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Phenomenon of Affectivity
Phenomenological-Anthropological Perspectives

by
Ghislaine Florival

edited by
Vensus A. George

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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In memoriam

Jean Ladrière

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

The affective dimension touches and bears its mark on every realm of existence. Existence in general and particularly human existence can become meaningless if the individuals and communities are deprived of affectivity. Without acquiring maturity in the affective level, we cannot think of a person attaining the full potential of his/her personality. In one's journey of self-actualization affective dimension, along with all other aspects of his/her personality, plays a vital role. Though people are often reluctant to give vent to their feelings and emotions in public, there is no doubt that they affect human life and activities deeply. A breakdown in the affective level can be more damaging to the person than a failure in physical health. Health can be restored by proper medication and treatment of the illness in question; but the repair of the crash in the emotional and affective level may be much more demading because it involves the ability of the person to cope with the damaged "affective situation" and find "sense" in it. The development in different fields of psychology and psychiatry in recent times and the attempts of these sciences to help human persons to come to terms with themselves in the affective realm clealy indicate the significance of the phenomenon of affectivity in human life. Hence, phenomenological and anthropological analysis of the phenomenon of affectivity by Professor Ghislaine Florival in this volume is very relevant to our times.

As Professor Ghislaine Florival notes, in the preface to this volume, these essays have been presented by her in different seminars and *symposia*, and published in some philosophical reviews and *Acta* of diverse Congresses from several universities over the last twenty-five years. Hence, these essays are not written in view of the volume we are completing now, but they are put together to constitute this volume. Hence, the need for some editorial work to make these essays suit this volume.

When Professor George F. McLean, the President of the Council for Research in Values and Philosphy, requested me to edit this volume he presented me with two outlines and arrangement of essays within the outlines proposed by Professor Ghislaine Florival for this volume at different times. Looking through both of these outlines I realized that the general structure of both of these outlines are the same, though the arrangement of the essays within the outlines are different. I could also get hold of four essays written by Professor Ghislaine Florival, which have not been included in both proposals made by her for this volume. Hence, in deciding on the outline that forms the content of this volume, I kept the general structure proposed by Professor Ghislaine Florival while making some changes in the arrangement of essays within this structure so that I could also include all the available essays of Professor Ghislaine Florival in this volume. I have also decided to make all the essays of Professor Ghislaine Florival as part of the body of this volume, even though she has

suggested two of her essays as the introduction and conclusion of this volume.

In the introduction I have given a general plan of the volume in five parts giving a short synopsis of each part and a lengthy summary of each chapter included in each of the parts. In short, the introduction presents the entire volume in a micro-form. The conclusion contains my own reflection on the contents of the essays of Professor Ghislaine Florival. The themes that I see as standing out in these essays are the following: bodiliness, otherness and culture as originary foundations of affective existence; affective existence though finite and being-towards-death yet is lived in hope; identity, diversity, and interrelationality of cultures and challenges to their affective foundation; affective existence as the result of one's openness to Being's self-giving and the mutal self-giving of persons; affective exsitence as related to moral values; affective experience finding expression in relation to bodiliness; affective existence finding expression in upholding respect for human persons and human dignity; and affective existence and new developments in metaphysics and anthropology.

Though the editorial work on this volume was rather demanding, I am happy that I have taken up this task and completed it thereby assisting the team at the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, which has been instrumental in publishing Professor Ghislaine Florival's life's work through this volume. I greately appreciate Professor Ghislaine Florival for the rich ideas on affectivity contained in this volume. A word of appreciation to Professor George F. McLean, the President, Hu Yeping, Executive Director, and all at the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy for taking the initiative in publishing this great work on the theme "affectivity".

Vensus A. George

PREFACE

These articles were published in some reviews and *Acta* of diverse Congress and *Symposia* from several universities during the last twenty-five years. They tried to answer the phenomenological question about various aspects of the phenomenon of affectivity. These texts were not written in order to make a work, but are put together only recently. Perhaps the problem of the phenomenon of affectivity has gained some special interest in recent times, while half a century before it was often seen with certain amount of suspicion when viewed in the context of classical philosophy and rational thinking in general. What is at stake at present is a more frequent problem between the question of affectivity and the new ethical interrogations about persons in their individual or collective cultural life.

Any text seems to take up again partially the main question, but to give a new perspective about the focal interrogation. Our methodological support is principally the phenomenology of Husserl, Sartre, and mainly M. Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy, which gives the originary anchorage of the "sensible ideas" giving birth to "sense".

There is a problem of translation of the terms, such as "affectivity", "sensible", and "sense": their meanings differ more or a less in French and in English. Here we emphasize the structure of affectivity considered from the universal point of view, and not at all the subjective manifestations of affectivity or "affects", even if the life of desire takes a major place in this reflection.

We have engaged in this research after a study of *Le désir chez Proust: A la recherche du sens*[1] and several articles, some years ago, in particular in *Etudes d'Anthropologie philosophique*,[2] which gives now an indication regarding the articulation of this essay. Part I aims at clarifying some themes related to bodiliness, such as perception, otherness and language, in order to bring about the emergence of the "originary" character of affectivity. Part II emphasizes the fundamental relation between affectivity and temporality. Part III underlines the question of "cultural difference". Part IV recalls the problem of affectivity faced with the ethical question of responsibility, both individual and social. Part V underlines the

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[1] Cf. *Le désir chez Proust. A la recherche du sens;* Préface: A. De Waelhens; Coll. *Pathei Mathos* (Bibliothèque de Psychologie clinique. Psychanalyse Phénoménologique. Dir. J. Schotte), Ed. Nauwelaerts / Louvain-Paris, 1971; XVIII+315 pp.

[2] Cf. *Etudes d'Anthropologie philosophique* (5 volumes), en collaboration, Ed. G. Florival (Bibliothèque philosophique de Louvain, 28-30-32- 34-40); Louvain-la-Neuve, ISP/ Paris, Vrin/ Leuven, Ed. Peeters, 1980-1984-1988-1990-1992).

fact of contemporary worldwide globalization by an anthropological and metaphysical interrogation open to the horizonal "affective Sense" of life.

I express my gratitude to Professor George McLean, the President of Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington D.C., who promotes scientific and philosophical meetings around the world. He asked me some years ago to gather my papers together and was gracious enough to get them translated. I thank also very friendly Hu Yeping who has taken up the plan of publishing them with efficiency and much patience. I wish to express my gratitude to the Editor, Dr. Vensus George, for his *most impressive* effort marked by precision and insight. Not only did he correct the translation and bring out the structure of the work, *but* his successive synthetic presentations of its five parts clearly elaborated its positive response to the question of whether a philosophy of affectivity is at all possible. For this Dr. George has my deep admiration and profound thanks.

I also would like to acknowledge each of my colleagues of different Universities and philosophical Centres, who invited me to speak on "affectivity". I mention them here in chronological order: Professors C. Giacon, X. Tillette (Galarate); H. Ngimbi Nseka (Kinshasa), G. Mclean (Montreal, Kyoto; Hong-Kong; Suchow; Shangai; Boston); M. Renaud, I. Carmelo Rosa (Lisboa), L. Morren (Louvain-la-Neuve,); Tang Yi-jie, Li Zhen (Beijing); V. Shen, Tran Van Doan (Taipei); A. Chenoufi (Tunis); G. Hottois, L. Couloubaritsis (Bruxelles); J. Brandâo da Luz, G. Castro, M. Patrâo Nevez (Açores); Academia of Sciences (Prague), L. Garcia (Manila); T. Ewens, S. Harrison (Milwaukee); Maison Descartes, Claessens (Amsterdam); O. Pegoraro (Rio de Janeiro); J. M.Aguirre (Vitoria); Li,Wang (Shanghai); T. Imamichi, N. Hachimoto (Tokyo, Kyoto, Kisarazu,); Inagaki (Nagasaki); Lerner, R. Rizo-Patrón (Lima); J. Liu, C. Huang, M. Gao (Taipei); J. F. Malherbe (Sherbrooke); J. Greisch (Paris).

I wish to remember my friends, colleagues, and old students, of the 'Institut supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université catholique de Louvain', and my masters: Profesors H. Van Camp (S. Louis-Bruxelles), H. I. Marrou (Sorbonne), A. DE Waelhens (Louvain). I thank them all, sincerely. However, it is essentially to Professor Jean Ladrière († 2007), great philosopher and great friend, that I confide this work in the horizon of "*L'Espérance de la Raison.*[3]

Ghislaine Florival

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[3] Cf. Jean Ladrière, *L'espérance de la raison* (Bibliothèque philosophique de Louvain, 59), Louvain-la Neuve, ISP, Leuven, Paris, Ed. Peeters, 2004; 290 pp. Cf. also G.Florival, " Originaire et *Eschaton*", *'L'œuvre de Jean Ladrière,', Laval philosophique et théologique*, volume 57, no. 3,octobre 2001, pp. 421-446.

INTRODUCTION

VENSUS A. GEORGE

This volume entitled *Phenomenon of Affectivity: A Phenomenological-Anthropological Perspective* attempts to unfold the reality of affectivity in its different aspects. The essays in general consider affectivity in its originary character, as related to time and space, as rooted and find expression in the context of the diverse cultures of the world, in its affinity to the ethical dimension, and the human person as a moral being existing in a world that is dominated by the techno-science, and in relation to developments in anthropology and metaphysics particulalry in the *milieu* of a world that is becoming more globalized. The clarification of the notion of affectivity, through the essays in this volume, revolves around the philosophical ideas of Aristotlean-Thomastic tradition, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel, Marcel Proust, Sartre, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Levinas, the significant place is given to the phenomenological ideas expressed in the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, particularly to the concrete and "fleshly" (*existentiell*) dimension. With the aim of clarifying the notion of affectivity, this volume is divided into five parts. Here below we consider the titles of each of these parts and what each part attempts to do in unfolding the theme of this volume.

PART I: AFFECTIVITY AND ORIGINARY

The Part I entitled *Affectivity and Originary* contains five essays that speak of the originary character of the reality of affectivity by unfolding some fundamental notions, such as bodiliness, affective difference as opening up sense and otherness, perception and values as the affective basis of an ethical perspective that is based on encounter with other persons, and language and desire as modalities of the expression of sense. Part I also expounds on the notion of affective comprehension as put forth by John Macmurray. Now, we briefly consider how the content of the first five chapters unfold the originary nature of the reality of affectivity.

The first chapter entitled "Notion of Bodiliness: A Husserlian Phenomenological Perspective" begins by unfolding the notion of phenomenology according to Edmund Husserl, as he expounded it in his work *Ideen II*. However, the main aim of this paper is to highlight the Husserlian notion of bodiliness. Clarifying the notion in Husserl, the first part elaborates on its origin, the opening of consciousness to the world, the intentional nature of consciousness, reduction and constitution. Husserl inscribes his phenomenological project according to three directions. Firstly, following Descartes, Husserl starts from the *cogito* in order to give a foundation to sciences and philosophy. He believes that mathematical and logical categories are the universal keys of knowledge. Secondly, while

criticizing the naïve objectivism of the positive psychology in the context of the crisis of the sciences, Husserl wants to grasp the originary and pre-predicative foundation that gives the sciences their real/fundamental ground and constitutes the only "truth Science". Thirdly, refusing the deadlock of idealistic rationalism, Husserl unveils the temporality of the consciousness that makes itself in history, in such a way that reason is itself "life" in the asymptotic becoming of its aim. This third phenomenological direction unveils an ethical dimension, which is linked to the work of truth proper to scientific research. The objectivity (*theoria*) of science is based on two poles: the perceptive, intersubjective, common life-world (*Lebenswelt*), and the transcendental/human *ego*, which is pure subjectivity. In relation to transcendental reduction the pure subjectivity gives itself in the horizons linked to the intersubjective life of the consciousness. The second part of the paper takes up the question of the constitution of the transcendental/human *ego* in its bodiliness. Since the objectivity of science is based on the intersubjective horizon of the life-world and is unfolded in the bodily intersubjective life of the transcendental/human *ego* it is important to clarify the question of constitution of human *ego* in its bodiliness. In unfolding the constitution of the human *ego* in its bodiliness, Husserl starts from a phenomenological method that depends on constituting and operating of consciousness. This explains the priority Husserl gives to the subject, pure *ego*, as constituting intentionality of any form of "sense". Husserl's analysis of the soul (*psyche*) crystallizes the states of consciousness. Finally, he considers the body (*Leib*) as mediation between soul and material body (*Körper*) that is linked to the physical nature. The body is the psychophysical subject and *substratum* that constitutes itself before material nature and in correlation with it. It constitutes the organs of perception – such as touch, sight, hearing, and the like – of the subject of experience. Thus, in the body the conditional and psycho-physical properties are constituted according to the progress of experience. Moving from the solipsistic constitution of the body, Husserl considers that in the originary experience of the *ego* all relation of exchanges is constituted by the apperception of the other human persons as *alter-egos* in the context of each other's bodiliness. The conclusion states that the "life-world" of culture, sciences, and philosophy is really our intersubjective horizon, our ground, the earth, and the *habitat* in which we learn to meet each other as persons. Here, Husserl engages the process of the reason that makes itself in history and that by a sort of hermeneutical second reflection constitutes itself in the "right knowledge"; and is nothing else but the "phenomenological philosophy".

The second chapter entitled "Affective Difference: Sense and the Singular Otherness" begins, in the introduction, by considering the phenomenon of affectivity as any other phenomenon – such as perception, imagination or categorial experience – and hence such a phenomenological analysis involves both concrete existential dimensions (*existentiell*) of the phenomenon of affectivity and its structural analysis (*die existentiale*

Analyse), by way of phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction respectively. Having described the method, firstly, the chapter attempts to thematize the phenomenon of affectivity. However, thematizing an affective experience cannot be limited to a founding moment of radical self-affection posing itself as subjectivity because affectivity, as a phenomenon, discloses itself in the decisive originary encounter and, thus, in otherness; and in relation to the sensory activities of the body/existing being (*Leib*). Secondly, the experience of affectivity by the body in the mode of lived-temporality and lived-spatiality is considered. In the temporal-spatial existence of the body (*Leib*), qualities play an important role in one's affective life, by provoking feelings of joy or sorrow, and hence the discussion on qualities and their role in manifesting affective experience is the topic of the third section. Fourthly, the chapter discusses the question of bodiliness and its relation to affectivity since the temporal-spatial realm and the qualities are related to and find expression in relation to the bodiliness of the persons involved in an affective relationship. Since persons in their bodiliness are, indeed, experiencers of affective life, the fifth section considers persons as subjects of an affective experience. Sixthly, the emergence of an affective experience in the context of encounter between persons, and significant role of "sexual difference" in the genesis and sustenance of an affective relationship is considered. Since the horizonal field of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) – the common world of interaction among persons – provides the context of affective experiences, the seventh section takes this up for discussion. The conclusion suggests that the affectivity is the originary "gift" of Being and everyone who receives it is called to become the "neighbor" of the other, in and through every authentic encounter.

The third chapter entitled "Perception and Value: The Affective Basis of an Ethics of Encounter," begins by reflecting on cultural tradition because perception, values, encounter between persons in affective interrelations, and ethical life are culture-specific and founded on the cultural tradition. Hence, it is important to move beyond western culture, and recognize and esteem the worldviews of the cultures of the east. Thinkers belonging to the phenomenological-hermeneutical tradition, such as Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Levinas have upheld the significance of culture as the basis of diverse dimensions of human life. Finally, Merleau-Ponty – in his phenomenology of "difference" called "the flesh of the world" – affirms that culture at the level of the living body is capable of expressing the fundamental role of affective structures. Secondly – basing on above-mentioned reference-point proposed by Merleau-Ponty the essential elements of the consideration of the affective basis of an ethical encounter – the chapter moves on to expose the various dimensions of this philosophical issue by stating and clarifying this problem in perspective. In clarifying this point further, some methodological *data* which have guided phenomenological research from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty in order to examine in what measure these two philosophers share similar intuitions, though in different ontological contexts, is elaborated; the

notions of perception and value as sources of openness and differentiation in every encounter is considered; and the ethical dimension of encounter through the existential field of desire, which opens the field of freedom is articulated. Thirdly, the chapter takes up the ethical status of culture and cultural values. Every culture bears its proper tradition and gives life again to the intrinsic truth contained in its tradition and brings out the most humanizing aspirations of that tradition, giving rise to ethical values in relation to which the truth and efficacy of our concrete actions and social justice is constructed, justified and objectively measured. The conclusion highlights that the encounter with the other – begins with the desire for the other – is an infinite invitation based on the excellence of the gift of one's existence, which is the gift of Being. Encounter is supported by the creative gesture of an appeal addressed to the entire human community and is expressed in the context of the "creative difference" called "the flesh of the world", which is culture in the level of living-body and to which belongs ethical values.

The fourth chapter entitled "Language and Desire: Modalities of Expression of Sense", in its effort to unfold the reality of "sense", begins by considering the problem of "sense" from the historical and anthropological perspective by unraveling how this problem is dealt with in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, Cartesian tradition, Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenological traditions and finally in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. The second section of the chapter attempts to explore the essence of "sense". "Sense" is something that is given to us from birth and it is the "*logos*" that gives significance to every moment of existence. Language and desire say about and give expression to "sense", in the structural context of bodiliness, otherness, and cultural world. Thus, bodiliness, otherness, and cultural world constitute the existential structures of "sense". The next three sections move on to clarify each of these three essential elements of "sense" in the process indicating how language and desire as modalities of the expression of "sense" manifest themselves in these existential structures of "sense". Bodiliness underlines the facticity of our embodied situation as beings-in-the-world. The body with the help of the sense organs presents itself to the world relationally and forms the center of differentiation from which the world takes its "sense". Language and desire – as modalities that express "sense" – manifest "sense" through "saying", "expression", and the "affect" particularly in the event of an encounter with the other. Thus, bodiliness is always a bodiliness that is related to otherness, which leads to the consideration of the question of otherness in the next section. Our bodiliness mediates all our possibilities of existence in our relationship with the other, which involves common belonging to the same "sense". The interrelation is expressed through language in its two aspects of gesture and word. The presence of the other through language appeals to desire, which aims at realizing the hope of a promise to which the other holds implicitly the secret, particularly in the context of sexual differentiation. Thus, assisted by language and desire in the context of an encounter we experience

"sense" in our bodiliness, in relation to the visible cultural world. This leads to the consideration of the cultural world in the next section. Cultural world is the life-world – though it belongs to the order of the primordial donation of Being – serves as the universal frame of all experiences of a being-in-the-world as related to other beings-in-the-world. It is the horizon of one's possibilities as lived out in relation to the other. Each cultural structure makes a difference and makes "sense" of history. Thus, each cultural world measures itself against the horizon of all the other cultural worlds and while reflecting itself in them gives history its singular expression. The conclusion states that phenomenology opens us to the hermeneutics of sense and renews ontology. The Being (*Sein*) is not metaphysical substance, but is understood as "Difference", i.e., the Source of the opening of the relational distance. As the Source, in donating gratuitously it brings about the interlacing of "feeling" and "saying", and gives desire its dynamism. The "sense" building itself is the cultural world that is exchanged in the reciprocal promotion of those beings each of which is a "oneself as another".

The fifth chapter entitled "Affective Comprehension in the Philosophy of John Macmurray" elaborates on John Macmurray's notion of affective comprehension in three stages. The first stage focuses on a reading of John Macmurray's thesis on affective comprehension. This reading bears essentially on the topic "Persons in Relation", the second volume of the *Gifford Lectures* given at the University of Glasgow in 1953 and 1954. It aims primarily at rediscovering with John Macmurray the originary "sense" of human life that makes man a person, in the sense that he is never being totalized in concepts and become an anonymous essence for the intellectual reflection. This is because personal existence is always already taken in the relational becoming, which opens it to the other in the very dynamics of a meaningful action, which takes place in the personal exchange – the other being constitutively present to me. John Macmurray elaborates this point further in the context of the originary relationship between the mother and the child. The second stage of the chapter attempts to build on what has been done by the first part by taking up John Macmurray's thesis on affective comprehension and makes a comparative phenomenological analysis with some themes which are present at the same epoch in phenomenology, particularly in the thoughts of Edmund Husserl, Gabriel Marcel, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. John Macmurray reproaches Edmund Husserl for the priority Husserl gives to consciousness forgetting the originary experience of the other in relationship. Then, he underlines some similarity with philosophers such as Gabriel Marcel and Merleau-Ponty in the description of encounter and the importance of the primacy of relation. In doing so, John Macmurray tries to discover the common foundation of this contemporary concern for originary *relation*, not only as manifesting some influences present in contemporary culture, but also as pertaining to the metaphysical essence of the meeting-of-the-others, to the radical aspect of the relation as such. The third stage attempts an investigation on the

meaning of affectivity from the phenomenological perspective. John Macmurray's philosophy of affective comprehension, its focus on personal relationship, and the comparative analysis of his thesis particularly with Gabriel Marcel and Maurice Merleau-Ponty confirm Ghislaine Florival's own perspective on the phenomenon of affectivity as the development of the interrelation of sexual otherness. Though it is not a notion directly expounded by John Macmurray, Ghislaine Florival believes that the latter notion is a further development of John Macmurray's philosophical and psychological analysis, and it aims at discovering the interrelation of the singular otherness as male and female. The conclusion reiterates that John Macmurray understands person in the context of relationality, which enables the existing human being to exist in relation to the other in every action, as the "agent". The "You and I" constitutes radically a person's singular identity. It is the belief of Ghislaine Florival that the kind of otherness John Macmurray speaks of – and which constitutes a person as most originary and singulary – is the sexual differentiation as opening of "sense".

PART II: AFFECTIVITY AND TEMPORALITY

Having expounded the originary and fundamental dimension of affectivity in Part I of this volume, Part II enittled *Affectivity and Temporality* attempts to clarify the notion of affectivity in its temporal dimension. This part includes two essays. The first essay unfolds the paradoxical nature of lived-time, its rootednees in *Dasein*'s bodiliness as a being-in-the-world, the finitude as the problem of subjectivity as a finite being-towards-death, and the phenomenon of death, while the second essay elaborates on life-death relationship in the light of the philosophies of Kant, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, and invites human beings to live through their death in genuine freedom. Now, we proceed to give a brief sketch of the contents of the two chapters included in Part II.

The sixth chapter entitled "Finitude and Temporality" despite the difficulties associated with conceptualization of the reality to death, dares to make philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of death, in three parts. The first part describes phenomenologically the lived-temporality and its constitution. The first section of this part, attempts to consider the paradoxical nature of lived-time. Time is experienced and lived in the context of everyday life. We experience natural life as measured and measurable in terms of hour, day, week, month, year, and the flow of the cycle of seasons. Again, we speak of time in terms of the past, the present and the future. In these modes, we experience time as something within in our control. However, we also experience time as something that controls us, envelops us, and the flow of which we cannot stop or control. In this sense, we experience time as perpetually overcoming itself and eroding everything that is living from birth to death just like the Titan who devours his children. Similarly, before we experience time as successive "nows", we

have a foundational experience of time, which make us speak of time in a matter-of-fact manner. Yet, we find it difficult to explain the true nature of time. Thus, lived-time as we experience is paradoxical in nature. The second section of the first part unfolds the constitution of time. According to Husserl, the experience of temporality is a double crossed experience: first, the longitudinal flow of the lived consciousness, the *distentio* – the living present which gathers up the retentional and protentional whole of what is lived; and secondly, the *intentio* – the transcendence of the existence-in-the-world. This double crossed experience of temporality is lived originarily as "feeling". Heidegger calls it *Befindlichkeit* – the originary feeling of the "Situation" as the existential condition of the being-thrown-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty interprets time by embodying the existential dimension of the *Dasein* in its bodily in-rootedness, which is precisely the lived condition of time. The second part deliberates upon the experience of finitude as the problem of subjectivity. The first section of this part makes an attempt to understand the nature and identity of subjectivity in relation to its act of existing. As a finite being the subjectivity is a being-towards-death. Its life is outlined against the objective horizon of a fateful date. It is only in a recapitulation in thought on the act of existing, that the subjectivity as finite being-towards-death understands the reality of its being in relation to the anguish of "not-being-any-more". Hence, subjectivity understands itself neither in relation to the reflective order, nor in relation to the ethical order, but in relation to the act of existing of subjectivity, which finds its concrete (*existentiell*) manifestation in relation to the encounter with the other in the dimension of desire mediated by bodiliness. Therefore, until the structural character of the "act of existing" manifests the subjectivity, it is transfixed with absence as finite temporality. In subjectivity's recapitulation in thought about death – precisely as having no more an "after" – it experiences death as the end of the whole of its temporality, thereby experiencing its true identity and nature as a finite existence. Having elaborated on this point, in the second section, we move on to consider subjectivity's finitude as presented by Marcel Proust in his work *In Search of Lost Time*. This work presents the totality of subjectivity's finitude as temporalizing experience in which the story of existence of the author and the reader is unfolded in the movement of a literary creation and its end culminates in the death of the author, who takes part in the act of time in its pure state, without distance. Therefore, death brings together the disconnected poles of the act of existing being filled in the difference in the present unity of the self. Then the unified word will make itself silent in the pure act of presence as out of time in the "instant". The third part takes up the discussion on the phenomenon of death of the others faced with the question of our own last end. The third part takes up the discussion on the phenomenon of death from the phenomenological and existential perspectives. The first section of this part attempts to state that objective death is a natural and cultural fact. Natural death is necessary for the emergence of new forms of life while cultural death contributes to the benefit of future collectivity of human

cultural existence which is the sign of social immortality. The second section analyzes the existential structure of the phenomenon of death. A person has an actual intuition of death in the context of his daily life, when he experiences a slowdown of the temporal flow of life in relation to his bodiliness due to physical illness, a psychological anomaly, and the like. Similarly, the actual experience of death of another person and especially the affective absence experienced in the bereavement of a close relative make us participate at the absolute aura of "the instant" of death. This experience of the "instant" of death, coupled with the realization that there is no longer an "after" of death makes one existentially experience one's own death. The conclusion states that the "instant" of death opens the existing being to the most personal singularity as authentically lived liberty and the "after" of death provides the effective solution to the absolute tension of desire, personal plenitude, moving beyond finitude, and all one hopes for.

The seventh chapter entitled "Life as the Meaning of Death" unfolds the theme in three parts. The first part attempts to situate the Kantian analysis of death according to Levinas, and his critique of ontology of finitude. The first section looks at the Levinesian interpretation of the Kantian analysis of death, by attempting to understand death in terms of the Kantian question: "What can I hope for?" Death is measured not by phenomenal time, but by the freedom of moral action. Though death implies solitude and mortality of being, yet in a more fundamental ethical level it implies the will of the Other. In this sense, death is intersubjective and interrelational because death comes on me from beyond. This Other puts my freedom into question and involves a struggle. In this struggle, I cannot prevail over this Other, and in this sense death amounts to a murder because the desire of the Other overtakes me in death. In the second section critiquing limited existential notion of finitude, and views it in relation to hope which takes two directions: the phenomenal path of happiness; and the noumenal path of freedom/virtue. The divine Other/God only can guarantee the unity of happiness and virtue, and ultimate justice for one's actions in the eternal and immortal existence. Levinas also speaks of concrete temporal immortality in the context of the heritage of one's family because a father is in some sense immortal in the son and in his cultural heritage. The second part takes up the controversy of Levinas with Heidegger by recalling the importance of the concept of historicity in understanding the reality of life-death relationship. The first section of this part elaborates on the concept of historicity and life-death relation as it is found in Husserlian later philosophy of genetic phenomenology going back to the origins, to the world and life. For Husserl, this constitutes the problem regarding the notion of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*). The second section of the second part clarifies this concept as Heidegger does by building on the destiny implied in the future. For Heidegger, this implies the subject of the comprehension of being-towards-death in the event of happening (*das Geschehen*). The third section of the second part attempts to bring together phenomenological

and historical interpretations of historicity and the life-death relation, and rethinks it in terms of lived bodiliness as presented by Merleau-Ponty. For him, it means understanding meaning of life and death as the experience of bodiliness in the context of encounter (*Ineinander*).The third part elaborates on life and the meaning of death. The specific concept of bodiliness unfolds the sense of one's unique life as existence "between" one's birth and death. This, in turn, permits relating death back to one's personal life. There is no opposition between being and non-being, between life and death because the lived meaning of bodiliness outlines the spatio-temporal structure of life against the backdrop of its absence in death. Besides, from the point of view of cultural historicity the dead survive concretely in the heritage of the tradition. Thus, death does not deny life, but it brings life's traces to fruition. Again life and death mix throughout a person's existence producing meaning between life and death, which in turn adds a sense of mystery to life. The conclusion states that there can be another interpretation of difference as differentiating relation between life and death which alone makes sense. The remedy for death and suffering which appear between death and me is not to turn away, but to pass beyond all that we bring to it, and live through our death in true freedom.

PART III: AFFECTIVITY AND CULTURE

Having looked into the phenomenon of affectivity in its originary and temporal dimensions in Parts I and II, Part III entitled *Affectivity and Culture* attempts to consider affectivity as founded on culture. The four essays that find their place in Part III clarify the relation between nature and culture in the backgound of the relational experience with the help of "lived-action"; focus on cultural difference by highlighting the importance of eastern cultures and the need for creating a horizon that brings about interrelation among different cultures of the world; consider role of cultural action and its ethical import in elaborating the originary affective experience, and looks into the phenomenon of affectivity and its relation to culture; and state the impact of techno-science and universal globalization on contemporary cultural experience and explore the manner in which this problem can be coped with both theoretically and practically while maintining the affective dimension in tact. We briefly unravel the contents of the four chapters that find their place in Part III.

The eighth chapter entitled "Towards a Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture" begins by raising questions regarding the understanding of nature and culture that have been widely debated for the last century in the history of western philosophy. Then, it reviews these two notions with the help of two methods: the first – the phenomenological – which retraces the process genetically beginning from perception; the second – the hermeneutical – which concerns the problem faced by the historical sciences. Since in each of these methods the given cultural reality appears as the basic *milieu* of meaning, the problem of nature and culture is treated against the

background of the relational experience with the aid of the concept of "lived-action" (*praxis*) in relation to meaning. Hence, attempt is made in this chapter to elaborate the problem of nature and culture in three parts. The first part focuses on the Husserlian phenomenological approach with the help of the concept of constitution. It attempts to analyze the constitution of physical nature, animate nature, and the reality of culture. The second part considers the Gadamerian hermeneutical approach guided by the concept of cultural horizon. It implies a foundational metaphysical prejudice in every search for meaning. Following Gadamer, the chapter presents this point in three subsections: the first deals with the phenomenological link which connects prejudice with tradition, and through this to authority; the second considers the ontological link which unites prejudice, tradition and authority on the basis of the "consciousness of the efficacy of history"; and the third looks into the metaphysical consequence of this state of affairs. The third part of the paper deals with the *praxis*-approach with the aid of "lived-action" in the context of culture. This is done by working out a concrete realization of the understanding culture, not merely in terms of the general meaning of culture, but in the context of the historically-situated existing cultures: east and west, north and south. The conclusion takes up the question of intercultural meaning. Hope for progress through intercultural cooperation seems to lie in the compenetration of our horizons, in the inter-relation of a living plurality of meanings differentiated according to the differences between cultures: each is unique and nevertheless part of the horizon for the others.

The ninth chapter entitled "Cultural Difference" considers the nature of philosophical questioning in general in the introduction and moves on to elaborate on the problem of questioning about cultures in the first section. Reflection on culture has opened the significance of eastern cultures presenting worldviews different from that of western culture. Western thinking from its origins up to the present has been indebted to eastern cultures, though it has not been publically acknowledged and fully accepted. The hermeneutical method proposed by Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas, and phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others have given us the right approach to raise questions about cultures. Secondly, the chapter deals with the actual interpretation of a cultural tradition. The interpretation of a cultural tradition implies finding again the lived modalities of the past and reading them in relation to the new horizon in which concerns about building the future is open for the present. This is done, as has Heidegger, in relation to the historicity of *Dasein*: it calls for a cultural tradition being understood in relation to *Dasein's* thrown-existence as the "having-been", lived in relation to the present, being open to the future, and shared with others of the same generation as a common destiny. This temporal nature of interpretation of the cultural tradition leads to the consideration of historical dimension of the cultural tradition in the third section. The historicity of the *Dasein* is the historicity of the world because *Dasein* is primarily historical and the world

is secondarily historical as the ground. History designates the transformations and the destinies of men, human groups and their civilizations. It is the "adventure" of *Dasein* that *has* happened, that *has-been* transmitted, and that continues always in *Dasein's* being-with-others. In this sense, a cultural tradition is the actual expression of the history of *Dasein* in his "Situation" with others; it has the origin from the past and continues all in one piece with a becoming. The fourth section takes up for analysis the question of cultural difference, which implies plurality of cultures. In unfolding the reality of cultural difference and plurality of cultures further, cultural difference as the basis of human condition, cultural difference as related to human persons and cultural difference as related to cultural values are dealt with. The conclusion says that the ontological foundation of our living together as persons in a relation of encounter with the other is, in fact, the encounter of cultures. Just as persons are interrelational, cultures are interrelational. Therefore, they do not belong any more to the horizonal order of a single life-world (*Lebenswelt*), but to the plurality emerging from the very movement of the operating difference among different cultures.

The tenth chapter entitled "Affective Foundations of Culture: Phenomenological-Anthropological Approach" having looked in the introduction into the gap between the life-world and the technologized world, and its consequences on the existing being and the society at large, moves on to consider the three parts of this paper. The first part situates the method and the main themes of a phenomenological-anthropological research. Phenomenology as fundamental ontology is, in fact, phenomenological anthropology and it forms the method of such a research. It is not the *metaphysica specialis* of the classical philosophy, but in placing itself in the hermeneutic circle brings to light the operating structures of the lived-existence and its concrete dimensions according to which they display themselves. Thus, phenomenological anthropology rediscovers the concrete cultural manifestations of the concrete existing being in relation to its bodiliness, and compensates for the existential neutrality of fundamental ontology. Having looked into the method we also briefly consider the three significant themes that emerge as essential to the phenomenological and anthropological research. They are the following: existence as being-in-the-world, existence as being-with, and the existence as being of "sense".The second part, examines the two fields of study relevant in today's context, when speaking of phenomenological-anthropological research and its relation to ethics. The first field of study has to do with the issue of violence and lack of communal harmony which often arise from cultural differences and lack of communication among various groups. This issue is closely related to the affective states of the groups involved regarding a contentious problem they have to tackle. Hence, we need to deal with the problem of affectivity, which rejoins the lived originary – from one's birth to the extreme possibility of his/her being-towards-death – and which expresses itself radically as "sense" of bodiliness and otherness. The second field of

research – related to the first – involves the problem of encounter between cultures, which aim at bringing the diverse cultures of the world together with the goal of effecting worldwide development. The third part underlines the mutual implications between an originary affective space and cultural ethics. The first section of this part considers the role of cultural action and its ethical import in elaborating the originary affective experience, while the second section looks into the phenomenon of affectivity and its relation to ethics. The conclusion states that in our consideration of personal affectivity or culture, we need to recognize the fundamental role of the "singular differentiation", in the epistemological field of the search for truth and in the ethical-political field search for values. In this search, we do not have to do with an anti-universalism, but rather with a differentiating universality, interlacing on the "flesh of the world", in which the reversibility of "sense" is always in movement and gives life to the cultures and through them to persons.

The eleventh chapter entitled "Existential Rootedness of Culture and Worldwide Globalization: Teleology and Reconstruction" states the impact of techno-science and universal globalization on contemporary cultural experience and explores the manner in which this problem can be coped with both theoretically and practically. This is done in three parts. The first part makes an appeal to the phenomenological concept of "teleology" as Husserl defines it in his later works and the present day instrumental teleology of the techno-science and the worldwide globalization. It also considers the impact and consequences of techno-science and worldwide globalization on the whole spectrum of culture in general and in different cultures in particular. This concept helps us to understand the manner in which the future constructed world of technology and the worldwide globalisation interferes already today with the cultural life of people and how a cultural restructuring can be integrated with this type of instrumental and technological domination. The second part enlightens the historical process of culture by taking up the question of its originary *existentiell* rootedness through the mediation of bodiliness. The concept of bodiliness makes explicit the necessary mediation between ontological and the anthropological dimensions of the existing being. The human body makes a living being to exist concretely (*existentiell*) among living beings genetically stemming from the natural development of the ontogenesis and the phylogenesis in the context of the natural world. Bodiliness, at the level of *Mitsein*, opens the existing being to cultural interrelations and intercultural sympathy. Thus, bodiliness is linked to the history of the world in the relation of reciprocity with others guided by the feeling/desire for the other. This call for shared "institutional incorporation" and ethical and political restructuring of cultural intuitions is based on people's cultural mind-set. In the third part, our goal to manifest the desiring tension of "sense" in relation to the institutional ethical-political action, considered in its proper cultural values, with the aim of justifying the ultimate call of "sense" in its ontological infinite donation. The ethical and political actions

by restructuring the world of persons and the cultures are essential for preventing the takeover by techno-science and universal globalization. This implies an ethical responsibility, which calls for founding ethical and political institutions on nature in totality as the process of life, which can give a "sense" of wellbeing both to individuals and cultures. Such a creative giving of "sense" has to move beyond simple ethical normativity and must be founded in the order of the heart. This is possible at the level of affectivity in its ultimate "sense of desire", which implies the personalizing act of one's existence being received as a gift from "Being" (*Sein*) experienced in the relation an encounter with the other in the life-world of cultures. The conclusion reiterates the need for founding any form of restructuring process, whether personal or cultural, on the originary "sense" of existence, which opens the authenticity of teleological sense in every person and culture. This, in turn, makes possible to recreate personalized cultural institutions and give a "sense" of hope to persons and cultures despite the technological superstructure of instrumental universal globalization.

PART IV: AFFECTIVITY AND ETHICS

Part IV entitled *Affectivity and Ethics* recalls the phenomenon of affectivity faced with the ethical question of indiviudal and social responsibility. The six essays included in Part IV – in elucidating the interrealtions between affectivity and ethics – unravel the notion of *aesthesis*, which underlies the *depth* of existence that calls for affirmation of freedom and responsible action moved by the force of conviction that emerges from being open to the donation and revelation of Being (*Sein*); raises the question regarding the Sartrean ideal of absolute freedom and liberty in the fields of metaphysics, ethics, politics, and symbolics and asks if Sartre does it with the transgressive aim of denouncing/provoking the system or out of his personal conviction; elaborate the theme of moral reality as proper to every existence by clarifying the moral criteria proposed by Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, and by presenting genetics, ethics proper, and community as conditions of a concrete moral philosophy; makes explicit the notion of bodiliness in its relation to nature, life, and spirit; unfold the concept of dignity as an ethical issue in relation to the contemporary ethical problems; and deals with the problem of relationship between nature and life, by analyzing the world as the natural *habitat* and the realtion of affectivity to techno-science, by raising ethical questions in confronting the consequences of the world of techno-science, and by spelling out the ethical principles guiding personal lives in the present-day world. Now, we briely sketch the content of each of the six chapters found in Part IV.

The endeavor of the twelfth chapter entitled "Aesthetic Dimension of Ethics" is to unravel the notion of *aesthesis*, which underlies the *depth* of existence and which calls for being open to the donation of Being (*Sein*). This task is accomplished by clarifying the aesthetic dimension of ethics, in

four sections. The first section expounds the notion of ethics from the phenomenological perspective. The phenomenological approach presents ethics in relation to two poles: the first one leans on the world as open totality that has its beginning in the originary donation of Being (*Sein*); the second one depends on the teleology of meeting that is linked to the interrelational otherness, which constitutes the field of ethics based on respect and mutual responsibility for each other. In these two dimensions ethics can be understood according the aesthetic manifestation: the *aisthesis* is given as the immediate originary perception of the world in the interrelation in the *Lebenswelt* where the responsibility of everyone is intertwined. The second section considers scientific knowledge and its relation to ethics, while the third section looks into art as applied to ethics. Science imposes itself as the desire of controlling all the things in the world with the help of rational knowledge and technology. Thus, science with its focus on "knowledge-to-power" and unlimited use of technology gravely damages human freedom. So there is the need to supplement theoretical reason with practical reason with its focus on the lived-affectivity in the lived-experience that finds expression in art. Part three, using art, attempts to explain the *pathic logos* which implies the donation and receptivity in the ontological level between Being and self, and in the anthropological level between *alter*-ego and *ego*. The *pathic logos* unfolds itself historically in relation to existential conditions, such as bodiliness, temporality, and the dimension of *depth*. Art, guided by the aesthetic attitude, takes us beyond the perceptive and representational knowledge and makes us participate essentially in the affective character of the originary "*fiat*" of the *pathic logos* thereby opening us to the "*depth* of the world". The fourth section takes up the consideration of the relation between ethics and aesthetics. Aesthetics sends us back to an experience contemplative in type that concerns the other only in the sharing of a revealing participation in Being, while the ethical dimension is essentially linked to the action that is constituted by practical reason. However, the aesthetic dimension has a double role in relation to ethics: firstly, aesthetics helps the existent being to be awakened to the ethical comprehension; secondly aesthetics makes the existent being vigilant regarding the exigency of the plenitude of Being in its self-donation. Art reveals to us Being; but the ethical experience puts the existence at stake in its quality of existing. The responsibility one has as the ethical subject as such is finally founded on the responsibility one has towards the donation of Being. Thus, the ethical sense as the practical *logos* is lead by aesthetic sense as the affective *logos*. The conclusion states that the ethic experience does not find in the aesthetic dimension something other than the favorable access to the affirmation of freedom, responsible action moved by force of conviction that emerges from the being open to the revelation of Being.

Chapter thirteen entitled "Sartre on Liberty: Transgression or Belief?" attempts to raise the question regarding the Sartrean ideal of absolute freedom and liberty. It also highlights the issue regarding the

manner in which he has pursued it all through his life is done with the transgressive aim of denouncing and provoking the system of existence in all its dimensions, or out of Sartre's own personal belief that it should be in the way he thinks. The paper attempts to do this task in two parts. The first part takes up for consideration Sartrean notion of liberty in general as developed in his writings. Sartre is known for his polemic in favor of liberty and against any *bourgeois* society. Taking interest in the cause of the most disadvantaged people and as anti-racist and anti-colonialist, Sartre displays his anarchistic will and rejects any authority and institution that prevents spontaneity of commitment. Moving beyond the borders of nations, Sartre attempts to actualize concretely the socialist ideal of *praxis* and protect human rights. Sartre's review *Temps modernes*, his theatre plays, his novels, and his entire philosophical works aim at deconstructing the social evil from within and pleads for the recognition of man by man for the sake of liberty because, for Sartre, "to be man is to be free". To achieve this ideal he unmasks every compromise, by saying that it must be always refused. For him, both in social relations and in personal encounter the truth of existence must be without any strings attached. Existence must be inscribed in the field of its historical concrete conditions and work out the "theory of freedom" which also is an appeal to responsibility and to the denunciation of inauthentic conduct as in occupied France during the war. The second part unfolds the Sartrean notion of liberty as found particularly in his philosophical works. Having discovered his philosophical approach from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and the hermeneutic phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, Sartre undertakes the critique of intentionality in his work *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1936). Then he publishes his main works: *Being and Nothingness* (1943), *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960) and *The Idiot of the Family* (1977), which guide his thought in four directions: metaphysics, ethics, politics, and symbolics. Each one of these philosophical themes regarding liberty as developed by Sartre can be viewed as a transgression of and provocation against the existing system. However, they can also be seen as reflecting the living belief of the existing being on the move, the belief of commitment. It is up to us to judge about it. At the same time the question is raised whether the approach of Sartre to uphold the supremacy of liberty is a transgression or belief, particularly as developed by Sartre in the fields of metaphysics, ethics, politics and symbolics. The conclusion states that the dynamics of freedom is really open to authenticity on the personal and interpersonal planes, making appeal to the rights of man. Authentic existence consists in living out the "call to live" – as Sartre expressed in his last work *The Hope* a few days before his death – without positing oneself, without instituting oneself, and nevertheless committing oneself for the good of all while refusing every form of "insincere belief."

Chapter fourteen entitled "Person and Moral Life" begins with a brief description of the nature of moral philosophy and then elaborates the theme of moral reality in three parts. The first part elucidates the stakes of moral

reality as proper to every existence. Moral reality as concretely lived out in the individual moral life is born thanks to the collective consciousness, but what makes it exist reciprocally are the individuals, who confer on the environment a new frame of action. Thus, every generation bears new light on the moral reality and gives new shape to the "moral sense". Normally, one lives out the moral reality without reflection and the conflicting moral situations force us to reflect and invent innovative solutions. At present traditional moral values are challenged due to the proliferation of diverse values emerging from different cultures; due to the breakup of the serene conceptions of a speculative classical moral philosophy; and due to the emergence of techno-science and its consequences on moral life. In this situation, if we want to find again in the *existentiell* lived experience of moral life some coherence of "sense", it is necessary to come back to the foundations of the moral fact/reality. The second part, basing itself on the moral philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel attempts to discern their moral criteria and discuss their scope: the first is the "golden mean" as presented by Aristotle; second, the autonomy of the Moral Law in us as expounded by Kant; and third, the State as political institution aiming at justice as an effect of reason as expounded by Hegel. These three dimensions are related to the mode of rationality. Now, practical reason is always a median position, torn between the necessity of a universalizable exigency and the daily experience of a concrete action which is tied up with historicity and with the singular events of each life. The third part attempts to elaborate on the conditions of a concrete moral philosophy by expounding on phenomenological-hermeneutical and structuralist approaches to moral philosophy. A moral philosophy which is not a mere theory, but one that tries to give a continuation to the lived-values, should be founded on the three conditions of genetics, ethics proper and the community. Genetics contributes to our understanding of the psychic growth of a person from his childhood; ethics proper helps us to see moral life as a life of relationship between persons who have respect for and responsibility towards each other; and the community, particularly the State, serves as the guarantor of a moral, just, and equitable life among persons within the community. The conclusion states that the concepts of respect and justice underline eminently the present sense of freedom, mutual liberation between the humans, and the effective recognition of the other as "our neighbor". At this stage moral philosophy must come to a halt because in the vision of the "neighbor" it grasps the meaning of a more profound existence, which belongs to the realm of committed faith, where justice and responsibility convert themselves in the hope and the welcome of forgiveness.

The fifteenth chapter entitled "Bodiliness and Mutual Engagement" proposes to make explicit the notion of bodiliness in its relation to nature, life, and spirit. Basically the exercise of existence in these three dimensions depends on bodiliness. Hence, on bodiliness as the anthropological basis one encounters the ethical problematic. This chapter elaborates this theme in

twofold considerations or parts. The first part deals with bodiliness in its original base as the anthropological reality. The bodiliness, as spatio-temporally incarnate, not only refers to the organic body considered as a life-system, but also stands for the concrete human existence lived in constitutive relationship to the world and to other human beings. Thus, bodiliness – the very movement of existence in the unity of our actions and representations – is an existential unity, which manifests itself in the concrete context of one's daily life in a meaningful way. For Merleau-Ponty, bodiliness is the "flesh" or the "element" of Being, the living element of the "Ontological Difference". It constitutes not only the vertical differentiated opening of meaning in us, but also a life of reciprocal bond between all beings. It is in bodiliness that the mobile network of relations, both sensible and that of the expressive spirit, and the reciprocal understanding of our life receives a concrete form, particularly in relation to the sexual dimension of our character as men and women. Thus, the nature of bodiliness is that it is a system of exchange of all our lived relations. In this sense, bodiliness is the anthropological support and basis of all our existential modalities. It is the concrete fundamental foundation of all our engagements in each of their manifestation. The second part considers bodiliness in its ethical dimension by looking into its relation to science or "to know", meeting of cultures or "to live", and faith or "to believe". Science plays an intrinsic role in the constitution of our being in the world: the world (*Welt*) is already there in the environenment (*Umwelt*) and the being-with-others (*Mitwelt*), which imply bodiliness. Scientific inventions, technological innovations, and development in bioethics and genetic sciences enable bodiliness to relate to universal communicative space and to open up new dimensions in understanding bodiliness. Similarly, in unveiling the basis of bodiliness in lived experience, culture manifests the inherited and shared presence of an identical destiny. The exchange and interaction among different cultures promote one another and manifest their inter-bodiliness. If the role of reason is to take up what was already implied by bodiliness as a circular and differentiated interplay in the comprehension of existents and will, then only by faith can one meet existents on the level of personally engaged bodiliness. This dimension of hope and original sense of bodiliness enters a symbiosis vis-a-vis every meeting without being expressed thematically. The conclusion states that science, culture and faith constitute a significant interrelation. With the help of bodiliness they always promote meaning so that one can take up ethical action by means of this lived intercommunication.

The sixteenth chapter entitled "Context and Life-World: Ethical Problem" attempts to unfold the concept of dignity as an ethical issue in relation to contemporary ethical problems. While questioning Habermas' theory of communicational action and the ontological phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty it is possible to bring to light the language anchorage of their respective fields of analysis – the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) or the "contextual background." When these two philosophical methods are

brought closer, there comes about the process of objectivization of language. In its concrete application into ethical experience in relation to the classical philosophy of Kant, we speak of "respect" as due to persons, characterizing it paradoxically as "rational sentiment" (*Empfindung*). We clarify this theme in three parts. In the first part, we begin by locating the ethical question today. Ethical questioning is presently propagated in all practical domains, in all professional disciplines, and it gives rise to greatly diversified philosophical answers: analytical, pragmatic, symbolical, cultural or hermeneutical. In the present day perspective there are twofold approaches: the first emphasizes the contextual "saying" as proposed by Habermas, while the second projects the phenomenological "sense" in relation of the "life-world" as proposed by Merleau-Ponty. This part clarifies these two approaches and highlights their significant features. The second part, tries to recognize the qualitative configuration of language in itself, understood in the originary sense. Language is attached not only to the intelligibility of practical reason, but also to the lived sensible existence. The retroactive movement of critical reflection is necessary in order to discover language again in its original anchorage. In the third part, without losing the validity of normative action that gives it its objective value, we come back to the singular experience of "person", and on the circular relation that underlies the originary and teleological import of the concept of dignity. The conclusion points to the fact that rational approach, by itself, does not account for what constitutes the dignity of the other and appeals for respect, i.e., the autonomy of the subject, which implies solidarity, responsibility, and commitment.

The seventeenth chapter entitled "Nature and Life: Ethical Questions Confronting the World of Techno-Science" begins by stating how Goethe and Hegel attempted to found philosophy as a real science of nature, thereby returning to the natural founding of life. This chapter neither gives a resume of the thoughts of these two philosophers, nor speaks of their impact on the history of the ideas regarding the relation of man and nature, but aims at emphasizing the value of the question about life deployment of the living beings that we are. In elaborating on this issue one must make use of reason that tries to research the concrete "sense" of life, and the factual instrumental information that gives the power of scientific knowledge. This task is accomplished in three parts. The first part deals with the problem of relationship between nature and life. The real problem we find at the beginning of the 21st century is the loss of the relationship between human existence and nature because scientific discoveries and technological progress lead the individual and collective existence to an absolutely new situation where the existing being loses his points of reference to any ethical dimension. Hence, there is the need to take up the ethical question in the context of a world transformed by the power of technology and science. The second part of the chapter enlightens this debate with phenomenological reflection in the light of the Husserl's philosophy of bodiliness and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of nature, unfolding the themes: the world as

the natural *habitat* and the relation of affectivity to techno-science. In doing so, this part of the chapter also takes up the question whether the techno-science with its emphasis on artificiality brings about a rupture in *Stimmung* of the natural life-world, or does it provide a new creative approach that can extend the aptitudes of our lived bodiliness? Part three moves on to consider those ethical questions a philosopher must take up in confronting the consequences of the world of techno-science. In unfolding this theme, this part takes up for discussion the challenges of techno-science to classical ethics and the need for a new perspective in ethics. Then the question of ethical responsibility in a world dominated by science and technology is considered. Finally, ethical principles guiding personal life of people in the present-day world is elaborated. The conclusion states that the research in ethics to face the consequences of techno-science pertains to the domain of *eco-ethica*, which attempts to understand the way of reciprocal institutions function between men and nature, and to establish a concrete ethics that can address the ethical problems of the present-day world.

PART V: AFFECTIVITY, ANTHROPOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

Part V entitled *Affectivity, Anthropology and Metaphysics* includes two essays that elaborate on the relationship of affectivity to philosophical anthropology and metaphysics. The first essay expounds the emergence of philosophical anthropology as a science, the change in perspective that has come about in it in recent times, and the renewed interest this science receives among thinkers and philosophers, which in turn find expression in Globalization that calls for the reconstructuring of anthropological structures and in the greater emphasis given to ethical dimension of human existence.The second essay clarifies the relationship between metaphysics and the globalized world, by recalling the “sense of metaphysics” in the history of philosophy, by interrogating the very notion of globalization, and by tackling the dimensions of historicality and wordwide globalization, in so far as both of them constitute the differentiation that is intrinsic to the question of Being. Now, we give a brief sketch of the two chapters of Part V.

This eighteenth chapter entitled "Subject and *Polis*: Reconstruction and Globalization" attempts to elaborate on the task of philosophical anthropology/Philosophy in redefining the subject and the political dimension in the face of the movement of universalization. The theme is elaborated in three parts. The first part speaks of the phenomenological origins of philosophical anthropology. It emerged as a philosophical science in the 20th century particularly in the philosophies of Gabriel Marcel, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Philosophical anthropology has its origin from the analysis of the lived-behavior of the pure-*ego*/originary consciousness – in the context of the "life-world" – both interrelational and linguistic, in the mutual recognition between the denizens of the "life-world". Besides, it provides the concrete basis for the

study of all the social-economical-political interactions in every culture. The second part looks into change of perspective that has come about in philosophical anthropology in recent times. The philosophical problem becomes that of the practical aiming at the sense of action. There is a development of instrumental reason, which transforms the real according to the operational mode. A new dualism of subject-object imposes itself. The subject becomes in its turn an object in the system, whereof it is the rational operator. So, traditional ethics becomes obsolete with respect to unprecedented situations and values. The same process is now active at the level of the "*polis*" in general where there is also a new dualism produced by an institutional objective action. Reacting to this situation, society creates new forms of collective encounter discovering the spirit of collegiaity and cultural responsibility. The third part deals with the renewed interest in philosophical anthropology. In the light of the distress experienced in the realm of ethics and the need for creativity in field of morality, there has come about a renewed interest in philosophical anthropology. This new perspective and the renewed interest in philosophical anthropology find expression in globalization that calls for the reconstructuring of anthropological structures and in the greater emphasis given to ethical dimension of human existence. The conclusion states that the aim of ethical thinking is to find again in lived-intropathy interrelational anchorage and to bring about the feeling of solidarity. The pathic lived-life, which is drawn from the originary interrelation in the "life-world", is the universalizing condition of mediation which rejoins the ethical call beyond the lived-difference of peoples and men, and which "affects" them *between* themselves.

The nineteenth chapter entitled "Metaphysical Difference and Globalization: Life of Desire" attempts to clarify the relationship between metaphysics and the globalized world. To speak of the "becoming" of metaphysics appears at first sight paradoxical particularly from the point of view of classical metaphysics, which inscribes itself under the predominance and the "Perennity of the Absolute". Moreover, to establish a relation between metaphysics and *age of globalization* seems to give simply an expression to their factual interdependence. These twofold questions appear as inscribed implicitly in the heart of the present debate. This chapter tries to make these questions more concretely explicit. These questions are elaborated on in three parts. The first part recalls the "sense of metaphysics" in the history of philosophy. It underlines its inscription in the west and the transcendental openness that links it today with intercultural horizon. In expounding the sense of metaphysics the philosophies of Parmenides, Aristotle, thinkers of the Middle Ages, and the philosophers of the Modern *Epoch*, such as Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger are briefly considered. The second part interrogates the very notion of globalization. The state of affairs that transforms today all the dimensions of existence – different cultures, techno-science, ecology and society, political and juridical sciences, and aesthetic and ethical values – constitute a new step in

the emergence of life. The third part tackles the dimensions of historicality and worldwide globalization, in so far as both of them constitute the differentiation that is intrinsic to the question of Being (*Sein*). Thus, taking into account that "Ontological Difference", named "flesh of the world" by Merleau-Ponty, we recognize in it concretely the emergence of sense and, more precisely, the sign of the future, always already there, which is called ontologically the "life of desire". The conclusion states that it is thanks to the originary construction of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) that we discover the import of desire: it bears the radical affectivity that attunes itself to the Spirit of "Sense". From destiny the desire for life emerges, not only as nature (*phusis*) of the terrestrial horizon, but – after the fashion of the infinite depth of the *cosmos* – as the appeal of Being, always more abyssal, from an in-finite donation of the "Sense".

In conclusion, we briefly reiterate and highlight some significant and charcteristic elements of affectivity that have come alive as we have reflected on the contents of these essays by Professor Ghislaine Florival. The themes that we see as important and that are dealt with in the conclusion are the following: bodiliness, otherness and culture as originary foundations of affective existence; affective existence though finite and being-towards-death, yet lived in hope; identity, diversity, and interrelationality of cultures and challenges to their affective foundation; affective existence as the result of one's openness to Being's self-giving and mutal self-giving of persons; affective exsitence as related to moral values; affective experience finding expression in relation to bodiliness; affective existence finding expression in upholding respect for human persons and human dignity; and affective existence and the new developments in metaphysics and anthropology. The work ends with a select bibliography of the books and articles used by Professor Ghislaine Florival in writing the essays included in this volume and with an index.

PART I

AFFECTIVITY AND ORIGINARY

CHAPTER 1

NOTION OF BODILINESS: A HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

The first part of the paper begins by unfolding the notion of phenomenology according to Edmund Husserl, precisely as he expounded in his work *Ideen II*. However, the main aim of this paper is to highlight the Husserlian notion of bodiliness. In order to clarify the notion of bodiliness we present a perspective of phenomenology of Husserl by elaborating its different aspects, such as its origin, the opening of consciousness to the world, the intentional nature of consciousness, reduction and constitution. Husserl inscribes his phenomenological project according to three directions. Firstly, following Descartes, Husserl starts from the *cogito* in order to give a foundation to sciences and philosophy. He believes that mathematical and logical categories are the universal keys of knowledge. Secondly, while criticizing the naïve objectivism of positive psychology in the context of the crisis of the sciences, Husserl wants to grasp the originary and pre-predicative foundation that gives the sciences their real/fundamental ground and constitutes the only "truth Science". Thirdly, refusing the deadlock of the idealistic rationalism, Husserl unveils the temporality of the consciousness that makes itself in history, in such a way that reason is itself "life" in the asymptotic becoming of its aim. This third phenomenological direction unveils an ethical dimension, which is linked to a work of truth proper to scientific research. The objectivity (*theoria*) of science is based on two poles: the perceptive, intersubjective, common life-world (*Lebenswelt*), and the transcendental/human *ego*, which is pure subjectivity. In relation to transcendental reduction, pure subjectivity is found in the horizons linked to the intersubjective life of the consciousness.

The second part of the paper takes up the question of the constitution of the transcendental/human *ego* in its bodiliness. Since the objectivity of science is based on the intersubjective horizon of the life-world and is unfolded in the bodily intersubjective life of the transcendental/human *ego* it is important to clarify the question of the constitution of human *ego* in its bodiliness. In unfolding the constitution of the human *ego* in its bodiliness, Husserl starts from a phenomenological method that depends on the constituting operating of consciousness. This explains the priority Husserl gives to the subject, pure *ego*, as constituting intentionality of any form of "sense". Husserl's analysis of the soul (*psyche*) crystallizes the states of consciousness. Finally, he considers the body (*Leib*) as mediation between soul and material body (*Körper*) that is linked to the physical nature. The body is the psycho-physical subject and *substratum* that constitutes itself

before the material nature and in correlation with it. It constitutes the organs of perception – such as touch, sight, hearing, and the like – of the subject of experience. Thus, in the body the conditional and psycho-physical proprieties are constituted according to the progress of experience. Moving from the solipsist constitution of the body, Husserl considers that in the originary experience of the *ego* all relation of exchanges is constituted by the apperception of the other human persons as *alter-egos* in the context of each other's bodiliness. The conclusion states that the "life-world" of culture, sciences, and philosophy is really our intersubjective horizon, our ground, the earth, and the *habitat* in which we learn to meet each others as persons. Here, Husserl engages the process of the reason that makes itself in history and that by a sort of hermeneutic second reflection constitutes itself in the "right knowledge". This is nothing else but "the phenomenological Philosophy".

Now, we begin by exploring the notion of phenomenology in Edmund Husserl, with the view of unfolding the notion of bodiliness.

NOTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN HUSSERL

In Edmund Husserl, we discover a new modality of the transcendental problem of knowledge: the problem of consciousness and the relation of consciousness as openness to the world. This question has been already there in 1907 in his work *Idea of Phenomenology*. Here, Husserl seeks to clarify the manner in which consciousness – which, for Descartes, is an internal substance, and for Kant, the knowing subject as act that conditions *a priori* knowledge – can transport itself outside to the factual and real world, in order to come back in itself absorbing the spatial exteriority of things in the spiritual interiority of the soul. We know the way in which Descartes resolves this "problem of the bridge" that depends on our innate idea of space to the objective exteriority of the reality of the world. The "deceptive God" is guarantor of the parallelism between the pieces of space and things of the exterior world, which corresponds to our sensations and gives them the corresponding sensible ideas. Kant transposes the Cartesian divine action of guaranteeing to the inside world, i.e., to the conditions of the possibility of the *a priori* nature of the transcendental subject. Only the phenomena, the things-as-they-appear to us, are determined by the action of the transcendental subject. Here, the things *per se* are only thought by the reflected reason as regulating ideas. This means that Kant is an agnostic.

In the modern epoch, the relation of the subject to the object in knowledge is generally linked to the question of the relation of body and soul. The act of knowledge is an intuition of the mind whereas the body is an empirical object, a machine linked to the laws of the physical determinism. Phenomenology attaches itself to the problem of the relation between consciousness and the empirical data, but it radically transposes the perspective. Husserl inscribes his phenomenological project according to

three directions. Firstly, following Descartes, Husserl starts from the *cogito* in order to give a foundation to sciences and philosophy. He believes that mathematical and logical categories are the universal keys of knowledge. Secondly, while criticizing the naïve objectivism of the positive psychology in the context of the crisis of the sciences, Husserl wants to grasp the originary and pre-predicative foundation that gives the sciences their real/fundamental ground and constitutes the only "truth science". Thirdly, refusing the deadlock of idealistic rationalism, Husserl unveils the temporality of the consciousness that makes itself in history, in such a way that reason is itself "life" in its asymptotic becoming. This third phenomenological direction unveils an ethical dimension, which is linked to a work of truth proper to scientific research. Objectivity (*theoria*) is realized against the background of a perceptive common "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*), which is one of *consensus* of persons: in fact, philosophers are "the civil servants of humanity."

Now, we need to address the nature and meaning of "phenomenology" as a pure science and a science of phenomena. We must consider the lived experience in its whole extent – the lived experience as it manifests radically – a science that makes the experience understand itself: an "auto-comprehension of the experience" by itself. The problem of knowledge must inscribe itself on this side of the classical objectifying distinction of the relation subject-object. Conversely to the classical philosophy that determines its object, the phenomenological question consists in the reconstitution of the lived-process by which the experience constitutes itself as experience. We must understand the manner in which the process of knowledge works from the meeting of the object in order to legitimize "the known object" in its essence. Here, Husserl pretends to come back to the "things themselves" in such way that the act of consciousness discovers them immediately. At this juncture we must spell out some principles of this pure science, which Husserl calls "pure phenomenology" or "phenomenology of essences".

Each consciousness is intentional in nature. Hence, the knowing subject is in immediate contact with the world in the very acting of knowing. What we have here is not a simple *Cogito* –not a pure "I think". For, Husserl, the consciousness – the knowing subject – is always already consciousness *of* something/somebody. Consciousness is "intentionally" open to the world, i.e., the openness to the world is the principle and significant aim of consciousness in its act of existence. Thus, the intentional nature of consciousness rejects all philosophical solipsism that locks up the knowing subject inside a universe of thought. The consciousness always directs its attention to a signification and goes to meeting the *datum* that may be empirical *datum* of daily experience. Opening itself to the "sense" of the given, the consciousness aims at a "sense" that is already empty of signification, as long as it does not take itself into the "intuition" of the "presence" of the *datum*. By the act of intentional consciousness that aims at the "sense" of the given reality and by the donation of presence of the aimed

object, the consciousness reaches a *phenomenon*, i.e., the thing as it gives itself to the intentional consciousness. The phenomenon is constituted by this meeting of the consciousness with the *datum* from the sense captured in the present donation of reality. Thus, the *phenomenon* is the "lived act" of the intentional consciousness. Now we move on to understand the manner in which we can understand its essence.

To understand the manifestation of the phenomenon and its lived essence, we must suspend the reality *per se* of things in the realistic sense of the term. For example, I see this table. It appears presently as the signifying object for me, which occurs in the actuality of my consciousness. To understand the essence of the present phenomenon I inspect its appearance as such, i.e., as the phenomenon "table". Therefore, I make use of "phenomenological reduction": I place in brackets the question of the objective reality of the table with the aim of knowing the phenomenon as such, i.e., the essence of table. The "eidetic reduction" helps me to move beyond the spontaneous exigencies of the particular experience – the one in which I live in the mode of belief and the one that makes me believe the reality of the things and others I encounter outside me – thereby identifying essence as such. To put into practice these twofold reductions, we must break with the naïve consciousness and seek to understand the meaning of what we perceive. If we mean by knowing, grasping the lived act and more radically the essence of the lived act, then the consciousness must start from itself and come back to itself. Presently in the intuitive presence of my consciousness, the table is only the "appearance table", a phenomenon. Taking a distance from this vision, I may see "my act of seeing table". The table has a set of sides, which follow one another. I see it according to this side and according to perspectives, which articulate themselves in relation to the others; it is a succession of profiles (*Abschattungen*), which depend on one another. In fact, I only see the relations – the table from the front, from the side; from here I see neither the other side, nor the legs – I see aspects in relation to other sides depending on other horizons, each time renewed in the enfolding of the seeing. Moreover I anticipate what I can see if I turn around the table and I retain these profiles and all the immediate anterior perspectives thanks to memory. This "perceived" table manifests itself in a succession of horizons – from here to over there, in the room, in the city, in the country – according to infinity of possible points of view. To say that "it is a table" is to grasp through the infinity of aspects a leading thread, the "invariant", which imposes on the variability of profiles.

In 1913, in his work *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and for Phenomenological Philosophy*, Husserl analyses the problems of "intentionality" and "phenomenological reduction". He breaks with all metaphysical positions and abandons the idea of a positivity of the thing *per se* in order to keep the appearance. He does not deny the object of metaphysics, but by the *epochè* he places the world into brackets, in order to know apodictically the phenomenality of the perceived reality and its relation to the consciousness that receives the "donation" of "sense"

presented by the reality. Neutralizing the position of metaphysics *per se*, Husserl makes the ability of consciousness "to be conscious of something" to emerge as the phenomenal opening. He makes the intentionality appear as such in all its lived modalities: not only at the level of perception that is originary, but also in all the other acts of consciousness, such as imagining, willing, desiring, cognition, judgment and the like. Describing the act of consciousness with all its "lived experiences", Husserl seizes the "pure essences": the perceived such as, the imagining, the willing, the knowing, the perceiving, and knowing consciousness. Then, Husserl aims that the poles of the intentional consciousness, in its "noematic" aspect – the objective dimension linked to the meeting of the object which also is the donation of the perceived as such – and "noetic" dimension – the subjective dimension of the consciousness that aims at perceiving the "sense" of reality. The phenomenological reduction emphasizes the activity of the consciousness as effective. For instance, it takes consciousness of its proper seeing in its perception of the perceived object. While it makes the *epochè* towards the exterior world, the knowing consciousness poses itself as intentional consciousness and discovers itself as constituent source of all the rays of consciousness, which opens to the perceived: the imagination, the knowing, and the willing. This makes the essence of the consciousness as the unity of the temporal flux. The operations of the consciousness – that are always positioned as aiming at the intentional rays that constitute the lived temporality of the consciousness – belong to the *ego*: it is their source, the *terminus a quo*, and the unity of the act whose essence is donation of "sense" given in the intentional encounter of consciousness and reality.

By the phenomenological reduction all the acts of consciousness are taken back to their transcendental foundation, the *ego.* Thus, the consciousness is self-constitutive of itself. In its lived temporality it relieves itself from longitudinal intentionality. At the same time, it is retentional with respect to the past and protentional with respect to the future, and from a transversal intentionality in the present attention to itself as the "lived-present". Thus, when the phenomenological reduction makes the emergence of modalities of the consciousness to itself, but correlatively, Husserl speaks of "constitution". By constitution, Husserl denotes the operation that makes the perceptive aim of the consciousness to set down transcendent objects for the phenomenological consciousness. By the theoretical attitude that emanates from the natural attitude – for instance, I am walking and enjoying the blue sky, by a reflection of my perceptive consciousness on itself, "I can" see the seeing of the blue sky – "the consciousness of" lays the appearance of the transcendent object. As *verso-recto* the constitution is correlative to reduction. I can see how my consciousness meets the object and how it constitutes it as an object.

Without doubting the soundness of science Husserl shows that the scientific knowing can constitute itself only from the lived-experience, and it is more originary than any positive construction done in the sciences. So Husserl's work *The Phenomenological Researches for Constitution* shows

objectively and systematically the chronological concatenation of the perceived *phenomena*: the idea of nature in general, then the world of the sensible *data*; first the spatio-temporal figures, then the schemes; and finally the material substances, which subsist in the succession of variable circumstances. Nature is the whole of the possible *phenomena* and the *aistheta* is the sensible as animated. Speaking of the the constitution of man, Husserl begins to describe firstly the pure *ego*, then the soul (*psyche*), and thirdly the body (*Leib*), emphasizing the mediating role of the body between the soul and the material body (*Körper*); he underlines the constitution of the *alter-ego* by the mediation of intropathy – the lived feeling of comprehension that makes us feel the expression of the body of the other – and finally the constitution of the cultural world.

Now, while the absolute consciousness of the philosopher constitutes the objective reality, Husserl discovers the necessity to invert the method: the constituting consciousness is always already constituted in the world of the daily life before it becomes the philosopher. The constitution of beings, man, and the world of the Spirit (*Geist*) is possible only because the lived-*ego* is always already captured inside the "life-world-of-sense" (*Lebenswelt*). The daily life makes us meet others immediately. They constitute *ego* as "I" in an intersubjective relation, which opens the “sense” and makes sense in the cultural horizon that constitutes always already the history of men. The “life-world” underlines all the possibilities of “sense” and becomes the ground of the constituting consciousness itself. From then on the “life-world” is the originary ground of intersubjectivity, where our perceptive aims objectively meet each other. Therefore, a pure objective science is possible. Thus, Husserl remains divided between two poles that are the bases of “sense”: *Lebenswelt* and transcendental-*ego*, even, in his *First Philosophy* (1921). In relation to transcendental reduction the pure subjectivity gives itself in the horizons linked to the intersubjective life of consciousness.

Having looked into Husserlian analysis of the notion of phenomenology which culminates in two poles that are the bases of "sense" – the "life-world" and the human-*ego* – we can move on to consider the constitution of the human-*ego* and the constitution of its bodiliness, in the next part of this paper.

NOTION OF BODILINESS IN HUSSERL

Since the objectivity of science is based on the intersubjective horizon of the "life-world" and is unfolded in the bodily intersubjective life of the human-*ego*, it is important to clarify the question of constitution of human-*ego* in its bodiliness. In unfolding the constitution of the human-*ego* in its bodiliness, Husserl starts from a phenomenological method that depends on the constituting operating of consciousness. This explains the priority Husserl gives to the subject, pure-*ego*, as constituting intentionality of any form of "sense". Husserl’s analysis of the soul (*psyche*) crystallizes

the states of consciousness. Finally, he considers the body (*Leib*) as mediating between soul and material body (*Körper*) that is linked to the physical nature.

Husserl learns about the pure-*ego* as source of "sense" for the entire intentional field of consciousness. Besides, it is also the source of all the intentional rays of which it is conscious, such as perception, imagination, desiring, and the like – constituting the "life-world" in its proper temporality. The "life-world" in its temporal dimension constitutes the lived unity of the temporal flux of consciousness. What makes consciousness an active temporality is the "living-present", which is the self-presence that retains in a new present the one that comes "just to pass" and starts already the instant of an imminent future that announces itself as "just to come". By the activity of retention and protention the consciousness is time making itself; it is the flux present to itself in the double longitudinal intentionality, wading to the past and the future, and in the transversal intentionality of consciousness of oneself, as the intentional presence of oneself. However, the pure-*ego* does not belong to oneself because Descartes, "goes inside and goes outside" and "actions are events" in the unity of the temporal flux that constitutes the life of pure consciousness. Thus, for Husserl, the self-perception as reflection of the pure-*ego* presupposes an "un-reflected" consciousness, which is the particular mode of "I live". There is a dual mode of the consciousness: the reflected mode and un-reflected mode. The temporal gap between these two modes in principle is not to be filled by the reflected consciousness.[1]

The psychic and empirical subject relates to the consciousness' lived-experiences as support of properties as much as personal; it is linked to the body (*Leib*) that suffers the somatic causalities, takes stock of external lived-experiences, linked to history, and connected to the relations of intersubjective dependence. Finally, the body relates to the material thing having properties that emphasizes physical behavior. It is a real spatial thing with sensible filling, and which constitutes a temporary schema in order to become a substance. It is the singular unity that remains during the changes of states, in relation to real circumstances that are effective or possible, and is dependent on the physical body (*Körper*). Thus, the body (*Leib*) is the psycho-physical subject and *substratum* that constitutes itself before the material nature and in correlation with it. It constitutes the organs of perception – such as touch, sight, hearing, and the like – of the subject of experience.

The body can touch itself in space. For instance, to a certain extent, I can touch myself. The body has parts, and I can touch me as I can touch other things. However, there is a difference because the hand that touches the other hand is also touched, and the body becomes bodiliness of the

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[1] One could compare the notion of the transcendence of the *ego* in Sartre with this notion of pure subjectivity in Husserl.

"flesh". With the touch, we do not have to refer to localized properties, as a smooth or a rough hand, which constitute the physical body that I see. However, we have to do with sensations, as they are sources of movement and indication. If the touch is localized, it is not in the same matter as the contact of a thing to another thing; it is a physical event that lasts beyond the contact of the inanimate thing, as for instance my finger touching the table the sensation of smoothness, pressure or being cold continues to vibrate. However, the hands that touch themselves and produce the one to the other similar effects and send back their mutual perceptions: the one touches and the other is touched, on a reversible matter without never succeeding in making action, feelings and suffering coincide. We have to do here with a double experience and with two objectives, which interfere with the physical world and with the proper sensible impression. The touch makes the emergence of the body and as "flesh" it has priority over all the other sense organs.

The sense of sight is different from the sense of touch. The eye does not see itself. I do not see myself seeing, even in mirror as seeing seen. Here Husserl recognizes that the eye can feel itself indirectly as its body, but by reference to the touch. The sense of hearing is similar to the sense of sight. We do not localize the sounds in the ear. However, the localization of sounds is not in the same manner as the localization of things in space, as extended things (*res extensa*). The quality of the sensible sound is not profiled as a perceived thing in perspective; it does not give itself in a schema. I can approach or go away from the sound or the thing: the impressions belong to the soul, while an external aspect belongs to the material thing. Though I can say that my hand is placed on the table, yet my hand is more than a material thing because it belongs to me. As a thing it can have a physical shock, but it is my body. Sartre explains the difference between the body seen by the doctor, the body of another, and the body that "I have" and "I am". It is, for instance, in the pain that "I am" that I suffer pain.

According to Husserl, of all the senses only the touch reveals originary nature of the body. Husserl underlines that if we do not have the sense of sight, we will be pure mind in front of the body as a thing. Yet, the exchange of vision is tangible; the fact that vision takes place with the tactile localizations makes the idea "of something that feels, that has and that can have in some circumstances some sensations" localized in the body. This body of mine is the preliminary condition for the existence of all sensations in general, even for visual and auditory sensations, which have no primary localizations. So, Husserl constitutes the body as the field of localization, and as the basic presupposition for all the other distinctive features relating to material things. The sense of touch gives us the primary localization, which intermingle themselves in an indeterminate way with sensations of movement. Moreover, the move of double sensations and the move of the "seesaw feeling-felt" determine the perception of the tangible as field of undetermined perception. The movement can be also constituted

by the *ego*. The "I can" makes the body an organ of will: it is my body. By its spontaneous movements the body makes the perception of things: my hand takes hold of things, lifts things, and takes things by its faculty of moving the organs freely and by them to perceive the exterior world.

The body is mediator of all the functions of consciousness: not only the sensible impressions that have immediate somatic localization, but also the impressions that constitute the ground of the life of desire, pleasure, suffering and the like – all depend on the body. Hence, all these sensible impressions constitute, in an immediate intuitive way, the body (*Leib*) as the realm of "subjective-objectivity" as distinct from sensations of the physical body (*Körper*). It is to this distinctive *substratum* that the intentional functions belong. So, the *data*/originary matter (*hylè*) receives the spirit-giving form in such a way that the entire human consciousness is linked to the body by a *hyletic* ground. Now, these lived-experiences are not directly localized as the sensation of my finger is in the perception of touch. Only the content of intertwined sensations are localized by the intuition, and not by the lived-intentionality. The body is still a unity constituted according to the fields of sensations to which states of sensations, such as the sensation of a bite, or sensation of heat and the like correspond. Thus, in the body the conditional and psycho-physical proprieties are constituted according to the progress of experience.

By this new *stratum* of non-localized properties and with the help of the organs of sense the body intertwines the soul and constitutes the ground of consciousness. However, the body is a thing of a particular type which is different from things of nature. It gives perception an orientation – a fundamental direction that implies the here and the there, the high and the low, the up and the down, the right and the left and the like – which is recovered from the bodiliness of the body. This orientation/fundamental direction in all its dimensions constitutes the objective differences in appearance and proximity and is linked to each other according to degrees from this point zero, the central here of all things, i.e., my body. Thus, the subject can make its appearances vary because of its free mobility and promote a new system of equivalence. Changing its place, the body does not change the places of things, but it constitutes their transposition by changing their orientation in relation to new "here and now". Actually, the body accompanies me always in all my perceptions, even if it makes obstacles against its proper perception. Freely moving it may equally suffer: the passive process is linked at the same time to the mechanical process of the corporal movement and to the sense of a pain that changes its apprehension. So, the relations of causality can be transformed into relations of "conditionality". Consequently, from within the body emerges the concrete unity that experiences the outside world as support and intertwining of sensations of the free life of the soul. From outside the body we have the physical thing of a proper type. Thus, the body stands between the material world and the subjective sphere in a kind of co-presence.

Until now Husserl goes no further than the solipsist constitution of the body according to the perceptions of things and animated beings. However, in the originary experience all relations of exchange are constituted by the apperception of other humans. Here, we have a distinct and different presence of the body to itself. This type of presence is called "archi-presence" and this presence for me is an "appresentation". In the first and originary "sense" nature is given as "archi-presence" for all subjects becaue it is the only and unique time and world of things. This individual unique presence is the proper presence of the subject in its actions and in its bodiliness of the "flesh". I can experience the exterior subject-bodies and seize in "appresentation" their psychic interiority. I apprehend them as bodies in such a way that I feel them an *alter-ego* by intropathy. I transpose the localization of my different sensible fields on these bodies that are presented to me and indirectly the localization of their spiritual activities. All that is given to me in this inter-belonging to themselves as co-presence – such as touch, the feeling of heat, and the experience of "affects" – happens through intropathy. The other is a system of active or passive expressive signs that my body understands, in the same way that language is the expression of my thinking.

Each person, as body, exists in a spatial place in the midst of things, but all that the body implies is the whole of the psychic life of the person tested by intropathy. So, the body and the soul form a proper empirical unity. Space and time have a role in this process because they naturalize the consciousness. The place where the others are appresented for us reveals their "here" in relation to every other place that is a "there". My "here" is a "there" for the other. From the moment I have a relation to an objective perceptive space, I lay on an *alter-ego* with its own perceptions, its sensible *data*, its subjectivity in the world around that also becomes its own. I take part in the position of the other and I can exchange my point of view with that of the other: each man in the same space of the world has the same appearances of the things because they have the same sensibility. However, the other can never have at the same time the same perceptive appearance as me.

Therefore, from this "here" that belongs to the realm of the other, I can consider my body as the object of nature, and reciprocally I can take the point of view of the other, consider other's body as an object of nature. From now on we have an experience in relation to two *strata*: the one archi-presence and the other the "appresentation" intertwined by intropathy. As for the constitution of nature, intropathy conducts us to the inter-subjective constitution of things and persons. All things are what they are only as *noematic* correlates of perceptive lived-experience of everyone, so that all the things that we have in experience only have a relative existence and depend on each other. As for nature, it is determined as the intersubjective instance afferent to all the subjective existences. It is the index of intersubjective regulation of unities, the appearances, and the horizon of horizons.

CONCLUSION

This apprehension bases itself on the presupposition of the absolute subject with its lived-experiences, aims, and rational acts. For this subject, nature is constituted in its entirety as physical and animal nature. In his work *The crisis of the European Sciences* Husserl goes on to recognize that the intentional subject is already taken inside a horizon of sense: the scientist, before becoming a scientist views the world with the natural attitude in the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*). Culture, sciences, and philosophy cannot be constituted except on the ground already there pre-given to the constituting consciousness itself. This world is really our inter-subjective horizon, our ground, the earth, and the *habitat* in which we learn to meet each other as persons. Husserl engages here the process of reason that makes itself in history and that by a sort of hermeneutic second reflection constitutes itself in the “right knowledge”, which is nothing else but “Phenomenological Philosophy”.

CHAPTER 2

AFFECTIVE DIFFERENCE: SENSE AND SINGULAR OTHERNESS

INTRODUCTION

Phenomenology aims at giving an account of the existence of a phenomenon in its radical manifestation. It captures the structure of a phenomenon as such, i.e., a phenomenon in its phenomenality. Phenomenology also tries to understand the constitutive mode of the existing being and the concrete foundation of its transcendence as a "being-in-the-world" in its quality of emergence. Besides, it attempts to grasp what makes a phenomenon precisely to ex-ist as a phenomenon. Hence a phenomenological reflection on affectivity involves both concrete existential dimensions (*existentiell*) of the phenomenon of affectivity and its structural analysis (*die existentiale Analyse*). According to Edmund Husserl, the former is done by way of phenomenological reduction, while the latter is carried out with the help of eidetic reduction. Firstly, a philosophical reflection on affectivity must be based on lived experience in order to understand its concrete existential (*existentiell*) features[1] because what is affectively lived manifests itself only laterally, i.e., in the "affects"[2] of an "in-the-world" behavior. Secondly, the structural analysis (*die existentiale Analyse*) involves the eidetic consideration on affectivity, which calls for a reflection on the affective existing being in its ontological foundation. Therefore, the hermeneutic and phenomenological question regarding affectivity must be viewed in relation to its existential structure (*existentiale*) and in its unveiling potentiality (*existentiell*) in the context of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*). Hence, the essence of affectivity implies the originary *pathic sense* of the *logos* as much as it reveals the "passivity receiving itself" of existence as the "gift" of Being (*Sein*). For this reason, affectivity can be considered as an object of phenomenological analysis just as perception, imagination or even categorial experience.

The comparison of affectivity with perception illumines this point. Perception – being a fundamental dimension of existence in the immediacy of experience – shows itself in its perceptiveness only inside the concrete acts by which we perceive something. Therefore, in order to understand the

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[1] The study of the concrete existential features of affectivity belongs to the fields of descriptive and genetic anthropology.

[2] The term "affect" and its plural form "affects" are used to mean the structure of phenomenon of affectivity as manifested in the concrete existential (*existentiell*) and in-the-world situations and actions.

phenomenon of perception we must first take recourse to the phenomenological reduction to grasp the concrete dimensions and then move on to the eidetic analysis of the act of perception in order to comprehend the originary structural aspects of its constitution. Similarly, affectivity – being a fundamental disposition of the existing being experienced in the immediate context – manifests in its "affectiveness" only in concrete states lived by the existing being. Hence, to understand the phenomenon of affectivity we must first analyze its concrete dimensions by way of phenomenological reduction and then proceed to the abstract/eidetic thematization by taking into consideration the whole of the affective behavior lived in its unity and its specific existential modalities. Therefore, the lived-experience of affective states is necessary for our access to the structural constitution of affectivity, i.e., the *eidos* of affectivity.

Having described the phenomenological method of our approach in understanding the phenomenon of affectivity, firstly, we attempt to thematize it. In thematizing an affective experience we cannot limit ourselves to a founding moment of radical self-affection posing itself as subjectivity because affectivity, as a phenomenon, discloses itself in the decisive originarity of an encounter and, thus, in otherness, and in relation to the sensory activities of the body/existing being (*Leib*). Secondly, we move on to consider the experience of affectivity by the body in the mode of lived-temporality and lived-spatiality. In the temporal-spatial existence of the body, qualities play an important role in one's affective life, by provoking feelings of joy or sorrow, and hence we take up the discussion on qualities and their role in manifesting affective experience in the third section. Fourthly, we discuss the question of bodiliness and its relation to affectivity since the temporal-spatial realm and the qualities are related to and find expression in relation to the bodiliness of the persons involved in an affective relationship. Since persons in their bodiliness are, indeed, experiencers of affective life, the fifth section considers persons as subjects of an affective experience. Sixthly, we deliberate on the emergence of an affective experience in the context of encounter between persons, and significant role of "sexual difference" in the genesis and sustenance of an affective relationship. Since the horizonal field of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) – the common world of interaction among persons – provides the context of affective experiences, the seventh section takes this up for discussion. The conclusion suggests that the affectivity is the originary "gift" of Being and everyone who receives it is called to become the "neighbor" of the other, in and through every authentic encounter.

THEMATIZING AN AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE

The phenomenological thematization of an affective experience, as immanent manifestation, is correlative to the question of its expression in language. Phenomenologically the reflecting act is always already taken into the realm of the signifying elements which thematize its reflected

mode. Reciprocally every speaking word is always already itself taken into the innermost reaches of the affective reality. However, there is always a part not-said of the affective reality, as the invisible of the visible, in such a way that the signifying elements interfere with its pre-understanding. Hence, Phenomenology is here before a paradox. In so far as it is a method of constitution, it has recourse to the intentional consciousness as the "sense-giver"; yet it depends for its constitution on a transcendental knowing. However, it is not removed from its thematizing aims in the face of the most originary donation of the sense *data*.[3] The intentional aims are here put to the test of a more radical dimension which contests the privilege of an objective truth of understanding at the benefit of a more originary receptivity which is the "life" of "sense".

This is what Michel Henry precisely notes about affectivity when he speaks of the originary process of in-extatic donation, which is always presupposed by the extatic donation of the intentional consciousness. For example, it is "pain teaches me about pain": it is not the present perception of pain that makes me experience it, but rather it is the painful impression that presents the pain. We are, nevertheless, not following this author in every respect because we believe that affectivity as a phenomenon discloses itself in the decisive originarity of an encounter and, thus, in otherness rather than in a founding moment of radical self-affection posing itself as subjectivity, even if we acknowledge the phenomenological "affectiveness" of the "sense" of life.[4]

Fundamentally it is affectivity that reveals the structure of temporality as the relational "ex-static" dimension, but it is the spatializing temporality which manifests to affectivity its differential dimension. The body (*Leib*) constitutes the foundation of both of these dimensions. Taking cue from Edmund Husserl's analysis of the body/existing being (*Leib*) as opposed to flesh (*Körper*) as support of the sensations, in *Ideen II*, Merleau-Ponty transposes it by abandoning the intentionality of consciousness at the benefit of the transcendence of the being-in-the-world, in order to grasp in it a signifying reversibility. The body is the perceptive anchoring-point that constitutes the fold of immanence and transcendence-to-the-world. It gives to the senses/sense organs their condition of reversibility. For example, in the case of the sense of touch, the finger while touching something is also touched by that something.[5] This duality of lived-activity-passivity rejoins the *Gestaltist* scheme of a figure upon a background, the poles of which condition each other. Thus, the "sense" of the reflective configuration of the

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[3] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la Constitution*, trad. Francaisç, E. Escoubas, (Paris: P.U.F., I982), p. 50.

[4] Cf. M. Henry, *Phénoménologie matérielle*, (Paris: P.U.F., 1990), pp. 36, 64.

[5] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1945.), pp.108 ss.

body applies not only to the five senses with respect to each other, but also to every lived-signification related to the body whether it is of a motor, a gestural, or an expressive kind. This self-referential behavior by which the body self-constitutes itself and receives itself from the originary passivity is, nevertheless, an exteriorizing presence to itself.

TEMPORAL-SPATIAL CHARACTER OF AN AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE

The experience of affectivity by the body presents itself in the mode of temporality and spatiality. Considering the temporal dimension, firstly, the existing being/body gathers up in the "living-present." Secondly, this transverse awareness of the perceived object temporalizes itself in successive phases according to the past retentions. Thirdly, the yet to come protentions – streamlined in comet-tails as Husserl would say – surmount each other in the longitudinal flow of objective time into the future. Thus, the longitudinal temporal flux is constituted in the present in the tension towards the past and the future in the distension.[6] However, the present – which consists in the exteriorization of oneself – cannot accomplish itself concretely in the lived actuality of the intentional consciousness (*intentio*), but in relation to the event of an encounter with the other. Since the present implies the relation of being-in-the-world, the existing being transcends itself towards beings and entities that show themselves immediately as favorable or threatening in such a way that the meaning of perception is immediately grasped in relation to this affective experience.

Thus, affectivity manifests the fact that existence presents itself to itself according to this double temporal horizon: the retentional and the protentional. For instance, the bygone past is experienced in the present as the affective coloration of the lost past or the originary paradise of desire or anguish of the dimension of loosing as retained in memory. This is a paradoxical situation because I am what I have been, but in such a way that this present which I am is always "just past". In the same way, the protention of the present makes of the future always a promise of what existence has not succeeded to be: it is the totality of my possibilities to come, but it is always in the desire and in the anguish of the project-to-be. More radically, it is by the temporal retention and protention of life and death that the existing being experiences the polarized and reversible "affects" of the experience of anguish and desire. Besides – the temporal dimension of double distension towards the past and the future – the manifestation of the self (*Selbsterscheinung*) as presence to itself of the body depends also on the lived-inscription in the present spatialization that determines the proximity and the distancing of the worldly beings. It is in

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[6] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps*, trad. H. Dussort, (Paris: P.U.F., 1964), p. 109.

the lived-present, called "passive synthesis of a relation from the self to itself" that the thisness/ipseity is identified, in the sense that what is affecting and what is affected are only one in the advance of time, which "is nothing other than as the transition from one present to another present."[7]

Phenomenology can display the structure-giving modalities of the affective manifestations in relation to the conditions of temporalization and spatialization which constitute the "act of existing" of the body/existing being. Affectivity reveals itself fundamentally in the structure of temporality as "ex-static" relational dimension, the self-constituting openness of the being-in-the-world as temporal. However, temporality opens perpendicularly to its own flux in the actual spatializing depth of the surrounding world. Thus, the retentional and protentional aspects of the temporal dimension and the spatializing dimension of affectivity immediately condition the manner in which the body/existing being presents itself to the world: the affective dimension is crossing, so to say, the relational modality of lived-time and the modality of lived-space. In this manner, affectivity inscribes itself structurally in the intersection of lived-time and lived-space. What is experienced in the retentional and protentional aspects of temporality and in relation to specialty (*distentio*) from birth until death cuts across what is experienced in the intentional consciousness (*intentio*). This experience opens the existing being/body to the threats or to the welcome of the world in every encounter. At the intersection of lived-time and lived-space the body experiences the affective *quale* that makes the reversibility of the passive synthesis present to oneself, in the process, as it were, tearing apart the self. The intensive magnitude of affective experience gives the sense awareness its feeling character. This lived relational "difference" is not the cause of the "affect", but it is the "affect" itself.

The body unfolds the relational difference of the lived-time and lived-space. On the one hand, the difference is the longitudinal dimension of the existential spatio-temporal flux which opens itself to the past and to the future by the circular play of retention and protention. This "distension" brings to the sense awareness the feeling character and makes it the field of action and passion, which forms the general background of life. On the other hand, this longitudinal dimension can be lived properly as mine only on the condition of the intervention of the intentional consciousness (*intentio*), which gives the present its intensity. The encounter of an actual being only can give rise to the emotional event by which the existing being transcends itself in the project of ex-sisting as a being-in-the-world. The concrete concept of encounter implies that the escaping of the present from itself – the body – is always lived in interaction with the world of others and entities. Through interrelational interactions the affective experience of

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[7] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp. 479, 487 ss.

feeling-awareness, as ex-static passivity, is experienced in its totality and in all its levels.

QUALITIES AND AN AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE

Affectivity as a lived-temporal and spatial experience is manifested particularly because of the significant role qualities play in making affective experiences possible. The qualities are defined as perceptive determinations in as much as they are susceptible to degrees. They constitute perception according to space and time, and belong to the *data* of sensation. They constitute themselves according to the most primitive mode, in the originary time-consciousness.[8] Things present themselves in their perceptible qualities, forming the texture of the perceptible universe. Affection depends on the concrete qualitative impact, but reciprocally the perceived qualities depend on the degree of intensity of the experienced "affect". Thus, it is the intensive magnitude of experience that gives the sense awareness its aspect of feeling. Perception is really affective only in the active mode of that present passivity which is properly reflected by the body. Let us take the proustian example of the biscuit, called "little madeleine" to illustrate this point further. The sense qualities present in this biscuit manifest a lived "originary difference" to which the body is resonating: thus the flavor, the smell and other qualities of the biscuit take the body and its existence to the past and the forgotten places of childhood – "all of Combray in a cup of thee".[9] They affect the body by the perceptible aura of a lost past with all its affective contents. Hence, it is not the positional objectivity of a quality that is the matter of concerns presently, but it is its intensity of the affective experience that calls into question the lived-temporality and lived-spatiality, in as much as it acts on one's possibilities, as retaking the past or as anticipating the future. For example, the musical audition of the little phrase of Vinteuil can be an appeal to authentic existence.[10] Thus, quality is not the cause of the "affect", but it is the "affect" itself, and it exists only by virtue of its concretization. In this concretization, the encountered thing presents to one in and through its qualities, the mode of resonance of existence with respect to itself.

Hence, qualities open the ambient world to a wider temporality, enlarging the actual present to all the distance of the past as the "have-been" and to the future as the possible. This experience provokes the enjoying emotions: on the one hand, because the body has the power to reincorporate them based on the sources of the lost temporality of the past in an instant;

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[8] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la Constitution*, pp. 48 ss.

[9] Cf. M. Proust, *A la Recherche du temps perdu*, Col. La Pléiade, vol. I, (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), p.178.

[10] Cf. *Ibid*., vol. III, p. 258.

and on the other hand, because it can relive in the future the affective experiences of childhood where one believes in the "true reality". Thus, brought out of oblivion and being outlined against the latent horizon of originary affectivity, the perceptible quality provokes the feeling of joy in the wonder of the recovered object, or the feeling of sorrow in the nostalgia of the lost object.

BODILINESS AND AN AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE

From the above-consideration, it is clear that the clarification of the affective states involves the analysis of bodiliness, which implies lived-temporality and lived-spatiality. The emotion is related to the unexpected event – such as a sudden encounter or an unanticipated happening – that occurs in the life of the existing being in its bodiliness. Losing all the worldly landmarks, the body plays for itself in the instant, and negates all its relations with the world. Negating its own transcendence, it makes of itself positively a petrified thing, overtaken either by surprise or horror; it may feel that it is annihilated, which can lead to physical or mental breakdown; or it flees from the terrifying situation, believing that such an act leads to the magical inversion of the victorial field of the world.[11] Passion reveals the global commitment of existence in front of the instantaneous emotional power of the event; it brings into play the temporality of an entire life. Freezing the sense of duration by turning it toward the lost past, passion goes out literally on the modes of repetition, imagination, and the march of time. Finally, feeling is connected with character of the body, which makes possible the sublimation of the originary affective state; to it belongs the capacity of imagining, the submission to the judgment of the self, and the attestation of itself as thisness/ipseity. All these are experienced in relation to one's bodiliness. Thus, the body measures in the things themselves the favorable or the threatening effect of an encounter in the context of its bodiliness. It recognizes in that effective polarity what modulates its degrees as many affective expressions. However, one may ask the reason for a particular perceptible quality bringing about an affective expression of a certain specific intensity. This is not only determined by things which have only a mediate reality, but also depends on persons in their bodiliness – the immediate experiencers of affective life – whose lives are conditioned and bred by the cultural world.

PERSONS: SUBJECTS OF AN AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE

Thus, affective experience manifests itself in a privileged manner in the encounter of persons. More radical than the perception of sense

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[11] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la Constitution*, pp. 231 ss.

qualities, the perception of the other in one's "living present" sets immediately in motion the springs of affectivity in its bipolarity of anguish and desire. In the intersubjective constitution of encounter, the other founds the ambivalence of one's lived present. Husserl uses the concept of intropathy (*Einfühlung*) in order to designate the mediation of that acknowledgment by which one's body (*Leib*) is living perceptively the body of the other.[12] Basing on this concept, but attributing to it its character of fleshly reversibility, Merleau-Ponty underlines the polarity of action-passion in the manner of one's being-in-the-world. It is the lived-body as related to the spatializing and temporalizing interplay of encounter, which founds the exchange of the "lived relations" of one body with respect to another one, in the un-reflected mode. Here, we do not have to do with a "fusion-like sameness", but with a lived "analogon". In intropathy, one situates oneself at the same time here and there, as the other of the other, in the otherness which is one's own, because "to feel one's body … is also to feel its aspect for the other."[13] Thus, in encounter one discovers not only the behavior of another one, the expression of whom one can live from the interior of one's own bodiliness, but also one can live it from his lived-centre, from which he poses the other at his turn as pole of his own transcendence. In fact, intropathy is not originary intuition as the bodiliness present to itself, but it gives the "appresentation" of the other.[14]

Intropathy makes it possible for my body to recognize itself in the other. It lives directly its exteriorization in the other, but in such a way that the other holds its secret in an unforeseeable and uncontrollable manner. This openness of the self to the history of the other is immediately threatening or welcoming. The "I" loses as it were its significance and is no more the centre of the world because its existence is implied by the existence of the other. Thus, the otherness of the "I" gets lost in a lived totality and leads to the position of objective subjectivization. Being condition of my acknowledgement the other also is in the reverse side of the pole as the one who "steals from me my world." His point of view and his enjoyment escapes me partially. Nevertheless our perceptions cross each other in the world, which henceforth is common to us. Though it separates us in the mode of jealousy, it unites us in the mode of interrelation.

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[12] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la Constitution*, pp. 231 ss.

[13] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, (Paris: Golimord, 1964) p. 299. Cf. also Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie première*, vol. II, trad. Francaisç, (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), pp.108 ss.

[14] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la Constitution*, p. 230.

EMERGENCE OF AN AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION

The body recognizes itself in the other affectively by the expression of gesture and word. Manifestation of affectivity – in the un-reflected mode – announces through gesture what the word is saying, in such a way that the word is implied in the originary gesture. Thus, gesture and word articulate the same affective intentionality because the body has a power of natural expression: it seizes "that silent and permanent question" which one body addresses another body in which desire is understood blindly. Hence, it is right to acknowledge with Freud that every human act has a meaning[15] and sexuality is linked to the knowing and acting of a body. However, the primary meaning is already assumed in it by the "first word" which "gives" the child to receive itself into being. Thus, encounter positions oneself in interrelation. Therefore, from now on the existing being is affectively mediated by the presence of the other. The aspect of otherness, lived by the bodily mediation of the other in me, reveals to me that I was the same "myself". This "me" revealed as another constitutes my subjectivity. This reversibility constitutes my existence as "mine". Thus, in encounter the bipolar structure of affectivity, viz., desire and anguish, finds the conditions of its manifestation.

Thus, affective differentiation is not only connected to the objective order of the constituting intentionality, but it is also imminent in what is proper to the event created by the encounter with other existing beings. Affectivity in its anthropological dimension manifests in all its expressions in what is radical in the lived-realm. Therefore, the phenomenological method must admit the event-like, the historical, and the fact-like moment of its genesis. We can thematize the existential structure of the being-in-the-world only from the existential experience of the affective life. If phenomenology is able to arrive at the essential structures of affectivity, like its temporality, its spatiality, and its event-likeness, it has to find it in encounter, where the "sense" of otherness is at stake as the dynamic and energetic force of life. However, is it not here that phenomenology meets the limit of every thematic, and consequently are we not allowed to have recourse, at least in the descriptive mode, to the energetic discourse of the psychoanalytic "saying"? Genetically received as ex-istence in the form of a "sexual differentiation," life is not a sense produced by a biological factuality, but it receives its sense from the signifying and dynamic affectivity of the mutual recognition in encounter. Positively considered, at the origin of existence the sexual relation between the parents constitutes the child's signifying openness to life from its birth. It carries the child towards its objective finality by the creative movement of desire, which in every human relation is the dynamic expression of the relational otherness

[15] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp. 184 ss.

of the couple. It brings immediately into play the resources of bodiliness. The child is carried along by the originary affection of desire which gives it in its turn the ability to enter into the life of desire and to pose itself in the sense of a finite existence. This anterior desire will permit the child to overcome the Oedipus stage: it recognizes itself objectively at its place in front of the positive relationship of its parents and it inscribes itself by identification with respect to the parent of the same sex, in the existence which is assigned properly to it.

For the above reason, affective life is genetically determined from birth, according to the donating desire of the parents, which is the "gift" of the realm of the senses. By its polarity of anguish and desire, it generates in the child the understanding of existence, openness to the horizon of its finitude and to the reality of death. This takes place in such a way that the sexual difference is the prime sense, which gives life and constitutes by its affective polarity the teleological sense of the singular becoming of the person. Thus, "sexual difference" is the most original signifying distantiation that induces affective truth and constitutes the interrelational dimension of human existence: man is masculine only by his relation to woman, and woman is feminine only by her relation to man. There is a condition of reciprocal constitution and it is on the basis of that structural truth that human truth becomes realized, in each of its manifestations at all the levels of existence: the sense, the sensorial, and the intellectual. The acknowledgment of the "differentiated relationality" of parental desire is lived affectively as real entrance into the significance of the "sense" of life, i.e., in the affective relationship of bodiliness as inscription in the "flesh of the world".[16] It is by the concrete recognition of this intermediary and affective experience of that sense relationship that the child is able also to introduce itself to the chain of the signifying affective relations it experiences as already inscribed in language.[17] Thus, the sexual difference constitutes the being-projects of man and woman. It reveals human dimensions of the "sense", the affective *logos* of the natural orientation, and their cultural meaning. By the "conditioning" reversibility of each other sex, man emerges in his masculinity and woman emerges in her femininity.[18] Hence, it is the sexual otherness – which is the singular and originary foundation of individual otherness and the inter-dependant existential relationality – that constitutes the relational becoming of the person.[19]

The individualization of "man" and "woman" constitutes actually a concrete affectivity as it gives affectivity its specific concrete status by

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[16] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 324.

[17] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 224, 225, 316.

[18] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 274.

[19]Cf. Ghislaine Florival, "Vie affective et temporalité"; *Figures de la finitude, Etudes d'anthropologie philosophique,* vol. III, (Louvain-la-Neuve: Ed. Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1988), p. 90.

determining it relationally. For example, there is a correlation between the anguish as it is experienced by a man as a man and the anguish as it is experienced by a woman as a woman. Nevertheless, in so far as it brings into play a manner of being-in-the-world that is conditionally reversible, affectivity manifests the "shaping" of a "sense relationship", i.e., the sexual difference as "difference". This dimension teaches the child the symbolic aspect of a sense relationship. By living affectively the reality of sexual difference, in the experience of jealousy, the child discovers the meaning of "difference" in general, i.e., the notions of relationship, connection, and symbolic meaning. This, in turn, makes the child grasp the signifying field that underlies every form of rationality. Therefore, the originary sexual difference concerns not only the mode of sexual otherness, but also all modes of social and personal encounter. The lived affective difference is the moment of emergence of the specifically human dimension and the objective "signifying understanding". It underlies potentially the natural possibilities (relative to generation) and the cultural possibilities in all the levels of expression. This implies that the "existential difference", the totality of the singular existence, and the sexual otherness are affectively reflected on all the beings that are encountered, in their perception of things, and even in their categorial and theoretical approach to life. Therefore the "originary affective sense", i.e., the sexual difference, is the basis of the material, the scientific, the technical or the aesthetic dimensions of the *truth* of the cultural world of different civilizations in their social, ethical and the political manifestations.[20]

LIFE-WORLD: THE CONTEXT OF AN AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE

Through the affective mediation of desire, which also implies anguish, the child introduces itself to the conditions of the world of common sense, and thereby realizes its life's project as well as its own proper subjectivity. This realization takes place in the horizonal field of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*), which unveils itself by the effective position given to it by the body/existing being, in so far as it receives itself properly from the source of life. Genetically considered affectivity engages an oriented operativity, and recollects itself as assumption of itself, without being susceptible of being thematized as such, it recognizes itself laterally in the relational sense of bodiliness and signifies expressivity in the dynamics that is proper to a finite existence. Parallel to this internal horizon of lived-temporality, there is an external horizon of lived-spatiality that is not intuitive. It continues in the domain of perceptive horizon, extends itself up

[20] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 274. Cf. also Ghislaine Florival, "Personne, culture et affectivité"; *Etudes d'anthropologie philosophique*, vol. II, (1984), pp. 281 ss.

to all the remote distances, and affects one intentionally.[21] This empty horizon embraces the entire world as the unique horizon of possible experiences. It includes nature and world for the existing beings. This environmental world affects the beings that exist in it, and is transfigured in culture by a kind of reciprocal constitution.[22] The intersubjective life inscribes itself in this world: "We are taken in the monadic universe of an unceasing life system, in the infinity of our proper life and of the intersubjective historical life."[23] This phenomenological *datum* reveals a new sphere of experience: the latent implications of the horizons send back to the transcendence of the world as immanent system of experience-correlations.

From that point of view, the "world" manifests itself radically as that affective horizon, which is "humor".[24] The ex-sisting being experiences the affections (*Stimmung*) which proceed from the manner/disposition (*Befindlichkeit*), according to which it receives itself into the openness of Being (*Sein*), and presents itself to its own being and to that of others. Disposition is a fundamental mode of the openness of *Dasein*, by which we discover primarily the world and of which anguish is the paramount mode.[25] Anguish – which transfixes the "thrown-being" submitted to facticity – is inseparable from the other existence-structure, the "project" of being-in-the-world for the existing being in understanding his mortal nature. However, existence does not pose itself only for itself in the "dwelling place" of the world. The life-world (*Lebenswelt*) that is always already signifying more radically manifests the depth, as distance and proximity. These structural dimensions determining existence make possible the foundation of the lived existential feelings which link together anguish and desire as affective conditions in the genesis of the individual.

The world – as constituting element of the existing being by its horizon of dimensionality – is always the "there is", the totality given to affective experience. It is the "Primeval Nature, a beginning of a world." [26] If it concretizes itself in the diversity of the living beings, it is always the "affects" of the persons it sends back. This is so, because its pathic content for the existing being that lives in it is always already cultural in the sense that there is "reversibility" or passive synthesis in the very fabric of the

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[21] Cf. Ghislaine Florival, "Personne, culture et affectivité"; *Etudes d'anthropologie philosophique,* vol. II, p. 205.

[22] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 210.

[23] *Ibid*., p. 213.

[24] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *L'être et le temps*, trad. Francaisç, R. Boehm et A. De Waelhens, (Paris : Gallimard, 1964), pp. 168 ss.

[25] Cf. F. Dastur, *Heidegger et la question du temps*, (Paris: P.U.F., 1990), p. 52.

[26] Cf. M. Proust, *A la Recherche du temps perdu*, vol. I, p.184; vol. III, p. 79.

world, i.e., "flesh", interlacing of action and passion, or reversibility of the perceptible.[27] We could say that the life powers of the world bear an anthropic significance: the world is the horizon of all our encounters; it gives rise to the depth of absence and presence; and it opens the affective dimensions of anguish and desire.

CONCLUSION

The intersection of lived-temporality and inter-relational otherness – at the existence-structural level of the prospect of anguish and desiring project – has existentially concretized itself from birth to death on the original background of the "donating" condition in generation. Now the question is: what is the essence of this "sense" donation? Do we not have to ascribe to Being (*Sein*) a personal aspect and, therefore, an affective dimension? Is it not possible to evoke here, while transposing the Heideggerian context, the Being which "loves" man and gives him "sense"?[28] Does not the affective dimension of the possibility of giving in man proceed from a presence, more interior to oneself than the very self? Are we not entitled to think that it is the ontological donation of sense which gives the existing being the capacity of "giving"? The notion of "gift" implies an ethical meaning, which teleologically binds human responsibility in affective personal recognizing. It is in the *quale* of the gift that an affective dimension appears and that the properly singular realization of the person is achieved. Phenomenology must here give way to the hermeneutics of gift. The personalizing act of giving finds its condition of possibility in the ultimate act of the self. This manifests the ultimate passivity of the reception of the self, "to acknowledge the gift by which one has received its own being." We are here beyond the realm of ontology and aim at an eminently personal reality. It is precisely this Infinite Personal Reality which gives desire its teleological sense. However, reciprocally it is affectivity in act which induces the dimension of personal relationship. Opening oneself to the horizon of the donation coming from Being (*Sein*), one can become the "neighbor" of the other in and through every authentic encounter.

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[27] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 304.

[28] Cf. M. Heidegger, "L'homme habite en poète"; *Essais et conférences*, trad. A. Preau, (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), pp. 244 ss.

CHAPTER 3

PERCEPTION AND VALUE: AFFECTIVE BASIS OF AN ETHICS OF ENCOUNTER

INTRODUCTION

In unraveling the theme "Perception and Value: Affective Basis of an Ethical Encounter," we begin by reflecting on cultural tradition because perception, values, encounter between persons in affective interrelations, and ethical life are culture-specific and founded on the cultural tradition. Hence, it is important to move beyond the western culture, and recognize and esteem the worldviews of the cultures of the east. Thinkers belonging to the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition, such as Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Levinas have upheld the significance of culture as the basis of diverse dimensions of human life. Finally, Merleau-Ponty in his phenomenology of "difference" called "the flesh of the world" affirms that culture at the level of the living body is capable of expressing the fundamental role of affective structures. It is on this reference point we base the essential elements of this chapter.

Having clarified the nature and significance of culture, and finding a basis in Merleau-Pondy's concept of the "flesh of the world" as the starting point for our consideration of the affective basis of an ethical encounter, we move on to expose the various dimensions of this philosophical issue. In this effort, firstly we state and clarify this problem in perspective. Having stated the problem of the affective basis of an ethical encounter, we must elaborate on these considerations. In clarifying this point further, firstly, we recall some methodological *data* which have guided phenomenological research from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty in order to examine in what measure these two philosophers share similar intuitions, though in different ontological contexts. Secondly, we take up the notions of perception and value as sources of openness and differentiation in every encounter. Thirdly, we articulate the ethical dimension of encounter through the existential field of desire, which opens the field of freedom.

The discussion of the problem of the affective basis of the ethics of encounter takes us to ethical status of culture and cultural values. Every culture bears its proper tradition and gives life again to the intrinsic truth contained in its tradition. It brings out the most humanizing aspirations of that tradition, giving rise to ethical values in relation to which the truth and efficacy of our concrete actions and social justice are constructed, justified and objectively measured. In the conclusion, we highlight that the encounter with the other – which begins with the desire for the other – is an infinite invitation based on the excellence of the gift of one's existence, which is the gift of Being. Encounter is supported by the creative gesture of an appeal

addressed to the whole human community and expressed in the context of the "creative difference" called "the flesh of the world", which is culture at the level of living-body and to which belong ethical values. Now let us turn out attention to the reflection on cultural tradition.

REFLECTION ON CULTURAL TRADITION

To reflect on a tradition means to rediscover the lived-rootedness of the experience of the collective life of a group as a people or as a community both in its temporal and geographic context, and in its permanent self-transcendence. Reflection on a cultural tradition implies raising the question regarding the becoming of that "heritage from the past" as both identical and different not only within its distinct factual situations and according to its own dynamic resources, but also in its relation to other cultures. Therefore, generally speaking our reflection on a cultural tradition calls for considering an historical experience in its present meaning, so that the "precipice of history" which the past life-forms offer can be meaningfully given to individuals today. In fact, every generation leans on the cultural experience of its predecessors, while reevaluating afresh its creative possibilities according to the new modalities of its life.

However, modern philosophical discussions regarding cultures has its meaning only within a particular culture which, since Socrates, has articulated itself through the logic of reasoning based on the resources of a reflective and conceptual mode of thinking. Recently, contemporary philosophy has discovered the philosophical contributions of other worldviews, such as those of the east. Unceasingly, these eastern worldviews have made present the truths of life un-thought by reason. In so doing, they do aim not at building discursive representations of the truth, but at a holistic view of truth and life. Hence, the western philosopher who tries to be initiated into these conceptions must make use of history, customs and civilization. Only in this manner, can he achieve what M. Merleau-Ponty – in *Les philosophes célèbres* – characterizes as a "fascination" for these cultures. For, it is not possible to enter only half way, for instance, into Chinese culture/philosophy because it "revolves around the same immemorial world which it tries not to think, but to make present."[1]

It is an over-simplification to oppose absolutely the contributions of these cultures. Coming from the Hellenistic world, the western philosophy has not been without living relations with the east. The Greek world has been living from the symbolic contribution of the beliefs of the east, which in various forms have crossed the centuries from Heraclitus and Pythagoras until the present. However, logical reason – coming from the patriarchal and

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[1] M. Merleau-Ponty, "L`Orient et la Philosophie"; *Les philosophes célèbres*, (Paris: L. Mazenod, 1956), p. 15.

juridical contribution of Rome – not only has placed its imprint on the entire western Christian culture and on all its national and Church institutions, but also in modern times has taken on a representative consciousness which distances itself from every imaginary, affective, and symbolic dimension. Today, western philosophy recognizes the lack of these dimensions in its own proponents who, prompted by techno-science, evolve the process of cultural universalization. Attending to the message offered by other cultures is required by reason of the unavoidable co-existence of cultures in a more globalized world. It should enable philosophy to situate itself in the scope of an "Enlarged Reason" whose project Husserl foresaw as the *telos* of the whole of humankind: philosophers, as he said, are the true "state servants of mankind."

Some philosophers already have understood this life message from the east while others have criticized the west: Meister Eckhart, for example, in the middle ages; a number of renaissance thinkers; and in the modern period, Hegel – in order to conceptualize the historical process, Schopenhauer – in his encounter with Buddhism, and Nietzsche. However, it is mainly to the contemporary phenomenologists – attentive to what Husserl has so pertinently called the "life-world" – that we owe the birth of a contemporary current of philosophical and anthropological questioning regarding culture as such and the different cultures. According to a new ontology which Heidegger has developed, the theme "historicality" implies understanding the "world" in its becoming. This has the living force of a tradition/destiny (*Geschik*), for, an understanding of the history of a people depends on an understanding of historicity (*Gewesen*) in order to grasp the fate of *Dasein*.[2] Thus, hermeneutics aims at interpreting concrete values shared with other cultures through language and its interrelated meanings. This path is followed by Gadamer [3] in speaking of the horizonal dimension of cultures with respect to each other; by the more recent thesis of Paul Ricoeur [4] on the ethical character of cultural values; and by the position of Levinas[5] on culture as a language which expresses itself not merely as thought, but as embodied in the convergence of being through cultural interaction. Finally and more fundamentally, i.e., at the level of the living body, it is found in the phenomenology of "difference" called "flesh of the world" presented by M. Merleau-Ponty in *Le visible et l`in-visible*.[6] Just as a language is expressive, phenomenology is capable of expressing the

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[2] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Etre et Temps*, trad. Francaisç F. Vezin, (Paris: Galliniard, 1986), par. 72, p. 439; par. 79, p. 447.

[3] Cf. H. G. Gadamer, *Verite et Méthode*, (Paris: Seuil, 1976), p. 147.

[4] Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Toi méme comme un autre*, (Paris: Seuil, 1990), pp. 388 ss.

[5] Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme*, (Montpellier: Fata morgane, 1972), p. 37.

[6] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 324.

fundamental role of affective structures. These are lived in "chiasmus", but are always understood implicitly in the process of recognition inherent in language. It is on this last reference point, which Merleau-Ponty calls "flesh of the world", that we intend to base the essential elements of this paper.

PROBLEM OF AFFECTIVE BASIS OF AN ETHICAL ENCOUNTER

Having reflected on the nature of culture, particularly the need to recognize the values inherent in the cultures of the east, and finding a basis in Merleau-Pondy's concept of the "flesh of the world" as the starting point for our consideration of the affective basis of an ethical encounter, let us move on to expose the various dimensions of this philosophical issue. In this effort, firstly we state and clarify this problem in perspective. Having stated the problem of the affective basis of an ethical encounter, we must elaborate on these considerations. In clarifying this point further, firstly, we recall some methodological data which have guided phenomenological research from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty in order to examine in what measure these two philosophers share similar intuitions, though in different ontological contexts. Secondly, we take up the notions of perception and value as sources of openness and differentiation in every encounter. Thirdly, we articulate the ethical dimension of encounter through the existential field of desire, which opens the field of freedom.

Statement of the Problem

To place in perspective the problem of the affective basis of an ethical encounter in perspective we need to raise the following questions. How can one understand the notion of ethical value and morality in the contemporary world? How can its cultural diversity be grasped? Should one still take recourse to the metaphysical concept of "human being", in order to vindicate the universal character of ethical values? Do we have to underline the differences among human beings in order to grasp the meaning of the *telos* that runs through them from the very roots of their diversity? What is the meaning of Husserl's philosophical call for "a sense of mankind" on the move and opening to its self-actualization in the face of the rational desire of being for totality? This classical problematic raised by the above questions is found in each particular culture and in the relation between its different groups.

Hegel contrasts it with the right of persons to a subjective morality because, for him, it exists between persons. This enables him ultimately to build a concept of the state as the synthesis of effective Reason. In contrast, the philosophical problem concerning value in its concrete/lived dimension must be analyzed phenomenologically from the "unspoken" basis of reason which is prior to the articulation of language and learned discourse. Indeed, it is already at work at the level of lived experience, for what is given

beforehand in the actual existence of the *Dasein* as existing being-in-the-world constitutes the basis of every perceptive encounter, and particularly of the phenomenon of affectivity and the experience of desire. However, if an originary meaning is already present in the affective dimension of every encounter, we can recognize in these dispositions also the premises of ethical valuation. In other words, there is a relationship in principle between the element of perception in an encounter and its value dimension.

As this is the central aim of this chapter on the affective basis of an ethics of encounter, this basis has to be transposed to the cultural level. In doing so, will we discover the same lived intuition in the ethical behavior of different cultures? Or should we reverse our procedure and say that every encounter is situated in and borne by its proper culture? This would give every encounter its distinctive affective space and hence the possibility of unfolding its proper values, which will have its own truth in relation to other cultures. In other words, the lived-cultural base is also the place of a lived differentiation which manifests itself at all levels: the personal, the individual, and the collective; and this inter-relational base in the "life-world" become the very "dimension" of intercultural exchange as such. Now that we have exposed the problem of the affective basis of an ethics of encounter, let us move on to consider affectivity and phenomenological perception in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty.

Affectivity and Phenomenological Perception in Merleau-Ponty

In the introduction to *Phenoménologie de la perception*, published in 1945,[7] Merleau-Ponty describes phenomenology as a philosophy of essences (*eidos*); but in contrast to Husserl he sees this as based on a consciousness rooted in actual existence. Hence, he proposes a rereading of Husserlian intentionality by no longer considering it in the mode of a transcendental subjectivity as consciousness *of* something, thereby linking the subject with the object, but as restoring the existing being in its openness to the world, i.e., as being-in-the-world. This directs his attention immediately to our embodied situation. However, to consider the thing which presents itself in intuitive experience as an object and to catch its meaning is to consider the phenomenon in its ontological reality as a meaningful event.

Hence, inverting the method of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty stresses "reduction" with respect to intentionality, which is still a manifestation of consciousness. For Husserl, reduction had been only an epistemological method by which he placed "in parenthesis" the world as a metaphysical object. He did this in order to see better the conditions belonging to the consciousness of something, namely, both the noematic side – the object *for* consciousness – and the noetic side – the subject as the donor of meaning

[7] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenologie de la perception,* pp. i -xv.

and aiming at the object as meaningful for consciousness. In contrast, for Merleau-Ponty, the "reduction" is an ontological method which enables one to see existence as being-in-the-world. In particular, it allows one to see the very act of seeing our being-in-the-world, the phenomenality of the phenomenon of existence, i.e., our openness to the world. At the same time, it enables one to see the world as the permanent horizon of our presence to things and to others. It seizes upon the point of view which we are – as the center – in terms of which things receive their meaning and orient themselves with respect to each other. Things, indeed, appear to our vision under diverse profiles as they organize themselves for being seen. This constitutes them in their discrete/non-total movement of appearing for the subject. It is a form of temporality in the process of its own constitution.

Thus, on the side of the perceived noematic object as well as on the subjective noetic side, signifying is always open on the "life-world". Hence, perception is temporal and borne by its negativity and specificity. In the same way, others enable us to discover what exceeds our situated existence: if we do not see ourselves as others see us, we at least see them as seeing us. Thus, vision is in principle reversible and narcissistic. One's body is relational and by articulating itself with the world constitutes effective lived existence. In this way, the body is the center of differentiation from which the world takes its sense. Therefore, as an interpretative method, reduction enables one to see the intentional threads linking the existing being to the world because so many ties connect the subject with its world. In perception the body appears as the central point of view in terms of the opening of the sense organs, but it is also a space-making point of view by grasping things with respect to each other and articulating them in the space-time field according to an orientation which begins from here; and this sets them in the world which is the total horizon. In this sense, my body opens space and time while it depends upon something out there to orient itself as a motor capacity. Generating space, it is able to move in a perceptive field which has sense and orientation. The differentiation of the five senses is itself an originating differentiation as one's own body layers – one sense upon the other. Intersecting with each other, the senses slip from the concrete towards the abstract in such a way that to see a problem and to seize a question manifests the perceptive field in the expression of all metaphoric meanings. This takes us to the next section, where we consider the relation between perception and value.

Towards Ontology of Difference or "Flesh of the World": Perception and Value

The phenomenological analysis of perception is important because it leads to the institution of a new ontology. Merleau-Ponty perceives the living-body not only as an effective being, but also as a feeling-being which is affected both actively and passively. The experience of the hand touching while being touched, at the same time wanting to feel itself while being

affected by itself, reveals a reflexive circularity which remains always incomplete. This discovery will orient all of Merleau-Ponty's research in *Le visible et l'invisible*, published posthumously. This gives incomplete witness to an ontology which concretely is ensured by its teleological self-transcendence.

If the perceiving body differentiates/discerns the senses, then it is also their reflected and reflecting pole: the fact that things are appearing to it makes it embodied in the sense of being located with respect to them. *A fortiori*, this situation of embodiment is manifested in the openness of the body as expressed through gestures and words. The body, therefore, unfolds a field of meaning, in a way similar to the cycle of "feeling/being affected", which constitutes a perceptive return of things upon the perceiving body. Like a figure upon the background of the world, the living-bodiliness of the others reflects itself upon the speaking subject. At the level of affective perception, by mutual feeling/intropathy from its lived center the body lives the behavior of the other by a kind of connivance which interlaces my body with his/her body, and reciprocally as if the bodies understood each other. However, they never succeed completely in this endeavor because the other remains irreducible for himself/herself, as I am for myself, in the narcissistic reflection of the signifying "I". In the same way, the word of the other extends my gesture and proceeds to inhabit my self-expression as in a "chiasmus", and my expression escapes me in order to emerge as meaning for the other. It is visible yet invisible because it goes out in the very act of being present. Just as the temporal now ceases to be in going ahead, it is always opened to a new signification.

Thus, there comes about an actual interrelation and a common belonging to the same "sense"/the same world: my perceptible gesture signifies my expressed word, and conversely. The expressive sense always goes ahead of itself displacing the actuality of what is signified by what remains untold in the expression whose sense is never exhausted. What is expressed in language always turns over onto itself in order to evoke a perpetual process of meaning whose sense can never be totally expressed. In actual fact, the word is the voice and expression not only for the one who is uttering it, but also for the one who is listening to it. Indeed, it can be said to listen to itself as if the expressive body is self-differentiated in each of its expressions. As a feeling-being which is affected in perceiving, it is both expressive voice and phenomenon heard. As a speaking subject, it is an unceasing concrete recapturing of the sense present in language. Thus, the three meanings of the word "sense" – the perceptive sense, the orientation of sense and the meaning – meet each other as concrete and abstract in a reversible manner as the living-meanings of the bodies meeting each other, coming reciprocally both from oneself and from the other, in intropathy and in expression through language.

It is at this level of understanding through gesture and language – which opens living expressiveness to perception by the other in a kind of chiasmus – that the intropathic and affective interplay of encounter can be

understood. Perception is the discerning and differentiating dimension of one's own body; at the same time it manifests itself as gesture and word. The gesture takes up the word; just as the other in receiving my gesture is actively engaged in the word which he/she speaks. In this relay of discourse as being always overcome – the perceptive sense finding the possibility of unfolding itself on symbolic grounds – there opens the invisible depth of what is perceived in language. As the voice makes itself into words addressed to somebody, we find at another level the movement of discerning and differentiating. Language is assumed into the visible – into listening or into the material form of writing – and differentiates itself as the invisible of the concrete meaning.

Thus, at the same time the perceiving body is both active and passive; it is both being-affected and feeling itself in the shared differentiation which links one existing being to another through intropathy and the mediation of language. This originary perceptive and affective awakening and openness conditions every encounter and actual communication. The ever-present distance is like the difference of the touching-touched of the hand or two fingers pressed together which touch and feel touched at the same time. It is like the relation between the senses of perception and expression; or like perception with respect to what is expressed in language: both have the reversibility from the concrete to the abstract and vice versa. This distance indicates a measuring or signifying foundation which always is at work and which exceeds itself in all its perceptive moments. Lived as differentiating the feeling being affected – as mutually felt or intropathic inter-relational expression in language – perception is assumed in creating concrete and intelligible differentiation through its own overcoming: Merleau-Ponty calls it the "flesh of the world." For Merleau-Ponty, the body is the privileged form of the "flesh of the world" because it feels itself feeling in the actual reversibility of language. This structure of distance and differentiation lived as such by the body opens meaning at all the levels of living. It is the structure of a speaking subject, whose expression is taken up by the others in the differentiated field, i.e., in the world of culture. It is from this core of "sense" that the possibility of speaking in common arises; that the texture of the effective dialogue is constituted; and the that differentiated poles of discourse become articulated as the power of the shared feeling-speaking by each person.

The life-world – which is transposed by Merleau-Ponty as the signifying and concrete reversibility, which he calls the "flesh of the world" – is the dimension in which cultural interrelations and the sense of the other can be understood as mutually felt in the expression of language. Hence, in the next section, we must take up the problem of ethics of encounter and the role of desire in the process.

Desire and the Ethical Dimension of Encounter

In expounding the problem of ethics of encounter, the approach of Merleau-Ponty is contrary both to transcendental idealism which promotes the universality of pure subjectivity, and to scientist positivism which reduces the body to its material causality in the chain of the concrete elements for the unprejudiced onlooker. He has deconstructed the *a priori* subjectivity as well as the objectivity of a subject in itself, in order to reproduce them through contact with others in cultural interrelations. It is in the proper field of their responsibility to each other from inside the institutional and environmental structure that each person must learn to act and to know oneself: one rises to one's personal stature through receiving oneself from the culture. This is not from things-in-themselves, but from the works which symbolize live-actions and reflect them to others in a common world.

It is thanks to the ontological differentiation, i.e., the "flesh of the world", that this encounter is varied according to sense differences, which always are reversible and are continually revived in their incompleteness. The ever more differentiated manifestations which constitute the cultural ground allow for discerning others in their particularity. They give the "I" the capacity to receive itself both as *alter* for others and as *ego* in its identity. One learns to recognize oneself in one's own field, to take the initiative in one's actions, to confront oneself with the surrounding world, and to assume one's proper responsibilities. This recognition of oneself as another originates in the movement, which is identified by the other as an "other-self"; it is a function of intropathy/ mutual-feeling and its affective derivatives. The recognition of the other occurs in encounter through initiating an essentially reversible process.

It is because of desire that the other appears to me in his/her otherness. This opens in the subject that temporal distance of objective differentiation which is always already supported by the lived affective interrelation. Desire is intrinsically "flesh" in the sense of differentiating distance in which concrete expressive bodiliness lives as a sign of its own overcoming. Desire embodies the reflexive movement of narcissistic bodiliness in search of itself in the *alter-ego*, i.e., in the ever disappearing promise of a fully realized fulfillment. However, from where does the intensity of desire arise and how does it give rise to values? Does it belong to the language of the other, which opens a presence which the living and desiring person tries to grasp in a bodily manner as an actually lived totality? Or does it belong more radically to the "concern" (*Sorge*) of everyday life in so far as the existence is the "passage" (*Gewesen*) between birth and death? Desire moves at the same time in both the directions. On the one hand, desire leads to the emergence of values in the authentic liberty of the existing person – the other – in understanding him/her in the temporal whole of his/her finite being. On the other hand, desire gives rise to the values of the past, which recall what was originally lived in terms of

affectivity. Whatever may be its affective modalities, desire aims to realize itself in the hope of a promise in which the others implicitly hold the secret in so far as they bear that difference which enables things to have sense. However, since the other plays a significant role in the whole process, he/she is not a simple phenomenon.

Here we find the emergence of the ethical dimension of encounter. It is not only a cultural work or something founded interrelationally on the presence of the other in the world. It is a matter of desire itself and not its effects. This is due to the fact that the ethical-encounter concerns another, who is facing me. He/she is no longer only a phenomenon included in the expressive whole of cultural meaning or a simple *datum*, but is primordially "sense".[8] According to Levinas, the other does not come from the horizonal meaning of the world of perception, but the coming of the other is a "visitation" out of the context; his/her "manifestation is a surplus". He/she is the first word, an opening in the very openness of "face', and an absolutely differentiating "trace" which announces the reception of an "absolutely" other. The "epiphany" of the "face" is not a phenomenon, but an enunciation of an authentic existing being, bespeaking both the sense of being and its invisibility. Thus, the respect for the other invites me to be more than myself; it urges me to recognize in him/ her the infinite gift of being and invites me to affirm the excellence of his/her appeal.

In his interpretation of the encounter of the other, Levinas emphasizes an absolute difference in otherness as such; he does so by taking recourse to the presence of the Infinite as the Absolute Other. However, since the difference is so radical that it leaves no possibility of exchange or mediation, Levinas speaks of the existing being as a hostage. This is because, though the perspective of difference is an originary differentiation polarizing the same and the other as different, it does so in a common expression of living-bodiliness. This sets the "event" of presence as unique, which no conceptual synthesis is able to represent, and which in such events as birth and death is of the absolute order of the person.

The above-discussion on the problem of the affective basis of an ethics of encounter takes us to ethical status of cultures and cultural values. In the next section, we turn out attention to this issue.

ETHICAL STATUS OF CULTURE AND CULTURAL VALUES

Culture and cultural values reflect the surrounding *milieu* from which personal exchanges proceed. They are always interpreted in relation to the collective experience, which they often inspire afresh. However, it is always in a group – particularly in the exchange between persons within a group, where mutual respect for the customs and aspirations is located concretely – that there emerges the ethical demand for recognition of cultural values.

[8] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 453.

This recognition inscribes itself along three ethical dimensions: firstly, the subject as responsible for others in one's relation to oneself; secondly, the other as recognized by me in his/her otherness, i.e., in his/her responsible liberty with respect to others; and thirdly, the cultural inter-relation constituting an institution or a "neutral third party". In relation to this the truth and efficacy of our concrete actions and social justice is constructed, justified and objectively measured.[9]

Nevertheless, there are no universal cultural values which exist *a priori*. All values stem from concrete and differentiated experiences in cultures. Every culture and tradition reveals while repeating the possibility of *Desein* in its existence as "having been". Therefore, each time and in each situation, every existing being has "to be" as his/her destiny because of his/her power to be and according to his/her choice.[10] Living the tradition can take on different forms, all of which are supported by the experience of being-in-the-world. However, in the last instance, it is always the concrete existing being who performs and acts; he/she lives his/her acts and is affected by them, even though these acts can become what Sartre called the "*pratico-inert*", i.e., they can produce effects which go beyond the intentions of those who performed them.[11] In this way, every existing being and every culture live in the context of its own values. These values delineate a plurality of human projects which through diverse actions intersect precisely in order to construct an ethical world. Hence, it is through the confluence of these diverse actions that there emerges hope of recognizing the values of each culture. This approach does not mean the amalgamation of the values of these cultures into one, but rather it aims at detecting in each culture the surge toward values with the promise of a better world. As every culture bears its proper tradition, it is up to each to give life again to the intrinsic truth contained in its tradition and to bring out deliberately the most humanizing aspirations of that tradition. There is no common ground of a uniform mankind, but there are only pluralities of ethical forms all working for the recognition of a humanizing fulfillment.

In the same way, historicity enables us to live in the present the temporal destiny of a whole existence; it permeates the history of the world in its emergence under different figures.[12] However, the genesis of the perception of values is parallel to the genesis of cultures. It has three successive moments, which reformulate the philosophical history of ethics

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[9] Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, (Paris: Seuil, 1990), p. 264.

[10] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *L'Etre et le temps*, trad. Francaisç F. Vezin, par. 76, pp. 457 ss.

[11] Cf. Jean Paul Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), pp. 323, 344, 369.

[12] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *L'Etre et le temps*, trad. francaisç F. Vezin, p. 453.

and reverses what philosophy proposes to itself in its present state of second reflection. We briefly state these three successive moments here below:

1) The first moment is the stage of archaic societies. They operate in the functioning of their universe of values located in a weakly differentiated collective interrelation, which Durkheim and Bergson called "closed societies". Institutionally they are static in the distribution of the respective roles of their members. It is the functioning of one's role that determines the individual. Since roles are not well defined in these "closed societies" the individual becomes only part of a collective interrelationship and the individual freedom of choice and dignity as persons are not given a prominent place in such societies.

2) The second moment recognizes the individual in his/her dignity and freedom as a subject. The dignity of the subject sets down the objective reality of the individuals with respect to each other according to a criterion of recognition which provides a foundation for the notions of respect and autonomy for the person. Hence, liberty is no longer linked merely to the political role shared by "peers" who have access to the public world of the *agora* in the Greek sense of the term. Therefore, it must be understood according to its ethical dimension: men recognize each other as equals before the greatness of the law which they bear in themselves as practical reason. This provides the capacity for the subject to raise himself/herself in his/her actions to a universal point of view,[13] and to be responsible for his/her acts as a human person. The Kantian notion of respect – in all probability is the first philosophical argument to denounce slavery radically – has also made it possible to understand the equality of cultural forms, races, and sexes which the 20th century has tried to discover through critical reflection upon its philosophical and religious self-understanding.

If we resituate the above-said perspective in the context of metaphysical thinking and non-critical religious behavior, together with the scientific revolution and the discoveries of technology, we can contribute to rethinking the genealogy of values. Abandoning its closed society, the western world that had considered itself as the mankind of universal reason, now discovers and recognizes the contributions of other cultures. Though the west claims for itself the prerogative of spiritual universality with regard to "human rights", it should be noted that those rights appear only in the course of a progressive awareness of the other in his/her otherness and hence in his/her proper culture. The inter-relational differentiation is at work in the recognition by which everyone becomes a citizen of the world, but it is always against the background of a new otherness operative at the levels of cultural, racial and sexual differences.

3) The third is the moment of the discovery of subjectivity as the self. It is of recent origin; it is a contribution from beyond modernity which

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[13] Cf. Emmanuel Kant, *Les fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs*, trad. Francaisç, (Paris: Delagrave, 1966), p. 159.

interprets critically the lived appropriation of subjectivity. In this perspective, the "I" is no longer *a priori* a rational subject, but is self in the light of customs and cultural interchange. The "I" who discovers itself as "oneself like any other" is relevant only to the universal rights of humankind in general. However, we must ask that if there is still a more specific distinctiveness/identity relevant not to the simple universality shared by all men, but to a part of humankind whose recognition as properly personal is made possible only by their sexual affectivity. Thus, the attainment of the humanness is not yet "personal" as long as it has not learned to recognize its own differentiation as constitutive of humanity.

The sexual difference is understood immediately as a relational truth, which is spoken in the reciprocal and constitutive openness of the two sexes, male and female, each calling the other as the other of the self. This new interchange of "sense" makes it possible to rethink values from the interior of the differentiating dimensionality of the sexes because they can be understood constitutively only as related to each other. This understanding of oneself as a personal interiority passes through the constitutive otherness of every person in his/her embodied being as incomplete, precisely as this is manifested at the edge of desire. As we have seen in the analysis of affectivity, this induces the proper character of differentiated recognition in one's lived-bodiliness, and, therefore, in the context of a desiring sexuality. Here, the dimension of person is linked to the radical polarity which already is the sexual difference at the dawn of life, and which serves as the foundation of every human relationship. It provides the radical foundation for the situation of the person as person because the person is always relational with respect to the other sex and, thereby, to the truth of his/her whole behavior. Yet beyond itself, beyond the very experience of sexuality which is only a sign of the person, the person is also the ultimate goal at which desire aims.

The modernization of values has taken account of the cultural and racial differences of humanity in general, but it is on the way to becoming aware of the sexual difference which is the life of the senses. This is not only the meaning of actual sexual desire, but it colors the whole of life with a correlative and reciprocal truth. Every project of a society of persons – whether it is in a socio-political or a religious society – must be rethought in the light of the new awareness of the sexual difference. The hermeneutics of person has radicalized itself: the truth and action of the senses present themselves to us in their primordial reversibility, which is the sexual difference in its cultural multi-dimensionality.

CONCLUSION

The aim of our project is to grasp the affective interrelation of feeling and being affected, its expression in language, and the ontological foundation of our living together our life-world. It is on that basis every encounter with others is constituted, and the different facets of life exist as

concrete and meaningful participations. However, while mobilizing the actors in the affective space, the ethical character of encounter belongs to a dimension which not only appeals to desire at the phenomenal level of lived-perception, but also realizes one's presence as unique. This is because, for the subject, the encounter is an infinite invitation based on the excellence of one's gift of existence. Desire overcomes itself by the requirements of its orientation towards others, opens itself to the excellence of the gift of existence in relation to the other, and enables one to receive it as the gift of Being. Hence, to love signifies the search which is simultaneously both immanent and transcendent. This is supported by the creative gesture of an appeal addressed to the whole human community. In this light it can be seen that ethical value belongs not to the horizonal order of a single *milieu* of the life-world, but to the "flesh of the world" in as much as "creative difference" expresses itself in an infinite transcendence of the senses.

CHAPTER 4

LANGUAGE AND DESIRE: MODALITIES OF EXPRESSION OF "SENSE"

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy faces today the question of "sense" and the essence of "sense". Both language and desire, each according to its own manner, express a "sense", i.e., communicate a signifying dimension. This expression of "sense" by language and desire takes place in the experience of otherness, which exists in every encounter, in the openness of the project of existing, and in the transcendence of the existing being. Language and desire – the two modalities of the expression of "sense" – support each other in our effort to understand the institution of "sense".

In our effort to unfold the reality of "sense", we begin by considering the problem of "sense" from the historical and anthropological perspective. We do this by unraveling how this problem has unfolded in the thoughts of some important thinkers of the history of western philosophy – in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, Cartesian tradition, Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenological traditions and finally in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Having done the historical review of the problem of "sense", in the second section, we move on to spell out the essence of "sense". "Sense" is something that is given to us from birth and it is the "*logos*" that gives significance to every moment of existence. Language and desire say about and give expression to "sense", in the structural context of bodiliness, otherness and cultural world. Thus, bodiliness, otherness, and the cultural world constitute the essence/existential structures of "sense". In the next three sections we move on to clarify each of these three essential elements of "sense" and in the process indicate how language and desire as modalities of the expression of "sense" manifest themselves in these existential structures of "sense". Bodiliness underlines the facticity of our embodied situation as beings-in-the-world. The body with the help of the sense organs presents itself to the world relationally and forms the center of differentiation from which the world takes its "sense". Language and desire – as modalities that express "sense" – manifest "sense" through "saying", "expression", and the "affect" particularly in the event of an encounter with the other. Thus, bodiliness is always related to otherness, which leads us to consider the question of otherness in the next section. Our bodiliness mediates all our possibilities of existence in our relationship with the other, which involves common belonging to the same "sense". The interrelation is expressed through language in its two aspects of gesture and word. The presence of the other through language appeals to desire, which aims at realizing the hope of a promise to which the other holds implicitly the

secret, particularly in the context of sexual differentiation. Thus, assisted by language and desire in the context of an encounter we experience "sense" in our bodiliness, in relation to the visible cultural world. This leads to the consideration of the cultural world in the next section. The cultural world is the "life-world" – though it belongs to the order of the primordial donation of Being – it serves as the universal frame of all experiences of a being-in-the-world as related to other beings-in-the-world. It is the horizon of one's possibilities as lived out in relation to the other. Each cultural structure makes a difference and makes "sense" of history. Thus, each cultural world measures itself against the horizon of all the other cultural worlds and while reflecting itself in them gives history its singular expression. In the conclusion, we state that phenomenology opens us to the hermeneutics of sense and renews ontology. Being (*Sein*) is not metaphysical substance, but is understood as "Difference", i.e., the Source of the opening of the relational distance. As the Source, in donating gratuitously it brings about the interlacing of "feeling" and "saying", and gives desire its dynamism. The "sense" building itself is the cultural word that is exchanged in the reciprocal promotion of those beings each of which is a "oneself as another". Having introduced the plan of the essay, we move on to consider the problem of "sense" in the next section.

PROBLEM OF "SENSE": HISTORICAL ANDANTHROPOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In order to explain the origin of the problem of "sense" for the existing being, it is useful to delve into the historical horizon of philosophy and philosophical anthropology because the problem of "sense", in all its expressive components, belongs essentially to an anthropological frame. Husserl reminds us in his work, *The Crisis of the European Sciences* (1936), that every scientist and philosopher articulates his/her reflection on the background of his/her lived and concrete (*existentiell*) experience. Now, we briefly consider the manner in which the problem of this lived and concrete (*existentiell*) experience has been posed by different thinkers, in the course of the history of western philosophical thought.

The history of western philosophy from its antiquity considered the reality of man in two dimensions. Man is viewed as a being constituted of the soul and the body. In the human substance, the soul is considered as the "form" of the human compound, while body is the "matter".[1] The Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition emphasizes the unity of the body and soul in the human being. On the other hand, Descartes imposes a dualistic schema: the human being is primarily a subject, the "thinking substance" that is united to the body-machine, a simple piece of space. However, these

[1] Until today it is the thesis of F. Van Steenberghen (Louvain) in his *Anthropologie philosophique*, Montréal, 1990.

two traditions agree with each other in that they recognize the priority of the soul with respect to the body and the primacy of the spirit over the matter.

Hegel speaks of a real relation between the intelligible and the sensible because for him what is rational is real. Far from being only a descriptive genesis, the Hegelian dialectic of the "this" or the "here" enables the natural consciousness to raise itself up to the level of the universality of reason. The different "this's" and the different "here's" realize the concrete truth of the concept, whereas the "this" or the "here" are still its abstract expression. In this sense, Hegelian phenomenology *is* the dialectic movement of the "difference" as such. Under the singularity of the sensible there operates the universalizing negativity of "sense" that manifests itself in its effective signification and thereby constitutes consciousness in the self-position of its proper emergence. Phenomenology *is* the experience of consciousness determining itself in its effective difference as the active subject. In this context the determination of language is not the intelligible affixed to the sensible, but the effective medium of its expression. The Spirit urges the concept to transcend immediacy towards the universal. However, it leads finally the real to identify itself with the *logos*, in such a way that the circular self-constitution of the Spirit cancels all recourse to temporality. The movement of desire is absorbed in the absolute "saying" and it is the end of history.

Husserl, in his phenomenology, has also met the problem of the relation of the sensible to the intelligible and the problem of the dynamics of "sense". However, Husserlian phenomenology remains imprisoned in the transcendental conception because he gives a privileged position to the constituting subject thanks to the "phenomenological reduction". Beyond the present intuition, the perceptive consciousness aims at constituting the perceived given at the appearing of the object, and it works out its signification. Hence, there is the passage from the perceptive feeling to the intelligible. Translating the experience of perceptive life on the reflexive mode, the expression in language keeps its intuitive richness, but it itself is the expression giving sense, taken from the constituting source, i.e., the pure *ego*. However, regarding the experience of the intimate consciousness of time, Husserl calls into question the classical conception of reason as the pure and *a priori* reason. His critique does not concern the formal/logical role of reason, but its predominance with respect to the concrete understanding of effective and lived reality. In his work on *The Crisis of European Sciences*, Husserl emphasizes the circle of reason[2] as necessary for the foundation of the "human sciences" because reason sees itself determined by the human sciences and by history. It is linked to the cultural evolution of humanity in the same way as it arises in the intellectual process of every individual. However, it is able to keep the self-confidence of the

[2] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, "Cours de Sorbonne"; *Bulletin de Psychologie*, (Paris: Bulletin de Psychologie, 1956).

logical certitudes, which precisely give a foundation to its own objective determination. If there is a circle, the understanding of reason must be enlarged. It must be situated again with respect to a broader mode of understanding of an *existentiell* character. This character of existence opens us fundamentally to a pre-understanding of a world already there, which makes sense for us as soon as we are acting or speaking. This world, which Husserl calls "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*), is prior to any theoretical attitude. Thus, for Husserl, demonstrative and objectifying reason is no longer the only place of "sense". It is no longer the ultimate source of truth because it itself leans on a essence of "sense" that is co-extensive with the unfolding of existence. It is on this first instance that the different forms of rationality – the philosophical, aesthetic and even the ethical – are constituted.

Following the Husserlian line of thinking and with the intention of countering positivistic determinism – according to which man is only an object of nature – Merleau-Ponty appeals no more to consciousness, but to the effective existence in the concrete unity of the human being as a being-in-the-world. The human existing being is a unity which lives itself in all the forms of encounter of things, other humans, and the world in general. Husserl characterizes the unity of consciousness by intentionality, i.e., the quality of consciousness to be "conscious *of* something" in all the activity of consciousness. The "aiming at" of consciousness is open to the world in the movement of temporality – by way of memory of the past and anticipation of the future – in such a way that the world is immediately present for us having meaning and signification. Merleau-Ponty takes the Husserlian thesis of intentionality of consciousness and transforms it, guided by the Heideggerian perspective on this philosophical issue. According to Merleau-Ponty, the human existing being as a being-in-the-world exists essentially as a relational being. On the one hand, this mode of existing is proper to man and distinguishes him from the other beings. On the other hand, the world is the horizon of his existence and the horizon of his openness to the lived totality. Thus, the world is not the physical nature, in the sense of the natural universe that constitutes the object of science; but the world is the horizon of the net-work of significations of the existing human being and the symbolic *habitat* of our being-in-the-world. We make it ours precisely by our use of language and by our actions. This world is constituted concretely by the whole of cultural objects, by tradition, and by all our projects of existence. Understood in the above-said meaning the world is the universe of "sense" which manifests the destiny of mankind, whereas world as nature in the scientific meaning of the term is a secondary concept built on and concretely anchored on the first meaning of the term "world". Thus, Merleau-Ponty has shown how existence is taken in the facticity of lived-bodiliness – the lived body which is implied in the phrase "I exist". However, in his later thought, he speaks of bodiliness itself is radically borne by the primordial Being which gives the openness of "sense", and thereby gives the ontological foundation of the relational dimension of being-in-the-world.

Having looked into the problem of "sense" from the historical and anthropological perspective as it has unfolded in thoughts of some important thinkers of the history of the western philosophy, we can move on to consider the essence of sense.

ESSENCE OF "SENSE"

"Sense" is given to one from his/her birth and it takes over every encounter throughout the course of one's finite existence. "Sense" is the *logos* which gives significance and meaning to every movement of existence. Language and desire give expression to the immanent presence of "sense". If we do not want to fall into the drawbacks of idealism and empiricism, we must understand the sense-relationship between the terms "expression" and "saying". We can speak of expression as an intention of language or as essentially the manifestation of a face-to-face experience which is offered in every authentic encounter by the immediate presence of oneself to the other. However, the expressive manifestation of the face-to-face experience opens up desire and brings about the expressiveness of language in every human relation through the expressiveness of the spoken word, the voice that modulates the spoken word, and the expressiveness of the written word. Therefore, in expression we have to do with the signifying- relation and with the "sense" which constitutes both the presence and the manner of each reality and its manifestation in the context of a cultural tradition. Hence, expression involves communication and is always sensible and intelligible. Though it involves an element of desire, it is not always carried away by desire, which Hegel sees as the symbolic entrance of language. Unlike "expression", the "saying" gives desire its effective power, in the same way as writing articulates through time the lived-progression of a cultural tradition.

The problem that is brought to the fore, here, is the relation between desire and language and their mutual implication. Every meaning gets ahead of itself in the sensible and the affective expression of the one who is speaking. Conversely, it is the first originary word of existence, which gives life to desire. Thus, the question of "sense" highlights the relationship of language to the sensible and to affective experience. We maintain that the "meaning" of the sensible takes place in the movement of desiring life – bound to the affective and active bodiliness. Desire as signifying expression transcends itself on the reflexive mode, and finds its expression in language through the "saying", which realizes the universality of the concept. On the other hand, the expression in language is always already involved in the experience of the flesh, which enables it to exist and to become present to the other in a bodily manifestation.

In order to understand the meaning of "sense", let us analyze formally the different aspects of the word "sense", by placing its reciprocal, sensible, moving, and intelligible implications as evidence. The term "sense" bears indeed three meanings: firstly it stands for the sense organ;

secondly it means a signification; and thirdly, it implies the direction of sense. Formulating the question of the meaning of "sense" in a different way we can ask the following questions: firstly, "What is the part of affectivity in what is "said" in language?" and "What is the part of significance in desire?; secondly, since expression is recognized as sensible and signifying at the same time, the question arises as to "What is the aim of 'sense' in the motion of desire?", "How does the movement of existence orientate itself?, "What does it mean for the being-in-the world that is called to be dynamic in the project of its being and its transcendence?" Every expression of "sense" at the level of its origin implies structural (*existentiale*) and concrete (*existentiell*) dimensions. Hence, being-in-the-world finds "sense" only in relation to the experience of encounter – the medium that makes us present to each other. Therefore, otherness constitutes "being-with" of the being-in-the-world. However, this experience of "being-with" in the context of encounter is immediately lived and mediated by bodiliness, which itself is a privileged mode of expression of the cultural mediation. From what we have said, it is clear that there are three essential elements that mediate "sense": bodiliness, otherness, and the cultural world. These three essential elements mediating "sense" thereby constitute the essence/existential structures of "sense". They enable us to understand the reciprocal exchange between different beings-in-the-world, with the help of two expressions of "sense", i.e., language and desire.

Now that we have spelt out the essence of "sense" as bodiliness, otherness, and the cultural world, let us move on to clarify each of these concepts and in the process indicate how language and desire as modalities of the expression of "sense" manifest themselves in these existential structures of "sense".

Bodiliness

In the introduction to *Phenomenology of perception* (1945), Merleau-Ponty describes phenomenology as a philosophy of the essences (*eidos*). However, this philosophical study of essences is based on consciousness that is rooted in the facticity of existence. The purpose of the philosopher is to understand Husserlian intentionality not in the mode of a transcendental subjectivity that is in the openness of consciousness to the world, but by bringing the consciousness back to existence and by defining the lived existing being which we are as being-in-the-world. Thus, the view Merleau-Ponty underlines the facticity of our embodied situation.

Reversing the method of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty gives a privileged position to "phenomenological reduction" with respect to intentionality, which is still a manifestation of consciousness. For Husserl, phenomenological reduction is only an epistemological method by virtue of which he places the world, as metaphysical objectivity, "in parenthesis". He does this in order to see better the conditions belonging to the consciousness *of* something: the noematic side – the object *for* the consciousness – and the

noetic side – the subject and donor of "sense", who aims at the object as meaningful for the consciousness. However, for Merleau-Ponty, the "phenomenological reduction" is an ontological method, by which the being of existence is perceived as a "being-in-the-world". At the same time it helps us to see the world as the permanent horizon of our presence to things and to others. Things appear to our vision under their diverse profiles and get organized by the conscious seeing which constitutes them in the movement of their appearing. The subject himself exists only in overcoming himself unceasingly according to the temporal nature of his existence. Bodiliness is the relational dimension presenting itself in the world, which constitutes the lived and effective existence of the subject. The body is the center of differentiation from which the world takes its "sense".

Thus, phenomenological reduction, as an interpretative method, helps the subject to see the intentional threads that link up the existing being to the world as so many ties connecting the subject to his world. Through perception the body appears as the focal point which opens up the senses/the sense organs. The sense organs in their space-making dimension seize things with respect to each other, articulate them in the depth field of space-time, and according to their orientation understand them leaning on the world as totality of horizon. In this sense, my body opens space and time while it leans on itself in order to orientate virtually its motor capacity. Generating space, it is able to move in a perceptive field with the sense of direction. However, the differentiation of the five senses is itself the object of an originary differentiation in which the body anticipates a sense upon the other: the sense of vision encroaches upon the sense of touch, the sense of hearing on the sense of vision, the sense of touch on vision, and so on. Interfering with each other, the senses slip also from the concrete towards the abstract, in such a way that seeing a problem, hearing what is said, or seizing a question show the participation of the perceptive field in the signifying expression in all the metaphoric meanings.

Hence, Merleau-Ponty describes the originarity of "sense" in relation to the bodiliness lived, felt, and manifested in gestures that signify expressiveness. Bodiliness involves the differentiating opening of the sense organs. At the same time, bodiliness is the reflecting and reflected pole of objects presented through the sense organs. The fact that things appear through the sense organs and are reflected on bodiliness brings to the fore the nature of body as embodied and as located with respect to sense organs. Consequently, that situation of embodiment unveils itself in the signifying openness of the body as expression. By gesture and the word the body unfolds a field of meanings. Language and desire as modalities that express "sense" play an important role in the manifestation of bodiliness. The sensibility of the sense organs exists only if the "saying" expresses/reflects it. Thus, language makes "sense" already in the concrete sensing by the sense organs. However, sense organs themselves are moved by the desire or the "affect", which makes sense only in the event of an encounter with the other. Thus, bodiliness is always a bodiliness that is related to the otherness

of the other whom one experiences in the context of an encounter. This takes us to the consideration of the second essential element of "sense", i.e., otherness. In the next section, we take up this point for discussion.

Otherness[3]

At the level of affective perception by intropathy the body lives in its bodiliness. From this lived center the behavior of the other by a kind of connivance which interlaces my body with the body of the other, and reciprocally as if the bodies understood each other though do not succeed in doing so completely. The other is irreducible to my constitution, as I am so for myself, in the impossible narcissistic reflection of the signifying "myself". Thus, there comes about actually an intersubjectivity/interrelation which expresses a common belonging to the same "sense" and to the same world. My perceptible gesture signifies my expressed word and the perceptible gesture of the other signifies his/her word. The expressive sense is always going ahead of itself with respect to what remains untold in the expression, displacing the actuality of what is signified without exhausting its sense. What is expressed in language turns always over onto itself in order to solicit the perpetual movement of a meaning by which it cannot totalize the "sense". In actual fact, the word is a voice that contains expressive signification for the one who has uttered it and the signification it has for the one who is listening to it. The voice makes itself a word as addressed to somebody. Thus, bodiliness links up the existing beings to one another through intropathy and the mediation of language. It gives a foundation to the originary dimension, which conditions every encounter and every actual communication.

Therefore, Phenomenology is primarily anthropology as it involves the encounter of and communication with the other. It is through language as lived-intercommunication that our bodiliness and concrete (*existentiell*) experience is thematized. There is no constitution of the other; he/she is given in the very signifying openness of the world. Thus, the recognizing of the other occurs in the encounter according to an initial and initiatory reversibility. The other appears to me in his/her dimension of otherness in every encounter. He/she opens in the subject that temporal distance of an objective differentiation, always already subtended by the live and affected interrelation. Desire intrinsically differentiates distance, which the bodiliness – both concrete and expressive – lives as the sign of its own overcoming. However, desire embodies the reflexive movement of the bodiliness, which is in search of itself in the narcissistic sense in the *alter-ego*, and in the always vanishing promise of a reflexivity of itself fully realized. Desire becomes alive in the announcement of word. Now, the

[3] Cf. Ghislaine Florival, "Phénoménologie de l'affectivité"; *L'affect philosophe*, Collective Work, Dir. G. Hottois, (Paris: Vrin, 1990).

question regards the basis/source of the intensity of the arising desire. It belong to the language of the other, which opens one to the field of the bodiliness more radically, helps one to perceive the historicality of the existing being, constitutes and overcomes the tension (*Geschehen*), which "exists" between one's birth and death.[4] Desire arises at the same time in both the directions of "sense": on the one hand, the yet-to-come-values, i.e., the values of the future, make an appeal towards the "resolution", which leads to the authentic liberty of the existing being understanding himself/herself in the temporal totality of his/her being "to be". On the other hand, the values of the past call the temporal resuming of an originary affective life lived in relation to affective modalities. Desire aims at realizing itself in the hope of a promise of which the other holds implicitly the secret because they are bearing the sign of the conditioning difference which give them "sense".

However, as Levinas says, the other does not appear in the manner in which every meaning appears in a cultural whole. The presence of the other is an appeal to the dimensionality of desire and not to its effects. It is an appeal to the plenitude of desire in its fulfillment because the other is neither a cultural meaning nor a simple *datum*, but he/she is "sense" primordially.[5] He/she does not come from the horizonal meaning of the world of perception, but the other is a "visitation" out of context, and "his/her manifestation is a surplus". The other is not always a first word, an openness in the very openness of the face, and an absolutely differentiating trace, which announces the occurrence of an "absolutely" other reception. The "epiphany" of the face is not a phenomenon of the other, but it is the authenticity of the existing being in the uprightness of his/her occurrence. He/she gives a sense of being as my neighbor, and his/her invisibility in the very trace of the expression. Thus, the respect for the other invites me to be more than myself; it urges me to recognize in him/her the infinite donation of being; and it induces me to subscribe to the excellence of his/her appeal. Thus, the relation with the other is reciprocal. In every relation, even when it concerns directly things or symbols, it is eventually the other who is made present to us.

Thus, generally speaking our bodiliness mediates all our possibilities of existence in our relationship with the other. This is all the more so, when we have to do with the affective and sexual dimension that is a proper and singular manner of living our human condition. The sexual character of our particular constitution is that which makes us men or women; determines the particular and differentiated mode according to which we inhabit the cultural world; and according to which we take part in the life of "sense". This cultural world organizes itself according to the polarity of male and

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[4] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *L'Etre et le temps*, trad. Francaisç F. Vezin, par. 72 ss.

[5] Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme*, p. 47.

female, which is quite original and does not reduce itself at all to the set of differences of biological order. This polarity has a meaning, which affects the human existing being in his/her very quality as a personal subject. Thus, the fact of being a man or a woman is not a simple accidental determination, but rather it belongs to the human essence defined by universal features, as in classical rationalism. The human being realizes humanity but in the singularity of a life which is proper to him/her, in as much as he/she is a personal subject. Hence, subjectivity cannot be understood without being intrinsically affected by the reciprocal constitution of the poles of man and woman. This implies that the personal truth – which everyone is called to discover and to build in his/her life as "sense" to come of his/her existence – does not constitute itself under the direction of a unilateral and disembodied reason, but precisely in the reciprocal exchange of the approaches of reason proper to a man and a woman. There is no truth of existence except inside the relation of mutual understanding, the interlacing in which these two polarities exchange each other. The concrete (*existentiell*) truth is authentic only according to this relationship of reciprocal constitution. Besides, in the final analysis, every approach to truth in a particular cultural context – whether it is *existentiell*, practical, ethical, spiritual, or theoretical – is effectively drawn from the originary differentiation that constitutes the objective interrelationship of the poles: the one by the other, a man by a woman, and human existence as sexual "difference". This living interrelationship – concrete, intelligible, and culture-bound in its own overcoming, and manifested in bodiliness – finds its foundation in what Merleau-Ponty calls "flesh of the world". We are capable of experiencing each other in the context of an encounter because we are from this visible cultural world, susceptible of being seen by each other, and bodiliness of the same "flesh of the world".

Therefore, everyone is at the life horizon of all the others. It is in this manner that the cultural groups constitute themselves. The groups themselves meet each other and influence each other. It is on the basis of this interrelational support of "sense" that we can appropriate progressively a universe of cultural meanings and build a proper truth of existence. This leads us to the consideration of the third essential element of "sense", viz., cultural world, in the next section.

Cultural World

The term "horizon" designates the openness of "sense" which makes possible the unification in a single totality of the whole of the profiles constituting the appearing of the perceptually given.[6] However, the expression the "horizon of horizons" designates the unity of understanding

[6] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie première*, trad. Francaisç, vol. II. Cf. also M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*.

of the whole of the beings, the unity which is certainly not effective but which is implied in the sense of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) always already there, and the cultural world which belongs to the order of the primordial donation of Being (*Sein*). However, the experience of the horizon of the cultural world is actually only a concrete figure of the condition of possibility of experience as such. It is the field of possibilities giving sense to our present experiences in our interactions with things and people. This cultural world becomes the universal frame of all experiences only in so far as it is for a being who is already there and who explains himself/herself in relation to others. Things are at the world because I am seizing them and they are possible means for the realization of my possibilities. In this sense, the cultural world is the horizon of my possibilities, the measure of the processes of temporalization and spatialization, and no more the pole of a concrete universality. As a result, we do not have to do with one "life-world" as the universal base, but with a plurality of "life-worlds", each of which containing a non-sizeable component. This component is the mystery of the cultural world – which as a whole embraces and penetrates all the historical "life-worlds" – the mystery which never gives itself as present in the "flesh", but always as that which has to be projected from the present world. In so far as these historical worlds delimit each other in the historical repetition and the overcoming of their reciprocal interpretation, it is no more the unitary ideal underlying the Husserlian universality which subtends their forms, but, for Merleau-Ponty, the reversibility of the singular cultural structures, which makes the difference and makes the "sense" of history. Thus, each cultural world measures itself against the horizon of all the other cultural worlds while reflecting itself in them gives history its singular expression.

CONCLUSION

What is at stake is no more to lay down the universality of transcendental reason, but to encounter the event of the existing beings as beings-in-the-world in the context of the cultural world. The task of phenomenology is to unveil the mystery of the cultural world and the mystery of the being-in-the-world. Phenomenology aims at bringing about the expression the things-themselves from the depth of their silence.[7] Philosophy does not pose itself any more as absolute onlooker in front of the pure object; and from the position of the *cosmotheoros* in front of the great object. It is no more overbearing as absolute subject, but recognizes the lack with respect to its being, perpetually originary, proper to the "there is". Thus, we have to learn how to see, and "it is true that the eye is listening

[7] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 18.

to".[8] "We are questioning our experience, precisely in order to know how it opens us to what are not us."[9] The ontology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty helps us to understand the dimension of reversibility always in excess of the perceptible, which is "sense" or "differentiation", that ontological distance which is the "flesh of the world". It is this differentiation – Merleau-Ponty designates as "Vertical Being" or "Sense of Sense" – as the generative dimensionality gives sense to sense, which human experience of bodiliness reveals to us.

Bodiliness is a lived-exchange, which at the same time is both exteriority and interiority. It appears as already taken in the relational exchange which gives to the cultures their respective foundations with respect to each other. However, more originarily, the relational distance of "sense" is already present in the desiring dimension. "Sense" inhabits the transcendence of desire and constitutes its dynamism. Reciprocally, desire fastens up always at the sexual differentiation, which conveys the life of "sense", the generations, and the cultural acts.

Thus, the contribution of phenomenology opens us to the hermeneutics of sense and renews ontology. The Being (*Sein*) is not metaphysical substance, but is understood as "Difference", i.e., the Source of the opening of the relational distance. As the Source, in donating gratuitously it brings about the interlacing of "feeling" and "saying", and gives desire its dynamism. "Sense" building itself is the cultural word that is exchanged in the reciprocal promotion of those beings each of which is a "oneself as another".

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[8] Cf. H. Maldiney, "Chair et verbe dans la philosophie de M. Merleau-Ponty"; *M. Merleau-Ponty, le psychique et le corporel*, (Paris: Aubier, 1988), p. 59.

[9] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 211.

CHAPTER 5

AFFECTIVE COMPREHENSION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN MACMURRAY[1]

INTRODUCTION

It is strange to discover – with the distance of time, through a creative philosophical work, proceeding from a proper intention and from an original style – the indication of a questioning and a renewal which has been, for the *epoch*, the point of departure of a philosophical trend called existentialism. It is astonishing that, at the same period, in places of the world remote from each other, without direct influences, in circumstances of infrequent communications, the same creative intention can be

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[1] "The alliance between 'affectivity' and 'comprehension' in the title seems paradoxical. The usual meanings of these concepts are the opposite in French too. This seems to indicate some error in the category. It seems a paradox. My aim is precisely to try another way than the classical philosophical and psychological distinction, which underlines two different states of existence: affectivity – 'affects' and feelings, as opposed to comprehension – and understanding as perception and conceptualisation. The concept of 'comprehension' is less speculative than 'understanding'. It aims at revealing the foundation of the *logos* in our lived experience, to point out the 'sense' – as sensible, perceptive and speculative, and underlining that mutual implication of those degrees of 'sense' as still present in Hegel's dialectics. However, below those different levels of 'sense', affectivity seems to give them their fundamental ground, which effectively determines the primary 'sense' of life, although it doesn't give immediately the objective significance as a concept. Like in Eschyle's drama, Agamemnon tells us: '*pathei mathos*'. Our affective experience is our basic learning and structuring of life. In an existential purpose, Heidegger proposes that *Dasein* is distended between birth and death, in anguish of its falling-down-in-the-world and being caught up in the 'project', and the desire to have-to-be, to go on to our future limit of life. This '*Geschehen*', i.e., this going-on between past and future, constitutes the principal contradictory feeling of life and its 'sense', like an attraction and an opposition of limits. The *Dasein* lives between birth and death, the first of all significances, which is the radical affectivity, reflecting our temporal orientation. In other words, this radical 'affect' is the 'essence' of all our lived affectivity: it makes the general 'sense' of life, its principal 'comprehension' (Cf. Martin Heidegger,, *L'Etre et le Temps*, trad. Francaisç F. vezin, para.72 ss.) It is on the basis of this essential structure of affectivity that the genesis of affective life in the child is made possible." Cf. The Letter of Ghislaine Florival to H.A. Carson dated August 17, 1992.

discovered, without their innovators' knowing. Thus, with the distance of almost half a century, we do notice, on both sides of the channel and even of the ocean, proximity of thought between philosophers like John Macmurray and Gabriel Marcel.

Hence, we want to stress the character of cultural historicity, which unites, in the same *epoch*, a family of mind in its social, spiritual, and philosophical commitments. In several aspects, phenomenologists – Husserl in Germany, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in France, today Levinas and Ricoeur, and Jonas in the United States – answer the same problems in different ways, giving testimony to the same personalizing approach. This character of historicity invites us to grasp human experience in its cultural interrelationality, which the post-war period has reinforced, in the face of the distress of a western world, submitted to the implacability of the dominant forces of technique. We do find before us today a still more extended technological power, which runs the risk of destroying the habitability of the world, forgetful as we are of our human in-rootedness. However, this problem had not yet been dominant when John Macmurray sought to make us conscious of it. If the relational action of the "I and thou" confers to the person the essence of his/her existence, it is in a communicational world that the philosopher intends to articulate it, inside a cosmic environment which alone gives meaning to human life.

In elaborating the notion of affective comprehension of John Macmurray, we proceed in three stages. The first stage focuses on a reading of John Macmurray's thesis on affective comprehension. This reading bears essentially on the topic "Persons in Relation", the second volume of the *Gifford Lectures* given at the University of Glasgow in 1953 and 1954. It aims primarily at rediscovering with John Macmurray the originary sense of human life which makes of man not a personality, which possesses all the abstract characteristics of "being man", but a person, in the sense where one is never susceptible of being totalized in concepts and become an anonymous essence for intellectual reflection. This is because personal existence is always already taken in the relational becoming, which opens it to the other, in the very dynamics of a meaningful action, which takes place in exchange – the other being constitutively present to me. John Macmurray elaborates this point further in the context of the originary relationship between the mother and the child.

The second stage of the paper attempts to build on what has been done by the first part by taking up John Macmurray's thesis on affective comprehension and makes a comparative phenomenological analysis with some themes which are present at the same epoch in phenomenology, particularly in the thoughts of Edmund Husserl, Gabriel Marcel, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. John Macmurray reproaches Edmund Husserl for the priority Husserl gives to consciousness forgetting the originary experience of the other in relationship. Then, he underlines some similarity with philosophers such as Gabriel Marcel and Merleau-Ponty in the description of encounter and the importance of the primacy of relation. In

doing so, John Macmurray tries to discover the common foundation of this contemporary concern for originary *relation*, not only as manifesting some influences present in contemporary culture, but also as pertaining to the metaphysical essence of the meeting-of-the-others, to the radical aspect of the relation as such.

The third stage attempts an investigation on the meaning of affectivity from the phenomenological perspective. John Macmurray's philosophy of affective comprehension and its focus on personal relationship and the comparative analysis of his thesis particularly with Gabriel Marcel and Maurice Merleau-Ponty confirm Ghislaine Florival's own perspective on the phenomenon of affectivity as the development of the interrelation of sexual otherness. Though it is not a notion directly expounded by John Macmurray, Ghislaine Florival believes that the latter notion as a further development of John Macmurray's philosophical and psychological analysis aims at discovering the interrelation of the singular otherness as male and female. The conclusion reiterates that John Macmurray's understands person in the context of relationality, which enables the existing human being to exist in relation to the other in every action, as the "agent". The "You and I" constitutes radically our singular identity. It is the belief of Ghislaine Florival that the kind of otherness John Macmurray speaks of – and which constitutes us the most originarily and singularly – is the sexual differentiation as opening of "sense".

Now, we move on to consider the notion of affective comprehension as expounded in the philosophy of John Macmurray.

AFFECTIVE COMPREHENSION: JOHN MACMURRAY'S PERSPECTIVE

Since Plato and Aristotle, traditional philosophy has insisted on the rationality of theoretical thought. This philosophical perspective – with the support of the rationalism of Descartes – has made it possible to bring to the fore the transcendental position of the subject as theoretical and voluntary consciousness. Every reference to the body is subsidiary and linked secondarily with the primacy of the soul.The solitary subject, as pure thinking substance, can only conceive the idea of a bodily substance, a representation of a piece of extension.Thus, dualism is insuperable as it condemns the *ego* to the egocentrism, a solipsistic point of view and a pure will.

John Macmurray denounces the ambiguity of the idealistic dualism, which tries desperately to link the intellectual soul with the bodily sensibility in human unity; quite to the contrary we must underline the primacy of action with respect to reflection in human experience and thereby rediscover the bodily experience in its vivid emergence. Action is by no means to be considered as the continuation of thought as applied to the movement of the body. Rather, it is the lived activity which enables us to grasp the in-rootedness of the body in the world, and reflection is always

secondary with respect to the lived primacy of the act of existing. Thus, the thinking of the self is a negative mode, abstracted from lived reality as inscribed in the practical action of a being in situation. Even if it is justified to grant to theoretical reflection its position of universality, and, thereby, a priority with respect to the singular positivity of a single subject, reflection is nonetheless deprived of its lived roots, this in-rootedness being the condition of every abstract representation. All our interests, feelings, imaginings, our bodily sensible experiences, reflection, and the distantiation in the return to oneself are located in the life of action. Hence, without the life of action none of the above is possible. At the point of departure of philosophy, it is the "I do" rather than the "I think" of reflection[2] that imposes itself. However, action itself supposes at least two agents,[3] always already in an existential relation[4] supported by language and manifesting its form as mutual expression. John Macmurray analyses the nature of this existential relation by following the dialectic and genetic movement which reveals progressively its meaning. Let us follow him in the process of his thought.

At the personal level, to think the nature of the person is to take a firm stand against every form of rationalistic and dualistic idealism, which opposes the thinking subject to its object, forgetting what is proper to the act of existing in the unity of incarnated existence. At the same time, it amounts to refusing egocentrism, which gives a dominating position to the subject of reflection, whereas we have to underline in the person what makes manifest its dynamic relation as open agent with respect to the other.[5] Nevertheless, this critical attitude is not a new form of reflexive negativity. On the contrary,[6] it is a positive undertaking to find again under the negativity of theoretical thinking the positivity of the existential agent, and to show that it is action that constitutes in the otherness the mutual becoming of the persons.[7] We find here the seeds of the "dialectic" dimension, which often appears in the texts of John Macmurray, in so far as this term "dialectic" does not refer to a conceptual form of representation in the Hegelian sense, but rather it means the openness towards the lived reality not as universalizable and as always interrelational in the act of existing. Thus, according to this critical and concrete perspective, the philosopher denounces the concepts of the self, the mind and the will. These concepts

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[2] Cf. John Macmurray, *Persons in Relation*; *Form of the Personal*, vol. II, (Glasgow: Faber & Faber Limited, 1961), p.15.

[3] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 17.

[4] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 24.

[5] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 16, 24-26.

[6] Cf. John Macmurray, *The Self as Agent*; *The Form of the Personal*, vol. I, pp. 28 ss.

[7] Cf. John Macmurray, *Persons in Relation*; *The Form of the Personal*, vol. II, p. 27.

reinforce the solipsism and the dualism of the subjective representation in the opposition subject-object, giving to the subject a purely theoretical priority with respect to the world, instead of encountering in it what makes its perceptive "presence" to things and others.[8]

The logical notion as opposing the true to the false rejects in the a-temporal heaven the subject that inhabits the world. In this abstract universe, the subject gives to himself the representation of a world outside himself. This other-than-oneself-world is constructed as an individual identity, the notion of universal being only the de-multiplied form of the self.[9] However, the others "are", if they differ logically from things and other living beings, as unities of the same class of subject then for empirical philosophy they become as many sensible *data*, possible objects of experimentation, and thus the foundation of an anthropological science.[10] From the point of view of inductive investigations and the transcendental apriority proper to theoretical thinking, man is the pole of an objective knowing, whose proper characteristics are described as universalizable, according to objective laws. In this deterministic frame, we cannot define the other as a "You". The other is only the same "I" as it depends on the universality of the concept of "self", and belongs to the intentionality of the perceiving consciousness. The action of which I perceive the modes are exterior to my proper acting and are ascribed to a will, which remains for me impersonal and which is generated by my mental representation. What involves us in action is not at all a knowing of the other, but an intentionality which no objective description of the motives can explain because the other is for me the one whom I encounter in the active experience of a mutual presence: You and I.[11]

If the anthropological and psychological sciences formulate a true judgment on men, it is as an objective kind of knowledge, by making abstraction from every effective and singular consideration concretely lived by the individual in such a way that this scientific knowledge misses the existential reality. In other words, it does not give an account of the human relation in its lived in-rootedness as "intentional agent".[12] Nevertheless, if science keeps an objective priority notwithstanding its formal limitation, it benefits itself from an emotional prejudice, which enhances its practical and universalizing power for the social activity.[13] This favourable prejudice for science underlies the intentional scientific action of the psychologist/the anthropologist. Now, as an existing being it is in direct contact with the common world of things and others, i.e., the "life-world", which Husserl

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[8] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 18.
[9] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 19.
[10] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 27.
[11] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 24 ss.
[12] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 27
[13] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 31.

calls the *Lebenswelt*. The men of science function with a theoretical attitude, even if they have forgotten the originary aim from which it proceeds and which is enrooted in the lived opinion and depends on affective modalities.[14] Thus, philosophy has to give an account of the hiatus between the deterministic human sciences, which are concerned with the objective motives, and the personalizing attitude which inspires every human individual as responsible agent. In fact, the motives can be subsequently described in a deterministic explanation of past actions, but the analysis of the motives cannot, in any case, be concerned by the future intention, which for its part depends on a personal aim that is intentional in the active sense of the word. Thus, society needs objective relations in order to constitute itself as a structured organization, even if this is impersonal. However, we must understand this structure derived from the intentional relation between agents, which is first personal relation.[15]

Certainly, we have to recognize that the two attitudes – scientific and personal – are correlated to each other. There is a correlation between the deterministic reflexive attitude and the free intentional intervention of agents who assert themselves in a mutual responsibility; the determinism of social organization is necessary for the stability of personal links, just as persons find an advantage in sustaining the effort of social objectification. The generalization of the impersonal attitude in society and in anthropological science is justified by a pragmatic necessity. For example, the organization of personal activities depends on an objective knowledge. Thus, we must distinguish between what belongs to the order of direct relations connected to the personal will of the persons concerned, and what belongs to the structure which as impersonal can find objective justifications.[16]

Until now the thesis of John Macmurray consists in underlining the role of action as condition of possibility of every theoretical reflection: The "I do" goes ahead of the "I think" at the point of departure of every human experience. However, the action itself is the fruit of an intersubjective relation; quite evidently initial: the "You and I" is at the foundation of existential understanding. This originary relation is structurally genetic. John Macmurray analyses its "dialectic" development in order to grasp in it the indication of a personal structuring. In particular, the text "Mother and Child" puts in perspective the psychological emergence of the relational dimension in the child.[17] The Aristotelian tradition understands the development of the child in its relational and organic potentiality.[18] The danger is to restrict this potentiality to the dynamics of the organism and to

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[14] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 29.
[15] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 34.
[16] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 39.
[17] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 43.
[18] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 49.

divert us from the intentional aim of the individuals by underlining only the biological and empirical process of the impulses lived by the child, following isolated satisfactions, which, through habit induce the acquired characters. If the organic component is necessary, it is not dominating. This means that the child has no instincts; it is directly dependent from the human "relation" which gives him his "sense" in the activity of a common life.[19] From the moment of the first contact with the mother or with her substitute, the child is immediately in a relation of communication and this very relation is the aim of the maternal word. The child has only to cooperate reflexively with the active sense offered to it by learning of the sensible qualities, the expression of which induces the rationality already present in seed form.[20] Thus, the cry of the child is not merely a natural and biological signal; it is already an intentional sign which aims at seeking an answer.

According to this thesis, the reflex activity does not develop automatically.[21] From the beginning, the child possesses an indefinite consciousness that enables it to distinguish "affects". In particular, through the senses of touch[22] and hearing,[23] the child discovers the order of comfort

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[19] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 49 ss.

[20] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 51, 55 ss.

[21] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 54 ss.

[22] "About the primacy of tactual perception in John Macmurray's philosophy: It seems that the notion of perception in John Macmurray's philosophy goes in another way than the classical point of view. Tactual perception is well discovered in the resistance with respect to the objects, but it is in the horizon of the radical and primary encounter with the mother. However, it is also, in a phenomenological conception, like in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of perception, a feeling of difference: the tactile sense 'touches' its own touching and lives its own interrelation as 'affect', so that the sensibility is also reflected by itself, and thereby is an affective experience. Anyway John Macmurray does not speak of convergence of tactual sensibility and 'affect', but his description of tactual experience implies that it is lived in the immediacy – more than in the visual approach, which is objective – in the present adhesion of interrelation, without interval of objective distance, as reflective sensibility of itself. Instead of saying that the tactual sense is at the origin of affectivity, pleasure or pain, it must be said that tactual effort and 'affect' are not originarily distinct and even that tactual sensibility is primordially the 'affect'. It is against the conceptual meaning of rationalist or empiricist philosophy that John Macmurray determines the primacy of the touch. It is revealed to itself as first encounter with something. This revealing is in the same way 'sense' and 'affect'. So it seems that the traditional difference is broken by the description of John Macmurray's philosophy as well as in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty." Cf. The Letter of Ghislaine Florival to H.A. Carson dated August 17, 1992.

and discomfort, the original pleasure and its negative counterpart. Affective attention decides its behavior, which is induced by the calling of the other – the mother – and transforms itself into the habit thanks to the natural rhythm. However, the mother is herself reflecting the expression of a personal community, in such a way that all the human development is linked with the positive aspect of the "You and I", mother-child community, inside a cooperating intention.[24] On this originary relation depends the ordered process which enables the setting-up of more and more precise limits between the positive pole and the negative one, the adequate or the inadequate will of the other, between what is requested or not requested, what is valid or not valid, and what determines the dimensions of truth and falsity.[25] This affectively perceived dichotomy between comfort and discomfort in the dual relation mother-child is also the first opening which gives the child the capacity to express in the reciprocity of language the "sense" of an affective relation.[26] The learning of speech is always already inscribed in a cultural world, which the child understands well before being able to express it in words.[27] There is an interplay of affective expressions, which constitutes the frame of the child's meaningful existence. Thus, the unity of the person is introduced not as an individual whole, but from the beginning as the dimension of an interpersonal relatedness.[28]

In fact, the phase of dependence is genetically first, but it is not due to the expression of a need and from the origin already meaningful to the mother. Thus, the original reference to the act of existing is immediately the other, much before the individual self, and the first "affects" of pleasure-displeasure are always an answer to the giving intention of the other. They are formed according to the motivations of the mother, who articulates progressively the relations of distance in view of the weaning the child.[29] Relationships of withdrawal and return generate thereby the implicit forms of love and fear. The bipolar and reciprocal aspect of this affective communication realizes symbolically an actual exchange, which is by no means an organic process; it gives meaning to the relation as such. Thus, the fear of isolation – which is implicitly the anguish of death – is positively supported by the maternal intention because the rhythm of absence negatively lived by the child is in reality implicitly his condition for maturation.[30]

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[23] Cf. John Macmurray, *Persons in Relation*; *The Form of the Personal*, vol. II, pp. 75-76.

[24] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 57, 78.

[25] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 59.

[26] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 87.

[27] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 60, 76.

[28] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 61, 77.

[29] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 61, 62.

[30] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 62, 90.

On the *rhythm of withdrawal and return*, John Macmurray analyses more deeply the intrinsic implications of the originary relational dimension, relating the child to the mother. He insists on the constitutive role of the reciprocal belonging in the originary relation, which will give rise to a history, according to the "dialectical becoming" of the person.[31] It is in a way a descriptive phenomenology of the originary affective development, conceived as what is at the basis of the learning of temporality and the emergence of the self as the personal agent. Therefore the repetitive rhythm of the maternal care initiates the child to the modes of succession and anticipation.[32] When the waiting occurs the child takes hold imaginatively of his past in order to recover there the ground of confidence and security which act as guarantee for the future that is still uncertain. Already there the first difference is outlined: the order of perception negatively lived by the absence of the other is transformed in an imaginary idealization, and this process is marked immediately by the seal of desire and correlatively by one of anxiety.[33] For, at its turn, imagination also induces the symbolic representation of the danger.

The refusal of the mother, which becomes periodical at the time of weaning, and which is unavoidable for the psychic growth of the child, is the positive expression of her watchful behavior with respect to the child. Nevertheless the child feels it as a threat for its own existence and the repetitive order of the world – the supporting moment of affective positivity – is inversed. The child is overwhelmed by the negative behavior of the other, which constraints it to withdraw to itself in the face of the indifference of the world.[34] Believing that it is abandoned, the child feels obliged to search for the pleasure, which the mother refuses to give and that is objectively positive. However, the child is not able to attain it effectively alone, except in the imaginary experience of desire and anxiety. The loss of the other induces the child to discover its dependence and the non-reciprocity of the stakes.[35]

We have to do here with a conflict in which the one and the other differentiate each other positively in the negative mode of opposition, and arriving finally at the Hegelian mode of identity beyond the originary and anonymous in-differentiation. Suffering the opposition of a "wicked" mother and the family which she symbolizes, the child realizes concretely its own relation to existence. Nevertheless, this first existential crisis is actually the crisis of the other in such a way that the other is always constitutive of the self, in an unceasing exchange, whatever the objective reality of the mutual behavior may be. Thus, the resistance is correlative to

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[31] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 78-79.
[32] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 87.
[33] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 88.
[34] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 95.
[35] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 97.

the action of the other as person, in this sense that the struggle for existence is always linked to the responsibility of the other. "We are part of that to which we oppose ourselves". To annul the other is to annul one's own self; to oppose each other in action is also to recognize the other. For the originary constitutive relation is not a fact; but it is an intention which can never be disowned. To do so is to disown with it all the cultural past that supports it. For example, a father rejecting his son confirms the symbolic illusion of such an attitude. Thus, the relation with the other is always one of mutual recognition, even during radical opposition.[36]

The child must believe in the refusal of the mother whatever may be the factual circumstances in order to enter into the objective differentiation which opposes positive and negative pole, real and imaginary, good and bad, true and false.[37] It is the beginning of a "re-flexion" on the world. The "affect" that is felt according to the rhythm of withdrawal and return of the other indicates the first step of the development of the child. This intentional situation reveals a universal structure, necessary for the existential development.[38] The *infans* becomes an agent at its turn and it must answer to the situation willed by the other in order to find a solution to his anxiety. Now, beyond anxiety there is the fear of being loved no more, and, thus, the necessity to play the role which can re-establish the prior situation; the child must be forgiven and find again the love which it has lost. We have to do here not at all with a situation of reaction with respect to an empirical stimulus, but with an intentional act that compels the child to choose itself in order to find again the order of personal relationship.[39] The structure of withdrawal-return, which brings about the definitive weaning, does not only explain the origin of a meaningful life but reveals the form of the problem itself, i.e., the positive intention to overcome the state of crisis in an effective action. Sigmund Freud has symbolized it in the game of the reel, the fort-*da*, the act by which the child mimics symbolically the withdrawal and the return of the maternal body by appropriating it bodily in an intentional behavior is a sign of life. Thus, John Macmurray sees in the active intention of the child to re-establish the true link with its mother, the positive expression of the act of existing – its "sense".[40]

Actually, the child has suffered the experience of frustration. It must pass from appearance to reality and grasp its proper affective error: the child has been mistaken about the maternal motives, which is positive under the appearance of the refusal. This first calling into question of its proper affective experience initiates the *infans* into the awareness of its limits; the child learns the variability of experience, the independence of motivations

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[36] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 98.
[37] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 98 ss.
[38] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 98.
[39] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 100.
[40] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 102.

with respect to the impersonal objectivity of the world. At the same time it discovers the positivity of moral consciousness and acquires by overcoming of the negative phase that confines it in egocentrism, the meaning of the cooperation with the mother in view of a new social mode.[41] However, between the motives and the intention, the child can turn away from the real meaning of its act and just play the effects. If the child is acting only in order to please the mother while keeping in itself the prevalence of the negative motive that opposes the child to her, or if the child systematically rebels against all her will, as a "bad boy/girl", the child gives only in imagination to itself the illusion of a solution.[42] On the one hand, according to a pacifying conformity, by obeying the intrinsically "wicked" mother, the child finds pleasure only in the imaginary life and in the world of ideas; spiritual life will appear to the child later as the unique mode of liberation. On the other hand, the child can take possession of the power, which is refused and give value to its own life by an aggressive action in all its future behavior.

These two modes of behaviour substitute themselves for the real capacity to overcome, by recognizing the originary conflict. They are nevertheless ambivalent because they are both dependent on a defensive attitude that is negative for the development of the individual.[43] Egocentrism, just like a too polite conformity, demands indirectly from the other to feel himself the one who is obliged; both reveal a narcissistic deception in the personal relation, which being indirectly unconscious hinders or even definitively stops the maturation of the social relationship.[44] This state of development is not in itself definitive. Not being structural, but acquired in the personal relations of the community, it is always able to find again its originary "sense" – the intention – which constitutes it in a mutual action.

AFFECTIVE COMPREHENSION: COMPARATIVE PHENOMENO-LOGICAL ANALYSIS

Until now, we have expounded the thesis of John Macmurray on affective comprehension and stated that personal relationship as the foundation of the radical meaning of every human life and behavior at the originary level. It is the condition of the intentional action, which gives its authenticity to the making of the person. At the second stage of this chapter, we would like to take up again John Macmurray's analysis while comparing

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[41] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 100.
[42] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 103.
[43] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 104.
[44] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 105.

it to some themes, which are present at the same *epoch* in phenomenology, such as in Edmund Husserl, Gabriel Marcel, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.[45]

John Macmurray and Husserl

Husserl has opposed idealism by putting forward the reality of the body and the notion of person as a "relational being". He has shown in his work *Ideen II* (1917), the manner in which the subject can live in an un-reflected mode by perceiving the world in natural attitude. In this state, the *ego* does not belong to himself; "he enters on stage and goes offstage"; and his acts – in the specific sense of the *cogito* – are really events in the flow of consciousness.[46] In this state, the subject, in the first place, does not begin by having the experience of reality at the originary level in relation to his own existence; but rather constitutes objects, tools, and transforms things in relation to his works.[47] Thus, he learns to know himself in acting and in suffering. Even if his every action on things is mediated by the body and his mind is conditioned by nature, it takes place in a causal relationship with nature.[48] While underlining the role of the body, in the sense where the "I can" is preceded by the acting which meets the inertia of things, Husserl still speaks in terms of consciousness having a priority in the process, and John Macmurray reproaches him precisely for the priority Husserl gives to consciousness. Furthermore, Husserl analyses the sense of intropathy by

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[45] "About the opposition to phenomenology in John Macmurray's philosophy: It is *only* against the very idea of 'constitution' as philosophical method in Husserl's work that John Macmurray fights in his work although he never mentions the concept as such. He denounces that phenomenological method as an idealistic approach which makes the subjective consciousness the centre of the all horizons of Being. On the contrary, for our philosopher, the relationship is first and constitutes progressively the consciousness of each individual. On the other hand, all the descriptions of John Macmurray's philosophy – in their relational dimensions – are going in the same direction as philosophers, such as Gabriel Marcel, Martin Buber, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who are in proximity with the phenomenological approach of perception and lived-experience, which involves the perceptive body, the tactual sensibility, and the affective encounter with its focus on desire and affective life linked in temporality and being-for-the-others in intropathy. Many phenomenological dimensions are present in John Macmurray's work, although he is independent from phenomenological influences in his analysis." Cf. The Letter of Ghislaine Florival to H.A. Carson dated August 17, 1992.

[46] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménolgiques pour la constitution*, trad. Francaisç E. Escoubas, p. 155.

[47] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 349.

[48] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 380.

which we perceive analogically the body of the other, as centre of "appresentation".[49]

John Macmurray and Gabriel Marcel

Gabriel Marcel is one of the first thinkers to have underlined the role of the body as mediator of the being-in-the-world as an existing being. It is the theme of his essay *Etre et avoir*, in the second *Journal* written between 1931-1933. For Marcel, the fundamental relation of the existing being to the world and to others is "presence" in "the communion of feeling". "If the assertion 'I am existing' may be retained, it is in its indecomposable unity, as translating ... an initial *datum* which is neither 'I think' nor even 'I am living' but 'I am experiencing'; and we must take here this word in its maximal in determination. German language is here more adequate: '*Ich erlebe*', in its infra-discursive unity, is not distinguished from '*Es erlebt in mir*'."[50] The existing being is affecting himself by a borrowed otherness which is not separable from the reality that "there is my body", the centre of reference from which the *ego* opposes itself to other existing beings and dissociates itself from them.[51]

Thus, like John Macmurray, Marcel underlines the priority of the *existentiell* with respect to the idea and he maintains that idealism may have remained without influence on the development of thought if it has not found a formidable ally in technique. For the progress of technique is also the progress of objectivity and, in the Promethean sense of the term, the progress of power, more yet than of the simple accession to having in the sense of "having a good time."[52] Moreover, Gabriel Marcel defends the position of the "second reflection", which does not fall under the criticism levelled at theoretical reflection, but which tries on the contrary to restore the concrete participation of the existing being to the world and with others. Besides, with Bradley he affirms the validity of a concrete philosophy.[53]

We find again in Marcel's work the thesis of John Macmurray concerning the distinction between person and personality. This thesis underlines the formal character of a philosophy of person which wants to be "objective" about the political and the moral domains, particularly with respect to social justice. In such a context the individual is only a statistical element, the anonymous "someone" who is "without expression [and] without face."[54] If the person is defined in history as the "subject of the act

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[49] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 334. Cf. also Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie première*, trad. Francaisç, vol. II, p. 191.

[50] Gabriel Marcel, *Du refus à l'invocation*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p. 26.

[51] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 28.

[52] Cf. Gabriel Marcel, *Etre et avoir*, (Paris: Aubier, 1968), pp. 21-28.

[53] Cf. Gabriel Marcel, *Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 34.

[54] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 151.

as act", it is only the mark of the personality which is thereby designated as its inneity (*Prägung*). Even the notions of confrontation and commitment are themselves deficient in their theoretical import. For what is proper to transcendence finds its place inside the relation of otherness with the "Thou", the other of the self, in the "act by which I open myself to him and make myself in some way penetrable for him."[55]

Thus, Marcel sees the foundation of the essence of every encounter in the personal "We" and intersubjectivity.[56] However, encounter is truly possible only where the "Thou" gives him/her as Absolute. "By a movement of decisive conversion, where the consciousness sacrifices itself before the One, whom it can only invoke as its Principle, its End, [and] its unique Recourse."[57] The calling coming from the other rejoins in belonging and receptiveness the mystery of the Absolute. Gabriel Marcel has not left the metaphysical point of view, but he discovers it through the ethical dimension of responsibility. The person is open to the mystery of the creating act of existing, in responsible action. It is also in the becoming of the *ego* before the other that the mystery of "presence" finds its place.[58]

John Macmurray and Maurice Merleau-Ponty

On this theme of the relation with the other, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his work *Le visible et l'invisible*, speaks of the radicalization of relation as "difference", taken in an ontological meaning, and which he calls the "vertical Being", i.e., the dimension and differentiation.[59] If it is still possible to establish a parallel with John Macmurray, it is in the function of understanding of the "relational" sense of the body, which Merleau-Ponty transposes as the modality of the "flesh of the world". However, without retaining the ontological dimension of this thesis, the comparison with John Macmurray is valid indirectly in the anthropological realm, with respect to the originary genetic aspect of the relation of existence and to the constitutively relational dimension of the existing beings.[60]

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[55] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 158.

[56] We find the same notion of encounter and intersubjectivity in Martin Buber, which he developed in his books: *I and Thou* and *Between Man and Man*.

[57] *Ibid*., p. 154.

[58] We can read in this dimension of the philosophy of Marcel an aspect of the philosophy of Levinas today.

[59] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, pp.157, 319, 322.

[60] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp.154, 183, 215. "The second part aims at underlining some similarity with philosophers such as Marcel, Buber, and Merleau-Ponty in the description of encounter and the importance of the primacy of relation. It would be interesting to try to discover the common foundation of this contemporary concern about *relation*,

PHENOMENOLOGY OF AFFECTIVITY[61]

John Macmurray's philosophy of affective comprehension and its focus on personal relationship and the comparative analysis of his thesis particularly with Gabriel Marcel and Maurice Merleau-Ponty confirm our own perspective on the phenomenon of affectivity as the development of the interrelation of sexual otherness. Hence, in this part, we do not apparently follow the philosophy of John Macmurray. The development of the interrelation of sexual otherness is not a notion expounded by John Macmurray. He never emphasises this problem as such. He only reveals that the meeting of the others in the otherness of the individuals. Our aim here is to develop further the analysis of John Macmurray. We recognize in his philosophy something that is induced by his concept of relation. All his descriptions give an indication about the otherness in the development of the child. In his time John Macmurray has given a very high value to the concept of person. However, the relationality proper to sexual relation has not been present as a primary concept in his philosophy. In this part of the essay we try to develop further John Macmurray's philosophical and psychological analysis that seems to be implicitly present in the movement of his thought, and which aim at discovering the interrelation also as singular otherness as male or female. Hence, the third part deals with an additional point of view where, though not directly present in John Macmurray's philosophy, but without any doubt is implied in his thinking and is a continuation of the line of his thought.[62]

The affective state of the existing being is inscribed concretely and imaginatively in the history of a life, on the basis of the first affective experiences. Thus, the "affects" of desire and anguish, in every perception, are articulated according to different degrees of qualitative intensity by virtue of that affective ground at the origin of life. This primeval affectivity

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not only as manifesting some influences present in contemporary culture but as pertaining to the metaphysical essence of the meeting-of-the-others, to the radical aspect of the relation as such. Then, my comparison in section B takes place to amplify the thesis of John Macmurray and to underline how much he concretizes, by means of his radical intuition at the basis of his anthropological description, some ideas which are without doubt actually present, but not already explicated as such in the French phenomenology." Cf. The Letter of Ghislaine Florival to H.A. Carson dated August 17, 1992.

[61] About this third part, I refer to my articles "Vie affective et temporalité", *Les figures de la finitude, Etudes d'anthropologie philosophique*, vol. III, pp. 86 ss. Cf. also "Phénoménologie de l'affectivité"; *L'affect philosophe,* pp. 102 ss." Cf. also The Letter of Ghislaine Florival to H.A. Carson dated August 17, 1992.

[62] Cf. The Letter of Ghislaine Florival to H.A. CARSON dated August 17, 1992.

gives the project of existence its intensive measure and confers on it all its singular modulations both positive and negative. At every phase of existence the body draws the affective experience – as a figure against a background – on the original "affect" and thereby it lives again implicitly its different dimensions (*avatars*).

Phenomenological analysis describes the constitution of the existential structures of affectivity – both anguish and desire – as borne by the two events of birth and death.[63] Thus, being polarized in the existential sense, the "finite" *existentiell* and lived affectivity of the body has been concretely constituted in an historical becoming. The first "affect" – that is situated theoretically at the beginning of life in the anguish of the act of existing and manifesting the "thrown-there-in-dereliction" of the existing being – is effectively recognized as originary only at the *epoch* of weaning. The breaking off of the affective fusion redoubles the intensity of this anguish, by rejecting the child definitively far away from the maternal breast. Nevertheless, this first "affect" is sustained by the listening to the "first word" – which always already has given to it its sense – because the child is borne by the maternal reception, which itself is signified in the family context of the interrelational desire of the father and the mother. In this sense, the "affect" of the word "heard" is the true affective foundation that shapes the first modulations of life – positively, in the full enjoyment of tenderness and negatively, in the suffering of rejection. In fact, this "affect" is originarily fusion-like *osmosis* of the parental field on the background of a nature fully oriented towards pleasure, i.e., it is libidinal. However, the separation of weaning deprives the child of this foundation: the child's discovering of otherness. Desire wants to come back to the lost "affect" – the primeval breast. However, it appears as affective tension that brings death – the regression that shuts up definitively the child in a fusion-like anonymity – and is vital for the commitment of his existence, which is as "having to be". Thus, *existentiell* "understanding" is radically permeated with anguish: the desire to be is at the same time death-to-oneself in the "project" of being.

Hence, phenomenology comes across with some basic ideas of psychoanalysis. The "affects" of anguish and desire give correlatively a foundation for the child at the first stages of life. They induce structurally the recognizing of the body: first by the reflexivity in a mirror that splits the self as another of the child in the imaginary realm; and second as effective difference lived in the encounter of an *alter-ego*, who appears as the rival with respect to the full object of desire, i.e., the "Other". However, jealousy is still linked to the imaginary status of the relation of the self towards the same. It becomes the effective principle of structuring for the socialized becoming of the child only when it recognizes the desire of the other in the

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[63] Cf. M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, J. E. Ribson, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), para. 72 ss.

differentiated duality of the parental relation. The totality of the project of existing depends on overcoming this affective crisis. In the measure the child gives up the omnipotence of the primeval desire by overcoming jealousy and anguish, it is able to leave the immanence circle wherein the child has been narcissistically enclosed. Recognizing the relational desire of the parents, and apprehending itself affectively as issued from this relation the child discovers his place of *infans*, and at the same time situates itself as a boy or as a girl. The child receives itself from this precedence of the parental desire, which is the aim at a personal sense and sexual differentiation. Thus, the child finds the sexual signifying foundation of its own bodily status. The sexual dimension is not simply a positive and biological fact, but the sense of the human way of signifying.

The bipolar aspect of anguish and desire induces the giving and responsible quality of the parental "affect" and condition the stages of the existence, by giving it the specific singular style according to which it situates itself in the world with the others and in the daily course of life. Through the effective resolution of its sublimated desire – by the recognition of its finitude – the child is able to assume the condition of the sexual "sense", and attain beyond adolescence, the relational power, constitutively reciprocal, and which poses the child in existence as a man with respect to woman and as a woman with respect to man.[64] The recognition of the "differentiated relationality" of the parental desire is affectively lived as real entering into significance, the signifying of the "sense" of life, i.e., in the effective relationship of the bodily condition, which Merleau-Ponty calls the "flesh of the world."[65] Through the affective experience of this "relationship" of sense, concretely recognized at the level of differentiated sexuality, the child is able to insert itself also in the chain of the signifying entities and apprehends itself affectively as already inscribed in language.[66] The sexual difference by which the project of being of a man and a woman constitutes itself in a reciprocal manner reveals the proper human dimension of "sense", the affective *logos* of the natural and cultural order. By "conditioning" reversibility of one sex by the other,[67] a man arises in his masculinity and a woman in her feminity. This sexual otherness is quite singular and more originary than the simply individual otherness. The "difference"/interdependent-existential-relationality constitute the relational becoming of the person.[68]

The individualization of a "man" and a "woman" constitutes actually a concrete affectivity. It gives affectivity its full concreteness by specifying

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[64] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 274.

[65] Cf. *Ibid*., p.324.

[66] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 224, 225, 316.

[67] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 274

[68] Cf. Ghislaine Florival, "Temporalité et vie affective"; *Etudes d'anthropologie philosophique,* p. 90.

it relationally. There is the co-relation between anguish as experienced by a man as a man or by a woman as a woman. However, in so far as it expresses itself in the way of being-in-the-world which is conditionally reversible, affectivity makes manifest the "shaping" of a sense, i.e., the "relationship of sense"; the sexual difference as real "difference" is also formal. Taken as such, this difference teaches the child the symbolic dimension of a sense relationship. By living affectively in the experience of jealousy the reality of the sexual difference the child discovers the meaning of the notion of "difference" in general, i.e., the notions of relation and "sense" in the concrete and symbolic meaning of the term. The child understands the signifying field, the formal relation as such, and that which underlies all forms of rationality.

Therefore, the relationship of the originary-sexual difference concerns not only the mode of sexual otherness, but also all the modes of social and personal encounter. The lived-affective- difference is the moment of emergence in the specifically human dimension and in the objective "signifying understanding". It underlies potentially the natural possibilities – the *id* as generation – and the cultural ones, according to all levels of expression. Thus, integrating the totality of the singular existence in the "existential difference", the sexual otherness is affectively reflected in all the beings that are encountered in the perception of things and even in the categorial and theoretical approach. Therefore, the truth of the cultural world – material, scientific, technical, and aesthetic dimensions of the different civilizations, in all their manifestations both in the ethical and political realms – has taken its roots in this "originary affective sense" which is the sexual difference. Thus, the objective truth of "sense" is constitutively relational and depends effectively upon the sexual polarity.[69]

CONCLUSION

Thus, having been led back to the "originary difference" we are in a position to conclude. John Macmurray defines person by the dimension of relationality, which enables him/her to exist in relation to the other in every action, as the "agent". The "You and I" constitutes radically our singular identity. It is our belief that the kind of otherness, which constitutes us the most originarily, is the sexual differentiation as opening of sense.

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[69] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 274. Cf. also, Ghislaine Florival, "Personne, culture et affectivité", *Etudes d'anthropologie philosophique*, vol. II, pp. 281 ss.

PART II

AFFECTIVITY AND TEMPORALITY

CHAPTER 6

FINITUDE AND TEMPORALITY

INTRODUCTION

Montaigne comments: "Each man is bearing the entire form of human condition." Again he says: "To philosophize is to learn to die." Thus, according to Montaigne, the sense or nonsense of death transfixes existence and constitutes permanently its latent horizon. For the philosophers of antiquity – starting from the *Phedo* of Plato, the Stoics, the Epicureans, Augustine, thinkers of the renaissance, Descartes, Pascal, Bossuet and thinkers of the romantic period – death unfurls the funeral and the grandiose spectrum of time which dismantles itself. Then comes the new dawn with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, who restore to man the powers of his destiny; and Kierkegaard inversely opens the abysses of renouncement. Here, we do not want to refer to all those figures who spoke of death; nor do we wish to take into consideration the more contemporary texts of Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Landsberg, and Jankelevitch on death.

What can we "say" about death? Discourse obliterates what reveals itself only obliquely in the break of daily life, in the creative or negative silence of passing time. How to face death as a philosophical theme? As a philosophical theme "death" is as significant as existence, even though the nothingness involved in death prevents its objective analysis. Although death is the universal fate, I can only speak of *my* death laterally as anguish at the final horizon of my existence, or analogically in presence of the death of others. Hence, one may be tempted not to take recourse to philosophical reflection on death and listen to poetic expression on death in the words of the poets, such as Hölderlin, Valéry, Rilke, or novelists like Proust. Nevertheless, as philosophers we cannot but philosophize on every theme including death. That is why Montaigne says: "To philosophize is to learn to die." So we dare to reflect on death in this chapter.

In this analysis of death we begin, in the first part, by describing phenomenologically the lived-temporality and its constitution. In the first section of this part, we make an attempt to consider the paradoxical nature of lived-time. Time is experienced and lived in the context of everyday life. We experience natural life as measured and measurable in terms of hour, day, week, month, year, and the flow of the cycle of seasons. Again, we speak of time in terms of the past, the present and the future. In these modes, we experience time as something within our control. However, we also experience time as something that controls us, envelops us, and the flow of which we cannot stop or control. In this sense, we experience time as perpetually overcoming itself and eroding everything that is living from birth to death just like the Titan who devours his children. Similarly, before we experience time as successive "nows", we have a foundational

experience of time, which makes us speak of time in a matter-of-fact manner. Yet, we find it difficult to explain the true nature of time. Thus, the lived-time we experience is paradoxical in nature. The second section of the first part unfolds the constitution of time. According to Husserl, the experience of temporality is a double crossed experience: first, the longitudinal flow of the lived consciousness, the *distentio* – the living present which gathers up the retentional and protentional whole of what is lived; and secondly, the *intentio* – the transcendence of existence-in-the-world. This double crossed experience of temporality is lived originarily as "feeling". Heidegger calls it *Befindlichkeit* – the originary feeling of the "Situation" as the existential condition of being-thrown-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty interprets time by embodying the existential dimension of the *Dasein* in its bodily in-rootedness, which is precisely the lived condition of time.

In the second part we deliberate on the experience of finitude as the problem of subjectivity. In the first section of this part, we make an attempt to understand the nature and identity of subjectivity in relation to its act of existing. As a finite being the subjectivity is a being-towards-death. Its life is outlined against the objective horizon of a fateful date. It is only in a recapitulation in thought on the act of existing that the subjectivity as finite being-towards-death understands the reality of its being in relation to the anguish of not-being-any-more. Hence, subjectivity understands itself neither in relation to the reflective order, nor in relation to the ethical order, but in relation to the act of existing of subjectivity, which finds its concrete (*existentiell*) manifestation in relation to the encounter with the other in the dimension of desire mediated by bodiliness. Therefore, until the structural character of the "act of existing" manifests the subjectivity, it is transfixed with absence as finite temporality. In subjectivity's recapitulation in thought about death – precisely as there no more being an "after" – it experiences death as the end of the whole of its temporality, thereby experiencing its true identity and nature as a finite existence. Having elaborated on this point, in the second section, we move on to consider the subjectivity's finitude as presented by Marcel Proust in his work *In Search of Lost Time*. This work presents the totality of subjectivity's finitude as temporalizing experience in which the story of existence of the author and the reader is unfolded in the movement of a literary creation and its end culminates in the death of the author, who takes part in the act of time in its pure state, without distance. Therefore, death brings together the disconnected poles of the act of existing being filled in the difference in the present unity of the self. Then the unified word will make itself silent in the pure act of presence as out of time in the "Instant".

The third part takes up the discussion on the phenomenon of death of the others faced with the question of our own last end. Here, we take up the discussion on the phenomenon of death from the phenomenological and existential perspectives. The first section of this part attempts to state that objective death is a natural and cultural fact. Naturally death is necessary for

the emergence of new forms of life while culturally death contributes to the benefit of the future collectivity of human cultural existence which is the sign of social immortality. The second section analyzes the existential structure of the phenomenon of death. A person has an actual intuition of death in the context of his daily life, when he experiences a slowdown of temporal flow of life in relation to his bodiliness due to physical illness, a psychological anomaly, and the like. Similarly, the actual experience of death of another person and especially the affective absence experienced in the bereavement of a close relative make us participate at the absolute aura of the "instant" of death. This experience of the "instant" of death, coupled with the realization that there is no longer an "after" of death makes one existentially experience one's own death. The conclusion states that the "instant" of death opens the existing being to the most personal singularity as authentically lived liberty and the "after" of death provides the effective solution to the absolute tension of desire, personal plenitude, moving beyond finitude, and all one hopes for. Now, we move on to consider lived-temporality and its constitution.

LIVED-TEMPORALITY AND ITS CONSTITUTION

In unfolding lived temporality and its constitution, the first section of this part attempts to consider the paradoxical nature of lived-time. In the second section, we move on to understand the constitution of time according to the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl.

Paradox of Lived-Time

Whether we like it or not, we live in time. It is always through time that we take a view of time, even though we can abstractly withdraw from the apparent passing away of time. The daily lived experience of time does not raise any problem. However, the fact of being the self-same existing being, despite the life transformations that happen to this existing being through its own actions and that of others does pose a problem. One does not call into question the identity of his "I" from his/her birth until his/her death; he/she also does not cast doubt on the proper experience of time in the course of his/her "I's" permanent transit between life and death. Yet, a philosopher does raise the question as to the manner in which an existing being maintains the self-sameness of its being despite the transformations and changes it undergoes as it passes through time. The objective world offers us the vision of natural life that is measured and measurable in terms of hours, days, weeks, months, and years at the inescapable rhythm of the cycle of seasons. We ourselves inhabit cosmic time. Everyone's life has its individual emergence, entrance into the succession of generations, and inscription into the course of the world. The concepts of cosmic time, biological time, lived-time, and cultural time rejoin each other in order to designate the proper modalities of the becoming of things, the punctual

fading away of instants, and the continuous yet more distant passing away of the past.

Heraclitus said that we never go down twice into the same river because each time we go into the river we do not step in the same collection of water. However, there is a symbolic ambivalence in this discourse. As soon as we introduce our point of view as an observer, time no longer appears under the form of an energy uprising from the past toward the current present in the expectation of the future, if we use the above-mentioned image of the river. On the contrary, it is the future of an inexhaustible source which comes up toward us, gives sense to the present, and gets lost in the faraway past. Thus, it seems that time is arrowed from the future toward the past, according to the image of a cosmic flow and at the rhythm of generations. Hence, time appears as perpetually overcoming itself and eroding everything that is living from birth to death just like the Titan who devours his children. As a matter of fact, we experience a double modality regarding time. The time of birth announces for us the creating innovation in its surplus of "sense". On the contrary, the time of fate sends us back to the disenchantment of the world: the Book of Ecclesiastes indicates this truth by saying, "Everything is but vanity". This is in effect the daily opinion.

However, if we want to understand time and question regarding the nature of the reality of time, we cannot explain it. This is because time is not a "real" and thing-like process. It does not appear first as an objective succession of "nows" that support things; that are passing away; and that punctuate every one of our actions. We read this on our watches. Yet, we experience time first: before we make any reflection on it from our relations with things and from our relationship of existence with the other people in the world. This becomes clear from the statements we make casually and in a matter-of-fact manner. For example, statements such as "I am in a hurry", "I am expecting", "I remember" and the like presume that we have already experienced the reality of time. According to Augustine, it is from this kind of experience while living the expectation of time, the promise of time, and the remembrance of time that we can speak about time and express it in a matter-of-fact way.

Having looked into the paradoxical nature of the phenomenon of time, we move on to understand the constitution of time according to phenomenological philosophy in the next section.

Constitution of Time: A Phenomenological Perspective

In his *Lectures on the Intimate Consciousness of Time*, Husserl opposes the scientific and positivistic determinism of psychology, which pretends to link together external facts and the interior facts of human consciousness – after the fashion of linking objective realities. Thus forgets the originary process that constitutes the immanent lived reality. According to Husserl, a true science of human phenomena should understand the

totality of experience and come back to the "things-themselves", in order to catch hold of the manner in which the scientific point of view – the psychology of the facts of consciousness – builds itself up. In doing so, we can know the limits of science in face of the richness of lived experience.

In order to understand better this lived experience, Husserl wants to analyze the essence of time. Now, we need to consider the method of Husserl to clarify the essence of time. In his attempt to find a method, Husserl accepts the classical philosophical distinction that speaks of three elements in the process of knowledge: knowing subject, acts of the knowing subject, and the known object – an objective thing in the world. Knowledge and "sense" about reality emerges when the knowing subject is open to the presence of the known object through acts of the knowing subject. Thus, the relation of intentionality between the subject and the object through the acts of the subject constitutes the knowledge of particular objects. Hence, thanks to phenomenological reduction and by placing the object in brackets the consciousness intuits the perceived object as a phenomenon, its phenomenality, and perceives the essence of the particular object itself. In the case of time, the perceiving consciousness through the intentional character of its perception perceives the phenomenality of time and its lived-essence. In other words, the "thing itself" of time gives itself to the immediacy of the perceiving consciousness.

Precisely herein lies the problem: consciousness does not perceive time as it perceives material objects; and consciousness itself is temporal. This being so, how can consciousness synthesize the temporal moments that constantly pass by? To raise this question more radically, how can consciousness extract time from the interior seizing of the lived moments that pass away? Husserl copes with this difficulty by taking first among the perceived objects a temporal object, sound. A sound, as a perceived object, gives itself to consciousness with some duration, either constant or changing; it manifests a multiplicity of felt-*data* and lived-apprehensions, which pass away in the mode of "one after the other". Sound, which is first a perceived object, perpetuates its felt-duration in the present immanence of consciousness: "before", I do not have consciousness of it; but, "after" I am still conscious of it for some time, and finally the whole extension of its duration "falls" into the past. When I hear a sound, I maintain its felt-resounding in the present; I "retain" it in my immanent consciousness with all its fallout toward the past. At the same time I keep the consciousness of the sound and its duration in the continual "flow" of time.

Husserl analyses the concrete experience of the current presence of sound as passing from the past, but as holding back by the present consciousness. For him, retention is the mode of temporal experience which retains in the present what has "just passed away". The sound, as resounding, remains felt as present in consciousness, but this presence itself is driven back continually by new retentions which push away the first ones before falling at their turn further into the past. Now, at each renewal of the present, the retentions articulate themselves with respect to each other and

modify their place in relation to this present, as the tail of a comet that moves away. This happens in such a way that all the chain of retentions at each new present holds back while modifying it; the initial originary sound sinks always more distantly into a past, while losing its intensity, as the pebble which sinks more deeply under new sheets of water. As long as I am conscious of a "flow" which marks the continuity of the retentional phases, which have occurred "just this instant", I keep all the extension of the duration since the initial instant of the first sound until the present instant. Again, according to the same process of embedding of the retentional phases of the past, the protentions of each sound that occurs articulate themselves with each other in the waiting of the future; and they prolong the present effects of the whole duration.

Actually, the phenomenological description of sound as temporal object is only an "analogon" used in order to pass to the analysis of time *sui generis* independently of every temporal object. Husserl proceeds to the reduction of sound itself. Starting from the sound as felt retentionally in the lived immanence of consciousness we catch what remains of the phenomenon lived by consciousness by a kind of specific and immanent reduction. Thus, Husserl wants to seize the temporal passing away immanent to consciousness not as the appearance in its perceptive and objective content of a temporal object, but as the "pure-immanently-felt" and the "purely lived" temporal passing away that is continually changing, and constitutes the outlined perspective of temporality as such, by embedding its phases in the duration. The originality of Husserl's thesis is to show that there is a double continuity of the modes of passing away. The daily impression induces us to believe in a kind of infinite regress that pushes simply the present toward the past and sinks uniformly toward the far away. Now, every retention – that holds back what has just passed into the present – is in itself also a continuous modification, thereby the sequence of retentions transformed by shifted mutations embed the whole process of retentions. Each one of those transverse sections of the lived present holds back the whole of the retentional past and the whole of the protentional expectation that is symmetrical to it.

All these retentional and protentional units constitute the living present of consciousness, i.e., its proper self-consciousness. Thus, consciousness is temporal flow; it constitutes itself at each instant as the whole of the lived units; and it is not only of the perceptive units, but also the units of remembrance, expectation, and other affective forms. At each instant, consciousness threads as horizontally the succession of the presents on the "longitudinal" mode of a flow. This flow – while keeping the same extension – opens itself constantly to the whole horizon of the past and the future, forming in itself a unity in the perpetual covering up of new presents. Therefore, the living present of the existing being temporalizes itself at each instant on the mode of a present which is "having-been" – pierced by absence toward the past as well as toward the future – and makes itself present to itself on the mode of a presence that is always in the permanent

movement of an objective time. Thus, consciousness is temporal and act of temporalization at the same time.

The temporal subject presents itself as the "living-present" – as consciousness of its own temporality. Yet, by what it experiences as felt – by the pathic dimension of the tearing apart of the present – it tends towards the future and holds back the past. Augustine names this tearing apart the *distentio* of the soul, in the Book XI of the *Confessions.* Now, what is felt in this tearing apart is itself made possible as pathic event only by the *intentio* which articulates – the temporal and spatial aim of the being-in-the-world – in so far as the existing being lives itself in its actions and in the perceptive encounter with things and others. Hence, temporality emerges in the consciousness only when this pathic relation is mediated by bodiliness.

Thus, time is not both primarily an objective real process which I measure and an objective succession of objective "nows" supporting the things that are passing. Nor does it arise from the pathic interrelation of the existing being with the others in the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*). It arises according to an intentional interrelation of the consciousnesses as open to the world. Heidegger considers this openness as transcendence of existence in the sense that the world constitutes for the existing being the totality of its horizon. The ontological difference of the being-in-the-world constitutes precisely its essence. Merleau-Ponty interprets this openness by embodying the existential dimension of the *Dasein* in its bodily in-rootedness, which is precisely the lived condition of time. The body inscribes our presence to the world on the perceptive mode of the feeling-being affected. Thus, by our embodied pathic presence we live; and the lived body – the flesh – is the condition of our encounter and affective relation with others. Consequently, if there is for us a "living-present", a consciousness of temporal thisness/ipseity, it takes shape only at the intersection of our life in which we experience each other as mutually affected. Time is the "sense" of life; it orients our passions and our anguishes; and it rules our actions and our works. This is what precisely makes the time of a life and thereby inscribes it in the more general unity of the cultural history.

Thus, the experience of temporality is a double crossed experience: first, the longitudinal flow of the lived consciousness, the *distentio* – the living present which gathers up the retentional and protentional whole of what is lived; and secondly, the *intentio* – the transcendence of the existence-in-the-world. This double crossed experience of temporality is lived originarily as "feeling". Heidegger calls it the *Befindlichkeit* – the originary feeling of the "Situation" as the existential condition of the being-thrown-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty situates it as affective expressive structure proper to bodiliness. This "feeling" concretizes precisely time as "sense" of life. Thus, Lived temporality constitutes the hiatus of the presence to oneself and the difference of the awareness of oneself to oneself. To recognize this is already to introduce the nothingness and finitude in the temporal presence of the self to which we turn our attention in the second part.

FINITUDE: PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVITY

In unfolding the problem of subjectivity as a finite existence, in the first section of this part, we make an attempt to understand the nature and identity of subjectivity in relation to the act of existing which consists in subjectivity's being-towards-death. Having elaborated on this point, in the second section, we move on to consider subjectivity's finitude as presented by Marcel Proust in his work *In Search of Lost Time*.

Nature of Subjectivity and the Act of Existing

Understood in the temporal meaning of bodiliness, existing involves the existential dimension of finitude. As mortal beings, we are in the continual overcoming of ourselves. In the existential sense *Dasein* is openness to Being (*Sein*), and radically this openness implies a being-towards-death. This means that our life is outlined against the objective horizon of a fatal date: death transfixes from afar the whole of existence; and this implies that existence sets itself up in the face of the "to be no more" of effective death. Concretely (*existentiell*) speaking, the reality of death raises the question of subjectivity – the finite existing being that I am. Among the beings the *Dasein* alone knows that he is going to die. Death confers a singular event-like position to the whole of existence and imposes to it its authentic limit. The individual subjectivity attests itself to itself by the knowing of this factual possibility. However, it is not something that is determinable by oneself. One may indirectly thematize his/her death in relation to the objective death of others – the other fellow human beings or by analogy the other living beings – which he/she experiences through intropathy in lived-behavior.

Now, we need to raise the nature and identity of subjectivity. What does lived subjectivity felt as finite bodiliness mean? Is it only in the encounter with others that subjectivity signifies itself as such for itself? Does not the experience of loneliness – which is only anonymous in the "with-world" (*Mitwelt*) – assert itself absolutely at the face of the moment of dying? Husserl in his *First Philosophy*, takes up the problem of subjectivity in its ambiguous reality of the un-reflected and reflected "I".[1] The main thesis of Husserl underlines the ambiguity of the presence of the present. A hiatus digs out in the present a "just passed", as present in the way of passing. This position of passage or relation deprives metaphysics of its traditional position because it transfixes the substantial presence with a kind of absence of itself. This amounts to saying that the subject cannot seize himself/herself in his/her proper foundation because he/she is just passed at the very moment when he/she reflects on himself/herself. If consciousness

[1] Sartre makes this notion of Husserl the cornerstone of his notion of the *Transcendental Ego*.

is open to the things and if it is always at the same time conscious of itself, it can never set itself up on the mode of the present. However, it can set itself up only on the reflecting mode of a return to oneself, in such a way that the active consciousness which thinks is precisely not the same as the one on which it comes back. Thus, self-consciousness is *time*; it is an action of temporalization in the movement that gives it to itself without ever being able to coincide with itself and to seize itself in the reflecting act. If it is present to itself, it is on the mode of the "having-been", as present made passed or possible to be. The "I" is always overcoming him/her in the "me", without being able to know himself/herself. Thus, the "I" is anonymous for him/her; and he/she is on the un-reflected mode and in this sense he is not.

For example, let us take my perception of the house. While looking at the house I set up the house without setting up the fact that I am looking at the house. I ignore my subjectivity in the act of my perception. It is only afterwards that I direct my look on the perceiving "I" that I have just been: the set up that has forgotten "I" as "myself" under the reflected form, which bears on the just passed subject. Thus, the active "I" is not conscious of him/her; and he/she becomes him/her only as a pole – the transcendent *ego* – for my reflecting act. The "I" is forgetful of him/her and cannot take hold of him/her except obliquely by a subsequent act of seizing. Therefore, the "I" cannot apprehend him/her except by a coming back to himself/herself, without coinciding ever with him/her in an objective present. There is a scission between the "I" of the reflecting act and the "me" which has just been present and which I set up in the retention of myself. In the same way, the "I" always overcomes himself in the "me" as future perfect, without being able to apprehend himself/herself except as proximate possible.

Hence, the existential ambiguity of subjectivity as presence to oneself is outdistanced from itself and rejoins the question of the temporal overcoming. The overcoming of the embodied "living present" of concrete existence articulates itself with the time of a mortal life. However, if we are in time and if by a kind of winding up it is our presence to ourselves, then time is a relational-lived-dimension of the "act of existing": it is at once active and passive as the proper reader of oneself. It is for this reason that time bears all the reality of our being. We do not look time in its face, unless through a kind of recapitulation – which Heidegger calls "anticipation in thought" – as to what an effective death means for us. Such a recapitulation in thought that the existing being as finite is a being-towards-death reveals to him the anguish of not-being-any- more. However, experience of finitude not only reveals that the time granted to us has the mortal limit, but also that time gives itself and exceeds itself always in the movement of transcendence. The feeling of relinquishment that expresses itself in anguish – in relation to which the existing being recognizes its finitude – is the originary suffering. However, this suffering also enables *Dasein* to assume the truth of itself in the authentic understanding of the project of existing by appropriating it in its specific manner. This understanding belongs neither to the reflective order, nor to an ethical order

in the proper sense, but as Heidegger says it belongs to the existential structure of the existing being.

However, the *existentiell* presence occurs in the encounter, mediated by bodiliness. It is from the recognition of otherness that one experiences the objectivization of the other in the world and the subjectivization of one's presence to oneself. It is the access to affective otherness – Hegel's "the time of desire" – that introduces the subject to itself. Thus, the subject's experience of his/her transcendence takes place in relation to the "desire of the other". Nevertheless, immediately the subject discovers the anguish of existing. In his/her presence to himself/herself he/she has to be in the perpetual overcoming of the self. The temporal finitude opens him/her to the multiple possible choices, whereas the nostalgic past of an undifferentiated whole lived affectively fascinates and attracts him/her in its death bringing regression. Therefore, until the structural character of the "act of existing" manifests the subjectivity, it is transfixed with absence as finite temporality. It is caught up in the double dimension: firstly, as exceeding existence overcoming itself all the time in the proper anonymous digging out of itself; and secondly, as open to the most impossible possibility of death. In subjectivity's recapitulation in thought death presents itself as the totality of our temporal horizon – precisely as there no more being an "after" – death experienced as the end of the whole of subjectivity's temporality, in the process subjectivity experiences its own identity and nature as a finite existence.

Having elaborated on the theme of nature and identity of subjectivity, we move on to consider the subjectivity's finitude as presented by Marcel Proust in his work *In Search of Lost Time* in the next section.

Finitude of Subjectivity: Proustean Analysis

Some passages from Marcel Proust's famous work *In Search of Lost Time* enable us to enter more easily into the phenomenological perspective on the finitude of subjectivity. The writer questions essentially about the experience of time. He describes its affective modalities in the course of a whole life, which he unveils at the end the essential dimension: the form of "time". The "lost time" announces itself paradoxically as the prospective object of the research at the occasion of a fortuitous and transient circumstance, taken from a trite moment of the daily existence. An aging adult experiences suddenly the effects of an unknown pleasure. You know perhaps the chosen pages of the reminiscence brought about by a biscuit – "the little Madeleine" – plunged in a cup of tea. It awakens gustative sensations of the past and profiles with them the whole process of lived memories and places – those of childhood and adolescence. Coming out of a kind of lethargy of a repetitive and depressive life, Marcel tries to maintain

the occasional evocation and sinks into the search of this mysterious affective calling.[2]

However, the novel as a whole is borne by the final reminiscence, which enables the narrator to begin his work. The end of the story winds up on its beginning, since the one who is living "the instant of eternity" discovers the sense of the work to be written and thereby the sense of his life as a writer. Finally this life enables him to transmit the message, to tell the "form" of time.[3] Paradoxically, the narrator and the author intertwine in the same temporal flow of life. The work of Marcel actually constitutes the novel of the novel. However, if the end of the novel coincides retrospectively with the first line of the story, it accomplishes much more positively. The real end of Marcel Proust is that he dies while revising the last proofs of his text. The author has put in perspective the affective and temporal unity of existence, as if it is always by the bodily feeling that we become actively conscious of time. Or, it amounts to the same that if the things as affective signs send us back to the persons and through them to the signifying dimension of time. It is by its affective, sensorial, imaginary, and symbolic anchoring that the body is living concretely its relation with the world and that the sense of time is arising.

Proust not only describes the man who awakens and lives passively, but also highlights actively the *existentiell* emergence of consciousness. More deprived than the cave man, the man who sleeps holds in a circle around him the thread of the hours, the order of the years and of the worlds.[4] At the awakening, thanks to the lived experience of the body and the senses, he orientates himself in space and time; but it is by the memory of the past places that he is able to situate himself again in a personal time. Thus, the lived time is not at all as formal: it organizes itself concretely thanks to the affective, imaginary, and perceptive mediation of the body, lived in the first person as an existence which is mine. The places of the remembrance draw again the relays of time, the different ages which have been crossed until the present now of the one who is awakened.

Another passage recalls the awakening of the personal story of Marcel. He speaks of the famous bedtime scene, where the child discovers torments of loneliness and separation from his mother. Late in his life as an adult the above-said deprivation manifests as jealousy.[5] The ordeal of anguish and need induce him to desire the intimate presence of the mother. It is all the more dramatic and death-bearing because it is marked by an interdict: "I should have been happy, I was not ... The sobs which I had [and] the strength to contain [it] before my father busted only when I found

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[2] Cf. *T. P.*, I, p. 46.
[3] Cf. *T. P.*, III, p. 1045.
[4] Cf. *T. P.*, I, p. 5.
[5] Cf. *T. P.*, I, p. 30.

myself alone with mummy. Actually they have never ceased."[6] The "lost time" is the time of anguish and repetition, in search of the same affective experiences. Thus, the years of the "lost time" confine the character in the nostalgia of the past and the nostalgia of the belief in the true reality – the primordial and immemorial beauty of nature. The places and things make sign as if the past is the guarantee of the present promise of happiness. Therefore, the successive loves of adolescent Marcel are in quest of an authentic salvation which adheres to the proper affective story of the self, from a same centre of reference: the Church tower of Combray, the one of the childhood. To quote him: "It was always toward it [the Church tower of Combray] that we had to come back, which dominated everything, [and] rose before me as the finger of God."[7] Now, more than things the persons get fixed with the distances – the dialectics of the "nearby" and the "faraway". Borne by their individual and collective differentiation, they evoke a series of profiles, which always correspond to the affective genesis of the subject. This one "reads" them according to the intermittences of the heart, "… a sequence of hypotheses unceasingly overcome." Temporal distances transform the memories as successive photographs and add the years to each other.

The years of the "lost time" have reversed the original march of time, where the child believes in the true reality of things. However, this results in enclosing more the subject in the time of nostalgia: it is never possible to be happy except retrospectively; life is made of "a great number of successive paradises ... but they are always lost paradises." It is on this background of weariness that suddenly the plot is reversed: the episode of "the little Madeleine", the other emotional manifestations, and the "correspondences" are going to untie the forgetting of the trite forms of the "lost time" while bringing about an unknown and unspeakable pleasure, until the moment when reminiscence re-conquers the distances of the rediscovered past. The whole life lived in relation to the Church tower of Combray are recomposed step by step by perceptive associations and concentrates itself in a cup of tea: "When from an ancient past nothing is subsisting, after the death of the beings, after the destruction of things, alone, frailer but more hardy, more immaterial, more persistent, more faithful, odor and flavor remain still for a long time, like souls, remembering, awaiting, hoping, upon the ruin of all the rest, bringing unfailingly, on their almost impalpable droplets, the immense building of remembrance."[8] Proust gives us to live this "originary difference ... which evokes an unknown quality of a unique world, which, if art did not exist, would remain the eternal secret of each one."[9] The art enables us to fly from star to star while remaining ourselves, to have other

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[6] *T. P.*, I, p. 37.
[7] *T. P.*, I, pp. 64 ss.
[8] *T. P.*, I, p. 47.
[9] *T. P.*, III, p. 895.

eyes, and to see hundred universes which each one of them sees and which each of them is. Thanks to art everyone can leave his negative loneliness of the "lost time" in order to recover in its essential truth a beginning of world – the birth of time itself.

The whole work of Proust presents itself as temporalizing experience. As a story, it is the story of an existence that winds itself up at its turn with the existence of the author and that of the reader, in the movement of literary creation. To quote him: "I understood that all those materials of the literary work were my past life." [10] However, at the end of the work there takes place the death of its author, as if leaving the time of life in "the instant" he is liberated and takes part in the act of time in its pure state, without distance. Therefore, death brings together the disconnected poles of the act of existing being filled in the difference in the present unity of the self. Then the unified word will make itself silent in the pure act of presence as out of time in the "instant".

Having analyzed the phenomena of temporality and finitude of subjectivity in the first two parts, we consider the phenomenon of death from the phenomenological and existential perspectives in the third part.

PHENOMENON OF DEATH: PHENOMENOLOGICAL-EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS

In unfolding the phenomenon of death from the phenomenological and existential perspectives, the first section of this part considers objective death as a natural and cultural fact. The second section attempts an analysis of the existential structure of the reality of death, particularly by clarifying the "instant" of death and the "after" of death.

Objective Death: Natural and Cultural Fact

In the empirical objective sense and in the scientific sense of evolutionism death is a natural fact. It is necessary for the emergence of new forms of life. The death of the human species prolongs its existence in the continuous transmission of the species. In the cultural and symbolic sense mortality means the permanence of generations. Properly speaking – in the archaic collectivity – the individual does not have a proper finality because he/she perpetuates ancestral life. It is the meaning Hegel gives to the burial ceremony, when he evokes the figure of Antigone, the sister, who ensures the continuous transmission of the family heritage. However, the objective observation of another's death and experience of one's death – as growing and aging announce it from generation to generation – is neither the end of the individual nor the termination of the human species. This is precisely because the ambivalence of individually lived death contributes to

[10] *T. P.*, III, pp. 899 ss.

the cohesion of the social group and, therefore, continues itself symbolically beyond physical death through the relays of generations. It is in this context the respect for the dead ancestors and prayer for the dead makes sense. Thus, the acts of remembrance of the dead ancestors – by denying the complete annihilation of the dead – thereby contribute to the benefit of future collectivity of human cultural existence which is the sign of the social immortality. However, in the Jewish Christian culture, the individual inserts himself/herself in an authentically personal becoming, even if he/she remains symbolically linked to the collective determination by his/her affiliation to the cultural context.

Having considered objective death as a natural and cultural fact, we move on to the analysis of the existential structure of the phenomenon of death in the next section.

Existential Structure of Death

Anguish is the originary suffering of the self that reveals the ontological nothingness of relinquishment and finitude. *Dasein's* being as temporality lives the *distentio* that surmounts itself continuously in the tearing apart of the presence to itself. However, the *intentio* – the openness of the intentional aim toward the world in every action and in every encounter – calls the existing being to project the total understanding of itself on the worldly background. It, in turn, fixes its temporal horizon though indeterminate due to *Dasein's* being-towards-death. In his lecture, *On Boredom* (1929), Heidegger studies temporality as the openness of the existing being to the experience of the "instant" (*Augenblick*) which is a moment of liberty. For *Dasein*, the "instant" implies his relation to Being (*Sein*), his originary temporality that is in opposition to the trite time of daily life. It seems that we have here a dimension, which concerns absolutely the "instant of death" as the authentic resumption of the accomplished originarity.

However, it is important to raise the issue of a person having an actual intuition of death. In the *existentiell* context of daily life, we meet with the inescapable experience of the temporal flow which everybody suffers in his bodiliness sooner or later in life. It implies the slowing down of life in its biological structural generality reverses the usual role of horizon which precisely overrides the act of existing. Similarly, the flow of life in its bodily dimension slows down in the context of a physical and objective happening that hampers activity, a psychological anomaly, or an illness. Other lived experiences, such as falling asleep – a reality which can never be objectified – and fainting due to a physical breakdown give us a sort of analogon of death, which implies the loss of all landmarks, all forms of consciousness, and the abyss of nothingness.

Nevertheless, from another point of view the temporal passing away and the irretrievability of the past are a modality of renouncement for the desiring experience, even if symbolically and imaginarily we keep a

potential and partial grip on the past through our faculty of memory. More specifically the death of others and especially the death of close relatives raise for us the question of our own identity. This is clear from what Augustine says at his dying friend's bedside: "I have become myself a question for me." Actually, the experience of death of another person in general and especially the affective absence experienced in the bereavement of a close relative make us participate at the absolute aura of "the instant", as if the death of the other is actualized for a moment in our respective horizons, endowing the question of my existing with an utmost importance. This experience involves not only anguish, but also the temporal breaking of desire and the consequent partial reduction of me into nothing.

Even our lived-time of the daily occupations – as conditioned by the worry in the existential sense – brings to our experience the most impossible possibility of existence, i.e., our possibility of not-being-any-more and its apprehension of nothingness. This implies that there is no more an "after" when the "instant" of death takes place and there is no more a future when the fatal date makes the anguish anguished. Correlatively, it makes an appeal for authentic actions, which in the acceptance of finitude places life under the light of its ontical truth. Paradoxically, this acceptance constitutes our utmost proper singularity in our most daily actions. Thus, we all have to die. This question of death that transfigures in the daily ordinariness, gives our actions their relief, and outlines them in the context of our whole life beyond the existential state. The question of death takes the value of a personal position that is authentically ethical. There is an undoubted link between death and liberty: death as the horizon of "sense" makes my life, but more than a fate it bears a "personal story".

To clarify the existential structure of death further, we need to analyze two dimensions of the phenomenon of death – the "instant" of death and the "after" of death which is our concern in the next two sections.

The "Instant" of Death. By an extrapolation on the Heideggerian mode, we take up again the emergence of liberty in the privileged existential act that makes the temporal synthesis of the past and the future, in the "instant". However, in comparison, on the anthropological mode the same lived intuition is found in the analysis of finitude of existing being in Marcel Proust. According to him, the "instant" enables us to overcome the elapsing time and to contemplate from outside time, i.e., time in its pure state. This phenomenon of the "instant" is quite singular: the *existentiell* ecstatic relation which links us in existence to the past and to the future disappears; there is neither past nor future; and the act of existing in-the-world and every project of an effective bodiliness are abolished. There is no more actual time; every temporal land mark is broken off; and "I" cling, as it were, to the entire definitive horizon of the self that needs to be overcome now. Here, we find an image that forebodes the act of total liberty of a life that constitutes effectively the most condensed essence of the person. In the religious context, this becomes the imaginary representation of the

"judgment" as the most radical, definitive, and plenary total presence of the self to the self.

If each of us can try to build hypotheses about death, we should retain so extraordinary a perspective of the "instant" in the ultimate sense of the word. For Proust, as in art, we should fly from star to star with the eyes of each one and with the eyes of the universe of each of them, as if life has opened itself to the horizon of the visible absolute which each one lives and each one is. However, if the lyrism of Proust keeps some proximity with the monad of Leibniz, it half-opens the doors of an esthetical absolute. Now, death convenes us precisely to the value of life by determining the limits to the length of our life. It decides concretely about the value of the period of time which may not be lost in such a way that every action takes an eminent place in the whole of existence and thus, contribute to its constitution freely as work. We are the responsible creators of ourselves. According to Proust, death itself becomes indifferent because the work realizes the subject who gives himself to it and it constitutes his immortality as long as there are human beings to read it. Perhaps we all are not writers; yet each life is in itself a work.

Merleau-Ponty – accepting both the existential interpretation of the "instant" and the Proustean intuition of the "instant" – discovers at the intersection of time and affective spatiality the "notion of flesh".[11] He adds the dimension of bodiliness as engaged in the world to the notion of "instant" as ultimate manifestation of liberty. However, like Proust, Merleau-Ponty remains attached to an esthetical vision of "sense". In such a vision, he finds only imperfectly the desiring dimension of the other in the ethical sense, the other remaining taken in the mirroring snare of the esthetical work.

Having explored the lived-tension of the future as un-decidable fact in our analysis of the existential notion of the "instant" of death, we need to raise the question of the meaning of the "after" of death. This is our concern in the next section.

The "After" of Death. In principle, the question of the meaning of the "after" of death escapes us, since death annihilates any possibility of reflection. Besides, according to Sartre, death is always out of sight because it is the un-reflected act, which cannot recognize itself obliquely in the reflecting movement. Thus, for Sartre, death has no objective place in a reflecting self that is no more; it does not exist except as the "in-itself" in the others. The Sartrean analysis on the "act of dying" does not concern pain and suffering in their biological and corruptible aspects, but it implies the act of essential personalization, i.e., death as essentially an ultimate

[11] Merleau-Ponty owes to Proust his discovery of sensible ideas, which makes him give significance to bodiliness.

experience of personal encounter. This stage is beyond any philosophical relevance.

However, in the course of the centuries, no question has been more debated as much as the question of the "after" of death. Some thinkers consider the "after" of death as nothingness in its pure state, i.e., the self definitively in-itself. The Stoics bring back the breath of life to the continuous time of the cosmic totality. Other philosophers, such as Aristotle and Plato maintain that the spirit is not corruptible. Therefore, they believe in the reality of the superior part of our soul and call it the *Nous*. For them, the human *Nous* continues to participate in the divine *Nous* in an anonymous manner. This is because ontological constitution of the individual being by the co-principles of body and soul is broken down at death and destroyed. Thomas Aquinas, thinking in same line of Aristotle makes the soul a substantial form that is a substance by itself. It is capable of retaining its spiritual-nature and the imprint of the individual bodiliness, after the death of the physical body.

If death provides a certain horizon, which though indeterminate makes us responsible and free for the existential choice of our life, then we are philosophically justified in inferring what constitutes the act of total liberation after death. This reflection – instead of imposing a term to that situated liberty of existence – may open to our existential living the key to a dimension of essential creativity. In all probability, this is the lived reason for people's belief that death opens us to the possibility of a new birth, a birth to the true life of the accomplished desire, and brings victory over human finitude. The question that concerns us is the manner in which we can phenomenologically give a representation to the meaning of death as such. The "instant" (*Augenblick*) of death – as the moment of liberty and as the total intuition of our lived temporality – can not only be the ultimate act which discovers the term of temporal existence, but also the act which inscribes itself as recapitulating act of a whole life that recognizes itself in the donation of its own being. Here, we touch the limit of existential ontology because the existing being receives its existence in all its modalities from this donation of Being (*Sein*). However, this donation reveals itself as authentic only through proper personal actions of the existing being, which draws from Being its value. For the above reason, we can say that in the dimension of love the final act of the existing being is situated. In fact, it is only in the recognition of the other in his/her objective difference and in the encounter as constituting mutual recognition that the truly ethical mode of the singular existence of the existing being can really emerge. If this is true, then the "instant" of death is neither the living recapitulation of the existential temporality, nor the *existentiell* temporality of embodied existence, but is recapitulation of the *existentiell* history of the lived body in the affectivity of the desire in an act of love. Only on this personal and value-based living provides the context for an authentically responsible existence.

The reciprocal recognition – which is mediated by the lived bodiliness in every encounter – gives each one his affective capacity for existing positively and for abandoning the narcissistic powers of desire of oneself as "will to power". The personal action of giving oneself to the other is no more linked to the masochistic form of goodness, but implies the acceptance of forgiveness beyond the gift, in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term. To give oneself in love to the other is to receive oneself from the other in the personal encounter of a reciprocal respect and donation.[12] To face death with this attitude implies liberating oneself absolutely from all forms of attachment to the *ego*. Here the assumed death of the dying man means to accept from Being and receive for himself the gift of ultimate existence in and through his total loving *existentiell* donation by his death. This free and radical abandonment of oneself to the Being finds its source in the desire of desire that is never ensured in existence, but establishes itself originarily in accordance with the desire, which always precedes us in human temporality. The originary desire – experienced prior to any love of oneself – is relieved in the course of existence by the implicit intuition of a creating loving donation. Death though actualized in the "instant" death, makes its effective presence in the whole life of an existing being, and gives to desire its solution in the absolute giving of itself, which is analogically absolute love. Therefore, human love is the temporal figuring of death. Hence, death is the actualization of an act of love.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we summarize the two questions. Firstly, by imposing an end to the action of finite temporalization, which is not open to any overcoming, the "instant" of death presents at once go the retentional recapitulation of the past, but outside any reflecting distantiation. It realizes the absolute coincidence of the self without distance, as the Husserlian *ego*. It is the free witness and actor of what constitutes the lived-totality of his/her own life, not as *cogito* but, in his/her most personal singularity, as authentically lived-liberty. Secondly, the "after" of death belongs to the *existentiell* finite desire and transfixes authentic existence in each free action and in each encounter. It is not expressed already by its teleological

[12] In this context, we can speak of the "dynamics of faith" which Christianity proclaims: Jesus hanging on the Cross reveals this dynamics of faith so beautifully in the last moment of his life before his death. Jesus' appeal to his Father from the Cross in desperation "Father, why have you abandoned me?" is itself at the same time the free and loving acceptance of the will of the Father. It is this attitude of surrendering faith that made Jesus to accept the Father's will, even though humanly it was very difficult for him, and say: "Father, I have accomplished your will" and "Into your hands I commend my spirit," and die with the satisfaction of accomplishing the Father's will.

significance and the presentiment of a *telos* – a city of ends – where contrary to Kant's claim the liberties keep the structure of their proper temporality and are anchored in bodiliness. Finally, there is every reason to believe that death is the effective solution to the absolute tension of desire, personal plenitude, moving beyond finitude, and all one hopes for.

CHAPTER 7

LIFE AS THE MEANING OF DEATH

INTRODUCTION

When Levinas met Heidegger at his Conference on "Death and Time" in February 1976, the former asked the latter the radical question: "Is there any other expression than being?"[1] Death is at the heart of existence and "one cannot fail to understand this, even if one wanted to," for it is the negation of being. This discussion goes back to the origins of philosophy and it is vain to speak of that over which no one has power. Yet while the moments of my life are between my birth and my death and they can be recalled or anticipated. To quote Levinas: "My death is an instant over which I in no manner exercise control."[2] This menace of the unknown is found in no horizon of experience, such as slumber or sleep that concludes a day. Time, as the moment, which separates me from death brings a last interval, which will be without me. Therefore, it is useless to take up the classical theses of life and death. According to Montaigne, one cannot know what follows his/her life because he/she cannot live the essence of that supreme instant of "passing through our door". Only hope can characterize the habitual subjective interpretations of death in the search to survive, or in the purely negative search for the negation of being. The first interpretation is pathetic and complaisant in the Hegelian sense; but the second is dray and resolute because assuming death makes us take on a sharper consciousness of life.[3] For Levinas, hope – which emerges from one's openness to God – is neither the desire to survive based on a subjective affective inclination, nor the submission to an ontological absolute. Hope manifests a surplus of the requirements of practical reason against all knowledge, and thus, it is "beyond being".

In unfolding life as the meaning of death, in the first part of this essay, we attempt to situate the Kantian analysis of death according to Levinas and his critique of fundamental ontology as ontology of finitude. The first section looks at the Levinesian interpretation of the Kantian analysis of death, by attemping to understand death in terms of the Kantian question: "What can I hope for?" Death is measured not by phenomenal

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[1] Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, "La question radicale, Kant contre Heidegger" et "Comment penser le néant" (Conférences des 6, 13, 20 février 76), *La Mort et le temps* (Paris: L'Herne, 1991), pp. 63-79.

[2] Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et infini* (*Phenomenologica*), (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 211.

[3] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, "L'existentialisme chez Hegel"; *Sens et non-sens*; (Paris: Nagel, 1948), p. 134.

time, but by the freedom of moral action. Though death implies solitude and mortality of being, yet at a more fundamental ethical level it implies the will of the Other. In this sense death is intersubjective and interrelational because death comes on me from beyond. This Other puts my freedom into question and that involves a struggle. In this struggle, I cannot prevail over this Other, and in this sense death amounts to a murder because the desire of the Other overtakes me in death. The second section critiques the limited existential notion of finitude, and views it in relation to hope which takes two directions: the phenomenal path of happiness; and the noumenal path of freedom/virtue. The divine Other/God alone can guarantee the unity of happiness and virtue, and ultimate justice for one's actions in eternal and immortal existence. Levinas also speaks of concrete temporal immortality in the context of the heritage of one's family because a father is in some sense immortal in the son.

The second part takes up the controversy of Levinas with Heidegger by recalling the importance of the concept of historicity in understanding the reality of the life-death relationship. The first section of this part elaborates the concept of historicity and life-death relation as it is found in later Husserlian philosophy of genetic phenomenology going back to the origins, to the world and life. For Husserl, this constitutes the problem regarding the notion of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*). The second section of the second part clarifies this concept as Heidegger does by building on the destiny implied in the future. For Heidegger, this implies the subject of the comprehension of being-towards-death in the event of happening (*das Geschehen*). The third section of the second part attempts to bring together phenomenological and historical interpretations of historicity and the life-death relation, and rethinks it in terms of lived bodiliness as presented by Merleau-Ponty. For him, it means understanding the meaning of life and death as the experience of bodiliness in the context of encounter (*Ineinander*).

The third part attempts to elaborate on life and meaning of death. The specific concept of bodiliness unfolds the sense of one's unique life as existence "between" one's birth and death. This, in turn, permits relating death back to one's personal life. There is no opposition between being and non-being, between life and death because the lived-meaning of bodiliness outlines the spatio-temporal structure of life against the backdrop of its absence in death. Besides, from the point of view of cultural historicity the dead survive concretely in the heritage of the tradition. Thus, death does not deny life, but it brings life's traces to fruition. Again life and death mix throughout a person's existence producing meaning between life and death, which in turn adds a sense of mystery to life. The conclusion states that there can be another interpretation of difference as differentiating the relation between life and death which alone makes sense. The remedy for death and suffering which appear between death and me is not to turn away, but on the contrary to pass beyond all that we bring to it. Others may menace our freedom, but it is necessary to live among the living.

Now we move on to consider the first part which attempts to expound death and finitude from the perspective of the philosophy of Levinas.

DEATH AND FINITUDE: A LEVINASIAN PERSPECTIVE

In this part we attempt to elaborate on the notions of death and finitude from the perspective of the philosophy of Levinas. In the first section of this part, we clarify the notion of death as understood by Levinas, particularly by considering the Levinesian interpretation of the Kantian analysis of death. The second section is a critique of the ontology of finitude propsed by Martin Heidegger.

Kantian Analysis of Death: A Levinesian Interpretation

Levinas stresses the dominance of being as "always meaning the event of being" or as "being the significance of meaning." "Despites its certitude, death is not reduced to the alternative of to be or not to be."[4] Here, Levinas refuses to understand the "finitude" of being-towards-death experienced in daily life in its original feeling of anguish. On the contrary, he wishes to discover a sense that questions more the sense of life and reconsiders the Kantian question: "What can I hope for?" His reasoning follows. Fundamental ontology does not exhaust the realm of meaning because it must turn to practical reason. Without doubt inquietude over God pervades in the whole history of philosophy, and even in onto-theology and the death of God movement, which lead humanity into error. However, in raising the question of the transcendental whole – which is never something given – Kant understands that the whole cannot have the being of a predicate and only the phenomenal order can be determined. Therefore, the transcendental ideal is not a proof of the existence of God, even if reason goes beyond the phenomena.

It is also clear that the death included in being-towards-death is neither something theoretically thinkable, nor is it the time before or after death. Yet, Kant tries to break this limit by contrasting the orders of theoretical and practical reason. Thus, he opens the space of the life of freedom to the consideration of an "after" death. Knowledge annuls this in time because the sense of freedom demands that a "beyond" death should achieve ethical agreement between virtue and happiness, which is realized in God. Hence, immortality is implicit in freedom; it requires belief in an "after-life" that has no theoretical tie with the ontology of time, even after it is conceived as an anticipative and ex-static possibility. Therefore, as proposed by Kant, Levinas continues with the dimension of hope inherent in practical reason. Hope does not come from the empirical order in the limited

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[4] *Ibid*.

time of being-towards-death, but on the contrary it emerges from the temporal surplus, i.e., "in relation to a surplus of being."[5] Hope is born of the sense of respect for persons – the sense of the rational *a priori* practical rationality – which makes us first of all responsible for one to the other. Death is measured not by phenomenal time, but by the freedom of moral action. This is realized as the determination of the will to act in conformity to the law. Thus, freedom issues from reason in so far as it reflects the universalization of the maxim. In this way, freedom in its exercise is absolutely independent even of God. The moral act postulates the existence of God as the Sovereign Good in relation to whom happiness and virtue unite.

Returing to the question of death, we must consider the meaning of that "other than being". Levinas calls it "the extra-projection of sense in a domain of pure nothing that it is impossible to think about." Having refused Heideggerian notion of finitude and having accepted the practical perspective of death from Kant, Levinas goes beyond this idea because he can no longer respond by reason to the question "what can I hope for?" For him, nothingness defies western thought because death is not a being, but rather it is something "other than being".[6]

This radicalization by Levinas expresses the unilateral attitude he takes before the problem of otherness. It breaks the "discourse" of hope by projecting meaning to the domain of "pure nothingness". This is the irreducible position Levinas takes in his work *Totality and Infinitude* with regard to the absolute inaccessibility of the face of the other. The infinite marks the thought of the other by the infinite respect we owe to it. It rules out all interchange to the point that the notion of hostage radicalizes the original violence which separates us and digs abysses that separate us from its infinite requirements.

The otherness is absolute. It presents a radical heterogeneity, which questions me before the transcendence of the face of the other. The self – as itself outside the distinction of the individual and the general and as irreducible interiorities – is not the object of a relation subjected to the power of signification; it does not constitute a system with the other as the object constitutes a system in a discourse.[7] In effect, the other, as infinite and absolute, opens desire as Plato has already said. Desire is the design of one who lacks nothing because it is the work of the one above being, i.e., the good-in-tself. Thus, desire is the mark of a being separated from the Infinite "whose aspiration goes beyond its fullness."[8] It is not a philosophy

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[5] Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, "La question radicale, Kant contre Heidegger" et "Comment penser le néant" (Conférences des 6, 13, 20 février 76), *La Mort et le temps*, p. 65.

[6] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 73.

[7] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 75-79.

[8] Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et infini* (*Phenomenologica*), p. 90.

of abstract thought, or that of a *cogito* which has the idea of the Infinite, but a metaphysics which puts the good above any essence. This makes Levinas say that "… the paradox of creation *ex nihilo* loses some of its boldness." [9]

The call of the Infinite is radicalized in the epiphany of the face of goodness: the law is not the limit; but it is the infinite requirement of goodness. Neverthless, because in the other the Infinite presents its face, the ethical resistance surpasses my powers. It is the other, who holds my freedom; "it holds the desire which comes from a surplus of the idea of the Infinite."[10] The other points to an infinite transcendence, sign of absolute goodness: God is the ultimate Other. This implies that metaphysics does not coincide with the simple negativity of being as totality – because "it is not based on the common level of a 'yes' or a 'no' to the work of negativity"[11] – but precedes ontology, which brings the Other to the same level. For metaphysics "produces itself concretely as placing in question the same by the Other", i.e., metaphysics is "ethics which achieves the essence of knowledge."[12]

In the same way, metaphysics emerges from ethics because death is related to the Infinite. Death is inscribed at the level of existence not solely as the mortality[13] of being, but more basically on the ethical level of a will that is based on the will of the Other. Thus, death marks my solitude "on the last part of the road which it will make without me." The solitude of the self is menaced in its being by a foreign will. In effect, the struggle is already the interval of transcendence through which death "comes and knocks." Further, Levinas adds that transcendence of death is always possibly a murder.[14] In this sense death assumes an interpersonal dimension; it takes on an intersubjective meaning. Besides, death is also absolute solitude in the imminence of a threat, which comes from beyond. "The Eternal makes life and death" and from this comes fear and hope. Therefore, Levinas derives from struggle – understood in the Hegelian sense – the deflection of my will from the call of desire. The other is the stranger who infinitely calls me, but the original violence the other resorts to amounts to murder. The eye of Cain looks at me in forbidding terms and constitutes my infinite responsibility. The epiphany of the face of goodness is the ethical demand. The other puts my freedom immediately into question. Thus, in the struggle, the enemy or God on whom I cannot prevail and who is not part of the world remains in relation to me as a will that is of the essence of desire. Its center of gravity does not coincide with my needs, but with the desire of the

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[9] *Ibid*., p. 76.

[10] *Ibid*., p. 185.

[11] *Ibid*., p. 11.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[13] Mortality is a concrete and original phenomenon, encountered in the death of one's neighbors and over which one has no power. Cf. *Ibid*., p. 208.

[14] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 210.

Other. As this desire remains in life, its extatic character supports an order of meaning in death.[15]

The philosophy of Levinas approches the problem of death also from another angle. Considering the sensible bodiliness and my enjoyment of the beloved, Levinas situates the plenitude of *eros* in life. It is not found face to face in freedom, but experienced more interiorly on the sense level. Femininity[16] conditions interior reflection. This is transcendence not yet of language, but of the irreducibly familiar sense of "you" (*tu*).[17] Enjoyment is found in the union of welcome and home, a union that cannot be objective from without, but a sensibility that is not blind to reason, but prior to reason. "Where enjoyment is the very product of a being, this is being born."[18] Engendering in love accomplishes the relation of self with self as the return to self that is immanent in the world.[19] However, the *eros* of the joy, which gives happiness, comes equally from the gift of the Infinite. It gives it the character of the choice of the child for the father, for the fact of "being his son"[20] in the temporal sequence of generation. Thus, death passes beyond itself in the infinite temporal filiation of choice.

Heideggerian Ontology of Finitude: A Levinasian Critique

Levinas rejects the Heideggerian existential interpretation of finitude. According to him, Heidegger's interpretation of finitude is so focused on being-towards-death that it does not open to any perspectives of hope and meaning. So, Levinas attempts at a critique of such a limited perspective of finitude by taking recourse the philosophical ideas of Kant, Sartre, Hegel and Merleau-Ponty, and in the process expresses his own view on this issue.

The absolute transcendence of the Infinite in the meeting with the Other calls forth a surplus of personal temporality and gives this interior perspective its character of absolute separation, with which the notion of intersubjective reciprocity or participation is incompatible. There is no reciprocal otherness in the *erotic* experience, and the *Einfühlung* realizes me as one elected in the sequence of generation. At the time of death, the interval of selfhood reveals me as a chosen person. In "Death and Time", the question of hope takes two Kantian directions: firstly, the phenomenal path of happiness, and secondly, the noumenal path of virtue. God alone unites the realization of happiness and freedom. Neverthless, there is a difference in the perspectives of Levinas and Kant. With the notion of hope, Levinas turns to an insertion of the Infinite with time in the *erotic* bodiliness

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[15] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 213.
[16] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 236.
[17] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 129.
[18] *Ibid*., p. 121.
[19] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 244.
[20] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 255.

of enjoyment. This reflects the immanent happiness of its definitive accomplishment in engendering the unique, the son. This elective point of life is the sign of my concrete temporal immortality. On the other hand, as the ethical freedom of the "I" is found in the epiphatic presence of the face, death is inscribed in existence as beyond the ethical act which infinite desire evokes in an "othering of being".

In contrast to Kant, Levinas reunites the life of interior experience as an interval of self between being and nothing.[21] On the aspect of enjoyment there is happiness which engenders; and on the moral side there is virtue. Ethics comes effectively from goodness as the "gift" and the power given, from which death cannot remove its personal meaning. However, the ethics "beyond" death has given its sense to the institution of justice in relation to a world that makes sense, but remains impersonal.[22] Let us recall here that some days before his death, Levinas discussed with Sartre the problem of hope.[23] For Sartre, death does not enter into existence. The "being-for-itself"/consciousness exist only in relation to a "being-in-itself" which it transcends. There is an irreducible dichotomy between "being" and "nothing". If there is no more of being-in-itself, i.e., the body in its situation as surpassed by the "being-for-itself," death remains "always outside". The Sartrian conception of death as a non-sensed is not radically opposed to the perspective of the metaphysical infinite, nor does it relate to a phenomenological position. If we reread what Merleau-Ponty says in his article regarding Hegel, for whom the awareness of death is synonymous with the consciousness of the universal, death is the negation of all particular given beings, and the awareness of death is only being conscious of an empty universal. However, if we can conceive nothingness only on the basis of being, then it is necessary to make concrete an empty universal, which is opposed to life. If nothing is at the crux of being one must seize in the awareness of death what surpasses it.[24]

Now the question is: "How can one realize such an act of surpassing?" The only authentic awareness of death comes from the experience of the other in the reciprocal relationship among human beings. If I am the negation for the other and I follow to the end this logic of a universal negation, I see it transformed into coexistence. This is what Sartre states in his essay "The Hope". However, Merleau-Ponty responds: "The other can be my rival only if he is 'I' and I find myself as another. I discover an awareness of life in the awareness of death, because I am from my origin that mixture of life and death, solitude and communion,

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[21] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 29.

[22] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 51.

[23] Jean Paul Sartre, "L'Espoir, maintenant"; *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 10, mars, (1980), p. 92.

[24] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, "L'existentialisme chez Hegel"; *Sens et non-sens*, p.135.

proceeding toward its resolution."[25] According to Hegel, certainly the truth of death and struggle transforms itself into the long maturation of history. However, it is the slave who is established in life in the world according to nature more than the master. That is why the slave understands death better than the master. The slave lives the anguish of being-no-longer at a higher level of consciousness of self, i.e., at the level of consciousness of humanity. One finds in Hegel this announcement of the dimension of history which later the phenomenologists understand as historicity.

HISTORICITY AND LIFE-DEATH RELATION: HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER AND MERLEAU-PONTY

This notion of historicity is at the heart of our search for the meaning of life-death realtionship. Historicity permits one to understand life-death relationship, the divergent interpretations which radically oppose being and nothingness, and analyses of life-death which underline the perspective of a sense that places truth at the existential point between the two as the point of difference "between" life and death. For Husserl, this constitutes the problem regarding the notion of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*), for Heidegger on the subject of the comprehension of being-toward-death in the event of happening (*das Geschehen*), and for Merleau-Ponty the experience of bodiliness in the context of encounter (*Ineinander*). Clarifying these notions according to these three thinkers, and thereby understand the meaning of life and death in terms of historicity is the aim of this second part.

Historicity and Life-Death Relation: A Husserlian Perspective

In his work, *The Crisis of the European Sciences*, Husserl describes the consciousness of the world as "consciousness of each one, which is always there *a priori* with a kind of certitude – one sole world for all."[26] However, Husserl critiques the concept of universality, whose purely formal character impoverishes the real dimension of universality in not joining in it the plurality of all the lived points of view. If the term "science" indicates the true sense of the common world it is necessary to rediscover the original intention which bases it and which enlarges the field to its proper conditions of possibility. This means discovering which makes sense not abstractly, but concretely in the operation of the learned. It must reconnect the principle of this science with the basic intuition of the "life-world", in which practice of the historical activity man is deployed on the basis of a shared social

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[25] *Ibid*., p. 137.

[26] Edmund Husserl, *La Crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale,* trad. Francaisç G. Granel, (Paris: PUF, 1976), pp. 285 ss.

universe.[27] In his article "Universality and *Lebenswelt* in the Later Husserl" Jocelyn Benoist underlines that the requirement of "intuitive fulfillment" present from the beginning in phenomenology here takes on its most immediate and difficult form[28] because its lived form as expressed by the notion of *Lebenswelt* precedes the universality of science. It is a universality that is already given in the practical order as the "life-world". Each one of us has the "life-world", "seen as the world for all."[29] The "life-world" comes from the natural attitude proper to each individual in such a way that it is participated in by all in a plural fashion. One faces a paradox: Husserl underlines the need for a perspective on truth which arises from a universality of the right world for all, but always in relation to the subjective lived-attitude of each.

We read in Husserl's *First Philosophy* – a course given in 1923-24 – that though the "life-world" is common, it is on the basis of a phenomenology of perception that one is able to open the horizon from one's own point of view. It can also seize in one's horizon the ensemble of the horizons of others and thereby comprehend the "horizon of all horizons". By intropathic acts "I have awareness as an *ego* in a sort of perception of the existence in flesh and blood of other subjects of whatever *alter-egos* having a copresent psychic life."[30] Living this manner speaks of their life of action. We can realize a reflexion in them, and by successive reductions disengage for each their perceptions, memories, and obtain the ensemble of their intentional givenness. Their fact of being present for one another designates an intersubjective intentionality: we can conceive specific acts of relation of "I-Thou" and the most diverse specific acts in communicative pluralities in as much as they constitute unities. Thus, there develops a community life with forms that are extremely varied, and a social relation that finally concerns all the members of humanity.

Husserl has constituted a series of phenomenological reductions based on the lived experience to pass to an *epoche* of the second degree. By a second reflexion he passes methodically to transcendental subjectivity. That second reflexion bears on the natural attitude and returns from conscious psychological reduction to universal reduction. It constitutes a broadening of sense vision in the measure in which – in one's actual universe – one adopts an abstract attitude concerning the objective validity of the world without losing "the ensemble of one's habitual capabilities by which the real world is constantly present and has value for me." This transcendental sphere permits opening each thing to its internal and external

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[27] Cf. J. Benoist, "Universalité et *Lebenswelt* chez le dernier Husserl"; *Recherches phénoménologiques*, vol. 5, (Bruxelles: Ousia, 1996), p. 28.

[28] Cf. *Ibid*.

[29] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *La Crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale,* trad. Francaisç G. Granel, p. 268.

[30] Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie première*, trad. Francaisç, vol. II, p. 188.

horizon.[31] This universal *epoche* becomes possible due to the essential particularity of my active life which at each phase presents an awareness of the distant – even if empty – a consciousness of the horizon. This creates anew and unceasingly in a universal manner being that has ever been or will be for me. Yet they tell us that the total present of my life encloses in its concrete intentionality (*intentionnalité*) one's entire life with that objectivity given to my perceptive consciousness. This includes in itself as horizon the universe of all the objectivities which have ever had value for me.[32] Husserl continues affirming that other subjects can carry in themselves the same systems of experience so that the real world reduces itself to a universe of intentional correlates of lived intentionalities – real and possible – of my transcendental *ego*. This transcendental reduction indicates an experiential certitude which should be verified in agreement: each practical world and each science presupposes the "life-world" and forms a contrast with the "life-world" that always already is and continues to be.[33]

What permits Husserl to form the "life-world" as transcending in his *First Philosophy* and as transcendental for all in his work *The Crisis in European Sciences* is the structure of the horizon. The structure of horizon points back to the non-visible of the visible – the "horizon of horizons" – which is given in the anticipative mode of an infinite induction.[34] The *Lebenswelt* is the postulated universal as requirement of the world and as the original opening with all its determinations. This world – as the correlate of a universal subjectivity – is not something given, but the horizon of the meeting in intersubjectivity "for all the subjects that can possibly be encountered."[35] Thus, the life of encounter becomes fundamental to the essential form of transcendental subjectivity to which belongs the transcendental intersubjectivity in the opening of the world to all transcendental subjects and to all men, i.e., to all cultures.[36]

Marc Richer has interpreted the transcendental intersubjectivity as the "symbolic institution". In fact, intersubjectivity as the horizon of encounter depends on communication of which Husserl has indicated only the "form" of universality: language. It is not the ordered language of logic, but a language of multiple worlds that is transcendental in tenor. This dynamic language expresses a meaning like presence; it can never be

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[31] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 204.

[32] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 222.

[33] Cf. J. Benoist, "Universalité et *Lebenswelt* chez le dernier Husserl"; *Recherches phénoménologique*, vol. 5, p. 33.

[34] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *La Crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale*, trad. Francaisç G. Granel, p. 15.

[35] Cf. *Ibid*.

[36] Cf. M. Richir, "La psychologie comme phénoménologie transcendantale, Husserl et au-delà d'Husserl"; *La voix des phénomènes*, Direct. R. Brisart et R. Celis, (Bruxelles: Fac.Univers. Saint-Louis, 1995), pp. 375 ss.

saturated – given the multiplicity of intentional and non actualized implications – because we know only very approximately what we live for and we have at most certitude that we exist.[37] Thus, we can see that the phenomenological perspective of Husserl in speaking of a lived transcendental intersubjectivity does not reach the transcendental intersubjectivity in the Kantian sense: the intersubjecive bond always manifests in a particular manner; but it always generates a generalizing horizon in relation to an encounter between all I am capable of encountering. Certainly, there is never a totalization of subjects, but it appeals only to the horizon, i.e., to the "effective sense" of a transcendental intersubjectivity. The structure of the horizon situates the original given of the *Lebenswelt* as its infinite surpassing, which arises both from the generality and from the concreteness of the lived singularity in each person.

What is lived is constituted genetically as surpassing the senses in the temporal movement of the given present, already carried out by non-being. Concrete existence is lifted to a transcendental intersubjective life. Thus, the single life in the interrelation participating in the same human "sense" is engaged in the teleological movement of the history of reason. The experience of humanity survives in the interdependence of subjectivities, tracing from generation to generation the sense of reason that is always at work in the endless transmission of the work of the institutions. As perceptive and affective existential rupture, death certainly is not "nothing".

Historicity and Life-Death Relation: A Heideggerian Perspective

Heidegger underlines the difficulty with the problem of life-death relation.[38] However, the thrust towards destiny contained in the notion of *Geschehen* enables one to relativize this point of view. *Dasein*, the being-in-the-world, is essentially being-toward-death. In the trial of anguish before the requirements of being without existence, the Dasein is placed before its own possibility for existence. It understands itself in measuring itself by the temporal horizon of its own finitude. Death constitutes the sense of its proper existing. At the same time "in the existing of Dasein there is already a "between" in its relation to birth and death."[39] Far from being an objective being the *Dasein* – in the active sense of existing – is between life and death characterized by concern and care. Consequently, temporality is its existential structure, which "assures the possibility of the understanding of being in the respective unity of the future, past and present."[40] From its

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[37] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 378.

[38] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Les problèmes fondamentaux de la phénoménologie*, trad. Francaisç (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), p. 329.

[39] Martin Heidegger, *L'Etre et le Temps*, trad. Francaisç F. Vezin, p. 438.

[40] Martin Heidegger, *Les problèmes fondamentaux de la phénoménologie*, p. 276.

beginning *Dasein* is temporal; it exists in an extatic mode as if "transported" toward a horizon. Horizontal-ekstatic-temporality constitutes the becoming of *Dasein* from birth to death.[41] The intentional character which, for Husserl, designates the essential determination of conscience, in Heidegger takes place in the movement of existence. By making itself transcendent it renders possible the understanding of Being (*Sein*). This comprehension is not an awareness of self as a substance, but an extatic auto-manifestation according to which I am the possibility for I exist freely. Thus, to understand this in terms of self-projection is the fundamental mode of the becoming of *Dasein* in history (*das Geschehen*). It is the specific temporal movement according to which the *Dasein* understands itself to the extent that the movement is historicity (*Geschichtlichkeist*).[42]

The character of destiny is the adventure (*das Geschehen*) of the existent being from birth to death. This is inscribed in intratemporaneity, i.e., in the temporal field of meetings with the world of things and others. It is tied to the wants of nature and to the destinies of others. The adventure of *Dasein* takes place in as much as it transmits itself in pursuing itself in "being-in company". *Dasein* as the primordial subject of history – in repeatedly transmitting the tradition – as one of the possibilities of its having been taken its turn in the struggle from generation to generation. The repetition is neither a reedition of the past, nor a limit imposed on the present, but the fact of the *Dasein* facing up to the "instant", present in the becoming of its being-for-death. This existential capacity of *Dasein* to be for death permits it to restore existence in the march toward its being-thrown/facticity. Thus, the historicity of *Dasein* is the opening by which repetition reactualizes the tradition in the present in function of its future destiny. It is properly the being-toward-death, but in return finitude gives sense to the possibility of authentic existence, that is to say, to the ethical life. In the process of its authenticity – the *da* of the "instant" – the *Dasein* encounters its destiny in which is found also the common destiny of "being-with" others. The process opens being-toward-death to its proper being in a worldly history which is also factual. Thus, death is the "instant", which definitively fixes the destiny, which was already inscribed from birth to death in the world. All the same, in the intratemporeity of the movement of other destinies lived in common the historical sense of the *Dasein* is prolonged beyond its past realization.

Hisoricity and Life-Death Relation: Perspective of Merleau-Ponty

Merleau-Ponty's notion of bodiliness with its focus on significant concreteness gives meaning to the interrelation of life and death. It enables one to grasp the central axis of existence and its distinctive perspective, and

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[41] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 321-322.
[42] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 334.

thereby to orient progress in the realization of subjective fulfillment. Consideration of the structure of existence as transcendence in the world and its works, and the genetic character of phenomenology of the later Husserl with its embodied prefiguration,[43] Merleau-Ponty holds the synthetic view that "I am a body which emerges in the world."[44] Here, the term "sense" – in the three senses of the term: sensible, direction of notion, and meaning – gives bodiliness its existential value because it is by the body that I exist as my own self. To analyse this one must turn to the notion of structure. Merleau-Ponty, building upon Gestalt theory and without taking a positivistic position, analyses the notion of form/structure according to the dimension of meaning that comes from the reversible movement between a figure and its ground. This "ambiguous" dimension of meaning expresses itself in the human behavior by emerging each time in a more inclusive manner, according to three levels of understanding: physical, vital and symbolic. These three levels are mutually inclusive according to the modes of existing they stimulate, according to equilibrium of present forces, whether physical, organic, or expressive. Thus, the structure of bodiliness is established: it makes sense in between the sensible meaning already anchored in the natural living being that we are and the culturally signifying expression which constitutes a being-in-the-world in its openness to things and to others. Thus, bodiliness is the conscious concrete meaning, which defines the behavior of subjectivity. It integrates meaning according to its modalities of sensing – the senses of the body; the movement – the directed notions of the body, and the expression – the signification of the body as gestural and linguistic.

Further, what makes these modalities to be properly subjectivity is the original narcissistic interweaving of these first manifestations. To perceive is to grasp the intersection of the concrete particular visible line and the basic generalizing horizon from which it separates and shows itself. This articulates in a reversible fashion all the other sensible meanings, which the bodily schema delineates: to see, touch, and hear. All are interrelated as a system of exchanges. The paradigmatic example is the fingers which touch each other without my being able to add up the reflexivity implied in this mutual sensing. It mounts even higher without ever being able to be made final. This lived "difference" of perceptive behavior is neither concrete nor ideal; it is the significance of the presence of bodiliness. The body itself is the "I" who exists in temporal and spatial movement. My presence in the world is the central point of view in relation to which things reflect themselves. These are perceived according to the movement their profiles trace one in relation to the other as figures on the

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[43] "Nous nous référons aux textes de Husserl traduits en français par N. Depraz"; *Alter, Revue phénoménologique*, N° 1/1993 : Naître et mourir, pp. 265 ss.

[44] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, p. 90.

depth of the world, and always in relation to my own point of view, which, in turn, they reflected.

This experience of originary narcissistic concrete reflexivity – that comes in sensing like a touching that is touched or a seeing that is seen – provides a mirror of the body to itself. This makes perception possible; it is the behavior as exchange with the world. The meaning signified in me as living bodiliness is only the exemplary expression of that significant interweaving of things among themselves, the "flesh" of the world.[45] The notion of depth takes up this notion of flesh to the degree that it reunites at once the temporal and spatial horizons. Thus, bodiliness as the concrete structure of being-in-the-world is a key notion. We find the notion of the "flesh" already present in Husserl. However, for him, it is a determination of the body tied to consciousness, and this notion of bodiliness is not relevant for fundamental ontology. With the *Dasein* of Heidegger as structure, the temporal extension "between" birth and death in Merleau-Ponty receives a fleshly basis.

The consideration of the notion of historicity and its connection to life-death relation in Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty leads us to the consideration of the life as the meaning of death in the third part.

LIFE AND MEANING OF DEATH

Bodiliness is this interweaving of organic life and symbolic expression which gives concrete orientation and meaning to life. The existent is constituted as an *Ineinander*, as a figure on the ground between nature and spirit. It is the organic physical givenness of natural life and its pycho-mental-symbolic condition that makes death possible. There is no opposition between being and non-being, between life and death. However, the "existant" is a sensed-structure such that the movement of meaning of the living body is found "between" nature and culture. On the one hand, the life of meaning is always inscribed on a horizon of meaning that is already there. The motor capacity actualizes this opening to the spatio-temporal field of the horizon. On the other hand, it is in the intersubjectivity of meetings that the bodily subjectivity situates itself in affective and expressive interplay through gestures and speech. Finally, all these movements of the lived meaning of bodiliness outline a spatio-temporal

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[45] Cf. Voir nos études sur la corporéité et le sens, "Structure, origine et affectivité"; *Études d'anthropologie philosophique* (en collaboration, éd. G. Florival), Louvain-la-Neuve, Éd. de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie (Paris: Libr. Peeters, 1980), pp. 97-119, Voir pp. 104 ss. Cf. also "Logos pathique et vie morale"; *Figures de la rationalité. Études d'anthropologie philosophique,* vol IV (1990), pp. 162-179, Voir p. 167. Cf. also "Phénoménologie de l'affectivité"; *L'affect philosophe* (en collaboration, dir. G. Hottois), (Paris: Vrin, 1990), pp .87-110, Voir pp. 93 ss.

structure of life against the backdrop of its absence in death. Like the preceding phenomenologists, Merleau-Ponty describes a reversible movement of time as the extension of birth toward death, between the future and the past, but for him it begins from bodily meaning as the passive synthesis of the singular existence.

If bodiliness is the place of bodily signification, it suggests an interpretation of death in terms of the meaning that fuses between organic life and its cultural expression – as the backdrop between nature and culture. Upon the death of the organic body the reversibility between figure and ground is annulled; it is the poles that last so that organic death is also mental death. What is traditionally the composite body-soul is annulled, no longer having concrete organic support. Neverthless, the sense that has been at work throughout the whole course of life and the structural difference as such that is the interweaving with a reversibility of poles, is the movement of meaning. This movement no longer has horizontal support given that the organic body no longer has a place in the world. Yet the power of the meaning that supports its movement cannot be abolished: it exists in the world of pure bodiliness. While no longer having a horizon and being incarnate in the depths of the world, in death – which is the rupture of the poles of figure on ground – it finds its proper meaning. Its worldly horizon being barred, the power of the emergence of the existential meaning returns on itself, drawing its sense from the original gift whence it is received. This existential sense reflects on itself, so that its own movement in the inverse exposes itself to the original gift and its loving light.

Thus, bodiliness, as my body, is reflected in an ultimate passive synthesis, which in some way defines the whole as the realization from birth to death, in the lived interrelation of presence and absence, at once personal and impersonal, and a special singularity.[46] While for Husserl the notion of *Lebenswelt* remains impersonal and transcendental, for Merleau-Ponty the notion of bodiliness is concretely singularized as itself. Just as, for Husserl the transcendental sense cannot die, for Merleau-Ponty neither can the structural force of the emergence of meaning which is consolidated as the life of bodiliness die. At organic death it is bound back to its original giving horizon, from where ultimately emerges its proper sense, definitively qualified as the "person". The structure of meaning personalized by its bodily grounding in the world is identified as a figure on the basis of its relation to the original gift of the *Lebenswelt*. It is on the gift of meaning which constitutes the basis of life that each mortal subject redesigns its own lived bodiliness and ultimately unveils its own personal dimension.

Moreover, from the point of view of cultural historicity, it is through the remembrance of those who pick up the life – which they inscribed in the temporal interrelation of historicity – that there is a prolonged, a chiasme with the tradition, the sense of a present subjectivity which remains at work

[46] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, p. 99.

beyond death, producing new cultural exchanges. Does not Descartes live today? The dead survive concretely on the heritage of the tradition, which leads toward new cultural modalities. The others, who have participated concretely in the same world, but in their own bodily mode, continue to make sense as having been in the affective and cultural-subjective history from generation to generation. Death does not deny life, but brings its traces to fruition.Yet, Merlean-Ponty suggests that life and death mix throughout the courses of existence; it is in the sense of an ambiguous production of meaning between life and death. A present without future or an eternal present is exactly the definition of death, is torn between a past which begins again and a future which it projects. It is then essential to the thing and to the world to present itself as open, to look beyond their determined manifestations, to have always other things to see. This is what one expresses sometimes in saying that the thing and the world are mysterious.[47]

CONCLUSION

The debate over life and death contrasts phenomenologists of finitude to those of infinity. However, there can be another interpretation of difference as differentiating relation between life and death which alone makes sense. It is here that the discussion can be picked up. In conformity with the texts of Levinas, Husserl and Heidegger one sees that they lack the emergence of existence as lived-bodiliness that is the emergence of the lived-relation, which constitutes meaning. Merleau-Ponty uncovers the original base, the differential and founding force of “sense” called "flesh of the world". In the context of the analysis of the life-death relation, as a rational instance that is singularly incarnate, a temporal beyond is prospectively engaged with significant meaning. Yet, the transcendence of “sense” produces in each the mark of the gift of its proper personalizing dimensions. Hence, in an instant, death confers retrospectively and in chiasm its own truth of life. However, one cannot better verify this tension than in the words of the philosopher we are living and it is here that we have our tasks. Meditation on death is hypocritical since it is a morose manner in which to live. The remedy for death and suffering which appear between death and me is not to turn away, but to pass beyond all that we bring to it. Others may menace our freedom, but it is necessary to live among the living.[48]

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[47] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 384.

[48] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, "Lecture de Montaigne"; *Signes*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), p. 265.

PART III

AFFECTIVITY AND CULTURE

CHAPTER 8

TOWARDS A HERMENEUTICS OF NATURE AND CULTURE

INTRODUCTION

Nature and culture constitute the object of a twofold analysis: one in terms of concepts and the other in terms of reality itself. The distinction between these two levels of analysis and their basic relations determine both our worldview and the objective value of any scientific knowledge. Is there a cosmic process which exists independently and in its own right – a nature (*physis*) broadly speaking – or would any positive answer to this question derive from the words of the one who enunciates it? If there is such a reality, it must be related to the meaning in which it is expressed. Again, if this is the case, how can one speak of "nature" without this very concept being bound up in the entire cultural history of his mankind? Nevertheless, the givenness (*es gibt*) of reality and its existence – the *cosmos* as such – obliges the mind to apply itself to the facts. How then can we justify the objectivity and, consequently, the value of the human sciences as distinct from the positive/natural sciences?

These questions have been widely debated for the last century in the history of western philosophy. We will review them with the help of two methods: the first – the phenomenological – which retraces the process genetically beginning from perception; the second – the hermeneutical – which concerns the problem faced by the historical sciences. Since in each of these methods the given cultural reality appears as the basic *milieu* of meaning, we need to treat the problem of culture against the background of this relational experience with the aid of the concept of "lived-action" (*praxis*) in relation to meaning. Hence, we attempt to elaborate our concern in this chapter in three parts. The first part focuses on the Husserlian phenomenological approach with the help of the concept of constitution. It attempts to analyze the constitution of the physical nature, the animate nature, and the reality of culture. In the second part, we consider the Gadamerian hermeneutical approach guided by the concept of cultural horizon. It implies a foundational metaphysical prejudice in every search for meaning. Following Gadamer, we present this point in three subsections: the first deals with the phenomenological link which connects prejudice with tradition, and through this to authority; the second considers the ontological link which unites prejudice, tradition and authority on the basis of the "consciousness of the efficacy of history"; and the third looks into the metaphysical consequence of this state of affairs. The third part of the paper deals with the *praxis*-approach with the aid of "lived-action" in the context of culture. We do this by working out a concrete realization of

understanding culture, not merely in terms of the general meaning of culture, but in the context of the historically situated existing cultures: east and west, north and south. In the conclusion, we attempts to take up the question of intercultural meaning. Hope for progress through intercultural cooperation would seem to lie in the compenetration of our horizons, in the inter-relation of a living plurality of meanings differentiated according to the differences between cultures: each is unique and nevertheless part of the horizon for the others. Now, let us begin by analyzing the constitution of nature and culture with the help of the phenomenological approach.

CONSTITUTION OF NATURE AND CULTURE: HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

In his work, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy*,[1] Book II, Husserl applies the theory of constitution which he has presented in the first volume of his work *Ideas*.[2] In this volume, he wishes to provide a foundation for the objectivity of the natural/positive sciences and to justify their unity. The first two sections of the work describe the constitution of nature on its material and animate levels. Both things and the soul as the form of living beings pertain to physical nature, whereas the dimension of the spirit (*Geist*) pertains to culture which is studied in the third section of Husserl's work. Following Husserl in this work, we make an attempt to consider constitution of the physical nature, the animate nature, and the spiritual dimension of culture. Let us begin by looking into the constitution of the physical nature.

Constitution of Physical Nature

Examining the natural/positive sciences, Husserl contrasts them to the sciences of the spirit/human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) and shows that they can be established only in terms of the opposition – already present in Dilthey – between "explanation" and "understanding". Whereas the natural sciences do nothing but "explain" on the basis of objective linear causality, the human sciences must be constituted in the function of an "understanding" which, in turn, depends on the lived realization of meaning. Husserl does not reject the objectivity of the sciences, but wishes to give them a foundation in perception.[3]

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[1] This work of Husserl was written gradually from 1912 to 1925, and was published posthumously after Husserl's death.

[2] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. F. Kersten, Book II, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982).

[3] Cf. Paul Ricoeur, "Analyses et problèmes dans *Ideen II* de Husserl"; *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, vol. 56, (1951), p. 359.

Let us begin with the constitution of nature as a process moving from matter to spirit. One might be tempted to see this merely as a traditional analysis. However, Husserlian analysis differs from the traditional analysis. For Husserl, the origin of meaning comes about for the conscious subject as the result of the constitution of nature, and hence at least methodologically it has a transcendental priority. However, the process of constitution is not merely idealism for two reasons: firstly because it sees consciousness as open to external reality given in experience; and secondly, consciousness directs its attention to the perceived object as its phenomenal correlate. Consciousness receives its capacity to signify only from the object given in perception, i.e., from the manifestation of the phenomenon in its own right. In this orientation to the object consciousness passes beyond itself to grasp, through a succession of profiles, the invariant sense of the object – the *eidos* – which fills up the object.

Husserl's first intentional analysis applies to nature. As his point of departure he takes a global idea – which has meaning for the mind – in order to elaborate the multiple senses/intentions found in the one object/nature. Beginning from this primordial correlate unfolding before the *ego*, i.e., from the universe as a totality of possible experiences, Husserl constitutes successively the thing, the body and the soul – material, living, and psychic natures. In approaching the natural object, consciousness first takes up a doxo-theoretical point of view to the exclusion of other attitudes, such as the aesthetic and the practical (*praxis*), thereby excluding all such factors as the beautiful and the useful. In this natural attitude, the thing/object is constituted in terms of the first attribute of nature in general taken in the strict sense, viz., the extension. Thus, "what is extended" has a form. However, this scheme by itself remains ghostly becaue it can affirm its materiality only in the function of circumstances which, despite constant variation, manifest certain permanent properties. Its materiality reflecting the durable essence and substantial unity of the thing constituted through the standard concrete causal interaction proper to normal and habitual circumstances by the *aistheta* which sensibly affect organic bodies. Thus, in sense experience, substances present themselves through multiple sense qualities to the intuition of the *ego*. These sensible qualities of the material thing "depend on the body of the subject having the experience".

To the relative stability of circumstances there corresponds a balanced organization of bodily dispositions which, in turn, depend on the motor and kinesthetic processes of the subject. Perception is always related also to the abilities of the subject. However, the body itself – as the condition of perception – is subject to changes that are produced or undergone, which can give way to anomalous states. This dependence regarding its changes underlines the physical character of the body as well as the contrast between the normal and the pathological conditions. Because a radical perturbation of perception calls methodologically for some recourse of others to the perceptions, Husserl's passage from the relativity of an object to the subject and from there to the objectivity of the thing is

regulated by what is normal in everyone's perception. Hence, according to Husserl, this actual inter-subjectivity becomes constitutive of theoretical objectivity. In this manner, Husserl constitutes the specific trait of the object – the objective space as a relational system of orientation – an ideal frame in which every form and every movement is inscribed. This is the physical and the mathematical space which determines the objectivity of physics, and is subordinated, in turn, to intersubjective determinations. In the next section, we move on to consider Husserl's description of the constitution of the animate nature.

Constitution of Animate Nature

Husserl, in analyzing the constitution of animate nature opens up the psychical order. Though a part of nature, this domain emerges from the material structure of mere things to which it adds the soul as a new layer of meaning. The *ego*-pole of the pure self has as its counterpart the animation of the body-object. Transcendental reduction makes it possible to bring to light both the reality of the *ego* as a constituting source and its parallel reality – the living body – which stands out from among things. Thus, the psychism is ambiguous because it is linked at the same time both to the objectification of a subject-object and to the level of autonomous experience. At this juncture, the analysis of the body as actually lived/living permits Husserl to rely on the field of experience which includes continuing temporal reality, the *ego*, and the concrete fragments of actuality it lives in its spatio-temporal context of the world. This "incarnation" of the *ego* poses the problem of interweaving the consciousness and the world in so far as the *psyche* is a flux rather than a schema or thing and, therefore, depends on the historical rather than causal circumstances. The soul is a quasi-nature and a dual reality "in which physical nature is elevated by a layer of meaning by which it is interiorized and made immanent". In this context, Husserl describes a double experience: the first, at the solipsistic level it concerns the body/the existing being; and the second, at the intersubjective level it is one of intropathy – the correspondence of our perceptions and feelings (*Einfühlung*).

The body – the reality that I am – is revealed in acts of perception which interrelate the perceiving organ and its action. Thus, my hand as touching and as touched constitutes a reflexivity in which the body is revealed both as an object and as an actor. As an object and as an actor, localized and spontaneous, my body is the basis of all psychic experiences. They are experienced in the lived space of my body which acts as an organ of my will and is linked to my feelings and intentions, thereby opening myself to others in intimate relationships. Though the tactile sense is not the act of touching and is localized only indirectly, nevertheless what constitutes my "presence" remains the point of view from which all other points of view are organized. As a thing the body has sensations, but it is also a center inhabiting a place around which things find their orientation. It

is not a natural object in the same manner as are things, but belongs to an *idio-psychic* order.

Husserl clarifies the difference between this original presence to oneself, the perceptive discovery in the appresentation of another body, and subjectivity present to me. The process of affective "transfer" allows me to localize in the other his/her own perceptions, as if I lived them in him/her and in his/her expressive and affective gestures. Through intropathy I am able to grasp the psychic life of the other objectively from his/her bodily expression. By a ricochet effect, I become an "other" for him/her – as I am also body for him/her – while discovering my own incarnate subjectivity. In this manner, my psychic and physical identity becomes also a perceptive and intersubjective co-presence.

So far, Husserl's methodology relies on the original lived-perceptions of things in order to move back gradually to the psycho-organic reality, and finally, by a lived-intropathy to actual intersubjectivity. This process of the constitution of nature is always related to the transcendental consciousness. Having analyzed the animate nature as perceived by Husserl, we move on to consider the constitution of culture.

Constitution of Culture

Husserl completes what remains ambiguous in the natural self by introducing the dimensions of person and community. He describes spirit (*Geist*) as the empirical counterpart of the pure subject with the cultural world and the *ego*-man – the objective self – reacting against the scientific *milieu* of his time which has naturalized man without taking account of the sciences of the spirit (*Geisteswissenschaften*). Phenomenological reduction brackets such a natural attitude and by changing perspectives looks disinterestedly into each human attitude. The natural attitude constitutes the person – the *ego*-man – as one appears bodily. Though not localized, the soul is considered to be so integral to the body that the psychic dimension is inseparable from the qualities of the physical body. Thus, the states of consciousness are seen to coincide with physical and measurable time. As susceptible to measurement, man is defined by the natural attitude merely as an animated being and a zoological entity.

Here, Husserl returns to the question of method, observing that the ultimate attempt to reduce man to nature produces a reversal of attitude which, in turn, makes manifest the absolute consciousness which constitutes nature. By "virtue of the eidetic correlation between the constituting and the constituted all nature must be relative". Hence, the transcendental reduction of man focuses no longer on man as nature, but on our life in common. In our daily life the world which surrounds us and which we inhabit contains not simply things, but objects for our use, works of art, literary products, juridical and religious symbols and institutions. The persons we encounter are members of our family, state, Church, and community – all cooperating toward the same political and social goals. The people we encounter are not

mere beings of nature, but beings of culture located in environmental world (*Umwelt*) which can be attained by the natural attitude. Thus, our convergent motivations bind us into mutual person-to-person relationships in common activities directed toward the constitution of works of culture. Scientific objectivity, in turn, is constructed on the basis of this common cultural world, which is the original and the basic context expressed by the term "*Lebenswelt*".

The other attitudes depend upon this constituting consciousness. Husserl returns "to the eidetic context of consciousness in its primordiality and plenitude". In the doxo-theoretical attitude, we have bracketed the beautiful and the useful – all that belongs to the practical, axiological and affective attitudes – whereas here opening once again to our entire context changes the way we look at what we experience. Husserl underlines the loss which had been sustained in objectifying the given cultural reality, reduced thereby to the same level of abstraction as the natural sciences. Psychic acts and states are treated inductively rather than as lived-modes of feeling and will. The objects we use and the social structures are considered according to their attractiveness, exchange value, or potential for conflict, so that in sociology human groups are analyzed in terms of causal links.

On the contrary, the new method converts our apperception of the world of things into a world of persons according to an intuitive rather than an inductive approach. To perceive our everyday world – in terms of the actions of persons with whom we are dealing – enables us to take on a continually developing meaning in a reciprocal production of "sense". This world emerges as the horizon of our mutual existences in which objects have personal meaning and, realities like the symbols have a motivating power. Thus, for example, a flag can be the sign of an entire people and it can bring to their awareness the range of the interrelationships they have built. Here, the person is no longer reducible to an object of nature, even if one finds one's bearings physically in the environmental world and in relation to other persons. He/she dwells in the sphere of the spirit (*Geist*) and the realm of intentional sharing so that the world is no longer merely nature – what is there in front of one – but what is organized according to a process of mutual understanding. In its evaluations and interactions the cultural world is based on the motivations which produce its meaning.

This world is not for one individual, even though it is through the *ego* that the others, each for him/her, exists within the cooperative action. To be a person is to be an *ego* freely motivated by the presence of the other. The world of persons manifests this capacity of social subjects for mutual promotion. This is true also in the preparation of people for the future on the basis of a living tradition as experienced through language, style and art. Science itself does not exist but is supported by the intention to learn through action which, in turn, is supported by reason and hope in what is reasonable. Thus, the environing cultural world is first of all an understanding of the universe of persons and from this motivating intuition

the spirit (*Geist*) descends upon "things" and permits the constitution of explanatory science.

Now that we have looked into the constitution of physical nature, animate nature, and the reality of culture by using the Husserlian phenomenological approach, we can move on to consider the cultural horizons by using the Gadamerian hermeneutical approach. This is our task in the next section.

CULTURAL HORIZONS: GADAMERIAN HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH

In his study of hermeneutics and ideologies, referring to the discussion between Gadamer and Habermas regarding historical science,[4] Ricoeur underlines the opposition between critical and hermeneutical consciousness understood in terms of Gadamer's work *Wahrheit und Methode*. This analysis is important for our reflection on culture because it introduces a critical conception of objective knowledge as tied to culture and locates therein the role of reason.

Gadamer's original conception of the impact of culture on science recalls Husserl's analyses. According to Gadamer, scientific knowledge is based on objectification and it supposes that the facts under study are placed at some distance. Ricoeur notes that this position of Gadamer reflects the influence of romanticism as a turn to the past, in contrast to Habermas who, in facing the same problem of objectivity, follows the enlightenment tradition of rejecting tradition. For Gadamer, history has no object unless persons are primordially related: we are immersed in history and this, in turn, calls into question our capacity for radical objectivity. In order to demonstrate this, Gadamer proposes three forms of distancing: the aesthetic, the historical and the linguistic. Focusing mainly on historical distancing, Gadamer places himself resolutely in the German tradition of the human sciences (*Geistwissenschafte*n), which is a new form of romanticism in the sense of Dilthey and Heidegger. This new form of romantic tradition enables Gadamer to rehabilitate the notion of prejudice, which has been disparaged by the enlightenment as authoritarian and opposed to pure reason. Gadamer wants to restore a sense of prejudice which is not opposed to reason. While the romantic solution failed by interchanging the truth-value of the two antithetic terms, *mythos* and *logos*, Gadamer displaces the question by redeveloping the meaning of prejudice.

Dilthey has first pointed to this in the essay he wrote to provide a foundation for the human sciences (*Geistwissenschaften)*, but he remained imprisoned in a traditional theory of knowledge based on the primacy of the

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[4] Cf. Paul Ricoeur, "Herméneutique et critique des idéologies"; *Demythisation et ideologies*, ed. E. Casteli, (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1973), pp. 25-64.

subject. Gadamer criticizes the primacy of subjective consciousness as a reflexive return to oneself. Ricoeur says on this point: "History precedes me and goes ahead of my reflection" and "I belong to history before belonging to myself."[5] This clearly differentiates his position, not only from all idealistic philosophies, but equally from philosophers of the Frankfurt School as heirs of the enlightenment. Thus, we escape from the traditional point of view which founds ontology on epistemology and, following Heidegger's fore-structure of understanding (*Vorstruktur des Verstehens*) look for what Ricoeur calls "the structure of anticipation in the very situation of our being in Being."[6]

This Heideggerian conception influences Gadamer, who notes especially its two dimensions of pre-understanding and temporality as the integral power-to-be of *Dasein*, i.e., the human manner of being-in-the-world. This redirects our attention from the history of historical facts to the meaning of Being, which is connected intimately to the destiny of western metaphysics. Following Heidegger, Gadamer underlines the structure of anticipation for "prejudice" is rooted in the history of metaphysics itself: the "history of Being" is the "prejudice" which is always already there; and it is the historical anchoring from where every reflection – especially hermeneutical reflection – arises. Analyzing the dimensions of this foundational metaphysical prejudice in every historical search for meaning, Gadamer presents them under three headings: first, the phenomenological link which connects prejudice with tradition, and through this to authority; second, the ontological link which unites prejudice, tradition and authority on the basis of the "consciousness of the efficacy of history" (*Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*); and third, the metaphysical consequence of this state of affairs. In the next three sections, we shall consider each of these steps in Gadamer's historical hermeneutics.

Prejudice, Tradition and Authority: Phenomenological Connection

The phenomenological essence of prejudice – pre-understanding – is linked to the historical character of human beings as such. This has been rejected by the rationalist critique due to its more fundamental prejudice, i.e., its identification of authority with violent domination. It is fundamental for Gadamer because authority belongs to persons: it does not imply a degrading act of submission, an abdication of reason, or a blind obedience; but authority is "the link through which we recognize in the other a judgment or apperception with priority over our own."[7] In this sense, tradition is endowed with authority even where it has become anonymous

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[5] Cf. H.G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1969).

[6] Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Du Texte à l'action; Essai d'herméneutique*, vol. II, (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 341.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 344.

because it molds our understanding and behavior: "Tradition is continually a factor of liberty and of history itself." Therefore, between reason and tradition we do not have a fissure, but a relationship in which tradition supports the work of reason by opening the mind to the realm of the reasonable. Between the spirit of innovation and the spirit of tradition there is dialogue rather than opposition as between understanding (*Verstand*) and explanation (*Vernunft*).

Prejudice, Tradition, Authority: Ontological Connection

Gadamer goes on to show that prejudice is legitimate because we cannot extract ourselves from the historical process, but must take charge of ourselves within this process. Though we must distance ourselves in history through a process of objectification, history acts on us through this distance and it is an illusion to believe that we can master it completely and render it objective. Because it is not possible to escape the effects of history in so far as a part of us is always engaged therein, history cannot be recovered as an objective past. Gadamer puts it: "An historical being never knows itself." On the other hand, there is no absolute limit because the historian can always take another point of view. Nevertheless – it is here that Gadamer's thought is the most interesting – the historian can never acquire an "objective vision". For, if we are to treat a text as an object, it would lose its intentionality and hence its claim to tell us by a word-in-act some living truth. The word cannot be understood unless there is previous agreement about the subject of this word; and without this it dies, crushed on itself for lack of a horizon of meaning to sustain it. Thus, Gadamer shows that history is not reducible to the absolute point of view of reason which contemplates all from above; and neither can it be reduced to the punctual analysis of limited facts. However, the horizon carries us along with it for we are implicated in it: the event is not a fact, but keeps its value as a horizon by which we are continually engaged.

Thus, we are not closed in one cultural horizon, for we can move to another point of view and to another culture. However, in doing this we do not cease to be ourselves, for then we would not "understand" what the "other" means. Though there is no absolute knowing, there is prior understanding because every point of view exists only against the background of other points of view. Thus, there is a fundamental "fusion of horizons" which has the form not of an objective totalization of all, but of living relationality linking one horizon with the other. Thus, Gadamer rehabilitates the prejudice of tradition as the horizon of my present in its openness to the future.

Metaphysical Consequences

The meta-critical consequence of such a hermeneutics is the impossibility of an exhaustive criticism of prejudices and the ideologies

associated with them. As there is no absolute horizon and as it is always from a tradition that our present position in history is understood, we are induced by a kind of criticism of the critique itself to speak of a living universality. This is not the universality of a totalizing and objectifying reason, but the kind of universality which in everyday experience founds the becoming of the world as an openness of the horizon. It precedes and envelops the very possibility of the sciences, because historical time of history is always already there: the historian/philosopher fights to distance him/her for purposes of objectivity from that in which they already are implicated. Gadamer's hermeneutics plays upon this methodological paradox by inserting distance in our understanding of the meaning by which we are borne along. Even our failures of mutual understanding become apparent only in this founding horizon which is constituted by language and art as the living flux of historical time.

***PRAXIS*-APPROACH: LIVED-ACTION**

In the above two parts, we have interpreted culture in its relation to nature from phenomenological and hermeneutical points of view. According to the above considerations the objectivity proper to the sciences of nature is founded on the "life-world"(*Lebenswelt*) which supports all cultural works. Further, hermeneutical critique shows that we are always involved in a basic horizon which changes in a manner which precludes any possibility of absolute observation. It is in the relations between our points of view that we differentiate one from another. In mutual implication we can take the measure of our own points of view without any of us being privileged over others in the historical process. These two methods – the phenomenological and the hermeneutical – have opened up the field of mutual cultural understanding. Now, we must work out a concrete realization of this understanding, not merely in terms of the general meaning of culture, but in historically situated existing cultures, east and west, north and south. This is the focus of this third part of the paper. In her work, *The Human Condition*,[8] Hannah Arendt speaks of "life-action" (*vita activa*) as the essential political dimension of the human condition. In this context she writes:

> Human plurality, the fundamental condition of action and of speech, has the twofold characteristic of equality and of distinction. If men were not equal, they would not be able to understand each other, nor would they be able to understand those who have preceded them, nor would they be able to prepare the future and to anticipate the needs of those who

[8] Cf. Hannah Arendt, *La Condition de l'homme modern*, (Paris: Calman-Levy, 1982). Cf. also Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

> will come after them. If men were not distinct, each human being distinguishing himself from any other being, present, past or future, they would need neither language nor action in order to make themselves understood. Simple signs would suffice to communicate the immediate and identical needs. . . Now man only communicates himself . . . and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings.[9]

For Arendt, the Greek city is the model of the *polis* – the place where free men are allowed to speak in the public market place (*agora*) and, through this interchange of words, overcome physical violence and bring it under control. The essence of liberty is in political action through the use of words. However, for people, to free themselves in action they must take initiatives so that something new happens in their world – something is produced through direct contact among people in the community. Persons reveal their identity in this work, which becomes the work of all. This active word is the mediation which imposes itself in relations with others; it is the place of interrelation and communion; and the *locus* of expression of freedom. By analogy, every particular culture is the product of a community and can be linked to the choice of a singular innovative action which promotes the entire cultural field.

Similarly, every culture presents itself in its proper historical identity as the act of a singular community. The identity of a culture is related to a tradition which precedes it as a horizon and is always open to a future understanding. This is true of all existing cultures. They are not juxtaposed wholes without doors or windows, but are co-determined in their relations to the horizons of others. Just as words are exchanged in a universe of meaning which already exists, in the same way cultures are constituted in the context of a "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) in which the singular points of view are interchanged. There, each one finds him/herself already engaged in the whole inter-related history of the world and implicated in the becoming of all humankind. No all-embracing view is possible because that is part of this history. Hence, cultures can in no way objectify each other, for as in a mirror they themselves are implicated in the horizon of others.

There remains, then, our initial requirement for the specific character of human interrelation. Is language this indispensable point of political action, the pre-cultural dimension on which every culture constitutes itself? In fact, we are not dealing here with a common linguistic rootedness – a syncretic basis of all cultures or some practical *Esperanto*, but rather, we are suggesting a relation whose pre-understanding enables everyone to remain themselves while opening in a reciprocal horizon to all others. Merleau-Ponty defined language by reference to the "body" as no more than bodily behavior elevated to expression through an interweaving of meaning by

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[9] *Ibid*., pp. 197-198.

which we are united to each other. From the point of view of Being, language is this relationality of meaning. It is neither nature nor culture, but the juncture of the two at which meaning is born.

CONCLUSION

In referring to the *Lebenswelt*, the historical horizon and action as operative word, we have linked together many concepts in order to describe the mutually related meaning of "nature" and "culture". "Nature" exists only in terms of man who, in turn, is understandable only in nature. Thus, there is only one meaning which gradually unfolds itself. This meaning is the radical outcome of the phenomenological and hermeneutic methods themselves. It is elaborated through a lived-temporality which exists, in turn, within the cosmic givenness of time. In fact, persons in nature alone are capable of encompassing in one glance this becoming from which they emerge and on the basis of which the whole cultural process progressively takes shape. Nevertheless, the problem of time clings to the *cosmos*. Kant – in the preface of his work, *General History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens* – says: "Give me matter and I will build from it a world, that is to say, give me matter and I will show you how the world has emerged."[10]

However, it is always from my lived-time from the present word that I re-read the meaning of history, the paleontological meaning from where we draw our present reality. It is always from a world which is already acquired culturally and from a language which is already constituted that we can designate what nature and matter are. Thus, the "in-itself" is only an idea projected backwards through a time that is already full of meaning.

The same reasoning with respect to cultural action suggests a similar process of reverse constitution for cultures. Just as the origin of time has meaning only with respect to the present, so also it is from the present that the looking-backward tries to recover the archeology of the first man or the appearance of the first atom. Similarly, we can change the present only on the basis of a future which calls us to self-understanding. Hope for progress through intercultural cooperation seems to lie in the compenetration of our horizons, in the inter-relation of a living plurality of meanings differentiated according to the differences between cultures: each is unique and nevertheless part of the horizon for the others. Is not this metaphor of meaning that is to come, and which manifests itself as the progressive unfolding of historical time, that pole of every human action which Kant called the "City of Ends"?

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[10] Cf. Emmanuel Kant, "Preface"; *Allgemeine Naturgescbichte und Theorie des Himmels*, (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1898).

CHAPTER 9

CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

The paradox of philosophy is well known: its task is to know the world and to recapture experience in the realm of concept. However, it cannot succeed in this project by leaving out any singular point of view in order to place itself at the level of the totality. When we consider philosophy as the absolute knowing it transcends the world. In doing this, philosophy brings itself down in the eyes of the common opinion: it is seen as proposing a vain discourse; and it is viewed as an escape out of the world of lived-experience. Does it not, then, belong to another order as one of an "intra-worldly" understanding of singularities?[1] Does it mean that philosophy brings the slowing down of life? Or on the contrary, is philosophy the only criterion that can help us to seize the finitude of life? In fact, the naïve course of daily life conceals from us the finitude because "God, the absolute creator, is yet not the same who commands and saves."[2] If the naïve consciousness tries to give itself security and certitude in its metaphysical representation, it nullifies itself as un-signifying language, as pure anthropocentric form of its own desire of being. Nevertheless, it is metaphysics that teaches us in the course of the centuries – from the medieval period until now – by inducing us to give an account of that central point of view which is our own subjectivity. Denouncing the age of technique, which has lost the authenticity of existence by producing the objective almightiness of reason, Heidegger wants to give back to existence its sense beyond its wandering and the forgetting of its own destiny.[3]

Having considered the nature of philosophical questioning in general, by way of introduction, firstly we move on consider the problem of questioning about cultures. Reflection on culture has opened the significance of eastern cultures presenting worldviews different from that of the western culture. Western thinking from its origins up to the present has been indebted to eastern cultures, though it has not been publically acknowledged and fully accepted. The hermeneutical method proposed by Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas, and phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others have given us the right approach to raise questions about cultures. Secondly, having

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[1] Cf. J. Patocka, *Liberté et sacrifice*, (Paris: Millon, 1990), pp. 14 ss.

[2] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[3] Cf. Martin Heidegger, "La question de la technique"; *Essais et conferences*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), pp. 9-48.

acknowledged the hermeneutical-phenomenological approach in understanding cultures, we move on to the actual interpretation of a cultural tradition. The interpretation of a cultural tradition implies finding again the lived-modalities of the past and read them in relation to the new horizon in which concerns about building the future is open for the present. This is done, as Heidegger has done, in relation to the historicity of *Dasein*: it calls for a cultural tradition being understood in relation to *Dasein's* thrown-existence as the "having-been", lived in relation to the present, being open to the future, and shared with others of the same generation as a common destiny.

This temporal nature of interpretation of the cultural tradition takes us to the consideration of historical dimension of the cultural tradition in the third section. The historicity of the *Dasein* is the historicity of the world because *Dasein* is primarily historical and the world is secondarily historical as the ground. History designates the transformations and the destinies of men, human groups and their civilizations. It is the "adventure" of *Dasein* that *has* happened, that *has-been* transmitted, and that continues always in *Dasein's* being-with-others. In this sense, a cultural tradition is the actual expression of the history of *Dasein* in his "Situation" with others; it has the origin from the past and continues all in one piece with a becoming. In the fourth section, we take up for consideration the question of cultural difference which implies plurality of cultures. In unfolding the reality of cultural difference and plurality of cultures further, we consider cultural difference as the basis of human condition, cultural difference as related to human persons and cultural difference as related to cultural values. The conclusion says that the ontological foundation of our living together as persons in a relation of encounter with the other is the encounter of cultures. Just as persons are interrelational, cultures are interrelational. Therefore, they do not belong any more to the horizonal order of a single "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*), but to the plurality emerging from the very movement of the operating difference among different cultures. Now we move on to raise the issue of questioning about cultures in the next section.

QUESTIONING ABOUT CULTURES

Modern questioning about cultures receives its meaning precisely in relation to the general philosophical questioning in the particular context of western philosophy, which has always articulated itself according to the resources of philosophical reflection and conceptual thinking. Faced with the growing supremacy of technology today, philosophy has discovered in recent times the contribution of other worldviews and cultures other than the western culture. In fact, these cultures never ceased to make present "what remains un-thought by reason", as the truth of *life*, while western philosophy – having never tried to think of this "what remains un-thought by reason" – gives itself to a discursive interpretation of reality. Therefore, it is important for the western philosopher who wants to become initiated

into the conceptions presented by other cultures to make use of the means afforded by history, customs, civilization and other cultures. Merleau-Ponty, in his introduction to *Les philosophes célèbres*, says that the relationship of the Chinese philosopher with the world is a "fascination", into which it is not possible for one to enter half-way because the Chinese philosophy "revolves around the same immemorial world which it does not try to think but to make present."[4]

It is an over-simplification of the problem to radicalize the separation between the two cultures – the east and the west – because the western philosophy, coming from the Hellenistic world, has not been without living relations with the east: the Greek world, under another aspect of itself, has been living from the symbolic contributions and beliefs of the east. Heraclites and Pythagoras provide us with a trace of that dimension of the Greek culture, which has lasted until now under different forms. This message of life has already been understood by some philosophers in the middle ages, such as John Scotus Erigena and Meister Eckhart. Similarly, we find such influence of the east on some thinkers of the renaissance period. In the modern and the contemporary periods, there are thinkers like Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche who have acknowledged the significance of the east and have criticized the western thinking in this regard.

However, the logical reason owes its proper specificity to Roman civilization, more than to ancient Greece. The patriarchal and juridical structures of Roman culture has marked its imprint on Christian culture and its institutions, the political organization of the European nations, and on the organization of the "Roman" Church. By giving to itself the representative consciousness of itself, western cultural and philosophical thinking has kept at distance all that belongs to the register of imagination, affectivity, and the world of symbols. Today, it recognizes the lack of those dimensions inside its own manifestations (*avatars*). Being subjected to the impact of a process of technological universalization, western thinking recognizes itself as being engaged in a world born from the ideal of universal mathematization, and finds itself being challenged for the first time by its own culture. The contribution – of the scientific discoveries and the link with the incredible possibilities of modern technologies – provokes a cultural revolution that can transform the whole socio-economic-cultural infrastructures of all countries. Besides, it makes use of the multinational forces and the mass media in order to implant in its ideological struggle a neo-liberalism at a planetary scale.

These new *data* have contributed to the conflicts of influence from the west to the east, and recently to the unification of the blocs, giving way to a new form of co-existence. By becoming the economic super-power

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[4] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, "L`Orient et la Philosophie"; *Les philosophes célèbres*, p. 15.

before of the third-world countries, the west has believed that it is able to make all the nations of the world into the field of its influence. However, by a kind of backlash, and in the frame of an unavoidable co-existence, the message of the other cultures has brought the west to recognize its own image. Despite this, the encounter of the west with the east is shaped more by the demands of productivity rather than by the ethics of mutual recognizing. This, in turn, has revealed to Europe the limits and the fragility of its own cultural empire. Other nations and other continents are now presenting other worldviews, which philosophy must soon assimilate. In the course of past centuries, there have been beginnings of encounter and cultural exchanges between the west and the east: for instance, the great invasions of the fifth century; the discoveries of America and India; the discovery of the east in general and in particular the immense empire, China. When the first missionaries have come from the west to the east, the cultural encounters have always been mediatory of recognizing. However, it has been most of the time in the juxtaposition of the modes of life without real cultural implication taking place, on both sides. It is the phenomenon of technological planetarization that has brought about a political universality of nations and has forced the west to abandon its autarkical point of view. Given this worldwide phenomenon, philosophy also must be able to adopt the measure of an "enlarged reason", which Husserl sees as the *telos* of the whole mankind. For Husserl, the philosophers are the "state servants of mankind."[5]

In the last century, hermeneutics has already introduced the method of interpretation of the concrete values of culture. It has its basis in the exegesis practiced by Schleiermacher; the concept of historicity proposed by Dilthey; in the mode of a communication taking place in the horizonal dimension of the cultures with respect to each other as put forward by Gadamer;[6] in the thesis of an ethical perspective about cultural values advocated by Paul Ricoeur;[7] and in the ontological stand taken by Levinas in measuring culture as a language which expresses itself not as thinking but embodied in the gathering of Being.[8] Other hermeneutical approaches have recourse to the language of action: in the inter-signifying of language and in order to grasp the cultural interference as proposed by the school of Habermas and his disciples. However, it is mainly to the phenomenologists – attentive to what Husserl has so pertinently called the "life-world" – that we owe the birth of a contemporary current of thought both philosophical and anthropological questioning about culture as such and different cultures; and hence about the role of cultural tradition as interpreted by Heidegger. The interpreting the cultural tradition is our concern in the next section.

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[5] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *La philosophie première*, trad. Francaisç, vol. II.
[6] Cf. H.G. Gadamer, *Vérité et méthode*, trad. Francaisç, p. 223.
[7] Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*.
[8] Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme*.

INTERPRETING THE CULTURAL TRADITION

To reflect on the cultural tradition means to find again the lived in-rootedness of an experience of collective life – the life of a group, a people or a community – in its temporal texture, geographic delimitation, and the permanence of its own surpassing of itself. Reflection on the cultural tradition implies the "heritage from the past" becoming the identity of its identity and the difference of its difference, not only in the proper factual situation and according to its dynamic resources, but in its relation to other cultures. Thus, generally speaking, to reflect on the cultural tradition means to have recourse to historical experience, and to the present meaning of this "precipice of history" which the forms of life of the past offer to the individuals of today. This is because every generation leans on the cultural experience of the preceding ones, while reevaluating anew its creative possibilities. To live one's own culture today is to find again the lived-modalities of the past and to read them again in relation to the new horizon, in which concerns about building the future is open for the present.

In his fundamental ontology, Heidegger has developed the theme of historicity (*Geschehen*) as understanding the "world" in its becoming itself and as articulating itself with the lively forces of a tradition. Destiny (*Geschichte*) – as understanding the history of the peoples – depends on the understanding of historicity, i.e., on the fate (*Geschikt*) of the *Dasein*. Let us now briefly consider Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein's* fundamental condition of historicity.[9] *Dasein* is thrown-in-the-world and is handed over to his power-to-be in so far as he is a being-in-the-world. Thrown in the world, he is in that condition as being-in-the-world in his concrete reality *with* others. In most part of his existence, he has lost himself in the world of "anyone" (*das Mann*). However, it is always the existential and the originary background that prevents him from evading his choice of existence. Even in the decay of the "anyone", he cannot evade the total understanding of himself on the background of the total horizon of his life. *Dasein's* life is closed in by the two existential limitations (*Nichtichkeiten*) which he has not chosen, but he has to recognize in order to be really *Dasein*, i.e., *there* of Being (*Sein*). The first limitation consists in the fact which his birth and death imposes itself on him in his attempt to present the truth of his existence. The second limitation consists in that if *Dasein* wants to recapture for himself his most proper possibilities, he has to understand them relatively to his proper situation with respect to his past and future, and as open to his present being.

Dasein's existence as being thrown inherits the moment of history, the "goods" transmitted to it, and allows them to exist as its own on the horizon of a history in which it is engaging itself today. Thus, "the tradition

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[9] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *L'Etre et le Temps*, trad. Francaisç F. Vezin, pp. pp. 436-469.

in which a heritage is handed over is constituted each time in resolution."[10] The more *Dasein* understands himself in relation to this double end, in which consists his finitude – the thrown-there-in-the-world at his birth and the being-towards-death, which is his eminent most proper possibility – the more the *Dasein* chooses himself in the equilibrium of a free existence, and rejects far from him the provisional decisions of the "anyone" (*das Mann*). He "hears" the call of Being (*Sein*) in the simplicity of his proper destiny: "*Dasein* hands himself over to himself by embracing an inherited but nevertheless chosen possibility." We may note here that *Dasein* does not have a destiny in the sense that he is submitted to the unforeseen shocks of concrete existence, but he *is* his destiny, and he exercises effectively his existence by choosing himself as a being-at-the-world, by assuming it in good fortune and misfortune.

Thus, *Dasein's* "adventure" – his advent as ex-isting (*das Geschehen*) – is the temporal passage which is his self-constituting in its proper temporality. This effective opening which makes of itself the free choice of itself in the active sense of an existence being under way of realizing the truth of its being-towards-the end. In this sense the *Dasein* assumes his double finitude: on the one hand as being thrown by embracing what he has inherited; and on the other hand, having the future before him, being free towards his death, realizing his possibilities, and "be for *his time* present to *the instant*" in the facticity of his situation.[11] In this sense, *Dasein* lives his temporality as his own and his destiny as proper both historicality and freely. This choice of himself in understanding of his finitude and this coming back to himself of *Dasein* – with respect to his possibilities of existence that have been transmitted to him – become the "repetition", i.e., the "tradition". This coming back upon his being as "having-been" is "the relief in battle, in order to take back the torch". What is at stake here is not at all to reproduce the past as it "has-been". In other words, for *Dasein*, the reassuming of the possible is neither a repetition of the past, nor an obligation imposed by the ancestors, but the "repetition" is a replica of what was his possibility of existence in his past as being "having been" in relation to the present instant/moment.

As a result, the past is no more past as such, but it is retaken in the progress of the destiny *there*, present, and open to the future in the properly finite adventure of the *Dasein*, which is being-*towards*-death. The "adventure" of *Dasein* is shared *with* others in a common destiny, the destiny of a people/community. The common destiny is surely not an addition of all individual destinies. It rather constitutes itself in the being-together in the midst of a common world where every one of the same *generation* lives, communicates and experience life together. This is done in such a way that culture is always already present for every generation which

[10] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 448.
[11] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 450.

lives in it as the ever re-effected frame of a new horizon. Every generation conveys the transmitted goods by reading them again in a new signification which the future as sense horizon proposes to it as its task in the present. This temporal nature of interpretation of the cultural tradition takes us to the consideration of historical dimension of the cultural tradition in the next section.

HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF THE CULTURAL TRADITION

The above-said thesis that gives the foundation to the historicity of the *Dasein* does not indicate that he is a subject without a world, but, rather that he exists as a being-in-the-world. The historicity of the *Dasein* is essentially the historicity of the world. This is because the ex-static temporality belongs to *Dasein's* temporalization. Thus, these realities that are unveiled through the world – the tools, the works, the institutions, and the monuments – belong to the same destiny. Even the landscape – as a region of habitation, as a battle field, or as a place of cult – is a historical world. This is equally true of the processes, events, or human actions: they are linked with the adventure of the historical world because all these belong to the historicity of the *Dasein*. Thus, the historical world is already objectively there in the "adventure" (*Geschehen*) of the existing being-in-the-world (*Dasein*), before being seized in a historical manner by the objective historical science. History, in the ordinary sense of historical science, receives its "sense" only on the ontological horizon of the historicality of the world, being supported by the "adventure" of *Dasein* existing in his proper temporality, i.e., in the interval between his birth and death. By the "repetition" of the possibilities which "have-been", *Dasein* places himself before that "what-has-been". This coming back upon the past of his ex-static "having been" is inscribed in the instant, as his "Situation". *Dasein's* existence remains faithful to itself by recovering itself, but it is always in the anticipation of that destiny-like future – his death – that the repetition is founded.

Consequently, what is primarily historical is the *Dasein*, whereas the surrounding world is historical only secondarily, as the historical ground. For example, the antiquity is still there in the museums and the monuments, though marked by time they do not belong to the past, but to the present of *Dasein*. Even if they are perishable and are in use or out of use these ancient works are actual. The world in which they "have-been" integrated into a cultural whole does not exist any more. However, in so far as they have being now, they are still there for *Dasein* because these objects are founded upon the past of the *Dasein* as the "having-been", i.e., in their ex-static presence towards the past.

In fact, history is defined as the whole of being that changes through time, thereby differing from nature: it designates the transformations and the destinies of men, human groups and their civilizations. However, the originary history that takes place in time *is* the specific "adventure" of the

existing *Dasein*. This "adventure" of *Dasein* – that *has* happened, that *has-been* transmitted, and that continues always in the being-with-others – receives in the strong sense of the word the name "history".[12] In this sense, a cultural tradition is the actual expression of the history of the *Dasein* in his "Situation" with others in the instant. Thus, a cultural tradition, like history, has the origin from the past and continues all in one piece with a becoming. The immediate question that arises is that of plurality of cultures and cultural difference, to which we turn our attention next.

CULTURAL DIFFERENCE: PLURALITY OF CULTURES

The recognizing of cultural difference and acknowledging the existence of many cultural traditions is closely related to our being in common, which differentiates itself according to generations and places. This, in turn, provides the conditions for cultural encounter. Husserl designates the term "horizon" to mean the openness of "sense" that makes possible the unification of the different profiles constituting the appearing of the perceptually-given into a single totality. However, he uses the expression "horizon of horizons" to designate the unity in understanding the whole of the beings: this unity, though not effective, is implied in the "sense" of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) that is always already there, which belongs to the order of the primordial donation of Being. Now, the givenness of the horizon is actually only a concrete figure of the condition of possibility of experience as such. It is the field of possibilities giving "sense" to our present experiences, in our interactions with things and people.

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty underline the fact that the world becomes a universal frame of every experience only in so far as it is for a being already there who explains himself with others. Things are in the world because I am seizing them as possible means for the realization of my possibilities. In this sense, the world is the horizon of my possibilities and thus, it is the measure of the process of temporalization and no more the pole of a concrete universality. Consequently, we do not have to do with one "life-world" as universal base, but with a *plurality* of "life-worlds", "each one of which contains a non-sizeable component". This component is the mystery of the world, which, as a whole, embraces and penetrates all the historical worlds; this mystery does never give itself as present in the flesh, but always as that which has to be projected from the present world. Thus, for example, the primitive cultures are worlds which have the form of myth because we interpret them from our present perspective.

Speaking about cultural difference and plurality of cultures Gadamer speaks of a "fusion of horizons" because different cultural horizons delimit each other in the historical repetition and in overcoming of their reciprocal

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[12]Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 442 ss.

interpretations. Therefore, it is no more the unitary ideal, underlying universality, which subtends its forms, but it is the reversibility of cultural, singular structures which makes the difference and the sense of history. Thus, every culture measures itself with respect to the horizon of all other cultures, reflecting itself in them as singular and autonomous expression.

In unfolding the reality of cultural difference and plurality of cultures further, we now consider cultural difference as the basis of the human condition, cultural difference as related to human person and cultural difference as related to cultural values. This is our task in the next three sections.

Cultural Difference: Basis of the Human Condition

We cannot understand history except by historicalizing ourselves in our proper and cultural existence because the interior of our own culture forms the basis of our understanding of the human condition. Besides, other worldviews and perspectives also must be understood in relation to one's own particular culture. Similarly, in the exchange of our cultural existence with the cultural existence of the others concretely in an intercultural dialogue we can aim at achieving the truth of "sense".

Since the beginning of the Christian era western philosophy appears to be principally preoccupied with the study of the human *person*. However, the reality of person cannot be understood without being open to the question of the *others*. In this sense, the deepening of the personal dimension is directly correlative to the recognizing the others in their difference. This is also true of cultures. Every culture deepens itself in the measure it listens to other cultures and finds itself interpolated by them in a common recognizing. Thus, every culture is of value for itself and gives value to other cultures to the measure it opens itself to the horizon of all the other cultures. Therefore, phenomenologically there is a direct correlation between the human condition of persons and the values of cultures. In the following sections, we elaborate on these issues.

Cultural Difference and Human Persons

Transcendental idealism promotes the universality of pure subjectivity. Scientific positivism brings back the body to its material causality in the chain of the concrete signifying elements for an unprejudiced onlooker. In order to counter these two outlooks on the human person, the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty has deconstructed the *a priori* nature of the subject and the objectivity of the subject in itself, in order to bring about the cultural inter-relationality of human persons through contact with others. In the proper field of their responsibility with respect to each other, and in relation to the institutional environment of their cultures, the persons must learn to know and act. In doing so, they receive their cultural presence – not from the things in themselves, but from the works which

symbolize their lived-actions – and send it towards others in a common world.

The ontological differentiation, which Merleau-Ponty calls the "Flesh of the world" is the dimensionality in relation to which is understood the cultural interrelation and the "sense" of the other in bodily intropathy and speech expression. Thanks to this ontological differentiation, the inter-relational encounter is diversified according to cleavages of "sense", always reversible and revived in their incompleteness. The more differentiated manifestations which constitute the cultural ground allow the recognizing of others in their proper particularity and give one the capacity of receiving himself/herself as differentiated, at the same time as an *alter-ego* for others and as an *ego* in his identity. He learns to recognize himself/herself in his/her field, to take the initiative for his/her action, to confront him/her with the surrounding world and to assume his/her proper responsibilities. This recognition of oneself as the other is originarily taken in the movement of recognizing which is identified by the other as "other-self", in intropathy and its affective derivatives. Thus, the other recognizes himself/herself in the encounter according to an initial and initiatory reversibility. The perception of the other as otherness is born from desire in encounter. He/she opens in the subject that temporal distance of an objective differentiation, always already subtended by the lived and affected interrelation. Desire is intrinsically the "flesh" in the sense of differentiating distance, which the bodiliness lives as a sign of its own overcoming, both concrete and expressively. Desire embodies the reflexive movement of bodiliness which is in search for an *alter-ego*.

The intensity of desire belongs to the language of the other, opening the field of presence which the desiring bodiliness tries to grasp as actual totality. Desire aims at realizing itself in the hope of a promise of which the other holds implicitly the secret because the other subjects bear the sign of that conditioning difference which makes sense. However, if the other appears in the way in which every meaning appears in a cultural whole – borne by that whole which ensures for him/her his/her presence – he/she, as the other, is not a simple phenomenon. The presence of the other appeals to desire, but not as does a cultural-work. The other appeals to the dimensionality of desire and not to its effects; but this appeal includes the expressive totality of the cultural world of the other. The appeal is to the fullness of desire in its fulfillment. According to Levinas, because encounter is directed toward the other in the face-to-face of the expression, the other is not merely a cultural meaning or a simple *datum*, but he/she is "sense" primordially.[13] He/she does not come from the horizonal meaning of the world of perception, but he/she is a "visitation" out of context, and his/her manifestation is a surplus.The "epiphany" of the face of the other is not a phenomenon, but it is the occurrence of the authenticity of the existing

[13] Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme*, p. 47.

being in his/her uprightness; it speaks of the "sense" of Being and its invisibility in the very trace of the expression. Thus, the respect for the other invites me to more than myself; it urges me to recognize in him/her the infinite donation of Being in his/her cultural context, and induces me to subscribe to the excellence of his/her appeal. Thus, there emerges the problem of ethical encounter which alone is able to situate the "persons" in relation to their cultures. This takes us to consideration of cultural values in relation to which ethical encounter between persons takes place.

Cultural Difference and Cultural Values

Cultural values reflect the surrounding *milieu* from which proceed the personal exchanges between persons in the context of an encounter. They are always interpreted in a new actuality of which they inspire afresh the collective experience. However, it is always in the exchange between persons that the mutual respect for customs and aspirations is concretely located as ethical demand for recognition. This recognition inscribes itself along three directions: firstly, the subject as responsible for the others in his relation to himself; secondly, the other as recognized by me in his/her otherness and in his/her responsible liberty with respect to the others; and thirdly, the cultural interrelations that constitute the institution – the "neutral third party" – with respect to which the truth and the efficacy of our concrete actions and social justice can be constructed, justified and objectively measured.[14]

Thus, there are no *a priori* universal values, but only values stemming from the concrete and differentiated experience of the cultures. In fact, every cultural tradition reveals itself while repeating the possibility of the person in his/her "having-been", and every existing being has "to be" his/her destiny, by virtue of his/her power to be according to his/her choice and each time in his/her "Situation".[15] To live the tradition can take on different forms, which are all supported by the experience of the being-in-the-world. However, in the last instance, it is always the concrete existing being that performs, acts, lives them and is affected by them, even if those acts themselves can also become what Sartre called the "*pratico-inert*", i.e., having effects which go beyond the intentions of those who have accomplished them.[16] For every existing being and every culture is moving in dimensions of proper values and these values delineate the plurality of human projects which interfere precisely in order to construct an ethical world with the help of diverse actions. Thus, from the universality which is at work we have the hope of recognizing values of each culture, not to

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[14] Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, (Paris: Seuil, 1990).

[15] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *L'Etre et le Temps*, trad. Francaisç F. Vezin, par. 76.

[16] Cf. Jean Paul Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique*.

amalgamate the approaches proper to the different cultures, but to detect in each culture the surge toward values as the promise for a better world.

From what we have said above it is clear that every culture bears its proper tradition and its proper values. It is up to that cultural to give life again to the intrinsic truth of its tradition and to differentiate deliberately the most humanizing aspirations of that tradition in relation to other cultures. There is no common mould of a uniform mankind, but pluralities of ethical forms which work towards the recognition of a humanizing plenitude.

CONCLUSION

Our project was to grasp the ontological foundation of our living together, in the encounter of cultures. The analysis of cultural tradition and historicity of the human person (*Dasein*) shows that every cultural experience is relevant to the human person in the understanding of his being-in-the-world, which involves his/her repetitive and destiny-like temporality. It is on this basis that every encounter with others is constituted and at another level, the recognition of different cultures is realized. Here the notions of person and culture reflect the same indication of "sense": appropriation passes though others. Thus, the person is not a phenomenon, but a presence, which deepens itself at the measure of its singular openness to the others. Similarly, every culture can be recognized ever more in its singular originality in the measure it gives place to the originary difference, i.e., the differentiating dimensionality of the other cultures. Thus, the ethical dimension of encounter depends on a dimension that does not any more refer to desire on the phenomenal level of lived perception, but realizes in the event of presence as recognizing. This event opens human persons and the cultures to the excellence of the donation and in the welcoming which enables them to receive the gift of Being (*Sein*). Therefore, to love the other signifies that search, immanent and transcendent, supported by the creative gesture of an appeal and a vocation addressed to the whole human community. Thus, the cultures are recognized as interrelational. They do not belong any more to the horizonal order of a single life-world (*Lebenswelt*), but to the plurality emerging from the very movement of the operating difference. This is concrete and signifies the “Flesh of the World” as “Creative Difference” which expresses it the infinite experience of “Sense”.

CHAPTER 10

AFFECTIVE FOUNDATIONS OF CULTURE: PHENOMENOLOGICAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH

INTRODUCTION

When we look at the world at large, scientific achievements and technological advancement widen the gap between the realm of the "life-world" and the emerging “technologized-world”. The widening gap between these twofold worlds has far-reaching consequences. The body – reduced to the objective body of instrumental reason – has lost its proper *milieu* and its symbolic value. The city is no more the place of a word of freedom in the *agora.* The political life has become the object of the anonymous power of money. The economical life itself is submitted to chances and fluctuations of the financial system. Disturbances and violence haunt our contemporary societies. All these oblige philosophical reflection – particularly philosophical anthropology – to answer the question concerning the "sense" of existence. While involving itself in this very question, the existing being finds itself bound to the cultural and social movement which supports it and in which it must find access to the understanding of its own legitimacy.

Having looked into the gap between the "life-world" and the "technologized-world", and its consequences on the existing being and the society at large, by way of introduction, we move on to consider the three parts of this chapter. The first part situates the method and the main themes of a phenomenological-anthropological research. Phenomenology as fundamental ontology is, in fact, phenomenological anthropology and it forms the method of such research. It is not the *metaphysica specialis* of the classical philosophy, but in placing itself in the hermeneutic circle brings to light the operating structures of the lived-existence and its concrete dimensions according to which they display themselves. Thus, phenomenological anthropology rediscovers the concrete cultural manifestations of the concrete existing being in relation to its bodiliness, and compensates for the existential neutrality of fundamental ontology. Having looked into the method we also briefly consider the three significant themes that emerge as essential to the phenomenological and anthropological research. They are the following: existence as being-in-the-world, existence as being-with, and the existence as the being of "sense".

Having elaborated on the method and themes of phenomenological-anthropological research, in the second part, we examine two fields of study relevant in today’s context, when speaking of phenomenological-anthropological research and its relation to ethics. The first field of study has to do with the issue of violence and lack of communal harmony which

often arise from cultural differences and lack of communication among various groups. This issue is closely related to the affective states of the groups involved regarding a contentious problem they have to tackle. Hence, we need to deal with the problem of affectivity, which rejoins the lived originary – from one's birth to the extreme possibility of his/her being-towards-death – and which expresses itself radically as "sense" of corporeity/bodiliness and alterity/otherness. The second field of research – related to the first – involves the problem of encounter between cultures, which aim at bringing the diverse cultures of the world together with the goal of effecting worldwide development. It, therefore, forms an interesting field of phenomenological-anthropological reflection. This is our concern in the two sections of part two.

The third part underlines the mutual implications between an originary affective space and cultural ethics. The discussion on relation between phenomenological-anthropological research and it relationship to ethics, by unfolding the problems of affectivity and encounter between cultures leads us to reflection on originary affective space and its relation to cultural ethics. The first section of this part considers role of cultural action and its ethical import in elaborating the originary affective experience, while the second section looks into the phenomenon of affectivity and its relation to ethics. The conclusion states that in our consideration of personal affectivity or culture, we need to recognize the fundamental role of the "singular differentiation", in the epistemological field of the search for truth and in the ethical-political field of the search for values. In this search, we do not have to do with an anti-universalism, but rather with a differentiating universality, interlacing on the "flesh of the world", in which the reversibility of "sense" is always in movement and gives life to the cultures and through them to persons. Now, let us move on to the first part by analysing the method and themes of phenomenological-anthropological research.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH: METHOD AND THEMES

In considering phenomenological and anthropological research, we make an attempt to understand its method. Phenomenology as fundamental ontology is, in fact, phenomenological anthropology and it forms the method of such a research. Having outlined the method of phenomenological-anthropological research, we move on to elaborate on some themes that dominate the whole enterprise of this research.

Method of Phenomenological and Anthropological Research

The ethical task of phenomenological anthropology is to uncover the dimensions and resources of cultural life and thereby to compensate for the present impoverishment of the *existentiell* world. Phenomenological

anthropology has to guard itself against all the forms of speculative discourse linked to the categorial and idealistic abstractions, which through the thematization of the formal essences miss precisely the approach of subjectivity and cultural encounter in the very act of "existing". In fact, philosophical anthropology has progressively recognized itself in the circle of a "second reflection" aiming at the concreteness of existence. However, this concrete philosophy remains marked by the problem of the relationship between soul and body – even purified of any dualism – since I "am" my body and I do not have the "having" of it in the lived-unity of my presence to the other. Consequently, it is more in the phenomenological method that philosophical anthropology finds its support.

Phenomenology begins by wondering about the essence of consciousness and wants to recapture its lived movement. However, while seizing the unity of man, it is still dependent on a perspective of "constitution" from consciousness, i.e., the *ego* as *terminus a quo*. For this reason, phenomenology questions existence as bearing on the pre-comprehension of its own being: phenomenology reveals itself as ontology of existence, understood as the transcendence of the being-in-the-world. *Dasein*, the only being, for which there is in itself a questioning about its own being, understands itself in the act of "getting ahead" of itself, which singularizes it in the most extreme way as a being-towards-death. In the coming to itself in its most proper power-to-be, it defines itself as a being of concern. Thus, the analysis of the finitude of the existing being has become a hermeneutics of the "sense" of the "act of existing".

Therefore, phenomenological anthropology does not any more identify itself with the reflexive analysis of the classical philosophy known as *metaphysica specialis*, which makes use of the concept of *anthropos* conceived as a universal essence. On the contrary, phenomenological anthropology has inscribed itself inside the hermeneutic circle, in the understanding act of the philosopher who is already living concretely its question. Therefore, it does not in the least have the task of describing a lived empirical *datum* that makes the unspeakable singularity which everyone lives for himself, but it has the task of bringing into light the operating structures of the lived-existence and its concrete dimensions according to which they display themselves. Thus, phenomenological anthropology explicitates the manifestation of existence as a "phenomenon" in so for as existence is the self-constitution of itself in the temporal emergence of its proper overcoming: existence, as being-in-the-world, gives itself in the intentional movement that opens it to the things and to the other existing beings. This opening/transcendence relates to the horizon of the world which is the originary existential modality of *Dasein*. It gives it its *habitat* and conditions its finitude by making it a being of concern in the intersubjective interrelation.

In this way, phenomenology – as existential analysis of the structure of the *Dasein* – has become an ontology. However, this analysis must depend on the *existentiell* concreteness of the lived-existence in its different

manifestations, even if these ones reciprocally find their foundation in the structures brought to light by the existential analysis. In this perspective, Merleau-Ponty has begun by underlining the eminent role of bodiliness as experience lived in a proper manner. The body is the living expression of the temporality and the historicity of the subject. It gives to the ontological understanding of *Dasein* its singular expressive concreteness. Already described by Husserl as the mediation between the *psychè* and the physical body, bodiliness becomes in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy the concrete dimensionality of the *existentiell* transcendence: the body is "that intentional bow which rises on the world". Phenomenological anthropology, understood in this way, rediscovers the concrete cultural manifestations of the existing being and compensates for the existential neutrality of fundamental ontology.

Having clarified the method of phenomenological and anthropological research, we take up the various themes that dominate such a research in the next section.

Themes of Phenomenological and Anthropological Research

There are three significant themes that emerge as essential to the phenomenological and anthropological research. They are the following: existence as being-in-the-world, existence as being-with, and existence as the being of "sense". We briefly consider each of these in the next sections.

Existence as Being-in-the-World. The existing being, as a being-in-the-world, is constituted by bodiliness. The body, as a privileged and fundamental dimension of the existing being, opens the existing being to the worldly horizon, transcends itself in the motor action, and orients itself towards the things and others. The analysis of the body underlines the lived "sense" of the sensible, motor, and expressive dimensions. In this manner, the body brings to focus the three ideas implied in the term “sense”: the idea of the sensible, the idea of orientation, and the idea of significance. Besides, it reveals that the body by itself is the concrete support of the openness which characterizes existence/existing being (*Dasein*) as being-in-the-world-with-the-others.

The body is not in the world as an isolated individual object, but it makes up our experience of the world. The body rises on the world and is of the the same flesh. This reversibility of the flesh enlarges itself at the dimension of the entire lived-field and inscribes itself in the unfolding of the body with the visible world, as in the encounter with the other seeing also the “narcissistic” themselves. This reversibility of the body and the relational distance which constantly encroach upon each other makes existence/existing being rejoin itself in each encounter. The sense, which emerges from reversibility, condition the differentiation by which the polarity of the one with respect to the other is constituted. Thus,

intersubjective relation is an operating dimensionality and no more that simple crossed play of subjective perceptions on the world.

Existence as Being-with. Reversibility in otherness makes sense and is carried by the force of originary desire which is at work already in every singular existence. In continuing that analysis on proper bodiliness, phenomenological anthropology describes the other/being-with (*Mit-Sein*) as the relational modality according to which the intersubjective communication is realized. Four modes appear in the relational process of being-with – work, language, politics, and affective expression. These constitute the original structures of human interrelation. We begin by analysis of work/action, since the being-with is a producing-being. The analysis of work and its productions underlines the operating and creative significance of man/existing being/body on all that is naturally given, through the common exchange of goods. It shows clearly that the world is first for the existing being/the body – a horizon where the things are grasped in their tool character. Besides, it manifests that the *technè* transforms it in its aesthetic and practical (*praxis)* dimensions. Thus, it gives rise to the originary and teleological sense of the cultural world. Effective action is itself the expression – gesture-like or symbolic – which gives rise to "sense" in its dialogical cultural modality.

The two anthropological structures, viz., work and language, interfere with each other. They condition the relational modes of the existing being as cultural being, which implies the political dimension. This manifests itself in its threefold mission – the economic, the institutional, and the ethical-juridical. In the political context, the affectivity of a partaken liberty is brought into play before the non-sense of violence. The affective expression supported by bodiliness eminently makes itself singular in the personal encounter. It is in affective exchange that the most originary structure of every "sense" expression is finally situated.

Existence as the Being of "Sense". It is on that basis of the analysis of "sense' that we can speak of the question of transcendence and the understanding that existence/existing being has about its own being. Similarly, to study liberty as personal and interpersonal commitment implies the existing being in his unalienable singularity of openness to "sense". Besides, the study of bodiliness as existence in act obliges phenomenological anthropology to take into account the objective results of the *science concerning* the human body, as physical object or psychological support, and to pick out the empirical features brought out by science. In fact, human sciences do not aim at questioning about the "I exist", nor at the contribution of a cultural horizon, which induces objective research. However, the sciences are often unaware that they lean on the non-said of daily life; the non-said which underlies and precedes reflective objectivity. Do not the scientist and even the philosopher exercise the lively dimension of existence/existing being quite before posing the *said* of objective

discourse about the object they describe? Undoubtedly scientific instrumentality ensures the objectivity of experience in general, but the scientific language that is constructed functions always on the lived basis of a "sense" already there, always at work; and constitutes precisely the regulating horizon of the existing being (*Dasein*).

It is well known that Merleau-Ponty has relied on experiments – which come under the provinces of psychology, neurology, psychoanalysis, and cultural anthropology, according to their empirical *data* – in order to validate his philosophy of perception, which describes the life of the body. He refers to the objective explanation in order to find again its lived in-rootedness. Thus, the hermeneutic circularity implied in sciences and phenomenological anthropology condition the effective dialogue between their respective forms of knowing and justifies their specific proceedings.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND ITS RELATION TO ETHICS

Having elaborated on the method and themes of phenomenological-anthropological research, in the second part, we examine two fields of study relevant in today's context, when speaking of phenomenological-anthropological research and its relation to ethics. The first field of study has to do with the issue of violence and lack of communal harmony which often arise from cultural differences and lack of communication among various groups. This issue is closely related to the affective states of the groups involved regarding a contentious problem they have to tackle. Hence, we need to deal with the problem of affectivity, which rejoins the lived originary – from one's birth to the extreme possibility of his/her being-towards-death – and which expresses itself radically as "sense" of bodiliness and otherness. The second field of research – related to the first – involves the problem of encounter between cultures, which aims at bringing the diverse cultures of the world together with the goal of effecting worldwide development. It, therefore, forms an interesting field of phenomenological-anthropological reflection. This is our concern in the next two sections.

Problem of Affectivity

In Martin Heidegger's work *Sein und Zeit*, the sections dealing with "originary affectivity" (*Befindlichkeit*), contain the themes, such as anguish and death. Besides, they introduce the existential status of finitude, which "repetition" radicalizes according to the mode of temporality as "the destiny-like adventure of *Dasein* between birth and death". If temporality manifests itself in the existential dimension of the being-in-the-world, bodiliness, for its part, manifests in the concrete anchorage of the *existentiell* inscription. Merleau-Ponty recognizes in it the differentiating experience of the "feeling-being felt" – the touching-being touched – of

perception. In the works of Merleau-Ponty, perception becomes experience of the depth, linked to spatiality and temporality, and belongs to the realm of the feeling reflecting itself in its pathic form. Hence, the originality of the thesis of Merleau-Ponty is to apply to the body the notion of form, emphasizing the crossed relation of figure upon background in the reversibility of the poles, from where "sense" is bursting forth. In fact, the *aisthesis* is the dimension of feeling, but it expresses radically the bodiliness, which constitutes the openness of "sense", in its three dimensions: the sensible, the moving orientation and the signification/meaning.

Bodiliness is the permanent axis of my "act of existing" and my relational and factual anchorage in the world. The lived-body is not a "having"; I *am* my body from the singular point of seeing the world all around. The five senses depend on the factual organic dispositions, but – in the project of existence – they embody the concrete possibilities of encounter with things and others, while taking support from the perceptive world. The point of view – the body is not for itself and it feels itself affected by the relational interference of the five senses – constitutes the sensible dimensions of the world. The affective quality emerges from the unity of this "resounding" is always overtaken as the impossible reversibility of the "touching and being touched". This reflexivity of the body is not analogous to the reflection of the thought on itself: precisely it is a pure dynamic relationship constituting itself as interval of exteriority *and* interiority. This disposition of overtaking applies to all the sense organs, which have among them also a power of reversibility. To see is also to touch, to hear is also to catch and even understand since perception – as concrete intentionality reflecting itself – predicts the possibility of a formal reflexivity of sense, symbolically signifying itself in language.

The body modulates itself in the space, delimits its parts, and orientates itself singularly in the living motricity – from above to the bottom, from right to left – without the intervention of any "knowledge". By giving the body its landmarks with respect to the environment and its own field of action, the spatial interval radicalizes the effectuation of a sense "relationship". The primordial listening to the word of the "Other" enables the *infans* to "enter" into the still undifferentiated sense, to rejoin him as spatially in the interval of the always-revived reversibility of desire. Being awakened to the moving power which animates it and being open to the horizon, the body articulates its aim from here to over there: while half-opening the space it leans on its own movement. Space is lived in that same relation of reversibility, in such a way that the perceived object and, *a fortiori*, the other are not simply an undifferentiated fact, but a visible reality that can be rejoined from another point of view like in an object transposable because it is reversible. The body catches there virtually the transposition of its feeling over there because it has caught the dimension of otherness at the moment where the other is missing for me, before becoming the one for whom I am an "other". This initial determination of reversibility

of the bodies, as primary affectivity, is un-reflected. Thus, the desiring play of bodiliness towards the other is already a pre-language.

Therefore, "sense" – in its affective and desiring dynamics – is grasped before any objective conceptual positivity. A comparison with the animal might well make us forget the emotional movement of reflexivity by which human bodiliness grasps the structure as such.[1] Thus, the essence of bodiliness is linked with a symbolic relation. It manifests itself in the bodily gesture implicitly communicational, such as beginnings of the speaking word. The bodies "understand each other" and are united by a same feeling in this sense where my body perceives on the other the "affect", which seizes it. There is reversibility in otherness in such a way that the transfer makes manifest the expressive understanding of the gesture [2] and enables the existing being to enter the cognitive signifying field. The child has the concrete experience of a spatio-temporal interval and constitutes concretely the field of exteriority as if the affective otherness of separation is coupled this time with an objective otherness of a bodily outside and inside, giving thereby consistency to the relational unity of the bodily schema. The linguistic expression, by widening in action the moving gesture, achieves the effective encounter. In the same way, as the resounding emerges from the perceptive interval and manifests the structural imprint of bodiliness, the child is going first to handle the words in their concrete objectivity, in order to catch the play of signifying reversibility which actualizes its symbolic power. Thus, the word is taken in the dialogical discursiveness and establishes immediately the overlapping of "sense", the signifying encroachment of every sense relation.[3]

By his bodily presence in the world the existing being assumes his own signifying emergence; he makes himself the subject; and he reflects on himself in a narcissistic way as to the movement of intropathic reversibility. What has been constituted in the originary emotion is his desire of being repeated implicitly in every encounter. Bodiliness keeps in its memory the originary affective experience while maintaining its desiring finality while temporalizing itself in the living action of a desiring invention. Now, bodiliness temporalizes itself as sense movement by reflecting concretely on the affected reversibility of the structural moments of time. Lived according to the qualitative bipolarity of originary desire in the modes of harmony or disharmony, these moments overlap and outdistance each other by the play of the "affects". Temporality articulates the desire of being from the depth of the past – the existing being thrown-there – to its possibilities to come. In

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[1]The analysis of Merleau-Ponty in *Phénoménologie de la perception remains* relevant even if neurology today is pursuing on more elaborate experiments.

[2] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp. 178 ss.

[3] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 215. Cf. also M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 190.

the tension from birth to death, the desire of the body in-the-world finds its resolution in the over-passing of the instant, i.e., death.

How to understand this reversibility of the body as self-referring behavior where action and passion exchange each other? The body is exteriorizing presence to oneself in this sense that what is perceived is founded on the "affect" reciprocally. This analysis rejoins the study of the "passive synthesis" that characterizes the play of subjectivity as affecting itself by the very act of its temporalization, and brings out precisely the dynamic "hiatus" of the "act of existing". As Merleau-Ponty explains in *Phenomenology of perception* that the manifestation of oneself (*Selbst-Erscheinung*) – the presence to itself of the body – reveals a "passive synthesis" of a "relationship of oneself to oneself", which identifies thisness/ipseity as such. By this passive synthesis, "the affecting one and the affected one are one because the thrust of time is nothing else but the transition from one present to another one. This ecstasy ... is subjectivity."[4] This relational difference, always revived, is apparently situated in the framework of the phenomenological un-reflected consciousness, whereas Merleau-Ponty, leaving the perspective of consciousness, is going to inscribe it later in its ontological foundation of "flesh of the world".

The existing being manifests the tensional relationship of action-passion, which is the act of *temporalization* of the body, in the very movement where existence presents itself to itself according to a double horizon. Thus, the "living present" is the pathic relationship, which underlies by retention the temporal phases of the past and by protention the temporal phases of the future. The lived modalities of the past fit retentionally into each other, sinking into the past according to successive horizons from the "living present". It is the same for the projection of possible lived moments, which inscribe themselves in the successive depths of a world to come, at the measure of the projects of the existing being. However, the longitudinal intentionality which runs across the retentional and protentional phases are constitutive of the transverse consciousness because the whole process of the ulterior phases of consciousness constitutes itself, as Husserl writes, "as form of the consciousness constitutive of time, and, in this one, itself."[5]

Now, even when accomplished the past keeps itself as such in the present in the affective coloring of a dimension of escape. The "present which I am" is always already lost as present because it has "just passed away."[6] The past contains in this sense the imaginary projection of a lost paradise. In the same way, the mode of protention of the future is always promise of desires as possibilities to come. Between birth and death the

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[4] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp. 479, 487 ss.

[5] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps*, trad. H. Dussort, p. 109.

[6] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 47, 55 ss.

affective tension modulates life under the form of anguish and desire: these two "affects" set temporality in motion, toward the past as well as toward the future. Thus, the side of the past testifies that desire is possible, but it is present to me by the anguish attached to its mode of escaping. In the same way, the future is always a promise of plenitude in the desire of coincidence of oneself with oneself, but it is transfixed by anguish faced with the danger of not being any more.

On the other hand, the temporal structure of the body is intrinsically linked to *spatiality*. Here, we do not have to do with the objective space constituted by the theoretical act, but with the motor dimension which is connected to the orientation of the body in the setting in space of the things upon the worldly horizon. In this sense, the places of the past stand out still in profile in the present as so many landmarks that constitute the support of existence in its concrete history. The places to come also are projected by the affective imaginary and lay out a proper topology that corresponds to the desire of plenitude attached to the anterior future. However, these places of a desired world are also sources of anguish, on the same account as the temporal modalities that bear them. The spatializing dimensions of the body open up the topology of the "nearby" and of the "faraway". The distancing of the world organizes itself over there in the function of the bodily proximity. Before being objectively the geographical *milieu*, the places depend on the affective resources of remembrance and the passive powers of forgetfulness, unless still they are becoming in imagination the models of an affective plenitude, past and found again. Revealing the past moments of our affective life, they are as much temporal as spatial: the body, remembering the distances covered goes back up and goes down again in imagination to their stopping places, at the scale of the historical and geographical units, intermittent of our anguishes and our desires.

Therefore, spatialization and temporalization cross each other in a unique dimension of the "*depth*" that makes up also the depth of the world.[7] The spatial and temporal fields modalize themselves according to the affective bipolar structure. The appeal of the plenary desire intersects the anguish of a bottomless abyss. However, anguish is interior to desire: in so far as it lets itself, desire sinks in its unlimited level. In the same way, desire is interior to anguish, in so far as the threat of death is a fascination which, in turn, stirs desire. Hence, the bipolar reversibility of the affective tension constitutes the proper field of the being-affected: the relationship of self to self, which is the proper affectivity of interiority/ ipseity/thisness.[8] What has been said of the affective polarity so far only indicates the formal character of the affective phenomenon: in brief it is the reverberation in the "living present" of the crossed structures of temporalization and spatialization as

[7] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp. 296, 306. Cf. also M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 272.

[8] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, p. 487.

manifesting themselves according to the characters of action-passion, as tension of the body with respect to its world. The longitudinal dimension of the *existentiell* flow which opens itself toward the past and toward the future by the circular play of retention and protention is a "distention" that provokes the pathic "sense" as sensible and reversible relation of a feeling-being affected, as the field of action-passion which is the generalized ground of life. However, this longitudinal dimension cannot be lived properly as mine unless the intentional consciousness (*intentio*) intervenes, and which, in turn, gives to the present the intensity of the event. The above-said process takes place in the context of the concrete interrelational experience of encounter. Hence, we move on to analyze such an experience.

The concept of encounter (*Ineinander*) indicates the escaping of the present from itself. The body is always lived in interaction with the world of things and others; this interaction in which affective experience builds itself up in the feeling-being affected of a suffering which experiences itself in totality and in all levels. The analysis of the sensible qualities and of the affective states makes possible the concretization of that "lived difference" which constitutes affective experience. The body measuring things as favorable or as threatening is the "affect" of an encounter and it recognizes in this affective polarity what modulates its degrees as there are so many affective expressions that bring enjoyment or suffering. However, it is difficult to determine why certain sensible qualities have precisely certain specific intensity. More than to the things that have only a mediate reality and some signification, the "affect" sends the affective expressions spontaneously to the persons and through them to the cultural world.

Thus, in my "living-present" the perception of the other engages immediately the ambivalent moving forces of affectivity in its bipolarity of anguish and desire. The concept of intropathy (*Einfühlung*) designates the mediation of recognizing by which my body (*Leib*) lives perceptively the body of the other.[9] Retaking the concept from Husserl, but while attributing to it its character of fleshly reversibility, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the polarity action-passion of our manner of being-in-the-world. The body – being the centre of the spatializing and temporalizing play of encounter – founds the exchange of the "lived relationships" of one body with respect to another one in its un-reflected mode. This intropathic mediation realizes the originary sense of *otherness*, which expresses itself as speaking word taken in the very actuality of the "affect" become gesture. We do not have to do here with a "fusion-like sameness" but with a lived *analogon*. In intropathy I situate myself at the same time "here" and "there" as the other of the other, in my otherness. I am able to live from his/her lived centre by which he/she poses me at his turn as pole of his/her own transcendence. This transcendence of the "I " in the history of the other makes manifest in

[9] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la constitution*, trad. Francaisç, E. Escoubas, pp. 231 ss.

another way the passive synthesis which gives life to the originary sense, the sensible, and the already signifying in relation to affectivity. The existing being is affectively mediated by the presence of the other: he himself is the other of the other, and this interval enables me to receive access to myself as subjectivity. Thus, otherness is the condition of my thisness/ipseity and the mutual recognizing of each other. To the measure our perceptions and our "affects" cross each other we discover ourselves as stemming from the same interrelational world.

Gesture and word articulate themselves from the same affective intentionality because the body has the power of natural expression: it grasps "that silent and permanent question" which a body addresses to another body and which desire understands blindly. Merleau-Ponty, following Sigmund Freud, says that every human act "has a sense"[10] and, therefore, *sexuality* is linked to the whole realm of the existing being's knowing and acting from its childhood. From the parental desire, which aims at a differentiated personal sense, the child receives itself and finds the sexually signifying support of his own bodiliness. That sexual dimension is not simply a positive, biological fact, but it conditions the significance of what is human. Right from birth affectivity sets in motion the life of "sense" for each one of us in our sexual being. By the affective and sublimated resolution – in recognizing its finitude – the child is able to assume the condition of the sexual "sense" which defines its being and its relational power; it, in turn, constitutes the child in its project of becoming a singular being, which make it a man with respect to a woman or a woman with respect to a man.[11] By the "conditioning" of reversibility of each sex by the other one,[12] the man becomes himself in his masculinity and the woman becomes herself in her feminity. This sexual otherness is quite singular and more originary than the simple individual otherness. This *existentiell* "difference", the interdependent relationality, constitutes the relational becoming of the person.[13]

This "sexual sense" will be the first opening of all the affective approaches and the instituting inscription of all modalities of significance in all the course of existence. The sexual difference is effectively the first "sense difference", womb of all the signifying aims. This first language and the "pathic *logos*" of the natural orientation underlie the cultural significance according to the entire levels of expression. Thus, engaging in the "*existentiell* difference" the totality of the singular existence, the otherness as relationally sexual difference, reflects itself affectively on all beings which are encountered, in the perception of the things and even in

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[10] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp. 184, ss.

[11] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 274.

[12] Cf. *Ibid*.

[13] Cf. Ghislaine Florival, "Vie affective et temporalité"; *Figures de la finitude*, *Etudes d'anthropologie philosophique*, ed. G. Florival, vol. 3, p. 90.

the categorial and theoretical approach. Therefore, it seems that the truth of the cultural, material, scientific, technical and aesthetic world of the different civilizations, and their social, ethical, and political manifestations take their in-rootedness from this pathic *logos* of the sexual difference, the first *difference* of the linguistic sense.[14] There is a life of "sense" for each one of us and even a genesis of "sense" in every individual from childhood to adulthood and from birth to death. This life of "sense" is always at work in its expressive and concrete sedimentation and sends back to the ontological anchorage of bodiliness.

Here, we must note that despite all these discourses, the apprehension of the "originary sense" that constitutes the possibilities of "sense" – which in turn makes possible the play of "sense" – does not give itself to representation. It expresses itself in the concrete and non-formal movement of an affective attitude that opens itself to the depth to the "originary sense". We have called the "pathic *logos*" this affectivity, which expresses that originary dimensionality of "sense". What is the meaning of this "pathic *logos*"? The formal analysis of the pathic sense brings to the fore a double context: the ontological and the anthropological. The abyssal depth of "sense" in its originary event-like manifestation comes from "Presence" as gift of the Being. However, the *existentiell* "*fiat*" – this "feeling" – as the originary "sense" inscribes itself concretely in its lived-historicity at the edge of life. The formal analysis of the originary "feeling" of the existing being expressed in the concept of "pathic *logos*" should precede the phenomenological description of its lived-manifestation.

The notion of affectivity connotes at the same time the idea of being-affected and the idea of "sense": affectivity makes "sense" in the "feeling". The pathic sense associates passive reversibility and active donation of "sense" according to a dynamic relation of reversibility. In this way, receptivity is constituted just because of the donation. In other words, the donation makes receptivity capable of receiving it and, reciprocally, receptivity enables the donation to give itself. However, reversibility engenders precisely the generating movement of "sense" and calls "sense" into question. It is given to us in such a way that the generation of "sense" is the making-possible the advent of "sense": it is the very donation of "sense" in the reciprocity of the two terms: "receptivity" and "donation", which constitutes "sense". This dynamic reciprocity is possible only in encounter. The analysis remains only formal as relation in general, if the relation between donation and receptivity is concretely effectuated in the context of an affective encounter. Husserl has well shown that the encounter with the *alter-ego* marks the limit of the "*ego*-logical constitution". He discovers that the reversibility of the *alter-ego* in the effective encounter generates the

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[14] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 247. Cf. also Ghislaine Florival, "Personne, culture et affectivité"; *Etudes d'anthropologie philosophique*, vol. II, pp. 281 ss.

"sense" that inhabits in the concrete intersubjectivity; and this "originary sense" is essentially intropathy (*Einfühlung*).[15]

Thus, encounter is the condition of otherness, feeling what is "being-felt". The generation of "sense" as donation is realized in the encounter under the concrete form of the "to feel-to-be-felt" . This "to feel-to-be-felt" comes forth from the intropathic sense. The pathic aspect of the "pathic *logos*" revealed as intropathy manifests itself as the reversible, i.e., the "to feel-to-be-felt", and constitutes itself as movement of reciprocal encroaching. This relational interval of the reversible feeling – the "lived difference" – accounts for the springing up of sense. The structure of the "pathic *logos*" *which manifests the character of reversible reciprocity of the encounter* is linked with the concrete character of intropathy. This originary relational interval of reversibility does not depend on fixed poles that precede it, but rather it makes itself the movement of separation: the "sense" makes itself "sense". In this movement, the dynamic process producing "sense" manifests itself according to the three connotations of "sense": the sensible, the oriented aim, and the signifying aim. We have still to understand the affective aspect of "sense" (to sense) as enjoying or suffering. The "affect" is qualified according to the pathic correspondence participated in intropathy: the other welcomes me or repels me, in such a way that the enjoyment and the suffering are manifestations of resonance with the one who gives him /herself in the welcoming or inversely, refuses him/herself. This double affective possibility of intropathy depends on the factual manner in which the donation is received or called.

However, the concrete donation which actualizes the duality of the affective possibility stemming from intropathy depends on the originary donation, which precedes always itself in the desiring genesis of "sense". Historicality – as the originary donating character of Being – gives "sense" the *existentiell* historicity of *Dasein*. The "feeling of being at the edge of life" is taken in the donating receptivity, which generates the positive or negative quality of feeling. Nevertheless, the anthropological analysis which manifests its historical sense can describe it in the genetic becoming of the *infans*. The "sense" – originary sensing – is itself linked with the parental desire as well as with the effective assumption of oneself in the finite resolution of the "act of existing". To underline the role of historicity in the pathic encounter consists in defining first its existential conditions: bodiliness and temporality.

The ontological dimension of "depth" reveals itself phenomenologically as the source of every "sense", in the crossing of temporality and spatiality, lived in the meeting of the world. It manifests the symbolic horizon that conditions the field of possibility of every encounter.

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[15] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie première*, trad. Francaisç, vol. II, pp. 190 ss. Cf. also Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la constitution*, trad. Francaisç, E. Escoubas, pp. 235-237.

The horizon is the always de-totalized dimension which, in its overtaking, discovers the incommensurability of the depth. It is upon the depth, lived as spatio-temporal sense-horizon of the world – totality always de-totalized and infinitely restarted – that the body reflects itself in the feeling. The depth gives affectivity its intensity. However, the depth as horizon of the world only indicates the affective origin as "gift of the Being". Ontological dimension of "sense" – the depth – founds itself not only in the emotional astonishment of the "there is" and visible in the perceptive faith, but more radically in the implicit openness of the gift of being. Poetry expresses the profound presence of "sense" as the power of human dwelling. It is expressed to the extent the human being – as a loving person attempts to maintain his being – is trans-appropriated and is open to the "the Divine".[16] The depth of sense – the abyss and the negativity that comes to the world – conditions the emergence of existence in its modality of the "act of existing". The affective sense of "receiving oneself from the gift of the Being" in the intropathic reversibility actualizes the "pathic *logos*" as the primeval *fiat* of "sense". However, the *logos endiathetos* that makes appeal to the *logos prophericos* is not singularly and existentially qualified by the proper desire of each one. This, in turn, implicates the affective *fiat* from birth to death, in the cultural becoming of the person, which takes us to the consideration of the problem of encounter between cultures in the next section.

Problem of Encounter between Cultures

We have clarified that the "life of sense" actualizes itself always in an encounter, but this encounter is always already linked to the "Situation" in the play of tradition. To understand the encounter with the other culture implies recognition of a stake similar to the encounter of the *alter-ego* in his singular historicity. In fact, tradition takes over the history of the past in the present, but by re-actualizing its values at the crossing of new encounters at each epoch from of its destiny-like advent that implies for it new possibilities of existing. According to Heidegger, the concept of historicity applied to the cultural dimension could not be understood except from the temporality of *Dasein*. Merleau-Ponty, on his part, discovers in the cultural otherness an aspect of the body, the "constitution" of which belongs still to the phenomenological method. Thus, in *Le Visible et l'Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty overcomes the experience of bodiliness of the subject in order to tie it up to a more originary ground, articulating it to the "wild-being" – the "flesh" – which gives the possibility of reuniting "in one sole fabric the

[16] Cf. Martin Heidegger, "L'homme habite en poète"; *Essais et conférences*, trad. A. Préau, pp. 244 ss.

plurality of the monads, the past, the present, nature and culture,"[17] the universal and the individual.

In fact, in Husserl, the lived-concept of "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) indicates the intersubjective ground, which supports the depth of concrete life of our intertwined horizons (*La Terre)*. However, it is by the mediation of the body that my perception rejoins the world of the *alter-ego* and constitutes the real as objective. Analogically my culture stands out on the horizon of the others and enables me to recognize them, while they impose themselves to my proper cultural emergence. The concept of horizon, designating the totality of openness and the limitation of the perceptive experience, generates this worldly overcoming. It not only indicates a totalization, but also the condition of creating the invention in the internal and external exchange. It involves a relational relay between the individuals of the community taking place in the horizon of "sense", which defines the other cultures all around.

Now, the problem consists in understanding a culture in its singularity without sacrificing it to our western conceptual logic. It is always the other of the self which raises a question. The *alter- ego* is situated at the horizon of my perceptive-consciousness by the intropathic mediation of the body, but in the concrete appresentation of encounter, I discover the relation of reciprocity which places me in the situation of an "*alter*" for the other. This intertwined play, which reveals us to each other as subjectivity, is analogically also what enables the different cultures to experience each other, in overcoming and appropriating themselves. To be the other of the other introduces in the encounter a reversible reciprocity, which engenders for each one the distance of the questioning. Here, the analysis of intersubjectivity applies specifically at the cultural plane. Precisely that lived-distance makes possible the living of the difference, but this time as "differentiating relation". Thus, we do not have to deal with the problem of phenomenological constitution, but with its ontological articulation.

Underlying the diversity of the cultural points of view, the space of a "common sense" arises: the "flesh" – the expression which gives a foundation to the relational dimension of one culture toward the other, as the natural basis of a partaken relationship in the affective reversibility of the "feeling", from which the differentiating element of the cultural "singularities" proceed. Each culture acquires a kind of personality in becoming; a style, in the repetition of its proper heritage; and a renewal of its past at each generation on the basis of new values. These arise by the shock of encounters in such a way that every culture is induced to open itself to the horizon of the other cultures and thereby aim at "sense", which conditions their dynamism and singular concreteness. Thus., there is always a contingent aspect in a culture, linked not only to the natural spatio-

[17] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 409.

temporal cosmological fact, but also to the history of a people, which, according to its creating exigencies, institutes in its own way its cultural identity.

Following Merleau-Ponty, we discover the world not only as the intersubjective place wherein takes place the transcendental openness of human universality, but also as the relationship of ontological sense and the "sense" of nature as such, i.e., the "sense" is the "between" as modality of reversibility. The play of figure against background in an epistemological meaning in the *Phénoménologie de la perception* is understood more radically as the ontological dimension, i.e., as relationship of exchange: it is the originary pathic sense (*logos endiathetos*), the one of sense reversibility that is originary affectivity. It is this *logos endiathetos* that gives the *Einfühlung* – affective lived-experience of bodiliness with respect to another one in the otherness of encounter – its sensed anchoring. It is this *logos* – as originary affectivity – that confers an ontological meaning to every relational dimension, whether it depends on individual bodiliness, on the socio-political communication, or more radically on what is called today the "worldwide development". The intersubjective transcendental interrelation – which according to Husserl, is the manifestation of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) – is subtended in Merleau-Ponty by what conditions "sense", the "wild-being" (*logos endiathetos)*, from which every symbolic institution emerges in the affective reversibility. However, there is also the reversibility of being always at work; and the *Ineinander* that conditions nature and culture in a circular play in such a way that it is still the power of the symbolic order. The sign/language – particularly the language of philosophy – reads again the affective originary, which, in turn, gives a foundation to its expression. Besides, the same circularity inscribes itself also in aiming at the "sense" of the philosophical and the cultural realms.

Therefore, the term "institution" which ties itself up to the originary affective ground is understood at three levels. Firstly, taken in its objective factual meaning, it stands for a "neutral third one" with respect to every individual or a particular collectivity. Secondly, taken in its political meaning it stands for the "effective reason" – which according to Hegel is the state. Thirdly, at the most fundamental and the most radical level it stands for the place of the emergence of "sense". Here, we can detect the metaphysical problem of the notion of creation, as what moves the interferential relationship of every placement in "sense" and the ontological substrate that gives the "differentiating difference" of every relation whether it is individual or collective. What makes sense *between* the cultures is the exchange, differentiating as such, i.e., the lived negativity that is pre-symbolic and pre-instituted. If the universality of cultures is possible, this lived-negativity is concretely the exchange matrix which subtends all the cultural forms and which enables them to enter in communication. Nevertheless, it remains that it is always from certain concrete situation that they are defined in their singular diversity. It is not the case where we ought to place ourselves above and outside all cultures in order to judge them from

an objective point of view. The point of view of the *logos prophericos* implies understanding the unity of the different cultures, while each of them finding again profoundly in it the origin of significance and the significance of an "operating differentiating word". This "word" of the *logos endiathetos* precedes every uttered discourse, and is not the property of any speaking subject. On the contrary, the subjects are taken in it, in the same way as every culture emerges from the "originary not-said".

Merleau-Ponty names the institutional openness of "sense" the "flesh of the World". This ontological concrete universal does not depend from any form of idealism, whether it is of Hegel or Husserl, for whom the concrete universal remains linked to the subjective transcendental consciousness. According to Merleau-Ponty, "sense" is not originarily dependent on symbolic action, or the action of a consciousness, but "sense" belongs ontologically to the "wild-being", i.e., the "sensible" being. The "sense", which always is sedimented and recreates itself; it is not an "in-itself"; but the continual creation in its proper movement that is the self-expression of itself. It is this sense, which gives verticality of sense to every symbolic institution, whether it manifests itself in bodily perception, or in communicational otherness that is political or cultural. In fact, the phenomenologically lived-sense is first recognized from the perceptive action-passion; and linked to the affective reversibility (*Einfühlung)* of the "feeling-being felt" of life, which goes back for every individual to his/her sexual originary anchorage. However, this lived sense is not linked to the constitution of a posing consciousness, the reflecting *cogito*; but to the concrete lived, affective feeling, emerging from the "flesh of the world".

This foundation of originary affectedness promotes the sense of natural and cultural life, and organizes the sense of every institution in a proper manner, according to the contingent mode of the communication for every individual, every city, and every culture. The singular cultural institution is linked to a spatio-temporal history, which recreates its symbolic dynamic through the epochs, precisely in the exchange of the cultural movements of receptivity. The *logos endiathetos* is a sensible source of "sense", affecting the effective action of the pathic bodies of the ones and the others, on the concrete singular planes, political and cultural, recomposing constantly new figures as so many aesthetic possibilities (*aesthesis*) in a springing up of an incredible novelty.

ORIGINARY AFFECTIVE SPACE AND CULTURAL ETHICS

The above discussion on the relation between phenomenological-anthropological research and its relationship to ethics, by unfolding the problems of affectivity and encounter between cultures leads us to the reflection on originary affective space and its relation to cultural ethics. The first section of this part considers the role of cultural action and its ethical import in elaborating the originary affective experience, while the second section looks into the phenomenon of affectivity and its relation to ethics.

Cultural Action and Its Ethical Import

In Merleau-Ponty, we have discovered the ontological dimension of "sense" as the source of differentiating "feeling-being-felt". This perspective helps us to understand from another angle the ethical aspect that links cultures together and institutes a worldwide process, which makes appeal to the human rights and the respect for cultural identity. The existing being (*Dasein*) coexists with the other (*Mitsein*) and encounters the other in the world not in the mode of a tool, but in the mode of mutual concern and solicitude. In such a co-existence the "affective disposition" makes me experience the other immediately as propitious or threatening, thereby ensuring the foundation of an actual community. However, the existential character of the mutual concern – ontologically founded in the *Mitsein* – indicates an ontological possibility of an *existentiell* appeal to the reciprocal recognition of people among themselves, and thereby also different cultures among themselves. This is because the existential character of the resolution for authentic life – the engagement to assume one's own proper "there" (*da*) as being-towards-death – must be understood in relation to the others. The other becomes a duplication of my existence[18] always overflowing. Besides, it is on this basis that intropathy – in the *existentiell* sense of passive synthesis by bodily mediation – is made possible. In the same way, the self-opening of sense, "flesh of the world", is taken in the cultural intertwining and founds the differentiating condition which gives foundation to the recognition of the one "with respect to the other" of singular cultures. Each of them is the anticipated reflection of the other.

Similarly, culture is illuminated by *historicality*. History, in the *existentiell* sense, means the whole of being which changes through time, that designates the transformations, the destinies of men, and their civilizations in reality. The history which takes place in time is the specific adventure of *Dasein* that has occurred, has been "transmitted", still continues to be-in-company, and assumes in the strong sense of the word the name "history". If *Dasein* is destiny-like, if it exists essentially as "being-in-the-world-in-the-being-with", in company of the others, his adventure is a shared adventure and it is defined as a common fate."[19] It is the adventure of the community. In fact, for Heidegger, there is a *telos* of destiny. In our perspective inspired by Merleau-Ponty, the destiny-like dimension shared by the generations, transposed into the destiny-like aim between the cultures each one in its singularity is recomposed each time there is an encounter. The creative novelty, instituting new exchange relations does never exhaust the universalizing aim which abstractly globalizes its content. On the contrary, we attend an ever more enriching bundle of "sense" in the very experience of "differentiation".

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[18] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Etre et temps*, trad. Francaisç F. Vezin, p. 167.
[19] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 449.

The philosophical understanding of a unity in difference can be founded on the plane of Being and in the *existentiell* plane by the mutual concern. We cannot speak properly of fusion between the horizons in mutual exchange and in the reversible delimitation of the cultures; it is what gives them precisely their singular *existentiell* diversity. On the other hand, the analysis of bodiliness has enabled us to detect in the articulation of a reversible relation the reality experienced, always as incomplete, in the encounters. The life of sense – as non-coincidence, sensible and signifying at the same time – is always already a life of desire. Every culture also is fundamentally borne by this dimension, always delayed, and non-coincidence with itself. However, is it not supported by a *telos* of the sense, as a hope of universality? Does it not find again a kind of signifying dynamics in the encounter as such? Does exchange as play of reversibility not implicate a position of solicitude? What would enable us to discern here the indication of a possibility of an ethical life in every culture?

Applying to the dialogue between the different cultures, Paul Ricoeur gathers together in the same practical ideal, the *telos* and the *norm* of mutual respect meet each other "in just institutions". It is on the level of a committed liberty that the philosopher, bound to a particular culture, gives account of his conviction in his research for "a good life with and for the others,"[20] but this time on the plane of the encounter between cultures. Actually, the differentiated and reciprocal contributions cultures among each other can be the object of an ethical mediation similar to the one, which is suggested by Aristotle that calls for friendship among all men. Is that dynamic of friendship not able to refer analogically in depth to the intercultural exchange? Because the term "solicitude" can also mean the space of recognition linked to the irreplaceable character of each culture, we can say what Aristotle speaks of as applicable to individuals as also applicable to cultures and say that friendship helps us to discover the other cultures as well.

In this sense, to impose a univocal conception of cultures "would be as intolerable as willing to impose a univocal conception of the institutions." [21] Philosophy, which grasps the foundations of the diversity of cultures, owes to itself to search for the conditions that render their encounter possible while maintaining their differences and allowing each of them to recognize themselves in the authenticity of their proper commitments. Therefore, while promoting each other towards the site of an ethical hope, they cannot recognize each other except in the reciprocal concern of a committed action.

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[20] Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, p. 202.
[21] Cf. *Ibid*.

Affectivity and Ethics

The phenomenon of affectivity has revealed itself as being the originary openness of every aim of sense. It enriches the understanding of all that is human in its *existentiell* modalities and recaptures reason (*logos endiathetos*), while widening it up to its foundation. Affectivity underlines the existential in-rootedness of ethics. The analysis of the dimensions of the "act of existing", language, desire, otherness, bodiliness, and living in the cultural *milieu* can help us to understand the dead ends of simple communication. To understand better the ontological "difference" as foundation, to explicitate for oneself and together with others the dimensions of actual existence each of us live and every community pursues induces action toward a more authentic commitment, in the sense of an effective responsibility.

Besides, phenomenological anthropology has already moved by an ethical concern, which guides it in its proper "critical" finality. There is a reciprocal influence of the respective finalities, open to the sense of the "act of existing". Precisely, we can emphasize here the double situation of the relationship between ethics and affectivity: on the one hand, the affective entrance of the child into existence influences the manner in which it recognizes the ethical field; on the other hand, affectivity induces the overcoming of ethics towards its "beyond", i.e., its donating sense: what does it mean to love? Beyond the respect of the other and the exchange of responsibilities with other cultures, affectivity engages the ultimate experience of desire that does not belong to the province of ethics, but belongs to the "order of the gift", and receives itself from a radical and originary donation of Being. Here, we find again in a reversible way the originary creator of sense. This originary donation is given to us only through culture. It has a significant bearing on our own individuality. It is always already there in each cultural tradition, but always recreated by every new birth, every new encounter, and every new intercultural exchange. Everything is borne by this "differentiation" of the original affective "feeling-being-felt", operating before language, and motor of "sense" recreating itself indefinitely as relational dynamics of "life".

CONCLUSION

The human institution is reverberated in the very heart of the symbolic reversibility of culture with its natural roots. Merleau-Ponty, in his last posthumous writings, reiterates the point that every culture is living and human as every individual is. This idea has been revived since the affective originary of life in "sense" which reflects itself as the "difference". The "sense" that is at work as affective transfer makes itself a movement, reverberating itself necessarily on all the levels of sense relation up to the rational creativity. It is also affected by the sexual polarity according to a differentiating and singularizing otherness. For instance, man exercises

reason according to a specific modality and the woman exercises it according to a constitutively reversible modality. The becoming of reason does not belong to the order of a complementarity, but to the openness of "sense" always operating and aiming at the *telos* of reason, but each one according to his/her singular affectivity in relation to each one's cultural tradition.

Thus, the fact of plurality of cultures inscribes the contingent condition of each one of them with respect to the horizons of all others, reflecting in them each time a singular otherness. Hence, no culture is totalizing in itself, but diversifies itself in the re-launching of its external and internal contributions as if a cultural tradition is re-appropriated in the instituting dynamic of a destiny. From this point of view, philosophy is no more the expression of a universalizing totalitarian aim, but rather it is determined by its own historicity, acceding to itself at the crossing of the different cultures, in a dynamic interpreting movement which opens it in the exchange to the question of its own reversibility.

Therefore, whether we consider the theme of personal affectivity or the theme of culture, we are led to recognize the fundamental role of the "singular differentiation", in the epistemological field of the search for truth and in the ethical-political field search for values. In this search, we do not have to do with an anti-universalism, but rather with a differentiating universality, interlacing on the "flesh of the world", in which the reversibility of "sense" is always in movement and gives life to the cultures and through them to persons.

CHAPTER 11

EXISTENTIAL ROOTEDNESS OF CULTURE AND WORLDWIDE GLOBALIZATION: TELEOLOGY AND RECONSTRUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary cultural problem is connected to technical globalization, which already constitutes the reality of the future world. The qualitative and quantitative changes the world undergoes in its objective realization and the constituted/constructed techno-scienticfic power universal in scale call the philosphers to renew their mode of understanding the world and the behavior of people. They have to engage not only theoretical reflection, but also a practical consideration in understanding the "sense" of the future world as it is pre-determined by technological globalization. Our task in this chapter is to analyze the impact of the future *factum* on the contemporary cultural experience and the manner in which we can cope with it both theoretically and practically. We attempt to do this in three parts.

The first part this chapter makes an appeal to the phenomenological concept of "teleology" as Husserl defines it in his later works and the present day instrumental teleology of techno-science and worldwide globalization. It also considers the impact and consequences of techno-science and worldwide globalization on the whole spectrum of culture in general and in different cultures in particular. This concept helps us to understand the manner in which the future constructed world of technology and worldwide globalization interferes already today with the cultural life of people. Besides, it assists us with information as to the manner in which a cultural restructuring can be integrated with this type of instrumental and technological domination.

The second part enlightens us regarding the historical process of culture by taking up the question of its originary *existentiell* rootedness through the mediation of bodiliness. The concept of bodiliness makes explicit the necessary mediation between the ontological and anthropological dimensions of existing being. The human body makes a living being to exist concretely (*existentiell*) among living beings genetically stemming from the natural development of the ontogenesis and the phylogenesis in the context of the natural world. Bodiliness, at the level of *Mitsein*, opens the existing being to cultural interrelations and intercultural sympathy. Thus, bodiliness is linked to the history of the world in relation of reciprocity with others guided by the feeling/desire for the other. This call for shared "institutional incorporation" and ethical and

political restructuring of cultural intuitions is based on people's cultural mind-set.

In the third part, our goal to manifest the desiring tension of "sense" in relation to the institutional ethical-political action, considered in its proper cultural values, with the aim of justifying the ultimate call of "sense" in its ontological infinite donation. The ethical and political actions by restructuring the world of persons and cultures are essential for preventing the takeover by techno-science and universal globalization. This implies an ethical responsibility, which calls for founding ethical and political institutions on nature in its totality as the process of life, which can give a "sense" of wellbeing both to individuals and cultures. Such a creative giving of "sense" has to move beyond simple ethical normativity and must be founded in the order of the heart. This is possible at the level of affectivity in its ultimate "sense of desire", which implies the personalizing act of one's existence being received as a gift from "Being" (*Sein*) experienced in relation an encounter with the other in the "life-world" of cultures. The conclusion reiterates the need for founding any form of restructuring process, whether personal or cultural, on the originary "sense" of existence, which opens the authenticity of teleological sense in every person and culture. This, in turn, makes it possible to recreate personalized cultural institutions and to give a "sense" of hope to persons and cultures despite the technological superstructure of instrumental universal globalization. Now, we proceed to consider a phenomenological analysis of the notion of teleology.

TELEOLOGY: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

In this part of the chapter we attempt to unfold phenomenologically the Husserlian concept of "teleology" as defined in his later works and the present day instrumental teleology of the techno-science and the worldwide globalization. We also look into the impact and consequences of techno-science and worldwide globalization on the whole spectrum of culture in general and in different cultures in particular. Besides, we analyze the manner in which a cultural restructuring can be integrated with this type of instrumental and technological domination.

Teleology: A Husserlian Perspective

In his later writings from 1931 to 1936, Husserl names "teleology" the last of all forms (*eidos*) even though it is in itself the first one. It is the "form of all the forms" that is implicit in worldliness. The term "teleology" is associated with the process of development to which every transcendental-subjectivity is submitted.[1] Jaques English in *Researches*

[1] CF. Edmund Husserl, HUA, XV, p.731.

Husserliennes shows clearly all the astonishing ambiguity of the text of 1933.[2] While phenomenology must maintain the essentially transcendental character of its tasks, it also must try to discover again certain continuity with the development of the "world of monads". The universal teleology has an all-enveloping character. It is the intersubjective drive, which embraces all the subjects from a transcendental point of view. In the relative worlds of monads, each one constitutes for itself a temporal objective world: the world of human monads and the temporal world of human beings. The being of the monadic totality as flowing is coming to self-consciousness and is already in the self-consciousness, gradation in *infinitum*. However, in his work *Ideas I*, Husserl seems to reject any facticity in the essentiality of certain invariant structures, whereas in his last writings he changes drastically his transcendental phenomenology and links himself up again to the primordial base (*ur*). It is from this fact-like base that the subjectivity has the means to make sure of a transcendental development. Husserl speaks of a *factum* by opposition to what belongs to the *eidos*. Yet, we have to do with a *factum* which is not a simple anonymous facticity devoid of any sense, but it is at the origin of any orientation and forms the very sense of teleology. A full ontology is teleology and it presupposes the *factum*. I am apodictically in the belief in the world. It is in the *factum* that the worldliness and teleology can be unveiled and become transcendental. Thus, Husserl sends back to the sensible (*aisthesis*) *data*, i.e., the *hyle* in the most general meaning, without which any world and transcendental all-embracing subjectivity is not possible. This takes us to the question of the manner of understanding the development between *factum* and *eidos*. While maintaining the possibilities of the eidetic development, Husserl gives it systematically a genetic treatment, even though the teleology which drives from it is understandable only as transcendental.

The later texts of Husserl transform the transcendental process of intentionality, linked to the earlier texts. There is a re-articulation of the general phenomenological problematic between the two extremities of the development: the one of nature and the other of history. This innovation, as Jaques English points out, has been the constitution of the other as *alter-ego* in a community of monads. In his *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* Husserl speaks of that which overcomes the dimension of my individual life. Here, he aims at moving beyond the constitution of the other monads to that of my own monad in order to support it eventually by the "structured articulation of our primordial belonging sphere." It is that which constitutes the "totality of nature". While doing this, Husserl does not lose anything of the

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[2] Cf. Jacques English, "Que signifie l' idee d'une teleologie universalle chez le dernier Husserl?"; *Researches Husserliennes*, ed. Centre de Researches Phenomenologiques Facultes Universitaries, vol. IX, (Bruxelles: Université Saint-Louis, 1998), pp. 3-36.

transcendental reflection, as he links the transcendental development of the communities of monads with the genetic development.

By his circular analysis from nature to history, Husserl gives to history its relations to the "life-world" – situated between the two extremes of birth and death – the movement of the genetic teleology. Yet he intersects it by multiple intentional lives which, while individualizing themselves in facticity, are nevertheless all of them united "by the same set of invariant eidetic structures."[3] Thus, two teleologies wrap themselves up in each other: the first, the inter-generativity of the one; and the second, the axial thematic of the other. He adds: "With the functioning of the transcendental intentionality taken in the integrality of its dimension." This leads us to the consideration of instrumental teleology as related to the cultural aspect in the next section.

Instrumental Teleology and Its Impact on Culture

The concept of teleology applied now to the future concrete *factum* of worldwide globalization does not belong directly to a transcendental analysis. However, we can recognize in it an analogical meaning, which makes appeal to the historical foundation. To the extent mankind recognizes itself – for the first time in its objective totality – and confronts nature thanks to the progress of the techno-sciences, man has taken himself in the constructed frame that bears him and recomposes the everyday-world without his knowledge and with his having willed or even contested it. The cultural intersubjectivity reconstitutes itself every day under other objective forms, in a world materially transfigured by new technologies. It is no longer possible to confine oneself to the idea of a simple natural world. The contemporary individual in his own culture has effectively transformed himself in another either by following the novel valorization of a technocratic aim that can impose the modalities of existence, or alter radically its sense, particularly in the case of the less integrated cultures. Practical reason, in some way, anticipated by the play of the instrumental possibilities of an artificial intelligence compels it to give a verdict on different fields of experience, where it has neither control, nor the spontaneous spirit of the Cartesian good sense.

Thus, the cultural problem today is connected to the impact of a future technological *factum* on the present decision. In fact, from time immemorial cultural exchanges have occurred between peoples, ethnic groups, and collective organizations carrying along in their wakes the dynamic renewal or the decline of collective or individual experiences. However, we have no more to do now with the community of experience, but with a "revolution" of the conditions of life by the universalization of artificial intelligence, by the infiltration of technologies in all the modes of

[3] *Ibid*., p. 19.

existence and by the continuous progress of scientific research. How, having become the totalizing field of social-economic-political relays the world of techno-science affects mainly our common *habitat*. Already in 1957, preceding the advent of the first *Spoutnic*, Hannah Ardent predicted a new era in which mankind has taken for the first time the measure of the earth. [4] Moreover, thanks to the interdependence of the network of contacts by computerization and by all other modes of communication all the cultures are concerned with the collective operation and subtended by an anonymous totalitarian movement. For instance, the power of the multi-national firms, the dependence on the financial and stock-market economy, the generalization of computerization of everyday life, the control of the biosphere, the supply of goods, and the like. However, this is dependent on external factors – such as the hazards of the economic and political powers or the resistance of the natural phenomena – which slow down or modify its effective achievement.

Clarifying the nature of culture, we can say that it is a set of modes of life, a system of representations and activity proper to a group of people. Culture becomes the heritage of the past by re-actualizing it and in relation to the present life and its projects in the future by orienting towards its ends. In fact, every culture expresses a certain *existentiell* style, retaken and transposed at each generation and in relation to each of its members. Culture depends on tradition, whether we have to do with objects necessary for action in the exchange of goods; with stories and rites in the communication of symbolic systems; with the creativity of aesthetic forms; or with the transmission of its values by education and ethnic/religious instruction. Tradition is the source of inspiration and imitation concerning gestures or languages. New activities come and graft themselves on tradition, transform its aims, and orient it toward new projects. Thus, tradition leans also on the future which promotes the force of sense of its will and its desires. In brief, culture is not a static network of concrete or symbolic signifiers, but it is the operator that launches and recomposes at each time under new figures the common feeling (*stimmung*) of a people or an ethnic group. Heidegger, influenced by Nietzsche, indicates specific characters attached to the cultural re-investments in three originary domains: monuments, archives and stories.[5]

However, today the cultural teleology is no longer specified only by the temporal and historical circularity of the memory of the past, even though it is re-actualized in the present and of re-invested in its future. In fact, we must recognize in it the teleological transcendental dimension, but concretely we must admit the unilateral pressure of the future, objectively constituted by the technologies: they hold the retrospective power of

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[4] Cf. Hannah Ardent, *La condition de l'homme modern*.

[5] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *L'Etre et le temps*, trad. trad. Francaisç F. Vezin, p. 461.

instrumental control of the present, at the risk of dominating the other possibilities of creativity proper to every culture. The pressure of the technological world articulates a life conditioned by artifacts, which block unilaterally the cultures in their natural destiny. The artificial *factum* stemming from the instrumental operationality at all levels of experience determines the world of future globalization while affecting all societies. Sooner or later, all cultures are constrained to accept its control, to assure its constituted power, whether it is only by the uniqueness of language or at the risk of extinction. The near-extinction of American-Indian culture is an example of this tragic actuality. Besides, for the first time, the earth as natural *habitat* is recognized as a common good shared by all cultures. This, in turn, induces correlatively the awareness of a collective responsibility particularly in view of future generations.

However, the world of techno-science constitutes a mythical and attractive force in the world of today. Its absolute significance finds expression not only in its mastery of nature in its constitution, but also in the ultimate scientific theory which enables a perfect pre-visibility of events yet to happen. In this way, mankind can have the mastery of space-time as object of a cosmic desire, the mastery of life with the recession if not the abolition of death, and, thus, pursuing the myth of an infinite temporality. The self-constituting rationality foreshadows a mode of life totally self-managed by the generalized instrumentalization marking constitutively the identity of a future world. It gives the present a technocratic aura which, in turn, imposes its control on the contemporary choices of life. The world of techno-science becomes the source and model that need to be kept as the standard in so far as it shapes the final products of the socio-economic plans, the formation of world policy, every form of expression in the media world, education, and even daily behavior of individuals and groups.

As a matter of fact, the negative side-effect of technology that comes from a too rapid initiation has put the cultural spectators and agents on their guard against the pre-defined dangers in the near future. For instance, there is the risk of losing control of the process of computerization with its unpredictable detonators. However, it is the self-constitutive proliferation of artifacts, which contributes to raise the fear of an anonymous and a blind world. Thus, this precarious situation calls for a collective responsibility, not only from the experts who foresee virtually its effects, but also from simple consumers who neither control, nor master its import. We can cite some dangerous areas as example: the greenhouse effect, reduction of ozone layer, genetic manipulation, human cloning, political-financial jumps which turn upside down at short or long term, the concrete predictions made by research, and the like. Since the danger involved is still uncertain programming a right response calls for a collective prudence, despite the obligatory mediation of the networks of virtual communication. Thus, the cultural process is intrinsically predetermined by the present impact of techno-science.

Techno-science has anticipated the future in the present. Hence, it determines the cultural concentration, which, in turn, imposes the *de facto* unification of all cultures: all cultures are being assimilated in the unity of one sole worldly-totalitarian-network, made uniform not only by the most advanced technologies[6] and without taking account the autonomy of multiple traditions and their differentiations both linguistic and cultural. Contrary to an assimilating totalitarian convergence of techno-science, does not the transcendental teleology maintain its power? Does it not accompany the cultural invention in all its creative dimensions, including those which integrate the arbitrary powers of the worldwide globalization in the movement of "life"? The answer to these questions invites us to recapture the differentiated modalities of cultures in their own creative, original and conquering values lived out concretely through the mediation of bodiliness. This is our task in the second part of the paper.

HISTORICAL PROCESS OF CULTURE UNFOLDED THROUGH THE MEDIATION OF BODILINESS

The Husserlian teleological analysis let us into the ambiguity of the sharing between the genetic movement and its transcendental import. Merleau-Ponty has taken up this same problem again. However, in his conception, the phenomenological component is no longer linked to the framework of internationalization, but rather it is connected to the framework of the *existentiell* transcendence. In his posthumous notes, *La Nature*, we discover an anthropological genetic study of the human being in the evolution of the living beings, developed from the analysis of bodiliness as chiasmic, sensible and expressive place in relation to the *Ineinander* with nature.[7] The human body is a constitutive part in this circular relation, which makes of it a living being among the living beings, genetically stemming from the natural development of the ontogenesis and the phylogenesis. In *La Nature*, Merleau-Ponty revives the ontological dimension of "sense", which is the relational dimension oriented towards "life".

The concept of bodiliness makes explicit the necessary mediation between the ontological and the anthropolitical dimensions of the existing being, as structure of the in-between of "sense", i.e., the "sensed" differentiating relation. The "sensing" consists in the pathic resounding of the perception of the other – another existing being or a thing – and in seeing, listening, and sensible seizing. Living the presence of desiring

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[6] In this context, the conquest of space is an interesting area, even though by and large this area is free from conflicts and is still neutral space of collaboration among the earthlings.

[7] M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes", *Cours du collège de France*, ed. D. Seglard, (Paris: Seuil, 1995), PP. 263-380.

history of the body, the present “sensing” stands out upstream to its originary affective anchorage lived at the edge of life, i.e., the birth; it opens downstream in the very act of existing and moves in search of what is given in the pre-sentiment since the origin in the “desire for the other.” Thus, the things around themselves are offered to the perceptive subject as the promise of an *existentiell* response to come. Borne by the imaginary affective “sense”, the present and the distant things always mark a sign in the perception of the world even before the things are named. The “sensing” keep alive the oral play of the senses/sense organs as primordial and symbolic “saying” before any universalizing linguistic expression.

Applied to our problem, "sensing" operates on the artificial world of our new *habitat* of the natural world (*Umwelt*) that is transfigured by the techno-science. Thus, the world of artifacts, material and virtual, exceeds in quantity and quality the productivity of the previous methods at the expense of the *habitat* itself. This dimension of time-space, the natural basis of bodiliness, recreates the *existentiell* horizons at a scale undreamt of. Now the question arises whether there is a real rupture of the feelings (*Stimmung*). The bodiliness anchorage and the mediation of the "common sense" continue to play their primordial role while enlarging the field of existence towards creative possibilities still unknown. There is actually a “sensing” of the artificial object, induced according to the conniving advertizing by the affective invitation of sensitivity. Evidently, the proper finalities of the artifact are not given directly in their modes of appearance, but we can recognize in them some analogy with the natural object or even anticipate their modes of appearance by perceptive analogies. This, in turn, brings about a kind of naturalization of the artificial-world, even if the sophistication is high. In the same way, as the artificial-object is carried along by the affective mediation of bodiliness, the technological operation as a whole through its synthetic material or its virtual models, and is able to supply the originary “affect” with a relay. Thus, the body inscribes itself analogically in this nature, “in totality”, enlarges itself to new artifacts and possibilities. There are actually new creative approaches concerning the aptitude of the living bodiliness.

Similarly, we can make use of the term "institutional bodiliness" analogically in order to establish at the level of *Mitsein*, a cultural interrelation and a structure of mediation for the cultures among themselves. The esthesiological body, as bodiliness, is intrinsically linked to the history of its *Umwelt* in relation of reciprocity with the others and with nature (*Ineinander*). Now this originary otherness is founded on the *Einfuelung*. There is a reciprocal "sensing" of the subject and other before any identification of body, in such a way that the “I” learns itself in a pathic mode as subjectivity, from the interior of a reciprocal aim at "sense". This common resending makes precisely the bodiliness the “in-between” as the language of the bodies among themselves. By widening this way of inhabiting the world, there is more than one feeling (*Stimmung*), which induces us to have a link with people and with things. To the existent they

become familiar and are readily recognized, places constitute the framework of our horizon of action. They keep in memory the originary imaginary structure of the "sensing" before any objective thematization. This pathic "sensing" locates them again in the originary space-time complex, which makes the natural basis of bodiliness. From this point of view, the cultural mode of life inscribes itself immediately in its originary affective places, linked to the memory of the subject and borne by the desiring tension. Thus, daily existence is marked by its cultural surroundings in all its factors. Hence, by the communicational relations the charge of the affective originary impact is borne in the most significant way. An example of this can be noticed in the incredible passion for the global system of mobile communications (GSM) today throughout the world.

Now, the question arises regarding the institutions depended upon as the aesthesiology proper to each culture. If we take into consideration the originary negativity of the "affect", it is generated from the beginning of life in birth by the existential crisis of the passage of the *infans* beyond weaning and jealousy. It makes one existent to discover the other and his/her other, i.e., as a companion (*socius*). The negativity gives an account of the principle of reality by the experience of its own subjectivity and by the experience of the "common sense". On the other hand, the concrete "affects" are the result of successive learning – by play of imitation, competition and rivalries – by all this interlacing collective relations stemming from the bodiliness proper. However, the interrelation between existing beings is founded in their participation in cultural history (*Geschichte*). Levi-Strauss underlines by his interpretation of the elementary structures of kinship based on exchange, an evolution of the natural process towards a more extended cultural differentiation. The priorities of existence are marked by the choice of values proper to each group of people. For instance, the values attached to family in china and other eastern traditions; or the values of the individual human rights in the western tradition. It can be also said that there is a pathic encounter of cultures among themselves in the sense that their institutions become interesting to people of other cultures by a kind of intercultural sympathy and by analogous life conditions, although they are different according to places, historical modalities, cultural levels, aesthetics, and philosophical and religious forms. All said above regarding intercultural sympathy are associated with the desire/feeling (*Stimmung*) of the shared "institutional incorporation", which calls for ethical and political restructuring of institutions based on the cultural mind-set of the different peoples. This takes us to consider desire and its relation to institutional ethical and political restructuring in the next part.

DESIRE AND INSTITUTIONAL ETHICAL-POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING

We have underlined the initial and initiator role of affectivity in the

history of the subject. However, it is to the notion of "passive synthesis" that we need to resort for the concrete awareness of ourselves in order to rejoin at the starting point because the life of "sense" is a temporality of presence. The self-position of subjectivity is the essence of the lived-time; the being is affected by the self itself because the pressure of time is nothing else but the transition from a present to another present; and the time which flows out but still knows itself as the relation of the self with itself is what we call "thisness/ipsiety". [8] The retention and the protention of the temporal spaces which inscribe themselves in the always overcome openness of oneself, proper to the self-reflecting subject, resound together in my present. However, the present opens itself to the relational spatializing depth of the successive horizons of the self, brought about by its encounter with the world of existing beings (*Mitsein*) and the world of existing things (*Umwelt*), i.e., nature in general. The present "passive synthesis" of the "I" resounds in the whole history of the "act of existing" of the subject, and its transcendence that articulates itself on the originary factual background, i.e., its "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*). Now, the setting in motion of "senses" inscribes itself in this *Lebenswelt* through the originary desire, which orients the life of sense in the *infans*. Hence, the tension of desire articulates itself circularly in the teleological finality of life. This circular double play of the transitional transitivity of desire – between the openness of the meaningful speech at birth and the future constituted by the appeal of "sense", which is the horizon of death – imprints its mark on the whole *existentiell* activity. The "passive synthesis" makes present its pathic dimension in the present in which I am. However, it bears the dynamics of the originary "sense" and the desire of its affectivity to come precisely through the mediation of bodiliness. Besides, in his work *De L'Existence A L'Existent*, Levinas recalls that the being that "I am" is the stanza which concerns the *habitat* of "well-being". This stanza can be widened to the totality of the lived temporality as relational, particularly in its essential desiring dimension.

So far, we have discussed about the history of the subject as the presence to itself in relation to the "passive synthesis", which bears the "knowing" [9] of the "I" as the *habitat* of well-being. It is on this *existentiell* base that we have to work in order to bring about the restructuring both in the personal and the cultural dimensions of the existing being. The ethical action is certainly the most appropriate means to defend the "world of persons" from any neutralizing and mortiferous drift that characterizes the techno-science and the blind totalitarian world. The persons who make ethical choices must base their life and choices on the interior of their adult and practical subjectivity, the originary affective base that engages them most profoundly and in the acuteness of their ethical intuitions. Besides, we

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[8] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenologie de la Perception*, p, 487.

[9] "Knowing" understood in the French sense of "*Co-Naitre*" which can be rendered in English as "to be born with".

need to question if the vital diversity, inscribed at the level of the existing individual is also valid on the cultural plane. Thus, there is an ethical responsibility on the part of the "deciders", i.e., the human persons. This ethical responsibility is applicabel to all dimensions of life. In the exercise of ethical responsibility the "deciders" must not only respect the human dignity in its bodiliness, but also the dignity of the communities in their relations of cultural exchange. More radically and globally, the ethical responsibility is related to the ontological foundation of human experience, i.e., nature as the process of life for all the features of existence in their promotional circularity and appearance (*Ineinander*). Therefore, we have to found an ethics of nature in totality as life-process – the vital sense of the living being – and as the institution of personal human singularity and circular singularity. The differentiating dimension of the "sense" gives the ethical attitude the exigency of its desiring vitality that is always relational. However, as ethics remains in the field of practical rationality that focuses on the "concept of duty" [10] it does not necessarily discover its original meaning and usage. The concept of duty, understood as confinement to the rule, runs the risk of stumbling on its own limit; it fails to unfold the original meaning of duty as the unspeakable and more-encompassing-experience, which is irreducible to objective rationality. It can also be affected by the "unwell-being" that results from a symbolic evil, and makes us recognize its uncertainty and powerlessness. Now, the fact of finding oneself in a positon of regulating limitation contains in itself its overcoming that does not belong to the ethical order. It enables us to have a glimpse of the "complementary spiritual enrichment" (*supplement d'ame*) of which Henry Bergson speaks in his moral philosophy. How can we express its approach?

The search for meaning of the ethical sense – the transcendental sense of the ethical conditioning – is to search for the originary-giving key of "sense". So far, the anthropological thesis of this paper has concerned itself with the implication of bodiliness in its affective, natural interrelation as necessary for cultural restructuring. It is our opinion that the deep-rooted dimension can condition ethical action in all its aspects. However, it is true that not all ethical debates are necessarily gravitating toward the affective resounding of the originary *Einfuelhung*. Yet, it is from this deeper perspective that ethics draws its own *existentiell* conditioning while bringing it along in the framework of ethical rationality. The structure of affectivity inducing the sense of "well-being" happens to be at its turn transposed in the framework beyond its *existentiell* aim while inserting itself in practical consciousness, in such a way that the ethical consciousness gives the affective existence a positive dimentison by regulating its "sense".

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[10] Here, we understand the "concept of duty" as it is understood in the moral philosophy of Kierkegaard.

Thus, there is a reciprocal constitution of desire and ethical consciousness. Firstly, the ethcial consciousness gives affective existence of desire the ability to respond from its point of view to the formal, universalizable dimensions of the law. Secondly, the affective structure of desire plays for the ethical consciousness by inducing it to make the entry into ethical life. Besides, the affective structure of desire works also for overcoming ethics. It brings into play the "sense' of existence, its ultimate finality and the infinite aspiration for which one can be prepared and marked out only with beacons by ethics. Therefore, the analysis of the structure of affectivity with respect to ethics brings to the fore a double perspective: the perspective of the originary conditioning as favorable field for the ethcial consciousness, and the perspective of the ultimate source of "sense" in giving proximity. The beyond the ethical limit gives a fore-boarding of the moment of conversation by which the ethical consciousness discovers itself as given to itself. The giving source of "sense" beyond the ethical limit and its hope has repercussions on the originary progression of affectivity and on the ethical widening of reasonable action. On the one hand, the transcendent source of "sense" gives "well-being" as the "transcendental sense" reverberates on rational ethics. On the other hand, what has been at the level of generation – the originary affective structure being the source of desire and giving creation – finds in the ultimate calling of "sense" the origin of its giving potentiality and the sense of its pathic implication on ethical consciousness.

Phenomenologically, the three dimensions – affectivity, ethics and gift – intersect each other, even though they do not interfere each time. We can take examples from different traditions to illustrate this point further. Chinese civilization is centred on two foundations: the family and the city. The affective institution of the family intersects in some way into the rights of the city and increases the value proper to the city, such as distributive justice, collegiate work, and faithfulness to the ruling hierarchy. Similarly, questions of human rights that belong to a philosophy oriented by the notions of love, justice, and helping the one in need inscribe themselves in the *existentiell* experience in the life-world as well as in the ethical institutions. In brief, the creative giving of "sense" founds the order of the "heart" and overcomes the practical rationality of the "concept of duty" as simple ethical normativity.

Ontological hermeneutics goes beyond the phenomenological method applied to the study of affectivity by its teleological intention that aims at the ultimate "sense" of desire. The personalizing act finds its *existentiell* condition in the event of the "I am". To recognize the gift by which the "I" receives itself from Being (*Sein*) is to grasp – in the depth of oneself – the intuition of an otherness that is not reciprocal, but only "gives sense". Now, it is on this giving horizon that effective affectivity induces beyond ethics the condition of a truly personal relation. This "horizon of sense" enables everyone to recognize himself/herself in every authentic encounter as the "fellowman" of the other, before the same cultural destiny.

At this stage, it is possible to have by way of analogy a glimpse of the required intercultural recognition, with respect to the future world that can guide us. The exigency of an ethical responsbility both interrelational and intercultural inscribes itself not ony at the temporal subjective level of the "passive synthesis", but also at the level of historicality. In turn, it enables us to recognize genetically and at the origin of existence the exigency of desire as intrinsic of the moment of life. Besides, it also helps us to recognize the movement of "sense", which becomes the future as already programmed in the facts, and which guides every culture to its proper destiny, even if a particular cultural destiny bears already the objective marks of techno-science and universal globalization. Each culture responds to the solicitaion of its own unique way of entering into the interesting field of exchange with other cultures, by the mediation of the kind of bodiliness, and by analogically constituting genuing intercultural encounter. In doing so, each culture actualizes its entire creative possibilities, by specifying their style and their effective imprint on the authoritarian texture of techno-science and the universal globalization.

CONCLUSION

If the cultural restructuring becomes imperative today – under the impact of the techno-science and the instruemntal universal globalization – it msut necessarily relate itself to the orginary "sense" of existence. Phenominologically, we can discover in it the retrospective founding aim of the "knowing" – in the sense of the French "*Co-Naitre*" – which consists in the emergence of desire in everyone. Desire guides any action, by opening it to the authenticity of a teleological sense in everyone and in every culture. The hermeneutics of the practical sense manifests itself by the mediation analogous to bodiliness, by the mediation of an "institutional incorporation" and by the essential anchorage of mutual recognizing between cultures. This interrelation is borne by the originary desiring force which makes the cultural recognition and the cultural differentiation possible. By this force it promotes in experience that it is possible to recreate personalized cultural institutions and hope to give "sense" to be both persons and cultures, despite the technological superstructure of instrumental universal globalization.

PART IV

AFFECTIVITY AND ETHICS

CHAPTER 12

AESTHETIC DIMENSION OF ETHICS

INTRODUCTION

Ethics concerns itself with two dimensions of existence: firstly, our transcendence in the world because the world manifests our common anchorage and "*habitat*"; and secondly, the practical requirements of our existence because it implies our mutual responsibility for each other and our engagement in a collective life. However, these two dimensions of existence – our transcendence in the world and the free action that come from mutual responsibility and engagement – cross themselves in relation to two major cultural modalities coming from the "will of having" that implies desire of possession and production, and the "will of being" that calls for the qualitative and creative goodwill of existence. The "will of having" consists in the scientific knowledge and the "will of being" includes the aesthetic attitude inherent in art. The scientific knowledge, the dominant form of our modern culture – that emerges from the ideal of universal knowledge and technological totalitarian domination – tries to impose its possessive power on the world. On the contrary, the aesthetic attitude, inherent in art, participates in the course of the world and emerges from the sensible and contemplative attitude of being-in-the-world. These two manners of living in the world through science and art question the role of ethics in the measure they both place their *habitat* and freedom together in question. It seems to us that both come from the originary mediation that has emerged from the intuition linked to the originary sensible perception (*aesthesis*). *Aesthesis* is that which underlies the *depth* in the phenomenological sense, i.e., being open to the donation of Being (*Sein*).

The endeavor in this chapter is to unravel the notion of *aesthesis*, which underlies the *depth* of existence and which calls for being open to the donation of Being (*Sein*). This task is accomplished by clarifying the aesthetic dimension of ethics, in four parts. The first part expounds the notion of ethics from the phenomenological perspective. The phenomenological approach presents ethics in relation to two poles. The first one leans on the originary dimension of the world as an open totality. This implies that the world is the essential anthropoid condition for life and calls human beings to respect the originary donation of Being (*Sein*).The second one depends on the teleology of meeting that is linked to the interrelational otherness. This calls for responding to my significant action that is responsible for and relevant to a common intersubjective participation and imposes essentially the recognition of other persons. There is a circle of constitution between these two poles of ethics. The implication of this meeting – where respect for and recognition of the other are present in the mutual responsibility for one another – constitutes itself in the field of

ethics where everyone is responsible of his "*habitat*" that conditions our collective existence. In these two dimensions ethics can be understood according the aesthetic manifestation: the *aisthesis* is given as the immediate originary perception of the world in the interrelation in the *Lebenswelt* where the responsibility of everyone is intertwined.

The second and the third parts look into science and art as related to ethics. In part two we consider scientific knowledge and its relation to ethics, while the third part looks into art as applied to ethics. The ways of science and art are two manners of "habiting" the world, viz., "to have" (having) and "to be" (being) respectively. These two manners of existing cross the course of the modern tradition and reflect in a typical manner the cultural common models, proper to each *epoch*. More radically they manifest a specific form of "habiting" the world, which implies an ethical dimension.

The second part speaks of nature of scientific knowledge and its ethical limitations. Science imposes itself as the desire of controlling all the things in the world. Scientific understanding is an objective good, without existential character. It comes not only from the ideal of a universal knowledge, but also from the ideal of a technological totality dominating the world. Thus, the classic science aims at opening its mode of representation to a reality that is more global. However, the ideal of scientific unity and modernity is weakened today because science is unable fully to thematize the aim of the objects of experience. Besides, the unlimited technological operation and the notion of "knowledge-to-power" gravely damage the conditions of human freedom. So there is the need to supplement theoretical reason with practical reason with its focus on the lived-affectivity in the lived-experience, which finds expression in art.

The third part unfolds the notion of the "pathic originary" and its paradigmatic application in the field of aesthetics, particularly in art. Art tells the creative life in its singular, receptive and giving activity. It indicates the originary *depth*, which is the way of participation with Being (*Sein*). It manifests the concrete forms which have their affective expressions from the lived sensible and imaginary life. Using art and work of art as the means we clarify the notion of *pathic logos*, the existential conditions in the context of which historicity unfolds itself in the *pathic logos*, and the aesthetic paradigm. *Pathic logos* is affectivity that expresses the originary dimension of "sense". It implies the ontological and anthropological dimensions. The ontological dimension is the double aspect of donation on the part of Being and receptivity on the part of the self/*ego*. Similarly, the anthropological dimension consists in the double aspect of donation and receptivity between *ego* and the *alter-ego*, which is experienced in intersubjective intropathy. The *pathic logos* unfolds itself historically in relation to existential conditions, such as bodiliness, temporality, and the *depth* dimension. Art, guided by the aesthetic attitude, takes us beyond the perceptive and representational knowledge and makes us participate essentially in the affective character of the originary "*fiat*" of

the *pathic logos* thereby opening us to the "*depth* of the world". This experience is not from the theoretical order or representational thinking, but it recalls the affective structuring – originary *logos* – present in filigree in each meeting.

The fourth part takes up the consideration of the relation between ethics and aesthetics. The aesthetics sends us back to an experience of contemplative type that concerns the other only in the sharing of a revealing participation in Being, while the ethical dimension is essentially linked to the action that is constituted by practical reason. However, the aesthetic dimension has a double role in relation to ethics: firstly, aesthetics helps the existent being to be awakened to ethical comprehension; secondly aesthetics makes the existent being vigilant to the exigency of the plenitude of Being in its self-donation. Art reveals to us Being; but the ethical experience puts the existence at stake in its quality of existing. The responsibility one has as the ethical subject as such is finally founded on the responsibility one has towards the donation of Being. Thus, the ethical sense as the practical *logos* is led by the aesthetic sense as the affective *logos*. The conclusion states that the ethical experience does not find in the aesthetical dimension something other than favorable access to the affirmation the freedom and responsible action moved by the force of conviction that emerges from the being open to the revelation of Being.

Now, we begin by considering the phenomenological consideration of the notion of ethics in the first part.

NOTION OF ETHICS: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION

According to Paul Ricoeur, ethics requires the commitment from everybody to initiate actions in realizing "the good life with and to the others for a more just city." The notion of *human rights* today comes no longer from an ontological foundation, as in the traditional metaphysics of Aristotle. The *social contract* – linking the natural will of everybody to stand on the social will – relates the notion of *human rights* positively to the notion of universality. However, the *Charter of Human Rights* is born of an economic and political necessity, relevant to the scientific discoveries of the globalization it imposes. The notion of *human rights* emerges essentially from a universal comprehension that is already deployed by the Roman jurisdiction in the occident; but the modern ethical thinking of Descartes and Kant attributes the emergence of this notion to the transcendental apriority, i.e., the *human rights* emerge formally from theoretical reason. However, the *social contract* and the revolutionary myth of freedom, equality, and fraternity – with which everybody presents a concrete will capable of acting freely in order to participate in the realization of the social unity – assume the effects of lived-experience and forces consciousnesses to transcend their particular will and to go up to the dimension of the universal will of reason. Yet, there is the risk of losing the lived-anchorage which

each individual, each generation, and each culture has in constituting the proper normative code.

In fact, both of the above-said significations – those of the *social contract* and those that are *apriori* – come together in the idea of *human rights* and refer the one to other in order to find a finality that gives sense and founds their significant commitment. On one hand, universality aims at a *telos* that is underlined by practical reason; it is the regulating Idea of the Sovereign Good in a City of Ends. On the other hand, the idea of universality – actually in act in the collective assembly of wills, linked to the notion of historicity – is that which emerges today from the convergence of the respective discourses of everybody, in order to obtain a *consensus* with the "innate language". We should underline that the common discourse of action supposes the sincere expression of each – implicitly given, but without formal foundation – in its freedom or committed word in order to realize a more just world. The idea of *human rights* is just a formal and rationally empty concept if it is not taken effectively in its lived-cultural implications. Without any doubt, the ethical aim of the *code of human rights* reflects ideally all the dimensions of the ethical will. However, it is not distinct enough from what belongs to a common will that is linked to its singular concrete anchorage. Indeed, in rupture with the lived-existential-life, the *Charter of Human Rights* is obliged to impose an obligatory law with the risk of denying the essence of the lived-traditions.

In this sense, the aim of phenomenology seems to oppose the pragmatic and linguistic ways of understanding the matter. We think that phenomenology can remedy this essential lack by clearing, firstly, the lived-*data* of the concrete experience and from them more essentially the ontological dimensions, which rejoin fundamentally the dimension of universality. Now, the question arises as to the manner in which phenomenology can approach the lived-experience. Heidegger unveils the existential ontological structure of the existent being in his work *To Build, To Dwell, To Think* (1951).[1] According to Heidegger, engaging in the thinking of Being makes the world the *habitat* and "dwelling place" of *Dasein*. This, in turn, enjoins us to reflect on the ethical aim of this ontological situation. This existential originary structure manifests itself in lived-experience as the affective totality. This gives the human person his initial comprehension as the being-in the-world, in his *habitat* and "dwelling place". It is not a matter of the representation of the world in the universal formal sense, but the lived-experience of the world through the "mood" – the original existential feeling of the situation (*Stimmung/Befindlichkeit*).[2] This experience is ontological, but it is singularly lived by each existent

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[1] Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Batir, habiter, penser"; *Essais et Conférences*, trad. Francaisç, A. Préau, (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), p.175.

[2] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *L'être et le temps*, trad. Francaisç, R. Boehm et A. De Waelhens, pp. 169 ss.

being, so that it is existentially lived according the proper historicity of each one within their proper culture. Reciprocally, if every culture is open to the positive universality of a regulating vision of the world, it is always according to the singular anchorage of its proper mode of living in the world. We never live abstractly in the life of the *cosmos* in its spatio-temporal neutrality of cosmic immensity. If there is an effective necessity to search with the aim of understanding our natural horizons through scientific knowledge, then the scientific knowledge itself must be fundamentally based on our lived-experience – the experience of the immediately lived-*habitat* or "dwelling place"[3] as a phenomenologist rightly understands.

The world in its cultural plurality is not, at first, an abstract universality and a regulating totality. It is conceived only under the lived-light of a radical intuition that organizes itself in the life-world (*Lebenswelt*). Husserl has already made the specific analysis, in his work *Ideen II*, about the first intuition that is linked to the originary sensible perception (*aisthesis*), which is attached to our concrete initial topology. The sense perception makes the experience of the passive synthesis,[4] i.e., the perception as the action of the conscious aim and receptivity in relation to the *data*. Now, the question arises as to the reason for the term "*aesthesis*" – that indicates the perceptive experience as a significant donation of the intuition – being linked to the presence of the *data*. The Husserlian analysis of this passive synthesis depends on the perception of the lived-world as the originary dimension, and such a depth level experience is possible only within the intersubjective perception that is founded in the *Lebenswelt*. There is a common ground of the lived-existence, a "life-world" that founds the concrete transcendental dimension of all subjective interrelations. Thus, the phenomenological reflection – after reduction (*epochè*), i.e., after placing the lived-experiences in brackets – can make the phenomenon of the lived-experience manifest itself in the temporal and spatial reality of its historicity. This reflection on the lived-experience *per se* – the lived phenomenon as lived phenomenon *per se* – reveals the pure essence of the "lived-experience". Therefore, since my perception crosses those of the others I can understand objectivity as such, that becomes the starting point of all objective knowledge. In brief, the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) – the lived-interrelational field – not only founds the possibility of my proper objective perception, but also the constitution of a theoretical objective field, i.e., the scientific knowledge as constitution of the practical universal field.

In his *Course on Nature*, Merleau-Ponty points to the way Husserl immediately highlights the aim of finality in each perception. The Husserlian perspective refuses the casual attitude – the natural attitude – that

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[3] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *La Crise des science européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale*, trad. Francaisç, G. Granel, pp. 139 ss.

[4] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Expérience et jugement*, (Paris: P.U.F., 1970).

is linked to the evolutionist empire. On the contrary, the Husserlian approach aims at the intuition of the *data* and the sense of the *data*, in its concrete significance by engaging in an infinite series of profiles in relation to which the totality to the world is presented to consciousness. At this level, Husserl indicates the essential foundation of existence: the world as present in all perception.[5] Here lies the task of the philosopher, the eminent "functionary of humanity", in his search for truth.[6] Husserl substitutes the transcendental idealism with the concrete and finalized experience of the human history, underlying the "life-world". Taking over this notion from Husserl, Merleau-Ponty abandons the aim of constituting and even conditioning consciousness to affirm the existential reality of the body. Only the bodiliness can mediate our worldly anchorage and can understand its transcendental dimension. Thus, the universality inscribed in the lived-experience of existence, gets founded in the intersubjective interrelations in the context of the *Lebenswelt.*

Thus, the phenomenological approach presents ethics in relation to two poles. The first one leans on the originary dimension of the world as an open totality. This implies that the world is the essential anthropoid condition for life and calls human beings to respect the originary donation of Being (*Sein*).The second one depends on the teleology of meeting that is linked to the interrelational otherness. This calls for responding to my significant action that is responsible for and relevant to a common intersubjective participation and does impose essentially the recognition of other persons. In these two dimensions ethics can be understood according the aesthetic manifestation: the *aisthesis* is given as the immediate originary perception of the world in the interrelation in the *Lebenswelt* where the responsibility of everyone is intertwined.

There is a circle of constitution between these two poles of ethics. The auto-implication of the meeting – where respect for and recognition of the other are present in the mutual responsibility from one to the other – constitutes itself in the field of ethics where everyone is responsible for his *habitat* that conditions our collective existence. In this sense, there is a concrete becoming of ethics enlarged to the *habitat* of the world, which stakes not only the security, integrity, and peace for the "habitants" including ecology, but also more profoundly the symbolic sense of Being and the concrete sense that conveys the signification of our life and our commitments. Heidegger demonstrates this from the ontological point of view and emphasizes the aesthetic sense (*aisthesis*) when he says that "man

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[5] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes"; *Cours du College de France*, ed. D. Seglard, pp. 104 ss.

[6] Cf. Edmund Husserl, "Introduction"; *Philosophie première*, trad. Francaisç, vol. II.

lives as a dreamer."[7] Hence, the harmony of the world – as presented in Hölderlin's dream – is the manifestation of donation of Being, i.e., the sense of the sense that calls everyone to exist by this act of receiving oneself from Being.

Having looked into the phenomenological understanding of the notion of ethics in the first part, we move on to consider science and art as related to ethics in the next two parts. In part two we consider scientific knowledge and its relation to ethics, while the third part looks into art as applied to ethics. The ways of science and art are two manners of "habiting" the world, viz., "to have" (having) and "to be" (being) respectively. These two manners of existing cross the course of the modern tradition and reflect in a typical manner the cultural common models, proper to each *epoch*. More radically they manifest a specific form of "habiting" the world, which implies an ethical dimension. Now we proceed to the second part which expounds on scientific knowledge and its ethical limitations.

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS ETHICAL LIMITATIONS

Scientific knowledge founds the objective understanding in terms of representation. Its work consists in interrogating all the domains of empirical experience in order to discover the formal structure that gives its content. This formal character – that comes from the conceptual capacity of the theoretical reason to abstract the structure of the real – gives scientific knowledge its universal charecter. Commanding a specific place in unfolding nature and human experience, science always continues to go deeply into fields that have complex interrelations of parts. Therefore, classic science aims at opening its mode of representation to a reality that is more global. However, the ideal of scientific unity and modernity is weakened today.

What has fundamentally changed – despite the instrumental improvement and the multiplied interrelational fields – is sciences' inability fully to thematize the aim of the objects of experience. In this realm science becomes uncertain. There is a flux in the unity of the interferential fields that cuts all efforts to fix each spatio-temporal determination. Being caught up in this uncertain horizon, science cannot fulfill completely its ideal of abstractive rational objectivity. We must think away the operative power of science in order to find a new approach to reason. Thus, the aim of science that has been exclusively linked to the regulator horizon of the theoretical reason, now must accept the fact that its theoretical aim itself is under the influence of the *a priori* will of the practical reason. Reflecting reason is supported by the will of the scientist who, while maintaining science's objective aim, reflects on the implicit ethical position in its proper

[7] Cf. Martin Heidegger, "L'homme habite en poète"; *Essais et conferences*, trad. A. Préau, pp. 244 ss.

existential way. It is the desire for the universal of point of view and transcendental position that regulates the communicational interrelation and objective finality of objective knowledge. This aim stands at all times for the glory of science, and today it is opens to its finite possibilities.

However, at present, the unlimited technological operation creates some problems that do grave damage to the conditions of freedom. This risk calls into question the cultural and personal assumptions of the existent being. So, the scientific responsibility concerns, now, the use of technology in the right measure and without being out of control, so that the artifact becomes by itself its proper creative power. The machine is no longer a simple reduplication of forces reproducing themselves because it channelizes the unpredictable surplus that risks making a robotized universe in the in-sensed movement of a world that becomes pure objectivity. The question about the "knowledge-to power" of science aims at the ethical reflection in general and the existence of the scientist himself. Certainly this risk questions the attitude of research linked to the theoretic reason alone. It obliges to think anew regarding our proper bodiliness lived as existential relation in the cultural institution of ethical, economic and sociopolitical structures. However, this responsibility of technology crosses one other. The “knowledge-to power” of the theoretical reason in reality also includes all the forms of technological domination on goods. The progress permits to answer more specifically to the economical needs and provokes, in turn, more demand for an improved level of life. That which is to be an asset for welfare in daily life can also become, according the motives at stake, the cause of more aggressive frustration. The desiring function present in everybody risks becoming more deadly. The neutralization of the communicational networks that are linked to the surplus of consummation, the more objective the investment of oneself in the subject, as well as all the *practico-inerte* lead to the fall not only of the existent being, but of its worldly *habitat*.

Being threatened by this, humanity indirectly discovers an obligatory solidarity. Paradoxically, what permits to universalize the theoretical *consensu*s, as the rights of the humans, cannot be effectively concretized without the condition of acceptability of the practical reason. The theoretical knowledge and the ethical requirement are not deducted from the same rational apriority. However, we must see if they can meet on the effective level of the lived-life. The contemporary disenchantment before the perplexity of reflecting reason forces us to read again the antinomic structures of freedom, which are correlative to our manner of being-in-the-world. Grasping by the phenomenological analysis the conditions and possibilities, we are to conduct a sort of inversion of the rational question both as scientific and philosophical, in order to achieve a re-evaluation of the anthropological forms of culture. Between the theoretical neutrality and the practical acceptability we must introduce the mediation that underlines the lived-affectivity in the lived-experience. This affective instance may be referred to as the originary "sense" or the *pathic logos*, which finds

expression in art, to which we turn our attention in the third part of the chapter.

PATHIC ORIGINARY AND ITS PARADIGMATIC APPLICATION IN ART

Here we unfold the notion of the "pathic originary" and its paradigmatic application in the field of aesthetics, particularly in art. Art tells the creative life in its singular, receptive and giving activity. It indicates the originary *depth*, which is the way of participation in Being (*Sein*). It manifests the concrete forms which have their affective expressions from the lived sensible and imaginary life. Using art and works of art as the means we clarify the notion of *pathic logos*, the existential conditions in the context of which historicity unfolds itself in the *pathic logos*, and the aesthetic paradigm in which the sense of the "*depth* of the world" finds its paradigmatic value.

Pathic Logos

We have just seen the necessity of mediation between theoretical reason and practical reason. This mediation as aim of "sense" must be situated in the context of in *depth* relation with the other. However, the apprehension of the originary "sense" that constitutes the possibility of meaning does not give itself in representational knowledge. It must inscribe itself in the concrete and non-formal movement of an affective attitude that opens deeply to the originary "sense". The affectivity that expresses this originary dimension of "sense" we call the *pathic logos* which we must analyze. The formal analysis of the *pathic logos* implies a double context: the ontological and the anthropological. The abyssal *depth* of "sense" in its manifestation as originary event comes to be present as the "gift of Being". Yet, the existential active reception of this originary "sense" is inscribed concretely in the lived-history at the beginning of life of the human person. In order to understand this better we must clarify this concept phenomenologically.

Formally the notion of affectivity gives at once the idea of affectation and the idea of "sense": affectivity makes "sense" in "act of feeling". The *pathic logos* doubles passive receptivity and active donation of "sense" according to the dynamic relation of reversibility. Because of this donation the receptivity constitutes oneself. In other words, the donation gives to receptivity the capacity of receiving oneself from Being. The reciprocal receptivity permits not only to receive the donation of Being for oneself, but also makes one capable of giving oneself to Being and to others. However, this reversibility creates the generator movement of "sense" by not only making the donation and receptivity in the originary "sense" between Being and the existent being, but also between oneself and the other. In this way, the reversibility opens up the generation of "sense" in the present and the

possibility of the future of "sense". Such a reversible reciprocal relationship is only possible in meeting. According to Husserl, the meeting with the *alter-ego* marks the limit of the constitution of the *ego*. It is the reversible relations between *alter-ego* and the *ego* in the effective meeting that creates "sense" in concrete intersubjectivity. Thus, the *pathic logos* or the originary "sense" is experienced essentially in intropathy (*Einfülhung*).[8]

This relational originary gap of reversibility does not depend on fixed a pole that has pre-existed. It makes oneself the movement of the gap: "sense" makes itself sense and becomes meaningful. In this movement the dynamic process, creator of "sense", manifests itself by three dimensions of feeling: the sensible, the aim of orientation and the aim of signification. What remains is to understand the affective aspect of the "sense" as giving pleasure or suffering. The "affect" is qualified according to the *pathic* correspondence participated through intropathy: the other accepts or rejects me. In this way, enjoyment and suffering are manifestations of the resonance with somebody that gives a sense of "being-welcomed" and inversely "being-refused". This affective bipolarity of intropathy is linked to the factual manner in which the donation is received and demanded. However, this concrete donation that actualizes the duality of the affective possibilities comes from intropathy and is founded on the originary donation that always precedes itself in the desiring genesis of the "sense". Historicality as the originary character of giving being, gives sense at the dimension of the existential historicity of *Dasein.* The feeling in the beginning of life is taken into the receptivity that creates the positive or negative quality of the "sense". At this level the anthropological analysis that manifests its historical sense can describe it according to the genetic becoming of the "*infans*": the originary "sense" is itself linked to the parental desire as the effective assumption of the self in the finite resolution of existence. To understand historicity in relation to the *pathic* meeting calls for analyzing the definite and first existential conditions in relation to which the *pathic* encounter occurs. This is our concern in the next section.

Existential Conditions

The existential conditions in the context of which historicity unfolds itself in the *pathic* meeting are bodiliness, temporality and the dimension of the *depth*. In this section, we attempt to clarify each of them briefly so as to unravel their meaning and their role in the originary *pathic* encounter.

Bodiliness. In Husserl's philosophy, "*aisthesis*" is the dimension of the sensible feeling and the condition of bodiliness. Merleau-Ponty

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[8] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie première*, trad. Francaisç, vol. 2, pp.190 ss. Cf. also Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la constitution*, trad. Francaisç, E. Escoubas, pp. 235-237.

considers that the bodiliness is the exemplar condition to the carnal opening of the sense understood in its triple conditions: sensible, orientation of movement and signification. The perception of the other is more originary than perception of the natural world – that is always in retrospection – because the other is always sensed in the opening of feeling, before it becomes a reflective adhesion and a later thematized signification. The other is already part of the first fusional contact: still thoughtless the other has participated as sensed "affect".[9] This first affective emotion indicates immediately the affective dimension of my life as the subject and first the possibility for me to see the other as objective promotion of myself. The emotion permits me to see the object that becomes the correlate to my lived life. This originary receptivity – linked to the emotion of the meeting – is an action of the subject coming from the affective consciousness that keeps the perceptive lived-life as an emotional effect reflecting on itself. This emotional movement, which is the effect of bodiliness and bodily contact, is experienced in oneself before any form of significant reflection. To meet the other is to meet the reality of signs, the things, and the world. It is first carried out in the inaugural order of "being-with" (*Mitsein*) in the mode of affective bodiliness.

Things are never pure thing-reality. In the meeting they give themselves, even as the tool-reality, the signs of a qualitatively affective signification and essentially humane. The perceptive object aims at the dimensionality of the affective originary quality, i.e., the bipolar structure of affectivity. It is lived concretely as a welcome or as a threat, even if all meeting is already globally positioned by the originary intropathic transfer at the beginning of life that has qualified its effective future. In the positioned and sensed mobility, which promotes us to the others and things, the emotional event of presence happens. Bodiliness constitutes the permanent axe of the lived-existence: "my existence" in its relational and factual anchorage is in-the-world. The body is not a good; I am my body as the singular point of view of seeing the world-around. It reveals my sensible touch in the movement of its transcendence to the world that spreads to the horizon creating the spatial and temporal *depth* of things. These profile the ones on the other in the successive approach of its happening. Certainly the body can touch itself, affected by the relational interference of its "sense" that constitutes its sensible dimensions in the world.

The affective quality of the feeling is founded on the sensible "affects". However, it is the primordial listening that permits the *infans* to accept itself in the "sense". The touching of the body, still undifferentiated,

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[9] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, pp. 190, ss., 202. Cf. also Ghislaine Florival, "Phénoménologie de l'affectivité"; *L'affect philosophe*, ed. Hottois, p. 102. Cf. also Ghislaine Florival, "Vie affective et temporalité"; *Etudes d'anthropologie philosophique*, *Figures de la Finitude*, vol.3, pp. 86 ss.

meets itself in the reversibility of the touch itself.[10] So, the world seems immediately symbolic in the lived-life because the "sense" in its affective and desiring dynamics is seized before all objective conceptual positivity. The comparisons with the animal risks making us forget the emotional movement of the reflection by which the human bodiliness seizes the structuring as such.[11] The essence of the bodiliness is linked to the symbolic relation. It manifests itself in the bodily gesture, implicitly communicational, as the premise of the speaking speaks. The bodies hear themselves, united by the same touch in that sense that my body perceives the body of the other, the "affect" that embraces. The reversibility of the lived-otherness creates a sort of transfer in which begins the originary comprehension of the gesture as expressed.[12]

The lived-spatiality articulates the opening of reversible relations, which come from the *depth*. It permits the existent being to make his entrance in the cognitive significant field, abstracted from the perceptive context. So in the walk, the *infans* makes concretely the experience of a spatial-temporal gap that constitutes concretely the field of exteriority as such. The originary affective otherness doubles itself this time with an objective otherness between the outside and the inside of the body and gives reality to the lived relational unity of the bodily schema. The innate language enlarges the movement of gesture[13] that opens the field of action into the effective meeting. If the affected feeling of space-time gives the structural imprint of reversibility of bodiliness, when the child uses the first words in their concrete objectivity, it seizes the signifying reversibility that actualizes the symbolic power of the concept. So, the word takes its place in the dialogical discursiveness that immediately establishes itself as the cross-checking of senses, as significant encroachment in relation to the senses. Moreover, the innate language itself precedes always as the origin and the *telos* while it is taken into the realm of the donation of Being. Bodiliness expresses in the context of temporality and hence, in the next section, we consider the notion of temporality.

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[10] Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la constitution*, trad. Francaisç, E. Escoubas, pp. 247

[11] If being a little human is capable of seizing the "here" in relation to the "there", there is a reversible relation. It is not a positive fact, a determined signal, but a relational function in relation to other relations. In this way, the lived body is not an objective body; it is lived as point of view expressing a "symbolic relation". Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Structure du comportement*; (Paris: P.U.F., 1943), p. 128.

[12] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp.178 ss.

[13] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 215. Cf. also M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 190.

Temporality. In the presence of bodiliness in the world, the existent being assumes its proper significant emergence and makes itself a subject reflecting on itself from the reversible intropathic movement of the "sense" and thereby realizes its bodiliness. What constitutes the originary emotion is the desire of being repeated implicitly at the same time in each meeting. The originary affective dimension finds itself maintained in its desiring finality. Bodiliness keeps it in memory and temporalizes in lived-actions its desiring aim. The bodiliness temporalizes itself as the movement of sense reflecting concretely by the fact of affective reversibility of temporal ecstasies. Lived according the qualitative bi-polarity of the originary desire either in the harmonic mode or in the disharmonic mode, they overlap each other or distance themselves by the game of "affects". Temporality articulates the desire of existent being from the *depth* of the past – as the "thrown-there existent being," and the future – as the "resolved comprehension". The desiring openness of the body in-the-world – in its tension from birth to death – finds its resolution in the existential plenitude of the "instant" of the death.

Having considered the temporal nature of bodiliness and temporality, we analyze the dimension of *depth* in the next section.

Dimension of Depth. It is in the context of the *pathic* meeting, at the intersection of lived temporality and spatiality, the ontological dimension of *depth* as the source of all "sense" reveals itself phenomenologically. It manifests the symbolic horizon that conditions the field of the possibilities in all meetings. The horizon of this dimension is always de-totalized and discovers in its overtaking the immeasurability of the *depth*. It is in the lived *depth* as the horizon of the spatial-temporal sense of the world – totality always gets de-totalized and infinitely reconnected – that the body reflects itself in the "feeling", which gives the future its intensity. However, *depth* as the horizon of the world only indicates the affective origin as the "gift of Being". In the ontological dimension of "sense" *depth* creates not only the emotional surprise of the visible "there is" in the perceptive belief, but also more radically generates the implicit opening of giving. Poetry – capable of giving expression to the Presence of Being in the most profound sense – expresses as power of human *habitat* which maintains its being and assures the person the measure of the Divine.[14] The *depth* of sense conditions the emergence of existence in bodiliness its modality of being. The affective sense of "receiving oneself from the gift of Being" in intropathic reversibility actualizes the *pathic logos* or the originary "*fiat*" of the "sense".

Having looked into the existential conditions that characterize the originary *pathic* encounter, we take up for consideration, in the next section,

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[14] Cf. Martin Heidegger: "L'homme habite en poète," *Essais et conférences*, trad. A. Preau, p. 244 ss.

the notion of aesthetic paradigm in which the sense of the "*depth* of the world" finds its paradigmatic value.

Aesthetic Paradigm

The phenomenological analysis of the bodiliness and the temporality in the functioning of intropathy introduces the sense of "the *depth* of the world". It finds in the aesthetic attitude its paradigmatic value. Indeed, art opens us to look into the originary plenitude of the world. The phenomenological analysis of the essence of art begins by describing in concrete actuality the singular nature of the work of art. The work of art, as an aesthetic reality (*aisthesis*), leads the perceptive approach to make sense. Art is the singular event in which the concrete sense makes it to be seen in the effective act of donation of "sense". Art presents immediately the things as captured by the creative movement of their donation. Thus, art makes present the originary quality that is missing in perception, and makes it emerge in concrete experience in the context of the donation of the meeting. Hence, art makes us participate essentially in the affective character that constitutes the future of the "act of sensing", as the originarily "*fiat*" of the *pathic logos* open to the "*depth* of the world".

Artistic creation expresses a universalized structure that is not linked to theoretical representation, but to the singular intuition of forms .This affective sense is the initial requirement in order that the work of art, in the instant, is a "beginning of the world".[15] Contemplating the aesthetic work makes us forget the ordinary perception and leads us to face the surprise of the "there is". Such contemplation reconstructs the emergence of the present and the joy-giving sense. As a result, the world is no more before us as a representation, but rather is the painter who is born in things as concentration and becoming visible to itself.[16] Undoubtedly the creative activity constructs the human *habitat*, but each culture and each *epoch* set their proper style.

Each object appears to the lived bodiliness as the object of sense, at which all our sensible potentialities correspond in the exchange and recreate their aims. Unlike the tool related to our daily actions, the aesthetic work renders itself as the pure emergence of forms. Given at the disinterested contemplation the existent being renders on it a festive world that has lost its instrumentality of use to the benefit of an imaginary space and time. It comes from the originary affective perception, but the concrete structure of the "act of sensing" manifests the game of cross-checking the senses – seeing, touching, hearing, grasping, smelling, tasting and the like. The sensible play of the organic senses opens the aesthetic work to "sense" of a

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[15] Cf. M. Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu*, vol. I, p. 352

[16] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, "L'œil et l'esprit"; *Revue Temps modernes*, no. 184 (Paris: Gallimard, 1961), p. 217.

spatial-temporal structure linked in the "*depth* of the world". The aesthetic work unveils singularly its infinite reality. The artistic creation consists in making bodiliness resonate with this *depth* in order that the spectator or the artist proves it spontaneously. Lived-bodiliness enjoys by intropathy the specific harmony of the aesthetic object according to the affective *depth* of the world.

However, the reversibility of the "act of sensing" modulates according to the whole affective scale that qualifies it. The tactile mould of a sculpture, for instance, makes the artist participate at its concrete matter even if the sculptural mass is objectively strange to his proper "flesh". In ordinary perception the object is there in an objectified quasi-bodiliness, while the aesthetic experience transposes the work in its *depth* of "sense". Indeed, the aesthetic bodiliness enlaces the forms to live again the originary inscription according to the affective unity that reactivates its pleasure. Listening to the melodic song, the subject goes into a specific temporality that echoes the temporality proper to the abyssal opening of the "act of sensing". This participated action has an effect particularly on dance as an art form. Here, lived bodiliness of the dancer brings into play the tactile and unified density of the bodily schema. The architectural framework of a musical space and the *depth* of movement infinitely started again by the dancer exorcises the place according the differentiated curves profiled of its figures in movement. The body of the spectator rejoins himself at a distance in the same operating circumvolution, as in the intropathic cross-checking of a chord.

The artistic object manifests the life of the forms that makes just the unity of a style, i.e., a singular dimension as participating at the unity of the world. The permanence of the singular unity of a style in the variety of its sensible/aesthetic figures reveals the continuity of the creative participation. We do not have to do here the analysis of the content, as the beautiful or the sublime – linked to the creative imagination and moved by the sensible intuition of the aesthetic forms – the reflecting judgment moves back to the singular unity of a concrete totality, as the regulator idea. We have to aim phenomenologically the aesthetic attitude as modality of being – to "habit" the world – and to see how the aesthetic object brings to the originary donation its specific connotation. The aesthetic attitude listens in the sensible seeing of a call emerging from the *depth* of the world and that, by the mediation of the bodiliness the existent being "habits" affectively. The artist creates the conviviality of the forms, a style that presents the sensible singularity of the work in the instant. The aesthetic attitude expresses an intuitive activity and however, rationalized and sensed, it is not from the theoretical or representational order, but it recalls the affective structuring – originary *logos* – present in filigree in each meeting.

Having clarified the propensity of art to take us beyond the realm of representational and theoretical knowledge into the realm of Being's originary donation, we can move on to speak of the relation between ethics and aesthetics in the fourth part.

ETHICS AND AESTHETICS

More than science, art with its aesthetic attitude contributes to the existential comprehension of the *habitat* of the world in the infinite plenitude of Being. If science discovers itself engaged in the project of a rational understanding of an infinite *cosmos*, art in its manner opens on the creativity that leads us to the *depth* dimension of the world. Science and art enable us to participate in the donation of the Being in their different ways. The *pathic logos* – the "*fiat*" creative of "sense" – engages the interrelational existence to situate itself in relation to affectivity as the existential dimension. About the concrete form of the apprehension of sense at the origin of the existential meeting, it brings the communicational experience of its affective structure. The analysis of the *pathic logos* is decisive in understanding the anthropological debate of a *consensus* today. To direct radically the affective life of sense is also to assume relational otherness in its creative reversibility. The *pathic logos* as originary condition of "sense" is at the source of the rational creativity in general. It inscribes in the heart of the scientific research itself and in ethical conviction and responsibility. So art and science meet together in the common originary that the practical apriority of reason presents. However, the analyses of art emphasize one manner of "habiting" the world, while the analyses of science bring us back to the problematic of ethics.

The extent to which ethics and aesthetic can come together is a question that needs to be raised. The ontological conception of the work of art evokes and sees a revelation of Being. A simple, descriptive, and impressionist conception may suggest a radical interpretation that may call for bringing back ethics to aesthetics. Yet, these two dimensions of mind and culture cannot be absolutely cross-checked. The aesthetic experience sends us back to an experience that is contemplative in type that concerns the other only in sharing of a revealing participation in Being, while the ethical dimension is essentially linked to the action that is constituted by practical reason. Action implies an engagement in which existence puts itself at stake by auto implication and "affects" themselves profoundly by the decisions that it assumes. However, this ethical engagement is promoted by the modality of otherness that personalizes immediately all modalities of co-existence. In order that everybody proves himself/herself in all meetings and being responsible for the other in reversible recognition underlined by intropathy. If the other opens me at the infinite search of desire, reciprocally he invites me to answer to the respective call that the respect of persons imposes. However, the aesthetic dimension has a double role in relation to ethics: firstly, aesthetics helps the existent being to awake to ethical comprehension; secondly aesthetics makes the existent being attentive to the exigency of the plenitude of Being that opens one to the possibility of its own overtaking.

The recognition of this fundamental difference between ethics and aesthetic does not prevent us from discerning some interaction between

these two dimensions. Art reveals to us Being; but the ethical experience puts existence at stake in its quality of existing. Nevertheless, what determines the quality of the existent being is the modality of its being as such, i.e., the manner of being which existent reality receives from Being. The responsibility one has as the ethical subject as such finally is founded on one's responsibility towards the donation of Being. So, in the ethical attitude there is the assumption of a relation to Being, but this relation to Being reveals itself as the form of an exigency to which the ethical attitude must answer. To the extent that the ethical experience implies this form of revelation of Being, it belongs to the "aesthetic" dimension, in the Heideggerian sense of "welcome" and "donation". However, there is a difference that derives from the distinct ground that separates ethics and aesthetic. The revelation of Being proper to the aesthetic dimension comes from a contemplative attitude focusing on the vision of the world. On the contrary, the revelation of Being proper to ethics has in the choice of a responsible action based on the conviction and engagement of the free subject. Liberty as an autonomous act of a person is at stake in ethics. Thus, my relation to the person in an interpersonal and collective relation is at stake in ethics because concretely it calls for my comprehension of existence and my power of acting.

Hence, to understand ethics from the formal point of view is not sufficient if it does not enlarge its productive modality. The concept of historicity deploys the advent through the evolution of the cultures and the evolution of the individual in its proper conditions, so that ethics never has anything other than a regulated finality that conducts the existence to its optimal future. Thus, ethics has to do with a personal responsibility of acting and accomplishing the moral goal between the two poles/moments of existence – the birth and the death. We have indicated how this responsibility is supported by two complementary stakes: the one that founds our *habitat*; and the other that founds intersubjectivity which implies the responsibility persons have for each other as human beings. This intersubjective dimension is kept within the finality of the "sense" that is linked to the originary donation of Being.

Indeed, the entrance of the child in the relation of communication and ethical participation is articulated from the beginning in relation to *the Other*, which helps the child to enter existentially in the perceptive life. It is first on the affective mode of desire and in the pleasure of the perceptive senses. In fact, here is a genesis of the ethical comprehension that advances by the exemplar imitation and is linked to the intropathic perception. This, in turn, gives the child a subjective instance of sense as *ego*. This "*fiat*" is fully affective before transporting itself from the lived mode to the reflective exigency of a responsible objectivization. Certainly ethics begins with training of language that establishes for itself the concrete aim of a sensed act. However, it is always from an affective *milieu*, in the rational articulation with the other that the ethical sense unveils itself as a radical exigency to engage. It seems that here the ethical sense as the practical

logos is led by the aesthetic/ affective *logos*.[17] It is the cultural and familial *milieu* that in the beginning induces the awakening of the perceptive quality in the child. It is the same *milieu* that modulates the conflictual play of the "affects". Within the genesis of behavior the interrelational movement of recognition takes place as the factor of personalizing subjectivization. In this sense, the ethical life depends from the origin on an affective harmonization, even though it is not identified with the stakes of ethics. Recognizing the lived field of the "habitat", encountering the other in the meeting in the mode of recognizing and respecting the other – which is the aim of the moral education – opens the child to the *telos* of ethical vocation. This call is all the more pregnant with affectivity as mobilized in its more profound finality – the originary donation of Being.

However, in all meetings the implicit vision of the call opening to the *depth* is already inscribed in immediate intropathic intuition.[18] The affective aesthetic perception (*aisthesis*) of the meeting modulates the communicational approach and induces equally the quality of hearing. Here, we are not concerned about ethical content as such. Yet, the aesthetic affectivity does not absolutely depend on the liberty that places oneself in this act. Inversely the "affect" of the lived-life is influenced by the objective constraints of the action and limits its autonomy. However, in the polarity of destiny we meet what overflows the deployment of the ethical domain. Beyond the plenitude of the ethical exigency, and being oriented by the subjective normativity of the ethical law we may hear the call, which emerges from the *depth* thereby opening one to the grace of the donation of Being. Love (*agapè*) transgresses the limits of ethics; it does not participate in the normativity; and it opens itself to the transcendental donation of Being. In this case, it is still bodiliness that mediates the giving level, and it no longer simply depends on the *eros*, but reveals itself as the ultimate act of receptivity of the donation of Being. Herein I encounter the intimacy that is more interior to me than me – in the *fiat* of the Giving-Presence of Being.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion we can say that the ethical experience does not find in the aesthetical dimension anything other than a favorable access to the affirmation of freedom. One difference subsists at the difference of ground: the revelation of Being, essential to the aesthetic dimension, belongs to a contemplative type, when the exigency of truth proper to ethics is exercised in responsible action, moved by the force of conviction had in engagement.

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[17] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes"; *Cours du College de France*, ed. D. Seglard, p. 104.

[18] Cf. *Ibid*.

CHAPTER 13

SARTRE ON LIBERTY: TRANSGRESSION OR BELIEF?

INTRODUCTION

In his work *Le scénario Freud*, Sartre writes: "The unconscious does not give itself to be seen, no more than the being of the philosophers!"[1] The unconscious transgresses the knowing of oneself; it is the opposite of objective knowing. To the question "What is man?" Sartre answered: "Nothing!" A few months before his death, Sartre confesses: "The death, I don't think about it; it does not come into my life, it will be outside. One day, my life will cease, but I want that it will not, in any case, be burdened by death. I want that death does not enter into my life, does not define it, that I be always an appeal to live."[2] Considering the phenomenon of death, do we deal with a negation of negation or simply the transgressive will of immortality? Confronting his fate, doesn't man want to remain living in the always-surmounted action of his existence, by refusing every contingency, up to its extreme limit, the most factual one, death, which is nonsense for the existing being? Is absolute liberty not the will of the philosopher? It is true that the "appeal to live" resonates through the whole life of Sartre himself. Thus, when he was offered the Nobel Prize in 1964, the writer refused to be "instituted" for the "Nobel Prize". In the same way, all along his activity as a writer-militant and a socio-political protester, he disrupted the whole world by his spirit of liberty.

Now the question arises as to the Sartrean ideal of absolute freedom and liberty and the manner in which he has pursued it all through his life: is it done with transgressive aim of denouncing and provoking the system of existence in all its dimensions,[3] or is it done out of Sartre's own personal belief that it should be in the way he thinks it should? This chapter attempts

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[1] Jean Paul Sartre, *Le scénario Freud, La Psychanalyse et son histoire*, (Paris: Gallimard, 984), p. 18.

[2] A. Cohen-Solal, *Sartre 1905-1980*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), p. 664.

[3] The term "transgression" comes from the verb "*transgredi*" which means "to pass across" or "beyond limit. Understood in this sense the transgressive connotation implies the notion of provocation. Even if we presume that Sartre defended liberty with the transgressive or provocative motive, it does not inscribe itself in any manner in the framework of psychoanalysis, but it is well in the ethico-political framework of phenomenology. It consists in the "overcoming" the limit and banning an objective institution that restricts individual and social liberty.

to highlight on this issue. We attempt to do this task in two parts. The first part takes up for consideration the Sartrean notion of liberty in general as developed in his writings. Sartre is known for his polemic in favor of liberty and against any *bourgeois* society. Taking interest in the cause of the most disadvantaged people and as anti-racist and anti-colonialist, Sartre displays his anarchistic will and rejects any authority and institution that prevents action in the spontaneity of commitment. Moving beyond the borders of nations, Sartre attempts to actualize concretely the socialist ideal of *praxis* and protect human rights. Sartre's review *Temps modernes*, his theatre plays, his novels, and his entire philosophical works aim at deconstructing the social evil from within and pleads for the recognition of man by man, for the sake of liberty because, for Sartre, "to be man is to be free". To achieve this ideal he unmasks every compromise, by saying that it must be always refused. For him, both in social relations and in personal encounter the truth of existence must be without any strings attached. Existence must be inscribed in the field of its historical concrete conditions and work out the "theory of freedom" which also is an appeal to responsibility and to the denunciation of inauthentic conduct as in the occupied France during the war.

The second part unfolds the Sartrean notion of liberty as found particularly in his philosophical works. Having discovered his philosophical approach from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and hermeneutic phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, Sartre undertakes the critique of intentionality in his work *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1936). Then he publishes his main works: *Being and Nothingness* (1943), *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960) and *The Idiot of the Family* (1977), which guides his thought in four directions: metaphysics, ethics, politics, and symbolics. Each one of these philosophical themes regarding liberty as developed by Sartre can be viewed as a transgression of and provocation against the existing system. However, they can also be seen as reflecting the living belief of the existing being on the move, the belief of commitment. It is up to us to judge about it. At the same time, a question is raised as to if the approach of Sartre to uphold the supremacy of liberty: is it a transgression or belief, particularly as developed by Sartre in the fields of metaphysics, ethics, politics and symbolics? The conclusion states that the dynamics of freedom is really open to authenticity on the personal and interpersonal planes, making appeal to the rights of man. Authentic existence consists in living out the "call to live" – as Sartre expressed in his last work *The Hope* a few days before his death – without positing oneself, without instituting oneself, and nevertheless committing oneself for good of all while refusing every form of "insincere belief".

Now, we move on to consider the notion of liberty as Sartre has envisaged and developed it in his writings.

NOTION OF LIBERTY: A SARTREAN PERSPECTIVE

Born in 1905 and died in 1980, Sartre is known for his polemic in favor of liberty and against any *bourgeois* society. Taking interest in the cause of the most disadvantaged people and as anti-racist and anti-colonialist, Sartre displays an anarchistic will and rejects any authority and any institution that prevents action in the spontaneity of commitment. Though Sartre comes from the middle class background, he tears himself away from the middle-class habits and claims that he is autonomous. Having grown up without the guidance of the father from childhood, in his generative biography entitled, *The Words*, Sartre describes himself as the young leftist secondary school pupil initiating the communitarian ideal of "socialism and freedom".

Sartre's novel, *The Nausea* (1938) and his philosophical work, *Being and Nothingness* (1943) launch a new perspective on existence which takes the name "existentialism" at Saint-Germain-des-Prés. Having become the "philosopher for all" Sartre builds up international contacts in Europe, America, USSR, China, Cuba, and in all countries which have received the collective name the "Third World". There are no more borders! The task is to realize concretely the socialist ideal which understands the true sense of the notion of *praxis*. As historical, *praxis* and action must become concrete in the existence of every individual and every social community, thereby making itself everything for all. After his work the *Critique of Dialectic Reason* (1960), Sartre radicalizes his outlook in the "proclamation of human rights"[4] in 1966. Sartre's review *Temps modernes*, his theatre plays, his novels, and his entire philosophical works – each in its own manner – performs a subtle analysis of violence. Actually, they aim at deconstructing the social evil from within and plead for the recognition of man by man, for the sake of liberty. Precisely, this is what at stake: to be man is to be free. This sense of "liberation" which he has enlightened later in his paper entitled "Libération" runs through the whole ethico-political itinerary of Sartre as an author.

Sartre makes use only of one weapon: the words, as in ancient Greece, where it was proper for free men to use language as a weapon to defeat their adversaries. According to Sartre, we must initiate action including sound arguments to counter every established social "system". He unmasks every compromise and every good consciousness from whatever place it claims to possess whether it is political, moral, or religious. The style itself is beyond any complacency for oneself as for the others; we all sometime dirty our hands and compromise, and for Sartre compromise must be always refused. In every social relation as in every personal encounter the truth of existence must be without any strings attached. Thus, we have to

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[4] Court founded at the initiative of Bertrand Russell and in collaboration with Sartre.

break by the saying, to provoke the social surrounding imprisoned in its proper reflection. The writing must never put itself down and be taken as an institution. It has to tear itself away from the words themselves and overcome continuously its proper "saying". As in the writings of Gustav Flaubert, for Sartre, words constitute themselves as fate. We cannot escape the weight of the *pratico-inert* at work in every action, and which makes itself an institution. Inspired by this spirit of Gustav Flaubert, Sartre says in his work *The Idiot of the Family*: "The worst is always the best! So, we must never to get caught in the lime light; but keep going as far as the abyss and surmount by other figures the appeal of a new becoming! With the force of this becoming and energy we must face the destiny of liberty." His philosophical work, *Being and Nothingness*, brings us the philosophical key to what has been already lived by Sartre, the man and the writer: to be the pure movement of existence, to be the "project" of oneself, always overcoming, and to exist in the very *act* of existing. Existence must be inscribed in the field of its concrete historical conditions and work out the "theory of freedom" which also is an appeal to responsibility and to the denunciation of inauthentic conduct as in the occupied France during the war.

Having looked into Sartrean notion of liberty in general, in the second part we move on to consider his notion of freedom and liberty as found particularly in his philosophical works. At the same time, we also raise the question whether the approach of Sartre to uphold the supremacy of liberty is a transgression or belief.

SARTREAN NOTION OF LIBERTY: TRANSGRESSION OR BELIEF?

While reading Henry Bergson – as a student at the Ecole Normale Supérieure – Sartre falls in love with philosophy. However, the phenomenology of Husserl and the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger – which he encounters in Berlin during 1933-1934 – enable Sartre to discover his method. He undertakes the critique of intentionality in his work *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1936). Then he publishes his main works: *Being and Nothingness* (1943), *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960) and *The Idiot of the Family* (1977), which guide his thought in four directions: metaphysics, ethics, politics, and symbolics. Each one of these philosophical themes regarding liberty as developed by Sartre can be viewed as a transgression of and provocation against the existing system. However, they can also be seen as reflecting the living belief of the existing being on the move, the belief of commitment. It is up to us to judge about it. It is our task in the next four sections of this part to elaborate on these four themes as expounded by Sartre.

Metaphysical Transgression/Belief

The subject – the existing being that I am – is always consciousness of something. Consciousness is the openness to the things of the world: it transcends itself; it relates always to something or to somebody whether to itself or in the moment of reflection. Thus, it is a matter of consciousness overcoming itself towards something. It is transgressive. The ontological bases of the "being-in-itself" and the "being-for-itself" as correlative to each other in their opposition – without lending themselves to be assimilated into the Cartesian dualism[5] – inscribe themselves in the phenomenological experience of intentionality. The "being-in-itself" is the concrete existing thing: it is the pure facticity; it implies the fact that "there is" something. In itself, it is pure contingency, without a *reason d'être*. It is neither necessary, nor created and possible; otherwise it would have in itself some ontological relationship. Thus, the "being-in-itself" is opaque, full, and massive, and is "in excess for eternity". Only a "being-for-itself" that has an ontological relationship is able to "transcend itself" towards the reality of the "being-in-itself": the "being-for-itself" is not "being-in-itself"; it is the transcending act, the reality that is ecstatic and aims at existence toward the world. The things and the world are *for* a "being-for-itself"/consciousness which gives them a foundation as a "there is" as pure unavoidable facticity.

Now, the "being-for-itself" wants to understand itself, while relating to the pure contingent fact – the "there is". However, while transcending itself towards the world, consciousness exhausts itself in the very position of its object. Precisely it is *not* the object, which it sets down. It is the "not", the negation that neg-intuits the "being-in-itself". The existing being alone – with the prefix "*ex*" meaning "out of" – indeed, questions reality, the "being-in-itself". By its questioning the "being-for-itself" places everything at a distance. Because of this recoiling, which is nothingness, consciousness is negativity. Nevertheless, the existing being because of which nothingness comes into the world is "being-for-itself". It "neg-intuits" the "being-in-itself" and "reduces to nothing" the "being- in-itself", while relating to itself as "nothingness" of that "being-in-itself", from which every time "being-for-itself" tears itself away. For example, we can consider the experience of desire. By filling itself with the missing object, desire escapes from it and passes beyond the object in order to open itself to the new object, which entices it. However, the "being-for-itself", while opposing itself to the object which it sets down, reduces itself to nothingness in as much as it is not that object, but only "pure relationship" to its being. The whole existence of the "being-for-itself" consists in projecting itself toward the

[5] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible,* p. 78. Cf. Also Ghislaine Florival, "Phénoménologie du corps et de l'affectivité chez Sartre et Merleau-Ponty"; *Acts of XVII World Congress of Philosophy, 21-27/O8/ 1983*, Section B 16, pp. 170 ss.

"being-in-itself", to "negate" it in order to let it be. Nevertheless, the "being-in-itself" though founded by the "being-for-itself", remains in itself pure contingency, pure facticity, i.e., the fact that "there is".

According to Sartre, the relation that reduces "being-for-itself" to nothingness is the operation, which manifests the absolute character of freedom. As ecstatic reality and pure transcendence, the "being-for-itself" is existing. Yet, by reducing its being to nothingness it is essentially free. Freedom is not limited by anything, it is absolute. Freedom is neither a character of the "being-for-itself" nor a "being-in-itself" that the subject possesses. It signifies only that existence has no limit and is carried along in a perpetual ecstatic flow. The "being-for-itself" is "condemned to be free" in the pure overcoming of itself. In this sense, it is also the "pure action" of temporalization, i.e., action that constitutes the existing being as self-transcendence. In this way, the act of the present consciousness is already surpassed as soon as it is accomplished. The present consciousness itself arises for itself only on the mode of a pure project and a free movement, which is "nothing" with respect to the "being-in-itself" and it sets down while negating it.

The act that always sets down something and intentionally aims at something intervenes in the notion of "unreflected consciousness". The "being-for-itself" in its transcending action is "positing" an object. However, it is not positing itself at the same time. For example, I see the table, but I *am* not the table. I am at it while not being it. Now, in this seeing I do not see myself, but "I-just-see-the-table". At the first degree, consciousness is always empty of itself in order that it can fill itself with the object, from which it tears itself away in so far it is not that object. Thus, it is free in its becoming of itself. It is a "reflecting reflection" of the object, a pure relationship in its presence to itself – as in a mirror-game in which each face is at its turn surmounted. Consciousness does not know itself; it is, thus, unreflected in its act of "positing" the object.[6] Hence, it has priority with respect to the reflected consciousness, which, on its part, is un-reflected before becoming an object for a reflecting consciousness, which sets down for itself. However, the reflecting consciousness is not at the same degree as the reflected consciousness which it posits and which as "having been" is un-reflected before being reflected, in such a way that there is also an unreflected consciousness in the reflecting act. This, in turn, posits a consciousness that has just been un-reflected in order to make of it a reflected object. However, this object is transcendent, and it is the *ego*. Thus, the consciousness of the "I think" is not the one, which is thinking. In other words, it is not its act of thinking that it is thinking. The "I" who is reflected has first been unreflected in the act of thinking. Therefore, there is always a hiatus, a withdrawal of the act, which gets ahead of the reflexive position and which is never thematically spelt out. Thus, the unreflected

[6] Cf. Jean Paul Sartre, *La transcendance de l'Ego*, pp. 13, 37.

consciousness is anonymous and impersonal in its uprising. This pure spontaneity is the condition of freedom.[7]

Nevertheless, consciousness self-constitutes itself unceasingly in the temporal flow, by a play of transverse units which are the concrete and real retentions of the past consciousnesses. For example, I can always revive laterally the conscious presence, but it is then in the past. Thus, Sartre says: "When I am running behind a tramcar, I do not posit myself to myself; but, by memory, I can induce from the facts the act of a subject that is having-been." There is present an effective consciousness, but it is a consciousness that does not posit itself. There has been no "I" in the existing being that runs behind the tramcar. It is only a by an *a posteriori* that the "I" arises. However, the "I" in act is never thematizable. Thus, the "I" is only a formal reality in the sentence. For example, in the act of belief I seize the object of my belief and as a result I believe. Nevertheless, on the mode of pure spontaneity, the free act of believing is without "I".[8] By reflection, my reflecting consciousness comes back on the unreflected consciousness of belief, and at the same time sets it down in its act of believing. We are coming out here into the reflection which thematizes the reflecting consciousness, which is pure spontaneity bringing about belief. Reflection imprisons belief; I have become there the object, the *ego* that possesses belief. Instead of living my belief, I have congealed it in itself. This is what Sartre calls "insincere belief" (*mauvaise foi*).

The "myself-*ego*" – which is "having-been" before as unreflected consciousness – has become a transcendent unit and the shadow, which always surpasses its lived moments. In fact, the *becoming of the lived temporalities constitutes the ego*; it is itself the transverse and the synthetic unity of its lived moments. Again, it is their horizon that unceasingly resumes all the time. The *ego* includes my states, my qualities, and my actions as reflected by my reflecting consciousness. Thus, it is the transcendent object for the present consciousness that posits it, but it itself is transcendence with a proper temporality, and is always re-actualized by the present consciousness. Therefore, the *ego* is the virtual centre of the lived moments, and a transcended pseudo-consciousness.[9]

Sartre demonstrates that the "myself-*ego*" is "having-been" and does not coincide with the free spontaneity of the "being-for-itself", even in its reflection. The "insincere belief" (*mauvaise foi*) consists in looking at

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[7] In his work *L'Etre et le néant* Sartre gives an ontological foundation – that the "being-for-itself" is nothing and it is on the mode of not-being to the unreflected consciousness, the analysis of which is of an epistemological order in *La transcendance de l'Ego*. Cf. Jean Paul Sartre, *L'Etre et le néant*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), pp. 61, 65, 77 ss.

[8] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 116 ss.

[9] Cf. Jean Paul Sartre, *La transcendance de l'Ego,* pp. 63 ss. Cf. also Jean Paul Sartre, *L'Etre et le néant*, pp. 209, 213.

oneself in a mirror and positing oneself as ideal of the self, because the "myself-*ego*" imprisons itself in a "being-in-itself": it makes of itself an "object-subject", from which emanate the lived moments as its proper products. The "myself-*ego*" has hypostasized itself by the accomplice reflection, whereas it is first lived by consciousness only according to the unreflected anonymous mode. The "myself-*ego*" becomes a passive magical power and a "quasi-being-in-itself" conscious of itself. In "insincere belief" we throw ourselves narcissistically in the "being- in-itself" and the "myself-*ego*" has become opaque in the consciousness. It is the case, for example, of the activist militant who sets down himself as the "being-in-itself", the militant being. The "myself-*ego*" has trapped itself in the snare of its proper reflection, destroying the pure movement of existence. Now the *ego*, the "myself", is only the sign of the self and its ideal limit.

The self of the "being-for-itself" is the reason (*telos*) for the movement of negativization (*néantisation*) by which the unreflected is present to itself as "reflecting-reflection", always sent back to the mirroring reflection. In reflection, the consciousness relates to the presence-self, un-reflected, with the desire of filling in its wants. The reflection that puts down thisness/ipseity – the "reflected reflection" of the person – is the second level of the consciousness for itself. The first one is the hiatus – consciousness-self as un-reflected "reflecting-reflection" and the second one is the act by which I reflect my act. I reflect my reflecting consciousness, which lays down an absent-presence, which is the "possible" for the "being-for-itself", which I have always to be. This "possible" stirs my consciousness in each action, in the pure overcoming of itself toward the world, in order to make of it my world. Thus, the self is the ideal pole of an ecstatic subject, which revives at each sending back in the reflexive circularity.[10]

In the first ecstasis, which is un-reflected, the consciousness lives in the immanence of a presence to oneself, not positing it, but only positing objects. In the second ecstasis, which is a reflected mode, the "being-for-itself" of reflection tries vainly to transcend itself, i.e., to negativize (*néantiser*) and to objectify its proper un-reflected negativization (*néantisation*) of the first degree. However, at the second degree, the negativization is more radical, as there is opposition between the reflected object – the "reflected reflection", and the reflexive consciousness – "reflecting-reflection". Thus, the consciousness manifests itself at two levels of existence. While keeping the unity of its transcendence toward the world, negation here is internal to consciousness, it concerns the "nothing" of consciousness. [11]Now, the self is the value, the ideal pole of the ecstatic subject. In order to reflect on it, we have to transcend it and objectify what is contradictory. I am transcendence at the mode of "not to be it" of the

[10] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 137, 244.
[11] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 359 ss.

nothingness of being. However, precisely existence wants always to totalize the self of the "being-for-itself", to be free and at the same time posit itself as the whole of oneself. This is a contradiction because the concept of "being-in-itself-for-itself" is a contradictory idea of a foundation, which totalizes itself by reflecting itself on the world, while keeping its transcendence and its transgressive freedom. It is to be willing to be God (*ens causa sui*), i.e., an existence which is at the same time consciousness and being-in-itself in totality.[12]

Now, this is the driving force behind existence and its most profound desire, i.e., the ultimate pole of transgression. This time, the concept must be understood in the metaphysical sense. We have to do here with the ontological challenge that consists in willing to be one's own foundation – one's own origin. It is to be willing to be God. However, this challenge – the most radical one – is precisely giving a foundation to the freedom of the "being-for-itself": paradoxically man is a useless passion precisely because existence is condemned to surmount itself always as free. Thus, existence is an absolute freedom because it is without limits, pure transgression *(transgredi*) and always beyond itself, and because it endeavours always in vain to totalize itself. According to Sartre, God is the absolute "being-in-itself", and at the same time the regulating idea of freedom. However, this idea is contradictory and is characterized by nothingness. If the God of Kant is the ultimate unity that finalizes existence, in Sartre, God is the unity of existence, which always conceals itself towards a not-totalizable infinite. Thus, for Sartre, God is a negated horizon that is barred by the contradictory dimensions of the essence "being-in-itself-for-itself."

Ethical Transgression/Belief

From the ontological point of view the "being-for-itself" is pure freedom, particularly seen against a background of finitude. This means that consciousness is always tied existentially by a finite situation. The human reality bears in itself the contingency of the "being-in-itself" – the body as the proper anchorage – and is located in a spatio-temporal universe. However, "I" exists in the body, i.e., I overcome it unceasingly as the body which "I have". Thus, I do not possess my body, but I "am" the body on the active mode of my involvement in the world, which, in turn, opens for me my possibilities. Let us take the example of emotion: it expresses our bodily mediation with respect to the world. Emotion is a behavior that is suffered, signifying and un-realizing, that applies to the body. Yet, the body is governed by consciousness. How does that happen? Emotion is a conduct, which endeavors to transform the world by an effect of belief. When a situation appears to us as too difficult and that we are obliged to act, we change the quality of the situation. Consciousness plays a new relationship

[12] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 708.

with the world, on an imaginary level. As it does not have the power to change the real perspectives in themselves perceived in the world, it lives them in the mode of belief. Its conduct is no more effective. Thus, usually the un-reflected consciousness finds for itself other solutions: the body it governs changes its relations with the world in order that the world change its qualities. For example, in the presence of an imminent danger which the body must escape: it can faint, flee from the distressing situation, or in despondency the world becomes dismal. Man plays the magic link in the mode of a relationship of participation which brings my body and that of the other in a dimension of active belief.[13]

In this context, Sartre inaugurates a new relationship of consciousness to its world – another level of human reality: its situation. The world is defined by the referential articulation proper to the tasks and to the actions of each one, depending on many signifying centres. I seize in the world potential-implements the keys of which are not given to me, but which manifest themselves to me as indicated as in a hollow. What I seize objectively in action is the world of instruments which hang on to each other and send back, in the very act in which I adapt myself to them and overcome them to another instrument.[14] I do not seize my hand in function of the act of writing, but only the penholder which is writing. Thus, the world is the correlative of the possibilities that I am, as the outline of all my possible actions, "as a hollow always future" "because we are always future to ourselves." [15]

In this sense, the structure of the world implies that we can insert ourselves in it only by being ourselves implements. We cannot act without being acted upon. The instrument which I am is the body; but I can never transcend it. It does not give objectivity to my action because "I am my body". It is lived and not known. The body manifests the individuality and the contingency of our original relation to things. It is given to me by a backward surge of the world toward my facticity, but the condition of that backward surge is a continual overcoming. The body is that beyond what I am; it is my finitude as the necessary condition of the originary project of the "being-for-itself". Consequently, to overcome the world is to involve myself in it by all my acts only in order to emerge from it! Thus, I find a "non-sizeable given" in the heart of the infinite pursuit of the "I am". All my tasks insert themselves in the dynamic order of action; but the action involved in the world is correlative to the refusal of being sucked down in an instituted work. In this perspective appears a properly ethical dimension.

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[13] Cf. Jean Paul Sartre, *Esquisse d'une Théorie des émotions*, (Paris: Hermann & Cie Ed., 1939), pp. 40-42.

[14] Cf. Jean Paul Sartre, *L'Etre et le néant*, p. 387.

[15] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 386.

It belongs to the third dimension of the human reality, i.e., "being-for-the-other."[16]

As we mentioned earlier, the "being-for-itself" is a presence to itself in the "reflecting reflection" of the unreflected consciousness, and in the second level reflection situates the thisness/ipseity of the person in the redoubled play of reflections: here, we have to do with the "reflecting-reflected-reflection". Now, the third mode of the human reality of the lived hiatus intervenes in the structure of the "being-for-itself". It is the "being-for-the-other". It manifests the most radical differential relation, as the "negation splits itself in two internal and reverse negations". Each one is the negation of interiority – thisness/ipseity – but each is separated from the other by a non-sizeable nothingness of exteriority. By the glancing at each other, each one becomes for the other a "being-for-the-other". The body sends me back to the existence of the other and induces me to discover in shame or in pride that contingent fact of my proper reality. I have become a "possible thing" for the other; and I have become an "outside reality" for the other because not only does the other de-centre me from myself, but it also occupies what has been my world. The original fall of the "being-for-itself" is doubled by the loss of a world of which I am no longer the centre. Therefore, for Sartre, "hell is the other!" Thus, there is no encounter but perpetual sending back, in a play of mirrors of transcendences, which transcend each other. Because I am always the other of the other, every effective totalization turns out to be impossible.

This third dimension of the human reality, the "being-for-the-other", asserts the presence of the otherness of the consciousnesses as a matter of fact. I do not constitute the other; I encounter the other in the conflict of two transcendences, which in no way can ever be transcended. The other becomes the object-body, escapes always by the movement of freedom. An authentic vision that is one of an absolute look becomes concretely impossible, as every consciousness is precisely the negation of the other. Thus, there is always only a demoralized totality in every encounter. Hence, Sartre recognizes the impossible desire of a "transcended transcendence". I never possess the other, even in the sadistic-masochistic game because the terms are always able to reverse themselves. In the same way, I do not possess the love of the other, as it is in a perpetual sending back that transcendences transcend each other. Sartre underlines here one of the most profoundly ethical aspects of his philosophy: I never possess liberty, neither that of mine nor that of the other. It is the place of an absolute respect. Because of the impossibility of transcending the transcendence of the other, it is decisive to justify the absolute of otherness of the other and, therefore, the absoluteness of the person of the other. For this reason, the third dimension of the human reality i.e., "being-for-the-other" makes man a

[16] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 342-345 ss., 360 ss.

useless passion: the other escapes always my desire of totalization in the impossible pursuit of "transcended transcendences".

Sartre has made us discover the ontological reality of the "being-for-itself" and the "being-for-the-other" as perpetual tearing away from the objective situation of all what conditions us with respect to the world. The absolute of freedom is located in the overcoming of every situation where our actions insert themselves. To be free also means to live authentically, i.e., in assuming this detachment: to be in the world without being caught in "insincere belief" (*mauvaise foi)* contrary to the inauthentic man (*le salaud*) or to the indifferent one. We must never slip into the objectified world, instituted by our actions. On the contrary, negating the situation the "being-for-itself" assumes it in each instant in the project that opens it in action to the "making" without respite or rest. There is never the totalization of my freedom in my acts; but a perpetual de-totalization of what I am. Authentic life is the active involvement in the world, while not being of the world. There is no place for an ethics of complacency that satisfies oneself. In this sense, ethics is fundamentally anti-narcissistic. The "being-for-itself" is only action in the way of realizing itself; even its death is always an "outside"!

After the death of Sartre two texts, which he had never published, were found: the *Notebooks of the Strange War* (*Carnets de la drôle de guerre*) and the *Notebooks for an Ethics* (*Cahiers pour une morale*). In the first essay, *Notebooks of the Strange War*, moral life consists in "existing more" under the ideal form which corresponds to the art of living in authenticity. This supposes all the work connected with the reflexive and non-accomplice attitude. This attitude does not set down itself in its settled being; it is a "conversion" bearing upon all the activities of life, in such a way that the man who "exists" in a situation has always to take himself up anew to build himself in his perpetual project of being-in-the-world. Being always in search like a "moving concern," man is responsible for the signification that he gives to the world, without ever being his proper foundation. On the contrary, in direct contact with a contingent situation the "being-for-itself" – the human person – assumes freely his facticity and historicity. He achieves his salvation by assuming freely the thisness of his person. In this sense, he builds his destiny not as human species, but by choosing himself in his epoch and in his generation. However, for Sartre, this whole project is always without any support from outside, because he negates any substantiality of the Good in itself or the Truth in itself. Thus, the transcendence of the person is eminently responsible for whatever he makes of himself.

In the second essay, *Notebooks for an Ethics*, Sartre describes the significance of morality inside human relations, beyond any violence – which is non-recognition. It is in solidarity and appeal – in the possibility of giving and receiving – that before others and by them we are becoming together responsible. Hence, we need only committed action to build a world with the others. However, the commitment is pure commitment: the

body does not enter here in the definition of moral life; consciousness alone has concerns of value. Yet, moral philosophy is in no way able to give it a foundation. This "failure" of moral philosophy finds an opening in the committed action on the sociopolitical front, in Sartre's *Critique of Dialectic Reason*. Here, abandoning all theories of moral life Sartre finds finally in his study on Gustave Flaubert the ultimate dimension of an effective moral life through an existence, which is living itself. Overcoming the antithesis of ethics and ontology, the *existentiell* psychoanalysis discovers in writing the sense of literary commitment, which also constitutes the "sense" of life.

Political Transgression/Belief

In his work *Critique of Dialectic Reason* (1960), Sartre tries to reintegrate the existing being in the course of history. He analyses the intelligibility of the social being according to his socio-politico-anthropological perspective. However, he demystifies every Marxist or *Bourgeois* ideology when he tries to seize the moving force of historical totalization. In fact, man is a product. When instituted each subject has alienated itself; but the existing being – as a social member of the group – is called to live the dynamic movement, creating humanity. This dimension has always worked again by *praxis* and opens the person to new horizons. Now, the history of the past is a place of violence: it is in effect a treatise on evil. The facticity of history and *praxis* is alienating because the historical dialectic encounters each time the *pratico-inert*, i.e., the negative effects derived from living action and produced by a fundamental evil, the scarcity of goods.

History can be compared to a living organism. When analyzed in the theoretical form of the "practical sets" (*ensembles pratiques*), human action self-organizes itself as interiorization and exteriorization. In fact, the vital needs are linked to nature, and to the fact of an objectively rare material, in a period of famine for example. In this case, we can organize the inert matter offered to our common *praxis* by humanizing the scarce nature according to the ends of each one, always antithetical, in order to obtain a converging action. It is like the game of chess: in playing this game I recognize the interfered and reciprocal sense of the existence of the other! Thus, life is an obligatory co-existence. "The existence of each one is a risk of non-existence for the others!" Nevertheless, these material or physical evils are surpassed by a much more radical evil which belongs to the individual relations of competition, in which the other man is always a rival. The dialectic of desire and the will to appropriate the world bear witness to this dimension. Scarcity is not simply contingent at the level of a quantitatively insufficient production in the demographic sense, i.e., for the physical survival of each one. It also reproduces itself in the qualitative sense of desire. At that level it is forever insuperable. Thus, humanization is

the historicizing always resumed which aims at surmounting the otherness of the ends of all: "The hell, it is the others!"

However, freedom rises up from the transformation of nature as well by economic *praxis* and sociopolitical action. It meets always in productive integration the bonds of a totalization, which is always to be surmounted. For example, it is a false reciprocal and anonymous alienation, which tries to realize the synthesis at the level of class. The *pratico-inert* has become their collective institution. Conversely, the "group" refuses the instituted, inert, alienating serial nature of a collectivity. Man fights against the ruling class, whereas individuals live in solidarity, like the unique responsible "we" in permanent revolution. Each one has been inscribed in it by contract on an equal footing, and recognizes the sovereignty of all towards everybody. The oath binds freely, beyond every individual freedom. However, this brotherhood of equals belongs to violence or terror for the one who would secede. Where there is no more objective legitimacy – which can be called the neutral third witness of the institution – where there is no longer a horizon of "sense" and there are no more parapets, there rises the danger of chaos and of implacable evil.[17] The freedom of the group bears in itself *in contrario* violence, which is the expression of totalizing passion. The project to recapture *praxis* in its ends organizes itself also inevitably according to the situation and stumbles over the effects of the *pratico-inert*. Because the political ends lean on a past that is already there, the meaning has to be signified again in relation to the new ends to come. Eternal resumption of the totality of history always is de-totalized and never completed! This is a law of fact, which we must always be able to surmount freely.

Symbolic Transgression/Belief

In 1970, Sartre proposes a new theory of freedom. After the pure historization of the group against the third one – the class constitutes the *praxis* in the solidarity of the "we" – Sartre takes it out on the historization of the person. He discovers it through the *existentiell* analysis, in Gustave Flaubert. Freedom has transformed itself in the fate, which presents a new form of de-totalization. Having read Sigmund Freud and having not accepted the Freudian thesis of the unconscious, Sartre remodels the unsignifying experience of the *pratico-inert*, by applying it to individual existence. Thus, he takes up, in his book *The idiot of the Family*, the life of Gustave Flaubert.[18] This immense epic presents itself paradoxically as the keystone of the entire work of Sartre and his proper life. It is the history of a

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[17] Cf. A. De Waelhens, "Sartre et la raison di alectique"; *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, no. 60, (England: I.S.P., 1962), p. 97.

[18] Cf. J.P. Sartre, *L'Idiot de la famille, Gustave Flaubert de 1821 à 1857*, (Paris, Gallimard, 1971), pp. 37,159 ss.

character the whole destiny of which has constituted itself concretely in function of language, in words. After the fashion of Sartre, the personality of Flaubert uncovers itself through his writings. They institute his proper life. However, the existence of Flaubert induces a new connotation for the notion of transgression. We have to do there no longer with the denunciation of the institution slowed down by reflection or history, but with the reinterpretation of personal freedom from the unconscious.

If it is true that "the unconscious is the discourse of the other", for Sartre, it is still in the order of a signifying discourse. In the preface of his work *Le scénario Freud*, Pontalis underlines the clear-sightedness of Sartre. He has well seen that the drive makes a sign and not an image. The sexual matter of Freud is not reducible to the realm of sex and lives from that distance. The Oedipus complex is not what binds us to father and mother, and that the horror of incest is born from an unbearable representation and not from a social prescription. Misunderstanding that which has not escaped the philosopher! Nevertheless, Sartre has gone no further than the presentation of signifying which make sense for the one who "sees" the totalization of a destiny. This sense seeing itself and the play of senses is not already in the mirror the expression of a de-totalization that Sartre, reader of Flaubert – and after him the reader of Sartre – assumes and negativizes at his turn. There is no limit to the destiny of language which makes itself the story. It is always surmounted by the new reader. Life, writer, and work understand each other indefinitely at the horizon of the "saying".

A question arises here. Does the Freudian unconscious rejoin the pole of the un-reflected "I", in the sense where there is absence or anonymity of the subject? Is the one which, from the origin, is not, and is no more but a trace for the reflected thisness/ipseity, and which appears as reflecting subject, not the *raison d'être* of the "always known" of a subject who recognizes himself as "consciousness which is "having-been"? For Sartre, the "I am free" and the "I am decided" assume themselves in the retention of a state of consciousness, which has been un-reflected for the reflexive consciousness. What then is freedom? An anonymous transgression, that the "being-for-oneself" appropriates while *not* being it; but which articulates itself as personality of the "myself" on the reflected and not an accomplice mode.

CONCLUSION

Sartre has analyzed philosophically what freedom is as expression of transgression. The challenge towards the contradictory notion of God polarizes finally all its internal dynamics. It is aimed at the horizon of de-totalization. Finitude transfixes existence, society, and the destiny of the writer. However, the dynamics of freedom is really open to authenticity on the personal and interpersonal planes. Eventually it makes appeal to the

rights of man. *The Hope*, last interview of Sartre, takes place in the same process.[19] Human action aims at an ultimate finality at the horizon of every sense. However, the ultimate sense of totalization, God, is in principle, always barred. The unlimited exigency that "we have to be committed to the world without being instituted in it", is certainly not that of the "well-meaning soul" (*belle âme*), but is that of the "act of existing". Thus, the act of existing is *to make work*[20] in perpetually creating action for the others and for oneself. Such is the authenticity of life and such also its contradiction in relation to Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian echoes. Authentic existence consists in living out the "call to live" without positing oneself, without instituting oneself, and nevertheless committing oneself, while refusing every form of "insincere belief" (*mauvaise foil*), which anyway binds us to useless passion. If man is nothing but his belief in action, is he not precisely called to live the exigency of that belief? Does not Sartre, in "*The Hope*", invite us, some days before his death, to that radical exigency of a "call to live"?

[19] Cf. Jean Paul, Sartre, "L'Espoir, maintenant" in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, p. 92.

[20] Cf. *Ibid*.

CHAPTER 14

PERSON AND MORAL LIFE

INTRODUCTION

We begin this chapter with a short description to moral philosophy.[1] Moral philosophy is a scientific reflection – operating from a distance – on the meaning of moral life as we exercise it in lived everyday experience. It depends on a practice that implies actively taking up a position which calls for significant lived action. This lived action precedes the theoretical moral reflection. This is because we live moral action long before we make of it a reflective knowledgewith universalizable scope. Hence, to attempt a provisional and purely nominal definition: "Moral philosophy is the normative knowing of human action as human. It consists in the objective knowledge of the rules related to the responsible conduct of man." This general definition places us immediately within the philosophical position: it supposes from the very beginning a universal point of view on human action and an objective knowledge of the rules of action. Now, it is precisely here that we meet the difficulty of every moral philosophy because it raises the issue of a moral criterion or a judgment that decides about moral value. Besides, there emerge questions regarding the one who validates the said moral criterion, to whom the moral value is applicable, the locality where the moral value has jurisdiction and how it can be recognized. Again there is the question regarding the existence of one or more moral truth/truths – single or many truths of action. As a matter of fact, the relative nature of moral values and the question of the possibility of a universal moral value applicable to all is one of the greatest problems of moral philosophy in our world today.

Hence, there arises the first question: Is there a "moral science", or at least an objective knowledge of morality? Do we not already break with the inalienable dimension of a singular subject, an "I", when we define or objectify him in his action, whether from the point of view of legitimating principles or as a matter of fact, by a kind of knowing which reduces him to a universal judgment? Could we, for example, and in the same line of

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[1] We have to be precise in our use of vocabulary: the philosophical elaboration of moral experience is often called "ethics", when we have to do with an objective moral science having a universal scope or with a positive science linked to the history of morals. We call "moral philosophy" the study of morality, which pertains to a personal commitment, where what is underlined is rather autonomy and responsibility. To tell the truth the two terms – "ethics" and "moral philosophy" – are often taken one for the other and nothing in their etymology forces us to distinguish them.

thought, establish a "science of values?" Does not every value bear in itself a good relative to such a concrete and quite singular situation? A second question imposes itself, more deeply in the critical examination of our definition of moral philosophy. Is it possible to pose the problem of morality with respect to human conduct if the very notion of subjectivity – the subject as author of his acts – disappears from the philosophical field of action and discourse, and gives way to the purely formal conception of a structure of exchanges between pure signifying, i.e., in the functioning of differentiated relations, such as they are admitted by structuralism? In fact, we do not have to answer these questions here. We can only try to clarify their stakes and analyze some of their aspects.

The third question about moral life is a wager, which must also be justified. No one among us has fundamentally to learn from somebody if, as Kant said, we possess "practical reason" equally. There is no privileged authority to rule on ethical judgment: the consciousness of everyone is always for itself *the last judge*. It is audacious also to speak about moral life because philosophical reflection – to which this presentation belongs – bears in itself the knot of a difficulty and an antinomy. Indeed, moral life concerns lively action, action taken as acting, whereas moral philosophy is made of a theoretical discourse about that action. In fact, philosophy is always a reflection on the other of itself; it is its vocation of intelligibility to capture the *logos* at work in humanity and in the totality of the *cosmos*. However, there is a difficulty about moral action: moral philosophy is only a particular branch of philosophy in general; but, as moral, it concerns the totality of human existence, under all aspects of its action and its insertion into the *cosmos*. This takes place in such a way that moral reflection does not judge only about a localized circumstance of human life. Man is moral in his family, in his profession, in his friendly relations, in politics, and the like. Hence, moral reflection includes the whole of existence in all its landmarks, which is seen as permeated by a moral connotation. Thus, philosophy does not have to invent what the moral "life" must be. Moral action, the actual normative acting, is always already there as soon as there are humans. Philosophy, which is a reflection on moral action – the coming back of thought on action – is itself an action in the unfolding of the human process. The difficulty comes from the fact that moral philosophy is itself linked to the commitment of existence. It is, in the etymological sense of the term "philosophy", i.e., as love of wisdom, and thus, committed to questioning.

Thus, the status of moral philosophy consists in a questioning about: the meaning of human action; the validity of concrete judgments which every one adopts actually in his life; and the desirability of the value of proper conduct, obligation or interdict, the aspects of which it has to justify and to make explicit.

This chapter elaborates the theme of moral reality in three parts. In the first part, we elucidate the stakes of moral reality or the "sensed action" proper to every existence. Moral reality as concretely lived out in the

individual moral life is born thanks to the collective consciousness and common environment. However, what makes it exist as reciprocal are the individuals, who confer on the environment a new signifying dimension – a new frame of action. Thus, every generation bears new light on the moral reality and gives new shape to the "moral sense". Normally, one lives out the moral reality without reflection and the conflicting moral situations force us to reflect and invent innovative solutions. At present traditional moral values are challenged due to the proliferation of diverse values emerging from different cultures; due to the breakup of the serene conceptions of a speculative classical moral philosophy; and due to the emergence of techno-science and its consequences on moral life. In this situation, if we want to find again in the *existentiell* lived-experience of moral life some coherence of "sense", it is necessary to come back to the foundations of the moral fact/reality, to make explicit the unfolding of a moral behavior, and to make apparent their structure and their meaningful finality.

In the second part, basing ourselves on the moral philosophies of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, and Hegel we attempt to discern their moral criteria and discuss their scope: the first is the "golden mean" or the excellence of a reasoned action as presented by Aristotle; second, the autonomy or the moment of subjective interiorization of the moral Law in us as expounded by Kant; and third, the State as political institution that aims at justice as an effect of reason, concretely realized between free individuals. These three dimensions are related to the mode of rationality. Now, practical reason is always a median position, torn between the necessity of a universalizable exigency and the daily experience of a concrete action which is tied up with historicity and with the singular events of each one. There is always a gap between the political constitution of the ideal State and the empirical reality of the positive societies. In the same way, there is a gap in us between the exigency of duty and the concrete realization of our choices in daily life. This leads us to the consideration of conditions of a concrete moral philosophy, which we take up for discussion in the next section.

The third part attempts to elaborate on the conditions of a concrete moral philosophy by expounding on phenomenological-hermeneutical and structuralist approaches to moral philosophy. A moral philosophy which is not a mere theory, but one that tries to give a continuation to lived-values, operates in the context of lived-experience, and is based on concrete attitudes that are founded on the three conditions of genetics, ethics proper and the community. Genetics contributes to our understanding of the psychic growth of a person from his/her childhood; ethics proper helps us to see moral life as a life of relationship between persons who have respect for and responsibility towards each other; and the community, particularly the State, serves as the guarantor of a moral, just, and equitable life among persons within the community. The conclusion states that the concepts of respect and justice underline eminently the present sense of freedom, mutual

liberation between humans, and the effective recognition of the other as "our neighbor". At this stage moral philosophy must come to a halt because in the vision of the "neighbor" it grasps the meaning of a more profound existence, which belongs to the realm of committed faith, where justice and responsibility convert themselves in the hope and the welcome of forgiveness.

Having outlined the general plan of this chapter, now, we begin our consideration of the moral reality in the next section.

MORAL REALITY

According to Immanuel Kant, moral reality "is tied to common consciousness." Hence, the moral reality is a fact for every individual and collectivity, whatever the value of its concrete modalities. Every society, whatever is its cultural stage, lives from its moral criteria –value judgments. This is true of the gentleman and the "mafia", the most archaic tribes and the most refined civilizations. However, any individual has access to the humanity of a discourse or an action inspired by rules only inside a living-collectivity, which holds the institutional modalities of these rules. It is the society which decides regarding the reflective apparition of the "I" or "*ego*" that reflects and discovers with its possibilities of action what Socrates calls the "voice of consciousness inside us." On the other hand, there is the reciprocity of moral promotion. Though the individual moral life is born thanks to the environment, what make it exist reciprocally are the individuals, who confer on the environment a new signifying dimension – a new frame of action. Thus, every generation bears new light on the moral reality and gives new shape to the "moral sense".

At this juncture, it is proper to raise the issue of the meaning of "moral sense" and read again its lived process. Usually, we follow the course of events without reflective distance: in the field of everyday life, we are able to direct ourselves; and we know what must be done or avoided, what is desirable or intolerable, and what is good or bad. Only obstacles or contradictions – physical or mental – call into question our usual certitudes, our self-confidence, and our "good consciousness". For example, the pain – bodily or moral – which forces us to reflect suddenly upon what is usually lived as self-evident, and induces us to look reflectively at the moral tradition itself from an external perspective and raise questions, such as "I have always behaved in this way. Is it truly just?" We can reflect on tradition only with respect to a new mode of existence, which enters into a conflict of values with that of our own so much that our behavior so far thoroughly assured becomes suddenly problematic, even disquieting or completely strange. This implies a shaking of the good consciousness, the consciousness accustomed, and falling into the attitude of indifference. Generally, this type of moral shock comes from others – from others' behaviors or from others' choices of commitment; it also occurs when novel situations – which have no longer foundation in the past – arise in our life.

This new state of affairs forces us to use our creative imagination towards new solutions. When tradition does not seem to provide an answer to this new situation, we have to invent a solution. However, there is the risk of getting caught up in a point of view that is relative, or the possibility of failure. Now the question is: "How to seize the new criterion of action?"

As we live our life today, several concrete moral values – coming from the variety of cultures or from different generations – confront each other. Besides, several unforeseen ethical situations impose themselves upon us without our having any traditional landmark upon which we could lean ourselves on in order to answer them. It can be said that this happens in every *epoch*: there has been always conflict of values and values which are exceptional with respect to the prevailing rules. However, what is manifest today is the transition from a relatively restricted problematic to one or the other culture – the western culture for example – or to a planetary reality strongly differentiated in its cultural representations. Thus, the moral problem, lived as a position of principle, submitted to practical reason in a particular philosophical framework, issued from a Greco-Roman and Jewish Christian tradition, is suddenly confronted with concrete realities lived by other cultures: the African, the Indian, the Chinese, and the like.

On the other hand, human sciences – sociology, economics, and psychology – reveal the urgency of the needs and the breakup of the serene conceptions of a speculative classical moral philosophy. For example, the problems of unequal distribution of goods, underdevelopment, delinquency, drugs, and gender inequality, which have always existed, are bursting today by reason of the amplitude of their progression. The fact – what is at stake is the survival of the three quarters of humankind – forces the States and the individuals to pose the problem of human rights urgently and look for rapid solutions. In fact, the standardization of the modes of life conforming to the western model and the generalized media-communication drive moral philosophy out of its abstract entrenchments and urge it to think concretely as to what can be a forced peaceful co-existence. The reason for this is globalization: if there is a crisis somewhere in the world, it rebounds immediately on each one of us. The ideologies that are in power look for opportunities to force their social models on society. This planetary situation belongs to a sociological observation, but it provokes necessarily our common responsibility. Now, a moral life can exist effectively only in a community of individuals who respect each other, as classical moral philosophy teaches. What ought to be justified? Is it still so today?

Now, we must turn our attention to the cause of this change of moral horizon today. Why do we live these conflicts of values on a planetary scale? There are the ideologies proper to the nineteenth century, which contribute to displacing the supremacy of a transcendental subject: Darwin, Marx, and Nietzsche, and after them all the empiricist and structuralist movements have been taken up in the twentieth century by the social sciences. Yet, another pitfall that threatens to shake moral reality today is the techno-sciences. They open a new era and a novel field of possibilities

for man. This is becaue not only do they mark the progress of the human mastery upon nature – as already shown by Marx – but also they constitute themselves unilaterally as the sole universe to which the world of man will be reduced tomorrow. The man who has programmed its existence is perhaps no longer able to control its continuation or its effects today. The *pratico-inert* that counter-effect our actions – about which Sartre has spoken – takes today uncontrollable amplitude. This question engages all our future: what are at stake are not only the individual or collective private existences, but also the *cosmos* in its entirety and the future humankind as a whole. The question is: "Shall we still be able to recognize our habitat tomorrow? Or will it be, in the manner of Orwell, the place of a physical and mental, genetic and ideological manipulation, in such a way that the fate of the persons runs the risk of being radically perverted? Our symbolic relationship with the real world gets lost at the benefit of a technological relationship without personal mediation.

If it is true that every *epoch* recognizes the relevance of new moral questions, today these moral questions impose themselves by the amplitude of their extension in space and by their repercussions in relation to the future of mankind. These questions – presently without solution – provoke anxiety, anguish, and indecisiveness; and threaten to mutilate and paralyze our moral judgment, unless, inversely, they displace their stakes or transpose their values on other modalities, by making appeal to our creative imagination. Here the task of a philosophical reflection is better justified. As is well known, every philosophical questioning on man must find again the sense of a project of existence, the essence of the act of existing, its ontological and practical finality. Because every man exists while knowing that he exists, he is not as the thing, submitted to physical inertia and going wherever one pushes you, but every human situation bears in itself an appeal to be, a task to be realized, whatever is its measure. Whatever is the diversity of the judgments and the concrete attitudes connected to the opinions of each one, the very fact that there is a judgment and that questions are posed shows that there is for everyone a moral *fact*.

This moral fact is negatively experienced in "remorse" – the retrospective act in us that links us to a past action – we feel ourselves responsible. As the word indicates, "remorse" leaves us with the dissatisfaction of a failure or an unaccomplished reality, which the individual translates spontaneously by the recognition of an evil or a fault in him/her – a kind of inadequacy of the self with respect to itself, a voluntary separation, or in a more archaic mode, a suffered or provoked stain. "Remorse" produces in us the emergence of moral consciousness, just as the myth of the fault brought about in the Socratic discourse on "Know yourself by yourself" – a conversion, which poses the knowing of oneself – the rise of guilt. The openness to the truth of knowing is also and at the same time the openness to the possibility of a transgression. Only the one who knows the law is sinner as St. Paul says in his Letter to the Romans; discernment is one of the entries in moral life. Therefore, it is not the moral fact that

philosophy questions, but its status, scope, and content. If there is a crisis of values, there is no absence of morality. However, there is an uncertainty or conflict about values because the received moral ideas have lost their relevance. Therefore, if we want to find again – in the *existentiell* lived-experience of moral life some coherence of "sense" – it is necessary to come back to the foundations of the moral fact/reality, to make explicit the unfolding of a moral behavior, and to make apparent their structure and their meaningful finality. This is what we attempt to do in the next section of this paper by basing ourselves on some philosophical positions on moral matters.

PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTION: CLASSICAL ANTINOMIES

Philosophy has always come out against an opposition between the upholders of a transcendental Good, in itself and *a priori*, and the advocates of an effective commitment, which underlines the historicity, and the creative dimension of "sense" in moral action. In this part, we – basing ourselves on the moral philosophies of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant and Hegel – attempt to discern their moral criteria and discuss their scope.

Aristotle

Aristotle, in his *Ethics to Nichomachus*, has developed a theory of moral action. Every being acts in view of an end, in such a way that the desires of man can be realized in the measure in which they aim at the perfection of his/her being – his /her rational animality. Only by pursuing this end can man find happiness, while devoting him to the most specific human action – thinking. However, as human person is not God – he only does his profession as a person – only progressively can he/she make his/her way towards the highest activity – the contemplation of ideas. Nevertheless, practically in the realm of action, he has to find an equilibrium within him/her between his/her tendencies, according to their proper values. As a person is permeated by irrational and rational desires, by practical reasoning he/she is able to deliberate on the motivations of all his/her wishes before he/she acts. Thus, he/she judges about the means – retrospectively or anticipating – which contribute to the fulfillment only of his/her reasonable desires. Thus, a distance is felt between the desirability of the motives and the singular “sensed” action. This distance implies for everyone a kind of strategy in daily life. The reasoned preference must be given to the motives, which lead toward a happy end of human nature – its *telos*. This practical wisdom (*sôphrosunè*) is a prudential art, which aims at the agreement between all our faculties in their proper domains, in order to find the right equilibrium of life. This equilibrium is precisely the virtuous life. For Aristotle, it calls for a habitual state which consists in keeping in all circumstances to the "golden mean" – neither too much nor too little, according to the adage inscribed at Delphi: “*mèden agan*”. The right desire

must aim at the preferential and more reasonable action. This has nothing to do with a rational theoretical knowledge, but depends rather from a moral art, which situates virtue at the level of the harmony of life.

The singular action about which Aristotle speaks attains its development only inside a social network, which awakens the child to moral life and supports the individual in the exercise of his condition as human. On the one hand, society maintains existence at the level of irrational desires, which constitutes the economy of the family, ensuring procreation. On the other hand, the political activity (*vita activa*) finalizes the essentially human action. For, it is in the *Agora* that the Greeks took part effectively in public affairs (*res publica*), by which they realized their essence of being free beings. Likewise, by word and rhetorical argumentation we overcome any physical violence and thereby gain access to freedom thanks to sensible communication. By the public word we enter into the city and constitute exclusively the society of free people. Thus, the moral life of the "golden mean" has rejoined the political order, the harmony of the *Polis*, in a community that gives to everyone his *reason d'être*. Therefore, the virtuous "golden mean" is situated at the collective level of action and constitutes justice.

Kant

However, neither Aristotle nor any Greek thinker could give an account of the fundamental character of morality – the proper personal dimension of responsibility – which is correlative to what Kant calls autonomy. Kant has broken with the metaphysical tradition, by developing the critique of the limits of reason. He denounces the capability of theoretical knowledge to reach objective knowing, mainly by asserting the existence of God as ultimate cause of everything and as the transcendental Good. For Kant, intellectual reason can only "think" the idea of God as cause of all the phenomena, outside their phenomenal series.

Now, if the existence of God is called into question, with it the foundation of morals also collapses. If God does not exist there is no justification of the idea of the Good. The Kantian revolution consists in giving the priority to practical reason as connected to action: it is not the Good – the unknowable-in-itself – which determines moral action, but the good intention in me which determines the good. It is a general fact of common consciousness to consider the good will as determining morality. That which matters is not the effect of action, but the intention. The good intention consists in doing one's duty in every action, and acting according to the practical reason within us. To do one's duty is not to aim at an interest or a useful effect, but it is to answer the pure exigency of practical reason. It amounts to saying that the rational will in us wills itself as good. This universal point of view in us raises us above all our particular, affective, and subjective intentions. Because every man bears within himself the moral law, imperatively every man deserves respect: he bears the greatness of the

Moral Law thanks to the practical reason within him. Even the worst criminal must be respected because he keeps in him the possibility of situating himself at the level of practical reason, taking a universal point of view. Thus, whatever may be the way in which Moral Law – that is purely formal – is applied, every human person is to be respected because he is "auto-enormous". Autonomy is the faculty to give to oneself one's own law, so as to situate oneself at the level of practical reason. Thus, it is what makes us "persons".

Therefore, the contribution of Kantian philosophy is essentially connected to the affirmation of the point of view of universality and the point of view of practical rationality, which makes of every individual a being worthy of *respect*. The dimension of ethical universality applies to all reasonable beings, to men as well as to God. Thus, respect is the principle of the recognition of person in me as in others. Nevertheless, this condition of the universality of the Moral Law is always formal. Kant maintains that we cannot be certain that a purely free act has ever existed in humankind. This remains in the order of hope. Although he has specified the rational condition of moral action, Kant has not proposed its concrete determinations. Freedom is always but hope of freedom towards the city of ends.

Hegel

Hegel criticizes that Kantian position. For him, it is only a moment in the historical development of consciousness. Hegel, contrary to Kant, recognizes in reason the dimensions of historicity and becoming in such a way that in the ethical realm, he tries to overcome the antinomy of the knowing and the pure formal duty in order to aim at the real efficacy of moral action. What Hegel emphasizes is the effectiveness of ethical life and its concrete realization as a task embodied in a work. He overcomes the antinomy of the concrete and the universality of the will. The action of the individual is always linked to a specific situation, but it aims at connecting the will with a sensible dimension which everyone can recognize: it is the work which realizes in its proper singularity the universal point of view that is valid for all. Among all the free actions the one – which is at best able to realize universality – is the action which creates the collective work as institution. Between individuals, the institution is the expression of the universal objectivity. Some of these institutions are the family; the social institutions, the economic institutions, and finally the State, which for its part realizes concretely effective reason, the concrete universal. The State is by right what mediates the community of the citizens and guarantees liberty for all. It is the effective third one, the active reason, guarantor of any sensible action. Without the mediation of the State, we can be be dragged along in the chaotic flood of terror and of uncontrollable violence.

Actually, what belonged to the "golden mean" in the Greek City is justice – that corresponds to the vocation of the citizen – and it finds in

Hegel's thought its rational justification in the political institution. The State represents the effective practical reason; the concrete reason of mankind, such as the French revolution has concretely idealized, or, still today, a society of nations like the Organization of United Nations. However, here, Marx has seen two difficulties: the exteriority of different nations and inside nations the different classes. For Hegel, in any case, in the State, what is at stake is the concrete expression of humankind as recognized will of the rights of man.

Now, we can summarize in their successive apparitions the three axes of ethics presented so far: first, the "golden mean" or the excellence of a reasoned action as presented by Aristotle; second, the autonomy or the moment of subjective interiorization of the Moral Law in us as expounded by Kant; and third, the State as political institution aiming at justice as effect of reason, concretely realized between the free individuals. These three dimensions are related to the mode of rationality. Now, practical reason is always in a median position, torn between the necessity of a universalizable demand and the daily experience of a concrete action which is tied up with historicity and with the singular events of each one. There is always a gap between the political constitution of the ideal State and the empirical reality of the positive societies. In the same way, there is a gap in us between the exigency of duty and the concrete realization of our choices in daily life. This leads us to the consideration of conditions of a concrete moral philosophy, which we take up for discussion in the next section.

CONDITIONS OF A CONCRETE MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Classical moral philosophy remains bound to the ideality of the City of Ends as the value of hope offered to our daily task; or the ideality of a political absolute conceived as effective rational reality. How can we reconcile these universalistic perspectives with our daily behavior where all the most disparate forms of moral life meet? How can we think of a project of existence which is universalizable? The phenomenological-hermeneutic perspective and structuralist perspective attempt to address this issue. We briefly consider these two perspectives before we spell out the possible conditions of a concrete moral philosophy.

Phenomenological-Hermeneutical Perspective

We must seize again the problem from its foundation, i.e., from the ontological point of view, raising the question of the meaning of existence. Phenomenology has tried to answer this question, underlining immediately the dimension of intentionality of the consciousness with its openness to the world. However, the phenomenology of consciousness – still subjective in its approach – is deepened by a hermeneutics, which poses immediately the relation of the being-in-the-world as constitutive of every existence. The openness to the world – to the things and others – is the structure of the

being-in-the-world, which we are. Man is "the only being for which in its being it has to do with its own being." We *ex*-ist[2] because we raise the question of our possibility of nothingness becaue we are being-towards-death. The question of death inscribes in us the character of temporal incompletion and finitude. Contrary to the other beings, which are what they are, we are always on the way of existing and projecting ourselves toward new possibilities of ourselves at each moment. As being-in-the -world, by our actions we give "sense" and from which we receive reciprocally meanings that is always already there.

Authentic life consists in overcoming the daily control exercised by the "anyone" (*Das Mann*) – the neutral third person – in order to "understand" and to assume the finite scope of our possibilities of action, and that in our encounters with the others, in exchange and in presence. Thus, to exist is to be open to all that surrounds us in the finite and temporal mode, retaining in that present the context of the past meanings and anticipating in the project to come what gives to the present its meaning and "sense". The "I" is no longer a consciousness transparent to itself; it exists while coming to the sense not only in the temporal mode of becoming oneself, but also borne by the exchange of the encounter with others. It is the signifying intersubjective community which brings the "I" to exist as a "self". This modality of intersubjective exchange is mediated by bodiliness. The lived-body – which is the "I" in the act of existing – is the point of view and the anchoring from which my project of existing emerges and everything and every direction of action receives its orientation. Being actively open to sense perception, the body is also receptivity that affects feeling and is vulnerable. Finally, acting and suffering at the same time, the lived body is the essential expression, the place of a signifying exchange, both in gesture and in word.

Thus, these phenomenological dimensions of existence may be summarized as follows: first, we are always borne by a sense already there, anchored in the cultural world that precedes us and that surrounds us; second, the world is intrinsically the expression of an intersubjective community where our actions exchange each other and communicate with each other; third, it is from that originary communication that the existing being has to realize himself authentically as a self, under the sign of finitude and death; and fourth, existence is always situated from the point of view of bodiliness, which is openness, project of sense, and vulnerability.

Structuralist Perspective

However, another contemporary philosophical perspective – opposed to phenomenology and bound to the structuralist movement – denies any

[2] The term "ex-ist" has the connotation of the "*ex*" which opens the project towards its final accomplishment.

reference to any subjective entity and underlines the sole play of language as the only signifying network. For this perspective, individual discourse does not bear any longer on its referential reality, but inscribes itself as pure relational function in the chain of significations, which interferes in the common text. No universal *a priori* gives a foundation to their reality. Truth is empirically linked to the effects produced in the texture of the sentences. In the same way, analogically action – whatever it may be – is the effect of opposing forces, which tend toward an objective equilibrium. The truth of the encounters is located ahead in the un-decidable play of discourse. Because the signifying power is not constituted by a "sense" already there, but constitutes itself in the very activity of the discourse which is an interferential process of meanings uttered by the speakers, it produces a truth that is always actual and always revived. History is broken and has no longer a finality in itself.

Possibility of a Concrete Moral Philosophy

The above-mentioned two contemporary theories confront each other today: first, there is the phenomenological hermeneutics, which leans on the hope of a "sense" which is coming; and second, there is the linguistic pragmatics that attunes itself to the openness of an un-decidable process. Is it still possible to speak of the conditions of possibility for an ethics? Hence, it is important to indicate the conditions that constitute a concrete moral philosophy. Some may not consider moral philosophy as a science or a theory because it depends on an intuition linked to the moral life. Thus, for instance, sociology is a science that aims at reaching a general theory applicable to objective facts. However, moral philosophy aims at bringing out the universalizable meaning of moral intuition, and it gives itself as having value, in the concrete circumstances of action. Thus, moral philosophy is not a *theorem*, but it tries to give a continuation to the lived values, which belong to a common sense, toward the universal horizon, which gives them a sense. Hence, it operates in the lived experience and is based on concrete attitudes. Three perspectives lead us toward such a moral philosophy: the first is genetics; the second is ethics proper; and the third the community. We briefly consider each of these in the next three sections.

Genetics. The contribution of analytic psychology enables us to detect the apparition in the genetic sense of the structures of moral consciousness. Without entering into the study of the oedipal structure, we underline some of its aspects. Here, we have to do with the process by which the child learns to accept a limit to its desire. The child comes to know the limits of desire when it discovers the sexual difference – which is imposed by the recognized reality of the parental relationship – and learns affectively to grasp the objective value of the law. The law, which is the interdiction of incest, puts an end to the child’s desire of being and having everything. Thus, the parental law is the first rule imposed on the little

child, a rule that situates it in the order of genealogy and thereby relates the child to culture. Experiencing the frustration of this desire, the child assumes this want and discovers its finitude. Faced with the authority imposed by the parental law, the child progressively recognizes the sense of reasonableness and autonomy. An excess of authority intensifies in him the *super-ego* and threatens to make of its morals the interdict. Finally the understanding of the fact of the law introduces the child to conscious life, not only by making it capable of judging the circumstances, but also by making it capable of deciding according to moral life. Knowledge opens the consciousness to the possibility of overcoming the limit. The possibility of transgression introduces the child to the dimension of guilt and to the creative capacity of invention in the face of the limit situations. It is said that there is, in certain occasions, a duty of disobedience and the exigency to have recourse to a solution more apt to promote self-actualization. This happens especially in our relationship to and responsibility for us and others. Now, we turn attention to this topic in the next section.

Ethics Proper. The second perspective, ethics proper, aims at the fundamental experience of moral life and the responsibility inherent in it. Responsibility implies always a relation to somebody: with oneself or the other. The relation to the other is still more radical than relation to oneself. This becomes manifest in a concrete manner in the event of encounter. To meet the other in responsibility constitutes precisely the relation with the other. We can see in this relation five aspects. The first, the other is always an ex-isting being. Thus, he is never an "object" of my possession, but eminently free in his power of transcendence and project. In this sense, the other inspires my respect. The second, I can meet concretely the other only through the mediation of the lived-body (*Leib*) in affective perception, imagination, expression, the aura of a sensitive presence and in the word, which calls out. The third, I experience the other in his/her essential difference only if he/she situates himself/herself as my "thou" with respect to a third reality. The fourth, the objectivity of the dual relation is possible only by relation to the neutral third reality – at the risk otherwise of being a relation in a mirror, purely narcissist, of the "I". The recognizing passes through the objective community of the others. The fifth, it is in the event of the effective coming in to be presence of the other that the other intervenes in my life, by the expression on the face that is always non-sizable. The face-to-face meeting of the other digs out in me the ethical exigency. It is in the other's lived bodiliness, his finitude, and his vulnerability that the other who is present appeals to my possibility of giving. However, this one is always limited, incapable of answering adequately this demand. This desire for ultimate encounter opens itself in an Infinite Openness to the Other which appeals farther than the immediate other, to the thoroughly Other, the Invisible Infinite Other.

Herein is situated the acknowledgment of our finitude, and on that background of finitude lies the admission of our fallibility. I confess in the

face-to-face encounter with the other, in the actual presence with the other, my shortcomings: the lack of capacity to give and beyond any imaginary desire of innocence. In this word of confession lies the true recognition of the other, the recognition of an impossible forgiveness – which is beyond the gift – up to the Infinite. It is in this actual gift of the acknowledgment in other's presence that the extreme recognition – the recognition of my own vulnerability, which is the consciousness of the evil in me – takes place. The evil is not an objective weakness, but a responsible event if I give up. I discover myself as guilty of a causality which goes beyond the proper truth of my being. I am faced with the unjustifiable, taken from behind in the experience of arbitrariness and violence. Violence is always against the other, as an inverted effort! The evil, which is the effect of repetition, is perverse, circle of an infinite re-launching ahead, and death-bringing as the nonsensical desire.

Thus, to encounter the other is to grasp oneself in the presence of the other. It is communicated by the mutual gift of responsible acknowledgment, open to an infinite exigency. To love the other is not to will that he loves me, as in desiring, but to give him the freedom to love, to be free in front of the others. The ethical responsibility, which situates its pole in the person of the other in respect – aims at suffering vulnerability, as the admiration which gives way to self-actualization – is the principle that opens one to other types of freedom. Responsibility widens the concrete dual relationship up to the dimensions of a community in which effectively the request of the excellence of the "value" is at stake. Be it a family or any social group that community inscribes itself actually in a political institution, the State, to which we turn our attention in the next section.

Community. Community forms the third dimension of a concrete moral philosophy. In fact, ethics proper differentiates itself from the political. However, the ethical exigency of responsibility and respect for persons demands suffuses the political field as well. It is probably here that the idea of justice intervenes, as "correctness of the relationships between individuals" through the formal dimensions of the juridical and political institutions. Justice compels the community – in case of the citizens the State – to give to any citizen the benefits of the rights of man. This is also applicable to any man universally considered in the context of the globalized world. How? Here it is the task of the politicians to build by efficient actions the concrete realization of human rights. For example, the principle of equity implies the idea of an equal treatment of the human beings. Since inequalities are a matter of fact reality in the world, there is never absolutely perfect equity. Therefore the political problem consists in judging the forms of inequality, which are acceptable from the point of view of equity. As everyone must be recognized as the personal other and as an "end", from the ethical point of view of justice, the degree of tolerable inequality has to be concretely measured by the mediation of the concept of equity. For example, what gives to the most disadvantaged a better situation

must be preferred over any other social situation. Choice of such situations can bring about a better sense of equity in the world. The community, particularly the State, has to play a significant role in making this world just and equitable.

CONCLUSION

It is through the concepts of respect and justice that the recognition of men between each other is constituted. This implies not the idea of morals of interdiction, but the exigency of a liberating progression achieved through self-control and intuitive listening to concrete values. Now, both the concepts of respect and justice involve in a dialectical and reciprocal tension the two orientations of morality. The concept of respect aims at the excellence of liberated individuals. It implies the sense of the joy in suffering which is proposed by Jesus in his "Sermon on the Mount"; and the *utopian* morals which makes appeal to the most intimate conviction and moral plenitude to which the heroes and the saints bear witness. The concept of justice aims at the concrete application of responsibility, where common sense teaches us the "reasonable", which bears with it necessarily the violence of sanctions. We are always living in the median way, which must accept the least evil and the calculated violence. It is in this reciprocal dialectical tension between the *utopia* and the "reasonable" that our finitude finds its self-concretization. Thus, the concepts of respect and justice underline eminently the present sense of freedom, its value, and mutual liberation between the humans. In the fallible contingency of our actions we search for what announces the reign of persons and the effective recognition of the other as "our neighbor". At this stage moral philosophy must come to a halt because in the vision of the "neighbor" it grasps the meaning of a more profound existence, which belongs to the realm of committed faith, where justice and responsibility convert themselves in the hope and the welcome of forgiveness.

CHAPTER 15

BODILINESS AND MUTUAL ENGAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The task of philosophy consists in responding to the emerging requirements of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*). It must take up our original foundation as being-in-the-world before being able to take up the ethical perspective required as the foundation of any existential engagement. Yet, this perspective is located in the proper context of incarnation – historicity as openness to the world. Philosophical anthropology precedes ethics, which cannot engage in any future project without considering the past in which it was constituted and which renews itself in the present. This historical dimension reveals how scientific discoveries and the renewal of knowledge – of the *cosmos*, human nature, and the socio-cultural whole – are situated in the light of our existential destiny. Just as one can never grasp the consequences of one's choices in daily life, *a fortiori* one can never estimate the future success of a cultural program. If methodologically the critical interpretation of the events of history should assure ethical progress, it is no less true that this advance will depend on the lived-intuition of the immediately lived-experience of the human future, and is limited in a circular manner to the "life-world". Beyond any deductive reason, the lived-intuition promotes the prospective of action, which at the same time enlivens retrospectively the imagination of the future, found in the interior *telos* or the "hope of reason."[1] To the question of how to confront the future cultural engagements one must respond by a prior evaluation of the human future: how can the future be lived in a specifically human manner at the personal and social level? It is necessary first to comprehend the structure of incarnate existence, i.e., the structure of the existent within an interrelational culture in which one is always engaged with one's historical partners. If this is true, then this structure is bodiliness.

Yet, precisely today the recent discoveries of science entail a profound transformation not only of modes of anthropological understanding, but even the epistemology of the sciences, both physical and biological. The role of science is no longer a simple sequence limited to phenomenological life as envisaged in Husserlian thought. For, science plays an intensive role in the constitution of the being-in-the-world, as the enviorenment (*Umwelt*) and being-with-others (*Mitwelt*). Correspondingly if

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[1] Cf. Jean Ladrière : "L'espérance de la raison"; *Création et événement: Autour de Jean Ladrière*, Actes de la Décade 21-31 août 1995 de Cerisy-la-Salle, Louvain-la-Neuve, (Paris: Ed. ISP et Ed. Peeters, 1996), pp. 367-387.

culture shapes us, it does so in the exchange of an incarnate bodiliness as being-in-the-world so that we exist as relationally differentiated. This dimension of reciprocal being realized in us is the emergence of meaning. Thus, to exist is to make meaning.

Following Merleau-Ponty, we propose in this chapter to make explicit the notion of bodiliness, in order to show the circular integration that exists between nature, life, and spirit.[2] These three dimensions are related to notions of science, culture and faith which correspond respectively to the questions: "What is it to know?"; "What is it to live?" and "What is it to believe?" Basically the exercise of existence in these three dimensions depends on bodiliness. Hence, in bodiliness, as the anthropological basis, one encounters the ethical problematics. We elaborate this theme in twofold considerations in two parts.

The first part deals with bodiliness in its original base as the anthropological reality. The bodiliness, as spatio-temorally incarnate, not only refers to the organic body considered as a life-system, but also stands for the concrete human existence lived in constitutive relationship to the world and to other human beings. Thus, bodiliness – the very movement of existence in the unity of our actions and representations – is an existential unity, which manifests itself in the concrete context of one's daily life in a meaningful way. For Merleau-Ponty, bodiliness is the "flesh" or the "element" of Being, the living element of the "Ontological Difference". It constitutes not only the vertical differentiated opening of meaning in us, but also a life of reciprocal bond between all beings. It is in bodiliness the mobile network of relations, both sensible and that of the expressive spirit, and reciprocal understanding of our life receives a concrete form, particularly in relation to the sexual dimension of our character as men and women. Thus, the nature of bodiliness is that it is a system of exchange of all our lived-relations. In this sense, bodiliness is the anthropological support and basis of all our existential modalities. It is the concrete fundamental foundation of all our engagements in each of their manifestation.

The second part considers bodiliness in its ethical dimension by looking into its relation to science – "to know", meeting of cultures – "to live", and faith – "to believe". Science plays an intrinsic role in the constitution of our being in the world: the world (*Welt*) is already there in the enviornenment (*Umwelt*) and the being-with-others (*Mitwelt*), which imply bodiliness. Scientific inventions, technological innovations, and development in bioethics and genetic sciences enable bodiliness to relate to universal communicative space and open up new dimensions in understanding bodiliness. Similalry, in unveiling the basis of bodiliness in lived experience, culture manifests the inherited and shared presence of an

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[2] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes"; *Cours du College de France*, ed. D. Seglard, p. 275.

identical destiny. The exchange and interaction of different cultures promote one another and manifest their interbodiliness. If the role of reason is to take up what was already implied by bodiliness as a circular and differentiated interplay in the comprehension of existents and will, then only by faith can one meet existents on the level of personally engaged bodiliness. This dimension of hope and original sense of bodiliness enters a symbiosis vis a vis every meeting without being expressed thematically. The conclusion states that science, culture and faith constitute a significant interrelation. With the help of bodiliness they always promote meaning and one takes up ethical action by means of this lived intercommunication. Now, we move on to consider bodiliness in its original anthropolicial base.

BODILINESS IN ITS ORIGINAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL BASE

The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty has brought the subject/consciousness – which in his opinion was still basically idealistic in Husserl – back to its natural context as the individual-in-the-world entity and, thus, a spatio-temporally incarnate reality. This directs attention to the concept of bodiliness which expresses not only the organic body considered as a life-system, but also in the world as concrete human existence lived in a constitutive relationship to the world and to other human beings. Bodiliness is the very movement of existence in the unity of our actions and representations. The unity associated with bodiliness is not a synthetic unity realized on a basis of two distinct principles: soul and body, but an existential unity. This existential unity manifests itself, in the concrete context of one's daily life, in a meaningful way. It takes place in a universe full of multiple meanings each constituting a general horizon that is always in a process of reconstruction.

This active structure of bodiliness consists in a reciprocal movement of interiorization and exteriorization. It passes from the exteriorization of body to the world while the world is interiorized by the subject. Bodiliness is the interchange proper to all existents. The chiasm moves between sensible things and their effects, between sensing and expressing oneself in a differentiated manner through language. This movement of exchange or differentiated interplay of bodiliness is the living expression of the "Ontological Difference" Merleau-Ponty names the "flesh" or the "element" of Being (*Sein*). This ontological sense of meaning meets the anthropological expérience, builds on one's experience and brings to light the vertical presence of Being as the constant gift of meaning in all experience. Reciprocally, the concrete existence manifests in becoming what it should be, points out the differentiated aspects that institute its meaning. This circular exchange constitutes the movement of meaning to all of existence. This is the movement from birth to death toward the goal of existence. In turn, this movement builds on the foundational presence, which originally gave it meaning. The exchange of the double temporality – horizontal and vertical – is made concrete in bodiliness. It constitutes not

only the vertical differentiated opening of meaning in us, but also a life of reciprocal bond between all beings. Further, bodiliness manifests the reciprocal movement of the external and internal dimensions of the existent as a being-in-the-world and opens it to its goal. At the same time it imposes on the mode of understanding sensible and concrete "meaning".

The circularity is possible only because originally the subject is entirely a being of "sensible meaning". First of all, the human person is an understanding sensible being who grasps him/her in the original experience of "being touched in touching". Thus, Merleau-Ponty deconstructs the very idea of the phenomenology of consciousness by focusing on the notion of understanding. As in opening to meaning this takes place in the differentiation of the organs of sense which "make sense" in a circular experience: to see it is to touch and to hear it is to grasp. Hence, the notion of body is no longer bound to the idea of substance, but to the relational and temporal movement from here to there. It is the action to the other which differentiates itself as it arises in its relation to the world. To sense is to resonate by the incorporation of a temporal and local movement, which constitutes the lived-situation.

The concept of bodiliness concerns the concrete realization of the act of existing. In existing I have defined a point of view whence I observe the world and others; from there I can recognize other points of view, enter into communication with them, and construct a human world and culture. Each has a point as anchor from which one deploys his/her actions, feelings, and imaginative and symbolic experience. On this basis we constitute the mobile network of relations in which reciprocal understanding – meaning/grasp of meaning – of our life receives concrete form. We discover our proper uniqueness only within these relations in which we are first implicated in an impersonal and pre-reflective manner. Now, in every relation – even when it is based directly on things, symbols or abstract objects – the other is made present. However, the relation to the other is reciprocal: each is the horizon of the life of all the others and all others are the horizon of my life. In a mutual interplay of relations, all these horizons constantly interact; cultural groups are constituted which meet and influence one another. It is on the basis of this interrelation of meaning to which we have access by our sensible awareness, symbol systems, education and all that gives life to politics, so that we can progressively appropriate a universe of meaning and construct existential truth.

This is true in general and *a fortiori* when it concerns the affective and sexual dimension of our situation, i.e., our proper manner of living the human condition. The sexual character of our constitution, which makes us men or women, determines the particular or differentiated mode according to which we live in the cultural world and participate in the reciprocal life of meaning. Meaning and grasp of meaning is also desire and in *Einfuhlung*, *eros* provides the aesthetic structure of the human body. It is "flesh" with other bodies in the lived-interbodiliness, not only with the world of things perceived and living beings, but with other existents. The "flesh" of *eros*

enters between oneself and one's pleasures and sufferings. These are not closed in on themselves, but invite me to grasp their meaning.[3] Bodiliness, as the affective original expression, conditions all understanding. However, abstract things may entail an affective dimension which in personal interchanges signals an exchange of desire. This is constituted in the infant where the first encounter opens a reciprocal sense of desire upon the first shock of otherness.

Thus, the body is a shared-exchange in *Einfuhlung* with the other existents between the sensible (*aesthesis*) and the expressive spirit. It inspires with concrete meaning the sensible that is found in the symbolism of the body. For, the body is "symbolic" of the point where "the body enters into the world and the world enters into the body."[4] Rather than considering from outside the "world" in terms of spatial relations of external parties, the body measures the world because I am within it with my body. In becoming the body, nature and *logos* structure its exchange at the same time that it opens to the world and participates therein. This is the world as in this life it is participated in by all living-beings. In this way, an organ of the senses – an eye or a hand – is already a language; it is a question in its movement and a response. For Merleau-Ponty, perception is always already the accomplishment of a project;[5] it is the tacit language of sensing which reveals the structure of a new expression. Thus, the world is a differentiated structure grounded in meaning and impressed on the bodily gesture, which it signifies. It manifests the differentiation projected by meaning toward other differentiated structures. In this way "what one calls spirit is still a re-equilibration, a decentering, [and] a 'system of equivalences' that inspires language which is no longer possessed by the speaking subject. … Thus, the key to the world is given to the perceiving subject…"[6] There is a *logos* of the natural world, an aesthetic one, which depends on the *logos* of language.[7] Thus, the nature of bodiliness is such that it is a system of exchange of all our lived-relations. In this sense, bodiliness is the anthropological support and basis of all our existential modalities. It is the concrete fundamental foundation of all our engagements in each of their manifestation.

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[3] *Nous soulignons ici le sens circulaire du sentir mis en évidence par Merleau-Ponty. Nous l' appelons "affectivité" ou plutôt "structure affective", même si Merleau-Ponty n'utilise pas le terme comme tel. Il ne s'agit donc pas d'une étude des affects, mais bien d'une dimension originaire de l'existant*.

[4] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes"; *Cours du College de France*, ed. D. Seglard, p. 273.

[5] Cf. *Ibid*.

[6] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 274.

[7] Cf. *Ibid*.

BODILINESS IN RELATION TO SCIENCE, CULTURE, AND FAITH

Having looked into bodiliness in relation to its original and primary anthropological basis, we move on to consisder bodiliness in its ethical dimension as related to science, culture and faith in this second part of the chapter.

Bodiliness and Science

Today we discover that nature is not an object bound to empirical facts and subject to representation by a concept. Nature is us, as "we are in it." This state of things changes the classical ontology of the physical object into an anthropological subject. There is a basic exchange between nature and man. Recent scientific discoveries introduce a basic transformation, not only regarding the foundations of anthropological knowledge, but also about the epistemology of the physical and biological sciences. The role of science is not a lived phenomenological sequence, but plays an intrinsic part in the ambiguous constitution of our being-in-the-world: the world (*Welt*) is already there in the enviornenment (*Umwelt*) and the being-with-others (*Mitwelt*). Scientific creativity transforms the givenness of existence. The discoveries broaden the field of action and engage human responsibility regarding the choice of the future in ways that distance it from the single lived-experience whether it is individual or collective.

The factual history is included in the structure of historicity, which is renewed in each *epoch* by other modes of existence. If by a sort of ever active retrospective creativity it reflects on itself in its own manner, then there is truly nothing new under the sun. Today the rupture with the lived-past seems to impose itself more radically. Due to the factual condition of practical realization, scientific action is in a position contrary to the traditional lived modes of society. The new technologies invent instruments, which escape the "intuitive" possibilities of bodiliness in the *Lebenswelt*. For example, the means of information give access to a space-time dimension which surpasses the natural limits of lived-bodiliness and enables it to relate to a universal communicative space – the internet. Thus, it is possible to visualize a virtual reality, and also to extend the creative imagination, which produces concrete futurable objects born in dreams. It is no longer the human hand which works, but the machine which creates its own universe, escaping all natural perceptive control. Now the question arises: "Can this technological vision assure the extension of lived-bodiliness and broaden human experience to infinite or indefinite possibilities?" Or on the contrary: "Can it be distanced from the 'system of the equivalence of meaning' essential to the appreciation of meaning in the exchange between nature and existents? How, for example, can artificial intelligence as the fruit of human effort relate to understanding? This

problem has special impact on scientific reason in daily-life and, in reverse, has original affective impact on the heart, reason and scientific-work itself.

Equally evident are the effects in bio-ethics. The return of interest to life revives the dialogue between the scientist and the philosopher. Nature becomes an unfolding of one or another meaning where man once again becomes a being of nature – not a spirit tied to a body, but a body that is entirely apart. The genetic code by which every individual, as a unique existence, is bound to the deceptive determination of matter by the same title as is any cosmic reality. Today the existent risks no longer understanding itself in its own bodily schema. Rather the perception of the world, which reattaches humanity to the *cosmic* world as to its *habitat* changes today under the new auspices of "a human history of nature."[8] Merleau-Ponty said: "Nature, life and man are in one another" (*Ineinander*) and intercondition one another; they constitute one another in *chiasm*."[9]

These challenges to our actual world emerge paradoxically from the work of man himself. Proclaiming a "super world" they disturb by their unknown consequence that *practico-innert* of action embraced by the passivity of effects.[10] Philosophy analyses the lived-world in its anthropological foundation by taking into consideration the new possibilities offered by science. The original insight, which constituted an awakening, must remain at work in every worldly action, perception or production. It is the supporting motor element, which conditions the new thrust of meaning. One can say, following Merleau-Ponty, that the structure of meaning as a movement of exchange is the opening of meaning. The mutually conditioning exchange of nature and the symbolic is the ontological expression or the "flesh" of the world. This sense/element is pregnant in every new creative production whatsoever because it redeploys itself at each new step in the rational exchange of meaning. This is the bodiliness, which enables mediation. Philosophy can consider ethical problems only by reinterpreting the field of values located in the movement of existence: the field of the *Ineinander*.

One of the ethical problems bearing on the success of science is whether it can effectively pursue all its research possibilities. How to exercise control despite the existential collapse of present and future humanity? The need of the ethical dimension to underline scientifically the vital interrelation of all beings is urgent, even if the conditions of an existential perspective assert themselves without the traditional foundations. It is necessary to reinvent the means to achieve this goal. An ethical consensus certainly cannot assure ethical objectivity in a radical sense, even if it is tempted to speak on the basis of the total economy of man in the

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[8] *Nous rappelons ici le sens circulaire du sentir*.

[9] Cf. Déjà en 1977. S. Moscovici, parle de *L'histoire humaine de la nature*.

[10] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes"; *Cours du College de France*, ed. D. Seglard, p. 275.

world according to all forms of life shared by nature – which is just what science today attempts to do. The principle task of ethics is to renew life with its original force of bodiliness. It is necessary to maintain the system of equivalence between the existential dimension and the world, whatever are their changes. It is this system of equivalences that maintains a perceived continuity beyond all technological transformation. Let us take the present example of cloning. Here science enables us to discover a new world of existence, which transforms to its roots the network of otherness, moving ever further from natural experience. The otherness between clones is ever narrower and the differences are of a merely spatio-temporal nature. Bodiliness seeks to produce an even more perfect resemblance between individuals, and the difference of generations cancels itself as the mother and child bear an identical genome. One can imagine in the caricature a mode of otherness according to which the point of view is interchanged dialogically. The proportion is enlarged to the whole group and each in the group discovers ones autonomy through reciprocal sharing. This is the premonition of a world where the individual is actually fragile before the possessive power of technology, moves beyond itself into a second structure. This structure is more responsive to the group, and brings it to life in function of an enlarged bodiliness by an *Einfuhlung* that is more pregnant, given the bodily resemblance. However, this is increasingly diversified because the one body participates in a plurality of individual situations. Then the actual bodiliness is open to a plurality of bodiliness in the bodily unicity of the *Einfuhlung* of the group. In this sense, it will become the place of an experience of life that is potentially open to the life of the whole humanity. The primordial sense of *Einfuhlung* is open to all the individuals concerned; it is the interchange of the "great brotherhood."

Now, the question arises as to what becomes the proper domain of the person of whom the sole individualing link is limited to its spatio-temporal situation? In the historical future where bodiliness is constituted in the eventual exchange of meaning, the other in the case of cloning, is the otherness of the self or the other of another group. The spirit of life, the *Einfuhlung*, from the original meaning of bodiliness, expands to the recognition of one by all and reciprocally as situated in its own point of view, each subject adapts differently to the circumstances. One could think that nothing has truly changed in relation to the actual destiny of the times. "The hereditary contest consists in permitting the development of the brain, but it is the manner in which one is brought up, the environment in which one grows, the cultural *milieu* in which one expands, that is at the base of one's future behavior. A clone of the other human might well have the same genome, but one can make of each individual twin a being with distinct behavior."[11] This is because the event of the meeting renews itself qualitatively without cease, broadening the differentiation between

[11] Jean Paul Sartr, *Critique de la raison dialectique*, p. 344.

individuals. Thus, one's personal realization is bound to the development of meetings, in such manner that a facticity which originally is similar, goes on to develop itself into qualitative differentiation. Neverthless, in the case of cloning, the changed bodiliness can retain its interplay with the significant others of the world. The *quale* – which constitutes the narcissistic dimension of sensing – opens itself ever more to the space-time that it encounters in transrelational space with each one and each group. Thus, the imaginative prognostication always depends on a system of exchanges which prolongs in one manner or another our worldly incarnation. If it were possible this would be to imagine new interplanetary spaces, unexplored worlds for example, that could be recognized only due to the original connection kept alive across a series of changes, which permit one to gain access.

With the support of anthropology and biophysics, ethics can maintain its traditional criteria enabling them to evolve according to present changes and to adapt to the future, but this is by conserving the "system of interchange" in a field that is being reshaped by technology. The artificially constituted structure of physical unity can be modified in ways that transpose its expressions, but it must still retain its ability to remain differentiated through all ethical transformations. Thus, it is the first meaning which each time reestablishes its meaning from a distance. Ethics is included in this context of lived-historicity.

Bodiliness and Culture

The challenges from the western culture, which come from scientific rationality, extend to the entire world, overturning the specificity of cultures whose riches come increasingly from symbolic intuition. Reason itself is no longer tied to the idealist conscious representation, but is intrinsically conditioned by its corporal inscription in the physical world and these *cosmic* changes. Reason is subjected to dimensions which artificially provide a critical horizon.

Philosophical questioning bears on the vision of the world at the heart of the city; it inspires and mediates the cultural world. In this sense, philosophy concerns historical formation and information, learning of wisdom and the search for truth. To learn to think and more specifically to recognize the ethical and axiological demands of existence is the goal of philosophy in its critical role. As such it is itself in history and presents there a properly *evocative* dimension. Yet this role does not fail to reflect the *milieu* in which it is exercised. Greek in origin, philosophy today frees itself from its solely western context. Opening before other cultures enables it to gauge its proper purpose. Hence, it has a broader import in the degree that it pursues the sense of a diversified universality. However, there is a *logos* of the sensible world which holds to the "visible," as the *logos* of

language does to the invisible sense it carries.[12] Philosophical truth is found in this movement of sense as the lived-powers-of-change.

Parallel to cultural transformation, the life of the city and men have lost their autonomy. The incertitude of the world at the planetary level rivals the ancestral desire to maintain local and family bonds. At the two ends of the chain is life built upon technologies and that conceives tradition, each balancing the other in a sort of interplay. Asiatic culture is constituted of two dimensions: family and city. In Africa, contrary to Christianized western society, it is not the notion of the person that prevails, but the notion of participation; tribal societies are supported by the unity of the clan. Thus, it is difficult to speak of the rights of man, even if one recognizes that the criteria from universally shared technological transformations must be situated in situations of different applicability that include for each culture the lived shock of otherness. Whatever be said of differences, they are recognized in the relation to the other, following a reciprocal interiorization bound to the specific *Einfuhlung* of each tradition. The rights of man are subject to specific recognition by each culture in a movement of exchange opposed to the unilateral thrust of individualizing reason to formal representation that is proper to the west. The reciprocal interiorization of an ethical view must be realized in correlation with the differentiated interrelation of their horizons.

In this context, philosophy is often presented as an understanding of foundations, very often joined with scientific disciplines whose critical boundaries it exceeds. In this unordered field where bodiliness risks losing its balance before a changing universe, where the anarchy of great historical violence builds – through wars, physical, moral and sexual delinquency, and drugs – ethics attempts to attach itself to the recognition of the rights of man.Yet, the very notion of "rights of man" is marked by a western rationality. Far from finding unanimity among peoples and places, it is necessary to find the specific conditions for an adaptation to each culture in order that they be recognized. Given the ethical ferment opened by the diversity of cultures, the rights of man have universal extent only in so far as each group and each individual takes effective responsibility for them in their interchange between cultures. Ethics serves in cultural interrelations like connective tissue which constitutes an effective and open unity subject to the historical context.

Thus, for example, the far east does not fail to reflect the effect of technology in its daily life. However, its destiny seems to resist scientific equipment, which does not pervert it in the same manner as it does western mass society. It is able to survive according to a double time, the origin and the future. Should we look for a greater universalization – as for instance the State of Europe? Or should we underline the lived-difference deepened by rationalism before the risk of economic integration and anonymous

[12] Cf. Koulicher Lucien (Univ. Liège); *Le Soir*, 19-3-97, p. 2.

agreement? Certainly there is the need for sufficiently strong political and cultural motivation to devise the interaction of a critical vision of the world and a systematic program of the different basic forms needed for the life of the city in its different purposes. Today the politico-ethical orientation seeks to determine the operation of a stable structure, i.e., "a better and more just city". Nevertheless, the concrete application of that socio-ethical orientation will take on the forms proper to each culture according to its proper foundations, which affect also the double movement of interiorization and exteriorization of the reciprocal interchange between cultures.

From another point of view, art can also contribute to the significant emergence of the city. Defying the simple pragmatism of economic and political interchange it contributes to the realization of a symbolic universe of the purely sensible. Thus, it expresses the concrete form of a collective *Einfuhlung*, the place for participation and exchange that contributes to the realization of the values of a people. In unveiling the basis of bodiliness in lived-experience, art realizes a cultural common sense, a style that manifests the inherited and shared presence of an identical destiny. This differentiated exchange in the *Einfuhlung* also permits the different cultures to promote one another. Certainly, one cannot speak of one unvaried universal language, which would be fundamental. Each culture has its own language, its mode of sensing, its way of living, and its art. Yet, just as in nature the interbodiliness of life is manifested in different ways, so also man finds himself in the lived-in-bodiliness of the *Einfuhlung* which permits understanding the other in his place, "my within being the echo of their within."[13]

Bodiliness and Faith

Philosophical research is directed toward a reinterpretation of the status of reason: this is neither solely deductive nor inductive in the scientific sense. It is not defined once and for all by the formal schemes of reasoning but is constituted in an historical process before being affirmed at the properly logical level. This "objective" pole, if it has the access to truth, lacks all the richness of the sense of rootedness lived at its source. Reciprocally, the lived-existence – even when reflected on – can by itself provide the justification of the universal truth. However, such generalization of lived-experience does not belong to the order of an abstract universal. As the understanding mounts without and in this process toward a future meaning, it opens to successive horizons constituted in an ever more inclusive circular manner. True logic should be able to reassume its prior steps. It is carried by a horizon of meaning that is unceasingly reconstituted

[13] M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes"; *Cours du College de France*, ed. D. Seglard, p. 274. Cf. also R. Gely, *La genèse du sentir, Essai sur Merlea-Ponty*, (Bruxelles: Ousia, 2000).

according to events. However, the route is not characterized by contingency, but by a regulative idea that indicates its *telos*. This progressively moving and expanding reason is constructed in the progressive appropriation/truth whose sense is interior to a tradition. It is not always passive, but in turn, an interpretation of each generation. Thus, it takes on responsibility and each time is marked by the effect of events and variations of the point of view of cultural interaction.

Religious faith is also marked by an historical dimension. Like a progressive appropriation of meaning it lies before us as a horizon at which all types of comprehension meet and which completes the proper dynamics of human existence, i.e., the "life of the spirit." Effectively this term translates the spiritual requirement of "enlarged reason". Thus, truth is in process; it is constituted at the intersection of a plurality of dimensions and points of view. These meet and reform; assure that their interaction expands the progressive emergence of meaning, and is assumed by each one according to what it contributes in the context of its proper tradition. This is ordered not to the abstract unicity of factual universality, but to the living-interrelation of an actually differentiated plurality. Every culture can recognize itself authentically in this opening.

The task of philosophical anthropology is to clarify the constitutive structures of the human being, to comprehend its statute as constituted in history. In contrast to theological anthropology, philosophical anthropology is a reflexion on the significance of the human being. Thus, it can contribute to ethical and spiritual reflection that enables human reality to experience its finitude and in the progressive reading of the interchanges in worldly communication. In this perspective the concept of the "person," whose importance is underlined by Christian experience takes on a new dimension. The "ex-istant" is always in the process of realizing itself as a being of expressed meaning – bodiliness. It has access to values, such as the rights of man, only on the basis of a concrete situation, made up of communication and exchanges, and in which one can note both cultural diversity and the sexual dimension of existence. In its engagement it calls for responsibility with regard to others. Hence, it is an ethical being whose purpose is none other than its vocation to be. Yet the dimension of the "person" or even the idea of individual well-being is not lived under the same title as other cultures. Thus, what is stressed is more the notion of participation. We find examples of this in the clan for an Africa, families in China, or the religious community in Islam. In any case, this vocation to be for an individual or a group is essentially relational; the "*Ineinander*" with nature and other existants, and it bears in itself a fundamental dynamism which is also hope in an effective recognition of persons.

However, the existent does not possess faith in a better future, for a realm that is more just than that determined for it, as if the Kantian realm of ends includes the whole *telos*. On the contrary, since in Merleau-Ponty there is no idea of an institutionalized teleology; it is always a matter of existing in reciprocal cultural interrelation, changing indefinitely in time and always

preceded by the call to "meaning". Thus, one can say today that the different religious and symbolic beliefs entail the requirement of a place of meeting at which each runs over the other in its differentiated movement of meaning. Here, again the interbodiliness enables each to recognize itself at the horizon of the other. Following Merleau-Ponty – who abandoned the Kantian morality of intention, but saw the connivance of values and human coexistence – it is necessary to say that "there is no destruction of the absolute or rationality, but only the absolute and separated rationality. God has need of human history."[14]

The great religious movements, such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism are on the side of religious and cultural representations that are tied to natural and local traditions. Whereas Shintoism, Taoism, Confucianism or even the most ancient form of animism are expressions of belief that offer being a vocation that transcends daily experience, even in the repetition of their forms. They are bound to the event of a spiritual, moral or even magical meeting. They manifest to the individual or the group a dimension of sacred power which comes from a vision of salvation or a desire for protection before the great dramas of existence, such as life and death. Belief makes the individual responsible before his/her existential horizon and tempers joys and sufferings. It permits a better recognition of man by man, at least if it does not lower the call of the self before a universal benevolence. Here bodiliness is the mediator, not only of affective and imaginary feeling tied to a meeting; it also supports the imaginary by a voluntary call, which inspires freedom. However this may be, religion entails the horizon of life and provides a source of hope and greater generosity.

Certainly from this point of view philosophy remains in the margin. Since philosphy does not imply an act of faith, it cannot convert itself into a proclamation of faith and turn toward the condition of a beliefful experience. Faith in the Judeo-Christian sense supposes an alliance in a properly personal engagement. Philosophy can signify only the figure of faith; it does not effectively realize the free act. If the role of reason is to take up what was already implied by bodiliness as a circular and differentiated interplay in the comprehension of existents and will, then only by faith can one meet existents on the level of personally engaged bodiliness. This dimension of hope and original sense of bodiliness enters a symbiosis vis a vis every meeting without being expressed thematically. To the spiritual ear of philosophy there is in belief a conviction that makes it attentive to such humanizing perspectives as those of justice and respect. Since, philosophy is essentially the companion of scientific and critical objectivity and promotes the conditions of possibility of research in itself as fundamental insight into truth, it convokes all activity to take up the

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[14] M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes"; *Cours du College de France*, ed. D. Seglard, p. 287.

givenness of the world. Our grasping – in each of these religious encounters – an echo of spirituality can promote in us the spirit of vocation to Being (*Sein*) as to a gift received.

CONCLUSION

Science, culture and faith constitute a significant interrelation. With the help of bodiliness they always promote meaning and one takes up ethical action by means of this lived-intercommunication. This mode of approach is not a uniform integration, but a respectful tolerance of the cultural plurality. Philosophy, particularly ethics, supported by anthropology bears the responsibility for communicating this spirit/sense not by simple passive agreement, but by the tension proper to engagement and arriving circularly to others. Its experience of an expanded reason – supported by scientific precision, the forces of cultural life, and the dynamism of faith – institutes new dimensions of existence. It recognizes the line of continuity which in each instant transposes the lived-balance of the original sense of living bodiliness in each person. Maintaining this balance contributes to living in a better and more just manner the ethical space of the meeting with the other. "To think" – science, "to live" – culture, and "to believe" – faith, all belong to the "sense" of the original event. This is the entry into "meaning"; it is the grasp of the signifying "power" which, in every encounter offers itself as the reflection of a desire that is always already present and precedes us. Therefore, in applying these dimensions to ethics one does not ask why or how the world changes, but rather asks whether it is better and more just. This evaluation refers back to the function of the destiny of new forms of life, each in view of meeting a new call for meaning, and each maintaining itself by the original line of the *Einfuhlung*, which gives birth to the first "grasp of meaning".

CHAPTER 16

CONTEXT AND LIFE-WORLD: ETHICAL PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

The concept of dignity has not the same ethical import when it is used either by the procedural theory of communicational action or by ontological phenomenology. While questioning Habermas' theory of communicational action[1] and the ontological phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty[2] it is possible to bring to light the language anchorage of their respective fields of analysis – the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) or the "contextual background."[3] When we attempt to bring these two philosophical methods closer, there develops a process of objectivization of language. In its concrete application to ethical experience in relation to the classical philosophy of Kant, we speak of "respect" as due to persons, characterizing it paradoxically as "rational sentiment" (*Empfindung*).[4] We clarify this theme in three parts. In the first part, we begin by locating the ethical question today. Ethical questioning is presently propagated in all practical domains, in all professional disciplines, and it gives rise to much diversified philosophical answers: analytical, pragmatic, symbolical, cultural or hermeneutical. In the present day perspective there are twofold approaches: the first emphasize the contextual "saying" as proposed by Habermas, while the second projects the phenomenological "sense" in relation of the "life-world" as proposed by Merleau-Ponty. This part clarifies these two approaches and highlights their significant features. In the second part, we try to recognize the qualitative configuration of language in itself, understood in the originary sense. Language is not only attached to the intelligibility of practical reason, but also to the lived-sensible-existence. A retroactive movement of critical reflection is

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[1] Cf. J. Habermas, *Théorie de l'agir communicationnel*, trad. Francaisç J. L. Schlegel, (Paris: Fayard, 1987).

[2] Cf. M. Carbone, *La visibilité de l'invisible*,(Hildesheim: George Olms Verlag, 2001).

[3] Cf. J. Habermas, *Textes et contextes*, trad. Francaisç M. Hunyadi, (Paris: Cerf, 1994).

[4] "le respect pour la loi morale est un sentiment qui est produit part un principe intellectuel"; "sentiment que nous nommons respect, …La cause de la détermination de ce sentiment réside dans la raison pratique…" Cf. Emmanuel Kant, .*La critique de la raison pratique*, trad. Francaisç, F. Picavet, (Paris: P. U. F, 1943), chap. II, pp. 77, 79.

necessary in order to discover language again in its original anchorage. In the third part, without losing the validity of normative action that gives it its objective value, we come back on the singular experience of "person", and on the circular relation that underlies the originary and teleological import of the concept of dignity. The conclusion points to the fact that the rational approach, by itself, does not account for what constitutes the dignity of the other, but appeals to respect, i.e., the autonomy of the subject, which implies solidarity, responsibility, and commitment.

Now we move on to consider the ethical problem of the present day and the manner in which different philosophical approaches look at these problems.

ETHICAL PROBLEM: CONTEXT OR LIFE-WORLD?

In this section, we locate the ethical question today and attempt to clarify the approach of Habermas and approach of Merleau-Ponty to ethics and human dignity. While Habermas stresses the significance of the context or the background, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the significance of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) in their attempt to locate and address the ethical issues that matter to human existence in our times. This part clarifies these two approaches and highlights their significant features.

Ethical Problem: Present-Day Perspective

Ethical questioning today presents different approaches which are not necessarily contradictory to each other. We begin by distinguishing "social morality" and "ethics", even though both refer to the intersubjective and social domain. "Social Morality" concerns transcendental and empirical subjectivity: it tries to generalize intersubjective common experiences, with the aim of instituting a collective morality. "Ethics", in the contemporary sense, is deductive in nature: it deduces concrete modes of moral action from general principles which are experiences already universalized by institutional history; it endeavors to elaborate a rational theory for "the concrete injection of morality in every individual" by a rational procedure that must impose its normative rules.[5]

Ethical questioning is presently propagated in all practical domains, in all professional disciplines, and it gives rise to much diversified philosophical responses: analytic, pragmatic, symbolic, cultural or hermeneutic.[6] We can discern two modalities of research applied to sociopolitical ethics. The first is discursive and abstractive, and belongs to the rationalization of social practices. It aims at building conditions of

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[5] Cf. M. Maesschalck, *Normes et contexts*, (Hildesheim: George Olms Verlag, 2001), pp. 37 ss.

[6] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 33-62.

universality of moral principles and determining the practical access to it, thanks to the procedural rules submitted to *consensus*. The second is comprehensive and is based on convictions, the whole cultural and symbolic context that enables justifying the legitimacy of the values issue from the "life-world". Now the question emerges as to the appropriateness of crossing these two methods. To establish theoretically the conditions of universality of discursive processes, and to propose values susceptible to keep safe a field of action for the person, while taking account of his conviction, calls for linking ethical action to "the creative *utopia* of the good life with the others."[7] Taking again this twofold approach we emphasize both the contextual "saying" as proposed by Habermas and the project of the phenomenological "sense" as proposed by Merleau-Ponty in the next two sections.

Significance of Context in Habermas' Ethics

Habermas presents a form of ethical inter-understanding that breaks off not only from the classical forms of rationalization, but also from all forms of philosophy of consciousness, such as phenomenology. In his theory of *communicational action*, Habermas is principally influenced by Mead's sociology and Durkheim's notion of positive morals. Besides, accepting the "linguistic turn" of contemporary philosophy Habermas takes from Austin and Searle the notion of *speech- act*. However, in order to transpose his philosophy into a theory of action, he also leans on Peirce's semiotics, which does not speak about communication, but belongs to a structure of linguistic and dialogical thought whereby the "epistemic relation of the 'sign' to something in the world may not be isolated from the communicational relation to a possible interpretation."[8] Habermas has read it again in its linguistic and structural import, but while abandoning its semantic element to the advantage of action. Therefore, the general theory of action aims at a social theory of interlocution. It concerns the discursive, formal and "abstractive" competence of the actors to agree on rules of communication and to appropriate the self-regulation of their practice of communication.[9] The problem is to enter into the internal relation of action, to conceive the everyday relation to the same world. The structuring of the "life-world" is understood as the function of a pragmatic schema. In this schema, the validity of ethical action presupposes belonging to the same form of life, where the world intercommunication and the conditions of self-transformation of intersubjective environment are given in the lived-interchange of life. Each rule must be inserted into the concrete world of

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[7] *Ibid*., p. 19.

[8] Cf. J. Habermas, *Textes et contextes*, trad. Francaisç M. Hunyadi, pp. 9-11, 198.

[9] Cf. M. Maesschalck, *Normes et contexts*, p. 44.

action, in the functioning of "its practical acceptance in the operational environment."

However, according to Habermas, the "life-world" tends to move in relation to a context/background, where the distinction between communication and linguistic use disappears. Habermas maintains an epistemic description when he catches sight of the *Lebenswelt* in his background perspective. It is thematizable by a rational action that reproduces its three components: culture, society, and personality. Therefore, we must *reconstruct* the background knowledge in a pragmatic action, which turns away from the model of linguistic-semiotics, in order to center it again on the rules of action in general, according to the discursive process of the "just society"/ the common world.[10] The modelization of "the communicative action" leans first on the contextual background, proper to the locutor-actor in the everyday world, but goes away from it in order to achieve its full possibilities in action, considering the most objectifiable conditions of normativity. Communication substitutes for the intersubjective relation in the life-world. It gains support only from individual intuition in daily experience according to procedural rules established in collective exchange: it is the interchangeability of perspectives between actors-locutors, and no longer the originary experience of the life-world, which assures the validity of the *consensus*. The general theory of action aims at the concept of pragmatic rational argumentation: procedural interlocution with pretentions of validity between the forms of speech-acts.[11] However, Habermas situates himself on two levels of idealization: the first, by his reference to the *utopia* of the absolute model – "the City of ends"; the second, by idealization of purely formal conditions of anticipation of the concrete process of communication, which has the capacity to anticipate by an argued discussion the "ideal conditions of communication" and to *translate* them into maxims.[12]

The procedural point of view privileges to the discursive approach in order to define the conditions of possibility of norms and renounces the comprehensive approach of "sense". Discussion must be able to make it more autonomous with respect to all systems of moral, philosophical, or religious values that can emerge from action,[13] because what is at stake is reflection on the conditions of instauration of an equitable system of social cooperation. Nevertheless, given this aim, any system of values must be

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[10] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 36.

[11] What Habermas speaks here is different from the cognitive-instrumental rationalization of M. Weber. Cf. J. Habermas, *Théorie de l'agir communicationnel*, trad. Francaisç J. M. Ferry, tome I, (Paris: Fayard, 1987), pp. 260-265.

[12] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 48.

[13] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 50. Cf. also J. Habermas, *De l'éthique de la discussion*, trad. Francaisç, (Paris: Editions du Cerf., 1992), p. 161.

pushed away to the background in order to reach the conditions of objectivization that assures by rational argumentation the stability of a *consensus* in a society that is not homogeneous. In fact, Habermas does not reject – by distinguishing between the communicational and the moral aspects of the application – the dramatic character of communicational reason disagreeing with other forms of arguments, dominated by modes of non-consensual regulation: "there are no rational answers to human sufferings", and "the practical injunction" is translated on the level of responsibility of each social actor.[14]

However, the de-contextualized morality brings about the loss of "indubitable evidences coming from the background of the "life-world"; it produces a rupture in the "moving force of empirically effective movers". Thus, procedural ethics wants to deconstruct all references to the discourse of motivation and to the appeal of the "life-world"; it gives up on all religious ethics as well as "radical evil".[15] Yet, it pretends to concor by the procedural context the conditions of objectivization of normative action. The concept of *context* brings to the fore exactly the linguistic turn of the procedural philosophy.

Nevertheless, it remains true that Habermas thematized it first from the notion of the "life-world", the originality of which, according to him, comes from Husserl: "the *Lebenswelt* becomes the foundation of sense forgotten by sciences … which conceals their own context of emergence linked to the life-world." He says further that the "common sense" obtains here "an unprecedented dignity".[16] However, the use of the term "life-world" is not without ambiguity. According to the ethics of discussion, "the unique admissible ethical injunction is intra-procedural" This implies that communication has a unique place in the possible verification that assures symmetry between the necessary self-verification of rational discussion and its effectuation as discursive process. Thus, "the validity itself asserts pretension in the communication that puts to the test the sense of life and the world."[17] Hence, it is no longer the sense of life or the world that conditions validity. However, Habermas does not break off with the "life-world", but in his perspective it becomes the background/context and is implicitly inscribed in everyday experience. Therefore, the actor-locutor keeps this background inside the "sincere" intuition of consensual intercommunication.

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[14] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 51. Cf. also M.L. Lamb, "Praxis communicationnelle et théologie par-delà le nihilisme et le dogmatisme", *Habermas et la théologie* (Paris: Cerf., 1993), p. 152.

[15] Cf. J. Habermas, *Théorie de l'agir communicationnel*, trad. Francaisç J.M. Ferry, tome I, p. 52.

[16] Cf. J. Habermas, *Textes et contextes*, trad. Francaisç M. Hunyadi, pp. 32 ss.

[17] Cf. M. Maesschalck, *Normes et contexts*, p. 55.

Life-World in the Ethics of Merleau-Ponty

A brief reminder brings us back to the phenomenology of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*), which constitutes ultimately, for Husserl, the originary transcendental *factum* linked to intersubjectivity. We know that already in *Ideen II* Husserl emphazizes "the transcendental architectonics"[18] by reversing the traditional movement of consciousness, which discovers itself always already there in the anchorage of the *Lebenswelt*.[19] It is not a question of imposing the positive entity of a world *in se*, as external spatial-temporal totality, but of living the donation of a world already there that gives sense to perception and to the existing being who receives himself from this anchorage. Merleau-Ponty does not use any longer the epistemology of *ante*-predicative categories, which still is the index of a rational objectivization. The "*there is*" of existential experience abandons all forms of noetical-noematical consciousness to give free openness to the "presence" of the horizon of lived relations: the world of things and others.[20]

Countering a thematizable analysis and an objective setting by the situation of observable perspectives by the neutral third person – the communicational philosopher – the "life-world" is the founding event that gives sense to existence: it promotes the originary access to language which is its symbolic and significant conceptualization. A thematization of the "life-world" is a phenomenological misinterpretation because it is the originary and reversible resort, which gives access to sense. Merleau-Ponty himself also abandons the philosophy of consciousness in order to catch the unity of existence. Bodiliness is presentation of the self to itself in the mirroring play of its proper temporalization. At the level of perception in the "life-world", bodiliness crosses the "feeling the self's own feeling" (*sentir-ressentir*) of things and others. At the level of subjectivity, bodiliness crosses the relational temporal dynamics between past and future, the conjunction of a self-making itself present. At the level of the spatial-temporal horizon, bodiliness crosses the profundity of the world, while recognizing itself borne by intersubjective relationality. In his last lectures on *Nature*, Merleau-Ponty generalized the originary experience of bodiliness, which constitutes the perceptive fission and the reversibility of feeling. He projects this experience to the languistic intersubjectivity, thereby opening the dimension of the "relational difference of sense" on the horizon of the cultural world. Thus, the world is that engenders the "difference" or the "play of sense" according to all the modalities of the

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[18] Cf. J. Habermas, *Textes et contextes*, trad. Francaisç M. Hunyadi, pp. 33 ss.

[19] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la Constitution*, trad. Francaisç, E. Escoubas, pp.240-241, 254, 375.

[20] Cf. M. Carbone, *La visibilité de l'invisible*, p. 112.

"feeling the self's own feeling", which makes the texture of things and beings. Subjective life represents not only bodiliness reflecting on itself in the differential interval of the feeling, but also living bodiliness in evolution, inscribing itself in the whole *Cosmic* Order of Nature.[21] Thus, bodiliness participates in the life and the sense of Being in the ontological circularity of the "sensible and significant" that constitutes the relational dimension: the "sense" and the structure of reversibility, which Merleau-Ponty names as the *Flesh of the World*.[22]

The dimension of intersubjectivity – as bodiliness and as spatio-temporal profundity in its proper reversibility – is borne by this desiring force that mobilizes the whole of the "act of existing" in its moving action and its word. Language itself is taken in the differentiated and dynamic articulation of sense, in the circularity of the feeling and of its significant expression.[23] Merleau-Ponty distinguishes the *talked word* reproduced and insignificant, and the *talking word* that says itself in living enunciation. The latter is borne by the tensional foundation of life and in the inter-relationality of meetings among the subjects who speak to each other, assuming in all of them the life of sense as intersubjective reciprocal play of *Einfühlung* [24] mediating the originary and teleological intuition – at the same time sensible and ideal.[25]

LIFE-WORLD, SENSE AND LANGUAGE: QUALITATIVE CONFIGURATION

The phenomenological perspective does not accept the abandonment of the existential, ontological, originary inscription by Habermas. The theory of communicational action proposed by Habermas for its part criticizes the phenomenological and hermeneutical powerlessness to establish effectively in concrete form the objectivity of ethical action. We think that a retrospective critical reflection can enable us to constitute the teleological[26] *data* of sense in its linguistic reversibility on the one hand,

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[21] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 335, 363. Cf. also R. Gely, *La genèse du sentir, Essai sur Merlea*-Ponty, (Bruxelles: Ousia, 2000).

[22] Cf. M. Carbone, *La visibilité de l'invisible*, pp. 112, 127. Cf. also I. Carmelo Rosa Renaud, *Communication et expression chez Merleau-Ponty*, (Lisboa: Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1985), pp. 187 ss.

[23] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 147.

[24] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes"; *Cours du College de France*, ed. D. Seglard, p. 272. Cf. also M. Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours1959-61*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), p. 89.

[25] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours 1959-61*, p. 195. Et à propos des "idées sensibles" chez Marcel Proust. Cf. M. Carbone, *La visibilité de l'invisible*, pp. 133, 170.

[26] Cf. M. Carbone, *La visibilité de l'invisible*, p. 112.

and the normative, intrinsic and procedural import of the language of action, on the other. This new light makes it possible to reflect on the originary quality of language: the *prose of the world* [27] that testifies with its sensible trace of its originary anchorage. It transfixes all rational and normative construction however formal and abstractive it may be. Even the most rational language does not capture its comprehensive, illocutionary and expressive force. However, by virtue of its anchorage and significant reversibility it makes language to recognize it. For Merleau-Ponty, the language "sense" contains the openness which includes the truth of the "feeling of the self's own feeling" as a radical expressivity of existence, which gives, for example, to art the capacity of telling itself,[28] and to the *talking word* its proper "affective inscription."[29]

We must recognize how the "feeling of the self's own feeling" can signify the dimension of "affectivity", even if Merleau-Ponty does not name it as such.[30] The affective structure does not signify the passive or active capacity to feel the "affects", but rather it is a pathic "structure of reversibility". It is the "difference" which inhabits the feeling of the self's own feeling"; it is actually the originary dimension of the existing one and its constitutive content. Affectivity defines the pathic and reflective "capacity" for feeling according to reversibility, action-passion, and feeling. Thus, when we evoke the concept of affectivity, we have to do with an essential structure that originates in the "sense" as the "differential interval", in the event that is a donor of life. Since birth relates itself already to its own end in the vital and intersubjective circularity that introduces us to the world among speaking subjects, capable of recognizing each other in the reversible play of bodily and linguistic differentiation, affective and significant, *the flesh-Being* – the "Sense" – makes itself present.[31] Thus, since the origin of life, in every one the event of desire founds: the concrete participation of the individual in his life-world; his roles instituted in social life; and his calling into question in language and to his presence in the cultural world. In fact, it is an ontological presence which is brought into play in any inscription in sense, the "narcissism"[32] of the feeling which feels its own feeling, as in a mirror in its sensible, imaginative and significant import. Any spoken word constitutes itself reversibly in this sensible

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[27] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *La prose du monde*, texte établi par C. Lefort, (Paris: Gallimard, 1969).

[28] The small musical sentence of Vinteuil's sonate in Marcel Poust

[29] Cf. M. Carbone, *La visibilité de l'invisible*, pp. 20-22, 30. Cf. also M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, pp. 479-487 ss. Cf. also I. Carmelo Rosa Renaud *Communication et expression chez Merleau-Ponty*, p. 37.

[30] Cf. M. Carbone, *La visibilité de l'invisible*, p. 113.

[31] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 112, 121.

[32] Cf. *Ibid*.

difference. Its living temporality inscribes itself as participating reversibility (*Ineinander*) in the "life-world".[33]

Language is not only attached to the intelligibility of practical reason, but also to the lived-sensible-existence. Now, the processes of a phenomenology of consciousness (Husserl) and the processes which invoke a contextual background (Habermas), in their expressive and critical frame, still remain engaged in a dualistic process – subjective consciousness or objectivizing reason of communicational action – despite their rootedness in the everyday life of the cultural existential frame. The retroactive movement of critical reflection is necessary in order to discover again its originary anchorage, always there although non-conceptual[34] but sensed in the conditions of the reflexive possibility itself.

ETHICS AND DIGNITY OF THE PERSON

In the perspective adopted here the term "affective intuition" seems more appropriate in order to define the mediating role of the ethical speech-act, even if in Kant it is linked to the subjective experience of reason. However, as the aesthetic dimension ethical intuition discovers itself included in the field of attraction of a concrete universal because it is rooted in the pathic sentiment of the sense. Our research aims only at rejoining the non-said of Kant, who used the term "sentiment" (*Empfindung*), even though he had in mind practical reason regarding respect.

This conception of ethics crosses two tendencies – ontological-phenomenological as understood by Merleau-Ponty, and the communicational action as understood by Habermas – and give account not only of the singularity of the person, but also of the proto-ethical force in the context of interlocution as in the context of thematization of procedure for normative action. Here, we attend to the concept of "dignity", by the radical mediation of the desiring *affective ethical intuition*, in the communicational context of intersubjective exchange. Thus, we may recognize the ethical character of the concept of dignity in its dimension of commitment, i.e. in respect to normative action. Therefore, ethical life – and its status of concrete autonomy – is the inscription of action in the field of Being. Hence, by mediation of the affective sense the lived temporalization of the "subject" structures itself singularly, in the signifying interrelation which confers on existence the "*Flesh Sense*" that neither transcendental definitions, nor formal/ instrumental explicitations can bring.

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[33] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes"; *Cours du College de France*, ed. D. Seglard, p. 379 ss.

[34] Cf. M. Carbone, *La visibilité de l'invisible*, p. 170.

CONCLUSION

This chapter emphasizes the divergence of ethical points of view between the linguistic experience of communicational action and the experience that favors the originary advent of sense to sense. In the first case, linguistic action is defined as objective significant totality that while leaning on the context – the life-world –as its foundation interprets it always rationally, even in its subjective requests. This critical position of rational objectivization does not seem capable of meeting the initial experience of the openness of sense, which unifies all positions of action in reciprocal structural interrelation with passivity. This structural openness of sense is the dimension of affectivity as significant and sensible interrelation, as "feeling of the self's own feeling". Affective structure is a fundamental human dimension that orients the sense of existence in the world with others. Linguistic rationality is itself implicated in the *Ineinander* of this fundamental structure and, thanks to it, is constituted as an objective communicational structure. Thus, rational objectivity is not separated from an affective structural dimension, but articulates itself on this constituting base of sense. Critical objectivity of communicative action cannot detach itself from it without running the risk of the human losing its essence as a subject. The rational approach, by itself, does not account for what constitutes the dignity of the other and appeals for respect, i.e., of the autonomy of the subject, which implies solidarity, responsibility, and commitment.

CHAPTER 17

NATURE AND LIFE: ETHICAL QUESTIONS CONFRONTING THE WORLD OF TECHNO-SCIENCE

INTRODUCTION

Goethe and Hegel had the intention of founding philosophy as a "real science of nature."[1] They speak about life and refuse any ideological inscription that emphasizes the mathematical reason linked to the formalization of the Cartesian space, *id est.*, on the empirical recessions of sensible *data* that are lost to the lived-essence. The rationalist idealism and positivist empiricism of the modern *epoch* pull the understanding of nature to the principles of their method, i.e., to the formal, rational, or factual instrumental action: the "body-machine" has been considered as the instrument of the soul. As a result, rationalism and empiricism lose the essence of the living reality. Goethe and Schelling with their *Naturphilosophie*, and Hegel with his absolute idealism, return to the natural founding of life, in the process countering the philosophers of the Encyclopedia. These two contemporary thinkers discuss the same problem, even though their aims are radically different: Goethe aims at the incarnated mode of the living being without losing symbolic knowing, while Hegel founds the Idea on concrete Nature in its dialectical becoming. Nevertheless, despite the contraries found in reality Hegel is able to place them under the concept of the Absolute Mind.

This chapter does not give a resume of the thoughts of these two philosophers nor does it speak of their impact on the history of ideas regarding the relation of man and nature. It aims rather at emphasizing the value of their question about life: the deployment of the living beings that we are. In elaborating on this issue one must make use of reason that tries to research the concrete "sense" of life, and the factual instrumental information that gives the power to scientific knowledge. This task is accomplished in three parts. The first part deals with the problem of relationship between nature and life. The real problem we find at the beginning of 21st century is the loss of the relationship between human existence and nature because scientific discoveries and technological progress lead the individual and collective existence to an absolutely new situation where the existing being loses his points of reference to any ethical dimension. Hence, there is the need take up the ethical question in the

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[1] Cf. Laurent Van Eynde, *La libre raison du phenomène*; *Essai sur la 3Naturphilosophie de Goethe*, (Paris: Librairie philosophique J.Vrin, 1998).

context of a world transformed by the power of technology and science. The second part of the chapter enlightens this debate with phenomenological reflection in the light of Husserl's philosophy of bodiliness and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of nature, unfolding the themes: the world as the natural *habitat* and the relation of affectivity to techno-science. In doing so, this part of the chapter also takes up the question whether the techno-science with its emphasis on artificiality brings about a rupture in *Stimmung* of the natural "life-world", or does it provide a new creative approach that can extend the aptitudes of our lived-bodiliness? Part three moves on to consider those ethical questions which a philosopher must take up in confronting the consequences of the world of techno-science. In unfolding this theme, this part takes up the challenges of techno-science to classical ethics and the need for a new perspective in ethics. Then the question of ethical responsibility in a world dominated by science and technology is considered. Finally, ethical principles guiding the personal life of people in the present-day world is elaborate. The conclusion states that the research in ethics in order to face the consequences of techno-science pertains to the domain of *eco-ethica*, which attempts to understand the way reciprocal institutions function between men and nature, and to establish a concrete ethics that can address the ethical problems of the present-day world. Now we move on the consider the problem of nature and life in the next section.

PROBLEM OF NATURE AND LIFE

The real problem we find at the beginning of 21st century is the loss of the relationship between human existence and nature because scientific discoveries and technological progress lead the individual and collective existence to an absolutely new situation where the existing being loses his points of reference to any ethical dimension. German romanticism saw mother-nature as the ground and the horizon of being, identifying the means from which each culture takes sense. After Aristotle – countering the century-long influence of the period of enlightenment – romanticism, to a certain extent, restores to nature its dynamic power and establishes its link to human existence by the means of a lived-duality: man is inscribed as the extension of nature on the mode of spiritualized bodiliness. For his part, Bergson develops the insertion of man in the current of the *Elan Vital*, giving to the spirit of nature its pole of facticity: "life goes back up the slope that the matter goes down." However, we can read again Goethe and Bergson with innocence without noting that this the concept of historicity. Yet, the reminder of Goethe is interesting because it evokes our rootedness, our relation to the world in its totality, and the measure of the whole humanity. Nevertheless, today the question is to connect the aim of man's senses to nature without going against the given that science opens in each domain, in all levels from the microscopic to the macroscopic. Even the word "nature" emerges only from a symbolic/poetic culture. The objective mind of the empirical science – which sees its contingent reality as the

sphere of positive structures and the linguistic structuring of a network of more complex communication – gives nature only an historical and ecological meaning, while the scientific vision of the universe as a totality makes it capable of being substituted for the principal *cosmic* dimension. Thus, it seems that the concept of nature can become useful to our ethical preoccupations. The term "nature" is not inscribed in the way of scientific objectivity, but in the human dimension that makes man emerge in relation to his life. This concept of nature emphasizes man in his proper historicity, so that the living body of man is no longer thought of as a unique biological concept, but as that which is in interrelation with nature. In other words man is considered as related to nature, particularly in his bodiliness.

We must take up the ethical question in the context of a world transformed by the power of technology and the science. Strangely it is not the myth of Prometheus that is still present in the early part of the 21st century, but the myth of Noah – as described in the Book of Genesis – because it attempts to answer the anxious question pertaining to the conditions for survival of the future generations.[2] More than ever science opens exciting horizons. Technology transforms the lived-experience after the war so much so that it changes more than the usual points of reference. The typical example is that of information technology: in its capacity for possibilities of networking it accelerates in an unprecedented speed the whole realm of economic, financial and stock market applications. However, the whole range of the sociopolitical and cultural relations entail planning for obtaining the right kind of knowledge and a globalization of the ethical and juridical norms. The leading technologies linked to the physical, chemical, and biological discoveries widen our understanding of the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of the world of living beings, while on its part the robotic technology may soon dismiss the natural human command. These examples of the consequences of technology challenge us in our daily existence. They call us to abandon our familiar environment by presenting novel situations. It is the question of transposing the objective finality of action on the artifacts, whose performance and growing complexity modify the reflexes of use, call for training and the effort involved in adapting them in our everyday life. This, in turn, brings about significant changes in the cultural behavior of young people, who surf easily on the network of inter-nautical exchanges and adapt its language, thereby instituting a new mode of society that rejuvenates creative life. It is a matter of transformation of the past to a mode of future existence. This "focus on the future" calls into question the world as the *habitat*, the bodiliness, and the cultural interrelation. For instance, these virtual realities can dominate the future world, bring about new initiatives, and engage in new behavioral patterns.

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[2] Cf. Edouard Bone, "Perplexité éthique devant le clonage"; *Revue théologique de Louvain*, vol. 30, Louvain-la-Neuve (1999), pp. 437-455.

In understanding the influence of technology on nature and on human existence, in the recent history of philosophy we had two approaches: the approach of the Cartesian dualism and the approach of Heideggerian hermeneutic-phenomenology. In Cartesian dualism, action has an objective function and is linked to the body-machine, only in a technological world. It is a kind of scientific determinism and, therefore, possesses no existential significance. The Heideggerian hermeneutic-phenomenological approach passes a negative judgment on technology (*Gestell*), which brings about "wandering away from Being" and a "forgetting of Being". Thinking on the same line as Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel speaks of the devaluation of life brought about by technology and rejects the negative effects of artifacts on the human body – "this body that I am." However, if technologies function more in accordance with the true nature of things, they can become the means of prolongation of nature because of the mediation of the body as bodiliness. Hence, for a proper ethical questioning, we must give significance to the anthropological dimension, i.e., bring to light the constituted lines of human life in general. When we describe the anthropological structure in its natural and interrelational integration with the other living beings, we can better understand the nature of the phenomenon of globalization, particularly in relation to technology. This, in turn, makes us capable of defining the eventual ethical limits, in order to avoid what it imposes upon us in its proper normativity.

NATURE, LIFE AND TECHNO-SCIENCE

Having stated the problem of the relation between nature and life, this part of the chapter illumines this debate with the phenomenological reflection in the light of the Husserl's philosophy of bodiliness and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of nature, unfolding the themes: the world as the natural *habitat* and the relation of affectivity to techno-science. In doing so, this part also takes up the question whether the techno-science with its emphasis on artificiality brings about a rupture in *Stimmung* of the natural "life-world", or does it provide a new creative approach that can extend the aptitudes of our lived-bodiliness?

World: The Natural Habitat

In saying that the "earth does not move" Edmund Husserl discovers the foundation (*Grund*) of the "life-world", implying that there is always a ground on which every being necessarily leans, both in the level of the perception of something and its phenomenological elaboration. It is a fact that our relations to things of nature, our contacts with others, and our immersion in the depth of the horizon is a matter for bodiliness and is anchored in space and time that affects our existence. The body is not a thing, but a relation to an environment (*Umwelt*). Indeed, unlike the animal

body, our human body is not moved, but moves itself; it perceives itself not as an object, but in the network of nature, with things "in circle with the world". Thus, the body is the "between" from and of sense: just as there is the relation of *Ineinander* of the physical-chemical life in man, so also man is to be brought in the relation of *Ineinander* with animals and nature.[3] Though the body is a product of the evolution and linked to the process of nature in the biologic sense, it has emerged from nature and understands itself in relation to nature, following a process that gives it its progressive autonomy in the different aspects of phylogenesis and ontogenesis. A phenomenological description emphasizes some important moments of the awaking of the body to itself: it is perceptible not only in the child from the first days of its life, but also in the adult person, who invests his/her sense by a sort of reflexive reduction. By the affective body some signification is inscribed in the nature: there is an interpretation of nature in relation to bodiliness that makes the bodily "sense", i.e. as the differentiating relation.

The "feeling" is the pathic impact of a perception on the conscious subjects – whether it is visual or auditory – the other human beings and their sensible grasp. Feelings occur in a retentional spatio-temporal ground of the perceptive memory. Experienced in the context of the desiring history of the body, the actual "feeling" profiles itself in its originary affective anchorage, lived from the beginning of life at birth; and it opens itself downstream in the act of existing in search for what is sought from the beginning, i.e., "desire for the other". Hence, the things around give themselves to the perceptive subject/consciousness as promise of a future existential responding on the part of the subject. Moved by the affective sense of the imaginary towards present or future things, the consciousness perceives the world pre-predicatively, i.e., before it attributes names and qualities to things. The sensible feeling entertains the oral game of the senses – sense organs – as the primordial symbolic "saying" before any universal linguistic expression. On the other hand, from the first moments of existence the "sensible feeling" becomes human behavior by incorporation of space and time. This step opens the space on the originary ground that carries us. To this concrete movement belongs the horizon of the world in which the existing being finds himself. It is his situation and it becomes his point of view, i.e., the "the body that I am". By his/her moving gesture the body makes "his-himself"/ "her/herself" his/her situation that becomes his/her point of view, while at the same time the things and the others around reflect themselves to the others in an interrelational otherness. This *aisthesio*-logical body as bodiliness is intrinsically linked to the historicity of its enviornment (*Umwelt*). Constitutionally the consciousness in its bodiliness is related to the reciprocity with other humans and nature. Merleau-Ponty calls this dimension of the conscious subject the *Ineinander*.

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[3] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature*, "Notes"; *Cours du College de France*, ed. D. Seglard, p. 269.

This originary otherness is grounded in the *Einfühlung.* There is a reciprocal feeling of the subject and the other before all identified meaning of the body. In the origin of existence, the affective bodiliness of the other reflects itself on the bodiliness of the subject – particularly in the context of the father-mother-child relationship. Therefore, the "I" experiences himself/herself pathetically as subjectivity from inside in a reciprocal sense of himself/herself and the other. This "reflective-sensible-common-feeling" makes the bodiliness "between" the subject and the other – in seeing, hearing, and feeling – a language of the bodies. However, we can enlarge this notion of *Einfühlung* to all the forms of life. There is more than one type of matter that inhabits the world, more than one *Stimmung* that makes us to sympathize with men and things. We apprehend them pathetically in the measure they become familiar to us. So, the different places that make our daily existence are *milieus* which we recognize immediately. They maintain in memory the originary affective structure of "sensible feeling" that makes sense before all objective thematization, so that things make the world exist for us. Even artificial objects are grasped by affective mediation: though moved back from the natural objects, the artificial objects are themselves taken back to the originary level of feeling.

The reflection leads to critical thinking that begins in relation to the experience of originary negativity in the realm of "sensible feeling". However, the originary negativity of the" affect" makes the subject discover the other as other, as *socius*, after the existential passage of the subject beyond the level of weaning and jealousy. The affective negativity marks the principle of reality; it belongs to the realm of "common sense". This is the first level of knowing. The second level of knowing is phenomenological. It is attained in the affective realm by successive learning; by the game of imitation, competition and rivalries; and intertwining the collective relations that bodiliness learns itself as proper. This interrelation between existents bases itself in their participation in the cultural history (*Geschichte*). By its affective dimension bodiliness is the structure that constitutes the concrete relation between men; it is already grounded on the relation to nature in its totality. There is a reciprocal constitution of the sense between nature and culture by bodily mediation.

Having looked into the world as our natural *habitat*, we move on to consider the contribution of techno-science to the natural world without an existential – personal and cultural – rapture/break-up.

World of Techno-Science and Affectivity

Jonas and Ricoeur use the term "techno-science" in the present-day philosophy. It is understood as the index of reciprocal insertion between the scientific research and the technological modes that science induces through scientific inventions. Science and technology support themselves reciprocally without merging into each other's spheres, but their reciprocal implications constitute a "never-before-known-surrounding-universe" that

is integrated into the natural totality and transforms the modalities of human existence. Though great civilizations try to preserve their cultural heritage uncontaminated by the reality of techno-science, they all are confronted with the problem of globalization and its consequences. In fact, the "world of tools" – which in former times emerged from the natural resources – makes place for the world of artifacts. Not only the produced objects are no more manufactured from the natural material with artisan instruments, but they are constructed from virtual models and synthetic material. With them the technological operation presents a performance that surpasses in efficiency, quantity, quality, and in time, the productivity of the past methods of work. Moreover, depending on economic interests, the techniques of research to integrate the totality of the process of production reduces all spatio-temporal dependence on *praxis* to the maximum. In fact, it is the dimension of space-time – the natural ground of bodiliness – that creates at a level beyond any above all imagination the innovation of the existential horizon.

Now, the question that arises is whether the techno-science with its emphasis on artificiality brings about a rupture in *Stimmung* of the natural "life-world", or does it provide a new creative approach that can extend the aptitudes of our lived-bodiliness? There is a sensible feeling that the artificial objects are products according to the an affective initiation of sensibility. However, the proper finality of the artifacts is not directly given in their modes of appearance, but we can recognize in it some analogy with the natural objects and anticipate their modes of appearance by a perceptive analogy. This calls for a sort of naturalization of the artificial world even if the sophistication is very high. The body inscribes itself analogically in "nature as a totality", but enlarged to new possibilities. The innovation of the phenomenon is the transfer of daily existence to a world of virtual reality with definitive delimitation as if the "perceptive-spatio-temporal-horizon" always goes further with the operative and creative pressure of the technological imagination. Therefore, science dominates the apparent structural autonomy of the net, but it creates itself again in each singular intervention: the space has no objective delimitation. We must see the double relation of constitution and reaction. The machine becomes by itself quasi-creative of new performances with a quasi-autonomous function and quasi-reflection.

Paradoxically when the world of communication enters in the inflated register of the virtual and the possible in the objective reality of science, scientists engage according to the theoretically given cosmic investigations, and the most audacious to the infinitely great, just as physics already does for the infinitely small. However, the two systems – science and technology – decide between themselves a new space-time. The first engages the experimental domain to the virtual world of possibility. The second founds itself truly on the abstractive operation of scientific theories, using a technological foundation. To the question – of the possibility of a radical rupture with the natural world and those of the autonomy of the

techno-science on the existent – the structural analysis of bodiliness as natural and the relational historicity answer that the self alone is the real mediation in so far as the configuration of the artifacts at the level of virtual operation.

ETHICAL QUESTIONS IN CONFRONTING THE WORLD OF TECHNO-SCIENCE

Having looked into the themes of nature, life and techno-science in part two, part three moves on to consider those ethical questions a philosopher must take up in confronting the consequences of the world of techno-science. In unfolding this theme, this part takes up for discussion the challenges of techno-science to classical ethics and the need for a new perspective in ethics. Then the question of ethical responsibility in a world dominated by science and technology is considered. Finally, ethical principles guiding the personal life of people in the present-day world is elaborated.

Challenges of Techno-Science to Classical Ethics

Approaching the question of the ethical responsibility in performing our actions in a technical world, we must address two problems: the first is about the constitutive ground of ethics; and the second is related to the elaboration of concrete principles which direct our actions and guide us to make right decisions in practical life. These two questions are known to classical philosophy. The scholastic thinkers ground ethics on the ontology of the Good. Scholastic philosophy poses the criteria of action: the conformity of the human existence to its essence, to the rationality of nature. In his moral philosophy, Emmanuel Kant aims at the requirement of "you must", with the corollary of recognizing the other person as the *telos*. So, the threat to proper action is situated at the level of a liberty that aims at being in accord with itself. Yet, Kant's moral universe is limited by the formality of action and the universality of the point of view of a transcendental subjectivity. Among contemporary philosophers, Levinas grounds his concrete ethics on the absolute recognition of the other in the face to face relationship. For him, action in relationship to the other is action *par excellence*.

Today facing the problems initiated by the success of technology, the development of science, and the power of the human persons in dominating nature, we must underline the impact of the *Ineinander* of living beings in the context of the *Umwelt*. The new element that challenges classical ethics' respect for human rights is the new predominance of the technological world and the relatively recent phenomenon of the reciprocal implication of all the problems of the planetary world. Nobody escapes today from the forbidden fruit of cognition and its effects on nature, the ground of the world in its totality. We assist at a turning of the ethical requirement.

Without abandoning the past moral vision, and instead of limiting it to the subject/transcendental subjectivity, ethics must understand itself from the point of view of the whole of the citizen of the world in the real concrete of an existential relation, i.e., in its essentially political character. Besides this existential relational dimension of life, there is the dimension of bodiliness which extends to the life of human beings in the world. It relies on the participation of all men in nature in totality and with all living beings. The relation becomes the ontological dimension, i.e., the concrete essence of the world. Merleau-Ponty calls it the "flesh of the world". The world is the horizon of the sensed totality at all levels of experience, so that life as simple and natural is founded on bodiliness in its ontological anchorage, i.e., the sensed dimension of relationality (*Ineinander*). On this ontological relationality of sense and its globalization, the measure of ethics finds its ground.

This ontological relation of sense finds its ethical counterpart in the notion of the "link of solidarity" that should not be confused with the notion of assistance. The "link of solidarity" consists in "holding all together" and "keeping all together" in the context of the responsibility of human beings and that of nature, which implies their living, global, and significant dimension. Hence, the concrete ethics is no more an ethics of subject/transcendental subjectivity because it leads the human being not only in the field of collective responsibility but in its participation in the "sense of life". This "link of solidarity" can be a mere abstraction if it fails to reflect the human issue by underlining the necessarily collective engagement, besides the individual engagement of ethics. The responsibility of ethical decisions engage not only the men who decide after consensus – indeed they are responsible as personal subjects – but their decision to engage in themselves with the whole of humanity in its responsibility to nature in its totality. In this manner, ethics not only concerns itself with the individual from inside himself/herself, the free subject autonomous in his/her action, and in only the recognition of persons, but also concerns itself with the totality of the citizen of the world, and the technological extension of the natural order. This effective conviviality with nature and men holds man in his bodiliness, which makes us personal living beings. In the authentically reflected sensible feeling of our actions, we recognize the givenness of material nature that we may call "creation".

Question of Ethical Responsibility

The ethical-political responsibility of the citizens of the world implies that we must impose measures of prudence, modify conditionality, and eventually stop/abandon the product of scientific research and

technological action. Hans Jonas said in 1979 about the *Principle Responsibility*[4] as follows:

> The known as well as the power were too limited to incorporate the more far future in the prevision, moreover to include the entire planet in the consciousness of personal causality. Under the sign of technology, ethics has to do with acts (even if it is no longer those of a personal subject), which have an incomparable causal impact the future and which have a pre-visional known that it's incomplete character overflows also all that we recognized in the past. We must add the simple order of magnitude of actions in the long term and very often its irreversibility. The whole places the responsibility in the centre of ethics, including the horizons of space and time which correspond to those of the actions.[5]

At present, the issues of ethics take up the large part of sociopolitical debates, which concern the answer to the great questions about respect for others and human dignity at the global level.

However, how can we think of the *Principle Responsibility* for humanity in the future? If it is difficult at the pragmatic level to assess the actual relation between nations and collectivities today, we cannot impose ethical judgments on future society. We must prepare from today juridical rules preceded by an ethical reflection. We must reflect and evaluate the indispensable consequences of the long reach for future generations and the technology from where the best and the worse can emerge. To draw up the criteria for this evaluation is the task of the philosopher, who does not give up.[6] It is not the fear of change of existence which arouses the questions for the future, but "the surplus of the human power of the actual macro-technology with respect to the prevision of the future effects that it provokes involuntarily." So it is rather the drifts of an overall powerful instrumentality. To the extend that scientific discoveries transform the quality of natural life and provide space for man to acquire forceful possibilities, they transform the dimensions of existence and perhaps for once the living beings in their proper species – transgenism; the man in his proper identity – cloning; and the man in his *habitat* and his cultural modalities – the futurism of an interplanetary *habitat*. Therefore, there comes about the necessity to anticipate the effects and to program the limits,

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[4] Cf. Hans Jonas, *Le principe responsabilité*:*Une éthique pour la civilisation technologique*, trad. J. Greisch, (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1990), p. 6.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 14.

[6] Cf. Hans Jonas, *Pour une éthique du futur*, trad. P. Ivernel, Poche 235, (Paris: Seuil, 1999), p. 16.

if not to objectify completely human life and to make it lose its proper vital anchorage, i.e., proper bodiliness. This is not to confuse with the physical body that can develop in its natural dependence – organ transplantation, artificial insemination, and the like.

One of the difficulties attached to the "futuribles" is that we cannot legislate about a reality that is absent; so only the philosophical reflection can use of this world "futuribles" as a reality that will come and to whom we are responsible. Of course we can argue about the responsibility of the parents for the children and for the future *habitat* they will enjoy; but generally, the responsibility issue of a vertical link to the future generation seems evident. It is easier to open the feeling of responsibility when we enlarge the vertical link to the horizontal link, and to that which overflows from the family, the tribe, the clan, to the social-political community, and at the limit of all is the future society .The problem risks not being heard with the same peremptory force. The interpretation of "otherness" that already requires the "feeling for one's fellow man" is at stake. It is a basically an ethical debate. The feeling is all the more radical that it is attached from the beginning of life in the parental "affect" that intervenes from the origin of bodiliness as binding by originary interrelation and solidarity, even though naturally mediated by desire.

The second ethical debate concerns the prudential liberty of research. It is right for science to maintain its autonomy, the liberty of questioning, whether it is a success or a failure. As such, science is absolutely neutral in relation to the results of its research. Nevertheless, immediately we must qualify the argument that pretends to be incapable of stopping the scientific action for fear of losing the fruit of free creativity or falling into a totalitarian aberration. We must not forget the necessity of ethical judgment for every scientist/philosopher. If it is right that the known is also marked by an ethical signification the scientist is responsible for the choice of his research in the transmission of knowing. Yet, the danger is more from the fact that the discoveries become the prey of marketing interest and economic considerations. For instance, the genetic patent: scientific research risks today being manipulated to other finalities than itself.

Ethical Principles Guiding Personal Life

In fact, the principle of otherness is linked to the principle of responsibility. However, the debate must awaken in us the adequate feeling to incite our action of responsibility not only in the sense that concerns the traditional ecological standing – preventing the destruction of the natural environment – but above all the biological and psychological control against all forms of totalitarian derivatives which would modify the genetic and even the generic conditioning of our nature. Thus, the survival and human dignity of future generations depends on our present action. It is a question of qualifying human dignity. To define the notion of human dignity, we take up again the concepts of historicity and bodiliness, but adding to them what

makes the originary structure of life: the generic dimension. Phenomenological analysis emphasizes the significance of bodiliness in such a way as to highlight the relational dimension of the subject to the other and the relation to totality as horizon of the world. Hence, for the subject, the world includes all the networks of signification/meaning, the spatial-temporal depth of the lived-horizon, and the structure of the historicity of "life". Yet "life" is the dynamic sense of reality, the relation "to and with" the process of differentiation that is always becoming. We learn from Bergson that this sense of the vital process prolongs into a spiritual process .The notion of nature in Merleau-Ponty takes the same evolving aim but emphasizes more the radical circulation that binds the biological evolution and the process of becoming of a symbolic sense – the mind. It is always in the "nature in totality" that the living being develops itself to its spiritual content, and articulates in its personal humanity. It is the question of the ontology of the "flesh of the world"; the relation as such, not in the abstractive sense but in the concrete sense of natural sensible feeling. The term "sense" says the differentiated dimension of the sensible – the act of sensing, directed at the relation of signification.

The anthropology of the person that leans on ontology takes again the three conceptual qualifications of sense. The person is: firstly, sensible bodiliness; secondly, directed to and with the other in the world – the "otherness" being constitutive of the transcendence of the subject; and thirdly, as signifying expressivity – it is linked to the historicity of the person and to language as the reflected manifestation of sense. What makes up the personal identity of the individual is the intrinsically differential element of bodiliness itself. The analysis of the personal identity cuts again the analysis of the singular historicity. Here, we do not take the risk of getting into the classical problem of relation of the body and the soul. If man is a body-machine directed by the soul, we would go against what Descartes defended all his life: the substantial unity of the body and the soul. Nevertheless, in the existential perspective, the problem of the personal identity and unity remains a major difficulty even if the identity of person – as "I exist" – tries to reduce it. The person is not constituted by the genome even if the genetic identity is constituted radically for existence. However, it must be assumed that in a history to express the personal identity, the "person" – as the word tells it – is nothing else than a relation of negative identity personifying the "himself as another". Therefore, the structure of genetic identity is only a partial principle that comes from the external pole of the objective relationality. We must add the intrinsic structure of the personal identity, in his singular historicity.

The matter of understanding the bodily process added by historicity would still be a dualistic manner of understanding human existence. Yet, even so the genome is not unharmed by its natural history and it is also linked to the "process of life". What makes the identity of the person is not the physical body, but the primordial natural inscription in the "process of life". The structure of the person is grounded on *the otherness of exchange*,

which is the originary reciprocal relation of the sensed nature. In nature rough matter is only a concept; it does not exist, no more than the concept of mind as a pure spiritual entity. Nature (*phusis*) is a more complex process and emphasizes a whole of potential networks. It engenders the existence that constitutes more for itself its lived autonomy by relation to the material *substrata*. From the fact of this growing autonomy the existence gives to itself not only the place of its mobility in the space-time complex, but its singular existence among living beings and its proper place that makes the personal "I am" and "I can". The human action modulates itself in interaction with the world and its surrounding. So, the new productivity of "sense" in nature takes itself in the growing existential complexity of the networks of communication.

If we analyze the lived-manifestation of this emergence of life in us – not merely from the objective perspective, but from the phenomenological point of view – we must necessarily come back to the point of affective intersection that constitutes the first sense for us, and its initial appearance. For the living being that we are, it is the presence of desire that constitutes the entrance of our identity in the history of sense. In other words, it is the sexual differentiation that gives to the dimension of desire its space of life, and hence its sense. What makes the sense of life objective in the natural evolution is *the differentiating impact* of a generic duality. The sexual *difference* gives to the affective existence its emerging reality in its historicity. So, bodiliness is crossed by a *basic differentiation*, which takes its signification leaning on the biological singular sexual identity. However, this affective differentiation that emerges from the parental desire is lived symbolically through the different historicity of every body. Thus, in this vital space anchorage of the natural differentiation of male and female, each individual existence has to constitute its proper differentiated life, to different levels of symbolic understanding – heterosexuality, homosexuality and bisexuality, thereby sublimate modes of desire. This affective orientation of the bodily constitution induces the different modalities and levels of sense of our life. So the personal existence happens according the dual constitution of humanity, the basic difference, and is grounded in relation to nature in its totality.

We may ask today the question regarding "cloning" in the human reproduction that annuls the dual biological constitution. Though hypothetical, the question does not concern the therapeutic human cloning, but the reproductive human cloning. This process of making identical genetic beings may risk conferring programmatic bodiliness without the sexual reciprocal aim of desire and without the genetic differentiated inheritance of the natural constitution. We must not compare this biological technique with the case of real twins, which have still the intervention of two lineages. In the hypothetical case of reproductive human cloning, we privilege one genome by separating its generically differentiated natural anchorage. In this hypothesis we have a double ethical question: the first is "how can we imagine the anthropological constitution of the human clone

as a subject?" and the second is "what will be the existential impact of the clone on the human social community in relation to nature?"

To the first question we answer that the clone loses an uncertain aspect of its genetic conditioning; it is closed inside only one way where it is no more affective differentiation. From the biological point of view the clone is maintained in a uniform world of similar human beings whom he can recognize in the objective phenomenal image like itself in the mirror. However, it is not crossed by its other in the natural relation; it is literally stuck to its other by physical identity and its productive conditioning. Hence, theoretically, it remains simply its historical singularity: in fact, it is linked to the process of its situation in the company of others, clones or no clones, but without originary relationality. Thus the differentiation between clones is not linked to bodiliness nor to the generic conditioning, which are the same, but only to the historicity of their individuality as historical beings in space and time. Yet, the dimension of historicity that belongs to the clone remains linked objectively to the nature in totality, even if its relation is mediated by the technological conditioning that constitutes it and constitutes a barrier for the originary natural desire. We can say by hypothesis that the clones do not feel the emergence of desire as differentiated from the sense of life for whether only their condition of objective similitude in their society uniquely qualifies them. They cannot find in themselves the effect of a sexual generic and reciprocal *Einfühlung*. If it is true, we must, on the ethical plain, raise the question regarding the right use of the technological power to arrange genetic capital of human being compromising the uncertain potentiality of natural reproduction. On the contrary, we can also think that historicity between clones can be the source of a more subtle otherness, in recognizing their respective personalities because this does depend from the natural differentiated bodiliness. This link of otherness is bound to a positional objectivity; it is mediated by technology; and it seems to be in juxtaposition to similar beings. We can still argue from the historicity that in the progressive courses of the clone through circumstances and different situations, it may have the originary physical similarity – this is scientifically not same as an equal identity. Here, perhaps we can have the *analogon* of the idea of "brotherness" – which, for Freud and Sartre, is correlative to terror. With the fact of a historicity separated from the objective body the philosopher can declare the true dualistic scission between the soul and the body. Nevertheless, even if it is the case, the clone can be always dependant on nature in totality for two reasons: the first is because the clone is no more linked to the generic duality of the previous line of a generation before cloning; and the second is because the clone's relation to nature can be impoverished by the fact of the technological programmatic condition that reduces its autonomy.

Responding to the second question regarding the existential incidence of the clone on the human community as related to nature, we can say that intrinsically the otherness that comes from the genetic and generic

diversity risks losing the quality of the originary affective desire. Yet, the natural life is always symbolically lived by everybody, whatever happens about the varied heterosexuality/homosexuality of human societies, each one is always linked to the symbolically differentiated otherness even though the historicity of bodiliness is separated at another level from the originary generic condition. With this hypothetical research about human cloning, we are to conduct research and underline the dependence of the generic state in relation to the genetic interrelation, and thus to think in a new view the conditions of otherness which do not find its anchorage in the singularity of bodiliness, grounded in the circular relation with the nature. The *Einfühlung* of exchange, inscribed in the originary desire, gives its mark as first differentiated sense of existence, i.e., the "sense of life". We must ask if the question of the vital diversity inscribed at the level of the person is not acceptable also at the cultural level. What Levi-Strauss indicates in his interpretation of the elementary structures of relationship founded in exchanges underlines the rise of the natural process to a cultural diversification. It must have an ethical responsibility that plays at all levels of life and that must respect not only human dignity in its proper bodiliness, but also that of the communities in their reciprocally cultural exchanges. At last more radically and globally it would have an ethical responsibility related to the ontological ground of the human experience, i.e., nature. It takes place in such a way that the process of life is in all the levels of existence in the promotional circularity of its appearance (*Ineinander*). Then, it is a question of founding an ethics of nature in totality, at the same time, as process of life – the vital rise of the living being – and as institution of the personal and cultural human singularity. The differentiation of "sense of life" – desire – is the originary key.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion we can say that all the hypotheses of research make us reflect on the domain of *eco-ethica*. It is to understand the way of a reciprocal institution between men and nature, his *habitat*. It is in the sense of establishing a concrete ethics, for instance, in the way of the political mode (*polis*). Or still, more radically, in the sense of establishing a dialectical confrontation constitutive of the community for the "person". Nevertheless, the three levels of sense correspond and interfere in clarifying our contemporary problem of the world of "techno-science", in terms of the philosophies of Hans Jonas and Paul Ricoeur, thereby underline the ambiguity that is at the same time alienating and creative.

PART V

AFFECTIVITY, ANTHROPOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

CHAPTER 18

SUBJECT AND *POLIS*: RECONSTRUCTION AND GLOBALIZATION

INTRODUCTION

The classical question regarding the "nature of the human person" is still relevant although it appears to have become outmoded in contemporary philosophy. The new philosophical work –following the different forms of structuralism – has abandoned the idea of the subject, and searches again to redefine the subject in relation to politics and the globalized world. It must find again the richness of the lived-life – which phenomenology recognizes as the originary consciousness – even though today it has to come from an objectivization of ethics in the language of communicative action. The problem of the subject becomes acute when faced with the repercussions generated by technology on the individual and social existence in their political and economical forms of globalization, which today absorb all cultures in one unique dynamic and constraining current. We need to articulate a "common *habitat*" program, which supposes an originary human inter-relationality both in city and nature. The ethical problem – which immediately arises in this context – discovers in it the risk of the forgetting the foundations which are necessary for the continuation of a "sense life" in the individual sphere of existence and in the sphere of the whole world and engage the the entire humanity.

This chapter attempts to elaborate on the task of philosophical anthropology/Philosophy in redefining the subject and the political dimension in face of this movement of universalization. The theme is elaborated on three parts. The first part speaks of the phenomenological origins of philosophical anthropology. It emerged as a philosophical science in the 20th century particularly in the philosophies of Gabriel Marcel, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Philosophical anthropology has its origin from the analysis of the lived-behavior of the pure-*ego*/originary consciousness in the context of the "life-world" both interrelational and linguistic, in mutual recognition between the denizens of the "life-world". Besides, it provides the concrete basis for the study of all the socio-economic-political interactions in every culture. The second part takes into consideration the change of perspective that has come about in philosophical anthropology in the recent times.The philosophical problem becomes that of practical aim at the sense of action. There is a development of instrumental reason, which transforms the real according to an operational mode. A new dualism subject-object imposes itself. The subject becomes at its turn an object in the system, whereof it is the rational operator. So, traditional ethics becomes obsolete with respect to

unprecedented situations and values. The same process is now active at the level of the *polis* in general where there is also a new dualism, produced by an institutional objectification. Reacting to this situation, Society creates new forms of collective encounter discovering the spirit of collegiate and cultural responsibility. The third part deals with the renewed interest in philosophical anthropology. In the light of the distress experienced in the realm of ethics and the need for creativity in the field of morality, there has come about a renewed interest in philosophical anthropology. This new perspective and the renewed interest are expressed in globalization that calls for the reconstruction of anthropological structures and in the greater emphasis given to the ethical dimension of human existence. The conclusion states that the aim of ethical thinking is to find again in lived-intropathy the interrelational anchorage and to bring about the feeling of solidarity. The pathic lived-life, which is drawn from the originary interrelation in the "life-world", is the universalizing condition of mediation which rejoins the ethical call beyond the lived-difference of peoples and men, and which "affects" them *between* themselves.

In the first part, we begin our consideration on the phenomenological origins of philosophical anthropology.

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: ITS PHENOMENOLOGICAL ORIGINS

First, we have to examine how the human problem is formed by two essential situations: the first relates to the subject; and the second pertains to the citizen (*zôon politikon*). The concept of subject is a product of Cartesian metaphysics. It aims at the substantial union of body and soul, which constitutes the human essence. The concept of the citizen belongs to philosophical anthropology, which emerged in the 20th century as a philosophical science. The focus of philosophical anthropology is on the concrete life of the subject as involved in human interaction based on the act of existence, and as related to other beings in the context of the concrete life in the world. Undoubtedly philosophical anthropology is progressively acknowledged in "Circles of Second Reflection" as concrete philosophy, particularly as presented by Gabriel Marcel. It is purified of all dualistic metaphysics marked by the problem of the soul and the body because as Marcel says "I am my body" in the lived-unity of my presence to others.

Edmund Husserl provides philosophical anthropology with methodological underpinnings. Phenomenology begins by questioning the essence of consciousness and considers lived-action according to a double reflective method: phenomenological reduction (*épochè*) and eidetic reduction. The grasp of human identity still is subsidiary to a sense of constitution on the basis of the pure *ego*, which is its *terminus a quo.* In fact, Husserl freed himself from the rationalism and empiricism thanks to the concept of intentionality as the perspective of consciousness in encountering things in the world. Consciousness understands itself

according to a double intentionality: through perception it lives among the things of the world and reflects upon itself in its intentional effort, while maintaining the "life of sense" in such a way that the dynamic source of meaning must be attributed originarily to the pure *ego*. This "enters and departs from the scene" because it is the *ego* in its proper intentionality which understands its own constitutive conscious outlook. There are two intentional outlooks, which are not parallel, but mutually imply each other: reflective consciousness and non-reflective consciousness. Thus, the phenomenalizing/philosophizing subject can deconstruct the life of the subject in the absence-presence of the self to itself, without losing thereby its perceptive bond to others and the world. At the same time, in an impersonal mode the reflecting subject attributes to itself what is just passed. Thus, the play of nothingness passes through the "I" that is a presence to oneself in the continuing process of moving beyond oneself into the future. Consciousness is time. On the impersonal underpinning the "I" reflects its active presence. This perspective directs Sartre toward an impersonal foundation of the "I" (*La transcendance de l'ego*), and Ricoeur, towards the concept of narrativity.

In contrast to Descartes, Husserl expounds in his work *Ideas II* that consciousness constitutes itself in a process, which always surpasses itself in its aim, whether it is toward sensible things (*aisthesis*), toward the psychic consciousness (*psuchè*) as concrete life of the *ego*, or toward the constitution of the Spirit (*Geist*) in intersubjective cultural relations. In the most recent philosophical publications this horizon absorbs the whole field of transcendental reflection. This horizon transforms the whole "project of reason" into intentional meaning on the basis of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*), and as transcendental underpinning of intersubjectivity. This is the source of phenomenological philosophy's attempt to contemplate on the *telos* of humanity. For Husserl, the philosopher is "*a functionary of humanity*." Thus, from a transcendental subjectivity he returns to the *terminus a quo* of meaning and to the temporal constitution of the history of reason in all its concrete manifestations of life and all social-political-cultural forms.

Martin Heidegger – putting aside the phenomenological idealism of transcendental subjectivity as conceived by Husserl – situates the existent being in the transcendental exteriorization of its being-in-the-world, and thereby underlines the ecstatic ontological dimension of *Dasein* as existence open to the total horizon of the world (*Umwelt*). Phenomenology, having become ontological, provides an existential analysis of *Dasein*. This makes explicit the manifestation of existence as "phenomena", in so far as existence is self-constitution understood as emergence in time of its own self-transcendence as "being-in-the-world". The transcendence of *Dasein* immediately manifests its structure of "being-with" in interrelation to the other existents in the "with-world" (*Mitwelt*). Experiencing the "original-affective-field" (*Befindlichkeit*) in its *habitat* as feeling the situation, it expresses its essentially existential mode, i.e., its finitude. It manifests itself

in existence under the structural form of "concern" (*Sorge*) throughout the entire course of the historical development of its being (*das Geschehen)* from birth to death. In its passion to exist *Dasein* comprehends itself in terms of these two dimensions which constitute it as a finite being and enable it to realize its existence in the "historical horizon of the world".

Thus, phenomenological ontology as such is not in principle an existential anthropology, even though it draws support from there. For phenomenological anthropology is always already within the hermeneutic circle in the comprehensive act of philosophy; it cannot escape the fact that it lives concretely its ontological question. This is not a matter of the given experience which constitutes the unique reality each one lives in oneself; rather it is a matter of bringing out the operative structure of concrete existence – the universalizable dimensions – according to which existence is deployed. The ontological *difference* of Heidegger's fundamental ontology has been drawn on both by Sartre and by Merleau-Ponty for the metaphysical life of the concrete existent being. Merleau-Ponty confirms the ontological *difference* by the "concept of sense". In its concrete living significance the term "sense" connotes a plurality of meanings: the sensible, direction, and signification by gesture and language both symbolic and affective. What makes the presence of meaning is the concrete *difference*, which always is overcome and extended in the time and space of every encounter. Repeating an expression of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty speaks of "the flesh of the world". The term "flesh" designates the impersonal structure of difference, which expresses the fundamental ontological relation of meaning, i.e., the concrete signifying "sense" of all relations. The "flesh" constitutes the dynamic texture of the totality of relations: they are all sensible and significant at the same time.

The concrete chiasm – intersection or fusion of terms, which constitutes the flesh of the world – is the place from where every existent being concretely achieves meaning. It is situated in the interplay from the beginning of the evolution of natural living things and human beings. The *Ineinander* of nature/culture – relation as such, reversibility or difference – should be understood as the basic relation of meaning. *Difference* is found in the reversibility of the concrete and the symbolic life and language of the *ego* and the other. Far from the classical perspective of substance, Merleau-Ponty opens a new way for philosophy which brings into play the experience of the intersection of figure on foundation in exchange relations. Thus, every dimension can be traced back to the originary ontological source from where meaning emerges and is exchanged. To the ontological meaning of *Dasein* the "notion of body" adds a singular concrete expression. For Merleau-Ponty – as already described by Husserl as mediation between *psyche* and the physical body – bodiliness becomes the concrete dimension of existence as transcendence with others and the world. Hence, "the body is the intentional arc which rises over the world." Constitutive of the self, not as "the other of the other" in the Husserlian sense, but in the inter-exchange of every encounter the subject lives

originally in the exchange of affective experience, found throughout the whole field of intersubjective sensibility that constitutes "intropathy" and the symbolic exchange signified through gesture and language. The existent reality emerges in its subjectivity thanks to the ensemble of affective and linguistic relations from birth to death. This is sustained by the power of desire which signifies the experience of exchange, always evolving, yet always already there in the limited and passing opening of the existence shared between the "speakers".

From what we have said above it is clear that philosophical anthropology has been renewed thanks to phenomenology with its concrete manifestation of lived-experience. This concerns the existential neutrality of the fundamental ontology and the formation of the transcendental schema of the freedom of the pure *ego*. It emerges from the analysis of the lived-behavior, both interrelational and linguistic, in mutual recognition between the denizens of the "life-world". Moreover this analysis is the concrete basis for the study of all the social-economical-political interactions in every culture.

Having looked into the phenomenological origins of philosophical anthropology, we move on to consider the change in perspective that has taken place in this science in the present-day in the second part of this chapter.

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: CHANGE OF PERSPECTIVE

A change of perspective took place in the middle of century after the war. Philosophical anthropology, notably with Sartre, assumed a militant role in response to the sociopolitical needs of the times. The philosophical goal was not only comprehension, but also critical involvement and action. This qualitative change provoked by social and cultural conflicts was reinforced by a new vision of the world in its concrete dimension of real and potential globalization. Not only exchanges between cultures, but also the techno-scientific powers with universal impact evoked a new mode of behavior on the part of philosophy. It was called upon to reflect no longer merely theoretically, but also with an action-oriented practical view. Sartre spoke of action in the mode of coexistence under the pressure of a scarcity of goods tied to desire, depended not only on an actual situation, but also on the perverse effects of "*pratico-inertia*" which checked the achievement of the goals of action. This warning from French philosophy spread during the second half of the 20th century. Structuralism inverted the humanist perspectives of Sartre to situate the focus of the philosophical perspective upon the linguistic/systematic interplay of signs. At the same time, this change of mentality brought about a great development in the techno-sciences; this promoted the sense of a constructed world that is distanced from the world of everyday-life. This is because for the first time humanity was able to recognize itself as a cultural whole as information is

instantly broadcast by the media on a planetary level. In this scenario the individual person is taken up in this flow and all of life is subject to a process of objectification. With daily "life-world" being transformed in its vital content, the significance of traditional values have begun to fade. The individual finding himself in this imposed new mode of life, feels alienated in his/her own subjectivity.

Undoubtedly, human coexistence should reform itself into other forms. However, it is no longer possible to escape the globalization of relations at a planetary level; hence what is affirmed on existential level risks losing all its meaning. Today the subject is measured by artificial intelligence, which projects a scientifically defined image. A new type of rational interpretation of reality supports the globalization of practical reason as well. Instrumental reason has transformed the real into an operational mode, thereby introducing a quantitative vision of the world, and a utilitarian and economic interpretation of humanity. These information and cultural changes not only condition the modes of life, but support new rules of existence. Reason in its concrete planning is preempted by the interplay of instrumental functional possibilities continually re-projected by new technologies. The ordinary person now has lost the resource Descartes spoke about, i.e., the "good sense".

We find ourselves faced with a new dualism of subject and object which no longer has anything to do with Cartesian rationalism, but on the contrary emerges from a new form of scientific positivism, subjected to a constructed functional reason. Scientists have developed new techniques, which rapidly transform the entire sphere of existence at all levels: material, geographical, vital, and socio-economic-cultural. This "constructed world" from now on articulates itself in world terms. It has power over the subject, which has become an object determined by the system. As a result, the subject interprets itself from the point of view of instrumental reason, and thereby is reduced while losing its own existential opening. He/she has become a scientific object – a new form of rational interpretative mode of reality. Thus, one finds oneself faced with a new dualism: on the one hand, the subject is considered as a rational agent at the instrumental level being abstracted from its lived dimension; on the other hand, the functioning of the “constructed world” produces situations in which thev subject is being objectified and constructed, and must live his/her life accordingly.

All these situations raise the problem of action: they confront individuals and collectivities with their responsibilities about which they have neither prior experience nor any possibility of foreseeing the consequences that may follow from the action. Let us take the example of new developments in biology: biological research on the human genome poses the acute ethical problem of the risks of experimentation both to the individual and to the species as a whole. The contemporary mastering of life by the techno-sciences in every domain generates a new collective awareness of the ethical problem as such. The universality of the system has radicalized the ethical self-awareness and risks itself becoming part of the

schema of instrumental reason through availing itself of the positivist presuppositions of the techno-sciences. This results from considering only the utilitarian and quantitative results of material nature and culture, thereby alienating the human condition in general. The subject or the collectivity is seen only as a system of utility to be run rationally. At this rate, even the objective language of ethical thinkers is reduced to the objective effectiveness of the individual in the collectivity, omitting thereby the behavior of the existential subject in order to consider only positive or empirical factors. Moreover, what has survived of the traditional ethics has been absorbed into the present situation and values. In the attempt to guarantee the objectivity of *consensus*, ethics constructs itself on purely exteriorized and positive bases, in search of a majority voice to justify the ethical answer.

In the same way, besides displacing the lived-subject and its scientific-technical objectification, an equivalent process takes place inside the *polis* in general. We can also speak here of a new dualism emerging from the institutional reification. In the past, the city was naturally directed by the political power as such, in the form of a State of rights, the force of authority being subjected to objective and formal laws. Established by the antique city, which gave to any citizen the right to speak in the *agora*, politics has conducted progressively the course of history to the universalizable laws of democracy, at least in their aims. Today its proper aim is precariously balanced because of two dominating factors. The first is linked to the evolution of the economy, which is supported by computerization, and is generalized in worldwide terms. To the extent there is unrestrained competition and financial possibilities, to that extent the multinational companies submerge the limits of the State, thereby making economy slip away from the control of the proper political domain, and become itself subjected to uncertain financial systems that completely dominate Stock Market transactions. This is the anonymous and uncontrollable trap of the pure speculation. The second factor that corrupts the political sense, concerns the increase in the weight of the judicial power: nowadays justice is overwhelmed by its ever harder work; it has imprisoned itself into more complex procedures that while controlling the extent of the deadlines, generates a conservative power upon political decisions, loosing *de facto* their original finality.

While deciding on the division of power between the executive, legislative and judicial domains, the collectivity comes up against institutions which have become more functional and produce more exacerbated social duality. The non-willing effects (*pratico-inert*) provoke the Institution's reification. The State of rights, which in theory constitutes the lived-interrelation of the citizens, loses sight of the goodness of life between the individual persons as Aristotle maintained. Civil service becomes an operating instrument in itself, indifferent to the interrelation of the social link and even to any personal autonomy. However, against this drifting *pratico-inert* reducing the collectivity to the dualism of a society

with two speeds, we attend to the progressive actions of a social and cultural burst of energy, which wants to be recognized. Against the instrumental technocratic system and the word-wide application this system generates, we must promote the expansion of the knowledge of a collective self, a kind of collective self-constitution. This is mediated and encouraged by the techniques of communication and the enrichment of cultural exchanges, such as newspapers, theatre, expositions, travel and the like. Hence, from now on, alienated in its political-economic power, the society invents for itself new forms of positive meeting, new cultural creations with the support of the image, the virtual, the game, or simple competition. It is strange to note that the exchanges between young people of different cultures discover again the sense of lived-interrelation while giving new resources to daily life according new modalities, which announce a world society. In the same way, the failure of the social factors and the institutional reification induce the consciousness to oppose and determine institutions of social renewal. New associations discover the forces, which motivate their collegial and cultural responsibility. We attend a new unprecedented social era, which belongs to a "common practical reason" the universality of which is at the same time differentiated and "communitarian".

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: A RENEWED INTEREST

In the light of the distress experienced in the realm of ethics and the need for creativity in the field of morality, there has come about a renewed interest in philosophical anthropology. Today, no one questions the fact that the issues concerning the human person involve ethical responsibility; rather this is seen as the radical anchor. The question of ethical responsibility is tied no longer to a theoretical understanding of the *anthropos*, but to a practical anthropology that is centered on action. For example, when a philosopher enters the ethical debate he/she must critically look at the issues and arguments in ethics that pertains to the functioning of human interests. From there he/she proceeds to the conditions of existence and debates the lived-problems of human living, such as the otherness, the dwelling-place, the future of the humanity in general, and the question of respect for individuals and cultural groups. The philosopher must question particularly the reduction of practical reason to instrumental reason and the reduction of human life to techno-scientific and techno-economic views of globalization. He/she certainly must reflect on the new dependence of the human individual in relation to nature and the new powers of a globalized system of the socio-economic world. The ensemble of applied problems radically transforms individual and social life, and raises all sorts of new ethical questions. As a result, ethics can assume a preponderant place in philosophy to the extend that it becomes conscious of the urgency of redefining the forms of a destiny that has come to be shared universally.

This renewed interest in anthropology calls philosophy to focus on action in elaborating a prospective strategy, which not only permits control

of applied research, but also responds to the problems raised by the new inventions, which upset people in their being, nature and tradition. Deontology certainly should permit regulating the initiatives of the different sciences and all systematic procedures of collective planning in view of living human destiny, both in the present and in the future. Hence, ethics can no longer be a theoretical science – a reflection either *a priori* on the essence of action or *a posteriori* on acquired human experience – but it must begin and carry out its work on new matters yet unexplored that have an immediate impact on the life of individuals, the *cosmic* potentialities, the protection of peoples, and the maintenance of socio-cultural life. We must come again to the lived-sources of the eco-ethical, i.e., the originary sense of the "intersubjectivity in the *habitat* of the world." This new form of thinking makes us conscious of our destiny, in which we find a worldwide solidarity. So when we speak of the integrity of the human person, his/her body, the natural *habitat*, and the traditional cultures, we confront the whole existence in all its finalities and values. We must consider the above-mentioned dimensions of the human person in relation to nuclear energy, control of the internet, genetic manipulations like cloning, effects of socio-economic and financial manipulation, excessive production of hydrocarbons, environment, and cultural heritage – all of which affect the human individual and the world at large.

This new perspective and the renewed interest in philosophical anthropology find expression in globalization that calls for the reconstruction of anthropological structures and in the greater emphasis given to ethical dimension of human existence. We turn our attentions to these two aspects in the following sections.

Globalization: Reconstruction of the Anthropological Structures

Phenomenological anthropology enables an analysis of the situation of globalization and its impact on the traditional ethics. For example, to free ethics itself from instrumental and utilitarian reason while responding fundamentally to the original intent of developing *consensus*, which risks remaining tied to a purely extrinsic rationality of discourse. This implies regaining contact with communicative action and understanding the bases in action of its central justifications. Today, our life and that of others are restructured in a certain direction by the diverse developments in the globalized world. The question that arises is related to the manner in which we can respond to this situation. Paul Ricoeur suggests three fundamental ethical directions in his work *Soi-même comme un autre* that can serve as a basis for formulating a proper response to the present situation. For him, the principles of self-esteem, concern for the other, and solidarity according to institutionalized justice can help us to face the anonymous globally omnipresent institutional system. We must return to the source and renew the bond of the subject to his/her lived-roots.

Phenomenological anthropology recalls the fundamental dimensions of existence, i.e., bodiliness in all its dimensions, such as perspectival, spatio-temporal, affective and expressive, the recognition of the other, and the world as lived-horizon (*habitat*). The concept of bodiliness, as developed by Merleau-Ponty, indicates the structure of openness of the existent to the world and to others on the basis of the practical dispositions that condition action. The analysis of bodiliness takes up the modalities of the existent. My body is the opening by which my existence engages the sensible through active perception and experience. Hence, my body is the dynamic *milieu* of the senses both internal and external. It involves the active-passive relation of my relational and linguistic gestures, which tie me to the other existents and enable me to recognize myself in relation to other, who manifests his/her subjective identity.

The body – as sensible, motor, affective and expressive – is experienced in every encounter, and is at the root of every lived-experience of sense. Both actively and passively body is a source that recognizes itself in every encounter. It is the other, who enables me to take my own stand in the Sartrean sense of ethical and immediate perspective subjectivity, testifying to the "feeling" of remorse or pride in self. These sentiments lived in the immediacy of one who is “for the other” are possible only because the affective relational inter-play always found in the *Ineinander* of natural and cultural life. Therefore, bodiliness is immediately an affective relation – an intropathy. It manifests our relation with the lived-other who in an un-reflected mode is at the level of our common existential openness to the world. For example, our behavior is not the same when it is a matter of respect for life with regard to a human being, an animal, and vegetative life – though they all relate to us affectively in the context of bodily living. Thus, every behavior finds its roots in bodiliness, even behavior belonging to the most abstract cultural level.

The phenomenological analysis of affectivity uncovers the meaning of behavior. It points out the way to comprehend the other through the mediation of feeling. Feelings of compassion, remorse, and shame are the different affective forms found in every encounter. Similarly, feelings of respect and responsibility are the affective forms tied to ethical action. These are, as it were, the affective resonance of the subject with regard to the ethical goals of the other in action. Bodiliness is experienced in its affective resonance to the world as its existential horizon. Though *cosmic* nature is objectively the vital anchorage of techno-science, the concept of *cosmos* is secondary phenomenologically in comparison to the concept of the "life-world". It is always on the basis of our affective insertion as being-in-the-world that we discover our *habitat.* The world opens us to existence in bodiliness in the perspective of the horizon in which things and others are perceptible to our senses. Yet, this is only the horizon of perception; it is intrinsically significant in relation to spatio-temporal depth only to the measure it retains the traces of the past and anticipates the future. Vestiges of the past – the world lived as *habitat* – point back to cultural traditions

and institutions which present themselves as the unspoken horizon of memory, anticipations of the future, in the measure the cultural and natural potentialities join to offer the ingredients of a new world to be constructed.

These three existential dimensions: bodiliness, recognition of others and affectivity in the *habitat* – the world of our existence – define the structure of the existent being. At all costs this existential structure should be preserved in any existential reconstruction at whatever level. The existential structure must be able to maintain itself in the most elaborate forms of constructivist reason. Otherwise, like the tower of Babel, it may collapse into phenomenological in-significance.

Greater Focus on Ethics

Phenomenological anthropology, which interprets the original anchorage of affectivity, makes it possible to discover the emergence of meaning in all that is human since the dawn of life. We use the concept of affectivity in the sense of an originating dimension and not as an analysis of the "affects". Phenomenologically we can suggest this only on the basis of adult affective experience. The body appears in every lived-experience as the *milieu* of exchange which leads to the recognition of others through intropathy, based on the reverberation of the "affective" sense of pleasure or displeasure. This is sensed already by the new born who lives without distance – an experience fused to the mother – and through her to the affectivity of parental desire. This fused-presence introduces the existent being from the beginning of life to the "affective dimension" much before having for oneself the experience of desire as a relational reality. As a result, the infant experiences the need to recognize otherness at the time of the breaking away of its birth. This provides the child with the notion of return to the fusional dependence and a movement of installation in being a project of effective existence. This constitutes the transcendence of the subject – its existential step. The *infant* is able to reflect itself as in a mirror through its bodiliness before discovering its distinctive otherness through eventually meeting the other. This encounter constitutes the child as a relational subject, situated in relation to an "other".

Finally, the affective experience of jealousy, made possible by the presence of the other, the parent – the other of the other – enables the infant to discover the possibilities of putting its self at a distance, as well as the experience of reality constituted as objectively significant. The temporality of the *infant*, already manifest in the negative phase of separation, becomes self-conscious in what has been called the Oedipus complex – the reduplication of the desire of desire – in which one discovers the objectivity of an affective sexual other. This introduces the self as the pole of a differentiated sexual relation, which prefigures one's future affective and sexual autonomy as an adult. One can hypothesize that relational play of "sexual life" is already at work even before the relation of otherness at the moment of separation, though in an impersonal manner in its first fused

manifestations. Here, the constitutive meaning remains undifferentiated and yet to be decided by lived-pleasure or displeasure. Thus, the meaning of life as "sexual difference" is the radical source of all meaning, lived unreflectively and sustained symbolically by parental desire. Without doubt, only the speaking subject – more strictly, philosophy – can theorize the early experience of life as the lived-past of the affective *ego*.

From the emergence of meaning on the basis of this sexual experience present from the first recognition of distinctiveness/otherness, one can hypothesize that the meaning attached to the original sexual affectivity is reflected in every encounter – the interplay of otherness – whatever are the dimensions of the exchange of different divisions and relations of meaning. One need not conclude that the sexual dimension is identified with the sexual difference, but only that differentiation as relation of meaning in the reciprocal exchange of the feminine and the masculine bears the mark of meaning which becomes sensible and significant at all levels. From the beginning of its entry into language meaning is autonomous in defining all its levels of meaning while life expresses itself in each person according to the situated condition of man/ woman, which polarizes the whole course of existence in all its meanings. Whereas the arrow of sense takes its autonomy at the first entry into language to define all the levels of meaning, life expresses itself in accordance with the emergence of the situation in everyone, which is his/her proper condition as man/women, which polarizes the whole existence in all its encounters. However, this is not to be confused with the tension of an effective sexual life, which is its most intimate expression. Thus described, the meaning of affectivity is expressed in phenomenological language only at the cultural level of a consciousness able to reflect on it. However, inversely it is on the basis of this origin of meaning that existence comes to the possession of itself in the course of its journey between birth and death. On this basis, it establishes its "biological destiny": it is anchored and achieves its own dynamism of "sense". In this case, the rational dimension too emerges through a reciprocally constitutive sharing of the truth according to the mode of the affective anchoring in which the individual is situated. In other words, there is no integrating truth, which cannot be differentiated in its structure. Thus, it is necessary to recognize the affective sexual situation of all action whatever it might be, in so far as meaning emerges in lived-interaction that is true of all societies and human cultures. This means that the coordinates of interrelational experience are borne by an originating affectivity, whatever is said of the cleavages and cultural constructions that give way to the most abstract formalizations. Thus, ethics is able to bring to light the affective implications lived in all circumstances and to maintain in their practical projections the articulations of sense of an originary bodiliness.

However, questions can be raised regarding the existential underpinnings that condition the subjects as *zooi politikoi*. The otherness between the personal pronouns, as inter-subjectivity – as "I" and "you" with

respect to the “he” or “she”, the other of the other, or the third party instituting the rationality inside the structure of Oedipian triad. This finds its corresponding pole in the interrelation between “we” and “you”, with respect to “they”, the objective institution. In fact, all the existential ingredients that we just described find place in this state of things, but is there not a kind of awareness which extends beyond the constitution of the triad on another level where the collective intropathy of the "social bodiliness" as such is tied to the proper situation of a particular culture and history. This “social bodiliness” has the same virtual recognition from a given society to another social complex, as the one, which exists between the subjects themselves. The triadic structure, which is necessary for the genesis of the individual, enables him to recognize the “principle of reality” that corresponds to the social genetic life of recognition where the institution becomes the objective third and the guarantor for all social individuals. Thus, the “social otherness” of a higher level is more embracing because it is multiplied in the exchanges of cultures and finds fundamentally its ground in the collective *habitat* of the world. It is the world that generates the conditions of life. From one embracing situation to another, there is an awareness of the collective life as such, i.e., the mentalities evolve according to the affective forces of participation acting through the worldly events. There is here a landmark of social affective objectification – formal and concretely-lived – which constitutes the “structural adult passage” of the society toward the awareness that its own history participates in the history of other social groups in the world.

Here, we find again the *eco-éthica*: it comes from the differentiated relation between the *socius* and the neighbor. The institution symbolizes the realized objective state of a “common action” becoming able – through its apprenticeship with its proper differentiation – to have access to the experience of the world as such. By the same logic as that of the recognition of the intersubjective otherness, we speak here of the otherness between relational otherness, which find its anchorage in the intersubjective "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*). Here, the “life-world” is the originary scene, which immediately gives bodiliness its social dimension, thereby it recognizes its proper difference in the gestures of the tradition and the cultural language opposing it to the other cultures inside the diversified horizon of a common world. To learn about the other implies participating in the “affective collegiality”, which is inscribed in every encounter according to the various institutions. This plurality of social life is what the new layers of generations are grasping with the greatest acuteness in the cultural difference. Not being aware of the constraints of the past engagements, the new generations are ready to receive the call for a change of mentalities and to recreate the social life according to and thanks to the originary affective resonance.

CONCLUSION

The question regarding the greater interest in ethical research finds in the analysis of affectivity – its source of sense as dynamic and significant force. The question is to understand how the affective structure, as originary generating force of sense, can induce the ethical attitude. We suggest that affectivity enables to the existent being to understand him/her in resonance with a particular lived-situation, precisely because affectivity is deeply involved in the originary interrelation of the "life-world". It is from this pathic originary structure that everybody is able to identify the lived-situations in their common resorts. This affective and communicative identification can give inspiration to “ethical intuition”. Besides, it can open the feeling of affective identification to a “beyond” with respect to the ethical experience, calling it always to overcome itself. We do not have to do here with the idea of the “city of ends”. Its aim is not the practical rational interest, but rather to find again in lived-intropathy the interrelational anchorage which induces it to a new mentality, i.e.., the feeling of solidarity. The pathic lived-life, which is drawn from the originary interrelation in the "life-world", is the universalizing condition of mediation which rejoins the ethical call beyond the lived-difference of peoples and men, and which “affects” them *between* themselves.

CHAPTER 19

METAPHYSICAL DIFFERENCE AND GLOBALIZATION: LIFE OF DESIRE

INTRODUCTION

To speak of the “becoming” of metaphysics appears at first sight paradoxical particularly from the point of view of classical metaphysics, which inscribes itself under the predominance and the perennity of the Absolute. Moreover, to establish a relation between metaphysics and *Age of Globalization* seems to give simply an expression to the factual interdependence. These twofold questions appear as inscribed implicitly in the heart of our debate. In this chapter, we try to make these questions more concretely explicit. We elaborate on these questions in three parts. The first part recalls the “sense of metaphysics” in the history of philosophy. It underlines its inscription in the west and the transcendental openness that links it today with intercultural horizon. In expounding the sense of metaphysics the philosophies of Parmenides, Aristotle, thinkers of the Middle Ages, and the philosophers of the Modern *Epoch*, such as Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger are briefly considered. The second part interrogates the notion of globalization. The state of affairs that transforms today all the dimensions of existence – different cultures, techno-science, ecology and society, political and juridical sciences, and aesthetic and ethical values – which constitute a new step in the emergence of life. The third part tackles the dimensions of historicality and world-wide globalization, in so far as both of them constitute the differentiation that is intrinsic to the question of Being (*Sein*). Thus, taking into account that "“Ontological Difference", named "flesh of the world" by Merleau-Ponty, we recognize in it concretely the emergence of sense and, more precisely, the sign of the future, always already there, which is called ontologically the “life of desire”. The conclusion states that it is thanks to the originary construction of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) that we discover the import of desire: it bears the radical affectivity that attunes itself to the Spirit of “Sense”. From destiny the desire for life emerges, not only as nature (*phusis*) of the terrestrial horizon, but – after the fashion of the infinite depth of the *cosmos* – as the appeal of Being, always more abyssal, from an infinite donation of “Sense”.

Having briefly spelt out our plan in this chapter, now, we move on to consider the sense of metaphysics in the next section.

SENSE OF METAPHYSICS: PERENNITY OR HISTORICALIZATION?

Greek thought teaches us the meaning of the terms “philosophy” and "metaphysics". Already in his didactic poem, Parmenides opposed the distinction between “Being” and “Becoming”. According to him: “We must move away from Being only to be born and to perish.” Paradoxically, and whatever may be the habits of thinking, Heraclites says actually the same thing because, for him, “Being *is* Becoming”. They give the name *phusis* to that which opens out by itself, stands up in this appearing, and has presented itself before them not from natural experiences, but from a fundamental inner experience, which involves aesthetics and thinking. *Phusis* is not only what we designate as phenomena of nature, but also it is the Being itself thanks to which the beings become observable.[1]

We know also that Aristotle has placed what he calls the “first philosophy” beside the science of beings because it alone is capable of demonstrating the principles of all sciences. It deals with “the first causes and the first principles”[2] and, in general it explains reality in its totality. Being a science superior to any subordinate science, it “knows in view of what end each thing must be made, and which is in each being its good and, generally speaking, the sovereign good in the whole of Nature.”[3] Thus, first philosophy aims essentially at the ultimate and last causes of all beings (*Meta ta physica*). As the first cause of every becoming, the Prime Mover is pure, eternal and motionless. As the first principle, it is life. Aristotle adds: “Life comparable to the most perfect one, which could be given to us to live one moment.”[4] In fact, life is said to be in multiple ways. Aristotle distinguishes, notably in his *Treatise on Generation and Corruption*, the modes of vital integration of the beings at the vegetative, sensitive and intelligible levels. *Érôs* is their dynamic dimension. In the treatise *On the soul* – where the Platonist intuitions of his youth can be found again – Aristotle reverses the causality of the desiring movement, starting from the intelligible beings and the celestial spheres, thereby relating nature of the physical beings to the cosmological circular translation. At the level of the human intelligence, the pathic intellect discovers itself necessarily moved by the Agent Intellect, which manifests the transcendence of the Good. This is because “the Thought, the one which is by itself, is the Thought of what is the best by itself and the sovereign Thought is the sovereign Good.” Being transcendent, the Good is the only object of contemplation; it attracts to itself any desire.

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[1] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Introduction à la métaphysique*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), p. 27.

[2] Aristotle, *La Métaphysique*, trad. J. Tricot, (Paris : Vrin, 1966), p. 10.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 15.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 681.

Later, in the middle ages, the Greek thought becomes the object of a Christian revision. Christian thinkers maintain the conception of an intelligible life and the absolute Good, in the immanence of the divine Transcendence. Thus, the concept of the "Substance that is in itself Infinite" translates positively. The Infinite does not comprise any more in itself negativity, at the opposite of the notion of the undefined infinite, in the Greek sense; it gives its positive delimitation to the totality of the real.

The modern *epoch* takes this concept again in the context of the ontological argument of St. Anselm, in order to recognize in it the omnipotence of reason, the reason of the *Cogito*, giving greater place to the mode of the thinking substance with respect to the corporeal substance. The rationalist dualism of Descartes cannot but re-launch the metaphysics of the Infinitely Perfect Being, as necessary condition of the thinking existence.[5] Thus, it is the order of reason, which founds the real in its totality. Through its variants, metaphysics remains for the philosophizing subject always the quest of the Being, even if Kant denounces its realist exteriorizing import and converts it in the subjective transcendental dimension of a science of the a prior principles of reason. Hegel, in turn, has broken the framework of the rationalist ontology, by investing in it the becoming of the history of Being and Life. However, desire, which was its intrinsic movement and which gives life to the totality of the real is finally reflected only by the consciousness of the philosophizing subject, up to its objective resolution: the Concrete Universal/the Absolute Spirit. This genial philosophical conception, which is self-realizing, is never only a unilateral thematization of reason as Spirit. Even though, in this occurrence, the metaphysical undertaking has taken itself genetically in the sensitive consciousness and the desire, the two figures of Being are systematically re-appropriated in the dialectical becoming of the whole of reality, by consciousness, i.e., the subjective consciousness of the philosopher himself. The system has certainly conquered the apogee of idealism, but it closes again its key on itself.

Now, it is precisely the questioning on Being in totality – "why is there Being and not rather nothing" – which must produce the shock in return (*Schritt zurück)*: it is on the questioning itself – "why the why?" – that we leave the habitual course of life as "the event of a questioning liberty".[6] There is the force of calling that the Being must be realized always again: "It is only in the coming-to-be that the philosophical truth opens itself."[7] Heidegger opens here the Greek term "*phusis*" towards a realm that is beyond-the-beings, and in the same way he opens the question of Being beyond the notions of pure Act in Thomas Aquinas, the concept of

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[5] Cf. H. Ngimbi Nseka, *Dieu à l'horizon de l'acte philosophique*, (Kinshasa: Facultés Catholiques de Kinshasa, 2000), pp. 25-28.

[6] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Introduction à la métaphysique*, p. 25.

[7] *Ibid*., p. 94.

the Absolute in Hegel, and the concept of "will-to-power" in Nietzsche. All these authors have brought back metaphysics to the question of the Being of the beings as such.[8] In the same way, the transcendental is the one only of the subjective consciousness, and it determines itself from the ex-static temporality of the being-there.[9] Thus, the metaphysical enquiry does not question thematically about Being and Being remains forgotten![10]

For the first time in the history of philosophy, the question of the "sense" of Being is raised and developed expressively as a philosophical question. Being is that through which the being-having-been comes toward us, the horizon not as far away, but as medium, element, or dimension of things. Measuring in the meaning of capacity of measuring. It is not man, but the Being, as dimension of the ex-static reality of existence. However, this dimension is not what is known as a spatial element, but rather we must say that any spatial element and any space-time realize themselves in the dimension that is as such Being itself.[11] Thus, Heidegger abandons any essentialist consideration of Being. Being belongs to the level of the world with respect to which any thing receives a sense. It is the excess of our experience on the "subject", "object", and "men" – all the beyond of these terms obtained by splitting, a beyond that is not nothing.[12] It is the "thinking" (*Das Denken*) – and not philosophy – of the Being as "sense"; the "*als*", which is the moving relationship in which Being manifests in entities, thereby Being hides itself in the entities. This relationship is embracing with respect to the senses.[13] What makes one say that the entities hide Being is not in the sense of theology of the dead God or the metaphysics of nothingness, but is the non-positive veiling of the essence of the Being – the bottom, the abyss.

This new conception of the fundamental ontology in its overcoming seizes the "sense" according its exceeding import. It engages the historical development of Being, founds in the history of men, and the calling of their destiny (*Geschick*). The trace of the future – inscribed in the heart of Being – announces the destiny of the "being-there" (*Da-sein*). The *Dasein* is open to the transcendence as ex-static movement, related to the world, and is borne by the "sense" of being, which is essentially "*pro-* coming". In the next section, we elaborate on the notion of globalizationa and its relationshipp to the notion of encounter (*Ineinander*).

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[8] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 430.

[9] Cf. *Ibid*.

[10] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 31.

[11] Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Lettre sur l'humanisme*, (Paris: Aubier, 1964), p. 80.

[12] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours1959-61*, p. 115.

[13] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 120.

NOTION OF GLOBALIZATION AND ENCOUNTER

The definition of the term "globalization" covers the experience of totalization, producing the emergence of a world, unifying the entire natural and cultural domains. Thus, the world becomes common in the communicative interrelation in which the limits of the earth are circumscribed, forming a concrete (*existentiell*) *habitat*. Globalization also aims at the notion of horizon as openness of the "life-world" to the *cosmos* in its totality. The recent scientific discoveries – in physics, biology, cosmology, and information-technology – impose a new conception of the global reality, which is extended to the universe in its entirety, pushes away the limits of the spatial-temporal horizon, and brings about a new and an unprecedented virtual universe. This horizon is open toward the most remote part of the *cosmic* depths, and towards the most elementary particles that constitute matter and life. However, it is perhaps more the world of artificial intelligence and the cognitive sciences which engages the space-time world towards quite original potentialities.

The globalization of the world (*habitat*) is a contemporary event. We can consider it as an ecological event. Globalization draws on our *Lebenswelt*, according to two complementary directions: the first towards the generalized institutional unification; and the second towards the traditional attachment that underlines cultural differences. Several factors have contributed to the deployment of a worldwide globalization: the tendencies linked to the movements of democratization and de-colonization; the social efforts promoting the liberation of the developing countries; generalized universal education; access to independence by women; and the recognition of human rights. However, it is principally the exponential development of the sciences and technologies that has contributed to open practically the intercultural horizon to the entire populations of the world. The new mentalities that are provoked by the world wars and propagated by the media – the radio, the press, the television, the telephone, the internet – and the proliferation of the mobility networks that have exerted their pressure on people, accelerate the setting up of a new spatial-temporal "life-world" and ensure to each one a polyvalent access to intercultural exchanges.

What is radically changed in the world of techno-science is the virtual capacity of creativity. The virtual space has become the measure of informatics, memory, and the performances of the principles of encoding. Thanks to simple association by similarity, the calculus of the neuronal networks is able to implement real associative memories and to generalize their capacities for classification of the new *data*. The self-organization of some networks is able to produce their structured "output" without any instruction at the encoding, while others are able not only to reconstitute perceptive images, but also "create" a global configuration of the "output"

after successive iterations in the learning process.[14] The choice of communication between networks is made at random, according to the contexts of the environment. We can interpret the "phenomena" in the sense Husserl proposes: the networks phenomenalize themselves without being limited by the spatial-temporal structure of the real objects in such a way that "the results of the simulation suggest unusual solutions, from which it will be possible to look at the real in a quite new way."[15] They make unexpected effects appear in reality, produced by the multiplication of the plans and the mnemonic connections, and by the effects of retroactive loops that enable them to attain an artificial performance. As a result, we are no longer able to effectively control the usual intelligence. Yet, whatever may be the mnemonic powers or the degree of abstraction controlled by the system, artificial intelligence is possible only in function of its anchoring, i.e., the perceptive and practical dimension of a lived-structure of bodiliness. If virtual reality enables one to see existential possibilities at an original level, the effective transcendence is not realizable in virtue of the lived-mediation of the body in the *Lebenwelt*. Phenomenologically the relation of bodiliness with the practical world gives the system the radical initial landmark of its surrounding contextualization. In this way, the modelizing of the structural connections maintains it implicitly present in all the transpositions and according to the successive interweaving of the relays.

The technologies anticipate the not-yet actual fallout of that "irresolute world"[16] of the possible modelizations to come. They exert on globalisation a competitive and increasing build up of artificial performances, leading existence in the conditioning of a virtual future life, as though the virtual is the dreamlike beginnings of an ideal world. From the anthropological and ethical points of view, the relation which connects the technological *praxis* to nature is practically reversed. The modalities of artificial intelligence in scientific research prefigure the field of existence in all domains – economic, political, and cultural. This inversion of the human situation breaks with the traditional movement of evolution of research in such a way that the uncertainty concerning the future fallout on the entire mankind must necessarily make appeal to new ethical and political criteria. In this sense, globalization is a form of impoverishment of mankind, in the measure in which it finds itself forced to loose progressively its proper cultural levels and particularities. Similarly, the attraction of a performing mode of expression takes its decisive part for a common constructive projects pertaining to International Law, and official/non-official organizations, such as UNESCO, HCR, and Doctors without Frontiers.

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[14] Cf. T. Dedeurwaerde, *Action et contexte, du tournant cognitiviste à la phénoménologie transcendantale*, (Hildesheim: OLMS, 2002), p. 39.

[15] *Ibid*., p. 175.

[16] Cf. K. Popper, *L'univers irrésolu*, (Paris: Herman, 1975).

Thus, globalization reflects a centrifugal movement: it is a force of connection between all the levels of action and human behaviour, and in reverse a centripetal movement of individual and collective independence. As one can see that the twofold tendency implies the dialectics of the one and the many, it brings into play the "becoming of sense" as "pro-ject". Besides, the new values of sense are produced actually by the cultural differences. At the moment where new constellations articulate themselves at each level, they aim at recognizing each other progressively with respect to the horizon of sense which totalizes their integrating movement: the projection of a future unity announces the possibility of a universal destiny of mankind, whereas the peoples discover the singular truth of sense in their proper traditional differentiation. However, actually we are not allowed to read these tendencies, from a subjective point of view, the dialectical movement described by Sartre about the desiring constitution as "pro-ject" of life, in itself without limitation The upsurge of desire, which differentiates objectively the modalities of existence, is precisely the force, which shapes also the destinal unity of that "common world" already in the process of its integration. "Sense" and "difference" produce historically the unity of a reality differentiated in its overcoming.

HISTORICALITY OF THE FUTURE AND WORLD-WIDE GLOBALIZATION

Until now, we have interrogated metaphysics in the history of philosophy, and asked the question of the "sense" of Being, developed expressly as question. we have also described the movement of globalization as the effect of the action of the techno-sciences confronted with the contingency of an "irresolute world". We believe that the movement of worldwide globalization questions the significance of metaphysics. It does not mean that we have to conclude that the globalization borne by the technologies bears in itself also the exceedence of Being.

The secularisation of the world by technique brings about the earth being dismissed of its privilege of being the "metaphysical centre"; it becomes a celestial object among others possibly inhabited.[17] This does not relativize the earth: if it widens through its contact with other planets, it remains in any case the pre-objective body from which communication is established. Even though other thinking entities existed, a communication open to a wider extra-terrestrial environment may still be connected with the starting point of our human universe. In other words, even though the *cosmic* rocket transforms our relation with "nature"/world as a unity that is always open to new horizons, always more remote with respect to the earth

[17] Merleau-Ponty suggests this possibility already in 1959. Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours1959-61*, p. 44.

– it is still by the intermediary of the technological mediations that we enlarge our possibilisations of habiting the *cosmos*: we are always somewhere. Actually, whatever may be the present cosmological discoveries, and without falling into the style of science fiction which they suggest, it remains in any case related to our bodiliness and by a continuous transpositions toward new modalities/creation of new bodily and linguistic identities, so that we can be assured of technological context and continue access to communication. In this sense, the present exploits of science – biological, physical or cosmological – are only widening the spatial-temporal possibilities of mankind/the *depth* of the world. They open more possibilities of intercommunication, which today are still measured at the intra-terrestrial level of cultural interrelation. Now, it is at the measure of the intercommunication between cultures that the whole of human creativities evolve. We must first put ourselves in its hands and consider the relation of sense they evoke. On one hand, differentiation produces effects of natural and spiritual contrasts between the ethnic groups and the cultural traditions, belonging to the different nations of the globe. On the other hand, the capacity for having a glimpse of an intra-cultural consensus initiates and makes the recognition of the progress between cultures. This twofold polarity – multiplication of the significations and unification of the understanding between peoples and cultures – underlines the movement of differentiation through which the enlargement of "sense" is promoted.

We wonder if the concrete globalization engages also the destiny of Being, and thus the future of metaphysics. Is it in the same way as the *Dasein*, which is opened to transcendence in the ex-static movement linking it to the horizon of the world? However, the *Dasein* is borne historially by the "sense" of Being, i.e., as essentially "*pro*-coming". We know that Heidegger has overcome the notion of temporality by the notion of historicality, thereby bringing back fundamental Ontology to the question of Being as "*Das Denken*" . Hence, the question of the temporality of *Dasein* is integrated in the event-like action of the history of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*) which evokes an operation of Being, not in the sense of a continuous series of acts and passions of men, but as advent of sense, "as given in sharing to the *Dasein* and to the *Mitsein* as *Moira*, i.e., as destiny (*Geschick*)."[18] Thus, this coming-to of the Being is by essence a metaphysical question. In order to understand its connivance with the concrete globalization of the world, we make an appeal to three phenomenological concepts, which foreshadow their interpretation: Encounter (*Ineinander*), Destiny (*Geschick*), and Desire (*Begierde*).

[18] *Ibid*., p. 136.

Encounter

The phenomenological analyses of Merleau-Ponty are well known. They apply themselves to seize the metaphysics of "sense" precisely according to two methodological directions, representing two dimensions of Being: the first places the "sense" in perspective of the relational and reversible play of the "structure"; the second refers to the understanding of "nature" according to the evolutive and inter-relational integrations of beings in the *Ineinander* in totality. In this context, metaphysics is quite the contrary of a system; its condition is linked to the contingency of all that exists. The task of metaphysics is not to highlight a separated world (Aristotle), but to have the experience – though full of paradoxes – of the human inter-subjectivity. Metaphysics helps us to think thoroughly about the same phenomena which science investigates by situating them again only in their originary transcendence and strangeness.[19] Whereas objective thought holds the things at a distance, subjective experience provides the certitude of the self in relation to two dimensions: the first pertaining to thought and the second related to lived-aspect of the *cogito*. This, in turn, forces one to recognize in the daily experience an affinity with all beings, and gives one the power to seize his/her life from the inside of individual difference and universal correspondence.[20] This is the metaphysics "within man."

Overcoming the notion of objectivization proper to scientism and classical philosophy and opposing existence as a thing and as consciousness,[21] the " structure" (*Gestalt*) in the perceptive plays and manifests the reversibility *between* figure and background, from which the "sense" spurts out. The structure relates to daily experience, co-extensive to the entire being, in such a way that in the perception and in the dialogue with the others we can find the "germ of universality" without which there can be neither knowledge nor truth. The concept of structure highlights the relationship of concrete universality of sense not only for the behavior of the lived-bodiliness in psychology, but also in the other human sciences that concern language, history, and sociology. Thus, structure manifests itself as a dimension of Being. As a result, metaphysics is not a construction of concepts: it is the experience that we have of Being in all the situations of personal and collective history,and in the performance of actions transformed by reason.[22] There is no absolute evidence: the metaphysical and moral consciousness dies upon contact with the Absolute, because it is

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[19] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, "La métaphysique dans l'homme"; *Sens et non-sens*, (Paris: Nagel, 1948), p. 186.

[20] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 187 ss.

[21] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 171, 176.

[22] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 191.

itself the living connection of myself with me and others.[23] Thus, metaphysics and science are not rivals; each of them contributes to interrogate the objective reality. Therefore, scientific questioning – as objectifying knowledge – reduce thinking as life. A purely formal metaphysics does not reach the field of the concrete experience of the world, invested by the sciences.

Thus, we have to discover the life of "sense" by interrogating nature. However, this qustioning of nature neither means considering nature as *factum* in itself ensuring the advent of modern science, nor considering nature as constituted by human history. Instead, it is all about viewing nature as the "nature-for-us as ground of all our culture" thereby creating the possibility for activity to take root while confronting the wild-being. It calls for perceieving nature as the process of life at all levels of existence in the promotional circularity of its appearing in the course of the evolution of the world. Since this is the case, the concept of encounter (*Ineinander*), which retakes the concept of structure at a generalized level of exchange, occurs here as "nervure of the full Being"[24] beyond the being-object and the being-subject. The *Ineinander* explicitates the links between beings in the reciprocal overcoming of sense. Intersubjectivity is retaken in the spatial-temporal framework of the cultures, their traditional modalities, and their respective creativities exchanged not according to the framework of a formal rationality as proposed by Levi-Strauss, but according to the fluidity of the "sense", taken in the surrounding context of the ambient world, as "flesh of the world". Thus, things appear through a subjective form, which is the fabric of our life, but they may appear through several lives, in such a way that one discovers the relation to oneself as subjectivity. However, one cannot cross himself/herself and his/her duration, which is non-coincidence. As the things are behind the appearance, one's cohesion is always behind his/her change and unity behind the multiplicity – as a horizon.[25] There is a kind of interlocking of the bodies – one on others: what happens to one, his/her life and death, metamorphoses the duration, the age, and the other.[26] However, the relation to the natural things and to the others are themselves borne by language and meanings, which constitute the relationships between cultures. Thus, "the universe of culture comes down in the visible", the spirit is not behind the things but within the things. The meanings are less positive entities than divergences between significances in suspense. Scientific knowledge is always in reprieve; the critical justification of knowledge shows in it the unfolding of an ontological function, an originary contact with being and with oneself, which is called experience.[27] Thus, the

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[23] Cf. *Ibid*.
[24] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours1959-61*, p. 392.
[25] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 365.
[26] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 211.
[27] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 369.

Ineinander indicates the presence of the Being, in *the inter-medium of the beings overcoming each other*. However, from where does the movement of overcoming proceed? This question taks us to the consideration of destiny in the next section.

Destiny

Here, we take up the concepts of destiny (*Geschick*) and historicality for discussion. Destiny is the original "adventure" by which the *Dasein* confronts existence with its finitude, as a being-towards-death: his "ad-vent" – between the two ends of birth and death – by which he assumes his nearest inherited/non-willed possibility and manifests his destiny in temporality. However, *Dasein* exists essentially in the world with others; his adventure (*Geschehen*) is shared with the others in the "common destiny"of the people.[28] Historicality is actually only a more concrete interpretation of temporality, as the world is a determination of *Dasein*. The adventure of history is the adventure of the being-in-the-world,[29] because the "having-been" and the "arising" are open to the triple possibility of human existence: the monumental, the antiquarian and the critical as proposed by Nietzsche.[30] In other words, historicality indicates the movement of human history, which manifests the emergence (*Ereignis*) of its essence, according to the succession of its modes of unveiling the cultural *epochs*. The modern *epoch* is marked by technology. The essence of technology is characterised by the concept of "*Gestell*"[31] which designates a relation of mankind with nature, become available as object, and submitted to the provocation of human engineering. This state of affairs is not the work of man; it is the concrete manifestation of a mode of unveiling of reality in its truth (*alêtheia*), i.e., Being in human history. Thus, historicality is the event-like mode of appearing of Being, in so far as it manifests the "Destiny of Mankind". The essence of metaphysics has rejoined the essence of technology. Here, we attend the turning point of the Heideggerian philosophy passing from fundamental ontology to the "thinking of Being" (*das Denken des Seins*). At the same time, the notion of Destiny is reinterpreted in the light of the "quadripartite structure" as Nietzsche said. This new conception of metaphysics, integrated with the destiny of nature, is retaken by Merleau-Ponty: "the vertical Being" is taken in the circular play of history and nature. This play is played in the "life-world".

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[28] Cf. M. Heidegger, *L'Etre et temps*, trad. Francaisç, (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), p. 449.

[29] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 453.

[30] Cf. *Ibid*., pp. 461 ss.

[31] Cf. Martin Heidegger, "L'essence de la technique"; *Essais et conférences*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1996).

Desire

Our purpose is to make metaphysics and concrete globalization of the world work together. We have touched on the effects of globalization at the level of the contemporary control of technologies. However, it is important to know from where the "*Gestell*", as mode of unveiling of Being, occurs. Understanding the concept of nature makes the "sense" of life arise. In the historial circularity of nature the movement of life has recognized itself thanks to "desire" (*Begierde*). Hegel secures for us its passage as manifesting the emergence of mankind to its dimension of universality. Merleau-Ponty modulates its signification from "biology". "As concrete psychophysics of man, it is not a contingent discipline" linked to terrestrial anthropology; it has a worldwide generality as much as physics.[32] Yet, how to understand its sense? Life is commanded by the effective and originary experience of the lived-subjectivity experienced in its humanity, since life in general is given, is originary in the most authentic manner, and manifests in the self-intelligence of the biological.[33] Methodologically, it is always with respect to the other, as perceived or experienceed in extraneous circumstances, so that the subject recognises itself and becomes able to take an objectifying distance. Thus, if we have access today to the concept of concrete globalization, it is thanks to the technological and scientific progress which enables mankind to recognize itself in the historiality of Being, nature and life.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion we can say that all the variants of affectivity (*Einfühlung*) develop in the same direction. We have a generative *a priori* such that we understand the structure of the natural environment, as the world of animal communication and communication between things. Finally, it is thanks to the originary construction of the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) that we discover the import of desire: it bears the radical affectivity that attunes itself to the Spirit of "Sense". We touch here on the event of life as desiring donation of Being itself: "Man is question for God himself."[34] The metaphysical conception is linked to the emergence of "Sense" in man; it has made us discover our belonging to the destiny of the world, from the historial action of modern technology. From this destiny the desire for life emerges, not only as nature (*phusis*) of the terrestrial horizon, but – after the fashion of the infinite depth of the *cosmos* – as the appeal of Being, always more abyssal, from an in-finite donation of "Sense".

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[32] Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours1959-61*, p. 386.
[33] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 383.
[34] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 39.

CONCLUSION

VENSUS A. GEORGE

Now that we have come to the end of this volume that has attempted to unfold the diverse dimensions of the phenomenon of affectivity from the phenomenological-anthroplogical perspective, we briefly reiterate and highlight some significant and charcteristic elements of affectivity that have come alive as we reflect on the contents of these essays. The themes are the following: bodiliness, otherness and culture as originary foundations of affective existence; affective existence though finite and being-towards-death, yet is lived in hope; identity, diversity, and interrelationality of cultures and challenges to their affective foundation; affective existence as the result of one's openness to Being's self-giving and mutal self-giving of persons; affective exsitence as related to moral values; affective experience finding expression in relation to bodiliness; affective existence finding expression in upholding respect for human persons and human dignity; and affective existence and the new developments in metaphysics and anthropology. Now, it is our task to elaborate on these themes thereby giving expression to our reflection on the contents of the essays contained in this volume.

BODILINESS, OTHERNESS, AND CULTURE: ORIGINARY/PRE-PREDICATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF AFFECTIVE EXISTENCE

Bodiliness underlines the facticity of our embodied situation as beings-in-the-world. The objectivity of culture, philosophy, science, and every form of affective existence belong to the perceptive, the intersubjective, and the common "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*), which is experienced in its originary and pre-predicative level in relation to bodiliness. Hence, the objective dimension of intellectual, moral, and affective life of human persons in their cultural existence is based on the intersubjective horizon of the "life-world", which unfolds in the intersubjective bodily life of human persons as *egos* and *alter-egos*. Thus, the originary experience of the *ego* in all its relation of exchanges is constituted by the apperception of the other human persons as *alter-egos* in the context of each other's bodiliness. The human *ego* is a psychophysical reality constituted of the soul (*psyche*), the body (*Leib*) and the material body/physical nature (*Körper*). Therefore, the human *ego* in its bodiliness is the psychophysical subject and the *substratum* that constitutes itself before the material nature and in correlation with it. It constitutes the organs of perception of the subject of experience. As the subject of experince, the *ego* in its bodiliness is mediator of all the functions of consciousness, both the sensible impressions that have immediate somatic localization as well as the impressions that constitute affective existence, such as the ground of the life

of desire, pleasure, suffering and the like. All these sensible impressions constitute, in an immediate intuitive way in the context of bodiliness as the realm of "subjective-objectivity" as distinct from sensations of the physical body (*Körper*). Therefore, it is to these distinctive intersubjective psychosomatic *substrata* as *egos* and *alter-egos* belong the "life-world" of culture, sciences, and philosophy; our intersubjective horizon – our ground, the earth, and the *habitat* in which we learn to meet each other as persons; all the intentional functions of the human pesons; and the originary experience of affectivity.

Thus, bodiliness is always a bodiliness that is related to otherness. Hence, the experience of originary affective existence in the context of personal and intersubjective bodiliness implies that affective experience is actualized only in relation to the decisive and originary encounter with the other, in the spatio-temporal realm. Our bodiliness mediates all our possibilities of existence in our relationship with the other, which involves common belonging to the same affective experience. Language and desire – as modalities that express affective life – manifest it through "saying", "expression", and the "affect" particularly in the event of an encounter with the other.The interrelation is expressed through language in its two aspects of gesture and word. The presence of the other through language appeals to desire, which aims at realizing the hope of a promise to which the other holds implicitly the secret, particularly in the context of sexual differentiation. Thus, assisted by language and desire in the context of an encounter we experience affectivity in our bodiliness.Therefore, the clarification of the affective states involves the analysis of bodiliness as related to intersubjective encounter and as experienced in the lived-temporality and spatiality, which in turn leads to intropathy between the persons involved, and this relationship also implies the dimension of sexual differentiation.

This intersubjective encouner in the realm of bodiliness is an experience that is culture-specific and is founded on a cultural tradition. Hence, every culture bears its proper tradition and gives life again to the intrinsic truths and values contained in its tradition and brings to light the most humanizing aspirations of that tradition. It thereby gives rise to ethical values in relation to which the truth and efficacy of our concrete/bodily actions and social justice are constructed, justified and objectively measured. The cultural world is the "life-world" – though it belongs to the order of the primordial donation of Being and serves as the universal frame of all experiences of a being-in-the-world as related to other beings-in-the-world. It is the horizon of one's possibilities as lived out in relation to the other. Each cultural structure makes a difference and makes "sense" of history and affective life. Thus, each cultural world measures itself against the horizon of all the other cultural worlds, and while reflecting itself in them gives history and affective existence its singular expression.

Thus, bodiliness, otherness, and cultural world constitute the existential structure, i.e., the "Sense" of affective existence. They form the

originary foundations of affectivity. Their realm is a gratuitous donation of Being (*Sein*), the Source of opening for every relationship among beings-in-the-world. Being, as the Source, in donating graruitously bodiliness, otherness, and culture brings about the interlacing of "saying" and "feeling" through language and desire, and gives affective existence its dynamism.

AFFECTIVE EXISTENCE: BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH, YET LIVED IN HOPE

As a finite being the the human person in his/her affective existence is a being-towards-death. Human life is outlined against objective horizon of a fateful date. It is only recapitulating in thought the act of existing the human subjectivity as a finite being-towards-death understands the reality of his/her being in relation to the anguish of not-being-any-more. Hence, the human subject understands himself/herself neither in relation to the reflective order, nor in relation to the ethical order, but in relation to the act of existing as an affective human being, which finds its concrete manifestation in relation to the encounter with the other in the dimension of desire mediated by bodiliness. Therefore, until the structural character of the "act of existing" manifests the human person as an affective being, he/she is transfixed with absence as finite temporality. In a person's recapitulation in thought about death – precisely as having no more an "after" – he/she experiences death as the end of his/her entire temporality, and thereby experiences his/her true identity as an affective being and nature as a finite existence. Therefore, death brings together the disconnected poles of the existing being filled in the difference in the present unity of the self.

However, the objective death is a natural and cultural fact. Natural death is necessary for the emergence of new forms of life. A person has an actual intuition of death in the context of his daily life, when he experiences a slowdown of temporal flow of life in relation to his bodiliness due to physical illness, a psychological anomaly, and the like. Similarly, the actual experience of death of another person and especially the affective absence experienced in the bereavement of a close relative make us participate at the absolute aura of the "instant" of death. This experience of the "instant" of death, coupled with the realization that there is no more an "after" of death makes one existentially experience one's own death. The "instant" of death opens the affective existing being to the most personal singularity as authentically lived liberty and the "after" of death provides the effective solution to the absolute tension of desire, personal plenitude, moving beyond finitude, and all one hopes for.

Therefore, life has its meaning in death. This, in turn, permits relating death back to one's personal life. There is no opposition between being and non-being, between life and death because lived-meaning of bodiliness outline the spatio-temporal structure of life against the backdrop of its absence in death. On the death of the organic body the reversibility between figure and ground is annulled. What is traditionally the composite body-soul

is annulled, no longer having concrete organic support. Neverthless, the sense that has been at work throughout the whole course of a person's life is the movement of meaning. This movement no longer has horizontal support given that the organic body no longer has a place in the world. Yet the power of the meaning that supports its movement cannot be abolished: it exists in the world of pure bodiliness. While no longer having a horizon and being incarnate in the depths of the world, in death it finds its proper meaning. Its worldly horizon being barred, the power of the emergence of the existential meaning returns on itself, drawing its sense from the original gift from where it is received. This existential sense reflects on itself, so that its own movement in the inverse exposes itself to the original gift and its loving light.

Besides, from the point of view of cultural historicity the dead survive concretely in the heritage of the tradition. Thus, death does not deny life, but it brings life's traces to fruition. Again life and death mix throughout a person's existence producing meaning between life and death, which in turn adds a sense of mystery to life. Hence, there can be another interpretation of difference as differentiating relation between life and death which alone makes sense. The remedy for death and suffering which appear between death and and the human person is not to turn away, but to pass beyond all that we bring to it, and live through our death in true freedom.

IDENTITY, DIVERSITY, AND INTERRELATIONALITY OF CULTURES AND CHALLENGES TO THEIR AFFECTIVE FOUNDATION

Every culture presents itself in its proper historical identity as the act of a singular community. The identity of a culture is related to a tradition which precedes it as a horizon and is always open to a future understanding. This is true of all existing cultures. However, reflection on culture has opened the question of the diversity of cultures, and particularly the significance of eastern cultures presenting worldviews different from that of the western culture. Western thinking from its origins up to the present has been indebted to eastern cultures, though it has not been publically acknowledged and fully accepted.The recognition of cultural difference and acknowledment of the existence of many cultural traditions is closely related to our being in common, which differentiates itself according to generations and places. This, in turn, provides the conditions for cultural encounter. A culture is not a juxtaposed whole without doors or windows, but is co-determined in its relations to the horizons of other cultures. Just as words are exchanged in a universe of meaning which already exists, in the same way cultures are constituted in the context of a ""life-world", in which the singular points of view are interchanged. Every culture deepens itself to the measure it listens to other cultures and finds itself interpolated by them in a common recognizing. Thus, every culture is of value for itself and gives value to other cultures to the measure it opens itself to the horizon of all the

other cultures. Hence, cultures can in no way objectify each other, for as in a mirror they themselves are implicated in the horizon of others. For this reason, there is hope for progress through intercultural cooperation when there is the compenetration of different horizons, in the interrelation of a living plurality of meanings differentiated according to the differences between cultures: each is unique and nevertheless part of the horizon for the others. Thus, the ontological foundation of our living together as persons in a relation of encounter with the other is the encounter of cultures. Just as persons are interrelational, cultures are interrelational. Therefore, they do not belong any more to the horizonal order of a single "life-world", but to the plurality emerging from the very movement of the operating difference among different cultures.

Having looked into the identity, diversity and interrelationality of cultures, we need to focus our attention on maintaning the affective foundation of each culture intact despite the danger of it being lost in the process of encounter and integration of cultures. The originary affective foundation of cultures can be challenged, thereby the loss of affectivity in the context of cultures can come about for a number of reasons. Firstly, it can happen in relation to the issue of violence and lack of communal harmony which often arise from cultural differences and lack of communication among various cultural groups. This issue is closely related to the affective states of the groups involved regarding a contentious problem they face and to which they must find a solution. Hence, we need to deal with the problem of affectivity, which rejoins the originary-lived-experience from one's birth to the extreme possibility of death, and which expresses itself radically both in bodiliness and otherness. Secondly, the affective dimension of culures can be challenged in relation to the encounter between cultures, which aims at bringing the diverse cultures of the world together with the goal of effecting worldwide development. Thirdly, the loss of affective dimension in cultures can come about due to the impact of techno-science and universal globalization on our experience of cultures in contemporary times. The qualitative and quantitative changes the cultures undergo in their objective realization in a globalized world and the impact of the constructed techno-scientific-power at the universal scale on cultures are great challenges the cultures encounter today.

It is significant to face the above-said challenges and cope with them, and thereby minimize the impact and consequences of the instrumental teleology of the techno-science and the worldwide globalization on the whole specturm of culture in general and different cultures in particular, and to see to it that the affective dimension of cultures is kept intact. This calls for delving into the historical process of culture by taking up the question of its originary *existentiell* rootedness through the mediation of bodiliness. The concept of bodiliness makes explicit the necessary mediation between ontological and the anthropological dimensions of the existing being. The human body makes a living being to exist concretely (*existentiell*) among living beings genetically stemming from the natural development of the

ontogenesis and the phylogenesis in the context of the natural world. Bodiliness, at the level of *Mitsein*, opens the existing being to cultural interrelations and intercultural sympathy. Thus, bodiliness is linked to the history of the world in the relation of reciprocity with others guided by feeling for the other. To achieve this goal we need to focus on shared "institutional incorporation" and ethical and political restructuring of cultural instituitions based on people's cultural mind-set. These ethical and political actions by restructuring the world of persons and the cultures are essential for preventing the takeover of cultures by techno-science and universal globalization. This implies an ethical responsibility, which calls for founding ethical and political institutions on nature in totality as the process of life, which can give a "sense of wellbeing" both to individuals and cultures.

Such a creative giving of "sense" has to move beyond simple ethical normativity and must be founded in the order of the heart. This is possible at the level of affectivity in its ultimate "sense of desire", which implies the personalizing act of one's existence being received as a gift from "Being" (*Sein*) experienced in the relationof an encounter with the other in the "life-world" of cultures. Thus, there is the need for founding any form of restructuring process, whether personal or cultural, on the originary "Sense of Existence", which opens the authenticity of teleological sense in every person and culture. This, in turn, makes it possible to recreate personalized cultural institutions and give a "sense of hope" to persons and cultures despite the technological superstructure of instrumental universal globalization.

AFFECTIVE EXISTENCE: RESULT OF BEING OPEN TO THE BEING'S SELF-GIVING AND BEING INTERRELATED TO OTHERS

Affective existence depends on the "life-world" as open totality which has its beginning and existence in the originary donation of Being (*Sein*) and in the the purposive encounter with and interrelation to the other. These two dimensions imply the intertwining of respect and mutual responsibility of everyone in the context of the "life-world". Science – with the help of rational technology and its focus on "knowledge-to-power" – can impose itself on the affective realm and damage human freedom. Hence, there is the need to supplement theoretical reason with practical reason with its focus the lived-affectivity in the lived-experience. This involves relation of donation and receptivity between Being and self at the ontological level, and the relation of mutual respect and responsibility between the *ego* and the *alter-ego* in the anthropological level. Being unfolds itself historically in relation to the existential conditions, such as bodiliness, temporality, and the dimension of the *depth*. To capture Being's giving we must move beyond the perceptive and representational knowledge and participate essentially in the affective character of the

originary self-giving of Being, thereby opening ourselves to the *depth* dimension. This calls for a contemplative experience that invites the *ego* and the *alter-ego* to participate in and share the revealing of Being, and perform actions constituted by the practical reason. To achieve these goals human persons, as the *ego* and the *alter-ego*, must be vigilant to the exigency of the fulness of Being in its self-donation and be awakened to ethical comprehension for practical action with other human persons in the "life-world". Thus, the responsibility one has as an ethical subject in relation to other human persons and the world, in its final analysis, is founded on the responsibility one has in receieving the donation of Being. Hence, the force of conviction that emerges from being open to the self-revelation of Being moves us to function ethically by affirming human freedom and taking recourse to appropriate responsible moral action. The dynamics of freedom opens us to authenticity on the personal and interpersonal planes, making appeal to the rights and duties of human persons. Thus, authentic affective existence comes about when we live out the "call to live" that comes from the originary self-donation of Being – without positing ourselves, without instituting ourselves, and nevertheless committing ourselves for the good of all – by living genuine moral life as related to others in mutural respect and co-responsibility.

AFFECTIVE EXISTENCE AND MORAL VALUES

Moral values – as concretely lived out in the individual moral life – emerge in the context of the collective consciousness. However, what makes it exist reciprocally are the individuals who confer on the environment a new frame of action. Thus, every generation brings in a bearing on moral values and gives them a new shape. At present traditional moral values are challenged due to proliferation of diverse values emerging from different cultures; due to the breakup of the serene conceptions of a speculative classical moral philosophy; and due to the emergence of techno-science and its consequences on moral life. In this situation, if we want to find again in the *existentiell* lived-experience of moral life some coherence and meaning, it is necessary to come back to the foundations of the moral philosophy. A moral philosophy which is not a mere theory, but one that tries to give a continuation to the lived-values, should be founded on the three conditions: genetics, ethics proper and community. Genetics contributes to our understanding of the psychological growth of a person from his/her childhood; ethics proper helps us to see moral life as a life of relationship between persons who have respect for and responsibility towards each other; and the community, particularly the State, serves as the guarantor of a moral, just, and equitable life among persons within the community. In this context, concepts of respect and justice underline eminently the present sense of freedom, mutual liberation between the humans, and the effective recognition of the other as "our neighbor". At this stage moral philosophy must come to a halt because in the vision of the

"neighbor" it grasps the meaning of a more profound existence, which belongs to the realm of committed faith, where justice and responsibility convert themselves into hope and welcome of forgiveness. These moral values guarantee an authentic affective existence.

AFFECTIVE EXISTENCE AND BODILINESS

Affective existence pertains to nature, life and the spirit; it finds expression in science, culture and faith; and it has to do with knowing, living and believing respectively. The exercise of affective existence in these three dimensions depends on bodiliness. Hence, in bodiliness as the anthropological foundation one encounters affective existence. Bodiliness in its original base is an anthropological reality and a "spatio-temporally-incarnate" that refers to both the organic body considered as a life-system and the concrete human existence lived in constitutive relationship to the world and other human beings. Thus, bodiliness – the very movement of existence in the unity of our actions and representations – is an existential unity, which manifests itself in the "Ontological Difference". It constitutes the vertical differentiated opening of meaning in us and the life of reciprocal bond between all beings. It is in bodiliness that the mobile network of relations, both sensible and that of the expressive spirit, and reciprocal understanding of our life receives concrete form, particularly in relation to the sexual dimension of our character as men and women. Thus, bodiliness provides a system of exchange for all our lived-relations. In this sense, bodiliness is the anthropological support and basis of all the existential modalities of affective existence. It is the concrete fundamental foundation of all our engagements in each of their manifestations. Without bodiliness science cannot unfold nature, life canot be lived out in cultural context, and faith cannot find expression in the act of believing. While science, culture, and faith – the foundations of affective existence – need bodiliness for their expression, they also enhances the power of bodiliness. For instance, scientific inventions, technological innovations, and development in bioethics and genetic sciences enable bodiliness to relate to universal communicative space and open up new dimensions in understanding and experince of bodiliness. Similarly, in unveiling the basis of bodiliness in lived-experience, culture manifests the inherited and shared presence of an identical destiny. The exchange and interaction among different cultures promote one another and manifest their inter-bodiliness. Likewise, it is only by faith that we can we meet other human persons on the level of personally engaged bodiliness. Thus, science, culture and faith constitute a significant interrelation, guarantee affective existence and manifests it through bodiliness. With the help of bodiliness science, culture and faith always promote meaning so that we can take up ethical action with the help of this lived-intercommunication.

AFFECTIVE EXISTENCE AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Affective existence presupposes giving respect due to persons and upholding human dignity. The human person is a singular reality and human existence involves a circular relation that is based on the originary experience and which has a teleological import. Herein lies the significance of the concept of human dignity. Hence, a mere rational approach by itself cannot account for what constitutes the dignity of the human person and appeal respect from the other. Human dignity has to do with the autonomy of the individual, which implies solidarity, responsibility and commitment. However, the success of technology, the development of science, and the power of the human persons in dominating and taking control of human existence, challenge the respect due to the human person, and thereby deny the value and singnifcance of human dignity. Thus, techno-science challenges the humanness of classical ethics – respect for human person, human dignity, and human rights. Hence, the biological and psychological control against all forms of totalitarianism must modify the genetic and even the generic conditioning of human nature. Thus, the survival and human dignity of future generations depend on our present action. It is a question of qualifying human dignity. To define the notion of human dignity, we take up again the concepts of historicity and bodiliness, but adding to them what makes the originary structure of life, i.e., the generically different. Thus, we can understand the "concept of dignity" by the radical mediation of the desiring *affective ethical intuition*, in the communicative context of intersubjective exchange and we may recognize the ethical character of the concept of dignity in its dimension of commitment, i.e., in respect to normative action. Therefore, ethical life in its status of concrete autonomy is the inscription of action in the field of Being. Hence, by the mediation of the affective sense, by the lived-temporalization of the "subject" that structures itself singularly, and by the signifying interrelation which confers upon existence the "*flesh Sense*" brings a right sense of human dignity that neither transcendental definitions, nor formal explicitations can bring. Therefore, upholding the dignity of the human person from the clutches of techno-science calls for an ethical responsibility that plays at all levels of life and which must respect the human dignity in its proper bodiliness. When this happens, genuine affective life can emerge in the life of the individual and that of the communities.

AFFECTIVE EXISTENCE AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTHROPOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

The general desire to cope with the challenges that come from techno-science, instrumental teleology, and universal globalizations on the affective dimension of existence in general and human existence in particular has brought about new developements in the fields of metaphysics and anthropology in contemporary times. Thus, we speak of

the “becoming of metaphysics” as we use metaphysical principles in our attempt to find solutions to the problems of the globalized world. Similalry we speak of the emergence of anthropology/philosophical anthropology in our attempt to redefine the place of the human subject and the human community, particulalry in the context of the political state, faceed with the movement of universalization. We briefly consider the current trends in these two sciences.

Classical metaphysics – which inscribes itself to the predominance and perennity of Being, that is absolute, unchangeable, infinite and simple reality – is challenged by the globalizing trend of the contemporary times that seems to have forgotten the reality of Being. In this context to establish a relation between metaphysics and the age of globalization seems not that easy because metaphysics stresses the significance of the unified reality of Being, while the age of globalization emphasizes factual interdependence. In a globalized world, the state of affairs transforms all dimensions of existence – different cultures, techno-science, ecology and society, political and juridical sciences, and aesthetic and ethical values – all of which constitute a new step in the emergence of life. Thus, globalization – placing itself in our "life-world" and adopting the virtual capacity of the world of techno-science – moves towards the generalized institutional unification and forces the connection between all the levels of action and human bebavior, while maintaning individual and collective independence. Hence, to achieve the goal of relation between metaphysics and the globalized world, we need to relate the transcendental openness of Being to the intercultural horizon in the context of a globalized world. This will lead the emerging new constellations of meaning at each level to recognize each other progressively with respect to the "horizon of sense" which totalizes their integrating movement, and project a future unity and the universal destiny of mankind in relation to which peoples can discover the singular truth of sense in their proper traditional differentiation. This differentiation produces effects of natural and spiritual contrasts between the ethnic groups and the cultural traditions belonging to the different nations of the globe. It also leads to the capacity for having a glimpse of an intra-cultural consensus between cultures and progress. This twofold polarity – multiplication of the significations and unification of the understanding between peoples – underlines the movement of differentiation through which the enlargement of “sense” is promoted. The upsurge of "Principle of Desire", which differentiates objectively the modalities of existence in relation to concrete historical encounter between the *ego* and the *alter-ego*, is precisely the force, which shapes also the destinal unity of the common “life-world” already in the process of its integration. This new conception of metaphysics, integrates the destiny of the world in the circular play of history and nature, which is played in the “life-world”. Thus, we have access to the concept of concrete globalization thanks to the technological and scientific progress which enables us to recognise itself in the

historicality of Being, nature and life. In this way metaphysics and globalization can be brought together.

Similalry, for anthropology, the problem of the subject becomes acute when faced with the repercussions generated by technology on the individual and social existence, in their political and economical forms of globalization. The immediate ethical fallout is forgetting the foundations that are necessary for the continuation of the "sense life" in the individual and collective spheres of existence engaging the stakes of the entire humanity. The challenge from these problems have brought about a change in the perspective of anthropology in recent times. Anthropology has assumed a militant role in response to the sociopolitical needs of the times. The philosophical goal was not mere comprehension of the problem, but critical involvement and action in coping with the problem. Hence, from now on, alienated in its political-economic power, society invents for itself new forms of positive meeting, new cultural creations with the support of the image, the virtual, the game, or the simple competition. It is strange to note that exchanges between young people of different cultures discover again the sense of lived-interrelation while giving new resources to the daily life according new modalities, which announce a society that is recognized. In the same way, the failure of the social factors and the institutional reification induce consciousness to oppose and determine the institution of social renewal. New associations discover the forces, which motivate their collegial and cultural responsibility. We attend a new unprecedented social era, which belongs to a "common practical reason" the universality of which is at the same time differentiated and "communitarian". In the light of the distress experienced in the realm of ethics and the need for creativity in the field of morality, there has come about a renewed interest in anthropology. This new perspective and the renewed interest in anthropology finds expression in the reconstructuring of anthropological structures and in the greater emphasis given to the ethical dimension of human existence. Thus, the aim of ethical thinking is to find again in lived-intropathy the interrelational anchorage and brings about the feeling of solidarity. For this, anthropology has to focus on the pathic lived-life, which is drawn from the originary interrelation in the "life-world", and is the universalizing condition of mediation which rejoins the ethical call beyond the lived-difference of peoples, and which "affects" them in their interactions among themselves.

These new developments that have taken place and the new line of thinking that have come about both in metaphysics and anthropology aim at maintaining intact the affective dimension in the context of existence in general and particularly in human existence.

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THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY

PURPOSE

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one's decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one's culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

PROJECTS

A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

1. *Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations for Social Life.* Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.

2. *Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues*. This series of 10 week crosscultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.

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The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Colombia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enterprises.

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