Philosophical Responses to Global Challenges with African Examples

Ethiopian Philosophical Studies, III

Edited by
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Introduction

Workineh Kelbessa & Tenna Dewo

Various global problems are haunting the world today. Although humanity has made incredible progress in the fields of economy, culture, science, technology, etc., it has not been able to address all problems. Currently, we are witnessing that human beings in many parts of the world are experiencing tragedies and agonies of unprecedented magnitude. A plethora of atrocities and horrendous acts have been deliberately committed by human beings against their own fellow beings in front of our naked eyes. TV is routinely full of reports on crimes against humanity, as if killing and being killed is a kind of duty. Apparently human beings are unceasingly dehumanizing rather than humanizing themselves. Some individuals give priority to their wealth and interests and ignore the plight of other human beings.

It should be stressed that human beings cannot live without one another. Human relations involve caring and sharing. Regrettably, however, the responsibility of caring and sharing is progressively declining, whereas the attitude of selfishness and indifference is unceasingly growing. It seems that human beings are superior to other species in knowing and changing things of the natural world but not in cultivating their own human character. The following observation made by Anthony Clifford Grayling perfectly depicts the present behavior of human beings:

[A]s Adorno said, the power of modern weaponry shows that we are cleverer, but not wiser, than our ancestors, for we have merely substituted the intercontinental ballistic missile for the spear, but we still behave like cavemen, motivated by greed and fear and unable to resist fights.\(^1\)

Human beings have also contributed to environmental degradation because of modern industry and technology, overexploitation of resources, unbridled, immoral, global capitalism and the like. Very often, human beings have not paid sufficient attention to the survival of non-human animals and the health of Mother Earth. Different individuals and nations have been guided by selfish economic interests at the expense of social and environmental values.

Given the global connectedness in which we find ourselves, it is a truism that there is no such thing as an isolated crisis. From the economy

to the environment, the failures of one are the failures of all. To consider all the present global dangers seriously and soberly can easily lead to despair. But if we have all fallen together, it is also the case that we may all rise together as well. Thus, there is reason to hope in order to overcome the plethora of planetary challenges facing us today, it is necessary to cultivate the wisdom of particular peoples and places so that their wisdom can be shared with the world. Different philosophical traditions can help humanity to address some of the global challenges we face today. As Irving Singer persuasively argues,

[p]hilosophers help by making important ideas a little clearer than before. At their best, they provide a challenging and novel vista upon the world. In the process they might elicit both criticism and approval from people who are willing to think about what has been argued. Future generations may go on to develop, in some manner and to some degree, whatever they garner from the challenging views. They may even use them to learn for themselves how to live. But there is no ultimate resolution to be achieved.\(^2\)

Philosophers can encourage human beings to reconsider their relationship to non-human beings and the natural environment and to lead a sustainable life; philosophy can contribute to the solution of the above-mentioned challenges; it is not irrelevant to real life problems as some people might assume.

It is really unfortunate that today philosophy itself is a misunderstood and sidetracked subject. “Philosophy is often thought to be an optional enterprise, a detached, erudite hobby for the intellectually elite or the socially disabled. Someone once defined the philosopher as ‘a person who describes the impossible and proves the obvious’.”\(^3\) The system of the present world seems to make philosophy powerless and unproductive. Grayling laments, “modern Westerners are like thirsty people drinking from a muddy puddle on the banks of a great river of clear water, as if they simply had not noticed the river’s existence, or did not know they could drink from it. The river in question is philosophy.”\(^4\) This is true not only of Westerners but also of people in other parts of the world. In an attempt to explain why people run away from philosophy, Grayling states: “[t]here are many reasons for this, but chief among them are laziness and

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\(^4\) Grayling, *The Heart of Things*, 264.
timidity." We think that not only laziness and timidity but also selfishness and ignorance have contributed to the problem.

Yet philosophy has a great potential to address global challenges. As William F. Lawhead persuasively argues, philosophy has an unfinished journey. “There are always new ideas to explore, new problems to solve, and old territory to explore in fresh ways. In this way philosophy is more like the journey we take in a lifelong friendship than a short canoe trip.”

Philosophy will continue to influence not only our thinking but also our way of life. It will continue to address various problems of societies in the years to come.

In addition to being a critical and rational enterprise, philosophy is also a discipline that studies values (especially ethical values) and is, therefore, better suited to dealing with human character. Ethics attempts to answer the fundamental question of how we ought to live our lives together and with other members of the natural world. There is no more fundamental question than this. If we seriously consider philosophy as a vocation, those of us engaged in it have a moral obligation to address this and other related questions. This is what this book aims to do, as philosophers with different backgrounds discuss the role of philosophy in addressing different global challenges.

Mogobe Ramose in “De-liberating Philosophy: Affirming Freedom” stresses that the hyphenated concept, “de-liberating,” points at two interconnected meanings: one pertains to the challenge to liberate philosophy from its self-imposed bondage to the preservation of the dominance of one epistemological paradigm tending towards world hegemony at the expense of the poor of the Earth. The other is that indifference to this challenge is tantamount to resistance to critical deliberation which is the core of philosophy as dialogue and, in our time, a necessary polylogue of world cultures and civilizations. Thus, it denies the equality of partners engaged in the dialogue. This double meaning of “de-liberation” is a challenge to freedom. The unfolding and intricate relationship between African and Western philosophy is the focal point of Ramose’s essay in defense of the thesis that the liberation of philosophy through the affirmation of freedom must be anchored in a critical deliberation of cultures and civilizations maintaining polylogue as the core meaning of philosophy.

In his essay, “Global Challenges and the Need for Dialogue among Civilizations,” Workineh Kelbessa aims to demonstrate the need for humanity to open a global dialogue on complex issues that affect the integrity of us all. He cites several issues that deserve the attention of “developed” and “developing” nations: global ecological problems such as rising sea levels, the melting of the polar icecaps, shortage of fresh water,
ozone layer depletion, anthropogenic global warming, transnational environmental crime, global poverty and inequality, imbalances in international trade rules, health issues, especially the expansion of HIV/AIDS; social and political conflict, human rights violations, transnational threats such as terrorism and humanitarian and natural disasters. Having presented evidence of bad behavior on the part of international actors and made observations regarding inadequate institutional constraints on that behavior, Kelbessa urges that offending parties enter into serious dialogue with those who suffer the consequences. Strong, wealthy nations should not presume that their self-interested reasons for acting are morally defensible; somehow or other, the interests of the weak should be effectively represented in international decision-making; and rich nations should help poor ones alleviate the various sources of suffering among their citizens. For Kelbessa, an ethically guided global dialogue of civilizations will help us to build a more civilized and a more just world.

Fasil Merawi’s “Religion, Universality, and Critical Theory” explores religious pluralism in the sphere of globalization. He employs contemporary critical social theory to delineate the status of religion in today’s “globalized” societies. Merawi argues that from the point of view of critical social theory and in an age where “globality” is being identified as an inescapable aspect of human existence, religion serves as a platform for raising issues of universality vs. cultural difference, true heterogeneity vs. enforced homogeneity, and ideological oppression vs. revolutionary emancipation. He analyzes two major strands in critical social theory’s approach towards religion. The conventional approach emphasized by philosophers like Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jürgen Habermas forwards the need to develop a philosophical critique of religion as a form of oppression, asceticism and something that ultimately needs to be transcended. Another approach developed by Cornel West, Enrique Dussel, and Mark C. Taylor emphasizes the revolutionary and dynamic aspects of religion. After considering Franz Wimmer’s and Ram Adhar Mall’s intercultural orientations, Merawi argues that in a world of globalization and re-emerging fundamentalism, ethnicity and nationalism, (1) the socio-political aspects of religion are prior to epistemic ones, (2) human cognition and religious experience are embedded and (3) religious pluralism should be conceived as part of the critique of philosophical pluralism and the modern/postmodern debate.

In “Discourse Ethics, Globalization and the Problem of Fundamentalism,” Binyam Mekonnen discusses the philosophical ground and limitations of discourse ethics in relation to the current debate on global citizenship and justice. He argues that discourse ethics predominantly employs the epistemological tool of a post-conventional communicative rationality. Despite this, fundamentalism is still one of the core problems in the contemporary global world. According to the proponents of discourse
ethics as a philosophical project, it is possible for such ethics to construct the system of globalization in a rational and peaceful fashion. As far as this claim is concerned, there is a call for discursive dialogue and communicative action through “systematic” inclusion of the Other. Practically, discourse ethics uses the character of essentialism to conceal its mythic interests within the so-called occidental universal homogenization.

Edward Alam’s “Freedom Then, Now, and Forever: Ethical Reflections” explores the relationship between freedom and ethics. According to Alam, an investigation into the history of the idea of freedom reveals that the modern notion of freedom has been progressively stripped of its deepest meaning and reduced to mere rights and individual liberties. This has been recognized by important modern thinkers such as Friedrich Schelling and Karl Marx, both of whom have tried to address this deficiency. Schelling overcomes this reductionist tendency precisely by bringing theodicy into the discussion. Marx, too, in taking Aristotle’s realism seriously, offers attractive alternatives to the reductionist notion of freedom, that is, a robust account of virtue-centered ethics. Such attempts to revive deeper and more meaningful accounts of freedom can be appropriated by all the peoples of the world, and lead to what might be described as a chance for global citizenship. A corresponding claim, Alam argues, is that such appropriation does not require peoples to give up their unique cultural differences but can actually augment these differences in the context of a rich complementarity and help promote richer, more humane and more realistic notions of freedom, citizenship and virtue, worldwide.

In “Africa and Climate Change,” Robin Attfield discusses the impact of climate change on Africa. Climate change has had negative impacts on African countries in various ways, including the inundation of coastal plains and cities as well as of islands, increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, the spread of diseases, human migration in different directions, the depletion of various species, ecosystems degradation, etc. Like other continents, its coastline is in danger of being flooded, and its islands are in danger of being inundated. Many people are forced by climate change to migrate, and this increases the flow of refugees moving both north towards the Mediterranean and south towards the Cape, seeking a viable homeland. It is in the interest of African countries to develop in ways that are climate-friendly. More electricity needs to be generated to enhance people’s quality of life, but this should be generated in environmentally friendly ways. Large schemes of tree-planting are also needed, to restore the forests of areas where they have been lost in civil conflicts (as in central and northern Ethiopia) and at the same time to sequestrate some of the carbon dioxide of the atmosphere. Attfield argues that African countries are required to tackle the problem of climate change on the basis of local knowledge in addition to pursuing their economic and social development. Current and future generations of Africans will
continue to suffer from the effects of climate change if they fail to take necessary and reasonable measures within their power. Attfield also stresses that developed countries have responsibilities to assist climate adaptation and mitigation measures in Africa.

In “The Power and Promise of Environmental Ethics and Shale Gas in the Karoo Area of South Africa,” Johan Hattingh explores whether environmental ethics can contribute to the resolution of the development-conservation conundrum as it manifests itself in the debate about Shale gas production in the Karoo, an arid zone in South Africa. He notes that there are arguments for and against the exploitation of Shale gas. Particularly, environmentalists in South Africa opposed the plan to extract Shale gas deposits in the Karoo, as it would have negative impacts on the quality of water and the stark beauty of a pristine ancient landscape. He concludes that environmental ethics can offer strong guidelines as to the implementation of hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo. Moreover, it can dictate the importance of maintaining ecosystemic processes and earth systems, and the value of Safe Minimum Standards for our actions. Similar debates in the rest of Africa on development and resource conservation can benefit from such guidelines.

Gail M. Presbey’s “The Challenge of Ubuntu Ethics and Humane Business Management in the Global Capitalist Context” discusses the role of ubuntu in business management. She critically examines the views of various scholars who hold contradictory views about the future of the capitalist system. Some of them are of the opinion that it won’t be possible to humanize the capitalist system, as it promotes money over human life. For others, the application of ubuntu management principles to the current capitalist workplace can make capitalism people friendly. Presbey recognizes the guiding role of an ubuntu ethics in determining the means to challenge and change the larger economic and political structures. She argues that as an aspirational guide to action ubuntu can still be helpful as a guide to management philosophy and practices in the current global capitalist context; however, there is a tension between ubuntu’s original context of egalitarian sharing, and the current context of most businesses who divert company profits to shareholders or owners and executives, often underpaying workers. She suggests that “ubuntu management ethics needs to take stock of its historical relation to forced labor, and management’s dedication to owners’ profits over the flourishing of its employees is a constant ethical problem.” She is of the opinion that many African workers have disappointing relationship with their current management and employer. She thinks that workers’ self-management can help solve this problem, and is a good expression of the philosophy of ubuntu. Thus, the application of ubuntu philosophy to business has the potential to enable workers to govern themselves at workplaces.
Appendices I and II focus on the life and works of the late Claude Sumner and Daniel D. Smith, the former members of the Department of Philosophy at Addis Ababa University as well as their biography and philosophical contribution.

We wish to thank all the authors for their excellent contribution as well as the Addis Ababa University for supporting this work. We would also like to express our gratitude to the anonymous reviewers of each chapter with the exception of Attfield’s chapter for their valuable comments, and the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy for its commitment to the publication of the volume.

References


I

De-Liberating Philosophy: Affirming Freedom

Mogobe B. Ramose

Modu Wa Taba

Tabakgolo taodisong ye ke gore: tokelo ya botho ya go dira ka boithatelo e tshwanetse go phedisiwa ga eba esa kgaphelwe thoko goba e gatakana yona tokelo ye ya ba bangwe batho. Go kwisisa taba ka mokgwa wo go laetsa gore tokelo ye e nyalana le toka ka gobane batho kamoka re a lekana ka botho bja rena. Re tseba gabo tse gore kgorong ya phedisano ke gona mouwe batho re seng meno resa lekane. Taodisong ye re laetsa gore thuta bothale dinageng tsa Afrika e tloga ele fase ga kgatelelo ke mafatshe a bodikela ao a ilego a tseela bana ba thari mabu ka dikgoka mola go dira bjalo ese tshwanelo. Esale go tloga nakong ye we go fitlhela lehono Afrika esa imelwa ke kgatelelo. Taodiso ye e nganga gore kgatelelo ye e tshanetse go fela go laetsa gore Afrika e lokologile ka makgonthe.

(The right to freedom ought to be seen alive in practice. Affirming this means avoiding to violate the right to freedom of the others. Understanding the right to freedom in this way is the endorsement of the principle that all human beings are ontologically equal. This equality is the basis for the demand for justice in the construction and sustenance of human relations. The argument in this essay is that philosophy in Africa is under pressure because Western colonial conquerors of Africa seized, by resort to ethically unjustifiable force, the countries of the indigenous peoples of Africa from time immemorial. The thesis defended here is that Africa ought to be relieved of this pressure by becoming authentically Africa.)

Introduction

Freedom as experience and concept is as old as human existence. The experience and concept of freedom emerges in an inextricable relationship with philosophy. The fundamental character of this relationship is the ineliminable condition of “plural intersubjectivity” and, because of this condition, “freedom remains the raison d’être of all philosophical teaching.”¹ Freedom endures as the reason for the existence of all philoso-phizing, and thus, philosophy proper is the affirmation of freedom. It is the

philosophy of liberation\(^2\) that focuses on freedom in the dynamics of the dialectical relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed and the colonizer and the colonized. In the “post-colonial”\(^3\) era, the latter is specifically the slave to the epistemology of the West.

Some philosophers continue to deliberate upon the meaning of freedom in the ever-changing human condition.\(^4\) This condition demands deliberation by affirming freedom through the rejection of self- or other-imposed slavery and, in the present context, the bondage of Western philosophy to the dominance of its own epistemological paradigm in its relation to African philosophy in particular.\(^5\) Because of this bondage that Western philosophy tends, even in its praxis, towards world hegemony.\(^6\)

To attain hegemony the West, under the leadership of the United States of America, is willing to use force if necessary, even in deliberate contravention of the ethics underlying the just war doctrine.\(^7\) The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is an example in point. Commenting on this invasion, El Baradei submits that:

> the Iraq War was a war of ideology, motivated by the fantasy of establishing Iraq as an oasis of democracy that would, in turn, transform the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Both Blair and Bush have indicated that regime change was at the heart of the motivation to go to war, regardless of the justification cited. Together with a number of their key associates, they significantly inflated the imminence of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, weapons which in fact did not exist…Both were deliberately selective in their use of available facts. And both presided over a war in which, time after time, bombing campaigns and armored assaults made little


attempt to protect the civilian population against the indiscriminate use of force, referring euphemistically to civilian deaths as ‘collateral damage’.  

Citing El Baradei and adding new information to the above citation, Schuessler corroborates the argument of El Baradei. 

One of the pillars of the will to hegemony is the doctrine of so-called anticipatory self-defense. “The doctrine is for us, not for anyone else. We will use force wherever we like against anyone we regard as a potential threat, and maybe we will delegate that right to client states, but it is not for others.” The will to world hegemony is the topic we shall focus upon. In doing so, we recognize that there are some commonly shared experiences among “the wretched of the Earth,” the colonized world, especially, Latin America. Accordingly, we will draw from this vast pool of experiences even though our focus is specifically on Africa.

The quest for the meaning of freedom in the ever-changing human condition demands deliberation in the second sense, namely, through the recognition and realization that there cannot be philosophy without dialogue: a polylogue among world cultures and civilizations without the assumption of hierarchy or superiority of one culture and civilization over the rest. This requires the move away from virtual to actual dialogue. The latter consists in the construction of “polyphonic or ‘heteroglossic’ texts that permit those being represented to speak in their own voices, tell their own stories, challenge the ethnographer’s constructions, advance alternatives…” The pursuit of actual dialogue means that:

if we are to be genuinely responsive to difference in a manner conducive to promoting mutual understanding and learning, we need to allow others to articulate their own positions in their

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13 For an extended critical discussion of the meaning and difference between culture and civilization, see Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations (New Delhi: Munshiram Manaohardal Publishers Ltd., 1997), 159-216.
own terms and accord them the status of equal partners in the conjoint exploration of a topic, to the extent that we are prepared to allow their views actively to challenge our own ‘settled opinion’, to modify our preconceptions when they are found wanting, and to learn from what they have to tell us rather than simply asserting the superiority of our own viewpoint...to stop treating those who occupy different discursive standpoints either as mirror images of ourselves or as denizens of a deficient socio-cultural standpoint who need to prove themselves to us before we will accord them a respectful hearing, and instead recognize that they represent a position comparable in value to our own from which we can productively learn.\textsuperscript{15}

To proceed from this position is to affirm human dignity, equality and freedom. Deliberation is the conceptual and moral imperative of philosophy because it gives meaning to dialogue or polylogue. We now turn to an extended discussion of the meaning of deliberation in this second sense.

**The Meaning of Deliberation**

Deliberation is defined as

that activity [which] is disintegrated, and that its various elements hold one another up. While none has force enough to become the center of a redirected activity, or to dominate a course of action, each has enough power to check others from exercising mastery...Deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more reasonable, more intelligent than would be the case with ‘blind’ trial and error.\textsuperscript{16}

The above definition implies that deliberation always involves a critical element. It is a philosophical critique in the sense that:


A philosophical education is always a critique of knowledge systems. When philosophy wants to contribute to freedom, it does not offer to replace ethical, cultural or political contents by others of the same nature, but offers a strict and radical criticism of any closed corpus of beliefs, precepts or dogma. When the teaching of philosophy is reduced to an ethical indoctrination, it betrays its liberating function.  

And, 

A philosophical education’s liberating power, however, lies in its capacity to carry out the shift from the particular to the general.

According to Scarantino, the liberating “intention” of philosophy means that “philosophical teaching cannot postulate new substantial entities any more than it can replace an immediate determination of data by a metaphysical determination.” We concur with Scarantino that dogmatism is incompatible with the core meaning of philosophy either in its etymological or constantly debatable technical sense. Dogmatism is fundamentally at odds with philosophy precisely because it denies and rejects dialogue. Dialogue is the core meaning of philosophy. There are, however, a few problems pertaining to Scarantino’s characterization of philosophy.

The first problem pertains to logic as “the theory of inquiry,” to borrow from Dewey’s terminology. The point here is that philosophy as a critique is already enmeshed in a particular and complex matrix of experience. This embeddedness in experience means that philosophy cannot rid itself totally of the entirety of experience, that is, it is ontologically and epistemologically tainted even before it can announce its critique of existing “knowledge systems.” The philosophical critique of existing “knowledge systems” is an already tainted critique in the sense that it declares an option for one or another “knowledge system” on the ground of intelligent discernment. In this way, philosophical critique is necessarily the taking of sides either expressly or implicitly. If this is correct then it is difficult to determine why and how philosophical critique “cannot [be the postulation] of new substantial entities.” In other words, it is difficult to see how deliberation as “activity” can dispense with the dimension of action and simply remain frozen as thought. There is an interactive connection between thought and action. Thinking does point to possible action.

18 Ibid., 114.
19 Ibid.
It does not command action in the sense of compelling the agent to perform the possible action indicated. Thinking has only hortative power. If it had jussive power, then “freedom” would be meaningless, and the term coward would be a vacuous sterility. In the light of these considerations, “knowledge systems” are not a “passive registration of reality ‘out there’.”

Our intervention, our action, is a crucial, necessary, and constitutive part of knowledge. In this sense we can say that knowledge is always a human construction…But this does not mean that anything is possible. We always intervene in an existing course of events, and, although our intervention introduces change, it will always be change of an existing course of events. We cannot create ex nihilo, we cannot construct out of nothing. The only possible construction is a reconstruction.

Based on this reasoning, logic as the theory of inquiry underlines the indissolubility between thought and action even if the possible action identified by thought may not be performed. It would seem then that in his justified caution and emphasis that philosophy may not itself fall into the trap of dogmatism, Scarantino overlooks the point that the dimension of action involves introducing or postulating “new substantial entities.” The postulation is simultaneously the declaration of an option for a particular knowledge system and the desirability of action to turn the option into reality. Such postulation is justified especially when the new issues challenging the teaching of philosophy today represent “an issue of a political nature.”21 This leads to the second problem we wish to explore.

The second problem pertains to the more geometrico which initially separated the physical from the social sciences. The problem here is that the extrapolation of this method into the social sciences is not necessarily appropriate nor does it constitute the basis for a scientific inquiry leading to conclusive results. Thomas Hobbes’ experiment is one of the cases in point here. Suffice it to state, in concurrence, that:

The fact that the social domain appears to be more complex than the physical domain is…not the result of a fundamental difference between the subject matter of the two types of inquiry. It is only because it has been possible to reduce the complexity of the subject matter of physical inquiry by separating it out from the influences of the wider sociopolitical context. The difference is a construction and not a given…A similar move with

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regard to social inquiry is simply not possible for the very reason that social inquiry has to do with social problems, which, if separated from wider sociopolitical influences, would immediately cease to exist.\textsuperscript{22}

Since philosophy has been, from the point of view of logic as a theory of inquiry, already tainted by experience, making intelligent choices out of the complex matrix of experience is integral to philosophy as critical deliberation. It is crucial to understand – in view of our frequent reference to “intelligent choices” – that “intelligent choices” in our context refers pre-eminently to the exercise of freedom with due and consistent regard for justice. Slavery was an “intelligent choice” for its protagonists. However, it was and still is a fundamental breach of ethics, an injustice through and through. It follows that an “intelligent choice” turning out to be unjust may be challenged in the name of justice. It is precisely this question of justice that underlies our entire argument in this essay.

Understanding the complexity of the social domain as well as its non-subjection to the more geometrico means that the hallowed criterion of “neutrality” or “objectivity” in science, especially in the humanities and social sciences, is problematical.\textsuperscript{23} The point is that “objectivity” is understandable as a criterion demanded by “science” as a conventional understanding over the method or methods to be used in the investigation of phenomena and the declaration of “truth” about them. The positing of this standard is not equivalent to the claim that it is indeed realized in practice. Feminist epistemology has demonstrated that for centuries “objectivity,” especially in Western philosophy,\textsuperscript{24} enabled the declaration of “truth” based on the experience of dominant males.\textsuperscript{25} This partial “truth” is deemed worthy of universalizability despite its unrepresentativity.\textsuperscript{26} This philosophic feminist critique of “objectivity” is affirmed by the philosophy of liberation. In answer to the question “can there be a Latin American philosophy?” Bondy replies that:

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{22} Biesta and Burbules. \textit{Pragmatism and Educational Research}, 74-75
\end{itemize}
I am convinced also, however, that the strict theoretical character, which is the highest contemplative requirement indispensable to all fruitful philosophy, is merely another way of condemning ourselves to dependency and subjection. In philosophy, as in science, only he who has the key to theory can appropriate the advances and powers of civilization. Our philosophy should be, then, both theory and application, conceived and executed in our own fashion, according to our own standards and qualities. Just as science, which in spite of its declared objectivity, tolerates, particularly in the social disciplines, an ingredient of interpretation and ideology, so too, should philosophy be elaborated by us as theory according to our own standards and applied in accord with our own ends.  

This argument is our response to the enduring skepticism on whether or not there can be African philosophy. Against this background, we now turn to a brief elaboration on this argument.

The Enduring Skepticism over African Philosophy

The question whether or not there can be an African philosophy must be distinguished from whether or not there is an African philosophy. The former focuses upon possibility in the ontological sense whereas the latter is empirical. It is the former that is most important precisely because it is directed at understanding and defining the being of an African. As such, it seeks a determination on whether or not Africans are human beings at all. It was held for a long time, even by Christians, that Africans could not be and were not human beings proper. This delusive belief was

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28 We take the view, like Wole Soyinka, that the “convention that capitalizes this [Christianity, Christian] and other so-called world religions is justified only when the same principle is applied to other religions, among them, the Orisa.” Accordingly, we will use the small letter “c” for Christian/Christianity including reference to the “God” of this religion. Where capitalization is used, it will be in inverted commas or a reflection of a verbatim citation. The use of capital or small letters with reference to all religions and their respective gods is intended to eliminate the implicit hierarchy and thus the putative superiority of some religions and their “gods” over all the other religions of the world. See Wole Soyinka, The Burden of Memory, The Muse of Forgiveness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 32.

strengthened by scientific racism in its endeavor to prove, among others, that Africans were not human beings proper. Philosophers such as Hume, Kant and Locke advanced arguments in support of this superstitious belief that Africans were not human beings proper. The following are some of the consequences of this superstitious belief.

It paved the way for the colonization and enslavement of Africans since it is logically valid and commonsensically permissible to treat sub-humans as other than human beings, for example, as slaves. The slaves were to be christianized and civilized on the recognition that nothing could be done to change their ontological condition of being sub-human beings. Las Casas and some of his supporters opposed this view vigorously. At that time, their opposition did little to change the situation in practice. Colonization, enslavement and christianization were an interrelated whole working as the means to define the meaning of experience, knowledge and truth for the colonized. This sustained attempt at epistemic annihilation inaugurated the dominance of Western epistemology, indeed, Western philosophy, in Africa. Alongside this epistemological dominance was the institutionalization of structural, systematic and systemic poverty. The indigenous peoples of Africa, conquered in the unjust wars of colonization, resisted and continue to resist the dual imposition of epistemological dominance and material poverty. Intellectual and material poverty thus constitute the core of the unfolding struggle for freedom on the part of the indigenous African peoples conquered in the unjust wars of colonization.

In view of the above, the irruption of the poor of the Earth in both intellectual and material terms is historical and not natural. Within this history, the poor remain the possible condition for their own liberation and the de-liberation of philosophy. Historical poverty has now become the source of scientific constructions such as studies in unemployment trends and the shifting boundaries of the “poverty datum line.” The statisticization that goes along with this tends to privilege precision in mathematical calculation over the presentation of the actual face of the poor hidden behind the percentages. The poor are real living human beings and not abstract mathematical figures. Against this abstraction of the poor, we prefer the following christian theological definition of the poor.

…the poor are the authentic *theological source* for understanding Christian truth and practice and therefore the constitution of the Church. The poor are those who confront the Church both with its basic theological problem and with the direction in which the solution to the problem is to be found. For the poor pose the problem of *seeking* God without presupposing that the Church possesses him once and for all. At the same time they offer the Church the place for *finding* him…The poor give a concrete name to sin. By their very presence and with dreadful simplicity they remind the Church that sin is what kills human beings. They know the kind of death sin causes and what the methods of killing are. They know what it means to confront sin and what the consequences of the confrontation are…The need is for an effective love that makes use of the practical and ideological means that will make justice a reality. And because the situation of the poor is desperate, love must be gratuitous, that is, more ready to give than to receive; it must not count the cost even if this be the surrender of life itself.34

One need only replace “the Church” with the State in order to appreciate the relevance and import of the above theological definition of the poor for the political domain. In fact, the citation itself leaves no doubt about its relevance and import to politics. After all, politics is an integral branch of ethics.

The intellectual and material poverty of the poor of the Earth is examined here in the limited context of the relationship between African and Western philosophies. The critical point to recognize is that this kind of poverty is the living reality of our time. The vigor and the intensity of the debate on whether or not there can be an African philosophy appear to have subsided. However, the rigor of argumentation between the skeptics and the protagonists of African philosophy is deepening and reveals that the argument of the skeptics does not hold. Despite their loss at the level of argumentation, the skeptics retain an enduring, resilient and hollow conviction that the African is sub-human. No doubt, experience and logic teach that where there is conviction there is argumentation that has gotten neither meaning nor a role to play. We propose to go against this on the ground that the hollow conviction does have a role in the continual refinement of the enduring reality of intellectual and material poverty foisted on the African. To this we now turn.

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The Relationship between African and Western Philosophies

It has been argued, plausibly, by Ali Mazrui in his “political values and the educated class in Africa,” that from the moment of colonization the universities in Africa were by character the “transmission belt” of Western epistemology and ways of doing. In this sense, there are Western universities in Africa. African universities grounded in the African experience as the primary point of departure for philosophy and all education in general are yet to be born. A number of conference declarations and published essays to this effect testify to the absence of truly African universities.

The struggle for justice towards African philosophy is the reaffirmation of the freedom to deliver a philosophy in theory and application “conceived and executed in our own fashion, according to our own standards and qualities.” There is no doubt that the political decolonization of Africa was defective. In a methodic and systematic critical study of the history of the political independence of East African states in particular, Makonnen shows that the attainment of political independence was a matter of government and not state succession. The force of Makonnen’s argument applies to all the states of Africa. The legal consequence of government succession is that political decolonization shall not coincide with the reversion of wholesome and unencumbered restoration of sovereign title to territory vested, from time immemorial, in the indigenous peoples conquered in the unjust colonial wars. The reversion to wholesome and unencumbered sovereign title to territory to its rightful holders, on the basis of state succession, thus vindicating Julius Nyerere’s “clean slate doctrine,” is the unfinished business of political independence in Africa. This is fundamentally different from demands for “equitable land redistribution” popularly described, with unmistakable ellipsis, as “the land is

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The crucial point of difference is not legal but ethical. It is that “the land is ours” sidesteps the prior and fundamental ethical question of the injustice of seizing by unjustified resort to violence, land – and thus the abrogation of sovereign title to territory – that belongs to others. In the meantime, African philosophy exists in these circumstances to some extent except that its application and execution still remain problematical. There are multiple and varied layers of problems in the application and execution of African philosophy. These will be addressed seriatim. They all speak to freedom in relation to justice as the fundamental issue. It is the demand for the de-liberation of philosophy because in the prevailing circumstances,

a philosophy that reflects and/or endorses the white experience dominates the discipline. Accordingly, to call for black philosophy, is to launch an implicit attack on racism in philosophy, especially in its conceptual, research, curricular, and institutional expressions…to advance a black philosophy is to affirm that the black perspective has been devalued and omitted from the recipe of Western philosophy and that that which has been ignored is a necessary ingredient for authentic philosophizing.

This is not a demand for the integration of African or “black” philosophy into Western philosophy. On the contrary, it is the reaffirmation of actual dialogue – polylogue – as the core meaning of philosophy. Deliberation on the basis of actual dialogue as equal partners shall deliver the liberation of philosophy. It shall deliver African philosophy from the unwarranted subordination to Western philosophy. At the same time, it shall deliver Western philosophy from its captivity of putative superiority and absolute power over all world philosophies. Why is actual dialogue virtually absent?

Problems Hindering Application and Execution

It is not uncommon to read or hear that a people, should forget, especially about a past injustice, and make the best of life in their present situation. The appeal to forgetting presupposes the capacity to remember.

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Memory is thus a crucial element for understanding the present and determining a future. Notwithstanding problems pertaining to the objectivity of any historiography crippled by the obvious absence of herstoriorography for centuries, history may be regarded as an important repository of memory. In this sense, history is memory. Through remembering, it makes the past a member of the present. The decolonization of Africa is predicated on the recognition of colonization in the first place. Post-coloniality – accorded this particular meaning here in agreement with Eze and, contrary to Grosfoguel$^{44}$ – as a lived experience in Africa is, to a large extent, the continuation of colonialism by philosophical and practical political means. It is neo-colonialism. Accordingly, post-coloniality is the remembering of the past injustice of the unjust wars of colonization. The remembering is invoked by the continuing burden of the material, historical, structural, systemic and systematic poverty. This is complemented by intellectual poverty manifested as bondage to the epistemological paradigm of colonialism. In these circumstances, it is problematic to appeal to the poor of the Earth, in the present context, formerly colonized Africa, to forget about the past. Her past is the living reality of an enduring epistemicide and deadly material poverty in the present. The imperative to change this condition in order to live a life worthy of the dignity of the human being is a question of justice: it is a challenge to freedom. It follows then that the call to forget about the past injustice to Africa is philosophically, ethically and politically unjustified. Concurring with Bujo, we argue that from the standpoint of African philosophy, the living today have the ethical duty to be in solidarity with the living-dead [“ancestors”] who lost their lives in the struggle for freedom against the injustice of the yoke of colonialism enduring even today in various guises.

The problem of the real debtor would have to be discussed anew. If the colonial past of Africa is reflected upon, the need for reparation in favour of the African people comes as an inevitable conclusion. Today it may be asked whether the tables should not be turned. Whoever recalls the history of black Africa cannot avoid thinking of reparation from the conquerors of this history…The history of those who were killed and exploited and robbed of their dignity is not yet buried. The unjust deeds of the past demand an anamnestic solidarity with the victims.$^{45}$

$^{44}$ M. B. Ramose, “Critique of Ramon Grosfoguel’s ‘The Epistemic Decolonial Turn’,” *Alternation* 27, no. 1 (2020): 271-307

The greatest difficulty is to find in Africa a university which in its institutional character, curriculum, research and teaching is not burdened with the imposed transmission of the Western philosophical paradigm and the conduct of a virtual dialogue amongst unequal partners. Yet, the West is free from a similar burden despite having disciplines such as African Studies. The West also has institutions such as the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. Even so, none of these institutions experiences the research and teaching on Africa as an epistemological burden imposed from the outside. Indeed, it may be argued with a very high degree of plausibility that the era of decolonization demanded – in pursuit of self-interest – a subtle transplantation and continuation of the colony within the geographic boundaries of the erstwhile colonizer. This assured the perpetuation of epistemological domination under the dazzle of a developed, rich industrialized country. In this situation, the argument for the epistemic presence of Africa on the basis of equal partnership in ontological terms is more than persuasive. It is a question of justice. It may be stated crisply as “the globalization of African scholarship and the Africanization of global scholarship.”

The Western scholarship’s enduring skepticism towards African scholarship is one of the barriers to the epistemic presence of Africa in all spheres of education within and outside of Africa. The attitude of subtle denigration is presented in the less than sophisticated argument that educational “standards” must be preserved in the construction of the educational curriculum. This is obviously a plea for the retention and continuation of the hierarchical relationship between Western and African epistemology. For example, at independence the original law of the land in Africa, renamed Customary Law during colonialism, was subordinated to the law of the conqueror as the superior and “supreme” law of the land. The question is: what is the justification for this subordination buttressed by an arbitrarily constructed but oppressive hierarchy of laws? Another example is the benign, apparently scientific but manifestly condescending appellation, namely, the “Third World” relegating the poor of the Earth to the bottommost rung of the ladder. The economic benefit of this argument is that the apologists of the Western epistemological paradigm retain their status as “experts” and in that way ensure their continued employment. One of the effects is that competent African scholars stay outside of the employment circle.

Following upon the preceding paragraph, the “experts” remain in the position to determine the content and even the time-table of research. They become the guardians and executors of epistemological dominance under the guise of “neutrality” and “objectivity” in science. They remain the gladiators killing their competitors by keeping them outside of employment.\(^{49}\) In this way, they are the perpetuators of material poverty. We have already argued against the claims to “neutrality” and “objectivity” in science. Suffice it to state that:

From the vantage point of the colonized, a position from which I write, and choose to privilege, the term ‘research’ is inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism. The word itself, ‘research’ is probably one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world’s vocabulary. When mentioned in many indigenous contexts, it stirs up silence, it conjures up bad memories, it raises a smile that is knowing and distrustful. It is so powerful that indigenous people even write poetry about research. The ways in which scientific research is implicated in the worst excesses of colonialism remains a powerful remembered history for many of the world’s colonized peoples. It is a history that still offends the deepest sense of our humanity…While the language of imperialism and colonialism has changed, the sites of struggle remain. The struggle for the validity of indigenous knowledges may no longer be over the recognition that indigenous peoples have ways of viewing the world which are unique, but over proving the authenticity of, and control over, our own forms of language.\(^{50}\)

One testimony to the will to silence Africa in pursuit of hegemony is the well-known fate of some high-level employees of UNESCO when the decision was made to conduct research into the history of Africa and publish the multi-volume UNESCO History of Africa. The United States of America and the United Kingdom did not conceal their displeasure at the publication of this series. It follows then that even in the context of research under the prevailing circumstances in which the Western epistemological paradigm is dominant, justice and freedom arise as the fundamental ethical issues for urgent deliberation and resolution.


\(^{50}\) Linda Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies, Research and Indigenous Peoples* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1999), 1 and 104.
As the gladiators who keep African scholars outside of employment and in that way kill them, the “experts” retain their proximity to and control over the research purse. Having excluded African scholars from employment in a university, the “experts” effectively deny African scholars access to institutional funding for research. Consequently, African scholars are condemned to seek alternative sources for the funding of their research. This condemnation speaks to the double deprivation that African scholars suffer. One aspect of this is material or monetary for as long as their labor cannot be engaged in gainful employment. Another is that their potential to produce and disseminate research results is put into indefinite abeyance. This impoverishes both the African scholar and the wider community which could have benefited from the knowledge of the research results. The denial of access to research funds, even if application for such funds is formally open to all who qualify, is the constriction as well as the deprivation of the freedom to learn and share the learning with others.

In the early stages of decolonization, the non-Africans who occupied research and teaching positions in the colleges or universities were numerically more than the indigenous Africans. This numerical majority was particularly important when it came to decision-making in accordance with the rules and statutes of colleges and universities. The importance lay in the fact that voting on a particular issue, provided it was in accordance with the rules and statutes of the college or the university, could weigh heavily and negatively against the educational interests of the numerically few indigenous Africans in the university. This can be illustrated by reference to Brizuela-Garcia’s study on “African Historiography and the Crisis of Institutions.” The study focused on the successes and failures of the actual acceptance and subsequent research and teaching of African history during colonialism and after decolonization. It also focused on institutions of learning both within and outside of Africa. With regard to South Africa, Brizuela-Garcia focused on the University of Cape Town (UCT) and observed that it “showed little interest in the teaching of African history. Their focus was on the history of South Africa, mostly on the history of Europeans in South Africa, and European history.”

Together with Monica Wilson and H. M. Robertson, L. M. Thompson prepared a memorandum entitled “Expansion in the Study of Africa” that was presented to the University Council in April 1960. The memorandum set down a number of proposals to expand the range of African Studies offered at UCT.

African History was among the new areas that were to be offered. The document suggested that funds might be obtained from an application to the Ford Foundation, and indicated the desire for the University to adopt a long time commitment to the expansion of African Studies…The Senate accepted most of the recommendations set out in this document. In reality, however, little was done to implement them.52

Pursuing the evolution of the acceptance and teaching of African History during the “golden era” of African nationalism in Africa, Brizuela-Garcia observes that:

The importance of nationalism in the consolidation of African historiography is underscored by the case of the UCT in South Africa. The rise of apartheid inhibited the free discussion of ideas, particularly those that were seen as subversive to the dominant regime. African history, with its strong connections to African nationalism and African liberation, was certainly not welcome at South African institutions. Under these conditions, the introduction and development of the new field of African history were negatively affected…Eric Axelson took over the running of the department during the 1960s…[he] proposed the introduction of a course in African History to replace the teaching of Constitutional Law. The proposal was approved in October 1963 and the course was scheduled to appear in 1964…A year later the economic history department also presented proposals to introduce a course on African Economic History. The introduction of these courses, however, did not have an immediate impact on the production of history at UCT. Research in the department continued to be focused on South African history and mostly fell under what has been called the ‘liberal approach’…Liberal historians were mainly concerned with political history and paid little attention to the activities of the African population…Axelson’s failure to get this project off the ground epitomizes the marginal role of African institutions in the introduction of the new approaches to African history.53

Brizuela-Garcia then studied the 1970s and 1980s noting the success of Robin Hallet in bringing the teaching of African History at the UCT “closer to what was being taught in African, American and European universities…Despite this, it is fair to say that the strictures of the apartheid

52 Ibid., 138.
53 Ibid., 144-145.
educational system and a widely sustained view on South African particularism made it difficult for African History to flourish at UCT.”\textsuperscript{54} In the post-apartheid South Africa the UCT still experienced difficulties in supporting the revision and the teaching of African History. This time the basic problem was “the attitudes towards African History.”\textsuperscript{55} These came to the fore in the course of debates between Mahmood Mamdani, then chairman of the Center for African Studies, and the History Department.

Having followed the evolution of African History in the UCT and other parts of the world, Brizuela-Garcia concluded that:

Although it is encouraging that African history is taught and researched in many corners of the world, the future of the field cannot and should not rely on what foreign institutions consider to be relevant at any particular time. The future of African historiography will never be as secure and healthy as it was when African colleges were active participants in its production.\textsuperscript{56}

The study of Brizuela-Garcia brings to the fore the fundamental issues that are the subject of this essay, namely, justice, freedom and the question of material and intellectual poverty. Her focus on the University of Cape Town is more than instructive on the issues we are focusing upon. The first is that “post-apartheid” South Africa enabled, theoretically, the indigenous peoples, conquered in the unjust wars of colonization, to gain access to all spheres of life especially government and educational institutions. Has this theoretical access resulted in the practical recognition and the elevation of the African experience – including the experience of conquest in the unjust wars of colonization as well as the protection and preservation of the privileges arising from this by the successors in title to such conquest – as the primary epistemological basis for the entire educational system in South Africa? More than twenty years after the evolution to “the new” South Africa the answer to this question is in the negative. It seems rather odd that in “the new” South Africa the indigenous peoples, conquered in the unjust wars of colonization, appear to be either unwilling or unable to change the colonial condition that imposed the vertical relationship of superiority and inferiority between the epistemologies of the conqueror and the conquered. However, it is ironically by the same vertical relationship, this time in the constitutional sphere, that the indigenous African majority is unable to alter this condition. I have elsewhere distinguished between the “indigenous peoples conquered in the unjust wars of colonization” and the “conquered peoples” of South Africa. The purpose

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 152-153.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 153.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 159.
of the distinction is two-fold. It is to maintain fidelity to history and to eliminate any impression of discrimination against the “Colored” and the Indian population groups of South Africa.\textsuperscript{57}

The above considerations bring us back to the fundamental issues, namely, the freedom to define the meaning of experience, knowledge and truth and the related question of material and intellectual poverty. This is the struggle in South Africa and many other countries in Africa. It is the struggle for the de-liberation of philosophy through collective critical de-liberation on the basis of equal partnership. For Africa and the poor of the Earth engagement in this struggle points to the need for African historical reconstruction\textsuperscript{58} and intercultural philosophy.\textsuperscript{59} This is no doubt the subject matter for a special extended critical discussion.

The will to epistemic domination and hegemonization is apparent even within Western philosophy itself. For example,

\ldots the sorts of questions raised by Continental philosophers are frequently dismissed by analysts as illegitimate, and the questions they regard as legitimate are dismissed by Continental philosophers as trivial…This technique of dismissal is a serious matter, for it clearly points to a kind of anti-philosophical dogmatic attitude that runs contrary to the very nature of the discipline as traditionally conceived…To reject at the outset any attempt and possibility of communication with those who oppose us is something that always has been criticized by philosophers and that, nonetheless, is generally accepted in the profession today. The curiosity to understand those who do not think as we do is gone from the philosophical circles to the detriment of the discipline. The situation, therefore, is intolerable not only from a practical standpoint but more important, because it threatens to transform the discipline into one or more of the many ideologies that permeate our times, where differences of opinion are settled not through argument but through political action or force.\textsuperscript{60}

Gracia’s argument against dogmatism reaffirms critical dialogical deliberation on the basis of equality as the core meaning of philosophy.


\textsuperscript{58} Innocent Osuagwu, \textit{African Historical Reconstruction} (Owerri: Amamihe Publications, 1999), 87, 94-95.


He observes, correctly, that this meaning is lost even in philosophy itself through its reduction to “doctrinal training” and in that way becoming “dogmatic, which is counter to its very nature.” By so doing, philosophy also abandons its mission of critique and becomes an active accomplice to the practical implementation of dogma. It thus instills fear in itself and adapts to an unnatural self-censorship.

This acts, in particular, on the political climate established at the core of an academic community, and takes the form of self-censorship on behalf of the members of this community, in particular when one touches on politically sensitive or controversial subjects. This phenomenon, widely experienced by researchers having undergone the trials of authoritarian regimes, is visible today even in certain democratic countries, where researchers no longer dare to even express political opinions even in the absence of laws or written legislation forbidding them to do so.

Thus have fear and force combined in our time to silence philosophy and blunt its sharp critical edge for the sake of epistemic dominance and hegemontization. The motto of the Jagellonian University in Krakow, Poland is profoundly significant for our time though it appears that its power is paralyzed. The motto is: plus ratio quam vim, more reason than force and, we wish to add, more reason and no force at all.

Force is not only physical. It can be psychological as well. If this were not so the prohibition on torture would be meaningless. Against this background, it is apposite to pause and consider the subtlety of force in our time as the relentless march towards epistemic dominance and hegemontization continues. The will to maintain the dogma that poverty is natural brought humanity to the brink of nuclear war during the 1961 Cuban missile crisis. The same followed the suicidal path of the nuclear arms race inexorably to the ultimate MAD (mutual assured destruction) condition. According to the rationality of the irrationality argument, it is untenable to sustain this deadly condition. Yet, some of those who possess these weapons of overkill capacity continue to insist that only they may possess them. Such insistence must be considered in the light of the argument that:

61 Ibid., 113.
62 Ibid., 111.
Today, we are left with the spectacle of democratic societies clinging to the proposition that threats to the lives of tens of millions of people can be reconciled with the underlying tenets of our political philosophy. Why should we accept a bargain whose contractual terms take as commonplace forms of retribution that hold at risk the lives of so many people and threaten the viability of life on the planet? Who can argue that this is the best to which we can aspire? In the final analysis, however, it will be extremely difficult—if not impossible—for any one nuclear power to fully disarm alone, or for a potential nuclear power to forego developing nuclear arms in the face of threats by a foe. Today, if any are to renounce their right to nuclear arms, all must do so.65

To continue to insist, even in the face of this argument, that the club of those who possess nuclear weapons must be limited and restricted by force, if necessary, is to demand domination and hegemonization. Here it is crucial to recall Mazrui’s argument that the cultivation of nuclear capability for Africa may be a “counter power” necessary for the liberation of both Africa and the rest of humankind. The core of his argument is that:

What Africa could cultivate is a sufficient degree of nuclear capability to force the powerful in the direction of reconsidering the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. But why should Africa engage in nuclear proliferation? By a strange destiny only the nuclearization of Africa could really complete the transition from the image that the village is the world to the vision that the world is a village, from the arrogance that the tribe is the human race to the compassion that the human race is a family. There is a strong possibility that the nuclearization of Africa is the catalyst that could create consternation among the big powers. The very distrust of Africa and its underdevelopment and instability could begin to induce a true recognition that nuclear weapons have to be denied to all if they are to be denied to anyone…The world needs a sense of urgency about nuclear weapons. This sense of urgency has not been created by the super-power’s acquisition of more sophisticated arsenals of destruction. Maybe the sense of urgency will be created by too many small countries acquiring nuclear bombs of their own. A nuclear inoculation is needed to shock the world into nuclear immunization. Muntu, Man, is

facing his most complete crisis. He needs a final scare to convince him that the world is indeed a village; that the human race is indeed a family.\textsuperscript{66}

The “Pelindaba Treaty” discouraging the nuclearization of Africa in military terms has, by an ironic deafness and blindness to \textit{real-politik} in international politics, ignored Mazrui’s argument. The unfinished business of the freedom of Africa continues even in our time. The “Pelindaba Treaty” may thus be considered as a temporary setback to this unfolding struggle. The Treaty is a contradiction of the village experience that a bull never delivers itself voluntarily for castration. By inserting itself as such a contradiction, the “Pelinda Treaty” has put \textit{Muntu} into assured immediate and imminent danger to its life; to planetary life as a whole. To stand by this irrationality and celebrate it is a mockery of “all men are rational animals” as held by \textit{Sublimis Deus}, the Bull of Pope Paul III, issued on June 2, 1537.

Is it so that the will to deny others the freedom to manufacture and own weapons of mass destruction is perhaps an unconscious declaration that reason proper belongs only to a specific ontologically restricted fragment of humanity? The point of including nuclear weapons is to illustrate that the Western resolution to define the meaning of experience, knowledge and truth for others is backed by the threat to use deadly force if necessary. This is tantamount to the intention to annihilate philosophy as the ideal site of actual critical dialogue to deliberate upon the problems pertaining to the present and the future of humanity on the basis of equal partnership. It is to preclude freedom and justice in the conduct of human relations in general and in the relation between African and Western philosophies in particular. The limping political independence of Africa is tantamount to freedom at gun point; a veritable subjugation to servitude.

\textbf{Conclusion}

We have distinguished between the two meanings of de-liberation and deliberation in pursuit of our argument for the affirmation of the inalienable right to the freedom of Africa to define the meaning of experience, knowledge and truth in its own way and to have such a meaning as part of its own educational system and also as part of the necessary collective critical polylogue among world cultures and civilizations. We have identified the hindrances to this and suggested that the projects of African historical reconstruction and intercultural philosophy are germane to the realization of this goal provided urgent attention is given to the prevailing material and intellectual poverty among the poor of the Earth. We have

argued that the use of either physical or psychological force to deal with these issues is both anti-philosophical and an unwarranted pursuit of world hegemony. A counter to this is a veritable threat to the prevailing MAD situation in the nuclear military sphere precisely by the nuclear militarization of Africa. For as long as freedom eludes humanity, so will the struggle for justice become more acute. Justice demands truthfulness and truth. It demands according difference a voice rather than suppressing it. It demands the recognition that:

At base we are against the theoretical colonialism of political philosophy as practiced in Latin America (and in Spain and Portugal), for which we plead that all take seriously the ‘decolonizing turn’ indebted to the philosophy of liberation, insisting on the necessity of starting from new bases in our reflection, which cannot be merely imitative or from authorized commentators on European-North American political philosophy, which necessarily is very different in practice, institutionalization and the perception of the normativity of the political principles practiced in Latin America...the Latin American people are living politically, and not simply reading the classics or famous political philosophers of the center to imitate them or comment on them. In that case we will only learn about the political situations of Europe and the USA as expressed by their philosophers, and we will not understand anything of our own.67

And so are the African peoples, still under the yoke of colonialism in its various guises, “living politically” in continual search for freedom, truth and justice.

References


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Global Challenges and the Need for Dialogue among Civilizations

Workineh Kelbessa

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, Samuel P. Huntington formulated the thesis that the clash of civilizations would be inevitable in the years to come. In the new world, he thought, the clash of civilizations would replace the rivalry of the superpowers. The primary sources of conflict in the post-Cold War world would be people’s cultural and religious identities. Huntington’s thesis points to endemic and deeply rooted differences between civilizations as a salient source of international conflict in general, and “the West against the rest” in particular. According to Huntington, the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world would be shaped by “culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities.” The conflict between peoples belonging to different cultural entities rather than between social classes, rich and poor, would be the most pervasive, and dangerous conflict. In particular, Huntington gave special emphasis to religion as a source of conflict by saying that:

[p]eople do not live by reason alone. They cannot calculate and act rationally in pursuit of their self-interest until they define their self…In times of rapid social change established identities dissolve, the self must be redefined, and new identities created…Whatever universalist goals they have, religions give people identity by positing a basic distinction between believers and nonbelievers, between a superior in-group and a different inferior out-group.1

For Huntington, people’s cultural identities do not develop as a result of rational reflection, rather religion plays an important role, not in the articulation and exploration of shared human values, but in the establishment of identities based in necessarily antagonistic relations characterized

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by the psycho-sociological structure of “us vs. them.” Those who advocated the one peaceful world paradigm after the end of the Cold War were proved wrong because of the occurrence of various conflicts in the world. Similarly, other writers also assert that “[c]ultural conflicts are increasing and are more dangerous than at any time in history,” and “future conflicts will be sparked by cultural factors rather than economics or ideology.”

Francis Fukuyama for his part declared the end of history after the end of the bipolar politics. He proclaimed that capitalism had been the victorious system and the only way out for all nations. The “developed world” had witnessed the establishment of liberal democratic political institutions and capitalist economic structures. He writes:

> “The essential meaning of the end of history is not that turbulence has ceased or that the world has become completely uniform, but rather that there are no serious systematic institutional alternatives to liberal democracy and market-based capitalism for the world’s most advanced countries.”

For him, history is a coherent and evolutionary process, but historians tend to distrust and reject such teleology. The current crisis of liberal democracy shows that Fukuyama’s optimistic view of history was wrong. Different political movements in the world have challenged Western liberal democracies.

In contrast, other voices stress that civilizations could coexist in peace, and replace confrontation with dialogue and that there are different alternatives to the capitalist system. History has shown that dialogue among civilizations is as old as civilization itself, and interfaith dialogue can create networks of international solidarity rather than conflict in the world. Intercultural and religious differences are not necessarily the causes of international conflict. The French-Muslim philosopher Roger Garaudy explained the need for dialogue among civilizations in the 1970s. In 1977, he published a book entitled *Les Dialogue des Civilizations.*

Stephen E. Healey advised the West to dialogue with other civilizations to avoid a “clash of civilizations.” For him, the imposition of liberalism on

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other cultures can be partially responsible for the potential “clash of civilizations.”

Amartya Sen has observed that Huntington’s analysis is flawed because it pays insufficient attention to the heterogeneities within most cultures and religious groups around the world and throughout history. The historical evidence (which Sen briefly surveys) simply does not support Huntington’s claim “that a sense of individualism and a tradition of rights and liberties” are uniquely distinguishing characteristics of Western countries and civilizations. As Sen says, “[h]eterogeneity of values seems to characterise most, perhaps all, major cultures. The cultural argument does not foreclose, nor indeed deeply constrain, the choices we make today.” If Sen is correct in thinking that democracy is, indeed, a universal value, then democratic values more likely connect various peoples than separate them. As Elizabeth Anderson points out, democratic values are also a basis for the less powerful to contest precepts that govern the behavior of the more powerful. As a consequence, intercultural differences are not merely irrelevant to the moral requirement for actors to justify their actions to others.

The poor in different civilizations share many things in common. Rob Nixon’s analysis of what he calls “slow violence” thrusts into relief the phenomenon of how “a host of environmental catastrophes,” including “climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans,” disproportionately inflict “long dyings” on the “unseen” poor. The end of the bipolar world order could pave the way for dialogue among cultures and civilizations. The UN General Assembly designated the year 2001 as the UN Year of Dialogue among Civilizations in 1998 following the suggestion of Seyed Mohammad Khatami, the former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1997-2005). The major aim of this designation was to help avoid the purported “clash of civilizations,” and thereby address global problems and build a peaceful world. Dialogue among civilizations is becoming more important than ever in the face of the burgeoning global

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8 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 71.
challenges in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. The reality on the ground has indicated that one nation or civilization cannot solve all or some of these challenges in isolation. A genuine dialogue across civilizations and the joint efforts of all nations are required to tackle the current global challenges.

This paper aims to examine some global challenges humanity is facing today and the need for dialogue among cultures and civilizations to help address these challenges. It argues that dialogue of cultural traditions is a means of building bridges of respect and understanding across cultures. Public awareness combined with candid dialogue can help contribute to the establishment of a sustainable and peaceful world. It explores various global challenges the world is facing today and examines the nature and the significance of dialogue among civilizations. It also looks into the major obstacles to ethical dialogue and offers some suggestions.

Global Challenges

Currently, the world is facing multiple challenges, such as ecological problems like rising sea levels, the melting of the polar icecaps, shortage of fresh water, ozone layer depletion, global warming, transnational environmental crime, global poverty and inequality, imbalances in international trade rules, the expansion of HIV/AIDS, social and political conflict, human rights violations, huge rises of food prices, transnational threats such as terrorism and humanitarian and natural disasters. In what follows, I will briefly examine some of these challenges.

Global Poverty

There is no universal agreement over the extent, impacts, and trends in global inequality and poverty. There are different views. Some say that the gap between the richest and the poorest has widened. Others say that inequality has been reduced over the years. It is true that globalization has benefitted many relatively poor people in China, India, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa. Global trade has pulled millions of people out of extreme poverty.

However, many people particularly in Africa are still suffering from poverty in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Although “the number of people living in extreme poverty has declined by more than half since 1990,” 40 \% of Africans were still living in extreme poverty in 2015.\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, sub-Sa-

African did not achieve the target for tertiary education and sustainable access to safe drinking water. In particular, it has been very hard for some African countries to benefit from the global economy. The situation in much of Africa is not getting better. Most Africans do not have safe drinking water and sufficient food. Many people live below the extreme poverty line according to the World Bank measurement (1:25 USD a day). As Rorden Wilkinson and Jennifer Clapp observe,

progress in terms of the numbers living in extreme poverty varies widely by region. In China the number living in extreme poverty dropped dramatically from 835 million in 1981 to 207 million in 2005. However, in that same period sub-Saharan Africa saw little progress and some countries actually experienced an increase in the number of people living in extreme poverty.

In Africa, food is not a commodity, but a requirement for living a minimally decent life. Many Africans have not been able to live a decent human life, as they have failed to obtain the basic needs of food, water, shelter, health, and clothing. Many young men and women have been risking their lives crossing the Sahara Desert. Many of them have perished in the Mediterranean Sea. Some of them have been trapped in modern-day slavery in the Arab world.

The major challenges to sustainable development in Africa include extreme poverty, persistent inequality, unequal distribution of national wealth, jobs and authority, rapid population growth, rural-urban migration, conflict, political instability, environmental degradation (biodiversity loss, surface and groundwater pollution, the loss of productive land, deforestation), recurring natural disasters, HIV/AIDS, climate change, unmanageable mountains of domestic and industrial wastes, lack of accountable and transparent leadership, lack of institutional capacity, inadequate education, poor and inadequate infrastructure, inappropriate production techniques in agriculture, livestock, mining and industry, high dependency on primary commodities, declining commodity prices and unfair international trade practices, corruption, foreign interference, high unemployment rates, the huge external debt burden, land grabbing, brain drain, harsh landscape, etc. A detailed discussion of these factors is beyond the scope of this study.

Although Africa is endowed with abundant renewable and non-renewable natural resources, it could not fully benefit from these resources

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13 Ibid., 29 and 58.
because of lack of infrastructure and facilities, armed conflicts, bad governance, foreign interference, etc. It has not yet added sufficient value to its natural resources. It has exported primary products and natural resources as well as jobs to other countries, as the transformation of these resources creates jobs outside Africa. The decline in the price of primary products, including crude oil, coffee, cocoa, and other agricultural products has had negative impacts on Africa. Moreover, tropical diseases, such as malaria, yellow fever, tuberculosis, dengue fever, sleeping sickness, river blindness, and the like have reduced productivity.

International financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the transnational corporations, and the governments of the major “developed” countries (the so-called Group of 7, led by the United States), have placed various pressures and demands on the governments of the previously colonized countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Islands. They have promoted Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to satisfy the economic needs of “developed” nations’ capital at the expense of the needs of “developing” nations. Many African countries were forced to adopt SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s and Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) from 1999. Although the World Bank stresses that adjustment programs have positive effects, some critics have stated that economic reforms have not worked in any country in sub-Saharan Africa because of poorly designed policy, the absence of local input, and the limited knowledge of foreign experts about the nature of African economies. They have led to environmental degradation, poverty, and other associated problems.

The “developed” world and its International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have not sufficiently tried to reduce poverty and inequality in the “developing” world. Among others, Western protectionism has undermined its assistance to the poor. Western nations have continued to participate in the emission of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, the arms trade, bribing local officials, and exploiting natural resources. Many countries have been forced to adopt neoliberal economic policies and aggravated their poverty. Thus, there has been a fundamental free market failure to address the current global problems. International trade has led to environmental degradation, human rights violations, poor labor standards, and economic inequality.

It is worth noting that world leaders adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in a summit in 2000 to meet eight major goals by 2015. Halving extreme poverty, halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education by the target date of 2015 were

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some of these goals. The major powers and the world’s leading development institutions were committed to policies including halving global poverty by 2015, but they were not able to achieve this, except in some countries where growing prosperity has raised the average income. Their apparent neglect or forgetfulness of the MDGs should have been drawn to attention more than it usually was. Despite the UNDP’s wish that the millennium goals were “within reach,” not all countries reduced poverty by 2015.

Although Africa made significant progress on many of the MDGs targets, it has been behind many countries and regions. Sub-Saharan Africa only met the MDG target three of promoting gender equality and empowering women. Only seven countries (Angola, Djibouti, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, and Sao Tome and Principe) met the MDG 1.c target (Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger). Moreover, positive changes have been made on [some MDGs] “gender equality, poverty reduction, improving education and health,” reducing infant and maternal mortality and the like.

Although “[m]ore than 1 billion people have been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990,” global poverty is still a threat to many people in the world, and requires dialogue among civilizations among other measures to gradually eradicate it. According to the UN report, Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are the two regions where the overwhelming majority of people live on less than $1.25 per day. In 2015, sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia hosted 80 percent of the working poor. Africa is the poorest continent in the world. In 2015, the UN reported that 40% of all Africans lived below poverty line. Millions of Africans die of preventable diseases. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), over 75 percent of the African population do not have access to electricity and 81 percent still use solid traditional biomass fuels as the main source for cooking.

This does not suggest that Africa has no future. In fact, in recent years, the view on Africa has changed dramatically from the aid perspective into the perspective of economic growth, opportunities and investments. Some African countries have made progress in economic growth. For instance, “[i]n 2013, growth rates averaged 4 percent, almost double the global average. One quarter of countries in the region grew at about seven percent or more, and a number of African countries are among the

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17 Ibid., 15.
18 Ibid., 18.
Sub-Saharan Africa hosts the top six (Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zambia, Tanzania, and Ghana) of the world’s ten fastest growing economies. Some African countries have created industrial parks and hubs, special economic zones, etc. For instance, the Ethiopian Industrial Parks Development Corporation (PDC) established various industrial parks in different parts of Ethiopia.

African leaders have envisioned that a different Africa should be built in the next 50 years. This idea urged African leaders to launch the African Union’s Agenda 2063 (the 50-year continental transformation blueprint) in 2013 at the golden jubilee of the Organization of African Unity and adopt it in 2015. Agenda 2063 has 20 Goals with 39 Priority Areas, and 256 targets.21 Agenda 2063 – The Africa We Want – is a call, a plea, and a demand for a united Africa based on self-reliance. It offers a new paradigm for Africa’s development and initiatives. It is a renewed call for action to all Africans, particularly to the youth who are the drivers of the future. Agenda 2063 suggests that Africa should take ownership of its own development, and women and youth should be at the center of development. It has the aim of making Africa a global player.

On September 25, 2015, Heads of state and government adopted the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, which includes the 17 integrated Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. All countries and stakeholders are required to implement the 17 goals. SDGs and Africa’s Agenda 2063 have many things in common. Both agendas recognize the role of agriculture, sustainable tourism, the need for the eradication of poverty and employment for all women and men, including the youth, persons with disabilities, as well as equal pay for work of equal value, reduction of maternal mortality, etc.

Global Climate Change

Global climate change is another challenge that has contributed to global poverty. The unlimited use of resources and natural factors have led to climate change that in turn has increased the vulnerability of the poor. Above all, climate change has undermined the wellbeing of the world’s poorest countries. Although the poor have contributed little, the globalization of climate change has reached them in different corners of the world. Prolonged drought and flooding have affected millions of people. Those who lack the resources to adapt, to find alternative sources of food and healthcare suffer more from climate change. The United States of America, Canada, Japan, Australia, Russia, and the European Union

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20 Ibid.
are using most of the energy that leads to the emissions that cause climate change. “Developed” nations are most responsible for global warming. The United States has contributed more CO2 on a per-person basis than any other country in the world. On the other hand, China, as a country and not in per capita terms, is today the greatest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs). However, its emissions per person are still lower than that of the US. Besides China, India, and Brazil are also the world’s largest emitters from the “developing” world.

However, Africa’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions is the least of any continent. The entire African continent emits less than four percent of the world’s total output. It is estimated that each year Africa produces an average of just over one metric ton of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide per person.22 “Africa’s share of global CO2 emissions rose from 1.9% in 1973 to 3.1% in 2002, representing an emission of about 747 Mt of CO2 in 2002.”23 Although African emissions have played a minor role in the build-up of greenhouse gases in today’s atmosphere, “Africa has been suffering from rising temperatures and evaporation, widespread water stress, increased frequency and severity of droughts and floods, crop loss, rising sea levels, ocean acidification, decline in biodiversity, higher levels of disease, and conflicts over access to land and water.”24 Climate change has had negative impacts on ecosystem functioning and ecological resilience. The 2007 regional report by Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicted that because of continued increase in greenhouse gases, 75 to 250 million people in Africa will be at risk of increased water stress with a one degree-centigrade rise in global temperature by the 2020s, 350 to 600 million with a two degree climb by the 2050s, and up to 1.8 billion if global temperature rises by three degrees, which could happen by around 2080.25 Further global warming will lead to the drying up of arid and semi-arid areas. It is expected that climate variability and change will reduce agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries and regions.

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Global climate change was not in the agenda of various governments before the 1980s. It has become the major concern of scientists and scientific organizations since the late 1980s. In 1988, The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization established an international body, the IPCC to reflect on scientific knowledge of climate change. So far, the IPCC has produced six major assessment reports in 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007, 2013/2014 and 2022.

Some countries signed and ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and 1994 respectively. The UNFCCC’s stated objective is

stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system…within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.26

It is worth noting that 197 countries ratified the UNFCCC. The UN’s wide-ranging debate about emission reductions culminated in the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted by delegates to COP 3, and entered into force on February 16, 2005 and currently has 192 parties. It introduced legally binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for developed countries. Accordingly, the commitments for GHG emission reductions in the Kyoto Protocol are restricted to the industrialized countries. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol do not require “developing” countries to fulfill specific mitigation obligations. All parties agreed on the differentiation of commitments between “developed” and “developing” countries, because

the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs, it is accepted that the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.27

27 Ibid., Preamble Article 3.2.
Some countries have not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Although the “developed” nations agreed to keep the levels of emissions in 2000 to 1990 levels, the US increased them by 14 percent in 2000.28 Far worse, it refused to join the states that have accepted the Kyoto Protocol, because, American leaders believe that there was too much scientific uncertainty about change and that the possible negative impacts of the Protocol’s emission limits could put upon the US economy. While the Clinton administration did not directly reject the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush administration clearly opposed it. The Bush administration rejected the Protocol because of the absence of emission limits for “developing” countries.29

In the same way, some climate skeptics still argue that the problem of global warming is not supported by scientific evidence. They boldly asserted that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the UN affiliate that is the source of global warming scientific consensus, did not forecast this in its projections. They think that although ozone depletion is real, it has not yet harmed anyone. Rather mild temperature increases of the past century have enabled “developing” countries to improve the lives of their people.

It is true that global warming can have some positive effects, such as Iceland’s agricultural improvement, particularly the growth of grain due to warming,30 new minerals discovered in areas once covered in ice as Canada discovered diamonds. The research by Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) also reported that fish living in warmer, shallow waters grow faster than those species living in cooler deep ocean.31

Contrary to this finding, another work in Africa reports the decline of the fish stock in the deep Rift Valley lakes of East Africa because of the rise of air temperatures.32 According to Catherine O’Reilly, climate change hinders the mixing of surface waters with nutrient-rich deep waters, because the temperature-mediated density difference between the two “has gotten greater, and so it takes more energy to mix deep water up to the surface.”33

33 Ibid.
Some of the benefits of global warming cannot rule out its negative impacts, therefore, various studies have shown that it has had negative impacts on the world, particularly on the poor. A broad spectrum of scientists worldwide has already accepted that greenhouse gases warm the surface and the atmosphere. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports outlined the negative impacts of anthropogenic global warming. According to the IPCC, “[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, the sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.”

Human beings themselves have increased the global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide since 1750.

The atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide have increased to levels unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Carbon dioxide concentrations have increased by 40% since preindustrial times, primarily from fossil fuel emissions and secondarily from net land use change emissions. The ocean has absorbed about 30% of the emitted anthropogenic carbon dioxide, causing ocean acidification.

78% of the total GHG emission increase from 1970 to 2010 came from CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes. In 2010, 76% of GHG emissions came from CO2, and methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and fluorinated gases contributed 16%, 6.2% and 2% respectively to the total GHG emission.

In spite of the fact that there is a strong evidence that climate change is real, the world does not take all necessary measures to cut greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol did not seem to have a significant impact. Various attempts have been made to replace the Kyoto Protocol and address the negative consequences of global climate change. The consecutive conference of parties every year has not yet led to a lasting solution

35 Ibid., 11.
to climate change. The 18th Conference of the Parties (COP 18) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change took place in Doha, Qatar, November 26-December 7, 2012. This conference established the second Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2013-2020). The second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol began on January 1, 2013 and ended on December 31, 2020. Although 37 countries (Australia, the EU and its 28 members, Belarus, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Norway, Monaco, Switzerland, and Ukraine) agreed to participate in the second commitment period, several key countries which signed up to Kyoto (including Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Russia) declined to do so. Humanity was expected to reduce emissions at least 18% below 1990 levels from 2013-2020. The US has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol.

The Paris climate Agreement was adopted by parties in December 2015, at COP 21 in Paris, and entered into force on November 4, 2016 and 146 out of the 195 signatories ratified it. Both “developing” and “developed” countries agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The objective of the Paris Agreement is to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.” The Paris Agreement requires each party to communicate “successive nationally determined contributions (NDCs)” that it intends to achieve. Parties are expected to implement the Paris Agreement by designing different strategies. Developed countries have promised to financially support developing countries for adaptation, mitigation, monitoring, loss and damage.

Unfortunately, the US government is not willing to provide adequate finance for mitigation and adaptation programs in developing countries against the promises made by the Obama administration in 2015. The Trump administration (2017-2021) refused to participate in the Paris deal. The US officially withdrew from the Paris Agreement on November 4, 2020. But under President Joseph R. Biden (2021-), the US re-joined it on February 19, 2021. The 24th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) took place in Katowice, Poland in December 2018. COP 24 did not persuade all parties to fulfil the promises they made during the Paris

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38 Ibid., 2.
Agreement although it made some progress on the “rule-book” of establishing a set of procedures that nations are required to follow to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1.5 °C but not above 2.0 °C.\footnote{Donald. A. Brown, “The US Government Behaving Badly at the Katowice, COP24, Climate Negotiations, 2018,” https://ethicsandclimate.org/2018/12/26/the-us-government-behaving-badly-at-the-katowice-cop24-climate-negotiations/.

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The seriousness of the impacts of climate change requires a global ethical solution without any further delay. As I argued elsewhere, successful climate policy implementation requires the cooperation of all stakeholders.\footnote{Workineh Kelbessa, “Climate Ethics and Policy in Africa.”}

Climate change is fundamentally an ethical issue, and requires ethical solution. Besides science, economics, and politics, ethics should play an important role in addressing the global problem of climate change.

Very often polluting nations have been reluctant to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As Camilla Toulmin notes, “[a]t present the rules for addressing climate change are being written by the powerful and polluting nations. And it is inevitable that the deal they reach among themselves will pay particular attention to their current and future interests.”\footnote{Camilla Toulmin, Climate Change in Africa (London and New York: Zed Books, 2009), 10.}

Many powerful countries and large economic interests will not take global climate change seriously. They need to reconsider their position and help solve problems related to climate change. It would be wrong to restrict negotiations about climate and to ignore international obligations. Thus, nations should try to balance their economic interests and duties, responsibilities, and obligations about the health of the people and mother Earth. I would thus argue that different nations should engage in genuine dialogue, reduce their respective emissions and make the world a better place.

\textit{HIV/AIDS and Ebola}

There are global health problems including the HIV/AIDS epidemic, respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), the mosquito-borne Zika virus, influenza (for instance, avian influenza viruses), hepatitis C virus, tuberculosis, malaria, and other infectious diseases, malnutrition, the lack of access to clean water, adequate food and medical care, in large parts of the “developing” world. HIV/AIDS has become one of the challenges of humanity.

According to the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) report, an estimated 33.3 million [31.4 million-35.3 million] people were living
with HIV in the world at the end of 2009, with 34.2 million at the end of 2011, a slight increase from 34 million in 2010, 35 million [33.2 million-37.2 million] in 2013, 36.7 million in 2016, and an estimated 36.9 million in 2017 and 2018. In 2013, 2.1 million people were newly infected with HIV. This shows "a decline of 38% from 2001, when there were 3.4 million [3.3 million-3.6 million] new infections." In 2016, 1.8 million people were newly infected with HIV, same number reported in 2017.

Although the number of annual AIDS-related deaths worldwide is steadily decreasing, HIV/AIDS claimed the lives of 1.8 million people in 2009, and 2010 respectively, and is increasingly affecting women and young people. In 2009, an estimated 1.3 million people (72% of the global total of 1.8 million) died of HIV related illness in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, 1.5 million people died in the world. 1.1 million [1.0 million-1.3 million] lost their lives because of AIDS-related causes in sub-Saharan Africa in 2013, and 1 million deaths in 2016. 940,000 people died from AIDS-related causes worldwide in 2017. Accordingly, "[t]he annual number of global deaths from AIDS-related illness among people living with HIV (all ages) has declined from a peak of 1.9 million [1.4-2.7 million] in 2004 to 940,000 [670,000-1,300,000]."

Despite an overall global decline in HIV infections, the virus has continued to infect new people in different parts of the world. In 2009, about 1.8 [1.6 million-2.0 million] people were newly infected with HIV.

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49 UNAIDS, Fact Sheet.
50 UNAIDS, Global AIDS Update.
53 UNAIDS, Fact Sheet.
54 UNAIDS, Global AIDS Update.
55 Ibid.
in sub-Saharan Africa, 2.7 million worldwide in 2010, while 1.9 million people were newly infected in sub-Saharan Africa, which indicated a 33% decline between 2005 and 2013. 70% of new HIV infections in the world were found in sub-Saharan Africa; 66% in 2015. In 2016, 43% of the global total of new HIV infections were from eastern and southern Africa.

“Although the rate of new HIV infections has decreased, the total number of people living with HIV continues to rise” in sub-Saharan Africa. Increased access to HIV treatment, as well as care and support, to people living with HIV, partly contributed to the large number of people living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa. With only 12% of the global population sub-Saharan Africa had 22.5 million [20.9 million-24.2 million], 68% of the global total, people living with HIV in 2009, 22.9 million in 2010. 59% of these people were women. It should be noted that 50% of the people living with HIV are women worldwide. In 2013, 24.7 million [23.5 million-26.1 million] people were living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for nearly 71% of the global total. 58% of these people were women. In 2016, 19.4 million people were living with HIV in eastern and southern Africa. Currently, more than two-thirds of all people living with HIV globally are found in sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa has 53% while 67% of children globally. Heterosexual transmission and the increased vulnerability to and risk of HIV infection among adolescent girls and young women, unprotected paid sex and sex between men are major contributors to the expansion of HIV in sub-Saharan Africa.

Like the HIV, the most widespread epidemic of Ebola virus disease (EVD) requires the attention of all nations. The EVD first occurred simultaneously in Nzara, South Sudan, and Yambuku, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) in 1976. The name of this disease

56 UNAIDS, Global HIV/AIDS Response.
57 Ibid., 24.
59 UNAIDS, Fact Sheet.
63 UNAIDS, Fact Sheet.
64 UNAIDS, Global AIDS Update.
came from the Ebola River, which is near one of the villages in Yambuku where the disease first appeared. From 2014-2016, the EVD claimed over 11,308 lives in Liberia, Sierra Leon, and Guinea.\(^6^6\) The transmission of EVD in this region was facilitated by conflict, political unrest, and resultant mistrust of government; densely populated cities; extensive travel between the affected areas; severely limited healthcare infrastructure; long-standing cultural practices, for instance, funeral practices, such as the bathing and embracing of corpses.\(^6^7\) 64 people died of EVD in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the US and Mali in 2014.\(^6^8\) The EBD has continued to kill a considerable number of people in the northeastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo bordering Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan between 2018 and 2019. Ebola is a public health crisis which requires the continued efforts of all nations to prevent the factors that cause it.

What has been discussed above implies that an international collaboration is required in order to successfully fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the Ebola outbreak in the world. The UN member states should enhance their efforts in this endeavor.

**Transnational Environmental Crime**

Transnational environmental crime is rampant in the current world. It has different manifestations. According to Lorraine Elliot,

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\text{[i]n simple terms, transnational environmental crime involves the trading and smuggling of plants, animals, resources and pollutants in violation of prohibition or regulation regimes established by multilateral environmental agreements and/or in contravention of domestic law. It includes illegal logging and timber smuggling, the illegal trade in endangered and threatened species, the black market in ozone depleting substances (and, potentially, other prohibited or regulated chemicals), the transboundary dumping of toxic and hazardous waste, and what is known in the environmental lexicon as IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing.}\]

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\(^{6^6}\) (WHO), “Ebola Virus Disease.”


\(^{6^8}\) World Health Organization, “Ebola Virus Disease.”

One of the above-mentioned transnational environmental crimes is hazardous waste export to “developing” countries, which is on the rise. Some people both in the “developed” and “developing” countries have been negatively affected by the exportation of toxic wastes and hazardous industries. Some corporations are involved in large-scale corruption by bribing politicians and warlords in poor countries to dispose of their wastes. Some African countries including Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau and Somalia have been polluted by hazardous waste from the “developed” world. The 2004 earthquake in the Indian Ocean, for instance, exposed radioactive and toxic waste dumped in Somalia in the 1990s. Also, some waste had been dumped in the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

Moreover, electronic waste or e-waste is being transferred from “developed” countries to certain “developing” countries because of the lack of capacity to handle the sheer quantity of e-waste they produced, the low price to dumping it in poor countries, strong environmental regulations in their own countries, and the lack of strong and enforceable environmental laws in “developing” countries. E-waste includes discarded computers, TV sets, mobile phones, printers, CD players, used air conditioners, used fridges, etc. Europe and North America are the largest producers of e-wastes in the world. European countries have transported and shipped e-waste as second-hand electronics to West Africa and Asia via the “ports of northwest Europe (for example, Tilbury and Felixstowe in England and Antwerp in Belgium) and of the Mediterranean.”

African countries do not have appropriate disposal technologies. Very often they are forced to burn or bury hazardous wastes – a process that releases toxins into the air and contaminates waterways respectively. Toxic materials such as mercury, lead, cadmium and persistent organic pollutants including polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and brominated flame retardants (BRFs) are found in e-wastes. These toxic materials have had negative impacts on the health of human and nonhuman beings and the natural environment. When toxic chemicals and electronics

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71 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 24.
products are burned, they release toxins into the air. Again, when they are buried, they contaminate waterways.\textsuperscript{75} In some places, animals graze plants contaminated by toxic chemicals.

Regrettably, certain Western scholars have encouraged the exportation of toxic materials to poor countries on economic grounds. For instance, Lawrence Summers, in his former capacity as Vice President of Development Economics and Chief Economist of the World Bank, in the early 1990s, (in)famously argued that exporting rich-nation garbage and toxicity to least developed countries (LDCs) is economically rational for both the sending and the receiving parties in the transition.\textsuperscript{76} He was of the opinion that the United States and Europe would benefit from this measure by promoting their economy and appeasing the rising discontent of rich-nation environmentalists. On the other hand, he thought that Africa will not attract environmentalists who can oppose garbage dumps and industrial effluent.

According to political philosopher Debra Satz, Summers’ reasoning is “impeccable”: “given that the economic consequences of increased pollution are far lower in LDCs than in developed countries, people in LDCs should be willing to sell pollution rights to people in developed countries for a price that the latter should be willing to pay.”\textsuperscript{77} Elmar Altvater also endorsed the views of Summers.\textsuperscript{78} As I argued elsewhere, the exportation of dirty industries and toxic wastes to Africa has aggravated environmental injustice.\textsuperscript{79} I suggest that African and other “developing” countries should oppose the contamination of their environment by the toxic wastes produced in other nations.

\textbf{Terrorism}

There are threats of terrorism all over the world. Here we should note that there is no universal agreement over what constitutes terrorism. As some writers argue, “the term ‘terrorism’ was value laden within political spheres: ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’.”\textsuperscript{80}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 122.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Debra Satz, \textit{Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 83 (emphasis in the original).
\item \textsuperscript{79} Kelbessa, “Environmental Injustice in Africa,” 112.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Heather Deegan, \textit{Africa Today: Culture, Economics, Religion, Security} (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 182.
\end{itemize}
The term “terrorism” is used to refer to both religiously inspired and non-religious groups/individuals. Very often the use of force or violence against injustice is described as terrorism. Anti-apartheid and other liberation movements were considered as terrorist by racist governments and colonial powers. Among others, Nelson Mandela was arrested and imprisoned for over a quarter of a century as a “communist terrorist.” In the 1980s, Western leaders including the UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990), the US President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), and the US Vice-President Dick Cheney (2001-2009) held this view.81 The British and American governments supported the apartheid government in South Africa as a Cold War ally. Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC), the political party with which Mandela was associated, were placed on a terrorist watch list by Reagan administration. In 1988, Cheney, a powerful Republican leader in the House of Representatives of the US, and the former Vice-President under the George W. Bush administration, argued that the ANC was a terrorist organization and therefore the US Congress should not call for the release of Mandela. President George W. Bush signed a bill into law removing the classification of Mandela and the ANC from all terrorist watch lists in July 2008. “In the twenty-first century,” Mandela was “acclaimed as a moral colossus of our time”82 and a symbol of peace and freedom.

Even these days some governments still attempt to crush opposition movements and peaceful protestors by characterizing them as terrorists. Other non-religious groups in the West (for instance, neo-Nazis, the anti-immigrant right-wing movements in Western Europe and North America) want to promote their aims using any means which may be considered acts of terrorism.

Moreover, there has been a religiously inspired terrorism in different parts of the world. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu notes, persons of different religious persuasion can engage in all kinds of nefarious activities including violence and terrorism.83 Some religious groups aspire to create a single nation of particular religious persuasion. Although some Muslims participated in the 9/11 attack, not all terrorists are Muslims. The Oklahoma bomber, and the Norway bomber and killer of innocent teenagers at the Utoya Island in July 2011 were Caucasian and Christian. It is true that some militant Muslims have intensified their activities in the 21st century. In particular, the detention of suspected jihadists at Guantanamo Bay by the US government, the “rendition” of suspects in which torture is being

82 Ibid.
practiced, and the systematic abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq are believed to radicalize Islamic militants. Some Muslims and Christians were slave owners in the past. Thus, it is not correct to associate all forms of terrorism with the right-wing so-called “Islamic” extremism.

For the most part, a deliberate attack on civilians is one manifestation of different forms of terrorism. Very often suicide bombers deliberately target the civilian population. Consider the following examples. The September 11 terrorist attack killed nearly 3000 people in the US. The Bali terrorist bombings in October 2002 killed about 200 innocent people in Indonesia. The attacks in Madrid, Spain, killed about 200 people in 2004. Bomb blasts killed 74 people at the Ethiopian restaurant and the Kyadondo rugby club in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, in July 2010. The Somali Islamist movement Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the Kampala attack. The group is against the presence of Ugandan soldiers as part of the African Union Mission in Somali (Amisom) force. It is to be recalled that al-Qaida bombed the embassies of the US in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, which led to the death of 200 people. Car bomb blasts killed 23 people in the UN building in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, on August 26, 2011. What is very sad is some groups want to kill innocent people who are not responsible for any wrongdoing in order to get the world’s attention and to force the respective governments to take notice and change their polices. A Norwegian killed 76 civilians including children at an Oslo government building at the Island of Utoya on July 22, 2011. 1,826 people died in Nigeria in 2013 because of the conflict between the Nigerian government and the Islamic militant group Boko Haram. In Kenya, Al-Shabaab attacked the Westgate Shopping mall in Nairobi, in September 2013 and Mpeketoni village in Lamu in June 2014 and killed 69 and 48 individuals respectively. About 6,000 people lost their lives in different parts of Iraq in 2013. Similarly, many people died in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, India, Somalia, the Philippines, Yemen, Thailand, Turkey and Mexico in 2013 due to terrorist attacks.

In order to address the problem of terrorism, we should try to understand its root causes rather than the violent manifestations. According to Archbishop Tutu,

[t]he cause of terrorism lies not in their faith but in various circumstances: injustice, oppression, poverty, disease, hunger, ignorance, and so on. To combat this terrorism, we should not foolishly speak of “crusades” against this or that faith, but we should eradicate the root causes that can drive people to the desperation that compels
them to engage in desperate acts. We will not win the war against terrorism until we do that.\textsuperscript{84}

Ahmed Zewail, the Chemistry Nobel Laureate, identifies poverty and hopelessness as the sources of terrorism and disruption of the world order.\textsuperscript{85} However, it should be noted that fundamentalist radical groups do not come just from poverty, etc., but from their foundational beliefs. What has been stated above shows that the source of terrorism is not from the “clash of civilizations,” but rather from a set of awful conditions that present insuperable obstacles to a decent human life for some people.

Violent forces against terrorists may reduce their movements for a short period of time, but cannot destroy them once for all. The movement of counterterrorism should use peaceful means to pacify those who decided to participate in the mass murder of civilians in the name of ideological and political agendas, religious causes, social hostilities, and for other reasons (nationalism, race, individual interest and the like). It is thus important to identify and address the major roots of conflict and injustice so as to avoid terrorism and other related problems. This requires dialogue among civilizations, among other measures, the principle which the United Nations General Assembly identified in 2001. “Dialogue is not only a ‘necessary answer to terrorism but, in many ways, its nemesis,’ and one of the most effective ways ‘to promote the best in humanity.’”\textsuperscript{86}

The radicalization of various religious and non-religious groups does not give us any hope for peaceful existence of cultures and civilizations. One may assert that we cannot negotiate with extremist religious groups; thus it is not possible to stop terrorists from carrying out their violent attacks. It is true that we cannot bring terrorism under control overnight; peaceful means will not always stop mass murder. They would not have stopped Adolf Hitler committing genocide. But I think we can do better in the future than we are doing now. However, if we allow different groups to peacefully and democratically express their views through dialogue, stop characterizing members groups and freedom fighters as “terrorists,” and if we avoid double standards in our dealing with global problems, we can make a substantial progress in reducing the number of people who want to resort to violence to fulfill their aims. Human reason is a

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 42.
principal factor in the decline of violence. Any reasonable person can understand and present his/her case and settle the issue. Sometimes individuals decide to commit suicide and kill combatants and noncombatants when they have no other alternative to realize their causes. In other words, sometimes terrorism is the instrument of the weak. If such individuals are given alternatives, most of them may peacefully advance their causes. If individuals blindly decide to wreak unnecessary destruction and do not accept ethical and peaceful dialogue, they cannot mobilize the majority of people to participate in their terrorist acts. When al-Qaida tried to incite a civil war between different religious groups in Iraq after the invasion of the US, many people ignored its call. There were also other historical examples that can remind us that humanity has solved such problems, for instance, the abolition of slavery despite a strong resistance from slave owners in the US by a bloody civil war. It is true that in some places slavery came to an end when it came to be seen as non-economic and not so for its immorality. The apartheid political system in South Africa was dismantled in the 1990s through continuous dialogue between the government and freedom fighters as well as external pressures.

Natural Disasters

Natural disasters require the cooperation of different nations to deal with their consequences. Consider some of the most devastating natural disasters in the 21st century. A heat wave killed more than 70,000 people throughout Europe in the summer of 2003. Hurricane Katrina devastated large swathes of New Orleans in the US. The Tsunami of December 26, 2004 took the lives of an estimated 126,473 people in Indonesia. Moreover, more than 230,000 people lost their lives in 14 countries. The 2005 Kashmir earthquake killed 88,000 people in Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan. Cyclone Nargis killed more than 146,000 people in Myanmar on May 2, 2008. The 2008 Sichuan earthquake killed over 84,000 people in Sichuan Province of China. The 7.0 magnitude Haiti earthquake killed about 230,000 people in Haiti in January 2010. The east coast of Japan was hit by a powerful 9-magnitude earthquake on March 11, 2011. Afterward, the coast of Japan was hit by a 10-meter tsunami which led to the breakup of a nuclear reactor and the death of about 20,000 people. The Sandy storm hit the north-eastern US destroying homes and businesses, knocking down trees and power lines and killing more than one hundred people in October 2012. Before moving to the US, the storm killed 71 people in the Caribbean region. Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) killed 6,300 people in the Philippines in 2013. Some of these examples do not necessarily imply that other nations come to the aid of one in distress.

Dialogue among civilizations will help different nations to pay sufficient attention and help those who have become the victims of natural
disasters across boundaries and religions. In what follows, I will discuss the importance of dialogue among civilizations and cultures to deal with the aforementioned global challenges and other related global problems.

The Need for Dialogue among Civilizations

The term “civilization” has been defined in various ways. It comes from the Latin word *civilis*, meaning civil. “Historically, civilization derives from ‘civil’ and ‘civility,’ which, in turn, go back to the Latin cives (citizen), the participant in a civitas (Greek: polis).”87 In the Western tradition, civilization is connected with city life and citizenship.88 Archaeologists and historians regard life in cities as clear evidence of civilization because of its introduction of a totally new kind of life and dissolution of former social ties.89 However, confining civilization only to cities is not fully acceptable, as civilization can occur outside cities. Civilization is also believed to have symbolic systems of communication (such as writing).

Some writers distinguish between civilized and uncivilized peoples in the world. They regard Europeans as rational, enlightened, and civilized, and non-Europeans as irrational, romantic, and barbarous. They define human civilization in Western terms. On this account, barbarians do not show clear signs of civilization. Civilization is believed to move from Europe to other continents. For them, the greatest people who were capable of creating advanced, dynamic civilizations were only the Europeans. The foundation of modern philosophy, mathematics and empirical science was assumed to be European thought. The popular view is that “Western Civilization begins with the Greeks and Romans,”90 and moves in other directions. Europeans, therefore, believe that ancient Greeks were the original thinkers and the founding fathers of philosophy. Western civilization is regarded as a good model for other civilizations. Other countries should follow in the footsteps of Western countries.

On the other hand, it is generally believed that human civilization began in Africa and Africans made important contributions to subsequent civilization. Although some scientists have started to question the theory that humans emerged in Africa, most scientists, archaeologists, historians and palaeontologists agree that Africa was the cradle of humankind. On this account, the early black African civilization began in the valley of the

88 Ibid.
Nile and became the foundation of world civilization. Among others, Herodotus, George G. M. James, Cheikh Anta Diop, Drusilla Dunjee Houston, Martin Bernal, Paul C. Boyd, Christos C. Evangeliou, Innocent C. Onyewuenyi, Workineh Kelbessa and the like held theories about the African origins of civilization. The secular writers of the Renaissance and Enlightenment period held a similar view. On the basis of the works of Herodotus, the Greek historian, a laboratory method of microscopic examination, osteological measurements, blood group, and archaeological evidence, Diop stated that ancient Egyptians were black and the initiators of Western civilization. According to Herodotus, “It is certain that the natives of the country [ancient Egypt] are black with the heat.” Diop insists that European civilization is based on the achievements of Africans, particularly ancient Egyptians. He writes,

[The ancient Egyptians were Negroes. The moral fruit of their civilization is to be counted among the assets of the Black world. Instead of presenting itself to history as an insolvent debtor, the Black world is the very initiator of the ‘Western’ civilization flaunted before our eyes today. Pythagorean mathematics, the four elements of Thales of Miletus, Epicurean materialism, Platonic idealism, Judaism, Islam, and modern science are rooted in Egyptian cosmogony and science. One needs only to meditate on Osiris, the redeemer-god who sacrifices himself, dies,


and is resurrected to save mankind, a figure essentially identifiable with Christ.\textsuperscript{93}

Diop suggests that humanity must “recognize in all objectivity that the first Homo sapiens was a ‘Negroid’ and that other races, white and yellow, appeared later, following differentiations whose physical causes still escape science.”\textsuperscript{94} It should also be noted that ancient Europeans such as Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Lucian, Apollodorus, Achilles Tatius, Diogenes Laertius, Ammianus Marcellinus, Aeschylus, Aristotle, and others declared that ancient Egyptians were native black-skinned Africans with woolly hair. As Diop puts it, “Herodotus was Indo-European; he therefore had no interest in asserting that ‘the Egyptians had dark skin and curly hair’, that they were Negroes and that it was they who had civilized the Mediterranean world, if it was not true.”\textsuperscript{95}

According to Bernal, “Egypt had by far the greatest civilization in the East Mediterranean during the millennia in which Greece was formed.”\textsuperscript{96} In this regard, it is interesting to note that ancient Egypt had its own written documents.

The Egyptian “cosmogony”...is attested in texts found in the Pyramids (2600 B.C.) to mention only well-established facts, i.e., it refers to a period when the Greeks did not as yet exist as a historical nation and when the notion of a Chinese or Hindu philosophy would have been nonsensical.\textsuperscript{97}

Furthermore, in the past, the best-known library was burned by fanatics; it was found in Alexandria, Egypt and not in Athens, Greece. It was the process of living which led to the emergence of writing which had a considerable impact on Egyptian civilization. The high population density around the Nile valley forced human beings to use writing to organize the irrigation system which determines the life of these people. For that matter, a considerable part of the Greek language was derived from Egyptian and Semitic language. The names of the cities, gods, and individuals were borrowed from Egypt. “Athena,” for example, is the Egyptian name. In fact, “the classical and Hellenistic Greeks themselves maintained that their religion came from Egypt and Herodotus even specified that the names of the gods were – with one or two exceptions – Egyptian.”\textsuperscript{98} It

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., xiv.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 262.
\textsuperscript{95} Diop, “The Cultural Contributions and Prospects of Africa,” 348.
\textsuperscript{96} Bernal, \textit{Black Athena}, xiv.
\textsuperscript{97} Diop, “Is There an African Philosophy?,” 2.
\textsuperscript{98} Bernal, \textit{Black Athena}, 72.
should also be stressed that the Mediterranean world had interacted with ancient Egyptians.

Bernal lamented that Europeans denied the Afroasiatic roots of Greek philosophy because of Christian reaction, the rise of the concept of progress, slavery, racism, and romantic Hellenism. He considers racism as the major reason for their denial. That is why Europeans have asserted that it is only the European descent which can use reason and do philosophy. With this fact in mind Bernal writes:

> [t]he development of Eurocentrism and racism, with the colonial expansion…led to the fallacy that only people who lived in temperate climates, that is, Europeans could really think. Thus the ancient Egyptians, who…though their color was uncertain…lived in Africa, lost their position as philosophers.\(^{100}\)

Diodorus Siculus (Diodorus of Sicily, an ancient Greek historian), Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren (a German historian, 1760-1842), C. F. Volney, Sir Ernest Alfred Thompson Wallis Budge (an English Egyptologist, orientalist, and philologist, 1857-1934), Lady Lugard (Flora L. Shaw, a British journalist and writer, 1852-1929), Bruce Williams (American radio host and writer, 1932-2019), Houston, and others generally believe that Egypt and peoples and Nations south of her borders had strong cultural and historical relations. They argue that Old Ethiopia\(^{101}\) was the cradle of human civilization. They further state that ancient Egypt was colonized by Old Ethiopia and derived most of its institutions from the latter and transmitted its civilization to Greece and Rome. Taking this as a point of departure some writers argue that Egyptian civilization was younger than Nubian civilization. Ancient Nubians had built temples, pyramids and advanced form of political organization long before ancient Egyptians knew their existence. Recently, such a view of black African civilization has been supported by archaeological evidence.\(^{102}\) But the detailed discussion of writers like Bernal and their views is beyond the scope of this study.

I strongly believe that although civilization reflects the advanced stage of development and organization, there is no doubt that each society has its own distinct way of life and has its own share in human civilization.

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99 Ibid., 189-223.
100 Ibid., 440.
101 Old Ethiopia is the term used to denote the inhabitants of certain areas South of Egypt but radically different from the modern nation of Ethiopia.
Different civilizations have had their own distinctive temporal and spatial dimensions and have developed their own unique worldviews over the years although there are some commonalities. This indicates that we can talk about African, European and Asian civilizations. Hernán López-Garay’s definition of the term “civilization” partly captures what has been stated above. “Roughly, a civilization is considered to be a group of peoples, which through an extended period of time have developed a common culture. This means a distinctive system of values and practices, a common language and way of looking at the world and acting, in sum a distinctive way of being.” Civilization also refers to the development of a common institution that sustained peoples’ culture for an extended span of time. There have been different forms of interaction among civilizations from time immemorial in the world. I would argue that dialogical dialogue among civilizations can help them resolve some global problems in the twenty-first century and beyond.

Dialogue happens between two or more individuals and groups. It involves expressing one’s view, a readiness to listen to the other, and a commitment to mutual respect and mutual openness. It searches for foundations, discloses hidden value assumptions and clarifies things. Different civilizations have engaged in dialogue to settle various problems in the history of the world. Various philosophers have adopted the method of dialogue to develop their ideas. As Robert Magliola and William Sweet persuasively state,

[i] Indeed, philosophy is pre-eminently and has been throughout its history, consistently dialogical. In the West, we may think of Plato’s dialogues and the so-called process of Socratic dialectic, and in the East we have the dialogue hymns of the Rigveda and the Indian epic Mahabharata…Dialogue has been used to seek foundations, achieve consensus, reach a state of wide reflective equilibrium, or attain a ‘fusion of horizons’; clearly, philosophy has much to contribute to a dialogue of cultural traditions.

Nigel Dower defines dialogue as follows:

[d]ialogue…is a form of communication between different actors who need to come to some kind of agreement (normally on how to act in relation to each other, or on the values and norms

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which provide the basis for this). In a dialogic communication each party is able to express their views freely and are expected to *listen* openly to the views of others...A dialogue in which there is genuine freedom to express points of view without fear or intimidation and there is genuine willingness to listen and on this basis to come to agreed decisions is already highly ‘ethical’ in terms of the norms internal to its operation (though most actual dialogues fall short of this ideal to some degree). ¹⁰⁵

As Dower notes, a basic minimum for useful discussion would include the following ground rules:

- All parties are free to express their views without intimidation.
- All parties are willing to listen to other parties.
- Discussion of these views occurs based on the offering of rational arguments or being guided by reason (where the weight of reason is not related to the economic or other bargaining power of the person or party who offers the reason)
- The intention of all parties is to reach a consensus decision which reflects the interests of the various parties. ¹⁰⁶

An ethical approach to the dialogue of cultural traditions can help different stakeholders to understand their roles and responsibilities, as hidden value assumptions and/or vested interests can be unmasked through the exposure of ethics. ¹⁰⁷ Certain formal features of ethical reasoning can be spelt out by ethical discussion: the principle of universalizability, the golden rule, the idea of reciprocity, the idea that ethics is about equal consideration of interests, and respect for persons. ¹⁰⁸ Ethics raises questions about values and norms and suggests what the world should be. Very often human beings frame their ultimate developmental goals from the point of view of some ideals or visions of the future and of how our world *ought* to be. Also,

[a]n ethical dialogue of civilizations has an important function in the process of learning to appreciate oneself and one’s own cultural background without the need to ‘demonize’ others. In

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 7.
¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 11.
¹⁰⁸ Ibid.
their quest to learn from others, people are guided by passionate emotions, including courage, friendship and love. Goodwill among people is at the core of any meaningful dialogue, together with the acceptance of the fact that human beings are not complete or fulfilled the way they are but can acquire a deeper understanding of themselves and enrich their lives through interaction with others.109

Similarly, Fred Dallmayr suggests that a particular notion should not be privileged during dialogue among civilizations. He insists that conversationists should not act as if they were omniscient. The parties involved in civilizational dialogue ought to be committed to global civility, which involves “a commitment to social justice and the rule of law, and a willingness to shoulder the sobering demands of ‘civic prudence’ (phronesis).”110 Dallmayr stresses the importance of mutual learning. Different civilizations are partial and can learn something from one another. So no single civilization can impose the content of social justice and the rule of law on other rules.

What has been discussed above reveals that ethical dialogue can help all stakeholders to reconsider their immoral position and listen to one another. “When all stakeholders know there is an open honest and persistent dialogue developing they won’t be able to capitalize on ignorance as many multinationals do who reside in the ‘developing’ world precisely because of lack of awareness.”111 Ethical clarification and rectification can help humans who share different beliefs, cultures, and languages to avoid unnecessary confrontation and address some grave imbalances in the current world.

As I stated elsewhere, dialogue among traditions helps us to rethink our place and future on the planet Earth.112 It is instrumental in understanding diversity as the constitutive of reality. As Denis Goulet persuasively argues, “[t]hat differences exist, must not be seen as something abnormal, aberrant or scandalous, a condition merely to be tolerated. On the

110 Dallmayr, Dialogue among Civilizations, 30.
contrary, plurality is the very standard of reality, to be cherished by all.”¹¹³ However, criticism cannot be prevented by sensitivity to difference. Instead, it can lead us to a lively pluralism,¹¹⁴ which can be fostered through different and constructive arguments.

“A creative cross cultural dialogue can help us recognize and reveal the importance of difference, and enable us to hear and benefit from important voices which would otherwise be unrepresented or underrepresented.”¹¹⁵ Here, I am not stressing fixed differences among cultural and religious groups that may be a salient source of international conflict. I do not endorse Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” framework for interpreting history and making predictive claims about history’s future course. Instead, I stress that dialogue helps us learn from various cultures without objectifying them and their people. Dialogue among different cultures will enable us to address problems that cannot be settled by a single culture. Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations (1997-2006), outlines the significance of the dialogue among civilizations as follows:

“First, it is an appropriate and necessary answer to the notion of an inevitable clash of civilizations. As such, it provides a vehicle for advancing cooperation. Second, and most important, the dialogue can help us distinguish lies from facts, and propaganda from sound analysis. This can be especially helpful in uncovering the real grievances that lie at the heart of conflict.”¹¹⁶

The African conception of ubuntu also implies the importance of dialogue among individuals and civilizations. Ubuntu is the idea that the self is defined in terms of relationships to others and that happiness and fulfilment are to be found within these relations. The concept ubuntu thus signifies that one can be a person through other persons. It enables human beings to acknowledge and appreciate unity in their humanity despite differences.¹¹⁷ A person who has ubuntu/botho can understand the values of

human life and avoid unethical and inhuman acts, such as rape, crime, robbery, discrimination, etc. in the community.\textsuperscript{118} The lesson that can be derived from \textit{ubuntu} is that all human beings can flourish through mutual recognition and respect. The principle of \textit{ubuntu} is not unique to Africa, but it can be found elsewhere. African behavior is not better or worse than other continents and other civilizations, but the worldview of Africans has had a positive impact on the relationship between individuals.

As some intercultural philosophers note, in the process of dialogue, the concerned parties should go beyond their territories and try to understand the positions of other parties. According to Vincent Shen, “comparison, communication and dialogue will never be conducted within one’s self-enclosure. On the contrary, it starts with a mutual act of going outside one’s self-enclosure to the other that I call ‘a process of mutual \textit{waitu}’.\textsuperscript{119} Shen modifies “the strategy of strangification” proposed by Fritz Wallner, and extends it to intercultural exchange, inter-religious dialogue, and intercultural philosophy. Shen believes that Chinese Buddhism exemplifies ‘strangification’ (i.e., an approach that is able not only to bridge to and learn from the other but also to apply its insights to the other). For Shen, strangification means “the act of going outside of oneself and going to many others, from one’s familiarity to one’s strangers, from one’s cultural context to other cultural contexts.”\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Waitu} is the Chinese version of strangification. This strategy can enable those who involve in dialogue arrive at better results. In short, ethical dialogue will enable us to improve understanding of each other’s attitude in a spirit of authenticity, to foster compromise, to recognize the needs and aspirations of others, to celebrate our diversity, to look beyond differences, and understand the fundamental unity of all human beings.

Although group differences are real, we all share basic human values that unite us. Among other factors, the golden rule is found in most religions, and is a wonderful tool to promote common human interests. Arvind Gupta is of the opinion that all religions contain the following common minimum secular values acceptable to most people: peace, truth, tolerance, honesty, non-violence,

\textsuperscript{118} Mulemfo, \textit{Thabo Mbeki}, 58.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 44.
Global Challenges and Dialogue among Civilizations

charity, justice, harmony, parsimony, mutual respect, philanthropy, right conduct, human rights, and compassion, self-restraint, rectitude, forbearance and family values.\textsuperscript{121}

Thus, responsible leaders, novelists, and intellectuals should teach the value of ethical dialogue and unity in diversity for a sustainable and peaceful world. According to Zewail, “[w]e need visionary leaders who make history, not leaders who envision the end of history.”\textsuperscript{122} Yes, this idea is good in itself. However, it is not easy to find visionary leaders.

Barriers to Ethical Dialogue

Various factors can affect the process and use of ethical dialogue. Among others, anxiety, assuming similarity instead of difference, ethnocentrism, stereotypes and prejudice, nonverbal misinterpretations, and language can be the major barriers to intercultural communication.\textsuperscript{123} The persistence of enemy stereotypes along civilizational lines has hindered international peace and stability. Over the centuries, armed conflict has resulted from “the demonization or vilification of another civilization (particularly in regard to religious identity).”\textsuperscript{124} Accordingly, the narrow self-interest of some international actors might be abetted by various morally indefensible and even repugnant attitudes, such as unreasonable hostility, intolerance, stereotypes and prejudice, exclusivism, chauvinism, and unjustified confidence in the correctness of one’s views. But in the virtue ethics sense, this vicious attitude is self-evidently indefensible and repugnant no matter how distantly or closely aligned are the cultures of those who have these vices and suffer from the effects of their exercise.

Some skeptics argue that individuals or groups who have different backgrounds and languages cannot dialogue with each other, as different languages are incommensurable with each other. But this is not a defensible argument. Although different languages have their own respective


\textsuperscript{122} Zewail, “Dialogue of Civilizations,” 106.


ontological and other implications, cross-cultural translations are possible. But not all translations are perfect.

The global inequalities of power, wealth, and knowledge can have negative impacts on dialogue among civilizations. It is likely that powerful countries may make use of dialogue of cultural traditions to further their interests. Motivations for dialogue can sometimes be conditioned by power relations. If the two parties do not have equal powers, very little can be achieved, as the stronger may dominate the weaker. In relation to the notion of “ethical dialogue” as a means of empowerment there is a good deal of evidence that “truth” and “justice,” in reality, tend to serve the interests of a tiny but powerful portion of the human population. Indeed, at least since the time of Plato and the character of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, powerful evidence and arguments have been developed that the only “ethical” principle is that there is no real ethical principle or “justice” in the real world, i.e., in reality it is always just a matter of power. Any honest inquiry into the historical emergence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the Kyoto Agreement, as just two examples, shows the limitations of using ethics as an ultimate strategy. Thus, “ethical dialogue has not had enough influence or power to adequately limit and ultimately end transnational corporations’ and powerful countries’ unjust and destructive exploitation of the environment and weaker countries and peoples.”

The current situation in the world has made it clear that ethical dialogue by itself may not enable us to address various global problems. Environmental treaties and institutions have not yet solved global environmental problems. Since power is unlikely ever to be equal, what can we hope for?

Some powerful countries are reluctant to participate in global dialogue and to fulfil their historical tasks. For instance, the US has further distanced itself from many institutions and mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICJ) designed to improve the global community. The US did not fully support the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2003. It demanded exemption of its soldiers and government officials from prosecution through the amendments of the statute. The Bush administration argued that the US military personnel and public officials might be targeted by its political enemies. Although the US approached 100 countries to sign immunity agreements that they would not support the jurisdiction of the ICC over Americans, 53

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127 Singer, One World, 119.
countries refused to sign this agreement. Surprisingly enough, following their refusal to accept its will, the US stopped giving aids to half of those countries as South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, Niger, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro.128 While Britain, Germany, Australia, and Japan escaped from any financial penalties.

Furthermore, the US withdrew from UNESCO on December 31, 1984 because of its dissatisfaction with the UNESCO’s program, the role and political motivation of UNESCO’s Secretariat, management practices, budgetary practices and efficiency, the lack of protection for Western interests, restrictions on press freedom inherent in the controversial New World Information and Communication Order and the like.129 US officials claimed that UNESCO failed to observe its original, proper mandate. Some writers questioned the credibility of these official reasons. For instance, Mark F. Imber writes, “[t]he content, tone and inconsistencies in the public record demonstrate that the withdrawal from UNESCO was prompted, overwhelmingly by the pressure of domestic political concerns. UNESCO’s failings represented the clearest target for an ideologically motivated campaign to achieve the punitive humiliation of a major UN agency.”130 The US rejoined UNESCO in 2003 under the Bush administration. However, after UNESCO voted to accept the Palestinian authority as a full member on October 31, 2011, the Obama administration withdrew its contribution to UNESCO. The Trump administration decided to withdraw from UNESCO in October 2017. The US officially withdrew from UNESCO at the end of 2018 for the reason of “mounting arrears at UNESCO, the need for fundamental reform in the organization, and continuing anti-Israel bias at UNESCO.” The US government claimed to support the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state through direct negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. Israel also officially quit the UN’s educational, scientific and cultural agency in December 2018.

The US not only fails to pay the dues it owes to the UN but also neglects its aid to the “developing” world – the lowest, in per capita terms, among industrial nations. It fails to meet the UN target for development aid of 0.7 percent of Gross National Product. For instance, it gave 0.10 percent of its GNP in 2000.131 Compared to other “developed” countries

130 Ibid., 119.
131 Singer, One World, 180-181.
the US’s record in advancing the interests of labor and environmentalists is minimal. The US government is not a leader in human rights agreements either. It did not adopt or ratify four of the eight covenants or conventions covering human rights that have been internationally accepted since 1951. It failed to ratify the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1979 Convention on Eliminating Discrimination against Women, and the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. The US government also revoked the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and became a hindrance to the efforts made to strengthen the biological weapons convention. The US government refused to endorse the Landmines Treaty, which has been signed by over 140 nations. After September 11 attacks, Richard Haass, the director of the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, stated how the US government could bypass all nations and organizations as follows:

[...] as we know from our own history, majorities are not always right. We also cannot forget that the United States has unique global responsibilities. And if we are to meet them effectively, we may not always be able to go along with measures that many or even most others support [...] We have, moreover, demonstrated that we can and will act alone when necessary [...] A commitment to multilateralism need not constrain our options.

As some writers have observed, all this indicates that the US failed to play its part in the international efforts to build a global community.

Other powerful states also maintain rigged rules and double standards. Although Europe endorsed some global agreements, it has continued to support agricultural and cultural subsidies for its own afflicted economic sectors while urging “developing” nations to drop their own trade restrictions. It pretended to support free trade doctrines. Western powers force “developing” countries to open their markets and remove their own subsidies although Western countries still use agricultural subsidies and dump their products in the world market.

Double standards were a pattern in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in the Arab Spring. While NATO decided

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to bomb military targets of the Libyan government, it was indifferent to the popular unrest in Bahrain. The government of Bahrain killed anti-government protesters following the Bahrain uprising of 2011. One can wonder why NATO ignored the mass murdering in this country but interfered in Libya for civilian protection. Barack Obama, the former President of the US (2009-2017), used dialogue with Syria in order to avert military means and with the Iranian leader in order to discourage continued research and production of nuclear weapons. The problem is that the US and European countries did not want the current government of Syria to survive its civil war. Their intervention did not stop the destabilization and bloodshed in Syria.

In the case of NATO, there is evidence that it failed to act during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, civil wars in Somalia, and other countries. It is unlikely for NATO to change its policy to protect civilians in sub-Saharan African countries against African dictators in the years to come. Western intervention seems to be highly influenced by oil and other material interests rather than by humanitarian reasons.

Although certain African governments and the African Union opposed the intervention in Libya, no one took their position into account. The African voice does not seem to count when it is incompatible with Western interests. I do not mean that no interventions should have been carried out while killing went on. The African Union tried to settle the problem in consultation with the then government and the opposition groups. However, some countries neglected this attempt and began assisting the latter and bombing the government targets. Africa should have had a voice and be listened to for its own affairs.

However, in today’s world, “Third World” countries in general and Africa in particular are being increasingly marginalized. Powerful countries and international organizations do not seem to agree to a more democratic sharing of global power and wealth, but to refuse to be bound by arrangements because their leaders perceive them as impinging on their narrow self-interest. Sometimes they prop up repressive regimes or demur from intervening in desperate situations. Decisions to act (or refrain from acting) in these self-serving ways often completely disregard or at least grossly discount the consequent suffering of people outside of these powerful nations.

Both capitalist and socialist governments had deals with some African leaders like Mobutu Sese Seko, the former President of Zaire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (1965-1997), Mohamed Siad Barre, the former President of Somalia (1969-1991), Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), the former President of Egypt, etc. Although Africa joined the non-aligned movement as a strategy to distance itself from Cold War rivalries, many Western countries and the former Soviet Union interfered
in the internal affairs of Africa to promote their vested interests. For instance, the US supported dictators such as Seko. Similarly, during the Cold War, South Africa and the Western world supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) while the Soviet Union and its allies supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Such interference aggravated post-colonial civil wars in Africa.

Throughout the Cold War, Western countries opposed African leaders who preached nationalism and sought aid from the Soviet Union. Among others, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Belgian operatives organized and arranged the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the first legally elected Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1961. American President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) directly ordered the CIA to kill him as part of the anti-Communist crusade of the Cold War. Seko took over as head of state in a military coup d’état in 1965. The CIA and Policymakers helped him to rule the Congo. The US, France and Belgium supported his 32 years of authoritarian rule. Moreover, the CIA and British diplomats and intelligence officers supported senior Ghanaian military and police officers to overthrow President Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, in 1966. The recently released Wikileaks cablegrams reflect how some US diplomats supported some dictators in the “developing” world against the interests of the people. France promoted its own economic and political interests in Africa rather than the interests of the African people.

Alemayehu Gebre Mariam explains how the West through aid and trade has been supporting what he calls Africa’s thugtatorships (organized criminal gangs):

[...] to cover up their hypocrisy and hoodwink the people, the West is now lined up to ‘freeze’ the assets of the thugtators. It is a drama they have perfected since the early days of African independence. The fact of the matter is that the West is interested only in ‘stability’ in Africa. That simply means, in any African country, they want a ‘guy they can do business with.’ The business they want to do in Africa is the oil business, the (blood)

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diamond business, the arms sale business, the coffee and cocoa export business, the tourism business, the luxury goods export business and the war on terrorism business. They are not interested in the African peoples’ business, the human rights business, the rule of law business, the accountability and transparency business and the fair and free elections business.\textsuperscript{139}

Although most of the above points are true, and some foreign interventions removed the democratically elected government and appointing the new one that satisfied their demands, there are some exceptions. Some Western nations have assisted the people in “developing” nations through various forms of intervention against poverty, HIV/AIDS and the like. Intervention should be intelligent and productive and promote the interests of the people. Another related problem is that not everyone in the “developed” world follows public affairs and has influence on public policies. Even the overwhelming majority of the attentive public are not sufficiently aware of the impact of the policies of their governments on the “developing” world. The internal pressure on leaders to participate in intercultural dialogue in the “developed” world is very weak.

Similar to some powerful capitalist countries, some “developing” countries seem to have a negative impact on dialogue among civilizations. They consolidated their ties with repressive regimes to meet their needs and thereby elongate the suffering of the people. To mention just one example, although the People’s Republic of China has supported African countries in many ways,\textsuperscript{140} its non-interference policy has encouraged certain African leaders to exploit their own people. Its thirst for energy and other natural resources seems to affect the peace and democratic processes in Africa. China imports oil from such African countries as Nigeria, Angola, Chad, Algeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, and Sudan as well as different raw materials and other commodities from some African countries. China does not seem to care whether its African allies are dictators or violate human rights and exploit their people.

The activities of certain African leaders have also had negative impacts on dialogue among civilizations. Some of them have become perpetrators of widespread crime and territorial and international violence. They have been reluctant to hold dialogue with opposition groups and their own people. As stated earlier, some of them have associated them-


Workineh Kelbessa

selves with former colonial masters and TNCs and exploited their countries’ resources. The former colonial powers have bribed African leaders and rebellious groups in order to have access to resources. Certain African leaders have eliminated dissident groups without any consequences. Among others, Africa produced dictators, such as Jean-Bedel Bokassa, the former President of the Central African Republic (1966-1976) and self-styled emperor of the Central African Empire (1976-1979), Seko, Michel Micombero, the former President of Burundi (1966-1976), Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi, the former President of Libya (1969-2011) and Idi Amin Dada Oumee, the former President of Uganda (1971-1979). Although African leaders established the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, it did not challenge such dictators. The OAU supported the principle of non-interference in the affairs of member states. A key provision of the OAU Charter called for respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing states (Art. III(3)). It was believed that this promotes the political stability of the continent. For African leaders, meddling to unseat the leader of a particular country is not acceptable. When the genocide happened in Rwanda it was treated as an internal affair. Some commentators described the OAU as the “Dictators’ Club” or “Dictators’ Trade Union” and a toothless organization. At one time, Julius Kambarage Nyerere, the former President of Tanzania (1964-1985) described the OAU as “a talking Club of Heads of States.” The OAU had no formal power. It was a little more than a talking shop for African dictators.

In order to consolidate the gains brought about by political independence and attain people-centered development, African leaders transformed the OAU into the African Union in 2002. The AU is expected to deal decisively with “regional integration, human development, intra-Africa trade, infrastructure development, governance as well as peace and security. Of paramount importance was also the need to build new and more reciprocal relationships on the global arena.” In the current rules of the AU, there are grounds for interference in the internal affairs of member states. There are some positive developments in the AU. However, a lot has to be done to make the AU a strong global player and protector of the interests of African countries.

I would argue that powerful and weaker participants of dialogue are required to establish a certain commonality in order to have a genuine dialogue. Dialogue requires some form of moral/nominal but not factual equality among participants. This implies that the interests of the parties involved in dialogue should be given equal consideration in order to hold

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141 For details, see David Lamb, *The Africans* (New York: Random House, 1982).
a genuine dialogue. Another important requirement is that participants in
the dialogue are expected to cultivate goodwill to hold a dialogue. They
need to express willingness to engage with and listen to each other.

Hans-Georg Gadamer also insists that a genuine dialogue ought to
rely on ethical foundations. For him, all understanding is based on preju-
dice, which he defines as “prejudgment.” He thinks that every dialogue
between readers and texts, or between people across distances starts from
the pre-judgments or background assumptions of the participants. An in-
dividual is required to go through a process of projecting his/her preju-
dices so as to obtain an understanding:

the suspension of one’s prejudices, whether this involves an-
other person through whom one learns one’s own nature and
limits, or an encounter with a work of art or a text; always some-
thing more is demanded than to understand the other, that is to
seek and acknowledge the immanent coherence contained
within the meaning claim of the other.143

Gadamer thinks that there is a dialogical relationship between the
reader and the text.144 A “genuine” dialogue between the two will give
rise to the truth. For him, when a person reads the text, he/she asks what
the text meant. The text responds to his/her question. Gadamer extends
this dialogical relationship to the intercultural relationship. He advises hu-
man beings to overcome a monologue through the dialogical engagement
between cultures. He counters the claim of methodological universality,
unilateral domination, egocentrism, and ethnocentrism. For Gadamer, all
genuine dialogue helps the person to understand the feeling and the posi-
tion of the other and engage with him or her.

The weakness of global governance is another hindrance to genuine
dialogue among civilizations. As I have stated elsewhere,145 although the
UN is the only body that can possibly have the moral authority to resolve
disputes between nations and its solutions to be accepted, the UN systems

143 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Problem of Historical Consciousness,” in Interpre-
tive Social Science: A Second Look, eds. J. S. Close, trans. P. Rabinow and W. M.
144 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Mar-
shall (New York: Crossroad, 1989).
145 Workineh Kelbessa, “Climate Change Impacts and Planning in Africa,” in Meltdown: Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Other Catastrophes: Fears and Con-
247-266; see also López-Garay, “Dialogue among civilizations,” 15-33; Singer, One
World; Benjamin R. Barber, “Global Governance in an Interdependent World,” in
After Terror: Promoting Dialogue among Civilizations, eds. Akbar Ahmed and Brian
are defective on many fronts, for these systems do not equally accommodate the interests of all nations. As Peter Singer has noted, the UN is undemocratic itself in giving excessive powers to the permanent members of the Security Council, who were the victors of the Second World War – China, France, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the US. These countries have the right to veto any resolution. In fact, China was simply listed for the appearance of respect. No one really thought China as a great power or a victor of World War II. The Security Council has never opened its door for other larger nations such as India, Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa as well as Islamic countries to become its permanent members.

The UN has no strong power to enforce international laws. Louise Frechette identifies three distinct factors that reflect an erosion of the UN’s perceived legitimacy. The first is that the current composition of the Security Council does not represent the world’s reality. The second is that the view of a number of “developing” countries, particularly the Muslim world, the UN is the instrument of the US and of the West. The third is “the benign neglect by almost all its member states.” In spite of its weaknesses, the UN has played an important role in different fields, especially in the fight against poverty and inequality as

A provider of peace
A provider of norms
A provider of knowledge
A provider of assistance
A provider of inspiration (for lack of a better term).

In order to be more effective the UN Charter needs to be amended and reflect the interests of all member states. Popular representation and qualified majority voting should replace the vetoes. As López-Garay suggests, the UN needs an intercultural dialogue to amend its Charter “because it has become the political and military arm of the culture of the West, of the rootless man and globalization.” All UN member states should come together, discuss and revise the shortcomings of the UN Charter. Powerful nations cannot continue to promote their interests against other nations indefinitely. Global dialogue is the only viable option for it promotes global peace and harmony.

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146 Singer, One World.
148 Ibid., xxvii.
149 Ibid., xxii.
However, we should be cautious about this idea. What has been suggested would be more democratic and the less powerful countries may rely on democratic values to challenge precepts that govern the behavior of the more powerful but the self-interest of states would still prevail, agreements might be even harder to reach (even in the EU) and a good many countries (the US certainly) would be even less willing to be bound by UN decisions. That move may not be useful for a sustainable and lasting peace in the world. In reference to September 11th, 2001, Singer makes an important, but perhaps, to some, surprising point that should directly affect our understanding of what a global ethic might reveal within the existing world order, where the heaviest weight of responsibility might lie, and what the dangers of ignorance might entail. In referring to the terrorist 9/11 attacks, Singer says that “developed” nations were morally wrong in ignoring the global ethical viewpoint. He further suggests that by failing to take a global ethical viewpoint into account the rich nations will endanger their own security.

Benjamin R. Barber also stresses that sovereignty alone cannot enable a country to be safe. All nations should depend on one another. He writes, “[i]n a world where the poverty of some imperils the wealth of others, where none are safer than the least safe, multilateralism is not a stratagem of idealists but a realist necessity.” In fact, nations never did rely on sovereignty alone. They relied on power and alliances. Whatever it is, history gives all nations the lesson that no country can ignore others and retreat into isolationism, and remain safe. Barber stresses that a civic architecture of global cooperation can be constructed by citizens who embrace interdependence rather than by governments that are reluctant to realize the global governance ideals to which they are committed in theory. Transnational civic cooperation and the work of NGOs and economic organizations can build global governance. However, some NGOs often serve their own personnel more than the poor, as we see in Africa.

Nevertheless, we still hope that NGOs can play a positive role in the world. Various social movements and NGOs in the world can contribute to a genuine dialogue across civilizations. As Barber notes, the current situation in the world indicates the importance of building global governance bottom up rather than top down. As I argued elsewhere,

ethical dialogue within local communities is a starting point that should also be institutionally enhanced. Ethical dialogue can be effectively used to enhance the participation and empowerment

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151 Singer, *One world*.
152 Barber, “Global Governance in an Interdependent World,” 173.
153 Ibid.
of local people on their own development. Obviously, indigenous ethics should form the foundation of such dialogues. The process can have multiple impacts in terms of raising awareness, self-empowerment, and drawing attention and putting pressure on decision-makers. For example, ethical dialogue might:
- consolidate local positions and strengthen their coordinate action;
- strengthen the view of local peoples as dynamic credible partners;
- reduce the ignorance about local aspirations in powerful groups;
- expose powerful groups positions to ethical critique;
- introduce an opportunity to showcase those weak positions to influential people or institutions who might press for change; and
- introduce rules to discussions to force adequate recognition of local people’s opinions, e.g., equity of opportunity to speak, what would you think if this was done to you, preferential rights to the most vulnerable, etc.

Alliances among local citizens, environmental, and other social movements, and intellectuals and other groups who support the causes of local people can influence global powers to accept genuine dialogues among civilizations. Through this process, both citizens and governments can consolidate global governance.

Conclusion

Dialogue of cultural traditions will help us to build a more civilized and just world for human and nonhuman beings. It will help different traditions to gain new insights about their own principles of life and that of others. Both powerful nations and the most downtrodden people have the potential to benefit from ethical dialogue.

Ethical dialogue is non-domineering, non-manipulative, non-coercive, non-violent, and free from preconceived notions, prejudices, and the feelings of animosity and threat. Ethical dialogue promotes mutual respect, civic equality (equality of respect among participants), mutual understanding, mutual trust and goodwill, reciprocity, openheartedness, recognition, toleration, etc. It opposes the wholesale imposition of ideas and methods of one civilization upon other civilizations, unilateral domination, and cultural arrogance. It accepts the authenticity of all groups and

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civilizations, and entertains rival conceptions of the good. In ethical dialogue, one position cannot be privileged over another, and the parties should not see themselves as enemies. Instead, they should consider themselves as partners in the search for truth, justice, and peace. Ethical dialogue can lead to the most reasonable, defensible, and appropriate solution to conflicts and can help human beings reduce the danger of mutual destruction.

A creative dialogue, conducted in the mode of reciprocity between “old” and “new” societies, old and new models of rationality, “can only be achieved if all patterns of domination, cultural no less than economic, are abolished.” What is important to note is dialogue between civilizations if based on some form of coercion will not have any fruitful outcome. Dialogue among civilizations contributes very little to the world that is divided into donors and recipients of charity. It will not give rise to constructive communication and cross-enrichment. Mutual respect, understanding, tolerance, and recognition are required in the process of the dialogue of cultural traditions. “When cultures meet in the spirit of tolerance and interculturality, they further the cause of cooperation and communication among cultures and religions. In spite of the tensions between Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism in China, these three Weltanschauungen succeeded in living together.”

Khatami, the former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, emphasizes the ethical aspect of the dialogue among cultures. He insists that a fundamental change in political ethics is required to realize dialogue among cultures. The primary ethical attributes required for the realization of dialogue among civilizations in politics and international relations include participation, fulfillment of obligation, and humility. Powerful nations should accept the logic of dialogue rather than the logic of force, imposition, and deceit in pursuit of their interests. According to Khatami, the barbarity of terrorist attacks can be avoided through a melange of ethics and politics.

As stated earlier, although many “developed” nations have tried to address global problems, some only promoted their vested interests at the expense of the human and natural world. Many of the international actors fail to consult with affected parties because of their disproportionate power. This enables them to act without engaging in serious dialogue with other parties, especially those weaker ones. As a consequence, these weaker parties have substantially reduced opportunities to lodge morally

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relevant objections. This leads to morally impermissible behavior on the part of actors who, in the presence of strong self-interested reasons and in the absence of dialogue, are ill-motivated and ill-equipped to understand morally relevant objections relating to how their actions impinge on the well-being of others. These actors then act with little or no understanding of what these objections might be.

Xie Wenyu suggested that no matter how strong and weak a civilization is, all people need to reflect on and deeply understand their sense of responsibility and correct their cognitive errors. This will help them build a relationship of mutual trust. For him,

only in an atmosphere of mutual trust can civilizations maintain close relations while staying true to their core values. We call this type of dialogue among civilizations the ‘core values and self-awareness’ model. In this model, civilizational self-awareness is envisioned as a tool for dealing with the clash of civilizations by building a platform for dialogue, emphasizing equality, alerting one another to perception errors, and encouraging civilizations to gain a deep understanding of their core values, leading to peaceful coexistence and harmony without uniformity.\(^\text{158}\)

Wenyu identified five main principles of the core values and self-awareness paradigm: respecting “the equality and the voice of all civilizations,” the need to gain a deep understanding of one’s own values, a policy of non-interference in the affairs of other states, economic globalization as the essential driving force behind dialogue among civilizations and the positive impact of inter-civilizational dialogue on interreligious dialogue.\(^\text{159}\) Wenyu advises human beings to replace the unrealistic paradigm of universal values with the paradigm of core values if they are to develop all the world’s civilizations. As long as powerful countries can reject international agreements and ignore the voices of “developing” nations, the danger of environmental degradation persists. Currently, there is no way to implement international treaties against the interests of global powers as perceived by their ruling elites.

However, self-interest of powerful parties can be used as an entry point for dialogue. What powerful countries, corporations, and others

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\(^{159}\) Ibid., 277-278.
are resistant to are regulations that might develop as a result of such dialogues—especially if it means they have to spend more money to reduce and/or clean up pollution. Self-interested dialogue can have some positive effects, but dialogues based on pure self-interests are not likely to be sufficient to move us towards a transition to a sustainable and peaceful world. Nevertheless, the key is to get some starting point for communication. Only then will there develop opportunities for real mutual respect and curiosity.\footnote{Kelbessa, \textit{The Utility of Ethical Dialogue}, 35.}

Citizens and the governments of “developed” nations have a moral responsibility to contribute to help reduce global poverty around the world although they are not necessarily the underlying causes of the poverty of “developing” nations. They must respond to human suffering. Besides giving aid, they should assist people in the “developing” world to empower themselves and promote sustainable development. I do not think that rich societies live a comfortable and good life when the majority of human beings are suffering, hungry and poor. Our lives become more fulfilling and meaningful if we work towards bigger goals that go beyond ourselves. Dialogue among civilizations should help us to do something serious about various global challenges.

Some may object that the idea of moral obligation is idealistic. However, the existence of various global challenges and our enlightened self-interests should compel us to take moral obligation into account in our actions and decisions. A good life means a less environmental degradation and pollution, no exploitation, clean water, and a safe healthy environment. If we ignore global challenges, it will be difficult for us to fix them in the future. We can end up with catastrophic situations.

Ethics is essential in tackling global problems and in making wise choices in daily life. Ethics can change the way people behave, because it helps individuals become responsible citizens and seek constructive solutions to complex moral issues. Ethics also enables us to test practices, conventions, and conducts. Ethical ideas can push against the narrow notion of self-interest.\footnote{The first version of this paper was presented at the 9th Annual Session of the World Public Forum: “Dialogue of Civilizations,” Rhodes, Greece, October 6-10, 2011. I would like to thank David Chapple and two anonymous reviewers of the paper for their valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.}
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Religion, Universality, and Critical Theory

Fasil Merawi

Introduction

The paper is an attempt to make sense of the place that is occupied by religion in emancipatory discourse in a world in which there is an attempt to revisit the relationship that is found between the religious and public spheres. In the contemporary discourse on religious pluralism, there is a growing interest in the analysis of the religious and public spheres, the implications of fundamentalism and nationalism for the idea of pluralism and the role of religion in a critique of existing structures. Through such a critical exposition, I will argue that the existing debate on religion failed to locate religious diversity within the social and political aspects of religion; it did not thoroughly scrutinize the rooted and culturally oriented features of religion and position religious pluralism within the modern/postmodern debate.

Taking globalization as the existential continuum within which issues of universality and its relation to the contextual aspects of the human experience are being probed, in the circles of social theory, sociology of globalization and philosophy, there is a growing attempt to problematize globalization has manifested itself in all modes of life.

As Chamsy El-ojeili and Patrick Hayden see it, the discourse on globalization entails an analysis of diverse issues such as the so-called disappearance of the modern state in today’s world, the synthesis of cultures that is currently taking place and the attempt to present free market capitalism as the only alternative.¹ Such an advocacy of globalization was met with a serious criticism from Manfred Steger, who viewed “globalism” as the ideological justification of globalization as a progressive and universal form of life. Steger generally identifies the five core assumptions of “globalism.” First, there is the claim that with the progress of science, technology and free market capitalism, one finds a greater realization of human subjectivity in our world. Secondly, it is proclaimed that nothing could escape the forces of globalization, which are the logical outcomes of “the integration of national economies.”² For the third major assumption, globalization operates under the laws of “market” and the

mutual interconnection of humanity at a global level. For the fourth assumption, with the passage of time globalization promises equal distribution of goods and liberty for all involved. Finally, there is the claim that economic prosperity and the realization of individual freedom are inseparable. However, “both the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the massive anti-globalist protests from Seattle to Genoa (which) has shown (that) the expansion of the market narrative has encountered considerable resistance.”

In this connection, Richard Langhorne argues that the issue of globalization deserves a unique significance in the contemporary world due to two main factors. First, the lives of individuals, social institutions and corresponding “economic, social and political relationships” are being challenged by globalization. Second, a great deal of confusion exists over the essence of globalization. For James H. Mittelman a well-detailed analysis of globalization must transcend three most common ways of understanding about the subject. (1) globalization must not simply be examined as an economic phenomenon, (2) goes beyond the mere influence of “public policies” and (3) also should not only be limited to local forms of resistance. Thus “globalization is not a single, unified phenomenon, but a syndrome of processes and activities.” Again, for Tony Schirato and Jen Webb, globalization serves as the web of relations where humanity is striving for a common universe of discourse although there is a mystery regarding the content of such a discourse. Thus, various forms of interpretations mainly focusing on the purely economic aspects of human movement and “effects of power” are being offered. Such an analysis was furthered by Allan Scott who focused on the tendency to conceptualize globalization under the modern/postmodern debate and the analysis as to whether the globalized world is more modern or postmodern. Still, ignoring its optimistic vs. destructive possibilities, globalization could be construed as “the expansion of diverse forms of economic, political and cultural activity beyond national borders.”

In philosophical circles, the quest for universality underlies the debate between “essentialism” which resides in the objective, universal and

3 Ibid., 73.
6 Ibid., 4.
9 Ibid.
unchanging aspects of the human experience and “relativism” which articulates the contextual nature of the human experience.\textsuperscript{10} As an alternative to such a dichotomy, philosophical categories that try to mediate the two extremes are also beginning to surface. Amongst others, intercultural philosophy as an “orientation” tries to deconstruct asymmetrical power relations and in return envision mutual enlightenment as the goal of cultural participation. Here, following the arguments of Cochrane and Pain, El-ojeili and Hayden characterized the discourse on globalization as rotating around three camps, i.e., “globalists” “traditionalists” and “transformationists.”\textsuperscript{11} “Globalists” introduce a descriptive analysis which demonstrates the inescapable aspect of globalization as the horizon of all human cognition, coupled with a normative analysis that analyzes the progressive and debilitating aspects of globalization. Second, “traditionalists” perceive globalization as a structure of exploitation that marginalizes local cultures and only serves Western liberal states. Finally, “transformationists” try to offer “a middle way between the globalists and the traditionalists” taking diverse forms as the critical appropriation of globalization, the advocacy of true diversity and the creation of a genuine synthesis of diverse cultures and voices.\textsuperscript{12}

According to Semir Yusuf, in the sociology of globalization, “homogenizers” conceive the forces of globalization as resulting in mutual participation and universal progress, while “heterogenizers” uncover the relations of hierarchy and marginality created by globalization, seeking a substitute in the appearance and consolidation of particular identities, ways of being and forms of resistance.\textsuperscript{13} For Roland Robertson\textsuperscript{14} globalization has the “local/global” dichotomy as a dialectics that recognizes the appearance of the global out of the local, and the local out of the global. Thus Yusuf assumes that for Robertson, “globalization has involved the reconstruction in a sense, the production of ‘home’, ‘community’ and ‘locality.’”\textsuperscript{15}

In an attempt to expose the limitations of the debate on globalization, Douglas Kellner argues that globalization must be understood as a consequence of progressions in technology and the universalizing aspects of

\textsuperscript{11} El-ojeili and Hayden, \textit{Critical Theories of Globalization}, 14.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 29.
capitalism which in turn produces an amalgam of “economic, technological, political and cultural features.”

Here any attempt to theorize globalization must escape the propensity as either an innocently technological improvement or a purely economic mode of organization. Globalization must be reconceptualized as “a highly complex, contradictory, and thus ambiguous set of institutions and social relations, as well as one involving flow of goods, services, ideas, technologies, cultural forms and people.”

Viewed from various theoretical perspectives, globalization is seen as a world in which the goals of modernity are seen on a universal level; the everlasting influence of technology on our conceptions of space and time; “Western imperialism;” the rise of a consumerist society; the “clash of civilizations;” the advent of a new world order; a realization of the project of modernity on a global level and so on. In order to unveil the debilitating aspects of globalization Kellner pursued a refuge in “globalization from below” where an effort is made by local communities and indigenous ways of being to use the democratizing and progressive forces of globalization without being subsumed into the world of others.

Philosophically speaking, one may ponder whether the world of globalization is more modern or postmodern. Using the arguments of Anthony Giddens in his The Consequences of Modernity one could argue that in the world of globalization, one finds the ultimate realization of modernity on a universal scale. Here, modernity is perceived as “modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence.” Thus, globalization occasions not a farewell to modernity but a heightened stage in which modernity is elevated to a universal ideal. Giddens adds, “rather than entering a period of postmodernity, we are moving into one in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more radicalized and universalized than before.”

In such a context, Shumel Noah Eisenstadt witnesses the re-emergence of the religious dimension of human life in the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey and some Arab countries, by Muslim diasporas in Europe and in the United States, by various Jewish groups, and by evangelical movements in the United States and Latin America; and, secondly, the emergence of national-communal movements in south and

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 285-86.
19 Ibid., 293.
21 Ibid., 3.
south-east Asia, India, and Sri Lanka.” As such, what poses a new ground for conflict in the contemporary world is the rise of “multiple modernities” striving for universality and attempting to make modernity its own.

Here one could argue that the world of globalization is paradoxical. On the one hand, it is assumed that the globalized world is reflexive, progressive, universal and emancipatory. On the other hand, one also witnesses the re-emergence of fundamentalism and nationalism. Such ambivalence finds an expression in critical social theory.

As Eduardo Mendietta puts it, religion is the platform around which crucial issues defining the fate of modern societies.

Reason as a universal standard and the inescapable fact that reason is embodied only historically and in contingent social practices, that reason as universality was, if not discovered, at least enunciated as a teleological standard by religions. In an age of accelerating homogenization and simultaneous manufacturing of difference…religions are articulated as the last refuge of unadulterated difference.

In a nutshell, religion serves as the background where individuals pursue genuine authenticity offering their distinctiveness in a world of contrasting identities all striving for universality. Eduardo Mendietta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen further argue that we are living in a world where our accepted beliefs regarding the relationship between the religious and secular aspects of human existence are subjects of serious discussion. As such, the conventional conception of religion as the journey of the individual symbolized by “purely irrational” ways of being is questioned. The renewed curiosity in religion also questions the view of the public sphere as a realm of truth governed by the force of the better argument.

In Habermas, one finds the view of the public sphere as a distinct category divorced from other forms of social life and power relations. Such a public sphere has served as a fertile ground for the development of

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23 Ibid.
a rational deliberated search for the truth. Currently Habermas’s post-conventional, postmetaphysical and postnational approach recognizes the continued existence of religion as both a “cognitive challenge” to everyday communicative action and also as “source of meaning and motivation…between faith and knowledge.”

The post-conventional approach is founded on the existence of three validity claims in everyday communication which are raised in particular contexts, but still transcends all local boundaries in claiming universal status. In the postmetaphysical approach that complements such a de-centered orientation, an attempt is made to overcome the Western metaphysical tradition by a procedural rationality that is situated in everyday language. Furthermore, Habermas concentrates on a postnational thinking which opts for the realization of a global life world where diverse voices are raised on issues that deserve a universal significance.

For another philosopher Charles Taylor, “modern social imaginaries” are inconceivable without the “modern moral order.” Taylor regards the binary operation of the philosophical tradition which draws a strict distinction between the religious and the public sphere as being rooted in the “myth of the enlightenment” For such a myth, religious and non-secular truths are hierarchically inferior to secular reason. This bifurcation neglects the broader context within which secularism originated not as a rejoinder “to religious positions, but non-religious positions as well.” For Judith Butler, the fact of being introduced into the world of others is disrupting, violent and eruptive. Individuals are brought into social existence through communication and this has radical consequences for the political dimension of human life. Such “interpellation” highlights the prospect of the political. Butler adds that “secularization may not spell the demise of religion, but, in fact, may be a fugitive way for religion to survive.”

In Cornel West (1993) one finds a critical articulation of prophetic religion in public life. Prophetic Christianity functions as one of the key pillars of West’s philosophy having the purpose of illuminating the tragic aspect of human life. As Craig Calhoun puts it, secularism incorpor-

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29 Ibid., 6.

rates the pursuit of meaning in a world where universality is being interroga-
ted and abandoned as a vital side of human experience. Such an ad-
vent “creates the occasion for politics.”

This paper is divided into two parts. In part one; I will examine the
place of religion in modern societies through a discussion of two major
strands in critical social theory’s approach towards religion. I will first
discuss the conventional approach to religion developed by such philoso-
phers as Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche and Habermas focusing on the
theme of religion as an instrument of oppression, asceticism and a “cog-
nitive challenge.” Then I will discuss, another approach developed
throughout the ideas of Cornel West, Enrique Dussel and Mark. C. Taylor
will be discussed. Here, the revolutionary and dynamic aspects of religion
are emphasized. In part two, I will demonstrate the role philosophy could
play in promoting religious pluralism in the world of globalization. Here,
the role of philosophy in the globalized world will be examined with a
special reference to religious pluralism. Thus, this paper has three major
aims: showing how religion is significant for philosophy and critical so-
cial theory, exposing the current debate regarding the re-emergence of the
religious dimension and identifying the limitations of such a discourse re-
garding philosophy and religious pluralism. Methodologically, this paper
is grounded on the analysis of the contemporary dialogue on religion, phi-
losophy, globalization and religious pluralism. I have employed an ap-
proach which draws upon the key intuitions of contemporary critical so-
cial theory, philosophy and sociology of globalization.

**Modernity, Religion and the Public Sphere**

I will start my discussion by briefly trying expose the dominant
strand of thought in critical theory regarding religion and the religious life.
from different points of analysis, Marx, Nietzsche and Habermas viewed
religion as structure of exploitation, negation of sensuous life and a non-
rational approach that plays a nominal role in modern reason respectively.

*Marx on Religion, Politics and Human Emancipation*

For Nancy Love, in both Marx and Nietzsche one finds a historical
analysis of the foundations of modern society with an aim of revealing its

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“scope? Its limits? Even its contradictions?” As such it is the historical advance of societies that basically determines the material relations and values that emerge in them. Whereas Marx focuses on the degradation of man’s potentials in the world of capitalism, Nietzsche exposes life denying values. For Marx, just as man creates God in his own image, in religion, it is the “products of man’s social production under capitalism” that assumes an objective reality. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s call for a new “transvaluation” of values is one that reaffirms the meaning of life.

Marx’s philosophy starts with a denunciation of pure idealism and pure materialism as the two unsuccessful attempts to understand the essence of modern life. As Marx sees it, prevailing philosophies of the world failed to conceive the active role of human beings in altering their immediate environment. Marx argues, “Hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves false conceptions about themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be.” Engels and Marx start from concrete relations, men’s attempts to deliberately oversee their own undertakings finding expression through labor and how this prospective ability currently labors under exploitative forms of relation. In his critique of modernity, Marx argues that humanity’s conception of time and history was transformed by the material advancements of the modern age. As Marx and Engels see it in the Communist Manifesto, “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his, real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.” Still this ensued in the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and proletariat.

Marx’s exploration of religion is founded on the creative potential of the individual and genuine labor free from external forces. Such potentiality is degraded by the capitalist ethos that subjects creative forces of the individual to the forces of the market. This results in the “alienation” of the individual from oneself, others, the product of labor and from the process of production. As Marx puts it,

So much does labor’s realization appear as loss of realization that the worker loses realization to the point of starving to death. So much does objectification appear as loss of the object that the worker is robbed of the objects most necessary not only for his life but for his work. Indeed, labor itself becomes an object which he can obtain

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33 Ibid., 3
only with the greatest effort and with the most irregular interruptions. So much does the appropriation of the object appear as estrangement that the more objects the worker produces, the less he can possess and the more he falls under the sway of his product, capital.  

In the context of alienation and exploitation of the proletariat, religion surfaces as the logical outcome of human’s inability to create oneself through labor. Thus, “The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself.” Initially Marx tries to elaborate on the issue of the relation between religion and emancipation within the context of Jewish emancipation. Marx asks; “The German Jews desire emancipation. What kind of emancipation do they desire? Civic, political emancipation.” Here Marx argues that political emancipation does not essentially lead to genuine human emancipation since in most contexts, freedom from external constraint is not sufficient enough and religion instils relations of domination by justifying existing exploitation and asymmetry. Thus, “The limits of political emancipation are evident at once from the fact that the state can free itself from a restriction without man being really free from this restriction, that the state can be a free state…without man being a free man.”

In a capitalist world of antagonistic relations and alienation, people project a perfect world where the goals of earthly life are realized. Thus, “Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to Himself, or has already lost himself again.” Ultimately, people must transcend this false consciousness and realize their true potentials as creative beings. Marx adds, “The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness.” Thus, Marx’s analysis of religion forms a part of ideology critique. Ideology critique in this context unravels the role of religion in rendering false satisfaction to the proletariat in the name of truth, justice and universal brotherhood. Such, historical and material analysis, which identified the alienating aspects of religion was advanced by Nietzsche’s equation of the ascetic with the religious in the historical development of religions in the world.

37 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 14.
40 Ibid., 33
41 Ibid.
Nietzsche on Ascetic Religion and the Negation of life

Nietzsche’s philosophy represents a critique of life denying ascetic values as well as an equal search for new values that will reaffirm the nature of life as will to power. As Love sees it, modern society for Nietzsche witnessed the highest stage in the creation of ascetic ideals in the history of humanity. Accordingly, Nietzsche was trying to introduce a critique of ascetic religion and speculative philosophy that negated the human will for the transcendent. Such ascetic ideals managed to negate life in the “name of God, of Being in the name of truth.”\textsuperscript{42} Modern society’s highest form of truth, i.e., science has led to an annihilation of all religious and mythical beliefs and finally ensued in atheism which is too weak to affirm this life. But the ascetic is not just confined to philosophy but also to religion.

For Nietzsche, religious life is characterized by the advocacy of the divine for the earthly and the ascetic for the worldly. Only an imposition of new values in the aftermath of the demise of religion leads to the affirmation of life. On descriptive terms, Nietzsche claimed that instead of comprehending one unified and objective morality, the possibility should be widened to “moralities;” and how moral notions represent particular interests. In terms of their normative roles, ethical theories functioned to enslave humanity into a life denying and negating morality that Nietzsche called “herd” or “slave” morality. Thus, in developing a “genealogy” against the dominant approaches in moral philosophy, Nietzsche argued that “there is no doubt that they lack the historical spirit, that they have been abandoned by all good spirits of history.”\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{On the Genealogy of Morals}, Nietzsche tried to make a historical analysis of different formations of moral precepts and philosophies. Here he argued that master morality is the origin of earthly affirming values originating with the powerful segments of a community. Thus Nietzsche remarks, “In the beginning, the noble caste was always the barbarian caste.”\textsuperscript{44} In his survey of the cultural history of humanity, Nietzsche identified two major types of morality, i.e., master and slave. Master morality is of moral agents that consciously ascribe meaning to life and forcefully adapt to nature. As Nietzsche remarks in \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, “the noble human being separates from himself those in whom the opposite of such exalted, proud states find expression: he despises them.”\textsuperscript{45} On the contrary, we find slave morality, which is inhabited by individuals who

\textsuperscript{42} Love, Marx, Nietzsche and Modernity, 4.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 204.
retain no respect for life, strife, struggle and emancipation. Thus, “here pity, the complaisant and obliging hand, the warm heart, patience, industry, humility and friendliness are honored. For here these are the most useful qualities and almost the only means for enduring the pressure of existence.”

As an alternative, Nietzsche introduces a “transvaluation” of values or the replacement of one moral value by the other. Thus, “human history would be a much too stupid affair were it not for the intelligence introduced by the powerless.”

It is in Judaism and the Jews that one clearly observes the formation of new values that succeeded to redefine master morality with slave ones. Thus, it is in religion that one finds the emergence of slave morality for the first time. In speaking of the transvaluation of the Jews, Nietzsche argues that, “it is they who have declared: the miserable alone are the good.”

For Nietzsche, Christianity is the highest manifestation of the renunciation of life. In religions like Judaism grounds were already laid, which managed to dissociate humans from the sensuous aspect of earthly life. But in Christianity through the notion of God, a human being was made a stern devotee to all-embracing metaphysical world view that negates the meaning of human life. Thus, “from the start, the Christian faith is a sacrifice: a sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of the spirit; at the same time, enslavement and self-mockery, self-mutilation.”

Thus Christianity follows with asceticism where, “life functions as a bridge to the other existence.” The standards transmitted by Christianity are not strong enough to reaffirm sensuous life. Christianity “would even will nothingness rather than not will at all.” In philosophical circles Nietzsche argues that the dominant philosophical systems manage to negate life in the name of knowledge, truth and reality. As such, “as long as philosophers existed on earth, regardless of their location…there is no disputing fact that they have harbored feelings of irritation and rancour towards sensuality.”

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche examines how the long standing and prevailing slave morality communicated in Christianity is decaying and that this has a hazard of nihilism. As Nietzsche puts it through The soothsayer, “I saw a great sadness descend over humanity...a doctrine

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46 Ibid., 207.
47 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 19.
48 Ibid.
49 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 60.
50 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 96.
51 Ibid., 77.
52 Ibid., 86.
circulated, a belief accompanied it: everything is empty.”  

On the one hand, people are freed from the chains of divine belief and faith, while on the other, this abrupt freedom also poses a warning, since God is a symbol of the metaphysics that solidified an answer to the value of existence. “From the moment when belief in god of the ascetic ideal is denied, a new problem exists: that of the value of truth.” The main concern here is, in a condition where our values have no reference, what will be the value of life?

For Nietzsche, the solution is creating a new set of values. Thus, “whoever must be a creator in good and evil-truly, he must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the highest goodness, but this is the creative one.” Ultimately Nietzsche sought a new “transvaluation” of values in the “overman.” The “overman” is not chained by otherworldliness and recognizes the will to power as the dynamic force of life. Thus Nietzsche adds “will to truth, you call that which drives you and makes you lustful, you wisest ones.” For Nietzsche, one thing that is expressive of the “overman” is the aptitude to affirm eternal recurrence. Nietzsche’s concept of eternal recurrence is a critique of other-worldly philosophies and ideals that sought reconciliation in the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche argues that throughout time and hence history, we continually struggled to affirm our existence and impose values on one another. Thus, “all things recur eternally and we ourselves along with them.”

Habermas, the Communicative Paradigm and the Continuing Challenge of Religion

The critique forwarded in the name of alienation and ideology critique of Marx against religion, and the debasing aspects of religion in creating life denying and ascetic values in Nietzsche, again present itself in Habermas’s decentered philosophy which conceives religion as a cognitive challenge and continuing inspiration in modern individuals’ everyday communicative action. Habermas’s intuitions towards religion are not systematically developed, but implicitly found throughout his different works and specifically in his two volumes of The Theory of Communicative Action, where he heavily relied on Max Weber’s views about religion to develop his insights regarding the transition from pre-modern to mod-

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55 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 90.
56 Ibid., 80.
57 Ibid., 178.
ern forms of life. Habermas’ conception of demythologization and “linguisticfication” of the sacred tries to capture the passage from pre-modern world of tradition and authority (including religious) into the modern world of secularized validity claims.

Habermas conceptualizes modernity as a progressive rationality located in everyday communication and as well as a project that must be defended against “modernization” which divorces modernity from its source in the rationalization of the lifeworld, “modernism” as an aesthetic critique of modernity which only focuses on the artistic dimension and finally “postmodernism” as a radical critique of reason that abandons the modern project as a whole.  

As an alternative reading of the modern project, Habermas advances a critical theory of modern societies holding both descriptive and normative elements. In this respect, Habermas tends to actualize the normative ideals of modernity while simultaneously offering a profound critique. Here, for Bob Cannon, Habermas’s unique alternative involves sketching two levels of interaction, i.e., the intersubjectively mitigated world of communicative interaction, and the instrumentally driven rationality of the state and economy. Here critical social theory is provided with the duty of “defending the system from the normative procedures of the lifeworld as much as it means defending the lifeworld from the ‘nonnormative’ steering mechanisms of the system.”

When emphasizing diverging conceptions of critical theory, Freundlieb, Hudson and Rundell argue that the input of Habermas to critical theory could be established via two routes. His endeavor to locate three claims to rationality and truth based on the objective, social and subjective realms; and also the plea to the linguistic turn in philosophy as a way of providing a new ground for critical theory.  

Resisting both a “contextualism” that situates truth in diverse socio-historical backgrounds and an essentialism that abandons the situated nature of reason, Habermas tried to cultivate a dialogical encounter between partners driven by “the public and non-violent force of the better argument.” Alongside these lines, for David S. Owen critical social theory emerged from the Marxian practical philosophy and the effort to launch the social grounds of knowledge. This awareness is further grounded on Hegel’s necessary affirmation of the

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59 Bob Cannon, Rethinking the Normative Content of Critical Theory Marx, Habermas and Beyond (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 5.

60 Dieter Freundlieb, Wayne Hudson, and John Rundell, Critical Theory after Habermas (Boston, MA: Brill Leiden, 2004), 1-2.

61 Ibid., 3.
“socio historical” aspect of knowledge coupled with the idea that our conception of the world shapes the world we live in, in as much as the world we live in also shapes possible cognition. Thus one ought to question the “rigid separation of fact and value, of theory and practice.”

Habermas belonging to the “second generation Frankfurt school” of critical social theory tried to cultivate an approach to modern societies which evolves a ground for critique based on everyday communicative action. What is the place of religion in modern society and contemporary critical social theory?

Max Weber traces the origin of modern society to a process where tradition, authority and religion were supplanted by a culture that explained basic questions of modern society through a reason separated into the value spheres of science, morality and art. In Weber’s analysis, mythical, religious and secular worldviews are emphasized. In mythical thinking and mythical societies, what is stressed is how things stand in an intrinsic relation to the whole. Amongst others, this excludes any split between one and others, and one and the objective world. Thus “The magical world of ideas is an impediment to the adoption of an objectivistic attitude toward technical innovation, economic growth, and the like.”

The sense of divine transcendence, objectivity of truth and the unconditional nature of human experience enters into the human experience with the emergence of diverse religions in the world. Thus “Only the ascetically oriented ‘religions of conviction’ of the Occident bind religious testing to ethical action, for which a devalued and objectivated world offers ever new situations and occasions.”

Here, the concept of demythologization is introduced.

In demythologization, the role of tradition is weakened and norms, conventions and rules are substituted by contestable claims to truth. Instead of a unitary whole, the world becomes discriminated into that of objects, norms and subjective states. Following Weber, Habermas argues, “since time immemorial humans have interpreted crises of inner equilibrium through myths, religions, and philosophies, which testify to the experiences of the painstaking formation of the subject of a species history.” Still for Weber, this process soon ensued in an instrumental rationality. Habermas in turn offers his communicative rationality, which

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63 Ibid., 2.
65 Ibid., 205.
66 Ibid., 208.
67 Habermas, Religion and Rationality, 62.
takes everyday communicative action as a point of departure. Such communicative paradigm treats religion as an alternate to modern validity claims.

One of the crucial concepts in Habermas’s description of the place of religion in modern societies is what he calls the “linguistification of the sacred.” This involves a process through which the absolutistic and dogmatic features of religion are made part of a secular culture and continually being reflected on. In such a process, religious intuitions in forms of abiding rules, norms and stocks of meaning are being assimilated into everyday communication. Thus, Habermas remarks that in the linguistification of the sacred, “The aura of rapture and terror that emanates from the sacred, the spellbinding power of the holy, is sublimated into the binding/bonding force of criticizable validity claims and at the same time turned into an everyday occurrence.” For Habermas, “modern forms of consciousness encompassing abstract right, modern science, and autonomous art, could never have developed apart from the organizational forms of Hellenized Christianity and the Roman Catholic church, without the universities, monasteries and cathedrals.” Still, as Habermas clearly puts it, “the authority standing behind knowledge does not coincide with moral authority.”

Generally, as Habermas sees it in a world where the truth emerges out of everyday communicative action and secular claims, one must become critical towards the mounting effort to position the role of philosophy as the universal basis of final reconciliation. As Habermas claims, this clearly contradicts the kind of postmetaphysical thought that he has been trying to develop. Accordingly, “on the premises of postmetaphysical thought, philosophy cannot provide a substitute for the consolation whereby religion invests unavoidable suffering.” Thus Habermas upholds that his postmetaphysical attitude to truth, knowledge and reality in general is founded on the everyday communicative exercise of modern society’s claims to truth that are contestable. Hence for Habermas “postmetaphysical thought differs from religion in that it recovers the meaning of the unconditional without recourse to god or an absolute.”

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68 Ibid., 11-25.
70 Habermas, *Religion and Rationality*, 135.
74 Habermas, *Religion and Rationality*, 108.
his analysis of modernity with the reemergence of fundamentalism and also in a manner that narrates modernity, religion and globalization, Habermas pictured the contemporary world as one in which religions are becoming more aware and open to the existence of a plurality of religious and secular outlooks. Accordingly, “every religious doctrine today encounters the pluralism of different forms of religious truth as well as the skepticism of a secular, scientific mode of knowing that owes its social authority to a confessed fallibility and a learning process based on long term revision.” In this background for Habermas being a fundamentalist is to entertain absolutist religious outlooks that limit the horizon of intersubjective communicative processes by providing uncritical and undiscriminating views that trace meaning to tradition and authority.

Having considered the philosophical criticism towards religion, I will now try to further expose the focus of philosophy in religion in terms of accentuating the unique and progressive possibilities religion holds. To this extent, Cornel West’s discussion of prophetic Christianity, Enrique Dussel’s emphasis on liberation theology and Mark C. Taylor’s emphasis on deconstruction and religion are explicated.

Cornel West and the Radical Aspect of Prophetic Christianity

West’s analysis of religion is part of his critique of the exhausted features of modernity and what religion makes possible, concerning its existential failure in the contemporary world as well as the radical possibilities it holds. Here, I will focus on West’s efforts to situate his philosophy as a critique of modernity on one hand and the descriptive and normative aspects of religion on the other. As West sees it, his philosophy appears as a consequence of a unique amalgamation of philosophical categories of thought that underlines the contextual and fragmented aspect of the human experience and religious ideals that condense existential analysis and the quest for truth possible. As such West believes that the search for democracy and the tragic sense of life which animates such a quest is best expressed in the pragmatic tradition that has been introduced in America. Here pragmatism entirely symbolizes the individual by recognizing the capability of human beings to radically alter their existence.

For West, although one could rightfully maintain a skeptical attitude towards the essentialist suppositions of Christianity, still the misery and suffering that exists in this world finds best expression in religious teach-

75 Ibid., 150.
76 Ibid., 151.
77 Cornel West, Keeping Faith, Philosophy and Race in America (New York: Routledge, 1994), 107, 111.
Religion, Universality, and Critical Theory

ing. Thus, West displays the positive role of religion in intellectual discourse by displaying that even the black intellectual tradition owes its origin in part to black prophetic Christianity. Such intellectual practice despite its limitations must participate in a “critical ‘self-inventory’ that scrutinizes the social positions, class locations, and cultural socializations of black intellectuals is imperative.”

Still this embrace of the religious for its elucidation of earthly suffering should be coupled with the appreciation and critique of the emergence of diverse stories and explanations in the name of which earthly life finds its expression in history. Thus West remarks, “despite my Chekhovian Christian conception of what it means to be a human – a view that invokes premodern biblical narratives – I am quintessentially modern thinker in that I weave disparate narratives in ways that result in novel forms of self-exploration and self-experimentation.”

More explicitly, West places his point of analysis as the recognition of the destructive aspects of modernity and its part in crafting humanity’s enigmatic present. Accordingly “this tragic springboard of modernity in which good and evil are inextricably interlocked, still plagues us.”

Alongside these lines the triumph of Europe is inconceivable without the triumph of Western modernity in consolidating itself in relation to an exploited “other.” West calls such an instance “secretion,” and it constitutes “the underside of modern discourse – a particular logical consequence of the quest for truth and knowledge in modern West.”

In this context, West’s discussion of religion directs itself at both the cross-examination of the existential American attitude towards religion as well as the positive role religion could foster in this world.

For West, in the present condition, religion in America is not geared towards future redemption which puts into question the credibility of existential forms of being. At a quick glance there is a propensity to pronounce American religions as deeply spiritual and as longing for the other world. Still, “American religious life-despite its weekly rituals and everyday practices is a shot through with existential emptiness.” The cry for justice, mutual association and strive for the messianic are not currently exhibited in the American religious life. Thus “American religious people have little memory of or sense for collective struggle and communal combat.”

80 Ibid., 52.
81 Ibid., 71.
82 Ibid., 357.
83 Ibid., 358.
The “religious intellectual” is the individual who longs for justice and reconciliation while simultaneously identifying the contextualized nature of human’s goals and ideals. In this framework history is the existential context through which human suffering is witnessed, whereas the call to the religious ultimately summons a longing for truth, justice and freedom. Generally as West sees it in the current world of racism, exploitation and oppression, religion and “philosophy of religion” must nurture an attitude that recognizes the contextual nature of history where critique emerges, envisions radical “moral visions and ethical norms” through which forms of oppression may suspect judgment, and finally must cultivate a sceptical attitude towards competing “religious and secular traditions” and the extent to which they manage to address the existential condition. For West, Currently in the age of globalization one finds the “revivals of nationalism… and religion.”\(^8^4\) This resulted from the sentiment of self-doubt and of discomfort, relationships of exploitation and turns out to be the key device through which non-Western societies try to affirm themselves.\(^8^5\) West’s discussion of religion focuses on the role of religion in illuminating existing suffering, challenging power relations and thereby holding a prodigious possibility for emancipatory critique. Such a view of religion is also found in Enrique Dussel’s attempt to carve out the place of religion in Latin America as challenging the dominant Western theology as well as concrete asymmetrical power relations.

*Enrique Dussel and Liberation Theology as a Critique of the Oppressed*

In Dussel’s liberation philosophy, religion surfaces as an expression of power struggles, challenges to liberal capitalism, antithesis to Western theology and above all a revolutionary paradigm in the road to emancipation. I will try to show the close affinities between liberation theology and liberation philosophy in challenging Western hegemony. In order to develop a transmodern position which is critical towards both modernity and postmodernity, but still tries to envision a universal dialogue based on the claims of the oppressed, Dussel tried to come up with a unique alternative. For Dussel the issue of communication starts between the oppressor and oppressed, with the question of whether full comprehension of meaning is possible between those communicating. Due to factors like competence in framing one’s views and the extent to which the speaker is able to master the language of the speaker there are serious limitations amid cultural communications. Still in such a dialogue the excluded encounters the normative standards inherent to the asymmetrical power structure. Above all,

\(^8^4\) Ibid., 357.
\(^8^5\) Ibid., 376-377.
in communication, the excluded who presents his views enters into a so-
cial relation with the privileged listener. Such asymmetrical relations are
also found in liberation theology.

For Manzar Foroohar the Cuban revolution had huge implications
for the stability of Latin America. As such Catholicism in Latin America
was shaken by the appeal of such revolution to the masses and the conse-
quent pursuit for justice not in an afterlife but in the temporal. Generally
confronted by “modern capitalism” the Catholic Church was trying to in-
corporate an element of temporality in its approach. There was also a
difficulty in embracing the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church in
Latin America due to the fact that “the different socio-political realities
in Europe and Latin America were ignored in the documents of Vatican II,
for there was no reference to the political conditions that would shape the
framework in which social reforms recommended by the church were to
be achieved.” Furthermore, as Foroohar puts it, for Dussel, liberation
theology is an attempt to question exploitative forms of life relations.
Here, Foroohar argues that Dussel distinguishes between two forms of
violence. First of all, one finds the use of institutional power to marginal-
ize others, and secondly, violence as a device of liberating someone who
is under attack. As such, Dussel “compares revolutionaries to parents
whose children are attacked.” Such violence is an attempt to reawaken
the value of life in the face of greater danger. Dussel goes on to look at
the background against which liberation theology emerged.

In his work *Ethics and the Theology of Liberation*, Dussel claims that
Western theology overlooked the fact that its teachings and theological
constructs emerged from the dominant power it assumes in the world. Beyond
the asymmetrical power relation that prevails between Western and non-Western theologies, non-Western theologies also insist in imitating and thereby unravelling the ultimate nature of reality by Western theo-
logical constructs. Here, Dussel witnesses the coming of Western Eu-
rope to the centrality of human existence in modernity. Thus, Europeans

Ethics and Formal Moralities,” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 23, no. 3 (1997): 1-
35.
87 Manzar Foroohar, “Liberation Theology: The Response of Latin America Cath-
olics to Socio-Economic Problems,” *Latin American Perspectives* 13, no. 3 (1986):
37-58.
88 Ibid., 38.
89 Ibid., 39
90 Ibid., 48.
91 Ibid., 49.
92 Enrique Dussel, *Ethics and the Theology of Liberation* (New York: Orbis Books,
1978), 150.
93 Ibid., 150-51.
“are centered upon themselves and, in a way, have made themselves god, denying divine transcendence.” 94 As Dussel puts it, liberation theology arises from the recognition that Western theology assumes a universal significance and that other cultures espoused a “theology of developmentalism” which had as its model the center. 95 Liberation theology aspires for a “theology of liberation” that begins with the concrete life of the oppressed. Dussel recognizes the importance of Gutierrez in bringing into focus “the other” and the oppressed in theology. The Other here refers to the oppressed and the subaltern perspective. The unique dimensions of such a radical approach typified in liberation theology resides on the adoption of dependency as an epistemological category and temporality as a crucial aspect of spiritual life. 96

European theology is not for the periphery, not for or from the barbarians. What we need is some kind of ‘suspicionometer’; we need to be suspicious of what is hidden in many of their reflections. Our theology will be much more critical than theirs, not because we are more intelligent, nor because we would have more theological tools, but simply because we are victims of the system and because we are on the outside. 97

Thus, the theology of the other holds unique alternatives.

For Dussel, liberation theology includes a critique of political injustice, resistance to capitalism, seeking new alternatives against free market capitalism and dissatisfaction with the unsuccessful attempt to embrace Western cultural values and economic models. 98 As Dussel sees it, most religious upsurges and histories of resistance are to be understood within the context of the introduction of a new religion over certain culture and how struggle becomes a matter of resisting certain values. Here the romantic past and traditional beliefs of a culture are invoked to generate a form of resistance. Liberation theology did not seek a perfect reconciliation in the past. Thus, “while the theology of liberation emerged from the

94 Ibid., 152.
95 Ibid., 165.
97 Ibid., 166.
intellectual and working class elites, beginning in 1968, it was not driven by an ideal return to a past identity.”

In liberation theology new interpretations of the “gospels” led many followers to a “crisis of faith.” It is a remarkable “synthesis” of diverse secular and religious views that led to the emergence of liberation theology. These include learning from the foundations of Christianity but still not a nostalgia for the past, challenging exclusion from the dominant discourse but still not envisaging instrumental mastery over the world, critique of capitalism and seeking a better future, respect for indigenous beliefs and seeking to dismantle asymmetrical power relations though not “by theologians as in the case of Islamic fundamentalism.” Still on general terms liberation theology “emerges from a commitment to the poor of the south, that is, those who have been excluded from the present globalizing modernizing process.” The exodus emerges as a paradigm in liberation theology.

The history of Christianity in Latin America is permeated by a constant reference to “exodus as a paradigm.” Liberation theology also inherits such paradigm in seeking to empower the powerless and degraded who are currently dislocated from the realms of human existence. Thus, “liberation theology from its very beginning understood the paradigm of the exodus as its fundamental schema.” The exodus paradigm is not only confined to Latin America but also serves similar functions in “African liberation theology” and “Asian liberation theology” signifying the future journey of the oppressed into progressive forms of life.

Alongside these lines, liberation theology assumed its mature form “when a revolutionary political idea was able to combine synthetically with the spiritual experience of subjective poverty.” The space opened by religion in terms of illuminating and revolutionizing human misery in West, and challenging dominant Western theology and discourse in Dussel, is found in Taylor’s attempt to capture and analyze the unique possibilities presented by deconstruction of religion.

**Mark C. Taylor on Deconstruction and Religion**

Postmodernity is a state of ambiguity where our conception of the world and our place in it are being questioned. This ambiguity also applies

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99 Ibid., 39.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., 40.
102 Ibid., 41.
104 Ibid., 84.
105 Ibid., 89.
to religion and may lead one into inquiring what the place of religion is in the postmodern world and what’s the relationship between the postmodern and the divine? For Jean Francs Lyotard, we are currently living in the postmodern world. Such world is characterized by the demise of “grand narratives” that solidified import to the life of humanity and in turn the emergence of diverse narratives in various socio-historical contexts. Thus, Lyotard argues that “simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward Meta narratives.”106 Currently one sees the deserting of the mottos of truth and universality and in turn celebration of difference. Accordingly, “postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert’s homology but the inventor’s paralogy.”107 In such a context Kevin J. Vanhoozer wonders what it actually entails to seek “a report on knowledge (of God).”108 Four general postmodern responses to religion could be developed, i.e., “deconstructive or eliminative…constructive or revisionary…liberationist (and)...conservative or restorationist.”109

Taylor tries to lodge the religious into the postmodern by underlining the prospect of a dynamic formation of meaning that the very interrogation of religion entails. Any inquiry into the place of religion in the postmodern must diagnose the intimate relation between theory and practice.110 In this context, Derrida’s deconstruction coupled with Nietzsche’s destruction of the Western theological tradition will lead to the emergence of new meanings that were hitherto excluded in the binary operations of the theological tradition and this constitutes the dynamic aspect of religion in the postmodern world. But, what is the relation between deconstruction and religion?

Generally deconstruction takes a form of destructing the history of philosophy by exposing its foundations, undermining its dichotomies and emphasizing an intrinsic relation between the different oppositions in order to show how meaning is produced as a result of relations of difference. Taylor focuses on what is made possible by deconstruction, once the search for presence and binary operation is uncovered. Remarking on Derrida’s deconstruction, Taylor argues:

107 Ibid., xxv.
109 Ibid., 19.
For all the richness of his diverse writings, Derrida’s point is always the same: while systems and structures—be they psychological, social, political, economic, or literary—totalize by excluding differences and repressing otherness, they are inevitably divided as if from within because they include as a condition of their possibility that which they can neither negate nor incorporate.\textsuperscript{111}

For Taylor, though not conscious of it, the space opened for the emergence of new values after the demise of religion becomes evident in the current world. This void “is not concretely actualized until the emergence of the twentieth century industrial state.”\textsuperscript{112}

Taylor’s deconstruction takes as its starting point the downfall of the ascetic and the axiological relationship that exists between God and earthly life. “As such, it provides a possible point of departure for a postmodern a/theology.”\textsuperscript{113} The determination of this “a/theology” is to engage in the interplay of meanings, to display the importance of those marginal theological constructs that were once disregarded within dominant theology. Offering an argument that draws on Derrida’s critique of binary oppositions and the attempt to situate the meaning in relations of “Difference,” Taylor argues that theological constructs also form a web of ideals where one part of the dichotomy owes its status in the exclusion of the other. Thus “such thoroughgoing correlativity implies that no single concept is either absolutely primary or exclusively foundational.”\textsuperscript{114} The binary is found even in monotheistic religions like Christianity. Thus Taylor remarks, “Christian theology is repeatedly inscribed in binary terms.”\textsuperscript{115} For Taylor it is now time for the other part of the dichotomy to take its turn and surface in the ever interplay of meaning.

Taylor calls the practice of ever announcing the infinite reversal of opposites as to “err,” “[W]riting that attempts to trace the border and retrace the margin can, therefore, be described as erring.”\textsuperscript{116} In hostility to the Christian theology which ascribes ultimate meaning to a divine being that is the source of life and all valuations, Taylor announces the emergence of “a/theology” which fosters the reversal of dichotomies and ever emergence of meaning. Thus, “A/theology represents the luminal thinking

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 111-112.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 436.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 439.
of marginal thinkers.”\textsuperscript{117} In the final analysis, religion in the postmodern world serves as a background for a heterogeneous and non-rational context in the dynamic world of meaning formation.

**Philosophy, Universality and Religious Pluralism**

The purpose of this part is to both descriptively expose the status of religion in today’s world of globalization and to demonstrate the fruitful role to be played by philosophy in addressing the issue of religious diversity. In the last two sections, I tried to consider various philosophical approaches towards religion, with an aim of conceptualizing the relation between philosophy, religion and society and exposing the contending philosophical approaches towards religion. Here, my discussion will focus on two major issues. First of all I will inquire into the status of religion in the so-called secularized world of globalization. Secondly, basing on the empirical existence of diverse religious outlooks coupled with the fact that the issue of religion emerges as one of the significant challenges to the secularized world of globalism, I will try to establish the possible role to be played by philosophy in upholding religious pluralism in the age of globalization.

**Religion in the World of Globalization**

The growing consensus that the globalized world is generally perceived as a form of interconnectedness, has not entirely supplanted other alternative movements. Following El-ojeili and Hayden, one could understand the “alternative globalization movement” as the major contender to the liberalist model of globalization.\textsuperscript{118} On the other hand, the globalized world is also being challenged by the reemergence of fundamentalism and nationalism. In this context, religion becomes one of the challenges to globalization in both the “alternative globalization movement” and other forms of resistance.\textsuperscript{119} Here, as El-ojeili and Hayden put it, the “alternative globalization movement” could be seen as a general label for different movements and critiques which called into question the credibility of globalization in its zeal for growing freedom, free markets and generally the creation of a better world. The “alternative globalization movement” has diverse origins, though it is mainly regarded as a resistance to Western

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} El-ojeili and Hayden, *Critical Theories of Globalization*, 192.
liberalism best captured in the agendas of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’s ideological support of capitalism. Thus, “contestation of neoliberalism and concern over the effects of an overriding emphasis on free trade are crucial nodes in AGM discourse.”

In terms of the close relationship between nationalism religious fundamentalism in the world of globalization, Catarina Kinnvall argues that, in a world of rapid acceleration towards free market capitalism and neo-liberal politics, the sense of “security” and prestige of diverse non-Western ways of being are being questioned. In this context, nationalism and religion emerged as the two significant ways through which people try to reaffirm their place in the world. Using Giddens, Kinnvall argues that under globalization the ability of individuals to consolidate their positions in the world is threatened as a result of the destruction of non-Western “grand narratives” by the ethos of globalization. For Asoka Bandarage, the internationalization of markets, the dominance of multinational corporations and free market capitalism is emerging as the only route towards the creation of a global order, thereby imposing itself as “a form of economic fundamentalism.” As a solution, one must “uphold the inherent interdependence and equality of all human beings, the sanctity of life and a deep commitment to non-violent strategies of conflict resolution.” The ideas of Bandarage are also supported by Mary Kaldor’s analysis of the relation between nationalism and globalization. Accordingly, for Kaldor, the reemergence of nationalism in the world of globalization is caused by the increasing assimilation in the world. Here, one could ask how one can accommodate the religious form of life in the world of globalization and what possible role philosophy can play?

Philosophy and Religious Pluralism

According to John Hick, the question of religion deserves merit in the contemporary world of difference and also the history of humanity which involved religion as one principal factor for the occurrence of wars. Hick laments the centrality of religious diversity as a philosophical problem in that “Each religion is accustomed to think of itself as either the one and only true faith, or at least the truest and best.”

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120 El-ojeili and Hayden, Critical Theories of Globalization, 192.
123 Ibid., 39.
126 Ibid.
For Hick, people today are more aware of the factual existence of different religions than earlier periods coupled with the fact that today’s religions are not confined to a specific geographical context. In such a context, “now the time has come to consider the theological implications of this.”127 Hick generally argues that there are three main philosophical attitudes towards religious pluralism, i.e., religious exclusivism, religious inclusivism and religious diversity. Exclusivism is the view that only one’s religious belief is the pathway to the truth. Such position was strongly developed in Christianity, although in the 19th and 20th centuries Christianity came to partially recognize the status of other religions.128 Here Hick believes that there is no religion which is superior to others in the world of globalization. As such Hick believes that “the basic criticism of both Christian and Muslim exclusivism is that it denies by implication that God, the sole creator of the world and of all humanity, is loving, gracious and merciful, and that His love and mercy extend to all humankind.”129 Hick conceives inclusivism as the position which designates God as the ultimate source of truth, divine truth as hierarchically disseminated amongst different religions and finally salvation as being accessible to all. As Hick argues,

To put it graphically, consider the analogy of the solar system, with God as the sun at the center and the religions as the planets circling around that center. Inclusivism then holds that the life-giving warmth and light of the sun falls directly only on our earth, and the Christian church, is then reflected off it in lesser degrees to the other planets, the other religions.130

According to Hick, religious pluralism as a third major approach broadens the horizon of religious truth to different forms of religion all aiming at the truth. Religious pluralism as Hick sees it finds support in the recognition of all the greatest religions of the world that “ultimate reality is in itself beyond the scope of human description and understanding.”131 For Hick, the religious experience is characterized by a certain “cognitive choice” to view the world in a certain manner within a context of other religious and pluralistic approaches towards the nature of the world.132 Still in a world of empirical verification and radical distinction between

127 Ibid., 2-3.
128 Ibid., 4.
129 Ibid., 6.
130 Ibid., 8.
131 Ibid., 12-13.
facts and values as espoused by the positivistic approach, how could one defend the cognitive aspect of religion?

Hick develops the notion of “eschatological verification”\textsuperscript{133} which doubts any reconciliation between scientific and religious worldviews, and establishes the status of religion as an alternative towards the world whose truth or falsity is to be situated in the longstanding struggle between various epistemological ideals. Two main reactions could be advanced according to Hick as a response to religious diversity. The first alternative which Hick calls “negative response” resides in the sole attempt to view other religions as potential threats to one’s own. The second alternative is a positive one and resides in the affirmation of religious pluralism. As Hick sees it, despite the diversity in religious outlooks, what permeates all religions is the kind of framework that each provides for its followers and thus their functionality in rendering a particular way of approaching the world possible. Invoking Aquinas’s insight that knowledge is fundamentally determined by the particular “mode” utilized, and the Kantian argument that the ultimate reality of the world and its discursive manifestations are radically opposed, Hick argues that in a world of diverse religious beliefs, one should recognize the impact of culture on religions.

So far I have analyzed philosophical reactions to religion as well as the place of religion in the contemporary world of globalization. Thus, finally I have arrived at my main point of analysis, namely, what role could philosophy play for religious pluralism in the world of globalization? As I see it, the role that philosophy could play for religious pluralism is related to the following three interrelated ideas:

(1) Hand in hand with embracing the model of religious pluralism, the socio-political aspects of religion must be emphasized over epistemic ones. Philosophy can serve as a foundation of peaceful coexistence amongst diverse religious backgrounds of the world only by adopting the model of “religious pluralism” as a reaction to the subject of religious diversity. Thus, the adoption of “religious pluralism” as a model for approaching the issue of religious diversity must be situated in the broader recognition that the primary role of religion in today’s globalized societies is not primarily epistemic but social and political in its nature. This is compatible with Hick’s division between, the object of religion as the realm of the unknown and how religious truth still finds expression on diverse socio-historical backgrounds. Again, such a position is further reinforced by Kaldor’s close inspection of the relation between the meaning giving capacity of nationalism and religion. Furthermore, it also finds expression in Khinvall’s quest for “ontological security” in the world of globalization. Alongside these lines we can argue that the reemergence of fundamentalism, and nationalism in the globalized world attests to the fact

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
that it is not a secular dialogue driven by the power of logic that embodies secular modernity, and that deep down inside globalization has not succeeded in developing a normative ideal that offers a symbolic meaning in all cultural backgrounds of the world.

Thus, in our analysis of religion resisting any a priori examination into the essence of religion one must recognize the ever encounter of religion with a given culture and spatio-temporal context, and how our understanding of religion affects such contextual aspects of humanity. Here the symbolic and culturally grounded aspect of religion relates to the fact that religion might have diverse roles in diverse contexts. Furthermore, above anything else it should be emphasized how religion provides answers to the ontological, epistemic and axiological concerns of humanity, thereby rendering a feeling of security and safety to individuals and ways of being which find themselves in opposition to Western secular globalization.

(2) the situated aspects of human cognition and the embedded nature of the religious experience must be emphasized. Here, philosophy could contribute to religious pluralism by cultivating an understanding of religion as one of the vital features of culture where mutual understanding is in demand. Using the intercultural philosophies of Ram Adhar Mall and Franz Martin Wimmer, one could invoke a spirit of respect and possible dialogue between the diverse cultures of the world and their contribution to humanity in general. As Mall sees it, intercultural philosophy emerges from the recognition that philosophy as a mental activity dwells in both the particular, which serves as its point of departure and the universal, which intercultural philosophy strives towards. Thus, intercultural philosophy strives “to create a situation whereby various cultures will approach each other with the sense of equality and having to contribute something to human culture and development. This is a result of the fact that, intercultural philosophy is open, tolerant and pluralistic in its approach.”

Thus acknowledging the exclusivist claims of the philosophical tradition in limiting possible dialogue to the Western soil, intercultural philosophy strives for a genuine dialogue between the diverse philosophical traditions of the world. Thus as Mall sees it “the idea of a totally pure culture is a fiction a myth, rather there is almost no philosophy that can claim to be fully free from influence.” As Mall puts it, the solitary and perfectionist attitude towards the claims of a given culture is “philosophically and methodologically unsound” and also renders political struggles

136 Mall, Intercultural Philosophy, 1.
for the dominance of one particular ideology. For Mall, what makes the current global world of globalization unique is that normative judgments do not simply arise from the dominant West but also from the other, which is interrogating the West as an object of analysis. Currently interpretation of diverse ethical values and ideals is undertaken from multiple centers. In this “hermeneutic situation” the Western own self-image, Western attitudes towards the other, the self-conception of non-Westerners and finally the conception of the European in the mind of the other, are all being highlighted as a point of analysis.

Looking at cross-cultural encounters between diverse hermeneutic standpoints in the history of humanity, Mall identified two major types of approaches. Accordingly, the “reductive” hermeneutics try to subsume the other into one’s way of being which is conceived as hierarchically superior, whereas the “analogous” hermeneutics searches for overlapping points between independent cultural backgrounds. For Mall the kind of goal that intercultural philosophy tries to achieve could be viewed from four diverse but interrelated angles. First, its “philosophical” core resists the insistence on conceiving one cultural background as the origin and end of inquiry, and recognizes the situated nature of diverse forms of philosophizing. Secondly, in terms of the “theological” perspective, a pluralistic approach towards the existence of diverse religious backgrounds and that no particular religion is in possession of an absolute truth is emphasized. Thirdly, under the “political” sphere intercultural philosophy envisages the creation of the spirit of democracy where equal relations are to commence against centrist claims. Finally, the “pedagogical” aspect “prepares the way for the practical implementation of the inner culture of interculturality.”

Generally, Mall argues that being presented with cultural diversity three possible alternatives could be offered. The first response resides in developing a closed system, thereby resisting alien modes of being. Secondly, there is the recognition of the other culture, though cultures conceive themselves as self-enclosed units that cannot communicate with one another. The third response is the “impartial” stand, which recognizes the equal contribution of all cultures to the world and thereby fostering a mutual dialogue of learning about the human condition. It is the third response that intercultural philosophy takes as its point of departure.

Wimmer, another proponent of intercultural philosophy, recognizes the cultural backgrounds of cognition that aim to reach at the universal. To this extent, intercultural thinking begins with resisting exclusive claims to philosophizing. Thus, Wimmer claims,

137 Ibid., 6.
speaking about philosophy, we are confronted with a permanent dilemma: philosophy can never demonstrate what they conceptualize other than by concepts, formed by words in a certain language, tied to a cultural, social and historical context. Yet philosophers always pretend to speak in the name of universal reason independent of socio-cultural and historical contexts.  

For Wimmer, living in an age of globalization, humanity is ever presented with a challenge of overlapping centers and in such a condition “the fundamental question for philosophy…consists in the need to question about the conditions of the possibility of systematic philosophy.”

Wimmer identifies four possible forms of cultural relations. First of all in “expansive centrism” hierarchical relations are developed between a center and periphery, knowledge and wisdom descending from the center. Furthermore, it is the “burden” of the center to enlighten the regressive culture. Second, in “integrative centrism” the ontological superiority and epistemological viability and generally the superiority of a culture are maintained. Though it is the inferior culture which imitates the superior which possesses virtues big enough to be envied by other cultures. Third, in “separative centrism” the ontological difference of diverse cultures is emphasized coupled with the idea that no understanding whatsoever is possible. Finally, in “tentative or transitory” centrism, the equal status of all cultures, contribution to a universal discourse and readiness to engage in a process of continual revision and learning is emphasized. This for Wimmer captures the spirit of intercultural philosophy. Regarding the status of religion in today’s societies, Wimmer holds that religions are mainly functioning as a basis of feeling of “intimate security” and that although “eclectic religions” are emerging in the world, still this does not overwhelm the deep-seated differences.

In terms of intercultural philosophy’s approach to truth and diversity one could grasp the significant insight in relation to the embedded nature of the conscious aspects of human undertaking including religious ones. Still in utilizing intercultural philosophy, we must also recognize the limitations of any dialogue regarding the divine. Amongst other things identifying “analogous structural patterns” as in “analogous hermeneutics” moving towards a “tentative centrism” where diverse centers are continually revised, is difficult to encounter in the world of religious experience Hick characterizes by a certain “cognitive choice.” Today, in the age of globalization, there is a need for cultivating an intercultural attitude that

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139 Ibid., 55.
exhibits a spirit of respect towards the various constituents of a culture and philosophy should deal with the enigmatic aspect of globalization, since “by its own very nature philosophy reflects or at least has the intention to reflect on any problem that is of concern to human kind. Globalization is of concern to all of us in that it affects all of us. This phenomenon that affects all of us should definitely be of concern to philosophy.” \(^{140}\)

(3) the issue of religious pluralism must be located within the broader concern of philosophical pluralism and specifically in terms of transcending the modern/postmodern debate. The issue of religious pluralism is part and parcel of the broader concern with philosophical pluralism. Though in the philosophical tradition, the debates between the one and the many, objectivism and relativism prevailed, still in the current intellectual landscape, it is the modern/postmodern debate that is of a greater importance to philosophical pluralism. Currently modernity mainly being defended under Habermas’s communicative paradigm points towards the possibility of developing a universal secular and rationalistic process where claims of truth are contested on the human condition geared towards the objective, social and subjective realms. On the contrary, postmodernism despite its multifaceted nature, orients itself to the socially constructed and contextual aspect of the human experience. As such the modern/postmodern debate is usually presented as one of universality vs. relativism, rationalism vs. skepticism and emancipation vs. deconstruction. \(^{141}\) Still in the final analysis, the universal road of modernity fails to fully reconstruct the multifaceted aspect of human culture, whereas postmodernism usually culminates in a contextual world of power strategies and history of identity constructions.

For modernity, religion is negated as the remainder of a vanished world in the passage towards freedom and progress; whereas in the postmodern world religion is at best another grand narrative that Lyotard unMASKS in *The Postmodern Condition*. Here we could appeal to the positive insights of those approaches like Dussel’s “transmodernity” that mediate the particular and universal while at the same time unveiling the limitations of the modern and postmodern project. Dussel’s project could be labelled as critical universalism, which seeks to deconstruct Western hegemony.

Dussel’s effort to recognize a universal dimension for a critical dialogue starts with the acknowledgment that “universal core problems” serve as a background to the attempt to identify certain patterns across diverse cultures. Dussel states that “myths” provided the initial alternative to humanity’s quest for certainty, whereas argumentative forms of thought emerged later on. Still, this does not exclude the mutual existence of myth

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\(^{141}\) Merawi, “Habermas, Modernity and Postmodernism,” 75.
and rationality alongside one another in today’s societies. Dussel develops the concept of a two-level dialogue as an alternative. The first level consists of a “north and south” dialogue on the dark sides of Western modernity which still shadows the contemporary world. Alongside this line a second level analysis should be undertaken as a “south-south dialogue” “in order to define the agenda of the most urgent philosophical problems in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, etc., and discuss them together philosophically.”

This dialogue for Dussel transcends both modernity which is a process of secularization grounded in the Western soil, and postmodernity which constitutes a critique of Western modernity as hegemonic, against embeddedness and difference. “Transmodernity” is a historically and culturally grounded critique of Western modernity that starts with miseries and agonies of the oppressed. Here, religion finds itself as one of the various features of a particular culture which holds an impetus for a profound socio-cultural critique.

Conclusion

Throughout human history the issue of religion reconfigures itself as one of the crucial aspects of the human experience. Especially in modern society’s secularism and philosophy’s rationally grounded claims, religion offers a unique challenge to the positivistic and rationalistic vision of the world. More specifically in the globalized world of increasing interconnectedness as well as secularization, the existence and consolidation of religion adds a paradoxical dimension to the human condition. Faced with such an enigma, philosophy and philosophers could contribute to the existence of religious diversity in the world by adopting a pluralistic model towards diverse religions, cultivating a firm intercultural understanding and developing philosophical models that could account for the multifaceted aspects of the human experience.

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Discourse Ethics and the Problem of Fundamentalism in the Globalized World

Binyam Mekonnen

This paper traces both the logical assertions and problems of Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics. Habermas bases discourse ethics in his specific philosophic project of *Communicative Rationality and Action*. This project seeks to bring an intersubjective discourse solution to the ethical crises of modernity. Fundamentally, Habermas’ discourse ethics aims to achieve ethical transformation depending upon dialogical communication. In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, he is chiefly concerned with the declaration of a new path that works on “a non coercive intersubjectivity of mutual understanding and reciprocal recognition.”

Despite this new path, in today’s global world people are confronted with a serious problem of fundamentalism which is occurring in all corners of the globe. And this may push us to quest for ethical perspectives which properly respond to the danger of fundamentalism. We may define fundamentalism as a metaphysical orientation of reductionism, an act of communicative pathology and exclusion for its projection is a “militant truth claim.” This worldwide scenario necessitates a critical reflection on the basic modern ethical approaches. That is why in this paper I explore the philosophical foundations and failures of discourse ethics in relation to the global fundamentalism.

My argument has two parts. First, I explore the philosophical account of discourse ethics focusing on the views of Habermas. I will show the intersection of cosmopolitanism and discourse ethics to maintain the global project of modernity. The second and major part seeks to identify the weaknesses of Habermas’ discourse ethics in addressing the problem of fundamentalism and to show its concealed suppressive myths and logical contradictions. This paper examines the critical problems of fundamentalism in line with the existential question of plurality and modernity’s project of global identity.

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The Universalization Principle of Discourse Ethics

Meaning and Basic Features

Habermas claims that contemporary ethical problems of the global world can be addressed by introducing a moral discourse which evolves in linguistic turn and communicative interaction. In this regard his philosophical conception of discourse ethics appears as a necessary postmetaphysical assertion of a consensus based on a universal norm. His critical writings on the enlightenment project of modernity, particularly the universal validity claims of language provide their real structure to develop discourse ethics. In such a discourse the universal validity claims appear to attain dialectical truth which means an intersection of truth of theory (the truth claim) and action (the rightness claim). 4

It is important to consider some of the basic features of discourse ethics. To begin with, it has a post-conventional attribute because it requires autonomous individuals who have a critical mind-set on matters of social being and their arrangements in diverse social institutions. Thus, one can argue that the obvious objective of communicative ethics is the accomplishment of mutual understanding of discussants holding a deliberative conversation in the life-world. In short, as Habermas notes, discourse ethics is a discursive process that underscores the importance of a democratic reflection on the fundamental moral problems of the contemporary world. It is in an intersubjective public sphere that discourse ethics places the rationality standards by which moral norms are tested for their validity.

Unlike discourse ethics, although conventional/traditional ethical theories are critical in philosophical or religious fashions, they lack a dialogical content. Put differently, conventional ethical thoughts are in general established and shaped within the philosophy of consciousness which employs the knowledge of acquaintance in its epistemological search. As Bertrand Russell argues, the knowledge of acquaintance is best described as the knowledge which is subjectively real. “I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of the object itself.” 5 Hence, the knowledge of acquaintance puts a demarcation between the subject and the object. This

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3 In his reconstructive project of modernity, Habermas uses a postmetaphysical approach to build a new philosophical trend that has an objective of locating discourse in public sphere and free communication of subjects of the world. This postmetaphysical paradigm works more in relocating discourse into intersubjective communication.


situation very likely creates hierarchy. In addition, it also prevents one from making a rational communication. The problems of conventional ethical theories appear in their ontological foundation on subjectivism and non-flexible metaphysical abstractions. What Habermas underlines is that ethics might develop only within the communicative rationality by employing the intersubjective perspective.

This communicative rationality recalls older ideas of logos, inasmuch as it brings along with it the connotations of a non coercively unifying, consensus-building force of a discourse in which the participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favor of a rationality motivated agreement.\(^6\)

In this account, it is in an intersubjective democratic talk of the linguistic community that one can situate the origins of universal ethics. When ethics is placed in the context of an ideal speech situation holding interpersonal beings then it aims at universality of truth and the good life.

Discourse ethics is largely shaped by Habermas’ *Theory of Communicative Rationality and Action*. For him, ethics must be held in a democratic public sphere where universal norms can unify people across the world. However, as a political instrument there is a presumed mission of imposing the euro-centered cultural invention on other cultures and philosophical traditions of the world. The simplest logical justification which has been given for such hegemonic rule of eurocentrism is the idea of “universalism.” Although the starting point of every communication is based in a specific cultural setting, in discourse ethics as a principle one is expected to go beyond egocentrism by way of using discourse to locate communication in its universal space of communicative rationality. Matthew Miller describes the importance of Habermas’ discourse ethics about its discursive approach to make valid norms:

…the principle advantage of discourse ethics is that it provides a means of *discursive will formation* in which the articulation of individual interests is possible. The communicatively competent participant in moral discourse can make his or her interests known in and through the process of argumentation.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 315.

\(^7\) Matthew Miller, “Kant, Hegel, and Habermas: Does Hegel’s Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?” *Auslegung* 25, no. 1 (2002): 71.
Habermas’ theory of communication underlines that this dialogical relation can be used to give an exact solution to human problems of the globe. His attitude to communicative rationality and action is strongly conditioned by the principles of democratic speech and ethical responsibility. He thinks that we human beings are capable of transcending cultural particularism, and therefore search for a global culture.

**Three Conditions for the Universalization of Discourse Ethics**

In the views of discourse ethicists the principle of universalization appears when ethics is seen as formalistic and deontological within an intersubjective communication of a language community. But when we say discourse ethics is formalistic and deontological we need to understand first of all the demarcation between Kantian ethics and communicative ethics.

As we know the profound philosophical theory relating to ethics of deontology is developed by Immanuel Kant. Kant’s approach is distinctively shaped by the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness. For Kant a moral consciousness is essentially originated from pure metaphysical abstraction in which moral agents think that they represent the universal self. Based on this principle of universalizability a moral agent is said to be an autonomous representative of his/her human self as a form. Kant places this universal human self in a transcendental world. His argument states that “the moral agent…is what he called a ‘noumenal’ self, outside time and causality, and distinct from the concrete, empirically determined person that one usually takes oneself to be.”

Discourse ethics differs from Kantian ethics, because in discourse ethics (1) a formal test of universalization principle originates from an intersubjective dialogical communication, (2) there is a rational framework in which cognition and experience occur in complementarity, and (3) other interests in addition to a rational will are also universalized. These three major features imply that ethics is a product of rational social consensus, and also a place where its universality lies.

Postmodernism highlights an essential argument in thinking about difference of historicity and administrative rationality. This argument challenges the mystified monopoly of the Enlightenment’s principle of

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8 In deontological ethical theory the rightness and wrongness of a given act is determined by one’s own moral obligation.
11 Badillo, *The Emancipatory Theory*, 82-83.
universalism. At the core of this challenge one can see how power is fundamental in inventing and shaping the world. Postmodernists like Derrida, Foucault, Adorno and Horkhiemer often criticize the modernists’ claim of universalism. I think discourse ethics has a good response for the central question of postmodernism. As it says, every communication including ethics flourishes out of a general historicity of life for by the power of reason people of different cultural horizons transcend a thrown condition of pre-established particularism. The discourse of modernity as it is projected by Kant explains that rationality transforms from what we may refer to as the imprisoned life style of the cave to the new historic moment of enlightenment. As stated above, discourse ethics contains a principle of ethical universalization which is established on the enlightenment revolutionary assertion of a re-worlding possibility that makes participation, equality and freedom necessary conditions.

In terms of the thesis of participation, discourse ethics as the science of enlightenment requires individuals to involve deliberately in communicative rationality and action. Thus all actors involved in the process of argumentative vindication are taken to be ethical/moral agents. According to Peter R. Badillo,

The participation thesis, the first condition, requires that any subject capable of speech and action be permitted to take part in discourses. The aim of this condition is that all potential voices be heard so as to establish an openness in which all viewpoints have an equal chance for being represented.

For its practical nature in the Hegelian sense a communicative engagement of individuals is decisive in discourse ethics. According to Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel participation fosters a democratic culture of disclosing universal civil-mindedness and constructs the road map of consensus. These two philosophers insist that discourse must be held in a logical mood in order to dismantle prejudice and make a breakthrough from ethnocentric tendencies of realizing human interests.

The thesis of equality describes that all participants in discourse ethics have an equal chance to speak out their interests, and in doing so no one is exposed for discrimination and subjugation in the discussion process. As Badillo argues, “all dialogical participants have the same opportunity to initiate and sustain dialogue by proposing claims and counterclaims, asking questions and providing answers.” This is to mean that every member in discourse ethics is in a symmetric relation, and thus the consensus of that discourse community is not coerced. Discourse ethics views equality as a principle to seek to maintain positive rational communication among participants. Nevertheless, one would raise the applicability conditions of equality in discourse in order to have a realistic approach. It should be emphasized that the question of power relation shows profound inequality in the world. It is visible that in the system of modernity Europe developed its power to be universal by dominating the periphery. And this system is nothing else but the colonization of the world. This is a power relation between Europe as a colonizer and the periphery/non-Europe as a colonized zone.

The thesis of autonomy is about the capacity of being oneself. As a rational agent all participants in discourse ethics are responsible for their decision. Discourse is important to present one’s own position by way of using an argument as a medium of communication. With regard to an intersubjective communication every participant is expected to make a reflection freely. Without freedom it is impossible to think that people can engage in communication. As Badillo notes, for Habermas’s autonomy is the foundation of modern social communicative rationality and action in so far as discourse is something universal which can only be constructed by participants’ free existence in the communicative sphere.

\[\text{The freedom of discussion thesis, demands that discussion advance free from all external and internal influences such that the conclusion may be viewed as proceeding from no motive other than a cooperative search for truth...each participant in dialogue attempts to place himself in the other person’s “shoes,” and vice versa, for the moral insight and empathy that may thus be achieved in a collective pursuit of norms acceptable from all viewpoints.}\]  

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Discourse Ethics and Global Citizenship

Now my discussion would go further to see the relationship between discourse ethics and global citizenship or *cosmopolitanism*. Again here we need to acknowledge Kant for his modern conception of cosmopolitanism which is understood as an ethico-political project of creating a polity universal to all human beings of the modern period. Kant in his political discourse clearly states that the moral imperative as a natural condition of humanity will lead to a universal sphere of polity which can foster peace and order. Accordingly, human beings naturally possess “a special dignity and freedom in the choice to constitute our community as universal and moral in the face of a disorderly and unfriendly universe, for then we are not following anyone’s imperatives but our own.”

Habermas thinks that Kant’s thoughts on the universalization of reason and morality are positive philosophical ingredients to understand democratic institutions which maintain the value of global citizenship. However, this understanding fundamentally requires an intersubjective communicative social world. For him, the universal principles of reason and morality are given in the domain of discourse. That is why Habermas has a clear vision of the importance of discourse ethics to solve many ethical puzzles of our world. The deontological and formalistic attribute of that ethics significantly prioritizes the morality of right. As we discussed earlier, the validity of claims is central in communicative theory and practice based on which it is possible to infer that valid ethical norms can be identified by participants of discourse, as these norms bind all members equally.

When we examine the *philosophical project of modernity* we can find the basis for globalization. There are debates among modernists, postmodernists and transmodernists as to when and how modernity started as a historical and philosophical project. Modernists claim that modernity started in the 18th century by introducing its noble program of rationalization. Most postmodernists also consider the 18th century as the starting point of modernity but disagree on the rationalization principle of modernists. In contrast to modernists and postmodernists, the proponents of

trans-modernism including E. Dussel believe that modernity historically was first developed in the 15th century when Europe colonized the periphery. Dussel thinks that modernity’s historical emergence is very different from its philosophical program of rationalization. He is of the opinion that “1492 is the moment of the ‘birth’ of modernity as a concept, the moment of origin of a very particular myth of sacrificial violence, it also marks the origin of a process of concealment or misrecognition of the non-European.”24 This clarifies how the historicity of modernity’s globalization contradicts with its philosophical project.

Since discourse ethics shares the perspective of reconstructive paradigm of modernism, it describes modernity’s plan of globalization as a rational interest of people of the world to achieve ethico-ontological change or better life. As we can see in social and political realms, the core interest occurs in bringing about revolutionary changes. Following the idea of modernism, the political agenda of globalization is to establish a democratic sphere of communication. Global citizenship or cosmopolitan interest is taken to be the ground for the development of secularization and a new form of social structures of the public sphere. Habermas proposes his notion of the public sphere as an intersubjective system of communication in which citizens develop their own rational public opinion to form a public body.25

As a framework, institutional knowledge in the modern age is thematically organized to maintain expertise and presents a critical reflective discourse of argumentation. The virtue of global change in the philosophical project of modernity is manifested within discourses of science, morality and humanity.26 Particularly in the field of humanities, people began to talk about discourses of liberty, equality, human rights and fraternity. Although all the discourses of the humanities are rooted in either practical or emancipative interests, they also have a strong link with the instrumental interest of science and technology. That is the major reason to institutionalize discourses in order to achieve a global emancipation of humanity. But when we particularly look at the practical discourse of the ethics of communication the struggle is to preserve human dignity and mutual recognition. Habermas’ moral philosophy consists of two endeavors:

Since moralities are tailored to suit the fragility of human beings individuated through socialization, they must always solve two tasks at once. They must emphasize the inviolability of the individual by postulating equal respect for the dignity of the individual. But they must also protect the web of intersubjective relations of mutual recognition by which these individuals survive as members of a community. To these two complementary aspects correspond the principles of justice and solidarity respectively. The first postulates equal respect and equal rights for the individual, whereas the second postulates empathy and concern for the well-being of one’s neighbor. Justice in the modern sense of the term refers to the subjective freedom of inalienable individuality. Solidarity refers to the well-being of associated members of a community who intersubjectively share the same life world.  

These two tasks of morality under the framework of *communicative rationality and action* offer ethical solutions to the social problems of globalization. The logic of justice and solidarity quests for the enlargement of personality into personhood in the process of socialization. This is to universalize oneself as a moral agent to give response to modern moral predicaments. Globalization is therefore a system in which one can recognize the status of personhood by her/his dialogical relation with other fellows. From the present modern historical condition it seems impossible to escape from the system of globalization. I think no one denies this fact. Today most thinkers would like to ask how people of the world can communicate democratically as global citizens. What do we say about our historical membership in the global system? As discussed before, in discourse ethics people are expected to act as rational-free agents to solve their own ethical crises in the communication process.

However, from the present condition the picture of globalization seems good as we participate in the discourse communication and its practical application. In reality, we are observing ideal and material refutation of globalization. If we accept the argument of global citizenship as it is projected in discourse ethics, then we expect that most of our global moral and social problems can be solved through dialogue. On the contrary, globalization of our time has been confronted with the problem of fundamentalism, such as religious wars of Jihad and Crusade, political and economic...
ideological terrorism, and other forms of metaphysical essentialism. These and other varieties of fundamentalism exist in almost all parts of the world. The confrontations between the system of globalization and fundamentalism cause mistrust, conflict, suffering and death. Thus, it is necessary to deal with this problem by analyzing the philosophical and historical system of globalization. This would help human beings to rearticulate ethical solutions to the practical turmoil of modernity.

Fundamentalism and Objections for Discourse Ethics

The Problem of Fundamentalism Today

The theory of communicative rationality and action rejects fundamentalism, because communicative rationality and action rest on uncompromising mutual discussion of participants who work for the production of truth. Here truth is conceived as the binding force which flourishes out of argumentative talk and consensus. When we look at the ethical assertion of discourse of communication participants are said to be morally responsible in a universal position. In short, discourse theory of morality requires members of the forum to be morally accountable to all and responsible for the ultimate decision of the life-world. One may post the question of “why do we need to be moral” to see the real challenge of discourse ethics in the system of globalization. I think Habermas’ communicative ethics deliberately presumes the clash of the life-world and the system. If we raise the question “why do we need to be moral” to different subjects of the world, for example to the United States’ government and NATO in relation to the Taliban and Al-Qaida, the Ethiopian government in relation to Al-Shabaab, religious and cultural extremists of different horizons, etc. We may wonder how can we decide who is in a better position to possess the status of personhood? Whether Habermasian discourse ethics can solve the ethical problems of fundamentalism?

Before trying to answer these questions, I would like to employ my own definitional framework of fundamentalism. Different scholars define fundamentalism in different ways. Mostly their definitions are given to explain the irrefutable metaphysical assertions of religious extremism. What I would like to provide is a more broad definition of fundamentalism. From a critical point of view Christoph Stückelberger defines fundamentalism as “a religious or political movement or attitude with a strict adherence to a set of basic principles, based on a literal, not adapted interpretation, especially as a return to former principles. Separation, exclusion and extremism

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are characteristics of fundamentalism.”

This definition allows us to develop a critical ethical attitude towards the global political and economic ideology and its system of marginalization and domination.

In today’s world the language of fundamentalism is largely associated with an act of terrorism. The 9/11 terrorist attack especially made fundamentalism a serious challenge of modernity. In his conversation with Giovanna Borradori, Habermas expresses the 9/11 attack as an assault on the global horizon for it has no realistic objectives and moral directives. Many people lost their life because of that particular violence of Al-Qaida. Gail M. Presbey states that September 11, 2001 for the Americans and their allies changed the moral conception of love with the fear of the rule of death. Following that attack, the US launched her international political principle of global fight against terrorism. Most of Western thinkers associated the attack with Islamic terrorism and fundamentalism.

Concerning the global problem of fundamentalism and terrorism, Habermas appeals to a single cause, i.e., the failure of communication. This failure is manifested through the use of violence which leads to destruction. According to Alexandra De Hoop Scheffer,

…the relation between fundamentalism and terrorism is mediated by violence, which Habermas understands as a communicative pathology: the spiral of violence begins as a spiral of distorted communication that leads through the spiral of uncontrolled reciprocal mistrust, to the breakdown of communication.

According to Habermas’ discourse ethics any kind of extremism opposes the universal principle of justice and solidarity. In order to maintain these two universal principles of morality, as global citizens of the modern world, people should develop a discourse of mutual respect for human dignity and recognition. Habermas has no doubt that there is an ethical

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solution for modernity’s failure at scoring a remarkable success over human’s practical and emancipative interests. And this is possible when communication is made democratically.

The fundamental objective of discourse ethics is to give a response to moral puzzles, which are part of the social interests of modernity. Social interests need a universal commitment of all people of the earth to secure human goodness. To achieve this final goal of good society, discourse ethicists believe that “all” human beings of the world should be in a life-world and discuss all matters freely. “All” here signifies the aspiration of cosmopolitanism.

**Ethical Critics on Habermas’ Discourse Ethics**

Although most Western scholarly writing described the system of globalization as an inevitable positive construction, some critics have begun to question it. Habermas in his works on modernity locates Europe at the “Center” of the universe, giving the supremacy to the occidental rationality. He tries to incorporate the other side of Europe within a particular philosophical tradition of the world. Habermas’ presupposition of the universality of occidental rationalism and cosmopolitanism in discourse displaces multitude horizons which exist in an exterior position. The objection to Habermas’ discourse ethics argues that it faces a difficulty in the acknowledgement, and promotion of cultural pluriversalness and intercultural communication, for it arises from the conventional system of morality of the Enlightenment. As Hassen Hanafi\(^\text{34}\) notes, the philosophical tradition of the West systematically posited itself as universal and held an ethnocentric position. Habermas like most Western thinkers was affected by eurocentric reductionism of global cultures. This eurocentric reductionism contradicts the ethical principle of tolerance and solidarity, and negates the ontological existence of other identities.

The other challenge to discourse ethics is that the latter may be developed by way of questioning the actual relationship between the globalization system and the life-world. This view is very strong. The global system for Habermas is composed of two spheres: namely politics and economy. But he believes that discourse can only take place in the life-world. By providing the difference between system and life-world, he systematically conceals the existential difference among people of the earth saying that in the life-world all fellows are equal, free and active actors. As we can see today in the globalized world, the majority of people are

placed in chaotic life conditions, such as poverty, alienation, insecurity and unnecessary death.

As Dussel notes, three-fourth of the global population today live in slums, poverty, exploitation, etc.\textsuperscript{35} These global conditions must be the starting point to develop a philosophical criticism. Our questions of morality have to be articulated in the secret and irrational aspects of the political and economic system of modernity, i.e., \textit{capitalism}. It is in this system that we can find the tension of power, inequality, conflict and destruction. Hence, we need to search for an ethical theory that can solve the practical questions of the “wretched of the earth,”\textsuperscript{36} termed by Franz Fanon to imply that there are people who have been subjected to the system of domination and exclusion, and who above all seek liberation.

In parallel with the second objection, Dussel accuses discourse ethics as a challenge to the ideology that misunderstands the proper meaning of matter. For Dussel, matter in Western philosophy is often viewed as a negation of form, i.e., \textit{content}. Foundationally, discourse ethics is more formalistic and so systematically ignores the important aspect of the physical existence of the oppressed. Dussel’s attack on discourse ethics is directed to Habermas’ weak consideration of material living conditions of the peripheral world. Dussel thinks that discourse ethics as a critic of ideology was developed within the living conditions of the “\textit{Center}”/West only. Based on Asger Sorensen’s understanding Dussel’s transmodern approach is important in revealing the eurocentric biases and moral deficiencies of Habermas and Apel on the human recognition of the oppressed groups of the underside of modernity. He states,

\begin{quote}
[\textit{t}he more benign living conditions in the center makes one ignorant to the sufferings of those excluded or living at the periphery, and that this also has an impact on the way we, the philosophers think of ethics and morality, no matter how much we discuss universality. Actually, it influences the very way we discuss universality. Dussel simply claims that it is the living conditions that conditions Western philosophers such as Apel and Habermas to be less aware of those aspects of ethics, which are important for the victims of exclusion and suppression…discourse ethics can in reality be recognized as a
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{35} Dussel, \textit{The Underside of Modernity}, 3.

much more limited validity, since it has not escaped the conditions of its origin.\textsuperscript{37}

In this light we can say that the very idea of extremism is preserved in discourse ethics since its validity claims are supposed to be militant and controlled by Europe. That is why Fanon calls for a violent struggle to crash the ideological orientation and domination of the modern system. Dussel is somewhat different from Fanon, as he suggests that the proper meaning of “matter” help us to develop a new trans-modern criticism of capitalism. For him, matter scientifically can be understood in triple ways: matter of physics as a mechanical object, matter of biology as an organic element, and matter of ontology as “something material.” Perhaps the primary focus of Dussel is matter of ontology. Based on his analysis, the proper interpretation of something material in its metaphysical sense is the reverse of what most Western thinkers conventionally used. He says that his notion of material is the application of an intersubjective revolutionary criticism of the status quo. According to Dussel,

\begin{quote}
\begin{center}
[i]t is in relation and in the interior of this critical-communitarian intersubjectivity of the dominated and/or excluded that the ethics of liberation ought to play its function. It concerns arguing in favor of the ethical sense of struggle for the [\textit{survival}] and the moral validity of the praxis of liberation of the oppressed/excluded. The grounding of the material principle and the moral pragmatic norm is essential for the constitution of ethics as theory, as philosophy, but its ultimate historical and social function is directed to establishing the ethical validity of the [\textit{survival}], of the human life of the dominated and/or excluded.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{center}
\end{quote}

For Dussel we can employ Marx’s materialism to understand the living conditions of the global population and to criticize capitalism in a trans-modern ethical point of view. This means that in a scientific way Marx’s critique of capitalism is the best tool to respond to the ethical interrogations of the unfinished project. In the twenty-first century, ethics has to question the political, economic and cultural structures of globalization, for the problem of fundamentalism appears mostly due to the political, economic and cultural impositions of the West upon the “Other.”


In this context, we can promote a realistic philosophical reflection on issues of military tension and violence, economic developmentalism, language and identity crises, etc. If our ethical commitment is to realize the good life, it is necessary to revisit the deeper existential conditions of global humanity. Hence, we need to enlighten ourselves and develop an ethical reflection on the historical and structural causes of ideological differences. People exist in different horizons it seems wrong in principle to seek universality by imposing one’s own cultural and normative values on others while ignoring their alternative values.

Conclusion

Given what has been said, Habermas’ discourse ethics contains both positive and negative sides in relation to the present global challenge of fundamentalism. The positive aspect is related to its characterization of ethics in an intersubjective dialogical tradition. The milestone of discourse ethics is the articulation of the better argument through communicative conversations among participants of different identities. In this regard we can argue that the communicative rationality and action would help us to maintain a system of critical reflection on practical interests of the world. Discourses of communication are generally good to transcend the level of particularism which has its own implication in the overcoming of the problem of fundamentalism. Differences of life can be recognized and unified by using logical and democratic discussion. However, discourse ethics has to adopt a realistic approach towards the practical interests of global population. This is a trans-modern approach of ethics which gives people a sense of belongingness to the system of globalization as global citizens.

Unfortunately the major problems of Habermas’ discourse ethics are associated with its universalistic and formalistic assumptions. The problem of universalism implies how discourse ethicists irrationally impose a single occidental rationalism on other traditions. Today most of the values in Ethiopia and other parts of the world have been dominated by the cultural values of the West. This is not because we have no deeper existential ontology, but rather the occidental culture by way of using its historical supremacy has promoted its hierarchical and imperial regime. In the twenty-first century one of the major causes of fundamentalism is the imposition of occidental culture on other cultures. Thus, discourse ethicists need to reformulate their project free from ethnocentrism. If this is not taken account, then the three themes of universalism in discourse ethics will lose sense. The problem of formalism as Dussel describes opposes the very meaning of ontological matter of “something material.” And this has ideological misconceptions over the living conditions of global population.
Generally speaking, Habermas’ discourse ethics has to be restructured in the context of discursive communication among the philosophical horizons of diverse cultures. The power tension, which we see today between the West and the Arab world, economic world division [First-World, Second-World, and Third-World], intra and interstate class and ethnic conflicts, need a cross-cultural conversation. This will bring justice and peace in the modern system of globalization.

References


Freedom Then, Now, and Forever:
Ethical Reflections
Edward Alam

Modernity is characterized by an unprecedented occupation (perhaps obsession) with freedom as the absolute good and defining value. Among other things, this has led to a reformulation of the very purpose of government, whose main task now is not the pursuit of the good, but the pursuit of freedom. And this is as true for Communism as it is for Capitalism. After all it was not Adam Smith but Karl Marx, while expressing his own dreams of what freedom would feel like in a future society, who said, “to do one thing today and another tomorrow; to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the evening and criticize after dinner, just as I please.”¹ By investigating the history and concept of freedom in modernity I hope to show that the notion has been progressively stripped of its deepest meaning and reduced to refer to mere rights and individual liberties.² In the light of this rather myopic account of freedom I then hope to show, by contrast, how certain modern philosophers have been able to overcome this reductionist tendency precisely by taking ancient and medieval philosophy seriously and thereby bringing theodicy into the discussion. Such accounts of freedom, which naturally entail a robust account of virtue-centered ethics, offer attractive alternatives to reductionism, and can be appropriated by all the peoples of the world – leading perhaps to what might be described as a global citizenship. A corresponding claim is that such appropriation does not require peoples to give up their unique cultural differences but can actually augment these differences in the context of a rich complementarity, and can help promote richer, more humane and realistic notions of freedom, citizenship, and virtue, worldwide.

Ancient Notions of Freedom

To better understand the modern notion of freedom it is helpful to take the long view and turn momentarily to antiquity. As we turn towards

antiquity, it is helpful to distinguish among national, political (or civic) and individual freedom, while reflecting on how these different kinds of freedoms are related in different places in different times. In ancient Sparta, for instance, one can speak of what we might call, for lack of a better term, a “national” freedom – in the broad sense of a general aspiration to be free from foreign domination; this may apply to other Greek city-states as well.

Spartans possessed a political freedom to pass laws, to vote, and to hold office; this freedom also entailed freely agreeing to be governed. However, one cannot speak of Spartans enjoying, or even conceiving of, anything that resembles what we today would call individual freedom, whereby individuals (as autonomous monads) are free to do as they please and to live any kind of life they want provided they do not violate the rights and freedoms of others broadly conceived. We can speak of a civic or political freedom in Athens with broad participation of citizens freely agreeing to rule and to be ruled by the force of law; the well-known “Council” and the “Assembly” are clear examples.

3 I rely in part here, and in what follows, on freedom in antiquity, on the many works of J. Rufus Fears. For a summary of his views see especially his article, “Freedom: The History of an Idea” which was based on his May 2007 presentation in Philadelphia “Living without Freedom: A History Institute for Teachers” published online, accessed January 14, 2009 and June 29, 2012, http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1219.200706.fears.freedomhistory.html. Fears’ work is helpful only as an introduction to the task of understanding in general terms what “freedom” meant in various places in the ancient world, and for distinguishing between different kinds of freedom. He seems not, however, to be interested in the notion of freedom in antiquity for its own sake but only to strengthen his position regarding the unique (and superior) notion of freedom in American history and democracy.

4 This may sound anachronistic, but by “national” here, I do not mean that “nations” and “nation states” existed in antiquity, or even in the medieval period. In fact, I think that the very notion of the modern state was created by Enlightenment thought and especially by the work of Immanuel Kant.

5 Spartan men, of course, not women. Although Spartan women did have the right to own and even inherit property, they had no governing role in the polis per se, but had what we could call governing “freedoms” in the household (oikos). See the reference to J. Rufus Fears noted above.

6 Although the term “individual” is often used as a synonym for “person” today, as in the common phrase, “individual person,” I maintain that the terms are closer to antonyms than to synonyms. I am not claiming that “personalism” existed in the ancient world, but just that modern individualism (inspired by the mechanical philosophy of the 17th century) is indeed modern and that “personalism,” in reacting against modern individualism, certainly harkens back to something present (though not explicitly perhaps) in Medieval times and to a lesser degree to something there in Ancient times as well. Aristotle’s anthropology which stresses the social and political “nature” of human beings gives expression to this. Also see Fears in this regard.
There is still debate on what is meant by freedom in the ancient Greek city-states for each city-state must be considered on its own terms. Nevertheless, Athens deserves special mention in the light of our theme since Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all had such a profound influence on its very spirit. Aristotle deserves special mention because in his interpretation (or modification) of its Constitution he contributes to an authentic definition of freedom.\(^7\)

In Book Six of Aristotle’s *Politics*, wherein he returns to the subject of democracy, we find important insights into the nature of freedom, which pick up on ideas already discussed in Book One, and which are too often missed since freedom is not discussed there in Book One explicitly. For that matter, Aristotle does not really address directly and thoroughly the subject of freedom anywhere in the *Politics* or in the *Ethics*, though in chapter two of Book Six in the *Politics* he does speak of freedom as the defining characteristic of democracy, and describes two aspects of freedom, namely having a share in governance, and living as one wants. These presuppose a very clear and rich philosophical anthropology that he has already referred to in Book One, which begins by examining the man/woman relation,\(^8\) the master/slave relation, and the body/soul relation, with the latter as the analogical foundation for all other relations.

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\(^7\) Of the many “Constitutions” collected at Aristotle’s school, only one survives (on two papyri) under the title of *The Constitution of Athens*. In the late 19th century, someone named it the *Aristotelian Constitution of Athens* but it is highly doubtful that Aristotle wrote it. It contains both a political history of Athens and seeks to describe the Constitution at the time it was being written. There is evidence that Aristotle made use of this document when writing his *Politics*. For an excellent account of this, see Stephen Everson, *Aristotle: The Politics and the Constitution of Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

\(^8\) Certain trends in modern Feminist thought often misinterpret Aristotle’s view of women and claim that he did not consider women to be fully human. This is incorrect. Aristotle held that women were fully human and had the full use of reason, unlike “natural slaves,” who, by definition, did not have the full use of reason. Now in relations between husband and wife, Aristotle did maintain that the husband had a natural rule over his wife, however, this rule was similar to the rule that was operative in the political realm wherein the ruler ruled over free and equal persons. Aristotle, in fact, challenges what seems to be the dominant view in his time regarding a certain inferiority of women to men when he chooses to quote a line from Sophocles in the context of his discussion of virtues specific to women. The significance of this quote is often missed or misinterpreted today because it seems to underscore the view that women are indeed inferior to men. The quote is from Sophocles’ play *Ajax*, wherein Ajax, the protagonist, says to his wife: “To a woman silence is an ornament.” He says this to her because he did not agree with the advice she was giving him in a particular matter. The irony here is that her advice turns out to be correct and by not listening to his wife, he made a crucial and costly error which even led to his death. Aristotle is surely aware of this and thus is not only challenging the view that women are inferior
To really appreciate Aristotle’s depth here, one must be deeply acquainted with his *Metaphysics* and his *De Anima*, both of which are presupposed in his use of the body/soul analogue. Only the very attentive reader will manage to see how it is that freedom, while not discussed directly, is a crucial concept in Aristotle’s political and moral philosophy. Most modern readers of Aristotle fail to see his all-important insight into freedom because they are put off by, and perhaps misunderstand, the context in which it first appears. That is to say, it is in the context of his discussion in Book One of slavery that we discover what he means by freedom. He first makes a distinction between natural slaves and legal slaves, defining the former as those who do not have the full use of reason, and the latter as those who were made slaves legally by military conquest. Aristotle is against legal slavery for to enslave those who have the full use of reason is against the virtue of justice.

It is not against the virtue of justice, on the other hand, to enslave those who do not have the full use of reason. If natural slaves do exist, then they are not free by nature, Aristotle claims, implying that freedom is the opposite of natural slavery in that the free man has the full use of reason. On this account, even a free man can momentarily become a slave when, for instance, he is not in possession of his reason, which is to direct him to his final end, namely, happiness. All the virtues of the soul are directed towards this one end for Aristotle; thus reason is not an isolated intellectual virtue to be understood as pure *ratio*, but presupposes all the other virtues of justice, courage, temperance, etc., belonging to the will and the appetitive parts of the soul. True freedom, for Aristotle, then, consists in being virtuous.

Ancient China has a long tradition of what we are calling “national” freedom, but certainly no practice whatsoever of political or individual (in the modern sense) freedom. The teachings of Confucius focus on compassion, honesty, human heartedness, goodness, and harmony, but not on political or individual freedom. However, if we understand “individual freedom” in the Aristotelian sense of “free from vice” and possessing the virtues through choosing to do the right things over and over (self-development so to speak), then we can claim that Confucius did address individual freedom. Here we find a deep compatibility between the teachings of Aristotle and Confucius.

In the Roman Empire, though things may have been different in the Republic, one cannot really find anything resembling the “political” freedom enjoyed in certain Greek city-states, but there was perhaps a species of “individual” freedom, rooted in Greek notions of virtue (especially among the Stoics), that thrived in an unprecedented way. And because the

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to men, but is suggesting that women have a particular “intellectual” insight that men do not have.
Empire was so dominant for so long, it is not really possible to say there was what we have called “national” freedom.

Finally, scholars claim that in ancient Egypt, there was not even a word for freedom, although they obviously had an advanced language and civilization. The point I am making here is that freedom, in any of its major variants, was never a universal value in antiquity, as most of us today too often assume, and much the same could be said about the early medieval period.

I shall not address the way the idea of freedom developed in the medieval period, except to say that, at least in the West, under the influence of the biblical, Abrahamic religions, the Platonic and Aristotelian idea of freedom is augmented, strengthened and developed, leading to what may be described as an over emphasis or a misplaced emphasis on freedom. This error led to an unbalanced and unhealthy obsession with freedom to the point of undermining its ultimate connection to virtue and preparing the ground for the consideration of it as an independent category. Needless to say, all of the above is much too superficial and cries out for more qualification and serious historical analysis, but my purpose has been simply to emphasize how complex the history of the concept really is and to claim that it is not even accurate to speak about “the concept” of freedom because it has meant so many different things in so many different ways in so many different places. When we come to the modern period in the West, however, we can begin to pin it down more accurately, as I now attempt to do.

**Modern Notions of Freedom (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)**

Many, if not most, accounts of the concept of freedom in modernity begin with the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau and the events leading up to the French Revolution, but the deeper foundations were laid by Martin Luther’s *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* [On the Freedom of a Christian]. In the words of an expert on Luther: Luther’s cry was “the cry of freedom which made men sit up and take notice, trigger[ing] a veritable avalanche, which turned the writings of a monk into the occasion of a mass movement that radically transformed the face of the medieval world.”

Though the force of this avalanche was helped along considerably by the then newly discovered printing press, it nonetheless was indeed an avalanche of unprecedented proportions. We could very well consider Luther’s little treatise (it is less than 15,000 words) as the first manifesto on individual freedom in Western modernity. The context is thoroughly theological; the new soteriological twist is that Christ’s saving works set

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people free not only from sin, death and the devil, but also from the au-

The individual conscience is set free through its faith in Christ, and
becomes an authority unto itself. Luther lit this fire exclusively in the re-

10 In this vein it is interesting to note that although the leaders of the 1524 Peasant
War in southern Germany appealed to Luther for support, declaring that they were
only trying to live out his own teachings, Luther denounced them and encouraged
their violent overthrow. It would not be incorrect to suggest that, in some ways, the
Anabaptist leaders of this revolt anticipated the thrust of Catholic Social Doctrine,
even though many Catholics were as equally hostile towards the leaders of the Peasant
War as Luther and his followers were.

11 The treatise is published online, accessed January 20, 2009 and July 1, 2012,
http://sap.ereau.de/kant/what_is_enlightenment/#note.

12 “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that
it should become a universal law,” is one basic formulation, which he first introduces
in The Groundwork of the Metaphysic(s) of Morals.
enough now to state that according to his *The Groundwork of the Metaphysic(s) of Morals*, also known as *Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals* or as the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, freedom is an idea of reason, its objective reality in itself is debatable, that we presuppose so as to think about ourselves as subject to moral laws. This also guarantees both private and public rights. I will say more about “freedom” in Kant when we turn attention to the philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling (1775-1854) in the next section.

Now in terms of how Kant continues the project of Luther, Kant states, “[t]he gradual transition of ecclesiastical faith to the exclusive sovereignty of pure religious [individual] faith is the coming of the Kingdom of God.” Luther would certainly have praised this in Kant, but he would have staunchly rejected how Kant goes on to redefine this pure religious [individual] faith as rational faith. This Kantian position is related to two major streams of thought in the West: one shows up in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of natural rights and constitutional democracy, while the other emerges in a Rousseau-nian ideal of self-rule. All three currents have antecedents in the mass freedom movement begun by Luther.

The Anglo-Saxon emphasis on democracy and natural rights brings together Lutheran and Kantian currents in an interesting way: one of the commanding ideas discovered and defended with certainty by reason in this tradition is that human nature itself is created free in its essence. Because man is free, he also has rights, and one of these rights, is to be free. More precisely, to be free from the absolute authority of the state is one of man’s greatest rights. In other words, this right to individual liberty over and against the absolute state authority is based on the knowledge that man is a free creature by nature; this is demonstrated by the authority of reason. Reason itself, in this tradition, is not contrary to nature, but part and parcel of a free human nature, that discovers natural law and lives accordingly. Nature in this tradition has some metaphysical weight: “Nature contains spirit, ethos and dignity, and in this way is a juridical claim to our liberation as well as its measure.”

Rousseau’s account of freedom, likewise, combines Kantian and Lutheran ideas, but in a very different way. One still finds the importance of reason, but now reason, coupled with will, are both understood to be opposed to nature. In fact, reason and will corrupt nature, which has lost its metaphysical substance, so to speak, and is now identified with a total, somewhat chaotic, almost dreamy notion of freedom. Reason is necessary

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13 In German *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785).
in discovering a “rational” solution to a fundamental, socio-political quandary that arises when we inevitably come out of the original state of nature – a quandary posed by Thomas Hobbes, which caught the attention of Rousseau in a powerful way. The problem posed by Hobbes had bothered Rousseau for years, for Hobbes had suggested that liberty could not co-exist with safety and security. People had to choose between freedom and security, as these two were mutually exclusive. Freedom led to anarchy, claimed Hobbes, and the only way to avoid anarchy, and enjoy safety and security, was to exchange freedom for obedience to the civil authorities, since only the authority of the state could ensure security.

While agreeing with Hobbes who argued that government must have absolute and unified power to be effective, Rousseau nevertheless strongly opposed the idea that human beings had to choose between being ruled and being free. Summing up the main problem in chapter six of Book One in his main work, The Social Contract, he asks, “[h]ow to find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each member with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before.”

In the same chapter, a few lines later, we get the only way out of this predicament: human beings can be both free and ruled at the same time only if they govern themselves. In Rousseau’s words, “[e]ach one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers under the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body, we incorporate every member as an indivisible part of the whole.” Because the general will for Rousseau means that unchanging, indestructible, and pure will, which exists in each individual and in society as a whole, people who obey it are in reality obeying their own individual wills; in other words, they are free because they rule themselves.

Rousseau’s general will must not be confused, however, with what we identified above as human nature in the Anglo-Saxon tradition; the general will, for Rousseau, has come about precisely as a corruption of nature. Although he does state that the general will is indestructible, un-changing, and pure, he also states that the general will is:

…subordinated to other wills which prevail over it. Each man, in detaching his interest from the common interest, sees clearly that he cannot separate it entirely, but his share of the public evil seems to him to be nothing compared to the exclusive good he seeks to make his own.

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17 Ibid., 51.
Where his private good is not concerned, he wills the
general good in his own interest as anyone else.\textsuperscript{18}

The foregoing, though brief and incomplete, suffices to show the
growing complexities involved in the development of the notion of free-
dom in modernity. But in spite of these accumulating complexities, the
notion of freedom progressively became more and more myopically asso-
ciated with an individual \textit{freedom-from} interpretation of freedom rather
than a \textit{freedom-for} approach. I shall return to this point below once I have
addressed the continued development of the notion of freedom in the nine-
teenth century.

\textbf{Modern Notions of Freedom (The Nineteenth Century)}

In the nineteenth century, the complexities continued to mount, as all
the major thinkers put forth dense and intricate accounts of freedom that
were influenced by more diverse currents of thought. Various readings of the \textit{French Declaration of the Rights of Man} (1789) and various accounts
of the French Revolution itself compounded the debate over the meaning
of the modern notion of freedom. In many ways, the \textit{French Declaration
of the Rights of Man} presupposed Rousseau’s ideas on freedom, and the
same could be said of the Revolution itself, but in other ways, both the
\textit{Declaration} and the Revolution seemed to be inspired by ideas of freedom
quite dissimilar to those found in the writings of Rousseau and his follow-
ers. In fact, the Anglo-Saxon ideas of freedom associated with constitu-
tional democracy were dominant at the very beginning of the Revolution,
but later replaced by anarchic notions rooted more or less in Rousseau’s
thought.

Whatever the case may be in this regard, it is clear that Luther’s ini-
tial ideas on freedom continued to influence nineteenth century accounts
via a growing number of various Kantian, Rousseau-nian and Anglo-
Saxon currents of thought, all colored by the earth shaking results of the
Revolution that imposed itself upon the new century.

I will not dare wade through the enormously vast and complicated
story of how the concept of freedom developed in the West in the nine-
teenth century. The list\textsuperscript{19} of important thinkers and the scope of their
thought in this regard are staggering. But it will be necessary to address

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 150-151.

\textsuperscript{19} Needless to say, the thought of Hegel, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, and especially, Nietzsche, with his preference for Dionysius over Apollo, are all tremendously im-
portant and relevant here, but for the present purposes, I shall only consider Marx and Schelling.
briefly the important work of one who stands out for our purposes, namely, the thought of Karl Marx.

Karl Marx on Freedom

Like those Rousseau-nian inspired criticisms of the particular concept of freedom operative in constitutional democracies, one can also find a steady criticism of democratic freedom in Marx’s thought. But this should not lead us to believe that either Rousseau or Marx were anti-freedom; nothing could be further from the truth. If they did err in the case of freedom, it was probably because their notions of freedom were simply too radical, and their passion for freedom too intense. Marx, especially, was exceedingly uncomfortable with the overly polite and domesticated notions of freedom that seemed too controlled in Anglo-Saxon constitutional democracy. He yearned for an indivisible, complete, and extreme freedom that would result in an unprecedented and radical independence for each and every individual; since freedom for Marx was indivisible it could not really exist unless it existed for all. In a particularly compelling expression of this, he writes,

…[f]reedom is so much the essence of man that even its opponents realize it…No man fights freedom; he fights at most the freedom of others. Every kind of freedom has therefore always existed, only at one time as a special privilege, another time as a universal right.20

It was precisely the promise of a radical, all-encompassing realization of individual freedom that made the ideas of Marx so attractive in the nineteenth century, and my hunch is that this promise is still behind much of the attraction, if any, that his thought may still hold today. The real crucial insight and turning point with respect to freedom in Marx’s thought was this: he sincerely believed that the fight for freedom was being fought on the wrong front. The battle for the rights of individual citizens vis-à-vis the state was simply the wrong war to be waging, he argued. The limited freedom one wins, if one wins at all, is restricted and fleeting. The fight for freedom must be fought on another more crucial and universal front: nothing less than the struggle to change the very structures of the world, and one of the first structures that must be overcome is the

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20 Quoted in R. Dunayevskaya’s Marxism and Freedom (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), 19. I attempted to claim here that Marx, like Freud, may have been much more influenced by his own religious Jewish tradition than is usually supposed. His praise of freedom at this ontological level echoes (at one significant level) what one finds on freedom in the kabalistic tradition. But this is a very bold claim, which I cannot defend here.
industrialist/capitalist structure that alienates man from himself by turning him into a commodity.

In a recent rereading of Marx’s four *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, I was struck by how convincing and inspiring his arguments still are today. His existentialist humanism rooted in a profound appreciation for, and celebration of, the dignity of man, could lead someone who did not know better to conclude that he believed human beings really were made in the image and likeness of God. His critique of democracy, moreover, is more relevant now than it ever was.

Having said this, however, I shall still maintain that Marx in some ways added to the over or misplaced emphasis on freedom, precisely because he chose not to bring into the discussion that which in my judgment is most relevant, namely, a metaphysics that takes traditional theodicy seriously. Only one philosopher of the nineteenth century, Frederick Schelling, really did this. I shall now briefly examine one aspect of Schelling’s thought which I consider to be the most relevant to the task of the remaining part of this paper. I want to show how he was able to overcome the modern tendency to strip freedom of its most essential properties. He did this, I will argue, precisely by not shying away from bringing metaphysics (theodicy) into the discussion.

But before turning attention to Schelling, let us briefly sum up our brief historical overview of freedom by noting that whether in Luther, Rousseau, Kant, or Marx, the tendency has been to emphasize the “freedom/from” model, undergirded by the assumption that individuals have a right to strive for greater and more absolute realizations of freedom. In Luther, it was freedom from the authority of the Church in order to realize total or perfect freedom through an individual faith in Christ; for Kant, it was freedom from the irrational in order to reach a more complete freedom in individual reason or in a rational faith; for Rousseau, it was freedom from the civil authority in order to enjoy the personal and more perfect freedom of ruling oneself; and in Marx, it was freedom from the slavery of the so-called free market, controlled by unbridled capitalism which alienates man and treats him like a commodity.

The peculiar twist in Marx is that in order to achieve genuine freedom, one must temporarily give it up since freedom only exists when it is the freedom of all. This essential connection with equality means that equality must first be established before the total unrestricted individual freedom can emerge. The preparatory norm, therefore, is emphasis on the *communal*, but the ultimate goal, once the structure of the world is changed, is nonetheless a radical and unprecedented *individual* freedom.\(^\text{21}\)

The common thread in all these notions of freedom is an *individualism* which claims that freedom can never be total and genuine as long as

\(^{21}\) See footnote 1 above.
there is some authoritative restriction that tries to temper and direct it. In short, the tendency is towards anarchy, which not only the philosophers of the twentieth century recognized, but which the horrific anarchic insanity of two world wars confirmed. To be sure, none of the above thinkers simply advocated anarchy, but the tendency to separate freedom from objective truth by ultimately defining freedom in terms of subjective truths and individual rights, necessarily led to this. And now, finally, to Schelling.

**Schelling on Freedom (Freedom and Theodicy: Reestablishing the Metaphysical Foundations of Morality)**

I stated above that it would be necessary to return to Kant’s notion of freedom in the section that addresses the role of Schelling’s thought since he both appreciates and critiques Kant’s contribution more deeply and more significantly perhaps than any other thinker in the nineteenth century. Schelling’s work, *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*, speaks for itself. To his great credit, Martin Heidegger saw early on how important and profound was Schelling’s *Investigation* and devoted a series of lectures to it, but to his discredit, he dismissed and thereby misled many regarding what is perhaps most significant about Schelling’s masterpiece: the revival of theodicy within the context of a new theological insight into the mystery of freedom and the origin of evil.

The way I have chosen to formulate Schelling’s contribution as “reestablishing the metaphysical foundations of morality” is meant to hearken back to Kant’s great work, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, which is crucial for understanding Kant’s notion of freedom and radical evil — notions which all but destroy the tendency in modern philosophy, beginning with Leibniz, to put theodicy at the center of metaphysical speculation. The full title of Leibniz’s *Essays on Theodicy* reveals much about how central (metaphysically speaking) theodicy is for

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22 Most notably, perhaps, as far as freedom is concerned, is the philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre, who argues for the absurdity of freedom. There is really no such thing as human nature per se, says Sartre. The only thing that comes close to defining human nature is that it is *undetermined*. Human beings, therefore, are faced with the horrible reality of making themselves into whatever they wish to be. What is so horrible and absurd about it is that, in the end, it really does not matter, as there is no ultimate measure of what is right or wrong, good or evil, or, if there is, it still does not matter, because we cannot really know it. See Ratzinger, “Truth and Freedom,” 16-35.

23 Although it is in Kant’s *Religion Within the Bounds of Reason* that he puts forth his notion of Radical Evil, it is also to be found in his *Foundations*.

him to properly understand freedom and thus morality. Kant challenges Leibniz’s equation of evil with lack of being and rejects all attempts to justify God’s goodness and omnipotence by defining evil as pure privation, claiming rather that evil is some-thing rooted in human nature; each and every human being freely chooses an evil moral orientation that gives priority to our sensual interests over our moral ones. All human beings have an evil disposition, but some human beings who cultivate their intellects and learn to think for themselves can move from an evil disposition (subjection) to a good disposition (autonomy). In other words, whenever we freely choose to obey the law of another we reinforce our evil disposition, but whenever we freely choose to obey the universal moral law determined by our own reason a priori, we begin to develop a good disposition. Political subjection is when an entire state obeys the laws of others imposed from the outside; individual subjection is when individuals choose to obey the laws determined by their sensual and physical desires or wants. One can see clearly why Kant is not interested in theodicy; not only does he reject the notion that evil by definition is a privation (an idea that theodicy is traditionally based upon) but he identifies the greatest good with individual autonomy.

Schelling appreciates Kant’s rejection of the “unreality of evil thesis” and admits that too many attempts to give an adequate account of the origin of evil fail because they are designed to fit neatly into the “noble” work of defending both God’s benevolence and omnipotence. However, at the same time, he sees that to give up theodicy is to separate metaphysics from morality and to give up any ultimate account of good and evil relating to freedom and morality. He attempts, then, to split the difference between Leibniz and Kant, not by reaching a compromise but by soaring higher than either one precisely by way of taking both so seriously. His conclusions both save theodicy and introduce unique and (I would say) “mystical” insights into the nature of freedom and evil.

Ultimately, Schelling sees that to grapple adequately with the question of human freedom, it is necessary to wrestle with the question of God’s freedom, in particular to reconcile the notion of God’s freedom with his necessary nature. To do this, he introduces two different ways of being: (ground – the principle of contraction) and (existence – the principle of expansion); these principles can be found everywhere in nature and capture the ways in which things “are” in the world. The balance in nature emerges when these two “opposing” principles maintain their proper

25 It is crucial to notice here the differences and similarities between Aristotle’s approach to ethics and morality which is virtue-centered and Kant’s approach which is more law or principle centered.

relation. When *ground* (or contraction) remains the “condition for” *existence* (or expansion) then the whole remains balanced and harmonious, but when *ground* becomes that for which the whole is conditioned, evil emerges. In God, according to Schelling, ground and existence, contraction and expansion, inwardness and outwardness, hiding and revelation, always maintain their proper relation, but not without divine struggle. This struggle is precisely where God’s freedom is located, while his necessity lies in the fact that the result of this struggle is secure: *ground* never becomes absolute, but remains the condition for the self-revelation of the absolute. Although the two ways of being are in tension, they together form the unity of being where the true absolute (God) can be.

Nature, too, and everything in it, including (and especially) human beings, enjoys these same two ways of being, but the outcome of the struggle is far from secure: evil often emerges because the contracting principle seeks to dominate the principle of expansion. In spite of Schopenhauer’s scathing critique of Schelling, claiming, as he does, that Schelling is simply aping Kant while pretending to be original, I suggest that, on the contrary, Schelling goes much deeper than, and even reveals the inherent weaknesses in Kant by identifying evil with a distortion of the relation between *ground* and *existence* whereby *ground* (or inwardness) becomes the perversely self-conscious, rational will of the individual no longer in real relation to anything but itself. In this light it is possible to read Schelling as criticizing a particular form of Kantian rationalism. At any rate, if Schopenhauer’s criticisms of Schelling are not accurate, there is still room for serious criticism of Schelling in that he never really tells us why the proper relation is maintained in God and not in nature or in human beings. Although his account of freedom and evil is weightier than virtually any other philosophical account in the nineteenth century, it is by no means the final word.27 For that matter, it is never possible to utter a final word.

Schelling’s work has always reminded me of certain trends in the mystical traditions of the Abrahamic religions. In particular, the Lurianic School of Kabbala with its emphasis on the teaching of *tsimtsum* (divine withdrawal) wherein God (in order to create out of nothing) becomes absent to himself in a kind of contraction so that “the void” or “nothingness” can come into existence. This sounds a lot like Schelling’s *ground/existence* distinction since this void (in the Lurianic School) then becomes the “place” where freedom originates. In Christian mysticism, too, one finds echoes of this in both the ancient and modern periods. One contemporary Christian mystic, Fernando Rielo, writes in terms strikingly close to what we find in the Lurianic School and is certainly commensurate with what Schelling proposes. See, again, Schelling’s *Philosophical Investigations*. And who could ever forget that incredibly pregnant statement by none other than Nicolas Berdyaev in his famous work, *The Destiny of Man*, when he wrote, “Freedom is not determined by God; it is part of the nothing out of which God created the world” (London: Semantron Press, 1937), 33.

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when it comes to such great mysteries. But perhaps a final word is appropriate in terms of a few concluding remarks in the context of the main theme of this present volume, the theme of global challenges.

I began this reflection by claiming that modernity is characterized by an unprecedented occupation with freedom as the absolute good and defining value. My focus has been primarily on Western thinkers and attitudes, but few would dispute that this preoccupation is now prevalent everywhere. The main challenge facing the world in this regard is not to reduce freedom to individual right and liberties, even though these latter are important and represent a certain amount of progress with respect to appreciating the dignity of the human person. But another front to explore in order to deepen our appreciation of human dignity is the deeper philosophical and theological meanings associated with the idea of freedom in the great world religious and philosophical traditions. I have attempted to show how certain modern European philosophers have been able to overcome reductionist notions of freedom by drawing upon the resources present in their own traditions, especially those efforts to wrestle with the enigma of evil. This problem, of course, is a perennial and global problem, and no one religious or philosophical tradition can adequately address it on its own. The challenge, then, is for religious and philosophical traditions to interact and dialogue since all of the great religious and philosophical traditions of the world have plenty to say about how freedom relates to good and evil, to virtue and vice, to good governance and to citizenship. Such a dialogue will reveal a rich complementarity and will help to overcome the structural and personal slavery that prevents so many people around the world from enjoying the fullness of genuine freedom.

References


Africa and Climate Change

Robin Attfield

Africa is undergoing multiple threats from climate change, and needs to reflect on policy options for responding to those threats. A beginning is made below to specify these threats and begin to chart a way forward in response to them.

This is an essay in applied philosophy. It incorporates the empirical findings of scientists and journalists, reflects on the international agreements made at Paris in 2015 and at Katowice in 2018; and applies ethical principles to consider their application in the form of policy options for African governments. The needs of Africa for development and for a future immune from poverty and malnutrition are not forgotten; what is needed is policies to move away from poverty and malnutrition without simultaneously exacerbating climate change and the evils that it brings, and at the same time to mitigate climate change and adapt to its unavoidable impacts.

Impacts of Climate Change on Africa

Africa is already being impacted by climate change in many ways, and is set to be further impacted unless sufficient effective international action is taken. Climate change in the first place involves rises in average temperatures, with consequent changes both to human societies and to natural ecosystems. Increased temperatures involve threats to human health and resilience, together with the expansion of deserts and increased difficulties for people living at their margins in their efforts to continue to support themselves. Climate change also causes an increase in both the intensity and the frequency of extreme weather events such as storms, hurricanes, floods, droughts and wildfires, and these derivative changes in their turn cause more than a few human communities to migrate to more hospitable regions, usually away from the equator and towards the poles, with many in Africa moving either north towards the Mediterranean or south towards the Cape of Good Hope, and the vectors of diseases (such

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as mosquitoes) to extend their activities to higher altitudes and higher latitudes, adding to the problems already suffered by vulnerable communities and by healthcare staff.²

Nor should it be forgotten that climate change involves rises in sea-levels, through the melting of ice-caps and glaciers, and that rising waters involve threats of inundation both to coastlines, where many major cities are situated (think of Lagos, Cape Town, Alexandria, Dar es Salaam and Mombasa), and to islands, including such endangered islands as the Seychelles, Mauritius and Aldabra, Zanzibar, Sao Tome and the Canaries. Some islands, such as Aldabra, are in danger of disappearing under the waves of their oceans.

To illustrate the impacts of climate change on normal life in the African countryside, it is worth quoting a passage here on the impacts of changing rainfall on Ethiopian farmers.

In Ethiopia, for example, generations of rural farmers have built their lives around regular rainy seasons: the short rains from February to May, and the long rains from June to October. In the long, wet season they grow their grain crops, which can be stored to provide year-round food. In the shorter season they grow vegetables and pulses which provide essential nutrients for families.

But rising temperatures have changed the familiar weather patterns. The short rains are starting later, and, although the same amount of rain is falling, it is more intense. When the rains come in a deluge like this, the water does not have time to sink into the soil properly, but runs off, leaving the ground parched. These shifts are leaving communities with a problem: they are prioritizing grain crops to secure their income, at the cost of losing vegetables and beans. This deprives them of essential vitamins and minerals, leading to malnutrition.³

These farmers, it should be noted, are not at the stage of joining the widely-publicized migrations which are a recognized impact of climate change. Rather, their regular annual cycle of activities is being disrupted, to the detriment of their own and their children’s health. For every family obliged to migrate there are likely to be others who have not migrated but whose lives and prospects are adversely affected by global warming. These phenomena are so widespread that governments need to take them into account, and consider remedial policies.

³ Ibid., 4.
Problems for Coastal Communities

In addition to farmers, coastal communities dependent on fishing as well as farming are being affected, as the same writer attests.

Climate change is also having devastating consequences for coastal communities. Rising sea levels inundate coastal areas with seawater, making the soil saline and difficult to farm. Seas are warming, and becoming more acidic as carbon dioxide concentrations rise. This is destroying coral reefs, the nursery ground for vital fish stocks.4

The context here concerns African coastal communities, which are being doubly affected by the salination of their land and the undermining of the fish-stocks from which they make part (or in some cases all) of their living. Other tropical and semi-tropical countries are affected in parallel ways, but for present purposes we are considering the cumulative impact of climate change on Africa, even where people are not directly affected by, e.g., deforestation, the spread of infectious diseases, or the growth of deserts.

Coastal communities have other problems to contend with, such as the pollution caused by oil extraction in the Delta area of Nigeria, and the dumping of toxic chemicals along the coasts of West and East Africa.5 These other processes are not caused by climate change, although in both cases climate changes contribute to the negative effects of toxic waste dumping and the off-shore drilling industry. The point is rather that coastal communities are affected by problems with more than one origin, and that the consequences of climate change often add to these problems, to such an extent that governments can no longer afford to ignore climate change (if they ever could); instead governments need to address it.

Africa’s Need for Development and for Generation of Electricity

At the same time Africa has many other problems, of poverty, malnutrition, disease, limited healthcare facilities, illiteracy, limited educational opportunities, limited transport facilities, and many others, all exacerbated by the effects of structural adjustment policies in the 1980s. Life expectancies were till recently on average increasing, except in areas

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4 Ibid.
where Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome is rampant. But much greater efforts are going to be needed to avoid the wastage implicit in the absence of electricity, which limits reading, writing and productivity in all sectors to daylight hours; and, more tragically, which contributes to avoidable premature deaths. There are many remedies for the different problems listed here, including new vaccines for malaria, and bed-nets to prevent its transmission, and much greater worldwide investment in tropical diseases such as dengue-fever.

One necessary condition of most of these remedies, and also of the infrastructure development needed to tackle the problems of African cities and transport, is increased generation of electricity. Electricity makes possible the functioning of the schools and hospitals that Africans need, the construction of improved road and rail systems, and the lighting of homes, allowing people to study and to communicate after nightfall. Electricity is also a crucial element in the development of medical research and interventions required to address the tropical diseases that contribute directly to Africa’s preventable mortality rates.

If the increased electricity were to be generated from coal, gas or oil, then this process would exacerbate the global problem of climate change, and the same holds good of the generation of electricity worldwide. Instead, electricity will need to be generated from renewable sources. Nuclear energy is not included here among renewable sources, since it is not known how to decommission nuclear power stations safely, nor how the waste products of these facilities can be disposed of without risk to hundreds of generations to come. Nuclear fusion might be more benign, but no one knows how to make such nuclear generation viable, except by using even more energy inputs than the likely outputs.

Besides, renewable energy sources are often close at hand. Coastal communities could derive their electricity from wave-power or (in some cases) from harnessing tides. Areas with significant rainfall can employ hydro-electric schemes, some of them based on large rivers, and supplying electricity to hundreds of thousands of people, and others based on much smaller sources, and supplying electricity to communities not linked to national or international grids. Some places have winds, suitable for the generation of electricity from windmills. Above all, most places in Africa are suitable for solar energy generation, using solar panels, and capable of fueling large areas. Replacement of desert ecosystems with unlimited fields of solar panels is not the only route to providing solar energy; investigations of where and how solar panels could be introduced without

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6 The pathogenicity of recent rates in morbidity and their overall impact on recent population growth rates in Africa is contestable. (The author would like to thank Helen Lauer, editor of Utafiti, for this and many other improvements to the current paper.)
becoming eyesores, and allowing adjacent arid areas to be beneficially cultivated, is an important research agenda item for resource assessment specialists.

These forms of electricity generation can be commended on grounds of efficiency, due to the accessibility of the needed sources: waves, tides, rivers, winds and sunlight. They also require the introduction of suitable technology, provision for which will be discussed below. These renewable energy sources are all very familiar; but in the context of this discussion they are especially commendable on the grounds that they could help to solve the demand for electricity without contributing to the more recently recognized problems of climate change.

Population growth is sometimes considered an obstacle to development away from poverty. Relatedly, there is often held to be a prospective problem of feeding all the people of the African continent, in view of expected population increases. While these issues cannot be taken lightly, it is advisable not to be alarmist about them. Hans Rosling, a leading statistician who died recently, used to explain that population has already reached a plateau, with births and deaths approaching equilibrium, not only in most of Europe, but also in most of Asia and Latin America. His expectation was that after some decades of delay, Africa too would reach this situation well before the close of the current century.

If Rosling was right, then the problem is not insuperable. Government policies, however, may have an influence on how soon the population of Africa stabilizes. For example, female education widely serves not only to boost development, but also to reduce rates of population growth. Accordingly, the adoption of policies of boosting female education on the part of African governments is likely to contribute significantly to overcoming the obstacle to development that population growth is often feared to be. At the same time, it is likely to increase the prospects that the population of the African continent can be fed, without all the forests being cleared for firewood, and without all the wild ecosystems being colonized by an expanding human community. It is also likely to mean that the problem of generating enough electricity is more likely to be met, and thus that development can go ahead without generating runaway climate change.

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The Paris and Katowice Climate Agreements

The reason for investigating international climate accords that are due to be implemented, and possibly enhanced in review conferences, is that African countries can play a crucial role in the success of these initiatives, granted the strength of African environmental cultures, the abundance of the relevant natural resources, and the continent’s entrenched problems.

The Paris conference of December 2015 attained agreement about climate targets, agreeing to a ceiling in the rise of average temperatures of 2 degrees (Celsius) above pre-industrial levels, and of 1.5 degrees (Celsius) if possible. As for the contributions of individual states, each participant state made its own commitment. Unfortunately the commitments, when aggregated, would involve an improvement on the status quo, given business-as-usual, but would fall far short of attaining the two-degree ceiling envisioned in the agreement. If these agreements were fulfilled, it is anticipated that they would collectively produce something closer to a three-degree average increase to global warming (from the same baseline).

Fortunately provision was made for ratcheting up these commitments in a series of subsequent conferences, and for developed countries to help poorer nations by providing “climate finance” of $100 billion per year from 2020 to adapt to climate change and switch to renewable energy.9 A subsequent IPCC report related that there is a vast difference between a 1.5-degree ceiling on average emissions increases and a two-degree ceiling, and that the former ceiling is vital for the preservation of islands threatened with inundation. It also predicted that the world had just twelve years to bring greenhouse gas emissions under control.10

The Katowice agreement of 2018 took important steps towards the implementation of the Paris agreement, instituting procedures for reviewing and verifying the discharge of national commitments and a committee to consider action in cases of non-performance.11 However, the opportunity for revising the national commitments will first arise at an international climate change conference which the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres has convened.12 The Katowice agreement was retarded by the delegations from USA, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Poland itself, and it was a success in the circumstances for so significant an agreement to be reached.

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10 UNFCCC, “The Paris Climate Agreement?”
Implementation of These Agreements: The Role of Africa

African nations play a crucial role in the implementation of these agreements. The need for increased electricity in Africa and for a switch to renewable energy generation has already been established, even though African nations have many other problems to attend to at the same time. While the funding agreed at Paris may prove insufficient to secure a worldwide change in the direction of renewable energy, it seems clear that it is in the interests of Africa and its peoples to collaborate with these funding plans. This involves initiating proposals for a transition to renewable energy generation, so that the funding can be put to its intended use as soon as possible after it becomes available in 2020. The way to show that the proposed funding is inadequate is to find ways to deploy the full total already agreed upon, and to show how much more could be done if the available funding were increased.

Accordingly each African nation should begin drawing up plans for conversion of its electricity generation to one or more sources of renewable energy. Countries with lakes and rivers should consider hydro-electricity, while coastal ones should consider wave-power and, where appropriate, tidal energy. Some countries may be in a position to consider geothermal sources, while almost all African countries are in a position to consider solar energy schemes. Several countries are in a position to consider several of these; for example, Nigeria could consider adding to its hydro-electric generation from the Kainji Dam on the River Niger both wave-power and solar power. Due regard would have to be given to the sharing of rivers; for example, new hydro-electric dams on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia could have an impact on downstream countries (in this case Sudan and Egypt). But despite the difficulties, making an early start on preparing these strategies is likely to make it possible to discuss funding before much delay has taken place, and then to construct and implement plans as soon as possible, bringing a more significant benefit both to the countries concerned and to the international community sooner rather than later, and possibly soon enough for the 1.5-degree ceiling to be honored and attained.

Carbon Mitigation Strategies for Africa

Besides, other forms of carbon mitigation should be considered, where they are consistent with development in one African country or another. The planting of trees is a widely celebrated initiative. Developed countries have hitherto been allowed to count their sponsorship of tree-planting projects as part of their mitigation contributions, and tree-planting is also likely to be allowable as the kind of project that the funding agreed at Paris would support. There again, countries which become re-
afforested stand to benefit, both because of improved water retention and because of the side-effects of the presence of trees, whether from fruit, fodder or building materials.

The restoration of trees to much of northern and central Ethiopia is likely to be beneficial to the climate and to reduce the incidence of droughts in that region. Ethiopia is not the only country to have lost many of its trees, and there is scope for restoration of forests in most of the countries in the sub-Saharan region and in those watered by the Congo and Zambezi Rivers. If at all possible, local people should be involved in planning the restoration of woods and forests, so that, when the new trees are planted, they have a sense of ownership, and seek to defend the trees, and present the case for more tree-planting to others.

Adaptation to Climate Change in Africa

As well as mitigation, collaborative efforts are needed in the field of adaptation, so as to limit the impacts of the climate change that has already taken place. For African countries are likely to carry their share of extreme weather events of increasing intensity and severity, and to suffer from ever more and ever stronger hurricanes, storms, floods and wildfires. Coastal areas are (as we have seen) at risk, as are the areas adjacent to large rivers. Forest fires set at risk both the remaining forests and their human and non-human inhabitants. Droughts are a problem both for forests and for areas of savannah, with crops often ruined and traditional forms of agriculture undermined. Meanwhile storms and hurricanes are a danger for all areas, bringing in their train the destruction of towns and villages, and urban trees as well as woodlands.

Forms of adaptation include improved coastal defences, of which some will be artificial and others natural, such as defences achieved through the restoration of shoreline mangroves along the Atlantic coast of West Africa. Constructing raised roadways in areas prone to flooding is a further example; this is particularly relevant to plains, and to places where rivers are prone to burst their banks. Some countries, such as Congo, have not yet built an infrastructure of roads, and building them in the coming decades would give an opportunity at the same time to curtail flooding and promote resilience against such impacts of climate change as its liability to block many forms of transportation.

Another example of adaptation in Africa involves collaboration between neighboring countries to develop regional electricity grids, which can both assist the development of schools and hospitals and facilitate the improved communications that adaptation requires. Thus in many the construction of dams could supply electricity to countries on both sides of a river, as happens with the Zambezi Dam at Hwange. Besides, regional electricity grids can be so constructed as to harness more than one source
of energy, and thus to become resilient even at times when water-levels are low, or the wind does not blow, through other forms of electric supply being available.

Developed countries should assist such measures, because adaptation is often of almost equal importance to mitigation. Grounds for such assistance stretch far beyond benevolence. For it is a plain requirement of principles of justice to make reparations for the exploitation of the past, and to put back into Africa some of the resources exported both in the colonial era and in the period since then. In addition, there is the ground of self-interest; for successful adaptation is a recipe for stable governments, from which trade results which is advantageous to developed countries as well as to developing ones.

A Consideration of Objections to Policies of Mitigation and Adaptation in Africa

To these suggested policies, a number of objections can be put forward. Africans, it might be suggested, have no obligation to help out the rest of the world, having itself suffered from colonial and neo-colonial policies and related exploitation. For example, multiple plantations were imposed on different parts of Africa by colonial regimes, or, in the case of Liberia, by the powerful American company, Firestone: plantations of tea, coffee, groundnuts, sisal and rubber, to the great detriment both of Africans and of African ecosystems. Africans have suffered from systems of land deprivation and taxation that forced many to become laborers under adverse conditions, and ecosystems have suffered through fertile areas with varied flora and fauna being converted into monocultures. In consequence, the now independent countries of Africa need to apply their efforts to rectifying all this exploitation, or so it might be said, rather than doing favors to the descendants of the formal colonial masters.

Besides, exploitation has not ceased with the ending of colonialism. Land-grabs, whereby non-African countries (including Malaysia and China) have purchased large tracts of land from governments, often to the detriment of peasant-farmers, have increased the flow of resources out of Africa, and worsened the situation of contemporary Africans. How can the victims of this ongoing exploitation be expected to play a role in alleviating or solving global problems elsewhere, it might be asked.

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There again, the main contributors to climate change are the developed countries, including Japan, and the more successful of the developing countries, such as China and, to a lesser extent, India. The difference capable of being made by African countries pales into insignificance beside the difference that developed countries plus China and India could make; meanwhile Africans continue to suffer from climate change, without having made historically significant contributions to it.

These are formidable objections, and it is true that African governments need to put effort into rectifying the anomalies resulting from plantations owned by non-Africans and from the dispossession of many former farmers. It is also true that land grabs have in some ways worsened the situation, although they have also brought increased opportunities for employment, and increased productivity. However, to claim that Africa is being asked to play a role in alleviating or solving environmental problems situated elsewhere is to ignore the fact that Africans are themselves suffering from climate change, and for that reason need to contribute to mitigating it.

There again, while the difference that Africans can make is smaller than the difference open to countries such as USA and China, the difference that national policy can make is still enough to affect the overall level of greenhouse gas emissions. In the unlikely event of the rest of the world as a whole cutting its emissions, and African countries allowing their emissions to rise, the outcome could still be that humanity fails to curb total emissions enough to limit average temperatures to 1.5 degrees. Certainly the fact that non-Africans have caused most of the problem, and that Africans are among the majority that are directly victimized by the adverse effects of climate change, means that there is a strong argument based on principles of justice for non-Africans to carry most of the burdens of mitigation. Yet given that Africans are suffering from climate change, it is contrary to their interests, and to principles of prudence, to allow their own carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions to continue and to increase.

Besides, in matters of adaptation, it is important for African governments to participate in protecting their populations against floods, storms, hurricanes, droughts and wildfires, and to protect their ecosystems and wildlife at the same time. Global opinion has come round to a recognition that worldwide investment in the cause of adaptation is necessary, and that developed countries need to grant financial assistance (and in some cases technical assistance as well) to developing countries such as the countries of Africa. In these circumstances, to take no part in adaptation schemes would amount to a form of self-harm not far removed from suicide. While it is hard to deny that reparations are due to many African countries for the harms perpetrated under colonial rule, international conferences are not prepared to make this explicit; yet at the same time their offers of
funding to rectify some of the resulting suffering effectively amounts to acceptance in principle that a debt is owed to African and other developing countries by (most of) the developed ones. In these circumstances, it is wise for African counties to collaborate in adaptation schemes, so that current and future generations of Africans do not have to suffer in the ways that their predecessors did.

Bottom-Up Approach to Climate Change Mitigation

It goes without saying that particular requirements for adaptation in Africa should be identified and proposed by the Africans whose interests and environments are at stake. Thus the siting of flood defences, raised roads and railways and of areas demarcated for tree-planting should be proposed by Africans, and Africans should have a say at all stages of the implementation of such schemes. This must include poor Africans, who may in some cases be at risk of being moved to make way for the forms of development that adaptation involves. But this constitutes neither an objection nor an obstacle to the implementation of adaptation. Rather, as is widely recognized, community participation in planning makes implementation more effective, increasing the likelihood that the measures taken will bring about their intended salutary effects all the sooner.

Further, granted that it is wise for Africans to welcome and take part in measures of adaptation, it cannot be wise for them to ignore and take no part in measures of mitigation. For it is greenhouse gas emissions that cause the problems which make adaptation necessary, and to contribute unnecessarily and avoidably to these problems is thus contrary to the interests of African countries themselves, as well as those of humanity in general. Accordingly, African governments should cooperate not only in schemes for adaptation, but also in implementing world-wide policies of mitigation, including policies to generate electricity from renewable sources, as has been the focus of the discussion above.

Conclusion

African countries are endangered by climate change in multiple ways. These range from the inundation of coastal plains and cities as well as of islands, to increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as storms, hurricanes, floods, droughts and wildfires. They also include the spread of diseases such as malaria and dengue fever, as their vectors spread to higher altitudes and latitudes, the prospect of human migration to north and south, and threats to African ecosystems and wildlife.

There is now, as a result of the conferences held at Paris (2015) and Katowice (2018) a global agreement on tackling the global problem of
climate change, in which most governments are participating through making voluntary offers involving reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Another provision concerns a large fund to support adaptation and the generation of electricity from renewable sources.

African governments, because of their focus on increasing productivity as a means to economic development, are going to need to generate increased amounts of electricity. Thus it would be wise to participate in such schemes of adaptation for their own interests. Otherwise coastal and other highly vulnerable populations will continue to suffer from the effects of rising temperatures, a situation which is capable of worsening drastically even in the next generation.

At the same time, African governments need to rectify problems still lingering from the colonial era and to protect themselves and their populations from contemporary styles of foreign exploitation. Yet this does not mean that these governments can ignore issues of climate change. Rather, there is a need to incorporate local knowledge of the problems to which adaptation is needed, and a need to adapt age-old indigenous methods of environmental conservation to central state agendas, and for local people to share in planning solutions.

It might be asked whether African governments should undertake schemes of adaptation even if developed countries default on their promises and commitments. In this undesirable scenario, the reasoning presented above indicates that effective adaptation remains in the interests of Africa and of African nations. Africa is suffering from climate change already, and will suffer more in the absence of wisely deployed adaptation. Further, adaptation will in the end prove futile unless mitigation of carbon and related emissions is undertaken. But undertaking this is a global challenge, in which African leaders will need to play their part. Even if countries such as USA and Brazil reject their obligations to amend the effects of anthropogenic global warming, African countries should play their own part, largely for reasons of self-interest, but also for reasons of global solidarity.

References


The Power and Promise of Environmental Ethics and Shale Gas in the Karoo Area of South Africa

Johan Hattingh

Introduction

Hydraulic fracturing is an innovative mining technique that was developed to extract gas from shale deposits between 1,000 and 5,000 meters below the earth’s surface. Existing for about 60 years, it entails drilling shafts not only downwards but also horizontally to extremely great depths. A cocktail of chemicals and sand (or ceramic proppant beads) mixed with water is pumped into these shafts under pressure, and then explosions are created in the horizontal tunnels that fracture the shale rock, delivering sand or beads into cracks which release gas trapped in the shale. Gas then flows up to the surface through shafts, collected and transported to refineries where it is further treated and finally distributed to users who will burn it for a wide variety of purposes, including the generation of electricity, or combustion in motorized vehicles like trains or cars.

However, the exploitation of shale gas is seen by many as the next step in the use of fossil fuels, because the looming exhaustion of liquid oil reserves drives humanity to develop alternative energy sources, some of which may be more difficult to achieve under increasingly extreme and dangerous conditions. Part of this scenario is rising fuel costs that makes it economically viable to exploit shale gas, which did not exist a few decades ago. Shale gas is considered to be cleaner in terms of greenhouse gas emissions than other forms of carbon-based energy. This makes it attractive to be included in a country’s fuel mix for meeting emissions targets in the fight against climate change. On the other hand, in spite of all its obvious economic benefits, there exists a huge and strong opposition to the exploitation of shale gas where it is already in place, as well as envisaged.

In Pennsylvania, USA, for instance, residents claimed that shale gas exploitation had contaminated their air and ground water. In West Sussex, England, residents prevented a drilling operation to start, while residents in Lancashire, England, experienced low intensity earthquakes resulting from hydraulic fracturing. In the Netherlands, continued seismic activity was experienced in areas where shale gas was extracted, leading to court cases and the government to stop the extraction. Because of uncertainty about its safety, hydraulic fracturing was banned by the French Parliament in 2011, and by Bulgaria in 2012.

In South Africa a partial moratorium was placed on hydraulic fracturing for exploration purposes in 2011, but this was lifted late in 2012, and reinstated again in February 2014. In June 2015, the South African government promulgated regulations for the exploration and development of shale gas.

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of shale gas\textsuperscript{10} and in 2017, following a comprehensive \textit{Strategic Environmental Assessment} published in November 2016,\textsuperscript{11} it formally gave permission for shale gas development, starting with baseline studies\textsuperscript{12} before serious exploration could begin. These regulations, however, were set aside by the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court of South Africa\textsuperscript{13} late in 2017, bringing shale gas exploration involving hydraulic fracturing effectively to a halt till further notice.\textsuperscript{14}

This dispute revolved around the prospects of hydraulic fracturing in an area in South Africa, called the Karoo, an arid and sparsely populated piece of land covering about 600,000 square kilometers and mainly used for livestock farming, game farming and tourism. The deposits of shale gas discovered there have the potential for economically viable exploitation. About 250,000 square kilometers of the Karoo Basin were earmarked for the extraction of shale gas deposits.\textsuperscript{15} While the South African government issued licenses to a number of oil companies which acquired exploration rights with a view to determine the extent of the gas deposits (this was done before the initial moratorium on exploration of 2011), very strong opposition to this plan came from land owners in the Karoo, as well as environmentalists from across South Africa. While not so much in the public eye, as it was initially in 2012 and 2013 when the moratorium on exploration was lifted, this opposition still existed in June 2021 when this chapter was finalized, and the controversy is basically still not resolved.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Republic of South Africa, \textit{Government Gazette} 600, no. 38855, June 3, 2015.
\item See the website of the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) of South Africa, https://www.dmr.gov.za.
\item High Court Case, Eastern Cape Division, no. 5762/2015. See Footnote 9 above. Applications for exploration licences for shale gas, even without the process of hydraulic fracturing, have also become highly disputed, leading to court cases setting these further applications aside. See Sipho Kings, “Court Throws out Fracking Application for KZN,” \textit{Mail and Guardian}, May 8, 2017, https://mg.co.za/article/2017-5-8-00-court-throws-out-fracking-application.
\item This did not rule out exploration without fracking involved, explaining why the Minister of Mineral Resources of South Africa could advertise in the \textit{Provincial Gazette of the Northern Cape Province} 25, no. 2195 of July 11, 2018 for comments pending his decision on exploration applications of Shell, Bundu and Falcon. See also Footnotes 38 and 78.
\item This is an ongoing dispute. In 2015, a farmers’ lobby group, for example, took the South African government to court (High Court Case, Eastern Cape Division, no. 5762/2015) on the regulations mentioned above (see Footnotes 9 and 10), and was successful in petitioning the High Court to quash the regulations. A similar action was brought in the Gauteng High Court by the Treasure the Karoo Action Group, but it
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The land owners of the Karoo are mainly concerned about the large volumes of water that will be required for each mining shaft, the pollution of ground water needed for human consumption and livestock farming, and the pollution from the effluent of gas wells. The environmentalists are mainly concerned about the ecological and biodiversity impacts, and the destruction of the stark beauty of a pristine ancient landscape connecting humanity with Jurassic times when dinosaurs roamed the earth. They point out alternative, more environmentally friendly and carbon efficient options for energy generation for South Africa in general, and for the Karoo in particular.\footnote{DMR, \textit{Report on Investigation of Hydraulic Fracturing.} See also the CSIR’s \textit{Strategic Environmental Assessment} referred to in Footnote 11.}

The debate about the exploitation of shale gas in the Karoo is emblematic of the development-conservation conundrum throughout the African continent. While Africa has vast needs for economic and human development, it is also faced with the triple irony that poverty as it exists in Africa, economic development as it has taken its course in the continent, failed. Both cases were taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (case numbers 1369/2017 and 790/2018), which handed down its judgement on July 4, 2019. The draft regulations of 2015 were again set aside in their entirety. Various academics and journalists continued writing about the controversy from different angles. See, for example, Surina Esterhuyse, et al., “A Review of Biophysical and Socio-economic Effects of Unconventional Oil and Gas Extraction: Implications for South Africa,” \textit{Journal of Environmental Management} (Elsevier, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2016.09.065; Jan Glazewski and Surina Esterhuyse, \textit{Hydraulic Fracturing in the Karoo: Critical Legal and Environmental Perspectives} (Juta, 2016); Mieke Willems, et al., “Environmental Reviews and Case Studies: Health Risk Perception Related to Fracking in the Karoo, South Africa,” \textit{Environmental Practice} 18, no. 1 (2016); Ken Fullerton, “South African Government Supports Fracking in the Karoo,” \textit{Sense and Sustainability} (August 28, 2018), http://www.senseandsustainability.net/2018/08/28/south-african-government-supports-fracking-in-the-karoo/. In the meantime, the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Gwede Mantashe, announced during his budget speech in Parliament on May 18, 2021 (https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-gwede-mantashe-mineral-resources-and-energy-dept-budget-vote-202122-18-may-2021), that his department drilled an exploration hole in which two promising pockets of shale gas were discovered. While it is not clear whether this exploration hole was drilled in the Karoo or in other areas such as the eastern Free State or Kwa Zulu Natal Province, he linked shale gas with the future energy mix of South Africa as specified in the Integrated Resource Plan. Furthermore, the South African government by the Minister of Human Settlements, Water and Sanitation published a new set of draft regulations for hydraulic fracturing in the Government Gazette of May 7, 2021 (General Notice 406, Government Gazette 44545, May 7, 2021). While the formal process of comments and review of these draft regulations are under way, environmentalists and landowners in the Karoo are staying vigilant about the shale gas issue and are ready to “take up arms” again to oppose shale gas extraction by way of hydraulic fracturing if their initial concerns about it are not properly addressed (personal communication). See also Footnote 78.
and armed conflict to control the natural resources of the continent, have proven to be detrimental to conserving its natural heritage, biodiversity and beauty.

In this chapter, I would like to pose the question whether environmental ethics, as it has evolved over the past 40 years in many parts of the world, can make a contribution towards resolving a major development-conservation conundrum as it manifested itself in the ongoing debate about shale gas production in the Karoo. Although the South African government supports the goal of shale gas exploitation by hydraulic fracturing in principle, it has been confronted with a huge opposition from landowners, environmentalists, journalists and scientists. A view from environmental ethics can hopefully make a difference to the quality and depth of the debates not only about shale gas development, but also about the substantive question whether it should actually go ahead or not, or whether alternative options for energy generation should be pursued. The general guidelines explicated in this chapter would then clearly be relevant to other similar situations in Africa where development and conservation clash head-on with one another, but a detailed discussion of these clashes falls outside the scope of this chapter.

To narrow down the very broad scope of environmental ethics, I will restrict myself to the trends that emerged over the past 40 years or so, focusing on the central question whether the main messages of environmental ethics have the power and promise (a) to overcome the stalemates and animosities when development for humans and the conservation of nature clash, and (b) to indicate a clear way forward in which both agendas of development and conservation can be pursued at the same time. To do this, I will start with an overview of the stalemate in the debate about shale gas exploitation in the Karoo as it has unfolded in South Africa, and then proceed to three central messages of environmental ethics. I will then explore the relevance of the messages of environmental ethics for the debate on hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo. To conclude this chapter I will indicate a number of areas in which I believe environmental ethics can indeed make a difference to the debates as well as the decision-making about the extraction of shale gas envisaged in the Karoo.

The Debate about Shale Gas Production in the Karoo

The debate about shale gas exploitation in the Karoo centers around three large themes, namely economic and livelihood issues, spiritual, aesthetic and ecological issues, and technical and governance issues. There are economic arguments in favor of shale gas exploitation, based on the revenue and job opportunities it will create for the country, but these arguments are strongly opposed by landowners in the Karoo who are deeply concerned that shale gas exploitation will contaminate the ground water
on which they rely to make a living from livestock and wildlife farming. In terms of an environmentalist’s position, such exploitation will destroy not only the ecology but also the beauty and spiritual meaning of an ancient landscape, while some alternatives for energy generation will not do so. On technical and governance grounds the counter-arguments are that South Africa has neither the technical expertise to successfully operate shale gas mining facilities, nor the regulatory framework and procedures to ensure that this exploitation can be done safely.

Economic Arguments for and Against Shale Gas Exploitation

In his State of the Nation speech at the opening of parliament on February 13, 2014, then President Jacob Zuma alluded to shale gas exploitation as a “game changer” in the economic landscape of South Africa, and indicated that the South African government was ready to issue licenses for it in the near future. He also referred to regulations that would be put in place to take care of environmental concerns that people may have about both the exploration for and eventual exploitation of shale gas. His announcement was a clear indication that the South African government had already accepted the economic argument in favor of shale gas production, but was not clear yet how strong its environmental commitment would be in this development agenda.

It cannot be denied that there are strong economic arguments in favor of shale gas exploitation. Initial estimates from 2012 about the shale gas deposit in the Karoo was 485 trillion cubic feet, while other estimates later 390 trillion cubic feet, that, if verified, would represent one of the larger shale gas deposits in the world. Initial estimates further indicated that it could take between 25 and 50 years to extract this gas, and that

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between 48,000 and 355,000 jobs would be created depending on different scenarios.\textsuperscript{22} Another estimate based on extracting only 30 trillion cubic feet of gas, was that about R960 billion\textsuperscript{23} would be added over twenty to thirty years to the South African economy.\textsuperscript{24} With the official Census figures of 2011 indicating the high levels of unemployment in the country, the production of shale gas could indeed be an economic game changer, as seen by many including Zuma.

This initial euphoria about the extent of the gas reserve and the contribution its development could make to the South African economy by way of revenue and job creation, however, was substantively dampened by figures from later studies. In the comprehensive Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) about hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo completed in late 2016,\textsuperscript{25} for example, studies confirmed that the extent of the shale gas deposits in the Karoo was uncertain, and that further exploration would be required in order to determine the more exact figures. The same SEA also indicated that expectations about the size of the gas deposits should be much more modest than the initial overly optimistic estimates, pinning a “Small Gas” development scenario down to only 5 trillion cubic feet, and a “Big Gas” development scenario to merely 20 trillion cubic feet (twenty five times lower than the high end of the 2012 estimates). Accordingly, expectations about revenue and job creation should also be tempered. The 2016 SEA thus claimed that a realistic Small Gas development scenario in the Karoo would only create about 420 new jobs (of which only 60-145 will come from the Karoo), while the Big Gas scenario would contribute only 2,575 new jobs (only 390-900 coming from the Karoo).\textsuperscript{26} In contrast to these modest figures, though, the Petroleum Agency of South Africa (PASA), a government institution created to promote exploration for offshore and onshore oil and gas resources in South Africa, officially estimated 205 trillion cubic feet of shale gas reserves.\textsuperscript{27}


\textsuperscript{23} About US dollar 74 billion.

\textsuperscript{24} DMR, Report on Investigation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 6.


\textsuperscript{26} CSIR, Strategic Environmental Assessment: Summary for Policymakers, 47. Given the many variables involved in determining the contribution that shale gas development could make to revenues (for example the Rand-Dollar exchange rate, as well as oil prices), the 2016 SEA did not quote estimated figures in Rand terms.

\textsuperscript{27} See the website of PASA, https://www.petroleumagencysa.com/index.php/petroleum-geology-resources/frontier-geology.
On the other side of the argument, concerns have been raised about the actual process of shale gas development itself. If approved, it would not only entail deep drilling but also hydraulic fracturing at great depths. In this regard, some opposing arguments point to the safety of the drilling process and the underground explosions for the actual fracturing, some to wells and casings failing, which would have real possibilities of contaminating aquifers which are used for human consumption and agriculture, as well as surface pollution around wells and wellpads. In the latter context, opponents are particularly concerned about the infrastructure required for the production phase. Production, for instance, means that 10 wells will have to be drilled for every wellpad, which requires about 2 hectares of land. Wellpads in a “production block” will typically be situated 3 to 5 kilometers from one another. In the scenario of Small Gas development for which a small area of 30 by 30 kms is envisaged as a “production block,” 55 wellpads will be constructed, associated with 550 wells in total. In the Big Gas scenario, four production blocks will be used in which 4,100 wells will be drilled for a total of 410 wellpads. Each wellpad will make provision for the storage of gas until it is transported by road or pipeline to a nearby refinery, dams for the storage of sludge and effluent, and water that will be used in the fracturing operation. A network of roads will be needed to enable trucks to reach the wellpads in order to make deliveries or to collect the gas. About 365,000 truck visits in total will be made to wellpads in the lifetime of the Small Gas production scenario, while it will be about 2,177,000 truck visits in total in the lifetime of the Big Gas scenario. Although actual fracturing will not create any noise pollution, noise will indeed be generated by pumps and drills on well sites, as well as the movement of trucks which cause dust pollution.

Residents of the Karoo, landowners mostly farming with livestock and wildlife, and those living in towns, are not happy with the prospect of such infrastructure and the volume of traffic going through their farms and towns. Their main economic argument is that exploitation of shale gas will contaminate the aquifers they rely on for drinking water both for themselves and their livestock or wildlife. Proponents of shale gas production claim that technical know-how can prevent such pollution, but landowners reject these claims on the basis that severe pollution of groundwater has occurred in many other places in the world in spite of all technical measures. Shale gas production is, thus, construed as a threat to

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28 CSIR, Strategic Environmental Assessment: Summary for Policymakers, 13.
29 CSIR, Strategic Environmental Assessment: Preface, 15.
30 Ibid., 19.
31 DMR, Report on Investigation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 47.
their livelihoods, livestock and game farming, which contributes annually about R200 million to the South African economy.33

Related to this argument is the concern that shale gas exploitation will require up to 10,500 cubic meters of water per well, and that, depending on certain conditions, Small Gas and Big Gas scenarios will require between about 6,000,000 and 45,000,000 cubic meters of water respectively.34 However, such volumes of water are not readily available in the Karoo and will have to be transported from elsewhere. While this could be taken as a technical matter by using sea water that will have to be pumped over big distances, or by making use of aquifers with brackish (salty) water, or even water from the sewage plants of towns, it is exactly these proposed solutions that exacerbate concerns, because shale tends to have adverse chemical reactions if exposed to brackish water, depending on the kind of clay the shale consists of.35

As such the controversy about hydraulic fracturing entails a stand-off between those who foresee enormous economic advantages coming from the production of shale gas, and those who see this as a short-term solution that will provide employment for relatively few people for about twenty to thirty years. However, a lifestyle and livelihoods built around stock and game farming will be destroyed.

Efforts have also been made to cast this stand-off in racial terms, by portraying those protesting against hydraulic fracturing as a number of white landowners who stand in the way of creating employment for a poor non-white population.36 Such a simplistic dichotomy, however, does not take into account that members from all population groups living in the area are part of the protest. As Fig37 indicates, white and black are saying no to hydraulic fracturing, so are rich and poor. In fact, the initial optimism about large employment figures is not supported by the more realistic studies.

Aesthetic, Spiritual and Ecological Concerns about Shale Gas Extraction

There is a wide-ranging opposition to shale gas exploitation in the Karoo from environmentalists representing a much wider population than

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32 R200 million represents about US dollar 15.4 million.
33 CSIR, Strategic Environmental Assessment: Summary for Policymakers, 29.
34 DMR, Report on Investigation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 41.
35 Ibid.
36 See High Court Case, Eastern Cape Division, no. 5762/2015, par. 17.
only the landowners and those making a living there. Supporting the landowners, environmentalists predominantly base their arguments on aesthetic and spiritual grounds which are closely linked to and combined with ecological concerns. The beauty of the Karoo is experienced in many ways, but can be captured in images of wide open spaces, defined by arid, slightly undulating flatland covered by climate adapted grasses, shrubs ("bossies") and succulent plants, and hillocks ("koppies") characterized in many cases by lofty cliffs and awe inspiring rock formations. As such the Karoo represents an ancient landscape that goes back 1,500 million years when it was covered by water, forming a sea fed by rivers which drained into it from highlands to the south, situated at that time in the southern parts of the ancient continent Pangea. The current shape of the Karoo stems from the times when the Karoo sea, on the shores of which dinosaurs roamed, finally dried up, leaving kopjes ("hillocks") with rock formations still marking the levels of ancient shorelines.

Because of these qualities the Karoo is experienced by many as a place of tranquility, peace and rejuvenation where one can find inspiration and recuperate from the hectic demands of city life. From this point of view, the Karoo is often described as a holy place where we as humans have no right to disturb. In this light, shale gas exploitation is seen as a serious disturbance of the aesthetic and spiritual values associated with the area, and a rape of the landscape. In popular language this dimension of the protest has been captured with references to hydraulic fracturing as "fracking" – a clear wordplay on the word "fucking." Accordingly, in the public campaign in South Africa, harsh slogans such as the following were often used: “Don’t frack with the Karoo” and “Shell, frack off.”

With regard to impacts on the ecology and biodiversity of the Karoo, environmentalists are mostly concerned about the fragmentation of the landscape due to the roads, pipelines and powerlines associated with shale gas development. Such fragmentation, according to their argument, will compromise the biodiversity and ecological integrity of the Karoo, an area with high levels of biodiversity including sensitive and unique ecosystems and species. Moreover, it is a well-established scientific fact that the Karoo as an arid area is very sensitive to disturbance, and "recovery from such disturbance is slow and not spontaneous."

However, such aesthetic, spiritual and ecological arguments may not play a big role in the minds of decision-makers in the South African government. As it was captured in the State of the Nation speech of former

38 Shell is one of three companies which applied for exploration licences before 2011 along with Bundu and Falcon. Rhino Oil and Gas Exploration South Africa is a fourth company that has also filed applications for exploration licences.

39 CSIR, Strategic Environmental Assessment: Summary for Policymakers, 36-37.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.
President Zuma in Parliament on February 12, 2014, and confirmed by numerous statements from government spokespersons since then, the presumption is clear that precedence should be given to the economic development of the nation, and that those already well-endowed members of society who can afford to pursue aesthetic and spiritual values, or campaign for environmental conservation should step back for the sake of others to improve their lives. The question is, again, whether decision-making about the development of shale gas in the Karoo should be driven by such a simplistic juxtaposition of values.

Technical and Governance Issues Around Shale Gas Production in the Karoo

A cluster of arguments in opposition to the extraction of shale gas focuses on governance and monitoring issues, as well as problems with regard to the rationality and transparency of the decision-making. One of the best summaries of these arguments can be found in a paper delivered by David Fig in 2012 in which he strongly argues against such an extraction. In this paper, Fig raises, amongst other issues, serious doubts about the ability of the South African government to put in place an appropriate regulatory framework that will effectively guide and monitor the sophisticated scientific and technological processes of shale gas extraction. His argument is that the extraction will require the introduction of a novel scientific-technological system into South Africa which has virtually no regulatory tools to monitor and control the wide scope and impact on society of this scientific-technological system.

Some may think that Fig’s argument has fallen away since he initially formulated it in 2012, because the South African government eventually did promulgate a regulatory framework for shale gas exploration and extraction in 2015. The fact of the matter, however, is that these regulations were successfully challenged in the High Court of South Africa as invalid, for they were unlawful and drafted in a procedurally unfair manner. Since then no other regulations have been successfully introduced to fill

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44 Fig, “Extraction and Displacement,” 13-16.
46 High Court Case, Eastern Cape Division, no. 5762/2015, par. 45. The South African Government’s appeal in this matter was dismissed in July 2019. New draft regulations for hydraulic fracturing was introduced in May 2021, but they are again regarded as fatally flawed in a number of ways. See also Footnote 16.
the vacuum that Fig refers to. What Fig is concerned about is the lack of knowledge and technical expertise to operate, monitor and govern deep drilling and hydraulic fracturing, which was confirmed by an extensive study by the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) and the South African Academy of Engineering (SAAE) in 2016 on *South Africa’s Technical Readiness to Support a Shale Gas Industry*.47

These concerns form part of a wider global worry that has to do with the track records of large oil companies of the world, some of which are, or have been involved in the bid for exploration licences (with extraction licences in their future). In one word, these track records are dismal, harking back to oil disasters such as that of the oil-tanker Exxon Valdez ship-wrecking on the shores of Canada, Shell’s implication in the North Sea oil rig scandal and its oil operations in Nigeria, and more recently the deep oil well disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in which British Petrol (BP) had to concede that its technology just failed. This global concern expresses a deep-seated lack of trust not only in the ability of large oil companies and governments to avert large-scale environmental and social disasters in spite of all the assurances given and all the regulations in place, but also in their ability to make rational decisions to serve the interests of society at large in the long run.

This last point is neatly captured in the logic of decision-making that has to be followed in order to prove whether hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo will be economically viable and societally and environmentally safe.49 The logic is that there is no way to guarantee safety in advance, there has to be a phase of exploration in order to determine the safety of hydraulic fracturing experimentally. A big element of risk is involved in this testing, because the tests themselves can go wrong from the start or may not. The point, however, is that even the go-ahead for exploration is given without really knowing in advance what it may entail and what the impacts could be if things go wrong seriously. The mere fact of giving the go-ahead for testing thus represents the first step of irrational decision-making to achieve goals that are deemed to be strong enough to justify the risks.

Fig rightly points out that it is not clear to the South African society what these goals actually are, and how they have been determined. In general terms, these goals are clearly economic development. When it comes to the magnitude and nature of the economic development envisaged,

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48 Fig, “Extraction and Displacement,” 18.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
there seems to be hyper-inflated expectations. Also there is a lack of transparency and real societal participation around the formulation of these goals and communicating the means with which they will be pursued and the risks involved. These contribute to the deep feelings of distrust and suspicion of the actual targets to be pursued by shale gas production in the Karoo. This is another way to articulate scepticism about the claims of vast economic benefits that shale gas extraction is promised to have for the wider South-African public. Those who will be able to take up new jobs in the Karoo if shale gas extraction goes ahead, are skilled and semi-skilled people, while unskilled farm workers currently living in the Karoo will experience minimal, if any, benefits.

Large questions can also be asked about the kind of economy and lifestyles that will be fueled by the shale gas production from the Karoo. Will the risks taken and the jobs created be part of a newly organized green economy in South Africa with alternative, environmentally friendly energy generation? Or will these risks and new jobs only perpetuate an economy that is fundamentally unsustainable because of its dependence upon fossil fuels, and seeing shale gas as an extension of its lifespan?

Fundamental questions like these do not have easy or obvious answers but compel us to explore further. One of the areas involved is environmental ethics. The sections below will explore whether environmental ethics can help us to address the quandaries and stand-offs mentioned above. If so, what will environmental ethics suggest for decision-making in this regard?

**Main Messages of Environmental Ethics**

As a sub-discipline of applied ethics environmental ethics emerged in the 1970s predominantly as a response to the destructive impact on ecosystems, biodiversity and the biosphere of a consumerist lifestyle, based on a globally dispersed industry fueled by carbon-based energy. Realizing that this impact, if not checked, will eventually destroy life on earth, all life, not only human life, different practical and theoretical avenues have been explored since then in efforts to do something about this dismal prospect. In the limited space of this paper, only the main messages of environmental ethics that emerged since its inception will be highlighted, placing them within the context of central insights from contemporary philosophy.

In my reading of environmental ethics, it has contributed three important elements to our intellectual make-up, even if what we have gained thus in principle has not yet been translated into an effective practical ethics of the majority of the world’s population:
1. Environmental ethics has expanded our moral horizon beyond humans.
2. Environmental ethics has identified a number of root causes of our global environmental crises, and campaigned for the transformation of society and culture to eradicate these causes.
3. Environmental ethics has provided practical tools of assessment, decision-making and policy formation centered around environmental considerations which can make a real difference to the future of life on earth if only they would be taken seriously and utilized accordingly.

I also would like to single out two main trends of contemporary philosophy to which environmental ethics resonates very well and actually makes contributions to. The first one is the continuation of the Socratic tradition of perpetual self-questioning. Environmental ethics fundamentally questions the conventional boundaries of the moral domain, that is traditionally restricted to humanity at large in its best versions, and to only certain humans in its worst versions. It also identifies root causes of the environmental crisis and calls for a fundamental transformation of society and culture to eradicate these causes. In this sense environmental ethics stands firmly within this Socratic tradition of continually asking who we are, and where we are heading to.

Environmental ethics also contributes to the cosmopolitan impulse in contemporary philosophy with its view of humankind as a single race. Environmental ethics provides the very practical insight that our well-being as humans is fully dependent upon the “ecosystem services” provided by nature, biodiversity and the biosphere. This means that any erosion or destruction of these services amounts to an erosion or destruction of our own well-being as humans. Thus, environmental ethics not only mirrors but also strengthens a deepening of the cosmopolitan view of society that promotes the vision of humankind not only as a single race, but also with the earth as common homeland.\(^{51}\)

**Expanding of the Moral Horizon Beyond Human Beings**

One of the most salient aspects of conventional ethics is that it reserves moral considerability for human beings only. From this vantage point, moral respect, or moral considerability, is traditionally reserved for entities with intrinsic value, which is shown exclusively by human beings.

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so the argument goes. The value possessed by everything else, nature included, is just in reference to humans, hence it has nothing but instrumental value, not moral value.

Various arguments have been used through the ages to support this idea. However, serious cracks emerge if we put them under critical scrutiny. Aristotle, for instance, argued that only human beings possess reason, therefore moral considerability should be reserved for them alone. Recent advances in etiology, however, has proven that certain animals like chimpanzees, dolphins and elephants can, as they were, put two and two together and arrive at conclusions, following a process of some reasoning. Similar holes have been punched in arguments that humans are the only beings on earth with self-consciousness, language, a sense of history or the ability to anticipate the future, the ability to play, or a sense of duty towards others.

From the early days of environmental ethics, such authors as Peter Singer and Tom Regan have invested a great deal of intellectual energy to expand the moral sphere beyond humans to include animals. Arguing from a consequentialist basis, Singer used the notion of sentience (the ability to suffer and to experience joy) to include certain animals (vertebrates) in the sphere of moral considerability. Animals that can suffer and experience pain, he argued, deserve the same kind of moral respect traditionally reserved for humans. He assumed the position of *animal liberation* in which he advocated a vegetarian diet and the abolition of animal experimentation, factory farming and keeping animals in zoos on the basis that all of these subject animals to pain and suffering. Regan arrived at a similar practical conclusion, but argued more from a rights perspective. In his view animals also have rights like humans, because they too are the subjects of lives. Like humans, at least some animals show the characteristics of consciousness, memory, anticipation of the future, a sense of identity over time, etc. For this reason they are the subjects of lives, and therefore have rights and deserve moral respect equal to humans.

Paul W. Taylor expanded the moral horizon even further when he argued in *Respect for Nature* that all non-human living entities (including trees and plants) should be treated with moral respect because they too

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have intrinsic value (i.e., value in and of themselves, irrespective of whether they have instrumental value to humans or not). According to Taylor every living entity is a teleological center of life, which means that it strives to be a magnificent and flourishing exemplar of its species. Thus, respect for nature entails for Taylor a thorough knowledge and understanding of the conditions that enable the flourishing of a species, and ensuring that these conditions are not diminished but maintained.

Aldo Leopold\textsuperscript{57} developed a \textit{land ethic} in which he moved even further, to include land itself as part of the community of life that deserves moral respect. For him, land includes the non-living preconditions of life such as water and soil, and he argued that any impact that diminishes the integrity, beauty and stability of the community of life as a whole should be regarded as morally unacceptable. He argued strongly against the onslaughts of mechanized man on the community of life, pleading for a new ethic to be implemented in which every element of the community of life, as well as the community of life as a whole, are given the respect due to them.

Holmes Rolston III\textsuperscript{58} took the next conceptual step in this line of argumentation by expanding the moral sphere beyond the human domain, narrowly conceived. For him intrinsic value is not only captured in every form and level of life on earth, including species and communities of life extending beyond humans, but also in ecosystems, earth systems, and evolutionary processes. Since these systems and processes not only produce intrinsic value, but also are part and parcel of intrinsic value, they should be respected as such. When asked what moral respect in this mode would entail, his point of departure is a sense of wonder about the uniqueness and particularity of life on earth and all of the processes making it possible. He argued that we have no right to diminish the richness and creativity of life and processes producing and maintaining it, therefore we have no right to shut down certain evolutionary possibilities by tampering with ecosystems and earth systems for narrow short-term human purposes.

A similar evolutionary, whole-earth perspective was developed in the \textit{gaia hypothesis} of James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis.\textsuperscript{59} For them the earth is a vast self-regulating system with a metabolism of its own that is too slow for individual generations to notice. However, functioning in such a manner keeps the conditions for life to exist on earth stable. The abiotic (for example the temperature of the earth) is as important for the

\textsuperscript{57} Aldo Leopold, \textit{A Sand County Almanac with Other Essays on Conservation from Round River} (New York: Ballantine Books, 1949).
maintenance of life on earth as are any biological or ecosystemic processes. Accordingly they arrived at a similar position as that of Rolston when they proposed that humans should contribute rather than take away from the processes that keep the conditions for life on earth stable.

Although the expansion of the moral horizon beyond the human sphere has taken its course in the realm of principle and theory, it is rather difficult and slow to implement it in the world of everyday practice. A variety of possible reasons for this state of affairs can be pointed out. For instance, the notion of extending moral considerability to non-human living entities is clearly alien to many cultures and conventional moral systems.

In the second place, it is in all probability much easier to appeal for the conservation of life in general on the basis that humans are dependent upon ecosystem, earth and evolutionary processes for survival, flourishing and well-being. This suggests an anthropocentric value position that is not ideal for environmental ethics as it has evolved in opposition to an instrumentalistic view of nature and the biosphere, emphasizing the intrinsic value of life and everything else that makes it possible. To put it bluntly, the first message of environmental ethics is that the instrumental valuing of nature, biodiversity, ecosystems, and the biosphere is not good enough. It could be argued, therefore, that a theory of co-existence should be explored in future, in which a profound sense of wonder about the uniqueness and intrinsic value of all lives on earth is combined with the very practical and perhaps even mundane insight that our security, well-being and flourishing as human beings are dependent upon ecosystem, earth and evolutionary processes that we share symbiotically with other living beings. Currently, however, we are undermining these processes and interactions to the point of severe disruption in order to maintain a consumerist lifestyle and related industries.

The Root Causes of Our Global Environmental Crisis

A second message conveyed by the evolution of environmental ethics over the past four decades could be formulated in terms of three short statements:

1. The root causes of our global environmental predicament can be found in the present organization of human society and culture.
2. Hence, it is necessary to critically assess this organization on a radical and profound level.
3. This present organization needs fundamental transformation.

Deep ecology, ecofeminism, social ecology and bioregionalism are four different positions in environmental ethics which propose a radical
response to our global environmental problems. While these positions respectively identify different root causes, they all articulate the same ultimate message: in order to overcome these root causes we need to profoundly and radically transform the organization of society and the character of the cultures we live by.

Representing deep ecology, and one of the founders of environmental ethics in the 1970s, Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess made a strong distinction between shallow ecology and a long-range deep ecological movement. The former, he argued, is only concerned about environmental challenges like pollution and resource depletion which threatens the continued existence of a consumerist life-style. As a shallow ecology this position only scrapes the surface, promoting a narrow, egotistic, materialistic self and its realization, which Naess identified as one of the deeply seated root causes of our environmental problems. In order to overcome them, Naess argued, we should strive to realize an expanded, mature self that can identify with ever widening circles of being. His notion of deep ecology entails the strategies of self-identification aimed at expanding the self, so that the self becomes progressively more immersed in society, nature and eventually being itself. Inspired by the Vedantic Hinduism of Mahatma Gandhi, Naess advocated a non-materialistic lifestyle in which humans tread lightly on the earth, living in harmony with other living entities, even with dangerous animals like wolves, snakes and spiders, respecting and promoting the richness and abundance of life, which we have no right to diminish. Naess thus argued for a different notion of self and self-realization that should guide the organization of society and give character to culture.

In the ecofeminism of Karen Warren and Val Plumwood patriarchy is identified as the root cause of our environmental problems. In Warren’s seminal article the “Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism,” patriarchy is characterised by a logic of domination of women which is similar to the logic of humans dominating nature. In both cases a dichotomous-hierarchical thought pattern with binary oppositions of male-female, reason-emotions, culture-nature, humans-animals, etc. is established, in which a hierarchical value is given to the first term which is deemed as superior, while the second as inferior. The logic of domination is completed with the conclusion that anything or anyone with a superior value has the right to dominate and exploit that with the inferior value.

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Against this background, Warren argued that the central agenda of ecological feminism is to unmask the logic of domination wherever it is found in society, not only in the relation between men and women. She suggested an approach in which differences, for instance, between genders, or between culture and nature, are not denied, but rather acknowledged in a manner that does not lead to the establishment of hierarchies and the subsequent domination and exploitation. According to her an accommodative stance with regard to differences acknowledges the relationship and continuity between the different poles of a distinction, as well as the value found across the whole continuum of the distinction (difference). As part of the strategy to confront the logic of domination in society, Warren prioritized the experiences of women, articulated through first person singular narratives, in which she found the truth of what it means to be silenced, marginalized and exploited in society. We also rediscover voices that have been suppressed and silenced by a logic of domination.

In the social ecology of Murray Bookchin hierarchy is also identified as the root cause of our environmental problems. However, he expanded the notion of hierarchy to something much wider than patriarchy, namely psychological dependency in all of its forms throughout society, wherever it is found, for example, in the domination of the populace by a central bureaucracy, rural areas by the city, or the old by the young. Bookchin argued that hierarchical societies through the ages tended to dominate nature as well, while self-determining consciousness and independent agency can serve as antidote to hierarchies. The re-organization of society in small-scale, independent, self-organizing, democratic communes should provide us with the organizational prerequisites to overcome the domination of nature, and thus our environmental problems.

In the bioregional environmental ethics of Kirkpatrick Sale and Peter Berg, unsustainable living, defined by them as living beyond regional means, is identified as the root cause of our environmental problems. The agenda of environmental ethics is to re-discover what it means to live sustainably in a place. This should entail a re-inhabitation and restoration of places that have been damaged by unsustainable living. Thus, Sale and Berg advocate strategies to learn from those indigenous to a place, taking their oral history and local wisdom seriously, to discover how to respect and celebrate the gifts of a place or a region.

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66 Peter Berg, Envisioning Sustainability (Subculture Books, 2009).
Radical environmental ethics in these formats have a wide range of very useful insights to share with society and decision-makers, but the uptake of these transformative ideas and strategies are as slow as that of expanding the moral horizon beyond humans alone. In fact, the transformation of society along the lines suggested above has only taken place here and there in small enclaves. It has not succeeded in transforming the mainstream of the world’s economy, society and culture of consumerism. However, our environmental problems are acute and pertinent, and we cannot wait for a slow transformation of society and culture to take its effects. Furthermore, it seems to be abundantly clear that to address our environmental problems, we also have to be practical and pragmatic and make compromises and trade-offs between the many values we hold. It is thus encouraging to know that environmental ethics has developed a number of practical tools that can be used to address environmental challenges. This brings us to the third main message of environmental ethics.

*Practical Decision-Making Tools and a Multiplicity of Values*

The environmental pragmatism of Bryan Norton\(^67\) arguably provides one of the most articulate and well-developed tool-sets for practical decision-making about environmental challenges in which a wide spectrum of values can be accommodated. Being a pragmatist, Norton emphasizes the importance of learning from experience, taking the context of decisions and values seriously as they function within a particular place at a particular time, and analyzing problems in terms of multiple time and spatial scales. This forms the basis of an adaptive approach to the management of environmental problems in which room is left to reverse decisions if experience shows that they have been wrong. This reversal of our actions, Norton argues, can only be done if certain thresholds for the effects of decisions are defined beforehand in consultation with those affected by these decisions. Monitoring of decisions and the flow of reliable information to all of the stakeholders involved in joint decision-making structures are crucial dimensions of adaptive management.

In one of the many concrete applications of this general approach, Norton\(^68\) discusses a decision-grid based on a typology of risk severities, in which room is made to consider the cost of interventions to address environmental problems, as well as the reversibility or non-reversibility of decisions and acts. For the sake of his illustration, Norton distinguishes five different levels of risk severity. On the one end of the scale he puts

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“varying degrees of real resource costs.” Depending on the abundance or scarcity of the resource, its real cost can vary between high and low, but in this domain, resources can also be substituted with one another, and therefore their non-availability may constitute nothing but a nuisance or inconvenience that can be easily reversed.

The next level of risk severity in Norton’s typology is “severe economic disruption,” the impact of which is moving beyond a mere nuisance, and the cost of which to reverse would typically be very high. The third level in Norton’s list is that of “cultural or political impoverishment,” the impacts of which are even more costly and difficult to reverse, and requiring much more time than an economic crisis to address. The fourth level is “biological impoverishment” where impacts start to show in wider timescales in ecosystems, are extremely difficult to reverse, and therefore very costly to address. The fifth and most severe risk is that of “extinction,” which represents a completely irreversible, cataclysmic event where the possibility of substitution is nil, and the costs of the event is incalculable.

With this typology of risk severities in mind, Norton then constructs a “decision square” or “decision grid” in which the five levels of risks are put on the upper line from right to left. He also inserts high and low costs into the square, with high costs on the top horizontal line, and low costs on the bottom horizontal line. The right-hand vertical line in this square represents reversibility, with the left vertical line representing irreversible decisions, acts or events.

With such a heuristic tool it becomes much easier for decision-makers to know what the risks are that they are dealing with, and what the kind of responses could be that they can contemplate. If an act or an event falls in the right-hand bottom corner of the decision-grid, it falls in the realm of fairly short-term economic decision-making where trade-offs can be made between the costs and benefits of resources, and where resources can be substituted with one another. If an act or event falls within the top left-hand corner of the decision-grid, it falls in the order of approaching what is irreversible, and the costs of which may be incalculable. Before we reach such catastrophic events though, Norton argues, society should define Safe Minimum Standards as thresholds beyond which we should not go. With such thresholds society then makes a clear distinction between what can be traded off in economic terms, and what cannot.

Norton’s decision grid thus helps us to consider a multiplicity of values, instead of reducing all considerations to a narrow economic calculus. With the notion of Safe Minimum Standards Norton also introduces a two-tier approach to decision-making, in which the one tier can trump the other. As Norton sees it, there is the realm of irreversible acts or events

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defined by Safe Minimum Standards that should always trump the realm of economic trade-offs where impacts can fairly easily be reversed, subject to costs.

Figure 1: Norton’s Decision Grid.\textsuperscript{70}

**Implications of Environmental Ethics for Hydraulic Fracturing in the Karoo**

Having considered in outline three main messages of environmental ethics, it now becomes possible to explore the implications that these messages may have to address and perhaps even overcome the quandaries and stand-offs emerging from debates about hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo. In particular and in the first place, I will pose the question whether an expansion of our moral horizon can help in this regard. In the second place, my question is whether radical, transformative approaches to environmental ethics can help us to overcome the stalemate in the debate about the issue in the Karoo. In the third place, I will ask whether pragmatic decision-making tools such as those offered by Bryan Norton can help us.

**Our Moral Horizon and Hydraulic Fracturing**

One of the strong implications from the first message of environmental ethics listed above is that moral respect for animals, or other non-human living entities like plants, rivers, land, ecosystems, communities of life, evolutionary processes and earth systems etc. are extremely important in any decision-making about economic development in the Karoo. The central message from this vantage point is that such respect should guide us not to disrupt, damage or destroy any elements of the

\textsuperscript{70} Adapted from Norton, *Searching for Sustainability*, 172.
environment and the biosphere, but rather to build our lives and livelihoods on a sound, wise, sustainable and long-term interaction with them.

Although this message may not be a first priority in the minds of decision-makers in the oil business and the government when they think about the prospects of hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo, it represents a baseline which, if ignored, will negatively affect the whole of the community of life, human and non-human. The extreme formulation of this message argues that nature should be conserved while people starve, but a more moderate and defensible version rightly points to the fact that we cannot reasonably embark on enterprises that provide society with short-term gains while creating long-term problems which can undermine or even destroy the ecological basis of a society’s livelihoods.

Evidence coming from other places in the world where hydraulic fracturing has been used for some time in order to harvest shale gas, clearly shows that the oil and gas industry has not succeeded to demonstrate that hydraulic fracturing only creates minor inconveniences that can easily be reversed. On the contrary, problems of water and air pollution caused by hydraulic fracturing are severe and long-term, disrupting the livelihoods of people, livestock and wildlife alike, and they are difficult and costly to control.

Before any decision can be made to proceed with hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo, we have to know its short and long-term risks in ecological and biodiversity terms, and how these risks could be addressed, i.e., avoided or mitigated. In lieu of such knowledge and assurances, it will be unreasonable and indefensible to give the go-ahead for hydraulic fracturing to proceed. It is encouraging to note that quite a number of studies have already been done to provide the South African public and the government with this kind of knowledge. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the South African government will take these studies seri-

\[71\] The most prominent of these studies is arguably the CSIR’s Strategic Environmental Assessment. It was done for the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) of South Africa under the title: Shale Gas Development in the Central Karoo: A Scientific Assessment of the Opportunities and Risks. Also of note in this regard is the report of the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) on South Africa’s Technical Readiness to Support the Shale Gas Industry (2016). The ASSAf Report was extensively discussed at a conference held on August 31-September 1, 2017, “The Shale Gas Industry in South Africa: Towards a Science Action Plan.” The Proceedings of this Conference is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/assaf.2017/0019. The third prominent study is the comprehensive book, covering various academic fields, including the humanities and social sciences, see Jan Glazewski and Surina Esterhuyse, eds., Hydraulic Fracturing in the Karoo: Critical Legal and Environmental Perspectives (Claremont, CA: Juta, 2016).
In order to inform rational decision-making on the issue under discussion, i.e., following a cautionary, information-based approach, there is more to be considered than only the actual risks of hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo. We also need to focus on deeper questions of principle, to which we now turn.

Radical, Transformative Questions and Hydraulic Fracturing

Environmental ethics furthermore helps us to delve beneath the surface and ask questions about the deeper lying causes of our environmental problems, and to argue that these causes can only be overcome by a fundamental transformation of society. As such, it is radical, because it tries to find and overcome the root causes of problems.

Taken together, the four radical positions in environmental ethics discussed above challenge the general framework of a society dependent upon fossil fuels to provide its energy needs. From the point of view of deep ecology, hydraulic fracturing could be construed as nothing but a temporary life-line for a consumerist lifestyle, extending the life-span of this life-style for a few more decades as gas deposits last. For deep ecology, this will amount to a cynical exploitation of an area that has certain characteristics (wide expanses of land with a history that goes back to Jurassic times), that can inspire us to think wider and further than short-term commercial exploitation, and to form more mature selves who are not only dependent upon material goods for self-realization.

From the point of view of eco-feminism, the central question is whether hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo is merely an extension of the logic of domination currently permeating Western society, or a move of society to challenge that logic in its many forms. Given the fact that hydraulic fracturing is part and parcel of the dominant, conventional economic model implemented in every other part of the world, and that it has been conceptualized and proposed as a possibility for the Karoo from the highest levels of industry and government in South Africa, it seems un-

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73 See the prominence given to shale gas exploration and development in the *National Development Plan* (2012) of South Africa, in particular the Executive Summary, 55-56, https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf. See also how the draft *Green Transport Strategy* (2017, 47) of South Africa refers to the discovery of shale gas in the Karoo as part of an enabling environment for a potential green transport sector in the country, as if the exploitation of shale gas is a forgone conclusion,
likely to conceive of hydraulic fracturing as a radical, transformative strategy emerging from the hearts and voices of the poor and the marginalized, or that it is designed to address their plight. Ecofeminism also asks the question whether the introduction of hydraulic fracturing will change existing power relations in the Karoo, and in South Africa at large for that matter, or rather contribute to its consolidation and perpetuation.

Social ecology asks a similar question: what would the point be of hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo if it only provides energy to be used elsewhere, outside of the Karoo, in a hierarchically structured economy, in order to support unsustainable lifestyles in cities, without changing the plight of poor, unskilled people, but rather putting the livelihoods they have at risk? Will hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo really help to create independence and autonomous self-realization for the people there, or for South Africans in general, if the jobs created will be of a temporary nature (25 to 30 years at the most, given the expected life-span of the shale gas deposit), and then only for those at the top end of the economic and skills ladder? The question is, similar to the one posed by ecofeminism, whether the introduction of hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo will really change existing relationships of dependence and domination, or rather contribute to its consolidation and perpetuation.

From a different angle, bioregionalism underscores the questions posed above, by asking why a fairly unspoilt area like the Karoo should be degraded by introducing vast numbers of industrial sites and infrastructure before rehabilitating and re-inhabiting the degraded and damaged city areas of South Africa that have fallen victim to the industrial “development” of previous eras. The Karoo has developed extensive farming with livestock and wildlife which has adapted fairly well over time to very arid conditions. This created an invaluable reservoir of local and indigenous knowledge about farming in arid zones upon which we will have to fall back upon in future if climate change leads to hotter and dryer zones elsewhere in South Africa. Bioregionalism thus argues for the conservation of this knowledge and the Karoo as a bioregion instead of putting it at risk.

These radical, transformative positions confront us with deep questions about the identity and character of the society we live in. What kinds of lives do we live, what makes us so dependent upon energy provided by fossil fuels, and why do we seek so desperately to continue these lives and modes of self-realization that we are driven to find the energy for this in more and more remote and risk-laden places? Are there no alternative forms of energy that we can exploit if we must? Are there not


alternative modes of existence and selves to realize than those we currently have? These questions are not formulated to keep the poor and the marginalized where they are, but rather to guide the broad policy choices we have to make in South Africa. This could be summarized as follows: should we choose a development path that is fossil fuel, resource and technology intensive, or one that creates more jobs for more people on more levels of society in a sustainable, green economy?

Pragmatic Decision-Making Tools of Environmental Ethics and Hydraulic Fracturing

The crux of pragmatic decision-making in any policy environment or practical context is to have (a) access to relevant information in order to enable decision-makers to learn from experience, and (b) guidelines, standards or thresholds defined beforehand so as to know when certain crucial mileposts have been reached, and to which extent adaptations should be made accordingly to the initial decisions. As we have seen above in the discussion of Norton’s environmental pragmatism, this knowledge and thresholds should be determined within the context in which decisions will be implemented, and in dialogue and negotiation with those affected. In such a process, Norton proposes multiple values and time scales should be taken into account, as well as any gaps that may exist in the knowledge base for decision-making.

It was therefore encouraging to read that the 2012 report of the Department of Mineral Resources of South Africa was sceptical about the facts and figures produced by the proponents and opponents of hydraulic fracturing in the popular press and public campaigns. It was also encouraging to read that this report openly acknowledged the lack of knowledge about hydraulic fracturing at depth in the South African context, and required extensive further studies before any firm recommendations about hydraulic fracturing can be made.

However, it is somewhat worrying that at the time of finalizing this chapter (June 2021) the Department of Mineral Resources of South Africa, after all the debates and studies over the last decade, still seems to be committed to shale gas exploitation, while at the same time seems to be uncertain about the details around hydraulic fracturing. On the one hand it states on its website that “South Africa has an estimate of 390 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of technically recoverable natural gas that can be extracted

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from Shale…,” but, on the other hand, expresses uncertainty about the “geological questions” of the “amount of economically recoverable gas trapped in the Karoo formations” and the “geo-environmental problems linked to the nature and the structure…of the rock, the ground water migration and the micro-seismicity.”

Calling for further studies in this regard (at least on this website) is an indication that the South African government is forging ahead with the prospect of extracting shale gas, in spite of the many gaps it concedes to have in its knowledge about hydraulic fracturing, its safety and its economic viability.

Furthermore, the 2012 report of the Department of Mineral Resources of South Africa did not seem to have questioned or problematized the framework of decision-making within which it operated, but rather went along all too easily with the dominant societal framework of utilitarian decision-making about hydraulic fracturing which has proven to be problematic in many other places in the world. As far as I can see, this position has not changed since then. The crux of the problem in this regard is that utilitarian decision-making is reductionist in nature, that is, only one kind of value is considered—utility (understood as economic growth), while other kinds of values are typically neglected or ignored. A wider framework of decision-making that takes into account Safe Minimum Standards and a multiplicity of values is still outstanding and need to be developed and formally recognized by the South African government before decisions can be made about hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo.

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78 At the time of finalizing this chapter (June 2021) the South African government has not yet finalized a new set of regulations to govern exploration for and production of shale gas by way of deep drilling and hydraulic fracturing. The draft regulations for hydraulic fracturing introduced in May 2021 are still under review, and regarded by legal experts as fatally flawed. A Draft Gas Amendment Bill (2020) was introduced in November 2020 for consideration by the South African government. It makes provision for the regulation of land fill gas, shale gas and coal-bed methane, amongst other conventional gasses such as liquid natural gas and compressed natural gas. The main focus of the Bill is on the storage and transportation of gas, and does not address exploration for or production of shale gas by way of deep drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Until specific regulations are introduced, the environmental impacts of shale gas, if ever explored or produced, are to be assessed in terms of the South African National Environmental Management Act of 2009. In this regard see the entry of Global Legal Insight (GLI) on Energy 2019: South Africa, and Energy 2021: South Africa, accessed May 13, 2019 and June 28, 2021 https://www.globalegalinsights.com/practice-areas/energy-laws-and-regulations/south-africa. See the DMR, “What is Shale Gas,” https://www.dmr.gov.za/mineral-policy-promotion/shale-gas. See also Footnote 16.
Strategic Environmental Assessment (2016) of the CSIR of South Africa, the 2016 ASSAf report on South Africa’s Technical Readiness to Support the Shale Gas Industry, and Glazewski and Esterhuyse’s 2016 book on legal and environmental perspectives on hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo are welcome contributions in this regard.

Conclusion

The central question of this chapter was whether environmental ethics has the promise and the power to make a difference to the stand-offs and stalemates in the debate about the question whether hydraulic fracturing should be allowed in the Karoo to harvest shale gas. Having sketched the main contours of the controversy, and having considered three main messages of environmental ethics, we have learnt that environmental ethics has much to offer on a theoretical level to pose certain pertinent questions to be addressed in the debate.

Besides introducing certain questions which may not have been obvious from the outset, environmental ethics also underlines certain guidelines that should be taken into account in any decision-making about hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo. These guidelines include the following:

1. We should not disrupt, damage or destroy ecosystemic processes and earth systems that sustain life on earth, including lives and livelihoods of humans.
2. We should acknowledge that the main causes of our environmental predicaments lie in the organization of society, including our economic systems; thus we should address this organization if we wish to overcome our environmental challenges.
3. In practical contexts we should define on a participative and contextualized basis Safe Minimum Standards for our actions that are non-negotiable; and we should design reliable information systems which can help to caution us when we start to approach these Safe Minimum Standards, while taking into account a multiplicity of values.

Although environmental ethics has not given a specific answer pro or contra implementing hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo, which can only be done in a wider societal debate between all stakeholders involved, it does have the power and the promise to provide strong guidelines in this debate, which should be taken seriously particularly by the government, policy-makers, scientists and the broad public alike. As such, these guidelines may be used elsewhere in Africa in debates about the development of its abundant and wide variety of natural resources and their utilization.

79 Glazewski and Esterhuyse, Hydraulic Fracturing in the Karoo.
the world over in which similar issues and questions as discussed above can and do emerge.\textsuperscript{80}

**References**


\textsuperscript{80}A case in point is efforts by the South African government and prospective role-players in the shale gas industry to shift exploration for shale gas from the Karoo to other areas in South Africa, for example the eastern parts of the Free State Province and Kwa Zulu Natal Province (personal communication). Another example is the development of geo-thermal energy in the Rift Valley of Kenya where issues of resource extraction and displacement of indigenous people arise.


Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, Bloemfontein. Minister of Mineral Resources vs Stern and others (Case no. 1369/2017), and Treasure the Karoo Action Group and another vs Department of Mineral Resources and others (Case no. 790/2018), July 4, 2019.


The Challenge of Ubuntu Ethics and Humane Business Management in the Global Capitalist Context

Gail M. Presbey

Introduction

The philosophy of Ubuntu or humanness has garnered much attention lately, with many philosophers having written on the topic in the last 25 years. Mogobe Ramose, the lead author of our volume, was one of the first to offer an in-depth, book length philosophical analysis of this concept. Ubuntu, or humanness, has been theorized as a uniquely African contribution to the world. At the same time, others insist that it is a universal ethical principle. There are pros and cons to emphasizing its uniqueness or its universal sources as well as applicability. The writing on ubuntu is now vast and it would be hard to summarize it all in one paper.

This paper particularly wants to look at a sub-theme of ubuntu studies, regarding how some of the authors and researchers have wanted to apply it to business, even suggesting that ubuntu can provide a model for ethical management principles that can also result in better outcomes for businesses. To approach business with an ethical emphasis is clearly better than casting ethics aside in pursuit of profit without concern for human flourishing. As Marx explained, capitalism itself has a tendency to indulge in “commodity fetishism” where the economic perspective can forget that the purpose of economic activity is to aid in human thriving, focusing on and measuring success in numbers of products and amounts of profit. But, can ubuntu management principles be used in a global capitalist framework, to soften the hard edges of cutthroat capitalism? Or does the ubuntu management approach without capitalist critique fall short of reaching the goal and practice of humanness? Additionally, perhaps the fault of current practices is not only due to the capitalist global economy, but also, an historical and a current global anti-black racism as well as sexism, which continues to skew the numbers of managers to greatly over-represent white males. This is due to historical privileging of men and the white race.

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The paper will first convey briefly the concept of ubuntu, with special attention to how it functions as a social concept with implications for economics. I will argue that ubuntu’s closest current model would be cases of workers’ self-management, or what is now called the “solidarity economy,” for example. Then the paper turns its attention to the concept of management, and whether to promote a normative concept of business management. I will argue that current management ethics needs to take stock of its historical relation to forced labor (slavery and indentured labor, and feudal peasant labor), and capitalist management’s dedication to owners’ profits over the flourishing of its employees is a constant ethical problem.

The paper then takes stock of two current problems in South Africa, that is, racial disparities of those holding management positions, and also the racial disparities in income and wealth. Can ubuntu management help with these problems? Advocates of ubuntu management think that it can. I then describe what many authors have called African cultural expressions of work and management, including contemporary authors who promote “ubuntu management” like Lovemore Mbigi and Symphorien Ntibagirirwa. These two authors advocate encouraging the solidarity and cooperation that was originally the motivation for work projects in the extended family be applied to private business, corporate, and/or state-run organizations, where, I note with concern, there may be no assurances that all participants’ needs will be met or the profits shared among members. The application of these methods for encouraging solidarity and cooperation are then called ubuntu management. While based in Africa, many researchers (like Sigger, Pollack and Pennink who will be discussed later) express confidence that Southern African-grounded experiences have a universal message for management-worker relationships everywhere. The paper ends with a mix of skepticism and cautious, limited optimism for the concept of ubuntu management, as long as it is used in tandem with respect for workers as decision makers and stakeholders, and possible workers’ self-management.

The Core Concept of Ubuntu

In the past forty years there has been a real blossoming of written works on ubuntu. Starting with the 1980 work, *Hunhuism or Ubuntuism* by the Zimbabwean nationalist Stanlake John William Thompson Samkange (1922-1988), there has been a special interest in tying ubuntu to solving practical dilemmas of daily life in Southern Africa. It was not, from the start, just an academic or ivory tower enterprise.

The concept of ubuntu derives from Southern African languages, found in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. As Fainos Mangena explains,
“among the Shona people of Zimbabwe, the expression munhu munhumuvanhu, which in Ndebele and Zulu languages translates to umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, both of which have the English translation of ‘a person is a person through other persons,’ best explains the idea of African humanism.”

Mogobe Ramose would disagree that ubuntu could be considered an “ism” of any sort, and he emphasizes instead that ubuntu be understood as “humaneness” rather than humanism.

Mangena explained that the core idea behind hunhu or ubuntu is that the community’s interests are prioritized over individual interests. This prioritization is accepted by individuals because they deeply experience the feeling of being closely related to everyone in the community, and therefore their wish is that the community would thrive. But, perhaps this is easier to manage in a roughly egalitarian society. Can it work as well within businesses where management pay is several times higher than median worker pay, or where executive pay is hundreds of times higher? On the one hand, workers often want their millionaires to thrive, so that they can have a job and feed their family. “Trickle-down” economics is often internalized by workers since it is a hegemonic discourse. But, workers can also resist and become unproductive if they think they are being exploited while other group members benefit. In this context, a smart manager with a narrow idea of his/her role will try to gain workers’ trust and loyalty to increase productivity, to the benefit of workers (but with a greater benefit to owners). But according to Ramose, the ubuntu way to peace and harmony is through justice (not any halfway measures).

Ramose further describes ubuntu philosophy as advocating the central importance of acknowledging the humanness in all others that one encounters – an attitude that would show itself in respectful and polite attitudes displayed in our human relations. Sharing is a central practice. From an ubuntu perspective, saving human life is always more important than financial gain. To enjoy the status of being considered being fully human one must share. A key expression of sharing is to have progeny.

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4 Mangena, “Hunhu/Ubuntu in the Traditional Thought of Southern Africa.”
6 Ramose, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, 64.
7 Ibid., 138, 154.
8 Ibid., 142-43, 167, 195.
and to support unemployed members of the family.\(^9\) The person is considered connected by family bonds not only to other persons but also to one’s ancestors and all of nature.\(^10\)

Hearing this description of ubuntu, let me contrast the picture drawn above to the scenario in businesses contemplating the possibility of ubuntu business management styles. Businesses often have a limited commitment to their employees (for example, they are not required to cover basic needs, as long as laws governing minimum wage and providing health care are followed). Businesses have commitments to the larger public through required taxes (possibly at a lower rate than other taxpayers if they can manage it through loopholes, etc.) and unemployment and family leave benefits, according to local law (both of which reach primarily citizens). They also engage in optional acts of charity (which may be motivated in part by the pursuit of good publicity). And so, while businesses may be larger than extended families and thereby have a larger scope of responsibilities, their responsibilities are in other ways narrower than ubuntu humane responsibilities for future generations, the youth, unemployed, retired and disabled family members, etc.

In a later article, Ramose explained that in the contemporary global world, money has become an end in itself. In our contemporary world, people are killed or left to die because of overarching concern for money, resulting in lack of care for the needs and dignity of people. Let me add, of course, that evidence of this callous disregard for life in pursuit of profit was clearly evident during the 17\(^{th}\)-19\(^{th}\) centuries, times of slavery and indenture, and continues to be true today, especially in places where labor is not allowed to organize to defend their rights. A look at the extent to which slaves died during the middle passage and within the first year of enslavement shows that enslavers considered high death to be the cost of business – a cost they bore monetarily in their ledgers but not emotionally.\(^11\) Likewise, the high rate of fatality of Native Americans forced to labor in the Andean silver mines shows a similar callous disregard.\(^12\) To jump forward to our current times, while there is not legal slavery to the extent of these previous centuries, forced labor and trafficking continues. Also, companies who knowingly cause foreseeable death through their pollution, as well as those who withhold lifesaving medicines due to their unwillingness to share patents, could be said to be valuing profits over

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\(^9\) Ibid., 150.

\(^10\) Ibid., 88-89, 154-55.


human life. Ramose’s point, as I understand it, is to argue that such businesses and the legal and political networks that make them possible are not examples of humaneness. I further add, to organize individuals to respond to calls of solidarity and cooperation to reach task-oriented goals of production in a larger context that is callous to human life would not be a case of ubuntu.

Ramose himself pointed out a key example of capitalism’s willing-ness to kill for profits, which is the nuclear arms race, which was (and still is) fought in large part to promote capitalism and fight against communism. He notes that those who think that capitalism is the only or best way are willing to threaten nuclear omnicide and destroy all life in order to defend capitalism from alternatives. A world order that threatens all life is not consistent with an ubuntu ethic.

Perhaps some scholars would think it is unfair of me to equate current capitalism, or the activity of corporations, to slavery and other activities that cause the death of workers. For example, Andrew West notes that current corporations, even those following Milton Friedman’s advice of embracing the goal of “making as much money as possible” for shareholders, nevertheless must follow society’s rules and respect ethical customs. West therefore thinks that the attempted contrast between African ubuntu economics and the capitalism of the North is not as extreme as ubuntu proponents like to portray, since corporations have moral constraints on their actions. But I would like to insist that the concept of ubuntu is radically different than placing minor constraints on self-interested actions. The ubuntu proponents like Ramose and others are describing an ethic that changes our conception of self and community, having closer and deeper connections to an extended family or social group, such that we care about these others, and the well-being of others is a key motivation for our actions. My point of showing how contemporary concepts of management grow out of slavery, indenture, and other exploitative contexts is to show that this extractive goal (get as much as possible out of

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the laborer, within limits, through using the skills and techniques of management) is different than the goal of common flourishing.

Ramoso points out that poverty is not natural, and it should not be considered normal. Poverty is the result of power relations; it is historical and systematic. Indeed, as J. A. I. Bewaji points out, Ramoso’s book begins with the assertion that Africans’ right to life and subsistence is endangered by the refusal to restore what has been taken by conquest. These points are well made. Most applications of ubuntu ethics to management theory leave the problem of ill-gotten past gains unexplored, without discussion of restitution for past dispossession. Also, contemporary businesses consider it the role of government or charity to ensure that poverty is eradicated. Their business goal is a narrower one, to ensure profitability of their company. But can these important issues be sidelined, relegated to other parties and entities, while ubuntu is practiced in a smaller, more insular context, ignoring these larger issues? It seems to me that ubuntu would have to transform all of society. If a business is going to set for itself a goal of just practicing ubuntu within itself, it should at least promote to the best of its ability the changes necessary in the larger context (that is, the political and economic systems as well as the philosophy and values of the society and globe) as well.

A Definition of Management?

As David Montgomery notes in his historical work studying the beginnings of “scientific management” put forward by Frederick Winslow Taylor, managers do not possess enough knowledge and ability to accomplish the work project, hence their dependence on workers. Managers, according to Taylor, have as their goal “inducing each workman to use his best endeavors, his hardest work, all his traditional knowledge, his skill, his ingenuity, and his goodwill, in a word, his ‘initiative,’ so as to yield the largest possible return to his employer.” The worker is goaded or forced to do this through systematic supervision, measurement by clear standards, and incentivized payment. Taylor called it an “enforced cooperation” under the direction of the manager. One sees straight away how the manager is in a social situation and related to persons as a community, while at the same time singling out individuals and their effort whenever it can help raise profits. Montgomery’s book gives the example of Joseph

and Feis Company, which could not figure out why the women in its employment would not work harder for incentivized pay. They found out that when women worked, they turned their entire salaries over to their families. The management researched the home life of their employees, and decided for each family what amount would satisfy the family’s welfare needs. They then arranged to send that agreed amount from the women’s paychecks to their families, while allowing each woman employee to keep anything in addition. Only then did production go up in relation to incentive pay. The example shows how complex relationships are between individuals and community. The women are shown to have a concern for their family’s wellbeing. Only when the family is adequately cared for do they want anything for themselves. At the same time management depends so much on payment incentives for work response that they are helpless when a person does not respond to such incentives.

While that above example comes from the US, it would be easy to find examples from South African history where Africans were at first reluctant to work for money of any kind. They preferred to focus on their family’s subsistence through livestock and farming. Outsiders who wanted labor either had to force that labor, through slavery or poll tax, or through destruction of existing forms of economic self-sufficiency, or induce that labor through the introduction of new goods that did not exist before.

The question is, is the level of control that a manager has, and the particular agenda that guides them (profits for the employer) something that can be condoned by an ethical system?

Lutz puts forward a normative or honorific definition of management. According to him, it is an error to think that the manager’s job is to maximize the wealth of the owner. Instead he insists that there should be ethical limits on owner wealth-maximization. This only results in the manager maximizing the wealth of the owner as long as one adheres to

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20 Ibid., 39.
moral guidelines. Lutz also rejects individualism and argues, in his normative definition, that the manager’s goal is the flourishing of the whole business community, or even more broadly, to promote the global common good.\(^{22}\) In the ideal, the individual does not sacrifice his or her own wellbeing for the collective, but rather pursues his or her own good by engaging in actions that will benefit the whole community.\(^{23}\) Lutz agrees with Metz’s description of ubuntu ethics as: “An action is right just insofar as it produces harmony and reduces discord; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to develop community.”\(^{24}\) According to Lutz, modern Western philosophy has ignored relationality as central to ethics. However, Lutz asserts that ancient Western ethics paid attention to this important aspect of ethics. For example, Aristotle philosophized about friendship, and said, the friend is another self. Aristotle also explained that seeming self-sacrifice for a group (such as a nation) is understood not by reward in the afterlife, but by distinguishing between lower order and higher order goods. From Lutz’s perspective, a person might decide to sacrifice material goods for other sorts of goods. (By itself without further explanation, however, Lutz’s account could not explain sacrifice of one’s own life, which is not the same as risking one’s possessions). While Lutz promotes the idea of a humane, ubuntu-like idea of business ethics based on Plato and Aristotle,\(^{25}\) he does not address how these ideals of relationship nevertheless tolerated gender discrimination and slavery prevalent in Athenian democracy and economy.

Lutz also draws upon P. F. Drucker and Charles Rarick to show that there is a Confucian version of business management style, which draws on Confucian humanism, and emphasizes the group and inter-relations more than rugged individuals. As Rarick explains, “Leadership under the Confucian tradition emphasizes a holistic concern for the welfare of employees, a concern for harmony in groups, teamwork, and self-sacrifice.”\(^{26}\) Lutz is nevertheless skeptical of contemporary Chinese businesses in Africa, a global development that he calls an attempt at a Chinese global

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23 Ibid., 314.


economic empire. As with earlier imperialism or with economic post-colonialism, a country’s search for cheap raw materials or mass markets for their goods is done to improve the economy of the home country.27

Similar to the way in which Lutz idolizes Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kemi Ogunyemi and other contributing authors included in his book, *African Virtue Ethics Traditions for Business and Management* advocate the spread of African virtue ethics to the entire world. They begin with a summary of Aristotelian virtue ethics, and then they draw parallels between Aristotle and African virtue ethics, noting that both emphasize character formation and gaining wisdom, as well as an emphasis on phronesis, that is, the practical wisdom of living well. They also both emphasize the idea that virtues must be taught and learned. The authors also argue that African communitarianism resonates with Aristotle’s emphasis on humans as political.28 Matolino’s chapter in the book insists that ubuntu’s emphasis on economic interdependence of those of different classes fosters mutual respect of everyone.29 (Again, how would this correlate with Aristotle’s acceptance of slavery?)

A book on Ubuntu management by Johann Broodryk advocates ubuntu practices by managers and firms in South Africa. Even if those managers are white, they can and should learn and internalize the values of ubuntu, and begin to treat their workers humanely. Doing so will also increase production, Broodryk predicts. His approach, while drawing upon longstanding African concepts and practices, incorporates recent management approaches that advocate teamwork, two-way communication, “carrot” rather than “stick” motivational practices, and tolerance for understandable worker imperfection or tardiness. He contrasts the ubuntu approach with what he calls “Western” practices of management that emphasized hierarchy, the barking of orders, misunderstanding and distrust between workers and management, and punitive practices that supposedly scare workers into higher production. Workers are asked to submit regular reports, and have their performance measured by unexpected inspections, so that the workers would live in fear of disciplinary action. Broodryk argues that management by fear does not work. Better to gain the trust of workers by being transparent, and developing teamwork. Of course non-performance still has to be measured and dealt with, but in a manner that

Gail M. Presbey understands that beginning workers are bound to make mistakes. Such an approach will lead to worker improvement.\textsuperscript{30}

Above all, the ubuntu approach, according to Broodryk, emphasizes respect for persons. The old management styles were often counter-productive because they left workers feeling that they had been disrespected and treated like tools or machines. Managers should instead elicit feedback and criticism of the current work set-up. Because of apartheid, and continuing lingering economic disparities, black South African workers often have challenges that elude their better paid white manager fellow workers. Transportation is often unreliable, and long distances must be traversed, making punctuality difficult. Some live in shanty towns where clean water and sewage systems are not plentiful, making it harder to meet certain standards of cleanliness. In the past, managers would show remarkable lack of compassion for hardships such as these. This lack of compassion was experienced by black South Africans as lack of the ubuntu spirit. Managers should realize that their job should instead be to encourage workers’ self-esteem and self-respect.\textsuperscript{31}

Broodryk’s description of ubuntu management informed much of the study conducted by Sigger, Polak and Pennink, completed in 2018.\textsuperscript{32} Broodryk’s descriptions, along with many drawn from Mangaliso’s work on the topic, helped to create the criteria behind their survey’s statements chosen to measure ubuntu management.

According to Piet Naudé, the exploration of Ubuntu ethics is motivated, in part, to find a decolonial source of knowledge. He begins his article noting that the “#FeesMustFall” movement has demanded the teaching of a decolonized education. But the prevalent way of teaching Ethics globalizes concepts and ideas that had well known European authors. “Local” ethics become subsumed under the categories of European ethics. To fight this seeming inevitability of relying on European models, he sees the ubuntu approach to Business Ethics as more promising than a mere transfer of Western ethics to Africa, or an attempt to translate Western ethics to the African context. However he notes that “ubuntu” is not unique to Africa, and its core ideas can be found in many places even if not known by the word “ubuntu.” He goes further to assert that ubuntu


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 100, 142.

philosophy is common in “pre-modern” societies, and cites a copious literature to show that ubuntu-like ethical views have been found in ancient Egypt, early rabbinical societies, sixth century BCE Greece, and the early Christian communities described in the New Testament. And he finds frustrating and unhelpful how some authors contrast Western individualism with African relationality, noting that African traditions also respect individuals, and many Western philosophies appreciate and value relationality. He finds “intersubjective recognition” treated as a serious topic in Western philosophers such as Fichte, Hegel, and Nietzsche.

Likewise, Pérezts, Russon and Painter explain that a host of European tradition philosophers have focused on how relationality plays a major role in our sense of selfhood. They name Deleuze, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur as examples. They nevertheless “believe that African traditions have a much longer tradition of acknowledging relationality and embodied subjectivity that shirks subject-object dualism.”

While Piet Naudé is glad to see philosophical ideas being translated into terminology that Business people can understand and then implement, he is nevertheless concerned that some of the popular ubuntu literature is just a marketing ploy, to give some sound business advice an African flair. He points to the books by Broodryk (2005), Mbigi and Msila (2016). He refers readers to McDonald’s (2010) critique of the marketization of Ubuntu.

Naudé thinks that ubuntu cannot escape coloniality, since “The post-colonial thinker is forever bound to the colony,” for example, the proponent of ubuntu is basically forced to emphasize ubuntu’s difference from Western philosophy in order to justify its importance. He notes that Ramose talks about Ubuntu’s epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics, when these are Western categories. Ramose even gets his definition of ethics from a Catholic encyclopedia.

There may be better philosophical parallels with ubuntu management philosophy in Western philosophy than Aristotle. For example, a key inspiration for the Western version of cooperative management is the American philosopher, Mary Parker Follett. She was a proponent of community centers and labor associations, and saw them as locations of effective democratic processes. Follett was schooled in philosophy and other liberal

34 Ibid., 32-43.
37 Ibid., 34.
arts at Thayer Academy (1884), Harvard, and Newnham College. Follett was influenced by Josiah Royce’s book, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, and she said that the nurturing of group loyalty will help individuals feel to be part of something bigger than themselves.\(^{38}\) She thought that community centers and labor organizations could counter-balance the feelings of isolation people felt in the factories and offices of capitalism, and offer people a place to initiate their own group projects. She advocated “power-with” and eschewed the models of “power over” others. She imagined that this feeling of “we” could extend to both management and labor, as they realize together that they have shared goals that can be reached without the use of domination. Her philosophy of person stated that individuals are both wholes and parts, and that we could widen the scope of our field of experience while maintaining our identity. Persons “interweave” themselves with their changing environments, allowing the expression of creative integration. She promoted her ideas to the business community during the last eight years of her life. She passed away in 1933. Erin McKenna and Scott Pratt note that Follett has been mostly ignored by other philosophers, but her works went on to inspire a segment of the management theory authors, as well as community activists like Saul Alinsky.\(^{39}\) While scholars like Judy Whipps note that Follett herself did not address race or racism in her works, others like Matthew J. Brown argue that her philosophical approach could possibly challenge the racism and societal division that the US has experienced during the recent Trump presidency.\(^{40}\) I mention her just to note that not all of Euro-American management theory upholds the “scientific management” model of Taylor.

There are also contemporary authors who insist that management skills and ethics have to be thoroughly rethought, and taught anew. Andrew Hoffman argues that the role of manager should be to ensure the long term health of the company, not profits in the short run. With this merely expanded utilitarian sense of the manager’s calling, he insists that managers should realize their need to promote environmental sustainability, diversity of the workforce, and ethical responsibility, not just the short term “bottom line.” He insists there is a need for a management “Hippocratic oath” of doing no harm to persons or the environment, and he wants


managers to consider themselves servant leaders who can help capitalism transition to practices of environmental sustainability. I am not suggesting that Hoffman is advocating ubuntu philosophy. While these are good ideas, there is the question of whether managers, from their middle position between workers and owners, can make this kind of change in direction by themselves, without a larger social movement changing our current capitalist culture as well as economic and legal systems. At least he takes the altruism of the utilitarian moral theory (that is, caring for the “greatest number” rather than the self) seriously, as Bentham intended.\footnote{Andrew J. Hoffman, \textit{Management as a Calling: Leading Business, Serving Society} (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2021).}

**Recent labor-Management Relations and Income Inequality in South Africa**

While South Africa has the advantage of being rich in resources and infrastructure, the legacy of racial segregation and apartheid and forced labor continues psychologically and structurally in the management of many enterprises. There is a growing black middle class; but a large working class, as well as the underemployed and unemployed, have not yet shared in the country’s wealth. Managers argue that if workers want to be paid more, productivity must rise. But the fast pace of production, as well as the larger worldview of capitalist enterprise, jars with the pre-colonial African value system, and the mistrust engendered during years of forced and underpaid wage labor makes many workers reluctant to work harder for others who will reap the benefits.

Such a predicament is not unique to South Africa. Development analysts have been studying the cultural clashes between African values and business settings based on Western models, in an attempt to find a way to communicate between the two paradigms. And South African scholars and businesspeople have been searching for business management ideas that are not foreign but arise from the traditions of black South Africans.

During the apartheid regime, black South Africans were not given access to managerial positions. Adele Thomas and Mike Bendixen share the results of several studies with their readers. Statistics in 1994 estimated black Africans occupied 2.5 percent of management positions, with Asians at 2.14 percent, and Colored professionals at 2.02 percent. The vast majority of managers were white. A 1993 study summarized the relationship between managers and workers as perceiving each other and acting towards each other as enemies. Although apartheid came to an end in 1996, change was slow. A University of Cape Town study in 1998 found 87 percent of private sector management positions were held by whites. In 1998 the Johannesburg Stock Exchange had a ten percent rate of market
capitalization by black-owned businesses, while white English-speaking conglomerates controlled most of the economy.42

Looking at current statistics, we see some change, but not as much as one would expect after 25 years of a free South Africa that had abolished apartheid. The BBC reported in 2019 (based on a study by the Commission for Employment Equity) that “Although black South Africans make up nearly 80% of the economically active population, they hold just 14% of top management jobs.”43 Just over two thirds of top management positions were held by whites. Asian South Africans, making up about two percent of the population, held 9 percent of the management positions. However, while white managers predominated in the private sector, about 70 percent of top government managers were black.

The study goes on to find that 77 percent of management positions are held by men. Senior management (a step down from top management) was still 56 percent white, despite their being 9 percent of the work-active population. (However, there was progress in the third “mid-management” category, with over half being Asian or black South Africans).44 Mildred Oliphant, South Africa’s labor minister, said that the study showed that a white male management culture prevailed in South Africa up to today. Additionally, the National Empowerment Fund studied the Johannesburg Stock Exchange to find that only three percent of the country’s biggest businesses were controlled by black South Africans.45

Ronel Erwee, referencing statistics from the mid-1980s, noted that South Africa had an executive to lower level worker ratio of 1:52, while most developed countries had 1:15 ratios. During the 1980s, government funds and subsidies were invested in training more potential managers of all races, but little actual managerial talent emerged from these subsidized training sessions. Erwee notes that white South Africans blamed black South Africans for their inability to secure employment as managers. They did not take into account factors such as discrimination in hiring.


44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.
lack of encouragement, or inadequate career guidance. Erwee also faults the strategy of overlooking the talents of both highly trained white and black women to seek new managers among black men. She also states that in the 1980s there was little “productivity consciousness,” by which she means awareness of the economic necessity to increase output.46

Some papers given at a World Bank conference seem to continue the theme that Africans would be better off if they dropped some of their cultural traits in favor of Western conformity. For example, Etounga-Manguelle takes an inventory of attitude problems exhibited by some laborers on the job, including categories such as “Fatalism,” “Unwillingness to Hustle,” and “Excessive Conviviality and Avoidance of any Open Conflict.” He also contributes cures to each of these ills. Absenteeism can be stemmed with penalties and internal regulations. Peer pressure, along with the message that “time is money” may help workers complete projects in a given time frame. Problems such as little curiosity and little desire to excel, coupled with aversion to risk and a feeling of persecution and being constantly watched, can be addressed by a new approach by management which emphasizes encouraging workers to speak their mind, and reviews of job evaluation criteria. The large management-personnel gulf can be bridged by creating a quality circle system.47 I have some criticisms of the study. The chart seems written from a management perspective which has not seen the employees in a more complete context, but rather evaluates them only insofar as they meet a pre-ordained standard of productivity. To take an inventory of “attitude problems” (which seem steeped in stereotypes) without the context provided encourages fault-finding with workers and deflects attention from workplace problems.

Etounga-Manguelle’s approach seems a continuation of an earlier approach described by Inkles in his book *Becoming Modern*, written in 1974, which suggested that despite cultural differences, factories can impose their own institutional culture on workers, overriding their traditional cultural mindset. Bryant notes, “Using empirical research, Inkles documents the speed with which traditional workers eschew traditional values once they are socialized into factory work with its own norms.”48 How is

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this any different than the co-optation during colonialism which rewarded individual Africans who conformed to the new, foreign standards of the colonizers? Yet Bryant cautions that it is important for managers to understand how motivation, incentives, delegation, communication, organization, and coordination are understood in the culture of the workers, in order to effectively manage them. But in this context, one is unsure if the increased knowledge of the workers is supposed to benefit both the workers and the managers, or just the managers (who will now be able to control workers’ actions more easily).

Symphorien Ntibagirirwa asserts that some African values and traits are helpful and could lead to increased production in the workplace and growth of the economy on a national level, thus lessening poverty. Those helpful values are solidarity and cooperation. He criticizes neoliberal capitalist presumptions that all human action is based on self-interest. He says that the success of Asian economies shows that people can be motivated by duty, loyalty, and good will. Growth and development can be achieved through community values. An ideal would be for community and individual values to be harmonized. He notes that for Africans, the extended family is the context for solidarity and cooperation. He therefore speculates that paternalism in the company could work to motivate Africans in the workplace. Ultimately, he advocates economic development models that he considers “ubuntu” economics, since they draw on “the synergy of the state, the market and the people.”

South Africa’s work force often had the challenge of possessing little formal education. In 1991, ten percent of white labor, and one percent of black labor had academic degrees. Most South African managers did not rise to their senior positions through educational achievement. Rather, they got their positions due to their seniority, or jobs legally reserved for their race, or due to practices of race prejudice. Black men who became managers had the experience of only being partly accepted by the white world. Forces of social discrimination persisted, and there were pressures to be individualistic, while at the same time they were reminded of their ethnic background. Erwee argued that the attitude of white male managers

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50 Bryant, “Culture, Management, and Institutional Assessment,” 448, 454.


52 Ibid., 308.
impeded the functioning and advancement of managers of other races and women.\textsuperscript{53}

The issue of racial discrimination in the workplace surely needs to be addressed, and a solution found. But, keeping the economic system the same and just ensuring better racial representation among the managerial class will not be enough to eradicate poverty and bring economic justice to South Africa. Income inequality is found the world over, and, a solution that addresses recurring and entrenched income inequality needs to be found.

**African Cultural Differences and the Impact on Management Style**

Segun Gbadegesin in his book on Yoruba philosophy voiced his concern that a renewed attempt at capitalist development would displace African communal social values “which emphasize fellow-feeling, love, humaneness and human welfare” in favor of “industrial values which emphasize productivity and development.” However, since the goal of development is supposed to be “human welfare,” he questions whether an economic program that disregarded African social values could rightly be considered a good thing.\textsuperscript{54} The challenge for Africa’s future is a development project that includes the empowerment and self-sufficiency of the entire community. Capitalist notions of production, while not entirely irrelevant, have to be placed in the larger context of human thriving.

Mamadou Dia thinks that for Africans, high social benefits were attached to their leisure, which was misunderstood by outsiders as “laziness.” Engaging in reciprocal social relationships was a kind of insurance, because, when some individuals succeed, others expect to profit from the trickle-down. So many are willing to “invest” a lot of time in their social and family relationships, rather than in wage labor. What seems like “lavish consumption” to the outsider is in fact connected to needs for security as well as desires for prestige.\textsuperscript{55} Dia notes, however, that such a value system makes saving money and paying debts difficult. But he notes that contracts and promises in traditional contexts were public and ritualized, and he suggests that lending agencies should not shy away from such ritualization, which might help guarantee the loan repayment. He cautions: “Managers should think twice before contemplating doing away with


what Westerners have sometimes seen as incidental and purposeless intrusions of magic or religion. Indeed, the absence of such features would only reduce the value of the parties’ commitments.56

One of the management consultants in South Africa most involved in creating new “rituals” for management to use, is Lovemore Mbigi. His book (with Jenny Maree), *Ubuntu: The Spirit of African Transformation Management* is filled with ideas for African rituals. Mbigi establishes his credentials by explaining that his grandmother, Makawa, was a reincarnation of the spirit Dembetembe, who was the rainmaker for the South African VaHera clan of the Shona people.57 He then tried out his rituals with shop-floor workers.

Mbigi noticed that the spirit of innovation and creativity is weak in South Africa. He suggested reviving this spirit by an appeal to the wandering spirit “Shave.” He suggests that business consultants (like himself) can play this role, because in the tradition, an outsider was needed. For example, a married person should not try to change the behavior of their spouse. Instead, a mediator (such as a maternal uncle or paternal aunt) can hear the unmentioned grievances and dare to say what has not been said. A workplace may be filled with strife or stagnation, and yet until an outsider with the spirit of “Shave” comes along, the problem cannot be addressed.58

Mbigi says many South African workplaces are filled with the spirit of “Ngozi,” the avenging spirit. This spirit is usually good, but when it is wronged, it seeks revenge. Dispossessed workers cannot begin a new, more positive reality if they still harbor bitterness. This situation calls for a cleansing ceremony. To begin the cleansing, Mbigi finds out the fears among black and white South Africans. Blacks fear being a sellout, being sold out, co-option, white manipulation, and victimization. Whites fear black revenge or retribution, affirmative action, black anarchy or poor standards, punitive taxation or redistribution of wealth, and nationalization of industries.59 Both sides have to understand each other.

To shed fears of the past and embrace the new, one needs a ritual. Mbigi notes that most South African ethnic groups will not bury a corpse if it shows a shadow (figuratively speaking). The shadow is symbolic of lingering guilt, fear, bitterness or anger, which will prevent the dead person from entering freely into the spirit world. In such a situation, a “burning platform” will be built, and people will gather to report all the negative actions and feelings associated with the deceased. Likewise, companies

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56 Ibid., 190-91.
58 Ibid., 23.
59 Ibid., 22, 57-59.
have to construct open and collective “burning platforms” where people can discuss the negative issues in public, and then burn the past to let it go, and begin anew.60

Mbigi also wants to get in touch with black workers’ aspirations. When he worked at the Eastern Highland Tea Estates, he noted that the workers, who had gone on strike three times, had a “glorious vision” of prosperity, and “wanted to achieve in 24 hours what other nations had taken centuries to achieve.”61 Workers wanted to end layoffs and “downsizing” while having their wages increase. But the company was in financial trouble, and the Management dismissed the workers’ dreams as impractical. Management only wanted to suppress the worker unrest. Mbigi thought that rather than suppress this “glorious vision,” management should instead engage the vision, and talk about the steps necessary to reach the vision. While management had tried a “rational” strategy, Mbigi insisted the approach had to be emotional, involving a workshop with singing, dancing, playing and humor, since people do not want just “facts” but rather a personal connection. Evening fireside story-telling can convey important management lessons in a context where they can be absorbed.62 After all, Mbigi explains,

In a village there is no such thing as permanent job security. What villages have is permanent worklife security based on continuous skill acquisition from others in the community. If this aspect is brought into the company, it would enable people to adjust to the realities of rightsizing. In a village, people gain recognition and status through contribution. It is high time this aspect is incorporated so that people are paid and given recognition according to contribution…63

Mbigi insists that the “spirit of the hunter” (Shavi Reudzimba) shares the same attributes as the modern entrepreneur. Since there are traditional ceremonies lauding the hunter’s spirit, such rituals can be drawn upon to encourage workers to become enterprising, enduring, and innovative.64

While it is undoubtedly helpful to communicate to workers using familiar mediums such as song, dance, ritual, and storytelling, it could nevertheless seem suspicious that all of these mediums carry what could be seen as a conformist message, where capitalist ideas of productivity go unchallenged. In fact, Mbigi seems to go as far as to claim that at heart

60 Ibid., 54-5.
61 Ibid., 32.
62 Ibid., 32-33, 112.
63 Ibid., 122.
64 Ibid., 30.
there is no contradiction between rural African values and the spirit of capitalist enterprise. Can such a happy coincidence be true?

On the other hand, there is also appreciation for Mbigi’s intriguing use of ritual in the workplace. In his criticism of Ogunyemi’s book, C. Bryan Davis (who describes himself as a Western scholar who spent nearly three decades in Africa) notes that while authors of the collection exploring African virtue ethics in the workplace gave copious examples of Africans using folktales to teach ethics and rituals to impart wisdom, the African authors in the volume did not suggest using the same methods when ubuntu ideas of African management were globalized for use by Western management practitioners. Davis thinks this is an oversight. He notes that some management scholars in the West already focus on the importance of stories (or as they call it, “organized storytelling”) to impart key ethical business ideas.65

**Challenges or Possible Problems with Ubuntu Management Ethics**

Much of Broodryk’s book on ubuntu sounds like an approach to cross-cultural understanding and conflict resolution. Often “Western” lifestyles and attitudes are contrasted to an amorphous “African” traditional approach. Such dualisms were practiced in colonial times, with the “twist” here being that the ubuntu personality is seen in praiseworthy terms as sharing, empathetic, and exhibiting other good traits, while the Westerner is presented as a control freak, selfish, grumpy, stressed out and in danger of having an early heart attack.66 In this way Broodryk’s approach is reminiscent of the negritude movement, thereby sharing in the strengths and shortcomings of a negritude approach. While championing what had been denigrated is certainly progressive and an important way to remove racist judgments, the process reifies ideas of races as holding opposing traits, and this reification (sometimes involving stereotyping) is counter-productive to overcoming racism.

An issue that seems missing from Broodryk’s book are discussions of whether black South Africans feel comfortable with white managers who (perhaps after reading Broodryk’s book) begin to adapt certain African cultural traits in an attempt to reach out to their workers. However, Broodryk does suggest that people at the workplace should gather and debate which cultural differences should be accommodated, rejected or adjusted, suggesting that there is no “one size fits all” answer.67

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66 Broodryk, Ubuntu Management Philosophy, 70-1, 107, 208-10.
67 Ibid., 204-05, 211.
issue missing from the book is the topic of how black South African behavior in the workplace has been shaped by years of apartheid and by racial and ethnic diversity. Broodryk acts as if the main or only influence on worker attitude and practices are the traditional rural values. Would not the situational dynamics be different if workers were from the Cape Colored community, who have a different relationship to African traditions than other workers? Fredrickson argues that it is the Cape Colored community that is the closest parallel to African Americans in the United States context, since both groups have had some of their African cultural heritage disrupted. Broodryk also does not mention Asian workers, or whether there are any specific gender challenges for managers.

Broodryk explains that black South Africans began to have negative ideas of capitalism due to colonial days, when they were reduced to slavery or working for substandard wages. He notes that African traditions practice communalism and sharing rather than the Western individualistic approach. Now, there can be dangers of oversimplifying ethnic and racial groups, and especially in suggesting that black groups share the opposite traits of whites. How much of this is projection, or fantasy? Nevertheless Broodryk is not the only person to suggest that Africans are communal in their practices. They think material abundance should be shared. Broodryk refers to the word “stokvel” to refer to informal cooperative enterprise, and he estimates that there are 800,000 stokvels in South Africa. They do not operate like capitalistic enterprises. Likewise, the goal of a business should be that “profits” generated by the business should be shared with the whole business “family,” including not only or merely stockholders, but workers as well.

There have been some critics of the ubuntu approach to management that are convinced that culture does not play as big a role in the workplace as Mbigi, Broodryk and others suggest. Thomas and Bendixen group several authors together as advocating African Management theories, suggesting there are different management cultures. Their study intends to

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68 Ibid., 116-17.
prove the opposite. Through interviews and surveys, they find that of the current managers in South Africa, there are no big distinctions between persons of different race and gender regarding their cultural profile as charted by Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture, including power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation.  

But perhaps there are ways to account for this seeming uniform culture? Perhaps in the current work climate, only those who adapt to “Western” prevailing models are given and retain the management jobs. Blunt and Jones argue that the education students receive while studying for their MBA degrees would emphasize Western management theories, whether the student was studying in Ecuador, Zimbabwe, or Pakistan. In addition, even Thomas and Bendixen cast a suspicious eye on their own questionnaires. For example, they note that several African philosophers have insisted that Africans have strong collectivist values, but the average management profile of black South Africans is (like other managers) individualistic. But they note that the questions to which people respond could be misleading. For example, if a person responds that the following statement is of high importance to them: “have sufficient time for your personal or family life” – the study will interpret that as a sign of individualism. Yet black South Africans may have a different idea of “family,” which includes extended family and friends, coming close to the social realm rather than the private realm.

Aju and Beddewela argue that “a pervasive expectation that certain institutions (for example, family, government, educational and corporate institutions) are in effect responsible for meeting the communal needs of the people is ingrained within African societies.” They draw their examples from the Igbo and Yoruba of Nigeria, among others, as well as from well-known proponents of ubuntu such as Mbigi, while arguing that these expectations are widely held across Africa. Despite the fact that Africans expect institutions to meet their needs, in Africa in 2016-17 a third of

71 Thomas and Bendixen, “Management Implications.”
73 Ibid.
74 Thomas and Bendixen, “The Management Implications of Ethnicity in South Africa.”
workers lived in extreme poverty, and almost another third lived in moderate poverty. Clearly workplaces were not meeting this expectation. A breach of employee expectations leads to a cynical interpretation of the organization by the employees, the authors assert.

Dissatisfaction showed itself in the many labor strikes on the continent in recent years, some of which were met by lethal violence by the State, such as the killing of 34 mine workers at Marikana, South Africa (with 78 wounded). Aju and Beddewela want to suggest instead the benefit and moral necessity of meeting employee expectations by embracing what they call employee-centered corporate social responsibility.

When it comes to mutual expectations, Aju and Beddewela explain that there are different kinds of contracts. “Transactional contracts are short-term economic exchanges characterised by explicit terms and conditions…” whereas relational contracts involve “an emotional investment nurtured by promises, agreement, trust, respect, and loyalty.” They note that the existing literature shows that violations of transactional contracts lead workers to experience less job satisfaction and to exhibit less loyalty to the workplace. But if the relational contract is strong, the authors think it will mitigate the possible effect of a breach of the transactional contract. They suggest that such an approach can be helpful both to the South African mining industry as well as the Nigerian oil industry.

The authors also suggest that an African (or Afrocentric in their terminology) workforce would be more motivated to be loyal to an employer if they received health care (and funeral benefits) for their family. Such a concern would override concerns for bonuses or retirement benefits, for example. This is due to ubuntu-based concern for their families. They would also prefer face-to-face education through workplace collaborations.

Why do Nigerian civil servants continue to come in to work for months, even though they have not been paid? Is it merely a calculation that they will be paid in the future, or a fear of losing their jobs? Drawing on Balogun, Aju and Beddewela argue that those workers believe in esan or “cosmic justice” – a concept found in the Odu Ifa, that cosmic reciprocity is in effect, in other words, what goes around, comes around. As Ba-

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77 Aju and Beddewela, “Afrocentric Attitudinal Reciprocity.”
78 Ibid., 767-68.
79 Ibid., 768, 774.
logun explains, “esan is that which a moral agent receives as a consequence of his/her moral deeds.” Drawing on Sophie Oluwole’s account, Aju and Beddewela note that Yoruba moral codes discourage negative reciprocity, saying that such actions will just compound bad experiences. Instead, leave the cosmic punishing to Olodumare (God), and rest assured that the wicked will receive their punishment. The authors further assert that similar counsel is provided by Christianity and Islam, meaning that this philosophy of reciprocity is widely embraced by most, if not all, Africans. This ubuntu spirit of Africans encourages them to not respond to a breach of rights through grievance but through forgiveness.

While one might wonder (as I did), temporarily, that Aju and Beddewela are telling employers that they can violate contracts and still expect good behavior and commitment from their African employees (primarily due to esan/reciprocity, but also perhaps partly due to “their docility, complacency, macro-economic misfortune and a lack of alternative job prospects”), they clarify that such views are not their chosen counsel. Instead, they want employers of Africans to exhibit institutional trust and encouragement towards their employees, rather than surveillance and punitive sanctions. It is a bit disconcerting, however, that while the authors point out the ongoing problems of “poor work environments and inequitable work practices,” they think the negative views and cynicism of the workers can be curtailed by specific social inducements that they will specifically care about, such as health care. Why not demand better pay, and responsive and consultative leadership? Why not encourage industries to heed demands of striking workers, instead of fear their violence and find ways short of institutional transformation to placate them, thereby only putting a bandage on a symptom, instead of going to the root of the problem and finding cures?

Mabogo More has been concerned about the co-opting of the term “ubuntu” by those he calls “apartheid managers.” The concept “ubuntu” means ethical and respectful humanness. While the concept originates in South Africa, More thinks that its popularizer, Desmond Tutu, has subtly changed the meaning of the concept by introducing an overlay of Christian concepts. Tutu describes ubuntu as:

81 Aju and Beddewela, “Afrocentric Attitudinal Reciprocity,” 772.
82 Ibid., 776.
83 Ibid., 776.
84 Ibid., 774.
...humaneness, gentleness, hospitality, putting yourself out on behalf of others, being vulnerable...not nursing grudges, but being willing to accept others as they are and being thankful for them. It excludes grasping, competitiveness, harsh aggressiveness, being concerned for oneself, abrasiveness.86

More is concerned that Tutu’s “ubuntu” encourages the dispossessed South Africans to forgive and forget past abuses under colonialism and apartheid. It also suggests that Westerners should have a corner on the market of the aggressive and competitive qualities, while they keep the aspirations of the working class in check, all so that the ruling class’s privilege can be safeguarded. More notices this same emphasis of “forgive and forget” in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)’s work, which makes demands for reparations difficult.87

The dilemma is that, if black South Africans harbor resentment about the years of their exploitation, they may harm themselves, and prevent the fresh start the country and its businesses need. But, if they let go of resentment and reconcile, then the status quo can continue with only a slap on the wrist, and the redistribution of resources happens slowly or not at all. It should be pointed out, however, that Mbigi’s cleansing ritual, if done properly, is not just an expedient on the way to forgetting the past, but involves a public confession and discussion of all past faults before the stage of forgiveness. Such a confession is supposed to curtail the possibility of returning to the earlier status quo.

Attempted Fixes and Changes, and Lessons to be Drawn

Philip Spies suggested that earlier definitions of development which focus on improving the quantity and quality of life through construction of designs, should be replaced by development with a human focus of enhancing competence. He suggests “development should be defined as a learning and creative process by which a society increases both its ability and desire to serve its members and its environment...”88 Drawing upon the schema of J. Gharajedaghi, Spies notes that the aspirations of individuals should be the subject matter of development. Recognition by society and peers as well as affirmative action are needed as motivational instruments for development strategies.89 Spies’s paper is another example of

87 Ibid., 44-45.
89 Ibid., 8.
development thinkers focusing on the need to tap and foster motivation for positive goals.

Some companies have gone far in affirmative action hires of new managers, changing the racial make-up of the management class. David Gaylin notes that in the 1990s Spoornet, the government-owned railroad, was mandated to hire and train 2,000 Asian and black South African managers. Before the changes most managers, and practically all of the 500 highest managers, were white. It was a challenge to find qualified applicants. Many were recruited from management positions in the former black homelands. Others had worked for foreign companies. Many came with resentments or anger over past injustices under apartheid. After all, the railroad had a history of providing good jobs for whites, and now that had to change. Few of the newly-recruited managers had any experience with railroads. White workers feared that their jobs and status were in jeopardy. However, the new managers were able to be trained and incorporated into the company by building trust through transparency and information sharing. All employees had to commit themselves to supporting the new changes in the company. Despite these difficulties, Gaylin’s report of 1997 on the relative success of the project held out hope that managers in South Africa can be drawn from a wide variety of race and ethnic groups and work together in a spirit of cooperation. However, we see in 2021 that change has been slow. While mid-management has changed in its racial make-up, the upper echelons of management continue to be white and male.

There are formidable problems still facing South Africa today. Shamim Meer notes that many women work as domestics, on farms, or in the informal sector, which are some of the lowest paid jobs where it is harder to organize for job improvement. C.S. van der Waal documented the effect that continued poverty has on domestic violence, when male's low self-image based on the demeaning roles they still play in the labor market come home to assert their kingship in the home. This is just a small sample of the problems that continue to challenge South Africa today.

Books like David Goodman’s Fault Lines: Journeys into the New South Africa and Adrian Guelke’s South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood Miracle sum up the contradictions of contemporary South Africa.

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with an eye towards predicting its future. Reviewer Dalvan Coger summarizes the insights of these books as noting that

There are still white policemen, but the number of blacks on the force has increased. Economically, the white and Indian population still dominate the business world...Most of the unemployed are other than white...Housing has improved little. Those who flee rural poverty probably end up with scraps of cardboard and metal improvising a shelter against the elements in what are instant slums.\footnote{David Goodman, \textit{Fault Lines: Journeys into the New South Africa} (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999); Adrian Guelke, \textit{South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood Miracle} (London: I. B. Taurus, 1999); Dalvan M. Coger [Untitled], \textit{Africa Today} 47, no. 3/4 (2000): 182-87; quote page 186.}

Coger is also concerned that South Africa’s “managerial, technical, and professional classes, of all races” are leaving for job opportunities abroad.\footnote{Coger, Ibid.}

The above problems cannot be easily addressed by the panacea of creating more wage labor jobs. Only development projects that can hold out the promise of regained self-sufficiency, that give a place to individual dignity and creativity, while reemphasizing the need to restore societal cooperativeness, not by turning back the hands of time but by working to create community today, can provide us with a successful plan for future development.

Here I would like to draw upon Kenyan philosopher H. Odera Oruka’s critique of John Rawls. While Rawls suggested that economic inequalities could be tolerated or even seen as a good thing as long as it could be argued that the increased riches of the rich brought some benefit (however meager) to the poor, Oruka was skeptical that increasing inequalities would really be for the benefit of everyone. If power and wealth were concentrated in the hands of a few, how could this be for the common good, when it could no doubt result in the same short lives for the poor, and lengthened lives for the rich? Would not the rich then have more political rights as well? For example, they could live longer, and therefore express themselves, vote, and run for office more than the poor citizens could do. Oruka was not easily reconciled to the idea that growing inequalities were harmless.\footnote{H. Odera Oruka, “John Rawls’ ideology: Justice as Egalitarian Fairness,” in \textit{Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical Minimum}, ed. H. Odera Oruka (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1997), 115-125.} While Oruka passed away in 1995, his concern
is all too relevant now, as citizens of poor nations die while the rich nations horde covid-19 vaccines (both the shots and the patents), while African countries have hardly received any vaccines.

While the majority of managers surveyed in the study by Sigger, Polak and Pennink agree with the statement that a main goal of their company is the well-being of their employees, almost no mission and vision statements mention that as a company goal.96 Pennink provides a website with many case studies of the implementation of ubuntu management.97 One can only hope that humane management practice, which really concerns itself with meeting the needs of its African workers, would be an improvement of the current status quo. But even more importantly, workers need a chance to organize themselves in industries that would be self-managed by workers. After all, if ubuntu has its beginnings as the ethics of families or tribes/ethnic units, then why would not it better express itself in worker owned and self-managed businesses? When a family works hard together, they expect to share in the fruits of their labors, not to be paid a pittance and taken for granted while the owner reaps the profits. This opportunity to be self-managed would be the best alternative to the cynical and disappointing relationship that many African workers have with their current management and employer.

There are some inspirational examples of workers’ self-management projects around the world. Chokwe Lumumba, Mayor of Jackson, Mississippi for one brief year before his untimely death, encouraged his city to organize and support workers’ self-managed businesses. The organization inspired to fulfill this goal, “Cooperation Jackson” has a website filled with news articles about the latest developments in workers’ self-management and the solidarity economy.98 Marcelo Vieta’s book on Workers’ Self-Management in Argentina follows the blossoming of a movement of “worker-recuperated enterprises,” that is, businesses salvaged by their workers and saved from the asset-stripping of departing owners. Vieta notes that not only do the revived businesses offer continued livelihoods to the workers, but workers transform these businesses into “socially focused enterprises that become deeply concerned with the wellbeing of surrounding communities and neighborhoods and that respond directly and

96 Sigger, Polak, and Pennink, Ubuntu or Humaneness, 35.
locally to social distress and economic depletion.”\textsuperscript{99} While this movement starts in the late 1990s, by 2016 there are 16,000 workers in self-managed “empresas recuperadas,” making it currently the largest example of this kind of self-management.\textsuperscript{100}

However, clearly cases of successful workers’ self-management are few. As Kristen Plys showed in her extensive analysis of workers’ self-managed businesses in peripheral States from 1952-1979, she found that all such businesses failed or were closed, the vast majority due to actions by the State to close them, either through nationalization or privatization. As she explains, “the very existence of self-managed enterprises poses a threat to the state.”\textsuperscript{101} Whether under capitalism or socialism, governments close these experiments in economic democracy to quell unrest, to control labor, or to strengthen capital. While her scope is worldwide, she covers examples from Tanzania, Mozambique, Libya and Algeria, among others. Despite these grim results, she states optimistically that “Regardless of its success or failure, worker self-management remains important as an ideology that counters dominant conceptualizations of economic development.”\textsuperscript{102}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Despite Mogobe Ramose’s assertion that capitalism is a dangerous system that has proven repeatedly to value money more than human life, a plethora of authors reviewed here presume that the capitalist system can be salvaged and made more humane by practicing ubuntu management practices. And many scholars and practitioners in the larger world believe that works emanating from South Africa that claim to apply ubuntu principles and practices to the current capitalist workplace can succeed in doing so and can lead to growth and development. Researchers like Symphonrien Ntibagirirwa have made careers over advocating corporate social responsibility through ubuntu management.\textsuperscript{103} Out of genuine concern

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 23-24.
for Africans’ prospering, he has searched for ways that Africa’s economy can grow, while affording people more say in the economic decisions being made, both as civil society and through the directions that their governments take. What are we to make of Ramose’s cautionary tales, suggesting that, for example, movements for “corporate social responsibility” are really just designed to protect an unjust economic system?104

And should not we also, while we are at it (I suggest) critique this idea (presumed by Ntibagirirwa and others) that the goal of our efforts should be “growth”? Especially when our world’s most vulnerable people facing climate change disasters are in the global South, perhaps a “degrowth” strategy that puts environmental concerns first would better protect the lives of Africans. While some scholars note that “degrowth” is not a popular term in South Africa and the global South (since it conjures up images of austerity measures), the degrowth movement’s goals of defending people and the environment from the ravages of extractive capitalism find some support.105 Perhaps a movement embracing ubuntu philosophy can strengthen the environmental concerns and practices outlined briefly in Ramose’s 1999 book on ubuntu.106

I have tried to express my concern throughout this paper that to ask people to put forth their best efforts in a work project is best motivated by fair treatment of workers, who are valued as persons, and paid a good wage, with profits to go to them so that they can nourish and support their extended families. I am concerned that certain workplace dynamics are being dealt with using ubuntu values, but the larger structure of the economy is not being challenged. If this is the case, I am unsure that poverty and injustice will be eradicated. But, an ubuntu ethic could indeed be helpful as a guide for deciding which kinds of changes to the larger economic and political structures we should advocate and fight for. The fact that workers’ self-managed businesses are so difficult to begin and are so often halted by governments could discourage some philosophers as well as activists from spending more time thinking about how an ubuntu ethic would more naturally express itself in that kind of form. But as Plys suggests, despite these difficulties, such experiments are great examples of

104 Ramose, “Towards the Betterment,” 78. And what about his larger claim that the whole idea of justifications for “sole ownership” of private property may be arbitrary and groundless, and that it is better to treat all resources as we do the air or sunlight currently, that is, as commonly owned (or owned by no one) and used as needed but without greed or hoarding? Ibid.


106 Ramose, African Philosophy Through Ubuntu, 154-159.
alternatives to our current global capitalist system whose dire shortcomings are so well known to us.

References


Appendix I

The Life and Work of Professor Claude Sumner (1919-2012)

Workineh Kelbessa

Claude Sumner, S.J., a Professor Emeritus of Philosophy in the Department of philosophy at the Addis Ababa University, passed away on June 24, 2012 in Canada, at the age of 92. His funeral took place on June 30, 2012 at the Chapel of Notre Dame de Richelieu, Canada.

Claude Sumner was born on July 10, 1919 in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Western Canada, from an English-speaking father and a French-speaking mother. He had a rich educational background. He studied philosophy as an undergraduate at Manitoba University, English literature and theology as a graduate at the University of Montreal, and a Ph.D. in linguistics at the University of Montreal in 1952.

Teaching Assignments

Sumner received his first faculty appointment to teach English literature, 1945-1948, at Brebeuf College, University of Montreal. He came to Ethiopia in 1953 and had an academic appointment in philosophy at the University College of Addis Ababa, where he became a full Professor in 1961. He lived and worked in Ethiopia from 1953 to 2001, even during the years of social and political turbulence. Sumner retired from Addis Ababa University in 2001 due to health reasons with an honorary rank of Emeritus Professor. He described himself as “a Canadian by birth and an Ethiopian by choice.” In the interview he gave to the Ethiopian Review in July 1994, he stated the following:

I think I fell in love with the country. There is such a phenomenon as love at first sight. I remember when I alighted from an Ethiopian Airlines plane on 15 September 1953 at 4.00p.m. I immediately felt at home amongst the people I met and the bit of country I entered.

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1 The first version of this paper was presented at the Feast of St. Ignatius Loyola organized by the Society of Jesus – Ethiopia, July 31, 2012 and at the International Seminar on Global Challenges and the Vocation of Philosophy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 15, 2012.

into: the cool weather, the green fields, the mountains, the exquisite politeness of the Ethiopian people.³

Sumner liked to be called by his Ethiopian name: Gelawdewos, which is equivalent to Claude.

He taught logic, history of philosophy, and other major courses of philosophy. He was also an invited lecturer in Canada for summer courses, 1959-2001. Sumner served as a Jesuit for 72 years in Eastern Africa.

Among others, his academic and professional positions include the following:

- He was appointed the Head of the Department of Humanities on October 30, 1961.
- He was appointed Head of the Department of Philosophy on January 30, 1963 and served the Department until 1977.
- He was the Head of the Cultural Commission of International Organization Justice and Development, Honor Committee (IOJD), 1971.
- He was the Vice-President of the Foundation for Health and Human Rights in 1973 and 1983.
- He was the President of the Foundation for Research and Publications on Ethiopian Philosophy and African Culture (EPAC) in 1982.

Publications

Sumner contributed significantly to the development of African philosophy. He devoted his career to the study of Ethiopian and African philosophy and was regarded as one of the world’s leading scholars on Ethiopian philosophy. Sumner himself said that he did not invent an original Ethiopian philosophy. He characterized his work on Ethiopian philosophy as “History of philosophy.”⁴

Sumner noted that Ethiopia, unlike most African countries south of the Sahara, has both a written and an unwritten philosophy. In Ethiopian philosophy, wisdom is expressed in both the oral and written form. First of all, he examined five written Ethiopic texts.

Before embarking on the project of studying Ethiopian philosophy, Sumner identified the manuscript of The Book of the Philosophers in the archives of the national library in Addis Ababa in June 1962. The original title of this book Mashafa falsfa tabiban was translated from Arabic to the ancient Semitic language called Ge’ez revised in the early sixteenth century by an Arabic-Speaking Egyptian monk, Abba Mikael.⁵ The Ethiopic version of the book was written on parchment by an unknown Ethiopian. The Arabic text

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was based on the Greek original text. Sumner translated it into English and published it in 1974. He claimed that the philosophy that had developed in Greece “came back to its place of origin, to Africa, to Egypt, and later moved from Egypt to Ethiopia.” Sumner believed that the Ethiopic Book of the Philosophers confirmed this thesis.

Sumner continued his research and later translated and published the Treatise of Zara Yacob (1599-1692) and that of Walda Heywat, The Physiologue, a fifth-century Ethiopian translation-adaptation from the Greek original, and The Life and Maxims of Skendes, an anonymous Ethiopic narrative of the classic Oedipus tragedy, translated from the Arabic text to Ge’ez between 1434-1468 AD being discovered in a manuscript housed in East Berlin Archives. Sumner was of the opinion that Ethiopians never translated literally. The creative assimilation of the Greek and Arabic texts by Ethiopians was an Ethiopianized contribution, as they are characterized by a triple phenomenon: omissions, additions and modifications. “A translation therefore bears a typically Ethiopian stamp.” The assimilation is equivalent to a new creation. The above-mentioned five texts belonged to Christian zones of influence. They are concerned with the Northern “historical Abyssinia (old Aksumite Empire) and the cultural manifestations of its Semitized inhabitants.” Thus, the name Ethiopia was radically different from the modern nation of Ethiopia. Sumner translated the five books into English, analyzed their content and published them in different volumes.

He synthesized the already published five volumes of his collection entitled Ethiopian Philosophy (The Fisalgwos, The Book of the Philosophers, The Life and Maxims of Skendes, The Treatise of Zara Yacob, and the Treatise of Walda Heywat) in a two book form. The first one is Classical Ethiopian Philosophy published in 1985 by Commercial Printing Press in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and again by Adey Publishing Company in Los Angeles, California, USA, with new foreword and preface in 1994. The second book is entitled The Source of African Philosophy: The Ethiopian Philosophy of Man published in 1986. What is interesting to note is that Sumner’s research confirmed the existence of written philosophical texts in Ethiopia. Teodros Kiros praises Sumner’s synthesized work as follows:

Sumner’s Classical Ethiopian Philosophy is an achievement of the first order. The contributions of this master thinker of Ethiopian Philosophy are on the same par as that of the lauded philosophers of the twentieth century: Habermas, Foucault, and Gadamer, just

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8 Sumner, Classical Ethiopian Philosophy, 51.
9 Ibid., 1.
to name a few. Had the subject matter of Sumner’s life-long career been any of the master categories of western secular philosophy, his name would shine like a star in the sky; sadly his theme is Ethiopian philosophy, a rational tradition that seeks to bind faith and reason.\textsuperscript{10}

Sumner classified philosophy both in a broad sense and in a narrow sense. In a broad sense, philosophy is wisdom. For him, different cultures in the world have philosophical components. He employed the expression “sapiential literature” to refer to the wisdom of people in different parts of the world. \textit{The Physiologue, The Book of the Philosophers, and The Life and Maxims of Skendes} are philosophical in the “broad” sense, as they are based on wisdom literature.

Philosophy in the narrow sense refers to the critical reflection of a person on different issues. For Sumner, the works of Zara Yacob and his disciple Walda Heywat (the two \textit{Hatatas}) are original Ethiopian philosophical contributions. Although Zara Yacob and Walda Heywat were influenced by Christianity, they were rationalist philosophers in 17\textsuperscript{th} century Ethiopia.

In the strict sense, Zara Yacob was a critical independent indigenous Ethiopian thinker who guided his thoughts and judgments by the power of reason. He presented his philosophical views and his life in his autobiography published under the title \textit{Hatata} (Treatise) in 1667. The original meaning of the word \textit{Hatata} is “to question bit by bit, piece-meal; to search into or through, to investigate accurately; to examine; to inspect.”\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Hatata} is aided by another Ethiopic method of inquiry, \textit{hasasa}, which means “‘to search for one who is absent,’ \textit{quaerere absentem}. When it has passed to invisible things, it came to mean, ‘to search,’ for them, ‘to follow eagerly,’ ‘to reach towards,’ ‘to be eager,’ as Latin \textit{sectari, petere, studere}.”\textsuperscript{12} Zara Yacob used the light of reason as his method to develop his ideas and inquiry as the canon of his method based on the goodness of nature. He used the light of reason to distinguish between the law of God and the law of man, revealed religion and man-made creation, the meaning of faith and prayer. He applied his ability and inclination in his own independent critical objection to the belief of his people. He used his mind to interrogate tradition and critically examine the Gospels.

For Zara Yacob, rationality is the intellectual activity of the heart. The heart is the seat of reason rather than the seat of feeling. Our creator has put our reason in our heart. With reference to foreigners’ interpretations of the Holy Scriptures, Zara Yacob writes, “oftentimes their interpretations did not agree with my reason; but I withheld my opinion and hid in my heart all the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Kiros, “Claude Sumner’s Classical Ethiopian Philosophy,” 49.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Sumner, \textit{Classical Ethiopian Philosophy}, 225.
\end{itemize}
thoughts of my mind.”  “To the person who seeks it, truth is immediately revealed. Indeed he who investigates with the pure intelligence set by the creator in the heart of each man and scrutinizes the order and laws of creation, will discover the truth.” According to Zara Yacob,

God indeed has illuminated the heart of man with understanding by which he can see the good and evil, recognize the licit and the illicit, distinguish truth from error, ‘and by your light we see the light, oh Lord!’ If we use this light of our heart properly, it cannot deceive us; the purpose of this light which our creator gave us is to be saved by it, and not to be ruined [by it.] Everything that the light of our intelligence shows us comes from the source of truth, but what men say comes from the source of lies and our intelligence teaches that all that the creator establishes is right.

For Zara Yacob, wealth, status, and power can deceive human beings, they may not choose truth over falsehood, and be tempted by errors and evil choices.

However, contrary to the assertion of Teodros Kiros, Zara Yacob was not the first philosopher to consider the intellectual activity of the heart. Empedocles (circa 485-425 BC), Augustine (354-430), Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), and Meister Eckhart (1260-1327) recognized the rationality of the heart.

Kiros states that only Pascal, the writer, attached important significance to the function of the human heart before Zara Yacob.

Ancient Egyptians also considered the heart as the seat of thoughts and emotions. As Théophile Obenga notes,

[the heart ib, also haty, in the Egyptian language was conceived as the seat of thoughts and emotions. The word for heart also meant “mind,” “understanding,” and “intelligence.” Reason, emotion, spirit, mind, and body were not conceived as separate antithetical entities. Matter and spirit were not opposites in conflict. Thus, in their inquiries philosophers can draw on all the resources of their being, including reason and feeling. In this way they can expect to achieve fulfillment.]

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13 Sumner, *Classical Ethiopian Philosophy*, 231.
14 Ibid., 236.
15 Ibid., 237.
Segun Gbadegesin also writes,

The Yoruba word *ókàn* translates as heart. Following the former suggestion, it would mean that the pumping and circulation of blood by the physical heart is construed as so crucial that its results are connected with the state of a person’s thoughts and emotions at any point in time, and that, therefore, between *ópolo* (brain) and *ókàn* (heart), conceived in physical terms, we may account for the mental activities and emotional states of persons.\(^\text{19}\)

For the Oromo people in Ethiopia, the heart can think and feel pain and pleasure. If one notes that someone is not thinking, s/he would ask: Does not your *garaa* (heart) think? A useful argument is buried in intelligent poor persons’ hearts. According to the Oromo people, true love springs from a heart which is the foundation for real love.

Some Oromo proverbs suggest that the heart is the seat of thinking. Consider the following proverbs:

“*Garaa yaadin seene / nyaati hinseenu*

The belly that thinking has entered the food does not enter/Worry spoils appetite.”\(^\text{20}\)

“*Garaan mini baatu ma dubi battuu didaa?*

Why can the belly that can bear a tapeworm not do the same with a secret?”\(^\text{21}\)

Zara Yacob defended the existence of God on the basis of reason. For him, faith in God presupposes profound reasoning; God is revealed through natural reason; faith is guided by God-given reason; faith can be rational; false faith is manifestly non-truth. Unlike some Western philosophers, for Zara Yacob, there is no absolute boundary between faith and reason; all created nature is good.

Zara Yacob is regarded as the first rationalist philosopher in Ethiopia and even in Africa. According to Kiros, “[i]ndeed, it is a mild exaggeration to assert that it is Zara Yacob who gave the continent of Africa an original autobiography, something that was at that time confined to literate traditions outside of Africa. His treatise is a masterful example of self-presentation.”\(^\text{22}\)

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For Sumner, Zara Yacob is comparable with Herbert of Cherbury, Mani, Luther, Rene Descartes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and is a rationalist thinker in the religious sense. 18 scholars had already characterized Zara Yacob’s philosophy as “rationalism.” Sumner qualifies the rationalism of Descartes as “scientific,” that is theory which holds that reason alone, unaided by experience, can be the source of basic truth. Associated with it is the doctrine of inborn ideas and the method of logically deducing truths about the world from “self-evident” premises. Zara Yacob showed no evidence of being a rationalist in this sense, but a religious one.

In spite of this, many writers noted that Zara Yacob and Descartes shared many things in common: they believed the power of reason or intelligence as the final judge of human controversies. For both the dark regions of human thought should be illuminated through the light of reason. Both questioned the dogmatics of the Church. Like Descartes, for Zara Yacob, God is perfect; “God is embodied in absolute reasonableness.”

Some writers consider Zara Yacob as an “Orthodox” reformer and a “Catholic” thinker. However, this does not hold water. The critical examination of his work shows that although his philosophical approach was influenced by the Psalms of David and the reality of God, he challenged some principles of Christianity. Zara Yacob questioned the value of fasting, celibacy, polygamy, and all positive revelation. According to Zara Yacob, God does not want human beings to punish their body through fasting. As he professes, Zara Yacob was not a monk. “I am not a monk, but I pretended to be one because of the difficult circumstances.”

He supported the idea of equality of men and women, monogamous marriage, and education of children, but objected unethical behavior including killing, stealing, lying, and adultery.

Walda Heywat (the son of life) was the disciple and promoter of Zara Yacob’s thought. He primarily used moral, parenetic, sapiential, and practical approaches to develop his ideas on different topics, such as creation, knowledge, faith, nature of the soul, law and judgment, social life, the “use” of love, virtues and human weaknesses, education, time and culture. He is against avarice and drunkenness, not taking good care of oneself, injustice, backbiting, adultery, theft, divorce, revenge and so on. He explained the value of self-care, marriage, happiness and hope. For him, all persons are equal irrespective of their background.

Walda Heywat transformed Zara Yacob’s individualistic ethics into social ethics. Although Walda Heywat was influenced by the philosophical

24 See Ibid., 75 in note 23.
26 Sumner, *Classical Ethiopian Philosophy*, 248.
ideas of Zara Yacob, unlike the latter he did not detach himself “from traditional patterns of thought and expression.” His philosophy has a place for traditional sapiential ideas. He advised individuals to praise the custom of their country. “It is in the junction of the radical and the traditional that lies the individuality of Walda Heywat as a parenetic educator of the nation as a whole.”

Sumner thus considered Walda Heywat as an Ethiopian traditionalist, a typical child of Ethiopia who was highly influenced by the folk literature of Ethiopia.

There has been no consensus as to the authorship of the texts of Zara Yacob and Walda Heywat. In 1920 and 1934, Carlo Conti Rossini and Eugen Mittwoch, respectively, denied that the two papers were the work of Zara Yacob and Walda Heywat. Instead, they claimed that Padre Giusto d’Urbino, a nineteenth-century Italian missionary in Ethiopia, was the real author of these treatises.

Sumner rejected this claim and states that these treatises were the authentic works of the seventeenth-century Ethiopian philosophers, Zara Yacob and Walda Heywat. Similarly, Amsalu Akililu and Alemayehu Moges also rejected this claim. Sumner argued that Giusto d’Urbino had inadequate knowledge of Ge’ez and qene, which uses double meanings of words and metaphors and could not be the author of the two treatises. Critical thinking is required to understand the hidden meaning of the word.

After finalizing his research on the written Ge’ez expression of Ethiopian philosophical and sapiential literature, Sumner examined the oral expression of Ethiopian Wisdom Literature: Oromo proverbs, songs, and folktales. On the occasion of the publication of his first volume on Oromo Wisdom Literature — Proverbs, Sumner gave a public lecture on the same subject at the Italian Cultural Institute on June 10, 1995. He started with the well-known statement of Sir Edmund Hillary. When asked why he had made the ascent to the summit of Mount Everest, “because the mountain is there!” was Hillary’s reply. For Sumner, the mountain is Oromo Wisdom Literature.

Sumner gathered the texts of Oromo oral literature printed in various languages: German, Italian, English and in Amharic transcription, and translated them into English. Making his way through such an intricate printed material is a credit to Sumner. The original Oromo printed oral literature in transcription was translated into English by his research assistants, Oromo-speaking lecturers at the Addis Ababa University and other experts.

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29 Cited in Sumner, Classical Ethiopian Philosophy, 226.

should be clear that he did not conduct fieldwork and gather Oromo oral literature in Ethiopia. He acknowledged the limitations of his method as follows: “One misses the original intonation, the gestures, the melody and rhythm for songs, the social background with reactions of the interlocutor or audience; one may also miss some new proverb, song or folktale which has not been recorded up to now.”

Altogether, he published various works on Oromo wisdom literature to show that Oromo oral literature contains Oromo philosophy in the broad sense. “The spoken words of an oral society constitute oral texts translatable into philosophical discourse...When carefully studied, proverbs, songs and poems are potential sources of philosophical reflections.”

I strongly support the view that oral tradition is a viable source of philosophical ideas and education. African philosophy, perhaps to a greater degree than other modern philosophical traditions, is based on a rich oral and written intellectual heritage, and thus benefits from the strengths of both orality and literacy. The claim that traditional Africa was innocent of philosophy is wrong. Professionally trained philosophers should not ignore the philosophical significance of oral traditions.

It is not mere hyperbole to assert that philosophers and other academic intellectuals who do not pursue such sources of wisdom are failing to accomplish a sufficient review of the ‘literature’ relevant to their fields of research. Philosophers and other intellectuals must begin to gather and document oral and non-academic sources of wisdom in urban centers and in far rural reaches of different parts of the world. It must be recognized that such an approach to addressing global issues is absolutely necessary if the full range of human wisdom is to be brought to bear on the health of our planet and its inhabitants.

Sumner stressed that the written works of Ethiopian philosophy and Oromo proverbs and folktales share the prevalence of the moral concern in content. This shows continuity from the written to the oral form in Ethiopian philosophy, although there has been discontinuity in the process. Sumner found eight key words common to all the work of Ethiopian philosophical

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31 Ibid., 420.
32 For details, see references.
35 Ibid., 305.
36 Sumner, “New Directions in Research in Ethiopian Philosophy,” 432-33.
and sapiential literature. “These eight key words may be considered as the linguistic nucleus of Ethiopia’s philosophical (written) vocabulary. Some are sapiential like wisdom and knowledge; others are theological like Lord, anthropological like flesh soul – are ethical spirit and heart; still others are ethical like law and love.”

He also identified the following notions in the collected Oromo proverbs: evil, ostentation, knowledge, association, caution, religion, foolishness, fear, speaking, inequitableness, conformity, deed, discernment, woman, and appearance. The concept “knowledge” appears in both written and oral literature.

Ethiopian written philosophical and sapiential literature and Oromo songs have different images. According to Sumner, images in previously written works are anthropocentric or personalist rather than theocentric. “Outside of man, and what is made by him the Ethiopian, as he is known to us by thirteen centuries of literary production, seems to lose his interest.”

The human being is the summit of the ontological structure in Ethiopian written literature, and the starting point and better known than the thing. Images in Oromo proverbs and songs represent “the totality of physical world: man, animals, plants and trees, material inorganic things plus the world of artificial objects: artifacts, food and beverage, clothing. We are dealing with an all-round view of reality – applied to the universe of images: it is a totality.”

Sumner concluded that the personalized images of Ethiopian written sapiential and philosophical literature and the physical nature represented in Oromo oral literature are complementary.

Therefore at the end of a long and thorough investigation of the totality of Ethiopian written and oral expression of wisdom and philosophy in the strict sense, one is left with an all-round view of the world and human experience which necessarily involves the complementary of continuity and discontinuity, tradition and originality, deep and firm cultural roots and new directions.

Whether one is against or for Sumner’s life-long research on Ethiopian philosophy, s/he cannot ignore his valuable contribution to Ethiopian and African philosophy. In his “foreword: Claude Sumner as an African Philosopher” to Sumner’s book, Living Springs of Wisdom and Philosophy, Henry Odera Oruka of Kenya stresses the contribution of Sumner to Ethiopian philosophy in the following words:

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37 Ibid., 437.
38 Ibid.
40 Sumner, “New Directions in Research in Ethiopian Philosophy,” 37-38.
41 Ibid., 438.
Given so far what he has done in unearthing and analyzing Ethiopian philosophy, Prof. Sumner is, without doubt, the combination of Plato and Aristotle of Ethiopia. What he has done to Ethiopia in the field of philosophy can, in all fairness, be as important and original as what Plato and Aristotle did to Greece. I can foresee no scholar of Ethiopian philosophy surpassing or ignoring Sumner’s contributions within the range of the next one hundred years.\textsuperscript{42}

Odera Oruka also considers Sumner as an African philosopher. In his letter to Odera Oruka, Sumner writes: “Friends of Africa have a title to be called “African Philosophers” if they make a significant contribution to ‘African Philosophy’. It is not one’s passport that makes the difference, but one’s dedication…”\textsuperscript{43}

Gail M. Presbey and George F. McLean also recognize the contribution of Sumner’s works to Ethiopian philosophy. Sumner’s “works play a major role in restoring an African country to its rightful place in the history of philosophy.”\textsuperscript{44} Edward Alam, the General Secretary of the CRVP in 2012, expresses a similar view: “Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to meet this great man in person, only in books. But these books have been for me valuable introductions into that rich world we call ‘Ethiopia.’”\textsuperscript{45} Messay Kebede also expresses the same feeling.

Sumner will be remembered for his remarkable contribution to Ethiopian Studies. There is no doubt that he was a good friend of Ethiopia, a scholar who devoted so much energy and commitment to presenting to the world an unusual and exciting face of Ethiopia. I hope that more philosophers from Ethiopia will follow his lead and indeed show us that there is more to Ethiopia than civil wars, dictatorships, and famines.\textsuperscript{46}

Similarly, Valentin-Yves Mudimbe explains the role of Sumner in Ethiopian philosophy.


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 7.


\textsuperscript{45} Edward Alam, e-mail message to the author, July 25, 2012.

\textsuperscript{46} Messay Kebede, e-mail message to the author, July 23, 2012.
A first rate intellectual and an exemplary spiritual guide, Father Claude Sumner was, in the very tradition of his historical and ecclesiastical model, “a magnanimous spirit and with great liberty” towards the sign of his existence and meaning. His life and his work in Ethiopia, as they are exemplified for instance by his universally respected contribution to the practice of philosophy in his adoptive country, constitute a remarkable testimony. They testify to an admirable dedication of the academic and a priest. With a generous spirit and all “his powers of desire and all their liberty,” Father Claude Sumner lived in the service of a powerful commitment. This reference to an annotation in Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises on the fundamental disposition summarizes well Father Sumner’s remarkable devotion to the work of his vocation and his life.47


He was the Chairperson of the Local Organizing Committee of the 7th Annual Conference of The International Society for African Philosophy and Studies (ISAPS) in Addis Ababa, March 9-11, 2001.

All in all, Sumner authored over forty books, and more than 200 articles, book chapters and reviews covering such diverse subjects as theology, Ethiopian philosophy, African philosophy, philosophical anthropology, history of philosophy, poetry, plays, etc. His research was supported by the European Union, Gudina Tumsa Foundation, and Research and Publications Office of the Addis Ababa University.

Sumner participated in various international conferences in Austria, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the USA. He gave public lectures in different countries including Cameroon, Canada (5 times), Congo Brazzaville (4 times), Ethiopia (67 times: in Addis Ababa, Gonder and Asmara), France (7 times), Germany (3 times), Italy, Kenya (twice), Mozambique (9 times), Switzerland (twice), Chad (4 times), The Netherlands (8 times), Uganda (6 times), the USA, and Zaire (now DRC Kinshasa (3 times)). He also participated in television and radio programs in Austria, Belgium, Benin, Canada, France, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nigeria.

47 Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, e-mail message to the author, July 24, 2012.
Certificates, Fellowships and Awards

For his research contributions, Sumner received more than a dozen international prizes in different fields.

University Gold Medal in Arts and Latin Philosophy, University of Manitoba, Canada in 1939;
Certificate of Merit on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of Addis Ababa University in 1980;
Certificate of Inclusion of Biography in Five Thousand Personalities of the World in 1984;
Certificate of Inclusion of Biography in the World Biographical Hall of Fame in 1984;
Certificate of Inclusion of Biography in the International Directory of Distinguished Leadership in 1985;
Life Membership to the World Institute of Achievement in 1986;
Certificate of Inclusion of Biography in the International Record of Biographical Achievements in 1986;
Honorary Doctorate Degree from Northland Open University, Windsor, UK on September 21, 1986;
Distinguished Service Award for Innovation in Higher Education, in Recognition of his Contribution to the Development of Higher Education, University without Walls International Council on December 12, 1988;
Blue Nile Medal, First Rank, for Contribution to Ethiopian Study, at the Congress Hall, Addis Ababa, on the Occasion of the XIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies on April 4, 1991;

He was awarded a Certificate of Recognition by the College of Social Sciences, Addis Ababa University, for his Outstanding Contribution in Teaching, Mentoring and Superior Scholarship on Ethiopian Philosophy in 2007.

Membership in Learned Societies

Among other societies, Sumner was a member of the following international societies:
La Société des Ecrivains Canadiens, Montréal, 1963.
International Organization Justice and Development, Honor Committee (IOJD), 1971, and
Honorary Lifetime Member of the Netherlands Association of Psychologists, Psychotherapists, and Educational Psychologists (NVPA) in 1984.
Entries in Biographical Dictionaries

Sumner was included in more than a dozen international dictionaries:

3. Directory of Scholars and Specialists in Third World Studies, Massachusetts, USA.
5. International Dictionary of Philosophy and Philosophers, Répertoire international de la philosophie et des philosophes, Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, USA.
6. International Directory of Scholars and Specialists in African Studies (1978), Brandeis University, USA.
8. Teaching and Research in Philosophy in Africa, UNESCO, France, Division de la Philosophie.
13. World Institute of Achievement. Life Membership, American Biographical Institute, USA.

International Centers

There are two international centers working on Sumner’s work: The Foundation of the Sumner International Center for African Studies (SICAS) in the Netherlands was established in 1983. The Gelawdewos Foundation in Addis Ababa, especially geared towards Promotion and Diffusion of Sumner’s Poetical Works, was established in 1993.

Sumner’s enormous body of work ranged from academic tomes to newspaper essays has provoked not only fervent praise but also hostility and contradiction. There are more than 363 articles, Brochures, BA and doctoral theses, and books on his work in twelve languages: Amharic, Arabic, Dutch, English, French, Frisian, German, Greek, Italian, Afaan Oromo, Portuguese, and Spanish.
Some writers are against the existence of philosophy in Ethiopia and ever discredit the work of Sumner but the severest critics have recognized the importance of Sumner’s work for the development of Ethiopian philosophy. As a Professor of Philosophy, for more than 46 years, Sumner left his indelible foot prints on the world map of Ethiopian and African philosophy and influenced various scholars and institutions in the continent, especially the Addis Ababa University’s Department of Philosophy. Over the years, he taught different generations. When I was a student in the 1980s in the Department of Philosophy at the Addis Ababa University, there were no courses on Ethiopian and African philosophy. In response to his impressive research on Ethiopian philosophy and other factors, the Department designed two Ethiopian and two African philosophy courses in the first decade of the 21st century. Currently most of our students are familiar with his works.

On a personal note, Sumner had the greatest impact and a profound and lasting effect on me. He introduced me to various African philosophers including the late Henry Odera Oruka of Kenya, and their works. He was always very generous with his time and so full of new insights. His encouragement and constructive criticism has had a significant impact upon my research in African philosophy. His personal example is a continued source of inspiration to me, and to many who were lucky to meet him.

What was unforgettable about Sumner was his modesty and consistency in duty. From my window at the University, I used to see Sumner constantly working at his desk in his office on the opposite wing of the same building. During weekdays, he stayed in his office from 8:00 to 11:30 am, and 3:00-5:30 pm. On Saturdays, he worked in his office from 8:00-11:30 am. One may say that his regular work and walk to and from the University was similar to the life of Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher in the eighteenth century. It is held that Kant’s regular daily walks helped his neighbors to set their clocks to his routine.

Sumner will be sorely missed by his friends, community and colleagues, and his former students. More important perhaps, future students and faculty members at the Department of Philosophy will miss the opportunity to learn from and get to know this great person. His colleagues at the Addis Ababa University will never forget his great and incisive intellectual insights, enthusiasm, sense of social justice, deep interest in both his research subject and the people he met and his cheerful and outgoing personality. Sumner died, he also lives. Sumner will live forever in our hearts. Sumner’s memories and thoughts will continue to grow and flower like the seed of a giant tree.

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Appendix II

The Life and Work of Mr. Daniel D. Smith (1957-2012)

Workineh Kelbessa & Bekele Gutema

Daniel D. Smith was born on July 16, 1957 in San Francisco, California, USA. He passed away on January 10, 2012 following a few months of illness. His passing was a terrible and unexpected loss. We thought we would have him around for many years to come.

Smith completed his first and second degrees in philosophy at the University of California in 1984 and San Diego State University in 1986 respectively, and began his career as a scholar at Oakland Unified School District in September 1987. Smith also obtained his Diploma in Teaching English as a Foreign Language (TEFL) from the University of Cambridge, San Francisco in 1996.

Smith’s professional career spanned more than two decades and covered four continents (North and South America, Africa, and Asia). From September 1986 to June 1991, he was a philosophy instructor at Las Positas Community College, Livermore, California. He also taught at Solano Community College, Suisan, California from September 1987 to June 1993. He was an English teacher in El Salvador and Guatemala from July 1993 to December 1994. He was a visiting lecturer at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana from February 1999 to February 2000, and Kunming University of Science and Technology, Yunnan Province, People’s Republic of China from August 2001 to July 2002. He was also a Visiting Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Hubei Province from September 2002 to July 2003, and the Departments of Philosophy and Foreign Languages, Northwest University, Shaanxi Province, the People’s Republic of China from September 2003 to January 2004.

We first met Smith at the University of Nairobi in March 2000, when we attended the Sixth Annual Conference of the International Society for African Philosophy and Studies (ISAPS). Professor Claude Sumner also participated in this conference. In 2001, Smith attended the Seventh Annual ISAPS Conference in Addis Ababa. Two years later, Workineh Kelbessa met him in Istanbul, Turkey in August 2003, during the XX1st World Congress of Philosophy. He joined the Department of Philosophy at Addis Ababa University (AAU) as an Associate Professor in February 2004. He lived in Ethiopia until his death. Above all, he taught and did research at Western, Latin American, African, and Chinese philosophy in various universities.

Smith contributed significantly to the Department of Philosophy since he began his assignment here. He had a good working relationship with his colleagues in the Department. He always raised important issues about the future of the Department.
Sometimes, he taught 21 credit hours more than the required teaching load (12 credit hours). Some of the courses he taught in our Department included introduction to logic, Aristotle, aesthetics, philosophy of science, Chinese philosophy, German idealism and its critics, critical social theory, African philosophy, and epistemology.

African philosophy became central to his research and development as a philosopher. Especially, he was interested in Henry Odera Oruka’s Sage Philosophy Project. He was of the opinion that “something like a globalized sage philosophy project is a necessary condition for the development of effective counter-hegemonic philosophical theories and practices in the twenty-first century.”¹ According to Smith, the primary objective of a twenty-first century globalized project would be to facilitate the emergence of alternative visions of humanity’s future and help to develop effective strategies for realizing such visions. One aspect of realizing this objective would entail challenging the regimes of truth within which we, as professional philosophers, find ourselves, by introducing the popular and philosophic wisdom of indigenous communities (which has developed relatively independently of professional academia) into academic researches and debates.²

Smith tried to develop this idea in his philosophical works. Smith supervised the undergraduate and graduate research of many students in the Department. He also served as an external examiner of graduate students in other Departments of the University.

Smith served the Department of Philosophy in several ways. He was a member of various standing committees in the Department. He was the Documentation Officer of Strategic Planning and Reform Committee of the Department in 2007. He was the Chairperson of the Department Staff Assembly and Academic Committee from February 9, 2011 until his sudden passing on the tenth of January, 2012.

He was a very generous person, especially to younger colleagues and students, with his time, ideas, and constant encouragement. In 2006, he helped philosophy undergraduate students establish a Student Philosophy Club and organize the series of lectures known as “RAPP” (Rationally Analyzing Practical Philosophy). He actively participated in the regular fortnightly lectures presented by both students and faculty. A number of undergraduate students participated in these sessions.

² Ibid., 569.
He had an admirable sense of justice and spoke up to powers when he felt the need for it. Following the highly contested 2005 elections and political crisis in Ethiopia, he raised the following question during the AAU general staff meeting: “how can I teach logic in an irrational situation?” He was a member of the Observation Delegation of the 2005 Ethiopia National Elections (August 21, 2005 Re-Elections in Ethiopia).  

As an American citizen, he opposed America’s war in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In one of RAPP’s lectures he presented a paper titled, “Is it Wise for Ethiopia to Ally Itself with the US?” and advised that in view of the US involvement in so many wars during the Bush years, it is counterproductive for Ethiopia to closely ally itself with the US. When Condoleezza Rice, former Secretary of the State of the US government, visited Addis Ababa in 2008, Smith stood alone in front of the gate of the main campus with a placard that read “Bring the boys back home from Iraq and Afghanistan” as Ms. Rice drove past the AAU campus to the US Embassy.

From February 2004 to June 2007, he was working for a local salary based on the institutional practice that an expatriate salary is only available to members of the faculty who have been working in the Department with an active graduate program. He did not complain about his salary, as it enabled him to fulfil his basic needs. Regarding his lifestyle, Gail M. Presbey, one of his colleagues, stated the following in her recommendation letter to the Department: “[h]e is a hardy person with simple needs who can be satisfied with the lifestyle that his salary at the university could provide (and such would not be true of most other Americans!).”


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Smith also participated in international conferences in different parts of the world such as the US, El Salvador, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, China, Vietnam, Turkey, Iran, Nigeria, South Korea, and Ethiopia.

He was a member of American Philosophy Association, the International Society for African Philosophy and Studies, and Ethiopian Philosophical Association.

**Non-Academic Service**

Smith worked as an international journalist in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Namibia, and Botswana from July 1993-2001. He also served as an organizer and moderator of various communities in Namibia and the US.

Besides his academic and non-academic activities, there are many memories to share, but what we would like to mention here is what Smith did in Istanbul, Turkey on August 17, 2003. During the seven days of the XX1st World Congress of Philosophy he learned that a group that supported communism was not allowed to display and sell books. He considered this as one form of injustice committed by the organizers of the Congress. He decided to raise this issue before the Congress. During the closing session, government officials including the Prime Minister of Turkey and journalists were present. When the organizers started the program, he wrote the following question on a paper and stood in front of the camera and waved it: “why did you exclude communists?” The security guards intervened immediately and took him out from the convention hall. Some of us were worried about his well-being. We later learned that nothing happened to him. Afterward, Professor Paulin Hountondji of Benin made the following joke that made everyone laugh: “It is good to be an American citizen.” Although Smith understood the difficulty of organizing a congress, he did not regret doing it. He said that he did what he thought he had to do.

We adored and respected Smith for his scholarly activities and uncompromising stand on matters of principle and justice. He was honest and straightforward. When he had reservations regarding the actions of his colleagues, he did not bicker behind their backs but told them to their face. Sometimes, he wrote a letter and distributed it to some scholars with whom he had some kind of personal relationship. He requested them to address rationally the problems he identified. In some instances, some individuals could not understand his behavior and reaction to different issues.

The untimely death of our friend was a great shock to all members of the Department. The consolation is that his spirit, his influence will live on.
Daniel Smith will be greatly missed by all who knew him. He will be remembered for many years to come by his many colleagues, friends, and students.

References


Notes on Contributors

Edward Joseph Alam is a full Professor of the Faculty of Humanities at Notre Dame University, Lebanon. He teaches philosophy, theology, and cultural studies. He has published over 70 in books, edited books, and articles in international journals. He is one of three philosophers on the Humanities Fetzer Advisory Council of the John Fetzer Institute, one of the most active and well-endowed philanthropic institutes in the world. He was General Secretary of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy from 2009-2012, and is presently the RVP’s Regional Director of Middle Eastern Activities, which presently has its center at his University. He has organized and participated in over 100 international and national conferences and seminars over the past 20 years, wherein he has given several keynote addresses.


Tenna Dewo is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Addis Ababa University, where he has taught and conducted research since 1999. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy from Panjab University (India), his Master’s in Philosophy from University of Pune (India) and his BA degree in Philosophy from Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia). In addition to his academic engagement, he also served the University in administration with different capacities. Before joining Addis Ababa University, he served as an instructor of philosophy courses at Ambo College of Agriculture (now Ambo University) and as an editor of a theoretical and political journal of the defunct Workers’ Party of Ethiopia. He has also published several articles.
Johan Hattingh is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, South Africa, specializing in Applied Ethics, Environmental Ethics and Climate Change Ethics. In his current research and teaching, Hattingh focuses on the problem of integrating ethical considerations in environmental decision-making, and in particular on institutional responses to the ethical issues related to climate change. From 2004 to 2011 he was member of the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) of UNESCO, where he also served on the Executive Board as Rapporteur since 2005. He is Member of the Editorial Board of the Netherlands based Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (since January 2007), and the African Journal of Business Ethics (since 2008). From 2008 to 2012, he was President of BEN-Africa (the Business Ethics Network – Africa). He was also Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University from 2013 to 2017.

Workineh Kelbessa is Professor of Philosophy at Addis Ababa University. He obtained his BA degree in Philosophy from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, his Master’s in Politics of Alternative Development Strategies from the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and his Ph.D. in Philosophy from University of Wales, Cardiff, now Cardiff University, UK. He is the author of two books. He also published many articles in refereed journals and chapters in books in the fields of environmental ethics, development ethics, climate ethics, African philosophy, globalization, philosophy of love and sex, and indigenous knowledge. He was a former Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and a member of the UNESCO’s World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology, and the Editorial Advisory Board of Environmental Ethics. He has also served on the Editorial Boards of Health Care Analysis, the African Journal of Environmental Ethics and Values, and the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics.

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Purpose

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one’s decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

Projects

A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.
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The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Columbia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enterprises.

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