalists have largely killed them. It is hoped that such debate will be pursued in oral debates as well as in writing.

However, the present volume does not take up this debate. It grapples with contemporary issues in Zimbabwe. Now that Zimbabwe has been politically independent for at least two decades, what concept of Zimbabwe could facilitate the growth and development of the nation and at

the same time help to build peace among the different peoples who find themselves as part of the Zimbabwean legacy?

The present volume presents what Leonard Harris, the African American Philosopher, calls, "Philosophy born out of struggle". In this volume, Zimbabwean philosophers are reporting their interpretations of the local struggles in the context of rural and urban poverty, demands for participatory democracy, the role of Christian Churches in the context of African traditional religions, the free market age, corruption, the desire for peace and social development. What they call "the struggle" is the fight against colonial rule which was wedged since 1890 when the British Pioneer Column arrived in the area between the Limpopo and Zambezi Rivers. This first uprising was in many ways defeated, yet the struggle did not end. In the sixties, the struggle intensified until the attainment of independence in 1980. The papers in this volume argue that the end of the violent liberation struggle in 1980 is not the end of the struggle. Each one of the papers identifies and discusses some struggle which Zimbabweans have been engaged in since 1980. The struggles after the struggle are varied yet connected to each other in so far as they are all attempts to facilitate the growth and flourishing of Zimbabweans as they work to participate and to contribute to the globalizing world. Simon Mawondo grapples with the issue of social justice and how it could apply to the land issue in Zimbabwe. Of particular concern for him, is to find a way of implementing the demands of justice without undermining the need for reconciling Zimbabweans. Ezra Chitando discusses how religion in Zimbabwe could play its part in building a better and peaceful society. He, however, is not unaware of the negative role religion has played in the past. Andrea Chimuka in his first article in the book picks up the debate on the negative role of religion in Zimbabwe, focusing on Christian churches. David Kaulemu, in his first article, pursues the discussion of why it has been difficult to establish a truly peaceful Zimbabwe. In many ways this volume is about the search for peace for which many of the authors demonstrate a deep concern. Sobantu Sibanda discusses the issue in the context of "the Ndebele" and Shona relations. Jameson Kurasha is concerned with corporate peace, not only in Zimbabwe but in the world at large. Patrick Tom looks at how we could establish peace with the environment and Munyaradzi Madambi looks at how we can go beyond colonial education to establish, through education, positive views about ourselves. David Kaulemu, in his second article in the volume looks at how peace and development could be established once traditionalist exclusivism is dealt with in Zimbabwe. Chimuka, in his second essays begins to identify Shona concepts that could be used to go beyond negative exclusivism. Francis Chumachawazungu takes up the same theme of how humans can deal with each other as humans. While he is confident that a new way of living is coming into being, he points out that a lot of work still needs to be done. But for him, hope is the key as he expresses the spirit that inspired the support group in the production of the present volume, "I hope to contribute

to the tradition of ‘hope talk’. Let us disagree, reflect, and criticize without demonizing and always never losing sight of hope.”

Almost all the studies in this volume are a result of thinking-in-community or thinking-with-others. They are a result of a carefully structured process in which members were encouraged to develop their ideas with the help of, and in support of, others. The resultant papers were presented and discussed as drafts, at least twice each, at deliberately structured seminars of what we called “The Philosophy Support Group” organized by some members of the Department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy at the University of Zimbabwe. The Philosophy Support Group was an informal voluntary group with no formal status in the University of Zimbabwe.

The idea was encouraged by David Kaulemu, who attended similarly organized seminars at The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy in Washington DC, and admired the thinking-with-others approach used by Professor George F. McLean. Professor McLean himself attended the culminating conference, which was held at the University of Zimbabwe, at which most of the revised drafts of the papers in this volume were presented. In many ways, this approach allowed the group of presenters, and those who could not produce papers, to search, develop and clarify for themselves the very things they were searching for at the national level.

It is not exaggerating to say that the project of developing this volume is probably more important than its result. Our thoughts and political orientations were all very different. Discussions of issues were really animated. And yet we all learnt the difficult processes of how to develop a truly national sense and began to go beyond received prejudices and exclusivism. We disagreed with each other and yet continued to develop appreciation of each other. It was wonderful to see people who had different view points helping to sharpen each other’s points of view. It would be wonderful if the kind of social solidarity and respect for each other which we began to develop were to be reflected on the national level. We regret that some sections of our community were not represented in our group. This should be work for the future.

Chapter I

In Search of Social Justice: Reconciliation and the Land Question in Zimbabwe

Simon Mawondo

The concept of reconciliation has been appealed to by many countries which have tried to move from a situation of civil war to peace. Zimbabwe is no exception. Robert Mugabe, the man who led the liberation movements at independence appealed to the concept of reconciliation in an effort to rebuild the newly independent Zimbabwe. However, this reconciliation was called for even before the basic injustices, that had caused the civil war in the first place, had been fully addressed. This article assesses the usefulness of the concept of reconciliation in the context of Zimbabwe's political independence since 1980.

THE LAND QUESTION AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

A deep sense of injustice caused by the inequalities and deliberate dispossession of Africans by the White settler regimes was amongst the fundamental causes of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. Top amongst the list of grievances was the massive alienation of the African people from the land, which formed the basis for their livelihood. The process of dispossession was legitimated by a series of pieces of legislation, which sought to entrench white privileges and to bring the Africans under colonial control. In this process Africans were denied rights to own land in the most agriculturally productive parts of the country. In addition to this, Africans were also denied training for skilled labour. The cumulative effect of these pieces of legislation was to make Africans serve the settlers by providing manual labour on white commercial farms, in industry, in the mines and in the domestic realm. Due to the fact that Africans were denied political rights the colonial system reduced them to subjects in a country they considered their own. Those Africans who were previously in power in the different African polities, were considered outsiders to the newly established white dominated power structures unless they paid tribute to it.

The fact that the land question was the root cause of Zimbabwe's war of liberation is widely acknowledged. Josiah Tungamirai, one of the top leaders of Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) makes this point when he says "The unequal distribution of land was the main reason why the African people fought the settler regime." (1995:37). Africans felt that the land was rightly theirs and it was a matter of justice that they fought to regain their lost heritage. Invoking John Locke's

argument that conquest does not found any property rights may vindicate indeed such a view. The fact that Locke holds such a view is particularly important because of his defense of private property.

The foregoing considerations help to highlight the fact that the struggle for independence was not just about political freedom and the right to vote, as the popularized slogan “*one man one vote*” may seem to have suggested. The struggle for independence must be seen as an exercise of the right of the descendants of those whose rights had been violated by conquest. Such descendants, Locke argues, have a right to revolt and regain title to their heritage. In making this point Locke argues as follows;

the People who are the Descendants of, or claim under those, who were forced to submit to the Yoke of Government by constraint, have always a Right to shake it off, and to free themselves from Usurpation or Tyranny, which the Sword hath brought in upon them, till their Rulers put them under such a Frame of Government, as they willingly, and of choice consent to. (Locke, 1994:394)

In the case of Zimbabwe and many other African countries, colonial rule was essentially based on conquest. The 1893 and 1896-1897 wars in Zimbabwe bear testimony to African resistance to colonial rule. However, it should be noted that Locke, the acclaimed founder of liberalism had argued that...”conquest is as far from setting up any Government, as demolishing an House is from building a new one in the place.” (1994:385) Politically, the act of conquest and the setting up of the colonial administration deprived Africans of the right to set up their own government. The colonial government reduced them to subjects. Economically, Africans were made manual labourers dependent on subsistence wages. The colonial set up was thus characterised by black labour on white owned farms, firms, and mines. This reality has not changed that much since independence and this is why it is crucial to question the efficacy of the reconciliation policy in bringing justice and peace to Zimbabwe. Is it possible for there to be genuine reconciliation when the fundamental injustices of the colonial past have not been addressed? Doesn't the perpetuation of the pre-independence property ownership structures and their protection by the law amount to recognition of and protection of the very injustices the liberation struggle sought to defeat? These are important questions, and any meaningful understanding of justice and reconciliation in this context must be able to deal with these issues. This paper hopes to make a contribution towards that end.

1980: THE PROCLAMATION OF THE RECONCILIATION POLICY

At independence in 1980, most Africans expected that the injustices of the past would be redressed. However, Robert Mugabe, then Prime minister elect told the nation on independence eve;

We are called to be constructive, progressive and forever forward-looking, For we cannot afford to be men of yesterday, backward looking, retrogressive And destructive.... If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. Is it not folly, therefore, that in these circumstances anybody should seek to revive the wounds and grievances of the past? The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten... (De Waal, 1990: 48-9)

In the name and spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness, all the grievances of the past were supposed to be forgotten. Consequently the inequalities and the landlessness, which characterised black Zimbabwean existence before independence, were to be forgotten. The vast majority of Zimbabweans today still remain poor and landless. They still stay in Gwai, Shangani and all those other marginal lands allocated to them by the successive settler regimes. Meanwhile the small group that benefited through colonialism has continued to hold on to the land. Legally they are protected in their possession. As a result the reality of black labour on white farms has continued to be a fact of life in Zimbabwe.

Statement of the Problem

According to Jeremy Waldron, "It is a well-known characteristic of great injustice that those who suffer it go to their deaths with the conviction that these must not be forgotten." (1992:5) Amongst the reasons why these injustices are recounted over and over again down the generations is the fact that this act of recollection and telling the story becomes an important aspect of the victims' identity. For that reason, to neglect the historical record is to do violence to the identity and thus to the community that sustains it." (Waldron, 1992:6) Neglecting the fact that black poverty in Zimbabwe is to a large extent due to concrete historical acts of deliberate dispossession is thus a continued act of violence against them, hence an injustice. Whilst the mere fact of poverty is not necessarily indicative of the existence of injustice, the existence of poverty due to deliberate acts of dispossession and marginalisation is evidence of injustice.

As we have noted above, Zimbabweans were told to forgive past wrongs and seek reconciliation. We have also made the point that massive dispossession was the fundamental cause of the liberation struggle. The question that must be raised is: what did the ordinary Zimbabweans gain at independence? Being told not to revive the wounds and the grievances of the past, to forgive and be reconciled, what exactly was this meant to imply?

If we accept that the pre-independence dispossession was an injustice, can we assume that we could have reconciliation and forgiveness without addressing the said injustice? As many African countries struggle to come to terms with their various pasts this question has become central. Several responses or models seem to be taking shape. In Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa we seem to have a model of *reconciliation without justice*.

A different model seems to be held in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. There, the assumption appears to be that we cannot have reconciliation without justice. These different models raise a number of questions. Amongst the most important questions are, just what is reconciliation; how is reconciliation linked to truth, forgiveness, and justice? Another question is, why is reconciliation so important? These are obviously pressing questions which I cannot pretend to address fully. An adequate understanding of reconciliation, however, seems to require that we analyze the issues raised in these questions. I shall attempt to define reconciliation and explore its relation to forgiveness and justice. The argument to be presented here is that in the Zimbabwean example there was a search neither for truth nor for justice. Given the political context of the Lancaster House Constitution, the enunciation of the reconciliation policy simply signaled ZANU's desire to make that constitution work. For this reason it will be maintained that the continued injustice is not to be understood by merely looking at events internal to Zimbabwe. Just as it was true in the run-up to the Lancaster House Constitution, it is still a fact that Zimbabwe's land question is not just hers to solve on her own. External interests have continued to determine how this problem is addressed.

WHAT IS RECONCILIATION?

Reconciliation has become more like a buzzword around the world in places where conflict resolution is in progress. This is perhaps natural in the sense that "before any serious nation building can be undertaken people need to come to terms with their past." Getting along together as friends when yesterday they were fighting is no mean task. However, if future conflict is to be avoided and the wounds and grievances of the past are to be healed it appears imperative that the ugly stories of the past are told. We have already noted that victims of past injustices often go to their graves with the feeling that their suffering must not be forgotten. What is therefore important is that such acts of recollection be a basis for reconstruction and

the healing process, and not a basis for revenge. Reconciliation as a process tries to create an environment conducive to that reconstruction and healing.

Reconciliation can be regarded as a process that re-establishes love and understanding between two or more estranged parties. According to Wiredu, what is central to the process of reconciliation is the re-appraisal of the importance and significance of the initial bones of contention (Wiredu, 1996:181-82). In this regard it may be said that, instead of trying to avoid the causes of the conflict; reconciliation requires that all the parties to the conflict must present their demands and that any proposed settlement should take into account these various demands.

Reconciliation presupposes estrangement, enmity or conflict. Its objective is to overcome this conflict so that there can be harmony. Because it entails that the bones of contention be re-appraised, reconciliation cannot be unilateral. As Walter Wink points out, "reconciliation is always mutual". It requires that I and the other person from whom I have been estranged by enmity mutually forgive each other and walk together into a common future (Wink, 1998:14).

The search for reconciliation must therefore always try to understand the reasons for the conflict. In other words it must ask why the antagonists were fighting. If this view is accepted it becomes clear that the Zimbabwe's prime-minister elect's call to simply forgive and forget past wrongs could not really have been a solid ground for genuine reconciliation. This is because it did not address the bones of contention between blacks and whites. Events in the country twenty years after independence seem to demonstrate this point, as the president accuses white Zimbabweans of spurning the hand of reconciliation he offered them when he was the prime-minister at independence. The act of recollection by the victims of colonial injustice has become a portent source of conflict. Walter Wink aptly warns about this when he observes that "...unresolved hatreds can lead to acts of revenge by those newly empowered" (Wink, 1998:13). This is due to the fact that under such circumstances the act of recollection tends to open old wounds. As such the unresolved hatreds can easily seep into society like a poison and cause turmoil. What is peculiar about Zimbabwe's policy of reconciliation is that it was a gesture made by the newly empowered to those who had just lost their place of dominance. It is as if the Africans are asking to be forgiven for fighting to oust the settler regime. The mutuality, which Wink takes to be essential to reconciliation, was not in any way evident. This reality, combined with the piecemeal resolution of the land question brings the whole reconciliation policy into question. Is it possible or even meaningful to forgive someone who has neither admitted that they benefited from colonial injustice nor asked for forgiveness? The crucial point that must be appreciated is that unless there is an acknowledgement of wrongdoing forgiveness makes no sense. However, in the Zimbabwean context the fact that the victims of injustice are ready to forgive should be taken as a good thing. This is due to the fact that it must be realized that such victims could not be so ready to let

bygones be bygones. In other words it is possible that they could refuse to forgive those who transgressed against them. That they are willing should therefore be a basis for reconciliation.

Far from requiring that past wrongs be forgotten, reconciliation and even forgiveness requires that we actually face these wrongs. Facing them in this case creates the possibility of redress and the symbolic handshake that says we can now put the past behind us. In the world over, such gestures have been hailed as avenues for mending broken bridges. Examples often quoted in this regard include the German acknowledgement of its Nazi past and its payment of reparations to Jews; Japan's admission of wrongdoing in its treatment of its Asian neighbors during World War II, and America's admission of maltreating its citizens of Japanese descent in World War II. In the Zimbabwean case no apologies were made and neither have symbolic handshakes been exchanged. The story that blacks were victims of white domination continues to be told, even by the current president in some of his political rallies. How many times have poor Zimbabwean peasants invaded commercial farms and claimed that these farms belonged to their ancestors? This surely suggests that people have not forgotten or forgiven.

Sam Moyo has also expressed the preceding sentiments. Discussing the salient role of the land question to Zimbabwean race relations he makes the important observation that,

A reasonable climate for white-black reconciliation can only be achieved through a more balanced redressing of the variety of land demands in Zimbabwe, in a manner which is transparent, equitable and focused on the productive use of land for agro-industrial and development purposes ... (Moyo, 1995:11)

Two issues that merit close attentions in this case are the need to "redress" past injustices and the need equitably to consider the variety of land demands. This at once brings out the fact that unless the underlying causes of the war of liberation are brought to the fore and squarely faced in the process of creating a new future, reconciliation cannot take place. To the extent that Zimbabwe's reconciliation policy did not seek to redress past injustices and to bring the causes of conflict into the open, it falls short of genuine reconciliation.

One very important reason why we must not simply forget the past is that going back to the past is not just an act of memory. We have made the point that the feeling of having been unjustly treated forms an integral part of the identity of those who suffer it. What also needs to be realized is such acts of recollection are never innocent. This means that what is remembered and for what purpose is always significant to understanding who we are. We form ideas of who we are in the light of what we think we were in the past, but also in terms of what we want to become.

When we recollect our common past of injustice, both the transgressors and the victims should have an opportunity to construct a shared view of that past. This is what the idea of dialogue seems to entail. For that reason remembering the past together will help us to learn from the past mistakes that were made. Reflecting on the importance of confronting past injustices Waldron asks the salient question, “What is the practical importance now of a judgment that an injustice occurred in the past?” (Waldron,1992:4) The fundamental point is that remembering the past ought to have practical relevance now and for the future. Precisely because who we are and how we perceive ourselves and how we relate to others is partly shaped by events in the past, the past in that sense is part of the present. As we have noted, the majority of black Zimbabweans are poor and landless as a direct result of the colonial legacy. For this reason it is unacceptable to simply say the past is a done deal which we cannot change. The future depends on how the past injustices are resolved. One reason why Zimbabwe’s reconciliation policy is not genuine is that “in concrete terms it prevented an assault on inequality in wealth and income.”

The Lancaster House agreement, which formally gave independence to Zimbabwe, sought to protect the right to private property in the true liberal sense. Whilst the right to private property may not necessarily be a bad thing the private property protected by the independence constitution were those that existed in 1979. This means the new constitution simply entrenched and protected the status-quo whilst at the same time giving it an appearance of legitimacy. Amongst the most important privilege thus protected by the constitution was the right to land, which as we saw earlier was the fundamental cause of the war for independence. No compromise was struck and for that reason the grievances of the majority remained unresolved. Given this scenario the question therefore arises; what had the majority gained? In advocating the reconciliation policy were the demands of the blacks to regain what they considered their land given a hearing? Commenting on a similar development in Namibia, Dona Pankhurst quotes Tapscott who thinks that to the majority of Namibians reconciliation is

...seen to be entrenching the status quo by protecting the pre-independence gains of the minority and by legitimizing patterns of social differentiation that had existed in the colonial era. (Pankhurst, 1995:557)

The point being made here is that the same thing happened in Zimbabwe. Numerous peasant invasions of commercial farms (e.g. the Svosve people’s invasions of 1998) bear testimony to the fact that the majority never really quit resenting the fact of their dispossession. This as we have been saying is due to the fact that “the independence struggle and commitment to the war were fundamentally fuelled by promises to restore the land rights of the majority.” (Moyo,1995:8) The fact that the powerful

minority did not want to give up their ill-gotten privileges made it impossible for reconciliation to be mutual. Without both sides coming together and willingness to make concessions it is difficult to see how reconciliation could become a reality.

In the light of the Zimbabwean situation an important question may actually be raised about the need for a reconciliation policy. Given that the war of liberation was fought to liberate 'our' land why should we be so keen on reconciliation? Put in other words the question is, who really stands to benefit from the policy? As things stand, the policy has really benefited descendents of the settlers more than those of their victims. This is the same in the Namibian context where Pankhurst makes the point that the majority see the policy as a means of entrenching the status quo. If one thinks of the liberation war as aimed at getting back what belonged to us, pursuit of this policy on the attainment of independence may be seen as uncalled for. However, given that the liberators want to take the settlers as citizens, the issue becomes significant. By recognizing them as citizens they become entitled to the same rights as all citizens. For that reason it becomes imperative that the past injustices be resolved with an eye to the future. In this regard we may consider reconciliation as trying to bridge the gap between justice as restoration and forgiveness.

Forgiveness seems to overlook justice. However, trying to await perfect justice would also be an illusion. It will be an illusion because so many economic, demographic, and political changes have occurred. Some who possess the land did not inherit it from conqueror ancestors, but bought it. Besides this it is also impossible to give land to all black Zimbabweans who need it. This makes the attainment of complete justice as restoration impossible. Under these circumstances the policy of reconciliation should be seen as an expedient or pragmatic way of moving ahead in a way that attempts to be fair to all.

RECONCILIATION AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE

As we have noted above, different models of reconciliation seem to be at play on the African continent. Referring to the great lakes region Rene Lemarchand notes that "There cannot be reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi without justice, and no justice without truth." (1998:3) Such a claim raises the important question, what is the relation between the key concepts here? In other words, just what is the relation between reconciliation and justice, justice and truth, truth and reconciliation? Is it possible to have one of these things without the other two? Can there be reconciliation without justice and truth? Assuming that these processes are not inter-linked and co-determining, meaning that they are independent of each other, which of them is most important? Whilst these are obviously important questions I cannot fully address them all. The question of primary interest here is the relation between justice and reconciliation.

Before attempting to address the question of how justice and reconciliation are interrelated it is important to make the point that justice is a contested concept. That means there are different interpretations of what it is and what it requires. People with different ideological orientations understand it differently and those with different interests to protect will tend to have conflicting conceptions of what it entails. The predominant view in this paper is that of those who consider themselves victims of colonial injustice. For that reason justice is going to be largely treated as righting the wrongs of the past and paying reparations to those, who as a result of those past injustices, find themselves disadvantaged in the present.

Justice may amongst many other senses be defined as giving to each his/her due. The basis of what is due to an individual may vary. It can be need, work, equal consideration etc. Central to this understanding is the presupposition that in some way people's dues can be determined. Theories of private property, such as Locke's are in their own way attempts to address this issue. As we noted at the beginning of this paper, a deep sense of injustice is what motivated the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The colonial process and the massive dispossession of land cited earlier robbed the people of Zimbabwe of what they considered their legitimate birthright. Part of the reason why the colonial system was unjust was that it was founded on a violation of the indigenous people's claim to ownership of the land and other resources.

Viewed from the conception of justice as giving to each his/her due it becomes apparent that if reconciliation is to be a reality such dispossession ought to be addressed. What is paramount on this view is that justice seeks to restore balance. In this sense restorative justice becomes a necessary precondition for reconciliation. This implies that we have at least to attempt to approximate the situation that would have evolved if the dispossession had not taken place. Such an exercise is obviously difficult, but this should not be used as an excuse to maintain the present situation.

It is important to appreciate the fact that for restorative justice to be fully effective we also need to do two things. Firstly, it is important that those who violated the rights of others should admit that such violations took place. We have already come across this point when we made reference to the examples of how recognition of past wrongs has helped mend relations in some countries or between them. The important lesson that these examples teach us is that, unless there is acknowledgement of wrongdoing, forgiveness does not make any sense at all. The second thing that seems indispensable to the process of restorative justice is that both sides of the story must be told. In other words, unless we make a genuine effort to know who did what to whom it is impossible to know who benefits from the restoration and from whom the restored dues are to be taken.

If the preceding reflections are accepted it becomes clear that there is an inextricable relation between restorative justice and truth. We cannot have restorative justice unless the truth is known. From this it can be concluded that truth is a necessary condition for restorative justice. If

therefore restorative justice is a necessary pre-condition for reconciliation we are led to the conclusion that truth is by implication also logically necessary to reconciliation.

From the reflections above it becomes clear that the Zimbabwean model of reconciliation falls short of the line of thinking developed up to this point. The insistence on justice without truth is also unlikely to produce genuine reconciliation. Rene Lemarchand is perfectly right to argue, in the context of the Great Lakes Region, that unless the truth about the history of genocide is uncovered what might appear as justice may actually be revenge. The cycles of violence of one group against the other ought to be revealed and then people can realize the futility of telling half the story. Crucial to the process is the fact that there has to be mutual face-to-face exchange, something that is indispensable to reconciliation.

In the Zimbabwean instance we did not have any attempt to tell the story of who did what to whom, and there was no attempt to redress the injustices of the past. That means we had neither truth nor restorative justice. What is more we did not even have a situation where the victims of the colonial dispossession and the beneficiaries discussed their differences. Those who benefited from colonial dispossession seem to believe that their good fortune is due to the virtues of their race or to their hard work. For this reason they have not seen fit to offer any apologies for the humiliation and impoverishment of blacks in the country. The effects of that past injustice are still being felt to this day. It is one of the characteristics of great injustice that its effects continue to affect people long after the injustice has been legally removed. Some people still suffer from an inferiority complex. Apart from this the colonial ways of referring to blacks as “boy” have now become accepted –we call ourselves “*maboy*”. Even though the pejorative connotations may not be there very few people bother to reflect on where this concept is coming from and what it implies.

Justice thus far has been considered as restorative or retributive. In this sense it is backward looking. However there is also an important sense in which justice is forward looking. This aspect is also very important to the reconciliation process. Fundamental to this sense of justice is how goods, services and burdens should be shared by people belonging to the same community. Viewing justice in this particular way is important for reconciliation because it recognizes the fact that even though segments of the community might have clashed in the past they have to live together. This is what reconciliation is ultimately concerned with, that is, how people who shared hostilities are able to transcend these hostilities and live together in harmony. Hope that former adversaries can share the same living space and resources, is the backbone of any meaningful reconciliation process. Summing up this kind of thinking Shriver quotes Rodney King, the victim of the police brutality that sparked the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, making the point that “we are stuck here for a while.” (Shriver, 1995:3) Due to this fact that we are here together we have to work it out.

Living together with former enemies can only be a reality if forgiveness and reconciliation are genuinely realized. If this forgiveness and reconciliation have not been found, lasting peace will remain elusive. This I think helps explain why reconciliation has become a buzzword in the troubled spots around the world. Where there is conflict the search for peace must therefore include the attempt to bring about reconciliation.

There is also another sense of justice that seems to be linked to the possibility of reconciliation. This is distributive justice. Justice in this sense looks at the distribution of goods and services in a given community. Unlike retributive justice which is backward looking, distributive justice is forward looking. The fundamental idea that needs to be appreciated is that distributive justice entails finding ways of resolving conflicting demands on goods and services. Such conflicting demands and the search for resolution generally derive from the moderate scarcity of the available goods. In this context justice demands that each individual's claims or demands be given equal consideration. This is part of what the idea of equality of persons implies. No single individual or group of people has morally prior claim to these goods and services. Land in our situation is the basis for the majority's livelihood, and it is obviously a limited resource. For that reason, apart from the injustice of colonial acts of dispossession, it must be noted that vast inequalities in access to land under such circumstances is in itself unjust. It is unjust for the reason that it denies the poor the means to meet their basic needs, like food and shelter whilst those who possess it allow the land to lay underutilized or unutilized as has been the case in Zimbabwe.

Recognizing the existence of past injustice and its effects on the present raises the question of what should be done about it. How to achieve a just society from the ashes of an unjust colonial system remains one of the struggles that post-colonial societies like Zimbabwe must face. Such a society must seek ways to transcend the conflicting claims to resources and to create a sense of common citizenship between former foes.

Justice as the resolution of conflicting demands and reconciliation seem to have something in common. They both require that all the demands be given a fair hearing. None of the demands or parties to the conflict should be taken as superior. Justice properly understood and reconciliation seems to lie in the ability to transcend the particularistic demands of the contending parties. Whilst the solution may not be absolutist or even universally accepted, all parties must accept it as fair. Only in this way can the solution be a basis for building a common future.

By excluding the majority's demands for land whilst protecting white possession of that land, the Zimbabwean independence constitution was thus unjust. It did not treat blacks and whites equally.

CONCLUSION

It has been noted that victims of great injustices tend to remember and re-live these injustices for a long time. They seem to remember their

suffering much longer than the perpetrators of the injustice. For this reason in many societies unresolved hatred and the desire for revenge tends to lie underneath the façade of peace and harmony. From time to time these pent up emotions burst out in violent conflict which may in turn create new scars. Societies that have sections of their populations divided by this sense of injustice need to go through a reconciliation process so that they will minimize the dangers of future conflict. This entails that the ugly stories of what happened must be recounted by both victims and aggressors in a process in which both participate. Both sides of what took place must be told.

When both sides to a conflict tell their sides of what took place we are likely to get closer to the truth. This is where truth and reconciliation are inter-linked. Because acknowledging the existence of past wrongs or injustices has implications for what we do now and in the future, such acknowledgement creates the need for justice. This is particularly so when the effects of the past wrongs still have a clear influence on the present. As we have noted, justice entails the resolution of conflicting claims. In this context the claims of the different communities to land in Zimbabwe ought to be considered seriously. From this process the possibility for reconciliation is created. An important assumption that has been made is that both blacks and whites are Zimbabweans and they want to live together in peace. As Rodney King is quoted as saying after the Los Angeles riots, "...we're all stuck here for a while. Let's try to work it out." (Shriver, 1995:3) Trying to work things out is what both justice and reconciliation seem to entail and none of them seems to make sense unless there is a willingness to stay together as one community and hope that this is possible. Justice and reconciliation must not be seen as some fixed points in the political landscape, but as continuous processes that help us deal with new demands and new conflicts.

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Chapter II

Religion and the Struggle for Peace in Zimbabwe

Ezra Chitando

Religion is not nice; it has been responsible for more death and suffering than any other human activity. (Smith, 1982:110)

Does religion have a place in the struggles for peace and prosperity in Zimbabwe? Given the fact that there are many instances where the trumpeter of peace has issued forth the cries for war (Ikenga-Metuh, 1992:13), should we even consider the possibility of a positive role of religion in national struggles? Is it not better to privatise religion, since, as some would say, it is a subject in bad taste? Religious bigotry has fomented tension and confrontation throughout history. That religion has, in some instances, frustrated the quest for an abundant life in Zimbabwe is a fact. However, in this paper I shall argue that religion remains very much central to the discourse on peace, development and prosperity.

This paper explores the meaning of religion and peace. It examines the relationship between these two concepts in a Zimbabwean context. An analysis of some of the factors that militate against the attainment of peace in the country is undertaken. Mawondo, in this volume has focused on the problems of wanting to establish reconciliation and peace without justice. This paper suggests how religious perspectives might contribute towards the process of struggling for peace even in the context where justice is still to be achieved. Cognisant of the fact that religion is not a panacea for all national ills, the concluding section pursues the contradictions and tensions that are engendered by religion itself as a social force.

RELIGION AND PEACE: THE DEFINITIONAL PREDICAMENT AND RELATIONSHIP

Religion, W.C. Smith (1978) observed, is notoriously difficult to define. It shares this trait with many other popular but contested concepts in the humanities. Scholars from diverse disciplines such as psychology, sociology, philosophy and others have tried hard to clarify the meaning of religion. Typically, no universally acclaimed definition of religion has been proffered. Cultural differences, ideological postures and many other factors have made the search for a binding definition of religion a frustrating exercise. W. Comstock (1984) rightly calls for an open definition of

religion, that is, one which does not seek to attain universal application. This notion of “openness” shall be adopted in this presentation.

Religion may be regarded as a system of beliefs and practices pertaining to things sacred. It is a form of social interaction among believers and their “unseen beings”. This is important since the existence of the entities postulated by adherents cannot be settled by empirically testable evidence. Critical for this paper is the notion that religion is lived out by human beings in public and in private. Far from being esoteric, religion constantly interacts with society. It both shapes and is shaped by society. (Bourdillon, 1990) This fact justifies our contention that religion is not peripheral to the quest for peace in Zimbabwe.

As a socially recognisable phenomenon, religion is very much a Zimbabwean reality. Does it occur in the singular? No. Religion in Zimbabwe, like anywhere else in the world, is a varied species. It takes many different forms. It is perhaps methodologically prudent to refer to religions in the plural since numerous religions can be found. African Traditional Religions (ATRs), Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Baha’i Faith and other traditions have provided havens of belonging to their adherents. J.G. Platvoet’s (1996:47) reference to Africa’s rainbow of religions accurately captures the religious landscape. Although it is difficult to subsume this myriad under the tag “religion”, these conceptual systems strive to provide their followers with a guide to belief and action. The singular form is adopted in this paper.

Having looked at the concept of religion, we may now focus on the concept of peace. Once again, no unanimity can be assumed when describing a peaceful state. For some, peace simply implies the absence of danger. Others read harmonious relations among individuals and communities. It could also be argued that the internal satisfaction, where an individual can sing, “it is well with my soul”, is an important ingredient for peace to prevail. The following observation brings together the different perceptions of peace:

Peace has been variously described as the freedom from or cessation of war or hostilities, freedom from civil commotions or disorders; public order and security; freedom from disturbances and perturbations (especially as a condition in which an individual person is); quiet, tranquility, undisturbed state, freedom from quarrels or dissension between individuals, a state of friendliness, concord, amity; freedom from mental or spiritual disturbance or conflict arising from passion, sense of guilt; absence of noise, movement, or activity; stillness, etc. (Mala, 1992:94)

From this comprehensive list we may deduce that peace may be construed negatively and positively. Negatively, peace implies the absence of factors that threaten well-being such as strife and mental anguish.

Positively, peace is not the absence of some factors, but a positive presence of certain desirable factors. It is a viable condition on its own. A state of equanimity and contentment may thus be described as a peaceful one. It must be acknowledged that these approaches to peace are not mutually exclusive.

What then is the relationship between religion and peace? Religion, I will argue, has everything to do with peace. Although religion may have been instrumental in disturbing public peace through brainwashing, fundamentalism and outright violence, it remains a possible and important vehicle for peace. Critics may point to the various religions' futuristic and idealistic notions of peace and may want to readily dismiss religion. If peace is only a mystical, unrealisable condition, religion may be accused of putting forward "a pie in the sky in the sweet bye and bye". However, the religions found in Zimbabwe allow one to reread and reclaim positive, liberating ideas of peace.

"The most sublime passages on peace," Ikenga-Metuh, (1992:10) observes, "are found in the sacred scriptures of many religions". By gleaning from the Bible, the Quran and proverbs from ATRs, we may see that the peace celebrated by religion is also practical, concrete and realisable "here and now". Thus Jesus pronounces that he came so that his followers may have life and have it abundantly. (John, 10:10) Also Parrinder (1987:22) writes, "To the Israelites peace was a social concept; it was visible and produced a harmonious relationship in the family, in local society, and between nations."

It must be conceded that peace is not some final state that can be reached at the end of a struggle. Paradoxically, "peace" is a site of perennial striving. Perhaps this is where religion's notion of "peace that surpasses all understanding" serves as a check on complacency. Christianity and Islam, for example, teach that a state of pure bliss, one in which there shall be no more weeping nor death, is to be attained in a future dispensation.

Presently, human beings can already begin to have a foretaste of this experience. In the paragraphs below, I seek to explore some of those factors that have hindered the attainment of peace in Zimbabwe.

ZIMBABWE: STRUGGLES FOR PEACE

In the foregoing paragraphs, this paper defined tentatively the concepts of religion and peace. It was argued that religion is not divorced from the quest for peace. In Zimbabwe many factors have coalesced to ensure that even after the armed struggle which marked the birth of a new nation in 1980, peace remains elusive. One would be forgiven for thinking that when the guns fell silent, peace reigned in Zimbabwe. The legacy of colonialism, particularly as it relates to the land questions, black economic empowerment, ethnic and racial conflicts, the search for meaningful health and education, reconciliation and many other issues have remained

simmering. Policy makers have reflected on these issues with little or no reference to religion. Is religion of little use in these matters?

It would be folly to marginalise religious perspectives from the discourse on peace, development and reconstruction in Zimbabwe for religion was very much part and parcel of the struggle that facilitated the emergence of the Zimbabwean nation. Indeed, tracing the history of religion in the struggle requires a separate and longer narrative. The Catholic Church (Linden, 1980), the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (Gundani, 1996), the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Bhebe, 1999) and other Christian denominations actively participated in the war of liberation. Admittedly, they tended to be found on different sides at different times, but this in itself illustrates the need to continue to recognise the significance of religion. Offering material and moral support, the church used its teachings on equality and human dignity to undermine racist oppression. By providing the “boys of the 60s” with education, the church empowered the nationalists to challenge the status quo. It is not surprising that the leading nationalists had a Christian background or were in the ministry. People like Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole were ordained ministers, while Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe were educated by missionaries and identified themselves with Christianity.

While Christianity had an increased profile, ATRs were vibrant during the struggle. Christianity, having been systematically introduced at the time of colonialism, could easily be accused of being the oppressor’s religion. In some areas, combatants demanded that bibles be burnt as a symbolic act of liberation. At any rate, the struggle was interpreted as a holy war to reclaim ancestral lands. Mediums such as Nehanda and Kaguvi were celebrated. Their memory was invoked and their guidance actively sought during the struggle. (Lan, 1985) Although Daneel (1998) exaggerates when he claims that the spirit mediums were another council above the ZANU *Dare Rechimurenga* (War Council), it is clear that ATRs experienced a revival during the struggle. Emphasising the “traditions of the elders”, they were used ideologically to attract the peasants to join the struggle.

Although there has been limited research on the role of Islam in Zimbabwe’s war of liberation, Mandivenga (1991:76) accurately notes that Muslim countries played an important role. They also provided material and moral support to the liberation armies. Religion has therefore been at the site of struggle. How relevant it is to the post-independence struggles will be discussed with special reference to the issues of violence, leadership and tolerance. These are not the only issues that have led to the absence of peace in Zimbabwe. Rampant corruption, wastefulness by the ruling elite, abandonment of the ideals of the struggle, and numerous other factors have reduced Zimbabwe to a nation that is unsure of itself. (Chitando, 1998) These factors represent some of the major challenges that Zimbabweans must deal with today. They represent the new “struggles after the struggle”. The selection of violence, leadership and tolerance as topics for discussion

is based on my conviction that these issues are useful in appreciating others and crucial in being positively creative. No claim to finality can be made; other nationals will no doubt come up with different lists of factors that militate against the attainment of “peace, perfect peace—in this neighbourhood.” Religious perspectives can be brought to bear on these issues and facilitate a more peaceful environment.

RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ZIMBABWEAN CONDITION

Violence

The liberation struggle bequeathed a legacy of militancy. The rhetoric of key figures such as President Mugabe during successive election campaigns is particularly significant. On a number of occasions he has openly declared that the ruling party cannot be matched when it comes to the capacity to resort to violence. “We have degrees in militancy!” he has declared to the ululation of party faithfuls. Perhaps taking their cue from the activities of the ZANU (PF) Youth and Women’s wings, many activists in Zimbabwe have resorted to high-energy demonstrations to hammer home whatever message they will be putting across. Significantly, militant songs from the liberation struggle (cf. Pongweni, 1982) are retrieved and utilised in the post-independence setting. The disposition towards violence is unmistakable from the “*toyi toyi*” and energetic performances. Dialogue, tolerance of diverging views and willingness to shift from deeply entrenched positions become difficult possibilities in such a setting.

There are many instances where the subterranean violence has been unleashed in Zimbabwe. Student demonstrations (including strikes by High School students), soccer fans, music enthusiasts, workers on stay-aways and many other activities have degenerated into violence. In 1997 ex-combatants waged incessant demonstrations and attained their goal. They were paid gratuities and monthly allowances. That the local currency has never recovered from the bashing of “black Thursday”, 4 December 1997 has been conveniently forgotten. The embattled patron of the ex-combatants, President Mugabe, pledged an unbudgeted Z\$5 billion and the currency plummeted. Violence had paid off, sending clear signals to students and workers that it is viable to be threatening and unflinching in one’s demands. “No retreat, no surrender” has been engraved on the national psyche. While Zimbabwe does not experience the kind of violence found in neighbouring South Africa, its existence means that the building of an environment of peace and stability becomes very difficult.

Given this general environment in the public sphere, it is not unreasonable to argue that domestic violence is bolstered by the dominant story of patriarchy, verbal violence where political rivals are labeled sell-outs, and violence on the self prompted by numerous factors constitute some of the forms in which violence is expressed. As the prices of basic

commodities soar, economic violence is its concomitant. Profiteering, ruthlessness in business dealings and preoccupation with the self are some of the consequences. As life becomes unbearable for the so-called AIDS orphans and blind beggars sing with very few people putting money into their bowls, the struggling majority remain puzzled at why the milk and honey of independent Zimbabwe have not flowed. Why has the “promised land” delivered so little? Can there be peace when the expectations of the majority remain unfulfilled? Is this not a violent rude awakening? It is amidst this sense of paradise postponed that religions are called upon to heal souls and offer hope. To live without hope is to die. Where there is no hope there is no peace. Rather, the well-educated unemployed youth, for example, lead lives characterised by angst. This is accentuated in a society where an ostentatious display of wealth, particularly in the urban context, is not frowned upon: intimidating luxury cars amidst abject poverty testify to this fact.

Religions in Zimbabwe can undermine the spiral of violence by highlighting the centrality of peace. “Where there is war”, St. Francis prayed, “let me bring peace”. Numerous passages in the Quran emphasise the need for peace and tranquility to prevail in society. These ideas from various religions should be reclaimed in Zimbabwe and be made part of civic education and replace the language of violence. Instead of restricting them to particular communities of faith, the teachings on peace should be made available to the larger public in a non-dogmatic manner. To this end, the multi-faith approach to the study of religion in Zimbabwe should no longer just be the pronouncement that it currently is. Practical implementation--Zimbabwe’s greatest singular failure since independence--should characterise this debate. ATRs’ teaching on consideration and respect for others is critical in cultivating attitudes that militate against violence.

Religions such as Christianity, are considerably better placed, in terms of resources, to conduct outreach programmes that promote peace. Both the CCJP and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches’ Justice and Peace wing could do more in terms of making society more aware of the importance of dialogue. Lest this be accused of being another Western glamour concept, consensus has been part of the process by which decisions have been arrived at in Zimbabwe. By drawing attention to the fact that individuals can differ in their approaches to issues without necessarily becoming avowed enemies, religions can foster the spirit of peace in Zimbabwe. Religious leaders (and their followers) should audibly protest when leaders blatantly celebrate a culture of violence.

To those who experience a sense of hopelessness and are suffocating under economic violence, religion should provide solace and warmth. This should not be in the form of preoccupation with the salvation of souls, but with the healing of visible wounds. Women have been particularly active in this regard. Carrying other people’s burdens, they have performed the hospital visitations, run home-based care projects, and

have looked after orphans. Where most men have pleaded, “let this cup pass”, women have groaned in faith. (Njoroge and Kanyoro, 1997) Regrettably, society does not include these activities under “work”. Supporting the informal sector projects, counseling the aggressive husband and abused wife, and making a committed preferential option for the poor, religion could really contribute to the attainment of durable peace in Zimbabwe in the life before death. By drawing on the need for individuals to “feel for and with” others, religion can empower its adherents and larger society not always to insist on things going their way.

Leadership

The Zimbabwean crisis, is largely one of leadership. That the gladiators of the nationalist awakening of the 1960s could still be playing and dominating the political game calls for national introspection. Charisma, sociologists assert, gets routinised somewhere on the way to the land of promise. The simple truth, according to critics, is that the current ruling elite has, with perhaps very few exceptions, overstayed their welcome. Indeed as one MP, Mataure declared, the horses have become tired, and new ones are needed to pull the cart if the nation is to meet its appointment with destiny. Ethnic cleansing in Matabeleland in the early 1980s; mismanagement of national resources as seen in the plundering of the War Victim’s Compensation Fund and the Pay for Your House scheme and the mysterious depletion of the Social Dimensions Fund; an ailing health-delivery system; galloping inflation and high unemployment figures constitute an indictment of the rulers of the day. Proclaiming peace in such a situation sounds hollow and insincere. When local deficiencies are coupled with unfavourable global economic trends, life becomes a hard, grim battle for daily bread. How relevant is religion to this question of leadership?

When the leadership appears unwilling or incapable of changing the fortunes of a people, religion should resort to what S.J. Samartha (1991:55) calls its “prophetic-critical” role. It must actively bring to the fore the shortcomings of such rulers. Writing from within the African American community in the USA, Cornel West has argued that Christianity, if it is to be true to itself, ought to constantly interrogate oppressive social and economic systems. Thus utilising traits within the various traditions that enhance human liberation (Cohn-Sherbok,1992), religions should critique wastefulness by the state. When more funds are committed to military adventurism when basic drugs are in short supply, religious persons as good stewards should protest. Indeed all people of goodwill should register their concern. Peace is possible where there is responsibility and accountability.

Zimbabwe will probably fulfill its potential if the model of servant leadership is adopted. ATRs, Christianity and Islam all teach that good leaders follow. By putting the welfare of the ordinary citizens at the fore, a servant leader (Osei-Mensah,1990), recognises his/her obligation to them.

Conscious of the needs of others and intergenerational responsibility, such a leader does not loot and plunder national resources. Resisting self aggrandisement, they are persons of integrity. Peace is ushered in when leaders at various levels put service ahead of enrichment. Where the black majority in Zimbabwe might end up yearning for "pharaoh's reign", peace is illusory. Religion could contribute towards the emergence of servant leadership by targeting those in leadership positions and impressing upon them their onerous responsibility.

Alongside these strategies, it is important that people be empowered to take their leaders to task. During the struggle it was critical that the authority of the "chiefs" be recognised. A guerrilla war can hardly be won through democratic participation by the majority. Combatants had the guns and the "povo" could at best be persuaded to comply with orders: coercion was a ready possibility. This point is expanded in Kaulemu's first piece in the present volume. Although the mystification of offices has been undermined to some extent, there appears to be a personalisation of national issues. Here, the approach of the 8th century Israelite prophets is instructive. They were at liberty to criticise the kings who multiplied houses when the poor were being sold for a pair of shoes. That the prophetic ministry is costly is well documented in the history of religion. That the truth does not always set one free is also acknowledged. Nonetheless peace can only be achieved through the struggle to have leaders with "large ears". While they do not have to be religious themselves, there would be no contradiction if they would be informed by ethical precepts from the world's religious ideas, for religion espouses humanistic values.

Tolerance

In Zimbabwe "our culture" is an ideological tool used to pound homosexuals into submission, to stop women from putting on mini-skirts, etc. Peace is difficult to achieve when members of a given society are not willing to embrace "otherness". Religion also tends to promote conflict by insisting on unchanging truth where things remain as they were in the beginning, as if we could simplistically dig up this time of the beginning. Religion however teaches the values of tolerance and compassion. ATRs provide the lead here. Eschewing a monopoly of truth, the indigenous religions of Zimbabwe are ecumenical. A telling example can be found in how Christians and Muslims are accommodated in African rituals. Their presence is cherished and numerous concessions are made to them, such as officiants offering libation on their behalf. For their part, Christians and Muslims generally look forward to the elimination of "paganism" in the country. Joseph Huber (1996:34) notes, "Shona proverbs try to create an understanding and tolerant attitude towards the faults of others by reminding us how nonsensical it is to criticise the shortcomings of others." Through sayings such as "*Makudo anosekana makuma*" (Baboons ridicule

each other about their foreheads), society seeks to nurture a middle path of mutual acceptance.

Tolerance, the ability to accommodate difference, is important for the attainment of true peace in Zimbabwe. When people from diverse ethnic and racial groups can tolerate each other, when people of different political persuasions can exchange views and not punches, and when adherents of various religions agree that “now we only see in part”, foundations for a peaceful society would have been laid. Religion promotes tolerance by its teachings on the primacy of justice. While this is another large concept whose nuances cannot be pursued at this stage, religions are uncompromising in their call for justice. Elaborate rituals without the attendant ethical commitment, religion teaches, are worse than useless. They are positively dangerous in that they lead to complacency where upstarts can mouth “peace, peace” when there is no peace. Real peace is tied to justice. Thus, “Peace is the sum of the benefits granted to justice; to have fruitful land, to eat to fullness, to dwell in security, to sleep without fear, ...to be multiplied.” (Leon-Dufor, 1988: 412)

It would appear from the preceding paragraphs that “more religion” would herald the era of total peace in Zimbabwe. Religion would mitigate the violence, provide the ideal leadership, and cultivate tolerance. Jesse Mugambi, a theologian from Kenya has made the candid observation that Africa appears to be the most religious continent. It also happens to be the poorest economically. Does Zimbabwe need more or less religion if peace is to be attained? I have wrestled with the question of whether religion has a role in the quest for peace and development throughout this paper that my position should be clear by now. However, there is need to acknowledge that there are contesting views on what it is that we are struggling for, what peace entails, whether it is possible to struggle peacefully (cf. Gandhi and Martin Luther King) and the status/desirability of the sublime peace postulated by religion. In responding to these issues, attention is drawn to the contradictions among religions themselves.

“PEACE, PERFECT PEACE”: UNATTAINABLE IN OUR TIME?

In this paper I have privileged the reading of the peace proffered by religion as a practical, present reality. Religion, here and now, can facilitate the struggle for peace in contemporary Zimbabwe. In emphasising the common positions reached by (in this narrative) ATRs, Christianity and Islam, there is a danger of overlooking deep-seated differences amongst them. While ATRs are stubbornly earth-bound, dwelling very much on the idea of living life in its fullness (Magesa, 1997:77), Christianity and Islam are eschatological in orientation. The idea of a new heaven and a new earth in Revelation 21 or of heaven as the abode of peace in Q 6: 127 means that the futuristic aspect should not be overlooked in the effort to harness religious perspectives. The tension between the “already” and the “not yet” needs to be creatively approached.

Religion, as the social reality that we have defined it to be, is also caught up in the struggles that Zimbabweans engage in. This paper might give the impression that religion is handed down from on high with all the solutions. Far from it, religion is susceptible to violence, impotent leadership and intolerance, as I alluded to above. Instead of regarding this fact as a source of weakness, therein lies the strength of religion. Because it interacts with these factors that undermine peace regularly, religion is able to critically reflect on them. Indeed, Christians may mystify and argue that when they are weak they are in fact strong.

Can the state of perfect peace be attained in this life? Given the contradictions that we have raised in this paper, it appears safe to admit that peace always represents a yearning for things hoped for; a desire for things not yet fully achieved. Indeed, as noted in the introductory section, even to maintain the peace that would have been partially achieved requires a struggle: struggles for peace! Religion helps by providing insights into what peace entails, although religious perspectives do not exhaust the totality of peace. In Zimbabwe, by combating violence, promoting the culture of servant leadership and tolerance, religion can demonstrate its social relevance. If it successfully accomplishes this role, J.Z. Smith's statement cited at the beginning of this essay will require careful rethinking in the Zimbabwean context.

CONCLUSION

If Zimbabwe is an example gone bad (Stoneman, 1998), can peace be attained? I believe that by adding religious perspectives to numerous other strategies to the struggle, the basis for a promising future may be laid. Mourning and nostalgically yearning for those days when Zimbabwe "was not like the rest of Africa" is self-defeating. On the basis of hope, one looks forward to the day when the Muslim greeting "*Salam alaykum*" (Peace be upon you), and the Hebrew salutation "Shalom" (Peace) shall find resonance in the daily experiences of ordinary Zimbabweans.

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Chapter III

Running in Vicious Circles: Paradoxes of Struggles for Peace in Zimbabwe

David Kaulemu

Many post-independence African societies have aimed at achieving peace and stability; many have not been satisfied with their progress. In some cases, more violence has been experienced after political independence from colonial powers than before it. It has been difficult to understand why this has been so. Mawondo, in this volume argues that part of the reason has been the attempt to reconcile people without adequately dealing with the injustices that caused the liberation struggles in the first place. Chimuka and Chitando suggest the negative role of religion. In most analyses of the post-independence situation in Africa, analysts have taken the liberation struggle, as a process, for granted. There has not been much analysis of the impact of the struggles on the prospects for the establishment of peace in post-independence societies. We need to understand what impact the liberation struggles have had on the psychology of post-colonial personalities and institutions.

This paper problematises the very struggles for peace in the context of Zimbabwe. I argue in this paper that some of the very strategies we have used in the struggles for peace have, in many ways, hindered our prospects of achieving it. This is not to argue that the struggles for independence were entirely negative. In fact, the struggles have in many significant ways opened up many possibilities for the attainment of peace. However, with the benefit of hindsight, I suggest that we could have thought more on the strategies that we took than we did. This assessment is made with the view of suggesting how we can learn from the past as we wage more struggles after the struggle. Sibanda, in this volume, traces the negative psychological impact of the struggle on the relations between the Shona and the Ndebele. I look at the negative impact of pre-independent violent strategies, languages and institutions on post colonial society.

IDENTIFYING PARADOXES

There was a time when the prospect of gaining political independence brought with it very high expectations for peace, development, prosperity and human flourishing. The hopes we¹ have today as the last virulent vestiges of colonial rule are wiped away from Southern Africa are not as high as when Ghana attained political independence in 1957. We no longer expect as much moral, social,

political, and economic good to come out of the *Christmas box* of political independence as we did fifty years ago. Yet the intensity with which we fought for political independence in the last few years of colonial rule was a great deal more spirited than we had done thirty years earlier. This indeed is a paradox. We fought less in the early 1960s and expected more and in the 1990s we fought more but expected less. We expect even less from the struggles in the new millennium. Hence the many apocalyptic stories that people told about the prospects of the millennium.²

To say that we expect less does not mean that we want and indeed demand less. We are just being realistic. Our demands have in fact increased and they continue to do so especially as we learn new languages for making demands and as we perfect the old ones. They have increased even as we learn new tactics and practices for making our demands. These demands have, at an exponential rate, been turning from polite requests to be ruled well to revolutionary demands for self-rule; from peaceful cultural resistance through the formation of various native associations such as burial societies, cultural groups, economic and social clubs and later trade unions to political parties which in turn initiated liberation movements and armies. Whereas our foremothers and forefathers started by demands to be ruled well, we now want to rule ourselves, and sometimes, even to rule others. Even our understanding of what it means for us to rule ourselves has continued to be radicalized. When we started, the phrase, "to rule ourselves" referred only to the rule of our old male adults. The popular slogan then to summarize what the liberation struggle was about was "*One Man One Vote*". And then we became aware, or at least we were made aware, that we were marginalising women. Although we, for some time resisted the inclusion of adult women in reference to self-rule, we now have no choice, at least on a theoretical level, but to include them. But now the young people are also fighting to be included. Student movements and organisations, particularly those organised in Universities, teachers' and technical colleges as well as in schools have been formed and are demonstrating their desire to be taken seriously in matters that affect the rest of the society. Recent developments in our political parties demonstrate that the youth no longer accept the idea that men who are over fifty years of age should continue to run "youth affairs". The 2000 Zimbabwean parliamentary elections ushered in a relatively significant number of youthful members of parliament, many of whom had been student leaders.

Whereas we started by asking for civil rights, we now understand the connections between politics and economics. And yet at the same time our demands have increased and become more sophisticated, our genuine hope for the actual fulfillment of those demands has significantly been decreased. Thus we expect less to come out of the independence of black ruled South Africa than we expected of the independence of Zimbabwe. It is not surprising then that the oppressors have begun more and more to expect the liberation struggles to bring more social goods for them than the oppressed. It is clear from the history of South African independence that by the time

de Klerk came into power, the majority of whites in South Africa had begun to feel that the best way of securing their interests was through granting permission for a black government. And already with the black government, many black people are beginning to feel that the peace that has come with the black government is benefiting white people more than the blacks. This is already threatening the peace in South Africa. In Zimbabwe, especially with the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, the majority of whites probably kick themselves for attempting to cling to political power, not realising that the best way of holding on to their privileges was to grant political independence to the Africans. Indeed when the politically independent Africans realize the emptiness of a political independence sequestered from economic power, and begin to ask for more, the whites begin to feel uncomfortable. Mawondo in this volume, has argued that without the resolution of the 'land question', which was the main reason for the African struggles, African political independence remains empty. The Zimbabwean experience clearly demonstrates how social peace can be threatened when black desires, expectations and aspirations are not fulfilled by political independence.

FORGETTING PEACE ON THE WAY TO PEACE

There is a fascinating story about how the dinosaur died out. It is said that the gigantic Mesozoic reptile had a disproportionately small brain. When the dinosaur felt hungry and made a firm decision to go and get food, it would be distracted by a small thing on the way and forget where it was supposed to be going. Eventually it died of hunger. This seems to be the explanation for our social failures in Africa. We are hungry for peace yet we seem to be distracted on the way and we lose sight of it in the very process of working for its attainment.

In this paper I argue that the paradoxes identified can be understood if we explain the vicious circle in which we have placed ourselves in terms of the strategies we have used to fight for our independence, freedom and peace. We have often understood our strategies in terms of two alternatives. Either we have to use violence or we do not. If we use violence, as we have done in our fight for political independence, we are likely to achieve our goal, as we have been doing up to the liberation of South Africa. Undeniably, this is the strategy that has worked. Yet the very process of fighting, if it involves violence, turns us into the kind of people who are capable of losing sight of our noble goals. We immerse ourselves into a culture of violence which is difficult to get out of. Even if we continue to have our noble goals in sight, we eventually realise that our active and even passive participation (as in 'passive smoking') in violent activities soon makes our desired goals virtually impossible to achieve.

The use of violence has often presented us a near empty Christmas box of political independence. Political independence, although always worthwhile and always morally demanded of us, has virtually always

turned out to be an anticlimax if not a nightmare. And yet, if we do not use violence, and indeed, if violence had not been used in the fight for independence, oppression, exploitation and humiliation would almost certainly have continued in the brutal forms it was practiced by the oppressors.

The paradox of African independence has been that the fight for independence has not delivered to us what the fight had been for. Something else has always been delivered! Yet the fight for independence has always appeared obligatory. The necessary fight for independence has been disappointing. This is due to two factors. First, the forces which granted us independence have pretended to withdraw their rule over us only to come back in different forms. Neo-colonialism, not total independence, has always followed our struggles for emancipation.

Secondly and more importantly, for this paper, the institutions, values and the kinds of people which we have created in the process of fighting for independence, have themselves been the major hindrances to the attainment of all those things that we expected independence to bring. Thus, the very instruments that have been seen to be necessary in the fight against oppression have themselves proved to be hindrances to the unpacking of the “fruits of independence”.

I will discuss this thesis concentrating on the institutions, values, and the kind of personalities that we have felt necessary for the liberation struggle. This is done to see if they have in fact been responsible for the frustrations we have felt after the attainment of political independence and the difficulties we have faced in attempts to establish peace. To do this, it is important to outline the general tendency or logic of the liberation struggle in Africa.

WE-ARE-IN-THIS-TOGETHER LOGIC

My thesis is that there are at least two kinds of logic of the liberation struggle. The first kind is the one that is familiar to us today and it has been made the most popular. It is the logic based upon understanding the liberation struggle as a fight for some moral goal such as justice, equality, human dignity or human rights. According to this understanding, liberation in Africa is not a concern for Africans alone. It is a universal problem. It is a fight for the British people as much as it is for the Africans. Therefore the “international community” has as much right to decide the goals of that independence as the Africans. It is seen as merely a contingent fact that the evils and therefore the struggle against them, is located in Africa. It could have been anywhere in the world. Thus the institutions, values and personalities to participate in this struggle are considered to be universally determined. According to this logic, the anti-apartheid activist, the white liberal, the black ANC member, the Umkhonto we Sizwe liberation fighter, an ordinary British person in the street and anybody anywhere in the world are seen as morally on the same plane when it comes

to deciding what the struggle against apartheid is about. In the case of Zimbabwe, the ex-combatant, the white commercial farmer, the landless black rural widow, the white teenager studying in Cape Town, Tony Blair, the white American 'potential investor' and an officer of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are all moral equals who in deciding the land question in Zimbabwe.

This logic is based on looking at morality as based on objective and universal moral standards, which prescribe for all human beings wherever they may be what they ought to do. As moral prescriptive standards, they are supposed to be supreme and to override all other considerations. Thus self-interest, political affiliation, religious convictions and economic considerations are taken to be subordinate to the demands of morality. According to this view of morality, each person who decides on the moral issue in question is supposed to be inspired by moral values and not just by political or economic interests. We are told that the American House of Representatives, in considering the Zimbabwe Democracy Bill, is searching for objective moral justice and that the ex-combatants ought to do the same.

This logic summarises emancipation as a fight against evil not individual people. Explaining this logic, Martin Luther King jr. had this to say;

It is evil that the nonviolent resister seeks to defeat, not the persons victimized by evil. If he is opposing racial injustice, the nonviolent resister has the vision to see that the basic tension is not between races. As I like to say to the people of Montgomery: "The tension in this city is not between white people and Negro people. The tension is, at bottom, between justice and injustice, between the forces of light and the forces of darkness. And if there is a victory, it will be a victory not merely for fifty thousand Negroes, but a victory for justice and the forces of light. We are out to defeat injustice and not white persons who may be unjust." (King, in Washington 1986:18)

US AND THEM LOGIC

The above logic is not the only one. In fact the very beginnings of what we now call the liberation struggle had a different kind of logic. This is not surprising given the fact that the concept of an international, universal society had not been sufficiently developed enough from the point of view of the African people. The struggle of Africans who met invaders from outside their world had a much simpler logic.

Foreigners came to our home pretending to mean no harm,
but ended up taking away our land and forcing us to

change our lives by demanding that we fit into their system in which we were systematically marginalised.

The fight begins with a simple logic, “You took our land, we should have it back; you came into our house unauthorised, you must get out”. This logic is clearly illustrated in many liberation songs. In one such song sung by the Mau Mau in the fight for Kenyan independence there are the following words:

The white community are foreigners
This land they must quit
And where will you go, their sympathisers
When all the Kikuyu will gather? (Barnett and Njama, 1966: 79)

This simple logic does not suggest what the foreigner will do if he returns the plundered land or what he will do if he vacates the African house. It simply assumes he will go back home, wherever that is.

This logic encourages the values of courage and heroism against the foreigner, and co-operation and solidarity with the fellow comrade in the struggle. Co-operation with the enemy is condemned as selling-out. Selling-out is a vice not a virtue. “And where will you go, their sympathisers?” As a warrior, one can kill, lie, hate and degrade the one identified as an enemy in the name of resistance. The foreigner is not part of us and we do not expect to live as neighbours. Whether the foreigner is equal, deserves justice or respect is not at the center of this logic. This logic centers around war, around warriors, around courage; victory is the goal. Emphasis on these values is clearly illustrated by the Action Oath which members made before being accepted into the Mau Mau army.

If I reveal our secrets, let this oath turn against me;
If I spy falsely let this oath turn against me;
If my father, my mother or my child betray the nation and I
refuse to kill him or her, let this oath turn against me;
If I leave any comrade in danger, let this oath turn
against me; (Ibid)

After this oath, the men would then go on to make promises, which include the following commitments.

I swear in truth before God and this Council that I will obey the laws of the Council and will be a steadfast soldier who will obey the Council's and the commander's orders. If I disobey or fail to fulfill any commission, let his meat turn against me and let my legs be fractured.

I swear to give my life as a sacrifice for the nation in the

fight for Independence, without demanding any reward except for freedom. If I speak falsely let the oath kill me.

I swear that if I am sent to cut off the head of a European or any of our enemies and I return without doing it, due to fear or cowardice, let this oath turn against me.

I swear that if I form my own private committee without the knowledge of this Council or my commanders, and commit such offence willingly, let this oath put an end to me.

Women swore to few points, committing themselves to the punishment of the oath generally for acting as a spy; refusing to come when called at night; failing to take advantage of an opportunity, or failing to report it to our men; neglecting a wounded soldier; reporting a soldier to the enemy; neglecting to report secrets of the enemy which she had learned; and betraying the nation, or resting before Kenya was Independent. (Barnett and Njama, 1966:116-7)

The logic of heroic virtue assumes specific conceptions of personal and social identity. The “us” is clearly defined in terms of tribal or national groupings. Anti-colonial struggles in the 1890s were not nationalist in the sense we understand nationalism after the Second World War. In the 1890s, concepts of national identity were understood in terms of people of the same blood relations, under the same chiefdom or kingdom. Anybody else was seen as alien.

However, history has shown that the foreigner in the form of the White man, does not go away, he does not leave “my father’s house” and does not voluntarily give up the land. Instead he proves to be powerful. He introduces a powerful system, powerful institutions and values into the African world. With time, the African people come to appreciate the rationality of the foreigner’s system. Once established, familiarity builds understanding, which in turn builds some assent to most of the institutions and values of the new system. The reality that the foreigners were not going away, that they were to be part of the African situation whether we liked it or not demanded that we deal with the issue of how we could live together. This is where the original crude logic changes into the logic based on moral concepts. This requires that the assumptions in the crude logic are to be dropped. It requires that we find ways of building relationships with the former outsiders. But to do this, has always meant to reconcile with the foreigner on his terms. To organise society in such a way that most of the interests of the more powerful former outsider are in general fulfilled, necessarily means the non-fulfillment of the interests and original goals of the indigenous people which are fundamentally based on

the human desire for freedom. As Martin Luther King Jr. points out in the context of America,

The determination of Negro Americans to win freedom from every form of oppression springs from the same profound longing for freedom that motivates oppressed peoples all over the world. The dynamic beat of deep discontent in Africa and Asia is at bottom a quest for freedom and human dignity on the part of people who have long been victims of colonialism. (King in Washington (ed.), 1986:7)

King recognises that “Privileged groups rarely give up their privileges without strong resistance” and the People do not stop fighting for freedom. He expresses our question as follows:

Hence the basic question which confronts the world’s oppressed is: How is the struggle against the forces of injustice to be waged? There are two possible answers. One is resort to the all too prevalent method of physical violence and corroding hatred. The danger of this method is its futility. Violence solves no social problems; it merely creates new and more complicated ones.

If the American Negro and the other victims of oppression succumb to the temptation of using violence in the struggle for justice, unborn generations will live in a desolate night of bitterness, and their chief legacy will be an endless reign of chaos. (King in Washington (ed.), 1986:7)

King points out for us that violence as a means or instrument to fight oppression is not an innocent instrument. It changes the person who uses it and the person on which it is used. The very personality or character of the user of violence is transformed by violence.

Violence has its own logic. Violence involves physically hurting, maiming, or killing others. When one kills, one may be prepared to kill again. The one who is hurt or maimed usually develops resentment and hatred towards the one who used violence against him or her. The relatives, descendents and friends of the killed usually cry for the apprehension and punishment of the perpetrator of violence. Historical memory usually ensures that the great grand children of the victims of oppression or injustice will always try to avenge the injustice. This is partly a demand for justice, but it is also a strategy of self-defense in case they are the next ones to be attacked. The one who uses violence feels he should defend himself. The defense may involve more killing, hurting and maiming. Thus as

Martin Luther King Jr. notes, "... the aftermath of violence is tragic bitterness." (8) He also makes it clear to his followers that,

I stressed that the use of violence in our struggle would both be impractical and immoral. To meet hate with retaliatory hate would do nothing but intensify the existence of evil in the universe. Hate begets hate; violence begets violence; toughness begets a greater toughness. (King in Washington (ed.), 1986:17)

Violence demands the establishment of institutions of violence. Often it snowballs into what we may call an industry of violence. Sibanda demonstrates this point in the political context of the marginalisation and persecution of "the Ndebele" in Zimbabwe. If the above quote from King is true, then it explains how once human beings invented war, all sorts of war related institutions, like the army, the police, the arms industry, and the nuclear weapons were invented. These weapons always need to be "improved" in the sense of making them more destructive. This is because the person who uses violence to gain an advantage will need more violence to maintain it. In the case of people fighting for independence, once a decision to use violence has been made, then violence related institutions must be put in place. These will be institutions of attack and of defense. In the case of liberation organisations, the logic of "us and them" of "friends and foes" should clearly be defined. Sitting on the fence is not tolerated in liberation organisations. This is so because of the real danger of spies and sell-outs. Because using and facing retaliatory violence involves risking life, institutions of suspicion and surveillance are put in place. The enemy and the potential enemy must be under constant surveillance and there must be constant vigilance against the enemy spies and saboteurs.

Once the logic of violence has taken over, new relationships between people come into being. It is about giving and obeying instructions. It is about total commitment to the organisation and punishment for giving less than that. The person capable of more violence, the person in possession of the means of violence is the one who is feared. Fear replaces respect as the cement of human relationships. Cruelty against the enemy or anyone under suspicion is applauded. The best test for heroism is when one has to be violent to blood relations who are seen as joining the enemy as illustrated in the Mau Mau oath. All this is reflected in the language that is used in the description of human relations. Violence therefore requires the establishment of the related values, personalities and practices, which go hand in hand with violence. It has a tendency to be particularistic, exclusivist and therefore displacing alternative value systems. Thus the system of violence which includes the values, the institutions and personalities of violence, once established during the fight for justice, replaces the originally desired values, institutions and personalities of an emancipated free and moral society.

King's strong position is in pointing to us the fact that we need, as much as possible, to keep or develop morally respectable personalities, institutions, values and practices even during the process of struggle. We should never lose sight of our humanity when we struggle against inhumanity. If we lose it or deliberately suspend it, we may never regain it. He gives us what he calls the alternative to violence through his five points:

1. The nonviolent resister is just as strongly opposed to the evil against which he protests as is the person who uses violence. His method is passive or nonaggressive in the sense that he is not physically aggressive toward his opponent. But his mind and emotions are always active, constantly seeking to persuade the opponent that he is mistaken. (King in Washington (ed), 1986:7-8)

This position depends on one assumption – that the oppressor can be persuaded to admit their mistakes. King is optimistic about human nature and the power of reason. Is he right to be optimistic? History has, so far, not been on his side. Our experience of the Enlightenment project has been symbolised more by the Holocaust and Apartheid than freedom and mutual respect and understanding. In Africa, no one seems to have been convinced of the need to apologise for the occurrence of the slave trade, colonialism and exploitation. Mawondo has stressed this point in the article in this volume. How then can we believe in the power of reason to persuade the opponent?

2 ...nonviolent resistance does not seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship and understanding. The nonviolent resister must often express his protest through noncooperation or boycotts, but he realises that noncooperation and boycotts are not ends themselves; they are merely means to awaken a sense of moral shame in the opponent. The end is redemption and reconciliation. The aftermath of nonviolence is the creation of the beloved community, while the aftermath of violence is tragic bitterness.

3. the attack is against the forces of evil rather than against persons who are caught in those forces.

4. At the center of nonviolence stands the principle of love. (King in Washington (ed.), 1986:7-8)

King is very strong when he tells us to keep our moral sanity. He strongly believes that we are morally responsible for our moral character even when surrounded by violence. He then goes on to argue that we must not allow ourselves to be sucked into the industry of violence.

The problem with King's view is that doing this will not change the society of oppression. The values, institutions and personalities of violence do have a life of their own and do not respond to the language of love, nonviolence and justice. The voice of reason is not usually listened to by those caught up in the industry of violence. The two are separate, almost self-sufficient systems. In order to change the society of violence and injustice there seems to be a demand to speak the same language of violence. This point can clearly be seen in the way in which in Africa, liberation movements have often failed to turn themselves into peaceful and democratic governing parties. Fearless liberation cadres have tended to fail to turn themselves into democratic members of parliament or ministers or simply civil members of society. Those who have participated in the violent activities of the war have inevitably found it virtually impossible to engage in democratic practices without cheating or resorting to violence of one form or another both in the public sphere as well as in the private spheres of family and personal relationships. Even a cursory look at how African governments which have come into power after liberation struggles attempt to govern democratically shows this point, such as cases of rigging of elections, tampering with the judiciary, interference with the mass media, and use of the defense forces and other agents of the law in order to intimidate opposing forces as well as serve the interests of the ruling parties.

On the whole, liberation organisations which come into power have tended to work as if they do not need to transform themselves into governments. They have tended to have the mistaken view that governing is essentially an extended activity of the violent liberation struggle. They have therefore tended to use the same language of war, of surveillance, of enemies and of winning. They continue to assume that the oath still applies in the same way it did during the war. In their scheme of things which reflects an uncompromising, intolerant univocal binarism, opposition parties are seen as enemies to be fought and eliminated even though their constitutional right to exist is theoretically recognised. Anybody not supporting a particular legislation suggested by the ruling party is counted as an enemy. This is why many African governments have been known to send the army to deal with criticism by university and college students. They deal with students' demonstrations and workers' legal strikes as if they were at war with a foreign army. Winning and losing local or national elections becomes a matter of life and death. When the population supports the opposition, this is regarded by former liberation movements a betrayal of the liberation struggle. This is clearly demonstrated in Zimbabwe, where the ruling ZANU PF government considers any support for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as treason on the part of the electorate.

During the liberation wars, the fighters learnt to organise militarily and to give or receive orders without questioning them. In some ways this was appropriate in the context of the fight against brutal colonial governments and the guerrilla war tactics the liberation movements used.

After independence, the new governments still expect everyone to accept quietly everything they do. Members of the party who want to represent the party should get their instructions from the party leaders who still act like army commanders. Those who want to experiment with different ways of doing things become enemies who will bear the consequences of being labeled enemies. Africa is full of examples of leaders who contributed very much during the struggle for independence and yet will not be recognised or acknowledged because they have disagreed with the party commanders. The classic case is Chiluba's attempt to declare that Kaunda is not a legitimate hero of Zambian independence. This resulted in the ridiculous situation in which Kaunda was declared stateless for some time. In Zimbabwe, the condemnation, by the leaders of the ruling party of those of its members who demand more open ways of running local and parliamentary elections assumes that they have turned into enemies of the party. When they attempt to participate in civil organisations, those organisations are identified as political and therefore enemies.

The war tactics of secrecy, manipulation, misinformation and lying learnt during the conditions of war are now being practiced within the new democratic structures of the state. The biographies of most post-colonial leaders of African states are full of examples of this point.

Politically independent Africa therefore suffers partly because of the means it used to fight for independence. It suffers on three levels, that is, on a personality level, institutional level, as well as on the level of social practices and activities. The personalities that our liberation struggles have churned out, the institutions and practices that they have encouraged have all tended to stand in the way of the establishment of a fully humane society aimed at genuine human flourishing. And yet it appears as if we could not have done without the struggles, which ironically still deserve to be identified as liberation struggles.

NOTES

1. The pronoun *we* refers to all Africans who see themselves as such and are politically committed to the liberation and development of Africa. *Europeans, Asians, or Americans* in Africa, whose political commitment remains non-African are not included in the pronoun. This however does not preclude white and yellow people who live in Africa and genuinely see themselves as and are committed to the advancement of Africa.

2. In Zimbabwe, the general imagination in the 1990s was dominated by very pessimistic stories about what would happen in the new millennium. Many expected “the end of the world”. Others feared total collapse of the communication network. Stories about Satanists who went around causing people’s deaths were circulated more intensely than usual.

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Chapter IV

The Quest for Unity, Peace and Stability in Zimbabwe

Sobantu Sibanda

INTRODUCTION

The people of Zimbabwe have continued to struggle from the time the Europeans settled on their land. While the purpose of this struggle has generally remained the same for the majority of the people in this country, over the years things have changed for 'the Ndebele'. The coming of independence in 1980 brought political victory for the rest of the country. However, it ushered in a new struggle for them. For 'the Ndebele,' it was time to face new opponents, as the struggle continued and continues today.

As had happened in 1980, in December 1987 their struggle assumed a new form, ushered in by the signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU P.F. and ZAPU. Unfortunately for these people, while the rest of the Zimbabweans celebrated the new found peace and stability, 'the Ndebele' continued to suffer under what they call 'alien domination' and discrimination. The *Sunday Standard* of May 9, 1999 quoted some of the leaders of the people of Matabeleland as having said, "We have been shouting about chronic drought for the past 15 years, but not one major dam was built here since 1980." The reporter went on to say "These are the words of anger emanating from the government's neglect of Matabeleland. Locals believe the ruling party, ZANU PF, pursues a policy of discrimination against the Ndebele, who make up 20% of Zimbabwe's population of 12,5 million." It should be borne in mind that the struggle for independence was essentially a struggle against "alien domination and discrimination". White rule was discriminatory on racial lines. The claim by the leaders of the people of Matabeleland is that the ZANU PF government is guilty of the same evil. The only difference is that their discrimination is on tribal lines while that of the White regime was based on race.

The question this paper seeks to address is whether it is possible to talk meaningfully of unity, peace and stability when a section of the people who fought so vigorously against alien domination and discrimination still feels dominated and discriminated against? The death of Dr Joshua Nkomo has seen more and more calls for the people of Zimbabwe to remain united if the country is to continue to enjoy the peace and stability which was brought about by the liberation struggle and subsequently the Unity Accord of 1987. Such calls are, of course, based on the assumption that indeed the country has been enjoying unity, peace and stability since 1987. It can be argued that such calls are a clear testimony of the fact that despite the

signing of the Unity Accord the country has over the years remained under the cloud of the events that preceded this historic event. Fears of what might have been, had the Unity Accord been a non-event continue to haunt the majority of the Zimbabwean people.

While there might be no denying that the Unity Accord brought calm to this country, some pessimists have not ruled out the possibility of collapse of this unity. Of course, such pessimism is not baseless, as some of the people of Matabeleland have recently openly declared that “The Unity Accord that brought together ZAPU and ZANU PF has failed to improve the poor conditions of the people of Matabeleland.” (*The Zimbabwe Mirror*, 18-24 December 1998.) In an interview with the same newspaper the leader of ZAPU 2000, Joshua Mhambi said, “the move to revive PF ZAPU reflects the mood of the majority of the people of Matabeleland”, who he said have been “marginalised following the signing of the Unity Accord on December 22 1987.”

Another view has it that unity was only between the two parties’ top leadership and had nothing to do with the masses at the grassroots level. Those leaders from the former ZAPU who felt left out in the new ZANU PF argue that Dr Joshua Nkomo betrayed his people. There are even those who have said that there was no unity. ZAPU was simply swallowed by ZANU PF. If the above statements are true the question then is why such a strong party as ZAPU accepted being swallowed by ZANU PF? The answer to this question and many others yet to be raised constitute the subject matter of this paper. As will be argued later the answers to these questions lie in what had preceded the 1987 Unity Accord. The events that had unfolded in Matabeleland between 1981 and 1987 might shed light on why Unity had become a must for the ZAPU leadership. Was this Unity the end of the struggle or was it the beginning of another but in a different form?

BACKGROUND TO THE STRUGGLE

While I acknowledge that the struggle of the people of Matabeleland as they are constituted today dates back to the time the Europeans set foot on their land, I want to focus on the events which provide a context for the concepts of “unity, peace and stability” as they are understood in present day Zimbabwe. This is a background which divides Zimbabweans (erroneously though) into at least two unreconcilable tribal identities. On the one hand, we have ‘the Ndebele’ who are generally found in the two provinces of Matabeleland and, on the other hand, we have ‘the Shona’ who constitute about 80% of the country’s population and generally are found in the rest of the provinces. This division will be looked at more closely later in this paper where a more critical analysis of tribal identities will be evaluated. For now suffice it to say Zimbabwe waged the struggle against the European invaders divided into these two main groups. Also important to note is the fact that there is a third component of the

Zimbabwean population which comprises of a small white community against which the struggle for independence was waged.

It should be remembered that while both the ZANLA and the ZIPRA fought in the liberation struggle with one purpose, they were not a single unit. Obviously the hostilities that ensued between these two groups during the war had not been resolved by the time independence was attained. The war of liberation saw an undeclared alliance being forged between the ZIPRA who were mainly 'Ndebele' and the ZANLA who were mainly 'Shona'. The reasons for such an alliance are obvious as the two groups had a common enemy and their purpose for fighting was the same, i.e. to repel alien domination. As Richard Werbner notes, the separate guerrilla armies, the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) led by Joshua Nkomo and the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) led by Robert Mugabe had difficulties between them from the onset. (Werbner, 1991:159)

A number of factors appear to have divided the guerrilla armies into two rival groups. Firstly, as has already been noted, the ZIPRA were mainly 'Ndebele' while the ZANLA were mainly 'Shona'. Secondly, the ZIPRA put greater emphasis on establishing a regular or more conventional army outside the country while the ZANLA were less organised militarily and put emphasis on numbers. (Werbner,1991:159) Thirdly, "In accord with their differences, they had rival sources of support, among others, the Russians heavily backed the ZIPRA and the Chinese, ZANLA"(Werbner, 1991:159). While the forenoted dividing factors between these two armies are important to note, the reader is warned against reading into this the idea that each of these armies was ethnically homogeneous. As Werbner rightfully notes, "Neither of these armies was homogeneous, ethnically or racially, and each of the armies espoused the causes of unity against colonial domination and of freedom for all, irrespective of race, tribe or gender. But the recruiting of the armies on a regional basis was itself a process that polarised people who came to be identified by language as Shona or Ndebele" (Werbner, 1991:159).

The polarisation of Zimbabwe's population immediately after independence can be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, there is the view that 'the Ndebele' and 'the Shona' have always been at each other since the time Mzilikazi and his people settled on the land from South Africa. This view is substantiated on the facts that 'the Ndebele' have always been a warlike people and used to raid 'the Shona' and loot cattle, women and children. Terence Ranger in his book *The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe*, quoted one British newspaper, *The Guardian*, as having spoken of "a thousand years of hostility between 'the Ndebele' and 'the Shona.'" He goes on to quote the same paper as saying "'the Shona' had good reason to hate 'the Ndebele' who, in the nineteenth century had specialised in roasting Shona babies alive." (Ranger,1985:3) In other words the conflicts between 'the Ndebele and 'the Shona' during and after

independence are viewed as traces of the conflicts dating from the pre-colonial times.

There is another view that sees this polarisation as the work of, and “a consequence of, a colonial policy of divide and rule according to which white settlers invented two hostile tribes, for their own purposes.” (Werbner, Op.cit: 159) While there might be some grain of truth in each of the above explanations of the polarisation of Zimbabwe’s peoples, I want to argue that such explanations are not sufficient in explaining the ‘tribal war’ of 1983-1987. The problem between ZAPU and Zanu P.F., Ndebele and Shona should be viewed as a product of the struggle itself which was not without effects on those who participated in it. Kaulemu, in this volume has developed this point with regard to the conceptualisation of peace. As we shall see later, the same instruments and structures used by the white government in dealing with the blacks were now used by the ZANU PF government in dealing with the people of Matabeleland. I want to contend here that the brutality suffered by the people of Matabeleland was not an antidote prescribed exclusively for a troublesome Ndebele. This point will be explained later.

A NEW STRUGGLE FOR THE MATABELE

The elections that ushered in independence announced unequivocally the extent to which Zimbabwean society was polarised. The two dominant forces of liberation one led by Robert Mugabe and predominantly Shona and the other led by Joshua Nkomo and predominantly Ndebele dominated the elections. It is interesting to note that the election results followed basically the same regional divisions witnessed during the liberation struggle. The ZANLA catchment area in recruiting cadres for the war was basically everywhere else except the two provinces of Matabeleland. That of ZIPRA was the two provinces of Matabeleland. The election graphs showing who won what and where could easily be superimposed on the recruitment graphs for the war of liberation. While Terence Ranger’s claim that, “the rhetoric of ZAPU 2000 lacks all historical sense, ZAPU has never been a Ndebele party and Nkomo has never been a Ndebele leader” (*The Zimbabwe Mirror*, 30 April – 6 May 1999) might have many subscribers, it is also true that the more critical readers will not fail to interpret the meaning of both the graphs of the election results and those of the two parties’ recruitment bases as pointing to the contrary.

In the same newspaper Ranger pointed out that, “Vice-President Nkomo’s image had always been a national one and during the days of African nationalism in colonial Zimbabwe ZAPU was the strongest party throughout Mashonaland and Manicaland” (*The Zimbabwe Mirror*, 30 April – 6 May 1999). While this might have been true before the formation of ZANU PF, the same cannot be said to have been true at independence. If the recruitment patterns of both ZAPU and ZANU PF and the election

results of 1980 and 1985 are anything to go by, then it is clear that as the struggle unfolded it also created possibilities of new struggles in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe's announced policy of reconciliation at independence reflects his awareness of the extent to which the new nation had been left divided by the liberation struggle. As Richard Werbner notes, "Reconciliation was Mugabe's announced policy, and to overcome the divisions between the people in different parts of the country, Mugabe as Prime Minister formed a coalition government that included Nkomo and several other members of the cabinet". (Werbner, 1991:160)

The coalition government that had been necessitated by the need to unify a divided people as the only option for peace was short lived. The man who had announced reconciliation as his policy for the new nation soon fired Joshua Nkomo from the cabinet early in 1982. There was suspicion on the part of the government that ZAPU had planned a coup d'état. (Werbner, 1991:160) The ex-ZIPRA and the ex-ZANLA forces found themselves in battle at the Bulawayo township of Entumbane where the two forces had been assembled awaiting conscription into the national army or demobilisation. The Entumbane clashes were not the only ones; they were followed by numerous other clashes throughout the country even amongst those who were already in the new national army.

This paper is not an attempt to rewrite the history of Zimbabwe immediately after independence. There is therefore no attempt to give the details of what happened. The survey is simply meant to provide a context within which we can reflect on what is generally believed to have happened and then see how in the stories that are being told we can make sense of the concepts of unity, peace and stability.

STORIES TOLD

The people of Matabeleland see themselves as victims of a tribal war. The stories they tell about this 'war' have since become part and parcel of their identity. They can no longer see themselves as anything else but a people who were brutalised for who they are, 'the Ndebele'. What is even more interesting is that the Gukurahundi as the Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe National Army had been christened, instilled a sense of unparalleled fear amongst their victims. As a result, for a long time these people have been afraid of openly telling their stories. The past two or so years have seen more and more people opening up and giving details of what actually happened. The fact that 'the Ndebele' have over the years maintained their silence despite their desire to tell their stories has made them even more bitter towards 'the Shona' people. The only solution they see is first and foremost getting freedom from their 'enemies'. As long as the Shona continue to rule them they can never be free to tell their stories and then redefine themselves. It is also imperative that all the problems they face, be they economic, social or political, are now construed in terms of their relationship with the Shona. In an interview with the *Zimbabwe*

Mirror, one of the leaders of the newly launched ZAPU, Mr Joshua Mhambi, argued that the move to revive PF ZAPU reflected the mood of the majority of the people of Matabeleland, who he said have been marginalised following the signing of the Unity Accord on December 22 1987. (*The Zimbabwe Mirror* 18-24 December 1998). Mr Mhambi went on to say “we are not trying to create unnecessary tensions, we are merely bringing to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive; we bring it to the open, where it can be seen and dealt with”(ibid.).

The above views are not baseless, as the history of the activities of the Fifth Brigade would show. Firstly, the name given to the army by the Zanu leaders is quite significant. The Ndebele equivalence of ‘Gukurahundi’ is ‘Isikhukhula’ which literally mean ‘that which washes away’. It is the mane of a heavy storm, which normally falls at the end or the beginning of the agricultural season. It is also significant to know that 1979 had been christened “Gore re Gukurahundi ‘the year of the storm.” Indeed it proved to be the storm that swept away the white minority rule. Its meaning in the new context could be that there was something unwanted in Matabeleland that had to be swept away. Unfortunately ‘isikhukhula’ is not selective and it normally leaves trails of destruction on its path. Of course, it cleans the place of the entire dirt that might have been there. While it is taken for granted that the storm in this context was meant to clean up Matabeleland of the dissident activities, its destructive tendencies were far reaching. The question that many observers have asked is whether the activities of the dissidents warranted the unleashing of the storm? Secondly, whether those who unleashed it were aware of the kind of destruction that the storm would cause and whether they cared? The people of Matabeleland are convinced that the sending of the Gukurahundi was a planned move meant to wipe out ‘the Ndebele.’ Such views are authenticated by Robert Mugabe’s speech in April 1983 when he was quoted by the British newspaper, *The Times* as having said, “Where men and women provide food for the dissidents, when we get there we eradicate them. We don’t differentiate when we fight, because we can’t tell who is a dissident and who is not” (Werbner,1991:161, citing from *The Times* of 27 April 1983.) Given the fact that the leader and chief commander of the Fifth Brigade could make such statements, it follows that the atrocities of his army were no accident. ‘The Ndebeles’ are in this light justified in believing that the aim had been to eradicate them as a people.

Another interesting dimension in this conflict is that ‘the Shona’ people themselves are not free to tell their side of the story either. It is quite clear that those who can, have a different version of the story to tell, about what actually happened, why it happened and why it happened the way it did. ZANU PF has over the years refused to take full responsibility for the atrocities. The government has not only refused to take full responsibility, but also has denied some of the claims that have been made by the people of Matabeleland. The point being made here is that neither ‘the Ndebele’ nor ‘the Shona’ can tell their stories openly. Of course the reason why they

can't do so are completely different. This has, however, created a gulf between people who seem to realise that they need each other if peace and stability and ultimately development are to remain a realistic possibility in this country. The 1987 Unity Accord might be viewed as testimony to this fact.

It should be recognised nonetheless that ZANU PF and ZAPU had different reasons for coming together in 1987. For most 'Ndebele' people, it was not a matter of choice. This was simply a survival strategy. It was the only way of coming out of the storm alive. Had the storm continued for a year or two more, Matabeleland might have been cleaned of its 'unwanted' group. It must be acknowledged that 'the Shona' strategy at least worked for that time. It worked along the same lines as it did in 1979 when the storm swept away the white government. The solution however appears to have been ill conceived. Firstly, while the storm did sweep away the dissident activities it also created lasting conflict between 'the Shona' and 'the Ndebele' and tended to perpetuate the misunderstandings that had ensued during the war of liberation. Secondly, the fact that when the Unity Accord was signed 'the Ndebele' were called upon to forgive and forget without telling their story, meant that they would always cherish the day they would freely speak out. It is also clear that 'the Shona' have always wished 'the Ndebele' could lay the matter to rest just as the Whites did not want the Blacks to raise the issue of colonial atrocities. As things stand 'the Shona' seem to need the Unity Accord more than 'the Ndebele' whom in the previous crises were the victims. The fear, of course, being that the tables might be turned and who knows how far 'the Ndebele' might go with their own cleansing. That the people of Matabeleland feel that the worst is over can be seen in calls by some ZAPU 2000 leaders, calling those who in 1987 had joined ZANU PF to come back to ZAPU. One of the ZAPU 2000 leaders, Mr Dube, was quoted by the *Zimbabwe Independent* of January 29, 1999 as saying, "Time has now come for all true ZAPU people to come back home. We were cheated into signing the Unity agreement that is useless to us." Cont Mhlanga added, "We know they joined ZANU PF to save lives, people were being killed as Gukurahundi imposed ZANU PF on us, but now the situation has changed, so they should return where they naturally belong." (Ibid.) While it is an obvious misconception for an individual to think that people naturally belong to this party or the other, I think the intended meaning is equally clear. The ZAPU 2000 leaders are saying, the storm is over hence there is no need for the former ZAPU people to continue hiding under ZANU PF shelter anymore.

The past two years have seen young 'Ndebele' professionals from different disciplines coming together and openly challenging ZANU PF. These young people have challenged the former ZAPU leadership to reflect on the impact of the Unity Accord on Matabeleland. They have claimed that despite the unity Accord the ZANU PF leadership has continued to discriminate against Matabeleland when it comes to development. Recently, a paper written by one of the youth pressure groups code-named 'Mbokodo'

was circulated. Its title was “To All The People Of Matabeleland” while upon reading this paper it becomes obvious that its contents are exaggerations and can be misleading in a number of ways, it is what it is meant to achieve that is of interest to me. This is part of what the paper reads.

This paper is to warn you the people of Matabeleland, the Nguni, Kalanga, Sotho, Venda, Tonga, Nambya, and Shangaan of what is happening in our land.

A: There is a conspiracy by the Shona to force everybody to become Shona by speaking Shona and abandoning our cultures.

B: There is a deliberate plan by the Shona to flood our areas. By doing so they will force us to abandon our ways and follow their ways. This is contained in a secret book they wrote in the 1970s and distributed amongst themselves. This is part of what they wrote.

a. They have removed everybody from Matabeleland from top posts and replaced them with Shonas, e.g. a, Most Headmasters are Shona.

b. In our colleges, nursing schools and other higher education places, only Shonas are admitted so that only Shona learn valuable skills to make them masters and keep us their servants.

c. All jobs in the formal sector are given to the Shonas deliberately. Even the tea boys, sweepers and messengers come from Mashonaland. As for us we are forced to sell vegetables in our land or jump the border.

d. All bus drivers and security guards are Shona and they force you to speak Shona.

e. All policemen are Shona and they harass our people for nothing.

f. All taxi drivers are Shona except emergency taxi drivers.

g. All postmen are Shona.

h. The army is all Shona.

We now appeal to all you people of Matabeleland to,

1. Refuse to speak or to be spoken to in Shona, everywhere, at your work places, in the bear halls, in church, in buses, and everywhere else. The Shona must learn to speak our languages otherwise they have no reason for being here.

2. Do not allow Shonas to rent your homes, not even one room. If you offer them your houses you are

helping increase their population on our land. You must make life tough for them.

3. To all parents, do not allow your daughters to marry or mix with the Shona. Remember the young one of a snake is a snake and it might turn on you later on. So parents, please stand firm, your ancestors would never have approved of a Shona son in law. So why should you? As for you sisters, you are being used, these people do not love you.

4. We all know that times are hard. Many of our people have joined Shona burial societies. What you are failing to see is that these are instruments that the Shona are using to promote their language, culture and customs. For instance, we now shake hands during a funeral, something that was taboo in our culture. We also play drums and dance during a funeral. All these are Shona customs unknown to our culture. Parents please leave these Shona burial societies and form your own that will promote our culture. Remember a people without a culture is lost.

Finally, everybody is slowly being changed into a Shona. They have even removed the Ndebele newspaper *Umthunywa* and replaced it with *Kwayedza* because it is their Shona paper. Both Radio and the television are now Shona instruments. Everything is now being given a Shona name e.g., super milk is now being called chimombe. The Shonas are trying to divide us into Nguni, Kalanga, Venda, Nambya, Sotho and Shangaan. Remember we are one. The Gukurahundi did not choose. Every body in Matabeleland was a Mundebele and we were killed the same way. People of Matabeleland, we your children are prepared to resist the Shona and we are working very hard. How about you, are you playing your part? Please start by sending a copy of this note to someone else.

While the contents of this document are obviously exaggerated, they seem to reflect the general feeling of the people in Matabeleland. Even prominent people such as the executive mayor of Bulawayo, Abel Siwela, while talking about discrimination against the Ndebele had this to say, “the civil service and the private sectors are staffed up to 80% or 90% with non residents. Out of 15 to 20 bank managers in Bulawayo only two are Ndebele. It is impossible to get a bank loan if you are Ndebele. Only 15% of the students at NUST University are locals.” (Sunday Standard, 9 May 1999) In 1998 an advertisement placed by the University of Zimbabwe in the government owned *The Herald* created a furore in Bulawayo. It read, UZ turns out competent ‘Shona’ graduates. Cont Mhlanga called this “the

Shonalisation of Zimbabwe.” (ibid.) If there is any truth in any of the above claims then one might be forced to agree with Cont Mhlanga when he says that everything that has happened since independence has been aimed at Shonalizing the country. Those who have tried to resist this process have been beaten into submission.

UNITY, PEACE AND STABILITY

In the introduction to this paper I pointed out that my aim is to see how in the face of mistrust, tension, and the general polarisation of the Zimbabwean population, unity, peace and stability remain a realistic possibility. The picture that has been painted thus far leaves no hope whatsoever for the possibility of a lasting peace in this country. This paper wants to contend that lasting peace and stability cannot be built on fear and silence. It has already been pointed out that the Gukurahundi left Matabeleland fear stricken and from that period until very recently the people of Matabeleland did not want to hear anything potentially likely to bring back their experiences of the Gukurahundi era. That for such a long time these people maintained their silence must not be mistaken to mean that their struggle was over and they were happy. We have also pointed out that ZAPU and ZANU PF had different reasons for signing the unity accord. While the signing of the Accord to ZANU PF might have been a victory over ZAPU and ‘the Ndebele’ in particular, for ‘the Ndebele’ it was a survival strategy as some of its leaders have said in recent years. One of the main reasons why the ZAPU accepted being swallowed by ZANU PF was because the only other option was being swept away by the ‘storm’ that ZANU PF had unleashed in Matabeleland. If this is true, then it follows that the Unity Accord was born out of fear. The people of Matabeleland did not voluntarily come together with ZANU PF. The question then is how long such Unity can be sustained? The most obvious answer is, as long as the people remain afraid.

What has become apparent in the past few years is that the majority of the people on whom fear was instilled by the Gukurahundi beating of 1983 and 1987 are now old and no longer politically active. Those who were children then are now adults and are the ones who are politically active. This development was inevitable and has meant that the fear is gone with those who are no longer politically active. These young people may not have directly experienced the storm and yet they know what happened to their parents, brothers and sisters. The fear that had kept people silent is now gone and left a people with hardened hearts. The perpetual silence that had characterised the people of Matabeleland has become unsustainable. Since the ‘Unity, Peace and Stability’ that Zimbabwe has been enjoying was a product of intimidation, violence and ultimately fear, the question is, how do we maintain it under a different context? The voices of dissension from the ZAPU 2000 leadership are an unequivocal announcement that the days of intimidation, violence and fear are over.

What then is the alternative for the people of Zimbabwe? Does the nation sit back and let 'the Ndebele' decide what they are going to do in response to what happened to them? My response to this question is that peace cannot be built on silence if things are not right. It has already been argued that people can only remain silent if they are afraid of speaking out. We have also noted that the generation of fear stricken people in Matabeleland is no longer in control of the political wheels of that area. So there is need for the people of this country to be pro-active in this matter, rather than to adopt a wait and see attitude.

Firstly, I want to contend that peace should not be construed merely as the absence of war. True, when there is peace there is no war or violence. While peace is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the absence of violence and war, the absence of violence and war does not constitute a sufficient condition for peace. The Matabeleland scenario is a very good example of a situation where the absence of violence and war misled people into thinking that there is peace. Peace within a society starts with the condition of peace in its members. When the individual is at peace within him or herself, then chances are that there will be peace in that society. This condition, however, cannot be said to have been or to now prevail in Zimbabwe. Peace starts in individuals who as members of a group need peace of mind in order to be members of a peaceful group. Peace then is a social condition under which all players are in continuous struggle to avert conflict. I see peace itself as a struggle to remain in a certain condition. The peaceful condition must be construed as a desirable goal towards which all members of that society strive.

An analysis of the Zimbabwean context will show that this is not how Zimbabweans attained their 'peace'. In fact, in the Zimbabwean situation it would appear that only one player out of the two warring players desired the peaceful condition. Again this condition was not even desired as an end in itself, but rather as a means to other ends. The 'Ndebele' agreed to sign the Unity Accord not because unity was in itself a good thing, but rather because it was their only escape route. On the other hand the arrogance and self centredness displayed by ZANU PF during the Unity talks does not reflect a people who saw the need for peace as a priority. It should be remembered that at one time during the discussions the talks collapsed because the two groups could not agree on the name of the new party. If a name could be a stumbling block to peace efforts, then it only shows the level of commitment of those who are involved. It is no secret that the main reason why 'unity' was eventually attained was precisely because ZAPU could not afford any other outcome. This is why now that circumstances have changed there are some who are calling for a return to the pre-unity situation where ZAPU was an opponent, not an ally of ZANU PF.

Now that divorce between ZAPU and ZANU PF appears to be imminent, how do we maintain the condition of peace that had been attained by default? My suggestion is that there is need to go back to the

drawing board and do what we should have done in 1987. Instead of suppressing our feelings for fear that we might suffer for them, there is need to speak out and let the truth be known. There is need to let those who were victims of the Gukurahundi atrocities speak out. The stories should not only be told by the victims. There is also need for those who committed the crimes to come out in the open and let us know the extent of their crimes. The breaking of the silence is not a fault finding mission, but rather part of the healing process. My contention is that lasting peace can only be built on trust and understanding. It is a misconception to think that some aspects of our history can just be forgotten simply because they are bad and we don't like them. If 'the Shona' people are serious about unity and peace, then they must also be prepared to face their mistakes squarely. They must come out in the open and tell their own story which must also confirm those of their victims. Similarly 'the Ndebele' should also tell the truth about what happened to them without exaggerations. It is inaccurate reports about what happened that fuel the wheels of violence and war. The Ndebele should also clear certain misunderstandings surrounding the presence of the dissidents in the area. Only when the truth about these issues is known to all parties can we hope for lasting peace. The pursuit of truth is the only hope for genuine Unity, Peace and Stability.

The concept of truth is here used in the descriptive sense. The truth is what describes the actual state of affairs. This is still possible because some of the people who participated in this tribal war are still alive. So the chance of reconstructing a true picture of what happened is realistic. The problem normally arises when those who were victims die without telling their stories. This leaves their children to speculate about what might have happened to their parents. Obviously since every victim defines himself as such, he/she normally blames all his/her problems and failures on those who once victimised him/her. The feelings of being victims conjure in individuals the desire to revenge the past wrongs. Such conflicts normally become cyclic in nature as groups of people take turns in becoming either victims or victimisers. Kaulemu, in this volume has made reference to Martin Luther King Jr. who described the cycles of violence. The Zimbabwean situation is no exception to this possibility, particularly if the truth is never told and, secondly, if people continue to think of unreconcilable identities such as tribal divisions.

THE TRIBAL MISCONCEPTIONS

In dealing with the problem in Matabeleland and how best unity, peace and stability can be achieved, it is very important to put into perspective the issue of tribalism in Zimbabwe. It has already been noted that the main problem in handling the atrocities in Matabeleland is that they have been construed as a tribal war. It becomes imperative therefore to clear up some of these tribal misconceptions.

Tribalism in Zimbabwe is often taken for granted, not only by outsiders, but more so by many Zimbabweans. Quite a lot of divisions and problems in the political and economic landscape are explained as symptomatic of tribal polarization. We have already noted that most leaders in Matabeleland find it easy to attribute the lack of development in their region to tribalism on the part of a 'Shona' dominated government. Even those within the larger 'Shona' group such as the Karanga will attribute the lack of development in their areas to a conspiracy by the ruling Zezuru against the Karanga. As Terence Ranger noted, the above assessment of events are informed by perceptions "which accept tribal and ethnic identities as deeply-rooted, immemorial, natural; and which therefore advance tribal identities as a self-evidently complete explanation for every significant political development in Zimbabwe." (Ranger, 1985:3) But as Ranger further notes, "So far from being immemorial, natural, deeply-rooted, tribalism of this sort did not exist in pre-colonial Zimbabwe at all." (Ranger, 1985:3)

While it is true that there was a 'Ndebele' state in pre-colonial Zimbabwe it would be a misnomer to construe it as constituting a people speaking the same language, i.e. Ndebele. Rather, 'the Ndebele' were those people who regarded themselves as belonging to a political unit. It is common knowledge that those who came from south of the Limpopo River and formed the core of this political unit were too few to form a state on their own. The question then is, who are 'the Ndebele?' This question can only be adequately responded to by African historians and I do not claim to be one. It is not even my aim to re-write the history of 'the Ndebele'. What is obvious however is the fact that 'the Ndebeles' were not a particular ethnic group as most of us assume today. Terence Ranger has argued that while the term 'Ndebele' was used even in pre-colonial times, "the term certainly did not indicate membership in a tribe. Indeed, no observer could possibly have supposed that the members of the Ndebele state constituted an ethnicity. The state was manifestly a machine for multi-ethnic assimilation of peoples, even if assimilation on a markedly inequalitarian basis." (ibid: 5)

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Chapter V

Reflections on Corporate Peace at the Dawn of the Free Market

Jameson Kurasha

Years after the Cold War regional wars are killing people the world over. Those who remain alive are living in a world of pain and suffering. People are battling, dying, and suffering now in my own part of Africa, in Europe and in the Middle East, the part of the world which has given us so much materially and spiritually. I wonder what the situation is like in North America? If there is no peace in other parts of the global village, peace cannot be guaranteed there. Brothers and sisters who faithfully do their duties in Embassies are enclosed in barricades; something is wrong and peace is being obstructed. Global violence and crisis is a threat too deadly to be left to politicians and soldiers alone, academics too have a crucial role. There is need for education for peace.

Promises of the Century and the Final Great Promise

When tensions were rising after the Second World War President Dwight D. Eisenhower met the leadership of Britain and France in Bermuda. On December 8, 1953 he delivered a memorable lecture to the United Nations on what has become known as “Atoms for Peace.” Eventually, Martin Luther King Jr., Sadat, Begin, Mandela, and De Klerke received international recognition as shining examples of peace lovers. Religious leaders such as Western evangelicals and Unificationists in the East have focused on the family as the medium for peace. Both the statesman and the pastor have contributed and continue to contribute immensely to world harmony. Here I cite the corporation as one source of contemporary discord and I would focus on the topic of “corporate peace” which, like family unity, is a prerequisite for international peace. Military wars come and go; corporate wars enjoy an unmerited tenure.

Corporate peace should be situated in the context of historical highlights during and just prior to the 20th century. Each continental highlight had a great promise and created great expectations.

(a) King Leopold’s Berlin conference’s great promise allowed colonial powers to divide the African continent and deadly wars were averted.

(b) The advent of Christian missionaries ‘great promise’ allowed locals access to medical, educational, and spiritual facilities when colonial political administrators were marginalising them.

(c) Nationalism's great promise after World War II allowed Africans to participate in political, social, and religious institutions on an equal footing.

(d) Socialism's great promise allowed Africans to participate, as it appeared to many intellectuals, in the ultimate extended family of the 'workers of the world.'

Alas, each of the century's great projects and highlights is remembered for something unfortunate. Dividing the great continent only made boundaries that divided brothers and sisters and affected the extended family forever. Some missionaries became influential and in theology joined the apartheid team which they strengthened negatively. Many nationalists became dictatorial, bitter and backward looking and lost vision. Socialism was simply unproductive and created moral and material poverty.

Given these problems, Africa has now turned to capitalism for the Final Promise since it now represents the spirit of the people, the 'folksgeist,' and spirit of the age of 'Zeitgeist.' At a World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Jean Cretien, Prime Minister of Canada, Jon Corzine, Chairman of Goldman-Sachs Ltd., USA, Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of Poland, and Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore were all euphoric over the victory of the free market over the command economy. There is a 'new economic faith' uniting East, West, North and South. Even the Church is not that united. The corporation is the institution that is doing the work for the Free Market; the corporation, not the cooperative, is where we have invested our hopes. Corporate culture has now reached the 'ends of the earth' including the African hinterland. Even institutions like the church and the academy (university) look up to the corporation as a model.

Leaving People Disappointed¹ and Conditions for Strife

I want to argue that the great promises mentioned above were indeed right, but what I called the unfortunate aspects of each promise could have been minimized if the architects looked on 'both sides' considering the moral consequences. They might have noticed that strife and struggles were built into the objectives of the great promises. Strife, struggle, and wounds are inevitable when a project divides people who speak the same language, more so when you separate blood brothers and sisters are separated. Wounds are inevitable when a people is told that they need to be civilized by a Christian brother. Struggle is inevitable when people find out that in nationalism, colonial oppression has been replaced with local tyranny. When people are hungry and poor they will fight for survival and socialist slogans become notes of social discord.

¹ A phrase borrowed from Dr Martin Luther King, see: 1981, *Strength to Love*, Philadelphia: Fortress Press edition, pp. 58-68.

In spite of its memorable victory at the end of the century, the free market is in danger of leaving people disappointed at midnight because its wounds could be as deadly as prophesied by its critics of old. We must consider the moral consequences of the corporation as it reaches to the ends of the earth.

My studies done over the past fifteen years at Georgetown University, the University of Zimbabwe and Christian College of Southern Africa in the area of business ethics, indicate beyond reasonable doubt that things are not right in the ultimate institution of the market, i.e., in the corporation. There is strife and tension. Even the vocabulary of political correctness such as 'stakeholding,' 'ownership,' 'empowerment,' etc. might not be the answer to corporate problems.

In a poignant article a professor of organizational behaviour at Harvard, Chris Argyris, characterises 'empowerment' as 'the Emperor's New Clothes.' He observed that:

CEOs subtly undermine empowerment, managers love empowerment in theory but command-and-control is what they trust and know best . . . we praise it [empowerment] loudly in public and ask ourselves privately why we can't see it. There has been no transformation in the work force; been no sweeping metamorphosis.²

The founder and chairman of Ideal Lab in Pasadena, California, Bill Gross, identifies "The New Myth of Ownership." He says that in reality employees are not owners. Ownership is basically a metaphor. Hence they "won't think and act like owners unless you make them owners."³

To make the task manageable, I will look first at corporate problems from an international business perspective, and then at the corporation from a local perspective. I shall examine these corporate problems as an African and in particular as a Zimbabwean. Hence my metaphors are also influenced by my traditional method of communication.

Multinationals – The Hunter's Mentality

Big multinational corporations' philosophy is not always driven by such moral ideals as 'ownership', 'empowerment', and certainly not by what Dr. Martin Luther King used to call "universal altruism."⁴ They generally behave like hunters and fishermen. The sole motive for the hunter is to take meat to his family, certainly not to share it with lions in the forest. Hunters never dream of deer, Impala, or hare as stakeholders requiring

² Chris Argyris, May-June, 1998, *Harvard Business Review*, p. 98.

³ Gross, Bill, 1998, *Harvard Business Review*, November-December, p. 68.

⁴ King, Martin Luther, *Strength to Love*, p. 31.

empowerment and ownership. Multinational companies are hunters and will not share the gold, diamond, platinum, and profits with the host nationals. The suggestion of sharing is invariably ridiculed; “Finders-keepers; losers-weepers,” as the old saying goes. The rest of the animals remain fighting over spilled blood and entrails. Hence hunters create necessary conditions for war.

There were multinational companies in the Congo from 1900. By the time Congo became independent in 1960 the remarkable legacy was the railway line to the sea. That was also the case in the Old Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In fact, in 1960 Congo had only 12 college graduates. The activity of the multinational corporation continues until today. What have the companies contributed to the Congo? They made profits, great profits, and ran away. Congo has no peace today. The diamonds are gone. The fight is over the entrails. Multinational corporations bribed local leaders who took the fortunes to foreign banks.

The U.S.A. realized that the streets of America and city neighbourhoods are in danger of gang wars and family instability because of drugs. North Americans, rightly, addressed the evil of war and instability by dealing with the ‘sources’ of such drugs. In Africa wars and future wars could be averted if the problem of bribing companies were to be addressed like the problem of drugs. Peddling drugs is dangerous; peddling capital also is dangerous. All should join hands in the fight against drug peddlers which is the fight to keep peace in homes, streets, and towns. Africa has now been politically liberated, but capital flight in the hands of what Jean Chrétien of Canada calls boys “with brown suspenders” and greased palms of the leaders is leaving us a bitterly divided people. The multinational corporation could be the bottle dropped from the air in the film “The Gods Must Be Crazy.”

Local Companies—Psychology of Threat

The Local companies’ internal and external philosophies are not necessarily driven by a search for harmony and concord either; we must avoid provincialism in our analysis. Modern executives behave like teams of military victors and liberators. Ideologically, there is a feeling that socialism has too long occupied the mind of the worker. Now that the occupied ‘lands’ have been liberated it is time to reinstate the ‘legitimate regime’ and old values. For example, the workers must ‘know’ how to lose jobs again. They must know that the point is to obey orders of the ‘coach’ or ‘team managers’ who can even speak ‘French’ to drive the point home.

The modern corporation tends to lack civility world over. Sports culture has influenced the language and the behavior of corporate leaders. It is as if the players require ‘four-letter words’ to grasp the point. The players themselves, like old troopers, have to swear at each other as a source of inspiration. Mohammed Ali started the verbal gymnastics in the 1960s as a promotion tactic and he was good and artistic about it. Now other boxers

and other athletes have 'perfected' the art. Business leaders have embraced the war psychology, too. In Africa the trend is not too different. Civility is no longer the character, even in the boardroom. The language is usually tough, macho, and uncompromising. The fashionable directors talk like boxers; the old fashioned directors are still very feudal in moral perceptions and prescriptions. If minutes of the board meetings and university councils were not carefully censored during the editing it would be self-evident that the modern corporation is a battlefield in its own right. Indeed it is a source of conflict in its own right.

The management teams can 'downsize,' i.e. 'fire' any day. In my country two leading conglomerates have directors whose mission is downsizing. For example a local company I shall refer to as 'Bid Holding Zimbabwe, Ltd.' had 7,000 workers in 1996. It is now down to 997. My point here is that managerial hygiene⁵ is not seen as the issue. People are now anxious because ordinary workers see themselves as glorified Christmas turkeys. A threat⁵ is held to corporate participants. Turkeys or sheep can die any day, any time, especially if there is a ritual such as Christmas or Thanksgiving. But animals do not know that they could be killed on any Christmas day or wedding day. Humans know it, more so where it is the corporate and national philosophy. Animals cannot distinguish a butcher from a vegetarian. But when a modern corporation has a downsizing director the workers know it. That creates fear and tension, which are signs of the absence of peace. This present philosophy and practice is bad for peace. Values-driven strategic planning and management ought to realize that monetary values and moral values must be integrated if we are to realize what Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. calls the "symphony of brotherhood," which is his word for peace.

Universities and Churches

An interesting development is that universities and churches have embraced the model of the corporation. Even university Vice Chancellors or Presidents now call themselves CEOs and noticeably imitate the corporate model, even borrowing office designs from the corporate world. Faculties and schools within universities are also constructing mini-corporations run by the Deans as the CEOs. Needless to say, young professors, especially those without tenure, are terrorized by such structures. There is a problem in education when you see students as

⁵ Rational disputations are certainly not characteristic of corporate discourse these days. "Appeal to force" rather than reason because most directors are shareholders appointees or state appointees. Hence the methodology is currently "might makes right." The corporate participant should 'behave appropriately;' truth is not a factor. An African philosopher says... "as a naughty boy uses cockroaches to extract cooperation from his sister never to report (his mischievous activities) to mother when she returns."

internal customers and the parents as external customers. In this model the professor is also a customer selling his labor and at the same time an employee who can only be consulted but not ‘co-govern.’ This mixture of categories and borrowing of models contributes to strife and struggles not conducive to peace. Academics have different levels of qualifications than do industrial workers. Hence the advent of the market mentality has created problems in the academy.

In business, the customer is ‘king.’ That is just another way of saying, “give the customer what he wants as long as you get what you want from that exchange relationship.” If the customer wants dessert before the main meal, that is not the café’s problem! In popular and profitable businesses the value is in profit. The customer’s value is in what he or she wants. Admittedly, not all companies are like that, but 98% of the workshops attended and 70% of research done with executive development students confirm the supremacy of the customer. My point is that such a philosophy is not ideal for students.

When a university deals with students along such models, tensions are inevitable. There is a kind of authority necessary in the academy’s operation. If students or parents resist such authority citing customers’ right in resisting a product, education suffers — at least learning suffers. If university managers become autocratic as hotel owners might be to their waiters and porters, educational delivery suffers. In most corporate-like universities there are tensions and universities in Eastern and Southern Africa are closed from time to time due to these strives.

Transport companies have collapsed due to consumer boycott. The workers (i.e. porters and waiters) have caused revolutions, and revolutions have led to poverty and war because someone wanted to maintain privilege and status. The strategic planners of corporate-model universities are invariably eager to implement concepts acquired at workshops without considering implications. There is no corporate peace in corporate Zimbabwe. That could be the case with institutions that have adopted the corporate model any where in the world.

Churches are also Entering into That Dangerous Zone

African independent spirituality has its entrepreneurs. Like the old Ford Motor Company, the founder is a patriarch who does not want to “let go.” Just as Henry Ford single-handedly appointed his son Edsel to be the corporate executive president, some African independent founders have also appointed their own sons to be Bishops. Some of these patriarch-appointed Bishops do not even have theological training! In the meantime believers are manipulated into contributions and donations. Some of these churches have already broken and others are still intact but educated members are beginning to question whether their collections are not investments in family businesses. Spiritual entrepreneurship based on a corporate model has created conditions of struggle and strife through

nepotism, appointing untrained Bishops, and collecting money in enterprises that will turn out to be family concerns. My point is that even in the church of Jesus Christ there is no corporate peace. There is no strategic plan for peace either. What exist at the moment are conditions for strife, quarrels, and inevitable discord. This is also the case in mission churches. The executive bishops have tended to run them like family concerns.

The university and the church should be leaders in searching for and demonstrating peace models. Unfortunately they are following problematic corporate models. Apparently the situation is not different in America. My studies during the past decade have convinced us that the corporate model is not peace-friendly when implemented in churches and universities, especially by the new “executives.”

The Question of Wealth and Prosperity?

That free market creates wealth we cannot deny. Lee Kuan Yew, in his wisdom, agrees that the free market creates wealth, but he rightly reminds us of different perceptions and expectations:

Many people in Asia have no idea of what it [the free market] means. All they know about it is airplanes, computers, people fly from nowhere . . . they bring in experts. They bring in capital. The next thing, factories are up, exports and imports increase. Japanese come; Americans come. Lo and behold enormous prosperity. Then there was exuberance of borrowing to increase growth which ended up in a collapse.⁶

Lee Kuan Yew goes on to demand clarification: “What went wrong?”

Managers in Southern Africa are given company automobiles, housing allowances and other benefits of the other prosperity observed by Lee Kuan Yew. However, welfare has problems and creates many others.

Borrowed prosperity is not secure and does not guarantee security. As a graduate student, my life was good especially during summer vacations when my teacher left me in charge of his 'dream house'. Young as I was, I had a million-dollar home to myself with its big rooms, gadgets, and food.

However, when the good Doctor and his wife came back, I would hand over everything and gratefully, then, after a meal, he would take me back to my bedsitter/studio. Borrowed prosperity was gone. I had gone back to where I, and other graduate students, belonged. I cooked in my bedroom, which was my kitchen: my food and toiletries were separated only by location. Borrowed opulence is very temporary. At least I had a

⁶ ABC interview, April 2001.

future to look forward to. For participants of corporate life now, especially in Africa, theirs is borrowed prosperity. The trade-off is not conducive to peace.

Historical Lessons

“Those who don’t learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” The general character of the corporations seems similar the world over, as case studies confirm. There are many cases but Ford Motor Company is a good case for students of corporate peace to study, especially if the other purpose of history is moral education or learning from the past so that we address difficulties of the future. Peter Collier and David Horowitz’s book, *The Fords: an American Epic* is an account of lasting value. Reading Collier and Horowitz, we see clearly that Ford Motor Company is a monument of struggles and strife — the temporary friendship between Henry and Alexander Malcomson; the strategy of Ford and James Couzens to get rid of Malcomson and force him out of the company; the domineering character of Charles E. Sorensen; the unjustified hatred of Ernest Kanzler, who was abused for his so-called Jewish looks (as if that was a problem); the bully Harry Bennett — who even ‘punched’ a few executives including Edsel, Henry Ford’s only son and corporate president. Ford Company produced wealth but it was an enclosure of wars.⁷ Who would ever imagine that Henry Ford’s son would die at 41 dreaming to put on at least “five pounds”?

The introduction of educated, young, talented men with financial and technical know-how such as Charles B. Thornton (“Tex”) and Robert MacNamara did not help. The “Whiz Kids” were despised. Youth was not at all an advantage.

In a contemporary corporation, the Second World War picture has now reversed, with youthful potential driven management being the order of the day. If you’re over forty, your job security is gone. The secure corporate leader could be 28 years of age. It’s not what he is now, but what he will become that matters. Nina Munk in *Fortune* magazine talks about new corporate leaders who do not know LBJ, or in the Zimbabwean context corporate leaders who do not know George Shaya the legendary soccer player of the 1970!⁸

Peace as Built into the Idea of Free Market -- the Classical Error

The error in the current conception of free market and its institutions such as the corporation is in viewing peace as built into the idea of free market. Free market does not produce peace freely just as freedom

⁷ Peter Collier and David Horowitz, 1987, *The Fords: an American Epic*, Summit Books, New York.

⁸ Nina Munk, February 1999, *Fortune*, “Finished at 40”, p. 50.

of speech and information does not make people rational. A long time ago Plato argued that ideas like goodness and justice are certainly absolute and objective, but for a person to be good or to be just education was necessary. In the same vein, the idea of peace is absolute, objective, and necessary but peace does not manifest itself without human educational effort. Peace must be planted in corporations through the education of corporate participants. The invisible hand is only a metaphor. Visible managers must consciously plant the seeds of peace more than they are doing now. They must aim at peace just as they aim for productivity and profits.

Plato's student, Aristotle, would advise moderns that in corporate craftsmanship strategists must view profits acquired peacefully in a good harmonious internal and external environment as the really meaningful end or final cause. Aristotle would remind modern corporate strategists that a good sculpture is a product (end) of a good sculptor, its efficient cause. Peace in an untroubled corporation is crafted by people of peace and good will. A modern executive whose eye is on profits, at the expense of peace, is not an efficient agent or cause.

What is the nature of a peaceful corporation? Is that not a philosophical ideal which is in the mind, not reality? Ancient wisdom says peace is not an ideal out there waiting to be discovered and implemented by the philosopher-manager. If one wants a cornfield one must actualize the cornfield by planting suitable corn on a suitable plot of land during a suitable time (material cause). The result is a cornfield and that is how we form it. The equivalent of forming a cornfield in corporate peace requires identification of minds with a peaceful disposition and potential to create a good structure in a suitable environment. A corporation with good people in a corrupt environment collapses or is corrupted, becoming an agent of strife and bitterness. In developing countries, good universities with good people have collapsed because of bad neighborhoods. It does not have to be political leadership that alone is responsible for strife and war. In fact political leadership is usually reflective of an environment in which institutional commitment and rules are not respected. The environment is the greatest threat to corporate peace in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2001. A good principal cannot perform well and effectively when people insist that they are entitled to favors from those in admission. Planting good seed in a game park is a bad idea. Many schools, banks, and even dry cleaners are good seeds planted in game parks.

Corporations must be conceived as instruments of profits and social harmony. That is the final corporate cause. Good harmonious corporations must be built and managed by people who care and have an idea of what corporate harmony is about; that is the efficient cause. The idea mentioned above is not something beyond, abstract and transcendental, but must be present in the minds and hearts of corporate managers, owners, workers, and the entire environment.

A Model Case in Western New York

As I was writing this paper an ideal embodiment of corporate peace comes to mind a college town in Western New York, U.S.A. Yet the town of Houghton, home of the college and two other small companies, was not always this peaceful. In the middle of the nineteenth century Houghton was a rendezvous for the Genesee Valley Canal boatmen. It was known for its famous three taverns and for its men and women lost in the excesses and addictions of gambling, horse racing, and so forth. The infamous Jockey Street was the main road through town and connected travelers from northern parts of the State of New York with the southern parts. Jockey Street provided diversion for many travelers in Western New York. A religious boatman, Edmund Palmer, once offered a prayer described by a local historian as one “that everyone but God would have laughed at.” Palmer’s prayer said: “Let this place some day be noted for its righteousness as it has been for its wickedness.” Palmer’s vision has been realized. Houghton is noted for its righteousness. Inquirers not familiar with that town often wonder how that town compares with Washington, D.C., Harare, and Barnsley. I am glad to report that Houghton Town is a ‘Peace Model’ and its College a reflection of its environment.

Peace in Houghton is mediated through its people. The college president gives a winter coat to a new member of staff. The custodian prays for the student who is sick. The attendant at the local shop asks a visitor how his family is doing though she does not even know the family! Doors are rarely locked. The entire town does not have a single house with a burglar bar! All people are ‘employed’ — even retired members. They drive less fortunate members, they preach and teach as if they are salaried for such voluntary services. The neighbourhood of Jockey Street is as alive as the neighbourhood of Wall Street, but the values are not identical. The ideas of corporate peace are immanent in this town and its driving spirit. The material causes are represented by the individual participants and the institutions such as stable family life, good governance, and openness. The problems faced by school principals in appointments and admissions which I pointed out above in Houghton would not arise because institutional regulations and public accountability would reveal rule breakers and the violation of rules would be costly to the violators. Good ends, good people, good environment, and good spirit intertwined are the chief ingredients for corporate peace. African institutions ought to emulate good cases from elsewhere just as institutions in Europe, America and Asia can emulate good cases from Africa – provincialism has offered little in history of peace; in the global 21st century it offers even less.

Recommendations

A program requiring education requires time, financial and human resources. But in an age of information technology does not require a big

organization; it is the big picture that matters. Houghton Town and College took a long time to be where they are today. It required sacrifice, cooperation, and inner dedication to realize Palmer's dream "that this place some day be noted for its righteousness." There are many Palmers in Corporate Zimbabwe and Corporate America. There are, somewhere, very good men and women to promote peace through good business in towns, growth points, commercial and communal lands -- mines and banks. The title of this paper exemplifies a vision for Zimbabwe, my home land. The vision could be applied anywhere; it is in the interest of business and the entire African community to support it. It is in the interest also of scholars everywhere to unite and participate in it. In this new century Africa must be noted for its righteousness, prosperity, and peace. The contention here is that corporate conflict, ferment and struggles must be made sense of by scholars, because the corporation like the family can be and ought to be a source of harmony in as much as it is a source of national and global strife today. The corporation has a serious role to play. May that vision be realized also in Corporations throughout the global village.

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Chapter VI

Reconciliation: Why the Church Failed to Live with Itself in Zimbabwe

Andrea T Chimuka

INTRODUCTION

Racial discord and ethnic intolerance are regrettable features of post-independent Zimbabwe. Since independence in 1980, a lot of effort has been directed at building a society conducive for all Zimbabweans to lead meaningful and more fulfilling lives. Yet, the problems of race and ethnicity always re-surface in different hues, threatening to scuttle the building process. The problem is largely historical, being a product of the colonial legacy. Colonial policy and subsequent practices tended to create and celebrate differences amongst communities as a means of social control and perpetuating domination. These practices bore grave implications whose residual effects are causing dissonance in contemporary Zimbabwe. This paper selects, for analysis, one aspect of the colonial legacy – spirituality. The Church is very active in bridging the ethnic and tribal gaps opened up by colonialism; it is regarded as a fountain of hope, of healing, of reconciliation and as such it has a critical role to play in social construction. However it is curious to establish what the Church's contribution has been to the very predicament that it is helping to dissipate. If one inspects the activities of the Church in Zimbabwe over the years would one qualify them as conciliatory? It is crucial to examine critically the internal activities of the Church in this respect. This is the general question this paper seeks to address.

The study, particularly investigates the disagreements, tensions and some times fights between the various churches, which are supposed to make one *Body of Christ*. Instances of intra-denominational tensions, leads one to ask, 'Why are there tensions within the *one body of Christ*? Why do Christians configure along the racial and tribal divisions? Cases abound where denominations hold separate services for the different races of converts. Would such practices be compatible with the Christian teachings of brotherhood and reconciliation? The Church in post-independent Zimbabwe seems to be preaching the gospel of 'reconciliation,' yet it does not seem to be at peace with itself. This scenario is problematic.

This study attempts to assess the role of the Church using one of its key concepts, the theology of reconciliation where the Church takes its cue. The idea here is to determine what Christ meant when he commissioned the apostles and whether they, in turn, managed to be loyal to the commission. The paper is divided into three sections. The first looks at the setting up of the Christian Church in the country. The section which follows, deals with the meaning of 'reconciliation' in Christ's teachings. The last section appraises the activities of the Church in the light of the 'great commission'. The position of the paper is that the Church's activities of reconciling the members of its congregation would be futile if it does not reconcile itself with itself, particularly with its past. Hence reconciliation is one of the most important struggles in which the Zimbabwean society must engage in the post-independent era.

THE CHURCH IN COLONIAL ZIMBABWE

Missionaries had been in this country before, but a historic influx was noticed in about 1890 when they accompanied the pioneer column into Zimbabwe. Father Andrew Hartmann (a Jesuit missionary) and Canon Balfour (an Anglican priest) accompanied the pioneer column both as Chaplains (Zvobgo, 1996:3)

By 1893, missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church, the Dutch Reformed Church, the Methodist Church, the Salvation Army, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and the London Mission Society had established themselves in Zimbabwe (Zvobgo, 1996: 3-6) The early Church in Zimbabwe started off as an extension of their missions in South Africa and as part of Rhodes' transplantation of capitalist society in the high-veld. (Linden, 1980:3) It was essentially a white oriented church -- a Rhodesian Church and the missions supported imperial expansion. (Linden, 1980:3) In the 1890s, any group which identified itself with England proclaimed itself to be a "Christian race." (Linden, 1980:11) Rhodesia was looked at as 'British Israel'. (Shelton, 1985:13) In this respect, the Church was tasked always to facilitate and cultivate this unique identity of 'the chosen-ness' of European existence. From the onset then, it seems the Church promoted racism, presented as the policy of "separate existence". This was not surprising given that it was part of the imperial force. According to Linden, the conquest state had three aspects for which it existed: Christian civilization, the good of Africans and that the Africans needed to be grateful. (Linden, 1980:13) While it is not the central concern of this study to trace the extent to which the Church sided with the State, there is abundant evidence to that effect. Ranger thinks that this symbiosis was State induced. It was an administrative policy of the Rhodesian government during the early period of colonial rule to control the entry and re-entry of missions into the country. Missionary activities were supposed to comply with the colonial policy and periodically, missions were required to pledge their loyalty to the State. (Ranger, 1962:4)

From the look of things, the church could not exclusively promote Christian spirituality without, at the same time, serving the interests of the empire. Yet on the ground, they met hostile reception from the Africans. As Ranger sees it, the earliest days of missionary endeavour in Southern Rhodesia were “marked by a complex of expectations and disillusion, of attraction and repugnancy, of respect and resentment, which constitutes the relationship of the African people with the Church.” (Ranger, 1962:1) Thus the Church was in a very precarious position with the State demanding conformity and loyalty and the African converts openly hostile. Yet, mission churches were expected by the colonial state to make Rhodesia a safe place. (Linden, 1980:14) According to the Rhodesia Herald,

The thin veneer of Christianity, which through the extremist efforts of missionaries may replace the savage code of conduct -- for a strict morality it is -- is not unfortunately effectual against the kleptomania which after the break-up of strong tribal custom and authority rapidly reduce the native to the last state so immensely worse than the first. (*The Rhodesia Herald*, 3 May 1895)

It seems from the passage that, as the missionaries feared the ineffectiveness of their work on African spirituality, they resolved to be more brutal and forceful. This approach, in my view, has made Christianity as repulsive as imperialism. Many an African always associates Christianity with colonialism.

The Church in colonial Zimbabwe was an integral part of the settler society. It shared the authority of white rule, values and ideas (Linden, 1980:17). According to Canaan Banana, the Church (especially the early church) was heavily influenced by the ideology of the time (Banana, 1996:37). It supported state policies to the disadvantage of the proper mission of 'Gospel identity' (ibid.) Thus the early church lost the opportunity to reconcile the different groups (ibid.) This was not due to the impossibility of the mission, but rather the lack of determination to do so (Linden, 1980:17). Banana is hopeful of the possibility of 'reconciliation', but laments at the absence of the initiative. The Church did not focus on its fundamental mission because it sought to please the state as if its mandate came from there. Banana thinks that due to the Church's loyalty to the colonial state, it was absurd to imagine it deviating from state policies. Hence he says, “Although the church was made up of individuals, its leadership shared the same values, prejudices, goals and aspirations with those of the dominant class. Thus Church polity was fashioned by those at its helm” (Banana, 1997:37).

Commenting on the same issue, Jameson Kurasha in an interview said:

... the Church was part of the colonial spirit. We must remember that Africa was basically occupied by that colonial spirit, hence we saw the many churches' consciousness was part of the entire colonial organism. In other words, colonialism and Church were one flesh, one body, i.e. one spirit. If colonialism being the mother spirit was unaware of the evils of racism in this logic of the spirit, it follows that the body of colonialism would not have been able to do otherwise or see otherwise. (Kurasha quoted in Banana, 1997: 37)

That the Church sided with the colonial state is common knowledge. Priests themselves confirmed it. Father Randolph even said:

For 70 years or more, a cordial relationship existed between the Government and the churches. Missionary opinion has acted as a brake on Governments, and pleaded the causes of subjects against their rulers when censure of abuses were necessary... [T]he positive effects of Government action on missionary work of the church has hitherto far outweighed its negative side. For all their numerous and sometimes bitter differences, officials and missionaries believed themselves in the same battle on the same side. (Quoted in McLaughlin, 1991: 103)

The Church also owned vast tracts of land on which it practised farming with black tenants. In this respect it behaved just like any other settler (Linden, 1980:17). The Catholic Church was allocated 12,000 acres of land at Chishawasha, the Salvation Army was allocated 3,000 acres at Nyachuru, the Anglican Church was allocated 3,000 acres of land wherever they established a mission and the Methodist Church was allocated three farms whose total acreage was 17,528 (Zvobgo, 1996:4-5). The patterns of land allocation and use changed significantly in the ensuing periods, but this paper will not go into this.

For our purpose, there is overwhelming evidence that the Church was for a very long time in conformity with the policies of the state. This is significant in explaining the institutional alienation of the black and white races of Zimbabwe. Linden aptly captures this scenario when he says:

Institutions find it difficult to escape their origins, they live on as limits, patterns and ideals. By the 20th Century, the Church in Rhodesia had become part of a structure, an integral part: The little events, Mother Patrick's Women's bazaar, the Sister's Work in Gwelo Hospital after the risings, a telegram to Rhodes, had become a way of doing things, the Rhodesian way. And this involved a stark

division between the African and the European worlds.
(Linden, 1980:17)

The fact that the church was an integral and loyal part of the colonial state means also that the interpretation of the Church's mission was in line with state ideology. Africans were also considered by the Church as inferior to Europeans, and as such were fit to be treated as subjects, never as equals. According to Father Daignaut, Africans need to be taught the values of servitude, "Men in authority ought to treat natives not only as children, but ought also to do all they can to make them acquire the habits of work. As this cannot be done by moral persuasion, authority must necessarily be used..." (Linden, 1980:17)

From what Father Daignaut says, it is obvious that the Church even sanctioned the use of brutal force on the blacks if this produced the desired goal of making them 'industrious children'. It is interesting to note that what the missionaries wanted most from the State was power which they would combine with their teaching to transform the Africans' frames of mind. Missionaries needed the support of secular power to effectively carry out their work. (Zvobgo, 1996:2) The Jesuits for example, sought power; where there was power there they too were present. They even influenced the state behind the scenes (Linden, 1980: 17) This easily explains why the early church aligned itself to the state. State power, in turn, lay in the military. Belloc succinctly puts it: "*Whatever happens, we have got the Maxim gun and they have not*" (Quoted in Linden, 1980:17). The stark observation is that the church contributed immensely towards the humiliation of the Africans. The church was an agent of oppression, not of freedom. This, regrettably, may be a social reality persisting in the present day.

The missionaries in colonial times were informed by the theology of mission of their time. For the most part, 19th and 20th century theology of mission seemed to be Euro-centric. It shared the widespread view prevalent in European modernity that European existence was superior to the African one and by implication that Europeans were more righteous than Africans. (Serequeberhan, 1991: 3-7) Converts were encouraged to conduct themselves like the white people in order to realize a cultural homogeneity in the name of spiritual unity (ibid.). It was either Christo-centric or theo-centric (Muzorewa, 1991:14). When it was Christo-centric, Christ was first painted (though wrongly) as a Westerner, and Africans and Asians were invited to become Western in their life styles and beliefs in order to be true followers of Christ (ibid.). Due to this gross error, often associated with a theology of mission and evangelism as presented in the 19th and 20th centuries, Africa went through the worst humiliation of being completely colonized. Throughout this period, the church in Africa was being stifled (Muzorewa, 1991:14). This was because deep inside, the Africans were bitter about being treated as having second-rate souls.

The 20th century development of the traditional Protestant theology of mission was narrow because it had primarily been the work of Europeans

and Americans whose views reflected a western bias on the interpretation of the work of God (Muzorewa, 1991:14). This perspective in itself is not wrong if it was intended for the Western church and for local consumption. The problem with this has been that they expected the Africans to assimilate it.

From the foregoing it is evident that the history of the Church in this country was problematic. It came in the spirit of imperialism. It worked side by side with the state and marginalized the black converts. By going along with the policy of racial segregation, the church alienated itself from itself. These problems become part of the struggles after the struggle. There is need to dig into Christ's teachings on human relationships.

CHRIST AND RECONCILIATION

The present scenario with regards to spiritual matters in this country is dented. If one was to look at the Christian Church, one would see intra-denominational divisions along racial lines. In many Church institutions, assemblies hold separate services for blacks and whites. A case in point is the Apostolic Faith Mission at its Living Waters Tabernacle in Avondale. There is very little interaction, if any, between white and black members. They do not hold conferences together; they behave like different denominations. This defeats attempts to establish what Jesus Christ taught about the relationships amongst different groups of Christians.

In Christian teaching, there is the belief that man's state of enmity with God is replaced by friendship, through God's act of reconciliation through Christ (redemption) and the individual's acceptance of that reconciliation by baptism and penance. Reconciliation, whether between God and humanity or between individual human beings, expresses the result of a restored relationship (Wells, 1997:2). Reconciliation involves forgiveness and as such it is very costly, since whoever forgives "bears the guilt of the one forgiven" (Wells, 1997:11). God offered reconciliation and bore the cost of our refusal through Christ. In this respect, God suffered for us.

In religious terms, offending against the holiness of God by human offence translates into guilt and enmity between God and his people. This enmity can only be set aside by God's forgiveness of the offence. The need for assurance that sin has been pardoned and right relations restored has led to rituals of actual or symbolic cleansing both at the individual and the collective level. The setting right of the relationship is what is termed justification, while the result of this fact, the actually restored relationship, is termed reconciliation (Wells, 1997:12). The two may be considered to form part of forgiveness, which is the divine and human practice both of the setting right and the resultant restored relationship. In Christian terms, the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is the atonement (at-one-ment) between God and humanity (Wells, 1997:9). Humanity no longer needs to

get right with God. The freedom this brings makes it possible to trust God, to trust neighbours, to trust enemies.

The relationship between forgiveness and justice and love is at the very centre of Christian ethics. It provides the context for human freedom and human responsibility in renewal and fulfilment. God's presence and grace are a sign of His love; His pardoning or doing away with human disbelief and violation of this loving initiative is forgiveness; His presence underlying human aspirations and struggle to be human, experienced as the setting right the wrongs in human interactions, is justice. This practice of love through the means of forgiveness and justice is expressed in the individual through his behaviour towards God and towards his fellows, in the intention that God's Will be done, and in the knowledge that it is done through God's power.

Associated with reconciliation are concepts such as repentance, penance, justification, redemption and baptism. Literally "to change direction", repentance has come to mean facing up to and feeling remorse for some negative action/emotion and making a new start. This is what Van der Walt has termed 'responsibility'. For Van der Walt, repentance is "to realize that you have been responsible for the evil done to another person" (1996:5). It seems that the wrongdoer has to admit that s/he is causally responsible for an undesirable outcome – in this case, souring a relationship. This is seen as a necessary prerequisite for spiritual and emotional health; the soul breaks away from the past so as to set out on ethical reformation. Thus it is man's nature as a moral being and his power of self-judgement that makes him capable of repentance. Socrates said that only by being convinced of one's own ignorance could one gain knowledge; and Plato said that the potential faculty within everyone to distinguish the lesser from the greater good made it possible to renounce the lesser for the greater.

As Van der Walt contends, one can only repent after admitting one's guilt (1996:12). Repentance is thus the answer to the question of past sin, as to how the individual can be freed from the burden of wrongdoing done of free will and the creation of free spiritual activity. Repentance for past wrongdoing shows that the sinner has risen above his previous personality; what he condemns in himself cannot be his true self and this leaves the true self, free to repent or, as in Islam, "tawbah" or "turning to God". In Sufism, this turning to God is a favour granted by God. Repentance from sin leads to contrition, which supplies the moral strength needed on the way to God.

True repentance brings new insight and illumination; not only anxiety to make atonement for the person wronged or the spiritual order violated, but also a readiness for any task. There is an insight into duty and a new energy and inspiration of will. *Penance* is a term generally used to describe an external act signifying internal repentance, consciousness of previous sin/wrong-doing, and conversion. Forms include public confession, baptism, fasting, prayer, wearing of uncomfortable clothing

(hair shirts), physical disfigurement, sacrifice and acts of charity. Penance may be by an individual, group, or by an individual acting symbolically for a group (for example a priest or a king). In the Christian tradition penitential acts and abstinence are also used to emulate the life of Christ and master human inclinations.

As a sacrament of the Church, penance may be equated with the sacrament of reconciliation. In order to rid him or herself of sin committed since baptism, the penitent makes full and sincere confession, expressing genuine sorrow for sins committed. The priest then, having counseled the penitent, prescribes the act of penance and the penitent receives absolution. God actually requires that people confess their sins not only to one another but also to God (1 John 1: 19; James 5:16; Nehemiah 1: 6-7; Ezra 10) Man has been uncomfortable with admitting guilt, but this is necessary in the process of restoration. In spite of the fact that confession of guilt is difficult, it is the only way to rid oneself of the burden of guilt. There is no other way to be relieved of the burden, and to truly breathe freely again (Van der Walt, 1996:16)

Justification is the act of being made worthy of salvation, the term used in Christian teaching being "justification by faith", which precedes sanctification. Here an offence against God is set right by an act of God, expressing the fact of restored relations between God and humanity. Finally, *redemption* in Christian teachings, refers to the delivery of humankind from the slavery of sin and restoring a state of grace as sons and daughters "by adoption" through the life and death of the incarnate Word of God, the "only begotten son" Jesus Christ.

The Bible tells us that in love, God gave Jesus Christ the responsibility to save the world through his vicarious suffering, death and resurrection. He died to reconcile the world back to God. God's mission of reconciliation is an ongoing process. It is important is the fact that this mission is subject to interpretations which, themselves, are influenced by the cultural orientations of people. At the end of His ministry, Jesus commissioned his apostles to go into the world and make disciples of all nations. (Matthew 28:19). This obviously did not amount to changing Greeks and Romans into Jews. Only it meant creating disciples out of those who believe in the Gospel.

THE CHURCH AND ITS RECONCILIATORY ACTIVITIES

Jesus did not also allude to the idea that Europe is exclusively the seat of spirituality when he decreed the "Great Commission". Christians from the continent of Africa should interpret the mission of God in a way which delivers from psychological bondage. At any rate, the World Council of Churches, in 1963, realized the need to revise their *modus operandi* and came up with a new definition of what God requires of preachers, "... a movement both to and from six continents. Each church in each part of the

world,...is both a sending and a receiving community. There are no longer 'mission fields' and 'missionary' Churches, but 'partners in mission.' Christianity has no seat in Europe from which emanates all missionaries and all theological wisdom."

This is part of the Church's efforts at self-inspection. It is born out of the realization that early missionaries reduced God's mission and sovereignty to a definition and limitation of a programme because their perception of mission was limited to a programme to "save the infidels" of Africa (Bennet, 1966). However this self-criticism is not comprehensive enough for it does not tackle seriously the product of its own making – racism within the Church.

The brief history outlined in the first part of this essay has revealed to some extent that the policy of racial segregation in Zimbabwe has its genesis as far back as the pioneering days. It was the policy of the colonial state to institute territorial and institutional separation for blacks and whites. This segregation was not only at the level of politics and society, but also at the level of religion (Keet, 1956:14-20).

A question to be raised is whether reconciliation entails the eradication of ethnic identities? According to the report on the Dutch Reformed Conference of Church Leaders (1953), earthly distinctions have and will always persist. What would be deemed important in God's sight is spiritual unity irrespective of other differences, national, language, sex and so forth (1953:35). This does not mean separation for separation places man and woman, Jew and Greek, black and white in opposition to each other, the one valued above the other, rights given to one but withheld to the other. For instance, there is great difference between man and woman, but this does not prevent them from living in closest union. In Galatians 3:28 there are these words, "There is neither Jew or Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ"

The meaning of these words is open to two interpretations. The first possibility is that Christians can inter-fuse into one homogenous whole. In other words, there should be no rigid policy on conjugal unions which stipulates from which racial group one should marry. This is believed to help neutralize racial tensions. This view assumes that racial identities are contingent, that is, there is nothing essential or necessary in races that make them to be identified by those names. The particular experiences we underwent, the socialization into these groups are important, but not necessary aspects of their identity. However the problem is that the essentialists maintain that God created people differently for the purpose of bringing diversity into the world. It seems, however, that were the diversity allowed by God to be interpreted in ways that would bar or inhibit fellowship spiritual unity in the end would be a mere utopia. Would the rejection of the maintenance of difference imply the diffusion of racial diversity? Some scholars notably Keet strongly believe that diffusing the different races would amount to destroying the rich diversity brought into being by God (1956:20). Diversity is divine. According to Keet, diversity is

an essential part of God's creation, among men, and among things (Keet, 1956:27).

The second sense is that people must pay attention to all natural distinctions, but strive to come to the oneness of the spirit. This characteristic of oneness is described in Jesus' prayer in John 17:11 where He says; "Now I am no longer in the world but they are in the world, and I come to You. Holy Father, keep through Your name those whom You have given Me, that they may be one as We are."

CONCLUSION

Can spiritual oneness ever be realized if the Church of God is not a fellowship? I remain sceptical of this possibility. Unless, metaphysically speaking, there are as many heavens for the different people as there are races or ethnic groups, there can be no justification for spiritual division in the Church. One of the most urgent challenges of post-independence Zimbabwe is the demonstration of the oneness of the Christian Church. Chitando in this volume has demonstrated the existence of some basis for different religions in general to collaborate on the issue of building peace in Zimbabwe. If this is possible with different religious groups, it must be possible with the Christian Church. The Church of God has a clear mandate to promote reconciliation between human beings. Only when this is done could humans approach God. Theologically, reconciliation is possible; it has been prepared for by Christ at Calvary. It is the Church which is failing to live up to the expectations. The Church needs first to reconcile itself with its past. Only then can it tackle effectively the social problems of the present day.

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Chapter VII

Rethinking Wildlife Conservation in Zimbabwe

Patrick Tom

INTRODUCTION

The loss of control over natural resources by the indigenous people of Africa is one of the negative effects of colonialism. This is one of the reasons why they fought against colonial rule. In Zimbabwe people thought that independence would bring about positive results such as the re-establishment of control over natural resources. However, this still remains a dream for the majority of poor black Zimbabweans. The local communities, at the moment, have limited control over the wildlife resources in their respective areas. The government inherited the old colonial policy, which states that wild life is state property. The post-colonial government has not yet addressed the land problem created by colonialism. The new attempts at “giving land to the people” have not addressed themselves to the important questions of the deliberate and systematic protection of the environment and natural resources.

The rural communities were marginalized as a result of the land policy adopted by colonialists. Westerners have an interest in Zimbabwean wildlife and they want to be involved in the formulation of Zimbabwean environmental policy. Different views have been put forward of how wildlife should be conserved. Most of these views have come from Westerners who perceive African wildlife as threatened with extinction. Local communities have been viewed as enemies of the environment. Conservation has operated on a comfortable belief that Africa is a paradise to be defended, even against the people who have lived there for thousands of years (Adams and Mcshane, 1992). Animal welfarists, like John Hoyt (1994) have defined conservation as a way of protecting wildlife and their habitats from human interference by means of enacting laws banning trade, banning the capture and killing of wild animals and establishing protected areas. They advocate a preservationist ecocentric philosophy of non-use of nature.

There are, however, some conservationists who have argued that wildlife should be utilised in a sustainable way in order for it to be conserved. These people have supported Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. What we have is a conflict between the view that nature has inherent value and should be left intact as much as possible and the view that nature has instrumental value and should be used to benefit human beings.

This paper looks at the problems created by the land policy adopted by the colonial government. It will argue that the marginalisation of the

local communities created tension between wild animals and the local communities as they were all competing for land. The present government has not yet addressed the land problem and the conflict between animals and humans continues. The paper will also look at the different actors in the conservation debate and show how the conflict between them has caused them to often be at loggerheads over which environmental policy to adopt. This has also affected the local communities. Most of the people in this debate are Europeans. It will be argued that the land problem, which has not yet been fully resolved at the moment and the conflict between different actors in the environmental debate, has affected the poor rural communities who live near national parks. Environmental justice requires that locals be allowed to control and benefit from environmental “goods” in their area.

COLONIALISM AND THE MARGINALISATION OF THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

The aim of this section is to show that colonialism is partly to blame for the current conflicts between the local communities and animal wildlife. Prior to colonialism the indigenous people managed their own natural resources. Land was not a scarce resource for the population in the 19th century and earlier and traditional methods of resource utilisation were well adapted to conservation (Moyo et.al., 1991:13). White settlers who came in the 1890s conquered the indigenous people and took their land. The peasants were forced to move to less productive areas which were adjacent to wildlife areas. According to Tshuma (1997), the colonial state took over ownership of the land occupied by the indigenous people and restructured their land tenure systems. Because peasants were moved to marginal areas and became overpopulated in those areas, conflicts between animals and human beings began to arise. Animals and human beings were now competing for land. The human population was growing and people needed land for cultivation and grazing. The land was not available because the most productive land was allocated to white settlers and the land adjacent to the rural communities was declared state land, therefore it was protected from the local communities by the colonial governments. Animals moved from the national parks to villages, killing and maiming people, destroying human property and crops. At the same time, animal wildlife was declared state property. Any person who was found hunting was declared a poacher and consequently prosecuted. The peasants developed a negative attitude towards animal wild life. The local communities viewed animal wild life as a problem. However, the real culprit was the colonial government, which created the institutions that lead to the conflict between human beings and animals.

Insufficient industrialisation and urbanization could be attributed to the current problems between animals and rural communities. In the past eighty years, Zimbabwe experienced a ten to twenty fold increase in population and yet the country remained predominantly agrarian. This has

resulted in serious problems in the country because local communities continue to compete for land with animals.

The post-colonial Zimbabwean government inherited this problem when it came into power in 1980. It adopted the old colonial policy, which stated that wildlife was state property. The local communities who were bitter about the way they were being treated by the colonial governments continued to engage in poaching activities even today. In order to change people's negative attitude towards wild animals, the Zimbabwean government introduced the CAMPFIRE programme.

THE CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME

One attempt at addressing this problem has been the CAMPFIRE Programme. Under CAMPFIRE the Zimbabwean government has given management rights to the local communities as it has realised that the conservation of wild animals does not only involve telling people not to poach, but also permitting them to use animal wildlife in a sustainable way. R.B. Martin who is quoted by Swanson and Barbier (1992:109) maintains that the government launched the CAMPFIRE project in 1984 specifically to address the problems of communal resource ownership by a more equitable allocation of natural resources and by placing a value on them which has hitherto been absent for the communal land resident. Local communities have benefited from the CAMPFIRE programme, for example, it has led to the development of their areas.

However, not all people are happy with the CAMPFIRE programme. Some locals have not changed their negative attitudes towards animal wildlife because animals, for example elephants, continue to destroy their crops and property. They also kill and maim people. As long as these animals continue to wreck havoc in communal areas, people will continue having a negative attitude towards wild animals. The Zimbabwean government thought that it had resolved the conflict between animals and human beings. However the problem is far from over as long as wild animals and human beings continue to compete for land. One cannot blame an elephant for destroying someone's crops or property since it needs space to move around freely. However, this space is almost always utilised by human beings. Elephants and other wild animals were also affected by the colonial land policy.

What then are the struggles in this case? The struggles here are to get out of the organizational structures created by the colonial land policy, to create sound post colonial institutions and finally to identify just and wise post-colonial policies. Some peasants ought to be resettled in order to get out of the institutions created by colonialism. This should, however, be done with their consent. Only peasants willing to be resettled ought to be resettled. Some villagers might resist forcing them to move from such areas on the grounds that they do not want to leave behind their ancestors' graves or that, by resettling them, the government is giving more value to animals

than to themselves beings. Some animal welfarists have argued against CAMPFIRE on the grounds that the consumptive use that CAMPFIRE advocates does not work and is wrong.

THE DEBATE OVER CONSUMPTIVE USE

A fierce debate is going on between supporters of consumptive sustainable use such as the Zimbabwean government and some conservationists and opponents of consumptive sustainable use such as The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and other animal protectionists. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), that is committed to sustainable development, states that “sustainable use” is applicable only to renewable resources. Sustainable use of resources means using them at rates within their capacity for renewal (IUCN, 1991:4). Resources should be used in such a way that they are not depleted. However, they should be allowed to regenerate. A renewable resource will only increase if its stock is used within its capacity for regeneration. If a resource is over-harvested, it will be threatened with extinction. This, according to Pearce and Turner (1990), will happen when the rate of harvest persistently exceeds the rate of natural growth of the resources. Consumptive sustainable use involves the use of animals that remove them permanently from their natural habitat. Animals are either traded live as pets or killed so that their dead parts can be traded. On the other hand, non-consumptive use of animals refers to the activity that generates income without harming animals or removing them from their habitat (Hoyt: 1994:1). Examples of activities that fall under the category of non-consumptive sustainable use are eco-tourism and photographing. According to the concept of sustainable use, in order for wildlife to survive it must “pay its own way” by being “utilised” to produce economic benefits (ibid.). Animal welfarists have argued against consumptive use on the grounds that it does not realize its goal (which is the conservation of animal wildlife) and also that it is wrong from a moral point because it causes a lot of suffering to animals.

However, the Zimbabwean government and some conservationists have argued that under appropriate circumstances, consumptive use leads to species conservation. The difference in theoretical commitment between the different actors in the environmental debate has led them often to be at loggerheads on which environmental policy to adopt. What then is the nature of this conflict between these actors in the environmental debate? How can this conflict be resolved? What are the implications of this conflict on the poor rural communities?

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

The conflict between the different players in the environmental

debate is partly a conflict in values and partly a policy conflict. It is a conflict between local communities, conservationists and wildlife managers, who argue that wild life should “pay its own way” in order for it to be conserved and preservationists who argue that “people do not have the right to consume, let alone derive monetary profit, from wild animals.” (Freeman and Kreuter, 1994:8, Wildes, 1995:143) On the first view animal wildlife has instrumental value. On the second view, it has intrinsic value. On this second view, animals ought to be preserved even if their continued existence were demonstrably harmful to human interests. (Passmore, 1974:101) The two conflicting views about the relationship between man and nature are embodied in the preservationist philosophy, which excludes human beings from nature, and a human-centred philosophy, in which human beings have dominion over nature. According to Bonner (1994), the battle among conservationists over the utilisation of resources is almost as old as the organised conservation movement. Though ‘conservation’ has become an all-embracing generic term meaning all efforts to save the environment and resources, initially it meant the wise and planned use, but use nonetheless. (Bonner:59) Opponents of anthropocentrism like John Muir have advocated protecting land in its natural state, setting aside tracts of land and protecting them from human interference. (Bonner 1994, Wildes 1995, Miller 1985, Adams and Mcshane 1992)

A HUMAN-CENTRED ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

According to Taylor (1986), a human-centred environmental theory of ethics holds that our moral duties with respect to the natural world are ultimately derived from the duties we owe to one another as human beings. It is because we should satisfy other people’s preferences and wants, or promote the well being of human beings, that “we must place certain constraints on our treatment of the Earth’s natural environment and its non-human inhabitants.” (Taylor, 1986:11) Those who argue for a human-centred environmental ethic argue that environmental policies should be formulated on the basis of how they affect human interests and preferences. If people have a responsibility to protect a threatened species, this is because it promotes human ends, not because species have intrinsic value. A human-centred philosophy recognises that poor rural people living with wild animals have no incentive to conserve them without being allowed to benefit from them. This is the kind of philosophy that CAMPFIRE advocates as it is both human-centred and species-centred. Thus, CAMPFIRE promotes both human welfare and the conservation of wildlife species. Resources are supposed to be utilised in a sustainable way so that they are not depleted. A human-centred philosophy argues for both consumptive and nonconsumptive utilisation of resources as long as this promotes human welfare. The philosophy allows both consumptive and non-consumptive use of resources, including elephants and whales, since it finds no overriding ethical content in the form use takes, the ethical issue is

whether the resource can sustain us over time. (Sugg and Kreuter, 1994:27) The Zimbabwean government is advocating this human-centred philosophy of resource use. President Mugabe and the then National Parks Director, Willas Makombe note this in the following statements:

We believe that Cites (The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 1997) needs to update its philosophy in line with the post-Rio Convention concepts. Any convention that militates against this (sustainable development in the post-Rio era) is depriving parties, especially the developing countries, of the right, access, ownership and utilisation of the resources. (Mugabe, *The Herald*, June 16, 1997)

We need to ensure that our rural communities, which are paying heavily economically, socially and politically are directly benefiting from the wildlife resource to ensure their survival. (Makombe, *Daily News*, June 17, 1999)

However, a human-centred environmental ethic has been criticised on the grounds that it only treats the desires and interests of human beings as the ultimate basis for saying that a certain act is right or wrong. According to animal liberationists this is wrong. It has been accused by animal liberationists of not taking the interests of individual sentient animals into consideration.

A SENTIENT ANIMAL-CENTRED ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC

The advocates of this ethic are animal welfarists and animal rights activists. Animal welfarists are all those humans who are concerned with the well being of sentient animals, for example, The Humane Society International and The Humane Society of The United States. According to animal welfarists, all those animals that have the capacity to feel pain and pleasure morally count. Their concern for these animals is grounded on the view that morality is concern for others. Human beings have an interest in avoiding pain. This means that if a person is to act morally, then he/she ought to promote this interest and not be concerned only with his/her own suffering. Animal welfarists like Hoff and Singer have argued that animals share with us an interest in avoiding pain. Because they share with us this interest, we should act in such a way that we avoid causing unnecessary pain to these animals, that is, we should promote their interests just as we do those of humans. Arguing that only humans matter is, according to Singer, advocating 'speciesism', which is not different from other forms of discrimination like racism, sexism and ageism. According to Singer 'speciesism' is the view that all members of our species have some special moral status lacked by members of any other species. Animal welfarists

reject speciesism saying that we have moral responsibility towards non-human sentient beings. They are extending an old and familiar ethical doctrine- namely, utilitarianism- to take account of the welfare of other individuals. (Sober, 1995:227)

What the animal welfarists are saying is that the criterion for moral standing is sentiency. In the ancient world, the historian Plutarch and the philosopher Porphyry were among those who insisted that human excellence embodied a refusal to inflict unnecessary suffering on all other creatures, human and non-human. (Elshtain, 1991:529) Animals lost the philosophic struggle as a result of the emergence of the Western rationalist tradition. (Elshtain, 1991) Philosophers like Kant argued that animals had instrumental value because they are not rational. In this case, a person can use them as means to his own ends. The view of Plutarch and Porphyry and which was shared by Kant is importantly different from the animal rights view. On this view, what is wrong about killing is not that it injures animals or violates their rights, but that it de-humanises us or shows us to lack some excellence or virtue. The belief that other humans are separate from and morally superior to, other animals was affirmed by Rene Descartes who argued that animals have no value in themselves since they do not have souls, free will, or consciousness. For Descartes, non-human animals are merely organic machines. This implies that, humans can do whatever they like with non-human animals, for example kill them for food, clothing and sport. Philosophically, animal-rights activists seek to close the gap between "human" and "beast" challenging the entire Western rationalist tradition, which holds that the ability to reason abstractly is the defining human attribute. (Elshtain, 1991:530) Elshtain tends to use animal welfare and animal rights interchangeably. However, it should be noted that the animal welfarist movement and the animal rights movement are distinct. The more radical environmentalists think we need a whole eco-centric orientation to nature and tend to lump animal welfare and animal rights perspectives together. A lot of people regard the idea that animals' feelings deserve some consideration as legitimate because most of us do not believe in kicking and killing animals for no apparent reason. Therefore, we should not totally ignore what animal welfarists are claiming (that it is wrong to inflict unnecessary pain on all sentient animals). Such a claim makes sense and we should accept it.

However, Wright (1991) notes that "the truth is that animal welfare is just a slippery slope that leads to animal rights. Once you buy the premise that animals can experience pain and pleasure, and that therefore their welfare deserves some consideration, you are on the road to comparing yourself with a lobster." According to Wright, animals have been given utilitarian value, but this does not technically mean that you have to extend individual rights to them. It seems that Wright is not using the terms "animal welfare" and "animal rights" in the precise way that philosophers do. Once one decides to take into account animal pain and suffering, then one is indeed on the road to comparing one's own pleasures and pains with

those of a lobster in deciding how to treat it. But this does not lead to animal “rights”.

The advocates of sentience as a criterion for moral standing argue that things which cannot suffer or feel pain are excluded from the criterion of moral standing. This means that objects like trees, soils, mountains, rivers, and rocks do not have moral standing in themselves because they do not have interests. These only count in so far as they promote the welfare of individual sentient animals.

However, some people have argued that in practice, we cannot live in accordance with the criterion that sentient animals matter, as it is impossible to carry out our duties and obligations to animals. For example, human beings need animals for food; therefore we cannot possibly go around treating animals with respect. However, a response to this criticism would be that this criterion is not as impracticable as it seems; that is, we can live without eating animals. And since the aim is to avoid animal suffering, if we kill animals painlessly, then according to Singer, it is acceptable to kill them. This contradicts Regan’s argument that it is the killing of animals that have interests and not just pain that matters morally. For Regan, all animals that are experiencing subjects of their own lives have inherent value. In other words, Regan is saying that we should not kill such animals. What we ought to do is to let nature take its own course. Regan is advocating animal rights and the model of rights he adopts is based on interests.

The problem with animal welfarism is that it argues against speciesism when at the same time, it is promoting speciesism. By arguing that only individual sentient animals matter and non-sentient animals do not matter, animal welfarists are being speciesists because they exclude other species from their moral domain on the grounds that they are not sentient.

Some animal rights theorists like Hoyt and Regan who take an extreme position, especially in the debate over elephant culling, have argued that these animals should be left alone because they have a right to exist. Hoyt in his book, *Animals in Peril*, has called for an international ban in the trade of ivory. However, in the case of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana, the ban was reversed during the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) conference that was held in Zimbabwe, Harare in June 1997. During the CITES conference, the animal rights groups were saying that animals have a right to exist without being hunted, should be protected and left in peace and that it is unethical to use them for commercial purposes. When it was announced that elephants were going to be down listed from Appendix 1 to Appendix 2, animal welfarists and animal rights activists were unhappy to the extent that some of them shed tears. On the other hand, Zimbabwean, Namibian, and Botswana delegates were happy to the extent that they sang “*Ishe komborera Africa*” (“God bless Africa”). For them, they had won a war against animal lovers. The then Zimbabwean Minister of Environment and Tourism, Chen Chimutengwende said, “We are happy that we have won our right to use

our resources for the benefit of people. (*The Herald*, June 27, 1997) A *Herald* reporter reported that, “the mood was undoubtedly that which prevails when a child has been born.”

Zimbabwe has not adopted animal welfare and animal rights issues as philosophical issues to the extent that they have been done in the United States, Canada and Britain. The reason for this is that we hold different values and that it is a question whether endorsing a human-centered perspective makes sense. Policy conflicts may divide those with the same values. For example, those who advocate that elephants have value in themselves and not just instrumental value for human beings, tend to disagree when it comes to the question whether governments should cull elephants in areas where they are over-populated. Some animal welfarists who take a moderate position might argue that there is nothing wrong with culling elephants if this promotes their welfare in the long run. For them, it will be unethical to let elephants destroy their habitat and then starve to death. However, animal welfarists who take an extreme position might argue against this view on the grounds that culling causes a lot of suffering to elephants. Those with different values might endorse the same policy, for example, conservationists who are concerned with ecological collectives, will endorse elephant culling in cases where its population threatens “the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community”. In this case, animal welfarist who take a moderate position and conservationists might agree that there is nothing wrong with culling elephants in areas where they are over-populated.

A CAMPAIGN TO REVERSE THE CITES DECISION

It was reported in the *Zimbabwean Chronicle* (March 5, 1998) that an American environmental pressure group and some European countries are campaigning for the reversal of the Cites decision that allowed Zimbabwe to trade in elephant products. They want elephants to be again listed in Appendix 1 which contains all animals and plants that are endangered and which people are not allowed to trade commercially. What this means is that the war is far from over. The struggle will continue as long as these groups exist, since they have a direct interest in individual sentient animals. They are alert to the interests of these non-human animals. This sometimes leads them to be unwilling to promote the interests of the poor.

Some animals have acquired “totemic” status among Western wilderness lovers. (Guha, 1997:15) In Zimbabwe, every clan is identified with a particular totem. (“*Mutupo*”) People of a particular clan are not allowed to kill or eat their totem animal. For example, those of the Zebra (*Mbizi*) clan do not kill or eat Zebras. It is believed that if a person who belongs to this clan eats a Zebra they will become ill, their teeth will fall out and consequently they will experience bad luck. What can be noted here is that this is applicable only to that particular clan. Those of the Zebra clan do

not discourage others, for example, those of the lion (*Shumba*) clan from eating Zebras. But those who love and cherish the elephant, seal, whale or tiger try to impose a worldwide prohibition on killing (Guha, 1997). Kalland, (Guha, 1997) argues that, the new totemists also insist that their species is the “true, rightful inhabitants” of the ocean or forest, and ask that human beings who have lived in the same terrain (and with the animals) for centuries be sent elsewhere. This is being unfair to the rural communities. What are the implications of this on the poor rural communities?

STRUGGLES FOR FAIRNESS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AND BADS

If the poor rural communities are not allowed to utilise animal wildlife, it means that they will continue to suffer and their situation will worsen. It will be very unfair to the poor rural communities who are being disadvantaged by wild animals that destroy their crops and it should be remembered that these people depend on subsistence farming. It will also be unfair to the rural communities, if they do not receive environmental “goods” and receive only environmental bads. “Environmental goods” are those uses that are socially valued and have the capacity to enhance individual well being. (Low and Gleeson 1998:102) It is unfair to let local communities receive bad elements of the environment and let those people who live outside these communities (foreigners, domestic tour operators, etc.), receive positive benefits from the environment. In this case, a humane environment for the local communities is an environment in which “their needs are met and in which they can optimally flourish” (ibid). Peasants need wild animals for meat; some are so poor that they cannot afford to buy meat from the butcheries in their areas. They have insufficient land to grow food and this in turn means that they have few resources. To disallow them from benefiting from wildlife resources in their areas, which are wrecking havoc in their areas while letting someone from Canada or Britain enjoy photographing these animals at the expense of the peasants, is not fair. If safari operators get the benefits and the poor rural communities the costs, that is unfair. The local communities and the government need to be courageous to fight those who are advocating a non-consumptive use policy. Such a policy should be argued in realistic terms. There is need for community empowerment; that is, peasants should be allowed to participate in issues that concern wildlife conservation. Wildlife should not be separated from them. The local communities should be respected as persons. This means that we ought to go beyond the traditional white middle class base.

GOING BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL WHITE MIDDLE CLASS BASE

A conservation policy which ignores African environmental values and cultures ought to be criticised. What should be noted is that public opinion has to include all the people involved and the conservationists will have to seek support beyond their traditional white middle class base, if wildlife conservation is going to make sense to a villager living next to a game park. There is need to get rid of the tendency to put a greater stress on wildlife than on the poor local communities who live with it. Conservation strategies that ignore the interests of those communities living in and around protected areas, should be done away with. There is need for the conservationist to come up with realistic strategies. Local communities should not be regarded as inevitably having a destructive effect on the environment. They ought to be regarded as partners in conservation. The dogma of total protection of wildlife against local communities can have tragic consequences (Guha, 1997).

CONCLUSION

The interests of the local people should not be neglected. Opponents of animal welfarism should also take seriously the claim of animal welfarists that we ought not to inflict pain on sentient non-human animals unnecessarily and this should be included in our conservation policy. The government's conservation philosophy should promote the well-being of poor rural communities. It should also let the locals benefit from environmental "goods." By so doing environmental justice will be promoted.

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Chapter VIII

Education at Cultural Crossroads: A Struggle for Meaningful Education in Zimbabwe

Munyaradzi Madambi

The works of thinkers such as W.E.B DuBois, Carter G. Wilson, Franz Fanon, Paulo Freire, Marcus Garvey, Harold Cruise, Walter Rodney, and others, have inspired and continue to inspire struggles for the dignity and integrity of those previously colonised. Besides giving chronicles of the suffering of the oppressed, they also go a long way in providing multi-pronged suggestions on how such victims can recover from the dehumanising experiences to which they were subjected during and after slavery, colonialism and imperialism. In the light and spirit of the works of these great thinkers, this paper looks at the ills and poverty of colonial education in post-colonial Zimbabwe and its effects on Zimbabweans' patterns of thinking and behaviour. Efforts will then be made to show that, as much as education was used to destroy Africans by colonial masters, it can also be used to reverse the situation as we strive to develop African societies.

COLONIAL EDUCATION AND THE CORRUPTION OF THE AFRICAN CHILD'S MIND

Twenty-six years after the struggle for political liberation of Zimbabwe, traces of colonial education are still prevalent. These have continued to militate against the complete development of human potentialities in African societies. Here a complete human being is perceived as one with stable capabilities of reason, consciousness and deliberation, which all harmoniously inform one's sense of self-worth, self-confidence, self-efficacy, self-actualisation and self-reliance (physically, mentally and economically). The term 'African' shall be used in its general form to refer to indigenous Zimbabweans. Any other usage will be clarified. On detailed discussion of the concept, see Mogobe Ramose's, *African Philosophy Through Ubuntu*, (1999).

The denigration and disintegration of Zimbabwe's African ethos, social and moral values can be linked to the colonial legacy. Colonial education fostered in Africans a lack of appreciation of the rationale and consciousness of the socio-political and historical transformation of their society. Colonial systems re-enforced fear, prejudices, myths, superstitions and misconceptions that culminated in cultures characterised by unwarranted submission, timidity, myopia and paranoia. Intellectual and material dependency, as well as meek self-submission to the rule of, and

control by, others have grown to become deep seated cultural traits and all these can be traced back to colonial education and experiences.

Twenty-six years after the struggle for political independence, Zimbabwe finds herself at cultural crossroads. The culture of violence, the culture of dependency (which we often call the dependency syndrome), the culture of self-denial (identity crisis), the culture of poverty, the culture of timidity, the culture of self-pity transverse Zimbabwean society today. This cultural onslaught is aggravated by Western information and epistemic systems which encapsulate the internet and satellite television. The Zimbabwean child is faced with an identity crisis, torn between Afro-centrism and Euro-centrism (modernity). The current wave of warped 'pan-Africanism' (or indigenisation) which is characterised by greed and violence cannot be ignored as a major force in culture adulteration. The culture of greed and violence can also be traced back to colonialism. Zimbabwe is in a situation that can best be described as a state of 'culture wars' (Shor, 1986:273), with various sub-cultures competing for supremacy.

It is a tragedy that colonial education turned an African child into a 'culture vulture', without the urge and zeal to analyse situations before accepting values in these culture wars. This historical catastrophe was captured with dismay by Walter Rodney when he pointed out that, "colonial education corrupted the thinking and sensibilities of the African and filled him with abnormal complexities." (Rodney, 1981:273) One senior Zimbabwean nationalist also expressed this poverty and corrupting tendency of colonial education when he said of misconceptions and complexities it created:

...we erroneously held to the view that education meant exemption from all forms of manual work. To us education meant reading books, writing and talking English, and doing arithmetic. We thought that the ability to do these things was the only true education. To use one's own hands to earn one's living, we thought, was below one's dignity. (Ndabaningi Sithole quoted in Veit-Wild, 1993:46)

This cancerous attitude prevails in parts of Zimbabwean society today, and it has affected every aspect of the black majority's ways of life. Certain foods, dances, dress codes, mannerisms and styles of life are said to be appropriate because they are 'white' (Euro-centric), and hence are the 'done things'. Even our attitudes, language and general conduct point towards Africans' acceptance of white supremacy. We have derogatory language depicting the African world and glorious language for the Euro-centric world. For instance, we comfortably talk of '*muriwo wechibhoyi*' (the black servant's vegetables which are unpalatable and a preserve for the poor and uncivilised) and '*muriwo wechiringu*' (the whiteman's vegetables which is a preserve for the rich and the educated). The learned and civilised

often shun '*muriwo wechibhoi*' (vegetables for the boys) regardless of the fact that medical doctors recommend it for its nutritional value. During the colonial period, adult blacks were referred to as 'boys' by whites and so '*mabhoyi*' became the new term for blacks. Colonialism treated adult Africans as poor dependent children with no voting rights and greatly restricted freedoms. The opulent African elite are also regarded as '*mavheti or varungu*' (literally meaning the sophisticated and powerful white man). Our language also shows that we have adopted Western conceptions of aesthetics. A beautiful woman is described as either '*bhulondi*' (blonde), '*bhuruneti*' (brunette) or '*karadhi zvaro*' (real coloured). Even our beauty contests have a Western bias which emphasise slim bodies, naturally excluding Africans most of whom have large bodies. Derogatory names such as '*madhafinya*' (meaning fat and amoeba-like) are used to describe large African women.

Wearing a jacket and tie, and speaking in English are also regarded as signs of civilisation, sophistication and being educated. In educational institutions, it is regarded more grossly embarrassing to make a mistake when speaking in speaking English than it is to make mistakes in one's mother language. Eating wild fruits in public attracts ridicule and scorn, while consumption of fruits such as apples or pears is associated with sophistication, flamboyance, modernity and wealth. Respect is often accorded depending on how one dresses, what one drives or how much wealth one has. People are also over conscious of where one stays and where they socialise. Those staying in northern suburbs are quick to give their addresses whereas those from high density suburbs sometimes even go as far as giving the address of a cousin who stays in a northern suburb where they hardly visit. Stereo-typical tendencies can also be picked in the area of sport. Playing sports such as cricket, rugby, hockey, tennis, baseball and badminton is regarded highly because these are considered the white man's sports. Tendencies to absolutize Western or European culture against African culture in its entirety is often referred to as the colonial mentality. Please note that 'man' is used here to refer to the human race.

All this emanates from the conviction that everything European is superior to that which is African. Walter Rodney's research confirms this sad pattern of thinking when he says, "colonial education had warped values that the African accepted without questioning". (Rodney, 1981:273) This is the thinking Ndabaningi Sithole describes above.

This source of cultural confusion is also reiterated by Frantz Fanon when he describes the black man's pursuits in education as aiming to be white. This mentality is also captured and scathed by Paulo Freire when he says, 'to be, for the colonised is to be like the colonial master'. And to be like a colonial master is to have massive wealth 'and to have it by all means necessary'. (Freire, 1972)

It is also interesting to note that whenever people have acquired wealth they want everybody to see that they have moved upwards. This attitude has tended to result in existential insecurity and compensatory

behaviour. Since it is considered inferior not to 'have', some would rather compromise basic necessities such as food, children's school fees and shelter in a bid to acquire trendy goodies. This also explains why most of our business people rush to buy flashy cars and houses at the expense of the business' economic viability. One would rather starve but dress like a model/celebrity, or struggle with debts but drive a 'fat and cool' vehicle.

However, a deeper look into the historical context of such patterns of thought will take us back to the roots of education in Zimbabwe. Right from the inception of the first school around 1902, we see that educational goals were subordinated to evangelism, and the primary aim was not to develop the African child, but to detach him/her from the tribe. The missionary system of education was aimed at replacing and supplementing the traditional African patterns of belief, ceremonial organisation, family and marriage practices. (Rogers C.A., and Frantz C., 1962:152) According to Shor (1986:ix), different social groups with different conceptions of what is important to know, and often power, fight it out for recognition and supremacy.

Despite Africans' insatiable appetite for education, many Europeans preferred to keep them as 'raw, untutored menials' uncontaminated by the knowledge and values of western culture. (Rogers C.A. and Frantz C., 1962:159. Maurice Nyagumbo (in Veit-Wild, 1993:48) said of his experience in his first school, "We had one teacher, an old man called Mr. Samuel Munyave. Although he appeared to have only passed Standard One, he was the most brilliant teacher we ever had." There was gross shortage of teaching staff and resources in schools for black people and government did not bother much about that situation (Murphree, et.al. 1975)

But what are the metaphysical and epistemic foundations of attitudes that prompted and sustained colonial education? It would be very interesting to look at this question before we propose injunctions for meaningful education in Zimbabwe.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL EDUCATION

A close look at the above discussion and its historical context will show that most problems associated with colonial education sprout from Western metaphysical perceptions of the African person. This metaphysics influenced the colonialist's worldview and attitude towards, and treatment of, the Africans. Based on the thinking of celebrated philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, David Hume, Charles Darwin, Levy Bruhl, A. and Karl Marx, Euro-centric metaphysics looked at Africans as non-thinking sub-human species. (Ramose, M., 1999) Africans were considered inferior to whites in literally every sense. Everything African was condemned as primitive, barbaric, redundant, unsophisticated and unpalatable. These convictions helped to strengthen the superiority complex among colonial settlers. Comte, for instance, believed that human society evolved through

three basic stages: the theological, metaphysical, and the positive. Within the first stage, the human mind develops from fetishism, through polytheism, to monotheism. Fetishism is the most primitive philosophy of human kind. (See Van der Walt, 1997:5 and for response, O. p'Bitek, 1971)

From the advent of slavery down to colonialism and imperialism, Africans were treated as irrational, uneducable and educable menials.

In his essay, *'On National Character'*; David Hume authenticated this conviction:

I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilised nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent in action or speculation. There are no ingenious manufacturers amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient Germans, have still something eminent about them. Such uniform and constant difference could not happen -- if nature had not made original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. (David Hume quoted in Eze, 1997:116)

The same vein of thought can be picked in Immanuel Kant's metaphysics when he says:

The race of Negroes, one could say, is completely the opposite of Americans; they are full of affect and passion, very lively but vain. They can be educated but only as servants (slaves), that is, they allow themselves to be trained. They have many motivating forces, are so sensitive, are afraid of blows and do much out of a sense of honour. (Kant quoted in Eze, 1997:116)

This metaphysical conviction that racially biased cultural differences are inborn and not acquired can be traced back to the Western evolutionary theories developed by Charles Darwin and thinkers such as A. Comte. Levy-Bruhl also had a similar influence and designed the concept of a 'primitive mentality'. He argued that "the rationale for the bizarre, strange and surprising deeds of primitive people should not be sought in a philosophy, that is, in a particular form of rationality, but in a specific kind of mentality or psychic constitution." (Levy-Bruhl quoted in Van der Walt, 1997:5) So-called primitive people, according to Levy-Bruhl, are not governed by reason, but their behaviour is determined by their emotions and natural orientations. Judged according to Bruhl's Western model of rationality or logic, the primitive (African) mentality is basically irrational and pre-logical.

Mitchell perceived this colonial pattern of thought in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). According to Mitchel,

...beliefs about the inability of Africans to think abstractly and hence to be occupied in managerial or technical posts, to lay a line of bricks on the level or set the frame of a door squire and hence to be employed as craftsmen, to understand the principles of democracy, to apprehend fully the tenets of Christianity, to appreciate art, music and literature, or to become civilised people in general, have been accepted by whites in central Africa. (Quoted in Murphree, 1975:6)

Colonial education was founded on this prejudiced metaphysical disposition. And it is our role to turn around the situation as we dispel such distortions, myths, misconceptions and prejudices about African people.

TOWARDS MEANINGFUL EDUCATION

In our effort to delineate meaningful education for Zimbabwe, we are perpetually confronted by intriguing challenges. Apparently, the Euro-centric nature of today's education continues to place conscious Africans on a collision course with its basic premise: that European culture stands at the centre and is pivotal in one's understanding of the world. Other equally demanding questions include: Will the introduction of African centred thought broaden African students or pigeonhole them into a false sense of security and narrow nationalism? If all education is value based, which values should African children be learning? Will African centred education teach a value base that will encourage and allow competition at a world level and co-operation at a local one?

Meaningful education for a society at cultural crossroads like Zimbabwe commences with the deliberate planning towards conscientization of students of the existence of a plethora of cultural views and the need for careful sifting and selection of substance from chaff. Meaningful education must continue with inculcation into children deep understanding of the political, racial, economic, scientific and technological realities that confront their very survival as an African people locally, nationally and internationally.

Meaningful education must be based on an epistemological precept that knowledge is anchored in positive self-concept and an environment that encourages growth. Education must be recognised as an instrument (process) that should reflect people's interests as a cultural nation and be grounded in cultural history. It must be perceived as a means of providing for the inter-generational transmission of values, beliefs, traditions, customs, rituals and sensibilities along with the knowledge of why these things must be sustained. Through education individuals must learn how to determine their interests, distinguish their interests from those of others, and recognise when their interests are consistent and inconsistent with those of

others. Meaningful education must prepare society to reflect, improve and preserve values from preceding generations, building upon its inheritance and making ready the generation that will follow.

Meaningful education must transform cultural dispositions, strategically placing people for the enjoyment of the fullness of life and reality: not any deliberate attempt by one group to design a human being for that group's purposes. Meaningful education for Zimbabwe, therefore, is an education that is designed to deliberately deal with inadequacies that are so apparent in our society. As much as education was used to inculcate negative cultural patterns, we can also use it to inculcate positive cultural dispositions that are in harmony with the integral development of the fullness of humanity. The concept of education is used in a general sense to mean all activities that take place in educational institutions. However, properly understood, the concept of education should not accommodate negativity. This view is informed by R.S. Peters' concept of education as pursuance of only that which is worth while. Hence, our project becomes that of cultural transformation, moving from the colonial mentality to what Freire would describe as a state of being conscious of one's consciousness. However, it would be very important for us to look at the meaning of culture before we link it with education.

CULTURE, EDUCATION AND MENTAL DECOLONIZATION

It is a fact that culture is a result of human thought and action. Only humans can invent and make sense of culture. According to Hannerz, "Homo Sapien is the creature who makes sense (culture). She literally produces sense through her experience, interpretation and imagination." (Hannerz, 1992:3)

Culture, according to Alan Bullock encapsulates "the social heritage of a community, the total body of material artefacts (tools, weapons, houses, places of work, places of worship, government, recreation, works of art); collective mental and spiritual artefacts (system of symbols, ideas, beliefs, aesthetic perceptions, values and distinct forms of behaviour, institutions, groupings, rituals, modes of organisation, etc.), created by people sometimes deliberately, sometimes through interconnections and consequences in their ongoing activities within their particular life conditions and undergoing kinds and degrees of change." (Bullock, Alan, L.C. and Stallybrass, Oliver, (eds.) 1988:247) Culture encompasses the customs and traditions of a people. When the anthropologist refers to the culture of a society, or the sub-culture of a group within a society, he means to pick out a way of life or a code of living that is distinctive of that society or group.

Hannerz's concept of culture is very handy for our purposes in this project. According to Hannerz, people create meanings and meanings create people as members of societies. As such people create culture, and culture in turn builds foundations for the further development of people. This can

be translated to mean that through education we can create, recreate and preserve culture. This view can also be understood from the viewpoint of John Dewey's constructivism. Dewey's view of education as the reconstruction and reorganization of one's experiences enables us to rid the African child of the colonial mentality through the deconstruction of rotten prejudices and the reconstruction of better worldviews.

However, as mentioned above, the relationship between education and the development of culture raises a number of philosophical questions: Who determines what is a good or bad culture? Who determines what a developed culture is? Does cultural development imply cultural absolutism? How does education close the gap in the bipolar tension between cultural relativism and cultural absolutism? It is not within the scope of this paper to deal with these questions in detail. We have thinkers such as T.S. Eliot, R. Woods, R. Barrow and R.S. Peters who deal adequately with such questions.

In the context of the questions just listed, it is important to note that discussions of meaningful education imply transformation and preservation of a higher standard of values. The concept of 'higher standards of values' is just as controversial as the concept of 'meaningful education' because they share the same axiological foundation.

The concept of cultural transformation advocated here is quite in harmony with R.S. Peters' concept of education. According to Peters, meaningful education implies changing people's states of mind for the better. It is a sort of process in which desirable states of mind develop. This view of education, in a way, concurs with Eliot's concept of higher culture in that, the element of desirability is quality oriented. For R.S. Peters, not every result or experience coming out of an educational institution is worthwhile or desirable (colonial education is a good example of such experiences that are not worthwhile). In a similar fashion, Eliot, Barrow and Woods distinguish between popular culture and higher 'culture'. Popular culture refers to ways of life or codes of living of a society or a group of people. In theory this use of 'culture' is purely descriptive; it contains no implications about the value or otherwise of any culture referred to. (Barrow, and Woods, 1975:160) On the other hand, higher culture implies reference to works of a high standard. According to Woods and Barrow, though we may disagree on what constitutes culture, it is in some sense desirable. People are not cultured simply because they belong to a group with an identifiable culture in the sociological sense. Whereas initiation into the culture of a society in an anthropological sense means initiation into the way of life of that community, initiation into culture must involve, perhaps among other things, introduction to what are regarded as works of some artistic quality.

Naturally, this view of culture cannot survive the wrath of critics of elitist views of culture. What we are face to face with here is a specific example of the conflict in education between those who think that some activities are more worthwhile than others, and that education should

initiate children into such activities, and those who deny this, or, alternatively, argue that anything is worthwhile if people like doing it. We also have thinkers such as H. Schofield who concluded that a cultured person is one who 'does the done thing'. But the question still remains as to what the done thing entails. Who is to decide what the done thing is? Is a cultured person simply a person who does the done thing according to the majority view in society? What if the majority is not interested in what he considers to be high culture? Even if we were to take Eliot's view of culture as 'those excellent works which mark a superior civilisation', our task remains enormous: What exactly do we mean by superior civilisation? What are these excellent works? Who is to decide and how does one decide? Much the same can be asked of Arnold's view that education should be concerned to introduce children to 'the best that has been thought and spoken in the past'. What exactly is the best that has been thought and spoken in the past?

Bantock's view of high culture also falls into the same predicament. For Bantock, "some human activities are of greater importance than others because they represent a more deliberate, refined and sophisticated exploitation of human potentiality, as poetry is superior to pushpin. It is not difficult to show that the study of poetry involves a higher and more deliberate degree of brain organisation, affects more aspects of the personality and produces more valuable consequences than the study of pushpin." (Quoted in Barrow, and Woods, 1975:174) The problem here is that culture is a value-laden concept. Qualities involved are themselves value judgements couched with obscurity. Any attempt to define the qualities that produce a work that belongs to the category of culture runs up against one of the most perplexing of philosophical problems: how to arrive at criteria for aesthetic excellence.

For our purposes, let us look at culture as those mechanisms and habits which enable people to prevail and co-exist as social, economic and political animals. These enable man to exist within his environment fully conscious of his rights and privileges and those of his fellow human beings.

African children are owed an education that gives them a profound base on which to grow proud to be Africans. It is the educator's responsibility to build meaningful education for them, and having meaningful education is the every child's right. The African child needs (a) cultural identity, not racial prejudices, (b) intellectual freedom from Euro-centric constructions of knowledge, and (c) knowledge of the values, aesthetics, spiritual beliefs, and all those things that give a particular cultural orientation its uniqueness. Otherwise they will get lost in this maze of cultural crossroads.

CONCLUSION

This paper was oriented to towards denouncing the legacy of dependency and inferiority seeded by the colonial system of education. The

paper is against the false identity instigated by this old system of education. The old system managed to impress upon Africans an inferiority complex which has continued to haunt them and to inhibit them from realising full growth and development.

After having denounced the colonial system of education and its consequences, we then recommended an education that would rejuvenate positive cultural perspectives. Positive cultural perspectives would subsequently lead to social development. I advocate an education that leads to an integral development of people; an education that respects a people's cultural and historical backgrounds; a system that respects people's cultural dignity and integrity; education that defies the creation of the European-American elite in Africa.

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Chapter IX

***Kugara Hunzwana:* Conceptions of Social Cohesion in an African Culture**

T.A. Chimuka

This study is an attempt to investigate how African societies maintained intra-group cohesion thereby keeping intact, their political communities. The study is part of the broader post-colonial African discourse where African intellectuals are working towards an appreciation of their place and role in history. This particular focus attempts to glean the past for practices and conceptions that might be useful in fostering and maintaining the post-colonial social order, which apparently is riddled with conflicts and violence.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Kwame Gyekye commences the book *Tradition and Modernity* (1997) with the observation that post-colonial Africa is riddled with a surfeit of problems. Some of these problems, he contends, emanate from culture – the enchanting practices, habits, attitudes and other inherited outlooks.(Gyekye, K., 1997:vii) But other problems were largely a result of the imposition of European colonial rule with its simultaneous introduction of Western values on the African people and also from the various reactions to the encounter with the West(Gyekye., 1997:vii). All these developments nevertheless, provide material for philosophical reflection. Taking the cue from the general picture as described by Gyekye, and regarding problems of the first category, this study is directed at resolving the problem of nation-building – of integrating and welding together the various social groups that were deliberately plunged into hostility and antagonism by the despotic colonial state. The aim is to create a harmonious political community – the multinational state. The need comes as a realization that contemporary Zimbabwe is rife with group tensions and disharmony, which developments threaten to plunge the country into turmoil. A case in point would be the violence to the run-up to the June 2001 parliamentary elections and the 2002 presidential campaigns.

When one looks into the Shona traditions, one is confronted with the once cherished ideas that the ancients utilized to cement intra-personal ties as well as intra-group harmony all of which were construed as promoting stable and peaceful living environments. In this regard, the study will attempt a conceptual archaeology with the hope of unearthing how the precedent Shona culture fostered cordial relationships that bound members together, not only within the particular social group but also those groups

that were within the proximities. It is hoped that some valuable ideas may be identified whose harnessing may bring about a peaceful integration of all members of the larger and more complex Zimbabwean political community. In more specific terms, the essay seeks to churn out a prospective understanding of '*Kugara Hunzwana*' (To live well is to understand one another) in the promotion of peace and the enhancement of life in political communities in Zimbabwe.

Thus, the paper seeks to demonstrate how a strand of the African tradition has understood and utilized intra-personal relationships in the creation of stable political communities characterized by harmony and peace. The central assumption here is that intellectual ideas develop in time, setting and sequence. Aspects of tradition are passed on from one generation to the other precisely because the older generations believe that the bequeathed tradition has utility for posterity. Useful aspects of tradition filter through from one generation to another and from one epoch to the next, while a large chunk of outdated ideas remain behind. Those that filter through from the past into the present and possibly the future are the connecting threads which guarantee continuity and identity of the said culture.

The paper also assumes that *ubuntu* is the basis of ethical as well as political conduct in the African world-view. It concedes also that the regulation of personal relationships outside the family circles and friendship in the Shona tradition finds expression in "*Kugarisana*" (living together harmoniously) and "*kunzwanana*" (understanding one another).

The study grants further that the intellectual treasure of any lively culture is not static but progresses with new experiences and challenges. The greater the experiential complex, the greater the conceptual tools with which to understand that experience. In line with the foregoing, the work attempts to extrapolate from and interpret the concepts and practices, in a manner that allows them to be relevant to the quest for national integration. In the main, the paper seeks to argue that '*Kugara hunzwana*' (mutual co-existence) can cement inter-personal ties in contemporary Zimbabwe.

THE ROOT OF THE SHONA TRADITION

Ubuntu, as Ramose has sturdily argued, is the ontological, epistemological, ethical as well as the aesthetical basis of African existence. (Ramosé, R., 1999:49) *Ubuntu* as an integrated whole, manifests itself in different modes. The modes are only aspects of the whole of being. *Ubuntu* is a centripetal fountain out of which the African modes of existence emanate and because of this, the whole gamut of extant phenomenal and consciousness derive from *ubuntu* and express themselves as nodes. Ramose puts it thus;

Accordingly, *ubuntu* is the fundamental ontological and epistemological category in the African thought of the

Bantu-speaking people. It is an indivisible oneness and wholeness of ontology and epistemology. (Ramosé, R., 1999:50)

It may strike the reader as curious that Bantu ontology is monistic. In addition, one may even be tempted to associate such a conception with aspects in Western thought such as the monism of Parmenides or Hegel. One may look at Parmenides' poem or Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*.

This is not necessary since when it comes to ontological questions, metaphysicians can only be either monists or pluralists. Variations are expected with respect to the specific shades of monism or pluralism individual thinkers, schools or movements in question may adopt. Whereas some metaphysicians adopt material monism, others uphold idealistic monism. Of the pluralists, some uphold the material pluralism or idealistic pluralism or even dualistic pluralism. It is entirely legitimate for the ontology of *ubuntu* to be monist as it in fact is. This remains true whether or not the African philosophers themselves had contact with Western thinkers.

Granted that *ubuntu*, is the foundation of an African world-view as well as an African way of life, the claim proffered is that, since it anchors all, it therefore informs conduct both moral or otherwise. Many scholars who adopt *Ubuntu* philosophy notably Ramosé subscribe to this view. However unlike Ramosé, I do not hold that accepting *ubuntu* commits one necessarily towards essentialism. Since the African people are spread right across the continent, there are bound to be variations in the expression of *ubuntu* due to their specific history and experiences. However, some links are traceable, establishing that the Bantu are a homogeneous population.

The paper does not seek to establish that *ubuntu* is expressed uniformly across Africa, since variation has already granted, rather it seeks to disclose by means of one African group how the conduct of a political and civic nature has been envisaged in a given African context. The Shona concepts of *kugarisana* and *kunzwanana*, which have a bearing on social and political conduct, will be explored with the hope of appraising their practical efficacy in contemporary Zimbabwe. I am aware that there are serious debates on this concept of the Shona. Recent studies by Professor Solomon Mutvairo has sought to prove that the 'Shona' are in fact the "Mbire" and that 'Shona' was a concept imposed from outside and applied to a number of the various dialects in Zimbabwe.

Some critics, notably antiquarians, may be uncomfortable with the move to try and adapt traditional concepts to present needs. For them, past ideas and concepts must be understood as applicable only to the epoch in question and have no bearing on the present. Although the pre-colonial past has been superseded by the present, there is still need to resuscitate it in the present discussion. Consequently, the paper utilizes anachronism. The opposite extreme of antiquarianism is anachronism. Anachronists hold that translation is not just unavoidable but that it permeates the historian's task

to such an extent that there is no possibility of avoiding the anachronism that it necessarily carries with it. According to this view, there is no way the philosophical past can be recovered as it was without our interpretation of it. In this respect the paper attempts a balancing act.

Historians of philosophy benefit more if they synthesize the virtues of the anachronistic and antiquarian attitudes in their approach to interpretation. As Georg Gracia notes, both antiquarianism and anachronism are impotent interpretation attitudes to the history of philosophy. Whereas the antiquarian seeks to preserve the past as it was and rejects any interpretations of it, he loses it. The same is true of the anachronist who regards everything as interpretations thereby throwing away the original in favour of a copy. Thus Gracia says,

We are also part of a tradition. Our philosophic past is not like some artifact completely alien to us. Our philosophical past is causally related to who we are. We are the product of that long tradition in which past ideas are often modified, the causal links that tie them to us, with effort and good historical methodology, can be followed up and reconstructed. Tradition means 'handed down from former times and passed on to another. We are linked to the past not only causally, but that repeated attempts have been made throughout history to go back and to recapture the past as it was. Each of these attempts discovers something new and passes it on to the future generations. These scholarly and pedagogic links are as important as the causal ones and they help us bridge the apparent chasms of separatedness between the present and the distant past. (Gracia, G., 1992:)

We are not totally unrelated to our past so these connections, no matter how loose, should help us recover the past. They also create bridges by which we can move back in a bid to retrieve ignored possibilities and forth again in our quest to carve new possibilities. Again as Georg Gracia notes:

We are linked to the past through the practices that are at the core of human society and are preserved through generations. These practices, linguistic, conceptual, and so on, are fundamental to social survival and, therefore are never completely obliterated. Although human societies may modify their customs, something always remains, and such remains are the threads through which we can return to the past. Besides, some ideas are not affected by their cultural location for, instance, logical and mathematical ideas. "Two plus two equals four" are ideas which do not

seem to be affected by cultural variations. No doubt, most philosophical ideas are entangled in their cultural locus, but this does not mean they can't be disentangled. Even in the history of philosophy, some ideas can be passed from one culture to another and from one language to the next without undergoing substantial changes. The translation of ancient Greek texts into Latin is an example. This development can only be explained by accepting that some ideas are not substantially affected by their cultural location. They can move from culture to culture, language to language, individual to individual. (Gracia, G., 1992:)

By going back to a prospective interpreting the traditions, the study acknowledges that colonialism had trivialized some of these Shona practices. But the resilience with which they survived and manifested themselves in various forms and especially in protest movements points to an important point, that these cultural practices are quite significant and hence entices a closer scrutiny. A careful examination of the conception of humanity by the Shona is helpful in this respect.

Amongst the Shona people, *hunhu* (in some dialects *unhu*) is a powerful instantiation of the African humanity. This involves not only the physical mode of existence but also the whole array of values – moral, legal, aesthetic and all the other norms. These values are pegged in the collective consciousness of specific groups, which are expected to vary in accordance with the history and experience of the collective. These values, in turn, are transmitted to progeny through the process of socialization. Part of the initiation into *hunhu* is the recognition of the humanity of others. (Hamutyineyi, M.A. & Plangger, A.B., 1987)

What Hegel said about self-consciousness may be helpful here. For Hegel, the self develops full consciousness as it confronts another self. Prior to this link, the self would be engrossed in efforts to interact with, subordinate and make the external objects satisfy his/her needs. The confrontation with the other self makes the self understand him/herself better. (Hegel, 1977:213-217) This observation has interesting aspects for moral and political communities which will be explored below. The character of *hunhu* is both at the individual and corporate levels, but both point back to the integral being.

Virtues directed at the self are as emphasized as those directed at the advancement of the community. At the level of the individual, virtues, which promote integrity, are vital since they ultimately lead to the realization of "*munhu ane hunhu*", the integrated moral entity, which in turn is the moral embodiment of *ubuntu*. Virtues, which promote the corporate self, preservation and hope, are also fostered. The hope of Ubuntu is in eternal sustenance as provided for by God. Anything with a destructive import either due to corruption or intent is understood in *ubuntu* as vice, which is the negation of virtue. In the socialization of a new member into

ubuntu, one was alerted to the vices of this world, which one was supposed to avoid, and to the virtues which one was supposed to develop.

CONCEPTIONS OF INTRA-PERSONAL TIES IN THE SHONA TRADITION(S)

This section focuses on past articulations of civic regulations amongst the Shona. This does not suggest that the Shona is the only African group with the concepts and practices in question. Ndebele and Sotho people, for instance, accept in general that what is said about the Shona may well be true about them as well. The Shona are selected to demonstrate how a particular Bantu community understands conduct.

The concepts *kugarisana* (cordial co-existence) and *kunzwanana* (mutual understanding of one another) are chosen in order to demonstrate that *ubuntu* has a lot to say, as it always did, about the regulation of relations whether of a personal or civic nature. These concepts have, within them other concepts such as *kugamuchirana* (tolerance) and *hushamwari* (civic friendship). As argued elsewhere, these concepts refer to integral aspects of the conduct of *ubuntu*. (Chimuka, 2001)

In traditional Shona culture, life was led in the *nyika* (territory) and *kunzwanana* (civic friendship), *kudyidzana* (mutual use of resources through exchange) and *kugarisana* (coexistence), were encouraged. If one treats a given Shona micro-community and the relations that ensured, using the mathematical principle of scale, one may harmlessly look at Zimbabwe as a macro-community. Obviously there are other important differences such as membership and institutional configurations between a Shona micro-community and Zimbabwe as a macro-community that need to be duly recognized and acknowledged. However, as the Shona still consider present Zimbabwe as their *nyika* (*Lizwe* in the case of the Ndebele). Thus indicating that the concept has survived. This realization became visibly manifest with the establishment of the colonial state, which had promulgated the race-caste model. (Mandaza, 1997) The trouble of the colonial political community was its operational policy, which manufactured division as a survival strategy at the expense of nation-building. (Mamdani, 1996:7) Zimbabwe, as they now realize, is a much bigger and more complex physical and social environment than the traditional spatial territories. Consequently, the concept *nyika* has been conceptually augmented to cater for the new political boundaries. The stark reality, which the Shona have come to grips with, is that their society had been opened up. Zimbabwe became a cultural crossroads, a political community also for other Bantu people who were not necessarily Shona. It became apparent that Shona humanity did not exhaust the scope of *ubuntu* humanity. With the coming in of people who defied being characterized as *Bantu* it also became apparent that there was more to humanity than just *ubuntu*.

Complex political and social realities had started to emerge with the advent and operations of capital which, necessitated interface between the Shona, not only with other different instances of *ubuntu*, but also with the other forms of humanity. The realization that the world was much more complex than what they had imagined became most manifest with contact with other cultures especially with the West. Some of the Shona people were even forced out of their traditional territories by processes such as slavery, but still carried their humanity wherever fortune and misfortune drove them. It remains true for the Shona today that it is not necessary to tie identity with physical space since migrations or other disasters could force people off their traditional territories. A people could be identified even in exile because they manifest a certain stamp in existence. Even if the whole gamut of qualities that mark the people in question to be the same is only accidental, it has been generally accepted, for example, that black people are so-called because they have a dark skin pigment.

That, change had impacted on Shona society is evident. However, by reading into Shona institutions such as marriage, family, and chieftainship, one can decipher ideas that nurtured human relationships, and kept intact the traditional Shona societies. Since some of the traditional Shona institutions are still intact, one may argue that the ideals that cemented inter-personal ties are still relevant to the present day social and political realities in Zimbabwe. On the basis of the above, one may make the contention that *Kunzwanana* (mutual understanding) and *kugarisana* (peaceful co-existence) are still relevant to the moral, legal and political spheres, though some modifications are anticipated to reflect the changed needs of modern social configurations.

Historically, *Kunzwanana* was conceptualized as the recognition by one (or a group of people) of the humanity of the other or group of people. This recognition meant the creation of space for the other. Admittedly, one gained direct access to *ubuntu* through a certain entrance. In principle, there was so single and rigid access point. The family was the usual starting point. Civic relationships were cemented by blood – (*hukama*). One then went out and got connected to the wider web of people related largely by blood. The young people got to know of these close ties at forums such as the *dare*, at games or at the pastures. (Gombe, 1986) Society had other convergence zones where members of the larger community had occasions for interaction. The *nhimbes* (cooperative ventures), *muchato* (marriage celebrations), *Mukwerere* (rain-making ceremony), *Dare romusha* (village court) and *Dare ravashe* (Chief's court) gave the members the fora to mix and build some relations and mend others.

In the traditional *nyika*, members knew each other personally on the basis of *hukama*, but more than this, they sought *hushamwari* (civic friendship). This was a very important bonding factor, which few writers recognize and highlight. *Hushamwari* found room in Shona civic relations due to the realization that *hukama* had limitations as a moral and political

fibre. Rivalries for power and other goods amongst brothers and blood ties were rife and blood fell helpless as a form of moral intervention. In other cases, injury to another was usually met by corresponding violence. However, these tendencies and practices were considered vices for they drove the whole community into strife and chaos. Where such violent skirmishes would have taken place involving people of the same communities, if the matter was for arbitration, usually the elders would conclude by saying “*Kugara Hunzwana*” suggesting that coexistence was best promoted by mutual understanding and tolerance.

Friendship (as long as it was still intact) was a very effective civic bond, hence the saying *hushamwari hunokunda hukama*. (friendship is much stronger than blood ties) Oliver Mutukudzi preserved the Shona wise saying in a song, “Husahwira Hunokunda Hukama.” It was even encouraged that blood relations be friends because it encouraged mutual respect and understanding. Obviously not any type of friendship would do, but that which was mutual and regarded the other party as an end – an embodiment of *hunhu*. *Shamwari*, was in this sense, very dear. It is interesting that the Greek philosopher, Aristotle said something, which one might find consider agreeable to the Shona; “Friends seem to hold states together, and lawgivers need to care for it more than for justice”. (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1155a22)

However as may be self-evident, *hushamwari* (friendship), need not apply the same across society. Realistically speaking, no one can be an end-friend of everyone else. Another form of social bond is required. The Shona had *kugarisana* (peaceful coexistence) where it was not necessary to have *hushamwari* in order to co-exist. *Kugarisana* required that one recognize the existence of the other and have moral, legal and other considerations, which enhanced mutual respect and tolerance (*kugamuchirana*). *Kugamuchirana* meant accepting the given ness of the being of another. Needless to say there were severe limits to tolerance in closed societies largely due to threats to their security and the need for preservation of values. Tolerance has been defined by most dictionaries in three broad ways:

1. The action of allowing; permission granted by authority; a licence to actions, practices or conscience.
2. The allowance, with or without limitations, by the ruling power of the existence of religion otherwise than in the form officially recognized or established.
3. The action of allowing or tolerating that which is not actually approved; forbearance; suffering.

However defined, tolerance appears to be either a matter of policy or a social virtue (McClure, 1990:362) . There is a sense in which whatever is tolerated has been allowed to exist or to be practised without interference from the authorities. If it is government policy to be tolerant, it would be

expected that the said government maintain neutrality and if it is a social virtue to be tolerant, one was supposed to bear the burden of tolerance without repugnance. (McClure, 1990:363)

One gained membership into a given community not because all people were friendly to that one. Actually, not all were members of the respective communities by virtue of descent. Others were invited to a given community to provide specialized services, for example, *n'anga* (doctors) or *mhizhas* (iron smiths). However, marriage was the most obvious way in which one could become a member of another community. However one (legitimately) found membership into that community, others were obliged to recognize that new status of that person even if they were not friendly to him or her.

In Shona societies, the *dare* (court) was instituted to settle the matter concerning members' conduct. According to J. Gombe there were four types of courts: *dare rendava* (the Shona court of justice), *dare reroora* (the family council called to consider a marriage proposal), *dumba ravatete* (the consultation that took place between a paternal aunt and her brother's children) and *dare rokushopera* (a consultation with a divine-healer). (Gombe, J., 1993:vi) However *dare rendava* was the most important since it dealt with the administration of justice. It was present at all levels of organization from *dare remhuri* (family court), *dare remana* (village court), *dare redunhu* (sub-chief's court) and *dare raShe* (Chief's court). (Gombe, J., 1993:14)

At the village level, for instance, if two people were in conflict over one's untoward conduct, usually that which was bound to savour *kugarisana*, the matter could be brought to an appropriate *dare* for arbitration. Such misunderstandings assumed different forms. Gombe gives an example of a case, which could be taken to a local court for arbitration. The hypothetical case is one in which neighbours in the *mana* (village level) clashed over one's cattle which strayed into the other's field thereby causing extensive damage to the crops. The litigants Badza and Chimombe are presented thus:

Badza: Imi mangozvionerawo madyirwo akaita munda, kuti hazvigoni kutsanangurika. Hupfumi here hunokupai kudada, kuti pane hupenyu hwavamwe ndipo pomofudzira zvipfuyo zvenyu? Kana mombe dzoita zvokuvata mumunda, varidzi vadzo vanenge vachiti dziri kupi? Idzo mombe dzinenge dziine varidzi chaivo vasingazivi kuti dziripi? Zvino ini ndinoda masaga gumi ezviyo, muripo womunda wangu wamakaparadza. Ini ndiko kuti tigarisane zvakanaka. Handingapedzi simba rangu kurimira zvipfuwo zvenyu. Mhuri yangu munoda kuti izodya vhu here? Kana vana venyu voita zvokufudzira mombe mumunda hakusi kuringa vamwe muhapwa here ikoko?

Chimombe; Ngaisiye matambo, Mazvimbakupa. Inonaya inosiya munera. Kuzvara hakusi iko kupa mwoyo. Kushinha kwepwere. Iyi imhosva haina nzvenda. Zvamataura zvanzwikwa, shoko harivhikwi. Mhosva rusudzo inongouya usingadi. Inga ndimi wani vakuru makati vana nembwa hazvina kusiyana. Vanokuparira mhosva wakavarairwa. Mukati zve mugoni wepwere ndiye usinayo. Vana zvamunoona, vanorwisanisa vagere havo. Kana nesuwo zvamunoona takagara kudai, tiri kutoshaiwa pokunyura nezvatakaitirwa navana. Zvamareva tazvinzwa hedu. Mati tingaramba zvipi tirisu takupaza? Asika vakuru vakati motsi haarwirwi asi piri. Zvino sezvo mangoona kuti kuita kwepwere, madini kutiitira tsiye nyoro?

Badza: Zvakanaka, mukumbiriro wenyu ndamunzwa. Asi zvino ngazvive ziita kamwe mimba yomusikana. Zvinhu zvakadai hazvidi kugaroitwa. Zvinokonzera mapfumo nemheremhere. Ibvai makomekedza vana venyu kuti vagare meso ari pazvipfuwo. Vavakidzani havanaki kugaromisisdzana savatevedzani. Mangwana unozoshaiwa anokukwenya mhezi yokumusana. Nokuti munhu kuvaviwa haukwizi pamuti semombe.

Chimombe: Tatenda chaizvo Mazvimbakupa. Chete kutenda kwakitsi kuri mumwoyo. Kuziva kwenyu henyu kuti kutongana kwavavakidzani. Ndekwekutsunyana zvisingabudisi ropa. (Gombe, J., 1993:4-5)

Gombe presents the Shona –English translation as follows:

Badza: You have seen for yourself how my field has been ravaged so much so that it cannot be described. Is it your wealth that makes you arrogant so that where other people's livelihood is involved there you graze your cattle? If cattle simply take their ease in a field, do their owners ever think of where they are? If cattle have proper herds, would they spend the whole day not knowing where they are? Now I demand ten bags of finger millet as compensation for my field, which you have destroyed. This is in order to enable us to live together in peace. I cannot waste my strength growing crops for your cattle. Do you expect my family to live on soil? If your children allow such things as to let cattle graze in a field that is now equivalent to showing contempt for others?

Chimombe: We beg for clemency, Mazvimbakupa. The falling rain does not destroy the tender grass. Begetting does not mean imparting irresponsibility. It is just the mischief of the young. This charge cannot be denied. We

have heard what you have said a word cannot be warded off. A case like this is like a fart, which comes out willy-nilly. Indeed, it is elders like you who have said, children and dogs are one and the same, they involve you in wrong doing while you are unaware. And, further, you have said, the man who boasts he can manage his children is a man without a single one. Children, as you know, cause trouble between those who are at peace with one another. Even we, as you see us here, are feeling ashamed of what the children did in your despite. We have understood what you have said, the first mistake must not be fought over, but the second. Now that you have seen that this is a result of children's carelessness, can you not be merciful to us?

Badza: All right, your request is granted, but let this be something done only once, like the first pregnancy of a girl. Things like this should not be allowed to happen regularly, they cause conflict and brawling. You must warn your children very firmly that they must keep their eyes on their charges. Neighbours should not fight one another like elder and younger brothers. Otherwise you will not have anyone to scratch your back in future because when a person has an itch, he does not rub himself against a tree like an ox.

Chimombe: Thank you very much, Mazvimbakupa. Only I find it hard to express my gratitude in words. It is your good sense that recognizes the fact that judgement between neighbours is like pinching one another without any loss of blood. (Gombe, J., 1993:6-7)

While Gombe was interested in discussing the registers appropriate at the Shona courts, this work is concerned with how the Shona people sought to develop harmonious relationships in the *nyika*. The judicial courts were instituted to deal with serious issues, which the disputants could not resolve on their own. These cases would even be referred to the superior courts. (Gombe, J., 1993:16-27)

KUNZWANANA, KUGARISANA AND THE MODERN POLITICAL COMMUNITY

Zimbabwe is now a modern political community, and a plural one for that matter; there are significant differences between it and the traditional *nyika*. In modern political discourse, the term *nyika* has been retained. It has no doubt undergone substantial modifications with the advent of the Colonial State. It no longer refers to the small territory controlled by the clan but to a very vast political sphere where complex structures have been established and where intricate activities take place.

Also membership to the *nyika* is no longer restricted to people related by blood. Many different and multifarious social configurations have been instituted. For example, there is now talk of residents and this has nothing to do with blood ties. The new social order is indicative of the transformation of the traditional Shona worldview into a modern one, in which blood ties though important and recognized, no longer determine membership. Interestingly, though the concept *nyika* has been retained, its meaning has been deconstructed and reconstructed in light of the emergent realities. As such, it has become a dynamic concept, which defies rigid fixations. The Shona even use the concept *nyika* to refer to other modern political communities like Botswana, Zambia, Canada and Australia.

It is the contention of this paper that, in terms of the moral and political dimension of conduct, considerations of *kunzwanana* and *Kugarisana*, which supported the traditional social institutions, may still be invoked and utilized in the political realities of contemporary Zimbabwe. The area of human relationships has been consistently strengthened in the evolution of human groupings. Due to the persistent desire to strengthen human relational networks, one may be justified in harnessing this development in a bid to create better social realities marked by recognition and tolerance. As with the broadening of the conception of the political community, likewise the conception of *kunzwanana* and *Kugarisana* which transcends familial and blood ties need to be encouraged. Other intra-personal and social links, which do not thrive on blood affinities, have been established. *Kunzwanana*, need to be expanded to include, in principle, the disposition to establish mutual understanding with all members of the political community. This would probably be equivalent to what political theorists refer to as civic friendship. *Kunzwanana* and *kugarisana* would foster togetherness, since political communities are still as ever concerned with ways of keeping members together. (Swarzenbach, 1996:1) *Kugarisana* and *kugamuchirana* involve what political scientists would label tolerance. (Galeott, 1993:1) For Swarzenbach, civic friendship has not been given due recognition in political theory as functional to keep the political community together, yet, it is very important. Emphasis had been placed elsewhere, for instance, Hobbes emphasised self-interest and Locke property, Hume commerce, and Rawls a shared conception of justice. Using Aristotle and other thinkers, Schwazernbach argues that civic friendship is important and for political community. As the paper has tried to demonstrate, this insight was present in the traditional conception of *kunzwanana* and *Kugarisana*. The contemporary political scene seems to require these concepts for use in building up a post-colonial social order. Modern institutions in Zimbabwe such as schools, clubs, churches and the whole spectrum of the public sphere require not just legal sanction, but intra-personal ties to complement and consolidate the various other efforts at integrating members of the various social groups and political communities.

Kugarisana as one may be aware did not require essentialist conceptions of identity, but rather accepting that the other is one's

neighbour who might, after all, be different both in appearance as well as the ways in which he leads his or her life. The fact that these belong together as members of the same community and are bound to experience the same national ideals gave them a common ground for mutual understanding. *Kugarisana* was defined and limited by the extent to which one promoted and recognized *hunhu*. It also involved accommodating the various differences amongst people of the same community. Even in terms of wrongdoing, *kugarisana* involved the realization that to err is human and that one could also be in the wrong someday somehow, hence the need for tolerance. Usually the Shona would say “*Muregerei ndozvaari*” (Leave him, he is like that) or “*Anebenzi ndoanerake rikadzanha unopururudza*” (If one has a fool for a child, if he dances, one ululates).

Post-colonial Zimbabwe is riddled with tensions and antagonism where intolerance seems to be rife in politics, religion, relations between the sexes, age groups and in the whole social spectrum. Given that, there is need to work out solutions. One such remedy is to invoke the ideas from our past, which had been very instrumental in the promotion of peace and stability in the *nyika*.

The need for tolerance is not unique to Africa and indeed Zimbabwe. It may be useful as well in discussions about globalization. Relations in the global village need to be regulated by a very generous measure of tolerance. The liberal democracies which often prided themselves in promoting individual freedom are still struggling to become more tolerant themselves. Galeotti gives us a very interesting test case of this phenomenon:

In October 1989, at Creil in France, three French girls of Muslim faith came to a public school with their head covered by the traditional Muslim scarf or chador. The controversy erupted at once: the school authorities ordered the girls to uncover their heads, claiming that they had to dress like all other students; the girls, supported by their own families and by the Islamic community, refused to comply and, as a consequence, were expelled from school. The case was made public and was widely debated in the country. Similar episodes started to happen in other public schools. At that point the Minister Lionel Jospin, in order to provide clear guidelines for the whole school system asked the opinion of the Conseil d'Etat, which in November 1989, formally took issue on the matter, ruling that French students had the right to express religious beliefs in the public school, as long as they respected others' liberty and on the condition that such an expression does not hinder the normal teaching and school order. Thus the girls were readmitted in the school with their Islamic veil, the legal decision in favour of tolerance

looked more like a de facto compromise than a principled choice, nor did it stop the controversy over what has come to be known as “the chador case”. (Galeotti, 1993:585)

What is interesting in this case is that even in the West, differences are not easily accepted. Yet, the West is chiefly renowned for the liberal principle notably from Mill, according to which each person should be left to follow his or her ideals and style of life as long as he does not harm other people.

CONCLUSION

What the paper is advocating for Zimbabwe is the need to create peaceful communities to maintain tolerant neighbourhoods. The twin concepts of *kunzwanana* and *kugarisana*, are painstakingly relevant more so now than they ever were. Apparently, they are versatile and dynamic. They have, within them, the potential for the augmentation of the values of friendship and tolerance, which are invaluable in civil life. Although values were found in small measures, looked at from the perspective of the political communities of the time, they are vibrant concepts; with timeless suppleness, they may be harnessed for maximum benefit for our time and for posterity. As this work has tried to demonstrate, dynamic concepts are not limited by time. In fact they can stretch into the future and are capable of transformation. Because of their suppleness and potential, they may be appropriated to institute habitable political communities for the diversity of citizens. However as with the past, there are limits to tolerance, and usually they limits are set at what people are prepared to accept. (McClure, 1990:384-387) One also expects the level of tolerance in Zimbabwe to be proportionate to the challenges of nation building.

Thus by involving themselves in bickering and violence, the Shona do not seem to live by the cherished values and practices of their forefathers. Members of the same *nyika* sought to live in harmony with each other and where serious differences occurred the *dare* was there as a channel for conflict resolution. This appears to have a progressive tendency in an evolving culture. The seeds need to be watered, not trampled upon.

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Chapter X

Beyond Contemporary Exclusivist Traditionalist Culture in Peace Building and Development

David Kaulemu

INTRODUCTION

Peace, like other fundamental building blocks of a healthy society, such as liberty, equality, justice and development, is a social good that is socially produced, distributed, enjoyed and/or denied. Indeed to talk of *peace building* is to admit that for peace to exist, it has to be built and maintained on a day-to-day basis. Human beings, working on a personal and social level, have to work to produce peace through the construction of social structures, economic systems, cultural institutions, political cultures, technologies and personalities with virtues that result in peace. Development too does not grow on trees. It is a result of human effort on a day-to-day basis. Just as societies produce and distribute such material social goods such as food, clothes, shelter, and vehicles, they also produce and distribute more abstract social goods like dignity, self-respect, social self-confidence, peace and development. But the form of the social goods produced depends on the nature of the human beings who build them. Hence the old Aristotelian question, “What kind of human beings do we want to be?” becomes central to issues of development and peace building. Only certain human characters with relevant virtues are capable of building peace in the world. Democracy cannot be built by people who have not cultivated, in themselves and in their interactions with others, democratic virtues that respect human dignity and encourage peace. Political leaders, doctors, teachers, development workers and peace builders who do not treat their clients and constituencies as made up of human beings cannot succeed in helping to build peace through development.

Yet, paradoxically, the social goods that people produce and distribute, also, reflexively mold these people in return. When people produce violence as a social good, they are sure to get violent people as a result. It is therefore important to look into the cultural virtues that we need to be encouraged and vices to discourage in order to facilitate peace building and human social development. It is encouraging that Erin McCandless and Mohammed Abu-Nimer, in their *Editorial* of the inaugural issue of the journal, *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, note that, “within developmental organizations, the relational (psychological, social, cultural) component is often not considered.” (McCandless and Abu-Nimer, 2002:2) This essay tries to deal with some aspects of this neglected area. It takes for granted that all cultures have within themselves, but also with help

from others, the capability of supporting human development and the building of peace. However the essay focuses on aspects of local self-understandings and systems of desire that make it difficult to achieve peace and development. It argues that the humanist concept of universal citizenship and the appropriate modern liberal civic cultures that respect all humans as free, intelligent and equal can help local ethnic, patriarchal, racial and religious value systems and institutions go beyond themselves to establish genuine broad scale communitarian society in which individuals and societies achieve development and peace in solidarity with others.

How people look at themselves and others, their cultural beliefs and ideals all enter into how these people are going to build their social world and how they are going to behave in that world. Hence, people's self-conceptualization, their day-to-day cultural practices, and their sense of personal and social security will determine whether and how they will contribute to peace building, development and conflict resolution. Therefore, we cannot understand possibilities for peace and development without assessing people's self-perceptions, cultural traditional practices and how those traditional practices define and influence the construction of moral selves, systems of desire, conceptions of the good life and how these create possibilities for sustainable human relationships. However, sometimes aspects of people's cultural traditions create obstacles for the building of peace and the achievement of true human development. In saying this, I do not mean to accept cultural determinism which postulates that some cultures are more democratic, more peaceful, and likely to make democratic progress than others. Every culture is capable of supporting development just as, at the same time, it also has aspects capable of hindering it. Every cultural tradition has tools, within itself for peace and democracy just as it has tools that can be used for undermining these. It is up to members of each cultural tradition to identify aspects of their traditional practices which best help human centered development by finding the best ways of expanding people's choices and building peace.

This paper assesses the potentialities for peace building and social development in African modernity as a social/cultural form. It argues that certain ways of looking at ourselves and others do not help our efforts to build peace in ourselves and with others. It demonstrates how traditionalist self-constructions which are based on traditionalist consciousness are exclusivist and fertile ground upon which personal and social conflicts germinate and grow.

This will happen whether or not more technological and material development is introduced. Technological and material development unaccompanied by moral or human development can be dangerous. In fact, there are many examples where such one-sided development is used as a tool to implement exclusivist traditionalist consciousness, such as in apartheid and the Rwandese genocide. Many of the conflicts in Africa, such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Sierra Leon, Nigeria and Kenya demonstrate the dangers of exclusivist

traditional mentality. Some conflicts take on a tribal character, others a religious one, and still others some narrow and crude form of nationalism. Sexism and homophobia qualify as exclusivist traditionalist consciousness for they involve focusing on maintaining the values and practices of the past with little consideration of whether those practices help the expansion of human choices and capacities.

People who take up exclusivist mentalities are self-referential in the sense that they try to refer only to themselves. They struggle to recognize the humanity of others, especially those who do not belong to their culture, ethnic group, race, nation or religion. Thus exclusivism is deeply selfish in the sense that it is closely linked to monopoly. Hence, traditionalism is an attempt to claim monopoly of virtue, and other material and abstract social goods for one's race, tribe, or religion. It contrasts to more inclusive sensibilities which recognize all humans as legitimate citizens of the world who have moral claims to the gifts of the earth. Exclusivist mentalities attempt self-referential self-definitions which exclude identifying with others. Thus just as a selfish person is one who tries to exclude others from goods and services he wants to enjoy alone, a sexist tries to exclude members of the opposite sex from power and other normal joys of life. Racists and tribalists try to privilege their own races and tribes.

In this paper, I also reject simplistic modernist approaches, especially those which operate in a consumerist society as nihilistic and unhelpful to attempts to build sustainable human development.

AUTHENTIC TRADITIONS

There is need to create authentic African traditions capable of "nurturing collective and critical consciousness, moral commitment, and courageous engagement." (West, 1993:69) Authentic African traditions are those that encourage African self-confidence while "never losing sight of the humanity of others" (West, 1993:5) even as we struggle against them. Their focus is in facilitating the growth of African individuals in all their various dimensions, physical, psychological, intellectual, emotional, social and cultural. Yet these individuals develop always in solidarity with others. The focus of African traditions is not simply to repeat the practices of some idealized past society or to pretend "having a monopoly on virtue or insight". (West, 1993:4) At a personal level, mature individuals who have developed not only physically but also emotionally, intellectually and morally will not embrace selfish individualism or pretend "having a monopoly of virtue".

Therefore, authentic African traditions should not restrict what Africans do, but facilitate their growth as individual human persons in solidarity with one another and in solidarity with other human beings. Distinctions within the Africans and between Africans and other peoples should be used only to help the growth of the human family to be more easy

and effective. We can learn from the spirit of the Olympic Games where people come from different nations to compete against one another in the spirit of solidarity. The fact that a person originally Kenyan or Nigerian can run for a country like Qatar or Italy is a sign that the national distinctions are not understood in essentialist exclusivist ways. That Kirsty Coventry and Lewis Banda can represent Zimbabwe, win medals for her country and be recognized as authentically Zimbabwean would really be wonderful.

The Limits of Local Perceptions and Practices

An understanding of the role played by culturally generated self-descriptions, conceptions of the good, systems of desire and ways of conceptualizing social reality is important in appreciating why most development programmes which have been enthusiastically accepted by African people, have not been implemented on a day-to-day basis, by the very people who have embraced them. In the Zimbabwean situation, for example, the government has embarked on the Land Reform Programme whose necessity has been widely recognized. Yet many participants in its implementation have not been able to allow the goals of the programme to be achieved. The idea of the Land Reform Programme is to give access to all people who need land and those who will be able to help the development of Zimbabwe as a nation-state in order to “achieve peace and stability...address issues of equity...ameliorating poverty ...improve agricultural productivity” (Masiwa M., and Chipungu, 2004:1). It is reported that many ruling party and government officials have acquired multiple farms for themselves, their friends and relatives at the expense of those who really need them and those who could really make a positive difference in agricultural production and national development. In fact, many ordinary people who have publicly criticized the manner the Fast Track Land Reform Programme has been handled by the Zimbabwean government, have at the same time joined the chaotic and violent stampede for the land, making contacts with the ZANU PF structures, paying graft and pushing others from pieces of land they have occupied. Some are now critical of the Fast Track programme because they have failed to get what they thought they would get. The problems of the Fast-Track programme emanates from a culture of selfishness that has developed among all of us. Those we condemn as corrupt are the ones that have succeeded ahead of us, to acquire what we have all aspired to achieve.

The big question that needs to be asked in this context is this, “Why do people undermine, on a day-to-day basis, the fundamental values they morally accept and believe in?” The answer to this question depends on assessing the limits of local self-perceptions, systems of desire, conceptions of the good life and the cultural structures and practices that inform how people behave on a day-to-day basis. I focus on how local perceptions and practices can undermine the values of development and peacebuilding. This essay is an instance of what Cornel West (1993:5) calls

“keeping track of human hypocrisy”. By tracking hypocrisy, he means “accepting boldly, and defiantly, the gap between principles and practice, between promise and performance, between rhetoric and reality.” (Ibid)

In the case of the Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme, a constellation of several local cultural practices or traditions have come together to prevent an open, transparent, democratic process that results in a just redistribution of land that respects the rights of all affected. First, some strategies which were developed and used during the war of liberation are now being used in the context of the land reform. This includes the practice of deliberately ignoring and undermining existing laws and procedures. This is what happened in the land invasions. There also was the politicization and militarization of the whole process resulting in the de-legitimization of legal procedures and the undermining of respect for human life and dignity. Secondly, the rhetoric of a nativist version of Afrocentrism which developed as a counterpoint to White settler racism and imperialism combined with some traditions developed as a result of the experience of the liberation war to deny the legitimacy of whites especially the former commercial farmers to automatically to claim Zimbabwean citizenship and to own land in Zimbabwe. Thirdly, white *larger* mentality came into play as some whites refused to see the limits of the Apartheid traditions of their ancestors and attempted to reconstruct their social and economic forms in an attempt to continue the traditions of racism and white supremacy. Fourthly, the traditions of tribalism and narrow nationalism were invoked to justify ignoring the plight of former farm workers whose ancestors had come to Southern Rhodesia from Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique as migrant workers. This resulted in the de-legitimization of their automatic citizenship despite the sterling contributions they had made to Zimbabwe even while being exploited and ridiculed and despite the Pan-Africanist rhetoric of the Zimbabwean government. Fifthly, modern consumerist traditions of the black middle-class ignited the tendencies to acquire multiple farms even by people who did not have an interest or ability to farm. The principle of owning land for the sake of ownership became more important than the attempt to facilitate the growth of Zimbabweans in relation to each other.

These negative cultural practices or traditions and more, overpowered some local morally and religiously inspired traditions that could have been used to direct the Land Reform Programme in a just, transparent and more humane way. Because of this, the publicly espoused goals of the Reform Programme as a way of achieving peace and stability were not realized. Zimbabwe, like any other society, has the relevant moral tools to solve the “land issue” in a just and humane manner and yet it has failed to do so because of the dominance of exclusivist mentalities and strategies. The local traditions of hospitality, charity, and communitarianism could have been appealed to without compromising the sense of justice which inspired people to go to war in the first place. Of course, for many people, it is precisely these open, kind and humane aspects

of African culture that allowed Europeans to abuse the hospitality of the Africans. Yet, no flourishing culture can be based on suspicion, hate and violence. People may liberate themselves using guns, but guns cannot be made the symbols of their liberation.

Addressing HIV and AIDS Programmes

Many campaigners for human rights undermine the very values and rights they fight for. This is clearly demonstrated in the HIV and AIDS programmes where many of those who lead campaigns against the spread of HIV and AIDS have themselves been caught up in what they preach against. Therefore, they have not themselves been spared by the pandemic. Tom Masland (*Newsweek*, December 15, 2003:40) reports that, an aggressive campaign was launched to distribute condoms as a way of fighting the pandemic in township beer halls of Botswana.

The audience of mostly men accepted the pink packs of condoms the troupe handed out, but once the choir departed, many scoffed at the message. "I don't believe it," said Charles Mauro, 49, a slaughterhouse worker. "I'm just a boy who lives from day to day." His friend, carpenter Innocent Fail, 45, said he suspects outsiders promote condoms use to keep the population low. "My father didn't use this -- and I have four children because I didn't," he said. (Masland, 2003:40)

Masland goes on to describe how in 2001 the president of Botswana, Festus Mogae launched the free antiretroviral drugs programme to all who needed them. The government estimated that 330,000 people were carriers of the disease and at that time 20,000 people already needed the therapy. The government assumed "that people would be motivated to learn their HIV status once lifesaving drugs were available free of charge." (Ibid., 40) The government also promoted voluntary testing and counseling to influence behaviour. President Mogae and officials of his government took the HIV test. But in 2003, only 9,000 people were on drug therapy and fewer than 65,000 had taken the test. Masland reports that "Many people say they couldn't live with the knowledge that they carry the virus." And yet little effort has been directed towards addressing the local cultural belief systems and self conceptions which inform the behaviour of the local people of Botswana. Instead, others have suggested mandatory testing and the banning of beer for 5 years. The key though is in addressing the rhetoric of local cultures. This point is summarized by Mercedes Sayagues (*Newsweek*, December 15, 2003:41) who writes,

Most Africans know what to say when asked about AIDS.
HIV causes AIDS. Abstinence, fidelity and condoms

prevent it. Western-style campaigns have accomplished that much. So why aren't the prevalence rates plummeting? Because deep down, people don't fully believe it's that simple. They may hold on to one belief system by day and another at night. "Someone did witchcraft on me and my eldest son got polio," says Salim Mohamed Said, a dhow captain on the Kenyan island of Lamu. He knows polio is a disease, and he also believes in witchcraft. (Sayagues, 2003:41)

Sayagues reports on how in many African countries people believe that having sex with a menstruating woman brings disease including AIDS. "It follows that postmenopausal and very young women are safe." (Ibid.) In some places, it is believed that "Widows must be cleansed by having sex with a brother-in-law or healer." (Ibid., 41) He goes on to say that "In rural Malawi, a Red Cross study found most women believe sexual pleasure depends on direct contact with semen," (Ibid., 41) and that "In northern Mozambique, teenage girls think that they can't get pregnant by having sex only once with a partner." (Ibid., 41)

There is no doubt that the people in Africa would like HIV and AIDS to be wiped out from the continent. They would also like to help in the fight against the disease. Yet on a day to day bases, their behaviour continues to achieve the very opposite of what they want. It is amazing how little attention has been put towards addressing the self perceptions, systems of desire and conceptions of the good life which motivate Africans and make it difficult for them to reorient themselves towards living, on a day to day basis, lives that help to stop the spread of HIV and AIDS. For as long as the local systems of desire are not addressed, attempting to implement HIV and AIDS programmes will continue to be like attempting to talk to a child glued to the television.

MODERN GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP VERSUS LOCAL SELF-UNDERSTANDINGS

Many governments, human rights activist and non-governmental organizations who have been fighting for social equality have been the first to accept, institute and sustain salaries, labour practices and consumption patterns which have helped to deepen, not lessen, social inequalities. Some have also helped to destroy the environment. It is ironic that in most HIPC countries NGOs are characterized by possession of huge and expensive cars and technological gadgets. Their salary budgets are proportionally larger than the actual aid which reaches the needy. Some African leaders who preside over some of the poorest nations in the world have been identified as among the richest individuals in the world, people like Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Daniel Arapi Moi of Kenya have been cited in this regard. Speaking of consumption patterns in most nation states,

Oswaldo de Rivero (2001:30) points out that “These consumption patterns are very difficult to change, since to do so would create the risk of great social turmoil: high-income citizens would not wish to relinquish their high living standards and the poor would not like to give up their dream of some day living like the rich.” This statement shows that people may intellectually accept the universal moral values of democracy, human rights, justice and peace, yet on a day-to-day basis they work according to locally manufactured motivating self-perceptions, systems of desire and cultural traditions. The goal is to develop appropriate democratic cultures and systems of desire that will enable people to behave appropriately on a day to day basis. Thomas Bridges makes this point when he says that,

The form of political association known as liberal democracy makes extraordinary cultural demands on those who live under it. In a liberal democracy, the state is committed to treat all citizens as individuals and to treat all individuals equally. But, in a developmental sense, human beings are never free and equal individuals *first*. Free and equal individuals (i.e., human beings who effectively regard themselves as such, and behave accordingly) are made, rather than found. They are produced through the influence of a special kind of political culture. Human beings (in a developmental sense) first are members of families and communities distinguished by ethnic, class, and religious cultural perspectives. Ethnic, class, and religious communities shape human desire and self-understanding in accordance with some more or less coherent world view or concept of the good life. As such, they introduce values and standards of conduct that establish a system of “preferences” – differentials of rank, status, and relative worth. Human beings whose self-understanding is shaped by these standards identify themselves and one another in terms of particular community membership and local ranking systems. In short, the defining attribute of liberal citizenship – free and equal individuality – is alien to the perspectives that most immediately shape human life. (Bridges, 1994:1-2)

It turns out then, that there is a wide gap between the perspective of modern liberal citizenship which underlies the dominant conception of the modern nation-state and that of particular cultural traditions – between the perspective that is assumed by most modern development programmes and peace building efforts and that of particularistic cultural communities. According to Bridges, “the perspectives that most immediately shape human life” and human desires are particularistic in that they emanate from and are shaped by the values of local families and communities which do

not assume the freedom and equality of all human beings as is required by the modern nation-state. Rather their value systems, standards of conduct, systems of desire and self-perceptions are shaped by various local ethnic, gender, class, age, and religious cultural perspectives. These locally developed self-understandings and systems of desire tend to support various forms of inequalities, prejudices and phobias along sexist, racist, tribalist and class lines. Possibilities for finding local traditions which are capable of negating these inequalities and prejudices are always there, but tend to be closed by traditionalist ways of looking at things.

Modern development programmes and peace building efforts, on the other hand, assume the existence of free and equal world citizens. Some of these programmes attempt to inculcate the cultural and political traditions of universal citizenship which are appropriate, not only to modern liberal democracy, but also to modern development and peace building programmes. Thus effective implementers of such programmes must be people who have been schooled in and have acquired the “countervailing culture” of modern universal citizenship. This is the simple but powerful idea that all human beings are members of one human family who should take care of each other. Racism, tribalism and sexism are attempts to create barriers between members of the human family. Recognition of global citizenship explains why people in America may be interested to fight the spread of HIV and AIDS in the SADC region and why European governments and NGOs may be committed to fighting poverty in Africa. It is also why Africans may legitimately criticize the mistreatment of prisoners by Americans, racism in Europe, violence in the Middle East and exploitation of workers in China. However, most development and peace building programmes fail because their goals are not accompanied by appropriate inclusive traditions and therefore are not lived on a day-to-day basis. Neither are they implemented by people oriented, on a day-to-day basis, towards the recognition of universal citizenship.

In African modernity, as in other modern states, most people have not fully acquired and internalized the culture of modern universal citizenship. Neither do many of them desire to do so especially in the postmodern context where many have misunderstood the dominant sensibility which celebrates diversity. To the extent that individuals have their desires and self-perceptions shaped by “local ranking systems” and to the extent that they either refuse or are unable to take up, on a day-to-day basis, a culture that treats every human person as free and equal, to that extent they will fail to fulfill the goals of genuine development and peace building programmes. While the celebration of diversity is desirable, it must be directed by a universal respect for all humans in all their various capacities and capabilities and the ultimate desire to facilitate the growth and flourishing of all.

It is this condition which explains why most projects which attempt to be all inclusive, actually end up achieving the opposite. Most African liberation movements, for example, have been limited in this regard. Many

of them have ended up facilitating the fulfillment of the desires of just a few leaders at the expense of, and excluding, the rest of the population. The self-descriptions that people accept at a moral level and are assumed by most development programmes, are not the identities that people take up on a day-to-day basis. While most people may generally accept the need to act on moral grounds, they may however, act on a day-to-day basis from the anger, envy, or hatred they may feel about people from a different race, gender, religion, ethnic group or class. Many public officers recognize that to work for public office requires the treatment of everyone equally and impartially, yet on a day-to-day basis, many public officers use their offices as personal resources to satisfy their personal and family needs and other self-serving ambitions.

Development programmes assume the equality of all human beings and the universality of human rights. Yet, on a day-to-day basis, people grow up in contexts of inequalities and various forms of injustices and cultural self-perceptions. This is true of ordinary people, politicians, social entrepreneurs and development workers. Thus, when development programmes and peacebuilding efforts are led by people who have not developed personal virtues and political and cultural practices which are appropriate to development and peacebuilding, chances of success are slim. Yet no society is incapable of learning these virtues. In order to appreciate the kind of mentality that is inclusive and supportive of the cultures of global citizenship, we need to look at the concepts of development and peace building.

WHAT DEVELOPMENT IS

Pope Paul VI in his Encyclical *The Development of Peoples*, wrote that, "Development cannot be limited to economic growth. In order to be authentic, it must be complete and integral; that is, it has to promote the good of every man and of the whole man." He understood development as human development. Pope John Paul II confirmed this position in his Encyclical, *Social Concern* when he wrote that, "True development *cannot* consist in the simple accumulation of wealth and in the greater availability of goods and services, if this is gained at the expense of the development of the masses, and without due consideration for the social, cultural and spiritual dimensions of the human being." (1988:6) Amartya Sen has helped to popularize development as human development. He understands development in terms of what happens to human beings. His work has greatly influenced the United Nations Development Programme's reports. For instance, the *Human Development Report 2000* defines human development in the following terms:

Human development is about people, about expanding their choices to lead lives they value. Economic growth, increased international trade and investment, technological

advance – all are very important. But they are means, not ends. Whether they contribute to human development in the 21st century will depend on whether they help expand people's choices, whether they help create an environment for people to develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives. (*Human Development Report 2000:13*)

Thus development is about allowing and facilitating the growth or flourishing of human beings. Human beings must grow physically, intellectually, emotionally, psychologically, socially and morally. They grow as individuals and also as communities, societies and the as the whole human family. To provide the environment for such human growth, economic, political, social and technological structures, processes and cultures are invented. Thus health care systems, food, shelter and clothing-producing systems, sport and leisure facilities are meant to help the physical growth of human beings. Educational institutions and the mass media are to develop the intellectual capacities of humans. Leaders who understand development in these terms will appreciate that an authentically flourishing society is also a just and peaceful one. For, a society in which members have developed intellectually, emotionally and morally must be a society in which human relationships are based on self-respect and respect for every one. Every person in a morally developed society is treated by everyone else as free and intelligent.

Fundamental to enlarging human choices is building human capabilities: the range of things that people can do or be. The most basic capabilities for human development are leading a long and healthy life, being educated, having access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living and being able to participate in the life of one's community. (*Human Development Report 2000:13*)

Truly Peaceful Society

Many people think that peace exists when there is no war. Yet a situation where there is no war can be characterized by resentments, anger, hatred, oppression, exploitation and disagreements. All these not only have the potential to igniter war, they are also, in themselves expressions of forms of war – cold wars. Although there may be no open war, people may be preparing for war. As the Vatican Council noted in 1965,

Peace is more than the absence of war: it cannot be reduced to the maintenance of a balance of power between opposing forces nor does it arise out of despotic dominion.

(Vatican Council II, *Church in the Modern World*, 1965:986)

A truly peaceful society is one in which people go beyond just tolerating one another to positively treating each other as human beings and facilitating each other's growth and fulfillment so that there is no reason for anybody to want to fight.

Peace cannot be obtained on earth unless the welfare of man is safeguarded and people freely and trustingly share with one another the riches of their minds and their talents. A firm determination to respect the dignity of other men and other peoples along with the deliberate practice of fraternal love are absolutely necessary for the achievement of peace. Accordingly, peace is also the fruit of love, for love goes beyond what justice can insure. (Vatican II, *Church in the Modern World*, 1965:987)

This understanding of peace is the reason why Pope Paul VI (1990:36) in his Encyclical, *The Development of the Peoples*, asserted that "Development Is the New Name for Peace." (Last Section of Part II) Thus a truly peaceful society is one in which the life and dignity of every human being is guaranteed and every member acts in solidarity with others. It is a society which takes care of those marginalised and looks after the environment for the benefit of present and future generations. In short, it is a society in which the common good has been achieved.

Culture, Development and Peace Building

Healthy traditions are those which recognize that true peace can be built only through genuine human development. In fact, true personal and social peace is one that results from human personal and social development. Unless there is true and balanced physical, intellectual, emotional, psychological and moral human development, there cannot be genuine peace. Thus to build peace is to build human beings in all their various aspects and capabilities and to build a society which facilitates their growth and fulfillment. Thus the construction of economic, political, technological and social structures, systems, processes, and institutions which facilitate human growth is not only development, but the work of building peace. Yet the most important aspect of development and peace building is the cultivation of the human persons themselves and the relationships between them. This takes the form of encouraging appropriate virtues and discouraging vices. The encouraging of ways of thinking, acting and organizing systems of desire which produce peaceful societies is what we are calling peace building. It is the encouragement of ways of living and traditions – that is, cultures of human development – that result in peaceful

existence. Culture, therefore, is what we get when there is true development. Reflexively, culture is also what cultivates development and builds peace.

When development is defined in terms of the expansion of human choices and capabilities, we can see clearly how the traditionalist position is retrogressive as it tries to freeze “the traditional” in order to use it as an ideal to follow. As the *Human Development Report 2004* demonstrates:

Cultural liberty is about expanding individual choices, not about preserving values and practices as an end in itself with blind allegiance to tradition.

Culture is not a frozen set of values and practices. It is constantly recreated as people question, adapt and redefine their values and practices to changing realities and exchanges of ideas. (*Human Development Report, 2004:4*)

Self-Consciousness in Modern Society and the Construction of the Traditional

Modern societies generally are characterized by experiences of reflexive self-construction and self-reconstruction both at social and personal levels, and at local and global levels. These processes are based on radical experiences of self-consciousness that are a major self-identifying characteristic of modernity as a social form of life. From the point of view of modernity, this is in contrast to traditionalist consciousness. For modernity, traditionalist societies assume the obviousness of their identities and the respective sources of those identities. There, we are told, identities are taken as given and natural. I do not think that traditional identity formation and reconstruction is as simple and straightforward as modern ideologists and indeed contemporary traditionalists want us to believe. Self-reflective identity construction was a complex process in the so-called traditional social setting. It always is. However, to demonstrate the complexity of traditional identity-formation is not my aim in this essay. I shall focus on the modern understanding of self-construction in the context of the consumer culture in African modernity.

With the dominance of the modern market economy in Africa, more and more Africans are taking up what has been described as a modern consciousness and its reactionary counterpart – African traditionalist consciousness. This involves conscious and unconscious self-construction, re-construction. This is done largely through a peculiar construction of narratives about the self, the Other and about reality in general. In this process of narrative construction, the focus is more and more with present and future sources of the self rather than the apparent traditionalist dependence on the frozen past. The limits of modern self-consciousness and self-construction must be assessed in the context of consumer culture as the

context within which modern moral selves are built and destroyed. There are dangers to peace building and the human development of certain forms of modernist consciousness and certain forms of traditionalist consciousness. Traditionalist consciousness is an aspect of modern traditions in the same way that tribalism and nationalism are off springs of modernity and to the extent that one is modern, one shares the strengths and weaknesses of modern self-consciousness.

AFRICAN TRADITIONS

Living traditions as opposed to frozen ones, are those in which humans focus on expanding their choices and capacities more than on attempting to follow what their ancestors did. There are today vital African traditions which are alive in the sense that the people there are working towards their own development as individuals and as societies using resources made possible by their ancestors. However, they are not afraid to invent new values that give meaning and hope to their children. They are comfortable with themselves and with borrowing from others and living side-by-side with other traditions. Many authentic Africans today will comfortably plug into the human rights, development and peace building discourses and traditions. Africans know that they construct their traditions even as they try to follow them. In doing so, they worry about creating abilities “to transmit meaning, value, purpose, dignity, decency to children” (West, 1993:16) Yet there is no guarantee in these living traditions that genuine human development and peace building will occur. It depends on what choices are made by people living in the really existing traditions. Efforts have to be made to encourage the construction of social structures, economic systems, and political processes that facilitate the growth of human capacities, freedom and the fulfillment of human needs. Given the freedom and equality of all humans, there will always be serious debates on what constitutes genuine human growth and fulfillment. But as long the debates recognize the desirability of universal citizenship and respect the lives and dignity of all humans, human development and therefore peace will be assured.

African Traditionalists

“African traditionalists” insist that they *have* to live their own traditions for no other reason except that they are theirs. But they define these traditions narrowly and what makes them narrow is the way they are located in some distant past historical period, usually before colonialism. This distancing of the “traditional society” creates opportunities for idealizing it. The narrowing of traditions through their idealization creates possibilities of exclusion and prepares the ground for conflict. But it is not only a distant “traditional society” that is capable of idealization. Patriarchal societies idealize male authority, just as racism in the context of African

modernity has done with white superiority. Thus traditionalists can be racist and sexist. However I will talk more about the idealization of the “traditional society” in some distant past.

When the origin of an African nation-state is located in some distant pre-colonial African kingdom, it tends to exclude others who legitimately belong to it. This is demonstrated by Stan Mudenge’s attempt, in his award winning history book, to locate the origin of Zimbabwe in what he calls “the inner core of the Shona historical experience”:

Present Zimbabwe, therefore, is not merely a geographical expression created by imperialism during the nineteenth century. It is a reality that has existed for centuries, with a language, a culture and a “world view” of its own, representing the inner core of the Shona historical experience. Today’s ...Zimbabweans have, both materially and culturally, much to build and not a little to build upon. (Mudenge, 1988:364)

I have asserted elsewhere that “This way of understanding Zimbabwe excludes many people as not being part of the “inner core” of the nation. Non-Shonas become secondary citizens who depend on their allegiance to the Shona historical experience for their membership of the nation” (Kaulemu, 2004:82) When nation building efforts and national development programmes are built on assumptions of this kind of history, possibilities for the development of authoritarian rule, war and civil strife resulting from resistance to the authoritarianism, cannot be ruled out. For example, many people in Matabeleland, especially those who see themselves as Ndebele, feel that the Zimbabwean government marginalizes their region. These sentiments were expressed in the context of the disturbances which occurred in the region in the mid-1980s and also in the context of the Zambezi Water Project which was started to harness water from the Zambezi River for the benefit of Matabeleland. It was felt that the project, and indeed a number of others, did not receive from government the priority they deserve and that they might have been supported more had they been Mashonaland based projects. In making this point, I do not rule out the possibility of some people who characterize themselves as Ndebele thinking in dangerously traditionalist ways. The new ZAPU party has demonstrated this tribalist mentality.

In most African countries, once the African traditional societies are located in the past, prior to the colonial period, there is a tendency to undermine and dismiss the nation-state as colonial. Hence, African traditionalists tend to criticize colonial administration for arbitrarily lumping them together with other *tribes* which are alien to them. When they take this view, they tend to argue for secession from the nation state and for political independence. Eritrea and the Saharawi Democratic Republic have successfully argued for such secession. Some political movements in

Zanzibar, the South of Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria have attempted to secede from the colonial nation state. Other movements like the Zulu Inkatha in South Africa and ZAPU 2000 in Matabeleland in Zimbabwe have not yet been successful in this endeavour.

Sometimes one ethno-cultural group will try to claim the whole nation-state for themselves and subjugate the other groups. Many wars in Africa have been a result of conflicts between communo-cultural groups which have been forced into forming nation-states with other groups. Thus a traditionalist approach to national identity, which assumes some form of cultural determinism, tends to undermine prospect for peaceful co-existence of communo-cultural groups. As the *Human Development Report 2004* points out,

Theories of cultural determinism deserve critical assessment since they have dangerous policy implications. They can fuel support for nationalistic policies that denigrate or oppress “inferior” culture argued to in the way of national unity, democracy and development. Such attacks on cultural values would fuel violent reactions that could feed tensions both within and between nations. (*Human Development Report, 2004:5*)

Traditionalist and Modernist Africans

The main difference between contemporary traditionalist Africans and modernist African people is that the former consider knowledge of themselves to be knowledge of what is *naturally* given. And they think positively about traditional knowledge of themselves. To be a traditionalist is to feel strongly about the need to live and encourage others to live whatever one understands as ‘traditional’ life. But this is done without a desire to proselytize; membership in tribal groups is often understood to be closed. African modernists, on the other hand, think that Africans used to think in ‘traditional’ ways which are no longer adequate and relevant for people living in modern societies. This means that African modernists also accept the idea of a distanced pre-colonial ‘traditional’ society. Thus African traditionalists and African modernists share the belief in the existence of a distanced, idealised African traditional society which has unique characteristics. The people of this unique society are supposed to have unique epistemology and metaphysics. The difference between traditionalists and modernists, however, is that the former take a positive view of the traditional society and the later a negative one.

I do not think that “traditional” Africans were or are necessarily traditionalist in the narrow exclusivist sense explained. Contemporary traditionalists, however, struggle to convince us that their knowledge of life and of themselves and others is the same objective knowledge that “traditional” Africans had. They never give the impression that our

ancestors struggled with determining what could count as knowledge. They do not give the impression that “traditional” Africans went through, and still go through, complex processes of narrative construction of their selves. Contemporary African traditionalists consider knowledge to be objective, unproblematic and that they possess it. For example, when not only feel superior to others but seriously believe that they really are so. They deny their contribution in the construction of social perceptions and their influence on the class, *tribe* and other social divisions that characterise their society. They often define their origin completely in terms of what they see as powerful external forces or beings like God, Nature, Culture, and Ancestral Spirits. When they experience problems, they accept that these may be caused by spirits who may be responding to the sins of their parents and grandparents. For example, a young woman may explain her failure to attract a young man who is prepared to marry her in terms of the evils that members of her family might have committed against the ancestral spirits. Such as murder. This kind of reasoning is also used by young men who fail to get jobs or politicians who loose in elections and as we have seen by men who are infected by HIV or suffer from AIDS. Many of them go through cleansing ceremonies in attempts to absolve themselves from the sins of their respective *natural* histories.

The concept of a restricted *African traditional society* is a creation of modernity. It reflects more of modernity’s self-image than the character of the postulated traditional society. (Kaulem, 1999) The ‘traditional’ is a creation of modernity and that of ‘traditional Africa’ of Western modernity. However, Africans have to be in complicity with these constructions in order for them to be established and sustained. Paradoxically, to be a contemporary African traditionalist is in some sense to accept the modernist interpretation of African tradition. In the context of colonial Africa, the so-called African customary laws were constructed by modernising colonial forces. The act of codifying these laws which was taken up by the colonial powers was an act that helped to determine the character of the so-called African traditions. Codifying the laws was a process which made rigid what had been more fluid. The process of codification must have closed some alternatives and choices that had been available to the people who lived these traditions. But this process was made complex by the fact that it also opened up new possibilities and choices. For example, it was in the interests of some Africans, especially men, petty bourgeois intellectuals, and chiefs to claim that these customary laws were their own. Thus, what have often been paraded as “African traditions” were actually created by colonial masters in collaboration with many Africans who benefited from the “invention of traditions”.

However, people living in African modernity can have a traditionalist mentality and they can operate as if they were living in an imaginary *traditional African society*, or at least live according to values they attribute to a ‘traditional’ society. It is this experience that I aim to characterise when I talk of African traditionalist consciousness. It is a

consciousness that people living in contemporary African modernity can self-reflexively choose to have. But it is a consciousness that never existed as such in any corresponding static 'traditional society'. It is a constructed consciousness that is presented as *natural*.

To have a traditionalist consciousness is to assume that one's identity does not, in any way, depend on one's decisions. Identities, in traditionalist consciousness are conceptualized as things that are discovered rather than constructed, given or inherited rather than made. It is assumed that if one is born a woman, a Shona, Chewa, Ndebele, Zulu, Tutsi or a White person, then they will always be such. The tribal, national, and racial categories are understood to be natural kinds, and not social constructions. Natural kinds never change their essences without changing their identities. Furthermore, what is natural is assumed to be good. To change *natural* identity or what is naturally given is regarded as evil, hence the conservatism of the traditionalist perspective. To say that traditionalism is conservative is not to suggest that it is by that count bad. It is good to conserve what is good. However, when we look at the history of African traditionalists, we see that they have tended to be too restrictive in what they count as morally legitimate human activity. Their conservatism has tended to be expressed in form of tribalism, racism, sexism, authoritarianism and xenophobia. It is in this sense that locally constructed systems of desire and particularist cultural practices fall far short of embracing a moral perspective demanded by universal citizenship.

Definitions of individual and social selves in African traditionalist consciousness, tend to gravitate towards essentialism. Essentialism in identity is the idea that there are essential qualities without which a person ceases to be who he or she is and a group of people ceases to be what it is. For example, essentialism assumes that all Shona people share a group of qualities which are common only to the Shona and which non-Shona do not have. Non-Shona people are seen as non-Shona precisely because they do not share this list of essential Shona qualities. Debate always ensues when it comes to identifying what that list of qualities is. A lot has been written on these sources of essence. I focus on blood as a source of identity. Individuals who take up a traditionalist consciousness often assume that their identities are given. A traditionalist child who discovers that step-parents who have taken care of him are not his biological parents, will feel it imperative for him to look for his *true* parents and could even abandon his adopted parents. *True* relations, in traditionalist consciousness, are determined by 'natural' *blood* relations and not by human choices. This is because a traditionalist believes that blood relations are the most important relations one has in terms of one's identity. These are considered as overriding all other relations one can enter into. The idea is that blood relations are always more important than the relations that one can enter into through agreements and contracts. This includes relationships such as friendship, marriage, and those at school and the work place. It is assumed that friendships, marriage, profession, and urban residence, do not really

give anyone an authentic identity. Or at least, that all these other relationships should be subordinated to the blood relations. Accordingly, my father should be more important to me than my mother, my brother more important than my wife and my son should be more important to me than my wife. On social and political levels, the traditionalist mentality is incapable of placing the nation-state as more important than the ethnic groups people feel they belong to. When nation-states are understood as constructs or based on agreements, such as those of the Berlin Conference, traditionalists see no reason for affording them more moral authority than the *tribe* they belong to.

This is a challenge to modernity given that modernity has a tendency of wanting to create identity on the basis of conscious decisions and agreements. In fact most African nation-states are based on forms of agreement. This happens at the level of personal self-creation as well as at a higher social level. On a personal level, people of modernist mentality feel that they can make of themselves what they want to be. Physically, people have begun to want to determine how they look and what experiences mold them. In extreme cases, sex changes, face-lifts, and psychotherapy are being used as tools for self-creation and self-recreation. Most relationships, in modernity, have been turned into *pure* relationships that have to be renewed constantly. Parents can no longer make assumptions about their relationships with their children. On a social level, modernists feel that they can create the world they want to live in. They can create nation-states, regional groupings like the African Union and the Southern African Development Community on the basis of agreements. These agreements are seen as so important that they can overtake natural relationships. On a personal level, my marriage to someone from a different communo-cultural group, can grow into a stronger relationship than that between me and my brothers and sisters. In politics, one-party states, life-long leaders and permanent leadership are being questioned and abolished. Thus the position taken by the African modernist is a slippery slope. It is very corrosive as it constantly reviews and undermines standing identities and relationships. The constant review of identities and relationships demanded by modernity threatens to create a self-destructive nihilistic society devoid of constant values and moral selves capable of suggesting how to proceed and meet challenges in life. Sustainable conceptions of the good life and good relationships are threatened.

Traditionalizing Modern Relationships

This explains why African traditionalists do not think that the nation-state should be explained in terms of contract theory. They feel that the foundation of a modern nation state must be more fundamental, deeper and more permanent than a human agreement. So, sometimes Africans make reference to tribe or race as the foundation of the nation state. This is why many Africanists have problems in accepting that white people can

belong to African nation states. Chiluba tried to prove that despite Kaunda having identified himself with Zambia so much that he fought for it and even helped to create it, he did not belong to it. Presumably because there is some essential quality that Kaunda did not share with the *true* Zambians. Stan Mudenge marginalizes all those people who do not describe themselves as part of the Shona core. According to this kind of traditionalist consciousness, Joshua Nkomo was less of a Zimbabwean than Simon Muzenda.

For a traditionalist, a wife, a husband, friend, or employer, remains an alien. This is expressed in the Shona expression, “*Mukadzi mutorwa*” (A wife is an alien.) The moral implication of this is that a man is supposed to belong to and therefore must trust his blood relatives more than his wife. In most traditionalist families, the *dare* or family court is very exclusive. Even in-laws are not considered participants even though decisions made by these family courts will affect the in-laws in fundamental ways. The same is true of the woman. She is encouraged to think of her blood relations as always more important to her than her husband, friends and any contract she can make with non-relatives. She is discouraged from looking at her home with her husband as her *true* home. She must always remember *where she came from* as her true home. Even if she feels estranged from her relatives, she is reminded that “*ukama haugwezwi*” (blood relationships cannot be washed away) The *true* identity of a traditionalist is never determined by his or her profession, residence, marriage or any voluntary associations, relations or organisations he or she might decide to join or enter into.

African traditionalists who define themselves as members of natural kinds, such as tribes, nations and races, tend to condemn themselves to those natural kinds. Like traditionalist members of families, they do not see how they could enter into more important relationships than those they have with members of their tribes, nations and races. Hence for as long as the traditionalist mentality is widespread in Africa, it will always be difficult to create nation-states in which different ethnic groups and races trust each other and live in peaceful co-existence as is required by the social and political morality of universal citizenship. It is true that, “There is little empirical evidence that cultural differences and clashes over values are in themselves a cause of violent conflict.” (*Human Development Report, 2004:3*) However, when cultural differences are understood in traditionalist ways, the tendency towards violent conflict is enhanced.

Many traditionalist Africans, living in the modern world, live a sadly paradoxical life. The paradox is emphasized by the fact that most people living in modern society spend most of their time away from their relatives. When they get married, they usually go to live separately from their *traditional* homes. Schools, workplaces and places of leisure are located away from their blood relatives. Many people living in a globalised modern world live away from members of their tribes, nations and races. Thus the paradox is that traditionalist Africans are supposed to trust and be

emotionally close to the people they do not live with and be distant and even suspicious of those they do live with. They are supposed to have more respect and concern for the people who do not know their day-to-day likes, dislikes, worries and achievements than those who share their life experiences on a day-to-day basis.

In development terms, African traditionalists do not fully trust the relationships they create with the communities they work with. Work relationships, for them, cannot override their family and tribal affiliations. Hence the development worker can work with different communities and yet fail to develop a sense of respect for those communities. Sometimes they even remain as tribalist as they always have been. I know of missionaries who, in spite of their having left Europe, gone through a long and intense period of training, accepted the Gospel message of love for all human beings and committed all their working life to Africa, still remained racist. In Rwanda, a number of members of the church were involved in, or supported, acts of tribal cleansing. There are those doctors who do not treat their patients as humans and teachers who abuse their students. I referred, above, to those HIV/AIDS counselors who do not follow their own advice and development workers who are employed to reduce poverty, improve our relationship to the environment and stimulate urban and rural development, yet whose own consumption patterns and personal conduct undermine their professional goals.

Relations in modernity, however, tend to be based on direct individual experiences. This is why marriages are based on intimacy and not routinized social conduct. As Giddens points out, relationships in modernity are characteristically “pure relationships”. Intimate bonds between two human beings in a pure relationship are radically challenging. They demand that each person in the relationship be autonomous. This demands that a participant in such a relationship cannot take the other or the relationship for granted. Any attempt to capture the relationship in some formula is problematic. For example, in modernity, the fact that a woman is in a romantic relationship with a man does not mean that the woman is always sexually available for the man. Or the other way round. Similarly, the formula that the man must always financially take care of the woman is obsolete. In a pure relationship, everything is always negotiated. This, indeed is a very radical idea for it means that at any time, either party in the relationship can opt out either temporarily or permanently. At any one time, any transaction between the two must be negotiated. The idea of a lifetime marriage still remains logically possible, but very difficult to promise. In a pure relationship, to promise a life-time marriage is to give up one’s freedom to negotiate as the relationship develops.

The universalisation of pure relationships in modernist societies has resulted in separating the identity of individual persons from the decisions, professions, relationships and life-plans they may have. In modern social life it is assumed that the individual’s identity is an abstract identity. Therefore, individuals can enter into any relationship at any time,

or at least they should be allowed to do so. Hence the tendency, from a modernist mentality, to say that institutions in modernity should facilitate individuals entering into and resigning from any institution from the family to the global world at large. Campaigns for the right to euthanasia are extreme examples of how modernist individuals seek to be allowed, in principle, to resign from any institution. Modernity facilitates individuals to be allowed to choose any partner, nation or profession. They should also be allowed to divorce, to commit suicide, and to abort. In modernity, if I am a member of a particular family, tribe, nation, political party or religious organisation today, I must not be asked to promise that I will always belong to that family, tribe, nation or party. This is seen as giving up one's freedom to choose what I want to be.

Traditionalists find it difficult to establish pure relationships. This is not the same thing as saying that there are no pure relationships in a traditional society. I suspect that there were more pure relationships in the so-called traditional societies than the traditionalists are prepared to allow. However, modern intimacy is difficult, if not virtually impossible to establish in traditionalist marriages. Many people who marry in contemporary traditionalist families usually notice how difficult it is to gain the trust of their in-laws. In a multi-cultural society, informed by traditionalist mentality, it is virtually impossible to create a genuinely peaceful society. The best that can be built in that society is a society of tolerance. But tolerance does not abandon the hatred one has for that which he or she tolerates. Hence, traditionalist mentality cannot build a peaceful society.

Given the traditionalist mentality, it is difficult if not impossible for any member of one family, tribe or nation to be accepted into another. This is why the practice of adoption is very rare in African traditionalist families. And this is why 'pure relationships' between members from different families are virtually impossible or always limited. This, in turn, explains why traditionalist individuals who are married never see themselves as members of the same family with their spouses. Any who try are usually labeled and ostracized by their respective families. Wives, in traditionalist families, are made to feel that they are visitors in their husbands' homes. Husbands are told that their wives are visitors who can go back to their homes at any time. My colleague, Jameson Kurasha always talks about how this traditionalist orientation, which might have made sense at a different time, is ridiculous. His father is in his nineties and his mother in her eighties. They have been married for more than sixty years. In traditionalist terms, *Ambuya* Kurasha has been in the Kurasha home for more than sixty years. She lived in her *own* home, before she was married, for, at most, only about twenty years. Yet she is supposed to see herself only as a visitor to the 'Kurasha home'. Jameson, who came to the 'Kurasha family' much later than his mother and has spent most of his life in boarding schools, overseas universities, and his house in Harare is supposed to belong to the Kurasha family more than his mother! Chiluba is supposed to be more

Zambian than Kaunda and Muzenda more Zimbabwean than Joshua Nkomo.

Traditionalist marriages are different, in orientation, from Christian ones. Christian marriages demand that husband and wife be “*one flesh*”. In traditional marriages, husband and wife can never be *one flesh*. They can never *share* the same blood or the same ancestors. Most African societies are patriarchal. Hence they consider blood relations as defined in terms of paternal relationships. This is a choice which is presented as if it were not a choice. They deny blood relations between children and their mothers. Children are taught to believe that they have no blood ties with their mother. Their mother is an alien. Of course this does not mean that the mother in African traditionalist societies is not respected. But the respect borders on fear. The mother is respected precisely because she is an alien in the man’s home. She is as sacred as an ambassador of a hostile nation who lives in your country.

People who cross tribal and racial lines find it difficult to establish strong, healthy relationships which are not threatened by suspicions and prejudices. Many third-generation Zimbabwean citizens of Malawian or Mozambican origin are still made to feel that they are aliens in Zimbabwe.

Modern diseases, especially HIV and AIDS however, have demonstrated the challenge to traditionalist thesis that wives and mothers are aliens. AIDS has demonstrated the blood relationship between mothers and children. Children are threatened by HIV and AIDS precisely because they share blood with their mothers. HIV and AIDS have also made it clearer to us how intimately close husband and wife are and to what extent theirs is a “blood relationship”, a matter of life and death. Here, it has been shown that they are indeed one flesh and they share the same blood. However, this ‘blood’ relationship does not need to compete with other relationships entered into voluntarily.

In traditionalist consciousness, geography or locale is used to define groups of people as belonging together. Hence contemporary traditionalists living in the urban areas prefer to relate to people who come from their rural home area. They expect *homeboys* to help them find jobs, houses to rent, places to live, schools to go to, food to eat and money to borrow. When they form political parties, they expect people from their home area to support them. Many African political parties appeal to the myth of same origin to gather support. Many associations which explicitly encourage the universal brotherhood and sisterhood of humans have been unable to transcend ethnic prejudices. Hence many burial societies, churches, clubs, musical bands, and social organizations tend to have an ethnic base. But as Mbembe points out, “Geography, by itself, does not determine the correctness of moral, intellectual, or ideological positions.” (Mbembe, No.1, 2000 : 3)

So far, I have given examples from “traditional” African societies to illustrate traditionalist consciousness. This gives the impression that Africans are essentially traditionalist and that all Westerners are modernist.

This is not true. Europeans, Americans, Asians and all other non-Africans can demonstrate the traditionalist consciousness. For example, European racism and sexism are forms of traditionalist consciousness. Many Africans express modernist consciousness by entering into pure relationships. This is what many African traditionalists have complained about.

THE CONTEXT OF AFRICAN MODERNITY

The traditionalist consciousness has received relentless challenge from modern institutional arrangements and its accompanying consciousness. It is becoming more and more difficult to operate according to the traditional consciousness without being forced to compromise. Modern social life is characterized by a number of tendencies which systematically undermine traditionalist consciousness and practices. First, modernity has individualizing tendencies. The market economy, industrialization, urbanization, modern political life and Christianity tend to physically and emotionally sequester individuals from their families and clans and local communities. A lot has already been written on how modernity as a way of organizing society and a mode of thought, has powerful tendencies that physically and spiritually force the individual from the locale of his or her family and community.

In modern societies schools, universities, jobs, churches and forms of entertainment are neither physically nor spiritually located in the local community. Individuals in modernity tend to look for and find these things outside their local communities and usually away from their families. Modernity is an age of mobility, dynamism and globalisation. (Mbembe, No.1, 2000:3) This means that on a day-to-day basis, in modern societies, children tend to spend most of their lives away from their parents, and spouses and relatives away from each other. Many people spend more time in these modern institutions than with their families and communities. What is more important is that the experiences that individuals have in these institutions do not necessarily confirm the values of the family and the local communities. They do not always respect the blood relations between people and the hierarchy of authority in families and communities. Every now and then, if not frequently, individuals in modernity feel the need to be protected from blood relations. Many African men and women have found themselves condemning African traditions and finding refuge in their intimate relationships, professions, and voluntary associations. Many, especially those who have been abused by close relatives, especially children, feel that the relationships they enter into voluntarily must be more important than the natural blood ties.

Every individual in African modernity always has problems of transition between the values of the different institutions and cultural practices. For example, children may find it traumatic to move from schools which give them respect and influence on the basis of knowledge and intelligence to their respective families which may appreciate blood

relations, age and gender more than knowledge and individual contribution. Many women may find it frustrating to navigate between the work-place which may respect them as professionals and the traditionalist community which may ignore their professional and individual capabilities. It surely must be frustrating for a modern woman lawyer or judge who is expected to submit herself to the traditionalist expectations of her husband and her husband's family, chiefs and traditionalist community. Men too may find it too heavy to move from the work place where reward is based on individual performance to community responsibilities which do not depend on individual effort. They may find that the community expects them to look after children of their irresponsible brothers and sisters. This modern experience increases the individuals' self-consciousness.

Secondly, modernity has globalizing tendencies. Once the individual is physically sequestered from the *traditional* and *natural* ties, one begins to rely more and more on one's own experience and knowledge. The individual's dependence on the family and the community traditions begins to diminish as the individual discovers alternative ways of arranging life and cultural practices. An individual who feels that the family and local community do not fully appreciate her knowledge and intelligence may decide to go overseas. This is not to say that the individual's trust in the family and community is non-existent in modern society. What it means, however is that the individual's trust in the family and local community becomes more and more a matter of choice. It is not taken for granted as in traditional societies. In modern societies, the experiences that the individual relies on for the acquisition of knowledge are no longer limited to the local context. Given the mass media and modern communication networks, literally the whole world is at the disposal of the individual. Children can challenge their parents on the basis of what they have seen on television, what they have heard from the teachers, what they have read from books and magazines and what they themselves have experienced. Individuals in Africa can challenge their traditional practices on the basis of Kant's arguments. Symbolic meanings for modern youths can come from anywhere in the world. For example, many young people in Africa do not speak their 'mother tongue'. Many are not comfortable with 'their' respective cultures. Yet they borrow symbolic meanings from others all over the world. Hence modernity has a tendency of creating world citizens who can relate to anybody anywhere. It attacks tendencies of localism and nativism and encourages contractual and voluntary associations. This, however, does not necessarily demonstrate the morality of modernity.

What facilitates this globalisation is what Giddens calls "disembedding mechanisms." These are "mechanisms which price social relations free from the hold of specific locales, recombining them across wide time-space distances." (Giddens, 1991: 2) This means that social relations that exist in a particular locale can be transposed onto other locales thereby challenging traditional relations. For example, Africans who have worked in modern organisations especially in the market economy can

introduce types of relationships and practices from this experience to their traditional institutions and rituals. Today, the process of getting married according to African traditions has become more and more identical with the process of buying, on account, a piece of furniture from a department store. Market relations and mechanisms have been priced from their contexts and introduced into African traditional marriage customs. Marriage has become more and more like a contract between two people. Traditional healers have become more like modern professionals who can charge up to Z\$300,000 for their services. (*The Herald*, 24 November, 2000:1) But the movement is not in one direction. African traditional experiences have also influenced the work place, the school, the church and the social arrangements of other cultures. As Mbembe points out, "Despite appearances and everything the dominant discourse suggests our history, our present, and the extraordinary richness of our reality are, more than is generally realized, objects and signs that can 'speak' beyond our borders, and in every contemporary field of knowledge." (Mbembe, No1., 2000:3)

This possibility which modernity makes available creates the sense that social relations are not natural, but a matter for choice. Hence Africans living in modernity are made to feel that they can choose what sort of people they want to be and what social relations they can create among themselves. Hence the demands from civil society and the new social movements to have African governments establish all sorts of new social relations that have to do with human rights, individual freedom, and the market economy.

Globalisation does not mean that African traditional experiences are abolished. What it means is that these experiences join other *local* experiences on the global market. They become part of what could be chosen even by the Africans themselves. In modernity, the essential link between experiences and identity is permanently severed. In contemporary Africa, Africans can choose to be African. But they can choose other identities. This has been shown when Africans acquire non-African passports and citizenship and they are allowed to represent non-African nations in sport, politics and entertainment. But they are also made available to non-Africans. Many white people today have taken up African cultural aspects like hairstyles, music, dress, languages, religions and food. Many can no longer see themselves in terms other than African. Despite appearances, they could not be comfortable in Western countries. And of course there are those *Africans* who hate to be referred to as Africans. Michael Jackson could be an example. There are many more young people like that on the African continent. They live on the continent only physically, but spiritually are elsewhere. The meaning of the slogan "Africa for the Africans" is now made permanently ambiguous.

Self-Reflexivity in Consumer Culture

I have suggested that Africans in traditional societies were not any less self-conscious than modern Africans. The difference was in the form and context of the self-consciousness. In late modernity, individual self-reflexivity spreads 'from the few to the many'. This is why there is a mass production and distribution of self-help manuals to help the individual consciously choose his or her identity

Late modernity and general Western culture has sometimes given the impression that identities can be picked up anytime anywhere wily-nily. They also give the impression that they are infinitely malleable or at least that they ought to be. Using the market as the paradigm for organising social life, it is suggested that anything can be sold on the market by anyone. The free market facilitates the selling and buying of food, clothing, cars and books. These may be essential goods for human needs. However, the market in late modernity has become more than this. It also facilitates the selling and buying of images, identities, lifestyles, life-meanings and even death. Even the most industrialised societies have not been able to live up to this ideal of a completely free market. However, globalisation has facilitated the dominance of the modern market in the creation and organisation of modern social life. This means that modern individuals are oriented to believe that they can be whatever they want to be on the market. They are also made to believe that they can express their individuality through commodities on the market.

Given that modern individuals can decide on what stories they want to live, it becomes easy to understand how the capitalist market can begin to offer stories, identities and lifestyles to be bought by consumers. Advertisers in consumer society are excellent story tellers; they are also excellent creators and sellers of images. Hence the consumer society is characterised by the proliferation of images. This is facilitated by the development of "advertising, the motion picture industry, the fashion and cosmetic industries, mass circulation tabloid newspapers and magazines and mass spectator sport." (Featherstone, 1991: 113-4) Many of the images on the market are so attractive that it is very difficult to resist them. People, especially women, hurt themselves, mutilate their bodies, and punish themselves by putting on uncomfortable clothes only to fulfill the demands of the images on the market. Many of the shoes people wear, for example, are not good for their feet and yet they are good image makers. Many foods we eat are dangerous to our health, but good for the image. Many ideologies for sale on the market are dangerous to our growth and to our relationships.

Consumer society thrives on consumption of perishables. It works on the principle of consumption for the sake of consumption rather than consumption for the sake of the fulfillment of human needs. The principle of consumption for the sake of consumption threatens many cultural institutions and practices for every object is turned into objects of consumption just like beer and bottles of wine.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MORAL SELF

A contemporary traditionalist approach on identity formation has generally been negative in its social impact. Using narrow and rigid essentialism, it has encouraged a communalism which is exclusivist in its approach. This exclusivism has been responsible for the negative tribalism, sexism, racism that has impacted social institutions and human behaviour in African modernity. It has failed to take seriously the universality of modern citizenship. It has also failed adequately and positively to encourage the idea that the identity differences between peoples are a source of rich human experiences and relationships. Hence, I have also demonstrated that the rejection of this narrow essentialism should not imply the rejection of a wider and more inclusive identity of human beings.

I have traced the implications of the narrow essentialism on identity formation on the consumerist market and concluded that the choices that are made on the market cannot be made from scratch. They have to be made from the point of view of treating the human being as special – free and equal and yet in community with others. The human being is special in so far as he and she is a moral self who must be cultivated as such and therefore cannot be part of what can be sold on the market. This must limit what decisions and narratives can be made and allowed on the market. Obviously, the market does not have, mechanisms for limiting itself. Dangerous drugs, weapons of mass destruction, human body parts, sex, children, women, the land, water can still be sold on the market. Human beings must make conscious efforts to decide what the market can process and what it cannot. These conscious decisions can be made on the basis of a selection of values and principles of what is good. Given human societies, and what kind of beings human beings ought to be, it cannot be true that all choices made on the market have equal status and that all images, lifestyles, and identities advertised on the market have the same moral status. Some encourage human flourishing more than others. Some encourage humane relationships more than others. Human societies must decide what role the market will play in their development. They must set its limits not the other way round. Hence the importance of constructing cultural traditions and communities which are capable of upholding moral values and bringing out moral selves capable of peace building.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to demonstrate that being conscious and proud of one's identity in one's family, ethnic group or race is not the same thing as refusing to recognise the humanity of others. When our local value systems direct us to deny the humanity of others through racism, tribalism, sexism, narrow nationalism and homophobia, then we know we have reached the moral limits of our traditions. I have also pointed out that while narrow essentialist approaches to self-identity may lead to terrible social

consequences, this is not a good reason to embrace popular postmodernist illusions about perpetual self-construction and reconstruction. Human identities and traditions are not infinitely malleable. I have identified some forms of African traditionalism and African modernism as obstacles to peace building and true human development. I have suggested that healthy forms of African traditions are possible and desirable, but they have to be guided by the recognition of all human beings as not only free and equal but also as in community with others in the universal human family. African traditions are healthy in so far as they are part of a cultural sensibility that shuns both exclusivism, on the one hand, and nihilism, on the other. More positively, they encourage virtues, cultural practices, social institutions, economic systems and structures that build peace through encouraging true human development and flourishing.

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Chapter XI

Could There Be a Completely Different Way of Living?

Francis Chumachawazungu

Question, “Is the world today OK?” Response, “Of course, definitely not!” Question, “What precisely is wrong with the world?” Response, “Well...uh...you know....” We all know what is wrong with the world. But what you know is not what I know. Even when there is unanimity with regard to what is wrong with the world there is however, divergence with regard to how to correct the situation. Could it be therefore that what is wrong with the world is our different experiences of it? Can truth be different for everyone?

However, even these considerations do not make the world not to be OK. They, however, enable us to shift our attention from the objective world to the cognitive and interpretative process that reveals the world of our experience. We recognize that it is this same process that is posing the question, “Is the world today OK?” This paper proposes that the world is not OK precisely by virtue of posing the question, “Is the world today OK?” Posing this question is in some sense the same as asking, “Could there not be another completely different way to living?”

BACKGROUND AND GENESIS

“If a person falls freely, he will not feel his own weight.” (Pais, 1982:179) This is, to physicists today, a very ordinary thought. To the majority of the world’s population, the proposition is technically incomprehensible – they will ask what it means. But to Albert Einstein, the thought was neither ordinary nor technically incomprehensible. To Einstein, the thought was personally earthshaking. The thought defines a turning point in his life because it compelled him towards a theory of gravitation.

Technically, Einstein’s theories (both special and general) are part of a cosmological narrative whose mathematical formulations can be traced back to Copernicus. We are, however, not concerned with the technical implications of Einstein’s theories. Of importance to us is the impact that a question or thought can have on the life of an individual. Any thought or question is personally earthshaking depending on the context in which it is posed. Outside such a context, any thought is either very ordinary or incomprehensible. And so it is with questions such as, “What is love?” “Who am I?” “What is the significance of life?” Very ordinary questions to a philosophical mind are probably incomprehensible to a casual mind, but very transforming when posed in an appropriate personal context.

Such has been the case with this article. Einstein's general theory can be traced to the above thought. His special theory can be traced, among other things, to the thought of "what he would see if he were to chase a beam of light at the velocity of light." (Ferris 1988:189) In a similar manner, I can trace the genesis of this article to a personally earthshaking moment that occurred sometime in August 1992.

The place was Eyam village in Derbyshire in England. On the day in question, a friend and I were discussing what we then referred to as "the sorry state of the world situation." We turned the pages of the dominant "isms" of the political world, i.e., capitalism, socialism, and communism. We found them all wanting and not fundamentally different. We considered history as a tale of the sins of the fathers being revisited on their children. We found such an account of history not providing a discernible leveraging place to change society. I suddenly blurted out, "Would the world be the same today had the roles of the colonizer and the colonized been reversed, say Africa doing it to Europe instead of the other way around?"

Stated thus, the foregoing is a very ordinary hypothetical question. But at the moment I uttered it, it came out of nowhere. It cut through and invaded the flow of our thoughts at that moment. It took me in particular by surprise – it actually startled me. Understandably, the question unlike say, Einstein's theories, cannot be empirically accounted for. One could not, as in a laboratory, perform an experiment in which Africa plays the role of the colonizer to discover what situation would obtain. Such a consideration will always remain hypothetical with no direct empirical verification. The consideration has, however, a profound implication for human consciousness.

What the question did for me was to awaken me to a window of possibility for a fundamental transformation of human consciousness. The question imparted hope that a profound change to the world situation was possible. My friend and I agreed that it was hypothetically probable that had the roles of the colonizer and colonized been reversed, the world would be different than it was then. Could it be better or worse? This was immaterial. Of major importance was that *it could (not would) be different*. Looking back in retrospect, I realize that was the question I was addressing then was "Could there not be another completely different way to living?" Indeed, to pose such a question earnestly and seriously suggests the possibility that human consciousness was not completely conditioned by history. It suggests that the human being was not a prisoner of existential history; that a profound change in human consciousness was possible, and that such a change was not a historical destiny and possibility.

It was not that prior to 1992 I was unaware of change. I was not only aware of it in my own personal life, but I had also read and heard about change. After all, history itself is a chronicle of changes. But until August 1992, I had just taken historical change as a given. History (personal and social) had, for me, the fixity of a law that I never questioned.

Also my perspective on life was generally similar to that of Samuel Sandweiss who confesses that,

I had always believed much like the pragmatic existentialists that life is rather absurd, incomprehensible and meaningless; that we are some sort of freak mistake of nature coming from nowhere – born in a dark confusing setting in which people are constantly warring and fighting, being cruel and unfeeling to one another. I had always felt that at best, we could get a few kicks out of life, some fleeting momentary pleasures – and that was that. (Sandweiss, 1975:61)

I was carried along automatically and unreflectively in the obvious truism of linear time. To question this givenness and obvious truism of a linear history and existence had such a decisive and irrevocable impact on my life. Since then my life has been literally riding on the shock wave of that impact. The ripple from the impact carried me later into David Kaulemu's office, an event that has culminated in this article.

In some sense this paper is a continuation of August 1992. The discussion continues from the earthshaking question retrospectively corrected to, "Could there not be another completely different way to living?" In this article I try to make sense of what it means not to be a prisoner of history in the context of the search for peace and humanity.

To put it in ocular terms, this paper is saying that the eye that sees cannot see itself. What sees the eye is not the eye or a part of the eye. Cognitively stated, the thought that challenges the thought that *is* cannot be the thought that *is* or part of it. The paper then explores the significance of the thought that *is* and its relationship vis-à-vis the challenging thought. The article puts into perspective the significance of the existential situation and its relationship vis-à-vis the challenge such as "Could there not be another completely different way to living?" within the context of the search for peace and humanity in the world.

This paper reflects more of journey than a destination. My reflections are not from a position of authority – one who has answers and knows the way. Instead, I reflect from a position of one who is sometimes not so sure of what he says; one who in some sense feels that August 1992 was not so much a blessing as a burden one has no choice but to carry. I say this also because there is no room for dogmatism in any discussion on the human situation. Due to the subjective nature of the discussion itself, I can only hope for convergence of perspective, and not agreement. The key word here is "may" because no theory can ever be completely descriptive of phenomenon. Our subject is the creature we call human being or human nature, but I think different investigators are analyzing different anatomies of this animal. We may all be familiar with the "story about a group of blindfolded investigators, each of whom was allocated a different part of an

elephant to examine; one the trunk, another the tail, the third the ear, etc. Separately they could not correctly identify the creature, but in sharing their information, they were able to approach the truth, i.e., the full description of the animal.” (Button and Bloom 1992:11) My hope is that this paper will add a toenail to the unfolding picture of the animal that we are investigating.

Most importantly, however, I hope to contribute to the tradition of “hope talk.” Let us disagree, reflect, and criticize without demonizing and always never losing sight of hope. Our disagreements are immaterial, but stifling and muzzling hope talk has terminal consequences. We become spiritually dead and our tears dry up; we become ethically barren and indifferent to the appalling misery; hope talk dies. Hope talk is therefore our lifeline; it keeps us alive. And for those who (secretly or defiantly) harbor some sense of hope in the hope talk may this article uplift their spirits. For those who do not, I hope this article persuades you to become a participant in this audacious and courageous enterprise of hope talk in the hopelessly and helplessly weary existential situation of the human being.

“Is the world today OK?” This is a very pertinent and topical question. The question is, however, very slippery and problematic. It demands delicate and respectful handling. When confronting it for the first time, it is fitting to pause and ponder for a while before volunteering one’s thoughts. And this is precisely what I am going to do here – pause a while before offering my worm’s view and reflections. I will, however, make the pause productive. In the “while” I will give a perfunctory observation and overview of what the world in question is like today.

Undoubtedly, the world today is, in various ways and at different social and cultural levels, not the same as that of yesterday. Technologically the world of today is different from that of yesterday. Today, the world has shrunk both in terms of communications and travel. The television and the telephone have respectively brought the world into our living rooms and within shouting distance. The aeroplane has extended our feet. In other societies, “test tube” babies and surrogate motherhood are no longer “events.” Human relations have also experienced some changes. The formally colonized have become politically free; gender issues and concerns are now topical.

Also undoubtedly, there is in our world today tremendous agony, immense sorrow, brutality and violence. Commensurate with the technological changes, outward physical security is rapidly becoming impossible for anyone. Amidst the abundant material riches of today, there is unspeakable starvation. The politico-social-technological changes are polluted by an overpowering stench of injustice and poverty. Indeed,

The world today appears on the brink of insanity. Half its population may be starving or undernourished. We are witnesses to shootings on the streets, suicides and terrorist attacks on a daily basis. The most grotesque inhumanities

to man and a virtual rape of the land are practised by us as a way of life. We are caught up in an absurd infatuation with weaponry and war and a selfish preoccupation with ourselves. (Sandweiss: 1975:12)

Human poverty is not, however, only that of the external situation with regards to material insufficiency or livelihood insecurity. Instead it is also this heavy and suffocating inner unfulfilment and poverty that clings to all people like a bad smell. By whatever label or name with which we identify ourselves, we are all human beings and suffering is our lot. Sorrow is common to all of us; to the educated as well as to the non-educated; to the materially rich and to the materially poor; to the philosopher, the politician as well as to the religious leader; to the idealist and to the materialist, etc.

The foregoing is a summary of the world as it is today. And so we come back to the question, "Is the world today OK?" The problem is that we have only a perspective on the world in question, and we are not privy to a similar perspective of OK. We have an idea of what the world in question is like that can be accepted generally. But what do we mean by OK or not-OK? What is it that suggests that the world is not-OK? By what criteria do we measure the state of health of the world?

Does my hate for you *per se* make you not-OK? After all I may hate you but others may adore and worship you, and does this adoration make you OK? Do human suffering and struggling *per se* make the world not OK? But without struggle would cultural advancement be possible? Suffering is also big business -- ask doctors and pharmaceutical companies. Some people make a living out of counseling others that may be facing personal problems. After all, in today's world, as the adage goes, "one person's loss is another person's gain". Also, just because you and I may abhor killing other human beings, this does not mean that all other cultures and traditions share this aversion. The immanence of external material poverty and human barbarity in the world does not *per se* establish that the world is not OK ontologically. Most significantly is the recognition that this state of the world is a human creation.

The question "Is the world today OK?" is evidently therefore very slippery and problematic. One would not get an unequivocal and unambiguous yes or no answer. The best one can settle for would be that the world is OK in some ways rather than others. Some areas need improving and reforming more than do others. There is also an absence of unanimity as to what the not OK areas are and consequently as to the priorities and solutions to the world's problems. The philosopher, politician, the ecologist, the economist, the religious leader, the worker, the corporate leader, the idealist, the materialist, the human right activist, etc., all have different perspectives to the issue. David Crocker illustrates this in the following way.

For instance if we ask, “How is India doing?” we are seeking an empirical analysis of what is going on in that country. Yet alternative ethical perspectives will focus on distinct, though sometimes overlapping facts; hedonistic utilitarianism attends to pleasures and pain; preference utilitarianism selects preference satisfactions and dissatisfactions (or per capita productivity and consumption); human rights approaches emphasize human rights compliances and violations; and contractarians investigate the distribution of “social primary goods” such as income, wealth, liberties and opportunities. In each case the ethic structures determine what counts as morally relevant information. (Crocker quoted in Kaulem 2002:16)

Consequently, by extension, if we would change the world, we would do so according to what is particularly not OK to us about the world. Politico-social revolutions are a product of such improvements and reformations. Historically, a few individuals have always taken it upon themselves to change the world into their ideals. In the process they use other people as instruments towards the realization of the ideals. Other people are only valuable in so far as they are useful to the realization of the ideal. But such changes have not eradicated or rendered irrelevant or anachronistic the question, “Is the world today OK?”. The question is still as pertinent, topical, and relevant today as it was yesterday. Probably of significance today is that not many people (at least I suppose so) today are still naïve and still believe in the attainment of humanity and peace through socio-politico-technological revolutions.

The slippery and problematic nature of the question, “Is the world today OK?” however, points to a fundamental feature of human existence. Human existential experience, which is basically our world, is different for each of us. Recognizing this enables us to refocus our attention and represent the question, “Is the world today OK?” within a different context. Within the new context, the object of our study is not the objective world as such. Instead, attention is directed at the cognitive and interpretative processes that reveal the world. The above question translates into whether it is OK to have different perspectives and experiences of the world. Indeed can reality be personally or culturally variant? Can truth be different for everyone?

In addressing these concerns, our real focus of inquiry becomes “Is the human existential experience the full and complete story of human life?” Certainly, this question is not as slippery as “Is the world today OK?” when the latter is served at the objective world level. The new focus is philosophically challenging, but not slippery to handle.

The position of this paper is that at the cognitive level and in context, the question “Is the world today OK?” is actually a negation of the obvious truism of the human existential experience. Consequently, implied

in the question at the cognitive level is the consideration “Is the human existential experience the full and complete story of human life?” Such negation is obviously not, as politico-social revolutions, vis-à-vis some notion or idea of how the world should be like.

Consequently, we are saying that depending on the context, the criteria for assessing the health of the world is the question “Is the world today OK?” itself. The world is not OK precisely by virtue of posing the question. Posing the question negates and challenges the obvious truism of the whole human existential situation – its beauty as well as its ugliness, its joys and tribulations as well as its sorrow and anguish, its technology as well as its history. In short the question is a critique of the whole existential package.

Within the appropriate context, specifically the cognitive level, the questions “Is the world today OK?” and “Could there not be another completely different way to living?” are found to be one and the same. Either question cannot possibly be directed at the existential consciousness for the latter to provide a response. Neither is the existential consciousness capable of posing either of the questions simply because the existential incarnates the world and the world cannot question itself – the world cannot see itself. The above questions suggest a state of the existential. The questions suggest a positing (suggestion or pointing to) the existential state. The existential posits (or is suggestive of) a reality other than itself. But this posited reality cannot be contrasted with the existential in the same sense that a dream cannot be meaningfully contrasted with the awakened state.

Of vital importance to this paper is, therefore, not what peace is, or how the world should be. Instead, of capital and fruitful importance is the understanding of the objective world within the context of the negating challenges. Such an understanding is part of a completely new reality. The road to heaven or hell is part of the heaven or hell, which ever is true.

Consequently, this paper looks at the existential as it appears as such, and articulates the positing of this. The article analyzes the self in both its existential mode and its positing aspect, i.e. it’s referencing of itself to something other than itself. It is this positing aspect of the self that offers and grounds hope. Hope not or much optimism about the future or some benign historical destiny of humanity as that the existential itself suggests something other than itself. What lies behind this suggestion or positing is of no existential importance. As Philip Pacey observes,

What is wrong with society is its aim, no less, which is not *for* us; from a fundamental change of aim, a new society would follow. What kind of society, who can say? It would be wrong to pretend to know, for unless we release our grip on our prejudices and preconceptions, the all-important aim will become distorted and laid aside before we begin. We might expect that it would not be based, as capitalism, on placing man against man in competition,

which can only work for some against the interest of others, and which in the long term may not be in one's interest.... Nor would we expect it to comprise the totalitarianism state bent on forging the mass of humanity into uniformity for the state's sake." (Pacey, 1977:105)

Of most significance to this paper is that the existential is uncertain of its own rational foundation. Such is the importance of the question, "Could there not be another completely different way to living?" It is a personally earthshaking question that also conveys hope that the human existential situation need not be the full and complete story of human life.

DEFINING THE HUMAN EXISTENTIAL SITUATION

What motivates an intellectual or academic to contribute to the discourse on the existential struggles on the Zimbabwe scene? What do the various contributors personally acquire in contributing to the anthology, "Struggles after the Struggle"? What does it mean for us personally to have the anthology published? These are not idle questions. It is neither an insult, derogatory, disrespectful, surprising, nor outrageous to allege particular vested interest in any intellectual production. Indeed it is much less plausible to deny particular vested interest tucked away in the silent folds of academic inquiries.

An intellectual production such as this anthology is a culmination and concrete realization of a conscious effort on the part of those who contributed to its fruition. The various contributions are obviously personally valuable and important. But effort speaks of a conscious intention to achieve an objective, hence the issue of (personal) interest.

Today, it is widely acknowledged that the rhetorical space in which the intellectual enterprise is conducted is molded and structured by personal interests. Facts and evidences are neither found, nor discovered in nature as such, nor do they report themselves. They are selected and the selection process is always from a position that is somewhere and not from nowhere. The geographical location of this "somewhere" is always marked and defined by interests (personal, social, or otherwise). Indeed, "facts are not to be considered as if they were independently existent objects that we might find or pick up in the laboratory. Rather, as the Latin root of the word "facere" indicates, the fact is "what has been made" (e.g. as in manufacture). Thus, in a certain sense, we "make" the fact. That is to say beginning with immediate perception of an actual situation, we develop the fact by giving it further order, form and structure with the aid of our theoretical concepts." (Bohm 1980:142) Academic inquiry is consequently – often imperceptibly – undoubtedly shaped by interests external to the inquiry itself which pass undetected through the standard sieve of epistemological objectivism.

This article, however, goes beyond interest as it incarnates in intellectual subjectivity. The paper asserts that intellectual works are already implicated in a context of a human existential struggle for power, prestige, recognition, self-worthiness, “mine is better than yours,” etc. This is the psychological struggle to become someone or something (positive or negative). Certainly, struggle in this wider context is not only for physical survival. It is not for minimal physical and livelihood security in terms of adequate nourishment, and decent clothing and shelter. If human existence were merely concerned with minimal survival, the whole human existential situation would be fundamentally different. Academic inquiries into existential struggles would not be necessary, and indeed even conceivable or conceived.

But as it is, the human being does not just struggle to survive. People struggle to survive within the horizon of a particular psychological or ideological pattern. They struggle to become something psychologically. This striving moulds and expands the struggle for basic necessities. At the social and physical level, people acquire physical necessities, and at another level, they use these for psychological gratification.

People acquire money, things, knowledge, etc., as a means to power, prestige, recognition, etc. They struggle to attain wealth and positions in society in order to be powerful in various ways. Success at the physical level is predicated on inner struggles for power and becoming someone.

But what kind of power is really referred to here? Indeed the concept of power is central to describing the existential situation of the human being. Kaulemu observes that:

The power that fascinates modernity comes in various forms. It can be power generated by knowledge when human beings understand the principles of nature to the point of having the ability to manipulate it. The power may be generated by the use of technology to destroy parts of nature as in the case where mountains are destroyed to build roads, houses, industries, and dams. The most impressive power of modern societies is that of producing wealth and information in industries and the press. (Kaulemu1, 2001:24)

Or we can look at power in its anthropological context. Thus we can also with Kaulemu observe that:

One major reason why morality has lost influence is the fact that modernity is fascinated by power. Part of what it means to be a modern person is to be fascinated by power. Members of traditional societies were not as fascinated by power as we are today. A lot that has to do with power was

taken for granted.... Democracy then, was seen as a dirty word. The power of the King or Chief was generally taken for granted.... In modern society, things have changed. People now want to know why those in power, either in the private or public realm are in power. People are interested in deconstructing power structures. Democracy is now the in thing. (Kaulem1, 2001:23)

Fascination with power is not, however, a fixation of modernity only. Power is both a concept and an existential moment or feeling of personal achievement and mastery. It consequently animates the whole human enterprise. The existential moment of power is psychological satisfaction (or gratification) and fulfilment. Indeed, to be powerful, as Jiddu Krishnamurti observes,

Is to dominate, to suppress, to feel superior, to be efficient, and so on. Consciously and unconsciously the ascetic as well as the worldly person feels and strives for this power. Power is one of the completest expressions of the self, whether it be the power of knowledge, the power over oneself, worldly power, or the power of abstinence. The feeling of power, of domination, is extraordinarily gratifying. You may seek gratification through power, another through drink, another through worship, another through knowledge, and still another through trying to be virtuous. Each may have its own particular sociological and psychological effects, but all acquisition is gratification. (Krishnamurti1, 1990:36)

An intellectual work, like this anthology, is, as with any other human existential activity therefore a source of power and gratification to all those who contribute to its fruition. The people become something psychologically. Could it be that areas of excellence are more manufactured psychologically to satisfy the struggle for psychological becoming? If discourse on poverty, colonialism, corruption, human rights, etc., are sources of livelihood, prestige, academic excellence, power, etc., would it be spurious to accuse our putative concern for society of being itself spurious and superficial? Could it be that human existential struggles are psychological creations to authenticate existence and give it meaning and significance? Could it be that human existence itself is born out of struggle? These considerations indicate the thematic context of this paper.

Thematic Context

The psychology of becoming speaks of a pre-conceptual, choice, cognition, consciousness, and interpretation opening or condition of human existence. To exist is to manifest in, and also reveal a pre-opened up context of psychological becoming (or motion). Human consciousness, cognition,

and interpretation are manifested in and structured by the opened up psychological framework. Human cognition and interpretation therefore refer to pre-structured motive activities. They are not causally set in motion by the psychological framework. Instead, cognition and interpretation mediate the psychological structure. The psychological framework is itself revealed by human consciousness, cognition, and interpretation.

But motion is a concrete realization and translation of effort. Indeed to speak of the psychology of becoming is to refer to a process in which effort is expended in motion. Consequently, human cognition and interpretation speak of effort in motion. Effort on its part speaks essentially of struggle. The expenditure of effort is basically a measure of the degree of struggle.

Struggle therefore speaks of a pre-choice and conceptual opening or condition of human existence. It is not subject to human choice. It is not *a* choice but *the* choice of human existence. Struggle logically precedes existence. It defines and structures existence.

The implication for epistemology of this position is that the articulation of existential struggles itself reveals and manifests the opened-up context of struggle. It is the opened-up context that makes possible academic inquiry. The academic or researcher manifests struggles not merely at the conscious and analytic level, but his or her presence or availability in existence is a revelation of struggle. Of capital importance to epistemology are not the external struggles that cognition and interpretation reveal, but the revelation that cognition and interpretation are already problematic. The thinker is not separate from struggles precisely because thinking itself is the explicit revelation of a pre-cognition and – interpretation context of struggle.

Are we here implying pure idealism in regard to existential problems? Are we suggesting that there are no external problems “out there”? That poverty, abusiveness, greedy, inequality in resources allocation, HIV/AIDS, etc., are merely figments of imagination? That there are no racial, gender, ethnic, professional, religious, political, tensions “out there”?

Without dismissing objective realism, the basic position of this paper is that the external is subject to human interpretation. Human interpretation is, however, already problematic. It incarnates struggles and problems because that is its nature. Interpretation mediates the psychology of becoming. The external is a means in the psychology of becoming. Of explorative significance to this paper is not the external, but the inner psychological process. The central thesis of this position is that a necessary requirement for a clear and unobstructed vision to the outside is the removal of the log in our eyes. We must become aware of our own internal struggles. How can a man “struggling in the same quicksand as all the others, with attachments like the others earn the right to be called teacher and be qualified to pull the others out of quicksand”? (Sandwiess:166) This consideration forms the basic theme of this article’s Section 1 “The Basic

Structure of Society,” and Section 2 “Existential Moral History – A Narration of Arrested Development”.

But if struggle is pre-choice, can the human being come out of struggle even if he or she wants to? Defining struggle as pre-choice alleges helplessness and hopelessness for the human situation. And indeed that is precisely the position of the existential human being. The existential human being is completely vulnerable, helpless, and hopeless. If the human being can climb out of the ditch, how can this be done? Is “struggle” the only opening in which human existence is made possible? These questions form the basic theme of Section 3 of the article, “Does The Human Being Have Free Will?”

Indicating that the human being is able to, and can, change does not, however, *ipso facto* suggest that he or she will change. Given this position, what grounds are there to be optimistic about the human situation. This is the thematic question of the concluding Section 4 of this treatise, “Hope Talk.” The article is, however, faced also with a praxiological demand. Consequently, an appendix “Practical Considerations” looks at the fundamentals that must inform programmes that are undertaken to deliberately intervene and correct social imbalances, and the implications for normative discourse of this paper.

The Basic Structure of Society and History

Society has no objective structure that is unmediated by human cognition and interpretation. Society cannot be seen. What is observable are people. Indeed society does not make sense of itself. What makes sense of human interactions and relations, and integrates and mediates the whole social interactive process, is human cognition and interpretation. Consequently, the basic structure of society is necessarily determined and translated by the basic psychology of the people constituting the society.

Society can and does influence the conduct of the people coming into it. However, it does not determine the basic psychology of the citizenry. Our goals, ambitions, choices, tastes, etc. are indeed socially influenced, but that influence does not change the basic structure of the process in which the exercise of choice is made possible. This position has implications for the transformation of society, which will be discussed in the next sections. Suffice it here to observe that society influences the consciousness of the individuals, but the psychological process that makes consciousness possible is socially immutable. This makes understanding the basic psychology of the human being a *sine qua-non* to understanding the basic structure of society.

Certainly to speak of the basic structure of society in this context is not to refer to the socially constructed “structures” of governments, civil society, etc., that demarcates and defines the objective social interaction, to borrow from biology, i.e., the different anatomies of the social organ. Instead, to speak of the basic structure of society is to refer to the basic

structure of the psychology that makes sense and integrates the anatomies into a single organism. Structures of governments, civil society, market forces, marriages, etc., all refer to objects or contents of consciousness. To speak of the basic structure of society is to refer to the basic psychology that administers to and organizes consciousness so it makes sense.

Within this context, we can deduce from our discussion so far that the basic structure of society is the psychology of becoming. This means that fundamentally, society is organized in such a way that it fulfils the basic requirements of the psychology of becoming. Consequently mutual usage constitutes the basic interactive medium for social interaction. What do we mean by this?

It means that we use each other (including ideas and knowledge) variously as instruments in the psychological process of becoming. Human society is, at bottom, an interaction of “things.” The interaction is not a relationship in the true sense of the word. True relationship is based on, and grows out of mutual respect. No one respects a tool, which is a dead thing. Consequently, the existential human society is an interaction of dead things.

Not only this, society is a meeting of struggles and problems. To meet the existential human being is literally to meet a problem. Struggles and problems meet each other in the space called society. When you meet a small child the meeting from the position of the child, is instantaneous, i.e., not a problem. With adults you meet entities that are psychologically becoming, hence you meet struggles. Adults are going to be polite, politically correct, respectful, “macho”, intimidating, clever, i.e., we are going to be all sorts of images. A small child does not become anything. It is direct. How much we can learn from how precise and direct a child is!¹

We are, undeniably physically dependent on each other and will always be. I need you to pass me the brick. Marriage necessarily requires two people. Inevitably we must come together to produce certain physical necessities. However, we organize not only to produce physical necessities. The various structures and organizations are tools to achieve fame, recognition, “to be the best in our business,” to feel superior and a sense of belonging, etc. Organizations are instruments that serve a psychological end – to achieve something that is over and above the physical necessities. People organize and use each other for psychological gratification.

Effort at the physical level may be necessary; the effort to build a bridge, to produce petroleum, coal, and so on, is or may be beneficial; but how the work is done, how things are produced and distributed, how profits are divided, is quite another matter. If at the physical level man is used

¹ Indeed, as will become clear later, to come into existence does not refer to physical and biological birth. To come into existence is to desire to become something. In so far as a child is direct, it does not exist. The child merely is. The child may be a human being, but certainly not an existential human being.

for an end, for an ideal, whether by private interests, or by the State, or for a religious organization, effort only produces more confusion and misery. Effort to acquire for the individual, for the State, or for a religious organization, is bound to breed opposition. Without understanding this effort of striving for acquisition at the physical level will inevitably have a disastrous effect on society. (Krishnamurti:34)

To conceive of usage in this sense is to transcend the deliberate and conscious opportunistic exploitation of someone for political or economic self-advancement. Usage is organically part of the definition of the process of psychologically becoming. The process has meaning and significance only within a context of accumulation and acquisition (negative or positive) of requisite raw materials and ingredients that go towards organically constructing something.

The psychology of becoming starts from a position of perceived lack or incompleteness or imperfection. This lack incarnates in various forms. It expresses itself as feelings of inferiority, isolation, alienation, fear, unworthiness, etc. All these incarnate a state of lack. And from this position, we want to become something. Imperfection or lack implies that we would be better off in a state somehow different from the one we are in. Consequently, the process of becoming is an organic process.

The means to satisfy the incompleteness are external. In marrying, we feel complete. We use the other to fill up a perceived missing space, which could be financial, fame, social standing, etc. We are important, and the other is not.

Understood thus, usage is not to be understood within the context of selfishness. This seems to be the case with Adam Smith when he says,

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages.² (Smith 1991:13)

² The work of Adam Smith demonstrates a feature of human existence alluded to earlier on. The two quotes in the text demonstrate that morally, the human being has not changed significantly from 226 years ago when Smith first published his work. The influence of society on individual behavior can be gleaned or reasoned from another assertion Smith made in the same book: "...and yet it may be true, perhaps, that the accommodation of a European prince does not always so much exceed that of an industrious and frugal peasant as the accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many an African king, the absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousands *naked*

Or when Smith says that “by directing that industry in such a manner as its products may be of greatest value, he (the individual) intends only his gain, and he is in this as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.” (Smith)

The position of this paper is that usage is pre-intentional. The choice for “altruism” or otherwise occurs in the already opened-up context of becoming. The exercise of choice is itself an instrument in the becoming process.

EXISTENTIAL MORAL HISTORY – ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT

It should not be misconstrued that the phenomenon of psychological usage is peculiar only to modernity. There is a temptation to appeal to a childhood of humanity in which society was supposedly more egalitarian. Re-appropriation of lost values is then advanced as a panacea to contemporary human existential problems. Such a position suggests that the present human situation is not original, but the result of a regression or decadence. This speculation cannot, of course, be *a priori* dismissed or refuted. Entertaining it, however, invites the question as to why such a cultural regression or decadence should take place. The position of this article is that a pristine past is more of a retrospective projection of the mind, a projection that fulfils the psychology of becoming – we have a sense of socially becoming something. But such a retrospective pristine past does not refer to a corresponding reality in the past. Kaulem makes this observation with respect to traditional consciousness vis-à-vis modern consciousness.

In some sense, there is no such thing as a coherent, static, pre-colonial traditional African society unless it is referred to in retrospect. Even then, the concept of *an African traditional society* is itself a creation of modernity. It reflects more of modernity’s self-image than the character of the postulated traditional society. It is modernity which felt the need to identify and distinguish a *traditional* society in order to know itself. (Italics original, Kaulemu2, 2000:3)

This paper asserts that the basic structure of society has always been based on usage and gratification. What has only changed is *how* we use each other. We have always used each other, but we have changed the

savages.” (Italics mine, Smith:11-12) Referring to Africans as savages is not politically correct today. One may *think* it, but to actually say it aloud or write it, is another thing. This phenomenon of change in a context of persistency will be revisited in the coming section.

way that we use each other. Traditional and modern consciousness must be understood within this context.

The question of identity is central to discourse on changes in socio-cultural consciousness. But the difference between say, a traditionalist and a modernist consciousness is not one of qualitative shift. But neither is it a quantitative shift. Rather, the difference is a shift in preference and out of convenience. The adage “there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests” comes to mind here, but bearing in mind that this is not a conscious and/or deliberate shift. A communal consciousness is not qualitatively but conveniently different from a professional consciousness. Identification, irrespective of its mode or form is a means to run away from incompleteness, smallness. One becomes larger.

People identify with the community, race, profession, ethnic, nation, God, etc. as avenues of escaping feelings of isolation. For the exalted price of becoming a part of something larger than they as individuals, people are prepared to emulsify their individuality into the community, tribe, nation, etc., in a form of social masochism. This is the root of patriotism. People are prepared to defend their nation, profession, community, God, family, ethnic, etc. against other people. The family, God, etc. are, to all intents and purposes, organically a part of the people. In this respect, any threat to the integrity and authenticity of their God, their community, family, etc. is taken personally. In this game of identification, the individual however, still remains important. Identity and association is for “my” protection. In identification, there is refuge from “my” isolation. In identification “I” become something bigger and larger. In place of “me”, there is the larger and bigger substitute “community”, “God”, “nation”. “My” God, community, nation, is more important, more egalitarian, and more developed than “yours.”

The opposite of social masochism is social sadism. The individual is not concerned with emulsifying his or her individuality into the community. Rather, the community, nation, must identify itself with him or her. The community must dissolve itself into him or her; his or her voice must be the voice of the community; when he or she is ill, the whole community must drown in tears. In swallowing up the community, tribe, company, I “expand” and become (something) larger, bigger, and heavier and massive. As you prostrate yourself before me in worshipping me and identifying your voice and success with my voice and success, I am worthy and important.

Social masochism and sadism are, of course, not mutually exclusive. It is not that the individual is either one or the other. Indeed, they complement each other. A man qua husband adopts the sadistic position in relation to his wife, but he masochistically emulsifies into the nation. In the latter, the man identifies with the voice of the politician (who in turn probably identifies with his wife’s voice at home). Of importance is not the avenue of escape, but the desire to hide from and muffle this forbidding sense of isolation and alienation.

Evidently, the existential moral history of the human being is fundamentally the same. Psychologically and morally, therefore, the existential human being has no significant history. The significance only lies in the social constructs, i.e., the terminological description that we use to describe social interactions.

But there may have been change in the social construct from slavery (the direct buying, selling, and owning of one human being by another) in some societies to freedom. But corporations now control human existence. The market commodifies everything including the human being which is now a commodity, a labour force, etc. to be bought and sold. Fundamentally, human social interaction still remains grounded on usage and aggrandisement.

Undoubtedly, there has been progress in the outward technical expression of life. Human existence chronicles the development of the human being's technical (outward) capabilities – of bending recalcitrant nature to serve the human being. The new technologies extend our eyes, hands, and feet. One is able to witness events as they occur elsewhere and anywhere in the world whilst in the comfort of one's home. Journeys that used to take “many moons” are now covered in a matter of a few hours, and that the problem of production – which was the problem of the past – is, in principle solved.

The same cannot, however, be pronounced psychologically. Human existential situation is, however, also resolutely recidivist. Conflicts, and dichotomies (on a human scale) are our regular diet. There is abject poverty amidst affluence. The availability of abundant technical means for material satisfaction and capability is matched only by an equal lack of wisdom to apply these for the wellbeing and betterment of all people of the world. Today, structural employment, chronic wars, impersonal and unpredictable market forces, etc., have become regular diets. Human existential realities present a picture of a human being helplessly attempting social reformation to bring about a better or new society. Today, in spite of our technological progress, the goal of resolving social and individual conflicts remains as elusive as ever. Indeed, even though the human being is capable of remarkable inventiveness, in the area where it matters most – in how the human being relates to others – the human being remains backward and as ‘primitive’ as ever. Martin Luther King, Jr., wrote:

Rich in goods and material resources, our standards of success are almost inextricably bound to lust for acquisition. The means by which we live are marvelous indeed. And yet something is missing. We have learned to fly the air like birds and swim the sea like fish, but we have not learned the simple art of living together as brothers. Our abundance has brought us neither peace of mind nor serenity of spirit. (King 1963:75)

Psychologically, and morally we are not therefore evolving in any significant sense. Human beings felt the same about life several thousands years ago as they do today. We know this because the moral teachings of people like Jesus, Buddha, Mohammed, etc. still challenge the conscience of the “modern” individual. Inwardly, the human being is still battling with the same psychological and moral problems – helplessness, loneliness, marital problems, fears, etc. Regardless of how outwardly sophisticated or primitive one may be, inwardly life is just a continuous struggle with opposing and contradictory desires. In visiting the most technically underdeveloped village in any developing country, and the peasant will lament to you about his problems with his wife, children, and neighbor. It is exactly the same thing with a company executive in the most technically developed country – only the people are wearing different clothes eating different food, or whatever. The same opera is played in different theatres throughout the world, only that the performers have different faces. As Krishnamurti observes,

Our bodies may be different in structure and color, our faces may be dissimilar, but inside the skin we are very much alike: proud, ambitious, envious, violent, sexual, power seeking and so on. Remove the label and we are very naked; but we do not want to face our nakedness, and so we insist on the label – which indicates how immature, how really infantile we are. (Krishnamurti 2, 1990:76)

Throughout the world, the human being is tethered to, and entangled in endless psychological problems. These problems are a-historical, and the human brain (the organ) has evolved in these problems. In each one of us is not only the experiences of our past predecessors, but also all the present conflicts, problems, corruption, struggles, and contradictions that are felt all over the world. Similar to a human gene, we singularly harbour, and epitomise all the human race experiences past, present and to come, all put together. Problems, conflicts, and violence are not particular – they are general. No one has a monopoly in misery.

Evidently, human struggle is beyond discourses on Afrocentrism, Eurocentrism, and multiculturalism. Indeed all problems are human problems. Neither Africans, nor Europeans, nor Asians, nor Christians, nor Jews, nor Hindus, nor Muslims have a monopoly on human existential problems.

Comprehensive and definite moral change (personally and socially) is evidently therefore not a historical possibility as some historical accounts suggest, say Hegel’s and Marx’s. Evidently so far social revolution on Marxist ideology has merely resulted in “the realm of an infallible party (and secretary-general) and a “new class,” and with all this bureaucratic constrains and orthodox narrow mindedness, oppression, and the denial of happiness. Socialism became...antisocial.” (Kung, 1984:183).

Indeed, the political dispensation in some formerly colonized countries has not changed significantly. The new leadership's (in the former colonies) zeal for power is matched only by its callous disregard for human life. The ruthless decimation of political opposition is rationalised as a defence of national integrity and against imperial (re) domination: history repeating itself. The impunity with which the former colonial leadership suppressed and muted indigenous people is now exercised and perfected by the new "free" leadership to cement and consolidate its chock hold on to political power. The principles of human freedom, and human dignity under which liberation struggles are waged, have been hijacked, and have degenerated to mere rhetoric. But the usage of one human being by another in the pursuance of any ideal, be it "in defence of our hard won freedom," or economical, etc. is a betrayal, and denial of human freedom and human dignity. The human being becomes merely a tool in the hands of the idealist, or politician, and any opposition to the latter's ideas is ruthlessly (and terminally) resisted.

Given this existential fact, probably with the exception of Africans in general and Zimbabweans in particular, are there still other people today "who believe so naively in the attainment of humanity by politico-social revolution? Or who believe without any doubt in humanity by technological revolution? Unquestionably, "capitalism," faith in science, technology, seem – just like "socialism," Marxism and revolution – to have lost their importance as ideologies for numerous people in East and West, no matter how much the two sides combined in the last decade." (Kung, 1984:183).

It is this phenomenon of displaying dynamism in one area (outward), and stagnation in another (psychological), that I term "Arrested Development". Evidently, human existence is a tale of outward progress in a psychological groove.

The human body (the organism) has also evolved. Since the brain is part of the organism, it has therefore also evolved. My body and its brain, and your body and its brain, are accordingly not ours – they have evolved. The human being is therefore not born into a fresh brain. Rather, we are heirs to a very old brain that has not only evolved organically, but also socially developed in a resolutely recidivistic way, i.e., the brain has evolved functionally set in a particular psychological and ideological structure.

Therefore, when we reflect and meditate on human existential psychological and moral history, we are observing a very old brain. It is a brain that has progressed leaps and bounds in technical knowledge, but whose core remains as it has always been, in struggle to become. To bring out the salient features of the concept of arrested development we will consider the existential story of a single man.

Existential History of an Individual

Our man will be born. He will become educated, travel and see the world, become a professor of philosophy, etc. He will marry a “beautiful” woman and have “well-behaved children.” The position of this paper is that these outward achievements are inspired from a psychological position of lack, i.e., to escape from incompleteness or the concept of inferiority. To develop from being a “nothing”, to becoming a “somebody”, the man is determined to succeed in life. His fear of failure also colors his relationship with his wife. He is (in obvious and not so obvious ways) very possessive and jealous. To him the wife’s infidelity only confirms his incompleteness and inferiority. Of course, he rationalizes this behavior as driven by his undying love for the wife. Is not jealousy and its anger proof of his love for her? The man may even rise to become national President. Predictably, he will distinguish himself as a despot and autocratic ruler. As long as other people exalt him, he is a “somebody”. Again he will rationalize his despotism as in the national interest against external imperialism. The man will relinquish political power only through force. He will not give up this power voluntarily. Now what has all this to do with arrested development?

Clearly, our man has moved in time. Firstly, his organism has developed from a small child to an old adult. This is obvious. Secondly, our man has acquired and absorbed a great deal of knowledge. This knowledge is wide ranging. There is the knowledge of driving a car; knowledge that the mother in law is a pain; professional knowledge – philosophy, psychology, management, economics, etc.; there is knowledge of a husband, father, professor, President, etc. Evidently time and effort was expended in acquiring and sponging up this diverse knowledge. Our man has therefore undoubtedly experienced growth in time. He has grown not only biologically, but also epistemologically. So far so good. However, the bone of contention is whether our man has developed inwardly (psychologically). In other words the question is whether his concept of himself has changed fundamentally. He may have become a (better) professor outwardly, but has he succeeded in escaping from his concept of himself as an incomplete and inferior person?³

³ The constant striving to become gives rise to an apparent order of needs. For instance Abraham Maslow identifies five needs. He proposes that people are motivated by, in order of satisfaction in ascendancy, physiological needs, security or safety needs, social affiliation or acceptance, self-esteem, and finally by self-actualization. This paper appreciates the importance of physiological needs, but identifies all the other needs as different means and attempts of solving the same problem, namely the problem of incompleteness. Within this context, the question is “Can there be a hierarchy or order of incompleteness or imperfection or inferiority?” Our discussion so far has shown that incompleteness has no history. Put another way, this paper is saying that we are making the same mistake over and over again.

Provided our man is still compelled to become somebody, then he still functions from a position of lack or inferiority. Of philosophical significance, however, is whether this position of lack or inferiority is “historically” persistent. Could it be that there is also a history of inferiority such that the position moves in time? In considering this issue, we need to recognize at the onset that psychologically becoming means that change is purely mental; change is only in consciousness. We *think* that we have changed. Consciousness has become another consciousness. But is consciousness endowed with volition that enables it to become something? Is it not the self that becomes something? Or is it?

INTRODUCING AND DEFINING THE SELF

The basic philosophical problem in regards a self is whether it is a substantive entity. It is generally taken as an obvious truism that a self is a subject of experience, feelings, thoughts, etc. It is said that the self thinks, experiences, and feels, etc.

To bring the problem into relief, the question is whether the grammatical subject in the commonplace assertion “I am a philosopher” refers to a substantive entity, or self. This concern is further problematized under two parts. One part is contained in the question, “Do grammatical subjects in the contemporaneous statements, “I am a philosopher,” “I am a husband,” “I am hungry,” “I am too ugly,” etc., refer to a single self?” The other point is contained in the question, “Does the grammatical subject in the implied non-contemporaneous assertion, “I am 40 years old,” “I used to be a sinner,” etc., refer to a historically persistent self?” We will explore this last consideration first and creep into and introduce the other explicitly or implicitly as we go along.

If the grammatical subject in the last assertion referred to only a momentarily existent, something that was previously not 40 years or a sinner, and cannot be identified with a permanent existent that made the assertion, then the statement would be false. But what really does the statement say and mean?

The statements contain elements of both change and persistence. Even though the message conveyed is that it is the self (or person) that has changed, in reality this is not what the statement is saying. The statements, “I used to be a sinner,” “I am 40 years old,” have the self-referring expression “I” as their subjects, and are thus apparently statements about the person who asserts them. “About” is more of a statement of description than identity of the subject. It is not the self that is 40 years old. Instead, 40 years describes something about the self, an aspect that is observable to the self; an aspect that is an object of the self.

Age (or sinner) is, however, content of consciousness. But content of consciousness is the consciousness, and consciousness is its content. Without content, consciousness is not, and without consciousness, content is not revealed. Consciousness is consequently an object of the subject. The

self can observe consciousness. What then does this say of the identity of a self?

To say that the self observes consciousness is to say that consciousness is revealed in the self. The self does not denote a substantive entity that acts. Instead the self is what we have in this paper hitherto referred to as the pre-conceptual opening that makes possible existence and experience. The self is pre-choice, -consciousness, -cognition, and – interpretation. We do not *choose* a self. Instead, the self is the opening in which choice, consciousness, cognition, and interpretation are made possible. To exist is to come into a self. A self is pre-existence. It precedes existence even though it cannot be without it. The precedence is logical and not ontological.

The philosophical doctrine of existentialism is founded on the axiom that existence precedes essence. It suggests that the human being comes into the world as nothing and chooses a person. In so doing he or she defines what life should be. This makes the essence of existence subject to human choice.

Existentialism, however, presupposes a chooser. The chooser is not chosen, but is the one that chooses. The self of existentialism is not chosen. We do not choose the “I.” Instead, the self is the one that chooses what it wants to become. According to this paper, the self, the “I,” is a pre-choice opening.

The human being may come into existence as nothing, but he or she comes into a pre-choice opening which make possible human choice. The essence of existence is not subject to human choice. The human being cannot choose not to or what to become. He or she cannot choose not to become “not complete,” or “not lacking,” or “not imperfect.” To exist is to become not lacking, or not incomplete, or not imperfect. Human choice is limited only to *how* to become. But this invites the very seductive question as to who or what chooses how to become. If the self is an opening, who or what exercises choice in the opening?

Here we are confronted with the full subject-verb-object problematic structure of commonplace language (all languages?). “The subject-verb-object structure of language, along with its world view, tend to impose itself very strongly in our speech, even in the cases in which some attention would reveal its evident inappropriateness. For example, consider the statement, “It is raining.” What is the “It” that would according to the sentence, be “the rainer that is doing the raining”? Clearly, it is more accurate to say, “Rain is going on” Thus instead of saying, “An observer looks at an object, we can more appropriately say, “Observation is going on in an undivided movement involving those abstractions customarily called the “human being” and the object he is looking at.” (Bohm, 1980:29)

The light does not flash. Instead, the flash and the light are one thing. Similarly we are the thoughts, experience, and the feelings, rather than say that we think, experience, and feel. The thoughts, experiences, and

feelings manifest the self. Consequently there is no chooser who exercises choice. Having said this, the factuality of the subject-verb-object structure in language, however, still needs to be explained.

A modification to the above definition of the self is called for here. The self is not so much a pre-choice opened up context in which consciousness and choice are made objectively possible. Rather, it is an opened up context in which *an appearance* of consciousness and choice is made possible. It is an opening in which the human being *appears* to manifest and make choices. A dream is an opening in which we appear to make real choices until we wake up. It is in this sense that human existence is drama of *appearances*. The self is the opening that makes this play of appearances possible. But in the same sense that a dream cannot be contrasted with reality, so must “appearances” here not be contrasted meaningfully with “reality.” We will allude to this observation in the next section.

Our position now is that human existence is a drama of appearances⁴, and the self is the opening that makes possible this play. The psychology of becoming is an apparent process in which consciousness appears to become another consciousness.

The Process of the Psychology of Becoming

A position of lack inherently refers itself to its opposite position of non-lack. Indeed, non-lack is only conceivable relative to lack. Similarly, the relative position of inferiority is non-inferiority (incarnating variously). Consequently, a position of lack entails two things, namely non-contemporaneous differentiation of positions, and a readiness to transgress the divide. The implied “I am inferior” of human existence, entails the non-contemporaneous separation between inferior and its opposite non-inferior in the self, and readiness to move from inferior to non-inferior. There is a conscious(ness) split or conflict. The what (consciousness) is stands in conflict with the what (consciousness) could be. This consideration points to a fundamental observation.

The desire to become not incomplete or non-inferior establishes a position of inferiority. Pain is as such relative to non-pain. The feeling of pain is the psychological movement to non-pain. To exist is consequently to manifest the movement towards becoming non-lack. To exist is to also manifest the conflict between lack and non-lack. This is the pre-existence package. The human being only (appears to) chooses how, i.e., the means to resolve the conflict and he or she cannot choose not to resolve the conflict.

The means are external. The external is interpreted to fulfil the inner requirements. Regarding our man above, he “thinks” that he can purge

⁴ From here on it must be taken as a given that this paper is discussing appearances. The word appearance and its derivatives will be used only when absolutely necessary.

the inferiority if only he acquired a university degree. The man then moves non-contemporaneously, i.e., in time and advances his outward capabilities. Through acquiring knowledge and his degree, the self (the opening) expands (or inflates) a little, and consciousness becomes a “somebody.” This achievement does not, however, alter the structure of the self. The process occurs within the opening, i.e., the self. There is only a feeling of gratification. The non-contemporaneous relativity of inferiority vis-à-vis non-inferiority does not change. The man is again compelled to annul the inferiority. The man is convinced that this will now be accomplished if only he is a professor. Another (seemingly different) psychological conflict is then created, and the man progresses outwardly. Everything (including other people) has only instrumental value to an ideal projected terminal. This process and pattern is repeated over and over again. If the man’s experience of life remains within the existential self, conflict is inevitable. He will win some battles, but he will always lose the war. The whole movement arises out of and falls into the self. The self, being a dream that it is, has no history. History is only outward technological change.

What we consider change is only an outward movement. Consequently, when we think that we have developed, it is actually only the outward progress. The outward becomes the inward, but it is actually only the outward. If the self of our man above could be annulled, then the man would really progress psychologically. His experience of life would not be confined within a particular psychological pattern. This development would inevitably impact on the outward movement. If his root motivation is no longer to become a “somebody”, this obviously alters his situation fundamentally.

This is also true phylogenetically. Outward organisational, technological, social, political, or religious change will not detonate the core of human conduct. Outward reformation does not touch and resolve the existential situation of the human being. Resolving the existential psychological situation, on the other hand, will naturally and inevitably transform and revolutionise society fundamentally.

The above existential narrative of our man indicates that the existential moral history of the human being is realistically described by Sisyphus’s eternal incline – the notion of eternally pushing a bolder up a hill only to have and see it roll to the bottom again. With each Sisyphean cycle, the self – the opening – expands correspondingly like a balloon. There is a marginal increase in the volume of the balloon, but the balloon is still a prison. The now inflated balloon clearly is more spacious. There is marginal increase in freedom. This new freedom, however, still remains limited because the balloon is still there. One is freer, but still not free. This is what we earlier on christened “arrested development.”

This is the existential story of the human being. Struggling in a dark floating balloon looking for a black cat (freedom) that is not there. Can the balloon continue to expand indefinitely? Who knows? But this consideration point to another consideration, namely that of free will.

Does The Human Being Have Free Will?

In normative discourse, the basic theme in the discussions on human free will is the conflict presented by two divergent views (There are always two apparently conflicting views in any discussion of human nature. In knowing one view, you also know the other). One view suggests that the human being is completely determined by circumstances which he or she cannot control, and thus the idea that the human being is free in his or her decisions is nothing but an illusion if not a delusion. This is because according to determinism, the world, or nature is everywhere subject to causal law, and every event in it has a cause. If this is true, then every event that actually happens has to happen since it logically follows from a description of the conditions of its occurrence, together with the relevant laws of nature. If human actions are included (which they must since they are part of nature) in the deterministic system, it follows that no one is morally responsible for his or her actions. Therefore, as far as human behaviour is concerned, determinism can be construed as implying that the more we learn about a person's past history, the less he or she seems responsible for his or her present behaviour. This is so also because neurologically, the brain's function was set up in the past. The conclusion drawn from this view is that the human being is not free, and cannot be judged for his or her actions.

The conflicting view, not surprisingly, basically contends that the human being has the faculty of free will which is exercisable regardless of psychological or external conditions. This means that the human being is responsible for his or her actions and can be judged by them. This is the judicial position. A modification of this premise holds that in certain psychological and external conditions (say in cases of insanity), the exercise of free will is thwarted.

The judicial position does not, of course, deny the cause-effect reality. The position recognizes the sequence when a cue (under the direction of a pool player) strikes a cue ball which then strikes a billiard ball. The position, however, objects to the monistic principle that the laws of the same kind operate in all nature by appealing to history. It is proposed that whilst history demonstrates that the physical universe (say the billiard ball) has not changed, i.e., the billiards balls have not become nothing more than what they are as they are caught in the cause-effect drama, human beings have become more than what they were, (Harris 1969:86) so the judicial position holds.

But have human beings fundamentally become anything else other than what they have always been, in conflict? Sections 2 and 3 of this paper demonstrated that whilst knowledge has evidently progressed, the basic structure of society has not changed. Does this paper therefore subscribe to the deterministic position?

The human being (notwithstanding historical evidence of arrested development) is undeniably different from the billiard ball in as much as the

human being has a psychological life. When we observe the billiard ball we are analyzing something that (we presume) is inanimate – something that has no mind hence no inner life. A human being, however, is animate – he or she has an inner life – hence the question of free will. Of course, quantum physics in analyzing the inner (microscopic) life of a billiard ball finds that the electron is not determinable; that the laws of determinism applicable on the macroscopic level do not hold at the inner (microscopic) level. The behavior of the electron, according to quantum mechanics, is inherently random and unpredictable and its behavior can be understood only in terms of probabilities or tendencies. Thus viewed from the microscopic level, the predictability on the macroscopic level is a statistical computation of the probability behavior of a (tremendously) large number of the fundamental building materials. Thus the predictability of the billiard ball is nothing more than a statistical computation of the laws governing large numbers.

But even if the “uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics was established for human brain cells, we should not like to think of our behaviour as having randomness or "freedom" in the quantum sense. People displaying this sort of freedom, are usually put under psychiatric care! The uncertainty principle would solve nothing for human freedom in itself. The principle, however, allows that if there are purposive events in the world that originate with our own minds, the laws of nature are not such as to confine these in a deterministic straight-jacket set up thousands of millennia before we existed.” (Morris 1972:45)

Indeed quantum mechanics simply suggests that nature is not always deterministic. It does not assert that there is free will as an opposition to determinism. Since there is no final scientific theory, it cannot be said that the universe is either ultimately deterministic or ultimately indeterministic. Therefore we cannot from physical theories alone draw any conclusions, for example, about the ultimate limits of human freedom.

It is difficult to predict how a single individual will cast his or her vote in a political election (and more so in an atmosphere of political intimidation), but we can predict with a fair degree of accuracy how the whole country will vote. But there is fundamental difference. The unpredictability in atomic behavior is not attributable to something mental inside the electron – something that wills or thinks. The (un)predictability in the human being is, on the other hand, attributable to his or her inner life. Discourses on free will therefore inquire whether this thinking is free or not. Of importance to psychoanalysis are the above two conflicting positions, the position adopted by Sigmund Freud (the deterministic position), and the judicial position.

It has also been suggested that the human being is genetically determined. It is all in the genes. Scientists are discovering genes that control our physical development, our appearance, and our health. Naturally this has led to discourses and deliberations on “whether there are genes that determine what sort of person we are going to become. Could it be that

genes within us are pulling invisible strings that lead us through life quietly deciding who we will work for, who we will fall in love with, or marry, and even for whom we will vote? Do our chromosomes contain genes for sociable, shy, or criminal, behaviour, for scientist, priest, murder, etc? It may sound crazy, but it is an idea that some researchers take seriously.”⁵

Analytically, both deterministic positions (Freudian and genetic) plunge us into an infinite lineal regress. However, with the Freudian position the future is not much different from the present, whereas with the genetic position the future is open. Our present conflicts and struggles are anchored in the past according to these two positions. Turning the telescope to the future, the Freudian position implies it will be in conflicts and struggles. A future in the hands of our genes, on the other hand, is open and subject to how the genetic coding instructs our cognitive and interpretative faculties. But is the whole determinism doctrine valid?

It is impossible to refute determinism precisely because any position one adopts, can be attributed to determinism – it was determined that one would adopt the position. Determinism has, however, profound unsavory moral implications. Taken to its extreme a regress into the past to establish primordial cause terminates at God. At this level, determinism undergoes some spiritual metamorphosis and becomes pre-destination – the notion that some God established the fate of people’s lives long before they are even born. This position can (and is) used to rationalize the protection of interests and privileges. It is a tool that is used to institutionalize all form of discriminations. The white person is destined to be superior to the black person and the woman will always be a woman and her fate is subservience to the male. Adolf Hitler’s doctrine of superior race comes to mind. Historical struggles against class domination, however, seem to deny determinism, at least at the level of the individual.

Having argued that the cause of the woman’s subservience to the man lies in the past, it would make nonsense out of logic and reason to further propose that the woman’s decision today to resist and fight male domination also is determined from the past. Of course, even this critique on determinism does not a priori invalidate it. But I think it is strategically sound not to adopt the deterministic position at the level of the individual, though determinism may have a case on the level of human interactions, i.e., at the social level. At this level, it may be valid to say that human beings are determined to conflicts and strife as exemplified by historicosocial class struggles. The regress to God would then invite the question: “Are human beings destined to struggling against each other?”

⁵ This is taken from a television documentary series, “Cracking The Code.” This particular quote is from the episode *Freedom In Genes*. A very interesting documentary series, whose other episodes includes *The Cancer Hunters*, and *Body Invaders*. Unfortunately I cannot recall and am not able to furnish the details pertaining to production information except to say that the narration is by Dr David Suzuki.

This is a way of inquiring whether we are destined to a life of resisting and fighting (or attempting to changing) each other at the individual level; whether we are destined to use each other.

Human existential moral history, as alluded to in Section 3, is a portrayal of social conflicts and struggles – finite beings fighting other finite beings. This historical legacy evinces some sort of capacity for change in the individual. The woman has the capacity to change and resist male domination. But this capacity also presupposes that the male can change his ways. The indigenous people's decision to fight colonialism demonstrates the capacity for change in the indigenous people and presupposes the capacity for change in the colonizer. The court's conviction of a crime presupposes the defendant could have acted otherwise.

The judicial position in negating determinism at the individual level is, however, judgmental. Its operative norm is a certain subjective good: "Your way is not good, and I want you to change to my good," To put it exploitatively, "Your actions are not profitable to me."

This is not surprising and inappropriate. Society, being based on usage, in general does not generally encourage freedom. It wants people to be predictable. The issue of determinism vis-à-vis free will comes to the fore when interests clash, and to avoid (or is it to conceal) these clashes, society adopts norms of behavior that aim to instill discipline in the citizenry and hence ensure predictability. So it is on the individual level. The settler to ensure efficient and maximum profitable exploitation establishes norms of conduct which the indigenous inhabitants must imbibe. Any revolt (show of resistance) against these norms is unlawful and punishable. And, of course, the post-settler revolutionary leadership perfects these norms to entrench its hold to power.

The judicial position does not therefore support the real exercise of one's free will. The will to change is never free, but influenced. It is influenced persuasively, threateningly, or forcibly, but always never free. But this is not all. The norms of the preferred conduct are not new, but influenced from the past. Even the individual's conception of the future is determined by the past. The judicial position is therefore also determined by virtue of the past influencing the conception of desired state. It is, however, not determined in the Freudian sense of incapability to change, only norms driving this change are determined.

I can change (not freely or willingly but through influence) from what I presently am to something else (psychologically), but the conception of this projected position is informed from what I presently am. Fear of imprisonment influences my decision not to steal, but knowledge that stealing is an offense is from the past. Fear of litigation, and being labeled a freak influences my decision to consider the woman as my equal (at least behaviorally). The judicial position, notwithstanding its deterministic element, seems to imply that the human being is (infinitely?) malleable.

But what influences the woman to fight male domination, i.e., to want to change the man? It certainly is not fear, or any outward compulsion.

In other words why are individuals for ever locked in conflict (i.e., wanting to change others and themselves) such that it appears as if human beings are (Freudianly) determined to be in conflict?

To recap the salient features of this article, conflict is inevitable as long as the basic structure of society remains anchored on the psychology of becoming. The psychology of becoming creates conflict between “what is” and the ideal “what should be.” Inevitably relationships are built and sustained on usage and aggrandizement. The external environment becomes the instrument by which the “what should be” is realized. The external environment is rearranged in accordance with the “what should be.” You are presently not free (inferior), and so you want to become free. There is conflict between your conceptions of yourself as not free, and free. And since, according to you, the external is the oppressor, i.e., the external causes you to perceive yourself as not free, then you naturally would like it rearranged to suit your conception of freedom. The environment is an instrument that satisfies your feelings of both oppression and freedom. As a result, you want me – the colonizer, man, parent, teacher, politician, husband, wife, etc. – to change.

Unfortunately, my own psychological insecurity (fear of losing control and becoming something – albeit less than what I presently conceptualize myself as), which is another form of psychological inferiority complex, resists your intentions to use me as I am using you. The result is a social revolution to physically eradicate and eliminate the impediment to our ideals. A “new” environment is created. Not surprisingly, however, this environment does not bring about an end to conflict. Being still anchored on usage and aggrandizement, it has its own form of social classes. The social (construct) organization changes, but conflict remains. The psychological struggle to become something (or fear of becoming something) influences human behavior. But is this desire a product of free will?

The central thesis of this paper in regards to free will is that one’s will is free only when he or she is free to exercise that will. In other words, in a state of freedom, the will is free. In this state, the will is spontaneous and expressive of the true nature of the human being. And so the question is, “Is the existential situation the true essence of the human being?”

Here we are now confronted with the question, “Is the self the only opening that reveals and makes possible the human experience of life?” Again, in light of what has been said about appearances, this question addresses the ontological significance of the existential situation of the human being.

Defining the self as a pre-choice opening in which the existential experience of the human being is made available and possible raises some very pertinent concerns. Among these is the meaning of self-reflection or introspection. The two concepts are implied in any discussion on free will. Indeed free will presupposes an ability and capability not only to think freely, but also for introspection and self-reflection. But if the self is what

makes cognition and introspection possible, what then is being introspected and self-reflected upon?

Our definition of the self tells us that self-reflection, or introspection is a reflection *in* the self, and not on the self. Self-reflection must, however, be distinguished from say self-concept. Self-concept does not refer to a concept of the self as in “an image of the self.” In this sense, a concept is like reflection. It is practically impossible for the self to have an image or idea of itself as it is for it to reflect on itself. Can the eye that sees see itself?

Indeed whatever the supposedly concept the self can have as its own image is certainly not of itself. David Hume agrees when he says:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat, cold, light, or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but perception. (quoted in Shoemaker 1963:73)

Nietzsche declares:

We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and with good reason. We have never sought – how could it happen that we should ever *find* ourselves?... So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we *have* to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law “Each is furthest from himself” applies to all eternity – we are not “men of knowledge” with respect to ourselves. (Urama 2001:77)

One can only discover something that he or she can identify. Searching presupposes a notion or account of what it would be like to be aware of the object of the search. Can the self set up a criterion for its own identity? Any criteria recede retrogressively as the self is approached and plunges us into an infinite “who is it that set up the criterion.”

“Self-concept” consequently speaks of a concept in the self. It is a content of the self. It refers to a moment or state of consciousness, a consciousness that is revealed in (and itself revealing) the self. The assertion “I am a philosopher” certainly does not suggest that it is “I” that is the philosopher. Rather “philosopher” is a concept in the self, in the “I.”

There is, however, a fundamental difference between a concept and reflection. Reflection is a cognitive process. Here I agree with Bernard Lonergan who observes that:

There is the word introspection, which is misleading as it suggests an inward inspection. Inward inspection is just a

myth. Its origin lies in the mistaken analogy that all cognitional events are to be perceived on the analogy of ocular vision; consciousness is some sort of cognitional event; therefore, consciousness is to be conceived on the analogy of ocular vision; and since it does not inspect inwardly, it must be an inward inspection. (Lonergan, 1972:8)

I, however, am not sure of the degree of convergence between Lonergan and this paper when he says

However, “introspection” must be understood to mean, not consciousness itself but the process of objectifying the contents of consciousness. Just as we move from the data of sense through inquiry, understanding, reflection, judgment, to statements about sensible things, so too we move from the data of consciousness through inquiry, understanding, reflection, judgment, to statements about conscious subjects and their operations. (Lonergan 1972:8-9)

If by “we” Lonergan refers to a substantive entity, an experiencer, then he and I part company even though in all likelihood our destination is the same. Suggesting that introspection is a process by which I analyze my subjective experience implies a division between my experience and me. The position of this paper is that introspection has more to do with trying to ground the experiencer by, for instance asking, “Who or what am I?” rather than trying to understand how and what I experience. But can *I* answer the question, “Who am I?”

This paper suggests that self-reflection or introspection speaks of a process *in* the self. It is, however, neither a process by or contained in the self. Like cognition and interpretation, introspection is a process that manifests the self. Through seeing a tree, I also become aware of myself. However, there is a fundamental difference. The self itself is in that state of process. What does this mean?

Self-reflection speaks of the inherently negating state of the self. The opening does not so much pose a question; rather, the opening itself is a question. The opening is a question that *it* cannot answer. It cannot account for its toehold. The self cannot account for its rational foundation or authenticity. The self as a pre-choice opening that is in a state of introspection, refers itself to something other than itself. To what could it be referring itself? The opening judges *itself* in reference to what? Reflection cannot “grasp its own ground. It is never transparent of itself and in itself, it therefore stands in need of an other to justify its own ways.” (Urama, 2001: 77) This paper proposes that the “other” is the whole cosmos.

The self refers itself to the whole cosmos. The self is not only a tear or incision (or a local mutation) in cosmic space, but also what caused the *appearance* of cosmic space. Human existence is a metaphysical contradiction. Ontologically, the human being is naturally at oneness with the whole cosmos. Epistemologically, however, the existential experience of the human being is that of as a separate entity from the whole cosmos. The human being is, paradoxically, existential and yet not of the existential situation. Human existential consciousness, cognition, and interpretation suggest that the human being is naturally and essentially a fragment that is apart from his or her natural and essential ontic position of at oneness with the whole cosmos. The implications of this contradiction for the discourse on free will is contained in the following question,

IS THE SELF HERMETICALLY AND STRUCTURALLY SEALED OFF FROM THE REST?

We can only explore this problem very marginally. The best that we can do is to indicate in the propositional form. The introspective or questioning state of the self suggests that the division between the self and the whole cosmos is more shadowy than real. It *appears* as if there is a division. The referential introspective or self-reflective mode of the self also suggests that the fundamental existential motivation for the human being is to experience oneness or consummation with the whole cosmos, and I refer to this as the existential theory of human motivation.

The human being, however, simply cannot choose not to be part of the whole creation. The human being, however, can think that he or she is a separate entity from the rest. But that thought does not invalidate or affect the unity of creation, it only affects how the human being conceptualizes existence and how he or she relates with the rest. The existential condition does not, however, affect his or her natural condition. The natural condition of the human being is union with the rest, which he or she is not free to annul. In this context, the human being is free only when he or she is in a state of complete union with the rest, because only then is he or she able to realize his or her nature. The human being is, therefore, already free to exercise his or her will, and he or she is also determined (not free willed).

The human being is already free because his or her nature does not depend on his or her choice. He or she is, however, determined if and when he or she thinks because thought creates a condition that compels him or her to drive for the state of complete freedom. Thinking is the medium through which the self is mediated. If the human being's experience of life is confined within the psychology of the self then he or she is not fundamentally free, hence does not exercise free will. This brings us to the questions, "Is the human being capable of change even if he or she wants to?" "And if he or she can, is even his or her changing a product of past conditioning?"

This article proposes that the human being is not naturally tethered to the past, hence naturally free to exercise his or her will provided there is no desire to become something. The desire to become has two profound implications. Any movement that arises out of desire is historically influenced; it is existentially tethered to the past by virtue of accumulating and adding on to and rearranging what is already in place. Secondly desire creates a condition of enslavement and fear. It (desire and not the past) ipso facto predetermines the human being to change and search for freedom. It creates a self in a state of referring. However, a reactionary and consequential response mediated through desire only further predetermines the search for freedom. Under this position the human being is not historically determined to change fundamentally. Instead, the human being conditions himself or herself to seek freedom. The search for freedom literally manufactures un-freedom. This observation is not unlike using “the felicitous term coined by Antony Giddens, ours is a manufactured uncertainty. Uncertainty is not something we repair, but something we create, and create ever anew and in bigger quantities, and create it through our efforts to repair it.” (Bauman 1999:145)

A young man approached an old woman. In his right fist the young man concealed a bird. The bird was alive. The young man outstretched his arm to the old woman, and with a smile, challenged her. “Tell me old woman, is the bird in my fist dead or alive?” The young man was convinced that the old woman would fail the challenge either way. If she responded that the bird was alive, the young man would simply squeeze his fist tighter and on opening the fist, a dead bird would be exposed. If the woman said that the bird was dead, the young man would simply open his fist and reveal a bird that was alive. So either way the old woman would fail the challenge. The old woman, however, looked into the young man’s eyes and with a smile said, “It is all in your hand my son.”

Indeed, to be free or not to be, is literally in our hands, or minds to be precise. Desire is the trigger that activates the psychological process. The desire to be, not the past, not only imprisons but also conditions us to search for freedom and peace. Sai Baba puts it this way:

Everyone is saying “I want peace.” Peace is like a letter in an envelope. The “I” of the “I want peace,” is the front of the envelope and the “want” is the back. The “peace” itself is the letter inside. Throw away the envelope of the “I” and “want” and keep the precious letter of peace. (Sandweiss, 1975:148)

Of fundamental importance is therefore not whether the human being is capable of changing if he or she wants to, but whether the human

being can end desire – the “I want” envelope of peace – even if he or she wants to.

Desire is not an actuating emotion of the individual. Rather, desire is a movement of consciousness. The self does not desire to become something, or to change. Rather, desire is the movement of consciousness in the self. We cannot therefore deliberate on the human beings ability and capacity to end desire for the simply reason that there is no division between the self and desire. Consequently, there is no self that can be considered as capable or not capable of ending desire – the self and desire are one and the same thing. Electricity and electrons are the same thing by virtue of electricity being a movement of electrons. And so it is with the relationship between the self and desire.

But the mediating mechanism for consciousness is thought, i.e., thought expresses consciousness. Logically therefore, desire is thought in motion. Thought, however, is a movement of knowledge. We can therefore say that desire is knowledge in motion. We are now confronted with the challenge of whether knowledge can end itself.

Knowledge as Wholly Instrumental: Putting It All Together

When reference is made to human experience and we deliberate, dialogue, and pontificate, on values, paradigms, concepts, and indeed the whole human enterprise, we are using and alluding to knowledge. Here we are not concerned with the epistemological questions of how we know that we know, and the argument of empiricism vis-à-vis rationalism. Of our concern here is the basic fact that we use knowledge.

Knowledge is contextual. It exists by virtue of its application. Its function precedes and determines its nature and significance. Thus the ontic status of knowledge is determined by human existence. We cannot make reference to a rational foundation for (any) knowledge except within a human context. Indeed, even suggesting an objective foundation unmediated by human cognition and interpretation has significance only within a human context. This ontic status of knowledge affirms that existential knowledge is wholly psychological and subjective. The mental aspect of knowledge does not in any way negate or dispute physical realism. It merely derives from the observation that our interaction with our environment is not purely and democratically interactive in the sense that some form of discourse ethics exists between the tree and us. Certainly, we cannot consider the tree as fully and voluntarily participating with our investigations to reveal its nature. Consequently, under this position, all knowledge of the physical and material universe is only our interpretation; our knowledge *is a way of seeing* hence merely perception and not true knowledge (true knowledge being defined as the true essence of phenomenon). We will return to this point later on. For now we are saying that our interaction with the environment and universe is wholly astigmatic

and subjective. This subjectivity obviously impacts on the knowledge produced.

The instrumental aspect of our knowledge (perceptive knowledge) derives from the contextual and subjective nature of knowledge, which indicates that knowledge, arises out of the human being's psychology of becoming. Knowledge enables the human being to (subjectively and undemocratically) survey and orientate his or her life, construct his or her environment, and interact with this environment of his or her creation. This environment and consequently human experience and conduct are limited to and by the world of his or her knowledge. The human being's ability to make sense of the world around him or her is limited by the tools (knowledge) at his or her disposal. But since the tools themselves are the ones constructing the world of the human being's experience, then the tools themselves are always limited.

We can distinguish the tools between outwardly directed and inwardly directed knowledge. Outwardly directed knowledge can be technical (of writing, cars, etc.), aesthetic and ethical (beauty, "real man," simple, elegant, good, etc.), situational (husband, wife, philosopher, tourist, etc.), ideological (political and social ideologies, religious, scientific, etc.), entertaining (movies, books, curiosity, etc.), and so on. This knowledge arises out of the human being's interaction with the environment, and enables him or her to function outwardly. This knowledge assumes a quasi-objective status by being "measurable" and "spatially identifiable" to a certain extent. This knowledge is also capable of being acquired and possessed in the becoming process. We can, for instance, gather knowledge of being husband, and socially measure the performance of the husband, or the effectiveness of a political ideology. Human existential history and development demonstrates that this knowledge is fallible and experiential. Outwardly directed knowledge is open to criticism, review, revision, and modification (*ad infinitum?*). Since this knowledge defines human existential experience then this existence and experience is outwardly experimental.

Inwardly directed knowledge is knowledge of lack or deficiency and gratification. It filters through as feelings (pain, fear, anxiety, sorrow, love, anger, joy, etc.). This knowledge is "immeasurable." It is also not cumulative and hence not fallible.

The existential human activity to reiterate for emphasis employs knowledge to its own ends. The self is thus terminal in the sense that all human activity emerges from it and dies into it; it sets the goal, and is also the goal; the beginning and end are the self but not necessarily the same. We can summarize this process as: "I (=terminal) want to satisfy (=instrumental knowledge) me (=terminal). This is a circular causal relationship with progress (or regress), if any, introducing a spiral twist so that the end is the same but not the same. The end is the self, albeit a psychologically different consciousness – consciousness has changed and become another consciousness. This circular causal relationship applies to

all human conduct. Knowledge of sin is instrumental in my interaction with others, and labeling you a sinner is merely a means to satisfying myself of my sinlessness; I am a better (or superior) person than you are. Someone holds a gun to your head, you want to satisfy your desire for living. Fundamentally, it is not the gun that causes you to cower, but your knowledge of what the gun does (A child will not necessarily break down in tears at a gun pointing at its head.). This brings us to the dual aspect of knowledge in its functioning – that of its passive and active nature.

Pure instrumental denotes that a tool is active only when the user employs it to perform a function, otherwise the tool is passive. In this passive state, the user may be aware of the tool (the non-availability may inspire invention), but he or she still exercises the free choice not to use the tool. His or her awareness of the tool does not in any way influence the user's choice to employ the tool (i.e., the tool does not entice an unwilling user to employ it). In this context, the tool is ethically neutral; the tool does not influence the user in any way being completely subservient to the intentional and deliberate guidance of the user. This, however, is not always the case in practice.

In practice, tools are (to a large extent) both passive and active. This is true also for knowledge – it is not completely passive, i.e., ethically neutral. Knowledge also influences behavior. Knowledge is wholly passive only at its recording stage or at imprinting onto the human psyche, otherwise it is always active. Once recorded (or learnt, acquired and absorbed) my outwardly directed knowledge on racial relations (consciously or unconsciously) influences my interaction with people of other races. Because outer knowledge is fallible and all outer experience experiential, then this knowledge of racial relations is open to revision and modification. During this process, outer knowledge is both passive and active. It is passive in the sense of being acted upon by cognition and interpretation (the recording is reviewed and modified), and active in the sense that it influences the orientation of the reviewing and modification process. What is being reviewed and modified remains knowledge of racial relations – the process takes place within the same field of knowledge, albeit the knowledge is modified. This process is what we referred to earlier as being not a qualitative but a convenient shift. The same argument holds for all outwardly directed knowledge.

Outer knowledge does not, however, compel us, i.e., the self; it does not instrumentalize us – it only influences us. This lack of compulsive force delimits outer knowledge's claim to a terminal status. Within a human context (which is the only context there is), and specifically within the existential human context, the concept of terminal (as I see it) denotes, as indicated above, not only the end which instrumental knowledge serve, but also the ability to instrumentalize knowledge. Within this context, the ability to only influence action endows outer knowledge with an active function, but its inability to instrumentalize does not qualify it for a terminus status. Only the self is terminus.

We saw that all movement emerges from and dies into the self. What drives this movement is an aspect of the self, namely desire. Desire is the movement to escape the position of lack, i.e., to escape inner knowledge. In this sense, desire is also a form of knowledge. It is inner knowledge in motion – the knowledge of fear becoming not afraid; the knowledge of inferior becoming less inferior; the knowledge of boredom becoming excitement. Generally, as observed earlier, all movement is from a perceived inferior to a projected superior state. This movement of inner knowledge instrumentalizes outwardly directed knowledge. The knowledge of inferiority in becoming not inferior acquires (measurable and weighted) situational knowledge not only of philosopher, husband, manager, or scientist, but also knowledge of what it entails to be philosopher, husband, manager, or scientist. The knowledge of inferior becoming superior reviews and modifies outer knowledge of what it entails to be philosopher, husband, or manager.

However, because inner knowledge is not fallible, it is existentially-historically immutable. There is no knowledge that reviews or modifies inner knowledge. Outer knowledge does not use or change inner knowledge. Inner knowledge can and does use and hence decisively act on outer knowledge, but that action is not mutual and reciprocal. The implications of this for social re-organisation are very profound. Altering the outer existential environment of the human being will not decisively and definitely change the human being morally.

Human beings are born into different and altered social organizations. Consequently, they acquire and assimilate different and altered outer knowledge. But because outer knowledge is a product of desire (inner knowledge in motion), then in acquiring and assimilating outer knowledge, the individual invariably acquires desire, i.e. inner knowledge. The implication of this for social conditioning is that we do not need to allege to conscious (or unconscious) teaching of fear, anxiety, inferior, i.e., inner knowledge. Rather, merely teaching (any) outer knowledge also imparts inner knowledge. *Outer knowledge intrinsically harbors inner knowledge.* For instance, any word is a product of time. Consequently, one does not have to learn time – the mere learning of the word also imparts time. Any word therefore carries the energy of time with it, and because a word also conveys knowledge, then it also carries the energy of inner knowledge – teaching a word invariably imparts inner knowledge. A word intrinsically harbors the self.

Because any outer alteration to the human situation uses knowledge, then it does not change the human being decisively. A fundamental moral revolution (which is the only revolution) must essentially and decisively act on inner knowledge; it must bring about a review and modification of inner knowledge. This position intrinsically posits something which can act on inner knowledge without itself being acted upon by inner knowledge.

Earlier on, we alluded to the fact that all human knowledge is really just *a way of seeing*, i.e., perception – it is not true knowledge, with knowledge defined as the true essence of phenomenon. Under this position, inner knowledge is also perception – a perceived sense of lack (or deficiency), and gratification of the self. With this modification in mind, we are saying that inner perception can decisively act on outer perception without outer perception reciprocating that action. Of course, outer perception can and does influence inner perception in ways discussed above. But this influence does not decisively act on inner perception in the sense of changing its nature. It merely influences the direction of inner movement but does not stop the inner movement, which is necessary for decisively revolutionizing human existence. Now we are saying that deliberation on fundamental change necessarily posits something that acts on inner perception without itself suffering reciprocal action. Without going into details of derivatives, I will just state that the something is true knowledge. Knowledge can therefore, according to this discussion, act on inner perception without the latter reciprocally acting on knowledge.

If we recognize that the experiencer is the experience, then my world is my perception, and my perception is also my world. This is so and obviously so. In other words, I am my perception, and my perception makes what I am. Correspondingly, the existential human being mediates the self's perception, and the self's perception manifests the existential human being. From our discussion above, the self's perception does not decisively act on or affect the natural human being (or knowledge).

Given that perception cannot decisively impact on knowledge, it follows that perception cannot generate or bring about knowledge – it generates and brings about only perception. But for knowledge to act on perception there must be some form of relationship between the two – they must somehow be contiguous but separate. They must be contiguous to allow knowledge to act on perception but separate not to permit perception to decisively touch knowledge. Now can there be such a relationship? What relationship exists between outer perception and inner perception?

Outer and inner perception are, if not for desire, separate (even non-existent). Not only does desire manufacture inner perception, it uses outer perception and in that process outer perception influences inner perception. Earlier on we, however, indicated that the self is in a referential introspective or self-reflective mode. The self is itself a question that it cannot answer. This has implications for the psychology of becoming from a position of lack to one of non-lack, i.e., to a gratified position. The referential mode of the self suggests, as mentioned earlier, that the fundamental motivation of the psychology of becoming is to completely obliterate lack. This observation suggests therefore that what ignites and drives inner perception is the desire to end inner perception. The motivation underlying the movement from lack to gratification is to obliterate the self itself. The movement from inferior to a conceptual superior is not driven by the desire to acquire outer perception *per se*. Rather, the root drive is to end

the perception of inferior. But because outer perception intrinsically harbors inner perception, then the acquired outer perception carries the energy of inner inferior, which then further ignites the becoming process.

But inner perception cannot end itself. Inner perception cannot perceive itself. If the above position on motivation is sound, then what desires to end inner perception is not inner perception but something extrinsic to it. There is something that can observe inner perception in as much as inner perception can observe outer perception. Outer perception cannot observe inner perception and hence is unable decisively to act on it. Inner perception cannot observe what is external to it and so is also unable to act on it. But because inner perception observes outer perception, then outer perception influences the direction of observation of inner perception by drawing inner perception to focus on it. Similarly, inner perception influences its observer in drawing the attention of the observer to focus on its activity. This observer is knowledge. But knowledge (true essence), and perception (a way of seeing) cannot be contiguous, they are mutually exclusive. So how can knowledge observe perception?

Knowledge, we can infer from our discussion, is timeless and therefore without direction. When it focuses its attention on a particular activity, it, however, assumes a direction and it becomes perception – a way of seeing. But that process carries the energy of knowledge. Outer perception, we observed above, carries the energy of inner perception. Therefore merely teaching a word imparts inner perception. And now we are saying that inner perception being a focused attention of knowledge itself also carries the energy of knowledge. Consequently, teaching a word also imparts knowledge. But this is not knowledge as in grasping the true essence of phenomenon. Rather, this is knowledge as a remembrance of knowledge – remembrance of the true essence of phenomenon. It is this remembrance that ignites human activity; it is the fundamental drive for human activity. Outer perception carries a remembrance of its source – inner perception – and inner perception carries a remembrance of its source – true essence. Remembrance is actually what observes inner perception. The referential mode of the self speaks of this remembrance. The self is haunted by the remembrance of the lost paradise. *A Course In Miracles* puts it this way:

This world you seem to live in is not home to you. And somewhere in your mind you know that this is true. A memory of home keeps haunting you, as if there were a place that called you to return, although you do not recognize the voice, nor what it is the voice reminds you of. Yet still you feel an alien here, from somewhere all unknown. Nothing so definite that you could say with certainty you are an exile here. Just a persistent feeling, sometimes not more than a tiny throb, at other times

hardly remembered, actively dismissed, but surely to return to mind again. (ACIM Vol.1, 1985:331)

Inner perception of lack, i.e., imperfection, incompleteness, and their feelings of fear, unworthiness, and inferior, etc., are all actually remembrances of our true essence. Inner perception is consequently not terminal, but also instrumental. From the perspective of outer perception, its link to inner perception is its remembrance. Similarly, from the perspective of inner perception, its link to knowledge is its remembrance. But remembrance does not act on what you remember. Rather, remembrance only draws you to what you remember. This aspect of remembrance grants inner perception the dual function of being terminal with regards to outer perception and instrumental in relation to itself in the sense of desiring to end itself as it remembers knowledge. This aspect of remembrance is what we refer to as conscience. Discourses on free will, hope, ethical norms, etc. are the explicit manifestations of remembrance as conscience.

How does perception revert to knowledge when perception ceases to move? The message is “Don’t do anything.” Just understand that doing something always involves the self. Any method is a movement to become something, hence focused attention. On the other hand, without movement, there is no focused attention. From a meaningful analytical point of view, any further investigation from this point onwards, such as inquiring into what stops perception from moving, or how perception can be stopped, draws one into an infinite regress. And with this in mind, I think we have said enough.

But what is it that convinces us that this paper has significance? Also, is a comprehensive moral revolution of society a practical possibility, or merely an intellectual proposition?

HOPE TALK

Having presented a conceptual framework for a comprehensive and social revolution, we are still confronted with the seductive problem of the grounding of such an exposition. Is this exposition merely a product of wishful thinking? Is it an intellectual flight from the rigors and realities of the existential, a flight that is animated by a subjective hope for something other than the existential? Is the exposition merely a product of historical evolution notwithstanding this paper’s rejection of such a historical account? Indeed what is the grounding of our certainty of anything?

That grounding is trust. The ultimate meaningfulness and nature of reality cannot be concretely substantiated beyond our trust. In all likelihood, the existential world is as such because we trust it to be as such. Any venture beyond this law of perception, and all the generalizations also have their toehold on trust.

The existence of an objective world independent of human experience is strictly philosophically improvable, improvable “as against a

philosophical solipsist, for whom the “self” alone, the ego, exists and all the objects of the external world and also other selves are merely contents of consciousness, merely dreamlike projections. The history of modern epistemology from Descartes, Hume and Kant, to Popper and Lorenz, has – it seems to me – made clear that the fact of any reality at all independent of our consciousness can be accepted only in an act of trust.” (Kung, 1984:227)

It is, therefore, on an act of trust that I am reasonably confident that this treatise is not merely wishful thinking, but is grounded on a firm foundation to explore the significance and meaning to the existential struggles. It is on an act of trust that I generalize what I feel strongly. That all human beings struggle and hurt; that they all long for something other than the existential experience. It is also on trust that I also propose than even someone who rejects the hypothesis of a deep longing in the human being “must occasionally wonder if it really can be the meaning of his life to be constantly hurrying and scurrying to make money and a career and beyond this at best to indulge in chatter and pleasure.” (Kung, 1984:187)

But if the existential experience is accepted on trust, what is the toehold that leverages the consideration of a change in this trust? What is the grounding of the consideration of a possibility of a comprehensive moral revolution as expounded in this paper? That the existential human being is not only able but also capable of decisively revolutionizing the trust that grounds his or her existential experience? Is there hope for the human being awakening to his or her natural state?

The full seductive force of the foregoing concerns draws from the observation that only a few people appear to be seriously concerned about the human existential situation. Many people engage exhaustively in processes of work, and the daily struggle for livelihood security (more so in developing countries) and appear to have scant interest on the question of deeply and profoundly changing the trusted society. Teilhard de Chardin’s observation of 1965 seems to be as pertinent today as it was then. He said then,

It is in fact quite clear that that ninety-nine men out of a hundred never explicitly ask themselves the question, “Is life worth living?” They fail to see the problem because life is still carrying them along automatically, just as it did the unreasonable beings who, until man, were alone in conducting the work of evolution.⁶ (Chardin, 1965:42)

Also, some of us have given up on the capacity of the human being doing anything right. A large number of people throughout the world do not believe that they make a difference. In a generation “of so many colossal

⁶ I, however, part company with Chardin’s implication that human awakening is a historical possibility and destiny.

disappointments, men have lost faith in God, faith in man, and faith in the future. Many feel as did William Wilberforce, who in 1801 said, "I dare not marry – the future is so unsettled," or as did William Pitt, who in 1806 said, "There is scarcely anything round us but ruin and despair." In the midst of staggering disillusionment, many cry for the bread of faith." (King, 1958:61)

Such feelings of helplessness and hopelessness are especially so in economically and materially impoverished communities where the meaningless, and hopelessness of social existence, and the state of siege that is raging is acute, where the sense of helplessness is acute such that hopelessness becomes the conclusion and walking nihilism becomes the enactment of it.

It is not only the poor, however, who appear thus incapacitated to change.

The sight of the poor keep the non-poor at bay. It thereby perpetuates their life of uncertainty. It prompts them to tolerate or bear resignedly the unstoppable "flexibilization" of the world. The sight incarcerates their imagination and handcuffs their arms. They do not dare to imagine a different world; they are much too chary to try to change this one. And as long as this is the case, the chances of an autonomous, self-constituting society, of republic and citizenship, are – to say the least – slim and dim. (Bauman, 1999:178)

Could it be that those few who are seriously concerned are merely fulfilling their allotted functions in some grand cosmological division of labor. Certainly the existential socio-political history of the human being does not instill a sense of confidence and optimism about the human situation. We saw in Section 3 that human social history is a chronology of changing social constructs, but the human being still has to achieve independence⁷ and dignity. Of course, institutional social constructs such as

⁷ I distinguish freedom from independence. To me, freedom is specific. We can be free from specific social constructs, but not from all of them. I can be free from colonialism but remain a slave to the same corporation that employed me during colonialism. I define independence as a state of standing out alone. Within this context, independence is not the opposite of enslavement. It is not a state in which one is free from, but in which the individual is free to. Understood thus, we ask, "Is independence possible, or merely a utopian wish?" "Can the human being be capable of standing out alone like a tree in the forest without being touched by history or social influence?" The position of this paper is that the only real hope for humankind is that independence is possible. I do not think that we can ever be free from, but I think it is possible to be free to.

colonialism and slavery do have a certain weight in that they may assume a certain element of natural state in their capacity to eat away at human freedom and dignity. But freedom from these socially constructed naturals has not awarded the human being with independence from external control. This freedom has only weighed down the human being with a debilitating sense of alienation and helplessness. "Modern man is too often not the rugged or radical individualist of legend, but rather a weak or lonely collectivist, reluctant to separate himself from, or to criticise, a group solution." (Madigan 2002:3) It is a paradox that "if freedom has been won, how does it come about that human ability to imagine a better world, and to do something to make it better was not among the trophies of victory?" (Bauman, 1999:1)

Hope has resultantly become one of the most difficult things to talk about. And yet we still must talk of hope, hope to a world-weary people. Indeed that is what we are – world-weary; we are tired. As Peter-Hans Kolvenbach reports, even in dire eternal situations, hope, not merely the provision of material necessities, sustains life.

What Jesuits working with refugees say they learnt about their needs is this: A tent or a hut to give shelter from the rain, from the blazing sun during the day and the freezing cold during the night, is important; food, however, meager and frugal, to keep the body going on the long march to the border, and medicines to fight the fever and heal the wounds are more important; but what refugees, especially young refugees, need and appreciate most is friendship, trust and a shared understanding of the reasons why they are forced to flee their country. Friendship, trust and understanding give refugees hope in their struggle against overwhelming odds. Without hope, few could survive as physically healthy and mentally sane persons. So long as there is hope, even when there is neither shelter, nor food, nor medicines, refugees even the most vulnerable among them, can overcome formidable obstacles. (Vella, 2000:50)

But how does one deliberate and convey a sense of hope to the world, not blind hope, but substantive hope – hope as a living truth that the human being can create a completely different world order?

To deliberate on hope is therefore to engage in an audacious consideration and discourse on the possibility, if any, of the human being transforming the existential situation. In this context, hope talk has a moral dimension; it has ethical weight and significance. Meditating on hope *ipso facto* gives immense hope – hope that maybe the bridge between the existential human being and the natural human being, the flame of remembrance, has not yet been completely obscured. At complete

obscurity, all sense of morality would be completely submerged, and buried beneath the weight of the outer technological and mechanical life. All forms of religion (in its etymological sense as a binding force) would finally yield, and bow down to the persistent and sustained onslaught by a “spiritless” and objective science. The human being, turned into steel, would be completely dry of tears, and insensitive to all forms of social and personal misery. At complete obscurity, the human being would be incapacitated, and completely immobilised to exercise any notion of hope, a hope that *ipso facto* brings critique to bear on the existential human situation.

Hence to deliberate, or even consider the issue of human hope, gives immense hope. As long as there is still a single human being who is capable of shedding tears of empathy, then there is hope. There is hope that maybe the human being has the will and longing for another mode of human existence. We need not consider what it is that obstructs, or holds humankind back from resolving his or her existential situational. The very possibility that the human being may have the will to change gives us reason for optimism.

We need though to consider the ground for this hope, this optimism. We need to deliberate over what it is within the human being that enables us to consider human hope in face of hopelessness, and the Sisyphean notion of human existence. Is it merely hope peddling and wishful thinking (the energy that elevates the Sisyphus bolder), or is it something else? So when we engage in hope talk, this is what we also need to consider. A hope that is not aware of the Sisyphean notion is wishful thinking and literally blind. Therefore to consider human hope is to engage in the deliberation in the full awareness of the Sisyphean notion. It is to engage in an audacious enterprise in full awareness of the many hopes betrayed, and the tragic evil and pessimism of human existence. We are talking of a hope that emerges from the pain, and tears of seeing the helplessness of the human being, the feebleness in the human attempts at resolving his or her existential situation. This is a hope that emerges from seeing how petty the existential situation has rendered human existence. This is a humbled hope and not a valorised and wishful Sisyphean hope.

A drowning person who “hopefully” affirms to himself or herself: “I am not dying” in the face of death, is trying to be defiant of the inevitable – this is wishful thinking (I wish I could not die). Hope, at least as considered here, is when you face death (without being defiant), but something in you feels humbled by the experience. You see the pettiness that death has rendered all your efforts at living. It humbles you. We are therefore considering hope as emerging from a humbled recognition of the feebleness and Sisyphean nature of human effort.

We are therefore saying that as long as (some) people engage in hope deliberations, and there is still a single human being alive who can shed tears at the agonising, and tremendous misery (both within and without), then there is hope that the human being has the will to change, and that this hope is not Sisyphean, but grounded on humbleness and

humility. The human mind has traversed all life, experienced everything, and has behaved Sisyphean, and at the end it is still capable of deliberating on human hope. This is something tremendous and immensely uplifting. The question is why? What is it within the human being that still considers hope in the face of hopelessness? I hesitate to say this, but I really cannot help wondering if this hope is not what we earlier on alluded to as a deep-seated remembrance of and longing for home – the true nature and essence of humanity.

Obviously this remembrance that still burns under the thick clouds of human helplessness cannot be personal. It is not resident in some and absent in others. It is a deep human longing. This longing is equal in all human beings; it is universal. Indeed unless our sense of hope is embedded in this universalistic perspective, then it is (so to speak) groundless.

The hope and longing have, of course, ethical weights. Harboring some sense of hope brings critique to bear on the human existential situation and invalidates the Sisyphean depiction of human nature. Hope talk presupposes some a-historical human capacity; it suggests that even though the Sisyphean notion may be historically valid, the human being is not necessarily determined or bound to history. The most important existential implication of this is that the human being is not bound to time. Understood thus, we cannot conceive of an open-ended history of human endeavour or an open or evolving universe of existence as long as we consider these as developments in time. Hope talk therefore does not indicate a future possibility but a dynamically present possibility; each moment is the dynamic present. A hope that presupposes, or expects a future better state defers the urgency of the present to some future maybe, the Sisyphean cycle. An important derivative of this position is that even though social change requires social galvanising (a process in time), the epicentre of this change is the individual (who changes now!).

Hope talk and the longing that attends it are, of course, not human nature, but merely characteristic of the human being in his or her relationship with the human existential situation. It (hope talk) must not be misconstrued as indicating the possibility of human progress and the human impossibility of paradise; as indicating human capability of both progress and regress (or lack of progress). The latter dualistic perspective of the human being is contradictory as a depiction of the nature of the human being.

The human existential situation is a package. Progress and regress are moral characterisations of the situation; they are subjective descriptions of certain aspects of the situation. These characterisations are, of course, important as they permit us to inquire into human life, but we need to recognise the subjectivity in the selection of what is good and/or bad about the existential situation. Hope talk is a complete negation of the whole existential situation – its “progress” and “regress”. As such, the longing for change, this negation, is intrinsic to the existential situation. The situation itself expresses a longing and desire for something other than this situation.

And this has been the central thesis for this article, that the human existential situation indicates what I hesitantly and timidly propose as a longing for “home”, the natural state of the human being; that the human existential situation posits something other than itself, i.e., refers itself to something else.

This paper proposed that the root existential motivation for the human being is to awake to his or her true nature. This proposition does not ask us to adopt an indifferent and callous disregard of human subjectivity and idiosyncratic desires. Rather, this assertion calls us not to demonise human actions and thereby lose sight of the humanness in all of us. The paper implied that the only solution to our seemingly endless and different struggles and problems is for the human being to awaken to his or her natural state of creation. This awakening constitutes the only true revolution of human existence.

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THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY

PURPOSE

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one's decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one's culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Studies in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

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