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The Humanization of Technology and Chinese Culture

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Introduction

This study of the role of Chinese culture in the humanization of technology is part of a series of joint studies by the Institutes of Philosophy of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and of Fudan University in Shanghai with the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP). Begun in 1987 with Peking University, this focused first upon the perennial concern for the modernization of China. During the 1990s, along with people's throughout the world, the Institutes of Philosophy in Shanghai extended their concerns beyond the classical Chinese issue of modernization and even beyond its critique in "postmodernism," and began to envisage a new more humane Third Millenium. Hence, in recent years these studies have examined the humanization of technology, economics, civil society, spiritual values and indeed of globalization itself.

The theme of this volume is the humanization of technology and Chinese culture. Modernization had ardently been sought by the Chinese people for over a century -- often, as in the 1919 movement, at the direct expense of the Chinese cultural heritage and identity. Technology was first been envisaged hopefully as the substitution of human labor by the machine. Brutally, however, fascination with technology shifted attention from human interiority to the objective world, to which it moulded human behavior. In this sense it now has come to symbolize the dehumanizing effects of modernization.

What is distinctive of the present Renaissance in all phases of life is that it renews the appreciation of culture, including its importance for the implementation of our physical and spiritual worlds. This, in turn, directs fresh attention to technology to see, not how it can be dominated, but rather how it can be developed on a new and more humane basis. Today, we look not merely for ways in which technology can be made harmonious with Chinese culture, but for how it can be stimulated, implemented and oriented thereby. This is the exceptional significance of the present study at this turn of the millennia.

The chapters of this work fall into three parts: Part I studies the and challenge of technology, with special attention to China; Part Two studies the emerging awareness of the role of the human subject with regard to technology; and Part Three concerns especially values in Chinese culture which can contribute to, and shape, technology at this historic juncture.

Part I "The and Challenge of Technology" begins with a study by T. Imamichi, host of the overall study, who reaches deeply into the , history and ramifications of technology. He identifies its logical, cosmological and ontological dimensions, but also provides a step by step historical account of the unfolding of technology up to its present form. This sets the horizons for the project. It is followed in Chapter II by Yu Xuanmeng's analysis of Heidegger's treatment of the theme. He identifies a tragic, but inevitable, human complicity in the problem by showing how it is human destiny to order and hold in reserve the force of being. The emergence of being in time is thereby promoted, but simul-taneously restricted by the limitations of the human itself. As it is destiny this cannot be avoided, but rendered conscious it can enable an attitude of watchfulness in order that our stewardship promote rather than impede the emergence of being in time. This is the essence of what humanity is now attempting to learn and implement with regard, e.g., to shaping the effects of technology on the environment.

This is brought out in Chapters III and IV by Lik Kuen Tong and Wang Xinsheng on Nietzsche and Confucius, respectively. Nietzsche took an essentially aesthetic attitude. He saw the universe

as basically chaotic so that all order is a violent imposition by human power. In these terms the "Super-man" or "Over-man" who most exerted his will was the archetype. The results of this attitude have been so tragic in this last century that at this turn of the millennia we look desperately for alternatives. Perhaps sur-prisingly for some, a major alternative is to be found in the Confucian traditions of China with its sense of harmony rather than of chaos, and of life as essentially the cultivation of the divinely given image of the good. This, in turn, suggests the inadequacy of Nietzsche's notion of the "Death of God" and its reductive humanism. Whatever be said of the Chinese tradition, it differs decidedly from this. In its choice of harmony over violence lies it possibilities for being watchful, in Heidegger's sense, as regards tendencies toward that *hubris* which would shape humans to the machines they manufacture.

In an exceptionally insightful and forthright Chapter V, Lui Fangtong analyses the moral dilemma which emerges from a subjection of all to a technological "overlord," and from the even more widespread attempts among individuals to constitute them-selves into imitations of the "Over-man", each in their own area. In this context he suggests that more positive attention needs to be given to the ethical possibilities of pragmatism. This was developed in the West, but in circumstances not dissimilar from those in which China now finds herself or toward which she seems to be moving.

Chapter VI by Zhou Changzhong in an historical overview shows that such an ethical concern since the last half of the last century has been central in the discussions of modernization and technology. In Chapter VII Wang Miaoyang's review of the positive and negatives aspects of technologization leads him to the conclusion that what is needed is, in sum, its humanization.

Part II "From Objectivity to Subjectivity: the Humanization of Science and Technology" begins to investigate how such humanization can take place. Obviously, this requires some reconciliation of objectivity and subjectivity. Li Jizong in his wonderfully sophisticated Chapter VIII refuses to see this as a matter of compromise in a zero sum game whereby both are compromised as each cedes to the other. Instead, he follows the development of science and technology, through periods of focused objectivity, to the more recent insight that their progress requires a new appreciation of the role of subjectivity. Conversely, a notable degree of objectivity is required for authentic subjectivity, thereby allaying the twin fears of subjectivism and relativism. It is most significant that Li Jizong is able to elaborate this position precisely by locating objectivity in terms not merely of sense data, but of the metaphysical dimensions of truth, goodness and beauty.

In Chapter IX Vincent Shen complements this masterpiece with specific attention to Confucius's ambiguity with regard to science and technology. His fusion of empirical knowledge with intelligibility enabled him to focus not upon the mathematically rational, but upon the reasonable as found through humane life practice. On this basis Prof. Shen introduces with deep insight the position that modernization and its technology can be developed better and more humanly on the Confucian, than on the rationalist basis to which historically it has been wed in the West.

Chapter X by Cheng Chaonan complements this insight by a study of ways in which subjectivity was salient in ancient Chinese thought, where it implied not a domination of , but an affinity therewith. This is echoed also in the subsequent chapters. In Chapter XI Fu Jizhong finds analogues of this in biotechnology's new methods of somatic cell hybridization. In Chapter XII K. R. Hanley finds in the plays of G. Marcel philosophical suggestions for the integration of subjectivity.

Richard Graham in Chapter XIII shows how this is a matter of taking personal possession of one's tradition by comparing it and correcting it in relation to more universal ethical principles. M. Dy in Chapter XIV brings the thought of J. Habermas to this task. Indeed Habermas uses the stages of development elaborated at the Kohlberg Center which R. Graham initially developed. Habermas would stress an ethics not of facts, but of dialogical process in which all have equal voices and cooperate in the development of the life world. M. Dy notes in Chapter XV that in this work philosophy must play an indispensable reflective and critical role, which is open as well to feeling and to love.

Part III "Asian Values and Technology: Humanizing the Modernization of China" suggests that this integration of human subjectivity requires levels of human awareness which classically have been central in the Chinese tradition. Chapter XVI by G. McLean traces the progression of the thought of Kant in his three critiques from science, to ethics, and thence to aesthetics. It is the third which, by synthesizing the earlier two, makes it possible to realize human freedom in the context of science and technology, and the converse. At this aesthetic level, on the one hand, it is possible to take account of cultural traditions as cumulative human freedom and to shape them for new circumstances. On the other hand, Confucius's humane concern for harmony between human-kind and becomes not an addition alongside technology, but the very manner of its assimilation and elaboration today. This is developed into an eco-aesthetic by N. Hashimoto in Chapter XVII.

Chapter XVIII by Chen Ganfa illustrates the importance of this for the new China where interests can seem to submerge righteousness, egoism overcome altruism, and individualism eclipse the community. In Chapter XIX M. Dy responds to this with the alternate view of Zhuang Zi, namely, that perfect joy is found not in grasping, but in letting go. This is the deep message of the Hindu *Bhagavad Gita* as well. M. Dy goes further in Chapter XX noting that the Chinese tradition has means to right the imbalance due to its cyclical view. This was never the Greek sense of repetition, but rather of ongoing development with cosmic proportions and endless possibilities. This enables one to overcome the exteriority of consumption and to find the meaning of reality in the deep center of human life as sacred, uniting the infinite and the finite, and .

Obviously to implement this requires developments in education and Chapter XXI by Shi Zhonglian points out that this must have two dimensions. One of these is the permanent value context of a tradition. The other is the spiritual enlightenment by which one is able to appreciate the present situation and apply the tradition creatively thereto.

Chapter XXII by T. Imamichi looks into Japanese culture's deep resources for this and finds a rich bonding to and its elements, and Chapter XXIII by Yamamoto Yasuo outlines the structure of values founded thereupon. Chapter XIV by Vincent Shen reviews the development in Taiwan of attempts to provide Chinese philosophy with additional dimensions in order to enable it to fulfill the demands put upon it for life in our times. Chapter XXV by T. Zasepa provides a spiritual grounding for this vision.

In sum, the work does not see technology as a threat. That would be the case were it interpreted only in terms of the philosophical context, insensitive to subjectivity and focused upon control, which unfortunately has been too characteristic of the modern and even the postmodern periods. Instead, the work sees technology as able to be a much needed and important help when appreciated in the context of an Asian vision centered on harmony and interiority, and with a sense of transcendence which invites human initiative and creativity.

Part I
The and Challenge of Technology

1.
Technology and Collective Identity: Issues of an Eco-ethica

Tomonobu Imamichi

Prologue

In early Chinese antiquity many philosophers such as Confucius, Laotse and Tschuang Tschou used the words "the same", "sameness", "the one", "the one and the same" and "the oneness". Therefore, without philological difficulty, we may say that there was a clear consciousness of identity in Chinese antiquity. Nevertheless, as the term identity is not univocous, but poly-semantic, we must refrain from a horizontal extension of the many kinds of identity and limit the range of the problem to the present task. For methodological reasons I will choose the following four dimensions where a comparative study of identity is possible between East and West, namely:

(1) linguistic scope (from the point of view of subjectivity),
(2) ontological structure of a person (from the point of view of inter-subjectivity),
(3) logical perspective (from the point of view of objectivity), and
(4) cosmological sphere (from the point of view of inter-objectivity).

As these four problems will be treated separately this study consists of four parts. But this does not mean that each part is separate one from the other. As ethical identity, all four parts have a common task and systematically compose one theme; hence this will be a comparative study of identity with regard to ethics.

The word "eco-ethica" will be used instead of "ethics", because consideration of the problems of identity brings us to the need to reflect on the collective identity of human beings in the eco-logical crisis caused by the technological superiority of the collective identity of the enterprises (legal person or corporation) or the state or nations as secular groups.

The term eco-ethica designates neither environmental ethics nor ecological ethics, but ethics in the *oikos* in the widest sense of human beings; this is ethics in the sphere of human life consisting not only of , but also of culture and technology. We shall begin then with some notes on technology and its humanization.

Technology: The Impact of the Machine Upon Humanity

Modes of Technology

The transformative effect of the machine upon humanity has had three modes.

(1) The human physical force is so strengthened through technological machines that the man who has a car of better quality can arrive earlier than the man with a normal car, although the latter may be a marathon champion who runs far better than the former. The superiority of individual physical power is nothing compared with the efficiency of technology in such a case. Humanity becomes so dependent on machines for human beings that it is not important to have physical strength for the labor necessary for human society. At least as regards the efficiency of physical

labor our attention shifts from human *physis* to machine *techné*, for automation in general means operation without a person.

Whereas social justice is calculated upon the power invested in work, the space for individual differences in physical work is so diminished that it is regarded as unnecessary. Hence, social justice concerning human physical efficiency is absent from present day social consciousness. The benefit of the "mechanization" of humanity is undoubtedly the diminution of the difficulty of labor and abolishment of inequality in physical conditions. But there are also negative sides which may not be overlooked, namely, the alienation of humanity in favor of the machine and disregard for individual physical differences. The danger of the mechanization of humanity consists in the ontic universality of the machine in which individuality is absorbed in the collectivity. The collective form of egoism, "nosism", must be avoided, because nosism asserts only the benefit of the group to which people as *nos* belong.

(2) The human faculty as mental force is so effectively strengthened through the technology of the machine that one who has a computer can calculate far better than one without one, although the latter be a professor of mathematics and better in calculation than the former. The qualitative superiority of individual mental power is as nothing compared with the efficiency of technology in such a case. The use of the machine by humanity is sought to the extent that it is not important to have mental abilities for memory or calculation. Education in a technological society inclines from humanism to the mechanical working of computers. No doubt it is necessary to operate machines like computers given the technological development of present society. But this often forces us to forget the importance of the mental problems which cannot be operated upon at the mechanical or technological level. For instance though signs can be worked by machines, language is on a higher spiritual dimension than are signs. The mental creativity linked with the individual's spirituality must not be forgotten, in spite of the marvelous efficiency of the mechanization of humanity. But as to social tendencies, the curriculum in high schools and universities is being changed more and more from humanism into the mechanism which despises the non-quantitative problems of spirituality.

(3) The human attitude of religion with regard to divinity generally is despised by technological progress. Here too is a mechanization of humanity in connection with divinity as the object of human piety. In older days as a symbol of salvation a cure from the agony of illness was sometimes interpreted as divine supernatural power; almost all predictions also were interpreted as divine supernatural knowledge. But now the cure of difficult diseases is the business of medical treatment, while the prediction of storms is the business of meteorological science. Control of gender also is possible through bio-scientific technology. Organ transplants between living individuals are now possible, though even the divinity could not show us an ordinary method of rescue from death. As a result people now very often believe that miraculous events in both the curative and predictive domains are caused not by divine power, but by scientific methods. Not only mechanization of humanity, but also mechanization of divinity are now the mode for world culture.

Although in bio-science the code of inheritance in DNA becomes more and more known, everyone knows that life science cannot touch the individual secret of why this individual exists here and now between general deterministic conditions and personal free decisions. The personality as an historical development of a person may be the object of scientific description, but the reason why it is so in its individuality is beyond scientific universality. *Haeceitas* is the problem of dignity as the religious correlate of the personal subject.

Emergence of Technology

If the mechanization of humanity is not entirely acceptable and humanity is necessary for the future of human society, then the humanization of technology must be discussed in order to change the horizontal technological dimension into the poly-dimensional configuration of society. For the human being has at least one other vertical dimension as nostos, that is to say, reflexion as*epimeleia tes psyches*. We must think principally in order to find some concrete points from which we can begin metaphysically a humanization of technology. We must examine the history of technology in the manner of a meta-technica or metaphysics of technology. There are five such stages in the history of technology.

Technologia in principio (1750-1900): This is the age of heavy industry beginning from the invention of the steam engine by J. Watt in 1765. If effectivity be positive immutability and accident be negative immutability, both became far more grave because the steam engine is stronger than the human hand. There was a transition from individual immutability to responsible inter-individual relations. Therefore the application of the notion of responsibility to the inter-relation between humanity and technology was an ethical event. The locomotive (developed in 1825 between Stockton and Darlington by Stevenson) was for public service and symbolized the gigantic progress in transportation which generates a dynamic society. In this age technology was in the hands of public authorities, and in the domain of heavy industry there was a confusion of morality with public order.

Technologia individualis (1900-1950): This is the age of precision industry. The universalization of precision instruments is characteristic of the first half of the 20th century. In the place of the locomotive, the automobile became popular and was used individually. Hence, traffic regulations became moral virtue so that blind obedience to traffic signals was classified in the category of moral goodness. The mechanization of humanity in the moral domain took place here first. The amalgamation of precision industry with heavy industry resulted in the production of the atomic bomb. This gigantic destructive power can be activated by just pushing a button with one finger. The transformation from inter-individual responsibility to the inter-subjective co-responsibility is absolutely necessary in the moral dimension. The aretological revolution prepared by eco-ethica must be recognized for human survival.

Technologica circumstans (1950-1980): This period is the age of technology as circumstance. Technology became more an environment than separate instruments. This is one of the most important transformations of our century. We must recognize the logical change of the practical syllogism, new social crimes regarding information, the change in the concept of neighbor in telecommunications and new classification of the real world through the efficiency of human activity.

Technologica ut agens (1980-1990): This is the age of the technological agent in various domains, and so-called automation appears. Technology plays the role of servant to human beings, e.g., robots, computers, automation, organ transplants, etc. These are realizations of technology as agents of humanity. Though the human being wished to use robots and computers like domestic animals, domestic technology is a far more effective servant of humanity. At least as regards affectivity even in the intellectual domain, the human being cannot rival technology as an agent.

Technologia ut dominus (1991-): In various domains technology becomes the master of human beings. In an aeroplane we must abandon our destiny entirely to the technological machine, as if technology like a feudal lord could decide our life and death.

Hence we must make efforts to humanize technology, lest we lose our humanity at the hands of the inhuman lord of technology. In order to recover our dominion as human beings, we must create new virtues through the aretological efforts of eco-ethica because we must live in technological circumstances and with technological apparatus. This implies such new virtues as punctuality, philoxenia, tolerance in thought, entrapelia, justice regarding human rights, machinastics, the learning of one foreign language, regard for , etc.

In this modern sphere of human life during the second half of the 20th century many ethical phenomena have arisen which cannot be resolved through the traditional ethics established for a natural society. For example, in traditional ethics individual identity has always been considered higher and more important than the collective identity.

Many scholars who investigated primitive societies have written, like Durkheim, that in pre-cultural savage societies there is only collective identity. Therefore individual identity is the product of the cultural activity of human beings. Hence, the so-called collective identity has not been regarded as important for philosophical meditation. Indeed collective identity as nationalism or militarism during the Second World War is an example to be avoided. Thus, we ceased to think of collective identity in treating ethical problems.

However, in a technological society we must face collective identity as a new dimension in the practical syllogism. Through technological development, the means for the purpose or end of actions has been so very much advanced that the traditional practical syllogism schematized by Aristotle has been changed in its logical structure.

The classical form of practical syllogism in the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 1111b 26-1112b 17, was as follows:

Major: A is wanted (I wish to have A).
Minor: p, q, r, etc, are means which will realize this wanted A.
Conclusion: I choose p for A because of some reasons.
This classical form of syllogism remains valid even today in our individual decisions to act.

But today one experiences at the same time a reversed logical structure of the practical syllogism because the extreme development in technology as means has brought about the primacy of the means over purpose. Hence, we have a really new practical syllogism:

Major: We have the power P (the subject is plural).
Minor: P can realize a, b, c as purpose.
Conclusion: We choose the purpose a.

This new type of practical syllogism has many implications for moral philosophy; here I would select two things regarding our theme:

(1) the new ethical meaning of collective identity, and
(2) the moral responsibility of this collective identity.

We have already referred to the plurality of the ethical subject: the subject of the act of decision in a technological society normally is not an individual person, but a committee. Hence in techno-ethics we must think about the moral meaning and ontological structure of the committee as a collective identity with respect to decision making power. This is a new dimension of post-cultural society and we must consider what is the topos of responsibility of such a collective identity. The theme of identity must be developed in terms of this most modern problem of consciousness.

Linguistic Scope

We must treat collective identity as well as personal identity as a very important moment of philosophical anthropology, that is to say, we must discover the new sense of collective identity not as a pre-cultural primitive mentality, but as the post-technological ethical mode. In order to think in this line, we must rethink the principal code of identity in the comparative linguistic dimension. Each cultural circle has traditional linguistic customs which sometimes suggest philosophical meaning concerning identity.

The linguistic form for presentation of oneself in everyday activity in society provides a basis for thinking about our theme, identity. For example when a brief self-representation is required in a certain committee in Western society each member would speak in the following way: "I am Tomonobu Imamichi, professor of philosophy at the University of Tokyo in Japan." One announces one's personal name first, secondly ones family name, thirdly ones profession, fourthly the name of the society to which one belongs, and at last the name of the city or country.

In this short self-presentation the first or the second person are more impressive and attractive than the third person so every other member can recognize clearly who is present as a member of committee. Therefore the above word order of self-presentation would seem to be the sole suitable form all over the world.

However, in the Orient, the linguistic form for self-presentation has just the opposite word order as in the West. According to Oriental custom, one must speak in the following way: *Watakushi-wa Nihon-no Tokyo Daigaku-no kyoju, tetsugakku tanto-no Imamichi Tomonobu de gozaimasu*: literally "I, of Japan, Tokyo University, professor of philosophy, Imamichi Tomonobu am" or in correct English form: "I am from Japan, from Tokyo University, a professor of Philosophy, Imamichi Tomonobu." And usually according to Oriental custom one must announce ones name in a low voice because of modesty. Through this self-presentation in the East all other members of the committee have a very clear cognition from what country the man comes and to which society the man belongs. But sometimes they cannot understand the name of the person, for very often in presenting oneself one eliminates his or personal name and says only the family name to which one belongs.

We interpret the above facts as follows. In Western society personal identity is of essential importance, so that one's personal name is the first thing one wants to present to the other and the first thing others wish to know. In contrast, in the Eastern world one's collective identity as belonging to a society is the most important; hence, the first thing one wishes to let the others know is not one's own name, but the name of the society to which one belongs.

What does this mean philosophically? One of the ethical dangers caused by the Oriental form of collectivism is a psychological resignation from individual morality. In place of the harm from egoism there arises in the Orient harm from nosism, that is, looking for the benefit of the group.

This is very efficient for team work, but it presupposes the defeat of another team. Moveover, the principle of Oriental collective identity is domesticism, which has the danger of inclining to nationalism. This, however, is not primitive collectivism under which individuality is dominated through one and same ideology. It is a functional collectivism, that is to say it is free from the ideology or religion of each member; what matters is the ability of the member to contribute to the function of the group. Hence, there is no spiritual identity, but there is effective functional identity.

Each member is really two individual subjects, one is the functional subject as a unit of the collective identity in public life, the other is the personal subject as a substance of individual identity in private life. This discrepancy of one's own existence is expressed in Japanese as *tatemae* and *honne*, *fasade*, or face and authentic voice.

Tatemae as *fasade* in the techno-ethical dimension sometimes is not acceptable for the *honne* as true voice in personal ethics. This existential paradox is often regarded as lack of sincerity by Western people who express their true voice by all means and under any circumstances.

Because of the technologization of society, even in the Western world there arises the need for collective decisions by a committee and for team work in various domains where in the past individual decisions were final. For example, no individual person has nuclear energy, but the society as a collective identity does have it. In this techno-ethical dimension some individual members of society may oppose the general decision for personal ethical reasons, but they are forced to accept it as members of society. Thus, the moral landscape of the modern technological society approaches the Oriental situation of two subjects, *tatemae* and *honne*.

Most Oriental people are used to realizing their true voice as *honne* in the private perspective of taste in poetry, painting or calligraphy, escaping from the public difficulty. This is half resignation as a modern hermit; in such a way one can find personal fulfillment, but this will not help to improve society. The theoretical contribution to technological society is collective identity from the Oriental tradition. We await the theoretical contribution to this problem of personal identity from the Western tradition. This is the topos of mutual dialogue in the eco-ethical dimension.

The Ontological Structure of a Person

The philosophical origin of the two sorts of subject or the difference within subjective identity is found in the reflective philosophy of Tchuang Tschou, a contemporary of Aristotle. So, the fact that in the Orient personal identity is at least socio-ethically less important than collective identity never means that philosophical reflection on personal identity is not found in the Eastern tradition, as was the case in some primitive societies. According to Confucius the highest happiness of the human spirit was the transcendent ecstasy of spirit caused by liturgical music. But in his time liturgical music itself was made for the royal dynasty as the center of collective identity. Thus the spiritual ecstasy of Confucius might be a self-forgetfulness of the individual spirit in the collective identity of the glory of the royal dynasty. Tschuang Tschou criticized this Confucian confusion of self-forgetful fascination with true ecstasy or pure awakening in the eternal one.

According to Tschuang Tschou there is a definite structural difference between the phenomenal subject "I as *wo*", which is objectified as an object of reflection and the un-objectified fundamental subject "I as *wu*", which is never used in the oblique cases and therefore is a constant subject. The former, namely, "I as *wo*" may be offered to the collective identity for its benefit, but the latter, namely "I as *wu*" is the reflecting, evoking subject and the original personal identity.

The practical difference between *tatemae* as fasade and *honne* as true voice must be combined with this reflection of the ontological intersubjectivity of the subjective identity proposed by Tschuang Tschou, so that the eco-ethical subject might be more clearly understood. The problem of intersubjectivity of the personal structure is not the epistemological inter-subjectivity in Husserl, but the ontological intersubjectivity which covers the phenomenal dimension and the ontological sphere.

Logical Perspective

The linguistic and ontological dimensions reflect the subjective side of the identity; now we turn to its objective side. On the subjective side decision always concerned ethical acts. But the decision must also be in logical thinking for objective truth.

Here loyalty to reality is always the principle of thinking. To say being is being, to say nothing is nothing, that is, to say the same is the same is the only correct principle of thinking in general; that is to say to recognize identity as identity is the principle of logic. Plato's *koinonia* is one concrete form of logical identity.

A positive judgement consists in the recognition of *koinonia* as the commonness between subject and predicate; a negative judgement consists of the refusal of *koinonia* as commonness between subject and predicate. So, the identity as commonness is a condition for logical decision. This is well developed in identity as "*to auton*" in the metaphysics of Theophrastos, who wrote: Generally speaking to know identity is the task of science. "*Holos de to en pleiosin to auto synidein epistemes*. So the intuition of identity as sameness in different objects is the principle of positive judgements which makes thetic assertion possible.

If we wish to make some positive propositions in order to describe the objective world we may not combine any predicate with any subject without recognizing an identity between them. In such a way, in the Western tradition of logic, science has exposed objective differences between beings through objective identity. The establishment of differences among beings constitutes the analytical perspective of the world. *Cognitio clara et distincta* is therefore the ideal of science in the Western tradition.

In this respect Tschuang Tschou is particularly interesting because he proposes the opposite view, saying "All things are the same if we regard them as non-nothingness." If in addition to this proposition we say that all things are the same if we regard them as non-perfect, then we can really see this vast identity as indifference all over the world. Such an indifference theory may be the basis of the "non-struggle" attitude of symbioticity in a future society without borders. In any case, in the Oriental tradition, the ideal of philosophy is this insight of a unifying identity through negative identity.

Nevertheless, humanity may not be simply identified with the other beings because, as Western science shows, everything is different. Could the *differentia specifica* of a human being have the right to survive without axiological difference from the other beings? Till now we have thought of ethics only *inter homines*. From now on we must think of eco-ethica not only *inter homines*, but also on a larger scale *inter res*. Is it none other than a nosism for the collective identity of humanity to think only of human survival? So we must think of inter-objectivity, in order to clarify the task of human beings among the various objects.

Cosmological Identity

We have observed above the objective side with respect to identity. Now we shall consider inter-objectivity. In order to concentrate on the moral problem we will treat here the cosmological identity rather than the ontological identity, for the range of ontology in Western philosophy is larger than cosmology due to the grammatical identity between the verb as copula and the verb as existence. As Thomas Aquinas said in Western philosophy *ens dicitur dupliciter*, "being is said in two ways": being means both real beings and categorical beings as predicates.

Hence in the Western philosophy inter-objectivity is very well exposed through the *analogia entis*. The concept being contains ontologically not only being in the cosos but also being the category as a concept, but the direct object of moral philosophy is being in the cosmos. We shall limit our reflections within cosmological identity because our theme is eco-ethical. In this regard I would comment on one of the ontological characters of oriental philosophy, namely, the impossibility of an *analogia entis* between the real being and the categorical being, because the copula is not the same as the verb for existence. Therefore the range of *analogia entis* in the Orient is limited only to the cosmological domain.

Moreover there is semantic identity between to be and to have in oriental philosophy. The fact that A exists in the cosmos means that the cosmos has A. So, from the point of view of the cosmos concerning A, to be and to have are the same. This cosmos is sometimes interpreted as nothingness, because it is beyond being and it is not being. We can compare this hyper-ontological nothingness with the grammatical subject as the impersonal pronoun in European languages: "*il y a*" or "*es gibt*". In any case in the cosmological identity of being there must be a cosmological difference as an *analogia entis* between the *res* and the *reale*. But until now we have confused the reality of the *reale* and the *reitas* (reity) of the *res*. In my opinion both the man-made things and the machine-made things are principally not *res*, but *reale* as resemblance of *res*, because the *reale* can be replaced with the simile.

Res is absolute data, which cannot be replaced with the other (the clear difference of "*il y a*" from "*L'homme y a*", of "*es gibt*" from "*der Mensch gibt*"). We may be lord over *reale*, but we must not be lord or *dominus* for *res*; we must be administrator for *res* in order to realize the symbiotic world. For reality we may be content with legal regulations, but for "reity" we must have moral consciousness, because its dignity and vitality are cosmologically beyond our quality with respect to its existence. So we have argued the cosmological identity for being as regards existence and the cosmological difference between the reality and "reity" with regard to axiology. We are in a collective identity with regard to the cosmological identity of symbioticity and in cosmological difference through our personal identity which can reflect our moral task for ourselves and for the cosmos.

Cosmological identity as constant circulation in is one of the collective identities. Vegetable and animal life can participate in that endless movement through their specific identity. Human beings as collective identity cannot participate in it because of their individual identity which vertically cuts this cosmic circulation. What we can contribute to the cosmic life is only to reflect on the lasting possibility of cosmological identity, in which we do something in our individual difference and are sustained by our personal identity. We must be conscious of our collective symbiotic identity with the cosmos and present ourselves as individual identities in our spiritual activity -- something never permitted for the other beings.

2.
Heidegger on Technology, Alienation and Destiny

Yu Xuanmeng

In his later thinking Heidegger wrote as one who knew destiny. He expresses himself freely on whatever he treats, as if he has been beyond the everyday secular world and enjoyed broad perspectives. This reaches not only from West to East, but from ancient times to the present, so as to seize the real through the eyes of his mind. This can be seen in his philosophizing about the essence of modern technology. Wherever technology holds sway in modern society and people strive to engage in technological pursuit, he finds the phenomenon of alienation. He tries also to pursue world destiny or providence through technology and maintains that man needs to keep observing destiny. This sounds like an old principal of the Chinese philosophy: through technique to Tao. This paper will provide a brief review of his view about technology, alienation and destiny.

Technology as Standing in Reserve

Heidegger searches deeply into this problem, questioning even the essence of essence. When talking about essence (*Wesen*), he maintains that: "The noun is derived from the verb *wesen* and is the same as to last or endure (*wahren*)."1 With the prefix *an*, *anwesen* means "to come to presence." In short, for Heidegger essence means enduring or being present. Thus, he could say, to question the essence of technology is to question how technology as a phenomenon is enduring and present. In his *The Question Concerning Technology*, sometimes, Heidegger uses the word *an-wesen* to denote essence.2 As originally, there was no hyphen between the prefix *an* (to, at, toward) and the root *wesen*, by it using the hyphen he intends to emphasize the meaning of "coming to presence".

Though Heidegger is often criticized as playing word tricks, here we shall not comment on whether this is legitimate or whether there is philological grounds for so tracing the meaning of essence. At any rate, it is obvious that his point is to focus not upon "what technology is", but rather to think how the phenomenon of technology comes to presence and endures, which is to grasp the essence of technology by its origin and procedure, i.e., a genetic manner.

Heidegger had developed this way of thinking much earlier in *Being and Time* where he points out that even in ontology which has universal beings or categories as its objects one should raise first of all the question of the meaning of Being. This is the so-called "ontological priority of the question of Being".3 There Heidegger brought out the primordial meaning of Being, which long had been forgotten. To deal with beings on this ground is to uncover the various ways in which the beings reveal Being. Hence, Heidegger's discussion of the essence of technology is a concrete use of "the ontological priority of the question of Being". Here the particular being is technology and to work out the essence of technology is to uncover the way in which technology reveals being.

Heidegger finds a support for his point of view from the origin of Greek culture. He writes that the Greek term for technology is *techné*, "the term not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the fine arts. *Techné* is a matter of bringing-forth, *poiesis*; it is something *poietic*."4 "From earliest times until Plato, the word *techné* was linked with the term *epistéme*: both being names for knowing in the broadest sense: to be entirely at home in something, to understand and be expert in it. Such knowing provides an opening, and as such is a revealing."5 "Thus what is decisive in *techné* does not lie at all in making and manipulating, nor

in using of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing. As revealing, not as manufacturing, *techné* is a bringing-forth."6

The problem then is in what way is modern technology revealing? In response Heidegger distinguishes different levels to reach his conclusion step by step.

First, "The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging (*Herausfordern*)".7 *Herausfordern* is formed by a verb root *fordern* (which means to summon, to demand, to challenge) and two adverbial prefixes: *her*-(hither) and *aus*-(out). No single element can be omitted if we are to grasp the full meaning. Thus, according to Heidegger, as a mode of revealing, challenging means "to come forth by challenge or demand"; this is a matter of putting to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored.8 This contrasts sharply with that of nature whose revealing is *physis*. "*Physis* is also the arising of something from itself, a bringing-forth or *poiesis*,"9 as with the blossoming or fading of a flower according to the season. But in contrast, if a flower is cultivated and preserved in a greenhouse articifially, this is an excessive demand upon nature, hence, is revealing by challenge. The revealing of the ancient technology is basically within the realm of natural presenting, as for instance, the energy of the wind is revealed by an old windmill which is left entirely to the wind and does not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it. In modern technology, however, a tract of land is challenged to bring forth coal and ore, which in turn is to yield energy. Even agriculture today is a mechanized food industry; the field has come under another kind of ordering.

Second, Heidegger points out, this challenging that brings forth the energy of nature is an expediting.10 That is, what is revealed is directed towards something else, i.e., toward the maximum yield at the minimum expense. For instance, digging coal is not only for uncovering it but for using the energy, which is challenged to turn the wheels that keep a factory running. This determines the basic characteristic of the things revealed in modern technology: "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing, namely standing in reserve (*Bestand*)."11

Standing in reserve is a different kind of being from that of object. Where an object is revealed mainly in human knowing what is standing in reverse is called to come forth in challenging and expediting. Its determination is according to its being a key link in the interlocking beings revealed in modern technology. In the age of modern technology, almost everything is standing in reserve which is a more essential determination than that of object. An airliner standing on the runway when seen as a sheer object conceals what and how it is; only when it is put into the air is it revealed as an airliner. On the runway every one of its constituent parts is standing-reserve; they are on call and ready to take off. Heidegger maintains further that in the age of modern technology not only artificial products stand in reserve, but even nature changes and is no longer an object as previously.

For example, to build a hydropower station on the Rhine River is much different than building a wooden bridge there. In the former case, the Rhine River is put into the interlocking process of modern technology as a waterpower resource. The difference is obvious if compared with the poem of Holdering entitled "The Rhine River". The Rhine River as natural landscape may be unchangeable, but in what sense is it now a landscape when it is on call for inspection by a tour group sent there by the vacation industry? Heidegger concludes: "Whatever stands by in the sense of standing in reserve no longer stands over against us as object;"12 "the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing in reserve."13

On the one hand, everything in the context of the interlocking of modern technology comes forth as standing in reserve. On the other hand, modern technology is a process in which everything is ordered, set into the interlocking context as a key link. Just as from the unfolding of the mountains we can see a mountain range or chain (*gebirg*) and from a person's feeling, style etc., his disposition (*gemut*), so from the context of interlocking shown by standing-reserve we can see its direction or trend, called by Heidegger "Enframing" (*ge-stell*). Enframing describes the mode of revealing which challenges, orders and determines the standing in reserve: "The essence of modern technology lies in Enframing."14 To understand this seemingly strange statement, we should recall that by "the essence of technology", he is concerned not with "what modern technology is," but with a process or phenomenon.

The Human Situation: Standing in Reserve as Alienation

What is the situation of man in the age of modern technology. Generally speaking, the theory of alienation discloses a situation in which man betrays his own essence. Hegel takes man as a link in the absolute spirit so that the alienation of the man is the alienation of self consciousness.15 As Marxism grasps the essence of human being in the light of its social relationship, the alienation of man lies in productive activity giving birth to the theory of alienated labor.16 As man's essence lies in its to be, in *Being and Time* alienation is seen as forgetting one's own Being. Later when he philosophizes on the problem of technology, he maintains that man's standing in reserve is the essence of modern technology. This theory of alienation might be called alienated technology, though he never mentions the word alienation here.

Being and Time see man as distinctive in that the human understands its own Being. This makes man a *Dasein* in which both man and the entities encountered in the world are revealed. As man's distinctive Being is called existence, man's essence "lies in his existence."18

This means that man is essentially his own possibility or ability to exist. Without such ability, one would no longer be human. Its loss means death: "Death, as possibility, leaves Dasein nothing to be `actualized'."19 Hence alienation is not the thorough loss of possibility in death, but the phenomenon or existential reality called facticity.

This is the realization of possibility in daily life. As representing the essence of man, the possibility is called authenticity. It entails realization as facticity, but possibility is more than facticity: With possibility there is room for man to choose this or that way to live; it inclines one to realize oneself in some facticity. *Dasein*, however, already has been thrown into the world, so that possibility as realized in some facticity is itself concealed. As a result, in daily life one is judged as who he or she is, mainly by his position, achievement, etc.

Heidegger sees man as being for the most part in his inauthenticity, not only because he already is his facticity in the world, but also because for the most part he would choose his way "to be" not according to his own possibilities, but as merely following others. As each one lives in the world together with the others, in choosing one's way one cannot but care about others or the mode of Being-with. Fearing being isolated, one chooses a way of existence like that of the others; the popular way of existence is a strong temptation in which each one would tranquilize himself. In this way the human becomes "They", but in so acting loses his or her own possibility to be. This is a universal phenomenon in daily life and one can hardly transcend this existentiality even when one thinks one is pursuing a character or personality of one's own. Such unauthentic existentiality conceals *Dasein*'s possibility or essence. "When *Dasein* is tranquillized and `understands' everything, it compares itself with everything, and drifts towards alienation (*Entfremdung*) in

which its own most proper potentiality-for-Being is hidden. Falling into Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilizing, but at the same time alienating."20

In these terms in the age of modern technology man obviously is in the situation of alienation for he does not decide the goal of modern technology. Superficially, man conceives, designs and expedites the development of modern technology, but more basically the essence of modern technology lies in a mode of revealing as *Enframing*; modern technology develops according to its own ordering or challenging. As Heidegger writes: "Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man does not control the unconcealment itself in which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws."21 As we will see later this "unconcealment" is destiny.

More importantly one not only can one not control the way of revealing, but is oneself the standing in reserve in the context of interlocking modern technology. It seems that the human begins the process of technology, but actually he is challenged or ordered to exploit the energies of nature from the very beginning. "If man is challenged, ordered to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature to the standing in reserve?"22 Heidegger points out that the current talk about human resources or the supply of patients for a clinic is evidence of this. Another example is that while the forester who measures a field of timber to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather, today he is driven by the profit-making of the lumber industry. He is subordinated to the necessity for cellulose, which in turn is challenged by the need for paper to be delivered to newspapers and magazines. The latter set public opinion, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand.23 This case shows how today even people in a traditional way of life are put into the context of modern technology, not to mention people now entering new professions of modern technology.

Of course, there is some difference between man and other entities in this interlocking context. Man is standing in reserve, but not sheerly so, for man is the first to be challenged in the ordering of technology and indeed is also "a way of revealing". But again, "The unconcealment itself within which the order unfolds is never a human handwork."24

As we have mentioned, according to Heidegger's *Being and Time* alienation is a situation in which man forgets his own possibility to be, but tarries and dwells in his inauthenticity. And, since in modern technology man is standing in reserve he must be in a situation of alienation.

It is no exaggeration to say that in modern technology man is in a situation of alienation. In modern technology, man does find many advantages. It is a means to improve the living standard; it strengthens the power to control nature; and it is taken even as a way to freedom. But as Heidegger indicates, as man behaves according to the way which modern technology reveals, he blocks other possible ways of existence. Before man grasps technology, he already has been grasped by it. Can man be said to be fully free when he enters the essence of modern technology? Indeed the more modern technology develops, the more difficult it becomes for individuals to live an average life without technological means for lack of the necessary training. Is not then the individual's existence threatened in an age when modern technology holds sway? The average age when individuals begin their technological training is moved ever earlier, due to the ever more complex context of technology. Even the creating of fine arts could be substituted by the technological practice; the slogan that the school should let the students develop in all dimensions reflects some degree of awareness of the prevalence of technology in modern society. However, when technology holds sway and the other possible ways of revealing are concealed we can hardly conceive what the other ways are.

Technology and Destiny: The Problem

People might look back to the past, but this obviously is unrealistic. What then can we do? Let us look further into Heidegger's theory. Heidegger does not mention the word alienation in his dealing with the essence of modern technology, for through modern technology he wants to trace something beyond human existence, namely, world destiny or providence.

It is surprising that a contemporary philosopher would talk about this, for usually one finds such a theme only in the ancient Eastern philosophies. However, Heidegger does talk about destiny in his later philosophy, since *The Letter on Humanism* (1945). The theme is his supreme aim appearing not only in his papers on technology, but also in those on art, language, poetry, thinking and so on. He sees revealing as the basic meaning or feature for both Being and destiny. As these can be substituted one for another, he formally preserves the Western philosophical tradition and can say that he never changed the theme of his philosophy. Further, his understanding of truth is based on the Greek word *aletheia*, which means unconceal or unconcealment, so that for Heidegger truth is on the same level as Being and destiny.

Given that the essence of modern technology lies in *Enframing* or revealing as challenging and ordering, till now we have not asked what it is that is revealing. In fact, it is Being or destiny, but he never indicates that these are a subject; rather they are presented as the process of revealing as such. "As a challenging-forth into ordering, *Enframing* is a way of revealing. Like every way of revealing it is an ordaining of destiny. Bringing-forth, *poiesis*, is also a destiny in this sense."25

Further, since the essence of modern technology is from destiny, Heidegger sees not first of all alienated man, but a danger within the destiny itself. Man's situation can be uncovered only by working out the above danger. Unfortunately, destiny, like revealing as such, is not something revealed, but conceals itself even while unconcealing. We cannot describe destiny as easily as we describe something revealed, for it is rather mystical. However, destiny reveals itself in various ways, as does Being. When the essence of modern technology holds sway, it blocks other ways of revealing as challenging to ordering; it even conceals technology as a way of revealing, because here everything seems to be revealed not by some mystic power, but in being challenged-forth by a certain order. Thus, "Where *Enframing* holds sway, the regulating and securing of standing in reserve marks all. They no longer even allow their own fundamental characteristic of revealing to appear." "Thus the challenging *Enframing* conceals not only a former way of revealing or bringing-forth, but it conceals itself and with it that wherein unconcealment, e.g., truth, comes to pass."26 One might question this as we are getting more and more knowledge by means of technology, but Heidegger distinguishes correct from true, maintaining that in technology "nature presents itself as a calculable complex of the effects of forces" which "can indeed permit correct determinations", but "in the midst of all that is correct the true will withdraw."27

Based on the above consideration, Heidegger concludes "The destiny of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but danger as such."28 "Thus, where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense."29

Since technology has a relation with destiny, we must consider the situation of man in the age of technology. First of all, regarding the relationship between man and destiny Heidegger says that "Man is rather `thrown' from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that existing in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are. . . . Man is the shepherd of Being."30 Further, he maintains that "Man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destiny and so becomes one who listens and hears

(*Horender*), and not one who is simply constrained to obey."31 Freedom means openness in which the unconcealing happens; when man listens and hears in the realm of destiny, he is in openness.

Because *Enframing*, which is the essence of modern technology, lies in destiny, everything seems to be all right for man in the age of modern technology, for there man is in destiny. However, as challenging and ordering, *Enframing* blocks the other possible ways of revealing, especially when it holds sway; otherwise, as the guard of destiny, "man might be admitted more, sooner and ever more primally to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order to experience as his essence his need of belonging to revealing."32 Furthermore, when *Enframing*reigns, it blocks revealing as such, and hence does serious harm to man's freedom.

In the light of the relationship between man and destiny, Heidegger points out another phenomenon which is also a danger to man, namely, that it is of the essence of modern technology that man seems to become the lord of the earth because here the revealing as such is blocked. As a result, man no longer holds that destiny is the source of the beings being unconcealed, but on the contrary the impression prevails that everything man encounters exists only as his own construct. This leads to a final delusion: "It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself."33 This is taken as a disadvantage by Heidegger for the true "advent of beings lies in the destiny of Being."34

Technology and Destiny: The Response

People usually think it not bad for man to be the lord of the earth. Man is supposed to be the center of the world; if he be subjected to nature he is alienated or reified. Although people have seen from man's controlling nature some unexpected results, such as pollution of the environment, loss of ecological balance, and so on, usually they think that these unexpected problems resulting from technology can also be resolved by means of technology. But, will rectified nature be the same one in which human beings and other living things primordially came to be? If not, why in practice could man not prevent those results beforehand; perhaps man is driven by some unknown force.

If a disadvantage is caused by man's fault, such as alienation, it could be corrected or remedied by man's own effort. But when a danger comes from destiny it could not be avoided merely by man. What man could do is not to give up technology, but to "keep watch over the unconcealment -- and with it, from the first, the concealment -- of all coming to presence in the earth."35 That is to say, man should take technology not only as an instrument at hand, but as a way of revealing. It is a way for human beings to recover their own dignity: man is the shepherd of the destiny of Being.

The above ideas of Heidegger seem full of enigmas. It must be asked, first of all, whether there is something like destiny and what is meant by keeping watch over it. If we follow the logical way of thinking, we cannot verify its existence. It is very difficult to understand Heidegger's idea here against the background of traditional Western philosophy.

Fortunately, as far as I can see, it is easier to understand Heidegger's thinking on destiny in relation with the traditional Chinese philosophy. If compared to Tao in Chinese philosophy,36 although Tao is not known by seeing or touching, nor can it even be named, most Chinese philosophers have thought Tao to be both nature and human society. They maintain that one can experience the Tao through everything and every event, despite differing in details as to which is the correct way to reach the Tao. We can read from *Yi Jing*: "That which goes ascending is what is called Tao. That which goes descending is what is called a `vessel'"37 Thus, as Chinese

philosophers understand, Tao is in the metaphysical realm; Tao is the supreme aim of doing philosophy.

That does not mean that one should do nothing but philosophy, but since Tao pervades the world one can reach or experience the Tao through action in the world. The man who has reached or experienced Tao is called a saint or a sage. Throughout the long history, Chinese intellectuals looked down upon technology, so the word technique should replace technology. But they did not deny that doing technique is also a way to experience the Tao. So, they maintain, "Go through technique to the Tao".38 This has the same meaning as Heidegger's saying "To keep watch over the destiny of Being" in the essence of modern technology.

The comparison between the two philosophies helps us to understand Heidegger's philosophy on the problem of technology. Much can be said on this comparison, but is beyond the purpose of this paper.

Notes

1. M. Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, trans. by William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977) (abbreviated as QT below), p. 30.
2. *Ibid*., p. 9.
3. M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 31 (abbreviated as BT below).
4. *QT*, p. 13.
5. *Ibid*.
6. *Ibid*.
7. *Ibid*., p. 14.
8. *Ibid*.
9. *Ibid*., p. 10.
10. *Ibid*., p. 15.
11. *Ibid*., p. 17.
12. *Ibid*.
13. *Ibid*., p. 19.
14. *Ibid*., p. 25.
15. See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*.
16. K. Marx, *Paris Manuscripts* (1944).
17. *BT*, p. 67.
18. *Ibid*.
19. *Ibid*., p. 307.
20. *Ibid*., p. 222.
21. *QT*, p. 18.
22. *Ibid*.
23. *Ibid*.
24. *Ibid*.
25. *QT*, pp. 24-25.
26. *Ibid*., p. 27.
27. *Ibid*., p. 26.
28. *Ibid*.
29. *Ibid*., p. 28.

30. M. Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, ed. by D.F. Krell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 210.

31. *QT*, p. 25.

32. *Ibid*., p. 26.

33. *Ibid*., p. 27.

34. *Basic Writings*, p. 210.

35. *QT*, p. 32.

36. Heidegger highly appreciated Lao Tzu's Tao; see *On the Way to Language*, trans. by Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 92; *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, ed. by Graham Parkes (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987); and my book *Transcendental Thinking in the Contemporary West -- Heidegger's Philosophy* (1989, in Chinese).

37. *Yi Jing*, *Great Commentary*, section one (my translation).

38. See Zhuang Tzu.

3.

Self-Transcendence and Morality: Human Creativity in the Thought of Nietzsche and Confucius

Lik Kuen Tong

According to Nietzsche self-transcendence is the common essence of all moral codes: "Man is something that should be overcome."1 Self-transcendence is of the essence not only of morality, but of humans themselves; it is one's authentic, civilized humanity. Nietzsche's model of the self-perfected most authentically civilized man is the overman or the one who has overcome or transcended himself. Self-overcoming as the basis of self-transcendence and self-perfection is in brief what the Nietzschean conception of man is all about.

Confucius once said: "To overcome oneself and return to *li* is what is meant by *jen*."2 What Confucius means by *li* and *jen* may be put succinctly: *li* is what constitutes the civilized order by which our authentic humanity or *jen* is defined. To be more specific, *li* is the ritual propriety essential to civilized life; it is the civilizing factor or element -- the "civilized form", if you will -- that distinguishes human from non-human existence. The civilizing function of *li* lies precisely in its disciplinary power or the human power of self-command. Like the Nietzschean overman, the Confucian *chun tzu* or superior man is also an authentic, civilized human being: he, too, is one who has overcome or transcended himself.

There thus exists at least a notable formal similarity or parallelism between Nietzschean and Confucian philosophy in its conception of authentic humanity: namely, the recognition that the being of man is at heart *moral* in character.3 They agree that the process of being human, the civilizing process, is fundamentally a process of "moral creativity", namely, the creative transformation of human character by virtue of self-overcoming or self-command. But thus conceived, moral creativity is in truth *human* creativity: for Nietzsche, man is at once the "creator" and "creature" of his authentic existence. To put this in well-known existential phraseology, "Man is nothing but that which he makes of himself":4 the product of his own "self-making". What makes such creativity "moral" and defines the "moral" dimension of being human is none other than the power and reality of self-overcoming. There can be no question that in both Nietzschean and Confucian thought the human capacity of self-command is of the essence of one's humanity: self-overcoming is the constitutive principle in the human.

But what is to be overcome; what constitutes the human reality of self-overcoming; how can one be at the same time the "overcomer" and the "overcome"? Are these two capacities of man constituted differently, or are they made of the same underlying substance or stuff? In overcoming oneself, one must first experience an opposition arising within oneself: what is the nature and meaning of this internal opposition? Is it an opposition between two mutually exclusive forces, or is it between polarities which belong in deep harmony to the same organic whole? The answer to these questions will not only throw light on the phenomenon of self-overcoming, but also will tell us that in spite of a fundamental similarity between Nietzschean and Confucian philosophy on the relation between self-command and humanity, the differences between them are decisive.

Nietzsche: Aesthetic Creation of the Self

That man is not a stone but, as Ortega observes, must fight for being what he is, and that he is quite capable of acting in opposition to himself or in spite of himself, is, of course, universally

recognized. But the nature of the internal struggle or opposition so characteristic of the moral dimension of selfhood is by no means obvious. It is generally agreed that humans differ from the rest of nature, as in Ortega's words, "Man's being and nature's being do not fully coincide."5 The distinction between a "natural" and an "extranatural" (Ortega's terms) part of humans is undoubtedly one of the most widespread conceptions in civilized thinking. The natural or animal self is the not-yet-civilized part that we readily recognize as part of nature. That seems to be universally agreed. But what of the extranatural part wherein exactly lies the "human differential" between humans and beasts; what is the source of this extra-natural self or humanity?

To the latter question, Nietzsche -- like Ortega, Sartre, and the other 20th century existentialists, profoundly influenced by him -- answers in unambiguous fashion. What distinguishes the human from the beast lies, of course, in one's creative activity: the creator of one's "extranatural humanity" or "humanity" in the proper sense is not God, but the human him- or herself. The extra-natural self is at once the creator and creature of his own creation: the human differential belongs to one as creative subject, to one's creative subjectivity.

That Nietzsche's thought is at heart permeated by an aesthetic or artistic conception of life is almost unanimously recognized by his commentators, including the late Walter Kaufmann and the much discussed Alexander Nehamas. Nehamas' brilliant commentary, subtitled "Life as Literature," is based entirely on this interpretation, as is in substance Kaufmann's earlier well-known classic.6 Nehamas' subtitle recalls a very Nietzschean statement by Ortega: "Whether he be original or a plagiarist, man is the novelist of himself."7 Nietzsche's words are more emphatic: "One thing is needful -- `to give style' to one's character -- a great and rare art!"8 Thus, Nietzsche's conception of human life and authentic selfhood is modeled fundamentally on the process of artistic creation. The human is at once the artist, the basic raw material, and the finished product of his own self-transcending creativity. Just as the creative artist must overcome the resistance of the raw material in transforming it into a beautiful work of art, so the creator in the human must overcome the resistance of his natural self in giving form and shape to his extranatural humanity (the self as creature). Moral creativity for Nietzsche is essentially aesthetic in character: it is a matter of imaginative ordering whereby the original chaos of raw material or data is organized in virtue of the artist's creative appropriative power of projection and interpretation. In the context of human life this "chaos" refers to the natural self and is the chaos of unrestrained instincts, drives, desires and passions -- in short, the chaos of (what the Greeks called) Eros. For Nietzsche, at bottom the human is nothing more than a field of warring instincts. Each instinct seeks its own gratification and seeks to control every other instinct. Nietzsche termed this dynamic essence of Eros or the instinctual field the "will to power". This is not itself a particular instinctual drive, but the common feature of all instinctual drives. The life of Eros seeks power: in essence it is the will to power.

The will to power is the will to command or to prevail over a situation or environment. In familiar Buddhistic language, it is essentially a form of grasping, that is, the tendency of a given organism or life-form or in general a strand of activity or power to persist in and to perpetuate itself. Like the Buddhists, Nietzsche too denies the substantial notion of "selves" and "things", dismissing them both as conceptually constructed fictions. But the fundamental difference between Buddhism and Nietzsche lies in their opposed attitudes towards the underlying reality of grasping, that is, of the life of Eros. For the Buddhists the life of Eros is *samsara*, the realm of suffering, liberation from which defines the very meaning of *nirvana*, whereas for Nietzsche the life of Eros is the only life there is: grasping or the will to power is of the essence of all life.

For Nietzsche the solution to the problems of civilized humankind and the enigmas of life is not to be found in the cessation of suffering or as the Buddhists would have it through extinguishing the fire and passions of grasping. Rather, and anticipating Freud, it is through the sublimation and creative transformation of the natural self, the chaotic complex of instinctual passions. Sublimation then is the mechanism of self-overcoming and thus the gist of human moral creativity. The overman is one who overcomes himself, that is, who succeeds in sublimating his gross or base instincts along the most fruitful or creative channels.9 There is no doubt in Nietzsche's mind that the sublimational process of self-overcoming lies at the heart of civilized humanity. From the "civilizational" standpoint, the noble and the ignoble -- or the good and the bad -- are not mutually exclusive: the noble is in fact derived from the ignoble, the good from the bad. If every human society is at heart nothing more than a civilizational strategy of "drives management", then the "repressive" strategy of most traditional societies would be for Nietzsche, as for Freud, highly undesirable. Much of Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality can be properly understood only from the standpoint of sublimational strategy. But the condition for the effectiveness of the sublimational strategy is the strength or power of self-command. Indeed, according to Nietzsche, the power of self-command -- which is the basis of all creative strength -- is the highest manifestation of the will to power. There is reason to believe that, although the power of self-overcoming is in principle only a special form of the will to power, in the order of discovery the latter concept was derivative of the former. It was Nietzsche's own experience and insight into the nature of self-command and moral creativity that finally led to the formulation of his power doctrine -- which perhaps is the way it should be.

That Nietzsche always depends on literary or artistic models for understanding life and world, as Nehamas observes,10 is not really surprising in light of his profound attachment to the Greek cultural tradition. For the artistic model of thinking is, among the civilized peoples in the ancient world, most prevalent with the Greeks. Plato's application of it in the cosmogony and cosmology of the *Timaeus* is the most notable example. Like Plato's Demiurge or supreme artisan, the creator in man in Nietzsche's aesthetic conception of life and self-creativity is also responsible for the passage from chaos to cosmos -- from the lack of order to the acquisition of order. But what is the origin of order: is it immanent in chaos or does it come from a different source? When we apply these questions to Nietzsche's philosophy, we are immediately reminded of his famous dichotomy in his early writings between the Dionysian and Apollonian principles, that is, between Impulse and Reason, Nature and Culture, betraying unmistakably a dualistic conception of life and reality. Yet in his later works the two symbols have, according to Kaufmann, become merged into one, with the Apollinian principle being absorbed into the all-encompassing symbolism of Dionysus.11 But Dionysus now stands for creativity itself and thus symbolizes at once both the ground of life and spirit, of impulse and reason, of nature and culture, in short, the will to power.

The distinction between life and spirit in Nietzsche corresponds to Ortega's distinction between the natural and the extranatural parts of the human being. "The spirit (Geist)," says Nietzsche, "is the life that itself cuts into life."12 This implies clearly not only that the natural self constitutes the foundation for the extranatural self, but that the latter actually is derived from the former and is indeed an aspect thereof. Thus Nietzsche's position is not only radically different from the traditional dualistic conception of man as typically exemplified by the famous "chariot" metaphor in Plato's *Phaedrus* in which impulses (nature) and reason are essentially unrelated, but also quite removed from the indifference or even hostility towards the natural that has figured so prominently in contemporary existentialism. If the relation between reason and impulse be represented as between a tamer and his beast, then for Nietzsche the tamer is originally beastly in

nature. To put it more emphatically, the tamer is in fact the beast itself, for the beast tames itself: it has evolved out of itself its own tamer.

In truth Nietzsche's mature philosophy is governed not so much by the artistic model which tends to give a dualistic interpretation of the self-ordering process inherent in the organization of selfhood, as by an organic model which conceives self-ordering as a function of organic, field determination. Nietzsche does indeed conceive the raw uncivilized self or life, which constitutes the natural foundation for the extranatural self or spirit, as originally nothing but a field of warring drives, a chaos of instinctual passions. The order of civilized humanhood, which is not a given but something to be achieved, is not to be derived from any transcendent source, external to its natural foundation. The passage from chaos to cosmos -- from a relatively unresolved state of conflict to a relatively determinate state of order and harmony -- is essentially a matter of organic evolution. It is the same dynamic field of instinctual drives, a multiplicity of contending desires, thoughts and interests forming the contents of the personal self, that plays the diverse roles of material and artisan, beast and tamer, object and subject. The conditions effecting the passage from disorder to order are all inherent in the instinctual field itself, which serves as a playground for the will to power. Hence, it is really the same will to power that is at once the beast and the tamer, the overcome and the overcomer: the will to power overcomes itself in the interest of greater power.

Confucius and Hsun-Tsu: The Cultivation of What the Heavenly Gift

Although Nietzsche's philosophy of man ultimately is based on an organic conception of selfhood, the aesthetic model remains a decisive element in his thought, at least as a metaphoric guide. The importance of the aesthetic outlook in Nietzsche is attested by the strong role in his philosophy of the conscious ego with its capacity for imaginative ordering, which is the hallmark of the creative artist. On the other hand, Nietzsche seems to be just as strongly committed to the organic, field conception of order which inevitably deemphasizes the agency and efficacy of conscious ego. This ambiguity and tension between the aesthetic and the organic approach is never quite resolved in his thought. A similar tension and ambiguity is discernible also in the theory of the self in classical (pre-Chin) Confucian philosophy. The "idealistic" and the "realistic" wings of Confucianism are represented respectively by the positions of Mencius and Hsun-tzu, with the former clearly leaning towards the organismic outlook, whereas the latter shows an unmistakably aesthetic orientation. Hsun-tzu frequently employs artisanal metaphors in his writings; his theory of moral order both for the individual self and for society is attributed ultimately to the work of conscious intelligence and often is couched explicitly and implicitly in such metaphoric expressions.13 Like Nietzsche, Hsun-tzu also identifies the initial state of instinctual passions as a state of chaos and anarchy by saying that original human nature is evil. Hence, one must subject oneself to the restraints and disciplines of *li* in order to lead a civilized life. The fact that for Hsun-tzu human beings ultimately are perfectible, that every one can become a sage shows that for him instinctual desires are not in themselves evil. Under the proper guidance of the conscious intelligence and through the taming power of *li* the beast in man or his animal self can be harnessed and transformed into a perfected civilized being. A dimly conceived "sublimationalism", in the Nietzschean sense, is detectable in Hsun-tzu's writings, for whom the good is derived from the bad, the noble from the ignoble. Evil as a matter of chaos, a function of excesses and unresolved conflicts; goodness lies in the achievement of the right proportion, in the restoration of order and harmony which is the hallmark of aestheticism.

What is fundamental to the aesthetic model of selfhood is the tendency to attribute the source of order to the creative agency of the conscious ego. Just as the beautiful form of a marble statue is to be attributed to the artistic power of the sculptor rather than to the original block of marble, so in Hsun-tsu's theory of human perfection, the source of authentic, civilized humanity is rooted in conscious intelligence, and not in chaotic desires or passions. The relation between the instinctual self and conscious intelligence in Hsun-tzu is indeed very much like that between the charioteer (reason) and the pair of horses (desires and passions) in Plato's metaphor of the soul; Hsun-tzu's artisan self is almost as intellectually inclined as is Plato's divine craftsman. Neither Plato nor Hsun-tzu recognized, as did Nietzsche, the possibility that conscious intelligence may itself carry the life-blood of Eros, that is, an expression of the will to power. Furthermore, we may note that although both Plato and Hsun-tzu employ the aesthetic model in their philosophical thinking. The human creator in their model has as much the spirit of a guardian as that of an artisan. Like Plato in his later Dialogues, Hsun-tzu's philosophy betrays a severe lack of appreciation for the importance of the creative imagination. In virtue of its impulsion towards the novel and the unknown, inevitably this poses a threat to the security and stability of the order so essential to the maintenance and continuation of civilized society -- a condition almost non-existent in pre-Chin China during Hsun-tzu's times. Such philosophical conservatism is a natural tendency for a thinker imbued with the guardian spirit.

This spirit of the guardian or, more precisely, the "moral guardian" figures so prominently in Confucian thought through the equation of *chun tzu* (authentic human being) with *shih* or "Knight of the Way." This is precisely what is lacking in Nietzsche's philosophy. Zarathustra's teaching of the overman fundamentally extols the supreme value of the creative individual whose striving towards individual self-perfection seems to bear no essential relation (at least as Nietzsche sees it) to the conditions of the civilized society of which he is a member. This is in sharp contrast to the spirit of Confucianism which is incurably social in character. To be sure, the Confucian *chun-tzu* aims also at his own individual self-perfection; but his individual perfection is inextricably connected with his expected role as *shih* or Knight of the Way, that is, as the moral guardian of civilized humanity. Indeed, in Confucianism the ideal of individual perfection or *nei sheng*(literally, sageness within) and the ideal of societal perfection or *wai wang* (literally, kingliness without) are essentially inseparable. From the Confucian standpoint there can be no morality apart from the standpoint of the "moral guardian" in us. Even if the Nietzschean overman may be said to have a "moral" dimension in his aesthetic self-creativity, in the context of Confucian ethics he cannot be said to be a "moral" being in the proper meaning of the term until explicitly or implicitly he assumes his role of moral guardianship.

Further, the Nietzschean overman as the supreme specimen of the self-transcending creative individual is forever haunted by the playful lure of mystery arising from confrontation with the chaotic and the unknown as the basic impulse of human appropriation in the life of Eros. In parallel, the Confucian knight is forever burdened with the solemn sense of responsibility issuing from a vital sympathetic feeling of kinship towards all life, but most strongly towards one's immediate relatives and kin. This is what defines our humanity in the life of *jen*. The life of Eros is prompted by possessive-aggressive tendencies towards grasping, by the desire to take hold of one's self in the persistence and independence of individuated ownness. In contrast, the life of *jen* is ruled by the cohesive-empathetic tendencies towards bonding, by the longing to unite with others in the mutual belonging and harmony that characterizes the oneness of the greater whole. The fundamental contrast then is between the life of Eros and the life of *jen*, between mystery and responsibility, between grasping and bonding, between creative individuality and

moral guardianship. In short, it is between what we may term the "way of wonder" and the "way of care" -- or "thaumaticism" (from the Greek *thaumazein*, wonder) and "curaticism" (from the Latin*cura*, care). These represent respectively, two radically distinct modes of life and thought. Since Eros and *jen* are both constitutive of the intrinsic nature of man it would be difficult for any thinker to philosophize along an exclusively thaumatic or curatic line. This accounts for the ambiguity in the thought of Plato, Hsun-tzu, and Nietzsche.

Perhaps the purest expression of the way of care or the curatic outlook is to be found in the "idealistic" Confucianism of Mencius. Although artisan metaphors are not absent in Mencius, they are not pertinent to his conception of self and authentic humanity. Mencius certainly recognizes that man must somehow act in opposition to himself in order to achieve authentic selfhood. But the harsh reality or -- to borrow Nietzsche's favorite term -- "cruelty" of self-overcoming,14 which both Nietzsche and Hsun-tzu would spare no effort to convey to their readers, is clearly not paramount in Mencius's mind.

For Mencius, the process of human creativity is much less like that of a sculptor working laboriously on his block of marble, than like the ripening of a seed or kernel under the nurturing care of a cultivator. If in the aesthetic or artisan model, the credit for authentic achievement is attributed primarily to the "active" side of the self -- to man as the artisan of his life -- the same cannot be said of the organic or cultivator model. For while in the aesthetic model, the conscious ego in its capacity as self-creative artist is the source of the order that is constitutive of the unity of the self, in the organic model the source of authentic humanity is not to be located in the conscious ego assuming the role of "self-cultivator". It lies rather in the "passive" side of selfhood -- in what Mencius and the *Chung Yung* (*Doctrine of the Mean*) refer to simply as *hsing* or "nature" -- that is, the original human endowment which contains the seed of true humanity. What the *seed* shall become is basically beyond the cultivator's control, for it is determined primarily by the inner law of its self-becoming.

Mencius indeed likened the realization of humanity (*jen*) to the ripening of grains; and one is readily reminded of how in the story of the man of Sung he warns against the disastrous consequences of intervening too eagerly in the natural process of maturation.15 For Mencius the way to become authentically human is simply to recover the "lost mind" in which are contained the germs of the human's original goodness. If Nietzsche sees in the will to power the unifying principle underlying the life of Eros, then for Mencius the beginnings or origins of humanity are to be found in what he termed the "unbearing mind", the principle of human integrity for the life of *jen*. This is one that cannot bear the suffering of others; its frustration is that of our primal feeling of care, our instinct for bonding and mutual belonging. This is diametrically opposed to the will to power which, as the primal instinct of grasping, is what underlies the experience of Wonder.

Unlike the artisan of the self, the cultivator in the process of self-becoming is not, properly speaking, a "creator". The creative principle belongs not to the imaginative ordering of the conscious ego, but to what is heavenly given in man -- to the power of *jen*, the immanently deposited seed of humanity. In the aesthetic model the willful acts of the artisan self are to be imposed upon the inertly given raw self. In contrast, the heavenly given seed is for the cultivator the object of his care and nurture. Indeed his nurturing care towards the seed is already an actualization of his potential humanity, beginning in the ripening of *jen*. This conception of human creativity as consisting basically in a *procreative* process of ripening is what sets Mencius apart from both Nietzsche and Hsun-tzu.

Notes

1. Friedreich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 12.

2. *Analects*, 12:1.

3. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 7, pp. 211-227. My treatment of Nietzsche's theory of self-overcoming is primarily based on Kaufmann's interpretation in this chapter.

4. Jean Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is Humanism," in Walter Kaufmann, ed., *Existentialism from Dostoevski to Sartre* (rev. ed.; New York: New American Library, 1975), p. 349.

5. *Ibid*., p. 154.

6. Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), especially chap. 1, pp. 1-40. See also Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, chap. 4 and also pp. 250-252.

7. Walter Kaufmann, ed., *Existentialism*, p. 156.

8. Friedreich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Press, 1974), p. 290.

9. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, pp. 211-237.

10. Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche*, p. 194.

11. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, p. 199.

12. Friedreich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, II-8, p. 104.

13. For example, his analogical allusions to the potter and the artisan in chap. 23, "The Nature of Man is Evil" of *Hsun-tzu*.

14. For Nietzsche's theme of "cruelty" and "hardness" in self-overcoming, see Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, p. 244.

15. *Mencius*, 6A-19; 2A-2.

1. *The Broken World, a Four Act Play by Gabriel Marcel*, trans. by K.R. Hanley (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1998).

2. "Concrete Approaches to the Ontological Mystery", in *Gabriel Marcel* (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), pp. 9-46.

See also: *Two Play, by Gabriel Marcel: "The Lantern" and "The Torch of Peace"* plus *From Comic Theater to Musical Creation*, a Previously Unpublished Essay, ed. Katharine Rose Hanley (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988).

"The Dangerous Situation of Spiritual Values", in *Home Viator, an Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope* (Glouster, MA: Peter Smith, 1978); Katharine Rose Hanley, *Dramatic Approaches to Creative Fidelity: A Study in the Theater and Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973)* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), esp. ch. VII, "Colombyre or the Torch of Peace: The Role of Person-Communities in Living Creative Fidelity to Values", pp. 129-136.

4.
Nietzsche's Superman: Toward a Transformation of Values

Wang Xinsheng

According to Nietzsche, the greatest problem man confronts is how to justify his life and make it meaningful and valuable. Nietzsche believes that human beings before him have been justifying human existence and life through a moral conception of the world or universe, but that this leads finally to the nihilism of his time when human beings lost their goal and meaning. He maintains that the real justification of human life and existence is not anything "beyond" or "God", but the highest earthly type of man--Superman. In fact, Nietzsche as a warrior of the "free spirit" soars aloft "beyond good and evil". With a solemn and stirring mood of "amor fati" he faces bravely the "nihilistic" reality and "twilight of the idols". He comes to the "daybreak" of affirming life; in a word, he devotes all his life to writing a prescription to cure declining Western civilization. His prescription is the Superman.

Superman as the New Ideal Goal of Man

Superman is the fresh goal set for human beings by Nietzsche after his analysis of the "declining" and "nihilistic" features of the 19th century. It brings to light the nature of Western civilization, namely, to pursue the "beyond" and to depress "instinct".

The horizon of Nietzsche's time was that of speculative philosophy falling asleep in the ambitious systems of F. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel, while the doctrine of C. Darwin was conquering the world, science and technology were progressing astonishingly, and the army of Prussia was the political overlord in Europe. Thus "bon sens" and "cheerfulness" became the prevailing taste and optimism spread. But all of this worried Nietzsche to the point of nausea. He realized more keenly than most of his contemporaries that this was a warning symptom of the "last days of the world", and that the Western world then was suffering a deep spiritual crisis. As a new Hamlet Nietzsche uttered cries of anguish for the "rotting of Denmark". More unfortunately, Nietzsche's patient "Denmark" went beyond that country to the whole of Europe.

Nietzsche pointed out that the shallow optimistic phenomena were a symptom of degeneration: it was abnormal in nature. The progress and richness of the material obscures the poverty of the life of spiritual creativity and culture. He reminds people: "Our time . . . is a time of the poor. Our "rich" are the poorest of all; the true purpose of all riches is forgotten" (WP 61). Nietzsche states this because he takes a person or nation as an "energy" (will to power). "If one spends in this direction the quantum of understanding, seriousness, will and self-overcoming which one represents, then this will lack for another direction" (TI, p. 62). To Nietzsche the degeneration of the 19th century represents a misuse of "energy" for state, politics and the material, but because "culture and state . . . thrive(s) at the expense of the other", finally the "energy" dries up in the non-political and non-material fields, and culture that represents the creativity of life degenerates.

Nietzsche believed that the reason why Western civilization finally came to the "degeneration" and "nihilism" of the 19th century is that the bases of Western civilization -- Platonism and Christianity -- are abnormal, and the history of Western civilization on the level of philosophy is a history of "how the `true world' finally became a fable", a "history of an error" (TI, p. 40). Reason is the warrior of Platonism, while faith is the knight of Christianity; both have common features -

- based on the same prejudice -- namely the moral conception of the world. This is manifest in the Western civilization as follows: In order to enjoy dignity and security, human beings project their desires onto the natural universe or world as morality and values. They objectify and sacralize these desires, that is, they create a "true world" beside "this world". In Nietzsche, the "true world" is a world invented by lies; the "true world", "the absolute", "the truth" and "God" are different names of the same mistake. They are invented as concepts opposite life (EH, p. 115).

In the history of Western civilization, the "true world" as the highest value prevails, but it seems to Nietzsche that it weakened repeatedly, and finally becomes "a fable". According to Nietzsche's analysis, Kantian philosophy is the first shock wave to "the true world" which finally becomes "untenable, indemonstrable, unpromisable" (TI, p. 40). The "true world" as "the old sun" is no longer maintained by reason (as in the case of Platonism), nor by faith (as in the case of Christianity). But as Kant is "a cunning Christian" (TI, p. 39), this time "the true world" is for the moral people acting according to the imperative, although neither for "the virtuous person" as in the case of Platonism, nor for "the sinner who repents" as in the case of Christianity.

To Nietzsche, the rise of positivism is the "first yawn of reason". According to the spirit of positivism, "the true world", "the Absolute" "as unattained" is "also unknown, and consequently also not consoling, redeeming or obligating" (TI, p. 40). It seems to Nietzsche that under the influence of positivism, people unlock themselves from the "true world", "error", or "fable". With positivism and the vulgar worship of science and technology prevailing in Europe, step by step the "true world" becomes "a useless idea and superfluous" (TI, p. 40). "Modern" Europeans do not need security for a "better" life any longer; their actions and conditions declare that their "true world" is a refuted idea, let us abolish it!" (TI, p. 40P). This is the "Death of God".

To Nietzsche the "death of God" seems to be an historical fact and its consequences are significant. Nietzsche asks: After we abolish "the true world . . . which world remains? The apparent one perhaps? . . . But no! With the true world we have abolished the apparent one as well!" This means that the highest values of the tradition such as reason, God, the absolute, etc. -- truth itself -- is unable to govern philosophies and control individuals, unable to sustain Western civilization any longer. For Nietzsche, because the traditional highest value has come to be devalued and Western civilization has lost its unifying basis in "myth", although Europe is full of "cheerfulness" and on its face people commonly feel that "bon sens" and material welfare have progressed leaps and bounds, in fact, at bottom Western civilization since Socrates has gradually degenerated to a kind of lifeless decorative civilization due to its separation from the source of life. Moreover, because of the disappearance of the "true World" or "God" that had replaced life as the basis of culture, "previous goals and values have become incommensurate and no longer are believed, so that the synthesis of values and goals (on which every strong culture rests) dissolves" (WP, 23). Thus Europe lost its cultural unity. All standards and differences disappeared with the abolition of "the true world". To Nietzsche, Europeans are in fact in a nihilistic condition, without faith and goals.

Nietzsche pointed out that the history of "the true world" becoming a fable and of the death of God meant that the orbit of the highest value was devalued. This is a two way process. It was a way for people to recover from abnormal conditions by abolishing the "beyond" and cherishing "earthly life". For this reason, Nietzsche thought that the soil of the 19th century was still rich. But he foresaw that some day it would become dry and barren allowing no big tree to grow up. Therefore, he shouted: It is time to set up our goals, it is time to plant seeds of the highest hope (Z, p. 31). In other words, according to Nietzsche, the nihilistic conditions of the 19th century meant that the declining Christian civilization of Europe would be overthrown; people were at the eve of

revaluating values and a new daybreak. If people want to step out of the black history, "an aim? a new aim? -- that is what humanity needs" (WP, 867). For this new aim or goal "not `mankind', but overman is the goal!" (WP, 1001).

Superman as "a Type of Ascending Life"

Superman as a fresh new ideal or goal for man is essentially different from the decaying type Nietzsche criticized and which had been cultivated in the Platonic-Christian tradition. Superman is "a type of ascending life"; it affirms and pursues earthly life and self-mastery; it is able to live "beyond good and evil", to return to life and rejoin nature.

This point of Nietzsche was based on his theory of "order of rank". From the position of aristocratic radicalism Nietzsche openly advocated the "order of rank". He pointed out that the notion that "everyone has equal rank with everyone else" was a metaphysical-religious hypothesis once ensured by God. But because human beings have no common human nature that sets them collectively apart from all forms of merely animal life, because "the true world" had become "a fable" and "god has died" (Z, IV:13) people have no reason to hold to a basic equality of all men. Nietzsche firmly maintained that men were absolutely not equal: there were higher men and there were lower men. This was the truth of the world, because the will to power as the principle of the world is form-giving and shaping. Because of the different degrees of the development and ramification of the will to power (B.G.E., 36), the world takes on different orders of rank. Things in different orders embody different degrees of "will to power" and the "order of rank" becomes a feature of the world. Nietzsche thought that the reason why some people held the doctrine of equality was that they wanted to draw others back to the same level as themselves, or wanted to surpass others in various respects. It seemed to Nietzsche that this proved that men were not equal, and indicated that there were at least potential "exceptions" to the average men.

Nietzsche not only believed that there were orders of rank in the world, but pointed out further that this was true of "different kinds of life" (WP, 592) which were essentially different. If human life is to develop and flourish, it is imperative "to maintain the order of rank in the world" (BGE, 219), to widen the "difference between strata" and to intensify "the pathos of distance" deriving therefrom. This is a condition of the possibility of "the enhancement of the type `man'", of the continual "self-overcoming of man" (BGE, 257). If this condition is not met, the alternative possibility is an overall "degeneration and diminution of man into the animal herd . . . the dwarf animal of equal right and claims" (BGE, 203). Thus, Nietzsche pays special attention to two orders of rank among all orders, and proposes to "distinguish between a type of ascending life and the other type of decay, disintegration and weakness", contending that there can be no doubt about "the relative rank of these two types" (WP, 857).

Based on this difference of order of rank, Nietzsche divides human beings into one or the other of two radically different and widely disparate groups. One group is very numerous occupying "the human lowlands"; the other group is "very small in number", but constitutes "a higher brighter humanity" standing far "above" the rest (WP, 993). The former is the general run of mankind, the latter is "man's lucky hits", which consist of "the rare cases of great power of soul and body" (GM, III:1). Thus Nietzsche pointed out, on the one hand, there is "the domestic animal, the animal herd" (A, 3); on the other hand, there are the "exceptions", the "fortunate accidents of great success",which are "encountered in the most widely different places and cultures" (A, 4). The former, "the lower man", is the typical traditional human whose feature is to depress the instinct of life (the will to power). The latter Nietzsche names "higher men" whose "exception"

consists in being the "strongest, richest, most independent and most courageous. They have at their disposal "a great quantum of power to which one is able to give direction" (WP, 776). This "higher man" is "the sovereign individual, like only to himself . . . , autonomous and supermoral . . . , who has his own protracted will," and whose "mastery over himself necessarily gives him mastery also over circumstances and nature," and elevates him above "all more short-willed and unreliable creatures" (GM, II:2).

Thus, what makes Nietzsche's "higher men" different from and higher than others is not only that they possess "overflowing power and abundance", "great power of soul and body", "creative power and strength". It is especially that such resources "are controlled" (WP, 966) and that they know "how to press these magnificent monsters into service" (WP, 933). Therefore, in Nietzsche the "higher man" is different from "the splendid blond beast prowling about avidly in search of spoil and victory," no less than from the "tamed" (and "sickened") "domestic animal" which civilization reduces, as well as from the inherently weak, ill-constituted and mediocre type of man he calls the "herd animal" (GM, I:11). What makes the "higher man" higher is a strong will to power and its rational utilization.

Up to now we can conclude that "higher men" as "man's lucky hits" acquire a "union of spiritual superiority with well-being and an excess of strength" (WP, 899) and a kind of "wholeness" and "completeness" that is lacking among the greater part of humankind. Thus the latter have a merely supporting role to play, as the "precondition" and "base" on which this exceptional type of man "can invent his higher form of being" (WP, 866). In Nietzsche the "higher men" are "synthetic, summarizing, justifying" human beings, and are "encountered in the most widely different places and cultures" (A, 4). For this reason the "higher men" are great or "higher" not as individuals or as members of a certain race, nation or ethnic group, but as examples of a "different type of life". They are non-ethnic and non-national. Further, "higher man" constitutes "a higher type that arises and preserves itself under different conditions from those of the average man". It represents the emergence of a "higher form of being" with regard to human existence generally. Nietzsche's "metaphor" for this, he remarks in passing, is "the word *Ubermensch*" (WP, 866): "Here we really do find a higher type, which in relation to humankind as a whole is a kind of *Ubermensch*" (A, 4). So in the final analysis Nietzsche's Superman is referred as "the ascending type of life", which incarnates the will to power. In personified terms Superman is a personalization of those qualities by which one belongs to the "higher" "type". Superman is a function of those qualities which human beings need in order to become "higher" and "higher". Hence it is not proper to interpret Superman in terms of heroism and racism.

Superman as the Incarnation of Value

As stated above, Superman is referred as "the type of ascending life", and is the personification of the plentiful life, which embodies will to power. In this sense Nietzsche's Superman becomes the incarnation of values, the new "highest value" replacing "God", and the direction of a "revaluation of values" and the yardstick of value judgement.

For Nietzsche, traditional Westerners make a big mistake in expanding their "requirements into cosmic and metaphysical values" (WP, 27), while the 19th century reaction to this religious-metaphysical illusion of values in history was a nihilism that rejects the objectivity of values and valuation. Contrary to all of this, Nietzsche maintains that value has objectivity, but its "objectivity" resides not in a metaphysical structure, but in life. Where traditional values were associated with "want", the values he advocates are associated with "abundance" (WP, 1009). The

former are merely "utilitarian" modes of evaluation, whereas the latter are genuinely "creative". For Nietzsche, all earlier values were opposed to life, whereas he stresses life.

"Assuming that life itself is the will to power", nothing in life has value except the degree of power" (WP, 55). "What is the objective measure of value? Solely the quantum of enhanced and organized power" (WP, 674). This enhancement and organization of power is further associated with the notions of growth ("that is life itself") and development -- "the morality of development" being "the doctrine which preached life itself to all that has life" (WP, 125). Thus life itself is value, which ultimately must be understood as "value for life" (BGE, 2), measured by the extent to which "it is life-promoting, life-preserving" (BGE, 4). So in Nietzsche, Superman as "the type of ascending life" becomes the incarnation of value; everything has its value in relation to Superman. As Superman is the metaphor of the excellent qualities of human beings, this relation is just man in terms of man himself or herself, not of something beyond this. To have more Superman qualities, that is, to enhance and organize more will to power, is to have more value, while the value of things outside man is determined in relation to Superman.

As the human is individual and Superman is the qualities of the individual, the value and meaning of "humankind" also are determined in relation to Superman. "Value is the highest quantum of power a man is able to incorporate -- a man not mankind!" (Wp, 713). Against the traditional notion of man as "humankind", Nietzsche points out, that the individual is a new, creative, absolute thing to whom every action belongs (WP, 846). Because of such features of the individual it is possible that under certain circumstances "a single individual can justify the existence of whole millennia -- that is, a full, rich, great, whole human being in relation to countless incomplete fragmentary men" (WP, 997).

Every individual may be regarded as representing the ascending or descending line of life. . . . If he represents the ascending line his value is in fact extraordinary -- and for the sake of the life-collective, which with him takes a step forward. If he represents the descending line of development; decay, chronic degeneration, sickening -- then he can be accorded little value (TI, IV:33).

Thus for Nietzsche the only value of humankind is in relation to what it represents and produces; it is a function of the qualities they acquire. Because the product of humans is the human itself, the source of value is self-formation, self-transcending and repeated sublimation of the will to power, that is, continually approaching the Superman. Moreover, it seems to Nietzsche that the value of the whole of humankind resides in producing individuals of Superman qualities. So Superman justifies human existence and endows humans with value. Thus, in conditions where the traditional notions of a beyond or "true world" and of "God" are no longer able to justify human existence, an earthly Superman solves the biggest problem humans face, namely, how to justify human existence.

Notes

Z: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.
BGE: *Beyond Good and Evil*.
GM: *Genealogy of Morals*.
TI: *Twilight of the Idols*.
WP: *The Will to Power*.

EH: *Ecce Homo*.
A: *The Antichrist*.

5.

Moral Predicament and Reconstruction in Contemporary China: A Comment on Pragmatism as a Moral Theory and Its Influence in China

Liu Fangtong

The Meaning of the Moral Predicament of Contemporary China

Whether there is a moral predicament, even a moral crisis, in contemporary China is a sensitive issue which often is discussed by many people, especially in academic circles. Views on this issue are very different. Some admit that there are serious problems in present day China, but refuse to use such words as "moral predicament" and "moral crisis" to indicate this condition because they think that these confuse the distinct nature of moral problems in different social systems. Others think that the moral problems in contemporary China are very serious and morally disruptive for many persons. This divergence is related both to different views on the problems and to different understanding of the meanings of such concepts as "moral predicament".

It is necessary then to explain these concepts. Moral predicament can simply indicate a dilemma people face when they make judgements on moral choices. In their lives, people often meet various moral problems and have to take positions about them. When people make judgements concerning moral problems they are often in an ambivalent condition and are asked to make choices. For example, people can sometimes have alternatives as to the pursuit of matter or spirit, personal economic profits or influence, taking into account friends or sticking to one's principles, etc. Thus people may fall into some difficult choices. Such conditions can be experienced by anybody in every society. Moral predicaments in this sense do not necessarily have the meaning of a moral crisis or of moral depravity. When people say that contemporary China is in a moral predicament they mean something different.

Moral predicaments in the sense of moral depravity and loss or moral crisis mean mainly that the whole society lacks a relatively stable system of moral standards, or that if there is such a system it cannot play the role of moral standards in society because it is incapable of adapting to the needs of social change or conflicts with some social mentalities. In this case, people will lack a certain relatively stable standard in their moral choices and fall in varying degrees into moral relativism or nihilism, even into a certain kind of moral depravity.

The causes which produced the above condition are very complicated and sometimes completely opposite in nature. For example, when a society is in a condition of decadence and depravity, the originally dominant ideology cannot suit the requirements of social development; the original system of moral standards is increasingly suspect and challenged; it can no longer provide moral standards for the whole society. Until a new social system is established and a new system of moral standards formed or recognized by the majority of people, moral relativism and nihilism may spread. The condition of the late years of ancient Rome is an example. In the modern Western world, some countries have also experienced a similar condition in specific periods of their history.

On the one hand, when a society is in its early years of formation and development or in a period of great change, the original system of moral standards is shaken seriously and to a great degree loses its influence. The new system of moral standards suitable for forming or changing

society is in the course of formation, but is not yet relatively stable and may even have some contradictions. In making their moral choices people may have a certain sense of instability and sometimes are influenced by moral relativism and nihilism. There may be some kind of moral loss, but in this case the "loss" is in the course of progress and hence often is transient and partial. With the realization of a new social system, the system of moral standards becomes increasingly perfect and the phenomenon of "loss" may even disappear.

When we discuss contemporary Chinese moral predicaments or moral loss, we mean these in the latter sense. The use of these terms to state the moral condition of contemporary China may be criticized by some left theorists as blackening socialist China. But as long as we define the meanings of these terms to some extent and do not take them as an evaluation of the whole society, it may be appropriate to describe the moral condition of contemporary China in order to draw attention to the change of conditions.

The moral problems of contemporary China have various manifestations, the most important of which include: disruption of traditional moral standards, wavering by many people in their belief in the communist moral ideal, imperfection in the system of socialist moral standards, the moral corruption of some, etc. Our views on these problems will be stated below.

Chinese Traditional Moral Standards: Their Fate in the Present Age

China is an ancient civilized country with a history of more than 5000 years. Since the social structure of China was basically linked with the patriarchal clan system and blood relationship with a characteristic unity of family and state, all aspects of social relationships have intense ethical qualities. Based on such a foundation Chinese culture was certainly ethical, and in the rich heritage of Chinese thought ethical ideas played a very important role. These traditional ethical ideas gave the Chinese people a lofty moral character. The basic spirit of "five virtues" (*jen* or human-heartedness, *yi* or righteousness, *li* or justice, *zhi* or wisdom, and *xin* or trustworthiness) advocated by Confucian moral doctrine teaches people to do good morally. *Jen* teaches people to work selflessly and love others. To practice *jen*, people should balk at no sacrifice, even that of one's life. *Yi* requires people to act according to a social standard of right and wrong and teaches them to be open, above board, brave and candid, and to use *yi* to overcome profit and perform the law according to *yi*. *Li* demands that people have an attitude of modesty and respect towards others and to esteem the personalities of others in relationships between people. *Zhi* calls for respect for knowledge and ability, and for regarding *zhi* as a criterion in associating with others. *Xin* demands that people be honest in words and actions and to be as good as their words in dealing with others.

The above moral ideas derived from the "five relations" were used by Confucian ethics for relations between the monarch and his subjects, husband and wife, father and son, old and young brothers, friends (the so-called "five relations") and various relations between people themselves and with society. Confucian ethics formulated a series of principles dealing with those relations and relevant practical steps. The traditional ethico-moral ideas of China played an important role in promoting the stability and development of Chinese society for a long time. Ancient Chinese society was maintained to a great extent by its special moral standards; China is a country of etiquette which was developed through the cultivation of just such ethical ideas.

However, the system of Chinese traditional ethics was based on focused production within the family and suited to a social structure linked by the patriarchal clan system and blood relationships. This restricts it greatly and generates a strong conservativeness and closed character. The Confucian theory of the five virtues and five relations stated above and many moral standards

derived from them were made absolute. They were regarded not only as products of human nature but were considered as well to correspond to the way of heaven and earth and to be an eternal moral standard. Being politicalized they came to be considered eternal standards of political action. Often they became a conservative power which fettered and hindered the originality of thought and political innovation, and were used by conservative forces to maintain the existing phenomenon: most rulers in all the dynasties of China highly praised and built up Confucianism into an idol, once their dominant position had been established. On the contrary, when society was in periods when new forces were replacing the old these new forces always violently attacked Confucianism in order to break through the net of conservative forces.

In the 150 years since the Opium War of 1840, especially since the May 4th movement of 1919, the various forces of Chinese society have launched a very sharp debate over where Chinese society should go. Attitudes toward traditional Chinese moral doctrines such as Confucianism were always an important part of this debate. During the May 4th Movement, the political positions and thought orientations of the various forces differed, but they all criticized traditional culture of which Confucianism was the main component especially its traditional ethical thought. They all held that a new culture and social system could not be established unless this critique were carried out. What they did in this regard had great significance.

For a long time, however, the critique of Chinese traditional culture and its ethical theories, such as Confucianism, were one-sided, left or right, that is, ossified Marxist and ultra-liberal. Both took a position of total repudiation toward traditional culture and morality. This attitude led to moral relativism and nihilism under some conditions, and became one of the important causes of the loss of morality and the consequent moral predicament of present day China.

The representative figure of the rightist inclination in its early years was Hu Shi, the leading figure of pragmatism in China. In many articles written in the 1920s and 1930s, Hu Shi publicly looked down upon the culture of China and the East and highly praised Western culture. He held that the characteristics of Eastern (Chinese) culture are "satisfaction", "conservativeness", "being happy-go-lucky", "discouragement in adversity", "ignorance" and "being content with poverty and satisfied with one’s place"; on the other hand, the characteristics of the Western culture are "dissatisfaction", "an enterprising spirit", "conquering nature", etc. He advocated that the Chinese "must admit that we are poorer than the Western people in every respect" and "should be not afraid of losing our national culture", but should follow the example of the West. Hu completely agreed with the "theory of a total Westernization" which was systematically demonstrated by another Chinese scholar at that time, Chen Xujing. Both Hu and Chen idealized the Western capitalist system and its culture; they held that as long as the Western system and culture are introduced into China and carried out, all problems, political, economic and cultural, in China can be resolved.

In all later historical periods, the inclination of total repudiation toward traditional Chinese culture and morality and the corres-ponding theory of total Westernization was accepted under various guises by some Chinese scholars. In another burst of discussion about culture launched in the 1980s, the inclination was developed in an extreme manner by some so-called "radical" scholars. In this period, the "Heshung" telefilm series caused a sensation throughout the country with the keynote of total repudiation of Chinese traditional culture, the so-called "yellow culture".

Those who completely repudiated Chinese traditional morality and culture from the left were mainly some Marxists or those who waved the banner of Marxism. According to the original doctrine of Marxism, we should not take an attitude of total acceptance or repudiation towards either foreign, including Western, or traditional Chinese morality and culture, but an attitude of critical inheritance: to repudiate what is obsolete and conservative or unsuitable for present China,

while absorbing what is positive and worthwhile therefrom. Early Chinese Marxists had long taken such an attitude. Although quite different from liberals such as Hu Shi and others who proposed total Westernization, such leading Marxists as Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu and Qu Quibai did not simply negate the worth and importance of Eastern ideas and culture. In order to struggle against feudal groups pointing back to ancient times and to stress the necessity of departing from the feudal patriarchal clan system and its ideology they used some extreme words, but did not sweepingly deny Chinese traditional culture. Mao Zedong and other communist leaders who turned to the left later described the attitude with which people should critically inherit the good traditions of Chinese culture. After the People's Republic of China was founded, the leaders of the CCP such as Mao Zedong retained such an attitude.

However, they increasingly fell toward the left and this ideological leaning often became an unresistable political force as the CCP became the ruling party of China. Matters of right and wrong in the realm of culture and moral ideas were no longer resolved by scholarly research, but by the leaders' thought. In the early and middle years of the 1950s, Mao Zedong launched a discussion of the film "Biography of Wu Xun" and the classic novel "Dreams of the Red Mansion", and developed such discussion into a punitive political expedition against those who took the opposite position. After that time discussion in the fields of culture and thought was more and more controlled by left political forces; Chinese traditional moral ideas and culture as well as related research were increasingly regarded as decadent feudal ideas opposed to socialism and were negated. This developed intensively during the ten years of the "Cultural Revolution". Under the slogan that communism must completely break with traditional ideas, all traditional cultures were regarded as reactionary and hindering the progress of China, and every effort was made to completely "eradicate" them. Since this eradication went beyond critique in the academic field and turned into a political critique in which hundreds of millions of people took part, among a great part of the masses Chinese traditional culture almost disappeared through "eradication". In a word, under irresistible political pressure the destruction of Chinese traditional culture by leftist orientations was much more serious than that by those who advocated total Westernization.

It must be noted that what was negated by the left was not only traditional Chinese morality and culture, but also its Western counterparts; where advocates of total Westernization affirmed everything of Western culture without any analysis, the left negated everything of the West.

The Communist Moral Idea: Its Conflicts with Present Reality

When those who designed and executed the "left line" wiped out the ideas of both traditional Chinese and Western moralities it seems that they did not intentionally want to advocate moral nihilism, but only to establish and advocate communist morality among people. But their intention did not have its expected effects.

For more than forty years since the establishment of the P.R. of China in 1949, communist moralities have been advocated as the most lofty. Those who followed communist moral standards or norms are considered in some respects as models for the whole people, especially for youth, to study; education in the communist moral ideal was regarded as the fundamental content of moral character. In one period, especially during the early 1950s, the advocacy of communist morality played a positive role by encouraging people's enthusiasm to devote themselves to the state and society.

However, a society governed by the communist party is not a communist society. There is still a long distance between the Chinese society which just cast off the yoke of the feudal-patriarchal

system and the communist society idealized by Marxists. Communist moralities can be taken only as a moral ideal. If the minority is willing to devote themselves to the communist ideal, and can take it as the standard of their actions in some respects and to some extent, they would be taken as fine examples for others. Yet, this moral system still could not be taken as an actual standard of actions for the majority of society. For example, "nothing for self, all for others", advocated by Mao Zedong, was regarded as one of the main expressions of communist moralities. Although a few advanced members can do so in some affairs, it is unrealistic for the majority in such a poor country as China where just to survive makes one think of one's own interests. Even of they can display the enthusiasm of "nothing for self" in some cases, this cannot last and be enlarged.

If we insist upon actualizing the communist moral system as the practical moral system which must orient people's lives regardless of the condition of actuality and history, we can succeed only in people claiming communist morality orally, but not executing it in action. In that case such morality becomes an empty slogan. It is worth mentioning that in the period during which the "left line" prevailed, especially the 10 years of "Great Cultural Revolution", the slogans of communist moralities were often used by some political conspirators and careerists as a means of deceiving the broad masses and poisoning their minds. This threw many people into perplexity and insensitivity.

In more recent years, along with the transformation to a market economy in China, those who are called "public servants" transform their power into money. In order to grab private or small-group interests, they do everything to the extreme under the cover of Marxism and communism. This is bound seriously to damage the reputation of Marxism and communism. If many people in the past had had a sense of respect and even worship of communist morality, the actions of those mentioned above have turned people cold and generated antipathy to communist morality. Except orally, the past pious belief in the communist moral system of many people gradually is vanishing.

The Moral Status of Present China: Its Relation to Pragmatism

Since both traditional Chines moralities and those introduced from the West have been rejected and the communist moral system is not a practical moral system for regulating people's actions, if there is no new moral system to fill in, people's conduct will have no standards to follow. No one would help; everyone would do as he or she likes; the result would be moral relativism and nihilism. Chinese leaders and relevant scholars who have some knowledge of this recently emphasize again and again that in order to construct socialism in the Chinese style it is necessary to pay attention to the construction of both a material and a spiritual civilization. If the construction of a socialist spiritual civilization could be successful, it would certainly be a fine standard for people's moral choices, and also helpful for people in facing moral predicaments. In fact, in recent years there have been great achievements both in theoretical inquiries regarding socialistic spiritual civilization and in promoting this among the broad masses. Moral relativism and nihilism have been restrained and to a great extent surmounted among those who have an appropriate understanding of socialist spiritual civilization. Following this route, we cannot only cast off moral predicaments, but also reconstruct China as a country with lofty moralities.

But as reform in the economic field is far from being finished in China, the co-existence of different economic systems and the conflicts between them are far from being well regulated and controlled. Reform in the political system is but the beginning; a more thorough democratic political system suited to a market economy is far from being established. The influence of the "left line" and feudal autocracy are far from being rooted out. Reform in the fields of thought and

culture has fallen further behind, and the inclination to be closed and conservative is still dominant; there still has not been an adequate and wise understanding of how both to critically absorb Western culture and to develop traditional Chinese culture. In a word, socialism with a Chinese face, far from being completely established, still is not a definite concept in people's minds. In this case, it is naturally very difficult to formulate quickly a clear-cut theoretical system of socialist spiritual civilization, and even more difficult for the system to be accepted universally and to become a practical system for guiding people's everyday conduct. Hence, achievements in this field are limited for the time being; they remain insufficient to clear up and restrain the influences of moral reactivism and nihilism which have long prevailed.

In fact, in present day China, a number of people still fall into some kind of moral predicament or even moral degeneration. The following phenomena are rather grim and surprising. First, in reaction against "selflessness", "nothing for self, all for others" and other noble mottos of communist morality, extreme individualism overflows to a very serious extent among some people, especially those in political or economic power or who have some special relationship with such persons. Their individualism is not one that advocates respecting the individual's personality and developing his or her activity and creativity; rather it is an egoism which takes everything for one's private benefit. Such people take the following ideas as the standard of their conduct: to use public goods for private ends, to harm the public good, to benefit oneself and to harm others for one's own good. They do not serve the people anymore, but force people to serve them. Their actions go far beyond general graft and embezzlement "legitimated" by some privilege. They transfer extensive public to their own pocket. Their actions have produced a very bad impression on the broad masses, and are the major factor causing the moral crises and political instability of present day China.

The second phenomenon concerned with extreme individualism under the impact of negative market economy factors, is the orientation to the money-worship: "All is measured by money" is not just an idea and slogan, but a motto earnestly practiced by some people. The commodity and money fetishisms analyzed by Karl Marx in his *Capital* have become a religion worshiped faithfully by some people in present day China. In order to gain money, some will spare no despicable or filthy means. According to their opinion, fame, conscience, personality, national dignity, all can be thoroughly abandoned; the discipline of the CPC and the national laws can be trampled. News of murder for money often appears in the newspapers.

The third phenomenon, hedonism, has developed to a very serious extent contrary to the life style of hard work and plain living which was advocated by communist morality and revolutionary tradition, and different from the rational consumption permitted by socialist morality. It has been reported that the amount of expenses for banquets arranged by officers at different ranks of government, the communist party and enterprises using public finances amount to more than 100 billion in Chinese currency each year. This is not comparable to any country in the world, even the most developed. That this has happened in so poor a country as China with nearly 100 million people not having enough food to eat and clothes to wear is even more inconceivable, but it is a matter of fact. This shows the extent to which hedonism has developed in present day China. Furthermore, such immoral and degenerate actions as drug-taking and prostitution, which once were regarded as the manifestations of rotten and corrupt capitalism, have been developing to a serious extent in some parts of China.

The fourth phenomenon which is especially ironic in view of the norms of communist morality regarding relationships between people and with society, and constitutes a repudiation of traditional Chinese morality is that many people despise public morality and will not be

responsible for elementary moral obligations and duties. Examples abound and are manifest in people's refusal to obey public order and in the destruction and pilferage of public property. Professional morality is not followed; people will not be responsible even for their parents and children.

The above factors suffice to show that in present day China, many people's thoughts and behaviors not only have no trace of communist and socialist morality, but are contrary also to virtue in both traditional Chinese and Western moralities. If this happened rarely it would not be surprising, for in any society some people depart from normal moral regulation or even become degenerate, violating social disciplines and laws. Society can restrict and limit such persons by certain means so that they do not lead to the collapse of all morality in society. But the actual status of present day China is that the above phenomena are numerous. The relevant authorities try to take measures of education and prevention, but have not achieved the intended effects. So there is a contradictory situation in the Chinese moral field today; on the one hand, the moral outlook of the majority of people is turning towards good order through advocating socialist spiritual civilization; on the other hand, moral loss and moral declination still run wild in certain spheres.

Why should this happen? We have analyzed some of the reasons above. It is worth mentioning that some do not like to seek the causes from such factors as the limitations in the social and historical conditions of present day China, the negative influences of the political and ideological "leftist line" which prevailed for a long time, and the imperfections of reform and openness in various fields. They simply impute all to Western trends, especially pragmatism. In their view, egoism, money-worship, hedonism, moral relativism and moral nihilism in any form, all reflect such Western ethics as pragmatism. In their view, in order to cast off the moral predicament of China today and to construct a socialist moral system as a constituent part of socialist spiritual civilization, we must criticize and reject pragmatism and other Western ethical theories, and eliminate their pernicious influences.

The above point of view is not new. Surveying Chinese history since the 1950s we note a regular phenomenon: once a theoretical inclination in the ideological and cultural sphere was criticized a major political leader, some scholars close to the leaders always imputed it to the influence of pragmatism and other Western trends. They always turned the criticism of a particular inclination into a criticism of pragmatism. For example, the criticism of the film "Biography of Wu Xun" and of the Chinese classic "The Dream in the Red Mansion" became critical of rightist opportunism in the communist party of China. Both were launched by Mao Zedong himself during the 1950s, and both were developed and transformed into criticism of pragmatism. The theoretical foundation of the persons criticized was said to be just pragmatism. During the "great cultural revolution", the extreme left also took pragmatism as the ideological foundation of the so-called revisionist and bourgeoisie lines criticized by them. After the "cultural revolution", some people took pragmatism again as the ideological foundation of the extreme left. In a word, in contemporary China, there always have been some persons who regarded pragmatism as the gathering place of all rotten and degenerate things and fallacies. No matter what was criticized, its theoretical foundation finally would be imputed to "bourgeois pragmatism". So it is no surprise that some people impute the reason for serious moral problems in present day China to the influence of pragmatism and other Western trends.

However, it may be asked, why pragmatism could influence China for so long time, why some people who criticized pragmatism under the banner of Marxism afterwards would be criticized in turn as being oriented toward pragmatism, why whose who never received any education in pragmatism could be regarded as having been influenced by pragmatism. In order to understand

the true relation between the moral situation of China today and pragmatism, the above questions are worth studying. It is impossible for this article to discuss these questions in detail. But it must be mentioned that either those who criticize pragmatism or those who were criticized have no clear and definite idea of authentic pragmatism. What they criticized, or are being criticized for, is neither pragmatism nor even contrary to pragmatism. Therefore, to analyze the connection between he present moral condition of China and pragmatism, and especially to explore the way to construct socialist spiritual civilization, it is necessary to study and reconsider the real meaning of the relevant theories of pragmatism.

Pragmatist Moral Theory: Its Misunderstanding in China

Pragmatist ethical and moral theories were early introduced in China. When John Dewey was invited to give lectures in China during the May 4th period, one of his main topics was precisely ethics and moral theory. Later, those who propagandized and criticized pragmatism referred to Deweyan ethics. It is impossible for this paper systematically to comment on pragmatist moral theory; I intend only to briefly mention certain of its contents related to the subject of this chapter, especially concerning Dewey's moral theory, because his theory not only is the typical representative of pragmatist philosophy, but also has great influence in China.

Dewey's Theory of Moral Reconstruction

In discussing the moral theory of pragmatism, Chinese philosophical circles always have been concerned with the theory of moral reconstruction as the important constituent of Dewey's broader theory of philosophical reconstruction. The most universal accusation brought against Dewey's theory of philosophical reconstruction was that it propagandized idealism and opposed materialism as a way of escaping the mind-matter dualism. Some did not deeply explore what the theory is for or against. If one takes an objective attitude and carefully reads Dewey's moral writings, one finds that they were misunderstood in some respects.

What is the reconstruction for which Dewey calls in moral theory? One of its main contents is to reject traditional moral theories which take the moral realm as absolutely different from scientific knowledge, and take moral research as essentially different from natural science. "After all, we are only pleading for the adoption in moral reflection of logic that has been proved to make for security, stringency and fertility in passing judgements upon physical phenomena. And the reason is the same."3 This logic is Dewey's experimental logic which he tried to carry from research in the natural sciences into socio-political and ethical-moral research. He thought that using experimental logic as a scientific method of inquiry he could unite separate research from the natural sciences and ethics and moralities, the separate fields of facts and values.

This view originated directly from Dewey's new empiricism, i.e., empirical naturalism, as he called it later. Its basic point of view is that the realm of philosophy should be limited to the world which can be experienced. Philosophy should be theory concerned with the world of experience, i.e., the life world of human beings. Experience is neither knowledge resulting from a process of cognition, nor subjective consciousness separated from the object; rather, it is human action, life, practice itself, or the united process of subject and object, or mind and matter. Human action, life and practice, are different from the instinctive behavior of animals; they are always in pursuit of some goals and are guided by reflection and thought, i.e., by intelligence. What philosophy should do is to help people in their action, life, practice, so that they could be successful. Therefore,

philosophy is nothing but a methodology of human action, life and practice. Its mission is to inquire how people can achieve their designated goals in their actions and practice. In this sense, philosophy is a scientific method of inquiry, i.e., a theory of inquiry or experimental logic.

According to Dewey, human action whether in the natural or the moral fields, all must be guided by intelligence, i.e., by experimental logic. Both scientific judgements and moral judgements are empirical judgements for they are all means for human action, life, or practice, "When physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, contribute to the detection of concrete human woes and to the development of plans for remedying them and relieving the human state, they become moral; they become part of the apparatus for moral inquiry or science."4 In a word, the moral realm is not an independent realm separated from other fields. There is no an unbridgeable gap between natural and moral "sciences", between knowledge and value, etc.

There are many weak points and shortcomings in Dewey's theory just mentioned. For example, he over-emphasized the unity between natural sciences and the moral-social-historical sciences, overlooking their diversity and the special character of each. But compared to the ethical trends of intuitivism, emotionalism and even mysticism which took the moral realm as fully contrary to science, his theory is certainly quite progressive. If we do not forget that one of the main shortcomings of traditional Chinese moral theories is weakness in scientific demonstration, we should recognize that Dewey's theory on moral reconstruction, especially his scientific method of inquiry in the ethical realm, is worthwhile and helpful for moral reconstruction in China.

Dewey's Criticism of Moral Absolutism

One of the important parts of Dewey's reconstruction in philosophy is to oppose the absolutism of rationalist idealism which used absolutized general concepts to generalize various special situations and reduced all concrete and ever-changing situations to single and fixed general concepts. It is the same in the ethical realm. Some rationalists took general, fixed, even eternal moral concepts as the starting point of moral research, and attributed special and concrete moral situations to these concepts. What Dewey did his utmost to reject is that there are unique, fixed, and ultimate moral ends as well as a highest good or supreme moral law and principle, and that the fundamental task of ethics is to find this kind of end, good or principle. This idea is in fact a moral absolutism, with different manifestations. Some people believe that this moral purpose is subjection and loyalty to a supreme power or authority, others hold that it is the intention of God or the will of a secular governor, and so on. But uniformly they search for this ultimate purpose and supreme principle. Dewey rejects the above rationalist norm because a person's moral situation and conduct is always particular, special, concrete and changing. So must be our moral judgements; we should make different moral judgements according to different moral situations. If we forcedly subject these situations to general and fixed concepts, we can only give rise to a series of nonsensical polemics and obstruct people from resolving the moral problems they are facing. Even to do so under the banner of advocating reason, would reduce the power of reason by preventing people from exploring concrete moral problems by scientific methods.

While opposing moral absolutism, Dewey did not promote moral relativism, nor did he recommend subjective idealism in general philosophy. In his view, although we cannot reduce concrete and special moral situations to universal, fixed and ultimate concepts, we should not go to the other extreme, i.e., to subordinate general universal concepts to particular cases. We should not absolutize concrete, particular moral situations so that every such situation would be taken as unique and unsimiliar, with no connection to other situations. This would simply exclude any role

for general concepts and principles and lead to moral relativism. Dewey clearly rejected such relativism:

The blunt assertion that every moral situation is a unique situation having its own irreplaceable good may seem not merely blunt but preposterous. For the established tradition teaches that it is precisely the irregularity of special cases which makes necessary the guidance of conduct by universals, and that the essence of virtuous deposition is willingness to subordinate every particular case to adjudication by a fixed principle. It would then follow that submission of a generic end and law to determination by the concrete situation entails complete confusion and unrestrained licentiousness.

This paragraph shows us that while emphasizing making particular moral judgments according to the particular situations, Dewey did not repudiate the importance of general concepts and laws in making concrete moral judgements.

Of course, as in Dewey's overall theory of moral and philosophical reconstruction, there are also certain shortcomings and onesidedness in his criticisms of moral absolutism and relativism. As to evaluating his criticism and even his overall reconstruction theory, scholars of different trends have different views. I will not discuss it here in detail. But one thing is definite: when Dewey opposes traditional moral theory, especially moral absolutism, his purpose is surely neither to promote idealism, nor to absolutize certain capitalist moral principles, nor to preach moral relativism and nihilism, but to shake off the yoke of the old tradition and authority so that moral research could be based on scientific methods of inquiry and could help to resolve the various concrete and realistic moral problems faced by people. Such an idea can play a positive role at least to a certain degree in smashing the trend of thought of China whereby traditional feudal-patriarchal moral ideas long fettered people's thought. This is the main reason why scholars of various trends in the May 4th new cultural movement all welcomed his theory.

Dewey's Instrumentalism in Moral Theory

Dewey did not completely negate the meaning of general concepts and principles when he opposed traditional moral theories which generalized special moral situations by using general moral concepts and laws. On the contrary, he emphasized the importance of these concepts and principles; there is a need for people to use them when they are to do research on morals, make moral judgements or apply the scientific method of inquiry in moral affairs. As when doctors examine various concrete and special illnesses, they need to use medical knowledge consisting of general concepts. However, we should not consider these concepts and principles as the end of investigation or the only yardstick for making moral judgements. We can take them only as means and instruments for exploring concrete and special moral situations. In other words, general moral concepts, principles and laws are not themselves the purpose and end of moral inquiry, but only the instruments for such inquiry. This is the basic meaning of Dewey's instrumentalism in the moral realm.

There are some serious limitations and fallacies in Dewey's instrumentalistic moral theory, which are criticized by both Chinese and Western scholars. I do not intend to recommend this idea, but it is appropriate to mention that Dewey's instrumentalism emphasized only that general moral concepts and principles be regarded as instruments for helping people to investigate and resolve various moral problems. There is no intent to satisfying only the individual's private interest. There

exist some misunderstandings in Chinese philosophical circles in this regard for some scholars have been severely criticizing Dewey's instrumentalism in the moral realm as not only a subjective idealism theoretically, but also an instrument for defending the bourgeoisie's private profit and interests. However, Dewey again and again asked people not to misunderstand the meaning of his theory:

When truth has been thought of as merely emotional satisfaction, a private comfort, a meeting of purely personal need, it is rather superficial misunderstandings. . . . So repulsive is a conception of truth which makes it a mere tool of private ambition and aggrandizement that the wonder is that critics have attributed such a notion to sane men.6

The Pragmatist View of Happiness

Many people undervalue the pragmatist view of happiness. They think it emphasizes only a person's private interests, success and satisfaction, but does not concern the happiness of other people, the collective or society. Some people even consider the pursuit of maximum possessions and material enjoyment to be the creed of pragmatism. In fact, this is not true.

Pragmatists emphasize the great importance of happiness in their whole ethical theory and believe that changes in moral ideas will always be embodied centrally in changes in the view of happiness. They refuse asceticism which excludes people's actual happiness and insist that each moral theory has to discuss the question of happiness. Moralists who seemingly neglect happiness retain the idea under the term "bliss". Therefore, we should accept such things as happiness, satisfaction and enjoyment.

Goodness without happiness, valor and virtue without satisfaction, ends without conscious enjoyment--these things are as intolerable practically as they are self-contradictory in conception. Happiness is not, however, a bare possession; it is not a fixed attainment. Such a happiness is either the unworthy selfishness which moralists have so bitterly condemned, or it is, even if labeled bliss, an insipid tedium, millennium of ease in relief from all struggle and labor. It could satisfy only the most delicate of molly-coddles. Aesthetic sensitiveness and enjoyment are a large constituent in any worthy happiness. But aesthetic appreciation which is totally separated from renewal of spirit, from re-creation of mind and purification of emotion is a weak and sickly thing, destined to speedy death from starvation.9

These sentences suggest that Dewey does not appreciate selfishness, unlimited possessions of property and uncontrolled material enjoyment. He even has a sense of advocating the construction of spiritual civilizations. So it is obviously improper to consider such things as upholding selfishness, hedonism and other relevant moral characters to be the creed of pragmatism.

What actually is the pragmatic view of happiness? Dewey answered: "Happiness is found only in success; but success means succeeding, getting forward, moving in advance. It is an active process, not a passive outcome. Accordingly it includes overcoming obstacles, elimination of sources of defect and ill."10 Here it is worth noting that the success Dewey emphasized is not personal, private interest and enjoyment, but only the overcoming of various obstacles and difficulties in human actions and going forward continually. "It is the same both for seeking personal happiness and making others happy. Making others happy does not mean giving others something particular, but helping others go forward, i.e., to foster conditions that widen the horizon

of others and give them command of their own powers so that they can find their own happiness in their own fashion." Therefore, happiness and success lie in continually overcoming difficulties and making progress, in struggling against various difficulties and obstructions. It is in just this sense that Dewey said: "The process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than static outcome and result, becomes the significant thing;" "Growth itself is the only moral end." In a word, the fundamental idea of Dewey's pragmatist view of happiness is to struggle, to progress, to grow continually.

The Individualism of Pragmatism

That the worldview of pragmatism is an individualism has not been doubted by many. The pragmatist philosophers themselves definitely recognized that. But individualism is a conception with various meanings; people can understand it in quite different ways. When people say that the moral depravity of present China was influenced by individualism advocated by such Western trends as pragmatism, what they have in mind is individualism in the sense of egoism. But such individualism is just what Dewey intensely opposed.

The view that Dewey rejects, namely, searching for personal private interests and enjoyment as happiness, indicates also that he does not agree with individualism in the sense of egoism. In fact, this tendency is reflected also in many of his writings on socio-moral questions. For example, he speaks highly of modern utilitarian ethics with regard to which he appreciates the emphasis on subjection of law and institutions to human needs, removing morality from Heaven to earth, and supporting various reforms. But he thinks that "Above all, it acclimatized in human imagination the idea of social welfare as a supreme test."13 Here what Dewey recommends is not private personal interests, but social welfare.

However, Dewey held that there are many deficiencies in utilitarianism in this respect. The main reason is that it cannot rid itself of one of the theoretical inclinations of traditional ethics, namely, to set an ultimate and supreme purpose for moral conduct and action. It regards the greatest possible aggregate of pleasures as this purpose. Therefore, certainly it is unable to consider concrete conduct and actions as having happiness and joyfulness in themselves, but considers them as external means of obtaining happiness and joyfulness. Pleasure and joy become consequences of these actions and conducts, which makes them things that can be possessed and enjoyed. To pursue happiness and pleasure is not to create something, but to obtain the outcome of this creation. Utilitarianism then is not separated from hedonism and the desire for possessing property. Although utilitarians criticize feudal hierarchies and their various evils, tacitly they consent to the similar evils of capitalist system. "Thus utilitarianism gave intellectual confirmation to all those tendencies which make `business' not a means of social service and an opportunity for personal growth in creative power, but a way of accumulating the means of private enjoyments."14 On the whole, the reason why Dewey criticized utilitarianism is that its theory is unable to get rid of the deficiencies of hedonism and the desire for possessing property. Dewey maintains that we should overcome this deficiency and encourage people to subject their own actions to obtaining social benefits and developing the individual's creativity. Of course, he was unable to propagandize the spirit of selflessness and collectivism, but obviously it is unjust to regard him as the defender of individualism in the sense of selfishness.

Dewey does not want to counsel individualism because of his opposition to selfishness and egoism. In *Individualism, Old and New* (1929) and other writings, he wants to substitute the old rugged individualism, which he consistently criticizes, with a new individualism. Although the old

individualism also flaunted guaranteeing the freedom of each person and equality between them, it is in fact distorted by the ruling pecuniary culture; it rather safeguards inequality and oppression. Dewey did not give an exact definition of his new individualism. Generally speaking, he suggests that the creative role of every person in contemporary society should be developed; the great development of modern sciences and technology should become the condition for developing personal creativity, not the external material force for enslaving it. He held that the development of science and industry should take social efficiency as its standard, but should not subject this to private pecuniary profits. Later, these theories of Dewey became one of the important theoretical resources of so-called democratic socialism which is different from Marxist socialism, just as Dewey's new individualism is different from the collectivism of communist moral thought. Although both are rejected in present day China, we should not insist that their worldview is based on egoism.15

Comprehensive evaluation of Dewey's and other pragmatists' moral theory needs to be explored from various angles, but this is not the mission of this chapter. But from the brief introduction above, it is also clear that if people impute the various problems of the moral realm in present day China to the influences of pragmatism and other Western trends, it is not practical or realistic to blame the people's immoral actions upon the pragmatist moral-view.

Moral Reconstruction in Contemporary China

Regardless of whether or not people support using such phrases as "predicament" to express the moral situation of present China, they cannot deny that there are serious moral problems in present Chinese society. No matter whether or not people consent to using the term "reconstruction" to represent the present task of moral construction of China, they must agree that there is difficult work to perform, including theoretical reflection and concrete measures.

To deal with the moral reconstruction in China, the first thing to do is to gain a clear and comprehensive understanding of the causes which engender these problems. These are various: the interior contradiction and conflict of the economic and political systems of contemporary China and the contractions and conflicts between them are the principal reason for the contradictions and conflicts in the moral and cultural realms. To overcome the problems in the moral and cultural realms presupposes a successful reform in the political and economic systems. Therefore the latter is the principal way for the moral reconstruction of China. Besides this, the ultra-left ideological and cultural line with its pernicious influence, the destruction of traditional Chinese moral standards, the conflicts between moral ideals and the present moral condition, the misunderstanding and mis-critique of the moral philosophy of pragmatism and other Western trends, etc., all are important causes of the present predicament. To overcome these carefully is also the way to moral reconstruction. Some additional ideas on these questions include being rid of the ossification of Marxism and making it an open and continually progressive theory.

China is a socialist country directed by the communist party. The Chinese constitution stipulates that Marxism and Mao's thought is the guiding idea for every cause. No matter whether or not people doubt the truth of Marxism, they could not deny the leading position of Marxism in the ideological realm of China. Neither theoretical study nor the practical operation of the moral realm in China could be practiced without recognizing the guiding role of Marxism. The important thing here is not whether to recognize this role, but how to treat it.

Why are there serious problems in the moral sphere of China? The most important reason is not that people did not emphasize the guiding role of Marxism, but that Marxism was ossified and

dogmatized, falling from guiding to mis-guiding. Therefore, in discussing moral reconstruction, the first thing to do is to extricate ourself from the yoke of this ossified Marxism and to recover original Marxism as an open and continuously progressive theory. This is easy to say, but difficult to do in practice; to fight against dogmatism, to fight against ossification, these slogans were shouted for a very long time, but they are only slogans. If in his practice one stressed "against dogmatism", he would be blamed for abandoning Marxism. The present situation is better than the past, but there is no cardinal change. More progress in this regard is what most scholars wait for.

A second step is to strengthen education in moral ideals and treat correctly the relation between these and practical moral standards. At the present time, belief in the communist moral ideal has been shaken. But we should not abandon moral education in the communist ideal for that, for beyond political reasons and considering only the development of the people's morality,ho education for a lofty moral ideal also is very important. A people who has a lofty moral ideal will always keep a lofty moral character in its life and action. In Western society, many people not only choose money and other private interests, as some leftists think, but seek also lofty moral ends. In this regard, religious organizations often play a positive role, teaching people to act morally. The moral order of Western society is supported to a great extent by Catholic and Christian moral ideals.

As a socialist country with Marxism as the guiding ideology and communism as the final social goal, China can only take communist, not religious, morality as her moral ideal. Here moral education is principally communist. But when relevant authorities carry out such education, it is better for them to consider such points as the following; (1) Do not take communist morality as the only ideal; do not take it as absolutely opposite other moral ideas which also may have some lofty implications. Christian morality, for example, has some things in common with communist morality: at least, it advises people to do good. (2) Do not confuse the communist moral ideal with present moral standards. Education in communist morality should be practiced in a limited area, for example, mainly among the communist party. We should carefully study its feasibility. (3) Advocating the communist moral ideal must be connected with a formulation of the standard system of socialist morality; at the present time, education in moral ideals must also be suited to conditions for the transformation to a market economy.

The third step is to develop and transcend the traditional ethico-moral idea of China. In order to overcome the full repudiation of Chinese traditional morality and culture by both the ultra-left and the ultra-right, many scholars from the Chinese mainland and overseas propose reviving and developing traditional Chinese morality and culture; some scholars even take this as a prerequisite for modernization in China. No matter what the political tendency of the persons who propose these ideas, they should be considered carefully. In the last ten years the Chinese people have suffered deep injury from abandoning the tradition. Many persons, especially the younger generation, are not familiar with this tradition. If we do not do our best to revive and redevelop it, the program of constructing socialist spiritual civilization in the Chinese style will become an empty slogan.

In recent years many Chinese scholars have discussed the relation between traditional culture and modernization with great ardor and interest. In order to revive and develop traditional Chinese culture and morality more effectively, it is not enough for us to discuss in academic circles. When the ultra-leftist fully negated Chinese traditional and Western culture, they did not only make an academic critique, but using powerful political pressure they also launched mass movements again and again in order to root out these cultures from people's minds. Although it is unnecessary, and even impossible, to launch a mass movement to revive and develop traditional Chinese culture, we

should study carefully how to encourage the broad mass of people to re-germinate a deep sense of their own culture and moral tradition, to make the excellent virtues with which Chinese culture is imbued once again the virtues of the Chinese people today, and to formulate practical operations towards that end. All these are very important to improve the moral condition of China today.

But we should not exaggerate the role of Chinese traditional morality and culture in the present day moral reconstruction. It is absolutely wrong to think that we can reconstruct our desired morality and culture only from the traditional heritage of our history. We must not forget that, after all, Chinese traditional morality and culture emerged and developed on the basis of a feudal-patriarchal system and is imbued with a strong feudal and conservative character. While nourishing the Chinese people with noble virtues, it also was used by feudal-conservative forces as an instrument to defend their reactionary control and other interests. In order to advance a more open reform in China, especially democratic reform in the political field, it is necessary to criticize continually the negative aspects of traditional culture. We must bear in mind that in contemporary China the influences of feudal autocracy are still rather strong, and sometime are even one of the main obstacles to realizing modernization. If we are limited by our traditional culture, it will be very difficult to overcome the influences of feudal autocracy. Therefore, in beginning to develop traditional culture and morality, we must also pay attention to how we can transcend them. Since Marxism is stipulated as the guiding ideology, we had better re-study it and make it a truly open and progressive theory and a helpful guide for our studies. We also should deeply study excellent Western moral and cultural thoughts, use them as references, and connect them with the excellent Chinese traditional culture. On this basis we can create a more progressive and superior morality and culture.

We must re-evaluate the role of pragmatist and other Western moral philosophies. As to how to use pragmatist and other Western moral philosophies, there is no common view among Chinese scholars. Theories of indiscriminately imitating or fully negating the West have cropped up sometimes, but their supports are few. The main obstacle at the present time is that while some people agree that the above Western theories should not be negated fully and that their positive elements can be used as references, they do not take a practical and realistic attitude to abandoning the prejudices against Western theories formed in past. They discovered in these theories only their negative side, so in fact they the question of how to use these theories for reference. For example, for a long time some people equated the individualism proposed by pragmatists and other Western scholars with egoism. Even most recently some famous scholars have criticized such individualism sharply. But they leave beyond their field of vision how such individualism encourages persons to develop their creativity and activity to contribute to social welfare, how it advocates transcending the limitation of a person's private interests, how it emphasize the individual's duty and responsibility to others and to society, etc. In this way, what such critics say about individualism is only negative, whereas, as we saw in case of Dewey, individualism is much different from rugged egoism.

Connected with the above, many leftist scholars over-emphasized the opposition and conflicts between Marxism and such Western theories as pragmatism. Analyzing and studying Western scholars' works, they are accustomed to taking them as only negative materials for Marxism and hardly pay attention to aspects which may be worthwhile and helpful in developing and enriching Marxism.

In order to surmount the above obstacles and to use Western theories for a Chinese end, it is necessary for Chinese scholars to re-evaluate pragmatism and other Western trends, to re-estimate the relation between them and Marxism.

To re-evaluate and re-estimate is not easy in practice. I have put some ideas forward in other papers. I would add several suggestions.

(1) Commenting on the above Western trends we must take full account of the condition of the economic, political and scientific developments of Western countries. Since we recognize that their condition in these fields is not bad, in some aspects they are worth our study and use as references. We cannot deny wholesale their morality and culture as they are all connected with each other.

(2) In order to emphasize the fundamental opposition between Marxism and such Western theories as pragmatism some scholars still proceed from concepts, not matters of fact -- which makes them fall into self-contradictions. For example, some speeches of a Chinese leader, such as the famous metaphor of white and black cats, clearly regard pragmatic philosophers, but as, according to authoritative commentaries in China, pragmatism is fully negative, scholars do not dare to recognize the fact. Taking the leader's speeches as deeply true and highly appreciating them, they take similar speeches by pragmatists as utterly absurd and criticize them violently. Such self-contradiction certainly will be harmful to the reputation of Marxism. If we do not over-emphasize the fundamental opposition, but recognize common views on some aspects, we can get more truthful and positive elements from Western theories. There are many ideas in Dewey's moral philosophy which certainly could be useful and helpful to moral reconstruction in China.

Both theoretical inquiry and practical work in the moral reconstruction of present day China are complex and formidable. The road is rugged and demands that scholars devoted to this must have great courage and insight in order to overcome the biases long originating from leftist orientation, and transcend various ideological and even political obstacles. If this could be done, certainly we would achieve our desired target.

Notes

1. Hu Shi, "Our Attitude towards Modern Western Civilization," *Modern Review*, IV (no. 83, July, 1926).
2. Hu Shi, "An Introduction of My Own Thoughts," a preface to *Hu Shi Papers, A Collection*, (Shanghai: Asian Press, 1931).
3. John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy and Essays* (1920; The Middle Works, vol. 12; Urbana: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), p. 174.
4. *Ibid*., p. 178.
5. *Ibid*., p. 173.
6. *Ibid*., p. 170.
7. *Ibid*., p. 183.
8. *Ibid*.
9. *Ibid*.
10. *Ibid*.
11. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922; The Middle Works, vol. 14; Urbana: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), p. 203.
12. *Ibid*., vol. 12, p. 181.
13. *Ibid*., p. 183.
14. *Ibid*., p. 184.

15. John Dewey, *Individualism, Old and New* (1930) (New York: Capricorn Books, 1962), pp. 74-100.

1. *The Broken World, a Four Act Play by Gabriel Marcel*, trans. by K.R. Hanley (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1998).

2. "Concrete Approaches to the Ontological Mystery", in *Gabriel Marcel* (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), pp. 9-46.

See also: *Two Play, by Gabriel Marcel: "The Lantern" and "The Torch of Peace"* plus *From Comic Theater to Musical Creation*, a Previously Unpublished Essay, ed. Katharine Rose Hanley (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988).

"The Dangerous Situation of Spiritual Values", in *Home Viator, an Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope* (Glouster, MA: Peter Smith, 1978); Katharine Rose Hanley, *Dramatic Approaches to Creative Fidelity: A Study in the Theater and Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973)* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), esp. ch. VII, "Colombyre or the Torch of Peace: The Role of Person-Communities in Living Creative Fidelity to Values", pp. 129-136.

6.
Ethical Reflections on Western Science and Technology in the Philosophy of Modern China

Zhou Changzhong

Beginning from the middle of the 19th century, Western science and technology were diffused in China on a large scale. This was a great shock to Chinese thinkers who envisaged the philosophical significance of Western science and technology from the viewpoint of ethics.

During the historical period to be examined in this paper, the development of ethical thought on Western science and technology in modern China can be logically divided into two consecutive stages. During the former, including the "Western Affairs Movement" from the 60s to the 90s of the last century and the "Reformation" in the 90s, the ethical significance of Western science and technology was only superficially attended to. In the latter, during the well-known debate regarding "Science and the View of Life" in the 20s of this century, these philosophical reflections entered deeply into the level of culture.

The Last Half of the 19th Century

Many important men of ideas, such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Tai Sitong, Yan Fu, Xue Fucheng and Guo Songtao, were devoted to the comprehensive study of the ethical significance of Western science and technology. The main results included the following five points:

The general relation between science-technology and ethics. Modern Chinese thinkers took as a starting point the search for truth as a way to save the thought rooted deeply in Confucianism, for which ethics was central. Therefore, it was natural for them to raise the problem of the relation between science-technology and ethics.

One of the important ways for saving the motherland they discovered was "to learn technology from the West." Kang Youwei observed advanced Western science and technology through visiting Hong Kong, reading many books on Western science, technology and history, and travels. This provided the source for his reform program. His formula for saving China was to establish an ethico-centric ideal society of "Universal Commonality." For Kang Youwei, the society of China must be motivated by the force of Western science and technology to approach gradually this ideal of "Universal Commonality". It is obvious that Western science and technology, on the one hand, and the social ethics of China, on the other hand, are united in Kang Youwei's thinking.

Yan Fu who studied Western shipbuilding engineering and naval affairs further united ethics and Western science, technology and an ethical utilitarianism. This doctrine incorporated three thought elements derived from Western science and technology: the biological theory of evolution, social progress as promoted by science and technology, and ideologies of all forms including the science of society as an organic whole.

Mutual promotion between the development of science and technology and ethical progress. Modern Chinese thinkers were not content with making clear whether there is a connection between science-technology and ethics, but had greater interest in knowing the nature of that connection. This they found to be a relation of mutual promotion.

Xue Fucheng pointed out that the West always took "Humanity as the standard," as the guiding idea in developing science and technology. He saw the secret of the richness and strength of various countries of the West as consisting in developing material civilization through science and technology for public welfare. He thought that the civilization of science and technology had a great influence upon the ideal of life and society, and hence that traditional ethics should be abandoned and replaced by an evolutionary outlook in view of the changes of values. Utility is a natural concern for human beings and develops as science and technology advance. Having seen the accomplishments made by science and technology in the United States within the space of one century, Liang Qichao also concluded that success relies on human might, and that understanding is developed on the basis of wealth and power.

The problem of justice and utility. The problem of justice and utility in Chinese traditional philosophy also became a focus in the thought of modern philosophers inquiring into the ethical significance of Western science and technology. The reformationists emphasized the utility of the progress of science and technology for the promotion of the ideals of life and society. Yan Fu justified self-interest by appealing to Western biology which takes utility as its value orientation. Tan Sitong showed that Western machinery leads to abundant products and high prices, and thus utility for people. Guo Songtao also noted that the development of such technology as the steam engine in the West was of great utility for the state and the people.

Intimately connected with the above was attention to the relation of science-technology to social ethics. They noted connections of utility as well as of justice between individuals and the collectivity or society. Huang Zunian pointed out that in Western societies, in order to attain the goal of utility via science and technology, individuals are united by the moral concentric force produced by law, order and feeling to form communities devoted to the interests of their members themselves and all society through their competition, excitement and union.

Analysis of traditional moral norms. Modern Chinese philosophers reexamined some particular traditional moral norms for the connection of science and technology, and concretely analyzed moral behavior. An example is Tan Sitong's analysis of the traditional idea of "advocacy of saving." He saw luxury and saving as relative. The problem here was "the advocacy" of saving which led to a decrease of products and hence to poverty. In this context saving is a false virtue not favorable for either oneself or others. Inversely, "luxury" becomes advisable where necessary. Thus, Western technology should be utilized to develop production, e.g., to work a mine, so that riches would appear. Luxury and saving can be compared with opening and closing a source. To open a source leads to prosperity, but to close the flow leads to a lessening of prosperity.

The use of ideas and methods of Western science in the development of ethics. Giving full play to the ethical significance of Western science and technology, modern Chinese thinkers made direct use of the ideas and methods of science as principles in proposing and explaining their ethical outlook.

As mentioned above, Yan Fu used the biological theory of evolution to develop his utilitarian ethics. Similarly, Kang Youwei made use of the biological theory of evolution in the development of his social ideal of "Universal Commonality". He also employed the axiomatic method of Western geometry to advance his claim for "Universal Commonality" as a "geometric axiom of humankind."

Tan Sitong made direct use of such concepts of Western science as "ether" and "electricity" to define the central category, "*ren*" (benevolence), in his ethics, noting its primary sense as "the instrument by means of which communication can be attained."

"Science and the View of Life" in the May 4th Movement

The well-known debate on "Science and the View of Life" in 1923 formed an important part of the May 4th movement on new culture. Its central problem, as indicated by the title, is precisely the ethical significance of Western science. The debate, also called "the Debate on Science and Metaphysics," considered problems on the level of culture, especially of philosophy as the soul of culture in the context of the collision of Chinese and Western cultures. Here the thought of Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, Zhang Junli, Ding Wenjiang and Fan Shoukan should be noted.

Starting from phenomena, Western science empirically grasps nature, thus distinguishing itself from philosophy as ontology or metaphysics. Science as the main element in modern Western culture became the focus of the debate. Both sides accepted the influence of science as the form of Western culture and inquired regarding its ethical significance. Generally, they developed the following five points:

1. The object of ethics is life viewed as transcendental substance. Therefore, this study is not science, nor are scientific methods applicable to it. This point was developed by Zhang Junli, according to whom the object of ethics is transcendental spiritual substance or "ego", while science takes phenomena as its object and searches to discover law in phenomena; therefore science and ethics are in contrast, the method of science being objective, logical, analytic, causal and seeking identity, whereas the method of ethics is subjective, intuitive, synthetic, single and concerned with free will.

2. Ding Wenjiang held that ethics can be studied using a scientific method regarding phenomena, for the study of false substances is not only useless but harmful. True ethical knowledge can be obtained only by use of the scientific method and reducing the object of ethics to moral phenomena.

The problem of the life view is not separated from that of science; indeed the most basic ethical problems are moral phenomena which can be studied by science. For example, the problem of whether the nature of humans is good or evil is the same scientific problem as Darwin's theory of competition, and both are solvable. Science has direct influence on the nature of humanity, and promotes moral progress as the best instrument for education and civilization. It enhances the human's abilities to seek truth, to know, to imagine and to intuit, thus making human life happy.

On the other hand, he rejected the existence of moral substance and in this employed a Western epistemology which he characterized as skeptical idealism. A skeptical attitude to substance behind phenomena restricts knowledge to systematizing natural phenomena by mental concepts. In terms of this limitation he considers the ethics of moral substance to be not only absurd, but harmful.

3. Hu Shi's "Scientific or Naturalist View of Life" divided human life between human behavior and general mental life. Scientific method and content applies to both sides. As human life is determined by the cosmos, knowledge about the cosmos through science becomes the norm of the view of life. Here the core idea is scientific causality and the theory of evolution. Based on science and biology regarding the cause and history of the evolution of living beings and human society, as well as psychology, it is clear that all mental phenomena have their causes.

The behavior of actual life is governed by the rules of the cosmos and explained particularly by science. At the same time, the internal life of humans, their ethical value, including free will, creative force, feeling and aesthetic sense, all can be described and regulated. Human freedom is not limited by causality; rather man is capable of explaining the past and of foreseeing the future by the virtue of causality. Even the idea of competition promotes man's pity and his faith in the importance of mutual assistance.

4. It is imperative to make a distinction between moral substance and moral phenomena. The former is not the object of science, whereas the latter is. This viewpoint is represented by Fan Shoukan who divided knowledge of life into its ideal and actual aspects. The former is "*a priori* form", while the latter is "*a posteriori* content". The former is the substance of morality, while the latter is its phenomena. Study of the moral ideal is of fundamental importance for ethics, for which the study of moral actuality constitutes a preliminary step.

Moral substance is an issue which philosophers studied by methods of intuition. But it is not possible starting from the doctrine of moral substance to deduce consequences about ethical actuality, for which study scientific methods are required. It is imperative to distinguish scientific method and science as a system of knowledge. Ethics becomes a science by using the scientific method. But it remains distinct from natural science which is science in a strict sense, whereas ethics belongs to general science as a normative rather than explanatory dimension.

5. Liang Qichao divided human life into its mental and material aspects, respectively governed by intellect and feeling. Accordingly, the view of life can also be divided into two parts, of which that corresponding to the mental aspect cannot be studied by scientific methods, whereas that corresponding to the material aspect must be studied by scientific methods.

Life in its material aspect alone cannot exist without a world of things, which can be rationalized by the use of precise scientific methods and is based on facts. He emphasized that the mental or feeling aspect is a prime motive in life, which it is absurd to direct as if it were an empirical reality.

7.
Development of Technology and Social Life

Wang Miaoyang

Changing Attitudes toward Technology

The Greeks agreed that the earlier something appears, the later people understand it. As technology appeared in the remote early time of human society thus far people understand it only to a small extent. In the West, technology has been differently appraised, and in history attitudes toward it have undergone diametric changes. Today, worldwide, understandings of technological development and attitudes toward technology in Eastern and Western, developing and advanced, countries are evidently different. Generally speaking, in the West before the 20th century an affirmative view of technology was held by most people, whereas since the beginning of this century an anti-technological view has come to be held more and more by the educated class. However, the developing and underdeveloped countries usually hold favorable views of technology and often take an optimistic attitude toward an ambitious development of technology. This contrast is a remarkable feature of contemporary views of the development of technology.

Despite such different understandings and attitudes to technology, since the 20th century progress and achievement in this one broad field of human activity have surpassed all those attained throughout history. There have been many inventions, including the airplane, rockets and spaceships, electronic techniques, atomic energy, antibiotics, the computer and robots -- even the simulation of the human gene. This has resulted in an unprecedented social situation, at once hopeful and potentially dangerous. All this was inconceivable before this century.

In the middle of the 19th century a splendid accomplishment was attained in modern technology which culminated the modern natural sciences as represented by Newtonian mechanics. At the London Fair of 1851 many novel and striking machines and products were shown in the Crystal palace. This seemed to prove Frances Bacon's projection that all things could be realized. The American, Edward Bellamy, in his novel, *Review*, foretold that technology would play the most magnificent and positive role in the ordered society of 2000. Inasmuch as technology has been highly developed and played an unprecedented role in social life in the 20th century, some thinkers have called the 20th century "the beginning of the technological era".

However, while homage was made to these great accomplishments, a warning was issued: "Do not become the slave of technology." The English writer, E. Huxley, in his well-known novel, *Brave New World*, described a future society fully dominated by technology. In this society, there will be comfort, not poverty and pain, but at the same time there would be no freedom, beauty or initiative, and no private life for individuals. In various science fiction novels, technology began to show its ability to control humans. Those situations in which scientific monsters and robots reigned over the world indirectly reflected the fear of technology. The formerly popular optimistic attitude whereby technology is considered the means for extending human nature and a powerful tool in hands of mankind is onesided at best. The view that technology is neutral does not accord with actuality; the time when technology was considered neutral is gone forever.

The modern progress of technology not only has profoundly influenced nature, but has penetrated all fields of social life, with ever increasing impact on society and its development. Fundamental change is introduced into the productive mode of society and its life. This has profoundly influenced the development of the human being himself, thereby making a deep

impression on the interaction between humans and nature and on interpersonal relations, in a word on the comprehensive development of contemporary human life.

The anti-technological tendency is growing primarily because the tremendous destructive power of technological progress during wars constitutes a grave danger to the life environment of humans and to the existence of humans themselves. This is due to such visibly harmful social outcomes caused by technological progress as traffic accidents, pollution of air and water, noise and damage to the ecology environment. These negative effects of technology are at a superficial level but are immediately obvious. At a deeper level the negative effects are mainly the domination of humans by technology and the bondage of their spiritual life and comprehensive development.

Effects of Technology

Positive Effects

Source of inventions: the many inventions and products found in daily life derive from new techniques. For example, the wireless, telephone, telex, television, computer, microwave oven, electric heater, air conditioner, high speed vehicle, high speed locomotive, airplane, etc. These countless new inventions and technological products provide comfort in our daily life.

Source of riches: the progress of science and technology enhances directly the productivity of industry and agriculture, thus increasing the total value of national production and income and improving the national welfare and level of life. The living standard of the American people in 1990 is double that of 1950, which mainly is the result of the development and application of science and technology. The realization of China's goal of doubling twice the total value of the national product also depends mainly on science and technology.

Creator of miracles: technology is equipment which at the bidding of humans assists in accomplishing human intentions; it enables the realization of miracles inconceivable by previous people by enhancing human abilities.

Negative Effects

In contrast to the above, technology is accused of dominating human life and controlling any comprehensive development of humanity. By increasing the limitations on human life and work, technology becomes sovereign over social life. On the production line it is imperative for workers to follow in an absolute manner strict procedures, thereby becoming "part of the machine". In other words, man is not able to master technology, which stands in opposition to him.

Though automation implements the human strength of the worker, the operation of pressing a button reduces the operator to a sense of monotony, suppressing thought and creativity. Man gradually changes into a robot in charge of some operation. Spare time also is limited by technology for one cannot change the programs on radio and TV; fast food and basically homogeneous modes of spending leisure time render daily life dry and lacking in individuality. Technologization of one's mode of life limits one's freedom to act and people have to select the technological formulas.

Further, as this effects all the fields of social life it deprives interpersonal relationships of interchange in feelings, mental communication and understanding. The use of socio-psychological consultations and hotlines reflect the weakening of interpersonal communication.

Thirdly, the development of high technologization decreases spiritual and cultural level. In advanced industrialized countries technologization places excessive emphasis on material results, thus relatively reducing the function of spiritual values. For the young this promotes their indulging in material enjoyment while putting aside the spiritual search; it urges paying great care to technological sciences while ignoring the humanities. While new technology and its instruments cause material progress, this is of no help for lasting inquiry into the human spirit and philosophy. Therefore, many religious and moral groups, and even men of ideas, have considered technology a reaction against spiritual life, lowering its quality and that of culture and turning to more superficial modes of intelligence. School examinations using technology allow students only to make choices and fill in elements of knowledge, but not of wisdom.

Especially, the support by society to profit generating technological sciences, technologies and practical knowledge is in striking contrast to the ignoring culture and the fostering of the quality of human life and of the human sciences. Today there is urgent need for strengthening the link between education and the human sciences; indeed, the development of technology should be guided by the human sciences, and thereby humanized.

Lastly, the influence of technology extends to the political field. Decision making is resolved by counting votes, with the result that opportunities for expressing different opinions are limited, communication channels between higher levels and lower levels are blocked, social democracy is weakened, the field of politics is closed, and the tendency of multiplicity is replaced by one of centralization. In sum, there is a "one dimensional society" dominated by technology.

The Nature and Guidance of Technology

Future society needs alternate orientations, but today we are alienated as thoughtless, non-creative machines, one dimensional robots, lacking individuality in the process of technological progress and automation. We must open once again a world where the existential conditions for human genius are created as conditions for progress towards comprehensive development. The present situation makes people anxious because the former tendencies outweigh these latter ones. It is essential for us to discover the way to overcome the negative effects of technological development and to change and control its direction and development.

The negative effects of technological development in social life force us to reexamine technology. What is its nature; what is its proper definition? Evidently, in our era, when science and technology have such wide and deep influence on the life of society, the instrumentalist definition of technology and the neutral evaluation are quite insufficient. Webster's *New International Dictionary* defines technology as "the end of material civilization". There is a similar definition by Immanuel G. Mason who thought of "technology as a system of knowledge for practical purposes", which incorporates intellectual methods, software, hardware, arts and skills for social welfare.

The American National Committee for Science sees technology also as a problem for the social sciences. Therefore its definition explicitly includes the following: "Technology is a system consisting of a series of interconnected inventions, including those involving the treatment of the environment, of which some are social. Philip Breno explains: "By the word "technology", I mean instruments, machines and applied knowledge, and the political relations for which they are used." He agreed with Paul Goodman who thought that, whether or not it is generated by new scientific inquiry, technology forms not only a branch of the physical but of the social sciences, and its assessment should be carried out firmly in accord with social goals. Bukharih definitely saw

technology as connected with society: therefore there is no pure technology, only social technology. The dual nature of technology, i.e., its character as art and as social, is the source of both the positive and the negative effects of technology. Before industrialization, the influence of technology on social life was too narrow and superficial to take care of its negative effects; hence it was misunderstood as "neutral". It is not possible to grasp the nature of technology without considering its interconnections.

Werner Heisenberg, the well-known German physician and discoverer of quantum mechanics explained the nature of technology through an analogy with a spider and its web. Like technology the web is a tool, yet the spider lives in that framework (Heiddeger's *Gestell*).

The social nature of the interconnection of technology with society suggests that from its beginning technology has existed in a certain social environment, for example, the intervention of state, the influence of public opinion, the decisions of technical experts and the stimulus of economic interests brought by society, etc. Making use of this it is possible to orient the developmental direction of technology.

The key to preventing the alienation of humans in the process of technological development lies in human beings themselves. It is imperative for humankind to turn to itself if it is to avoid the catastrophe caused by the development of technology. This is possible if we attend to the humanization of technology, and direct technological development in terms of the comprehensive development of humankind. In this connection, the pessimism in the 20th century for which technological development has been considered as being against humankind is as naive and one-sided as the optimism of the last century's Victorians who thought technology would elevate human life to heaven. Heisenberg said to correctly: "The day will perhaps come when the relation of much of technology to the human is necessarily the same as that of a shell to its snail and of a web to its spider, that is, technology becomes part of our organism." Humankind still will be the master, however, for the web can be repaired by the spider.

What should be done comes down to the following three points:

Firstly, a global consensus regarding the general principles of the future development of technology should be attained. As this is a global issue, common opinion in isolated countries is of no use. These principles should include: war should be abandoned, and mass killing and destruction avoided; the ecological environment of humankind should be protected; social problems of the second order should be solved by a humanization of technology. Special institutions are needed to investigate technological problems, taking into account the social factors.

Secondly, it is important for countries and societies to control the direction of technological development. Authoritative institutions must take responsibility for the direction of technological development and decision making regarding important technological projects. These must be constituted of experts in technology and in the social and human sciences who are devoted to the humanization of technology. These experts should be familiar with the general principles of future technological development and its humanization.

Lastly, the education of students must be concerned with the complementarity and fusion of two cultures (liberal arts and physical sciences) and of two trends in ideas (scienticism and humanism). It is essential to strengthen the humanities and social sciences in physical and engineering programs, and for liberal arts students to study the history and philosophy of science and technology. In this way, as Marx said, the two cultures can be integrated in a unified science of man and education.

The future society conceived by Marx is one in which the talents of all its members are "developed comprehensively". Based on the development of technology, everyone has opportunities to realize his or her free development. This ideal society can be realized only through the humanization of technological development.

Part II
From Objectivity to Subjectivity:
The Humanization of Science and Technology

8.
The Change in Modern Scientific Thought and the Conception of Values

Li Jizong

Great development and change in modern science and technology is one of the basic features of modern times. Their advance by leaps and bounds has altered the world picture of science and the human modes of thinking. This change has a number of dimensions.

From Certainty to Uncertainty

In the modern history of science, the mechanical determinism of classical mechanics occupied a dominant position for about three hundred years. It constructed a closed and simple cosmic model, in which all things move exactly and regularly. The model believes that if the original state of a system is known, in the light of the universally applicable laws of dynamics, we can deduce all the states it will undergo. Thus, Laplace complacently declared that so long as we realize the positions and velocities of all the material particles in the world, a "holy calculator" may exactly know the past and the future of the world. People generally believe that the mission of science is to provide certain knowledge, and that science is able to do so completely. In disputing with Bohr, Einstein said "God does not play dice" which is to say that nature is completely certain and that science should be also.

Under the control of such a cosmic model and view of nature, the only aim of science was to dissect exactly, and draw the properties of the whole from the parts of an object. But as the properties are restricted to the parts, the relations and transformations between levels are beyond the view of researchers.

From the late 19th century, as the realm of knowledge constantly expanded, research in the natural sciences changed to complex systems with a large number of elements. This entailed expansive freedom, inasmuch as the large quantity of their elements imply complicated random movement. Among neighboring elements, and between every element and the whole, there are almost no fixed relations. Thus, classical dynamics turns out to be powerless, not only because of the difficulties in dealing with the intrinsic complexity of a system, but because such complexity results in changes in the thing. Even if we have exactly determined the trajectories of all the particles and the interactive forces among them, we can obtain no certain knowledge of the whole.

The discovery of statistical laws is a fundamental breakthrough which brings to light the relations between levels. Problems about macroscopic thermodynamic phenomena can be interpreted in terms of interactions between micro particles. By treating the behavior of any amount of elements statistically, we are shown that large amounts of complex actors that cannot be calculated in detail take on certain patterns as a whole. Such properties of the whole as strength, temperature, entropy, etc., (the forms of relations between elements, levels, etc.) can neither be shared by every single element, nor be created as results of their linear super-positions; they are, in fact, the states and process of interconnections and interactions themselves. The so-called trend of the whole — ordering, necessity, etc. — are the appearances of such relations. A large amount of things existing simultaneously and interacting on each other is the fundamental reality that brings on the phenomena of randomness. This idea appeared first in Boltzmann's study of statistical physics in the late 19th century and by Gibbs in the early 20th century. A statistical law

is the concentrated expression of this idea. Thus, Wiener noted that "We must owe the first great physical revolution of 20th century to Gibbs, not Einstein, Heisenberg or Plank."

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the statistical law and the idea of scientific knowledge as well as the understanding of natural law in its general meaning have been undergoing a process of transformation. From now on, statistical laws are seen as reflecting no longer almost ignorance of the objective process, but the general law of complex systems themselves. Every system composed of smaller unit levels, its property, the formation of its structure, the condition and process of certainty and change, the relation and transformation between order and disorder — all these can be studied with the statistical method of probability. It establishes contact with different levels, and brings to light the identity and continuity, as well as the difference and discontinuity, between them. Each level both depends on itself and on the other levels. The property of every level is determined by the whole structure; it is restricted within the higher level and at the same time provides its grounds. This shows that ultimately the objective world is a unity of many levels with a complicated structure. Hence, only when we inquire in depth into statistical laws and randomness can we grasp the pulse of modern scientific thought.

After the uncertainty principle had been put forward in 1927, the American mathematician, Godel, proposed the theorem of incompleteness in 1931 — perhaps the most important achievement in research regarding uncertainty. The theorem states that in any consistent formal system containing elementary number theory, there are propositions which cannot be verified, i.e., neither the proposition nor its negation are able to be proven in the same system. The theorem shows that even mathematics cannot provide completely certain knowledge, for invariably there are propositions in any kind of theory — information theory, cybernetics, dissipative structure theory, fuzzy mathematics, grey system theory, etc. -- all of which have indissoluble characteristics of randomness, probability and uncertainty. People now know that the world itself is not as completely determinate as had been assumed.

From Being to Evolution

Evolution is another mainstay of the scientific thought in the current century. As a scientific theory, it is a product of the 1850s. In the most creative years, in several realms of science there appeared scientific theories of evolution at almost the same time, the most influential of which were Clausius' second law of thermodynamics, Darwin's theory of biological evolution, and Marx's materialist conception of history.

In 1850 Clausius pointed out that heat cannot flow automatically from low-temperature objects to high-temperature objects, namely, heat conduction is irreversible. Fifteen years later he introduced his greatest contribution a physical state function that had nothing to do with concrete elements — entropy (S). In terms of entropy, the second law of thermodynamics can be expressed in a closed and isolated system as: ds/dt>/0, which means that the variation of entropy of such a system will never be less than zero; this is the famous principle of entropy increase. By the conception of entropy, natural evolution could be interpreted through the intrinsic change of a physical system. But the theory of evolution in the sense of Clausius is in fact a theory of retrogression. In his opinion, nature is retrogressing from lower entropy to higher-entropy, namely, from order to disorder; finally, the whole universe will be in that most disordered state of thermal equilibrium or heat death. Obviously, he was mistaken to extrapolate the principle of entropy increase from a closed system to the whole universe, which resulted in an opposite conclusion to Darwin's theory of biological evolution. However, by virtue of his conception of entropy, science

has been able to evaluate the physical world and the direction of the physical events, and time is no longer merely the parameter of motion but has become a physical reality.

The tides of physical revolutions in the 20th century have been pounding incessantly at the cornerstone of classical physics. Relativity was the first to launch the attack: the unity of space and time means that the existence of matter and its property are inseparable. When the mass-energy relation regards mass as a form of energy, it in fact regards material being as a kind of process. Quantum Mechanics revealed the wave-particle duality of matter. This expresses the interpenetration of space and time, includes the equivalent procession of energy replacement and the unity of space, time and mater, and finally endows the world with an essentially dynamic form. In the picture described by Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, th whole universe is involved in a kind of dance of the universe of energy. The existence of latent energy and the introduction of probability change the direction of scientific research from an object-centricism to "relations" and the whole.

However, despite the fact that science has admitted change as a basic fact of nature, in classical physics it was nothing but limitless exchange of energy, and the arrow of time did not exist. At the heart of scientific thought, the varied and colorful world was still attributed to different appearances of a certain simple basic "element". The intrinsic character of time was eliminated; irreversibility was but an illusion resulting from the deterministic development of the original state; evolution was but the development of being. As Prigogine notes, the classical order was first particle, and second the second law of thermodynamics: being is prior to evolution. Science always intended to surmount the external world and get to a most reasonable but timeless world; its ideal was to trace back to the origin of the world and the fixed laws under change. This conviction endowed the physical laws with objective, absolute and eternal significance.

Today, scientific research has begun to move from being to evolution. In the large span of history, this is a change from a space-culture to a time-culture. Time has become the central problem of modern science, for the existence of irreversibility elevates evolution to the ontological-level and endows entities with a basic lively and restless character.

The birth of the theory of dissipative structure has made it possible to tie physics to evolutionary biology. An open system originating from a state of non-equilibrium, by way of the order of fluctuation, changes the retrogressive arrow of thermodynamics to the direction of cosmic evolution. Bifurcation theory introduced the history into physics. Non-equilibrium state physics, especially the modern theory of dynamics, has greatly deepened the understanding of evolution. From Newton’s force, to Einstein’s energy, to entropy in thermodynamics, physics is exceeding the level of conservation and the transformation of "quantity"; it is entering the level of creation and the evolution of "quality". At this latter level, the arrow of time adds to past dynamic time an arrow, direction, or evolution in the material word; the micro meaning of irreversibility has been discovered, revealing the mechanism of the evolution of a system; and the arrow of thermodynamics has been reoriented to cosmic evolution. Recent developments in theory have broken through the conception of time-arrow, and advanced a completely new system "time" about -- internal time. Around this, a complicated structure of space-time is in formation.

Both non-equilibrium state physics, and the modern theory of dynamic systems are altering in marvelous manners science’s picture of the world. The rise of modern theory of dynamics marks a second unity of dynamics and thermodynamics, this time on the grounds of thermodynamics. Its "second law" is now seen as supreme, so that motion is united with evolution and complexity embraces simplicity. Starting from the new conception of space and time regarding the world as a constantly evolving active organ, all rigidity dissolves, fixed bounds disappear, and laws are no

longer unique or eternal: we can now transit from one description to another. Reversibility and irreversibility, motion and evolution, are neither diametrically opposed (as in Newton mechanics), nor in contradiction to each other (as in statistical physics and quantum mechanics), but concordant and unified. Once science has understood the relation and difference between internal and external time it will achieve a new level of understanding. In this greatly broadened theoretical frame order and disorder, degradation and evolution, and dynamics and thermodynamics are complementary. With evolution seen as the core of the material world marks science has entered into evolution; thenceforth time on time will be the central problem.

From Intuition to Participation

The problem of the relation between humans and nature, subject and object, or objectivity in natural science, is the basic problem in understanding and changing nature, as well as the most fundamental philosophical problem in natural science. The classical scientific system centered around Newtonian mechanics, understood "objective", firstly, as being independent of our processes of understanding, and, secondly, as being able to be described changelessly (or approached infinitely); the extent that knowledge conforms to the thing-in-itself and that subjective effects were eliminated are the yardsticks of the objectivity of truth. Such objectivity was abstracted on the grounds of the classical cosmic model and principle of knowledge; it was closely related to the European cultural background of which classical mechanics was the key form.

For the original model of classical mechanics a celestial body can be taken as a mass point, with position and velocity (or momentum) of itself. A specific process is an objective event taking place in space and time, as well as the result of certain known physical laws. As this is logical (or conceptual), self-enclosed and independent of the action of humans the object is observed and meditated upon, but not engaged or transformed. In such a relationship the subject does not act on or change, the object in any way; it simply reflects the properties and relations of the object itself in the subject's mind.

In truth, the object of natural science is nature or the laws of nature itself; what is abstracted is only the objective aspect of the object. On the side of the subject, the process and form by which we acquire knowledge -- human activity and any cultural characteristics -- are abstracted out. Thus, things become pure objects, which are treated as concrete and real objects, whose totality is believed to be the world, the material for research. Correspondingly, the view of nature is that of an enclosed object-world; this set of natural causal relations is in fact but an idea we produce. This self-enclosed world of knowledge leaves no place for subjectivity: the extent of the participation of the subject is reduced to measurements of objectivity as well as of error. Such an abstraction regards the things in human thought and practice as the object itself, but leaves the reflection and investigation of such activity and its effects to philosophical epistemology. This was necessary and reasonable during a certain stage of scientific development. But it creates the illusion that we can talk about world-in-itself without a subject, or its perceptual activity (including constructs of pure thinking). Such an illusion and the mind-matter dualism in the Western philosophical tradition have verified each and strengthened each other. This created a "Godlike" epistemology and the objectivity principle of classical science.

In giving up the mechanistic universal picture, modern science has given up as well such "Godlike" epistemology. Through the process of evolving a completely new order of theory it becomes ever clearer that science expands centrally around the human being. It can be only by,

and of, human beings. Hence, it is completely meaningless to describe in abstract terms the world in its original form.

By means of the radically changing scientific rationality itself, the 20th century revolution of science and technology has replaced that of the 17th century. Whereas that earlier tradition of objectivity believed that knowledge is acquired through passive observation and by way of formal reconstruction of the objective mathematical structure of nature and society, modern scientific epistemology believes that the object of under-standing is constructed or transformed to some extent in the research activity of subject. Quantum mechanics indicates that the method of research itself has changed the observed entity. As the state described by physicist is the interaction between observer and observed object, the results of observation depend on the method of measure. This was made clear by the physicists Bohr, Heisenberg and Wheeler: The quantum world is not like an orderly machine; the answer acquired depends upon question asked, the experiment constructed and the instrument chosen, we ourselves inevitably become involved in the question: "What is happening?"

This being the case, what appearances will be presented by phenomena or events will depend on the instruments we choose -- on the questions and the probable forms of answers to the questions we choose. What we are observing is not the world itself, but the world revealed by the method we are using to inquire into our problems. The form of asking the question becomes the focus for the creation of the appearances observed.

It is self-evident that scientific reality is not random subjectivity, for then reality would not be reality nor would science be science. The subjective result is solidified as scientific reality: first it is restricted within a practical method; next it is "assimilated" by being stated in language; then it is related to conjecture and expectation in the research process in order to attain the character of explanation, interpretation, test and verification, calculation, etc., and thereby to emerge from other kinds of phenomena. It is a description not only of knowledge of scientific achievements, but of subjective action itself. For concepts, laws and theories the subjective contribution is more obvious, for it includes free creation in thought and the human pursuit of unity, simplicity, aesthetic feeling, etc.

From quantum mechanics to information theory, cybernetics and systematology to non-linear science, ecology, etc., it becomes ever clearer to scientists that their work expands centrally around the human; it can be only of and for humans, which is to say that we are participating in the universe we are describing. A human is the human-in-the-universe; he or she describes the universe from inside and by his or her own means. The universe also is of humans for it appears both in the form of the result of human action as humans objectify themselves in science and embody their human nature in their creation.

From Seeking Truth to Seeking Effect

Around the Second World War, a group of new and developing sciences appeared in succession, such as management science, operational research, systems engineering, decision theory, design theory, etc. These sciences differ from the traditional ones, such as classical physics, chemistry, biology, etc., or so-called "entitative sciences" which have their own specific objects of study which are believed to be independent of human’s activity. These new and developing sciences have no specific things as their objects of study, nor do they aim at understanding, and grasping certain objective truths as do the entitative sciences. Rather, they organize or standardize human action for a certain purpose and in accord with specific realms of human activity. Such

sciences study some "man-made" phenomena, which depend mainly on human aims or intentions so as to be brought into the living existential environment. Such so-called "operative sciences" are distinguished by having considerable purposiveness. What is learned by them is not the "what" or "why" of changes of things, but "what should we do?" Because the purpose of these sciences is to direct human's action in a certain realm, and what is studied are "man made phenomena closely related to human action," the American scholar Herbert A. Simon called them "sciences of man-made things."

Besides the above-mentioned sciences, we have a different understanding of modern technology from the traditional one. In recent years, scientific research has inclined to more and more narrow conceptions; it stresses only skills, technical ability and method, instruments, machines, etc., but ignores the human and social aspect. In response some scholars would give important place in modern science to the social relation and control aspect of technology. This lays particular emphasis on organization and especially on planning and management, including the management of research work, the professional organization of technical specialists and scientists, control of pollution and other regulatory systems against abuses of technology, etc. In contrast others would place the human aspect mainly in the cultural realm, including views regarding values, goals and varied convictions regarding customs skills and scientific activity which affect the designer's and inventor's creativity. In this way technology includes not only skill (software, hardware), but also culture and organization.

In present research even such basic traditional sciences as chemistry, biology, physics, etc. are to a large extent subject to control according to social needs and outlooks on values. Hence, we should consider their effect on both human beings and society, rather than purely seek truth. Here seeking truth and seeking effect, scientific reality and value, are no longer opposites. This is an additional challenge to classical science and technology beyond the scientific revolution which resulted from relativity and quantum mechanics.

Traditional science and epistemology both saw the aim of knowledge to be understanding truth so that the central problem of epistemology was the possibility of understanding which in turn problem of how to acquire truth. In contrast, the aim of "operative" or technical knowledge is not to understand objective truth, but to direct people to attaining predetermined objectives. The problems to which these sciences pay close attention are not true or false knowledge, but whether a certain strategy of action or program design is effective or not.

The entrance of validity and value into science is another great revolution in the mode of thinking of modern science and technology. It tells us that science is no longer a purely rational activity independent of human being's life and interests, but is situated in human practice and life world, closely bound up with human pursuits and needs. Hence, Marx said that all kind of science concern the human being.

From Subjective Value to Objective Value

In accord with the change in scientific conception, there is a change also in the understanding of value from subjective to objective.

It is a very popular view that the difference between reality and value is identical with that between object and subject. Truth or reality is seen as objective being having nothing to do with human being. In the final analysis value is nothing but an expression of subjective human feelings, attitudes, interests, etc.; it is non-cognitive and cannot be verified logically; and therefore there is no objective or generally valid standard of appreciation or evaluation. The error in such a point of

view is to have understood action in terms of an abstract human being as a purely subjective being, so that human behavior is a purely mental activity which cannot grasp the essence of value in the context of practical life. It reflects also a one-side approach to objectivity: in the light of the mechanical materialism grounded on Newton mechanics, it considers the physical and chemical processes of natural things to be the entire objective process, so that eliminating the subject and its action is a measure of objectivity. Accordingly, it excludes value from the objective realm for it belongs neither to physical nor chemical processes, nor can it be reduced to physical and chemical properties and grasped by such language.

As stated previously, what the category of objectivity stipulates is the independence of the reality indicated by the objective action of the subject from his or her subjective consciousness, feeling and will. To understand this stipulation we should start not from the side of the thing-in-itself, but of the practical relation between subject and object. Firstly, the activity of the human being pertains to objective social history. This objective process has two basic forms: i.e., nature (mechanical and chemical) and the goal-directed activity of the human being (Lenin's words). The former is the basis of the latter, which has the greater immediacy and reality. For the human subject, only when the former process has entered into the realm of social-historical activity and formed an organic opposition with he latter can it present its objective reality and law and be understood and put to use by us. Furthermore, such a "presentation" appears in a subordinate and remolded form, i.e., in a form restricted by structure, good and patten of activity.

Secondly, the objectivity of knowledge and understanding depends upon their conformation to objective reality. The outer world that is independent of the consciousness of human beings has supplied the ontological prerequisite and possible space for the creation of the object, and practical-epistemic activity has supplied the thing-in-itself with the mechanism and condition for it to change into an object-for-me. Thus, "conformation" is actually a sort of coupling between the subjective grasping form and the presenting type of the thing-in-itself (possibility space). Therefore, epistemic objectivity needs also to be grasped at the level of practical relationships. We should not lose sight of its human characteristic, which in brief is precisely the social relationship. This is a crystallization of all the practical human achievements of social history, including all practical elements, which includes the rationality of activity. This is the basis of the objectivity of value.

With regard to the objectivity of value we will consider the following two aspects.

1. The basis of the objectivity of value lies in the objectivity of practical human activity, including the objectivity of the subject.

Taken as a whole, human socio-historical activity differs from the physical and chemical processes of nature, because it intrinsically possesses purposiveness (N.B. human purpose has not been referred to before). Seeking, creating and realizing value are its elemental contents, the same as for objective process. Such a trend toward the realization of good and of value constitutes the intrinsic dynamics of change and is the source of development.

Advanced system theory holds that the fundamental difference between the activity of an organic system and of mechanical change driven by external forces is that the former is self-regulating and self-organizing. The structure of this activity is goal oriented of itself and has regulates itself in order retain a steady state. In this the functional requirement of self-preservation and self-development is normative. This illustrates the objectivity of values and their role in the self-development of material systems most broadly taken.

As subject and object are the bearers of practical activity, the objectivity of the object is naturally a prerequisite to the objectivity of value. But this is not the sole prerequisite, because value is a subject-object relation, not an objective attribute. Especially, this relation implies that the object conforms to or satisfies the subject; it is integrated into the yardstick of the subject, where the subjective factor is the leading one. Every type of idealism and earlier materialism took the human being as an abstract subjective being, regarded human activity as purely mental activity, and "explain(ed) their behavior with their thinking not with their needs" so as to conclude that value is subjective. Therefore, in order to understand the objectivity of value, beyond the objectivity of the socio-historical process and of the structure of subject-object interaction, the objectivity of subject needs also to be further elaborated.

The human being or subject is a kind of objective social being. It is distinguished from natural beings by its "possessing goal, requirement, self-consciousness, etc." and "existing for itself", but it remains a kind of objective being. The natural instincts, essence, ability, existential condition and activity of the subject are all definite social properties; they are objective, not appearances of random subjectivity. Human needs -- whether physiological or mental, natural or social, material or spiritual -- all are radically related with social being and have an objectivity and necessity independent of the subjective will of human beings. In a certain sense, the objectivity of the subject is not only the precondition of the objectivity of value, but also the final form of its assumption and embodiment: the objectivity of value ultimately will express itself and be verified by means of the objective change of subjective existence and development. Conversely, only by understanding the objectivity of value can one fundamentally grasp the objectivity of the subject, for the most basic and definitive property of subject is "to exist for itself", and this is subordinate to the value category.

Furthermore, the process by which value is created and realized is at the same time the process by which law is grasped and applied, it is the process by which law enters into play, and it is material social process. Thus we may say that the value relation is the objective relation between the human being and nature, between human beings and society, or between human beings themselves.

2. Value evaluation also requires an objective measure.

The specific needs and interests of human beings and society, as well as the means for satisfying them, all have their socio-historical roots and practical objective foundations. Value consciousness, norms for evaluation, etc., which appear by means of ideology are "practical relations and activities. Their generation and relations are purposive expressions of the socio-political organization." Such expressions may be real or illusory, but it is not possible to decide by subjective desire alone the foundations and preconditions upon which people make judgments of "should" and "should not", nor within the realm of real knowledge and practice what objects are displayed to the subject, what it does or can bring about in the subject, and what it obtains or can obtain from the object through understanding and practice. In brief, the socially and historically formed aims, expectations and ability of the subject, the practical possibility offered by the object and environment, and the coupling of the both is an objective structure. Moreover, through the feedback mechanism of the interaction between activity and the result of activity, it can guide the direction of activity and usher in new possibility. Thus value judgements and evaluations also have objective and generally valid norms.

Going further into the objectivity problem of the norm of evaluation, we should be aware that, despite the difference between the language, norm and object in understanding the problem of objectivity, they have the same roots. That is to say, all have a social character and can be regarded as the rationality of practical activity.

Marx said that "man's perceptual activity" is not individual but social and includes both production and association. Association is, so to speak, the concentrated embodiment of the socio-historical nature of practical activity. It is expressed in social relations, in shared activity within the community, class, nation and even the world. Through production and association which carries forward the accumulated achievements of production and association of past ages (material productive forces, social living conditions, social organizational forms and norm, objectively shaped knowledge, language, etc.) people form a certain socio-cultural relation, participate in it and mould themselves. Thus men can move beyond animal instinct in their relations to others and ego consciousness appears. This is followed by objective attitudes to external objects and people as well as the more generalized patterns of ethics, morality, aesthetic standards, etc.

The key point here is ego consciousness, which essentially is a kind of social and practical consciousness. The reason why ego consciousness is able to be aware of itself is simply that it can reflect upon itself as distinct from others, from its actions and from object or result of activity. Thus, it is possible for ego consciousness to reflect upon or criticize its knowledge and behavior from a third party or historical point of view. From this follow such things as observing, judging, thinking, reasoning in terms of common forms of human rationality man, expression through a common language and symbols, and evaluating and examining the results of knowledge in terms of standard criteria approved by the subjects. The so-called human characteristic of objectivity is to a large extent just such social characteristics of knowledge. Similarly, ethically normed behavior and a generally valid value system can be formed because of such participation in the common activity and association, the understanding of each other and reflection upon various social phenomena and goals, needs, expectations and behaviors, with understanding and conscious evaluation. In brief, from the practical point of view we can see that the objectivity of the true, the good and the beautiful all originate from the same roots, namely, all are modes of sociality which have general validity and rationality in practical activity.

9.
Confucianism and Science: A Philosophical Evaluation

Vincent Shen

Practical Wisdom versus Theoretical Knowledge

When searching for an explanation of the fact that no science in the Western modern sense was produced in traditional Chinese culture under the dominant ideology of Confucianism, we should first of all trace back to the philosophical origins of both Western and Chinese sciences, and compare their differences. To be brief, we could qualify Chinese science as a search for practical wisdom and Western science as a searching for theoretical knowledge. In other words, one of the fundamental reasons for the absence of modern science in Chinese culture is the latter's lack of purely theoretical interest.

Nowadays, modern science becomes more and more operational both in its theory formation and its data construction processes. This calls for more interaction between knowledge and action, thus disengaging itself f rom its former qualification as knowledge f or knowledge ' s own sake. But, we should not forget that, in the beginning, it was produced as the last avatar of the Greek notion of *theoria*, the disinterested pursuit of truth and sheer intellectual curiosity.1 Compared with this, Chinese culture in general and Confucianism in particular seemed to be short of such theoretical interest. Generally speaking, Western philosophy began as a result of the attitude of wonder, which led to the theoretical construction of scientific knowledge. In contrast, Chinese philosophy began as a result of an attitude of concern, which led finally to practical wisdom for guiding human destiny. Therefore, in the beginning, the difference between them was that between "wonder" and "concern".

With regard to wonder, Aristotle wrote in *Metaphysics*:

For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, . . . therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know and not for any utilitarian end.2

Aristotle continued to point out that the way of life in which science began was constituted of leisure (*rastone*) and recreation (*diagoge*), as enjoyed by Egyptian priests who discovered geometry. Aristotle believed that in such a state of life, human beings did not need to care about the daily necessities of life and could wonder about the causes of things and search knowledge for knowledge's own sake. The result of wonder was theories. These came from an important transformation of the originally religious meaning of the Greek term "*theoria*"into its philosophic meaning. Such a transformation was an essential event in the European intellectual history. In the beginning, the "*theoros*" were the representatives sent by Greek cities to Athenian public ceremonies. Through "*theoria*", that is, through looking on and not through praxis (actions), they participated in the sacred events. This religious meaning was transformed into the contemplation of the cosmos, of the totality of beings.3

The philosophical meaning of"theory", therefore, was determined in one sense with respect to praxis -- as Aristotle put it, "not in virtue of being able to act, but of having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes"4 -- and second, in another sense, with respect to a universal

object, which was seen by Aristotle as the first characteristic of science.5 Modern science was historically grounded in this Greek heritage of *theoria*, which regarded our human life no longer as determined by diverse practical interests, but as submitting itself hence forward to a universal and objective norm of truth.

By contrast, Chinese thought in general and Confucianism in particular were originated as a result of the attitude of concern which led not to universal theorization, but to universal praxis. It was because of his concern with the destiny of the individual and society that the Chinese mind began to philosophize. The *Great Appendix* to the *Book of Changes*, traditionally attributed to Confucius as its author, proclaimed that the author of Yi must be face anxiety and calamity with compassionate concern. It reads:

Was it not in the last age of Yin, when the virtue of Chou had reached its highest point, and during the troubles between King Wen and the tyrant Dzou, that the study of Yi began to flourish? On this account the explanations in the book express a feeling of anxious apprehension, and teach how peril may be turned into security, and easy carelessness is sure to meet with overthrow. The way in which these things come about is very comprehensive, and must be acknowledged in every sphere of things, If at the beginning there is a cautious apprehension as to the end, there probably will be no error or cause for blame. This is what is called the Way of Yi.6

This important text shows that in the eyes of Confucius, philosophy as a serious intellectual activity began with an attitude of concern in the situation of anxiety and calamity, not at all in the situation of leisure and recreation, as Aristotle would suggest. The proposition that "the way in which these things come about is very comprehensive, and must be acknowledged in every sphere of things" would suggest that Chinese philosophy intended to be a practical wisdom that could serve as guidance for a universal praxis. Consequently, Confucianism did not have any distinctive method of dialectical discourse, taking no explicit system of logic as canon of reasoning. Neither did it, as did modern science, take mathematics as model of true knowledge. The dialogues that we read in the *Analects* (or *Lun Yu*) do show us a way of discursive interaction, yet they contain no explicit logic. Dialogues are not yet dialogic.

Still we can recognize, as did B. Schwartz, that, to a certain degree, the Confucian pleasure in learning may reflect a pure interest in "the mastery of a body of significant knowledge as such."7Confucius himself had shown his regret for those who did not have such an interest. "In days gone by, he said, men studied for their own sake. Today men studied for the sake of impressing others."8 Therefore the learning of practical wisdom could be seen as possessing an independent value in Confucianism. But this is not the same as knowledge for knowledge's own sake, as in the case of modern Western science.

Ambivalence of the Confucian Relation to Science

The difficulty of evaluating Confucianism's import upon science consists in its ambivalent attitude towards the latter. Joseph Needham has pointed out this paradoxical position of Confucianism which helped the beginnings of science, on the one hand, and injured them, on the other.

On one side, Confucianism was basically rationalistic and opposed to any superstitious or even supernatural forms of religion. . . . But on the other side its intense concentration of interest upon

human social life to the exclusion of non-human phenomenon negated all investigation of Things, as opposed to Affairs.9

Here we have the contrast between "Natural Things" and "Human Affairs". The above judgment of Joseph Needham is correct to a certain degree, but it has to be developed by deeper reflection. We can ask, does this paradoxical attitude imply a contradiction within the system of Confucianism, or, on the contrary, does it manifest a coherent philosophical attitude that insists on developing science only in a humanistic context?

Confucianism's agnostic rationalism is manifested in the texts where Confucius expressed his distance from such supernatural powers as ghosts and spirits.

Fan Chih asked what constituted wisdom. The Master Confucius said, "To give one's self earnestly to securing righteousness and justice among the people, and while respecting the gods and demons, to keep distantiated from them, that may be called wisdom.10

Chi-Lu asked about serving the ghosts and spirits. The Master Confucius said, "While you are not yet able to serve human beings, how can you serve ghosts?" Chi-Lu then ventured upon a question about the dead. The Master said. "You do not yet know about the living, how can you know about the dead?"11

These texts show not only a negative attitude towards supernatural powers, but also a positive emphasis on this life and social activities such as serving human beings and securing righteousness. Max Weber was correct when he said, "Confucianism maintained that magic was powerless in the face of virtue. He who lived the classical way of life need not fear the spirits; only lack of virtue in high places gave power to the spirits."12 Humanism with an ethical orientation is therefore fundamental to Confucian teaching. This explains also why Confucius' frequent themes of discourse were the Odes, history and the maintenance of the rites.13 He took four subjects for his teaching: culture (letters), the conduct of affairs, loyalty to superiors and the keeping of promises.14Subjects on which the Master never talked were: extraordinary things, unnatural forces, disorders and spiritual beings.15

In J. Needham's eyes, Hsun Tzu' humanism perfectly exemplifies the ambivalent relation of Confucianism to science.16 On the one hand, Hsun Tzu preached an agnostic rationalism and even a denial of the existence of spirits. For him, the term "Tao" means the order of nature and the right way of human society. His socio-ethical orientation was shown in his exaltation of Li, the essence of rites, good customs and traditional observances. On the other hand, he strongly opposed to the efforts of the School of Names and the Mohists to work out a kind of discursive logic. He insisted on the practical and social uses of technological process while denying the importance of theoretical investigation.

J. Needham's judgment upon Hsun Tzuis sound, but it does not tell the whole story.Viewed from the philosophy of science, Hsun Tzu's ideological framework is favorable for the development of modern science and even for that of technology: an attitude of domination over nature by seizing her causal regularities and her transformation by technical process. In the following text, Hsun Tzu said:

Your glorify Nature and meditate on her,
Why not domesticate her and regulate her?

You obey Nature and sing her praises,
Why not control her and use her?
You look on the seasons with reverence and await them,
Why not respond to them by seasonal activities?
You depend on things, marvel at them,
Why not unfold your abilities and transform them?
You meditate on what make a thing,
Why not so order things, that you do not waste them?
You vainly seek into the cause of things,
Why not appropriate and enjoy what they produce?"17

Notice that this important text is interpreted by Needham as merely a protest against Taoists, especially Chuang Tzu's preference for nature and negligence of man, and as exhibiting a certain legalist learning. In fact, it was not so simple, because here "to domesticate and regulate" and "control over the course of Nature" would mean an attitude of domination over Nature by using her causal regularities. "Unfold one's abilities", "transform things" "order things and appropriate what they produce" would mean the application of technology in accomplishing things and transforming natural process.

Therefore Hsun Tzu had an ideological framework favorable to the development of science and technology in the modern sense. His difficulty consisted in the fact that he did not understand the importance of investigating "what makes a thing" and consequently missed the dimension of knowledge for knowledge's own sake, the disinterested pursuit of truth. What he had in mind was a pragmatic and utilitarian vision of domination over nature and technological application.

As to the Neo-Confucians in the period of Sung and Ming Dynasties, their vision of the world was also very congruent with that of the modern natural sciences. In fact, as Needham's studies have shown, Neo-Confucian philosophy in the Sung dynasty was connected with the golden period of natural sciences and technologies such as mathematics, astronomy, botany, zoology, architecture and military technology in Chinese civilization.18 For example, Chu Hsi's (1033-1170 A.D.) emphasis on "the investigation of things" and "the extension of knowledge" were quite positive for the development of science. Chu Hsi held that all actual and potential principles are contained in the Great Ultimate, which is complete in all things as a whole and in each thing individually. The Great Ultimate involves both Li (logos) and Chi (physis) which, while seemingly dualistic, are never separate but in mutual complementarity. This philosophy of organism is, as Needham would suggest, quite analogous to that of Whitehead, without having passed through the stages corresponding to Newton and Galileo. But it is not fair to say, as Needham does, that this philosophical system was produced only by "flights of genius."19 I would suggest that it was rather a philosophical system achieved by deep philosophical meditation on the nature of reality and also by creative interpretation of the Confucian tradition. The function of reason it implied was therefore speculative and hermeneutic, without being scientific and operational. Classical Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism never took into consideration the interaction of the logico-mathematically structured theories with the systematically controlled experimentation, which, on the contrary, was the essence of modem science.

Empirical Knowledge Interacting with Intelligible Unity

Modern Western science is a rational way of constructing knowledge of the world in view of its valid explanation and efficient control. Science is a product of human construction as well as a continuing process of construction. As we have said in the first chapter, this process of construction consists in three aspects.

- First, on its rational side, modem science is an activity of constructing theories that use logical-mathematically structured language to formulate knowledge of local validity, that is, knowledge about a particular domain of phenomenon with explanatory and predictive power.
- Second, on its empirical side, modem science is characterized by its well-controlled systematic experimentation which, by elaborating on the sensible data and our perception of them, assure itself of keeping in touch with the Environment, the supposed "Real World", but in an artificially, technically controlled way.
- Third, there is a conscious checking of the correspondence between the rational side and the empirical side in order to combine them into a coherent whole to serve man's objective in explaining and controlling the world. The rational side of science builds up a theoretical vision of the world, while the empirical side relates this vision to the scientist' s sensible construction and controlling experience of the world. Philosophical reflection, in checking the correspondence between these two aspects, assures us of their coherence and unity.

Now, let us compare Confucianism with Western modem science. Apparently speaking, Confucianism seemed to have emphasized the accumulation of empirical knowledge on the one hand and their intelligible unity on the other. B. Schwartz is right when he says,

To Confucius knowledge does begin with the empirical cumulative knowledge of masses of particulars, . . . then includes the ability to link these particulars first to one's own experiences and ultimately with the underlying unity that binds this thought together.20

This judgment is supported by texts where Confucius affirmed the necessity of unifying diverse empirical knowledge. To his disciple Tzu Kung the Master put the question: "You think, I believe, that my aim is to learn many things and retain them in my memory?" Tzu Kung replied, "Is that not so?" The Master replied, "No, there is an unity which binds it all together."21

Besides, Confucius seemed to affirm, as did Kant, the complementary interaction between empirical data and thinking. He said, "He who learns without thought is utterly confused. He who thinks without learning is in great danger."22 These words of Confucius remind us of Kant's proposition that sensibility without concept is blind, whereas concept without sensibility is void. "I have spent, elsewhere he said, a whole day without eating food and a whole night without sleep, thinking. It was of no use. It is better to learn."23 So it seems that for Confucius, learning, analogous to modem science, is a process of interaction between empirical knowledge and their intelligible unity.

Unfortunately, further reflection shows that, first, the empirical knowledge in Confucius was not technically controlled data collection; second, the ultimate unity for him was not merely the logico-mathematically structured theories; and finally the mode of interaction between the above two moments was not that of deduction and falsification in Popper's sense, or induction and verification in Logical Empiricists' sense or in other looser concepts such as testing and

confirmation. Let us explain this more explicitly in order to evaluate the epistemological import of Confucianism.

First, concerning the empirical side of Confucian learning, Confucius did not have in mind any sensible data gathered by technically controlled process. What he stressed consisted rather in the concrete and factual knowledge of the institutions, the code of behavior, the achievement of an idealized culture, that of Chou dynasty for example, and the realities of our life environment. This extended from knowledge in respect to the names of birds, animals, plants and trees, to that of the meaning of a religious rite. This empirical knowledge concerns mostly the meaningful world of human being, rather than with the savage world of nature, which in Confucius' eyes was to be constructed in terms of codes congenial to human nature, not to be controlled by mere technical process. Even if we take the broad concept of "technique" such as the one given by Weber, which means the rule-governedness of reproducible behavior to which others can adapt themselves in a calculative manner, we cannot say that empirical knowledge in the Confucian sense is technically controlled. Perhaps it is for this reason that Confucianism did not offer any method conducive to modem scientific development.

Second, concerning the rational side of Confucian learning, there seemed to be no regard paid to the rigorous logico-mathematic structure of discourse. One thing Confucius proposed which was connected with the rationality of discourse was his emphasis on the correctness of names. This concerned mostly the use of language and the relation of language to reality. In fact it was not proposed by Confucius as a semantic theory, not to mention any concern for syntactical issues. It concerned terms not in themselves, but as used in human speeches and actions. Therefore it had some pragmatic significance determined in term of the social, rather than theological. Confucius said:

Would it not be necessary to correct names? . . . If names are not correct then one's words will not be in accord [with one's actions]. If words are not in accord, then what is to be done cannot be [correctly] implemented! . . . Therefore a noble man uses names only in their appropriate way, so that what he says can be appropriately put into effect. A noble man in his speech leaves nothing to chance.24

This text shows that the Confucian theory of language refers not to any observed physical entity, but to modes of human behavior. Confucius never tried to formulate any definition in the sense of Aristotelian logic. Neither did he propose any semantic theory. What we can discern here is only an ethically oriented pragmatic vision of language.

In the long history of Chinese science, mathematics was never considered by Confucians as the measure of rationality, not to mention taking it as necessary for structuring a meaningful discourse. The only exception was perhaps Shao Yung, who gave a very high place to numbers, seen by him as the manifestation of Tao. But this is a metaphysical rather than scientific thesis. Anyhow, mathematics was not highly evaluated in itself. The priority of social and ethical concern in Confucianism seems to explain this attitude. As Needham suggests,

Mathematics was essential, up to a certain point, for the planning and control of the hydraulic engineering works, but those professing it were likely to remain inferior of facials.25

This social and political reason given be Needham explains partly the unimportance of mathematical discourse in Confucianism. A more internal reason might be that mathematics was

considered as technique of calculation and instrument of organizing empirical data, not as the objective structure of reality and discourse.

Third, concerning the mode of relation between empirical knowledge and the intelligible ground of unity, Confucianism had not conceived of any interactive relation in the mode of deduction/falsification, or induction/verification, or testing/confirmation. The mode of unity was for Confucianism a kind of mental integration in referring to the ultimate reality through the process of ethical praxis. Here praxis or practical action was not interpreted as a kind of technical application of theories to control concrete natural or social phenomena. It was understood rather as an active involvement in the process of realizing what is properly human in the life of the individual and that of the society. As to science and technology, they are not to be ignored but must be reconsidered in the context of this ethical praxis.

Marx Weber does not appreciate this integral Confucian humanism, which, compared with Occidental natural science, fails in rationalistic ambition. He also believes that Occidental natural science, with its mathematical foundation, is a combination of rational form of thought grown on the soil of ancient philosophy and the technical "experiment" originated on the soil of the Renaissance. The "experimenting" great art of the Renaissance was considered by Weber as a unique blend of two elements: the empirical skill of artists based on craftsmanship, and their historically and socially determined rationalist ambition, while the masterly refined Chinese art lacked all these understood incentives to rationalist ambition.26

Although Weber's judgment here is convincing to a certain degree, still we have to distinguish what is rational from what is reasonable. To be "rational", as we have said before, we have to control the gathering of empirical data through systematic technical process, to formulate theories in a logico-mathematic manner, and to establish their correspondence through an interactive checking process. On the contrary, to be "reasonable", we have to refer to the totality of our existence and to its meaningful interpretation by human life as a whole. Confucianism endeavored to be reasonable, while neglecting its own rational potentiality. Without scientific rationality, Confucianism did not produce modem science in the long history of Chinese culture. But with its reasonableness, it can serve today as remedy to modem science when the scientific rationality has brought humankind to the impasse of the impoverishment of reason.

The Reasonable in Contrast to the Rational

In modem times, science and technology, characterized as problem solving mechanisms, serve as the model of cultural rationalization and as the measure of progress in the history of humanity. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber sees cultural rationalization in modem science and technology, in autonomous art, and in a religiously anchored normative system (both ethical and legal).27 Modem science, as theoretical knowledge expressed in logical mathematic form and tested with the help of controlled experiments, represents in an excellent way this phenomenon of rationalization. Weber designates as "rationalization" every expansion of empirical knowledge, of predictive capacity, of instrumental and organizational mastery of the empirical process. Modem science not only concretizes this rationality in its logic of research, but also becomes the leading factor of rationalization in the world history. This has two reasons. First, modem science was institutionalized in university settings and other research organizations, the university being regarded as the concrete image of rationality. Second, in being applied to the process of industrialization, modem science penetrated into the area of economic life.

In the latter sense, modem science and technology could also be seen by the Marxists as a model of rationalization. Because, according to Marx, the rationalization of society takes place in the development of productive forces, that is, in the expansion of empirical knowledge, in the improvement of production techniques and the increasingly effective mobilization, quantification and organization of socially useful labor power.

This conception of modem science and technology as model of rationalization and measure of progress could be traced back to the time of the Enlightenment. For example, Condorcet had, under the influence of Turgot and d'Alembert, well articulated this ideology in his famous *Esquisse d 'un tableau historique des progres de l'esprit humain* of 1794. The mathematical sciences of nature were seen there as the model of rationality. Especially, Newtonian physics was taken as a paradigm for knowledge in general. In his *Tableau ge'nerale de la science qui a pour object I 'application du calcul aux sciences morales et politiques* of 1793, Condorcet took as examples the questions concerning demography, electoral operations, the theory of value and that of prize. He took probability calculation as technique indispensable for the progress of human spirit. With what he called as "social mathematics", he hoped for the elimination of superstition and skepticism, and for the possibility of relating humankind to reason. The methodology of the natural sciences thereby was extended to the social sciences, human sciences and even to the philosophical vision of history in general.

Habermas has well pointed out that this philosophy of progress has four basic presuppositions.

- First, it interpreted the concept of perfection according to the model of scientific progress and thus based a linear conception of progress on the advancement of natural sciences.
- Second, it universalized the rationality represented by modem science which took on the function of enlightenment and emancipation.
- Third, it connected the cognitive aspect of scientific progress with the moral-practical aspect of the coming of age of mankind.
- Fourth, it based the progress of civilization on the progress of the human spirit only by counting on the empirical efficacy of an ever-improving theoretical knowledge. In other words, the progress of human spirit could also be measured by laws of nature discovered by natural science.28

This positivist philosophy, with all its presuppositions, has long dominated our visions of science, society and reality. It constitutes a dominant paradigm of scientific research and social development in general . But recently, with the fall of this dominant paradigm, we see quite clearly now that this conception of rationality has many unacceptable implications.

It implies that, first, science and society follow a linear and irreversible way of development. But in reality, it fails to recognize the fact that desired changes in a few indices do not necessarily lead to overall development of the society in question, and that growth rarely follows an irreversible, unilinear path. It implies also an overemphasis on the rupture of the modern society with traditional values and practices as a precondition to modernity. Tradition and cultural values are viewed as obstacles to growth and have to be removed. This tradition/modernity dichotomy leads to an erroneous assumption that there is only one way to modernity which too can be manifested in but one single model. In reality, new discoveries in science and technology must find support from the existing cultural tradition before they can take hold in the system. Finally, on the cognitive level, it implies a sort of domination of empirical data by theories. On the social level, it implies also a strategy of domination of the more developed over the less developed, and

of the center over the periphery. To a certain degree, we could say that scientific rationality means domination.

In contrast to the rationality of modern science, Confucianism is a system of reasonable ideas which refers ultimately to the totality of human existence and its realization as the horizon within which the meaning of human actions, and even that of natural phenomena, is to be determined. Instead of thinking of explaining natural phenomena by law-like theories and of my technical control over the world, Confucianism thinks in terms of our relation to others, to Nature and even to the transcendental. It thinks in the framework of the totality constituted of Humanity, Nature and Heaven.

In the case of Classical Confucianism, as we have said, this system of ideas was constituted essentially of Jen, Yi and Li. Jen could be seen as the dynamic interconnectedness of one's Self with others, with nature and even with Heaven, seen as the ground of the transcendental dimension of existence. It is the ultimate ground of cosmic harmony and the transcendental foundation of men's ethical life. It is our subjectivity as well as our intersubjectivity to be manifested especially in and through our moral awareness.

From Jen, the Confucians would derive Yi, which represents respect of, and the appropriate behaviors towards, others. From here emerge all moral norms, moral obligations, moral judgments, our consciousness of these obligations and even the virtue of acting always according to moral norms. From Yi, the Confucians would derive Li which represents code of behavior, religious and political ceremonies and social institutions.

Both Yi and Li represent the "ought to be" of human existence, whereas Jen represents the Being of beings, natural, divine and especially human. The rule-governedness of human nature is not to be understood in light of natural laws, or to be reduced to them. On the contrary, it is to be understood in accordance with the *to be* and the *ought to be* of human beings as expressed in the conceptual framework of Jen, Yi and Li. Even the laws of nature have to be reinterpreted by, and reintegrated into, the dignity of human existence and its transcendental foundation. Arthur F. Wright seems to have grasped this reasonable system centered around the human agent when he says:

Confucianism of all ages viewed the natural and human worlds as an organism made up of multitudinous interconnected parts. When any one of the parts fell from its place or was disrupted in its functioning, the harmony of the whole was impaired, Heaven . . . presided over this organic whole and was a force for harmony and balance. But man was the principle agent of both harmony and disharmony. Out of ignorance or perversity, men could cause serious disruptions; by the application of knowledge, wisdom, and discipline, men could restore harmony.29

Compared with the Western scientific rationality, the Confucian vision of reasonableness has the following implications:

First, in place of the linear conception of progress presupposed by scientific rationality, Confucianism proposes a creative movement which cherishes the sedimentated traditional values while moving forward towards novelty. Confucianism does not presuppose a linear and eschatological concept of time. In the Confucian eyes, progress must not be an excuse for entering into the situation of dependence. On the contrary, it must be an authentically creative act based on the dynamism of each tradition.

Second, in place of a radical rupture from the past, Confucianism cherishes the notion of continuity. In the Confucian eyes, "modernization" should not be understood in rupture with tradition. On the contrary, it is but a modern manner of interpreting traditional values and of forming a novel tradition according to the demand of modern times.

Third, in place of the strategy of domination implicit in the scientific rationality, Confucianism proposes a strategy of harmonious coordination. Science and technology are not to be seen as instruments for domination over nature and society. They are but knowledge of, and technique for, coordinating human being and nature, individual and society.

In view of the above, even if Confucianism did not produce any science of the modern Western type, it could have the following advantages in facing today the challenge of science and in overcoming its malicious presuppositions and ill effects.

On the theoretical level, Confucianism emphasizes the priority of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity over logical and technological systems. In other words, according to Confucianism, the human being has to be master and not slave of science and technology. All development of the latter must be in the service of the unfolding and realization of human potentiality. Confucianism also accentuates the priority of the meaningfulness of human life over the rigor of mathematical and experimental structures. In short, it emphasizes the existentially meaningful, rather than the semantico-syntactic side of discourse. Finally, it stresses the priority of the human and social sciences over the natural sciences. Because human sciences concern mostly the ways through which human beings understand themselves in history, rather than the mathematical structure of natural laws in the case of natural sciences. They are characterized by human being's historicity and therefore cannot get rid of traditional values.

On the practical level, Confucianism would not favor modernity to the detriment of tradition. On the contrary, it would try to adapt to the demands of modern world on the basis of the dynamism and resources of the cultural tradition. All new developments in the domain of science and technology are to be conceived in a way to be absorbed into the cultural dynamism of each historical community. In short, it prefers acculturation, rather than westernization. Finally, it would protest against any policy of domination, but will agree with any policy of harmonious coordination on both the national and on the international levels.

Concluding Remarks: Hoping for a New Synthesis

Today these Confucian principles have already proved their effectiveness in promoting modernization on the societal and economic level. Herman Kahn affirms in *World Economic Development -- 1979 and Beyond*:

In the Confucian hierarchic society, the emphasis is on cooperation among complementary elements, much as in the family (which is in fact the usual paradigm or model in a Confucian culture). The husband and wife work together and cooperate in raising the children; each has different assigned duties and responsibilities, as do the older and younger siblings and the grandparents. Synergism -- complementarity and cooperation among parts of a whole -- are emphasized, not equality and interchangeability.30

As opposed to the earlier Protestant ethic, the modern Confucian ethic is superbly designed to create and foster loyalty, dedication, responsibility, and commitment and to intensify identification

with the organization and one's role in the organization. All this makes the economy and society operate much more smoothly than one whose principles of identification and association tend to lead to egalitarianism, to disunity, to confrontation, and excessive compensation or repression.31

The problem now is that mere economic development is not enough. There is no modernity without science. The concept of modernization is inextricably bound up with advancing modem science and technology. How could Confucianism, in mastering the creative tensions between theoria and praxis, logical structure and empirical data, the reasonable and the rational, produce novel development in science and technology worthy of its noble principles and create thereby a new cultural synthesis, this is still a task for those who are Confucian-minded in the days to come.

But, on the other hand, when Western science is now more and more trapped in a menacing scientific rationality, Confucian emphasis on reasonableness, on the holistic relation of human beings to the Reality, can help us to redefine science's place in human existence as well as man's place in the cosmos. In this perspective, we need more a reasonable system of ideas such as the one offered by Confucianism, rather than the modern Western science. Also Confucianism can help humankind to think over the urgent problem of how to reintegrate science into the context of human existence.

Notes

1. Vincent Shen, *Disenchantment of the World* (Taipei: China Times Publishing Co., 1984), pp. 31-37.
2. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 982b, 12-22.
3. Georg Picht, "Der Sinn der Unterscheidung von Theorie und Praxis in der griechischen Philosophie," in *Evangelishe Ethik* (1964), pp. 321ff.
4. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 981b, 6-7.
5. *Ibid.*, 982a 3-10, 20-23.
6. *The Text of Yi Ching*. Chinese original with English translation by Z.D.Sung (Shanghai, 1935), p. 334.
7. Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 99.
8. *Lun Yu*, XIV 24, my translation.
9. Joseph, Needham, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Vol. II, p. 12.
10. *Lun Yu*, VI 20, tr. Legge, modified by myself.
11. *Ibid.*, XI, 11, tr. Legge, modified by myself.
12. Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, tr. by H. Gerth (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 155.
13. *Lun Yu*, VII, 17.
14. *Ibid.*, VII, 24.
15. *Ibid.*, VII, 20.
16. Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol., pp. 26-29.
17. *The Works of Hsun Tzu*. Tr. Dubs (London: Probstain, 1928), p. 236.
18. Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. II, pp. 493-495.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 458.
20. Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China*, p. 89.

21. *Lun Yu*, XV 3. (tr. Waley).

22. *Ibid.*, II 15.

23. *Ibid.*, XV 30.

24. *Ibid.*, XIII 3.

25. Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. II, p. 30.

26. Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, trans. by H. Gerth, pp. 150-151.

27. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. T. Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1958), pp. 13-31.

28. Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. I, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), pp. 145-153.

29. Arthur F. Wright, ed., *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization* (California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. ix.

30. Herman Kahn, *World Economic Development--1979 and Beyond* (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1979), pp. 121-122.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

1. *The Broken World, a Four Act Play by Gabriel Marcel*, trans. by K.R. Hanley (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1998).

2. "Concrete Approaches to the Ontological Mystery", in *Gabriel Marcel* (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), pp. 9-46.

See also: *Two Play, by Gabriel Marcel: "The Lantern" and "The Torch of Peace"* plus *From Comic Theater to Musical Creation*, a Previously Unpublished Essay, ed. Katharine Rose Hanley (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988).

"The Dangerous Situation of Spiritual Values", in *Home Viator, an Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope* (Glouster, MA: Peter Smith, 1978); Katharine Rose Hanley, *Dramatic Approaches to Creative Fidelity: A Study in the Theater and Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973)* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), esp. ch. VII, "Colombyre or the Torch of Peace: The Role of Person-Communities in Living Creative Fidelity to Values", pp. 129-136.

10.
The Humanization of Technology in Ancient China: A Study of the *Meng Xi Notes*

Cheng Chaonan

Science in Ancient China

The *Meng Xi Notes*1 were written by the brilliant scholar, Shen Gua (1031-1095) of the Song Dynasty from 1086 to 1093, and published in the 11th century. This book covers a broad area including astronomy, meteorology, the calendar, mathematics, geology, geography, physics, biology, chemistry, medicine, literature, history, music and painting. It is regrettable that its scientific contribution never has been appreciated properly.

Due to the research by such famous scholars as J. Needham and the well-known Chinese scholar, Hu Daojin, in recent decades its status in the history of Chinese science and technology has come to be recognized. Its numerous and jumbled contents were classified and its scientific value made clear especially by J. Needham's use of the Western scientific method of analysis and induction. His conclusion that this book is a "milestone in the history of Chinese science" has been broadly accepted. Its essence was revealed by the efforts of Hu who wrote the books *To Correct and Criticize Meng Xi Notes* and *Introduction to Meng Xi Notes*, which discard the dross and select the essential, eliminate the false and retain what is true.

The Song Dynasty was a splendid period for the development of Chinese science and technology. For instance in architecture, *The Classic Book of Civil Engineering* by Mu Jing summed up the experience in wooden architecture. In astronomy, *The Calendar of Feng Yan*2 was completed, which improved the celestial globe. In mechanical technique, a special chart as instrument for measuring distance, *Ji Li Gu Che*, was invented. In printing technology, type print was created by Pi Sheng. In medicine the *Compendium of Materia* was supplied. In mathematics, *The Ten Volumes of the Classic Book of Algorithms* was edited. All of the above achieve-ments are reflected in the *Meng Xi Notes*. Shen Gua himself also made a great contribution to science and technology. For instance, seeing the fossils of shells and cobbles in the fault of the Tai Huang mountains, he deduced that in the past that place had been a beach, though today it is a thousands Li distance from the East Sea: the so-called main land is an accumulation of mud and soil (article 430). This view, deducing the origin of land from the sea based on the relics of ancient living things is 400 hundred years earlier than C.R. Darwin's formulation that fossils are the relics of the ancient living things. Again, in mathematics Shen Gua developed the geometrical progression from *The Nine Chapters of Algorithm* up to his time, and was able to invent a new kind of advanced progression by which to work out the bulk of a pile of jars.

It should be noted that since Shen Gua's profound learning covered not only philosophy, culture and arts, but also morality and so on, his work reflects the basic features of Chinese philosophy in a manner consistent with the Chinese cultural tradition. As a milestone in the history of Chinese science and technology, (1) it is one of the most important representations of the science and technology in Chinese history; and (2) it is a summary of the scientific thinking of ancient China. In the light of these two factors, the ideas concerning the humanization of technology in *Meng Xi Notes* typically inherit the past and usher in the future. It is a true epitome of the technological humanization of the ancient China.

Two Examples

The achievements in science and technology are one of the indispensable marks of ancient Chinese civilization. Speculation on the relationship between science, technology and human beings is an important component of the cultural ideas of ancient China. Based on many scholarly studies, it is broadly accepted as an essential feature of Chinese culture that human beings and heaven should be in harmony and be parts of the same virtue.3 This feature is obvious in the tradition of science and technology. Xu Fuguan pointed out: "In Chinese culture human beings and nature are in too close an affinity. In conquering nature for the use of humans scientific knowledge regarding nature was not successfully developed."4

These two points, i.e. too close an affinity between man and nature, and failure to develop theoretical scientific knowledge, can be seen in *Meng Xi Notes*. Let us examine two examples.

Case A: A reflected picture behind a small hole and a reflected reverse picture through a concave lens. The first to describe this phenomenon was Mu Tse. We read in *Mu Jing*: "The light which is reflected shines like a shooting arrow. In the picture formed by the light, the bottom of the real figure goes to the top of the picture, and vice versa." We read again from *Mu Jing*, Vol. 2, "In mirroring a figure, when the real thing is far from the concave mirror the reflected picture will be changed, but it will be proper when the real thing is near the concave mirror. This depends on whether it is inside or outside the focus." Shen Gua described and explained the phenomenon in even greater detail. He pointed out that when the bird flies from the West to the East its shadow on the ground moves along to the East. But if the light shining upon the bird is reflected through the small hole of a window, then the shadow inside the window will not move toward the East, but toward the West. Similarly, the shadow outside the window is inverted because it is formed by the light through the small hole of the window. He gave the same reason for the reverse picture reflected by the concave lens, pointing out that the sunlight reflected from the concave lens is focused one or two inches in front of the concave lens, where it can even start a fire (article 44).

Though Shen Gua's explanation of the picture formed through the small hole and the reverse image reflected through a concave lens was on the level of only superficial description and concrete metaphor without an explication on the theoretical level, he was aware that the key points for the above phenomena were the small hole through which the light passes and the focus where the light is concentrated. The small hole and focus were called by him obstacles. "The reason is that there is an obstacle between them" (the real thing and the picture formed). He could not go deeply into the principles of optics, but only made an analogical deduction in view of an association of the two; this is a useful way of thinking in Chinese tradition.

This is not only for things, but also for man, for there is hardly anything which does not contain an obstacle. A small obstacle inverts gains and losses, and substitutes the correct by the erroneous. A large obstacle even causes one to treat oneself as a thing and things as oneself (article 44).

Here two points are to be noted: (1) Such analogical deduction, without including the object as such in the problem and without analysis of the essence of the phenomena, cannot reveal the causality and rule involved. How can the phenomena, a picture formed through a hole and the focus of a concave lens, be traced to the same cause, namely, an obstacle which causes gains and losses, truth and error. An obstacle in social life is only a metaphor to explain a phenomena in optics. Such explanation cannot reach the truth but can lead only to confusion. Lack of a deep

scientific analysis of phenomena was one of the main reasons that science could not develop successfully in China.

(2) There is an inclination, not only for Shen Gua, but also for many other scholars to make analogical deductions among nature, human society and daily life. Though sometimes metaphors can help us to understand something, e.g., since steel is harder than iron, Shen Gua took gluten-making as a metaphor for steel-making: "Wash the soft ingredients from flour, then gluten results. It is the same for making steel out of iron" (article 56). Here the metaphor and analogy indeed make sense. But any metaphor limps it is not exact and cannot be taken as a scientific investigation of the object.

Case B: Scale and temperament. Shen Gua recorded and commented on scale and temperament in a considerable part of his *Meng Xi Notes*. To facilitate discussion some preliminary information is needed. Since ancient times, in China music has been an important field of art and has had great development. In the Western Zhou period (770 B.C.) orchestras comprised up to 1400 musicians. Twenty-nine kinds of musical instruments are mentioned in *Classic Poems*. Such ample musical activities provided favorable conditions for discovering temperament, and in this period incomplete five-note and twelve-note scales were discovered.

Scale and temperament give definite norms for musical activities, but also are objects of scientific research because they are related to physics and mathematics. As there is an inseparable connection between scale and temperament, both come under the name of "tone systems" in some classical writings. The notes of the Chinese scale were designated by *Gong*, *Shang Kiao*, *Zhi Yu*, which are basically equivalent to the notes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, in contemporary notation. With the addition of "variant *Zhi*" and "variant *Gong*", a seven-tone 7 note scale is formed:

Gong Shang Jiao Variant *Zhi Yu* Variant *Zhi Gong*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The spaces of the five-note scale are constant. For example, the space between *Gong* and *Shang* is always an "entire tone". The pitch of four notes depends on that of *Gong*. Every tone can become the start of a scale, thus forming five modes of different tonics.

The scale is intended to fix the pitch of a note. Mode can be selected as required, but pitch should be determined correspondingly, for which a reference to pitch is required. The contemporary pitch pipe is such a device. Twelve bamboo pipes of non-equal, but proportional length were used to measure pitch, thus determining the twelve temperaments.5 As there is proportionality among temperaments, a relation to quantity is introduced. Guan Zhong (750-645 B.C.) was the first to envisage temperament in terms of quantity. He proposed the method of "subtraction of one from three and addition of one to three for determining temperament." Accordingly, as a vibrator (pipe or chord) is divided equally in length into three parts, one third is added. In this way, various temperaments are generated. The note generated by a vibrator of two-thirds length is a pure fifth higher than one by a vibrator of full length; the note generated by a vibrator of three-fourth this length is a pure fourth lower than one by a vibrator of full length, the lower pure fourth being a transposition of the upper pure fifth.

The quantitative relation of scale and temperament are determined by means of above method. The twelve temperaments are as follows:

1. *Wang Zhong*; 3. *Tai Cu*; 5. *Gu Xi*; 7. *Rui Bin*; 9. *Yi Ze*; 11. *Wu She*;
2. *Pa Lu*; 4. *Jia Zhong*; 6. *Zhong Lu*; 8. *Lin Zhong*; 10. *Nan Lu*; 12. *Ying Zhong*.

In this series, the six odd temperaments are called "solar temperaments" or "six temperaments"; the six even temperaments are called "lunar temperaments" or "six lu". Together they are called "temperament and lu". In their historical development, scale and temperament were improved through scientific study.

Shen Gua reexamined these historical studies from the view point of mathematics and proposed the "Four Numbers of Temperament": "Temperament has the number of real volume, the number of length, the number of diameter and the number of acute and obtuse."

On the other hand, scale and temperament were humanized within the framework of the Chinese cultural tradition which included two main facets: the ethical and the aesthetic. Scale and temperament are not only combined with the doctrine of the "five elements" philosophized in terms of the "union of heaven and human", but also obtained an ethical connotation in the ritual interpretation of the moral union of heaven and human. "The Book of Music" which incorporated the musical theories of the pre-Qin Dynasty treated music as an art generated by mind and also connected it with society and politics. It wrote: "*Gong* is king, *Shang* is officer, *Jiao* is people, *Zhi* is affair, *Yu* is thing." If the relation among the five tones is out of order, not only can melody not be generated, but the state is led to destruction. Hence, *Shen Gua* emphasized that the hierarchy among the five tones must not be violated.

On the aesthetic side, Shen Gua pointed out that sound is generated by chords which should be divided into sections according to a twelve-tone system. Only in this way could "right tone" be generated. He thought that pitch can approach infinity in both high and low directions, and has its respective twelve-tone system in either direction. But in order to render sound a musical tone, "It is imperative to seek the moderate tone." Musical instruments are possible only if a right tone is obtained; musical tones are possible only if a moderate tone is obtained." This view of "moderate tone as musical tone" can be traced to Dong Zhong Shu (179-104 B.C.). But in contrast to Dong Zhong Shu, Shen Gua considered musical tone as starting from the internal law of temperament. He claimed that sounds too high or too low in pitch not only could not become melody, but even the "tone of high harmony" favored in the China cultural tradition.

Science and Technology as Mediating between Heaven and Humankind

Technology is the means and method of production based on natural law; science is the system of knowledge in terms of categories, theorems and laws of the essence and law of movement in the actual world. Science and technology are determined by natural laws, and hence possess natural attributes; on the other hand, being generated in certain social contexts they possess social attributes. In the relation between humans and nature, science and technology are not only the premises and conditions of material production, but also the effective means for regulating the mutual relation between humans and nature. Therefore, science and technology mediate between humans and nature forming a structure, human : science :: technology : nature.

In this complex, Chinese culture emphasized the affinity of humans to nature, in contrast to domination of nature by science and technology. According to Taoism, humans should take nature as the supreme rule in order to keep harmony among the three parts: "The rule for humans is earth, for earth it is heaven, for heaven it is Tao (logos), and for Tao it is nature."6 As regards technology, Zhuang Zi thought that if Tao is the trunk then technology is the branch: "Technology submits to

affairs, affairs to righteousness, righteousness to morality, morality to Tao and Tao to heaven."7 Confucianism takes a similar position. Confucius said: "The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain."8 Hence, technology as a means of obtaining things occupies an unimportant place.

In the Song Dynasty this viewpoint was still dominant, which had a negative influence on the development of science and technology. Firstly, the end of science and technology is ethical in nature. For Dong Zhongwronshu, Tao entails feudalistic ethical norms. Even Shen Gua drew a parallel between inter-personal conflicts and the opposition with right and wrong, on the one hand, and such optical principles as image formation through a hole and the inverted image from a concave lens, on the other. As mentioned above, he used kings, officers, people, affairs and things to explain in an ethical way the order of a scale.

Secondly, guided by the idea of the harmony of heaven and humans, Chinese thinking paid great attention to the organic connection among all things, emphasized the similarity between man and nature, and used analogy as a method of developing an image. This mode of thinking confined one to seeking the apparent similarity of things and failed to discover the difference between their appearance and essence. Thus it failed to grasp the essences and laws of things and to construct a corresponding set of categories, theorems and laws. Shen Gua did the same. For example, in order to describe image formation through the hole he appealed to the variation in projections by birds and the inverted image of an outside building formed through a hole in the window.

By comparison, as to the complex of "human-science and technology-nature", Western culture paid great care to the cognitive attitude toward nature. For Heraclitus, wisdom consists in speaking the truth, acting in accord with nature and listening to nature. Socrates emphasized the consistency between virtue and knowledge: "virtue is knowledge", so that in general knowledge is higher than morality. Aristotle in his *Physics* pointed out that according to their relation with nature, the arts are divided into two parts, the one part completing what cannot be completed by nature and the other imitating nature. He emphasized the imitative in human knowing and creating, and claimed that it is imperative to describe what would happen based on the law of probability or necessity, even in the imitation of nature.

Since early times Western scholars had established system-atic logico-mathematical and experimental approaches for this cognitive attitude. According to them, observation, experiment and analysis are employed to learn the essence via phenomenon, and mathematical methods are used to master the structure and law of objects. As noted by A.N. Whitehead, beginning with a "bifurcation of nature", Western science dismisses the subjective world and devotes itself to the objective world. This cognitive attitude plays a great role in the formation of systematic scientific knowledge. Based on such attitudes and methods Western scientists developed the principle of optics and photography.

As to scale and temperament, the Greeks discovered them early in the 6th century B.C., almost simultaneously with ancient China. But, in the study of scale there was an evident difference between the Chinese and Greek traditions of science and technology. Pythagoras (582-493 B.C.) experimented with the scale by means of the monochord, and sought the method for determining the scale in a mathematical manner. He thought that all musical tone could be generated by "using the method of mutual generation of five tones". In this way, he proposed "the law of the mutual generation of five tones", i.e., Pythagoras's musical system. Based on mathematics, the Greek musician and mathematician, Aristoxenos (c345 B.C.) created the twelve-tone equal temperament while China discovered temperament in its original forms only eight centuries later.

It is true that formal logic and mathematical abstraction provided the foundation for modern science. However, as noted by A. Einstein, the science of ancient China provides inspiration through its brilliant accomplishments.

J. Needham, the well-known scholar of the Chinese history of science and technology, called attention to the important role of Chinese philosophy in the development of natural science. He thought it impossible that "modern" natural science be generated naturally from Chinese civilization. But it is also impossible for natural science to attain completeness without the philosophy proper to Chinese civilization. This is an historical paradox.

The inspiration derived from the humanization of ancient Chinese science and technology can be summarized as follows:

1. The idea of the harmony between heaven and humans, which emphasizes the harmony and balance of man and nature, promotes the use of science for attaining a harmony between humans and nature and for keeping the ecological balance.

2. Great care should be paid to the social attributes and ethical ends of science and technology, so that science and technology are included in the organic whole of society, and scienticism is prevented.

3. Associative and intuitive, imaginative thinking can help scientific insight and complement simple analysis.

Notes

1. This book is composed of a series of articles under the title *Meng Xi Notes*. Meng Xi is the name of the author's private garden. In Chinese the title is pronounced as *Meng Xi Bi Tan*.

2. Feng Yan, in old China the name of a region which includes Chang-An, the capital of ancient China.

3. I.e., "Tian Ren He Ri", "Tian Ren He De".

4. Xu Fuguan is a famous Taiwan scholar. See his work, *The Spirit of Chinese Arts*.

5. Jiang Kung-yan, *Treatise on Aesthetic Thought of Music in the Pre-Qin Dynasty* (Beijing: People's Literature Press, 1986), pp. 45-46.

6. *Lao Zi*, ch. 25.

7. Zhuang Zi, *Heaven and Earth*.

8. *The Confucian Analects*, Book IV.

11.
The Development of Biotechnology and the Future of Human Civilization

Fu Jizhong

Science and technology is always an important component of human culture. Science directs technological innovation and technology accelerates the progress of science. Both are clearly distinct yet closely related.

Since the last century, the modern scientific and technological revolution has brought rich cultural achievements. Now, at this junction of the two centuries, we ask what will be the main trend of science and technology in the next century; what will their future look like; how should we evaluate the future of human culture? These are subjects both for futurology and for philosophy. In this article, I shall attempt a concise answer to these questions.

The Century of Biotechnology

As the development of science is closely related to human culture, the different cultural backgrounds of Western and Eastern societies generated different paths for science. Western peoples through scientific exploration tried to understand the cosmic structure from the micro point of view, while Eastern people endeavored to discover the elementary structure of all matter from a macro point of view. From Shang to Han dynasties, China always led the way in scientific civilization. Why then did Chinese science fall behind after the seventeenth century when in the West a veritable Renaissance spread widely in Europe?

The famous physicist Li Zhendao in a speech at Fudan University in November 1992 said, "When we anticipate the 21st century, we must understand the principal problem in contemporary science. Only when these problems are fully understood is it possible that a breakthrough be made. . . . Once the principal problems are grasped, other problems can be readily solved." Thus a grasp of the principal problems in contemporary science can help to understand the development of science and technology in the century to come.

Whenever we try to recollect those outstanding scientists who made important contributions to the civilization of mankind since the Renaissance, and especially since the 19th century, the first to come to mind are Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Faraday, Plank, Michelson and Einstein. In this list almost all are famous physicists. The helio-centric theory put forward by Copernicus and Galileo, the three laws of Newton's dynamics, Faraday's theory of electronic magnetism and Einstein's theory of relativity are all outstanding achievements in physics. Their application to technology resulted in the progress of human civilization. So we can conclude without hesitation that in the 19th and the 20th centuries the progress of civilization is owed to physics.

With the passing of time, more urgent and exact questions are presented to science and technology for still more advance in human civilization. Some problems that have puzzled humankind over a long period of time, such as why human beings must age and die, what is the nature of life and what is the essence of human being, have come up once again for discussion. This challenges the present technology, and the new problems cannot be solved by relying only on physical science and technology. The theory of evolution established by Charles Darwin in the 19th century has opened a totally new field for biology on the individual level and laid the foundation for the development of modern biology. But the new approaches to clarifying the

phenomenon of life were not discovered until 1944 when the famous Austrian theoretical physicist and the founder of wave dynamics, E. Schrödinger, published "What is Life". This explained the essence of life through the theory of thermodynamics and quantum physics and elucidated the material structure of the organism, the sustenance of life and the heredity and variation of living things. This book played a major role in diverting the attention of some physicists to the problems of life science and urging biologists to investigate the mystery of life through the achievements of physics and chemistry. Some bold assumptions were made, especially the assumption that genetic material is a kind of organic macromolecule and that genetic characteristics were passed on through chromesomes in the form of a "code" --which later proved to be true. In the 1950's Click and Watson, under the influence of Shrödinger's theory and after careful analysis of the data concerning genetic material, suggested the double helix model for the structure for DNA. The establishment of the model marked a new age for the research of living materials on the molecular level.

The rise of molecular biology has brought new hope to the science of life. What exactly is life is the question natural science has long tried to answer. The development of molecular biology has led research on life in the direction of elucidating the basic structure and mechanism of the organism and has accelerated especially the advance of medical genetics. The achievement of molecular biology, along with computer science and modern physics and chemistry, can change our world greatly and can discover an effective way to solve many problems which concern humankind itself. Moreover, biotechnology, under the direction of molecular biology, will take on an entirely new aspect. For these reasons we can infer that biology will become one of the most attractive and promising branches of natural science in the next century.

The elementary purpose of life science is to reveal the origin of life, the mechanism of evolution, heredity and individual development, and the mystery of memory and thought. In essence, life science is deeply concerned with the development of humankind. A kind of driving force from both inside and outside is needed for the development of humankind and the progress of civilization. In the future this can be supplied by biotechnology. Hence, it can reasonably be imagined that the next century will focus largely on biotechnology as the future of civilization.

The Development of Biotechnology

The invention and application of biotechnology has a long history. In ancient times, whether in China or in foreign countries, people gradually selected various kinds of animals and plants to domesticate or turn into crops. Observing the variation of species, they began to notice different characteristics of the species and tried to keep these species at an excellent qualitative level. This can be regarded as the beginning of the application of biotechnology. In the middle of the 18th century the industrial revolution in the Western countries accelerated agricultural production. The appearance of Darwin's theory of evolution paved the way for recognizing the law of growth and variation of living beings. As a result the biotechniques of breeding came to be governed by exact and effective scientific theory. The experimental method was adopted to discover the pattern of variation, and the monk, Gregory Mendel, found two genetic laws by experimenting with peas. Mendel's work demonstrated that genetics had undergone the transition from phenomenal description to theoretical analysis and from empirical to theoretical science. Modern genetics and biotechnology owe much to Mendel's research in the last century.

Breeding in agricultural production is an example. Some method of breeding, such as sexual hybridization, seed selection and the creation of distinct varieties by physical means and chemicals

were widely accepted soon after human society, for its livelihood, became engaged mainly in agriculture rather than hunting. These methods, in essence, were a kind of genetic engineering on the individual level.

With the advent of the 20th century, owing to the rapid increase of industrial production and the explosion of world population, the area under cultivation diminished. Moreover the aggravation of environmental pollution and the deterioration of the global climate has brought many unfavorable conditions to agricultural production. In some countries environmental pollution has caused soil erosion to thousands of hectares of good farmland. In Africa, the harsh climate constantly turns farmland to desert, making arable land more and more scarce. Obviously under such circumstances, the regular method of breeding cannot satisfy the basic requirement of human existence. Though traditional biotechnologies do not lose the potential for developing new varieties, they have certain inevitable weaknesses. In the second place two species that are distant in evolution cannot be matched, so that the good characteristics are hard to transplant to one variety. Thirdly, repeated sexual hybridization results in a complexity of characteristics for the new generation which in turn will make the next hybridization more difficult. As for agricultural production, with the progress of human civilization, if a way to solve this were not found a crisis endangering the future of human society surely would spring up. Thus, the challenge of a better biotechnology was laid out before scientists.

A new technique of breeding, somatic cell hybridization, has been developed since the 1960's. To explain this simply, a specially devised procedure is used to cross-breed two or more cells from different species, so that the different chromosomes and genes co-exist in one hybrid cell; this hybrid cell is then transplanted to a normal host plant as a medium for growth into a complete and normal individual. Somatic cell hybridization is superior to sexual hybridization in the following aspects: 1. Somatic cell hybridization overcomes the restriction of non-affinity in sexual hybridization. 2. Rich varieties of cells ensure the availability of the material for cross-breeding. 3. The fusion of cells enlarges the sphere of cross-breeding. 4. The time needed for a new variety to grow into a mature plant is shortened. This implies as well the above wide adaptability of cell hybridization; its application will lead to a new agricultural revolution. This is a brilliant example of the combination of biotechnology with productive practice. This new biotechnique makes it possible to increase the yield of crops and to produce more nutritious food. It also can strengthen the resistance of crops to unfavorable climate, diseases and destructive insects. In addition, the rich varieties of cultivated crops can be retained and the gene resources consisting in the wild species conserved.

Nowadays, the crops created by somatic cell hybridization are very popular in a certain sphere and have produced good results. But with the success of somatic cell hybridization for plants, a new question has surfaced: can somatic cell hybridization be extended to animal cells? Some scientists have already striven to do so. Though there are still many technical difficulties, we can expect a brilliant future for this research which surely will have far-reaching influence upon the future of humankind.

Since ancient times, people have hoped for longevity, but have not been able to resist the natural law of aging and dying. In ancient China, many Taoist priests believed in alchemy and tried in vain to find a way of extending their lives. Tracing the real cause of their failure, we cannot help deriding their ignorance of science. The pills prepared by those Taoist priests contained heavy metal which is deadly. Now civilization has advanced; at the end of the 20th century science and technology are surging forward at a tremendous speed, and biotechnology has risen to new heights. At this time of transition the "task of investigating the cause of aging and death, which is deeply

related to the progress of civilization, is put before biologists throughout the world. To this end, biologists are engaged in research using various techniques and so far have made encouraging progress.

For instance, some biologists believe that aging has much to do with genes. It is probable that aging is caused by a change of gene action when the human being reaches the late period of mature human reproduction. The cell-controlled genes which control the living beings are turned on and then off. The gene products responsible for differentiation and growth when they reach a certain concentration pass the information to special switches in the gene concerning reproduction, turning the switch on. In this way, the individual acquires the capability of reproduction. In the later period of reproduction, the excess of gene product results in a feedback to the gene controlling differentiation and growth so that the "switch" is turned off. This is probably the cause of aging. Though the theory is an imperfect one which needs to be proved by experiments, it has made encouraging progress in the efforts to solve the problem. Aging and dying are accepted as common sense, yet people still have never given up hope for longevity. The history of mankind suggests that with the advance of civilization and further adaptation to environment, we shall acquire higher flexibility and a stronger capacity for survival, so that life expectancy gradually and proportionally will be increased.

A great amount of data indicates that the average life span can surpass 100 years; the ancient hope for longevity is not a fancy. Biologists are making unremitting efforts to turn that hope into a fact by finding an effective way of postponing senility.

One more advanced technique is the growth factor, a kind of hormone with many usages, such as healing wounds and helping the growth of children. When injected into the human body it speeds up the metabolism so that fresh cells are produced more quickly and dead cells are discharged more effectively. This has many advantages: efficacy, convenience and minor side-effects. This method can be expected to become important in the next century.

Molecular biology has made great contributions to the advance of medical genetics. Since ancient times genetic diseases have been a difficult challenge for medical science. Modern biotechnology may serve as a promising tool to solve this problem by disclosing the nature of genetic diseases and providing prerequisite conditions for the treatment of these diseases. Modern biotechnology is able to focus on the ultimate cause of genetic disease--the chromosome where the variation has taken place. New technology helps to devise better procedures such as gene recombination to cure such diseases. At last the diagnostic technique for genetic diseases has been aimed directly at the detection of DNA instead of at the chromosome and protein. The technique of gene diagnosis has great clinical significance and it can be used to detect genetic disease with excellent accuracy, at great speed and without harmful effects to the patient; thus it has provided clinical medicine with an effective diagnostic method. In theory, genetic disease can be cured by gene transplantation, that is, to eliminate the abnormal variant from the cells of patients with genetic diseases and then put in normal genes. Though this therapy is still in the experimental stage with animals as its subjects, it promises a bright future. Gene therapy is a dream no more, but is waiting to be cultivated in order to cure patients so as to strengthen the potential to resist diseases and better adjust to the environment,

In sum, biotechnology has emerged under the impact of productive practice, with experimental research in molecular biology and genetics as its prelude. It not only has provided industrial and agricultural production with useful tools, but also perfects itself in the course of its application. This is the general trend of biotechnology.

The Future of Human Civilization

If we suppose that biotechnology will be the mainstream of technological culture in the next century, how will it influence the development of science and society? Of course, it can be only speculation, but it seems inevitable that the rapid development of biotechnology will lead to a great leap forward for human civilization, for advantages belonging solely to biotechnology can have immense impact on the future. These advantages are: 1. The recycling of the biological supply can provide the raw material so that there is no lack of resources; and 2. Low investment, a short period for generation, high economic benefits and wide utility of the products. All this suggests that biotechnology will be the leading industry in the next century and biological products will come to occupy the market. A dominant reason for biotechnology being so attractive is that it meets the requirements of the advance of civilization. The rapid development of science and technology and the rich varieties of the means of sustenance has made it possible for humankind to develop. Under such circumstances the rise of biotechnology brings hope for a solution of problems, for it can be used not only to modernize agriculture and industry, but also to solve environmental, ecological and health problems.

Science and man should never be placed in opposed positions. The more advanced science becomes, the more freedom humans acquire, so that civilization is driven forward. It was on the foundations of classical biology that modern biology was built. Biotechnology is an epistemological summary of Darwin's theory of evolution and the consequence of research in traditional physics, chemistry and biology. It established the goal of medical science. It results in progress for civilization as well as hope for the human future.

Of course, as all is dialectical in nature there is both a positive and a negative side. Hence, we must employ subjective initiative in order to amplify the positive side and to overcome the negative side and make it useful for humankind. We do not suggest a scientism which leaves the development of society out of account, and we oppose a humanism which inhibits the development of science. Only by associating science with the essence of man can we achieve its splendid future. The dialectic of the relation between biotechnology and man has the two sides, positive and negative. Antibiotics as one bioproduct possesses the remarkable ability to kill bacteria, but its improper administration may produce harmful effects on human health. For this reason there will be a thorough and systematic investigation before their complete acceptance. Thus a further demand is placed on biotechnology, namely, to advance only in the direction of benefiting mankind.

It should be pointed out here that contemporary scientists and philosophers have different views on the achievements of molecular biology. Some believe that modern biology is in conflict with social morals and ethics, and that the conflict cannot be compromised. They would engage the doctrine of the mean of the Confucian School and the theory of non-doing of the Taoist School. Close connection between Western and Eastern cultures on the basis of a correct understanding of the spirit of traditional Chinese culture can be beneficial. In contrast, to focus on the negative side and regard the problem as unsolvable will block the development of science and cannot be accepted. History is going forward, as does the human cognitive ability. Only by understanding the dialectical character of science and distinguishing what takes place of necessity from what can be controlled can we devise a splendid blueprint for the contemporary development of science.

This future culture of humankind is the one thing that fuses Western and Eastern cultures and unifies truth, goodness and beauty.

12.
Cultural Diversity and a Path Toward Wisdom: Perspectives of Gabriel Marcel

K.R. Hanley

To appreciate storytelling as a way of communicating wisdom consider the stories about the Buddha and Mohammed and the parables of Jesus. Gabriel Marcel uses this approach as an introduction to philosophic reflection that can lead to wisdom.

A Parable of Unity and Conflict

In *The Broken World*,1 one of Gabriel Marcel's strongest and most important plays, we encounter concretely a dramatic portrayal of our situation, namely, that of living in a broken world.

Christiane evokes the following situation in Act I, Scene Four. We are fragmented and dispersed. We live superficially and try to lose ourselves in overworking, business, productivity, diversions. If asked who we are, or if we try to estimate our worth before others and even ourselves, we articulate our identity as a bundle of functions and roles. Yet in this we suffer a sense of metaphysical uneasiness. We have lost our center and feel alienated from ourselves, from others and from God.

This impression of living in a broken world is perhaps even more vivid today than at the time Marcel wrote the play, i.e. 1932. In a philosophic reflection that accompanied the publication of *The Broken World*, "Position and Concrete Approaches to the Ontological Mystery",2 Marcel pointed out that we live in a world riddled with problems but devoid of mystery. We have become so fascinated with technical knowledge that we have let our sense of wonder atrophy. And while we can scientifically accomplish any task we set before ourselves, we no longer have the wisdom to know what projects are worth doing. We no longer know who we really are, nor do we know the value and purpose of life.

Philosophic Reflection

Marcel's philosophic reflection in "On the Ontological Mystery", opened a path for rediscovering the perspectives of wisdom. He distinguished between problems that are exterior to us and to be solved scientifically, and mysteries that include us vitally. The latter are part of our being, and can only be experienced and clarified if we accept their presence and reflectively clarify them as they affect our being. Marcel affirms that while certain issues are adequately dealt with by problem solving approaches, some realities can be studied adequately only through reflection on mystery.

For example, consider friendship: two persons meet and become friends. A problem approach takes into account economic, sociological and psychological factors and explains that these two individuals were in the same place at the same time, e.g. a health spa or a ski resort, because they come from the same socio-economic bracket and share the same illness or philosophic or sporting interest. Still an encounter, a meeting that has left a deep and lasting trace upon my life, requires another type of reflective analysis that draws on my recollecting the experience and clarifying how it affects me in my subjectivity or personhood and what conditions were required for this to happen. An encounter, and then a friendship, develops through a dialogue of freedoms involving

an appeal, a response and, if freely affirmed, a gratuitous gift to be with and for one another. It is specifically in this manner that an I-Thou relation is constituted.

The first part of Marcel's essay addresses the question: "Who am I?", which he asserts cannot be separated arbitrarily from its counterpart: "Is Being empty or full?" It reminds us that metaphysics is the logic of freedom. Varying attitudes and stances will produce different interpretations of the meaning of life and of human dignity, both individual and familial. So the attitude or mode of presence I freely adopt toward the world, will influence the response I evolve to the questions Who am I? Is Being empty or full?

Presence to the world in an attitude of "having" leaves one dissatisfied and uneasy. What one "has" remains always exterior to oneself, so one is never fulfilled interiorly or deeply satisfied by mere "having". Moreover, one is always covetous and threatened because one's possessions can be stolen or overshadowed by someone else's even greater collection. One has no true sense of self worth because worth is defined only exteriorly and precariously on the basis of quantifiable and horizontally comparable possession of things, prestige or power. By contrast, through the authentic attitude of "being" one is open and available to unite with realities encountered. One who is capable of admiration can be enriched and uplifted by the presence of excellence wherever it occurs. An attitude of "being" lets one participate in the enriching gift of presence -- of objects, of persons and of the Transcendent.

The second part of "The Ontological Mystery" establishes how each of us can illumine the mystery of who we are by reflectively clarifying our experience of being. As we saw earlier Marcel distinguishes between problem and mystery, and welcomes the presence of life-enhancing mysteries. Recollection enables one to gather within one's reflective experience those things which are part of one's life and which affect who one is. One can then discriminate what attitudes freely adopted allow one to participate in the life enhancing gift(s) offered by being. Recollection is an act whereby I gather myself and also that which is other and more than myself, yet this hold or grasp upon myself is also relaxation and abandon.

Marcel's own answer to the questions "Who am I?" and "Is being empty or full?" comes in terms of fulfilling encounters one can have in the regions of objects, persons, and Transcendence. One can find fulfillment by participating in the material world as an extension or enrichment of one's embodied subjectivity. One finds fulfillment in the gratuitous gifts of loving communion with family and friends, the enrichment of one's subjectivity by the uplifting and life enhancing presence of another in a communion of love. Ultimate fulfillment can be found in experiencing that grounding and personalizing force of a Transcendent Absolute Thou or Sacred Other. Only the most patient probative searching unearths this dimension of reality as a trans-subjective source radiating a light of wisdom inseparable from love.

The third moment of his essay illumines who I am called to be if I strive authentically to fulfill my highest human possibilities as a person of hope. This means being available to, with and for others; it means welcoming life not as a series of events and objects to be possessed, but rather as a presence that reveals itself and invites me to become myself as gift. My response must be one of creative fidelity to an abiding, yet ever freshly renewed call, revealed to me through others. It is in such personalist terms that Marcel clarifies what it means to be in a free and authentic manner.

In a comedy, *Colombyre or the Torch of Peace*, Marcel portrays a peace commune gathered in the high Swiss alps in the summer of 1937. The pretention was to be a refuge of peace, yet there was so much selfishness and chauvinism that the so-called haven of peace became a hotbed of war. In the end the chalet explodes and the experiment fails utterly.

The play is a farcical satire, but it portrays the erroneous attitudes that doom the project from its outset. It raises the question of whether people of different nationalities, religions and cultures can ever live together in peace and harmony.

Discovering Human Meaning

Marcel addressed those questions in an essay, "The Dangerous Situation of Ethical Values", stating that what is at stake is the survival of human life itself. Each of us is in danger of death because we are separated from other members of the human family; we are in danger of death also because we are uprooted from the natural foundations of wisdom and virtue.

If values are to survive it must be in the context of a community, a human family. With his friend, Max Scheler, he remarked poignantly that values are not mere concepts. they are real when carried on the backs of human actions. They then become the life-enhancing qualities of human relations.

Whereas the play characterizes attitudes that undermine and destroy community, philosophic reflection critically clarifies issues to be resolved and the requisite attitudes in order for any life with dignity to survive.

First, can we do anything to preserve and communicate values? He recognizes that it is divisive to separate those who believe in values and those who do not. He is aware that cooperating with groups that have different philosophies and purposes -- some selfish and limited, others focused on the sacred dignity of persons -- entails a danger of being compromised and exploited. Yet a failure to cooperate, i.e. not to promote values concretely and in cooperation with others, is to abandon the values we profess to cherish.

How can values be communicated and shared? To pretend that our knowledge should inform the ignorant, or to pretend that from our wealth we will remedy the other's poverty, are erroneous and harmful approaches. Attitudes of the haves dealing with the have-nots only incite anti-religious resentment. Besides, faith, spirituality or values are not something we "have", they are genuine only on the condition these gifts radiate through us as grace.

We cannot provide for the survival and growth of values by instructing the ignorant, by doles to the "have-nots". Marcel suggests rather that we address the other person with deep respect and a love of his or her sacred uniqueness. Marcel goes so far as to say that we address that unique act of adoration which is owed to the divine reality to the particle of the divine that is this other person. In this manner one does not pretend to instruct or give to another; one merely awakens the other's awareness of his or her divine filiation. This approach Marcel calls a kind of maieutic in that it brings to birth the other's sense of their sacred dignity and worth.

With this model of how values may survive and grow, we can imagine a different development of the story of the international colony at Colombyre. Each one of us seeks, or at least needs to strengthen our grasp and deepen our rootedness in values. When others invite me to reflect on the values I cherish, and encourage me to share the ways in which these values are expressed in the particular cultural rituals or traditions with which I am familiar, I deepen and enrich my celebration of these values. As I recollect my values and my culture's way of observing them, that in turn encourages and enables others reflectively to clarify their own experience of values and the cultural traditions they use to communicate them.

As we encourage one another to come more fully in touch with our true selves, and the values we personally love and want to live for, we can help one another to find new and fresh ways of

incorporating our values and traditions into the changing circumstances of our lives. Marcel calls this effort to find fresh ways to carry forward our revered and cherished values creative fidelity.

For example, the growth in popularity of the martial arts T'ai Chi ch'uan, Aikido, Tae Kwon Do, and Karate, has done to lead new generations of young people into a disciplined, meditative and noble spiritual way of life. For example, the recent concern for physical fitness has done much to revive the ancient art of T'ai Chi Ch'un, introducing many to its graceful philosophy of life. Many Western young people have been drawn to the meditative techniques and the ways of wisdom of Zen, Buddhism, and Yoga. Children from ghettos and suburbs find discipline and dignity through such programs. Some of the traditions of Islam also have brought a renewal of respect for woman and family to many in the United States through Black Islam.

Marcel saw hope for the survival and growth of values as many small group communities emerge with humble beginnings and modest goals. The one-to-one relations of members of these communities are characterized by a spirit of light and love which comes to them from above. The spirit animating their community extends beyond their members and shines through their use of natural resources and of the physical things they own. Without the development of such small groups striving in creative fidelity to preserve and promote the spiritual values they cherish, the masses will fall into infra-human levels of behavior precipitating an apocalyptic destruction whose terrible first symptoms we are now witnessing. The key to the survival of values lies in the quality of interpersonal relations that characterize a community, viz., an attitude and regard of love, a profound respect that quickens the other's sense of his or her own sacred dignity and worth.

Social transformation and/or cultural tradition always require personal conversion, an encounter with truth as a personal presence. One's personal witness and interpersonal testimony is a requisite occasion for another's personal discovery of, or growth in, wisdom. Individuals experience this when they are inclined to go beyond scientific knowledge of techniques to open onto the mysterious dimensions of life which can be enlightened by wisdom's compassion and love. In turn, however, any introduction to wisdom's truth as a personal presence must always be mediated by the witness or testimony of a loving mentor, teacher, friend or family member.

Notes

1. *The Broken World, a Four Act Play by Gabriel Marcel*, trans. by K.R. Hanley (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1998).

2. "Concrete Approaches to the Ontological Mystery", in *Gabriel Marcel* (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), pp. 9-46.

See also: *Two Play, by Gabriel Marcel: "The Lantern" and "The Torch of Peace"* plus *From Comic Theater to Musical Creation*, a Previously Unpublished Essay, ed. Katharine Rose Hanley (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988).

"The Dangerous Situation of Spiritual Values", in *Home Viator, an Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope* (Glouster, MA: Peter Smith, 1978); Katharine Rose Hanley, *Dramatic Approaches to Creative Fidelity: A Study in the Theater and Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973)* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), esp. ch. VII, "Colombyre or the Torch of Peace: The Role of Person-Communities in Living Creative Fidelity to Values", pp. 129-136.

13.

Science and the Moral Life: A Philosophy of Moral Education

Richard A. Graham

Science and the Moral Life

I was born the year after John Dewey delivered in Japan the lecture that became his *Transformation in Philosophy*. It was 1920, the year of his lectures in China, including "Science and the Moral Life" and "The Need of a Philosophy of Education". This paper will attempt to add to what he said some of what I think he would have said if he had known what another three quarters of a century of scientific inquiry -- in particular, research on human development -- would contribute to his work in philosophy, psychology and education.

The research of the Center for Moral Development and Education at Harvard University, of which I was the first director, was dominated by Lawrence Kohlberg, who once said that his work was only "Dewey warmed over". My first introduction to Dewey was by Hu Shi who in 1942 gave the commencement address at my graduation from Cornell University. His son, my friend and classmate, T.S. Hu and I had just completed our studies in engineering. In those days an education in engineering consisted exclusively of science with no room for philosophy or anything bordering on cultural values. Hu Shi's respect for Dewey was for a foreign idea.

Dewey though that in some ways the problems of modern societies are alike. In the United States there is deep concern about a loss of traditional virtues, about what appears to be a growing lack of respect for truth on the part of leaders and a growing confusion on the part of many young people about what it is to be a good person.

There, as in other societies, there has been a long running debate about whether material values take precedence over moral obligations, whether science and technology, as well the patterns of thought on which they depend, are opposed to aesthetics and to cultural and spiritual traditions and to the patterns of thought on which they depend. Indeed, the definitions of these terms in authoritative American dictionaries clearly indicate opposition. Aesthetics is defined not only as "pertaining to a sense of the beautiful" but also as "concerned with pure emotion and sensation as opposed to pure intellectuality" while spirituality is defined not only as "pertaining to the spirit as the seat of moral or religious nature" but also as "pertaining to the spirit or soul as distinguished from physical nature".

In this paper I want to question whether the intellectuality on which science and technology depend is necessarily opposed to a sense of the beautiful, and whether intellectuality is necessarily opposed to emotion, to sensation and to spirituality; indeed, whether intellectuality may not join with the spirit in providing the underpinnings of one's moral or religious nature. This may appear as little more than "Dewey warmed over", but in considering the question of whether science and technology are opposed to spirituality I want to draw upon some post-Dewey research conducted in over 40 societies throughout the world. It is research on traditional values and how they develop the kind of abstract thought upon which science and technology depend.

I will, from time to time, selectively refer to the conclusions of George McLean in his paper "Harmony as a Metaphysics of Freedom". I do so because, while McLean's conclusions are arrived at philosophically and hermeneutically, they appear to be in accord with the conclusions I cite from research which is guided by the conventions of empirically based scientific thought in which a

problem is identified, relevant data are collected, an hypothesis is formulated from these dates, and the hypothesis is systematically tested.

In brief, it appears from this research that the patterns of reasoning associated with scientific thought are, as suspected, different from those associated with traditional belief, though not necessarily at odds with cultural traditions or spirituality. Indeed, for most individuals cultural traditions and spiritual belief provide an assurance of self which helps translate into action decisions of "ought" arrived at by the kind of thought associated with science and technology.

I will consider economic development and the retention of cultural values not as ends in themselves, but as means to greater justice in one's society, while taking into consideration that, for many people, greater justice in this world is secondary to spiritual concerns. I want also to consider the ways in which the education of a citizen must go beyond the education of a subject. I want to present some evidence and considered opinion in support of my own convictions that:

- the foremost cultural values are justice and compassion, which are also the means to both greater justice and compassion in a society;
- the development of reason and compassion should be the foremost aim of education;
- the dominant determinant of behavior is a natural compulsion to preserve the self, one's society-shaped but self-established sense of identity; and
- cultural values and the responsibilities they assign are the most important means to self-identity for most members of most societies.

Research on the Moral Life

Turning now to one of the more consequential findings of the research: most people in most societies never develop the patterns of thought upon which a modern technological society must depend for its science and for its assurance of justice. The research seems quite clear about this. McLean, in "Harmony", reaches a similar conclusion in saying: "Few can carry out the conceptualization required for the technical dialectics of Platonic or Aristotelian reasoning, but all share an overall sensibility." The interplay between reasoning and sensibility that is suggested by McLean is discussed later in this paper.

The development of scientific patterns of thought is roughly associated with opportunities that are not widely shared in most societies. Development of such thought is associated with higher education that is grounded upon a liberal secondary education, or associated with taking a wide variety of social roles and responsibilities, or with both formal education and varied social responsibility. Modern science and technology require a store of knowledge, but knowledge is not the same as a pattern of thought; rather, an advanced pattern of thought -- "structure of reasoning" is a better term -- involves the ability to manipulate the concepts and categories by which one gives one's own order and meaning to the knowledge one has accumulated. Such patterns of thought or reasoning have been described in Western literature by Immanuel Kant, J.M. Baldwin, G.H. Mead, and John Dewey among others. They have been researched by Jean Piaget, Vygotsky, and Lawrence Kohlberg, and have been identified with phenomena in the brain in recent work by Gerald Edelman. While widely shared and quite discrete patterns of thought have been identified by this research, no two individuals think alike. The integrating concepts and categories that are constructed by each individual reflect their own idiosyncratic interpretations of received opinion and personal experience. McLean appears to agree in saying,

the imagination, in working toward an integrating unity, is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts, but ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see whether and wherein relatedness and purposiveness or teleology can emerge and the world and our personal social life can achieve its meaning and value.

Imagination is thus one's own construction of what is real or might be. For an individual, only the imagination is real; all else is imagined.

But, as McLean notes above, few develop the conceptualization required for the technical dialectics of Aristotelian reasoning, much less for Kantian principles or for the science required of a technological society. As Socrates might have put it, most people hold rightly to heteronomous traditional values and to received opinions about science. Only a minority develops scientific reasoning; only a few, selectively and autonomously, hold to traditional values not because they are traditional, but because they meet self-interpreted or self-created criteria for the good, the right, or the beautiful.

Socrates might be challenged by cultural traditions which ask: You speak of true knowledge, but what is truth? Our cultural traditions have served us well enough in the past and can be counted upon to serve us well enough in the future. Or, at least, they are a better choice than the uncertain consequences of rapid change.

Socrates might reply:

Is not truth the hypothesis we hold while searching for the next better one? Is not true knowledge developed through the unrelenting test of hypotheses by considered experience? Are all cultural traditions equally good? Can we agree upon criteria for sorting out the good from the marginal and then determine, as best we can, an optimum rate of change toward a modern economy and to conventions, laws, and principles of beauty that are better than we have now, while cherishing the sense of beauty and spirituality that helps to make us what we are as individuals and as a people? Can we assume that the rate of change affects our ability to approach the good and does so in somewhat predictable ways -- that change can be too fast or too slow?

I would go along with Socrates.

Some twenty five years ago as Director of a national program of educational reform, one of our smaller Great Society programs, I tried to see how far the scientific methods -- more particularly, the principles of cybernetics -- could be applied in determining the optimum manner and rate of social change in one aspect of our American society. Prior to that I had been a designer and manufacturer of industrial controls which relied upon the principles and mathematics of cybernetics. From a social-cybernetic analysis of what we had attempted in one of these programs of social reform, my conclusion was that, qualitatively, the concepts of resistance, reluctance, impedance, induced counter forces that are proportional to rate of change, inertia, momentum, over-correction, rate of feedback, unstable systems, and the like. These could be helpful in planning and carrying out a program for social change, but, for the most part, they were not quantifiable as in an electro-mechanical control system. I found, however, that any attempt to approach a problem of social change in these terms was quickly lost on politicians, economists and social planners. While intuitively they took some of these factors into account, several of their programs were guilty of over-correction while others could be charged with contributing to social instability.

This was true even in a society where the patterns of reason required for the intended social change probably were held widely enough to support the changes in public opinion necessary for

carrying out the program. This would be indicated by the fact that some 80 percent of Americans complete secondary education and about 50 percent receive some form of post-secondary education. Further, the few surveys of reasoning conducted in the United States indicate that almost 80 percent of the population is about equally divided between the pattern of reason characteristic of a traditional society while another 20 percent manifest reasoning based upon the principles of justice on which the Helsinki Accords are founded. These Helsinki trans-cultural patterns of reasoning come pretty close to the presumed intentions of Kant's categorical imperative wherein the human rights and dignity that one would seek for oneself and one's family must be accorded to all others regardless of race, creed, ethnicity, sex or nationality.

Where most members of a society hold to traditional or communal patterns of reason, rather than to the patterns that support a civil society, opinions change slowly, except, perhaps, when new conventions are imposed by their leaders. In most societies, fundamental social change requires not only changes in patterns of reason, but also changes in the content of thought or opinion, or of "sensibility" which is defined by Random House and Webster dictionaries as the "capacity to respond to aesthetic and economic stimuli." Whether fundamental social change could best be achieved by manipulation of public opinion or by development of new patterns of though was much debated by Plekhanov and Lenin and others in the journal, *Iskra*, in Geneva around the turn of the century. Almost ninety years later, when the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe came to reject the Soviet system, Gorbachev attributed the readiness for change to "new ways of thinking" while Havel credited the change to a new sensibility.

Let us now examine briefly the recent research on the development of patterns of reason and on the interplay of reason and sensibility and other components of self-identity as they affect behavior. We shall examine how the highly predictable development of an individual's sequential patterns of reason can be expected, in combination with the development of reason by others in one's society, to affect scientific and economic development, as well as the less predictable effect this may have on the retention of cultural values. Here I shall focus particularly on the structural differences between: (1) traditional patterns of reason which, in communal societies, are predominately heteronomous; (2) a largely heteronomous pattern of reason that is closely associated with the necessary condition for maintaining civil society; and (3) the pattern of thought, largely autonomous, that is closely associated with adherence to principles of justice that foster respect for human rights, equal opportunity, and human dignity within and between societies. In this regard I shall follow especially Kohlberg's research which focused on the development of reasoning about justice and led him to agree with Socrates that:

(1) virtue is ultimately one, not many, and is the same ideal regardless of climate or culture;

(2) the name of this ideal form is justice;

(3) not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good: He who knows the good chooses the good; and

(4) the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or the acceptance of conventional beliefs.

David Hume did not agree that he who knows the good chooses the good, but thought that at least one cannot be counted upon to act upon that choice. For Hume, virtuous action was more occasioned by sympathy and hence was a higher virtue.

Both appear to be correct; surely justice is the first virtue of a society while love or sympathy may be the first virtue of an individual. But, for a society to be virtuous through justice, a critical

number of its members must have highly developed ideal forms of the good which can be translated into principles of justice and, in turn, into civil laws. The laws of a society, if founded on justice and fairly administered, will then do much to establish the correct opinion or conventional beliefs which, along with sympathy and compassion, create a virtuous citizenry.

I would like later to address the frequently-heard objection that these concepts of justice as conceived by Socrates, Kant and John Rawls are too often used to condone the imposition on other societies of Western values which may be in conflict with cultural traditions that accord different rights and responsibilities to men and women, to believers and non-believers, or to persons of different statuses of other kinds in their present life in this world.

The research here has been quite rigorous. It was conducted with safeguards against cultural bias and with well-regarded tests of reliability and validity. It has been subjected to several critical reviews and to Lakatos-type analyses that indicate that the theories derived from the research findings are increasingly useful in understanding human development and, consequently, the prospects for societal development.

Findings from the Research

Four or five distinctive patterns of reasoning about justice are manifested by individuals in every society, from the largely undeveloped to the most advanced. But the content of thought is not the same: knowledge, beliefs, and opinions vary widely between and within societies.

Each individual in every society starts as a child with the same pattern of reasoning and then, through quite idiosyncratic interpretations of education and other forms of experience, constructs for himself or herself several discrete patterns of reasoning, one after another. Each individual develops them in the same sequence, without skipping a pattern or without going back. But there is no assurance of progress unless, through education as well as experience, an existing pattern of reasoning cannot accommodate new and conflicting information and, as a consequence, stimulates the development of a more adequate pattern of reasoning. Advanced societies tend to provide education as well as roles and responsibilities that require abstract mental operations. It is in these societies, particularly in the professions, that research finds individuals capable of the more advanced patterns of reasoning.

Development of a capacity to apply complex mental operations in the field of science, technology and administration in a modern society does not assure a comparable capacity or inclination to apply these structures of reasoning to issues of justice, whether within a family, society, or between societies. Nor does a capacity for advanced reasoning have much to do with sensibility, love or compassion, or with self-assurance to act on one's capacity for reason, love or compassion. In each longitudinal study that gathered data of this kind, an individual first developed a capacity to apply complex mental operations in the physical domain; only later, and sometimes not at all, did one develop a capacity to apply this reasoning to issues of justice.

Kohlberg's longitudinal studies indicate that there is a universal human tendency to progress in an invariant sequence through these well-defined stages of reasoning about what is right and just. This begins in childhood with a first stage where "right makes right"; it progresses to a second stage where justice is equal exchange, good for good, bad for bad; then it advances to a third where what is right is what the traditions and conventions of the group to which one belongs hold to be right. Most well-educated people who have had complex responsibilities in a modern society will progress to a fourth stage that can be thought of as civic reasoning based upon an implied social contract to uphold the laws of one's country. This, in effect, is the right thinking upon which the

maintenance of a democracy depends. A small part of a society--generally not more than 20 percent of the citizenry in an advanced society and much fewer in a primitive society--will respect laws that foster a stable, productive society, but will give primary allegiance to the principles of justice upon which most societies ostensibly are based. It is these few who hold to the universalizable principles of justice upon which democracy is founded.

Good accounts of the level of abstract reasoning required for a true knowledge of democracy are provided in Jean Piaget's *The Growth of Logic in the Child*, and in his *The Early Growth of Logic in the Child*. But while the higher levels of abstract reasoning may be necessary for founding a representative government, they are not necessary for its maintenance. To the degree that a nation's laws represent "right thinking" about principles of justice expressed in a nation's constitution, and there is general adherence to these laws, a representative democracy can be maintained.

It cannot be emphasized enough that in this stage-by-stage development of reason one's stock of thoughts and experiences is not supplanted, but merely reorganized; one's cultural traditions are not replaced. One's sense of identity still depends primarily upon one's roots, even though a broader sense of identity is formed as a broader concept of justice is developed.

From related, but less rigorous research, it appears that:

- cultural values and the traditions that support them, if learned when young, persist to a greater or lesser degree throughout the lives of most people in every society; and
- cultural values remain part of a person's identity and, generally, provide a part of the self-assurance needed to translate judgement to action.

The second part of this paper will draw upon these findings for implications for the kind of education that will promote science and technology as well as economic and social development, while still retaining cultural values. In concluding, it will note some implications that recent research might have for a philosophical justification both of scientific and technological development and for cherishing cultural values. In this there is a concern is to seek harmony between pure and practical reason. This will conclude with an effort to understand why so few modern societies can be counted upon to uphold their best judgements of justice or their traditions or virtue.

Analysis of the Research Findings

The studies that bear most directly on whether scientific method and spiritual values are in conflict have been conducted from two perspectives or strands: research in mental operations and research in brain functions. Both strands are part of an expanding science of the nature of reason.

For centuries the disparate claims of material reason and moral authority were resolved by one or another doctrine of the two-fold nature of truth. The realm of ends and values was revealed by God and apprehended by faith; the realm of nature was revealed by knowledge and apprehended by reason. Kant retained the notion of moral authority as separate from nature, but substituted for revelation the idea of faith grounded upon practical reason. He was confident that "If the kingdoms of science and righteousness now here touch, there can be no strife between them." But there has been strife between the kingdoms, and within them, ever since. Conflicting understandings of revelations and conflicting faiths, derived from the underdeveloped practical reason of most people in most societies, have been the cause of strife within and between nation.

The mitigation of strife and the enhancement of harmony between the scientific method of pure reason and the more traditional methods of practical reason seems best achieved not through exclusion, but by a combination of the two methods. In this, traditions are valued to the degree that they correspond to the practical reason of love, sympathy and compassion and the goals of technological progress are valued only to the degree that they are consistent with the pure reason of justice.

There remains a dualism that is both within and between selves, and between individuals at different stages of moral development. For, as noted earlier, only a few individuals, even in highly developed societies are capable of making judgements in accord with pure reason as it is defined by Kant -- or true knowledge as described by Socrates, or autonomous reasoning as Dewey defines it, or principled judgements in Kohlberg's terms. Most people in most societies make moral judgements heteronomously according to normative moral codes based upon conventions that are associated with commonly held precepts or beliefs.

But this is not to agree with Kant that science stands apart from spirituality. Pure scientific reason, at the full extent of its development, encounters the mystery of creator and a grand design which can only be addressed through faith. It is a faith in understandings yet to be revealed or discovered. In this sense, there is no difference between scientific and spiritual thought, only a difference when understanding of one's self and the cosmos and of a measure of harmony between them becomes a hypothesis of faith beyond one's self.

Moreover, there never was a dualism and this persists today. No one has ever held to a neat separation between faith of some kind and considered judgment based upon material evidence. The most scrupulous scientist indulges in food fads and health nostrums, has undue faith in the local football team or current psychiatrist. On the basis of scattered evidence, it would seem that most proponents of Cartesian or Kantian dualism partly believed it on faith, and partly concluded on the basis of ample evidence that dualism helped them get published and keep their jobs. The human brain has a useful capacity to draw upon concepts and patterns of thought that are useful in maintaining the self. Self-maintenance surpasses reason, pure and practical.

Research of recent years puts the focus not on how we ought to think, but on how we do so: on how individuals in all societies actually do develop reason and, sometimes, righteousness in their journey from infancy to infirmity. The Center for Moral Development and Education at Harvard University was directed toward research on how individuals develop moral reasoning, but also toward education that would foster the assimilation of moral precepts, the accommodation of more embracing moral concepts, the development of more adequate structures of moral reasoning, and the qualities of sympathy and compassion that would both increase attention to issues of justice and encourage one to go beyond justice to act more often out of love or sympathy.

William P. Alston, in his "Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgment" (*Nous*, 1968, 2, no. 1, 1-23) suggests that the highest stage of moral reasoning that one can manifest parallels "the highest mode of conceptualization that one has thoroughly mastered to date" -- a suggestion consistent with Piaget's thinking and Kohlberg's as well. Kohlberg's research was directed largely to identifying discrete mental patterns of moral reasoning which, unless the dualism of Descartes can be resurrected, must be associated with a phenomenon of the brain whereby an individual constructs concepts and categories. Kant anticipated something of the sort. He used, as an example, the concept of "house" which embraces thousands of quite disparate structures. Gerald Edleman, in *Neural Darwinism*, reports on brain research that gets at how such concepts are constructed and drawn upon, e.g., how a pigeon constructs the concept of a "tree" so as to distinguish a wide variety of trees from other tree-shaped objects. The research helps to support earlier hypotheses about how

an individual constructs concepts of objects and of justice and, if these hypotheses are further confirmed, how to apply these conclusions to programs of education.

Here then is a sampling of conclusions from recent research as they bear on the issue of how a society can develop economically and technologically while retaining cultural values:

- There is no dualism in which pure reason or the scientific method is appropriate to scientific, technological and economic development, while practical reason, tradition and transcendent belief are appropriate to moral development.
- In the process of an individual's development of higher concepts, both in scientific and moral reasoning, there is a succession of transitions that lead from predominately heteronomous belief toward predominately autonomous judgement, although, for want of formal education and experience with various roles and responsibilities, most individuals in most societies do not reach the stages of reasoning required for creative scientific work or for principled moral judgement.
- An individual first develops the concepts required for advanced scientific thought and later, if at all, develops a capacity for advanced moral judgment.
- An individual's ability to handle higher order concepts does not give assurance that this ability will be exercised. Most jobs in all societies do not require higher order scientific concepts and most issues of justice inherent in everyday situations are not addressed by one's highest capacity for moral judgment, but are resolved by habit, convention or emotion.
- An individual's capacity for higher order moral reasoning tends somewhat to correspond to higher order moral behavior. But whether one attends to moral issues, then exercises the highest stage of moral judgement of which one is capable, and then acts on that judgement is much affected by a number of factors. These include traits of personality, judgements of one's responsibility and ability to act, and the perceived constraints upon one's action, including those of other conflicting responsibilities. Most individuals -- saints excepted -- intuitively abide by the adage that "ought implies can" and do not consider themselves obliged to undertake moral action they cannot fulfill, particularly if it would not be in accord with an emotional preference.
- Most people in most societies most of the time behave virtuously not so much because of their capacity for moral reasoning, but because of habit or convention or religious precepts or out of self-respect. But if David Hume is right, it is mostly because of benevolence, love, sympathy, or compassion. Often these engender behavior that does not stop at justice, but goes beyond it to supererogation.
- Most people in most societies do not behave virtuously much of the time and the reasons they do not do so are mostly the inverse of why they do. It may be that they are insufficiently aware of moral traditions or religious precepts, but it is more likely that they have an underdeveloped capacity for moral judgement and, still more likely, underdeveloped sympathy and compassion.

It appears from all this that education for good people who will take their share of responsibility for a good society must embrace a dualism that is symbiotic rather than dichotomous, a dualism in which each of two methods has its season and its reason:

- the methods of science are drawn upon for their part in higher order reason; while
- the methods of tradition, culture, and religion are drawn upon for their part in development of higher order character.

14.
The Ethics of Communicative Action: Habermas's Discourse Ethics

Manuel B. Dy, Jr.

The task of this chapter is to present an ethics appropriate for society, that is to say, for social agents. Many traditional and modern ethical theories have in mind the individual person as actor, and only peripherally the social person. It is an outstanding achievement of Jürgen Habermas to have developed an ethical theory for contemporary society, one that takes into account the central role of societal persons. His ethics of discourse provides us with a foundation or standard for discussing and judging what is right or wrong in the context of society.

Phenomenology of Moral Experience

Habermas takes as his point of departure P.F. Strawson's phenomenology of moral experience.1 For Strawson, moral experience has a real content. It comes as "a response to disgraceful wrong done to one by another,"2a response of indignation or resentment when there is no restitution for personal insult. At the start, the perpetrator or a third person may produce excuses that try to make repairs to the disturbed interaction. The excuses may be attributed to circumstances, thus making the act less unjust, or to the incompetence of the actor (that he is just a child, or not himself, etc.), thus taking an objectivating attitude and precluding any moral reproach from the start. The important point here for Strawson is that the personal response of indignation or resentment is possible only in the *performative* attitude of persons taking part in interaction.

Such is the case of moral feelings, the content of moral phenomena, that they are linked to each other internally. We feel gratitude for a good deed done to us, admiration for a good act, forgiveness for an injustice suffered, and many other emotions such as contempt, malevolence, consolation, encouragement, satisfaction, recognition, indifference, etc. Moral feelings are accessible to us only in a performative attitude, that is, they are embedded in the practice of everyday life, and as such are unavoidable.3 One can, of course, take an objectivating attitude towards this interpersonal relation, but this cannot be sustained for long. "The human commitment to participation in ordinary interpersonal relationships is . . . thoroughly and deeply rooted for us."4

What makes the indignation or resentment moral? The emotional response is rightly directed at a specific other person who has violated our integrity. But what makes it moral is not that the interaction between the two concrete individuals has been disturbed, but because of the violation of an underlying *normative* expectation that is valid not only for the *alter* and the *ego*, but also for all members of the social group.5 Emotional responses such as guilt and obligation "would be devoid of moral character were they not connected with an *impersonal* kind of indignation over some breach of a generalized norm or behavioral expectation."6

This impersonal character of norms is inwardly linked to their authoritative or obligatory character. Norms claim to exist by right, and "if necessary . . . can be *shown* to exist by right."7 The indignation or reproach directed beyond the person to the violation of a norm has a cognitive foundation. "To say that *I ought* to do something means that *I have good reasons* for doing it."8 These reasons are irreducible to questions of mere prudence (the empiricist's questions of what do I want to do and how can I do it) or expediency (the utilitarian's question of what can we do to produce desirable outcomes).

Habermas sums up Strawson's observations in three points: (1) "Moral phenomena are grasped only in the performative attitude of participants in interaction." (2) Indignation and "personal emotional responses point to suprapersonal standards for judging norms and commands." (3) "Moral-practical justification of a mode of action aims at an aspect different from a feeling-neutral assessment of means-ends relations, even when such assessment is made from the point of view of the general welfare."9

Where can such cognitive foundation of norms be found; and why do we have norms in the first place, and ultimately morality? For Habermas, the answer is seen in the vulnerability of the human species. Human beings are profoundly vulnerable and therefore in need of consideration and compensation. This vulnerability of the human species is rooted not in its biological weakness (the infant's lack of faculties and long period of rearing), but in the fact that human beings are individuated only through socialization.10 Human beings are constituted as individuals by growing into an intersubjectively shared lifeworld, which lifeworld is reproduced in turn through the communicative actions of its members.11 Thus, the identity of the individual and that of the collective are interdependent through the medium of language. This is "the medium by which the intersubjectivity of the shared world is maintained"12 and where participants become more and more individuated. The human person can form his personal identity only through participation in relations through language. This explains the insecurity and fragility of the human being.

Norms and the cultural system they form as such constitute the compensation or safety device for this vulnerability. They have the two-fold objective of defending the integrity of the individual and preserving the vital fabric of the ties of mutual consideration.13 Human beings develop moral intuitions "that instruct us on how best to behave in situations where it is in our power to counteract the extreme vulnerability of others by being thoughtful and considerate."14 "The fundamental problem of ethics is guaranteeing mutual consideration and respect in a way that is effective in actual conduct."15 The two tasks of morality are then to emphasize the inviolability of the individual, that is, the respect for the dignity of each individual, which is *justice*, and to protect the web of intersubjective relations of mutual recognition, which is *solidarity*.16

Moralization of Society

Clearly morality's two-fold task of justice and solidarity can take place only in interactions that are communicative. Interactions are communicative "when the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims."17 To carry out their action plans on a consensual basis, the participants must reach understanding about something in the world, be it the objective world of facts and states of affairs, the subjective world of lived experiences, or the social world of interpersonal relationships.18 "In reaching an understanding about something in the world, subjects engaged in communicative action orient themselves to validity claims. . . . This is why there is no form of socio-cultural life that is not at least implicitly geared to maintaining communicative action by means of argument, be the actual form of argumentation ever so rudimentary and the institutionalization of discursive consensus building ever so inchoate."19

Validity claims, argument, understanding and consensus are mediated in linguistic processes which are symbolized concretely in the speech act. Depending on the kind of speech act (constative, regulative or representative), validity claims can be of three types: (1) claims to truth, referring to the objective world of facts and state of affairs; (2) claims to rightness referring to the social world of regulated interpersonal relations; and (3) claims to truthfulness referring to the

subjective world of lived experiences.20 What is of interest to us is, of course, the second type, the claims to rightness or normative validity. But first we need to distinguish communicative action from strategic action, norms from facts, and moral questions from valuative ones.

Communicative action is distinct, though not separate in the lifeworld, from strategic action. In strategic action, "one actor seeks to influence the behavior of another by means of the threat of sanctions or the prospect of gratification," whereas in communicative action, "one actor seeks rationally to motivate another by relying on the elocutionary binding/bonding effect (*Bindungseffekt*) on the other contained in his speech act."21Unlike in strategic action, the agreement in communicative action "cannot be imposed or brought about by manipulating one's partner in interaction", but "depends on the rationally motivated approval of the substance of the utterance."22 Strategic action is teleological, geared towards implementing an action plan, and thus directly oriented towards success; whereas communicative action is after a shared interpretation of the situation, oriented towards understanding to reach a consensus.23

For Habermas, communicative action is important for the reproduction of the lifeworld, which is reproduced through cultural tradition, social integration, and socialization which operate only in communicative action.24In communicative action, there is a circular process wherein social agents are both the initiators who master the situation and the products of tradition, of the socialization process. The social agents are supported by the lifeworld which is simultaneously the context and the resource of their action.25 In the context of the lifeworld, they really have no choice between communicative action and strategic action;

They do not have the option of a long-term absence from contexts of action oriented toward reaching an understanding. That would mean regressing to the monadic isolation of strategic action, or schizophrenia and suicide. In the long run such absence is self-destructive.26

In communicative action, there is the universe of norms and the universe of facts. The objectivity of norms is different from the objectivity of facts in that the former refers to the "independence of `objective spirit'" while the latter points to the existence of states of affairs independently of formulation.27 Nevertheless, the relation of facts to its corresponding assertoric speech act is symmetrical, that is to say, claims to truth reside only in the speech act; whereas in norms, the relation is asymmetrical: norms "lay claim to meaning and validity regardless of whether they are promulgated or made use of in a specific way."28 True, there is a connection between the existence of norms and the anticipated justiciability of the corresponding "ought" statements, but the connection is not an inner one as in the case of states of affairs and of assertoric statements.29 This is because norms are dependent upon the "continual reestablishment of legitimately ordered interpersonal relationships,"30 and the orders of society "are not constituted independently of validity, as are the orders of nature, towards which we can assume an objectivating attitude."31

The social reality has an intrinsic link to normative validity claims, and normative claims to validity "mediate a mutual dependence of language and the social world."32 The fact that there is no inner connection between the existence of norms and their justiciability as regards their claims characterizes the ambiguity of norms. The "existence of social currency of norms says nothing about whether norms are valid," and "norms whose claims to validity are in fact redeemable do not necessarily meet with actual recognition or approval."33 Norms are encoded in social reality by conviction or sanction or both, a mixture of rational insight and force. The acceptance of a norm by society or social agents does not necessarily mean or is not identical to its worthiness to be

followed; for the latter we have to resort to the logic of practical discourse.34 In this regard, Habermas reminds us of Durkheim's warning regarding the fallacy of reducing the obligatory character of norms to the obedience shown by the followers of those in power: "a norm does not enjoy validity simply because it is linked to sanctions that enforce compliance."35

Given the difference between norms and facts, normative statements cannot be tested in the same way as descriptive statements.36 Not being a property, norms or rightness can only be justified essentially in communicative endeavors, in real discourse.37

When participants engage in discourse over rightness or norms of interaction they enter into the sphere of the practical. Practical discourse, however, can be on moral or valuative questions. Valuative questions deal with issues of the good life, which is distinguished from the mere reproduction of life. Issues of the good life can be discussed within the horizon of life or individual lifestyle because, being value preferences, they shape the identities of groups and individuals in such a way that they become part of culture and personality.38 Moral questions, on the other hand, are decided rationally in terms of justice or universalizability of interests.39 They presuppose a hypothetical attitude or certain detachment from the concrete particular lifeworld in order to claim normative validity in the strict sense.

How does a society arrive at moral consciousness or engage in practical discourse of moral consequence? Habermas utilizes Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development in describing the logic of the development of the moral point of view of society or of social agents in action.40 We cannot describe this in detail but in summary: the stages can be divided into: (1) pre-conventional, (2) conventional, and (3) post-conventional. The key to understanding the division lies in the increasing differentiation and integration of the system of the speaker's perspectives and the system of world perspectives. In Kolhberg's psychological terms differentiation "refers to the degree to which the structure of thought at a given stage allows one to separate out specifically moral judgements from other value judgements of practical reason; integrate conflicting claims in such a way as to resolve conflicts."41 Speaker perspectives are the communicative roles of speaker, hearer and listener, or first, second and third person perspectives, the third being an observer's point of view interpreting the I-thou interaction. World perspectives are the three world relations of the natural, social and subjective.

In the pre-conventional stage, the implementation of the I-thou perspectives is learned through the experience of reciprocity of the roles of speaker and hearer. The introduction of the observer perspective into the realm of interaction and its linkage with the I-thou perspective demand a reorganization of action coordination at a higher level. This gives rise to two contrasting types of action: the strategic and the norm-governed interaction, but the actor at this stage still is success-oriented, guided by self-interest, because the observer and the reciprocal participants' points of view are not yet coordinated. Authority is still centered on a specific person.

Only after the transition to the conventional stage of interaction are the communicative roles of the first, second and third persons fully integrated, and the actor becomes able to recognize non-strategic types of action and to conform to the social world. At this stage the speaker and the world perspectives are developed, but not yet coordinated.

It is when the social world of norm-guided interactions is set off from the lifeworld that the post-conventional stage of discourse ethics begins. Here the speaker and the world perspectives are joined while differentiated, that is to say, the two systems must be put in relationship to one another.42 At the level of discourse, the opposition between consensual orientation and success orientation or between normatively regulated and strategic actions is overcome. At this third stage of interaction, the pressure to act is minimized and the focus is on testing validity claims implicit

in communicative action. With a hypothetical attitude, norms are now thematized and tested in terms of principles.43

In the conventional stage, the social world is still very much embedded in the lifeworld: morality and ethics have not yet really separated; morality has not yet become autonomous as morality.44 In ethical life, justice is not yet problematic as it is situated in the horizon of the good life, but in the moralizing gaze of the participants in the third stage, justice and the institutions it embodies cease to be familiar and are in need of justification.45

The three stages of moral development can be exemplified in the conception of justice. In the preconventional stage justice takes its natural embryonic form of bonds and loyalties based on the complementarity of command and obedience or on the symmetry of compensation. In the conventional stage, justice assumes a social world and consists in the conformity to roles and norms. In the post-conventional stage, "the social world dissolves into so many conventions in need of justification . . . traditional norms are split into social facts and norms."46 Norms now have lost their certainty and have to be justified in the light of principles. The justification can only take place in discourse, and thus here the idea of justice can be "gleaned only from the idealized form of reciprocity that underlies discourse."47

What can be gleaned from this development is the gradual decentering of the social actor in his understanding of the world.48 Simultaneous with this decentered understanding of the world is a consciousness which is becoming reflective as it takes up an observer's attitude towards interaction.49 The moralization of society consists thus of interactions emancipating themselves from parochial conventions and of norms losing their attachment and historical coloration to a particular form of life and becoming more abstract or generalized. Norms are now subject to other norms, subordinated to principles or to higher level norms. The performance of duties moves from a motivation of respect for the law to a demand that validity be the motive.50 The reciprocity built into action oriented towards reaching understanding moves from an authority-governed complementarity and interest-governed symmetry to behavioral expectations of social roles guided and linked together by accepted norms, and finally to ideal role-taking in discourse where participants are given universal access and equal opportunity, and thus are impregnated by a cooperative search for truth.51 It is in discourse that the success-orientation of competitors in strategic action "is assimilated into a form of communication in which action oriented towards reaching understanding is continued by other means. . . . Here convictions change internally via a process of rationally motivated attitude change."52 The moral point of view is to be found only "in discursive procedure that redeems normative claims to validity."53 This can be only from the perspective of a decentered understanding of the world able to integrate different but coordinated perspectives.

Principles and Presuppositions of Discourse Ethics

In discourse ethics conflicts of action are settled by consensus. The argument reached is truly reflexive in nature and expresses a general interest or common will because it is brought about by a real process of argumentation where the concerned social agents cooperate.54 The agreement attained relies on the actors' complete reversibility of relations with other participants in argumentation, and at the same time in the persuasive force of the better argument.55 The general will takes on a moral quality because the judgement aims at universality and impartiality.56 For a contested norm to be valid and consented to, the principle of universalization (U) must be applied. This states:

All affected can *freely* accept the consequences and the side effects that the *general* observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of *each individual*.57

Phrased in another way, "U" states that:

All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its *general* observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of *everyone's* interests (and these consequences are preferred to those known alternative possibilities for regulation).58

From this condition, the principle of discourse ethics (D) follows:

Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.59

Principle (U) is distinguished from principle (D), "which stipulates the basic idea of a moral theory but does not form part of a logic of argumentation."60 Principle (D) is "the assertion that the philosopher as a moral theorist ultimately seeks to justify,"61 and already presupposes principle (U).62

The principle of universalization does not mean that moral norms are valid if they are generally teachable and publicly defendable (Kurt Baier & Bernard Gert), nor that they ensure equality of treatment (Marcus Singer). For a norm to be valid, "It is not sufficient . . . for one person to test whether he can will the adoption of a contested norm after considering the consequences and side effects that would occur if all persons followed that norm or whether every other person in an identical position could will the adoption of such a norm."63 Valid norms deserve recognition by all concerned, and therefore the principle of universalizability requires "all affected to adopt perspectives of all others in the balancing of interests . . . to compel the *universal exchange of roles* that G.H. Mead called "ideal role-taking" or universal exchange."64 But unlike Mead's or John Rawl's theory of the original position, which is fictitious and under the veil of ignorance, Habermas' principle takes place in the context of a real practical discourse or argumentation; therefore it is presupposed in the principle of discourse ethics.

The principle of discourse ethics refers to the procedure to redeem normative claims to validity. It is formal like Kant's categorical imperative, but reformulates the monologism and rigorism of Kant by introducing moral argumentation that ensures awareness of consequences.65 As formal, it does not provide substantive guidelines for generating justified norms, but is a procedure for *testing* the validity of norm. This absence of substantive guidelines does not mean that principle (D) is devoid of content, for practical discourse takes place within the horizon of lifeworld, of real life conflict situations, of actors seeking consensual means of regulating controversial social matters.66

What rules are presupposed in discourse ethics? Habermas enumerates some of R. Alexy's presuppositions of argumentation on three levels, logical, dialectical or procedural, and rhetorical or process. It is the third level that has ethical import which includes the following rules: 67

(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.
(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.

b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.

c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.

(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).68

Rule (3.1) sets the potential participants to the moral discourse; rule (3.2) ensures equal opportunity for all participants; and rule (3.3) protects them from the possibility of repression.69 Consensus depends on these rules: on the inalienable right of the actor to say yes or no, his freedom to respond to criticizable validity claims, and his overcoming of his egocentric viewpoint, his emphatic sensitivity to the needs and interests of all others.70 The two aspects of these rules, autonomy of persons and their imbeddedness in intersubjective relations, are intimately connected and provide the framework of a practical discourse: an unrestricted communication community motivated solely by the force of the better argument in the cooperative search for truth.71

Habermas argues that the above rules are not mere social conventions or a free personal decision to adopt them in order to "play the game" of discourse, but *inescapable* presuppositions in discourse intended to reach rationally motivated consensus. "Commitment to them is rationally inescapable because they must, logically, be assumed if one is to engage in a mode of thought essential to any rational human life."72 Acceptance of these presuppositions implies the validity of the principle of universalization.73 Social agents who engage in discourse to validate contested norms inescapably presume these rules. To repudiate them while participating in discourse is to be involved in what Karl Otto Apel calls "performative contradiction."

Nevertheless, these conditions are merely approximations and may therefore the counterfactual. Discourse rules (3.1) to (3.3) state only that participants in argumentation must assume these conditions to be approximately realized, or realized in an approximation adequate enough for the purpose of argumentation, regardless of whether or not and to what extent these assumptions are counterfactual in a given case."74 The conditions are idealized and therefore institutional measures are needed to approximate them.75

Since the conditions are idealized, there is no guarantee that consensus can be reached, What happens when interests continue to conflict and do not prove susceptible to generalization? Should social agents then resort to compromise? In modern societies, where interests and value orientations become more differentiated, this usually happens. There is a need in modern societies for "regulations that impinge only on particular interests."76 Here, Habermas contends, discursive consensus is not needed, but compromise is sufficient. Nevertheless, a fair compromise calls for morally justified procedures of compromising, and in the end communicative ethics provides that ground.77

The ethics of compromising cannot be reduced to simple contractarianism as in the minimal ethics of J.L. Mackie,78 nor to the theory of argumentation of Ernst Tugendhat who sees argumentation as making possible not impartiality of judgement, but freedom from influence or autonomy in will formation.79 Both Mackie and Tugendhat reduce compromise to a bargaining and balancing of power. For Habermas, generalizable interest is an issue not in compromise but in particular conflicting interests. Of course, in compromise all concerned have equal rights to participation, "but these principles of compromise formation in turn require actual practical discourses for justification."80 This demands an impartial judgement about the interests of all concerned that "is not met by equality of opportunity to make one’s interests prevail."81

Conclusion: The Limitations of Discourse Ethics

The question of power brings us to the limitations of an ethics of communicative action. The justification of norms in terms of their universalizability necessitates a disengagement from their lived context to subject them to hypothetical reasoning. Their worthiness to be recognized does not always mean in actual practice that they are indeed recognized, accepted and followed. The "discursive justification of norms is no guarantee of actualization of moral insight . . . and cannot by itself insure that the conditions necessary for the actual participation of all concerned are met."82 Material living conditions and social structures, such as poverty, abuse and degradation, make a mockery of the demands of discourse ethics.83 And always the threat to use force rather than argumentation to settle conflicts confronts the human species. Practical discourses, unlike theoretical ones, "cannot be relieved of the burden of social conflicts."84 This is where perhaps Paul Ricoeur's "hermeneutics of suspicion" can complement Habermas' communicative ethics. Ricoeur "provides us with an ethical orientation toward structures of inequality such that those structures are, at least initially, always to be brought under interpretations which illuminate them as possible structures of power."85

Nonetheless, the limitations of Habermas' communicative ethics also bring into focus its merits and demands. Its distancing moment of critique is oriented towards reflectively tested claims to validity which must be effective in practice, for only when action and conflicts are guided by moral insight can they motivate. But this also necessitates reinsertion into the practical life by hermeneutic effort and prudence, and an internalization of abstract and universal principles.86 In the social context, institutions are needed as support for socialization and education that serve the general interest. The principle of universalization, which makes discourse ethics an exacting type of communication and therefore a liability, transcends the boundaries of the concrete lifeworld of the family, neighborhood, city or state. This transcendence makes discourse ethics truly objective and integrative. The ethics of communication unites the opposition of justice and solidarity and expresses indeed the oneness of humanity.

Notes

1. P.F. Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment* (London, Methuen, 1974).
2. Jürgen Habermas, "Discourse Ethics", *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 45. Henceforth, the book title will be abbreviated as *MCCA*.
3. *Ibid*., p. 47.
4. *Ibid*., p. 48.
5. *Ibid*.
6. *Ibid*., pp. 48-49.
7. *Ibid*., p. 49.
8. *Ibid*.
9. *Ibid*., p. 50.
10. J. Habermas, *Philosophical-Political Profiles* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), p. 120. Also in *MCCA*, p. 199.
11. J. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action", *MCCA*, p. 199.
12. *Ibid*., p. 197.
13. J. Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life", *MCCA*, p. 200.

14. *Ibid*., p. 199.
15. J. Habermas, *Philosophical-Political Profiles*, p. 120.
16. J. Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life," *MCCA*, p. 200.
17. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics", *MCCA*, p. 58.
18. J. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," *MCCA*, p. 136.
19. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics", *MCCA*, p. 100.
20. *Ibid*., pp. 58, 137.
21. *Ibid*., p. 58.
22. *Ibid*., p. 134.
23. *Ibid*.
24. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," *MCCA*, p. 102.
25. J. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," *MCCA*, p. 135.
26. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," *MCCA*, p. 102.
27. *Ibid*., p. 61.
28. *Ibid*., p. 60.
29. *Ibid*., p. 62.
30. *Ibid*., p. 61.
31. *Ibid*., p. 60.
32. *Ibid*., p. 61.
33. *Ibid*.
34. *Ibid*., p. 62.
35. *Ibid*., p. 73.
36. *Ibid*., p. 53.
37. *Ibid*., p. 69.
38. *Ibid*., p. 108.
39. J. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," *MCCA*, p. 178.
40. See Appendix, taken from J. Habermas, *MCCA*, p. 166.
41. Stephen K. White, *The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 59.
42. J. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action", *MCCA*, p. 158f.
43. *Ibid*., p. 168.
44. *Ibid*., p. 164.
45. *Ibid*., p. 108.
46. *Ibid*., p. 165.
47. *Ibid*.
48. *Ibid*., p. 132.
49. *Ibid*., p. 170.
50. *Ibid*., pp. 161-162.
51. *Ibid*., p. 163.
52. *Ibid*., p. 160.
53. *Ibid*., p. 163.
54. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," *MCCA*, p. 67.
55. J. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," *MCCA*, p. 159.
56. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics", *MCCA*, p. 51.
57. *Ibid*., p. 93.
58. *Ibid*., p. 65.

59. *Ibid*., pp. 66, 93.
60. *Ibid*., p. 93.
61. *Ibid*., p. 94.
62. *Ibid*., p. 66.
63. *Ibid*., p. 65.
64. *Ibid*.
65. J. Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life," *MCCA*, pp. 197, 201, 204, 206f.
66. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics", *MCCA*, p. 103.
67. *Ibid*., p. 89.
68. *Ibid*.
69. A.J. Watt, "Transcendental Arguments and Moral Principles," *Philosophical Quarterly*, 25 (1975), 40; quoted by J. Habermas, *op. cit.*, p. 83.
70. J. Habermas, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
71. *Ibid*., p. 80.
72. J. Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life," *MCCA*, p. 202.
73. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," *MCCA*, p. 89.
74. *Ibid*., pp. 91-92.
75. *Ibid*.
76. J. Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life," *MCCA*, p. 205.
77. *Ibid*., p. 265.
78. Stephen White, *op. cit.*, p. 76f.
79. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," *MCCA*, p. 71.
80. *Ibid*., p. 72.
81. *Ibid*.
82. J. Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life," *MCCA*, p. 209.
83. *Ibid*.
84. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," *MCCA*, p. 106.
85. Stephen White, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
86. J. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," *MCCA*, pp. 180f.

Part III
Asian Values and Technology:
Humanizing the Modernization of China

15.
The Philosophy of Value, the Value of Philosophy

Manuel B. Dy, Jr.

The intention of this paper is twofold: to present a philosophy of values, with the help of the noted phenomenologist of value, Max Scheler, and to show the indispensable role of philosophy in value education, especially in the context of national reconstruction.

It has often been said that at the root of the economic and political instability of the Philippines as a nation is a moral crisis of such a paramount degree that our culture has been termed a "damaged culture." Recently, it has been ranked the third most corruption-ridden country of Asia. Graft and corruption have become an accepted way of life for most, not only for government officials and their relatives. Undoubtedly, a moral recovery must go hand in hand with economic and political recovery. But such a moral recovery must come to terms with an understanding of values, notably in the field of education, which otherwise will be haphazard and lacking in direction.

This paper hopes to contribute to such an understanding of values. But more than that, it proposes that such an understanding of values entails an emphasis upon teaching philosophy in our curriculum, perhaps more than, but at no expense to, the other disciplines.

What Are Values?

The first thing to be said about values is that they are objects of our intentional feeling. Intentional feeling is different from the sensory feelings of the five senses (e.g., pain, tickling), from bodily vital feeling-states (e.g., tiredness, illness, health), and from psychic feelings (e.g., sorrow, joy). Intentional feelings by their very nature are oriented towards values; they are feelings of something. Spiritual feelings such as bliss and despair are essentially intentional or directed towards the value of the holy, but other feeling acts like preferring, subordinating, love and hatred, likewise are oriented towards values.

Values are given to us in intentional feeling; we "know" values by feeling them, and to appear in our lives they do not wait for our rational justification. Our intellect is blind to values just as the eyes are blind to sounds. This does not mean that we cannot reflect on values, but when we do (as we are doing now), we are reflecting no longer on values as values, but on values as concepts. To illustrate this point let us consider the value of service, of being a person-for-others. Students understand the readings related to this concept, but how many after graduation venture to spend a year or two in a service-oriented job? For the few who do the decision usually comes after an immersion program in which they experience the feeling of poverty.

As objects of our intentional feeling, values are essentially *qualities* and are not to be mistaken for goods, though goods are carriers or bearers of values. Misconceiving values for goods may be due to a language problem. The Filipino word for value is "*halaga*"; but "*bale*" is another common expression used by young people. This is Spanish in origin and may also mean "worth", "have the same value." However, "*bale*" also refers to that small place of paper that the Filipino(a) brings to the sari-sari store, with the words "good for" a can of milk, a bag of sugar, for values qualify our life and do not easily give in to quantification. As qualities, values are objective and immutable, whereas goods as carriers of value vary and depend on the subject, time, circumstance, situation. A metaphor may be of help here. The color green is a quality (seen by the eyes) different from the

color black. Should I decide to paint the green board black the board is now a carrier of the color black where before it was a carrier of the color green. Still, green is green and black is black. The quality green or black does not change; only the board has changed.

It is important to stress here the immutability, the objectivity of values; for values, especially higher values, call on the person and when the person fails to respond to a value, it is not the value that is destroyed, but the person himself. Justice as a value calls on the person to be just; if he does not respond to this call by being just, it is not the value of justice that is destroyed, but the person himself. We are here reminded of the words of Socrates, "to do injustice is worse than to suffer injustice." As qualities, values transcend man.

Here precisely lies the ambiguity of values in their immateriality. Our life attains a quality because values constantly present themselves to us, intervene in our life as instigators of action, prospects for commitment, reasons and standards for behavior and expression, norms and principles of conduct, and criteria for aesthetic appreciation and economic utility. But values elude all these embodiments or carriers. A value gives itself in an object to be desired, but once the goal is attained it affirms itself in the form of another demand. In this sense we can speak of the universality of values -- they exercise an influence on the totality and unity of our life. Values form a kind of horizon to our life.

More specifically, values generate an "ought-to-be" and an "ought-to-do". For instance, because justice is a value, it ought to exist and I ought to be just. Values, in other words, ground our obligations, beliefs, ideals, and attitudes, without being identical with them.

How then do we experience values? The key to this question is to be found in the notion of the human being as a person, for in the real sense only men and women can experience values. For Max Scheler, a person is the seat of the spirit which transcends nature. As spirit, the person is not part of nature but apart from it; one can determine oneself, direct one's own life. (Self-determination is another word for freedom.) This is manifest in the human being's capacity to go against the drive of evolution, the instinct of survival -- a person can willingly take his own life. In his freedom the person is the unity of diverse acts; past, present and future. As such the person is open to reality. Martin Buber in a similar vein, talks of the person as a being in dialogue with the world. The being of the person is a being of response-ability; freedom is the precondition for one's responding to the other, be it a human other, nature, thing, event or God. For Buber the opposite of constraint is communion. To be free, and thus to be a person, means to be able to respond to the call of communion. It is here that values are experienced -- in the dialogic relationship of the human being as a person. Unlike in the animal where a biological need compels it to satisfy a necessity with the force of a natural physical law, values call for a free response from the person. There is no experience of value if value is not recognized as such, consented to and willed by the human being.

Values appear in the human being's engagement with the world, in his or her openness to reality. The experience of value is at once the experience of person. Values then are not created, but discovered by the person in one's involvement with the world

The person is a unity of diverse acts, among which three uniquely characterize the person: (1) the act of reflection or of making oneself the object of one's thinking, (2) the act of ideation or abstraction, of deriving an essence from existents, and (3) the act of loving. Of the three, the last one is the most important trait of the human being as person: a person is a being capable of loving. Loving and hating are the fundamental primordial acts of the person to which all other acts are reducible. In this sense, a person is judged by what he or she is and by what he or she loves and hates.

Both love and hatred are movements of the heart oriented towards values. Love and hatred are similar in that as movements, they open up a hierarchy of values. The opposite of love is not hatred, but apathy. Love directs us to higher values, whereas hatred directs us to lower values. It is interesting to note here that the Filipino word "*mahal*" (love) also means "esteem" or "of high value".

The following is Scheler's hierarchy of values:

Holy/Unholy
Spiritual
Vital
Sensory

At the lowest rank are sensory values: the pleasant and the npleasant, technical values and luxury values. Next in rank are the vital values of the noble and the vulgar, the values of civilization. Higher than vital and sensory values which are both related to the ego are the spiritual values of justice/injustice, truth/falsehood, and the aesthetic values of beauty and ugliness. The highest values are the holy and unholy. Both spiritual and holy values refer to our being as person or spirit.

This ordered rank of values is also objective and immutable. What is subjective and mutable is our ability to perceive this hierarchy, our "value-conception," and our concrete realization of values. Hatred is a disorder of the heart because it wrongly reverses the order of the rank of values.

For Scheler, the moral values of good (positive) and evil (negative) are not to be found in this hierarchy of values, but in their realization; they, so to speak, "ride on the back of the deed." A deed is good if it prefers a higher or positive value in place of a lower or negative value. On the other hand, a deed is evil if it prefers a lower or negative value in place of a higher or positive one. Without the deed and the person who performs it no moral good or evil occurs. In this sense, moral values are personal values in that they originate from persons. Good is the realization of higher values, the spiritual and the holy, which refer to our being persons. In contrast, evil is the realization of lower values, the sensory and the vital, which refer to our likeness to the animals. Hence, good enhances our personhood, while evil degrades our humanity.

The moral acts of good and evil then are based again on the person and not on any moral authority. Obligation, as we have earlier said, is based on value and not the other way around. Values generate an "ought" in the person through models: without a person to posit them, there would be no norms or obligations. In the case of moral values, nothing can make a person good other than the intuition of a good person as an example. Love by such a person invites a following. Scheler cites the example of Christ loving the sinner, Mary Magdalene, and effecting a moral conversion in her. Model persons are the primary vehicle of value transformation in our moral world.

The Nature of Philosophy

There are as many definitions of philosophy as there are philosophies and philosophers. Our task here is not to define it and thus limit the value of philosophy to its definition, but to seek its meaning in what it does in the context of the other disciplines, the human and natural sciences, and in the ordinary endeavors of human beings. We shall be led to see the value of philosophy then as corresponding to the points we mentioned regarding the nature of values.

The Western tradition has always associated philosophy with wisdom, forgetting the "love" that precedes wisdom in its original meaning. Our culture has not been spared this Western influence, for *pamimilosopo* also means to be pedantic, to theorize and juggle concepts in a dull and narrow way. Whereas originally, to philosophize was passionately to search for wisdom, to love it because one is not in full possession of it. Far from being purely speculative, philosophy is first of all felt, a passion, a desire, a value.

What is this wisdom loved by the philosopher? The Eastern tradition can offer us interesting answers, for it is to the East that we turn for wisdom. The Hindu word for philosophy is "*darsana*", which means "to see" not just with the eyes, nor with the mind, but with one's whole being. What is to be seen with one's whole being is none other than the truth or the real, which is what is unchanging, eternal, universal. The Chinese tradition terms philosophy as "*cheh-hsueh*" (philosophy). *Hsueh* means learning, but the character *cheh* is a compound character made up of a hand, a measurement, and a mouth, that is to say, philosophy is learning to measure one's words with one's deeds. To philosophize is to know in a very different way from learning a skill; it is first of all to learn to be moral where one's speech, feelings, knowledge and action are integrated into one whole. The wise man is one who always knows the good to be realized in any concrete situation, whereas the clever one knows the means to utilize for whatever ends, good or otherwise.

Where does this love for wisdom emerge; when does a person begin to philosophize? It should be said at this point that just as it is only the person who experiences values, also it is only human beings who philosophize. Different philosophers have varied accounts for the beginning of philosophizing. Plato traces it to wonder, Descartes to doubt, Jaspers to the limit situation. Whether is it from wonder, or doubt, or the helplessness of a situation that one begins to philosophize, there is something in the very being of the human situation that impels the person to philosophize. Robert Johann calls this the tension of human experience. This tension springs from the very nature of the person as openness to reality, as response-ability to the other (to nature, fellowman, society or the Absolute), as not being identical with oneself or one's self-becoming. Philosophy springs from the tensions of human life, and to philosophize is to bear witness to this situatedness of our humanity.

But what does a philosopher do with this tension that a non-philosopher or one who has ceased to philosophize does not? The philosopher brings it to consciousness, to awareness, to reflection, making explicit what is implicit in humane experience. Reflection in this sense is bending back on oneself, becoming aware of one's own life and necessarily of the world that includes the other, for self-consciousness, needless to say, entails consciousness of the other. "The unexamined life is not worth living," says Socrates, but if it is to be authentic, philosophizing this examination of one's life can never be mere navel-gazing.

There is, however, another sense to reflection beyond the mere clarificatory bringing to consciousness of one's experience; this is the critical sense. To reflect is also to gain distance from oneself and one's situation. "Disengagement" is a necessary moment in philosophizing. This is not to be construed as an escape or alienation from reality; it means rather for the philosopher to take a "second look", to hold back from instinctive reactions, to examine one's presuppositions and prejudices.

At this point, the "retreat" of the philosopher is no different from the scientist's objectivity. In his concern to solve the problem in his hands the scientist distances himself from it in order to examine its parts, test his hypothesis, verify his conclusions. To philosophize, however, is to be concerned with the whole, with the totality; and if the scientific process and data are of relevance to the whole, then these too are taken into consideration and questioning. Thus, the objectivity of the philosopher includes subjectivity, or to be precise, to be objective is to be intersubjective. In

the sense of Gabriel Marcel, to philosophize is secondary reflection, that is, to be concerned with the mystery of being, not in the theological sense of being unknowable, but in the sense of a "problem" that encroaches upon one's own being and that of others.

The tension in human life calls for a resolution or reconciliation different in sort from the solution of the scientist, for here the philosopher's own self is involved -- his very being is at stake in his reflection. In the metaphor of Marcel, the philosopher is like a person trying all sorts of positions in bed to get some sleep. Philosophical reflection attempts to see the "sense" of everything in Claudel's usage, that is, as one would speak of the meaning of a word, the direction of a river, the opening of a door, the smell of a perfume or the texture of a cloth.

To philosophize is to be concerned with meaning, as we would say in Filipino, *kahulugan* -- the root word being "*hulug*" meaning "fall", or as one would say in English, "fall together". To philosophize then is to integrate both past and future in the act of presenting the personal and social meaning of one's life. Ultimately, of course, the *raison d'être* of philosophy is the person's inner longing to come to oneness with one's self, with nature, with others, with God -- which is the very meaning of sagehood in the oriental tradition.

It is not surprising that the authentic philosopher must also be a lover of justice (Socrates, Confucius, Mencius, Gandhi, Sartre, are examples). After all, justice implies a vision of the totality of the situation and a respect for the dignity of the human person. It is also worth noting that the philosopher must also be a peacemaker or a lover of peace, for peace reconciles conflicting forces both within and without one's self.

The Values of Philosophy

First, just as value is the object of our intentional feelings, philosophy makes us sensitive to the quality of our lives. The greatest danger facing us today is apathy, a sort of spiritual anesthesia. Philosophy awakens us from our spiritual slumber, our take-for-granted attitude in the same way as do literature or the arts. But more than literature or the arts, philosophy not only sensitizes us, but also brings us to the level of holistic, critical and evaluative reflection. This can be said to be the second value of philosophy, a step beyond sensitivity that turns it into sensibility -- reflection.

Just as values differ and transcend goods, philosophical reflection enables us to see beyond the facade of superficiality the perennial, lasting and deepest quality of our lives. Because philosophy attempts to see the totality of any human experience, it can provide a vision. This is important in the task of national reconstruction, for the development of a society cannot be haphazard and aimless. Short term goals and long term objectives have to be blended harmoniously, and this requires a vision of what a nation intends to be. This vision, of course, must be rooted in the historical realities of the present. Although philosophy may lack the discipline of the sciences and technology, nevertheless it is trained to inquire into the basics. Philosophical reflection seeks to go back to the roots of any human endeavor; it sets the foundation.

Both vision and foundation demand of philosophical reflection a critical sense. The thinking that is properly philosophical is reflective and critical: it is reflective because it is critical, and critical because it is reflective. Traditionally thinking was considered reflective when its object was within the mind. But much thinking about oneself can be anything but reflection; it can be mere daydreaming. Thinking is reflective when it is done disinterestedly without preconceptions and when it opens itself to the wider horizon of values. Just as values form a horizon in our lives, so philosophy in its search for truth opens us to a range or hierarchy of values against which we must evaluate the quality of our lives and the sensibleness of an issue or project. This is the

outstanding value of truth; it illumines other values, including the value of justice. In the light of truth, the world is not just a world of facts and figures but is imbued with priorities, with a sense of importance and with purpose.

One cannot overestimate this critical role of philosophy especially for peoples, such as those of the Philippines, who are undergoing a transition from a long period of dictatorship to a new era of self-determination. The same seems true more generally for the universal phenomenon of cultural globalization at the turn of the millennium. In the prospect of national reconstruction and total human development this critique must necessarily include the re-evaluation of traditional Filipino values and traits.

Finally, just as values generate an "ought-to-be" and an "ought-to-do" and call forth moral persons, so philosophy invites us to be integrative. This integrative function of philosophy is more an ideal to be achieved than a guaranteed role, for philosophy does not impose itself but springs from the responsible freedom of the philosopher as a human being. Philosophy urges us to be moral persons, persons of integrity who are self-possessed because their speech, feelings, thinking and action are one; they are one because they are committed to the value of persons. Philosophy invites us to be true to ourselves, to our humanity, by committing ourselves to the value of other humans. Just as love is the movement towards the realization of higher values, so philosophy moves us to be responsive to the value of persons -- to love.

The above mentioned values of philosophy make philosophy an indispensable factor in value-oriented education. These insights on value and philosophy have grave implications for our curriculum, for pedagogy, and most important of all, for the person of the teacher. But that is another topic.

16.

Confucian Harmony and Technical Progress: Suggestions from Kant

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In 1919 it was suggested -- indeed vehemently declared -- that in order for Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy to be introduced to the history of China it would be necessary for Confucius to bow out. This paper explores the opposite thesis, namely, that in order for Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy to be introduced, Confucius is needed as their host.

In the context of the search for modernization and for appropriate standing among the nations of the world there seems to be not doubt that science is needed. Certainly, necessary and universal laws have made it possible to interpret and predict natural forces, and the development of an objective and mathematical spirit has enabled humankind to manage the forces of nature. Together these have provided the ability to project and realize the great accomplishments needed in order to support the quantity and enhance the quality of human life -- and, by implication, that of nature as a whole.

Much -- very much -- has been accomplished in this direction; but there are reasons to fear that these accomplishments have been so single-minded as to place in question the broader context of human life, its meaning and dignity.

The Problem

In the history of philosophy brilliant new creative openings often degenerate into reductivist efforts to absorb all other meaning. This perverse dynamism is found in no less central a personage than Plato who inverted Parmenides' relation of thought to being into a reduction of reality to what was clear to the human mind. Thus, he invited the mind to soar, but where it met his limits -- as in taking account of concrete realities and the exercise of human freedom -- he generated the classic blueprint for a suppressive communal state.

Such temptations of all-controlling reason are characteristic as well of modern times, beginning from Descartes' requirements of clarity and distinctness for the work of reason. The effect in his own philosophy was to split the human person between the extended substance or body and the nonextended substance or spirit. Much as he tried for a unity of these in the human person, this could not be done in the clear and distinct terms he required. As a result philosophers and then whole cultures proceeded according to either body or spirit, and modern thought polarized between the atomism of discrete sensations and the ever greater unities perceived by spirit.

What is particularly frightening is the way in which theoretical philosophical experiments in either of these isolates were carried out by a fairly mechanical pattern of reason and then translated into public policy. It is fine for a thinker to give free range to the constructive possibilities of his or her mind by saying with Hobbes: let's suppose that all are isolated singles in search of survival and then see what compromises and what rules will make survival possible. Over time we may have become so accustomed to that game that we have forgotten Hobbes's identification of the wolflike basic instincts by which it is played, but we should listen to others from all parts of the Southern hemisphere when they perceive the resulting system as predatory, brutish and mean.

Similarly, it could be helpful for a thinker to hypothesize that all is matter and then see how its laws can shed light on the process of human history. But when this was done by Marx and Lenin

society began to repress the life of the spirit and term irrational everything except scientific historicism; the freedom of individuals and of peoples was suppressed and creativity died.

Both are parallel cases of theoretical axioms becoming metaphysical totalities even while, or perhaps especially due to, denying such a thing as metaphysics. It is not surprising that the result for this century was a bipolar world armed to the hilt and subsisting by a reign of mutual terror. What is surprising is that the internal collapse of Eastern Europe in 1989 should have given popular credibility to the notion that the parallel road taken by the other partner, namely, the West, can be followed now without fear -- that the wolf has been transformed into a lamb for lack of a mirror in which to observe the effects of its own root problems.

This suggests that it is necessary to look for additional dimensions of science beyond reductive analysis and universal and necessary laws. While there is much to be discovered here which will be, and indeed has been, very helpful, it is important to recognize not only what is common but what is unique and distinctive in reality. Though true that without the necessary and the universal life would be chaotic, it is no less true that without the unique and different there would be neither life nor progress: all would be static, rather than emergent.

In this world logos must be realized in the concrete and unique. This points to events with their radical novelty. In human life this is the reality of promise and creativity, of uniqueness and freedom, of sharing and love. Surprisingly perhaps, it may be Confucius who can help to see how these can be not only juxtaposed to science and its offspring, technology, but enable technology to be integrated into Chinese culture and receive thereby the full force of this culture's creative power. For Confucius to help it is necessary that technology and culture not be placed on the same level or considered as alternatives one to the other. To see how they can be positively related, indeed how Confucius is needed for the introduction of science and the technological transformation of China, the threefold structure of Kant's critiques can be instructive

Kant's Response

The Critique of Pure Reason

Kant provides an example of the requirement to move beyond an atomic reductionism in the direction of synthesis in his first and third critiques. In the former his problem is how, in the face of Hume's empiricism science could have universal and necessary laws.

It is unfortunate that the range of Kant's work has been so little appreciated. Until recently, the rationalist impact of Descartes directed almost exclusive attention to the first of Kant's critiques, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, which concerned the conditions of possibility of the physical sciences. Its rejection of metaphysics as a science was warmly greeted in materialist, empiricist and positivist circles as a dispensation from the need for any search beyond what was reductively sensible and phenomenal in the sense of being inherently spatial and/or temporal.

Kant himself, however, quite insisted upon going further. If the terms of the sciences were inherently phenomenal, then his justification of the sciences was precisely to identify and to justify, through metaphysical and transcendental deductions respectively, the sets of categories which enable the phenomenal world to have intelligibility and scientific meaning. Since sense experience is always limited and partial, the universality and necessity of the laws of science must come from the human mind. Such *a priori* categories belong properly to the subject inasmuch as it is not material.

We are here at the essential turning point for the modern mind, where Kant takes a definitive step in identifying the subject as more than a wayfarer in a given world to which one can but react. He shows rather that the subject is an active force engaged in the creation even of the empirical world in which one lives. The meaning or intelligible order of things is due not only to their creation according to a divine intellect, but also to the work of the human intellect and its categories. If, however, human beings are to have such a central role in the constitution of their world, then certain elements will be required, and this requirement itself will be their justification.

First, there must be an imagination which can bring together the flow of disparate sensations. This plays a reproductive role which consists in the empirical and psychological activity by which it reproduces within the mind the amorphous data received from without, according to the forms of space and time. This merely reproductive role is by no means sufficient, however, for since the received data is amorphous, any mere reproduction would lack coherence and generate a chaotic world: it would be "a blind play of representations less even than a dream".1 Hence, the imagination must have also a productive dimension which enables the multiple empirical intuitions to achieve some unity. This is ruled by "the principle of the unity of apperception" (understanding or intellection), namely, "that all appearances without exception, must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception."2 This is done according to the abstract categories and concepts of the intellect, such as cause, substance and the like, which rule the work of the imagination at this level in accord with the principle of the unity of apperception.

Second, this process of association must have some foundation in order that the multiple sensations be related or even relatable one to another and, hence, enter into the same unity of apperception. There must be some objective affinity of the multiple found in past experience -- an "affinity of appearances" -- in order for the reproductive or associative work of the imagination to be possible. However, this unity does not exist, as such, in past experiences. Rather, the unitive rule or principle of the reproductive activity of the imagination is its reproductive or transcendental work as "a spontaneous faculty not dependent upon empirical laws but rather constitutive of them and, hence, constitutive of empirical objects."3 That is, though the unity is not in the disparate phenomena, nevertheless they can be brought together by the imagination to form a unity only in certain particular manners, if they are to be informed by the categories of the intellect.

Kant illustrates this by comparing the examples of perceiving a house and perceiving a boat receding downstream.4 The parts of the house can be intuited successively in any order (door-roof-stairs or stairs-door-roof), but my judgment must be of the house as having all of its parts simultaneously. Similarly, the boat is intuited successively as moving downstream. However, though I must judge its actual motion in that order of succession, I could imagine the contrary. Hence, the imagination, in bringing together the many intuitions goes beyond the simple order of appearances and unifies phenomenal objects in an order to which concepts can be applied. "Objectivity is a product of cognition, not of apprehension,"5 for, though we can apprehend appearances in any sequence, they can be unified and, hence, thought only in certain orders as ruled by the categories of the mind.

In sum, it is the task of the reproductive imagination to bring together the multiple elements of sense intuition in a unity or order capable of being informed by concepts or categories of the intellect with a view to making a judgment. On the part of the subject, the imagination here is active, authentically one’s own and creative. Ultimately, however, its work is not free, but necessitated by the categories or concepts as integral to the work of sciences which are characterized by necessity and universality.

The Critique of Practical Reason

In his second Critique, that of practical reason Kant proceeded to recognize and provide a separate basis for human freedom. But how realistic is this talk about freedom? Do we really have the choice of which so much is said in the West? On the one hand, we are structured in a set of circumstances which circumscribe, develop and direct our actions. This is the actual experience of people which Marx and Hegel articulate when they note the importance of knowledge of the underlying pattern of necessity and make freedom consist in conforming thereto.

On the other hand, we learn also from our experience that we do have a special responsibility in this world to work with the circumstances of nature, to harness and channel these forces toward greater harmony and human goals. A flood which kills thousands is not an occasion for murdering more, but for mobilizing to protect as many as possible, for determining what flood control projects need to be instituted for the future, and even for learning how to so construct them so that they also can generate electricity for power and irrigation for crops. All of this is properly the work of the human spirit which emerges therein. Similarly, in facing a trying day, I eat a larger breakfast rather than cut out part of my schedule; instead of ignoring the circumstances and laws of my physical being, I coordinate these and direct them for my human purposes.

This much can be said by pragmatism. But it leaves unclear whether humans remain merely instruments of physical progress and, hence, whether their powers remain a function of matter. This is where Kant takes a decisive step in his second *Critique*.

For if the above were the total explanation of science one might claim to explain necessary and universal laws, but this would not explain its creative dimension. On the contrary, human creativity would be suppressed in the search for the laws of necessity: freedom would be unwelcome, initiative would be suppressed and stagnation would follow.

The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment

It was well along in the so-called "critical decade' in which Kant wrote his three critiques, and only after writing the first two, that Kant was in position to discover -- indeed, was forced to recognize -- what at the beginning of that decade he had not thought possible. Whereas he had once looked upon the human spirit only in order to uncover the universal and necessary laws at work therein, and considered the imagination only instrumentally as the power for reproducing in an ordered manner what was perceived, he now became aware of a new, productive, indeed creative function of the imagination.

It is in the third *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* that Kant provides the needed context for such uniqueness and creativity,6 and thus approaches the aesthetic sensibility of Confucius in articulating the cosmic significance of freedom. Kant is intent not merely upon uncovering the fact of freedom, as in his second critique of practical reason, but upon protecting and promoting it. He faces squarely modern man's most urgent question: how can this newly uncovered freedom survive when confronted with the necessity and universality of the realm of science as understood in his first *Critique of Pure Reason*? Will the scientific interpretation of nature restrict freedom to the inner realm of each person's heart, where it is reduced at best to good intentions or to feelings towards others?

When we attempt to act in this world or to reach out to others, must all our categories be universal and hence insensitive to that which marks others as unique and personal? Must they be necessary, and, hence, leave no room for creative freedom, which would be entrapped and then

entombed in the human mind? If so, then public life can be only impersonal, necessitated, repetitive and stagnant. Must the human spirit be reduced to the sterile content of empirical facts or to the necessitated modes of scientific laws? If so, then philosophers cannot escape forcing upon wisdom a suicidal choice between either being traffic directors in the jungle of unfettered competition or being tragically complicit in setting a predetermined order for the human spirit. Freedom would, indeed, have been killed; it would pulse no more as the heart of humankind.

Before these alternatives, Kant's answer is a resounding No! Taking as his basis the reality of freedom -- so passionately and often tragically affirmed in our lifetime by such revered figures as Ghandi and Martin Luther King -- Kant proceeded to develop his third *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* as a context within which freedom and scientific necessity could coexist, indeed, in which necessity would be the support and instrument of freedom. Recently, this has become more manifest as human sensibilities have opened to the significance of culture and to awareness that being itself is emergent in time through the human spirit.

To provide for this context, Kant found it necessary to distinguish two issues as reflected in the two parts of his third *Critique*. In the "Critique of Teleological Judgment",7 he acknowledges that nature and all reality must be teleological. For if there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws, if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be directed toward a transcendent goal; it must manifest throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, nature, even in its necessary and universal laws, is no longer alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom. The structure of his first *Critique* will not allow Kant to affirm the metaphysical character of the teleology or its absolute and self-sufficient basis, but he recognizes that we must proceed "as if" all reality is teleological precisely because of the undeniable reality of human freedom in an ordered universe.

If, however, in principle teleology provides the needed space, there remains a second issue regarding how freedom is exercised, namely, what mediates it to the necessary and universal laws of science? This is the task of his "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment",8 and it is here that the imagination reemerges to play its key integrating role in human life. From the point of view of the human person, the task is to explain how one can live in freedom with nature for which the first critique had discovered only universal and necessary laws. How can a free person relate to an order of nature and to structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating?

There is something similar here to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In both, the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena is not simply to register, but to produce the objective order. As in the first critique, the approach is not from a set of *a priori* principles which are clear all by themselves and used in order to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. Rather, under the rule of unity, the imagination orders and reorders the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle whose appropriateness emerges from the reordering carried out by the productive imagination.

In the first *Critique*, however, the productive work was done in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and carried out under a law which dictated that phenomena must form a unity. The *Critique of Pure Reason* saw the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena as not simply registering, but producing the objective order. The approach was not from *a priori* principles which are clear all by themselves and are used to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. Rather, in the first *Critique*, under the rule of unity the imagination moves to order and reorder the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying

principle on the part of the intellect, the appropriateness of which emerges from the reordering carried out by the reproductive imagination.

Nevertheless, this reproductive work of the first *Critique* took place in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and was carried out under a law of unity which dictated that such phenomena as a house or a receding boat must form a unity -- and which they could do only if assembled in a certain order. Hence, although it was a human product, the objective order was universal and necessary and the related sciences were valid both for all things and for all people.9

Here in *The Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment*, the imagination has a similar task of constructing the object, but not in a manner necessitated by universal categories or concepts. In contrast, here in working toward an integrating unity, the imagination is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts, but ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see whether and wherein relatedness and purposiveness or teleology can emerge and the world and our personal and social life can achieve its meaning and value. Hence, in standing before a work of nature or of art, the imagination might focus upon light or form, sound or word, economic or interpersonal relations -- or, indeed, upon any combination of these in a natural environment or a society, whether encountered concretely or expressed in symbols.

Throughout all of this the ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities. Unrestricted by any *a priori* categories, indeed it can integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and therefore creative production, and scientific universals within its unique concrete harmonies. This work is properly creative. More than merely evaluating all according to a set pattern in one's culture, it chooses the values and on that basis orders reality. This is the very constitution of the culture itself.

It is the productive, rather than merely the reproductive, work of the human person as living in his or her physical world. Here, I use the possessive form advisedly. Without this capacity the human person would exist as another object in the physical universe, not only subject to its laws but restricted and possessed by them. He/she would be not a free citizen of the material world, but a mere function or servant. In his third Critique Kant unfolds how one can truly be master of his/her life in this world, not in an arbitrary and destructive manner, but precisely as creative artists bringing being to new realization in ways which make possible new growth in freedom.

In the third Critique, the productive imagination constructs a true unity by bringing the elements into an authentic harmony. This cannot be identified through reference to a category, because freedom then would be restricted within the laws of necessity of the first Critique; rather, it must be recognizable by something free. In order for the realm of human freedom to be extended to the whole of reality, this harmony must be able to be appreciated not purely intellectually in relation to a concept (for again we would be reduced to the universal and necessary as in the first Critique), but aesthetically, by the pleasure or displeasure of the free response it generates. It is our contemplation or reflection upon this which shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved. This is not a concept,10 but the pleasure or displeasure, the elation at the beautiful and sublime or the disgust at the ugly and revolting, which flows from our contemplation or reflection.

Confucian Harmony and the Distinctively Chinese Integration of Technological Progress

One could miss the integrating character of this pleasure or displeasure and its related judgment of taste11 by looking at it ideologically, as simply a repetition of past tastes in order to

promote stability. Or one might see it reductively as a merely interior and purely private matter at a level of consciousness available only to an elite class and related only to an esoteric band of reality. That would ignore the structure which Kant laid out at length in his first "Introduction" to his third Critique12 which he conceived not as merely juxtaposed to the first two Critiques of pure and practical reason, but as integrating both in a richer whole.

Developing the level of aesthetic sensitivity enables one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future. This is manifest in a good leader such as a Churchill or Roosevelt -- and, supereminently, in a Confucius or Christ. Their power to mobilize a people lies especially in their rare ability to assess the overall situation, to express it in a manner which rings true to the great variety of persons, and, thereby, to evoke appropriate and varied responses from each according to his or her capabilities. The danger is that the example of such genius will be reduced to formulae, and thereby become an ideology that excludes innovation. In reality, as personable, free and creative, and understood as the work of aesthetic judgment, their example was inclusive in content and application as well as in the new responses it continually evokes.

When aesthetic experiences are passed on as part of a tradition, gradually they come to build a culture. Some thinkers, such as William James and Jürgen Habermas,13 fearing that attending to these free creations of a cultural tradition might distract from the concrete contemporary needs of the people, have urged a turn rather to the social sciences for social analysis and critique as a means to identify pragmatic responses. But these point back to the necessary laws of the first *Critique*; in many countries now engaging in reforms, such past "scientific" laws of history were found to have stifled creativity and paralyzed the populace.

Kant's third Critique points in another direction. Though it integrates scientifically universal and necessary social relations, it does not focus upon them, nor does it focus directly upon the beauty or ugliness of concrete relations, or even directly upon beauty or ugliness in themselves. Its focus is rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images of these which we imaginatively create, that is, our culture as manifesting the many facets of beauty and ugliness, actual and potential. In turn, we evaluate these in terms of the free and integrating response of pleasure or displeasure, the enjoyment or revulsion they generate most deeply within our whole person.

Confucius probably would feel very comfortable with this if structured in terms of an appreciation or feeling of harmony. In this way, he could see freedom itself at the height of its sensibility, not merely as an instrument of a moral life, but as serving through the imagination as a lens or means for presenting the richness of reality in varied and intensified ways. Freedom, thus understood, is both spectroscope and kaleidoscope of being. As spectroscope it unfolds the full range of the possibilities of human freedom, so that all can be examined, evaluated and admired. As kaleidoscope, it continually works out the endless combinations and patterns of reality so that the beauty of each can be examined, reflected upon and chosen when desired. Freely, purposively and creatively, imagination weaves through reality, focusing now upon certain dimensions, now reversing its flow, now making new connections and interrelations. In the process the creative human freedom of a person or people manifests not only the scientific forms and technological possibilities of the first critique and the potential forms of social and democratic interrelations of the second critique, but their interrelation in way that evoke our free response of love and admiration or rejection in hate and disgust.

In this manner freedom becomes at once the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the arbiter of all that imaginatively we can propose. It is *goal*, namely to realize life as rational and free in this world; it is *creative source*, for with the imagination it unfolds the endless possibilities for human expression; it is *manifestation*, because it presents these to our consciousness in ways appropriate to our capabilities for knowledge of limited realities and relates these to the circumstances of our life; it is *criterion*, because its response manifests a possible mode of action to be variously desirable or not in terms of a total personal response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion; and it is *arbiter*, because it provides the basis upon which our freedom chooses to affirm or reject, realize or avoid this way of self-realization. In this way, freedom emerges as the dynamic center of our human existence.

There is much in the above which evokes the deep Confucian sense of harmony and the role of the gentleman in unfolding its implications for daily life. This uncovers new significance in the thought of Confucius for the work of implementing, in a mutually fruitful manner, Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy in our times. Looking to the aesthetic sense of harmony as a context for uniting both ancient capabilities in agriculture with new technology and industrialization and for applying these to the work of building a democratic nation is a task, not only for an isolated individual, but for an entire people. Over time, a people develops its own specific sensibilities and through the ages forms a culture and a tradition which, in turn, constitute the human capital for such a project. In this sense, one can look to the Confucian cultural heritage for its aesthetic sense of harmony as a way to carry forward technological development for the authentic progress of the Chinese people in our day.

The Confucian sense of harmony is not a rationalist law whose unfolding would suggest an attempt to read all in an *a priori* and necessitarian manner. Its sense of life and progress is not that of a scientific view of history after the dialectic of Hegel and Marx. Rather, Confucianism understands humans as bringing their lives together in relation to other persons and in the concrete circumstances of everyday life. In this sense, it is not massively programmatic in the sense of a rationalist scientific theory of history. This may be very much to the good, for it protects against efforts after the manner of an ideology to define and delimit all beforehand -- which indeed surpasses human capacities.

Further, one must not underestimate the cumulative power which the Confucian sense of harmony and resonance can have when it brings together creatively the many persons with knowledge of their circumstances in an effort to provide for life in its many modes. This extends from those farmers who know and love their land intimately and are committed to its rich potentialities (and analogously for all phases of productive economic life), to family members and villagers who love their kin and neighbors, to citizens who are willing to work ardently for the welfare of their people and nation. If the exercise of freedom is a concrete and unique expression of the distinctive reality of its authors, then the task is not how to define these by abstractive and universal laws which stifle personal initiative, but how to enliven all persons actively to engage the new technology and scientific structures in the multiple dimensions of their lives.

In this context, the philosophical importance of the Confucian attitude becomes more evident. For if harmony and resonance enable a more adapted and fruitful mode of realization for the human being, then the identity and truth, dynamism and goodness of being are thereby made manifest and proclaimed. In this light, the laws of nature and the technology they enable emerge, not as desiccated universals best read negatively as prohibitions or intrusive machines, but as rich and unfolding modes of being and actualization best read through an appreciation of the concrete harmony and beauty of their active development. This, rather than the details of etiquette, is the

deeper Confucian sense of the gentleman and sage; it can be grasped and exercised only with a corresponding aesthetic, rather than the merely scientific or pragmatic sensibilities.

Nor is this beyond people's experience. Few can carry out the precise process of conceptualization and definition required for the technical dialectics of Platonic and Aristotelian reasoning. But all share an overall sensibility to situations as pleasing and attractive or as generating unease or even revulsion. Inevitably, in earlier times, the aesthetic Confucian mode lacked the scientific precision which is now available regarding surface characteristics of physical phenomena or the technological prowess this makes available. But, in its sense of harmony, it possessed the deep human sensibility and ability to take into account and integrate all aspects of its object. This is essential for the contemporary humanization of our technical capabilities for the physical and social implementation of our world.

This is foundational for integrating with this scientific and technological age the democratic practice and cultural traditions without which the creative life atrophies and progress ceases and dies. A strong indication of the importance of this, and of the fact that its principles are found in the Confucian tradition is that without physical resources Japan has become so great a world productive and economic power. If in China the problem is not with willingness to change and initiative, but with how to harness the needed technology so that progress can be not only rapid, but authentically Chinese, then the Confucian sense of aesthetic harmony endows it with the crucial means for integrating and implementing the needed technological means. It is with -- not without -- Confucius as host that Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy can enter and truly help.

Notes

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A 112; cf. A 121.

2. *Ibid*., A 121.

3. Donald W. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 87-90.

4. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 192-93.

5. Crawford, pp. 83-84.

6. Cf. Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroads, 1982), Part I, pp. 1-2, pp. 39-73; and W. Crawford, espec. Ch. 4.

7. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1968), pp. 205-339.

8. *Ibid*., pp. 37-200.

9. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A112, 121, 192-193. Crawford, pp. 83-84, 87-90.

10. See Kant's development and solution to the autonomy of taste, *Critique of Judgment*, nn. 57-58, pp. 182-192, where he treats the need for a concept; Crawford, pp. 63-66.

11. See the paper of Wilhelm S. Wurzer "On the Art of Moral Imagination" in G. McLean, ed., *Moral Imagination and Character Development* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1998) for an elaboration of the essential notions of the beautiful, the sublime and taste in Kant's aesthetic theory.

12. Immanuel Kant, *First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. Haden (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

13. William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Washington Square, 1963), Ch. I, pp. 3-40. For notes on the critical hermeneutics of J. Habermas see G. McLean, "Cultural Heritage, Social Critique and Future Construction" in *Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America*, R. Molina, T. Readdy and G. McLean, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1988), Ch. I. Critical distance is an essential element and requires analysis by the social sciences of the historical social structures as a basis for liberation from determination and dependence upon unjust interests. The concrete psycho- and socio-pathology deriving from such dependencies and the corresponding steps toward liberation are the subject of the chapters by J. Loiacono and H. Ferrand de Piazza in *The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas*, G. McLean and O. Pegoraro, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1988), Chs. III and IV.

17.
Eco-Aesthetica

Noriko Hashimoto

In the three parts of this paper, I shall first present a new terminology, eco-aesthetica, then treat the semantic transformation of the concepts "perception" and "concentration", both of which are necessary for aesthetic activity, and conclude with a philosophical reflection on silence as the revelation of the positive meaning of concentration in our technological environment.

The Interrelation between Eco-ethica and Eco-aesthetica

"Eco-aesthetica" is proposed here as a new concept which should be taken as the essential systematic feature of aesthetics. Briefly put, eco-aesthetica treats problems of aesthetics in the present day situation in close connection with the new concept "eco-ethica". In the twentieth century the ecological situation of man has been entirely changed from what it was in the past. The environment is no longer merely a sphere of physical things, namely, "nature", but instead is a technological sphere, a systematically structured set of technological relations. This complicated technological context exerts an important influence upon human existence. To take a rather simple instance, the telephone creates many invisible neighbors. The semantic transformation of the concept "neighbor" from "the well-known person who lives next door" to "the unknown person in the telephone network" is one of the most important newly emerging problems in present social and interpersonal relations. We can speak immediately and directly with the invisible person at long distance, and we can always menace such a technological neighbor by virtue of our invisibility. Professor Tomonobu Imamichi has therefore proposed that a new ethics should be developed to respond to this technological reformation. More than fifteen years ago he proposed for that purpose a new ethical term, *eco-ethica*.

Inspired by that concept, I propose the term "eco-aesthetica" to mean an aesthetics that deals with the newly developed art-phenomena and newly proposed problems of beauty. I avoid the term "environmental-aesthetics" because the environment of aesthetics is not limited merely to the outer world; aesthetics is for the subjective inner world as well. The purpose behind the choice of "eco-aesthetica" is the desire to demonstrate the tension between our newly developed environment and human subjectivity.

The Semantic Transformation of the Concepts "Perception" and "Concentration"

Perception emerges from the first moment of the aesthetic coincidence between subjectivity and environment; it is the first and fundamental stage of the aesthetic experience. In the past, the first stage was regarded as the relative contact of human unsubjective nature with the subject itself, and the range of perception was limited to what was sensually accessible. Thus perception was the direct relation between subject and objective substance. Of course, through perception we could reach the level of understanding. Now, however, perception sometimes occurs without this direct substantive relation. Consider, for instance, the case of television in which the physical perception of substance no longer has any importance. The principal object in this kind of perception is a floating shadow on the screen, of which the original substance obviously is far from the subject. In our day, perception becomes an indirect semantic comprehension of "nonsubstantive"

information; the world filled with natural things "vanishes". In an information society perception is no longer substantive contact on the ontological level, but instead semantic apprehension on the "*skialogical*" level (a term derived from the Greek for shadow). We are confronted now with a "skialogical" perception without ontological substance.

As a second example of semantic transformation one might consider "concentration". Although perception is a *conditio sine qua non* both for aesthetic creation and for appreciation, it is not yet sufficient for them. Neither aesthetic creation nor appreciation can be achieved without concentration.

The aim of Plato's philosophy was to concentrate one's consciousness upon oneself in the contemplation of *idea*. The soul of a philosopher rids itself of the constraint of his corporeality and becomes pure soul; the concentration of consciousness upon one's self is an attempt to touch true reality itself. Through art as the *skia* (shadow) of *idea*, the artist concentrates his consciousness upon himself and perceives beauty itself in himself. According to Plotinus, exteriority is emission from the One, and everything must return to that origin. The artist's search for beauty expresses this orientation to the One. The *logos* of beauty is interior to the beautiful soul; by concentrating consciousness upon oneself, we can transcend the phenomenal world and contemplate eternity (*nous*). For Augustine one concentrates one's consciousness upon one's interiority (through prayer) in order to transcend oneself and coincide with God. Classical antiquity and the middle ages in both the East and the West concentrated upon *oneself* as the most important spiritual process in relation to absolute beauty.

But with the arrival of the scientific period the other tendency, namely, concentration upon the outside world also appeared. Galileo observed the phenomenon of light and discovered that light passing through a lens concentrates itself on its focus. It is not an internal but an external concentration at the level of the physical phenomenon. This external concentration was emphasized by the natural sciences. On the level at which technology operates, the human being concentrates his consciousness not upon the self, but upon the external world. Man's attitude toward concentration is changed into its opposite, as concentration upon the objective world. In modern times this concentration invites us to devote ourselves to work. It takes a centripetal orientation, tending to the spot where our hands work; the more intensively we concentrate upon our work, the more effective we are. There remains no place for spiritual beauty except in the creation of art where spiritual beauty realizes itself.

In the present technological context, the alienated outward tendency is reinforced so that paradoxically concentration sometimes produces dispersion. Spiritual movement is expressed through processes within the mechanical environment. Even the artist must disperse his consciousness through operative institutions: artistic **activity is often executed in a three-dimensional space or in new media, such as the electronic television. In such cases artistic activities have to be calculated so the mechanical systems can be operated in a controlled manner. The artist must pay attention to the dynamic transfiguration of his art. In this case his concentration results, paradoxically, in a divided subjectivity, totally directed upon the outer world. He must attend to his instruments, watch light and tone conditions, phenomenal transformations, and so on. Through the concentration of consciousness upon these operations one is entirely alienated from one's subjectivity. Inside one becomes empty, and art, even in the stage of creation, finishes in alienation.

This paradoxical situation of concentration is in precise contrast to the past which stressed the concentration of consciousness upon oneself. This semantic transformation is caused by the present technological conjuncture.

Rejection and Silence

In order to be free from this technological context art may reject that influence and return to nature or to the *Lebenswelt* where it can recover its domain only as the making of folk crafts, but that is not the ideal situation for art. The tension between art and technology can run to extremes, so that in current society art must keep a distance from the technological. The time belonging essentially to human consciousness is destroyed by the technological efficiency required to make things instantly at the sacrifice of consciousness, whereas art takes us into aesthetic experience for which time is indispensable. Therefore art stands against technology. Art is a *topos* where the human being ensures his conscious existence, especially concerning temporality; reconstruction or recovery of temporality through aesthetic experience is one of the most important problems of eco-aesthetica

Art must be created and appreciated in order to achieve perfect liberty from the dominance of the technological context. True art to support human existence must be suitable for this perfect spiritual liberty and hence distant from the technological. This distance must be expressed by silence as the expression of profound self-consciousness. Therefore silence in art is a revelation of the positive meaning of concentration. This character of art is derived from eco-aesthetica reflection. Silence is the immense perspective where the concentration of consciousness manifests itself in spatial and temporal dimensions. Japanese art, *Ma*, is the symbol of this perspective.

Philosophical Reflection on Silence

With the development of the technological conjuncture, art transforms itself into two phases, (1) the adjustment to that conjunction -- the mechanization of art, art's self-mechanization -- and, (2) keeping a distance from technological conjuncture -- rejection and silence.

Owing to the current technological conjuncture, the artist can now craft art works on a large scale. Mechanization is abstraction, but what we need to know is the meaning of abstraction. In painting, abstraction should remain a challenge to extract the essence of being (*Sein*). What are some of the features of the technological conjuncture in painting?

For painting, in Mondrian for instance, abstraction is merely the emphasis of geometrical form made explicit by a technological two-dimensional cropping, whereas in the case of abstraction, like Klee's, the essence of being is expressed by a repetition of figures and symbolic signs. In painting, there is no place for the concentration of consciousness, except in the abstraction of dynamic movement and the limitation of meanings.

The new media in music, involving newly created electronic sounds, revolutionize creation and appreciation. Electronic sounds that fill the space of the auditorium leave no place for self-consciousness. Repetitions, collages, systematically structured combinations are the concrete appearance of the mechanization of art.

Mechanization is abstraction. If abstraction is the essence of a technological conjuncture, it is because this abstracts from process, namely, temporality, and introduces efficiency. Moreover, in computer art the dominant role is taken by the program, which transforms art into simplified arithmetical numbers, figures, or signs. In a technological conjuncture, art becomes self-mechanization, which means that art must introduce technological phases into itself and assimilate them. The more the environment changes into a technological conjuncture, the more art becomes self-mechanized. This is a typical problem for eco-aesthetica.

18.
The Conflict of Values: The Contemporary Transformation of Values in China

Chen Genfa

To a great extent, a change of mind is represented as a difference in ideas. But for the direction of human life, values act as paradigms in the spiritual and actual life of people, determine the goals of action, the end of life and the mode of behavior of people. For this reason, any reform of society is concerned with a reform of values.

However, a reform of values requires a division and reorganization in which traditional values come into conflict with new ones. In China, the center of traditional values is Confucianism, which is characterized by an emphasis upon righteousness and a belittling of interests; in contrast, Western values emphasize individuals and interests. Since the reform and opening of China these two values have been in conflict.

Conflicts now emerge in Chinese values: between righteousness and interests, between egoism and altruism, and between collectivism and individualism. All these conflicts are manifest in the orientation of the values of human life; in the end they influence moral ideas and modes of thought and behavior. When their influence becomes too great the social structure changes and the individual must readjust his or her place in society.

The Conflict between Righteousness and Interests

The conflict between righteousness and interests emerged long ago. Even in times of extreme collectivism this conflict did not disappear completely, but continued in hidden forms.

As early as before the Qing dynasty, Confucius said: "The gentleman understands what is right, the cad understands what will pay." In the Chinese moral dictionary, righteousness and interests constitute a pair of irreconcilable contradictions. Some Chinese who maintain the doctrine of the mean are at a loss as to what to do in confronting the choice between righteousness and interest, because many see only two such kinds of people: the gentleman who emphasizes righteousness and belittles interests and the cad who forgets righteousness when he or she perceives interests. Therefore, when anyone made a choice between righteousness and interests, one faced a dichotomous moral evaluation: either the good name of the gentleman or the bad name of the cad. Such judgements about righteousness and interests have been the subject of Chinese culture and the backbone of the Chinese moral system.

It often asked why market economics has not developed in China for over two thousands years. A simple and immediate answer is that the Confucianist values, which held the central place in China and determined the Chinese national character, emphasized righteousness and belittled interests. To some extent this answer is reasonable, but it is unsatisfactory because as long as they did not become an extreme monasticism Confucianist values would not hinder the development of a Chinese market economy; on the contrary, they would promote standardization and order. Although many Chinese persons like to connect the merchant with treacherousness, whence appears the concept of the "treacherous merchant", there exist maxims useful for a market economy such as "Good-naturedness leads to wealth in business", "There still exists good will even when business is unsuccessful", "Buying and selling at reasonable prices", etc. All these maxims manifest the Confucian spirit and the principle of placing righteousness above interests.

In a broad sense, keeping one's word, an important principle for the development of a market economy, is part of Confucianist righteousness. Just as any game is impossible without its rules, society would fall into disorder and disaster were there not the principle of righteousness ruling one's behavior in searching for interests. In this sense, righteousness and interests can be unified. Because of this some scholars consider Japanese capitalism to be Confucian.

But now, some younger Chinese experience the conflict between righteousness and interests much more than in the past. On the one hand, the Confucian principle in which their fathers believed has lost its authority. Some people are bent solely on profit and see all social relations in terms of profit-making so that one worries whether "China will become more capitalist than capitalism". At present, there are no healthy values appropriate for the market economy in China; often it is noted that some people are corrupt, steal and loot in self-interest. This phenomena is not much more serious than in Western countries, but it lies heavily upon the Chinese mind and society so that many feel distressed about these immoral phenomena.

On the other hand, there still exists a moral mechanism which limits materialism in China. It is characteristic of Chinese society that relations among people are harmonized not by law, but by morality -- for which reason there were no police in China for over two thousand years. The Chinese crowd around the scene of an accident to judge between the right and wrong because they think of themselves as moral observers and judges. Hence, the Chinese pay special attention to the other's evaluation of themselves. Although the force of moral evaluation is decreasing and the force of law is increasing in Chinese social life, the value of putting righteousness above interests still holds a central place in Chinese society.

The Conflict between Egoism and Altruism

In May 1980, the magazine *Chinese Youth* published a letter from a young man named Pan Xiao: "The creative person is for oneself subjectively and for others objectively. . . . Perhaps this is the law of human beings and of the evolution of life."

Pan Xiao's letter evoked great repercussions among the young and led to a prolonged debate which centered on the problem of life values, especially the proposition "to be for oneself subjectively and to be for others objectively."

This debate represents the conflict between two values faced by Chinese youth after the reform and opening of China, namely, the conflict between egoism and altruism. Although we may not be able to say whether such action is for ourselves or for others, we find that there are two types of tendencies in the actual life of the Chinese people. On the one hand, individuals in China were subordinated and attached to the collective. Almost everyone recognizes the social evils brought about by extreme collectivism and it's harm to one's sense of person. On the other hand, some people believe in the principle "everyone for oneself and the devil take the hindmost". They harm other's interest when there is a conflict between their own and other's interests. The whole society could descend to a state in which everyone is like a wolf to every other member of society and would harm the other for oneself.

Certainly, as the relation between self and other is very complex, it is difficult to judge whether a kind of action is moral or not by the standard of "either for oneself or for others". Spencer remarked, if the maxim "to live for oneself" is wrong, the maxim "to live for others" also is wrong. So, a conciliatory attitude is the only possibility; for the evolution of human beings it is necessary to reconcile "for oneself" and "for others".

However, we must consider some possible extreme case. For example, when a boat on which there are many women and children is sinking, the children in the boat cannot flee for their life. Thus, there have been heroic paeans for men who give up their chance for life to women and children. Altruism is an important means for maintaining affinity and the integrity of society. Heroism exists because there is altruism to the extent of offering love and life. If everyone indulged his interests, heroism would be impossible and the spiritual force maintaining social justice would disappear.

In China now one finds that when a boy falls into the water some are not willing to rescue him, while others do their best to rescue him even at risk to their lives. A student named Zhang Hua died a martyr in rescuing a farmer who had fallen into a manure pit. Some persons said Zhang Hua's action was unwise because Zhang Hua was a highly educated young man who would be able to contribute a great deal to the society. Obviously, this is a utilitarian value according to which we must calculate the amount of the value of an action to the society or individual before we take a certain moral action. But if so, there would be such absurd phenomena as not rescuing an idiot or an old man because they are burdens to society.

In the above-mentioned case, if Zhang Hua did not go to the rescue of the farmer, still we could not say that he was an egoist, for in Chinese to be an egoist means "to use public office for private gain" or "to injure the public interest to benefit one's private interests." In law Zhang Hua was not obligated to rescue the farmer, but moral nobility consists in the spirit of devotion of a person precisely when he is not responsible. Zhang Hua's death confirms the greatness of morality and the nobility of the devotion which strongly influences our society and inspires us all. If every member of society saw someone in mortal danger without lifting a finger to save him, what would happen to our society?

Obviously, "to be for oneself subjectively and to be for others objectively" is not feasible for the simple reason that "to be for oneself subjectively" does not necessarily mean "to be for others objectively". On the contrary, there are conflicts between "for one-self" and "for others" in many cases. "For oneself" is impossible if there is no person willing to be for others subjectively. So, "to be for oneself subjectively and to be for others objectively" is not a useful solution to the conflicts between "for oneself" and "for others".

The Conflict between Collectivism and Individualism

There are traditions by which collectivism is upheld in Eastern nations, but because of the different cultural traditions and the different levels of development the collectivism of these nations plays different parts in social life. With the fusion of the Eastern and Western cultures collectivism in the traditional sense practically disappeared.

The Chinese people upheld an extreme collectivism with a taint of puritanism for the last several decades. The whole society was understood as a machine of which everyone was a part. "Everyone is a screw never getting rusty" was a vivid note in that extreme collectivism. During the period called "eating food in the collective", the collective spirit entered every aspect of the social life. The collective was seen as a mechanical accumulation of individuals so that the relation between the collective and the individual seemed to be a relation between a bag and potatoes. This extreme collectivism necessarily led to the extreme egalitarianism whose result was that individualism is a false egalitarianism because it does not recognize the difference in ability among individuals.

For this reason, a movement of liberation in thought arose in China after the policy of reform and opening. Some outdated Western trends of thought were very welcome and were studied by Chinese youth with great eagerness. Philosophies which emphasized the liberation of individuality did away with the earlier blind faith in collectivism and propagated the idea of freedom. With the rapid development of Chinese market economics young Chinese longed for self-realization, self-determination and self-struggle.

Too great an emphasis on individual value causes extreme individualism, so that some persons denied community concerns in general and not only extreme puritanical collectivism. Some who understood freedom as doing whatever one likes without limit of law, only asked for rights but would not perform obligations. Hedonism and a worship of money led young people to commit crimes. Now, when individual interests conflict with collective interests, some put their own interests above community ones. To quote Sartre some even think that "the other is hell".

Like the extreme collectivism, extreme individualism is not useful to the healthy development of our society. If extreme collectivism sacrificed individuality and strangled human creativity, then extreme individualism would break down social harmony and lead to a hostile state among people. In China there is an historical tradition which emphasizes community and underestimates individuals. This must be reformed gradually. But without community concern China would cease to be China, and the East would cease to be the East. As long as this does not sink into racism and extreme nationalism, as long as it can develop individual activity and creativity, concern for the community is helpful to individuals, society and human civilization.

19.

Zhuang Zi's Perfect Joy: An Answer to the Contemporary Predicament?

Manuel B. Dy, Jr.

Zhuang Zi lived in the fourth century B.C., during the Warring States period of Chinese history. Historians describe this era as one of social, economic, political and moral upheavals; yet, ironically enough, it was also one of great material and technological strides. States clashed against one another for power and dominion, and people starved under tyrannical rulers; yet the wars stimulated technological developments. New skills in casting iron introduced a new class of people engaged in commerce. Bronze alloys, soldering and inlaying came into use alongside weaving and other crafts. For currency, shells were replaced by minted metal coins. Imposed systems of levies financed the digging of canals and the exploitation of forests and lands. The improvement of writing instruments made writing and communication relatively easier and faster, and thus literary works abounded, became longer and their authors less anonymous.1 During this period the "hundred schools of philosophy" arose, each trying to grapple and put some order into the chaos and complications of society. The chaotic conditions of the times stimulated the Chinese mind to become more alert and more receptive to the outlandish new ideas that were in the air.

The Human Problem: The Root of Unhappiness

Zhuang Zi himself described the situation of his day in the following words:2

Since the days of pious Yao and virtuous Shun
Everybody has been trying to get rich:
A son will kill his father for money,
A minister will murder his sovereign
To satisfy his ambition.
In broad daylight they rob each other,
At midnight they break down walls;
The root of all this was planted
In the time of Yao and Shun.
. . .

Zhuang Zi's situation is no different from our present 20th century world. Today we witness the shift from agriculture to industrialization and mechanization which has resulted in a more advanced but complicated way of life. We have become more civilized indeed with our machines, skyscrapers, rockets and pills, but alongside these wars are being fought locally and internationally. Poverty, disease, pollution and immorality are pervasive. Both Zhuang Zi's Warring States period and our contemporary age are characterized by technological and material prosperity at the expense and neglect of the moral and spiritual aspects of the human being.

While Confucianism saw the solution to this predicament in the propagation of the *jun zi*, the man of virtue, Lao Zi in the *Dao De Jing* emphasized inaction in government. Zhuang Zi, on the other hand, addressed himself more to the individual3 with the immediate concern of how the individual can survive in an age of turmoil, especially under a bad government that is active, or

more accurately over-active. In the *Book of Zhuang Zi*, the central problem of Zhuang Zi is "How can man be or remain free in an unfree world?" If our contemporary world is not dissimilar to Zhuang Zi's,4 then perhaps Zhuang Zi's prescription could contribute to an answer to the predicament of living in a chaotic world.

The gist of Zhuang Zi's prescription is found in his chapter entitled, "Perfect Joy".5 At the outset, he poses the question that has preoccupied many existentialists today: "Is there to be found on earth a fullness of joy, or is there no such thing? Is there some way to make life fully worth living, or is this impossible?" One is reminded at once of the striking lines opening Albert Camus's *Myth of Sisyphus*: "There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy."6 The question, no doubt, is at once metaphysical and ethical (perhaps even psychological, too), for it hinges on the meaning of being and the very way of living necessary for man.

In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says that the ultimate end of human action is happiness. For Aristotle this cannot be found in wealth, honor or moral virtue, though they are necessary for a stable life. Ultimately, human happiness lies in the activity which is proper to human life, namely, contemplation, without sacrificing his material needs.

Zhuang Zi, in a view both similar and dissimilar, goes through a description of what people consider to be the source of happiness or joy:7

What the world values is money, reputation, long life, achievement. What it counts as joy is health and comfort of body, good food, fine clothes, beautiful things to look at, pleasant music to listen to.

What it condemns is lack of money, a low social rank, a reputation of being no good, and an early death.

. . . If people find that they are deprived of these (valued) things, they go into a panic or fall into despair. They are so concerned for their life that their anxiety makes life unbearable, even when they have the things they *think* they want. Their very concern for enjoyment makes them unhappy.

Here, Zhuang Zi's answer is clear. The standard of this world as regards what can make man happy is wealth, honor, long life and achievement. This is what people think can make them happy, and because they think so, to be deprived of them is to lose happiness; thus, they worry over acquiring these things, and this worrying causes unhappiness.

What is so "unhappy" about wealth, prestige and achievement? All are things or material objects to *have*; but the more one possesses material objects the more one wants to have. Because it is of the very nature of an object that it can be lost, stolen or destroyed, the one who possesses such objects naturally would want to secure his or her possessions from these risks by having more and more objects, and more safeguards. Consequently, the possessor is enslaved by the very things he or she possesses.8 This is especially true for those who are wealthy and those who hold power. Now as then, the two are almost always synonymous. Zhuang Zi says in another passage:9

Those who are caught in the machinery of power take no joy except in activity and change -- the whirring of the machine! Whenever an occasion for action presents itself, they are compelled to act; they cannot help themselves. They are inexorably moved, like the machine of which they are a part. Prisoners in the world of objects, they have no choice but to submit to the demands of

matter! They are pressed down and crushed by external forces, fashion, the market, events, public opinion. Never in a whole lifetime do they recover their right mind. (XXIV. 4)

As regards long life, striving for it also causes unhappiness. Death is unavoidable, and the span of life is not quite within our power. The person who strives to live long so thirsts for "survival in the future", that he or she forgets to live in the present. Similar to one who pursues wealth, prestige and achievement,10

If you persist in trying
To attain what is never attained
(It is Tao's gift!)
If you persist in making effort
To obtain what effort cannot get;
If you persist in reasoning
About what cannot be understood,
You will be destroyed
By the very thing you seek. (XXIII. 7)

"What about self-sacrificing officials and scholars? They are honored by the world because they are good, upright, self-sacrificing men."11 Yet, for Zhuang Zi, their self-sacrifice leads to death or the threat of death. The self-sacrificing official is like the monkey who did not flee to hide from the Prince of Wu, but instead faced his attackers and consequently was destroyed.12 It is to be doubted then that the way of self-sacrificing men is indeed the way of happiness if in the end its goodness is fatal.

"The birth of a man is the birth of his sorrow."13

If the standard of the world as to what is happiness is that of man it brings him not happiness but sorrow. Zhuang Zi laments the way people go about attaining what they consider as happiness -- they are "carried away headlong, grim and obsessed, in the general onrush of the human herd, unable to stop themselves or to change their direction."14

Why is the birth of man the birth of his sorrow; is man then the source of his own unhappiness? Zhuang Zi seems to imply this in many interesting accounts. In chapter I, for example, he tells the story of the mystical *p'eng* bird who can ascend to the height of ninety thousand *li* for six months duration, and the tiny cicada and the young dove. The contrast is evident: one is big, the others small, yet both are equally happy. In the case of men, some men are equipped with knowledge for the duties of some office, others with skill to secure harmony in a district, still others with virtue which befits them to be rulers. All are in harmony with their *de*, their nature. Unhappiness results when one tries to tamper with it and go against his nature. It is man with his cleverness who does this most of the time for what comes from man is artificial. Beings in their natural state are happy and carefree; it is when man interferes with the course of nature that sorrow is born.15

The duck's legs are short, but if we try to lengthen them, the duck will feel pain. The crane's legs are long, but if we try to cut off a portion of them, the crane will feel grief. Therefore we are not to amputate what is by nature long, nor to lengthen what is by nature short.

The story is told that once a seabird alighted outside the capital of Lu, and the Marquis became fascinated with it. He gave it ample wine, invited musicians to play for it and had a bullock slaughtered to feed it. But the bird would not eat nor drink, nor be nursed. In three days, it died. For Chuang Tzu this was due to treating the bird not as a bird, but as a man. "Water, which is life to fish, is death to man."16

The trouble with humans is that they tend to impose their own concept of happiness on others, when each being is happy in its natural state of simplicity and spontaneity. In other words, happiness is relative to the nature of each being: what may be happiness for the Marquis is not necessarily happiness for the bird; what is happiness for the duck is not happiness for the crane. How does Zhuang Zi know this? He does so by intuition, for in the argument between Zhuang Zi and Hui Zi regarding the "Joy of the Fishes" Chuang Tzu concludes by saying, "I know the joy of the fishes in the river through my own joy, as I go walking along the same river."17

Similarly, the viewpoints as to what constitutes happiness for men differ in many ways. Arguments naturally arise when people stick to their concepts of right and wrong, happiness and unhappiness. "This" gives rise to "that" and to another "this" and another "that" *ad infinitum*;18 arguments can lead to wars, and wars to suffering, all in the name of what one thinks is happiness. What then is to be done?

Happiness as Doing Nothing

"My opinion is that you never find happiness until you stop looking for it. My greatest happiness consists precisely in doing nothing whatever that is calculated to obtain happiness."19

For Zhuang Zi, the key to happiness lies in doing nothing, *wu-wei*. *Wu-wei* means acting by not-acting, doing nothing. At first glance, this may seem negative, a certain kind of passivity towards events. Yet for Zhuang Zi (as well as for Lao Zi) this is an active letting-things-be. For Lao Zi, the main reason for *wu-wei* is the law of reversion which is the way *dao* works -- that is, when one thing reaches one extreme it reverts to its opposite. When one strives for happiness, one reverts to unhappiness. Zhuang Zi, on the other hand, goes beyond Lao Zi in pointing to the *de* of *dao* as the ground for *wu-wei*. To do nothing is to let things be themselves in their own nature, in their own *de*, because that is where their happiness lies.20

I know about letting the world alone, not interfering. I do not know about running things. Letting things alone, so that men will not be changed into something they are not!

Zhuang Zi's statement, therefore, that "perfect joy is to be without joy" cannot be interpreted literally. It is not to be interpreted as meaning there is no joy at all to be found in life. Rather, there is joy in life in simply being oneself, in letting things be, not in striving for it. "Contentment and well-being become possible the moment you cease to act with them in view, and if you practice non-doing *wu-wei*, you will have both happiness and well-being."21 There is no need to strive for happiness because happiness is already there in nature, in what is natural and spontaneous, in the *dao* which is not a thing, but the One, the whole.

Zhuang Zi sums up the whole chapter by saying: 22

Heaven does nothing: its non-doing is its serenity.
Earth does nothing: its non-doing is its rest.
From the union of these two non-doings

All actions proceed.
All things are made.
. . .
All beings in their perfection
Are born of non-doing.
Hence it is said:
"Heaven and earth do nothing,
Yet their is nothing they do not do."

In the above lines Zhuang Zi has gone beyond the notion of relative happiness implied in letting things be. More than just letting things be, avoiding striving for happiness, is the positive movement of resting in serenity, in tranquility. To be happy is to cease being concerned with things and to embrace the One, the *dao*, who is silent and tranquil. It is "to unlearn so that you can be led by *dao*. Be a child of *dao*."23 Unless one frees oneself from the cares of the world, one cannot be tranquil in *dao*, and vice versa, unless one rests oneself in *dao*, one cannot free oneself from the cares of the world.24

So from the sage's emptiness, stillness arises:
From stillness, action. From action, attainment.
From their stillness comes their non-action, which is also action
And is, therefore, their attainment.
For stillness is joy. Joy is free from care.
. . .
Joy does all things without concern.
For emptiness, stillness, tranquility, tastelessness,
Silence, and non-action
Are the root of all things.

Ways of Doing Nothing: Zhuang Zi's Prescriptions

Concretely, what are Zhuang Zi's prescriptions for living in an unfree world? To answer this question requires discussing the ways and forms in which *wu-wei* can be actualized:

Letting alone. As a philosophy of life this means accepting things are they are, and not interfering or going beyond the limits of one's nature. It means letting one's bodily functions take care of themselves. It is ironic that the discovery of new medicines also has brought to the scene new forms of diseases. Could there be a direct connection between the two? Yet, does not nature have a way of healing, perhaps even more effective than new Western medicines? In the field of psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis, many mental disorders are due to man's wanting to be what he is not, comparing himself to others, and desiring to have what others have. Letting alone is divesting oneself of all overt acts and aspirations, such as becoming wealthy, building a large house with a garage for three cars, engaging in too many responsibilities, etc. One should live simply, accept one's limitations as well as the potentialities of one's nature. Being situated in time and space, one cannot realize too many possibilities at the same time. Instead of launching a spaceship to the moon, can we not first try to settle ourselves peacefully on earth? There is a beautiful prayer in this Taoist vein of letting alone:

Lord, grant me the serenity to accept
the things I cannot change,
the courage to change the things I can, and the
wisdom to know the difference.

Knowing when to stop. Zhuang Zi says:25

To know when to stop
To know when you can get no further
By your own action,
This is the right beginning!

We are said to live in a "rat race" as the pace of living (and dying) becomes faster than that with which nature, human and physical, can cope. This has resulted in energy crises, pollution, and in what Alvin Toffler calls "future shock", which eventually may lead to the destruction of human beings. Zhuang Zi tells the story of a man who in running away from his shadow and footsteps eventually died. Had he only sat down under a tree, his shadow and footsteps would have disappeared.26 To know when to stop is to know that one is going too far, that one has had enough and needs to take a break, to sleep it off, to rest.

From another angle, knowing when to stop is to live in the fullness of the present, enjoying the immediacy of the fruits of one's labor, instead of preparing frantically for survival in the future. If one has learned to let things be, one need not worry about the future.

Knowing when to stop is grounded in the belief that there is a season for everything, "a time to be born, a time to die, a time to plant, a time to reap. . . ."27 If one realizes that there is a time for everything, then one acts with timing or, as the Greeks would say, with *kairos*. Zhuang Zi says:28

There is a time for putting together
And another time for taking apart.
He who understands
This course of events
Takes each new state
In its proper time
With neither sorrow nor joy.

"With neither sorrow nor joy" refers to staying in the pivot of things. This means not to lean to one side, but to be at the center of events because the center is where one has a broader, wider view. Positively speaking, to be in the pivot of things is to be flexible, to be broadminded and all embracing. It means to "take in past and present, without sorrow for the past or impatience with the present. . . . Not rejoice in success or lament in failure."29 In arguments, it means seeing that both sides are right, to take no side. Taking-no-side and treating things and people equally does not mean insensibility, as may appear at first glance: rather, they mean being sensible to things, past, present and future. Sensibility differs from sensitivity: to be sensitive is to be "touchy", to be carried away by one's self and one's emotion. Sensibility, on the other hand, is an awareness that transcends the narrow confines of one's ego; it is centrifugal in direction, and yet does not lose

one's hold on oneself. For example, I may want very much to go out today to see a movie. Suddenly it rains heavily. Instead of crying childishly because my wish cannot materialize, perhaps I should in a childlike manner make my stay indoors enjoyably listening to music or doing some reading.

Being oneself. Zhuang Zi teaches the relative joy in being true to one's nature. On this hinges also his ideas of freedom. When one can be oneself without regard for what others have to say, when he can take flight on his own wings instead of conforming to the uniformity and fad of institutions and laws or sucking the blood of others or saying "yes, yes" to those in power, then he is free; and such freedom is joy. Being oneself therefore means being contented with what one has or is because one sees and understands his own nature and that of others. There is therefore no need to be envious of what others have or are. Being in the pivot of things, one knows their relativity, and knowing this rests secure in his own nature. One knows that he is different from others, and yet equal to them. His actions are spontaneous; being oneself is doing away with rationalizing or intellectualizing, which usually are the bane of people with too much knowledge or sensitivity.

Being Humble Because Grounded on the Dao. Being oneself, however, is being humble because one's self is grounded on the Dao or Absolute. The source of misery for contemporary man seems to be the lack of a sense of the spirit, the holy, the Absolute. Instead, the modern mind tends to be calculative, assertive, acquisitive and quantitative. Zhuang Zi presents a different outlook on life: an attitude of humility realizing that one is embedded in the Dao. Before this Dao one is nobody,30 but in the Dao one is secure and free. To be lost in the Dao is not to be lost at all, but to find one's being. Far from being simply an attempt to seclude oneself from society, Taoism teaches us to embrace a greater, more inclusive society, namely, the Dao from which all the ten thousand myriad things arose, and of which society is only a part.31

To be humble is to be open and to be receptive to the Dao in all its manifestations. In the modern context, it is to have a sense of mystery and oneness with the Absolute, with what is greater and deeper than myself.

Attendant upon this sense of mystery, which is the result of humility, is also a sense of humor. This pervades the whole work of Zhuang Zi and is needed today if one is to remain sane. This sense of humor is the readiness to laugh at oneself; it is a manifestation of one's freedom. It is as if to say that "after all is said and done, more is said than done", and so let us better keep silent.

Conclusion

The above prescriptions of Zhuang Zi to my mind are applicable to modern man today. They are interpretations of Zhuang Zi's *wu-wei*, not literally but in spirit. Were they to be paraphrased in modern language, probably they would echo the words of the now popular poem and song, *Desiderata*, minus the last sentence.32

Go placidly amid the noise and haste, and remember what peace there may be in silence. As far as possible without surrender, be on good terms with all persons. Speak your truth quietly and clearly and listen to others, even the dull and ignorant; they too have their story. Avoid loud and aggressive persons, they are vexations to the spirit. If you compare yourself with others, you may become vain and bitter: for always there will be greater and lesser persons than yourself. Enjoy your achievements as well as your plans. Keep interested in your career, however humble; it is a

real possession in the changing fortunes of time. Exercise caution in your business affairs; for the world is full of trickery. But let this not blind you to what virtue there is; many persons strive for high ideals, and everywhere life is full of heroism. Be yourself.

Especially, do not feign affection, neither be cynical about love; for in the face of all aridity and disenchantment it is perennial as the grass. Take kindly the counsel of the years, gracefully surrounding the things of youth. Nurture strength of spirit to shield you in sudden misfortune. But do not distress yourself with imaginings. Many fears are born of fatigue and loneliness. Beyond a wholesome discipline, be gentle with yourself. You are a child of the universe, no less than the trees and the stars; you have a right to be here. And whether or not it is clear to you, the universe is unfolding as it should. Therefore be at peace with God, whatever you conceive Him to be, and whatever your labors and aspirations, in the noisy confusion of life, keep peace with your soul. With all its sham, drudgery and broken dreams, it is still a beautiful world. Be careful.

Notes

1. Liu Wu-chi, *A Short History of Confucian Philosophy* (Taiwan: Liu Wu-chi, 1955), pp. 36-38.

2. Thomas Merton, *The Way of Chuang Tzu* (New York: New Directions Publishing Corp., 1965), ch. XII, pt. 2.

3. See for example, the "Fasting of the Heart", *Chuang Tzu*, IV. 1, where Confucius belittles the attempt of the disciple to change the ways of an unjust king, but instead teaches them to change one's own heart.

4. I would like to direct the attention of the reader to the contemporary character of the situation mentioned in *Chuang Tzu*, IX, 2, entitled by Merton, "Cracking the Safe", where an attorney general "did away with the king and took over the whole state", where a "poor man must swing for stealing a belt buckle, but if a rich man steals a whole state, he is acclaimed a statesman of the year."

5 *Book of Zhuang Zi*, ch. XVIII, pt. 1.

6. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays* (New York: Vintage Books, 1942), p. 3.

7. *Book of Zhuang Zi*, ch. XVIII, pt. 1. Italics mine.

8. Zhuang Zi foreshadows the phenomenological treatment of "having" by Gabriel Marcel. Cf. Gabriel Marcel, "Outlines of a Phenomenology of Having", *Being and Having* (London: Fontana Library, 1965), pp. 168-189.

9. *Book of Zhuang Zi*, ch. XXIV, pt. 4.

10. *Ibid*., ch. XXIII, pt. 7.

11. *Ibid*., ch. XVIII, pt. 1.

12. *Ibid*., ch. XXIV, pt. 8.

13. *Ibid*., ch. XVIII, pt. 1.

14. *Ibid*.

15. *Ibid*., ch. VIII. Fung Yulan translation.

16. *Ibid*., ch. XVIII.

17. *Ibid*., ch. XVII, pt. 13.

18. *Ibid*., ch. II, pt. 1.

19. *Ibid*., ch. XVIII, pt. 1.

20. *Ibid*., ch. XI, pt. 1.

21. *Ibid*., ch. XVIII, pt. 1.
22. *Ibid*.
23. *Ibid*., ch. XXIII, pt. 3-7.
24. *Ibid*., ch. XIII, pt. 1.
25. *Ibid*., ch. XXIII, pt. 7.
26. *Ibid*., ch. XXXI.
27. *Ecclesiastes* III, 1-8.
28. *Book of Zhuang Zi*, ch. VI, pt. 9.
29. *Ibid*., ch. XVII, pt. 1.
30. *Ibid*., ch. XVII, pt. 3.
31. An inherent contradiction in the Western mind is the emphasis on the worth of the individual or the ego, and yet the demand that this ego conform to the standards and conventions of society, however arbitrary and artificial they may be.
32. Found in old St. Paul's Church, Baltimore, dated 1692.

20.

The Chinese View of Time: A Passage to Eternity

Manuel B. Dy, Jr.

There is a time for putting together
And another time for taking apart.
He who understands
This course of events
Takes each new state
In its proper time
With neither sorrow nor joy. . . .
(Chuang Tze, vi. 9)

There is a given time for everything and a time for every happening under heaven: A time for giving birth, a time for dying; a time for planting, a time for uprooting. A time for killing, a time for building. . . . Finally I considered the task God gave to the sons of men. He made everything fitting in its time, but he also set eternity in their hearts although man is not able to embrace the work of God from the beginning to the end.
(Ecclesiastes iii, 1-10)

The difficulty in discussing time in relation to the human spirit stems from, what Paul Ricoeur calls " a fundamental feature of our experience of time, namely that time is never lived directly, never a mute, immediate lived experience, but always structured by symbolic systems of varying complexity. This "varying complexity"1 is even more apparent in Chinese culture with the seemingly opposing orientations of Confucianism and Taoism, as well as of Buddhism if one were to make it part of Chinese culture. The difficulty is aggravated by the character of the Chinese mind whose primary interest is ethical. Metaphysical problems such as that of space and time, matter and spirit, are rarely discussed, and if they are it is for the sake of ethics.2 Hence, the intent of this chapter is an explication of the Chinese concept of time3 with a view to how we can live a good life and make society and the world a better abode for the human spirit.

Confucian Time

Confucius, standing by a stream, said, "It passes on like this, never ceasing day or night!"4 The passage indicates Confucius's view of time: time is the ceaseless passing of things and events, and of human nature. Like the stream, time has a definite past, but an indefinite future. Travelling forward, it invites the human being to participate in this movement, to take an active part in the drama of life so the person can achieve the ideal of *Jen*, humanity in its fullness.

Jen is the supreme virtue of the Confucian sage. Translated in various ways as "benevolence," "kindness," "humanheartedness," *Jen* is composed of the character *Jen*, meaning "man," and the character "*erh*", meaning "two," thus signifying the virtue that governs interpersonal relationships. For Confucius, "It is to love men."5 The *Doctrine of the Mean* makes a pun by saying, "*Jen* is *Jen*":6 to become a man of *Jen* is to be human.

Such an ideal is part of the Confucian *Tao*, the moral way, This is not divorced from the Master's objective in teaching, namely, to train students to become a *Chun Tze*, a gentleman who will take the responsibility of being of service to the government and to the county, and to like it.

This program is briefly outlined in the Confucian classic, *The Great Learning*: One begins by cultivating the personal life through rectifying the mind-heart, making the will sincere, extending knowledge and investigating things; then one rules the family, next brings order to the state, and finally maintains peace in the world.7

What of the spirits and the after life? Confucius said," If we are not yet able to serve man, how can we serve spiritual beings? If we do not yet know about life, how can we know about death?"8 Once when Confucius was very ill, his disciple asked that a prayer be offered. Confucius said, "Is there such a thing?" His disciple replied, "There is an eulogy which says, "Pray to the spiritual beings above and below." Confucius said, "My prayer has been for a long time that what counts is the life that one leads."9

The life that one leads in time takes on a gradual progression of mastering oneself. Confucius said,

At fifteen my mind was set on learning. At thirty my character had been formed. At forty I had no more perplexities. At fifty I knew the Mandate of Heaven *T'ien-ming*. At sixty I was at ease with whatever I heard. At seventy I could follow my heart's desire without transgressing moral principles.10

For the Confucian, time never simply repeats itself. In the process of production, something new evolves which does not destroy the past, but recuperates it. A good teacher is one "who reviews the old so as to find out the new".11 The inscription on the bathtub of King T'ang read, "If you can renovate yourself one day, then you can do so every day, and keep doing so day after day."12

This self-renovation is natural in the sense that it is in keeping with our human nature, for after all, it is man that can make the way great, and not the way that can make man great.13 The development of oneself is also natural in the sense that it takes time, and no artificial effort must be exerted to make the self grow. Mencius told a story of a man of Sung who was so eager to make his corn grow that he pulled it up only to be told by his son that the corn had already withered.14

The full development of the self, however, entails sincerity. Mencius said, "One who is sincere with himself is called a true man,"15 and the *Doctrine of the Mean* said, "Only those who are absolutely sincere can fully develop their nature," and only those who can fully develop their nature can develop the nature of others, and developing the nature of others can then develop the nature of things and assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth.16 Sincerity is having no division in oneself, just like Nature (Heaven and Earth) which has no dalliances and thus can produce things in an unfathomable way.17 Sincerity is the completion of the self,18 thus the task of self-realization is to integrate oneself, to make oneself whole. But "sincerity is not only the completion of the self, it is that by which all things are completed. The completion of all things means wisdom. These are the characters of nature, and they are the way in which the internal and external are united."19

Being the completion of the self and of all things sincerity is "the beginning and end of things.20 Because the integration of self entails the development of the nature of things,

Therefore absolute sincerity is ceaseless. Being ceaseless, it is lasting. Being lasting, it is evident. Being evident, it is infinite. Being infinite, it is extensive and deep. Being extensive and deep, it is high and brilliant. It is because it is extensive and deep that it contains all things. It is because it is high and brilliant that it overshadows all things. It is because it is infinite and lasting that it can complete all things. In being high and brilliant, it is a counterpart of Heaven. In being infinite and lasting, it is unlimited.21

Confucius was a sincere man "who conformed with the natural order governing the revolution of the seasons in heaven above, and followed the principle governing land and water below. He may be compared to earth in its supporting and containing all things, and to heaven in its overshadowing and embracing all things."22 It is possible then for man in time through sincerity to achieve harmony with nature.

The Taoist Time

If the *Tao* in Confucianism stands for the moral way, in *Tao*ism it refers to the origin of all things, nameless (but we are forced to give it a name) and eternal.23 As the origin of all things, *Tao*'s essence is non-being (because only what is no-thing can be responsible for the being of all beings) but its function is being.24 Both being and non-being are simply two aspects of the one infinite *Tao*.

How does Tao produce all things?

Tao produced the one.
The one produced the two
The two produced the three.
And the three produced the ten thousand things.
The ten thousand things carry the *yin* and embrace the *yang*, and through the blending of the material force (*ch'i*) they achieve harmony.25

Clearly, there is a definite past of all things since they all originate from the *Tao*. Their evolution is from the simple to the complex: from the "one" that is the original material force that is produced by *Tao* to the *Yin*, the female principle, and the *Yang*, the male principle, and to the three, the blending of the *Yin* and then *Yang* with the material force. But all this is done by *Tao* in a spontaneous manner, that is, by doing nothing or *wu-wei*. "*Tao* invariably takes on action, and yet there is nothing left undone."26 *Wu-wei* does not mean doing absolutely nothing, but simply the naturalness of *Tao*, its effortless non-exerting way of bringing forth being from its nothingness or simplicity.

The movement of *Tao*, however, follows the law of reversion.27 When one thing reaches one extreme, it reverts to the opposite. In the end,

All things come into being,
And I see thereby their return.
All things flourish,
But each one returns to its root.
This return to its root means tranquility.
It is called returning to its destiny.

To return to destiny is called the eternal (*Tao*). . . .28

To return to the root is simply in keeping with the harmony of nature which works in an endless cyclic rhythm of birth, growth and decay, in the ceaseless, alternating flow of the seasons. "To know harmony means to be in accord with the eternal. To be in accord with the eternal means to be enlightened."29

What then is the *Tao*ist time? Time consists simply of the events of Nature that originate from the eternal *Tao*, a nothingness that is fullness because it is unlimited, unbounded, unnamed. Time is the movement of *Tao*in nature, following the law of *wu-wei* or acting by not-acting, and the law of reversion, where opposites complement and complete each other in one whole and where the end is also the beginning. Time then travels in a circle, but each being in its own nature has a definite past since it originates from the *Tao* and is reared by the *Tao* through its *Te*, the aspect of the *Tao* which makes a being what it is.

Does time then repeat itself?
What must man do in this view of time?

It would seem that time does repeat itself in the sense that all must return to the beginning. But each return to the beginning brings a change and transformation, so there is constant movement in nature: nothing is final. Only the *Tao* remains, unchanging, a great whole of continuous duration.

What must man do in the face of such a time?

Fishes are born in water.
Man is born in *Tao*.
If fishes, born in water,
Seek the deep shadow
of pond and pool,
All their needs
Are satisfied.
If man, born in *Tao*,
Sinks into the deep shadow
of non-action
To forget aggression and concern,
He lacks nothing.
His life is secure.

Moral: All the fish needs
Is to get lost in water.
All man needs is to get lost
In *Tao*.30

To live in the *Tao* is to practice wu-wei and to live by the law of reversion, in the harmony of opposites.

Wu-wei is not doing absolutely nothing, but doing nothing that is unnecessary, artificial or not natural. To practice *wu-wei* is to be empty of desires, to be humble, to do things without attachment to the fruit of one's labor, withdrawing as soon as the work is done.31 The reason why Heaven and Earth are eternal is because "they do not exist for themselves."32 *Wu-wei* is what Chuang Tze refers to as the "fasting of the heart," the emptying of faculties, so that the person is free from limitation and preoccupation and his heart, like the window, becomes full of light, secretly transforming others.33 Empty, still, tranquil, silent, the non-action of the *Tao*ist sage is not inaction but action, or perhaps the distinction between action and inaction is lost since joy is attained.

If (still) water is so clear, so level,
How much more the spirit of man?
The heart of the wise man is tranquil.
It is the mirror of heaven and earth
The glass of everything.
Emptiness, stillness, tranquility, tastelessness,
Silence, non-action: this is the level of heaven and earth.
This is perfect *Tao*. Wise men find here
Their resting place.
Resting, they are empty. . . .34

To live by the law of reversion is to stand in the pivot of the *Tao*, where one is in the center of the circle of change, harmonizing the opposites. "The pivot of the *Tao* passes through the center where all affirmations and denials converge."35 Knowing that one extreme leads to the opposite, the *Tao*ist sage stays in the middle, not taking sides, not competing nor interfering, sensitive to the changes around him but sensible enough not to be affected by them and seeing the totality. "Letting things alone, he rests in his original nature."36

Long life is no ground for joy nor early death for sorrow. Success is not for him to be proud of; failure is no shame. Had he all the world's power he would not hold it as his own; if he conquered everything he would not take it to himself. His glory is in knowing that all things come together in one and life and death are equal.37

The key to both wu-wei and the law of reversion is the life of simplicity. Just as *Tao* is simple, so the man of *Tao* lives simply. He is one with his own nature, true to himself, and seeks not to identify himself with possessions and prestige, with things that pass away. "Though, like objects, he has form and semblance, he is not limited to form. He is more. He can attain to formlessness."38 Simplicity is formlessness; it is placing one's heart not in anything (where there is the possibility of getting lost), but in the *Tao*. The man of *Tao* "will rest in his eternal place which is no-place. . . . His nature sinks to its root in the One."39

In sum, for the *Tao*ist:

There are no fixed limits.
Time does not stand still.
Nothing endures,
Nothing is final.
You cannot lay hold

Of the end or the beginning.
He who is wise sees near and far
As the same,
Does not despise the small
Or value the great:
Where all the standards differ
How can you compare?
With one glance
He takes in past and present,
Without sorrow for the past
Or impatience with the present.
All is in movement.
He has experience
Of fullness and emptiness.
He does not rejoice in success
Or lament in failure.
The game is never over.
Birth and death are even.
The terms are not final.40

Convergence: The I-Ching

At first glance, Confucianism and *Tao*ism may have divergent attitudes towards time: Confucius sees time as travelling forward into an indefinite progressive future, while Lao Tze and Chuang Tze view time as a cycle of change, stretching indefinitely into the future and the past with the infinite *Tao* as the source and return. The former lives time to master oneself and return to propriety; the latter to transcend it and be one with the *Tao*. The former emphasizes the way of man; the latter the way of Heaven. Both, however, find their convergence in the view of time in the Book of Changes or the *I-Ching*.

The *I-Ching* was one Chinese classic that Confucius regarded so highly that he is said to have written ten commentaries on it and would have devoted an entire life to studying it if given another life. Originally used as a book of divination by Confucianist and *Tao*ist alike, it interprets symbolically all cosmic phenomena and their interrelatedness. It begins with the T'ai Ch'i the Primordial Unity or the *Tao*, and descends into the yin and *yang*, the female and male principles, representing these two into broken (- -) and unbroken ( ) lines respectively. The *I* records all the possible happenings in human and physical nature in terms of *hsiang* or symbols, the eight triagrams and the sixty-four hexagrams. The hexagram is a combination of two triagrams, representing the relationships and interplay of ideas, states, and things represented by the triagrams. The word *hsiang* refers to not only the symbolic representation of an object, but also the object itself. Symbols or *hsiang* serve as models or patterns for which physical objects, including institutions, evolved.41 For example, the *meng* hexagram (4) is a combination of the triagram *ken*, meaning "mountain," and the top and the triagram *k'an*, meaning "water", below.

above *ken* (mountain)
below *k'en* (water)

Meng then symbolizes "a spring rising at the foot of a mountain," conveying the idea of "inexperience" and giving rise to "child education."42

The *I* is "a reflection of the universe in miniature."43 There are three meanings to the word "*I*": ease and simplicity, change and transformation, and invariability. But "*I* primarily means change, used interchangeably with the word *Tao* since *Tao* is life, spontaneity, evolution, or in one word, change itself."44 All changes and transformation are the result of the movements of the two primal forces, the *yin* and the *yang*, the female passive principle and the male active principle. *Yang* and *yin* are also equated with Heaven and Earth, represented by the first two of the eight triagrams, *ch'ien* and *k'an*. The transformation then is from simplicity to complexity. Yet in the midst of this variability, there are the elements of continuity and invariability, a constant definite order, the *Tao* of Heaven and Earth.45

Two rules are to be followed in interpreting the hexagrams: first, the two triagrams symbolize the past and future in time, height and depth in space. Second, the three lines of the triagram represent the three different degrees in time and space: the bottom line represents the cautious attitude, the top line the "on guard" attitude, and the middle line the active attitude.46 In divination, one line in the hexagram indicates the degree in time and space while the other five lines symbolize the different conditions of the universe. What is implied here is the notion of ming or fate and destiny. For any action to succeed, the cooperation of the time and the situation is needed. The development of something cannot go counter to its time and situation. Moreover, nothing can divorce itself from the *Tao* and its natural order.47 Even the consulter himself is part of this order; as such his action must acknowledge the existent conditions of the universe and harmonize with the *Tao*.

What laws can one detect in the workings of the *Tao* in the universe? Once again, as in *Tao*ism, the first law is the law of reversion, or put in another way that everything involves its own negation. An example is the judgment of the feng hexagram (55):

When the sun has reached its meridian height, it begins to decline. When the moon has become full, it begins to wane. Heaven and earth are now full, now empty, according to the flow and ebb of the season.48

Given the law of reversion, the giving rise to the opposite and the ensuing reconciliation, the process of change in the universe is a cyclic process, but one that calls for constant transformation and not simply a repetition. Perhaps, a spiral transformation is a better image. Thirdly, in this spiral transformation, "There can never be an end of things. The things in the universe are never absolutely completed or finished, they follow a definite order to which they move everlastingly."49

What then is the concept of time in the *I-Ching*; how are the Confucian and *Tao*ist views reconciled in it? And being not simply an interpretation of the changes in the universe but a guide for human conduct, what must man do in view of such a conception?

The I-Ching being a reflection of the universe in miniature, its time is cosmic. The cosmic conception is "based on the assumption that all that happens in the universe, natural and human, is a continuous whole, like a chain of natural sequences."50 The universe is a continuous whole, evolving or revolving around the *Tao*, the source of life, in an endless cycle of change and transformation. The cosmic view conceives of time as cyclic but not in the sense of a mere repetition of opposites represented in a closed circle. The essence of time is change, but the universe being a continuous whole, nothing is absolutely different and separated from everything

else: "Everything is constantly changing into something else, and therefore all things are one."51 The change generated by *Tao* is creative, dovetailing the old and the new:

The dynamic sequence of time, ridding itself of the perished past and coming by the new into present existence, really gains something over the loss. So, the change in time is but a step to approaching eternity, which is perennial durance, whereby, before the bygone is ended, the forefront of the succeeding has come into presence. And, therefore, there is here a linkage of being projecting itself into the prospect of eternity.52

Tao in fact is identified as the Creative and in the words of the I-Ching:

The Creative is strong. The Creative works sublime success, furthering through perseverance. Great indeed is the sublimity of the Creative, to which all things owe their beginning and which permeates all heaven. The way of the Creative works through change and transformation, so that each thing receives its true nature and destiny and comes into permanent accord with the Great Harmony: this is what furthers and what perseveres. . . .53

With such a creative cyclic view of time, the Confucianist will find no disagreement. Faced with a creative world, he is called to be "equally creative in order to fit in with it," "to participate in the cosmic creation through the process of transformation and thereupon become a *co-creator* with Heaven and Earth."54 On the other hand, the *Tao*ist is at home with the idea of the I-Ching that the *Tao* of Heaven is identified with the *Tao* of Man, although the *Tao* of Man should be normalized in accord with the *Tao* of Heaven.55 The sage attains both the *Tao* of Man and the *Tao* of Heaven.

What does it mean to attain both the *Tao* of Man and the *Tao* of Heaven? It means to harmonize oneself with the universe and to enter into "a fellowship of sympathetic unity . . . with other persons in thought, feeling, and action."56 The human being, occupying the central position between Heaven and Earth, must follow chung, the mean, in his action, taking the mean between extremes and synthesizing them. To act in accord with the mean is not simply to do things no more than halfway, which can be a mediocrity, but to maintain a delicate balance between the *yin* and the *yang*, neither too much nor too little but just right. To be in the mean is also to be humble, simple, and modest for one cannot arrogantly set limits to the opposites. In the concrete, it means "not to forget danger in time of peace so as to protect one's peace; not to forget ruin in time of security so as to preserve that security; not to forget disorder in time of order so as to guard that order."57 Positively, *chung* means to have one's conduct attuned to the situation at the moment, but holding on to the Center that is the eternal *Tao*. On *Tao* lies the common center of the sympathetic unity with fellowmen and the perfection of man.

Cyclic Time vs. Linear Time: The Chinese Notion of Perfection

If we are in fact destined to make contact with a sort of eternity, it will be at the core of our experience of time.58 (Maurice Merleau-Ponty)

. . . human time cannot exist without an irreversible evolution toward eternity, which subtends it.59 (Jean Guitton)

The above two quotations follow one another and indicate the inseparability of time and eternity. Eternity feeds on time, and "the truth of time is the concurrence of all events in an eternal present," "the unity of all time," hidden in the flux of time and simultaneously exceeding our experience of time.60 Phenomenologically speaking, if man is an embodied spirit, then human spirituality is expressed in time, in a field of presence that opens itself to the past and the future. But if we are to equate eternity with perfection, then cyclic time would have a different idea of perfection from that of linear time, which would entail a distinct kind of spirituality.

Cyclic time represented by the circle is self-contained while linear time represented by the line is open and must have a beginning and an end. Although cyclic time does not necessarily imply repetition, it nevertheless subjects the transient to the law of recurrence. In this it is unlike linear time with its succession of events (one after another), though not necessarily implying a series of disconnected "nows", which would make everything once-for-all. Because of the law of reversion in cyclic time, the power of death diminishes and emphasis is placed on the cosmic rather than on the individual. Linear time, on the other hand, accentuates the individual consciousness, and death becomes for it a break and a threat.61 Both times can have a mysticism where there is a "Great Year in which time begins again and a new heaven and a new earth come about. In linear time this must, of course, be a complete break, with an absolute end and beginning, while for cyclic time it is merely a turning, a new day in the life of Brahma."62

Traditional Western science relies on linear time, while acupuncture, Tai Ch'i Chuan and herbal medicine are all based on the Chinese concept of *yin* and *yang*. Understandably it took a long time for China with its concept of cyclic time to develop scientifically, leading Max Weber to think that modernization may not be possible in China. Modernization did come to China, but it aroused great philosophical self-questioning. The impact of Western science on the Chinese people has unleashed in them a drive for material prosperity that involves a mastery of nature, which may be conceived as a disruption of the cyclic view of time. On the other hand, the new science, particularly physics, has gradually come to discover the compatibility of science and Eastern mysticism.63 If acupuncture and other forms of Chinese traditional medicine work, can one not then speak of Eastern science? And is it not possible to integrate Western and Eastern sciences in view of humanizing the earth and making life more human?

Cyclic time combines the duality of the constant and the changing; permanence is implied in change and vice versa.64 Life is grasped in constant change and growth, and death and rest are not an interruption but part of life. The cyclic movement is one of renewal, revolution, endless possibilities, but this is a natural development or envelopment with cosmic completion. The opposite of change and transformation is not rest but regression.65

Perfection in cyclic time is symbolized by the circle which is rounded off. The perfection of nature, human and physical, is to be found not outside of its dynamic cyclic movement but within it, not at the end of the process of evolution but at the very heart or core, the Center, which is the principle of equilibrium, harmonizing opposites. Nature's perfection conceived as a whole consists precisely in the "unceasing movement going on in the Universe."66 In the words of the Confucian classic, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, "to the most perfect, there is no rest."67 Nature is already that "infinite realm wherein the universal Flux of Life is revealing itself and fulfilling everything with its intrinsic worth. Nature is infinite in the sense that it is not limited by anything that is beyond and above it, which might be called Super-nature."68

The perfection of the self entails also the perfection of others, in fact of the whole of the universe, inasmuch as one is a significant part of the organic whole. This is the meaning of sincerity or *cheng* mentioned in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, which is the beginning and end of things and also

signifies "realness," "truth" and the fullness of virtue (*Jen*). "The perfection of the self lies in the quality of *Jen*."69 Sincerity is the unity of Heaven and Earth, which is infinite and lasting because they do not exist for themselves.

Cyclic spirituality consists of returning to one's roots, which is "passing from the moving circumference of the cosmic wheel to the unmoving Centre which unites all," something akin to the return to childhood (*balya*) in Hinduism and "becoming like a child" in the Gospels.70 It is to see in the finite the infinite which has been there from eternity, and harmonizing these is "to come home". To unite the finite and the infinite is the spiritual. This is attained by keeping the *yin* and the *yang* in balance, "avoiding all extremes and establishing harmony."71 The spiritual man or "wise man maintains an even course through prosperity and adversity and is neither elated by the one nor downcast by the other,"72 knowing that these are but the seasons of *Tao*. Cyclic spirituality integrates spirit and matter; as integrated, the whole universe becomes centered on the passive yet creative *Tao*; and life becomes not simply a means to an end, but sacred, as it is itself a consummation of perfection.

Notes

1. Paul Ricoeur, "Introduction", Time and the Philosophies (UNESCO, 1977), p. 13.
2. Wing-tsit Chan, "Synthesis in Chinese Metaphysics" in Charles A. Moore (ed.), *The Chinese Mind* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), p. 132.
3. The Chinese character for time is *shih*, a composite character made up of three characters: the sun, the earth, and the small unit.
4. *Analects* (Wing-tsit Chan translation), IX, 16.
5. *Ibid*., XII, 22.
6. *Doctrine of the Mean* (Wing-tsit Chan translation), ch. 20.
7. *Great Learning* (Wing-tsit Chan translation).
8. *Analects*, XI, 14.
9. *Ibid.*, VII, 34.
10. *Ibid*., II, 4.
11. *Ibid*., II, 11.
12. *Commentary on the Great Learning*, ch. 2.
13. *Analects*, XV, 28.
14. *Book of Mencius* (Wing-tsit Chan translation).
15. *Ibid*., VIIB, 25.
16. *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 26.
17. *Ibid*., ch. 26.
18. *Ibid*., ch. 25.
19. *Ibid*.
20. *Ibid*.
21. *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 26.
22. *Ibid*., ch. 30.
23. *Tao* Te Ching (Wing-tsit Chan translation), chs. 1, 31, 25.
24. *Ibid*., ch. 1.
25. *Ibid*., ch. 42.
26. *Ibid*., ch. 37.
27. *Ibid*., ch. 40.

28. *Ibid*., ch. 16.
29. *Ibid*., ch. 55.
30. *Chuang Tze* (Thomas Merton edition), VI, 11.
31. *Tao* Te Ching, ch. 9.
32. *Ibid*., ch. 7.
33. *Chuang Tze*, IV, 1.
34. *Ibid*., XIII, 1.
35. *Ibid*., II, 3.
36. *Ibid*., XI, 1-2.
37. *Ibid*., XII, 2.
38. *Ibid*., XIX, 2.
39. *Ibid*.
40. *Chuang Tze*, XVII, 1.
41. Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, "Introduction" to *I Ching*, trans. by James Legge (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. xlviii-xlix.
42. *Ibid*., p. liv.
43. *Ibid*., p. liii.
44. *Ibid*., p. xl-xli.
45. *Ibid*., pp. xl-xlviii.
46. *Ibid*., pp. lxiv.
47. *Ibid*., pp. lxvi-lxvii.
48. *Ibid*., p. lxx.
49. *Ibid*., p. lxxvii.
50. *Ibid*., p. lxxi.
51. *Ibid*., pp. lxxviii-lxxix.
52. Thomas H. Fang "The World and the Individual in Chinese Metaphysics," in Charles A. Moore (ed.), *The Chinese Mind* (Honolulu: East-West, 1967), p. 240.
53. *Book of Change* (Wilhelm Translation), II. pp. 1-2, 4, 8, 10, quoted by Thomas H. Fang, "A Philosophical Glimpse of Man and Nature in Chinese Culture," *The Chinese Heritage*, ed. and published by Youth Culture Enterprise Co., Ltd., p. 94.
54. Thomas H. Fang, "The World and the Individual", pp. 241-242.
55. Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, *op. cit*., p. lxxxix.
56. Thomas H. Fang, "A Philosophical Glimpse", p. 111.
57. Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, *op. cit*., p. lxxxiii.
58. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1965), p. 415.
59. Jean Guitton, *Man in Time* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 113.
60. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *What Is Man?*, trans. by Duane A. Pruke (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 74.
61. J.C. Cooper, *Yin and Yang, the Tao*ist Harmony of Opposites (Great Britain: Aquarian Press, 1981), p. 22.
62. *Ibid*., p. 23.
63. Cf. Fritzof Captra, *The Tao* of Physics (New York: Bantam Books, 1987).
64. J.C. Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 24.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

66. Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, *op.cit.*, p. lxxviii.
67. *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 26, sec. 1.
68. Thomas H. Fang, "The Chinese View of Life". p. 18.
69. *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 25.
70. J.C. Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 27.
71. *Ibid*., p. 10.
72. *Ibid*., p. 57.

21.
Education in Values and Spiritual Enlightenment

Shi Zhonglian

Education in values and spiritual enlightenment are the two wings on which the human spirit can soar, or the two wheels on which human civilization can advance. Though both are absolutely necessary, in the actual process of historical development humankind attends to one and loses sight of the other, whence comes a series of problems. Neglect of education in values leads to nihilism, renouncement of the world and anti-culturism; too much stress on education in values, dogmatism, formalism and scholasticism brings thought to a standstill and causes the spirit to wither. So, establishment of a proper relationship between education in values and spiritual enlightenment in accord with the historical experiences of mankind and earlier theoretical thought on this issue should be the main task of philosophy.

Education in Values

Education in values is a perpetual concern peculiar of humankind. Unlike animals, human beings acquire the ability to adapt to circumstances, mainly not by hereditary instinct, but by learning. From primitive times, human beings began to impart their knowledge and skills to their posterity, although there were at first no permanent educational institutions or standard educational methods and systems. With the progress of human civilizations, the content of education has been increasingly enriched, and educational methods and systems continuously perfected. The degree of educational development is in direct proportion to the level of the evolution of civilization. Therefore, education can be regarded as a sign of the prosperity of the civilization of a nation.

In essence, education is in values, that is, the imparting of thought, knowledge and skill beneficial to human beings. What is called value is the usefulness of an object to a subject; it reflects the relation of need and satisfaction between subject and object. Education is a means by which the needs of subject are linked with the satisfaction of object. As needs are multi-leveled and the properties of the object are manifold, the values which people seek are varied and the subjects and contents of education are extremely manifold. But all education must be imbued with a certain value, and must evaluate and recognize values: it is the search for values. Even religious or moral education uses a certain kind of values to mold one's morality and personality. No matter how universal the kind of value, it serves only to satisfy the specific needs of the subject.

It must be pointed out that value education not only meets certain practical needs of the subject, but also enlightens and develops the human spirit. The human spirit has unlimited latent potentialities and can be enriched and filled with wisdom, but it achieves its powers only by being watered culturally by various values, and by moral cultivation guided by certain values. For instance, history records not only the vicissitudes of nations and states and the behavior of villains despised and detested by later generations, but also the merits and achievements of great minds which command admiration and inspiration. The thought, feeling and activity of historical figures are linked with the destiny of a society, a state and a nation. Therefore, the study of history not only concerns the processes of development of societies and the past experience of humankind, but also cultivates one's collective consciousness and broadens one's field of vision and breadth of mind. If one observes society and life with an historical vision, one's heart can beat with the rhythm of society, state and nation. The natural sciences, not only provide theories and knowledge

about nature, but also discipline man with strict, methodical thinking and keen, exact insight. In short, the achievements of culture, which manifest all kinds of values, are both products of human creation to meet their needs and means by which human beings understand, remold and develop themselves.

For this reason, from ancient times to the present, the human spirit has been trained and developed mainly through imbuing cultural and educational values, but the binding of the human spirit by culture and the relativity of values has been neglected.

As a system of values, culture is both an expression of human creativity in certain circumstances and conditions, and the formalization and fixation of human creativity according to the need of the subject. As such in its essence culture is a shaped creation. Cultural products can enlighten man forever; but as a fixed form of creativity, cultural products lose their positive meaning beyond the particular time and place in which they are needed. Becoming outmoded they bind human thought.

Because of spiritual inertia, men are used to conventional ways of living and thinking, and to the established and fixed models. At the same time, custom and education make culture the existential environment of man and inculcate the spirit of a particular culture. This creates his way of thinking and psychological habits. Consequently, the cultural products made by man to meet his needs become his yoke.

There is a hierarchy values. Max Scheler, a German phenomenalist philosopher, held that there are four grades of values proceeding from low to high: pleasure, the vital, the spiritual and the religious. The highest value is that which endures and has the highest independence. It satisfies a person to the greatest extent and has little bearing on natural feelings. Obviously, a spirit which remains with the inferior value cannot develop to a high extent and enter a lofty realm of mind. The search for, and addiction to, such low and vulgar values as the mad satisfaction of carnal desires lowers one's temperament to the level of animals. Low and outmoded values often become the fetters of human spirit and stifle human subjectivity and creativity.

Even such high values as religious beliefs and ethical ideas also can limit the development of human spirit. Christian belief in God has led many people to renounce the world. In the Christian era, belief was higher than reason and divinity higher than personality, which resulted in a loss for the human ego. In the East, such Confucian moral ideas as *Ren* (benevolence) and *Yi* (righteousness) taught people to submit tamely to, and advocate actively, the patriarchal hierarchy, though they also enabled people to do good and become morally good. As for the suppression and devastation of personality by these moral ideas, Chinese critics from Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, Ji Kang to such representatives of the May Fourth Movement as Chen Duxiu and Lu Xun, all have made full and scathing exposures and criticisms.

Spiritual Enlightenment

It follows that the development of spirit and culture cannot depend wholly on education in values. This must proceed with continuous spiritual enlightenment. Spiritual enlightenment breaks the deception and binding imposed on the human spirit, in order to recover its original vitality and creativity. In the East, the philosopher who earlier than anyone else advanced the task of spiritual enlightenment was Lao Zi. He said: "In the pursuit of learning, every day something is acquired. In the pursuit of Tao, every day something is dropped."1 "The pursuit of learning" is education in values; "The pursuit of Tao" is spiritual enlightenment. Lao Zi set one against the other; he negated the former and affirmed the latter. "The pursuit of learning" is the absorbing and accumulating of

knowledge; but "the pursuit of Tao is unceasingly to reduce the deception human spirit by value. In view of the dilution of mind by all kinds of values, Lao Zi pointed out, "The five colors blind the eye; the five tones deafen the ear; the five flavors dull the taste; racing and hunting madden the mind; precious things lead one astray."2 Only by "Washing and cleaning the primal vision,"3 i.e., by cleaning one's mind thoroughly can one grasp Tao and acquire supreme consciousness. Lao Zi said "Give up sainthood, renounce wisdom."4

These words did not mean to negate knowledge and culture, but to break away from the binding of a certain value upon the human spirit in order to maintain in one's mind a state of supreme clarity and brightness. Therefore, Lao Zi's sayings that "In the pursuit of Tao, everyday something is dropped" and "give up sainthood, renounce wisdom" were not claims of obscurantism, but, on the contrary, advocated spiritual enlightenment.

Zhuang Zi and his followers grasped the essence of Lao Zi's doctrine of "the pursuit of Tao", and adhered to the basic orientation of Taoist philosophy: i.e. they devoted themselves to spiritual enlightenment. The Zhuang Zi school which was most concerned with the freedom of mind and the extension of spirit made every effort to eradicate all obstacles to the freedom of the mind. In ancient times, no other person could so fully and thoroughly expose the psychological factors and values which hindered the expansion of the human spirit. Zhuang Zi held that the common people admire "a man who creditably fills some small office, or who is a pattern of virtue in his neighborhood, or who influences his prince to right government of the state."5 But according to him, the human spirit must transcend those values. He thought: "The perfect man ignores self; the divine man ignores merits; the true sage ignores reputation."6 He considered ego-centricity, exploits and fame to be heavy burdens on the mind, and regarded the clearing away of these things as the way of spiritual enlightenment. Zhuan Zi's followers pointed out twenty-four factors which must be broken with: They said:

Honors, wealth, distinction, power, fame, gain -- these six are entanglements to virtue; mien, carriage, beauty, arguments, influence, opinion -- these six disturb the mind; Hate, ambition, joy, anger, sorrow, pleasure -- these six are entanglements to virtue; Rejecting, adopting, receiving, giving, knowledge, ability -- these six are abstractions to Tao.7

Although even certain intrinsic, necessary functions of spirit were negated by the Zhuang Zi school, their intention was to relieve the disturbances of mind caused by desires, to free the mind from enslavement by feelings and to lead it into the realm of freedom.

Wang Bi, one of the founders of New Taoism in the Wei (220-265) and Jin (265-420) dynasties, and who regarded nonbeing as noumenon, refused to define and limit the noumenon. His aim was to get rid of the burden of all kind of values over the mind. Later, Ji Kang advocated the "Transcending of ethical code, and complying with Nature." This view was intended to overcome the greatest obstacle of spiritual freedom, i.e., the patriarchal ideas and systems in politics and ethics. Therefore, the historical mission of New Taoism in the Wei and Jin dynasties was spiritual enlightenment.

In the Confucian school, the philosopher who noticed the obstructors to mind earlier than anyone else was Xun Zi. He discovered that any idea or thing can become an obstruction to the mind. He said, "Desire is an obstruction, as is detestation; the beginning and end, the far and near, extensiveness and meagerness, the ancient and the present, all these are obstructions."8 He summarized his thought as follows: "So long as all things on earth are distinct, they all might become obstructions to each other. This is the origin of the common ills of the mind."9 Actually,

the obstructions appeared because of the value of an idea or thing rather than the difference between ideas or things, for the value of a thing fascinated men. Although Xun Zi did not point this out explicitly, the abundant instances — cited by him in his theses titled as *Jiebi* (elimination of obstructors) — of the descriptions suffered by men in politics and mind indicated that it is value which is unduly admired by men that becomes an obstruction of the mind.

Obstructed by utility, Mo Zi ignored decoration; obstructed by desire, Song Zi ignored virtue; obstructed by law, Zhen Zi ignored the role of the worthy; obstructed by rhetoric, Hui Zi ignored reality; obstructed by nature, Zhuang Zi ignored man.10

This paragraph not only summarized precisely and succinctly the advantage and weakness of each school in the Warring States (475-221 B.C.), but also demonstrated how values become obstructions to thought. In order to clear away these obstructions, Xun Zi advocated: "Desirefree, detestationfree, beginningfree, endfree, nearfree, farfree, extensivefree, meagerfree, ancientfree, presentfree."11 His practice was similar to Zhuang Zi's as was its meaning, that is, to break the bonds of the mind. However, unlike Zhuang Zi, he stood for "showing all things all-sidedly and selecting what conforms to criteria."12 He called for opening the mind to all kinds of values and making a selection. This attitude was more reasonable and desirable than was Zhuang Zi's nihilism.

Wang Yangming's idealism stressed that the original substance of mind is void, intelligent, bright and self-conscious, and that there is nothing in the mind. This theory was belittled as Chan's philosophy, but its real meaning was to avoid the obstruction of mind by values. Zhan Ruoshui, the famous idealist in the Ming dynasty held the same view as Wang Yangming. Later, Wang Yangming's idealism was accepted by other factions of the Confucian school. For instance, Gao Panlong was a follower of Donglin in the later period of the Ming dynasty, and advocated Cheng's and Chu's rationalism in Neo-Confucianism. He held also: "There are no affairs at all in the mind,"13 and stressed this argument in order to establish a foundation for philosophy. The objects which the neo-Confucianists intended to clear away were mainly "lusts" and "selfish desires and interests"; they wanted to eliminate all desires which run counter to Confucian ethics. However, Wang Yangming's doctrine of "Nothing in the mind" may lead in theory to the negation of all values and hinder the development of the human spirit, including even some basic principles of the Confucian school, for instance, the first "Cardinal guide", i.e., that ruler guides subject. In fact, since the middle period of the Ming dynasty the Chinese enlightenment has used this doctrine as an ideological weapon.

The Combination of Values and Spiritual Enlightenment

Therefore, spiritual enlightenment has been an important issue to which since ancient times Chinese philosophers have always paid great attention. Education in values and spiritual enlightenment are the same as regards the development of the human spirit and culture, but differ in method: the former instills values while the latter breaks the bonds of the human spirit; the former is mainly construction whereas the latter is mainly destruction. As for the quantity of knowledge, the former is increase, while the latter is decrease; in grasping the external world, the former strives for increase, while the latter strives to lessen; and in education the former stresses teaching and receiving, while the latter emphasizes eliciting and consciousness. Both are necessary for the development of knowledge, culture and spirit; they cannot replace each other. However,

people often are confused about the functions of the two, and substitute one means of spiritual extension for the other.

The most common substitution is the reduction of spiritual enlightenment to education in some religious, ethical or philosophical values. In advocating revelation as the basis of belief, Christianity demands that the judgement between rightness and wrongness, good and evil, justness and unjustness must be in accordance with God's decree brought to light in the Bible. In the East, spiritual enlightenment as the task of moral education was essentially the inculcation of ethical ideas such as *Ren* (benevolence) and *Yi* (righteousness), in order to cast off the yoke of selfish desires and interests. The European Enlightenment overthrew the spiritual domination of Christian theology and the political rule of feudal autocracy by establishing the value of reason. However, a particular value, no matter how high, can in no way replace or do away with spiritual enlightenment.

For instance, reason played a powerful role in criticizing obscurantism and autocracy in the Middle Ages, in the development of science and democracy, and in the modernization of Western societies. However, after the practice of reason for 200 years, reason has been found to have created a new spiritual domination and alienation of man. Some point out that reason separates the true from the good and the beautiful, science from ethics, and transforms man into an abstract concept disregarding human feeling. As a result of the rule of the abstract laws and principles of logic and mathematics over everything, human ideals and subjectivity disappear. Horkheimer and Adorno note in *Dialectics of Enlightenment* that in order to liberate human beings from terror, Enlightenment reason established autonomy, but the world marked by the enlightenment shows signs of disaster. From the beginning the spirit of the Enlightenment contained factors latently harmful to freedom, which might lead even to totalitarianism. In the process from myth to logic, thinking has lost its ability for self-reflection, reason has been materialized into scientific technology, and languages, philosophies, weapons and machines all have become means for ruling people. The dialectics of the Enlightenment moved to the opposite of its own goal, so learned men led society to a state of barbarism. According to both philosophers, the havoc of Fascism and the calamities caused by the Second World War are clear proof of these statements.

Another tendency in the relation of education in values and spiritual enlightenment is to stress spiritual enlightenment exclusively, in the belief that education in values might obstruct free spiritual development. In the West the representative of this tendency was existentialism; in the East it was Taoism. Existentialism holds that the subjectivity of human beings is supreme; it must not be limited and bound by any value. Taoists advocated resolutely that the human spirit should not hold to any idea or value. The negation of the need to inculcate values will lead to nihilism which either fosters blindness of mind, or brings about a passive, inactive outlook on life. The former is characteristic of existentialism, whereas the latter was the end result of Taoism.

Thus it is clear that overstressing the role of either education in values or spiritual enlightenment will lead astray culture and spirit so that people will fall into dire straits. The way to escape this predicament is a combination of spirit enriching and developing itself with values and at the same time searching incessantly to realize higher values. On the one hand, the spirit must not separate itself from values, but always rely on their support and guidance. On the other hand, the spirit must not allow itself to be bound by former ideas, but constantly and perpetually engage in new explorations of the true, the good and the beautiful. In this way, nihilism, relativism and blindness can be avoided, while dogmatism, absolutism stagnation and ossification of the thought can be prevented.

Notes

1. *Lao Zi: The Daode Jing*, ch. 48. See *Tao Te Ching* by Giafu Feng and Jane English (New York: Random House, 1972).
2. *Ibid*., ch. 12.
3. *Ibid.*, ch. 10.
4. *Ibid.*, ch. 19.
5. Zhuang Zi, *Xiao Yao You* (transcendental bliss). See *Chuang Tzu: Taoist Philosopher and Chinese Mystic*, tran. By Herbert A. Giles (London: Mondala, 1980).
6. *Ibid.*, *Gengsang Chu*.
7. *Ibid*.
8. *Xun Zi: Jie Bi* (elimination of obstructors).
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. Huang Zongxi, Mingru Xuean, Donglin Xuean (1).

22.
The Character of Japanese Thought

Tomonobu Imamichi

To think about thought requires attention to, at least, three factors.

First, we must make clear the positive manner of thinking. Because thought is the effect of thinking, we must discuss the dynamic structure of thinking.

Second, we must make clear what is produced through this dynamic structure, namely, the thought produced by thinking.

Third, we must not forget to observe the results produced by thought, e.g., social institutions and the emergence of culture. If there is an interaction between thought and cultural appearance this interactive phenomenon must be included.

Reflections on Thinking

On Analogia Entis

Thought is formed through thinking activity which, in turn, follows a line of logic. Logic, however, is embedded in language, which is ruled by grammar. Therefore we must regard the characteristic points of Japanese grammatical structure in order to discuss the characteristics of Japanese thought. The following reflection does not require any linguistic knowledge of the Japanese language, although it refers to the grammatical structure. To make this accessible to the reader, a comparative method with Western language will be employed.

Being is said in many senses wrote Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*. This is summarized by Thomas Aquinas in the following form: "being is said in two senses (*Ens dicitur dupliciter*)". This means the grammatical *isoform* with semantic *difference*. For example:

Here *is* a box.
(a)
In the box there *is* an animal.
(b)
This animal *is* a cat.
(c)

From these three sentences we can immediately understand the meaning of the word grammatical *isoform* of semantic difference in regard to the word "is". The "is (a)" means the existence of an inorganic thing (box). The "is (b)" means the existence of an organic, living object (animal). The "is (c)" does not mean the existence of anything, but functions as a copula which combines subject and predicate in a sentence. So we can say without hesitation that there are at least two different senses under the same form, namely, designation of existence and copulative function of same being. "Is (a)" and "is (b)" designate existence, and "is (c)" designates copula. These three sentences are said in Japanese in the following form:

Koko-ni hako-ga *arimasu* (Here is a box.)
(here) (box) (is)

(a)
Hako-no-naka-ni dobutsu-ga *imasu* (In the box there is an animal.)
(in the box) (animal) (is)
(b)
Kono dobutsu-wa neko *desu* (This animal is a cat.)
(this animal) (cat) (is)
(c)

It is not necessary to think about the details. The important thing is the fact that in the Japanese language there are three different grammatical forms for the three different semantic phenomena. Namely, the verb for the existence of a lifeless inorganic object like a box is said *arimasu*, the existence of living thing like an animal is said *imasu*, and finally the copula is said in the form of *desu*.

Here we must state at least two very important things about Japanese thinking.

(1) There is no possibility of analogia "entis" like in Western language.
(2) In the sign of existence there is a clear formal difference between the lifeless thing and a living existence.

Analogia Nullius Rei (Strictly, the Genitive Form of Nihil)

As I mentioned above, it is very difficult to discover the grammatical possibility for analogia entis in the Japanese language. Instead of this fact, or in other words in contrast to this fact, there is *analogia nullius rei*, analogy of nothingness in the Japanese language.

Here is *no* box (*koko-ni hako-ga arimasen*).
In the box there is *no* animal (*hako-no-naka-ni dobutsu-ga imasen*).
This animal is *not* a cat (kono dobutsu-wa neko *dewa arimasen*).

For the negative form of existence in the English sentence "no" is used, and for the negative form of copula *not* is used. "No" and "not" come, naturally, from the same etymological origin, but at least they do not have completely the same form. By contrast, in the Japanese language, the three negative forms "masen" are the same. If we use the formal sentence (not the oral form used in everyday conversation), the negative form for three different situations are expressed as "nai", or in the older form "arazu"; they are the same.

We can easily say that there is a possibility of an analogy of nothingness, because the philosophical origin of negation is negation itself, negation as such, nothingness. And, as is well known, not only in Japanese thinking but also in Chinese or all over the Asian world, the nothingness which is thought beyond being is the key word for philosophy. I will not now enter into this problem, but I would like to make clear the existence of an antipodic contrast between the occidental and the oriental world to which Japan belongs, through denoting the contrast of analogy of nothingness and the analogy of being. Note also the linguistic difference between organic existence and inorganic existence in the Japanese language, which opens a very interesting reflection on the technological problem below.

Fundamental Meaning of the Truth

As mentioned above, I wish to attempt a comparative study in order to make clear the character of the Japanese thinking. A danger of comparative study is sometimes to exaggerate some outstanding phenomena. I avoid using superficial comparisons and impressistic observations, and will go to what is fundamental or basic. Here, we wish to discuss the concept of truth through the philosophical reflection of the linguistic fact. As the Greek tradition is one of the most important origins of Western culture with regard to philosophy, I will take an example from the Greek philosophy.

The word "truth" in Greek is aletheia, which means either "what comes out from forgetfulness" or "what is from forgetfulness". Therefore we can safely say that this word means "clear from being present in the consciousness". We can come to see this form (idea) through the logos, because Socrates says that logos is the most important organ of the philosopher. Logos has many important senses which are connected to each other in a logical structure, namely, word-concept-syllogism-rule-calculation and theory. These senses make one system of thinking in the identity of the word *logos*, namely, in order to make clear the *truth* we must express the object in the *word*, and through the *logical calculation* in the form of *syllogism* we must find out the *rule* of the phenomenon and finally we must formulate what we think in the proposition as *theory*.

Therefore the truth is stated in the objective form of concept: truth is logical form. Naturally there are some exceptional opinions in the occidental world on another form of truth, but principally what I have depicted is the authentic type of truth. In the Japanese language what words are connected with *logos* and *aletheia*? There is an interesting word connection of the group of *koto* (situation). In the Japanese language the truth is *makoto*. *Ma* signifies perfect or beautiful and *koto* denotes the situation. *Kotoba* denotes the theory, but etymologically it means analysis of a situation.

Concrete Images of the Two Types of Truth

What I have said about the truth as *aletheia* and truth as *makoto* will be here exposed through the concrete method of imagery. Let us take as an example a child falling into the river. What is the truth in this situation? For the objective descriptive truth of *aletheia* in the Greek tradition we must make clear the proposition with strictly measured words. So, we must say a child about six years old fell into the river. His clothes were red and he is driven away by the current of the river. The speed of the current is 5m per second, the temperature of the water is 50c, the child will be drowned within three minutes, etc. Every proposition is correct. We must say that they are to some extent true. But if we make efforts to stick to the facts as closely as possible, in order to assess the complete truth of the situation in this way, we delay saving the child. By the time we have written down all the facts the child will be dead. Even then we can continue writing down the facts, like how much water the child has swallowed, what is the direct cause of his death, etc. The idea, the objective correctness, can in this way destroy the given situation.

What is the truth according to the Japanese *makoto* which signifies the perfect siltation? If we are in the process of arithmetical calculation, the perfect situation as *makoto* must be accomplished after finishing the theoretical calculation. But the perfect situation is not always accomplished through theoretical activity. The situation in which the child faces the danger of death is a given imperfect situation, remote from the truth as perfect situation. We must realize the truth as a perfect

situation in the middle of the injured given situation. To jump into the river and to make efforts to save the child is the way to truth as perfect situation.

This comparison is naturally too simple; nevertheless, I dare say it is not meaningless. In the Western tradition there are many long, discursive books which make efforts to demonstrate the objective truth through logical arguments. By contrast, in the Eastern tradition there are many symbolic abbreviations in which the writer as a philosopher realized the perfect situation. That is the reason behind the Zen-Buddhistic meditation, in which the argument in discussion is strictly forbidden, and in which the suggestive expression after a long silence is welcomed.

Perhaps we may say without serious danger that the typical form of the Western philosophical truth is objective science as knowledge and the typical form of the Eastern philosophical truth is subjective wisdom as salvation. So, there is an inclination to natural science in Western philosophy and an inclination towards religion in Eastern philosophy.

In this word series of *koto* (situation) we must say the word (a little part of situation, *kotoba*) cannot grasp a given situation (*koto*), not to mention the perfect situation (*makoto*) as truth.

Thought

Japanese Mythology

Every nation has its own mythology. This is the natural origin of the nation's characteristic thought because it is the reflection of the destiny and unified imagination of pre-historical legend, sustained by the primitive world view of the nation.

Japanese mythology has a remote origin which had been conveyed through oral recitation. The oldest known written record was edited at the beginning of the 8th century in a book called *Kojiki* (the record of the old things) which contains many old oral traditions. In this book we can discover the botanic view of the world or vegetal assimilation of all the processes of the world.

All myths have an imaginative exposition of the origin of the cosmos. In the Japanese myth according to *Kojiki* there is no god as creator. In the beginning of the *cosmos* (heaven and earth) there arose at first the god of the center (the apotheosis of seed) and then secondly two gods of binding (apotheosis of ripening of the fruit).

In the beginning of the world there was a watery chaos, the unstable vagueness of a jellyfish, from which came out something like a sprout of reed. And this sprout has the name of a beautiful male god of the reed sprout.

This god is the incarnation of the three unseen powers as symbol of seed and ripening. And this god, the reed sprout, is the origin of all the natural phenomena. Therefore we can confirm that the unconscious ground of the Japanese traditional thought has been formulated with the botanic language. It means that the Japanese world view has the tendency towards the reduction of human history to the vegetable dimension.

Throughout Japanese spiritual history the influence of this vegetable assimilation and humanity has been so strong that many ethical and aesthetic terms used in modern times were originally adjectives for the vegetable phenomenon and that whole family emblems have always been designed using the leaves of trees.

Philosophy of Wind

The vegetable existence does not usually move from one place to another. Its dynamic movement is normally divided into two kinds, the first growing up and down because during growth they develop trunk, branches, leaves and roots; the second is the horizontal movement of leaves of branches through the wind. Sometimes the leaves are prophets of the seasonal wind through their trembling, sometimes the branches are the organ of the wind for its roaring, sometimes the groves are the defense against the wind for the village. In such a way the wind is a phenomenon correlative to vegetable. So the moral philosophy or aesthetic of the vegetable viewpoint of the world calls for the philosophy of the wind as its essential counterpart. Actually, the wind as natural phenomenon itself is very interesting: it is essentially invisible, but it functions very effectively, namely, when it blows strongly like a storm it destroys human dwellings and sinks ships; and when it blows gently, it gives consolation to the tired eye or the sad and sorrowful ear. So the wind can be used as a symbol of the transcendental principle.

At the end of the Japanese mediaeval time the wind was used as the most important key word for poetics, because in the poem or art in general, the unseen and untouchable atmosphere must be created through the visible form and audible voice, and because the wind is the most suitable word for this unseen, untouchable and influencing atmosphere.

In the course of the years the spiritual importance of the symbol of the wind has been used more and more intensively, so that the wind became the terminology in the domain of moral philosophy and Buddhistic religion.

In my opinion, in the natural world the form of the things shows their essence and function so clearly that the form in general can become one of the most important key words for describing the world. So, the "idea" of Plato as principle denotes the form, as is well-known. But technology has changed such a natural world so extremely that there are now many isomorphic and heterofunctional machines in which the decisive priority of form with regard to function must be rejected. Therefore we must seek out some other principle for new dimensions in this technological world, for which purpose, the wind as principle of the world could be helpful. At this moment I hope at least the suggestive force of Japanese classical philosophy for the revival of thought is possible or can be recommended.

I would like to show some examples of the vegetable influence on the aesthetic terminology in our tradition.

The oldest word for "beautiful" is "*kuashi*", which means dense and compact natural growth of the leaves. That can be demonstrated through the philosophical facts, but I refrain from going into linguistic detail in this text.

In medieval poetics there are many symbolic terms for the aesthetic fulfillment of poetic creation, e.g., "*hana*" (flower) as rhetorical beauty of the word, "*tane*" (seed) as creative moment of poetic activity, "*taketakashi*" (tall tree) as sublime, etc.

This tendency to reduce the artistic or poetic activity to the vegetable is continuously inherited in the later periods of our history. At the end of the mediaeval time in the dramatic theory of the "no" play an outstanding aesthetician, Seami, used also the word *hana* (flower) as the most sublime and deepest value of dramatic expression. Moreover, as he taught the principal attitude of actors in drama, he wrote that in the drama of mystic divinity, people should be like a gigantic cypress, in the drama of grace like a blooming cherry tree, in the drama of tragic love like a marble tree in autumn with red burning leaves.

And in modern times, Basho, poet of the "*haiku*" (short poem consisting of 17 syllables) and at the same time an able aesthetician, said, as he taught his disciples how to create a poem, "learn the spirit of a pine tree from the pine tree itself". For him the tree is the teacher. Not only in the domain of aesthetics but also, and more importantly, in the domain of ethics, there is a strong tendency to reduce human morality to the vegetable.

The pine tree is a symbol of steadiness and unchangeable loyalty, the bamboo a symbol of straightforwardness and strong will, the plum flower is a symbol of dignity and a forerunner, and the cherry blossom stands for sacrificing death at the peak of one's life.

Similar symbolism of vegetable phenomena can be found all over the world, but it has been far more used in Japan than in any other place.

World Construction

In the *Kojiki* there are dramatic developments of the world of gods. These mythological stories are very interesting due to the interaction of many gods, who are mostly the personification of natural phenomena. So, not only because of the polytheistic structure, but also because of the visual description of dramatic construction, there is a resemblance between Japanese myth in *Kojiki* and Greek myth in Hesiod and Homer, etc., as was observed by the French orientalist, René Grousset. Although *Kojiki* resembles Greek myth in this, there ar two remarkable differences between both traditional myths.

The first is that, in the Japanese myth there is no war on the sea, but by contrast the Homeric epics contain a history of war and wandering on the sea. The lack of consciousness of this war on the sea in Japanese myth suggests that the Japanese, even in prehistoric time, had no perspective of foreign cultures and no consciousness of the existence of other countries. The Japanese myth is accomplished within the limited little islands united in Japan proper. There was a world theory, but it was constructed only vertically within the autistic narrowness of Japan itself, namely, there are first the land of the heaven (*Takama-nohara*, that is to say grassland of high heaven); and second the middle country of reed land (*Ashihara-no-nakatsukuni*), namely, Japan itself. This country, Japan, consists of several islands, which were children produced by the gods. So, the gods, islands as nature and human beings were children produced by the gods. So, the gods, islands as nature, and human beings were constructed as a relationship of family; namely, the gods are like father and mother, the nature, and human beings are brothers and sisters, or at least relatives.

There is the movement of cosmic eros through the universe. Therefore nature is not objectified enough to be observed or to be used or abused as tool of the egoism of humanity, at least in the traditional thought of Japan. That is one positive side of Japanese myth, but at the same time there is no possibility of a strong consciousness of human dignity, entirely different from cosmic animality. The individuality of the person, as the essence of human being, was not evident in the mind of the people at that time. It was hidden under the anthropomorphic description of the natural world as the dimension of human relatives. And third, under this world of the middle land there was thought to be the land of Hade (*Yonu-no-kum*) wherein the dead people were hidden.

Colors

Although Japanese myth, as I have stated above, is full of dramatic scenes, which are visually described, only four colors are named in the old text of *Kojiki*; namely, white, red, black and blue. It is really curious that we find only these four colors in the *Kojiki* and that in *Manyoshu* (10,000

leaves -- the oldest anthology of traditional poems), edited almost at the same time, we find about 20 different color names. What is the reason for this remarkable differences in both texts in this point?

We can guess without danger that the *Kojiki* maintained the older and primitive oral traditional, which is more original and older than the many poems created by poets who can be identified individually. So, it is my opinion that these four colors in *Kojiki*, namely, white, red, black and blue, belong to the original, primitive arrangement of Japanese color consciousness.

We may not say, however, that these four colors are fundamental only in Japan. Within the Chinese sphere of influence there are four protecting guardian animals which are posed at the four gates (East, West, North, South) of the capital city. These animals have their own color: white tiger, red pheasant, black turtle, blue dragon. These guard animals must protect the yellow emperor (in Chinese tradition gold is symbolized by the yellow color and also the Chinese natural world is the perspective of yellow immensity. Therefore in China the color yellow is the supreme color under which the other four colors are dominated.

But in the *Kojiki* there is no name for yellow color. And at least in *Kojiki* there is no influence of such four animals guarding the gates of the capital. The four colors are mentioned already in the process of the wandering history of gods, long before the establishment of a capital city in Japan. Therefore we can confirm that these four colors are really the original color arrangement of the Japanese. According to my research (details of which cannot be presented here; see my *Aesthetic in the Orient*), the four colors mentioned above have among them the most interesting anthropological symbolic relations.

- White is used only for the glory of god, the cleanness of the heart and the vividness of life. Therefore it is the symbol of luck.
- Red is used only for blood, which means the danger of life or the testimony of life; therefore sometimes it is the symbol of unluckiness.
-Black is used for badness, dirtiness and also for death and for the world of Hades, where there is no light. Therefore it is the symbol of misfortune.

These three colors construct the human subjective destiny. By contrast, blue is used for leaves of the trees or grass, for sky, mountains and water. Therefore it is the symbol of the natural environment wherein the human existence, consisting of three colors, is situated (Blue denotes the environment, fells us also that the vegetable things are the most important elements of which Japanese land, where the vegetal world view has been collectively created.)

In *Kojiki* the color is anthropologically or even philosophically so important that, after the acceptance of Buddhism, the Chinese character of color has been used in Japan in place of the word *form* in the European tradition. In European philosophy the form (Platonic idea, Aristotelian eidos) is the essence of the thing, whereas in Japanese tradition, the color represents the existence of the thing.

Reflection on the Thing Produced

Until now we have studied the two moments of thought: the first, its subjective activity, thinking, namely, logical structure; and the second, the characteristic points of the original objective thought in *Kojiki*, what was thought through the above logic.

The third part of this article is a reflection on the produced thing by which I understand the material crystallization and phenomenal emergence of the thought supported by thinking.

By the word's "material crystallization" I understand here only the work of art, by "phenomenal emergence" I understand here only religious liturgy and moral deed.

On Art

Very clearly everyone can remark that there is an antipodal difference between the traditional occidental painting and the traditional oriental painting. The former is the representation of the objective world with regard to form and color. In this type of paintings there is no unpainted nothingness, it is always finished, *finito*. We can find here the influence of the objective, descriptive method of thinking and the observational spirit of scientific thought: that is the result of the idea of *mimesis* which is highly valued by Plato and Aristotle as a fundamental idea for artistic creation. In the latter, namely, in oriental painting, there is a concentrated expression of the one phase of one thing behind which there is the waste white space of nothingness.

There is no perfect form and there is no real imitation of colors: i.e., the paintings are sometimes monochronic, that is to say, there is no objective description with regard to the form and color of the phenomenal world. Almost all Western scholars call such paintings *non-finito*, because externally there is no fulfillment of objective description of the external world. But according to the oriental idea of art, it is really accomplished, *finitissimo*, because the painter expresses the most essential in his perspective by ignoring the unnecessary: that is the result of the idea of expression (in Chinese *shai*). It is unnecessary to mention that the Japanese art belongs to oriental art. So it is very difficult to distinguish how far there is a great difference between Chinese and Japanese architecture in the classical tradition.

In Chinese architecture, e.g., on the Chinese temple, there are many artificial curves in the design of the roof, plenty of ornaments and a lot of colors, but the Japanese temple is very simple and ascetic, without curves, without ornaments, and without color. Also there is a dissimilarity in the Chinese and Japanese paintings. There is a basic difference with regard to the intention behind artistic creation. In Chinese painting the painter expresses his feeling or the spirit of the world intuited internally. By contrast, in the Japanese painting the painter chooses only the most impressive theme and suppresses other things, although they are sometimes necessary.

So Chinese painting is the result of the expression of eloquence, whereas Japanese art is the result of suppression through silence. We must remember that in Japanese art is the result of suppression through silence. We must remember that in the Japanese language the world is *kotoba*, which means the small part of *koto* (thing), so that the world cannot reach the splendid fertility of reality.

We must meditate about it in deep silence. Art is the entrance to this silent secret of the universe.

Religious Liturgy

As is well known, in Japan there are now four major religions, namely, Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity (both Catholics and Protestants and a few other groups, like the Russian Orthodox) and Shintoism. Among them the first three religions come from foreign countries. Confucianism, although it is the first religion accepted in Japan, is usually not enumerated as a religion, but is a humanistic cultural system which penetrates the fundamental

consciousness of the Japanese. Christianity is, generally speaking, the religion for the intellectual persons in the cities, which were opened to Western culture after the Meiji restoration, the so-called Japanese modernization. (Naturally, we may not forget the old Christian tradition which has survived through martyrdom in the face of long persecution by the government. But the families who belong to this tradition are very few.)

Therefore the religions in Japan that are actually widespread through the population are only Buddhism and Shintoism. As a result of its doctrine Buddhism has been accepted in Japanese thought without changing its principal character. But in regard to liturgy it has been, to some extent, Japanized. The liturgical change in religion is usually achieved through an attempt at accommodation stimulated by other religions, especially by the native religion. Therefore it is sufficient to discuss the character of the liturgy of Shintoism, which is the only native religion in Japan.

Shintoism derives from the Japanese word *Shint* , which means the way of god, but it is polytheistic. So there are many gods and goddesses, so that in the oldest text, *Kojiki*, 8 million gods were supposed to exist. What sorts of gods are they? Principally they are natural gods: sometimes every natural phenomenon is regarded as a god and sometimes the hidden spirit behind the natural phenomenon was regarded as a god.

We have affirmed in the previous section that the proper Japanese religion, Shintoism, is a polytheistic natural religion. Like many other natural religions the principal god is the god of the sun, the sun-goddess in Japan. Being in heaven, she dominates over the whole world. But curiously there is a shrine to this goddess on earth, in Ise. What, then, is the function of this shrine? We may pose such a question because the goddess is in heaven and not in this shrine and, moreover, there is no clear doctrine of *ubiquitas Dei* in Shintoism. Therefore the shrine must be empty since the sun-goddess is in heaven.

In order to solve this problem, the symbolism of the mirror is effectively used. The mirror which shines by reflecting the sun is on the one hand the symbol of the sun herself and on the other hand it is the symbol of the judgement of god because it shows the face of the person who stands in front of it, the symbol of god. (Perhaps because of this second reason almost all the shrines, not only the ones devoted to the sun-goddess, but also the ones devoted to other gods, have mirrors as a substitute for god.) Therefore the function of the shrine is the place for liturgical movement in front of the symbol of god. The shrine must in principle be constructed only of unpainted wood. The roof is made of straw. In the construction no nails are used for fixing the wood.

What is the meaning of this architecture? It is clear that this architecture is a concrete form of the vegetable point of view of the world and that this simple naturalness of the shrine takes away the luxurious secularity from the mind of the visitors. So the final end of the liturgy is the pure, silent encounter with god in a remote place, away from the common world. But in order to reach this place there are presupposed steps to the liturgy. One must enter through the gate, called *torli* (seat of the birds as messenger of god). This signifies that the visitor exists after this moment, not in the material world, but in the garden of the spiritual. In order to show it visually, small white sand stones cover the ground, and acoustically the trees bring the voice of the wind as a sign of the vividness of nature. Through this atmosphere the visitor already acquires an elevated mood. The visitor must wash his hands and clean his mouth with fountain water in the little hall. This is the symbol of purification of the body, but it is the reminiscence of the old style of purification when visitors had to enter a river to clean themselves.

In order to purify the mind from sin and crime, after the purification by water, the visitor comes to the front of the shrine and claps his hands twice in order to draw divine attention to

himself. He bows and then the priest comes with a symbol of trees, made of white paper and wood, and swings it above the bowing head of the visitor in order to drive away sin and crime.

The origin of this liturgy of purification was perhaps the oldest ascetic deed in the river and in the mountains because, as I have mentioned, in Japanese natural religion the natural entities and phenomena like river, mountain and winds are gods as such. Therefore the liturgical form mentioned above is the practically compacted style of purification without ascetic essence, but it retains the psychological protection of the divinity. The central thought of this liturgy is clearly written in the text of the "Norito" (prayer) of "Otsugomou" (the last day of the month) in "Engishiki" (one of the ligurtical canons edited in the 9th century): the principle thought behind this canon is that when the sins and crimes of every sort become replete in the country of Japan, then the priests of all the shrines have to read this canon in order to evoke the divine winds which sweep out all the sins and crimes like dirt into the water of the sea where a certain ocean god swallows them and brings them to the bottom of the ocean in order to spit them out of the mouth into the split of this bottom, so that all the world gets purified.

This optimistic idea of purification is like a legal institution, automatically operated without subjective regard, moral reflection, or religious sense of guilt. We can confirm that here the excessive longing for cleanliness is so strong that it is not permitted to reserve any space for subjective remorse which contain the shadow of dirty sin. So here we have a religion without inner repentance. The sins and crimes must be completely forgotten in order to live brightly in the difficult world. Although this superficial optimism for the clear dimension without repentance has been to some extent remedied and deepened by the spiritual influence of Buddhism, received in the 7th century but especially accepted after the 12th century (by received I understand taken in hand objectively, and by accept I understand taken into the heart), in my opinion, even today we can perceive its influence in the excessive use of game centers and TV in the daily life of Japan, because such technological apparatus makes people forget every thought of internal conflict brought by personal imperfection and makes them recover their vitality in the real world.

So technology takes the place of religion in regard to the so-called "purification". The religious festival is also transformed into popular performance wherein the substitution of religious ecstasy is experienced in order to forget the spiritual stress.

In the realm of philosophy of religion Japan we can also discover such an influence of so-called purification in two delicate ways. First, in Shinran Buddhism there is an avoidance of relying on the institution and an accentuation of reliance on the Buddha only through prayer. Even good people receive salvation, not to mention the bad ones. This means that the good persons can enter paradise through their own good deeds without the grace of Buddha, which is very strong. The bad person, to whom Buddha gives his grace through sympathy, must be more definitely saved than the good person without grace.

The second is the opposite of this thought, namely, the independent attitude of Zen-Buddhism which teaches salvation through ascetic meditation which enables us to be unified with the truth. One half of this doctrine is a complete reaction against the superficial attitude without asceticism, but the other half is the inheritance of the forgetfulness of the phenomenal dimension found in the old Shintoism.

On Moral Deed

The simple optimistic purification of Shintoism without any guilty sense has been amended or moderated through the influence of Confucianism, which the Japanese spiritual world accepted

from China in the 4th century. The moral philosophy of Confucius teaches five principal virtues which are charity (love), responsibility, sublimity of deed, of which the summit is liturgy, cognition, and confidence. The very important fact is the inventive consciousness of the second virtue, responsibility. As I have already shown both philologically and philosophically in my many other articles, that virtue, responsibility, is of the relatively recent origin in occidental history. One cannot discover any equivalent Greek word for it and there is no word *responsibilitas* in the classical or medieval Latin language. The word "responsibility" which we find in John Steward Mill is almost punishability and the German word *Verantwortung* or *Verantwortlichkeit*, which was created in the nineteenth century, meant only *Zurechnung*. The real sense of responsibility as moral response of intersubjectivity has been realized in Western society in the twentieth century. But in the oriental world, especially in China, the moral inter-subjectivity was realized already in classical time through the philosophical reflexion of Confucius, because in his opinion the fundamental fact of human existence is intersubjectivity or interindividuality. At any rate, in Confucius the vertical responsibility to Heaven and the horizontal responsibility to fellowship were strongly known.

The individuum who failed to be responsible in both senses exists outside of intersubjectivity as the fundamental human condition. That is to say, the individuum in question no longer lives as a human being. Here, it is an animal that breathes, because in the oriental world there had been no idea of "persona" until Wang Yangming, who proposed the concept "Ryang Tsi" as *Gewissen* in later times. The human being who failed to be responsible lost face as a human being; he lives no more as a human, but as an animal. Where is the meaning of his life as a human being? This reflexion guides the Japanese to the ethical idea of suicide. Especially in chivalric morality suicide known as "Harakiri" is a moral idea for the chivalric person who lost face. But suicide as a moral deed of responsibility has been found very often, even in the class of normal merchantman, namely, in the citizenship. The work distributed to the individuum seems to him sometimes to be the task to which he must consecrate his life in order to be responsible enough. This idea is, on the one hand, very good for the effective functioning of the collective project, but, on the other hand, very inhuman because human life seems to be thought of as a functional part of a machine. It is the defect of a tradition without the concept of "persona". But even here we can discover the tragic beauty of the humanity which is consecrated to the virtue responsibility.

Bibliographical note: For Section 1: Reflections on thinking, see my book *Betrachtungen über das Eine* (1986). For Section 2: Thought, see my books *Toyo no Bigaku* (*Aesthetics in the East*) (1980) and *Studia comparata de aesthetica* (1976). For Section 3: Reflection on the thing produced, see my book *Tzai no Tetsugaka* (*Philosophy in the East and in the West*) (1981) and my article "Contrarieté et compatibilité" in *Actes du Congres de Santa Margherita*, pp. 55-71, Genova, 1990.

22.
Technical Creativity in Japanese Literary Culture

Takehiko Kenmochi

The Japanese have little originality, so that Japan has very few geniuses who could create religions, philosophies or scientific principles that bring about revolutions in human consciousness in history. So say many foreigners, and sometimes this is believed by many Japanese themselves.

But creativity is not always a matter of individuality. True, there are few geniuses in Japan who could contribute something great to world history through their individual originality, but there is rich originality and creativity in Japanese culture itself. E.g., in Japan there is a very characteristic literary culture which is truly original and powerful.

For example, today's Japanese use four sorts of letters, namely, Chinese characters, katakana, hiragana and the Roman alphabet. All educated Japanese can imagine these four sorts of characters at the same time and instantly when they think of something, for the Japanese language is always a combination of four types of characters. In the Japanese consciousness the inter-relation between these is incomparably better organized than in any computer. The Japanese can decipher and use the configuration of these four sorts of characters with precision and in context. No one has invented such a super machine, and it is the product not of an individual genius, but of collective creativity.

To grasp the functions of these four sorts of characters note that Chinese characters are not simple phonetic signs; but each letter is one word constructed through a symbolic figure. Thus, sometimes it is very difficult to write foreign proper nouns only through Chinese characters. In such a case the Japanese use katakana which are phonetic signs used for foreign pronunciation.

In the Japanese language Chinese characters have several ways of being read. The first is a limitation of Chinese phonetics for the Chinese technical terms which the Japanese had to import as foreign words. The second is the application of Japanese words for Chinese words. In such a case the Chinese characters are written, but their pronunciation is entirely Japanese. The third is a semantic interpretation of Chinese words. In this case one Chinese word may be said in several Japanese words and vice versa. The katakana was originally phonetic signs in order to read Chinese text in the Japanese way. Hiragana was also phonetic signs in the Japanese language, but invented in order to write Japanese together with Chinese characters. Chinese characters were used at the beginning also as phonetic signs of Japanese (manyogana) from which hiragana was made. So, there is creative invention in analyzing a Chinese character to its elemental form and applying it to another dimension. This analytic operation and hetero-dimensional applications are the two Japanese creative peculiarities found in the modern technological domain.

Compared with Western languages in which the verb has dominant with decisive function as to person, number and tense, the Japanese language is a language of the noun which has dominant and decisive functions. Western language is one of point and line with which the meaning of the word becomes clear; in contrast Japanese is one of phase and field in which the atmospheres of the nouns are combined with each other through post positional words.

In the present world there are 2796 language, divided into 12 principal language families and another 50 less important families of languages. Of these 62 language families, Japanese is one. Each language family is a product of original creativity, and hence one of the clearest signs of collective creativity. The writing custom consisting of four sorts of characters is a product of such collective creativity on the part of the Japanese people.

In countries where the upper class uses a difficult manner of writing, the lower classes cannot learn to write and civilization cannot be shared. In Japanese the Chinese characters were employed by the dominant class from the ancient Edo era, but for the lower class there was hiragana parallel to the Chinese characters. Thus humanistic education with reading and writing was diffused to a very high percentage of the population. This enabled Japan quickly to receive and learn foreign civilizations after the Meiji restauration. This too is the result of its creativity with regard to writing.

Parallel to the literary culture are a number of technological achievements. One of the most characteristic inventions is the form of rice cultivation in the water fields. This is a refinement of the original method received from South China or some Southern islands. By improving this method, the quantity of the harvest was very great, which made possible a self-sufficient system of food production till the Edo era. This too is an impersonal collective creation and another is the electro-technological system. The prosperity of Japan in this technology also originated from a collective creativity for which no personal name is necessary, but parallel to the creativity of language and writing in Japan.

Thus the theme, "humanization of technology", can be studied in the context of a literary culture in which the technical must be integrated along with such other values as the ethical and communicative.

(Translated by Prof. Noriko Hashimoto)

23.
The Structure of Oriental Values and Education

Yamamoto Yasuo

European rationalism and American utilitarianism have promoted the development of material civilization in Western countries, and have brought liberalism and individualism into vogue. Nevertheless, due to the disorders in developed societies, many people lack confidence in state power. This is related to issues of education in values.

In Western countries states are administered in terms of law; in education, great attention is paid to training all kinds of abilities instead of cultivating a lofty moral character and overall development.

In Eastern societies, because the Confucians attach great importance to morality and to the relation between virtue and ability, there is a tendency to place virtue above ability. Dong Zhonshu, the famous philosopher in the West Han dynasty, said:

A man of ability, however, who is not benevolent and wise, will use his ability to foster wicked thoughts and wild ambition which will encourage his hypocritical and eccentric deeds; consequently his ability intensifies his mistakes and evils.1

Regarding the relation between virtue and ability, Sima Guang, the great historian in North Song dynasty, said:

What is called ability is cleverness, astuteness, strength and resoluteness; what is called virtue is honesty, uprightness, moderation and kindness. Ability is the medium through which virtue is effected, while virtue guides ability.2

That is, virtue determines the use and purpose of ability, while ability is the means of virtue.

Consequently, in Eastern countries, especially where the Confucian tradition has been preserved, education in virtue has always received great attention. In these countries, the influence of Confucian thought regarding education has been preserved till now, whether consciously or not. The culture favors the preservation of familial relations, the unity of society and the power of a state.

However, Confucian thought regarding hierarchy has ben criticized by modern intellectuals as anti-democratic. This criticism was reasonable and necessary, but the real problem was in the relation of the Confucian tradition to the monarchy, rather than in the theory itself, whose view of moral value has important theoretical significance.

The oriental view of morality is inseparable from the concept of human nature. We shall look here at the philosophy of Dong Zhongshu. On the basis of Mencius's theory of human nature, influenced by the doctrine of Yin and Yang and the five elements, Dong Zhongshu claimed that human nature manifests five constant virtues, i.e., benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity, which correspond to the five elements, i.e, metal, wood, water, fire and earth.

The Five Virtues

According to the Dong's interpretations, the meaning of the five constant virtues can be expounded as follows:

- Benevolence manifests itself in the inner mind in love and compassion for people and in avoiding harm or envy toward anyone. In terms of behavior, benevolence demands that one be amiable, not wrangle with others nor do evil deeds. In short, as parents treat their children, the benevolent person spares no effort to help others, one even lays down one's life to this end, with no thought of being repaid.

- Righteousness in contrast to benevolence involves thinking and acting from one's own viewpoint. It demands rational action, mainly through a proper relation between position, power and duty, that is, the higher the position and power, the greater the duty. Righteousness demands concern for neighbors: to be righteous is to wish that one's neighbors be as happy as oneself. In a word, as an elder brother is concerned about his younger brothers, the righteous person shares the comforts and hardships of others and is fair and just in handling affairs.

- Propriety, originating in ancient sacrificial rites, in a general sense signifies behavioral norms which maintain hierarchy. Xun Zi said: "Human life cannot subsist without society. A society will sink into fierce rivalry without differentiation. The rivalry will cause chaos, which will lead to poverty."3 Therefore, in order to maintain the order of society, different relationships should be established according to different status. In ancient society, besides the relation of monarch and subjects, there were also the relations of father and sons, husband and wife, the elder and the young, teacher and students, and others. These relations differ but all demand respect and modest deference to others. You Zi, Confucius's disciple, said: "To be respectful is close to being observant of the rites."4 Mencius also said: "The courteous man respects others, . . . he who respects others is always respected by them."5 Thus, it is clear that propriety must be instilled with a spirit of equality, that is, only by treating others as oneself, can one do proper deeds, and maintain their relation in an harmonious state. For this reason a disciple of Confucius said: "Of the things brought about by the rites, harmony is the most valuable."6 The contents of propriety include loyalty, filial piety, fraternal duty, chastity, respect, etc. All are norms maintaining hierarchal order between the superior and the inferior, parents and children, the elder brothers and the younger brothers, husband and wife, and the elders and the young. However the spirit of equality is an essential prerequisite of propriety, especially in relations with unfamiliar persons.

- Wisdom is the innate knowledge by which one judges right and wrong, good and evil. This is necessary in the practice of moral norms, for otherwise one cannot become a person of virtue.

- Fidelity is honesty. This means that, externally, one's deeds match one's words; and that internally one's words and mind are in unison. Fidelity is a key to the perfection of human nature. It is the basis without which other virtues lose their authenticity; hence they are inseparable. Fidelity is inherent in a child, but might be lost due to external influences.

Wisdom is knowledge of morality and can be cultivated through moral education. In contrast benevolence, righteousness and propriety are developed only through practice and cannot be acquired through reason. Therefore Wang Yangming advocated the theory of the unity of knowing and doing, to stress the importance of practice.

The Properties of Virtues

The five virtues, as factors of human nature, constitute a complete system of values in accord with certain laws and structures, just as the elementary factors form nature in accord with certain laws. In order to apply these values to society and bring them into play in education, it is necessary to understand the specific properties of the system of the values.

- Sequence. There is an order of priority in the five virtues. Benevolence is first, righteousness follows, then propriety and wisdom, and finally fidelity. The criterion for this order is the benefit of each to people and society.
- Duality. According to Chinese philosophy, the five elements in nature are governed by the law of Yin and Yang. The five virtues also have this character: Yin is the seven human emotions, namely, joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate and desire; Yang is the principles of the five virtues.
- Harmony. Because of different qualities, some contradictions and conflicts arise among the five virtues, although each virtue is good. Therefore, only by coordination can these virtues display their good quality, which manifests the harmonious character of this system of values. For this reason, a Confucian philosopher said of the Doctrine of the Mean: "The state of centrality is the deep root and the state of harmony is the far-reaching Way of all the world's existence."7
- Stratification. The system of five virtues can be divided into three sub-systems, namely, large, middle and small. The large system of five virtues involves all people in the world, the middle system of five virtues involves the people of a state or a nation, and the small system of five virtues involves all members of a family or a clan. In judging the value of a virtue, this stratification is a decisive factor. For instance, the righteousness in the middle system is more important than the benevolence in the small system, but less important than propriety in the great system. Concretely, aggression against an other state, to free it from crisis, conforms to righteousness in the middle system of values, but violates propriety in the great system.

Rules of Coordination

The forms of coordination of these values are important in order to apply them concretely to society. These forms are established with the following rules:

- Fidelity is the basic virtue from which the other four virtues cannot be separated.
- Benevolence and righteousness are close in meaning, but differ in value, and therefore cannot play their roles coincidentally.
- Propriety defines different attitudes for different persons, that is, it can be used to supplement benevolence as well as righteousness. Especially when people are not familiar with each other, propriety is a more effective means for handling mutual relations.

Forms of Coordination

The first is benevolence, propriety and fidelity; the second is righteousness, propriety and fidelity; the third is righteousness, wisdom and fidelity. The first form is most lofty and suits the person of high rank in the society, for instance, persons of royal lineage in a state, parents in a family, etc.; the second form can be used by persons of middle grade, for instance, those in charge of enterprises in a state, the adult in a family, etc. The third form suits the persons of low rank, for

instance, the common people in a state, or children in a family. Therefore, each member of every social stratum must select a suitable coordination of values for him or herself. *The 17-articles Constitution* drawn up by Shotoku Taishi (574-622), the great Japanese philosopher and statesman, stipulated: "All subjects and officials must take propriety as the fundamental." This stipulation and the order of official position in "the 12 Court ranks" formulated by him, i.e., benevolence, propriety, fidelity, righteousness, wisdom, and so on, conform to the above applied principles of the five virtues.

In cultivating the five virtues, one must begin with fidelity and wisdom, after that, propriety, righteousness, benevolence. Thus the spirit is extended from the small system of five values to the middle and big systems. *The Great Learning (Daxue)* in the Confucian classic, *The Book of Rites*, described the whole process of moral cultivation as follows:

Only when things are investigated is knowledge extended; only when knowledge is extended are thoughts sincere; only when thoughts are sincere are minds rectified; only when minds are rectified are our persons cultivated; only when our persons are cultivated are our families regulated; only when families are regulated are states well governed; and only when states are well governed is there peace in the world.8

The investigation of things and the extension of knowledge are the completion of the principle inherent in things, namely, the cultivation of wisdom. Sincerity of thought and rectification of the mind are the cultivation of fidelity. Therefore, in *The Great Learning*, wisdom is put before fidelity. The cultivation of persons is to acquire benevolence, righteousness and propriety. The sequence of the priority of these three virtues is not fixed; however their degree of difficulty is definite, the most difficult being benevolence, and then righteousness. The regulated family is perfect having all five virtues of small system; the well governed state is orderly having all five virtues of middle system; the pacified world is tranquil having all five virtues of big system. That is, only by expanding the education of five virtues can world peace and human happiness be acquired.

The Method of Cultivation of the Five Virtues

The Doctrine of the Mean advocated "extensive study, accurate inquiry, careful reflection, clear discrimination and earnest practice." The preceding four steps are related to the culturation of wisdom in the five virtues. All rely on reason, instead of on desire and feeling which impede the cultivation of human nature in these steps. Therefore the mind must be concentrated and open; in moral cultivation one must keep a sincere and reverent attitude. Moral cultivation is a process of self-understanding through introspection to discover human nature and to advance one's consciousness. It is not ordinary learning or knowledge. However cultivation should not end here.

Once human nature has been discovered and wisdom has been acquired they must be practiced; this is "earnest practice". To this extent, moral cultivation requires feeling to foster implementation in social practice. Only thus can one acquire the virtues of propriety, righteousness and benevolence. In this phase, it must control desire and feeling by reason and wisdom. In the last phase reason and feeling are united and desire is moderated by virtue. The mind is then clear, pure, bright and focused.

People always are affected by circumstances, so the social organization in which one lives and works is an important factor in one's spiritual development. Therefore, in cultivating the five

virtues, besides the above mentioned introspection and practice, the role of society is important. The one who leads a society or organization has great influence over those who live and work in the society or organization. So, these leaders must make greater efforts to cultivate virtues. Of all the forms of society, the family is the most fundamental. In moral education, the great effect of the family is very obvious. One who failed to enjoy the love and sincerity of parents in childhood could hardly acquire the virtues of benevolence and fidelity. Thus the moralization of society must begin with family.

In short, even in modern society the Asian theory of moral values has profound significance. Though the modern state is administered mainly by law, law only restrains people; it cannot teach man, especially it cannot perfect one's mind. Hence, Dong Zhongshu called for law to be used as a supplement to virtue. This oriental wisdom still can inspire us.

Notes

1. Dong Zhongshu, *Chunqiu Fanlu* (*Luxuriant Gems from the Spring and Autumn Annals*), Chapter, *Biren qiezhi* (*Must Be Benevolent and Wise*).

2. Sima Guang, *Zizhi Tongjian* (*The Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Governmant), Zhouji* (*The Biography of the Kings in Chou Dynasty*).

3. Xun Zi, *Fuguo* (*Enriching the State*).

4. *The Analects* (Lun Yu), Book I. See *Confucius, The Analects* (Lun Yu), trans. by D.C. Lau (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1983).

5. Mencius, Book IV, part B. See *Mencius*, trans. by D.C. Lau (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984).

6. *The Analects* (Lun Yu), Book I. See *Confucius, The Analects*.

7. *The Doctrine of the Mean*: Chapter one. See *Source of Chinese Tradition*, Chapter I, compiled by W. Theodore de Bary, Wing-Tsit Chan, Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 119.

8. *The Great Learning*. See *Source of Chinese Tradition*, p. 11.

24.

Creativity as Synthesis of Contrasting Wisdoms: An Interpretation of Chinese Philosophy in Taiwan since 1949

Vincent Shen

The Problematic of a Meeting of Chinese and Western Philosophies

Ever since Matteo Ricci came to China in 1583, bringing Western science, philosophy, and Christianity to Chinese culture, scholars of Chinese philosophy have faced a totally new task: how to accommodate Chinese philosophy to Western ideas. This task began with the translation and publication of Western books into Chinese by Matteo Ricci, Hsu Kuangchi, Li Chih-tsao, and others. Matteo Ricci's "True Ideas of God" introduced such Scholastic concepts as "being", "substance", "essence" and "existence" and tried to synthesize the Scholastic philosophy of man with the Confucian theory of human nature. It interpreted the Confucian concept of Heaven with the help of the Scholastic concept of a personal God, justifying this later by combining the Thomistic *Quinque Viae* with the Mencian theories of Liang Chi and Chin Hsin. This approach provided the philosophical foundation for integrating Confucian *Jen* with Christian love. This was the first attempt to use Scholastic philosophy to reconcile Chinese and Western philosophical systems. This tendency has been continued by Chinese neo-Scholastic philosophers in Taiwan.

The second attempts were launched by the Ch'ing scholars Ku Yen-wu and Yen Jo-chu, and by the subsequent Ch'en Chia school of philosophical studies. These scholars adopted the logic and mathematical methods introduced into China by Matteo Ricci, Francisco Futardo and others, applying methods of induction and classification to study the ancient Chinese phonological systems investigating ancient texts. Their key contribution was to set a precedent for positivist research, to be continued by later researchers in the natural and even the social sciences. (It was in reaction against this positivist tendency that contemporary neo-Confucianism emerged in Taiwan.)

Toward the end of the Ch'ing dynasty and the beginning of the Republic period, scholars like Yen Fu, Li Lih-ying, and Wang Kuo-wei continued without interruption the task of translating and introducing Western philosophy. This effort continued until the year 1921, when Tsai Yuan-pei wrote a critical assessment entitled "Chinese Philosophy over the Past Fifty Years", in which he expressed the judgment that philosophical activity in China during this period was limited to introducing Western philosophy, on the one hand, and continuing to expound on traditional Chinese philosophy, on the other. No original school of Chinese philosophy had emerged.1

Chinese philosophy did experience a period of development, however, after the central government moved to Taiwan in 1949, and its visage today is vastly different from what it was in Tsai Yuan-pei's day. On the one hand, research in the area of Western philosophy became more sophisticated and refined; it is no longer content with mere translation and introduction. On the other hand, scholars of traditional Chinese philosophy have familiarized themselves with Western philosophical concepts and incorporated them into their studies, resulting in more eclectic philosophical systems.

The conscious effort to effect a meeting of Chinese and Western philosophies is the main task of philosophical activity in Taiwan today. In this sense, it differs from what is happening in the natural and the social sciences, which either are entirely determined by, and conducted according to, the paradigms of modern Western science, or are merely applications of Western theory to Taiwanese empirical data. The recent call for a "Sinicization of the social sciences" means, at most,

the empirical application of Western social theory to Taiwanese society. The work of accomplishing a meeting of Chinese and Western ideas has been most fruitful in philosophy. But whether this meeting on the level of systems of ideas is relevant to the needs of the Life-world2 still is open to question.

Three Schools of Synthesis

Generally speaking, there are three approaches to a synthesis of Chinese and Western philosophies: a Comprehensive Synthesis, a Contemporary Neo-Confucian Synthesis, and a Chinese Neo-Scholastic Synthesis.

Comprehensive Synthesis -- Represented by Thomé Fang (1899-1977) and His Followers

Clinging to the essence of Chinese philosophy, which it characterizes as a unique type of transcendental-immanent metaphysics, this school helps itself to any kind of philosophical idea -- Chinese or Western -- where it finds pertinent insight into cosmic existence and human nature. Chinese philosophy, with its different systems of thought, is seen by Thomé Fang as having three common features:

(a) a doctrine of pervasive unity taken in multifarious significations,
(b) a doctrine of the Tao -- a common idiom imbued in each system with the richness of difference in meaning, and
(c) an exaltation of the human individual into ever higher realms of existence variously conceived.3

In this sense, this trend toward synthesis could also be called a "metaphysical synthesis". The two pillars of Thomé Fang's philosophical system are the theory of being and the theory of human nature. In the domain of being, he affirms the multifaceted nature of existence, including the physical, biological, psychological, aesthetic, moral, and religious, as well as the unfathomable. He argues that something at a basic, fundamental level can evolve and develop into something at a subsequent higher level (represented as a "turning upward"), and that things that exist at the higher levels can pour their creative forces back into, and thereby fortify, those at the lower levels (represented as a "turning downward").

As for the domain of human nature, he argues that a person can advance from *Homo faber* to *Homo 'creator'* to *Homo sapiens* -- signifying a person of knowledge -- and then to *Homo symbolicus*, to *Homo honaestates*or moral human being, and finally to *Homo religiosus*. Human nature can either develop from a lower level to a higher one or come down from a higher level and become firmly settled on a lower one -- thus realizing within itself the two aspects of the process that encompasses turning upward and turning downward.4

Taking these two theoretical points as the structural framework of his system, Thomé Fang's philosophy emphasizes specifically the creativity, rationality, and interconnectedness of thinking and existence.

Aesthetic experience forms the core of Thomé Fang's philosophy of life. It stresses the unending creativity that finds a common denominator between all sorts of differentiated realms and the unfathomable, and combines them as well -- in this way incorporating elements of both Western and Chinese philosophy into a new thought system.

Contemporary Neo-Confucian Synthesis--Represented by T'ang Chu-yi, Mou Tsung-san, and their Followers.

Contemporary Neo-Confucianism emerged as a transcendentalist movement against what had been a trend toward positivism since the Ch'en Chia school. It represents a search for a foundation in subjective experience for the science and democracy that have become essential to Chinese intellectuals since the reinforcement of these ideals by the May Fourth Movement. Following this philosophy of subjectivism, they have been trying as well to resolve the cultural crisis of modern China, especially since the advent of the Communist regime. In their efforts at synthesizing Chinese and Western philosophy these intellectuals explain why they place particular emphasis on the idealist school of *hsin-hsing* studies, and especially on the writings of Mencius, Lu Hsiang-shan, and Wang Yang-ming. They are attempting to appropriate the teachings of this school and accommodate them to German Idealism, in particular to the transcendental philosophy of Kant and the spiritual phenomenology of Hegel.

Briefly, moral experience is the source of T'ang Chun-yi's philosophy. Its ultimate end is to construct an image of the perfect human being. T'ang explores the structure and dynamism of subjective experience in much the same way as does Hegel in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit* and schematizes the structure of this subjective experience into what he calls "the nine horizons of the human mind". The first three horizons ascertain the status and content of "individual", "concept" and "principle" to derive the transcendental basis for the establishment of science. The second three horizons tackle "perception", "language" and "morality" to explain the constitution of a world of meaning, thus laying a transcendental foundation for the humanities. The last three horizons treat God, Dharma, and Heavenly Virtue, respectively -- and so reconstruct Monotheism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Hereby T'ang provides a transcendental basis for religion, while adding a religious dimension to Confucianism.5

The philosophy of Mou Tsung-san, on the other hand, takes the activity of knowing as the core of its reflection. Its aim is to synthesize Neo-Confucian philosophy with the philosophy of Kant so as to clarify the transcendental capacity and legitimacy of subjective experience in order to lay a transcendental foundation for science and democracy. His recent book, *Fourteen Lectures on the Encounter and Synthesis of Chinese and Western Philosophy*,6 shows this synthesis as the main problematic of his philosophical concern. In brief, Mou Tsung-san's philosophy can be summarized in the following propositions:

(1) Based on a Kantian critical approach, Mou traces the transcendental foundation of the sciences, especially the formal sciences such as logic and mathematics, in order to save them from the trap of positivism.

(2) He overcomes the critical limitations of Kantian philosophy and affirms the necessity of intellectual intuition, the existence of which is proved by Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism.

(3) He reinterprets, on an ontological level, Kantian free will, resulting in the affirmation of a "free, unlimited mind".

(4) Through a process of self-negation (*tzu-wo k'an-hsien*) and a "twofold unfolding of the unlimited mind" (conceived through Mou's interpretation of the *Mahayana-sraddhotpada atra*), the free and infinite mind could be developed into both modern science and modern democracy.

(5) Mou proposes a principle of coordination, as opposed to subordination, as the basis of modernization.

Mou's philosophy is a reaction against positivism, with the help of transcendental philosophy, and a reaction against Westernization, with the help of a reinterpretation of Chinese philosophy, especially Confucianism. His concept of free and unlimited mind stands in the place of the God of Christianity, thereby giving Neo-Confucianism a religious overtone.

The Chinese Scholastic Synthesis -- Represented by Wu Ching-hsiung and Lo Kuang and Other Catholic Philosophers

This school mainly carries on the tradition of Matteo Ricci and his followers. It is based on the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, which is combines systematically with Chinese philosophy. In its incorporation of Chinese philosophy, it places particular stress on classical or primordial Confucianism of the pre-Ch'in period.

Wu Ching-hsiung's main contribution is in the area of legal philosophy. In such books as *Fountain of Justice* and *Cases on Jurisprudence*, and in such papers as "Mencius's Theory of Human Nature and Nature Law", "My Philosophy of Law: Natural Law in Evolution" and "Comparative Studies in the Philosophy of Natural Law", Wu combines Confucian-Mencian thought with Thomistic philosophy. He argues that a Confucian Tao consists of a set of ethical principles, comparable to the so-called "natural laws" of the Scholastics. Such Confucian concepts as the "mandate of Heaven (*t'ien ming*), "human nature" (*jen-hsing*), and "educationalization" (*chiao-hua*) refer to different aspects of Confucianism while still remaining closely interconnected. They are quite similar to the "eternal law", "natural law", and "positive law" of Scholastic philosophy -- which are also distinct concepts yet part of the same continuum.7

Lo Kuang proposes to link up the ontology of Scholastic philosophy with the doctrine of change in Chinese philosophy in order to lay a foundation for a philosophy of life that is capable of encompassing both the ethical and the religious life. He uses the concept of a personal God to interpret the Great Ultimate (*t'ai-chi*). He argues that *t'ai-chi* is the Heavenly God, the uncreated Being itself, the source of the creation of life, the one who has created the perpetually changing universe. The main concept of his philosophy of life is the humaneness of *jen*. Through *jen* humanity is capable of endless development because *jen* is a dynamic aspect of existence relating all human beings and all things. This development ranges from the Confucian ideal of taking the welfare of others into consideration in everything one does (*chi li li jen, chi ta ta jen*) to achieving a great world commonwealth of love, harmony and peace, and from this to a realization of the unity of all things -- even of Heaven and humanity. But even though humanity can be in union with Heaven, humanity is not itself Heaven. For this reason, one must examine one's errors and try to be rid of one's small self, to facilitate the way to loving communion and union with the Heavenly God.8

In short, the Chinese Scholastic philosophers posit a personal God as the creative source of all life, and the communion of love as the ultimate attainment in human life. Clearly these two insights are closely linked to the core religious experience of these philosophers.

New Elements for New Syntheses

In addition to the three syntheses just described, the continued absorption and evaluation of Western philosophy has been from the outset a major task of contemporary Chinese philosophers. For example, logical positivism has had a strong influence on Fung Yu-lan and Jin Yue-lin and

some philosophers in Taiwan. Analytic philosophy, phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, hermeneutics, and critical theory, all have been imported and given close study. They too may someday become components of a future new synthesis.

For example, existentialism enjoyed a period of popularity in Taiwan in the 1960s, and the works of Sartre, Kafka, Camus, Heidegger, and others were translated into Chinese and widely studied. Existentialist thinking was able, on the one hand, to satisfy the intellectual and emotional needs of Taiwan's dejected and apprehensive youth as the country was undergoing the process of industrialization. On the other hand, existentialism was in accord with the traditional concern in Chinese philosophy for the meaning and value of life. It was particularly compatible with the Zen Buddhist emphasis on existential enlightenment.

Phenomenology's emphasis on subjectivity, intentionality and meaning is not far removed from traditional Chinese philosophical thinking, Structuralism has been used in analyzing classical Chinese literature and mass culture. Hermeneutics has opened new doors to an understanding and reinterpretation of the classical works of Chinese philosophy. Studies on critical theory in Taiwan are motivated mainly by the need for improvements in political communication and the critique of ideology. Philosophies of science and technology have also begun to receive considerable attention in Taiwan: inquiries into the relationship between science and technology and society and culture have been elevated to the level of philosophical reflection.9 The studies concerning these issues demonstrate that philosophy in Taiwan has caught up with world philosophical trends today, and surely will contribute to a new outlook for Chinese philosophy in the years to come.

But for the Chinese philosopher, the study of existentialism, analytic philosophy, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and critical theory cannot simply follow Western currents; instead, these currents must be analyzed and utilized in novel and creative syntheses. To this purpose, new trends in Western philosophy, including its problematic and methods, must be subjected to the following questions.

(1) What is their possible relationship to the Chinese experience today, and their relevance to the problems encountered by the Chinese people and society in the process of development?

(2) What is their relevance to the categories of values, cultural expression, life purpose, human nature, and so forth so cherished by the Chinese people in their everyday life *praxis*?

(3) What is their relevance to the problems and methods of traditional Chinese philosophy, and how is this to be made explicit through comparative studies?

Final Reflections and Conclusion

While studies in Western philosophy have their own legitimacy, it must be said that they may not necessarily become an essential part of the Chinese philosophical enterprise. The idea of synthesis itself has to be submitted for examination. Its most crucial problem is that of incommensurability. Different philosophical perspectives, both Chinese and Western, such as Confucianism, German Idealism, and Scholasticism, might be incommensurable with one another either because of their internal structures or because of their external relationships. Alasdair MacIntyre once gave an example of Confucian versus Aristotelian theories of virtue: "Aristotelianism and Confucianism each have a conception of human nature to match their theories of the virtues and there is no adequate neutral conception available. Those two moral theories are incommensurable."10Although this may be the case, MacIntyre also recognizes that it does not follow that all possibilities of mutual understanding are precluded. Understanding requires that we

translate other theories into our own language. The problem of synthesis may be seen, therefore, as a process of adopting and being well versed in different philosophical languages in order to make one's own philosophical tradition understandable to other traditions and vice versa.

However, the notion of incommensurability does not hinder Chinese philosophers in Taiwan who have the following intentions in their study of Western philosophy: first, to use Western philosophical languages as conceptual instruments for translating and thematizing Chinese philosophical ideas; second, to use different philosophical languages as revealing and expressive of different cultural experiences; and third, to appropriate different languages to express philosophical ideas emerging from new contexts of the life-word.

In this sense, philosophical activity in Taiwan, increasingly centered on the project of synthesizing Chinese and Western philosophies, is at the same time engaged in a process of language appropriation. This is essential not for synthesis itself, but for the creation of new ways of thinking.

It is not enough to consider philosophical synthesis merely on the level of philosophical ideas. It is rather a process of appropriating other languages as a prelude to new creations. Languages translate our philosophical experiences into intelligible and therefore understandable forms for ourselves and others in the process of historical and cultural change.

As we have seen. T'ang Chun-yi's philosophy is based on his moral experience, whereas Mon Tsung-san based his philosophy especially on his own critical and cognitive experience. The philosophical languages they appropriate, both Kantian and Hegelian, are considered by them as ways of modernizing Chinese philosophy and providing transcendental ground for the study of science and morality.

Thomé Fang has aesthetics as the core of his philosophical experience. The philosophical language he adopts, not grounded in a specific doctrine but comprehensive in its synthesis, is based on the problems of existence and human nature; it has offered an all-encompassing vision for reconstructing Chinese philosophy as a whole.

Lo Kuang, basing his philosophy on his religious experience, which finds its themes in traditional Scholasticism, adopts Chinese philosophy -- especially classical Confucianism -- in order to make his religious belief suitable for enculturation.

As I have said, the synthesis of Chinese and Western philosophies is not, as the philosophers mentioned above might think, merely a synthesis of systems of ideas; it is a process of enrichment of philosophical languages in view of the new possibilities of philosophical creativity facing a life-world that is always changing -- now more rapidly than ever. One's personal philosophy is a constitutive element of a world-in-the-making. For Chinese philosophers in Taiwan, and also for those on the Chinese mainland, a new "synthesis" has to be conducted in and for the life-world. This is especially true as the whole process of modernization taking place on both sides of the Taiwan Straits has its philosophical implications. Mainland China has been suffering social and cultural alienation as a result of conditions created by the Marxist regime. This situation must also be analyzed, clarified, and evaluated from a philosophical perspective. Moreover, we are coming to a crucial point in world history where capitalism and socialism can no longer offer any viable principle for organizing individual and collective lives. The very modernity of this world is now being criticized, and even rejected, in a growing postmodern cultural reaction. Between the modern and the postmodern, the Chinese mind has to orient itself consciously and philosophically toward its own future Way.

Chinese philosophers like Thomé Fang, T'ang Chun-yi, Mou Tsung-san and Lo Kuang have established their model for a synthesis of systems of ideas; but now it is time, based on their

experiences and in response to the dynamics of the life-world, to search further for possibilities of creative philosophical synthesis.

Notes

1. Tsai Yuan-pei, "Chinese Philosophy over the Past Fifty Years," in *Fifty Years of China since Late Ching* (Shanghai: 1922), p. 31.

2. I use the term "life-world" in the Husserlian sense; see Vincent Shen, "Life-world and Reason in Husserl's Philosophy of Life," *Analecta Husserliana*, 17 (1984), 105-116.

3. Thomé Fang, *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development* (Taipei: Linking Press, 1981), p. 1.

4. Thomé Fang, *Creativity in Man and Nature* (Taipei: Linking Press, 1980), p. 84.

5. T'ang Chun-yi, *The Existence of Life and the Horizons of the Spirit* (Taipei: Student Bookstore, 1977), vol. 1, pp. 39-46.

6. Mou Tsung-san, *Fourteen Lectures on the Encounter and Synthesis of Chinese and Western Philosophy* (Taipei: Student Bookstore, 1990).

7. Wu Ching-hsiung, *The Spiritual Source of Joy* (*Nei-hsin yueh-le chi chuan-yuan*) (Taipei: Tung Ta book Company, 1981).

8. Lo Kuang, *Philosophy of Life* (*Sheng-ming che-hsueh*) (Taipei: Student Bookstore, 1985).

9. Vincent Shen, *Disenchantment of the World* (in Chinese) (Taipei: Times Publishing Co., 1984).

10. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation between Confucius and Aristotelians about the Virtues" (Paper presented at the Sixth East-West Philosophers' Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, July, 1989).

25.
Transcendence and Progress
Thadeusz Zasepa

The Challenge of the 20th Century

As the 20th century draws to a close we look back upon a period in which persons and peoples have striven most ardently (and not without marked achievement); yet it has been perhaps the most violent period of human history. This paradox may have its explanation.

Let us begin with the search to recover and affirm the human person. The search is as old as the life of humankind, but in this century it has had some remarkable successes. It achieved the overthrow of totalitarianisms on both the Fascist right and the Muscovite left; it has dispelled colonialism across the world and has proclaimed human rights as universal. All of this reflects remarkable progress in the recognition of the dignity of the person as a prime value.

If that were the whole story we could be satisfied in these achievements and hopeful for the future. Alas, there is more to the history of our century. These achievements have generally consisted in finally overcoming what had been a nightmare but a few years earlier. What is more, both the tragedy and the triumph may have come from the same generic source, namely, the search to affirm the human person, for like all things human this can be done ill or well.

It may be the tragic character of our humanity that our very attempts at great and good things can be carried out in too limited or single-minded a manner. This would seem to be true of our modern quest to affirm and promote human life as implemented under the rationalist fascination with clear and distinct ideas. This took the form of some attractive myths, which, as they spread into ever wider circles, gained ever more disciples:

- The myth of progress, which is associated with the belief that science, and technology based on science, can resolve all human problems and create a paradise on earth. Consumerism and an attitude directed toward possession ("to have") follow from acceptance of the belief that science and technology have unbounded possibilities;
- The messianistic myth which makes up the basis of what are described as "political religions"; these in turn are based upon the promise that humanity will be able to appropriate to itself powers which hitherto had been ascribed to God, and then will be able to create a kingdom of freedom and happiness on earth. Humanity needs no savior, it will save itself by effecting a change in socio-economic structures and attain paradise on earth.

The painful and costly experiences of the twentieth century have shown that the "absolutes" man has created have not fulfilled man’s aspirations; they have not created a paradise on earth, and have not eliminated all forms of alienation. On the contrary, they have brought forth enormous threats, new forms of alienation, and above all new forms of human slavery. The "great drama of our times" is that great achievements and great opportunities exist side by side with hitherto unencountered threats of the destruction of man or the total annihilation of humanity.

Transcendence as the Context of Humane Life

This enables us to ask another question. If the search to affirm the person as good can be perverted into excesses of violence, oppression and slavery, what are the conditions which can enable this search to be salvific. It would appear first of all that this search must be marked by openness. In contrast to the Hobbesian image of humans defending themselves in violent conflict against all others, whether this be in terms of one's physical possessions, one's territory or one's ideology, true progress can take place only in a context which invites all to open and share, rather than to grasp, compete and conflict. If this be so, then the key to being human may lie somehow beyond man himself. Conversely, it has to be said wisely that to be without a transcendent is for man the essential, definitive and inescapable state of slavery.

Further, the quality in terms of which we live must be such that it opens to others in care and concern. Rather than the forces of matter as extension, impetus and hence violence against others, the key to human life is understanding of being in its origin, meaning and destiny, in terms not of antipathy but of care, not of conflict but of love.

Indeed the rejection of God which was expected to secure man complete freedom, in reality has led to a hitherto unencountered slavery and submission to human creations. Today better than ever we understand that the freedom of the human person, as his ability to decide and select from among various values and goods, is linked with the human person's being open in unlimited love. Without this man becomes deformed, and even dies the worst death, namely, moral death.

Today, better and more clearly than a century ago, we know that loving transcendence not only does not cramp human freedom, but is the sole guarantee of human freedom. "Man cannot be truly free or serve the cause of the development of true freedom, if he does not acknowledge and does not experience the transcendence of his existence in relation to the world" (John Paul II, address on the XIV World Day of Peace, January 1, 1981).

Our experience in this century brings us then to two conclusions. One is the need for real transcendence, for being that transcends man. The other is that the very nature of being ultimately must be of the character not of matter, impetus and violence, but of understanding and concern. This sense of transcendence in being, which in turn is of the character of love, is at the root of all religions.

Thus, religion is an answer to those questions which arise in the life of every thinking person, regardless of his or her cultural, social or political environment. These are questions about the sources and meaning of human life (why and to what end one exists), the meaning of love, of duty, and above all those questions which arise from the inevitable reality of death. Religion is a response to human love, which neither science, nor highly developed technology, nor politics are in a position to change. Independently of these systems the human person is born, loves, creates, suffers and dies.

Religion and Relations between Cultures

In acknowledging the transcendent dimension of human existence and the corresponding reality of the divine, religion gives meaning to the human person and sheds light upon this mysterious world and its incomprehensible history.

In the face of today's widespread sociological and pragmatic concerns regarding the problems of culture, it is possible to see the human person anew with his or her openness to truth, good and beauty. To look at the human and his/her "source" points to the central importance of religion to

the other domains of culture -- science, morality, creativity and the arts. Religion itself is the transcendence of culture as it provides perspective and meaning to the whole of human reality. Culture is nothing other than the manner of human existence, the road of human development, the bridge extending life eternal to life in time and *vice versa*.

It is here that Christ in his paradoxical character as both God and man has inspired human hopes through the centuries. Fully transcendent, he is yet fully human and hence immanent to humanity. This harmony is essentially healing to mankind. Whereas the human urge to be has generated the overbearing brutality of the *ubermensch*, the Christian God did not grasp power to himself but became man so that all might be saved. Conversely, one who insists on being human fully does not grasp this to himself in conflict with all others, but in the image of Christ is willing to give his life that all might live.

Since religion constitutes a cohesive group of responses to fundamental, existential human questions which confront each person and every society, and since it opens the path for human development, the means for achieving full realization, and a way of salvation, the religions in the various cultural formations, if practiced authentically, should open the way towards deep mutual acknowledgement and understanding of the other cultures. They have arisen in response to problems which are common to all; they bespeak a common source and goal of life.

Religion is an enormously complex and rich phenomenon, and there can be different ways of looking at it. Hence, there arise various kinds of knowledge about religion. Scientific knowledge, including such disciplines as history, sociology and psychology, afford a great deal of information, but do not resolve the central problems connected with religion. There is need also for a philosophy of religion and the theologies of particular religions.

Tranquil and profound philosophical reflection, complemented by the historical experience of the last century, shows how religion can render human existence intelligible and open the full horizon of human hope. It penetrates all the domains of human life and culture -- science, moral attitudes, creativity, the arts -- giving them inspiration and, from the personal point of view, justifying all the factors which make for an open and fulfilling humanism.

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