Spiritual Values and Social Progress

Uzbekistan Philosophical Studies, I

edited by
Said Shermukhamedov and Victoriya Levinskaya

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
# Table of Contents

*Preface*  
*Introduction*  

**Part I. The Need for Spiritual Culture**

1. Issues Regarding the Interaction of Spiritual Culture and Social Progress  
   *Said Shermukhamedov*  
   9

2. New Ways of Thinking and Political Culture  
   *Rustam Z. Jumaev*  
   19

3. Moral Culture  
   *Boris Patlakh*  
   27

4. The Role of Aesthetic Culture in Social Progress  
   *Umarov Erkin*  
   33

5. The Human Person as Object and Subject of Culture  
   *Abidjanov Alisher*  
   39

6. The Culture of International Communications and Social Progress  
   *Said Shermukhamedov*  
   43

**Part II. Resources for a Spiritual Culture**

7. Festival-Ritual Culture as a Factor of Social Progress  
   *M. Karabaev*  
   55

8. The Place of Islamic Culture in Social Progress  
   *Abdusamedov Anvar*  
   65

9. Language and Its Role in Social Progress and the Spiritual Perfection of the Person  
   *Usein Karimov and Olga Lantseva*  
   71

10. The Continuity of Knowledge in the Socio-Cultural Progress of Independent Uzbekistan  
    *Tukhtaev Khakim*  
    77

11. National-Cultural Interests and Social Progress  
    *Achildiev Abduvakhid*  
    85

**Part III. Structures of Spiritual Culture**

12. The Role of Economic Culture in Social Progress  
    101
Valiev Botir

13. Social Progress and the Administration of Cultural Processes
Nazarov Ravshan

14. The Role of Science in Social Progress
N. Shermukhamedova

15. The Place of Ecological Culture in Civil Society
Victoriya Levinskaya

Epilogue: The Philosophy of Culture and Social Progress
Imamjon Rakhimov

George F. McLean
Preface

Said Shermukhamedov

This volume of studies in the series, “Uzbek Philosophical Studies,” is by a group of philosophers of the Republic of Uzbekistan. It concerns the present problems of the Role of Spiritual Culture in Social Progress.

In the relationship between nature and human society the phenomena of culture and especially of spiritual culture are of very great significance. Having through consciousness broken beyond the limits of physical nature, the human mind and hands have created a “second nature” of material and spiritual culture. No sphere of human and social activity escapes this cultural influence.

Now, at the entrance into the 21st century humankind has greatly developed not only its material but also its spiritual culture: philosophical, physical, political, international communications, economic, moral, ecological, aesthetic, humanistic, national, language, religious, scientific, and so on.

The authors of this volume have taken as the object of their research some of these dimensions of spiritual culture which contribute to social progress: without culture there could be no social progress, and without social progress the development of culture would be impossible. Since the independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan the state and particularly its President, Islam Karimov, recognized spiritual culture as the most important factor in social progress. The goal of the authors of this volume is to bring this to light.

An important task for philosophers is to research deeply and in detail the aspects of spiritual culture in order to promote further progress and to support society and humankind in their development. Unfortunately, in the different periods of the development of society, especially in recent years, one can observe a trend toward the simplification of culture, propaganda and the cult of violence, pornography, immorality in the cinema, belles-lettres, the fine arts and other kinds of spiritual culture.

This weakening of culture leads to personal immorality, which in turn lowers society to animal conditions. Therefore, we see acts of vandalism and terrorism, interpersonal, inter-ethnic and religious.

The most important task of philosophers and students of culture is to provide a very strict critique of such activity because the main function of culture in general, and particularly of spiritual culture, must be the re-humanization of life: the content and essence of every kind of culture must be humanized. In that connection it is necessary to renounce the Marxist-Leninist division of humanity into bourgeois and proletarian. There are no different kinds of humans, but only one humanism, namely, that of respect, love and relationship of one to another, of society to persons, and of humankind to peoples. This must be treated as sacred, that is, at a level of spiritual culture. Only thus can we enter the 21st century with a culture which promotes the social progress of humankind.
Introduction

George F. McLean

This volume of studies from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, gives important insight into the deep challenges which confront the so-called newly independent states of Central Asia. These include the economic challenge of developing an adequate base after the physical links with the Soviet Union have been severed, and the problem of developing democratic educational and political institutions in the aftermath of a totalitarian ideology. These are enormous tasks any one of which would paralyze most peoples, yet all of them must be confronted simultaneously. Moreover, this cannot be delayed, for the population lives now and the next generation is being educated, rightly or wrongly, today.

The deeper issue, however, is how this people will respond to so great a challenge: what are its real roots; what paths will constitute a response, rather than its perpetuation; and where can one find the resources of vision which will enable this people to pursue paths which lead not into the past, but into a future they choose as the way to live their identity in these circumstances.

To confront these question Professor Said Shermukhamedov, who had been Minister of Education in the past, brought together a young team to reflect in a structured manner upon the quandaries of the people, upon the resources available from the past, and upon the tasks being faced in the various dimensions of Uzbek life. The results of this work may not be a full prescription for the future, but any attempt at such a prescription will have to take account of the matters found in this work.

These are organized in three Parts which focus in turn upon the present need for the development of spiritual culture, the resources from which this can be drawn or in terms of which it can be developed, and some areas of application.

Part I “The Need for Spiritual Culture” is a theme which in one way or another pervades the entire work. Throughout, in a fairly muted manner but with great cumulative force, there emerges a sense of the repression and distortion entailed by the radical application of the Soviet materialist ideology over most of the 20th century: the murder of successive waves of leadership and of vast numbers of people, the destruction of 14,000 mosques in a two year period and of 26 of 29 medrasas or schools for classical Islamic learning, and the imposition of an exploitive monoculture. Alluded to but briefly, these are glimpses of the harsh terror which froze the mind and heart and which provide the essential, if largely unstated, premise for the desperate present need for the missing spiritual culture.

This appears all the more starkly when cast against the rich cultural resources of the past. These are traced back even to the periods of totem, myth and zoroastrianism (see G. McLean, Ways to God [Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1999], chs. II-IV). Conversely, that the flourishing seven centuries of Christianity in their cultural history are not mentioned is indicative of the systematic elimination of their history under Marxism, and hence the extreme importance of the work of Kristoff Kukulka in bringing together teams of anthropologies, historians and other scholars in Tashkent to write two indispensable volumes which begin to fill this gap.
The rich Islamic cultural history of the region is identified with such great philosophers as Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and scientists such as Ulubek. Truly this was the cultural center of the world in the middle ages, before coming under attack from East and more recently from the West.

In this light it begins to appear true, but much too little, to say simply that because for 60 years the focus had been on material values there is need now to complement this by spiritual values in order to assure social progress. The formula is true and seems to have been foremost in the mind of Said Shermukhamedov in Chapter I, “Issues regarding the Interaction of Spiritual Culture and Social Progress,” and perhaps in the mind of most of the authors. On this basis one can find suggestions of steps needed in order to humanize past practice.

But to proceed to ask on what basis such steps can be realized opens a subtext that pervades the work and gives it its special meaning. As the first volume in the series of Uzbek Philosophical Studies it outlines the needs for various elements of a spiritual culture and this is its contribution. But by doing so it raises the deeper question of how such a spiritual culture can be founded.

Yes, as stated by Rustam Z. Jumaev in Chapter II, “New Ways of Thinking and Political Culture,” it is central to make place for a pluralism of cultures and peoples and develop a civil society by which they cooperate in any new political order conducive to social progress. But for this one needs to go more deeply into the nature of freedom as a properly spiritual human reality.

Similarly, as noted by Boris Patlakh in Chapter III, “Moral Culture,” there is need for moral values and indeed for a culture based thereupon, but for this it will be necessary to go much further into the nature of values and the way they delineate culture as a foundation for Chapter II.

Moreover, as noted by Umarov Erkin in Chapter IV, “The Role of Aesthetic Culture in Social Progress,” it will be necessary to develop this not simply in terms of law or even of ethics, but with an aesthetic competency in order to provide for creativity in the development of the new society and to be able to relate this as well to the Creator and to the order of physical creation in which we live. The aesthetic has long been overlooked in the search for certainty understood as rational clarity. It is characteristic of this age that the importance of the aesthetic has now begun to be recognized; the work of the new century, if not the new millennium, will be concerned notably with this.

Chapter V by Abidjanov Alisher, “The Human Person as Object and Subject of Culture,” points toward the heart of the matter by stressing that such creative work must be carried out by persons as both subjects and objects of culture. This cannot be adequately expressed in semiotic or structuralist term, but must take account of the person as someone who is actively engaged in producing himself. It may be symptomatic of the present challenge that Alisher places his hope for this in the very science which had produced the stultification of human life in the past. Real persons who can build a personal future for the people must be more than scientific products. Whence can such insight be derived; how can it be developed?

Chapter VI by Said Shermukhamedov, “The Culture of International Communications and Social Progress,” carries the issue into the field of international communication as he proceeds from the need for technology and thence for information. But he begins to touch a deeper nerve when he speaks of the need for respect. This suggests the need for a hermeneutics that enables one to see the other as a needed companion rather than merely as a competitor, and for a philosophy whereby one can value one’s cultural tradition and draw therefrom the resources for basic respect of self and other? Beyond a sense of abstract unity in the species, there is need for the culture’s living bond of religion and the metaphysics.

All of this points to the most basic human need — that of a spiritual culture — to which the ideology which dominated 20th century life in Uzbekistan life left little or no room. Perhaps the
only place in the USSR where a philosophy or phenomenology of the person was to be found was in Tbilisi, Georgia. But though relatively close geographically, all lines of communication were interrupted as they passed through Moscow and its dehumanizing ideology.

The appendix suggests ways in which a sense of civil society can be developed which is not dependent upon a socialist or an individualist ideology, but is rooted in the cultural traditions of a people, whether Eastern as Confucian or Islamic, or Western in its deeper Graeco-Christian roots.

Part II “Resources for a Spiritual Culture” indicates that Uzbekistan does have such resources for a restoration and renewal of its social life. Chapter VII by M. Karabaev, “Festival-Ritual Culture as a Factor of Social Progress,” traces these cultural resources far back into the history of the people by tracing their festivals. This suggests that there is much detailed work to be done to draw out the moral culture which these festivals bespeak.

Chapter VIII by Abdusamedov Anvar, “The Place of Islamic Culture in Social Progress,” surveys the development of Islam not merely in this area, but across the world. There is much to be done here in promoting deep study of this tradition, not only to mine the cultural resources it harbors for social redevelopment in our day, but also for setting up a strong fire wall, as did al-Ghazali in the past, against radical manipulation of these forces.

Chapter IX by Usein Karimov and Olga Lantseva, “Language and Its Role in the Social Progress and the Spiritual Perfection of the Person,” develops a wonderfully insightful examination of language as not merely speech, but meaningful knowledge which emerges when being is addressed in terms of spirit. For this the author points importantly to Eastern, especially Hindu, philosophy as well as to modern metaphysics.

Chapter X by Tukhtaev Khakim, “The Continuity of Knowledge in the Socio-Cultural Progress of Independent Uzbekistan,” unfolds the implications of this for the broad range of social values from good neighborliness to moral evolution toward social justice. Chapter XI by Achildiev Abduvakhid, “National-Cultural Interests and Social Progress,” describes the policies for the preservation of national monuments and museums which embody this cultural heritage of the nation.

Part III “Structures of Spiritual Culture” examines a series of areas of public life whose concern is not directly spiritual culture, but which must be so marked if the national life is to be truly humane. Thus, Chapter XII by Valiev Botir, “The Role of Economic Culture in Social Progress,” identifies not so much the structure and mechanics of a market economy, but such of its human factors: experience, will, initiative, etc. Indeed, Fukayama distinguishes here between the directly economic values of work parsimony, etc., and a deeper set of such more humane values as trust, cooperation and the like upon which the former rely. It would be wrong to think that these can be decreed or developed as simple matters of technique; instead they emerge from the culture of a people. Some of these factors are already present, others call for further elaboration of virtues which had been developed in the cultural tradition under other circumstances. Combining, evolving and transforming these spiritual values is the major task in developing the spiritual culture needed for an economy dependent upon private initiative.

Similarly in Chapter XIII by Nazarov Ravshan, “Social Progress and the Administration of Cultural Processes,” provides an intricate schema of the administrative function. The efficiency and above all the humanity with which these are exercised sets the quality of the public life of the country. This, in turn, calls most fundamentally for a redevelopment of the spiritual culture of the people which during the last century had been systematically suppressed.
Chapter XIV by N. Shermukhamedova, “The Role of Science in Social Progress,” describes the change taking place in the present day from an industrial to a technological society and the need this entails for science. But she moves beyond a simply pragmatic need for technicians to indicate how this is a matter as well of developing a populace and a public life in which passion is directed by reason and reasonable goals are sought passionately.

Finally, Chapter XV by Victoriya Levinskaya, “The Place of Ecological Culture in Civil Society,” takes up the role of spiritual culture in social progress with regard to the physical environment. One might expect the usual account of the ecological disaster resulting from the physical exploitation of the region, but she takes us much further by reaching back into Russian authors from the period around 1900 for suggestions regarding human interaction with the universe. Drawing upon elements in the Orthodox religious tradition, they first opened the sense of the world as a whole considered from the perspective of outer space.

She follows this with an extensive review of the thought of V. Vernadskiy regarding the noosphere which he constructed initially upon the suggestion of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a Jesuite in the Catholic tradition. Vernadskiy examines the way in which the major forces not only of human evolution, but of the world (and potentially of the universe as a whole) are becoming less matters of physical life which might be described as the biosphere, than of the noosphere as matters of human intelligence and its direction by the will and the spiritual moral qualities of humankind. This is the central issue of spiritual culture as a set of moral values for social life.

But more deeply it is also a matter of the metaphysical and religious values by which spiritual culture not only orders its social relations, but sets their goals; by which it not only manipulates nature for short term advantage, but finds the bases for harmonious cooperation; and by which it not only follows its own interests and culture, but expands these to the dimensions of the global interchange which opens now before us.

These insights of Victoriya Levinskaya bring the potentialities and challenge of the entire volume into focus. They are suggested in a more general manner in the epilogue by Imamjon Rakhimov, “The Philosophy of Culture and Social Progress.” He grounds these in the deep wisdom and warm heart of the Uzbek people, giving hope thereby that this people can not only survive the rigors of the last century, but he once again be a light to the world.
Part I
The Need for Spiritual Culture
Chapter I

Issues Regarding the Interaction of Spiritual Culture and Social Progress

Said Shermukhamedov

For its model of spiritual development the Republic of Uzbekistan has reviewed the direction taken by many countries. But an understanding of the modern historical events of our own country, at both the theoretical and the practical levels, is now urgent and decisive. This is due to a number of causes.

First, at the present time many skeptics and pessimists are discouraged with the concept of social progress. They had followed the Marxist view but now are faced with new theories of social progress. The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan has formulated new views on the development of society for the present and the future and sees that “only with cooperation and trust between nations can our history progress.”

Second, the broad dissemination of the theory and practice of social development must integrate spiritual culture, which is based on particular systems of values, with technocratic reason and a world outlook.

Third, one sector of scholars reduces culture to literature and art, another sector sees this as grounded in religion. In any case, it is necessary to overcome the menace to culture and society in fundamentalist and extremist tendencies which would subjugate all of culture, policy and education.

Fourth, research on contemporary life needs to re-conceptualize some problems about the foundation and development of society, and the role of spiritual culture in social progress.

Fifth, exploration of the interaction of spiritual culture and social progress must analyze such issues as the relationship of modern society: to its historical and spiritual-cultural legacy; to the modes, tendencies, objective laws and criteria of social progress; to the direction of the development of culture and the administration of society; and to the organization, functions and achievement of a common national culture.

In the theory elaborated by the President and its practical realization in domestic and foreign policy, social progress is both an ideal and a goal for independent Uzbekistan. It must find its foundation in a theory of civilization oriented toward the evolutionary development of society and based on shared values of life and culture.

What is meant by a theory of spiritual culture; what are its driving forces, essence and criteria? The content of one’s culture constitutes one’s “social nature.” But a methodical approach would note that the contradictions between society and nature are increasing and that the contents of culture and society are not identical. Any society has many phenomena opposed to culture, and many philosophers have considered such “anti-cultural” phenomena to be products of civilization.

The modern situation is the result of interactive processes between man, society and nature. Society and nature are objects of expedient, rational and changeable spiritual practice which constitutes, as it were, a “second nature.” Culture was a created by man for the development,
Prosperity and happiness of life and reflects the best of human creative forces. The contradictions between culture and “anti-culture” are at the heart of society and culture. Different phenomena at the various levels of social structure influence the characteristics, rate and direction of social development, which in turn depends upon the resolution of such contradictions in the sphere of social relations. All elements in the structure of a culture are interconnected, interact and constitute a single whole.

The characteristics, measure and results of the purposeful activity of people are shaped by historical, cultural and social events. Although material production is a foundation of existence and a motive power in the development of society, it could not exist without spiritual culture. These then are two sides to social progress. Production was emphasized by the theory of socio-economic formation because of its principles of class and party, the destruction of private property and the inevitability of the Socialist Revolution. For those times in the Soviet regions the theory of the socio-economic formation answered the needs of Communist ideology. But the development of the information-production stage of technological civilizations rendered the principle of class obsolete and a great changes have taken place in the spheres of production, society and culture.

Modern civilization does not deny the contribution of production to social progress, but adds new relationships with different kinds of culture, such as international communication and contact between classes, nations, societies and states. Relationships of production were only one factor and society founded thereupon cannot be permanent but must be situated in its historical and sociocultural context. Even the measure and quantity of the influence of productive forces depended upon the connections with the culture of the spheres of production, agriculture and economy. Culture and society are always mutually interconnected in their development.

Culture is so central a source of society that without it stability and progress are impossible, for all social existence and activities are marked by cultural characteristics. But these relations go in two directions, on the one hand between society and persons, on the other side between society and nature.

What is meant by culture as a “second nature”? The components of culture are: science, technology, politics, art and religion; world outlook, ideology and legal norms; social and personal ideals, common national values, all human activities; man as a subject and the highest values; relationships to nature as transformed by man (environment); all kinds of relations between people: interpersonal, intergroup, international and others; organizations and establishments with responsibility for the development of medical and educational systems, traditions, customs, rituals, information systems, etc. In all these areas culture fulfills educational, communication, predictive, informational, axiological and regulative functions.

Some scholars divide culture into two parts: material and spiritual, but no component of material culture could be created and employed without such components of spiritual culture as aims, means, knowledge, etc. Hence, there are many reasons for exploring spiritual culture.

First, because some see spiritual culture as having a religious dimension or roots.

Second, because now we have great interest in our cultural heritage, especially that of the Middle Ages Central Asia.

Third, because technocratic views threaten the stability of society and its development.

Fourth, because it is necessary and important for education, for the improvement of relations within society, for all kinds of human activity and for social progress.

The Nature and Structure of Spiritual Culture
Spiritual culture reflects, expresses and incorporates the values of human society and humankind with their needs, wishes, interests, hopes, beliefs and persuasions. This is the world of emotions, sensations, aspirations, views, wills, impulses and actions found in the internal world of man. It is realized through the context of the interaction between society and nature, but man is the subject of these common national values. Man is the highest value and his life, goodness, interests, harmony, happiness are the goals of society. Through all this one overcomes estrangement from other peoples and from society, and thereby improves both oneself and one’s relations.

Spiritual culture, therefore, is the most successful and purposeful expression of man and society, and the most important factor for social progress. It provides the principles for philosophy, law, science, morality, politics, art, religion, different forms of activity and social relations in all aspects and at all levels; it reproduces and realizes national and common values.

At the same time, the division of culture between the material and the spiritual is really between correlatives because the different forms of social relations and levels of communication which express the internal spiritual world could not exist without such technology, industry and agriculture. These are regarded as material culture, not only by tradition, but because they incarnate rationality, morality and humanism.

This is important for the relation of spiritual culture and social progress, especially as the modern development of technology relates to the spiritual improvement of man and the progress of society.

At the present time the life of humankind depends upon nature as the objective bases of culture and society. The basic manifestation of social progress must be the activity of man and society according to the objective laws of nature and society, law and moral-ethical norms, rules and so on, which is to say that it is also cultural activity. This makes the content of industrial culture of wider and deeper importance because the subject of industry has to form itself as a subject of culture, that is to say, as an active, creative and responsible person.

Unfortunately, this understanding of the subject of industrial activity in theory and practice is seen as opposed to the universalization of the industrial system of values, and the insertion of technocratic mentality and relationships into the world. On the contrary, automatization, computerization and the information industry suppose not just intellectually creative subjects, but morality, humanity and responsibility.

At the present time there are many examples of contradictions between culture and society:

- some components of culture (for example, some branches of science, technics, technology) are opposed to society and injure society, the planet, culture and civilization;
- some aspects of society (for example, the administrative-command method, totalitarian regimes) are opposed to culture.
- single elements of culture (for example, religion, technology, the scientific and technocratic world outlook and so on) would force out other elements, and subordinate culture and society to themselves.
- some would reduce the concept of culture to art, which losses touch with real life and underestimates the potential of culture for the development of society.

These are dangerous for culture, society and social progress; they show that culture and society do not have intentional unity and that the contradictions between them threaten the stability and
development of both. Overcoming the contradictions and developing harmony between society and culture is an important condition for their development and for social progress.

Of principle importance here is awareness of the relation of people to their historical and spiritual-cultural legacy. The long period of domination under the administrative-command system created by, and supporting, a totalitarian regime, separated the peoples of the former USSR from their history, national spiritual values and culture. “From the first days of our independence,” said I.A. Karimov, “the most important task, promoted by state policy, has been the reconstruction of the great and invaluable cultural and spiritual heritage created by our ancestors…”

Such state policy reflects a deep understanding of the objective laws of the interconnection between the culture of a people and the development of its society. Without a spiritual-cultural revival of the people it is impossible to assure the progress of democratization, and to contribute to harmony between society and nature, between peoples, nations, religions and so on. Without such a revival a unity of national and universal values is impossible, as is the vision required for a particular society or its place and role in world civilization. Independent Republic of Uzbekistan is convinced of the importance of national values, traditions, the mentality of the people and common values for directing the democratic transformation of all spheres of life: the formation and development of a market economy, the system of education, the training of personnel, culture and the democratization of society. The President noted that: “Our life is convincing proof that an educated, well-informed society appreciates all the advantages of democratic development, whereas in contrast an uneducated, ignorant people prefers an authoritarian and totalitarian system.”

Both our own and world experience testify to the real dependence of the democratization of society and its progress on the character and level of development of spiritual culture according to principles of justice and humanism.

The main problem of interaction between spiritual culture and social progress at the level of humankind is that of creating a modern social picture of the world. Modern scholars must research the interests of people and of their governmental and social organizations in order to find mutual understanding, contacts and collaboration. That is the reason for the present importance of the elaboration of a new world outlook, a new philosophy and psychology, able to express the reality of modern life.

Where the former approach meant conflict of social systems, the civilizational approach is orientated to such values of life and culture as interrelated and interdependent collaboration, and the evolutionary development of all human society. At the present time it is possible to undertake such important tasks as building human society, achieving tolerance, mutual understanding and international friendship and as a result to promote social progress founded on historical traditions and common national values. The present world outlook and its methodology prove convincingly that humanistic spiritual-cultural factors play a very important role in social progress. Moreover, due to their spiritual-cultural direction modern industry, science and technology contribute to human society, nature, culture and civilization.

The actual problems of the present time are those of knowledge, objective laws, values and spiritual culture for the benefit and development of society. The problem of understanding the relation of spiritual culture and social progress, its ways, means, tendencies, objective laws and criteria, requires decisions on two problems: (1) the direction of cultural development and (2) the organization of society, its functions and development according to the progress of culture.

---

2 Ibid., p. 131.
3 Ibid., p. 143.
A comparison of such common definitions of culture as an open system of values and a determined method of human relations to the world, nature, society and to oneself testifies to the historical changeableness of culture, its dynamism and tendency toward stability. Theoretical analyses reveal such characteristics of culture and society as self-organization and self-development. There are many scientific definitions of culture, of which we have chosen the following: culture is the content and form of knowledge, values and theoretical and practical activity, along with the method of organization, function and development of educational systems, social awareness and social-historical practice. In essence, culture contradicts chaos and creates a regulated system with norms, rules, values, organizations and the realization of individual and collective actions, communication, socio-cultural institutes, structures and so on.

Spiritual culture includes world outlook, ideology, methodology, knowledge, awareness of the person and of society, value orientations and social action. The interconnection and interaction between spiritual culture and social progress is central to directing the development of the historical process. We cannot understand the goals of the development of society without spiritual culture.

The direction of the development of culture must be founded on:

- recognition of the human person as the essence of culture;
- understanding the problems of culture as those of society: the character of relationships between people, and dependence of everyone’s life and fate upon the character of these relations;
- careful attention to culture in the past and at present not only of the state, but of the society and people who, in order to create their history and their future, must know their historical and cultural past;
- consideration of spiritual-cultural values as one of the most important conditions for the formation and development of the creative abilities and humane relations between people;
- care for the blossoming of culture and society;
- consideration of the activity of organizing and establishing culture: the systems of education and information based upon the deepest understanding of social progress as a long socio-cultural revolution;
- development of the creative work of the mass formation of interests and abilities for creative work based on traditions and human values;
- finding possibilities and resources for resolving difficulties and problems of cultural development, and overcoming negative tendencies and promoting those which are positive;
- remembering that the main aim of culture is to promote the humanization of social relations for the future of our civilization.

The problems of culture are those of society which lives, functions and develops through the cultural activity of people. The most important factor of social progress at the present time and for the future must be the humanization of scientific-technical progress, education and other social organizations. As the promotion of social progress requires promoting the development of culture, an important goal in the administration of culture is the realization of its humanistic or spiritual essence.
Chapter II

New Ways of Thinking and Political Culture

Rustam Z. Jumaev

New Ways of Thinking

In a stable state a new way of thinking based on democratic principles must play the major role. President Karimov often points out that the basic principles for the development of new ways of thinking are threefold.

1. The development of independent thinking in every person and in the entire society. To achieve this we need to get rid of the remains of the totalitarian USSR society. This can be achieved through Oriental principles of development: “Our humanity, faith and conscience do not accept revolutionism and communistic ideas which ideas artificially penetrated into our life.”

Oriental social development is based rather on the principle of continuous development. A nonthinking, weak and powerless person and society are condemned to stagnation. The totalitarian society of the communist period was not used to thinking, and therefore supported the attitude of the “callous, iron man.” In such a society the leading officials, instead of showing initiative, carried out everything they were ordered to do, saying only “Yes.”

In 1989, the President indicated the end of this stereotype: “We leaders must handle problems with skill and firmness, solve them thoroughly and not seek whom to blame. We have to take the responsibility on ourselves.” The independent way of thinking of a leader influences the formation of a new way of thinking in society. Nevertheless, leading officials today still cannot rid themselves of the relics of a totalitarian way of thinking.

2. The achievement of a high level of thinking by every person. This task used to be solved one-sidedly as the ideology was based on communistic moral ideas. There the level of a person’s way of thinking was defined without due regard for human reality and real conditions, but only by revolutionary ideology. The President reflected this, saying that our task was to get to the level of developed countries. We cannot achieve that without a physically, spiritually and financially healthy generation; such an all-round healthy generation is invincible. A high level of consciousness means spiritual wealth for all generations; a healthy generation is spiritually wealthy.

Unfortunately, remnants of the totalitarian society still exist. The test conducted at the Academy of State and Social Construction in 1997 is an example: 150 scientists and specialists from the higher educational establishments of the country took part in this test in order to raise their qualification at the Academy in the field of the humanities and social science. The test showed perturbing results.

To the question: How do you value the role of the Shuro period in history?, ten percent answered “negative,” while 50 percent of them answered that C.P.S.U. played a positive role in the history of our country. To the question “What was the social state of Uzbek people during the Shuro period?,” 62 percent answered average, 26 percent — high and 12 percent — low. It can be understood from these answers that the participants have not yet gotten rid of the stereotypes of a
totalitarian society, despite the fact that 90 percent of them are doctors and candidates of science. In fact the totalitarian society went down in history as a period dominated by dogmas and the rejection of alternate positions.

Conscientiousness means living in a way worthy of oneself and being concerned with the global problems of humankind. This applies not only to the present, but to the future as well. Accordingly, “the 21st century will be a century of spiritualism, enlightenment, science, culture and information.” Are we ready for this? Only when this is so will conscientiousness begin to awaken.

3. The formation in every person of a spiritual outlook which will meet the requirements of a new time: “intellectual development and spiritual ability are the two wings of the enlightened person.” One’s way of thinking plays an important role in the society we are establishing. It is a system of notions regarding one’s place in society and reality and one’s self-understanding; it is basic to the spiritual and practical assimilation of the world by a human being.

The President calls the person who has formed his own ideology or spiritual outlook an “enlightened person.” This is a serious duty for one who has a high spiritual attitude is responsible for the world, the epoch, his Motherland and the destiny of the whole of humanity. This determination of one’s way of thinking is formed by an integration of such elements as “intellectual development and moral ability.” The outlook must not be a remnant from the totalitarian society of the former Soviet period, but the development of a theory of World from Oriental experience. New ideas regarding the outlook of society can be seen in the humane reforms taking place in society. The spiritual basis of society requires a new form of thinking which must be free from stereotypes.

It is necessary to pay special attention to the new spiritual formation because a person’s way of thinking, his consciousness and political culture, as well as independent ideology are important factors in the development of society.

Political Culture

Political culture comprises in itself the elements and phenomena of social wisdom. It includes the social and political institutions as well as the political processes connected with spiritual culture. It also influences the formation and evolution of state and political institutions as well as their activity and development.

Political culture clarifies and determines the norms and the rules of behavior in the political sphere. It is closely connected with the whole culture of a nation. This is because it is an essential constituent of the entire national culture. The national culture strongly influences the system of political belief considered as a constituent of the foundation as well as of the formation of a political culture.

In spite of the fact that a political culture in some respects is independent of the social conditions which bring it to life, under their influence it develops the inner and outer peculiarities and features of such political units as country, the various strata of the society, categories, nation, territory and others.

The structure of the differentiation of political cultures proposed in the book, Civil Culture (1963) written by G. Almond and C. Verba, has been used widely in Western politology. These authors analyzed the political systems of England, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, the USA and Mexico. From the comparison and analyses of the forms of activity and the main
constituents of these political systems they divided political culture into patriarchal, civil and active.

The citizens of the patriarchal type are characterized by non-involvement and indifference to political life. In the civil type, we see weak and passive activity of citizens in the political institutions but considerable interest in their activity. The active type of citizen is interested due to being involved in the political life and the publicizing of political positions and activities.

These three types of political culture influence one another. Besides the above-mentioned three main types of political culture, there exist in political life special subcultures which express the interests and viewpoints of social, ethnic, territorial and other groups. These subcultures are characterized by their different outlooks, attitudes towards government and ruling elite, and involvement in governing activity and in the formation and control of political life. The study of such categories as “political ideology,” “legitimacy,” “sovereignty,” “law” and “political parties” also pertain to the study of political culture.

Political culture in some respects restricts the activity of the members of society due to the beliefs, feelings and values of the political processes and behavior which are important parts of political culture. In spite of the fact that a political system and political culture are independent parts of a polity they are closely connected with one another. One of the sources of the development and activity of political culture is the legitimation of the existing power and the political regime characteristic of that period of development. Its constituents, such as values, directions, stereotypes, play a major role in preserving the existing political system.

Whence does political culture arise? One cannot obtain political culture by merely studying and learning theoretical sciences. Its elements appear when people begin to participate in political activity with the aim of achieving their own social, economic and political advantage or possibilities. This becomes possible only when one is involved in the activity of political parties, social political groups, etc. As no one can obtain his own material, political and legal benefits or freedom of thought acting alone but needs some social organization, the status of political parties and social organizations is high in democratic states.

It is very difficult to realize the driving forces of the political processes in society without having learned in detail the political culture while enables one to develop political processes and determines the behavior of social groups and various strata of society. At the same time this is the main part of the “social sphere” which aids or sets obstacles to the intentions of people to create conditions for future development. Political culture is considered also the most steady or conservative part of the socio-political system as can be seen more clearly in the periods of great historical changes in the society as are now taking place in our society.

Political systems are divided into two groups by social researchers: totalitarian and pluralistic. A totalitarian system as a type of political culture based on the idea that social, economic and spiritual life should be of one type. It suppresses the intention to change the existing system of ideas in the society. The totalitarian political culture of the former Soviet Union did not allow social groups to express openly their ideas and preferences. It also restricted the possibilities of choice in political life. In this way from the very beginning it did not allow people to act freely, but insisted upon only one type of ownership, one party, one candidate. This condition in its turn brought the society to stagnation and, as a result, to collapse.

Pluralistic Culture
Naturally, the first victims of a totalitarian system are the constituents of civil society and its structural divisions. This could appear, develop, conduct its activity and perform the functions of a leader given certain important conditions:

- Economic and social pluralism, different types of ownerships, especially private property; different methods of managing the economy; independent units of economic activity along with other factors prepare the grounds and conditions for political pluralism. A non-correspondence of social interests — even at times their clash — creates favorable conditions for pluralism.
- The more versatile the society in its social structure and interests the better the conditions for the type of society which supports political pluralism and a pluralistic political culture;
- A leading role for civil society: civil society develops political institutions and delegates to the government the required powers. The distribution of powers in the government is usually conducted by means of elections. No one group, in practice is legally allowed to convert the government into its own monopoly.
- Human rights are ensured both in practice or by law.
- Parties and leaders in the government change rather than occupying the same posts for a long period.

A pluralistic culture has the following important features: stable democratic principles and standards of life; consistent directives; vital practical democratic norms, skills and traditions; the need and inevitability of pluralistic ideas; tolerance of different thinking and of those who think in new or even contrary ways, etc. In this culture democratic goals are sought only by democratic methods and mechanisms. Between classes, groups and other social strata there is political cooperation, which is typical of this type of social tradition. Vital present problems are: the development of practices corresponding to the socio-political life of leading foreign states, preservation of Eastern features and national distinctiveness, developing research and practical activities in this field.

To understand political culture in the framework of modern democracy there is need: to inform people about the experience of the leading states in the fields; to open special sections in the mass media; and to conduct meetings and lectures among social organizations.

The priority condition for our people’s developing a political culture is to facilitate their active involvement in social affairs. They should come to understand as quickly as possible the need to achieve material, spiritual and political satisfaction. The main condition for the development of political thinking and political culture in the framework of the reform taking place in our society is to organize the activity of social organizations in society in a truly democratic manner. The management style in these organizations should be totally different from that of public organizations. They should be conducted on the grounds of self-management and be socially oriented. Creating a social environment based on a democratically oriented political culture has the following criteria: that leaders fully understand that they are responsible to those who elect them and to the members of the community; that they should shape the manner in which they conduct their activity according to the principles of democracy; that the organizational, financial and social activity of the organization should be carried out on the basis of discussion and debate; that a main task of social organization is to enable the members of the community to understand the importance of self-governance; and that the management principles of the old regime where the organizations were governed by individuals must be abandoned.
At the present stage people are doing their best to strengthen their national independence and at the same time to form a political culture answering to the needs of the present society. The main condition for the formation of modern political culture is the active participation of the people in the processes of the democratization of the society and having a modern world view that corresponds to civil society as their future.
Chapter III

Moral Culture

Boris Patlakh

Among the factors and criteria of social progress, moral culture holds a special place, for it is the system of self-determination in society. It includes the notions and concepts of person and society, good and evil, the purpose and meaning of life, honor and duty, freedom and responsibility, justice and dignity, love and friendship, traditions, rituals, customs, norms, rules, principles, models of conduct, ideals and national and common values which were transformed in conformity with the values, emotions, senses, persuasions, views, acts, vital activities, models of life and personal qualities. These are also the main support of the moral culture whose principal function is the regulation of mutual relations of man with nature, society and other peoples.

Moral culture is a reflex product of man and society. It is also the moral rules which correct the mutual relations between people, their consciousness, psychology, acts and vital activities. The beginning of morality, its imperatives and taboos at the dawn of human history, reflect an understanding that man lives not by himself without other people, but must have some rules for social life. Upon that thesis, we draw the following conclusions:

First, morality began at the same time as human society and before moral culture.
Second, the concepts of morality and moral culture are interconnected, but are not identical, the latter being broader than the former.
Third, at the present time moral culture is developing and improves human life through individual forms of activity and social-historical practice.
Fourth, the essence of moral culture is to become aware of every man as necessarily related to other people.
Fifth, the subjects of a moral culture must include everyone in order to improve persons and society in their indissoluble and versatile connections and interconnections.

Moral culture is a measure of moral values and their practical realization in all the spheres of social activity by persons, groups, communities or society. An important characteristic of the subject of moral culture is an alignment of national and common values, with priority given to common values in consciousness, action, communications and practice. It is the formed self-awareness of man as a member of an ethnos, group, social stratum, society and, of course, his civic, social, human duties and responsibilities.

Moral culture is founded on the historical, moral ethics of a tradition and at the same time is oriented on present and future values. It unites such factors of development as change and stability. As a dynamic system of society it has the chance and the means to secure its stability, development and progress. The president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, I.A. Karimov, places a high value on moral culture: “The programs of social development of Uzbek society are founded on the most
important and morally significant traditions and customs, which enrich common values and answer the demands of democratization and the renewal of our society.”

The spiritual-cultural values of the past attract our attention because we can see in them the orientation and foundation of our moral search for the purpose and meaning of life, social activity, happiness and goodness. In the new historical, social, economic and cultural situation it is necessary to understand this. The moral orientation for modern man can and must include the moral values, ideas and views of such famous scholars, poets and philosophers of Central Asia as Rudaky, Beruny, Farabi, Navoy, Ibn Sina and others.

For Rudaky good actions are the measure of the intellect. Al-Farabi thought that mutual aid must be a principle of collaboration as a condition for achieving human ideals. Beruni taught that duty is the main principle of “one’s achieving activity in the world,” that knowledge is the way to improvement, and that one must care for other people. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) was convinced that justice and order will triumph if we support those who are positively related to them and restrain others who contradict them.

Alisher Navoy considered the role of man, the meaning and purpose of his life, to be the search for goodness, justice and understanding as the highest value and key to the self-improvement of his soul. Respect, friendship and love, according to Navoy, are the great values which improve and develop the human soul. They increase goodness and justice, and strengthen patriotism and humanism, which are the bonds between people and nations that transform a person in the world.

The highest social value of the culture is its unity. The acquisition of moral culture is founded upon the education of the intellect, emotions, senses and will. The brain is the basis of human actions; but one’s emotions constitute the internal, spiritual world of a person as a moral force confirming goodness, truth, beauty, responsibility, achievement, knowledge, patriotism, honor, duty, justice, friendship, love and dignity. Moral culture, therefore, concerns the formation, development and manifestation of the creative essence of man. The process of reforming society, its change, development and progress, are examples of the creative activity of man. At the same time the stability of society is a condition and foundation of social development. This cannot be described without its subject which is oriented by social, spiritual-moral values. In the process of such activity, one changes oneself and at the same time improves social relations, assisting in both their stabilization and their progress.

Orienting life on moral norms, ideas and principles manifests moral culture and strengthens the interconnections and interactions between people and their improvement. A human being has only the potential or possibility to be a “whole subject”; for its formation and development moral culture plays a great role, together with other components of culture and social-historical factors. Man and the world are connected and interact on the basis of moral values. The experience and practice of totalitarian society showed the communist moral to be erroneous both in the sphere of morality and in economics.

Moral culture is the complex of social and individual moralities. Individual morality is the means, method and form for the realization of the moral value of man and society. It is a condition and factor of the moral cultural development and the self-improvement of every person. The actions of the morally cultured person follow the norms, rules and principles of society. They do not contradict the main interests of man and society, but coordinate one’s activity with the interests of other people and subordinate one’s own interests to those of society. Therefore, individual and social morality, professional ethics and moral culture are important factors in the development of

personality and social progress. This requires the highest development of social and individual consciousness and of the self-awareness, self-education and self-improvement of the person. By it one becomes aware of one’s needs and interests, and of one’s civil, professional, human duty, dignity and responsibility.

One of the main characteristics of personality is to be self-critical, that is to say, the ability to relate to oneself as to another person — the objective analysis of one’s own actions and the correction of one’s own mistakes. Self-improvement takes place through the connection between a self-critical personality and his or her sense of responsibility.

Moral culture is the creative activity of people and its result. Circumstances change and new tasks appear as people look for new activities, ways and methods of self-improvement. These are connected with the characteristics of the subject of moral activity and one’s spiritual and emotional experience. The foundation of the independent Republic of Uzbekistan has given strong impulse to the development of moral culture by awakening the social and moral activity of people.

This culture plays a great role in the realization of a society in which objective social relations, laws, norms and the moral atmosphere give persons the possibility and right to choose for oneself their convictions, profession, place and mode of life and self-improvement, thereby enabling one to transform one’s relations to oneself, to other people, to nature and to society. Moral norms, rights, principles, values and criteria are the basis of such transformations and moral culture is the main factor in the education of a personality and the promotion and progress of a society. As the subject of moral culture the person has special needs which conform with norms of morality as with his or her purpose, tasks and characteristics. The person respects laws and has rights shared by all members of society; one fulfills one’s duties according to the demands of morality and the progressive development of society.

Moral culture is manifested in human desires as one lives in accord with his group, society and nation. The human person has his or her own national and common values; one knows one’s place, role and responsibility before society and before oneself. It is a special state of emotions, consciousness, will, needs, wishes, interests, forms and methods manifest in all spheres of personal activity. The significance of the person depends upon one’s character, the level of knowledge and of the development of one’s consciousness, and upon the measure of one’s self-education and self-improvement. These are engaged in social practice as defining the purpose and meaning of one’s life.

Here the human is always the end, never the means (I. Kant). The development and self-improvement of the person and of society is the end. This is the task and foundation of moral culture because social progress has the improvement, self-improvement and development of persons as its main goal. For the development of modern civilization, moral culture is the main factor. Only this is able to safeguard positive achievements and exclude negative tendencies.

Every epoch needs a special moral culture for the person and society. The great significance of moral culture lies in its specific but non-coercive method of overcoming the negatives. These methods are: the system of education, information, self-education and self-improvement, social opinion, awareness of law and self-awareness, and, according to this, the methods, activity and practice of goodness. Moral culture is specific to a nation, but is a common and universal method of mutual understanding and collaboration between people as ethnicities, nations and countries. It is the main source and factor of social progress, because it has a great influence on social and individual consciousness and their activities and on the characteristics of social relations.
Chapter IV

The Role of Aesthetic Culture in Social Progress

Umarov Erkin

Among the conditions for building legal democratic states and open societies a special place is held by the improvement of the cultural-creative atmosphere. The Republic of Uzbekistan needs continued development of the cultural level and of the spiritual character of all levels of the population. In this process of the spiritual renewal of society the social aspect of man is enriched, which includes spirituality along with other characteristics.

Aesthetic culture is the most important part of spiritual culture, and is especially creative in character. The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, I.A. Karimov, in the ninth meeting of Oliy Majlis (the Uzbek Parliament) said: “It is no secret that every state, every nation, has its strength not just under and above ground in natural richness, military forces or industrial potential, but above all in its higher culture and spirit” (I.A. Karimov, “Development of an Harmonious Generation Is the Bases for the Progress of Uzbekistan”).

Interest in developing the highest culture and spirit of the Republic of Uzbekistan increases year by year because there is increasing need in society for knowledge, tradition, world outlook and the creative potential of man. The Legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan supports the cultural development in the Republic by affirming the educational system as a priority in the sphere of social development: reformation of the schools and of professional and higher education, the humanization of the educational system and the increase of creative activity by the citizens of Uzbekistan. Aesthetic culture is one of the factors increasing human spiritual activity. Reformation of professional and higher school is directed at improving human spiritual activity, which requires the formation of aesthetic culture at all levels of the population.

Aesthetic culture is not just “creative activity according to the laws and norms of beauty,” but a relation of these activities to the environment in a way that reflects the humanistic ideal. That is to say, aesthetic culture is the purposeful, gradual and consistent realization of the best spiritual traditions of the nation, an intelligent relation to nature, and the resurrection of the spiritual values of other nations. That is why, aesthetic culture is becoming for man not just an ideal and spiritual requirement of creative activity, but a source of purpose and direction for creative activity.

Aesthetic culture is a complicated system of human needs. It consists of the experience, knowledge and convictions of man. In aesthetic culture the senses regulate the creative and common activity; a world outlook is stipulated by human knowledge and so on.

Hence, the aesthetic culture of a society has many functions: informational, axiological, communicative, regulative, educational and predictive. All functions of aesthetic culture are closely connected and inseparable one from another, but some distinguish between the aesthetic culture of society and that of the person. The aesthetic culture of society includes: aesthetic values and knowledge about their nature and functions; aesthetic consciousness, activity and relations between the people; relations on the bases of aesthetic values; and aesthetic education for transferring to the new generation the aesthetic cultural foundations, the method for aesthetic transformation of the environment, and also the shaping of the aesthetic consciousness.

The aesthetic culture of the person includes knowledge as aesthetic experience, will and awareness of the aesthetic and artistic values not only of the nation, but of all humanity. The ability
of reason regarding art has a creative relation to work and respect for nature. The aesthetic culture of the person manifests itself in all kinds and forms of activity where it is reflected as a common level of the spiritual culture of man, as concrete individual aesthetic notions, relations, aesthetic consciousness, behavior, mentality, language, organization of life and work, international contacts and so on.

As noted above, one important moment of aesthetic culture is a creative assimilation of the spiritual values of the past. For the Soviet Union this did not transpire because the Communist Party ignored past spiritual culture. For example, from the spiritual culture of the nations of Central Asia such schools as Sophism, Ismailism, Kalam, Judaism and others were not considered. Also the creative works of such representatives as Ansory Sanoy, Attor, Rumy, Bachouddin Nakshband, Nazmitdin Kurbo, Chodga Akhror, Abdukhalic Gishduvaniy, Chodga Aly Romitany, Amir Culol and many others were considered unnecessary for the new generation. Not just the philosophical, religious, political heritage of the past of the nations of Central Asia, but many works of art—painting, calligraphy and applied arts were ignored. Such masterpieces of the Uzbek people as “Alpomish,” “Gurughly,” “Rustamchon” were declared reactionary. Aesthetic culture in the period of the domination of Communist ideology was formatted and developed in a lop-sided manner, without the spiritual experience of humankind. This necessary component of the Communistic ideology led to breaking the connections between man and history, between personality and society, and created indifference to the spiritual culture of the past. As a result, social apathy was high at that time. This situation was described in the novel by Ch. Auytmatov, *Blizzard’s Halt*.

Aesthetic culture is one of the main components of social progress. It is the best contribution to the realization and affirmation of human existence; at the same time it is a process of humanization of social life. The aesthetic culture of the Uzbek people has deep historical roots and contributed to the Uzbek survival of many social and historical shocks. Different aspects of the history of the Uzbek people are expressed in its cultural monuments.

Aesthetic culture, though the most important element of the spiritual life of society and of humans, is not exhausted by spiritual things, but is preserved in objects of the material world and in a social contacts, in social experience and so on. That is to say, the content of aesthetic culture includes the experience of humankind, which can be preserved in the social consciousness, social relations, social-psychological phenomena and others.

Aesthetic culture itself is communicated from generation to generation by art (architecture, poetry, music, dance and so on), because only art has given people a chance to listen through the centuries to the tragic or happy stories of preceding generations. Art is an historical experience, the social memory of humankind, and at the same time an image, purpose and ideal for the development of humankind. Aesthetic culture is a force which has consolidated the people of the world into one humanity. Such architectural masterpieces as “Shakhy-Zinda,” “Gur-Emir,” “Bibi-Khanum” in Samarkand, Ismail Samoni’s mausoleum and in others not only fix attention upon the socio-historical life of the past generations, but transmit patriotism, humanism and diligence to present and future generations. There is similar significance to the poem “Shachnome” by Firdousy, which is one of the most interesting items of world literature. In the 11th century this poem expounded all the principles of patriotism and humanism. Hence, for independent Uzbekistan in its present profound reformation of the educational sphere, it is necessary to include the aesthetic culture of the past.

However, formation in aesthetic culture is a complicated and contradictory process. Humans need time to come to realize the changes of consciousness taking place under the influence of circumstances or through self-development, self-education and self-improvement. The aesthetic
culture of the person has a higher stability, which is why its change proceeds very slowly and with
great difficulty. In social practice we encounter a conservative mentality, which slows down the
process of progressive social change, because people do not want to do without their stereotypes,
old norms and principles of action.

The new social activity in Uzbekistan changes all the forms of social life, and this
reorganization of social consciousness needs a new spiritual culture. In that process aesthetic
culture could play an important role because its appeals directly to each person, speaks to him or
her in an emotional language and is addressed at the same time to both mind and soul.

Each person through aesthetic culture learns common and natural values and then develops
one’s own system of ideals, tastes and notions. Aesthetic culture is the strong regulator of the real
behavior of people. It is both comprehension of the meaning of life and manifestation of the social
essence of humans, especially of connections between man and society. Value orientations, which
are aesthetic culture, give man a program for self-realization.

At the present time, it is necessary to develop an ecological culture, because there is need for
a new relationship between nature and humankind. That is why, in the content of aesthetic culture
aesthetic relations to nature hold a special place. Nature always has a very great influence on the
human. The spiritual culture of the Uzbek people in the past as in the present contains many
examples of understanding the importance of such relations. Abdurahmon Ghamy and Alisher
Navoy called for man to live in accord with nature. In unity with nature Ghamy saw the meaning
and destiny of man. In our time, such understanding of the relationships between nature and
humanity is reviving. Hence, one purpose of aesthetic culture must be a deep awareness by people
of their responsibility for natural conditions. Aesthetic culture must promote the forming of
ecological culture, i.e., awareness of the ecological unity between nature and man. Such awareness
is now becoming important because the ecological situation is worsening, especially in the Central
Asian region (the tragedy of the Aral Sea, Central Asian plants and animals). In other words
aesthetic culture must be given a new ecological direction.

Aesthetic culture is not an inherent quality of personality, but is formed in the process of
education throughout one’s entire life and at different levels.
Chapter V

The Human Person as Object and Subject of Culture

Abidjanov Alisher

The problems of human existence and culture are becoming very important, especially now, in this time of great socio-economic transformation and political reform. The modern period is characterized by the transformation of nature, society and human personality, the struggle for peace and mutual understanding between states and people, and the common movement of humankind toward democracy and real humanism. Building a new society in such young states as Uzbekistan means rebuilding the economy and the complex of social relations and human consciousness. The deep transformation in economic, political and spiritual life is founded on common cultural values and ideals. The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, I.A. Karimov, considers “preserving the historical-cultural and spiritual values and the education of the new generation to be the main tasks.”

The modern period manifests also a characteristic increase in the importance of the subject and its social development. This pertains only to countries which have found their independence and with great effort paved the way for a world society. In these conditions the human as a creative subject of history and transformer of the environment becomes a question not only for science and culture, but for the political realm especially in the present development of the spiritual life of Uzbekistan. That is why the development of persons as the subjects of the historical-cultural process is one of the main conditions for social change and the achievement of independence.

The issue of culture, consequently, is a central condition for creative human intellectual and moral potential. But for this it is necessary to link culture and man in order to realize the possibilities of culture in the process of the formation of personality and the improvement of human relations. In socio-philosophical literature, the principles for the definition of culture were formulated many years ago. However, the development of social life brought many new principles, questions and problems. These require such diverse approaches as the axiological, systematic-structural and semiotic.

There are different classifications, but the most popular axiological or value approach to culture was an understanding of culture as the historical creative process which creates, develops and absorbs spiritual and material values. Another approach is based on the analysis of culture as a social sign or semiotic system as well as a structural-functional system.

The semiotic approach to culture is founded on historical principle, while at the same time understanding culture as a special system of the means which secure human existence together with that of the environment, and help to resolve socio-cultural problems. This approach is a complex of the philosophical, aesthetic, political and other concepts and categories; it sees culture as a comprehensive sign system. The different local political and economic languages express different spheres of human activity as symbols and signs of a “world model.”

The structural-functional approach to culture was developed by Markarian and others. He considered the concept of “culture” to be a function of knowledge, seeing culture as a “specific function of the social life of people.” The structural-functional approach has opened some new

---

1 I.A. Karimov, Uzbekistan Is a State with a Great Future (Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 1992), p. 123.
aspects of knowledge in the science-culture system, but does not suffice for a comprehensive analysis of that system. My own point of view is closest to that of M.S. Kogan, who defined culture as a human activity. Everyone understands the connections between culture and humanity. The starting point of any philosophical conception is a nature. This has been so since ancient philosophy and still is very popular because nature is the characteristic essence of a culture. Humans are also representatives of a culture which is situated all around them, in their masterpieces and even inside the person. Hence, the scope of one’s culture is that of one’s social, spiritual and creative being. Culture is a product of one’s creative and transfigured activity. This realizes ideal values, surpassing mere expediency and especially the anarchy of blind necessity. This is an infinite process because it entails the whole transformation of matter by humans as their world. Culture is the goal of human activity and its internal means, because humans are able to create themselves by transforming the conditions, circumstances and goals of their existence.

Consequently, culture is also history in which persons can create the method and form of their contacts with other individuals. Hence, culture is historical, for the human person is the subject of his historical being. Culture is the world of humans with their values, transformation of nature, material and spiritual activity, social institutions and spiritual achievements. This is a humanistic-axiological approach to the understanding of culture.

This interpretation of culture is founded not only on technological characteristics, but on the creative work of man as its subject. This approach is oriented upon the subject which produces a philosophical culture as an object. The human is a complicated system of practice, knowledge, morals, aesthetics and creative art works. Above all, he is ontological subject of these human characteristics rather than merely of theoretical positions, because the human is part of a world. That is why to consider the human as a biological system is not philosophical. Labor is an objective personification of the social connections between individuals understood as social animals. The objective reality of culture can be understood as possible personal existence. One is able at the same time to create the world of things and oneself, to improve one’s forces and contributions and to achieve the best intercommunication. The development of the objective world by humans is a matter of self-production or self-development. The objective richness created by people is an outward form of culture, which in turn influences human development (here we understand the human as a social animal), that is to say, it is the development of the whole complex of one’s relationships, forces and abilities.

The essence of culture is expressed by the thesis: man produces himself as he has become aware of his integration. According to this point of view, culture is the special mode of production whose main result is the human person and his social existence. It is linked to activity that produces not only things and ideas, but humanness as a quality of the social subject.

This socio-material and spiritual production constitutes the essence of the entire social history. By identifying the stages of the development of culture we are able to see the development and improvement of persons. This development has two stages. The first is to prepare people for creative social activity; the second is their direct participation in this activity. Culture is the process of the development of the creative forces and abilities of humans and at the same time of the contribution of these abilities to the broad results of social activity. This understanding of culture has provided a new conception of the person who is able to resolve difficult social issues of social values operative in the practical activity of people as they transform the environment and themselves. That is to say, it expresses not passive, contemplative and consumer relationships of humans to the world, but their active, creative conduct as active subjects of history. At the same
time, one is a subject of the cultural-historical process and is connected by one’s activity with the future, which is founded on past experience.

As a result, one’s cultural heritage and the modern culture is appreciated on a scientific basis. Therefore, man is both subject of the cultural-historical process and creator of culture in its different forms and manifestations. The creative activity of man throughout the entire sphere of being and consciousness is the real essence of culture. Without that activity and its personification in the universal process of the assimilation and reconstruction of reality, there can be no human material and spiritual culture. This means that the human is the real heart of culture, both its basis and its source of development, as well as its main goal. In the end, we have ascertained that the person is an open dynamic microsystem, and as such the active subject of culture.
Chapter VI

The Culture of International Communications and Social Progress

Said Shermukhamedov

The book of President Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the XXIth Century: Threat of Security, Conditions and Guarantee of Progress, is a key text on the culture of international communications at the present time. This treatise had great resonance and in a short time was translated into many languages, West and East. The political and social leaders of many states as well as scholars in many countries have highly appreciated this work. The book treats the main international events in the sphere of culture and science, past, present and future, and according to modern theoretical and methodological positions.

This chapter follows the President’s lead in treating the problems of the culture of international communications as an important condition for civil society, international agreement and the progress of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which has chosen an independent way of development. This is a new page in its national history and in the international contacts between the nationalities of the Republic of Uzbekistan and other peoples of the world.

These include: the celebration of Independence Day; the days of the Uzbek’s culture in Tajikistan; the Central Asian folklore festival, organized with famous writers and scholars of the region; the international film festivals; festival “Shark taronalary” (“Talents from the East”); the dialogue “Uzbekistan-European Union”; the participation of UNESCO and other international organizations at the celebration of the anniversaries of Mirzo Ulugbek, Amir Timur, Imam Bukhary in the cities of Bukhara and Chiva; cooperation between Uzbek and German philologists; the showing of the best German, French, Japanese movies at the Republic Cinema; exchanges of pupils, students and specialists from different countries, such as the USA, Europe, Asia, and other activities and exchanges.

The Nature of International Communications

This is a matter of the integration of the Republic of Uzbekistan into world society with the improvement of international relations and of the culture of international communication. Research on the concept, content, essence, structure and functions of the culture of international communications shows that the culture of international communications must be a part of the personal culture of each citizen, especially of the younger generation. Hence, it is necessary to create part of the national politic as a culture of international communications. “The world experience and our own,” wrote I. Karimov, “shows convincingly that the most important condition for the successful realization on a large scale of reorganization in the economic, political and spiritual spheres, and for radical reform of social society and for active international cooperation is to secure in the country’s social-political stability, the place of the citizen and international harmony.”

---

The culture of international communications at the present time is an essential structural element in the cultural system and subsystem of society and humanity. I. Karimov wrote: “The whole world is an interdependent system with no place for self-isolation. That is why it is necessary to develop new approaches for modern international relations, cooperation with international structures and participation in their activity.”

Therefore, it is necessary to study the culture of international communications, the objective laws, ways and methods of its formation, and its development and manifestation in every sphere and at every level of society. The main aim of the culture of international communications is social progress, which is the integrated and mutual dependence of different parts of the whole society. In this way, humankind has many possibilities and means, as well as many difficulties and obstacles. The culture of international communications is very important at the present time; many things depend upon it because the culture of international communications is both a factor of stability in social relations and a factor of progress for the whole of humankind, inasmuch as it is an essential part of national culture and international relations. The culture of international communications is the self-awareness of the independent interests of nations and nationalities, as well as a step in the process of economic, political, social and spiritual life. It can be realized only on the basis of the principles of equal rights, mutual aid and social justice for the benefit of every nation, every nationality and the whole multinational family.

The culture of international communications has a political, legal and spiritual basis. This means, that the basis, connections, mutual implications and interactions are based upon the character, content and direction of the culture of international communications.

The deformation of that basis, which took place for a long time in the former Soviet Union, certainly affected international relationships and their culture. The cult of Stalin’s personality and despotism in the sphere of national politics limited the independence of the Soviet Republics and entailed the deportation of many nationalities from the Crimean states, Germans from the Volga, Turk-meskhitines and other nationalities. Excessive centralization in state administrations which did not admit democracy, and big errors in political planning of the productive forces and the formation of the industrial potential brought about inequality of the nations and nationalities of the former USSR. That is why, the Soviet Republics differed greatly in the level of their economic, social and cultural development. These steps, as well as the desire to hide contradictions in the sphere of international relations brought about conflicts in many places in the former Soviet Union.

The administrative-command system, which never was real democracy and humanism, but worked only for itself and primarily for the central elite of the system, impeded the development of the region and consequently of international relationships and their cultivation. This political approach made the former Uzbek SSR and all Central Asian regions only “raw material and an appendage” of the Soviet empire. Central Asia was the greatest producer of cotton in the former Soviet Union, but the spinning industry and weaving mills were built far from the Central Asian Republics. The aviation industry was created in Uzbekistan during the Great Patriotic War, but the larger part of the specialists worked in the main cities of Russia. This was necessary and historically justified in that historical period. But this method was used in other conditions for different branches of industry, such as weaving, metallurgical and so on. This national politic, of course, did not further the modern development of a classless social structure of the nations. Further, the government underestimated the abilities and possibilities of the Uzbek nation. The formation and strengthening of brotherly friendship and cooperation, and the cultivation of

---

international contacts were subject to the politics of a totalitarian state, which broke the democratic rules of the equality and freedom of all nations and nationalities of the former USSR.

The experience of many countries shows that a multinational state must keenly but gently interweave the scientific, cultural and historical heritages of all nations and nationalities in order to develop national cultures and national languages. This was not done; instead, intellectuals who asserted national traditions and customs were called “nationalists” which wounded their national dignity and exerted a repressive force upon the outstanding people of those nations.

The contradictions in the development of international relationships have become manifest in the conflicts in such post-Soviet territories as Russia and Chechnya, Nagorny Karabach in Armenia, Abchasia in Georgia, etc. These conflicts have many causes, but all reflect an insufficient development of the culture of international communications. The present events show that a way out of conflict situations requires cultivation of international interaction and that decisions on international questions and problems at all levels in social structure must be based upon positions of equality, respect and mutual understanding. This appears negatively from the bad heritage of the administrative-command system, which deformed the deep basis of social and international relationships. Very often many people were deported from their native lands and many nations were not able to participate in the political life of the former USSR.

International experience shows that not only economic, but also socio-political, spiritual and cultural causes and factors play a very great role. A culture of international communications can be formed and developed when law and other social and moral values are observed consistently, when there is respect for the independence of other nations, and when peoples and nations share common interests with other nations and develop international communications.

This supposes awareness by every nation and nationality of the obligations and duties of life in a multinational environment. Recently the idea of national movements has become widespread as an effect of the growth of national self-awareness. Though there is truth in this, national movements have a very complicated structure. Consequently, we need another approach for understanding the culture of international communication because very often self-awareness of the social, as of the theoretical, level is impermissibly simplified to seeing national self-awareness as only the relationship to one’s own nation, whereas it reflects an appreciation of the relations of that nation or nationality to other nations and nationalities and vice versa. On that basis we need to generate a new concept of national self-awareness.

**Components of International Relations**

Self-awareness is the affirmation of the national independence of a really existent subject entailing material and spiritual values according to the national-awareness to the some ethnic groups, states, languages, cultures and traditions. Our interest in the problem of national self-awareness is due to its place in the content, structure and role of the culture of international communications. We consider national self-awareness as one’s specific impression of one’s relation to one’s own nation as a subject of socio-historical life and particularly of international communications.

First of all, we must underline that the culture of international communications is not reduced to national contacts, but includes many elements, such as:

- mutual respect, mutual understanding and consideration of interests of nations, nationalities and races;
- the different languages of every nation and nationality and also the international languages, stipulated by the development of contacts and mutual understanding;
  - history;
  - national rituals and customs;
  - national cultures (literature, music, different kinds of art: applied and fine arts, architecture, theater, choreography);
  - national mode (way of life, utensils, clothes, traditions, specific modes of family relations);
  - common and specific kinds of religions; and
  - the national self-awareness.

As noted above, the culture of international communications includes such important elements as knowledge. At a minimum, all subjects of culture in national communications have their own language and it is necessary to display mutual respect for the language of another nation as if its language were our native language. First, such simple knowledge of one’s own language is an important condition for the culture of international communications; second, national self-awareness is enriched and developed by this knowledge. The same is true of the correlation of historical knowledge, national rituals, customs, national cultures and styles, different religious confessions, national character and self-awareness, and awareness of other nations. This approach develops important objective laws, which are connected concretely with human culture and the culture of international communications: these are fuller, many-sided, more correct and freer from prejudices, wrong stereotypes, and so on, the higher the level of the culture of international communications.

An objective analysis and exploration of problems must attend as well to the fact that the activation and rise of national self-awareness can ignite, isolate and contrast one nation to others and transform national self-awareness into nationalism. This tendency leads to the destabilization of the international order and an overall pattern of social relations because it means a disastrous isolation of moods and positions of one nation from the whole society, an endeavor to contrast one’s own interests to those of other nations. It is very important not to confuse the culture of national contacts with nationalist extremism, which has nothing in common with culture. The main characteristics of national extremism are:

  - impatience;
  - desire to intimidate rather than to convince;
  - imposition of one’s ideas and will; and
  - ignoring law and moral rules.

It is typical of extremist positions to ignore absolutely the other’s opinion. That is why it is necessary to develop the theory and pursue the practice of national self-awareness and the cultivation of international communications which overcomes these negative tendencies and opens new ways and possibilities for resolving the problem of international communications, democratization and the humanization of society. Experience tells us that without taking account of the interests of nations there can be no culture of international communications, because interests are the most important factors of interaction between nations.

A high level of the culture of international communications and national self-awareness are displayed by those different nations which support the “Law of State Language,” secure the State status of the Uzbek language and also consider it necessary to provide good conditions for the
function of languages of other nations and nationalities of the Uzbek Republic, especially Russian. This culture must be developed throughout one’s whole life in the process of interpersonal relations and the observance of national rituals and national customs. In the families of different nations, nationalities or religions the birth of a child has different modes of celebration, but the essence of that event is the same — acknowledgement of the great goodness of this gift. Another example is the wedding ceremony. It is necessary for every person to know such rules as:

1. a public profession as the heart of the wedding ceremony;
2. respect for the national rituals of the wedding ceremony;
3. providing some support for that ceremony.

Our analyses underlines that it is necessary to understand that international relations depend upon national self-awareness and the culture of international communications. As noted above, the administrative-command system deformed all aspects of social life including the culture of international communications. The new approach is to revive and develop the social, economic, political, spiritual and cultural spheres of social life, integration into world civilization and, of course, the development of the culture of international communication. The latter is a mode of relations between people which enables everyone to fulfill oneself in one’s country with responsibility for its future. The culture of international communications is the process of transforming interaction between nations and nationalities into cooperation.

Cooperation is the most important condition and factor for the stability of each society, nation and nationality as a subject of economic, political, spiritual life, culture and the contacts of international communications. Each kind of human activity in a multinational country shares the character of international communications. This is characterized by the basic principles of that society and also the dynamics and objective laws of the development of human culture. Of course, the culture of international communications cannot decide economic, political, military and other problems. But it furthers the forces of consolidation, simplifies mutual consensus, and creates a socio-psychological and moral atmosphere for optimal collaboration between the subjects of international social contacts.

The culture of international communications pervades all aspects of social and individual being and consciousness. Without this no questions about international relations in one country, or between countries, regions and society as a whole can be decided, such as, for example, communications between the USA and Iran. The crisis situation for many years manifests a lack of international communication between those countries.

At the present time an absence of a culture of international communication is a hindrance for the resolution of economic, military, political, social, spiritual and moral problems. The culture of international communications must be an important factor for decisions on those problems because one of the functions of the culture of international communications is to support every subject of international relations in developing its own potential and to assist in establishing the stable development of society and humanity on their own way of progress.

Among many conditions and factors which have helped to form and develop the culture of international communications the most important has been the development of understanding. By this is meant objective research and knowledge of the history and culture of one’s own nation and of other nations, of one’s region and of the world, and also awareness of the importance of national and human values. That is why it is necessary, indeed very important, for the formation of national
self-awareness and national culture to know one’s real history. Many nations do not know this because they were separated from their Motherland and estranged from their history and culture.

Precisely here it is necessary to develop such characteristics of the culture of international communications as mutual respect, mutual aid, mutual understanding, tact and tolerance. This is especially true as the development of international relations takes place as a process of democratization, humanization of society, pluralism of views and priority of human values. This tends toward globalization. This tendency is stipulated by the level of the culture of international communications — interpersonal, international and regional — between CIS countries and worldwide interchange. All these levels form an interconnected unity ordered by principles and laws for the formation and development of the culture of international communication.

The prospects and processes of integration in its different spheres and at different levels are specified by the cultural integration of a society — for example, the cultural integration of the nations of the Central Asia region. In his work, *Turkestan as Our Common Home*, I.A. Karimov wrote: “The most important result of five years of independence is the foundation of a `common home’ for all nations, the creation of a new multi-ethnic society. The key to this society, i.e., Uzbek culture, is a revival of moral values and of national self-awareness. People living in Uzbekistan must not lose what is distinctive in acquiring a new mentality and common philosophy.”

The culture of international communications is founded on such principles as:

- mutual respect for the cultural and historical heritage, languages, literature and arts of the nations and nationalities living in other countries;
- mutual understanding;
- good relationships between nations;
- collaboration;
- orientation of all spheres of culture (school education, all systems of education, arts, public opinion) to national and human values;
- priority of human values;
- equal rights of nations, nationalities, regions, countries, states;
- pluralism of world outlooks;
- tolerance and working out compromise agreements where nations have problems or conflicts;
- mutual confidence and responsibility;
- humanism; and
- respect for human dignity and national pride.

Therefore, the culture of international communications is a conscious interaction of nations, nationalities and regions on the basis of mutual confidence in the good of each. It is a method for humane and progressive development, for well-being of nations and nationalities depend, for the most part, upon such cultivation of international communication.

---

Part II
Resources for a Spiritual Culture
Chapter VII

Festival-Ritual Culture as a Factor of Social Progress

M. Karabaev

In all periods of socio-cultural progress one needs to celebrate the most important events in one’s life, changes in nature and success at work, as well as to pour out one’s feelings and thoughts in sorrowful moments. This emotional impulse is a source of all ritual culture. At the same time this natural requirement of human existence was a foundation for the formation of festive traditions, which have been one of the most important forms of socio-cultural life throughout the history of humankind.

Festivals are one of the most stable components of social life. They reflect the system and mode of the life of an ethnos, the means of life, its main critical moments and its sense of happiness. For this reason festivals constitute a “temporary ideal life.” Beruny called festivals “the most important days in human life”; Makhmud Kashgary, “days of common joy and merriment”; Omar Khaem “heavenly time.”

Information from modern archeology, history, culturology and art critics corroborate the theory that festivals are the most ancient form of culture. Particularly, according to the well known Russian culturologist M.M. Bakhtin, “Festival is the first form of human culture.”¹ Another Russian scholar, D.M. Genkinthought, states that “the deep roots of festivals disappeared into the childhood of humankind.”² According to Polish scholar, K. Ghigulevskiy, “Celebrations took place in ancient times.”³

We can see clearly the process of the creation and development of festivals in the example of ancient nations. With regard to the Central Asian nations, the ethnic Uzbeks had the most ancient traditions and rich festive-ritual culture. To trace the source to just one ethnos is impossible, because the deeper one researches this ethnos in history the more difficult it is to distinguish one nation from others. The sources of the festivals of the Uzbek and many other nations, which have a close historical fate, lie in the depths of human history. According to archeological information, ancient and medieval sources, scientific hypotheses of philosophers, histories and culturologists, we can see something of the genesis and sources of festive-ritual culture. The first object of our research is hunting games, held before the hunt, and especially after successful hunts, as a solemn, joyful ritual. Noological festivals appear to have been the most interesting. One festival (40-41 thousand years B.C.) was connected with the totem bear.

The Sources of Spiritual Culture

After the noological revolution, which took place in Central Asia two to three thousand years B.C., there were created new cults and labor ceremonies — cattle-breeding rituals and landowners’ festivals. A special place in the life of ancient tribes and their members were the rituals of initiation

---

¹ M.M. Bakhtin, The Creative Work of F. Rableu and Folk Culture of the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Moscow, 1965), p. 11.
² D.M. Genkin, Festivals for the Masses (Moscow: Enlightenment, 1975), p. 44.
into manhood, which held the most important role in the development of the culture of the tribal system and was the first step in the ethnic diversity of human culture.

In the late paleolithic age when stable religious ideas were created in the territory of Central Asia we find such different religions as: totemism, fetishism, animism, magic and so on. The main manifestations of these religions were special rituals: in droughts to call for rain (syst kchotin), in strong winds (choy memo), in bad weather adoration of the Sun (kuesha ciginish), in loss offerings (kurbanlic), in illness charms (badic aytash) and so on. These ancient rituals are the sources of the modern folk festivals. Though they were simple and primitive, as was the life of primitive people, they were an ingenious discovery of the tribes. It was a special mechanism for interaction with the environment and an important means of spiritual health. At the same time, these rituals played an important role in the spiritual value system as the sphere of organization of culture and the spiritual education of the people of that time. They were the most important factors in the formation of the foundation of human culture and social progress.

**Ancient Festivals of Central Asian Nations**

The period from the origin and development of Zoroastrianism (VIII c. B. N. E.) till the dissemination of Islam (VIII c. B. N. E.) was a rich and interesting page in the history of culture. With the development of landownership, the appearance of new towns, the foundation of such states as Sogd, Khorezm, Baktriya, and the development of Zoroastrianism, under the influence of such cultures as Buddhism and ancient Greece new forms of ritual culture, religious customs, and state festivals were created. Regarding the festivals of Central Asia the richest heritage can be found in the creative works of a scholar of the 10th-11th centuries, Al-Beruny, *Monuments of Past Generations*. This work includes voluminous information about the traditions, customs, rituals and festivals of the ancient peoples.

Of great scientific interest is the information about the time-tables of rituals and festivals of the Sogd state, such as: “Navruz” — the beginning of year; “Romysharam” — the festival of the fire temple; “Mokhirdge,” “Nikch Odam” and “Ams-khvora” — dedicated to food; “Bobakhvora” — the festival of the grape juice; “Kashmen” — the festival of trade and market; “Nim sorda” — at mid year. Khorezm also had different festivals, such as: “Apudgo suvon” — the festival of dress in overcoats; “Adzor” — the festival of bonfire; “Frbrikh” — the departure of relatives to war; “Asdokand-Khvora” — the festival of winter; “Mina’s night” — in the early spring mourning for the woman who died of cold weather and “Vaksh Angom” — the day of worship before water.

The largest part of those festivals was connected with fire worship. After the appearance and spread of the Zoroastrian calendar, festivals were transformed into stable traditions and were celebrated on definite days. Of special interest are the Zoroastrian calendar festivals at the beginning of every season: “Forverdin-Markh” (beginning of summer), “Tir Makh” (beginning of winter), “Dey-Makh” (beginning of spring). These festivals were the most important proof of the level of culture. Their meaning, content, form and organization arose from the real biological-social needs of the people, which testify to the high level of knowledge of the environment, the depth of philosophical ideas and the breadth of the creative abilities of the people of Central Asia. The materials about the ancient values of the festive-ritual culture had not been recognized as having historical significance, but today this is recognized. The organization of festivals has great interest first of all because many examples testify to the interaction between humans and nature at the beginnings of the creation of human culture. “Navruz” as the day of vernal equinox is the festival of the New Year, in the spring the renovation of nature was celebrated. At the period of
summer solstice there was celebrated the festival “Angom” dedicated to water, which was the most important value in Central Asia. At the moment of autuminal equinox there was celebrated the festival “Mechrgon” (another named “Chary-Rudz” or “Nim Sorda”) at the beginning of autumn as a harvest festival. At the period of the winter solstice “Cada” or the festival of fire was celebrated.

Beginning from ancient times the peoples of the Central Asia created a system of festivals celebrated during the year. Each festival having a definite place in human life satisfied the natural and socio-cultural requirements of the population. The socio-ecological system of festivals is the heritage not only of the peoples of Central Asia, but of humankind.

Folk Festivals of the Middle Ages up to the Socialist October Revolution

These folk festivals were greatly transformed, first of all through the Islamic religion. After the Arabian conquest of the Central Asia, there were included together with Muslim culture such Islamic festivals as “Iyd-al-curbon” (local name is “Kyrbon-khait”), “Iyd-al-firts” (local name is “Ruza-khait”) and so on. At the same time a religious context was included in the ancient Central Asian festivals.

To create good conditions for Muslim culture, not only were mosques and medrasas built, but also special festival buildings, such as “Nomozgokh” (place for praying), “Musulla-al-iyd” (place for praying during festivals), “Iydokh” (place for festivals) and others, which were cultural-religious centers during festivals and after the festival were places for rest and enlightenment. In those special buildings and out-of-town mosques, on the days of festival there were the morning prayers, sacrifice, regaling, trade and so on.

There is especial interest in the festivals of the Uzbek people which related to the natural, climatic conditions, especially of labor and culture. The main festivals were celebrated in the early spring before field labor, in summer before the harvest; and in winter when cultivators had more free time.

Spring Festivals and Rituals

Spring festivals celebrated a renewal not only of nature, but of the human spirit and generated emotional inspiration, enthusiasm, entertainment, magnificence, etc. Research on the history of the traditions of “Navruz” — “Yil-Boshy” (beginning of the year) — show that this was complex and had a number of aspects: before the festival “Khayria” — support for beggars; “Khashar” — improvement of house; visits to teachers, relatives, old people and the graveyard; and cooking of ritual dishes — “Sumalak” and “Chalim.” The second stage is the organization of the festival, the election of the chairperson of the festival (Rais or Bayram-osh). Usually the festival lasts from three days to a month. A typical plan for festival days consists of: games of chance; wrestling; kurash; ulok; kunkary; horsemanship; the performance of “mascaraboze” (clowns); festival dishes; guests and others. The end of the festival was a ritual measure “Dalada kysh chicarish” (preparing of the wooden plough). This festival consists of: “Kush oshy” (the cooking of ritual dishes); “Shock toy” — greasing of oxen, horse and ploughing; “Ok fotikha” — blessing by old people; and “Kush oshy” — beginning of sowing.

There was a special place among spring traditions for different festivals of flowers (Gul sailary), such as: “Boychechak” (snow festival), “Kizil gul sayli” (festival of the red flowers); “Lola saily” (festival of tulips), “Sumbula sayli” (festival of hyacinth) and also festivals of the
blossoming of fruit trees: “Bodom guli” (blossoming of the almond tree), “Uric gulsayli” (blossoming of the apricot tree), “Bekhi guli” (blossoming of the quince tree). These festivals were expressions of the deep feelings of the Uzbek people toward nature and beauty.

Summer-Autumn Festivals

In the short summer, festivals were fewer than in the spring. There were traditional festivals connected with the cult of water: “Sust khotin” (ritual of calling rain), “Sul saily” (worship before water). But the end of summer and the beginning of autumn were rich in festivals and wedding ceremonies. Cultivators celebrated the agricultural festivals: “Obla-baraka” (festival of the wheat harvest), “Kovun saily” (festival of the melon); “Pachta-saily” (festival of cotton). At such festivals the harvest was divided among the people.

Winter Festivals

After finishing the work season cultivators had free time. Very popular in this season were “Gon-gashtac” (leisure); “Korboshy” (first snowing); and “Kurultoy” (Folk meeting of cultivators and stock-breeder). The nature-landowner calendar of festivals shows that the people of Central Asia, particularly the Uzbek people, had a deep respect for the Earth, planets, animals and water. The people demonstrated a high level of ecological culture.

Mass folk festivals changed at the second part of the 19th century. After the conquering of Central Asia by the Tsars and especially before and after the first years of the October Revolution there was an ardent political struggle between different political trends and groups, who related differently to social, national and religious traditions. The majority of the intellectuals wanted a renewal of culture, but one part held the position of “panturkizt,” Islamic ideology, while another part preached the need to develop local culture along with the values of European and Russian cultures.

Different opinions existed in the community of European and Russian military people, intellectuals and revolutionaries. One group created in Tashkent in 1919 “the society of proletcult” (proletarian culture) whose position of “Cultural Negativism” rejected all cultures created before the Revolution as feudal and called for building a new common culture for all nations. Another group, organized for the first time, was the social-democrats. This post-Bolshevist revolutionary movement called for inculcating new traditions into the old mode of life.

Soviet power, organized such revolutionary festivals as May 1st, March 8th and the Anniversary of the October Revolution, using new forms of celebration such as theatre meetings, concerts, mass rallies, theatre propaganda among the masses, carnival processions and so on. The 1930s-1959s were years of mass repression, hunger, war, and the deportation of nations. The Soviet power tried to show to the world that socialism is the best system, and that the people of the Soviet Union were happy and supported the Communist party and the government. At that time it was very popular to hold “Spartakiads” of athletes, “Olimpiads” of art, military parades, cults of personality, demonstrations of might, and the propaganda of a “cloudless, happy life of the Soviet people.” At the same time, a struggle was waged against folk traditions, and national rites were condemned as nationalistic.

In th 1960s, when the cult of personality was exposed, positive changes took place and some national traditions were allowed. At that time a new approach to folk traditions was developed. They were divided into two groups: progressive, such as labor traditions, and reactionary, which
included religious traditions. According to such a primitive division many traditions, rituals and sometimes the mode of life of the Uzbek people were forbidden because they had some religion elements. At that time the main slogan was: “For a new life — new rituals,” and the main place was held by labor holidays and family rites. In the middle of 1980s again traditional national religious rites were forbidden. For example, the centuries old festive “Navruz” was changed into the new festival, “Novbachor.” This had a negative influence on the moral atmosphere of the Republic of Uzbekistan and created dissatisfaction with the government.

According to social history, change in the political, social and economic spheres influenced the spiritual and festive-ritual culture. After the independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan Uzbek festivals were changed. There were favorable conditions for a restoration of the festive-ritual culture: from 1991 to 1993 the President of Uzbekistan decreed the celebration of such celebration festivals, forbidden during Soviet times, as Navruz, Ruza Khait, Kurbon Khait and others. In 1991, after separating from the Soviet Union, the Parliament of Uzbekistan founded a new festival — “Independence Day of the Republic of Uzbekistan” — which is celebrated every September 1. On December 8, 1992 the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan was accepted, and now this day is celebrated as “Constitution Day.” On March 2, 1992 Uzbekistan was received in the United Nations Organization; this is now a political holiday in Uzbekistan. After Independence a new music competition “Uzbekistan — vatanim manim” (Uzbekistan is my Motherland) was created. The international forum: “Shark taronalary” (Melodies of the East) is held in Samarkand, where the best music masters of the world, not only demonstrate their musical heritage, but have a wonderful opportunity to come to know the musical masterpieces of other ethnoses. The celebration of the 2500 anniversary of the ancient cities of Bukhara and Chiva (1997), under the auspices of UNESCO, became not just propaganda for historical culture, but a demonstration of the role of our ancestors in world civilization.

Thus, since the foundation of independent Uzbekistan little by little new ways of festive-ritual culture are being developed:

1. renaissance of traditions and festivals, which were created almost a thousand years ago, such as “Navruz,” “Kurbon Khait” and others;
2. progressive international festivals, adopted in the 20th century, such as “New Year” (January 1); “The International Women’s Day” (March 8); and “Victory Day” (May 9);

Progressively, Uzbekistan is shaping a new calendar of festivals which held an important place in the social life of the Republic. Research on the festive-ritual culture of Uzbekistan has shown that their number and kind is continually expanding. This is connected, first of all, with the restoration of folk traditions. Some festivals are of international significance, such as “International Women’s Day,” “New Year” and so on; some festivals have national significance, such as “Navruz,” “Gul-Sailly,” “Khosil bayrami” and “Kovun Saily”; and there are also such professional festivals as “The Day of Theater,” “Farmer’s Day,” “Builder’s Day” and so on. For classification, festivals can be divided into six groups:

1. Festivals of nature, because the human is a part and child of nature and these were the first festivals in the history of humanity.
2. Labor festivals, because through labor, humans developed and improved their lives.
3. Festivals of culture. Though all festivals are part of common culture, a range of festivals are connected directly with culture, art, enlightenment and sport; there are festivals of books, languages, music, folk festivals, film festivals, sports festivals and so on.

4. Political festivals which developed under the influence of historical processes. Each political festival has important significance for one historical period. The main political festivals in the Republic of Uzbekistan are: “Independence Day,” “Constitution Day” and “Day of Membership in the UN.”

5. Personal family festivals connected with memorable moments in the life of every human, such as birthdays, weddings and so on.

6. Religious festivals are a component of belief and as the Uzbek people adhere to Islam, the basic religious festivals are “Kurban Khait” and “Ruza Khait” which are festivals of goodness, spirit and mercy.

Festivals were created by humans on the basis of their bio-social and spiritual needs and were transformed into one of the main obligatory parts of their lives. Festivals have existed through all human culture and are of perduring values of life. The social values of the festive culture have the following principles:

- first, festivals, as a part of life, are distinguished from the ordinary week-days and fix the most important events, celebrated as joyful and/or solemn;
- second, festivals give life its special rhythm, breaking its monotony;
- third, festivals mirror the culture of the people, reflecting the best aspects of their lives. That is why on these days people wear their best clothes and jewelry, cook the best dishes, sing beautiful songs, and so on. As Rudaky wrote: “At that time an old man is transformed into a young man, and an old world is transformed into a young world”;
- fourth, festivals are for people days of happiness; on this day everyone tries to forget their sorrows;
- fifth, festivals are days off; on these days people are free from their weekday problems and cares;
- sixth, festivals are days of equality and expressions of folk democracy, because on that day everyone has equal rights;
- seventh, festivals are days of peace; on these days wars ended, injuries and quarrels were resolved, people were introduced to each other and began friendships;
- eighth, festivals have given belief and hope for a better future.

Folk festivals have three sources:

1. memory;
2. understanding of the particular day, joy, and participation in the solemn event;
3. belief and hope in a good future.

Therefore, the history of humanity shows festivals in all periods of its development, beginning from ancient times, to be one of the main forms of human culture. Created on the basis of people’s needs, developed under the influence of the conditions of the natural climate, labor and mode of life, they are one of the main parts of the sociocultural life of people. Every epoch gives birth to its own festivals and develops its own traditions. Some festivals have a long life, for example,
“Navruz”; other festivals disappeared but after some time were restored, for example “Mekhrdzon.” Many festivals were created in the context of a particular period of state government and ended with its creator or remained only as an historic memory. However, multifunctional festivals will continue as a most important sociocultural value through all ages.
Chapter VIII

The Place of Islamic Culture in Social Progress

Abdusamedov Anvar

Culture, as the specific method of organizing and developing human activity must characterize the consciousness and activity of a people according to their national, ethnic and confessional environment. As international and intercultural links are develop and broaden it is important to define the place and role of Muslim culture in social progress and its influence on the formation of world culture.

People are now conscious of fundamental and dynamic changes in the formation of world outlooks. These require a new mentality and new methods of action. Moreover, the internalization of social life has given people a chance to know the cultures of other nations. In the present intensive economic, social and informational interaction between people, the problem of the unity of humankind is not just theoretical, but practical. The “New book of belief” by a team of authoritative Protestant and Catholic theologians states that now the history of different cultures is becoming a new type of history without differentiation between West and East, Muslim and Christian. In addition the present is characterized by an increasing role of Islam and its culture in the modern world and the strengthening of the influence of the Islamic religion in the political life of humankind, especially in the region of Western and Central Asia.

The prior totalitarian system carried out active propaganda against religion as the “opium of the people,” with the result that people “lost their human face.” This propaganda was very strong in the former USSR so that the larger part of its population lost their relation to religion. But after the collapse of the communist system, deep changes took place in the socio-political system of the Republics of the former Soviet Union. In the formation of new socio-democratic institutions the role of religion and of Muslim culture very notably increased.

Beginning from the 7th century in West Asia a rich, many-sided and distinctive Islamic culture arose and spread very fast to the West as far as France, and to the East as far as India and China. The system and mode of life of the Muslim peoples, not only in action but also in thought, spread over most of the world. The Islamic outlook with its regulation of all spheres of social life began in Arabia and brought about radical change in the social life of the isolated Arabian tribes. It was also the foundation of the great Arabian empire as it provided the spiritual basis for the union of the Arabian State. At the same time medieval Europe was divided into many small states which could not withstand the Arab-Muslim advance. The Arabian Caliphate was the greatest center of world culture, science and economics. A high level of agriculture, craft and commerce promoted the development of science. Higher education establishments were founded many years before the foundation of the universities in Europe.

The highest level of Arabian science was achieved by many nations in the Arabian Caliphate, including the Central Asian countries. This reflected the rapid development of Muslim culture. In the 9th century, when Caliph Al-Mamum reigned, Baghdad became the greatest centre for the sciences of mathematics, logic, mechanics, geography and medicine. In Baghdad and Damascus astronomical observatories were opened. For the first time Arabs carried out difficult mathematical tasks and had great success in such science as physics, mechanics, optics and chemistry.
The first scholars of Central Asia also made valuable contributions to science by developing dialectics, logic and the Aristotelian theory of knowledge. The influence on the Christian world was very deep and was expanded in the works of the greatest scholars born in Central Asia, al-Farabi and his followers, Biruny, Ibn Sina and others. The culmination of the work of al-Farabi was his commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. In the East, al-Farabi was called “the second teacher,” “the first teacher” being Aristotle.

The medieval scholars of Central Asia made a great contribution to the development of philosophical culture. The greatest influence was the 11th century scholar Ibn Sina, known in Europe as Avicenna. Ibn Sina authored more than 300 works, the most popular being his “Canon of the Medical Sciences,” which work retains significance even in modern times. His encyclopedic *Book of Healing* had great influence on the philosophical thought of Europe. It consists of 18 parts divided into logic, physics, mathematics and metaphysics. Also well known in Europe was his work “Book of Knowledge.” The greatest achievement of Ibn Sina was his classification of knowledge. However, his priorities were philosophy and medicine. Philosophy is healing of the soul; medicine is healing of the body; the good health of the body depends upon the good health of the soul, because body and soul have an organic connection and one cannot exist without the other.

The highest authority at that time was another Muslim philosopher, Ibn Rushd, or in Latin Averroes. According to his doctrine matter is eternal, but limited in space. The material elements in his world outlook alternated with an idealistic world understanding, culminating in divine life as God thinking himself. His ideas about a double truth were very popular both in the East and in the West. According to this theory, philosophy and religion give humankind the same truth. Religion founded on belief, displays truth in allegorical forms coming from the mouth of God, whereas philosophy is comprehended through knowledge. That is why religion and philosophy have some differences. What in philosophy is accounted as truth, might not be so from the religious point of view. The purpose of Ibn Rushd was to establish the autonomy of science vis-a-vis religion, but he affirmed the highest level of philosophical knowledge to be blissful.

The greatest contribution to “the golden heritage” of Central Asian science was made by the great scholar Abu Raichan Al Beruny. He had a universal education and for his time he was a “living encyclopedia.” He was a perfect Muslim, holding the commandments of Islam sacred; but he also praised the power of the human mind, which could open the deepest secrets of nature. In his astronomical research Beruny expounded a doctrine of the characteristics of the movement of celestial bodies; he doubted the Aristotle-Ptolemeean theory about a motionless Earth as the centre of the Universe and hypothesized the movement of the Earth around the Sun. These ideas were developed by the grandson of Amir Temur, Mirzo Ulugbec, in his well-known creative work, *Zidsh*, which included brilliant astronomical tables with four values (maals). Mirzo Ulugbec founded a great scientific school with an observatory in Samarkand the capital of his empire.

In the broad sense, Muslim culture was the totality of the economic, social, political and cultural relations built on the foundation of the interchange between Muslim and Christian nations during many centuries of the co-existence of the two religions. These relations between the East and the West are important at the present time, because the future development of nations depends upon their mutual understanding.

The influence of Christian culture on early Muslim culture was felt in the early kalam or the theological discussions about God’s predetermination and human free will. But beginning from the 12th-13th centuries this situation changed when Muslim scholars and philosophers became
scholastic authorities. West Asia (Avicenna) and Muslim Spain (Averroes) were for Europe sources from which European civilization drew its culture. The influence of Muslim culture on Europe in the Middle Ages was varied and spread among all spheres and levels of European society including its mode of life, trade, economics, politics, science, philosophy and religion.

The “beautiful life” cultivated by Muslim people, particularly the aspiration to magnificence, comfort and higher education, especially in the territory of Spain began to attract people’s attention in other countries of Europe. From the second part of the 10th century some European scholars began to learn “Arabian science.” The first Crusade began a process of “cultural connections” between Western Europe and the Muslim world. The main channels, through which elements of Arabian Muslim culture penetrated to medieval Europe were Spain and Italy. Creative works of Jewish and Muslim theologians were considered as authorities for Catholic theologians, and works of the Greek philosophers originally translated by Christians into Arabic were commented on by Muslim philosophers whose work became popular in Western science. Thus, works of the ancient scholars returned to Europe through two or three languages and the work of Muslim theologians such as Al Ghazali, who was the author of “Makasid al-falasifa” (“Aspiration for Philosophy”) an important source of Aristotelian philosophy for the Western Scholastics.

In Europe a famous translator, John Spanish, translated the physical, mathematical, logical and psychological works of Ibn Sina. By 1180 all the creative works of Avicenna were translated into Latin. At that time theology was integrated with physics and metaphysics in a process of rapprochment between Arabo-Muslim and European philosophy, particularly with regard to the ideas of neo-Platonic thinkers and Aristotle. In the works of Al Farabi, Ibn Sina and al-Ghazali the theories of hierarchy and of the active intellect were of great interest. One important result of the influence of Muslim philosophy in the West was the syntheses of neoplatonic ideas by Ibn Sina with Christian doctrines developed with a Platonic orientation by such authors as Augustine, Boethius and so on. Some works of Aristotle entered medieval Europe through Arabo-Muslim culture. Before the 12th century in Europe only such works of Aristotle as the “categories” and “perihermeneutics,” which had been translated by Boethius, were well known. Later other work of Aristotle were translated. At the beginning of the 12th century the Aristotelian heritage arrived in Paris and Oxford, after which in the 13th century the works of Averroes were popular with European scholastics, especially his commentary on Aristotle. Dante called him “the best commentator at the present time.” In Europe three basic doctrines of Ibn Rushd were well known: the theory of the eternity of the world, the theory of active intellect, and the doctrine of the correlation between belief and knowledge.

In the 14th-16th centuries there appeared the first signs of the cultural estrangement of Europeans from the Arabo-Muslim peoples. However, this estrangement did not break the connections between the two cultures. There were cultural, diplomatic and commercial contacts and some philosophical sources from Arabian countries were also famous. But beginning from the 15th century, after the conquering of the Balkans and Constantinople by the Turkish-Ottomans, the interest of the European peoples in the Muslim culture began to revive.

In 1691-1698 the Koran was translated and published in Latin by Ludovico Morache. In the first years of the 18th century, the teacher of the Arabian language in Cambridge, S. O’Key, wrote his “History of Saracines”; for the first time in England, the history of the Arabian people was presented scientifically. In the middle of the 18th century, the French scholar, G. Postel, began to teach Eastern languages in the College de France.

Muslim culture was of great interest in the Age of Enlightenment. Walter in his tragedy Magomet (the complete name: Fanatism and Prophet Magomet), Montesque in the Persian
Letters, Diderot in the Unmodest Treasures identified issues which were very interesting to their contemporaries. For Europe of the 18th century the Muslim East was seen as a place of absolutism and endless reaction, but after publication of the Thousand and One Nights by A. Gallan in 1704-1708 all European philosophers, writers and poets were enthusiastic about Muslim culture. For Europe the East became a source of the romantic, exotic and erotic.

In the 19th century a great wave of European immigrants — military people, merchants, missionaries, administrators and scholars — coming from the West opened broad possibilities for introducing that new world. The circle of knowledge about life in Muslim countries, about their culture and religion, broadened rapidly. Interest in the Muslim countries was practical in nature, for the origin of Islamology as an independent scientific discipline was connected with the history of colonial conquest.

The great Russian religious philosopher, V. Solovev, wrote about the influence of the religious philosophy of Islam on the cultural history of Western countries. He said that in the development of the history of humanity there are three forces: the first would like to subdue humankind to God; the second would skip “the unity of the world” and give freedom to the individual form of life; the third would reconcile the unity of God with individual freedom. In the modern world, according to Solovev, these forces exist in three historical cultures: the first is the Arabian East, the second is Western civilization, and the third is Slavonic.

The modern relation between the West and the East is a dialogue between two great religions. Now, we begin to see the unity of humankind and of religions. Strengthening and developing cultural connections will both promote, and depend upon, cooperation between Muslim and European cultures.
Chapter IX

Language and Its Role in Social Progress and the Spiritual Perfection of the Person

Usein Karimov and Olga Lantseva

Language is the materialization of the process of thinking in the integrated and self-sufficient phenomenon of “speech.” In order to comprehend the nature of language in the process of thinking it is necessary to understand the phenomenon of speech as a “microcosm” of being, a small model of existence. To understand this means discovering the innermost laws of the creation and functioning of speech: “the process of human thinking and its materialization in language forms.”

“The internal Logos and its materialization by the physical forms” is similar to the Absolute Truth or the “macrocosm” of Being. The law of the creation and functioning of the “microcosm” — “the process of human thinking and its materialization by language forms” — is an outcome of a knot of problems of knowledge at the first stage of the process of knowing. The further development of that process goes on to perfect both the “microcosm” and the “macrocosm.” In other words, through the knowledge of the law of creation and the functioning of the “microcosm” of being that is human speech it is possible reliably to speak about all problems and their resolutions. All are found in conjunction with the truth of the “microcosm” and with the Absolute Truth of Being, as all problems are connected to truth.

The purpose of this article is not to summarize the truth of the “microcosm” and the Absolute Truth or “macrocosm,” but to show the role of language culture in social progress. This should aid the person and society correctly to evaluate the knowledge fixed by the language forms in the different periods of the development of humanity.

We shall begin from a simple conversation of a tutor and student, in which the student with a certain preparation always gives the correct answer.

The tutor asks the student a question: Is there a process of thinking without any opportunity to materialize it in language forms?

Student: It is mute!

Tutor: That is completely correct! Is there another opportunity to materialize the process of thinking?

Student: Of course! In writing and gesture.

Tutor: But are there means to materialize language forms without a process of thinking?

Student: This does not happen! (Karimov, 1996, p. 4)

Through a conversation between tutor and student the latter discovers the answer to a major question in philosophy.

The Life of the Spirit

The process of thinking can be materialized in numerous forms of written speech: verbal (oral) and an infinite set of other artificial means created for this or that necessary sign system. The same process of thinking can be materialized by an infinite number of natural and artificial languages.
The infinite number of material language forms hide its essence as a process of thinking, which is the sole means for comprehending the spiritual, and at the same time the main obstacle to the comprehension of the spiritual. If the mentality of a person is lower than the norms fixed by the language forms at a given stage of development of society, then comprehension of these forms is an obligatory condition for further progress in the comprehension of spiritual perfection. Alexey Nikolaevich Tolstoy speaks about this level:

In general we can think that speaking clever things and philosophizing is only for educated people, who are high above the crowd. This is a strange opinion which could be correct only if for clever speech and philosophy one needed to receive from clever books, combinations of still other words and other ideas. Then education and reading would be ballast for the brain that it hardly has time to digest, combine and generalize. Where would there be independent, original thinking? It would happen in the very few elect. (A.N. Tolstoy, 1961, p. 7).

When the language culture of a given level of development of society has been adopted, the person passes into the category of the elect, to independent thinking. In this case not only the popular values of the given society, but also the language norms (categories) of sensual perception and thought (ideal categories) are the main units of the process of thinking and can be obstacles in the way of comprehending spiritual perfection. Thus, the sensually perceived world is a “dark kingdom,” whereas the spiritually perceived world is “The bright Kingdom of Truth.” To reach the spiritual level of perception of being, the process of thinking must be cleared from the dark material as Indian philosophers say, and from the vision behind the habitual language forms” (Berkeley, 1978, p. 169).

The stratification of being consists of seven levels, through which a physical human essence should pass in the process of spiritual perfection:

1. The physical body without sensual perception; this is a biological base for perception of an information space (world).
2. The physical body with sensual perception; this perceives only the environmentally isolated physical world.
3. The physical body with thinkable perception which has not been freed from the common background of sensual perception. This is also the level of reflection. Here the weak display of perceptions of the world is observed, whereas the common background of sensual perception it almost imperceptible.
4. The physical body with thought, but not completely free from sensual perception. This has two worlds: the sensually perceived and the mentally perceived. It is the world of doubts, chaos and insoluble problems. This is the level of the mentality of modern man. Its measure (level) of development was described by the American cybernetic linguist Marvin Minsky as follows: “It is impossible to consider thinking to be sufficiently developed if it is not capable of addressing the analyses of its own process of thinking” (Minsky, 1988, p. 284).
5. The physical body with thought perception and free of sensual perception, but not free from “the deceit of words,” as the habitual language forms include their habitual essence (the contents as units of the process of thinking).
6. The physical body with accomplished thought perception, capable of escaping not only the isolated habitual world of sensual perception, but also from the false world of “the deceit of words.”
7. The physical body with the perfection of spiritual perception. This body is completely free from “dark material,” that is from the captivities of the previous six worlds. This body is now the world of truth where the contents (“I” or spirit) of this body achieves perfection and ceases to require the physical world. The perfect consciousness is a spirit released from sensual perception and from all kinds of thinkable perception. This is the “I” or ego of the person; its truth lies outside subjective and predicative thought.

The spirit is the divine “I” of the person. When the person is born, it is most near to God and truth; as the divine “ego” it is not soiled with the norms of societies, traditions and conventions. Thereafter the divine spirit — the “I” of the person — begins to be defiled. The defilement of the spirit is the soul which permits it to define a nationality, residence, creed, employment, kind of thinking, etc., whereas the spirit is cosmopolitan, supra-human and divine.

The level of the content or “mentality” of language formed in human speech directly depends upon the level of perfection of the process of thinking. When the person has reached the spiritual level of perception of being, and has recognized its own “I” or own divine spirit, the content of one’s speech is truth, which excludes the existence of imperfect knowledge had by imperfect methods of research. The truth is comprehended only by a few and is unclear for others. For this reason peoples still have not repented that they persecuted their geniuses. In the Bhagavat-Gita it is remarked: “Live feelings are higher than dead matter, the mind is higher than feelings, the reason is higher than mind, and spirit is even higher than reason” (A.Ch. Sri Srimad, Bhagavat-Gita Bhaktivedanta Svami Prabhuapada, p. 208). The language culture of a society is formed at the level of mind, but that language culture is penetrated by elements of both reason and spirit.

The intuitive or unconscious contains the spiritual or divine “I” of the person. This reflects the divine “I” of the person, which coincides with the “I” of Being as well as with Absolute Truth. For this reason, some statements of the people who have opened to the divine “I” are so deep and boundless that they submerge one in the infinity of their contents. Such statements outlive the centuries and millennia as samples of spiritual perfection at the height of the seventh level. These processes of thinking make their way through challenges, mistakes and errors; only the rare mind manages to succeed in passing through this labyrinth.

Language and Spirit

We remain still in experimental research in the field of sensually perceived language where the harmony of these language forms and processes of thinking is infringed upon by strong sensual perception. Sensual perception, as an alienating process of thinking, not only infringes upon the harmony of speech as an integral phenomenon of being, but also destroys its own unified whole because some parts and their qualities do not represent qualities of the whole. As a result the object of research does not promote the whole, but destroys it. Not noticing this researchers continue deepening the errors as sensually perceived language divides into ever smaller parts. The phenomenon of language cannot exist independently, as the purpose of language forms is the process of thinking, but not quite the reverse: the process of thinking can exist without language forms. Moreover, the process of thinking “lives” its own complete life, so that when it is materialized in language forms the infinity of the process of thinking in speech is lost. Further divisions into parts which already destroy the whole becomes senseless, as it is a progressively deeper withdrawal into a labyrinth of errors. For this reason the stratification of language levels in linguistics is a most important error, as if the language forms of speech can exist independently.
Hence the phonetic, word-building, lexical and morphological levels of language especially have no right to independent existence.

Here the main formal conclusion has been made by Gegel who asserted that “the content is indifferent to the language forms. “Linguistic research is of interest only at the level of syntactic problems, but cannot pass at the level of speech into the synthesis of a “microcosm” of being. Thus, comprehension of the truth of the “microcosm” of life is similar to the Absolute Truth of Being. It is neither phonetic, word-building, lexical, nor the morphological levels of language.

Hence, language culture, as well as common culture, bears in itself the image of the synchronous level of development that appears in the erroneous working out of norms of language and common norms of society. However, sooner or later these norms will collapse and be destroyed, and must be worked out anew. This will continue until not only a group of people, but the large part of society comes to the spiritual, eternal, immutable truth found at the metaphysical level.

Bibliography


Chapter X

The Continuity of Knowledge in the Socio-Cultural Progress of Independent Uzbekistan

Tukhtaev Khakim

In the conditions of deep socio-cultural transformations which have taken place in Independent Uzbekistan during the transition to a market economy, multiple forms of property and different social systems, the problem of the formation of citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, their historical memory and their education have special significance. All people, especially the young, need a deep appreciation and love of the rich heritage of our great ancestors and the inexhaustible fund of their philosophical and scientific works. Without the historical experience of one’s own nation and national and human values it is impossible to build a great future. That is why the problem of the continuity of the knowledge and spiritual values of our ancestors, and an understanding and familiarity with such values by all citizens of the Republic has special significance.

The ancient spiritual values of the Uzbek peoples were carefully preserved and passed from age to age. Today it is necessary to revive such spiritual values as justice, modesty and national dignity. The highest goal of the spiritual-moral renaissance of the nation is the foundation of its humanism, justice and duty.

For each nation of our multinational Republic to master its material and spiritual values is one of the most important challenges at the turn of millennium. The axiological orientation of humankind at the present time pervades all other aspects of the life of nations and nationalities from the individual to society. The understanding and proper use of science and technology, and the spiritual values which were created by great scholars, masters of art, culture and literature of the past and present times are the most important factors of social progress.

Every nation shapes its values in their special historical conditions. Material or spiritual value have something eternal, important and common; human values are the basis of the renovation and progress of society. But it is important to remember that some material or spiritual values were created by a person or group of persons and afterwards achieved common acceptance. Such human values stood the test of time and integrated the historical experience of all of humankind, reflecting the principles of morality which were developed through all generations and civilizations.

In all stages of the development of humankind one finds spirituality, morality and all the values and culture which enrich nature. Real humanism and benevolence are the highest spiritual-moral values. These ideas have been propagated by the best human minds over many centuries. I.A. Karimov said: “Humanism is the inalienable characteristic of the Uzbek people; cruelty and violence are alien to them. Through a thousand years of the richest events of our history, our people survived many things — joy in the blossoming of culture and science, and sorrow in quarrels and the loss of our best sons and daughters. But the circumstances of history — cruel wars and natural disasters — could not break the benevolence of the people. Now the Uzbek family is the
personification of goodness and light, love of children and sympathetic response to human troubles.”

As real followers of traditional humanization our people always aspire to neighborly relations and hospitality. To friends and partners we always say “Welcome.” Love of children and of the new generation is also an inalienable characteristic of Uzbek people; after the foundation of the independent Republic of Uzbekistan the first theme was “Soglom avlod ychun” (“For a healthy generation”). The cult of family and children over many generations is closely connected with the cult of health. According to the tradition of Ibn Sina, our people traditionally followed the recommendations of our ancestors and stood categorically against the bad habits which undermine people’s health. In this connection, I.A. Karimov underlined that a “culture of personal care of one’s own health needs to be inculcated from one’s youngest years, using all the forces of family, school and makhalla for the protection of the health system, physical training and sport. It is important that in speech and action people value their health and care for it as a national heritage.”

The human goal and meaning of social progress is impossible without a government of law and continuity between generations. The sociocultural significance of real, practical humanism is directed toward the actual tasks of social progress, the fundamental reconstruction of society and its economy and mode of life. Friendship and collaboration between nations in the different spheres of life have important significance. Such connections are especially important for people living in our region who have a common history. The friendliness and good-neighborly relations of the Uzbek people are well known everywhere. During the hard years of the Second World War there arrived in Uzbekistan hundreds of thousands people who had been evacuated. All were welcomed, and for many people Uzbekistan become their second motherland.

The many nationalities which now are permanent citizens of the Republic have their own national cultural centers, and have carefully kept the traditions, language and culture of their ancestors, but they also are drawn into the cultural values of the basic nationality of Uzbekistan, its language, art and literature. Representatives of other nationalities contribute to increasing the spiritual riches of the Republic, its science, literature and art. The entrance of the independent Republic of Uzbekistan into the market economy opened international collaboration with many countries of the East and West and a real possibility for the development and moral improvement of the person. The moral potential of each person for society is becoming one of the most important factors in the reconstruction of civil society.

The President holds that the “behavior” of people is not only a matter of contact with each other; morality is first of all conscience and justice based on faith and honesty. Our ancestors developed complex criteria for morality, that is to say, they created “the Eastern moral code.” Formation of a rich moral culture, which is coherent and civilizing, is impossible without connections with customs, traditions and rituals which were created thousands of years ago. This has complicated the process of assimilation by our contemporaries of the best that comes from our ancestors.

For a long time it was inculcated into the consciousness of people that social interests were more important than personal ones. This meant that the interests of the state were always the most important. Of course, social interests are very important and everyone has his or her duty as citizen,
but society must help one satisfy one’s needs. That is why I.A. Karimov emphasized: “The most important characteristic of the new constitution is its recognition of the responsibility of state establishments and its officers before citizens, that is to say the priority of the interests of every citizen.”

The substance of the different human values is spiritual culture, which concentrates the expression of the best things created by humankind during thousands of years. Therefore, in the process of the development in society of democracy, equality and freedom, and the strengthening of the law, spiritual values have a more important significance in their differentiation and richness. In that connection the emancipation of the creative activity of those mastering science, technology, literature and art is most important. But revival of national originality must not be a break from the ideals of humanistic world culture, human values and the traditions of our multinational society.

Of central importance for protecting the life of people is the environment. To preserve it, and enrich our surroundings with its energy and mineral resources is the moral duty of every human. The ecological catastrophe of the Aral Sea is an example of the most dangerous changes of the natural balance. That is why it is very important to become familiar with ecological culture, to form an ecological consciousness, and to use all the educational possibilities and forces of law to forbid any pollution of land and water that harms animals, plants and humans.

The modern period of development of the different nations of Uzbekistan, the revival of their national self-awareness, a real renaissance of national cultural self-awareness and the national psychology is possible because our Republic has become free. Freedom has made it possible to revive many rich centuries of national culture and to join to that culture the best from the whole world. It is the duty of everyone carefully to keep and increase the great spiritual values created by people over the whole history of civilization. The common norms of morality, the basic rules of common human life, are the foundations of all systems of relationships between people on all levels of social life. These moral demands and taboos protect society from different social excesses which threaten normal modes of life, such as gangsterism, hooliganism, extremism and narcotics.

An ancient moral taboo such as “do not steal,” “do not lie,” “do not attack” in civilized society are becoming common rules of behavior; they are common for all civilizations because they are the highest norms of morality. The most important human values which stipulate human behavior in any society are such qualities as: honesty, dignity, courage, adherence to principle and clear conscience. The modern man is able to distinguish goodness from evil, justice from injustice, bravery and courage from cowardice, honesty from lies, happiness from unhappiness, egoism from altruism. If relationships between people are founded on mutual respect and mutual aid, such as “hashar” in Uzbekistan, individualism has no place.

One of the most important human qualities is honesty and dignity. These moral categories characterize the level of social awareness of one’s personality and its aspiration for retaining one’s prestige, reputation and good name. Honor and dignity are incompatible with different kinds of insults to one’s personality and one’s human dignity. The conception of honor includes not only self-awareness of personality, but its acknowledgement, prestige and relationships in the family, and an appreciation of its activity in the community and the whole society.

The conception of honor and dignity has a close connection with such social values as conscience which means the responsibility of a person for his or her own activity and behavior. Conscience is characterized by the ability of the person for the self-appreciation and self-criticism

---

of one’s mode of life or of avoiding moral duties. Conscience as a moral prodding is a regulator of personal behavior. It urges humans to do what is right on the basis of personal conviction and the common norms of morality, without further external direction, for example, from authorities and government.

Conscience entails awareness of the person and one’s moral responsibility, not just before one’s own family, but before the nation and society. The result of such self-control and self-appreciation can lead to a conflict situation; to go against one’s conscience entails moral dissatisfaction which pricks our conscience. Conscience is the strictest, most objective, judge of acts, thoughts and sense; sometimes moral duty and conscience are the same.

In the system of human values a sense of empathy, that is to say, one’s ability to appreciate morally or put oneself in the place of another has great significance. Empathy is the ability to draw another person close to one’s own heart, and to adapt thereto one’s own activity and actions. It orients the personality along the humanistic values of kind-heartedness and benevolence.

Adherence to principle as a moral category is incompatible with indifference to moral demands. A democratic society is incompatible with a bureaucracy which puts barriers in the way of progress and undermines the belief of people in social justice. Bureaucracy is a gross distortion of real democracy; it dictates an administrative-command mechanism, vanity, arrogance, contempt and disrespect for ordinary people and their needs.

The most dangerous and amoral forms of abuse of official duty are different kinds of graft. It is detrimental to the moral health of society, when honest relations between people are changed to, e.g., “You must give me something and after that I will give you something” or “Live well yourself and give another whereby to live well,” etc. Under such conditions, very often, there develop widespread time-serving, flattery and fawning which spawn plots, backbiting, envy, slander, the seeking of special advantage, etc. All these distortions of moral values have a common basis, namely, an egotistic psychology of personality. Distorted morality and ambition very often create a bad moral atmosphere in labor teams. At the present time, as many hundred years ago, there is conflict between people with different value orientations. Of course, the highest level of moral culture is not a panacea for all troubles and mistakes. But as a rule, moral culture determines the behavior of persons and their attitudes and relationships with other people in society. Common values help people to face complicated, extraordinary situations as active citizens and to be patriots for their own nation.

The double morality used by many people is incompatible with common values. The moral demands of civilized, democratic society categorically rejects in social life proposing one value, but in personal life living by another. These clearly suffer a split personality which can be seen in the opposition between words and deeds.

The creation in Uzbekistan of an ideology of national independence is founded upon national origins, language, customs, traditions and human values. The national ideology is a good basis for education in such qualities as benevolence, tolerance and aspirations to knowledge and justice. That is why I.A. Karimov noted that “we talk about national consciousness, national honor, national ideology, because we have decided to lead Uzbekistan into the realm of great states. Our children, our young men and women must be educated in such a way that they believe in that idea and have the dignity to be citizens of such a great state.”

---

This ideology founded on humans values means an affirmation of social justice which rules out different forms of social injustice and requires the continuing efforts of all to create a new ideal of social justice. This is the highest aim in reviving the people’s spirituality and in social progress.
Chapter XI

National-Cultural Interests and Social Progress

Achidiev Abduvakhid

The Dialectic of National and Cultural Interests

A history of the development of a human society reveals words which long ago turned into an aphorism: “Interests are corrected by life.” Behind the activity of simple and great persons, and of various social groups lie certain interests. These interests are a major factor driving and orienting human activity. The various paths of public development and human history imply as many human needs and interests as there are people and social groups. This results in collisions of interests.

But to stop on the idea that interests are the driving forces of the activity of the people would mean that the progress of human society would be unilateral. This opens the question of the reverse influence of social progress on the formation and development of interests. The successes achieved in the public development of culture, training, science and engineering, have derived and continue to derive from new requirements, and new interests. For example, the development of science and engineering has resulted in radio and TV. Together with newspapers and magazines they enable more complete satisfaction of the needs of the people in the field of information and have resulted in the formation and development of interests connected to the freedom of the word and the reception of information. As is evident, interests and social progress are inseparable from each other and form a dialectical unity.

Proceeding from the above approach, it is evident that the formation of nations is a natural result of thousands of years of ethnic development of humankind, which includes new and original forms of social and national interests. National interests are as differentiated as is national life and according to its spheres it is possible to allocate the social, economic, political and cultural interests of nations. In a system of interests a special place is occupied by interests connected with the satisfaction of cultural-spiritual requirements: the existence, preservation and development of culture in general, and of national culture in particular or, in other words, national-cultural interests. This special place is due, first, to the penetration of culture into all spheres of social life, and its inseparable involvement at the level of public development. Secondly, the changes occurring in social, economic and political life themselves cut a road through consciousness, values and the image of the life of the people — that is, through culture. Thirdly, it is necessary to remember that the national culture was generated as a whole over many centuries, and therefore represents a special, distinct and unique national phenomenon. In contrast to the economic and political spheres, which abstract from national characteristics, a national culture while incorporating the best of other cultures, does not lose the “person,” for such a loss would result in the disappearance of the ethnos. Due to these features of culture, the realization of national-cultural interests has a perduring and urgent meaning.

Various social groups, political parties and movements can understand and interpret essential national interests. In such conditions it is possible to achieve a correct and exact comprehension of national interests. In contrast, an absence of political pluralism, of freedom of speech and publicity, and a denial of democratic values can result in an inadequate or wrong understanding of national interests. Besides it can create conditions for certain social groups and political forces to
bring forward their interests for the nation and attempt to introduce an understanding of them in the public consciousness.

Just such a situation arose in our country after the October Revolution. This was because of the prevalence of Marxist-Leninist ideology, based on the idea of class struggle. National policy dismissed as nationalism the native culture and aspirations carefully to perfect national values and traditions. Such a situation was reflected in the following steps.

- First, the whole layer of creative intelligenzia which had been generated before the October events and provided a link to national-cultural development was destroyed.
- Second, the invaluable products of national oral creativity by outstanding poets, writers, scientists were declared to be ideologically hostile and their study forbidden.
- Third, much from the past of our culture was considered as feudal, obsolete and unnecessary. Many achievements of applied art were lost — wood carvings, gold embroidery, the manufacturing of jewelry, etc.
- Fourth, the monuments of culture — architectural complexes, madrasas and cultural structures, in which the history of our people is fixed — were destroyed. For example, experts calculate that in 1929-1930 in Turkestan 14,000 mosques were burned. In Tashkent alone in 1911 there existed 26 madrasas, of which, 30 years later, 23 had been destroyed. This negligent, indeed intentionally destructive, attitude to historical monuments dominated in subsequent years so that in 50 years no less than 20,000 monuments were destroyed. In Fergana valley only a third of the historical structures escaped.

It is necessary to note that the above-mentioned situation arose owing to the actions of external forces violently introducing a hostile world outlook, values, traditions and image of life of the communist ideology and its ideas of class struggle. At the same time the practice of former allied republics — now independent states — shows that such a situation could arise again under the influence of international factors.

In particular, the experience of Tajikistan bears witness to this. There backwardness in the national self-consciousness, instability of local moods, the focus of the political elite of the country upon their own interests or upon corporate and regional interests rather than national interests, the formation of political forces aspiring to build a basis for an independent nation on religious principles to counterbalance the secular way of development, all have created a situation of internal contradictions in a struggle for authority which has resulted in civil war, and negated decades of socio-economic development in Tajikistan.

Today opposing parties there consider only themselves to be the unique mouthpiece of national interests and, under various pretexts, break achieved agreements and continue to worsen the situation of the country. Naturally, in such conditions there cannot talk about satisfaction of the cultural requirements of the people, realization of national-cultural interests, or moving with the developments of a global culture.

In contrast, in our Republic since the first days of independence a way to maintain and strengthen both the social and the international was chosen. Due to this the country advances by sure steps along the way of constructing an economy based on market relations, democracy, a lawful state and civil society. Naturally, the new system of social relations is not formed without the certain difficulties. The prevention and solution of the difficulties of a transition period has been a huge accomplishment of politics carried out in the Republic.
Cultural Renewal

The nucleus of this politics consists of five principles put forward by the President I.A. Karimov: deideologization of the economy above politics; the basic reformer of society is the state; a humane and strong social policy; the rule of law everywhere and in all things; and stages of transition to a market economy.

What is the meaning of these principles? Before answering this question even in general it is necessary to look at the essence of these principles. It is well-known that in the Soviet period the economy, as well as all spheres of public life, was subordinated to the politics of the Communist Party armed with a Marxist-Leninist ideology. Failure to take account of objective economic laws, and proceeding according to ideological dogmas and political orientations has in the end resulted in a crisis of the whole system of socio-economic relations. Under the conditions of independence such an approach was ended. The principle of the priority of the economy above politics was assumed, freeing the economy of ideological and political dogmas. This emphasized that economic changes could be made not on the basis of abstract political doctrines, but in as much as they help to accelerate economic development and answer the interests of the people.

New socio-economic relations and a world outlook based on democratic values are forming as the result of socio-economic reforms and the spiritual-moral updating connected to life and the introduction in the consciousness of the people of the need for these changes. All this cannot be carried out without direction and hence a reformation of the role of the state. The new way of development requires adequate time for the formation of a new generation of staff. This means that reformation of the role of the state requires development of a new system of preparation and retraining for the staff. The formation of a legal base opening a way to a reformation of society cannot be overlooked. The redirection of intellectual, material and financial resources toward reforms also cannot be carried out without reforming the role of the lawfully elected state authorities.

Reform is not an end in itself, but a means to the establishment of a just public order and improvement in the standard of living of the people. Therefore a series of questions is connected with the prospective transformations: the difficulty in a transitive period of the effects on the standard of living of the various layers of the population and the possibility of preventing negative consequences are questions with urgent practical effect. Even ignoring the other parties and considering only the large part of the population which lives in villages, more than 60 percent of which is made up of children, teenagers, young man and girls under 25 years, these questions are vital.

Therefore, achieving a well-rounded development, the realization of a system of social protection for the vulnerable layers of the population — students, pensioners, invalids — is a central, if not the main, part of the policy being carried out by President I.A. Karimov. It is necessary to note that a strong social policy has created conditions for positive changes in carrying out reforms.

In the Soviet period there were laws and legal controls directed at maintaining the order of the society, but all were penetrated by and subordinated to ideological dogmas. Ideological principles were stronger than laws and the state; especially party bodies intervened in the personal lives of the people, social processes and law-enforcement bodies — nothing was excluded. Even the “right” of Communist party association was limited to only a certain part of the members of society by the Constitutional provision that the Party was the “managing and directing force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system, state and public organizations.” The key principle of
the law was directed to overcoming competition and maintaining the law everywhere both for individual persons and the whole society, with its state and public organizations and their mutual relations.

Today formerly socialist countries, according to their own socio-economic, political and other features, proceed along their own way to market relations. Practice shows that there are various ways of transition, among which two seem to be basic. The first is called “shock therapy.” This was carried out, and still continues, in a number of the formerly Communist countries of Europe and in Russia. Such a way assumes a fast, spasmodic and revolutionary transition to market relations. But as practice shows, such a way actually results in the destitution of the greater part of the population, deepening social differentiation and generating a complex of unsolved social problems — in a word, a shock for the population. In its worst variant this can be observed in present day Russia.

In contrast, Uzbekistan has chosen a stage by stage evolutionary transition to the market in order to preserve the existing industrial potential and promote its qualitative reorganization. This aims at a steady development on the basis of advanced engineering and technology, the building of new workplaces, and the increase of export opportunities of the country and the output of economy. On these bases it has been possible to reform step by step through a planned process while avoiding a growth of unemployment and deterioration of the material conditions of the population — which generally accompany a transition period. This way of development of the Republic has allowed first, deep structural transformations of the economy; second, radical political and legal reforms; third, the assurance of civil, social and international consent; and fourth, the generation of a new world outlook of the people reflecting the spirit of new times and ensuring steady development.

Naturally, such successes cannot be achieved outside of cultural processes, or without a positive and salutary influence upon them. Due to these changes it was possible to comprehend the natural requirements for the development of culture and the realization of national-cultural interests, that is reflected in the changes occurring in the cultural life of our people, namely, in the material culture and history of the people, its relation to the environment and to itself. Attention to culture is directed to the past of a nation, its traditions and requirements according to the interests connected with the knowledge and understanding of the culture.

Therefore it is remarkable that since independence more than 1500 of 4000 invaluable monuments of history and culture have been restored. A whole complex of measures connected to the preservation and restoration of other monuments will be carried out. At the same time, many memorial complexes and structures of culture, drawing upon and incarnating the history of the country and the traditions of our people, have been built. A cultural heritage in close communication with the needs of the time can become a great driving force. In this connection it should be noted that works of restoration and development of various kinds and forms of national applied art are being carried out, with the material and financial support of the national leadership.

The positive changes related to national-cultural interests in the sphere of spiritual culture are reflected in the following:

First, religious values have revived. Spread by high morals, they have become a component of the national culture and spiritual world of the people. This is evidenced by the publication in a short interval of time of four religious volumes, “Chadisa,” which are the philosophical labour of such leaders of Islamic culture as Al-Termize, Buchory, Bachauddin Nakshband and Achmad Yassavy.
Second, art history publications which, for whatever reasons, were forbidden, now have been revived. The heritage of works of poets, scientists and figures of culture repressed by Stalinism is now studied, and overlooked national traditions have been revived. Thus, the national holiday “Navruz,” has been revived and is now a day off.

Third, a wide scale search for monuments of culture, historical, scientific, artistic or religious taken away in different period of history has had success.

Fourth, special attention has been paid to the text and study of products of the nation’s oral creativity, which in past times remained outside the field of research. With the participation of UNESCO a 1000-year anniversary of the national epic “Alpomish” was commemorated in 1999. The decision has been made to publish, beginning in 2001, a collection of 100 volumes under the general name “Monuments of Uzbek Folklore.”

Fifth, there was an opportunity not only to celebrate memorials connected with the history of the cultural heritage, but also to mark anniversaries of its outstanding figures. Holidays have been devoted to the 2500-year history of such ancient centers of civilization as Bukhara and Chiva. For the first time there are anniversaries of Imam Al-Termize, Bochoutddin Nakshband, Amir Temur, Mirzo Ulugbek, Babur and other great ancestors who made invaluable contributions to the development not only of domestic, but also of global culture as seen in the preparations for the anniversaries of Imam Buchary and Al-Fergany.

Education

The national cultural interests do not concern only the development of the cultural heritage, for that is not the sole factor involved in the cultural progress of a nation. The future culture of a nation is impossible without new creation, enriched from the achievements of global culture. To proceed with such an approach it is expedient to look at changes in the sphere of formation. The experience of the advanced countries shows that this is closely connected to the radical interests of the nation and the ensuring of its progress. Therefore, since the first days of independence attention to the national system of formation was adjusted to the requirements of the times and raised to global standards. Today the reform of this system is being carried out according to the law “about formation,” on “the National program of training of personnel” and other normative acts.

Only under the conditions of Independence was it possible to introduce a system of entrance examinations for special educational institutions, ending the negative phenomena which had taken root in the Soviet period of bribery and protectionism. This has opened the way for an objective and fair evaluation of the knowledge of graduate students and the acceptance in educational institutions of talented youth. At the end of their comprehensive preparation they have become advanced experts. Today the system has successfully taken root throughout the whole educational process.

Today there is a two step system of common education and special training. General training consists of a closely interconnected preschool, initial (1-4 classes), general training (5-9 classes) and also special-academic and special-professional educational institutions with a term of training of not less than three years. This system replaces the 11-year training begun at the end of the 80s which spread into a network of professional and technical schools which still exists. In academic schools the pupils will have an opportunity to train in their chosen field beginning from some specialized studies in high school, and follow this up with at least two or three modern trades. Higher special training consists of the bachelor’s degree (four years) and masters degree (three
years), as common throughout the world, instead of the five years’ of training which had long existed.

The official system of extended study has two stages — post graduate (three years) and doctor’s degree (three years). This existed in former time and has been retained. Without stopping to detail the features of each of these stages and the contents of the particular programs, it is important to note the following: the system is directed, first, to maintain the unity of the educational process and the strengthening of its national basis; second, to eradicate rote learning and develop in students the ability for independent and creative thinking; third, to form knowledge and skills reflecting the varied social relations and the constant development of the educational process; fourth, to stimulate the increase of knowledge and the improvement of the professional skills of teachers; fifth, to promote the creative development of global science and engineering and their introduction in the educational process.

The acceptance of a multistage system of training and a definition of the tasks which must be accomplished in each will not of themselves ensure achievement of the objective. It is necessary to mobilize huge material and financial resources and an advanced scientific-pedagogical staff to carry out the required large scale measures. Therefore, the changes in this sphere will be carried out stage by stage.

- The first transitive stage (1997-2000) focuses on maintenance, the preparation of the pedagogical staff, the creation of new educational standards and programs, structural reorganization of comprehensive schools, the beginning of academic schools and professional colleges, development of a system of social protection, and the realization of other measures necessary for the scientific, methodical and financial conditions for the development of the system of training personnel.

- The second stage (2001-2005) foresees the realization of the national program in its full extent, the increase of the efficiency of the educational system both by the realization of the necessary changes and the principles of the national program, and by responding to the labor market and socio-economic conditions.

- The third stage (beyond 2005) will proceed on the basis of the analysis and generalization of experience and on the basis of the varied socio-economic conditions to further improvement and development of the system of personnel training.

The tasks of the first stage already are successfully resolved. The structure of the specialties in high school and educational institutions has been reconsidered and new educational standards developed with new staff preparation and retraining in a number of the new institutes, in the academy of state and public construction and in the bank and financial academy. Through structural transformations, the pedagogical institutes at the regional centers have been transformed into universities. Some of these changes are on-going. Due to independence there is now opportunity to establish integral and equal relations with other states and to become familiar with the achievements of global culture. This is closely connected with national cultural interests.

Diplomatic relations established with more than 120 states of the world and the existence in our country of representatives of over 200 international nongovernmental organizations serve the development of many fields, including cultural communications. One thousand pupils, more than 3000 students and post-graduate students, over 1000 teachers and scientists since independence have studied and raised their qualifications by visiting or training in foreign countries, and more than 200 foreign experts have worked in our educational institutions.
Many scholars refer to the 20th century as the century of information. Truly it has been characterized by the rapid development of mass media and a sharp increase in its role in public life. Its influence is so strong that today without mass media it is difficult to think of the socialization of the person, the spiritual development of a society and, in general, social progress. Such a role is already accepted, as is expressed by the designation of mass media by the classical term of “the fourth estate.” The satisfaction of the cultural needs of a nation, and the realization of its interests in films, radio and TV are impossible outside the development of a world system of information. Under the conditions of independence radical qualitative transformation in this sphere of cultural life has taken place.

The character of these changes can be seen in the following examples. Where in the Soviet period the Republic’s radio and TV were on two channels, today there are four channels. There are radio broadcasts for more than 70 hours per day; telecasts on weekdays are more than 30 hours, and on holidays about 50 hours. The changes are not only quantitative, but also qualitative. This is evident in the fact that a large place is occupied in radio and telecasts by the study and diffusion of science, art and the historical heritage, national-cultural values and problems of moral education.

Changes have occurred also in the areas of the press. In particular, in 1996 there were 416 newspapers with an overall circulation of 2,659,800 from 360 state, 40 public and 26 other organizations. There were 77 magazines with a general circulation of 1,231,600 from 62 state, 9 public and 6 other organizations. Such a large quantity of newspapers and magazines, and their large circulation, naturally follow from the increased interest of the people in different kinds of information of a social, economic, political, legal and spiritual character. Today in the Republic there are 11 publishing houses. The cumulative circulation of the books issued in 1994 is 29,930,000. In 1995 the volume reached 40,410,000. Among these an especially large place is occupied by books devoted to the history and culture of Uzbekistan, development of the Uzbek state, urgent questions of socio-economic and political reforms which are carried out in the country, and also the work of outstanding representatives of the past, whose publication had been forbidden.

Whereas before the basic publishing houses were located in the capital, today publishing houses are located also in regional centers and have an extensive political role. Among these are the publishing houses “Gaychun” in Chorezm, “Nasaph” in Kashkadary and “Zaraphshon” in Samarkand.

The development of the national-culture is closely connected to the development of cinema, theatre, music and museums. These spheres of culture are integral to present national-cultural progress. Many Presidential decrees and decisions of the government are directed to this development and already render fruitful results.

It is not possible to cover all the positive changes occurring in this sphere, but it is necessary generally to describe the essence of the changes occurring in the work of theaters and museums. In 1987 in the Republic there were 31 theaters and 58 museums; now there are 37 theaters and 66 museums. The theaters and museums are a powerful means of increasing spirituality and
education. Theaters serve to develop the spiritual world of the people, forming in them patriotic feelings with both national and human values. Museums, being engaged in the storage and study of historical materials and spiritual values through expositions and exhibitions, contribute to the spread of science and spiritual education.

Taking this into account and with the purpose of involving researchers more actively in the spiritual transformation of the country, of reviving museums, and of perfecting a system of special training in these spheres, two decrees of the President of the Republic have been especially important: “Concerning Radical Improvement and Perfection of the Activity of Museums” (January 12, 1998) and “Concerning the Development of the Theatrical Arts of Uzbekistan” (March 26, 1998). These have had major import for the development of Uzbek theatre and museums.

First, the association “Uzbek Theatre” was created by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic. All organizations engaged in the organization and management of theaters were incorporated in one “family.” The importance of this association in overcoming the disorganization and increasing the efficiency of theaters is undoubtedly great. Moreover, having such associations under one “roof” opens the way to fruitful international cooperation.

Second, the magazines Theatre and Uzbek Museum were established. These will play a large role in the overall improvement of works of theaters and museums and will publicize their achievements.

Third, in order to strengthen the material base of “Uzbek Theatre” and coordinate the activity of the various museums and provide spiritual stimulation, the funds “Artmadid” and “Uzbek Museum” were created.

Fourth, the association “Uzbek Theatre” and the fund “Uzbek Museum” and their branches are freed from all state taxes, customs and other payments for five years.

Fifth, to attract sponsors for the improvement of the activity of theaters and museums income taxes will be reduced according to the amount contributed to “Uzbek Theatre” and “Uzbek Museum” and their related organizations. A large role in responding to national-cultural interests is played by a management system which today consists of three interconnected and complementary dimensions — official bodies, public organizations and various funds. Among the official bodies for the management of culture are the Ministry of Culture for Regular, Higher and National Education, the Academy of Sciences and Academy of Applied Arts, state committees on science and engineering and also “Uzbek Radio Company” and “Uzbek Cinema.” These organizations play a special role in determining the basic directions in the development of their spheres of culture.

Management

Another, not less important, part of the system of culture are such public organizations as the republican public center “Manaviat va marifat” (“Spirituality and enlightenment”), the republican international cultural centre, the national-cultural centers, and the union of writers, journalists, composers and theoreticians. They carry out the overall planning and activities to satisfy the cultural requirements of the population, propagate cultural achievements and protect creative intelligence.

A large place in the management of culture is occupied by various funds, which today are more than 100 in number, through which funds are allocated to the educational sphere. These
include “Soglom avlod uchun” (“For health generation”), “Umid,” “Ulugbek,” “Kamolot,” “Ustoz.” They are concerned with the optimization of youth activities, and the stimulation of teachers especially through training in other countries for a spiritually rich and physically healthy generation, and support for gifted children and youth.

Funds support the study of history, cultural heritage, national traditions, ritual and values, their careful preservation and development, and the realization of various cultural projects and programs. These funds include “Navruz,” “Oltin meros,” “Artmadid,” “Uzbek Museum,” and the international fund “Amir Temur.”

From the above, it is easy to see how the national-cultural interests in each sphere are shaped according to the present level of their development. For example, today our national-cultural interests in the area of education are connected to its radical reorganization and the introduction of advanced methods of personnel training. In the sphere of theatrical arts there is the creation of art products, educating people in a spirit of fidelity to national independence and respect for national and human values. In the museum sphere there is careful security, preservation and augmentation of historical cultural treasures and the transformation of museums into genuine educational centers.

Reflecting the specific requirements of the particular spheres of culture, the national-cultural interests promote the activity of people, social groups and society, and thus are driving forces of social progress.
Part III
Structures of Spiritual Culture
Chapter XII

The Role of Economic Culture in Social Progress

Valiev Botir

The transition to the modern market economy requires an integral and well-rounded study of the peculiar character and factors of contemporary economic transformation. Undoubtedly, the human person is always the main factor in production and in the development of the economy. This creates individual means which become elements that come to constitute an industrial system. Hence the labor force is the key industrial force in society. However, the correlation of industrial factors is changeable. A new technology never appears by itself, but is created by labor. As the newest means of labor and technologies spread, a particular mode of development can take priority for labour is a means for industries. For example, if a commune requires one type of labour, machines require another and the revolution of modern science and technology calls for a third. The important historical role of a democratic society is that it frees creative human resources from social and economic obstacles and enables people to work for their own gains and profit. Motivation and interests must become the principal for forming a modern market economy.

The subjective factors in society are a useful aspect of economic culture. This includes economic policy, the quality of management and the productivity of each person; it determines how socio-economic laws work. Economic culture is under constant reform by people in society working according to their degree of economic knowledge, their qualifications for management and their economic outlook.

From experience some things have been learned regarding the formation and nature of economic culture. In the former Soviet Union this was seen as a synthesis of economic understanding and practical action. Though useful for the theory of the meaning and role of economic culture in society these are not enough. First of all, economic culture was linked with issues of “the development of socialist society,” “the communistic upbringing” and hence described from the limited point of view of the Party and of classes. Second, such issues were perceived within the limits of the communist ideology in the framework of subjective voluntarism and could not have a fresh objective character. Third, many questions which have not been sufficiently described or totally worked out need to be identified; for instance, economic culture in general and for persons, its deep meaning, types, motions, mechanism and manners of formation, its function and roles in economic growth, and so on.

Finally, we had not learned from experience that economic market relations are based on a democratic society. We need objective theoretical experience and philosophical analysis of the meaning of economic culture. In democratic societies economic culture means economic relations, creative resources for the development of the economic life of social bodies, specialists and entrepreneurs. All are coordinated as a total economic activity of the people in which a major factor of socio-economic development is work practices and economic behavior. Economic activities and relations which serve people are learned as integral to economic culture. In democratic society among the laws of social development the economic factor plays a sensitive role. That is why economic culture is linked to the development of society, and economic culture plays a main role in providing a satisfying life for people and in developing a new quality of social life. A society is united by its economic culture which acts not only through economic interaction,
but also through the economic policy of the state. A democracy requires an industrial force of high quality. As people look for new ways to satisfy their needs, economic culture is an objective requirement for a democratic society and becomes coincidental to the economic policy of the state.

Economic culture changes as society develops. Today an economically cultured person must have economic knowledge, ability to economize on resources, attention to the quality and quantity of production, decision making capability, and care in the investment of time and resources. This is an ideal form of economic practice. Here economic knowledge is a basic element as it enables people to comprehend their own economic and political interests as they develop economic knowledge, theory and public strategy.

The common theoretical economic knowledge needed for economic culture must be completed by concrete information and application, for instance, the economics of this industrial or agrarian sector, the management rules of this company or firm, knowledge of how to use technology and so on. The knowledge included in economic culture are: the meaning, character and costs of materials, their production, exchange and consumption and the means, forms and methods of economic growth of society: all that is learned theoretically. Objective economic laws must be applied to economic life. Economic knowledge is a main element in a culture. The experience and knowledge of specialists, businessmen and entrepreneurs plays a big role in economic growth. As people develop knowledge of the economy, they should learn to use it in practice; their degree of economic knowledge should be reflected in the level of economic activity.

Each person has their individual subjective form of economic life. The economic mind is the main element of economic culture. This understanding of the place of people in industry includes intellect (knowledge) and emotions (feelings). Modern industry and the new economic relations require that people have extensive knowledge. The emotional side of the economic mind is also highly active. People pay great attention to their work in order that it be considered highly by managers and the people who work with them.

The intellect generates economic thought, which means that knowledge with observation and explanation and social relations may be different in different countries: theoretical and practical thinking and discussion, use of terms, analyses and intuition, concrete and imaginative, productive and unproductive. Economic thought appears in the process of the knowledge and explanation of economic activity. Different types of thinking enable one to achieve knowledge of the structure of social relations and thought processes.

Each new generation receives and develops the economic knowledge gathered by the previous generation. From this process each person forms his or her own economic thought and builds his or her own economic activity. For a high quality of economic culture everyone must have economic understanding that can produce results in any situation. Nowadays, for example, decisions depend upon information and business planning and activities which require that persons understand and interpret correctly the present and future economic situation.

Another important component of economic culture is conviction. Economic knowledge of people does not help them to accomplish immediately what they decide. The first thing to do is to fix their aims. For this each person needs their own action program. A program means following a method which serves to bridge decision or conviction to concrete activities (behavior). Conviction is not born with the person, but forms as the person grows in the society and enables effective behavior.

Economic culture also requires experience, talent and practice. Each person develops him or herself as a person. Experience means practice over time enabling people to do things quickly, correctly and automatically. A specialist with high skill and experience can generate great profit.
Some activities are difficult and can be performed effectively only by people who are talented. In the end, practice means learning by doing.

The important components of economic culture, then, are economic knowledge, conviction, experience and talent. On this basis it is possible to describe economic culture as a way of creatively forming the economic activity of people, based upon deep economic-technological knowledge connected with their problem and profession, a sufficiently broad sense of the objective laws of socio-economic growth, and conviction based on economic activity and experience.

This description does not claim to be absolute, but includes only the essential traits of economic culture. Such economic culture is a necessary condition for efficient work and a basis for advanced ownership. Labor and natural materials are the basic initial conditions of industry. Work is the activity of people reforming objects of nature. This can be either by physical handling of objects at work, sense perception, or intellectual action in the acquisition of information and decision making. These aspects express the personal factor of industry or the labor force. Its efficiency is based on the experience and interest of people which shows in the result of their work, linking economic culture with the work experience of people. In the present epoch of scientific-technological progress, the role of the person in industry is changing in its fundamental form. In the industrial setting based upon modern technology one has to work with more expensive equipment whose price often exceeds one’s wages. Sophisticated equipment raises the requirements for professional training and experience. The cost of negligence and irresponsibility is exceedingly high. Catastrophes in air, water and railway transportation and in other areas result from such negligence and irresponsibility.

Another reason for the great attention in economic culture is the growing specialization in work. People have to do concrete but very difficult tasks which require considerable professional knowledge, experience and skill. In the modern conditions one’s role and place in the economic process is important. In market conditions initiative in the development of enterprise and the growth of profits, in defining problems and making decisions on personnel questions are of broad range and have legal implications. Independence and responsibility are two sides of self-government and shape the concrete duties and rights of specialists. But it is a mistake to think that initiative always generates efficiency, though generally initiative based on the experience of specialists gives the expected results.

In general, the activity of economically cultured people, with professional knowledge and experience, conviction and interest in their work, when skilled and able-bodied, is highly efficient. The correlation between results and work is connected with economic culture, increases therewith and is reflected in the accounting of labor costs. The increase in productivity is defined by the increase in the quality and quantity of production within a certain time, and its increase depends on the economic culture of the subject.

A number of essential signs of economic culture are found in entrepreneurs and businessmen, but this is not identical with enterprise and business. They are connected and have much in common, but they must be distinguished from each other. Within legal limits one profits from one’s initiative and risk-taking. One proceeds according to a harmony of personal and social interests and scientific-analytic knowledge, and directs one’s enterprise so that no one suffers but everyone wins. Moreover, acting with initiative produces efficient results, useful both for oneself and for society, as one’s enterprise corresponds with one’s economic culture.

But not all entrepreneurs are economically cultured. Unfortunately, one meets people in search of their own profit who pay no attention to society and sometimes cause material or moral harm. Such people do not realize or do not want to know that harming society has a bad influence on
their own lives, too. Some entrepreneurs do not perceive the relation to economic natural law or cannot appreciate it. As entrepreneurs and business people are the driving force in the market economy, the importance of giving them an economic culture is evident. The essential elements of economic culture — knowledge, experience and skill, thinking and conviction, activities and initiatives — all are necessary qualities of the entrepreneur and businessman. That is why formation in these qualities parallels economic cultural education.

Hence, formation and education in economic culture is one of the important factors in the development of society.
Chapter XIII

Social Progress and the Administration of Cultural Processes

Nazarov Ravshan

Social administration is a continuing, conscious and purposeful direction of the normal functions, improvement and development of the social system (or sub-system). Administration is based on study, understanding and the use of objective laws involved in the system. Its narrow meaning is only social administration but in a broad sense it includes biological and technological systems, as well.

Administration of the national-cultural processes includes:

- discovering trends in the development of the National-cultural processes (NCP);
- prediction of their changes;
- elaboration of the corresponding measures and methods for realizing such measures;
- formation of the requirements and interests of the society in the sphere of NCP; and
- criteria for the truth of the theoretical conception, for the system of administration is able to be effective and to improve only on the bases of an absolute unity of theory and practice.

The structure of the administration of the NCP includes such elements as:

- object of administration: the sub-system administrated;
- the subject of administration: the administrative sub-system;
- the purposes of administration and of the purposeful sub-system; and
- the subsystem of connection between the subject and object of administration;
- the process of administration of a dynamic sub-system;
- the principles of administration of the basic sub-system;

The subject of administration is the national-cultural process itself and is complicated in character:

- the state with different kinds of functions;
- other elements of the political system: political parties and movements, socio-political organizations, agency of self-administration, and so on; and
- non-political social institutions: professional and creative unions, social organizations, professional communities, and so on.

The connection between the subject and object is dialectical in character; both subject and object are independent, but are interconnected, mutually defined and interactive.

Administration of NCP includes the following:

- harmonization of the national-cultural interests;
- assuring the equal rights, freedom and possibility of culture for representatives of all nations, nationalities and ethnical groups;
- settlement of the national-cultural problems;
- identification and warning of incipient national-cultural conflicts; and
- the quest for a resolution of conflicts once begun.

The administration of NCP can be reduced to three basic principles:

1. develop decisions, including plans, predictions, information, etc.;
2. realize the decisions, including preparation, organization, regulation, etc.; and
3. control execution, including coordination, evaluation, etc.

The principles of administration of NCP are divided between

- common administration: concrete, systematic, objective, scientific, dynamic and so on;
- specific to only one sphere, e.g., national self-determination, equal rights for all nations and cultures, guarantees of the freedom of the national-cultural life, etc.; and
- specific to the NCP as an administrative project:

These principles include:

(a) international cultural groups as participants in processes differ among themselves;
(b) the object has great influence on the subject of administration;
(c) social-psychological factors play a large role due to the special social rules of national psychology and self-awareness;
(d) as one of the most complicated objects, the social administration of NCP requires constant and continuing attention; and
(e) being an aspect of the social system, problems in NCP influences the other aspects of life.

The basic world tendencies in the development of NCP in the modern epoch are differentiation and integration. The essence of the tendencies of differentiation is to isolate ethnic societies and groups from each other in their separate striving for the independence and strengthening of their distinctive culture. The basic manifestations of these tendencies are:

- a strengthening of the ethno-cultural distinction and specification;
- growth of popular slogans about self-determination (cultural, political and so on);
- disintegration of many poli-ethnic states; and
- elevation of the national self-awareness;

The essence of tendencies of integration is in strengthening interaction, lowering barriers, stereotypes and prejudices and the dissemination of international and common cultural values. The main manifestations of such tendencies are:

- strengthening processes of assimilations and consolidations,
- the interaction of different cultures, and
- the creation of the world economy, information and cultural space.

Hence, the tendencies of differentiation are both positive and negative as development is often contradictory and different; the tendencies of integration are contributions to progress.
The main issues for deciding problems, contradictions and conflicts in the sphere of NCP are:

- national-cultural self-determination;
- cultural autonomy;
- cultural rights of national minorities;
- status of the national-cultural organizations;
- national languages;
- confessional questions;
- education; and
- questions of the development of national art.

The super-imposition of many different kinds of problems and their accumulation can lead to conflict. Conflict in the NCP sphere is a special kind of intergroup contradiction, where the groups are polarized according to their national-cultural symbols. Such conflicts are of many types, each depending upon the character, purpose, intensity, duration and methods of the conflict.

The structure of conflicts includes such elements as its

- object,
- subject,
- basis (conflict situation), and
- reason (incident).

The main conditions of the resolution of conflicts are:

1. the will of the two sides for collaboration;
2. the clarity of positions on the two sides; and
3. the mediator, who needs such qualities as strength, independence, authority, commitment.

The foundation of the NCP in the modern situation of the Republic of Uzbekistan is included in the Declaration of State Independence of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and such legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan as laws on state language, citizenship, religious organizations, and so on. The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, I.A. Karimov, has set forth the following principles:

- everyone, who was born, lives and works in the Republic of Uzbekistan is a citizen of this Republic with full rights;
- the Republic of Uzbekistan guarantees all rights and interests of national minorities, including the development of their languages and cultures;
- the government of the Republic of Uzbekistan affirms the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Bill of Rights;
- the Republic of Uzbekistan guarantees economic, political, social, cultural rights and freedom without any differences according to race, confession or other factors.
Chapter XIV

The Role of Science in Social Progress

N. Shermukhamedova

We are not only at the end of the 21st century, but at the beginning of the third millennium. The 21st century will soon be history, but in spite of all misfortunes it was a serious step on the road of social progress. In its time progress penetrated each cell of the social programs and affected all areas of society. Considerable progress was achieved because of the rapid development of the various sciences important for modern society. The technical revolution which took place mostly in the second half of the 20th century not only became the most important factor in social progress, but changed the meaning and role of science in the life of society.

Over the centuries the development of science was completely dependent upon the development of industry. It was a true success of science when recommendations were put into practice. For example, people knew about electricity in the time of Aristotle, but only from the 18th century did this science begin to develop as one of the most important parts of the modern physics, because only at that time was it possible to connect the theory of electricity with practical usage.

Generally, practical needs and demands, first of all of industry, determined the path of development of science, which was conditioned by the needs and demands of industry. Now we see another picture: today the most important factor in social progress is not industry, but science. Today’s social industry depends upon the development of science, upon new technologies and so on.

Acceleration of scientific-technical progress plays a big role in social progress. Many qualitative changes in the technology of human civilization are taking place at the threshold of the 21st century. This constitutes an active process of the transition of society from the industrial era based on the machine technologies, to the post-industrial era based on the organization of the activity of international technologies.

Here we should emphasize the growing importance of information technologies in the development of the social environment. The President of our Republic, I.A. Karimov, emphasizes: “The 21st century will be a century of informational technologies, and our country will enter it with a well-organized base in order to play an active role in the sphere of science and technology, as well as in the area of education, culture and more open humans relations.”

The level of meaning and the role of science and technical revolution in our country is always growing, which shows the importance of the development of science and its meaning in social progress. Nowadays, State policy in the area of science in the Republic of Uzbekistan is directed to preserving and ensuring the development of its scientific-technical potential. Its efforts are concentrated on socio-economic tasks which remain at the forefront of Uzbekistan’s transition to a socially oriented market economy.

At the time of independence there were scientific schools, research groups, organizations and institutes which now are working on the most important concrete problems of the Republic of

---

1 I.A. Karimov, Uzbekistan along the Road of the Deepening Economical Reforms (Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 1995), p. 3.
Uzbekistan. Today Uzbekistan has a strong scientific potential, supported by more than 150 scientific research institutes and universities, projects and technical organizations. Besides the governmental research organizations, many private scientific organizations have been formed which now compete with traditional research centers. Today we can see the successful effects of national and foreign funds. Scholars and specialists of Uzbekistan are carrying out fundamental and applied research in such promising fields of modern science as physics, mathematics, chemistry, philology, micro-electronics, machine-building, astronomy, archeology, biology, biochemistry, biophysics, history, geology, seismology and so on.

In Uzbekistan some state laws determine the working of science and technics. These have been adopted and put into action through various laws and directives regulating specific parts of scientific-technical activity. These include laws about “production and service”; “information” (1993); “inventions, useful models and industrial samples,” “protection of the PC software and database copyright” (1994); “scientific breeding achievements” (1996); and “copyright and adjacent rights” (1996); as well as “the civil code of the Republic of Uzbekistan” (1997).

The national system of patents was formed and the country signed international agreements and contracts for the protection of industrial and intellectual property. Now there are provisions in the Republic regarding industrial property. More than 50 intergovernmental agreements about scientific-technical cooperation have been signed with foreign countries and some projects from this program have already been started by international funds.

These are first, but real, steps of our Republic’s integration into the international scientific-technical community. However, in spite of the above, some difficult problems confront scientific activity due to the economic and political reorganization of the country. The financing of the scientific-technical base of science is insufficient to create normal working conditions for scholars. The biggest problem on the road to the renovation of the technical base of the industry is now industrial funding.

The wear-out of the material-technical base of science leads to a reduction in the amount of scientific research and technological development which is damaging to the competitiveness and technological level of local industry. Over the years the scientific-technical achievement in creating new materials and high technological processes and in producing experimental samples of new technics has decreased. Co-operation between the branches and “factories” of science, which depended in large part on state orders, has grown weak. In spite of all the measures taken to save the scientific potential the number of specialists in the area of scientific research and technological elaborations has shrunk. Some of these specialists have moved to commercial organizations. The number of younger scholars also is shrinking. In this regard the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan has emphasized the problem of succession in scientific knowledge and its passage from one generation to the next.

This is a problem of connecting present day scholars and the scientific potential left by our great ancestors, such as Farabi, Beruny, Ibn Sina and other great scholars of Central Asia whose works are still useful. Of course, cooperation between Eastern and Western scholars has an important role in the process of stabilization. All this shows that continuity and cooperation are most important issues for the development of society and science, and for the deeper integration of the two.

In present day conditions the problem of succession between generations in reviving and developing the spirit of the nation and its liberation from dogmatic and bureaucratic methods of managing plays the main role. Here the main focus of attention has been the revival of national self-awareness. First of all, important steps were directed to changing the mentality of people from
dogmatic to liberal horizons. This is a duty of all nations. This process is led by the philanthropic fund “Oltin meros,” which means “Golden legacy,” which was formed under the initiative of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, I.A. Karimov.

Without exaggeration we can say that the changes taking place in Uzbekistan are fundamental and will change radically the destiny of the nations of our Republic. I.A. Karimov thinks that all reforms carried out in the country on the way to social progress must include spiritual training of the young, respect for the rich cultural legacy, historical traditions and general human values, in the spirit of love of the Motherland and devotion to the ideals of independence. It is very important to train youth and future generations in the perduring national and common values developed by our ancestors over a period of thousands of years. This focuses on the regeneration, development and formation of the whole nation and its historical memory, engaging everyone in the rich history and culture of our people. Discovering and teaching the golden legacy of our ancestors to today’s scholars is an essential contribution to the social progress of our country as, in turn, it increases knowledge of our predecessors.

In our Republic for more than 50 years an Academy of Science has functioned along with many research institutes as its branches, as well as higher special educational institutions which work successfully on many actual problems of fundamental, applied and human sciences. Our scientific schools are widely known beyond the bounds of the Central Asia and the CIS. First of all, there are the representatives of mathematical schools with such members of the Academy as T.A. Sarimsakov, C.A. Sirajdinov; and of the scientific school of Uzbek physics, such as S.A. Azimov, U.A. Afirov and P.K. Khabibullaev. The works of members of Academy, A.S. Sadicov on the chemistry of natural combinations and Y.K. Turaculov on genetics are well known. Geologists of our Republic who made an outstanding contribution to the discovery and industrial exploitation of huge supplies of raw materials, have been led by the head of the Academy, V.X. Abdullaev. In biology and zoology the works of academicians T.Z. Zakhidov and A.T. Tulaganov are well known. An original scientific school led by academician Y. Gulamov in the area of human social sciences has made important contributions to archeology. There is the school of the founder of scientific philosophy in our Republic, I.M. Muminov. The works of famous scholars in language and literature, Abdulla Kodiriy, Oybeck, Gafur Gulamov and others, are well known far beyond our country.

The spiritual values of the holy “Koran” have particular meaning. For the first time this book has been translated into the Uzbek language. The works of Uzbek literary scientists are published far beyond the bounds of our country and spread broadly in the world. In recent years more and more attention has been given to the study and theoretic ordering of thousands of manuscripts kept in the institute of Orientalism and other storehouses of our country. They have great value for the full and deep study of the scientific teaching and conception of our ancestors.

In this stage in history contacts and collaboration among all scholars of the world community have a great influence on social progress. That is why the skillful combination of the spiritual-moral values of peoples of different countries and continents, along with general humane and national values now receive more attention. An account of the role of science in social progress must include not only the higher significance of science, but also its use in the hands of inhuman scholars, statesmen and military leaders, from which come global problems, pollution of the environment and the spread of weapons. If we do not give social direction to present science and technology and resolve global and regional problems of scientific-technical progress by united efforts they can have fatal influence on the environment, health and the genetic future of humanity.
Undoubtedly, the present progress in science and technology is contradictory in character, but progress in one area, first of all in the economic sphere, can lead to progress in other spheres.

The problem of more effective use of scientific research persists. The degree of research and the development of advanced scientific technologies support the economic reforms in our country. There is a certain gap between actual and legal rights in the creation, transformation and use of intellectual property and other results of scientific-technical activity. Difficulties in scientific development in our country are closely linked with the transitional period which Uzbekistan has been going through. This is, of course, to be expected. However, any scholar who has been abroad surely knows that the myths in our country about the prosperity of foreign science are not all correct. Only those projects and programs are well financed that promise quick and large profit.

Traditionally it is agreed to support science, but for a society it is above all important how science serves social functions. These can be divided into three parts:

1. the cultural-world outlook,
2. spontaneous-productive forces, and
3. social forces.

These functions are developed only in conditions of social progress, for the cultural-world outlook for science can improve only if we first overcome the conflict between the scientific and religious world-outlooks. The connection between science and technology through the applied scientific disciplines must be brought to a productive state. When the number of people connected with scientific progress reaches a definite mass, when related social groups have developed, and the scientific world outlook becomes predominant, science will begin to be a social force. The scientific idea of social progress is now indissociable from the development of science.

On the other hand, this kind of connection has a reverse influence. If the aim of classical science consists in developing knowledge and methods, the institutional aim is, first of all, such “external factors” as the political, military, economic and governmental. In the works of scholars these begin to predominate over scientific problems in the forms of scientific organizations and the preparation of specialists. As the social scientific role is strengthened, the style of science becomes insufficient for opening the mind to truth. The social, economic, political goals become the leading part of research in a process which subordinates scientific research to certain “ends” or goals. The number of scientific factors becomes fewer, which the social means grow so that the main role in the direction of science is played by economic, military, medical and ecological concerns. This has the following symptoms:

- the formation of special state authorities for the direction of science;
- the creation of non-governmental organizations interested in the development of new knowledge; and
- the professionalization of science leading to a situation in which scholar-professionals cannot always do what they like, but must work according to the plans laid out for them.

In this way a functional scientific crisis arises. The first symptom of this crisis is in its cognitive dimension. The main cognitive function of science is to achieve a new fundamental knowledge as a basis for applied knowledge, and in the end as a basis for the social functions of science. But fundamental science is adding knowledge faster than the applied sciences can render it practically useful. This leads to an excess of fundamental knowledge to which society calls a “halt.” The
mechanism for stopping this is the social-psychological mood of society, “pointing out that science has many embezzlers.” Modern society has become prevalently pragmatic, which makes the explorations of very expensive science insecure. This is particularly evident in the ecological consciousness.

The development of crisis symptoms in science influences the social progress. The scientific community can be divided into two parts: in the first knowledge, values and goals are realized by stimulus, more or less in accord with the system of the “internal” norm of science. In the second part, scholars who made their scientific discoveries on the basis of the cognitive norms of science add to them values and goals that are “external” as regards science or even hostile to scientific methods (obtaining declarations by colleagues and society, affirmations of oneself and of vital values, and so on).

It is clear that the socio-scientific functions are important in the function of spontaneous productive and social forces. The social functions of science concern:

1. “States” — strengthening the defensive power of the country and raising its prestige in the world;
2. “Society” — production of new knowledge, and the acceleration of technical progress; and

The “state” function of science is little by little retreating to a secondary level behind the “society” functions which reflect the interests of the whole society and the political and economic elite who profit and are becoming more important. The successful achievement of long-time priority goals of any state, including Uzbekistan, include first of all such factors as national security, economic development, national health, internal stabilization and lowering of social tensions, international authority and influence upon the conditions of the reconstruction of the structure of the economy. All these require the resolution of a number of economic and scientific-technological tasks.

The resolution of such problems depends above all on new and rapidly changing technology. Gaining access to advanced technology is the most important factor in providing for national security and raising the level of the national economy. The strength of a country in the scientific and technological sphere assures its position in the world market and at the same time raises its defence capability, just as defects in quality can be compensated by high technology which shortens the length of time and other quantitative factors for development. The level of development of science and technology determines the effectiveness of economic activity, and helps the spiritual and political culture of the population of a country defend persons and society and overcome unsuitable natural and humanly dangerous factors. Most of all, the national scientific potential in large part determines the place of a country in the world market, and its ability to resolve its own problems. Of course, national security cannot be guaranteed only by means of mind over politics in the area of science and technics, but neither can national security be guaranteed without it.

It is becoming clear, that the economic and military security of a state without highly qualified personnel is impossible; technological security is impossible without scientific workers. In the 1980s it became clear that the place and role of any country in the international division of labor depended, first of all, upon the quality of the training of specialists and the conditions that the country or socio-economic system creates for the development of the scientific potential of scholars.
At the present time, science, technology and education stand in the first place among the factors in developing a nation. This is connected with the transition to a post-industrial stage of development and an information society. The strategy of industrially developing countries must be based on the development of scientific potential.

Another very important function of science is to improve the educational system. This is especially important in high schools which have the largest number of teachers and students. Teachers who do not want to be researchers will not be good teachers, because they lack current knowledge. Most of all, science as a school for thinking is an important element in the educational system. Science creates in society an intellectual atmosphere and gives it such problems as: are there other intellects in the Universe? If science is necessary for any society, it is a permanent necessity in order for societies to develop dynamically.

In sum, social progress and the development of science, though not identical, are interconnected. Sometimes they can move independently of each other, but development of society without the work of science will have a destructive future generations.
Chapter XV

The Place of Ecological Culture in Civil Society

Victoriya Levinskaya

Ecological Problems in the History of Philosophy and Culture

Ancient and Medieval Times

The relations between human society and nature contain problems and contradictions as well as developmental prospects. Humankind and nature are subject to common laws whose violation can lead, sooner or later, to man-made ecological disasters. Even now we recognize that our misuse of natural resources has resulted in changes of climate and desertification. Mother Earth takes revenge against the exhaustion of the soil. Yet, ecological concern has become one of the fundamental aspects of modern global culture. It is now international in character and influences all spheres of the vital activity of humankind.

The life of primitive human was strongly dependent upon nature. At that time the first appearance of ecological culture idolized natural events in the first mythological world outlooks. Primitive culture and ancient civilizations have many examples of humane relations to the processes of nature.

The idea of unity between human beings and nature is an ancient tradition. According to the ancient Chinese treatise Guan-Che (III B.C.) water is the blood and living energy of earth; it is clean, soft, humane and modest. The author of this treatise attributed to water the best ethical qualities, such as honesty, justice, nobility and so on.

In ancient Eastern civilizations this system of values remained invariable for a long time as they venerated nature. It was also an object of aesthetics and, for the first time in history, laws of the protection of animals and plants were developed. For example, the Mongols turned up the toes of their shoes to keep from damaging the grass cover.

The ancient Eastern civilizations were the first ecological civilizations in history. In the Indian philosophical tradition there was a concept of non-interference with the development of natural processes. The basis of these traditions was deep thought about the reincarnation of everything on earth and also in the universe. According to the principles of Indian philosophy, the human is just one part of the transformation from one form of life to another, for which reason in Indian philosophy any manifestation of life must be preserved.

Muslim culture retained the ancient Eastern tradition. A. Nasr wrote: “Nature in the Islamic countries is considered as one’s `own house` where one must live not as in an enemy country that is to be conquered.”

Late 19th and Early 20th Century Russia: Religious and Space Perspectives

A special place in the history of attention to nature is held by Russian philosophical thought of the end of the 19th century and first years of the 20th century. The 20th century brought great changes in cultural orientations. Russian philosophers for the first time in philosophical history looked upon the world as if from space. Such philosophers as V. Soloviev, P. Florenskiy, N.
Rerikh, K. Ciolkovskiy, N. Fedorov and V. Vernadskiy created new philosophical principles for relations to nature according to this view from space. This point of view was very original for that time especially for Russia, and became well known in Europe. Every philosopher of the Russian Religious School had his special theory regarding the need to overcome tensions between nature and society, but all the theories had common ideas, for example, the idea of “universal ethics” or “space mentality.” Russian religious philosophers used such terms from the Orthodox Church as “Unity of the Universe” and “micro and macrospace.”

Nature as the result of God’s creation and the Incarnation harmony is of the greatest value and evokes the best from people. This was the main principle of the Russian religious philosophical school: that Earth is part of space and one step in the development of the Universe. Humans are the best part of nature because they are in the likeness to God. The human being is responsible for the order of space and the unity of all humankind. Therefore, the human as, on the one hand, a likeness of God and, on the other, a part of nature is the key to the “unity of the Universe.” Humans are not values in themselves, but are completed by their surroundings.

The deepest ethical problems of Russian space philosophy are found in the works of Vladimir Soloviev. According to V. Soloviev, ideas and ideals acquire great significance for humankind, and his own interests centered on the person which is the source (or egg) of the harmony of space. Thus, a human is both dependent upon the universe and responsible for the world’s fate because he or she is a spiritual-moral substance. Moral existence and the improvement of the person is a basis for the improvement of the world.

Ethical rules must create the future culture. The main aim of this new culture is the aspiration for space even beyond the world because in space, as in the body of God, there will be a united, spiritual-moral humankind. This will relate to nature as a living substance and to the human as an inimitable being. The highest ethical category, goodness, must be realized through the category of Beauty to save nature from death. Humankind must save itself from moral death. Moral law and order regulate all spheres of human life and decide even economic questions. The ideal is that economic progress to enter into moral progress. Nature has the some roots as man: it is the result of creation and is connected with the Absolute through human relations. The task is to create moral ethical relations in order to separate from chaos God’s order of humankind and the world.

Very close to Soloviev’s conception is the ethical conception of Nikolay Fedorov. In his literary works the Russian writer, N.I. Dostoevski, used and illustrated the ideas of this Russian religious philosopher. The subject of his interest is humankind and its moral preoccupation. The improvement of humankind is moral improvement on the basis of a transformed evolutionary space. This process will be possible only when humankind transcends the earth. The intellect of humankind must spread into space, keeping and improving science, philosophy, culture and religion. It must begin to transform space as the environment for future generations. To protect the spiritual-moral potential of humankind will be impossible without acknowledging the objective and necessary connections between humankind and space. Humankind must become a force in space.

The reasonable assimilation of nature is a necessary condition and “common enterprise” of philosophy and a main subject of Fedorov. He understands it as unity of moral practice, duty and responsibility, past and future. Ecological culture has gone out from the biosphere of earth and become a global space problem. The main goal of humankind must be to change the world according to moral laws, which process is to “give us a basis for the decision to spread the human intellect through the solar and other star systems for control of these systems by the human brain.”
Fedorov suggested space travel from one star to another and after him K. Ciolkovskiy “the pioneer of the new space era” suggested the principles of building rocket jet engines.

_Teilhard de Chardin and Vladimir Vernadskiy_

The ideas of the Russian philosopher and scholar, V. Vernadskiy, are most important for the modern ecological situation. He suggested a new sphere of human life — which sphere he called the “noosphere.” This term was suggested, for the first time, by the French philosopher, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Vladimir Vernadskiy met him at a scientific conference in the 1920s and took this idea. The main book of Vernadskiy is _The Living Substance_ in which he described all the spheres of the Earth, such as atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere and biosphere and described their evolution.

According to V. Vernadskiy the biosphere is the cradle of human society, which one day it will have to leave. The noosphere is a process of the conscious human transformation of the natural environment; it is not just a new state of biosphere: it is not a context, but a scientific transformation of nature. The human is a “part of the biosphere and is a product of evolution, but he is the main and the basic factor of the development of the noosphere.” The noosphere is the most difficult conception. The evolution of matter has two levels: the first level is geological, the second is evolution.

The evolution of inanimate substance and its unity formed a biosphere and created a new quality of living substance. In a human society, the next step in the evolution of living substances must be a new state of biosphere, the “noosphere.” Vernadskiy studied not only the objective conditions of the formation of the noosphere, but also the subjective conditions of this process. According to Vernadskiy humankind has to understand its place in the evolutionary process in order to understand itself as a new geological force and after that as a new unitive space power.

Of course, there are many factors which make this process most difficult and it is possible that our civilization may die. But V. Vernadskiy thought we have a chance to decide these problems: “The process which has been developing during billions of years could not be stopped. That is why the biosphere must transfer, sooner or later, into the noosphere.”

This thought is illustrated by the idea of the aphytrophical substance of humankind as a part of living nature, which depends on inanimate substance. The greatest part of aphytrophical substance is plants. The higher forms of life are dependent on lower forms, but not otherwise. This is the evolutionary order. Vernadskiy thought that one of the characteristics of the noosphere is a transformation of humankind from geteratrophical substance to aphytrophical existence. Humankind must be free from its dependence upon lower forms of life, and the noosphere must push out into the biosphere; this will be possible if humankind is creating new artificial food products, operating biological processes and so on. The resolution of these problems will ensure the future of humankind. For Vernadskiy, man is not standing “out” or “above” the biosphere, but is a part of it; he is a product of evolution and the main factor in its development. The scientific thought of humankind is working in the biosphere and transforming it into the noosphere.

The noosphere has a very complicated structure, which includes a unity of material and ideal components, the work and brain of man. The most important part of the noosphere is the highest level of social consciousness, scientific thought and the conscious activity of people who transform the world.

However, the activity of the mind does not mean intellectual activity, which the modern ecological situation corroborates. Ecological culture is the most important component of the
noosphere and has a specific activity. It is a measure of the consciousness of the noosphere because in culture humans are able to show their value as ecologically creative.

Ecological creativity has taken place on every level of social life. On the social levels ecological culture operates by processes of the creativity of the noosphere. On the level of personality the noosphere is created by the “internal” noosphere, according to a unity of natural and social laws. Ecological culture helps to ensure the humane essence of humankind, which is changing its quality and improving not just its relation to nature, but also its social relations.

Ecological culture is a new prospective part of human culture. All dimensions of nature are connected; ecological culture is a synthesis in itself of different levels of their development. The interaction between ecological culture and civil society has two aspects: First, ecological culture as a whole is a new cultural phenomenon reflecting the ecological situation and is an indicator of the value dynamic of modern civilizations; second, ecological culture stipulates the direction of the development of material and spiritual culture and determines the formation of the quality of the new values, goals and ideals of humankind. Nature and culture are two opposites, interconnected and interacting upon each other. The “world of nature” and “world of culture” each suffer: nature from the ecological crisis and culture from a spiritual crisis.

The Aesthetic Approach to Ecological Culture

The development of an ecological culture is impossible without aesthetics, that is to say, the realization of nature as a special spiritual-aesthetic value. Just as the human is a requirement of nature, aesthetic value is a part of spiritual culture. At present aesthetics, as the so-called “natural” conception of beauty, is popular. Nature, together with its physical, biological and other characteristics, also has an “aesthetic” character founded on such natural objective laws as harmony, rhythm, proportion and measure. The beauty of nature has the same level as its other characteristics; in the creations of nature, humans discover beauty.

Analysis of the results of research on the reflection of nature in art lead to an appreciation of nature as an aesthetic value. These analyses show its beauty, for example, a picturesque landscape is connected first of all with its expressiveness. In the landscapes of Turner, Resdale, Backhausen, van der Meer, Claude Monet, van Gogh, Ayvazovsky, Rerikh and other artists of different countries, periods and nations what appear before us is not just pictures of the woods, fields, mountains, seas and so on, but types of exalted, inspired nature. Sometimes it is “enraged,” “somber” or “depressing”; sometimes “reconciliating,” “agitated” or “joyful”; sometimes it is “triumphant” or “majestic.” Our apperception of nature is very closely connected with our emotional condition and our vision of the world. The wavy, angular, softly bent or straight line of limbs, roads, fields, forms of stones and lakes are manifestations of nature. The interactions of the elements of a landscape evoke impressions which engender intellectual activity shaped by one’s emotional condition. Art by its essence is a means of harmonization of different processes of human life, which is able to balance the relationship of the human with the environment. That is why art has close relations and interactions with ecological culture.

There are interesting connections between ecological culture and architecture as forms of “second nature.” Architecture means “first creation” (translation from Greek), by which meaning architecture is an unachieved synthesis of different kinds of art, culture, science and technique. Architecture is a prototype of the harmony between the human and the world, because it is a harmony of different branches of art and culture. It impresses a spirit on (or “inspirits”) a stone, the symbol of architecture. We can analyze past epochs through the monuments of those epochs.
The penetration of ecologization into art and architecture creates a good foundation for an approach to aesthetics and ecological culture. Dostoevski wrote: beauty saves the world, Nockolay Rerikh added one word: the realization of beauty saves the world. The ecological interpretation of this expression is that “the creation of the beauty saves the world” because it is very closely connected with goodness, the love of humans for the world, and affirmation of the harmony between personality and nature. The ideal of humanity is the whole and includes the harmonious developing personality and the cultural as well as ecological facts. This ideal is achieved only if society has a high ecological culture in all spheres of material and spiritual activity.

Another concept which unites ecological culture and aesthetics is the ecology of culture. The Russian Academician, D.S. Likhachev, suggested the term “ecology of culture” for the first time in 1988. In that year he wrote: “The ecology of culture is more than the task of preservation of biological surroundings. The human lives not only in a biological environment, but also in an environment that was created by one’s ancestors and by oneself. Preservation of the cultural environment is as important a task as is the preservation of nature, because while nature is necessary for people for their biological life, culture is necessary for their spiritual, moral life.” According to D.S. Likhachev the patrimony of the cultural environment is very limited, so that sometimes restorers, working according to their own unreliable views or the modern understanding of beauty, destroy monuments.

Therefore, ecological content has two sections: biological and cultural. These two sections unite, because an exact border cannot be drawn between culture and nature. It’s impossible to save the original beauty of an architectural masterpiece without the original landscape; that is why it is necessary to keep a monument and its landscape together, to keep a cultural object in its natural environment, and to keep both of them in the soul.

**Ecological Culture and the Modern Ecological Crisis**

Technocratic and ecological culture are not just two different approaches to the task of developing relations between culture and society, they are two different ways of realizing these relations, two different kinds of reflection and self-awareness of culture. Technocratic culture has a high transformative potential, but is less sensitive to its relations to values. A technocratic mentality is little sensitive to its ecological relations to the biosphere and to the crises of nature due to the actions of humans and of society. “Material industry” and “ecological culture” are less compatible, but society depends on its economic and industrial culture. Without economic consciousness and culture an ecological culture is impossible. The social culture of labor, industry, exchange, distribution and consumption compose a socio-economic basis for the formation and development of ecological culture. Its level and the character of this basis depends upon the quality of the process of production and the economic relations in society. Hence, the development of the techniques and technology of industry and economic laws must be combined with the laws, characteristics and qualities of nature.

However, such recreation zones as Amudaria, Cirdaria, the lake of Issic-cul, Gurtulin reservoir, the eastern seaboard of the Caspian Sea and also the suburbs of the big cities are intensively polluted by rubbish. All Central Asian rivers are polluted by chemical and organic fertilizers, city sewerage and the refuse of industry; only artesian well water remains drinkable.

Recently the Uzbek region has had many different ecological problems, such as the drying up of the Aral Sea, a high level of solar radiation and the impact of the summer heat and poor annual precipitation that characterize the Central Asian climate. During the past 10 to 15 years there has
been a striking rise in temperatures in this region. The warming is caused by the global temperature circulation, a global rise of air temperatures accompanied by the increase of CO2 concentrations and other greenhouse effects and by local human factors. The main consumer of water resources originating in the Central Asian Mountains is agricultural irrigation. During the past 25 years, the irrigation area increased by 15 times. Irretrievable consumption of water for irrigation has caused a substantial reduction of the flow into the Aral Sea and the lowering of the sea level, a decrease of surface water in this area and an increase in the salinity of the water. The rapid recession of the Sea and the parching of large areas contributed to the climatic changes in the adjacent areas. An additional rise of temperatures (by 1.5 degrees C) owing to desertification has been observed for 100 to 150 kilometers around the Sea. The relative humidity decreased by five to 10 percent. No records were made regarding any changes in the amounts of precipitation since more than 90 percent of the annual total consists of atmospheric moisture.

The total mineral concentration is considerably higher in the territory adjacent to the Aral Sea. The main effect upon the environment caused by the Sea’s recession consists in the movement of sand. Repeated dust storms and drought increased during the period of the Sea’s intensive recession. Several protective measures for the dry surface along with reduced wind speeds during the past years have slightly diminished this development.

The fate of the Aral Sea has concerned many international organizations, such as the United Nations. Uzbek President I.A. Karimov has said that the decline of the Aral Sea is one of the greatest disasters of the 20th century and requires the collaboration of many countries and organizations.

In spite of different conditions in the various countries, the socio-ecological results of the scientific-technical revolution are common for all countries. As with other forms of politics, ecological politics must serve social progress. The government of Uzbekistan declared 1994 and 1995 years of “Ecology and Health” and developed a great program for protection of nature. The role of ecological culture is to work out criteria and rules for such programs.

Bibliography

Vernadskiy, V. The Living Substance (Moscow, 1984), p. 125.
Likhachev, D.S. Memory of Culture (Moscow, 1988), p. 205.
Epilogue

The Philosophy of Culture and Social Progress

Imamjon Rakhimov

In present conditions, with our people released at last from “socialist experiments” in the creation of a communist culture, in order to solidify and develop our national-state independence attention needs to be shifted to the resources of our national originality. Attention now must focus on the philosophical and cultural issues, both theoretical and practical, required for social progress.

Without bitterness, we must acknowledge that the inheritance of the period of colonialism and Soviet totalitarianism undermined the socio-cultural and national integrity of the Uzbek people. Through colonial and socialist experiments the spiritual values and traditions of the Uzbek people were subjected to manipulation and distortion to a degree exceeding that of other peoples of the world.

This destroyed the spiritual bases, values, ideals, traditions and social orientations of the individual person and the whole nation. Social mobility was reduced to dull historical and social memory and repetition, the instinct of self-preservation was reduced, and the social will atrophied. All this intensified the degradation of the person and nation by the genocide of the native language, the ecological catastrophe of the Aral Sea, the monoculture of a cotton, child mortality and the self-immolation of women. In the years of post perestroika a deep anger and protest by the people gradually ripened and expressed itself in a struggle for the national independence of Uzbekistan.

This resulted in national state independence, with President of Uzbekistan I. Karimov coming to power. A presidential board to promote the creative powers of our people specified the fundamentals of their social philosophy and the national spiritual values and traditions. He wrote “the time for an especially serious attitude toward spirituality has come. It is necessary as soon as possible to release this from the vestiges of our former philosophy. Earlier the focus was only on workers in the cotton fields, cattle-breeders and shepherds. Now we must be released from such narrow humiliation of our nation, and restore the spirituality and the national pride of our people. The president underlined, that “it is necessary to take into account the psychology, philosophy of the East and its great Muslim religion.” He placed attention not only on the Eastern sense of tolerance, but also on the fundamental spiritual and social values of holidays, traditions, and revivals of diligence, cleanliness, honesty and the role of traditions. All of these are the basic paths and means for socialization, personal self-affirmation and the formation of a diligent person.¹

The Revival of the National-Spiritual Values of the Uzbek People

The destruction of the socio-cultural and ethno-national character of the Uzbek people was so deep and the degradation of consciousness and loss of spiritual values so great, that not only at the level of the common people, but also at the level of philosophical understanding there was hardly any understanding of the need for change. If anything there was here and there a predominantly pessimistic note.

It is not possible to say that the socio-cultural destruction of the national integrity of our people has ceased. Teachers of social and political science, philosophers, scholars, culture and the educational establishment may even have begun to act contrary to public progress. Some scientists attribute as native features of the Uzbek people’s national character an attitude contrary to change, large families, an aversion to industrial labor — in general a low ability for modern forms of life.

In fact, the Uzbek people is no worse than other peoples not only industrially and economically, but also politically and spiritually. In all these aspects they are dynamic, adaptable and capable of rapid high-performance. Before the Islamic period parents were considered good, if they managed to bring up a child to be able to read, write and independently conduct trade in his father’s shop.

Its scientists, politicians, philosophers, artists, artisans were know throughout world: Takhirids, Samanids, Kharezmshakh, Mamluks, Makhmud Yalavoch, Babur, Timur. Even after feudal hibernation and the aggression of imperial Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century our people rapidly began to revive and one could observe a rising bourgeoisie. Their capitalist attitude inspired not only Russian industrialists and financiers, but European business people and industrialists who, in the first quarter 20th century, began to explore the economic market of Turkestan.

Tragically, the main road of public development was interrupted by the October Revolution which derouted not only the Uzbek and Russian peoples, but others as well from the path of their natural, historical progress. Until now there remain residuals of that totalitarian mode, whose attributes of autocracy and sedition, with the help of a backward level of technology, deformed life, consciousness and rights.

This has impeded a natural smooth progression out of the crisis, and the development of the path of rapid and optimal development toward new, modern technological levels.

Despite the colonial policy of the Soviet government our people has sufficient potential and ability for rapid adjustment and the determination to evolve modern forms of life. The extreme totalitarian command-administrative system could not exterminate the ability of our people for self-preservation, survival or transition to modern forms of life.

One reason is that in all social catastrophes there is an ability for both the individuals to survive based on spiritual values, the traditions of the people and their moral foundations. Thus, the path of withdrawal from the crisis, including that of the spirit depends on the conversion of the people to spiritual values and traditions. This enables also the development of market attitudes (relations), instead of economic and political improvisation. Spiritual values and tradition, if rationally employed, will help as is shown by the experience of England, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Turkey and other countries.

Among our fundamental spiritual values and traditions are the following qualities of our people: practical, pragmatic, freedom-loving, adaptability in ideas and operations, independence, consistence, patience, humanity, diligence, a developed sense of one’s own dignity, honor, shame and adherence to common values, especially to friendliness, charity, collective forms of life and creative activities.

The revival of these spiritual values and traditions of the Uzbek people is required for restoring the national integrity of our people and hence their basic economic, political and spiritual goals. This is important also for the political will required in order in the future to take a worthy place in the development of the modern world. This should reflect the report of Julian Khaksly the first Director of General of UNESCO, “UNESCO, Its Purpose and Philosophy.” “The key to the acceleration of progress is the cumulative tradition, the common fund of the ideas of humankind’s
ability for self-preservation and self-development…The closer the engagement of the tradition, the faster the transnational movement…The highest result of the evolution of the human community is the comprehensive development of the person.”

The evolution of the person is a natural prolongation of development and must be carried out with the help of society and, first of all, in terms of the cumulative tradition of the people.

Clearly the error of unlimited individualism is the opposite of this thesis. The individual simply makes no sense in isolation. Everyone requires connection with some social form and one’s development depends on the family and community in which one is born and its social traditions. The value of work depends on a public structure.

Thus, the activity of UNESCO is directed toward maintaining the full development which must take into account the social context. The many particular problems must be seen in terms of the main purpose, namely, to improve the social mechanisms, including the educational systems, research organizations, arts centers and the press.

In particular, UNESCO should pay special attention to the social mechanism of all aspects of the cumulative tradition using it efficaciously in the realization of its main goal, namely, the promotion of human development. For this tradition provides the fund of experience, consciousness and purposes which integrates the great religions of the past and thereby provides the necessary premises for further social progress.

Today it is necessary to convince the inhabitants of huge regions of our planet of the possibility and necessity of full international cooperation. Therefore, UNESCO should pay special attention to the creation of an integrated fund of the traditions of all humankind. This implies uniting the variety of world art and culture and the creation of a uniform fund of scientific knowledge.
Summary Outline


George F. Mclean

Part I. The Meaning and Challenge of Civil Society

Part II. Civil Society in Classical Thought

A. Before Philosophy: Principles of Social Unity and Diversity

Totemic thought reflecting the original unity of small groups.
Mythic thought as a symbol system introducing diversity within the original unity.

B. Greek Thought: The Components of Civil Society

Plato’s stress on formal unity diversified through the notion of participation.
Aristotle strengthening of diversity within this unity and his development of the following principles of civil society.

1. Governance and Community: Eidetic reduction reveals the basic components of Aristotle’s civil society to be (a) governance as set in (b) community.

2. Solidarity and Community: Community as it unites a diversity of persons and groups is characterized by solidarity so that the smaller are not replaced, but promoted by the larger.

3. Subsidiarity and Community: Society with a structure of diverse groups keeping responsibility for each sphere of activity in the hands of those involved.

C. Medieval Thought: The Existential Sense of Person, Solidarity and Subsidiarity

The emergence of awareness of existence in the Christian context and of freedom as reasoned action according to nature.
Its implications for the affirmation of the person in union with others interacting creatively in an ordered pattern of groups: i.e. solidarity and subsidiarity.

Part III. Civil Society in Modern Thought

As civil society us a matter of the exercise of freedom, but modern thought is characterized by its attention to reason, these sections treat first knowledge, next freedom and then the strengths and weaknesses of the resultant modern notions of civil society.

A. Civil Society in the Anglo-Saxon Enlightenment and in Contemporary Liberal Theory

1. Knowledge as Empirical: The Lockean Tradition: The political context of the decision to restrict knowledge to the empirical order and its implication for knowledge.
2. **Freedom as Choice**: The implication of the above for the reduction of freedom to a choice between objects.

3. **Civil Society and Moral Sentiment**: Civil society in the Scotch philosophers (Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson) as a safety net founded upon moral sentiment.
   John Rawls’ veil of ignorance as separating comprehensive vision from public life.

**B. Civil Society and Continental Rationalism: Kant, Hegel and Marx**

1. **Knowledge**: *The Critique of Pure Reason*: A search for the necessary and the universal.
2. **Freedom**: *The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and The Critique of Practical Reason*: To will as I ought according to the rules of reason.
3. **Civil Society**: *Kant, Hegel and Marx*: Freedom made concrete in the life of society, in ways which either transform civil society into the state (Hegel) or make it subject thereto and ultimately to dissolution in the ideal communal society.

**Part Iv. Opening a New Space for Civil Society**

**A. The Aesthetic in Kant and the East**

If the modern limitations on the notion of civil society stem from the characteristic modern stress on technical reason and its corresponding notions of freedom, how can we develop a broader sense of both? This points to Kant’s third critique and the Confucian notion of harmony.

1. **The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement**: The aesthetic as integrating and transcending the sense and the intellectual orders and their corresponding first two sense of freedom.
2. **The Aesthetic and Social Harmony**: The work of the creative imagination in elaborating a diversified but harmonious social unity.
3. **Confucius and Social Harmony**: The related resources in Confucian philosophy.

**B. Cultural Tradition and Human Communities**

If civil society consists in governance in, and by, the community, then how does aesthetic awareness bring to awareness, and hence make humanly available, the resources needed for community (and then for governance)? This is done through culture and its components whose origin and nature are treated here.

1. **Value**: The order of preference determined by a community in search of its realization.
2. **Virtues**: The particular capabilities in a community for social action.
3. **Cultural Tradition and Community**: The cumulative results of the experience of social life as the context within which we act in society which in turn builds the pattern and structures of a civil society.

**C. Cultural Tradition and Governance in Civil Society**

If a cultural tradition can constitute a basic unity and orientation for the life of a community, can it provide the degree of authority needed for governance that respects the diversity of social
groupings, promotes their initiative, and yet directs them effectively to a shared social goal which promotes the well being of all?

1. The Genesis of Community and Tradition: Tradition as what experience continually reaffirmed.

2. Moral Authority and Governance in Civil Society: The foundation of authority is not in will or sentiment but in insight concerning the good, its effective expression in special symbols and archetypes and the normative direction this gives to the search to develops an adequate social life.

D. The Confucian Tradition and Civil Renewal

If the aesthetic awareness unfolds the meaning of tradition from the past can it contribute as well to rebuilding civil society in the future?

1. The Confucian and Marxian Heritage and Civil Society: Shared tradition as building community. The grasp of the components of the Tao as unifying Chinese culture. As this is worked out according to the nature and purpose of each sub-group in an order of subsidiarity it constructs a civil society.

2. Tradition and Renewal in Civil Society: Application as a process not of copying an abstract and universal model but of constituting societies by inspiring human action, directing it to an end, and adapting this action and its structures with a view to that end. As things change through time this implies a continual process of renewal and adjustment resulting civil society evolving as a living organism.

George F. Mclean

Part I. The Meaning and Challenge of Civil Society

In entering upon the new century, we learn daily how deeply we have been conditioned by the Cold War extremes of the last 50 years. As with any war, these worked in two directions. In vast regions one ideology, in order to affirm the totality, laid waste to intermediate levels of association, treating people as masses. In reaction, contrary ideologies so stressed individual autonomy and rights as progressively to dissolve the bonds of community, neighborhood, and even family, thereby projecting ever greater responsibilities upon the state. Whether out of allegiance to the state or to the individual, to the whole or to the part, there emerged a world of communal living and lonely crowds, overshadowed by a faceless and increasingly bureaucratic state.

Upon reflection, it is not surprising that the new initiatives have generated new problems, but it is truly frightening to find that the responses reflect a return to old ‘solutions’. This does violence to the emerging personalist aspirations and threatens to compound the tragedies of the XXth century for the XXIst century now underway.

On one level, a reductivist or reactionary focus on individual rights tends to sweep away shared traditional standards of human decency and with them the social bonding they reflect. As a result new (market) expressions of individual initiative give way to irresponsible greed and corruption. Instead of responding by developing a moral sense proportionate to the newly acquired freedom, the technology of government control is expanded. Thus, individual corruption threatens to be extrapolated into a battle of commercial interests at the national level, where, corruption being joined to coercive power, people and their needs are trammeled.

On another level, there is a new awareness of the national and ethnic identities of peoples. This calls for a creative integration of diversity, but it also generates fear and chauvinism and evokes responses which range from legal restrictions on the liberties of all to ruthless military suppression of minorities.

In these circumstances there is a renewed call for the redevelopment of civil society as a way both old and new to draw upon, and realize more perfectly, passionately held values. What is sought is a new stage overcoming and superseding the conflictual contraposition of values so that their complementarity can emerge and the deep concerns they reflect can be protected and promoted.

That civil society is a theme whose time has come — once again — is indicated by the convergence of the many reasons now being cited for its importance:1

- that it can expand the active participation of citizens,
- that it expresses an achieved synthesis of different values in the search for the good life (M. Waltzer),2
- that it is the cutting edge of the search for freedom in the modern world (C. Taylor),3

---

that it envisages a more manageable scale of life emphasizing “voluntary association, churches and communities, arguing that decisions should be made locally, and should not be controlled by the state and its bureaucracies” (D. Bell), and that it can take us beyond the excesses of authoritarianism (V. Tismaneanu).

That those who express such varied concerns converge upon the notion of civil society as the hopeful bases upon which a response to their varied problematic can be built suggests strongly that it provides a special vantage point to examine and organize ways of developing a more adequate social life in the coming century.

To get to the root of this notion and to uncover its key components with a view to effective action M. Riedel suggests a phenomenological approach, the development of an eidetic reduction after the manner worked out by Edmund Husserl. In such a approach what is sought is not the natural object in itself, but its mode of appearing before consciousness, that is, its meaning for us.

The move here from individual objects to essences is called eidetic reduction, and the path to the essences is through imaginative variation. The empirical individual, either given in sense experience or constructed in the imagination, is considered as one possible instance of the eidos in question. One imaginatively varies the different features of this instance to discover what remains necessarily present through all the instances. He will discover in this way those variations that will lead to a change in the eidos as distinct from those that lead simply to another possible typical instance within the limits of the eidos. In this way what pertains to this essence is brought to immediate evidence in intuition.

Carrying out such a search longitudinally through time, promises to provide a cumulative sense of the meaning which can be accessed through this term, the possibilities and difficulties of a range of approaches to its conceptualization and realization, and even a suggestion of a new approach appropriate to the challenges and new opportunities of our times.

We shall begin our study of civil society from the earliest modes of social life as it emerged in totemic and mythic forms and then look to its philosophical articulation by the Greeks. In this our concern will be to work toward uncovering its basic elements and dynamism. We shall seek not simply the bare historical facts with all their happenstance, but the creation of the meaning of social life sought by people living together in their many circumstances. This is the basic social good which is struggled for when absent and celebrated when attained. As the basic concern which moves people to respond to their circumstances meaning mediates the multiple events to a life goal. If well conceived it is the key to constructive responses to the challenges of each age; if ill conceived it assures that the responses will be at best ineffective or even conflictual. It is precisely here then that philosophical reflection is needed and promises to make an especially important contribution.

---

4 Daniel Bell, American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Role of Civil Society,” The Public Interest, 95 (1989), 38-56.
6 Manfred Riedel, “In Search of a Civil Union: The Political Theme of European Democracy and Its Primordial Foundation in Greek Philosophy,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 10 (1983), 101-102.
In this it is necessary to recognize that we ourselves are located in particular temporal and spatial circumstances, but acknowledging this to make it work for us in searching out the lessons of human experience. With the help at the human sciences it is possible for philosophy to reach back even further to the earliest forms of social life in its search for the basic and primary principles of social life.

**Part II. Civil Society in Classical Thought**

**Before Philosophy: Principles of Social Unity and Diversity**

If we look back as far as the human search can go and then come forward we find that the basic dichotomy between unity and diversity as salient in the last half century is as old as is humankind. In the earliest societies unity was realized in terms of the totem with which all members of a tribe simply identified. ‘I am parakeet, or lion, etc.’, the members of a tribe would quite simply affirm. In this common symbiotic identity they both expressed the unity of their community and posited a symbolic principle for the maintenance and development of their common life. The totem was then, in Geertz’s terms, both ‘model of’ and ‘model for’ their social life. For civil society the bases of sociality were firmly laid.

We note then an intensive social unity or community, symbolized by the totem with which people identified in an immediate manner. Life was little differentiated, everyone did everything. As differentiation of roles had not yet arisen, there was no need for a more complex symbol system. Though found quite universally throughout the world and lasting over vast lengths of time, the simplicity of this model, even in its various analogous configurations catalogued by Claude and Levi-Strauss in his *Totemism*, would not be sufficient for the emerging complex diversity of life.

With the development of differentiation in roles there came a point at which it could be appreciated that the unique and unitive principle of a differentiated society needed to be free from, and in that sense transcendent to, the many realities it unites. With this came gradually the sense of multiple gods each transcending the realities they symbolized, yet united genetically among themselves in anthropomorphic patterns. As the varied myths expressed the meaning of life and shaped its realization, this period came to be termed rightly the age of myth.

What is important philosophically here is that this created and expressed a sense of unity among persons, while allowing nonetheless for their individual distinctiveness. Together, these bespoke a sense of complementarity or sociality. If there was conflict among the gods there was also a basic hierarchy and overarching unity in which humans participated as their descendents and expressions.

This symbol system for society was so significantly varied and enriched that it was possible for Homer to write in its terms his enduring statements of the nature and meaning of human life, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

What then does primitive and mythic life yield for an eidetic reduction of the notion of civil society? It gives first an insight into the basic character of unity in social life and enables us to see something largely unintelligible to those in an individualist culture, namely the foundational

---

8 G.F. McLean, *Plenitude and Participation: The Unity of Man in God* (Madras: The University of Madras, 1978), Chapters I and II.
10 Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), Chapter IV.
character of social unity for human life. Second it enables us to see how differentiation can be had within a social unity and in such wise that it promotes rather than destroys it as a community. Thirdly, it provides a context within which an extended number of people can provide for the complexity and direction of their life through some degree of stratification.

**Greek Thought: The Components of Civil Society**

The philosopher is concerned especially with the point at which myth could be transcended through the development by reason of a capacity to articulate the basic character of reality no longer in symbolic, but in proper terms. This made it possible to reason discursively and thereby to discover the nature of reality in its multiple, including its social, forms.

Once philosophy had been initiated in Greece, the mind rapidly searched out a speculative understanding of the unifying principles which stood as causes in the various dimensions of reality. In but a few generations speculation moved from cosmology with Thales, to mathematics with Pythagoras, and to metaphysics as the study of the basic nature of reality with Parmenides. He came immediately to the theme of unity and hence of identity as essential to the notion and reality of being; but he left unthematized the issue of plurality. In so doing he set up for metaphysics its central issue: unity and plurality, namely, how is the multiple related to the one in a manner that enables the two to be mutually complementary rather than subversive?

As regards civil society this comes to: how can human beings establish a social unity which promotes, rather than subverts, the unique dignity and self-realization of all who are its members. This remains the basic issue to our day. It could be expected that whoever would open the way to resolving this issue would be the father of the Greek, and hence the Western, tradition in philosophy. This proved to be Plato and Aristotle.

Plato opened the way from unity to multiplicity through his notion of participation which envisaged the many as having their reality from, expressing, and ultimately being directed toward the one. This breakthrough was foundational for all the Western philosophy which Whitehead termed a series of footnotes on Plato. Plato’s sense of participation was expressed in the long Platonic tradition through the imagery of light coming from a simple exalted source, but shining down in ever expanding, if diminished, ranks. In his famous allegory of the cave in the *Republic* Plato described the preparation of leaders as one of liberation from the darkness of the cave in order to ascend to the light and then returning to the cave to govern in an enlightened manner. This was not a role, but the center of one’s reality. Hegel beautifully expressed this Platonic sense of the citizen as “living in and with and for one’s people, leading a general life wholly devoted to the public interest.”

There was, however, a fatal weakness which showed up in his description of an ideal state in his *Laws* (in some contrast to his *Republic*). In response to the chaotic situation of his times, Socrates had sought a pattern of virtues which could provide real guidance in actual intuitions of human action. Plato, seeking greater clarity in their regard, reduced them to ideal forms in relation to which the many individual instances were but passive formal images. This made room for diversity between different forms, but left the many instances of any one form as basically identical — just as all number threes are the same among themselves and in relation to threeness itself. As a result the ideal state he described in the *Laws* had a shocking absence of any sense of the

---

13 *Republic*, VI 509–527.
14 *Politics*, 263b.
uniqueness of human beings. It reduced social life to a communal form in which all was determined by and by for the state.

To the degree possible, and in terms of the sense of reality had at the times, this image of society was corrected by Plato’s pupil, Aristotle, who first mapped out the field of philosophy as a science and a wisdom. It is here that we shall attempt to advance our eidetic reduction of the notion of civil society and to observe the contribution that philosophy can make the development of that notion.

With regard to civil society Aristotle took three preliminary steps. Speaking thematically, rather than chronologically, he first developed the science of logic in order to make it possible to control the steps of the mind in extended and complex reasoning. The result was the first elaboration of the structure of scientific knowledge in both the theoretical and the practical orders. Second, he proceeded actually to design the sciences for the first time. He developed Physics as an appreciation of the active character of physical reality, and by implication of all being. In his de Anima, the science of living beings, he identified intelligence and freedom as the distinctive characteristics of human life. These found the proper dignity of human beings and imply a civic union of human communication and cooperation. But the practical creative work of developing and directing these cooperative unions is the topic of ethics and politics as sciences of the practical order.

In that order of making and doing the principles of scientific understanding lie not in the object but in the subject — the agent or artist. Aristotle’s work, The Nichomachean Ethics, begins with the observation that every action aims at an end, and that the end sought by all is happiness or the good life. Politics as a science consists of the study of the search for the good life as a goal not only of an individuals, but of the whole integrated society. What must be understood here and expressed in language is the goal, meaning and modes of realization of life in community. Phenomenology has been developed precisely as a mode of access to this interior life of meaning. Hence Manfried Riedel suggests that if reached by a process of eidetic reduction after the manner of Husserl described above the language of Aristotle’s politics can unveil the real meaning of civil society.

Generally, this is aided by Aristotle himself who begins most of his works with a description of how the matter in question has appeared historically through time, thereby gradually delineating the field whose scientific principles and structure he will seek to determine in the process of establishing the science of that field. This we have done above, for Aristotle begins his politics not historically by thematically delineating the elements in which political life consists. Both however bring us to the same point, namely, that to be political means to govern and be governed as a member of a community.

Governance and Community

We find immediately that most properly the political bespeaks governance or directive action toward the goal. Significantly this is expressed by the term arché which originally means beginning, origin or first source. Secondly, this is extended to governance in the sense of sovereignty, that is, directing others toward a good or a goal but not oneself being necessitated by others. It is the point of beginning or origin of social action, and as such bespeaks responsibility for the overall enterprise. This is what is characteristically human as an exercise of freedom by

---

15 Cf. note 7 above.
16 Politics, I, 1, 1252a22.
individuals and groups in originating responsible action. Though most actions of humans at the different inorganic and organic levels can be performed by other physical realities, it is precisely as these actions are exercised under the aegis of freedom that they become properly human acts. This issue of corporate directive freedom — its nature and range — is then the decisive issue as regards civil society. How this is needed and how it can be effectively exercised today is the heart of the issue of civil society for our times.

There is a second dimension to the issue of governance in Aristotle. It is indicated in what many have seen as a correction of his evaluation of types of governance. His first classification of modes of government was drawn up in terms of the quantity of those who shared in ruling. When ruling is seen as a search of material possessions or property, this tends to be an oligarchy; rule is by the few because generally only a few are rich. Democracy, in contrast, is rule by the many who are poor. Aristotle needed to improve on this basically quantitative division founded empirically on the changing distribution of property, for conceptually there could be a society in which the majority is rich. Hence, he chooses instead a normative criterion, namely, whether governance is exercised in terms of a search not for goods arbitrarily chosen by a few out of self-interest, but for the common good in which all can participate. In this light governance has its meaning as a species of broader reality, namely, the community (koinonia) which comes together for its end, namely, happiness or the good life of the whole. Community supposes the free persons of which it is composed; formally it expresses their conscious and free union with a view to a common end, namely, the shared good they seek.

The polis is then a species of community. It is a group, which as human and hence free and self-responsible, comes together in governance to guide efforts toward the achievement of the good life. Community and governance are not the same or tautological, but they do go together for persons are united as a community by their common orientation to the same end, and as free they rightly guide or govern themselves toward that end. In this way Aristotle identifies the central nature of the socio-political order as being a koin nia politika or “civil society.”

Civil society then has three elements. First there is governance: arché, the beginning of action or the taking of initiative toward an end; this is the exercise of human freedom. But as this pertains to persons in their various groups and subgroups there are two other elements, namely, communication or solidarity with other members of the groups and the participation or subsidiarity of these groups or communities within the whole. In search for the goal or end, that is, for the common good, the participants form communities marked by solidarity and interrelated in subsidiarity. Thus to understand a civil society we must seek to uncover the solidarity and subsidiarity of the community as its members participate in the governance of life toward the common good.

**Solidarity and Community**

Through time societies have manifested in increasing diversity of parts; this constitutes their proper richness and strength. As the parts differ one from another, this increase is numerical, thereby bringing quantitative advantage as with an army. But it is even more important that the parts differ in kind so that each brings a distinctive concern and capability to the common task. Further, differing between themselves, one member is able to give and the other receive in multiple and interrelated active and receptive modes. This means that the members of a society not only

---

17 *Politics*, III, 7.
18 *Politics*, III, 8.
live alongside others, but that their shared effort to realize the good life thrives through their mutual interaction.

Aristotle develops this theme richly in chapter 6 “On Friendship” in Book IX of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, stressing a theme which will reemerge later, namely, that the members of a civil society need to be of one mind and one heart. Toward the end of this chapter he evolves the importance of this for the common weal.¹⁹

Such solidarity of the members of society is one of its essential component characteristics. Plato would use the terms *methexis* and *mimesis* or participation for this. But Aristotle feared that if the individual were seen as but another instance of a specific type or an image of the primary form their individuals would lose their reality. So he soon ceased to use this term; the term ‘solidarity’ which recognizes the distinctive reality of the parts seems better to reflect his thought.

In the human body, where there is but one substantial form, the many parts exist for the whole and the actions of the parts are actions of the whole (it is not my legs and feet which walk; I walk by my legs and feet). Society also has many parts and their differentiation and mutuality pertains to the good of the whole. But in contrast to the body, the members of a community have their own proper form, finality and operation. Hence, their unity is an accidental one of order, that is in terms of the relation or order of their capabilities and actions to the perfection of the body politic or civil society and the realization of its common good.

Aristotle does not hesitate to state strongly the dependence of the individual on the community in order to live a truly human life, concluding that the state is a creation of nature prior to the individual.²⁰ Nevertheless, in as much as the parts are realities in their own right, outside of any orientation to the common good of the whole, society is ultimately is for its parts: the society is for its members, not the contrary.

*Subsidiarity and Community²¹*

But there is more than solidarity to the matter of order of which a civil society is constituted. Community in general is constituted through the cooperation of many for the common goal or good, but the good or goal of a community can be extremely rich and textured. It can concern nourishment, health maintenance, environmental soundness; it includes education both informal and formal, both basic and advanced, initial and retraining; it extends to nutrition, culture, recreation, etc., etc., all the endless manners in which human beings fulfill their needs and capacities and seek “the good life.” As each of these can and must be sought and shared through the cooperation of many, each is the basis of a group or subgroup in a vastly varied community.

When, however, one adds the elements of governance (*archê*), that is, the element of freedom determining what will be done and how the goal will be sought, then the dimension of subsidiarity emerges into view. Were we talking about things rather then people it would be possible to envisage a technology of mass production in a factory automatically moving and directing all the components automatically toward the final product. Where, however, we are concerned with a community and hence with the composit exercise of the freedom of the persons who constitute its membership, then it is crucial that this not be substituted for by a command from outside or from above. Rather governance in the community initiating and directing action toward the common

---

¹⁹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, IX, 6, 11613.
²⁰ *Politics*, I, 2, 1253a20-37.
end must be exercised in a cumulative manner beginning from the primary group, the family, in relation to its common good, and moving up to the broader concerns or goals of more inclusive groups considered both quantitatively (neighborhood, city, nation, etc.), and qualitatively (education, health, religion) according to the hierarchy of goods which are their concerns.

Aristotle recognizes the many communities as parts of the political order when he treats justice and friendship inasmuch as this seeks not particular advantage but that of the whole. Justice here, as distributive, is not arithmetic but proportionate to those involved according to the respect and honor that is due to each. In the Politics in his concern for the stability of the state he stresses the need for a structured diversity. Groups such as the family and village differ qualitatively form the state and it is necessary to recognize this and promote them as such for the vitality of the whole.

The synergetic ordering of these groups, considered both quantitatively, and qualitatively and the realization of their varied needs and potentials is the stuff of the governance of civil society. The condition for success in this is that the freedom and hence responsible participation of all be actively present and promoted at each level. Thus, proper responsibility on the family level must not be taken away by the city, nor that of the city by the state. Rather the higher units either in the sense of larger numbers or more important order of goods must exercise their governance precisely in order to promote the full and self-responsible action of the lower units and in the process enable them to achieve goals which acting alone they could not realize. Throughout, the concern is to maximize the participation in governance or the exercise of freedom of the members of the community, thereby enabling them to live more fully as persons and groups so that the entire society flourishes. This is termed subsidiarity.

Thus through considering phenomenologically Aristotle’s analysis of the creative activity of persons striving consciously and freely toward their goals it is possible to articulate the nature and constituent elements of civil society as a conscious goal of persons and peoples. It is a realm of persons in community solidarity and through a structure of subsidiarity participating in self-governance.

This manifests also the main axes of the unfolding of the social process in Greece, namely,

- (a) from the Platonic stress upon unity in relation to which the many are but repetitions, to the Aristotelian development of diversity as necessary for the unfolding and actualization of unity;
- (b) from emphasis upon governance by authority located at the highest and most remote levels, to participation in the exercise of governance by persons and groups at every level and in relation to matters with which they are engaged and responsible;
- (c) and from attention to one’s own interests, to attention to the common good of the whole.

Following progress along these axes will be the key to efforts to develop civil society and will provide guidance for efforts to promote a proper functioning of social life.

**Medieval Thought: The Existential Sense of Person, Solidarity and Subsidiarity**

If these be the original components of the notion of civil society, as first systemized philosophically by Aristotle, we should look to the major subsequent stages in the evolution of philosophy for the unfolding of this notion of civil society as the heart of social life. We shall do so first in the classical medieval synthesis of Aquinas, then in the turbulent reality of modern

---

thought. This should put us in position to look at the new avenues along which civil society can be pursued in our day.

Above we referred to Aristotle’s speculative philosophy, and then especially to his ethics and politics, in order to uncover (or “unveil” in Heidegger’s terms) the basic and perennial components of social life and to come thereby to the meaning of civil society (koin nía politikà). To appreciate the development of this meaning in the medieval Graeco-Christian synthesis it is helpful to begin with the shift in metaphysics, that is, the development in appreciation of the character and content of reality, which took place with the advent of Christianity. In his Metaphysics Aristotle noted that the most fundamental issue “which was raised of old and is raised now and always…is just the question what is substance,” that is, what is reality in its strongest, foundational and primary sense. If humankind’s appreciation of this were to shift then the whole vision of reality in all its ordering, relations and striving would evolve. This indeed is what occurred in, or better constituted the step from, Greek to Christian philosophy. The former had been concerned with forms, the essences or natures of things; the latter would be enlivened by the coming into consciousness of the existence, actuality or affirmation of things. It is the difference between knowing what a car is and driving one; some have described it as the difference between a dream about life and the actual process of making decision, bearing responsibilities and building a life. In biblical terms S. Kierkegaard and Paul Tillich would see it as the difference between the dreaming innocence of the Guarder of Eden and the difficult ambiguities of the exercise of freedom.

This development required transcending the Greek notion of being which had meant simply a specific type or kind to an explicit awareness of the act of existence (esse) in terms of which being could be appreciated in its active and self-assertive character. The precise basis for this expansion of the appreciation of being from form to existence is difficult to identify in a conclusive manner, but some things are known.

Because the Greeks had considered matter (hyle — the stuff of which things were made) to be eternal, no direct questions arose concerning the existence or non-existence of things. As there always had been matter, the only real questions for the Greeks concerned the shapes or forms under which it would exist. Only at the conclusion of the Greek and the beginning of the medieval period did Plotinus (205-270 A.D.), rather than simply presupposing matter, attempt the first philosophical explanation of its origin. After the Platonic image he explained the origin of matter as light coming from the One and, having been progressively attenuated as it emanated ever further from its source, finally turning into darkness. But whence this new sensitivity to reality which enabled him even to raise such a question?

It is known that shortly prior to Plotinus the Christian Fathers had such a sensitivity. They explicitly opposed the Greek’s mere supposition of matter; affirming that, like form, it too needed to be explained, and traced the origin of both form and matter to the Pantocrator. In doing this they extended to matter the general principle of Genesis that all was dependent upon the One who created heaven and earth. In so doing two factors appear to have been significant.

First, it was a period of intensive attention to the Trinitarian character of the divine. To understand Christ to be God Incarnate it was necessary to understand Him to be Son sharing fully in the divine nature. The Son, like the Father, must be fully of one and same divine nature. This made it possible to clarify, by contrast, the formal effect of God’s act in creating limited and

---

24 Metaphysics, VII, i, 1028a29-b4.
25 Plotinus, Enneads, II 5 (25), ch. v.
differentiated beings as constituted in their own right. This pointed to the meaning of existence, which for humans means human life, and for society is issue of how life in community can truly be lived humanly.

Cornelio Fabro suggests that another factor in the development of this awareness of being as existence was reflection upon one’s free response to the divine redemptive invitation. This response goes beyond any limited facet of one’s reality, any particular consideration of time, occupation, or the like. It is a matter of the self-affirmation of one’s total actuality. Its sacramental symbol, baptism, is not merely that of transformation or improvement, but of passage through death to radically new life. This directs the mind beyond my specific nature or individual role. It focuses rather upon the unique reality that I am as a self for whom living freely is to dispose of my act of existence and living socially is to do this in cooperation with others. This opens the way to a new seriousness and great potential progress as regards the realization of civil society.

It took many centuries for this evolution in philosophical awareness from essence to existence to emerge clearly and for its implications vis a vis the Christian Platonism, which had reigned from Augustine to Bonaventure, to be brought clearly to light.

The catalyst for this was the new availability of the texts of Aristotle in the 12th and 13th centuries. His work on civil society was taken up immediately by Thomas Aquinas and effectively elaborated upon in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Because man is naturally a social animal, since he needs many things for his life which he cannot provide for himself alone, the consequence is that man is naturally a part of some group, through which assistance toward the good life is furnished him. This assistance he needs for two purposes. First, for those things that are necessary to life, without which the present life cannot be maintained. In this respect the domestic group of which he is a part may be an aid to man, for each man receives generation and nourishment and training from his parents, and the individuals who are members of a domestic family assist one another to the necessaries of life.

In another way man is assisted towards the perfect sufficiency of life by the civil group of which he is a part: namely, that he may not only live, but live well, having all the things which suffice him for life. The civil group of which he is a part may be an aid to man in this respect, not only in regard to corporal goods, since there are many crafts in the state to which a single household is not adequate, but also in regard to morals, inasmuch as insolent youths, whom paternal admonition cannot correct, may be coerced through public power by the fear of punishment.

Moreover, it should be known that this whole — a civil multitude or a domestic family — has only the unity of order, according to which it is not one thing in the strict sense of the term. Therefore, a part of this whole can have an operation which is not the operation of the whole, even as a soldier in an army has an operation which is not that of the whole army. Nevertheless, the whole itself also has an operation which does not belong to any of the parts, but to the whole, as a battle belongs to the whole army, and as the rowing of a ship is an operation of the multitude or the oarsmen.

Now there is a kind of whole which has unity not only by order but by composition or connection, or even by continuity, according to which unity it is, in the strict sense of the term, one thing; and in this kind of whole there is no operation of the part which is not that of the whole, for in continuous things, the movement of the whole and of the part is the same. Likewise in things composed or connected the operation of the part is, in principle, that of the whole. Therefore, it is fitting that consideration of such wholes and consideration of their parts should belong to the same science.27

27 *In X libros Ethicorum ad Nichomacum*, I, 11 (Opera, XXI, p. 2).
In a sense this is an insightful synthesis of Aristotle, but in the light of Thomas’ existential emphasis it signifies considerably more. We saw above in Aristotle the principles of human freedom, solidarity and subsidiarity. We saw also how in terms of reality as primarily act, existence and freedom came to be much more than the choice between different forms or contrasting natures; it became the creative affirmation by which things were made actual or brought into reality.

Thus, one was not simply taking part in a process of cyclical return such that no matter how hard one struggled all ultimately returned to its original state. Life is much more significant: it has history and directedness, radical newness and definitive meaning. It has a uniqueness and creativity, such that the exercise of human freedom is always momentous with sacred meaning which has eternal import. This is a vastly deepened sense of the dignity of human freedom and the reason why its exercise must be protected and promoted.

Further, in terms of existence this can be seen not only from the teleological point of view of the goal or end as with Aristotle, or from the formal point of view as with Plato, but from the point of view of its origin in, and from, existence itself. This did not take away the importance of natures in ordering to an appropriate end, which allowed the contribution of the Stoics regarding natural law to be integrated. But it transformed this from pattern to which we surrendered to a wise and loving source by which our more limited but yet decisive powers should be measured and inspired. The Stoics had seen moral life as simply a matter of following the laws of nature; Kant would see it as living up to laws which we ourselves autonomously decreed. But for Thomas to assimilate and act upon the laws of a God-given nature was to participate in and express the wisdom and love from which all came and toward which all was directed. Moral action in a civil society was creatively to mediate this ideal pattern into concrete cooperative action by the members of society in the many and myriad ways in which they intersected in their lives.

For human solidarity this had great import. In this light, community was even less than for the Greeks a matter merely of a shared specific form and of harvesting all human power in a quantitatively cumulative manner, as might an army. It was rather the enablement of each person to express this freely and hence in a thoroughly unique action, and to do this actively by contributing effectively as a cause to their life and its actuation. This takes us far beyond the notion of a unity merely of order which it evolves into a dynamic unity of action and graded interaction in patterns of subsidiarity.

But how is this not to destroy the uniqueness of each person but to intensify it, and in the process how is it not to destroy the unity of society but to intensify that? Thomas’ answer is to redevelop Plato’s notion of participation, but in the sense of Aristotle’s notion of being as act and of its Christian sense as existence. In this light all exist by sharing in a common source of existence. This is reflected through time in their active conscious cooperative commitment to striving toward a common goal. This is inspired by conviction regarding their transcendent origin and purpose, and made actual in the hope and mutual love which this engenders.

The bonds of solidarity which this builds and which spread out, beyond family and blood relations, to strangers we meet and hopefully even to peoples afar are deep and vast. Indeed, from tribal to medieval times the great challenges of mankind have always been at the border of these felt unities where other persons or groups appear as markedly “other,” alien, and threatening. Given present mobility, this defines the major problem of immigrant peoples who become aliens within. Hence, the transcendent and active principle of unity, solidarity and cooperation between persons and communities is the more necessary in our task of binding together increasingly different groups.
For *subsidiarity* too the deepening of the notion of reality opened a major new opportunity. For to the degree that reality could be seen in terms not of closed forms, but of the act of existence then the forms and structures could become, as it were, translucent one to the other. Each was constituted not in terms of its opposition to others, as are material blocks or contrasting forms such as red and brown, but rather in terms of the degree to which the original source of existence was reflected in their actuality and through their efficient causality was communicated to others. The paradigm of an original gift of being in which all were created meant that the significance of life lies in sharing or giving in turn. In social terms this means that the significance of a level of society lies not in holding all exercise of governance to itself but in enlivening other groups and subgroups in the exercise of their own freedom.

For civil society this meant not deadening the initiative of other groups by holding power to oneself, but enlivening and empowering the multiple communities to direct or govern their own life or area of activity and to train people progressively in guilds and other forms of comity to live and exercise responsibility in their own sphere of community life.

Finally, without reducing the importance of material possessions, this kept the nature of social life from being understood as most basically a matter of possessing materials goods or products. It directed attention rather to the meaning of life and to the development of a social order in which all could contribute and share. This meant exercising their proper freedom in cooperation with others and with an eye to the common good of all.²⁸ The implications of this for community and for the exercise of authority are developed by Yves Simon in his *Community of the Free*²⁹ and *Theory of Authority, and Democratic Government.*³⁰

**Part III. Civil Society in Modern Thought**

**Civil Society in the Anglo-Saxon Enlightenment and Contemporary Liberal Theory**

In order to take up the present challenge we need to look with special attention at the modern landscape with regard to civil society. If that concerns the way of governing and directing or, more basically, of humanly initiating our search for the good life as a community or society, then our attention must be directed basically to the nature of freedom and its exercise. When, some decades ago, Mortimer Adler and his team at the Institute for Philosophical Research undertook the most comprehensive review of philosophical literature in order to determine what humankind had discovered about freedom they found this highly differentiated field to be constituted of three clusters of meanings.³¹

(a) Circumstantial freedom of self-realization: “To be free is to be able, under favorable circumstances, to act as one wishes for one’s own individual good as one sees it;”

(b) Acquired freedom of self-perfection: “To be free is to be able, through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as one ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature;” and

---


(c) Natural freedom of self-determination: “To be free is to be able, by a power inherent in human nature, to change one’s own character creatively by deciding for oneself what one shall do or shall become.”

The suggestion which follows is that the Enlightenment explored the first two senses of freedom and in attempting to develop the notion of civil society has manifested its own limitation for the task. This will imply for our final section an exploration of ways of developing civil society at the third level of freedom, and doing so in a way which integrates and thereby humanizes, rather than simply dismisses, the earlier two levels of freedom.

The opening of modern times is marked by, and probably consists in, a characteristic shift in governance. This no longer was shared by all or at least by the notable number of free men as in the ideal of the Athenian polis, but had been concentrated in Roman Emperors, kings and nobles. Later, while great empires emerged in the East, in the West governance was highly divided in small kingdoms led by local princes, as is reflected today in the abundance of castles in Italy, Austria, etc. They had broad responsibility, yet were held to moral standards, if not legal norms, with regard to the concerns, if not the rights, of the people they ruled.

The story of the emergence of the citizenry— from the Magna Carta to the American “Declaration of Independence,” to the French “Rights of Man,” to the Chinese Revolution of 1949—is, of course, the defining context of the evolution of civil society in modern times. This can be followed in many terms such as population, health or sovereignty. But it is significant that in philosophy and political theory the modern age has been characterized above all as the Enlightenment or Age of Reason. This suggests that underneath, or at least in close and controlling tension with, the development of the notion of freedom there stands a development in the understanding of knowledge. We are faced then, as it were, with a series of boxes. To understand and prescribe philosophically regarding the notion of civil society we need the notion of the modern of freedom; but in order to grasp this notion of freedom we need to be aware in turn of developments in the meaning of understanding. Hence, in order to explore the development of the notion of civil society in modern times and to understand its present problematic we shall take three steps in both British and Continental enlightenment thought. First we shall investigate their sense of knowledge which enables the awareness of meaning and the interests of people; second we shall investigate their notion of freedom; thirdly we shall see how this defines the mode of governance in the society referred to as civil.

Knowledge as Empirical: the Lockean Tradition

Turning to the epistemological dimension it is important to note the difference between the more rationalist continental, and the more empirical British traditions. To follow this it is necessary to reach further back to John Locke and indeed to the Reformation.

On the one hand, as an ex-Augustinian friar Martin Luther was educated in a loosely Platonic, rather than an Aristotelian, tradition. As seen above, this favored the ideal pattern over the concrete and differentiated. On the other hand, as a follower of Ockham, and hence of nominalism, he held closely to knowledge of single things and rejected a capacity of the intellectual for knowledge of natures and universals. These came together to constitute a fideism in order to bring out the importance of faith in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Luther focused upon the damage done to humankind by the Fall seeing it as not merely weakening, but corrupting human

---

32 Seligman, pp. 36-41.
nature and its capacities for reason. On this theological, rather than philosophical, basis human reason was seen as no longer capable of knowing the divine or thinking in terms of being or existence as the proper effect of His causality. Suddenly, the world became very opaque. Knowledge of natures and hence of natural law was no longer possible, a study of human life could reveal at best what was, but not what ought to be. The morally good, could be known not from an understanding of the nature of things themselves, but only from the will of their creator, which, in turn, could be known only by special revelation as communicated in Scripture. In the important matters of life, faith firmly held was substituted for reason; theology replaced philosophy, which shrunk suddenly to external knowledge of accidental happenings.

The questions of the time, however, were not shrinking, but expanding and becoming more pervasive. They included not only what one could know, but how one could redevelop the socio-economic in view of the vastly expanded resources of a far flung empire and the newly invented industrial capabilities. No less importantly there was question of how all this could be managed by the new parliamentarian manner of governance which soon would be institutionalized by the American and French revolutions. The issue of civil society (the koin nia politika) would have to be rethought on this new basis but by very narrow bands of knowledge and correspondingly narrow understandings of freedom.

Sense knowledge. Early on John Locke was an assistant to the Earl of Shaftsbury who would soon become the Lord Chancellor of the British Empire — and literally loose his head in the complex political edies of those changing times. In these circumstances, in a regular series of discussions with colleagues he came to see how progress on political and other issues required further clarification of what we could know. Thus, Locke’s thought moved from issues of governance to community, and hence to knowledge. Facing the issue of how the arché, origination and sovereignty in political decision-making could reside not in the single person of the king, but in a group or parliament communication became central in importance. How could the members of such a group think together in order to come to agreement upon decisions on public policy and thereupon exercise their will in legislation? For Locke this meant that all needed to have equal access to the same foundations of knowledge.

To this end Locke designed for his colleagues his historical plain method. He proposed that we suppose the mind to be a white paper void of ideas, and then follow the way in which it comes to be furnished by ideas. These he traced from external things through the senses and onto the mind. To keep knowledge public, he insisted that only those ideas be recognized which followed this route of experience, either as sensation or as reflection upon the mind’s work upon the materials derived from the senses. On this basis David Hume reduced all knowledge to either matters of fact or formal analytic tautologies derived therefrom. They could concern neither the existence or actuality of things nor their essences, but could be simply the determination of one from a pair of sensible contraries, e.g., red rather than brown, sweet rather than sour.

The resulting ideas would be public in the sense that they could be traced back to their origin and thus could be replicated by anyone who would situate himself in order to make the same observation. The mind could proceed to make all kinds of combinations with such ideas, and Locke eventually worked out the intricate pattern of such possible associations and dissociations of ideas. But all ideas, no matter how complex, were always subject to a test of verification, namely,

35 Locke, An Essay, Book II.
that in principle all content could be traced back to an origin in the simple ideas drawn directly from the senses. No distinctive order of intellectual knowledge was recognized; substance remained only an unknowable supposition soon to be dismissed by Hume. This 17th century epistemology was adopted broadly in the following century not only in England and in America, but in France where it became the context for the Enlightenment proper. It provided this thought with its systematic codification and imposed strict limits upon reason. From the passion to hold to its restrictive results the times would come to be denominated the age of reason.

Thus knowledge sedulously avoided any consideration of the nature of one’s own reality or of other persons and things. Interpersonal bonds of civil society and human community based on an intimate appreciation of the nature of the person, and on respect for the dignity of other human beings were replaced by external observations of persons as single entities wrapped in self-interests. This lent itself to the construction only of external utilitarian relations based on everyone’s self-interests. Mutual recognition constituted a public order of merely instrumental relations assured by legal judgements rendered by the courts. In this way there came to be established a system of rights and of justice to protect each one’s field of self-interested choices and of action against incursion from without. This field was progressively defined through legal judgements and legislation by the coercive power of the state. Through the combination of industrial and colonial expansion, property or wealth was vastly expanded as was the public impact of the self-interested decision making based thereupon. In turn, the state by legislating these private interests into public law and engaging its coercive power created a legal pattern which defined the meaning of justice for its time.

The restrictions implicit in this appear starkly in Rudolf Carnap’s “Vienna Manifesto” which shrinks the scope of meaningful knowledge and significant discourse to describing “some state of affairs” in terms of empirical “sets of facts.” This excludes speech about wholes, God, the unconscious or entelechies; the grounds of meaning, as well as all that transcends the immediate content of sense experience, are excluded. All of these would be absent from the construction of the public order.

Freedom as Choice

What then could be the meaning of freedom? Just as knowledge had been reduced to external matters of fact (red or brown), freedom was reduced to choices between external object. In empirical terms, it is not possible to speak of appropriate or inappropriate goals or even to evaluate choices in relation to self-fulfillment. The only concern is which objects among the sets of contraries I will choose by brute, changeable and even arbitrary will power and whether circumstances will allow me to carry out that choice. Such choices, of course, may not only differ from, but even contradict the immediate and long range objectives of other persons. This will require compromises and social contracts in the sense of Hobbes; John Rawles will even work out a formal set of such compromises.36 Throughout it all, however, the basic concern remains the ability to do as one pleases.

This includes two factors. The first is execution by which my will is translated into action. Thus, John Locke sees freedom as “being able to act or not act, according as we shall choose or will”;37 Bertrand Russell sees it as “the absence of external obstacles to the realization of our

The second factor is individual self-realization understood simply as the accomplishment of one’s good as one sees it. This reflects one’s personal idiosyncracies and temperament, which in turn reflect each person’s individual character.

In these terms, one’s goal can be only what appeals to one, with no necessary relation to real goods or to duties which one ought to perform. Liberty consists in doing what one desires,” and the freedom of a society is measured by the latitude it provides for the cultivation of individual patterns of life. If there is any ethical theory in this, it can be only utilitarian, hopefully with enough breadth to recognize other people and their good, as well as my own. In practice, over time this comes to constitute a black-hole of self-centered consumption of physical goods in which both nature and the person are consumed; it is the essence of consumerism.

This first level of freedom is reflected in the contemporary sense of “choice” in North America. As a theory, this is underwritten by a pervasive series of legal precedents following Justice Holmes’ notion of privacy, which now has come to be recognized as a constitutional right. In the American legal system the meaning of freedom has been reduced to this. It should be noted that this derived from Locke’s politically motivated decision (itself an exercise of freedom), not merely to focus upon empirical meaning, but to eliminate from public discourse any other knowledge. Its progressively rigorous implementation, which we have but sampled in the references to Hume and Carnap, constitutes an ideology in the sense of a selected and restrictive vision which controls minds and reduces freedom to willfulness. In this perspective, liberalism is grossly misnamed, and itself calls for a process of liberation and enrichment.

Here a strong and ever deepening gap opens between, on the one hand, what reason could ascertain, namely, a set of self-interested single agents interacting in the Hobbes manner as wolves to wolves, and, on the other hand, what would undergird the construction of a public social order.

Civil Society and Moral Sentiment

Where in this mechanism was civil society to be found? Due to the restriction of knowledge to the empirical reporting and managing of facts, the moral realm was no longer an effort at rational ordering of all toward the common good of the overall society and its variously articulated subgroups. The newly restricted reason could provide no basis for a public moral order of duty and obligation. Instead, all moral life was located in the private, interior sphere as a matter not of reason, but of feeling, affectivity and emotions.

Further, when it came then to issues of the basic motivation for decisions in private or public life these could not be the result of reason, for there reason of itself is entirely incapable. “The ultimate ends of human action can never be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiment and affections of mankind.”

It would not be right to underestimate the power of this sentiment or its influence in humanizing the new social universe of Locke and Hume. The Cambridge Platonists had written eloquently of moral sentiment. Locke in his Second Treatise on Government invoked

---

39 Adler, p. 187.
41 Adler, p. 193.
prominently the subordination of human self-seeking to a unifying and uplifting order of divine providence. The Scottish Common Sense Realists propounded this eloquently in Scotland and in the major Ivy League colleges in North America in an effort to articulate the moral dimension of life.

This articulation of the moral order in terms of affectivity is central to the work of Adam Smith as is evidenced by his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and of Adam Ferguson in his landmark work: *An Essay on the History of Civil Society.*

In this process two sources of motivations are noted. One is theological, namely, divine inspiration and its approbation of love, charity or benevolence as actions in accord with divinely approved law of nature. This is a strong and pervasive influence in Locke and it continues in such Scottish moralists as Francis Hutcheson. Aladair MacIntyre documents this at length in his *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*

A second, more humanistic, source is the desire for social approbation developed in the work of Adam Ferguson. While recognizing the realm of self-interest, he defends the overriding reality of a moral sphere. “Mankind, we are told, are devoted to interest; and this, in all commercial nations, is undoubtedly true. But it does not follow that they are, by natural dispositions averse to society and natural affections.” He expresses contempt for mere “fortune or interest” and looks rather to a benevolent heart with “courage, freedom and resolute choice of conduct” as directing us to act with a view to the good of society. This, in turn, is seen less as divinely mandated universal laws of action than as universal attributes of “moral sentiments and natural affections (discovered) through the study of particular human agents acting in society.”

In this manner the moral warrant for the civility of civil society is separated from reason, from the creator as source of society, and from the substance and end of society. Its warrant is left as self-justifying and self-motivating. While moral sentiment can generate a certain conception of a way of life and a conviction that this is a good way to live, these are hard pressed by the internalized motivation of self-interest based on the drive for material possessions. These even receive divine sanction in the complex convoluted puritan rationalization described by Max Weber.

Is this motivation for a separated civil society adequate to harmonize all the elements in the full breadth of human life? In the context of the first level of freedom as developed in early British empiricist philosophy following Locke, with its external utilitarian structure for human relationships, Adam Smith developed a corresponding economic theory. His goal was social promotion and protection of the economically disadvantaged. These, he thought, could best be achieved by the untrammelled development of economic forces under the guidance of their own inner logic, namely, free market interchange working as an invisible hand. Being blind to realities other than its material, economic self, however, it was inevitable that this would trammel inadvertently upon the broader human and social reality which needed and deserved to be protected. Hence he turned with full and equal seriousness, if with less success, to the elaboration of another realm — civil society. This was neither the economic order nor the state, but was needed in order to provide a “safety net” for those endangered or damaged by the interplay of market forces and the dislocation and unemployment which they generate.

It could and should be argued further that in this understanding civil society is not merely a matter of protecting the victims of the economic system, but even more of providing a human

---

45 (Edinburgh: Kincaid and Bell, 1767); (New York: Garland, 1971).
46 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).
context for the lives of all who do participate in that system. It would be a field in which they could as community exercise their humanity and hence their freedom. Here the exercise of freedom need not be limited to its first level; thus the early modern Scotch theorists, responding to Locke, developed their theme of civil society as a realm of altruistic activity guided by moral affectivity. This stood in constant contrast to the self-interested and self-seeking management of property in terms of its own maximization. It was inspired both by such religious motifs as the example of divine providence and benevolence, and the desire to be seen and appreciated by one’s peers as a good and morally sensitive person. Adam Smith’s *The Theory of Moral Sensitivity* was a natural, integral and typical part of this crucial early modern development, though he seemed over time to have moved to stress justice over benevolence.

Finally, it should be noted that civil society was conceived not only a refuge from the economic realm both for its victims and its participants, but also as a wellspring of economic abilities. Without health and basic education there cannot be a successful work force; without further education and communication there will not exist the creative inventiveness to generate more products and to compete successfully; without a sense of self-worth, human dignity and social concern the invisible hand will be left to destroy its own environment and the human potentialities it requires.

All of this argues for a civil society on the basis of economic interchange exercised not reductively at the first level of freedom, but essentially transcending that dimension. Even those who would attempt to hold reductively to the first level would refer to civil society in terms of “enlightened” self-interest play loosely with words, for in effect it means exercising self-interest with levels of insight and meaning which transcend the empirical and utilitarian. This is to say that for utility to be maximized and really succeed it needs to be situated in a context of meaning and a set of values which transcend it. The Scotts recognized this and drew insight from other, especially religious, sources in order to humanize their world and support their system.

But is this sufficient to ward off the deleterious effects of leaving the economic order of production and distribution to a non-human “hidden hand”? Marx’s world shattering analysis of the conditions of mill workers in 19th century England was a resounding “no.” While these condition have since been seriously attenuated, his indictment of the system itself that generated them, though fought over in wars hot and cold, has never been truly answered. The difficulties increase as the material stakes and self-interest increase, and as not only workers but management becomes more distant from ownership and communication slips ever more toward the inadequate language of the economic balance sheet.

And what can be expected of this arrangement as we move from the industrial to the information age in which the focus of material self-interest will shift to competencies possessed by the technically sophisticated few? This promises to catapult large members of people out of industrial production, which previously had absorbed massive numbers, and thus out of the economic web leaving them to wander and search for their survival in that intermediate field called civil society?

The “liberal” response to this follows Hume’s separation of “is” from “ought” to develop a bifurcation between the public realm ruled by justice and the realm of private morality ruled by virtue. John Rawls’ *Theory of Justice* and its subsequent evolution in *Political Liberalism* follows this penchant. The so-called integrating visions of the meaning and exercise of life he relegates to a position behind “veil of ignorance” in order to constitute a “pluralistic” public

---

domain charted by a minimum set of rules to which all would be expected to assent in order to be assured of a maximum range of action. The denizens of this domain, having deposited their basically identifying sense of meaning and commitment behind a veil of ignorance, remain denatured clones whose age, religion, race and sex must not be considered in the public domain.

This does not exclude that people might yet be inspired and motivated by values held in private behind the “veil of ignorance,” but these are not a matter of public concern which is only that a field of action and equal competition be guaranteed by an agreed structure of rights protected by the state. This is the self-styled “the free world”; Kant would consider it a field of lawful right (rechts) worked out by practical reason concerned with defining its own prerequisites; in the common law areas it would be constituted by legislative or judicial will as exercised in resolving conflicts. In either case it would not be a properly moral field of ethical action, for that is relegated to the private and the personal.

But perhaps this exclusion of the ethical from the public arena and its relegation to the private realm is what is most important here for the issue of civil society. For if the point of civil society is to constitute a realm for the full exercise of a richly textured social life, this approach implies strong limitations. It creates a notion of the private, but does so in a negative manner, that is, not in terms of full personal self-expression but as that which is excluded from public expression and engagement. Further, even when defined as the realm of the private, civil society is in a precarious situation for the requirements that one abstract from gender, age, race, religion, etc., which the liberal approach imposes upon the public order, are continually extended to the private. More and more it becomes difficult to express one’s identity in a school or club, all of which come under the strictures of the public domain if they participate in any public funding or have important for social or professional advancement. Recent anti-federal paranoia in Oklahoma is an aberrant sign of the sense of threat created by this invasive depersonalization not only of the public but of the private realm, as is fundamentalism in other lands.

In sum, certainly we need guarantees of equal participation by all in social life. The fight against discrimination and the calls for a society of law rather than of men have primarily that meaning. But where this has not already evolved over time what forces will generate it; and where it already exists is it sufficient? The critics of Rawls would note that his political liberalism does not provide the motivation for its own implementation, and thinkers ranging from Hobbes to Hegel and Marx would see what motivation there is as lying captive to self-interest in terms of material possessions and Adler’s first level of freedom. Most serious this reflects their separation of morality and of religious and other integrating views of the meaning of life from the public sphere. As this progressively expands it pervades all and promises to subvert the bases for civil society as well.

This suggests some important elements for any development of the notion and reality of civil society. First, it must not be relegated to a private realm defined by exclusion from an ever expanding domain of public life and meaning. Second, the ethical must not be separated from the public exercise of freedom lest social life be a mere voluntarism. Third, the ethical must not be separated from reason and hence from reasoned discourse or from the experience and shared traditions of a people. The last section of this paper must look for how this can be done.

**Civil Society and Continental Rationalism: Kant, Hegel and Marx**

In the previous section we saw how in the Anglo-American context the reduction of understanding to sense knowledge and the corresponding reduction of freedom to the choice
among external objects first reduced civil society to the realm of sentiment and then marginalized it on public life. On the continent a more rationalist philosophical context had an analogous effect.

In Western cultures since Plato clarity of reason has been endowed with a special, almost fetishistic, value. Time after time this has led to a dismissal of what did not possess that clarity, or to its reduction to what could be presented with a high degree of rational clarity. This resulted in the marginalization of the insights of Pascal in favor of the search for rigorous clear and distinctive ideas following Descartes; the same was true of the insights of Kierkegaard in the aftermath of Kant. It is not surprising then to note that the proposals of a civil society based upon moral sentiment would not survive in the renewed rationalization of philosophy by Kant, Hegel and Marx.

Kant provided the basis for another, much richer notion of freedom, which Adler’s team called “acquired freedom of self-perfection.” This acknowledges the ability of man to transcend the empirical order and to envisage moral laws and ideals. Here, “to be free is to be able, through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as one ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature.” This is the direction has been taken by such philosophers as Plotinus, Spinoza and Bradley who thought in terms of ideal patterns of reason and of nature. For Kant, freedom consists not in acting merely as one pleases, but in willing as one ought, whether or not this can be enacted.\(^\text{50}\) Moral standards are absolute and objective, not relative to individual or group preferences.\(^\text{51}\)

But then we face the dilemma of freedom. If, in order to have value, it must be ordered, can freedom be truly autonomous and, hence, free; conversely, if to be free is to be autonomous will it be surely a value. In either cases, how can freedom be free? The dilemma is how persons can retain both meaning and value, on the one hand, and autonomy or freedom, on the other. One without the other — meaning without freedom, or freedom without meaning — would be a contradiction. This is the kind of question that takes us to the intimate nature of reality and makes possible new discovery. I will suggest in the last section that eventually this could allow us to appreciate from within the more intuitive insight of Confucius and, thereby, to engage this in new ways particularly adapted to present times. To see this, we must look at the structure of the three critiques which Kant wrote in the decade between 1781 and 1790.

Knowledge: the Critique of Pure Reason

It is unfortunate that the range of Kant’s work has been so little appreciated. Until recently, the rationalist impact of Descartes directed almost exclusive attention to the first of Kant’s critiques, the Critique of Pure Reason, which concerned the conditions of possibility of the physical sciences. Its rejection of metaphysics as a science was warmly greeted in empiricist, positivist and, hence, materialist circles, as a dispensation from any search beyond what was reductively sensible and, hence, phenomenal in the sense of inherently spatial and/or temporal.

Kant himself, however, quite insisted upon going further. If the terms of the sciences were inherently phenomenal, then his justification of the sciences was precisely to identify and to justify, through metaphysical and transcendental deductions respectively, the sets of categories which enable the phenomenal world to have intelligibility and scientific meaning. Since sense experience is always limited and partial, the universality and necessity of the laws of science must come from

\(^{50}\) Ibid., p. 253.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 257.
the human mind. Such \textit{a priori} categories belong properly to the subject inasmuch as it is not material.

We are here at the essential turning point for the modern mind, where Kant takes a definitive step in identifying the subject as more than a wayfarer in a world encountered as a given and to which one can but react. Rather, he shows the subject to be an active force engaged in the creation even of the empirical world in which one lives. The meaning or intelligible order of things is due not only to their creation according to a divine intellect, but also to the work of the human intellect and its categories. If, however, man is to have such a central role in the constitution of his world, then certain elements will be required, and this requirement itself will be their justification.

First there must be an imagination which can bring together the flow of disparate sensations. This plays a reproductive role which consists in the empirical and psychological activity by which it reproduces within the mind the amorphous data received from without, according to the forms of space and time. This merely reproductive role is by no means sufficient, however, for, since the received data is amorphous, any mere reproduction would lack coherence and generate a chaotic world: “a blind play of representations less even than a dream.”\textsuperscript{52} Hence, the imagination must have also a productive dimension which enables the multiple empirical intuitions to achieve some unity. This is ruled by “the principle of the unity of apperception” (understanding or intellecction), namely, “that all appearances without exception, must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception.”\textsuperscript{53} This is done according to the abstract categories and concepts of the intellect, such as cause, substance and the like, which rule the work of the imagination at this level in accord with the principle of the unity of apperception.

Second, this process of association must have some foundation in order that the multiple sensations be related or even relatable one to another, and, hence, enter into the same unity of apperception. There must be some objective affinity of the multiple found in past experience — an “affinity of appearances” — in order for the reproductive or associative work of the imagination to be possible. However, this unity does not exist, as such, in past experiences. Rather, the unitive rule or principle of the reproductive activity of the imagination is its reproductive or transcendental work as “a spontaneous faculty not dependent upon empirical laws but rather constitutive of them and, hence, constitutive of empirical objects.”\textsuperscript{54} That is, though the unity is not in the disparate phenomena, nevertheless they can be brought together by the imagination to form a unity only in certain particular manners if they are to be informed by the categories of the intellect.

Kant illustrates this by comparing the examples of perceiving a house and of a boat receding downstream.\textsuperscript{55} The parts of the house can be intuited successively in any order (door-roof-stairs or stairs-door-roof), but my judgment must be of the house as having all of its parts simultaneously. Similarly, the boat is intuited successively as moving downstream. However, though I must judge its actual motion in that order, I could imagine the contrary. Hence, the imagination, in bringing together the many intuitions goes beyond the simple order of appearances and unifies phenomenal objects in an order to which concepts can be applied. “Objectivity is a product of cognition, not of apprehension,”\textsuperscript{56} for, though we can observe appearances in any sequence, they can be unified and, hence, thought only in certain orders as ruled by the categories of the mind.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, A 121.
\textsuperscript{54} Donald W. Crawford, \textit{Kant’s Aesthetic Theory} (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 87-90.
\textsuperscript{55} Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, A 192-93.
\textsuperscript{56} Crawford, pp. 83-84.
In sum, it is the task of the reproductive imagination to bring together the multiple elements of sense intuition in some unity or order capable of being informed by a concept or category of the intellect with a view to making a judgment. On the part of the subject, the imagination here is active, authentically one’s own and creative. Ultimately, however, its work is not free, but is necessitated by the categories or concepts as integral to the work of sciences which are characterized by necessity and universality.

How realistic is talk about freedom? Do we really have the choice of which so much is said? On the one hand, we are structured in a set of circumstances which circumscribe, develop and direct our actions. This is the actual experience of people which Marx and Hegel articulate when they note the importance of knowledge of the underlying pattern of economic and other laws and make freedom consist in conforming thereto.

On the other hand, we learn also from our experience that we do have a special responsibility in this world to work with the circumstances of nature, to harness and channel these forces toward greater harmony and human goals. A flood which kills thousands is not an occasion for murdering more, but for mobilizing to protect as many as possible, for determining what flood control projects need to be instituted for the future, and even for learning how to so construct them that they can generate electricity for power and irrigation for crops. All of this is properly the work of the human spirit which emerges therein. Similarly, in facing a trying day, I eat a larger breakfast rather than cut out part of my schedule; instead of ignoring the circumstances and laws of my physical being, I coordinate these and direct them for my human purposes.

This much can be said by pragmatism and utilitarianism. But it leaves unclear whether man remains merely an instrument of physical progress and, hence, whether his powers remain a function of matter. This is where Kant takes a decisive step in his second Critique.

*Freedom: The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason*

Beyond the set of universal, necessary and ultimately material relations upon which he focuses in his first Critique, Kant points out the fact of human responsibility in the realm of practical reason. If one is responsible, then there must be about him a distinctive level of reality irreducible to the laws of physical nature. This is the reality of freedom and spirit; it is what characterizes and distinguishes the person. It is here that the bonds of matter are broken, that transcendence is affirmed, and that creativity is founded. Without this nature would remain a repetitive machine; peoples would prove incapable of sustaining their burgeoning populations, and the dynamic spirit required for modern life would die.

Once one crosses this divide, however, life unfolds a new set of requirements for reality. The definitiveness of human commitments and the unlimitedness required for its free creativity reflect characteristics of being which soar far beyond the limited, fixed and hypothetical relations of the physical order. They reflect rather the characteristics of knowledge and love: infinity, absoluteness and commitment. To understand the personal characteristics experienced in our own life, we need to understand ourselves not as functions of matter, but as loving expressions of unlimited wisdom and creative generosity.

Locke had tried too hard to make everything public by reducing everything to the physical dimensions and concrete circumstances of human life. Instead, in order to understand the proper place of man in the universe, we must read ourselves and our situation from the opposite end, as expressions of conscious life, progressively unfolding and refining.
Many materialist philosophies of a reductionist character, such as positivism and other materialism, would remain at the level of Kant’s first Critique. The necessity of the sciences provides control over one’s life, while their universality extends this control to others. Once, by means of Kant’s categories, the concrete Humean facts have been suffused with the clarity of the rationalist’s simple natures, the positivist hopes with Descartes to be able to walk with confidence in the world.

For Kant, however, this simply will not do. Clarity which comes at the price of necessity may be acceptable and even desirable for works of nature, but it is an appalling way to envisage human life. Hence, in his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant proceeds to identify that which is distinctive of the moral order. His analysis pushes forcefully beyond utilitarian goals, inner instincts and rational (scientific) relationships — precisely beyond the necessitated order which can be constructed in terms of his first *Critique*. None of these recognizes that which is distinctive of the human person, namely, freedom. For Kant, in order for an act to be moral, it must be based upon the will of the person as autonomous, not heteronomous or subject to others or to necessary external laws.

This becomes the basic touchstone of his philosophy; everything he writes thence forward will be adapted thereto, and what had been written before will be recontextualized in this new light. The remainder of his *Foundations* and his *Critique of Practical Reason* will be composed in terms of freedom, and in the following two years he would write the *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* in order to provide a context enabling the previous two critiques to be read in a way that protects human freedom.

In the *Foundations*, he recasts the whole notion of law or moral rule in terms of freedom. If all must be ruled or under law, and yet in order to be free the moral act must be autonomous, then my maxim must be something which as a moral agent I — and no other — give to myself. This, in turn, has surprising implications, for, if the moral order must be universal, then my maxim which I dictate must be fit to be also a universal law for all persons. On this basis, freedom emerges in a clearer light. It is not the self-centered whimsy of the circumstantial freedom of self-realization described above; but neither is it a despot exercise of the power of the will; finally, it is not the clever, self-serving eye of Plato’s rogue who can manipulate and cheat others. This would degrade that which is the highest reality in all creation. Rather, freedom is a power that is wise and caring, open to all and bent upon the realization of “the glorious ideal of a universal realm of ends-in-themselves.” It is, in sum, free men living together in righteous harmony.

**Civil Society: Kant, Hegel and Marx**

In one sense Kant would appear to agree with Hume by developing as two separate critiques his treatment of pure and practical reason. The first provided an epistemology for scientific reason which does not attain to the nature of things. According to this, one could not define a pattern of natural law nor determine a set of ends in relation to which one could construct a teleological ethics. In contrast, in the second critique he began afresh to develop a distinctive order of practical reason and to define the formal conditions of such reason. It is precisely on this that principles such as never treating a person as a means rather than an end are formulated and founded.

---


59 *Foundations*, III, p. 82 [463].
In this way he makes a twofold transformation. One is to translate much of the content of the realm of moral sentiment, which had been the moral warrant for the virtues of civil society in the thought of the Scotts, into patterns of universal reason and thereby to provide them with rigor and universality. The second is to move these elements from the realm of the subjective and private to that of the objective and public. This was of central import for Kant, as it was through the civil structures of political interchange that his central notion of human autonomy was established. This was a noble effort, a landmark for the sense of the person, and for a high standard in the exercise of freedom. It enshrined as a condition of freedom the public right to rational debate and critique in the realm of civil society seen now as distinct from the state.

At first sight Kant seems to have translated civil society back into the public realm and strengthened it with rational clarity and rigor. But one does not find here the personal bonds of community which would move one to put into action the universal dicta of practical reason nor does one find its formal preconditions such as assuring equality of participation in public debate (more recently elaborated by J. Habermas). Neither does one find the free determination of, and commitment to, ends. The public order is not a “kingdom of ends,” nor is it concerned with inner motives. Rights, and the laws which articulate them, require only that actions which outwardly affect others be done with their consent, actual or supposed. In this light the ethical, like religion, remains separated from the public order and is guarded jealously in the privacy of the human heart.

With regard to civil society this provides some cognitive preconditions for community and for participation, but it omits any actual meeting of hearts such as Aristotle considered central and it allows for only a selectively restricted meeting of minds. As to freedom and governance, especially in its basic sense of initiating and directing action, the concern for ends or goals and the motivation and conviction these evoke — all are left in the privacy of the heart. Natural sympathy has no place in the public order and virtue is seen to be a purely private. How could these elements be reintroduced? Efforts to do so are very significant for the issue of civil society today, because their success or failure will indicate the degree of sufficiency of the basic modern projects of knowledge and freedom. Even should these prove unsuccessful that fact may bear clues as to how we can proceed to the future. This is the special interest for us of the attempts of Hegel and Marx to respond to this challenge and thereby to save civil society, even if in Europe both seem in the end to have taken the notion down dangerous paths without exit.

Hegel attempted to reimburse with value civil society understood as the sector between family and state. In the characteristically holistic and dialectical manner of his *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, he followed the expansive unfolding of the idea. Just as the unity of the family would be based on love, so the unity of the civil society would be related to the satisfaction of needs and wants and hence based on property for it is in the exchange of property that the individual attains both self consciousness and mutual recognition.

For Hegel then this takes civil society beyond the realm of practical theory or of the “ought” and incarnates it as an “external” state and abstract universal. But there it is in grave difficulty, for when personal identity is tied to real property and possessions it comes to reflect not just greed,
but the real needs of its members.\textsuperscript{63} In time this comes to include the extravagances and wants of the people with the physical and ethical degeneration this implies.\textsuperscript{64} The power of self-interest generates conflicts which remain insoluble in terms of particular persons or smaller grouping; hence the state is necessary, while the corporation mediates between the two. This state, however, is not an impersonal structure, but is the locus of the exercise of freedom and of the values and virtues needed to overcome private self-interests and the conflicts they engender. It is a concrete rather than an abstract universal, and is diversified internally by the multiple classes into which people have chosen to group themselves.

However, civil society, having now become the state, is not only public but is suffused with the power of coercion and provides therefrom no protection or escape. “Individuals can attain their ends only insofar as they determine their knowing and willing and action in a universal way and make themselves links in a chain of social connections.”\textsuperscript{65}

For Marx the ideal of a civil society in which all participated fully in all pursuits, including governance, could be a matter only for the future a soteriological myth.\textsuperscript{66} For the present the private individual was dominated by his or her property and in turn treated others as means for its advancement. Only the state was concerned with the communal being. But as this took all governance to itself it became increasingly distanced from the people and their concerns. Thus, Marx predicted the end of the socialist state in a transformation to an ideal communist society. Where this has taken place, however, it has not been succeeded by the envisioned ideal communal state, but by a return to private property and less central control, thereby reestablishing the initial problematic of how to assure the solidarity and subsidiarity of civil society.

\textit{Part Iv. Opening a New Space for Civil Society}

At the present juncture we find ourselves after the cold war between the individualist and communalist ideologies and in search of ways to proceed. Civil society as understood in modern terms has experienced a check. But this may be more a check of the modern rationalist context itself. For it can be said that the individualist ideologies reflected the British tradition of working in empiricist terms (from Locke, the Scotts and Hume to Rawls) on the one hand, while the communalist ideologies reflect the continental traditions (of Hegel and especially Marx), on the other (both lines drawing on the first two critiques of Kant). From different perspectives they took up the perennial quest for ways to fulfill the human dignity of persons as free, self-determining and sharing in governance, not only in one mass society, but with respect to the variegated levels and modern of human comity. Both appear to have pushed the logic of their own positions and can be proud of real achievements. But the destructive and paralyzing isometrics into which they fell could be the judgement of history confirming the philosophical assessment above that neither line provided an adequate route for human progress. This perennial question returns now in the new and more potent circumstances of greater property, people and needs.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., n. 185, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., n. 187, p. 124.
What strategy does this invoke for a response? Seligman’s assessment upon reviewing the modern field is that civil society is not sufficient for our times, and Ernest Gellner would seem to agree. I believe Seligman to be correct in holding that the modern notions of civil society he investigates are insufficient for the future and have even been checkmated, but his work begins from the Stoics and ignores the rich dimensions of classical thought (Plato and Aristotle are referred to but once and together, p. 79). Others such as Cohen and Arato see civil society as a perennial task which must be taken up. But they would restrict its ambit to the realm between, but not including, the economy and the state. But should one simply strike a compromise by cutting off the dimensions of property/production, on the one hand, and of state, on the other, as areas to be guided by hidden hands or abstract laws of reason and their prerequisites. This would be to exclude where full humanness in order to be left in exchange with an intermediate realm of varied other forms of human comity. In that case the effort would be to suffuse this intermediate realm with ethical meaning and set it as a bulwark against supposed non-ethical realms of productive property ruled by the hidden hand and the coercive powers of the state. Or more manipulatively, is it desirable, right or feasible to set these two powers against each other as non-ethical counter balances in order to create the private sphere of civil society for a properly human life? This would seem to be neither feasible nor desirable for to leave both these power centers devoid of ethical direction would be to leave two of the most pervasive dimensions of reality unrelated to human dignity as source or arche and as goal. Thus, Hegel and Marx were correct however in stressing the importance of the economic order for human self understanding and interaction in our times and to struggle to define a role of the state in this. We seem to have come to the end of the possibilities of the present order of things and to be in need of considering life at a deeper, less abstractive and reductive manner. What is needed is a level which is more integrative and potentially fulfilling. What could this be?

All of this, together with the existential and postmodern critiques of rationalism suggest that the task of developing a more adequate notion of civil society must be taken up, but on a new, more open and inclusive basis. To do so will require a richer notion of reason and of freedom capable of integrating the personal dimensions of moral sensitivity in a broader sense of human life and meaning such as is suggested by the new hermeneutics of culture.

If then there is agreement on the need for civil society in the broad terms cited in the introduction, but disagreement on its feasibility in the terms of modern rationalism, this suggests that we need to continue the effort to redevelop the notion of civil society, but to do so at a new level of freedom. Adler’s third level natural freedom of self-determination is: “to be able, by a power inherent in human nature, to change one’s own character creatively by deciding for oneself what one shall do or shall become.” It is significant that it is to this, rather than the proceeding two levels of freedom that Adler adjoins political liberty and collective freedom.

But there are a number of indications that this new level of freedom will require and reflect a new level of knowing: the result of Adler’s search of philosophical literature shows how closely the levels of freedom correspond to those of knowledge; modern times has been defined by technical reason above all; the enlightenment whether the 16th and 17th centuries have worked in terms of empirical knowledge and in the 18th century in terms of Kant’s first two levels of reason;

67 The Idea of a Civil Society, 199-206.
69 J.L. Colen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mas.: MIT, 1992).
finally it is particularly significant that post-modern attention has shifted to the third critique of aesthetic reason. Following the pattern used to analyze the modern notions of civil society, let us look at this third level of knowledge or critique and proceed from there to the new ambit of freedom, and thence to what this can mean for the development of civil society. Above the progression followed that of the earlier British-French Enlightenment in which the limitations of knowledge implied a corresponding limitation on freedom. This meant, in turn, that civil society was a realm of moral sentiment separated from economic and political life. For the later continental Enlightenment, it was constituted of necessary prerequisites of reason, whether the properly ethical was relegated to the private inner life of individuals. Here we shall look once again to Kant for indications of new dimensions of meaning for social life which will draw upon the resources of the culture of a people and find there moral authority for governance. This will be based upon the rich store of their cumulative experience and free commitments and reflect the solidarity and subsidiarity of their society.

**The Aesthetic in Kant and the East**

*The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*

In initiating the decade in which he wrote his three critiques Kant did not have the third one in view. He wrote the first critique in order to provide methodologically for the universality and necessity of the categories found in scientific knowledge. He developed the second critique to provide for the reality of human freedom. It was only when both of these had been written that he could see that in order to protect and promote freedom in the material world there was need for a third set of categories, namely, those of aesthetic judgement integrating the realms of matter and spirit in a harmony which can be appreciated in terms not of a science of nature as in the first critique nor of society as can be worked out from the second, but of human creativity working with the many elements of human life to create human life and meaning which can be lived as an expanding and enriching reality.

This can be seen through a comparison of the work of the imagination which he provides in the first and the third critiques. Kant is facing squarely a most urgent question for modern times, namely: how can the newly uncovered freedom of the second critique survive when confronted with the necessity and universality of the realm of science as understood in the *Critique of Pure Reason*?

- Will the scientific interpretation of nature restrict freedom to the inner realm of each person’s heart, where it is reduced at best to good intentions or to feelings towards others?
- When we attempt to act in this world or to reach out to others, must all our categories be universal and hence insensitive to that which marks others as unique and personal?
- Must they be necessary, and, hence, leave no room for creative freedom, which would be entrapped and then entombed in the human mind? If so, then public life can be only impersonal, necessitated, repetitive and stagnant.
- Or must the human spirit be reduced to the sterile content of empirical facts or to the necessitated modes of scientific laws? If so, then philosophers cannot escape forcing upon wisdom a suicidal choice between either being traffic directors in the jungle of unfettered competition or being tragically complicit in setting a predetermined order for the human spirit.
Freedom then would, indeed, have been killed; it would pulse no more as the heart of mankind.

Before these alternatives, Kant’s answer is a resounding No! Taking as his basis the reality of freedom — so passionately and often tragically affirmed in our lifetime by Ghandi and Martin Luther King — Kant proceeded to develop his third Critique of the Faculty of Judgment as a context within which freedom and scientific necessity could coexist, indeed, in which necessity would be the support and instrument of freedom. Recently, this has become more manifest as human sensibilities have opened to awareness that being itself is emergent in time through the human spirit and hence to the significance of culture.

To provide for this context, Kant found it necessary to distinguish two issues, reflected in the two parts of his third Critique. In the “Critique of Teleological Judgment,” he acknowledges that nature and all reality must be teleological. This was a basic component of the classical view which enabled all to be integrated within the context of a society of free men working according to a developed order of reason. For Kant, if there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws, if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be directed toward a transcendent goal and manifested throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, nature, even in its necessary and universal laws, is no longer alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom. The same might be said of the economic order and its “hidden hand.” The structure of his first Critique will not allow Kant to affirm this teleological character as an absolute and self-sufficient metaphysical reality, but he recognizes that we must proceed “as if” all reality is teleological precisely because of the undeniable reality of human freedom in an ordered universe.

If, however, teleology, in principle, provides the needed space, there remains a second issue of how freedom is exercised, namely, what mediates it to the necessary and universal laws of science? This is the task of his “Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment,” and it is here that the imagination reemerges to play its key integrating role in human life. From the point of view of the human person, the task is to explain how one can live in freedom with nature for which the first critique had discovered only laws of universality and necessity and especially with structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating?

There is something similar here to the Critique of Pure Reason. In both, the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena is not simply to register, but to produce an objective order. As in the first critique, the approach is not from a set of a priori principles which are clear all by themselves and used in order to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, under the rule of unity, the imagination orders and reorders the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle whose appropriateness emerges from the reordering carried out by the productive imagination.

In the first Critique, however, the productive work was done in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and carried out under a law which dictated that phenomena must form a unity. The Critique of Pure Reason saw the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena as not simply registering, but producing the objective order. The approach was not from a priori principles which are clear all by themselves and are used to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, in the first Critique, under the rule of unity, the imagination moves to order and reorder the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed

---

71 Ibid., pp. 37-200.
by a unifying principle on the part of the intellect, the appropriateness of which emerges from the reordering carried out by the reproductive imagination.

However, this reproductive work took place in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and was carried out under a law of unity which dictated that such phenomena as a house or a receding boat must form a unity — which they could do only if assembled in a certain order. Hence, although it was a human product, the objective order was universal and necessary and the related sciences were valid both for all things and for all people.\textsuperscript{72}

Here in “The Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment,” the imagination has a similar task of constructing the object, but not in a manner necessitated by universal categories or concepts. In contrast, here the imagination, in working toward an integrating unity, is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts, but ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see whether and wherein relatedness and purposiveness or teleology can emerge and the world and our personal and social life can achieve its meaning and value. Hence, in standing before a work of nature or of art, the imagination might focus upon light or form, sound or word, economic or interpersonal relations — or, indeed, upon any combination of these in a natural environment or a society, whether encountered concretely or expressed in symbols.

Throughout all of this, the ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities. Unrestricted by any \textit{a priori} categories, it can nevertheless integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and, therefore, creative production and scientific universals within its unique concrete harmonies. This is properly creative work. More than merely evaluating all according to a set pattern in one’s culture, it chooses the values and orders reality accordingly. This is the very constitution of the culture itself.

It is the productive rather than merely reproductive work of the human person as living in his or her physical world. Here, I use the possessive form advisedly. Without this capacity man would exist in the physical universe as another object, not only subject to its laws but restricted and possessed by them. He/She would be not a free citizen of the material world, but a mere function or servant. In his third Critique Kant unfolds how man can truly be master of his/her life in this world, not in an arbitrary and destructive manner, but precisely as creative artists bring being to new realization in ways which make possible new growth in freedom.

In the third Critique, the productive imagination constructs a true unity by bringing the elements into an authentic harmony. This cannot be identified through reference to a category, because freedom then would be restricted within the laws of necessity of the first Critique, but must be recognizable by something free. In order for the realm of human freedom to be extended to the whole of reality, this harmony must be able to be appreciated, not purely intellectually in relation to a concept (for then we would be reduced to the universal and necessary as in the first critique), but aesthetically, by the pleasure or displeasure, the attraction or repulsion of the free response it generates. Our contemplation or reflection upon this which shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved. This is not a concept,\textsuperscript{73} but the pleasure or displeasure, the elation at the beautiful and sublime or the disgust at the ugly and revolting, which flows from our contemplation or reflection.


\textsuperscript{73} See Kant’s development and solution to the problem of the autonomy of taste, \textit{Critique of Judgment}, nn. 57-58, pp. 182-192, where he treats the need for a concept; Crawford, pp. 63-66.
The Aesthetic and Social Harmony

One could miss the integrating character of this pleasure or displeasure and its related judgment of taste by looking at it ideologically, as simply a repetition of past tastes in order to promote stability. Or one might see it reductively as a merely interior and purely private matter at a level of consciousness available only to an elite class and related only to an esoteric band of reality. That would ignore the structure which Kant laid out at length in his first “Introduction” to his third Critique, which he conceived not as merely juxtaposed to the first two Critiques of pure and practical reason, but as integrating both in a richer whole.

Developing the level of aesthetic sensitivity enables one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future. This is manifest in a good leader such as a Churchill or Roosevelt — and, supereminently, in a Confucius or Christ. Their power to mobilize a people lies especially in their rare ability to assess the overall situation, to express it in a manner which rings true to the great variety of persons in their many groupings in a pattern of the subsidiarity characteristic of a civil society, and thereby to evoke appropriate and varied responses from each according to the circumstances. The danger is that the example of such genius will be reduced to formulae, become an ideology and exclude innovation. In reality, as personable, free and creative, and understood as the work of the aesthetic judgment, their example is inclusive in content and application as well as in the new responses it continually evokes from others.

When aesthetic experiences are passed on as part of a tradition, they gradually constitute a culture. Some thinkers, such as William James and Jürgen Habermas, fearing that attending to these free creations of a cultural tradition might distract from the concrete needs of the people, have urged a turn rather to the social sciences for social analysis and critique as a means to identify pragmatic responses. But these point back to the necessary laws of the first Critique; in many countries now engaging in reforms, such “scientific” laws of history have come to be seen as having stifled creativity and paralyzed the populace.

Kant’s third Critique points in another direction. Though it integrates scientifically universal and necessary social relations, it does not focus upon them, nor does it focus directly upon the beauty or ugliness of concrete relations, or even directly upon beauty or ugliness as things in

---


themselves. Its focus is rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images of these which we imaginatively create, that is, our culture as manifesting the many facets of beauty and ugliness, actual and potential. Here Marx makes an important contribution in insisting that this not be left as an ideal image, but that it be taken in its concrete realization of a pattern of social relations. As we appreciate more and more the ambit of free activity in the market and other levels of life, this comes to include those many modes of solidarity and their subsidiary relations which constitute civil society. In turn, we evaluate these in terms of the free and integrating response of pleasure or displeasure, the enjoyment or revulsion they generate most deeply within our whole person and society according to the character of our culture.

Confucius probably would feel very comfortable with this if articulated according to the sense of peace generated by an appreciation or feeling of harmony. In this way, he could see the sensibility of which the Scotts spoke as freedom at the height of its sensibility, not merely as an instrument of a moral life, but as serving through the imagination as a lens or means for presenting the richness of reality in varied and intensified ways. Freedom as social sensibility, understood not only morally but aesthetically, is both spectroscope and kaleidoscope of being. As spectroscope it unfolds the full range of the possibilities of social freedom, so that all can be examined, evaluated and admired. As kaleidoscope, it continually works out the endless combinations and patterns of reality so that the beauty of each can be examined, reflected upon and chosen when desired. Freely, purposively and creatively, imagination weaves through reality focusing now upon certain dimensions, now reversing its flow, now making new connections and interrelations. In the process reality manifests not only scientific forms and their potential interrelations, but its power to evoke our free and socially varied responses of love and admiration or of hate and disgust.

In this manner harmony becomes at once the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the arbiter of all that imaginatively we can propose. It is goal, namely to realize social life as rational and free, united and peaceful in this world; it is creative source, for with the imagination it unfolds the endless possibilities for social expression; it is manifestation, because it presents these to our consciousness in ways appropriate to our capabilities for knowledge of limited realities and relates these to the circumstances of our life; it is criterion, because its response manifests a possible mode of action to be variously desirable or not in terms of a total social response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion; and it is arbiter, because it provides the basis upon which our freedom chooses to affirm or reject, realize or avoid this way of self-realization. In this way, freedom emerges as the dynamic center of the creation of civil society.

Confucius and Social Harmony

There is much in the above which evokes the deep Confucian sense of the harmony and the role of the gentleman in society in unfolding its implications for daily life. This uncovers new significance in the thought of Confucius for the work of implementing in a mutually fruitful manner science and democracy in our times. Looking to the aesthetic sense of harmony as a context for uniting both ancient capabilities in agriculture with new powers of industrialization and for applying these to the work of building society is a task, not only for an isolated individual, but for an entire people. Over time, a people develops its own specific sensibilities and through the ages forms a tradition and a culture, which is the humane capital for such a project. In this sense, one can look to the Confucian cultural heritage for its aesthetic sense of harmony as a way to carry forward civil society in our day.
The Confucian sense of harmony is not a rationalist law whose unfolding would suggest an attempt to read all in an *a priori* and necessitarian manner. Its sense of life and progress is not that of a scientific view of history after the dialectic of Hegel and Marx. Rather, the Confucian way of understanding humans brings people together in relation to other persons and in the concrete circumstances of everyday life. In this sense, it is not massively programmatic in the sense of a rationalist scientific theory of history. This may be very much to the good, for it protects against efforts to define and delimit all beforehand, after the manner of an ideology.

Further, one must not underestimate the cumulative power which the Confucian sense of harmony and resonance can have when it brings together creatively the many persons with knowledge of their circumstances and in an effort together or socially to provide for life in its many modes. This extends from those farmers who know and love their land intimately and are committed to its rich potentialities (and analogously from all phases of productive economic life), to family members and villagers — teachers, storekeepers and health workers — who love their kin and neighbors, to citizens who are willing to work ardently for the welfare of their people and nation. If the exercise of freedom is a concrete and unique expression of the distinctive reality of its authors, then the task is not how to define these by abstractive and personally stifling universal laws as in some enlightenment theories, but how to enliven all persons to engage actively in solidarity in the multiple dimensions of their lives.

Philosophically, the Confucian attitude is of great importance. For if harmony and resonance enable a more adapted and fruitful mode of the realization of being, then the identity and truth, dynamism and goodness of being are thereby manifest and proclaimed. In this light, the laws of nature emerge, not as desiccated universals best read technically and negatively as prohibitions, but as rich and unfolding modes of being and of actualization best read through an appreciation of the concrete harmony and beauty of their active development in patterns of social subsidiarity. This, rather than the details of etiquette, is the deeper Confucian sense of the gentleman and sage; it can be grasped and exercised only with a corresponding aesthetic, rather than merely pragmatic, sensibility.

Nor is this beyond people’s experience. Few can carry out the precise process of conceptualization and definition required for the technical dialectics of Platonic and Aristotelian reasoning. But all share an overall sensibility to situations as pleasing and attractive or as generating unease or even revulsion. Inevitably, in earlier times, the aesthetic Confucian mode lacked the technical precision which is now available regarding surface characteristics of physical phenomena. But, in its sense of harmony, it possessed the deep human and social sensibility and ability to take into account and integrate all aspects of its object. This is essential for the contemporary humanization of our technical capabilities for the physical and social mobilization of a richly textured and harmonious civil society.

From this it appears that it is not reason as working according to the necessary laws of the physical world (as in the first critique) or as working out the necessary order of the prerequisites and conditions of freedom (as in the second critique), but the active and creative work of freedom which takes up the constructive work which must be done in the social order and which focuses upon the work of freedom in governance as that constitutes the origin or sources (*arché*) of the pattern of social interaction of which civil society is constituted.

Ernest Gellner stumbles upon this, without recognizing it in his *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* when he speaks of the deep commitments of a people which generate strong emotive responses when touched, such as patriotism which unites and mobilizes a country for a
revolution as in 1777 and 1949, or outrage at a patently unjust judicial decision as in the first case of Rodney King (significantly, it could not be the last).

R.T. Allen sensed this as early as 1976 when he pointed out that human nature when lived in society is itself an object of aesthetic appreciation for this must constitute a harmony which proclaims an order or form. In this light he cites from Burke’s Reflections his critique of the sufficiency of enlightenment reason to understand or adequately promote civil society:

But now all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions which made power gentle and obedience liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life, and which, by a bland assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the super-added ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion.

In the same context Burke developed the conditions of reform:

Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world...wherein...the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or young, but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation and progression. Thus, by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve, we are never wholly new; in what we retain, we are never wholly obsolete.

Nothing is more beautiful in the theory of parliaments, than that principle of renovation, and union of permanence and change, that are happily mixed in their constitution: That in all our changes we are never either wholly old or wholly new.

In a sense he mocks Locke by calling it a criminal presumption to treat one’s country as a blank sheet on which one may scribble whatever one will. The social life of human kind is much deeper and richer than that.

Cultural Tradition and Human Communities

In the West the pervasive work of reason became an exclusivist rationalism in modern times. Confucius, in contrast, suggests that, appreciated from an aesthetic point of view, the long experience of peoples can be not only a valid, but a richer and more amply humane resource for constructing a social life, and particularly civil society.

In this light the Islamic tradition, characteristic of Central Asia and so much of the world, stands out. By intent it is not only a way of personal salvation, but a total way of organizing the life of the community. The intensive work of legal interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith

---

79 Ibid., II, 307.
80 Correspondence (1844), Works IV, 465.
constitute an extended systematic process of articulating the meaning of the tradition for social life.

Other cultures have done this in a less systematic but nonetheless real manner. It is time to look to this process to see its roots and formation, and above all to see if the cultural tradition of a people, with its values and virtues, can provide sufficient authoritative direction for a people to orient their exercise of freedom in society.

Civil society is not self sufficient, but a dialogical partner with the economic and political sectors. The later is needed in order to direct and even exercise coercive power in regulating the exercise of freedom, yet it is the essence of a democratic political order to reflect the will, and hence the values and virtues, of the people.

We shall then look to how these form a culture and a tradition and assess its role in enabling the people to exercise their freedom creatively in the manner of a civil society.

If civil society requires governance then how can these patterns of values be endowed with the authority needed in order that governance not be arbitrary and willful; and if times change, how can this pattern of meaning which constitutes a culture adapt to new times and be articulated with an appropriate order of sociability and subsidiarity.

These questions point to the new hermeneutic sensibility opened by the work of Husserl, and developed by Heidegger and especially Gadamer (to cite the key figures over three generations) as a new road to the appreciation of civil society for our time.

This phenomenologically based approach would take account of the free and creative work of inspiring, social cooperation. Working out the aesthetic level it promises to be able to harmonize and direct social cooperation. And as with Kant’s third critique, it would integrate rather than omit the natural basis and political coordination of social life. This directs us therefore to a hermeneutic procedure interpreting the human social creativity of civil society though time.

I have developed this at some length in a set of lectures delivered at Fudan University in Shanghai and published under the title: Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence especially lectures I “Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Creativity” and III “Harmony as a Contemporary Metaphysics of Freedom: Kant and Confucius.” Here, I would recall the following with regard to values and virtues, culture and application.

Value

For the drama of self-determination and the development of persons and of civil society one must look to their relation to the good in search of which we live, survive and thrive. The good is manifest in experience as the object of desire, namely, as that which is sought when absent. Basically, it is what completes life; it is the “per-fect,” understood in its etymological sense as that which is completed or realized through and through; once achieved, is no longer desired or sought, but enjoyed. This is reflected in the manner in which each thing, even a stone, retains the being or reality it has and resists reduction to non-being or nothing: the most that we can do is to change or transform a thing into something else, but we cannot annihilate it. Similarly, a plant or tree, given the right conditions, grows to full stature and fruition. Finally, an animal protects its life — fiercely, if necessary — and seeks out the food needed for its strength. Food, in turn, as capable of contributing to animal’s realization or perfection, is for the animal an auxiliary good or means.

In this manner, things as good, that is, as actually realizing some degree of perfection and able to contribute to the wellbeing of others, are the bases for an interlocking set of relations. As these relations are based upon both the actual perfection things possess and the potential perfection to which they are thereby directed, the good is perfection both as attracting when it has not yet been attained and as constituting one’s fulfillment upon its achievement. Goods, then, are not arbitrary or simply a matter of wishful thinking; they are rather the full development of things and all that contributes thereto. In this ontological or objective sense, all beings are good to the extent that they exist and can contribute to the perfection of others.

The moral good is a more narrow field, for it concerns only one’s free and responsible actions. This has the objective reality of the ontological good noted above, for it concerns real actions which stand in distinctive relation to our own perfection and to that of others — and, indeed, to the physical universe and to God as well. Hence, many possible patterns of actions could be objectively right because they promote the good of those involved, while others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of persons or things, are objectively disordered or misordered. This constitutes the objective basis for values and disvalues.

Nevertheless, because the realm of objective relations is almost numberless, whereas our actions are single, it is necessary not only to choose in general between the good and the bad, but in each case to choose which of the often innumerable possibilities one will render concrete. However broad or limited the options, as responsible and moral an act is essentially dependent upon its being willed by a subject. Therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is not sufficient to examine only the objective aspect, namely, the nature of the persons, actions, and things involved. In addition, one must consider the action in relation to the subject, namely, to the person who, in the context of his/her society and culture, appreciates and values the good of this action, chooses it over its alternatives, and eventually wills its actualization.

The term ‘value’ here is of special note. It was derived from the economic sphere where it meant the amount of a commodity sufficient to attain a certain worth. This is reflected also in the term ‘axiology’ whose root means “weighing as much” or “worth as much.” It requires an objective content — the good must really “weigh in” and make a real difference; but the term ‘value’ expresses this good especially as related to wills which actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable. Thus, different individuals or groups of persons and at different periods have distinct sets of values. A people or community is sensitive to and prizes a distinct set of goods or, more likely, it establishes a distinctive ranking in the degree to which it prizes various goods. By so doing, it delineates among limitless objective goods a certain pattern of values which in a more stable fashion mirrors their corporate free choices.

This constitutes the basic topology of a culture; as repeatedly reaffirmed through time, it builds a tradition or heritage about which we shall speak below. It constitutes, as well, the prime pattern and gradation of goods which persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through a lens formed, as it were, by their family and culture and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history — often in its most trying circumstances. Like a pair of glasses it does not create the object; but it focuses attention upon certain goods involved rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for the affective and emotional

---

life described by the Scotts as the heart of civil society. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action which, in turn, reinforce the pattern of values.

Through this process, a group constitutes its moral concern in terms of which it struggles to advance or at least perdure, mourns its failures, and celebrates its successes. This is our world of hopes and fears, in terms of which, as Plato wrote in the *Laches*, our lives have moral meaning. It is varied according to the many concerns and the groups which coalesce around them. As these are interlocking and interdependent a pattern of social ends and concerns develops which guides action. In turn corresponding capacities for action or virtue are developed.

**Virtues**

Martin Heidegger describes a process by which the self emerges as a person in the field of moral action. It consists in transcending oneself or breaking beyond mere self-concern and projecting outward as a being whose very nature is to share with others for whom one cares and about whom one is concerned. In this process, one identifies new purposes or goals for the sake of which action is to be undertaken. In relation to these goals, certain combinations of possibilities, with their natures and norms, take on particular importance and begin thereby to enter into the makeup of one’s world of meaning. Freedom then becomes more than mere spontaneity, more than choice, and more even than self-determination in the sense of causing oneself to act as described above. It shapes — the phenomenologist would say even that it constitutes — one’s world as the ambit of human decisions and dynamic action. This is the making of the complex social ordering of social groups which constitute civil society.

This process of deliberate choice and decision transcends the somatic and psychic dynamisms. Whereas the somatic dimension is extensively reactive, the psychic dynamisms of affection or appetite are fundamentally oriented to the good and positively attracted by a set of values which evoke an active response from the emotions in the context of responsible freedom. But it is in the dimension of responsibility that one encounters the properly moral and social dimension of life. For, in order to live with others, one must be able to know, to choose and finally to realize what is truly conducive to one’s good and, to that of others. Thus, persons and groups must be able to judge the true value of what is to be chosen, that is, its objective worth both in itself and in relation to others. This is moral truth: the judgment regarding whether the act makes the person and society good in the sense of bringing authentic individual and social fulfillment, or the contrary.

In this, deliberation and voluntary choice are required in order to exercise proper self-awareness and self-governance. By determining to follow this judgment I am able to overcome determination by stimuli and even by culturally ingrained values and to turn these, instead, into openings for free action in concert with others to shape my community, as well as my physical surroundings. This can be for good or for ill, depending on the character of my actions. By definition, only morally good actions contribute to personal and social fulfillment, that is, to the development and perfection of persons with others in community. When this is exercised or lived, patterns of action develop which are habitual in the sense of being repeated. These are the modes of activity with which we are familiar; in their exercise, along with the coordinate natural dynamisms they require, we are practiced and, with practice, comes facility and spontaneity. Such

---


patterns constitute the basic, continuing and pervasive shaping influence of our life. For this reason, they have been considered classically to be the basic indicators of what our life as a whole will add up to, or, as is often said, “amount to.” Since Socrates, the technical term used for these especially developed capabilities is ‘virtues’.

**Cultural Tradition and Community**

Together these values and virtues of a people set the pattern of social life through which freedom is developed and exercised. This is called a “culture.” On the one hand, the term is derived from the Latin word for tilling or cultivating the land. Cicero and other Latin authors used it for the cultivation of the soul or mind (*cultura animi*), for just as even good land, when left without cultivation, will produce only disordered vegetation of little value, so the human spirit will not achieve its proper results unless trained. This sense of culture corresponds most closely to the Greek term for education (*paideia*) as the development of character, taste and judgment, and to the German term “formation” (*Bildung*).

Here, the focus is upon the creative capacity of the spirit of a people and their ability to work as artist, not only in the restricted sense of producing purely aesthetic objects, but in the more involved sense of shaping all dimensions of life, material and spiritual, economic and political. The result is a whole life, characterized by unity and truth, goodness and beauty, and, thereby, sharing deeply in meaning and value. The capacity to do so cannot be taught, although it may be enhanced by education; more recent phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiries suggest that, at its base, culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation. This leads us beyond self and other, beyond identity and diversity, in order to comprehend both.

On the other hand, “culture” can be traced to the terms *civis* (citizen, civil society and civilization.) These reflect the need for a person to belong to a social group or community in order for the human spirit to produce its proper results. By bringing to the person the resources of the tradition, the *tradita* or past wisdom produced by the human spirit, the community facilitates comprehension. By enriching the mind with examples of values which have been identified in the past, it teaches and inspires one to produce something analogous. For G.F. Klemm, this more objective sense of culture is composite in character. Tyler defined this classically for the social sciences as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits required by man as a member of society.”

In contrast, Geertz came to focus on the meaning of all this for a people and on how a people’s intentional action went about shaping its world. Thus he contrasts the analysis of culture to an experimental science in search of law, seeing it rather as an interpretative science in search of meaning. What is sought is the import of artifacts and actions, that is, whether “it is, ridicule or challenge, irony or anger, snobbery or pride, that, in their occurrence and through their agency, is

---

86 Tonnellat, “Kultur” in *Civilisation, le mot et l’idée* (Paris: Centre International de Synthese), II.
87 Mathieu, *ibid*.
88 V. Mathieu, “Civilta,” *ibid*., I, 1437-1439.
89 G.F. Klemm, *Allgemein Culturgeschicht de Menschheit* (Leipzig, 1843-52), x.
getting said." For this there is need to be aware “of the imaginative universe within which their acts are signs.” In this light, Geertz defines culture rather as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of intended conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”

The development of values and virtues and their integration as a culture of any depth or richness takes time and, hence, depends upon the experience and creativity of many generations. The culture which is handed on, or tradita, comes to be called a cultural tradition; as such it reflects the cumulative achievement of a people in discovering, mirroring and transmitting the deepest meanings of life. This is tradition in its synchronic sense as a body of wisdom. This sense of tradition is very vivid in premodern and village communities. It would appear to be much less so in modern urban centers, undoubtedly in part due to the difficulty in forming active community life in large urban centers. However, the cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values of a culture through time is not only heritage or what is received, but new creation as we pass this on in new ways. Attending to tradition, taken in this active sense, allows us not only to uncover the permanent and universal truths which Socrates sought, but to perceive the importance of values we receive from the tradition and to mobilize our own life project actively toward the future.

The recognition of the value of tradition would appear to constitute a special problem for all heirs of the enlightenment and it may be helpful to reflect briefly on why this is so. The enlightenment rationalism idealizes clarity and distinctness of ideas both in themselves and in their interconnection; as such, it divorces them — often intentionally — from their existential and temporal significance. Such an ideal of human knowledge, it is proposed, could be achieved either, as with Descartes, through an intellect working by itself from an intellectually perceived Archimedean principle or, as with Locke and Carnap, through the senses drawing their ideas exclusively from experience and combining them in myriad tautological transformations. In either case, the result is a-temporal and consequently non-historical knowledge.

Two attempts to break out of this have proven ultimately unsuccessful. The one, in order to recognize historical sequence while retaining the ideal of clarity and distinctness, attempted to attain detailed knowledge of each period, relativizing everything to its point in time and placing historicity ultimately at the service of the rationalist ideal. The other, the Romantics, ultimately adhered to the same revolutionary enlightenment ideal even in appearing to oppose it, for, in turning to the past and to myths, they too sought clear and distinct knowledge of a static human nature. Tradition thus became traditionalism, for all was included in the original state of nature and our only way of obtaining a firm grounding for human life was simply to return thereto.

In the rationalist view, any meaning not clearly and distinctly perceived was an idol to be smashed (Bacon), an idea to be bracketed by doubt (Descartes), or something to be wiped clean from the slate of the mind as irrational and coercive (Locke and Hume). Any judgment — even if provisional — made before all had been examined and its clarity and distinctness established would be a dangerous imposition by the will.

---

92 Ibid., p. 10.
93 Ibid., p. 13.
94 Ibid., p. 85.
This raises a number of problems for civil society which we have seen in some detail in the analyses of enlightenment theories of this notion above. First, absolute knowledge of oneself or of others, simply and without condition, is not possible, for the knower is always conditioned according to his or her position in time and space and in relation to others. But neither would such knowledge be of ultimate interest, for human knowledge, like human beings, develops in time and with others. This does not exclude projects of scientific knowledge, but it does identify these precisely as limited and specialized views: they make important but specific, rather than all-controlling, contributions.

Secondly, according to Descartes, reason is had by all and completely; authority, therefore, could be only an entitlement of some to decide issues by an application of their will rather than according to an authentic understanding of the truth or justice of an issue. This would be the overhastiness of Descartes’ fourth Meditation. Further, the limited number of people in authority means that the vision of which they dispose would be limited by restricted or even individual interests. Finally, as one decision constitutes a precedent for those to follow, authority must become fundamentally corruptive. As a result there has been a tendency to exclude public authority from the realm of civil society and its shared moral sense of the community. But then the moral quality of government is compromised.

If, on the contrary, the cumulative experience of mankind in living together in peace is to make a contribution to the development of modern life, then it will be necessary to return human knowledge to the ongoing lived process of humane discovery and choice, within a broad project of human interaction and an active process of reception by one generation of the learning of its predecessors. The emerging consciousness of the importance of this effort has led to broadening the task of hermeneutics from the study of ancient, often biblical, texts to a more inclusive attention to the integral meaning of cultures. There it has found, not a mere animal search for survival, but a sense of human dignity which, by transcending survival needs enables human creativity and encourages a search for ever higher levels of human life.

The reference to the god, Hermes, in the term “hermeneutics” suggests something of this depth of the meaning which is sought throughout human life and its implication for the world of values. For the message borne by Hermes is not merely an abstract mathematical formula or a methodological prescription devoid of human meaning and value; rather, it is the limitless wisdom regarding the source and, hence, the reality, and regarding the priorities and, hence, the value of all. Rather than evaluating all in terms of reductivist clarity and considering things in a horizontal perspective that is only temporal or totally changing, — with an implied relativization of all — hermeneutics or interpretation opens also to a vertical vision of what is most real in itself and most lasting through time, that is, to the perennial in the realm of being and values; this it does with a view to mobilizing life accordingly.

**Cultural Tradition and Governance in Civil Society**

If, however, one can look to tradition in order to find general inspiration for life, will this be sufficient for civil society which must have not only a certain tenor or quality of life, but governance as well? In the past the solution has been to centralize authority which then became autocratic and voluntaristic, and under the cover of efficiency and equality ruled by general

---

97 Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, I.
decrees. This subverted the rich differentiation of solidarity and subsidiarity essential to civil society. Is it possible for tradition to bear sufficient authority to provide coordinated governance.

In *Truth and Method*, Hans Georg Gadamer undertook, on the basis of the work of Martin Heidegger, to reconstruct the notion of a cultural heritage or tradition as: (a) based in community, (b) consisting of knowledge developed from experience lived through time and (c) possessed of authority. In order to analyze the genesis of a cultural tradition we shall look at each of these in turn. Further, because tradition, sometimes is interpreted as a threat to the personal and social freedom essential to a democracy, attention will be given here to the way a cultural heritage is generated by the free and responsible life of the members of a concerned community and enables succeeding generations realize their life with freedom and creativity.

*The Genesis of Community and Tradition*

Autogenesis is no more characteristic of the birth of knowledge than it is of persons. One’s consciousness emerges, not with self, but with its relation to others. In the womb, the first awareness is that of the heart beat of one’s mother. Upon birth, one enters a family in whose familiar relations one is at peace and able to grow. Just as a person is born into a family on which he or she depends absolutely for life, sustenance, protection and promotion, so one’s understanding develops in community. It is from one’s family and in one’s earliest weeks and months that one does or does not develop the basic attitudes of trust and confidence which undergird or undermine one’s capacities for subsequent social relations. There one learns care and concern for others independently of what they do for us and acquires the language and symbol system in terms of which to conceptualize, communicate and understand.99

Similarly, through the various steps of one’s development, as one’s circle of community expands through neighborhood, school, work and recreation, one comes to learn and to share personally and passionately an interpretation of reality and a pattern of value responses. The phenomenologist sees this life in the varied civil society as the new source for wisdom. Hence, rather than turning away from daily life in order to contemplate abstract and disembodied ideas, the place to discover meaning is in life as lived in the family and in the progressively wider social circles into which one enters. As persons we emerge from birth in a family and neighborhood from which we learn and in harmony with which we thrive.

If it were merely a matter of community, however, all might be limited to the present, with no place for tradition as that which is “passed on” from one generation to the next. In fact, the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to a people’s evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history, the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. Horizontally, we learn from experience what promotes and what destroys life and accordingly, make pragmatic adjustments.

But even this language remains too abstract, too limited to method or technique, too unidimensional. While tradition can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feed-back mechanisms and might seem merely to concern how to cope in daily life, what is being spoken about are free acts that are expressive of passionate human commitment and personal sacrifice in

---

responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances and constructing and defending one’s nation. Moreover, this wisdom is not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns; it concerns rather the meaning we are able to envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments over a period of generations, i.e., what is truly worth striving for and the pattern of social interaction in which this can be lived richly. The result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes our awareness of the bases for the decisions of which history is constituted.

This points us beyond the horizontal plane of the various ages of history and directs our attention vertically to its ground and, hence, to the bases of the values which mankind in its varied circumstances seeks to realize.100

Tradition, then, is not as in history simply everything that ever happened, whether good or bad. It is rather what appears significant for human life: it is what has been seen through time and human experience to be deeply true and necessary for human life. It contains the values to which our forebears first freely gave their passionate commitment in specific historical circumstances and then constantly reviewed, rectified and passed on that content, generation after generation progressively over time. The content of a tradition, expressed in works of literature and all the many facets of a culture, progressively emerges as something upon which character and community can be built. It constitutes a rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it be accepted and embraced, affirmed and cultivated.

Hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part or arbitrary will on the part of our forbears that our culture provides a model and exemplar. On the contrary, the importance of tradition derives from both the cooperative character of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience and the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have defined, defended and passed on through time the corporate life of the community.101

Moral Authority and Governance in Civil Society

Perhaps the greatest point of tension between a sense of one’s heritage and the enlightenment spirit relates to authority. Is it possible to recognize authority on the part of a tradition which perdures, while still asserting human freedom through time? Could it be that a cultural tradition, rather than being the negation of freedom and, hence, antithetic to democracy, is its cumulative expression, the reflection of our corporate access to the bases of all meaning, and even the positive condition for the discovery and realization of needed new developments?

One of the most important characteristics of the human person and societies is their capability for development and growth. One is born with open and unlimited powers for knowledge and for love. Life consists in developing, deploying and exercising these capabilities. Given the communitary character of human growth and learning, dependence upon others is not unnatural — quite the contrary. Within, as well as beyond, our social group we depend upon other persons according as they possess abilities which we, as individuals and communities, need for our growth, self-realization and fulfillment.

100 Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 245-53.
101 Ibid. Gadamer emphasizes knowledge as the basis of tradition in contrast to those who would see it pejoratively as the result of arbitrary will. It is important to add to knowledge the free acts which, e.g., give birth to a nation and shape the attitudes and values of successive generations. As an example one might cite the continuing impact had by the Magna Carta through the Declaration of Independence upon life in North America, or of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in the national life of so many countries.
This dependence is not primarily one of obedience to the will of others, but is based upon their comparative excellence in some dimension — whether this be the doctor’s professional skill in healing or the wise person’s insight and judgment in matters where profound understanding is required. The preeminence of wise persons in the community is not something they usurp or with which they are arbitrarily endowed; it is based rather upon their abilities as these are reasonably and freely acknowledged by others.

Further, this is not a matter of uniform universal law imposed from above and uniformly repeated in univocal terms. Rather it is a matter of corporate learning developed by the components of a civil society each with its own special concerns and each related to the other in a pattern of subsidiarity.

All of these — the role of the community in learning, the contribution of extended historical experience regarding the horizontal and vertical axes of life and meaning, and the grounding of dependence in competency — combine to endow tradition with authority for subsequent ages which is varied according to the components and their interrelation.

There are reasons to believe, moreover, that tradition is not a passive storehouse of materials simply waiting upon the inquirer, but that its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages. On the one hand, without such a normative referent, prudence would be as relativistic and ineffective as muscular action without a skeletal substructure. Life would be merely a matter of compromise and accommodation on any terms, with no sense of the value either of what was being compromised or of that for which it was compromised. On the other hand, were the normative factor to reside simply in a transcendental or abstract vision, the result would be devoid of existential content.

The fact that humans, no matter how different in culture, do not remain indifferent before the flow of events, but dispute — even bitterly — the direction of change appropriate for their community reflects that every humanism is committed actively to the realization of some common — if general — sense of perfection. Without this, even conflict would be impossible for there would be no intersection of the divergent positions and, hence, no debate or conflict.

Through history, communities discover vision which both transcends time and directs our life in all times, past, present and future. The content of that vision is a set of values which, by their fullness and harmony of measure, point the way to mature and perfect human formation and, thereby, orient the life of a person. Such a vision is historical because it arises in the life of a people in time. It is also normative, because it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. What begins to emerge is Heidegger’s insight regarding Being and its characteristics of unity, truth and justice, goodness and love, not simply as empty ideals, but as the ground of things, hidden or veiled, as it were, and erupting into time through the conscious personal and social life of free human beings in history. Seen in this light, the process of human search, discussion and decision — today called democracy — becomes more than a method for managing human affairs; more substantively, it is the mode of the emergence of being in time.

One’s cultural heritage or tradition constitutes a specification of the general sense of being or perfection, but not as if this were chronologically distant in the past and, therefore, in need of being drawn forward by some artificial contrivance. Rather, being and its values live and act in the lives of all whom they inspire and judge. In its synchronic form, through time, tradition is the timeless dimension of history. Rather than reconstructing it, we belong to it — just as it belongs to us. Traditions then are, in effect, the ultimate communities of human striving, for human life and

---

102 Ibid., p. 254.
understanding are implemented, not by isolated individual acts of subjectivity — which Gadamer describes as flickerings in the closed circuits or personal consciousness\textsuperscript{103} — but by our situatedness in a tradition. By fusing both past and present, tradition enables the component groupings of civil society to determine the specific direction of their lives and to mobilize the consensus and mutual commitments of which true and progressive community is built.\textsuperscript{104}

Conversely, it is this sense of the good or of value which emerges through the concrete, lived experience of a people throughout its history and constitutes its cultural heritage, which enables society in turn to assess and avoid what is socially destructive. In the absence of tradition, present events would be simply facts to be succeeded by counter-facts. The succeeding waves of such disjointed happenings would constitute a history written in terms of violence. This, in turn, could be restrained only by some utopian abstraction built upon the reductivist limitations of modern rationalism. Eliminating all expressions of democratic freedoms, this is the archetypal modern nightmare, \textit{1984}.

All of that stands in stark contrast to one’s heritage or tradition as the rich cumulative expression of meaning evolved by a people through the ages to a point of normative and classical perfection. Exemplified architecturally in a Parthenon or a Taj Mahal, it is embodied personally in a Confucius or Gandhi, a Bolivar or Lincoln, a Martin Luther King or a Mother Theresa. Various] termed “charismatic personalities” (Shils\textsuperscript{105}), “paradigmatic individuals” (Cua\textsuperscript{106}) or characters who meld role and personality in providing a cultural or moral ideal (MacIntyre\textsuperscript{107}), they supersede mere historical facts. As concrete universals, they express in the varied patterns of civil society that harmony and fullness of perfection which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing in a word, liberating.

\textbf{The Confucian Tradition and Civil Renewal}

\textit{The Confucian and Marxian Heritage and Civil Society}

Anton T. Cua\textsuperscript{108} traces to Vico\textsuperscript{109} attention to the unreflective cognitive consensus on common needs and to Shaftesbury\textsuperscript{110} the affective sense of common partnership with others that all this entails. The result is the constitution of a community of memory whose members revere and commemorate the same saints and personages who have sacrificed to build or exemplify the community’s self image. This results in a community of vision or self-understanding, as well as of hope and expectation. A cultural tradition, in this sense, is the context of the conscious life and striving of a person and the communities of which one is a member; it is life in its fullest meaning, as past and future, ground and aspiration.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[103] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 245.
\item[104] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 258.
\item[107] \textit{MacIntyre, After Virtue}, 29-30.
\end{footnotes}
In this light, Cua notes that, in the *Great Learning*, Chu Hsi stresses the importance of investigating the principles at great length, until one achieves “a wide and far-reaching penetration (*kuan-t’ung*).” Read as *Kuan-chuan*, this suggests an aesthetic grasp of the unique interconnection of the various components of the *tao* as the unique unifying perspective of the culture. This is not only a contemplative understanding, however; it implies active engagement in the conduct of life. If this be varied by subgroups structured in a pattern of subsidiarity then the accumulation of cooperate life experience lived according to *li* or ritual propriety and *i* or sense of rightness then the learning emerges from the life of a people as a whole. “For the adherents of the Confucian tradition, the tradition is an object of affection and reverence, largely because the tradition is perceived as an embodiment of wisdom (*chih*), which for Chu Hsi is a repository of insights available for personal and interpersonal appropriation, for coping with present problems and changing circumstances.”

The truly important battle at the present time is, then, not between, on the one hand, a chaotic liberalism in which the abstract laws of the marketplace dictate and tear at the lives of persons, peoples and nations or, on the other hand, a depersonalizing sense of community in which the dignity of the person is suppressed for an equally abstract utopia. A victory of either would spell disaster. The central battle is, rather, to enable peoples to draw on their heritage, constituted of personal and social assessments and free decisions, and elaborated through the ages by the varied communities as they work out their response to their concrete circumstances. That these circumstances are often shifting and difficult in the extreme is important, but it is of definite importance that this people’s response be truly theirs in all their variety and of their society with all its interrelated sub-units. That is, that it be part of their history, of the way they have chosen to order and pattern their social life and in these terms to shape their free response to the good. This is the character of authority in a civil society. It reflects and indeed is the freedom being exercised by a people in all the varied groupings in which they have chosen to live and to act.

*Tradition and Renewal in Civil Society*

As an active process tradition transforms what is received, lives it in a creative manner and passes it on as a leaven for the future. Let us turn then from the cumulative meaning and value in tradition, its synchronic aspect, to its diachronic or particular meaning for each new time receiving from the past, ordering the present and constructing the future. This is a matter, first of all, of taking time seriously, that is, of recognizing that reality includes authentic novelty. This contrasts to the perspective of Plato for whom the real is the ideal and unchangeable forms or ideas transcending matter and time, and of which physical things and temporal events are but shadows. It also goes beyond rationalism’s search for clear and distinct knowledge of eternal and simple natures and their relations in terms of which all might be controlled, and beyond romanticism’s attention to a primordial unchanging nature hidden in the dimly sensed past. A fortiori, it goes beyond method alone without content.

In contrast to all these, the notion of application is based upon an awareness that “reality is temporal and unfolding.” This means that tradition, with its inherent authority or normative force, achieves its perfection in the temporal unfolding of reality. Secondly, it shows human persons and social groups, not as detached intellects, but as incarnate. Hence, they are enabled by and formative

---

of, their changing social universe. Thirdly, in the area of socio-political values and action, it expresses directly the striving of persons and groups to realize their lives and the development of this striving into attitudes (hexis) and institutions. Hence, as distinct from the physical order, human action is a situation neither of law nor of lawlessness, but of human and, therefore, developing institutions and attitudes which do not determine and, hence, destroy human freedom, but regulate and promote its exercise.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 278-279.} This is the heart of civil society for it shows how community and governance can come together.

Certain broad guidelines for the area of ethics and politics serve in the application of tradition as a guide for historical practice and vice-versa. The concrete exercise of human freedom as unique personal decisions made with others in the process of their social life through time constitutes a distinctive and on-going process. Historicity means that responses to the good are made always in concrete and ever-changing circumstances. Hence, the general principles of ethics and politics as a philosophic science of action cannot be purely theoretical knowledge or a simple accounting from the past. Instead, they must help people consciously exercise their freedom in concrete historical circumstances and groups which change and are renewed.

Here, an important distinction must be made from techné where action is governed by an idea as an exemplary cause that is fully determined and known by objective theoretical knowledge (epistémē). As in the case of an architect’s blueprints, skill, such as that of the engineer, consists in knowing how to act according to that idea or plan; and, when it cannot be carried out perfectly, some parts of it are simply omitted in the execution. In contrast, civil society and its ethics and politics, though similar in the possession of a practical guide and its application to a particular task, differ in important ways. First, in moral action subjects and especially societies which are constituted by shared action toward a common end constitute themselves, as much as they produce an object: agents are differentiated by their action, societies are formed or destroyed by their inner interaction. Hence, moral knowledge, as an understanding of the appropriateness of human action, cannot be fully determined independently of the societies in their situation and in action.

Secondly, adaptation by societies and social groups in their application of the law does not diminish, but rather corrects and perfects the law. In relation to a world which is less ordered, the laws, rules and regulations of groups are imperfect for they cannot contain in any explicit manner the adequate response to the concrete possibilities which arise in history. It is precisely here that the creative freedom of a people is located. It does not consist in arbitrariness, for Kant is right in saying that without law freedom has no meaning; nor does it consist in an automatic response determined by the historical situation, for then determinism and relativism would compete for the crown in undermining human freedom. Freedom consists, rather, in shaping the present according to the sense of what is just and good which we have from our cultural tradition, and in a way which manifests and indeed creates for the first time more of what justice and goodness mean.

The law then is not diminished by distinctive and discrete application to the varied parts of a complex civil society, but corrected and enriched. Epoché and equity do not diminish, but perfect the law; without them the law would be simply a mechanical replication doing the work not of justice, but of injustice. Ethics or politics is then not only knowledge of what is right in general but the search for what is right for this group or sub-group with its goal and in its situation. Adaptation of the means to the social group, whether occupational, religious or ethnic, is not then a matter of mere expediency; it is the essence of the search for a more perfect application of the law in the given situation. This is the fulfillment of moral knowledge.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 281-286.} This takes us beyond the
rigid rationalism of the civil society of the later Enlightenment and the too fluid moral sentiment of the earlier enlightenment. It enables us to respond to the emerging sense of the identity of peoples and protect and promote this in a civil society marked by solidarity and subsidiarity.

In this as a social work the guiding principle is to maintain a Confucian harmony through time. The notion of application allows this tradition to provide guidance in facing new issues and developing new responses to changing times. With rising numbers and expectations economic development becomes an urgent need. But its very success could turn into a defeat if this were not oriented and applied with a pervasive but subtle and adaptive human governance sensitive to all forms of human comity and orienting all suavely to the social good in which the goal of civil society consists.

This will require new advances in science and economics, in education and psychology, in the humanities and social services, that is, across the full range of social civic life. All these dimensions, and many more, must spring to new life, but in a basic convergence and harmony. The values and virtues emerging from tradition applied according to freedom exercised in solidarity and subsidiarity can provide needed guidance along new and ever evolving paths. In this way the life of civil society can constitute a new birth of freedom.