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Social Memory and Contemporaneity

Kyrgyz Philosophical Studies, I

by
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Table of Contents

Preface	v
Foreword	vii
Introduction to Social Mnemology: The Scientific Base	1
Chapter I: The Ontology of Human Memory	11
1. The Presence of Man in the Past, Present, and Future	
2. Memory as a Means of Existential Possession	
3. Human Subjectivity and the Mnemonic Nature of Spirituality	
Chapter II: The Semantics of Social Memory	35
1. West and East: Mnemonic Experience	
2. Logic and the Mnemonic Reconstruction of Turkic Peoples' Metaphysical Culture	
3. "Manas" as the Mnemonic Mind of the Kyrgyz	
Chapter III: The Cognitive Aspect of Social Memory	73
1. The Actual and Virtual in Social Memory	
2. The Social Memory of Science and Conceptual Modeling	
3. Science as a Kind of Social Memory	
Chapter IV: The Praxiological Aspect of Social Memory	89
1. The Aesthetics of Social Memory	
2. Social Amnesia	
3. Social Memory as a Basis for the Construction of Reality	
Chapter V: Social Memory as Communication	107
1. Mechanisms of Social Memory Transmission	
2. Education as a Mnemonic-Communicative System	
3. The Memory of Generations and the Problem of Intergenerational Communication	
Chapter VI: Social Memory as a Factor of Modernization	123
1. The Dichotomy between "Traditional Character" and "Contemporaneity": The Mnemonic Aspect of Modernization	
2. The Social Memory of the Kyrgyz Society and Modernization	
3. Globalization of Social Memory	
Conclusion	151
Bibliography	155
Index	163

Dedicated to the blessed memory of my mother

Preface

Contemporaneity is the present, which includes the past and the future. As a moment of the space-time continuum in a concentrated state, contemporaneity expresses both discreteness and endlessness. That is because history consists of a multitude of concrete historical and local contemporaneities.

Contemporaneity is “here and now,” while the past is “already” and the future is “later.” History and human life go on between the “already” and the “later.” Time is irreversible, and it runs from the past to the future. However, the past, present and future can be synchronized, thanks to social memory. Synchronization of the past and the future link in the present and represents the way humans move to the future.

Participation of social memory in the past, present and future tied to real historical processes is not a backward look, but rather the genuine basis that creates society.

Contemporaneity is the maximum concentration of internal and external life of a society in definite material values, spiritual findings, social ideals, and symbols, which exist in the present time.

Contemporaneity allows for the ability and possibility of certain generations to realize their potential. It is a chance to create one’s self first of all, and to continue living on in the memory of others, which is given to people capable of thinking and feeling.

The being created by contemporaneity is projected from the point of view of the past, because contemporaneity is the continuation of the past and the basis of future.

Contemporaneity represents the original spiritual and intellectual space for supporting the tree of social memory. However, all this does not mean that contemporaneity is the time to “shred” the accumulated memory into the “archive” of social memory or to accumulate more data and store it.

Rather social memory is a training ground, where the viability of a person or a people, and their spiritual and intellectual tradition are tested. The search for understanding human existence and history are advanced.

Social memory is universal in its form, and concrete in its content. That is why it is always filled with concrete historical, social, national and individual content; in modern conditions it would be expedient to mention the global (universal), national and individual in social memory. In this context the author pays special attention to these three levels of social memory: global (universal), social (national), and individual (personal). Major changes are taking place on all three levels. On the individual human level it is an “anthropological revolution” where a person becomes his own horizon (Thierry Goden); on the social (national) level, the unprecedented growth of national self-consciousness can be noted; on the global level, globalization of informational, intellectual and educational processes which influence the structure of

social systems as a whole, is occurring. All these changes characterize modern life.

However, even in this stream of historical changes, the eternal and primordial questions being asked by the human person—"What am I?", "Where am I from?", "Why am I?"—and, correspondingly, the questions being asked by peoples—"Who are we?", "Where are we from?", "Why are we?"—remain unchanged.

On the global level the actual question now is "Will we be?" If yes, then what are the forms of life in this new global order? Ivar Lesner in his preface to the book *The Living Past* wrote: "Every day in your life happens only once and cannot be repeated, this day must not be lost. Only then you can realize that generations before you were trying to create something for you: you will admit the fact that you can use the chance that your short life gives you. And only when you understand that you are sitting in human history you will understand that there are thousands of years before you."¹

So, in the very meaning of the word "contemporaneity" there is information about the complicity of the past and future. And the contemporaneity of the three historical time spaces is provided, thanks to social memory.

"In the explanation of the past you must proceed from what makes the important power of contemporaneity. Only by straining your noblest qualities to the uttermost will you be able to guess from the past what is worth knowing and keeping and what is great in it. Equality is recognized by the equal."² Consequently, modern man must be willing to question the social, the familial, and even his own memory.

To constantly question social memory with the purpose of finding our place in the world is the way of existence of modern man.

Your fate, from the sick loss of memory you must protect—
A man on his hard, long road must remain erect.
Apart from the Mother—the one who brings life to children—
There are four others—as if they were four wide wings:
There's the Mother Earth—our essence, and core of the core,
There's the Mother Tongue—which comes from our forbears, what's
more.

There's Mother Custom—a kindly and generous light,
Which shines and warms us through generations, still bright!
There's Mother History—however hard it was seen—
With bitter distress, torment, oppression...

(M. Shahanov)

NOTES

1 Ivar Lesner, *The Living Past: Views of Central Asia and World Culture*, 1997. No. 2-3. p. 78.

2 See F. Nietzsche, *Utility and Harm in History/Two Volumes*. Moscow, 1990. p. 198.

Foreword

In this study Professor Bakieva, of the Kyrgyz Republic, gives new and philosophical meaning to the old adage, “you cannot know where you are going unless you know where you came from.” Building on the later Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, Gadamer, and the Sociology of Knowledge, Bakieva invites the reader into the kind of meditative and ontological thinking that Heidegger reflectively unpacks in his “Conversations on a Country Road” [Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking: A Translation of Gelassenheit* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966)].

This study is a phenomenology of social memory. The role of social memory in the construction of reality is illustrated with extensive materials from Kyrgyz history and its Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Bakieva develops what she refers to as “Social Mnemology” and presents “mnemonic models” for the functioning of Kyrgyz society. Her retelling of the Kyrgyz epic tale “Manas” and how it represents the “mnemonic mind” of her people resonates with many of the great epic novels and myths which are the defining stories of a culture and people. It is these stories to which a people return in moments of deep suffering or elevated joy. In popular language, they provide ontological roots.

Some definitions are offered in the preface and introduction. “Contemporaneity” is the present point that holds the roots of the past as well as the seeds of the future; it is the creative unfolding of historical being. “Social memory” is historical consciousness as it moves backward and forward in its creating and understanding of the present. This retrospective and prospective memory is “where the viability of a person or a people and their spiritual and intellectual traditions are tested.”

Bakieva has coined the term “Social Mnemology.” By this she means the study of the cognitive and social parameters of memory. It seeks to correlate social memory with society, to analyze the thinking of individuals in their social and cultural context, and to characterize cognitive processes in various spheres of communication. Social memory can be national, ethnic, political, collective, familial, and autobiographical. Social mnemology presents a system for preserving and coding the products of social memory. It is a discipline of interpreting and coding that “studies the mechanisms of accumulation and transmission of sociocultural experience as well as the social, spiritual, philosophical and prognostic tasks of a society.”

Bakieva’s mnemonic approach, in short, claims we cannot know who we are as individuals or as a people unless we can somehow return to the root of our being. She unpacks this ontological search for being through the history of the Kyrgyz and other Central Asian peoples. Each chapter unveils key pieces of the ontology of memory. Each chapter also unveils what Heidegger meant by “man is the shepherd of being.”

An introduction, “Social Mnemology: The Scientific Base,” lays out the terminology and outlines the history, tradition, and methodology of

social mnemology. Chapter I, “The Ontology of Human Memory,” follows Gabriel Marcel in his warning against “the spirit of abstraction” and toward “presence” which means coming into relation with the world. [Marcel, *Pour Une Sagesse Tragique et Son Au-Dela*, Paris: Plon, 1968] This happens in “recollection,” that is being “experienced for the second time.” This kind of meditative thinking can have its down-side and cause a painful disruption of personality, but it can also be the basis for finding a new and deeper self. Like Heidegger, Bakieva understands “memory as the ontological resistance to the power of time.” Memory plays a key role in the body-spirit battle, which is played out both in the autobiographical and the collective memory.

Chapter II, “The Semantics of Social Memory,” works off Karl Jaspers “axial time.” Bakieva develops the need for a personal and cultural “home.” Thus the importance of founding myths, epic stories, and fairy tales, which, in different ways, embody the “spirit of a people.” Language is focal in the production and maintenance of that spirit as is the concept of “homeland.” With Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* hovering close at hand, Bakieva leads her readers through a retrieval of the folk culture of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and especially the moving epic tale *Manas*, which is the story of the Kyrgyz people as seen by an exiled boy who longs to return to his homeland. The story, interpreted through the prism of the early Khan’s oppression, the Czarist conquest and colonial policy, the 1916 uprising, and the Soviet and post-Soviet eras provides the language and context for reconstructing Kyrgyz existence today. As mentioned, “*Manas*” is the “mnemonic mind” of the Kyrgyz people. Reliving that epic provides a recognizable and communicable way to keep alive the “being” of a people. Ideas, settings, and traditions are rekindled in memory to “create” culture. The orally transmitted story, passed on down the ages, is the perfect expression of the mnemonic mind for the Kyrgyz. It is an “inexhaustible source of cultural memory, the result of the realization of a people’s spirit.”

Chapter III, “The Cognitive Aspect of Social Memory,” presents social memory as the intellectual landscape where the reconstruction and integration of knowledge, as the search for solutions to practical problems takes place. Conceptual models are constructed which build on the foundations of the past but are open to new horizons and needs. Drawing on Marx, knowledge and values come together in a praxis approach applied to practical social tasks.

Chapter IV, “The Praxiological Aspect of Social Memory,” follows Kant’s third critique and begins with an aesthetical understanding of Social Memory. Spirit resists time and the limits of the past. It creates an integrated picture and allows the human to be open to the transcendent in one’s life, culture, and future. In Kyrgyz culture, the epic *Manas* opens the memory to the whole and the beautiful, to a wholistic story as a basis for action and behavior in the world. The reverse is a repressed memory that creates only illusions.

Out of this practical understanding of social memory emerges practical application, “the arsenal of social memory reaches a pragmatic level.” Moreover, this ethical application to individual behavior, institutions, and

government comes from a social metaphysics which Bakieva constructs with the help of the Sociology of Knowledge. [See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966)].

Chapter V, “Social Memory as Communication,” moves the reader beyond social memory as a state phenomenon and turns to a hermeneutic of memory. Using Gadamer, [Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury Press, 1973)] the author makes the case for understanding, interpreting, and applying the past—at least that small portion of the past that remains alive and preserved in social memory. It is that small portion—the living tradition—that cries out to be communicated. It is that “tradition” that puts a person and a people in touch with their being—past, present, and open to a new future.

In this context, education is understood as a mnemonic and communicative system. In Hegel’s sense, it is self-reconciliation and self-recognition in the “spirit.” Education allows the person to see herself/himself in a new mirror. “Responsibility” is education’s most important goal and is obviously of great importance in the construction of a new society especially in a situation such as that of the post-Soviet Kyrgyz Republic.

Chapter VI, “Social Memory as a Factor of Modernization,” seeks to overcome the apparent clash between tradition and modernity. Modernization does not necessarily imply the demise of tradition. Tradition and contemporaneity can be better understood within a framework of the synchronic-dia-chronic system of the mnemonic approach.

Bakieva uses Karl Popper’s *The Open Universe* and his concept of the asymmetry of past and present to wrestle with post-Soviet nations’ current attempts to construct civil society. Given such a fractured past how might they build a civil society that would be open to a creative future? Bakieva’s conversation on this rough country road is quite frank, honest and down to earth. She states flatly: “Kyrgyzstan may be compared to a beautiful girl who will be very lucky if she marries a rich man.”

National identity and ethnic memory, of course, play a big role in the unfolding of this drama. However, for Bakieva, freedom lies buried deep in that drama. Much excavation must go on. Freedom is wrapped up with national self-consciousness, but must be unearthed in order for a people to create their own being. The historical and cultural “amnesia” caused by Soviet totalitarianism is gradually being overcome by a return to spiritual, cultural, and social roots. Renewed interest in Islam is a key indicator of this. This kind of new awakening is contrasted with the ambiguous implications of the globalization of social memory with its threat of a leveling homogenization.

Bakieva, representing a new brand of post-Soviet philosophy, invites the reader down that same country road Heidegger finally walked. After personal and social oppression, being human, being historical, being social—simply being—needs to be grasped in a new light. Suffering and oppression do that to people. The author literally pulls us along the dark path with her—it is a hard journey and still uncharted, but her ontological understanding of social

memory has its signposts: spirituality, freedom, responsibility, education, and tolerance. The arduous ontological journey is worth the effort and could shed light on such issues of current concern as: integral and sustainable development; ethnic conflict resolution; inter-religious dialogue; and the construction of civil society.

John P. Hogan

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The editors have left the late author's references as presented. Many references to the translations and editions were available to her in the Kyrgyz Republic or in Russia. Only a few references have been changed to standard English translations. Likewise, with few exceptions, the author's use of gender language, e.g. "man" "his," used in a generic sense, has been left intact.

The author herself had translated the text from Russian to English. Special thanks are owed to Maura Donohue for her excellent editorial assistance and for her work on the English translation. Gratitude is also expressed to Professor George F. McLean, general editor, and to Ms. Hu Yeping, assistant editor, for help with bringing the volume to publication.

It is with deep sadness that the editors acknowledge the passing of the author Gulnara A. Bakieva, who died while her volume was in the process of editing and publication. This volume was her contribution of love, commitment and scholarship to Kyrgyz thought.

Introduction

SOCIAL MNEMOLOGY: THE SCIENTIFIC BASE

The spiritual potential of modern civilization in many respects depends on how much it can synchronize the values of the past, present and future. "For many centuries man acted too much and thought too little... In the world, which constantly gives us the chance to think, thought still does not exist," wrote M. Heidegger.¹

According to Heidegger, to think means to go carefully into what exists and keep it in your memory. "Memory is a collection of thoughts. Thoughts about what? About what holds us in our essence to the extent that we think about it. To what degree must we think about what holds us? To the degree to which it has been since the time immemorial what must be interpreted and understood. When we give meaning to something we endow it with recollection. We recollect it because it is the call of our essence."²

Interpretation of the past, reminiscences of the future, and the creation of contemporaneity are the ontological requirements of any society. The necessity of synchronization of the past, present and future reveals itself on the theoretical and practical levels. Separation of these three components of historical time reduces the sense of human history to nothing. Events and facts of the past and present are pressed into social memory and form a mnemonic time and space different from physical time and space.

Time and space in the mnemonic world are compressed to the maximum extent. Unlike physical time, mnemonic time is reversible and repetitious, because a property of social memory is that when necessary it can reproduce the facts and events of the past. The question is how necessary and how fruitful this repetition is. Unlike physical space, mnemonic space is not linear. Synergetics suggests new characteristics of space. Mnemonic space is formed semantically. The concept of semantic space from the field of cognitive psychology is close in meaning to the concept of mnemonic space.

Human activity is based on an intersubjective system of knowledge and information. It is, in principle, impracticable without this semantic, semiotic and historical basis. For this reason, there is a real problem with the principle of mnemonic synchronism.

To what extent is the principle of mnemonic synchronism substantiated? In spite of the fact that this principle has existed from the earliest times as a methodical instrument of cognition and understanding, it was substantiated relatively recently. In part its essence is reflected in the principle of historicism, which was popular in Marxist philosophy. But meanwhile mnemonic synchronism, partly substantiated by researchers, lacks status in social and humanitarian sciences. The author has undertaken an effort to emphasize this mnemonic principle and substantiate it as an essential basis for carrying out social and humanitarian research and the realization of social tasks.³

The essence of the principle of mnemonic synchronism is interpreting the fundamental components of culture and society in the triunity of social time: past, present, and future.

The necessity of synchronization of past, present and future values has always existed. But it has become more important today because man in his historical and logical development has gone through a clear cycle of cultural and technical processes, has reached a limit, and now is going over to a new round of development for which he is neither morally nor physically ready. Cloning, “the end of history,” nuclear weapons, and many other issues have become the subject of bitter discussion in very different circles. And the question of human survival or a collapse of the existing sociocultural order is turning into a global problem.

Meanwhile, the philosophical pathos about the current historical period is justified because disorganization and collapse of the sociocultural order are painful and are reflected in inhuman behavior and thinking, and in a growing social sickness.

The good gives up its place to “truth,” the cold, merciless truth. The efforts of ancient Greeks to put the good above the true are knocked down by European culture, which is the outcome of Greek civilization. In this situation it is necessary to interpret and understand the sense of what is going on; thus, the sphere of our interpretation is the individual and the social being in the past and present.

In a certain sense, according to M. Mamardashvili, the past is the enemy of thought, because it prevents us from understanding what is actually happening. Sometimes man and society need to clear their conscience of imperfect ideas and experiences in order to interpret the past anew.⁴ Nietzsche was concerned about this issue. But this cleansing cannot happen without a realization of what has already been.

The revision of individual and social experience is realized through recollection, value judgments, classification of the positive and negative, and the rational appropriation of the past into the present. The total denial of the past, a kind of social amnesia, leads to physiological and sociocultural sickness.

Of great interest in this regard is the position of twentieth century philosopher Karl Popper on the interaction of the past, present and future. He substantiated his position on the asymmetry of the past and future—that the past has already happened and we cannot influence it except to change our knowledge about it. However, our lives and actions are aimed at the possibility of influencing the future. “The arrows of time,” in any event, are directed at the future. By this claim K. Popper proves that the past, present and future are not determined linearly.

Contemporaneity commits us to build the future intelligently, using an arsenal of development alternatives. The disproportion of the past and future gives more responsibility to man and society, but does not lead to determinism in the historical process. K. Popper emphasizes that the possibility of building the future greatly depends on the growth of human knowledge.⁵

Interrelation between the past and future depends on how much they are semantically interconnected. The disproportionate presence of the past, present, or future as well as an imbalanced denial of knowledge of the past lay completely new tasks on every new generation. Every historical span of time in the form of the past, present and future, to a certain extent, is autonomous and self-sufficient in the realization of the potential of a whole generation. Thus mnemonic synchronization of the past, present and future is a natural phenomenon in the sociocultural context.

The modern differentiation of sciences gives rise to new branches of human knowledge. New scientific disciplines are forming at the meeting points of specialized directions, which are at times close to each other and at times far apart. This is the technology of the modern mind.

One of these scientific disciplines aspiring to an independent status is social mnemology (from the Greek *Mnemosine*—the name of one of the Titanids, the daughters of the earth and the sky. *Mnemosine*, Zeus' bride, in nine nights became the mother of the muses embodying drama, dance, singing, poetry, and so on, all from the womb of *Mnemosine*—memory).

The main concepts of social mnemology are recurrence, recalling, recognizing, forgetting, and, most important, social memory. In scientific and philosophical literature, social memory is used often and finds its roots in cybernetics and the beginning of informational theories of social development.

The problems of memory in different fields of science led to the formation of the concept of “social memory” and its achieving scientific status. Other terms such as inheritance, coding, social information, and succession have come into active use. In a strictly sociocultural, philosophical meaning, the concept of social memory came into use later. Other types were singled out, such as political memory, historical memory, sociocultural memory, ethno-social memory, cultural memory, popular memory, people memory, national memory, collective memory, written memory, verbal memory, women's memory, communist memory, Sicilian memory (connected with *Mafia*), and so on.

Researchers have singled out the following types of social memory: mythological (N. S. Volskaya), epic (M. Bloc), classical-analogical, classical-systematic, and system-genetic (V. A. Kolevatov).

In connection with the fact that at the end of the twentieth century completely new methods of fixing, reproducing and transmitting information appeared, such as the Internet, holography, and satellite television, knowledge and information are now turning into global phenomena. As a result, a new type of social memory, which we conditionally will call “global,” is being formed. Thus, science, particularly philosophy, has prepared a basis for further interpretation of the essence of the social memory phenomenon, which gives us the right to speak about the need to develop the area of social mnemology.

Social mnemology as a scientific direction—in spite of its epistemological status—has not received wide recognition, especially in Russian-

language literature. But, in the scientific literature of Europe, America, and Russia, the study of social memory has grown.

This fact determines “the right of citizenship” of social mnemology in the system of social-humanitarian knowledge. The emerging existence of social mnemology is based on such sciences as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, ethnology, social psychology, and economic history. In these sciences the sphere of fixation, reproduction, and transmission of knowledge, experience, traditions, stereotypes, and cultural codes is designated with the help of the concept of social memory.

The scientific arsenal of social-humanitarian sciences—natural and technical disciplines concerning the study of memory in general and social memory in particular—is extremely rich. Modern social engineering integrates all knowledge about memory with the aim of more rational construction and prognostication of the future. As a result of this need, “the industry of memory” has been created in the form of museums, books, monuments, engineering designs, and technologies. On this basis, the industry of heritage, satisfying the needs of such important fields of economy and culture as tourism, has emerged. “Heritage” tourism, as a subject, for example, is being studied in many western universities in the United States.

The globalization of mnemonic activity with the help of television, the electronic net, and other technical means leads to the reproduction of social memory worldwide. For example, with the help of holography it is possible to multiply the treasures of museums, archives, and natural monuments and enjoy them the way we enjoy the original artwork.

“The volume of knowledge about the past, its relevance and the degree of interest of the modern world in the past is the evidence of the presence of a deep instinct in man and society of the aspiration to preserve, at least, the possibility of historical continuum. In museums, libraries, and archives humanity keeps the creations of the past, realizing that this way something unalterable in its meaning is being saved, even if it is not understood now. All countries, parties, and some men are unanimous in this attitude. This faithfulness to the matter of saving the creations of the past has never been so universal and standing to reason as in our days. Europe is becoming something like a grand museum of the history of western man. In striving to mark the dates of the founding of a state, city, university, or theater, or the dates of the births and deaths of famous people lies a recollection...[but also]...a symptom of the will for preservation.”

Thus, the will for preservation, the will for repetition with the help of memory, occurs as the real historicity of the existing societies, states, and cultures. The meaning of sociocultural memory as a fundamental phenomenon is indisputable. However, the concept of social and cultural institutionalization of accumulated material needs developing. Social mnemology plays a great role in all this as an important discipline interpreting and explaining the essence of social and cultural factors in a society.

THE HISTORY AND TRADITIONS OF SOCIAL MNEMOLOGY

Social heritage fixed in social codes occurs in any society. That is why the most ancient cultures and societies owned the system of fixation, reproduction, and transmission of technological and schematic structures directed at the social creation, reproduction, and transmutation of sociocultural patterns of activities.

In the ancient eastern societies, this system was realized through traditions, which pedantically reproduced not only conceptual structures of social life but also forms of things. Social transmission of cultural values was similar to consecration into the sacrament and actualization of symbolic, universal mechanisms of community. According to the conceptual basis of social memory developed by ancient eastern philosophers, time—because of its unity in the past, present, and future—repeats everything. So, a cultural repertoire was being transmitted in the East relatively without loss.

As for the western system of sociocultural codes, it was more rational and subjected to practical and intellectual expediency. In the West in the system of social memory, fashion and ideology, but not traditions, have the paramount meaning. The West is directed towards the future, therefore the mechanisms of its social memory are especially dynamic.⁶

As for the traditions of social mnemology, the philosophers Confucius, Plato, and Aristotle laid their foundations in ancient times. Confucius's judgment about the traditions in social and family life, Plato's thoughts about the historical memory of ancient Greeks, and Aristotle's ideas about the traditions of Athenian democracy can easily serve as the basis of social mnemology. The ideas of Saint Augustine, the views of Hegel about society and the philosophy of history, the teaching of Locke about ideas, the concepts of Bergson about the memory and spirit, the opinions of Alexander about the memory of knowledge, the ideas of B. Russell about images and knowledge all contributed to the theoretical basis of social mnemology.

Scientific traditions of anthropology represented in the works of Levi-Bruhl, Levi-Strauss, and Mead and expressed in the ideas about sociocultural inheritance and the peculiarities of cultural coding in primitive societies, the reasoning of S. Freud about taboo and totem, and the reproduction of culture, the idea of K. Jung about archetypes—all these constitute the colossal arsenal of social mnemology.

The role of “philosophy of science,” represented by T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, K. Popper, P. Feyerabend, V. Vartovskiy, and the latest scientific research of Boston University (USA) about the memory greatly expanded the bounds of social knowledge and by so doing directly prepared the beginning and coming-to-be of social mnemology as a scientific discipline.

The psychological theory of memory, represented by I. M. Sechenov, B. P. Lomov, P. P. Blonskiy, V. S. Vygotskiy, A. N. Leontyev, P. K. Anohin and A. R. Luriya, was especially productive and, extrapolated on the phenomenon of our study, added much to the methodological approaches to the research of social memory.

In the development of social mnemology a special role was played by existentialism. In the teachings listed above, in our opinion, an instrumental approach is realized; that is, memory, including social memory, is considered an instrument of personality and societal activity. Naturally, this approach is fully justified. Besides, in the tense search for new paradigms on the border of the third millennium, when the logic of history and cultural development demands humanist concepts of development, existential reflections about the fate of man in the historical context become particularly relevant.

The study of domestic and foreign literature shows that the problem of social memory started to be actively studied in the twentieth century. In 1950, the French researcher M. Halbvaks's (1877-1945) *About Collective Memory* was published. In this work Halbvaks analyzed the main constituents of social memory in space and time and substantiated the principles of the interrelation of different elements of social memory and the principles of social memory's functioning in a society.⁷

In the 1960's, Soviet philosophical literature presented the idea of social memory in the works of Estonian philosopher Y. Rebane, who imagines social memory as the "eureka" principle of scientific cognition. This idea was picked up by his disciples and other scientists who were able to develop it further. Y. Rebane substantiates the idea that the principle of social memory has a methodological meaning.⁸

M. Bloc in his fundamental work *Apology for History* uses and substantiates the importance of collective memory in social creation.⁹ The Kyrgyz researcher T. J. Karakeyev wrote about a mnemonic model of civilization.¹⁰ In European and American scientific literature the problem of social memory in its different aspects was widely researched. Social memory was reflected first of all in connection with the problem of national and political identity.

In *Social Memory and Cognition*, V. A. Kolevatov reveals cognitive aspects of social memory.¹¹ Different aspects of social memory are partly reflected in many works of cultural science. The importance of the research of social memory is emphasized by D. Lihachyov, Ch. Aytmatov, and M. Shahanov.¹²

Reflections about the phenomenon of social memory, the functions of which are not limited by the passive chronological fixing of facts and events in individual and social existence, gave birth to the idea of the principle of mnemonic synchronism. Aytmatov in his novel *The Block* convincingly substantiates the necessity of the given principle. The new philosophy of education proves the need to study social memory and shows its role in forming a philosophy of man.¹³

In the post-Soviet period, interest in the problem of social memory is growing. Scientific research in this field is being encouraged, and doctoral dissertations on this problem are being defended. The transformation of post-Soviet societies caused a flurry of publications touching on different aspects of memory. Research in almost all spheres of humanitarian knowledge has intensified. Thus, for instance, in Kyrgyzstan the works of A. Ch. Kakeyev, J.

Sh. Janybekov, Sh. B. Akmolodoeva, J. A. Urmanbetova, Choyun Omuraly and others are being published.¹⁴

Methodological Aims of Social Mnemology

In the dictionary the word mnemonics or mnemotechnics (from the Greek word *mnemosine*), which means the art of remembering and includes methods that facilitate remembering using artificial associations, is used more than mnemology. However, the notion of mnemology is much wider than the notion of mnemonics or mnemotechnics.

Mnemology should be considered as the study of memory in general. The subject of mnemology is memory as the material and spiritual substance of the inorganic, organic and social worlds. Mnemology synthesizes knowledge from the natural, technical, and social sciences.

However, in science the status of the notion “mnemology” has not been defined, and its subject, object and tasks have not been institutionalized. It is natural then to question the rightfulness of a conversation about mnemology as science.

The history of scientific development shows that any new science is formed little by little with the accumulation of actual materials, the growth of knowledge, the formation of historical and logical bases, and the accumulation of basic methodological principles. Are there premises, facts, knowledge which give the right to speak about social mnemology? Knowledge about memory is scattered throughout the spheres of different sciences and it is to a certain extent heterogeneous. Thus, the author considers homogenization of knowledge about memory in the framework of mnemology, including social mnemology, on the basis of some single cognitive space, where the problems of individual memory and social memory will be concentrated and analyzed, one of her immediate tasks. Elaboration of this problem in the context of historical and philosophical processes will allow revealing institutional fundamentals of the given phenomenon. The consideration of the process of crystallization of the ideas about social, historical, and cultural memory in historic and philosophical processes is the foundation of the possibility of mnemology as a science. It should be noted that since the exhaustive logical procedure of the establishing of adequacy of knowledge does not exist, our striving to construct the portrait of mnemology represents the effort to establish cognitive contact with reality in the sphere of memory. But even in this cognitive contact we study phenomena not only phenomenally but essentially, reflecting the qualities of reality.

The subject of social mnemology is memory—historical, cultural, and ethnic. It investigates cognitive and social parameters of memory, establishes the correlation of social memory with historical types of society, analyzes the thinking of individuals and societies in the concrete social and cultural context, and characterizes cognitive processes in the sphere of communication and interaction. Since social mnemology is interdisciplinary, the

methods it uses are synthetic. The divergence of methods is a result of the universality of the phenomenon of social memory itself.

Nevertheless, considering social mnemology first of all in the framework of philosophy, it should be noted that its general methodological foundation is the rational theoretical reflection substantiating individual and social vectors of social creation in the process of mnemonic activity.

Social mnemology uses methods on theoretical and praxiological levels. In the former case it analyzes the sense of mnemonic phenomena, for example, memory, culture, science and language, and in the latter case it determines the type of sociocultural life of a society and social communication as the cause and effect of a society's modern life and activity.

In the study of social memory different approaches have formed. In particular, according to informational and technical approaches, social memory is considered as a system of accumulation, reproduction and transmission of socially significant information. Thus in Soviet literature the concepts "social information" and "social memory" are very close in meaning.

Historical and cultural approaches consider social memory as a system of sociocultural heritage and coding. In the framework of such an approach, teaching about social and cultural determination of cognition and about the conditioning of thinking and behavior by the social and cultural environment is developing. This approach to the study of ethno-national memory has proven to be very fruitful.

The sociological approach is being developed most actively within the framework of English and American scientific tradition. This research entails making and developing political memory in connection with civil and national identity, with the reflection in autobiographical memory of sociopolitical events and their influence on the thinking, behavior and social activities of citizens.¹⁵

The existential approach is no less productive. The author's experience of philosophical interpretation of existential ideas from the point of view of social memory shows the accuracy of this approach, having substantiated the existential significance of social memory in the spiritual life of man.

In social mnemology, the axiological principle plays a great role, because a value's attitude to memory and the social selection of meaningful information, all lead to the deeper existential and spiritual use of the approach.

The Conceptual System of Social Mnemology

A conceptual system of social mnemology is determined by the subject of the given scientific discipline. The terms "mnemonic space," "mnemonic time," "social memory," "mnemonic processes," and "cultural" and "social amnesia" have not become permanent parts of scientific vocabulary yet.

The varieties of social memory are: national, ethnic, political, collective, family, and autobiographical. These concepts are used and have epistemological weight in different contexts. Thus, new concepts connected with other aspects of social mnemology need to be substantiated.

The introduction of the concepts “mnemonic mind,” “mnemonic activity,” “mnemonic communication,” and “mnemonic creation” into use would be interesting and productive. Regarding the concept “mnemonic mind,” it should be noted that it implies the rational in sociocultural experience, which has been retained and used in practice. “Mnemonic mind” is a prerequisite side of the mind of a society; from the “mnemonic mind” a society derives in part the knowledge for solving a great number of today’s practical tasks.

The author uses the concept “mnemonic activity” to describe the activities of Kyrgyz *manaschy*, Turkic *bakshy*, Greek *rhapsods*, Tajik *roviens*, and Turkmen *ashugs*.

“Mnemonic communication” implies communication between generations and also the means of communication, for example, written language and traditions as kinds of mnemonic communication.

Finally, the concept “mnemonic creation” is closely connected with the concept “mnemonic activity”, because activity is fully expressed in creation. In the development of creative activities, education plays a great role as the way of contemplative understanding and historical assimilation in order to create something completely new.

The aforementioned concepts of social mnemology can be used depending on the context of the analyzed phenomenon.

Thus, social mnemology can be defined as follows: social mnemology is a scientific discipline aimed at the interpretation of what has to be interpreted first of all. It studies the mechanisms of accumulation and transmission of sociocultural experience and the social, spiritual, philosophical, and prognostic tasks of a society.

NOTES

1 M. Heidegger, *Conversations on a Country Road*. Moscow, 1991. p. 140.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 135.

3 Y.K. Rebane, *The Principle of Social Memory/Philosophical Sciences*, 1977/No. 5. Kolevatov V. A. *Social Memory and Cognition*. Moscow, 1984; Halbachs, M. *The Collective Memory*. New York, 1980.

4 M. Mamardashvili, *Cartesian Speculations*. Moscow, 1996. p. 31.

5 K. Popper, *The Open Universe*. London; New York, 1995. p. 55-77.

6 K. Jaspers, *Meaning and End of History*. Moscow, 1991. pp. 361-362.

7 M. Halbachs, *The Collective Memory*. New York, 1980.

8 Y.K. Rebane, *The Principle of Social Memory/Philosophical Issues*, 1987. No. 3.

9 M. Bloc, *Apology for History*. Moscow, 1978.

10 T.Dj. Karakeev, *Semantic Aspects of Dialectics of Social Development*. Frunze: Ilim, 1978.

11 V.A. Kolevatov, *Social Memory and Cognition*. Moscow, 1987.

12 D. Likhachov, *The Past for the Future*. Moscow, 1984; M. Shakhanov, *Civilization Under a Delusion*. Almaty, 2000; Aitmatov C. Selected works. Bishkek, 1989.

13 L.P. Shwetz, *Philosophical Analysis of Social Memory*. Moscow: published by MHU, 1987; M.A. Rosov, *Scientific Knowledge and Mechanisms of Social Memory*. Moscow: published by MHU, 1990; K.K. Moldobaev, *Ethnic Nationality of Memory*. Published by Saint Petersburg University, 1995.

14 A.C. Kakeev, *Philosophical Thought in Kyrgyzstan: Researches and Problems*. Bishkek, 1998; Sh.B. Acmolodaev, *The Ancient Pattern of the World*. Bishkek, 1996; J.L. Urmanbetova, *Culture of the Kyrgyz in the Philosophical History*. Bishkek, 1996; Choun Omuraly. Tenirchilik. Bishkek, 1996.

15 See V.G. Afanasjev, *Social Information and Governance of Society*. Moscow, 1975.

Chapter I

THE ONTOLOGY OF HUMAN MEMORY

THE PRESENCE OF MAN IN THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

Appear before people and yourself as the person you are.

- G. Marcel

To speak about man as unique, self-sufficient, suffering, and mortal, without making it a cliché, ideological dogma or an excessive abstraction, became possible thanks to existentialism. This teaching, which arose and became popular after the Second World War, approached man more closely and deeply than all the philosophical teachings before it.

The main point of existentialism—"Existence precedes essence"—was a philosophical admission of man's dichotomous nature, which lies between biological vulnerability, finiteness, and claims of mind and spirit.

Overcoming the dichotomous nature of man is possible in the process of searching the sense of existence as a result of the individual experience. Nietzsche's definition, "human is too human," sounded like a reproach not only to human weakness but to human nature in general and a justification for striving for the "superman." He prepared the way for existentialism, which moved beyond him in its understanding of the essence of man.

Man's eternal search for his own essence can be fruitful when pursued in an existential direction. All the information about man accumulated through natural science over many centuries cleared up very little about the essence of man—otherwise man would not ask the question again and again: "What is man?"

Existence is the actualization of the essence of man; therefore, man is man to the extent to which he exists. The "substance" of man is existence. Everything that happens in the world in the form of an historical event can either drown the human essence in endless turns and revolutions or actualize it. In any case, man "thrown" into this world always strives for freedom and is called upon to preserve the truth of being. In this sense man is responsible for being. "Man is a shepherd of being," Heidegger wrote.¹ We consider the formulation of the problem of social and individual memory in existential philosophy to be productive. Its fruits can be understood by an analysis of the essence of memory phenomenon in its different manifestations. The author's ten-year search for a solution to this problem in her home country and abroad shows that there is a gap expressed in the absence of a special philosophical analysis of the interrelation between existence and memory which does not allow a complete estimation of the significance of memory in personal and social life. Scientific literature about memory represents the essence of memory as a phenomenon of human nature. However, in the research, memory is the

instrument of human activity. The author would like to approach this phenomenon in a different way.²

An “anthropological turn” in science and philosophy, which became a reality at the end of the twentieth century, leads to the intense study of peoples’ spiritual aspirations. Modern man, as never before, owns the world, and this possession makes his philosophical contemplation exceptionally rich.

The philosophy of modern man is based on a deep knowledge about the world and man himself; this information is growing in volume and becoming more concentrated. In this situation, sociocultural space expands and time seems to become more fleeting. In this crazy circulation the center of permanency is existential values: life, love, memory, death. In any social structure, in any life situation, these values remain unshakable. Losing one of them breaks the “plan” or “project” whether understood in terms of Nature, God or a Highest Mind about life in general.

In this context, existence and memory are linked and are the theoretical structure that allows us to be the author and to build our own concept about the essence of social memory and its role in modern life. It is necessary to note that the main purpose of this research is to reveal that “it is not possible to understand the essence of memory if you see nothing but general inclinations or ability in it. Retaining in memory, forgetting and recalling belong to historical conditions of man and form a part of his history and education.” The time has come to free the phenomenon of memory from psychological equalization with abilities and to understand that it represents an essential characteristic of the finite historical being.³

The existential way of explaining memory is caused by the nature of this phenomenon. Memory as the fixation of the fact of things’ existence connects a subject and an object. The thinking-knowing subject directs his attitude to the object in ideas and material phenomena.

Rationalistic traditions of classical philosophy claimed the position according to which *cogito* (“I think”) discovers reality, introducing us into the system of affirmations, since *cogito* keeps watch by the threshold of reality. Existential philosophy, not denying the role of *cogito*, nevertheless prefers real processes characterizing the subject’s connections with the real world.

In counterbalance to rationalistic traditions, existentialists—following phenomenologists—substantiate the idea that the world is not a transparent world. G. Marcel and M. Heidegger emphasize that the world resists the subject as the object of cognition.⁴ Thus, the gap between the knowing subject and the object is the basis of an existential understanding of the world. Existential philosophy best expressed the essence of existence as a sense of pain, suffering, and joy in human life, rather than in abstract terms..

Existential philosophy tries to warn a society against the expansion of “the spirit of abstraction,” which is embodied in the undivided domination of man over nature, the rationalization of human interrelations and the suppression of man by anonymous, bureaucratic structures. However, “this order is finding roots in defenseless minds more and more,” G. Marcel wrote.⁵

A deformed social order is, as a rule, the result of trusting ideological dogma, the result of the estrangement of primordial values of human life, and the result of the substitution of humans by inanimate objects, for example, the State or market.

To be in the world, and not be a substitute for inanimate objects, is the ontological need of man. Identifying man with society's stereotypes does not reflect the essence of man. For example, during a war, man is only a soldier with arms; in post-Soviet time man is only a business man chasing the market, or a communist, unthinkingly carrying out the will of his party. However, deeper study of the inner, real world of man shows the complexity of the human essence. Let us remember, for example, the young soldier from E. M. Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, or Tanabay in *Farewell to Gulsary* by Ch. Aytmatov.

The world develops in two dimensions: exterior and interior life. The interior life of man is built on *recueillement*—the principle of bringing the interior experience together. To exist for yourself means to stop existing for others. However, man upon reaching maturity is bound to find his humanity and openness in others.

In finding ourselves, the most important role is played by memory because the human "self" is always not only someone today, but also someone with a past and a future. The content of his life—his space and time—depends on how much of his past experience he was able to integrate into his behavior and thinking. The English expression "lifetime" vividly expresses the fleetness, length, and finiteness of the life of man, the sense of which is revealed by the past human experience. Thus, memory is the existential value that gives man roots in the world.

Estrangement of individual life experience and the inability to synchronize it in real life lead to the degradation of a personality and rips it from reality. According to existential philosophy, estrangement from one's own experience tears a part of man's life away from him, and he loses the fullness of his "self." On the other hand, the unity of individual experiences promotes the mobilization of mental resources and the realization of personal "self."

Thus, existential philosophy sees the problem of self-identification, considering it in tight connection with man's attitude to his own past and his ability to recollect it. Self-reflection is realized in past experience; it makes human thought human and inspired. As a result the gap between the personally available being and the unrealized being is not as painful; wisdom and tolerance link them. G. Marcel calls this level of self-reflection "the reflection of the second level"—life on its higher level.

One important component of self-reflection is concentration. Thanks to this quality, man can determine his position with respect to his own life. And in the process he discovers that he and his life are not identical. In this case he can either fall into despair or find mental equilibrium and peace.

Concentration is based on reflection. G. Marcel writes:

At least, you will say, recollection is recollection, and the present, whatever it will be, cannot affect it. However, I am afraid that this objection is based on an absolutely illusory idea, according to which recollection is something like a hardened, in some sense, objective image, which we keep in a drawer, like a photo album. Recollection is something different: it is a way to live through the past experience again; it could be called experience of the second degree, and if it is so then the extent of the past being infected by the present becomes possible, and might be inevitable.⁶

Another fact connected with recollection is a convincing argument advanced by the history of culture. Here recollection is like catharsis, when in the process of thinking a person experiences purification.

Recollection is the core of the inner nature of man, his taking root in his own essential space. Recollection is being, experienced for the second time, which reveals the past life, accumulated knowledge, facts and feelings, in order to understand and become enlightened. The enlightened soul of man brings him purification. Recollection as understanding creates a reality of self-being in the present and is the condition of man's taking part in everlasting being.

According to M. Heidegger, there is a rock, eagle, tree, or sea, but only a person exists. There is God and angels, but they do not exist—only man exists. However, it does not mean that only man is living, and the rest of being is not real. Rather it means that the person's ability to see is limited or clouded.

The existential nature of man presupposes his ability to imagine being in his consciousness. Being becomes obvious, open, and interpreted in time as a result of perceiving, understanding, and holding it in memory.

Interpreting the world, which is realized in the process of existing, gives birth to inquiry. The ability of man to inquire makes him the founder and legislator of history and culture.

Human "presence" means to come into relation with the world. Man as a subject wants to and must be the center of the world, the measure of all existing. Presence is not only passive evidence of what is going on with man himself. Presence, according to Heidegger, is human existence, the aim of which is to be in the world and to realize itself in it.

The realization of the essential power of man as man is the realized presence. Speaking about human presence in general, it is possible to grasp that presence not only as a man's individually, but as his depth. If speaking about a specific human presence, this is man's chance to realize himself in a stream of time. It is found by man in the process of the individually experienced in his life.

It is noteworthy that through heroism and weakness, faithfulness and treachery, crime and punishment, all demonstrated by man during and after

the Second World War, and since, existential philosophy, understood as never before how deep and many-sided man is inside.

“Presence” is the interpretation and understanding of being. Man cannot live in any other way, because he is attached to being. Metaphysics begins from the interpretation of being. The aim of metaphysics is truth as something sought and wished-for, as trustworthiness.

“The essence of man is determined from the true essence of being through self-being.”⁷ The existence of man is his being represented in the world, which is realized through his actions and self-realization. That self-realization of a person is based on a spiritual experience.

“The essence of presence is in its existence” is one of Heidegger’s themes.⁸ Human presence in the world means an attitude toward the world, aim, intrusion—these moments are the fundamental components of human existence.

Human existence can be considered as existence here and now. However, it is not fully realized if it is limited only to the present, not taking into account the past and future. When we speak about human presence we mean that the life of man is ontologically universal and fundamental; we do not mean the life of a separately taken individual in definite time and space.

Every thing has its time, writes Heidegger. He means that every existing thing comes and goes in the time which is due him. In the same way every individual man comes and goes into non-existence. Thus, human presence is historical. “Presence means: permanent, touching man, catching him, given him being.”⁹ Presence in the world is not only idly examining it, it is the discovering of being. Being is discovered only by man’s efforts. Presence envelops the past, present and future. Consequently, time is the fundamental factor of human existence.

The lifetime of every man is measured and finite. For this reason, the problem of time is central to philosophy. M. Heidegger considers the phenomenon of time quite differently than it is analyzed mathematically or naturally, considering that the problem of time is the problem of human life. So, human presence in the world is not only his being immersed in time, but time itself is the condition of human presence.

Nonetheless, in the history of philosophy time is interpreted differently. According to the views of ancient Indians, time is vanity, a falling out from eternity; it is illusory, deceptive, not real. Time is paradox, and it is realized through sense. In this plane the sense of history is revealed through time. Ancient Greeks introduced the concept of *Kairos*, according to which every thing comes and leaves in its time. The Kyrgyz have such a concept: “*Ar ners-enin oz ybaktysy bar*”—everything has its time. If the time has not yet come, then, even with titanic effort, it is not possible to do what you want to do.

Creation and human action make human time a time of building and movement. However, Saint Augustine in his *Confessions* advanced an opinion about the ontological sense of time, having noted its paradoxical and illusory nature. Time disintegrates into the past, present and future, but the past has gone, the future has not come yet, and the present falls apart into the past and

future. Time is like eternity fallen apart, and in this eternity none of the disintegrated parts—past, present and future—is perceptible. All run together.

Human fate is realized in this disintegrated eternity, in this terrible reality of time, in the illusion of past, present and future. Therefore, human fate is perverse and obscure.¹⁰

What do the past, present and future mean in human fate? Human fate is realized in time, which is broken into the past, present and future. N. Berdyaev considered that there are two pasts: the past which was before and has disappeared, and the past which is now a component of our present. The second past is in memory in the present; it is a quite different past—transformed and clear. A creative act was accomplished, and only after this creative act does it form part of our present.¹¹ Recollection is not the preservation or restoration of the past, but the always new, always transformed past.

“Time is illness,” writes N. Berdyaev, “because the flow of time is irreversible and sad. The flow of time strikes horror and fear and inspires hope in man. Ontological offense or anger—because of the impossibility of possessing time and remaining in eternity—makes man resort to memory. To concentrate the past and future in the present here and now is to interpret one’s own being, to find peace and humility and as a result of one’s search to find sense and creation.”¹²

Recovered time, according to Berdyaev, is eternity, and it makes sense for man in the plane of creation. Only creation, turned to eternity, overcomes the fall of time into the past, present and future—the absence of fullness in human fate. “*Biri kem dunuyo*,” say the Kyrgyz. It means that the absence of the fullness of being is stored up in the fate of man.¹³

The fullness of being exists more as possibility than reality. The Kyrgyz expression “*Telegeyi egiz adam*” means that man has complete happiness. As a rule, the fate of people is evaluated more as an exception—a possibility—than as an ontological rule of life. The fullness of being is found by man as a result of philosophical reflection, which in its turn is realized thanks to recollection, the recalling of one’s own spiritual and social experience.

Existentialism is interested in exactly this side of human life, and that is why it calls it real being. The anonymity and subjectivity of personal experience in some way propose the self-being of man, in the sense that an individual and unique being is formed in man himself and then is realized in the world. Until it happens, man is hidden from himself. “Self-being is something which comes into the world against the world of being.”

Memory is the deepest ontological root in man, which connects and holds the unity of personality, because the human “self” is formed not only from his present self-consciousness but from the past and future ones.

Thus, to consider recollection just as recollection, not touching the present and future, is wrong. Another consideration is the sense carried by recollection. Sometimes it can be painful and it can destroy the unity of personality, whereas at other times it can become the basis of a newly found personal “myself.” Memory is the ontological resistance to the power of time.

Only memory knows the inner mystery of the past—it is the action of eternity in time. The consciousness of “myself” is connected with memory, and through memory, through its metaphysical depth, all the history of the past is revealed.

Memory represents the primary fact of a personality, the unity of “myself;” that is, the recollecting consciousness is the absorption of all the world and all history into the inner existence of the “self.” The world history, the history of the past, is memorable to us if it happened to us, and if we did not miss it in the process of receiving our education.

Self-being, according to K. Jaspers, takes two routes. The first way leads from the world to loneliness, where man, using intellectual, physical and spiritual efforts, tries to become integral. The second way leads to the world through the same efforts, but learns that self-being cannot be found in the world.¹⁴

Another existential problem was defined by N. Berdyaev who wrote that the personal “self” feels frightened before the social multitude of “ourselves,” because personality is the depth that is impenetrable for a society. The spiritual life of a person does not belong to a society and is not determined by it.¹⁵

A person’s distance from society and State, or estrangement, is interpreted not only by existential philosophy. Marx paid much attention to this problem. But he considered that this distance could be overcome with the coming of social harmony.

Existentialism insists on the principal of man’s being distant from both State and society. This phenomenon becomes more complicated in modern life where society and State are abstract, global categories, and man does not have a voice in them. “He is merely a number in the file, where there are many others, each with their own number. However, man is not a number: He is a living creature, an individual, and as such he tells us about a home, about a people, who are also individuals, about his pets, each of which has a name. This is what his thought is directed at when he asks questions that do not have answers: ‘Who am I?’ ‘What sense does all this have?’”

Take memory away from a man, and he will stop being a man, for he will lose his essence. Therefore, memory, first of all, is the call of man’s essence. The ontological status of memory is determined by the fact that it is the most important factor of man’s immersion in history.

In existential philosophy, the functional approach to man is criticized, which makes an active man business-like, and measures his importance by the functions he fulfills. This man denies himself, runs away from himself. If the essence of man is reduced to fulfilling different functions, then it is possible to lose the principal matter in man—his “ontological responsibility.” (G. Marcel)

Marcel agrees with Heidegger that man is the shepherd of being and writes that the function of man as a person is to protect being as a shepherd guards a herd. For Heidegger and Marcel, this is the ontological responsibility of the human person. In essence, human reality, which unfolds in differ-

ent cultural and social situations, is the same, because the main ontological responsibility is to become a person.¹⁶

Ontological anxiety, as understood by Heidegger and Marcel, leads man to the feeling of the sacredness of being, to the conviction that being is a sacred reality. This understanding is not given all at once, for it requires deep reflection on the basis of existential experience, as a result of the restoration of the past, interpreted and understood through memory in the present.

Marcel developed the idea about man “on his way.” He used the term for the title of his book *Homo Viator*—“wandering man.” Marcel understands man’s way not as wandering with a planned aim but as searching for truth by touch, as preferred by Socrates. According to Marcel, “to be means to be on the way.” Man on his way is alone and not alone, and this way is the way to openness, to intersubjectivity.

The life-giving power of human existence is in thinking about others, in interpreting one’s relations with others. Marcel wrote: “I rely on you—for us.”¹⁷ Thus, memory is man’s way of self-possession and self-expression in order to represent, to be present, in the world. This is imposed on him as a duty, as the basis of his generic essence.

MEMORY AS A MEANS OF EXISTENTIAL POSSESSION

Was that life? All right, let’s try again. - Nietzsche

Man discovers his own finiteness as well as the infinity of the world. This perception of the world, inherent in every person, is depressing. This depression, wandering in the abyss of our being, reveals being to the self.¹⁸ The discovery of the real horrifies man, for he discovers “nothing”. This is neither fear nor terror, but a fundamental mood of man, giving rise first to fear and anxiety, then humility.

Humility and peace, coming as a result of horror, are complemented by the determination of man to create, to dare, to fill his given time with sense.

Man’s actions, directed at putting Heidegger’s horror, the fundamental terror waiting for him everywhere, on the back burner, is based on the principle of existential possession.

Human existence is built on preserving, taking care and using certain things. It concerns, first of all, our body, food, home, clothes, and tools, which are all necessary for satisfying our needs. This form of possession can be called existential possession because it is rooted in the very conditions of human existence.

Unlike self-centered possession, existential possession does not come into conflict with being. Striving for possessions is caused by the existential dichotomy between life and death. The fear of death is compensated for by the seeking of possessions—both material and spiritual valuables. This sense of possession is the expression of attachment to one’s own “self.”¹⁹

According to Marx, possession is one way to exist. Marx analyzed the nature of possession with regard to private property. Striving to keep and increase property is considered by him as the sense of possession.²⁰

Buddhism calls the striving for the unlimited right to possess “insatiability,” Christianity calls it “greed.” Man, even in striving for possessions, nonetheless understands that it is temporary and transient, because man himself is mortal; “you can’t take it with you.”

The ontological components of the spiritual being of man are: offense, anger, humility, gratitude, and creativity. The human “self” is formed by what a person possesses as a man, a personality, a citizen. Erich Fromm writes that two principles are the basis of human recollection: possession and being.²¹ Life leads to the striving for superiority over others, which shows itself in the ability to suppress, capture, and steal. Being generates love, care for others, and self-sacrifice.

Moreover, possession is always accompanied by loss. The man who possesses material wealth, sound health, and authority risks losing everything, and this can cause the loss of his own identity, his human “self.” At this point, the question arises: if man is what he has, then what is man when he loses everything he has?

A man, oriented towards the possession of material valuables will lose his “self” and will turn into a devastated, incapable man. A man oriented towards the possession of not only material but also spiritual valuables manages to keep afloat and retains his “self” throughout life’s storms.

The problem of possession was examined by Mougne, who considers that personal life is not only self-reflection and being absorbed in yourself, but also potential and intention, the striving for possession. According to Mougne, possession is the essential characteristic of personality, for without possession it dissolves into an object; moreover, possession is the possibility of contacting the world.²² Personality finds itself only by losing itself. Its richness is made of what is left in the moment when it loses everything that it has in the moment of its death. After a man is dead, what remains is his deeds, the memory of him, the things and people with whom he was connected.

The first principle of possession is expressed in the uncontrollable, relentless struggle for physical existence.²³ This circumstance as a condition of life and development for the sake of the continuation of existence most vividly manifests itself in the organic and even inorganic world in the form of genetic memory.

Recent natural science research has produced some interesting results. Specialists found serious scientific ground for such concepts as “water memory,” “sugar memory,” and “metal memory.” Functioning on the molecular level, genetic memory contains and passes vitally important information. In biological systems it is very well seen in the example of plants and animals not changing and not “forgetting” their forms and functions during millions of years. At first sight, it seems an obvious elementary phenomenon. Nevertheless, deeper research in cybernetics, holography, and other fields of knowledge reveals surprising properties of memory on the molecular level.

The so-called “form memory” of inorganic substances is widely used in engineering and medicine. For example, for treating scoliosis, a nitinol rod, which is initially straight, is used. Before an operation, it is bent; eventually it is able to return to its initial form and straighten a spine.

Researchers have been working energetically toward the creation of a metal type with “form memory.”

Holographic memory is worth noting as well. Holographic memory represents the “dream of future technology.” Holography allows the creation of memory with super-dense cubic content. The research of member-correspondent of the USSR Academy of Sciences Y. N. Denisyuk became an outstanding achievement in the development of holography.

Holographic memory is the ability to put, for example, the exhibits of the Hermitage in the form of holograms which would give the full effect of “presence” among the actual works of art themselves. Holograms are used in libraries, architecture, computers, and mechanical engineering. All these uses of holographic memory can be designated by the concept “technical memory.”

Another scientific finding, the discovery of “biologically active liquid”(BAL), is interesting. This is water with memory. Scientists proved that water in the human body is able to “remember” all the structure of DNA, and also the condition of the organism as a whole, which allows for certain early diagnoses with an accuracy of 82-84 percent. With the help of BAL it is possible to acquire information about the condition of an athlete during training with 98% accuracy. With the help of “water memory” it is possible to learn in 70 percent of the cases if there are drugs in an athlete’s body. This is an example of “biological memory.”

The previous stories were all examples of memory, but of a qualitatively different kind. They are needed to lay the groundwork for the phenomenon of memory as an ontological component of world organization. Human memory in this system is one of the links of fundamental memory, without which the world does not exist as such. Take memory away from man, animals, plants, and inorganic things, and the result is chaos. The world will be destroyed, and there will be no geo-bio-socio-system.

In synergetics another approach is being considered, in which chaos is order—the world is not organized linearly. But in both cases different forms of matter are reproduced thanks to memory. This is the norm. Full or partial absence of memory means destruction, the collapse of a self-organized and self-reproduced system. Thus, memory is the way of self-possession of the world. Without this self-possession, the world is not possible in principle.

Man strives for possession of the organized world because of his imperfection—mortality. The passion and will to live is characteristic of man; they provoke his excruciating search of answers to the questions: “What do I do in this world?” “If I am the consummation of nature, why am I lost in the world?” and so on. At this point memory as an ontological component of human being in semantic terms grows from the biological level to the mental, then to the spiritual level.

It is the semantic context of human memory that makes man different from animals. The disposition of man to the semantic and sensory level makes him a creature of another order. For animals there is no yesterday, today, or tomorrow. So they are not engaged in thinking about the problems of individuality, social action, and fate. Animals are not historical. Man, by nature, is a “creator-destroyer;” he is a creature able to create culture. Nietzsche illustrates this point:

An animal’s life is so non-historical: it is dissolved in the present as an integer, not leaving any strange fractions to itself, it cannot pretend, does not conceal anything, and at every given moment is quite what it is, and that is why it cannot but be honest. Man, on the contrary, has to come up against the enormous, growing weight of the past; the latter either bends him down or moves him aside. It hampers his movements as an invisible and heavy burden, which he is ready to drop... That is why, as a recollection about the lost heaven, he is excited by the sight of a grazing herd, or by a more familiar view of a child, which, for the present, need not renounce any past and who is in a state of blessed ignorance, playing on the border of the past and future. And, still, the child’s games come to an end: he is deprived of the ability to forget too early. Then he learns how to understand the meaning of the word “was,” the very fatal word, which, signifying struggle, suffering, satiety for man, reminds him that his existence is radically the never ending (*Imperfectum*).²⁴

When finally death brings the wished-for oblivion, it carries away the present with man’s life, and by doing so it affixes a seal to the truth that our existence is an interrupted withdrawal into the past which is a thing that lives by permanent denial, self-devouring, and self-contradiction.

Self-possession and the possession of the world is given to man through education. The essence of education is, according to Hegel, in making man a spiritual creature, genuinely free “in himself and for himself” in order to rise above self-interest by contemplation over what was before, what is now, and what will be in the future.

The educated consciousness can always rise upon the particular to the general. It surpasses natural feelings and possesses the ability to understand and act in all directions. Gadamer considers that education forms a general feeling in which its essence is enclosed, for you can hear the echo of historical connections in it.²⁵

Efficiency of education depends on considering the abilities of an individual in the educational process in connection with the maximum concentration of knowledge and a series of cultural factors. This particular basic problem gives rise to a great number of other problems, one of which is the mnemonic aspect of the educational process. This aspect is covered in detail

in Chapter Five, where the question of education as a mnemonic and communicative system is discussed.

Education requires a cultural and mnemonic interpretation. Jaspers wrote about the essence of this problem:

When hostility to education conceitedly destroys all the past, as if the world begins all over again, spiritual substance can be preserved in this reform only by means of historical recollection, which as such is not only the knowledge about the past but the power of life in the present. Without this a person would become a barbarian. The radical nature of the crisis of our age grows pale in front of eternal substance, a part of which is recollection. It is immortal and always able to be.²⁶

Thus, education is a means to form and develop the culture of abilities, which allows the subject to act freely and rise to the general.

Man's education is in his skills, moderation, sensibility, recognition of himself in the world, and striving to be engaged in what belongs to the field of recollection and thinking, which satisfies the striving of man for possession. The one who possesses the feeling of the whole can appreciate the distinction between past and present. And if everything is based on education, it means that it is not a matter of experience and position, but a matter of the past coming-to-be of being. In the educational process it would be good to see two fundamental components of education: labor and language. These two phenomena are the basic characteristics of the ancestral essence of man and are the main means of social reproduction. All other creative activities are derived from them.²⁷

The process of teaching skills is the means of passing accumulated knowledge and techniques to the next generation. In the story "Skewbald Dog, Running Around the Edge of the Sea," Ch. Aytmatov writes, "The life of a hunter lay ahead of him—to begin it in order to finish it in the sea, this is the life of a sea hunter, for there is not a more difficult and dangerous thing in the world than hunting in the sea. And you have to get used to it as a child... Kirisk will be the bread winner and support of the family. It should be this way, it goes on this way from generation to generation. This is the way life goes."²⁸ Skills and labor activities are the effective means of social and cultural reproduction, the means of learning the world, the form of possessing things, processes and phenomena. If in the old times the secrets of a profession were passed individually within the limits of a family, then in modern times the fundamentals of professionalism are taught by institutions—educational, legal, scientific, spiritual, ethical, and religious. A society's institutions, synthesizing and actualizing everything necessary for the present, modify the character and forms of labor. The estrangement of labor is the estrangement of man from values which were accumulated over centuries; consequently, it is the estrangement of culture.

The second moment connected with education is language. Language is not invented by every generation, though it can be changed with time. Mostly it is connected with its lexical and semantic aspects.

Language is an attempt to envelop the world, the “ability to be close to being,” for language is a “home of being.” It is the home in which humans live and find the truth of being. “Moreover, the gift of speech is not one of human abilities together with many others. The gift of speech singles man out from the rest of the world, it makes him what he is. His essence is outlined by his language. Man would not be man if he could not speak—about everything and incessantly! Because all this is provided by language, the essence of man rests on language.”²⁹ Thus, language is the first hypostasis of being human.

Likewise, language is the repository of the memory of history and culture, the repository of individual memory. The emotional and intellectual activity of man is fixed in language and is passed through language. Language is one of the most important means of social coding. Labor and language are the two means of objectification of feelings, thoughts, and philosophy in general. They represent phenomena with the help of which man tries to name, control, and comprehend the world. This is nothing but the striving to possess in order to understand not only the sense of everything existing but also one’s own existence.

HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY AND THE MNEMONIC NATURE OF SPIRITUALITY

“Myself” is the aim, support, master, witness, abode and nearest friend.

“Myself” is the creation and destruction, the basis of everything, and the place of rest and eternal seed.

Existentialism radically changes the idea of human subjectivity, concentrating on the values of everyday human life. The idea of human subjectivity in science, which considered man closed, incorporeal, not connected with the outer world, a subject of introspection, was gradually being transformed.

Existentialists insisted on presenting subjectivity as existing, as being, and gave it ontological significance. They considered that in order to study human nature it is important and valuable to know the real character of man’s attitude toward the world. They believed that personal senses and perception of the world are important and valuable.

They were proving the importance and value of a “philosophy of experience” for philosophy itself not only with the help of philosophical postulates but also by the power of the artistic word. Camus, Sartre, and Marcel were brilliant writers. In addition, they chose a dramatic art with a special style of narration—the opportunity for the author to make the characters say the words, expressing experiences, understanding, and attitudes toward things, man, and the world.

Existentialists claim that withdrawing from the specific living human person leads to the abolition of philosophy. Striving to be free from the “subjective actual man” is to divorce philosophy from life. That is why in Heidegger’s philosophical ontology is an ontology of human existence.

The relational, intersubjective understanding of man in Jaspers’ and Marcel’s philosophy contributed greatly to the understanding of the essence of modern man.

In any case, the existentialists’ contribution is that they convincingly proved the philosophical thesis that the structure of being is revealed in the existence and destiny of a person. The proof of this thesis required a lot of effort and a reinterpretation of the traditional classical philosophical conception of correlation of the subject and object.

Beginning with the Renaissance and especially in modern philosophy, the center of gravity of philosophical debate goes to the side of the subject. What is the subject? The subject is the main “characteristic of cognition and man’s practical activity. The subject is man getting in contact with the world, changing the objective environment of his being and himself in the process of solving practical, spiritual, and theoretical tasks.”³⁰

That definition is very general, and undoubtedly does not satisfy existentialists who consider that man does not just get in contact with the world, but that the world itself comes to man through feelings and makes sense thanks to the subject. That is why man “is absolutely present in the world,” and objects are not simply given to him. Existence supposes a subject and a predicate.³¹ However, the predicate, when not the predicate of something, destroys itself. That is why objectively “nothing” does not make sense unless it is interpreted by a subject. But sense opens the self to the world of objects; it is commensurable with the spiritual subject.

In the context of the search for foundations of subjectivity, some new vectors appear at the meeting point of modern eastern and western thought.

Efforts are being made to join the valuable from western and eastern philosophical thought by both western and eastern researchers. The classic work of the Indian teacher Sri Aurobindo, *Adventure of Consciousness*, which became a classic in the West, can serve as an example. In his book, Aurobindo emphasizes subjectivity; its eternal role in the organization of the world is presented. Western philosophers, especially Marxist philosophers, are accustomed to using the objective as the only criterion of truth, whereas the Indian philosopher of the twentieth century advances the principle of the subjective. Analyzing creation he writes: “Of course, it is easy to be certain of the existence of a beefsteak, consequently, a beefsteak is more objective than joy in Beethoven’s last quartet, but this impoverishes the world by not discovering its treasures. In actual fact this is a false opposition. Subjectivity is a higher and at the same time preparatory stage of objectivity. If everybody tasted the cosmic conscience or the joy in the last quartets of Beethoven, then, probably, objectively there would be less barbarism in our universe.”³²

Under the influence of the social and philosophical research of the twentieth century, the understanding of the essence of the subject and object

has changed. The concept of “subjectivity” means the psychological, spiritual, and intellectual aspect of human activity.

Social and philosophical approaches define subjectivity as an important aspect of human subject being, as a necessary form and connection of social being. Subjectivity is an important aspect of the realization of man’s qualities, a process of a subject’s feeling of his communion with being, the realization of his own program by himself.

Man is the arbiter, determining the truth, for he is a living creature, existing at the heart of being. Spirituality is something to which man comes as a result of interpreting the world, as a result of the realization of his highest striving for knowledge and being and service to life.³³

The origin of primitive peoples’ spirituality has been thoroughly analyzed by western anthropologists and ethnographers such as Levi-Strauss, Levi-Bruhl, Malinovsky, Mead, and others. A great number of scientific works were dedicated to the study of the origin of spirituality of the ancient Egyptians, Indians, Chinese and others.

Spirituality comprises many components: namely, thought, language, self-consciousness, cognition, education, writing, reason, skills, wisdom, honor, justice, respect, creativity, ancestors, family, death, art, and social feelings. Consequently, spirituality is a very capacious concept, comprising a wide spectrum of human existence. Spirituality, although often concealed, is found in our life and experience of every individual person and all peoples.

The nature of spirituality is mnemonic. This means that spirituality is objectified, reproduced, and passed on through social and individual memory. That is why the absence of memory is at the same time the absence of spirituality. Of course, spirituality can be seen as a living process which is “here and now”. But spirituality “now, at the moment” is based on a thick layer of mnemonic processes, because it represents a process of imperceptible birth and permanent awakening on the basis of actualization of past experience. The one who is forgetful is soulless. These concepts are shown vividly by Ch. Aytmatov in the legend about Mankurt. “Mankurt” in English means “worm,” i.e., an imperfect creature that has no memory. “Mankurt” as a philosophical metaphor designates the scale and danger of a person, society, or culture without memory.

We claimed above that man develops to the extent the world opens for him through the structure of individual being, since man’s will for life is, first of all, the individual form of his physical, spiritual, and mental existence. If this harmony breaks, man loses his humane qualities. The body, without mind and memory, becomes a biological unit. In this sense Mankurt, having become a worm (though it is more through misfortune than guilt), is in a worse state than an animal. Both physiological and spiritual forgetfulness are a pathology, a disease, and, if not treated, destroy the body and the spirit. Some pathologies cannot be cured; some give rise to negative side effects.

Memory is conscience. This claim became the main idea of Ch. Aytmatov’s novel *And Night Is Longer Than Day*. The notion of the interrelationship of time, human fate and memory is concentrated in the very name of

the novel. In one day of the main character Edigey's life, the past, present, and future are concentrated, thanks to his good memory. Edigey's recollection is convincing evidence of the involvement of history in the life of an individual man. In mnemology this phenomenon is designated as autobiographical memory, or the memory of individual man.

Autobiographical memory has a personal context of historical and social memory where it becomes richer. If social memory fixes mostly facts, knowledge, and information, then autobiographical memory holds much more. It also has emotional coloration and authenticity of the experienced. The authentic spirituality of man, having had his own way, is nourished by the life-giving juice of the individually experienced, interpreted being. Edigey went his way with dignity. The way to Ana-Beyit is the "way of memory," which allowed him to experience the past in order to interpret the fundamental events of man's fate: life and death.

Heidegger, following Novalis, whose verses he often uses in his works, wrote that man in the world tries to be like he is at home. But for man to have a home, it is necessary first to find it.³⁴

In the search for this home, man seeks his way. Let us remember Marcel who claimed that to be means to be on the way. Aytmatov's hero Edigey is revealed through these existential postulates. In finding himself, Edigey is helped by the recollection of people, historical events, the way from Saryozek station to Ana-Beyit. It is not a simple way, because it contains the past, present, and future of the people and of the man having the same fate as his epoch.

Aytmatov emphasizes the idea that the man's individual, living memory is the basis of his spiritual search. Disregarding this leads to cosmopolitanism in the negative sense; it gives rise to the soulless person—a personality type in the novel exemplified by the Sabitjan, son of Kazangap. He speaks about outer space and world problems as a functionary-dilettante who is used to worming himself into the favor of everyone who has power. The cosmopolitanism of this functionary, neglecting his father, his country, the memory of history and destiny of the people he knew—this is what makes a man soulless.

Ancient Indians used to say: "The number of people on the Earth is the number of centers of the Universe." Man is the focus of all the phenomena in the world. "Man is the insurmountable, but the obvious 'here,' which does not consist of different elements of the world, but open to everything as the only place, capable of fitting the Whole." Is not Aytmatov's Edigey the one? All the things experienced by him, other people, history, as ancient legends, war, Stalin's death, love to Ukubala, Ayzada, the flight to outer space, Kazangap's death, the fate of the camel Karanar, and so on—all this comprises the invaluable unique arsenal of Edigey's spirituality.

In this context a question arises about how authentic human subjectivity is. Heidegger writes: "Man establishes himself as a legislator of the measures that are used to measure and calculate something, which has the right to be considered reliable and true, and therefore, existing. Though the

authenticity lying at the foundation of the subject is subjective as such, that is, it rules the essence of the subject, it is not egoistic. Authenticity is obligatory for every “self” as such, as a subject.”³⁵ “Subjective egoism” can be overcome by uniting “self” into “ourselves.” Subjectivity becomes stronger in a “we situation.

Thus, Edigey’s subjectivity and its authenticity confirm some of “ourselves” which were present in the Saryozek steppes in Kazangap, like Abutalip, the children, even the camel Karanar. Sabitjan’s subjectivity is rejected as false and not true. This is so because human subjectivity is authentic, if it represents man’s involvement with the world.

Self, involved with the world, as a criterion of the authenticity of human subjectivity is realized as the root of human memory. For the explanation of this thesis let us return to the example of Mankurt. He does not remember his name or the names of his father, mother, and birthplace. Memory does not allow man to lose his “self” and dissolve into the social multitude; it helps man to forge his individuality and uniqueness, and this leads to the forming of a name.

A name is not only a word that is given to man so as not to confuse him with others. A name is a fundamental event of man’s spiritual being, a mnemonic sign of the human creature which singles him out as this person. A name is the idea, the sense in which the nature of man’s existence is hiding itself. When we say Buddha, Muhammad, Jesus, John, or Peter, we hear a word. But in this case what is important for us is the sense, the life which is formed in a name.³⁶

In philosophical meaning, a name is not only a word but a concrete life-line; in a name there is a sense of personal being. The well-known Soviet philosopher A. F. Losev in his work *The Philosophy of Name* writes the following: “A name is the element of reasonable communication of living objects in the light of sense and intelligent harmony, the revelation of mysterious faces and the clear knowledge of the living energy of being. Being in love we repeat the loved one’s name and call the beloved by name. In hatred we abuse and humiliate the hated through his name. There are no limits to the life of a name; there is no measure of its power. The world was created and exists by naming. Every living creature bears a name. Peoples live, move from their land, sacrifice their lives, and win or lose, thanks to names and words. The name has won the world.”³⁷

Thus, we can claim that the name is one of the basic phenomena of human existence. The sense of name is well illustrated by the film “Sommersby” starring actors Richard Gere and Jody Foster. Sommersby returns to his home village after imprisonment. His fellow villagers greet him heartily. No one suspects that it is not the real Sommersby. Only his wife can see that it is not he, but she does not expose him. The character was in prison with the real Sommersby and remembers everything he had been told. He looks exactly like Sommersby.

After the death of the real Sommersby in prison, the man decides to take the name of Sommersby, returns to the village, and starts to work, gaining

general sympathy and confidence by his behavior, intelligence, and honesty. The woman falls in love with the false “Sommersby” and gives birth to his daughter.

Eventually the police arrive, accusing him of a crime. After several trials, he is proven guilty and imprisoned. But his real guilt is that he has taken another man’s name, for which he is to be executed. If he renounces the name Sommersby, he could save his life. But he will not do that.

The man, who had lived a shady life and had committed crimes, now felt like a good man and respected himself after he got the name of Sommersby. He felt he had earned the name by his hard work and love. That is why he could not deny this name even in the face of inevitable death.

The main idea of the film is that a name is not just a word; there is life behind it, filled with searching, accompanied by suffering, loss, delusion, and great ideas. It was exactly this idea that made the film so expressive. The long, excruciating obtaining of a new name happened on the basis of the recollections about what the man was, how he lived, what he lost, what he understood.

For Sommersby, the memory of the past was the arena of the reinterpretation of all his life and the determination of his fate despite its tragic end. That is why for him the loss of a name meant more than the loss of his own life. He wanted to remain worthy of the name Sommersby in the memory of his neighbors and his beloved wife.

In this sense, a name is the essence of man’s life. The name is the arena of being-for-the-self, where man becomes self-conscious and self-determining with regard to other people and to other existing matters. The name is man’s self-reference to his essence. The name is the expression of the sense or the energy of the essence of an object. The degree of the possession of the world is expressed through a name.³⁸

Man’s “philosophy of experience” (Anri Bugo) is the basis for the realization of second degree reflections, where the formation of one’s “self” begins from a name. That is why people say: “Remember your name.” And, on the contrary, absence of memory about yourself is called retrograde amnesia in medicine and in psychology, that is, partial loss of memory. Mankurt did not lose memory in general—otherwise he could have stopped existing even as an animal. He remembers “fear,” “hunger,” “satisfaction,” and so on. He lost memory-conscience and memory-spirituality, that which makes man humane. The memory he possesses maintains only biological life. That is why such a biological creature deprived by force of personality and self-substantiation in the world is capable of any conduct, even maternal murder.

Another kind of memory loss is present in Sabitjan’s life. This is forgetfulness leading to spiritual infantility. This is the subjectivity, acquired as a result of an apocryphal interpretation of the world and egoism. The former and the latter types of forgetfulness are the precipice where not only individual men but also peoples can fall. These are the ideas of Ch. Aytmatov. His characters confirm the existence of human space as the sphere of individuality. And individuality is mostly based on memory.

A further aspect of human subjectivity should be noted, which is often mentioned by Heidegger, Marcel and Jaspers. This is “planetary technical imperialism,” a force of technical, calculative, and mechanistic world which is the framework man is forced to adapt to.

For the present he cannot escape this fate. Turning again to Ch. Aytmatov’s novel in connection with the aforesaid, another episode is worth remembering: the funeral procession of several men, reaching the bounds of Ana-Beyit, found out that a space-vehicle launching site was being built there. Thus Kazangap had to be buried on the steppe, where his grave would soon disappear because of severe erosion.

Conquering space, and the space-vehicle launching ground, are the symbols of the triumph of the human mind. The graves of relatives and ancestors and their preservation are the symbols of the transience of human being. In human subjectivity two great origins of life are constantly fighting—the spirit and the body—and memory is always present in this fight.

The scientific mind with its “technologized” memory is referred to as “cybernetic memory.” Biological memory or the “memory of the body” which is the way man exists is being modified as a result of adaptation and study in connection with new requirements of life. Technology and Cybernetics play a role.

Human subjectivity is present both in technical and biological memory. For example, technology, forming the technically organized person and society, makes him adapt to the unified world. Biological memory is the basis for the subjectivity of the concrete human. The genotype of man, somatic organization, health and diseases—all this is unconditionally reproduced on the basis of biological memory.

The mnemonic nature of modern man’s spirituality is growing from the two types of memory mentioned above: technical and biological. This process is complicated and equivocal. Let us again turn to Ch. Aytmatov’s novel *And Night Is Longer Than Day*. The funeral procession comes to its destination. But they were not allowed to continue, because it was a space launching ground. Here the collision of two parameters of modern life is shown. The destruction of cemeteries in favor of technology and technical progress, which was repeatedly told about by Ch. Aytmatov in his speeches, is becoming a common phenomenon. When it is a question of such colossal modern technical projects, the problem of the demolition of cemeteries is solved very easily and simply. This is the planetary imperialism of technology which Heidegger and Marcel spoke about. This dilemma becomes almost insoluble in principle, because modern man cannot deny technology or his natural, spiritual demands, including the memory of the past.

The many sides of human nature unfold in individual memory. Only memory knows—or knew and then forgot—the thoughts from great to vile, the feelings and experience of man. That is why individual memory is the sphere of the secret, particularly personal being, in which social problems are also crossed. Not only the individual but also the social side of memory equally participate in the self-substantiation of a person. The result of this

self-substantiation is the activity through which man expresses all the mnemonic potential of his nature. However, since memory is the sphere of the secret being of man, it cannot be expressed completely. Some facts of man's life are put in the depths of memory because of the fear of being exposed and condemned. They remain in memory, making up its deep layers, which can nourish or destroy the human personality.

That is why the inexpressible part of memory lives in silence, in which an impartial dialogue of human "self" and memory goes on. The articulated part of memory, expressed in speech, becomes another kind of mnemonic culture: literary work, information given to others. Individual memory mostly lives in silence, too. Memory, living in silence, is not the hardened facts and events, doomed to disappearance without a trace; it is the ground for the intense, independent work of the spirit.

Memory, put into shape and expressed by the inner speech of man, cannot but be the most important sphere of spiritual activity. Memory is like a looking-glass of an individual being. This "looking-glass reflection" of memory is displayed in its representativeness—the way it represents man in the world of culture and society.

Thanks to collective memory, man learns traditions and values, finds himself, recognizes himself, identifies himself; in other words, this is how the "looking-glass reflection" of memory is displayed. This allows man to represent himself among the same creatures before the past, present, and future generations. Without memory he is deprived of the possibility to be represented and, consequently, to be recognized in a society.

In English-language literature, especially in the context of interdisciplinary research, much attention is paid to such a phenomenon as autobiographical memory, which has been mentioned above. Autobiographical memory is the mental image of autobiographical facts. From the position of cognitive psychology the composition of autobiographical memory includes:

1. Ego as the personal inner experience which is the primary aspect of consciousness functioning in space and time.
2. Self-outline as the cognitive structure of the main layer of knowledge about oneself. This is a system of individual knowledge in the context of long-term memory, because of which it changes very slowly.
3. Self-complex mental structure which contains ego and self-outline, and is connected with personal memory and autobiographical facts.
4. Individuality as the main essence which comprises the depersonalized aspect of mind and brain. Individuality is the sum total of knowledge and temperament.

The sketch given above summarizes the very complicated nature of autobiographical memory.

In the context of autobiographical memory, "childhood memory" is very unique. This subject is noted by many researchers because often "childhood memory" is the basis of human spirituality. This point is illustrated by

the French researcher M. Halbvaks who, in his work, *The Collective Memory*, describes the life and work of Stendahl and analyzes the influence of “childhood memory” on the writer’s philosophy.

This linkage of birth, childhood, and spirituality is also described by Saint-Exupery. Indeed, “childhood memory” is the basis of spirituality. Frustration and anxiety about “childhood memory” formed many well-known writers. The explanation of many facts in a biography, the interests and attachments of authors can be found there.

As juridical psychology and juridical anthropology point out, many crimes are committed as a result of re-experiencing episodes from childhood. Some childhood complexes come from memory, which can provoke people to crime. Thus, “childhood memory” is fundamental in the forming of a personality and, consequently, its social interests and motivations for behavior.

American scientists have done some interesting research concerning social memory and its personal context. A survey of personal memory is itemized in a list of recent political and non-political events, engraved in the memory of Americans, for example:

Political Events

- March, 1978 – the conclusion of the Panama Canal Agreement by the USA
- October, 1978 – the receiving of the Nobel Prize by Sadat and Begin
- December, 1979 – the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR
- July, 1980 – the USA boycott of the Moscow Olympics
- September, 1981 – the Iran–Iraq war

Non-political Events

- November, 1978 – the suicide of 911 members of the community in Johnstown
- October, 1979 – the receiving of the Nobel Prize by Mother Teresa
- January, 1980 – the arrest of Paul McCartney
- December, 1980 – the murder of John Lennon
- July, 1981 – the marriage of Prince Charles and Diana Spencer

It is natural that during the opinion polling it was revealed that the respondents did not remember exactly the time and place of many events and that those events were often remembered in connection with some facts of their individual lives. The commentaries of the American researchers convince us that social memory has an autobiographical component.³⁹

Further this American research proves that social memory affects people’s social opinions. The cognitive basis of social comprehension is prepared by social memory. This manifests itself in a complicated interrelationship of social and individual memory. In individual memory facts and events are fixed and interpreted differently.⁴⁰

In any case, individual memory is confidential. That is why the process of forming social opinions of people who affect the motivation of their behavior is very latent. The study of this confidential aspect of memory is only possible on condition of revealing the semantic features of memory.⁴¹

Memory is organized by information. Man's interpretation of the essence of events which happened or are happening is based on the knowledge about the past or the present. For example, the word "war" for the past Soviet generations is connected with the memory of the Great Patriotic War and the Chechen war, and for Americans, with the Second World War and the war in Vietnam. The memory of the word contains an extensive amount of knowledge.

A deeper interpretation of the information about war forms the convictions of a positive and negative character. The information extracted from collective memory is the social stimulus for the choice of this or that type of behavior. This circumstance obliges us to study individual and social memory as an expanse of knowledge. In connection with this, questioning of the authenticity of knowledge contained in the memory of man and society is natural. American researchers suggest dividing the contents of individual and social memory into "memory-opinion" and "memory-judgment." They propose to introduce a "memory-indicator" for verification of these manifestations of memory.⁴²

In this proposal there is a grain of truth, for the problem of the authenticity of individual and social memory is important for determining the truth. The point is that individual and social memories based on false facts can lead to more than delusions. Taking into account the opinions of American researchers that social memory is to a certain extent a stimulus for behavior, it becomes clear that falsity and falsification can give rise to many negative phenomena, beginning from an individual's feeling of inferiority to a whole people's erroneous judgments.

NOTES

1 M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*. Moscow, 1993, p. 201.

2 *Ibid.*

3 G.-H. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*. Moscow, 1988, p. 57.

4 See G. Marcel, *Tragic Wisdom in Philosophy*. Moscow, 1995, p. 56.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 75.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 126.

7 Heidegger, p. 144.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 33.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 398.

10 See N. Berdyaev, *Philosophy of the Free Spirit*. Moscow, 1994, p. 28.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 285.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 287.

- 13 *Ibid.*
- 14 K. Jaspers, *Meaning and End of History*. Moscow, 1991, p. 400.
- 15 N. Berdyaev, *Philosophy of the Free Spirit*, p. 306.
- 16 G. Marcel, *Tragic Wisdom in Philosophy*, p. 109.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 186.
- 18 See Heidegger, p. 68.
- 19 See A. Fromm, *To Have or To Be*. Moscow, 1990, p. 92.
- 20 See K. Marx, *Engels*. Tome 42, p. 120.
- 21 Fromm, p. 87.
- 22 A. Munje, *Personalism*. Moscow, 1992, p. 59.
- 23 Fromm, p. 37.
- 24 F. Nietzsche, *Two Tomes*. Tome 1, pp. 161-162.
- 25 Gadamer H. G. *Truth and Method*. Moscow, 1988. p. 59.
- 26 Jaspers K. *Meaning and End of History*. p. 361.
- 27 See Gadamer, pp. 58-59.
- 28 C. Aitmatov, *Stories*. Moscow, 1989, pp. 358-359.
- 29 See Heidegger, p. 259.
- 30 *Modern Philosophical Dictionary*. Moscow; Bishkek; Ekaterenburk, 1996, pp. 525-526.
- 31 N. Berdyaev, *Philosophy of the Free Spirit*, pp. 24-63.
- 32 Sri Aurobindo, *The Adventure of Consciousness*. Bishkek, 1992, p. 5.
- 33 See P.V. Simonov, P.M. Ershov, and U.P. Viazemsky, *Origins of Spirituality*. Moscow: Science, 1989.
- 34 V. Bidikhin, *Heidegger's Works*; Heidegger, p. 4.
- 35 Heidegger, p. 60.
- 36 *Ibid.*, p. 61.
- 37 A. F. Losev, *The Philosophy of Name*. MHU, 1990, p. 228.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 162.
- 39 "Public Memory and their Personal Context"/*Memory: Interdisciplinary Approaches*. New York; Springer-Verlag. Berlin; Heidelberg; London; Paris; Tokyo, 1989.
- 40 S. Robert Wyen, "Social Memory and Social Judgment"/ *Memory: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, pp. 243-279.
- 41 Thomas M. Ostrom, "Three Catechisms for Social Memory"/ *Memory: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, pp. 201-220.
- 42 William F. Brewer. "What is Autobiographical Memory"/ *Autobiographical Memory*. London; New York; Melbourne; Sydney: Duke University Press, 1980, pp. 25-47; Don Locke, *Problems of Philosophy and Memory*. New York: Anchor Books / Doubleday and Company. Inc. Garden City, 1971.

Chapter II

THE SEMANTICS OF SOCIAL MEMORY

WEST AND EAST: MNEMONIC EXPERIENCE

Everything has its East and West. - Hegel

According to the conception of Karl Jaspers, the foundations of western and eastern civilizations were laid in the “axial time”—after ancient Indian, Chinese and Greek civilizations had been formed. It was the epoch of mythological thinking, which gradually gave up its place to speculative thinking. Man in that time began to obtain his authentic essence thanks to the ability to interpret being on the philosophical level and to the invention of social organization, which let man communicate intensively, especially spiritually.¹

The lives of human beings unfolded as history in the “axial time,” and that is why since that time history has become the object of real philosophical thought. The “axial time” (between 800 and 200 B.C., about 500 B.C.) seemed to be the beginning of history to the contemporary man, and it was full of reminiscences of the previous epochs. Buddhism, Confucianism, and ancient Greek philosophies contain many judgments about the previous epochs and regrets about their passing and burial in oblivion. So, for example, Plato in his work *Timaeus* put into the mouth of one of his characters the words that Hellenes always remained children and that among Hellenes there were no old men, because society did not preserve legends or teachings or pass them on from generation to generation.²

Inquisitive minds of that time required a careful, respectful attitude toward the past, that is, to the pre-historical period.

Attitudes toward prehistory became not a matter of simple inquisitiveness but the vital necessity of self-substantiation in the new historical process. Certain outlines of historical space and time urge peoples and civilizations to realize their spiritual and historical potential. But before every effort to build up historical being, our distant ancestors asked the question of where the beginning of history was and what the beginning was like.

“Why since that time has there been a transfer of experience; that is, from the beginning of history it has been characteristic of man to feel the end—either the reached completion or the state of decline?” These claims, brought to cognition by prehistory, are expressed in questions which can hardly be answered. Where did we come from? What were we at the dawn of history? What were the possibilities before history? What decisive events happened then: the events making a man humane, capable of having a history? What were the existing depths of “primordial inventions,” hidden from our insight? What were the languages and myths which had existed before the beginning of historical time? The search for answers to these questions has gradually developed a historical, civilized, and cultural self-consciousness.

In the conception of “axial time,” it is noteworthy that Jaspers convincingly develops the parallel provenance of three civilizational centers, developed separately and experiencing different historical modifications. These civilizations only started to be in close contact after several centuries and finally forming a cultural whole in the second half of the twentieth century. Further Jaspers emphasizes that the synchronism of a historical process becomes more obvious by moving off “axial time,” and again only in the last century, making up the unity of human history.³

Nevertheless, Kipling’s expression “East is East and West is West” is based on historical and cultural grounds. Civilizational parameters of the West and East are due to historical circumstances and were formed differently. The foundations of man’s being are different in the East and the West and are expressed in the man’s attitude toward the world. These differences stipulate the means and character for reproducing social and cultural life.

In order to understand more deeply the difference and commonness of eastern and western civilizations, let us consider an account of the essence of the dichotomy between “West and East.” The principal difference between the two civilizations is most convincingly presented by Heidegger, who acknowledged the universality of human being in space and time, but still emphasized that western man and eastern man are cultivated by different civil qualities and these stipulate the character of their thinking and behavior.

Pondering the destiny of present day humanity and the different spheres of its activity, Heidegger concludes that the West and the East are based on different philosophical paradigms. The West began in ancient Greek civilization and accepted its postulates, such as the fundamental concepts of subject and object. The subject is considered separately from the object and the substructure of the world, while in the eastern culture the subject and the object are indissoluble—they are the two parts of one whole.

What does that mean? This means that in the basis of the sociocultural systems of the West and East there are different principles of reproduction and transmission. The West possesses atomic, alphabetic, and analytical languages, which analyze and makes sense. In the western thinking, pragmatism, achieving the aim, sometimes by any means necessary, dominate in order to actively change the outer world. For the western man “to understand” means to experimentally reproduce. The abstract introduction of oneself to the world, the anthropological perception of the world, and conflict between the technical, environmental, and the personal are characteristic of western thinking.

There is no need to prove the fact that the roots of personal knowledge are in the past. The problem of memory has completed several gnosiological and semantic conversions. The first conversion can be called classical, as the conversion from myth to logos. In the ancient eastern and classical cultures, memory was mythically designated through the concepts *atman* and *mnemosina*, which exist on the border of mythology and philosophy and represent operating thinking structures. They serve as the memory-premise for theory. This is the early stage of phylogenesis, later cultivated in the process

of historical development. *Atman* as spiritual substance and *mnemosina* as the goddess of memory were the signs symbolizing a definite order in the world. However, inside they are homogeneous, a whole; there is no border between real and unreal, objective and subjective. The mythological logic of culture represented *atman* and *mnemosina* as the self-sufficient, universal, invariant beginnings of knowledge.

The conversion of knowledge from logos to pre-science was carried out, on the whole, by the collection of facts and inductive generalizations. The gnoseological process was again connected with classical culture. Every kind of knowledge was formed depending on the utilitarian and technological demands of man.

On the other hand, knowledge in ancient eastern culture was reproduced and passed on in the process of intra-family and intra-community communication. To be more exact, knowledge was transformed from one generation to another by way of inherited professionalism. The cult of ancestors and the unquestionable authority of literary texts gave rise to the synchronism of available knowledge, combining the knowledge of the past, present, and future. That is why learning in ancient eastern culture was accomplished by drilling and the informal acquiring of job skills. The ancient eastern type of cognition was not reflex-rational. It did not happen on the basis of discursive discussions, using the process of cognition, democracy, and openness that was characteristic of western culture.

This is also shown in languages. Eastern languages are inflected; they do not translate the sense, but contain it. In their hieroglyphic expression they are directed at comprehension of the unified essence of the world. This allows eastern man to get used to the world in order to understand and support it. Unlike western man, man from the East is not the axis of the world, but one of its great and equal manifestations. In the East and West the transmission of knowledge is realized through a teacher, relaying knowledge which "is being recorded in the soul" of a student.

If in the West the aim of science is truth, with practical results, then in the East the aim of knowledge is the development of values necessary for life. In the West the aim of cognition is the determination of truth but truth that does not touch moral problems.

In the East cognition and morality are unified, and the main problem of cognition is the correlation of good and evil. This correlation is still present because of the absence of technological revolutions with their destructive influence on human life.⁴

The general state of modern man, his spiritual search caused by the global crisis, are nourished and supported in the conditions of the East by the cultural genotype, the spiritual and philosophical codes of consciousness formed by the previous generations. Western man, despite his significant contributions to the development of world civilization, evidently feels uncomfortable in matters of being. This manifested itself in the twentieth century when the human mind triumphed, conquering new peaks of science and showing the strength of man's spirit.

Heidegger thinks that modern man is enslaved by the epoch of planetary technology and that he escapes only by thinking. "Science does not think," he claims. This claim seems paradoxical, because man, having been able to understand the laws of the macro- and micro-world and having created supertechnologies, had previously been called an "intellectual fugitive."

But Heidegger finds a suitable basis for his thesis. He believes that modern man possesses a calculating but not an interpreting, meditative mind. A calculating mind, leading to immediate practical results, brings about the estrangement of man from his own nature. However, according to his personal, emotional, and creative demands, man strives for spirituality as the fundamental orientation towards the world. That is why modern technical ideology can be opposed to authentic philosophical inquiry.⁵

Technical ideology has made education belligerent towards spirituality, reducing the content of spiritual activity to technical skills. This position is correlative to the technological process on the planet and in the individual's life. This process leads to the cessation of all peoples' historical tradition and gives existence only to the new, western world of technical rationality.

This causes a shock reaching all the way to the roots of human existence. This is the deepest crack known in the West. However, since it was created by the West itself, it is a spiritual problem that is the continuum of the world, to which it belongs. To all other cultures it comes as a crisis, or even a catastrophe. All other cultures, however great—Indian, Chinese, and Arabic—need to adapt and change their social and moral values.

Meanwhile the unrestrained stream of progress, carrying forward American and European societies as the most mobile and radically inclined, demands historical examination.

In the depth of American social consciousness, a clear understanding of the role of social memory in the solution of super-modern problems is maturing. However, it is noteworthy that in this society social memory plays a more instrumental role than the role of historical fact and transmission as a means for understanding the present. And still it is understandable that in any society historical recollection as a spiritual endeavor must be preserved. However, as Jaspers writes, despite many thousands of museums, temples, celebrations of anniversaries, people, dates, and holidays honoring historical heroes, in spite of the fact that all the world looks like a museum, only the recollections of a few people turn into understanding or contemplation.⁶

At this point it is necessary to consider the problem of the peculiarities of European social and cultural coding. In any culture, besides universal conceptual codes connected with common processes such as the differentiation of physical and mental work, there are types of social codes created by cultural and geographical factors. That is why it is necessary to separate European and Eastern sociocultural codes.

The peculiarity of European sociocultural coding comes from the fundamental foundations of world creation, that is, from the priorities, leadership, and superiority of the subject.

According to M. K. Petrov, peculiarities of the subject -- the subjective attitude in European sociocultural coding -- are determined by the fact that there is "wisdom" in it, that information is not only transmitted from one to another from left to right, but also transformed, concretized, and moved to practical concrete action.

Petrov considers European culture in its nature mobile and, therefore, always having non-standard situations, which, to a certain extent, upset the habitual codes of mental activity and lead to the weakening of the fundamentals of inherited professionalism.

In the West the transmission of experience from one generation to another is radically different from the Eastern way. This process was especially strengthened in the twentieth century and reaches its climax in American culture. That is why the American system of education and American professionalism are becoming the standard for modern times. If in European culture starting from the Renaissance such concepts as talent, originality, and creativity became important components of cultural development, then in American culture "talent" not only becomes the property of culture, but also becomes the embodiment of power, money, business, and fame.

Cultivating talent, turning it into an idol, makes it equal to God. Contrary to Christian tenets, this sanctions a way of life and a way of thinking for all society. On that scale this property is not inherent even in the modern classical Europe. This is the result of American culture, in which following tradition gives up its place to "fashion" and ideology. Breaking with the past, talent and originality dominate now, at this moment.

Petrov singles out the second peculiarity of European coding, the essence of which is that in culture is always a group of universal social codes which form civil skills. These peculiarities were first presented by the ancient Greeks: the Greek was scribe, warrior and citizen in one person. The principle of universal participation in public affairs allowed Greeks to develop unified norms of social life and realize a universal program of equalization, which led to the idea of equality, and, consequently, to the idea of democracy.⁷

On the basis of the European social code there is a principle of citizenship that consists in the combination of the personal and the social. "What we consider," writes Habermas, "is the categories of Greek origin, which came to us through the Roman tradition. In the developed Greek city-state, the sphere of *polis*, which is common for free citizens (*koine*), is strictly separated from the sphere of personal (*oikos*), which belongs to each individual person (*idia*)."

Public life (*bios politicos*) is performed in the market square (*arope*), but it is not limited in locality: publicity is formed in discussion (*lexis*), which takes a consultative form in the form of a court and also a form of joint action (*proxis*). The public life of every citizen takes on the form of a monolithic public, which forms a civil society. Civil society is the result of European culture in its social and mnemonic experience of European history.⁸

Transmission of civil society happens through sociocultural channels, through education, art, literature, academics—and down to cafes, bars, clubs, and so on.

As for the sphere of the personal, it should be noted that European culture sanctioned free enterprise as the basic component of the economic life of a society. Free enterprise is really free from professional, family, and national traditions and requires maximum mobility and the ability to recognize a new situation in order to solve a problem and end up a winner. In this case the experience of predecessors or even someone's own past experience is often overturned.

Because the modern technological structure of a society is changeable, it is always being updated. A European man does not have one profession for all his life; he is always learning and changes his profession several times. Therefore, it is hard to speak about inherited professional experience or family dynasties of miners or weavers, as it was, for example, in the Soviet period. That is why, unlike eastern culture, in European culture, traditional ways of transmitting professional skills and knowledge are no longer basic.

The third peculiarity of European social coding, in Petrov's opinion, is the inclination toward universal conceptual social codes. In European culture, "fire" (Heraclitus), "number" (Pythagorus), "interaction and causality," and others are considered universal social codes. In the New Age this is the result of the effort of the European mind to bring order to the world as something complete and organized and to give it sense. European rationalism is very passionate in its structured approach to the world and being of man. But in the second part of the twentieth century rationalistic traditions, based on the accumulation of human knowledge about the world, gradually gave up their place to synergetics.

However, European coding as the most open mobile system makes gigantic strides in comparison with Eastern coding. Technology radically destroys the system of classical coding, which does not obey the power of European man, for he is subject to the madness of planetary technology. Science's new methods—cloning, or the capability for man-made selection with the aim of creating a regiment of people without memory and the past—is evidence of this.

The mnemonic experience of the East is diverse, though in its base lies a seemingly pedantic, monotonous reproduction of traditions. Traditions, as forms of mnemonic culture, have always been present in the East. They embody fundamental principles of attitude toward the world and the creation of the world. That is why they are constantly reproduced and are the way man immerses himself into the world.

Until recently the dynamic European mnemonic experience had seen stagnation, backwardness and inertness. The wisdom and value of the eastern mnemonic experience are based on fundamental philosophical postulates. Heidegger considered that in eastern culture the subject and object are not "split," that they make up a whole. The subject does not tower above the world, it is inside it, and the world is in the subject. The world does not throw

out the subject to transform the world using all its potentialities and passions. These passions ultimately lead to estrangement and deprivation of the basic components of being human and the mutuality which that entails.

If in the European system of coding man is torn by his “estrangement” and “cognition” of the world, then in eastern coding man is co-author of the world.

The mnemonic experience of the East comes from the position that there is no past, present, and future. That is why the human mind must rest in the unity of things. As a result, splitting and disorder of the world disappear. Constancy is the way to “enlightenment,” that is, a state allowing complete and present mingling with the world.

In this connection it is clear that the conceptual basis of the mnemonic experience of the East is connected with the spiritual, but not the physical, man. Unlike in the West, tradition, the spirit of ancestors, endless repetitions, and the learning of canons of the past do not play an instrumental role in the life for Eastern man they are verily the way of spiritual being.

The mnemonic experience of eastern man is not a collection of feelings, reminiscences, and facts of individual and collective life which are strung on the temporal thread of being—the past, present, future—but the ability to live in the rhythm of Dao. “The great Dao is in endless movement, and something which is in endless movement does not reach the End. Not reaching the End, it returns to the Beginning.” That is why eastern man does not consider it useless, antiquarian, old-fashioned, or not modern to dedicate time and effort to study past experiences and lives of ancestors. Constancy is the phenomenon of the East, under the vault of which life, quite human, with all its manifestations, unfolds.

“Reach the maximum emptiness, stop in rest, and all things will alternate, we shall have only to contemplate their return. Though there is an innumerable number of things, all of them return to their beginning: I shall call return to the beginning Rest. It means return to the command of Heaven.”⁹ “A sage stays in Constancy, does the good, saves people, and does not abandon them. It means to be Enlightened.”¹⁰ The way to enlightenment lies through a non-creative learning of all that has been created by people. That is why the eastern system of teaching is mostly based on appropriating cultural and philosophical dogmas. In this process, liberty, creative imagination, and originality are not permissible. Deviation from tradition or attempts to show originality are taken as an insult to the spirit of the forefathers. The transmission of the sociocultural legacy in the eastern system of coding is realized through textual stamps, family contacts, and the teacher-student system without independent interpretation.

The East does not know the “Great End” or “Nothing.” “Nothing is neither an object nor something existing. It can be met neither by itself nor by any supplement to it. Nothing is a condition of the possibility of opening existence as such for the human being. Nothing is not, strictly speaking, the antonym to the existing, but initially it belongs to its basis. In the being of the existing “Nothing” commits its elimination,” writes Heidegger.¹¹

How can European man live in the grasp of such contemplation of the world? Such a feeling causes ontological “insult,” maybe, “audacity,” expressed in active transforming activity in the world, which is objectified in material and spiritual values. Recollections connected with such feelings express the essence of European man.

Eastern man is intent on an eternal return to the beginning. In order to comprehend the beginning as something integral, he must forget himself and completely flow together with the world. Only then can he find himself as integral—man meets himself. In Buddhism the picture of the world is represented as the unity of space and time, interruption and continuity, cyclical and linear, consciousness and unconsciousness. In every moment of this unity there is a temporal line: past, present, and future. In the state of “nirvana” space becomes emptiness, and time—eternity.

Eastern and European ways of thinking are different. For example, eastern man is involved in a system of communication where transmission of information is reduced to the minimum message. This is contact without words. If for a European extra-textual silence means a vacuum of sense, then for eastern man silence is one of the most important ways of comprehending the real sense of things.

When communicating, a European prefers to give all the details, analyze, give arguments, and make conclusions. While eastern man posits that the truth is beyond words; intuition, guesses, and perceptions are most important. Moreover the eastern type of communication could be called symbolic in the sense that communication of information is realized through symbols which are only the surface of a deeper, hidden sense.

D. B. Zilberman singles out two types of communication: eidetic and acoustic. By doing so he connects eidetic communication with writing, and acoustic with verbal, cultural traditions.¹² These two types of communication are inherent in both eastern and western mnemonic experience. Brahmins, for example, as well as Plato, considered written sources inferior, believing that there are many false interpretations and speculations in them. In *Phaedra* Plato wrote that the Egyptian king Tamus reproached the god Tevt for inventing writing allegedly intended to become a “canon of memory and wisdom.” “It will cause forgetfulness in the souls of those who learned it, because memory is not trained here; trusting to writing, people will remember outwardly—through extraneous signs, but not interior ones, from themselves. So, you have found a means not for the memory, but for reminding. You give your students an outward appearance of wisdom, but not the truth. They will learn by hearsay, without studying, and will seem to know a lot but remain mostly ignorant and unable to communicate; they will exhibit a false wisdom instead of really being wise.”¹³

In eastern culture, a subject’s inclusion in an object allows it to reject Aristotle’s definition of an individual: “A subject cannot be a predicate.” Japanese philosopher Niside Kitoro wrote that everything that exists now is reality; the presence of man in the world raises “pure experience” in the sense of the mutual penetration of man and the world. Similar ideas are character-

istic of western philosophers—Heidegger and Marcel. This may be linked to the fact that after the Second World War many Japanese people studied philosophy in Europe and synthesized eastern and western teachings.

Hegel wrote that the West and the East are present in everything. That is why a meeting of the West and East is becoming a historical necessity. The mnemonic experiences of the East and West, accumulated for thousands of years, on the basis of historical and cultural forms of learning now supplement each other.¹⁴

In this sense T. P. Grigoryeva's comparison of the concepts "yang" and "ying"—and her claim that "yang" is western and "ying" eastern—seems convincing. "Yang"/"ying" represent the unity of oppositions, and this unity constitutes the universal potential.

Nonetheless, Eastern culture in its structure is radically different from western culture. It has inner cultural space in which its own intellectual and spiritual situation unfolds. Cultural space stretches diametrically in intervals from its genesis to its modern state; and semantically between different heights of spirit and mind which were conquered by it. The semantics of cultural space is formed thanks to a mnemonic base, that is, thanks to cultural memory. In this sense one can speak about mnemonic space in the sphere of culture.

Mnemonic space is a cultural field or a cultural circle, where contents are concentrated and from which a cultural situation itself grows. In the East a cultural situation is reproduced, first of all, thanks to traditions, broadly speaking.

Tradition as a mnemonic phenomenon in eastern culture is understood not only as rituals and symbols, but as an ontological law that happens according to the will of the Universe, from Dao. That is why traditions, making up the semantic density of mnemonic space in the East, become the basis of human life.

A characteristic of eastern culture is intellectual synchronism, that is, the past, present, and future are always at the same time—actual and parallel. Buddhism says: "There is no past, present, or future. One is in everything and everything is in one: there is no yesterday or tomorrow, there is only today." The past with all its accumulated experience and today with its potential reality, realizing the knowledge and experience of the past and the future, which is programmed by the past, are pulled together in one whole, an interfaced, organic being of spirit and material world.¹⁵

An Indian parable comes to mind. Once there lived an inquisitive young man. He made up his mind to travel around the world in order to know it better. These travels took so long time that he returned a very old man. He had seen and understood a lot. Feeling very tired after his long travels, he fell asleep in his small hut. In the morning, after waking up, he saw a drop of dew in which all the world was reflected. The legend's breadth and depth of content are striking.

According to the eastern understanding of the world, every point of the Universe in the temporal and semantic sense is a point of intersection, a

point of contact of everything. Life and sense everywhere are self-sufficient and full of sense.

Thus, the peculiarity of philosophical thinking is analyzed by researchers in the framework of the “East-West” dichotomy. By making the traditionalism of eastern philosophy absolute, some of them reject the value meaning of achievements of western philosophy; others, by preferring classical examples of eastern philosophical thinking, underestimate the progressive ideas of eastern philosophy. The supporters of “synthesis” or “integration” of progressive traditions of eastern and western philosophical thinking do not consider them to satisfy intellectual inquisitiveness but think they are a necessary requirement of the development of philosophical culture. Mastering the models of philosophical thinking by special education through the system of social institutions gives the subject the possibility to develop cognition in the framework of the given philosophical community. Tradition in philosophical thinking is natural, even necessary, and without it a philosophical system of any people is not possible.

The process of beginning new traditions from old ones, how history and human conditions influence innovation, are questions of great interest. Likewise, the coexistence of traditions and innovations in one philosophical system of thinking are also of great interest.

Undoubtedly, we have a great and long philosophical heritage, transmitted through traditions, which influence all forms of human activity, especially human thinking. Innovations in philosophical thinking arise inside traditional forms; that is why traditions of philosophical thinking are appealed to in search of innovative ways, forms, and means to comprehend objective reality.

Traditions and innovations are not in opposition to each other, being different products of philosophical thinking in the functioning of their mechanisms and transmission of information. In the framework of traditional forms of thinking, a subject in the process of learning about the objective world studies the known sources of ideas which are the products of past generations’ philosophical thinking.

New philosophical thinking, according to the conservative position, can be recognized only if it is the interpretation of what was laid-out by forefathers in the distant past. Traditionalism, having deep roots in eastern philosophy, sets exact limits. The most widespread form of philosophical composition in eastern philosophy is the commentary in which the author’s ideas were formed as interpretations or explanations of an authoritative commentator’s thoughts. Thus, traditionalism in the philosophical thinking of eastern peoples presents an essential part of that civilization’s general sociocultural mechanism. However this must not create an impression that there are invariable “archetypes” allegedly lying in the basis of eastern philosophical thinking.

Traditions appear before us not only in all their variety and differentiation—they not only remain, but are also reproduced, transformed, and joined in unexpected combinations with the latest innovations in philosophical thinking.

Traditionalism in philosophical thinking has not denied new developments. But nonetheless, the sage is one who could best master the intellectual achievements of previous ages.

So, a tradition is one of the means of supporting and reproducing the given way of philosophical thinking, subjected to different kinds of transformations, acquiring a new life, or documenting a declining culture. The mechanism of developing philosophical thinking is connected with traditions and innovations, which appear as a result of entering non-traditional cultural spheres in general, and philosophical thinking in particular.

Innovations outside the spheres of traditionalism do not break off with the latter completely—they interact with it. In this dialectic, the character and dynamics of the interaction of traditions and innovations in philosophical thinking are revealed. Thus, the mnemonic experience of the West and East is, in essence, analogous and shows the necessity of the succession of generations and historical epochs.

THE LOGICAL AND MNEMONIC RECONSTRUCTION OF THE METAPHYSICAL CULTURE OF TURKIC PEOPLES

Thinking of being is the primordial way of verification.

- M. Heidegger

The historical metamorphoses that befell the Turkic peoples over two thousand years has mostly disappeared from memory because of the absence of a written historiographical tradition. But the current research, to some extent, can restore our ancestors' ways of thinking and life.

“An idea is the memory of being,” wrote Heidegger.¹⁶ The flow of history, the spirit of people, the history and sense of the existence of man were kept in the thoughts of our forebears. That is why an attempt at a logical reconstruction of what was remembered, what was given to human recollection, will rekindle to some extent the issues of Turkic cultural logic.

A thought is a concentrated expression of information and knowledge about being. A thought as a phenomenon of culture fixes not only an objective state of being in time and space, but also the attitude of man to being, caused by personal, cultural and historical factors.

Being for man is possible in feelings and thoughts. A thought as an orderly, systemized view of the world gives man the most adequate idea about it. The world before us is the way a human thought comprehends and lights it up. A thought about being saves man from homelessness, from estrangement from the world. Having no roots in the world, spiritual and mental roaming are caused by man's lack of connection with the world. “Homelessness is becoming the fate of the world,” wrote Heidegger.¹⁷ Homelessness is forgetfulness. Homeless man, homeless thought, homeless soul are all caused by forgetfulness. That is why man needs to determine his “essential abode”—a home, where man becomes man.

His outer manifestations of “homeland” not only in a national, patriotic sense, and “mother tongue” not only in the sense of a means of communication, but also in the sense of a home of personal being. Man can determine his essential abode only as a result of an inquiry into being, and this is the main destiny of man. This is the path to a settled way of man’s essence. The evident world, lit up by the human mind, is preserved in the memory of being, that is, in thoughts.

There is intellectual material for a logical reconstruction of the mnemonic culture of Turkic peoples: a great scientific, philosophical, historical and literary heritage.

The claims of our forebears’ mind were high enough. If we divide the history of our peoples’ thought into three periods, ancient, medieval, and modern, then in this framework it is possible to reveal fundamental components of the Turkic mnemonic culture. It is possible to guess the eternal role of the realization of sociocultural codes for the forming of historical and cultural identity. It is necessary to determine one’s own collective “self” in the context of modern civilization while paying special attention to the importance of the logical reconstruction of the spiritual processes of the Turkic peoples on the modern stage.

This search must be realized in the form of cultural-philosophical reflection. In this respect the way has already been paved by such western philosophers as V. Vindelband, Henry Rikert, Ernst Cassirer, Wilhelm Dilthey, Richard Kroner, Georg Simmel, Oswald Spengler, Nicholas Hartmann, and others.

Our research is guided by Descartes’ opinion that “all the sciences, taken together, are identical to human wisdom, which always remains the same, and, though being applied to different objects, experience changes like sunlight when it throws light on different things.”¹⁸ Therefore, the use of methodological principles of twentieth century western philosophers to explain and reconstruct the intellectual history of Turks must not seem incorrect from the point of view of the old scientific approach.

Resorting to methodological premises of western cultural-philosophical traditions, we must remember that our main task is to restore the architectonics of the intellectual traditions of Turkic peoples.

The line of demarcation between western and eastern cultures concerning Turkic culture is objective, not only geographically but also culturally. It is important for us to determine the grammar of our ancestors’ thinking as a historical form of mnemonic culture and understand how much of the ancient forms of thinking are present today and to what extent they participate in practical culture; that is, we want make an effort to reveal, as much as possible, the living forms of Turkic culture.

Spiritual forms of past human activity possess a flow of energy which nourishes our modern world. This thesis is confirmed by Hegel. At the end of his work *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel, bearing in mind the process of restoration of cultural forms by recollection, writes that this process of self-realization of spirit represents a continuous movement, an uninterrupted line

of recollections, a gallery of images. “The ‘self’ must comprehend and master the richness of its substance. Its perfection is in an approximation to the cognition of itself. This knowledge is a spiral, in which it rejects its outer existence and subjects its knowledge to recollection. But this recollection is the preservation of experience, it is a quintessence, and in essence a higher form of substance.

The way to this substance lies through the inner organization of recollections, in letting the peculiarity of imagination unfold. The preservation of recollections, being considered as free human actions and as occasional succession of facts, makes up history; from the side of their being comprehended by mind, and somehow organized, it will be a science of phenomenology of spirit. Both of them, as comprehended by mind, form a recollection and an opening to absolute spirit. This is real history—reality, truth, the authenticity of a higher position without which life is empty and lonely.”¹⁹

Proceeding this way, we want to perceive the “inner forms” (E. Cassirer) of our culture to understand the regularity of its structure, the philosophical system of the spirit of our nations.

The activity of the spiritual life of Turkic peoples manifested itself in language, ethnic culture, scientific research, and in great examples of literature, art and social creation. To substantiate this immutable fact we must unpack something of the inner system of spirit by “recollecting” what is possible as examples of the richness and value of Turkic culture. We know that “in order to recollect some content, consciousness must by some way, but not by simple feeling or perception, master what is inside. In this case it is not enough just to repeat something, what was given in some other moment of time. But in this repetition a new way of understanding and forming (mnemotopy) must come to the fore. For every reproduction of content includes a new step of reflection. By the fact that conscience, perceiving it not as the present, but as something past, realizes it as an image, as something still present, by this attitude, consciousness gives itself and the content another ideal meaning. And the latter appears with a greater definiteness and richness of content with further differentiation of its own world of images—‘self.’ Now ‘self’ not only performs the primordial activity of construction but at the same time teaches us to deepen and understand it. And by so doing, the bounds of the subjective and objective world for the first time can be seen clearly and distinctively.”²⁰

The historical self-consciousness of the Turkic peoples became an important sphere of philosophical reflection in the self-realization of the peoples’ spirit as a result of a long process of building on integrity. This process is connected with recollection, the retrospective estimation of the past stages of culture development.

“In historical reflection recollection of individual ‘self’ is expanded to the recollection of cultural consciousness, which recollects all its activities, taking back ideas and forms. This creative search on the way to self-realization digs into its inner depth and assimilates history, self, and culture.”²¹

Unfortunately, the mnemonic culture of Turkic peoples has not preserved an uninterrupted line of historical development that would make up

a complete structure of our spiritual being, supporting us and most fully expressing our civilization's accomplishments and potential. But perhaps exactly this incompleteness gives us the possibility to create this anew in the new century. In order to do this Turkic culture should make a retrospective estimation to substantiate the spirit of Turkic culture as an objective history of our peoples and the present time.

This task meets with methodological difficulties, for the methods and instruments of logical reconstruction are not developed well enough. Besides this, any methodology is also restricted by the limits of a definite culture, in respect to which it has been developed and used.

In any case the analysis must be started from the methodological problems of the social memory of Turkic peoples. These problems can be formulated as the prospects of Turkic peoples experiencing a fundamental turning point in their cultural and historical development.

From what time and space did the history of our ancestors begin? How synchronous and rhythmic were the historic phenomena and events in our peoples' lives with world history? Are there peculiarities in the cultural-historical development of Turkic peoples? If yes, then what were they? What was the logic of historical-cultural development, or, in other words, do the "individual laws" of Turkic civilization (T. Zimmel) work in historical development? What paradigms determined the movement of sociocultural organization in different epochs?

The history of culture is witness to the collapse of many great metaphysical structures in history. And still science never refuses to interpret, generalize, and systematize historical-cultural processes in order to explain them and succeed in their cognition. We shall also try to reconstruct the past, which was retained in the historical-cultural memory of the Turkic peoples.

It is known that Dilthey suggested a method that unites the search of historical truth through the concepts of historical logic with intuitive understanding. But Hartmann considers that this method cannot be universal, that it was dependent on the personal skill and approach of Dilthey.²²

In our opinion, the ideas of Rikert solve the problem described above. Rikert held that science moves thanks to the forming of concepts, and concepts in their nature are universal. Besides, every effort to reconstruct the past is connected with an estimation of value caused by a researcher's personality, and also with an estimation dictated by the present. Thus, positive analysis is accompanied by a number of subjective factors. For this reason many western researchers insisted on the fact that social and humanitarian sciences must possess their own methodological approach.

The attempt to determine the mnemonic constants of culture is both simple and complicated, because they are in a double-layered state. The first is hidden, virtual, and silent; the second is something on the surface, articulated, and demonstrated. The first represents the spiritual and logical level; the second, the documented, observed level.

In the first chapter we partly touched on the problem of the past, present, and future. This triunity of historical time is causal, which is axi-

omatic. A great number of researchers paid attention to the content of this causality. Whitehead writes:

The past objectively exists in the present, which turns to the future. But it is not clear enough in what sense the future is immanently present in the previous events, and the events of the present are immanent to each other, if you are limited by the conception of subjective-objective structure of experience. It is easier to consider, first, the attitude of the future to the present. It is clear that for the present the future has some significance. Well-known customs and habits of people are evidence of it...Reject the future—and the present will be devastated, ruined. Immediate existence requires filling the cracks of the present with the future.²³

The initial objective order of things presupposes that for the mnemonic analysis of any society it is necessary to begin with the principle of the triunity of historical time.

The principles of the historical method that have become classical in the social sciences and humanities do not reveal the essence of mnemonic culture completely.

A main principle is directed at taking into account the experience and values of the past while studying the problems of the present. As for the mnemonic principle, it differs from this by suggesting a synchronism of the past, present, and future not on a historical level, but on a logical level.

Some basic points surrounding this principle were developed by Estonian philosopher Y. Rebane more than twenty years ago. But because of various reasons this very important principle did not become effective in the arsenal of scientific methodology of social science and epistemology. Given the conditions of fundamental change in the culture of the peoples of the former Soviet Union, this principle plays a very important role. It is known that “history is not just a sequence of events.” It is rather the interrelationship events. In this case, the past has not absolutely passed, has not completely died, but is somehow living in the present.

“Contemporaneity of the past is not repetition and not even analogy. Rather it can be called original preservation, the actuality of the past in the present, despite the passing of what was before. This is exactly what was previously called the invasion of the past into the present,” as Hartmann points out.²⁴ He thinks that this invasion can be of two types. A “silent” invasion is expressed in ways, customs, and manners, the original meaning of which can be lost, but which live actively enough in the present time. It is the same with the forms of language and thinking, philosophical trends, ideas, prejudices, and moral, legal and political phenomena. National cultures, writings, and historical sciences are varieties of an articulated invasion.

However, in the interrelationship of the past, present, and future there is a selective moment. This phenomenon of mnemonic activity is caused by

the invasive nature of human subjectivity. This subjective attitude toward mnemonic experience is, in principle, what determines the selection of what to consider from the past. It is sometimes not objective, not complete, to the detriment, perhaps, of the significance of certain phenomena, facts, or richness, which can play a role in the present and future.

However, the general line of mnemonic activity is preserved and transmitted from generation to generation, remaining the beginning point of reading the roots of people's spiritual being. And this stability embodies the axis of spiritual life around which cultural creation emerges and spreads.

The common historical experience shared by the peoples of Central Asia gave rise to the axial canons of their cultural development. The region's science, philosophy, religion, and art is evidence of the high level of social and cultural self-consciousness. Inner unified layers of culture were formed by many centuries of living together, by ethnic and cultural mutual dependence, and by confessional communities.

The history of Central Asia's ancient peoples has many layers. Russian researcher C. Panarin divides the historical legacy of the region into two parts: the eastern historical heritage and the Soviet period.²⁵

In the eastern period of Turkic civilization, farmers and nomads opposed each other. Gradually the transition from a conflictive to a producing culture was accomplished. The collective memory of ancient Turks reproduced deep-seated elements of culture, which remained in the sociocultural memory. Their presence in the context of modern culture is evidence of this. Their social situation, having changed after the collapse of the Soviet system, brought layers of culture of different times from very old ages, which played a significant role in motivational and intentional structures of people's consciousness. This can be explained by the rich resources of the Turks' cultural genesis and the stable indicators of our ethno-cultural identity.

It is known that in the territory of Central Asia different political powers exercised dominion and tried to introduce their own cultural traditions. But the main cultural code of the Turks remained. A healthy conservatism of both ancient and medieval Turks promoted the organic unity of the ethnic groups. Nonetheless, trade and cultural exchange flowed between the regions of Central Asia, promoting the penetration of new ideas and knowledge.

The basis of Kyrgyz metaphysical culture is drawn from the East, expressing the spirit of the people. They were objectified both in their rational culture—economic and state structures—and in their intuitive, reflexive culture—the spheres of art, morality, customs, law, and religion.

The metaphysical culture of the people is formed by reflection and self-reflection. Reflexive culture pledges itself to interpret historical practice, where the intellectual, artistic, religious, economic, and political experience of a people is embodied. In philosophical reflection, consciousness, the result of self-comprehension, is formed.

Metaphysical culture is the sphere where the spirit and the philosophy of a people are expressed. A great number of naive intuitive forms, reflecting

different conditions of self-consciousness, different ways of self-reflection, precede the forming of an integral metaphysical culture.

The research of ethnographers, cultural anthropologists, and psychologists indicate the existence of archetypes inherent in almost all the peoples and symbolizing deeply spiritual phenomena. Let us refer to the original forms of sociocultural memory—fairy tales and myths.

The Kyrgyz, like other peoples, have fairy tales and myths, legends and parables, which are significant in their spiritual life. They are woven into historical consciousness as the expression of their self-understanding and self-determining in the world.²⁶

Let us begin with the archetype of an old man, a sage, Kydyr-Ata, who is encountered by people in decisive moments of their life and, as a rule, gives them wise advice. His advice is esoteric: not every person understands the sage, or even listens to his advice.

Kydyr-Ata possesses not only intelligence, wisdom, and knowledge, but also high moral qualities; he is always reasonable and generous. In short, Kydyr-Ata possesses spiritual supremacy and is the mouthpiece and bearer of the spirit of the people.

In many cultures' fairy tales there are archetypes of a girl-orphan and an angry old woman or stepmother as symbols of fragile good and dominating evil respectively. Similar fairy tales can be found in the other Turkic peoples. Three powers—the Good, the Wise, and the Evil—are constantly fighting against each other, at times trading places with each other. This system of triunity was a characteristic of the primitive ancient metaphysics of the Kyrgyz people.

Likewise, in the folk culture of the Kyrgyz, a special place is taken by ceremonies, in which concepts about soul, life, and death are coded. In this respect, as with many other peoples, *koshok* is especially noted. It is very hard to decode the initial sense of this notion. Morphological analysis of this word shows that its root is “*kosh*”; it is possible to form the words “*koshtoo*” and “*koshoo*.” The first word means “accompaniment” to a funeral ceremony by a story of the life of the dead person, and the second means the “joining in” of the dead person to the other world. Both meanings are evidence of the connection of human beings and an afterlife.

It is known that the performing of *koshok* requires certain skills. That is why many peoples invite special mourners. Soviet philosopher M. K. Mamardashvili wrote that once as a youth he happened to be in a Georgian village and saw mourners who drove people to an ecstatic state. Later he understood the meaning of this ceremony, which at that time seemed a pretense to him. He writes: “the point is that to forget is natural, but to remember is artificial. The *koshok* introduces a person into the succession and constancy of memory, into the attachment and links.”²⁷ It serves to activate a “code.”

The peoples of Central Asia, like many other peoples, have a very well developed cult of ancestors. Knowledge of ancestors back seven generations is the holy duty of every person, and ignorance means bad breeding and

humble origins. This oral memory of peoples has preserved the heroic deeds and defeats of distant relatives.

Moreover, they are still remembered when someone wants to characterize the life of some community or ethnic group. "The spirit of ancestors" is present in the structure of social consciousness; it is still the arbiter of life's activity for modern peoples.

The appearance of epic novels, poetry, religion, and state structures makes the metaphysical outlook of our ancestors creative and reforming. Metaphysical efforts are now directed at the interpretation of phenomena of a higher-order social order and society, which must be directed at the good, at the realization of the social ideals of a society.

As a result, historical self-consciousness, growing on the basis of historical memory, is forming, and in the change of generations a selection of values and knowledge necessary for the further development of an individual and society is happening. In any case, metaphysical orientation is aimed at reflecting a stable picture of the world and, through it, finding inner spiritual and mental stability in counterbalance to the fluidity and changeability of destiny.

Religion played a great role in the development of the metaphysical conceptions of Turkic peoples. During their history Turkic peoples were witnesses to and representative of many religious confessions. In Central Asia, especially during the Middle Ages, different religious philosophical tendencies flourished: Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Gnosticism, Christianity, and Islam. The dominant position of Islam, having absorbed the beliefs of Turkic peoples, finally determined their religious philosophy as the mnemonic experience, transmitted from generation to generation.

Religious philosophy established and reproduced patterns of attitudes toward life and death. Imans, mosques, and cults appeared, which normalized people's behavior in different life situations. For example, such traditions as *nike* (marriage), *uch talak* (divorce), *parzov* (duty) of a Muslim, rituals of *namaz* (prayer), the ceremony of parting with the deceased and a funeral repast, are cultural codes found as a result of the spread of Islam. In general, Islam regulated the life of an individual, a community, and the state in the history of the Turkic peoples.

Turkic metaphysical conceptions are most vividly expressed in art, poetry, literature, music, architecture, applied arts, and painting as the best ways of coding cultural values, ideals, and historical memory. The colossal epic culture of Turkic peoples, which reflects our ancestors' conceptions of the world, is an inexhaustible source for reproduction of social behavior and social order. Besides, as people's memory it is a source for the formation of historical self-consciousness.

Metaphysical conceptions in a more rationalized form are reflected by science. Science has taken a stable place in Turkic culture. In Central Asia medicine, mathematics, astronomy, philosophy, geography, and linguistics received attention after the ancient Greeks, medieval Arabs, and representatives of other eastern civilizations had developed them.²⁸ Scientific data attached

harmony and logic to the Turks' idea of the world. The perceptible form of the world became more rational and was expressed in the concepts of value, the good, truth, law, necessity, causality, and freedom. Even happiness is considered by Turks as an intellectual and spiritual category. As a result, a system of general significance was created, which included values and the significance of key moments in the life of man and the world. According to this system, the basis of the world is Mind: Divine, Supreme and Absolute.

If the rational spirit, which does not know its end, is expressed more in the scientific consciousness of Turkic peoples, then the moral and rational spirit is expressed in politics and state organization as the objectively realized spirit. As is known, Hegel defined the essence of statehood as the "reality of a moral ideal." With the creation of statehood an opportunity to organize the culture of a people, through which subjective consciousness accomplishes objectively interpreted social actions, appeared. But this is not a guarantee of a full and valued cultural existence. Culture will become internally organized and will be fully valued only due to reflecting consciousness, which integrates, selects, and transmits the sociocultural experiences of a people. And, although a state did not become a real embodiment of spirit, as Plato, Al-Farabi, and Hegel dreamed, the spirit of the person and a people manifest themselves in political will.

To substantiate this thesis let us turn to the political and ethnic memory of Turkic peoples. With Turkic peoples, wide empirical activity is comprehended by the concept of "state." Their political memory noted the existence of different states, which have come and gone in the course of their history.

Some states were created by the peoples themselves as a result of their own political will and obligation; others were thrust on the Turks because of different historical circumstances. That is why their political memory has preserved the extensive experience of political organization, which is used now by modern national independent states. Thus, recent contentions of a lack of political ability in Central Asian peoples are disproved by history itself.

However, social ideology in the former Soviet Union sowed forgetfulness in the consciousness of several generations, rendering them "non-historical." And people without history and historical memory are not well grounded. Reconstructing the historical memory of Turkic peoples is very complicated, for their history has not been recorded in great detail. Moreover, it has not been authentically analyzed by historical and philosophical thinking. The sources used in modern scientific research and literature are fragmentary. That is why many scientific theses, though based on common sense and historical truthfulness, are confirmed and grounded a priori. In connection with this, a problem arises with the correlation of historical memory and historical truth. This problem is very complicated and methodologically cannot be authentically described, because interests, likes, and tastes of a subjective kind are added on to the historical process. Besides, oral history can always be interpreted anew. Modern research dedicated to the analysis of the philosophical and metaphysical systems of Turkic peoples cannot fill in large cultural gaps.²⁹

Turkic culture has witnessed four invasions.³⁰ The first of those invasions was committed by Arabs; the second, by Mongols; the third, by Russian colonial policy; and the fourth, by the Soviets. With each of these invasions, the written language changed; thus, the link with previous generations was interrupted. In this connection we need to do justice to the memory of past generations and recapture the history and culture in the flow of time.

During the Soviet period, the role of national languages greatly decreased due to the Russian influence, although, in all fairness, it should be noted that in that time a paradoxical situation arose. On the one hand, the Kyrgyz got the opportunity to publish books and be educated in the national language. On the other hand, the Soviet language policy did not promote the full value development of national languages.

Language is not too serious a phenomenon for easy speculation. The essential character of language was described by the French philosopher Foucault: “A language is not the outer manifestation of thought, but thought itself.”³¹ Thus, a change of language actually means a change of direction in the character of thought itself.

Man takes root in a language so deeply that to change languages often is ruinous for culture. Unfortunately, a similar situation took place in the history of Kyrgyz society. Because cultural memory is the social creation of generations and a product of intergenerational communication, sociocultural gaps cause injury to the social organism.

So, from the moment of establishment of Soviet power and for more than thirty years, written language—and therefore culture—was interrupted a number of times. In 1929 Arabic written language was changed to Latin characters, and in 1941 the Latin alphabet was replaced by Cyrillic. This was the basis for cultural amnesia. The language experience of several generations was lost. The loss of written language by the Kyrgyz meant, to a large extent, the loss of past generations’ experience.

If our cultural memory was strong and reliable, we would not be wandering in search of social and national identity—we would be a more advanced society.

It is necessary to search for paradigms of the metaphysical culture of the region in the context of historical and logical reconstruction. We need to undertake a retrospective of history and culture. Paradigms of the cultures of Central Asian peoples can be schematically composed from the following stages or categories: archaic, epic, Muslim Renaissance, educational (realization of the social ideal), Soviet (ideologization of cultures).

The oldest and deepest layer of Central Asian metaphysical culture is represented in mythology, fixed in material culture, imprinted in historical memorials and expressed in traditions and ceremonies. Systematization of these materials as paradigmatic principles of cultural development is a very complicated and laborious matter, it requires the efforts of many specialists.

Many sciences provide information about our ancestors' conception of the world. History, ethnography, archeology, paleoanthropology, paleogeography, ethnolinguistics, ethnopsychology, and art history show that ancient Central Asian principles of the formation of the world and models for human behavior are in keeping with similar phenomena of other cultures. There are opinions that there are universal cultural archetypes which are present in the different stages of cultural development. These archetypes are more significant in ancient and medieval cultures. The French ethnologist-structuralist Claude Levi-Strauss illustrates in his work that primitive thinking is most boldly reflected in myths. Myths, with strict and scientific logic, reflect the originality of the "conceptual thinking" of an ancient collective subject. "Non-tamed thoughts" of an ancient collective subject form the outline of an ancient culture's rationale.

The fact that almost all myths contain the same archetypes of understanding and representation of the world is interesting. For example, universal models of the world constitute the core of ancient cultures. The world appears as a multi-story, complicated, whole space. The axis of the world is the "world tree" (*duynonun turkugu* in Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Turkmen languages). This mythical tree supports the world and props up the sky. It is situated in the center of a "world mountain," which rests on the "world ocean."

A similar model of the world can be found in the culture of the peoples of Central Asia. Stone statues (Orhono-Enisey stone sculptures), rock drawings (Saimaluu Tash and others), mythological culture, applied art, architecture, household articles, and management traditions are evidence of analogous cosmological concepts of the world in the region. Archaic concepts of the world in a transformed state are present in the modern culture of Central Asian peoples. Ornamentalism in applied art and architecture most boldly expresses the social as well as spiritual knowledge of our ancestors.

First, Central Asian peoples had quite clear ideas about the world, nature, and man. Constructing the conception of the world, taking into account the expediency and wisdom of the world structure and the primary classification of the world phenomena, is vividly reflected in "tengrianity." Tengrianity is systemized knowledge, based on early stone carvings, about the primary beginning, primary elements of space, time, order, and chaos in the world. Man is one of the equally great phenomena in this complicated world; he is a part of the world, he is created by the world, and he is dissolved in the world in the same way as animals and plants. That is why the primogenitor of humanity is some animal or plant. The Turkic peoples of Central Asia have traditionally honored the Blue She-Wolf as their primogenitor. The deer, snow leopard, and other animals are totems—"the founders" of different families and peoples of the region.

But the analogy of the paradigms of Central Asian cultures with the paradigms of other cultures does not mean their identity. Creating the same conceptions of the world, the peoples of Central Asia filled them with their own knowledge and feelings about the world. Our ancestors' mythological way of thinking built its own schema of space and time, of the real and pos-

sible, whole and part, and different spheres of human life—soul and spirit. For example, they considered that space and time are not linear, but circular; that is, what goes away returns, the real and possible exist in unity.

Thus, the sociocultural experience of Central Asian peoples let them develop their own cultural limits.

The second step in the development of Central Asian cultural paradigms is characterized by a flourishing of creation epic. This phenomenon was typical both for eastern and western peoples. The most notable epic period in the history of culture was the Middle Ages, when “epic ferment” (M. Bloc) took place, even having strong influence on Philosophy.

Cultural paradigms of the epic period were set by the logic of epical thinking and perception of the world. The epic character as a conditional cultural paradigm of Central Asian peoples represents an integral world where different layers are present. They are mythology, fantasy, hyperbole, totemic concepts, esoterica, historical facts, and so on. The peoples of Central Asia have outstanding epics, such as “Manas,” “Alpamysh,” “Kyrk Kyz,” “Korogly,” “Koblandy batyr,” “Korkut,” “Kyz-Jibek,” “Kojojash,” and many others. It should be noted that many epic works belong to more than one nation in the region. For example, “Alpamysh” is wide spread among Uzbeks, the Kazakh, and the Karakalpak; “Kogoly,” among the Tajik, Turkmen, Uzbeks; “Korkut,” among Turkmen, the Kazakh and Uzbeks; and “Manas,” among the Kyrgyz, the Kazakh and the Tajik.

Different aspects of Central Asian creation epics were studied in the Soviet period. But most works are of historical and philological character only. However, the analysis of epics from philosophical and cultural positions is still in a rudimentary form.

The paradigms of the epic culture of Central Asian peoples are the following:

Epic world - endless, mysterious, of three levels, spherical, esoteric

Epic space and time – are not linear, the past, present and future are historically synchronous, real life and its forms exist in a unity

Epic heroes – are personified ideals of the region’s peoples about moral and physical perfection. The heroes are generous, noble, and fearless. They are, to some extent, supermen possessing supernatural abilities.

Epic life - is strictly hieratic and successive; life is an eternal going away and returning in the circulation of the world. Death is a natural link in the chain. Fate and destiny are predestined from above by Tenir and Allah.

Epic philosophy – syncretic, mythological, ideas of the world are not differentiated, knowledge is not divided, the social and the spiritual are united.

Epic mentality – is characterized by didacticism, collectivism, traditionalism, symbolism, and contemplation.

Epic values – homeland, family, people and people’s interests, sanctity of nature, sacralization of the spirit of ancestors, love, a wise wife, a horse, etc.

Epic creation – sacral and esoteric. For example, the dream of the folk-tale narrator is a mystery even for himself. Kyrgyz *manaschi-jamakchy*, Uzbek *bakshy*, Kazakh *tolgoochu*, *jyrauchy*, Turkmen *bakshy*, Tajik *roviens* are tales which carry out a significant role by transmitting knowledge, experience, and artistic creation between generations.

The third step is the development of a historical type of paradigm of Central Asian metaphysical culture. This is connected with the Muslim Renaissance of the ninth through twelfth centuries. The revolution taking place in the minds of eastern men of genius gave rise to the flourishing of science, philosophy, and literature. This global phenomenon developed both the West and the East. It showed the highest patterns of scientific understanding and philosophical interpretation of the world. Creatively transmitting ancient culture, Arabs discovered the cultural world of ancient civilization and introduced it to the West in the Middle Ages.

The Central Asian region was also included in the cultural stripe of the Muslim Renaissance. The cultural processes taking place in this region were enrolled into the common process—the Renaissance of the East. The process of cognition, use, and inner processing of the cultural heritage of Greece by the Central Asian cultural world was accompanied by fruitful thought, success in the field of cosmology, geometry, and astronomy. The transformation of ancient thought, but corrected and updated, can be seen in the examples of the work of Al-Farabi, Ibn-Sina, Biruni, and other scientists. In the ninth through twelfth centuries the works on Astronomy by Al-Fergani, Al-Horezmi, and Al-Farabi appeared. Scientific works by Biruni and Ibn-Sina were inspired by the needs of society and the need to solve practical problems.

The cultural and social atmosphere of the time presented a favorable basis for the flourishing of the creations of Yusuf Balasaguni, Mahmud Kashgari, Ahmed Yassavi, Rudaki, Hayam, Nisami, Navoyi, Ulukbek, Nasimi, Lutfulli, Jami, Firdousi and Babur. These Turkic and Iranian thinkers formed scientific and philosophical paradigms for the Middle Ages in Central Asia.

A typical characteristic of metaphysical culture of that time was a syncretism of thought, which was expressed in the mingling of scientific and artistic thinking. Synthesis of these two types of thought was aimed at the search for answers to the question of the correlation of good and evil. The energetic intellects of our ancestors like Al-Farabi were immersed in the world, feeling solidarity with the cosmos. They tried to construct a model of the world. Intellectual and spiritual activities in medieval culture worked out philosophical paradigms: Man, the Good, Truth, Beauty.

Those paradigms were most boldly reflected by Y. Balasaguni in his composition “*Kutadgu Bilig*.” The main characters of the composition personify concepts: Kuntugdy—just law, Aitoldy—happiness, Ogdulmin—mind, and Odgurmaysh—contentment. It is noteworthy that this work absorbed the Turkic epic traditions in the form of the cult of the Sun (Kuntugdy) and the Moon (Aitoldy). Ogdulmyn and Ogdurmysh in their dispute express two types of attitude toward life. The first character defends the creative actions of man,

the second is a supporter of a lonely life as the way to comprehend truth and the sense of life.

The wave of Muslim renaissance that had rolled across the region is the creation of M. Kashgari (XI c.), who is known by his fundamental work *A Dictionary of Turkic Dialects*, an encyclopedia of the phonetics, lexis, and grammar of Turkic languages. In this work it is possible to find rich information about the ethnogenesis of Central Asian peoples. The works of M. Kashgari promoted the development of ethnic languages and the self-consciousness of Turkic peoples.

The philosophical paradigms of the Middle Ages in the world-outlook and culture of Central Asian peoples were determined by the basic categories of eastern peripateticism, the forefather of which is Al-Farabi, a Turk by origin, born in Otrar, which was in the territory of modern Kazakhstan.

Eastern peripateticism, translating knowledge, social experience, and culture, was reflected in the region's scientific, public, and political thought. Cosmological, social, moral, and ethical problems were solved by peripatetics on the basis of the knowledge accumulated by the Greeks, Arabs, and Central Asian peoples themselves. Their understanding of the world's multilateralism, complexity, and eternity and of the completeness of human happiness in this world was reflected in their music, philosophy, science, and literature from the ninth through seventeenth centuries.

The fourth step in the paradigmatic circle of Central Asian peoples' metaphysics was connected with social and philosophical ideas of the value of human life, justice, equality, enlightenment, poverty and richness, good and evil. During the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries in Central Asia, feudal fragmentation increased, internecine wars became frequent, cities were devastated, people became poor and uneducated, and taxes increased. Land and other property was concentrated in the hands of feudal nobility. People's disturbances increased. Russia's conquest of the Central Asian region created resistance. The common people, tired of the local khans' oppression, stood up to both colonial policy and tsarist autocracy. The evidence of this protest was finally shown in the 1916 rising in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Before the October revolution the leaders of national movements against colonialism appeared among educated people. All these processes built on the ideas listed above, which were closely connected with the social and historical consciousness of the people of this region. These paradigms began to be seen more clearly among the national professional classes of the nineteenth-early twentieth century—among poets, thinkers, and teachers educated in Buhara, Samarkand, Kazan and Russia. Talented poets, akyns, who were of common origin, appealed to people's aspirations and reveries. Ch. Valihanov, Abay, Toktogul, Hamza, Mahtumkuli, Ahmad Donish and many other educators expressed the ideas of freedom and equality for people.

Having started educational activities, the rising national professional classes tried to raise the self-consciousness of the masses at the beginning of the twentieth century. Among the Kyrgyz and the Kazakh at this time a great number of *akyns-zamanists* appeared, organizing educational activities.

Their creation was open to the general public. They formed a national self-consciousness and respect for national culture, and drew people's attention to their self-respect.

Nonetheless, Soviet society offered many opportunities for cultural and national development to the people of the region. There is an opinion that for the culture of the Central Asian peoples the Soviet period was the period of Renaissance. In our opinion, the cultural construction of the Soviet society was contradictory; there were positive as well as negative tendencies.

The main cultural paradigm of Soviet society was an ideologizing of all spheres, a selective attitude toward spiritual heritage, a metaphysical denial of the past, isolation from the world cultural process, isolation of ideas, and monopoly of the party. The main principle of Soviet cultural development was absolute diachronism that contradicts the nature of culture. Synchronism in cultural development promotes a succession between different stages and extends the thread of basic nodal points and axis paradigms inherent in every original culture. It brings together past, present, and future of a people.

Culture in its development experiences the processes of synchronic and diachronic development. From the point of view of cultural history, this is quite natural, for it is independent in its choice of ways of evolution. As far as its content, the synchronism and diachronism of cultural development touch a great number of human and social problems, and they not only touch but to some extent cause the development of man himself, outlining his environment. Consequently, the influence of culture, the influence of its "ebb and tide" on societies, to some extent, sets a program for societal development. Thus there is a need to know the inner rules, if they exist, of the development of culture.

Culture is synchronic when it combines all the richness of cultural values of the past, successfully functions in the system of cultural values of the present, and determines their prospects. Otherwise, synchronism of culture is provided if it dialectically combines different layers of its historical development and makes up "the moving spirit" of real culture, successfully solving the problems of contemporaneity.

The analysis of cultural history proves that culture along the whole length of its functioning cannot be only synchronous. Periodically diachronism sets in as a crisis of culture (crises in the development of science and culture are normal phenomena, to some extent, even necessary). It is connected with the nature of culture, which is caused by value orientations, ideological and philosophical aims, a type of rationality and irrationality of a certain epoch and a certain historical period.

Cultural diachronism is revealed both in the framework of one mentality and between mentalities. We suppose that in the first and second cases diachronism appears as a result of unclaimed moral and social values because of the character and logic of culture development and also the requirements of the dominant ideology. In our context, this especially is true of the Soviet

period of cultural development. In other words, cultural diachronism is understood as the absence or temporary break of causation between cultural values and mentalities. This, in its turn, leads to the disturbance of harmony between the past, present, and future. The past, considered big, autonomous, and isolated, is very different from the present, which causes a lot of contradictions in the future and at times leads to dramatic moments in the history of culture. A good example is the inferior cultural history of my people and the country inherited by the present generation.

It is noteworthy that although diachronism is a natural moment in the development of culture, its synchronization promotes beneficial conditions for the development of national cultures, giving the opportunities for their self-realization.

In the present we are experiencing a period where the role of social heritage in interpreting the spiritual life of persons in society is finally being realized. This is caused by the fact that a society, overcoming the sickness of growth and not being afraid to rise to a higher level, needs the beginning point of reading, the historical support to mine the prospects for development.

In the base of normal societal functioning lies the principle of historical synchronism in the fields of economics, social relations, and spiritual life. Historical synchronism is the ability of a society to rationally combine experience, knowledge, skills, material, and spiritual values of the past and present to determine ways and guidelines for the future. "Historical synchronism," writes Ch. Aytmatov, "is when a man is able to live mentally in several temporal embodiments at the same time, sometimes centuries or thousands of years between them. This is possible, to some extent, at least for every man with imagination. But the one, for whom the events of the past are as close as current activity, the one who goes through the past as his own, as his intimate destiny, he is the martyr, the tragic personality. This is because he knows in advance what the end of the story is. He knows what it entailed, and therefore he suffers, unable to change the course of events, and sacrifices himself for the triumph of justice, which will never fully take place.

This thirst to establish the truth of the past is sacred. This is how ideas are born. This is how new generations join the previous ones, this is how it always happens on earth, and its life experience is growing, the good is increasing but evil is still passed from generation to generation in the never-ending memory, in the never-ending time and space of the human world. That is why it was said: those who came yesterday cannot know what is going on today, but those who live now know what happened yesterday. And tomorrow the todays will become yesterdays... the todays live in what happened yesterday, but if the tomorrows forget about what is going on today, there will be trouble for everybody..."³²

The principle of historical synchronism is especially important in the sphere of spiritual culture, in particular, in the process of education and upbringing. The point is that, without a subject's purposeful and energetic action in the strengthening of social memory and preserving of spiritual heritage, it is not possible to preserve the synchronicity of material and spiritual values.

And this, in its turn, generates a lot of problems not only of a spiritual and moral order, but also economic. Historical synchronism is the land of plenty, where ethical and economic culture is formed. Man's ability to perceive different temporal and spatial cuts of human culture is the sign of a society's health, the criterion of a personality's social maturity.

Man as a sociocultural creature absorbs extra-genetically the social experience and culture of the previous generations. Archetypes of culture promote stereotypes and directions of thinking and behavior. That is why a relative "sameness" of men of the same time and space forms peculiarities of spiritual culture in certain periods of history. One fact worth noting is that the spiritual culture of humanity is rich and various. When we consider man's ability to combine the culture of different times, we mean certain peculiarities of acquiring culture by man and all people. History contains many examples of when some newly introduced cultural values did not assimilate and did not turn into an organic component of the internal culture. This problem really exists. That is why man, capable of historical synchronism in spiritual culture, is not restricted in his opportunities to adopt another culture, for in the sphere of spiritual culture there are moments common to all people, which favor the intertwining of their content and forms.

The reconstruction and integration of past spiritual values with undoubted advantages have some shortages. In this connection, some philosophers spoke skeptically. Analyzing the reasons of the downfall of ancient culture, Hegel wrote that the works of art of that time

for us are a wonderful fruit, picked from a tree, having been sent to us by good fortune, imagined as a girl. There is no longer real life in their available being, no tree which they grew in, no land and the elements making up their substance, no climate which created their definiteness, no seasonal changes which ruled the process of their beginning. Thus, in these works of art the fortune gives us not their world, not the spring and summer of their moral life, when they blossomed and grew, but the hidden memory about that reality.³³

Indeed, the historicity of our being hampers the process of our restoring the spiritual values of the past. By restoring the creations of the past, we, actually, in the end, obtain not the original, not the original form and content of the sense, but sometimes the surrogate forms of heritage.

And still the spiritual heritage of people, in spite of existing skeptical views, is a constant value, for it serves as the example, the base, the support for the following generations, mediating and directly creating the social, historical, and moral background for the spiritual being of modern man. From what was said above, it is possible to come to the conclusion that a concrete man and a people are in a close spiritual interrelationship. They are a unity of the general and single, because through a concrete man the level and spiritual

character of a people's culture reveals itself; he is their component, and his spiritual culture is a part of the people's spiritual culture.

Some people of genius are able to move their own people and other peoples forward in economic, social, and cultural respects. But one should not forget such a person achieves a high level of intellectual and moral development because he absorbs the knowledge, experience, and skills worked out by the previous generations. Thus, the interrelationship of an individual and people in the spiritual plane is caused by the succession of culture.

“MANAS” AS THE MNEMONIC MIND OF THE KYRGYZ

Admit that the base of being is mind. - Firdousi

The concept “mnemonic mind”³⁴ is used by us not as a set, scientifically sanctioned expression, but as a working concept to designate the reasonable and rational which remained in social memory and is transmitted from generation to generation.

In the arsenal of social-human sciences there are such notions as “dialectical mind,” “historical mind,” “communicative mind,” “social mind,” “the world mind,” “collective mind,” and “vital mind,” etc. The subordination of the concept “mnemonic mind” with respect to other concepts is expressed in its intermediate position. This concept can be considered in the framework of the volume of the concepts of “historical mind” and “collective mind.”

According to Kant, mind includes intellect, reason, and the ability to form an opinion. He wrote:

If mind is the ability to give rules, and the ability to form an opinion is the ability to assent, because it agrees with the rule, then mind is the ability to deduce the particular from the general and to present this particular in principles as something necessary. Thus, mind can be defined as the ability to form an opinion according to basic regulations and to act in accordance with them. For each moral judgment...man needs mind and cannot rely on resolutions and generally accepted customs.³⁵

G. Tard uses the concept “social mind” and substantiates it, contrasting it with the concept “individual mind.” He considers that peculiarities of the social mind are in social judgments of people who agree. When they meet each other they recognize each other, and that is the basis of social identity.³⁶ Language, Deity, Good, and Evil play an important role in the emergence of social mind. Additionally Tard traces the components of the social “self.” This is, first of all, the appearance of a head, chief, leader, or political power open to God, to divine will. Besides, the establishment of social order in the lives and minds of people is worked out by ethical and legal norms—dogmas, orders, prohibitions—God's law. In this line the ancestors, reflected in sacred

books and oral history, take their deserved position. Revelation and consecration into the truth of the past was considered and is still considered spiritual growth—enlightenment in the eastern culture, and salvation in the western culture.

Let us dwell at least briefly on the problem of social reason and mind. Conceptual schemata concerning reason and mind were reflected in the classical works of Kant, Sartre, Bashlar, and others, in the works of Soviet philosophers K. Mamardashvili, G. S. Batishev, A. S. Bogomolov, N. V. Motroshilova, N. S. Avtonomova, and others.

In these works reason is considered a lower level of thinking, directed at division and calculation. And mind is an integral reflective-thinking process, including aim and contradictions of the cognition process. The social level of reason and mind embodies the thinking of a group; peculiarities inherent in collective ideas are thoroughly analyzed in the works of Jung. The first peculiarity is the archetype of consciousness expressed in the collective unconscious. The second, in our opinion, is in the conscious and expedient selection and forming of collective forms of behavior and thinking, which are formed in social institutions, what forms the social mind.

Social mind is the result of the established but at the same time dynamic social order. The reproduction of a stable social order is realized by the mnemonic mind, playing the role of “social mill” which grinds and sends, giving what is necessary and valuable for the needs of the present and future. The latter may sometimes be the sincere passion of the “social heart.” (G. Tard)

Mnemonic mind is a rather complicated phenomenon which has not been systematically studied in science, though traditions of mnemonic learning have been in existence since the earliest times. In this respect the hermeneutic tradition established by the ancient Greeks should be mentioned. The aim of mnemonic mind is to understand and master what is accumulated and rationally retained in sociocultural memory.

Mnemonic mind is present in all stages of social order formed in the process of habituation—that is, objectification. It establishes different forms of order on the level of habits, because it corresponds to common sense and is convenient and effective; it can also be present in an institutional form, that is, on the level of symbolic actions.

Mnemonic mind not only objectifies knowledge and norms, but it transmits, selects, and perfects them. That is why mnemonic mind can be called the creative constant of public conscience. Mnemonic mind contains concepts of normative culture, for it is fixed in a text.

It promotes communication among generations according to certain rules and norms, which, in turn, promotes verification of opinions and achievement of common understanding. Plato confirmed that the aim of history is not the individual, but the idea. Jose Ortega-y-Gasset documented the necessity of forming the “vital mind.”³⁷ He considers that a clear mind must hand over its power to the vital mind. Mnemonic mind, having gone through the sieve of time and practice of many generations, concentrates in itself the necessary rational values which are adequate to modern reality.

Mnemonic mind is characterized by conventional meaning, for recollection of the established truth and order acquires real social character and can be embodied in practical action when the content of social memory is accepted by the majority.

A society's mnemonic mind shows its organic unity in the sphere of sense and symbols. Mnemonic mind is the core of spirituality. In this connection it is possible to confirm that the epic "Manas" is the mnemonic mind of the Kyrgyz.

The epic "Manas" and other minor epics are the historical form of social memory. They were created under the conditions of intensive development of a national self-consciousness which found its objectification in concrete forms. Epic culture, possessing far more opportunities to objectify sociocultural memory, became the form of expression of Kyrgyz history and self-confidence. Ch. Aytmatov wrote that every Kyrgyz man cries over the epic "Manas," not only worrying about his exploits and taking his death hard but also recognizing himself in it.³⁸

There is an interesting supposition, not yet proven, that the name "Manas" is identical to the word "mind" in ancient Sanskrit (*manas*). But the content of the epic "Manas" really concentrates on the social mind of the Kyrgyz, and this fact allowed the formulation of "gifts of Manas."

The character of Manas is secularized. The notion "the spirit of Manas" is conceptualized and is widely used—by politicians to consolidate the society, by painters to create talented works, by *aksakals* to maintain traditions, by mothers to teach children. There is a belief among people that nobody can speak rudely to a boy called Manas.

Every character of the epic "Manas" has certain functions, responsibilities, abilities, skills, and knowledge. Every one of them is a bearer of certain values or orientations, among which there is a certain hierarchy and coordination in accordance with canons of the epic genre.

All these characters give us valuable information about social and domestic, moral and ethical views of the Kyrgyz. Thus, the history, spiritual biography, moral experience, and memory of the Kyrgyz are imprinted in the characters and situations of the epic "Manas."

The story allows consideration of it as an outstanding historical memorial, presenting great social value. The value structure of "Manas" can be considered in three aspects: first, its value as an outstanding artistic creation; second, its role in reproducing cultural life; and third, its meaning in the upbringing of many generations of Kyrgyz people. Because the description of each aspect requires a thorough analysis, let us dwell on only the general features of "Manas" as the highest artistic and esthetic value of the Kyrgyz people.

The spiritual culture of the Kyrgyz has existed mainly in epic works and, indeed, because of them. They were passed from generation to generation like a social relay race, as a result of which many traditions and examples of human behavior, interrelationships, and creative activity were reproduced. Thus, "Manas" is the most important component of the Kyrgyz cultural fund.

Social memory is the result of cognitive and creative activity, not of separate personalities, but of a collective subject. Only the memory of a collective subject is able to win back the right to designate great events and historical personalities in the life of a people. This is because the volume of the accumulated information over many centuries does not allow for preserving and processing the production of material and spiritual activities of a nation by a single human brain. This process is further complicated because of the absence of literary texts. This fact gives rise to a special form of spiritual production—“collective mind” (Marx), or “collective memory” (M. Bloc).

Transmission of social experience from generation to generation and from one individual to another is realized with the help of specific mechanisms of storing and transmitting socially significant information—mechanisms of social memory. Three typical forms of storing and transmitting accumulated experiences are singled out: thing-and-object, traditional, and rational.³⁹

The traditional form of transmitting information does not preserve it, but rejects and changes it, because tradition, as Hegel said, is not “only a householder, who takes care of what she receives and, thus, preserves it for her descendants...no, tradition is not an immovable statue: it is alive and growing, like a powerful stream, which becomes wider the further it is from its source.”⁴⁰

The originality and uniqueness of “Manas” and its great meaning for the spiritual development of the Kyrgyz was promoted by social-collective memory. This memory served as a bridge over a several-century precipice, transmitting knowledge and information about the distant past of the Kyrgyz and other peoples.

Ch. Aytmatov in his preface to a variant of “Manas” by Sagymbay Orozbekov called this epic the Bible, that is, a repository of knowledge, skills, and understanding of the ancient Kyrgyz, a connecting link of cultural succession, a cultural inheritance.

The rich political experience of the Kyrgyz and the growth of national self-consciousness created favorable conditions for rapid cultural development in general. The collective mind was energetically working out a self-appraisal, which was looking for ways of objectification in concrete forms and expressed itself in the only acceptable form—the reflection of the nation’s history.

An epic oral tradition, accessible and expressive, was evidence of the flourishing of the nation’s history. For the Kyrgyz, “Manas” substituted for historical discipline, preserved a taste for the past, and removed psychological distance between generations. Kyrgyz self-understanding and self-consciousness, which is attributed only to the present, or in any case, only to the Soviet period, are based on social-moral postulates of the centuries-old history of the Kyrgyz. If Kyrgyz history and self-consciousness had been determined only by the nearest previous period, then, given a flexible social structure and social change, it would have lost its backbone, its true worth, its “self.”

After all, can we believe that the phenomena described in “Manas” that belongs to the past can still impact the present? Or, conversely, can we

believe that it is useless for the understanding of the present? But, the latter would mean to forget that true thinking comes by comparing.⁴¹

Thus, the study of “Manas” as an epic form of social memory means that it is not only an attempt at the reconstruction and interpretation of history, but also a revelation of the moral traditions of the Kyrgyz. It is the determination of peculiarities of world understanding and originality of world perception which are present in the spheres of philosophy, law, religion, morals, and art of the Kyrgyz. Many phenomena which originated in ancient times exist implicitly, secretly. The experience of a people fixed in “Manas” combined everything that had not been preserved in oral history. Unfortunately, oral history is more subject to being forgotten, despite its advantages in reproducing living forms of memory. Of course, it is not possible to claim that all sociocultural memories of the Kyrgyz, thousands of years old, will go into “Manas.”

The sociocultural creation of the Kyrgyz is also fixed in material culture, ways of thinking, archetypes of social relations, family traditions, and rules of work. Yet, it is exactly “Manas” that remains the cultural code of the Kyrgyz, where the reasonable and the rational secretly exist. These are so necessary for the self-identification of the national spirit, for the preservation of the mnemonic mind of the world of “Manas” for contemporaries and for following generations.

“Manas” is the first integrated expression of the mnemonic mind for the Kyrgyz. The literary sources of ancient Turkic culture existing before “Manas” such as Orhono-Yenisey belong to many peoples but do not possess the significance for the Kyrgyz which “Manas” does. It is the foundation of Kyrgyz intellectual and spiritual creation. “Manas” represents the experience of the past, the mind of the present, and the hope for the future.

The architectonics of “Manas” is very complicated. It includes mythological, religious, protophilosophical, and protoscientific views, knowledge, and values, which consider the fundamental problems of the organization of human life during the uneasy time of war. The spiritual arsenal of the Kyrgyz is rich in oral works of folk creation, but it is “Manas” that gives the most complete picture of Kyrgyz history and culture.

As is known, each culture begins with language. This means that the world before us reveals itself through language, through the articulation of thoughts about the world and with the help of language. Language is the receptacle of memory. That is why language, as a way of sociocultural coding, is of the same order as sociality. Through language the matrix of the sociocultural code is expressed in the thinking and behavior of the following generations.

Ch. Aytmatov said: “Language is the first hypostasis of any nation. Language is the crossing of its experience, cognition, culture, history, and, after all, language is the emotional repository of feelings and the memory of a nation.”⁴² A word is a cell of memory; a sentence has mnemonic essence, and in the aggregate it constitutes semantic memory. Language play is the means of the most adequate expression of the world, and combines the memory of

word as well as the memory of things. It reveals the hidden as a result of interpretation.

In the metaphorical language of “Manas” there is the implicit sense, which is esoteric. The analysis of the semantic meaning of the words and expressions of “Manas,” is made by a patriarch of the Kyrgyz culture, H. Karasyov.⁴³ In his works we find entire layers of an archaic lexical arsenal which provides information about the thinking of the Kyrgyz. In addition, he analyzes many words borrowed from Farsi (Iranian), Arabic, Mongolian, and other languages. These borrowed words can also be codes, the decoding of which shed light on the ethnic and cultural life of the Kyrgyz.

“Manas” is an inexhaustible source of cultural memory, the result of the realization of the peoples’ spirit. “Manas” is an integral, regulated world, which possesses a strong mnemonic base. How does it manifest itself? The composition is built on the ongoing actualization of the memory of generations. Manas became Manas due to the fact that in the far Altay he remembered his native land. Manas’ mother constantly reminded him of it. He had to remember his origins (*ata tegi*) and the worship of the ancestor spirits, which gives each person strength and confidence. The spirit of ancestors informed Manas, who possessed special strength, much stronger than ordinary mortals. That is why in the early stages of Manas’ life the name of the native land Talas was coded in the memory of a future hero. Later, when Manas himself becomes the heroic leader of the Kyrgyz, the name “Manas” becomes a sociocultural code, comprising the historical and cultural memory of the Kyrgyz. Decoding the name Manas unfolds the Kyrgyz history, culture, way of life, and way of thinking. Moreover, the architectonics of traditional society, based on the reproduction of a stable social scheme and philosophical directions, tightly connects the memory of generations over thousands of years. The Kyrgyz society, not having undergone consistent development due to different historical facts, interprets its knowledge and social experience in “Manas.”⁴⁴

Plato valued the role of oral communication. He considered that recorded speech is deprived of the ability to “think” and to “sensibly” transmit information and knowledge. “Writing—like painting, however questioned—is always majestically silent.”⁴⁵

In this connection, interpretation of oral speech is the verbal creation of folk tale narrators: Greek *rhapsodes*, Persian *roviens*, Kyrgyz *manaschy*, Turkmen *ashugs*, Kazakh *tolgoashy*, and so on.

Folk tale narrators play a great role in the transmission of not only information and knowledge but also in the richest emotional and psychological layer of culture, that makes oral speech “living” and “thinking.” The creation of folk tales is distinguished by the fact that the narrators establish the connection of times, past, present, and future, due to the unique memory of the storyteller. The emotional and intellectual loading of the narrator’s mind and memory and the historical synchronization of the events of different times are the content of mnemonic activity.

Every narrator, leaning on certain social and artistic aims of the historical period, presented the material of the epic in accordance with the de-

mands and interests of the hearers. As far as the inner structure of the epic, as a form of social memory, the following should be noted. The information, “recorded” in the actions, understandings, and intentions of epic characters, is realized in certain functions in the reproduction of cultural life.

The *manaschy*, the story teller, is a man with phenomenal memory, or, to be more exact, with associative memory. For example, the great *manaschys*, S. Karalaev, S. Orozbekov, and others, possessed the ability not only to reproduce the epic exactly, but also to recreate it according to the highest artistic patterns of the present. The efficient functioning of the *manaschy's* memory is realized in full. The gift of knowing is the gift of remembering.

Memories and recollections are accompanied by synchronous creative interpretations. The process of the *manaschy's* creation is emotional, full of gestures and voice play. The presentation is a wonderful theater involving one genius actor creating the atmosphere of that heroic epoch.

The essence of the *manaschy's* mnemonic activity is in interpreting and introducing his vision and understanding into the work. The oral text passed through the personality of the *manaschy* forms a dialogue between the narrator who interprets the text, and the context of the epoch. It is not difficult to imagine how one “lives” and “thinks” the epic work. The moment of novelty, which is due to the powerful potentiality of a *manaschy* to remember and recollect, shortens the time and space distance between the listeners and the period when the events of “Manas” took place.

It is noteworthy that a subjective factor does not eliminate the “originality” of the text. Remembering the text, the *manaschy* builds on the fixed canons and the subject contours. He also tries to reproduce exactly the types of relationships, peculiarities of life, names of battles, war methods, arms, heroes' equipment and clothes, etc.

Nietzsche wrote: “History belongs to the living as an energizing, striving, and guiding feature, as well as a suffering, freedom-seeking feature. Three historical types correspond to these features: monumental, antiquary, and critical history.”⁴⁶ In our opinion, the history of the Kyrgyz in “Manas” is monumental history; it belongs to the people. For a certain part of the Kyrgyz people, “Manas” probably is an “antiquary thing,” which is interesting from the point of view of its antiquity, originality, and so on. And for a *manaschy*, the epic “Manas” is the whole world, where he puts not only his feelings for the world but also the world itself. The third type of history, the critical, means that “Manas” has lived through his life and society's life with dignity. We all remember the creative criticism concerning its interpretation from the point of view of its centuries-old experience of the Kyrgyz people, and the pseudo-criticism that searched for ideologically harmful trends.

An artistic, oral text gives a *manaschy* maximum freedom in where it places emphasis. That is why a problem arises about the extent of truthfulness of the history which is being told. Artistic truthfulness exists, otherwise “Manas” would not attract attraction. As for historical accuracy, as such, scientific strictness does not apply here, because “Manas” has existed in the memory of the Kyrgyz in the oral form.

Now, when “Manas” was put in written form, certain claims (not official, of course) are made by listeners that restrain the fantasy of the narrator. In this connection, the character of the mnemonic activity of the *manaschy* has changed. The point is that there are many variants of the epic “Manas”; it is copied and this brings changes in its cultural field and interpretation.

Another important feature of the mnemonic activity of the *manaschy* is its impact on the listener, who witnesses to the emotional background of the narrator’s state of creative ecstasy or meditation.

The *manaschy* by his intellectual and emotional activity stimulates not only his own memory but also the memory of the listeners, who sink into the distant historical time, into the past, while actually being in the present, and who direct their consciousness into the future. An important peculiarity of our people should be noted: they possess a special artistic perception which allows them to experience the history and destiny of their people in the past in the same emotional way as the *manaschy* and as the characters of the epic. The listeners cry and the experiences shock without any extra effects—no music nor decorations, etc. This is evidence of the peculiar cultural and historical memory of the Kyrgyz. As the Japanese call their culture the culture of silence, we might call the Kyrgyz culture the “culture of listening.”

Thus, the *manaschy* plays the role of transmitter of the nation’s social experience, history, and fortune. Based on the synchronization of different periods of Kyrgyz cultural development, they connect different generations intellectually and spiritually. The *manaschy*’s living word is the living memory, history, and culture of the nation.

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Chapter III

THE COGNITIVE ASPECT OF SOCIAL MEMORY

THE ACTUAL AND THE VIRTUAL IN SOCIAL MEMORY

What can I know? - Kant

Social memory is a complicated system of storing and transforming information in a society. Information kept in the memory of social systems is not always included in the active process of cognition and solving social problems, at least not always to the same extent. Social memory is a living process, the creation of a collective subject. And that is why the information is always studied and developed, sometimes disappearing and later reviving. In this connection a problem arises about the importance and worthiness of the information, which is kept in social memory.

The word “actual” (from Latin *actualis*) means “important, essential for the present time.” “Virtual” (from Latin *virtualis*) is something which can or must reveal itself in certain conditions. For modern informational technology, the virtual, or virtual reality, has a broader meaning. In general, the concept of “virtual” means a “deeper, temporarily not actualized layer of reality.”

As applied to social memory, the actual and the virtual can be understood as the information, experience, and skills which are necessary now, at this moment. It is the information kept in the memory of social systems which is passive for the present, because there is no social demand, but which under certain conditions will be used for scientific research and the study of the world.

What is the technology of the actualization and virtualization of the information kept in social memory? Preference for this or that knowledge, experience, or information fixed and reproduced by social memory depends on the people’s practical demands. As far as it is necessary for the development of science, philosophy, and art, knowledge from the past is revived and returned to a new level of consciousness and is raised in rank of priority by a collective subject. For example, the epoch of the Renaissance revived the canons and traditions of ancient culture; in painting, art, and architecture the ancient ideal of the beautiful, and the harmonious man was enlivened.

This thesis does not mean that social memory is something like a money-box of important and necessary knowledge whose actualization and virtualization depend on factors in the development of science, philosophy, art, and human cognition in general. The style of thinking, type of rationality, scientific ideals, and scientific images can be referred to several inner factors: the sociocultural foundation of science, philosophy, art, and also the value attitudes of the collective subject, the accumulated knowledge, experience, and skills. These lead to outer factors. That is because these mechanisms de-

mand certain socially significant information that circulate in society, become actual, and then transmit into a “virtual” condition. The collective subject, having been processed by “collective mind”—the past experience and accumulated knowledge -- generates and produces new knowledge in the process of its mnemonic activity.

Reproduction, which can be arbitrary and involuntary, can be referred to the important processes of social memory. The basis of the process of the reproduction of material is the joint work of many facets of human cognition and many phenomena of “collective mind.” The history of the development of human cognition shows numerous examples of when some materials are involuntarily reproduced and actualized. As for arbitrary actualization, this process is conscious, deliberate, and selective and is brought to life by life’s demands.

We noted above that social memory is a living process; that is why this phenomenon not only preserves socially important information, but also assimilates, generates, and produces new information, and the basis of it is a complicated mechanism of interaction—the actualization and virtualization of the circulating information.

Reconstruction and integration of knowledge represent an important mnemonic task. The effectiveness of this process mostly depends on what knowledge is actualized at the moment. The point is that the social meaning of knowledge, especially in the human sciences, is caused by the spiritual and intellectual situation of the moment.

The movement of scientific thought presupposes preparation of the inner content of the social memory of science, without which there cannot be development of knowledge. The principle of social memory “work” is complicated, and is also a self-reproducing system. In connection with this, problems arise about the mechanism of the functioning of accumulated knowledge; how this correlates with new knowledge; what mediating elements form between them, and so on.

Reconstruction and integration are the mechanisms that possess the possibilities to restore, to define more precisely, to unite the outer sides of knowledge and their inner sense. The sense of knowledge is dynamic and pluralistic. This is the reason for the need to constantly take into account sense innovations, which appear as a result of separating the initial sense of knowledge and transferring it to another scientific context.

That sense of knowledge is the ideal, which represents the ideal product. The sense of knowledge depends on many factors, particularly the aim and task of the subject. That subject integrates and reconstructs the sense of knowledge included in the sphere of his scientific research.

Social memory is a kind of intellectual landscape with a general but visible picture of knowledge development and “meaning centers” forming packets of knowledge about some phenomena. That is why in the process of reconstruction there are two tasks: first, reconstruction of the initial sense; second, elaboration of the new sense in the context of new social and cultural factors and the latest scientific data. Thus, for example, today the laws of clas-

sical mechanics give up their place to the laws of quantum physics, in connection with which our ideas of the world have changed. Twentieth century science got rid of classical scientific knowledge—“of that, which was concentrated around the basic thesis, according to which on the certain level the world is built simply and is subject to change in time and fundamental laws. This point of view is seen by us as extreme simplification.” To some extent any change in science occur as a result of the efforts to find and introduce the newly acquired “universal constants.”

“Re-shaping” the sense of knowledge—and this is what is always required—leads to innovations, and at times to sense disparity between the needs of the “information market” and the received sense of knowledge and message.

Integration of the sense of knowledge is caused by the development of science, culture, and the needs of social practice. In the process of integration, first, the blending of the available and newly received sense of knowledge takes place; second, the integrated sense of knowledge becomes relatively stable until a certain time and serves scientific processes; third, as a result of integration, the sense of knowledge becomes poly-variant.

Reconstruction and integration of knowledge are the means of searching for ways of scientific development and solutions to practical problems. Social memory makes this possible, due to the “intellectual game” aimed at finding more optimal variants of sense of knowledge. In this connection, the active side of mnemology should be noted, because it is not a question of the simple accumulation of knowledge, phenomena, and facts, but of the promotion of their development. For this exact reason, reconstruction and integration of knowledge are important tasks of mnemology.

The study of any subject presupposes turning to history. All the information about the subject under study is kept in the “memory” of science, and when necessary practices of scientific cognition are transmitted to and involved in the active scientific sphere. The available scientific facts are the substantiation of new knowledge, acting as the launching pad of its formation. Retrospective evaluation plays an important role in this.

Retrospective evaluation is not only establishing the obviousness of scientific facts and their significance, but also deepening and interpreting theoretical theses and practical results, in which there is the beginning of future sciences and knowledge. The value of retrospective analysis is in the systematization and modification of scientific facts, and sometimes in its change of the determined concepts and paradigms.¹

In addition, retrospective evaluation of scientific memory clears up matters of some importance, e.g., the process of cognition of outstanding scientists who greatly contributed to the existence of a scientific picture of the world. Retrospective evaluation of the contributions of many great scientific geniuses to the development of human culture, their personal qualities, and their attitude toward science and its consequences reveal the great educational meaning of their lives and creations for many generations.

Retrospective evaluation represents, in a sense, an arena of dialectic negation of “old” knowledge by new. An example could be non-Lavoisier chemistry, non-Euclidean geometry, non-Newtonian mechanics, and non-Aristotelian logic.

Retrospective evaluation is a searchlight on science that lights up the “territory” of cognition, points at the location of knowledge components in a particular science. The more exact the evaluation is, the wider the radius of lighting, the more in relief are the new perspectives, new facets, and new qualities of the subject studied. At this point the problem of borders between modern and ancient knowledge arises. The border of new knowledge is at the same time the border of problems with which modern science is occupied. This border is changeable, unsteady, and relative.

Retrospective evaluation of science shows that it is almost impossible to determine postmodern, new knowledge that does not have a source in the past. Thus, the forming of new knowledge is conceptually determined.

With the help of retrospective evaluation it is possible to determine the significance of scientific knowledge, and give it a push for further development. Retrospective evaluation is the methodological procedure which finds the symptoms for the beginning of new knowledge.

THE SOCIAL MEMORY OF SCIENCE AND CONCEPTUAL MODELING

What should I do? - Kant

It can be said that modeling is inherent in human activity. Any actions directed at learning in the objective world are realized on the basis of modeling and the use of models.

Marx wrote:

A spider performs operations, reminding one of the operations of a weaver, and a bee building its wax cells puts some architects to shame. But from the very beginning the worst architect is different from the best bee by the fact that before building a cell from wax, he builds it in his head. At the end of the process of work there is the result, which at the beginning of the process was present in a person’s imagination, was present ideally.²

In this case a man’s idea about the product of his own activity is a model, an example, which later is objectified in the various forms.

Models are widely used in the sphere of cognition. According to their form and content they can be divided into material and ideal or logical. The role of models and modeling in scientific knowledge is very serious and deserves more attention from different disciplines. Models, though very well used in natural sciences, are not popular in the Humanities and Social

Sciences. At present, foreign scientists demonstrate the necessity of modeling, pointing to the models kept in the “memory” of science, and, of course, at their axiological role in the spiritual foundation of a society.

For society to develop purposefully we should determine methodological premises from which one starts the process of social creation.

However, for the present time, the model is studied as a mode of scientific knowledge; its philosophical, logical, “Gnostic,” and concrete scientific aspects are illuminated; new definitions of model and modeling concepts are developed.

Usually a “model” is understood as a system, arrangement, invention, schema, or description which imitates and reconstructs existing objects. “Model” (from the French for “measure,” “pattern,” “norm”) in logic and science methodology is an “analogue,” “schema,” “structure,” or “sign system” of a certain fragment of natural and social reality, the result of human culture, the conceptual and theoretical formation of the model’s original.

M. Vartovsky, who is known in the scientific world for his brilliant work, greatly contributed to the definition of the role and status of a model and modeling. His original analysis of modeling contains a number of important moments which allow for interpreting models and modeling non-traditionally. Vartovsky emphasizes:

Philosophy itself is considered ... as a systemized arrangement of such models and their logic and critical analysis. Moreover, models are understood in their most developed form: as formal structures, as ontological claims about the nature of things (worlds, societies, individuals, actions, and thinking) and as heuristic structures, suggesting the variants of structuralism for our understanding of the world and ourselves.³

As for conceptual modeling and a conceptual model, it should be noted that they belong to the ideal or theoretical and exist in the form of hypotheses and theories. Conceptual models have a quality that most deeply reflect the essence of an object; that is why they are formed on a sufficiently developed stage of cognition. A conceptual model is based on theoretical and empirical premises and allows raising the studied events and phenomena to the level of theoretical concepts and reproducing their structure and functions.

A conceptual model is always the representation of a real object. In the course of the development of different conceptual models, a general conceptual unity is formed, which later grows into a conceptual field. A conceptual field includes notions, laws, and principles, which determine the direction of the search and the creation of fundamental theories.

The search for and exposure to the connection between scientific social memory and conceptual modeling, or, more exactly, the establishment of the role of conceptual modeling in the construction of the “memory” of sci-

ence is an important and hard task. Nonetheless, let us look at that process and try to reach some conclusions.

Let us begin with the problem of memory modeling. Modeling of memory is considered an integral part of the psychic process of modeling. The impetus for the development of this method was the appearance of the problem of the “man-made intellect,” or “artificial intellect.” With this understanding of intellect, modeling of the most complicated processes of the human brain and more efficient use of scientific data became possible.

The scientists who understand and believe in artificial intellect consider that man obtained a reliable partner in the struggle with ignorance. At the same time some would say that modeling of the brain has no prospects, because the human brain is too complicated.

However, research in this field is ongoing—the medical, biological, electrical, and physiological study of neurons. There are attempts to build artificial intellect, which would more or less adequately repeat complicated operations of the brain. To solve this problem two approaches are suggested: the first is phenomenological, which pays attention not only to the structure of the brain, but to its functions; the second is ontological, considering the work of neurons. For the present the first approach is winning. It can be explained by the impossibility to model the “work” of neurons, which are numerous, and that is why describing the connections between them, at least superficially, is practically not possible. Memory, which exists due to these complicated processes of the brain, is complex and many-sided. At this point the principal difference in our understanding between the “work” of an individual brain and the “work” of the collective brain should be emphasized. The difference between them forms the difference between individual and collective memory.

Of course, when speaking about the social memory of science, we mean the sociocultural definiteness of science, the epistemological and axiological meaning of the accumulated knowledge and information which are kept in the “memory” of science.

We might suppose that the history of science, being a whole discipline in science, is close to the phenomenon of the “memory” of science, but they are not the same. The history of science describes, fixes, and records. The “memory” of science performs more complicated operations. In this case, it is a process of selection, synthesis, and integration of knowledge and information. Moreover, the “memory” of science is tightly connected with the self-consciousness of science.

In the “memory” of science there is much experience of modeling of intellectual processes and models of knowledge. The history of natural sciences, human sciences, and social sciences is evidence of this. But the absence of historical and logical reconstruction of models (laws, theories, and hypotheses) narrows the researcher’s choice.

Moreover, big “gaps” in the memory of science form an “amnesia” in the biography of the sciences. And the problem of actualizing scientific “memory,” models, and modeling would allow the comprehension of scientific truth, avoiding a “labor of Sisyphus.” Moreover, the old models and pat-

terns of modeling could serve as a premise for the creation of new directions and patterns.

Conscious and purposeful cognitive activities cannot be carried out without conceptual modeling. "Specific human activities," writes Vartovsky, "can be characterized in the following way: technology operates by aim, conscious aim; "modeling," in this broad sense of the word, is an inquiry of this kind of activity in order to realize a creative human aim."⁴ Thus, models are the tools for the realization of man's creative aim; they are the technological means of conceptual research.

The dynamic of science, following cognitive aims, is achieved by building and constantly correcting such models of knowledge which are applicable. For this it is not always expedient to form new models. In such cases the actualization of scientific "memory" allows the bringing to life of virtually existing models. Conceptual modeling will reveal the value of some scientific theories and principles which are key channels of scientific development. Conceptual modeling itself is subject to the principle of succession, for any concepts, theories, and laws are socially determined, and they are built on the basis of the existing ones by way of "removing" the previous types of modeling.

Turning to the history of social thought, to the "memory" of philosophy, we find numerous examples of models and patterns of modeling: philosophical theories, teachings, conceptions, ideas, hypotheses, etc. Some of them are, for example, Democritus' atomistic theory, Plato's ideas about the ideal state, Campanella's social utopian structures, Hegel's views on state structures, Marx's materialistic understanding of history, and Lenin's Socialist model. All of them can be considered as conceptual models of state and society. Making a short excursus into the history of science, or, to be more exact, taking a look at the change of tasks and the subject of research, we can easily reveal the dynamics of some very different conceptual models.

Thus, for example, Aristotle's understanding of the Cosmos and its structure was preserved in the teaching of cosmology by Phoma Akvinskiy. But it would be an oversimplification to consider that the perception of ancient models of the world was easy and painless. Aristotle's teaching about the eternity of the Cosmos was contrary to Christian ideas. During the period of the birth of the new sciences, the heliocentric system of Copernicus changed the thinking on the Cosmos. The typical idea of the world in the seventeenth century was an understanding of a huge mechanism created by God and set in motion forever. This was also an original model of the world which that substantiated with the help of certain scientific concepts. This same kind of development can be noted with the change of the world model in connection with findings in physics at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Einstein's theory of relativity would be but one of the best known new models.

The quality of conceptual modeling to be a "tool for realizing a goal" is especially distinctive in the modeling of global problems. The model "State of the World" (USA, 1984-1987) studies the state of the global system "Society

and Environment” and the search for ways to build an ecologically balanced self-supporting society. One can take the model “BAK” (Switzerland, 1984) which represents a long-term econometric model for the period beyond the 1990’s.⁵

Conceptual modeling of spiritual processes is tightly connected with philosophy, ideology, and values. For example, Schweitzer’s ethical model “Reverence for the World” or existential conceptions of life and death built on the basis of different philosophical values and feelings, would be examples. Adorno’s model of freedom is clear evidence of the link with ideology, though he, as well as other followers of the Frankfurt School, consider freedom as the basis of the opportunity to realize non-ideologized cognition. His model of freedom, however, was built speculatively, disregarding social and historical practice.

Summarizing the above, it is necessary to draw a preliminary conclusion: the attitude toward the nature, roles, and functions of models and modeling in scientific knowledge and cognitive activity should be radically changed. It is necessary to admit that they remain too vague and moribund.

Giving life to models and modeling, we shall obtain an important instrument for researching different problems in the natural and social spheres. Moreover, by actively introducing methods of conceptual modeling, we shall have the opportunity to extract the necessary information kept in the “memory” of science in order to deepen our understanding about various societies and the nature of human thinking.

Taking from scientific “memory” conceptions, theories, hypotheses, and ideas existing in a virtual state, we can reproduce both historically and logically the beginning and development of knowledge. For science, the integration and concentration of knowledge, accumulated by many generations, are more important. A certain role is played in this by conceptual modeling, which best reproduces the inner qualities of the object being revealed and reveals the essence of complicated intellectual processes.

SCIENCE AS A KIND OF SOCIAL MEMORY

In science the most valuable is that which can be repeated...

- J. Ortega y Gasset

One of the significant characteristics of science is its cumulative ability, that is, its ability to collect, concentrate, interpret, and summarize the knowledge acquired in different periods of scientific development. Science as a kind of social memory contains the accumulated knowledge that functions in the present time and some of the knowledge that anticipates the future state of science.

The history of science shows that extra-genetic transmission of socially significant scientific information is possible as long the subject is supported by the “memory” of science as in the process of cognition, and extracts from it all the necessary information for solving new scientific problems.

Science as a social phenomenon is many-sided. It can be considered from many different positions: as a system of knowledge, as people's activities, as a social institution, as a form of social consciousness, as an immediate productive force. All these facets of science are due to its ability to store, transform, and transmit the necessary sum of knowledge.

The "scientific memory" is the basis for the development of the subject's cognitive activity.

One of the most important moments of social memory's content in the theoretically generalized collective experience of humanity is the results produced in the sphere of science. In the history of science, turning points are connected with the names of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Einstein, and others. But none of these scientists would have been able to make a revolution in science if he had not leaned on "scientific memory"—previously accumulated knowledge. Copernicus' theory, which in the sixteenth century was considered new, in fact was not so new. It was proposed in ancient times by the Pythagorean school; the astronomer Arystarh Somoss, who lived in the second century B.C., taught that the Earth moves and thus invented a method to calculate relative distances between the sun and the moon. Copernicus knew that the theory of the sun's central position was proposed by Arystarh. Reliable sources testify to the fact that if Copernicus had not known this fact, he would not have dared publish his great work *On the Turning of Celestial Spheres (De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium)*.

It follows from the above discussion that the "scientific memory" is a system which not only stores and regulates knowledge but also gives rise to new knowledge. At this point it should be noted that the notion of "scientific knowledge" is more narrow than the notion of "science." But when it is a question of science as a social phenomenon, its research begins with scientific knowledge.

Scientific knowledge is a special mechanism of social memory. It is caused by the fact that in the functioning of scientific knowledge there is succession; that is, the condition for its functioning is social inheritance. Every generation receives prepared knowledge and develops it further. By so doing, it consciously or unconsciously acts in the framework of the systems and traditions worked out before it.

Thus, the knowing subject is not free in the choice of some spheres of knowledge. Marx wrote: "People are not free in the choice of productive forces, which form the basis of all their history, because every productive force is the product of the previous activity. Due to the simple fact that every generation finds productive forces, acquired by the previous generation, and these productive forces are the raw material for new production; because of this fact connection in human history forms scientific history..."⁶ This thesis of Marx refers to the production, functioning, and development of science.

A process of selection acts in the fixing, storing, and reproduction of information by science. This is evidence of the presence of an evaluative moment in the functioning of scientific memory. "Forgetfulness" is a property of this "memory." At the same time, selective fixing of some knowledge causes

the actualization of some scientific knowledge and some scientific facts, proceeding from their expediency on the given stage of scientific development. By this we mean that, in the study of science as a kind of social memory, not only an informational but also a value approach can be used. The latter has not been well enough elaborated because, first, the problem of social memory in general has been developed very little, and, second, an opinion predominates that other approaches, outside the quantitative, are not effective.

If scientific knowledge is considered not just pragmatically, then this value approach can reveal the humanitarian potential of science in the solution of many global problems. Thus, the scientific memory is the product of a collective subject's actions. It provides the ability to selectively, estimate, fix, store, and reproduce certain socially significant information in order to form new knowledge and establish the essence of phenomena, objects, and things.

Historical articulation of the inner content of social memory is not an "antiquarian" interest to science and culture. Most likely, it is caused by striving to interpret factors of social development and to look at them "from outside." "We all live in culture and thanks to culture. It is passed from generation to generation like the baton in a relay race, reminiscent of a wave, which preserves and carries away with itself our accumulated experience into the future, joyful as well as tragic. Our duty is, by perceiving this 'wave' and 'relay race,' to carry it further on our shoulders, putting in, when possible, a part for our own life and passing it on further. These social "genes" are the key to our social immortality. Culture in this understanding forms, as we see it, absolute value."⁷

Today's historical-scientific and historical-cultural research of the development and functioning of these phenomena is aimed at building rational theoretical models based on the experience of cognition and social practice of past generations. Thus, a relay race model of knowledge is being formed. According to M. A. Rosov, knowledge is a cumulative tidal wave. The wave-like nature of knowledge causes it to be periodically implemented or, in some cases, transmitted into a virtual passive condition.

Humanity still does not know the ways of cognition of objective reality without loss, sometimes very serious loss. Social organizations with all of their useful action remain utopian conceptions. That is why man is always looking for the ways and means of perfecting the rational structure of order in the world, which leads to rationalization of methods, theories of cognition, and the tools of science. In all this a great role belongs to social memory as a system, which fixes the condition and dynamics of science, art, literature, philosophy, religion, and so on. It accumulates a large amount of historical material with the help of which it is possible to trace the development of our cognition from embryo to its current condition, which is characterized by the tendencies of differentiation and integration of sciences.

Characteristics of social memory as an "arsenal," "reservoir," and "archive" of knowledge, experience, and skills do not exclude the action of selection mechanisms. These let the socially meaningful information pass through a rationalistic and value sieve. From the history of science and cul-

ture it is known that every epoch has its type of rationality and fundamental value structures, which significantly affect the development and character of human cognition.

The fundamental postulates of scientific research during the Renaissance epoch were the standards of genteel culture, rationalization in the understanding of objective reality, emergence of a dynamic picture of the world, and orientation of cognition toward the practical use of knowledge. Other canons were followed by the rationality type and value invariants of the Renaissance epoch.

The rationalistic ideas of western European thinkers, directed at liberating philosophy from theology and church dogmas with the help of logical categories, opened the way for the ideas of the Renaissance. The emancipation of philosophy from theology was mostly caused by a new stage of revival of ancient culture and by the interpretation of ancient heritage.

A short historical excursus into the “depth” of the problem of rationalism and value structures shows that their evolution and transformation occurred as a result of the change in the research object. Also the realization of new problems in the cultural sphere is evidence of the way the understanding of the reasonable was accumulated and how the belief and respect for it were formed. In the twentieth century the problem of rationalism became more complicated. The value structures which existed in science and culture were characterized by a radical change in attitude toward the scientific and social heritage. The contradictions of modern time made scientists look again at the humanist aspects of mankind’s material and spiritual activity.

N. S. Avtonomova claims that “...the general philosophical mind as a means of achieving the universal and necessary is degenerating into the purely scientific, identified with logic and discursive knowledge.”⁷⁸ In a positive sense, this phenomenon can be considered a result of the universal gain of scientific rationality in the twentieth century, thanks to which humanity has made daring steps in all the history of the scientific thought. But today the other side of the problem of scientific rationality is prominent. This is the problem of choosing a rational theory which would correspond to the general and final goal of cognition and science. That is because “cold” scientific rationality can serve good as well as evil. The best but also most frightening examples of this are the creation of nuclear weapons and the results of genetic engineering.

Plato considered the good to be above the truth. And in our days the ecology of culture, science, and man is considered to be higher than narrow rational theories. In light of this, the analysis of social memory as a many-layered and complicated phenomenon is of special interest to science.

At this point it is necessary to note the following: First, when we speak about rationality and value with regard to social memory, we mean rational structures, stereotypes, values, norms, and instruction schemes, which determine the borders of knowledge. Second, a characteristic of modern discussions about rationality is that too little attention is paid to the differences between the rationality of knowledge and the rationality of methods.

That is why it is expedient to consider the problem of rationality, the value of knowledge, skills, and experience which constitute the inner content of social memory separately. Third, the problem of the correlation of the rational and the valuable in social memory, in this case in knowledge, represents a great scientific concern, but this aspect has not yet received sufficient attention in philosophical literature. Social memory, as it has already been noted, holds the most valuable arsenal of standards, structures, and instruments of cognitive activity. These factors of scientific development are not static, but changes in them do not happen arbitrarily. On the one hand, rationalistic structures and value stereotypes are changed with the change in knowledge itself; on the other hand, change in the understanding of scientific rationality and values dictated by known sociocultural factors also defines what kind of knowledge must be received and is involved in the practical activity of man.

Certain traditions of the research of objective reality are an obligatory component of scientific functioning. All this is a condition of research programs in scientifically scientific societies. The cognizing subject does his research on the basis of the accepted "patterns" that promote the succession of research procedures and methods. In this sense the scientific memory is the mechanism which promotes the succession of cognitive activity.

Any phenomenon of nature and society is many-sided. Which facet is turned to us depends on the type of rationality, on our value structures. In this interpretation, the scientific memory and culture fixes some knowledge or information. That is why the perfection of research procedures based on past performance is a most important methodological task.

Modern historical research confirms the rightfulness of T. Kuhn's theory about the paradigmatic characteristic of science. A. Rosov wrote: "Historians of science know very well the strength of traditions, the stagnancy of thought, and the inability to see the new. But if earlier traditions and inculcated opinions were considered, first of all, as an obstacle to the development of knowledge, then Kuhn showed that we deal with natural and necessary phenomena, without which there is no science."⁹ In this connection we can think that rationality and the value of research procedures and methods are caused by the paradigmatic characteristics of science. This can be traced in the material of social memory, by contrasting and comparing different historical forms and types.

A discussion about the rational and valuable within the framework of the problem we are interested in entails the question of how significant and valuable the knowledge is that constitutes the content of social memory. Social memory is not only a simple money-box of knowledge, but also an active system of fixing, processing, and transmitting the results of man's practical and intellectual activity. As a basis of cognition, social memory is the starting point from which the study of the world begins and where knowledge gained by man returns. Thus, social memory is directly included in the process of human cognition.

Due to its nature, social memory "forgets," "loses," "wipes out" knowledge and information. This process is called the "amnesia" of social

memory, which happens partly spontaneously; that is, it is hard to predict what and when scientific fact will be lost, and which one decades later might emerge from its virtual condition to be included in the modern scientific context.

Any kind of human activity, especially cognitive activity, always pursues a concrete goal. Man's efforts which take the form of purposeful actions are directed at studying a problem; solutions depend on thinking. The result of these actions is new knowledge, which is a stimulus for penetration into the unknown.

The rationality and value of knowledge depend on the demand of the "informational market." It is this market that determines the fortunes of knowledge: if it will be active or passive in the "memory" of science, useful or not useful. The demands of the informational market are formed on the basis of social, ideological, material, economic, spiritual, cultural, and philosophical factors.

The market does not deny the objective rationality of knowledge, but, nonetheless, we must bear in mind that some rational theories in the history of science turned out to be partly irrational.

These collisions in social memory result in the concretization, or amplification of rationality of both knowledge and methods of cognition. Thus, social memory is not only an instructive history of knowledge, but also a living system which regenerates scientific thought and advances it. It is natural that it does not happen by itself—the conscientious and impartial work of a scientist or scientific community who reconstruct knowledge, methods, and research is necessary.

Rational reconstruction reveals the logic of the development of scientific conceptions, theories, and ideas. This procedure is realized from the point of view of the rationality of modern knowledge. This process is endless. I. Lakatos wrote: "When a more successful theory of rationality appears, its inner history expands its estate and frees the lands, which before belonged to the outer history."¹⁰

Before speaking about the fact that the existing type of rationality has become obsolete and requires further development, we should evaluate it from the position of the demands and prospects of science. In this case rationality is a criterion which estimates the value of a concrete type of rationality, conditioned by certain norms existing in science, by which the estimating subject is guided. So, for example, considering the scientific memory, we take from it what we need, and it is a difficult task—from this arsenal of knowledge we have to find the information necessary for us. Of course, armed with modern knowledge, this selection satisfies our demands and helps solve some new problems. I. Lakatos noted: "Progress in the theory of rationality in science is in discovering new historical facts and in expanding the rational reconstruction of the history of science, which is penetrated by values."¹¹

An evaluation of concrete rationality is, in essence, an evaluation of the truthfulness of knowledge, an establishment of its value. However, truthfulness and the values in knowledge are relative; they can be substituted for

by new knowledge. Retrospectively evaluating the previous history of science and culture, it is possible to establish how rational and valuable our knowledge is today from the point of view of scientific development.

Knowledge is a form of accumulating human experience. That is why it carries rationality and value. The proclamation of knowledge as value presupposes the necessity and solution of its rationality problem. This becomes the criteria for truth. Scientifically and socially meaningful knowledge is had in the construction of authentic, logically substantiated, empirically confirmed, and historically justified human experience.

Nonetheless, the history of science shows us how the evaluation of knowledge was changing in European culture. In the eyes of a European, it acquired the status of the good only in the modern times. The Age of the Enlightenment turned knowledge into the absolute good. And in modern times, the definitions of rationality and value acquire a dramatic character. The rationality of any theory today is evaluated from the point of view of its influence on culture. That is why the claim "everything rational is valuable" no longer works.

However, knowledge includes both rational elements and axiological components. As a the whole, the comparison between the rational and valuable acquires sense in two respects: first, when considering the axiological compounds of social memory, which comprises science as well as culture; second, when defining value orientations and choosing the optimal ways and forms of development of culture, spiritual life, and social practice.

The value of knowledge can be established in the process of its actual existence. The existing knowledge is barely subjected or almost not at all subjected to value analysis. Virtual knowledge in social memory exists as potential value. It becomes real value only with active involvement in the process of cognition. As Marx wrote: "A dress becomes really a dress only when it is worn; a house where nobody lives is not actually a real house."¹²

The value of knowledge kept in the memory of social systems is in the realization of the functions of scientific and theoretical cognition and in the solution of practical social tasks. In conclusion, it should be noted that knowledge held in the memory of social systems and transformed by them acquires value only if it satisfies the vital demands and interests of a people.

NOTES

1 See I. Prigogine and I. Stengers, *Order from Chaos*. Moscow. Progress 1986, p. 47.

2 K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*. tome. 23, p. 189.

3 M. Vartovsky, *Models, Representation, and Scientific Comprehension*. Moscow Progress, 1988, p. 10.

4 Vartovsky, p. 12.

5 See for details; V.V. Kosolapov and A.N. Goncharenko, *21st Century. In the Mirror of Futurology*. Moscow. 1987.

6 Marx and Engels, p. 402.

7 See Rozoev. "The Problem of Values and Science Development"/
Science and Values. Moscow Science, 1982, pp. 5-27.

8 N.S. Avtonomova, *Mind and Rationality*. Moscow. Science 1988,
p. 25.

9 M.A. Rozov, *Ways of Scientific Discoveries*. (Critique of irrational-
ity.)

10 I. Lakatos, "History of Science and Rational Reconstruction"/
Structure and Science Development. Moscow. 1973, p. 259.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 257.

12 Marx and Engels, pp. 27-28.

Chapter IV

THE PRAXIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF SOCIAL MEMORY

THE AESTHETICS OF SOCIAL MEMORY

The present always becomes the past—that is an immutable law of Nature and history. People derive knowledge, experience, and inspiration from the past. That is why man always wants to “embellish” the past, for he is by nature an aesthetic creature. Man is a “fascinated stranger” in the present world.

The eternal aspiration of man to go beyond what he sees and hears and his appeal to his own mind which leads him to the sphere of the transcendental lets him reveal the aesthetic in his own life as both subjective and substantial. Extrapolation of this model on society and objectification of subjective aesthetical ideas give rise to an ideology of aesthetic values. These values actively participate in the formation of history, memory, and attitudes. As a result, the “aestheticization” of history as social memory is a factor in the realization of a people’s will not only for self-preservation but also for further development.

A society’s potential to flourish lies in social memory. Moreover, on the level of ordinary consciousness there can be an understanding of the uselessness and antiquity of that social memory. But historical continuity, due to which civilization exists, is possible exactly in the context of social memory, because the experience and knowledge of generations in themselves are discrete. That is why social memory is the concrete base for man’s historical activity.

Social memory is the pedestal on which man and society stand so that they can see new horizons and prospects.

The aesthetic understanding of social memory is caused by ontological demands. Striving to understand what Heidegger meant and giving sense to human existence through social memory, man finds justification and comfort in the face of mortality and time. That is why mnemonic time in counterbalance to physical time saves man from oblivion and complete disappearance in the universe. The similar emotional and expressive experience of man leads to the victory of his spirit. Social memory in this case is the “ontological resistance to the power of time.”¹

Time tends to deny the human spirit. Spirit as a creative act of man always strives for existential depth and harmony. This can be understood in the objectification of spirit in history and is expressed in the rise and fall of the human spirit. Thus, the aesthetic is the substantial in the being of man and society. And since it is so, then society always accumulates the aesthetic in the history of social memory.

Spirit as intellect, mind, and logos is not the only component of human history. An irrational beginning, connected with man's mental and bodily needs, most often plays the role of catalyst or destroyer in that history. And quite often society is thrust on the will, fed by the irrational aspirations of some charismatic personality, which leads to great calamities. Having sacrificed millions of lives to his ambitions, the culprit is then elevated to the rank of hero or idol. In this case, the aesthetic role of a personality takes place in the eyes of the young and future generations. This, however, does not pass by without leaving a trace in the consciousness of the coming generation.

A clear example of this is neo-fascism. Moreover, sometimes a society's attitude toward the most terrible, irrational, unreasonable events in history is tolerance. That is why the philosophers, holding that history at times is irrational, may be right.

There is another direction in the attitude toward history. If a variant of historical interpretation was represented above where personalities and events are evaluated and explained with the help of the categories "heroic" and "wonderful," where, for example, Hitler is a hero, and the idea of National Socialism is wonderful, then history can be evaluated in the categories of "tragic" and "awful." For example, at the beginning of *perestroika* the Stalin period of Soviet society was evaluated as tragic by one part of society and as heroic by the other. In connection with different feelings the words of Jaspers should be noted:

If in the endless data of historical consciousness everything is represented as worthy of remembrance only because it was inviolable, which is established by being as endless, then this inability to make a choice leads to the aesthetic attitude, for which everything, whatever happens, can serve as a stimulus of excitement and satisfaction of curiosity: one thing is wonderful and another is too. This, non-committed approach, whether it is scientific or aesthetic historicism, leads to the fact that you can be guided by whatever you like, and because everything is equal, nothing matters. However, historical reality is not neutral. Our real attitude toward history is a struggle with it. History concerns us; everything that concerns us is constantly changing, and this constitutes a problem for the present. The less history serves as a subject of aesthetic enjoyment, the more it becomes the problem of the present.²

However, the "aestheticization" of history—at times the relishing of some historical event by social memory—becomes a way of satisfying some social feelings, especially when it concerns a nationalistic and chauvinistic public mood.

While not disputing Jaspers' point of view, it should be noted that there are positive sides to the aesthetic understanding of social memory. They

can reveal themselves when history is repeated. With the help of social memory, other times and other conditions serve as the basis for interpreting the past, learning lessons from it, and serving the good. Repetition of history must not be idle puffing up and admiration—it must be repetition with substantial change, that is, repetition of an essence preserved in social memory, which is an important factor for the future. The repetition of essence disposes our consciousness and feelings for a spirituality that makes our being self-sufficient.

Spirituality is based on an aesthetic of life which makes our ideals and our interpretation of the world agree with the harmony of the world. But in this hope, man and society are open to an uncritical attitude toward history and social memory.

Struggling with history, as Jaspers sees it, is an obligation, a categorical imperative. But, on the other hand, an aesthetic interpretation of social memory has a productive history. It promotes society's activities, and is a criterion for the extension of personal and social values. Evidence for this can be found in specific sociological research carried out in different countries.

Analogous research was done in Russia.³ In the course of this work it was noted that between 1989-1994 respondents had expressed positive and negative attitudes toward the Soviets. Judgments like "It was a history of heroic victories" and "This was one of the most tragic pages of world history" were expressed. A 1996 opinion poll showed that evaluation of historical events does not depend on the political preferences of the electorate. So, for example, answering the question "Is the scale of Stalin's repression exaggerated?" 23 percent of the electoral group "Apple" answered "agree"; 56 percent—"not agree"; 21 percent—"hard to say"; and from the CPRF, correspondingly 49 percent, 29 percent, and 24 percent.

And, at last, the analysis of social opinion in Kyrgyzstan, in the course of sociological research done in 1997, showed the following: to the question "How do you feel remembering the Soviet past?" 54.8 percent responded "a glorious past"; 2.3 percent, "the time of trouble and fear"; 5.7 percent, "humiliation, lack of freedom"; 31.8 percent, "the usual story"; the remainder found difficulty in replying. Answering the question "What is your attitude toward a reevaluation of the historical past of the Soviet period?" 29.9 percent responded "For the sake of the country's future, it is necessary to interpret history"; 27.1 percent, "Why stir up the past?"; 22.1 percent, "Blackening the past is bad for the present and future." Speaking about the ten most important historical events, 60.1 percent of respondents singled out the Great Patriotic War; 59.1 percent, the collapse of the USSR; and 31.7 percent, *perestroika*.

Thus, as noted above, historical facts—whatever happens—are evaluated in the categories "tragic," "heroic," "wonderful," "terrible," etc. Opinions about a tragic or wonderful past are historically conditioned and predetermined by the values of that time and of the present. Even if it does not directly serve to predetermine history, it plays a great role in a society's self-identification.

When the past is interpreted, mythology is always present. That is why in the historic and cultural memory of all nations there is an image of a

“Golden Age,” “Silver Age,” or in Soviet history an idealistic view of communism. Such interpretations of a historical process are inherent in philosophical systems, for which Utopian views about a perfect society are characteristic. Hartman wrote that in historical structures two things are very distinctive: “intermingling of descend and ascend and non-synchronous realization of both components in a final goal of freedom. Usually the state is successful at the beginning and at the end, and unlucky in the middle”⁴

Besides objective conditions, judgments about the past and interpretations of historical memory depend on determining a goal that really matters to people. In this the causal connection of the past and present, the human aspect is expressed.

The aesthetic grasp of human memory lies in the nature of memory. Culture as social memory realizes itself in the process of its development. The element of “play” in a culture of national being is a special catalyst of recollection about the past and about origins. “Playing” man sets life in motion, and in that exact moment it begins to play with all the facets of its essence. The role of game in the actualization of social memory is revealed in making people of the past, present, and future participants at an event. The social, artistic, and reflective sides of the game blend into one. Let us remember the performances adapted for the stage dedicated to the 1000-year anniversary of the epic “Manas.” It was a grandiose game, combining social, philosophical, artistic, and cognitive understandings of the ancient and modern Kyrgyz people. In this case, a game is an aesthetic means of expressing one’s own attitude to the present order of the world.

This means of remembering the Kyrgyz people’s past created a special spiritual aura in our society. The same can be said about holidays as elements of game culture. Holidays have much more significance than mere entertainment of people on their days off. In particular, such a holiday as *Nooruz* is a way to sink into the cultural and national context for self-definition and self-identification.

In the functioning of social memory, a great role is played by art. Their interrelationship existed from the beginning, as *Mnemosine*, the goddess of memory, is the mother of the muses of poetry, dance, and music. Art as a production of the absolute Spirit, according to Hegel, is a form of self-consciousness on the part of man and society.

Art feeds on the fruit of social memory; it is the most dynamic phenomenon influencing memory. It denies and develops traditions, knowledge, and experience stored in the arsenal of social memory. For example, in technique and aesthetics modern architecture denies the canons of classical architecture. The creation of Picasso was the denial of classical forms of artistic representation. Now they are a symbol of the past—the practical and spiritual experience of the past. In this sense, Hegel—who maintained that art is “the move away into the past”—might be right.

The transmitting function of social memory is realized through art—through cinematography, painting, photography, radio and television—which by depicting and reproducing historical facts, experience, and aims, inform

new generations about the past. For example, Picasso's "Guernica" and Romm's "Ordinary Fascism" place the historical events of the Second World War and have aesthetic expression, significance, and power.

Above we said that the aesthetic understanding of social memory can lead to mythologization of the past. The climax of mythologization is hyperbole, especially in oral history: myths and legends are transmitted by word of mouth, creating colorful images of the lives and actions of personalities. Literature plays a great role in it. For example, the romanticization of American history of the nineteenth century is seen in the plains, desert, and cowboys of literature. Likewise, the image of the historical personality of *Kurmanjan Datka*, shrouded in legend, gives an aesthetic understanding of the history and the past of the Kyrgyz.

Life demands that we combine historicity and progress. That is why being shut up in historicity as well as in the illusion of progress is equally undesirable for the normal functioning of any society. The task of a viable society is a deep understanding of the fusion of past and modern processes.

SOCIAL AMNESIA

It is completely and absolutely not conceivable to live without the possibility of total oblivion. - Nietzsche

The functioning of social memory is always accompanied by social amnesia, that is, forgetfulness. For the present, science has established the nature of individual amnesia, which can begin after severe mental shock or trauma. It should be noted that, on the whole, forgetfulness and the disappearance from memory of some facts and events is normal and natural. But forgetfulness exceeding the bounds of such natural norms has dire effects both in the physiological and social sense.

A study of literature in English using the computer system "ERIK," which provides annotation of literature published in many languages, showed that in modern science the notion "amnesia" is used in various sociocultural contexts. Here is a list of such notions: "female amnesia," "historical amnesia," "media amnesia," "sociological amnesia," "childhood amnesia," "intellectual amnesia," "cultural amnesia," "collective amnesia," "genealogical amnesia," "linguistic amnesia," and "political amnesia." All these notions are united in one meaning—the crisis of memory.

Extrapolation of an individual model of forgetfulness on society and on humanity inevitably leads to cardinal changes, sometimes to catastrophes. From the first, this assertion looks like false pathos, because modern civilization has tremendous technical possibilities for fixation and restoration of facts of the past.

In any society respecting itself, there are museums, archives, historical memorials, etc. In addition, national cultures have strong mnemonic traditions for the reproduction of values accumulated over thousands of years: folk art, music, painting, and poetry, etc.

On what level and under what conditions, then, does social amnesia turn into a disease? And how dangerous is it for a society?

Social amnesia is a complicated phenomenon. Its complexity is not its influencing the functioning of culture and society directly. Just as a living organism can function for some time without certain organs, so can society and culture seem to exist without whole layers and periods of cultural values.

However, social amnesia is terrible because it destroys the base of culture, in other words, the viability of culture. After such a disease some cultures cease to exist, some manage to recover. This is their fate or punishment for ignoring the laws of cultural and historical development. It is impossible to say that all the now lost great cultures, all the collapsed public systems, were affected by this ailment, social amnesia. But it is quite clear that the history of the development of human culture was accompanied by certain periods of social amnesia. At the same time, sometimes it is amnesia, artificially created forgetfulness, that is the stimulus of society's progress. Narcissistic affection for the past and poisoning of the present can turn the actions of a social subject into complete imitation.

Social amnesia begins as a result of metaphysical denial in a society, starting with various territorial claims, divisions, and re-allotment of land and ending with absolute reforms of the administrative system. This gives opportunities to unceremonious and unrestrained innovations, completely destroying the past. That is revealed especially vividly in the sphere of culture. In the history of culture a clear example of artificially created amnesia is the burning of books. The Chinese emperor Tsin Shihuandi periodically burned books because he was afraid that dangerous ideas would interfere with his project of a new social order—the creation of a universal Chinese state. In Germany after the Nazis came to power, thousands of books considered dangerous to the ideas of National Socialism were burned.

Another form of social amnesia occurs when the connection between the past and present is interrupted. In the history of Turkic peoples this was repeated several times with the aim of Europeanization. For example, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who changed the Arabic alphabet into Latin in 1928, broke off the connection of Turkish culture with its Iranian roots. The Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union, as mentioned above, also experienced a change of alphabet.

Toynbee described some of the phenomena in social memory.

Both futurism and archaism are the efforts to tear the chains of the present by turning to other time periods, but not leaving the mundane of human being. These ways are alternatives along the axis of temporal change, but they are similar because both of them have no prospects. The directions are different but the method is the same. At the same time futurism is different from archaism in that it further deviates from human nature, which can be considered as a significant

condition of this way of life, because by moving away from the unpleasant present, people most likely turn to the known past rather than to the unknown future.⁵

Consequently, social amnesia happens where and when a break between the past, present, and future occurs. Social amnesia periodically relieves man from the burden of the past. That is why social amnesia and memory are necessary both for an individual's health and for a nation and culture in general. Nietzsche wrote that history and historical knowledge are necessary for the health of a nation and culture, but the excess of history is harmful for life. Likewise, Jose Ortega y Gasset writes that the European soul was able to move ahead by not falling victim to the past.⁶

Social amnesia appears when only monumental, heroic events are described and shameful events are omitted. Of course, this, in its turn, leads to misrepresentation and falsification of history. This quality of social amnesia is, perhaps, the worst, because it results in cultural degeneration. In addition, misrepresentation of history creates illusions, which lead to delusion.

Humanity has accumulated enough knowledge and experience to organize its life reasonably. The human mind goes into macro and micro-worlds, answers many questions that appear as a result of unrestrained curiosity, and explains the mysteries of the world and human psychology. In the "archives" of collective, historical, national, cultural, and scientific memory, a huge volume of knowledge could give place to common sense in our life, especially politics, human relations, and social structures. However, as real life shows, accumulated knowledge and social experience usually remain on the level of antiquarian interest.

The sphere of social knowledge is determined by a great number of factors, such as interest, ideology, selectivity of human memory, time, space, and so on. Otherwise, how can the phenomenon of war—the senselessness of which has been proven by history thousands of times—be explained? War is the climax of selectivity of social memory, its susceptibility to the influence of unresolved problems, the vanity of individuals, and the forgetfulness of the crowd. It represents short-sightedness of the collective mind.

Thus, we have come to the conclusion that social amnesia is a property of social memory. Social amnesia represents the same phenomenon as the second "self," accompanying consciousness as death might. It resists life, as a dream, yet does not exist without reality. In short, it is a characteristic of social memory. That is why it should be studied as carefully and deeply as social memory itself.

Excessive worship of the past and idolization of history, facts, events, personalities, and social institutions tear man and society away from the real and lead to a sharp deterioration of culture and civilization. That is why the ancients condemned idolatry. In this case social amnesia is a natural means of liberating and cleansing the historical memory of the frozen, dead tissues of a social organism.

Social amnesia in some of its manifestations can do a lot of harm to the initiation and development of cultural forms and can hamper social development.

Revolutions and reforms in social development subject social consciousness to a forced amnesia, first of all, by means of a system's ideological processing and ideological pressure. Fascism and totalitarianism, which are clear examples from the twentieth century, can be evidence of this. In these post-Soviet times there are also attempts to create social amnesia in history and culture. They revealed themselves, for example, in the attempt to cross out many pages of Soviet history for the sake of democratic transformations. In this process, there was great unfairness with regard to the older generation. This kind of rehashing of history leads not to its integral perception, but to fragmentation, which lowers a society's creative abilities.

The sources that constantly nourish the phenomenon of social amnesia include the "archetype of the steady decline of history"; for the sake of metaphysically denying the past, the former heroics of the ancestors are sacrificed, and they themselves are represented in a pale and tragicomic light. In this form of history, the absurd prevails and the present generation loses out.

In both cases, a retrospective and perspective in the covering of history, leave place for social amnesia. The conception of a cyclic flow of social development, clearly expressed in the phrase "There is nothing new in this world," is evidence that social memory constantly produces repetition of the essence of things and knowledge, which are necessary for the viability of a society.

Thus, social amnesia is an important manifestation of social memory, the role of which is significant in the mnemonic activity of a society. This role calls for serious research into the nature of this phenomenon.

In the context of social amnesia, a repressed memory should be noted. This appears as the result of suppression of a certain order of events and knowledge. Repressed memory of a personality and society is a deprivation of reality, because repressed memory creates distorted reality. In Marcuse's opinion, the "true value of memory is in its being the driving force of liberation." The point is that man, constantly turning to his memory, again discovers the past. "The search for lost time becomes a means of achieving future liberation."⁷

A society's repressed memory is the basis of the creation of social illusions. Social illusions have a certain political aim—to turn people into *mancurts* (worms), not remembering their past.

SOCIAL MEMORY AS THE BASIS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY

History is nothing but the activity of man using his reason.

- Marx, Engels

The praxis level of social memory is revealed in its being a base for constructing social reality. In practice we are always doing that, beginning with making everyday decisions and ending with such a complicated sphere as social administration. We always come from previous experience and knowledge. They help us recognize the new reality appearing before us, demanding that we apply new kinds of actions. That is why the analysis of social memory in this aspect has great practical significance.

The source of ideas in this attempt will be social phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge. Three trends of German thought greatly contributed to the study of social and historical determinism. These are Marxism, Nietzscheism, and Historicism. The works of E. Husserl, A. Shusterman, M. Scheler, K. Mannheim, M. Weber, P. Berger, and T. Luckmann laid the foundation of traditions to study and use the knowledge determined by social and cultural context.

Man's thinking is historical. That is why every type of thinking can be understood in the framework of its "native" historical context. Otherwise false interpretations, misunderstandings, and delusions can appear.

Consequently, concrete knowledge corresponds to concrete reality. The question should be raised—is that true? If so, then storing and transmitting knowledge and experience turns into a senseless activity, a waste of time and money. But situational determinism does not satisfy thinking, because thinking moves and develops. A lot of money is spent by the state for preserving knowledge of cultural values, and a great number of people are employed in this sphere. The assertion that the autonomy of knowledge caused in a certain situation is good only because it would mean a capitulation of thinking before the historicity of human beings.

In our opinion, to begin with, reality should be divided into "everyday" and "historical." It is necessary to try to model participation in knowledge, experience, and the spiritual and intellectual structures of social memory. These could then be harnessed in the construction of these realities.

Let us assume a neighbor is complaining for a long time that she cannot cure her child's cough. I would recommend for her to try using a folk remedy that was used by my grandmother. And my grandmother learnt it from her grandmother. Calculated roughly, approximately six generations have used this simple folk remedy for a cough. On a temporal plane, it is more than one hundred years old. Transmission of knowledge from generation to generation creates a mnemonic field of everyday reality. In this case my neighbor is privy to knowledge which has been kept in oral form in collective memory. In everyday life my neighbor and I are privy to a colossal reserve of social knowledge.

Man is privy to a social reserve of knowledge because in a society there is social distribution of knowledge. Being aware of how a socially accessible reserve of knowledge is distributed (at least, in general), is an important element of the very reserve of knowledge. In everyday life we know (at least, approximately), from whom we can get some necessary information

which we do not possess and, on the whole, what kind of knowledge can be expected from different people.⁸

Social memory regulates ideas of reality in consciousness. And what is more, it promotes the establishment of social order. Historical reality, which was mentioned above, appears before us in the form of a certain social order.

The efforts of construction of social reality were undertaken in history a great number of times. Both Cartesian and Soviet men felt antipathy to their past—the existing order of the past seemed stagnant and undeveloped to them. Cartesian and Soviet people were interested only in the present and an ideally constructed future. Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset wrote: “Man is a revolutionary only to the extent to which he does not see the past or present—history as the reflection of the pure, upright, vital mind.”⁹

Berger and Luckmann emphasize the idea that human activity is not possible without a classification of their interests, demands, and attractions. This is an anthropological necessity, which is a premise for the creation of the social order.

“Social order is a human product or, to be more precise, an interpreted human production. It is created by man in the process of constant externalization... Social order is not a part of the nature of things and does not appear due to natural laws. It exists only as a product of human activity. It cannot be given any other ontological status...”¹⁰ Social order is a product of past and present activity. Consequently, social order is an embodiment and an expression of a society’s collective memory.

The properties of collective memory are most vividly expressed in ceremonies and rituals. The Kyrgyz historian Belek Soltonoev in his work *From the History of the Ancient Kyrgyz* writes: “When one died, the poorest man or a rich feudal lord, a one-year funeral repast (*ash*) was prepared. Big *ashes* were arranged with horse races and prizes, with spear fights, wrestling contests, and shooting at gold and silver coins. At some funeral repasts an unfortunate widow was forced to ‘untie a she-camel.’ Widows and daughters of the deceased had to cry, lament, and scratch their faces till they bled...”¹¹

Kyrgyz traditions, connected with funeral meals (*ash*) still remain. They are observed by the Kyrgyz both in rural regions and in cities. Funeral repasts are the communal rituals of remembering the person they knew, or ancestors, so that their spirits accompanied them in their daily activities.

The lives of the modern and ancient Kyrgyz have mostly been determined by how they observed their traditions. However, they should not be observed only because of the feeling of solidarity. Traditions also play a more serious role.

First, organizing and holding funeral repasts are a confirmation of a family’s social status in a community. This is an action that proves the identity of a family with the majority, maintaining the social order. It is also evidence of the social and moral maturity of members of a family. It is the way of life for individuals and the community. It is the right to call a community one’s people. It is the environment where a man has an opportunity to defend his honor, where his efforts will be valued, and where he gets moral satisfaction

and recognition. It is evidence of the extent of socialization and a form of communication not only with his community but also with other peoples. It is also a form of economic relations, where an equal exchange takes place. So, traditions, such as funeral repasts, play a colossal axiologic role. That is why in the epic “Manas,” the chapter “The Funeral Repast of Koketay” is one of the most important.

All the factors mentioned above express the everyday reality of the Kyrgyz. This is their social life, and it calls for some explanation.

What is the relation of this and similar traditions to social order within a community, state, and society? Traditions are the constantly active cultural instrument of actualization of social memory. Traditions as ideas, knowledge, values, and experience express themselves in reality. For example, understanding of epic culture in Kyrgyzstan in the post-Soviet time gave rise to a series of social actions so that a new social order with its inner cultural space began to emerge. Academic publications of epic works, creation of an institute for studying “Manas” and other epic works, recruiting of personnel for the organization of the celebration of the 1000-year anniversary of “Manas” all began. Likewise, the magazine “Muras” appeared, and public funding for these projects was available. This created a special atmosphere in society and attracted the attention of the public to their origins. All this, in the aggregate, created a new reality, a new society.

Traditions need transformation because they have a negative side. They can become self-centered and jealous about ancestors and authority. A squandered tradition can lead to violence.

Continuing the analysis of one of the significant traditions, *ash*, it should be noted that, in the post-Soviet time, *ashes*—holidays in honor of *batyrs* (heroes) and prominent public figures of the past—turned into important political events. This can be observed not only in Kyrgyzstan but also in other Central Asian societies and in Russia.

The necessity for national identity causes the search for common ancestors and worshipping their spirit. In such traditional societies as the Kyrgyz, the structure of community character dominates the public character. That is why the forming of a new post-Soviet reality demands, first of all, sociocultural memory and derives from such phenomena an ancestor cult, clan consciousness, traditions, habits, stereotypes and social structures. In combination with the Soviet experience, they can take on odd forms.

In post-Soviet times, an Islamic layer of social experience is emerging. Freedom of conscience in society gave rise to an interest in religion. Kyrgyzstan has turned into a polyconfessional society. In Kyrgyzstan there are many different religious organizations. They all try to introduce something of their own and attract followers. But the majority of the population confesses Islam. Rehabilitation of Islam in the post-Soviet time allowed for the creation of new cultural and religious space. This reality is gradually becoming institutionalized and gaining clearer form. The relevancy of Islamic religious structures in the consciousness of people is obvious.

The beginning of market relations “remove a spell” (Weber) from traditional structures of the Kyrgyz consciousness. In particular, a monolithic community gets split. But political society, in the formation of which lies civil practice, has not formed its basis. In this sense, even Russia is more advanced than Kyrgyzstan.

The cognitive and normative interpretation of similar facts is produced on the basis of historical memory. Gradually, through education they reach the consciousness of new generations and become the criterion of society’s social and spiritual development.

With the concept “social order,” Berger and Luckmann use the notions “social world,” “institutional world,” and “institutional order.” These concepts merge two trends: legitimizing existing institutions and passing them on to the next generation. To become convincing and constructive for the new generation, institutional order must have real content and the ability to transform—otherwise the young generation will reject it.

To reproduce social order a social system is required which can transmit it to a new generation. Social sedimentation of order, hardened in the memory as an unforgettable and unchangeable essence, determines the behavior and thinking of man and society.¹² It means that the essence of social order is internalized in the consciousness of a group. Internalization of social order is realized through language, ideology, and symbols. The extent of internalization of social order depends on structures and how those structures are accepted by members of society. For example, the traditional type of social relations in the Kyrgyz society is well internalized and institutionalized because it is shared by most people and in almost all spheres—politics, economy, and culture. On the other hand, the “Islamic order” proclaimed by the leaders of Chechnya was not shared by everybody; moreover, in the Chechen variant, Islamic order discredited itself.

Social order is supported by symbolic universal mechanisms. As a rule, they have a conceptual character and serve as an interpretation of societal foundations. For example, *Manas* carries a conceptual load for Kyrgyz society, just as Peter the Great does for Russian society. We should note that these are conceptual personages of the past whose importance was understood mostly in the post-Soviet period.

The search for the philosophical foundations of Kyrgyz public thought is connected with nomadic civilization, and the idea of the unity of Turkic culture with Central Asian civilization. This idea of the Eurasian character is linked to the search for conceptual mechanisms to support social order. Conceptual mechanisms in this case are derived from the social memory of Eurasian peoples.

Thus, reconstruction of social memory helps reveal the meaning and sense of human activity which lie in the base of communication of generations, historical epochs, civilizations, and social systems.

New social metaphysics presupposes the joining of past experience and future problems. This joining is possible due to the productive work of a “collective brain,” which, by operating in symbolic universals, interprets

social order and consolidates society. The French researcher Halbvaks and Austrian philosopher and sociologist Shusterman both wrote about this approach to interpreting the social order.

A society's transcendental character is revealed in its conceptualization of social order but also in the being of an individual. The cognitive premises of conceptualization are in the sphere of social intellect. It is that which selects and interprets past events and personalities. By doing so it presupposes new alternative conceptual mechanisms supporting society. This in turn promotes the transformation of subjective and objective reality. In this case, unconditionally, an important role is played by symbolic universals.

A symbolic universe regulates history too. It binds collective events into one whole, including the past, present and future. With regard to the past, "memory" is created, joining all those who are socialized in this society. With regard to the future, a general system of reading is being created in order that an individual can plan his actions; this way a symbolic universe joins people with their ancestors and descendants in a sense of unity.¹³

Let us remember the years of *perestroika*, when one part of society denounced Stalinism, and the other justified him: in both cases revision of social memory stirred up social consciousness. Tension appeared in society. The older generation was slapped in the face, and not only morally. The new "social engineers" in the person of "superintendents of *perestroika*" were given the opportunity to establish a new reality. The establishment of a new reality was accompanied by "shock therapy" and "privatization."

In the post-Soviet space, discrediting the conceptual foundations of the new reality—democratic society—strengthened the memory of the Soviet society. As a result, rival conceptions about social reality—procommunist—and other models of social development appeared. The monopoly of one certain conception will be recognized depending on a society's attitude toward its past.

At this point we come to the problem of the interrelationship of social memory and ideology. Social memory provides the historical basis for the formation of an ideology. Focal political processes occurring in the post-Soviet period made people reevaluate their political past. However, retrospective evaluation of the political past at the beginning of *perestroika* turned into political frustration, which to some extent liberated repressed memory from the dictates of ideology.

The construction of a new society turned into a hard task. It was necessary to build a new reality. The analysts of post-Soviet history held that this task, unlike the Chinese reforms, failed. There was no rational social construction concerning *perestroika*. During the period of *perestroika*, social and political processes went out spontaneously.

However, some researchers-politicians, analyzing the past social and political experience, found answers to actual problems.

Revision of political memory became the main subject of scientific and practical interests. If we turn to foreign experience, we can see that in Europe and the United States political memory is the source of peoples' social creation. Political decisions, the upbringing of youth, and ideological culture are realized through the actualization of political memory. This confirms a direct participation of political memory in the creation of contemporaneity.

The concept "political memory" means a system of storing, reproducing, and transmitting political knowledge, political practice, and experience. We naturally have political memory as a phenomenon because it is a characteristic of any political system, but the concept "political memory" has not received wide recognition. Nonetheless, social practices of the last ten years show the involvement of political memory in social, cultural, and economic life.

Moreover, our present life proves that political memory is the base where the coordinates for the future, both state and people, are determined.

Political memory is often "exploited" for the formation and development of national ideology. Ideology is based on the actualization of political memory being used for particular goals. It moves the positive to the negative.

Man somehow gets absorbed by political memory in the process of education or self-education. The evaluation of facts and events in political life happens in man's consciousness. In this case the set guidelines for the interpretation of political memory are very important. Opinions and motivations formed in the process of sinking into political memory determine social behavior, at least, in the long run. Ideological motivation may lead a man to heroic or cowardly deeds—for example, the behavior of Russian soldiers during the war, or the behavior of neo-fascists.

The non-linear character of historical times, with its chaotic, repetitive, and cyclic character, makes us return to political memory. It is natural that interpretation brings about subjective and objective correlations, and this fact in its turn creates an understanding of political facts but filtered through the knowledge and goals of an interpreter.

First of all, man and society turn to political memory with the goal of meeting their intellectual and social needs. In this respect, political memory carries out a kind of didactic function. If an intellectually honest man turns to political memory, he will try to reveal and restore the truth in the "native" context and avoid misinterpretations. Such an interpretation by a researcher will promote the positive goals of political community and the results of the research will let us construct political reality. Political memory brings "a history feeling" for some people which means an unselfish interest in the past, "fed by the museum syndrome." Others purposefully use political memory for their ideological goals. Political leaders, whose charisma is aimed at creation, use political memory for a consolidating ideology.¹⁴

A kind of proof can be seen in the activity of the American presidents. On the other side are leaders whose goals are fed by destructive use of political memory as ideology leading to non-freedom and war. Hitler might be the best example of this.

The Chechen war has demonstrated that the realization of the Chechen people's memory of the nineteenth century, with the conquest of the Caucasus by the Russian autocracy, plays a major role in today's Chechen conflict and bloody war. The president of Serbia, S. Milosovic and his followers, exploiting the political memory connected with the outbreak of the First World War in the Balkans, tried to amass political capital. However, the wounded political memory of Yugoslavia led to war.

The first wound was caused by the relationship between Croats and Serbs. The reason for this was Serbian domination which resulted in Croat separatism. The second wound expressed itself in the relationship of Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Muslims took part with the Turkish in the fight against the Serbs, and the Serbs, in turn, remembered that fact. The third wound was caused by Serbian and Albanian relations. "Serbianization," the deporting and mass murder of Albanians, and the actions of the Albanian fascists during the Second World War were fixed in political memory.¹⁵

Political memory is given a lot of attention in the United States. The settlement of the new continent by the first pioneers is represented as a heroic act in American history. It is not only the revelation of positive or negative events that is important in the evaluation of social memory for American researchers. It also determines the social opinions of the people, who, in turn, determine social behavior and the thinking process of citizens.

For example, comparative analysis of American and Lithuanian social memory over the past fifty years revealed that Americans remembered the Second World War and the war in Vietnam. Those historical facts played a major role in determining the life perspectives and political socialization of the 15-25 year old Americans. 44% of Afro-Americans noted the fight for their civil rights, while only 5% of white Americans paid attention to this problem. The Lithuanians noted the facts which were most deeply fixed in their collective memory: the deportation of Lithuanians to Siberia, the Ribbentrop and Molotov pact, the activity of the "Sayudis" movement, and Lithuania's becoming independent. In addition, a comparison of Russian and Lithuanian social memory revealed their different attitudes toward the same events of the Soviet period.¹⁶

The political memory of Central Asian peoples is also dramatic. The pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods of social development were filled with heroic and dramatic events. The actual layers of Central Asian political memory focus their attention on the main stages and historical types of pre-Soviet statehood, political leaders of the past, charismatic people, and political ideas which could unite the people both within Central Asian countries and in the framework of the whole region. Doctrines, such as the "Silk Road," the ideas of the "Great Turan," and the creation of one inter-Turkish language, have been proposed as a basis for such unity.

The dramatic state of political memory is aggravated by the actualization of political processes during the Soviet period, especially in the first years of Soviet power and during the periods of repression when thousands of free-thinking intellectuals of that region were exterminated.

Also in the years of stagnation, when the region was turned into a monoculture area, everything was subsumed under priority of cotton. In the first years of *perestroika*, the cotton matter became inflated and there was a series of suicides by political leaders of Uzbekistan. These events brought about an ambivalent national sense of the people of Central Asia.

The systematic Russification created an inferiority complex in those Central Asians who were not Russian. One of the most important tendencies of the Russification ideology was reducing the political memory, or causing political amnesia; for the Soviet generations of Central Asia, it purposefully promoted a sense of their non-historicity and their lack of political ability. That doctrine imposed the idea that the history of Central Asian peoples began only in 1917!

However, the Central Asian political memory is not limited to only the dark side. The people of that region have complex ideas about the Soviet period, considering that Soviet power gave them many benefits both political and cultural. For instance, there is an opinion in Kyrgyzstan that, apart from the dark side, the Soviet period gave rise to a cultural Renaissance. However, it is considered that Uzbeks in Uzbekistan have lost more than they acquired under Soviet power. As we can see from the facts mentioned above, the political memory of the people of Central Asia is rather dramatic.

The following aspects of political memory are understood in connection with this:

- The mechanisms used in events in political memory
- The externalization of political memory and its influence on present political life
- The role of political memory in the system of political technology
- Political memory as a factor in the formation of political settings
- The use of the positive potential of political memory and preventive political control

The collapse of the USSR and Soviet ideology and the formation of independent states in Central Asia gave rise to the problems of new national and ideological identification. The need for the social construction of a new reality placed on the agenda the elaboration of conceptual mechanisms for ideological self-identification both for individuals and ethnic groups and, generally, for Central Asian communities. The internalization of new political events in people's consciousness formed individual ideological guidelines for new social structures.

The problem of using accumulated knowledge and experience in social practice is a classical philosophical issue. To define this phenomenon, ancient Greeks used the notion called "*techne*" which means "art," "crafts-

manship,” “skills.” Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle formed profound traditions for employing accumulated knowledge and experience for the creation of new things. They considered the ability to use knowledge and experience to be a superior moral knowledge. Knowledge and experience “in themselves” turn into knowledge and experience for others in the process of using them.

But it is necessary to possess knowledge and experience before using them. The possession of knowledge and experience, naturally, means that we are to understand and use them.

As social practice shows, the use of society’s knowledge and experience, the search for and actualization of that particular knowledge which is necessary for the present situation are a rather complex phenomenon. Social institutions, such as schools, universities, and other educational establishments, which seek solutions to problems with the help of available knowledge are required. However, despite the fact the every society has such institutions, the efficiency factor of employing knowledge, information, experience, and values remains rather low. For instance, the use of legal norms by the citizens of our society is unsatisfactory. Legal nihilism and the character of present life realities that are far from being regulated according to law make the use of legal norms problematic.

Thus, the problem of employing the arsenal of social memory reaches a pragmatic level. Another important aspect of the pragmatic level of social memory is its influence on people’s behavior. The specific character of social behavior is that it has a subjectively implied meaning. The meaning is formed in the context of social objectivity. At the same time not all the manifestations of social behavior have a sense beginning. It is known that in the process of socialization the acquired stereotypes may sanction social behavior and be unconscious and uninterpreted. It goes without saying that this layer of a person’s behavioral program is formed as a result of being plunged into a certain society. Because of a specific society, man acquires the important quality of identification. It appears as a result of a person’s communication with other members of society, and not only contemporaries.

The intentional structure of consciousness is formed in the process of reflection by working out settings and stereotypes. They, in turn, are determined by heritage, on the basis of which man lives and creates. Determination of social behavior by biological factors is arguably proven in the conduct of behavior. Behaviorism, for example, emphasizes the social and cultural determination of behavior. Stereotypes of social behavior of the Japanese, Americans, Russians, Kyrgyz, Germans, and other ethnic groups grow out of their social and cultural experience, knowledge, and traditions. The most expressive and comprehensive stereotype for us is the behavior of Soviet man, whose behavior singles him out everywhere. Thus it becomes quite clear that the social and genetic substrates of culture and history have always played a role in forming different social behavior types.

NOTES

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- 5 A. Toynbee, *Perception of History*. Moscow. 1991, pp. 431-432.
- 6 Ortega refers to "grief for the past."
- 7 H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*. Kiev. 1995, p. 10.
- 8 See P. Berger and T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, p. 79.
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Chapter V

SOCIAL MEMORY AS COMMUNICATION

MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL MEMORY TRANSMISSION

We do not lack communication, on the contrary, we have too much of it, but it lacks creation. - G. Deleuze and F. Guattari

Until now social memory has been considered as a phenomenon in its static state. The time has come to examine social memory with all its dynamics. The process of communication carries out the dynamism of social memory. It should be noted that social memory is a product of communication, because in the flow of communication memory fixes, transmits, and reproduces knowledge, values, experience, and institutions. At the same time social memory can be a source of communication, providing the connection between the people of different times and countries.

Lately society itself has been considered as a communicative system in scientific literature. The German sociologist N. Luman has actively worked out this approach.¹

A person in society finds himself as a communicating individual. The first condition of a person's formation is the acquisition of the rules of life in a broad perspective. As these rules are set and objectified before him in institutions, values and knowledge, the context of formation occurs. The person learns all this in order to use it in his life.

A person receives the "rules of life" mainly from social (cultural, historical, and family) memory. He or she does not get life scenarios already made; he realizes, interprets, rejects, and doubts the truth of the knowledge which was checked by time and experience. In other words, a person's attitude toward the available life materials is rather dramatic. Social drama in which both individuals and social groups take part happens because of the attitude toward social memory—it always brings something new, individual, and original, and the interpretation of its contents is a condition of their existence. Otherwise, social memory is dead, archaic, and pointless.

To understand more deeply the heart of the problem, we believe it is necessary to turn to hermeneutics, a somewhat universal philosophy of our times. The problem of interpretation—in this case, the interpretation of the contents of social memory—has a long history in philosophy as hermeneutics, in the persons of F. Schleiermacher, W. Dilthey, H. G. Gadamer and H. Rickert.

Considering the possibilities of interpretation they expressed the following points of view. According to Schleiermacher, psychological "getting" into the text and into the world of images lets us get into the root of historical events and reconstruct them much more deeply than the original partici-

pants could. Dilthey stressed that understanding the past is the main problem. According to Dilthey, history is an intuitive living psychological experience, and to realize the past in our mind, and with the rational categories of thinking, is impossible. H. G. Gadamer proved that an attempt to understand and reconstruct the past is really a transmission of the meaning of past. Gadamer and Hegel considered that a true understanding and adequate interpretation of the past are not only reproductions, but also productions, as the goal of the interpretation is to provide a link with our present life. That is why constant inquiry into the past is not an ancient aspect of spiritual activity, but an attempt to determine trends of social development, a construction in the present.

The necessity for inquiry into the past by interpreting it is conditioned by the issues of forming social consciousness. Inquiry is a condition for social creation. Understanding, interpreting and applying the past sums up the attitude of the historical individual toward social memory.

An inquiry into the past is necessary for historical transcendence, the point of which is community self-determination and self-substantiation.

Understanding in the context of social memory is a necessary phenomenon, because understanding lets us reproduce the inner contents of social memory for future generations. As a rule, understanding the meaning and transmission of knowledge is the prerogative of certain representatives of society. The issue is that not all members of society understand the contents and forms of production of social memory and participate in its "comprehensive" transmission. Only conceptual individuals are able to understand deeply, interpret, explain, and show ways of employing knowledge and experience from the context of social memory. These individuals have a will to understand and break down the massive amount of knowledge and experience frozen under the pressure of time in order to create new concepts and promote the interpretation of the archive of social memory. In any case, the need for legitimizing memory is passed on to other generations. A social apparatus is required for this, which can act in the form of types of people passing on knowledge and acquiring experience and knowledge of the past.

A large part of the contents of social memory is not understood, though it can be reproduced and transmitted. For instance, rituals, symbols, and myths are not always interpreted and understood by people. Most people receive and pass them to other generations without thinking about the original sense. Very often it happens as result of mimesis (imitation). For instance, rituals carried out by the members of society are the principle of inter-individual communication, the form of behavior and social and cultural characteristics of a person.

Rituals form a rich arsenal of social memory; they represent a standardized complex of actions which are used to realize common social actions and traditions. Rituals have different forms, for example, religious, national, or political. Ceremonies, which are different from rituals, also make up a certain layer of social memory.

Various forms and kinds of rituals and ceremonies are the commemorative means of actualizing social memory, for example, the yearly celebration of Victory Day and the rituals and symbols connected with it.

The communicative functions of rituals and symbols lie in their promotion of the concordance of rules of people's behavior in a group and of a feeling of solidarity. Man has an opportunity to form and reproduce collective identity in the process of communication based on these rituals and symbols.

However time flies by without stopping and makes all that man creates, accumulates, and lives through fall into oblivion. Only a small part of the real and live contents of history is preserved in social memory. Knowledge and experience which are kept in consciousness are imprinted in our memory. These become our "traditions." E. Husserl called this the sedimentation process. Berger and Luckmann in their book *The Social Construction of Reality* write that objectified and materialized sedimentations multiply the traditions of a given society.

Intersubjective sedimentation becomes truly social only when there is a possibility for a repeated objectification of experience and when the experience can be passed from one generation to another.²

Acquisition of past experience comes through interpretation. It is a kind of social activity which always accompanies it as a condition of existence.

"Interpretation is not just a separate act, adding to understanding should the need arise: understanding is always interpretation."³ Interpretation of a text as a certain form of social memory always contains subjectivity. According to the theory of interpretation, there are cognitive, normative, and reproductive interpretations. Gadamer's typology raises questions. He stresses that any interpretation must be subject to the sense of authority.⁴

Every man and every generation always interpret the contents of social memory. Nowadays on the basis of scientific achievements and with the help of computers, scientists try to realize what may be considered fact, and to interpret and explain the facts and events of the past. They then try to explain the tendencies of social and historical development.

The sciences of historical information attempt to determine the manner of social development in historical time and space on the basis of knowledge accumulated by man.⁵

However, an attempt to interpret the contents of social memory objectively does not exclude subjectivity. The interpretation of the contents of social memory by an individual is conditioned by many factors of subjective and objective correlation.⁶ That is why the evaluation of the past and its interpretation bring about many versions of the past. For instance, the outbreak of the Second World War was associated in Soviet times with the treacherous attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. But there appeared a different version in post-Soviet times which suggested that Stalin provoked Hitler to begin the war because of his plan for the "global revolution." Therefore, evaluation of the past depends on the atmosphere of today's world outlook. In any case, the interpretation of historical facts has a didactic function. However

this is a difficult problem, as the interpretation of the facts of the past spark different consequences—sometimes destructive ones.

The interpretation of any fact actualizes the issue about either the true or the good. The existence of the good and the truth in interpretation gives it a didactic character. Active use of the contents of social memory is an important theoretical and practical question for social development. In the hermeneutic context it is considered an integral phenomenon which has a principled meaning.⁷

The best use of the knowledge and experience kept in social memory concerning a specific situation must be commensurable with such notions as sensibility, constructiveness, etc. For this reason, using the arsenal of social memory charges man and society with special requirements and responsibilities in the spheres of ideology, spiritual life, and education. Problems of security and responsibility in education and in the information technologies are now applied with these responsibilities in mind.

EDUCATION AS A MNEMONIC AND COMMUNICATIVE SYSTEM

Spiritual being is essentially connected with the idea of education. Education is a truly historical notion and it is this historical character of “preservation” that should be discussed in order to understand the essence of the human sciences.

- H.G. Gadamer

Education is a system that connects the past, present, and future. This connection is conducted through the internal quality of education, what and how it creates. Education forms world images on the basis of a system of knowledge. The transmission of these images turns education into a vivid and self-growing process.

Education is virtue, for, from Hegel’s viewpoint, it is self-reconciliation, self-recognition in a different being and the ability to find the common essence of spirit. This in turn allows man to recognize himself in a different mirror.

Education is an opportunity to minimize the gap between the current existence of a subject and his unrealized being. That is why education is an ontological human need. The constructive quality of education is realized, first of all, through knowledge. The human ability to use accumulated knowledge guides humanity in its current reality and forms a new one.

Education creates man. His natural capabilities are shaped into cultural forms in the process of education. The human mentality is filled with the cultural content which has been accumulated over many generations. Man absorbs knowledge intertwined in the spiritual and intellectual life, not noticing the fact that his inner world is full of the previous generations’ thoughts and ideas. Education creates such plasticity in the subjective reality that man feels confident and worthy.

Thus, education gives man his roots in being and lets him feel the world as if “at home.” Therefore, education has a double power of creation. First, it creates a new man; second, man, in turn, creates “a new world.” But “a new man” and “a new world” always contain the past and the future.

Education is a mnemonic system. The social stock of knowledge which makes up education represents patterns, schemes, and concepts of perception and interpretations of the world. The human world, to a great degree, is established according to paradigms of education.

The social stock of knowledge represents the world in an integral form. After birth, man gets into a certain sphere of social and cultural knowledge. Receiving knowledge, he can “split” and “feel” the world individually.

In previous epochs, the storage and transmission of knowledge was an individual rather than universal process. Under those conditions man was creating internal and external worlds in his own way. This fact, according to the modern philosophical paradigms, is considered to be a good, since the individual creation of one’s own world makes the inner world more interesting and unique.

Standardization and unification of education make the individual experience of perception of the world less possible. According to many philosophers of the twentieth century, limiting the possibility of individual experience tears man from his roots, which, in turn, prevents him from being his usual self and from being internally self-sufficient. This is the reason for the dehumanization of a human being.

In light of the present problems of education, a question has arisen about the reality of its axiological and mnemonic points. This question arises with the need to humanize education and democratize schools. The present drawbacks of education, as is often stated, are connected with the absence of these qualities. First, one should notice that the quality of education is lagging behind its growth in quantity. The process of education is becoming merely a link which transmits a great amount of knowledge. However odd it may seem, the human person is losing out in this process.

The proportionality of education with possibilities and the needs of culture and man remains in the shadow of mass education. Moreover, its national aspect is ignored, and this in turn has led to the unification and standardization of education. As a result, a number of problems have arisen not only spiritually but also intellectually, for the sake of which human spirituality has been sacrificed. At present there exists a pattern of education that is like the “transmission of knowledge like the filling of a pillow” (Gadamer); however much it is modernized it remains, in essence, soft and ineffective.

It seems that one of the ways to educational improvement is to realize the importance of its value and mnemonic points which form our social and cultural background.

However, the technological pattern of education makes transmitting and storing knowledge with computers more preferable. On the one hand, technical means are important for the improvement of the social memory of education, because they give an opportunity to concentrate knowledge; but,

on the other hand, they lack depth. In this connection, Heraclitus states that “multiple knowledge does not give much intelligence.”

Education is a collective production of knowledge and skills which make up an integral system of material and spiritual culture. It is a product of the activity of both forerunners and contemporaries. Cooperation of people and knowledge, conditioned by history and human laws of existence, makes up the historical synchronous process of education, which presupposes the human ability to have knowledge and culture, even though split by centuries and millenniums. The result of this is that spiritual relationships between generations are formed. Of course, under the conditions of unprecedented growth in information, there might be a question of how rational is the realization and appropriation of knowledge and culture of previous generations. According to pragmatism, this can seem useless. If we try to grasp the problem more profoundly, then we will reveal the great significance of value appropriation of educational “memory” in order to form a world outlook and a spirituality for society. This is especially important for the younger generation.

Historical, logical, and axiological reconstruction and construction of education are efficient in solving current problems. For educational improvement both a strengthening of new scientific knowledge and the actualization of virtual knowledge accumulated by the previous generations are important. Likewise, a value selection of necessary social and scientifically significant theories, teachings, and views are essential for sound education. In addition, the “memory” of education contains different patterns of education, which have been historically tested. Thus, education can be humanized through culture, spirituality and the “memory” of education.

The history of culture shows that there are archetypes in the system of education, which from time to time emerge from a virtual state and enter a dialogue with present canons and principles of education. The prevailing archetype in modern education can be rudimentary only if historical layers of cultures and education assist with present problems. This proves once again the historical interrelationship and succession of education as a system or a subsystem of integral culture.

Axiological and mnemonic points of education are not superficial. These factors can be revealed through detailed historical and logical reflection. Today, we have a great stock of information, facts, knowledge, practical skills, and abilities which, to put it mildly, are not reliable and do not assist education with its most important goal—responsibility.

Responsibility is the main point of modern education; it justifies the existence of education as an institution. Theory directed forward and cultural and epistemological innovations do not represent the system that can shape responsibility for man and society. Responsibility for the past and the future on the level of an individual personality is not always realized or understood properly. Otherwise, there would not have been such blunders and personal tragedies in history.

That is why an evaluation of the potentiality of educational “memory” is essential for the formation of responsibility as the core of spirituality and the civilized character of society.

Education is a communicative system. In this system, man satisfies one of his important needs—communication. E. Fromm, classifying the human necessities, presented the following: the need for communication (in individual ties) which is fully expressed in love; the need for creation; the need for understanding roots; the need for safety and stability; the need to search for one’s own identity; and, last, the need for knowledge.⁸

All these needs are satisfied fully or partly in the sphere of education, in a communicative aspect. A society’s mental space keeps its memory; a society’s memory is organized there. However everything that has been kept is not static; on the contrary, it is dynamic. The dynamic character of social memory accounts for the primary establishment of human communication, realized through the transmission of knowledge, experience, and feelings.

Following Talcot Parsons, German sociologist N. Luman outlines two kinds of mediators of communication in a social system: first, money, power, and influence, and, second, value orientations—systemic truth of science and love, in intimate personal terms.⁹ These mediators of communication are effective when they are realized in intergenerational experiences both horizontally and vertically. In different circumstances, man is inclined to turn to different responses: to other people, to the past, present, or future. This is the search for identity. That is why man’s communicative character is one of the most important aspects of human nature.

The importance of transmitting socially significant information about education was valued even at the dawn of human civilization. This has been dramatized by cultural anthropology. American anthropologist M. Mead, in analyzing cultural succession, distinguished three types of culture:

- postfigurative (forerunners teach children)
- cofigurative (children of the same age teach each other)
- prefigurative (children teach adults).¹⁰

The first type of culture and communication is more typical of traditional societies which do not have or did not have written language. Oral memory kept all information in synchronism, putting the past, present, and future in one line. Socially significant information is transmitted from the older to the younger.

In a cofigurative culture, communication is realized among contemporaries. The intellectual structure of consciousness in this type of culture is formed owing to the information circulating within the limits of communication of modern generations; information and life experience of the previous generations is kept in enclaves of generational memory. An electronic communicative network as a world web supports this type of culture.

Originally communication was vertical, inside the interaction of contemporaries and forerunners, but it is now utterly horizontal inside a genera-

tion. Moreover, communication is becoming global due to new informational technologies.

The third type of culture presupposes a system of education through communication which can be called circular, i.e. children teach their parents, and children of the same age teach each other. This type of education to some extent was typical of immigrants settling in the New World.

Peculiarities of the educational process in light of the main problem—the creation of a responsible personality in a society, that is, in the process of social interaction—is described in detail by Erickson in the context of the conception of human life.¹¹

According to Erickson, the generative character typical of humanity as interested in life structures and the teaching of a new generation can be expressed through such notions as productivity and a creative character. Education is one of the important institutions that protects and strengthens this generative character.

Erickson writes that educated nations that have a wider range of professions teach those subjects that will help a child become educated and provide him with a basic education to be eligible for numerous professions.¹²

Education as a social institution has a general character, i.e., it should involve everyone. Otherwise there will not be a common social structure at different levels from family to state. According to Socrates, the state should exist as the one to which every citizen should submit, and that is virtue. High virtue is the knowledge that should be sought.

The Ancient Greek notion of *paideia*, according to Heidegger, is very similar to the modern idea of “education.” According to the ancient Greeks, *paidaia* is aspiring to the Good through the constant eradication of illiteracy.

The Ancient Greeks regarded education as an opportunity to take care of oneself and then to be able to rule other people and a city as well. As care of oneself was a rather difficult occupation, a youngster needed a tutor-guide.

The teacher is the main communicative character in the education process. A message, as the basic ingredient of communication, is possible thanks to the teacher. Moreover, the teacher is at the center of the communicative network, stretched throughout historical time and space. Communication between generations of different epochs and transmission to pupils of knowledge and experience coded and preserved in social cultural memory is realized via the teacher.

The teacher in Christian culture is he who teaches how to save one’s soul. In Buddhist culture, the teacher clears and strengthens the spirit. In Muslim culture, the teacher talks about duty. As a whole the Teacher embodies the Light and Good. He is a medium of rational communication among people.

In this context of education, what is the connection between social memory and world outlook? Obviously the connection is that social memory forms the system of world perception with the following content: Life and Death, Knowledge and Hope, Mind and Morality. These fundamental notions of the human metaphysical search are filled with meaning in the process of

education. In addition, education through the “memory” of sciences systematizes the spiritual and intellectual experience of humanity.

With the rise of informational technologies, data-bases have become the pantheon of memory, containing information both about great leaders and ordinary people. Psycho-physical investigations reveal the possibility of fixing the results of creative self-realization in the sphere of personal information.¹³ This means that technology of storing information and knowledge to a certain degree allows for solving problems of control over the spiritual and intellectual development of a personality in the process of education.

However, textual analysis of social science textbooks reveals very different approaches. The knowledge and beliefs gained after reading such books are also different. In Soviet books, the core of knowledge was information about communist party activities and trust in its might and wisdom. Time showed that the knowledge and belief of Soviet generations were primarily illusory. For instance, the syndrome of “perpetuation” was characteristic of the Soviet political leadership. The death of every high-ranking party leader would result in the renaming of cities, streets, or squares. And as a former name fell into oblivion, new ones arose. But the old names of the cities were still kept in memory for several generations.

Nonetheless, during the post-Soviet period, the seeds of those educational systems germinated deep in social thought, forming mind and morality.

A sensible man is he who tries to overstep the limits of his subjectivity and concentrate on knowledge and values in order to comprehend wholeness. The mind makes hearing keen and broad; it gives flexibility to communication and the capability of transformation. “The mind needs communication without borders, it itself is immense zeal for communication,” wrote Jaspers.¹⁴ The process of education is the sphere where the desire to communicate is realized. In the process of communication, man gets the opportunity to overcome isolation and gain access to the truth.

The modern philosophy of education seeks ways of overcoming the flat education which continues obsolete concepts and knowledge. One approach to achieve this is discursiveness. Discursiveness conducts analysis in two ways: language analysis, and analysis of the finite human being. Analysis of language and the human being in their organic unity is conditioned by social philosophy, in particular, modern theories of social communication.¹⁵ In this case, Habermas’ theory of the communicative mind is very important.

The aim of discursiveness in the system of education is the formation of the communicative mind. The communicative mind is possible only in an interpretive society, taken as an association of people with a “perfect speech situation,” in which a discourse is realized. As a result of the discourse, an ultimate perspective is formed as an expression of social consensus.

Consensus is the truth, claims Habermas, and it is the basis of the communicative mind. The communicative mind is not the source of norms of actions. Any kind of consensus, any decision, contains errors that need to be corrected. Proceeding from this, Habermas has put forward a conception of

discursive democracy, which means not only the power of people's opinions, understood as natural value, but also as a context for the possibility of the mind's power, embodied in structures, citizens' communication, and open, honest exchange of opinions.¹⁶

Discursive democracy is possible through an institution of education, understood in the broad sense; it comprises formal and informal education, the press, electronic mass media, art, and traditional means of communication. The modern system of formal education needs discursiveness, for it makes authentic, free, and independent communication possible.

The program "Reading and Writing for the Development of Critical Thinking," implemented by the Soros-Kyrgyzstan Foundation is, to some degree, the realization of the idea of the communicative mind.¹⁷ This program has been widely introduced into American and European universities and research institutes. It has also been written about in monographs and journals.

This program extends to such aspects as the social-cultural ingredients of thinking and student behavior. Critical thinking and writing make students plunge into the deep layers of science and culture in order to argue and uphold their views.

An analysis of the educational system in Kyrgyzstan from a position of mnemonics and communication permits us to establish the fact that it is the symbiosis of traditional and modern technologies of education. Two Kyrgyz examples illustrate this: first, lessons on *Manas* in the high school system during the post-Soviet period; second, the program "Reading and Writing for Critical Thinking." As a whole, the idea of integral education matured in the modern system of education with the call for formation of the integral personality.¹⁸ The essence of integral education is spirituality, which is the product of the creative work of many generations.

THE MEMORY OF GENERATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERGENERATIONAL COMMUNICATION

We should determine our place in the change of generations and answer the question, can we pass from generation to generation those values that will help us solve the eternal issues of human existence? Does the collective memory exist which helps find the meaning of life on our planet? We should support the tree of our collective memory.¹⁹

- G. Blancoff-Scarr

Social memory is structured on an intergenerational level, which means that it is subdivided into generational memory. Generational memory can make up epochal memory, or a century memory. The lifetime of a generation is about twenty-five to thirty years, so the lifetime of three generations existing in one social time and space is approximately 100 years. A century is a long historical period, full of events and facts.

Generational memory is connected first with natural processes, conditioned by biological succession, change of people, birth and death. Second, it is connected with the spatial-temporal historical definiteness of a generation of life. Every generation has its specific destiny within a certain cultural and social space and develops its own attitude toward life.

There are many designations such as “the military generation,” “post-war generation,” “revolutionary generation,” and “lost generation” which have certain specific meanings. Every generation has its destiny and its objectives.

“Each generation is not a gang of mavericks or a great mass, but it is like a whole new social body, which has an elected minority and its masses, launched into the orbit of existence with a certain life trajectory.

Each generation, as a dynamic compromise between the mass and the individual, is the most important notion and trajectory according to which history moves.”²⁰

Generational memory in the architectonics of social memory represents ingredients of the integral phenomenon. We can outline relatively two types of memory within a family: “parent’s memory” and “children’s memory.”

The notion “generational memory” is used as memory not of the individual, but of the “total group”; it is the people’s memory, formed not as a result of the sum of individual memory, but as a memory of people who interact. Generational memory has an “emergent character.” For example, the memory of the *Gulag* generation was formed as a result of the mutual exchange of camp life experience, as a result of the interaction of people who had the experience of such a life.²¹

The Nobel prizewinner and popular Japanese writer K. Oe wrote a lot about the post-war generations that lived through the defeat of Japan in the Second World War and the nuclear explosion in Hiroshima. He wrote that those events were the sense of their philosophy.

We must admit that every man in the world tries to forget the Hiroshima tragedy. We all try to forget our troubles—great or little—as soon as possible. No wonder that mankind has forgotten the world tragedy in Hiroshima. There is not a single word about Hiroshima in the textbooks of elementary schools. Nowadays adults do not try to pass recollections about Hiroshima to their descendants. Those who were lucky to survive and not to be radiated forget people killed in Hiroshima and keep on fighting irresistible death. Erasing the events of Hiroshima from memory, we try to have a cheerful life in the crazy bustle of the twentieth century.²²

The above quote contains two aspects related to generational memory: first, every generation has its own layer of social memory, which may turn into amnesia if the future generation tries to forget the past; second, the

imperfect episodic memory of the younger generations may spawn immorality, and subsequent generations may be infected with it.

It is characteristic of man to forget bad, tragic things, and quite natural, for deep shock and physical pain, lead to suffering. Time moves away within the framework of generational memory, losing touch with specific situations. As is popularly stated, "Time cures all things." Being distant from the past, memory evolves from an emotional sphere into a mental one. This fact changes with the issues; the reality is replaced with the subjective, placed by generations into the history of their life. That is why generational memory is something integral and emergent.

Generational memory contributes to the formation of the roots of society and social identity. For example, the Soviet generation of the '60's consider themselves a generation that managed partly, at least, to contribute to liberty. This period in Soviet history was called the "thaw." The self-consciousness of subsequent generations—advocates of the ideals of liberty—was based on the social, spiritual roots of that '60's generation.

Generational memory is not always accompanied by appropriation of past famous works. For instance the concept "lost generation" describes the lives of the younger generation of writers, disappointed and crippled by war. Ernest Hemingway, Gertrude Stein, and John Steinbeck, for example, all wrote about this "lostness."

Generational memory is historical. Its historicity shows itself as a correlation with the past and future and is one of the imperatives of evaluating the generational memory.

That is why every generation questions its own memory in order to be emotionally and meaningfully supported. The meaning of the communication of forerunners and contemporaries may form new concepts of activity and world outlook. The communication of generations may substantially affect the intentional structure of the consciousness of subsequent generations and determine their inner motives and activities.

Sometimes generational memory takes on a mythical character. Examples are myths about glorious heroism, enthusiasm of the youth aimed at improving the economy after the war, large-scale construction projects, speeding up the spread of communism, or a myth about a generation meeting its death with the name of Stalin on their lips, etc. Hitler's myth about the special place for German Aryans lured millions of German youth into war. All this is kept in generational memory as vivid pictures and considered, by many, as true reality.

Indeed myth is a good way of constructing reality, and it has a special function. Without myth, it is extremely difficult to account for the deeds and memory of the military generation in Stalin's time.

Josef Vissarinovich Stalin had inexplicable ties to the last mystery of History, to the mystery of Death. As millions of Russian Soviet soldiers met certain death; a generation toiled in horrible conditions...both the innocent and the

guilty toiled in the GULAG with humility and bitterness; bigots of the great national dream put up with humiliating, dark laws, doing it all with his name on their lips.

It seems that half of his person looks into an unattractive, dark horizon. Without the cheap oratorical tricks, bourgeois European garish parades, sugary mysticism of sham knights with cardboard swords, ludicrous pseudo-priesthood and pseudo-rituals, he was a strict, modest, temporal, rather short Georgian. He was a real messenger from on high, a bearer of news about Death, of its mysterious, enveloping power, of news about “silence,” about the strange dignity of what has left the world of change. Great Stalin, the silent messenger of Death.²³

To die for the homeland fulfilled a great desire to do something worthwhile and noble, to leave one’s trace in history, for Stalin was seen by the Soviet people as the way to overcome the “deafness” of individual life. The finiteness of an individual had to be filled with heroic deeds, which in their turn are kept in the memory of subsequent generations.

The course of generational memory to subsequent generations is a core of society’s mnemonic praxis. The essence of the mnemonic praxis is to provide for the succession and support of a mechanism for the reproduction of collective memory.

However, this process is contradictory and controversial. As a matter of fact, every generation possesses its own system of values that in turn may cause latent tension in intergenerational communication. “Today’s youth is used to luxury; it has bad manners and contempt for authorities; it does not respect the elderly. Children argue with their parents, gobble their meals, and exasperate their teachers,” said Socrates in 490 B.C.

The generation gap problem still goes on. Meanwhile, no generation completely rejects the life and works of previous generations. Positive and negative evaluations of generational memory remain. Ronald Ingerhald put forth a theory of intergenerational value changes, based on two basic hypotheses:

1. Hypothesis of the value significance of the inadequate—the state of social and economic environment determines priorities of an individual: the greatest subjective importance is attached to what is relatively inadequate.
2. Hypothesis of the socialized lag—when the social and economic environment and value priorities do not correspond to the state needs, a temporary lag gets in between them.²⁴

Value changes take place while the younger generation is replacing the older one. Every generation has its specific economical, political, and cultural environment. When it comes to priorities in the structure of generational

consciousness, the categories “we” as the elder generation and “they” as the younger one are actualized and transmitted in multi-channel communications. This communication system based on forerunners’ memory is contradictory. This problem can be called the intergenerational conflict of memory.

Mutual reproaches and hidden reprimands between the military and subsequent generations degenerate to the following: “we won the war, created the mighty country, and they destroyed it all.” Afghan war veterans complain to party leaders for sending them to Afghanistan and waging a useless war: “we were dying in a foreign country.” How instructive will all the injuries, conflicts, and disagreements fixed in generational memory be in the future? Is generational memory useful, or is it like unemployed capital, only consciousness ballast?

Considering generational memory within the limits of moral judgments, it is important to note that it prompted the formation of social responsibility. Responsibility due to intergenerational mnemonic communication must be its opportunity, reality, and necessity. Otherwise, a generation gap appears inevitable.

Human immortality is accounted for by the spatial-temporal wholeness of generational memory. Human immortality is provided by its responsibility. To remember the past and to be responsible for each other is a great source of life.

An example using more expressive, poetic language comes from an episode in a poem by M. Shakhanov entitled “Civilization Under Delusion.” The book tells a story comparing people and penguins. A man with two youngsters goes to explore Antarctica. On the way to their destination they are caught in a blizzard and get lost. They wander around in the icy desert for four days and nights at a temperature of eighty degrees below zero. Finally the two youngsters are utterly overcome, fall down, and remain motionless. The man takes the rest of the bread and moves on. All of a sudden he sees a group of penguins standing close to each other; the youngest stood in the middle, then the older ones, then the adults closing the circle. The adults and leaders were shielding the rest of the group with their bodies, standing like a wall. Seeing this, the man realizes his mistake and feels ashamed of his behavior. He wants to go back to the youngsters, but it is too late. In the morning he himself freezes to death.

Another problem is inertial memory. The point is that every generation keeps a trail of experience and adopts a new life and values. The result is generational conflict.

Inertia of older generation’s social memory may impede change if a generation rejects everything new and is captivated by its own memory. In this case, the wisdom of elders and the life-asserting position of youth are needed.

Are there social mechanisms regulating harmonic relations between generations? The state is one of the most important institutions that regulate intergenerational relations. State ideology is significant in this matter. Values

of education and upbringing, expressed in public ideology, may harmonize intergenerational relations.

The state regulates the intergenerational correlation of mnemonic processes through a system of education and upbringing, depending on the needs of history and social development. Textbooks and other literature, art, and traditional culture provide the young with access to the heritage of the past. In textbooks previous generations' experience and heritage are systematized. That is why in all states great importance is attached to the content and form of textbooks; occasionally they are revised with the aim to determine content. Publishing new textbooks is not a quick process, compared with the dynamics of social relations. That is why textbooks must reflect basic principles of knowledge and values. That means they must represent the present time but point to the future.

Kyrgyz society, challenged by history like other post-Soviet societies, needs profound social reflection to develop the concept of social identity, corresponding to their new economic and political status. Social reflection is aimed at processing the experience of all generations. Its effective understanding will lay the groundwork for the preservation of the historical wholeness of people's consciousness, which in turn is the basis of the social mind.

NOTES

1 N. Luman, "Incredibility of Communication"/*Issues of Theoretical Sociology*. 2000. pp. 43-55; and "Concept of Society"/*Issues of Theoretical Sociology*. 1994, pp. 25-43.

2 For this insight of the Sociology of Knowledge, see Berger and Luckmann.

3 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), pp. 235-245; 274-278.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 245 ff.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 108 ff.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 16-19.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 225-234.

8 E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*. Moscow, 1990, pp. 256-257.

9 N. Luman, "Incredibility of Communication"/*Problems of Theoretical Sociology*. 2000. p. 47.

10 M. Mead, *Culture and the World of Childhood*. Moscow, 1988, p. 322.

11 E. Erickson, *Childhood and Society*. Moscow, 1996.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 374.

13 See V. Lefevre, "From Psycho-Physics to Soul Modeling"/*Philosophical Issues*. 1990. No. 7, pp.25-31.

14 K. Jaspers, *Essence and Meaning of History*. Moscow, 1991, p. 442.

15 See J. Habermas, *Democracy, Mind, Morality*. Moscow, 1995; A. Voronin, "Technology as Communicative Strategy"/*Philosophical Issues*. 1997. No. 5.

16 J. Habermas, *Democracy, Mind, Morality*, p. 197.

17 See Unrau J. Norman, *Thinking Teacher and Thinking Students/ "Soros-Kyrgyzstan Foundation"* Bishkek, 1999.

18 For more information see K. Narankho, *Agony of Patriarchy*. Voronej: NGO "Modak", 1995.

19 See the material of the Issk-Kul Forum/Central Asia and World Culture. Bishkek. 1994. No. 2-3, p. 80.

20 C. Ortega y Gasset, *What is the Philosophy?* Moscow, 1991, p. 5.

21 "Emergent character" is from the English "emergence"; character is formed in the course of interaction.

22 K. Oe, "About Human Dignity." October 1964/*Call to Contemporaries: Social and Political Journalism*/Translated from Japanese. Moscow: Progress, 1987, pp. 91-92.

23 A. Dugin, "Stalin and Death"/*Word of Kyrgyzstan*, May 19, 2000.

24 R. Ingelhard, "Postmodern: Changing Values and Changing Societies"/*Policy* 1997. Num. 4, pp. 11-17.

Chapter VI

SOCIAL MEMORY AS A FACTOR OF MODERNIZATION

THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN “TRADITIONAL CHARACTER” AND “CONTEMPORANEITY”: THE MNEMONIC ASPECT OF MODERNIZATION

The fact that a system-process of past- present- future exists is beyond doubt. The problem is the connection between the past, present and future. The quality of connection may immediately affect the ability of people to expand the range of their opportunities and prolong human existence in the foreseeable future. - A. Brudny

The key notions of the theory of modernization are traditional character and contemporaneity. These notions characterize social and cultural systems, conditioned by the peculiarities of historical time, i. e. the past, present, and future. Traditional character represents a sphere that accumulates many pieces of contemporaneity, gradually evolving into traditional character.

Traditional character is something that remained in social memory after historical metamorphoses. Therefore, the traditional is necessary, essential, and significant.

Tradition not only contracts into culture, but also develops from it; the intersection of channels of previous and future tradition take place in culture, this way some changes take place in its content. Culture in this case is like a ball, a mill, a grid and a codifying device, in which wires are interwoven, like a mincing machine. Each of its forms may appear real in specific historical circumstances.¹

The significance of traditional character is basic, though there may be objections, then it may be called “inessential,” and some of the forms of the traditional, in a certain sense, might be considered useless. This is connected to the fact that some traditions, or traditional character, are exotic. The correlation of traditional character and contemporaneity can be understood better within the framework of the synchronous-diachronic system of mnemonic time and space.

Let us consider that in order. A mnemonic approach to this problem obliges us to consider such phenomena as mnemonic time and space, since traditional character and contemporaneity occur, sink, and harden in the context of these phenomena.

Mnemonic space in psychology is believed to be a special case of subjective space.² Mnemonic space is based on the total number of traces of memory. In a social and cultural sense, it is organized by “traces” of human activity and represents a particular structure of social space.

Mnemonic space may be considered as the space forming the origins, the beginnings. Elaborating on this thesis, one may say that mnemonic space is a sphere that collects different events, facts, knowledge, experience, and values, and over time turns them into homogenous social memory. Time “grinds” events, facts, relations, regulates them, and finally puts them into the foundation of contemporaneity.

Traditional character is analyzed within the framework of mnemonic time and space. Every part of homogenous traditional character, taken separately as it has been shaped by time and space, turns into contemporaneity. This is what causes the problem of the synchronism and diachronism of mnemonic time.

Mnemonic time in itself, in its essence, is discrete. It is this peculiarity that makes synchronization possible for sensory formation. For instance, to find out a man’s attitude toward something means to find facts from different spaces of time, synchronize them, and proceeding from this, form a model and make sense of them.

The analysis of the diachronism of mnemonic time shows the changeability and dynamics of man’s attitude toward something. The synchronism and diachronism of mnemonic time are the rhythm of traditional character and contemporaneity.

This modeling, because it is established by mnemonic time and space, traditional character and contemporaneity can mutually transition into each other. Traditional character is the source of contemporaneity, and the latter bears the seal of traditional character.

Let us consider contemporaneity within the context of modernization. One may say that traditional character and contemporaneity are the static and dynamic parts of social memory. Traditional character is fixed knowledge, experience, institutions, relations, and values. Contemporaneity is the potential of these ingredients, aimed at change and reaching for something new.

Social memory comprises traditional character and the potential of contemporaneity, and develops as a social and cultural field of modernization. It is social memory that determines the vector of the modernization processes.

The modernization process, as a rule, involves the whole society, beginning from its material foundations to the emotional and intellectual spheres. An historical excursus into modernization reveals its two stages: the first stage caused the conversion of rural communities into industrial society; the second stage was the conversion of industrial societies into postindustrial societies. In this connection, it is necessary that social memory be analyzed as the modernization process of material, spiritual, and intellectual values, as well as models of social relations and institutions.

In modernizing society, we change the spheres listed above which are subject to change. Constants of social memory may remain unchangeable despite modernization. For example, Kyrgyz society preserved many traditions, institutions, and patterns of behavior after the Soviet period of modernization. Moreover, these started to revive in post-Soviet times. According to F. Tennis, a German philosopher of the twentieth century, we observe processes taking place within the framework of two types of social order: communal and social. All post-Soviet countries, including Kyrgyzstan, experience the revival of two opposite tendencies in a new social and economic basis. On the one hand, clan relations—the roots of which are deep in traditions, kinship ties, friendly associations, and clan character—are actualized. On the other hand, sovereignty sets tough limits getting man and society to survive in the world economic and political space. This harsh reality demands the development of the second type of relations—social—in which rational exchange, development of rational structures, and the establishment of public policy (Habermas) acts in the interests of the whole society. Policy takes precedent.

Modernization does not imply an absolute denial of traditional character. Theorists of the updating process claim that modernized traditional character can promote modernization, despite the fact that different types of personalities, social relations, institutions, and values are formed in the traditional and modern society.

Using a concept from American researcher S. Hamilton on traditional character and contemporaneity, L. Ionin, a Russian writer, stated the following: “In traditional society man is oriented by the ascriptive status, where sex, age, position, social hierarchy, and caste are important. Traditionally, first, a partner is perceived “diffusively,” that is, not like a partner in a concrete interaction, but as a member of a family, clan, community (not as a member), and, only second, as a partner. It is these signs and not rational views that determine the way a bargain will be struck. The partner is also perceived “particularly,” that is, as a concrete individual with a whole range of characteristics, but not like a type (a buyer, a business client, a passenger).³

The Kyrgyz society as a traditional one can be described within the limits of the definition presented above. Indeed, the points that guide a society based on a market economy do not correspond to this traditional pattern of relations.

The essence of social relations in our society is still tribalism, regionalism, and paternalism. On the one hand, this traditional character is evidence of the revival of feudalism; on the other hand, under the pressure of new, open market relations, they are collapsing. The destruction of these “isms” in social consciousness is painful. Is this the evidence of social conversion from “community” to “society”? Probably so, as F. Tennis commented upon a similar situation in Europe in the past, saying that social progress is connected with losing the foundations of cultural relations. This loss is expressed in the weakening and rupture of traditional ties, and loss of warmth, family bonds, cordiality, and sincerity in human relations. Social relations are losing out to more business contacts.

All this can be observed in Kyrgyz society. According to research on poverty carried out by the World Bank in 1999, people prefer “money to friends.” It was this saying that had been chosen as an indicator of the changing social relations in Kyrgyzstan. A new interpretation expresses changes in aims under present conditions.

It means that the arsenal of social memory in the field of social relations is being modernized, and one should say this is not always a change for the better.

It is known that contemporaneity proceeds from traditional character. Powers, mechanisms, and processes pulsating in the social system promote this, for every functioning system contains the potential for the new.

Returning to the analysis of social relations, this time in modern society, one should pay more attention to the assessment of human efforts, which gets one ahead, rather than belonging to a certain clan or family.

Man in the modern society becomes no more than a type, a function. From the viewpoint of existential philosophy, this is a weak point in modern society, where man as a functioning creature is replaced with other mechanisms. As we have seen, this was the view of the French existentialist Marcel.

The aforementioned is all evidence of drastic changes in the course of modernization, which takes place not only in a political system but also in social foundations. Thus, this current process of modernization affects the whole arsenal of social memory. As a result, in the search for new paradigms corresponding to reality, we have to enter the arsenals of other nations’ social memory. An example of this is the interest shown in Kyrgyzstan in pragmatism as the philosophical heritage of the American people.

The interest in the philosophy of pragmatism, in the works of Benjamin Franklin, Dewey, and Pierce, is accounted for by the desire to survive in a system of collapsing social structures. Undoubtedly, there exists an opinion that in a changeable world, pragmatism will help much more than the outdated philosophical values of a nomadic civilization. This, so-called redemption seems to be contributing to a cultural and linguistic nihilism in the modern generation.

SOCIAL MEMORY OF THE KYRGYZ SOCIETY AND MODERNIZATION

The process of modernization is perceived and fixed in the consciousness of its participants as an acceleration of events, which are open to purposeful collective intervention.

- J. Habermas

The post-Soviet transformation of social, political, and cultural life needs more profound understanding. The theoretical solution to this problem calls for a certain methodological approach in order to grasp the reality. In this respect, the predicament is that transformation processes are better described

in political science and sociological research than in philosophy. Most modern western theories on society concern the problems of civil, open society. Models of these societies have been described in great detail.

Post-Soviet societies, aimed at creating civil societies, are at the early stage of this construction. The inertia of Soviet society was great. Post-Soviet societies are burdened with the Soviet mentality and social memory. How will they create a civil society? What will they choose from what has been accumulated over the centuries? What should be their attitude toward the past? How should they combine the past, present, and future? In the attempt to find solutions to these problems, the following question is posed: what are the philosophical concepts of modern transformations?

K. Popper's work, *The Open Universe* is most helpful in conceptualizing and illustrating the asymmetry of the past and future.⁴ For Popper, this asymmetry proves the proximity of the past and the openness of the future. Historical time is irreversible, as it goes from the past to the future. That is why the space-time factor plays the leading role in social transformations, the success of the latter being dependent on the society's knowledge and experience. This position perfectly fits the present situation in the post-Soviet area. As a matter of fact, there are no specific concepts in scientific and social consciousness that can guide post-Soviet societies in the future. In our opinion, the process of transformations is spontaneous. Some values and social institutions rejected during *perestroika* are gradually returning to the sphere of social consciousness. Thoughtless, passionate criticism of the Soviet system turns into moderate analysis, taking into consideration both advantages and drawbacks. It is this tendency that exists in Russian society and in some post-Soviet countries now.

In general, Soviet society was traditional. The communist ideology, with its principles of collectivism and community character, was principally different from that of western society. The present situation breaks up the basic foundations of society, and the problem arises of how to combine traditional systems with liberal ones in the process of transformation. This problem cannot be avoided; it needs to be solved. And this, in turn, needs detailed conceptual schemata of social development. Otherwise, all of society's essential foundations can be destroyed.

Is it worth doing? Modern civilization's way of development entitles us to select and invent our own social order, based on peoples' social experience, will, and intellect. It is for this reason that K. Popper's concept of the asymmetry of the past and future are relevant. Popper holds that the past and future are disproportionate. Every historical space of time is autonomous. The autonomy of time and space in history is displayed through the relative independence of the social being and the spiritual sphere. They have potential, allowing principal changes in the course of social development. Popper also excludes one's own long-term prophecy, conditioned by the past. It gives opportunity to new independent nations to establish new social practices, which have a new logic for the social development of countries and societies. Proceeding backward from strict determination of the past and future,

societies may not count on their development in the future. The fatal destiny of traditionalist peoples seems to be due to their feeble past development, not evil fate. Is this true?

Considering the development of Kyrgyz society, one may say that there are different geopolitical, economic and cultural concepts at work. Geopolitics does not predict well for Kyrgyz society. Kyrgyzstan may be compared to a beautiful girl who will be very lucky if she marries a rich man.

Economically, the republic cannot have first place even in the region, although, in some aspects, Kyrgyzstan is in a better position than other countries of the region. It has an advantage over its neighbors in water and energy resources. Some conflicting changes have happened in Kyrgyz culture. On the one hand, there are positive tendencies in the system of education. On the other hand, those value systems, which for many centuries have preserved the Kyrgyz as a nation, are going to ruin. At present, the post-Soviet cultural revival of Kyrgyz society, which is often talked about at an official level, has not even reached the scale that was present during the Soviet period of cultural development.

There is a contradiction in the system of intergenerational values. The question must be asked: What is going on in the sphere of social consciousness?

In any case, there appear to be more images of the past, conjuring up the period when the people formed the Kyrgyz nation, and charismatic leaders led them through the centuries to this moment. Nostalgia about the past is a constant of social memory for all peoples and all times.

In this context, an attempt to substantiate the history of the Kyrgyz as ancient and rich is aimed at self-substantiation and self-interpretation as a nation in the modern world.

Returning to Popper's idea, the author wants to underline the fact that the asymmetry of the past and future puts a special responsibility on contemporaneity. Contemporaneity shapes the future. The social mind of the modern society, due to the asymmetry of the past and future, has an opportunity to make a historical choice now. This fact allows modern generations to reach new heights of social creation. This inspires and gives hope to people.

Popper's concept presented above contains a methodological approach for interpreting the past, present, and future. If every historical time space in the past, present, and future is autonomous and their interaction is not linear, then the past and future do not depend on the past completely. As for social development, such an approach inspires people with optimism, for there exists a real possibility to correct the present and future. Moreover, because the future is not burdened with "the spoiled past," the social mind can work more efficiently.

In this case, we can suppose that previous traditional societies of the Soviet Union are quite able to create a democratic society. It does not mean that we have to upset our past. The past and present provide an opportunity to foresee the outlines of a future society by accumulating knowledge and experience about society.

A society's modernization processes promote its transition from stagnation to innovations. This process is always complex and conflicting, accompanied by the collapse of the old, conflict of values, social inertia, and disorganization on the one hand, and by the gradual installation of new patterns of social order on the other hand. All this is taking place in the newly independent nations that appeared after the collapse of the USSR.

Kyrgyz society was involved in social turmoil at the turn of the current century. A new world order requires new paradigms of development. Is our society ready to take on the challenge of history? Does the arsenal of Kyrgyz society have what it takes to ensure proper economic, political, and cultural existence? If yes, then what is it? Where can this potential—this life-line—be found? Will the potential be viable? If not, will we have to reject completely the flimsy social and cultural experience and start without the “burden of the past” in order to keep pace with other nations? The fact is that all social processes have become extremely swift. Speed and success are a new religion that has more fans than calm and reasonable advocacy.

As was said before, the initial terms of history are that the past, present, and future exist as a triunity, which means that historical components are uniform in essence; they sustain the life of man and society. Thus, in any case, having moved to cosmopolitan society, we will not be able to understand the structure of our society, much less make a step forward.

If in striving for success we forget about the past and leave history, we end up like a hare running forward who, all of a sudden, finds itself out of the forest, but without space or habitat. A hare without a forest will die, as will a nation without a history. What is more important? To have temporary success and leave a historical stage, or to have our own “habitat” and leave an imprint on history for as long as possible, that is the question? To really be in history demands that Kyrgyz society change its thinking, paradigms, spirituality, and social character.

Kyrgyz society exists simultaneously in three waves of the historical process: agrarian, industrial, and postindustrial societies.

The waves of history enliven all vectors of its development, although the new philosophy preaches postindustrial ideals. The traces left by agrarian types of society and taking a place in the social character structure of Kyrgyz society exist not as an historical rudiment, but rather as a functioning tissue in the organism of Kyrgyz society.

Thus, the agrarian character as a mnemonic layer is a part of human activity not only in management, but also in social and cultural activity, expressed in social relations, thinking, and behavior. Agrarian character and backwardness are mistakenly believed to be of the same order. Meanwhile, agrarian character, as culture and experience, is becoming the source of a different reality in the context of the new world order.

Postindustrial consumer society is opposed to agrarian society, which is idyllic, measured, and environmentally safe. The inevitable catastrophe generated by a consumer society develops a new type of philosophy—a phi-

losophy of restrictions, returning to fundamental, basic ways of life in which man and nature are balanced.

“*Affluenza*” is an abundance syndrome with which postindustrial societies has been infected. It forces western man to find the antidote to consumerism. In this context, the aspiration of Kyrgyz society to be integrated into the world community is accompanied, or must be accompanied, by the application of social and cultural memory in order to derive usefulness from the tradition. Nomadic civilization’s interest during the postmodern period comes from man’s acute need to create such a social and cultural reality in which he can live a full-blooded life.

Not only nomadic people have an interest in nomadic philosophy. Western researchers are also interested in discovering its secrets, having the experience of modernism and postmodernism and a sober view of their merits and drawbacks.

The analysis of nomadic civilization by modern French researchers Deleuze and Guattari detected new conceptions of considerable interest. In their work *Rhizome* they represent the image of postmodern consciousness. *Rhizome* is a metaphor, personifying nomadic culture. The authors try to conquer the new space of thinking, that is, to break traditional postulates of metaphysics: a subject is an author; an object is the world. The image of the world in their philosophy is represented as a collective literary work-book, referred to as *rhizome*. This idea, unlike that of the academic roots of classical metaphysics, is based on collective opinion that is inherent in nomadic civilization.

As a result of their reconstruction of the classic image of the world, we have come to a new kind of a book-*rhizome*. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the idea of a tree presupposes the origin, embryo, and development of “treelike” thinking, aimed at the search for unity, representing itself in plurality and distinctions.⁵ There were attempts to reject “treelike” thinking by the end of the twentieth century. For example, people engaged in politics began to speak of a multi-polar world.

In the type suggested, i.e., in the book-rhizome, the world is characterized by new principles of a social scheme, heterogeneity, decentralization, plurality, and cartographic character, contrary to the principle of a genetic axis according to which the world of the West is organized. The advantage of the principle suggested by Deleuze and Guattari is that it is not a system in which some failure can trigger the collapse of the entire system. The principle of an “insignificance gap” is substantiated as a principle of work of such a plurality and wholeness in which failures of elements do not cause the destruction of the whole. That is why a rhizome can be torn into parts, but it restores its growth, because its structure protects the entire system from destruction, even though some elements are damaged.

The historical prototype of the “book-rhizome” was the social structure of nomads. “In this sense, nomads have neither past nor future; they appear and stop, not having a history but rather a broad geography and landscape.”⁶

Deleuze and Guattari speak of scientific models of social development: *compars* and *dispars*. *Compars* is a model applicable to the constantly developing western society—developing in one direction of progress. *Dispars* is rather the principle of nomadic existence. Nomadic space is tactile rather than visual, and time is cyclical.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the “life of a nomad is an intermezzo,” in the sense of his independent part in the choir of humanity. Deleuze and Guattari attach great importance to speed. Nomadic motion is extensive, and speed is intensive. “Only a nomad possesses absolute motion and speed. The Earth is no longer the Earth; it is a prop for legs.” Deterritorialization of nomads is the principle of their existence.

Deleuze and Guattari next speculate about the possibility of realizing the nomadic model in the social and cultural structure and policies of modern nations. This long excursus into their thinking allows us to find a new approach to the assessment of the mnemonic arsenal of Kyrgyz society in order to determine its social and spiritual guidelines. In light of their ideas, we have become more interested in the Kyrgyz perception of the world, coded in social memory in a kind of virtual state. Their conception of nomadic culture reveals the advantages of the paradigmatic character of nomadic civilization, and much about Kyrgyz as nomads.

As was stated above, decentralization, plurality, cartographic character, and an insignificant gap ensure viability of the ethnic and social structure. It should be noted that Deleuze and Guattari made their conclusions proceeding from their experience of the steppe and desert, and, probably, other nomads, wandering horizontally. The Kyrgyz nomads, on the other hand, travel both horizontally and vertically.

This nomadic model brings to mind a geometrical figure, reproduced in virtual reality. If this figure is imagined in motion, then it is possible to imagine something similar to the conception of Deleuze and Guattari, but at the same time different from it. The suggested schema reminds us of their cartographic conception of decentralization.

The nomadic character of the Kyrgyz based on their horizontal and vertical motion creates a spherical way of perceiving space and the cyclical character of time. *Yurta* is a symbol of the Kyrgyz spherical perception of the world. The social character of the Kyrgyz itself is organized as a group of numerous centers. One might say probably that is the reason for the absence of general postulates and institutions in Kyrgyz identity and society, despite its centuries-old history. This matter is coded in the social memory of the Kyrgyz people, which was neither structured nor regulated by statehood or ideology up to the nineteenth century. The tradition of collective idea and the fact that democratic discourse, though undeveloped, takes place in our society, must have originated from this fact. The Kyrgyz tradition of collective opinion is realized through the *kenesh*, a council that exists as a traditional institution, functioning inside the family of the community. *Kenesh* is a place where problems are discussed and decisions are made collectively taking into account common interests.

The absence of a strict structure for social character due to the decentralization of nomadic culture prompted the development of social connections within the framework of local, social, and cultural spheres such as *beeys*, *khans*, and communal character in general. However, concepts of the Kyrgyz as a whole were preserved and reproduced. Let us recall an episode from the epic “Manas,” when Manas, coming from Altai as a representative of a part of the Kyrgyz, people reached the Talas Kyrgyz in order to unite them.

According to the “insignificance gap” of Deleuze and Guattari in the course of substantiating the peculiarities of the Kyrgyz social character and spirituality, metamorphoses, breaks, and destruction in the history of the Kyrgyz ethnos did not affect their viability. Despite huge historical gaps and social and cultural amnesia, the Kyrgyz have not abandoned the historical stage.

Post-Soviet modernization processes first affected the sphere of national and political life, because the appearance of new independent nations and the ideology of independence created a difficult situation. People who found themselves in unusual situations in a short time as subjects of changed political status and social state did not have enough time to get used to it, not to mention the ability to interpret these facts in their own lives and determine their attitude to new phenomena. They lost their political and national identity.

Post-USSR groups faced the problem of identification in three hypostases: political, national, and psychological. This is what caused changes in consciousness and self-consciousness in the former citizens of the Soviet Union and present citizens of new independent states. If before there were no contradictions between political and national parameters of an unidentified person, then now these two points of life are becoming poles apart. It should be noted that it is a rather serious political problem for today: an interrupted semantic connection with the previous state, social institutions, a partly native culture for the non-indigenous population, adoption of new statehood, changes in the status of social institutions, and revival of the national culture for the indigenous population create different situations in the newly independent nations.

These nations announced to the world community their democratic goals and committed themselves to solving these problems. In fact, there were no incidents in determining the civil status of people of different nationalities. But the need to move forward and set new tasks is not on the surface but in the depths of social relations.

National identification is a multilevel and long phenomenon. It occurs in the process of socialization and cultural development throughout one’s life. Someone’s identification with a certain nation may form a different attitude toward both himself and other people. Some examples are American and Japanese patriotism at the present time, the inferiority complex of the German and Japanese after the Second World War, and the Soviet people’s patriotism and pride in their motherland.

Assimilation, or the process of identification, can cause mixed feelings. What is national identity? In Russian literature, it exists mostly as a psychological problem and is interpreted as identification or recognition of something or somebody and assimilation to something or somebody. However, it is a very important problem of philosophy, social anthropology, political science, and social psychology. The problem of identity (national, political, and cultural) is considered in a broad social and political context in the following way: memory and identity, heritage and history; identity in culture, identity in a political sphere. And this is only a small list of issues which are raised by researchers abroad. The matter is that identity is one of the most important constants of personality structure, and that is why it shows itself in all spheres of life. In this connection, the fact of national identity in the social practice of newly independent states must be taken into consideration.⁷

National identity is based on social memory, which includes ethnic, cultural, political, and other kinds of memory. Social memory is a collective memory, which allows man to identify himself with a definite ethnic, social, and cultural community in historical space and time.⁸

In light of the expanse of the problem, we are going to dwell on three of its aspects: first, the connection of ethnic memory and mentality with national identity; second, political memory and national identity; and, third, national identity and citizenship.

The notion of ethnic memory is the least developed notion of our scientific and social lexicon. Ethnic memory was leveled and subjected to amnesia by an excessively ideological society. Moreover, ethnic memory was intentionally not allowed to emerge. The strategic goals of the Soviet society were aimed at creating a new historical community—the Soviet people. For this reason, national peculiarities fixed in ethnic, cultural and historical memory were not included in the cultural and social orbit of man's existence. This niche was being filled with pseudo-ideological values.

However, ethnic memory is a most important component of social life, without which the latter simply cannot exist. Ethnic memory is the aggregate of socially significant information concerning the peculiarities of a community's life, culture, and morality. Ethnic memory preserves and reproduces the cultural environment in which a person is raised, absorbing the canons, stereotypes, and settings of a peoples' life. National culture determines one's peculiarities, which exist either implicitly or explicitly and are expressed in behavior, life orientation, knowledge, and moral values.

Ethnic memory contains a multi-layer information network, a stock of knowledge, and various scenarios that influence and regulate human behavior. On the strength of these qualities ethnic memory serves as a public component of socialization.

Modern and traditional institutional systems of socialization provide the unity and succession of goals, motives, settings, and orientation of self-consciousness that make up the basis of an individual's identity. Social identity is a system of social attributes and characteristics which determine the social group to which a person belongs. The national aspect of a person's

social identity in this context includes ethnic, cultural, and language memory carrying out social functions.

All socially significant information stored in the arsenal of ethnic memory runs through the social and psychological structure of a person and is present in its activity in different spheres of life. Reconsideration of anthropological concepts is caused by the necessity of human relationships and by the changing role and place of man in the modern world in general. The reasons for social behavior, its motivation, social identity factors, preconditions of normal social feeling, as well as the rights to personal autonomy and sovereignty—all play a great role in the deeper understanding of man. On this plane the emphasis on the national ethnic aspect of social identity may be considered as one side of a complex study of man.

A man is not born Kyrgyz, Uzbek, German, or French. He becomes a representative of a nation gradually, stepping into the orbit of national life. Ethnic memory shows itself as a sphere of initial socialization, as an individual is plunged into language, traditions, education, and upbringing which allow him to identify himself in the system of social, ethnic, and cultural values. If during initial socialization an individual acquires these values without a deeply realized and interpreted attitude toward them, then during the second socialization, when man acquires skills, knowledge, and a world outlook, when ethnic memory is more selective, he pays more attention to it and his attitude toward it becomes more intelligent. In other words, ethnic and cultural memory is the basis of a “spiritually settled life,” and deliverance or escape from “spiritual weightlessness” (D. Lihachev). A state of physical weightlessness requires colossal strength for adaptation, otherwise it destroys the body. In the same way, spiritual weightlessness without cultural “life belts” can destroy the spirit.

The need for a culturally settled way of life causes the problem of identification, that is, comprehension of social, ethnic, and cultural values and the correlation of oneself and one’s life and spiritual guidelines with them. In this case we mean ethnic (national) identification. The individual identifies himself with a definite ethnic organism, internalizes its regularity, norms, and peculiarities, which are reflected in his psychology, behavior, and philosophy. In other words, ethnic identification allows for comprehending and perceiving a man in concrete reality. For instance, the behavior of a Kyrgyz, American, or Japanese in the process of his work may be understood or perceived correctly on the condition that we pay attention to the specific (in this case) ethnic reality and mentality into which one is plunged. It is the ethnic context that sets a program of notions, stereotypes, settings, and norms. It goes without saying that ethnic identification is a part of the social ambience and that is why it is subjected to changes and perfections, or, in some cases, decline and disenchantment. The process of identification itself is neither good nor bad; it is, to some extent, a given for man.

However, persons with ulterior motives may use ethnic identity in a positive or a negative way. For instance, during the war Germans used it for

self-preservation, or to justify the elimination of Jews, or to deny the fascist ideology. Today a Kyrgyz may use it to build a career.

The present situation requires another kind of mentality, experience, and knowledge. The task of ethnic and cultural analysis is in finding within the ethnic and cultural memory of a people the values and knowledge that were coded by the experience of many generations.

The actual question for us is whether our mentality will let us painlessly integrate into the civilized world. Which negative features or cultural peculiarities, conditioned by many factors, will slow down the process? Which features of the fully developed mental and ethnic context can be used rationally today? A. O. Boronev and P. L. Smirnov tried to answer these and other questions in their book *Russia and the Russians: The Character of the People and Fortune of the Country*.⁹ A very curious article "About the Kyrgyz Mentality" by the academician T. Koichuev was published in 1992. This work presents historical facts as well as an analysis of the interrelation of social life, labor traditions, spiritual values, and national identity.

The authors of the first book, along with the Russians, in general, stress those qualities which do not promote survival in today's world. They state that the Russian community in recent history has no values for stimulating individual economic activity. Apart from limiting individual freedom in economic technology, the community was "against rational, individual management because the principal of justice in practice led to strip-mining, communal farming, and constant land redistribution as the population was growing. This objective situation formed an appropriate mentality in the sphere of labor activity and man's identification with the community. That is why the people of the former Soviet Union are characterized by generally the same mentality."¹⁰

The sharing of the same mentality is conditioned by the basic structures of society. Koichuev stresses that

mentality components of a people in general can be classified according to certain properties, characteristic capabilities, social qualities, emotional and psychological peculiarities. If today we assess the representatives of the former Soviet Union using the world standards, then, to some extent, they are half-workers, half-professionals, half-intellectuals and half-educated. And here there is no difference between a Russian, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, or Ukrainian, etc. This is communist likeness.¹¹

The way for independent states to survive and prosper is difficult. However, the experience of survival over many centuries will help overcome the obstacles in the new situation.

The problem of national identity and citizenship comes up nowadays in connection with the sovereignty of new states. In Soviet times these phenomena (ethnic and political memory, national identity, and ethnic mentality)

existed in a passive state, as social and cultural norms were different at that time.

Political memory greatly influences politics, changes the government's role, and creates new political values. Individual identification of feelings and consciousness, along with the political values of leaders form patriotism. However, there are also pseudo-patriotism and political illusions, which play an important role in people's lives. Respect for political values and the appropriation of a glorious political past have a positive meaning for individual self-identification in the context of social and political relations. For instance, cultivation of the institution of the presidency in the United States or the attitude toward monarchy in Great Britain are important factors of political consciousness in these countries.

As for the political memory of our citizens, it is full of conflict and controversy. Identification with the political system of the Soviet period played an important role in the forming of their consciousness. In Soviet times ethnic and political memory were unified. Moreover, political memory and the attitude toward it were the basic means of forming social illusions. It is likely that national identity left its imprint on the evaluation of facts held in the political memory.

During the Soviet period, ideological principles led to the repression of the Soviet people's memory. Over time, repressed memory played a political role and supported the Soviet system. However, true memory was alive in a virtual state. The removal of ideological pressure let people learn the real history, which in their opinion was not as ideal as it had been described in textbooks. Debunking the official memory undermined the authority of the Soviet idols. Lenin, Stalin, Krushchev, Brezhnev, and all the gerontocratic political power of the Soviet period were represented in a quite different light. The authority of the KPSU was ruined along with them.

During the period of *perestroika*, the exaggerated official memory was changed into a "popular memory" (M. Fuko), which was actively supported by mass media, art, and literature. The experience of the post-Soviet period shows that popular memory was used not only for good social intentions, but also, unfortunately, for the populist intentions of new political leaders.

The stark contradictions between official Soviet memory and the popular memory of the post-Soviet times sparked discontent. Nostalgia for the Soviet times and thirst for something new divided families, communities, and society as a whole.

Society's leaning toward the past completely ruined the Soviet ideology, which had been considered unshakable. The spontaneity of the process of actualizing the past and the new interpretations of many historical facts might even have introduced new inaccuracies.

Oral and written memory diverged in content. Oral memory retained a lot of what had not been recorded in written memory. A good example is the history of the Second World War and Stalin's actions. This interpretation differs from official ideology.

In any case, memory is the basis for forming identity.¹² The interrelation of memory and national identity is revealed by American researchers. They show how historical and cultural heritage promotes the formation of national identity and the development of patriotism. The slogan “Democracy and Memory” is the main one for ideological events in the United States.¹³ That is why there is a special policy of memory that purposefully actualizes certain historical and cultural facts. The heritage industry and its perspectives are always at the center of the government’s attention

In the United States, the revision and reconsideration of history is carried out in the most scrupulous and, at times, pedantic way. In the post-Soviet period, on the other hand, many errors were made as a result of unskilled exploration of social memory. According to post-Soviet settings, the revision of social memory inflicted moral damage upon the memory of the older generation. The conflict in social memory formed the basis for determining value and ideological guidelines for different layers of the population.

History, as social memory, plays a great role in the consolidation of society.¹⁴ That is why a negligent attitude toward history, or re-writing it in favor of temporal political passions, is sure to cause damage to the spiritual and intellectual life of a society.

Kyrgyz political memory has many shades. The events connected with the elimination of the first generation of intellectuals of the region for the manifestation of national patriotism and idealization of the feudal past are still kept in people’s memory. Nationalism in the first years of *perestroika* was the expression of the conflicted character of political memory and, to some extent, was a way to protect the civil rights to labor, freedom of movement, and normal living conditions.

There is another acute ethnic and political problem in Kyrgyz society: changing former stereotypes and acquiring new guidelines by those for whom Kyrgyzstan is not their historical motherland. This concerns mainly the Russian-speaking regional population which is visibly oriented toward Russia in all respects. There are some objective reasons for this, however, old stereotypes still dominate the consciousness of Russian-speaking people and do not allow them to agree with the new social situation.

That is why it is necessary for those who consider Kyrgyzstan their homeland to be ready to learn its new political culture, not rejecting the cultural of the countries where they are from. Habermas calls this process “political adaptation.”¹⁵

Striving for post-national community in Soviet times cultivated the ideas of national revival, independence, and democracy. The understanding of ethnic (national) identity, and the idea of national statehood and its realization greatly intensified this consciousness, having provoked controversial reactions from subjugated nations.

Many representatives of the satellite nations, especially the Russian language ones, suffer political discomfort because of separation from their historical motherland. Problems of national and ethnic identification prohibited real social identity. This is natural, as earlier generations of the satellite

populations considered themselves a part of the great motherland. There is a close semantic relation between the notions of “citizenship” and “national state” for those who consider Kyrgyzstan their permanent residence and motherland. And those who do not identify themselves with a new national state, either in political or national terms, have lost the semantic relation between citizenship and national identity.

Analyzing the problem of citizenship and national identity, Habermas stresses the fact that finally the controversy between them could be settled in the process of “political adaptation.”

Appropriate conditions should be created for the “political adaptation.” The social guidelines of a non-indigenous population are likely to change in this case. This process is far from easy. Emigrants who find themselves in a different ethical and cultural environment (for instance, Central-Asian Germans in Germany, Jews in Israel or America) have to go through a much longer period of “political adaptation.” The non-indigenous population of Kyrgyzstan who has lived in the region for several generations would deal with changing stereotypes and accepting a “new motherland” less painfully, as they acquire citizenship. On the other hand it is much more difficult to eliminate outdated social guidelines than just to throw them off on the border of a new country where one arrives as an emigrant.

Everything depends on a person’s readiness to accept and understand his new situation, on the desire and efforts to integrate in a new country. And it also depends on the efforts and responsibility of new independent countries to follow democratic values and to create a community where the interests of all social groups, representatives of many nations, and individuals would be protected.

The usefulness coefficient of the social activity of the older generations was high. Thanks to their efforts, the social foundations of the modern Kyrgyz society were created. How can we account for the fruitfulness of their actions? To answer this question, we are going to analyze the concept of social creation.

Social creation is the productive activity of people aimed at creating a new, more socially-organized community. Unlike the concept “social activity,” which has earned a permanent place in philosophical literature, the notion “social creation” presupposes the activity of a transcendental subject, and leads to new creative social forms and to new contents of social life.

Social creation is the construction of a new reality that can significantly advance a society, mainly in its humanitarian development. It is a creative process that is carried out on the basis of high-level community self-consciousness. Thus, social creation is embodied in the rational forms and content of society. It is the process of concentrating intellect, spirit, and moral will.

Indeed, social creation is the people’s prerogative, and its result is the values which have been created and which are being created now. The factor of historical development is the level of social consciousness, which is measured by the ability of a society to reasonably solve the tasks they face.

That is why the democratic challenge, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, accelerated the pace of social creation.

The new situation of the post-Soviet space demanded great changes in social consciousness. Indeed, major changes have happened in Kyrgyz society, and it will take a lot of time and effort to understand and fully realize them. The social mind calls for uniting different interests in one whole, and this is called for in the constitution of the Kyrgyz republic. However, the question arises to what extent the unity and integrity of a society are internalized in its consciousness. It is the elaboration of common ideas which come from the depth of social consciousness and their being accepted by the whole society that determines the extent of national self-conscious development. This is because the realization of change in one's own nature is an important component of a society's social and national growth. Moreover, as Ch. Aitmatov wrote, "The level of national self-consciousness shows how a civilized nation develops."¹⁶

Freedom lies in the basis of that national self-consciousness. A people who are not free cannot form an adequate national self-consciousness. Free people receive the opportunity to create their own being. This is a great responsibility given by historical destiny. Historical destiny is not ironclad; it can be changed. In this case we do not completely agree with the opinion of E. Troeltsch, who stated: "One must have enough courage to admit his historical destiny, or he will not be able to get out of his historical skin."¹⁷ Further he wrote that peoples outside Europe have no historical self-consciousness. "Only the European spirit felt this need."¹⁸ This is a display of the European tendencies that were strong both in science and culture in the first half of the twentieth century.

Acquired freedom will let people change their historical destiny. The question is how they are going to change it, and what will assist or hinder it, and also whether there is the potential in the arsenal of social and cultural experience which will allow the creation of a new historical future.

The temporal factor has great importance in the forming of national self-consciousness. An evolutionary theory presupposes gradual stages of social development. However, there are cases in social experience when a short historical space is much more useful than long historical periods. In other words, the results of social creation are not always measured by time. Thus, the post-Soviet decade played a colossal role in the emergence of Kyrgyz national self-consciousness. However, there are some components of social activity which are hard to change. They include a type of economic management and a type of sociality.

A new reality is known to demand from people new skills, new models of behavior, and, on the whole, a new social culture. However, the transformation of these spheres does not usually happen together. There are reasons for this.

Economic culture is one aspect of memory of a society.¹⁹ Geographical, environmental, economic management, and labor skills are framed in social

memory and are transmitted from one generation to another. Economic traditions, in turn, are the result of adaptation to a certain environment.

American anthropologist B. Malinowski wrote that traditions also carry out a biological function: “From a biological point of view tradition is a form of collective adaptation of community to its environment. Eliminate a tradition, and you will deprive a social organism of its protective cover, dooming it to a slow and inevitable process of dying.”²⁰

Not only in physical labor are traditions coded, but in consciousness and mentality as well. All that is imprinted on social consciousness later objectifies itself in things in an objective form. This fact was substantiated by M. Weber in his work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.²¹ He claims—contrary to Marx—that it is not the material way of production that forms the basis of society but ideas, knowledge, facts, and traditions in religion, culture, and social memory; they are the basis of economic activity. In particular, Protestantism as a religious philosophy played the key role in the development of the economic well-being of many peoples.

The search for one’s own social authenticity is a factor of national and social self-consciousness. Social authenticity is likely to be obtained through the revision of social memory and the interpretation of a new reality. This is not a simple task. The intelligence of a whole society is required to solve it. Mutual material, spiritual, and intellectual activity will promote the growth of national consciousness in order to create a new historical future.

Modernization in the post-Soviet period acquired new forms. The question of national and civilizational identity is becoming acute. This search naturally leads to the field of social memory. Modernization of the post-Soviet period initiates the re-substantiation of its social and cultural fundamentals. The gaps in Soviet society in the field of social self-consciousness became more noticeable in the post-Soviet period.

During the course of modernization, the Kyrgyz, in addition to striving for urbanization and technology, also acquired an interest in *sanjyre*, that is, the history of its people’s origin.²² Books aimed at the reconstruction of Kyrgyz historical and cultural memory are being published.

The period of forgetfulness and cultural amnesia caused by totalitarian Soviet ideology is compensated by a great interest in the origins of spirituality and social character. Scrupulous ethnographic research is gradually restoring ethnic and cultural memory, which, in turn, promotes the formation of national and social identity.

The emergence of Muslim cultural layers added to the process of ethnic and cultural identification in post-Soviet times. The notion “we are Muslims” turns into a feature of Kyrgyz social life. However, this principle does not have a total application, as the Kyrgyz society includes other religious groups.

The search for civilizational identity by the peoples of Central Asia conditions the rise of interest in Islam. Moreover, the ideas of Islam concerning modernization and democratic values have a somewhat different ring.

The retrospective estimation of the role of Islam in Central Asian social and cultural development reveals its new parameters. Islam contains a system of codes regulating behavior and thinking which in no way contradict modern values. This can be proved by a careful reading of Islamic historical texts. In this plane the Koran plays a special role.

The Koran is known to contain the rules of religious ceremonies, moral rules, lawful guidelines, a description of a way of life, thinking, and behavior. It goes without saying that such a memory repository contains the spiritual and intellectual experience of the peoples who have been preaching Islam for many centuries, passing it on from one generation to another.

In modern times, the values of Islam are like a vector of the search for the spiritual identity of both individuals and peoples as a whole. It is the most important factor of social solidarity of the peoples of the Central Asian region.

Another side of real life for the Central Asian peoples is the split inside Islam between the adherents of Islamic fundamentalism and "moderate" Islam, which tries to combine the Soviet values with those of Islam. Such a split occurs when political interests are substituted by religious slogans and political games are carried out on the basis of speculation of religious feelings.

However, Islam as a social phenomenon woven into the life of local people has cemented cultural codes into consciousness and social practice. Consequently, Islam is a major cultural source for the coding system of information, knowledge, and experience. Because of Islam, the peoples of the region have retained a great amount of the knowledge and religious activities necessary to promote the social creation of new generations.

That is why it is necessary now to approach Islamic values carefully and delicately, so as to reveal with the help of scientific research all that is necessary and reasonable for an individual's and people's self-identity in today's world.

Political and ideological passions concerning Islam, intimidation by Islamic Fundamentalism, and a subsequent rejection of the experiences of the people of Central Asia could lead to social and cultural amnesia. The people of our region have already faced this problem and it led to no good. A well thought-out and impartial attitude toward the values of Islam will bring a great number of positive factors, both scientific and practical.

In Soviet times there was a ban on religious teachings, and the values of Islam were passed orally from one generation to another. The Koran and the oral tradition of Islam existed mainly in a cryptic form. Not all the people who observed rituals and possessed knowledge of Islam understood the meaning of the prayers which they learned by heart and repeated thousands of times. People just believed that the words of the prayers and the rituals made them closer to God. However, the meaning which was not understood was transmitted in the process of cultural reproduction. The decoding of the hidden and sometimes even esoteric meaning was carried out only by people who had a religious education and knew Arabic.

The spread of Islam in the Central Asian region rested on the social and cultural codes which already existed at that time and had been worked out before in Islamic culture. And the social and cultural experience of the people of the region was rich and varied. Moreover, the historical and cultural creation which formed and elaborated the whole system of codes of the nomadic civilizations resisted Islamic social and cultural codes.

According to researchers, the introduction of Islam in Central Asia was carried out not by a simple rejection of folk culture, but by its transformation. However, that does not mean that dramatic situations did not take place during the introduction of Islam.

Taking into consideration the lack of education in Islam, the cryptic cultural code was reproduced by simple mnemonic techniques and the procedures of memorizing. The knowledge and practice of Islam was not understood by most of the believers.

In Soviet times when atheism was cultivated, Soviet values, which could not be combined with the values of Islam, were formed in the consciousness of at least two or three generations. In that time, the norms of Soviet ideology were also being formed.

The difference in codes existed in the consciousness of the people, and it caused controversial actions. A Soviet man, for instance, a communist, could not bury his relatives according to the rituals of Islam. The Soviet ideology prohibited him from doing that. However, religious tradition insisted that the funeral should be organized according to Muslim rules. A man had to choose between his career, reputation, and traditions. That choice was far from easy as the two codes were struggling for dominance in his consciousness.

Nowadays, when liberty of conscience is proclaimed, Islam as a social and cultural code is reproduced through Islamic institutions. The existence of mosques and printed works gives youth the opportunity to study and get a theological education. The young people educated in Islam can understand its values by decoding the meaning of the symbols and rituals, and by coding religious knowledge and behavior in the consciousness of new generations.

The actualization of Islamic canons initially took place in the frame of different traditions which were followed during family or community events. Later mullahs and other religiously educated people began proclaiming the necessity to teach Islam to children. Religious literature in the Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian languages was collected for this purpose. The fact that the religious literature was accessible and that there was no ban on carrying out the religious rituals raised the interest in Islam even in those people who considered themselves atheists. Moreover, affluent people began to build mosques in their villages, increasing their social prestige.

Yiman sabagy was introduced at schools, and the history of Islam began to be taught. Pupils now can learn about the life of the Prophet and about the role of Islam in the life of ordinary men. Mass media also assisted in the spread of religious knowledge, both the Koran and the Bible. These educa-

tional events, to some extent, decreased the latent tension in the religious life of the community.

The interest of intellectuals in the Koran rose. Intellectuals consider it the social and cultural experience of past generations, which can assist in the solution of modern spiritual problems. The Koran is viewed as a background for a spiritual life during a period of collapse in the community's traditional values.

The *Hadji* also became possible in the post-Soviet period. The number of women who do *Hadji* has increased. According to Islamic canons, during this holy visit a woman is to be accompanied by her husband, brother, or son. A woman who did *Hadji* must change her way of life and thinking. The responsibility of a woman who did *Hadji* is greatly increased; she becomes an example for the community to follow concerning religious rituals and the spread of religious knowledge. Women who have mastered religious teachings have a right to read and explain the Koranic texts. They can explain the origin of certain rituals and the norms of life. For instance, the constant contradiction between a mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is explained by the fact that when the prophet decided to marry a young girl the prophet's wife rejected her. Since then the feud and mistrust has existed between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. This explanation was given by a woman from the southern region of Kyrgyzstan doing ethnic and sociological research with the World Bank in 1999. Other similar interpretations of the prophets' life give examples for the patterns of behavior of the community.

As mentioned, there was no widespread practice of religious education during the Soviet system. That is why social and cultural information from religious texts was reproduced by ordinary mnemonic techniques and the procedures of memorizing. These rituals were often very emotional. For instance, among rural women a religious event called *bushembi* is practiced. Only women gather during this event. They cook ritual food called *alvaitar* and *umach ash*. Next they open *surpa* and make flat cakes. After that they wind cotton wool around small oiled sticks and called down the "spirits". Then they read the Koran for a long time and start crying together, through which they get emotional relief. The women themselves experience a deep spiritual and religious sense in this ritual.

Aji—a man who has gone to Mecca—also has a special authority. He is a member of a community's Council of Elders and solves or participates in the solution of the problems of his community, such as child rearing, divorce, births, and funerals.

In the public consciousness, Islam is a way of bringing people into a healthy moral state. The "transformational slump" followed by poverty, unemployment, rise in crime, and, on the whole, the demoralization of working people intensifies the role of Islam as a form of logotherapy, which assists people for whom there is no point in living. This is needed given the number of suicides and mental health problems which arose abruptly in post Soviet times.

Apart from this, there is a belief fortified in the public consciousness that implementation of Islamic canons is a tribute to the memory of ancestors, whereas acquiring a different faith is a betrayal of ancestors. This point of view was formed in opposition to the tendencies of the youth who accept different faiths. Some Kyrgyz Christians became followers of Hare Krishna, Judaism, and other beliefs. A certain part of the population considers the presence of such groups as a threat to morality. The ethnic and sociological research mentioned above revealed the case of a scandal that took place during the funeral of a rural man who went to the city, accepted a different faith, then fell ill and died. The people of the village did not allow him to be buried in the local Muslim cemetery. The civilized attitude toward Islam, the use of its potential for spiritual and cultural growth, and the formation of mutual trust and respect between people is thought to bring positive results. Leaving Islam brings on negative results.

The post Soviet period rekindled cultural traditions, games, rituals, and symbols of the past. The rites of commemoration, which appeared in our life from the past, and make up a sacral core of social and cultural memory were reactivated. They concern almost all spheres of life, from family to government.

Interest in the pre-Soviet past is growing. The Soviet period of social and cultural development is falling into oblivion. As for Soviet values, they are falling into a state of social and cultural amnesia. The greater part of society considers this as revenge for totalitarian control of history and culture and for the artificial changes imposed in the pre-Soviet period.

For all this, we forget that the principle of succession of historical epochs lies in social reality. It should not be forgotten, as history is not merely the past, but rather the heritage received from previous generations. It is important to understand history as a process of man's being and social being, unfolding in time.

The comprehension of history as a process means its consideration and description through people's activities, through the connections of these activities, its means and products. Then, history is seen as living, active, and full of strength and as peoples' abilities to connect the past, present and future.²³

In the connection of the past, present and future, the present is seen as a living reality. It is the present that sets the principles for interpretation of the past and projection of the future. That is why it is important to see in the present the actual, which gives meaning for both the past and the future. Missing or losing meaningful concepts of social being is sure to lead to social disease, because a lost meaning takes away the fundamentals of spirituality and sociality. French philosopher M.Foucault distinguished between the present and the actual. The "new and interesting" are actual. According to his opinion,

the actual is not what we are, but what we become in the process of making ourselves, in other words, in our becoming different.

And on the contrary, the present is what we are, and, consequently, what we stop being. That is why the process of modernization, our coming-to-be and acquiring the new, which comes from the depths of public consciousness, is important. It is important that the new things are not just imitation but rather allow us to acquire our social authenticity.

GLOBALIZATION OF SOCIAL MEMORY

The world has formed a circle. The globe has become a whole. New dangers and opportunities are revealed. All existing problems have become world problems, our situation is the situation of all mankind. - K. Jaspers

Today the process of integration, which grew in strength in the first half of the twentieth century, has formed one mnemonic and cultural space. The sources of modern global opportunities and dangers are laid in the oneness of human history and memory about it. And the possibilities are that modern man and every civilized state may use the achievements of the world's civilization and create their own social world.

The acquisition of cultural and historical memory not only of one's own people but also of all mankind forms the basis for global opportunities. Can a present day man realize himself without knowledge of science, politics, economics, culture, etc.?

Education and world standards play a major role in the globalization of mnemonic culture. The expansion of the opportunities of information technologies in reproducing the achievements in science and culture, especially the patterns and idols of mass culture, homogenizes new generations in many countries.

Information and the use of computers in education have made its content and forms almost identical. Education is a historical notion. Its power, as noted above, is in the preservation, reproduction, and transmission of knowledge.

Access to the memory of mankind allows an individual today to expand the sphere of his personal consciousness, because social memory "simultaneously contains all the initial moments and our coming back to ourselves, but in the form of a truly universal essence of spirit."²⁴

We have claimed in the previous chapters that memory is not just a tool for learning the world. It is much more than a technique of memorizing and reproducing knowledge.

The memory of an educated person is a totality of informational, intellectual, historical, and spiritual layers. Moreover, in the context of educational philosophy it is suggested that a pantheon of memory should be organized with the help

of informational systems, which would represent a bank of information concerning spiritual values and celebrations and great persons—the elite of civilization.²⁵

The sources of today's globalization are science and technology, and their main products are knowledge, information, and the means of spreading information. The access to information enriches mnemonic culture with new facts, and a person's historical consciousness deepens, creating a historical being.

The heritage and the traditions in which people are plunged on a local scale grow into a global state. The mono-causality of today's world is also realized on an individual level. Facts, events, and knowledge become an organic part of understanding the world, enriching the historical and cultural memory of a person by means of education. For instance, the colonial policy of Russia, the social and cultural phenomenon of the medieval Arabic and Muslim world called the "Muslim Renaissance," the pyramids of ancient Egypt, or the origin of the Kyrgyz constitution form one layer of mnemonic culture in Kyrgyz society. The knowledge preserved in the memory of mankind should be the criteria of a person's education. In this case, he is an autonomous historical individual as well as a representative of mankind. This fact is the fundamental fact of the spiritual and intellectual existence of modern man. And it is this fact that conditions the communication not only among individuals but also among generations.

Accessibility of information and openness of education is creating the over-arching historicity in the activities of modern man. That is why the process of enriching the historical and cultural memory of a person with values common to all man becomes a prerequisite for spiritual and intellectual freedom. In this consciousness man reaches a certain scope which promotes an adequate comprehension of things.

Globalization in the real historical process becomes feasible thanks to "intellectual technologies." American sociologist D. Bell in his work *The Social Framework of the Information Society* wrote that computerization led to "reorganization of information systems on the basis of computers, and interactive information networks."²⁶

The present day individual is aimed at the future. Success becomes the main criteria for one's actions. However, according to K. Jaspers, "the only thing that is essential in history—the ability of man to remember, and by doing so to preserve all that will become the facts of the future."²⁷ However, there is a direction in history that is always trying to tear itself away from tradition, and historical and cultural memory. This is what might be called the utilitarianism and intellectualization of modern life.

The highly pragmatic goals of the present presuppose a very selective attitude toward values. This position is often justified by the goals and interests of "future progress". Values and knowledge sometimes conflict with the progress of modern science and technologies. However, the experience

of mankind serves to illustrate that the great and the valuable sooner or later return from the archives of social memory.

The main means of globalization of social memory is information that spreads through communication systems—television, radio, e-mail, telephone, and the Internet. For example, the television broadcast of the annual carnival in Brazil, the Academy Awards ceremony in the United States, or the winter Olympics from different parts of the world simultaneously introduces millions of people all over the world to these events. And after some time these events become a fact both of individual and social memory of people who have a quite different historical and cultural experience.

Mega-tendencies of the modern world involve the sphere of social memory. As was stressed above, this leads to globalization and the selective utilization of memory. The point is that the basis of modern human activity is the utilitarian-voluntary principle. “One cannot foresee the future, but one can invent it,” said Dennis Habor, a physicist, futurologist and Nobel prize-winner.²⁸ Another futurologist J. R. Quenten is of the same opinion: “This perspective implies a voluntary attitude toward the future, which is no longer considered conditioned by reason, but is constructed as a result of deliberate choice.”²⁹

In this connection, a pragmatic and instrumental approach to the phenomenon of social memory thoughtlessly invades its organic structure and alters it for the sake of “future planning.”

The necessity of the deliberate formation of history, corresponding to the inner logic of human development, needs a thoughtful, sober and well-planned attitude toward the past without unjustified optimism and destructive pessimism. Theoretically, it can be realized through social and political doctrines and cultural programs.

A lot of “isms,” like “Eurocentrism” and “Asia-centrism,” are stored in social memory. In the second half of the twentieth century, paradigms of a multi-polar world and cultural coalitions were gradually taking their proper niches in social consciousness.

The interrelationship of the past, present, and future requires a purposeful use of social design. It does not mean we should embellish our past. It means regulating and understanding the past and present. In any case, the ideology of any civilized country is engaged in this. Without this, in the eyes of a younger generation history is devoid of sense and full of destruction, chaos, and cruelty.

Such a history is a source of repressed consciousness. That is why social engineering uses “future creation planning” and prognostication. Moreover, the external limits of developing modern civilization have been reached, while internal bounds, based on the activity of the human spirit, remain borderless. In the future, the human spirit needs to be supported by sources of cultural ecology. In this connection, a set of mnemonic tasks arises, the fulfillment of which will allow us to change the way modern man thinks and clears his consciousness.

We believe that to realize this, first, an axiological analysis of accumulated values and social experience should be carried out; second, it is necessary that a society's memory be reconsidered due to present social and economic, moral and spiritual needs; third, we should bring to life the potential mechanisms of integration for an advanced humanist modern civilization; fourth, we should draw practical conclusions from social memory based not only on narrowly defined practical human actions but also on the formation of social and spiritual foundations on which human existence rests. This is necessary in order to build a new world order.

NOTES

1 See D. B. Zilberman. "Tradition as Communication: Transmission of Values, Written Language"/*Philosophical Issues*. 1996. No. 3, p. 101.

2 Admittedly, subjective space means a geometrical model of a mental phenomenon, which is characteristic of thinking (feelings, perception, views and attitudes) in multidimensional space. In this model, feelings and perceptions form a perceptive space. Notions are organized in semantic space. Mnemonic space corresponds to memory traces. (see *Investigation of Memory*. Moscow, 1990, p. 90).

3 L. Ionin, *Cultural Sociology*. Moscow, 1996, pp. 32-33.

4 See Karl Popper, *The Open Universe*, London, New York. 1995, pp. 55-57.

5 *Modern Philosophical Dictionary*. Moscow; Ekaterenburg; Bishkek; 1995, pp. 320-326.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 321.

7 *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*/Edited by John R. Gills. Princeton; New Jersey; Princeton University Press. 1994, p. 290.

8 See Halbachs, *The Collective Memory*. New York, 1980, p. 186.

9 A.O. Boronev and P.I. Smirnov, *Russia and the Russians: The Character of the People and Destiny of the Country*. 1993.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 64.

11 T.K.O. Kochuev, "Kyrgyz, Mentality"/*Republic*. July 12, 1992.

12 John R. Gills. "Memory and Identity: The History of Relationship"/*Commemoration: The Politics of National Identity*, pp.3-11.

13 David Lowenthal, "Identity, Heritage, and History"/*Commemoration*, pp 41-57; G. Kammen, *Mystic Chord of Memory*. New York. 1991.

14 P. Burke, *History as Social Memory/Memory, History, Culture, and Mind*. New York, 1988, pp.97-111.

15 J. Habermas, *Democracy, Mind, Morality*. Moscow. 1995, p. 243.

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- 17 E. Troeltsch, *Historical Character and its Problems*. Moscow: Jurist, 1994, p. 610.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 609.
- 19 A.I. Rivkina, *Economic Culture of Society and Memory*/EKO. 1986.
- 20 S.A. Tokarev, *History of Modern Ethnography*. Moscow, 1978, p. 246. Moscow, 1989.
- 21 See M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*/ Selected Works, Moscow, 1989, p.419.
- 22 *The Kyrgyz: Sources. Ethnography*. Bishkek, 1996. Kirgizdar. 4 books. Bishkek, 1996-1999; Zakirov S. Sanjyre. Bishkek, 1996.
- 23 *Modern Philosophical Dictionary*. Moscow. Bishkek; Ekaterenburg. 1996. p. 246.
- 24 Hegel. *Works*. 2 Vols. Book 1. Moscow, 1971, p. 406.
- 25 B.S. Gershunski, *Philosophy of Education*. Moscow, 1998, p. 237.
- 26 See Daniel Bell, *The Social Framework of the Information Society: The New Technocratic Wave*, Moscow, 1986, pp. 148-166.
- 27 K. Jaspers, *Essence and Meaning of History*, Moscow, p. 450.
- 28 See V.V. Kosolapov and A.N. Goncharenko, *The Twentieth Century from a Position of Futurology*. Moscow, 1987, p. 19.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 39.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of social memory helps us to draw conclusions about the existence of any society. The process of accumulation, conservation, and transference of material and spiritual values is an integral part of a people's activity.

The memory of a society is not a system which passively records facts and events. By nature it is the source of the viability and the condition for the self-sufficiency of a social organism. That means that social memory is the sphere of intellectual and spiritual activity that will ultimately solve problems and open prospects for a society.

The present and the future of a society result from its past. That is why correct evaluation of the past forms the truthfulness or untruthfulness of social facts, events, and knowledge. It is important and necessary to solve some societal problems in terms of the positive transference of social experience of previous generations and the formation of right values. The direction of a people emerges from their own history and culture. In this connection we have tried to reflect the spiritual basis of social memory proceeding from its ontological base. This roots the human person not only in himself, but also in culture and society. The person's attitude develops as a functioning of the universal mnemonic system of recording, storing, and transmitting knowledge, experience, and material values in a process of socialization and cultivation.

This ontological task allows a person to possess himself and the world by means of memory. As a result he not only creates his own life and spirituality but also maintains the traditions of preceding generations and passes them on to future generations. Culture and society are based on this uninterrupted succession.

Social memory is the sphere of a person's roots. Taking root in the first place promotes a self-interpretation of one's nature. A person's individual spiritual experience, in becoming familiar with the world and the experience of previous generations, enable him to get an historical perspective.

Memory is conscience. It has to do with how our very "being" prohibits a person from becoming intransitive, unconscious, and soulless. In this volume, we have tried to substantiate this thesis.

It has been noted that recording and storing of knowledge and experience in material and nonmaterial systems can vary in form and content. Thus, the author has used a comparative approach. This approach reveals different ways of coding and decoding content in social memory, because different types of civilizations are based on different fundamental principles of culture and society. Here the author means the ontological composition of social memory: time, space, the spiritual experience of Eastern and Western peoples. In this context, the social and cultural memory of the peoples of the Central Asian region is emphasized. Mnemonic parameters of social and cultural creation are revealed. They are characterized by the accumulation and functioning of storing and transmitting content in social memory from

generation to generation, shown by an example from the Kyrgyz epic “Manas” by means of the concept “mnemonic mind.” The author emphasizes that this epic reflects a primary characteristic of sociocultural memory which constitutes the rational core of social memory for the Kyrgyz people.

Analysis of the cognitive aspect of social memory—social and cultural determination of knowledge and cognition—testifies to the mnemonic cause of the beginning of new knowledge and its functioning. This concerns both the natural and exact sciences and social-human knowledge. In this respect the role of retrospective evaluation of knowledge and facts is emphasized because it determines the essence of the social and intellectual composition of a person and society.

Maintaining the character of knowledge transmitted from generation to generation causes the existence of knowledge as a basic element of social memory. The praxiological aspect of social memory is considered in the context of the present time situation. Here the emphasis is on the problems of social memory, functioning in the context of the actions of a person and society. The aesthetics of social memory and its influence on people’s choice of judgment and behavior are shown in words from Soviet and post-Soviet societies. We presented a new concept “social amnesia” defined as a natural or special process of forgetting or obliteration in which whole layers of culture and history are erased from the context of social memory due to some objective or subjective reason. The role of social memory in the formation of social reality is considered through the prism of the Sociology of Knowledge. The claim is that a newly created social and cultural reality is caused by the functioning of social memory. Thus social memory should not be thought of like the storage of old material but rather like a living system that is always present in the activities of a person and a society.

Considering social memory by means of communication, the author emphasizes that creation occurs and is needed in interpersonal and intergenerational communication. Social memory comes to life when it is in the system of communication, because exchange of information, knowledge, and news between individuals and generations is realized therein. It is clear that exchange in the system of communication is selective. However, selection of knowledge, information, and news can evolve in the social and cultural sphere.

Knowledge, information, and news are mediators of communication. The means of communication, language, writing, and technology, all play a role. They are exactly the things that make the past, the present, and probably the future accessible synchronically. Under contemporary conditions in the process of communication, generalized symbols based on social memory appear. They make it possible to develop broad, one might even say universal limits for culture and society.

The process by which education becomes standard and sociocultural systems become international promotes this. On the one hand, communication promotes tolerance and openness. Tolerance, the philosophy of contemporary society, allows the development of civil feelings and conscience. On the

other hand, universalization of social memory leads to an absence of originality, not only in the ethnic sphere but also in the social and cultural spheres. This contradiction in the modern world is at the core of interaction between individual and social existence, requiring a person to take on both cosmopolitan directions and local or particular originality. But in any case, human authenticity remains the philosophical essence of social and cultural memory.

The philosophy of tolerance is necessary to allow the common culture of individuals to emerge, because a contemporary person cannot do without the memory of his people, the memory of his society. Indeed, the contemporary person needs the memory of all mankind. That is why the contemporary person strives to become familiar with social memory in its three hypostases: the memory of ethnos, the memory of society, and the memory of humanity.

The phenomenon of social memory is analyzed in the context of modernization: the modernization of the Kyrgyz people in particular. The conceptions of Popper concerning the asymmetry of the past and the future and the nomadic theories of Deleuze and Guattari are suggested as methodological approaches to studying Kyrgyz society. In addition, attention is concentrated on the characteristics of the modernization processes in Kyrgyz society. Analytic corrections of both the present time and traditional character are also undertaken. The social and political processes of the post-Soviet period are illustrated from the point of view of the mnemonic process.

The author, throughout this work, has followed the principle of mnemonic synchronism, and has emphasized the necessity to observe the principle of historical synchronism in science, education, politics, and social conduct. These approaches are needed for the socio-creative work of modern societies.

The gist of the principle of mnemonic synchronism is in the essence bringing together of individual and social existence. The search for the essence of social and individual existence remains the principal task of modern philosophy. This merging of social and individual development is best expressed in the concept of “responsibility.”

Responsibility needs to be the new philosophy for the new century. In this context, the problem of social memory is important. The Kyrgyz people have the concept *mamy kazyk*. *Mamyk* can be translated as the “center.” The center is surrounded by life, knowledge, ideas and thoughts moving in a circle around it. *Mamyk* is a center of a settled way of life. A center that “holds.” This is where the *homo viator*—the itinerant person—starts his life, and the center to which he returns. That is why social memory has ontological characteristics.

The arguments presented here enable the author to advocate for an ontological understanding of the human sciences as a social mnemology. This idea, of course, needs further development that might or might not happen. However, the author is grateful for the patient reader who has accompanied her on this ontological journey of both personal and social memory.

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Index

A

- Abay 58
Abramzon 155
Absolute 44, 47, 59, 82, 86, 92, 94, 125, 131
Actualization 5, 11, 25, 67, 73-74, 79, 82, 92, 99, 102, 104-105, 112, 142
Aestheticization 89-90, 92, 152
Afanasev 155
Aitmatov 10, 33, 70-71, 139, 148, 155, 161
Akmoldoeva 7, 155
Akvinskiy 79
Al-Farabi 53, 57-58
Al-Fergani 57
Al-Horezmi 57
Allah 56
Amanaliyev 155
American 6, 8, 31-32, 38-39, 93, 103, 113, 116, 125-126, 132, 134, 137, 140, 146, 157
Amnesia ix, 2, 8, 28, 54, 78, 84, 93-96, 104, 117, 132-133, 140-141, 144, 152
Ancestors 25, 29, 35, 37, 41, 45-46, 48, 51-52, 55-57, 62, 67, 96, 98-99, 101, 144
Anger 16, 19
Anthropological v, 12, 36, 98, 134
Arabic 38, 54, 67, 94, 141, 146
Archeology 55
Archetypes 5, 44, 51, 55, 66, 112
Art 7, 20, 23, 25, 40, 47, 50, 52, 55, 61, 66, 73, 82, 92-93, 104, 116, 121, 136
Asia-centrism 147
Ataturk 94
Attokurov 155
Augustine 5, 15
Aurobindo 24, 33
Authenticity 26-27, 32, 47, 140, 145, 153
Avtonomova 63, 83, 87, 155
Aytmatov 6, 13, 22, 25-26, 28-29, 60, 64-66
Ayzada 26

B

- Babur 57

Bahtin 155
Balasagin 155
Balasaguni 57
Balkans 103
Bartold 155
Batishev 63
Batmanov 155
Beauty viii-ix, 73, 128
Beethoven 24
Bell 146, 149, 155
Berdyayev 16-17, 32-33, 106, 155
Berger ix, 97-98, 100, 106, 109, 121, 155
Bergson 5, 155
Bibihin 155
Bidikhin 33
Biological 11, 19, 20, 25, 28-29, 31, 64, 78, 105, 117, 140
Birth 6, 14, 25, 28, 31, 79, 111, 117
Biruni 57
Blancoff-Scarr 116
Bloc 3, 6, 9, 56, 65, 71, 155
Bogomolov 63
Bokoshev 155
Boronev 135, 148, 155
Boyarin 155
Brewer 33, 156
Brezhnev 136
Brudni 156
Brudny 123
Buddha 27
Buddhism 19, 35, 42-43, 52
Bueva 156
Bugo 28
Burke 148

C

Campanella 79
Cassirer 46-47, 70
Causality 40, 49, 53, 146
Central Asia i-ii, vi, viii, 50-52, 55-58, 70, 104, 122, 140-142, 148, 155-156
Ceremony 51-52, 147
Chauvinistic 90
Chechen war 32, 103
Childhood 30-31, 93
Chinese 25, 35, 38, 94, 101

Christianity 19, 52
Civilizations 35-36, 52, 100, 142, 151
Civil society ix, x, 39, 40, 127
Cognition 1, 6, 8, 12, 24, 25, 35, 37, 41, 44, 47, 48, 57, 63, 66, 73-77, 80, 82-86, 152
Collectivism 56, 127
Communication vii, 7-9, 27, 37, 42, 46, 54, 63, 67, 99, 100, 105, 107-109, 113-116, 118-120, 146-147, 152
Community 5, 31, 37, 44, 52, 85, 98-100, 102, 108, 125, 127, 130-133, 135, 137-138, 140, 142-143
Connerton 156
Conscience 2, 24-25, 28, 47, 63, 99, 142, 151-152
Consciousness v, vii, ix, 14, 16-17, 21, 25, 30, 35, 37-38, 42, 47, 50-53, 58-59, 63-65, 69, 73, 78, 81, 89-92, 95-96, 98-102, 104-105, 108-109, 113, 118, 120-121, 125-128, 130, 132-133, 136-147, 159
Contemplation 12, 21, 38, 42, 56
Contemporaneity ii, v, -Vi, ix, 1, 59, 102, 123-126, 128
Copernicus 79, 81
Cosmological 55
Cosmos 79
Creativity 19, 25, 39
Crime 14, 28, 31, 143
Cultivation 136, 151
Culture vii, viii, 2, 4-5, 8, 14, 21-25, 30, 36-40, 42-73, 75, 77, 82-86, 92, 94-96, 99-100, 102, 105, 111-114, 116, 121, 123, 128-133, 137-140, 142, 144-146, 151-153
Cyrillic 54

D

Danilevski 156
Dao 41, 43
Death 12, 18-19, 21, 25-28, 51-52, 64, 80, 95, 115, 117-118, 120
Dehumanization 111
Deity 62
Deleuze 107, 130-132, 153
Democracy 5, 37, 39, 116, 137
Denisyuk 20
Depression 18
Determinism 2, 97
Diachronism 59-60, 124
Didacticism 56
Dignity 26, 68, 119
Dilthey 46, 48, 107-108, 156
Divine 62

Donish 58
Dridze 156
Dugin 122
Durkheim 156

E

Earth ix, 3, 60
Education ix-x, 6, 9, 12, 17, 21-23, 25, 38-40, 44, 60, 100, 102, 110-116,
121, 128, 134, 141-143, 145-146, 152-153
Egoism 27-28
Einstein 79, 81
Engels 33, 86-87, 96, 158
Enlightenment 86
Epochs 35, 45, 48, 100, 111, 114, 144
Erickson 114, 121, 156
Erofeeva 156
Eternity 15-17, 42, 58, 79
Ethical viii, 22, 58, 61-62, 64, 80, 138
Ethnopsychology 55
Eurocentrism 147
European 2, 6, 38--2, 83, 86, 95, 116, 119, 139, 159
Evil 37, 51, 57-58, 60, 83, 128
Existence v, vi, viii, 4, 6, 11-12, 14-15, 17-28, 38, 41, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 63,
75, 86, 89, 107, 109, 110, 112, 116-117, 123, 129, 131, 133, 142, 146,
148, 151-13

F

Faithfulness 4, 14
Family 5, 8, 22, 25, 37, 40-41, 56, 66, 98, 107, 114, 117, 125-126, 131, 142,
144
Farsi 67
Fear 16, 18, 28, 30, 91
Feelings 14, 21, 23-25, 29, 41-42, 45, 55, 66, 68, 80, 90-91, 113, 133, 136,
141, 148, 152
Findings v, 79
Firdousi 57, 62
Forgetfulness 25, 28, 42, 45, 53, 93, 94-95, 140
Form v, 1, 3-4, 11-12, 16, 18-22, 25, 39, 44, 46-47, 51-53, 55-57, 61-69, 74,
76-79, 81-82, 85-86, 92-99, 108-109, 111-112, 118, 121, 124, 132,
136, 139-148, 151
Foster 27
Foucault 54, 70, 144, 156
Frankfort 156

Frankl 156
Freedom ix, x, 11, 53, 58, 68, 80, 91-92, 103, 135, 137, 139, 146
Fromm 19, 33, 113, 121, 156
Fuko 136
Fundamentalism 141

G

Gaben 156
Gadamer vii, ix, 21, 32-33, 107-111, 121, 156
Gadias 106
Gershunski 149, 156
Gift 23, 68
Globalization v, ix, 4, 145-147
Gnosticism 52
God 12, 14, 39, 62, 79, 141
Golden Age 92
Goncharenko 86, 149, 158
Gratitude 19
Great Turan 103
Greeks 2, 5, 15, 39, 52, 58, 63, 104, 114
Grigorjeva 43, 69
Grigoryeva 43
Guattari 107, 130-132, 153
Gumilev 70, 157
Gurevich 157

H

Habermas 39, 69, 115, 122, 125-126, 137-138, 148, 157
Habor 147
Halbachs 9, 148, 157
Halbvaks 6, 31, 101
Hamilton 125
Hamza 58
Happiness 16, 53, 57-58
Hartmann 46, 48-49, 70, 106, 157
Hayam 57
Hegel viii-ix, 5, 21, 35, 43, 46, 53, 61, 65, 70-71, 79, 92, 108, 110, 149
Heidegger vii-ix, 1, 9, 11-12, 14-15, 17-18, 24, 26, 29, 32-33, 36, 38, 40-45,
69, 70, 89, 114, 155, 157
Held 106, 157
Heraclitus 40, 112
Heritage ii, 4-5, 8, 44, 46, 50, 57, 59-61, 83, 105, 121, 126, 133, 137, 144,
146

Heroes 38, 56, 68, 99
 Hieroglyphic 37
 Historicism 97
 History v-vii, 1-2, 4-7, 12, 14-15, 17, 23, 26, 35-36, 39, 44-50, 52-56, 59-69, 74-75, 78-86, 89-98, 101-109, 112, 117-119, 121, 127-137, 140, 142, 144-147, 151-152
 Hitler 90, 103, 109, 118
 Holidays 38, 92, 99
 Homelessness 45
 Honor 25, 98, 99
 Hope 16, 66, 91, 128
 Hostility 22
 Hudyakov 157
 Humanitarian 1, 4, 6, 48, 82, 138
 Human memory 21, 27, 92, 95
 Humility 16, 18, 19, 119
 Hunger 28
 Husserl 97, 109
 Hvosstova 157

I

Ibn-Sina 57
 Identity ix, 6, 8, 19, 46, 50, 54-55, 62, 98-99, 109, 113, 118, 121, 131-138, 140-141
 Ideology 5, 38-39, 53, 59, 80, 89, 95, 100-104, 110, 120-121, 127, 131-132, 135-136, 140, 142, 147
 Imagination 41, 47, 60, 76
 Immortality 82, 120
 Indian 24, 35, 38, 43
 Individuality 21, 27-28
 Information vi, 1, 3, 8, 11-12, 19-20, 26, 30, 32, 39, 42, 44-45, 55, 58, 64-69, 73-75, 78, 80-82, 84-85, 97, 105, 109, 110, 112-113, 115, 122, 133-134, 141, 143, 145-147, 152
 Ingerhald 119
 Inghard 157
 Insatiability 19
 Intellectual v, vii-viii, 5, 17, 23, 25, 38, 43-46, 50, 53, 62, 66-67, 69, 74-75, 78, 80, 84, 93, 97, 102, 110, 113, 115, 124, 137, 140-141, 145-146, 151-152
 Interrelationship 25, 31, 49, 61-62, 92, 101, 112, 147
 Intersubjectivity 18
 Ionin 125, 148, 157
 Islam ix, 52, 99, 140-144
 Isolation 59, 115

Izacovich 106

Izakovich 157

J

Jami 57

Japanese 42, 43, 69, 105, 117, 122, 132-134, 159

Jaspers vii-viii, 9, 17, 22, 24, 29, 33, 35-36, 38, 69, 90-91, 106, 115, 121, 145-146, 149, 157

Jesus 27

Jung 5, 63, 70

justice 25, 54, 58, 60, 135

K

Kakeev 10, 157

Kammen 148, 157

Kant viii, 62-63, 70, 73, 76

Karakeev 9, 157

Karalaev 68

Karasyov 67

Kashgari 57-58

Kasimjanova 157

Kazakhstan 58

Kazangap 26, 27, 29

Khan viii

Kipling 36

Klashtorny 157

Knowledge viii, 1-9, 12, 14, 19, 21-22, 25-27, 30, 32, 36-37, 40, 43, 45, 47, 50-52, 55-58, 60, 62-67, 73-86, 89, 92, 95-99, 102, 104-105, 107-115, 121, 124, 127-128, 133-135, 140-143, 145-146, 151-153

Kochuev 148

Koichuev 135

Kolevatov 3, 6, 9, 157

Koran 141-143

Kosolapov 86, 149, 158

Kozubaev 158

Kroner 46, 70

Kruglikov 158

Krushev 136

Kuberski 158

Kuhn 5, 84

Kydyrbaeva 158

Kyrgyz i, iii, vii-x, 6, 9-10, 15-16, 51, 54-58, 64-69, 92-93, 98-100, 105-106, 121, 125-126, 128-132, 134-135, 137-140, 142, 144, 146, 148-

149, 152-153, 155-159, 161

L

Lacatos 158
Lakatos 5, 85, 87
Language vii-viii, x, 4, 8-9, 22-23, 25, 30, 47, 49, 54, 66-67, 100, 103, 113,
115, 120, 134, 137, 152
Latin 54, 73, 94
Lavoisier 76, 81
Law 43, 50, 53, 57, 62, 66, 89, 105, 143
Legacy 41, 50
Legend 25, 43, 93
Lenin 79, 136
Lesner vi
Levi-Strauss 5, 25, 55
Liberty 41, 118, 142
Lihachev 134
Likhachov 10, 158
Loche 158
Losev 27, 33, 158
Love 12, 19, 26-28, 56, 113
Lowenthal 148
Luckmann ix, 97-100, 109
Luman 107, 113, 121
Lutfulli 57
Lvova 70, 158

M

Mahtumkuli 58
Mamardashvili 2, 9, 51, 63, 70, 158
Manas iii, vii, viii, 56, 64-69, 71, 92, 99, 100, 116, 132, 152, 155
Mankurt 25, 27-28
Mannheim 97
Marcel vii-viii, 11-13, 17-18, 23-24, 26, 29, 32-33, 43, 126, 158
Marcuse 96, 106, 158
Maritain 158
Marx viii, 1, 24, 17, 19, 33, 65, 76, 79, 81, 86-87, 96-97, 140, 158
McCartney 31
Mead 5, 25, 113, 121, 158
Mechanism 44-45, 74, 79, 81, 84, 119
Medicine 20, 28, 52
Mentality 56, 59, 110, 127, 133-135, 140
Metaphysics ix, 15, 17, 48, 50-54, 57-59, 94, 100, 114, 130

Metz 158
Mikhailov 158
Milosovic 103
Mind vii-viii, 3, 9, 11, 25, 29-30, 37-38, 40-41, 43, 46-47, 57, 62-67, 70, 74,
83, 85, 89, 90, 95, 98, 108, 110, 115-116, 121, 128, 131, 139, 152
Mnemology vii-viii, 3-9, 26, 75, 153
Modernization 123-126, 129, 132, 140, 145, 153
Moldobaev 10, 158
Moon 81
Moral 37-38, 49, 51, 53, 56, 58-59, 61-62, 64-66, 98, 105, 120, 133, 137-
138, 141, 143, 148
Morality 37, 50, 115, 133, 144
Mortal 11, 19
Mother Teresa 31
Motivations 31, 102
Motroshilova 63
Mougne 19
Muhammad 27
Munje 33
Museums 4, 38, 93

N

Narankho 122, 158
Nasimi 57
Nature 11-12, 14-15, 19-23, 25-30, 38-39, 48, 50, 55-56, 59, 77, 80, 82, 84,
89, 92-94, 96, 98, 113, 130, 139, 151
Navoyi 57
Newton 81
Nietzsche vi, 2, 11, 18, 21, 33, 68, 71, 91, 93, 95, 158
Nihilism 105, 126
Nisami 57
Norman 122

O

Objectification 23, 63-65, 89, 109
Objectivity 24, 105
Offense 16, 19
Oktyberskaia 70
Ontological vii-x, 1, 13, 15-20, 23, 42-43, 77-78, 89, 98, 110, 151, 153
Ontology vii, 24
Openness 13, 18, 37, 127, 146, 152
Oppression vi, viii, ix, 58
Organic 7, 19, 43, 50, 61, 64, 115, 146, 147

Originality 39, 41, 55, 65-66, 68, 153
Orozbekov 65, 68
Ortega-y-Gasset 63, 70, 80, 95, 98, 106, 122, 159
Ostrom 33
Otrar 58

P

Paleoanthropology 55
Panarin 50, 70, 159
Paradox 15
Parakhonsky 159
Parsons 113
Participation 39, 97, 102
Peace 13, 16, 18
Peculiarity 38-39, 40, 44, 47, 63, 69, 124
Perfection 47, 56, 84
Peripateticism 58
Perlman 159
Personality viii, 6, 13, 16-17, 19, 26, 28, 30-31, 48, 60-61, 68, 90, 93, 96,
112, 114-116, 133
Petrov 39, 40, 69, 159
Phenomenology vii, 47, 97
Pivkina 159
Pivoev 159
Plato 5, 35, 42, 53, 63, 67, 69, 71, 79, 83, 105, 159
Plurality 130-131
Popper ix, 2, 5, 9, 127-128, 148, 153, 159
Possession 12, 18-22, 28, 105
Pragmatism 36, 112, 126
Praxiological 8, 152
Prigojin 86
Privatization 101
Prophet 143
Psychology ii, 1, 4, 28, 30-31, 95, 124, 133-134
Ptulov 159
Punishment 14, 94
Pythagorus 40

Q

Quenten 147

R

Rationalism 40, 83

- Rationality 38, 59, 73, 83-86
Rationalization 12, 82-83
Reality vii, 7, 12-14, 16-17, 18, 42-44, 47, 53, 61, 63, 73, 77, 82-84, 90,
95-99, 101-102, 104, 110-111, 118, 120, 125-126, 129-131, 134, 138-
140, 144, 152
Reason 1, 4, 15, 25, 48, 62-63, 74-75, 96, 103, 110-111, 127, 131, 133, 147,
152
Rebane 6, 9, 49, 159
Recollection viii, 1, 2, 4, 14, 16, 19, 21-22, 26, 38, 45-47, 64, 92
Reflection 8, 13, 16, 18-19, 30, 46-47, 50-51, 65, 98, 105, 112, 121
Reinterpretation 24, 28
Religious x, 22, 50, 52, 66, 99, 108, 140-143
Remarque 13
Renaissance 24, 39, 54, 57, 59, 73, 83, 104, 146, 158
Respect 13, 25, 46, 48, 51, 59, 62-63, 83, 102, 119, 126, 144, 152
Responsibility x, 2, 17-18, 110, 112-113, 120, 128, 138-139, 143, 153
Revolution v, 57-58, 81, 109
Rickert 107
Rieger 106
Rikert 46, 48
Rivkina 149
Rosov 10, 82, 84
Rudaki 57
Russia x, 4, 58, 91, 99, 100, 135, 137, 146, 148, 155-156

S

- Sabitjan 26-28
Sacrifice 19, 27
Sagalaev 70, 158
Sage 41, 45, 51
Salagaev 159
Samarkand 58
Sanjyre 149
Sanskrit 64
Satisfaction 28, 90, 98
Scheler 97
Schleiermacher 107
Schuman 106
Science 3, 5-8, 11-12, 19, 23, 37, 47-50, 52, 57-59, 63, 73-86, 93, 113, 115-
116, 127, 133, 139, 145-146, 153
Second World War 11, 15, 32, 43, 93, 103, 109, 117, 132, 136
Self-consciousness v, ix, 16, 25, 35, 47, 50-52, 58-59, 64-65, 78, 92, 118,
132, 133, 138-140
Self-expression 18

- Self-identification 13, 66, 91-92, 104, 136
 Self-possession 18, 20
 Self-realization 15, 46-47, 60, 115
 Self-substantiation 28-30, 35, 108, 128
 Semantics 43
 Sensibility 22, 110
 Serbianization 103
 Shahanov vi, 6, 70
 Shakhanov 10, 120, 155, 159
 Shuts 97, 101
 Silence 30, 42, 69, 119
 Silk Road 103
 Silver Age 92
 Simmel 46
 Simonov 33, 159
 Skills 22, 25, 37-40, 51, 60, 62, 64-65, 73, 82, 84, 105, 112, 134, 139
 Skvortzov 159
 Smirnov 135, 148, 155
 Socialism 90, 94
 Socialization 99, 103, 105, 132-134, 151
 Social system 100, 113, 126
 Sociology 4, 97
 Socrates 18, 105, 114, 119
 Solmonoev 159
 Soltonoev 98, 106
 Sommersby 27, 28
 Sorokin 160
 Soviet vii-ix, 6, 8, 13, 27, 32, 40, 49-51, 53-56, 59, 63, 65, 90-92, 94, 96,
 98-105, 109, 115-116, 118-119, 121, 125-128, 132-133, 135-144, 152-
 153
 Spencer 31
 Spengler 46, 160
 Spirituality x, 25-26, 28-31, 38, 64, 91, 111-113, 116, 129, 132, 140, 144,
 151
 Stalin 26, 90-91, 109, 118-119, 122, 136
 Standardization 111
 Stengers 86
 Structure v, 12, 20, 24-25, 30, 40, 43, 47-49, 52, 55, 64-65, 68, 77-79, 82,
 99, 105, 113-114, 118-119, 124, 129-134, 147
 Subjectivity 16, 23-29, 50, 109, 115
 Substance 7, 11, 22, 37, 47, 61
 Suffering vii, 11-12, 21, 28, 68, 118
 Superiority 19, 38
 Swetz 160

Symbols v, 29, 42-43, 51, 56, 64, 100, 108-109, 142, 144, 152
Synchronism 1-2, 6, 36-37, 43, 49, 59-61, 113, 124, 153
Synchronization 1-3, 60, 67, 69, 124
Systematization 75

T

Tanabay 13
Tard 62, 63, 70, 160
Technology 3, 20, 29, 38, 40, 73, 79, 104, 115, 135, 140, 146, 152
Tengrianity 55
Tenir 56
Tennis 125
Time v-vi, viii, 1-3, 5-6, 8, 12-18, 23-25, 30-31, 35-36, 41-49, 51, 54-58, 60-61, 63, 66-69, 73, 75-78, 80-81, 83, 89, 91, 94-97, 99, 105, 107-109, 112, 114, 116, 118, 121, 123-124, 126-128, 131-133, 136, 139, 142-144, 147, 151-153
Toktogul 58
Tolerance x, 13, 90, 152-153
Totems 55
Toynbee 94, 106
Tradition v, vii, ix, 8, 38-39, 41, 45, 63, 65, 99, 123, 130-131, 140-142, 146
Traditionalism 44-45, 56
Tragic 28, 60, 82, 90-91, 118
Transmission vii, 4-5, 8-9, 36-39, 41-42, 44, 67, 80, 108, 110-111, 113-114, 145
Troeltsch 139, 149, 160
Truth 2, 11, 15, 18, 21, 23-25, 32, 37, 42, 47-48, 53, 58, 60, 63-64, 78, 83, 86, 102, 107, 110, 113, 115
Turkic iii, viii, 9, 45-48, 50-58, 66, 94, 100, 157-159, 161

U

Ukrainian 135
Ukubala 26
Ulukbek 57
Understanding v, vii-ix, 1-2, 9, 11-12, 14-15, 18, 23-24, 38, 43, 47-48, 51, 55, 57-58, 63, 65-66, 68, 77-80, 82-84, 89-90, 93, 99, 102, 107-109, 113, 121, 126, 134, 137, 146-147, 153
Unity 5, 13, 16-17, 36, 41-43, 50, 56, 61, 64, 77, 100, 101, 103, 115, 130, 133, 139
Urbanization 140
Ustmanova 70
Uzbekistan 104

V

Valihanov 58

Values v, viii, 1-2, 5, 12-13, 22-23, 30, 37-38, 42, 49, 52-53, 56, 59-61, 63-64, 66, 80, 83-85, 89, 91, 93-94, 97, 99, 105, 107, 115-116, 119-121, 124-129, 133-136, 138, 140-144, 146, 148, 151

Vartovski 160

Vartovsky 77, 79, 86

Vindelband 46, 160

Violence 99

Virtualization 73-74

Volskaia 160

W

Weakness 11, 14

Weber 97, 100, 140, 149, 160

Whitehead 49, 70, 160

Wisdom 13, 25, 39-40, 42, 46, 51, 55, 115, 120

Wyen 33

Y

Yang 43

Yassavi 57

Z

Zakirov 149, 160

Zilberman 42, 69, 148, 160

Zimmel 48

Zoroastrianism 52

THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY

PURPOSE

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one's decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one's culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Studies in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

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